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Too Close for Comfort? NGOs, Global Civil Society and the U.K. Arms Trade

Anna Stavrianakis

A dissertation submitted to the University of Bristol in accordance with the requirements of the degree of PhD in the Faculty of Social Sciences and Law, Department of Politics, 15 March 2007.

81,751 words

Abstract

This thesis examines non-governmental organisation (NGO) activity in relation to U.K. involvement in the arms trade through the lens of debates about global civil society. I examine the objectives, strategies for change and impacts of six NGOs – Amnesty International, British American Security Information Council (BASIC), Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT), International Alert, Oxfam and Saferworld – in three cases. The case studies focus on sustainable development and the export of a £28m air traffic control system to Tanzania; human rights and arms exports to Indonesia; and conflict prevention and small arms and light weapons.

I make four core arguments in the thesis. First, there are two networks on arms issues, both comprised of state, capital and civil society actors. Arms capital has been integrated into the institutionally stronger elements of the U.K. state, whilst NGOs have formed alliances with weaker elements of it. Arms capital is structurally privileged and state policy is oriented towards arms exports accordingly. Second, U.K.-based NGOs have limited counter-hegemonic potential because of their understanding of the problem of U.K. arms exports and their reproduction of liberal understandings of development, human rights and conflict prevention. The partial exception to this is CAAT. Third, power relations within the NGO world are such that reformist insider NGOs dominate the political space available to civil society, muting the counter-hegemonic potential of more radical actors such as CAAT. Fourth, the research findings challenge the dominant liberal literature on global civil society. I identify four core features of this literature – the relationship between the state, market and civil society; civil society as the locus of progressive values; civil society as globalising; and an emphasis on non-violence – and on each count, the case of NGO activity in relation to the U.K. arms trade poses a challenge to liberal theorising.

Acknowledgements

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I am grateful to the Economic and Social Research Council for a Postgraduate Studentship, PTA-030-2003-01403, which funded this research.

Author's Declaration

I declare that the work in this dissertation was carried out in accordance with the Regulations of the University of Bristol. The work is original, except where indicated by special reference in the text, and no part of the dissertation has been submitted for any other academic award. Any views expressed in the dissertation are those of the author.

Signed

Date: 15 March 2007

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

AeIGT:	Aerospace Innovation and Growth Team
AI:	Amnesty International
ATT:	Arms Trade Treaty
BASIC:	British American Security Information Council
CAAT:	Campaign Against Arms Trade
CAVR:	Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation
CHAD:	Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department
CHASE:	Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department
CIA:	Central Intelligence Agency
GCPP:	Global Conflict Prevention Pool
Comtrade:	United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database
CPD:	Counter Proliferation Department
CPN (M):	Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)
CND:	Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
DASA:	Defence Analytical Services Agency
DEMAF:	Defence Export and Market Access Forum
DERA:	Defence Evaluation Research Agency
DESO:	Defence Export Services Organisation
DESP:	Defence Export Services Policy
DfID:	Department for International Development
DTI:	Department of Trade and Industry
ECGD:	Export Credit Guarantees Department
ECO:	Export Control Organisation

FCO:	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
GAM:	Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement)
HIPC:	Heavily Indebted Poor Country
HRPD:	Human Rights Policy Department
HRDGG:	Human Rights, Democracy and Good Governance Department
IA:	International Alert
IMET:	International Military Education and Training
KAR:	King's African Rifles
LDC:	Least Developed Country
MIC:	Military-industrial complex
MoD:	Ministry of Defence
MoU:	Memorandum of Understanding
NATO:	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDASP:	National Defence and Aerospace Systems Panel
NDIC:	National Defence Industries Council
NGO:	Non-governmental organisation
OIEL:	Open Individual Export Licence
PKI:	Partai Komunis Indonesia (Communist Party of Indonesia)
PKK:	Kurdistan Workers' Party
RECSA:	Regional Centre on Small Arms
SALW:	Small arms and light weapons
SIEL:	Single Individual Export Licence
TANU:	Tanganyika African National Union
TCAA:	Tanzania Civil Aviation Authority

TCDD:	Tanzania Coalition on Debt and Development
TNI:	Tentara Nasional Indonesia
TPDF:	Tanzanian People's Defence Force
UKWG:	UK Working Group on Arms
UN:	United Nations
UNDP:	United Nations Development Programme
VERTIC:	Verification Research, Training and Information Centre
WMD:	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WMEAT:	World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers

Chapter One: Introduction

Aims and Objectives

Global civil society has become an increasingly popular concept in International Relations scholarship and policy debates since the 1990s. It is commonly understood as a realm separate from the state and market, populated by non-violent actors such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) whose activity is based on progressive or emancipatory values. The aim of this thesis is to interrogate this understanding of global civil society through an examination of NGO activity on U.K. involvement in the arms trade. The United Kingdom is a leading actor in the international arms trade and, in recent years, debates surrounding the use to which recipients put weapons, the purported role of small arms in conflict, and government subsidies on arms production and export have provided a campaign focus for a number of NGOs. This thesis examines the objectives, strategies for change and impacts of the six main U.K.-based NGOs involved in arms campaigning in order better to understand their role as global civil society actors. These NGOs are Amnesty International, British American Security Information Council (BASIC), Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT), International Alert, Oxfam, and Saferworld.[1] Their activity is analysed in three cases, of sustainable development and the licensing of a £28m air traffic control system to Tanzania in 2001, human rights and arms exports to Indonesia, and conflict prevention and small arms exports and control efforts.

I have chosen to focus on NGO strategies for change in the U.K. arms trade for three reasons. First, the United Kingdom is one of the most significant actors in the international arms trade: between 2000 and 2004 it was the world's fifth largest exporter of major

[1] Amnesty International comprises an International Secretariat and over 50 national sections and structures, including one in the United Kingdom. Both the International Secretariat and U.K. section are based in London, and the U.K. section has been heavily involved in the development of work on military, security and police transfers, alongside the International Secretariat. Evidence from both is used in this thesis, and I identify which branch of Amnesty is being discussed where appropriate. Oxfam GB, based in Oxford, is one of twelve Oxfams (the others are based in Australia, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Hong Kong, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Quebec, Spain, and the USA), which together comprise Oxfam International. Most of Oxfam's work on the arms trade is done via national Oxfams; the thesis thus focuses on Oxfam GB.

conventional weapons (by volume), behind Russia, the USA, France and Germany,[2] and was also the world's fourth largest recipient of arms, behind China, India and Greece.[3] The government has a publicly stated policy on arms exports control and is particularly active in small arms control initiatives. It claims to be guided in its arms export activity by concerns regarding the United Kingdom's international commitments, human rights, the internal situation in the recipient country, regional stability, U.K. national security, the recipient state's attitude to terrorism and international law, the risk of diversion, and sustainable development.[4]

Whilst it is supported in its small arms control work by a number of NGOs, the U.K. government's activity in the wider, international arms trade continues to attract the criticism of a number of (sometimes the same) NGOs. Its claim to a responsible export policy is therefore worth investigating in light of the volume of equipment exported around the world and many of the recipients of that equipment. The thesis focuses on arms export policy under the Labour government (1997-present day); this government pledged to introduce an "ethical dimension" to foreign policy,[5] to support the introduction of an EU code of conduct on arms sales (although it also claimed to "support a strong U.K. defence industry"),[6] and to work with civil society, particularly in the areas of development and poverty elimination.[7] This makes it a good test case of U.K. involvement in the arms trade and NGO activity in relation to it.

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[2] Wezeman, Siemon T. and Mark Bromley (2005) "International Arms Transfers," in Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *SIPRI Yearbook 2005* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 417- 448; pp. 418, 427, 453.

[3] Wezeman, Siemon T. and Mark Bromley (2005) "The volume of transfers of major conventional weapons: by recipients and suppliers, 2000-2004," in Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *SIPRI Yearbook 2005* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp.449-454; p. 449. A note about the term "United Kingdom" is in order here. Reference in the literature is usually made to states as actors in the legal international arms trade. However, where arms industries are formally private enterprises, as in the United Kingdom, what this shorthand refers to is the exports of U.K.-based companies, which are licensed by the government. As is argued in this thesis, the close relationship between industry and the state means that the difference between the two is not always distinguishable.

[4] MoD, FCO and DTI (2000) *The Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria* ('Consolidated Criteria') (26 October), HC 199- 203W, reprinted in ibid., *Strategic Export Controls, Annual Report 2001* (London: FCO), Appendix F, pp. 413–416.

[5] Cook, Robin (1997) "Mission Statement for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office", speech delivered at Locarno Suite, FCO, 12 May 1997, reproduced in *The Guardian,* 12 May 1997, http://www.guardian.co.uk/indonesia/Story/0,2763,190889,00.html (15 January 2007).

[6] Labour Party (1997) *Labour Party Election Manifesto*, reproduced at http://www.psr.keele.ac.uk/area/uk/man/lab97.htm (15 January 2007).

[7] DfID (no date) "Working with civil society", http://www.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/dfidwork/civilsociety.asp (16 January 2007). The 1997 and 2001 Labour election manifestos also make reference to a positive relationship with the voluntary sector, although it is unclear whether this includes NGOs. In 1997 Robin Cook stated that "In bilateral contacts, Britain will seek dialogue on the observance of human rights wherever we have cause for concern. We will support the work of NGOs, such as Amnesty International, by raising at our meetings with the

Second, whilst the literature on U.K. involvement in the arms trade is growing, there is to date no research on the impact of NGOs on government activity in this area.[8] This study aims to address this lacuna. Under the Blair government, there has been increased access for NGOs on a variety of subjects, including arms issues. More widely, NGOs have become increasingly visible actors in international relations in both policy and academic debates in the last decade. Research into their understandings and strategies for change is therefore timely and important.

Third, there is an interesting gap in the global civil society literature between "soft" security issues such as environmental and development issues, human rights and indigenous peoples,[9] and "hard" (or traditionally realist) security issues associated with state sovereignty and military security. Most of the literature – which is overwhelmingly positive about the normative role of global civil society in world politics – focuses on soft issues. The arms trade is a hard state security issue; examining the ability of NGOs to generate change on it is therefore a good test of their influence. In addition, existing studies addressing weapons control, focusing on landmines and small arms, for example, illustrate the ways in which weapons can be framed in humanitarian terms, leaving states' authority over the security realm

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relevant regimes the cases of individual prisoners of conscience"; Cook, Robin (1997) "Human Rights into a New Century," Speech at the FCO, London, 17 July 1997, www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029391647&a=KArticle&aid=1013618392902 (17 January 2007).

[8] For overviews of U.K. involvement, see Cooper, Neil (1997) *The Business of Death. Britain's Arms Trade at Home and Abroad* (London: Tauris Academic Studies); Cooper, Neil (2000) "The pariah agenda and New Labour's ethical arms sales policy", in Little, Richard and Mark Wickham-Jones (eds.) *New Labour's foreign policy. A New Moral Crusade?* (Manchester: Manchester University Press), pp. 147-167; Mayhew, Emma (2005) "A Dead Giveaway: A Critical Analysis of New Labour's Rationales for Supporting Military Exports", *Contemporary Security Policy,* 26(1):62-83; Phythian, Mark (1997) "'Batting for Britain': British arms sales in the Thatcher years", *Crime, Law and Social Change,* 26: 271-300; Phythian, Mark (2000) *The Politics of British Arms Sales since 1964* (Manchester: Manchester University Press). On economic issues surrounding arms exports, see: Chalmers, Malcolm, Neil Davies, Keith Hartley and Chris Wilkinson (2001), *The Economic Costs and Benefits of UK Defence Exports* (York: University of York Centre for Defence Economics); Ingram, Paul and Ian Davis (2001) *The Subsidy Trap. British Government Financial Support for Arms Exports and the Defence Industry* (Oxford/ London: Oxford Research Group and Saferworld); Ingram, Paul and Roy Isbister (2004) *Escaping the Subsidy Trap. Why arms exports are bad for Britain* (London/Oxford: British American Security Council, Saferworld and Oxford Research Group); Martin, Stephen (2001) "The Implications for the U.K. Exchequer of an Ethical Arms Export Policy," *Applied Economics,* 33: 195-99. On specific cases in export policy, see Miller, Davina (1996) *Export or Die. Britain's Defence Trade with Iran and Iraq* (London: Cassell); Norton Taylor, Richard (1995) *Truth Is a Difficult Concept: Inside the Scott Inquiry.* (London: Guardian Books).

[9] Lipschutz, Ronnie (1992) "Reconstructing World Politics: The Emergence of Global Civil Society," *Millennium,* 21(3): 389-420.

– in particular, that of dominant states such as the USA – intact.[10] Weapons issues have also been addressed in the constructivist literature on norms. Whilst this literature does not focus on global civil society *per se,* it analyses NGOs and other global civil society actors as norm entrepreneurs or nodes in the system of norm formation and/or spread.[11] What is interesting about this literature is the way in which particular categories of weapons, in particular chemical and nuclear weapons, become delegitimised. It appears that weapons are a hard case, but some weapons are harder than others. Even these hard cases leave the realm of state security intact: the argument that particular categories of weapons are beyond the pale means they cannot be called "conventional" weapons, and they become delegitimised. One effect of this is to reinforce the legitimacy of "conventional" weapons and disparities in global military spending.[12] The case studies in this thesis speak to this issue: Chapter Seven demonstrates much higher levels of governmental and NGO control activity on small arms issues than on the wider conventional arms trade. The argument put forward in this thesis is that highly publicly visible control of particular types of weapons technology serves a legitimating function for wider governmental activity in the international arms trade, allowing it to claim to take NGO demands seriously whilst avoiding having to change its fundamental stance towards the trade.

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[10] On landmines, see Price, Richard (1998) "Reversing the Gun Sights: Civil Society Targets Landmines," *International Organization*, 52(3): 613-644; Hubert, Don (2000) "The Landmine Ban: A Case Study in Humanitarian Advocacy," Occasional Paper #42, Watson Institute Humanitarianism and War Project; Scott, Matthew J.O. (2001) "Danger-Landmines! NGO-Government Collaboration in the Ottawa Process", in Edwards, Michael and John Gaventa (eds.) *Global Citizen Action* (London: Earthscan), pp. 121-134. On small arms, see Anders, Holger (2003) "The Role of Non-State Actors in the European Small Arms Regime", University of Bradford, Peace Studies Papers Working Paper 6; Anders, Holger (2005) "European Controls on Small Arms Exports", in Krahmann, Elke (ed.) *New Threats and New Actors in International Security* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 177-196. This thesis does not engage with the substance of the arms control and strategic studies literature; for an overview of this literature, see Cooper, Neil (2006) "Putting disarmament back in the frame", *Review of International Studies,* 32: 353-376. I agree with Cooper that the majority of arms control literature is positivist, realist, and functions to delegitimise more radical proposals for disarmament.

[11] Price, Richard (1995) "A Genealogy of the Chemical Weapons Taboo", *International Organization,* 49(1): 73-103; Price, Richard (1997) *The Chemical Weapons Taboo* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press); Price, Richard and Nina Tannenwald (1996) "Norms and Nuclear Deterrence: The Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Taboos", in Katzenstein, Peter J. (ed.) *The Culture of National Security, Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press), pp. 114-152; Tannenwald, Nina (2005) "Stigmatizing the Bomb. Origins of the Nuclear Taboo", *International Security,* 29(4): 5-49.

[12] Cooper, Neil (2006) "What's the point of arms transfer controls?" *Contemporary Security Policy,* 27(1): 118-137. Also Cooper, "The Pariah Agenda and New Labour's Ethical Arms Sales Policy".

The focus of the thesis is U.K.-based NGOs' activity in relation to U.K. involvement in the arms trade, but it is necessary to understand the NGOs in the context of global civil society as several of them have global reach, with branches in many states and links with organisations in other parts of the world. More importantly for this thesis, in making arguments about development in Tanzania, human rights in Indonesia and conflict prevention in relation to small arms control in the global South, the NGOs contribute to the discursive construction and reproduction of international relations. The thesis explores these representations and their effects.

Within the overall aim of the thesis, there are five main objectives. First, to explore the U.K. government's declaratory policy and actual behaviour in the field of arms exports. Second, to examine the involvement of the U.K. state in the international arms trade, in which it is a leading exporter and regularly licences exports to destinations that NGOs deem controversial. Third, to establish how the six NGOs understand the arms trade, sustainable development, human rights and conflict prevention, and what strategies they use to achieve their objectives. Fourth, to understand the role of NGOs in global civil society. Fifth, to consider the implications of the thesis findings for how we theorise global civil society.

Methodological Issues

The methodology used to conduct the research is qualitative empirical analysis,[13] based on a postcolonial Gramscian and activist academic approach. Gramscian and postcolonial approaches can be combined to understand the relationship between the material and the ideal, and between class and other identities. Such an approach – in line with Laffey and Dean's call for a "flexible Marxism" – allows greater attention to be paid to questions of agency and expands analysis beyond parochial European concerns associated with economistic historical materialism.[14] A Gramscian approach understands the material and ideal to be mutually

[13] Silverman, David (1997) (ed.) *Qualitative Research: Theory, Method and Practice* (London: Sage).
[14] Laffey, Mark and Kathryn Dean (2002) "A flexible Marxism for flexible times. Globalization and historical materialism", in Rupert, Mark and Hazel Smith (eds.) *Historical Materialism and Globalization* (London: Routledge), pp. 90-110. Laffey and Dean turn to Althusser for their flexible Marxism rather than Gramsci, but the same sprit animates this thesis, especially given Gramsci's attention to the cultural and ideological aspects of hegemony.

constitutive: they influence one another and are not reducible to each other.[15] The material realm is not extra-discursive and separate from the ideal realm; rather, they can only be understood in tandem. In addition, racial, gender and other identities as well as class identities are intertwined in relations of domination and subordination in a global capitalist economy.[16] As Morton argues, "Class identity is inscribed in social forces, but those are not reducible to class."[17] Rather, the emphasis is on identities forged in relation to oppression. There is an enormous diversity of writings that can be included under the label "postcolonial": the usage in this thesis draws on critical investigations into western discourses of modernity; the relationships between colonialism, imperialism, Enlightenment values, and liberalism; the mutually constitutive role of the global North and South; and the relationships between imperial power and the politics of theory.[18] There is thus an emphasis on marginality based in historical processes of colonialism and the continued salience of postcolonialism despite formal independence of states in the global South.[19]

A Gramscian approach can be combined with postcolonial approaches because it avoids an economistic reference to class identities and does not deny the salience of other forms of identity; indeed, it poses as a question the relationships between these forms of identity. The research for this thesis is based on the understanding that particular forms of social relations, "while always being historically and differentially inflected ... have persistently (though never absolutely or in any monocausal way) organized people's lives across social formations and specific situations. Among these are capital's extraction of surplus labour, imperialism's tactics of eminent domain and white supremacy, and patriarchal gender hierarchies."[20] This avoids a totalizing approach that seeks to attribute causality to a single source; rather, it seeks to explain social life as "an ensemble of social practices," which is

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[15] Cox, Robert W. (1983) "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method", *Millennium*, 12(2): 162-175; p. 168.

[16] Morton, Adam David (2003) "Social Forces in the Struggle over Hegemony: Neo-Gramscian Perspectives in International Political Economy", *Rethinking Marxism*, 15(2): 153-179; p. 159.

[17] Ibid.

[18] See Slater, David (1998) "Post-colonial questions for global times", *Review of International Political Economy*, 5(4): 647-678; p.653.

[19] Ashcroft, Bill, Gareth Griffiths and Helen Tiffin (2003) "General Introduction", in Ashcroft et al (eds.) *The Post-colonial Studies Reader* (London: Routledge), pp. 1-6.

[20] Rosemary Hennessy, quoted in Laffey, Mark (2000) "Locating Identity: Performativity, Foreign Policy and State Action", *Review of International Studies*, 26: 429-444; p. 438.

"politically necessary" as a response to domination and subordination.[21] In this way, class and other identities are created in relation to the capitalism, imperialism and racism associated with the emergence of the modern state system, and are interlinked in relations of domination and subordination.

A key insight of postcolonial and Gramscian approaches is the immanent possibility of change, or at least the disruption of dominant discourses. It is vital to remember that "[t]he reproduction of social powers, dominance relations, and the practices that sustain them is ... always problematic, contestable."[22] One of the key foci of this thesis is the ability – or otherwise – of NGOs to contest dominant narratives of the arms trade and issues associated with it. Such an approach enquires as to the emergence and operation of representations through processes of articulation, which constructs a set of non-necessary linkages between terms, and the power they attain through their connection to social forces.[23] Linkages are made and entrenched through processes of repetition and citation and there is always the possibility of crisis because of the room for manoeuvre in conceptual structures; agency thus resides in the possibility to disrupt. [24] Discourses "require effort on the part of authorized speakers in order to produce and reproduce them, and such efforts are not always successful." Discourse is therefore open-ended and unstable.[25] The analysis in this thesis investigates the ways in which NGOs reproduce and/or challenge dominant representations of the arms trade, development, human rights and conflict prevention.

