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Tientsin and its hinterland in Anglo-Chinese Relations, 1925-1937

Suffian Mansor

A dissertation submitted to the University of Bristol in accordance with the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, in the School of Humanities.
Department of Historical Studies
February 2009

Abstract

The British informal empire in China is often mistakenly believed to have represented the British government's policies and views. The second biggest Chinese treaty port, Tientsin, had a different point of view to that of China (mostly in treaty ports) and Westminster. Tientsin's British community's main interests lay either within the concession or in Tientsin's hinterlands. These interests included its people and property. In addition the British community was proud of the British empire's prestige. All these created a determination in the British community that any attempt to jeopardise their interests would be opposed. However, the situation in Tientsin was rather different to that of their counterparts in Shanghai. The limited power of the British Municipal Council meant that the British community had, reluctantly, to obey British liberal policy when faced with the rise of the anti-imperialist movement in the mid-1920s. Under Kuomintang, the Chinese had launched the Northern Expedition, which led the British government to agree in principle to return several of its concessions to China. In Tientsin this policy met with opposition. Though the British community there had to accept the decision, it fought successfully to avoid rendition. This was not the only challenge the community faced: in 1929-1931 it had to fight to retain its extraterritorial rights. At that time several events challenged the British interests, such as the Tientsin Customs crisis (1930) and the disappearance of John Hay Thorburn (1931). The British community's attitude became more cautious when the Japanese began to expand their influence in North China in 1931, when they had played more pragmatic approach towards the Japanese because of Japan's formidable military power. The concession afforded sanctuary from Japanese pressure. Only from late 1937 onwards did the Japanese challenge the British authority within the concession. In Tientsin's hinterlands, British interests opened up to Japanese pressure, and the British firms had to adopt a more neutral position towards the Japanese.

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AUTHOR'S DECLARATION

"I declare that the work in this dissertation was carried out in accordance with the Regulations of the University of Bristol. The work is original, except where indicated by special reference in the text, and no part of the dissertation has been submitted for any other academic award. Any views expressed in the dissertation are those of the author.

SIGNED: 

DATE: 07 FEBRUARY 2009"

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List of Abbreviations

ADM	Records of the Admiralty, Naval Forces, Royal Marines, Coastguard, and related bodies
APC	Asiatic Petroleum Company
BMC	British Municipal Council
BMEC	British Municipal Extension Council
BRA	British Resident Association
C. N. Co.	China Navigation Company
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
FO	Records created and inherited by the Foreign Office
GLU	Shanghai General Labour Union
HSB	Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank
HSBC	Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation
IOLR	India Office Records
JMA	Jardine Matheson and Corporation Archives
JSS	John Swire and Sons
KMA	Kailan Mining Administration
KMT	Kuomintang
LMS	London Missionary Society
LSE	London School of Economics
NCGA	North China Garrison Armies
NP	Nathan Papers
PRO	Public Record Office
SCR	Special Collection Reading Room
Shangda	Shanghai University
SMC	Shanghai Municipal Council
SMR	South Manchurian Railway
SOAS	School of Oriental and African Studies
TACC	Tientsin Anglo Chinese College
TBCI	Tientsin British Committee of Information
TGP	Tientsin Provisional Government
WO	Records created or inherited by the War Office, Armed Forces, Judge Advocate General, and related bodies

Introduction

Preface

The study of Anglo-Chinese relations in the 1920s to 1930s offers an interesting insight into the history of imperialism in China. British concessions in treaty ports, of which there were many in China such as Amoy, Chinkiang, Hankow, Shanghai and Tientsin, are one of the issues that can be studied to explore British imperialism in China. My research explores the relationship between Britain and China from 1925 to 1937 through a case study of the British concession in Tientsin and its hinterlands at the time. However, this is not a study of Tientsin, as such, or of its municipal administration. The subjects of this study are the British government, the British community in Tientsin and its relations with the Chinese. Tientsin and its surrounding area has not previously been a focus for studies of Anglo-Chinese relations. Some scholars deal with it in passing, but it has not been a main issue in their studies. Shanghai is a more popular topic, which makes Tientsin interesting as a comparative study or to enrich the study of the Treaty Ports and their role in Sino-British relations.

The scope of this research begins with the May Thirtieth Incident in 1925 and ends in 1937. The focus of the study is British interest in the British concession in Tientsin and its hinterlands in a period which saw great changes in British policy as well as in the international and internal situation in China. The year 1926 marked the beginning of the Northern Expedition under the KMT to unite China. This expedition northwards from Canton was one of the important issues faced by the British government in China at the time. It was made clear that

the British government did not want to interfere in the civil war in China and that it hoped the fighting would not jeopardise British interests. However, these hopes were dashed by the seizure of the British concession in Hankow in January 1927. The Foreign Office in London realised that it should find a moderate way to build good relations with the KMT. This consequently shaped the renegotiation of what were called the 'unequal treaties' – the nineteenth century treaties, on which the treaty port system was based – the tariff, extraterritorial rights, concessions, and settlements and leased territories.

The new British policy in 1927 made several modifications to the British presence in China, especially with regard to its concessions and settlements there. The effect of the policy can be seen at the point when the British concessions in Chinkiang and Amoy (1930) were returned to Chinese control. On 1 October 1930, the lease of Weihaiwei was also formally returned to China. In other concessions and settlements, including Tientsin, reforms were implemented, heralding a new era for the foreign settlers in which they lived on a more equal footing with the Chinese population as opposed to the previous structure of foreign settlement in China. However, these reforms were not welcomed by all British settlers in China, and some of the British community formed a bureau to defend and protect their interests and privileges within the concession. Tientsin provides an excellent new case study for the assessment of the impact of reform on its large British population and self-governing British concession authority (the British Municipal Council-BMC). It was an important trading hub for British firms and a military base for the North China Command. It was also, especially after 1931, the site of growing Anglo-Japanese tension. This is a new study of the British concession in Tientsin that

explores the role played by the British community there in Anglo-Chinese relations and what this suggests about Sino-British relations more widely.

Literature Review

Before I focus on the literature on Anglo-Chinese relations in the 1920s and 1930s I will first summarise the literature on these relations in the nineteenth century. Since the beginning of the nineteenth century researchers have generated a huge amount of literature on Anglo-Chinese relations. These studies start from the beginning of the British contact with China and cover the wars, treaties and developments of British relations with China. Among the scholars and writers who have contributed to this literature are John King Fairbank, Alain Le Pichon, Michael Greenberg, P. J. Marshall and J. C. Crammer-Byng. These writers agree that trade encouraged the British to make contact with the Chinese.¹ However, Anglo-Chinese relations faced a problem with the Canton System, which restricted British trade to a select group of Chinese merchants in that city, and that city alone.² Of steadily increasing importance treaty port this trade was the opium trade, which damaged Anglo-Chinese relations and led to war between them in 1839-1842.³ This conflict ended with the Nanking treaty (1842),⁴ which began a

¹ John King Fairbank, *Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast: the Opening of the Treaty Ports 1842-1854, Two volumes in one* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), pp.57-73; Alain Le Pichon, *China Trade and Empire: Jardine, Matheson & Co. and the Origins of British Rule in Hong Kong 1827-1843* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p.3; Michael Greenberg, *British Trade and the Opening of China 1800-1842* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1951), pp.1-17; P. J. Marshall, 'Britain and China In the Late Eighteenth Century,' in Robert A. Bickers (ed.), *Ritual & Diplomacy: The Macartney Mission to China 1792-1794* (London: The British Association for Chinese Studies, The Wellsweep Press, 1993), p.16; and J. C. Crammer-Byng, *An Embassy to China, Being the Journal kept by Lord Macartney during his Embassy to the Emperor Ch'ien-lung, 1793-1794* (London: Longmans, Green & Co. Ltd., 1962), p.150.

² Fairbank, *Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast*, p.52 and Greenberg, *British Trade and the Opening of China 1800-1842*, pp.42-74; Weng Eang Cheong, *Hong Merchants of Canton: Chinese Merchants in Sino-Western Trade* (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 1997), pp.105-6.

³ Fairbank, *Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast*, pp.74-8; Greenberg, *British Trade and the Opening of China 1800-1842*, p.198 and Pichon, *China Trade and Empire*, pp.11, 15 and 36.

⁴ Fairbank, *Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast*, pp.102-3.

new chapter in Anglo-Chinese relations with the opening of British settlements in China. The settlements created close relations between the British and the Chinese, but their early establishment was beset by several problems, including the unwillingness of the Chinese to rent land to the British, problems with moving Chinese graves and language difficulties.⁵ But these were not the reasons behind the second war between Britain and China, the Arrow War (1856-60). In his survey of the conflict J. W. Wong examined its origins of this war, asserting that opium and opening trade in the interior to the British were the main issues. However, the Arrow Incident was the British *casus belli*.⁶ Eventually war broke out between the British and French armies and the Chinese in the Arrow War and other fighting in Peking in 1860. The crisis ended with the Tientsin Treaty (1858) and the Peking Convention (1860). After 1860 Anglo-Chinese relations were therefore based on rights enshrined in various treaties which gave the British extraterritoriality privileges and established British concessions, gave British ships the right to enter inland China and allowed the missionaries freedom to own property and operate in the interior.⁷

Some scholars take a different approach to Anglo-Chinese relations at the time. James L. Hevia asserts that these Anglo-Chinese wars and treaties were due to British Imperialism's attempt to teach the Chinese to recognise the multiple imperial powers.⁸ This included punishing Chinese who threatened British life and

⁵ Linda Cooke Johnson, *Shanghai: From Market Town to Treaty Port, 1074-1858* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), pp.191 and 192.

⁶ J. W. Wong, *Deadly Dreams: Opium and the Arrow War (1856-1860) in China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p.468.

⁷ Fairbank, *Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast*, p.462.

⁸ James L. Hevia, *English Lessons: The Pedagogy of Imperialism in Nineteenth-Century China* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), pp.3-4, 69, 32-43, 111 and 220-9.

property. The suppression of the Boxer Uprising (1900) is a case in point.⁹ Wang Gungwu, on the other hand, portrays the British as adopting a policy to secure peace and stability in China after 1860. The Qing agreed to take on several British advisers to help with the modernisation of the Chinese army.¹⁰ The British were even willing to help the Qing in the Taiping Rebellion.¹¹ All of this literature talks about international relation between Britain and China. In short almost all the literature on Anglo-Chinese relations before 1920 show that Anglo-Chinese relations were dominated by crises, due to the unequal treaties in which the Chinese regarded the British as an imperialist power trying to dominate the Chinese economy and imposing its gun boat policy. This situation continued into twentieth century and came to a head as the anti-imperialist movement in 1920s. These studies offer good introductions to issues around the coming of the British to China and the establishment of their concessions there. However, they mainly discuss diplomatic and trade relations and do not go into depth about the new British communities that developed and the British concessions themselves, or about the British community's reactions to and feelings about British policy in China. This includes the British community in Tientsin and its hinterland, which is not well represented anyway in these studies.

Now I turn to the literature on Anglo-Chinese relations in the 1920s and 1930s and tried to look on where were Tientsin in the Anglo-Chinese relations. This can be divided into three themes, which I discuss below: the diplomatic

⁹ Ibid., p.231.

¹⁰ Wang Gungwu, *Anglo-Chinese Encounters Since 1800: War, Trade, Science and Governance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp.4 and 19.

¹¹ Katherine F. Burner, John K. Fairbank and Richard J. Smith (eds.), *Entering China's Service: Robert Hart's Journals, 1854-1863* (Cambridge MA: The Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1986), p.240 and John S. Gregory, 'British Intervention Against the Taiping Rebellion,' *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 1. (Nov. 1959), p.19.

history of Anglo-Chinese relations in the 1920s–1930s; studies in imperial history (reinvigorated by Cains and Hopkins); and recent studies relating to the treaty ports focussing on their social, cultural and political history.

Anglo-Chinese Relations in the 1920s

Work on Anglo-Chinese relations from the 1920s to the 1930s has generally focused on the response to the emergence of Chinese nationalism in the 1920s and the international crisis in East Asia in the 1930s. The literature on the 1920s is dense, but mostly diplomatic in focus and concentrates on Britain's aims in China concerning trade,¹² an interest protected by extraterritorial rights in treaty ports. These rights extended to the protection of Britons and their property. Sir John Pratt, a former China consul turned diplomat, wrote in 1943:

In certain circles British policy in China has been described as imperialistic, but the one certain fact that emerges from the record is that Great Britain came to China for no other purpose than trade, that she consistently sought her own commercial interests in the prosperity and general welfare of China.¹³

In order to maintain progress in its trade, Great Britain wanted a stable China; it wanted to uphold its British commercial and treaty rights, defend the lives and property of the British community, and prevent China from being dominated by any single foreign power.¹⁴

The importance of trade may be illustrated by the level of British investment in China. In 1902 this represented 33 percent of total foreign investment in the country, rising in 1914 to 37.7 percent and falling a little in 1931 to 36.7

¹² Sir John T. Pratt, *War and Politics in China* (London, Jonathan Cape Ltd., 1943), p.37.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ Christopher J. Bowie, 'Great Britain and the Use of Force in China, 1919 to 1931' (unpublished Ph.D., thesis, University of Oxford, 1983), p.8.

percent.¹⁵ However, China supplied only around five percent of Britain's imports between 1840 and 1870 and about three percent of the British export market in the same period. Between 1911 and 1937 Britain's total exports were just two to three percent.¹⁶ In other words, there seemed to be an asymmetrical trade relationship. But in terms of strategy and security, however, it played a substantial role, because trade with China underpinned the British presence in East Asia with its nationals, properties, naval stations, colony and concessions. If the China connection collapsed it would allow enemies of the British, such as the Soviet Union or Japan, to fill the gap and threaten China's position and British prestige in Asia.¹⁷ In short, a well-organised trading lobby stridently asserted the importance of trade with China, but in general terms we have to look elsewhere to understand the importance to Britain of Anglo-Chinese relations. These studies highlight how the British interests were interrelated with the trade interests of the existing of the British community as well as imperial security issues. They help us understand then why the British government sought to protect its interests in concessions such as Tientsin.

Trade was perhaps an excuse which provided a rationale for Britain's defence of its interests, which were fundamentally based on strategic considerations. This leads to the question of how to protect these interests. This is raised in the literature referring to the instability which marked China after the collapse of the Ch'ing Dynasty (1911) and the death of President Yuan Shih-kai

¹⁵ C. F. Remer, *Foreign Investments in China* (New York: Howard Fertig, 1968), p.76.

¹⁶ P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, *British Imperialism, 1688-2000, Second Edition* (Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 1993), pp.363 and 595.

¹⁷ Robert Bickers, *Britain in China: Community, Culture and Colonialism 1900-1949* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), p.117 and Edmund S. K. Fung, *The Diplomacy of Imperial Retreat: Britain's South China Policy, 1924-1931* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1991), p.81.

(1917). As a result of these events there was no strong central government in China. Although Peking was recognised internationally as the central Chinese government, effective power was fractured and regionalised. In addition China at the time was disturbed by war, piracy and banditry, which to some extent also disrupted British trade activities in China. Such instability in China became one of Britain's concerns in her efforts to protect her traders' interests in China. Tientsin, for example, could not turn its back on this problem, and in many cases such disturbances had a profound impact on British interests, especially trade. The British trading community in Tientsin and throughout China sought stability and security.

However, this instability also had some advantages for Britain. A weak China could not adequately protect Chinese national interests, for example. So the biggest challenge facing Britain in China overall was the emergence of an assertive and revolutionary Chinese nationalism under the KMT after 1925. The Chinese had long been neglected by the foreign Powers; China had received little benefit from the Washington Conference of which David Armstrong said "... the Powers would only accept a weak resolution proposed by the American delegation ..."¹⁸ which was to protect China's sovereignty. That is to say the rejuvenation of the KMT had a strong impact on British interests because of the anti-British campaign in China, especially when the Chinese formed the United Front with the CCP for the Northern Expedition.¹⁹ Edmund S. K. Fung pointed out that:

¹⁸ David Armstrong, 'China's Place in the New Pacific Order', Erik Goldstein and John Maurer (eds.), *The Washington Conference, 1921-22: Naval Rivalry, East Asian Stability and the Road to Pearl Harbor* (Ilford: Frank Cass, 1994), p.262.

¹⁹ In the First Congress KMT's National Congress in 1924 with influenced from the CCP had issued anti-imperialism propaganda. See Hu Sheng, *Imperialism and Chinese Politics* (Westport: Hyperion Press, Inc., 1955), pp.285-91.

Recognizing the rising tide of Chinese nationalism and still reeling from the effects of the First World War, Britain was no longer able to maintain the old treaty regime and War, was forced to conduct a strategic retreat from a position which was bound eventually to be untenable.²⁰

The rise of Chinese nationalism led to a change in British policy towards China; it posed a problem which the British needed to deal with. At this point I present two headings: the problem and its resolution.

1. Problem

The emergence of a new force in China, the KMT, gradually altered British policy towards China. The rise of the KMT was not sudden: anti-foreign feelings had been growing since the Opium War, after which the foreign powers had gained many privileges in China. The Chinese state itself had unsuccessfully contested the power of France in war in 1884-85. Some scholars state that the victory of the Japanese in the Sino-Japanese war (1894-95) contributed to the beginning of Chinese nationalism among Chinese intellectuals.²¹ Kang Yu-wei and Liang Chi-chao, for example, began to talk about the reform of the Chinese government to meet the foreign challenge in China.²² But this initiative failed when the Empress Dowager Hzu-hsi made a coup d'état and returned to power in 1898. Meanwhile missionary activities in China had occasioned much ground-level unrest and 'missionary cases', sometimes sparking outbreaks of violence. This type of situation was greatly aggravated when the Chinese in north China faced a drought,

²⁰ Edmund S. K. Fung, 'The Sino-British Rapprochement, 1927-1931', *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol.17, No.1 (1983), p.104.

²¹ S. A. Smith, *Like Cattle and Horses: Nationalism and Labor in Shanghai, 1895-1927* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2002), p.38.

²² *Ibid.*, p.39.

the tension from which exploded in the Boxer Uprising of 1899-1900.²³ This uprising was a nightmare for the foreigners living in China. The British in Tientsin in particular had bad memories of this event. Although the uprising was subdued and the Boxers punished, Chinese awareness of threats to Chinese sovereignty remained strong. Different forms of protest developed in the decade after the Boxer events, including boycott movements against foreign powers, such as a protest against the Russians (1904) and a boycott of American goods (1905).²⁴ Students and labourers were among the groups active against foreign imperialism. They organised associations and joined the nationalist movement in China.²⁵

As well as opposing foreign imperialism, Chinese leaders such Sun Yat-sen and others developed critiques against the Ch'ing rulers of China. Sun aimed to overthrow the Ch'ing Dynasty and establish a republican system. He argued in terms also used by others: that the Chinese had been 'asleep' for a long time and should wake up to oppose the absolutism of Ch'ing Dynasty rule. He wanted a China ruled by its people, not under a monarchy.²⁶ Sun Yat-sen was also aware of the problem of anti-imperialism. He argued that the imperialists had aimed to control China.²⁷ This development led him to develop a critique of imperialism in his struggle to provide an ideological foundation for the work of recovering Chinese sovereignty.²⁸ His first task to realise the nationalist feeling was to try to organise a revolution to overthrow the Ch'ing dynasty. It was only in 1911 that this

²³ Paul A. Cohen, *History in Three Keys: the Boxers as Event, Experience, and Myth* (New York: Columbia University Press (New York: Columbia University Press, c1997), p.94.

²⁴ Smith, *Like Cattle and Horses*, pp.45-46.

²⁵ Marie-Claire Bergère, *Sun Yat-sen* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), p.105.

²⁶ John Fitzgerald, *Awakening China: Politics, Culture, and Class in the Nationalist Revolution* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), p.8.

²⁷ Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, *Student Protests in Twentieth-Century China: the view from Shanghai* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), p.39.

²⁸ Bergère, *Sun Yat-sen*, p.75.

dream was achieved when a revolt broke out in Hankow. The Ch'ing abdicated in 1912 and the Chinese people celebrated by cutting their queues, firing gun salutes, raising the flag with "the Republic of China" written on it and making speeches.²⁹

However, the 1911 Revolution could not create stable, democratic sovereignty in China, which fell under the absolutist rule of Yuan Shih-kai. Yuan's Reorganisation Loan and the murder of KMT leader, and Prime-minister designate Sung Chiao-jen in 1913³⁰ created ill feeling among the KMT.³¹ This was followed by what was know as the 'Second Revolution' (1913), which was crushed by Yuan Shih-kai's army.³² However, the nationalist feeling among the Chinese did not subside. The issue of foreign imperialism was not resolved by the 1911 Revolution. The anti-Japanese boycott by students, merchant and intellectuals in 1915 against the Twenty-one Demands was a case in point.³³ These demands would have put China under Japanese influence by appointing several Japanese advisers in the Chinese administration and military. The demands also related to several Chinese territories such as Shantung, southern Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia.³⁴ Despite strong resistance from the Chinese people to these demands³⁵ Yuan Shih-kai had to accept them under Japanese pressure. Only Sun Yat-sen and his supporters did not follow the anti-Japanese wave; he continued work with the

²⁹ Henrietta Harrison, *The Making of the Republican Citizen: Political Ceremonies and Symbols in China* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p.20.

³⁰ Sung Chiao-jen was Sun Ya-sen's associate and an effective leader in getting Chinese support for the KMT to win the Chinese election in 1912. But he was assassinated in 1913. See Norito Tamada, "Sung Chiao-jen and the 1911 Revolution," *Paper On China*, Vol.12, East Asian Research Center, February 1968.

³¹ Bergère, *Sun Yat-sen*, pp.236-237 and 243.

³² *Ibid.*, pp.243-244.

³³ Wasserstrom, *Student Protests in Twentieth-Century China*, p.43.

³⁴ Bergère, *Sun Yat-sen*, p.263.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

Japanese.³⁶ They continued to struggle to unite China with South China, but their effort were constantly betrayed by Chinese warlords there.³⁷

In 1916 Yuan Shih-kai died and effective political power China disintegrated into the hands of regional and even smaller militarist forces. The central government in Peking was not very powerful. Three powerful warlord groups; the Anfu, the Chilli and the Fengtian, dominated North China and Peking. They were not a united group. They were constantly warring to control the central government in Peking. For example, in 1924 there were two wars between the Chili group and Fengtian group.³⁸ These wars created hardship for the Chinese.³⁹ The rise of the warlords created another problem in China besides imperialism.

The problem of foreign imperialism remained, although the Chinese had demanded full sovereignty after World War I. While we now accept that the internationally-recognised Chinese government in Peking was more successful in asserting China's sovereignty than was traditionally assumed⁴⁰, this was a policy with only limited success. Others began to articulate an even more robust policy of contestation of foreign power. One source of this was communism, which came from the success of the Bolshevik Revolution (1917) in Russia. The Bolshevik Revolution became a beacon of hope among some young Chinese wishing to save their country from foreign imperialism.⁴¹ The communist idea spread widely

³⁶ Ibid., pp.263-264.

³⁷ Ibid., pp.269-276.

³⁸ Arthur Waldron, *From War to Nationalism: China's Turning Point, 1924-1925* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p.3.

³⁹ See Waldron, *From War to Nationalism: China's Turning Point, 1924-1925*, pp.141-160.

⁴⁰ W.C. Kirby, 'The Internationalization of China: Foreign Relations at Home and Abroad in the Republican Era', *The China Quarterly*, No. 150, Special Issue: Reappraising Republic China, (Jun., 1997), p.443.

⁴¹ Ibid., pp.11-12.

among the students and intellectuals in the May Fourth period.⁴² The movement, which attacked traditional Chinese thought and customs, opened Chinese students' minds to the weakness of their country.⁴³ Ironically, the movement began to see the good of western ideas compared with those of traditional Chinese philosophers with regard to China's future. Apart from students and intellectuals, the movement also made labourers aware of exploitation by their employers.⁴⁴ The movement, which started in 1915, reached its climax when Chinese students staged a protest against the Versailles peace treaty (1919) which proposed to transfer the German rights in China to the Japanese. This sparked the anger of students, intellectuals, labourers and merchants.⁴⁵ They decided to boycott Japanese goods and services.

Some newspapers and magazines flourished as a result of what became known as the May Fourth Movement. They became one of the Chinese communists' tools for spreading their ideas. This was followed by the formation of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1921. The CCP aimed to liberate China from foreign imperialism and the warlords agreed to form an alliance with the KMT. In 1923 several communist members joined the KMT to develop the idea of a United Front.⁴⁶ In short the aim of the United Front was to fight the foreign imperialist and the warlords. In order to gain the support of the Chinese masses, the CCP and KMT began to organise themselves to penetrate the student and labour movements. As already mentioned, these two groups had participated in the Chinese nationalist movement against foreign powers and warlords. They

⁴² Arif Dirlik, *The Origins of Chinese Communism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p.105.

⁴³ Lucien Bianco, *Origins of the Chinese Revolution, 1915-1949* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971), p.37.

⁴⁴ S. A. Smith, *Like Cattle and Horses*, p.123.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p.93.

⁴⁶ Bergère, *Sun Yat-sen* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), p.322.

organised themselves into several associations such as the Shanghai Student Union (SSU), the National Student's Union (NSU) and the Shanghai General Labour Union (GLU), and mobilised very effectively against the foreign imperialism.

A new nationalist movement erupted in Shanghai in May 1925., Chinese students and labours joined to form the Union of Labour, Commerce, and Education (ULCE) to demonstrate against the murder of Chinese workers in a Japanese factory.⁴⁷ Twelve Chinese demonstrators were killed by British-led police in Shanghai's International Settlement on 30th May, sparking a large-scale nationalist movement. The CCP used this opportunity to highlight the foreign imperialists as China's oppressors.⁴⁸ The May Thirtieth Movement, as it became known, began to spread spontaneously throughout China, and there additional incidents, such as the Shakee Incident in Canton, boycotts of British goods in Hong Kong and demonstrations in Hankow, Kiukiang, Peking, Chunking and Tientsin.⁴⁹ Meanwhile the Zhejiang-Jiangsu Civil War between the warlords in 1924-25 aggravated the chaotic situation in China. People suffered in this war from incidents such as warlord soldiers aggressively taking money from shops and seizing junks and conscripting young people for war.⁵⁰ This situation created an opportunity for the United Front to gain new supporters. Thus the Northern Expedition achieved tremendous results when it was launched by the United Front in 1926. Nationalism grew steadily and became more organised against the imperialists and warlords.

⁴⁷ Nicholas R. Clifford, *Spoilt Children of Empire: Westerners in Shanghai and the Chinese Revolution of the 1920s* (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1991), p.97.

⁴⁸ S.A. Smith, *A Road is Made: Communism in Shanghai, 1920-1927* (Surrey: Curzon Press, 2000), p.90.

⁴⁹ Clifford, *Spoilt Children of Empire*, p.119.

⁵⁰ See Waldron, *From War to Nationalism*, pp.141-160.

However, the Bolshevik influence gradually focused the nationalists against the British in particular, leading to a nationwide anti-British movement, which shocked British policy-makers. At this point, the British saw that they must address the subject of Chinese nationalism. In the 1920s it was hard for the British to maintain their position in China, as disturbances began to focus on British property and interests. William James Megginson noted that Britain was worried not only about the rise of Chinese nationalism, but also about growing communist activity,⁵¹ as the Bolsheviks were supporting not only the KMT but also warlord Feng Yu-hsiang. Russia's involvement created concern among the British in China and in London.⁵² The British Legation in China monitored Feng Yu-hsiang's activities in North China.⁵³ Thus the disturbance in the mid-1920s was not limited to south and central China but also caused problems for the British in Tientsin and its hinterland.

2. Retreat

What was the "strategic retreat" on which Great Britain embarked in dealing with the Chinese nationalism? David Wilson noted in 1973 that, "...Deputy Under-Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs, 1925-1936 [Sir Victor] Wellesley's consistent view that Britain should be conducting a strategic withdrawal without, if possible, allowing it to deteriorate into a rout, was based on a good understanding

⁵¹ William James Megginson, 'Britain's Response to Chinese nationalism, 1925-1927: The Foreign Office Search For a New Policy' (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, George Washington University, 1973), p.196.

⁵² Ibid., p.197.

⁵³ The British Library, IOLR, L/PS/10/1197, F1941/1941/10, Mr. Lampson to Sir Austen Chamberlain.- (Received March 1.), Peking, January 10, 1927.

of Britain's diminishing power in Asia."⁵⁴ As a global power and ruler of the biggest empire in the world, a rout in China would be a serious setback, tarnishing British prestige and causing, it was feared, subsequent effects elsewhere. The fear was that British trade, prestige and power would be affected by a domino effect starting with China and expanding to the colonies. Colin Ross (1968) points out that, "...signs of stirring in the chaotic mass of China itself...could threaten not only the colonies in China and Malaya themselves (including Malayan rubber) but also the balance of security of the imperial territories of India and Australasia."⁵⁵ The context for these concerns was also provided by grave unrest elsewhere in its empire, such as in Ireland and India.⁵⁶ Furthermore, America which had interests in Japan, was moving to extend its trade into the Asia-Pacific region. At the end of World War I, the Americans began to increase their business in other fields in China such as shipping, insurance and legal services.⁵⁷ The war had serious consequences for the British empire. Britain's resources dwindled and its share of world trade declined, leading to the costly management of its Empire.⁵⁸ In London, policy makers knew that the British empire faced financial difficulties, but remained confident that it could be maintained by the implementation of new

⁵⁴ David Clive Wilson, 'Britain and the Kuomintang, 1924-28: A Study of the interaction of official policies and perceptions in Britain and China' (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, SOAS, University of London, 1973), p.697.

⁵⁵ Collin Cross, *The Fall of the British Empire 1918-1968* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1968), p. 202.

⁵⁶ Deirdre McMahon, 'Ireland and the Empire-Commonwealth, 1900-1948', in Judith M. Brown and Wm. Roger Louis (eds.), *The Oxford History of the British Empire, Vol.IV, The Twentieth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp.144 and 155, Judith M. Brown, 'India', in Judith M. Brown and Wm. Roger Louis (eds.), *The Oxford History of the British Empire, Vol.IV, The Twentieth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.433, A. N. Porter and A. J. Stockwell, *British Imperial Policy and Decolonization, 1938-64, Volume 1, 1938-51* (London: Macmillan Press, 1987), p.13 and Robert Johnson, *British Imperialism* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p.164. After World War I Britain faced simultaneous disorder in Ireland, Egypt, Turkey, Iraq and India. Other unrest and protests against the British Imperialist in the late 1920s included violent riots against colonial taxation in south-eastern Nigeria and mineworkers' unrest in Northern Rhodesia.

⁵⁷ Eileen P. Scully, *Bargaining with the State from Afar: American Citizenship in Treaty Port China 1844-1942* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), pp.145 and 146.

⁵⁸ Porter and Stockwell, *British Imperial Policy and Decolonization*, p.5.

policies involving creating dominions (Canada, Australia, South Africa and New Zealand); 'independent' countries under indirect control (such as Egypt) and self governed countries (such as India).⁵⁹ The British government handled the problem of Chinese nationalism in the mid-1920s differently. But British officials on the ground in China had their own perspective. In 1927 in China, Sir Miles Lampson, British Minister to China (1926-1933) and the senior naval commander, Admiral Tyrwhitt, Chief in Command of China Station, were concerned that an anti-imperialist campaign under the KMT would jeopardise interests in China. They agreed that British interests should be protected at all costs. They did not want the Hankow Incident to spread to other concessions and settlements, threatening British trade interests. This created a dilemma for the British government about the shape of their response to Chinese nationalism. It needed to adopt more liberal policy in China, which included the return of several British concessions to the Chinese government. The concession in Tientsin was one of the concessions to be sacrificed to realise this policy.

However the Anglo-Chinese tension subsided at the end of 1920s, especially after the KMT succeeded in uniting China. These issues are certainly discussed in the extensive literature on Anglo-Chinese relations, but where is Tientsin in this discussion? The British concession in Tientsin was overshadowed by the importance of British interests in Shanghai, Hankow and Canton. Tientsin is very rarely discussed; it is merely mentioned as one of the British concessions. In the above discussion, the disturbance in China in 1920s seems not to have affected Tientsin. What happened in Tientsin during these years can be divided into two

⁵⁹ John Darwin, 'Imperialism in Decline? Tendencies in British Imperial Policy Between the Wars', *The Historical Journal*, Vol.23, No.3. (Sep., 1980), pp.657, 659-60, 661, 669, 671 and 673-4.

categories. Firstly, Tientsin's rendition can be related to the British government's effort to mend relations with the Chinese. This was important because Tientsin would become one of places in which we can assess the responses of the British community in China. Another issue was the evacuation of the British community from Tientsin's hinterland. All these events suggest that Tientsin is a new field from which one may understand the British government's attitude and policy and the reactions of the British community in China in the mid-1920s. Tientsin was not the focus of any single crisis, such as at Shanghai or Hankow. In the less extreme atmosphere at Tientsin we might gain an insight into more considered policy objectives and practices. In short, the British concession in Tientsin provides a case study of how far the British government was able to fulfil its liberal policy and handle the British community's opposition to returning the concession to the Chinese.

The Japanese threat in the 1930s

In this section I discuss the main theme which shaped Anglo-Chinese relations in the 1930s. After facing turbulent years with the Chinese in the 1920s Britain was now worried about the instability in East Asia which continued until the 1930s before climaxing in the Pacific War and World War II. Louis points out that during World War I the Japanese advocated "a policy aiming at political and commercial supremacy on the Asian Mainland, as proved by the attempt to reduce China to status of a 'vassal State' of Japan through the Twenty-one Demands of 1915."⁶⁰ Ann Trotter's 1975 work furthers this study, focusing on British anxiety about the Japanese in the 1930s. She points out that from the viewpoint of Sir John

⁶⁰ Louis, *British Strategy in the Far East*, p.17.

Jordan, the British Minister (1906-1920), the Japanese would create trouble in East Asia. The creation of the puppet state of Manchukuo by the Japanese in 1932 placed Britain in a dilemma. There were two bodies of opinion in the Foreign Office; one supported the continuation of the spirit of the 1902-1922 Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and the other urged Britain to take a friendly attitude towards the Chinese. Britain took a neutral attitude to the hostility between China and Japan.⁶¹ To Britain, both nations were important in the maintenance and defence of its interests in China.⁶² But the Japanese problem was serious, not only at the international level but also regarding British interests in China. Tientsin, which was near Manchuria, was more strongly affected by the Manchurian crisis. Japan's ambition to extend its interests into North China challenged British interests. This point is part of my discussion of how the British traders reacted to the emergence of Japanese power in North China.

At the international level, Britain sought cooperation from other powers to resolve the Manchurian crisis. But the United States, for example, adopted a lukewarm attitude to the world crisis, including the Manchurian troubles. Britain could not depend on much help from the United States in 1931-1932. Warren Cohen wrote in 1971 "...the President [of the United States] was resolutely opposed not only to the use of force but also to economic sanctions, to which Japan might respond in force."⁶³ America could not risk its interests in East Asia and would not fight for China in the Manchurian crisis. Many in the United States, on

⁶¹ Anthony Best, 'The Road to Anglo-Japanese Confrontation, 1931-41', in Ian Nish and Yoichi Kibata, *The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1600-2000 Volume II: The Political - Diplomatic Dimension, 1931-2000* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 2000), p.37.

⁶² Irving S. Friedman, *British Relations with China: 1931-1939* (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940), pp.227-8.

⁶³ Warren Cohen, *America's Response to China: An Interpretative History of Sino-American Relations* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1971), p.129.

the other hand, did not trust the British, accusing them of being a selfish nation which just wanted to manipulate the Americans to protect its own interests.⁶⁴ The inter-war period, from the 1920s to the 1930s, were hostile and suspicious years. America was worried not only about Japan but also about Britain.⁶⁵ Britain, on the other hand, was concerned that America's naval program would challenge it.⁶⁶ The suspicious attitude among the powers made it difficult to resolve the Manchurian problem. Without unity between the powers to pressure the Japanese in Manchuria, the crisis gradually became a serious problem in North China, troubling Tientsin and its hinterlands. The Japanese, with little challenge from the international community, pressured the Chinese with smuggling activities and military activity in North China. These two activities develops are my discussed in my last two chapters.

Notable contributions to our understanding of this period come from Endicott, Bennett and Trotter, who have largely contributed to this study; all mention the active role of the British Treasury in easing the East Asian crisis. The importance of the Treasury in the making of British foreign policy lay in the constraints imposed on defence expenditure by the state of the British economy. For these reasons, the Treasury, under the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Neville

⁶⁴ Thomas H. Buckley, 'The Icarus Factor: The American Pursuit of Myth in Naval Arms Control, 1921-36', in Erik Goldstein and John Maurer (eds.), *The Washington Conference, 1921-22: Naval Rivalry East Asian Stability and the Road to Pearl Harbor* (Frank Cass: Ilford, 1994), pp.127-8. This statement came after the Americans blamed the British for dragging them into World War I to help the British and to protect British interests.

⁶⁵ William R. Braisted, 'The Evolution of the United States Navy's Strategic Assessments in the Pacific, 1919-31', in Erik Goldstein and John Maurer (eds.), *The Washington Conference, 1921-22: Naval Rivalry East Asian Stability and the Road to Pearl Harbor* (Ilford: Frank Cass, 1994) and Buckley, 'The Icarus Factor'. The Americans had targeted the Japanese as a prime threat but worried more about the combined threat from the British and the Japanese.

⁶⁶ John H. Maurer, 'Arms Control and the Washington Conference', in Erik Goldstein and John Maurer (eds.), *The Washington Conference, 1921-22: Naval Rivalry East Asian Stability and the Road to Pearl Harbor* (Ilford: Frank Cass, 1994), p.286.

Chamberlain (1931-1937), supported by the Permanent Secretary, Sir Warren Fisher, advocated a non-aggression pact with Japan and dispatched the Leith-Ross Mission (1935-1936) to persuade the Chinese and the Japanese to join with Britain in developing the Chinese market. Bennett argues that the reason behind Chamberlain's proposal was twofold: firstly, British commercial interests in China should be protected, and in achieving this, its relationship with Japan would be mended;⁶⁷ and second, considering the serious German threat to Europe, Britain should work at developing friendly relations with Japan. However the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Sir John Simon, pointed out that the non-aggression pact would shock the Americans, create difficulties with Canada and, "as a condonation of Japanese proceedings in Manchukuo", it would create a negative view among the British public and at the League of Nations.⁶⁸ Though Chamberlain's plan was criticised, this was the only way that the British could protect their interest in East Asia.

The dispatch of the Leith-Ross Mission to East Asia had two objectives. First, it would help the Chinese to rehabilitate their economy through currency reform. Second, it would involve the Japanese in supporting this effort.⁶⁹ The mission was also initiated because Britain worried that any agreement between China and Japan without British participation could endanger its interests in China.⁷⁰ In short, the British not only wanted stability in East Asia, it would also not permit any attempt by other Powers to deny its interests. The British wanted to

⁶⁷ Gill Bennett, 'British Policy in the Far East 1933-1936: Treasury and Foreign Office', *Modern Asian Studies*, 26:3 (1992), p.547.

⁶⁸ Stephen Lyon Endicott, *Diplomacy and Enterprise: British China Policy 1933-1937*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1975), p.65.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p.112.

⁷⁰ Trotter, *Britain and East Asia 1933-1937*, p.213-4.

defend their Chinese interests and also those of the whole of its Empire, including the British Dominions. For example, Australia and New Zealand wanted peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific and to avoid any instability in East Asia.⁷¹

However, throughout the mid-1930s this initiative did not receive a positive response from the Japanese. In fact the Leith-Ross Mission aggravated the East Asia crisis. Yakichiro Suma, Japanese Consul-General in Nanking was suspicious about mission. Some of the Japanese leader believed that the British had 'encouraged' Nanking Government to adopt 'anti-Japanese feeling'.⁷² Furthermore, "British policy...was obviously a challenge to the Japanese, who had announced their own exclusive programme for China"⁷³ as outlined in the Amaru Statement. On the other hand, it was claimed that the British effort was opportunist and that they were only interested in protecting their interests in China by using the Japanese to check Chinese nationalism.⁷⁴ The failure of the British effort illustrates the strength of the Japanese threat in North China. The British in Tientsin and its hinterland are an interesting community to study. With the failure of the Leith-Ross Mission, the community had to extend its utmost effort to avoid Japanese interference. This is why this case is part of my study.

⁷¹ Michael Graham Fry, 'The Pacific Dominions and the Washington Conference 1921-22', in Erik Goldstein and John Maurer (eds.), *The Washington Conference, 1921-22: Naval Rivalry East Asian Stability and the Road to Pearl Harbor* (Ilford: Frank Cass, 1994), p.63.

⁷² Endicott, *Diplomacy and Enterprise*, p.162.

⁷³ Endicott, *Diplomacy and Enterprise*, p.182 and Kibata Yoichi, 'Anglo-Japanese Relations from the Manchurian Incident to Pearl Harbor: Missed Opportunities?', in Ian Nish and Yoichi Kibata, *The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1600-2000 Volume II: The Political-Diplomatic Dimension, 1931-2000* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 2000), p.11.

⁷⁴ Yoichi Kibata, 'Reasserting Imperial Power? Britain and East Asia in the 1930s', in Shigeru Akita (ed.), *Gentlemanly Capitalism, Imperialism and Global History* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp.173 and 174.

The cotton trade dispute between the British and Japanese aggravated the problem for both parties. Tension between Lancashire cotton industrialists and the Osaka Textile producers had begun in the early 1930s. Exports of Japanese cotton goods had affected the Lancashire industries, which had made several attempts to frustrate the Japanese export, including holding talks with Dutch cotton industrialists about restricting the import of Japanese goods into the Dutch East Indies⁷⁵ and pressuring the Australian government not to reduce the tariff on Japanese cotton textiles in trade negotiations with Japan.⁷⁶ Though it was not a problem in Tientsin and its hinterland, the dispute illustrated the Japanese need for a market for their goods and raw material for their industries. Therefore the Japanese had to seek opportunities to expand their trade outside Japan. The Manchuria crisis was a case in point. The impact of Japanese efforts to expand trade created a problem for British trade in North China. Among the places under Japanese pressure was Tientsin.

To conclude this section, the extensive literature about the 1930s focuses not only on Anglo-Chinese relations but also discusses Japanese action in Manchuria and North China. Although the literature does include North China it is merely concerned with the diplomatic aspect rather than the situation on the ground in North China, especially in Tientsin. Again, the feelings of the British community in Tientsin about the encroachment of the Japanese on North China are not discussed; even though the pressures, tensions and reactions of the British community in Tientsin differed from those of their government. Moreover,

⁷⁵ Ishii Osamu, 'Markets and Diplomacy: the Anglo-Japanese Rivalries over Cotton Goods Markets, 1930-1936', in Ian Nish and Yoichi Kibata, *The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1600-2000 Volume II: The Political-Diplomatic Dimension, 1931-2000* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 2000), pp.70-1.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.71-2.

neither the impact on the British community in Tientsin and its surrounding areas of the activities of Japanese troops in promoting the smuggling and encouraging the autonomy of North China have not been studied thoroughly. In addition, many of the important issues in China are not discussed in these studies. The seizure of the customs house in Tientsin in 1930, the extraterritoriality negotiations and the Thorburn case had a significant impact on the British community there. These issues had a profound impact on the British community, especially regarding their trade interests and extraterritoriality in China. In short: the existing literature on East Asia and Sino-British relations explores the world of diplomatic debate and high politics, but ignores places like Tientsin. Therefore my study focuses on Tientsin and its hinterlands, on how both the British government and the British community there tackled the situation in China from the growth in Chinese nationalism to the rise of the Japanese military's influence in North China.

British Economic Activity

Next I look at the literature on British imperialism and its discussion of the projection overseas of British power and capital. The key recent debate here is highlighted by P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins. First, however, I look into the British imperialist influence in China. It is difficult to define the imperialist presence in China, as the infringement of Chinese sovereignty took different forms in different places -- parts of Chinese territory fell under wholesale colonial rule such as Taiwan (Japan), Hong Kong (Britain) and Jiaozhou (Germany). Other forms of imperialist territorial domination in China included leased territories (such as Weihaiwei), concessions (such as in Tientsin, Hankow and Canton) and

international settlements (such as in Shanghai and Amoy).⁷⁷ In addition there was extraterritoriality which restricted the Chinese jurisdiction over foreign nationals, and the loss of sovereignty over coastal and river navigation. Chinese sovereignty also affected by the basing of foreign military forces in major Chinese cities such as Tientsin and Beijing, and the stationing of foreign gunboats on the coast and major rivers.⁷⁸ Although certain parts of China, such as Manchuria, Taiwan and Hong Kong, were formally colonised, other parts, such as the eighteen Chinese provinces, were never subject to foreign domination, and the Chinese government controlled its own currency and foreign policy.⁷⁹ As Feuerwerker opines, "China's sovereignty might be derogated, but it never came near to being extinguished".⁸⁰ At this point the British presence in China was regarded as an informal empire rather than a colonial present. The term informal empire was introduced by John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, and was intended to indicate that the Imperial power's '[r]efusals to annex are no proof of reluctance to control'.⁸¹ Gallagher and Robinson focused on the British informal empire through investment, community, treaty and funds (sometimes by force) in Latin America. Jürgen Osterhammel extended this term to include China. Britain had no territorial ambitions⁸² in China and had only one colonies (Hong Kong; Weihaiwei was a leased territory) and several concessions and settlements. Although these concessions and settlements had their own powers regarding law and taxes, Chinese sovereignty was still in

⁷⁷ Jürgen Osterhammel, 'Semi-Colonialism and Informal Empire in Twentieth-Century China: Towards a Framework of Analysis', in Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Jürgen Osterhammel (eds.), *Imperialism and after and Discontinuities*, (London: German Historical Institute, 1985), p.300.

⁷⁸ Bowie, 'Great Britain and the Use of Force in China, 1919 to 1931', p.25.

⁷⁹ Osterhammel, 'Semi-Colonialism and Informal Empire in Twentieth-Century China', p.290.

⁸⁰ Albert Feuerwerker, 'The Foreign Establishment in China in the Early Twentieth Century', *Michigan Papers in Chinese Studies*, 29, 1976, p.1.

⁸¹ John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, 'The Imperialism of Free Trade', *The Economic History Review*, New Series, Vol.6, No. 1 (1953), p.3.

⁸² Cain and Hopkins, *British Imperialism, 1688-2000, Second Edition* pp. p.373.

place in terms of land ownerships (land was leased, not sold, to the British).⁸³ Therefore my study will investigate how the informal empire worked and how it could have affected Anglo-Chinese relations. Thus the study of the British concession in Tientsin is a good example of how the informal British empire could work in China.

Though the British community had several advantages, such as extraterritorial rights for British subjects, this privilege did not necessarily afford them an unchallenged advantage in the Chinese market, where British firms faced difficulties such as limited capital and resistance from local Chinese elites.⁸⁴ The British firms already felt handicapped because they could not penetrate the Chinese market.⁸⁵ In addition, this privilege became a target for a Chinese attack on the unequal treaty. Tientsin and its hinterland were not excepted from the attack. For instance, the distribution of goods within China was controlled by Chinese interests. The British could only penetrate the Chinese market with the help of compradors. With the new wave of Chinese nationalism in China, rather than another outburst like the May Thirtieth Movement, British traders and Britons faced another problem: 'official' and 'popular' resistance. Popular nationalism took the form of effective mass action against the foreigners in the form of anti-

⁸³ Osterhammel, 'Britain and China, 1842 - 1914', in Andrew Porter, et. al., (eds.), *The Oxford History of the British Empire, Vol. III, The nineteenth century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp.150-1.

⁸⁴ Osterhammel, 'Britain and China, 1842 - 1914', pp.152-3. This resistance was obvious when the British firms tried to open cotton mills in China and received strong opposition from Chinese local official. It was only after the Sino-Japanese War in 1894-1895 that the Chinese were forced to allow foreigners to establish their cotton mills in China. See Swam, 'British Cotton Mills in Pre-Second World War China', p.177.

⁸⁵ Nathan A. Pelcovits, *Old China Hands and the Foreign Office* (New York: The King's Crown Press, 1948), p.35, Osterhammel, 'Semi-Colonialism and Informal Empire in Twentieth-Century China', p.305 and Jürgen Osterhammel, 'Imperialism in Transition: British Business and the Chinese Authorities, 1931-37', *China Quarterly*, No.98, June, 1984, p.273 and Yen-P'ing Hao, *The Comprador in Nineteenth Century China: Bridge between East and West* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1970), pp.24-5. Compradors were middleman between the foreign traders and the Chinese people.

imperialist campaigns, strikes and boycotts.⁸⁶ This form of resistance, known as the National Product Movement, intensified greatly from the 1920s onwards with sufficient mass support from many Chinese consumers to have a significant impact on Japanese and British trade and policy discussions.⁸⁷ All these problems had a profound impact on the British traders. Their privileges could not protect their trade interests. The only way to settle these problems was by cooperating with the Chinese themselves.

Cain and Hopkins stress the importance of finance capital and networks of finance and government, which they describe as Gentlemanly Capitalism and which played an important role in supporting British investments overseas. The existence of gentlemanly capitalism came about with the growth of the financial and service sectors in London as a tool to force the development of British investment and trade abroad.⁸⁸ In this way London's financial sector generated economic development in several parts of the world such as Australia, New Zealand, Cape Colony, Argentina and Uruguay.⁸⁹ In China's case, London's financial institutions had an 'invisible influence' on the British government through loans, holding China together and increasing prospects for financial and commercial services in China.⁹⁰

⁸⁶ Osterhammel, 'Semi-Colonialism and Informal Empire in Twentieth-Century China', p.305, C. F. Remer, *Foreign Investments in China* (New York: Howard Fertig 1968), p.369; Edmund S. K. Fung, *The Diplomacy of Imperial Retreat: Britain's South China Policy, 1924-1931* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1991), p.50; and Megginson, 'Britain's Response to Chinese nationalism, 1925-1927', pp.167 and 170. On 24 July 1925 major firms such as Jardine, Matheson and Company, the Asiatic Petroleum Company, HSB and the British American Tobacco Company handed over a joint letter to the Foreign Office complaining that their trade was suffering.

⁸⁷ Karl Gerth, *China Made: Consumer Culture and the creation of the Nation* (Cambridge MA: the Harvard University Asia Center, 2003), pp.4 and 6.

⁸⁸ P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, 'Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Expansion Overseas I. The Old Colonial System, 1688-1850', *The Economic History Review*, New Series, Vol.39, No.4. (Nov., 1986), p.517.

⁸⁹ P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, 'Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Expansion Overseas II. New Imperialism, 1850-1945', *The Economic History Review*, New Series, Vol.40, No.1. (Feb., 1987), p.11.

⁹⁰ Cain and Hopkins, *British Imperialism, 1688-2000*, p.380.

Therefore London's financial institutions and services became an important factor in spreading British capital outside Britain. This point led us to understand the link between London's business and British trade in the British empire especially in China. This link helped the development of British business, including those in Tientsin. In other words, the British in China had strong relations with their counterparts in London, and so were not alone in China with their grievances. This empowered the British community to pressure the British government to help them in China and gave any suggestions to the British government about changing British policy in China.

Cain and Hopkins' argument has caused considerable debate, both general and specific. In the case of China, some critics do not agree that the British played the gentleman in order to invest in China. The collapse of the Ch'ing Dynasty was a case in point. There was envy and fierce competition between the foreign powers in China.⁹¹ This point, as mentioned earlier, was proved when Japan expanded her interests into North China in 1930.⁹² The tension caused by this in North China created a problem for Britain in East Asia, and affected the British traders in Tientsin.

Shunhong Zhang (2002) does not agree that gentlemanly capitalism worked in China, because imperialism "means war, political oppression and economic exploitation." He continues; "Empire-building went virtually hand in hand with

⁹¹ Jürgen Osterhammel, 'Britain and China, 1860s – 1850s', in R.P.T. Davenport-Hines and Geoffrey Jones, (eds.), *British Business In Asia Since 1860* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p.199.

⁹² Niels P. Peterson, 'Gentlemanly and Not-so-Gentlemanly Imperialism in China before the First World War', in Shigeru Akita, *Gentlemanly Capitalism, Imperialism and Global History* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp.114 and 115. Another example was France secretly supported its bank, the Banque Industrielle de Chine, in obtaining industrial concessions from China by offering loans.

numerous evils. Imperialism, no matter whether it was British, American or any other, was not 'gentlemanly' or 'gentle' at all."⁹³ The British used any means available to secure business concessions in China, such as introducing opium to the Chinese market and building railways further into the interior of China to secure raw materials.⁹⁴ Zhang points out that the superior British military was an advantage to British business progress in China.⁹⁵ The use of force or the gunboat policy was an important tool which Britain used to protect its interests. However, Cain and Hopkins never ignored the fact that the British used force to penetrate the Chinese market to protect British interests and especially to promote free trade in China.⁹⁶ This led to our understanding that the British in China created anxiety among the Chinese and illustrates how the arrival of the British (and other foreign powers) in China in the nineteenth century evolved into anti foreign sentiment, which later became Chinese nationalism.

Other scholars such as Shigeru Akita (1999) agree with some of Cain and Hopkins' arguments; Akita emphasises that gentlemanly capitalism was important to Britain in investing in its colonies and dominions so the British could develop their industry and produce a surplus in order that they could not only to pay off their debts but also pay out dividends to shareholders and the interest on government loans.⁹⁷ With this connection, it demonstrated that the British in

⁹³ Shunhong Zhang, 'British Imperialism and Decolonization: a Chinese Perspective', in Shigeru Akita, (ed.), *Gentlemanly Capitalism, Imperialism and Global History* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p. 126.

⁹⁴ Ibid., p.127.

⁹⁵ Ibid., p.128.

⁹⁶ Cain and Hopkins, 'Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Expansion Overseas I', p.523.

⁹⁷ Shigeru Akita, 'British Informal Empire in East Asia, 1880-1939: a Japanese Perspective', in Raymond E. Dumett (ed.), *Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Imperialism*, (London: Longman, 1999), p.144 and Akita and Naoto Kagotani, 'International Order of Asia in the 1930s', in Shigeru Akita (ed.), *Gentlemanly Capitalism, Imperialism and Global History* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p.157.

London also wanted stability in China to maintain their interests. This proved, as mentioned earlier, that the relationship between investors in London and British interests in China was strong. It could play an important role in London to help the British community in China, including Tientsin.

To sum up this section, Osterhammel, Cain and Hopkins' work offers a new dimension to the study of Anglo-Chinese relations. Their work had shown the role of the British firms in China and the challenges they had to face from the Chinese and other foreigners. The drawback to all these studies is that they do not examine the whole of the British community in China. They are studies of British businessmen in China that focus on Shanghai and ignore the British communities in other treaty ports. Osterhammel, Cain and Hopkins point out that the British businessmen had a liberal attitude towards the Chinese. Could this apply to British businessmen in North China?

Treaty Port Communities

Next I turn to recent studies on Anglo-Chinese relations which concentrate on treaty port communities. The study of the treaty ports has increased our knowledge of the role of foreign communities such as other Europeans, the Japanese, the Americans, the Jews and others in treaty ports.⁹⁸ In his study of

⁹⁸ These studies include Chiara Betta, 'Marginal Westerners in Shanghai: the Baghdadi Jewish Community, 1845-1931'; in Robert Bickers and Christian Henriot (eds.), *New Frontiers: Imperialism's New Communities in East Asia, 1842-1953* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), pp.38-54; Claude Markovits, 'Indian Communities in China, c. 1842-1949'; in Robert Bickers and Christian Henriot (eds.), *New Frontiers*, pp.55-74; Françoise Kreissler, 'In search of identity: the German community in Shanghai, 1933-1945'; in Robert Bickers and Christian Henriot (eds.), *New Frontiers*, pp.211-30; Christian Henriot, 'Little Japan' in Shanghai: an insulated community, 1875-1945'; in Robert Bickers and Christian Henriot (eds.), *New Frontiers*, pp.146-69; Mark F. Wilkinson, 'The Shanghai American Community, 1937-1949'; in Robert Bickers and Christian Henriot (eds.), *New Frontiers*, pp.231-49; Marcia R. Ristaino, 'The Russian Diaspora community in Shanghai'; in Robert Bickers and Christian Henriot (eds.), *New Frontiers*, pp.192-

Shanghai, James Layton Huskey points out that the American community had two attitudes to the treaty port in Shanghai. The majority of the American community was parochial and adopted the treaty port mentality.⁹⁹ The second, cosmopolitan group was in the minority. The cosmopolitans were more sympathetic towards the Chinese.¹⁰⁰ Huskey's work raises the question of whether this was also true in British communities in China.

Fung comments that one of the reasons for the spread of anti-British feeling in China in the mid-1920s was that "[s]ocially the British communities in the treaty ports were arrogant, aloof, and unashamedly racist."¹⁰¹ This statement indicates that the Britons' attitudes were also parochial. Fung's opinion is based on the attitude of the Shanghailanders, who restricted the scope of their relations with the Chinese, on whom their status in Shanghai depended, because they did not see them as equals. The Shanghailanders were exclusively British and did not include in their image of themselves other British colonial settlers such as Eurasians, Indians or Jews or other nationalities,¹⁰² apart from Russian Jews.¹⁰³ Only the rich Jews were treated as equals and allowed to join the British Shanghai club.¹⁰⁴

The Indians also received different treatment; those who were rich enjoyed a good relationship with the British while normal Indian-British relations were as

210; and Marcia Reynders Ristaino, *Port of Last Resort: The Diaspora Communities of Shanghai* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), pp.1-369.

⁹⁹ James Layton Huskey, 'Americans in Shanghai: Community Formation and Response to Revolution, 1919-1928', (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1985), p.43.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p.50.

¹⁰¹ Fung, *The Diplomacy of Imperial Retreat*, p.36.

¹⁰² Robert Bickers, 'Shanghailanders: The Formation and Identity of the British Settler Community in Shanghai 1843-1937', *Past and Present*, No.159 (1998), pp.170 and 175.

¹⁰³ Ristaino, *Port of Last Resort: the Diaspora Communities of Shanghai*, p.4.

¹⁰⁴ Chiara Betta, 'Marginal Westerners in Shanghai', p.49. However this did not mean that the Jews were free from anti-Semitism, expressions of which often appeared in the English newspaper.

servant to master, especially between Sikh police constables and British men in treaty port police forces.¹⁰⁵ After the outbreak of World War I the Germans also had unequal status to that of the British (and the French). Their member on the Shanghai Municipal Council (SMC) was replaced by a Japanese member, after which some Germans gave up their social interactions with other foreigners.¹⁰⁶ The Japanese themselves also received unequal treatment from the British, their representation on the council being only in proportion to their population in the International Settlement.¹⁰⁷ The Shanghailanders found the Americans easiest to accommodate. They accepted them in the SMC and the Shanghai Volunteer Corps.¹⁰⁸ However, on some occasions, such as in the early part of World War I, the Americans were made uncomfortable by British criticism of the United States' decision not to support with Great Britain in the war.¹⁰⁹

In British society itself the Shanghailanders tried to preserve their image from the so-called "floating population of the British poor...British seamen, discharged soldiers and discharged policemen", deporting "distressed British subjects" back to Britain.¹¹⁰ Although they remained loyal to the British Empire, they regarded themselves in ways which mirror the "colonial nationalism" of Australians, New Zealanders or Rhodesians. Furthermore they did not want to be

¹⁰⁵ Markovits, 'Indian Communities in China, c. 1842-1949', p.70. Even the relations between the Sikh and British constables also did not seem equal. The British constable still felt superior to the Sikh constable.

¹⁰⁶ Kreissler, 'In search of identity: the German community in Shanghai, 1933-1945', p.213.

¹⁰⁷ Henriot, 'Little Japan' in Shanghai', p.163.

¹⁰⁸ Wilkinson, 'The Shanghai American Community; 1937-1949', pp.234 and 236.

¹⁰⁹ Huskey, 'Americans in Shanghai', p.13.

¹¹⁰ Bickers, 'Who were the Shanghai Municipal Police, and why were they there?', p.173. One example was the British policeman Maurice Tinkler who was treated little better than the Chinese. Moreover the police, the fire brigade, outdoor Customs workers and their families were at the bottom of Shanghaileander society. See Bickers, 'Shanghailanders', p.183.

controlled by London and tried to maintain their autonomy.¹¹¹ Harumi Goto-Shibata (1995) points out that the Shanghailanders' attitude, and especially that of the *North China Daily News* with its anti-Chinese stance, did not foster good relations with the Chinese in the treaty ports.¹¹² The judicial inquiry formed to investigate the May Thirtieth Incident blamed the foreigners in Shanghai and this narrowed the minds of the world around them.¹¹³ This attitude had existed since first-generation Shanghailanders came to China to work, uninterested in learning about the Chinese culture.¹¹⁴ Since then the Shanghailanders had built up their own exclusive world, opening a British school with a British curriculum and building churches and libraries. A British-only club was formed. Moreover a taboo was instilled against marriage or open sexual contact with the Chinese. The Chinese were not even allowed to visit European brothels.¹¹⁵ The Shanghailanders' attitude added to the British problem in China. It created unfriendly relations with the Chinese, with a strong negative effect on the British liberal policy of maintaining good relation with China. But did this also happen to the British community in Tientsin? Did this community also have a diehard attitude?

The 'diehards' became an obstacle to Anglo-Chinese relations, and this problem grew when the Chinese demanded the return of sovereignty of Chinese territory, the foreign holdings of which were underpinned by the tenet of extraterritoriality. The Shanghailanders' reluctance to adjust their attitude extended

¹¹¹ Bickers, 'Shanghailanders', pp.179 and 181.

¹¹² Harumi Goto-Shibata, *Japan and Britain in Shanghai, 1925-31* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1995), p.17.

¹¹³ Clifford, *Spoilt Children of Empire*, p.141.

¹¹⁴ Bickers, 'Shanghailanders', p.185, 186, 187, 188 and 190. This taboo could not prevent the British taking Chinese concubines, and some married Chinese women. The taboo on mixed marriages was not confined to the Chinese; it included Eurasians and the Russians.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.186, 187, 188 and 190. This taboo could not prevent the British taking Chinese concubines, and some married Chinese women. The taboo on mixed marriages was not confined to the Chinese; it included Eurasians and the Russians.

beyond this situation to their response to the idea of pursuing a better understanding between themselves and the Chinese in Shanghai. Traveller and novelist W. Somerset Maugham noted in 1920 that the British community's attitude towards the Chinese was closed.¹¹⁶ This was due to the Chinese themselves, he claimed, who did not mix with foreigners.¹¹⁷ However, this seems to blame the Chinese, whereas in reality it was the diehard attitude of the British community that soured the relationship. The Shanghailanders, for example, had put several limitations onto their relations with the Chinese; the Huang Pu Park, in Shanghai, was case in point.

The Shanghailer's attitude was challenged by the May Thirtieth Incident, which eventually resulted in the reform of the SMC.¹¹⁸ Although the changes occurred after the incident, Clifford (1979) does not see this as a total victory for the Chinese:

The direct achievements of May Thirtieth were slight by anyone's reckoning: the ending of the Mixed Court, the offer of \$75,000 as a "compassionate grant." But extraterritoriality was not abolished, the ending of the Mixed Court did not mean unconditional Chinese jurisdiction in the Settlement, the Chinese did not get parity on the Council, the extra-Settlement roads were not abandoned, British and Japanese gunboats were not withdrawn, the Municipal Police did not come under Chinese leadership, the Volunteer Corps was not abolished, and the right of workers to form unions and to strike was not recognized.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁶ W. Somerset Maugham, *On a Chinese Screen* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp.31-2.

¹¹⁷ It is notable that Christopher Cook's interview with former workers at Butterfield & Swire in China in the 1920s and 1930s found that they did mix with the Chinese, and that to some extent the Chinese tried to avoid the foreigners in their daily life. See Christopher Cook, *The Lion and the Dragon: British Voices from the Chinese Coast* (London: Elm Tree Books, 1985), pp.119, 131 and 132.

¹¹⁸ Clifford, *Spoilt Children of Empire*, pp.150 and 154.

¹¹⁹ Nicholas R. Clifford, *Shanghai, 1925: Urban Nationalism and the Defense of Foreign Privilege* (Michigan: Michigan papers in Chinese Studies, 1979), p.80.

This passage shows that the Shanghailanders made little effort to please the Chinese. Was this the case in other communities as well? Were the British in Tientsin as 'diehard' as their counterparts in Shanghai?

Osterhammel doubts that all the British communities were parochial. Large companies such as Butterfield and Swire (Taikoo) and the British American Tobacco Corporation were aware of the waves of change happening in China and responded to them.¹²⁰ The willingness of these big companies to accept the situation increased the understanding between them and the Chinese. Their awareness of Chinese nationalism was due to several reasons; the emergence of Chinese competition such as the Yong Li Soda Company, Nanyang Brothers and the Minsheng shipping line; Chinese government support for Chinese businesses, which gave them an advantage;¹²¹ and British companies' worries about Chinese boycotts and the Chinese appeal to buy national goods (*guohuo*).¹²² For these reasons, Warren Swire of Butterfield & Swire made an effort to stay in touch with Chinese businessmen and politicians.¹²³ There was also a change in attitude by the big British firms in Tientsin, which became more open to the Chinese and avoided any confrontation with them.

¹²⁰ Sherman Cochran, *Big Business in China: Sino-Foreign Rivalry in the Cigarette Industry, 1890-1930* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1930), p.193, Osterhammel, 'Imperialism in Transition', p.274 and Osterhammel, 'China', p.655, cited from 'Outport Agents' Conference, Shanghai, September 1931: Minutes of Discussions on Chinese Staff and General Matters,' John Swire & Sons Archives, School of Oriental African Studies (London) II/2/10.

¹²¹ Wang, *Anglo-Chinese Encounters Since 1800*, pp.48, 62 and 64.

¹²² Robert Bickers, *Britain in China: Community, Culture and Colonialism 1900-1949* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), pp.176 and 177.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, p.179.

Table 1.1: Foreign Investments in China, 1902, 1914, and 1931, in US\$m

Year	1902	1914	1931
Great Britain	260.3	607.5	1,189.20
Japan	1*	219.6	1,136.90
Russia	246.5	269.3	273.2
United States	19.7	49.3	196.8
France	91.1	171.4	192.4
Germany	164.3	263.6	87
Others	5	29.6	167

Source: C. F. Remer, *Foreign Investments in China*, p.76.

* This figure does not include investment in Taiwan.

Changing British attitudes were also influenced by foreign competition, especially from the Americans, the Japanese and the Germans. Table 1.1 shows a fourfold increase in American investment due to the efforts of American cosmopolitans to build a 'special relationship' and gain strong support from American-trained Chinese doing business in China.¹²⁴ British businessmen were concerned about the Japanese as the second biggest investors in China, and that their activities in Manchuria would close the Manchurian market to other Powers. W. J. Keswick from Jardine, Matheson and Co. complained about weak British policy in China,¹²⁵ saying that if this continued British companies would be pushed aside by the Japanese. German investment fell, but the British businessmen were still worried about German competition. For instance, the Germans had overtaken

¹²⁴ Huskey, 'Americans in Shanghai', p.164.

¹²⁵ Endicott, *Diplomacy and Enterprise: British China Policy 1933-1937*, pp.89-9.

the British as suppliers of metals and machinery to China.¹²⁶ The figure in Table 1.1 does not give a true representation of German investment in China because it also participated in bartering with the Chinese. Furthermore, the Nationalist government had special relations with the Germans which the Germans had established through Hapro, an agency which managed their trade relations with the Chinese.¹²⁷ Again, this pointed to the issue of foreign competition, especially from the Japanese, who had a big impact on British interests in Tientsin particularly from the 1930s onwards, when they tried to penetrate North China. Indirectly this shows that Tientsin was a place of competition between the foreign powers.

Despite British awareness of the need to establish a cordial relationship with the Chinese, some British communities retained their parochial attitude. On this matter Bickers stated that:

British settlers reacted bitterly to this diplomatic offensive because they could see quite clearly that it signalled their redundancy. As indeed it did – the thrust of the diplomatic process was to engineer collaboration between the new Chinese ruling elite and its chosen British partners, thereby jettisoning the small treaty people. For their part, settlers' relentless barrage of propaganda about China maintained that every such concession threatened British lives.¹²⁸

The diehards gathered in the Shanghai British Residents' Association (BRA) in order to discuss the protection of their rights in treaty ports. Among the major issues they dealt with was their opposition to the renegotiation of

¹²⁶ Ibid., p.43, cited from DGFP, Series C, 1933, 1:811, 867; 1934, 3:761; 1936, 5:348, 411, 502.

¹²⁷ William C. Kirby, *Germany and Republican China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984), pp.120, 125 and 137. Hapro was a German organisation which conducted barter trading between Germany and China. The Germans were keen to import Chinese ore which was claimed to be high quality. In return they agreed to supply the Chinese with a contract for arsenal, heavy industry and export machines to China.

¹²⁸ Bickers, *Britain in China*, p.146.

extraterritoriality.¹²⁹ As one of the diehards of a parochial mind, H.G.W.

Woodhead, said in 1925:

In the course of China's long and chequered history she has survived decades and even centuries of internal disorder. And inasmuch as there are no really fundamental differences between the Chinese, whether they come from North or the South, or the East or the West, it may be hoped that time will overcome the present disruptive tendencies. . . . No real good would be done by premature surrender on the part of the Treaty Powers to the present popular clamour.¹³⁰

This passage exemplifies the strong opposition this group towards any modification of the unequal treaty. It proves that there was still resistance in the British community to any changes to their privileges in China. Another event – the disappearance of John Thorburn in 1931– sparked British protest, and in Hankow, Tientsin and Shanghai large gatherings were organised in protest.¹³¹ Moreover, the change in Britain's policy concerning the Nationalist government brought more negotiations on the revision of the status of the British concessions and settlements. The Shanghailanders were worried about their future and wanted to preserve the *status quo*. Furthermore they wanted their government to protect their interests in China.¹³² So the Shanghailanders' attitude was diehard. They had reason to oppose any changes which would jeopardise their livelihoods, which depended solely on the treaty ports.¹³³ It became important to look deeply at the society's behaviour in response to the changes.

¹²⁹ Ibid., p.149.

¹³⁰ H.G.W. Woodhead, *The Truth about the Chinese Republic* (London:, Hurst & Blackett, Ltd., Paternoster House, 1925), p.271.

¹³¹ Robert Bickers, 'Death of a Young Shanghaider: The Thorburn Case and the Defence of the British Treaty Ports in China in 1931', *Modern Asian Studies* 30:2 (1996), p.292.

¹³² Arthur Ransome, *The Chinese Puzzle* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1927), p.30.

¹³³ Bickers, 'Shanghailanders', p.207.

The literature on the treaty ports shows that the Shanghailanders became symbols of the British communities' resistance to the reform of their interests in China. The echoes of their resistance would resound throughout most of the British concessions and settlements. In Tientsin, the situation was almost the same, but the power vested in the Consul General meant that the British government could control and monitor the British concession in Tientsin. The other important factor was the role played by the British traders in this concession. They were very keen to protect their interests and were prepared to take a more moderate approach to handling their problems. For example, the Kailan Mining Administration (KMA), which dominated the British Municipal Council (BMC) in the 1920s and 1930s, had to change its attitude according to the development in Chinese politics. The small size of the British population in Tientsin was another factor which made the traders more pragmatic.¹³⁴ They were willing to make changes in order to maintain the progress of trade in Tientsin. Therefore, as Chapter 1 of this thesis will show, from the beginning of the twentieth century up to end of the 1920s the British in Tientsin were much readier to accommodate the interests of Chinese residents. In the next the section I discuss the importance of studying the British concession in Tientsin in detail.

Significance of the Study of Tientsin

I now consider the significance of studying the British concession and its hinterlands from the point of view of Anglo-Chinese relations. My review of the literature has shown that Anglo-Chinese relations were important to the existence of the British population, the strategy, security and prestige of the British empire in

¹³⁴ For example, in 1925 the British population of Tientsin and Shanghai were 682 and 5879 respectively. See Appendix 4 and Table 4, and Bickers, *Britain in China*, p.125.

East Asia, and British trade. However, studying Anglo-Chinese relations purely at a diplomatic level does not provide a sufficient understanding of the relationship. This would neglect the importance of the study from below which had some impact on the British policy in China. Therefore the study of Anglo-Chinese relations has to be wider and cover on the ground reactions such as the British community's response to changes in British policy and developments in China such as the impact of Chinese nationalism in the 1920s. The British community in China would fight to protect their terms of trade and properties. Even this community could be an obstacle to Anglo-Chinese relations. This became more dangerous when the Chinese read the British communities' views in English language newspapers in Shanghai and Tientsin as British policy in China.¹³⁵ These arguments show that the British community was 'bedevilled' in its Anglo-Chinese relations.¹³⁶ Why did the British community oppose the demands from the Chinese government? My study will enhance knowledge of Anglo-Chinese relations from the view of the British community. Study of the British community in China is still new, and so far has only concentrated on Shanghai. Due to this the study on the British community in China always overshadow by what happened in Shanghai. Therefore the study on other British concessions would avoid any general view that all the British community in China had a same attitude with the Shanghailanders.

Studying British concessions other than Shanghai, such as that in Tientsin, will enhance the study of British communities in treaty ports more widely. Furthermore this study will show the impact of the British community in Tientsin and its hinterland on Anglo-Chinese relations. As mentioned in the literature

¹³⁵ Ransome, *The Chinese Puzzle*, p.28.

¹³⁶ Bickers, *Britain in China*, p.14.

review, the British community in China was not a passive community; its members tried as far as possible to fight to prevent their interests from being jeopardised by the policies of Britain, the Chinese or other foreign powers, especially Japan. This community also took several measures to avoid any parties disturbing their interests. The study of the British community in Tientsin and its hinterlands is important because this community was willing to fight even though, compared with the community in Shanghai, British interests in Tientsin were small. Yet they succeeded in maintaining the British concession, in contrast with other British concessions in Amoy, Chinkiang, Kuikiang and Hankow, which were all returned to China. However, studies on Anglo-Chinese relations generally omit to mention the existence of British communities in China.

Studying the role of the British community in Tientsin and its hinterland opens up another dimension of the British mentality. Bickers' profound study of the Shanghailanders contributes sound knowledge of the general British mentality in China. Bickers saw that the Shanghailanders' diehard attitude to change not only affected their trade interests but also protected the British image and prestige in China. However, these mainly refer to Shanghai, and there is little information on other treaty ports. Moreover there is a tendency to consider Shanghailanders representative of the general attitude of the British community in China,¹³⁷ which is an incorrect assumption. As we know, there were many other concessions and settlements in China where British communities settled, lived and worked. Therefore the British communities' attitudes may have been the same as that of the Shanghailanders, but in Tientsin, controlled by the British consul general, the

¹³⁷ Ransome, *The Chinese Puzzle*, p.28.

small British population and different interests distinguished them from the Shanghailanders. Knowledge of this will contribute wider knowledge about a British community in China other than Shanghai.

Tientsin was the second most important city in terms of British trade. According to Remer, British investment in Tientsin was £8m in 1931, second only to Shanghai,¹³⁸ while F. C. Jones estimates it as £9.9m.¹³⁹ Tientsin was also important to the Chinese, as after Shanghai it contributed the second greatest amount of customs revenue. According to the Chinese Maritime Customs tax collection records of 1927, Tientsin and Chinwangtao contributed HK Taels 9,225,000 (13%) of the HK Taels 68,687,000 overall customs revenue.¹⁴⁰ In 1930 though the Tientsin custom revenue declined to 7.82% but Tientsin still became second contributor in custom revenue behind Shanghai (47.97%). Other port such as Dairen, Canton, Kiachow, Hankow and other ports contributed only 6.85%, 5.4%, 5.08%, 4.15% and 23.25% respectively.¹⁴¹ In addition, the big investment of the British community in Tientsin made the port important to British trade on the one hand and a lucrative source of revenue for the Chinese on the other. The importance of Tientsin to both the British and Chinese means that its study could expand our knowledge of how the British community in treaty

¹³⁸ Remer, *Foreign Investments in China*, p.392.

Shanghai	£164,272,504
Tientsin	8,000,000
Hankow	3,734,145
Canton	3,000,000
Peking	500,000
Total	£179,506,649

¹³⁹F. C. Jones, *Shanghai and Tientsin With Special Reference to Foreign Interests* (London: Oxford University Press, 1940), p.150. Furthermore, British interests, including in North China, amounted to £37m.

¹⁴⁰ The British Library, IOLR, L/PS/10/1202, F624/46/10, Sir Miles Lampson to Sir Austen Chamberlain, 7 February, 1928.

¹⁴¹ Donna Marce Brunero, 'Through Turbulent Waters: Foreign Administration of the Chinese Maritime Customs Service, 1923-1937', (unpublished Thesis, Ph. D., 2000 [Feb.], University of Adelaide), p.209 from Figure 7.1.

ports other than Shanghai handled the Chinese demand to return these ports and how the British community in Tientsin survived the rise of Chinese nationalism.

The above facts show how important Tientsin is to this study. Several scholars and writers have written about Tientsin, including Brett Sheehan, Gail Hershatter, Jennifer Yang, Kwan Man Bun, Marjorie Dryburgh, S. P. Swann, and Ruth Rogaski. O.D. Rasmussen is one of the earlier writers on Tientsin. Two of his books focus on its early history before 1925, concentrating on the development of the foreign concessions there, and in particular the British concession. His narrative writing gives an overall picture of the foreigners' role in developing Tientsin. The more recent scholars mentioned above have carried out more thorough studies, although from different viewpoints. Kwan Man Bun investigates the importance of the salt merchants and suggests that they played an important part in the development of Tientsin.¹⁴² Kwan's study helps us to understand Chinese business practice before the coming of Westerners to Tientsin. Brett Sheehan's study provides a comprehensive account of Tientsin's financial, social, and political history in Republican China, showing how it developed as an important trade centre. The development of financial institutions in the form of both foreign and Chinese banks created a good business environment in Tientsin.¹⁴³ Overall Sheehan and Kwan both highlight the importance of Tientsin in trade and banking systems in North Chinese history, a prominence which attracted Chinese central government and warlords to fight to control it. These studies show that Tientsin

¹⁴² Kwan Man Bun, *The Salt Merchants of Tianjin: State-Making and Civil Society in Late Imperial China* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2001), pp.94, 95, 99-103 and 110-3.

¹⁴³ Brett Sheehan, *Trust in Troubled Times: Money, Banks, and State-Society relations in Republican Tianjin* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), pp.11-13 and 53.

was not only a small trading port but also the centre of the banking system in North China, and was already a trading port before the coming of the Western Powers.

Rogaski examines public health in Tientsin's foreign concessions and Chinese city. Her study is a case study of the impact of informal empire or semi-colonialism on the development of the city and its people in the twentieth century. The multiple colonialism in Tientsin noted by Rogaski, makes the study of Tientsin very interesting. From 1860-1943, Tientsin consisted not only of a Chinese city but also eight (latterly four) foreign concessions.¹⁴⁴ As a result of the diversity of foreign control, research on Tientsin is not generally focused on any single community such as the British. It also led to study of the interaction and sometimes tension between communities such as the Boxer Uprising (see Chapter One). Gail Hershatter furthers this study by looking at Chinese workers to examine the development of Tientsin. Her study also considers another important element in Tientsin. She does not agree that the Chinese in Tientsin responded to the rise of Chinese nationalism conservatively and passively.¹⁴⁵ The Chinese there were involved in big protests in 1925-1926 (and 1946-1948), which shows that it was not a quiescent place during the Nationalist era in China. Even before 1925 members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) organised the Tientsin workers in a labour union.¹⁴⁶

This literature on Tientsin also discusses relationships between the international powers in Tientsin. As Rogaski mentions, "Tianjin [Tientsin] fostered

¹⁴⁴ Ruth Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity: Meanings of Health and Disease in Treaty-Port China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), p.3.

¹⁴⁵ Gail Hershatter, *The Workers of Tianjin, 1900-1949* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986), pp.210-1.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.212-20.

no simple binary division between 'coloniser' and 'colonised', but instead gave rise to an unstable and contested hierarchy among many nations."¹⁴⁷ The imperialist powers with concessions in Tientsin kept their own identity, power and policy confined to their concessions. The unique style of architecture in every concession symbolised the distance each of these concessions kept from the others.¹⁴⁸ This also raised animosity and clashes between them. For example, the Sino-Japanese crisis in the 1930s had had an impact not only on the Chinese but also on other foreigners. The crisis in the 1930s in relations between Japan and China extended to affect British interests in Tientsin. On 8 November 1931, Japan used Tientsin against China by supplying Chinese hooligans with arms with which to create trouble.¹⁴⁹ Although this did not have a profound impact on British trade, the traders were still concerned about their future when the conflict escalated in the mid-1930s. These two studies demonstrate the existence of imperialists in this city and the development of Chinese workers' grievance against the imperialist powers. It would be interesting to know how the small British community in Tientsin managed to develop its interests steadily despite the Chinese agitation and competition from other foreign powers.

This is elaborated by Marjorie Dryburgh, who points out that in the 1930s the Japanese military tried to expand Japanese interests in North China.¹⁵⁰ Although Tientsin's Japanese residents seemed unwilling to support this

¹⁴⁷ Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity*, p.194.

¹⁴⁸ Tess Johnston and Deke Erh, *Far From Home: Western Architecture in China's Northern Treaty Ports* (Hong Kong: Old China Hand Press, 1996), p.63.

¹⁴⁹ *The Tientsin Incident: Troubles Created by Plain-clothes Men under Japanese Protection November 8-30, A Record of Facts* (Tientsin: The Municipal Government of Tientsin, 1932), p.1.

¹⁵⁰ Marjorie Dryburgh, 'Parallel Lives: the Japanese Community in 1930s Tianjin', *EARC Research Papers* 96.11, pp.10-2.

initiative,¹⁵¹ the Sino-Japanese conflict created problems for the British traders' interests. This issue is raised by both Swann and Young. Both of their studies examine the tension between the British and the Japanese in 1939. Swann points out that the existence of Chinese residents in British concessions created unforeseen problems, which became more overt when the Sino-Japanese tension reached a high peak in 1937. The Chinese used the British concessions as a hiding place or a centre from which to attack the Japanese,¹⁵² causing the Sino-Japanese tension to spill over into Anglo-Japanese tension.¹⁵³ This study again shows that Tientsin was not a quiet city in the 1930s; the Japanese activity created tension in Tientsin and its hinterlands, and despite Japan's domination of North China in the 1930s, the British interests were still intact.

After reviewing all the above studies, my postulation is that the British community in Tientsin and its hinterland was moderate and adaptable community which recognised the British liberal policy would help foster a good relation between British and the Chinese. In my thesis I look at the role played by the British traders in Tientsin and its hinterlands and Anglo-Chinese relations. As we know that the British traders in Tientsin and its hinterland have never been studied, it would also be interesting to look at this community to see how the British community in other parts of China (in this case in Tientsin and its hinterlands) reacted to the changes in China between 1925 to 1937. What factors determined how the British traders in Tientsin and hinterlands reacted? Did they have the same attitude as the British community in Tientsin and its hinterlands? Was the British

¹⁵¹ Ibid., p.13.

¹⁵² S.P. Swann, 'The Tientsin Incident (1939): A Case-Study of Japan's Imperial Dilemma in China' (unpublished Ph.D., Thesis, the University of London, 30 November 1998), pp.22 and 372.

¹⁵³ Jennifer Yang, 'British Policy and Strategy in the Tientsin Crisis, 1939' (unpublished M. Litt Thesis, Oxford University, 1994), p.79.

community in Tientsin and its hinterlands united against the challenges of the Chinese and other foreign powers? Did it also have diehards, as in Shanghai? Did the British community in Tientsin and its hinterlands have an impact on the Anglo-Chinese relations? How did the British community in Tientsin and its hinterlands manage to avoid Japanese competition in the 1930s? Lastly, how did it respond to Japanese activity in North China? My discussion of the British community in this thesis focuses mostly on the traders, because it was they who controlled the BMC. However, I do not neglect the rest of the British community, especially the views of the missionaries and the settlers. My study does not include the other communities in Tientsin.

Thesis Structure

This thesis is divided into five chapters. This introduction touches on the objective of this thesis, the literature review, the structure of the thesis and the methodology. The first chapter concentrates on the development of the British Concession in Tientsin, from its opening until 1925. This chapter briefly discusses the establishment of the British concession, touching on its population and economic and administrative development. It highlights social interactions between the British and the Chinese and other communities. Several important events in Tientsin are discussed, especially the Tientsin Massacre (1870) and the Boxer Uprising (1900). These events also impacted on the concession, such as with the establishment of a British garrison in Tientsin after the Boxer Uprising. There is a brief history of Tientsin before the arrival of the Westerners and the emergence of other concessions. It is important to know how this city emerged and its importance to China before the arrival of the foreigners. The interest of the other

Powers, notably Japan, Russia and Germany in finding a foothold in Tientsin in order to grasp the trade opportunities in North China, are also discussed. The chapter provides an empirical account of the development of the British presence, which is not available in the current literature, and it provides material for understanding the position of the Tientsin British at the onset of the Chinese nationalist revolution. Given the emphasis placed upon the history of some of these events in British communal life in Tientsin – which Bickers has pointed to¹⁵⁴ – it is also important to understand their impact on the city and the British concession.

The second chapter is concerned with the period from 1925 to 1927, when Chinese nationalism began to grow in China and the British became the target of boycotts and resentment from the Chinese. In this chapter I examine the British communities' response to the rise of Chinese nationalism. Were they concerned about the situation? Were they and the British Legation prepared for any incident that might occur in Tientsin, such as what had happened in Hankow? How did the local Chinese in Tientsin react to the anti-British sentiment in China? What was the British community's response to the December Memorandum? These questions are investigated in depth.

Chapter three considers the establishment of good relations between the Chinese Nationalist government and Britain, focusing on the period between 1927 and 1929. This period is important to the future of the British communities, as both the Chinese and the British governments were willing to discuss the rendition of the British concession in Tientsin. I focus on the British community's response. Was

¹⁵⁴Ibid., p.137.

there any opposition to these negotiations? In addition I study the negotiations between the Chinese and British representatives, the demands of the Chinese and the British reaction. Also discussed in this chapter is the preparation of the British Legation to protect the British concession in case of Chinese troops coming into north China. Owing to, this chapter has to cover 1927, the year of the negotiations about rendition.

Chapter four covers the period between 1930 and 1933, when both the Chinese and the British governments agreed to discuss extraterritoriality. It examines the response of the British community in Tientsin to this and to the Thorburn case. However, the invasion of Manchuria by Japan disturbed the negotiation process. In these circumstances, what did the British community think about the Manchurian Crisis? The chapter also investigates the seizure of the Chinese Maritime Customs (CMC) in Tientsin and the response of the British community and government to this episode.

Chapter five highlights events between 1933 and 1937, a time of truce between China and Japan. Through these events I look upon Britain's China policy and the attitude of the Tientsin British community towards China and Japan. Where did the British communities stand regarding the tension between both countries? Was Tientsin and its hinterland also affected by this tension? To what extent could the British authority in Tientsin stay neutral in this crisis? The main issues discussed in this chapter are the smuggling activities, the Japanese puppet government and the Sino-Japanese War in 1937. Lastly the thesis ends with my conclusions, including the significance of Tientsin and its hinterlands in Anglo-

Chinese relations, and lastly some suggestions on how my study could be expanded.

Sources

Documentary material on the British presence in Tientsin is vast. There are abundant Foreign Office (FO) files regarding the British Concession in the National Archives in Kew Garden, London. Amongst these is FO 228, the Peking legation files, which included material on activities in Tientsin. These files include letters from and to London, to the British Minister in Peking and the British Consul General in Tientsin, and other letters sent by the British community in Tientsin to London, the British Legation in Peking and the Consul Office in Tientsin. Other than the FO 228 files, I also look into other files such as FO 656: Supreme Court files, FO 674: Tientsin consular files and FO371: Political Departments' files, which also contain important papers regarding Tientsin.

I also look at material in the records of the Chinese Maritime Chinese Service in the Second Archives of China in Nanjing, which contain many documents relating to Tientsin. Amongst the materials are files on the seizure of Tientsin Customs, which forms part of my research. Other interesting files are concerned with the smuggling in Tientsin and its hinterlands, which were significant events in Anglo-Japanese and Anglo-Chinese relations.

The Tientsin British Committee of Information Memoranda, 1926-1933 (in School of Oriental and African Studies) is important to my study, as it demonstrates the attitude of the British community in Tientsin to British liberal policy in China.

The memoranda became a tool of the TBCI through which they voiced their opinions, not only on their government's policy but also their responses to situations in China. These memoranda provide me with a comprehensive view of the Tientsin British community's attitudes.

Another source which I explore is newspapers and magazine. Several English newspapers and magazines are important to my study. The *North China Herald*, the *Chinese Times*, the *Celestial Empire*, *Oriental Affairs* and *The China Express and Telegraph* were published in China at the time and bring more light to my study. These newspapers not only covered the news in China but also expressed their own opinions on what was happening. These opinions became part of the British community's views in Tientsin. I could not locate a full collection of *The Peking and Tientsin Times* in any library or archive. However, I managed to retrieve some of its news from other materials, especially in Foreign Office files. In addition this thesis also uses other Chinese and Japanese newspapers or magazines such as *News Bulletin*, *Chinese Affairs*, *China Weekly Chronicle*, the *China Critic* and *The Japan Weekly Chronicle*.

Abundant documentation exists from major British firms with a presence in Tientsin, notably the Kailan Mining Administration, Jardine Matheson & Co., Butterfield & Swire and the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank. The British missionary society was also a prominent feature in settlement, cultural in educational activities. All these documents can be found in archives and libraries in London, Oxford and Cambridge. I also look into reports published by the British Municipal Council in Tientsin (in the Shanghai Municipal Archive). From these

reports I learnt of the activities of this Council relating to its economic, social and political municipal development. This research was not able to use material kept in the Tianjin (Tientsin) archives, as material on the concession was not accessible during the period of my research. However, this did not compromise my research; the materials mentioned above have given me enough information to produce this study. This study does not focus on the BMC administration or local history as such. It concentrates only on the extent to which the British community in Tientsin and its hinterlands influenced and had impacted on Anglo-Chinese relations. Therefore the materials to be found in English archives were sufficient for my study.

My secondary sources are books, theses and articles, although the literature on Tientsin in the period of 1920s and 1930s is limited. Some of these books, such as Ruth Rogaski's *Hygienic Modernity*, have enriched my understanding of Tientsin and the informal British empire in China. I also used books relating to British policy in China, the history of modern China and the Japanese presence in China.

Conclusion

To conclude, the study of Anglo-Chinese relations has been approached by many scholars. Early writings on Anglo-Chinese relations focus on diplomatic matters. The literature on the diplomatic theme has come from a diplomatic point of view, looking at relations from the top down. These studies create a general view of British activity in China. The size of China means that there were a variety of responses and therefore impacts on events there. These themes gradually change to

focus on the problems of British trade activities in China linked to the imperialist theme. The British imperialist theme takes a different approach by looking at the relationship with British imperial and economic history in China. They agree that Great Britain's position was weak in the 1920s and the old privileges could not support it at the time of the Chinese anti-British campaign. However, their argument covers only part of the British community, its traders.

Recent studies have opened up a wider perspective on Anglo-Chinese relations. This study concentrates on British community life in China. It is important to examine this component of history because it provides greater understanding of Anglo-Chinese relations. The British communities regarded the treaty port as their livelihood and would not accept the imposition of policy from London without protest or comment. This study of the British concession at Tientsin and its hinterland therefore considers these responses. The communities not only demanded that their livelihood be protected but also acted to influence government policy. The tension between the Chinese and Japanese also presented these communities with a substantial challenge, as any action which inclined to either party would lead to retaliation by the other.

All in all, the study of the British concession in Tientsin is essential for an understanding of the community's view of the situation in China in an era of disturbance and war in the 1920s and 1930s. It offers a good view of their opinions and reactions, including relations between British and other communities. The British community's reaction also determined the success of British policy in China. In other words this study brings another British voice to what is known

about Anglo-Chinese relations at the time and fills a vacuum in the history of community interaction in Anglo-Chinese relations.¹⁵⁵ So far we know about the Shanghailanders, but we know little about other British community views in other ports. Did they have homogeneous attitudes and reactions? Did the British community in Tientsin and the Shanghaileander have any connection? Furthermore, the study of Tientsin has become important because it has been so little studied. It contributes another valuable study, not just of the British community in China but also of Anglo-Chinese relations.

¹⁵⁵William Kirby, 'The Internationalization of China', p.456.

Chapter One

The Development of Foreign Concessions in Tientsin (1861-1925)

Introduction

Before this thesis looks more deeply into Sino-British relations in Tientsin, this chapter explores the early development of the concession between 1860 and 1925 in order that we can understand what was at stake – in British terms – in the age of assertive Chinese nationalism.¹ Three main themes are explored in this chapter. Firstly, it sketches out the history of the opening of Tientsin as a treaty port and the development of foreign concessions in the city. The second issue is the early relationship between Chinese and foreigners in the city, up to 1900. This section discusses the tensions which escalated into the Tientsin Massacre of 1870, and the Boxer Uprising of 1900. The last section considers the development of Tientsin in the twentieth century with particular reference to the British concession. The discussion concentrates on British interests, especially those of the British traders, in Tientsin and the surrounding area. This section also includes other developments such as other foreign concessions, the Chinese City and the development of trade in Tientsin. In order to understand why Tientsin was important for trade it is necessary to begin briefly with the general history of Tientsin before the western Powers arrived in China. Aside from Ruth Rogaski and Hershatter's survey, there has been no account of the British concession and its neighbours since 1925, and Rogaski and Hershatter's book, of course, does not have the concession as its focus. An updated survey is therefore even more relevant than might usually be the case.

¹ However the discussion also would include the period beyond 1925 to see progress such as trade figure and population.

Location and Early History

Tientsin is located in northeast China and connected to Peking by the Hai Ho, which runs through Tientsin to Taku and the Gulf of Pohai (see Map 2.1). To the north of the city are Manchuria and Mongolia. Today, Tientsin is under a separate authority from that of Hopei Province, but previously it had been part of what was formerly Chihli province. The change in Tientsin's status began when the Nationalists took over the city in 1928 and created a Tientsin Special Area Municipality.² The city developed gradually from a small fishing and agricultural village in the Hai Ho valley to an important trading centre in the nineteenth century. Two events influenced this development. The first was the opening of the Grand Canal during the Sui Dynasty (581-618), which connected Tientsin via this inland waterway with the middle and southern parts of China. The Grand Canal was used to maintain food supplies to the northern frontier and the capital area, Loyang.³ The second was when the Yuan Dynasty (1279-1368) established Peking as the capital city and Tientsin became the centre of goods supplied to this city via the canal. As a result Tientsin developed steadily throughout the mid-fifteenth century as a grain distribution centre.⁴ The Imperial Court paid a great deal of attention to maintaining and developing the Grand Canal⁵ and these efforts brought many vessels to Tientsin and prosperity to the city.

² PRO FO371/13171, Tientsin Special Area Municipality by Vice Consul Pelham, 25 July, 1928.

³ Bun, *The Salt Merchants of Tianjin*, p.13 and John King Fairbank, *China: A New History* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), pp.77-8.

⁴ Jacques Gernet, *A History of Chinese Civilization* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1996), p.371, and Mark Elvin, *The Pattern of the Chinese Past: A Social and Economic Interpretation* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973), p.139.

⁵ *U. S. Government Translation of Tientsin, Pao Chiao-ming and He Tz'u-ch'ing Moscow* (Research & New York: Microfilms Publications, 1960), pp.43-6.

Map 2.1: Location of the Treaty Port of Tientsin



Source: modified from 'Map', <http://www.enchantedlearning.com/asia/china/map.GIF>. 29 December 2006.

During the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), a guard unit was installed in Tientsin to protect the grain traffic.⁶ At this point Tientsin became an army garrison, and in 1404 a wall was built around the city.⁷ This was when the city got its name, which means Ford of Heaven.⁸ Another development which made Tientsin an important city to the Chinese government was salt mining. The mining of salt in Tientsin can be traced back to the Spring and Autumn period (770-476 B.C.) in China.⁹ Foreigners visiting Tientsin before 1860 witnessed its

⁶ Edward L. Farmer, *Early Ming Government: the Evolution of Dual Capital* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard East Asian monographs, 1976), p.156.

⁷ Bun, *The Salt Merchants of Tianjin*, pp.13 and 29, and Peking, *North China, South Manchuria and Korea: With Maps, Plans and Illustrations, Fifth Edition* (London: Thos. Cook & Son., 1924), p.96.

⁸ Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity*, p.51.

⁹ Bun, *The Salt Merchants of Tianjin*, p.16 cite from *Guanzi* (1920), *juan 22*, 1a-2b.

importance as a salt distribution centre.¹⁰ Overall, the importance of Tientsin in North China after 1860 was not new. The Chinese had used this port for several functions, beginning as a small farming village and growing to a trade centre and fortress to protect central government in Peking. This historical narrative shows that Tientsin offered a good environment in which foreigners open the port. Thus the foreigners wanted to make Tientsin one of the treaty ports in China. Before this discussion focuses more specifically on the importance of Tientsin, it is useful to understand how the port was opened to foreign trade.

The Opening of Tientsin

After the ratification of the Nanking treaty (1842)¹¹, the ill-feeling between China and the western countries was still not resolved. The westerners made three main demands of China. The first concerned trade, which was still limited to coastal areas. Western traders wanted more ports opened, especially in the Yangtze Valley. Second was the need to establish diplomatic relations. The Western governments wanted equal status between themselves and the Chinese and to establish direct relations with Peking rather than with the provincial governments.¹² Third was the need for free access for the Christian missions in China. To achieve these objectives, Britain, France and America went to Peking in 1854 to negotiate with the Chinese Court, but were rejected.¹³ Meanwhile several incidents led the westerners to accuse China of violating the Nanking Treaty. One

¹⁰ O.D. Rasmussen, *Tientsin: An Illustrated Outline History* (Tientsin: The Tientsin Press, Ltd., 1925), p.33 and N.B. Dennys, *The Treaty Ports of China and Japan: A Complete Guide to the Open Ports of those Counties, together with Peking, Yedo, Hongkong and Macao* (San Francisco: Chinese Materials Center, Inc., 1977), p.473.

¹¹ This treaty was signed to end the Opium War (1840-1842) between Britain and China.

¹² Hevia, *English Lessons*, p.34, and Masataka Banno, *China and the West, 1858-1861* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1964), pp.15-7.

¹³ Douglas Hurd, *The Arrow War: An Anglo-Chinese Confusion 1856-1860* (London: Collins, St. James's Place, 1967), pp.26-7.

was the reluctance of the Chinese provincial authorities to open Canton city to westerners, even though the Nanking Treaty specified Canton as one of five ports to be opened up to trade.¹⁴ Then came the murder of a French missionary in Kwangsi (1856), which caused the French to ally with the British in the war.¹⁵ Finally the Arrow Incident led to a second bloody war. The seizure of the 'Arrow', a Chinese-owned ship registered in Hong Kong as British, sparked protest from the British.¹⁶ In this conflict, known as the Arrow War, China faced the combined Anglo-French armies. The conflict lasted four years, and was finally resolved with the 1858 treaty of Tientsin and in the 1860 Peking Convention. Tientsin was one of the new treaty ports opened to foreign trade and residence as a result.

Overall the opening up of Tientsin made it one of the places of importance to the British (and other powers) in establishing and extending their trade interests in China. The foreign powers' choice of Tientsin as one of their trade centres demonstrates that Tientsin had a trade value as important as that of other Chinese ports such as Shanghai. But the foreigners' coercive manner in opening up Tientsin and other treaty ports caused ill-feeling among the Chinese, who saw them as a challenge to Chinese sovereignty. These two points, the trade interests of the foreigners and the animosity created by the foreign forces regarding Chinese sovereignty, developed side by side and created tension in China, which manifested first in an anti-imperialist movement and then in a more organised nationalist movement in the twentieth century. Before looking more deeply into the clash

¹⁴ G. F. Bartle, *Sir John Bowring and the Arrow War in China* (Manchester: The John Rylands Library, 1961), p. 298 and Hurd, *The Arrow War*, p.19.

¹⁵ John F. Cady, *The Roots of French Imperialism in Eastern Asia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967), p.162.

¹⁶ Hevia, *English Lessons*, p.33.

between the foreigners in Tientsin and the Chinese, it I will show how Tientsin developed and benefited the foreign powers, especially the British.

Early Development of Tientsin

In order to operate their trade interests smoothly, France, America and Britain established concessions in Tientsin under the terms of the Peking Convention. Two of the concessions (the British and the French) were situated at Tzu Chu Lin, (Purple Bamboo Grove), on the west side of the Hai Ho.¹⁷ The British concession was established in 1860. The French concession was established in June 1861¹⁸ occupying 360 mou,¹⁹ or about 60 acres, on a triangular piece of land to the south-east of the Chinese city. Below it was the British concession on a narrow strip of land on the bend of the Hai Ho (See Map 2.2). Although the Americans were given land below the British concession near the bank of the Hai Ho, their concession never acquired the same status as the others because it had no municipal administration as the French and the British concessions did. The other two concessions developed steadily and well. The area of the British concession was 460 mou, and the agreement was for a 99-year Crown lease. Colonel Charles George Gordon took the initiative and led the British community in dividing this land, which contained vegetable gardens, docks, fishermen's hovels and huts,²⁰ into several plots which were auctioned to the British traders, with some land reserved for new roads, wharves, a bund and a godown. With these developments, shops, houses and company buildings began to grow steadily. The early development of the British and French concessions

¹⁷ Rasmussen, *Tientsin*, p.36.


¹⁸ 'Special Articles: Tientsin's Foreign Concessions', *Oriental Affairs*, 10:4, October, 1938, p.195.

¹⁹ A mou is roughly equivalent to 0.2 acres.

²⁰ *The Chinese Times*, 3 November 1888, p.705.

illustrates the serious intent of these two powers to strengthen their position in North China. Owing to this development, the foreign population began to increasingly seize opportunities for trade and found jobs in the service and administration sectors in the concessions. Christian missionaries also came to Tientsin and its hinterlands. However, the majority of the early foreign residents were traders.

Map 2.2: The Foreign Concession in the 1860s



In 1861, the foreign population, excluding the allied troops, numbered only thirteen, of which twelve were British consular staff, traders and missionaries²¹ and the thirteenth was the American missionary. The fact that half of this number was British traders demonstrates how quickly traders took up this opportunity to operate their businesses in North China. This trading group controlled the British Concession in Tientsin right from its inception. Therefore the earliest infrastructures to appear in these concessions were trade facilities as mentioned above. Building on the model of the Municipal Council at Shanghai, the trading

²¹ Rasmussen, *Tientsin*, pp.39.

community collectively created the British Municipal Council (BMC) in 1862 to help with the development and running of the concession. Although it came to look very much like the body which administered the International Settlement at Shanghai, the Tientsin Council, as we shall see, lacked the same degree of autonomy from British diplomatic and consular control. This became the distinctive difference between the municipalities, and which had a profound impact on the BMC in the mid-1920s. Vast power was held by the British consul-general to monitor the BMC's adherence to British policy and avoid tension with the Chinese.²² As we shall see, The British community had to follow much of the British government's policy, and this made the British concession in Tientsin behave more moderately towards the Chinese. Owing to this situation the diehard attitude of British communities in China did not prevail in Tientsin and its hinterlands, so the British government had little trouble in implementing British liberal policy in Tientsin in the mid-1920.

The first council consisted of three members: E. Waller, the chairman, from Phillips & Moore (he later became an agent for Smith, Kennedy & Co.); J. Henderson, the honorary treasurer, an agent for Lindsay & Co; and J. Hanna, an agent for Dent & Co. When the number of councillors increased British traders still dominated. For example, in 1874 when the BMC had five members all were traders. A few customs officers managed to get appointed to this council, for example G. Detring, who was chairman from 1878 to 1881 and 1885 to 1893. W. Jackson of the acting municipal police (although even he was also a British trader), served as a council member in 1875. From 1887-1889 and in 1894, Dr. A. Irwin, a

²² F. C. Jones, *Shanghai and Tientsin: with special reference to foreign interests* (London: Oxford University Press, 1940), hlm.121.

medical practitioner, was a member – though he too owned a firm (Frazer and Irwin, medical practitioners) in Tientsin. For details of BMC members see Appendix 1.

As Tientsin's British population was still small the BMC had to open its doors to other nationalities for help with running the municipality. This practice is evidence in the election of a German, G. Detring, as well as a Russian, A. D. Startseff, as honorary treasurer from 1887 to 1889, and an Indian Sephardic Jew, D. Ezekiel, as honorary treasurer from 1879 to 1880. The land renters chose these members quarterly. The earliest information regarding the administration of the BMC shows that the BMC's administration staff was small. For example on January 1875, it was administered by a Chairman, and an Honorary Secretary. The BMC also had a Superintendent of Roads and Police²³ with a police sergeant and a constable serving below him.²⁴

In the spring of 1862 the British population of Tientsin numbered fewer than fifty,²⁵ but the foreign population there increased year by year. For example, in 1877 there were 175 foreigners in Tientsin, increasing to 262 in 1879, 612 in 1890, 700 in 1896 and 2206 in 1900.²⁶ The growth of the foreign population demonstrates how Tientsin gradually developed as an important trading centre in North China. Concurrently with the development of trade in Tientsin and its hinterland, the number of foreign firms, of which only three were British in 1861,

²³ *Desk Hong List; A General and Business Directory for Shanghai, Northern and River Ports, Japan, January 1875* (Shanghai: The North-China Herald Office, 1875), p.111.

²⁴ *Desk Hong List; A General and Business Directory for Shanghai, Northern and River Ports, Japan, January 1878* (Shanghai: The North-China Herald Office, 1878), p.121.

²⁵ Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity*, p.95.

²⁶ Shang Keqing and Liu Haiyan, *Tianjin Zujie Shehui Yanjiu* (Research on society in the Tianjin foreign concessions) (Tianjin: Tianjin Renmin Chubanshe, 1996), p.160 from CMC Trade Reports.

also grew to 19 in 1863.²⁷ In 1874 there were 33, including an insurance company and a private doctor's surgery,²⁸ and this figure increased again to 61 (including Anglo-Chinese firms) in 1889²⁹ and to 71 in 1895.³⁰ All in all the increase in the foreign community and its property illustrates the growing importance of Tientsin as a centre for investment in North China. The increase of trade interests caused the foreign communities to seek greater progress in their trade and they were keen to protect these interests from any challenges from China. The British and other foreign communities were prepared to fight for their interests if these were threatened.

The increase in the foreign population led the BMC to create a more conducive environment in the concession, with several basic public facilities. Only after the 1880s did other public facilities appear in the British and French concessions. In the British concession the first library was set up (circa 1880).³¹ On 21 June 1887, Victoria Park was opened to mark the fiftieth anniversary of Queen Victoria. In 1890, a Town Hall was built in the British concession and named Gordon Hall in commemoration of Colonel Gordon (see figure 2.1).³² At the end of the 1890s, the Queen Victoria Diamond Jubilee Memorial Hospital was opened.³³ To accommodate guests coming to Tientsin, the Queen and Astor Hotels (1886) were built on the British bund.³⁴

²⁷ Rasmussen, *Tientsin*, p.39 and *The China Directory for 1863*, p.52.

²⁸ *The China Directory for 1874, fourth annual publication, New Series* (Taipei: reprinted by Ch'eng Wen Publishing Company, 1971), p.p1.

²⁹ *The Hongkong Directory and Hong List for the Far East for 1889*, pp.320-3.

³⁰ *The Hongkong Directory and Hong List for the Far East for 1895*, pp.439-42.


³¹ An Old Hand, 'Memories of Tientsin', *Oriental Affairs*, VI, No.3, September 1936, p.175.

³² Rasmussen, *Tientsin*, p.63.

³³ *Ibid.*, p.105.

³⁴ 'List of 160 Significant Historic Buildings in Tianjin-1', <http://www.wayabroad.com/tianjin/text/text45.htm> NO. 29 December 2006.

Figure 2.1: The Gordon Hall



Source: Pennell, W. V., *Tientsin North China: the Port, Its History, Trade, Industry and Community Life* (Tientsin: the Tientsin Press, 1934), p.18.

After 40 years the British concession still lacked several essential facilities necessary to meet the demand of the increasing population. The British municipality had not yet developed sanitation facilities such as underground drains and a water supply.³⁵ The nightsoil carrier still played an important role in collecting wastewater from households. The British community relied on water from the Hai Ho, although its cleanness was dubious.³⁶ Another, cleaner source of water was the southern branch of the Grand Canal. The water carrier collected water from the Canal and supplied it to the British households in Tientsin.³⁷ Around 1897 a private firm, the Tientsin Waterworks Company, embarked on a waterworks project for the British concession using Hai Ho water and completed in

³⁵ Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity*, p.133.

³⁶ *Imperial Maritime Customs, II. Special Series: No.2, Medical Reports, for the Half-year ended 30th September 1897, 54th Issue* (Shanghai: the Statistical Department of the Inspectorate General of Customs, 1898), p.27.

³⁷ Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity*, p.209.

1899 that supplied the foreign community with clean water³⁸ after which the British community installed indoor water pipes. But another water problem arose; the BMC still did not have a proper sewerage system and continued to hire a Chinese water-carrier to carry away waste.³⁹ These developments in the British and French concessions show how the British concession was not only a place of trade but also one for settling down, living and working. The British community became embedded in the daily life of the concession and felt it to be their own town. The concession, which had been built in accordance with imperial culture, especially regarding its customs and architecture, encouraged colonial aspirations amongst some residents.⁴⁰ In short, with the foreign look of the city the foreign concession helped foster a diehard group in the British community in Tientsin and its hinterlands. The imperial mentality of this diehard group was very concerned to protect the British image and prestige in China. This group played a major role in upholding British interests and privileges in Tientsin and its hinterland, as discussed in following chapters.

The 'scramble for concessions' in the mid-1890s changed the landscape in Tientsin. On 30 October 1895, Germany was given 1,034 mou of land, situated near the riverbank and south east of the British concession. The Japanese concession was 1,667 mou and northwest of the French concession. The Japanese acquired their concession after the Shimonoseki Treaty on 17 April 1895, and the

³⁸ *Imperial Maritime Customs, II.-Special Series: No.2, Medical Reports, for the Half-year ended 30th September 1899, 58th Issue* (Shanghai: the Statistical Department of the Inspectorate General of Customs, 1898), p.24.

³⁹ Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity*, p.212.

⁴⁰ Robert Bickers, *Britain in China* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), p.76.

Sino-Japanese Protocols in October 1896 were signed.⁴¹ However, the Japanese did not acquire land in Tientsin immediately the protocols were signed. It took them almost two years to claim it.⁴² In 1897 the British received another 1,630 mou of land from the Chinese Taotai. The new area was named the British Municipal Extension and was administered by a separate municipality from the original concession.⁴³ This separation was created because the BMC did not want to use its bund revenue to maintain the British Municipal Extension.⁴⁴ This municipality consisted of nine members with their own authority under the Land Regulations, which came into effect in March 1899.⁴⁵ The new municipality was also dominated by British traders (see Appendix 1). France also demanded new extension land, but the outbreak of the Boxer Uprising delayed their negotiations with the Chinese. After the uprising, the two governments resumed their talks and in December 1900 the French concession received another 1,380 mou of land⁴⁶ stretching from Taku Road to the Weitze Creek.

Disturbance

Although the prosperity of the foreign concessions grew and Westerners enjoyed the privileges afforded them by the unequal treaties, that presence did not remain uncontested by Chinese, and Tientsin was the site of two iconic episodes of

⁴¹ Mark R. Peattie, 'Japanese Treaty Port Settlements in China, 1895-1937' in Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie (eds.), *The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895-1937* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), p.172. This treaty was signed between the Japanese and the Chinese due to the defeat of the Chinese in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895).

⁴² Peattie, 'Japanese Treaty Port Settlements in China, 1895-1937', p.178.

⁴³ Rasmussen, *Tientsin*, p.95.

⁴⁴ PRO FO674/198 Letter from H.E. Fulford to C. R. Morling, Tientsin, 2 February 1919.

⁴⁵ F.C. Jones, *Shanghai and Tientsin: With Special Reference to Foreign Interests* (London: Oxford University Press, 1940), p.122, and *Twentieth Century Impressions of Hongkong, Shanghai, and other Treaty Ports of China*, p.729.

⁴⁶ 'Special Articles: Tientsin's Foreign Concessions', p.194.

Sino-foreign conflict: the Tientsin Massacre on 21 June 1870 and the Boxer Uprising, as described below.

The Tientsin Massacre of 1870

The Tientsin Massacre can be linked to tension among the local Chinese concerning the Christian missions. After 1860 the missionaries had the right to carry out their activities, travel, and rent land inland. However, the mission protected Chinese converts from Chinese law.⁴⁷ These circumstances inflamed the Chinese with anger at the mission, which anger erupted in several incidents involving injury, murder and damage to properties.⁴⁸ The massacre was also linked to the conversion of the Imperial Palace to the French Consulate in 1870 and of Buddhist temple land to Notre Dame des Victoires.⁴⁹ The French mission, the Sisterhood of Mercy, adopted deserted and orphaned Chinese children to be taken care of by the church, offering a reward to whoever brought these children to them. Then came a rumour that accused the mission of kidnapping the children for their eyes and hearts. The rumour quickly spread around Chinese society in Tientsin, creating fear and anxiety among the Chinese.⁵⁰

With no action being taken to control this situation, things grew ugly and the cathedral was attacked. All French properties came under attack, including the

⁴⁷ Ibid., p.85.

⁴⁸ At Nanchang in 1862 the Catholic orphanage and several Chinese Christian shops and houses were destroyed by a Chinese crowd. Then, in August 1868, Chinese raided and burned the missionary station in Yangchow. In Tientsin the activities of the missionaries also became a target for the Chinese. The agitation against the missionary was furthered by the rumour that missionaries were involved in the kidnapping of children. Owing to the spread of this rumour the Chinese became frightened and angry. See Paul A. Cohen, *China and Christianity: The Missionary and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860-1870* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1963), p.88 and George Thin, *The Tientsin Massacre: The Cause of the Late Disturbances in China and How To Secure Permanent Peace* (Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1870), pp.45-6.

⁴⁹ See O. D. Rasmussen, *Tientsin*, p.46.

⁵⁰ Rasmussen, *Tientsin*, pp.46-9 and *The North China Herald*, 7 July 1870, p.4.

French Consulate. Twenty-one foreigners were killed, mostly French, including the French consul M. Fontainer.⁵¹ Three Russians were also killed. The British concession was spared the attack; no British person was reported molested or killed in this massacre.⁵² The massacre was put down when foreign gunboats arrived. The foreigners demanded redress and punishment for the rioters. In the end, Li Hung-chang and the French agreed on payment of compensation and punishment for the Tientsin prefect and magistrate.⁵³

Did this massacre have an impact on the BMC? The British concession had never been harmed by the Chinese. This did not have a profound impact on the British, who merely sympathised with the French. Furthermore the British still had faith in the Chinese; for example, the election of the first Chinese member (1878) to the BMC suggests that the British did not harbour ill-feelings towards the Chinese after the massacre. On other hand this massacre indicated a challenge that could potentially affect the British and other foreign interests in Tientsin and its hinterland, such missionary incidents' happened elsewhere in China also. Tientsin was spread further outbreak, but it played a central role in the 1900 Boxer rising and war.

Tientsin under siege, 1900

The Boxer Uprising began in Shantung and spread to northern China. The causes of this crisis were varied; the Sino-Japanese war (1894-1895), drought and

⁵¹ J. K. Fairbank, 'Patterns Behind The Tientsin Massacre', *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, Vol. 20, No. 3/4. (Dec., 1957), p.480.

⁵² FO17/607 Telegram from Sir Thomas Francis Ward, Peking, 25 July 1870.

⁵³ Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, *The Rise of Modern China, Sixth Edition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p.303 and O. D. Rasmussen, *Tientsin*, pp.50-2.

floods in the Shantung, Henan and Kiangsu provinces, and missionary activities⁵⁴, all combined to create a tense situation. As violence erupted across north China in the winter of 1899 and spring of 1900, Tientsin became a site of conflict. A grave situation began in the mid-June 1900.⁵⁵ Boxers used the Chinese city as a centre from which to attack foreign concessions, where about 2,000 foreign troops were brought in to defend foreign lives and properties.

The Boxers used Chinese cannon to bombard the foreign concessions and lay siege to them. The shelling began on 17 June 1900. The shells caused great damage and fire in the French concessions. The British concession was not directly hit by shells and suffered little damage. After several days' fighting the death toll was high, with many bodies in the street and floating in the river, where between 50 and 100 dead bodies were counted.⁵⁶ The situation on 21 June 1900 became graver when the Ching Court officially declared war on the foreign Powers. Chinese reinforcements came daily to support the Boxers,⁵⁷ while foreign ammunition stocks steadily decreased. Faced with this situation, the foreign officers worried about the possibility of the Chinese capturing the settlement, and sent for help.⁵⁸ This task was carried out by James Watts, who went to Taku with three Cossacks.⁵⁹ The arrival of Watts led the Allied Powers to send troops to the defence of the foreigners in Tientsin. The arrival of relief troops on 11 July 1900

⁵⁴ For account see Lanxin Xiang, *The Origins of the Boxer War* (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), p. 37 and Joseph W. Esherick, *The Origins of the Boxer Uprising* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), pp.114, 183 and 198–200.

⁵⁵ Esherick, *The Origins of the Boxer Uprising*, p.298 and Paul A. Cohen, *History in Three Keys: The Boxers as Event, Experience, and Myth* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), p.271.

⁵⁶ *The North China Herald*, 18 July 1900, p.141.

⁵⁷ G. Gipps, *The Fighting in North China, up to the fall of Tientsin City* (London: Sampson Low & Co., 1901), p.39.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p.53, and O'Connor, *The Boxer Rebellion*, p.108.

⁵⁹ *Correspondence respecting the Disturbances in China* (San Francisco: Chinese Materials Center Inc., 1975), p.150.

brought new hope to the foreigners in Tientsin. On 13 July 1900, after a tough battle the Chinese city was captured. The scene in the Chinese City after it was captured was of many dead bodies, and houses ruined by fire.⁶⁰

As a result of the defeat of the Boxers, in September 1901 the Chinese Court and the Allied Powers signed the Boxer Protocol. In Tientsin, the 27 days of Boxer shelling had caused considerable damage to the foreign concessions. Among the buildings which were partly damaged either outside or inside were the Taku Tug and Lighter Company offices, the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, the Chartered Bank, Astor House Hotel, the British Consulate and several houses. Gordon Hall remained intact with minor damage to the tower walls.⁶¹ Unfortunately, Butterfield and Swire's and Mackenzie & Co.'s godowns were destroyed by shelling and fire.⁶² After the defeat of the Boxers the Chinese city and its surroundings (apart from the foreign concessions) were put under the foreign Powers' control.⁶³ A new administration was set up and named the Tientsin Provisional Government (TPG), which had several functions, as shown below:

- (1) To reinstate order and security to the city
- (2) To improve hygiene and prevent the spread of infectious diseases
- (3) To make sure that the Allied forces continued to receive supplies
- (4) To protect and record properties belonging to the Chinese government and private individuals

⁶⁰ Bun, *The Salt Merchants of Tianjin*, pp.108 and 138, and *China's Millions*, London, October 1900, p.156.

⁶¹ Other buildings received slight damage, such as the Club Concordia, Carlowitz's, the Tientsin Gas Works, Tientsin Water Works and the Jardine Matheson building.

⁶² Rasmussen, *Tientsin*, pp.218-9.

⁶³ Thomas P. Bernstein, 'After and Fall: Tianjin under Foreign Occupation, 1900-1902', in Robert Bickers and Tiedemann, R. G. (eds), *The Boxers, China, and the world* (Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), p.4.

(5) To prevent a food shortage amongst local Chinese.⁶⁴

One important task of the TPG was to restore Tientsin to how it was before the Boxer Uprising, the aftermath of which had destroyed much of its infrastructure, with looted banks and shops, danger of disease and pitiful living conditions. The TPG encouraged business, cleaned the city, constructed new roads, built a drainage system and eliminated begging.⁶⁵ With this encouragement Tientsin gradually returned to its pre-1900 state. The TPG's administration ended on 15 August 1902, when it was handed back to the Chinese⁶⁶

The Boxer Uprising raised British anger towards the Chinese. The newly created British Municipal Extension Council (BMEC) which had portrayed a liberal attitude towards the Chinese by appointing a Chinese councillor did not renew this position after 1900. The Boxer Uprising was seen as showing the inability of the western Powers to control the Chinese. Samuel Lavington Hart, a London Missionary Society (LMS) worker who had arrived in Tientsin in 1900, felt that Chinese-western relations could be mended by offering young Chinese people a western education. Therefore the Tientsin Anglo-Chinese Colleges (TACC) was established in 1902,⁶⁷ showing that not all the British in Tientsin felt that the Chinese should be punished.

Meantime, a new strand of opposition to foreign encroachment and Ch'ing weakness, developed. The emergence of educated Chinese leaders such as Sun

⁶⁴ Rasmussen, *Tientsin*, p.221.

⁶⁵ Bernstein, 'After and Fall', pp.6, 7, 9, 11 and 15, and Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity*, p.173.

⁶⁶ Rasmussen, *Tientsin*, pp.225, 226, 227 and 229.

⁶⁷ A. P. Cullen, *Lavington Hart of Tientsin* (London: The Livingstone Press, 1947), pp.15, 20-21 and 25-6.

Yat-sen, Huang Xing, Zhang Binglin and Hu Hanmin continued the Chinese struggle to recover Chinese sovereignty by seeking to awaken the Chinese to the idea of rebuilding the nation under nationalism. This movement posed a strong challenge to the British and other foreigners at the beginning of the twentieth century. As mentioned in the introduction, the Chinese organised strikes and boycotts as new weapons against foreign imperialism and later against the Chinese warlords. Students and workers also joined the nationalist movement on several occasions, such as against the Russians in southern Manchuria (1903), at the renewal of America's Exclusion Act (1905), Japan's Twenty-one Demands (1915) and the May the Fourth Movement (1919). All these movements were part of a continuous wave against imperialism and became a considerable threat in the mid-1920s. Tientsin did not escape Chinese nationalism. Before discussing the impact of Chinese nationalists, it is useful to see how the development of foreign imperialism created competition among the foreign powers to open concessions and then to expand their trade interests in Tientsin and its hinterlands.

Developments in the Twentieth Century

After the Boxer Uprising the foreign powers demanded to be allowed to extend and open new concessions in Tientsin. For example, Russia was allowed to occupy 5,971 mou, in November 1900, on the right east side of the Hai Ho facing the French and British concessions. In February 1901 the Italian government was given about 722 mou of land above the Russian concession. One year later, on 1 February 1902, Belgium obtained an area covering 1,427 mou just below the Russian concession as its concession. Japan extended its concession to the South Wall Street of the Chinese city and added another strip below the German

concession. The last power which took the opportunity to establish a settlement was Austria-Hungary, which rented land above the Italian concession and opposite the Chinese city. The agreement was signed in 1902.⁶⁸ Britain received another portion of land in 1900 which became known as the British Extra-mural Area, covered 3,928 mou and was situated to the south west of the British Extension Area. The American concession had been returned to China in 1880, with the option of taking it back if they wanted to. The Americans took it back after the Boxer Uprising in order to induce it to become an International Settlement. However, this scheme failed, and finally in October 1902 America transferred its administration to the British concession, and it was renamed the Southern Concession.⁶⁹

This development illustrated competition amongst the foreign powers for trade opportunities in Tientsin and its hinterlands. The spread of foreign imperialism in Tientsin added to the grievances of the Chinese about the weakness of their country. The growing foreign trade interests and the rise of Chinese nationalism were concurrent. This situation of conflict had a profound impact on the British and other foreigners in middle 1920s. The next section elaborates on how the foreign concessions achieved prosperity with the progress of trade in Tientsin and its hinterlands.

⁶⁸ Lee Chinyun, 'Trieste and Austro-Chinese Trade from 1869 to 1918' (unpublished Ph.D., thesis, Ljubljana University, 2002), p.3.

⁶⁹ *Special Articles: Tientsin's Foreign Concessions*, pp.194-196 and Rasmussen, *Tientsin*, pp.237 and 244.

The British Area

Altogether the British had the biggest concession, covering 6149 mou. However, it still had two separate administrations (BMC and BMEC), while the British Extra-mural Area was left without administration. The BMC, which had developed since 1862, had a more advanced administration system than the BMEC. In 1903 the BMC had a secretary, an engineer, a police inspector, an interpreter and an accountant. The BMEC had to get the BMC's staff to support the administration of the BMEC.⁷⁰ The original plan to amalgamate these concessions came about in 1897 after Britain acquired the extension area which the Chinese Taotai allowed under the British Municipal Council. However the new Consul, B.C.G. Scott, made no effort to accomplish this.⁷¹ In 1917 the matter was addressed again in the form of a petition from British residents, following which the British Minister instructed the Consul-General to hold a conference and draft regulations on the amalgamation of the concessions. A joint committee of the Concession and Extension Councils was set up to look into the matter. The meeting produced a draft of new Land Regulations to be applied to all the British concessions. On 1 January 1919, with the promulgation of the regulations,⁷² the British concession finally achieved a single municipal council which functioned until 1943. The effort to merge the British concessions in Tientsin took so long because most of the traders in the BMC opposed it. They did not want the BMC's revenue used to support the administration of the new BMEC. This indicates that the British community had the power to delay the amalgamation, although the British consul general could eventually overrule them. In other words this scenario

⁷⁰ *The Dest Hong List; A General and Business Directory for Shanghai and the Northern and River Ports, &c, 1903* (Shanghai: the Office of the North-China Herald, 1903), p.173.

⁷¹ PRO F.O. 674/198 Letter from Consul General, H. E. Fulford to Chair. of BMC, Tientsin, C.R. Morling, Tientsin, February 2, 1916.

⁷² Jones, *Shanghai and Tientsin*, p.122.

saw the British community voicing their opposition to any decision by the British government which would affect the British community's interests in Tientsin and its hinterlands. It was not a passive community and would fight for its interests, as further discussed in Chapter 3.

After the amalgamation the BMC consisted of at least five but no more than nine members. The chairman and five of its members had to be British subjects, and one had to be a citizen of the United States but could be replaced by another nationality if no such candidate was available.⁷³ Another sign of significant progress in the membership of the council was the appointment of one Chinese representative (1919). In 1927 the number of Chinese representatives on the council increased to three.⁷⁴ The appointment of the Chinese representatives was a sign of the awareness of the BMC administration that it should treat its Chinese ratepayers fairly. But this did not mean that the British community was liberal. It should be understood that all the Chinese were businessmen. For example, K. H. Chun, a member of the BMC from 1919 to 1929, was assistant director in China Merchants' Steam Navigation Co. (later in the 1930s he became director of the Land Investment Company).⁷⁵ Therefore these Chinese businesses could help the British traders to expand their interests in North China.

⁷³ *Land Regulations for the British Municipal Area of Tientsin* (Tientsin: 1919), p.6.

⁷⁴ PRO FO228/3179 Report of the China Association, Tientsin Branch, and the Tientsin British Chamber of Commerce, 7 February, 1927.

⁷⁵ See *The Directory and Chronicle China, Japan, Corea, Indo-China, Straits Settlements, Malay States, Siam, Netherlands India, Borneo, the Philippine, etc., with which are incorporated "The China Directory" and "The Hongkong Directory and Honglist for the Far East" for the year 1926, Sixty-fourth year of publication* (Hong Kong: The Hongkong Daily Press, Ltd., MDCCCXXVI), p.597 and *China Hong List 1934* (Shanghai: the North-China Daily News & Herald, Ltd., 1935), p.713.

There were also British representatives from the traders' community, such as W. Forbes (1874-1875), who was engaged at William Forbes and Company⁷⁶; E. C. Peters (1920-1936), firstly as an agent for Jardine, Matheson & Co., Ltd. and later representing his own company, E. C. Peters; and James Turner (1924-1927, 1934-35) from the Eastern Engineering Works, Ltd.⁷⁷ Such traders, as mentioned above, dominated the council from the concession's establishment until the twentieth century, the big British firms which among them being KMA, Jardine, Matheson & Co., Peter & Co. and Tipper & Co. (see Appendix 2). However, not all the British firms in Tientsin had decision-making power. Some of the firms listed in Appendix 3 did not have a place participated in the BMC and had to voice their opinions through the British Chamber of Commerce and the China Association, as discussed in the trade and business section. These bodies had links with their counterparts not only in China but in Britain. Therefore any important problems affecting the British community in China were channeled to their counterparts in London to be addressed by the British government. The roles of the BMC, the British Chamber of Commerce and the China Association in conveying their interests are discussed in following chapters.

The power of the BMC in the twentieth century did not change. Tientsin's British Consul General had the power to check the BMC's activities and policy in the concessions.⁷⁸ For example any byelaws issued by the council had to be submitted to him for approval. The Council could bring any matter to the British Minister for appeal in Peking for a final decision if the Consul-General still did not

⁷⁶ *The Desk Hong List; A General And Business Directory for Shanghai and the Northern & River Ports, Japan & c., January 1875* (The North-China Herald: Shanghai, 1875), p.110.

⁷⁷ *China Hong List 1934*, p.689.

⁷⁸ *Land Regulation for the British Municipal Area of Tientsin*, p.2.

approve it.⁷⁹ The Council had full powers to develop, maintain and control everyday life in the concession, such as by increasing the number of men in the municipal police; enrolling into and maintaining the fire brigade and volunteer corps; issuing licenses to hawkers, taverns and shops.⁸⁰ This was how it differed from the SMC, over whose council the British Consul-General had no power. The SMC only had responsibility to their ratepayers.⁸¹

This difference made a profound impact on the British concession in Tientsin because it led to the understanding that the British community in Tientsin had limited power to oppose the modification. But as mentioned earlier, the British community wanted to protect their interests. As mentioned, the BMC members were traders, who had big interests in Tientsin and its hinterland. For this reason the British community fought to safeguard its interests before any decision of their government could be implemented. If they could not stop the decision, the British traders would aim to delay or modify any British policy in China towards the British community in Tientsin and its hinterlands. This happened for example in the British government's effort to amalgamate the British concessions in Tientsin. The same tactics were also used when the British community could not fight the British liberal policy in the mid-1920s by delaying the process in order to modify British liberal policy to reflect British community's interests more, as discussed in Chapters 3.

After the amalgamation the BMC had important responsibilities in the larger British concession. It created new administrative departments. For example,

⁷⁹ Ibid., p.8.

⁸⁰ See *Land Regulation for the British Municipal Area of Tientsin*, pp.9-15.

⁸¹ Robert Bickers, *Britain in China*, p.127.

in 1926 it had two important departments: the secretariat and the accounts department. The secretariat had a secretary and two assistant secretaries, while the accounts department consisted of an accountant, an assistant accountant, a stores accountant and an assistant stores accountant. The responsibility of the BMC to its taxpayers meant that it had to provide residents with facilities including roads, buildings, parks and gardens and flood and bund control, all of which came under the Public Works Department which was staffed by an engineer, two deputy engineers, assistant engineers and two engineering assistants.⁸² But the BMC's responsibilities increased year by year and its staff expanded accordingly. (see Appendix 4)

In 1920, with the support of the municipality, the Electric Department, a private company, was established, an example of the BMC's progress. The Electric Department not only gave a service in the BMA, it also provided electric power to the No.1 Special Area the former German concession.⁸³ The Water Department was established after it took over the expired franchise of the private water company in 1922.⁸⁴ This department also developed a new source of water from Artesian Wells.⁸⁵

The Municipal Police was among the most important bodies in Tientsin. This department was usually under the control of former military officers and was headed by a superintendent and two inspectors. The force numbered 229 in 1920,

⁸² *The Directory and Chronicle China, Japan, Corea, Indo-China, Straits Settlements . . .*, p.603.

⁸³ PRO FO228/3179 Report of the China Association, Tientsin Branch, and the Tientsin British Chamber of Commerce, 7 February, 1927, p.4.

⁸⁴ PRO FO228/3179 Report of the China Association, 7 February, 1927.

⁸⁵ Rasmussen, *The Growth of Tientsin* (Tientsin: Tientsin Press Ltd., 1924), pp.15 and 17.

which increased to 338 in 1924 and about 700 in 1940.⁸⁶ Along with this, the Council also set up a small Concession Volunteer Corps. This paramilitary squad had experienced the Boxer Uprising and was supported by British soldiers in Tientsin as permitted under the Boxer Protocol. The need for a proper fire-fighting force led to the formation of the Tientsin British Volunteer Fire Brigade on 6 December 1902. The BMC also had two hospitals; the main Victoria Hospital and the Isolation Hospital, a seclusion ward for the control of contagious disease.⁸⁷ Appendix 3 shows the number of BMAs employees at the BMC. Owing to the lack of pre-1926 data, this table only covers from 1926 onwards.

In the field of education, the Tientsin Grammar School was opened in Recreation Road in 1905 by The Tientsin Grammar School Association. The school enrolled increasing numbers of students, growing from 63 in 1915 to 250 in 1925. In 1918 it was put under BMC authority, which added new buildings in the Extra-mural Area.⁸⁸ It served children of all nationalities from six to sixteen years old and prepared its students to take the Cambridge syndicate examinations abroad. The foreign communities also set up several clubs in Tientsin. The Tientsin Race Club was the wealthiest club in Tientsin. The Tientsin Club was another club opened to all nationalities but not to the Chinese. Under the influence of the Tientsin British Chamber of Commerce, the Union Jack Club was formed in 1924. This club was an important tool for the British community to lobby for British

⁸⁶ Rasmussen, *The Growth of Tientsin*, pp.53-4 and Jones, *Shanghai and Tientsin*, p.124.

⁸⁷ Rasmussen, *Tientsin*, p.280.

⁸⁸ SOAS, the John Emmett Woodall Papers, 1919-1990, *The Story of the Tientsin School*.

troops to stay put in North China. The existence of this club depended on public support.⁸⁹

The LMS was an important Christian missionary body in Tientsin. Established in Tientsin in 1861, its activities embraced health and education work as well as evangelisation. In Tientsin the LMS had two churches, one on Taku Road and one west of Drum Tower in the Chinese city.⁹⁰ As mentioned, early in 1902 the LMS founded the TACC. This college became their base for training the Chinese as preachers and Chinese officers.⁹¹ The LMS also operated in the hinterlands of Tientsin. At southern Tientsin, it had two stations, one at Tsangchow and one at Siaochang, which together covered 5,050 sq. miles.⁹² Another British mission active in Tientsin and its surroundings was the United Methodist Mission, which opened in Tientsin in 1861. In order to expand its missionary work it built a Theological College in 1867 on Taku Road.⁹³

The physical appearance of the BMA developed greatly with the erection of many houses and commercial buildings, and great progress was made in the public infrastructure. Old buildings still standing in Tientsin such as Gordon Hall were used for the police station, law office, BMC office and as an assembly place for meetings and concerts.⁹⁴ The Tientsin Club moved to a new building in 1905. In

⁸⁹ HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 47 Letter from R. C. Rice to C. I. Cookes, Tientsin, 28 February, 1931.

⁹⁰ SOAS, the CWM North China Reports Box 11 1932-1936, LMS Annual Report for 1934 from W. F. Dawson, Tientsin, January 22, 1935.

⁹¹ A.P. Cullen, *Making China's men* (London: Livingstone Press, 1936), p.16.

⁹² *The Christian Occupation of China: A General Survey of the Numerical Strength and Geographical Distribution of the Christian Forces in China made by the Special Committee Survey and Occupation, China Continuation Committee, 1918-1921* (Shanghai: China Continuation Committee, 1922), p.59.

⁹³ Frederick Brown, *Religion in Tientsin* (Shanghai: Methodist Publishing House, 1908), p.46.

⁹⁴ Brian Power, *The Ford of Heaven* (New York: Michael Kesend Publishing, Ltd., 1984), p.21.

addition to this, new buildings such as KMA (c1919-1921), the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank (HSB) building (1924) and the Empire Theatre (1922) emerged as handsome and massive structures.⁹⁵ The macadam streets and roads in the concession were replaced by asphalted concrete.⁹⁶

Figure 2.2: The Tientsin Club Building



Source: Pennell, W. V., *Tientsin North China*, p.21.

Figure 2.3 : The KMA building at Meadows Road



Source: Pennell, W. V., *Tientsin North China*, p.21.

⁹⁵ 'List of 160 Significant Historic Buildings in Tianjin-1', [http://www. The Gordon Hall wayabroad.com/tianjin/text/text45.htm](http://www.TheGordonHallwayabroad.com/tianjin/text/text45.htm)NO, 26 December 2006.

⁹⁶ Allister Macmillan, *Seaports of the Far East: Historical and Descriptive Commercial and Industrial Facts, Figures, & Resources, Second Edition* (London: W.H. & L. Collingridge, 148 & 149, 1925), p.122, and Rasmussen, *The Growth of Tientsin*, p.14.

Within this comfortable and prosperous atmosphere the British population began to increase (see Appendix 5). The size of the foreign population of Tientsin and its hinterlands cannot be traced year by year. Statistics are available from a variety of sources, but the information differs according to its geographic territory. For example the foreign population in 1913 for Tientsin was 3,945 strong. Six hundred and thirty-four of these were British. The Japanese community was the largest, at 2,175. The rest of the foreign population numbered 405 Germans, 149 French, 145 American and 140 Russians.⁹⁷ According to Julean Arnold, an American Commercial Attaché at the US Department of Commerce, in 1917 the British living in the Tientsin district numbered 1,371 out of a total foreign population of 8,951.⁹⁸ In 1925 Tientsin contained around 11,000 foreigners. The largest foreign communities were the Japanese, with 5,200 people, and the British, with 1,300.⁹⁹ Another source put the number of British living in the concession in 1927 at about 650. Overall figures for British nationals registered with the British Consul General in 1927 and living in and surrounding Tientsin District reached 2,137,¹⁰⁰ not significantly different from the figures in Appendix 5. Apart from the figures in Appendix 5, other sources show that the number of foreigners, including British, living in the British concession decreased from 1,970 in 1906 to 857 in 1913. In 1925 this figure increased to 2,045. In 1934 and 1938 the foreign population totaled 4,045 and 4,728 respectively.¹⁰¹

⁹⁷ H. G. W. Woodhead and H. T. Montague (eds.), *The China Year Book 1914*, (London: Routledge & Sons, Limited), p.658.

⁹⁸ Julean Arnold, *Commercial Handbook of China, Volume 1* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1919), pp.321-2.

⁹⁹ Rasmussen, *Tientsin*, p.263.

¹⁰⁰ PRO FO228/3836 Enclosure No.1 in Consul-General Sir J.W. Jamieson's dispatch No.5 of January 20, 1928.

¹⁰¹ Shang and Liu, *Tianjin zuijie shehui yanjiu*, p.166.

There was also a growing British Indian population. They worked in the BMC Police Department and were sometimes employed as watchmen by large foreign companies. Some of the Indians were involved in the silk business; for example Abdulla & Co.'s,¹⁰² Indian Silk Shop¹⁰³, Khathuria, R. S.¹⁰⁴ and M. Tarachand.¹⁰⁵ Other British protected subjects such as the Persians were also involved in business, such as Talati Bros. Co., which owned property in Tientsin and Peking.¹⁰⁶ Apart from these communities, the BMC was also home to other nationalities. The largest community was the Chinese, of course who made up almost 90 percent of the whole of the BMC.¹⁰⁷ Other communities were the various Europeans, the Russians, the Jews (mostly refugees from Russia), Americans, Japanese and several small communities from Asia and Latin America.

Overall the British concession had been developing steadily since the nineteenth century. Several disturbances by the Chinese opposition seemed not to deter this. The concession continued to develop and people kept settling in Tientsin to seek jobs and business opportunities. This increased the diehard attitude among the British, who began to regard the BMC in Tientsin as a symbol of British colonial power which should be protected.

¹⁰² *The North-China Desk Hong List 1922: A General and Business Directory for Shanghai and the Northern and River Ports, Etc.* (Shanghai: The North-China Herald, 1922), p.520.

¹⁰³ HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.2 Letter from Lyon-Mackenzie to the Manager, International Acceptance Bank, Inc. Tientsin, January 6th, 1930.

¹⁰⁴ *China Hong List 1934*, p.698.

¹⁰⁵ PRO FO678/1938 Letter from Kent-Mounsey to the Register, H.B.M. Court, 28 April 1931.

¹⁰⁶ HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 47 Letter from C. R. Rice to J. E. B. de Courcy, Tientsin, 18 December, 1929.