I combine a postcolonial Gramscian approach with an activist academic stance. The basic premise of activist academic practice is that concerns to document and challenge oppression are incorporated into one's scholarship.[26] It is based on a post-positivist epistemological position that fact and value are not separable – that is, that facts only exist

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[21] Hennessy, Rosemary (1996) "Queer Theory, Left Politics", in Makdisi, Saree, Cesare Casarino and Rebecca E. Karl (eds.) *Marxism Beyond Marxism* (London : Routledge), pp. 214-242; p. 220.
[22] Rupert, Mark (2005) "Class powers and the politics of global governance", in Barnett, Michael and Raymond Duvall (eds.) *Power in Global Governance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 205-228, p. 209.
[23] Grossberg, Lawrence (ed.) (1986) "On Postmodernism and Articulation. An Interview with Stuart Hall", *Journal of Communication Inquiry*, 10(2): 45-60, p. 53.
[24] Carver, Terrell (1998) *The Postmodern Marx* (Manchester: Manchester University Press), p.32, 48.
[25] Milliken, Jennifer (1999) "The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods", *European Journal of International Relations*, 5(2): 225-254; p. 242.
[26] Stavrianakis, Anna (2006) "Call to Arms: The University as a Site of Militarised Capitalism and a Site of Struggle," *Millennium*, 35(1): 139-154.

within particular value schemes – and that there are competing social forces that contribute to both hegemony and counter-hegemony. The researcher never stands outside her field of study; academic research is always a political pursuit. Research results are thus "not *findings* but *creations*."[27] A key feature of activist academic practice is direct involvement in the process one is studying. The idea for this thesis emerged whilst I was working as an intern at Saferworld in 2002. Through the PhD process, I have found myself increasingly persuaded by the more radical arguments of groups such as CAAT. In November 2004 I met other Bristol-based activists at the national CAAT Annual Gathering, and together we re-established a Bristol CAAT group. This was the start of my activity as an activist scholar, trying to straddle the worlds of academia and activism; since late 2005 I have been on the Steering Committee of CAAT. I have also been involved in NGO activity on the arms trade in other ways, co-convening a Workers' Educational Association peace education course and co-facilitating an Ministry of Defence (MoD) sponsored workshop for civil servants and NGO workers on U.K. small arms policy. In these ways, I have become increasingly involved in the subject I am researching: not only has it brought me into contact with civil servants and NGO workers, it has also increased my understanding of the politics of U.K. arms sales and NGO activity. I am thus part of this PhD as well as the author of it.

There are, of course, pitfalls associated with activist research and issues to be addressed. Gaining a reputation as an activist scholar can close off access to elite policymakers and civil servants. Whilst I was directly refused an interview by only one person, this was likely to have been because of the sensitivity of arms exports to Indonesia (the potential interviewee's area of expertise) rather than my reputation, if any, as a former NGO worker. Therefore, I consider that this did not materialise as a significant risk in the course of the research. I was able to establish rapport with many interviewees on the basis of having worked at Saferworld, which is seen as a respectable organisation within both the NGO and civil service worlds, and was on familiar terms with many of my interviewees already. Access was hardest to achieve in the Defence Export Services Organisation (DESO, part of the MoD) and the Department for Trade and Industry (DTI). I gained access to one official in each department, but they were reluctant to pass me on to other colleagues, and officials who did

[27] Irvine et al, quoted in Davidson, Julia O'Connell and Derek Layder (1994) *Methods, Sex and Madness* (London: Routledge), p. 77, emphasis in original.

not already know me were unwilling to meet me. However, the officials I did gain access to were relevant for the thesis, and from discussions with other academic researchers, it seems that access to these departments is typically difficult, regardless of one's background. This is itself interesting for the research, as it demonstrates that some government departments are less open to scrutiny than others. As is argued in the thesis, arms capital is most closely integrated with the MoD and DTI, which are institutionally stronger than other departments on arms issues; it is thus not surprising that they were less open to academic enquiry than the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Department for International Development (DfID).

Another potential risk associated with activist research (although I believe it applies whether one understands oneself as an activist researcher or not) is that of only seeing what one's political persuasions want one to see; that is, the risk of bias. Through the use of multiple data sources and triangulation, and by being explicit about my epistemological and political persuasions, I believe I have minimised this risk. Scholars have a duty to deal explicitly with "inconvenient facts", regardless of their political persuasion.[28] One can deal with this by acknowledging one's positionality, refusing to distort empirical data to suit one's advocacy agenda, distinguishing between empirical observation and political claim, and avoiding veiling one's positionality through omniscient third-person reporting.[29] Associated with the risk of bias is that of "going native", in which the researcher gets drawn completely into her informants' lives and loses critical perspective.[30] However, a post-positivist approach means that going native does not pose the same risks – indeed, sociologist Loïc Wacquant encouraged young researchers to go native, but not to go native naked, and to ensure that they return.[31]

Case Selection

The thesis objectives are achieved through analysis of NGO arguments and strategies in relation to U.K. arms export policy and practice in three cases. The six NGOs chosen are

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28 Weber, Max (1991) "Science as a Vocation," in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.) *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (London: Routledge), pp. 129-156; p.147.
29 Madison, Soyini D. (2005) *Critical Ethnography. Method, Ethics, and Performance* (London: Sage), pp. 138-9.
30 Russell, Bernard H. (2006) *Research Methods in Anthropology: qualitative and quantitative approaches* (Lanham: Alta Mira Press), pp.348-9.
31 Loïc Wacquant, personal communication, graduate seminar in Bristol, 2 June 2006.

the main NGOs active on U.K. involvement in the conventional arms trade. There are a small number of other U.K.-based NGOs that work on arms issues to a lesser degree, including Christian Aid, The Corner House, the Omega Foundation, and the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). They are not included in the thesis as they are not part of the main group of NGOs working on these issues. There are also groups such as Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) and Trident Ploughshares that are not included in the thesis because they focus predominantly on nuclear weapons. NGOs that work on conventional arms issues do not have day-to-day engagement with anti-nuclear groups. The focus of the thesis is on NGOs that work on conventional arms trade issues with a view to understanding the role of NGOs as actors in global civil society.

The case studies focus on sustainable development and the Tanzania air traffic control system, human rights and arms exports to Indonesia, and conflict prevention and small arms exports and control programmes. The government and NGOs agree that sustainable development, human rights and conflict prevention are important issues in arms export licensing and wider U.K. foreign relations. These issues are therefore good test cases in which the government can reasonably be expected to act to restrict arms exports and NGOs can reasonably be expected to have the most impact. The criteria for choosing the examples to analyse in each case study are: debate has been generated in parliamentary, media and/or academic circles on the merits of the government's actions; NGOs have attempted to exert influence; the cases have not already been analysed in the academic literature; data is available.

I chose Tanzania as the example for the case study on development because the licensing of the £28m air traffic control system in December 2001 generated debate about government policy, which states that it will take into account whether exports seriously hamper development in the recipient country. NGOs have used the Tanzania case as a symbolic example of how sustainable development is paid insufficient attention in export licensing: they use the example to try to gain leverage. I have only found one academic article that focuses on the Tanzania case, in the field of public administration.[32] My approach to the case and detailed

[32] Caulfield, Janice (2002) "Executive Agencies in Tanzania: Liberalization and Third World Debt", *Public Administration and Development*, 22, 209-220.

analysis of it thus contribute a new case study to the arms trade and global civil society literatures.

I chose Indonesia as the example for the human rights case study because the export of Hawk jets, Scorpion tanks and associated components and equipment has generated media, NGO and academic commentary in relation to the government's stated policy on human rights, namely that it will not issue an export licence if there is a clear risk that the proposed export might be used for internal repression. The Indonesian military is accused of human rights violations in Aceh and West Papua, in addition to its well-documented role in the massacres and destruction in East Timor in the late 1990s. It is different to the Tanzania case because it concerns ongoing exports rather than one particularly controversial deal. NGOs use the example of exports to Indonesia to flag what they see as the inconsistency in the government's approach to human rights. There is a small literature on arms exports to Indonesia that largely focuses on East Timor: I focus on Aceh in order to contribute a more recent example to this literature and focus on NGO activity.[33]

I chose small arms as the example for the conflict prevention case study because small arms control has been linked to conflict prevention measures in government and NGO discourses.[34] In addition to the small arms control programmes it runs in various parts of the global South, the U.K. government also licences small arms for export, including to states engaged in internal conflict such as Turkey, Morocco and Nepal. Armed violence perpetrated by the state therefore appears to be excluded from the government's definition of conflict prevention. The case study explores this apparent disjuncture between stated government policy and practice. Debate about the role of small arms in conflict and the importance of small arms control measures in conflict prevention programmes has been generated in NGO, academic and media circles. Small arms control is the issue on which NGOs are most active and have the closest relationship with government: this makes it a good test case of NGO influence and success. Whilst there is a literature on small arms control, some of which focuses

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[33] Curtis, Mark (2003) *Web of Deceit. Britain's Real Role in the World* (London: Vintage); Herring, Eric (2001) *Wiping the State Clean? How British IR Academia Can Contribute to Emancipatory Practice in World Politics.* BISA Paper 2001; Pilger, John (1998) *Hidden Agendas* (London: Vintage); and Wheeler, Nicholas J. and Tim Dunne (2004) *Moral Britannia? Evaluating the Ethical Dimension in Labour's Foreign Policy* (London: The Foreign Policy Centre).
[34] Bell, Louise (2003) *The Global Conflict Prevention Pool. A joint UK Government approach to reducing conflict* (London: FCO), August 2003, p. 33.

on the role of NGOs, there is no academic literature specifically on the question of how small arms programmes relate to wider arms export policy, and nothing that focuses on the counter-hegemonic potential of NGOs.[35]

Not every NGO is active in relation to each case but between them, they constitute the universe of NGOs involved in key issues relating to arms export control. In the Tanzania case, CAAT, Oxfam and Saferworld are active. In the Indonesia case, Amnesty, CAAT and Saferworld are active. In relation to small arms, Amnesty, International Alert, Oxfam and Saferworld are active, and BASIC has been active in the past. In addition, all the NGOs except CAAT are part of the UK Working Group on Arms (UKWG), which undertakes some specific advocacy and campaign work that covers all three issues.

Data Sources and Methods

The data for this thesis has been generated from primary and secondary data sources, and interviews with civil servants and NGO staff members. The main methods used are documentary analysis, interviews and a limited amount of participant observation. The research is activist but not very participatory: whilst I am in some senses researching *with* activists, I am not conducting research *for* them.[36] The interviews I conducted and my involvement in seminars and campaign work have served to link me both to policy debates and campaigning and protest. I have striven to achieve "intentional interplay between reflection and making sense on the one hand, and experience and action on the other," to ensure there is "neither too much reflection on too little experience, which is armchair theorizing, nor too little reflection on too much experience, which is mere activism."[37] A key benefit of such an approach is that it allows me to make empirically grounded theoretical arguments.

[35] Anders, "European Controls on Small Arms Exports"; Atwood, David C. (2002) "NGOs and Disarmament: Views from the Coal Face," in Vignard, Kerstin (ed.) *Disarmament Forum. NGOs as Partners: Assessing the Impact, Recognizing the Potential* (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research), pp.5-14; Batchelor, Peter (2002) "NGO Perspectives: NGOs and the Small Arms Issue", in Vignard, *Disarmament Forum,* pp.37-40; Boutwell, Jeffrey, Michael T. Klare, and Laura W. Reed (1995) (eds.) *Lethal Commerce: The Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: American Academy of Arts and Sciences); and successive editions of the Small Arms Survey's *Small Arms Survey* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
[36] See Stavrianakis, "Call to Arms."
[37] Heron, John and Peter Reason (2001) "The Practice of Co-operative Inquiry: Research 'with' rather than 'on' People", in Reason, Peter and Hilary Bradbury (eds.) *Handbook of Action Research. Participative Inquiry and Practice* (London: Sage), pp. 179-188; p. 179, p. 185.

I use the websites of the six NGOs, which contain information on their areas of interest, objectives, influence strategies and claims to success.[38] The NGOs' submissions to government, parliamentary questions, advocacy documents and campaign materials are accessible from websites; where they are not, they were made available by NGOs on request. I also use government websites, which give details of departments' involvement in the arms export process.[39] Parliamentary questions and answers, debates and Select Committee reports that deal with arms exports are all available from the U.K. Parliament website.[40] These data sources give information regarding legislation, government declaratory policy and patterns of arms exports, and NGO responses to these.

Data on U.K. arms export licensing and transfers is generated from a variety of sources: the U.K. government's *Annual Report on Strategic Export Controls*, U.K. annual defence statistics published by the Defence Analytical Services Agency (DASA), the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (Comtrade), the U.S. Department of State's World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers database (WMEAT), the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), and the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers' (NISAT) small arms databases.[41] Whilst the U.K. government produces more transparent data on its involvement in the arms trade than many other states, a number of overriding problems remain that make it difficult for independent analysts to assess its involvement in the arms trade with any degree of accuracy. These include state secrecy about involvement in the arms trade, claims to commercial confidentiality that preclude publication of certain data, and the incomparability of data across sources.[42] In order to mitigate the considerable difficulties in generating reliable data on U.K.

[38] Amnesty International UK, http://www.amnesty.org.uk; BASIC, http://www.basicint.org; CAAT, http://www.caat.org.uk, International Alert, http://www. http://www.international-alert.org; Oxfam GB, http://www.oxfam.org.uk; Saferworld, http://www.saferworld.org.uk.
[39] FCO, http://www.fco.gov.uk; DfID, http://www.dfid.gov.uk; MoD, http://www.mod.uk; DTI Export Control Organisation, http://www.dti.gov.uk/export.control.
[40] UK Parliament website, http://www.parliament.uk/.
[41] Annual Reports available from http://www.fco.gov.uk/; Defence Analytical Services Agency, http://www.dasa.mod.uk/natstats/ukds/2006/ukds.html; Comtrade, http://unstats.un.org/unsd/comtrade/; WMEAT, http://www.state.gov/t/vci/rls/rpt/wmeat/; UN Register, http://disarmament.un.org:8080/cab/register.html; SIPRI, http://www.sipri.org/contents/webmaster/databases; NISAT, http://www.nisat.org/ (all 29 September 2006).
[42] For example, data on licences granted for small arms and deliveries of small arms in Chapter Seven are not directly comparable because data for licences is calculated on the basis of the government's Military List codes,

arms exports, I pay most attention to the licences granted by the government. As an expression of what the government is willing to export (whether the equipment is actually exported or not), and as the U.K. government's own representation of its activity, I take this as the most significant measure. This data is supplemented with information from SIPRI and NISAT databases and the UN Register of Conventional Arms where possible or necessary.[43] In addition to these sources, I use news articles that relate to the arms trade in order to obtain information about developments in the arms industry, the arms trade and national export policies. These are largely obtained via the Weapons Trade Observer email list, which monitors national and international news coverage of the arms trade.[44]

A further note on arms export and licence data is in order. Export licenses are required for Military List and dual-use (i.e. military and civilian) equipment.[45] The two main types of licence of interest in this thesis are Standard Individual Export Licences (SIELs) and Open Individual Export Licences (OIELs). As a rule, SIELs allow the shipment of certain quantities of specified items to particular consignees; licences are valid for two years, unless the export is only temporary, in which case the licence is valid for one year. OIELs are granted to individual exporters and allow multiple shipments of specified items to specified destinations; in some cases, the consignee is also specified. OIELs for Military List items are valid for two years, while those for other items are valid for three years. For the purpose of this thesis, only permanent licences are counted because they signal that the equipment is being exported permanently. Government-to-government transfers do not always require a licence (as this would mean the government was licensing itself), such as for gifts of military equipment.[46] Whilst these can also cover permanent exports (and offer significant opportunities for the

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whilst data for exports is calculated on the basis of EC tariff codes. Another example is that the Comtrade database on U.K. arms exports, which gives information on exports through Customs, presents the information in US$, rather than the number of weapons exported.

[43] The UN Register, established as a transparency measure in 1992, is voluntary and the data is highly likely to be incomplete.

[44] Weapons Trade Observer e-group, http://groups.yahoo.com/group/WepsTrade/ (29 September 2006). The Weapons Trade Observer is run by David Isenberg, Senior Analyst at BASIC and commentator on weapons trade issues.

[45] Annexes to the government's annual report on strategic export controls contain lists of the goods and equipment covered under each of these categories. Equipment on the so-called "Military List" includes automatic weapons, ammunition, ground vehicles, vessels and aircraft designed or modified for military use, and military helmets; dual use equipment includes electronics, chemicals, computers and lasers.

[46] FCO et al (2004) *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2003* (London: The Stationery Office), pp. 20-1.

government to transfer weaponry without public scrutiny), they are much harder to document. Where information on government-to-government transfers has been obtained, it is included in the thesis.

The government's presentation of information has changed over time, in several instances leading to improved transparency. A minor inconvenience is that data across years is not necessarily comparable; for example, it was only in the 2000 Annual Report that the government first published the number of small arms for which SIELs were licensed. In 2004 the government moved to a quarterly reporting system, which gives the independent observer a better idea of when licences were granted; but no new types information are presented. It remains impossible to tell what has been licensed to whom, and it is very difficult to compare years and make generalisations. Nevertheless, the data used in this thesis is consistent with that provided by the government and used by research centres and NGOs; it thus conforms to widely accepted standards of analysis.

Interviews with civil servants involved in the arms export licensing process and NGO staff members lead to a deeper understanding of the issues explored via publicly available sources. The purpose of the interviews is to understand individuals' views on the nature of U.K. involvement in the arms trade and NGOs' objectives, strategies and impacts. Civil service interviewees were selected and approached on the basis of being part of a core group of civil servants involved in arms export licensing and control policy. They are all part of horizontal and vertical networks of staff from the four departments involved in arms export licensing and small arms control: DfID (particularly the Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department, CHAD[47]); the DTI (particularly the Export Control Organisation, ECO); the FCO (particularly the Counter Proliferation Department, CPD, Human Rights Policy Department, HRPD, relevant country desks, and the Security Policy Group); and the MoD (particularly Counter Proliferation and Arms Control, CPAC, and Directorate of Export Services Policy, DESP, which sits within DESO). NGO interviewees were selected and approached on the basis that they work specifically on U.K. arms export activities and/or on small arms control activities,

[47] CHAD was renamed as the Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department (CHASE) in late 2006. In this thesis reference is made to CHAD as this was the name of the department for the majority duration of the fieldwork.

whether on case work, strategy, parliamentary relations or media outreach. Further contacts were recommended by NGO staff members and civil service interviewees, through a process of "snowballing".[48] A list of interviewees is included in the bibliography.

Interviews were not conducted in one single fieldwork block, but rather in an iterative process during the course of the research period. This was facilitated by the short travel distances required (Bristol to London, Oxford etc). Interviews became progressively less structured as I built on my existing knowledge and understanding in an iterative process, which allowed me to engage in dialogue with interview partners. Each interview was a mix of semi-structured and unstructured questions, allowing for the pursuit of unexpected lines of enquiry and giving interviewees greater scope to discuss the issues they felt to be important.[49] This allowed me to gain a sense of what are seen as the salient issues in the NGO and civil service worlds, in addition to the issues I had already identified as important. All interviewees were offered the opportunity to be kept informed of the output of the research and invited to comment on draft chapters.

Common difficulties associated with interviewing, such as getting accurate and truthful responses to relatively closed questions, and getting full and sincere responses from open questions, look different from a critical perspective than they do in more orthodox approaches.[50] This thesis challenges the common assumption that "subjectivity is bias" and needs to be eliminated: in qualitative research, interviewing is "an opportunity to delve and explore precisely those subjective meanings that positivists seek to strip away."[51] An interviewee is understood as "a subject with agency, history, and his or her own idiosyncratic command of a story."[52] Interview material thus provides both empirical information on and representations of U.K. arms export and NGO activity. Interviewees' representations of the issues surrounding the arms trade are themselves part of the research findings: they form the

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48 Champion, Robby (2003) "Taking Measure: Start with a Plan, Pick Subjects Carefully, Train Interviewers to Listen," *Journal of Staff Development* 24(3): 65-6, p. 65; see also O'Connell Davidson and Layder, *Methods, Sex and Madness*, pp. 176-7, and Kull, Steven (1982) *Minds at War. Nuclear Reality and the Inner Conflicts of Defense Policymakers.* (New York: Basic Books), p. 33.
49 Grix, Jonathan (2001) *Demystifying Postgradaute Research.* (Birmingham: Birmingham University Press), pp. 73-77.
50 O'Connell Davidson and Layder, *Methods, Sex and Madness*, p. 116.
51 Ibid., p. 121. See also Avis, Hannah (2002) "Whose Voice is That? Making Space for Subjectivities in Interviews", in Bondi et al, *Subjectivities, Knowledges, and Feminist Geographies. The Subjects and Ethics of Social Research* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield), pp.191-207.
52 Madison, *Critical Ethnography*, p.25.