¹⁰⁷ For example in the mid-1920s in the British, Belgian, Japanese, Italian and French concessions there were 98,544 Chinese. There were therefore 8,969 foreign nationals. *China in Chaos: A Brief Outline of the Foreign Concessions, with Examples of China's Disruption and Failure to Observe Her Obligations due to Civil War, Bolshevist Propaganda and Mob Law* (Shanghai: North-China Daily News & Herald, Ltd., 1927), pp.6-7.

Other Concessions

Concurrently with the progress in the BMC, other concessions also developed rapidly. For example the French concession became a major area in which new traders established their offices, particularly Americans, who found no accommodation in the BMC. The French municipal authorities constructed a plan to supply water to residents and build a sewerage system to prevent flooding in the area.¹⁰⁸ The French municipality had 250 police in 1920. In 1923 this number increased to 283.¹⁰⁹

The Italian concession had a problem with its low lying ground. A young lieutenant Marines, Captain Fileti, took on the task of reclaiming the swamp with mud and by 1917 its level had risen by five feet, after which a road was built. Fileti continued his task, setting up public utilities, a police department, a hospital, a fire department, gardens, a club and a domestic market.¹¹⁰ In 1920 the peace and order in this concession were under the control of an Italian inspector and 60 Chinese policemen.¹¹¹ The Russian concession had similar problems with swampy land. Efforts were made to reclaim the land using river mud, after which the land was surveyed and roads, parks, a sewerage system and residential houses were built.¹¹²

¹⁰⁸ Rasmussen, *The Growth of Tientsin*, pp.20-1.


¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p.54.

¹¹⁰ Tamagna, *Italy's Interests and Policies in the Far East* (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1941), p.74 and O.D. Rasmussen, *The Growth of Tientsin*, pp.25 and 26.

¹¹¹ Rasmussen, *The Growth of Tientsin*, pp.54.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, pp.28, 32 and 33.

Map 2.3: The Foreign Concessions in Tientsin



Source: 'The Foreign Concessions and Special Administrative Areas,'

<http://www.geocities.com/eureka/plaza/7750/tientsin01.html> 29 December 2006

The Japanese concession began its extensive development after the Boxer Uprising under the Japanese Consul-General, who was responsible for monitoring its development and welfare,¹¹³ although it was administered by the Japanese Residents' Association.¹¹⁴ The Tokyo Building Company designed and built a beautiful bund with broad parallel streets and several commercial and office buildings.¹¹⁵ The development of the Belgian concession began later because of lack of interest from the Belgian government until 1913. The first task the concession's authorities undertook was to rebuild the bund to accommodate a landing place for steamers and then to extend the railway line in order to provide

¹¹³ Barbara J. Brooks, *Japan's Imperial Diplomacy: Consuls, Treaty Ports, and War in China 1895-1938* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000), p.102.

¹¹⁴ Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity*, p.263.

¹¹⁵ As with the Russian concession, the Japanese concession had to obtain its water and electricity supply from the Tientsin Native City Water Works and the French Electric Light Works. Mark R. Peattie, 'Japanese Treaty Port Settlements in China, 1895-1937', pp.178 and 180 and Rasmussen, *The Growth of Tientsin*, pp.36-7.

convenient facilities for transshipment of commodities onto trains.¹¹⁶ However after 21 years of existence the concession was:

. . . almost completely derelict and except that the river bank had been bunded and lined with trees it was entirely undeveloped and contained only one foreign-style house – the residence and offices of the small administrative staff – and a few small native houses, lumber and boat repairing yards.¹¹⁷

Against this situation the Belgian owned one of Tientsin's big companies. The Belgian Campagnie de Tramways et Eclairage de Tientsin, or Belgian Tramways, was known for its electricity service to all residents in Tientsin excepting the British, French, and Japanese. Belgian Tramways was also famous for providing trams in Belgian concession.¹¹⁸

The German concession was mainly developed as a residential area, as many Germans had established their commercial and banking interests in the BMC.¹¹⁹ The most unfavorable concession in Tientsin was the Austrian, due to the influence of more progressive concessions and its location to the north of the other concessions, which brought no significant progress in trade. This concession was under the administration of the Austrian Municipal Council, which consisted of eight to ten members.¹²⁰

Appendix 6 shows the sizes of the populations of several foreign concessions in selected years. In 1917, the Chinese government declared war on Germany and Austria-Hungary, and took over their concessions, which were

¹¹⁶ Rasmussen, *The Growth of Tientsin*, pp.40 and 41.

¹¹⁷ PRO FO228/4015 Letter from Sir James Jamieson to Sir Miles Lampson, Tientsin, 22nd June, 1929, p.2.

¹¹⁸ Hershatter, *The Workers of Tianjin, 1900-1949*, p.28.

¹¹⁹ Rasmussen, *The Growth of Tientsin*, p.42.

¹²⁰ Lee Chinyun, 'Trieste and Austro-Chinese Trade from 1869 to 1918', pp.5-6.

administered by Chinese as the First Special Area.¹²¹ In Russia the political system changed in 1917 when the communists toppled the Russian monarch, and after this, the new government offered a 'good will' proposal to the Chinese government. As result of the Karakan Manifesto of 1919, Russian returned all its concessions to the Chinese. However the Diplomatic Body in Peking wanted the status quo of the concession to be recognised by the Chinese Government.¹²² This hope was dashed when, in 1920, the Chinese government took drastic action to seize back the concession following a withdrawal of recognition of the new government in Moscow. The next concession to go was the Belgium Concession. The take over of this concession took peaceful steps when both governments agreed to take part in negotiations between themselves. Finally, both of them ratified an agreement on the retrocession of the Belgian Concession in 1928.¹²³

The modernisation of the Chinese city was accompanied by the growth of the concessions. The walled city was demolished to make room for a growing population and extra facilities. Roads were widened and a modern tram system installed. After the TPG returned power to the Chinese the city fell under the responsibility of the Provincial Government. The water was supplied by Tientsin Native City Water Works. This department was under British management and


¹²¹ Xu Guoqi, *China and the Great War: China's pursuit of a new National identity and Internationalization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p.169 and Rasmussen, *The Growth of Tientsin*, pp.42 and 48.

¹²² Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity*, p.221 and O.D. Rasmussen, *The Growth of Tientsin*, p.29.

¹²³ PRO FO228/4015 Agreement between Belgian and China for the retention of Belgian Concession in Tienstin.

had made lot of revenue.¹²⁴ This firm was established in 1901 and pumped water from the Grand Canal.¹²⁵

Map 2.4: Foreign Concessions and Special Administration, 1937



Source: 'The Foreign Concessions and Special Administrative Areas'

<http://www.geocities.com/eureka/plaza/7750/tientsin01.html> 29 December 2006

In conclusion, the development of the foreign concessions illustrated the positive environment of Tientsin as a trading centre. Although some of the concessions had problems and others no longer existed, Tientsin remained a main attraction for traders in twentieth century. Trade in Tientsin steadily increased year by year. As with the British community, other foreigners had embedded their lives in their concessions and regarded them as their properties. Only by force could the Chinese, with support from other powers, regain these concessions (the German

¹²⁴ HSBC Group, SHG II 510.3 Letter from E. T. Barnes to the Manager, Banque Franco-Chinoise, Tientsin, November 25th, 1932.

¹²⁵ Ruth Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity: Meanings of Health and Disease in Treaty-Port China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), pp.216-8.

and Austria concessions). In addition the development of the foreign concessions not only indicated the progress of trade but also raised competition between the foreign traders to grab opportunities for big business in North China. The next section discusses the progress and variety of foreign firms in Tientsin.

Trade and Business

Although Tientsin experienced disturbances in the late nineteenth century, these did not halt the progress of its trade. The importance of Tientsin as a trading centre, Sir Miles Lampson pointed out, made it 'the Shanghai of North China'.¹²⁶ This situation was the result of the needs of the businesses surrounding Tientsin such as those in Kansu, Shansi, Shensi, Mongolia, Manchuria and Chihli to, gain access to a market for their goods, internally or abroad. Lampson also called Tientsin 'the business heart of North China and Mongolia'.¹²⁷ These regions were rich in natural resources and agricultural produce. Kaiping and Lanchow were rich in coal. Kansu, Shansi, Shensi and Mongolia produced valuable animal skins which they imported as raw materials or for use in the carpet industries in Tientsin. Three provinces in Manchuria had vast areas of agricultural land which produced grains and soybeans. Manchuria also had big reserves of fossil fuels and other minerals.¹²⁸ All of these products came to be in great demand locally and internationally. However, this was not a one way trade. The great demand for China's modernisation made Tientsin a center for imported machinery and engineering tools for distribution in north China. This shows that Tientsin and its

¹²⁶ PRO FO228/3179 Letter from Sir Miles Lampson to Sir Austen Chamberlain, Peking, 23rd March 1927.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Ramon H. Myers, 'Creating a Modern Enclave Economy: The Economic Integration of Japan, Manchuria, and North China, 1932-1945', in Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie (eds.), *The Japanese Wartime Empire 1931-1945* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), p.142.

hinterland had great economic potential to expand and became a centre from which to distribute Chinese goods overseas.

Appendix 7 show Tientsin's trade progressing on an upward path. It cannot be denied that it experienced several hiccups, especially in the immediate aftermath of the Boxer Uprising, when the value of trade dropped sharply. After this disturbance Tientsin returned to a healthier condition. This led to progress in the trading activities in Tientsin in twentieth century, once again showing that the foreign traders still believed that Tientsin had trade potential after the Boxer Uprising. Tientsin still offered a centre for export of Chinese goods from inland North China such as straw braid, red and black dates, camel and sheep wool, marmot and fox furs, peanuts shelled, unshelled and ground, almonds, walnuts, beans and peas, rhubarb and coal. The imported goods were also varied, including arms, tea, sugar, matches, cotton piece goods, iron, flour, typewriters, machinery, wines, motor cars, printing paper and mineral oil. Parallel to the development of trade, manufacture in Tientsin began to grow modestly. Among the industries that flourished in Tientsin were cotton-yarn spinning mills, match, soap, and egg-product factories, carpet factories, oil mills, and ice and cold storage plants.¹²⁹ This development was supported by the emergence of financial institutions in Tientsin,¹³⁰ which became the financial centre of North China with both foreign and Chinese banks flourishing there.¹³¹ All of these business activities gradually caused Tientsin to grow from a small trading port to an international trading and

¹²⁹ SOAS, the PP MS 2 Confidential Letters, Etc. of Sir Frederick Maze Vol.1, 1900-28. See also Macmillan, *Seaports of the Far East*, p.118.

¹³⁰ Brett Sheehan, 'Urban Identity and Urban Networks in Cosmopolitan Cities: Banks and Bankers in Tianjin, 1900-1937', Joseph W. Esherick, *Remaking the Chinese City: Modernity and National Identity, 1900-1950* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2000), p.47.

¹³¹ See Brett Sheehan, *Trust in Troubled Times*, p.53.

industrial centre in North China, and increased the interests of foreigners in protecting their trade interests. This made British concession in Tientsin less easy to be surrendered in 1925, because many of the British traders were not ready to agree to British liberal policy.

Business activity in Tientsin and its hinterland became livelier with the development of transportation in the area. As mentioned, the Hai Ho was the most important route for transportation of goods. Owing to the importance of this route, the foreign Powers and the Chinese authorities always took care of the river, and in 1901 the Hai Ho Conservancy Commission was established. Tientsin also developed other means of communications such as by railway, road and channel. The two railways in Tientsin gradually developed as an important means of transportation. The first was the Peking-Mukden Railway (1884),¹³² which connected Tientsin with north China and Hankow, and with, Tongshan and Chinwangtao, which was a coalmine area. The line also connected with Tangku, which provided a landline to Taku Bar where facilities for ocean steamships at anchor were handled. The second was the Tientsin-Pukow Railway (1912),¹³³ which connected Tientsin with lower Yangtze. At Pukow, a train ferry connected this line to Nanking, from where it connected with the Shanghai-Nanking Railway.¹³⁴

¹³² E-Tun Zen Sun, 'The Pattern of Railway Development in China', *The Far Eastern Quarterly*, Vol.14, No.2. (Feb., 1955), p.180.

¹³³ Crow, Carl, *Handbook for China: with an introduction by H.J. Lethbridge Lethbridge Introduction* © Oxford University Press First Issued, with permission and with the addition of an introduction by Oxford University Press (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1984), p.22.

¹³⁴ Louis Beale and G. Clinton Pelham, *Trade and Economic Conditions in China 1931-33 report* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1933), pp.18 and 19 and F.C. Jones, *Shanghai and Tientsin*, p.135.

Several big British companies invested their capital and established their branches in Tientsin with a huge interest in Tientsin trade. In 1917 81 of the 357 foreign firms established in Tientsin were British.¹³⁵ Appendix 2 shows several of the British firms in Tientsin and its hinterland in 1927. In 1928 there were 85 British firms, not including doctors and dentists, in the Tientsin British concession, with another 13 British firms established in other concessions. Four or five firms had their properties outside the concessions.¹³⁶ Around 1939, the number of British firms in Tientsin had increased to 117.¹³⁷ These firms can be categorised into two types. First, the big firms which operated not only in the British concession but also had interests in Tientsin's hinterland (see Appendix 2). For example, KMA had headquarters in Tientsin but operated coal mines in Tongshan and Linsi. Other British firms which operated their business in Tientsin and its hinterland were Jardine, Matheson and Co., and Butterfield and Swire, which operated exports, imports and shipping, and owned several properties in Tientsin.

These firms' representatives were elected members of the BMC almost every year. For example Butterfield & Swire had a member in the BMC in 1894–1895, 1897–1899, 1901–1904, 1907–1917, 1919–1925 and 1935–1938. KMA had a member in the BMC from 1919–1938 and Jardine Matheson & Son in 1866, 1872–1873, 1876–1893, 1895–1897, 1899–1901, 1905–1917, 1920–1926 and 1929–1932. Apart from these firms British banks also participated in the BMC, as such HSB and the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China. These banks had to protect firms which had loans from them from the consequences of any threat in

¹³⁵ Julean Arnold, *Commercial Handbook of China*, p.322.

¹³⁶ PRO FO228/3836 Enclosure No.1 in Consul-General Sir J.W. Jamieson's dispatch No.5 of January 20th, 1928.

¹³⁷ Irving S. Friedman, 'Britain's Large Tangible Stake in Tientsin', *Far Eastern Survey*, Vol.8, No.14 (Jul.5, 1939), p.166.

North China. (For more details see Appendix 1) They used the BMC to manage the concession and to concentrate on efforts to protect their interests. A second category of British firms played little or no part in the BMC. They operated within the concession with little interest in the hinterland of Tientsin and included small companies involved in supplying food and drink, such as Caldbeck Macgregor & Co. Ltd., Crystal Ltd., E. Pennell & Co., Edward Evans & Sons Ltd. and Hall & Holtz, Ltd (see Appendix 3). Comparison between the first and second category of British firms shows that the first category dominated the BMC. For example, in 1923 KMA, with several British import and export firms, Butterfield and Swire, Fairchild and Son, Hatch, Carter and Co., Jardine, Matheson & Co., controlled the BMC. Other firms involved were the insurance firm Tipper and Co. and Chinese and American firms. Appendices 1 and 2 show that the BMC had always been controlled by these prominent and influential firms.

In short the first category of British firms played an important role in resisting changes to the British position in North China that would affect their interests in Tientsin and its hinterlands. With big interests in and outside Tientsin, the big British firms mentioned were cautious about the British liberal policy in 1920s. Their opposition to it merely showed their concern that their interests would not be protected. These firms continuously tried to find ways to safeguard their interests under British liberal policy in the mid-1920s.

Foreign countries such as Japan, the United States, Germany and Russia were among the biggest competitors for British business in Tientsin. Firms from these countries followed the British firms in operating their businesses and

commercial activities in Tientsin and its hinterlands. For example, besides the HSB, the sole bank in the concession in 1881, other foreign banks such as the Deutsch Asiatische Bank (1890), the Russo-Chinese bank (1897), and the Yokohama Specie Bank (1899) established branches there.¹³⁸ This illustrates the competition between the British and other foreign nationalities. Although America, as an emerging industrial state, had the potential to undermine British interests, the Americans could not compete with the British in Tientsin and its hinterland, where there were only 27 American firms compared with the 81 British ones in 1917.¹³⁹ The American position in the 1930s even declined, as shown by the decrease of its population in the British concession in Tientsin from 273 in 1929 to 253 in 1934 and 185 in 1938 (see Appendix 6) due to the rise of Japanese traders in the 1930s who tried to drive out other foreign firms from Tientsin and its hinterlands. The Americans did not seem keen to continue trading in the atmosphere of animosity between the Japanese and the Chinese.

The Germans, trying to recover from the losses incurred by their defeat in World War I, made tremendous progress in increasing their investment and trade with the Chinese. The good relationship between the Chinese and the Germans following the establishment of the Nationalist government in 1928 improved trade relations between these countries. The increase in German trade interests could be seen in the increasing numbers of Germans in the British concession, rising from 85 in 1934 to 111 in 1938 (see Appendix 6). The reemerging of the German traders in China caused the British some alarm because the Nationalist government

¹³⁸ Lord Charles Beresford, *The Break-Up of China: With an Account of Its Present Commerce Currency, Waterways Armies, Railways, Politics and Future Prospects* (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1899), p.16 and *Twentieth Century Impressions of HongKong, Shanghai, and other Treaty Ports of China*, p.734.

¹³⁹ Julean Arnold, *Commercial Handbook of China*, p.322.

tried to get advisors from Germany and mending close the trade relations between China and Germany.¹⁴⁰

The Russians were envious of the British success and used their influence in Mongolia to threaten British trade between Tientsin and Mongolia. Both the Russians were able to divert trade in Mongolia and Manchuria to Vladivostock.¹⁴¹ Russian interest in trade grew, as can be seen with the tremendous increase in its population in the concession from the beginning of the twentieth century, as illustrated in Appendix 6, growing from 43 in 1913 to 1,527 in 1929 and 2,323 in 1938. This was part of Russia's increasing interests in Mongolia to North China. Other foreign firms also had interests in Tientsin, many involving the export import trade. These foreign firms were J. Mansouk & Co. (Belgian), J. Furer & Co. (Swiss), Chihli Import & Export Co. (Austrian and Greek), M.P. Altamira & Co. (Spanish), Two Stars Trading Co. (Italian), P. Jarno & Co. (French) and China Netherlands Produce (Dutch).¹⁴² In short the British traders had to try to keep or maintain their position against the challenges of new and established foreign traders.

¹⁴⁰ William C. Kirby, *Germany & Republican China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984), p.74.

¹⁴¹ PRO FO228/3179 Report of the China Association, Tientsin Branch, and the Tientsin British Chamber of Commerce, 7 February, 1927.

¹⁴² HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.2 Letter from Lyon-Mackenzie to the Joint Manager, Royal Bank of Canada, Havana, Cuba, Tientsin, June 18, 1929; HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.1 Letter from Lyon-Mackenzie to the Manager, Bank of China, Tientsin, 8 January, 1927; HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.1 Letter from Lyon Mackenzie to the General Secretary, Chambre de Commerce Francaise de China, Tientsin, April 16, 1928; HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.3 Letter from Lyon-Mackenzie to The Provincial Bank of Canada, Montreal, Tientsin, October 20, 1930; HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.1 Letter from Lyon Mackenzie to the Manager, Banca Nazionale di Credito, Tientsin, July 14, 1928; HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.2 Letter from Lyon-Mackenzie to the Agent, Jardine Matheson & Co. Ltd., Tientsin, November 14, 1928; HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.2 Letter from Lyon-Mackenzie to the Manager, the Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China, Tientsin, November 25, 1929; and HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.2 Letter from Lyon-Mackenzie to the Manager, Banque Belge pour l'Etranger, Tientsin, March 10, 1929.

The biggest threat to the British traders' interests was the Japanese, who had a strong interest not only in Tientsin but also in southern Manchuria. In Tientsin and its hinterlands, they already had 357 firms in 1917 compared with 81 British firms. Concurrently with the growth of Japanese trade interests in Tientsin and its hinterland, the Japanese population, at 4,752, made up half of the total foreign population of Tientsin and its hinterland in 1917.¹⁴³ When the Japanese expanded their influence in the 1930s, their trade interests also increased, as shown by the increase in the Japanese and foreign population in the Japanese concession in Tientsin from 5,104 in 1926 to 6,700 in 1932 and 19,252 in 1938 (see Appendix 7), while in the British concession the Japanese population increased from 89 in 1934 to 294 in 1938 (see Appendix 5). This shows the large number of Japanese administrative jobs in the industrial and service sectors following the development of Japanese interests in Tientsin and its hinterlands, and demonstrates how the expanded Japanese interests challenged British interests. At the same time competition from Italian interests also increased with a sudden rise of the foreign population in the Italian concession from 373 in 1937 to 739 in 1938 (see Appendix 7). As we know, Italy was an ally of Japan.

British traders had to be cautious about the rise of Japanese encroachment in North China. The British government could do little to help the British community in China because it was preoccupied with the German threat in Europe in 1930s. This was a dilemma for the British traders in facing the challenge of the Japanese encroachment of North China, as discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.

¹⁴³ Julean Arnold, *Commercial Handbook of China*, p.322.

Lastly, the Chinese become a strong challenge to the British. Until the 1920s the British traders were not able to penetrate the interior directly, as the Chinese compradors and businessmen still effectively held the keys to opening up this market themselves. Therefore British traders could only operate effectively in and around the treaty port. Competition intensified in the 1920s with the rise of Chinese nationalism, which manifested not only in political struggle but also in a campaign to buy Chinese goods. This is discussed in the following chapters. In short the British traders had to try to keep or maintain their position against the challenges of new and established foreign and Chinese traders.

Relations among the people

Tientsin was not owned by a single nationality. Chinese of course formed the majority population this city. After 1900 Chinese nationalist activists did not seriously challenge the foreigners again until the mid-1920s. The diversity of Tientsin's population, different administrations and growing numbers of residents also created tension between the foreigners themselves. In 1903 the Austrian concession conflicted with the local Chinese there. The area which the Chinese authority had leased to the Austrians had been occupied by Chinese owners, and the Austrians took over their land. Chinese residents complained that the Austrians had not paid them compensation. However, this conflict did not create a big issue between them.¹⁴⁴ In 1913, French gendarmes entered the Japanese concession, which brought protests from Japanese residents and led to serious fighting between both parties.¹⁴⁵ Further tension arose on March 1919 when Japanese troops attacked Americans. The origin of this incident was a quarrel in a brothel in the

¹⁴⁴ Lee Chinyun, 'Trieste and Austro-Chinese Trade from 1869 to 1918', p.5.

¹⁴⁵ Brooks, *Japan's Imperial Diplomacy*, pp.103-4.

Japanese concession between an inebriated American and some Japanese soldiers. Angry Japanese soldiers and civilians chased the American into the French concession.¹⁴⁶ Although this fighting did not involve the British, they were concerned that it could spread to the British concession.¹⁴⁷ In addition, some Japanese had tried to attack some British people passing by in the French concession.¹⁴⁸ This incident illustrates how the multi-racial mix of people and diversity of administrations did not prevent animosity among the different cultures and backgrounds of its people. The British so far were not harbouring ill feeling which might have triggered the incident in Tientsin.

In Tientsin, the Englishman was allegedly noted for his '...conservativeness, and his insularity in order to set up a miniature replica of his tight little island home. He might even have been excused by critical brethren if he had turned his concession into a fortress of national aloofness and exclusiveness.' This view enunciated here by Allister Macmillan writing in 1920s, who criticised it stating that the British did not dominate any club, school or public property.¹⁴⁹ He agreed that certain of the British were still conservative and insular and wanted to uphold British prestige, especially in business.¹⁵⁰ For example, the Japanese attempt to build the Fakumen Railway Extension from Manchuria to North China was opposed because it would affect Britain's economic dominance in North China.¹⁵¹ But the discrimination was more tangible between the British and the

¹⁴⁶ PRO FO674/207 *Peking and Tientsin Times*, Friday, March 14, 1919.

¹⁴⁷ PRO FO674/207 Letter from J. N. Jordan to the Japanese Minister, Peking, March 15th, 1919.

¹⁴⁸ PRO FO674/207 Letter from L. F. Smith to H.B.M. Consul General, Tientsin, 15th March 1919.

¹⁴⁹ Macmillan, *Seaports of the Far East*, p.123.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p.124.

¹⁵¹ SOAS, the CHAS/MCP/9, China Association Circular, Vol. I Nos I-XXV, Nov. 1907-2 June 1908; China Association Circular: Correspondence for the General Committee, Manchuria, No.XIV, 26 March, 1908; China Association, Tientsin, to General Committee, Tientsin, 7 March, 1908, p.55.

Chinese. Most Britons were not interested in learning Chinese, since they could hire interpreters,¹⁵² and some even spoke English with their servants.¹⁵³ The British saw the Chinese as a “lower-class society” with an unhygienic lifestyle. They forced them to apply for a pass to enter Elgin and Victoria Parks.¹⁵⁴

However, after 1900 British-Chinese relations began to grow more cordial.¹⁵⁵ Signs of formal discrimination began to disappear from the 1920s onwards¹⁵⁶ owing to the growing importance of the Chinese in the concession. Chinese-British relations can be classified in two main categories. Firstly as between ‘master and servant’ with the British as master and the Chinese, whether as labourer, amah, cook, pilots or guards, as servant. The second main relationship was collaboration as partners. At this stage there was cooperation between the Chinese and British in business, with the Chinese either as partner or as compradores. Both these relationships were important elements in the progress of the British community in Tientsin, which the small number of British there could not achieve alone. Apart from this, the importance of this relationship was to penetrate the Chinese market and secure the support of the Chinese government. For example, the establishment of the KMA was important to ending the rivalry between the Chinese and British coal companies.¹⁵⁷ Other British firms still needed

¹⁵² Robert Bickers, ‘Citizenship by correspondence in the Shanghai International Settlement, 1919-43’, unpublished article, forthcoming in Yves Chevrier, Alain Roux et Xiaohong Xiao-Planes (eds), *Citadins et citoyens dans la Chine du XXe siècle, Mélanges en l’honneur de Marie-Claire Bergère* (Paris: EHESS/MSH, 2008), p.4.

¹⁵³ This was the mentality not only of the British but of almost all foreigners in the concession. See Isabelle Maynard, *China Dreams: Growing up Jewish in Tientsin* (University of Iowa Press, Iowa City, 1996), p.79.

¹⁵⁴ *Handbook of Municipal Information* (Tientsin: Tientsin Press Ltd., 1922?), pp.45 and 92 and Power, *The Ford of Heaven*, p.20.

¹⁵⁵ Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity*, p.186.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p.204.

¹⁵⁷ Tim Wright, *Coal Mining in China Economy and Society, 1895-1937*, pp.123 and 149.

the help of Chinese compradores to penetrate the Chinese market inland,¹⁵⁸ as, for example, William Forbes and Company, who established a longstanding relationship with a Chinese compradore.¹⁵⁹

The awareness of the British community of the importance of the Chinese, especially the wealthiest, can be traced to the election of the first Chinese councillor in 1878, and of a further two in 1919.¹⁶⁰ Next the British traders proposed that their staff learn Chinese.¹⁶¹ The American-British-Chinese Club (1919) was established to further relations with Chinese politicians and businessmen.¹⁶² The progress and survival of British interests in Tientsin and its hinterland made the British aware that good relations with the Chinese should be cultivated. The KMA, for example, set the fostering of good relations with its Chinese counterparts as a priority, in order to protect its interests. Thus the mentality of the British in Tientsin can be seen to have become less antagonistic towards the Chinese, even though they had come under their attack in 1900. Even the Chinese population (see Appendix 6) had increased in the British concession from 15,946 in 1913 to 33,172 in 1925 and 36,029 in 1929. However, this did not mean that the British had a liberal attitude towards the Chinese. The nightmare of bloody fighting in the Boxer Uprising kept some of the British cautious in dealing with disturbances in China. Therefore the British often referred any disturbances and disabilities in China as 'Boxer' alike "anti-foreign" movements. The developing anti-imperialist feelings of many Chinese climaxed in the rise of

¹⁵⁸ Osterhammel, 'Semi-Colonial and Informal Empire in Twentieth-Century China', p.305.

¹⁵⁹ Rasmussen, *Tientsin*, p.260.

¹⁶⁰ P. H. B. Kent, *The Twentieth Century in the Far East* (London: Edward Arnold & Co., 1937), p.206.

¹⁶¹ PRO FO674/194 Letter from Secretary of the Tientsin British Chamber of Commerce to Sir W.P. Ker, British Consul-General, Tientsin, 15 January 1918.

¹⁶² Jerome Cavanaugh, *Who's Who in 1918-1950* (Hong Kong: Chinese Materials Center, 1982), p.233.

Chinese nationalism, threatening British interests as discussed in the next chapter. Apart from the challenge from Chinese nationalism, in the 1930s relations between the multi-racial communities in Tientsin brought further challenges to the British concession. The increase of the Chinese population in the British concession (see Appendix 6) from 36,029 in 1929 to 72,087 in 1938 increased the BMC's responsibility to maintain peace and order in the concession, particularly regarding clashes between the Chinese against the Japanese on the eve of the rise of Japanese aggression in the 1930s.

Conclusion

To conclude, Tientsin had gradually developed before the arrival of the Europeans, due to its strategic location not only for settlement but also as a centre for trade. Then came the war and the treaty with the Western Powers and China in 1860 which opened Tientsin as a treaty port.¹⁶³ At this point the British (and other foreign powers) began to develop their influence and establish their powers in North China. The concessions in Tientsin were a case in point. Their power in Tientsin began to grow steadily as a small replica of Western (and Japanese) cities and cultures. To develop trade, the bund was built on the banks of the British concession following the establishment of several British and foreign firms in Tientsin. British interest not only concentrated on Tientsin but also spread to its hinterlands, and British missions such as the LMS began expanding their influence further south. British traders, especially the KMA, established themselves in Tongshan and surrounding areas. All in all what was important to Britain in Tientsin was its trade, its subjects, its properties, its Christian missions and its

¹⁶³ Immanuel Hsu, *The Rise of Modern China, Third Edition*, p.190

prestige. The development of the British concession on the one hand brought prosperity and wealth to the British community, while on the other it also brought a strong need for protection from any challenges from China. These are the factors which the British government had to consider in handling Anglo-Chinese relations.

The establishment of the BMC symbolised the British Informal Empire in China. The BMC was an administrative body totally dominated by the British community, especially by its traders. These traders (as listed in Appendix 2) played an important role in maneuvering the British concession in line with their interests. The emergence of bunds and godowns as the first structures built in this concession showed the British traders' eagerness to establish trade in Tientsin. The development of other infrastructure and institutions created a British ghetto in which all aspects of British life were evident in the names of streets, buildings, theatres and sports facilities. Restrictions were imposed on the Chinese entering parks, and the Tientsin Club became exclusively British. With development thriving in the concession, the British community began to regard it as 'Little London'. As R. C. V. Bodley, a traveler, noted:

Were it not for the rickshas [rickshaws], the Victoria and Race Course Roads, which are the principal thoroughfares in Tientsin, might be any streets in a London suburb, for not only are the Shops of the same type as in England, but the semi-detached residences and the villas might have been transplanted direct from Greater London.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶⁴ R. C. V. Bodley, 'Tientsin', in Chris Elder (ed.), *China's Treaty Ports: Half Love and Half Hate* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.231.

At this point the some of British community seemed to regard the concession as one of Britian's Asian colonies. The community seemed to forget that the concession was on land leased from the Chinese. The Shanghailanders had a similar attitude, regarding land in Shanghai as 'owned' rather than leased.¹⁶⁵ Therefore some Chinese critics regarded the British (and other foreign) concessions as foreign imperialist 'controllers' in China. Although the Chinese were in the majority in the British concession, they did not have an equal footing in the BMC. In short, the environment of the concession, with its European architecture, British administration and English style of living encouraged the growth of conservative sentiment among the British, increasing the some of the British community's focus on their imperial culture and refusal to accept any change which could affect the status of the concession or their privileges.

At this point (before 1925) it seems that the British community in Tientsin was similar to the Shanghailanders. The difference was the formal structure of power in the concession. If in the SMC the Shanghailanders (and the Americans) enjoyed the ability to make decisions about their municipality, this was not the case in the BMC in Tientsin. The British Consul General had formal power over the BMC, unlike his counterpart in Shanghai, who did not have such power over the Shanghai Municipal Council (SMC). The British community only could make applications to the British minister, and the British concession was under the British government's influence. For example, the SMC was able to purchase land

¹⁶⁵ Johnson, *Shanghai*, p.192.

outside their settlement to build a road.¹⁶⁶ In Tientsin, when the BMC tried to purchase land outside the concession it met with a veto from the British Consul General.¹⁶⁷

Within the limitations of the BMC's power, the British concession in Tientsin witnessed overall a history of a more liberal policy towards the Chinese. This included the gradual abolition of discrimination against the Chinese there. In fact this came about for trade purposes, with the British traders controlling the BMC adopting a pragmatic approach by agreeing to open good relations with their Chinese business counterparts, illustrating that not all in the British community were diehards. The British traders agreed to cooperate with the Chinese in the cause of British interests. The rich Chinese benefited from this relationship, although the lower strata of Chinese were still ignored. When other groups – especially the farmers – was affected by hardships such as a long drought, they blamed the foreigners for all their difficulties.¹⁶⁸ More importantly, the Tientsin Massacre and the Boxer Rebellion were examples of Chinese anti-foreign feeling at the time. But in the twentieth century new Chinese critiques of the foreign presence developed, and adopted a range of powerful new tactics: boycotts, mass political activism and new diplomatic pressure. The foreign community in China was not at first aware that the Chinese had begun to fight for their sovereignty. The nationalist movement developed gradually and was intent on recovering Chinese sovereignty under the banner of nationalism. As nationalism developed,

¹⁶⁶ Meng Yue, *Shanghai and the Edges of Empires* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006), 173.

¹⁶⁷ PRO FO674/198 Memorandum on the Relation of the BMC and the British Municipal Extension at Tientsin, Tientsin, December 6, 1915.

¹⁶⁸ Robert Bickers, 'Chinese Burns: Britain in China 1842-1900', *History Today*, Volume 50 (8), August 2000, p.10.

Tientsin did not escape from their demand that the foreign concessions be returned to them.

Even before this movement reached its peak the British community had felt threatened. The fear of a repeat of the Boxer Uprising lingered in foreign residents' minds. The some of British community even regarded the Chinese civil war in the 1920s as another 'Boxer' rising.¹⁶⁹ This was a challenging time for the British Government, British Legation and British community in China. The British concession, which had been established with modern facilities and new buildings, now had to face the Chinese challenge. It is interesting to see on how the British and other foreign nationalists with considerable interests in Tientsin and its hinterland would clash with the rising of the Chinese Nationalism. So how did the British react to the nationalist movement? Were they ready to face the demands of the Chinese nationalists, which grew throughout the mid-1920s? Could the British save their interests in Tientsin and its hinterlands? How did the cordial relations which the Chinese and British had developed help in avoiding negative repercussions on British interests? These questions are addressed in the following chapters.

¹⁶⁹ SOAS, the Sir Alwyne George Neville Ogden's Papers, PP MS 47, File 4, Box 1, Letter from Jessie to Ogden, Tientsin, 16 July 1920.

Chapter Two

Turbulent years: Cause, impact and reaction, 1925–1927

Introduction

Nationalist activism marked the mid-1920s in China as the KMT launched the Northern Expedition in its campaign for national unification. It was a period of violence and insecurity. During the drive to unite the country and restore Chinese sovereignty various incidents occurred which badly damaged British and Japanese interests. This chapter describes the impact of these events on British interests (especially those of the traders) in north China in general and in Tientsin in particular. The discussion addresses two main issues. Firstly, it highlights and discusses the impact of the disturbances in China on British interests. Although the anti-imperialist movement mainly centered on south and central China (1925-1927), the KMT and communist agents had tried to start the activity in Tientsin. However, the British were undeterred by this action because the May Thirtieth Incident had alerted them to the need for early preparation to avoid any anti-imperialist propaganda circulating in the British concession. Tight control by other foreign concessions had prevented all Chinese attempts at agitation. The failure of these moves also resulted from the fact that the Northern government did not support anti-imperialist agitation.

The last part of this chapter discusses the attitudes and responses of the British community to Chinese activism and to the implementation of a more liberal British policy that aimed to open negotiations with the Chinese government about the

'unequal treaties', especially on the retrocession of the British concession. At this point my focus on the British community is the British traders and missionaries. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the key British traders had strong financial interests in Tientsin and its surroundings, and the missions operated in Tientsin and surrounding area. The community saw what happened in Shanghai and other parts of China as a serious threat to British interests and was mobilised to act against the Chinese activism. This chapter does not go deeply into the rendition of the Tientsin Concession. At this stage it discusses only the response of the British community to changing government policy. In order to understand all these three points, it is essential to look the nature and cause of the British government's anxiety regarding its interests in China, and the concern of the British subjects in Tientsin regarding British policy and the situation in China. Therefore this chapter begins by focusing on how Chinese nationalism evolved and became focused on the British, and the impact of this anti-British feeling on British interests in China. The section below illustrates why the British government adopted a liberal policy towards the Chinese.

The impact of Chinese nationalism on British interests

As discussed in the introduction, a new Chinese nationalist movement developed in the early twentieth century. The Chinese showed their patriotic spirit in several ways, such as by boycotting American goods (1905), demonstrating against the Twenty-One Demands (1915) and the May Fourth Movement (1919). In the 1920s Chinese nationalism became more active and united against foreign imperialism.

But in the 1920s Chinese nationalists began to attack the British as 'brutal imperialists'.¹ This happened when Chinese activists were killed in the Thirtieth May Incident in 1925. Although began at a Japanese factory the incident, the killing by SMC police of number of Chinese demonstrators in the international settlement inflamed the Chinese activists against the British. Almost all the British interests came under attack. Even Hong Kong suffered a boycott and strike from July 1925 to 9 October 1926.² Then Chinese anger towards the British (and the Japanese) spread throughout the Yangtze Valley. The British Consulate in Hankow was attacked; the Acting Consul General, E. G. Jamieson was beaten in Chinkiang; the Chinese press in Kiukiang attacked British Imperialism in China; British subjects in Chungking were warned not to appear in the street, and in Amoy British and American Tobacco Co., (BAT) cigarette stocks were burnt by Chinese students.³ The British in China and British domestic opinion were shocked by these events. The British government considered several possible responses. The Foreign Office began to see that its old method, the gun boat policy, no longer deterred the Chinese.

During this time, foreigners, especially British interests, were in danger. British merchants in China worried about their property in inland China.⁴ Many missionaries left the interior for coastal areas. They looked to their government to act to prevent

¹ Wm. Roger Louis, *British Strategy in the Far East, 1919-1939* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), p.126 and P. Cavendish, "Anti-Imperialism in the Kuomintang 1923," Jerome Ch'en and Nicholas Tarling, *Studies in the Social History of China and South Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p.34.

² John Fitzgerald, *Awakening China: Politics, Culture, and Class in the Nationalist Revolution* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), pp.248-9.

³ Megginson, 'Britain's Response to Chinese Nationalism, 1925-1927', (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, George Washington University, 1973), pp.83-5, 88 and 90.

⁴ Richard W. Rigby, *The May 30 Movement: Events and Themes* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1980), pp.143-5.

further damage to their property and businesses. The biggest challenge for the British was the spontaneous seizure of the concessions in Hankow and Kiukiang in January 1927 by a Chinese crowd acting without direction from either communist or KMT leadership.⁵ Though the British government offered the 'December Memorandum' (December 1926), in which it outlined its readiness to negotiate with the Chinese authorities regarding its interests in China, it did not receive a positive response from the KMT. Several Chinese newspapers in the KMT area had denounced this declaration as a hypocritical ruse to defend the British position.⁶ The willingness of the British government to pay customs surtaxes to China was interpreted by the *Canton Gazette* as benefiting Chang Tso-lin's government. But the Peking government also believed that the memorandum was aimed not at them but at the KMT.⁷ On the other hand, the British-owned *North China Herald* condemned the Chinese and demanded that the government re-occupy the concessions.⁸ During the KMT's occupation of Nanking (1927), foreign residents were attacked, leading to some loss of life. The American and British forces responded to the incident by bombarding the Chinese army in Nanking. This was another reason for the KMT to accuse the foreigners, especially Britain, of siding with the northern government and participating in the Chinese Civil War.

⁵ Harold R. Isaac, *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), p.124 and Lee En-han, 'China's Recovery of the British Hankow and Kiukiang Concessions in 1927', *Occasional Paper No.6 August 1980*, University of Western Australia, Centre for Asian Studies, pp.11–2.

⁶ Fung, *The Diplomacy of Retreat*, p.109.

⁷ Wilson, 'Britain and the Kuomintang, 1924-28', pp.442 and 443.

⁸ *The North China Herald*, 15th January, 1927, p.60.

Before the December Memorandum was announced the KMT had been continuing their campaign to damage the British image by accusing Britain of agreeing to support Chang Tso-lin's attack on them. Although they believed this to be a rumour, they still accused the British of advancing giving half of their loan of fifty million dollars to Chang Tso-lin's government.⁹ In 1926 Chang Tso-lin and Sun Chuang-fang had approached British consulate and legation officials to seek financial aid to suppress the KMT in the south.¹⁰ However the British government reiterated that they never approved such a loan and British policy remained neutral. The indictment went on to point out that Britain had supplied Wu Pei-fu and Sun Chuan-fang with ammunition.¹¹ Apart from this the KMT also condemned the British authorities in Hong Kong for the suppression of Chinese nationalism there.¹²

In conclusion, Chinese nationalism caused the British community and its government great alarm because the British felt the strong pressure against their staying put in business in China. Therefore the British government had to find moderate ways of opposing Chinese nationalism and it offered to renegotiate what Chinese critics termed the unequal treaties and, in principle, returned British concessions to Chinese control. Little of the literature discusses what happened in Tientsin at the time of these disturbances in China in the 1920s. It seems that anti-British agitation never happened in North China. Therefore with this background of

⁹ *News Bulletin, the Chinese News Service*, Series 1, No.I, December 16, 1926, p.9. HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 25, Letter from an agent of the Hong Kong Banking Corporation to P.C. Young, Tientsin 17th September, 1926.

¹⁰ HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 25, Letter from an agent of the Hong Kong Banking Corporation to P.C. Young, Tientsin 17th September, 1926.

¹¹ *News Bulletin, The Chinese News Service*, Series 1, No.IX, December 27, 1927, p.6.

¹² *Ibid.*, p.4.

Chinese nationalism and its impact on Chinese interests, the next section looks into the detail of what actually happened in Tienstin and its hinterlands with the rise of Chinese nationalism. Did the British community also suffer from the Chinese activists?

The Situation in the North


North China was not affected by the nationalist movement so much as by the civil war between the Northern warlords, especially between Wu Pei-fu, Chang Tso-liang and Feng Yu-hsiang, each of whom was fighting for the control of central government in Peking. Figure 3.1 shows Sapajo's caricature in the *North China Herald* illustrating foreign perceptions of the situation in the civil war in China (1926). The North was an occasional battleground. Sporadic warfare, from the late 1910s until the mid 1920s, had affected rail services because the armies had seized, for example, the trains for army transportation.¹³ These problems were more due to technical problems than to the anti-imperialist agitation that was occurring in central and southern China.¹⁴ Generally the foreigners in the north were free from assault or attack by Chinese soldiers. Therefore the train delays were more an indirect consequence. Apart from delays, the disruption to the train service hampered missionary work in the interior and brought trade in Tientsin to an occasional standstill, causing heavy losses to traders.¹⁵

¹³ See Waldron, *From war to nationalism*, pp.110, 149, 150 and 151.

¹⁴ SOAS, CWM North China Report Box 9, 1922-1927, Report 1926 by J.D. Liddell, December 31, 1926, p.2.

¹⁵ SOAS, CHAS/MCP/31 China Association: Circular No.348-359, 1925, Letter from W. Wolfers Chairman of Tientsin General Chamber of Commerce to W.P. Ker, the British Consul General in Tientsin, 23rd January, 1925, p.1.

**Figure 3.1: Fighting between Chang Tso-lin, Wu Pei-fu and Feng Yu-
hsiang**



Source: *The North China Herald*, 6 February 1926, p.221.

The impact of large-scale conflict between Chang Tso-lin and Wu Pei-fu in 1925 put trade in the north in great difficulties.

Supply of raw produce from the interior received during the week has been almost negligible. The continued control of all the northern Railways by the military parties and the consequent chaos

added to the complete cessation of all water traffic because of ice, is responsible for the shortage.¹⁶

Although this was an indirect problem, it made it difficult for the traders to fulfill demand from abroad, especially from Europe and the United States. As Chapter 1 and Appendix 2 illustrate, almost all the big British firms had strong interests in collecting and exporting raw Chinese materials from inland North China, and the continuation of the disturbance had an impact on this.

The Chinese themselves suffered badly because the warlord government imposed a heavy tax, some peasants' property was looted and carts and mules seized, which paralysed the peasants' transport system for carrying the harvest to market.¹⁷ At Chinwangtao, Chinese people described what had happened to them during the war between Feng Yu-shiang and Chang Tso-lin at the end of 1925:

With the first movement of troops, when General Kuo Sung Ling effected his coup d'etat last November, large number[s] of troops poured into Chinwangtao and villages in the vicinity, billeting in private homes and shops, forcing the people to supply provisions to their men passing through the Chinwangtao station on way to the front; and, at same time, looted all shops and even burned the buildings. We were, consequently, thrown into utter panic.¹⁸

In short, what happened in North China was different to when the civil war was the main problem in 1925 and 1926.

¹⁶ HSBC Group Archives SHG II 28 Letter from Agents, HSB to A. E. Baker, Tientsin 5th January 1925.

¹⁷ SOAS, CWM North China Reports Box 9, 1922-1927, Letter from Eithel S. Livens to Mr. Hawkins, Siaochang, 13 February 1926.

¹⁸ PRO FO228/2942 Letter from Merchants and residents of Chiwangtao to Sir Ronald Macleay, Peking, 14th May 1926.

Tight security and order in the British concession (and other foreign concessions) also helped it safe from disturbance from the anti-imperialists in Tientsin.¹⁹ The lives of foreigners in Tientsin hinterlands were relatively unaffected by civil war. Only bandit activity frightened the missionaries.²⁰ Anti-imperialist (and particularly anti-British) activities in north China were on a small scale, because the north was not dominated by KMT troops. Generally the life of the British in north China was pleasant and peaceful, free from the troubles suffered in other parts in China. Life in the British concession continued as normal. Reports emphasised how the streets were busy with cars and pedestrians, people were enjoying the peaceful conditions, young people were freely playing their games and the Christmas celebrations were proceeding uninterrupted.²¹

This does not mean that evidence of nationalist sentiment can not be seen in North China; northern Chinese clearly shared the feelings of their compatriots in central and south China. Nationalistic feelings among the North Chinese can be traced to as early in 1905 when there was a boycott of American goods because the United States government was trying to restrict Chinese immigration.²² Apart from that the nationalist activists in Tientsin also formed a women's awareness movement. The role played by the Women's Patriotic Comrades in 1920 is a case in point. This association had tried to bring sense of awakening regarding the weakness of the

¹⁹ Brett Sheehan, *Trust in Troubled Times*, p.47.

²⁰ SOAS, CWM North China Incoming Correspondence Box 25, 1926-1927, Folder 1, Letter from A.H. Jowett Murray to Hawkins, Tsangchow, 14th May 1926.

²¹ SOAS, CWM North China Reports Box 9, 1922-1927, Report of C.H.B. Longman, Tientsin, 1925.

²² Kwan Man Bun, *The Salt Merchants of Tianjin*, pp.127-8.

Chinese to the Chinese peasants. Therefore these movements to some extent contributed to the nationalist movement in Tientsin.²³ When news of the Shameen Incident (1925) and the May Thirtieth Incident broke, it catalysed nationalist sentiment amongst the Chinese, especially the students.²⁴ In Tientsin the students began agitating on 1 June 1925. They distributed leaflets after the May Thirtieth incident containing news about events in Shanghai, tried to organise demonstrations, and urged Chinese workers to strike.²⁵ From 8 August 1925 Chinese workers at Pao Cheng Mill and the Sino-Japanese Yu Ta cotton mill,²⁶ both of which were located outside Tientsin, demanded a wage rise. At the same time, British Steamship Company seamen held a strike. Several tens of thousands of people later joined the mass demonstration in the Chinese city to protest against the May Thirtieth Incident. The demonstrators shouted anti-imperialist slogans and denounced the unequal treaties.²⁷

The British community viewed this situation with great alarm, afraid that their lives could be in danger, and the British Legation took precautionary action, sending 400 troops to Tientsin from Shanhaikuan and Chinwangtao. Efforts were also made to

²³ Fitzgerald, *Awakening China*, p.31.

²⁴ As early as the 1920s, the communists had operated by establishing worker schools in the vicinity of mills in Tientsin. The students were their agents in building relations with the workers. Here the students gave free tuition and lectures about the importance of forming a union. Further seeds of the patriotic movement had been sown by representatives of Sun Yat-sen who visited Tientsin on 28 December 1924. His chief speaker told Chinese students to rise up against foreign imperialism, especially against Britain, which had caused China to suffer from its unequal treatment. With Chinese nationalism running high in 1925, the students started to agitate, influencing the Chinese masses and especially the workers. Hershatter, *The Workers of Tianjin, 1900-1949*, pp.212 and 213 and SOAS, CWM North China Reports Box 9, 1922-1927, Report for the year 1924 by Lavington, Tientsin.

²⁵ Waldron, *From war to nationalism*, p.252 and *The Times*, August 13, 1925, p.10.

²⁶ PRO FO371/10949 Enclosure No. 1, Letter from W.P. Kerr to Michael Palairret, Tientsin, 15 August 1925.

²⁷ Hershatter, *The Workers of Tianjin, 1900-1949*, p.214.

talk with Chang Tso-lin to control the situation in Tientsin.²⁸ However, the anti-imperialist movement in Tientsin did not escalate into a major incident for several reasons. Firstly, the student agitation failed to spread the nationalist propaganda. The Chinese workers only wanted better pay and benefits from their employers. P. H. B. Kent said that Tientsin was fortunate because it did not have any of the extreme Chinese groups that prevailed in other parts of China.²⁹

The most interesting point, reported in *the Celestial Empire*, was that; “. . . [a]s far as is known there was no attempt to turn the strike into an anti-British movement, the matter being entirely a labour dispute pure and simple, but the activity of the students does not make for comfort”.³⁰ This passage suggests that the British had little reason to be concerned about the labour strike in Tientsin. This is confirmed by E. C. Peter, the Jardine’s agent in Tientsin, in a message to Brooke Smith; “. . . I regret to hear the serious situation which has arisen in Shanghai and I confirm my telegram advising you that I do not anticipate serious trouble here.”³¹ The Chinese demonstration was a normal situation between the employers and employees. Nationalism was not the main cause of the workers’ struggle. Therefore the strike would gradually fade away once the demands were met, and the disturbance caused by the Chinese workers in Tientsin did not cause a great deal of concern among the British. The British were glad that this strike would not last long or become part of the Chinese nationalist movement.

²⁸ Waldron, *From war to nationalism*, p.260.

²⁹ P. H. B. Kent, *The Twentieth Century in the Far East*, p.207.

³⁰ *The Celestial Empire*, 15 August 1925, p.120.

³¹ CUL, Jardine Matheson Archive, MS JM J29/1-7, JMA, Letter from E. C. Peter to Brooke Smith, Tientsin, 10th June 1925.

The second factor which contributed to the lack of strong feeling in the Chinese in Tientsin was Chinese business interests. These Circles were worried by what had happened in south and central China. Though they shared the same patriotic feelings as the Chinese there, their priority was protecting their business from further damage. Therefore they took a pragmatic approach, secretly simultaneously supporting the KMT and making loans to the Chang regime.³² The British had made a sound decision in appointing Chinese business to the BMC council, as they helped to keep the Chinese community peaceful compared with other such communities in China. For example, local Chinese notables stopped Chinese students from distributing anti-imperialist leaflets in foreign concessions when the Chinese rickshaw peddlers, with the support of the Chinese local authority and Chinese traders, stopped students trying to distribute propaganda leaflets. They blocked the students and turned them over to the French authority. In the British concession BMC police stopped Chinese students from distributing anti-imperialist leaflets.³³

The third and deciding factor adding to the relief of Tientsin's British community was the lack of northern government support for the Chinese students' agitation. The key factor which diminished the agitation in north China generally and in Tientsin particularly was the northern government under Chang Tso-lin, which opposed the KMT. They opposed "anti-imperialist" sentiment because it was clearly seem to be part of part of the KMT and communists' strategy to undermine the

³² Sheehan, *Trust in Troubled Times*, pp.127-8.

³³ *The Celestial Empire*, 8 August 1925, p.73.

northern warlords in the north. General Li Chang-ling, the Chihli Governor, ordered the closure of all centres of activism such as the Union of All Classes of People, Students Union, Association of Mill Hands and the Cantonese Guild. All these associations and unions were in the Chinese city. The other unions, which operated in the French Concession, were under close watch by the Chinese and French police.³⁴ Most of the labour leaders were put in jail. The Chinese authorities banned the holding of public meetings without police permission, and processions were prohibited.³⁵ As a result, the labour activism was paralysed in August 1925.³⁶ Before that, General Li Chang-ling's troops had raided the ex-Russian and ex-German Concessions and arrested nearly 100 people. This raid was made to counter Bolshevik activities in Tientsin.³⁷ As LMS missionary, A. H. Jowett Murray pointed out in the middle of 1925, "we are benefiting from Chang Tso-lin's censorship . . ."³⁸

Another report, by the British Consulate, also supported this opinion, mentioning that:

Tientsin has been singularly fortunate during this period of strikes and disorders it having been the only important commercial centre which has remained peaceful and quiet. The reasons for this are twofold, firstly that as far as local conditions are concerned the Chinese have no particular grievances against foreigners, and secondly that Marshal Chang Tso Lin made it clear from the outset that so far as the districts over which he had direct control were concerned no outrages would be countenanced. He feared the possibility of a riot in the concession which might result in a clash with the British Police and / or

³⁴ *The North China Herald*, 22 August 1925, p.202.

³⁵ PRO FO371/10949 Enclosure No. 1, Letter from W.P. Ker to Michael Palairret, Tientsin, 15 August 1925.

³⁶ Hershatter, *The Workers of Tianjin, 1900-1949*, p.218.

³⁷ *The North China Herald*, 4 July 1925, p.509.

³⁸ SOAS, CWM North China Incoming Correspondence Box 24, 1924 – 1925, Folder 3, Letter from A. H. Jowett Murray to Hawkins, Tientsin, 15 June 1925.

military and would lead to a situation which he might not be able to control.³⁹

In addition the BMC took several precautionary measures to counter anti-imperialist elements in the area. This is the fourth factor that contributed to the failure of the Chinese activists' demonstration against the British.

The BMC supported the effort to preserve peace and order in the concession. BMC police were ordered to guard against and control any subversive elements which could upset the concession, including the KMT, the activities of which were suppressed with the approval of the British Consul General on receiving information from the Chinese local authority. The KMT headquarters were raided and 14 KMT members arrested when literature relating to the anti-imperialist movement and the northern government was found.⁴⁰ The British authority in the concession believed that these KMT members had intended to create problems in the British concession.⁴¹ All the KMT members were handed over to Chang Tso-lin's army on 24 November 1926. The fate of these KMT members is uncertain, but we can safely assume, from other episodes of the time, that most did not survive the experience.⁴²

On the other hand, the above case could also show that both the British Minister and the BMC had learnt from the May Thirtieth Incident. By gaining the support of Chang Tso-lin, the concession's British authority could avoid the

³⁹ PRO FO228/3285 Tientsin Political Report for the quarter ended 30th June 1925.

⁴⁰ PRO FO371/11663 Telegram from Mr. O'Malley, Tientsin, 11th December, 1926.

⁴¹ *The Times*, November 29, 1926, p.12.

⁴² Wilbur, *The Nationalist Revolution in China, 1923-1928*, p.104.

responsibility for killing any demonstrators. Therefore only Chinese local authorities prevented the strike and demonstrations in Tientsin.⁴³ The Chinese demonstrators were thus unable to inflame Chinese anger against the British in China. Early preparation as mentioned above and cooperation with the Chinese local authority and other foreign concessions had prevented Chinese anti-imperialist feeling from exploding into a bloody incident. At the time of the war between the KMT and the Northern government under Chang Tso-lin, who controlled the Chinese authority in Tientsin, there was a strict rule by the Chang Tso-lin's administration against KMT activism in Tientsin. Therefore, Chang Tso-lin were willing to stop the Chinese activists under the aegis of the KMT. The KMT, on the other hand, used the arrest of some its members in Tientsin to accuse the British of siding with the Northern government.⁴⁴

The missionary schools and colleges did not entirely escape the student unrest, which had spread to almost all parts of China, at the time of the June 1925 demonstration in Tientsin and the arrest of the KMT members in November 1925. They supported the revolution staged by the KMT.⁴⁵ Some of these students also supported the proposal of the Anti-Christian Federation to continue the movement against Christians and mission schools.⁴⁶ This circumstance worried the missionaries. They were concerned about their students' activities in 1925 because the Chinese

⁴³ Waldron, *From war to nationalism*, pp.260-1 and Osterhammel, 'Imperialism in Transition', *China Quarterly*, No.98, June 1984, p.278.

⁴⁴ *News Bulletin, The Chinese News Service*, Series 1, No.I, December 16, 1926, p.10. However the Foreign Office warned the British Legation that the BMC action had been illegal, and would bring problems on the British themselves. See PRO FO371/11661 Telegram from Foreign Office, 3rd December, 1926.

⁴⁵ John Israel, *Student Nationalism in China, 1927-1937* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966), pp.12-3.

⁴⁶ Wen-Han Kiang, *The Chinese Student Movement* (New York: King's Crown Press, 1948), pp.94-5.

students began to join the demonstration, refusing to attend the classes, boycotting annual examinations and threatening to open a new school.⁴⁷ This happened in TACC in the middle of 1925 when their students responded to the anti-imperialist movement in China. However, it took eight days for these students to react after several of their fellow students influenced them. At first they boycotted classes.⁴⁸ They accused the British of moving into China uninvited and demanded that all relations with them must be cut off.⁴⁹ Next propaganda was circulated, spreading news of alleged British 'cruelties' in Shanghai and warning shopkeepers not to sell British goods. Attacks on the TACC continued, with a small group of its own students opening an office in the native city to organise propaganda activities that pointed to the TACC as a British imperialist institution, and pledging not to study in that college anymore.⁵⁰

However, the impact of the student activists in the TACC was not serious, and the British missionaries took a moderate approach to handling the student agitation. They did not oppose students joining the demonstrations. This did not mean that they supported them, but in this case they did not want to interfere. From this moderate approach it is clear that the missionaries had also learnt that the Chinese students could not be opposed by harsh action, the May Thirtieth Incident in Shanghai being a case in point. Therefore the impact on the missionaries was slight, and the only matter of concern to them was the future of their activities, which would be jeopardised by the

⁴⁷ Ka-che Yip, 'Nationalism and Revolution: the Nature and Causes of Student Activism in the 1920s', in F. Gilbert Chan and Thomas H. Etzold (eds.) *China in the 1920s: Nationalism and Revolution* (New York: A Division of Franklin Watts, 1976), p.104.

⁴⁸ SOAS, CWM North China Reports Box 9, 1922-1927, Report for the year 1925 by S. Lavington Hart, Tientsin.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ SOAS, CWM North China Incoming Correspondence Box 24, 1924 – 1925, Folder 4, Letter from S. Lavington Hart to Hawkins, Tientsin, September 4, 1925.

rise of Chinese nationalism. This worry slowly subsided, because at the end of 1925, the TACC was still receiving many applications from Chinese to enlist in the college.⁵¹ When they opened the TACC on 15 September 1926, they took in 300 pupils, increasing again to 500 in March 1927. This meant that the TACC still did not suffer much from the anti-imperialist movement organised by students.⁵² Overall, between 1925 and early 1927, the missionaries did not have to worry much about the war or the anti-imperialist propaganda. All their work went on as usual.⁵³ Only the Nanking Incident interrupted their work, when orders came from the British Minister in Peking to prepare to evacuate.

To conclude, what happened in Tientsin on in the aftermath of the May Thirtieth Incident had little impact on the British community there, which was, however, worried about the situation in China. Some were afraid the Boxer Uprising would be repeated in Tientsin. They therefore prepared themselves against any trouble from the Chinese. The foreign community had always had a bad perception of the Chinese and the anti-foreign character of the Boxers was used as a symbol of the Chinese nationalist attack on the foreign interests.⁵⁴ However, the so-called 'New Boxer Rising' never happened.⁵⁵ The three factors outlined above show that the British were in a safe position. These factors can be summarised as the nature of the disturbance focusing on labour and economic issues; the good relationship between the

⁵¹ SOAS, CWM North China Reports Box 9, 1922-1927, Report for the year 1925 by S. Lavington Hart, Tientsin.

⁵² SOAS, CWM North China Reports Box 9, 1922-1927, Report of C.H.B. Longman, 1925.

⁵³ SOAS, CWM North China Reports Box 9, 1922-1927, Report for the year of 1926 by J.D. Liddell, Tientsin, December 31, 1926.

⁵⁴ Paul A. Cohen, *History in Three Keys: The Boxers as Event, Experience, and Myth* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), p.253.

⁵⁵ *The Celestial Empire*, 22 August 1925, p.163 and Cohen, *History in Three Keys*, p.252.

British and Chinese in the concession; and the early suppression of the strikes. What happened in Tientsin was a sideshow which did not evolve into greater disturbances (such as those in Shanghai in 1925) happening elsewhere in China, particularly in the centre and the south.

Evacuation

As described above, it seemed that Tientsin was now under control and the student activism had been suppressed by 1925. However, the British government was still concerned about the impact both of the civil war and of the anti-imperialist movement in Tientsin's hinterlands. British interests were under attack in the Yangtze Valley (1925-1927). Britain lost its two concessions in Hankow and Kiukiang. The news of the seizures warned the British in China to prepare to counter further problems caused by the Northern Expedition of the KMT armies. It was their first alarm, warning them to stand by to evacuate from the interior if anything worse happened.⁵⁶ The British government was frustrated that it had offered to ameliorate the situation in the December Memorandum to no avail and decided that the time had come to counter the Chinese reaction and save British interests in China. In the case of the Nanking Incident, the British government in London agreed to demand a written apology from the Commander-in-Chief of the KMT forces, Chiang Kai-shek, and the punishment of all those responsible for killing and injuring foreigners and the destruction of foreign properties, with full reparations.⁵⁷ At this stage they also felt that the security, lives and property of British people were at stake. Apart from the

⁵⁶ SOAS, CWM North China Reports Box 9, 1922-1927, Letter from Edith S. Murray to friends, Tsangchow, February 2nd, 1927.

⁵⁷ Wilson, 'Britain and the Kuomintang, 1924-28, p.559.

Nanking Incident, the northern government under Chang Tso-lin also had problems holding its position in Peking. A rumour had spread that Chang Tso-lin would retreat to Manchuria, and the British Legation feared that the situation would become perilous when KMT troops reached the north.⁵⁸ The British community in Tientsin feared a repetition of the Nanking events and this greatly worried the British in both China and London. At this point, the British Minister in Peking, Sir Miles Lampson, requested that the British Government dispatch another 500 men to strengthen the existing British troops available in Tientsin. However, this suggestion was rejected, as the small numbers of British troops available would not be able to counter larger Chinese forces. They suggested that at least two or three full divisions were required to defend British interests in both Tientsin and Peking from any Chinese attack, but all this depended on the willingness of other Powers to join hands with the British troops to protect both cities. If this scheme failed, the alternative would be evacuation.⁵⁹

In the north the missionaries had established their stations in the interior to develop social work and propagate Christianity in China. The LMS had two outstations in the north, in Tsangchow and Siaochang (both situated south of Tientsin). Tientsin became the headquarters of the LMS. The LMS also had workers on the outskirts of Peking. When news of the disturbance in south and central China came (1925), the north was still engulfed in the civil war. Tientsin did not escape the fighting. The Kuominchun Army under Feng Yu-hsiang began its attack on the city

⁵⁸ Kane, 'Sir Miles Lampson at the Peking Legation 1926-1933', p.73.

⁵⁹ Bowie, 'Great Britain and the Use of Force in China, 1919 to 1931', pp.291-2.

on 22 December 1925.⁶⁰ In a few days the Kuominchun successfully captured Tientsin. General Li Ching-lin, a supporter of Chang Tso-lin, fled to the Japanese Concession and moved his army to Shantung.⁶¹ Before the defeated army retreated from the city, they looted it. At this point the foreign volunteers and troops in foreign concessions stood ready to protect the concessions. To prevent aggression from this army, they built barricades. There was a small incident when Italian guards guarding the electric works killed two Chinese soldiers; however, there was no retaliation from the Chinese.⁶²

The civil war had little effect on the missionaries except for the emergence of bandits in the north. Neither army disturbed the missionary workers or their properties, although some fighting took place close to churches or schools. The war kept the missionaries busy with the refugees who came to them seeking shelter. Most of the refugees were women and children. The civil war in the north put great pressure on the Chinese peasants in the interior. Their lives were threatened not only by the danger of war but also by Chinese forces who took their food and animals. These circumstances made their lives dangerous and difficult, and the only places that the army did not touch were the missionary churches and schools.

However, news of the Nanking Incident gave the foreigners cause to consider their safety in the case of a similar incident happening to them. The British

⁶⁰ Sheridan, *Chinese Warlord: the Career of Feng Yu-hsiang*, p.184. War between Feng Yu-hsiang and Chang Tso-lin began when both Feng Yu-hsiang and Kuo Sung-lin demanded Chang Tso-lin to resign. Both of them had cooperated to attack the Chang Tso-lin's troops in North China.

⁶¹ *The North China Herald*, 26th December 1925, p.552.

⁶² *The North China Herald*, 2nd February 1926, p.2.

government ordered all British subjects in the interior to evacuate to Tientsin (April, 1927). In addition, the British government prepared an ultimatum to the Chinese to comply with their demands concerning the Nanking Incident.⁶³ At this point the British government seemed likely to choose to go to war with the Chinese, which was another reason why the British government wanted to evacuate its subjects.⁶⁴

As mentioned in Chapter 1, the missionaries, who had big interests in terms of workers and several properties, had differences of opinion regarding the evacuation. Some did not think that the measure was justified, since the north was now at peace, and found the order to evacuate 'very premature' and disturbing to their missionary work in the interior.⁶⁵ They did not feel that the situation would cause any trouble, as the KMT troops had already pulled back from the north. In addition the northern warlords had full control of the situation there.⁶⁶ Other missionaries worried that this decision would affect their work in the interior. After the evacuation their work would not be the same. They feared that their 'anti-imperialist' activists would invade their stations and loot everything, stopping their missionary work.⁶⁷ As A. Christiansen, one of the Missionary workers said:-

Then we were not really sure the Chinese truly wanted us back again and there were times when one was tempted to ask if it was worth while making so much effort to try to help people who

⁶³ SOAS, CWM North China Report Box 9, 1922-1927, Report of 1927 by Evan E. Bryant, Tsangchow.

⁶⁴ Wilson, 'Britain and the Kuomintang, 1924-28', pp.559 – 60. A memorandum prepared by the Chief of Staff suggested that Yangtze River and Canton should be blockaded.

⁶⁵ SOAS, CWM North China Incoming Correspondence Box 25, 1926-1927, Folder 3, Letter from A.H. Jowett Murray to Mr. Hawkins, Tientsin, 16th May 1927.

⁶⁶ SOAS, CWM North China Incoming Correspondence Box 25, 1926-1927, Letter from Stuckey to Folk, Tientsin, 24 April 1927.

⁶⁷ SOAS, CWM North China Report Box 9, 1922-1927, Report for 1927 by Arnold G. Bryson, Tsangchow.

apparently did not want us, not that we had much evidence locally to feel that our colleagues were not our friends, but there was so much communistic propaganda, and all Chinese are easily influenced.⁶⁸

Although some of the missionaries were reluctant to follow the evacuation order, doubting that the situation was really perilous, they had to obey.⁶⁹ The situation in Siaochang became more dangerous when the arsenal in Techow was seized by the army and communication with Siaochang was cut. The missionaries in Siaochang were advised to move fast because it would be unsafe if anything happened there. Furthermore, the British government told them that the Powers had prepared strong action against the KMT government if it did not comply with their ultimatum after the Nanking Incident.⁷⁰ Therefore the missionaries had to obey the evacuation order to avoid any unexpected attack from the Chinese.

In the early spring of 1927 the British Minister ordered the Consul General in Tientsin to call all British subjects to Tientsin and other treaty ports.⁷¹ The evacuation to Tientsin began in April 1927, and involved not only British missionaries, but also other nationals.⁷² In Tientsin the situation was peaceful, with no sign of danger whatsoever in the foreign concessions. When almost all of the refugees had entered Tientsin, the situation became crowded and uncomfortable. As one LMS missionary, Evan E. Bryant wrote;...“ [a]s summer came on a serious problem loomed up. Many

⁶⁸ SOAS, CWM North China Report Box 9, 1922-1927, Report for 1927 by A. Christiansen, Tsangchow.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ SOAS, CWM North China Incoming Correspondence Box 25, 1926-1927, Letter from Stuckey to Folk, Tientsin, 24 April 1927.

⁷¹ Peter Stursberg, *Memoirs of Imperialism and Its ending: No foreign Bones in China* (Alberta: The University of Alberta Press, 2002), pp.172 and 173.

⁷² SOAS, CWM North China Report Box 9, 1922-1927, Report for 1927 by Evan E. Bryant, Tsangchow.

of the refugees were living in very unsanitary circumstances, and roughing it in the most cramped and ill-furnished quarters, while at Peitaiho were many empty well furnished houses tenantless owing to the troubles.”⁷³ As a result missionary representatives met the British Consul General about the issue (1927).⁷⁴ Lampson agreed to let the British go to Peitaiho with adequate protection.⁷⁵ He added that the congestion of refugees in Tientsin would create a health problem.⁷⁶

Lampson brought this matter to Chamberlain. Chamberlain also agreed that the British should be allowed to take holidays in Peitaiho.⁷⁷ He shared Lampson’s view, afraid that the situation in Tientsin, which was full of refugees, would invite an epidemic which would especially hit the women and children.⁷⁸ To avoid any incident in Peitaiho, the British government sent a gunboat, H.M.S. Magnolia, to stand by in case of an emergency. In addition, two British battalions in Peitaiho and Chinwangtao were ready to take on the evacuation of Peitaiho if the situation necessitated.⁷⁹ If the situation in the north became critical, the British troops had a contingency plan to move British subjects to Chinwangtao before evacuating them to Shanghai.⁸⁰ In order to get the other Powers’ support to protect the lives and property of foreigners, the

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Peitaiho (Beidaihe) was a popular holiday beach place where the foreigners took their break in summer time. It was 240 miles north of Tientsin, and had several holiday hotels which only opened during the season. Here also the visitors could rent cottages. This beach could be reached by the Peking – Mukden railway. See Carl Crow, *Handbook for China: with an introduction by H.J. Lethbridge Introduction* © Oxford University Press First Issued, with permission and with the addition of an introduction by Oxford University Press (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp.311, 312 and 313.

⁷⁵ FO228/3618 18C, Telegram from Sir Miles Lampson to the Foreign Office, 10th June 1927.

⁷⁶ FO228/3618 18C, Telegram from Sir Miles Lampson to the Foreign Office, 18th June 1927.

⁷⁷ FO228/3618 18C, Telegram from Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir Miles Lampson, 15th June 1927.

⁷⁸ FO228/3618 18C, Telegram from Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir Miles Lampson, 23rd June 1927.

⁷⁹ SOAS, CWM North China Reports Box 9, 1922-1927, Annual Report 1927 by W.F. Dawson, Peking.

⁸⁰ FO228/3618 18C, British Subjects at Peitaiho: Arrangements for Evacuation in Case of Emergency.

British Legation had a meeting with the American Legation. The Americans also had a small detachment of troops and their cruiser 'Marblehead' stationed in the vicinity of Peitaiho. After this decision was reached they let the British subjects move to Peitaiho, and hundreds of them went. Throughout their stay there the situation remained peaceful and without incident.

In central China the Northern Expedition was at a lull at this point. Chiang Kai-shek had turned on the communists and their sympathisers in Shanghai in April 1927.⁸¹ The implications of this led to the KMT split. In Hankow, the KMT was led by Wang Ching-wei, still supported by the KMT-Communist alliance, but in Nanking, Chiang Kai-shek opposed any cooperation with the communists.⁸² As a result the Wuhan government launched an expedition against the Nanking government, which provided an opportunity for the Northern Allies to launch a counter offensive.⁸³ The lull allowed the missionaries to move back to their stations in north China. In September 1927 the missionaries moved gradually back. They moved at their own risk, because the British government did not permit any move to the interior for at least the next six months.⁸⁴ After they returned to their station they found the situation

⁸¹ *Supplement to the China Express and Telegraph*, 14 April 1927, p.84, *The North-China Daily News*, 2 May 1927, p.7 and Smith, *A Road is Made*, pp.201-2.

⁸² Tien-wei Wu, 'A Review of the Wuhan Debacle: the Kuomintang-Communist Split of 1927', *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol.29, No.1. (Nov., 1969), pp.126-7 and Smith, *A Road is Made*, pp.204-5.

⁸³ On 25 July 1927, the Northern Allies, composed of Chang Tso-lin, Sun Chuan-fang and Chang Ts'ung-chang had succeeded regaining Hsuehchow from the KMT. See Martin Wilbur, 'The Nationalist Revolution: from Canton to Nanking, 1923-28', in John K. Fairbank, *The Cambridge History of China, Vol.12, Republican China 1912-1949, Part 1* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 682.

⁸⁴ SOAS, CWM North China Incoming Correspondence Box 25, Letter from Stuckey to Black, Tsangchow, 15 April 1927.

peaceful. The Chinese Christians who had taken over their jobs were also unharmed, and had continued the regular work of the mission.⁸⁵

In conclusion, the British government faced a challenging responsibility had a great responsibility to protect its nationals scattered as they were in the treaty ports and inland China. In addition, the missionaries' reluctance to evacuate Tientsin's hinterland illustrated that they, like the British traders, wanted to stay in China in the long term. This situation laid great responsibility on the British government to make sure that its nationals were safe from disturbances. It had to formulate a moderate (liberal) policy to protect not only the missionaries but also the British traders and other British nationals who wanted to stay. This policy, as mentioned earlier, created a dilemma in the British community as to whether the government could protect them or not because the majority of the British community doubted that the British liberal policy would succeed. The doubts of the British community are discussed below.

British Retaliation

When talking about British reaction to the disturbance in China, after May Thirtieth, British commercial voices in Tientsin had their own opinions about the likely impact on their affairs, as E. C. Peter, Jardine's agent in Tientsin put it:

As regards business, I think the position very serious indeed, unless some compromise is arrived at on the political situation in Shanghai. All our information points to the probability of a boycott of everything British. There is a tremendous propaganda going on throughout North China, and it is the opinion of leading Chinese, and also of leading

⁸⁵ SOAS, CWM North China Reports Box 9, 1922-1927, Report of 1927 by Evan E. Bryant, Tsangchow.

British business men here, that the British should do something to counteract it.⁸⁶

The KMT took this opportunity to use the boycott to put pressure on foreign imperialists.⁸⁷ Even the Chinese were urged to show their nationalist spirit by buying Chinese goods.⁸⁸ This pressure was brought directly to bear on British traders in China, who were relieved that the BMC had taken the precaution of cooperating with the Chinese authorities and so prevented a boycott in Tientsin.

Another event that raised concerns for the British was the announcement of the more liberal British policy, by which the British government intended to lighten the burden of maintaining the unequal treaty system. The British could not afford the amount of commitment needed to retain this system as Chinese nationalism increased. The announcement was heralded by the December Memorandum at the end of 1926, which opened a new space for the British and Chinese governments to settle anomalies in their relationship. The British government had agreed to negotiate "...on treaty revision and all other outstanding questions..." which the Chinese government wanted to settle.⁸⁹ This included two major issues: extraterritorial rights to be resolved in the near future; and the return of all British concessions and settlements in China to the Chinese authorities. The policy was received with mixed feelings in Tientsin. This reaction can be described in two parts; firstly, British traders and community in the

⁸⁶ CUL, Jardine Matheson Archive, MS JM J29/1-7, JMA, Letter from E. C. Peter to A. Brooke Smith, Tientsin, 16 June 1925.

⁸⁷ Karl Gerth, *China Made: Consumer Culture and the creation of the Nation* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2003), pp.176-7.

⁸⁸ Harrison, *The Making of the Republican Citizen*, pp.147-8.

⁸⁹ *The North China Herald*, 31st December 1926, p.613.

concessions' feelings about the liberal policy; and secondly, the missionaries' point of view. These two views are discussed in the following sections.

The Publicity Bureau

The British across China, including those in Tientsin, shared the same feelings about events as they unfolded. In Tientsin, the British were shocked and sympathetic about what had happened to other British subjects in China after the May Thirtieth Incident in Shanghai. The Nanking Incident increased their fear and worry greatly. Then in early 1927 came news condemning the BMC for discriminating against Chinese entering Victoria Park.⁹⁰ This inflamed the Chinese Nationalists' spirit in Tientsin. As we know, the "Chinese and dogs" sign in Shanghai had become a big issue from which attacks were made on the British image in Shanghai.⁹¹ As a result Chinese regarded that the British community in Tientsin was alike their cousin in Shanghai. So the British community in Tientsin was unable to escape in the same lights from the Chinese anger.

Like other British subjects in China, they wanted the British government to take sterner action to counter Chinese nationalism. However, this hope was dashed by the December Memorandum. The government's agreement to negotiate on the rendition of the British Concession in Tientsin further shocked the community. They did not believe that the time was right to return the concessions. Furthermore, they did not believe that Chinese law could protect them in China. In order to counter the

⁹⁰ SOAS, MS186361, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Box 7, "Memorandum No.19, A Mischievous Slander".

⁹¹ See Fitzgerald, *Awakening China*, p.123.

Chinese attack on British interests, the British community established in July 1925 a bureau through which to channel its views on the problems in China.⁹² This illustrates how the British community in Tientsin was worried about the disturbance in China and wanted to protect its interests.

This would become the Tientsin British Committee of Information (TBCI), which would disseminate news of China to the British public. It stated that “[p]eople at Home need to be educated on Chinese affairs, and on the affairs of British interest in China. The ignorance at Home is lamentable and at a time like this likely to be shewn [shown] and correspondingly felt out here.”⁹³ One of their targets was to secure the support they would need from their home country to justify their case that China was still not ready to administer the lives of foreign residents. On the other hand, this bureau would become a pressure group to influence the British government to abandon the abolition of extraterritorial rights in China and the return of the Tientsin concession to the Chinese authorities. Apart from this, the Bureau monitored the British press for attacks on British communities in China.⁹⁴ In China, the Bureau would act as a counter measure against Chinese agitation. It would:

. . . . collect, examine and file all the mischief making leaflets, pamphlets, posters, and important Chinese newspapers throughout the land. By this means it will be possible to know just what poison is at work and direction and colour will be given to the counter attack. Newspapers in English will be gathered in [the] same way, and articles containing the right kind of propaganda will be translated into Chinese and distributed. Arrangements will be

⁹² Bickers, *Britain in China*, p.146.

⁹³ SOAS, CHAS/MCP/31 China Association: Circular No.348-359, 1925, Memorandum by China Association, Tientsin, July 10th, 1925.

⁹⁴ SOAS, CHAS/MCP/31 China Association: Circular No.348-359, 1925, Letter from A.H. Bridge to Mr. Lyness, Tientsin, July 4th, 1925.

made to reach all classes of the Chinese community with the kind of propaganda that will be most effective.⁹⁵

According to this statement, the Bureau had two strategies. As mentioned earlier, on one hand the target would be the British public, and on the other the Bureau would serve to give information to the Chinese themselves. All information would be gathered from British traders, missionary workers in the interior, the Consulate and also several British travelers in China.⁹⁶ The bureau was formed after the May Thirtieth Incident in Shanghai as the Tientsin British Committee of Information (TBCI).⁹⁷ It was run by a small group headed by P.H.B. Kent, a prominent British lawyer in Tientsin and jointly owned the firm Kent and Mounsey – leading British solicitors in Tientsin.

After the TBCI was formed, it started to spread its own news to its colleagues, friends and the public in Britain. The first Bureau news came as two memoranda, No. 1: 'Foreign Settlements and Concessions in China and No.2: 'The Protocol of 1901 in relation to Railways'. British business circles supported the establishment of the TBCI, which was also supported by the China Association, which advanced money for its operation. Other leading British firms were willing to give further funds to this bureau.⁹⁸ The establishment of the TBCI had also been approved by the British

⁹⁵ SOAS, CHAS/MCP/31 China Association: Circular No.348-359, 1925, Memorandum by China Association, Tientsin, July 10th, 1925.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ SOAS, CHAS/MCP/32 Circulars No.360-373, 1926, Letter from Percy H.B. Kent to H. C. Wilcox, Secretary of China Association, Tientsin, 23rd March, 1926.

⁹⁸ HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 28 Vol.2 Letter from D. Forbes to H. B. Roe, Tientsin, 17 July, 1925; CUL, Jardine Matheson Archive, MS JM J29/1-7, JMA, Letter from E. C. Peter to A. Brooke Smith, Tientsin, 11 July 1925; CUL, Jardine Matheson Archive, MS JM J29/1-7, JMA, Letter from E. C. Peter

Legation in Peking. The Foreign Office sent a letter of appreciation to the TBCI because it helped them to get news from China. Other British communities in China also welcomed the establishment of this committee. This brought other British representatives from Shanghai to Tientsin to learn more about the committee and to urge the Bureau to help them in countering the problem in Shanghai.⁹⁹

The comments in the memoranda relate to different issues and problems in China, from the chaotic political situation to the misery of the Chinese people. These memoranda illustrate the mentality of the British community in Tientsin and its hinterlands as they made argued that the Chinese would be unable to administer foreigners. To the memorandum authors what was happening in China was due solely to small groups of people who tried to force the Chinese to join with them to launch anti-British movements.¹⁰⁰ The Bureau pointed out that the British communities were being victimised, and doubted that the Chinese could run China freely including resumed jurisdiction over the foreigners. It asserted that the Chinese could not manage their own country. In addition the militarists were freely using government transportation such as railways. This not only affected the foreign bondholders but also caused trade to grind to a standstill.¹⁰¹ The British community alleged that the Chinese justice and police systems still had weaknesses. According to the Bureau, practices such as corporal punishment to obtain evidence were still used in China.

to A. Brooke Smith, Tientsin, 21 July 1925 and CUL, Jardine Matheson Archive, MS JM J29/1-7, JMA, Letter from Brooke Smith to E.C. Peter, Tientsin, 21 July 1925.

⁹⁹ SOAS, CHAS/MCP/32 Circulars No.360-373, 1926, Letter from Percy H.B. Kent to H. C. Wilcox, Secretary of the China Association, Tientsin, 30th September, 1926.

¹⁰⁰ SOAS, MS186361, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Box 7, "Memorandum No.12, Tientsin British Committee of Information".

¹⁰¹ SOAS, MS186361, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Box 7, "Memorandum No.3, 'Economic Consequences of Military Control of Railways'".

Furthermore, few judges in China were independent from the Chinese authorities.¹⁰²

Added to this the chaotic situation in China, with “ ...political assassinations, rapine, loot and devastating disorganisation consequent upon civil war, but there has been increasing growth on the part of those authorities in the direction of the disregard of law and order ... spread all over China.”¹⁰³ In order to safeguard foreigners, the TBCI suggested that the abolition of the extraterritorial jurisdiction must follow several steps such as:-

1. Chinese Laws (approved by the Treaty Powers) administered in foreign cases by Foreign Judges, with Chinese Judges as spectators.
2. Foreign and Chinese Judges jointly trying such cases with equal powers, in accordance with Chinese Law.
3. Chinese Judges trying such cases, with Foreign Judges acting as Assessors.¹⁰⁴

From this point of view, it seemed that the British in Tientsin were concerned about their future. However the establishment of the TBCI cannot be interpreted as meaning that the British community mostly the traders were totally diehard. A better description would be that they were in shock and not ready to face any drastic changes to their rights in China. They were afraid that this continued attack on their interests would damage their image in China and in the world. They felt it better to make their own stand against the Chinese and Communist agitation. Therefore the TBCI was

¹⁰² SOAS, MS186361, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Box 7, “Memorandum No.13, ‘Extra-Territorial Jurisdiction in China’, Tientsin British Committee of Information”.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

formed not only as a vehicle to fight against the erosion of rights but also to clear their image in China and the world.

Missionaries' Views

Missionaries did not have clear or united views on the demands of the Chinese to abolish extraterritoriality and return the British Tientsin Concession to the Chinese. They did not form societies or issue memoranda on their thoughts about the matter. One memorandum, said to be produced by the LMS in Tientsin, pointed out that the missionaries in Tientsin supported the abolition of extraterritoriality and the reversion of the treaty in force between the British and the Chinese governments.¹⁰⁵ However, the LMS in Tientsin denied issuing any such statement, making clear that the LMS in Tientsin wished to avoid causing trouble by siding with any of the groups in China.¹⁰⁶ The missionaries had personal views, but did not present any opinion as a group. One of these personal views was from Dr. E. J. Stuckey, who did not agree at all to the opposition of British diehards to object the negotiation of the rendition of British concession. However his stand was midway between the Chinese rights and sympathy towards his own people. On one side, he agreed that the negotiations should be proceed. He also agreed that the forces could not remain in China forever to protect British interests, as they would not be able to hold off the Chinese Nationalists for long. It was necessary to negotiate with the Chinese about what they wanted.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁵ SOAS, CHAS/MCP/32 Circulars No.360-373, 1926, Letter from J.A. Andrew, Secretary of China Association in Tientsin to H.C. Wilcox, Secretary of China Association, London, Tientsin, 17th December 1925.

¹⁰⁶ SOAS, CHAS/MCP/32 Circulars No.360-373, 1926, London Mission Manifesto, Tientsin, 14th December 1925.

¹⁰⁷ SOAS, CWM North China Incoming Correspondence Box 25, 1926-1927, Folder 3, Letter from Stuckey to Folk, Tientsin, 24 April 1927.

On the other hand, Dr. Stuckey understood that this would have an adverse effect on the British traders, rather than on the missionaries. In addition, he argued China did not have a central government with which to negotiate, so it was useless to make them any proposition. He also doubted whether the new government under the Nationalists could legally be the sole government when it was split between Hankow and Nanking.¹⁰⁸ In addition Evan E. Bryant said:

If those who talk of the abolition of 'extrality' and of the retrocession of the Concessions, and the putting of missionaries under laws administered other than by their own consuls, would only open their eyes, and open the eyes of the Britain and America to the daily injustice and brutal cruelty rampant in countless towns and villages to-day, worse far now than under the Manchu Empire; to the utter disregard not only for property but for life itself under the "Republic"; and to the fact that the treatment of Chinese by Chinese over and over again would give points to those who wrought the Congo atrocities:¹⁰⁹

He did not think it wise to surrender these privileges because they protected not only themselves but also of Chinese. He argued:

We who live inland know the time is not yet. The distant roar of military trains at this moment emphasises my words, "the time is not yet". The groans of wounded farmers cry out, "the time is not yet"! The fact that the foreign mission compounds and the Concession are the only safe places in large parts of China to-day where Chinese men and women can live other than in daily terror demands their repetition.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ SOAS, CWM North China Reports Box 9, 1922-1927, Evangelistic Report for 1925, Evan E. Bryant, Tsangchow.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

These views reflect the fact that the missionaries did not have unified position.¹¹¹

The main worry of the missionaries was the developing anti-Christian movement in China. This was not new in China, as mentioned in the previous chapter. But it gradually became more organised when, in 1922, students formed the Anti-Christian Student Federation in Shanghai. At its sixth Congress in August 1924, the National Students' Union urged that the missionary schools be closed because the Christian Mission had 'denationalised' its Chinese students,¹¹² meaning that the school had converted the Chinese students to Christianity, isolating them from the Chinese Nationalist Movement. The students published two anti-Christian magazines, *Anti-Christianity Weekly* and *Anti-Christianity*.¹¹³ The actions of the young Chinese against the missionary movements in China created grievances among the LMS workers. For example in 1924, S. Lavington Hart showed his irritation, saying:

Stern demands for yielding no more to the Foreign aggression are made by the young Chinese, and a crying out for the abolition of Extraterritorial rights. No thought is allowed as to the weakness of China or the incapacity of any of her rulers to rule: but all the fault is laid at our doors. Young Christians are quite strong on all this. I have felt that Great Britain must not pour its money, together with the money from America and especially Russia, in to these Chinese schools and Colleges. It will be worse than thrown away.¹¹⁴

Such statements were very common among the British in China. The Chinese students had been branded, by the British community, as agents of destruction towards British

¹¹¹ Ning J. Chang, 'Tension within the Church: British Missionaries in Wuhan, 1913-28', *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol.33, No.2, (May, 1999), p. 443.

¹¹² Jessie G. Lutz, 'Chinese Nationalism and the Anti-Christian Campaign,' *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol.10, No.3 (1976), p.407.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, p.409.

¹¹⁴ SOAS, CWM North China Incoming Correspondence Box 24, 1924-1925, Letter from S. Lavington Hart to Hawkins, 2 January 1924.

interests.¹¹⁵ This statement also shows that some of the British missionaries were diehards who not accept the new wave of the Chinese patriotic movement against the foreign imperialism.¹¹⁶

However, the missionaries could not oppose the Chinese nationalists. The young Chinese were fighting fiercely for Chinese sovereignty and condemned all 'imperialist' elements in China, including the mission schools. For example, in 1925 some young Chinese educators condemned the missionaries' teaching methods and proposed to the Board of Education that religious instruction such as worship in schools should be prohibited.¹¹⁷ This young Chinese faction injected nationalist policy into Chinese education and put pressure on the missions. The missions had no choice but to acquiesce to the new era in China by accepting the orders and regulations of the Chinese government.

The LMS faced a dilemma in continuing its work in China. It would not pull out from China; and so could only achieve its aims by changing its attitude to Chinese nationalism. The missionaries were non-provocative and willing to obey the orders of the Chinese government, because the sinification process was part of their long-term aim of giving the Chinese the opportunity to run the missions.¹¹⁸ Furthermore the lack of funds also encouraged the LMS to implement sinification. Cheaper Chinese

¹¹⁵ W. Somerset Maugham, *On a Chinese Screen* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), p.24.

¹¹⁶ Bickers, *Britain in China*, p.146, pp.94-95.

¹¹⁷ SOAS, CWM North China Reports Box 9, 1922-1927, Report for the Year 1924 by S. Lavington.

¹¹⁸ SOAS, MS186361, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Box 7, "Memorandum No.19, A Mischievous Slander".

labour would benefit the LMS in their operations in Tientsin and its hinterland.¹¹⁹ The vast operation of the LMS, not only in Tientsin but also in its surroundings, needed many employees not only for evangelical work, but also in education and medicine. The process of employing the Chinese had been carried out by the LMS when they were active in employing Chinese teachers, doctors and priests in by 1931.¹²⁰

Their willingness to change according to the Chinese education ministry directives had put two of their schools in Peking under the Chinese Church.¹²¹ The modifications required to meet the new Chinese education policy were discussed with an attitude open to accepting any changes required in order to allow the missionary schools to continue:-

By proving their willingness to abide by government regulations, too, they hope to disarm the fears that are seriously entertained of foreign aggressiveness and to open the way for more liberal treatment, since the Government's desire to regulate the schools is due not a little [to] such fear.¹²²

According to these aims, in 1927 the TACC's constitution was amended to follow the new Chinese education policy which required schools and colleges in China not to be under the administration of foreign missions. In that year, the LMS had transferred authority in the TACC to a Court of Governors, elected from among prominent British and Chinese citizens. Its executive power lay with a Board of Managers, with a

¹¹⁹ Robert Bickers, "To serve and not to rule": British Protestant Missionaries and Chinese Nationalism, 1928-1931', in Robert A. Bickers and Rosemary Seton (eds.), *Missionary Encounters: Sources and Issues* (Surrey: Curzon Press, 1996), pp.218 and 224.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, p.224.

¹²¹ SOAS, CWM North China Incoming Correspondence Box 25, 1926-1927, Folder 3, Letter E.J. Stuckey to Friends, Tientsin, March, 1927.

¹²² SOAS, CWM North China Incoming Correspondence Box 25, 1926-1927, Folder 1, North China District Committee, London Missionary, Minute of Annual Meeting, 1926, Tientsin, February 12-19, 1926.

Chinese majority.¹²³ The Chinese majority on the board was another condition imposed by the new education regulations.

All in all, the LMS and other Protestant movements seemed to fall in with the requests of the Chinese nationalists. Missionary work would be impossible without the support of the Chinese government. Moreover the fact that their work was directed at the public made the situation more complicated and dangerous. The Tientsin Massacre and the Boxer Uprising illustrated that they needed the trust of the Chinese in order to have a chance of converting them to Christianity. In addition the safety of the missionaries and their property was among the missionaries' concerns. The anti-Christian attacks on several mission stations such as the one in Fujian brought about fear in the missionaries of a "Boxer resurgence" in China. The communists' role as agitators inflaming the Chinese students to attack the mission stations added to their worries.¹²⁴ Therefore the LMS missionaries always hoped that the situation in China would return to normal, and that the KMT armies, and especially Chiang Kai-shek, would modify their extreme attitude when they reached the north.¹²⁵ However, the missionaries had a long term idea of the sinification of their institution. Therefore the transfer of their schools into Chinese hands was not a problem. This transfer was important to the survival of the missionaries in China, and included transferring any mission staff not suited to the Chinese environment. New staff, more capable in the

¹²³ SOAS, CWM North China Reports Box 9, 1922-1927, Report of A.P. Cullen, Tientsin, North China, 1927.

¹²⁴ Cohen, *History in Three Keys*, p.253.

¹²⁵ SOAS, CWM North China Incoming Correspondence Box 25, 1926-1927, Folder 3, Letter from E.J. Stuckey to Hawkins, Tientsin, 17 June 1927.

Chinese language and culture, were employed.¹²⁶ The year 1927 was the starting point from which the missionaries transformed their institutions in the sinification process towards the Chinese social environment.¹²⁷

Conclusion

So did the British in north China suffer? Generally, they did not suffer as much as their counterparts in south and central China. As there was no real anti-British movement, so the strikes, demonstrations and disturbances never became big incidents in Tientsin. During Lampson's visit to the KMA's coal mines in Tongshan, he mentioned that:-

At a time when the great majority of the industrial undertakings of China are suffering from strikes, boycotts, loss of trade, and even actual destruction, as the result of the deplorable state of the country, it is refreshing to come into actual contact with a British-controlled organisation which is still comparatively unmolested, and which is operated in a manner and with results which bear comparison with the most successful enterprises of its type throughout the world.¹²⁸

Lampson's view illustrates how the impact of the disturbance to British control and power in the British community in Tientsin and its hinterland differed from that felt in other treaty ports in the Yangtze Valley.

The rise of Chinese nationalism in the middle 1920s also threatened the British presence in Tientsin and its hinterlands. As in the Yangtze Valley, the rise of nationalism caused the British community great concern. Chinese student activists

¹²⁶ Bickers, *Britain in China*, p.201.

¹²⁷ John King Fairbank, *The Great Chinese Revolution, 1800-1985* (London: Pan Book, 1988), p.194.

¹²⁸ PRO FO228/3595 From Sir Miles Lampson to Sir Austen Chamberlain, Peking, 25th October 1927.

brought about strikes in several foreign factories, organised demonstrations in Tientsin and boycotted the mission schools. This disturbance (apart from at the mission school) happened just near the foreign concessions. The civil war in North China affected the progress of trade in Tientsin's hinterlands. The British could do nothing to stop these disturbances in Tientsin or to prevent the disruption caused by the civil war.

After the mass demonstration in Shanghai in 1925, the 'gun boat policy' no longer deterred the Chinese. Therefore the British concession in Tientsin became a testing ground for the British government's good relations with the Chinese authorities, particularly with the Fengtian group under Chang Tso-lin. The British needed to adopt a moderate approach in order to avoid repercussions from Chinese activists. Owing to his animosity against the KMT, Chang Tso-lin was willing to help to suppress subversive activities by the KMT and communists in Tientsin. This approach to keeping peace and order in Tientsin succeeded. The Chinese activist propaganda and labour unions were suppressed by the Chinese local authorities. Some Chinese activists were killed. By relying on the Chinese themselves to suppress the activism the British succeeded in avoiding incidents which might have jeopardised their interests.

However, the British were still in a fragile position because they needed to protect not only the concession in Tientsin but also their interests in its hinterland. Missions and the KMA were still open to a Chinese attack. At this point the solution

was to evacuate the British community from the hinterland to Tientsin, where the entire British community could be protected. Apart from the BMC police, British troops were called in as a precautionary measure to safeguard the concession.

All decisions regarding the security of the Tientsin British community and its hinterlands were taken by the British Minister and Consul General. The BMC was not able to act independently. It even had to get approval from the British Minister and Consul-General before it could take action against the KMT activists within the concession. Here lay another difference between the BMC, with its limited power to decide on security measures, and the SMC. The British government's control over the BMC was strong, but the British government could not completely control the British community in Tientsin. For example, as mentioned above, when the refugees came to Tientsin leading to unhealthy condition in the British concession. These refugees had made a request to the British Consul General to go to more relaxed place, Peitaiho. The British minister was reluctant to allow them to go to Peitaiho because of security reason. But the pressure from the British community had led Lampson to agree to give permission for this. This is a small example of the resilience of the British community.

The members of the British community in Tientsin responded to the situation in China and to the British government's policy in different ways. The British traders were very concerned about their position in Tientsin and China as the continuation of the Chinese attacks put their interests at stake. To avoid prolonging the Chinese

attacks the British traders had to establish their own weapon; therefore the TBCI was formed. The formation of this bureau served as a defensive strategy to counter-attack Chinese propaganda and to influence British government policy. This bureau became a tool of the British in Tientsin to attack Chinese nationalism. Through it they claimed that Chinese nationalism resulted purely from the after made of the Russian communists on the Chinese to attack the British interests in China.¹²⁹

At the same time the British government adopted the more liberal policy outlined in the December Memorandum, which offered much to ameliorate Britain's relationship with China; the return of their concession in Tientsin and extraterritorial rights. The TBCI was their only hope as a voice to protect their rights in Tientsin. They believed that their business interests would suffer if they were deprived of their rights. Thus, the TBCI would help in correcting negative views towards them in China and would enlighten the British government to secure a proposition to safeguard British interests.

Another group in the British community in north China was the missionaries, who had no clear view regarding the new British policy. Some favoured the policy, and others opposed it. To the missionaries, the prime aim of the missions was not to seek profit but to convert the Chinese; they catered to the Chinese people rather than the Chinese markets. However the missionaries still had negative view of the Chinese.

¹²⁹ SOAS, MS186361, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Box 7, "Memorandum No.12, Memorandum Dealing with events in Swatow and District since 1925 and with the situation that development out of the anti-British movement which began in June in Shanghai and later spread to south".

Some of them still branded the Chinese 'jelly-fish' and criticised them for having a 'topsy-turvy' nature.¹³⁰ At this time the missionaries still believed in the privileges of foreigners as inviolable and as such they considered themselves protected from Chinese attack. When the British did come under attack from the Chinese in the mid-1920s the missionaries began to talk about modifying their methods and operations in China. Owing to this they needed to change their rules and regulations. They had to amend their constitution and obey the Chinese government's order. Whether the Chinese dominated their schools did not matter. They wanted to avoid any criticism towards them as British Imperialists. Furthermore, this was part of their liberal attitude towards the sinification process in their Church institutions in China. All in all, it was not the control of the British concession that was a problem for the British government but how to control how the British community's responses to the changing political situation. This is discussed in the following chapter.

¹³⁰ Bickers, "To serve and not to rule", p.212.

Chapter Three

'Let Sleeping Dogs Lie': The New Proposal (1927-1929)

Introduction

The year 1928 was very tense for the British in north China. The KMT had begun the second phase of their Northern Expedition in 1928 after a lull the previous year. Although Chiang Kai-shek had purged the Communists, this was no guarantee that British interests would not be attacked. The British Legation was also unsure whether news of the KMT and Communist split would bring about in Tientsin a repeat of the Hankow seizure or the Nanking Incident. Furthermore, the Tsinan incident (3 May 1928) between KMT (Nationalist) and Japanese troops illustrated another uncertainty about their fate when the KMT arrived in the north. So the British Legation had to evacuate its subjects from the interior to Tientsin, triggering another panic among Tientsin's British community, which was alarmed by the seriousness of this move by their government.

This chapter examines two points related to British interests and the above events. Firstly it discusses the responses of the legation and the British commandant to the advance of the KMT army and the retreat of Chang Tso-lin. The previous chapter described how the British community seemed pleased with the way Chang's government maintained peace and order in north China. However, as Chang's troops were gradually defeated by the Nationalist troops the situation became uncertain. This chapter looks at the different viewpoints of the British Legation and the British commander about the preparations to protect

British interests, the British evacuation from Tientsin's hinterland and the situation in the KMA mine as Chang's troops retreated to Manchuria. The second point of this chapter is the implementation of the new liberal policy in Tientsin, focusing on discussion over the rendition of the concession. This was part of the British government's offer to ameliorate Anglo-Chinese relations. This section also examines the British community's response to this offer and its efforts to influence the government. My discussion at this point concentrates mostly on the British traders' point of view. This important group dominated the BMC and guided the concession in line with British policy and the changes in China. Before looking into these points, I summarise the advance of the KMT into north China in 1928 which from the background to the later stage of the rendition discussions.

The Nationalist Advance

On 7 April 1928, after a long lull, the Nationalist government launched the second phase of its Northern Expedition.¹ Chiang Kai-shek had emerged as the dominant figure in the Nationalist camp and allied himself with two northern warlords, Feng Yu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan. On the northern side (known as the 'Fengtian' or 'Ankuochun' forces), Chang Tso-lin had made an alliance with Chang Tsung-chang and Sun Chuan-fang, both based in Shantung. The second phase of the Northern Expedition saw the KMT restructure their approach to dealing with the foreign powers. However, their main objective, to abrogate the unequal treaties, was still on the agenda. Their approach was to avoid any confrontation with the powers and in doing so Chiang Kai-shek expressed his

¹ Wilbur, *The Nationalist Revolution in China, 1923-1928*, pp.173-5 and Iriye, *After Imperialism*, p.193.

willingness to respect foreign lives and property.² Furthermore, the Central Executive Committee of the KMT had agreed that the struggle against the foreigners should concentrate more on diplomatic measures.³ This pledge was repeated by Feng Yu-hsiang, who said on the eve of the Northern Expedition that he was willing to protect the foreign interests.⁴

This promise, however, could not guarantee foreigners protection from the indirect impact of war on normal life in north China. The war, as before, affected transportation, telegraph and telephone services and missionary works, and hampered trade in the area. The situation is illustrated by comments from S. Evan Meech, an LMS missionary worker:

Since Chang [Tso-lin]'s departure the railway service has been stopped, the cars being wholly in the hands of the retreating troops. As a consequence we have had only three deliveries of mail from outside in these ten days. But a daily delivery is promised by road.⁵

There were relatively minor and by now familiar inconveniences. The most serious event in this war was the 3 May 1928 Tsinan Incident when the Japanese troops, trying to protect Japanese interests in Tsinan, clashed with Nationalist forces, sparking alarm once more among foreigners.⁶ One of these described how:

. . . Tsinanfu had fallen to the Southerners and it was reported that Techow had fallen. The murder of Dr. Seymour at Tsining and the trouble between the Chinese and the Japanese at Tsinan

² Iriye, *After Imperialism*, pp.193-4.

³ P. Cavendish, 'Anti-Imperialism in the Kuomintang 1923,' Jerome Ch'en and Nicholas Tarling (eds.), *Studies in the Social History of China and South-East Asia* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1970), pp.42-3.

⁴ PRO FO371/13231 Translation of letter from Feng Yu-hsiang to H.M. Minister, 1 May 1928.


⁵ SOAS, CWM North China Incoming Correspondence Box 26, 1928-1929 I, Letter from S. Evans Meech to F.H. Hawkins, Peking, 13 June 1928.

⁶ Iriye, *After Imperialism*, pp.199-204.

with accompanying looting of Japanese houses and the murders of Japanese civilians . . . ⁷

Memories of the bloody incident in Nanking increased concerns about the safety of Tientsin.

Figure 4.1 : The Road Hog



THE ROAD HOG

Source: *The North China Herald*, May 12, 1928, p.213.

Figure 4.1: Sapajou's caricature of the news from Shanghai was clearly also the view from Tientsin about the advance of Chinese troops to north China. Around 1927-1928 the British community were very anxious about their fate as the

⁷ SOAS, CWM North China Incoming Correspondence Box 26, 1928-1929 I, Letter from M.F. Dawson to F.H. Hawkins, Peking, 16 May 1928.

Chinese advanced on Tientsin. One by one, incidents in China were occurring, starting with the Shameen Incident (Canton), the May Thirtieth Incident (Shanghai), the Hankow Incident, the Nanking Incident and the Tsinan Incident, all of which involved foreigners under attack. The Chen-O'Malley agreement regarding the Chinese takeover of the British Hankow concession had not yet improved the British position in China.⁸ The cartoon clearly links the trouble at Nanking with Tsinan. The Nationalist government under Chiang Kai-shek also used the Tsinan Incident to mobilise the masses, especially the students, against Japanese imperialism.⁹ Owing to this, the British in Tientsin feared that the next place to be endangered would be Tientsin, where the memory of the Boxer Uprising began to haunt them, leading them to call on their government for protection.¹⁰

There were concerns that unless precautionary measures were implemented similar danger to that which faced Shanghai in spring 1927 would threaten Tientsin.¹¹ At this point the BMC was able to do little to protect the British concession as it needed the approval of the British minister and the Consul General. Therefore these measures were dealt with by the British government. The British community's worries increased and they turned to the British government for help. The British government endeavoured to secure its interests by adopting two actions. Firstly, they decided to evacuate all foreigners from the

⁸ Louis, *British Strategy in the Far East*, p.160.

⁹ Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, *Student Protests in Twentieth-Century China: the View from Shanghai* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), pp.157-8.

¹⁰ SOAS, MS186361, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Box 7, "Memorandum No.26, The Treaty Port of Tientsin".

¹¹ Louis, *British Strategy in the Far East*, p.131.

interior to Tientsin, and second, to defend Tientsin and routes from Peking to the sea. The first action urged the missionaries to retreat to Tientsin.

Missions in the interior seemed to adopt a different view of the situation in spring 1928. In 1927, they had appeared determined not to evacuate, but in 1928 the missionaries believed that the advance of Nationalist troops could be problematic. The news from Tsinan, the killing of two American nationals - Dr. Seymour in Tsining and Mrs. Hobart by bandits in Taian - and the kidnapping of a Dr. Osborn by an unknown group (possibly bandit) had greatly alarmed them. To avoid trouble from the advancing troops, they decided that the situation was serious. The British Consul General in Tientsin had also ordered that evacuation was necessary in advance of the arrival of Nationalist troops in the north.¹²

When this telegram was conveyed to the missionaries in Tsangchow, they moved in spring 1928 with haste and without complaint.¹³ The missionaries in Siochang also took this advice and began to move from their station in May 1928. Tientsin became the centre of their evacuation.¹⁴ As mentioned in the previous chapter, Chang Tso-lin was regarded as the 'protector of the foreigners'. When the Nationalist troops succeeded in defeating the Northerners, the fate of the inland missionaries became uncertain. The repeated defeat of the Northern Troops in Shantung, beginning in April 1928, signalled that evacuation was imperative, and

¹² PRO FO371/13231 Letter from Sir E. Howard to Sir Austen Chamberlain, Enclosure No.1, Washington, 24 May 1928 and SOAS, CWM North China Incoming Correspondence Box 26, 1928-1929 I, North China Executive Committee Minutes, Tientsin, 11 May 1928.

¹³ SOAS, CWM North China Reports Box 10, Report for 1928-1931, Report by Edith Murry, Tsangchow, 19 February 1928.

¹⁴ SOAS, CWM North China Reports Box 10, Report for 1928-1931, Report by Ethel S. Livens, Siochang, January 25 1929.

the missionaries believed that it would be dangerous to remain at their station.¹⁵ Their journey to Tientsin was completed without problems, although the Peking-Pukow railway was not running properly and Northern troops were still lingering in the interior.

Disagreement over the Defence Plan

The second action, as mentioned earlier, was to defend British interests in Tientsin and its hinterlands. However, this option created a divergent view between the British Legation and the British Commandant. The British Legation and its colleagues in Peking disagreed about their commandant's plan. The British Commandant, Colonel Ronald Heath, favoured the opinion of General Arai, the Japanese commander, regarding the defence of the foreign concessions in Tientsin. According to Heath, this step was necessary and correct in order to prevent another Tsinan Incident.¹⁶ Heath still believed that the Chinese could be controlled through a 'gunboat' policy. His option was to strengthen and uphold the Boxer Protocol in defence of British interests, and he proposed imposing a 20 li radius zone around Tientsin. The imposition of this zone would allow foreign troops to guard foreign interests, while Chinese troops, whether Northerner or Nationalist, would not be allowed to enter the zone. It is uncertain whether Heath's decision was influenced by the BMC as there are few sources on the BMC's thoughts about the advance of the Northern Expedition to North China. Certainly the nationalist movement caused great concern in Tientsin. In short, Heath's view challenged the British

¹⁵ SOAS, CWM North China Incoming Correspondence Box 26, 1928 – 1929 i, Letter from C. E. Busby to H.F. Hawkins, Siaochang, 15 July 1928.

¹⁶ PRO FO228/3785 Telegram from O.C. Troops, Tientsin Area to G.O.C. North China Command, Shanghai, 8 May 1928.

government to mend its good relationship with the Chinese. This was a big task for the Foreign Office and the British Legation, but was necessary in order to avoid any incident with the Chinese which could ignite anti-British movement in North China.

Sir Austen Chamberlain was worried by this plan. First, he would not allow the British to become involved in any Japanese scheme which could damage Britain's image.¹⁷ The Foreign Office saw this incident as a serious case which had to be handled with great care to avoid further destruction of British interests. In facing this problem, Chamberlain did not want Lampson and Heath adopting a policy which would create trouble for the British not only in the north but also in the whole of China.¹⁸ Chamberlain did not want a repeat of the May Thirtieth Incident in 1925. Although that originated as a Japanese problem, it eventually also became a major problem for the British.¹⁹ In the end, the military's plan was unacceptable to the foreign Ministers in Peking. The Japanese Minister himself would not back it. The French Chargé d'Affairs took the same attitude and ordered the French commander not to adopt any plan without approval from the Diplomatic Body. The Americans had stated their opposition on this matter. The Japanese Minister still had to think about precautions after the Tsinan Incident which led him to have reservations about the plan. At this point the British Legation seemed inclined not to support Japan.²⁰ Furthermore, Lampson's suggested solution was to offer passive defence to the Chinese troops by only defending the concession, and,

¹⁷ PRO FO228/3785 Telegram from Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir Miles Lampson, 9 May 1928.

¹⁸ St. Anthony College, Lampson Diaries, 10 May 1928, Killearn Diaries and PRO FO228/3785 Telegram from Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir Miles Lampson, 12 May 1928.

¹⁹ Nicholas R. Clifford, *Spoilt Children of Empire: Westerners in Shanghai and the Chinese Revolution of the 1920s* (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1991), p.100.

²⁰ PRO FO228/3785 Telegram from Sir Miles Lampson to Foreign Office, 12 May, 1928.

if the Chinese troops became bolder, to put up a fence around its border. He did not want provocative measures taken which would cause more damage than good to the foreigners.²¹ In other words, Lampson was very cautious about every step taken by the British Legation to protect British interests. Any move or action by the British Legation in Tientsin and its hinterlands had to avoid confrontation with the Chinese.

After failing to convince the Diplomatic Body, the foreign Commandants proposed another plan. According to them, they had agreed to establish restricted areas in Tientsin which the Chinese troops could not enter.²² Heath gave the reasoning behind this plan: "...[i]t was considered essential to issue this notice now, so that in the event of a general withdrawal of the Fengtien forces, the Concessions should not be in danger by [from] disorganized retreating soldiers."²³ This indicates that Heath still wanted to employ military action to deter the Chinese activists in Tientsin. In response to this, Lampson stressed that the plan had come from a purely military perspective and did not consider the political situation, which would endanger not only them but all foreign interests in China.²⁴ The American Commander, General Castner, after discussion with the American Consul-General in Tientsin, Mr. Gauss, declared that they would not comply with the notification.²⁵ Owing to this opposition, the notification plan was also dropped.

²¹ PRO FO228/3785 Telegram from Sir Miles Lampson to Foreign Office, 15 May, 1928.

²² PRO FO228/3785 Telegram from Sir James Jameison to Peking, No.20, 20 May 1928 and Telegram Officer Commanding, H.B.M.'s Troops, Tientsin Area to H. B. M.'s Minister for China, Tientsin, 22 May, 1928.

²³ PRO FO228/3785 Telegram Officer Commanding, H.B.M.'s Troops, Tientsin Area to H. B. M.'s Minister for China, Tientsin, 22 May, 1928.

²⁴ PRO FO228/3785 Confidential from Sir Miles Lampson, 23 May 1928.

²⁵ PRO FO228/3785 Letter from Sir James Jamieson to Sir Miles Lampson, 23 May 1928.

The disagreement between the military commander, the Legation and the Consul General was wide-ranging. Heath, with his military plan, wanted more precautions taken. On one occasion he suggested the occupation of Nankai University, which was located very near to the British Concession, as a preventive measure.²⁶ Heath's plan was supported by the British Municipal Council (BMC). They argued that it was necessary to occupy the buildings to avoid disorder from the Chinese troops.²⁷ In response to this, Consul General Jamieson opposed any attempt to send notification to occupy the university. The occupation of the university would undoubtedly harm the British, because it was the centre of Chinese student activity in Tientsin.²⁸ The BMC and Heath had clearly learnt nothing from student disturbances in Shanghai. In short, both the BMC and Heath's actions and views contradicted the British liberal policy, which aimed to mend relations with the Chinese. The British Legation succeeded in overruling Heath's plan for military action.

Under the Nationalist Troops

However, the actual transition in Tientsin was generally peaceful. There was only some minor fighting in the vicinity and in the Chinese city. Northern troops began their evacuation on 4 June 1928 after defeats in Shantung and Hopei.²⁹ The transition took place on 12 June 1928, when Chang Tsung-chang agreed to give up his power to Yen Hsi-shan's representative Fu Tzo-yi in his

²⁶ PRO FO228/3786 Enclosure No. 1 to Consul-General Sir J. W. Jamieson's dispatch No.54 of the 26 May 1928 to H.M. Minister, Peking.

²⁷ PRO FO228/3786 Enclosure No. 2 to Consul-General Sir J. W. Jamieson's dispatch No.54 of the 26 May 1928 to H.M. Minister, Peking.

²⁸ PRO FO228/3786 Letter from Sir J. Jamieson to Sir Miles Lampson, Tientsin, 17 May 1928.

²⁹ PRO FO371/13184 Letter from Sir Miles Lampson to Lord Cushendun, Enclosure No. 1, Peking, 10 August 1928 (260) After the Nationalist troops captured Chihli, the province was renamed Hopei.

capacity of Garrison Commander. In addition, Fu Tzo-yi's power was supported by General Chang Chi-ying, Chief of the Tientsin Police Bureau.³⁰ On Fu Tzo-yi's appointment, he had expressed a friendly attitude towards the foreigners and pledged to restore trade in the city.³¹ However, the Chinese city was in a bad state when, on the night of 12 June 1928, looting forced shopkeepers to close their shops. This chaotic situation was caused by so-called 'plain-clothes men' who had the city under a reign of terror.³² The foreign concessions also took precautionary measures as a result.³³

When Peking and Tientsin were deemed safe, Lampson worried about the KMA plant and mines at Tongshan.³⁴ By the end of April 1928 the defeated Chihli-Shantung troops (the Fengtian allies) had dominated the area. The route from Tongshan to Kuyeh on the Peking-Mukden Railway, and goods and passengers, were at a standstill. The defeated Chinese troops were undisciplined and disorganised. The KMA made proactive attempts to avoid disturbances. Because the British government would not commit to taking military action in order to nurture good relations with the Chinese, the KMA had to act moderately with the Chinese troops. It provided the troops with food, although this could not guarantee their safety because food supplies were steadily in decline.³⁵ Things were made worse by Chang Tsung-chang's threat that he would attack the mines if

³⁰ *The North China Herald*, 16 June 1928, p.450.

³¹ PRO FO371/13171 Enclosure to Peking dispatch No.721 of 2 July 1928 Consul-General Sir J. W. Jamieson to H.M. Minister, Peking.

³² *Ibid.* Sources regarding the plain-clothes men are still unclear in terms of who they belonged to; whether the Nationalist, Communist or Northerners. However they could have been the remaining Northern troops, who had been defeated.

³³ PRO FO371/13231 Enclosure to Consul-General Sir J. W. Jamieson's dispatch No. 98 of the 26 June, 1928 to H.M. Minister, Peking.

³⁴ Bowie, 'Great Britain and the Use of Force in China, 1919 to 1931', p.300.

³⁵ PRO FO228/3787 Telegram to Foreign Office, No.645 of 21 June 1928.

the KMA did not pay him.³⁶ The British staff in KMA were worried that there would be danger unless British troops were dispatched to Tongshan. They felt that the evacuation option was not wise at this point because evacuation would – in their eyes - lead to loss of property, prestige and cooperation with Chinese traders. Therefore they felt it was necessary for the British government to dispatch troops to Tongshan.³⁷ At the same time, in early June 1928, American troops stationed at Tongshan withdrew.³⁸ Owing to this situation and to avoid causing problems for the KMA mines and their employees, on 23 June 1928 British troops were dispatched from Weihaiwei.³⁹ They managed to control and protect foreign lives and property in Tongshan. Then in early September 1928 the arrival of Kwangsi troops under General Pai Chung-hsi (Nationalist allies) to disarm the remaining northern troops settled the problem. There was some fighting between both troops in the mining area, but the foreigners were largely unharmed.⁴⁰

Another challenge to British liberal policy was the communist threat. The communists, who had targeted British interests, might make it difficult for the British to mend Anglo-Chinese relations. The communists also tried to stage a disturbance by encouraging the emergence of several labour trade unions in the Tientsin district, but the Nationalist government's anti-communist policy undermined the existence of such unions.⁴¹ Luckily the Nationalist authority in

³⁶ Bowie, 'Great Britain and the Use of Force in China, 1919 to 1931', p.301. Cite from Sir M. Lampson, H.M. Minister, Peking, to Foreign Office; 5 June 1928. F2848/2496, PRO FO371/13232.

³⁷ PRO FO228/3787 Telegram to Foreign Office, No.645 of 21 June 1928.

³⁸ British Library, IOLR, L/PS/10/1202, F3299/2255/10, Extract from the "United States Daily" of June 6, 1928.

³⁹ PRO FO371/13184 Letter from Sir J. Jamieson to Sir Austen Chamberlain, Enclosure No. 1, Tientsin, 2 July 1928.

⁴⁰ PRO FO371/13184 Tientsin Political Report for Quarter ended 30 September 1928.

⁴¹ Ibid.

North China suppressed the communist movement. To bring about peace and order after the capture of Tientsin, Fu Tso-yi arrested 300 to 400 agitators, beheading 60 to 70 of them.⁴² He was helped by Sun Chia Nai, head of the General Affairs Department in the Police Office, who had suppressed the plain-clothes' activity in the Chinese City.⁴³ Another problem arose concerning against British interests in the TACC, where Chinese students tried to cause problems for the administrators by boycotting classes and examinations. However, with help from their Chinese staff the college managed to control the situation. The student agitation failed to persuade other Chinese students to boycott the college.⁴⁴ The main reason that the Chinese students backed down was that the local Chinese authority suppressed nationalist activism. The real threat of capital punishment for anybody involved in such activities halted Chinese activism in Tientsin.

The general situation in North China is described in J. D. Liddell's report below:

North China has not suffered at all from "Red" propaganda as the South, and there has not been anything in the nature of massacre, confiscation of property, or even occupation of property by the Armies, and forcible possession of foreign premises, as was the case in the South. None of the horrors of a Hankow, or a Nanking were experienced, and up till now there has been very little interference with the normal life of either Chinese or Foreigners.⁴⁵

⁴² PRO FO371/13231 Enclosure to Consul-General Sir J. W. Jamieson's dispatch No. 98 of the 26 June 1928 to H.M. Minister, Peking.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ SOAS, CWM North China Reports Box 10, 1928, Report of A.P. Cullen, Tientsin, North China, 23 February 1928.

⁴⁵ SOAS, CWM North China Reports Box 10, 1928, Report of 1928 by J. D. Liddell, Tientsin, North China.

This statement illustrates that the Nationalist Troops under Chiang Kai-shek seriously wanted to avoid confrontation with the foreigners and took diplomatic measures to settle their relations with foreign powers.⁴⁶ In short, the second phase of the Northern Expedition created little trouble for the British interests. The missionaries were also glad to find the situation normal after they moved back to their station at the end of August 1928.⁴⁷ Overall the British Legation and Consulate at Tientsin succeeded in preventing the British community, especially the BMC, from taking action which could damage Anglo-Chinese relations.

The successful occupation of Peking (6 June 1928) and Tientsin (12 June 1928) did not mean that the Chinese challenge was over. The new regime continued to demand the abrogation of foreign privileges.⁴⁸ Concurrently with this effort, the Nationalist government implemented its takeover of the Chinese municipal administration in Tientsin, beginning with the health office. Before 1928, especially in Yuan Shih-kai's era, both Chinese and foreigners were employed in the Chinese department. The KMT began to employ only Chinese in the health department and the Nationalist government planned a hospital to cater for its people, who until then had depended on the missionary hospital.⁴⁹ This was a challenge to the British community to recognise the reality of the new Chinese government. Before the KMT army occupied Tientsin, negotiations for the rendition of the British concession were under way. In this section I have shared the basic contours of the situation in 1927 – 1928 and the real and perceived threats

⁴⁶ Cavendish, 'Anti-Imperialism in the Kuomintang 1923', pp.41-3.

⁴⁷ SOAS, CWM North China Reports Box 10, 1928, Report of 1928 by W. F. Rowland, Siaochang.

⁴⁸ Lee En-han, 'China's Recovery of the British Hankow and Kiukiang Concessions in 1927', *Occasional Paper No.6*, August 1980 (University of Western Australia, Centre for East Asian Studies), pp.23-4.

⁴⁹ Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity*, pp.188-9 and 234-5.

to Tientsin and British interests in its hinterland cause by the phase of the nationalist revolution. During this period an intense political and diplomatic debate over rendition had also taken place, and to this we now turn.

The Rendition Issue, 1927

Against the backdrop of civil war and Sino-Japanese tension in the north, discussion of treaty revision had commenced. The previous chapter describes the British community's reactions to the new British China policy. One of the steps taken under this policy was discussion of the return of the British concession in Tientsin to the Chinese authorities. This policy was proclaimed in the second memorandum on 27 January, 1927:

His Majesty's Government are prepared to discuss and enter arrangements, according to particular circumstances at each Port concerned, for the modification of Municipal Administration of British concessions, so as to bring them into line with the administrations of Special Chinese Administrations set up in former Concessions, or for their amalgamation with former Concessions not under Chinese control or for the transfer of police control of Concession Areas to the Chinese Authorities.⁵⁰

The above statement was clearly a shock to the majority of the British community, whose rights in the concession never been questioned before. As a consequence, the community tried to show how this news affected business confidence. A fall in Tientsin land values and municipal debentures in 1927 was a case in point. The banks would not facilitate the lending of money to the municipality, and investors

⁵⁰ PRO FO674/241 A Memorandum on the History of the Negotiations for Retrocession of the British Concession of Tientsin, from February, 1927 to August, 1928 and *The North China Herald*, 12 February 1927, p.218.

waited for further developments before deciding on investing in the concession.⁵¹

This worried certain of the British residents, and one comment regarding this was highlighted by R. C. Allen, Manager of the local branch of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank. He noted that:

The fears expressed in my telegram of 25th January, that the declaration would cause a serious fall in the values of property and local securities here were only too fully justified when the terms of the offer were made public. Within two days no buyers could be found for British Municipal Bonds which up till then had a ready sale at par. . . . Since the declaration, dealings inland have been practically at a standstill, though cases have been reported of land in the extra mural area changing hands at something like one third of its value as estimated immediately before the declaration, such transactions clearly indicating apprehension on one side and speculation on the other.⁵²

This fall in value also affected other property values, including the bank's own properties. This was recorded by Allen in his letter, saying that the buyers seemed to be awaiting further developments before dealing with the bank after the British government declared their policy.⁵³ However, Chamberlain doubted that the fall in land values and municipal debentures were caused by British policy. He pointed out that the falls were due to the seizure of the Hankow concession.⁵⁴ Lampson, though, still believed that these falls were related to the announcement of British liberal policy on 24 January 1927.⁵⁵

⁵¹ HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 427 Managerial Correspondence, Letter from A. B. Lawson to R. C. Allen, Shanghai, 27 January 1927 and PRO FO228/3179 Telegram from Sir Miles Lampson to Foreign Office, Peking, 26 February 1927.

⁵² HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 46 Letter from R. C. Allen to A. B. Lawson, 16 March 1927.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ PRO FO228/3179 Telegram from Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir Miles Lampson, 3 March 1927.

⁵⁵ PRO FO228/3179 Telegram from Sir Miles Lampson to Foreign Office, Peking, 7 March 1927.

The BMC also voiced its opposition to Chamberlain's opinion that it was not the news of the British government's plan in principle to return the British concession in Tientsin that had caused the fall in value. The Vice Chairman of the BMC, W. J. Warmsley, reinforced this point, and claimed that land values in other concessions had remained the same, and in fact the demand for land in the Italian concessions had increased, as there was no change of status to this concession. His statement went further: ". . . the effect of disturbance elsewhere in China has hitherto been precisely contrary to what H. M. Secretary of State supposes."⁵⁶ At this point Warmsley stressed that, "[d]isturbance elsewhere has invariably had the effect of increasing the demand for land in the British Concession and so enhancing the market price".⁵⁷ This was because the instability in China had led the Chinese businessmen and politicians to secure their interests by keeping their money in foreign banks and buying land in the concession.⁵⁸

Whatever the reason behind the decline, the British community in Tientsin was in shock at the drastic decision of its government to return the concession.⁵⁹ Allen's letter to A. B. Lawson shows that the British government's decision also affected Tientsin's Chinese community:

There is something rather ironical in the situation when the British Government consider that they are making a most generous offer (incidentally of their national interest and assets) to the Chinese, to find that while the so called Peking Government and their military masters may welcome the under-lying possibility of getting their hands on the Municipal

⁵⁶ PRO FO228/3179 Enclosure to Consul-General Sir J.W. Jamieson's dispatch No. 28, of 19 March 1927, to H.M. Minister, Peking.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ *The Times*, June 9, 1927, p.13.

⁵⁹ PRO FO228/3179 Report of a Joint Meeting of the China Association, Tientsin Branch, and the Tientsin British Chamber of Commerce and other British Subjects Interested Held in the Gordon Hall at 5.15 P.M. on Friday 8 April 1927.

Revenues and being in a position to extort money from foreigners, the Chinese community of Tientsin, or at any rate the property owning and business class, regard the offer with undisguised consternation. Some are even reported as saying that the British Government's action is a betrayal of trust in the case of those Chinese who showed their confidence in the security of a British Concession rather than in the administration of their own people, whether that of the so-called Chinese Government or the district military rulers.⁶⁰

Allen remarks that neither the British community nor the Chinese living in the British concession would benefit from this rendition.⁶¹ This was another of the British community's statements to show that the status quo of the concession should be retained because the British administration was a good model which protected not only the foreigners but also the Chinese in the concession.

Nevertheless at this juncture the British subjects' attitude in Tientsin could be described as "...in strong disagreement, [but] bound in loyalty to H.M. government to accept the decision."⁶² P. H. B. Kent, makes it clear here that the majority of the British community was strongly in opposition to the more liberal British. However, the community could not totally reject the British government because "...the decision of H.M. Government in this matter was irrevocable and any attempt to alter it would be futile."⁶³ As mentioned in Chapters One and Two, the British Minister and Consul General controlled the BMC, unlike the SMC, where the power largely on vested on their electorate.⁶⁴ In these circumstances the

⁶⁰ HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 46 Letter from R. C. Allen to A. B. Lowson, 16 March 1927.

⁶¹ As Rogaski stated that "... Western medicines do the best job for all bodies [the Chinese]." This statement tried to show that only the Westerners could help the Chinese in many aspects such as in medication to development in China. See Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity*, pp.227-33.

⁶² PRO, FO 228/3646, Letter from P.H.B. Kent, Chairman, Advisory Committee to Sir James Jamieson, the British Consul-General in Tientsin, 10 November 1927.

⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴ Robert Bickers, *Britain in China*, p.127.

'loyalty' of the British community was called upon to accept the changes to the BMC. Therefore instead of opposing it strongly, the majority of the British community had to seek other avenues which would ensure that they would avoid losing the majority of their interests. This view came mostly from the big British firms, especially those listed in Appendix 2, which did not want their interests jeopardised and wanted British policy to support them in staying in Tientsin and its hinterland.

The British communities in Tientsin took dual action. The first measure has been highlighted as their effort to establish the TBCI (see chapter 2), which became their voice in protecting their rights in China. In addition they used newspapers and pamphlets to bring their case to public and government attention. The second approach was to participate with any associations and committees involved in rendition negotiations, to avoid any disappointment to them if the rendition actually took place. The British in Tientsin realised that their government's decision was irrevocable and any attempt to oppose it would be futile. So if the rendition finally happened they would not lose all they had in Tientsin and its surroundings if they took part in the negotiations. The British in Tientsin feared a similar situation to that which had happened to the Hankow concession, which had put all the power within its Council into the hands of the Chinese authorities, thus undermining the Council's independence.⁶⁵ In short, the big British traders were fast learners and took the Hankow agreement as proof that they could not continue to ignore the changes happening in China. They agreed

⁶⁵ CUL, The Manuscripts Reading Room, MS JM J29/1-7, JMA, Copy of telegram Tientsin to London Despatched 21 March 1927.

that they should participate in any agreement with the Chinese in order to avoid big business losses.

At this point Consul General Sir James Jamieson tried to enlist the support of the British community by asking several liberal Britons, especially those from the big British firms, to form a committee which would give the British community the opportunity to voice its opinion on rendition.⁶⁶ Jamieson understood that approaching these big firms would make the British policy easier to implement. The British firms, aware that Chinese nationalism could jeopardise their interests, were willing to make great efforts to mend any loopholes between themselves and the Chinese in order to avoid more Chinese attacks on their interests, not only in Tientsin, but also in other parts of China.⁶⁷

The rendition issue was brought to the attention of all British residents in Tientsin in early 1927. A meeting was held on 7 February 1927, attended by 282 people, including not only British subjects but also the Tientsin branch of the China Association and the Tientsin British Chamber of Commerce.⁶⁸ This meeting emphasised that the British community had to unite and find a collective way to protect its interests. It was agreed that government policy should be followed to modify the British concession in Tientsin. In order to look after their interests, the meeting came to the conclusion that it would approve the formation of a 14-strong Advisory Committee. These men were R. C. Allen (HSB), J. M. Dickinson

⁶⁶ HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 46 Letter from R. C. Allen to A. B. Lowson, 16 March 1927.

⁶⁷ Jürgen Osterhammel, 'Imperialism in Transition', p.282.

⁶⁸ PRO FO674/241, 'A Memorandum on the History of the Negotiations for Retrocession of the British Concession of Tientsin, from February 1927 to August 1928'.

(William Forbes and Co.), A. H. George (unknown), W. M. Howell (Butterfield & Swire), P.H.B. Kent (Kent & Mounsey), H. W. Matheson (unknown), Howard Payne (Collins & Co.), E. C. Peters (Peter & Co.), R. K. Rodger (Butterfield & Swire), James Turner (Eastern Engineering Work, Ltd.), D. B. Walker (unknown), W.J. Warmsley (Arnold, Karberg & Co.), P. C. Young (KMA) and J. R. Lyness (unknown).⁶⁹ The members of this committee came from the big British firms such as KMA, Butterfield & Swire and Collins & Co., most of which had considerable interests locally. In brief this committee's task was to:

...prepare a statement setting forth the manifold dangers against which it was necessary to guard, to formulate definite proposals regarding the future municipal government of the British Municipal Area, and to communicate the result of their labours to His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General for the consideration of H.B.M. Government.⁷⁰

From this statement it is clear that the Advisory Committee, which represented the British community, had stated their real reaction towards the new British policy, which was that they wanted their rights to be safeguarded. One of the British subjects who attended the meeting mentioned that "...we want the Committee to feel that any agreement has got [to] be agreeable not only to the Chinese but to us."⁷¹ The above illustrates the British trader community's desire for a win-win solution to discussions about rendition. In addition, the Advisory Committee would become the united voice of the British community in protecting their interests and rights in the Sino-British negotiations and became the medium of communication between the British communities and the British government. This

⁶⁹ PRO FO228/3179, 'Minutes of a Joint Meeting of the China Association (Tientsin Branch) and the Tientsin British Chamber of Commerce, Tientsin, 7 February 1927'.

⁷⁰ PRO FO674/241, 'A Memorandum on the History of the Negotiations for Retrocession of the British Concession of Tientsin, from February 1927 to August 1928'.

⁷¹ PRO FO228/3179, 'Minutes of a Joint Meeting of the China Association (Tientsin Branch) and the Tientsin British Chamber of Commerce, Tientsin, 7 February 1927'.

meant that the committee had a duty to recommend any plan which could protect British interests in Tientsin.⁷²

Negotiation

Before the British residents' meeting above, on 28 January 1927, the British Minister handed the treaty revision programme to the Waichiaopu (Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Northern Government). Owing to the protest of the Chinese government regarding British troops in Shanghai, further discussion was delayed. It was only on 1 March 1927 that the Peking authorities informed the British Legation of the appointment of three of their delegates,⁷³ although this created problems with faction groups in Peking. On 2 April 1927, the Fengtian Group sent a letter requesting to send three of its representatives.⁷⁴ Thus the Fengtian group sent Hu Shih-tse, E. Dzau and Van Ho Fang to Tientsin. Then Jen Chih-shang and Chuang Ching-k'o from the Governor of Chihli Province (Chuang Ching-k'o also represented the Waichiaopu) also came down to participate in the negotiations.⁷⁵ This caused several delays to the negotiations in April 1927. However, on the British side there was no problem in selecting delegates. The delegation was led by Sir James W. Jamieson, the British Consul-General in Tientsin. Two other delegates were Kent,⁷⁶ Chairman of the local branch of the

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ The British Library, IOLR, L/PS/10/1197, F5333/1872/10 Letter from Sir Miles Lampson to Sir Austen Chamberlain, Peking, 8 June 1927.

⁷⁴ PRO FO228/3179 Letter from Sir Miles Lampson to Sir Austen Chamberlain, Tientsin, 23 April 1927.

⁷⁵ PRO FO228/3179 Enclosure No.2 in Consul-General Sir J.W. Jamieson's Despatch No.48 of 16 April 1927, Notes of Meeting held on Monday 11 April 1927.

⁷⁶ HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.4 Letter from G. H. Hankinson to the Manager, The Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd., Johannesburg, Tientsin, 18 June 1934.

China Association, and P.C. Young,⁷⁷ the BMC Chairman.⁷⁸ Kent and Young were both members of the Advisory Committee. These nine men formed a Joint Commission to discuss various issues regarding finance, police, trust deeds, franchises and the administration of the municipality.

Discussion of rendition can be divided into three points. First, the Chinese authorities wanted more power and to recover sovereignty in Tientsin from the British administration. Additionally, the Northern government wanted to show that it also had nationalist feelings⁷⁹ to counter the Nationalist government, which had succeeded in reclaiming the British concessions in Hankow and Kiukiang. They were very dominant in discussions among the Chinese delegation. They began to put the issue of Chinese power and sovereignty at the head of their discussion, and in the negotiations they wanted to create a President as the sole power in the municipality. In their eyes, the President ought to have veto powers and the same position as the Chairman of the municipality. Furthermore, an official Chinese Executive Secretary should be appointed to help the President. The Chinese Executive Secretary would officiate over municipal decisions and coordinate the work of all municipal departments.⁸⁰ Tsao wanted five Chinese nationals to be appointed among the nine members of the Council. He added that other nationalities apart from Britons and Americans should not be allowed to sit

⁷⁷ Young was a General Manager of KMA. See Carrol Lunt, *The China Who's Who 1927 (Foreign): A Biographical Dictionary* (London: Walter Judd, Ltd., 1927), p.283.

⁷⁸ PRO FO674/241 A Memorandum on the History of the Negotiations for Retrocession of the British Concession of Tientsin, from February 1927 to August 1928. PRO FO674/241 A Memorandum on the History of the Negotiations for Retrocession of the British Concession of Tientsin, from February 1927 to August 1928.

⁷⁹ Waldron, *From war to nationalism*, pp.250 and 273.

⁸⁰ PRO FO228/3179 Enclosure No.1. in Consul-General Sir J.W. Jamieson's Despatch No.50 of 18 April 1927, Tuesday – 12 April 1927.

on the Council.⁸¹ According to him, the arrangement of the members of the council should be five Chinese, three British and one American. The Chairman would be elected by the councillors.⁸² The Fengtian group went further in their attempt to restore sovereignty, denying other nationalities, except for the British, any franchise in the new administration. Under this suggestion foreign nationals would have the right to live in the concession and pay taxes, but not to vote.⁸³ Finally the Chinese delegation pointed out that they wanted the Municipal Police to become a part of the City Police of Tientsin.

The British seemed taken aback by the Chinese demands. They were worried about the independence of the Council⁸⁴ and about how the President having the final say and the majority of the councillors being Chinese would affect their own position in the municipality. In order to avoid being dominated by the Chinese authorities, the British proposed equality and a limit to the President's powers. They agreed to accept the Presidential position, but without any power in the municipality, and argued it must be kept away from Council authorities and meetings.⁸⁵ This point furthers Young's statement, which opposed any interference in municipal administration such as the introduction of a President. He echoed the Gettysburg Address by Abraham Lincoln, saying that the British concession in Tientsin should be "...the government of this Area by the people of the Area for

⁸¹ PRO FO228/3179 Enclosure No.1 in Consul-General Sir J.W. Jamieson's Despatch No.50 of 18 April 1927, Thursday - 14 April 1927.

⁸² PRO FO228/3179 Enclosure No.1 in Consul-General Sir J.W. Jamieson's Despatch No.50 of 18 April 1927, Friday - 15 April 1927.

⁸³ PRO FO228/3179 Enclosure No.3 in Consul-General Sir J.W. Jamieson's Despatch No.48 of 16 April 1927.

⁸⁴ TCUL, The Manuscripts Reading Room, MS JM J29/1-7, JMA, Copy of telegram Tientsin to London Despatched 21 March 1927.

⁸⁵ PRO FO228/3179 Letter from Sir James Jamieson to Sir Miles Lampson, Tientsin, 14 April 1927.

the people of the Area, without any nominee or anyone associated with the Executive coming from outside . . .”⁸⁶ The British used this claim that they were upholding the principles of democracy to try to prevent Chinese domination of the BMC. To convince the British delegation, Tsao said that the President would not interfere in any executive power in the municipality, but would function as a monitor to prevent the municipality from committing any violation of Chinese law, contravention of their customs or infringement of China’s sovereignty. However, the British would still not accept the Chinese delegation’s argument. The British only agreed to put the President in the same position as the British Consul General, outside the municipal executive power. They did not want the President to interfere in the Council’s daily work or to have the power to vote at municipal meetings.⁸⁷

Regarding the composition of the members of the Municipal Council, the British representatives suggested equal members. Young suggested that the arrangement should be five Chinese, four British and one American. Although this simple arithmetic gave the Chinese a simple majority (but not if the Americans and the British combined), Tsao rejected it and wanted more Chinese, his suggestion being that of the eleven members of the Council, there should be six Chinese and five British or Americans. He added that a Chinese should be elected as Chairman of the Council, and that the President should be the Chairman. Young put his point that the election of a Chinese as Chairman was not a problem, but to make the

⁸⁶ PRO FO228/3179 Report of a Joint Meeting of the China Association, and the Tientsin British Chamber of Commerce and other British Subjects Interested Held in the Golden Hall at 5.15 pm on Friday 8 April 1927.