"mythico-history", in which what matters is not so much the truth or falsity (although it is interesting in cases where narratives are demonstrably false), but rather their role in "worldmaking".[53]

Interview transcripts were analysed manually, through a process of numerous readings and the elucidation of themes. These readings are not innocent and are themselves part of the analytical process.[54] Themes are labelled according to issues I knew I wanted to explore before I start interviewing (e.g. factors behind the Tanzania sale) and others that emerged from the analysis of the data (issues that are raised by interviewees themselves e.g. perceptions of professionalism amongst NGO workers).[55] Interview transcripts were triangulated or cross-referenced with other documentary sources to gain a greater degree of nuance in the understanding being put forward.[56]

A key opportunity and challenge for the research is the contemporary nature of events covered in the thesis. Whilst the Tanzania licence was granted at the end of 2001, the repercussions of the deal and the debates it generated are ongoing. In the cases of arms exports to Indonesia and small arms, exports are continuous, as are small arms control efforts in which the U.K. government is involved. The benefit of this is that it is possible to solicit interviewees' views on events as they happen, or just after. This means that events are fresh in interviewees' minds, the research is timely and relevant to political debates of the day. On the other hand, interviewees may be reluctant to discuss current developments as the issues at stake are 'live'. In this respect, off the record interviews or interviews held under the Chatham House rule were used where participants preferred this. The Chatham House Rule states that: "participants are free to use the information received, but neither the identity not the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed."[57]

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[53] Malkki, Liisa H. (1995) *Purity and Exile. Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), p. 55.
[54] Punch, Keith F. (1998) *Introduction to Social Research. Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches.* (London: Sage), p. 190. See also Oliver, Daniel G., Julianne M. Serovich and Tina L. Mason (2005) "Constraints and Opportunities with Interview Transcription: Towards Reflection in Qualitative Research," *Social Forces*, 84(2): 1273-1289.
[55] On coding, see Madison, *Critical Ethnography*, pp. 36-9, and Rubin, Herbert J. and Irene S. Rubin (1995) *Qualitative Interviewing. The Art of Hearing Data* (Thousand Oaks: Sage), pp. 238-254.
[56] Triangulation refers to the use of "an intersecting set of different methods and data types ... in a single project;" Punch, *Introduction to Social Research*, p. 190.
[57] Chatham House (2002) *The Chatham House Rule*, http://www.riia.org/index.php?id=14 (3 October 2005). This is in addition to adherence to the more general rules relating to interviewee and data protection outlined by the

Attribution of interview material in the thesis is as full as possible, but always in line with interviewees' wishes. In practice, it has resulted that material from interviews with civil service officials is usually used under the Chatham House rule, and material from interviews with NGO staff members is usually fully attributed. This unintended outcome is itself interesting: it is indicative of the social roles of government officials and NGO workers. Officials were wary of speaking in an individual capacity, emphasising when they were putting forward a personal opinion rather than official position and often asking that this personal openness be kept off the record. This is related to their role as a public official and also concerns about career progression. Also, the arms trade is by its nature secretive and opaque: the government emphasises commercial confidentiality and will not comment on individual cases, giving an added impetus to the use of the Chatham House rule. The partial exception to this was provided by some DfID officials, who were happy to go on record with their views on arms control; this may be because they are more concerned with controlling the arms trade than many officials from other departments. In contrast, most NGO interviewees spoke with me on the basis of their role as representatives of their organisations, but were more willing to go on record and put forward personal opinions. This is partly a difference in organisational culture and because NGO workers do not bear the burden of representing the state.

In addition to interviews, I conducted a small amount of participant observation through my involvement in NGO work since 2002.[58] Participant observation has a dual purpose: to engage in "activities appropriate to the situation" and also "observe the activities, people, and physical aspects of the situation", with the aim of becoming aware of things one would not normally notice and studying the tacit cultural rules of the situation.[59] This tool of ethnographic study allows the researcher to conduct embedded and embodied social inquiry that focuses on and engages in practice.[60] Conducting participant observation makes the

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British Sociological Association in its statement of ethical practice, relating to consent, agreement on level of attribution, and safe storage of research data; British Sociological Association (March 2002) *Statement of Ethical Practice,* http://www.britsoc.co.uk/bsaweb.php?link_id=14&area=item1 (3 October 2005).

[58] There are a variety of ways in which participant observation can be categorised; see Spradley, James P. (1980) *Participant Observation* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston), pp. 59-60; Russell, *Research Methods in Anthropology,* p. 347. I understand myself to have been acting as sometime participant-turned-observer, and sometime observer-turned-participant; these categories are from Gold, cited in O'Connell Davidson and Layder, *Methods, Sex and Madness,* pp. 168-9.

[59] Spradley, *Participant Observation,* pp. 54-6.

[60] Loic Wacquant, personal communication, graduate seminar, Bristol University, 2 June 2006.

research simultaneously an insider and an outsider;[61] this simultaneous involvement and distance makes it well suited to an activist academic approach. Whilst participant observation is only done to a limited degree in this thesis, it suggests a fruitful avenue of future research into global civil society activity and will be considered as a central research method for subsequent projects.

Concepts and terms

Several concepts and terms feature regularly throughout the thesis; they are defined here as a precursor to their use in the remainder of the thesis. They are NGO, arms, global North and South, polyarchy and imperialism. The concepts of global civil society, hegemony and counter-hegemony are the subject of Chapter Two. The usage of these concepts in the thesis is in line with the postcolonial Gramscian approach to the research project.

Non-governmental organisation (NGO)

There are a plethora of definitions and usages of the term "NGO" and, likewise, of their perceived function in world politics, much of which depends on the perspective of those writing about them or engaging with them.[62] Distinctions can be made according to their size, income, function (e.g. relief, advocacy, campaigning), scope (national, international, transnational), audience (grassroots, elite), membership, across a range of issues (human rights, social justice, welfare, the environment) and strategy (from reformist insider to radical outsider approaches, introduced in Chapter Four). Labels such as grassroots organisations, community based organisations, civil society organisations, citizen groups and voluntary sector organisations abound in the literature as equivalent terms. The main literatures on NGOs tend to come from development or international relations specialists.[63]

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[61] Spradley, *Participant Observation,* pp. 57.
[62] Fisher, William F. (1997) "Doing Good? The Politics and Antipolitics of NGO Practices", *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 26, 439-464; p. 442.
[63] Examples from the development literature include: Edwards, Michael (2000) *NGO Rights and Responsibilities. A New Deal for Global Governance* (London: The Foreign Policy Centre); Edwards, Michael and David Hulme (eds.) (1996) *Beyond the Magic Bullet. NGO Performance and Accountability in the Post-Cold War World* (West Hartford: Kumarian Press); Edwards, Michael and David Hulme (1996) "Too Close for Comfort? The Impact of Official Aid on Nongovernmental Organizations", *World Development,* 24(6): 961-973; Fowler, Alan (2000) "NGDOs as a moment in history: beyond aid to social entrepreneurship or civic

What unites many or most of these conceptions is that NGOs are independent of government, although they may receive government funding; usually reliant on voluntary contributions for a significant proportion of their income; and voluntary, although many NGOs employ at least some permanent staff. There is a tendency in the literature to idealize them as somehow removed from both the politics of state policy and the greed of the market.[64] As is argued in more detail in Chapter Two, NGOs are generally understood as driven by progressive or emancipatory values. The organisations under analysis in this thesis are all formally independent of government, not-for-profit, and organised (they have offices, budgets, and employ permanent staff). Whilst there are significant differences between them in terms of their objectives and strategies (introduced in Chapter Four and discussed in more detail in the case studies), they can all be understood as NGOs.

The rise of NGOs is part of a "New Policy Agenda" that privileges markets and private sector initiative in the economic sphere and "good governance", based on political democratization, in the political sphere.[65] As will become apparent in the case studies, good governance is a frequent theme in North-South relations in the development, human rights and conflict prevention spheres. Debates around NGO efficiency, legitimacy and accountability are often set within this New Policy Agenda frame; there is a general lack of critical purchase on the wider context of NGO activity. Such an approach depoliticises the status quo; I seek to unsettle the status quo and investigate the role of NGOs in buttressing or challenging hegemonic understandings of the arms trade, development, human rights and conflict prevention.

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organisation?", *Third World Quarterly*, 21(4): 637-654; Korten, David (1987) "Third Generation NGO Strategies: A Key to People-Centred Development", *World Development*, 15: 145-59; Padron, Mario (1987) "Non-governmental development organisations: from development AID to development cooperation", *World Development*, 15: 69-77; Thomson, Ann (1992) *The World Bank and Cooperation with NGOs* (Ottawa: CODE). Examples from the International Relations literature include: Collingwood, Vivien (2006) "Non-governmental organisations, power and legitimacy in international society", *Review of International Studies*, 32: 439-454; Kaldor, Mary (2003) *Global Civil Society. An Answer to War* (Cambridge: Polity Press); Keck, Margaret and Kathryn Sikkink (1998) *Activists Beyond Borders. Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press); Lipschutz, "Reconstructing World Politics: The Emergence of Global Civil Society", Mathews, Jessica T. (1997) "Power Shift", *Foreign Affairs*, 76(1): 50-66; Wapner, Paul (1995) "Politics Beyond the State: Environmental Activism and World Civil Politics", *World Politics*, 47(3): 311-340; Weiss, Thomas G. and Leon Gordenker, (eds.) (1996) *NGOs, the UN and Global Governance* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner).

[64] Fisher, "Doing Good?", p. 442.

[65] Edwards and Hulme, "Too Close for Comfort?", pp. 961-2; Edwards, Michael and David Hulme (1996) "NGO Performance and Accountability", in Edwards and Hulme, *Beyond the Magic Bullet*, pp. 1-20.

Arms

The goods and equipment that NGOs are concerned about are variously labelled as arms, weapons, or defence items. In the literature on the arms trade, scholars also variously refer to arms or defence.[66] I refer to arms because it is a central contention of this thesis that the label "defence" serves an ideological function of making weapons and weapons transfers appear necessary and restrained. The goods and equipment produced and exported by the United Kingdom are not purely defensive, but are often used in aggression and cause massive suffering. This point aside, there remain disputes over what equipment counts as an arm.[67] In this thesis, complete weapons systems, components, spares, ammunition, and any other items that the U.K. government requires companies to obtain a licence for exporting, are included as arms.

Global North and South

I have chosen to use the terms global North and South in preference to references to the developed and developing worlds, or First and Third worlds, which are commonly associated with differences in levels of industrialization.[68] My understanding of these terms is that the global North and South are "imagined geographical space[s]"[69] rather than objective labels to be attached to particular places. They do not have a prior existence as unproblematic entities; rather, they are produced and reproduced through discourse and practice.[70] The categories of North and South are mutually constitutive, producing and reproducing each

[66] See the titles of texts listed in footnote 8.

[67] For example, David Edgerton argues that historical accounts of Britain as a welfare state rest, in part, on a significant under-calculation of what counts as "arms"; Edgerton, David (2006) *Warfare State. Britain, 1920-1970* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 306. And Paul Dunne and Eamon Surry document the increasing importance of information technology, electronics and services in the military industry; Dunne, J. Paul and Eamon Surry (2006) "Arms Production", in Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *SIPRI Yearbook 2006* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 387-418; pp. 394, 414-5.

[68] Sklair, Leslie (2002) *Globalization. Capitalism and its Alternatives* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 12. In 1980 the Brandt Commission's *North-South* report popularised the terms North and South, although their usage is broadly synonymous with rich/poor or developed/developing, and is not the usage intended here. The Independent Commission on International Development Issues (1980) *North-South: A Programme for Survival* (London: Pan Books).

[69] Duffield, Mark (2002) "Social Reconstruction and the Radicalization of Development: Aid as a Relation of Global Liberal Governance", *Development and Change*, 33(5): 1049-1071, p. 1052.

[70] Doty, Roxanne Lynn (1996) *Imperial Encounters. The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), p. 1.

other in a context of hierarchy.[71] The concept of the global North and South is important for the thesis because of the role of the arms trade and NGO activity in creating and reproducing both categories.

Imperialism

Imperialism is re-emerging as a popular concept on both the political right and left.[72] In this thesis I draw on historical materialist understandings of imperialism and supplement these with a postcolonial approach, in order to understand the context of both the arms trade and global civil society. There are a variety of positions on empire and imperialism within the literature broadly situated on the political left.[73] The approach used in this thesis draws on the work of scholars such as William Robinson and Leo Panitch, who emphasise the centrality of the U.S. state in contemporary imperial relations, albeit in an increasingly internationalising formation.[74] In the thesis I refer to processes of the internationalisation of both states and capital, led by a transnational capitalist class, defined (following Sklair) as consisting of "those people who see their own interests and/or the interests of their social and/or ethnic group,

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[71] Doty, *Imperial Encounters,* p.7. See also Barkawi, Tarak and Mark Laffey (2002) "Retrieving the Imperial: *Empire* and International Relations", *Millennium,* 31(1): 109-127; Barkawi, Tarak (2006) *Globalization and War* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield), pp. 101-2.

[72] E.g. Boot, Max (2001) "The case for American empire: The most realistic response to terrorism is for America to embrace its imperial role," *The Weekly Standard,* 15 October 2001, 7(5), http://www.weeklystandard.com/Utilities/printer_preview.asp?idArticle=318 (18 May 2006); Ikenberry, G. John (2001) "American power and the empire of capitalist democracy," *Review of International Studies,* 27: 191-212; Mallaby, Sebastian (2002) "The reluctant imperialist: Terrorism, failed states, and the case for American empire," *Foreign Affairs,* March/April 2002, 81(2): 2-7; Mann, Michael (2003) *Incoherent Empire* (London: Verso); Hardt, Michael and Antonio Negri (2000) *Empire.* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press); Gowan, Peter (1999) *The Global Gamble: Washington's Faustian Bid for World Dominance* (London: Verso); Robinson, William I. (2004) *A Theory of Global Capitalism. Production, Class, and State in a Transnational World* (London: The Johns Hopkins University Press).

[73] Hardt and Negri, for example, emphasise the declining sovereignty of the nation state and emergence of a "decentered and deterritorializing apparatus of rule" that is imperial in nature but not tied to any single nation state; Hardt and Negri, *Empire,* pp. xi-xvi. Gowan, in contrast, investigates the methods used by the American government and business elites to "'go global'", that is, to "entrench the United States as the power that will control the major economic and political outcomes across the globe in the twenty-first century;" Gowan, *The Global Gamble,* p. vii.

[74] Robinson, William I. (2002) "Capitalist globalization and the transnationalization of the state," in Rupert, Mark and Hazel Smith (eds.) *Historical Materialism and Globalization* (London: Routledge), pp. 210-229; Robinson, *A Theory of Global Capitalism*; Panitch, Leo and Sam Gindin (2003) "Global Capitalism and American Empire", in Panitch, Leo and Colin Leys (eds.) *Socialist Register 2004. The New Imperial Challenge* (London: Merlin Press), pp.1-42; Panitch, Leo (1998) "'The State in a Changing World': Social-Democratizing Global Capitalism?", *Monthly Review,* 50(5). Robinson and Panitch agree that processes of internationalisation are occurring and that the USA is dominant, but Robinson argues that U.S. supremacy is declining and in the process of being replaced by a transnational state; Panitch and Gindin call this "clearly exceedingly extravagant;" Panitch and Gindin, "Global Capitalism and American Empire", p.24.

often transformed into an imagined national interest, as best served with an identification with the interests of the capitalist global system."[75]

The U.S. state is economically and militarily dominant within this imperial formation, with coercion providing the backbone to economic globalisation: "McDonald's cannot flourish without McDonnell Douglas .... And the hidden fist that keeps the world safe for Silicon Valley's technologies to flourish is called the U.S. Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps."[76] The United Kingdom plays a leading secondary role in this imperial formation.[77] It is one of the leading second-tier arms exporters, having been a first-tier exporter with the advent of the modern international arms trade.[78] There is thus an intersection of the United Kingdom's own imperial past with that of the current leading imperial state.

Whilst "empire often denotes a distinct type of political entity and imperialism a policy of formal conquest and rule," this is insufficient for understanding contemporary international relations.[79] The age of formal empire is over; decolonisation led to the creation of new nation states with ostensible control over their own economies and militaries. But unequal economic, political and military relations systematically situate the global South in a subordinate position to the global North; these are relations of hierarchy. It is these hierarchical relations that the term imperialism captures, in an attempt to rescue International Relations theorising from the "territorial trap" that privileges state sovereignty without taking into account the imperial

[75] Sklair, Leslie (2002) *Globalization*, p. 9. Sklair identifies the four "overlapping fractions" of the transnational capitalist class as "TNC executives, globalizing bureaucrats, politicians and professionals, consumerist elites (merchants and media)"; Sklair (1997) "Social movements for global capitalism: the transnational capitalist class in action," *Review of International Political Economy*, 4(3): 514-438; p. 514. Military actors are not named specifically in this understanding; they are probably included in the category of "politicians and professionals" but Sklair's definition is indicative of a wider silence on the role of force in globalisation. Robinson, in contrast, does not include non-propertied strata in his definition; he defines the transnational capitalist class as "the capitalist group that owns or controls transnational capital"; Robinson, *A Theory of Global Capitalism,* p. 36. Given the integration of arms capitalists and state representatives (documented in Chapter Three), it is appropriate to include non-propertied strata such as globalizing bureaucrats in the definition of the transnational capitalist class.
[76] Friedman, Thomas L. (2000) *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (London: HarperCollins), p. 464.
[77] Benn, Tony and Colin Leys (2004) "Bush and Blair: Iraq and the UK's American Viceroy", in Panitch, Leo and Colin Leys (eds.) *Socialist Register 2005. The Empire Reloaded* (London: Merlin Press), pp. 324-333.
[78] As is argued in Chapter Three, the international arms trade is hierarchically structured into three tiers, according to states' abilities to produce weaponry; state's positions in this hierarchy also shapes their export behaviour.
[79] Barkawi and Laffey, "Retrieving the Imperial", p.111.

relations between them and that have constituted them.[80] An imperial understanding of the international means it is "a 'thick' set of social relations, consisting of social and cultural flows as well as political-military and economic interactions in a context of hierarchy."[81] A central element of this understanding of imperialism is the discursive effect of a distinction between the global North and South, in which the global South is understood as dangerous, barbarian, weak, or somehow otherwise lacking, in contrast to the rational, strong, benevolent North.[82] In this understanding, military intervention (often represented as "humanitarian") and development assistance can both be understood as exemplifying and further entrenching imperial relations.[83] Imperialism should thus be understood as "a social formation that importantly transformed both colonizer and colonized" and continues to reverberate today.[84] NGO and global civil society activity is analysed from such an imperial perspective, enquiring as to whether NGOs buttress or challenge imperial representations and relationships between the global North and South.

Polyarchy

Polyarchy refers to "elite minority rule and socioeconomic inequalities alongside formal political freedom and elections involving universal suffrage," as defined by William Robinson; that is, capitalist social relations plus limited formal liberal democratic political arrangements.[85] A structural feature of the post-Cold War era, polyarchy is "a global political system corresponding to a global economy under the hegemony of a transnational elite which is the agent of transnational capital."[86] Robinson argues that since the end of the Cold War, the USA has been promoting polyarchy in the global South on behalf of a transnationalising capitalist class, in particular through "democracy promotion" programmes, which are "aimed not only at

80 Barkawi, *Globalization and War*, pp.46-7; Agnew, John (1994) "The territorial trap: the geographical assumptions of international relations theory", *Review of International Political Economy*, 1: 53-80; Agnew, John and Stuart Corbridge (1995) *Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory, and International Political Economy* (London: Routledge).
81 Barkawi and Laffey, "Retrieving the Imperial", p. 110.
82 Barkawi, *Globalization and War*, p.103; Doty, *Imperial Encounters*; Escobar, Arturo (1995) *Encountering Development. The Making and Unmaking of the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press); Said, Edward (1978) *Orientalism* (New York: Random House).
83 Barkawi and Laffey, "Retrieving the Imperial", p. 112.
84 Krishna, Sankaran (2001) "Race, Amnesia, and the Education of International Relations", *Alternatives*, 26: 401-424; p. 414; and Barkawi and Laffey, "Retrieving the Imperial".
85 Robinson, William (1996) *Promoting Polyarchy. Globalization, US Intervention, and Hegemony* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 356.
86 Ibid., p.4.

mitigating the social and political tensions produced by elite-based and undemocratic status quos, but also at suppressing popular and mass aspirations for more thoroughgoing democratization of social life."[87] This marks a change from post-World War Two U.S. foreign policy, which revolved around the development of alliances with authoritarian and repressive regimes. The emergence of authoritarian social relations in the global South is thus intimately related to U.S. foreign policy.[88] As a leading secondary power, the U.K. state has actively participated in the polyarchy agenda; as is argued in Chapter Five, it has been a leading proponent of good governance in relation to military spending, and as is argued in Chapter Seven, it is a leading actor on small arms issues and conflict prevention.

Whilst there is a new trend in the external relations of the U.S. and transnational elites, Robinson makes a caveat that is central to the arguments of this thesis. He argues that during the transitions from military to civilian rule that have occurred in many parts of the global South, states' coercive apparatuses have remained intact, as they underpin the wider social order. Demilitarization is thus "controlled" and never total.[89] The promotion of polyarchy is "a general guideline of post-Cold War foreign policy and not a universal prescription" – authoritarian regimes such as that in power in Saudi Arabia are thus left in place and supported as they are too strategically important to risk. As Robinson argues, "As a general rule, authoritarian regimes are supported *until* or *unless* a polyarchic alternative is viable and in place."[90] As is argued in the course of the thesis, the uneven promotion of polyarchy is exemplified through the arms trade, which provides the means of coercion that ultimately back up state regimes. The Tanzania deal was, it appears, agreed by elite military figures under the Mwinyi regime and the subsequent President, Benjamin Mkapa, despite his exemplary record in DfID-led debt relief and anti-corruption programmes, was unable to reverse it. The promotion of polyarchy in Tanzania was thus stalled by the persistence of this deal. U.K. arms export and wider defence policy towards Indonesia has historically involved support for repressive regimes; policy under New Labour demonstrates the tentative promotion of polyarchy, except in relation to restive areas such as East Timor, Aceh and West Papua. And small arms control measures are exemplary of the promotion of polyarchy, as they are

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[87] Ibid., p.6.
[88] Ibid., p.15.
[89] Ibid., pp.64-6.
[90] Ibid., pp.112-3, emphasis in original.

promoted as part of a wider good governance agenda; the exception comes with states such as Morocco, Nepal, and Turkey, states that claim to face insurgency or terrorism, and whose elites are supported by the United Kingdom and other states for the purposes of regime stability.

Overview of the arms export licensing process

The arms export licensing process is administered and controlled by ECO, which sits within the DTI.[91] Companies submit export licence applications to ECO, which circulates applications within the DTI and to the MoD, FCO and (where development concerns are an issue) DfID.[92] Each department gives recommendation as to whether licences should be granted or not, having assessed applications on a case by case basis against some or all of the criteria in the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria (hereafter, Consolidated Criteria). Formed in 2001 through the amalgamation of the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports with the United Kingdom's national criteria, the Consolidated Criteria form the main regulatory mechanism for U.K. arms exports, setting out the government's commitment to be guided in its arms export activity by concerns regarding the United Kingdom's international commitments, human rights, the internal situation in the recipient country, regional stability, U.K. national security, the recipient state's attitude to terrorism and international law, the risk of diversion, and sustainable development.[93] The Consolidated Criteria are listed in full in Appendix One.

If departments or sub-departments cannot agree on a course of action, the licence application is referred to Ministers, along with the evidence for each position, and the Minister decides whether or not a licence should be granted. Whilst Number Ten has no formal role in the licensing process, the Prime Minister has traditionally been involved in promoting arms exports and, as is detailed in Chapter Five, was in all likelihood consulted in the Tanzania case because of the Cabinet-level dispute over it. This is one example of a wider pattern of Number

[91] For a more detailed overview of this process, see Dover, Robert (2007) "For Queen and Company. The Role of Intelligence in the UK's Arms Trade", *Political Studies,* forthcoming; Miller, *Export or Die,* pp. 22-63; and Phythian, *The Politics of British Arms Sales since 1964,* pp.47-105.
[92] DfID's role in the licensing process is dealt with in greater detail in Chapter Five and the role of HRPD is discussed in Chapter Six.
[93] MoD et al, *The Consolidated Criteria.*

Ten involvement in what is officially a bureaucratic process. The late Robin Cook argued in his autobiography that "the chairman of British Aerospace [at the time, Sir Richard Evans] appeared to have the key to the garden door to Number 10. Certainly I never once knew Number 10 come up with any decision that would be incommoding to British Aerospace, even when they came bitterly to regret the public consequences."[94] As is argued in Chapter Three, the relationship between arms companies, in particular BAE Systems, and the more institutionally power elements of the U.K. state, is crucial to understanding the impetus to arms exports.

A key element in the bureaucratic process is the so-called "Form 680" process. Administered by the Directorate of Export Services Policy (DESP), which sits within DESO as part of the MoD, it occurs before the formal licensing process and functions to give MoD clearance to companies for the sale, demonstration, promotion or export of certain equipment, goods or information that is classified.[95] It gives companies "an indication of what markets may provide viable export opportunities for their products" and "speeds up the assessment of any eventual Export Licence Application made through the Department of Trade and Industry."[96] Whilst F680 approval does not guarantee that any subsequent licence application will be approved, or remove the necessity to comply with licensing requirements,[97] it does give industry a good idea of what will be licensed. As an industry lobby group argues, it plays a role in "enhancing the potential customer's comfort factor feeling that a licence would be issued by HMG."[98] The Form 680 process is thus an indicator of the pro-export stance of the U.K. state. Once licences have been granted, scrutiny of the government's export record is performed by the Quadripartite Committee. This comprises four parliamentary Committees (Defence, Foreign Affairs, International Development and Trade and Industry) and serves to "review

[94] Cook, Robin (2004) *The Point of Departure. Diaries from the Front Bench* (London: Pocket Books), p.73.
[95] DTI (2006) "Strategic Export Control – Licensing and Rating – Guidance", 21 September 2006, http://www.dti.gov.uk/europeandtrade/strategic-export-control/licensing-rating/guidance/page8721.html (7 December 2006).
[96] MoD (2006) *Guidance Notes on Completion of MoD Form 680,* http://www.deso.mod.uk/pdfs/F680-Guidance.pdf (7 December 2006).
[97] DESO (no date) "MoD Form 680 Procedure", http://www.deso.mod.uk/arms_control.htm (7 December 2006).
[98] Export Group for Aerospace and Defence (no date) "680 Advice", http://www.egad.org.uk/sw3163.asp (7 December 2006).

Government policy on licensing arms exports and licensing decisions."[99] The Chair of the Committee, Roger Berry, described the role of the Committee as to scrutinise, not make policy, to ensure exports are consistent with the EU Code of Conduct and with stated policy, to check whether the policy is correct, and to see if monitoring and enforcement provisions are adequate (which, he added, they are clearly not).[100]

In addition to issues surrounding the implementation of the government's guidelines, there is a wider problem with the government's approach to licensing. The inevitable time lag between the licensing of an export and the actual delivery of the equipment raises the question of the adequacy of the government's case by case approach to licensing. A case by case approach is problematic because of the delay between the granting of a licence and the actual delivery of the equipment: there is always the possibility that circumstances will change in the recipient state. The longevity of hardware means that once it is exported, a state has it for many years; the export of components and spares becomes important to maintain equipment exported years ago (and under a different government). But the lack of information as to the precise nature, quantity and recipient of components and spares makes it difficult for independent analysts to ascertain what equipment is being maintained or upgraded.

Core arguments

In this thesis I advance four inter-related core arguments. First, the analysis of U.K. arms export policy and NGO activity in relation to it suggests that there are two networks on arms issues, both comprised of actors commonly understood to represent the state, capital and civil society. Arms capital (in the form of the largest companies and arms lobby groups) is integrated into state structures, in particular via the MoD (especially DESO) and DTI. This is a structurally powerful network of actors that makes the core decisions regarding arms policy and forms the main part of a military-industrial complex. Labour is integrated into the military-industrial complex (e.g. through trade union representation on the advisory bodies), although its position remains weak. NGOs, on the other hand, have formed alliances with DfID

[99] Quadripartite Committee (no date) "Quadripartite Committee (Committees on Strategic Export Controls)," http://www.parliament.uk/parliamentary_committees/quad.cfm (6 December 2006).
[100] Interview with Roger Berry MP, 24 February 2006.

(especially CHAD), and those parts of the MoD and FCO involved in the Conflict Prevention Pools (cross-departmental funds for conflict prevention programmes, dealt with in more detail in Chapter Seven). These alliances are less formal than the arms capital-state networks; and the state actors involved in them are institutionally weaker. The state is prepared to admit NGO actors at the margins and on issues that it does not deem strategically vital or central to state functions.

It is important to understand that, whilst these networks are competing, their actions are not contradictory. Rather, they are different expressions of the same phenomenon. That is, the maintenance of coercive capabilities at home and abroad (via domestic procurement and exports to key recipients such as the USA, other NATO allies, and Middle Eastern states, especially Saudi Arabia), which provides the coercive backbone to the capitalist order, and the promotion of human rights, good governance, and the removal of small arms from Southern societies (what Robinson calls the promotion of polyarchy), are different means to the same end, namely control by the transnational capitalist class and the prevention of autonomous or alternative development.

Second, U.K.-based NGOs as a whole have limited counter-hegemonic potential on the issue of the arms trade for three reasons: their understanding of the problem of U.K. arms exports; their integration into state activity on small arms issue; and their reproduction of liberal understandings of development, human rights and conflict prevention. Whilst the NGOs challenge the U.K. government for its controversial export record, they remain largely on the same discursive terrain, accepting the government's presentation of its involvement in the arms trade as legitimate, necessary and restrained, and analysing controversial exports as anomalous and unfortunate aberrations, rather than the logical expression of pro-capital government policy. The partial exceptions are BASIC and CAAT. Whilst BASIC accepts the legitimacy of the arms trade, it critiques the government's stance towards arms companies in relation to national defence industrial strategy, for example. And CAAT argues that controversial exports are the result of the close relationship between the arms industry and government. CAAT is the only NGO to challenge arms companies as well as the government. CAAT also (occasionally) discusses the United Kingdom's arms relationship with the USA as problematic, challenging the wider scale of the arms trade rather than simply the most

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controversial exports. CAAT pays lip service to challenging the United Kingdom's use of force in the international arena, and has links with other peace organisations such as CND and the Peace Pledge Union, but it does not actively campaign on it. Whilst this is a weakness, CAAT and BASIC are the only NGOs of the six to consider the United Kingdom's use of force and domestic procurement to be part of the problem.

Another reason for NGOs' limited counter-hegemonic potential is their integration into state activity on small arms issues. NGOs, in particular Saferworld and International Alert, work in tandem with elements of the U.K. state (predominantly DfID), contributing to the discursive representation of small arms issues and to practical policies on them. The disproportionate role of NGOs on small arms issues as compared to the wider arms trade is striking. Whilst insider NGOs understand this as a sign of their success in forging partnerships with the state and working together to find solutions, the shared understanding between (elements of) the state and NGOs is a liberal one that delegitimises violent conflict in the global South without a nuanced understanding of its causes, facilitating intervention to effect social transformation. It also focuses attention on the illicit trade in small arms, diverting attention away from, and legitimising, the wider, state-sanctioned trade in conventional weaponry.

NGOs largely reproduce liberal representations of development, human rights and conflict prevention. The case studies demonstrate that, whilst NGOs are critical of exports to Tanzania and Indonesia, they accept and reproduce the government's development and human rights agendas. The partial exception is CAAT, with its more critical account of the role of U.K. arms exports to Indonesia and their role in bolstering capitalist development there. On conflict prevention, NGOs provide intellectual content to small arms programmes and acting as partners, or at the very least, sub-contractors to the state in carrying out small arms control programmes in the global South. Based on the understanding of imperialism outlined above, which emphasises the importance of representation and hierarchy in North-South relations, NGOs can be understood to play a role in reproducing imperial relations. In this, they contribute to hegemonic understandings of development, human rights and conflict prevention; they do not contribute to the intellectual or practical development of alternative social relations that would mean they were a counter-hegemonic force.

Third, power relations within the NGO world are such that, through their insider strategies and their understanding of the impetus to U.K. export policy, the more mainstream organisations dominate the political space available to NGOs. The combination of this insider activity and CAAT's own self-identified outsider role renders CAAT ineffective in a manner independent of CAAT's own shortcomings and mutes CAAT's counter-hegemonic potential. Much of this is associated with the emphasis on professionalism that circulates within the NGO world and is seen as a pre-requisite for engagement with the state. This signals the marginalisation of protest as a legitimate social activity; the work of insider NGOs serves to cast outsider NGOs as irresponsible and unconstructive. This has implications for counter-hegemonic struggle, as it suggests that the activity of more mainstream NGOs plays a role in stifling the construction of alternative social relations.

Fourth, this analysis of NGO activity on U.K. involvement in the arms trade generates a challenge to liberal accounts of global civil society, which dominate the literature. Liberal understandings take the separation of civil society from the state and market as real, rather than methodological. My concern is to investigate NGOs, but from a perspective that understands the capitalist context to civil society that disciplines NGOs into acting in particular ways that do not threaten hegemonic social formations. A liberal approach emphasises the progressive values that drive global civil society activity. However, a Gramscian focus on hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forces suggests that NGOs have been incorporated into hegemonic social forces and that they are thus not as progressive as they (and liberal scholars) would like to believe. A liberal approach also rests on a problematic conception of the "global" nature of global civil society. The postcolonial approach used in this thesis emphasises the reproduction of narratives that posit the global South as requiring intervention and the promotion of values that are tied to liberal social arrangements. What liberal scholars understand as global, I understand as imperial. Finally, liberal accounts emphasise the non-violent nature of global civil society: this writes out the violence of capitalism the states system, obscures the capitalist context of civil society, and disciplines protest and challenge into being non-violent.

Significance of this study

This thesis aims to contribute to three broad literatures, on the arms trade, (military) globalisation, and global civil society. There is a small but growing literature on U.K. involvement in the arms trade. This research contributes three new case studies, and uses significant amounts of interview material to try to understand the arms export licensing process. It also analyses NGO activity in relation to exports, which has not been addressed in the literature despite the growing role of NGOs in providing expertise to elements of government. This thesis also contributes to the literature on military globalisation.[101] Whilst there is a large literature on globalisation and its effects, it focuses less on the coercive aspects than on the economic, political, and/or cultural dimensions of globalisation.[102] And whilst there is a growing literature on the inter- or transnationalisation of the state, it focuses predominantly on the United States.[103] This thesis analyses the U.K. arms trade as a facet of military globalisation in an attempt to understand the continued relevance of coercion in world politics, the role of states and their relations with internationalising capital, and the perpetuation of imperial relationships. The thesis also contributes to the literature on global civil society through an analysis of a key set of actors in it, NGOs.[104] Whilst there is a literature

[101] This literature includes: Barkawi, Tarak (2004) "Connection and Constitution: Locating War and Culture in Globalization Studies", *Globalizations,* 1(2): 155-170; Barkawi, *Globalization and War;* Shaw, Martin (1998) *Dialectics of War. An Essay in the Social Theory of Total War and Peace* (Pluto Press, London); Shaw, Martin (2002) "Globality and historical sociology: State, revolution and war revisited," in Stephen Hobden and John M. Hobson, eds., *Historical Sociology of International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 82-98; Shaw, Martin (2003) *War and Genocide: Organized Killing in Modern Society* (Cambridge: Polity Press); Held, David, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathon Perraton (1999) *Global Transformations. Politics, Economics and Culture* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press), pp. 87-148.
[102] Tomlinson, John (1999) *Globalization and Culture* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press); Herod, Andrew, Gearóid Ó Tuathail, and Susan M. Roberts (eds.) (1998) *Unruly World? Globalization, Governance and Geography* (London: Routledge); Rupert, Mark, and Hazel Smith (eds.) (2002) *Historical Materialism and Globalization* (London: Routledge); Sklair, *Globalization;* Bhagwati, Jagdish (2004) *In Defense of Globalization* (Oxford: Oxford University Press); Cameron, Angus and Ronen Palan (2004) *The Imagined Economies of Globalization* (London: Sage); Rapley, John (2004) *Globalization a and Inequality: Neoliberalism's Downward Spiral* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner).
[103] Murray, Robin (1971) "The internationalization of capital and the nation-state," *New Left Review*, 67: 84-109; Poulantzas, Nicos (1974) "The internationalization of capitalist relations and the nation state," *Economy and Society*, 3(2): 145-179; Picciotto, Sol (1990) "The internationalization of the state," *Review of Radical Political Economics*, 22(1): 28-44; Aronowitz, Stanley and Peter Bratsis (2002) *Paradigm Lost: State Theory Reconsidered* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press); Robinson, "Capitalist globalization and the transnationalization of the state."
[104] This is not to commit the liberal fallacy of equating global civil society with NGOs; rather, it is to analyse a particular global civil society actor from a perspective that understands the separation between state, market and civil society as methodological rather than substantive.

on Amnesty and Oxfam, it does not explicitly analyse them as actors in global civil society; the other NGOs have not been studied before.[105]

Chapter summary

The remainder of the thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter Two reviews and critiques the dominant liberal literature on global civil society and situates NGOs as key actors in it. I identify four key features of the mainstream literature, which understands global civil society as a sphere separate from both state and market, as progressive or emancipatory, as linked to processes of globalisation, and as non-violent. I argue that this liberal approach is problematic because it fails adequately to situate global civil society in the context of a global capitalist economy, what it understands as progressive is better understood as hegemonic, what it understands as global is better understood as imperial, and it writes out the violence of the global North and of capitalism.

Chapter Three explores U.K. involvement in the arms trade under New Labour. I argue that the ongoing and large-scale political and economic support for arms exports is the result of the integration of internationalising arms capital into the structures of the U.K. state, which is itself internationalising. This relationship is the main expression of a military-industrial complex. The arms trade plays a significant role in providing the coercive backbone for

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[105] On Amnesty International, see: Buchanan, Tom (2002) "'The Truth Will Set you Free': The Making of Amnesty International", *Journal of Contemporary History*, 37(4): 575-597; Christiansen, Lars and Keith Dowding (1994) "Pluralism or State Autonomy? The Case of Amnesty International (British Section): the Insider/Outsider Group", *Political Studies*, 42(1): 15-24; Clark, Ann-Marie (2001) *Diplomacy of Conscience. Amnesty International and Changing Human Rights Norms* (Princeton: Princeton University Press); Cook, Helena (1996) "Amnesty International at the United Nations" in Willetts, Peter (ed.) *'The Conscience of the World'. The Influence of Non-Governmental Organisations in the UN System* (London: Hurst and Co.), pp. 181-214; Desmond, Cosmas (1983) *Persecution East and West* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books); Ennals, Martin (1982) "Amnesty International and Human Rights", in Willetts, Peter (ed.) *Pressure Groups in the Global System* (London: Frances Pinter), pp. 63-83; Hopgood, Stephen (2006) *Keepers of the Flame. Understanding Amnesty International* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press); Power, Jonathan (2002) *Like Water on Stone. The Story of Amnesty International* (London: Penguin); Scoble, Harry M. and Laurie S. Wiseberg (1974) "Human Rights and Amnesty International", *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 413: 11-26; Thakur, Ramesh (1994) "Human Rights: Amnesty International and the United Nations" *Journal of Peace Research*, 31(2): 143-160. On Oxfam, see: Black, Maggie (1982) *A Cause for Our Times. Oxfam the First 50 Years* (Oxford: Oxfam/Oxford University Press); Jennings, Michael (2002) "'Almost an Oxfam in Itself': Oxfam, *Ujamaa* and Development in Tanzania", *African Affairs*, 101: 509-530; Stamp, Elizabeth (1982) "Oxfam and Development", in Willetts, *Pressure Groups in the Global System*, pp. 84-104.Duffield makes reference to International Alert and Saferworld but does not examine their activity in a sustained manner, and not in relation to their activity on arms trade issues; Duffield, Mark (2001) *Global Governance and the New Wars. The Merging of Development and Security* (London: Zed Books).

processes of globalisation in other spheres. The spread of weaponry to the global South has been significant in the creation of a global military culture that privileges capital-intensive militarisation. Such an analysis of the arms trade suggests that the arms trade is not simply controversial when equipment is exported to known human rights-abusing regimes; rather, the role of the arms trade in bringing such regimes to power and maintaining them, and the role of the trade in maintaining the wider capitalist system, becomes important.

Chapter Four introduces the six case study NGOs. It gives an overview of their overarching objectives and strategies, introducing the concept of insider and outsider strategies as a spectrum of activity along which to situate the NGOs. It gives an indication of the likely counter-hegemonic potential of the NGOs prior to the specific analysis in the case studies. I argue that CAAT has the greatest counter-hegemonic potential but that relations between NGOs – that is, within the sphere commonly understood as civil society – have a significant dampening effect on CAAT's potential.

Chapters Five, Six and Seven are case studies and follow broadly similar formats, exploring government declaratory policy and practice, the relations between branches of the state and capital, the view from the global South[106], the development/human rights/conflict prevention agenda, NGO arguments, and NGO strategies and impacts. Chapter Five examines NGO activity in relation to sustainable development concerns in U.K. arms export licensing, through the example of the granting of a licence to BAE Systems for the sale of a £28m air traffic control system to Tanzania in December 2001. I argue that the government contravened its publicly stated commitments to sustainable development by granting a licence for this deal, and that the relationship between BAE Systems, the MoD and DTI, and the intervention of senior political figures, were significant in facilitating the deal. When the deal was first negotiated in the early 1990s, the Mwinyi regime was in power in Tanzania; the subsequent President, Benjamin Mkapa, was unable or unwilling to renegotiate or cancel the deal, despite the advice of the World Bank and International Civil Aviation Organisation. I then critique the neo-liberal development agenda, arguing that, even though Clare Short and DfID officials

106 Chapter Seven does not include a section on the view from the global South as this is incorporated into the critique of the conflict prevention agenda. Unlike the other two case studies, it does not focus on a particular country.

spoke out against the deal, their understanding of the development agenda remains a neo-liberal one that is problematic. The problem is not one of the implementation of policy; rather, the values and assumptions informing development policy are what orient practice in particular ways. In light of this critique, I analyse NGOs' arguments against the deal and their strategies for implementing their critique; CAAT, Oxfam and Saferworld are active on this case. I argue that, despite their opposition to the deal, their arguments serve to buttress the government's representation of the arms trade and the dominant neo-liberal understanding of development.

Chapter Six is a case study of NGO activity in relation to human rights concerns in U.K. arms export licensing, analysed through the example of U.K. arms exports to Indonesia under New Labour, with a particular focus on the conflict in Aceh in 2003. I argue that, despite the efforts of actors such as HRPD within the FCO, there is a high-level consensus on the importance of arms exports to Indonesia. The wording of the guidelines and overall pro-export stance make it difficult for HRPD's concerns to be addressed in the licensing process. I go on to situate exports to Indonesia in the context of the development of Indonesian capitalism and the state's integration into the global capitalist order. In this understanding, human rights violations are an intrinsic feature of capitalist development rather than unfortunate aberrations. This provides the basis for a critique of the human rights agenda, which dissociates human rights violations from their broader social context. In light of this critique, I analyse NGOs' arguments against arms exports to Indonesia and their strategies for implementing their critique; Amnesty International, CAAT and Saferworld are active on this case. I argue that, whilst they all criticise the government for its continued exports to Indonesia, only CAAT is able to make an explicit argument relating to the wider context of capitalist development and adequately characterise the implications of U.K. arms exports.