⁸⁷ PRO FO228/3179 Enclosure No.3 in Consul-General Sir J.W. Jamieson’s Despatch No.48 of 16 April 1927.

President Chairman with a casting vote would not be acceptable.⁸⁸ For the British delegation to give the Chinese a majority and the chairmanship would they argued, not instil confidence in investors.⁸⁹ The Chinese delegation thought that this was not a serious matter, and that the British had brought it up more as a face-saving tactic. At this point, Kent suggested that the Chinese could have the chairmanship with a casting vote, but that they should be a minority in the Council. This suggestion was not supported by the Chinese delegation, which thought that if it were to be accepted no Chinese would want to accept the Chairmanship. Finally the meeting on 15 April 1927 put this matter to a compromise solution with the proposals following:

The Council shall consist of ten electors of whom five shall be Chinese, four British and one American, or British if no American is nominated.

At their first meeting the new Council shall elect a Chairman and Vice-Chairman, the senior member by service on the Council being Chairman for the purpose of such election.

The Chairman of the Council shall be a Chinese if any Chinese Councillor is willing to act in this capacity . . .

At all meetings of the Council the Chairman of the meeting shall have a second or casting vote.⁹⁰

Another issue that the British community felt threatened by was the effort of the Chinese to deny the rights of other foreigners to vote. Given that the Chinese population was around 90 percent and the British only between 1 – 2 percent in the concession, it was unwise not include other nationals. This was because the British and other nationals had a close relationship. Therefore the British delegation accused the effort as undemocratic and "...in bad faith and unfriendly towards the

⁸⁸ PRO FO228/3179 Enclosure No.1 in Consul-General Sir J.W. Jamieson's Despatch No.50 of 18 April 1927, Friday – 15 April 1927.

⁸⁹ PRO FO228/3179 Enclosure No.2 in Consul-General Sir J.W. Jamieson's Despatch No.50 of 18 April 1927.

⁹⁰ PRO FO228/3179 Enclosure No.1 in Consul-General Sir J.W. Jamieson's Despatch No.50 of 18 April 1927, Friday - 15 April 1927.

foreign residents in the area...”⁹¹ However, the Chinese argued that the suggestion was made to try to avoid any misunderstanding among the Chinese public to give back the Germans and the Russian privileges as they had been deprived before.⁹² Jamieson opposed this suggestion because non-extraterritorial nationals such as the Germans had contributed much to the development of the concession. To other extraterritorial nationals, this suggestion was seen as “...extremely discourteous to deprive them of rights which they hitherto enjoyed and which they have exercised with due loyalty.”⁹³ The British community was playing a strategic game to avoid the Chinese ousting them from power. But Tsao still wanted the other nationals not to have a vote in the concession. From this point Tsao mentioned that there were two reasons for this proposal; firstly to protect the sovereignty of China, which did not allow foreign nationals to vote, and secondly to allow the British to vote because the concession was British and they had special rights to it.⁹⁴ Tsao’s proposal shows that the Northern delegation had a nationalist agenda. Though they allowed the British to vote, by denying it to other foreign nationals (especially non-extraterritorial nations) they could engineer a Chinese majority. However, the British delegation still could not accept it, and forwarded the question to be settled by the British Minister. Later in the day, Tsao considered that only nationals with extraterritorial rights could vote, but he still opposed giving the same rights to other nationals who did not have extraterritorial rights.⁹⁵

⁹¹ PRO FO228/3179 Enclosure No.3 in Consul-General Sir J.W. Jamieson’s Despatch No.48 of 16 April 1927.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ PRO FO228/3179 Letter from Sir James Jamieson to Sir Miles Lampson, 16 April 1927.

⁹⁴ PRO FO228/3179 Enclosure No.1 in Consul-General Sir J.W. Jamieson’s Despatch No.50 of 18 April 1927, Thursday - 14 April 1927.

⁹⁵ PRO FO228/3179 Letter from Sir James Jamieson to Sir Miles Lampson, Tientsin, 20 April 1927.

On the police matter, the British delegation had no objections but wanted a small modification. They proposed that the police in the concession maintain its separate identity, and at the same time cooperate with the Chinese police. This point was agreed by the Waichiaopu, which added the suggestion that the same uniform as the Chinese police wore be introduced but with a distinctively different badge.⁹⁶ At this point the British were willing to accept several changes to the Police Department but not its independence. The Chinese wanted the police under the President rather than the Council. This suggestion was to prevent political offenders finding a 'safe haven' in the British concession. They did not want the Council to be a countersignatory of all arrest warrants, thus slowing the process. They wanted the President to have the power to order warrants. Young suggested that the endorsement of warrants should be referred back to the President and Consul-General. However, the Chinese delegation saw this suggestion as upsetting Chinese dignity, as they were trying to prevent foreign interference.⁹⁷ This was another matter in which the British did not want the Chinese authorities to have total control. Concerned that the Chinese authorities would 'interfere' in British affairs and interests, the British wanted the British Consul-General to form another party to control the Police Department and safeguard British interests.

Another point which worried the British concerned concession bondholders. This was an important matter stressed by the British communities represented by Young and Kent. After the fall of municipal debenture values, the

⁹⁶ PRO FO228/3179 Enclosure No.2 in Consul-General Sir J.W. Jamieson's Despatch No.48 of 16 April 1927, Notes of Meeting held on Monday 11 April 1927.

⁹⁷ PRO FO228/3179 Enclosure No.2 in Consul-General Sir J.W. Jamieson's dispatch No.50 of 18 April 1927.

bondholders opposed any attempt by the British government to transfer municipal assets under Chinese control.⁹⁸ The bondholders tried to take legal action against any attempt to change the debtor to a third party.⁹⁹ The British Municipal Council raised cash from bank loans and bond issues. Municipal properties and assets such as the Electric and Water Departments and wharves were part of the mortgage to secure any loans or bonds. Therefore the bondholders had a right, they argued, to decide the future of the concession. This matter also became part of the discussion between the delegations. Young explained to the Chinese delegation that some security should be imposed not only to gain the confidence of the present bondholders but also to get further loans for the new Administration.¹⁰⁰ Therefore, it was agreed that a Board of Trust should be established which would consist of the British government, the Chinese government and bondholder representatives, to take care of the interests of the bondholders. In addition the Electric Department, the Water Department and Municipal Bund and Wharves would serve as mortgage for the bonds.¹⁰¹

In the end several points were agreed, while uncertain issues such as the power of presidents and the franchise remained unsettled. The problem with some of these issues, as noted above, was the conflict between the idea of Chinese nationalism and opposition to any effort by the Chinese to control the British concession. This shows that the British adopted the latter stance, which illustrates

⁹⁸ PRO FO228/3179 Letter from Sir Miles Lampson to the Foreign Office, Peking, 16 April 1927.

⁹⁹ PRO FO228/3179 Report of a Joint Meeting of the China Association, and the Tientsin British Chamber of Commerce and other British Subjects Interested held in the Golden Hall at 5.15 pm on Friday 8 April 1927.

¹⁰⁰ PRO FO228/3179 Enclosure No.1 in Consul-General Sir J.W. Jamieson's Despatch No.50 of 18 April 1927.

¹⁰¹ PRO FO674/241A Memorandum on the History of the Negotiations for the Retrocession of the British Concession of Tientsin, from February 1927 to August 1928.

how the British community could not suddenly and totally accept the Chinese demands. But at the same time, the Nanking Incident put the negotiations at a crossroads. The British communities in Tientsin were shocked by the incident, and this affected the continuation of the negotiations. Indeed, there were differences of opinion as to whether to continue the negotiations at all.

Diehards vs. Moderates

In the middle of the negotiations some grievances emerged amongst the British community regarding the situation in Hankow and Nanking. In April 1927 British community diehards saw the Hankow agreement (19 February 1927) as a total failure. This group consisted mostly of settlers engaged in business and other work in Tientsin (see Appendix 3) whose interests were confined to Tientsin. They were only concerned with extraterritorial rights and defended the British concession against Chinese control. The group produced several influential publications such as the *Peking and Tientsin Times* through which they could convey their views. *The Peking and Tientsin Times* described the situation in the following terms in April:

The Hankow agreement, the signature of which, it is amazing to remember, was greeted with loud cheers in the House of Commons... The safeguards it should have contained, and the guarantees that should have been exacted, are lacking, with the result that there is nothing to prevent Tom Mann, the British Communist, or Roy, the notorious Indian seditionist, being nominated and elected, as British members of the Council, when the first council is actually elected. Relinquishment of foreign control over the Police has resulted in the virtual withdrawal of police protection, so far as British residents are concerned. British residents have recently been driven from the streets at the point of the bayonet. [The] British bank, the British newspaper, and British factories, have been compelled to close down by barefaced intimidation.

Strike pickets enter foreign homes and intimidate the servants.¹⁰²

This statement is the diehards' description of the British community's shock at the events in Hankow. The article continued: "... any modification in the status of other British areas should be accompanied by safeguards which will not, as at Hankow, prove wholly illusory."¹⁰³ On 24 March 1927 there was further shocking news came from Nanking. The Nationalist army had entered the city, attacked foreign consulates and killed some foreigners.¹⁰⁴ In short, this group tried to discredit Chinese nationalism, saying that it was inspired by the Russians rather than being a spontaneous Chinese patriotic movement. Their depiction of Chinese nationalism as "mob action"; "barbarous"; "anti-foreign"; "hideous" and "disgusting savagery" created a fearful atmosphere in the British community.¹⁰⁵

The diehards considered that the British community was not ready to accept any drastic changes to its concession, as they felt that the Chinese were not sincere about upholding the Hankow Agreement and thus would not respect British Liberal policy.¹⁰⁶ The diehards' efforts to convince the British community succeeded in persuading the Advisory Committee that the situation in China did not permit any agreement with the Chinese. Therefore the Advisory Committee agreed that for the time being no agreement should be concluded regarding modification of the British Municipal Area in Tientsin. The Advisory Committee did not want British

¹⁰² PRO FO228/3179 Cutting from *the Peking and Tientsin Times*, 7 April 1927.

¹⁰³ PRO FO228/3179 Cutting from *the Peking and Tientsin Times*, 7 April 1927 and Putnam Weale, *Chang Tso-lin's Struggle against the Communist Menace*, (Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, Ltd., 1927), p.46.

¹⁰⁴ Bowie, 'Great Britain and the Use of Force in China, 1919 to 1931', pp.272-3.

¹⁰⁵ Paul A. Cohen, *History in Three Keys: The Boxers as Event, Experience, and Myth* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), p.253.

¹⁰⁶ PRO FO228/3179 Cutting from *the Peking and Tientsin Times*, 7 April 1927.

interests in Tientsin to be 'gambled' with in the unstable conditions in China with war, disturbance, killing and looting happening in most of the country.¹⁰⁷ Lampson did not agree to suspend negotiations. He was aware that the situation in Hankow was not favourable to safeguarding British interests, but he reminded the committee that changing British government policy was not an option. Lampson urged that it was important to satisfy Chinese aspirations by offering to return the concession. To suspend negotiations would impact negatively on the Chinese, and especially lend momentum to Chinese agitation against the British.¹⁰⁸

However, some of the British firms did not agree to suspension of the negotiations. At the British community's meeting on 8 April 1927, Young spoke on the negotiations. His speech touched on whether or not to stop the talks. As a prominent KMA manager, he had experience in dealing with the Chinese and held a different opinion to that of the rest of the British community, particularly the diehards, who saw the disturbance in China as a reason to call a halt to the rendition negotiations. Young commented that it would be unwise to break off negotiations with Chang Tso-lin at that point because he was a trusted authority in the north and he alone would be able to establish peace and order. Furthermore, Chang Tso-lin was friendly towards the foreigners. Young, as Chairman of the BMC, worried that the KMA would be exposed to danger if negotiations were terminated. He used the BMC as a tool to stress his point that the British concession would also be in danger if negotiations ceased.

¹⁰⁷ PRO FO228/3179 Letter from P.C. Young to the British Consul-General in Tientsin, 6 April 1927.

¹⁰⁸ PRO FO228/3179 Letter from Sir Miles Lampson to Sir J.W. Jamieson, 18 April 1927.

The basis of Young's worries was the outcome of the Nanking Incident in 1927. The British government in London was considering adopting a 'strike-back' policy in retaliation for this incident.¹⁰⁹ A meeting of the foreign powers was held in Peking and Lampson proposed imposing sanctions on the Nationalist government and China.¹¹⁰ At this crucial moment Young was afraid of the situation deteriorating if sanctions came into effect and negotiations on rendition broke down. The impact on the KMA would be very negative. In such a critical situation Young was afraid that breaking off negotiations would cause Chang Tso-lin to join the Nationalists in launching an anti-imperialist movement. Therefore he stressed that the foreign troops in the north were few and would take a long time to reach Tientsin.¹¹¹ E. S. Little, agent for Imperial Chemical Industries, felt that the military impact was not as important as the impact on the future of the concession if rendition proceeded, stressing:

The vile outrages in Nanking are well known to all of you... The Southern Party [the KMT] has been there several months and have [has] had ample time to settle down and establish their authority, yet the only result of our policy of conciliation is renewed insults and attacks and the need for complete evacuation; in fact, the complete breakdown of all arrangements. Hankow is the headquarters of the Nationalists and Eugene Chen, in whom so much confidence was reposed, is resident there, yet no finger is lifted to protect foreigners but, on the other hand, the situation gets steadily worse.¹¹²

Little used the Nanking Incident and the Hankow agreement to justify his case for the British government to avoid gambling Tientsin, another of its prestigious interests, in China. Little also pointed out that Chang Tso-lin's troops could not

¹⁰⁹ Megginson, 'Britain's Response to Chinese Nationalism, 1925-1927', pp.618-26.

¹¹⁰ Kane, 'Sir Miles Lampson at the Peking Legation 1926-1933', pp.88-94.

¹¹¹ PRO FO228/3179, 'Report of a Joint Meeting of the China Association, and the Tientsin British Chamber of Commerce and other British Subjects Interested, 8 April 1927'.

¹¹² Ibid.

protect foreign interests. He said that although Chang Tso-lin had done his very best to establish peace and order in the north, the evacuation of the foreigners from the interior exemplified that the Powers still did not believe in Chang Tso-lin's ability to protect foreign nationals. Hence this situation illustrated that Chang Tso-lin was not a fit person to deal with the British delegation on the rendition of the concession.¹¹³

...the Chinese [are] incapable of proper civil government and protest now may be of some use – after we have given the concession away it will certainly be too late.

It might be as well to remember that though we at present live here in peace and quietness in the past in Tientsin and Chihli Province have occurred [a] most ferocious massacre of foreigners and any weakening of our position might invite a repetition of this.¹¹⁴

This statement pointed out that some of the British community were not comfortable with what was happening to British interests in China. This statement also illustrates that past massacres such as had happened in Tientsin during the Boxer Uprising, were a salient point for the British community when reconsidering whether it could accept Chinese rule.¹¹⁵

Little's strong rejection of the negotiations for this reason was supported by others. H. G. W. Woodhead, well-known as a diehard, agreed that at this stage negotiations should not be resumed. With this attitude he pitied the Hankow community which had not been consulted about the return of the concession in the first place. He continued that not only had British interests in the Hankow

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Robert A. Bickers, 'History, Legend and Treaty Port Ideology, 1925-1931', in Robert A. Bickers (ed.), *Ritual & Diplomacy* (the British Association for Chinese Studies: London, 1993), pp.84-7.

agreement not been safeguarded; but that the return of the concession also encouraged the extremist element in the Nationalist government to further its activities in attacking British interests in China. He did not believe that the Chinese government could be relied upon.¹¹⁶ Woodhead did not want the British government merely to keep giving its word of assurance about the safety of its subjects and how it would protect their interests in China, as these assurances had proved valueless in Hankow and Nanking.¹¹⁷ Woodhead and Little's view was the general view of the foreign community in China at this point. This diehard group considered Chinese nationalism a sickness which should be settled not by conciliation but by a Western military force.¹¹⁸

But some of the British community did not consider Little and Woodhead's view as a good option. A. P. Richards (agent of the Asiatic Petroleum Company) wanted negotiations to continue, because as Lampson had said earlier, the breakdown of negotiations would be a slap in Chang Tso-lin's face, which would jeopardise the security and peaceful conditions in the north.¹¹⁹ Young added to his argument by highlighting several dangers which would occur if the negotiations were broken off.

We know that Kuo Min Tang agents are at work all over this area and we have every reason to believe that a plot is hatching directed against Foreigners and against de facto Government in Peking. That is a danger from which, for six weeks, only Marshal Chang Tso-lin can protect us. Is it wise to say to him now, in spite of our promise, we are going to do nothing? We know Chang Tsung Chang's troops have been defeated, and we know the Southern troops are making their way up the

¹¹⁶ PRO FO228/3179 Report of a Joint Meeting . . . 8 April 1927.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Cohen, *History in Three Keys*, p.253.

¹¹⁹ PRO FO228/3179 Report of a Joint Meeting . . . 8 April 1927.

Tientsin-Pukow railway. That is a threat to Chang Tso-lin's communications. His troops are in Honan. As soon as Tientsin is threatened by an attack from the South, Marshal Chang will have to beat a hasty retreat. That will mean the passing through Tientsin of a defeated Chinese rabble.¹²⁰

Young's statement again stresses the danger of the British abandoning negotiations. As a businessman, he was concerned that the danger from both the north and the south was real.

This is why Young stated that "...[w]hat the Committee recommended to you they recommend with a full knowledge of what is taking place, and because they believe that what they advise will save us from a repetition of such horrors."¹²¹ His next point clearly tried to convince the British community that by showing a liberal attitude further Chinese attacks on British interests would be avoided. In addition it would dampen down the Chinese pressure from attack by a British concession in Tientsin. At this juncture there were two groups with different views regarding whether to urge for suspension of the negotiations or otherwise. The debate between these two groups was put to the vote. Finally the suggestion by Little and Woodhead to urge for the suspension of the negotiations was defeated by a majority supporting Richards' argument.¹²² In other words, the diehards were defeated by expatriates, led by the APC.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² PRO FO228/3179 Letter from Sir James Jamieson to Sir Miles Lampson, Tientsin, 25 April 1927.

Delays in the Negotiations

However the diehards never gave up their fight. The diehard group continued to put forward another resolution at the end of July 1927, which stated that it would be "...profoundly sceptical in regard both to the willingness and the capacity of any Chinese authorities at the present time to fulfil the terms of any agreement reached in pursuance of the policy which H. M. government initiated at Hankow."¹²³ The statement was conveyed to the China Committee, which also supported this idea and urged that negotiations should be postponed owing to instabilities in China and objections to the Hankow agreement.¹²⁴ They argued that they chose to be attacked rather than to conclude any agreement regarding Tientsin.¹²⁵ This statement illustrates how the diehards were adamant about not returning the British concessions to the Chinese; they would continue to fight any attempt to any disturb their interests in China. Further action they took was to release a resolution with the British in Shanghai during the winter of 1927 to urge the retaking of the Hankow concession and to show no compromise in letting go of treaty rights or other special privileges. In addition they urged a halt to negotiations on the British Tientsin concession.¹²⁶ However, the Foreign Office would not retreat from their liberal policy and would fulfil their promises to any Chinese government.¹²⁷ In an effort to influence the British government, Woodhead met with Lampson and urged him to halt the negotiations. Lampson,

¹²³ PRO FO228/3646 Letter from E. H. Young, Deputy Chairman of China Committee to H.M. Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, London, 29 July 1927.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ PRO FO228/3646 Letter from E.M. Gull and H. C. Wilcox to H.M. Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, London, 25 August 1927.

¹²⁶ Richard Stremski, *The Shaping of British Policy during the Nationalist Revolution in China* (Taipei: Department of Political Science Publication Series No.1, Soochow University, 1979), p.137.

¹²⁷ PRO FO228/3646 Letter from H.M. Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Deputy, China Committee, London, 11 August 1927.

however, could not agree with Woodhead for fear of creating ill feeling towards the British government.¹²⁸ Furthermore, after Chiang Kai-shek purged the communist members from the KMT on 12 April 1927 the British attitude towards the KMT softened.¹²⁹

However, the diehard group were never quiet. They seized any opportunity to attack British liberal policy - for example during a Conference of Chambers of Commerce, the China Association and China Committees in China and Hong Kong was held on 6 -7 March, 1928 to discuss the situation in China. In this conference the Tientsin delegation pointed out their worries about British trade interest wanting:

1. To impress upon His Majesty's Government the necessity of arresting for the present the execution of the proposals communicated simultaneously to the Chinese Authorities at Peking and at Hankow on January 27th, 1927, believing as they do that these proposals, if carried through under present conditions, will result in the destruction of British trade in China.
2. To outline briefly those immediate measures which they consider essential to the preservation of British Trade interest, and which they consider would pave the way to cooperation with another Power or other Powers, for the restoration of political and economic stability in this country.¹³⁰

This passage illustrates the diehards' attempt to present British opinion in Tientsin to the entire British community in China. The wording of the statement from Tientsin came solely from this group, urging that:

¹²⁸ St. Anthony College, Lampson Diaries, 12 October 1927, Killearn Papers.

¹²⁹ Lucien Bianco, *Origins of the Chinese Revolution, 1915-1949* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971), pp.56-7 and Megginson, 'Britain's Response to Chinese Nationalism, 1925-1927', p.635.

¹³⁰ SOAS, CHAS/MCP/35 China Association, Tientsin Statement, Tientsin 14 January 1928.

The practical steps advocated above would amount to calling a halt, giving the time necessary for a revision of the policy [of] H.M. Government in the light of the events of the past twelve months. Such steps would also pave the way for co-operation with some other Power or Powers, with a view to the restoration of political and economic stability in this country.

Whilst in general sympathy with the liberal spirit of H.M. Government's declaration of December 18th, 1926, it is our opinion that the execution of the Proposals of January 27th, 1927, is impracticable under existing conditions in China and would be disastrous to British trade interests.¹³¹

This statement challenged the British government's liberal policy as unable to ameliorate the situation over a year after it had been introduced. Chinese attacks on British interests were still occurring, and several indirect disturbances to trading in China such as illegal taxes, worries about the Hankow concession and the stagnation of the railway services added to their anxieties about their future in China.

Alternative

Between the end of 1927 and early 1928, Young worried about the diehards' strong resistance to British liberal policy. He was very concerned that the continuing opposition was not good for the KMA. However, continuing disturbances from the anti-imperialist movement also threatened British interests. Young took the middle way to settle this problem. As representative of the moderate group he had to find a way to stall British liberal policy, save their business interests and secure the support of the diehards and a satisfactory outcome for the Chinese.¹³² In order to realise this objective he teamed up with Kent to

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Osterhammel, 'China', p.655.

devise a new plan that would balance the ideas of the diehards against those of the British government.

This hope was related to new developments in late 1927, with the proposal by the local Chinese representative in the BMC urging the elimination of any discrimination against the Chinese in the municipality and the giving to the Chinese a greater role in the administration of the municipality.¹³³ The BMC rejected this proposal, giving the financial difficulties of the municipality as an excuse.¹³⁴ However, more important was the pressure exerted by the diehards against the implementation of this proposal. The moderates saw the Chinese proposal as an alternative way to satisfy the Chinese and to delay rendition. This was the liberal attitude of KMA leaders such as Young, who agreed that the Chinese should be given the opportunity to be involved in the BMA's reform. This was supported by Kent as a way to liberalise the BMC.¹³⁵ He added that rather than giving everything to the Chinese, it was better to support the suggestion.¹³⁶ At the Advisory Committee, Committee of China Association and British Chamber of Commerce meeting on 14 December 1927, the supporters of this proposal, Young and Kent, saw that this proposal had a threefold objective. First, it would bring goodwill between the British communities and the Chinese. Secondly, it would

¹³³ PRO FO228/3646 Letter from K.H. Chun, K. S. Chwang and S. M. Chung to the BMC, Tientsin, 12 October 1927.

¹³⁴ PRO FO228/3646 Letter from Chairman of the BMC to K.H. Chun, K. S. Chwang and S. M. Chung, Tientsin, 12 October 1927.

¹³⁵ Kent, *The Twentieth Century in the Far East*, p.207.

¹³⁶ PRO FO228/3646 Letter from Sir Miles Lampson to Sir Austen Chamberlain, Peking, 30 November, 1927.

bring benefits to those who wanted to delay the rendition negotiations.¹³⁷ Thirdly, they regarded the proposal as being in line with British liberal policy.

However, Young's proposal met opposition from D. B. Walker and Richards, who argued that it would show weakness on the part of the British and encourage further demands from the Chinese government. Furthermore, it would lead to bad faith with their counterparts in Shanghai, because the British (and other foreigners) had resolved such reforms there. They also said that the proposal would confuse the British community in Tientsin, and would be construed as conflicting with the original view of the British policy.¹³⁸

The hot debate regarding this matter was decided by a vote in the 14 December 1927 meeting. The first resolution was that:

This joint meeting records its view that under existing circumstances it is politic to take steps to amend the existing Municipal Regulations with a view to the elimination, as far as practicable of discriminatory features.¹³⁹

This resolution was deemed too lenient and generous and was therefore defeated, illustrating that the British diehards were not happy with the idea of reform in Tientsin. Young and other moderates could see that the great opposition had altered the resolution, which stated that:

This meeting disapproves of any change in the status of the British Municipal British Area but if assured that it will assist His Majesty's Government in postponing the present negotiations regarding the modification of the status of the area,

¹³⁷ St. Anthony College, Lampson Diaries, 7 March 1928, Killearn Papers.

¹³⁸ PRO FO228/3837 Letter from Sir James Jamieson to Sir Miles Lampson, Tientsin, 4 January 1928.

¹³⁹ PRO FO674/241A Memorandum on the History of the Negotiations for the Retrocession of the British Concession at Tientsin from February 1927 to August 1928.

is prepared to recommend the alteration of the existing Municipal Regulations on the lines of the draft [from the British community in Tientsin] submitted to it and authorises the Chairman to communicate this resolution to His Majesty's Minister.¹⁴⁰

This resolution was passed in favour (by 11 to 6) of modifying the Land Regulations if the British government was willing to postpone negotiations on the concession.¹⁴¹

The first task of the moderate group seemed to have successfully captured support from the British community. Its second task was to get support from the British government and the Chinese in order to delay the negotiations.¹⁴² The moderate strategy seemed to be working, although reactions to the proposal from the Legation, the Consul General in Tientsin and the Foreign Office were diverse. Lampson and Jamieson "seemed to be parallel" with the British communities. According to Lampson, after 1927 the Chinese had not made any attempt to continue the negotiations. Lampson furthered his idea by suggesting that the dormancy of the negotiations be allowed to continue while he tried to promote the new plan to satisfy the Chinese as adopted by the resolution above. Moreover the situation in China was still uncertain with the continuation of the civil war, and it was not clear who controlled Tientsin.¹⁴³ Chamberlain also seemed to have given

¹⁴⁰ PRO FO228/3837 Letter from Sir Miles Lampson to Sir Austen Chamberlain, Peking, 19 January 1928.

¹⁴¹ PRO FO228/3646 Telegram to Foreign Office No. 1749 (21582/27) 18 December 1927.

¹⁴² PRO FO228/3837 Telegram to Foreign Office No. 77 (906/28) of 28 January 1928 sent at 9 a.m. in "2" by cable.

¹⁴³ PRO FO228/3837 Letter from Sir Miles Lampson to Sir Austen Chamberlain, 19 January 1928, Peking and PRO FO228/3837 Telegram to Foreign Office No. 77 (906/28) of 28 January 1928 sent at 9 a.m. in "2" by cable. At that time Chang Tso-lin, who controlled Peking, did not have true power in Tientsin. Chihli, the province in which Tientsin lay, was under the control of Chang Tso-lin's lesser ally, General Chu Yu-pu. The situation became more complicated when the Nationalist Troops advanced into Shantung neighbouring of Chihli.

the British communities the green light to carry on the scheme of eliminating discrimination against the Chinese in the municipality. On one point he agreed that the British should not press the negotiation issue while the Chinese were still not interested, or as Lampson said, to "...let sleeping dogs lie..."¹⁴⁴ But Chamberlain did not agree to alter the original plan to return the concession. The issue of disturbance and stable government in China were not the issue that prompted Chamberlain to reconsider the January 1927 offer.¹⁴⁵ He added that:

We are, therefore, in my opinion as much committed now as we have been at any time since last January to continue negotiations in principle and it would be generally regarded as a breach of faith on our part to endeavour to go back on that obligation. The most we can do is to refrain from pressing on actively with the negotiations so long as the Chinese themselves remain quiescent.¹⁴⁶

Regarding the proposal by the British Communities, Chamberlain suggested two points of action that the British should take:

1. Undertake the amendment of the Land Regulations to suit the Chinese councillors' demands. However he stressed that the action should be regarded as a "...step towards and not an alternative to rendition ..."¹⁴⁷
2. Give the Chinese an opportunity to participate in the executive in municipal administration. In addition, without a formal procedure to modify the Land

¹⁴⁴ PRO FO228/3837 Telegram from Foreign Office to H.M. Minister, 7 February 1928, p.1 and FO228/3837 Telegram to Foreign Office No. 77 (906/28) of 28 January 1928 sent at 9 a.m. in "2" by cable.

¹⁴⁵ PRO FO228/3837 Telegram from Foreign Office to H.M. Minister, 7 February 1928.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

Regulations, they also been suggested to remove any discrimination against the Chinese.¹⁴⁸

At this point the Foreign Office had the support of the British communities in continuing the proposal in amendment, while the Foreign Office would support the British communities by not pressing the negotiation issue on the Chinese government. In short, this development shows that the moderates managed to engage the support of the British government.

The Last Ditch Proposal

With this encouragement, the British communities, led by Young, followed Chamberlain's suggestions. Young's next step was to draft a new regulation to deal with future negotiations with the Chinese government. The moderate group once again won the support of the majority at the meeting of all British communities in Tientsin on 22 March 1928, for their proposals for several changes to be made to the municipality's Land Regulations, such as:

- 1) To eliminate discrimination on qualification. This would change Regulations 6, 7, 8 and 9. The implication of the amendment was that it gave more votes to the British communities.
- 2) On the membership of the Municipal Council, the British communities agreed to amend Regulation 13, giving an equal number of British and Chinese members on the council, i.e. five each.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

3) This amendment continued with the suggestion to eliminate Paragraph 2 of Regulation 13, which gave only persons who could speak English the right to become members.¹⁴⁹

The new draft of the regulation was similar in that it tried to get support from three groups i.e. the British government, the Chinese and the diehards. The British moderate group had to make several compromises with the diehards owing to their protests about the 'misgovernance' of the Chinese government in the former Austrian, German and Russian concessions.¹⁵⁰

Next the proposal was brought to the Annual General meeting of Electors of the BMC on 11 April 1928 just after the KMT's Northern Expedition moved into the new phase. There the moderate group once more received huge support from electors in the BMC for an amendment regarding discrimination against the Chinese.¹⁵¹ In another development the moderate group had to make a plan for dealing with the Chinese government in future rendition negotiations. Kent's statement pointed out that:

The Committee earnestly draws attention to the considerations urged in its dispatch of the 14th April last which inspired the plan of dual control. It trusts that the only circumstance which would be held to justify reversion to last year's draft are the emergence of a Government in China which would exercise effective control over the country, and which had given proof that it would honour its international engagements. It desires respectfully to emphasise once more the absence of such a government and the intolerable conditions of areas under

¹⁴⁹ PRO FO228/3837 Letter from Sir James Jamieson to Sir Miles Lampson, Tientsin 26 March 1928.

¹⁵⁰ PRO FO228/3837 Copy of Resolution Passed by the British Ratepayers of the British Municipal Area at Tientsin at a Meeting held in the Gordon Hall on 22 March 1928.

¹⁵¹ PRO FO228/3838 Enclosure to Consul-General Sir J. W. Jamieson's Despatch No.30 of the 13 April 1928 to H.M. Minister, Peking.

Chinese administration, in the face of which the relinquishment of British control beyond that contemplated in the draft of 14th April last could only involve in the opinion of the Committee the most disastrous consequences.¹⁵²

This statement did not mean that the moderate group had no faith in the Chinese government; it was presented to illustrate that the moderate group wanted their interests protected. Therefore a new version of the modification furthered the earlier suggestion, as stated below:

The municipality would be named as Tzu Chu Lin municipality.

1. The regulation also named the Chinese government as the government responsible for the municipality.
2. In order to recognise Chinese sovereignty, the Chinese flag would be hoisted together with the British flag on Gordon Hall.
3. The municipal police would be under the Tientsin City Police but maintaining independent organisation under the municipal office. The police would have the same uniforms as the Chinese police but with a purple hatband.
4. Article 23 (3) gave the chance to the Chinese to be either head or deputy head of municipal departments.
5. Chinese characters would be used alongside English on every municipal notice.

¹⁵² SOAS, CHAS/MCP/35 China Association, Letter from P.H.B. Kent to Sir James Jamieson, Tientsin, 31 July 1928.

6. Article 42 empowered both the Chinese and British governments to sanction any modification of the Land Regulations.¹⁵³

7. Equal numbers of Chinese and British members to be appointed in the ten-member Municipal Council.¹⁵⁴

This proposal, called the 'Last Ditch' proposal, was drafted on 14 April 1928. The new draft dropped the position of President agreed in early negotiations between the Chinese and British in 1927. However, it stipulated that the administration of the municipality would be on joint veto by the British Consul-General and the Chinese Commissioner of Foreign Affairs.¹⁵⁵ In short the Last Ditch proposal could be examined as a new offer which gave diarchic rule, with both governments involved as equal partners in municipal membership. Kent justified this, saying that:

...the Committee has reached the conclusion that it should advise the community, as a matter of practical politics, to support the scheme of joint control, since it provides certain safeguards, offers reasonable hope of a workable solution of an embarrassing problem, and provides tangible evidence of British sympathy with Chinese aspirations.¹⁵⁶

This statement illustrates that the Last Ditch proposal was the final proposal which would be offered to the Chinese government if negotiations were resumed.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵³ PRO FO228/3838 Letter from Sir James Jamieson to Sir Miles Lampson, Tientsin 17 April 1928.

¹⁵⁴ PRO FO228/3838 Minutes of the Annual Meeting of Electors of the British Municipal Area held in the Gordon Hall on Wednesday 11 April 1928, at 3.30 p.m.

¹⁵⁵ PRO FO228/3838 Explanatory Note, p.10.

¹⁵⁶ SOAS, CHAS/MCP/35 China Association, Letter from P.H.B. Kent to Sir James Jamieson, Tientsin, 4 July 1928.

¹⁵⁷ PRO FO674/241A Memorandum on the History of the Negotiations for the Retrocession of the British Concession at Tientsin from February 1927 to August 1928.

The new draft of the Land Regulations was gladly accepted by Lampson. He supported the idea as part of the effort to bring down critics of the British liberal policy, and it also opened a way to satisfy the Chinese.¹⁵⁸ Chamberlain responded with sympathy to the British communities' efforts to make amendments to the regulation, and was concerned only about dropping the position of President in the new regulation, as he felt that it was bad faith to drop this point which had already been agreed by both parties. He accepted the Last Ditch proposal for future negotiation with the Chinese government.¹⁵⁹ In short, Chamberlain expressed his sympathy towards British nationals in Tientsin by playing the 'let sleeping dogs lie' policy. In order to 'play slow' he moved to implement their policy while the Chinese were engulfed with their own problems (as the KMT was marching north) and anti-British sentiment was less overt, at the end of 1920s.¹⁶⁰

At the time of the debate on the Last Ditch proposal in spring and summer 1928 the KMT troops had succeeded defeat the Northern army. The Northern troops gradually retreated and the KMT began to establish its power in North China. But the British community had taken steps towards the successful reform of the BMC to cope with change.

This reform further changed and modified the BMC's rules and regulations, implementing several provisions that would eliminate grounds for existing Chinese grievances against discrimination in the concession. This change was in

¹⁵⁸ St. Anthony College, Lampson Diaries, 18 April 1928, Killearn Papers and PRO FO228/3838 Letter from Sir Miles Lampson to Sir Austen Chamberlain, Peking, 23 April 1928.

¹⁵⁹ PRO FO228/3838 Telegram from Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir Miles Lampson, 24 June 1928.

¹⁶⁰ Fung, *The Diplomacy of Retreat: Britain's South China Policy, 1924-1931*, p.170.

accordance with the suggestion of the Foreign Office, which wanted to make minor changes in the draft Land Regulations, especially regarding Article 38 and 47 on municipal employees and registration of land, without waiting to negotiate with the Chinese.¹⁶¹ In 1927, for the first time in its history, the annual general meeting report could be found in Chinese. On the 1 September 1927, the Tientsin Kung Hsueh Chinese School was opened.¹⁶² In 1929 the school had an acting headmaster and 17 assistant teachers. The local Chinese supported it, as indicated by the increasing numbers of Chinese students. The school opened with 46 pupils, rising to 219 in 1928 and 337 in 1929. The BMC also agreed to form two trusts, to maintain the English Grammar School and the Chinese Kung Hsueh School, thus treating both schools equally.¹⁶³ In order to continue the reform, several suggestions in the Last Ditch proposal were implemented, especially the abolition of discrimination regarding electors' qualifications; enlarging the Council from nine members to ten, of which five were to be Chinese; eliminating the provision which stipulated that only persons fully conversant in English could be members of the Council; eliminating regulations which demanded that only Chinese clubs should be registered so that now all clubs should be registered; and stipulating that all municipal publications and notifications were to be published in both English and Chinese.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶¹ PRO FO674/241A Memorandum on the History of the Negotiations for the Retrocession of the British Concession at Tientsin from February 1927 to August 1928.

¹⁶² PRO FO228/3838 Minutes of the Annual of the British Municipal Area held in the Gordon Hall on Wednesday 11 April 1928, at 3.30 p.m.

¹⁶³ BMC, *Tientsin, Report of the Council for the year 1929* (Tientsin: Tientsin Press Ltd., 1930), pp.85-6.

¹⁶⁴ PRO FO228/3838 Minutes of the Annual of the British Municipal Area held in the Gordon Hall on Wednesday 11 April 1928, at 3.30 p.m.

In 1929 the number of members of the Municipal Council was enlarged, with five Chinese members appointed alongside five British members. In that year also the Police Department was reorganised and the Chinese Assistant Superintendent position was created.¹⁶⁵ A Chinese Deputy Secretary was also appointed. It had been further decided to appoint a Chinese Assistant Waterworks Engineer.¹⁶⁶ In 1928 the Chinese responded to the efforts to reform the BMC by giving a Sino-British banquet as a sign of the Chinese residents' and business community's gratitude for the reform. Dr. W. W. Yen (a former Chinese Prime Minister) gave a speech saying that among the reasons for this gathering was "...to show Chinese appreciation of what the British ratepayers and authorities had done with regard to the rights and privileges of Chinese ratepayers in this Municipality (BMC)."¹⁶⁷ J. S. Chwang (a Chinese councillor) also praised British efforts to reform the BMC, starting with opening Victoria Park to the Chinese in 1926 and increasing Chinese representation in the BMC. He hoped that this reform would continue in the future. For the British, Jamieson, representing the British government, praised the long tradition of the British community in Tientsin for maintaining good relations with the Chinese throughout the reform. On Young's speech, he touched on the reforms to the BMC should not be revolutionary or drastic but a gradual evolution.¹⁶⁸ Young aimed to protect British interests and avoid damage to them from disturbances caused by Chinese nationalism.

¹⁶⁵ PRO FO228/4015 Letter from Sir James Jamieson to Sir Miles Lampson, Tientsin, 13 May 1929.

¹⁶⁶ SOAS, CHAS/MCP/35 China Association, Letter from P.H.B. Kent to Sir James Jamieson, Tientsin, 4 July 1928.

¹⁶⁷ PRO FO228/3838 Enclosure to Consul-General Sir J. W. Jamieson's despatch No.313 of the 14th December, 1928 to H.M. Minister, Peking.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

In 1929, the British community organised a Second Sino-British dinner attended by many distinguished British and Chinese leaders. Here the Chinese and British flags were displayed together in the Grammar School Hall, and Chinese and British songs were played by the Royal Scots band. Several British and Chinese leaders made speeches. Jamieson, as representative of the British government, began his speech by making it clear that the British government would help the Chinese government to meet their aspiration to regain Chinese sovereignty. Two Chinese speakers, Liang Ming-ting (former Chinese Foreign Minister) and K. C. Tu (a merchant), praised the reforms in Tientsin, which had created better relations between both nations. They agreed that further efforts were needed to eliminate any differences in the BMC and increase their friendship and mutual understanding. Z. S. Bien, manager of the Bank of China and newly-elected BMC councillor, stated:

Let us hope that the date is not very far when Tientsin will become one real city instead of a combination of small cities, in which every able-bodied and able-minded citizen can have equal opportunity to share the responsibility of city affairs and also the desired equitable protection to life and property. It is our common goal.¹⁶⁹

This speech illustrates how the Chinese still wanted more than modification: they wanted the full return of the foreign concession. This means that there were still hopes for further efforts to restore Chinese sovereignty. Bien's speech represented the Chinese people's nationalist aspiration to regain the Chinese sovereignty in China.

¹⁶⁹ PRO FO228/4015 Enclosure to Consul-General Sir James Jamieson's dispatch No.28 of the 9 April, 1929 to H.M. Minister, Peking.

Young, on other hand, tried to protect the interests of British firms in his speech:

It is true that we have not adopted the principle of "one man – one vote" ... We have frankly adopted the principle that the municipality should be governed by the people who have a financial stake in the prosperity of the area irrespective of their nationality.¹⁷⁰

Woodhead's speech was 'friendlier' and was concerned with the Sino-British relationship, saying that the British community had given many opportunities to the Chinese in the BMC and furthered their prosperity and peace.¹⁷¹ In other words, Woodhead suggested that the concession should be preserved as it was, without many changes.

The Nationalist government which took over the Chinese government in 1928 was to some extent satisfied with what the British communities had done. Dr. Wang Cheng-ting, the Chinese Foreign Minister, expressed his intention not to press for negotiations on the British concession for the time being as a result of this modification. He would first deal with the other concessions, especially those of France and Japan. He hoped that progress would be achieved with the other concessions before focusing on the British concession again. In short, his idea was to settle all these issues in order to unite the concessions as one city.¹⁷² However, his idea was overshadowed by his effort to tackle the issue of extraterritoriality in late 1920s. This was because one month after his appointment as Foreign Minister he focused Chinese foreign policy on the abrogation of the unequal treaties with

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity*, pp.249 and 253.

¹⁷² PRO FO228/4015 Telegram from H.M. Minister at Nanking (by wireless) to H.M. Minister, 3 June, 1929.

Foreign Powers.¹⁷³ In addition to this reason, the Nationalist government was still concentrating on destroying the communists, and for this reason it allowed the foreign concessions to continue as they were.¹⁷⁴

Against this background the situation in the British concession was normal, although the incidence of armed robbery was quite high, fluctuating between 17 in 1927 to 37 in 1928 and 21 in 1929. In 1929 the Waterworks Department completed building a pump house at Parkes Road Station. In the same year electricity consumption decreased due to the depression in trade and the departure of large numbers of foreign troops. The Public Works was busy paving roads, constructing bricks for the Kung Hsueh building, lighting the streets and clearing snow. One of the interesting events in the concession that year was the Annual Memorial Service for the foreign soldiers and sailors of the allied Expedition of 1900.¹⁷⁵ Ironically, this event seemed to be in opposition to the British government's efforts to mend relations with the Chinese, as the British community in Tientsin continued to remember the clash with the Chinese at the time of the Boxer Uprising. In other words, the majority of the British community still ignored the reality of Chinese Nationalism and opposed efforts to abolish extraterritoriality, as is discussed in the next chapter.

All in all the BMC had succeeded in dealing with the problems of Chinese nationalism. In contrast to Shanghai, no serious disturbances had occurred such as

¹⁷³ Edmund S. K. Fung, 'Nationalist Foreign Policy, 1928-1937', in David Pong and Edmund S. K. Fung, (eds.), *Ideal and Reality: Social and Political Change in Modern China, 1860-1949* (Lanham: University of America, Inc., 1985), pp.190-1.

¹⁷⁴ Wasserstrom, *Student Protests in Twentieth-Century China*, pp.151 and 156-157.

¹⁷⁵ BMC, *Tientsin, Report of the Council for the year ended December 31, 1929*, pp.45, 47, 64, 70 and 90.

the Thirtieth May Incident. The close cooperation between the British Consul General and moderate groups had created peace in Tientsin's British concession. The British liberal policy seemed to have achieved its target of good relations with the Chinese.

Conclusion

The years 1927 and 1928 were crucial for the British communities in Tientsin. They witnessed the advance of Nationalist troops on the north, signalling concern to the British community. This concern was twofold. First, the danger of open attack by the Chinese on British interests. The British could no longer protect their informal empire using the gun boat policy. The Foreign Office was very cautious in dealing with the British community's demand for protection. As stated in the conclusion to Chapter Two, the BMC was powerless when it came to security. The British government controlled all decisions about how to protect the British community. But the British Commander and some of the British community in Tientsin and its hinterlands seemed to believe that the Chinese could be controlled by force. This was a challenge to the British government's effort to avoid further confrontation with the Chinese. Eventually the British legation succeeded in avoiding British involvement in a big military plan to defend Tientsin.

The second concern of the British regarded their future in north China. They were anxious and opposed to British liberal policy and challenged the British government about how it would be implemented in China i.e., principally through rendition of British concessions. The British concession in Tientsin became one of

the tests to recover cordial Anglo-Chinese relations in the turbulent years of the mid-1920s. Though the British government controlled the BMC, the British community criticised the rendition proposal, and the British government could not implement this policy without the involvement of the community. The British government, through its Consul General, had to get the cooperation of influential British community leaders. This was not because the British government could not implement the policy unilaterally because it wanted to achieve this policy with the support of its nationals. The continuing of opposition from the British community would disturb the British effort to create the good relationships with the Chinese. This was because Chinese nationalists or the communists would regard the British community's opposition as official view from the British government.¹⁷⁶

This meant that the British community had some influence in determining the success of British liberal policy and the future of Anglo-Chinese relations. Influential leaders, mainly British traders, were very concerned the future of their interests. As the British government policy was a *fait accompli*, so the traders (the moderates) had to accept this policy in order to avoid damaging their interests. This moderate group adopted a pragmatic approach to all the changes in China and in British liberal policy. It recognised the changes in China but did not take extreme action, agreeing to all aspects of the British liberal policy. Another group in the British community adopted the diehard approach. They did not believe that a liberal policy could alter the situation in China. They considered China 'barbarous' and the Chinese unlikely to respect foreign interests.

¹⁷⁶ Bickers, *Britain in China*, p.151.

These were the obstacles faced by the British government in its effort to restore Anglo-Chinese relations. From 1927 to 1929 the British community had shown their ability to alter British liberal policy. The pragmatic approach of the moderate group resulted in the introduction of the Last Ditch proposal. The moderates considered that losing a little was better than losing everything, and in this way they retained the concession and regained the support of the Chinese. Both the Chinese Nationalist government and the Chinese leaders in the concession welcomed this result by holding the Sino-British Banquet in 1928. This effort was part of the big British firms' awareness that they could no longer stop Chinese nationalism.¹⁷⁷

While in Shanghai E. Finley Johnson headed a judicial enquiry into the blame for the May Thirtieth Incident, which was laid on foreigners (especially Shanghailanders),¹⁷⁸ it was different in Tientsin, where the British community were enjoying friendly relations with the Chinese. The moderate group did not want a repeat at Tientsin of what had happened in Shanghai and Hankow. Learning from both incidents, the moderates opened up a middle road to protect British interests and please the Chinese. As a result, the Chinese did not see the British community as trouble, as they saw the Shanghailanders. The common sense of this group had pacified the situation in Tientsin after the Nationalist government took control of this city. Though the Chinese still regarded the British concession in Tientsin as a fortress of imperialism, the seizure of the British concession never happened as it had in

¹⁷⁷ Wasserstrom, *Student Protests in Twentieth-Century China*, p.150.

¹⁷⁸ Clifford, *Spoilt Children of Empire*, p.139.

Hankow. The early application of the British to mending relations with the Chinese had calmed Chinese envy of the British concession in Tientsin.

Another striking difference between the British communities in Tientsin and Shanghai was that the BMC was controlled by moderates. Young, the General Manager of KMA, used his position as chairman of the BMC to lead the British community towards a more liberal approach. He knew that it was important that British interests were protected against the Chinese activists. The diehards tried to gain support by telling inciting news about Chinese activists and Chinese authorities. With support from the British Minister and the Consul General, the moderate group succeeded in preventing this group from making the British concession in Tientsin similar to the International Settlement in Shanghai. For example the Thirtieth May Incident.

Chapter Four

The Transition Period: Chinese Challenges and the Coming of the Japanese (1929-1933)

Introduction

Between 1930 and 1933 Anglo-Chinese relations entered a new phase. It was a new beginning after the long and bitter relationship which had endured since the early 1920s, as mentioned in Chapters 2 and 3, and saw the emergence of a new crisis in China throughout the 1930s and 1940s which gradually transferred the focus of nationalist sentiment from the British to the Japanese. Before the anti-Japanese movement became overt, the new Nationalist government of China had demanded the abolition of the 'unequal' treaties – the extraterritorial rights and concessions in China. To do so it had to face tough negotiations with the foreign Powers. The diehard British community in China was stunned by the fact that Lampson went to negotiate and appeased to have reached agreement in 1931. As discussed in Chapter 3, they retaliated against what they saw as a threat to protect their privileges. Several minor issues such as the Thorburn case (1931) were used by the British community to buttress arguments about the Nationalists' alleged 'incompetence' and the unsuitability of giving them a free hand to manage foreign interests, especially where extraterritorial rights were concerned.¹ The moderate group was more cautious in its response to the Chinese demand for the abrogation of extraterritoriality.

¹ Robert A. Bickers, 'Death of a Young Shanghaier: The Thorburn Case and the Defence of the British Treaty Ports in China in 1931', *Modern Asian Studies* 30, 2 (1996), p.290.

Before this issue could be settled, China under Chiang Kai-shek, faced further disunity when several of his supporters turned against him. One of these opposition moves came from Feng Yu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan, who formed an alliance with other anti-Chiang forces (the Kwangsi clique, the Reorganisationist clique and the Western Hills faction) in 1930.² The revolt against the Nanking government under Chiang Kai-shek came to the attention of the foreign Powers when the Chinese customs house in Tientsin was seized in what seemed to be a familiar version of the old story of warlord civil war. However, the Manchurian crisis in autumn 1931 opened the door to a new crisis in China, which had an impact on British interests. The crisis continued and gradually escalated into a broader conflict when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbour at the end of 1941.

This chapter examines three key issues regarding the British community in Tientsin in particular and north China in general during this period. The first was the seizure of the customs house in Tientsin by Feng Yu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan in 1930.³ What was interesting about this incident was that it involved a British national, Bertram Lennox Simpson, appointed as Customs Commissioner by the rebel Peking government. At this point Tientsin came into the limelight of Anglo-Chinese history. In addition this section discusses how the British community (especially the traders) responded to this crisis. The community worried that the crisis would affect their trade. The second issue was the response of the British community in Tientsin to negotiations over extraterritorial rights in China. The

² Lloyd E. Eastman, 'Nationalist China during the Nanking decade, 1927-1937' in Lloyd E. Eastman, Jerome, (et.al), *The Nationalist Era in China 1927-1949* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p.12.

³Eastman, 'Nationalist China during the Nanking decade, 1927-1937', p.12 and Hans J. Van de Ven, *War and Nationalism in China 1925-1945* (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), pp.139-8.

previous chapter highlighted the extensive effort made by the British community to prevent the concession from falling under the control of the Chinese government. Although for the time being this effort had succeeded, the community's fight to retain its privileges continued, and it opposed the proposed abrogation of extraterritoriality. As with negotiations over the concession, it showed strong opposition. This chapter also considers the reaction of the British community in Tientsin to the Thorburn case relating to extraterritorial rights, and the tools they used to tackle these problems. The last issue in this section is the link between the Manchurian crisis and the response of the British community in Tientsin. This crisis overshadowed negotiations over extraterritorial rights, attracting Chinese attention there instead. The last part of the chapter considers how the British community reacted to the Manchurian Crisis.

The Customs Crisis, 1930

The Tientsin Customs Crisis originated from the crisis between Feng Yu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan (the Northern Coalition) on the one hand, and Chiang Kai-shek on the other. The capture of Peking in 1928 by the Northern Expedition had cemented the victory of the KMT. Chiang Kai-shek, who led the KMT, had established the National government in Nanking and wanted to unite and control all Chinese administration. In doing so, he had to deal with several of his supporters such as Feng Yu-hsiang, whose ambition to control Shantung led him to confront Chiang Kai-shek in order to get control over this province. Chiang's efforts to eliminate Feng worried Yen Hsi-shan, who joined forces with Feng to

confront him.⁴ In Peking, Yen Hsi-shan had established another government made up of Chinese leaders who were all opposed to Chiang Kai-shek.⁵ In order to avoid Customs revenues from Tientsin being used in Chiang's military campaign against them, Yen Hsi-shan asked the Commissioner, Colonel Francis Hayley-Bell, to retain tax revenues in the Bank of Communications in Tientsin until the dispute was settled.⁶ As Yen expected, Hayley-Bell refused. Yen then acted on his final option, which was to seize the Tientsin customs house, causing anxiety among the traders, including the British. Hayley-Bell was dismissed on 16 June 1930 and replaced by Bertram Lenox Simpson.

The British traders (particularly the firms listed in Appendix 2) which had big interests in Tientsin and its hinterlands were concerned that this crisis would disturb their business.⁷ The British concern became reality when Hayley-Bell closed customs houses and instructed all staff to cease work.⁸ In retaliation, Simpson who had served in the Customs from 1896-1910, reopened the customs house and urged all staff to continue their routine work. Workers who ignored this order would be dismissed and punished, although the form of punishment was not

⁴ James E. Sheridan, *Chinese Warlord: the Career of Feng Yu-hsiang* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966), p.264 cited from Ma, p.138 and Donald G. Gillin, *Warlord Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi Province 1911-1949* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), p.111 and 112 cited from Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, *op.cit.*, p.102, and Fairfield, p.2.

⁵ Akira Iriya, *After Imperialism*, p.269.

⁶ Donna Maree Brunero, *Britain's Imperial Cornerstone in China: the Chinese maritime customs service, 1854-1949*, (New York: Routledge, 2006), p.121.

⁷ SHAC, 676(1), 17761, Assumption of Charge: by Mr. B. Lenox Simpson, Commissioner, informing, 4254, 16 June 1930 and HSBC Group Archives, SHG 47, Letter from Mr. B. Lenox Simpson to the Manager, Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corp., Tientsin, June 16, 1930.

⁸ L. C. Arlington, *Through the Dragon's Eyes* (London: Constable & Co. Ltd., 1931), p.255 and SHAC, 676 (1), 17761, Copy of Express issued on 20 June by Mr. F. H. Bell, Commissioner of Customs; Tientsin.

specified.⁹ Some sources accused Simpson of planning to any Chinese workers who disobeyed these orders shot.¹⁰ To encourage staff to return, Simpson announced a month's bonus, and by 23 June 1930 the customs house in Tientsin was once more fully operational.¹¹ This crisis put a great deal of pressure on Hayley-Bell. He was given leave and all his duties, including monitoring the development of the custom crisis,¹² were taken over by his deputy commissioner R. C. Grierson.¹³

The impact of this incident on Tientsin trade was twofold. Firstly, the merchants wanted the administration of the Customs to be quickly and fully restored. At the time that Hayley-Bell was removed from the customs house, the Customs service was dysfunctional and creating confusion in shipping.¹⁴ The merchants were worried about the outcome of this seizure, but their concern gradually subsided when they saw that Simpson's administration had brought about a quick recovery of the service.¹⁵ The first day of the reopening of the customs house was reported by *The North-China Herald*: "...the Customs to-day appeared to be working at full blast, though their methods were necessarily most slipshod with a large army of newly engaged Chinese and a number of foreign supervisors styled 'emergency officers'".¹⁶ The article shows that although

⁹ SHAC, 676(1), 17761, 'Copy of Notification issued on 21 June 1930 at Tientsin by the Mayor, the Garrison Commander, and the Superintendent of Custom'.

¹⁰ PRO FO676/59 Telegram from Sir Miles Lampson to Mr. Ingram, No.158, Peking, 18 June 1930 and 676 (1) 768 Letter from Mr. Hayley-Bell to Sir Frederic Maze, Tientsin, 28 September 1930.

¹¹ SHAC, 679(1), 17761, *Circular No. 2656*, 23 June 1930 and SHAC, 676(1), 768 Letter from Mr. Hayley Bell to Sir Frederic Maze, Tientsin, 28 September 1930.

¹² SHAC, 679(1), 767, Telegram from I.G., 1st July 1930.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ *BMC, Tientsin: Report of the Council for the year 1930* (Tientsin: Tientsin Press, 1931), p.48.

¹⁵ SHAC, 676(1), 768 Tientsin N. C. Despatch No. 1704/I.G. of 1930: 'Report on Seizure of Tientsin Customs by Marshal Yen Hsi-shan for period July 2 to October 2, 1930'.

¹⁶ *The North-China Herald*, June 24, 1930, p.482.

Simpson had had little time to reopen the customs house and had lost many of the former staff, he had managed to resume the service with emergency staff. Another comment on Simpson's administration stated that:

At the first the Customs procedure was hopelessly slow under the new regime, and that meant longer office hours for the Wharfage Dues Office as well, a rather unwelcome occurrence, especially during the trying summer season. Otherwise there was no inconvenience or unpleasantness experienced during this emergency regime which terminated with the reinstatement of the regular staff on October 3rd.¹⁷

This comment indicates that Sampson's administration had weaknesses, which did not, however, hinder the progress of trade in Tientsin. At this point the Tientsin community, especially the British traders, wanted the crisis settled to avoid hindrance to trade. The business community was not opposed to administrative changes as long as trade was not disturbed.

The business community remained neutral: their only concern was that the crisis should end immediately in order that free trade could continue in China without interference from political disputes. However the impact from the crisis had made the British traders very concerned such as double taxes. The British traders tried to alert the British government to the issue of double taxes, which had come about because Maze, the Inspector General of Customs, had instructed that all foreign and local traders should redirect their trade to other ports (Dairen and Tsingtao), where duties normally paid at Tientsin would be collected.¹⁸

¹⁷ *BMC, Tientsin: Report of the Council for the year 1930*, p.48.

¹⁸ *The Times*, 21 June 1930, p.12.

However, foreign traders still recognised Simpson's customs house as a *de facto* establishment and were willing to resume trade relations, despite Maze's order to close the port. As a result, two Butterfield and Swire ships were taxed twice, once in Tientsin and once in Shanghai.¹⁹ Owing to the serious impact of this crisis, especially such double taxation, the British Chamber of Commerce held a meeting and agreed to urge the British Legation to take action.²⁰ The British Legation and Consul-General in Tientsin took a passive approach, but were most concerned about the integrity of the customs house and British trade interests. Lampson saw this crisis as a challenge to British trade interests in China. He said that the integrity of the customs should be restored to avoid any consequences which might harm their interests. There was no support for Simpson.²¹ Lampson approached him to advise him that he should avoid involvement in the crisis. However, Simpson declined to follow his advice without discussing it first with Yen Hsi-shan.²²

At this stage, Lampson said that the crisis was out of the Legation's control and that Maze could do little to settle it owing to his position as a Chinese civil servant who did not have quasi-independence in this case.²³ Lampson had no communication with Maze, his close involvement with the Inspector-General's succession a few years earlier having strained relations with him.²⁴ Moreover the

¹⁹ SOAS, CHAS/MCP/36 Letter from Butterfield & Swire, Shanghai, June 27, 1930.

²⁰ St. Anthony College, Lampson Diaries, 30 June 1930, the Killlearn Papers.

²¹ PRO FO 676/59, Letter from Sir Miles Lampson to Arthur Henderson, Peking, 24 October 1930.

²² St. Anthony College, Lampson Dairies, 13 May 1930, the Killlearn Papers.

²³ St. Anthony College, Lampson Dairies, 7 May 1930, the Killlearn Papers.

²⁴ Martyn Atkins, *Informal Empire in Crisis: British Diplomacy and the Chinese Customs Succession, 1927-1929* (Ithaca: East Asia Program, Cornell University, 1995), pp.37-9. Lampson had supported A. H. F. Edwards' succession as Inspector General of Chinese Maritime Customs but the Chinese Government favoured the selection of Maze.

British government adopted a neutral approach.²⁵ It took more collective action with assistance from other Powers to settle the crisis. As result the Diplomatic Body agreed to submit letters of protest to both parties, at the same time agreeing to adopt a neutral attitude in the crisis.²⁶ However, to ensure the continuation of trade in Tientsin the Consular Body recognised Simpson's *de facto* administration, because the Powers could not formulate a definitive policy in which Chinese groups would be real winners in this crisis. The British Legation admitted that it had little power to settle the problem because the British government's policy was not to intervene in the crisis.²⁷

Another point which concerned the British traders was that the crisis would become serious if the British government did not handle it carefully. Therefore the traders advised their government not to recognise any groups in this civil war in order to avoid damaging their trade interests. They also pointed out that the consequences of this crisis were profound:

The precedent set at Tientsin is a most dangerous one, inasmuch as upstarts such as Lennox Simpson – and there are unfortunately more than one in China – may be encouraged to influence the militarists to follow the example set by the North in provinces where allegiance to Nanking in certain cases is doubtful. Needless to say, further action of this sort will in time result in chaos and finally must not only mean a break-up of the Customs service itself, but also of the attendant services controlled thereby, such as Coast and River Lights, Conservancy, Pilotage, quarantine, etc. etc.²⁸

²⁵ SHAC, 679(1), 17761, Tientsin N. C. Despatch No. 1704/I.G. of 1930, 'Report on Seizure of Tientsin Customs by Marshal Yen Hsi-shan for period 2nd July to 2nd October 1930'.

²⁶ St. Anthony College, Lampson Diaries, 23 June – 1 July 1930, the Killearn Papers.

²⁷ PRO FO 676/59, Telegram from Sir Miles Lampson to Mr. E. M. B. Ingram, No.237, Peking, July 19 1930.

²⁸SOAS, CHAS/MCP/36 Letter from Butterfield & Swire to Messrs. John Swire & Sons Ltd., Shanghai, June 28, 1930.

This passage put Tientsin on the Chinese political map; the impact of the seizure was serious, as it could act as a model for other Chinese militarists to follow, which would be disastrous for Chinese revenue, loan payments and the progress of free trade in China. In addition, the break-up of the Chinese Maritime Customs would affect the port services mentioned in the passage above. As a result these traders wanted the British Legation to protect the integrity of the Chinese Maritime Customs, thereby also protecting British shipping interests in China.²⁹ However, this statement was the British traders' emphatic account of the seriousness of the issue, which could have an impact on British interests everywhere in China.

The BMC did mention this crisis in their annual report, as stated above. Its main concern seemed to be that this crisis would affect the progress of trade in Tientsin. The BMC wanted the crisis resolved as quickly as possible because the majority of its members were traders who wanted protection. Disturbances in China such as the seizure of the Chinese Maritime Customs' house in Tientsin could jeopardise the development of Tientsin. In short, not only were British interests outside the treaty port exposed to the impact of such disturbances, but also the British concession, always regarded as a 'safe' place in the British informal empire, became vulnerable when trade was threatened by the disturbance.

Because the Tientsin customs house was not located in the British but in the French Concession, the crisis had little direct impact on developments in the British concession itself. In 1930 affairs in the British concession were

²⁹ SOAS, CHAS/MCP/36, Letter from E. M. Gull to all Members of the China Association Committee, London, August 15, 1930, pp.4 and 5.

unexceptional. The BMC's daily tasks were more concerned with public health. The quality of water taken from the Hai Ho was poor, according to the annual municipal report. As it was one of the concession's water sources the British were concerned that this might affect the health of the community.³⁰ In another development, the Electricity Department planned to make the concession a 'Smokeless City', and in 1930 neon-lighted advertisements were introduced.³¹ The murder of a Chinese BMC constable in the concession was highlighted in the annual report.³² Such developments suggest that the British concession was under control and operating as normal.

However, Britain's problem was not only its trade interests in Tientsin; the seizure of the customs house had put Tientsin at the centre of Anglo-Chinese relations. Some of the British nationals, including Simpson, challenged the British government's efforts to mend relations with China, and used this opportunity to join his administration.³³ Apart from Britons there was also one United States, German and French national. Extraterritoriality seemed to offer them protection as they joined the Simpson's administration. Although this was a small group, to some extent it irritated the Chinese government.

³⁰ *BMC, Tientsin: Report of the Council for the year ended 1930*, p.2.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p.28.

³² *Ibid.*, p.36.

³³ Among the British involved in the Simpson's administration were G. S. Woods, Boat Officer at Taku, John Anthony Grandon, Examiner A at Parcel Department of Head Office (Ex-customs, dismissed 1922), C. A. E. Carr, Examiner, J. V. Moulard, Examiner, J. R. Stewart, Examiner, H. W. M. Taylor, Examiner, Patrick Murray, Examiner and W. Sheppard-Graham, Examiner. *The North-China Herald*, 8 July 1930, p.43.

Simpson's involvement had brought protests from the Chinese government, which urged the British to take stern action.³⁴ The Chinese political magazine *The China Critic* criticised the misuse of extraterritoriality by Simpson, who had interfered in the Chinese civil war. The magazine also criticised the British government for not taking action to stop him.³⁵ Another Chinese magazine, *China Affairs*, reacted in the same way, feeling very frustrated by extraterritoriality and by how the British government had handled the case. Simpson, according to *China Affairs*, was not only free of Chinese law because of his privileges, but also was not convicted under British law.³⁶ All these comments put Tientsin on the map where big issues in Anglo-Chinese relations - specifically extraterritoriality - were contested, as discussed in the next section.

The Chinese government in Nanking was irritated by Lampson's adamant refusal to take action over Simpson. Lampson tried to handle this crisis with caution. As mentioned above, he had doubts about the stability of the Nationalist government. His scepticism stemmed from his belief that almost all the Chinese governments since the collapse of the Ch'ing Dynasty had not survived for long. He also had had his doubts about Chiang Kai-shek's government since its establishment in Nanking in 1927.³⁷ After almost five years it was losing its unity. There were many factions in the government, each with its own interests, such as the CC clique, the Political Study clique and the Whampoa clique.³⁸ Furthermore, as a government leader Chiang Kai-shek had political enemies such as Hu Han-min

³⁴ *The North China Herald*, 9 April 1930, p.193 and *The North China Herald*, 2 September 1930, p.342.

³⁵ *The China Critic*, July 24, 1930, p.706.

³⁶ *Chinese Affairs: Weekly Survey of Important Events*, No.86-87, June 30, 1930, p.4.

³⁷ David Clive Wilson, 'Britain and the Kuomintang, 1924-28', p.627.

³⁸ Eastman, 'Nationalist China during the Nanking decade, . . .', pp.26-32.

and Wang Ching-wei. Another problem faced by this government was the threat from the communists and rebel provinces such as in south China,³⁹ with the warlord factions making matters still worse. For this reason the British government kept its legation in Peking rather than in the new Chinese capital, Nanking. Regarding the Tientsin customs crisis, by not punishing Simpson, Lampson seemed to be playing neutral so as not to offend Yen Hsi-shan.⁴⁰

But Lampson was seriously concerned about the involvement of British nationals in this crisis, especially when he heard that Simpson had apparently threatened to have Chinese employees who would not serve in his administration shot. Lampson ordered the Consul-General in Tientsin to intervene in this matter.⁴¹ The Vice Consul met Simpson and advised him to avoid hostility, which could only make matters worse.⁴² However, Grierson denied that Simpson would shoot Chinese staff who refused to resume their duties, adding that such workers would be punished according to Chinese law.⁴³ The Chinese government's request that Simpson should be deported from Tientsin was not granted. Privately, Lampson said that in fact the British Legation could not agree that the National government in Nanking represented a Chinese government. If the Nationalist government was the true government of China, Simpson's action could be claimed

³⁹ Donald G. Gillin, 'Problems of Centralization in Republican China: The Case of Ch'en Ch'eng and the Kuomintang, *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol.29, No.4. (Aug., 1970), p.837.

⁴⁰ PRO FO676/59 Telegram to Ingram at Nanking, Peking, 16 June 1930.

⁴¹ PRO FO 676/59, Telegram from Sir Miles Lampson to Mr. E. M. B. Ingram, No.158, Peking, June 18, 1930.

⁴² PRO FO 676/59, Telegram from Sir Miles Lampson to Mr. E. M. B. Ingram, No.171, Peking, June 23, 1930.

⁴³ SHAC, 679(1), 768, Seizure of the Tientsin Custom House: Statement by Mr. R. C. Grierson, Deputy Commissioner.

to be helping the rebel government and he could be prosecuted.⁴⁴ The inability of the Nanking government to control China would make such a prosecution useless.⁴⁵ This caused a problem in Anglo-Chinese relations, because the Chinese government accused the British government of approving Simpson's action. To avoid any misunderstanding, Lampson clarified that the British government had no such intention.⁴⁶

In the revolt against the Nationalist government, the Manchurian warlord Chang Hsueh-liang became an important figure from whom both hostile parties tried to gain support.⁴⁷ In the war Chiang Kai-shek's troops were victorious against the Feng-Yen Coalition. To avoid setbacks from either side both parties tried to gain Chang's support.⁴⁸ Therefore Simpson went to Manchuria to negotiate with Chang Hsueh-liang, and has been accused of trying to bribe Chang to allow him to retain his position as Commissioner of Customs. This accusation was still unproven, because the letter he wrote was not clear.⁴⁹ However, Simpson failed to get support from Chang, who had given his support to Chiang Kai-shek in Nanking. So Chang Hsueh-liang's force quickly occupied and gained control of the Peking-Tientsin area.⁵⁰ The crisis then drew to a close; Yen Hsi-shan had to obey Chang Hsueh-liang's order to evacuate north China and retreat to Shansi. In

⁴⁴ PRO FO 676/59 Telegram from Sir Miles Lampson to Mr. E. M. B. Ingram, No.187, Peking, June 27 1930.

⁴⁵ PRO FO 676/59 Letter from Sir Miles Lampson to Mr. Arthur Henderson, Peking, October 24 1930.

⁴⁶ PRO FO 676/59 Telegram from Sir Miles Lampson to Mr. E. M. B. Ingram, No.188, Peking, June 27 1930.