Chapter Seven is a case study of NGO activity in relation to conflict prevention concerns in U.K. arms export licensing, analysed through the example of U.K. small arms exports and small arms control programmes. I analyse government declaratory policy and practice in relation to both small arms exports and small arms control programmes. I argue that there is a dual impulse in U.K. small arms policy: the continued export to states deemed to be facing the threat of insurgency or terrorism; and attempts to remove small arms from non-state actors' hands in other parts of the global South. This is facilitated by a liberal

understanding of conflict and the measures necessary to prevent it. This sidelines Northern-supported and state-based violence and the structural violence of the capitalist economy. The discourse of conflict prevention facilitates intervention in the global South by a network of actors including elements of the U.K. state and U.K.-based NGOs. In light of this critique, I analyse NGOs' understandings and strategies in relation to conflict prevention and small arms. I argue that NGOs share – indeed significantly contribute to – a liberal understanding and act as subcontractors to DfID on policy development and project operationalisation.

Chapter Eight draws together the arguments made across the three case studies, assessing the role of NGOs as actors in global civil society and the implications for International Relations theory. I argue that there are two networks of actors on arms issues, both comprised of actors within what are commonly understood as the state, market and civil society; the actions of these networks are complementary rather than contradictory. I argue that NGOs have limited counter-hegemonic potential; not only have they had limited impact on the pattern or volume of U.K. arms exports, they also, largely reproduce liberal understandings of the arms trade, development, human rights and conflict prevention. They play an important role in legitimating the status quo, which reinforces the dominant position of states such as the United Kingdom in the international arms trade and further entrenches liberal understandings of social, economic and political life, signalling the role of civil society in buttressing hegemony. They thus largely fail to contribute to counter-hegemonic struggle. The partial exception to this is CAAT, which has a more transgressive understanding of the arms trade and uses more confrontational tactics to effect it; but the dynamic of the cumulative impact of CAAT's self-identified outsider position and the insider activity of the other organisations renders CAAT ineffective. This analysis means that NGOs play a significant role in global civil society, but not in the way that most liberal theorists would expect. It suggests that what liberal scholars understand as global relations are actually imperial relations, as the representations and practices fostered by NGO activity contribute to hierarchical North-South relations. The last part of the chapter considers areas for future research.

Chapter Two: Theorising Global Civil Society

Introduction

In International Relations scholarship, global civil society is commonly understood as a realm separate from both the state and the market in which NGOs play a key role in promoting human rights, development and good governance. There is an emphasis on the pacific and non-violent elements of global civil society, along with the emancipatory potential of this realm. This is a liberal account, set against the background of a post-Cold War security discourse of new threats and actors, and a particular view of globalisation as the intensification of interaction between states and communities in an age of global telecommunications, the rise of non-state actors and the spread of norms, and the emergence of global governance. The aim of this chapter is critically to assess this vision; I argue that it is conceptually problematic as a basis for understanding the role of NGOs as global civil society actors for four main reasons, each dealt with in turn.

First, understanding global civil society as a non-state, non-market sphere fails adequately to situate the actors of global civil society in the social setting of global capitalism. In privileging the agency of global civil society actors such as NGOs, the constraining and enabling structural factors that necessarily affect the prospects of success or failure of global civil society movements are not adequately taken into account. Second, NGOs claim to be, and are understood in the liberal literature to be, driven by progressive or emancipatory values. Using the Gramscian concepts of hegemony and counter-hegemony, I argue for a more ambivalent understanding of NGOs' progressive political value. Whilst NGOs may play a role in counter-hegemonic struggle, they are perhaps more likely to contribute to hegemonic social formations because of the capitalist nature of civil society. Third, liberal accounts of global civil society rest on a problematic conception of globalisation that serves to depoliticise the transformatory and universalising urge inherent within liberalism, and disguise the imperial (re)ordering of international relations. Fourth, the emphasis on the non-violent nature of global civil society in liberal accounts sidelines the violence of capitalism and the state system, and reproduces a problematic opposition between liberal and non-liberal ways of life, in a manner that facilitates intervention and, at times, the use of force against the non-liberal.

These four limitations of the liberal literature on global civil society stem from a pervasive Eurocentrism that fails to recognise civil society as a distinctly modern phenomenon associated with the rise of European capitalism, and applies a historically and geographically specific concept universally. This raises the question of how liberal scholars understand global civil society to operate in non-European and post-colonial contexts, and how NGOs understand global civil society to operate in the regions and countries in which they work. A key function of the global civil society literature is to shore up relations of hierarchy between the global North and South as it facilitates intervention in the South by a network of state and non-state actors predominantly from the North. Intervention under the sign of benevolence is understood here as the latest reincarnation of the civilising mission. This function of the liberal literature signals the constitutive role of theory: dominant Northern representations of global civil society facilitate particular practices through the construction and normalisation of the categories through which action is taken.

In response to the liberal literature, I turn to Gramscian and postcolonial approaches, which have significant purchase on the concept of global civil society. I draw on Gramscian approaches to emphasise the ambiguities within civil society and its role in both maintaining and potentially challenging a hegemonic status quo, in which dominant ideas gain consent and become naturalised, setting the parameters of understanding and action. I draw on postcolonial approaches to focus attention on the universalising urge of liberalism that facilitates intervention in the South, and to emphasise the mutual constitution of the global North and South. The analysis of NGO activity in the thesis assesses the extent to which NGOs play a part in counter-hegemonic struggle, not only challenging common sense understandings about the arms trade, development, human rights, and conflict prevention, but also contributing to alternative constructions of social life that do not privilege Europe as the master narrative of history. The aim is to understand the operation of the "remarkably fertile call-to-arms"[1] of the concept of civil society, its discursive power and the practices that it facilitates. In attempting to do this, I echo Philip Darby, who states that "Recognising that a critic in the West cannot write for the non-West, attention is primarily directed to the role of criticism within Western

[1] Comaroff, John L. and Jean Comaroff (eds.) (1999) *Civil Society and the Political Imagination in Africa. Critical Perspectives* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), p. vii.

societies which might help clear a space for non-Western peoples to pursue agendas of their own."[2]

Global civil society as a non-state, non-market sphere

Liberal accounts of global civil society define their subject of study as a realm distinct from both the state and the market. Price refers to a "'third system' of agents, namely, privately organized citizens as distinguished from government or profit-seeking actors."[3] Similarly, Florini and Simmons state that the concept "includes only groups that are *not* governments or profit-seeking enterprises."[4] Whilst authors disagree as to whether the concept includes the family or not, they agree that it is located "between" the economy and state.[5] Following on from this definition, the actors that populate global civil society are deemed to be non-profit groups, charities, social forums, informal associations, and a key role is played by NGOs.[6] Price argues that, despite the diversity within the literature, there is a dominant "distinctive liberal theoretical statement" that "privileges the role of agency, namely transnational civil society activists", thus challenging other theoretical approaches that privilege other agents, or structure.[7]

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[2] Darby, Phillip (2004) "Pursuing the political: a postcolonial rethinking of relations international", *Millennium* 33(1): 1-32, p. 3.

[3] Price, Richard (2003) "Transnational Civil Society and Advocacy in World Politics", *World Politics*, 55, pp.579-606, p. 580.

[4] Florini, Ann M. and P.J. Simmons (2000) "What the World Needs Now?" in Florini Ann M. (ed.) (2000) *The Third Force. The Rise of Transnational Civil Society* (Tokyo/Washington, D.C.: Japan Center for International Exchange and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), pp. 1-15; p. 7, italics in original.

[5] Anheier et al argue that civil society is "the sphere of ideas, values, institutions, organizations, networks and individuals located *between* the family, the state, and the market, and operating *beyond* the confines of national societies, polities and economies", whilst Cohen and Arato call civil society "a sphere of social interaction between economy and state, composed above all of the intimate sphere (especially the family), the sphere of associations (especially voluntary associations), social movements, and forms of public communication;" Anheier, Helmut, Marlies Glasius and Mary Kaldor (2001) "Introducing Global Civil Society", in ibid. (eds.) *Global Civil Society 2001* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 3-22, p. 17, italics in original; Cohen, Jean L. and Andrew Arato (1992) *Civil Society and Political Theory* (Cambridge, Massachussetts: MIT Press), p. ix.

[6] Florini and Simmons, "What the World Needs Now?", p. 13; Lipschutz, "Reconstructing World Politics," p. 390; Kaldor, Mary (2003) *Global Civil Society*, p. 13; Shaw, Martin (1994) "Civil Society and Global Politics. Beyond a Social Movements Approach", *Millennium*, 23(3): 647-667, p. 650.

[7] Price, "Transnational Civil Society and Advocacy in World Politics", p. 601.

Several liberal scholars trace the separation of state, market and civil society to Gramsci.[8] What they forget, however, is that Gramsci's differentiation of civil society from the state and market was purely methodological, so as to allow "a serious thematization of the generation of consent through cultural and social hegemony as an independent and, at times, decisive variable in the reproduction of the existing system."[9] It is not that Gramsci "*ever* forgot or neglected the critical element of the economic foundations of society and its relations. But he contributed relatively little by way of original formulations to *that* level of analysis"; his key contributions were on issues such as ideology, culture and the potential of civil society.[10] Liberal scholars thus fall into the trap of severing the political sphere from the socioeconomic spheres.

In contrast, Marxist accounts of civil society emphasise that the modern separation of public from private, state from market, is purely formal; this means that civil society contains the market and is riven by class inequalities. In order to participate in the public realm of the state as citizens, people have to abstract from their real lived selves.[11] As Marx argued, the state, or political life, in which differences between individuals are seen merely as social differences with no political significance, rests on the inequalities of civil society.[12] Contemporary Marxist scholars such as Ellen Meiksins Wood argue that any adequate account of civil society must expose "the relations of exploitation and domination which irreducibly *constitute* civil society." This is because Gramsci's concept of civil society "was unambiguously intended as a weapon against capitalism, not an accommodation to it."[13] As such, Marxist accounts of NGO activity emphasise its role in undermining emancipatory struggle in the global South and reproducing imperial relationships through a failure to tackle structural causes of poverty.[14] Whilst this has the benefit of paying attention to the mutual constitution of the

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[8] Anheier et al, "Introducing Global Civil Society", p. 13; Cohen and Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory*, p. 118; Shaw, "Civil Society and Global Politics" p. 647.
[9] Cohen and Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory*, p. 143; see also Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy*, pp. 352-354.
[10] Hall, Stuart (1986) "Gramsci's Relevance for the Study of Race and Ethnicity", *Journal of Communication Inquiry*, 10(2): 5-27, p. 8, emphasis in original.
[11] Marx, Karl (1843/1989) *Critique of Hegel's Rechtsphilosophie* and *On the Jewish Question*, in Sayer, Derek (ed.) (1989) *Readings from Karl Marx* (London: Routledge).
[12] Marx, *On the Jewish Question*, in Sayer, *Readings from Karl Marx*, pp. 124-5.
[13] Wood, Ellen Meiksins (1990) "The Uses and Abuses of 'Civil Society'", in Miliband, Ralph, Leo Panitch and John Saville (eds.), *Socialist Register 1990. The Retreat of the Intellectuals*, (London: Merlin Press), pp. 60-84, p. 63, 74, emphasis in original.
[14] Hearn, Julie (2001) "The 'Uses and Abuses' of Civil Society in Africa," *Review of African Political Economy* (28)87: 43-53; Manji, Firoze and Carl O'Coill (2002) "The missionary position: NGOs and development in Africa",

economic and political realms, thus remedying a key weakness of liberal approaches, this leads to a tendency to overdetermine the character of civil society. The impetus to Gramsci's work was indeed a desire to challenge the forces of domination and fascism in Italian society, but his concept of civil society is inherently ambiguous, in order to account for the domination and resistance that are both intrinsic to it.

There is admittedly a lack of clarity in Gramsci's writings about the relationship between civil society and the state. His legacy is a diverse set of writings that lack a single coherent thread, partly because of the prison conditions under which he was writing and his role as an intellectual and activist, and partly because of his awareness of the historical and geographical specificity that one must bear in mind when analysing social relations.[15] This means Gramsci's ideas are not to be mechanically applied, but rather can be used to pose questions about the complexity of state–civil society relations in circumstances that differ from those under which he originally formulated his ideas.[16] Gramsci differentiates civil society from political society for methodological purposes; but working in the Gramscian spirit means one has to pose as a *question* the relations between the state and civil society in the case under analysis.

For Gramsci, civil society is both the realm in which domination is maintained and the seedbed for an alternative social order. He refers to "two major superstructural levels": civil society, defined as "the ensemble of organisms commonly called 'private'"; and political society "or 'the State'".[17] A key insight from Gramsci is that superstructure (political and ideological developments) cannot simply be 'read off' an economic base. Whilst he took Marxist concepts such as the capitalist mode of production and the forces and relations of production for

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International Affairs, 78(3): 567-583; Petras, James (1999) "NGOs: In the service of imperialism", *Journal of Contemporary Asia,* 29(4): 429-440; Petras, James and Henry Veltmeyer (2001) *Globalization Unmasked: Imperialism in the 21st Century* (London: Zed Books), pp. 128-138; Wallace, Tina (2003) "NGO Dilemmas: Trojan Horses for Global Neoliberalism?", in Panitch, Leo and Colin Leys (eds.) *Socialist Register 2004. The New Imperial Challenge* (London: Merlin Press), pp. 202-219.

[15] As Stuart Hall argues, Gramsci's theoretical writing had the aim of "informing political practice" and his ideas are therefore historically specific and conjunctural; Hall, "Gramsci's Relevance for the Study of Race and Ethnicity", pp. 5-7.

[16] Morton, Adam David (2003) "Historicizing Gramsci: situating ideas in and beyond their context," *Review of International Political Economy,* 10(1): 118-146, p. 121.

[17] Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*, p. 12.

granted, the relations between base and superstructure are not simple.[18] The implications of a Gramscian account of civil society for this thesis are that civil society can be separated from the state and market in methodological terms, but that the structural relationship between arms capital and the U.K. state, and between NGOs and the state, must be taken into account as the context in which NGOs are working. For the purposes of this thesis, this involves analysing the enmeshment of arms capital with institutionally strong elements of the U.K. state such as the MoD and DTI, and the more informal alliances that NGOs form with institutionally less powerful branches of the U.K. state such as DfID.

A key Gramscian concept with regard to the relationship between the state and civil society is that of the "extended state", in which the superstructural levels of political and civil society are combined. Gramsci's formulation of "State = political society + civil society, in other words hegemony protected by the armour of coercion" means that the state is both "the apparatus of government, but also the 'private' apparatus of 'hegemony' or civil society."[19] The integration of arms capitalists into the U.K. state (detailed in Chapter Three) speaks precisely to this conception of the extended state. Such an understanding requires that attention be paid to "the underpinnings of the political structure in civil society" because the administrative, executive and coercive apparatus of government is "in effect constrained by the hegemony of the leading class of a whole social formation."[20] Gramsci does not provide one single answer to the question of the relationship between the state and civil society. Whilst at one point, civil society acts as the "outer perimeter", able to defend the state in times of crisis, he later conceives of the state in the West as "only an outer ditch, behind which there stood a powerful system of fortresses and earthworks."[21] This is partly related to his insistence that the exact form of relations is historically and geographically contingent.

Are NGOs part of what Gramsci called the extended state? Hirsch argues that civil society is "largely determined by the structures of capitalist society"; for him, NGOs must be understood as part of the extended state.[22] Whilst he is right to point out the structural

[18] Hall, "Gramsci's Relevance for the Study of Race and Ethnicity", pp. 7, 11.
[19] Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci,* p. 261, 263.
[20] Cox, Robert W. (1983) "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations", p. 164.
[21] Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci,* p. 235, 238.
[22] Hirsch, Joachim (2003) "The State's New Clothes: NGOs and the Internationalization of States", *Rethinking*

constraints generated by capitalist society, his argument is overly deterministic: it is the ambiguity of his claim that civil society is "largely" determined that is of interest here. Actors' social roles can be conditioned, but they are never completely determined. This means that there is no way *a priori* to tell whether NGOs are part of the extended state or not: analysing their characteristics, such as funding and staffing profiles, assessing their critiques and their strategies will demonstrate whether they are or not.[23] Analysis of the six NGOs therefore starts from the assumption that they could either play a role in reproducing hegemony or in generating resistance to it, as civil society is "the realm in which the existing social order is grounded; and it can also be the realm in which a new social order can be founded."[24] As Chapter Four demonstrates, there is much about the objectives, strategies and funding of the six case study NGOs to suggest that their role lies in maintaining consent for the operation of the arms trade, with the (partial) exception of CAAT. However, relations between NGOs – relations *within* the space commonly understood as civil society – are such that CAAT is rendered less effective than it might otherwise be.

In addition to a Gramscian critique, a postcolonial approach to the study of global civil society is instructive with regard to the relationships between civil society, the state and the market. Civil society emerged as a geographically and temporally specific phenomenon in relation to the emergence of capitalism; its application across space and time as a potentially universal emancipatory category is therefore problematic. As Chatterjee argues, the history of state-civil society relations "is intricately tied to the history of capital," meaning that "the concepts of the individual and the nation-state both become embedded in a new grand narrative: the narrative of capital."[25] According to Chatterjee:

> If there is one great moment that turns the provincial thought of Europe to universal philosophy, the parochial history of Europe to universal history, it is the moment of capital – capital that is global in its territorial reach and

Marxism, 15(2): 237-262; p. 242.

[23] This echoes a point made by Fisher that NGOs "are as likely to maintain the status quo as to change it" – he argues that it is difficult to generalize about the impact of NGO activity; Fisher, "Doing Good?", p. 452. Munck argues that global civil society has reformist or radical potential but has to a "very large extent been co-opted as the "social" wing of neoliberal global capitalism." Munck, Ronaldo (2002) "Global Civil Society: Myths and Prospects", *Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations*, 13(4): 349-361, p.355.

[24] Cox, Robert (1999) "Civil Society at the Turn of the Millennium: Prospects for an Alternative World Order", *Review of International Studies*, 25, 3-28; p. 4.

[25] Chatterjee, Partha (1990) "A Response to Taylor's "Modes of Civil Society"", *Public Culture*, 3(1): 119-134, pp. 123, 128.

> universal in its conceptual domain. It is the narrative of capital that can turn the violence of mercantilist trade, war, genocide, conquest, and colonialism, into a story of universal progress, development, modernization, and freedom.[26]

Thus the task of a postcolonial critique is to reveal the parochial nature of Europe, to disturb its self-image as (potentially) universal - that is, as the "master narrative" of world history[27] - and to recall the centrality of capitalism to the emergence of civil society and its relations with the modern state.

Modern civil society is based on capitalist economic and social relations, which means that "civil society exists not merely in opposition to the state but in relation to a certain form of state", one with "effective rule based on representative institutions, supporting and supported by a system of rights."[28] Analytically, the concept of civil society, as other concepts associated with modernity, "is impossible to *think* of anywhere in the world without invoking certain categories and concepts, the genealogies of which go deep into the intellectual and even theological traditions of Europe."[29] This raises the question of how the concept of civil society applies to post-colonial states. Blaney and Pasha argue that there is a tendency for commentators to label "informal economic activity" or "any organized opposition to the state" as "an emerging 'civil society' and the bellwether of a democratic transition."[30] Similarly, Garland refers to the practice of "looking for non-Western *analogues* to civil society" that appear to be "the only viable option for a progressive politics;" this has the effect of naturalizing the liberal origins of the concept.[31] She argues that NGOs "appear to be almost natural institutional embodiments of the liberal conception" of global civil society, despite it being "an ideologically charged ideal", as non-Western and postcolonial critiques have

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[26] Ibid., p. 129. Universality and difference is a key theme in postcolonial writings. Achebe criticises the use of the term 'universal' as "a synonym for the narrow, self-serving parochialism of Europe;" Achebe, Chinua (2003) "Colonialist Criticism", reprinted in Ashcroft et al, *The Post-colonial Studies Reader*, pp. 57-61; p. 60. Similarly, Gupta asserts the need to challenge the naturalisation and universal application of what is a historically specific experience that occurs in most scholarship; Gupta, Akhil (1995) "Blurred Boundaries: The Discourse of Corruption, the Culture of Politics, and the Imagined State", *American Ethnologist*, 22(2): 375-402, p. 376.

[27] Chakrabarty, Dipesh (2000) *Provincializing Europe. Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), p. 27. Also Chakrabarty (1996) "Marx After Marxism. History, Subalternity, and Difference," in Makdisi et al, *Marxism Beyond Marxism*, pp. 55-70.

[28] Blaney, David L. and Mustapha Kamal Pasha (1993) "Civil Society and Democracy in the Third World: Ambiguities and Possibilities", *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 28(1): 3-24; pp. 6-7.

[29] Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*, p. 4, emphasis in original.

[30] Blaney and Pasha, "Civil Society and Democracy in the Third World", p. 17.

[31] Garland, Elizabeth (1999) "Developing Bushmen: Building Civil(ized) Society in the Kalahari and Beyond", in Comaroff and Comaroff, *Civil Society and the Political Imagination in Africa*, pp. 72-103, p. 74, emphasis in original.

demonstrated.[32] A postcolonial critique that highlights the situatedness of the concept of civil society raises questions about NGOs' understandings of the relations between state, market and civil society, who they work with in the global South and how, what contestation over understandings of the arms trade take place, and how this is resolved.

Global civil society as the locus of progressive values

NGOs claim to pursue progressive social change, and liberal theorists herald them as agents of emancipation.[33] However, the Gramscian concepts of hegemony and counter-hegemony throw a different light on NGOs' objectives and strategies. Hegemony is achieved when "one class or fraction of a class exercises leadership over other classes and strata by gaining their *active consent*."[34] That is, when dominant ideas gain consent and become common sense; even those subordinated by the operation of these ideas consent to them. Whilst dominance can be achieved by the use of force, hegemony requires the consent of those living under it, although force will be applied in deviant cases.[35] Gramsci rejected the idea of false consciousness and a simple correlation between base and superstructure, so the cultural and ideological aspects of hegemony become a key focus of analysis. Even under conditions of hegemony there is never a single, homogenous and all-pervasive ideology.[36] Rather, civil society is "the realm of hegemony supportive of the capitalist *status quo*, but also ... the realm in which cultural change takes places, in which the counter-hegemony of emancipatory forces can be constituted."[37] Counter-hegemonic struggle requires a rupture in the naturalisation of hegemony, and the sowing of the seeds of an alternative order.[38] What is required is analysis of

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[32] Ibid., p. 73.
[33] As an example of the NGOs under analysis in this thesis, Saferworld claims that it: "works to prevent armed violence and create safer communities in which people can lead peaceful and rewarding lives;" http://www.saferworld.org.uk/; International Alert claims to work in pursuit of "sustainable peace"; http://www.international-alert.org/; Oxfam "works with others to find lasting solutions to poverty and suffering around the world". http://www.oxfam.org.uk/about_us/index.htm (all 6 October 2006). In terms of the academic literature, Florini and Simmons are concerned to examine "value-driven organizations and networks"; Florini and Simmons, "What the World Needs Now?", p. 13.
[34] Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy*, p.21, emphasis in original.
[35] Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations", pp. 173-4.
[36] Hall, "Gramsci's Relevance for the Study of Race and Ethnicity", p. 22.
[37] Cox, "Civil Society at the Turn of the Millennium," p. 10.
[38] Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations ", p. 165.

the specific alliances and social formations in play at a particular time in a specific place as each hegemonic formation has its own social composition and configuration.[39]

The concept of hegemonic formations prompts questions about the relationships between arms capital, labour, the state and NGOs. For example, it requires attention to be paid to the fact that arms capitalists, elements of the U.K. state and trade unions representing arms workers all argue in favour of greater government protection and investment; that NGOs and the arms industry make similar arguments in relation to particular issues such as arms brokering and small arms proliferation; and that NGOs, DfID and the Treasury all make similar arguments regarding the relationship of the arms trade to development. There is thus a complexity of relations involved in the arms trade and at times shifting alliances; understanding these relations allows a more nuanced analysis of the possibilities of NGOs' counter-hegemonic potential.

A Gramscian approach means that the dual function of civil society in both maintaining capitalist hegemony and providing the seeds of counter-hegemony must be appreciated in order to "understand the strength of the *status quo*, and then ... devise a strategy for its transformation."[40] Hegemony is created and maintained through "institutions which helped to create in people certain modes of behaviour and expectations consistent with the hegemonic social order" such as the family, church, media and educational institutions.[41] Building counter-hegemony entails the creation of "alternative institutions and alternative intellectual resources within existing society" and requires "resisting the pressure and temptations to relapse into pursuit of incremental gains for subaltern groups within the framework of bourgeois hegemony.[42] Civil society has contradictions built into it: it can serve to naturalise and further entrench socially dominant forces but it can also (and perhaps simultaneously, depending on the concrete historical conditions) be the breeding ground for a counter-hegemony of resistance and a new social order. The task for scholars and those trying to generate social change is to identify the historically and geographically specific forms of social relations within society, and from there to strategise for change.

[39] Hall, "Gramsci's Relevance for the Study of Race and Ethnicity", p. 15.
[40] Cox, "Civil Society at the Turn of the Millennium," p. 4.
[41] Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations"; also Morton, "Historicizing Gramsci", pp. 158-9.
[42] Cox "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations," p. 165. See also Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy*, p. 381.

The critique of the liberal literature, and of the NGOs themselves, being made here, is that they ignore this dual meaning of civil society. They fail adequately to understand the sources of domination in play and are therefore ill-equipped to challenge them. The concept of civil society, in being emptied of one of its potential meanings, "has been appropriated by those who foresee an emancipatory role for civil society."[43] Civil society "is itself a field of power relations"[44] and it is vital to understand the relationships within civil society and the relationships between the state and civil society. As Pasha and Blaney argue, "a failure to attend to the mutually constitutive relationship of civil society, capitalism, and the liberal state will misguide our assessments of the emancipatory possibilities of associational life."[45] The emancipatory potential of NGOs in relation to the arms trade therefore needs to be assessed with the relations between civil society, the state and market under capitalism at the forefront of analysis.

A postcolonial approach requires greater attention to be paid to the ways in which associational activity is categorised. It is necessary to interrogate the effects of the liberal desire to understand associational activity in the global South through the lenses of civil society. As Blaney and Pasha argue, some efforts of indigenous peoples seeking to preserve isolation from the wider economy and political society, or of efforts at theocratic constructions of political society may be "*counter*-civil society movements" because they are not in line with the historical and theoretical specificity of the term civil society.[46] Liberal approaches thus ignore "the vector of resistance politics"; that is, the marginalized may be actively resisting neoliberal globalization rather than simply suffering its effects as victims.[47] This suggests that liberal accounts deny the diversity of activism in the global South by a blindness to particular types of activity that do not correspond to liberal understandings of civil society and an emphasis on those activities that they recognise as familiar. The disciplining effects of liberal lenses thus require an investigation into the repercussions of such representations and a qualification of the

[43] Cox, "Civil Society at the Turn of the Millennium," p. 10.
[44] Ibid., p. 25.
[45] Pasha, Mustapha Kamal and David L. Blaney (1998) "Elusive Paradise: The Promise and Peril of Global Civil Society", *Alternatives*, 23(4): 417-450, p. 420.
[46] Blaney and Pasha, "Civil Society and Democracy in the Third World," p. 18, emphasis in original.
[47] Mittelman James H. (2005) "Globalization, Cosmopolitanism, and the Kantian Revival: Commentary on David Held's 'At the Global Crossroads'", *Globalizations*, 2(1): 114-116, p. 116.

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celebratory tone of much of the literature that focuses on the emancipatory potential of global civil society.

A key danger for NGOs is what Gramsci called *trasformismo*, in which dominant power co-opts elements of opposition forces.[48] As "a strategy of assimilating and domesticating potentially dangerous ideas by adjusting them to the policies of the dominant coalition and ... thereby obstruct[ing] the formation of class-based organised opposition to established social and political power"[49], it relates directly to Gramsci's emphasis on the cultural and ideological aspects of hegemony and is a key mechanism of rule. It refers to the potential for co-option that NGOs face, not only regarding their relationship with government but also relating to their understandings of the arms trade. In terms of the arms trade, ideas that are potentially dangerous include the idea that subsidies on arms exports mean U.K. taxpayers' money is used to fund corporate profits and promote repression abroad; and the idea that the states with the biggest military expenditure are also the world's largest arms exporters, which opens up avenues for challenging western militarism and use of force in the international arena. Hegemony depends on consent, so NGOs play a crucial role in either maintaining or challenging the continued operation of the arms trade depending on their response to ideas such as these; they potentially play a role in generating consent for the means of coercion. They are key actors in the field of cultural and ideological relations, as they generate knowledge about issues and try to effect policy change.

It is important to avoid a monolithic understanding of hegemony. Chapter Three addresses the relationship between the arms trade and capitalism, but the arms trade predates modern capitalism and operates/has operated in non-capitalist areas, so capitalist hegemony, whilst crucial to the analysis, cannot be the only hegemony in play. Other key hegemonic formations include states' use of force (given then centrality of war-making to state-making[50]) and hierarchical North-South relations. So the question of whether NGOs challenge the various contemporary hegemonic social formations is key. How do they understand the arms

[48] Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*, p. 58-9.
[49] Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations," pp. 166-7.
[50] Tilly, Charles (1985) "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime", in Evans, Peter, Dietrich Rueschmeyer and Theda Skocpol (eds.) *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 169-191.

trade, development, human rights and conflict prevention? How do these understandings relate to dominant accounts of state-capital relations, states' use of force, and North-South relations? And what strategies for change are facilitated by these understandings? The importance of the specifics of hegemonic formations in a given place and time also suggests that counter-hegemonic activity does not necessarily have to be explicitly anti-capitalist. That is, "the struggles engendered by capitalist relations of production, particularly in the colonial and postcolonial world, most often take cultural forms that are incompatible with European-style proletarianization", which means that struggles will not necessarily take class forms.[51]

Whether class-based or not, strategies against hegemony require transgression to be effective; that is, they must signal an "assault on the way social norms, beliefs, inequalities and oppressions are reproduced."[52] Effective strategies therefore make demands that "cannot be met within existing structures": the changes that result from effective strategies do not leave society as it was before.[53] This is the distinction between incremental changes that leave the parameters of an issue untouched, and transgressive change that fundamentally alters the social landscape as well as generates concrete improvements. Transgressive activity does not have to "aim at all social institutions and structures simultaneously ... different social institutions can be identified as a component of society that needs changing."[54] But it is important to recognise the links between issues and create "a chain of equivalences between all the democratic demands to produce the collective will of all those people struggling against subordination."[55] Crucially, transgressive change is always possible, as hegemony is never established once and for all: it requires ongoing political and cultural, as well as economic, practices to sustain it.[56] The task is therefore to identify the weak spots in representations and exploit them in pursuit of changes that not only ameliorate the current situation but also change the terms of debate and understanding. Chapter Four and the case studies demonstrate the extent to which NGOs

51 Laffey and Dean, "A flexible Marxism for flexible times: globalization and historical materialism," p. 93.
52 Jordan Tim (2002) *Activism! Direct Action, Hacktivism and the Future of Society* (London: Reaktion Books), p. 32.
53 Ibid., p. 36.
54 Ibid., p. 37.
55 Mouffe, Chantal (1998) "Hegemony and New Political Subjects: Toward a New Concept of Democracy," trans. Stanley Gray, in Nelson, Cary and Lawrence Grossberg (eds.) *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture* (Houndmills: Macmillan Education), pp. 89-101; p. 99.
56 Ibid., p. 91.

promote transgressive understandings of the arms trade and how their understandings simultaneously inform and are informed by their strategies.

Global isation and *global* civil society?

In liberal accounts of global civil society, NGOs are seen as key actors in an emerging regime of global governance, promoting progressive normative change. Such accounts are premised on the ending of the Cold War and the ostensible end to ideological conflict that accompanied it, which is taken to mean that governments and international institutions have become more responsive to peace and human rights groups.[57] Kaldor argues that globalisation (defined as a qualitatively new "intensification of global interconnectedness – political, economic, military and cultural" since the 1980s) has changed the meaning of civil society: it is "no longer confined to the borders of the territorial state."[58] She refers to "an emerging framework of global governance, what Immanuel Kant described as a universal civil society, in the sense of a cosmopolitan rule of law, guaranteed by a combination of international treaties and institutions."[59] Similarly, Held sees an emerging global governance along the lines of a "global social democracy", driven by liberal and social democratic European states, liberals, Southern states, NGOs, social movements and progressive economic forces.[60] Such accounts challenge state-centrism and give a pluralist account of the spreading of political authority in a globalizing world. The advantage of these accounts is that they do not treat states as unitary actors; fractions within states can ally themselves with non-state actors who share their values and interests.

The problem with this account of globalisation however, is that it privileges northern and cosmopolitan agency. As Mittelman points out, Held's agents are "those with superior capacities of awareness, the ability to project cosmopolitan values and norms," in an echo of the nineteenth century European *mission civilisatrice*.[61] Several of the actors tasked with

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[57] Kaldor, *Global Civil Society*, p. 79.
[58] Ibid., p. 1, 3.
[59] Ibid., p. 7.
[60] Held, David (2004) *Global Covenant. The Social Democratic Alternative to the Washington Consensus* (Cambridge: Polity), p. 166.
[61] Mittelman, "Globalization, Cosmopolitanism, and the Kantian Revival," p. 116, emphasis in original. Also Darby, "Pursuing the political," p. 8.

promoting and reforming globalisation are the direct inheritors of liberal ideas that facilitated colonial practices, thus obscuring the role of modern liberalism in creating the problems to which these actors now claim simply to respond. The claim that civil society is (in the process of becoming) global thus masks the particularity of the actors that liberals see populating it. The defence against critiques that attempt to recover the violent history of liberalism is, according to David Held, that "it is a mistake to throw out the language of equal worth and self-determination because of its contingent association with the historical configurations of Western power."[62] Yet, historically speaking, the emergence of the modern European state system was "coterminous with, and indissociable from, the genocide of the indigenous peoples of the 'new' world, the enslavement of the natives of the African continent, and the colonization of the societies of Asia."[63] Whilst the urge to imperialism is inherent in liberalism but not a necessary outcome,[64] Western liberalism has a bloody history. As Jahn argues, liberalism's "others" are excluded from liberal norms because the definition of otherness "is *prior*" to theories of politics and the international.[65] Held asks us not to dismiss liberalism because it contains the promise that one day, via some of the very actors that are implicated in the emergence of this state of affairs, the world's problems will be solved. The effect of this is to enact a strategy common to International Relations discourse of "an eternal deferment of the possibility of overcoming the alienation of international society that commenced in 1492."[66] This deferment serves to justify contemporary and historical violence and inequality because "the present is inscribed as a transitional phase whose violent and unequal character is expiated on the altar of that which is to come."[67] Liberal accounts of globalisation and progressive change thus serve to entrench and perpetuate some of the very practices they claim to oppose.

Spatial metaphors are common to liberal accounts of the end of the Cold War and the emergence of globalisation. Keane, for example, argues that global civil society "contains

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[62] Held, *Global Covenant,* pp. 156-7.
[63] Krishna, "Race, Amnesia, and the Education of International Relations", p. 401.
[64] Mehta, Uday Singh (1999) *Liberalism and Empire. A Study in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal Thought* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
[65] Jahn, Beate (2005) "Barbarian thoughts: imperialism in the philosophy of John Stuart Mill", *Review of International Studies,* 31(3): 599-618, p. 618, emphasis in original.
[66] Krishna, "Race, Amnesia, and the Education of International Relations", p. 402.
[67] Ibid.

pockets of *incivility* – geographic areas that coexist uneasily with 'safe' and highly 'civil' areas."[68] We are told by Kaldor that cosmopolitanism is "emerging side by side with the politics of particularism."[69] The task in responding to conflict is to find the "islands of civility" that "need to be taken seriously and given credibility by outside support", in order to generate "an alliance between international organizations and local advocates of cosmopolitanism in order to reconstruct legitimacy" so that "alternative forms of inclusive politics can emerge."[70] This political programme is based on a Kantian cosmopolitanism, in particular the idea of the spread of pacific relations, and reproduces some problematic aspects of it. Whilst the principles of reason and common humanity sound laudable, the question remains as to who defines the standards of rationality and acceptable behaviour. In liberal accounts, it is liberalism that arrogates this right. The function of the cosmopolitanism/particularism discourse is to reproduce a distinction between peace/war, civil/uncivil, liberal/non-liberal, which is arrived at by viewing the world through liberal lenses and in which the former term is valorised over the latter. Whilst they argue against the idea of networks as simply vehicles for the diffusion of Western liberal norms, emphasising instead the negotiation of meaning involved in normative change,[71] liberal scholars still locate progressive agency in cosmopolitan actors within global civil society – those who have internalised modern liberal subjectivity and personhood – and are blind to the imperial relationships fostered in the course of globalisation.

Imperial relations are still prevalent, not because of formal, territorial colonisation but because of continuing hierarchical representations of the global North and South and the practices facilitated by them. We therefore need to ask what "relations of power and struggle" are inscribed in the way people talk about global civil society.[72] Given that "what could once be said in public about 'civilising the natives' now figures, often literally, in the 'small print' for both liberals and critical theorists,"[73] it is important to examine the discursive construction of global civil society and the ways in which NGOs (re)produce it; we may find old patterns of

[68] Keane, John (2003) *Global Civil Society?* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 12, emphasis in original.
[69] Kaldor, Mary (1999) *New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era* (Cambridge: Polity), p. 139
[70] Ibid., pp. 120-5.
[71] Keck and Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders,* p. 211.
[72] Mohanty, Chandra Talpade (1997) "Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses", in Kemp, Sandra and Squires, Judith (eds.), *Feminisms* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 91-95, p. 93.
[73] Hopgood, Stephen (2000) "Reading the Small Print in Global Civil Society: The Inexorable Hegemony of the Liberal Self", *Millennium,* 29(1): 1-25, p. 3.

power persist. This raises the prospect of global civil society as a "hegemonic project" in its own right.[74] There is a transformatory, universalising urge within liberalism inasmuch as "liberalism bases its moral authority on the promise that its civilized sociality will one day embrace all humanity."[75] The effect of the universalizing urge of liberalism is that the concept of civil society gets "unmoored from its very specific history in the West" and deployed in a "normative manner", with the effect that "the concept becomes a universal condition of possibility"[76] Whilst authors such as Keane argue that languages and terms are subject to "re-export", meaning that the language of civil society is "both *pluralised* and *globalised*,"[77] it is important to understand the negotiation over concepts and meanings in the context of an imperial hierarchy in world affairs, in which representational and physical encounters between the global North and South are "imperial encounters", that is, asymmetrical and also mutually constitutive.[78]

Through the privileging of cosmopolitan agency and use of spatial metaphors, liberal accounts of globalisation sideline the mutual constitution of global North and South. They show a presentist understanding that ignores the coeval and dialectical production of both the global North and South in modern times,[79] the ways in which "what we now call Europe, Africa, the Americas and Asia were constructed together in the midst of a relationship, at once economic and cultural, military and political, which tended and still tends to allocate to the

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[74] Pasha and Blaney, "Elusive Paradise", p. 435. This raises the question of the politics of a Gramscian approach to global civil society. Germain and Kenny argue that the simply uploading of a Gramscian argument is inappropriate given the historically and geographically specific conditions under which Gramsci was working and of the arguments he made; Germain, Randall D. and Michael Kenny (1998) "Engaging Gramsci: international relations theory and the new Gramscians", *Review of International Studies*, 24: 3-21. This is in contrast to the arguments of Gramscians such as Robinson, who argues that transnational efforts at building counter-hegemonic movements must be promoted; Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy*, p. 381. The position taken in this thesis is that a Gramscian approach prompts a particular set of questions rather than provides a set of answers - it thus encourages us to ask what the relations between the national and transnational are, and to theorise and build counter-hegemony at the most appropriate level; Morton, "Historicizing Gramsci." Following Rupert, I argue that, given the transnational nature of capitalism and growing internationalisation of the state, discussion of (the possibility of) a *global* civil society is both intellectually and politically appropriate, albeit in a fashion that is sensitive to the postcolonial critiques of Marxian thinking; Rupert, Mark (1998) "(Re-) Engaging Gramsci: a response to Germain and Kenny", *Review of International Studies*, 24, 427-434.

[75] Garland, "Developing Bushmen", p. 94.

[76] Bissell, William Cunningham (1999) "Colonial Constructions: Historicizing Debates on Civil Society in Africa", in Comaroff and Comaroff, *Civil Society and the Political Imagination in* Africa, pp.124-159, p. 124.

[77] Keane, *Global Civil Society?*, pp. 38-9, emphasis in original.

[78] Doty, *Imperial Encounters*.

[79] Krishna, "Race, Amnesia, and the Education of International Relations", pp. 404, 414. Also Spivak, cited in Krishna, Sankaran (1993) "The Importance of Being Ironic: A Postcolonial View on Critical International Relations Theory", *Alternatives*, 18(3): 385-418, p. 399.

West a disproportionate share of the power to command and consume resources."[80] The language of globalisation and global civil society therefore betrays a particularist, yet simultaneously universalising urge, reaffirming Europe as the "silent referent in historical knowledge."[81] Through this interaction and mutual constitution, "Africa comes into being, alongside Europe but as a space of lack, of inadequacy, incompleteness, and incompetence in the business of achieving nationness;"[82] and NGO intervention is posited as a benevolent response to this. Whilst liberal accounts avoid self-interested justifications for empire, they function to provide a "veneer of legitimacy" to the imperial project.[83] The aim here is to unpack the self-identification of liberal writers as progressive and point to the tensions in their accounts of global civil society. A similar self-identification as progressive occurs in relation to the question of violence.

Global civil society as non-violent

There is agreement within the literature that the realm of civil society is non-violent.[84] This is because civil society actors are seen to be motivated by shared progressive values such as altruism.[85] In asserting that global civil society is a non-violent realm, authors draw on the historical link civil society has had with civility and the removal of violence from the public sphere. Kaldor argues that "original" definitions of the term emphasise "the assumption of a rule of law and the relative absence of coercion in human affairs at least within the boundaries of the state."[86] She argues that the civilising process was based on the establishment of monopoly on violence and taxation; citing Tilly, she acknowledges that the construction of

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80 Drayton, Richard (2002) "The Collaboration of Labour: Slaves, Empires and Globalizations in the Atlantic World, *c.* 1600-1850," in Hopkins, A. G. (ed.) *Globalization in World History* (London: Pimlico), pp. 98-114, p.103.
81 Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*, p. 28.
82 Krishna, "Race, Amnesia, and the Education of International Relations", p. 411. Also Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*, p. 32.
83 Rao, Rahul (2004) "The Empire Writes Back (to Michael Ignatieff)", *Millennium*, 33(1): 145-166, p. 147. Similarly, Vitalis critiques both the cosmopolitan and nationalist strands of International Relations scholarship for its upholding of racism as a norm and institution; Vitalis, Robert (2000) "The Graceful and Generous Liberal Gesture: Making racism invisible in American International Relations", *Millennium*, 29(2): 331-356.
84 Kaldor, *Global Civil Society*, p. 3; Kaldor, Mary, Helmut Anheier and Marlies Glasius (2005) "Introduction", in Anheier, Helmut, Marlies Glasius and Mary Kaldor (eds.), *Global Civil Society 2004/5*, (London: Sage), pp. 1-25, p. 2; Keane, *Global Civil Society?*, pp. 8, 12; Price, "Transnational Civil Society and Advocacy in World Politics", p. 580.
85 Florini and Simmons, "What the World Needs Now?" , p. 7; also Kaldor, *Global Civil Society*, p. 86; Keck and Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders*, pp. 1, 30.
86 Kaldor, *Global Civil Society*, p. 7.

these monopolies was bound up with wars against other states, through which interstate war became the only legitimate form of organised violence.[87] In such a way, processes of internal pacification and external aggression accompanied the rise of capitalism and the nation-state system, meaning that civil society came to be defined as a non-violent sphere.