⁴⁷ Rana Mitter, *The Manchurian Myth* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), p.53.

⁴⁸ Eastman, 'Nationalist China during the Nanking decade, . . .', p.12

⁴⁹ PRO FO676/59 Letter from Mr. J. F. Brennan to Sir M. Lampson, Shanghai, 14 October, 1930.

⁵⁰ Eastman, 'Nationalist China during the Nanking decade, . . .', p.13.

Tientsin, Simpson was fatally wounded by gunmen at his house.⁵¹ His killers were never identified, and mystery still surrounds the question of why and by whom he was killed. Maze gave three possible reasons for his murder. The first was that he had tried to blackmail Chang Hsueh-liang. The second charge was that Sampson had tried to negotiate with Chang, who seemed to be offended by Yen Hsi-shan and Feng Yu-hsiang; and the third, that he had been involved in trafficking drugs in Tientsin.⁵² At the end of the crisis, all the employees who had served under Simpson were dismissed except for workers in the Marine Department.⁵³ The Tientsin Customs were reopened under the control of the Nanking government on 3 October 1930, with Grierson appointed Acting Commissioner.

All in all this crisis shows that the British community could do little to protect their trade interests except by mending relations with the Chinese. It was hard for the British government to protect Anglo-Chinese relations because the involvement in the crisis of Simpson and others threatened its efforts. The next section elaborates further about the British community's attitude towards the abolition of extraterritoriality.

In Defence of Extraterritoriality

The next item on the Nationalist government's agenda after the end of the Northern Expedition was to regain China's sovereignty. From 1929 onward they

⁵¹ PRO FO656/204 Letter from Tientsin Consul General to Judge Sir Peter Grain, Tientsin, 10 November 1930.

⁵² Brunero, *Britain's Imperial Cornerstone in China*, p.130.

⁵³ SHAC, 679(1), 17761, Letter from Chief Secretary to Mr. Chiang Hui, General No. 9059, October 16, 1930.

had struggled towards this.⁵⁴ On 27th April 1929 the Chinese Foreign Ministry sent a note to all the foreign Powers in China, urging them to open negotiations on abrogating extraterritorial rights. Implicitly this note demonstrated the Nationalist government's hope that all the foreign countries who had extraterritorial rights would agree to abrogate them on 1 January 1930.⁵⁵ The British government seemed to agree to this request, but many British policy-makers wanted the abolition to be gradual, safeguarding British nationals' interests, and they also wanted the Chinese government to rule China without interference from other parties such as the military.⁵⁶

Opposition

However, the Chinese government's call for negotiations on the abrogation of extraterritoriality met with opposition from the British community in China, which saw the move as degrading their status and privileges. They still believed China to be unstable, and the protection of the Chinese authorities was not enough for them. In Tientsin, they had already experienced a most challenging time when the British government had been willing to surrender the British concession. This had shocked them, but they had gradually managed to control the situation by giving certain equality to the Chinese, which had prevented rendition. The next and greatest challenge was the Chinese government's call for the foreign powers to relinquish extraterritorial rights. This lay at the core of the British informal presence in China. If it was abrogated, all other privileges, such as the British

⁵⁴ Fung, 'Nationalist Foreign Policy, 1928-1937', p.190, *Malay Mail*, 9 July 1928, p.9 and *The Strait Times*, July, 10 1928, p.9.

⁵⁵ Fung, *The Diplomacy of Imperial Retreat*, p.201.

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, pp.203 and 204.

Municipal Administration in Tientsin, would also be lost.⁵⁷ In addition, the British community felt betrayed by its own government's willingness to consider relinquishing this right. For almost 70 years, from 1860 to 1930, they had built up the British Municipal Council and its trade interests in Tientsin and the surrounding area, and they saw this achievement as threatened by their own government's effort to negotiate with the Chinese.

Following the announcement by the Chinese government that it wanted to abolish extraterritoriality, the British community in Tientsin gathered to discuss the matter. Two memoranda from the TBCI were released after the Chinese government sent its note to the foreign Powers. The first pointed out that the British community had tried to show that Chinese law and its judiciary were still not capable of protecting and safeguarding foreign nationals. Among the comments in the memorandum, one noted that:

There are some Modern Courts and prisons, but even in Shanghai, where there Courts function in the full glare of publicity, the judiciary are under political control. The Civil Code has not yet been completed and the revised Criminal Code is a dead letter where the accused are members of the Kuomintang, or are able to enlist the support that Party.⁵⁸

The key point in this passage is the accusation by the British community that Chinese law and its judiciary would not accord them true justice. In addition, the British community in Tientsin continued to blame Chinese politicians for using their position and power to undermine the law. This explanation was a useful tool for eliciting sympathy from London's public.

⁵⁷ Osterhammel, 'China', p.653.

⁵⁸ SOAS, MS186361, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Box 7, 'Memorandum No.27, The Abolition of Extraterritoriality: How the Law is administered in China'.

However, the eagerness of the Chinese government to abolish extraterritoriality alarmed the British community in Tientsin. The Chinese Minister of Justice, Dr. Wang Chung-hui, who was despatched abroad on a mission to explain the modernisation of Chinese judicial codes and to seek the end of foreign extraterritoriality in 1929, became an irritation to the British community in Tientsin. In order to counter the Chinese campaign to abolish extraterritoriality, the British community in Tientsin, via the TBCI, condemned Dr. Wang Chung-hui's explanation as concealing the true story in China, where Chinese law was not working well. The Chinese authorities, according to the British community, did not dare to enforce the law in China, where criminals always got away without trial.⁵⁹ At this point the British community in Tientsin seemed relentless in its opposition to the Chinese government's efforts to attack their interests. Every effort by the Chinese to attack extraterritoriality met with a counterattack from the British community.

Memorandum 28 illustrates the belief of the British community in Tientsin that the Chinese demand for the abrogation of extraterritoriality rights was unnecessary, as these rights had been beneficial, a point illustrated in this statement:

The economic fabric built up upon the foundation of the so-called unequal treaties, – which considerations of Chinese Government revenue, the trade requirements of the country, the prosperity of the great Chinese merchant class, the maintenance of British Trade in one of the world's potentially greatest markets, and Justice to foreign vested interests, all demand shall be conserved – is seriously jeopardised.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

Chinese politicians demand change. Yet as everywhere the economic is ultimately the dominating factor. The problem becomes in fact one of how to effect political change without economic disaster.⁶⁰

This statement lists the ways in which its defenders believed that extraterritoriality promoted progress in China. Moreover, the British community stressed that it had no feelings of racism against the Chinese. It added that the Chinese government's effort to abolish the rights was merely in its own interests:

Would it not even be a crime against the Chinese People, since the delicate fabric of foreign trade laboriously constructed during the past 80 years and supported by the very influences and safeguards which Chinese officialdom desires to see abolished, would crash to the ground with disastrous results to millions of Chinese.⁶¹

This paragraph comes from another appeal by the British community in Tientsin to avoid any change in their status. This statement tries to broaden the extraterritoriality issue to show that it was not only for the benefit of the British, since the Chinese also enjoyed prosperity created by the existence of this right. However, the appeal did not stop the British government from negotiating with the Chinese early in 1930.⁶²

On 31 May 1931, in the middle of these negotiations, John Hay Thorburn, a 19-year-old British boy, was reported missing in central China. He was said to have set out adventuring and it was confirmed that he had some "hare-brained" scheme including going to central China to fight the communists.⁶³ However, his

⁶⁰ SOAS, MS186361, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Box 7, 'Memorandum No.28, Problem of the Extra-territorial Privileges in China'.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Fung, *The Diplomacy of Imperial Retreat*, p.209.

⁶³ Bickers, 'Death of a Young Shanghailanders', p.273.

fate after he left Shanghai was unknown. His disappearance sparked anger amongst the British community in Shanghai. In Tientsin, the case became another important factor in their opposition to the abrogation of extraterritoriality.⁶⁴ On 15 September 1931 the British community called a meeting to discuss the Thorburn case, extraterritoriality and the rendition issue. A telegram they sent to *The Times* stated that:

A mass meeting of British residents in Tientsin on the 16th [September 1931?] passed a Resolution recording their indignation at the continued failure of the Chinese Government to deal satisfactorily with [the] Thorburn case. The Thorburn case affords a tragic illustration of the inability of the Chinese Government to exercise the normal functions of government even close to its own capital, and of the contempt of the requirements of the law by the military, who are the real rulers of the country.⁶⁵

The above passage exemplifies the deep sadness and anger of British community in Tientsin about what had happened to Thorburn. At this point they condemned the Nationalist government as incapable of preventing tragic incidents happening to British nationals, and if they could not do this, how would they manage if extraterritoriality rights were relinquished? The outcome, to the British mind, would be trouble, and their lives and properties would be jeopardised by what had happened to Thorburn.⁶⁶ In short, the British community used Thorburn's case as another reason why the Chinese authority could not be trusted.

At this meeting the British community repeated its claim about the incompetence of the Chinese government, stressing:

⁶⁴ SOAS, MS186361, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Box 7, 'Memorandum No.32, 'The Average Foreigner Looks at China'.

⁶⁵ SOAS, CHAS/MCP/37 Copy of telegram to the Times from its Shanghai Correspondent, dated, Shanghai, the 18th September, 1931.

⁶⁶ Bickers, 'Death of a Young Shanghailander', p.290.

- (a) **“THAT the spirit of personnel of Chinese administration is not such that it can yet be entrusted with the control and protection of British persons and property;**
- (b) **“THAT the security of the persons and property of British subjects at Tientsin and the due protection of the economic essentials of trade relations in North China demand the continued maintenance of existing conditions at Tientsin;**
- (c) **“THAT if and when negotiations are resumed the conditions accorded to Tientsin should in no wise differ from those agreed to in respect of Shanghai, to which its position is analogous, the conclusions of the Feetham report no less applicable.**
- (d) **“THAT the period of exclusion of Tientsin and Shanghai and any other Treaty Port from the operation of any new treaty shall not be limited by means of terms of years but by the test of the realities of the situation.”⁶⁷**

The above illustrates how the British community in Tientsin organised and presented their protests systematically. Points (a) and (b) had been stressed before in frustration over the incompetence of the Chinese government to settle the Thorburn case.

Presenting these points, the British community in Tientsin demanded that its government should not resume negotiations on extraterritoriality with the

⁶⁷ SOAS, John Emmett Woodall Papers, 1919-1990, Tientsin British Committee of Information, 'Memorandum No.31, The Tientsin Resolution'.

Chinese until the Thorburn case was settled and the Chinese government could rule efficiently and exercise its authority over the whole of China. The British community in Tientsin supported the British government's proposal to settle the Thorburn case by any means, including putting pressure on the Chinese government.⁶⁸ One of the speakers at the meeting, Howard Payne (from Collin and Co.), criticised the British liberal policy, claiming:

When I first arrived in Tientsin, just thirty years ago, the British Municipal Area could be said to be bounded on the West by what is now Gordon Road, and we had very few of the amenities of civilization which you now enjoy. The wonderful development in the interim is entirely due to the enterprise of British residents, principally merchants, but since the British Government's declaration of January 1927, this development has been greatly retarded and there is a general lack of confidence and security which has restricted building programmes to essential needs without any attempt as hitherto at anticipating future requirements.⁶⁹

The above passage gives another of the reasons which the British community used to try to pressure and elicit sympathy from the British government and the public in London. It attempted to show the incapability of the Chinese government to develop or rule the foreign concession.

At this juncture the British liked to compare the high British standard of living with, as they claimed, the 'cruel and uncivilised' Chinese. The British community pointed out that the British (and other Westerners) had the ability to rule and administer. Payne argued that:

⁶⁸ PRO FO371/15464, Extraterritoriality in China, Teichman, 16/8/1931 and PRO FO371/15464, Extraterritoriality in China, Teichman, 23/8/1931.

⁶⁹ SOAS, John Emmett Woodall Papers, 1919-1990, Tientsin British Committee of Information, 'Memorandum No.31, The Tientsin Resolution'.

Since the promulgation in 1928 of the revised Land Regulations for the administration of the British Municipal Area of Tientsin, ...the Chinese Residents of this area enjoy more and greater privileges than in any other place or city in China. Not only have they the advantages of living under conditions which compare very favourably with any city in Europe or America ... , but they have voting rights which give them equal representation on [the] Municipal Council and freedom of speech on matters affecting municipal administration, and finance which they do not, as many you know, hesitate to exercise at the Annual Meetings of Electors.⁷⁰

Payne's statement illustrates his view that British leadership was necessary to protect the Chinese and assist their progress. Payne also pointed out that the facilities in the British Tientsin Municipality were better than those of the Chinese city and other Special Areas in Tientsin. He added that freedom of speech was not practised in the Chinese areas.⁷¹ His condemnation continued, criticising the weakness of the Chinese government's administration, judiciary and municipality. Payne's statement reflects the British feeling that the Chinese police could not be trusted and were easily bribed.⁷² Another claim, made by Munro-Faure, claimed that the 'anti-foreign' feelings of the Chinese never died down and would arise in any incident, however big or small. Munro-Faure referred to what had happened in Hankow (September 1931), where foreigners present when two rickshaws collided had been insulted, as an example of the failure of the Chinese government to do anything to curb Chinese hostility to foreigners.⁷³

All these claims suggest that the British community tried to avoid any effort to put them under Chinese rule. Munro-Faure reminded his audience that their fate

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Fung, *The Diplomacy of Imperial Retreat*, p.200.

⁷² SOAS, John Emmett Woodall Papers, 1919-1990, Tientsin British Committee of Information, 'Memorandum No.31, The Tientsin Resolution'.

⁷³ Ibid.

would be the same as that of the Russians when they were deprived of their extraterritoriality rights, with the consequence that they were treated like 'dirt'.⁷⁴ Munro-Faure's statement illustrates the feeling that the British community's image should be protected and that the Chinese should not be allowed to rule them. The British community was still proud of the British image as a world power and did not realise that this power had been challenged by the Chinese people. The narrow minds of many British community regarded extraterritoriality as able to protect them and they had closed their minds to the development of Chinese nationalism. In reality, extraterritoriality had isolated them from the real picture in China and they still thought the British superior to the Chinese, therefore they feared that the loss of this right would mean loss of British dignity.

Points (c) and (d) at the 15th September meeting represented new arguments which Tientsin's British community used to highlight the fact that it was not ready to relinquish extraterritoriality or return the concession to the Chinese; in this they acted in parallel with other British communities in China. When the Feetham report on Shanghai was published in 1931 the British community in Tientsin used it to support their own case. The report on the governance of the international settlement was conducted by a South African Judge, Richard Feetham. The British community in Tientsin saw it as providing concrete evidence with which to oppose further rendition of the concession. The tone of the report suggested that it shared the anxieties of the British community in Tientsin, which condemned rendition as a premature move. The British community was satisfied that the report

⁷⁴ SOAS, John Emmett Woodall Papers, 1919-1990, Tientsin British Committee of Information, 'Memorandum No.31, The Tientsin Resolution' and Marcia R. Ristaino, 'The Russian diasporas community in Shanghai', p.193.

acknowledged its view of the inability of the Chinese administration to govern foreigners.⁷⁵ The reason given was that Chinese control of the settlement could easily be influenced by politicians or the Chinese authorities. The British community in Tientsin stressed that this would happen in Tientsin if the Chinese controlled the BMC.⁷⁶

The Feetham report was another major boost for the British community's opposition to negotiations over extraterritorial rights as discussed by both Lampson and the Chinese Foreign Minister, C. T. Wang.⁷⁷ At this juncture the British community in Tientsin wanted the British government to follow the example of other nations such as Japan, France and the United States, which were not yet willing to give up their extraterritorial rights as related to Consular Jurisdiction.⁷⁸ The Chinese, though, regarded the reasons the British gave for their opposition as a travesty and just another effort to underestimate the Chinese and tighten British control in Tientsin and the rest of China.⁷⁹

Two Groups

The discussion above illustrates the general feeling of the British community in Tientsin in late 1931. However, there were differing degrees of opposition to the change. As explained in the previous chapter, opinions about rendition were divided between moderate and diehard. The moderate opposition

⁷⁵ SOAS, John Emmett Woodall Papers, 1919-1990, Tientsin British Committee of Information, 'Memorandum No.31, The Tientsin Resolution'.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Robert A. Bickers, 'Changing Shanghai's "Mind": Publicity, Reform and the British in Shanghai', *China Society Occasional Papers*, 1992, p.11.

⁷⁸ SOAS, CHAS/MCP/37 Copy of telegram to the Times from its Shanghai Correspondent, Shanghai, September 18, 1931.

⁷⁹ Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity*, p.245.

was willing to relinquish some small privileges in order to avoid the total abrogation of their privileges in China. As mentioned in Chapters Two and Three this group formed the TCBI, whose main function was to counter this issue. At first the TBCI became the voice of the British community in Tientsin, illustrating the situation in China and its position in Tientsin, and then it became part of their weapon to protect British business interests in Tientsin.

Memoranda 27 and 28 demonstrate the TBCI's strong opposition to the surrender of extraterritoriality up to the time of the Thorburn case. Memorandum 32 illustrated the group's return to a milder attitude, but it still explicitly rejected abrogation of extraterritoriality totally. The memorandum began with praise for the China's contribution to the Western countries. Tientsin, for example, had grown into a great city and had become an international trade centre.⁸⁰ But it went on to condemn the Nationalists' decision to uphold Chinese sovereignty when the KMT was as they saw it, incapable of ruling the country. The group then became apologetic towards China and the Chinese, blaming British foreign policy as insensitive to what had happened in China and unconcerned with China's future. The mistaken decision not to support the KMT had created a chaotic situation in China which unleashed anti-imperialist feeling and brought 'tumult, disorder, confusion and mob-law'.⁸¹ The memorandum concluded that at this time it would not be wise to relinquish extraterritorial rights. If the decision to abrogate the

⁸⁰ SOAS, MS186361, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Box 7, 'Memorandum No.32, The Average Foreigner Looks at China', p.3.

⁸¹ Ibid.

status became reality, they believed that the prosperity and peace of Tientsin would be at the mercy of the chaotic events in China.⁸²

The above does not mean that the TBCI had abandoned its struggle to protect its rights. It tried to get the support of others in the British community in Tientsin to unite to strive for the same goal: to uphold their privileges in Tientsin in particular and in China in general. As the British community worded its response to British policy:

The actual terms of statement of British policy in 1927 did not envisage a land slide in the sense of overwhelming, or perhaps more correctly overweening, demands. In face of these the harmonisation of the general liberal policy of the British Government with the realities of the situation became impossible.⁸³

This statement pointed out that even though the British in Tientsin had seemed willing to compromise on the rendition issue a few years earlier and had tried to make all compromise with the Chinese in the municipality, as with their counterparts in Shanghai they were still not eager to renounce all British privileges. What they meant by “the realities of the situation became impossible” was that for years after the Manchurian crisis erupted there had been hostility between China and Japan. Owing to this crisis they believed that the abrogation of extraterritorial rights and other matters related to foreign privileges should not be discussed at that time. This matter is addressed in the following section.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ SOAS, MS186361, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Box 7, ‘Memorandum No.33, British Policy in China’, Tientsin, January 27, 1932, p.3.

Owing to the limited power of the BMC compared with the SMC, the moderate group had to be pragmatic in order to avoid putting their interests at risk. What was important was that the progress of their business should not be gambled in negotiations with the Chinese. The British community in Tientsin hoped that any discussion relating to their interests such as the Tariff Treaty would protect the British community and its property. Regarding the rendition of the British concessions, the British community still felt that all the important British concessions, such as Shanghai, Tientsin and Canton, should be defended, and that British interests in Hankow should also be made secure. In relation to the British government's willingness to continue its liberal policy, the British in Tientsin agreed to accept the surrender of small British concessions which they felt were of no real importance.⁸⁴ In short, the moderate British were largely those of the business community, who were not overly concerned with their prestige or preserving the British concession. What was important was that their business interests should be protected. Therefore they were willing to let go of smaller, less important British interests in China in order to maintain the more important ones. This tactic had been practiced some years before and succeeded in retaining British prominence in Tientsin.

The moderates in Tientsin's British community represented the importance of British business circles in Tientsin (especially the KMA), and adopted this policy in an effort to avoid repercussions from the Chinese if they continually fought against any alteration in their position. They would lose everything if they did not follow the changes in China. They knew that British interests had been

⁸⁴ Ibid.

long established and had dominated the Chinese economy since the existence of the British concession in Tientsin, and that their opposition would get them thrown them out of Chinese business dealings. Their competitors, such as the Americans, Japanese and Germans, were waiting to replace them in the domination of Chinese business.⁸⁵ In Tientsin, the emergence of Japanese business in north China would push British businessmen out of north China. The KMA was a case in point, as discussed below. In Tientsin and the surrounding areas, not only did the British not want to lose business but they were prepared to fight together with other British communities for their interests. They wanted their government to be very cautious about showing willingness to follow the Chinese demands, and questioned China's integrity, as stated below:-

To rake over the ashes of the past and to apply to them the eye of cold reason, is at the best of times an ungracious task. Yet how otherwise emphasise the corrupt methods and the disregard of obligations and existing rights practised by every Chinese Government which in recent years has assumed office? How bring to notice the danger of further modification of treaty rights until a government has been established which can exercise effective control and establish the rule of law throughout the country? How demonstrate that the remaining foreign concessions represent the only areas of security throughout the country and constitute the foundation on which the vast economic fabric is reared?⁸⁶

The moderate British community in Tientsin was attempting to show the British government that the Chinese nationalist government was still weak and not ready to rule China. It depended on foreign concessions building up their interests in China. In short, the British community wanted stability in China with proper law

⁸⁵ Osterhammel, 'British Business in China, 1860s-1950s', p.200.

⁸⁶ SOAS, MS186361, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Box 7, 'Memorandum No.33, British Policy in China', Tientsin, 27 January 1932, p.3.

enforcement and a justice system free from any inference, which would create a good environment for business and the maintenance of free trade in China.

The second group was against any changes to British privileges. H. G. W. Woodhead, one of this diehard group, who was unwilling to entertain any bargaining about the abrogation of extraterritorial rights, did his utmost to resolve this issue. He had opposed the move since the issue was raised. Continuously in his writing from 1929 onwards, Woodhead laid down his strong view of the weakness of the Chinese legal system as a reason to avoid any abrogation of extraterritoriality. He claimed that the Chinese did not have a complete legal system that could deal with all aspects of daily life including insurance, business and public safety.⁸⁷ The diehard group continued to attack Chinese law as a 'dead letter' because its enforcement was insufficient and ignored by other Chinese provinces. Woodhead claimed that the law was promulgated merely to protect the Kuomintang's interests.⁸⁸ He further commented that the Judicial Administration in China was not functioning.⁸⁹ His comments illustrate how some of the British Tientsiners, similar to the British Shanghailanders, were keen to oppose change and willing to cite any reason for attacking Chinese law and order.

After Woodhead moved to Shanghai in 1930, the diehard group continued to thrive in Tientsin, fighting for its core concern: its survival in China. The revocation of extraterritoriality threatened to expose the group to the Chinese

⁸⁷ H. G. W. Woodhead, 'Extraterritoriality in China: The Case against Abolition', reprinted in Ramon H. Myers, *A Garland Series: the Modern Chinese Economy* (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc, 1980), p.12.

⁸⁸ Woodhead, 'Extraterritoriality in China', p.13.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p.14.

system of law and order, which they felt would be unable to protect them. The United Services (Great War) Association released their resolution as stated below:

This meeting of British ex-servicemen and women resident in Tientsin views with indignation and alarm the prospect of the relinquishment, or partial relinquishment, of safe-guards hitherto accorded His Majesty's subjects in China, despite the proved inability of the Chinese Government to afford to foreign residents the ordinary protection given by any civilised State, or to enforce respect for the laws of the country amongst their own officials, as exemplified in the Nakamura, Thorburn, and many other cases.⁹⁰

The existence of this association further illustrates how the diehards tried to channel their views to the British government, repeating their opinion that extraterritoriality should be protected and that the Chinese should not be trusted.

The diehards tried to inciting that the relinquishment of extraterritoriality would put the British interests in danger. This is highlighted by another part of the resolution, "[a]ny relinquishment of existing safe-guards will not only result in further injury to British trade and interests in this country but will definitely endanger the lives and property of His Majesty's subjects".⁹¹ In this passage the diehard group underlines two important points: first, that British interests not only consisted of the British traders and their property but also included the settlers and missionaries who lived and worked in Tientsin. Therefore the British government must not think of protecting only the traders. The other British groups also had their interests in Tientsin and its hinterlands. The diehard group still believed that extraterritoriality could protect their interests in China. The second point that they

⁹⁰ PRO FO371/15464 Letter from the Honorary Secretary of United Services (Great War) Association to the Secretary of British Legion, Tientsin, 5 October 1931. Captain Nakamura was a Japanese officer who had been murdered in western Manchuria. His murder had infuriated the Japanese military and the Japanese had blamed Chinese soldiers for his death.

⁹¹ Ibid.

emphasised was that British subjects were under threat in China, and needed protection. In other word the diehards endlessly attempted to alert the British people and the British government to the bad consequences the British community in Tientsin would face under the Chinese rule.

Another reason for the diehards' resistance was their desire to continue to uphold the prestige and image of the British in the eyes of the world. British concessions such as in Tientsin had sentimental value to them. Bickers mentions that "...[u]pholding prestige involved practicalities. These included the physical structures of the British establishment in China: the gunboats, control of Customs, and the large Legation in Beijing".⁹² The concession was also part of the prestige which the British in Tientsin wished to retain. Since the early 1860s the British community had transformed a brackish, waterlogged and swampy area at Tzu Chu Lin into an important trading port and a small, modern European-style city,⁹³ and had built modern, memorable buildings associated with heroes such as Colonel Gordon.⁹⁴ They named the roads and streets after British people pioneers in the opening up of China to trade: for example Elgin Avenue, Parkes Road and Napier Road.⁹⁵

'Fighting' Weapons

The British in Tientsin were not alone in fighting to keep their position in China. They were not a loose group fighting apart from other British communities

⁹² Bickers, 'History, Legend and Treaty Port Ideology, 1925-1931', p.88.

⁹³ W. V. Pennell, *Tientsin North China: the Port, Its History, Trade, Industry and Community Life*, (Tientsin: the Tientsin Press, 1934), p.22.

⁹⁴ Robert A. Bickers, 'History, Legend and Treaty Port Ideology, 1925-1931', p.83.

⁹⁵ Hershatler, *The Workers of Tianjin, 1900-1949*, p.19.

in China. The communication between themselves and other British nationals, especially in Shanghai, was carried out through individuals or organisations such as the China Association and the British Chamber of Commerce. British businessmen in Tientsin such as Nathan and Young from the KMA, journalists such as Woodhead, and prominent individuals such as P. H. B. Kent often went to Shanghai and other treaty ports, forming a network which united them in fighting for their common goal. The China Association and the British Chamber of Commerce had long established a network with other British communities in China and in England. For example, the China Association consisted of about 60 firms and 250 members.⁹⁶ Letters and news were posted between these groups in order to supply the metropole with direct news of the reality of the situation in China as they saw it and the British community's situation in Tientsin particularly and in China generally. In Tientsin, the TBCI collected all the news from Shanghai, Hankow, Canton and other parts in China.

Nathan urged the British community in Tientsin to take proactive action, stating that:

One other thing I think we can do, and believe me it is on public opinion in Great Britain that we must ultimately rely for help. This is a particularly good moment.... All of you have friends and relatives in England. All of you therefore can reach British public opinion, and I hope everyone will realise that it is his or her duty to write to your friends and relatives and tell them what is the true position in China; what is the danger we are facing; and what they can do to help us. We shall then reach a bigger public than we have reached in the past and if at this juncture British public opinion can be made to realize that what we are doing in China is of great importance in restoring British

⁹⁶ Stephen Lyon Endicott, *Diplomacy and Enterprise*, p.31.

prestige and British prosperity then there is some hope our fate may be averted.⁹⁷

His argument demonstrates that the British community in Tientsin was very serious and strong in opposing the abrogation of extraterritorial rights, preferring its situation and problems in China to be channelled to the British parliament and public. Only in this way could the British community in Tientsin gather support from Britain. To cry for help to the British Legation seemed to them useless, and only by bypassing the Legation could their fate become known to their fellow countrymen.⁹⁸ This was one of the ways in which the British community in Tientsin pressured the British government and Legation to avoid further negotiations on extraterritoriality rights.

The formation by the British in Shanghai of the British Residents' Association (BRA) in 1931 did not isolate the British in Tientsin. Support for a united British community in China pushed the BRA to fight not only for Shanghailanders. This association was one more vehicle used by the British in Tientsin to further their common interests with other British communities in China and to express their feelings and opposition towards treaty negotiations.⁹⁹ But the British community only joined this association when the BRA changed its name from Shanghai British Residents' Association to British Residents' Association of China.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁷ SOAS, John Emmett Woodall Papers, 1919-1990, Tientsin British Committee of Information, 'Memorandum No.31, The Tientsin Resolution', pp.6-7.

⁹⁸ PRO FO371/15464 Letter from the Honorary Secretary of the United Service (Great War) Association to the Secretary of the British Legion, Tientsin, 5 October 1931.

⁹⁹ Robert A. Bickers, 'Shanghailanders: The Formation and Identity of the British Settler Community in Shanghai 1843-1937', *Past and Present*, No.159 (May 1998), p.207.

¹⁰⁰ *Shanghai British Residents' Association, Annual Report, 1931*, p.3.

In conclusion, the feeling against the abrogation of extraterritorial rights was as strong in Tientsin as it was in Shanghai. Although some of the opposition adopted a moderate, and some an aggressive tone, the aim was the same: to oppose the Chinese government's demand for the surrender of extraterritoriality. The moderate groups were willing to compromise if the decision of the British government was a *fait accompli*. The second group held tightly to its belief that extraterritoriality should not be abolished. The different approaches of these were due to differing interests and positions. The moderate group were from the business sector, whose progress depended on good relations between the British and the Chinese. Therefore they agreed to accept changes which did not jeopardise their business interests. Their contact with the Chinese people, Chinese authorities and government had made it clear that their future lay in goodwill between themselves and the Chinese. Some of these moderates, such as the KMA, depended on their Chinese partners to settle problems with the Chinese government in order to run their mining industries in north China. These Chinese became prominent leaders in Tientsin and members of the British Municipal Council. However, the moderates would not agree to changes that did not benefit their businesses, and tried in every way possible to protect their future position in China. The previous chapter illustrated how they managed to avoid the Chinese taking over the concession by making several compromises.

The more aggressive group, which was eager to avoid any compromise that would affect their future, had its own reasons for opposing the abrogation of extraterritoriality. The group consisted mainly of settlers who had been in Tientsin

for many years and who had children and grandchildren there. These people considered Tientsin their home,¹⁰¹ and found it hard to relinquish their privileges. As with the Shanghailanders, the group's priority was its community in Tientsin rather than the home country.¹⁰² Woodhead, for example, even though not born in Tientsin or even in China, had arrived in China in 1902, lived and worked there as a journalist and was a member of the Tientsin Volunteers and the Tientsin Club. Tientsin was embedded in the lives of this group. Woodhead was more concerned about what would happen to them in the future if the Chinese abrogated extraterritoriality and took over the British concession. Their only hope was to defend the concession for their future, and they would have felt helpless if their privileges had been removed without any guarantee.¹⁰³ They feared that if the Chinese took over the extraterritoriality it would destroy the foundation which they had built there. They were afraid that their situation in China would be degraded and they would become like the White Russians; stateless. Furthermore, part of their diehard mentality considered the Chinese an 'inferior race', and they feared that to be under the Chinese would downgrade their status as white men.

At this point they believed that the Chinese could not manage the administration of western-style justice, nor could they avoid political interference or the corruption of their officers.¹⁰⁴ They believed that the Thorburn case was an example of cruelty against foreigners in Chinese law. If extraterritoriality was abrogated, they did not believe that the Chinese would be able to protect them in

¹⁰¹ Hershatter, *The Workers of Tianjin, 1900-1949*, p.20.

¹⁰² Bickers, 'Shanghailanders', p.178.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, p.207.

¹⁰⁴ Edmund S. K. Fung, 'The Sino-British Rapprochement, 1927-1931', *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol.17, No.1 (1983), p.100.

their daily life, and therefore they saw no reason for the British government to concede the rights. They enjoyed the *status quo* in Tientsin, where the British and Chinese got along - in their eyes - and development was maintained.

The Manchurian Crisis, 1931

A new chapter in Chinese history began in 1931, when the Manchurian Crisis focused Chinese nationalism on the Japanese. The crisis began on 18 September 1931 when a small explosion destroyed the South Manchurian Railway tracks at Mukden. The Japanese army used the incident as a pretext to seize control of Mukden and advance along the north of the Great Wall.¹⁰⁵ Chiang Kai-shek's non-resistance policy allowed the Japanese troops to control all the areas north of the Great Wall easily.¹⁰⁶ After this success they proclaimed a new nation, Manchukuo. This event led the Chinese students to demonstrate with a parade urging the Chinese to boycott Japanese goods.¹⁰⁷ Fighting between the Japanese and the Chinese continued into the area south of the Great Wall and also erupted in Shanghai in early 1932.¹⁰⁸ Both parties agreed to a ceasefire by signing the Tangku Truce in 1933.

¹⁰⁵ Yoshihisa Tak Matsusaka, *The Making of Japanese Manchuria, 1904-1932* (Massachusetts: Harvard University Asia Center, 2001), p.383.

¹⁰⁶ Mitter, *The Manchurian Myth*, p.73.

¹⁰⁷ Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, *Student Protests in Twentieth-Century China: The View from Shanghai* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), p.171.

¹⁰⁸ Donald A. Jordan, *China's Trial by Fire* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001), pp.73-9, Christian Henriot, *Shanghai, 1927-1937: Municipal Power, Locality and Modernization* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p.83 and *The Times*, 28 November 1931, p.10.

British missionaries saw this situation as acute. Some expected a clash between the Chinese and Japanese to occur at any time.¹⁰⁹ When the crisis erupted, the British in Tientsin showed that they felt the invasion of Manchuria by the Japanese army was justified. This was a price which they believed China should pay after the disappearance of Thorburn, the killing of a Japanese soldier, Captain Nakamura Shintaro (27 June 1931), and other incidents linked to foreigners before that. Nakamura was ordered by the General Staff Office in Tokyo to explore and map the Hsingan range, but was murdered in Suokungfu.¹¹⁰ The Japanese military leaders in Manchuria demanded that the Chinese authorities settle the problem. However, the investigation carried out by the Chinese authorities did not satisfy the Japanese military, and the incident inflamed Sino-Japanese relations.¹¹¹

The British community in Tientsin agreed that the murder of Nakamura was another sign of the 'incompetence' of the Chinese government when it came to settling foreign issues. Therefore in common with other British communities in China it supported the Japanese action,¹¹² and the Chinese were blamed for what had happened in Manchuria. The editor of *The Peking and Tientsin Times* claimed, 'the fact is that the Chinese, by a policy of utter irresponsibility and all-round aggravation, brought this upon themselves. They literally goaded the Japanese Militarists into action.'¹¹³

¹⁰⁹ SOAS, CWM North China Incoming Correspondence Box 30, 1932-1933 ii, Letter from A. P. Cullen to Mr. Hawkins, February 11, 1932.

¹¹⁰ Daniel B. Ramsdell, 'The Nakamura Incident and the Japanese Foreign Office', *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol.25, No.1, (Nov., 1965), pp.53-4.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp.64-5.

¹¹² Robert Bickers, *Britain in China: Community, Culture and Colonialism, 1900-1949* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), p.150.

¹¹³ SOAS, MS186361, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Box 7, 'Memorandum No.32, The Average Foreigner Looks at China'.

The view was that continued Chinese agitation towards foreigners had created this crisis. The editor referred to the problem as similar to what had happened to the British in the May Thirtieth Incident, continuing that the Nanking government had not cultivated good relations between the Chinese and the foreigners. It had failed to counter Chinese problems such as the continuing civil war and banditry in China. Several Chinese organisations and some Chinese individuals wrote to *The China Critic* that such a widely held foreign view had further damaged relations between the Chinese and foreigners.¹¹⁴

Furthermore, the British community in Tientsin felt that the Chinese should not blame other Powers for their problems. China, to them, had internal problems which had to be settled to create peace and order in China. Law and order were not the only problems the Chinese faced; there were also problems at the Chinese treasury and the anti-imperialist feeling which had engulfed the Chinese public. Some of the British community believed that if China could clear up all these problems, peace and prosperity would emerge. These were among the Chinese problems that the British community in Tientsin believed had led to the failure of Chinese relations with other countries, creating conflicts such as the Manchurian crisis,¹¹⁵ which became a further justification for foreign countries not surrendering extraterritoriality or other privileges.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

As the real impact of this crisis approached, the British community in Tientsin hoped that it would not affect its interests in Tientsin particularly and China generally. They were happy with the British government's attempts to mediate the situation. They also wanted protection for its people and property in Tientsin and China.¹¹⁶ This was a challenge to the British, as relations with the Chinese had become more serious when the Japanese became part of the problem, especially where the KMA was concerned. In the concession itself life was normal and people were not much concerned about what was happening between the Chinese and the Japanese. But on 8 and 30 November 1931, Tientsin residents were shocked by street fighting between Chinese and Japanese soldiers.¹¹⁷ The Japanese military wanted to extend the war in Manchuria beyond the Great Wall. Using the Japanese concession in Tientsin as an operational base, the Japanese military had employed Chinese hooligans together with some Japanese in plain clothes to make trouble in the Chinese city.¹¹⁸

The fighting began when a large group of Chinese started a riot, attacking the Chinese police in the Chinese city in Tientsin on the night of 8 November 1931. This led to the Chinese authorities tightening security, which worried the Japanese who demanded that the Chinese police withdraw to 300 metres from the Japanese concession.¹¹⁹ Meanwhile, 'plain-clothes men' were pouring in from the Japanese concession to create a disturbance in the city. Fighting between them and the Chinese police resulted in some being shot dead and others arrested. The

¹¹⁶ SOAS, MS186361, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Box 7, 'Memorandum No.33, Addendum to Memorandum No.33', April 7, 1932.

¹¹⁷ See *The Tientsin Incident: Troubles Created by Plain-clothes Men under Japanese Protection November 8-30, A Record of Fact* (Tientsin: Municipal Government of Tientsin: March 15, 1932).

¹¹⁸ *The Tientsin Incident*, p.1 and Brett Sheehan, *Trust in Troubled Times*, p.154.

¹¹⁹ St. Anthony College, Lampson Diaries, November 9, 1931, the Killlearn Papers.

arrested plain clothes men (Chinese hired by the Japanese) informed the Chinese authorities that they were supported by the Japanese, and that the Japanese had given them weapons and money to stage a riot in the Chinese city.¹²⁰ At the same time, Japanese troops moved from the Japanese concession towards the Chinese city with machine guns and armoured cars.¹²¹ This fighting did not have much impact on the British community. The Chinese and Japanese did not disturb the peace and harmony of the British concession, as the British authorities kept tight control of the area to avoid fighting spreading to there. This control also played an important part in managing the vast numbers of Chinese refugees pouring into the concession.¹²² British business circles such as the KMA did not see this fighting as a threat to their business, which was unaffected.¹²³

The fighting between the Chinese and Japanese happened over a short period only, but anti-Japanese feeling had flourished in China at several events such as the Twenty-one Demands (1915), the May Fourth Incident (1919) and Tsinan (1928). Amongst the organisations against the Japanese imperialists was the 'Blue Shirt Society', a Chinese underground organisation formed in 1932. This organisation was secretly under Chiang Kai-shek's guidance and had caused much damage to Japanese interests.¹²⁴ Another group tried to act independently of government control, ignoring government instructions not to strike, advocating war

¹²⁰ *Chinese Affairs*, November 15, 1931, No.152-153, pp.571, 572 and 573.

¹²¹ *The Tientsin Incident*, p.5.

¹²² SOAS, MS186361, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Box 7, 'Memorandum No.33, British Policy in China', Tientsin, January 27, 1932.

¹²³ The Bodleian Library, NP, Letter from Mr. E. J. Nathan to W. F. Turner, 10 November 1931.

¹²⁴ Lloyd E. Eastman, 'Fascism in Kuomintang China: The Blue Shirts', *The China Quarterly*, No. 49. (Jan. - Mar., 1972), p.26 and Frederic E. Wakeman, *The Shanghai Badlands* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.18.

and forming patriotic associations.¹²⁵ This student group also organised the movement in Tientsin,¹²⁶ although information about this is elusive. The only information which can be associated with the anti-Japanese movement concerns a bomb incident directed against the Japanese and their collaborators. In Tientsin, this group was named 'The Blood and Iron Group', and its main purpose was the destruction of Japanese interests.¹²⁷ There were several cases of bombs thrown by unidentified persons exploding in the Japanese concession.¹²⁸ The group wanted to damage Japanese interests, and threatened to attack any Chinese or foreigners who dealt with the Japanese, an attack which was also intended to create a boycott of Japanese goods.¹²⁹ The French concession had been threatened when a young Chinese man had thrown a bomb at a shop there. The British concession suffered only one bomb incident which focused on the Japanese Consul-General's residence and did little damage. The British authorities, it seemed, had succeeded in controlling the situation, and took every precaution to avoid any Chinese attacks. Therefore from 1931 to 1933 Chinese resistance attacks did not seriously frighten British residents.¹³⁰

As mentioned earlier, the Manchurian incident did not seem to create much of a problem for the British community in Tientsin, since the community's relations with both the Chinese and the Japanese were felt to be cordial. For this reason, the British community was not unduly worried about the possible impact of

¹²⁵ Wasserstrom, *Student Protests in Twentieth-Century China*, pp.178-179.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, p.161.

¹²⁷ *The China Weekly Chronicle*, March 9, 1933, Vol. 1. No. 20, Serial No. 20, p.1.

¹²⁸ *The North China Herald*, May 24, 1932, p.290. On the night of May 23, 1932, an unidentified person had thrown a bomb and caused the death of a woman and injury to a man.

¹²⁹ *The North China Herald*, August 24, 1932, p.289 and *The Chinese Weekly Chronicle*, 20 November 1932, p.15.

¹³⁰ *The North China Herald*, 21 December 1932, p.452.

the crisis. As long it maintained good relations with both parties and neutrality in this incident, it was safe from harassment or attack. Outside the concession, however, it was a different story. Without British authority in the area surrounding Tientsin, the British government and the BMC were powerless, as were the KMA in north China. The KMA operated in the Tongshan area. When the Manchurian crisis occurred the KMA was worried about the outcome of the war. Firstly, the Japanese troops might gain control of the KMA's mines and the port at Chinwangtao after the Tangku Truce.¹³¹ Secondly, defeated Chinese troops might turn to banditry and threaten the KMA's mines and Chinwangtao port.¹³² However, neither of these possibilities really disturbed the KMA. The Japanese did not interfere with the enterprise,¹³³ but they used their Chinese collaborators to establish the Japanese influence in north China.¹³⁴ A group called the National Salvation Army under General Li Chi Chun was among these. This group proclaimed that its task was to function as the new government for the Tongshan area and demanded taxes from the KMA.¹³⁵ This worried the KMA, who wanted the British government to intervene on their behalf.

The following statement shows the concern of the General Manager of KMA, E. J. Nathan, who wanted the British Legation to protect the company's

¹³¹ The Bodleian Library, NP, Letter from Mr. E. J. Nathan to W. F. Turner, February 4, 1932, p.15.

¹³² The Bodleian Library, NP, Letter from Mr. E.J. Nathan to the Consul-General, Tientsin, January 7, 1933, Parks M. Coble, *Facing Japan: Chinese Politics and Japanese Imperialism, 1931-1937* (Cambridge MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1991), p.94 and Mitter, *The Manchurian Myth*, p.193.

¹³³ Tim Wright, *Coal Mining in China Economy and Society, 1895-1937*, p.125.

¹³⁴ Coble, *Facing Japan*, p.112.

¹³⁵ The Bodleian Library, NP, Letter from Mr. E.J. Nathan to the Consul-General, Tientsin, June 8, 1933.

mines to avoid unnecessary demands by unlawful elements from both the Chinese irregular army and the Japanese collaborators.

I propose at the appropriate moment to submit through you to H. B. M. Government a claim for any monies so extorted, together with a claim for the loss of business suffered by the Administration consequent on the interruption to traffic between the Mines and the shipping ports, and any other losses that have been or may be suffered by the Administration in the future which can be considered to have been caused by circumstances arising out of military operations which have taken place between Tientsin and the Mines Area and the Mines Area and Chinwangtao or at points between them.¹³⁶

However, the British government reacted passively to helping the KMA to deal with General Li because it did not want to involve itself more deeply in the Sino-Japanese crisis by taking unilateral action.¹³⁷ It needed the support of the other Powers to settle the crisis.¹³⁸ Therefore the weakness of the British in this case left the KMA to do its best to settle the problem alone, and it succeeded in avoiding military confrontation.¹³⁹ From this point onwards the KMA had to face the reality that its government would not help it directly, and so it utilised various means of negotiation, including its links with its Japanese and Chinese counterparts to employ bribery.¹⁴⁰ However, the fighting between the Chinese and the Japanese took hold when the Tangku Truce was signed on 31 May 1933. On the one hand this brought the KMA relief, but on the other, as a consequence of the truce, the Japanese used the creation of the demilitarised zone as a base for its Kwantung

¹³⁶ The Bodleian Library, NP, Letter from Mr. E. J. Nathan to the Consul-General, Tientsin, June 19, 1933.

¹³⁷ The Bodleian Library, NP, Letter from Mr. E.J. Nathan to W. F. Turner, 25 June 1933.

¹³⁸ Louis, *Britain Strategy in the Far East, 1919-1939*, p.188-9.

¹³⁹ Osterhammel, 'Imperialism in Transition', p.278.

¹⁴⁰ Osterhammel, 'China', p.655 and Wright, *Coal Mining in China Economy and Society, 1895-1937*, p.133.

Army, and in later years as a place to hide smuggled goods to be supplied to north China,¹⁴¹ as discussed in the following chapter.

In conclusion, the British community had its own views as to the cause of the Manchurian crisis. The British reaction was highly condemnatory of the Chinese, blaming them as a result of the nationalist diplomacy of the Nationalist Government. The British in Tientsin used the crisis to claim that the Chinese were not yet capable of handling their own country, and still harboured 'anti-foreign' feelings. Furthermore, the time was not yet right to relinquish extraterritoriality, because China was still disunited and embroiled. Therefore the British community used the Manchurian crisis as a reason to undermine the Chinese. If extraterritoriality were to be relinquished the position of the British in China would be in jeopardy due to the disorder in China at the time. The British community pointed out that in Tientsin, for example, when fighting broke out between the Chinese and the Japanese on 8 November 1931, if the British government had surrendered the concession in Tientsin at the time the danger from the disorder would have been unfavourable to British interests. The British were satisfied that with the British authority still in control of the concession their security was safeguarded.

The impact of the Manchurian crisis was twofold. First, the British community in the concession was not unduly worried about the Sino-Japanese hostilities. Although the fighting continued at Tientsin, the BMC took great care

¹⁴¹ Takafusa Nakamura, 'The Yen Bloc', p.174 cited from *Minami Manshu tetsudo kabushiki kaisha, Tenshin shitsu, chosabu, Kito chiku no boeki gaikyo to kanzei jijo*, February 1936, and *Kito tokushu boeki no jitsujo*, June 1936.

that it did not spill over into the concession. Life in the concession seemed peaceful, although the Chinese tried to attack Japanese interests in Tientsin. The Grammar School was running as usual and the community was unperturbed by Chinese sabotage activities. The BMC's police had to deal with six robberies and four murder cases that year, and the Electricity Department reported that demand for electricity had increased.¹⁴² The development of the concession was also unhampered by the disturbance in China. Several new buildings and facilities such as a new fire station were planned, and others, such as a new market and the Kung Hsueh School's building, were already under construction.¹⁴³ Second, this was not the case for the KMA, which was far from Tientsin and where British power was not overt. The British government seemed weak in maintaining peace and order in north China, although British interests were threatened.¹⁴⁴ The British Legation took very little action and avoided intervening in the disturbance caused by the Japanese collaborators. Only the Tangku Truce between the Chinese and the Japanese brought the KMA relief concerning its fate in north China. This illustrates how the British government had limited power to deal with the two hostile parties. Its power rested upon legal administration, such as in the concession in Tientsin.

Conclusion

This chapter has discussed extraterritoriality under three main headings: the seizure of the customs house in Tientsin; negotiation of extraterritoriality (plus the

¹⁴² Shanghai Municipal Archives, *BMC, Tientsin, Report of the Council for the year 1933* (Tientsin: Tientsin Press, Limited), pp.32 and 46.

¹⁴³ *The North China Herald*, 13 May 1933, p.170.

¹⁴⁴ Trotter, *Britain and East Asia 1933-1937*, pp.2 and 3.

Thorburn issue); and the Manchurian crisis. All three demonstrate that the main concern for the British was simply how to protect British trade interests. The seizure of the Tientsin customs house was an indication of the confusion that Anglo-Chinese relations were in. As in the mid-1920s when British interests were under attack, the British were at a crossroad with the civil war in China. The crisis threatened British trade interests. The community was very concerned about the impact on the progress of their trade in North China. But the British traders played neutral and wanted the crisis settled in order to avoid any repercussions from the civil war. They were wise enough not to support any group. Therefore the British trade interests survived the crisis. But the crisis also had a strong effect on Anglo-Chinese relations, which were affected by the involvement of the British national, Simpson. The Chinese government was unhappy with the British government's failure to punish Simpson. But Lampson was a good mediator who did not show any bias towards either side in the civil war.

Though extraterritoriality was very fragile, some of the British community still held this privilege sacred. Therefore the British community in Tientsin joined other Britons in China to fight against relinquishing it when negotiations were held in 1930. The British in Tientsin opposed the negotiation of this privilege because they still underestimated the ability of the Chinese authorities to rule over foreigners. They were afraid that their future in the concession would be uncertain due to the unstable situation in China. But the Chinese saw these accusations as a tool to tighten British imperialist control.¹⁴⁵ The moderates and diehards seemed to take the same stand concerning extraterritoriality. The disappearance of Thorburn

¹⁴⁵ Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity*, p.247.

exacerbated matters, sparking their phobia about the Chinese. The formation of the TBCI in the mid-1920s became the British community's tool by which to bypass the British Legation and convey their message to England. The moderates were more flexible in dealing with this issue than the diehards, due to the difference in interests between the groups. The British traders, who operated not only in the concession but also outside it, had to think about their future. Their continued opposition to the Chinese was bad for business interests. It was up to the British traders themselves to protect their interests from the Chinese demands. So the British traders, who were mostly moderates, had to sacrifice a few of their small privileges to retain their larger interests in China.

But the British community, especially the diehards, used every means possible to stop the extraterritoriality negotiations. When the Manchurian crisis broke out they saw it as caused by the Chinese prolonging anti-imperialist feeling and making the Japanese furious in Manchuria. The British community considered that this crisis justified their accusation that the Chinese could not be trusted to rule foreigners. The British concession became a fortress in which the British felt safe from the Sino-Japanese war. Both parties respected the British concession, but this crisis illustrates the fragility of the informal British empire outside the concession. The dilemma of the KMA is a case in point. At this point the KMA began to feel the heat of the war. Nathan had always warned in his letters that this new threat was coming. This threat was no longer from the Chinese but from the Japanese, and is discussed in the following chapter.

Despite these crises and excitements, throughout the years 1930 to 1933 the British concession again became a place of peace and safety for the British community. The seizure of the Chinese customs house in Tientsin and the Manchurian crisis did not interfere with normal life in the concession. The British community (apart from the British Indians) increased by 92 percent from 1929 to 1934 (see Table 2.2 in Chapter 1). The total population of the British concession increased in the same period by 20 percent. Such growth was an indication of the prosperity of trade in the British concession. Also in 1930 the British improved their relations with the Chinese through the appointment of J. S. Chwang as Vice-Chairman of the BMC. The murder of Simpson had not become as big an issue as the disappearance of Thorburn; the BMC's police had investigated Simpson's death but had failed to find the murderer.¹⁴⁶ In the long run, nobody seemed to mind.

¹⁴⁶ *BMC, Tientsin, Report of the Council for the year 1930*, p.36.

Chapter Five

The Making of the Enemy: British-Chinese-Japanese Relations

(1934-1937)

Introduction

The outbreak of the Manchurian crisis gradually caused growing difficulties for the British communities in North China. The Tangku Truce became a turning point by which their military spread the Japanese influence in the area through three ways. Firstly, they tried to force the Chinese in North China to proclaim their autonomy from Nanking.¹ The Chinese East Hopei Anti-Communist Council (EHACC) on 24 November 1935, and Hopei-Chahar Political Council (HCPC) established on 18 December 1935 were puppet administrations.² Then the Japanese tried to divert North China's customs revenue to the EHACC.³ Secondly, the Japanese tried to use the demilitarised zone to encourage the smuggling of goods into China. Thirdly, Japanese troops were dispatched to the zone to suppress anti-Japanese elements. These three tactics indirectly disturbed the position of the British in North China, including in Tientsin and its hinterlands.

This chapter explores the impact of the Japanese military presence on the British community. It considers three important points. Firstly, it takes an in-depth look at the British response to Japanese smuggling activities. This illegal activity confused the British attitude towards the Japanese, who were apparently not eager to help to eradicate the smuggling. While this chapter covers the period from 1934

¹ Parks M. Coble, *Facing Japan*, p.200.

² Marjorie Dryburgh, *North China and Japanese Expansion 1933-1937* (Richmond: Curzon Press, 2000), p.79.

³ SOAS, CHAS/MCP/41 Letter from Mr. E. M. Gull to H.M. Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 5 February, 1936.

to 1937, it also covers events in the early 1930s, since the smuggling activities began as early as 1931. Secondly, as mentioned earlier, the Japanese intended to create North China as territory geo-politically separate from the Nanking government. This impacted on British interests, especially in the demilitarised zone. The KMA became a test case. As mentioned earlier the Manchurian crisis affected the KMA. This section discusses how the KMA maintained its position in North China on the eve of the Japanese expansion in North China. Lastly, the chapter examines the British community and government response to the Marco Polo Bridge Incident (Lukouchiao Incident) on and after 7 July 1937. The onset of the Sino-Japanese War (1937) changed the position of the British in and around Tientsin. These events foreshadowed the disputes which arose between the British and Japanese before war broke out in December 1941. Although three of these points affected Anglo-Japanese relations, Anglo-Chinese relations were not unaffected. As the Nanking government had lost control of North China, the discussion deals with the pro-Japanese Chinese and the Japanese themselves.

Smuggling

To understand smuggling activities in North China it is essential to set out the background of why, by whom and how these activities began and flourished. As mentioned above, in 1931 smugglers were unloading their goods at points on the North China coast and moving them by truck to railway stations for distribution in North China, including in Tientsin.⁴ The Japanese concession in Tientsin

⁴ SHAC, 679(1), 20385, Letter from Mr. L. de Luca to Mr. Frederick Maze, Tientsin, 22 August, 1931.

became the distribution centre for illegal narcotics for the whole of North China.⁵ Smuggling became more overt after the creation of the demilitarised zone.⁶ Smugglers' activities increased considerably in August and September 1935, when the Japanese garrison commander at Chinwangtao disarmed all Chinese Maritime Customs Preventive Service guards along the Great Wall and the Japanese garrison ordered all armed cruisers belonging to the service to withdraw along the coast between Chinwangtao and Lutai to a distance of 150 miles.⁷ The zone became a haven in which the smugglers, who were mostly Korean and Japanese, with only a small proportion of Chinese, were able to offload their goods and freely use any facilities on the railways, roads and waterways to distribute their goods in China.⁸

The smuggled goods were of three types; firstly household goods such as spirits, rayon, kerosene, sugar, cigarette, cotton cloth and artificial silk; secondly drugs; and thirdly silver. The first and second categories were imported from Dairen, Manchukuo and other Japanese territory.⁹ The third category, silver, was smuggled out of China to Manchukuo. The silver smugglers' impact was mainly

⁵ Marcus Mervine, 'Japanese Concession in Tientsin and the Narcotic trade', *Information Bulletin*, Vol. III, No.4 February 11, 1937, pp.83-84 and *The China Critic*, May 20, 1937, Vol.XVII, No.8, p.173.

⁶ The demilitarised zone was among the conditions agreed by Chinese and Japanese in Tangku Truce.


⁷ Haldore Hanson, 'Smuggler, Soldier and Diplomat', *Pacific Affairs*, Vol.9, No.4 (Dec. 1936), p.547.

⁸ The smugglers were mostly Korean and the Japanese, who were immune to Chinese law as Japanese subjects who enjoyed extraterritorial rights in China. They were often armed and operated in groups of 100 - 200 to avoid opposition from the Chinese authorities, on whom they did not hesitate to use violence if they felt threatened, or if their goods were seized. See SHAC, 679(1), 28031, Enclosure II: "Notes on the Causes of the Recent Increase of Smuggling in the Tientsin District", *The North China Herald*, 18 September 1935, p.458, Barbara J. Brookes, *Japan's Imperial Diplomacy*, pp.112-3 and Donna Brunero, *Britain's Imperial Cornerstone in China*, p.151.

⁹ Sheehan, *Trust in Troubled Times*, pp.167-8 and Hallet Abend, *My Years in China, 1926-1941* (John Lane The Bodley Head: London, 1944), p.208.

on the Chinese rather than on the British community in Tientsin,¹⁰ thus this chapter focuses on smuggled household goods and drugs.

Map 6.1: The Peiping-Tientsin Area, showing the line marked by the Tangku Truce



Sources: T.A. Bisson, *Japan in China* (West Port Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1973), p.5.

The Chinese Maritime Customs felt handicapped in their efforts to prevent smuggling in the demilitarised zone.¹¹ When smuggling vessels were caught, protests from the Japanese authorities in North China would usually result.¹² Some of the smugglers even flew the Japanese flag in order to prevent customs officials from searching their goods.¹³ In other cases, smugglers captured by the Chinese authorities sought support from the Japanese authorities in North China to have

¹⁰ Ann Trotter, *Britain and East Asia, 1933-1937*, p.132.

¹¹ SHAC, 679(1), 28031, Enclosure II: "Notes on the Causes of the Recent Increase of Smuggling in the Tientsin District" [1935].

¹² *The North China Herald*, 13 May 1936, p.270.

¹³ SHAC, 679(1), 28031, Letter from Mr. Y. Akatani to Sir Frederick Maze, Tientsin, 24 August 1936.

their goods released or to bargain for a reduced fine.¹⁴ The Japanese authorities were willing to help these smugglers to settle their cases with the Chinese, and blamed the Customs for seizing or hurting any of them.¹⁵ This was part of the Japanese military's plan to undermine Chinese authority in North China.

Effects of Smuggling on the British Community

In light of the above developments the British traders' concerns in China and Tientsin were two-fold. Firstly, they were anxious that the impact of the smuggling would reduce customs revenues and thus affect the ability of the Chinese government to pay back its loans. The British community in Tientsin expressed its concern that the smuggling would affect Chinese revenue in this way.¹⁶ As a 1936 cartoon in *the North China Herald* alleged, smuggling seriously and blatantly breached China's Customs defences. (See Figure 6.1).

¹⁴ SHAC, 679(1), 28031, Letter from Mr. Frederick Maze to Mr. Loy Chang, 7 April 1936 and *The North China Herald*, 22 April 1936, p.141.

¹⁵ SHAC, 679(1), 20843 Copy of Despatch No.2/c from Mr. A. Tajiri, Acting Consul-General to Tientsin Commissioner, Tientsin, September 8 1936; the Bodleian Library, NP, Letter from Mr. E. Pryor to W. F. Turner, 19 September 1935, and *Oriental Affairs*, July, 1934, p.34. In addition, in the demilitarised zone these smuggling activities were protected by collaborationist Special Police supported by Japanese troops, who would not hesitate to confront the local authority in order to prevent any effort to disturb the distribution of the smuggled goods. See SHAC, 679(1), 28128 Report on Smuggling for February 1934, 679(1), 28030 Copy of Memorandum from Mr. Sung Ko Cheng, 1st Assistant A to Commissioner, Tientsin, 20 May, 1934, and *The China Critic*, December 26, 1935, Vol. XI, No.13, p.293.

¹⁶ SOAS, CHAS/MCP/41 Letter from Mr. H. F. Dyott, Chairman of China Association, London, to the Chairman, British Chamber of Commerce, Shanghai, Tientsin, May 11, 1936.

Figure 6.1: Breaking the Dam



Source: *The North China Herald*, 13 May 1936, p.261.

The Chinese authorities estimated that Tientsin customs' revenue lost on average more than \$10,000 a month in 1936.¹⁷ The China Association pointed out that the indirect impact of this problem fell on the British. The Japanese authorities were blamed as being behind all this activity.

¹⁷ *The China Critic*, April 23, 1936.

Table 6.1: Total Maritime Customs Revenue from Chinese ports in Gulf of Pohai, 1932-37

Port	1932 St. \$	1933 St. \$	1934 St. \$	1935 St. \$	1936 St. \$	1937 St. \$
Tientsin	39,100,174.78	41,809,156.86	41,154,742.04	41,089,011.55	35,518,115.75	33,389,158.52
Chinwangtao	1,946,090.32	1,463,307.24	1,759,463.98	1,428,311.59	1,235,971.79	1,608,821.03
Chefoo	1,531,028.09	2,388,061.53	3,574,932.83	3,356,194.49	3,023,237.87	2,502,186.65
Lungkow	586,484.86	1,264,233.91	1,322,991.11	1,462,720.68	1,069,672.76	845,252.60
Weihaiwei	359,018.94	499,655.93	516,287.82	588,505.20	515,187.81	387,396.36

Source: *The Chinese Year Book 1938-39 Prepared from Official Sources by the Council of International Affairs Chungking* (The Commercial Press, Ltd.: China, 1939), p.398.

Table 6.1 illustrates either a dwindling of or a fluctuation in Customs revenues of all the Chinese ports in the Gulf of Pohai after 1934. Figures for Tientsin show that the smuggling activities injured Customs revenues, with collection decreasing steadily until the outbreak of war in North China. Tientsin's tax customs revenues dropped by 1.6% in 1934 and 0.2% in 1935. The biggest annual decrease was in 1936, at 13.6%; in 1937 revenues were down by 10%. Though these decreases are not great they illustrate the consistent impact of the smuggling activities on Chinese customs revenue up to the point when the Sino-Japanese war started in 1937. Only Chinwangtao showed resurgence in customs revenue by 1937 but it is lower than 1934

Furthermore, the formation of the EHACC, according to the British traders in Tientsin, jeopardised the ability of the Chinese government to repay its foreign loans. This collaborationist regime permitted smuggling and gained considerable revenue from taxing smuggled goods at a lower rate than the tax imposed by the

Chinese government. At this point the British traders blamed the Japanese for all these problems and sympathised with the Chinese government's inability to stop the smugglers and its loss of tax revenue. They understood that its inability to take action against the collaboration regime because of Japanese support.¹⁸ As the British Chamber of Commerce in Tientsin pointed out:

It does not appear to this Committee that the Nanking Government can deal with the present serious situation except by considerable concessions to the Japanese or else by allowing matters to drift until the effect on the Customs revenues is such as to call for intervention by the Foreign Powers. My Committee is, however, very definitely of the opinion that no effective measures can be taken by the Local Authorities to adopt preventive measures through the Customs or Railway Authorities unless they can come to terms with the Japanese on questions which are entirely political and economic.¹⁹

This passage reflects the concerns of this committee about the seriousness of the crisis and the inability of the Chinese government to stop it. The British community stressed this to highlight the problem in North China to the British government. In fact the loan repayments by the Chinese government were never interrupted, nor did they become a big issue at the international level. The real issue in China at this time was the Japanese occupation of Manchuria and Jehol; this was what the British community was really concerned about. In short the Japanese occupation in both these areas would affect North China.

The second impact on British interests was that smuggling depressed the prices of many goods in Tientsin.²⁰ Smuggled goods had a big impact on Chinese

¹⁸ SOAS, CHAS/MCP/41 Letter from Mr. H. F. Dyott to the Chairman, British Chamber of Commerce, Shanghai, Tientsin, 11th May, 1936.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ The impact of the smugglers' activities not only injured British and Chinese trade interests, but also other foreign traders. For example, Italian traders were angered that the smugglers were not

manufacturers and retailers, but British traders in Tientsin found that they also were gradually being affected.²¹ This led the British Chamber of Commerce to bring the issue up with the Chinese Customs, where the Chairman of the British Chamber of Commerce in Tientsin, P. D. MacFeat, wrote:

I feel sure that the Maritime Customs are already taking all possible steps to deal with the situation that has arisen as I believe that there has very recently been some improvement in the situation; the situation is, however, so grave from the point of view of the business of importers who are Members of this Chamber that I venture to bring the [matter] officially to your notice.²²

The British traders' concern about smuggling steadily increased between 1935 and 1937, during which time smuggled goods jeopardised their profits. Members of the British Chamber of Commerce in Tientsin felt that the activity threatened their interests.²³ This free and open smuggling in Tientsin had made the British trading community more sympathetic towards the Chinese authorities. Some of the British leaders in Tientsin, such as P.H.B. Kent, also believed that the smuggling was a Japanese method of undermining Chinese Customs authority, which it was.²⁴ His view represented that of the majority of traders, who, from this sympathetic stance towards the Chinese, condemned the Japanese.

The inability of the Chinese authorities to stop the smuggling led the Chamber to dispatch protest letters to its Senior Consul.²⁵ British kerosene and

only in competition with them but also falsely labelled their goods 'Made in Italy'. See SHAC, 679(1), 28030 Letter from Mr. L. de Luca to Mr. A.C.E. Braud, Tientsin, 17 February 1933.

²¹ Hanson, 'Smuggler, Soldier and Diplomat', p.552.

²² SHAC, 679(1), 20385 Letter from Mr. P.D. MacFeat to Commissioner, Tientsin, 11 July, 1932.

²³ Trotter, *Britain and East Asia, 1933-1937*, p.163.

²⁴ Kent, *The Twentieth Century in the Far East*, pp.287-8.

²⁵ SOAS, CHAS/MCP/40 Tientsin British Chamber of Commerce, 8 November 1935.

sugar were the two items that suffered most,²⁶ as highlighted in one piece of contemporary reporting:

Between May 1 and August 15 [1936] the Japanese smuggled 1,370,000 gallons of kerosene and 170,000 gallons of gasoline, causing the North China business of the British and American firms to drop 40 percent. . . . The British sugar sales in North China ordinarily run over Ch.\$20,000,000 a year, but for eleven months between October 1935 and August 1936 not one pound of legal sugar was sold. On September 1, the smugglers were still holding 300,000 bags of sugar in Tientsin, enough to supply North China for six months.²⁷

The British community in Tientsin felt that the smugglers were playing games with them, and the stakes were high, especially for the British. The Tientsin Chamber of Commerce pointed out the serious impact of their activities. In March 1936 J. C. Taylor, the new chairman of the Chamber, stated that the British were concerned that the smugglers were hampering their legitimate business. British sugar traders in Tientsin could not compete with the smuggled sugar.²⁸ Another British good affected was kerosene. A report by the British Chamber of Commerce illustrates the anxiety and frustration of the British and other traders:

Most of the oil agencies I visited stated that they were unable to compete against these smuggled kerosenes. They stated that the quality of the Japanese Kerosene was not so good as the other foreign kerosenes, but when the smugglers were bringing in these foreign kerosenes as well they had no chance of competing.²⁹

Taylor added, "...[i]t is deplorable to watch the complete breakdown of responsible authority in the face of the stronger forces".³⁰ His statements explicitly blamed the Japanese, who did not respect Chinese Customs' utmost

²⁶ Hanson, 'Smuggler, Soldier and Diplomat', p.552.

²⁷ Ibid., pp.552-3.

²⁸ *The North China Herald*, 4 March 1936, p.392.

²⁹ SOAS, CHAS/MCP/41, 'Smuggling in North China: Report from the British Chamber of Commerce, Tientsin, 24 April, 1936'.

³⁰ *The North China Herald*, 4 March 1936, p.392.

efforts to stop the smuggling activities. In addition Taylor said "...this illegal traffic can be stopped immediately if it is sincerely desired,"³¹ highlighting the suspicions of the British traders that while the Japanese authorities tried to show that they were concerned about stopping the smuggling, in reality they were not serious. Although the British were disappointed in the Japanese, they wanted to maintain cordial relations with them³² and thus avoid creating British-Japanese tension that would further affect their interests.

British traders in Tientsin were supported by the British Residents' Association (BRA), and the China Association, both of which condemned the Japanese for their irresponsibility in allowing these activities. At a meeting of the China Association in mid-1936, the Chairman of the Association, D. G. M. Bernard, expressed his strongly-held views on the smuggling activities:

We neither underrate nor do we lack appreciation of the difficulties out of which Japan's policy in China to [a] small extent arises. But her policy and the method which she employs to further it we have to condemn, partly because it provides no solution for these difficulties and partly because it is creating fresh problems of a grave and dangerous character both for China and for ourselves.³³

This comment condemns Japanese policy towards China, which was also creating difficulties for other foreign traders. In other comments, Bernard expressed his sympathetic view of the Chinese Customs' difficulty in solving the problem amid the insincerity of the Japanese authorities towards the issue of helping the Chinese Customs. Bernard pointed out that:

The Japanese authorities claim that they are not responsible for the smuggling: the fact remains that the Chinese Maritime

³¹ Ibid.

³² Brunero, *Britain's Imperial Cornerstone in China*, p.149.

³³ *The North China Herald*, 20 May 1936, p.313.

Customs authorities in Tientsin are greatly handicapped in dealing with the smugglers by the attitude of the Japanese authorities towards the Customs Administration.³⁴

However, the smuggling did not have much impact on the British concession itself. Business there decreased slightly only in some years, especially in the first half of 1935,³⁵ and the daily lives of the residents continued as normal. Although in some parts of Tientsin the Blue Shirt Society arranged the assassination of several alleged collaborators, the British concession continued as normal.³⁶ According to police reports the British concession was under control, with only three murder cases reported between 1934 and 1937.³⁷ The BMC had only domestic problems to contend with, such as the continuing issue of river pollution.³⁸ The pressure of the smuggling activities had not really impacted to any great extent on the concession itself, although individual firms had their concerns about the effects on their business activities, both in Tientsin and in the areas around it.