This narrative of the pacification of the domestic sphere and civilising of civil society is not innocent, however. According to Krishna, the emphasis on the emergence of national states, itself a dominant idea in International Relations scholarship, means that through the definition of the subject as inter-*national* relations, "much of a violent world history is instantly sanitized."[88] The function of the discipline is therefore to bracket "questions of theft of land, violence, and slavery."[89] Postcolonial literature can help us recover the "repression and violence that are as instrumental in the victory of the modern as is the persuasive power of its rhetorical strategies."[90] Tracing the intellectual heritage of liberalism demonstrates that a discourse of freedom and tolerance went hand in hand with violent practices in the age of colonialism.

The characterisation of unfamiliar ways of life and parts of the world as uncivil means they no longer qualify for liberal tolerance and as such are subject to violence, or at least interventionary practices. This points to "the role of war and armed force in *making liberal* the illiberal."[91] John Locke, one of the first theorists of civil society, is famed for enunciating key liberal principles such as the equality, freedom and independence of all men, the transition from the instability of the state of nature to political or civil society[92] via the social contract, the crucial role of consent in the creation of civil society, the role of civil society in preserving private property, that conquest does not equal right of possession, and the right to rebellion or resistance.[93] However, his writings demonstrate intolerance of those ways of life that do not conform with liberal understandings. According to Locke, God gave the world to the

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87 Ibid., pp. 32-3; also Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, pp. 18, 20.
88 Krishna, "Race, Amnesia, and the Education of International Relations", p. 406.
89 Ibid., p. 401.
90 Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*, p. 44.
91 Barkawi, *Globalization and War*, pp. 19-20, emphasis in original.
92 For Locke, political and civil society are taken to mean the same thing, as distinct from the state of nature; however, they are also distinct from government. Civil society is not reducible to government, and government should be the agent of civil society; Goldie, Mark (1993) "Introduction", in Locke, John (1689/1993) *Two Treatises of Government*, edited by Mark Goldie (London: Everyman), p. xxviii.
93 Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, pp. 156-178, 208, 215.

industrious and rational, meaning those who labour;[94] those who do not labour in a way that Locke recognises – such as native American societies – fall outside of the boundaries of liberal tolerance and forfeit the right to non-intervention. Because native Americans did not have a relationship with the land that Locke recognised, their land was therefore deemed not to be owned, and open to conquest. As Parekh argues, Locke and other liberals' narrow, ethnocentric view of human nature and the good life meant they could only understand the native Americans through liberal lenses; therefore, based on their assumptions of what it means to act rationally, the native Americans failed this test, which meant that the English were allowed, indeed it was their duty, to take over their lands.[95]

A similar understanding of non-liberal ways of life can be found in Kant's writings, on which contemporary global civil society scholars such as Mary Kaldor draw heavily.[96] His vision of an expanding federation of republics, and thereby the spread of peace, is based on particular liberal principles that contain within them the seeds of intervention, force and transformation. Kant argues that forming states is civilizationally superior to remaining in a "state of nature", in which "savages cling to their lawless freedom." He juxtaposes their "freedom of folly" to a superior "freedom of reason" and looks on the former with "profound contempt."[97] Not only is the state of nature civilizationally inferior, it is also threatening: Kant argues that the person living in a state of nature "robs me of any such security and injures me by virtue of this very state in which he coexists with me." It is the "very lawlessness of his state" that presents a threat, and "I can require him either to enter into a common lawful state with me or to move away from my vicinity.[98] The mere existence of non-liberal life forms is deemed a threat to peace and liberal ways of life, and must be "required" to either transform

[94] Ibid., p. 131.
[95] Parekh, Bikhu (1995) "Liberalism and Colonialism: A critique of Locke and Mill," in Pieterse, Jan Nederveen and Bhikhu Parekh (eds.) *The Decolonization of Imagination. Culture, Knowledge and Power* (London: Zed Books), pp. 81-98, pp. 84-90; also Jahn, "Barbarian thoughts," p. 613.
[96] Kaldor, *New and Old Wars* and *Global Civil Society*. Kaldor adopts and extends Kant's vision of cosmopolitan right to promote "tolerance, multiculturalism, civility and democracy" and the use of force to ensure "respect for certain overriding universal principles" and the defence of "islands of civility", including through the establishment of local trusteeships or protectorates; Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, pp. 115-6, 133-4. In effect, what Kaldor is arguing in favour of is the use of force to pacify what she understands as incivility and support those forces of liberalism to be found in conflict zones. Understood through a postcolonial lens, this looks more like the use of force against those elements of society that fall outside the circle of modern liberal tolerance.
[97] Kant, Immanuel (1991) "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch", in Reiss, Hans (ed.) *Kant. Political Writings*, 2nd edition, trans. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 93-130, pp. 102-3.
[98] Ibid., p. 98.

themselves into acceptable forms or be removed. According to Kant, "natural right allows us to say of men living in a lawless condition that they ought to abandon it"; it is not until peoples organise themselves into (liberal republican) states that they enjoy the principle of non-interference.[99] The principle of tolerance therefore applies only to those ways of life that Kant deems acceptable.

The examples of Locke and Kant demonstrate that the urge to imperialism and the use of force is internal to liberalism; empire is therefore not a contradiction of liberal principles but emanates from and is facilitated by them.[100] The liberal justification for empire was that representative democracy and other political forms dear to liberalism depend on having reached a particular level of civilization.[101] If a country or a community has not reached that level, "liberalism in the form of empire services the deficiencies of the past for societies that have been stunted through history."[102] According to Mehta, interventionist and violent practices are facilitated by liberalism's failure to understand what is "unfamiliar" to it in anything other than liberalism's own terms. Liberal imperialism "relentlessly attempts to align or educate the regnant forms of the unfamiliar with its own expectations"; when this does not work, the unfamiliar gains an "impenetrable inscrutability" that means it no longer needs to be understood.[103] The norm of non-intervention thus applies only to civilised nations.[104] This is what facilitates the use of force against non-liberal life forms. Liberal tolerance only extends as far as the boundaries of liberalism itself: non-liberal social forms are incomprehensible to liberalism, and require transformation – by force if necessary – in order to fulfil the promise of liberal progress.

A key feature of classical and contemporary liberal approaches is the use of educational metaphors, which infantilise unfamiliar cultures, saying "not yet" and "[consigning] Indians, Africans, and other 'rude' nations to an imaginary waiting room of history."[105] Such metaphors also legitimise intervention in the name of promoting cosmopolitan values; conceptualising

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[99] Ibid., p. 104.
[100] Mehta, *Liberalism and Empire*, pp. 20, 200.
[101] See also Jahn, "Barbarian Thoughts" and Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*, p.8.
[102] Mehta, *Liberalism and Empire*, p. 81.
[103] Ibid., pp. 18, 68.
[104] Jahn, "Barbarian Thoughts", pp. 605-7.
[105] Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*, p. 8.

colonialism as a pedagogical process allowed colonial violence to be justified as in the long term interests of all.[106] Mehta also emphasises the educational aspect of liberalism, describing the impetus to the education "of societies in toto", not just of individuals within it.[107] This impulse to liberalism continues today: as Duffield argues, whilst modernisation has always been a key component of development discourse, since the 1990s, effecting the social transformation of "dysfunctional" societies in the South into "cooperative, representative and, especially, stable entities" is itself now "a direct and explicit policy aim" for agents of global liberal governance.[108] This is because "remedial development is not only a moral right, but can be justified as a form of enlightened self-interest"[109], echoing the classical liberal desire to transform unfamiliar societies and cultures into liberal ones and the presentation of this as of universal benefit.

The aim of this thesis is to explore whether NGO activity is a contemporary example of such liberal activity. Sounding an alarm bell to the celebratory accounts of NGO activity on the world stage, it asks whether there is a "will to govern"[110] or an "urge to dominate the world" inherent in the "self-confident embrace" of liberalism[111] and in the "liberal gaze."[112] Is it possible to identify imperial urges in liberal thought now that the age of colonialism is over? Are there strands of thought that persist and shape liberal engagement with the non-liberal or the unfamiliar? And more symbolically, is civil society "a new alibi for old-style 'humane' imperialism, its Eurocentric liberalism promoted by such latter-day evangelists as nongovernmental organizations and development agencies"[113]?

It is not that global civil society authors deny that violence and incivility take place in the world; rather, they exorcise it from view. Keane locates violence on the edges of civil society: "On the outskirts of global civil society, and within its nooks and crannies, dastardly things go on, certainly. It provides convenient hideouts for gangsters, war criminals, arms

106 Parekh, " Liberalism and Colonialism", p. 96.
107 Mehta, *Liberalism and Empire*, pp. 83-4.
108 Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars*, p. 39, 11.
109 Ibid., p. 37.
110 Duffield, Mark (2002) "Social Reconstruction and the Radicalization of Development," p. 1053.
111 Mehta, *Liberalism and Empire*, p. 200.
112 Krishna, "Race, Amnesia, and the Education of International Relations", p. 418.
113 Comaroff and Comaroff, *Civil Society and the Political Imagination in Africa*, p. viii.

traders and terrorists."[114] This assumes that violence is unusual and located on the periphery of world politics, rather than central to capitalist globalisation and the constitution of the state and global civil society. Keane admits that there is a "stench of violence" surrounding "talk of 'civilised society', 'civilisation' and 'civility'. ... The foundations of civil societies have often been soaked in blood. 'Civilised' worldliness typically developed hand in hand with profoundly 'uncivil' or barbaric forms of domination."[115] However, the idea that the violence committed via "arms traders" is to be found "on the outskirts of civil society" is ironic given the focus of this thesis. Similarly, Kaldor claims civil society to be "an answer to war"[116]: again, this is an especially interesting claim if one examines the arms trade, which provides the instruments of war. A Gramscian understanding of civil society requires us to pay attention to the relations between the state, arms capital and NGOs. Arms capital has been central to state formation and processes of pacification. And it may be the case that NGOs facilitate war by failing to tackle the impetus to the arms trade, and by representing the South in particular ways that facilitate intervention.

Another issue with regard to violence relates to the relationships between global civil society actors. As Pasha and Blaney argue, "where civil society prescribes a hegemony of liberal civic culture (simultaneously experienced as the domination and/or deculturation of many of its members), the result will be a periodic and irresolvable problem of policing the noncivil within civil society."[117] This is of interest because it highlights the tensions that can be generated within civil society: the emphasis on particular, liberal models of behaviour generates resistance that must be policed. In addition to questions regarding who Northern-based NGOs work with in the global South, it also raises questions of relations between Northern-based groups. There is a degree of policing that goes on within the NGO and campaign world; as is demonstrated in the course of the thesis, the more mainstream NGOs try to distance themselves from CAAT, which supports and undertakes direct action, albeit in an explicitly non-violent fashion.

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[114] Keane, *Global Civil Society?* p. 12.
[115] Ibid., p. 30.
[116] Kaldor, *Global Civil Society*, p. 3.
[117] Pasha and Blaney, "Elusive Paradise", p. 424.

In part, attitudes to violence are a question of political strategy and morality. To challenge a hegemony based on violence, many activists refuse to use violence as to do so would be to further entrench the social phenomenon they are challenging. Acting in line with the principles one wants to see operationalised across society is, for many activists, a key principle. But it is also a sign of disciplining: it means that direct action protestors who do not eschew violence are further sidelined as political actors. Yet such actors (usually) have a political rationale for not ruling out violence; often, their violence is conducted against property, challenging the capitalist definition of violence that includes violence against private property. The use of the state's coercive apparatuses in the protection of private property in turn further stimulates violent conflict. The liberal emphasis on non-violence also further entrenches the hold that the state has on the claim to legitimate violence; the use of force against the state-sanctioned means of force is still widely socially unacceptable. This thesis does not investigate the understandings and strategies of activists who do not rule out the use of violence; I focus on NGO activity, and direct action protestors tend to organise themselves in more autonomous forms. However, the disciplining of NGO activity is visible in the distance at which CAAT is held from other NGOs, even though it abides by a code of non-violence. And CAAT also distances itself from direct action groups that do not eschew the use of violence (usually against property, in which activists come up against a particularly capitalist definition of violence), serving to delegitimise violent protest activity.

Conclusion

This chapter critiques four aspects of the dominant liberal literature on global civil society. First, liberal authors delineate civil society from both the state and the market in a manner that sidelines the structures of capitalism from debate. Second, the emphasis on the progressive or emancipatory character of global civil society is mitigated by a Gramscian analysis of hegemony and counter-hegemony. Third, liberals situate their discussion of a globalising civil society in a problematic account of globalisation that obscures the imperial nature of North-South relations and mutual constitution of both categories. And fourth, the emphasis on the non-violent nature of global civil society is a normative rather than analytical commitment, and has the effect of dismissing the historical and contemporary use of force by liberal actors as well as sidelining the violent spaces that exist in global civil society and

disciplining NGOs and activists into non-violent activity. These limitations of liberal approaches can be remedied with a postcolonial Gramscian approach that focuses on the structural constraints of capitalism, the Eurocentrism and universalising urge of discourses of global civil society, and the ambiguity of global civil society as an emancipatory agent. The aim of this chapter has been to critically assess the literature on global civil society. The four critiques all speak to NGO activity in relation to U.K. involvement in the arms trade. Before moving on to an analysis of NGO activity, the next chapter analyses U.K. involvement in the arms trade as a facet of military globalisation.

Chapter Three: Understanding U.K. involvement in the arms trade

Introduction

The United Kingdom is a leading actor in the international arms trade: in the period 2000-2004 it was the world's fifth largest exporter of major conventional weapons, behind Russia, the USA, France and Germany. Together, these five states accounted for 81% of all transfers of major conventional weapons in this period.[1] Russia and the USA accounted for the greatest share of this market by a significant margin (32% and 31% respectively); the United Kingdom accounted for just over 5% of global arms exports in this period.[2] The United Kingdom has a diverse set of clients for its products but its key post-World War Two customers are NATO and other European states, Middle Eastern states (such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Oman and Kuwait), India and Indonesia. Table 1, overleaf, shows the top ten recipients of U.K. arms export licences between 1997 and 2005; the pattern displays continuity with the United Kingdom's traditional client base for weaponry.

[1] Wezeman and Bromley, "International Arms Transfers," p. 418.
[2] Ibid., pp. 418, 427, 453.

Table 1: U.K. arms exports, 1997-2005[3]

Total value of exported goods and top 10 recipients per year (figures in £m)

997 lay- ec)	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
59.59	**1,968.29**	**980.52**	**1,720.51**	**1,533.08**	**942.07**	**992.4**	**1,390.81**	**1,390.32**
udi abia 76.66	Saudi Arabia 803.23	Malaysia 200.04	Australia 256.96	USA 349.78	USA 162.22	Saudi Arabia 189.33	USA 213.90	USA 308.88
ance 7.17	France 242.95	Saudi Arabia 131.09	Saudi Arabia 238.42	Saudi Arabia 161.36	Germany 127.77	USA 116.3	Italy 123.48	Malaysia 157.00
many 2.06	Germany 178.51	Indonesia 102.06	South Korea 183.51	Italy 145.42	Italy 98.47	Malaysia 97.26	Saudi Arabia 97.47	Oman 141.03
AE 9.57	UAE 172.40	USA 86.91	Germany 167.50m	Germany 140.91	India 68.98	Germany 94.64	Oman 91.90	France 89.10
iwait 0.32	Turkey 84.15	Italy 69.98	USA 138.94	Canada 121.02	Saudi Arabia 63.65	Italy 82.24	Germany 91.75	Italy 87.53
razil 6.32	USA 82.39	Germany 45.47	Italy 122.58	Australia 119.80	Canada 54.77	India 78.03	South Africa 86.49	India 69.46
onesia 2.49	Indonesia 72.66	South Korea 43.04	UAE 111.02	UAE 60.26	Oman 46.04	France 48.5	India 83.71	Romania 58.01
man 0.23	Qatar 66.28	Kuwait 40.51	Indonesia 95.38	Kuwait 57.95	France 38.85	Turkey 42.37	France 69.44	Turkey 55.14
taly).20	Italy 55.14	France 36.46	Kuwait 68.09	France 53.96	Jordan 38.34	UAE 25.19	Turkey 65.72	Germany 50.69
SA 4.21	Singapore 25.96	Canada 36.14	Oman 60.58	Switzerland 49.95	Turkey 35.15	Oman 25.17	Romania 60.36	Switzerland 47.95

[3] FCO et al (various years) *UK Strategic Export Controls. Annual Report* (London: The Stationery Office).

The international arms trade is hierarchically structured. Within this hierarchy, first-tier states are those that can undertake technological innovation and produce weapons systems for all military applications. With the emergence of a global, industrialised arms industry, which was given massive impetus by the Industrial Revolution, the United Kingdom became a dominant first-tier arms producer.[4] After World War Two that mantle was taken over by the USA and USSR, which between them accounted for fifty to seventy five per cent of all global arms deliveries.[5] Since the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the USSR, the USA has been dominant in the global arms market, although Russia has reasserted itself as a major arms exporter since 2000.[6] Thirty eight of the top 100 arms-producing companies are based in the USA; they accounted for 63.2% of the world's total arms sales in 2003.[7] The United Kingdom remains a leading second-tier producer, alongside other European states such as France, Germany and Italy. Second-tier states can satisfy some of their own needs and sell arms to the third tier. The U.K. arms industry survived World War Two intact, with massive capacity, and since 1945 has produced the entire range of modern weapons systems (including nuclear weapons). The commercial orientation to arms sales and the export of a relatively high proportion of its production, in particular of high technology weapons such as aerospace equipment (including, at times, weapons of superior quality to those in use by the U.K. armed forces), are indicative of the United Kingdom's second-tier arms producing status.[8] Third-tier states such as Brazil, China, Israel, India and South Korea, attempt to create an indigenous capacity through the import of technology; several such states are emerging as second tier producers and increasing their share of the export market.[9]

The U.K government provides extensive financial and political support for arms exports, which it justifies with reference to the economic, strategic and security benefits they

[4] Krause, Arms and the State: Patterns of Military Production and Trade (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); McNeil, William H. (1982) The Pursuit of Power: Technology, armed force, and society since A.D. 1000 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
[5] Krause, *Arms and the State*, p.87.
[6] Wezeman and Bromley, "International Arms Transfers," p.418. It remains appropriate to label the USA as the dominant state in the international arms trade because of a likely peak in Russian exports and the continued superiority of the USA and Western Europe in technological terms; ibid.
[7] Sköns, Elisabeth and Eamon Surry (2005) "Arms production", in *SIPRI Yearbook 2005: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 383-416, p. 384.
[8] Krause, *Arms and the State*, pp. 127-153; Buzan and Herring (1998) *The Arms Dynamic in World Politics* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner), p. 35.
[9] Krause, *Arms and the State*, p. 27-29.

ostensibly bring. In this chapter I critique this understanding, arguing that government support for arms exports is an expression of a military-industrial complex, and that U.K. involvement in the arms trade plays a significant role in both the internationalisation of the state and capital, and the production and maintenance of hierarchical North-South relations. The arms trade is a key means of the transfer of coercion, which underpins hegemony and facilitates capitalist expansion and development, both historically and in the contemporary era. The transformations in the arms industry and its relationship with the state are an expression of military globalisation, which facilitates other processes of capitalist globalisation. The arms trade has also played a role in the hierarchical constitution of North-South relations: it contributes to the creation of a hegemonic global military culture, which promotes capital-intensive forms of militarisation. Thus, not only does the U.K. government licence arms exports to repressive governments in violation of its own publicly-stated commitments, but the scale and overall pattern of exports, and the domestic trade between arms companies and the U.K. government are also significant. Such an analysis has implications for the remainder of the thesis, raising the question of the nature of NGOs' understandings of U.K. involvement in the arms trade and its role in international relations.

The rest of this chapter proceeds in four parts. First, I set out the U.K. government's own account of its involvement in the international arms trade. This centres on the ostensible economic, strategic and security benefits of arms exports; the right of sovereign states to self-defence; the United Kingdom's role as a so-called great power; and the strict controls that the government claims govern the export of weapons. These claims, all of which are underpinned by an ideology of defence and national security, form socially powerful and durable pro-export narratives – "magnetic lines of tendency which are very difficult to disrupt"[10] – that facilitate significant political and economic support for arms exports by the U.K. government. The rest of the chapter focuses on the reasons for, and effects of, these powerful pro-export narratives. The second part of the chapter documents the integration of internationalising arms capital into the structures of the U.K. state and explains this in terms of a military-industrial complex. The third part situates the arms trade as a key mechanism of military globalisation and the internationalisation of the state, which is itself reliant on coercion in the first and last instances. The fourth part is concerned with the emergence of a global military culture and the role of the

[10] Grossberg, "On Postmodernism and Articulation," p. 54.

arms trade in the reproduction of hierarchical North-South relations. Repressive Southern states are not simply a phenomenon to which the U.K. state must respond, but one which the U.K. state, and capitalism as a system, have played a role in creating. Overall, this analysis of U.K. involvement in the arms trade provides the context against which I analyse NGO arguments and strategies in Chapter Four and the three subsequent case studies.