The BMC took preventive action to prevent the dumping of smuggled goods in the British concession. The municipal police inspected and raided every shop involved in selling smuggled goods. For example, in a raid on 25 July 1936 the British authorities discovered and seized 500 sacks of sugar with unpaid duty.³⁹ In another case in 1937, the BMC allowed the Chinese Customs, with the cooperation of the British municipal police, to inspect a Russian shop, financed by

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ BMC, *Tientsin, Report of the Council for the year 1935* (Tientsin Press, Limited), p.29.

³⁶ Frederic Wakeman Jr., *Spymaster: Dai Li and the Chinese Secret Service* (University of California Press: Berkeley, 2003), p.174.

³⁷ BMC, *Tientsin, Report of the Council for the year 1936* (Tientsin Press, Limited), p.61.

³⁸ Ibid., p.43.

³⁹ Hanson, 'Smuggler, Soldier and Diplomat', p.550.

Italian traders which they suspected of being involved with smuggled goods. Police and customs staff examined account books, invoices and shop correspondence and found that it was indeed engaged in selling smuggled goods. Eventually the shop was closed down.⁴⁰ This case shows that the BMC was serious enough about the problem to be willing to help Chinese Customs to suppress the smuggling activities on their own territory. This was now not only a Chinese problem; the dumping of smuggled goods in Tientsin was also causing British traders to suffer. But the British concession could only control smuggling activities within the concession, not outside it. British interests were very fragile where the Japanese were concerned.

The willingness of the BMC to cooperate with Chinese Customs was stressed as early as January 1935 by the BMC's Chairman, E. C. Peters, who stated; "I have no doubt that my Council will be prepared to take every possible step in their power to assist the Customs in the prevention of smuggling, and to facilitate Customs examination of all cargo passing our Bund...",⁴¹ This is another example of the willingness of the British authorities in the BMC to help the Chinese Customs by giving them permission to build checkpoints in the British bund in order to control the smuggling activities. The sincerity of the British authorities in the BMC in helping Chinese Customs led to the formation of a close relationship between them.

⁴⁰ SHAC, 679(1), 28237 Letter from Mr. W. R. Myers to Mr. E. A. Pritchard, Tientsin, January 29, 1937 and HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.5, Letter from E. T. Barnes to the Manager, Tientsin, February 8, 1937.

⁴¹ SHAC, 679(1), 28030 Copy of Letter from Chairman of the BMC to Commissioner, Tientsin, January 17, 1935.

With the continuation of the smuggling activities the British traders in Tientsin urged their government to intervene to bring pressure upon the smugglers. The British Members of Parliament were also concerned about the increase in smuggling activity and the inability of the Chinese to counter the problem. In addition the British government had grave concerns about the smuggling activities and urged its embassies in China and Japan to monitor these activities. In Nanking the British embassy dispatched the following letter to Sung Che-yuan (Chairman of HCPC);

I have the honour to invite Your Excellency's attention to the continued prevalence of smuggling in Hopei and Chahar. Such smuggling not only has a serious effect on the trade of British and other merchants both foreign and Chinese who are engaged in legitimate business, but, by reason of evasion of import customs duties on a large scale, has even more serious indirect effects on trade in general and the economic situation by undermining the credit of the Chinese Government in London and other financial centres of the world and thus seriously affecting the wider economic relations between China and the United Kingdom.⁴²

The British government took the initiative of raising this problem at the diplomatic level. For example, in Tokyo on 2 May 1936, the British Ambassador Sir Robert Clive was ordered to meet the Japanese Foreign Office to obtain clarification regarding the smuggling activities, but met with denials of any involvement through the EHACC.⁴³ The Japanese ostensibly stressed that they could do nothing to counter the smuggling owing to the high Chinese tariff and the weakness of the Chinese government. In response to this the British government expressed its disappointment,⁴⁴ but was powerless to persuade the Japanese to stop the smuggling.

⁴² PRO FO371/20944, Letter D. J. Cowan to Sung Che-yuan, Peking, January 16, 1937.

⁴³ *The North China Herald*, June 3, 1936, p.402.

⁴⁴ PRO FO371/20944, Parliamentary Question, May 24, 1937.

British missionaries had a different view of the smuggling activities. Although, like the rest of the British community in North China, they opposed it, they were more concerned about the moral impact of the narcotics smuggling on the Chinese people. This opinion was elucidated by Arnold Bryson, who stated:

The scandal of the iniquitous drug traffic throughout this Province, carried on by Japanese and Korea traders under their Government's protection, has been developing of late to an unprecedented degree. I have seen many examples in the District of the utter demoralization of the people, young and old of both sexes, who find no difficulty in obtaining supplies of heroin.⁴⁵

Bryson added that "[a]lthough, officially, Japan denies any responsibility for this state of affairs, her protestations of innocence are hypocritical in the extreme."⁴⁶ There was of course nothing they could do to stop such activities in North China, apart from voicing their concerns to the LMS in an effort to gather support from home. The LMS aimed to help the Chinese people educationally and morally, and felt handicapped in their effort to ameliorate the Chinese addiction to drugs.

This view was conveyed by Anna Christiansen, who had a sympathetic view of the Chinese government and its inability to eradicate the smuggling:

The drug traffic still continues to flourish; many folk are of the opinion that it is growing instead of diminishing, despite all the efforts the Government is making for its eradication. The Government has opened free clinics in some centres to help the people to break off the habit; numbers are cured, but alas! , fall back again. We hear that several shops for the sale of opium, morphia

⁴⁵ SOAS, CWM North China Reports Box 11 1932-1936, LMS Annual Report, from Arnold, Station Tsangchow, February 26, 1936.

⁴⁶ SOAS, CWM North China Report Box 11 1932-1936, LMS Annual Report, from A.G. Bryson, Tsangchow, March 1937 for 1936.

and heroin have recently been opened in our city of Tsangchow by Koreans and Japanese.⁴⁷

From this passage it is clear that the smuggling activities were out of control. British missionaries were frustrated by the ugly situation created by the smugglers, who had no fear of law and order.⁴⁸

In conclusion, explicitly the smuggling activities in North China jeopardised the future of the British position and interests and hampered many foreign and Chinese traders.⁴⁹ But the incapability of Chinese customs officials and the frustration of the British trader community over this problem stemmed from the division of authority in Tientsin. The Chinese were handicapped regarding launching more active preventive measures against the smugglers. Though the BMC supported the Chinese in this matter the British only had power within their own concession.

The Japanese influence

After successfully occupying Manchuria (1931) and Jehol (1933), the Japanese Kwantung Army engaged with their next strategy; to spread Japanese influence in North China.⁵⁰ The demilitarised zone offered them a great opportunity to sweep the KMT and the influence of the Nanking government out of North China. The Japanese military used the failure of the Chinese authorities to

⁴⁷ SOAS, CWM North China Reports Box 11 1932-1936, LMS Annual Report from Anna Christiansen, Tsangchow, February 1936.

⁴⁸ Frank Dikötter, Lars Laamann and Zhou Xun, *Narcotic Culture: A History of Drugs in China* (London: Hurst & Company, 2004), p.168.

⁴⁹ SHAC, 679(1)28031 Copy of letter from Belgian Consul-General Acting Senior Consul of Consular Body to Commissioner, Tientsin, October 31, 1935.

⁵⁰ Marjorie Dryburgh, 'Regional Office and the National Interest: Song Zheyuan in North China, 1933', in David P. Barrett and Larry N. Shyu (eds.), *Chinese Collaboration with Japan, 1932-1945: the Limits of Accommodation* (Stanford University Press: Stanford, 2001), p.39.

suppress banditry in North China as justification for encouraging the area to become autonomous.⁵¹ In addition, the killing of two Chinese pro-Japanese journalists in 1935 gave the Japanese further grounds for their demand for the elimination of Chinese governmental powers in North China.⁵²

Eventually the Ho-Umezu Agreement was signed in 1935, giving Japanese troops a free hand in the demilitarised zone.⁵³ Japan's next move was to urge Chinese leaders in North China to declare the region autonomous from the Nanking government with the ostensible aim of defeating the communist activities there. Tientsin became the centre of Japanese activity to influence Chinese leaders to help create the autonomous region. The Japanese also encouraged collaborationist Chinese to launch a campaign to damage the image of the Nanking government and oppose its new currency reform.⁵⁴ Japanese efforts to create larger autonomous regions (including Shantung, Hopei, Chahar, Suiyuan and Shansi) failed, but it succeeded in establishing EHACC, with its capital at Tungchow, around twelve miles from Peiping (Peking).⁵⁵ The chairman of this council was Yin Ju-keng, who in his statement on the establishment of EHACC claimed that the council was formed to counter the communist movement in North China.⁵⁶ This was followed by the creation of the HCPC under Sung Che-yuan.⁵⁷ Although the Nanking government appointed the members of this council, most were

⁵¹ Ibid., p.43.

⁵² *The North China Herald*, May 8, 1935, p.215 and *The Japan Weekly Chronicle*, 6 June 1935, p.735.

⁵³ See detail of this agreement in *China Today*, May 1936, p.150.

⁵⁴ *The Times*, November 25, 1935, p.11.

⁵⁵ Coble, *Facing Japan*, p.272.

⁵⁶ *The Times*, November 25, 1935, p.11.

⁵⁷ Dryburgh, *North China and Japanese Expansion 1933-1937*, p.87.

suggested by the Japanese Kwantung Army and Tientsin Garrison.⁵⁸ Moreover, Japan put considerable pressure on Sung Che-yuan to concede to several demands such as the pacification of communist activities in North China and economic cooperation, and it also opposed the Nationalist government's financial reforms in 1935.⁵⁹

Using the Boxer Protocol the Japanese military increased its power and influence in China. For example, in early 1936 the Japanese troops were supplemented by around 8,000 men, and additional army barracks and an aerodrome were built near Tientsin.⁶⁰ This situation demonstrated the Japanese military's powers in North China.

The Japanese Motive

Several reasons can be found to explain the motivation behind the smuggling activities and the creation of the autonomous regime in North China. Firstly, there was the political motive of pressuring the Chinese government to recognise Manchukuo. This was one of the Japanese Kwantung army's aims in its effort to gain recognition from the Chinese. Secondly, the Japanese wanted the Chinese government to reduce duty rates on imported Japanese goods.⁶¹ Ironically,

⁵⁸ Coble, *Facing Japan*, p.274.

⁵⁹ Dryburgh, 'Regional Office and the National Interest', pp.49-50, Dryburgh, Marjorie, 'Parallel Lives', p.13 and Sheehan, *Trust in Troubled Times*, pp.169-70.

⁶⁰ *The Times*, May 15, 1936, p.15.

⁶¹ Hanson, 'Smuggler, Soldier and Diplomat', pp.553 and 554, and *The Japan Weekly Chronicle*, 7 November, 1935, p.571.

the smuggling activities injured not only Chinese and Western firms but also small Japanese traders in Tientsin, whose businesses were seriously threatened.⁶²

Therefore the main motives behind the smuggling were political and economic, mostly benefiting the big Japanese firms. At this point, Hanson made a significant conclusion:

In 1935 the Kuantung [Kwantung] Army, inheritor of the old continental policy, found in the smuggling scheme a method of destroying the native industries of North China, undermining China's national revenues and at the same time crippling Western trade in China.⁶³

The Japanese tried to launch their scheme to eradicate the western Powers in Asia. Tientsin was not excepted. Furthermore, it was one of the centres from which the Japanese promoted their scheme in North China. The Japanese army, on the other hand, became a tool to pressure the HCPC to agree to cooperate in economic development.⁶⁴ The big Japanese agencies in China such as the South Manchurian Railway (SMR) were willing to sponsor and realise this scheme, which can be described as a cooperative economic bloc to include Japan, North China and Manchukuo.⁶⁵ The scheme could be linked to the Amai Statement, delivered on 17 April 1934 and summarised as "white hands off China", which opposed the open-door policy in China.⁶⁶ The policy was part of the Japanese effort to create an autarkic bloc in East Asia.⁶⁷

⁶² *The North China Herald*, March 18 1936, p.470 and SOAS, CWM North China Report Box 11 1932-1936, LMS Annual Report, from A.G. Bryson, Tsangchow, March 1937 for 1936.

⁶³ Hanson, 'Smuggler, Soldier and Diplomat', p.556.

⁶⁴ Dryburgh, 'Parallel Lives', p.11.

⁶⁵ Trotter, *Britain and East Asia, 1933-1937*, p.162.

⁶⁶ Endicott, *Diplomacy and Enterprise*, p.66 and Anthony Best, *Britain, Japan and Pearl Harbor: Avoiding War in East Asia, 1936-41* (London: Routledge, 1995), p.9.

⁶⁷ Anthony Best, 'The Road to Anglo-Japanese Confrontation, 1931-41', p.29.

The main actor in this scheme was not the Japanese government in Tokyo but the Kwantung Army, which had a powerful influence on Japanese foreign policy in China. Without them, negotiations between the Chinese and Japanese seemed useless.⁶⁸ In light of the Japanese objective of furthering its interests in North China, Tientsin witnessed a flood of Japanese economic missions. Despite a cold response from the Chinese, they made several successful deals with the Chinese authorities and with Chinese businessmen.⁶⁹ But to what extent this cooperation succeeded and how willing the Japanese firms were to join is arguable.⁷⁰

But this development implicitly showed that British interests were among the Japanese targets for removal from North China. The Japanese motive of undermining the British could be seen in the smuggling activities and the creation of the autonomous regime. The impact of the smuggling on British interests has been discussed, while the impact on the British community in Tientsin and its hinterland of the creation of the autonomous regime is discussed in the next section.

The British Response

In the area surrounding Tientsin the Japanese penetration of North China affected the KMA's position, as E. J. Nathan noted in 1934:

⁶⁸ Hanson, 'Smuggler, Soldier and Diplomat', p. 555.

⁶⁹ *Oriental Affairs*, Vol. VI, No. 4, October, 1936, p. 195.

⁷⁰ Marjorie Dryburgh argued that the Japanese firms were not willing to join the Japanese army's economic plan in North China. See Dryburgh, 'Parallel Lives', pp. 13-14.

It is, however, pertinent to point out that it is highly probable that in the very near future we shall be forced into a position where the Japanese will protect us whether we like it or no. . . . the higher authorities in Peking are equally either puppets of the Japanese or in secret collusion with them [the Japanese] to ensure complete control by the Japanese of the whole area from the Great Wall to at least the near boundary of the demilitarised zone. It would not surprise me to know that Japanese influence is even paramount in Tientsin and Peking.⁷¹

Nathan saw that the KMA had to be pragmatic by accepted the reality in North China. The encroachment of Japanese troops in North China was a sign of the gradual growth of Japanese influence in North China.⁷² The new rulers would adjust the KMA's position so that it no longer relied on the Chinese. It is not certain how far the Nationalist power was influencing the Chinese authorities in the north at this point. But it can be assumed that the Japanese influence gradually increased and the Chinese authorities in north China, Tientsin included, became puppets of the Japanese. This is illustrated by the Japanese attempt to use the Chinese as a tool to undermine British interests, as discussed below.

The effort to eradicate Western, and especially British interests was tangible when the Japanese military tried to undermine the KMA's interests in Tongshan in 1934. Some of the Japanese military in Tientsin encouraged the Chinese workers to strike in 1934, as Nathan wrote to W.F. Turner:

It was inevitable that reports should get about that the Japanese were at the back of the trouble at Tongshan and even that the Administration considered them in some way responsible. Needless to say such a suggestion never emanated officially from me or any other responsible person in the Administration's employ. Nevertheless the Japanese Military in Tientsin, under whose orders

⁷¹ The Bodleian Library, Modern Paper Room, NP, Letter from Mr. E. J. Nathan to W. F. Turner, March 24, 1934.

⁷² Wright, *Coal Mining in China Economy and Society, 1895-1937* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p.127.

the detachment at Tongshan operates, professed to be hurt by the suggestion that the Administration considered them in any way connected with the trouble.⁷³

The KMA's complaints about the Japanese military's attempt to encourage the workers to strike continued in 1935, with them pointing out that certain Japanese military officers were involved in this intrigue.⁷⁴ The Japanese military's support of these strikes reinforces the point, that the Japanese not only had an influence in the Chinese territories but also that they were gradually trying to remove British interests.

The British at this juncture realised that their problem was no longer with the Chinese but with the new threat from the Japanese and Japanese puppets. However, the British community in Tientsin and its hinterlands, including the KMA, adopted a careful approach to this problem, unlike the way in which they had handled Chinese resentment against them in the mid-1920s. The powerful Japanese position in North China could not be directly attacked, as with the Chinese. There was no memorandum or direct criticism concerning the Japanese. Nathan stated that although the KMA knew that the Japanese were trying to interfere in their interests, "...I have done my best to remove any cause for ill feeling and believe that our traditional friendly relations with the Japanese Military are not impaired" demonstrating that the KMA knew that their future was in the hands of the Japanese military.⁷⁵

⁷³ The Bodleian Library, NP, Letter from Mr. E. J. Nathan to W. F. Turner, April 27, 1934.

⁷⁴ The Bodleian Library, NP, Letter from Mr. E. Pryor to W. F. Turner, June 20, 1935 and *Modern Papers*, Bodleian, NP, Letter from Mr. E. Pryor to W. F. Turner, June 22, 1935.

⁷⁵ Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity*, p.242 and The Bodleian Library, NP, Letter from Mr. E. J. Nathan to W. F. Turner, 27 April 1934. On the eve of the World War II in Asia-Pacific, Nathan continued his pledge to continue to fully cooperate with Japan. The KMA collaboration with the Japanese

The Japanese military, according to Nathan, created hostility in Chinese-Japanese relations when they tried to undermine Chiang Kai-shek and his government by supporting the anti-Chiang groups and installing a puppet government.⁷⁶ However, in this position the KMA was also helpless and could not take serious action against the Japanese military. Because of this situation in the KMA's mining area, the KMA was only concerned with the progress of its business and its only concern was to avoid confrontation with the Japanese.

Nathan went on to comment:

As far as our area is concerned there does not appear to be any evidence of any activity above the surface, but undoubtedly Japanese influence in this area is on the increase and our relations with local officials and the amount of support we can get from them are all dependent upon the attitude likely to be adopted by their real masters. This necessitates our playing a certain amount of politics, much as we dislike doing so.⁷⁷

All the KMA could do was to express its frustration with the Japanese military, which was acting unchecked. Nathan's expressed his attitude thus:

I think we all here feel that Japan is challenging, or is about to challenge, the world in support of her intention to become the dominant Power in the Far East. Is the rest of the world going to allow her to take the position unchallenged?⁷⁸

However, the KMA's greatest concern was the Japanese military's intention to remove the British interests from North China. In addition, the Japanese military used Chinese workers to create havoc in the KMA mines, and tried to get support from Chinese collaborators to cover up their action to achieve

was maintained in the war. See Bernard Wasserstein, *Secret War in Shanghai* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1999), pp.166-169.

⁷⁶ The Bodleian Library, NP, Letter from Mr. E. J. Nathan to W. F. Turner, June 30, 1934.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ The Bodleian Library, NP, Letter from Mr. E. J. Nathan to W. F. Turner, December 28, 1934.

their goal of overthrowing the KMA in North China. Previous to Nathan's comments, W. Pryor showed his concern that:

. . . at the Dairen Conference in 1933, at which Yin Tung was present, the Japanese remarked that the British influence in this area was undesirable and suggested that, if Yin Tung could make the Kailan Mines inoperative through the withdrawal of traffic facilities, the South Manchuria Railway would recompense the P.N.R. for any losses in freight.⁷⁹

The continuation of the Japanese military intrigue in KMA interests caused the KMA to make every effort to avoid the demise of its position in North China. The KMA, which operated in a demilitarised zone under Japanese military influence, could not afford to lose its position in North China. In order to avoid interference or disturbance by the Japanese military, whether direct or indirect, the KMA had to play safe by not provoking the Japanese military.

The KMA was continually challenged by Japanese military intrigue. The EHACC was the tool it used to indirectly disrupt KMA operations. The KMA, on the other hand, understood that the Japanese were employing the Chinese as their agents against them.⁸⁰ Fortunately the KMA had the support of the British Legation (later the British Embassy), which allowed British interests to continue to operate. However, it took great precautions in dealing with the Japanese by not interfering with any of their expansion schemes, including not denouncing their drug trafficking, as KMA areas were one of the centres of the drug trade.⁸¹

⁷⁹ The Bodleian Library, NP, Letter from Mr. W. Pryor to W. F. Turner, May 3, 1935.

⁸⁰ The Bodleian Library, NP, Letter from Mr. E. J. Nathan to W. F. Turner, February 14, 1936.

⁸¹ *Oriental Affairs*, October, 1934, p.155.

The British disappointment with the Japanese military continued when the Japanese tried to give the autonomous regimes in North China legitimate control of the Chinese Customs and helped the Manchukuo government take over several customs houses in Manchuria in 1932-33.⁸² The north-eastern provinces contributed important tax revenues to the Chinese government, and the British were worried that the Japanese were trying to hamper foreign interests in North China.⁸³ Furthermore, the British were afraid that the formation of the autonomous region was diverting Chinese revenue from China. The Japanese had demanded that all customs houses in North China be rendered to these autonomous regions.⁸⁴ This point was made by E. M. Gull, the Secretary of the China Association, who stated:

As to the position of bondholders, it is unnecessary for me to say more than that the loans secured on the Salt and Customs revenues are largely held by British subjects and other persons paying income tax in the United Kingdom.⁸⁵

Explicitly this quotation illustrates the British trader's concern; that the impact of the rendition of Chinese customs stations and revenue would injure the interests of British bondholders, as the bulk of Chinese loans were borrowed from British subjects.⁸⁶ As the biggest loan sponsors in China British enterprises and banks in Great Britain tried to protect their business in terms of interest on government loans and dividends on investments in China.⁸⁷ However implicitly, the quotation above was a reason to bolster the China Association's demands to get sympathy

⁸² Brunero, *Britain's Imperial Cornerstone in China*, pp.134-40.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p.136.

⁸⁴ SOAS, CHAS/MCP/41 Letter from Mr. E. M. Gull to the H.M. Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, February 5, 1936.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶ Maxwell S. Stewart, 'Smuggling: Japan's Latest Weapon,' *China Today*, June 1936, p.169.

⁸⁷ Shigeru Akita and Naoto Kagotani, 'International Order of Asia in the 1930s', in Shigeru Akita (ed.), *Gentlemanly Capitalism, Imperialism and Global History* (Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2002), p.157.

from their government to help them in dealing with the Japanese influence in North China.

However, this was not the only reason that the British community in Tientsin was disappointed by the Japanese. British cotton industries had faced tough Japanese competition in the early 1930s.⁸⁸ Japanese textiles had spread across China and the British Empire, which had an impact on the Lancashire cotton industries.⁸⁹ In addition, prices of other products such as electric lamps, concrete, bicycles, hair combs and rubber footwear were also affected by the low price of the Japanese goods.⁹⁰ In North China and Tientsin, the British traders faced the same problem. Using the political power they had gained after the Manchurian Incident, the Japanese steadily began to conquer the cotton market in North China, challenging the British cotton industry. In addition the British began to notice the decline of their metals imports to North China due to Japanese competition.⁹¹ F. H. Pentycross, Manager of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank in Tientsin, described the situation in Tientsin:

Generally speaking, as far as Tientsin is concerned, import dealers have not done well this year [1934], and at the present time are showing little, if any, interest at all.

As stressed in my letter of 12 months ago, Japanese exporters continue to gain ground in North China at the expense of British interests.⁹²

⁸⁸ Ishii Osamu, 'Markets and Diplomacy: the Anglo-Japanese Rivalries over Cotton Goods Markets, 1930-36', p.59.

⁸⁹ Best, *Britain, Japan and Pearl Harbor*, p.12.

⁹⁰ Best, 'The Road to Anglo-Japanese Confrontation, 1931-41', p.32.

⁹¹ HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 25 Letter from Mr. F. H. Pentycross to Mr. W. C. Cassels, Tientsin, December 19, 1934 and HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 25 Letter from Mr. F. H. Pentycross to Mr. W. C. Cassels, Tientsin, December 12, 1933.

⁹² HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 25 Letter from Mr. F. H. Pentycross to Mr. W. C. Cassels, Tientsin, December 19, 1934.

Pentycross highlighted the gradual decline of British economic interests in North China.

British missionaries in the area surrounding Tientsin also had a poor view of the Japanese effort to exert influence on North China. The creation of the so-called autonomous council in East Hopei made the missionaries suspicious. They saw the Japanese military in this situation as the aggressor towards the Chinese territory and the autonomous council as merely a puppet of the Japanese military,⁹³ understanding the movement as part of the Japanese scheme to achieve further control over North China and undermine the Chinese government.⁹⁴

There was, then, strong ill-feeling concerning the influence of the Japanese military in North China. However, not all the British community saw the Japanese military as menacing their interests. Politically conservative Britons were confused. At first they were in favour, seeing the Japanese military's influence in North China as good for China in that it was helping to prevent the spread of communism there.⁹⁵ The diehards felt unsafe with North China under Chinese control as they were unable to forget what had happened to British interests from the May Thirtieth Movement to the Thorburn case. However, the real interest of this diehard community was to retain the British concession in Tientsin and avoid any Chinese attacks or demands to relinquish it. Therefore their hopes of retaining all the British interests rested with the Japanese military.

⁹³ SOAS, CWM North China Reports Box 11 1932-1936, LMS Annual Report from Anna Christiansen, Tsangchow, February 1936.

⁹⁴ Dryburgh, *North China and Japanese Expansion 1933-1937*, p.63.

⁹⁵ *The China Critic*, December 12, 1935, p.244.

The diehards in Tientsin used popular printed media such as magazines and newspapers to air their ideas and views on the situation. One of these was *Oriental Affairs*, a magazine edited by H. G. W. Woodhead, with W. V. Pennell and Maurice D'Alton as North China journalists. Regarding the above issue Pennell wrote a heavily condemnatory letter to the Chinese government in Nanking. He seemed happy with what had happened in North China, which was far from the influence of the Chinese government, adding that:

It is probably true to say that the masses in the North, if they look at all, regard the struggle which has begun in the South with an almost bovine calm. There is much discontent in the cities, and many emissaries of disgruntled political factions are blowing their slogans upon it. But they find agitation hard work in the North, which smoulders rather than burns, reluctantly and mostly slowly. That is one of the reasons why, in the end, stability can come neither from Canton nor the great Yangtze centres, but only from the North.⁹⁶

From this statement it is clear that the diehards in North China still felt uncomfortable with the Chinese government in Nanking, which after six years they still did not believe could rule China efficiently. The reason they did not trust the Chinese government was that it was still unstable, with factions in government and separatist activity in several Chinese provinces.

So like the Shanghailanders, the diehards in Tientsin were anti-Chinese and pro-Japanese.⁹⁷ Pennell, who was supportive of Japanese intervention in North China said that “[t]he atmosphere has improved greatly, however, and the feeling is that while the Japanese are prepared to leave us alone the North should mind its p’s

⁹⁶ *Oriental Affairs*, Vol.I, No.2, January, 1934, p.37.

⁹⁷ Trotter, *Britain and East Asia, 1933-1937*, pp.26-7.

and q's and be quiet".⁹⁸ In addition, Pennell felt that the Chinese could not muster a unified effort sufficient to challenge the Japanese. Almost all the Chinese leaders had their own interests and could not participate in unified resistance towards the Japanese. Pennell supported the anti-Chinese government in North China. He knew that the Japanese were behind the agitation but believed that their sincere motive was to demand better Chinese government.⁹⁹ Unlike the KMA, the British diehards considered that the trouble in the KMA mines was caused purely by anti-British Chinese elements trying to cause havoc. They were pleased to see that the Japanese were trying to settle the trouble. At this point the diehards pointed out that the Chinese police were not accepting this help.¹⁰⁰ Moreover, the diehard group claimed that the Chinese government's spying machinery, such as the Iron and Blood Corps, was nothing more than an anti-modern terrorist gangster group, out of the control of the local authority and creating violence in Tientsin.¹⁰¹

The diehard group denounced the Chinese volunteer groups' resistance movement towards the Japanese as "merely a group of bandits".¹⁰² They wanted this group to keep away from North China, and saw the existence of the Japanese military as important in controlling this so-called 'bandit element' in the demilitarised zone which had "become a nuisance to everybody".¹⁰³ To the diehard group, this bandit element overshadowed the Japanese effort to create a rapprochement with the Chinese, and that Japanese efforts towards economic rapprochement with the Chinese, represented a positive approach to the Chinese'

⁹⁸ *Oriental Affairs*, Vol. I, No.2, January, 1934, p.37.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁰ *Oriental Affairs*, Vol. I, No.4, March 1934, p.41.

¹⁰¹ *Oriental Affairs*, Vol. I, No.6, May, 1934, p.34 and Vol. II, No.13, December, 1934, p.255.

¹⁰² *Oriental Affairs*, Vol. III, No.19, June, 1935, p.286.

¹⁰³ *Oriental Affairs*, Vol. IV, No.4, October, 1935, p.193.

weakness. The Westerners would also benefit from such cooperation, which could prevent the Chinese returning to their old policy of seeking aid from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).¹⁰⁴

The smuggling activities, on the other hand, were another issue of which the diehard community was aware. Unlike the British traders in Tientsin, the diehard community did not directly blame the Japanese for this. They claimed that the blame fell on the autonomous Chinese regime, especially the EHACC, which was involved in the smuggling. The diehard group supported the Japanese suggestion to reduce the tariff as a remedy for the smuggling activities. They felt that "the exorbitantly high tariff" on several imported goods brought the traders hardship.¹⁰⁵ In addition, the diehard group did not consider that the Japanese would damage foreign interests significantly. The Japanese influence was important to the diehards as a way of reducing the existence of Chinese communists. The main point in the diehard policy in North China was that their fear of increased communism was greater than that of increased Japanese influence in North China.¹⁰⁶ The German-Japanese anti-Communist pact added to their relief as they were concerned that the Soviet Union would interfere in Chinese affairs.¹⁰⁷

However, the diehards gradually began to accept the fact that the Japanese posed a new threat in the north China (such as smuggling activities) and saw that this was problematic for British-Japanese relations. Moreover several Japanese

¹⁰⁴ *Oriental Affairs*, Vol. I, No.7, June, 1934, pp.39-8.

¹⁰⁵ *Oriental Affairs*, Vol. IV, No.5, November, 1935, p.241; Vol. V, No.2, February, 1936, p.94; Vol.V, No.5, May, 1936, p.263 and Vol. VI, No.4, October, 1936, p.195.

¹⁰⁶ *Oriental Affairs*, Vol.VI, No.4, October, 1936, p.194.

¹⁰⁷ *Oriental Affairs*, Vol.VI, No.6, December, 1936, pp.297-8.

newspapers began to attack the British effort to help the Chinese government to reform its economy, which had created a great opportunity for British investment in China. British involvement in the Chinese economy became more overt when the Leith-Ross Mission made a visit to China in 1935, which, to a great extent, involved helping the Chinese¹⁰⁸ to undermine the Japanese effort to exert their influence in China.¹⁰⁹ For example, British businessmen were accused by the Japanese of pursuing the goal of colonising North China by offering the Hopei-Chahar authorities a loan.¹¹⁰ There were two more reasons for Japanese anti-British feeling. Firstly the Japanese military saw the British as a hypothetical enemy (in 1936). Secondly, the rise of the Pan-Asianists among the Japanese, who were frustrated by the unjust Western attitude of not practicing equal status between the Japanese and westerners after World War I.¹¹¹

In addition, Japanese support for the smugglers began to annoy the diehards. They were sympathetic to the Chinese Customs, which was helpless against the armed Korean smugglers, and suggested that Customs enforcement officers should carry firearms. The diehards also urged the other foreign Powers to intervene to stop the smuggling in North China.¹¹² The diehards were implicitly against the autonomous movements under Japanese support.¹¹³ According to this group, the movement threatened North China's peace and stability. Even *the*

¹⁰⁸ Sheehan, *Trust in Troubled Times*, p.168.

¹⁰⁹ Kibata Yoichi, 'Anglo-Japanese Relations from the Manchurian Incident to Pearl Harbor: Missed Opportunity?', pp.10-1.

¹¹⁰ *Oriental Affairs*, Vol.VII, No.5, May, 1937, p.265.

¹¹¹ Yoshio Aizawa, 'The Path Towards an "Anti-British" Strategy by the Japanese Navy between the Wars,' in Ian Grow and Yoichi Hiramata with John Chapman (eds.); *The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1600-2000 Volume III: The Military Dimension* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 2000), p.143; and Naoko Shimazu, *Japan, Race and Equality*, pp.170 and 180-1.

¹¹² *Oriental Affairs*, Vol.VII, No.6, June, 1937, p.329.

¹¹³ *Oriental Affairs*, Vol. VI, No.1, July, 1936, p.41.

Peking and Tientsin Times, in 1935, criticised the Japanese aim of encouraging independence as a pretext for gaining control of North China.¹¹⁴

In conclusion, the encroachment of the Japanese influence on North China again reflected the weakness of the British informal empire. British interests in the hinterlands of Tientsin appeared to be open to attack. The Japanese military became a new threat. Furthermore the different interests of the British community created differences of opinion about the Japanese. The traders recognised the reality of conditions in North China and responded pragmatically. The diarchs still considered that the Chinese were causing problems for foreigners, but slowly accepted the new situation in North China and recognised that British interests faced a strong challenge from the Japanese military. However, the situation in the British concession prior to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war seemed to be normal. The BMC adopted a 'mind your own business' approach in the concession, thereby avoiding the suspicions of the Chinese or the Japanese. In 1935 the municipality decided to organise a celebration of King George V's jubilee, including the decoration and illumination of the council buildings and parks. This celebration provided another opportunity for the British community to symbolically mend its relations with the Chinese with the decision to give one of the King George V Jubilee Memorial Scholarships to a Chinese student at the Kung Hsueh School.¹¹⁵

¹¹⁴ Kent, *The Twentieth Century in the Far East*, p.286.

¹¹⁵ BMC, *Tientsin, Report of the Council for the year 1934* (Tientsin Press, Limited), p.4.

The Sino-Japanese War

The tense relations between the Chinese and Japanese gradually escalated into war. The trigger was the Marco Polo Bridge Incident on 7 July 1937. Tientsin did not escape the fighting; both parties continued to bomb each other and the roar of gunfire continued between the border of the Chinese city and the Japanese concession. Japanese planes created havoc for inhabitants of the city and damaged the Chinese commercial section.¹¹⁶ Eventually Chinese troops had to retreat from Tientsin because of the continued bombardment, although the British concession was spared. This raised the concern and pity of the British community for the Chinese civilians' destitution and homelessness. Fortunately the foreign concessions were able to offer them some relief from the menace of war. British missionaries were busy attending to Chinese refugees, who came to the British concession from every corner of Tientsin.¹¹⁷ In addition other Britons in Tientsin joined in. The community called for more aid for the Chinese refugees from home, who had increased to around 40,000 in number by early August.¹¹⁸ However, there were limits to the amount of help the BMC could offer them. The hospital in the concession was full of Chinese casualties. Before long the BMC had to erect barriers the concession and only Chinese with a pass from the municipality could enter.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁶ *The China Review*, September, 1937, pp.2-3.

¹¹⁷ SOAS, CWM North China Reports Box 12, 1937-1939, LMS Annual Report, from W. F. Dawson, Tientsin, December 31, 1937.

¹¹⁸ SOAS, CHAS/MCP/41 Copy Cable Received 2.8.37 from P. Kent, Chairman, China Association, Tientsin Branch.

¹¹⁹ SOAS, CWM North China Reports Box 12, 1937-1939, Mackenzie Memorial Hospital, Tientsin, Report for 1937.

At this point the Tientsin British community's concern about the repercussions of the war in North China was threefold. Firstly, there was war damage to British interests in Tientsin and North China. In Tientsin only one British national's residence was hit by a Japanese bomb.¹²⁰ The Asiatic Petroleum Company's tanks were also damaged, having come under fire, and a protest was sent to the Japanese military.¹²¹ In the area around Tientsin the British missionaries were greatly alarmed by the war. As their mission stations were not protected by British troops, anxieties about the war loomed large in Tsangchow and Siaochang. They feared for their lives and properties from Chinese and Japanese gunfire and looting by deserting Chinese troops. Fortunately they were unharmed and their properties left alone.¹²²

The second concern of the British community in Tientsin was the intention of the Japanese military to control Chinese Customs in Tientsin in order to stop the Chinese government using its revenue to support Chinese resistance against the Japanese.¹²³ The Japanese military's action had shocked British traders in Tientsin. The community was also unhappy with the Japanese authorities' threat to take over the Customs at Chinwangtao. When the war broke the British community quickly protested against the Japanese takeover of Tientsin Customs. They felt it would be dangerous if the Japanese tried to separate the Customs in Tientsin (and elsewhere in North China) from the Chinese government, as 'interference' (in their eyes) in

¹²⁰ SHAC, 679(1), 14864 British Residences Shaken: Three Bombs in Garden.

¹²¹ SOAS, JSS, From Per Pro Butterfield & Swire to John Swire and Sons Ltd., Shanghai, July 30, 1937.

¹²² SOAS, CWM North China Reports Box 12, 1937-1939, Report for the year 1937 from A. H. Jowett Murray, Tsangchow, December 31, 1937, and SOAS, CWM North China Reports Box 12, 1937-1939, Report for the year 1937 from W. F. Rowlands, Siaochang.

¹²³ Brunero, *Britain's Imperial Cornerstone in China*, p.152.

Chinese Customs administration, which would create confusion around the repayment of foreign loans.¹²⁴ This was the worst part of the Japanese activities in North China for the British community in Tientsin. Japan's intention to control customs signalled danger to the British. The customs house in Tientsin controlled the flow of the trade there; Japanese control of this customs house would control the progress of trade in Tientsin, endangering British trade interests. Kent's telegram below illustrates this concern:

...[the] China Association have made representations Ambassador as follows no move made yet against Customs but anxious regarding sudden demand might leave no time (for) International action (stop) China association respectfully urges understanding be negotiated with Japan and China that in such event Commissioner be instructed hold all customs collections as earmarked for external and internal loan services and to make no remittance pending settlement between Tokyo and Nanking thus maintaining China's credit (stop) Gravest danger would result if Japanese established separate customs or interfered with present administration (stop)¹²⁵

Kent's telegram was a call for help from his counterparts in London to avoid Japanese military interference indirectly affecting the interests of Britain as the biggest lenders to the Chinese government. The China Association in London's response to this telegram was very apprehensive and brought the matter directly to the Foreign Office.¹²⁶ At this point the British community used 'loan repayment' as the reason to highlight the problem in China to the British government, although its real worry was how the Japanese were gradually trying to control trade in North China.

¹²⁴ SOAS, CHAS/MCP/41 Copy of cable received from the China Association at Tientsin August 14, 1937.

¹²⁵ SOAS, CHAS/MCP/41/China Association: General Committee Papers Nov 1935 – Mar 1938, Copy of Cable Received from the China Association at Tientsin August 14, 1937.

¹²⁶ SOAS, CHAS/MCP/41/China Association: General Committee Papers Nov 1935 – Mar 1938, Letter from E. M. Gull to the Foreign Office, August 16, 1937.

Owing to the seriousness of the situation, the British community's leaders in Tientsin took proactive measures to prevent the Japanese military from separating the Tientsin and Chinwangtao Customs, as described by Kent at the China Association's meeting in Tientsin. The British community and the British Chamber of Commerce in Tientsin gave their support to the Customs Commissioner, W. R. Myers to settle the problem.¹²⁷ In order to achieve this, the British Chamber of Commerce urged the British government to back Myers to enable him to continue his work as Commissioner and protect the integrity of the Customs Service in Tientsin.¹²⁸ The British community and the Foreign Office were very active in mediating negotiations between the Chinese and the Japanese. The solution, reached with the help of the British, was to retain the Tientsin and Chinwangtao Customs function of repaying foreign loans. All import, export and inter-port duties and all surtaxes would be remitted to Japanese bank. This compromise reduced British interests, as before this almost all the import and export duty was remitted to British banks.¹²⁹ This was the price that the British had to pay to avoid further damage to their influence, and it demonstrated that the British in North China, and especially in Tientsin, were so vulnerable that they had to bow to the Japanese military's demand to put the Tientsin and Chinwangtao Customs under Japanese influence.¹³⁰

¹²⁷ SOAS, JSS, Letter from R. K. Rodger to Fisher, Tientsin, 7 October 1937.

¹²⁸ SOAS, JSS, Minutes of a meeting of the General Committee of the Tientsin British Chamber of Commerce, held on Thursday, 7th October, 1937.

¹²⁹ SOAS, JSS, Note Proposed to be included in the Minutes of the Annual General Meeting of the China Association, Tientsin Branch, October 25, 1937, and SOAS, CHAS/MCP/41/China Association: General Committee Papers Nov 1935 – Mar 1938.

¹³⁰ Osterhammel, 'China', p.660.

Thirdly, the British community in Tientsin began to experience the first direct impact of the Japanese military's interference in their concession. This was the beginning of the tension between the British and Japanese. For example, the fighting between the Chinese and Japanese at Tientsin had put pressure on the BMC. Japanese troops coming from Taku had asked permission to use the British concession as their route to the Japanese concession to the northwest, creating a dilemma for the British authority in the concession. At this point the British authorities had to grant the Japanese request because the BMC did not have the power to reject it. However, this permission still created tension between the British and Japanese. Nathan recorded the situation:

The British Authorities have to date accepted the position as being one of necessity, while during the first few days the fiction was maintained that the Japanese asked permission for each lot of troops before they came through, and actually the British Authorities provided police escorts. After a few days, however, the situation got completely out of hand and [the] route from the Taku Road to the Japanese Concession is now a Japanese highway with continuous processions of troops, stores and lorries, both loaded and empty, proceeding in both directions. As might have been expected, an incident was bound to occur between the Japanese troops and the local inhabitants, and such a one has taken place only an hour or so ago.¹³¹

Nathan's statement demonstrates the early ill-feeling of the British towards the Japanese, whose soldiers had attacked two BMC constables and a British resident.¹³² The BMA downplayed these incidents, recognising that the Japanese troops should not be provoked. Owing to this, the BMA took several measures to suppress any attempts by the Chinese to promote anti-Japanese feeling in the concession.¹³³ At the same time the British community was very concerned about

¹³¹ The Bodleian Library, NP, Letter from Mr. E. J. Nathan to W. F. Turner, 29 August 1937.

¹³² *Oriental Affairs*, Vol. VIII, No.4, October, 1937, p.227.

¹³³ Swann, 'The Tientsin Incident (1939), pp.26-7.

its government's proposed decision to withdraw a battalion of British troops from North China.¹³⁴ However the decision was never implemented, perhaps because the British government was beginning to recognise the emergence of the Japanese military expansion in North China and saw the need to protect their nationals in North China. The existence of the British battalion would be used as a deterrent measure to avoid Japanese military action against British interests.

Nathan concluded that this situation meant that the Japanese military would dare to interfere in the British concession, stating:

The point of all this is, however, that the sanctity of the Foreign Concessions has gone and with it the fundamental cause of their prosperity during all those troubled years through which China has been passing. Gone with it, or fast going, is the prestige of the foreigner, by which I mean the Americans and Europeans, in the eyes of both Chinese and Japanese. The seriousness of this aspect of the situation cannot, I feel, be exaggerated, and serious notice must be taken of it by you and your colleagues as it is certain to affect the position of the K.M.A. in the future.¹³⁵

Nathan's statement highlights the important point that British interests were not being respected by the Japanese military. Before this, the British concession had been isolated from interference or disturbance from foreigners. Therefore the Japanese military, which did not obey the rules and order of the British concession, turned the British against them. Nathan's statement above shows his anger towards both the Chinese and Japanese. The fighting between them, according to Nathan, had created havoc regarding the foreign position in the International Settlement.¹³⁶

¹³⁴ PRO WO106/116, "China: Garrisons and Accommodation at Shanghai Conference with Foreign Office. Conclusions reached at preliminary Meeting of War Office representatives on January 28, 1937".

¹³⁵ The Bodleian Library, NP, Letter from Mr. E. J. Nathan to W. F. Turner, August 29, 1937.

¹³⁶ Harriet Sergeant, *Shanghai* (John Murray: London, 1991), pp.301, 302, 304, 308 and 309.

The British traders at this point felt very frustrated about the crisis which had disturbed the progress of trade in China.

Apart from this incident, the British community and other nationals living in the concession mostly experienced little or no impact on their daily lives and were able to continue with their own business. This contrasts with the International Settlement in Shanghai, where residents experienced first hand the conflict between Chinese and the Japanese troops within the settlement and in Chapei. There were heavy casualties in the settlement.¹³⁷ People were enjoying their lives in the clubs and parks, at sporting events and several public occasions. However due to the war, this concession's population increased by 36 percent (mostly the Chinese refugees) from 1934 to 1938 (see Appendix 5). However, the British population declined slightly by around 5.4 percent (79 persons) during this period, a fall which might reflect the slowly growing difficulties facing business in China. On the other hand the war did have an impact on the Chinese population in the concession; refugees increased it drastically by around 68%. Other nationals also increased in number by around 29 percent.¹³⁸ This growth can also be linked to the impact of war as refugees of other nationalities sought shelter from the dangers of war.

The grammar school was functioning as usual, although the number of students attending was slightly reduced. Interestingly, there were no kidnapping, or murders in the British concession 1937. The Fire Brigade continued its daily work

¹³⁷ Christian Henriot, 'Shanghai Industries under Japanese Occupation: Bombs, Boom, and Bust (1937-1945)', in Christian Henriot and Wen-Hsin Yeh (eds.), *In the shadow of the rising sun: Shanghai under Japanese occupation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp.20-5.

¹³⁸ Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity*, p.270.

of ensuring the safety of the residents. The Electricity Department reported that hostilities in July 1937 between the Chinese and the Japanese had reduced the consumption of electricity, as several factories had temporarily had to stop their operations. The Waterworks Department, on the other hand, seemed to ignore the war in Tientsin and continued to provide a full service to residents while continuing their work of finding more wells to improve the water supply.¹³⁹

Even the BMC's meeting in 1937 tried to avoid any discussion of the war between the Chinese and Japanese. This was part of their attempt to take a neutral position between the two sides, and does not mean that there was no anxiety. Some of the British members of the BMC, lead by Nathan (1936), were intending to alter the makeup of the council to put the British in the majority, changing the ratio from five members each to six British and four Chinese. The motive for this proposal was the British community's fear that increased Japanese domination in Tientsin would also lead to its domination in the BMC via the Chinese councillors. However, the proposal was opposed by some British councillors as unwise.¹⁴⁰

The grievance of the British community, mirrored in the above proposal, shows that although they were leading a normal life in the concession, the British nevertheless felt that the Japanese threat to their interests in the concession was waiting to be exposed. Furthermore they were shocked by several incidents that had happened elsewhere in China such as the attack on the British Ambassador, Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen on 26th August 1937, and another incident in which

¹³⁹ BMC, *Tientsin, Report of the Council for the year 1937* (Tientsin Press, Limited), pp.38 and 50, 59-60 and 73.

¹⁴⁰ SOAS, JSS, Letter from Jss to John Swire and Sons, Shanghai, 10 April 1936.

the British gunboats *Ladybird* and *Bee* at Wuhu and the *Cricket* and *Scarab* near Nanking were fired on by the Japanese.¹⁴¹ The USS *Panay*, an American gunboat, also fell victim to Japanese attack. These incidents raised the apprehension of the British communities in China and Britain and were among the reasons that Anglo-Japanese relations ceased to be amicable.¹⁴² In late August 1937 E. J. Nathan pointed this out as a great challenge to British interests:

We are all much relieved that the latest reports of his condition are so satisfactory, and it would seem that he [Sir Knatchbull-Hugessen] is now out of danger. . . . It must not be forgotten, however, that prior to this incident British lives have already been lost in the fighting between the Chinese and Japanese, and immense damage has been done to British property.¹⁴³

Although the British community in Tientsin was angry with the Japanese, it remained anxious not to offend them. The Japanese success in controlling North China, including Tientsin and the British community, meant that the British had to keep up good relations with them and with their collaborators. Nathan considered this position important in order to avoid Japanese disruption of British operations in North China. In October he wrote:

I am naturally apprehensive of the outcome of the cry being raised in certain quarters throughout the British Empire for a boycott against Japan. I do not believe that our Government will give it any official support, but were it to become at all wide-spread the repercussions would undoubtedly be felt here, and our position might easily become a much more difficult one than it has been up to date. . . .¹⁴⁴

Given the KMA's position in North China and the Japanese military domination of that area, Nathan saw that anti-Japanese action by the British would be unwise.

¹⁴¹ *The Japan Weekly Chronicle*, December 23, 1937, p.825.

¹⁴² *Great Britain and the East*, September 2, 1937, p.326.

¹⁴³ The Bodleian Library, NP, Letter from Mr. E. J. Nathan to W. F. Turner, 29 August 1937.

¹⁴⁴ The Bodleian Library, NP, Letter from Mr. E. J. Nathan to W. F. Turner, October 11, 1937.

Nathan was under intense pressure to preserve the neutrality of the British, believing that an anti-Japanese approach would undermine his efforts to preserve the KMA's business interests.

At this point British firms such as the KMA in Tientsin found themselves in a dilemma. Nathan's October 1937 letter continued;

While we must continue as far as we possibly can to maintain a neutral attitude, we must not forget that we are a semi-Chinese organization and that the centre of our operations is being carried on in what is virtually occupied territory. We cannot afford to displease the Japanese, nor can we risk hurting the feeling of our Chinese Partners.¹⁴⁵

This statement, importantly, shows that the British firms in North China put their own business interests first rather than following the anti-Japanese feeling of the British in both China and Britain. The destruction, especially of British life and properties, caused by the war between the Chinese and Japanese, provoked the anger of British expatriates all over China.¹⁴⁶ However, this anger was not overt among the British community in Tientsin in particular and in North China generally. The Japanese military control of North China meant that they had to react differently.¹⁴⁷ British firms in North China were hard put to balance their attitudes between the Japanese and the Chinese. The KMA in particular, a Sino-British firm, had to do its best to work alongside the hostile parties. However the British – due to Japanese control of Tientsin – were more inclined not to provoke the Chinese, in line with their government's policy of not encouraging anti-

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Christopher Cook, *The Lion and Dragon: British Voices from the China Coast* (London Elm: Tree Books, 1985), 162-3 and Harriet Sergeant, *Shanghai*, pp. 299-300.

¹⁴⁷ Wright, *Coal Mining in China's Economy and Society*, p.127.

Japanese feeling.¹⁴⁸ This attitude was adopted by the British traders, who hoped to keep up their businesses free from interference from any powers in China.¹⁴⁹

The British missions in the area surrounding Tientsin, especially the LMS, were not greatly affected by the Japanese penetration of North China in the 1930s.

F. W. Dawson commented on the situation, saying:

Here in North China we are living amidst change and uncertainty, in fact we hardly know whether we belong to China or to Japan. Fortunately all these troubles and unsettled conditions have interfered very very little with Christian work but they have been a constant source of anxiety and of fear to the ordinary Chinese people.¹⁵⁰

However, Dawson saw that the encroachment of the Japanese military in North China added to the Chinese government's problems. The missionaries pitied the Chinese efforts to recover from after the effects of the long civil war and their problems with foreign imperialism: the influence of the Japanese military in North China made progress in China hard to achieve.¹⁵¹

However, the Japanese military's interference in the British missions' activities became apparent after July 1937. In Tientsin the British missionaries complained that the Japanese were affecting their church in the Chinese city:

. . . the Japanese occupation of the Tientsin city . . . stopped all church activity and progress for several weeks. With the exception of perhaps one Sunday the Sunday worship was carried on all through those troublous days, but for the first few weeks very few people attended the services. They felt it was too dangerous to do

¹⁴⁸ Endicott, *Diplomacy and Enterprise*, p.156.

¹⁴⁹ Jürgen Osterhammel, 'British Business in China, 1860s-1950s', p.200.

¹⁵⁰ SOAS, CWM North China Reports Box 11 1932-1936, LMS Annual Report, from W. F. Dawson, Tientsin, 1935.

¹⁵¹ SOAS, CWM North China Incoming Correspondence Box 32, 1934-1936 i, Letter from Miss A. G. Buchan to Mr. Brown, Siaochang, February 10, 1936.

so. This applies especially to the women. Gradually they have been returning but congregations are still unusually small, and, strange to say, more than half of those now attending are women. Since July the services have been held in the small hall behind the church. At one time it was feared that Japanese soldiers would occupy the premises, but fortunately this did not actually happen.¹⁵²

Clearly, the full range British interests in Tientsin had become affected by the Japanese military encroachment.

This made the British mission apprehensive about its future. Dawson expressed the apprehension of the British missionaries, pointing out:

Unfortunately the Japanese occupation of many parts of China is rendering this new arrangement abortive. Not only in this matter but in many other ways it is probable that we shall have to face new conditions in connection with our missionary work as a result of the events of the last few months. It is too early as yet to form any definite conclusions.¹⁵³

Although the above points out the uncertain future of the British missions as an outcome of the new Japanese military rule in North China, it could apply to all British interests in Tientsin and its hinterlands under the Japanese military regime.

In short, the onset of war in China in 1937 endangered the British position,¹⁵⁴ affecting the British community's attitude towards the Japanese, both in Tientsin and in its surrounding districts. The British community here was highly apprehensive of the Japanese military, which controlled not only Tientsin but almost all of North China. They were facing a new era in which they – including

¹⁵² SOAS, CWM North China Reports Box 12, 1937-1939, LMS Annual Report, from W. F. Dawson, Tientsin, December 31, 1937.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Bradford A. Lee, *Britain and the Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1939: A Study in the Dilemmas of British Decline* (Stanford: Stanford University Press: 1973), p.16.

the British firms – could no longer rely on the Chinese but had to look to the Japanese military. This was indicated by the steady change in British firms' attitudes towards China from 1933 onward. Before 1933 they had had to follow the Chinese government's rule and order, but after 1933, as Japanese power spread across North China, this gradually changed¹⁵⁵ British power which had protected the British against Chinese attack was impotent against the Japanese. The British position in Tientsin and its hinterlands had to depend on its good relations with the Japanese, particularly after the outbreak of war.¹⁵⁶

Conclusion

Between 1933 and 1937 Anglo-Chinese relations shifted due to changes in the political scenario in North China. The Nationalist government had lost power there and the Chinese in North China were represented by two autonomous bodies under the influence of the Japanese. This meant that Anglo-Chinese relations in North China were more overshadowed by the Japanese than by the Chinese, who now played a minor role in North China. In other words the Japanese controlled the political scenario in Tientsin and its hinterlands.

Japan's activities in North China exposed the limits of informal empire. The British could not use their extraterritorial status to defend themselves. The new threat from Japan paralysed their British privileges. Big British firms such as the KMA maintained a pragmatic stance, knowing that they could not rely much on

¹⁵⁵ See Jürgen Osterhammel, 'Imperialism in Transition', p.283. Osterhammel argued that the British firms had become more pragmatic in order to protect their interests by give their support to the Nationalist government since 1928. This also happened in North China but the British firms had also to recognise the Japanese influence in North China.

¹⁵⁶ Osterhammel, 'China', p.661.

British power to help them against the Japanese military. Even in the British concession found itself in a dilemma in the face of this new threat. The BMC recognised the new situation and avoided provoking the Japanese. However, pressure from the Japanese was unavoidable; allowing their army to cross the British concession was a case in point. The BMC had to view the situation realistically. The Japanese posed a far greater threat than the Chinese. At this point the British community gave priority to British interests rather than to maintaining good Anglo-Chinese relations.

Smuggling also illustrated how the existing differences between the authorities in Tientsin were part of the problem with suppressing this activity.¹⁵⁷ The BMC, with approval from the British consul general, agreed to support the Chinese in this matter. However, this support did not suffice to suppress the smuggling activities because the Chinese could not also obtain the support of the Japanese concession, and the smuggling continued to hamper the interests of the trader community. The cry for help by the British trader for their government was futile because the British government, pre-occupied with the European problem, was unable to help much.¹⁵⁸ The Chinese, on the other hand, were helpless in this matter. In these circumstances the British community had accepted the reality and played neutral to avoid their interests under threat. Even the diehard group gradually realised that the Japanese military was a new threat to the British. The Missionary also took neutral stand to evade the Japanese military interference in their activities.

¹⁵⁷ Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity*, p.266.

¹⁵⁸ Yang, 'British Policy and Strategy in the Tientsin Crisis, 1939', pp.66 and 176.

The Japanese attempt to seize the Tientsin Custom House was another example of the threat to British interests. If this had succeeded Japanese would have gained the power to administer not only the customs but also business interests in Tientsin. This was a nightmare for British traders, and for this reason they made strenuous efforts to avoid it happening. The British traders became the middle-men in this dispute between the Chinese and the Japanese. In order to avoid Japanese control of the Chinese Customs in Tientsin, the British agreed to allow customs revenues to be remitted to Japanese banks, which illustrates how it was in British traders' interests that their businesses in Tientsin be protected from the Japanese threat. So the British traders pragmatically agreed to this proposal by informally recognising the Japanese demands. This point illustrates that the British informal Empire in Tientsin was hard to maintain in the face of emerging Japanese military pressure. The blockade of the British concession in 1938 demonstrated finally that the British position became more 'weak' in China before the outbreak of World War Two.

Conclusion

Introduction

This thesis has examined and discussed the impact and response of the British community in Tientsin to events in China from 1925 to 1937. For twelve years the British community in Tientsin and its hinterland succeeded in maintaining its position, despite several demands from the Chinese for the recovery of their sovereignty, and Japan's attempts to spread its influence in north China. The nationalist movement of the early twentieth century gradually developed and became a serious threat to the British in the 1920s, including the British community in Tientsin, whose concern escalated in early 1927 to fear, after the seizure of the British concession in Hankow and the Nanking incident.

The establishment of a moderate KMT government in Nanking, which adopted a mild policy towards the treaties, did not ease these worries. The demands of the Nanking government for the abolition of extraterritorial rights challenged the British to fight once more for their survival in Tientsin. The British government, in principle, agreed to negotiate about the future of their concession in Tientsin with the Chinese but had met with opposition from the British community. However, these concerns were all managed, but early in 1931 further problems stemming from the Sino-Japanese war in Manchuria led to unease in north China. The Japanese military was eager to overthrow the KMT in north China and exerted its influence to undermine not only the Chinese but also the other foreign powers in the area, especially the British. This created feelings of enmity in the British in Tientsin and its hinterlands towards the Japanese. However, before 1937 the

Japanese threat to British interests was indirect, involving, for instance, smuggling, and support for the Chinese separatist movement.

In order to begin this discussion, this chapter is divided into three parts. First, it examines the significance of the British concession in Tientsin with regard to Anglo-Chinese relations: second, it addresses the nature of the British community in Tientsin in connection with the changes that occurred there between 1925 and 1937. The last part presents a study of the British concession in Tientsin as a model for studying other British concessions in China and the informal British empire in Latin America.

Tientsin and Anglo-Chinese Relations

This study has demonstrated how the British concession in Tientsin played a significant part in Anglo-Chinese relations. There was no May Thirtieth Incident, or crisis akin to Shanghai's which faced Communist uprisings and Nationalist encirclement in 1927, but throughout the 1920s and 1930s this concession met several challenges from racial tension, civil war, the nationalist movement, strikes, crises, smuggling and assassination. All of this supports the assertion of this thesis that Tientsin was not insignificant; the British concession there played a significant role and highlighted Anglo-Chinese relations. The significance of the British concession in Tientsin for Anglo-Chinese relations was fourfold.

Firstly, as part of the informal British Empire, the British concession in Tientsin was used as a bargaining piece by the British government in its attempt to

restore good relations with China in the face of the anti-British movement. Britain agreed in principal to return this concession to the Chinese. The Northern government, on other hand, used this opportunity to demand full control of the concession as part of its effort to show its nationalist spirit. In this way it could win Chinese support against the threat from the KMT. This circumstance demonstrated that the British concession was not only important to the British liberal policy, but that it also became a place where rival Chinese groups and leaders competed for the support of the Chinese people.¹ This situation demonstrates that the British concession in Tientsin was one of the important concessions used as 'bait' by both the British government and the Chinese rival groups to win over the Chinese.

Secondly, the British government's power was more overt in the Tientsin concession than it was in the Shanghai settlement. This caused the difference between the British concession in Tientsin and the International Settlement in Shanghai. The British government found the concession in Tientsin much easier to manage and control than the International Settlement. The power vested in the British Consul General in the British concession in Tientsin was extensive, meaning that the concession had to follow any changes in British policy, which made it less controversial than the International Settlement in Shanghai. The international settlement in Shanghai was controlled by the British and other foreign communities, which were responsible to their electors. Therefore the Shanghailanders, with their imperialist agenda, tried to defend their British image

¹ Arthur Waldron, *From war to nationalism*, p.265.

and prestige and to control the Chinese in the settlement.² This created problems for the British/Chinese relationship. For example, in Shanghai the Siming Gungsuo Riots of 1874 and 1898 over *huiguan* (burial land),³ “the Wheelbarrow Riot (1897) over an increase in license fees, [and] the Mixed Court Riot (1905) over SMC interference with the court”⁴ illustrate the problems between the British and Chinese there.⁵ Then followed the May Thirtieth incident in 1925. However, in Tientsin the British concession did not experience a clash with the Chinese. As mentioned, the British Consul General managed to avoid tension in the concession by exercise his powers over the concession and council.

Thirdly, owing to the control of the British Consul General, the concession in Tientsin fostered a good relationship between the British and the Chinese. For example, after the concession had been in existence for almost 15 years the first Chinese person was elected to the BMC, something which never happened in Shanghai. Then the BMEC elected a Chinese councilor to its council. When the BMC and BMEC (including the British Extension Area and the American concession) amalgamated, the Chinese councilor was retained and the number of Chinese on the BMC council increased from one in 1919 to two in 1926 and three in 1927. In 1926 the BMC also took proactive measures by opening its parks to all residents without discrimination, and a Chinese was elected to a high post in the BMC administration.⁶ This shows that the BMC was further advanced in reforming the concession than the SMC was in Shanghai. All this progress was

² Bickers, *Britain in China*, pp.127-128.

³ Bryna Goodman, *Native Place, City, and Nation: Regional Networks, Identities in Shanghai, 1853-1937* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), pp.158-69.

⁴ Bickers, *Britain in China*, p.128.

⁵ See also Tiina Helena Airaksinen, *Love Your Country on Nanjing Road: the British and the May Fourth Movement in Shanghai* (Helsinki: Renvall Institute Publication 19, 2005), pp.168-179.

⁶ Bickers, *Britain in China*, p.138.

also the result of the British traders' readiness to adopt a liberal policy in Tientsin. In other words this concession showed that not all British concessions or settlements suffered poor Anglo-Chinese relations. Even the Nationalist government recognised the reforms carried out in Tientsin in 1929. Therefore the Tientsin concession was very different to the Shanghai settlement.

Another significant facet of Tientsin and its hinterlands is that it seems to be free from any big disturbances when the Manchurian crisis began. Though there was some street fighting in the Chinese city (November 1931), this had little effect on the British community. Lampson seemed to be unconcerned about this short burst of fighting,⁷ and the British community in Tientsin was not harmed by it. In contrast on 18 January, 1932 Shanghai faced a Japanese attack on the Chinese. It seemed that Tientsin was away from the real Sino-Japanese crisis, but Japanese support for smuggling activities and the puppet government in North China brought Tientsin into the bigger picture of the Sino-Japanese crisis. The British community in Tientsin and its hinterlands felt insecure with the increasing Japanese military power in North China. It could do little to counter this Japanese influence, and its best option was not to provoke them. The BMC remained nonaligned in the tension between the Chinese and Japanese. As mentioned in Chapter 5. British traders did not want to create tension by appearing to support either the Japanese or the Chinese. The BMC understood that the Japanese must be respected and that the British community's relationship with the Chinese should be fostered. For example, the British community continued to support the inclusion of Chinese in the BMC, though there was also an effort to decrease the Chinese

⁷ St. Anthony College, Lampson Diaries, 9 November 1931, the Killearn Papers.

members in the BMC fear that they would be Japanese puppets (See Chapter 5). The British community never showed their animosity towards the Japanese effort to supersede their interests in Tientsin and its hinterlands. In this way it avoided confrontation between the Chinese and Japanese. By remaining neutral from 1931-1937, the British prevented the Sino-Japanese conflict from causing problems in British community. But in 1937 the Japanese pressured the British community very hard, and the BMC allowed them to use a route through the British concession to attack the Chinese city in 1937.

The British community

The nature of the British community in Tientsin was more moderate and pragmatic than that of its counterpart in Shanghai. This was due to the British Consul General's control of the British concession in Tientsin, which made the BMC behave more moderately towards the Chinese. Tientsin's British consul general created a friendly relationship between the concession and the Chinese. Even though some members of the British community there were diehards and very reluctant to adapt the change in China, the Consul General managed to avoid the diehard group from making much trouble in Tientsin. But the diehard group continued to fight to retain the status quo of British rights in Tientsin with propaganda to undermine the Chinese effort to regain sovereignty. This group could not accept the Chinese nationalists' demand for Chinese sovereignty. They regarded Chinese nationalism as an anti-foreign movement as in the Boxer Uprising, rather than China's effort to regain sovereignty. This mentality of the diehard group was a continuation of the nineteenth century British view which regarded the concession in Tientsin as owned by the British. The community saw

the Chinese nationalists as the same people who had taken part in the Boxer Uprising, now led by Russian communists.⁸

However, this group was not as powerful as the Shanghailanders and its opposition had little influence on the British community in Tientsin and its hinterland. The majority of the British community, especially the traders, remained loyal to the British government because the British traders recognized that the government's decision could not be challenged and that Chinese nationalism was the aspiration of the Chinese people to regain their sovereignty. Therefore the British traders, who controlled the BMC, led the British community in taking a more moderate stance in response to British liberal policy and Chinese nationalism.

For example the British government's decision was to render the British concession in Tientsin. Although there was opposition from the diehard group, the Consul General and the British Minister in Peking continued to negotiate with the Chinese regarding the future of the British concession. The firm decision made by the British government to render the British concession to the Chinese was obeyed by the British community in Tientsin. Therefore the British community agreed to send its delegation with the British Consul General to negotiate with the Chinese delegation regarding the future of the concession. The diehards demanded that the negotiations were stopped, citing several reasons, such as the Nanking Incident, but the British Minister and Consul General ignored their grievance. Although rendition never happened in the end, the British community accepted the need to

⁸ *The North China Herald*, 8 August 1925, p.148.

create a good environment with the Chinese and several changes were effected by the BMC to eliminate discrimination against the Chinese, such as allowing the Chinese enter Victoria Park without a pass.

This led to the argument that the British concession in Tientsin had a friendlier environment than that of the SMC. In the International Settlement it took several years of reforms in SMC to be implemented. The British members of the SMC seemed reluctant to implement reforms in the settlement.⁹ Again this indicates that the British General Council's control on the British concession made the British community to be moderate. The British community in Tientsin agreed to increase the number of Chinese in the BMC, while in the same year the British traders in the SMC rejected a proposal to increase Chinese representation on its council.¹⁰

However, the power of the British Consul General continued to be challenged by the diehard group in the early 1930s. The abolition of extraterritoriality was a case in point. The diehards tried to undermine Chinese law by representing it as a dead letter and emphasising the brutality of the Chinese police against their prisoners, but their opposition could not stop the British government's negotiations with the Chinese on extraterritoriality. The moderate group, under the traders, continued to support British liberal policy and to mend its relationship with the Chinese by publishing the BMC's annual report in Chinese as well as English in the late 1920s, and awarding scholarships to Chinese students in the early 1930s.

⁹Clifford, *Spoilt Children of Empire*, p.150 and Bickers, *Britain in China*, p.132.

¹⁰Bickers, 'Changing Shanghai's "Mind"', p.12.

The moderate nature of the British community continued when Japanese influence increasingly grew in North China in the early 1930s. The British traders were aware that their new challenge – the Japanese – should be handled carefully without provocation. Therefore the British activities in Tientsin and its hinterland did not meet much trouble with the Japanese. Even though the Japanese tried to create problems in North China such as by supporting the strikers in the KMA coal mines and the smuggling activities, British interests were little affected because the British community was making an effort to maintain good relations with the Japanese. The most important thing for the British community was to remain where it was, retaining its business interests in North China. In short the moderate nature of the British community in Tientsin and its hinterland created a stable, peaceful situation in the concession, as illustrated by the fact that the British government faced few problems there.

In conclusion, most of the British community in Tientsin and its hinterland displayed a moderate attitude towards the British's liberal policy and managed to meet all the challenges described above. Although some amongst the community there were resisted to the changes in Tientsin, the power vested in the Consul General led to the failure of the diehard group's efforts to oppose British liberal policy. The British community succeeded in nurturing a friendship with the Chinese which brought about a stable environment in the British concession in Tientsin.

Suggestions for further research

This study has opened up and explored another area of the role of the British community in China. This matter has been taken up by several scholars who have made new discoveries. Bickers and Osterhammel thoroughly studied the role played by this community in Shanghai, and found that the British community was not homogenous but rather fractured according to their interests. This study has also shown that the British community in Tientsin was divided into traders, missionaries and settlers. This difference in interests created division between the moderate group (more liberal) and the diehard (more parochial).

Before the study by Bickers and Osterhammel, the British community had always been branded as insular in attitude. This was a generalised statement regarding the British community in China. This study has illustrated that it was not strictly true. It cannot be denied that some of the British community in Tientsin had a diehard attitude – this group had good reason to oppose any changes that would affect their interests, and was worried that these would affect their lives, which relied on the concession. The concession had developed since in the early 1860s. Besides the emergence of the separate administration, the British image and identity were also apparent in the concession in the form of its architecture, English-style gardens and parks, bunds, schools and hospitals. With these conditions the British community felt that the concession was not a Chinese city but was owned by the British. Therefore it became a haven for the British community, in which they confined themselves with their own culture and language, isolated from the rest of China, with the result that the majority of the British there knew little about China as they were uninterested in exploring the

country further inland. The news they received about China came through British travelers and English language newspapers, and always portrayed China as a wild, uncivilised, disorganised country full of bandits and corrupt officials, adding to the general view of its backwardness.

In short the British community had arrived in China and settled in the concession not to learn the Chinese culture or language but to look for opportunities and work. Their main aim was to amass wealth. Other settlers in China worked with port service industries or in municipal councils in foreign concessions.¹¹ Even the missionaries, whose work was to propagate Christianity and provide education and a health service, did not accept that the Chinese were socially equal to them.¹² This situation created difficulty for Britain's fostering of good relations with China at the international level. The British community's mindset and ideas in China conflicted with the will of the Chinese nationalists.

The Chinese saw the British community in China as problematic regarding regaining Chinese sovereignty. The British community in Shanghai was targeted by the Chinese media as a stumbling block against the Chinese effort to retake the international settlement in Shanghai.¹³ However the diehard attitude of the British community in Tientsin never became a big problem for the Chinese. This community was less problematic, and the British General Consul's control of the BMC and the pragmatic attitude of the British community created a good environment in which it established cordial relations with the Chinese. The

¹¹ See Bickers, *Britain in China*, pp.69-76.

¹² See Robert A. Bickers, "To serve and not to rule": British Protestant Missionaries and Chinese Nationalism, 1928-1931', in Robert A. Bickers and Rosemary Seton, (eds.), *Missionary Encounters: Sources and Issues*, Surrey: Curzon Press, 1996.

¹³ *The Chinese Critic*, April 24, 1930, p.394.

Chinese government was happy with the BMC's effort to eliminate discrimination in the concession.

As this study only covers 1925 to 1937, it would be useful to explore this study on the behaviour of the British community from the earliest establishment of this concession. The earlier history of Tientsin is fascinating. In these early years the British community was struggling to develop the swampy area of its concession and deal with Chinese animosity towards the foreigners such as was expressed in the Boxer Uprising. It also worth studying this concession after the Second World War, and its formal retrocession in 1943, as there was dissatisfaction on the part of the British community about losing the concession. For example, John Emmett Woodall, headmaster of the Tientsin Grammar School, conveyed his frustration of not able to obtain compensation which he and his colleagues demanded from the British government.¹⁴

It is interesting to examine not only the trader community but also the other British communities, especially the role played by the missions. This study has shown that the missions had problems with the Chinese, and this pressure made them more liberal in their activities in China. Bickers found that the British community in Shanghai was divided by social status – the Shanghailanders at the top and – at the very bottom – ‘Distressed British Subjects’ ready for shipping home.¹⁵ The British seamen, for example, had a low quality of life and there was,

¹⁴ SOAS, John Emmett Woodall Papers, 1919-1990, *The Tientsin Grammar School after "Pear Harbour"*.

¹⁵ Robert Bickers, 'Who were the Shanghai Municipal Police, and why were they there?', p.173.

according to P.D. Coates, much murder among them.¹⁶ Further research, extending to the community's marginalised stateless people, such as Russian Jews, would enrich the study of the British community in China. Though this group did not have diplomatic protection, the Jewish community had succeeded maintaining their interest in the BMC. In the British concession the Jewish community had its own school, synagogue, association and shop.¹⁷

This study also exemplifies Tientsin as one of the treaty ports under the greatest tension. As Rogaski mentions, Tientsin had been controlled by eight foreign powers (before 1915) and one Chinese authority. This division of power had made it a very tense city, beginning with the effort to suppress the Boxer uprising.¹⁸ Therefore it would be interesting to study about other concessions such as the French, which had as long a history as the British concession, although we know little of its history. But Tientsin's history illustrates that this concession was a more contested site. The concession experienced massacre (1870), bombardment (1900) and racial tension (1919). The Japanese concession in Tientsin developed significantly. In 1930s it became the centre from which the Japanese planned their strategy to expand their influence in North China, and it was the also centre of smuggling activities and drug trafficking. The study of the power and control, community, tension and everyday life of these other concessions should not be neglected, in seeking a complete picture of the pattern of foreign imperialists in China.

¹⁶ P. D. Coates, *The China Consuls: British Consular Officers 1843-1943* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1988), p.47.

¹⁷ Hershatter, *The Workers of Tianjin, 1900-1949*, p.23 cite from Interview with Israel Epstein, Dec. 7, 1980.

¹⁸ Ruth Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity*, p.170.

Other Concessions

This study has illustrated that the British community in Tientsin gives us important information about nature and processes of informal empire. The presence of the British community, the BMC and its business interests and troops illustrates the existence of the informal British Empire in Tientsin. This study has opened up and explored the informal empire in China by investigating the British presence as one of six British concessions and two British-dominated international settlements in China. The British also had one British Crown Colony and two leased territories, and were present in the form of communities in other treaty ports where they did not have concessions.¹⁹ It would be worth studying the British communities and presence in other parts of China, to generate a full picture of the British Informal Empire in China and to discover what proportion of the British presence was diehards.

My thesis' methodology could be used as a model by which to expand the study of the British presence in other parts of China. Using this methodology, we could learn about the roles, attitudes and responses of the British community in China. For example, we know little about the British communities in Hankow and Canton. Both had a long history but neither have been thoroughly researched; particularly the response of the Hankow community to the seizure of the concession. So far we know about the negotiations over rendition from David Wilson, William James Megginson, Harold Edwin Kane and Lee En-han. But none of these provide an in-depth study of the British community's response. It would also be very interesting to study the British community in Hankow after the

¹⁹ Robert Bickers, *Britain in China*, p.10.

concession was handed over to the Chinese. A 1928 report by the China Association suggests that the British community in Hankow were not satisfied with the Chinese administration.²⁰ Canton was another hotspot in the 1920s; the British and French communities there experienced a bloody clash with the Chinese in 1925. We know little of the British community's response when Canton was very briefly under communist control in December 1927 (the Canton Commune). Studying both of these concessions would show how British informal empire operated in small but significant China outposts.

Beside these two big concessions we do not know much about the responses of the British communities in Kiukiang, Amoy (International Settlement) and Chinkiang when the British government handed over these concessions. Owing to the insignificance of these treaty ports in terms of the amount of trade going through them and their small size, the British government decided to sacrifice these concessions and international settlements, and the British communities seemed to obey this decision without a fight. It seems that it was easy for the British government to return them to the Chinese government. Did the British community in these treaty ports have a liberal attitude?

A study of the British communities' responses in these concessions and international settlements would reveal a wider picture of their behaviour and attitudes. Tientsin exemplifies a case where the British consul and traders had considerable power to eliminate the opposition of the diehard group, providing a

²⁰ See SOAS Library, Association of British Chambers of Commerce China, Associations and China Communittee In China and Hongkong, Conference, March 6 and 7, 1928.

good starting point from which to explore behaviour and responses of the British in other treaty ports to British policy in the mid-1920s.

It would also be interesting to extend this study to the period of the Japanese penetration of China in the 1930s. Tientsin was an example of the British trader community's problem with the coming of the Japanese to North China. The puppet government and smuggling activities created an awkward position for the British in their relations with the Chinese and Japanese. At this point it would be interesting to see the British position in Harbin when the Manchukuo government emerged. The British community there had faced a strong challenge with the Japanese imposition of several restrictions on their businesses.²¹

Other Contribution

This study is also a reflection on the study of Informal Empire in other parts of the world, especially perhaps the role played by the British community in Latin America,²² for example Argentina, which had gained independence in 1810 and which faced problems in term of labour and finance. In order to resolve these, foreign nationals were invited to help to develop Argentina, and this led to a British community of migrants settling there²³ which formed a division between itself and native culture. The British preserved their own culture and maintained all their connections with Britain, with an English newspaper, a Protestant church to serve the British community and a Catholic church for the Irish, and English became

²¹ Wu Dongsheng, Jiang Haozhi, and Yu Wenzhang, 'A Brief Introduction to the Binjiang Products British Import and Export Company Ltd.- The Chicken and Duck Company (Excerpts)', Soren Clausen and Stig Thogersen, *The Making of A Chinese City: History and Historiography in Harbin* (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), p.64.

²² Anthony Webster, *The Debate on the Rise of the British Empire* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006), pp.71-2.

²³ David Rock, 'The British Community in Argentine 1806-1960' (unpublished paper, c.2006), p.3.

necessities to all the British, cricket, rugby and football were introduced, a hospital for British patients and school for British children were built.²⁴ All these insulated the British community from the native environment. The community's relationship with Britain was close, as shown by its support for the British in two world wars. This situation was similar to that in Tientsin, where the British had created a division between themselves and the Chinese people and maintained strong connections with Britain. To show their loyalty to Britain they celebrated the King's birthday and supported Britain during both world wars. There were, however, no British-controlled concessions, and there was no extraterritoriality. To that extent the British in Argentina were eventually in a much weaker position than those in China.

This study of Tientsin has shown that the British community had to be pragmatic about the changes in China. Therefore the British traders had cooperated with the local elite to maintain the favour of the Chinese government.²⁵ The KMA, for example, showed its willingness to collaborate with the Chinese in order to maintain their interests. This collaborative approach was also important in Latin America, owing to the weaker position of the British. Therefore the British hoped that by indirectly controlling Uruguay by collaborating with the local people would turn the Plata Basin in Uruguay as their domination.²⁶ So, comparative research on how the British community upheld its interests in Latin America and China could provide a way of exploring the reality and limits of informal empire.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp.7, 10, 11, 12, 14 and 15.

²⁵ Jürgen Osterhammel, 'Semi-Colonialism and Informal Empire in Twentieth-Century China: Towards a Framework of Analysis', in Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Jürgen Osterhammel (eds.), *Imperialism and After and Discontinuities*, (London: German Historical Institute, 1985), p.305.

²⁶ Peter Winn, 'British Informal Empire in Uruguay in the Nineteenth Century', *Past and Present*, No.73, (Nov., 1976), p.103.

Apart from this, this study of Tientsin has showed how the British community tried to counter the rise of Chinese nationalism with reform. This local resistance could have created a problem for the informal empire.²⁷ In the case of Tientsin the British community had to give up many of its privileges in order to retain its interests in Tientsin. From this point the rise of nationalism in Argentina and Uruguay made it difficult for the British to maintain their position there. The emergence of the nationalist movement, led by the Argentine leader Juan Manuel de Rosas in the mid-nineteenth century, was dangerous to the British and other European influences in Argentina and Uruguay's economies.²⁸ In Argentina the emerging nationalist era under Juan Perón in 1943-1955 was another challenge to the British community.²⁹ At this point we would like to know the British community's response to the local resistance in Argentina and Uruguay. Were the patterns of response of the British communities in these countries similar to those in Tientsin?

²⁷ Robin A. Winks, 'On Decolonization and Informal Empire', *The American Historical Review*, Vol.81, No.3, (Jun. 1976), pp.551-2.

²⁸ Peter Winn, 'British Informal Empire in Uruguay in the Nineteenth Century', p.105.

²⁹ David Rock, 'The British Community in Argentine 1806-1960', p.1.

**Appendix 1:
List of the British Municipal Council from 1862-1938**

1. The British Municipal Councils 1862 to 1918

Year	Chairman	Hon. Treasurer	Councillors
1862	E. Waller (Phillips & Moore)	J. Henderson (Lindsay & Co.)	J. Hanna (Dent & Co.)
1863	E. Waller (Smith, Kennedy & Co.)	W. M. Norton (unknown)	J. Hanna (Dent & Co.)
1864	E. Waller (Smith, Kennedy & Co.)	J. Livingstone (merchant)	J. Hanna (Dent & Co.)
1865	J. Hanna (Dent & Co.)	D. Eastwood (unknown)	J. A. T. Meadows (Meadows & Co.)
1866	J. A. T. Meadows (Meadows & Co.)	J. H. McClure (unknown) H. C. Maclean (Jardine, Matheson & Co.) J. Livingstone (Merchant)	S. J. Morris (Bower, Hanbury & Co.)
1867	J. A. T. Meadows (Meadows & Co.)	J. Livingstone (merchant)	J. Hanna (Dent & Co.), H.G. Howard (unknown)
1868	J. A. T. Meadows (Meadows & Co.)	J. Henderson (Lindsay & Co.)	G. Hughes (unknown), J. Livingstone (Merchant)
1869	J. A. T. Meadows (Meadows & Co.)	J. Hanna (Dent & Co.)	J. Livingstone (Merchant)
1870	J. A. T. Meadows (Meadows & Co.) J. Henderson (Lindsay & Co.)	H.G. Howard (unknown)	J. Hanna (Dent & Co.)
1871	J. A. T. Meadows	M.G. Moore (Russell & Co.)	E.G. Beebe (unknown), A.C. Cordes (Cordes A., & Co.)

	(Meadows & Co.)	Co.)	
1872	J.A.T. Meadows (Meadows & Co.)	M.G. Moore (Russell & Co.)	H. Beveredge (Jardine, Matheson & Co.), A.C. Cordes (Cordes A., & Co.), P. Kierulff (merchant and commission agent)
1873	E.A. Solomon (D. Sassoon, Sons & Co.)	J. Livingstone (Lindsay & Co.) J.A.T. Meadows (Meadows & Co.)	H. Beveredge (Jardine, Matheson & Co.), J.J. Hatch (Hatch & Co.), M.G. Moore (Russell & Co.).
1874	E.A. Solomon (D. Sassoon, Sons & Co.)	J.J. Hatch (Hatch & Co.)	W. Forbes (William Forbes & Co.), J.A.T. Meadows (Meadows & Co.), M.G. Moore (Russell & Co.).
1875	J.A.T. Meadows (Meadows & Co.) M.G. Moore (Russell & Co.)	J.J. Hatch (Hatch & Co.) S.A. Nathan (D. Sassoon, Sons & Co.)	A.C. Cordes (Cordes A., & Co.), W. Forbes (William Forbes & Co.), W. Jackson (Acting Municipal Police/Merchants).
1876	M.G. Moore (Russell & Co.)	A.C. Cordes (Cordes A., & Co.)	H. Beveredge (Jardine, Matheson & Co.), W. Gubbins (Jardine, Matheson & Co.), J. Henderson (Sun Fire Office), W. Jackson (Merchants), A. Macpherson (Customs Commissioner).
1877	J. Henderson (Sun Fire Office)	P.L. Laen (P.L. Lean & Co.)	W. Gubbins (Jardine, Matheson & Co.), J.J. Hatch (Hatch & Co.), A.D. Startseff (Takmakoff, Sheveleff & Co.).
1878	G. Detring (Customs Commissioner)	W. Gubbins (Jardine, Matheson & Co.)	J. Henderson (Sun Fire Office), P.L. Laen (P.L. Lean & Co.), Liao Too Sang (China Navigation Company).
1879	G. Detring (Customs Commissioner)	D. Ezekiel (unknown)	W. Gubbins (Jardine, Matheson & Co.), W. Forbes (William Forbes & Co.), A.K. Kooznetseff (unknown), A.D. (Takmakoff, Sheveleff & Co.).
1880	G. Detring (Customs Commissioner)	D. Ezekiel (unknown) S.A. Haroon (D. Sassoon, Sons & Co.)	W. Forbes (William Forbes & Co.), W. Gubbins (Jardine, Matheson & Co.), A.D. Startseff (Takmakoff, Sheveleff & Co.).
1881	G. Detring	S.A. Haroon (D.)	W. Forbes, W. Gubbins (Jardine, Matheson & Co.), A.D. Startseff (Takmakoff,

	(Customs Commissioner)	Sassoon, Sons & Co.)	Sheveleff & Co.).
1882	W. Gubbins (Jardine, Matheson & Co.)	S.A. Haroon (D. Sassoon, Sons & Co.) F. de Bovis (HSB))	E. Farago (Customs), W. Forbes (William Forbes & Co.), H.E. Hobson (Customs Commissioner), Colin Jamieson (unknown), A.D. Startseff (Takmakoff, Sheveleff & Co.).
1883	H.E. Hobson (Customs Commissioner)	F. de Bovis (HSB)	E. Cousins (Jardine, Matheson & Co.), W. Forbes (William Forbes & Co.), A.D. Startseff (Takmakoff, Sheveleff & Co.)
1884	H.E. Hobson (Customs Commissioner)	F. de Bovis (HSB) G.C. de St. Croix (unknown)	E. Cousins (Jardine, Matheson & Co.), W. Forbes (William Forbes & Co.), J. Grabam (William Forbes & Co.), A.K. Kooznetseff (unknown), A.D. Startseff (Takmakoff, Sheveleff & Co.)
1885	G. Detring (Customs Commissioner)	W.W. Dickinson (Collins G. W., & Co.)	E. Cousins (Jardine, Matheson & Co.), W. Forbes (William Forbes & Co.), A.D. Startseff (Takmakoff, Sheveleff & Co.)
1886	G. Detring (Customs Commissioner)	W.W. Dickinson (Collins G. W., & Co.)	E. Cousins (Jardine, Matheson & Co.), W. Forbes (William Forbes & Co.), A.D. Startseff (Takmakoff, Sheveleff & Co.)
1887	G. Detring (Customs Commissioner)	W.W. Dickinson (Collins G. W., & Co.) A.D. Startseff (Takmakoff, Sheveleff & Co.).	E. Cousins (Jardine, Matheson & Co.), W.H. Forbes (William Forbes & Co.), Dr. A. Irwin (Frazer & Irwin), (medical practitioner) A.D. Startseff (Takmakoff, Sheveleff & Co.)
1888	G. Detring (Customs Commissioner)	A.D. Startseff (Takmakoff, Sheveleff & Co.).	E. Cousins (Jardine, Matheson & Co.), W.H. Forbes (William Forbes & Co.), R. Inglis (Jardine, Matheson & Co.), Dr. A. Irwin (Frazer & Irwin).
1889	G. Detring	A.D. Startseff	E. Cousins (Jardine, Matheson & Co.), W.H. Forbes (William Forbes & Co.), R.

	(Customs Commissioner)	(Takmakoff, Sheveleff & Co.)	Inglis (Jardine, Matheson & Co.), Dr. A. Irwin (Frazer & Irwin).
1890	G. Detring (Customs Commissioner)	W.W. Dickinson (Collins G. W., & Co.)	E. Cousins (Jardine, Matheson & Co.), W.H. Forbes (William Forbes & Co), A.D. Startseff. (Takmakoff, Sheveleff & Co.)
1891	G. Detring (Customs Commissioner)	W.W. Dickinson (Collins G. W., & Co.)	E. Cousins (Jardine, Matheson & Co.), W.H. Forbes (William Forbes & Co), A.D. Startseff. (Takmakoff, Sheveleff & Co.)
1892	G. Detring (Customs Commissioner)	W.W. Dickinson (Collins G. W., & Co.)	E. Cousins (Jardine, Matheson & Co.), A.D. Startseff (Takmakoff, Sheveleff & Co.), J. Wilson (Wilson & Co.).
1893	G. Detring (Customs Commissioner)	W.W. Dickinson (Collins G. W., & Co.)	R.A. Cousins (Wilson & Co.), (Jardine, Matheson & Co.), A.D. Startseff, (Takmakoff, Sheveleff & Co.), J. Wilson (Wilson & Co.).
1894	W.W. Dickinson (Collins G. W., & Co.)	R.A. Cousins (Wilson & Co.) J. Wilson (Wilson & Co.)	Dr. A. Irwin (Frazer & Irwin), W. Fisher (Butterfield & Swire), J. Stewart (Taku Tug and Lighter Company)
1895	W.W. Dickinson (Collins G. W., & Co.) E. Cousins (Jardine, Matheson & Co.)	R.A. Cousins (Wilson & Co.) J. Wilson (Wilson & Co.)...	W. Fisher (Butterfield & Swire), D.H. Mackintosh (HSB), J. Stewart (Taku Tug and Lighter Company)
1896	E. Cousins (Jardine, Matheson & Co.)	J.M. Dickinson (William Forbes & Co.)	W.C.C. Anderson (G. W. Collins & Co.), E. Cousins (Jardine, Matheson & Co.), J. Stewart (Taku Tug and Lighter Company), Ross Thomson (unknown).
1897	E. Cousins (Jardine, Matheson & Co.) J.M. Dickinson	J.M. Dickinson (William Forbes & Co.) W.C.C. Anderson (Collins & Co.)	W. Fisher (Butterfield & Swire), M. March (Carlowitz & Co.), J. Stewart (Taku Tug and Lighter Company).

	(William Forbes & Co.)		
1898	W.W. Dickinson (Collins G. W., & Co.) J.M. Dickinson (William Forbes & Co.)	W.C.C. Anderson (Collins & Co.)	W. Fisher (Butterfield & Swire), E. Heyl (E. Meyer & Co.), C.H. Ross (unknown), J. Stewart (Taku Tug and Lighter Company).
1899	J.M. Dickinson (William Forbes & Co.)	E.B. Lees (Lees & Co.)	W.C.C. Anderson (Collins & Co.), E. Cousins (Jardine, Matheson & Co.), J. Stewart (Taku Tug and Lighter Company), Ross Thomson (Butterfield & Swire).
1900	J.M. Dickinson (William Forbes & Co.) E. Cousins (Jardine, Matheson & Co.)	E.B. Lees (Lees & Co.) W.W. Dickinson (Collins G. W., & Co.)	W.C.C. Anderson (Collins & Co.), E. Heyl (E. Meyer & Co.), J. Stewart (Taku Tug and Lighter Company).
1901	E. Cousins (Jardine, Matheson & Co.)	E. Heyl (E. Meyer & Co.) W.E. Southcott (William Forbes & Co.)	W.W. Dickinson (Collins G. W., & Co.), W. Fisher (Butterfield & Swire), J. Stewart (Taku Tug and Lighter Company).
1902	W. Fisher (Butterfield & Swire)	E.F. Mackay (Butterfield & Swire)	W.W. Dickinson (Collins G. W., & Co.), E. Heyl (E. Meyer & Co.), D.H. Mackintosh (HSB), W.E. Southcott (William Forbes & Co.).
1903	W. Fisher (Chinese Engineering and Mining Co., Ltd.)	E.F. Mackay (Butterfield & Swire)	W.W. Dickinson (Collins G. W., & Co.), E. Heyl (E. Meyer & Co.), D.H. Mackintosh (HSB), W.E. Southcott (William Forbes & Co.).
1904	W. Fisher (Chinese Engineering and Mining Co., Ltd.) J.M. Dickinson	E.F. Mackay (Butterfield & Swire) W.A. Morling (Collins & Co.)	A. Cumming (unknown), E. Heyl (E. Meyer & Co.), W.E. Southcott (William Forbes & Co.).

	(William Forbes & Co.)		
1905	J.M. Dickinson (William Forbes & Co.)	W.A. Morling (Collins & Co.)	J. Boyce-Kup (Jardine, Matheson & Co.), G.T. Edkins (unknown), E. Heyl (E.Meyer & Co.), W.E. Southcott (William Forbes & Co.).
1906	J.M. Dickinson (William Forbes & Co.)	W.A. Morling (Collins & Co.)	J. Boyce-Kup (Jardine, Matheson & Co.), G.T. Edkins (unknown), W.E. Southcott (William Forbes & Co.).
1907	J.M. Dickinson (William Forbes & Co.) W.E. Southcott (William Forbes & Co.)	W.M. Howell (Butterfield & Swire)	J. Boyce-Kup (Jardine, Matheson & Co.), G.T. Edkins (unknown), C.R. Morling (Collins & Co.), W.E. Southcott (William Forbes & Co.), W.A. Morling (Collins & Co.)
1908	W.A. Morling (Collins & Co.)	W.E. Southcott (William Forbes & Co.)	G.T. Edkins (unknown), C.R. Morling (Collins & Co.), G.W. Sheppard (Jardine, Matheson & Co.), Ross Thomson (Butterfield & Swire).
1909	W.A. Morling (Collins & Co.)	W.E. Southcott (William Forbes & Co.)	C.R. Morling (Collins & Co.), G.W. Sheppard (Jardine, Matheson & Co.), Ross Thomson (Butterfield & Swire).
1910	W.A. Morling (Collins & Co.)	W.E. Southcott (William Forbes & Co.)	D. MacHaffie (unknown), C.R. Morling (Collins & Co.), G.W. Sheppard (Jardine, Matheson & Co.), and Ross Thomson (Butterfield & Swire).
1911	W.A. Morling (Collins & Co.)	W.E. Southcott (William Forbes & Co.)	E.W. Carter (Hatch, Carter & Co.), G.W. Sheppard (Jardine, Matheson & Co.), C.L. Maxwell (unknown) and Ross Thomson (Butterfield & Swire).
1912	C.R. Morling (Collins & Co.)	W.E. Southcott (William Forbes & Co.)	E.W. Carter (Hatch, Carter & Co.), C.C.F. Cunningham (unknown), Ross Thomson (Butterfield & Swire) and C.L. Maxwell (unknown).
1913	C.R. Morling (Collins & Co.)	W.E. Southcott (William Forbes & Co.)	E.W. Carter (Hatch, Carter & Co.), C.C.F. Cunningham (unknown), T.H.R. Shaw (unknown), and for a portion of the year, F.A. Kennedy (Lees & Co.).
1914	C.R. Morling (Collins & Co.)	W.E. Southcott (William Forbes & Co.)	E.W. Carter (Hatch, Carter & Co.), R. Ross Thomson (Butterfield & Swire), G.W. Sheppard (Jardine, Matheson & Co.) and for a portion of the year, C.C.F. Cunningham (unknown), and T.H.R. Shaw (unknown).
1915	G.W. Sheppard (Jardine, Matheson	W.E. Southcott (William Forbes & Co.)	R.K. Douglas (Wilson & Co.), R. Ross Thomson (Butterfield & Swire), and for a portion of the year, E.W. Carter (Hatch, Carter & Co.).

	& Co.) C.R. Morling (Collins & Co.)		
1916	G.W. Sheppard (Jardine, Matheson & Co.)	E.W. Carter (Hatch, Carter & Co.)	R.K. Douglas (Wilson & Co.), C.R. Morling (Collins & Co.), R. Ross Thomson (Butterfield & Swire), and for a portion of the year R.G. Buchan (Wilson & Co.).
1917	G.W. Sheppard (Jardine, Matheson & Co.) E.W. Carter (Hatch, Carter & Co.)	E.W. Carter (Hatch, Carter & Co.), R.G. Buchan (Wilson & Co.)	R.K. Douglas (Wilson & Co.), C.R. Morling (Collins & Co.), R. Ross Thomson (Butterfield & Swire) and for a portion of the year, R.G. Buchan (Wilson & Co.), G.S. Knowles (unknown), W.W.G. Ross (unknown).
1918	E.W. Carter (Hatch, Carter & Co.)	R.G. Buchan (Wilson & Co.)	C.R. Morling (Collins & Co.), W.W.G. Ross (unknown), and for a portion of the year, G.S. Knowles (unknown) and F.W. Maze (Custom Commissioner).

2. British Municipal Extension Councils 1899 to 1918.

Year	Chairman	Hon. Treasurer	Councillors
1899	J.M. Dickinson (William Forbes & Co.)	E.B. Lees (Lees & Co.)	W.C. C. Anderson (Collins & Co.), E. Cousins (Jardine, Matheson & Co.), H. Schroeter (unknown), W. McLeish (Peking & Tientsin Times), J. Stewart (Taku Tug and Lighter Company), C.D. Tenney (unknown), Ross Thomson (Butterfield & Swire), Tsai Shou Chi (unknown).
1900	J.M. Dickinson (William Forbes & Co.) E. Cousins (Jardine, Matheson & Co.)	E.B. Lees (Lees & Co.) W.W. Dickinson (Collins G. W., & Co.)	W.C.C. Anderson (Collins & Co.), J. Droste (unknown), E. Heyl (E. Meyer & Co.), W. McLeish (Peking & Tientsin Times), J. Stewart (Taku Tug and Lighter Company), C.D. Tenney (unknown), Tsai Shou Chi (unknown).
1901	E. Cousins	E. Heyl (E. Meyer & & Co.)	C. Denby (unknown), W.W. Dickinson (Collins G. W., & Co.), J. Droste (unknown),

	(Jardine, Matheson & Co.)	Co.) W.E. Southcott (William Forbes & Co.)	W. Fisher (Butterfield & Swire), W. McLeish (Peking & Tientsin Times), C. Poulsen (Electric Engineering & Fitting), J. Stewart (Taku Tug and Lighter Company), C.D. Tenney (unknown).
1902	W. Fisher (Butterfield & Swire)	E.F. Mackay (Butterfield & Swire)	W.W. Dickinson (Collins G. W., & Co.), J. Droste (unknown), E. Heyl (E. Meyer & Co.), D.H. Mackintosh (HSB), W. McLeish (Peking & Tientsin Times), C. Poulsen (Electric Engineering & Fitting), W.E. Southcott (William Forbes & Co.), C.D. Tenney (unknown).
1903	W. Fisher (Butterfield & Swire) J.M. Dickinson (William Forbes & Co.)	E.F. Mackay (Butterfield & Swire) W.A. Morling (Collins & Co.)	G. Baur (Mandl & Co.), A. Cumming (unknown), C. Denby (unknown), E. Heyl (E. Meyer & Co.), A. Hide (Mackenzie & Co.), W.A. Morling (Collins & Co.), J.H. Osborne (Mackenzie & Co.), W.E. Southcott (William Forbes & Co.), C.D. Tenney (unknown).
1904	J.M. Dickinson (William Forbes & Co.)	W.A. Morling (Collins & Co.)	J. Boyce-Kup (Jardine, Matheson & Co.), C. Denby (unknown), G.T. Edkins (unknown), E. Heyl (E. Meyer & Co.), J.H. Osborne (Mackenzie & Co.), F. Sommer (Astor House/Telge & Schroeter, Ltd.), W.E. Southcott (William Forbes & Co.), C.D. Tenney (unknown).
1905	J.M. Dickinson (William Forbes & Co.)	W.A. Morling (Collins & Co.)	J. Boyce-Kup (Jardine, Matheson & Co.), C. Denby (unknown), G.T. Edkins (unknown), A. Hide (Mackenzie & Co.), W.M. Howell (Butterfield & Swire), F. Sommer (Astor House/Telge & Schroeter, Ltd.), W.E. Southcott (William Forbes & Co.), C.D. Tenney (unknown).
1906	J.M. Dickinson (William Forbes & Co.)	G.T. Edkins (unknown) W.M. Howell (Butterfield & Swire)	E.G. Adams (unknown), J. Boyce-Kup (Jardine, Matheson & Co.), E. Heyl (E. Meyer & Co.), W.M. Howell (Butterfield & Swire), C.R. Morling (Collins & Co.), F. Sommer (Astor House/Telge & Schroeter, Ltd.), H.D. Summers (Imperial Chinese Post Office).
1907	J.M. Dickinson (William Forbes & Co.) W.E. Southcott (William Forbes & Co.)	W.M. Howell (Butterfield & Swire)	E.G. Adams (unknown), J. Boyce-Kup (Jardine, Matheson & Co.), G.T. Edkins (unknown), C.R. Morling (Collins & Co.), W.E. Southcott (William Forbes & Co.), F. Sommer (Astor House/Telge & Schroeter, Ltd.), H.D. Summers (Imperial Chinese Post Office), J. Stewart (Taku Tug and Lighter Company).

1908	W.A. Morling (Collins & Co.)	W.E. Southcott (William Forbes & Co.)	E.G. Adams (unknown), G.T. Edkins (unknown), C.R. Morling (Collins & Co.), G.W. Sheppard (Jardine, Matheson & Co.), F. Sommer (Astor House/Telge & Schroeter, Ltd.), H.D. Summers (Imperial Chinese Post Office), James Stewart (Taku Tug and Lighter Company), Ross Thomson (Butterfield & Swire).
1909	W.A. Morling (Collins & Co.)	W.E. Southcott (William Forbes & Co.)	E.G. Adams (unknown), J.R. Brazier (unknown), W.M. Howell (Butterfield & Swire), C.R. Morling (Collins & Co.), G.W. Sheppard (Jardine, Matheson & Co.), F. Sommer (Astor House/Telge & Schroeter, Ltd.), Ross Thomson (Butterfield & Swire).
1910	W.A. Morling (Collins & Co.)	W.E. Southcott (William Forbes & Co.)	A.S. Anmand (National Bible of Scotland), W.A. Argent (Mackenzie & Co.), Dr. R. Colman (unknown), W.M. Howell (Butterfield & Swire), K.F. Melchers (Melchers & Co.), Major Nathan (KMA), R.E., J. Travers Smith (Travers Smith & Sons), P.S. Thornton (KMA), Jas Watts, C.M.G (Tientsin Hotel).
1911	W.A. Morling (Collins & Co.)	W.E. Southcott (William Forbes & Co.)	A.S. Anmand (National Bible of Scotland), W.A. Argent (Mackenzie & Co.), R.H. Chandless (Chandless & Co.), W.M. Howell (Butterfield & Swire), K.F. Melchers (Melchers & Co.), Major Nathan (KMA), R.E., J. Travers Smith (Travers Smith & Sons).
1912	C.R. Morling (Collins & Co.)	P.S. Thornton (KMA)	A.S. Anmand (National Bible of Scotland), W.A. Argent (Mackenzie & Co.), R.H. Chandless (Chandless & Co.), K.H. Chun (China Merchants' Steam Navigation Co.), W.M. Howell (Butterfield & Swire), K.F. Melchers (Melchers & Co.), and W.I. Pottinger (Hotung Land Co.).
1913	C.R. Morling (Collins & Co.)	P.S. Thornton (KMA)	A.S. Anmand (National Bible of Scotland), W.A. Argent (Mackenzie & Co.), R.H. Chandless (Chandless & Co.), K.H. Chun (China Merchants' Steam Navigation Co.), W.M. Howell (Butterfield & Swire), K.F. Melchers (Melchers & Co.), and W.I. Pottinger (Hotung Land Co.).
1914	C.R. Morling (Collins & Co.)	P.S. Thornton (KMA)	A.S. Anmand (National Bible of Scotland), W.A. Argent (Mackenzie & Co.), R.H. Chandless (Chandless & Co.), K.H. Chun (China Merchants' Steam Navigation Co.), W.M. Howell (Butterfield & Swire), K.F. Melchers (Melchers & Co.), and W.I. Pottinger (Hotung Land Co.).
1915	G.W. Sheppard (Jardine, Matheson	P.S. Thornton (KMA)	W.A. Argent (Mackenzie & Co.), K.H. Chun (China Merchants' Steam Navigation Co.), I.F. Drysdale (British and Foreign Bible Society), R.M. Gatliff (Grofts & Co.),

	& Co.) C.R. Morling (Collins & Co.)			W.M. Howell (Butterfield & Swire), D.B. Nye (Dental Surgeon), and W.I. Pottinger (Hotung Land Co.).
1916	G.W. Sheppard (Jardine, Matheson & Co.)	P.S. Thornton (KMA)		W.A. Argent (Mackenzie & Co.), K.H. Chun (China Merchants' Steam Navigation Co.), I.F. Drysdale (British and Foreign Bible Society), R.M. Gatloff (Grofts & Co.), W.M. Howell (Butterfield & Swire), G.S. Knowles (unknown), D.B. Nye (Dental Surgeon) and F.R. Scott (Mackenzie & Co.).
1917	G.W. Sheppard (Jardine, Matheson & Co.) E.W. Carter (Hatch, Carter & Co.)	P.S. Thornton (KMA) W.M. Howell (Butterfield & Swire)		K.H. Chun (China Merchants' Steam Navigation Co.), Rev. I.F. Drysdale (British and Foreign Bible Society), R.M. Gatloff (Grofts & Co.), W.M. Howell (Butterfield & Swire), G.S. Knowles (unknown), D.B. Nye (Dental Surgeon), F.R. Scott (Mackenzie & Co.), and for a portion of the year, R.W. Hamlet (Standard Oil Co.), D.P. Ricketts (Imperial Railways of North China), and A.H. Watts (KMA).
1918	E.W. Carter (Hatch, Carter & Co.)	W.M. Howell (Butterfield & Swire) F.R. Scott (Mackenzie & Co.)		K.H. Chun (China Merchants' Steam Navigation Co.), R.M. Gatloff (Grofts & Co.), R.W. Hamlet (Standard Oil Co.), G.S. Knowles (unknown) and D.P. Ricketts (Imperial Railways of North China), and for a portion of the year, N. Leslie (Asiatic Petroleum Co.) and Major W.S. Nathan, C.M.G., R.E (KMA).

3. British Municipal Councils, 1919 to 1938
(Amalgamated Areas)

Year	Chairman	Vice-Chairman	Hon. Treasurer	Councillors
1919	E.W. Carter (Hatch, Carter & Co.)	F.R. Scott (Mackenzie & Co.)	R.G. Buchan (Wilson & Co.)	K.H. Chun (China Merchants' Steam Navigation Co.), W.M. Howell (Butterfield & Swire), N. Leslie (Asiatic Petroleum Co.), F.W. Maze (Custom Commissioner), Major W.S. Nathan, C.M.G., R.E. (KMA) and Dr. D.B. Nye (Dental Surgeon).
1920	E.W. Carter (Hatch, Carter & Co.)	W.M. Howell (Butterfield & Swire)	R.G. Buchan (Wilson & Co.)	K.H. Chun (China Merchants' Steam Navigation Co.), F.W. Maze (Custom Commissioner), D.B. Nye (Dental Surgeon), E.C. Peters (Jardine, Matheson & Co.), W.J. Warnsley (Arnhold, Karberg & Co.) and P.C.

1921	Major W.S. Nathan, C.M.G., R.E. (KMA) P.C. Young, C.B.E. (KMA)	W.M. Howell (Butterfield & Swire)	F.A. Fairchild (Fairchild & Co.)	Young, C.B.E. (KMA). M. Boniface (Mackenzie & Co.), K.H. Chun (China Merchants' Steam Navigation Co.), A.C. Cornish (unknown), F.A. Kennedy (Lees & Co.), W.W.G. Ross (unknown), R.H.R. Wade (unknown), and for a portion of the year, E.C. Peters (Jardine, Matheson & Co.).
1922	P.C. Young, C.B.E. (KMA)	W.M. Howell (Butterfield & Swire)	F.A. Fairchild (Fairchild & Co.)	R.G. Buchan (Wilson & Co.), K.H. Chun (China Merchants' Steam Navigation Co.), A.C. Cornish (unknown), E.C. Peters (Jardine, Matheson & Co.), A.E. Tipper (Tipper & Co.), R.H.R. Wade (unknown), and for a portion of the year, E.W. Carter (Hatch, Carter & Co.) and H.A. Lucker (American Chinese Co.).
1923	P.C. Young, C.B.E. (KMA)	W.M. Howell (Butterfield & Swire)	F.A. Fairchild (Fairchild & Co.)	E.W. Carter (Hatch, Carter & Co.), K.H. Chun (China Merchants' Steam Navigation Co.), H.A. Lucker (American Chinese Co.), E.C. Peters (Jardine, Matheson & Co.), A.E. Tipper, R.H.R. Wade (unknown), and for a portion of the year W.E. Leckie (unknown).
1924	P.C. Young, C.B.E. (KMA) W.M. Howell (Butterfield & Swire)	Vice-Chairman & Hon. Treasurer E.W. Carter (Hatch, Carter & Co.)		K.H. Chun (China Merchants' Steam Navigation Co.), H.F. Dyott (Taku Tug & Lighter Co.), (unknown), H.A. Lucker (American Chinese Co.), E.C. Peters (Jardine, Matheson & Co.), A.E. Tipper (Tipper & Co.), James Turner (Eastern Engineering Work, Ltd.) and for a portion of the year H. Bailey (unknown), R.G. Buchan (Wilson & Co.) and E.J. Nathan (KMA).
1925	E.C. Peters (Jardine, Matheson & Co.)	E.W. Carter (Hatch, Carter & Co.)		R.G. Buchan (Wilson & Co.), K.H. Chun (China Merchants' Steam Navigation Co.), W.M. Howell (Butterfield & Swire), H.A. Lucker (American Chinese Co.), E.J. Nathan (KMA), Howard Payne (Collins & Co.) and James Turner (Eastern Engineering Work, Ltd.) and for a portion of the year A.E. Tipper (Tipper & Co.) and P.C. Young, C.B.E. (KMA).
1926	P.C. Young, C.B.E. (KMA)	W.J. Warnsley Arnhold, Karberg & Co.)		G.H. Charleton (unknown), K.H. Chun (China Merchants' Steam Navigation Co.), J.S. Chang (KMA), H.A. Lucker (American Chinese Co.), Howard Payne (Collins & Co.), E.C. Peters (Jardine, Matheson & Co.).

					Co.) and James Turner (Eastern Engineering Work, Ltd.), and for a portion of the year R.T. McDonnell (unknown) and R.H. Rowlatt (Taku Tug & Lighter Co.).
1927	P.C. Young, C.B.E. (KMA)	E.C. Peters (Peter & Co.)			K.H. Chun (China Merchants' Steam Navigation Co.), S.M. Chung (unknown), J.S. Chang (KMA), R.T. McDonnell (unknown), Howard Payne (Collins & Co.), James Turner (Eastern Engineering Work, Ltd.) and W.J. Warmsley (Arnold, Karberg & Co.) and for a portion of the year A.E. Tipper (Tipper & Co.).
1928	P.C. Young, C.B.E. (KMA)	E.C. Peters (Peter & Co.)			K.H. Chun (China Merchants' Steam Navigation Co.), S.M. Chung (unknown), J.S. Chang (KMA), R.T. McDonnell (unknown), Howard Payne (Collins & Co.), A.E. Tipper (Tipper & Co.) and W.J. Warmsley (Arnold, Karberg & Co.) and for a portion of the year C.D. Dixon (Mackenzie & Co.), Z.S. Bien (Bank of China) and A. Brearley (unknown).
1929	P.C. Young, C.B.E. (KMA)	E.C. Peters (Peter & Co.)			Z.S. Bien (Bank of China), A. Brearley (unknown), H.K. Chang (unknown), K.H. Chun (China Merchants' Steam Navigation Co.), S.M. Chung (unknown), J.S. Chang (KMA), Howard Payne (Collins & Co.) and A.E. Tipper (Tipper & Co.) and for a portion of the year T.S. Young (unknown) and J.C. Taylor (Jardine Engineering Corporation).
1930	P.C. Young, C.B.E. (KMA)	J.S. Chwang (KMA)			Z.S. Bien (Bank of China), S.M. Chung (unknown), K.C. Hu (unknown), L.K. Liang (unknown), Howard Payne (Collins & Co.), E.C. Peters (Peter & Co.), J.C. Taylor (Jardine Engineering Corporation) and A.E. Tipper (Tipper & Co.).
1931	A.E. Tipper (Tipper & Co.).	J.S. Chwang (KMA)			A. Brearley (unknown), Chunta T.L. Chao (KMA), C. Cheng (unknown), Cheng Pin-zen (unknown), Howard Payne (Collins & Co.), E.C. Peters (Peter & Co.), Sun Feng-tsao (unknown) and J.C. Taylor (Jardine Engineering Corporation), and a portion of the year C.K. Wang (unknown) and K.Y. Pao (unknown).
1932	A.E. Tipper (Tipper & Co.)	J.S. Chwang (KMA)			A. Brearley (unknown), Chunta T.L. Chao (KMA), C. Cheng (unknown), Cheng Pin-zen (unknown), Howard Payne (Collins & Co.), E.C. Peters (Peter & Co.), J.C. Taylor (Jardine Engineering Corporation) and C.K.

1933	A.E. Tipper (Tipper & Co.) E.C. Peters (Peter & Co.)	J.S. Chwang (KMA)		Wang (unknown), and for a portion of the year Li Ta (Central Bank of China), F.A. Perry (unknown) and L.R. Rees (unknown). Z.S. Bien (Bank of China), Chunta T.L. Chao (KMA), L. V. Lang (Arnold & Co.), Li Ta (Central Bank of China), R.D. Murray (Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China), E.C. Peters (Peter & Co.), L.R. Rees (unknown) and C.K. Wang (unknown), and for a portion of the year Howard Payne (Collins & Co.).
1934	E.C. Peters (Peter & Co.)	J.S. Chwang (KMA)		Z.S. Bien (Bank of China), Chunta T.L. Chao (KMA), L. V. Lang (Arnold & Co.), Li Ta (Central Bank of China), H.H. Reed (KMA), L.R. Rees (unknown), James Turner (Eastern Engineering Work, Ltd.) and C.K. Wang (unknown), and for the portion of the year W.F. Ridler (Doney & Co.).
1935	E.C. Peters (Peter & Co.)	J.S. Chwang (KMA)		Z.S. Bien (Bank of China), Chunta T.L. Chao (KMA), Li Ta (Central Bank of China), C.E. Peacock (unknown), H.H. Reed (KMA), R.K. Rodger (Butterfield & Swire), James Turner (Eastern Engineering Work, Ltd.) and C.K. Wang (unknown), and for the portion of the year D.O. Russell (Perrin Cooper Co.).
1936	A.E. Tipper (Tipper & Co.)	J.S. Chwang (KMA)		Chunta T.L. Chao (KMA), T.F. Hwang (unknown), Li Ta (Central Bank of China), E.C. Peters (Peter & Co.), H.H. Reed (KMA), R.K. Rodger (Butterfield & Swire), D.O. Russell (Perrin Cooper Co.) and C.K. Wang (unknown), and for the portion of the year Mr. C.H. Pian (Central Bank of China) and Mr. C.D. Dixon (Mackenzie & Co.).
1937	A.E. Tipper (Tipper & Co.).	J.S. Chwang (KMA)		A. Burgess (unknown), Chunta T.L. Chao (KMA), C.D. Dixon (Mackenzie & Co.), P.Y. Hsu (unknown), T.F. Hwang (unknown), R.K. Rodger (Butterfield & Swire), D.O. Russell (Perrin Cooper Co.) and C.K. Wang (unknown).
1938	A.E. Tipper, C.B.E. (Tipper & Co.).	J.S. Chang (KMA)		A. Burgess (unknown), Chunta T.L. Chao (KMA), C.D. Dixon (Mackenzie & Co.), P.Y. Hsu (unknown), T.F. Hwang (unknown), R.K. Rodger (Butterfield & Swire), D.O. Russell (Perrin Cooper Co.) and C.K. Wang (unknown); and for a portion of the year Mr. F.P. Ling (unknown), Mr. Keats (unknown), S. Chu (unknown), Mr. T.H.R. Candlin (William

					Forbes & Co.) and Mr. J.A. Andrew (Haiho Trading Co.).
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Source: BMC, *Tientsin, Report of the Council for the year 1938* (Tientsin Press, Limited), pp.12-14, *Desk Hong List; A General and Business Directory for Shanghai, Northern and River Ports, Japan, 1875, 1878 and 1903, The Directory and Chronicle China, Japan, Korea, Indo-China, Straits Settlements, Malay States, Siam, Netherlands India, Borneo, the Philippine, etc.*, *The Hongkong Directory and Hong List for the Far East for 1889, 1891-1893 and 1895 and The North-China Desk Hong List 1922: A General and Business Directory for Shanghai and the Northern and River Ports, Etc.*, (Shanghai: the China-Herald, 1922).

Appendix 2

Prominent British Businesses in Tientsin (and North China) 1860 - 1937

Company	Production/Service	Other Information
Anglo-Chinese Wool Co.	Collecting, cleaning and packing wools	Bought by Liddells. Mainly dealing with wool business of W.O. Oelbermann Co., Philadelphia. ¹
Arnhold & Co. Ltd.	Not specific	Registered at Shanghai and controlled by E. D. Sassoon & Co., Ltd. ² Supplied goods to Peking Chinese Electric Light & Power Co. and Chinese railways – Tientsin – Pukow Railway and Tientsin-Mukden Railway. ³ Also export of Chinese goods such as bristles and wool. ⁴
Asiatic Petroleum Company (North China), Ltd.	Oil	-
British American Tobacco Co.	Cigarettes	Large business in North China and Large factory in Tientsin. Also known in China as Yee Tsoong Tobacco Distributors Ltd. Head office in Shanghai. ⁵
Capstick & Co.	Import and export	Export mainly of walnuts and peanuts. Importers of provisions from Australia. ⁶
Chandless & Co. Ltd.	Export	Mainly export Chinese sheep wool and camel wools. ⁷
Collins & Co.	Wool cleaning and press-packing	-
Cornabe, Eckford	Import and export	Established Tientsin branch 1864. ⁸

¹ HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 47 Letter from C. R. Rice to C.I. Cookes, Tientsin, June 13 1930.

² HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.4 Letter from E. T. Barnes to the Managers, the Shanghai Commercial & Savings Bank Ltd., Tientsin, February 21, 1935.

³ HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 28 Volume 2, Letter from D. Forbes to H. B. Roe, Tientsin, December 7, 1925.

⁴ HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 28 Volume 2, Letter from D. Forbes to H. B. Roe, Tientsin, December 7, 1925, p.2, and SHG II 510.3 Letter from E. T. Barnes to the Manager, Banque Belgo pour l'Etranger, Tientsin, March 24, 1932.

⁵ HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.4 Letter from E. T. Barnes to the Managers, Banque de l'Indo Chine, Tientsin, January 15, 1935.

⁶ HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.4 Letter from M. B. Matthew to the Manager, the Royal Bank of Canada, Havana, Tientsin, December, 1, 1933.

⁷ HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.3 Letter from E. T. Barnes to H.B.M. Vice-Consul, Tientsin, June 25, 1932.

⁸ HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.2 Letter from Lyon-Mackenzie to the Manager, the Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China, Tientsin, November 25, 1929 and HSBC Group Archives, SHG

& Winning		
E. C. Peters & Co.	Import and export	Established in 1926. Joint venture with the Chinese compradore⁹ and agent for the Union Oil Company of San Francisco.¹⁰
Fairchild & Co.	Export	Dealing with collecting and buying Chinese goods mostly in bristles.¹¹
Hatch, Carter & Co.	Export	Mainly wool, carpets and animal skins.¹²
Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking	Banking	First branch opened in Tientsin in 1881.
Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI), Ltd.,	Importers of alkalies, dyestuffs, indigo, fertilizers, commercial and industrial chemicals, metals, and sundry products	This firm also known as Brunner, Mond & Co., Ltd.¹³
Jardine, Matheson and Co.	Involved in different businesses	Operated with several agents such as in Indo-China, S.N. Co. Ltd., P. & O. Steam Navigation Co., Canadian Pacific Ocean Services, Ltd., Kelvin Marine Motors and Bombay, Burmah Trading Corp., Ltd.¹⁴
Kent & Mounsey	Solicitor firm	-
Liddell Bros. & Co. Ltd.	Gathering animal fur, skins and cotton	Not only in north China but through agent, D. E. Hramzoff, in Urga.¹⁵
Mackenzie & Co., Ltd.	Wool cleaning and press-packing factories	-
North China Finance Tientsin Co.,	Exports	Backed by Wilson & Co.¹⁶

II 510.3 Letter from Lyon-Mackenzie to the Manager, the Bank of California, Seattle, Washington, Tientsin, February 31, 1931.

⁹ HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 28 Vol.2, Letter from R. C. Allen to H.B. Roe, Tientsin, December 15, 1926.

¹⁰ HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 47 Letter from C. R. Rice to C.I. Cookes, Tientsin, 9 September, 1930.

¹¹ HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.1 Letter from Lyon-Mackenzie to the Manager, The Yokohama Specie Bank, Ltd., Tientsin, 6 December, 1926.

¹² HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.3 Letter from E. T. Barnes to the Agent, New York, Tientsin, September 28, 1932.

¹³ *China Hong List 1934* (the North-China Daily News & Herald, Ltd.), p.694.

¹⁴ Macmillan, *Seaports of the Far East*, p.126.

¹⁵ HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 28 Volume 2 Letter from D. Forbes to H.B. Roe, Tientsin, 10 May 1925.

¹⁶ HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.5 Letter from E. T. Barnes to the Managers, London, Tientsin, December 29, 1936.

North China Wool Co. Ltd.	Packing and export wool	One of Perrin Cooper & Co. Ltd.'s subsidiary firms. ¹⁷
Perrin, Cooper & Co.	Import and export	Owned by J. A. Russell of Kuala Lumpur. ¹⁸
Rendall & Co.	Exporters	Dealing in exporting chiefly carpets, lacquer work and sundries. ¹⁹
Robert Smith Co. Ltd.	Wool, skins and fur	Head office in Tientsin and branches established in North China such as Kalgan, Harbin and Paotou. ²⁰
Taku Tug and Lighter Co. Ltd.	Dockyards, Shipbuilding and Engineering Works	-
Butterfield and Swire Co.	Involved in various businesses agents for China Negation Company, insurance, Taikoo sugar, Blue Funnel and etc.	Established headquarters in Tientsin in the mid-1880s. ²¹
The Chartered Bank of India, Australia, and China.	Banking	Established in 1895.
The Haiho Trading Co.	Export and Import	Founded by Mr. A. J. Andrew. ²²
The International Export Company Limited	Export	Located in the Belgian concession with branch elsewhere in North China such as in Manchuria, Chihli and Shantung.
The Kailan Mining Administration (KMA)	Mining	KMA was originated from merger between the Chinese Engineering and Mining Company (British) and the Lanchow Mining Co., (Chinese) in 1912. Also supplied stones, lime, ballast and sand for building. Brick factory at Machiaokow known to produce the best fire-bricks in China.
The North China Wool Co. Ltd.	Export	Owned by W. R. Loxley & Co. Managed by Perrin Cooper & Co. Export of wool to America. ²³

¹⁷ HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.5 Letter from E. T. Barnes to the Manager, Banque de l'Indo Chine, Tientsin, March 2, 1937.

¹⁸ HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.2 Letter from Agents of Hongkong and Shanghai Bank to The Manager, Banque de l'Indo, Tientsin, 11 August 1928.

¹⁹ HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.2 Letter from Lyon-Mackenzie to the Manager, Mercantile Bank of India, Limited, Shanghai, Tientsin, December 3, 1929.

²⁰ HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.1 Letter from Lyon Mackenzie to the Manager, The Equitable Trust Co., of New York, Tientsin, August 29, 1927.

²¹ SOAS Library, the SCRR, John Swire & Sons's Papers, Letter, Shanghai, 15 June 1885, JSSI 2/17 Box 1176B, p.1.

²² HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 695.2 Letter from E. P. Carrington to E. Barnes, Tientsin, 28 October, 1935.

The Stanley Co.	Import and Export	Established by Rev. Stanley P. Smith. Owing to lack of business experience this company was managed by Chinese. ²⁴
Tientsin Anlee Export Co. Ltd.	Export	Registered in Hong Kong in October 1935. 51% of its share owned by Arnold Trading Co., Ltd. ²⁵
Tientsin Lighter Co. Ltd.,	Dockyards, Shipbuilding and Engineering Works	Used The Butterfield & Swire as its agent
Tipper & Co.	Life, Fire and Marine Insurance Agents ²⁶	-
William Forbes and Co.	Import and Export	Among the earliest British firms in Tientsin (1864) Processing, packaging and exporting Chinese goods. Had big interests in providing the Chinese railways with several train facilities such as car and rolling stock. Suffered from inability of Chinese government to settle all its debts to this firm. ²⁷
Wilson & Co.	Collecting, cleaning and packing wools	Co. cmpradore gathered wools in Kalgan. ²⁸
Yao Hua Mechanical Glass Co. Ltd.	Glass	On of the KMA's subsidiary companies,,situated in Chinwangtao. ²⁹

Sources: Allister Macmillan, *Seaports of the Far East: Historical and Descriptive Commercial and Industrial Facts, Figures, & Resources, Second Edition* (W.H. & L. Collingridge, 148 & 149: London, 1925); *List of the Principal Foreign and Chinese Industrial Enterprises in China and Hong Kong* (Revised to December 31st, 1917), compiled by H.M. Commercial Attache, etc., Shanghai January 1st, 1918; Lord Charles Beresford, *The Break-Up of China: With an Account of Its Present Commerce Currency, Waterways Armies, Railways, Politics and Future Prospects* (Harper & Brothers Publishers, New York and London, 1899), p.16; *Twentieth Century Impressions of Hongkong, Shanghai, and other Treaty Ports of China*, p.734 and HSBC Group Archives.

²³ HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.4 Letter from E. T. Barnes to the Manager, the Yokohama Specie Bank Ltd., Tientsin, March 27, 1933 and HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.4 Letter from F. H. Pentycross to the Manager, the Chase Bank, Tientsin, January 30, 1934 .

²⁴ HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.2 Letter from Lyon-Mackenzie to the Manager, the Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China, Tientsin, April 29, 1930.

²⁵ HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.5 Letter from E. D. Black to the Manager, Shanghai, Tientsin, April 29, 1936 and HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.5 Letter from E. T. Barnes to the Agent, Netherlands Trading Society, Shanghai, Tientsin, October 14, 1936.

²⁶ *China Hong List 1934* (the North-China Daily News & Herald, Ltd.), p.715.

²⁷ HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.2 Letter from Lyon-Mackenzie to the Manager, the Far Eastern Bank of Harbin, Tientsin, December 13th, 1928.

²⁸ HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 28 Vol. 2, Letter from D. Forbes to V. M. Grayburn, Tientsin, 26th May 1926.

²⁹ HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.3 Letter from Lyon-Mackenzie to the Manager, the Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China, Tientsin, December 29th, 1930.

Appendix 3
Other British firms in Tientsin

Company	Production/Service	Other Information
A. E. Bulling & Co., Tientsin	Manufacturer ¹	-
A. Mackie & Co.	Aerated Water Manufacturers ²	Established 1910 by A. Mackie.
A. S. Watson & Co.	Chemists	Sole proprietor A.E. Keen. ³
Adair Graham & Co., Tientsin.	Dockyards, Shipbuilding and Engineering Works	-
Borrows & Co. Ltd.	Marine Surveyors	Capital up to Tls. 40,000 ⁴
Caldbeck Macgregor & Co. Ltd.	Wine, spirits and mineral water	Head office in Hong Kong and branches in Tientsin, Shanghai and the Straits Settlement. ⁵
Central Trading Co. Ltd.	-	Registered as the British Company. ⁶
Chihli Motors	Motorcars	One of the Arnhold & Co. properties. ⁷
China Booksellers Ltd.⁸	-	-
China Foreign Corporation	-	Established around 1929 under the Hong Kong Ordinance. ⁹
China Import and Export Lumber Co. Ltd.	Lumber	Headquarters at Shanghai. ¹⁰
Crystal Ltd	Distilleries,	Established 1905 ¹¹

¹ HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.5 Letter from E. T. Barnes to the Agent, New York, August 20, 1937.

² HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.2 Letter from Lyon-Mackenzie to the Manager, the Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China, Tientsin, December 17, 1929.

³ HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.2 Letter from Lyon-Mackenzie to the Manager, the Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China, Tientsin, November 27, 1929.

⁴ HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.2, Letter from Lyon-Mackenzie to the Manager, the Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China, Tientsin, October 29, 1929.

⁵ HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.5 Letter from E. T. Barnes to the American Consul, American Consulate General, Tientsin, June 2, 1936.

⁶ HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 47 Letter from C. R. Rice to C.I. Cookes, Tientsin, November 26, 1930.

⁷ HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.3 Letter from E. T. Barnes to the Manager, The National City Bank of New York, Tientsin, May 5, 1932.

⁸ HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.2 Letter from Lyon-Mackenzie to the Manager, the Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China, Tientsin, November 2, 1929.

⁹ HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.2 Letter from Lyon-Mackenzie to the Manager, Equitable Eastern Banking Corporation, Tientsin, August 9, 1929.

¹⁰ HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.1 Letter from Lyon Mackenzie to the Manager, Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China, Tientsin, May 28, 1928.

	Breweries and Aerated Water Factories	
Doney & Co.	Exchange and Share Brokers ¹²	-
Dunlop Rubber Company	Manufacture rubber goods	Opened branch in Tientsin 1915. Development and sale of tyres to motorists, including rickshaw drivers.
E. Pennell & Co.	Wine and Spirit	Purchased by E. W. Pennell, son of the owners, in 1934. Firm name changed to E. W. Pennell & Co. ¹³
Eastern Engineering Works (James Turner)	Dockyards, Shipbuilding and Engineering Works	Established in 1923.
Eckford Motor	Motorcars	Established in 1930. A subsidiary of Cornabe, Eckford & Co. ¹⁴
Edward Evans & Sons Ltd.	Stationery Printers ¹⁵	-
Hall & Holtz, Ltd	Shopping complex and furniture factories	Another respectable British storekeeper. ¹⁶
Hemmings & Parkin	Architects ¹⁷	-
I. Pecker	Tailor, furrier and outfitter ¹⁸	-
J. Twyford & Co.	Engineering firm and import and export ¹⁹	Established in 1913 by J. Twyford.
Jardine Engineering	Engineers and	Subsidiary of and sponsored by Jardine

¹¹ HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.3 Letter from E. T. Barnes to the Manager, National City Bank of New York, Tientsin, April 4, 1932, p.644 and HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.5 Letter from E. T. Barnes to the American Consul, American Consulate General Tientsin, September 25, 1936.

¹² HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.3 Letter from E. T. Barnes to the Manager, The Chas Bank, Tientsin, April 9, 1932.

¹³ HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.4 Letter from E. T. Burners to the Manager, the Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China, Tientsin, May 22, 1933 and HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.4 Letter from E.T. Barnes to the Manager, London, Tientsin, December 13, 1934.

¹⁴ HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.3 Letter from Lyon-Mackenzie to the Manager, National City Bank of New York, Tientsin, September 17, 1930.

¹⁵ HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.2 Letter from Lyon-Mackenzie to the Manager, the Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China, Tientsin, December 4, 1929.

¹⁶ HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.2 Letter from Lyon-Mackenzie to the Manager, the Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China, Tientsin, December 9, 1929.

¹⁷ HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.4 Letter from E.T. Barnes to the Manager, the Chase Bank, Tientsin, November 23, 1934.

¹⁸ *China Hong List 1934* (the North-China Daily News & Herald, Ltd.), p.706.

¹⁹ HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.2 Letter from Lyon-Mackenzie to the Manager, the Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China, Tientsin, December 2, 1929.

Corp. Ltd.	Contractors, Importers of machinery etc.	Matheson & Co. Ltd. ²⁰
Keen & Co.	Mineral water manufacturers ²¹	-
Mackie & Co., A., Tientsin.	Distilleries, breweries and aerated water factories	-
Moutrie & Co. Ltd.	Musical Instruments ²²	-
Moyler Powell & Co.	Dressmakers, milliners and general outfitters	First established in 1916 ²³
Mustard & Co.	Imports	Subsidiary of the British American Tobacco Co. ²⁴
North China Butter Co.	Margarine and butter	Located in British concession and sold goods in Tientsin and Peking. ²⁵
North China Printing and Publishing Co. Ltd.	Printing	-
Ralph Harper & Co.	Import	Mainly dealing in imported metals, piece goods and sundries. ²⁶
Robinson Piano Co., Ltd.	Piano and Musical Instrument dealers ²⁷	-
Sims & Co.	Furniture factories	Also provided other services to office facilities such as installing sun blinds. ²⁸
The British Engineering Works	Engineering	Formed to undertake various works such as boiler making, ship repairs, heating and sanitary installations and general

²⁰ HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.5 Letter from W. H. Steward to the Manager, Banque de l'Indo Chine, Tientsin, May 6, 1936.

²¹ HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.2 Letter from Lyon-Mackenzie to the Manager, the Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China, Tientsin, December 13, 1929.

²² HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.2 Letter from Lyon-Mackenzie to the Manager, the Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China, Tientsin, April 8, 1930.

²³ HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.3 Letter from E. T. Barnes to the Manager, Banque Franco-Chinoise, Tientsin, December 29, 1931, HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.3 Letter from E. T. Barnes to the Manager, The Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China, Tientsin, September 17, 1932 and HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.4 Letter from E. T. Barnes to the Manager, London Tientsin, April 10, 1935.

²⁴ HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.2 Letter from Lyon-Mackenzie to the Manager, the Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China, Tientsin, April 9, 1930.

²⁵ HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 695.1 Memorandum to Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, Tientsin, 30 December 1933.

²⁶ HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.2 Letter from Agents of Hongkong and Shanghai Bank to HBM Consul-General, Tientsin, 26 July 1928.

²⁷ *China Hong List 1934* (the North-China Daily News & Herald, Ltd.), p.708.

²⁸ HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.3 Letter from Lyon-Mackenzie to Messrs. Domes of Silence, Inc., New York, Tientsin, October 8, 1930.

		mechanics.
The Tientsin Press	Printing	One of the important newsagents in Tientsin Printed the newspaper and also had a bookshop.
Tientsin Gas and Electric Light Co. Ltd.-Tientsin.	Electric Light Works	-
Tientsin Native City Waterworks Co. Ltd.	Waterworks	-
Tientsin Waterworks Co., Ltd.	Waterworks	-
Twyford China Ltd.	Sanitary Engineers²⁹	-
White Star Aerated Water Factory, Tientsin	Distilleries, Breweries and Aerated Water Factories	-
Woollen Vossy & Co. Ltd.	Chemists	A private limited company and registered in Hong Kong.³⁰
Yang Tsun Brickworks, Yangtsun	Cement	-

²⁹ HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.2 Letter from Lyon-Mackenzie to the Manager, the Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China, Tientsin, December 9, 1929.

³⁰ HSBC Group Archives, SHG II 510.2 Letter from Lyon-Mackenzie to the Manager, the Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China, Tientsin, November 25th, 1929.

Appendix 4

Number of the BMC employees in each department by nationality in 1934, 1938 and 1939.

Departments/Offices	Number of Staffs											
	1926			1934			1938			1939		
	B	C	T	B	C	T	B	C	T	B	C	T
Secretariat	3	0	3	3	3	6	3	2	5	3	2	5
Account Department	4	0	4	3	5	8	3	6	9	3	6	9
Public Works Department	6	0	6	5	4	9	6	5	11	4	8	12
Electric Department	3	0	3	2	2	4	2	4	6	3	3	6
Waterworks Department	2	0	2	1	3	4	2	2	4	2	2	4
Police Department	4	0	4	6	6	1 2	8	9	17	8	9	17
Fire Bridgade	na	na	na	2	0	2	2	2	4	2	0	2
Wharfage Dues Office	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1
Health Office	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	0	2
Hospital Staff	6	0	6	6	2	8	7	4	11	7	4	11
TOTAL	31	0	31	30	26	5 6	35	35	70	34	35	69

B – British
C – Chinese
T - Total

na – Not available

Sources: *The Directory and Chronicle China, Japan, Corea, . . . 1926*, p.603, *China Hong List 1934*, p.702, *China Hong List 1939*, pp.717-718 and *China Hong List 1939*, p.700.

Appendix 5

Table 2.2: The Population of the British Concession in Tientsin

Nationality	1913	1925	1929	1934	1938
American	72	294	273	252	185
Armenian	-	-	15	3	10
Australian	5	-	7	10	6
Belgian	12	4	8	24	26
Brazilian	-	-	-	5	2
British	388	682	755	1,451	1,372
British Indians	48	35	25	52	18
Canadian	-	-	-	1	-
Chinese	15,946	33,172	36,029	42,764	72,087
Czechoslovakian	-	-	5	4	4
Danish	4	11	4	10	4
Dutch	-	-	-	5	3
Estonian	-	-	-	9	5
French	15	22	30	55	69
Georgian	-	-	-	6	-
German	141	25	90	85	111
Greek	21	-	11	14	28
Hungarian	-	-	-	3	7
Italian	11	18	13	29	32

Japanese	84	107	160	89	294
Jewish	-	-	24	232	-
Korean	3	3	-	1	-
Latvian	-	7	13	20	10
Lithuanian	-	-	4	16	22
Norwegian	-	8	-	2	1
Persian	-	-	-	3	6
Peruvian	-	-	1	-	-
Filipino	-	70	24	15	19
Polish	-	21	75	48	77
Portuguese	2	2	10	7	21
Romanian	-	1	6	8	3
Russian	43	731	1,527	1,448	2,323
Serbian	-	-	-	-	6
Spanish	-	4	-	4	4
Swedish	-	-	3	2	6
Swiss	8	-	14	10	22
Tartar	-	-	-	11	-
Turkish	-	-	20	13	12
Ukrainian	-	-	-	7	-
Yugoslavian	-	-	-	-	6
Total	16,803	35,217	39,146	46,809	76,815

Source: British Municipal Council, Tientsin, Reports of Council for the year ended December, 31, 1938, and Budget for the year ended December 31, 1939, (Tientsin Press Limited, Tientsin, 1939), p.9.

Appendix 6

The Populations of Foreign Concessions in Tientsin.

Year	Nationality	British Concession	French Concession	Belgian Concession*	Italian Concession	Japanese Concession
1926	Foreign	2,045	1,450	na	470	5,104
	Chinese	33,172	35,000	2,000	7,000	21,347
1929	Foreign	3,117	1,300	-	375	4,000
	Chinese	36,029	51,500	-	7,000	30,000
1930	Foreign	na	980	-	375	4,000
	Chinese	na	49,610	-	7,000	30,000
1931	Foreign	na	980	-	360	5,800
	Chinese	na	49,610	-	6,000	27,000
1932	Foreign	na	980	-	360	6,700
	Chinese	na	49,610	-	6,000	25,000
1933	Foreign	na	980	-	360	7,100
	Chinese	na	49,610	-	6,000	27,400
1934	Foreign	3,954	980	-	375	6,535
	Chinese	42,764	49,610	-	7,258	27,057
1935	Foreign	4,045	915	-	375	7,835
	Chinese	42,764	69,996	-	7,258	27,159
1937	Foreign	4,045	915	-	373	10,153
	Chinese	42,764	69,996	-	6,447	26,360
1938	Foreign	4,728	1,800	-	739	19,252
	Chinese	72,087	120,000	-	14,879	19,444

na – Not available

Note

*The Belgian Concession was returned to China in 1929.

The foreign population in 1938 in the British concession is slightly different from the figure in.

Sources: H. G. W. Woodhead (ed.), *The China Year Book 1926-7* (Tientsin: Tientsin Press, Ltd.), pp.603-605, *The China Year Book 1929-30*, pp.99-100, *The China Year Book 1931* (Shanghai: North-China Daily News & Herald, Ltd.), pp.73-74, *The China Year Book 1932*, pp.147, *The China Year Book 1933*, p.105, *The China Year Book 1934*, pp.655-656, *The China Year Book 1935*, pp.347-348, *The China Year Book 1936*, pp.382, *The China Year Book 1938*, pp.350 and *The China Year Book 1939*, pp.158-159.

Appendix 7

Trade Development in Tientsin (selected years)

Years	Total Value (Tael)	Imports (Tael)	Exports (Tael)	Revenue (Tael)
1861	5,475,644	5,014,071	461,573	-
1871	18,557,682	17,610,540	947,142	441,162
1881	21,606,231	19,105,554	2,500,777	382,540
1891	37,245,515	26,546,064	4,700,451	590,455
1900	31,920,658	23,847,274	8,073,384	516,707
1901	49,411,423	39,257,317	10,154,106	764,514
1911	116,536,648	77,241,699	39,294,949	3,421,543
1921	224,779,202	161,160,671	63,618,531	6,878,496
1924	251,695,599	164,128,861	87,566,738	6,922,577

Source: O.D. Rasmussen, *Tientsin*, pp.298-299.

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