U.K. government support for arms exports

Arms exports from U.K.-based companies are facilitated by extensive economic and political support from the U.K. government, in the form of contributions towards research and development costs, insurance cover against the risk of recipient default via the Export Credit Guarantees Department (ECGD), the use of defence attachés, ministers and the Royal Family in promoting arms sales abroad, and the role of the Defence Export Services Organisation (DESO), a department of the MoD dedicated to promoting arms exports. The government justifies this support in terms of the economic benefits that supposedly accrue from exporting arms and related technology, the strategic benefits it claims result from reliability of supply, and in terms of the defence and international security benefits that arms exports ostensibly bring. These are encapsulated in the MoD's "Defence Vision", which revolves around "Defending the United Kingdom and its interests" and "Strengthening international peace and stability."[11]

The government claims that arms exports bring savings of "around £300 million a year" to the defence budget because of the longer production runs they generate and the significant levels of employment they support.[12] However, the economic case for arms exports is, at best, unproven. As Mayhew argues, the largely non-competitive environment of arms manufacturing and MoD contributions to research and development costs mean that the benefit of exports – which contribute little to fixed costs and are typically agreed after domestic production runs are established – is unlikely to be as great as the government

[11] MoD (2005) "About Us – The Defence Vision", 29 April 2005, http://www.mod.uk/aboutus/mission.htm (17 January 2006).
[12] DESO (no date) "Why Export Defence Goods and Services?", http://www.deso.mod.uk/policy.htm (6 June 2005).

claims.[13] In terms of the employment generated by arms exports, there are a number of studies that challenge the government's position, emphasising for example that the number of jobs dependent on arms exports amounts to approximately 0.3% of U.K. employment and each job is subsidised by over £4,600 per year.[14] More generally, Saferworld and BASIC calculate that subsidies on arms exports – in the form of direct assistance for exports via DESO, the use of defence attachés and the armed forces for promotion, and the Defence Assistance Fund; export credits; the distortion of MoD procurement; and support for research and development of weapons systems – equal at least £453m, and possibly up to £936m per year, depending on how they are calculated.[15] Indeed, one study, co-written by two MoD economic advisers, concludes that "the economic costs of reducing defence exports are relatively small and largely one-off' and that "the balance of argument about defence exports should depend mainly on non-economic considerations."[16] The government's presentation of the economic benefits of arms exports is thus, at the very least, overstated, yet it continues to have salience in political debates.

Alongside the supposed economic benefits, the government claims that arms exports are important for strategic reasons, predominantly because of their role in helping domestic companies remain competitive, thus contributing to the national defence industrial base, which guarantees supplies to the military in a time of crisis.[17] But the arms industry is internationalising via a process of cross-national mergers and acquisitions, multinational consortia and joint ventures between firms based in different countries, co-development and co-production of products, licensed production (in which one company allows another to manufacture its products under licence), and offsets (in which sales involve some domestic sourcing of components, or inward investment to the buying country).[18] International sourcing of components has also increased, to the point where 40% of the equipment exported from

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[13] Mayhew, "A Dead Giveaway."
[14] Ingram and Davis, *The Subsidy Trap*, pp. 38–40.
[15] Ingram and Isbister, *Escaping the Subsidy Trap*, p. 24-25.
[16] Chalmers et al, *The Economic Costs and Beefits of U.K. Defence Export*, 3.
[17] DESO (no date) "Why does the government support defence exporters?", http://www.deso.mod.uk/policy.htm (16 January 2007).
[18] Bitzinger, Richard A. (1994) "The Globalization of the Arms Industry: The Next Proliferation Challenge", *International Security*, 19(2): 170-198; Hayward, Keith (2000) "The Globalisation of Defence Industries", *Survival*, 42(2): 115-132.

the United Kingdom is made up of imported components.[19] These factors, combined with increasing foreign direct investment, mean that "the ownership of key assets is becoming more transnational" and that globalisation is "creating or accelerating the emergence of transnational defence markets and corporate structures."[20] These features represent the growing internationalisation of the arms industry; it is becoming less and less realistic to talk of national companies or national defence industrial bases.

The transformation of the six largest U.K.-based companies is indicative of the trends at work in the internationalisation of the arms industry.[21] BAE Systems, Rolls Royce, VT Group, Cobham, Smiths and GKN have a growing number of joint ventures abroad, foreign subsidiaries and co-production efforts.[22] Few, if any arms-producing companies are involved solely in the military sector and there is no clear boundary between "military" and "civilian" companies. However, arms production forms a significant proportion of all six leading U.K.-based companies' activities, and companies are increasingly military- and U.S.-oriented.[23] In addition, the growing importance of information technology, communications and services mean that the definition of military production is changing. Whilst "spin out" from military to

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[19] Sprague, Oliver (2004) *Lock, Stock and Barrel. How British Arms Components Add Up to Deadly Weapons* (Oxford: Oxfam).

[20] Hayward "The Globalisation of Defence Industries", 117; 125; see also Bitzinger, "The Globalization of the Arms Industry," and Schofield, Steven, Malcolm Dando and Malcolm Ridge (1992) *Conversion of the British Defence Industries*, Peace Research Report Number 30, October 1992, (Bradford: Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford), p. 43.

[21] It is important to note that it is not just U.K.-based companies are expanding their presence abroad; other, foreign-owned companies are also increasing their presence in the United Kingdom. For example, Lockheed Martin, the world's largest arms company, has a unit in the United Kingdom, employing approximately 1,000 people at over ten facilities, and the MoD's multi-billion pound programme to build a new class of aircraft carrier for the UK's armed forces comprises a "carrier Alliance team" made up of the U.K. MoD, BAE Systems, Thales, KBR, VT Group and Babcock. Lockheed Martin (2003) "Lockheed Martin UK to provide European Hub for World's Largest Defence Programme", 31 March 2003, http://www.lockheedmartin.co.uk/news/138.html; Defence Talk (2005) "Future Aircraft Carrier Project Moves to Next Phase as Assembly Plans Are Agreed", 15 December 2005, http://www.defencetalk.com/news/publish/article_004468.php (both 16 July 2006).

[22] For example, BAE Systems has a 40% share in BAeHAL Software, in partnership with Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd of India, and Rolls Royce has a licensed production partnership agreement with the same company, as well as with Samsung Techwin in South Korea; VT Group acquired the U.S.-based Griffin Services company in 2002, giving it a significant position within the U.S. support services market; Smiths Aerospace manufactures components in China, Poland and the USA; Cobham has companies in South Africa, USA, France, Canada, Sweden, Germany, Malaysia, Finland, Australia, Austria and Denmark; and GKN Aerospace has technology, engineering and manufacturing facilities in the USA, Mexico, Germany, India and Australia.

[23] Arms sales accounted for 76% of the VT Group's total sales in 2004, 50% of Cobham's, 30% of Rolls Royce's, 29% of GKN's and 26% of Smiths'. BAE Systems is the most military- and US-oriented of U.K. based firms. Eamon Surry and the SIPRI Arms Industry Network, "The 100 largest arms-producing companies, 2004," in Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *SIPRI Yearbook 2006: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2006), pp. 419-427.

civilian sectors has traditionally been a feature, now "spin in", through which civilian-oriented developments in technology are applied to the military sector, are increasing.[24] This has the effect of blurring the distinction between civilian and military production.

The transformation of the arms industry means that it is increasingly difficult to refer to a national defence industrial base. The government acknowledges that arms companies are becoming increasingly international in terms of their ownership, governance and production, but articulates this in terms of the national interest. In its October 2002 Defence Industrial Strategy the MoD argued that "The U.K. defence industry should ... be defined in terms of where the technology is created, where the skills and the intellectual property reside, where jobs are created and sustained, and where the investment is made."[25] By this logic, companies such as French-owned Thales can be considered part of the United Kingdom's defence industrial base because they have established significant U.K. market share and employ people in the United Kingdom.[26] Whilst the DTI argued in 2005 that approximately 25% of the U.K. defence industrial base was foreign-owned, the MoD simultaneously argued that "we welcome overseas investment, especially from companies that create value, employment, technology or intellectual assets in the UK *and thus become part of the UK defence industry*."[27] Simultaneously, BAE Systems, which is increasingly orienting itself to the U.S. military market and is a major supplier to the Pentagon, is understood as a strategic national asset. The U.K. government thus articulates processes of internationalisation as in the national interest.

In addition to the supposed economic and strategic benefits, the government claims that arms exports bring defence and security benefits. Arms exports are said to play a role in "deterring aggression and promoting stability by strengthening collective defence relationships."[28] The claim that arms exports deter aggression and promote stability is problematic given the leading role played by Prime Minister Tony Blair in lobbying Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee in October 2002 to buy Hawk jets despite ongoing and

[24] Dunne and Surry, 'Arms Production', pp. 394, 414-5. Also Singer, Peter W. (2003) *Corporate Warriors. The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), pp. 61-3.
[25] MoD (2002) *Defence Industrial Policy*, Ministry of Defence Policy Papers No.5, October 2002, http://www.mod.uk/linked_files/issues/paper5/defence_Industrial.pdf (7 June 2005), p9.
[26] O'Connell, Dominic (2005) "What price defence?", *Management Today*, p.54, 3 October 2005.
[27] MoD (2005) *Defence Industrial Strategy. Defence White Paper* (London: The Stationery Office), p.30, p.7, emphasis added.
[28] DESO, "Why Export Defence Goods and Services?".

increased tensions between India and Pakistan and the threat of a nuclear confrontation. In September 2003, BAE Systems secured a £1bn deal to supply the Hawks.[29] Whilst the Hawk is often described as a training jet, it can also be used as a ground attack aircraft; newspaper reports claim the Hawk can be used to train pilots to fly fast jets such as Jaguars, which can be adapted to carry nuclear weapons (and were previously sold to the Indian military by BAE Systems).[30] Another example is arms sales to Israel: the United Kingdom regularly licences components for combat aircraft, small arms and ammunition to Israel, which are used by the Israeli military in human rights violations in the Occupied Territories. In July 2002, new guidelines on incorporation issues in arms transfers were introduced at the same time as licences were granted for the export of head-up displays to the USA for incorporation into F-16 fighter planes destined for Israel.[31] The licensing of such equipment directly to Israel would contravene the Government's publicly stated arms export control guidelines as the Israeli air force has used F-16s in attacks on the Occupied Territories. It is widely believed that the new guidelines were introduced in order to facilitate transfers such as this one.[32]

The government also claims that arms exports promote stability through the maintenance of collective defence relationships. Notably, a large proportion of U.K. arms exports go to the USA and NATO allies and to the Middle East – both areas of central importance to the stability of the capitalist system. In this sense, arms export play a significant role in maintaining the coercive backbone of the global capitalist order. The United Kingdom's arms relationship with Saudi Arabia is emblematic of this. The *Al Yamamah* deals with Saudi Arabia in the late 1980s, worth £15bn and paid for largely in oil, are the most lucrative military export deal in British history and made the United Kingdom the largest arms supplier to Saudi

29 Edwards, Dave (2005) "What's so funny about peace, love and Armageddon?," *ZMag*, 26 April 2005, http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?ItemID=7736 (3 December 2005); Tran, Mark (2003) "BAE wins £1bn Hawk contract", *The Guardian*, 3 September 2003.

30 Norton-Taylor, Richard (2002) "British plane sales to India raise fears of nuclear use", *The Guardian*, 23 April 2002, http://www.guardian.co.uk/kashmir/Story/0,2763,688932,00.html (17 January 2007).

31 Davies, Mark (2002) "Straw defends arms sales change", *BBC News Online*, 9 July 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/2110081.stm (4 December 2005).

32 CAAT (2002) *Arming the Occupation: Israel and the Arms Trade*, http://www.caat.org.uk/information/publications/countries/israel-1002-summary.php, October 2002 (5 December 2005), p. 16; Saferworld (2002) "Submission to the Quadripartite Select Committee: New Guidance Issued by the Government – July 2002", http://www.saferworld.org.uk/government/submissions/SubXcriteriaJul02.htm (4 December 2005); White, Michael and Richard Norton-Taylor (2002) "Straw provokes row over arms for Israel", *The Guardian*, 9 July 2002; Ahmed, Kamal (2002) "Cabinet in arms to Israel row", *The Observer*, 7 July 2002.

Arabia.[33] More recently, in December 2005, the United Kingdom signed a deal with the Saudi government to supply £8bn-worth of Eurofighter Typhoons.[34] There are four key features of this relationship that are pertinent here.

First, arms sales to Saudi Arabia are facilitated by extensive support from the U.K. state. Financial support (over and above the generic support for research and development of weaponry noted earlier) comes in the form of ECGD cover, with press reports claiming that insurance worth £1bn (to be drawn from taxpayers' money) has been guaranteed to BAE Systems in the event that Saudi Arabia fails to pay for its arms purchases.[35] Political support comes through the involvement of senior politicians, including the Secretary of State for Defence and the Prime Minister, in official visits to promote arms deals, and the use of the state's intelligence machinery in deals such as those with Saudi Arabia that are deemed strategically or financially important.[36] A second persistent feature of the relationship is extensive secrecy. The 1992 National Audit Office (NAO) report on the MoD's accounts, including the *Al Yamamah* deal, has never been published by the cross-parliamentary Public Accounts Committee (PAC) for reasons of confidentiality between the U.K. and Saudi governments, in what Lustgarten calls a blatant subversion of government and parliamentary accountability.[37] It is the only NAO report to remain confidential[38] and it is claimed that a second report, prepared in 1997/8 by the NAO, was not even passed to the PAC.[39]

[33] Phythian, *The Politics of British Arms Sales,* pp.26, 216-226.
[34] Davis, Ian and Emma Mayhew (2005) "What Happens When a White Elephant Meets a Paper Tiger? The prospective sale of Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft to Saudi Arabia and the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports", BASIC Occasional Paper on International Security Policy, #49, December 2005, http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Papers/BP49.htm (28 October 2006); Leigh, David and Ewen MacAskill (2005) "Blair in secret Saudi mission", *The Guardian,* 27 September 2005. BAE Systems Chief Executive, Mike Turner, is reported to have said that "We've had 43 billion pounds from *Al Yamamah* over the last 20 years and there could be another 40 billion pounds;" quoted in Davis and Mayhew, "What Happens When a White Elephant Meets a Paper Tiger?"
[35] Leigh, David and Rob Evans (2004) "Secret £1bn deal to insure Saudi arms contract", *The Guardian,* 14 December 2004.
[36] Dover, "For Queen and Company."
[37] Lustgarten, Laurence (1998) "The Arms Trade and the Constitution: Beyond the Scott Report", *The Modern Law Review,* 61(4): 499-514; pp.501-2.
[38] FOIA Centre (2006) "NAO doubts over keeping Saudi arms report secret", 30 June 2006, http://www.foiacentre.com/news-al-yamamah-060630-01.html (28 October 2006).
[39] FOIA Centre (2006) "NAO wrote second secret 'Al Yamamah' report", 7 July 2006, http://www.foiacentre.com/news-al-yamamah-060707.html (28 October 2006).

A third key feature of the U.K.-Saudi Arabia arms relationship is allegations of corruption and the U.K. state's response to these. Allegations have been made of bribery and the use of slush funds by BAE Systems in its dealings with Saudi Arabia. Recent documents found at the National Archive suggest that the price of Tornado jets was inflated by £600m in the 1985 *Al Yamamah* deal.[40] Former Secretary of State for Defence, Lord Gilmour, admitted on *Newsnight* in June 2006 that bribes were routinely paid in arms deals with Saudi Arabia and were sanctioned by the government.[41] There have also been more recent allegations of slush funds relating to the sale of BAE Systems equipment to Saudi Arabia.[42] A Serious Fraud Office investigation into these allegations was dropped at the end of 2006 under political pressure from the Prime Minister and allegedly under pressure from the Saudi government.[43] The fourth feature is the internationalisation of the U.K. and Saudi states through this relationship: 161 of DESO's 600 officials work for the Saudi Armed Forces Project and at least fifty of them are permanently stationed in Saudi Arabia to "supervise the training and technical support which keeps the Saudi air force flying" and to "supervise the payments of £1bn a year which Saudi Arabia makes to BAE in return for spares and maintenance."[44] On top of this, RAF air crew are seconded to Saudi Arabia to fly the Tornadoes and Hawks sold by BAE.[45] These four features demonstrate that the relationship between arms capital and the state is one of mutual support, with the interests of the arms company being understood as in the interests of the state; the state takes action to promote and, when it seems threatened, to protect arms capital. As is argued later in the chapter, the integration of arms capital into the state is such that their interests are often the same. Saudi Arabia is an extreme case, but it demonstrates the lengths to

[40] Leigh, David and Rob Evans (2006) "The secret Whitehall telegram that reveals truth behind controversial Saudi arms deal", *The Guardian*, 28 October 2006.
[41] BBC (2006) "Press Release: Former Minister admits Saudi bribes on Newsnight", 6 June 2006, http://www.bbc.co.uk/pressoffice/pressreleases/stories/2006/06_june/16/saudi.shtml (30 October 2006).
[42] Leigh, David and Rob Evans (2003) "BAE accused of arms deal slush fund", *The Guardian*, 11 September 2003; Tendler, Stewart (2006) "Home raid on magnate amid slush fund allegations", *The Times*, 19 October 2006; http://business.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,19609-2410932,00.html (28 October 2006).
[43] Leigh and MacAskill, "Blair in secret Saudi mission"; Hope, Chris (2006) "SFO drops BAE-Saudi investigation", *The Telegraph*, 15 December 2006, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2006/12/14/ubae114.xml; BBC (2006) "Saudi defence deal probe ditched", 15 December 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/6180945.stm (both 16 December 2006). At the time of writing, this story was very much live. It seems that the U.K. government's claim that the Saudis were threatening to cut security links is not shared by the U.K. intelligence services; Leigh, David, Richard Norton-Taylor and Rob Evans (2007) "MI6 and Blair at odds over Saudi deals", *The Guardian*, 16 January 2007. This raises the question of the evidence on which the decision was taken.
[44] Leigh, David and Rob Evans (2005) "Over a quarter of MoD arms sale unit works for Saudis", *The Guardian*, 9 March 2005.
[45] Ibid.

which the U.K. government will go in order to promote the interests of arms companies (in particular BAE Systems) and maintain relations with key arms recipients.

The narratives that support the arms trade all rest on the underlying ideological function of the term "defence". The technological mystique around military activity gives it a "sacred" aura; military spending has an anti-democratic quality as ordinary people are less likely to think they deserve a say in setting spending priorities because of "national security" concerns,[46] generally understood to be "quintessentially the business of the state."[47] As Kurtz argues, the field of "national security" is particularly susceptible to rationalisation and deceit; unlike any other industry, the military can justify its spending by appeals to patriotism.[48] Prime Minister Tony Blair's reaction to criticism of U.K. export policy - that critics want to "shut down our defence industry"[49] - is emblematic of the appeal to national security as a means of silencing opposition.

The concept of national security rests on a discourse of state sovereignty, which gives an underlying justification to the very idea of an international trade in arms. By this logic, it would be unfair of the United Kingdom to deny non-producing states the right to self-defence. In reference to the UN Charter, which affirms every state's right to self-defence, the government argues that the United Kingdom, as an arms producing country, "cannot deny it [that right] to others."[50] States' rights to self-defence is an argument used by the U.K. government on a regular basis when it is criticised for its export record, as in the case of Indonesia[51] and Israel.[52] As is argued in Chapter Five, state sovereignty was used as an argument by politicians on both sides of the Tanzania air traffic control deal to silence criticism that the deal might not be in Tanzania's best interests. The effect of narratives of state

46 Melman, Seymour (1970) *Pentagon Capitalism*. The Political Economy of War (New York: McGraw-Hill), p.26. This is echoed by Chomsky: Chomsky, Noam (2003) *Understanding Power. The Indispensable Noam Chomsky*, ed. Peter R. Mitchell and John Schoeffel (London: Vintage), p.71.
47 Weldes, Jutta, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson and Raymond Duvall (1999) "Introduction", in ibid. (eds.) *Cultures of Insecurity. States, Communities, and the Production of Danger* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), pp. 1-34; p. 18.
48 Kurtz, Lester R. (1988) *The Nuclear Cage. A Sociology of the Arms Race* (Englewood Cliffs: New Jersey), pp. 53, 95.
49 Blair, Tony (2002) *Press Conference by the Prime Minister*, 20 June 2002, http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page2999.asp (16 June 2006).
50 DESO, "Why Export Defence Goods and Services?".
51 e.g. BBC (1999) "Halt Indonesian arms exports – MPs", 3 September 1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/434350.stm (23 July 2004).
52 e.g. Straw, Jack (2002) *Hansard*, House of Commons Debates, Column 839-842, 23 July 2002.

sovereignty is to present U.K. arms export activity as the duty of a mature and responsible actor on the world stage. Alongside state sovereignty, participation in the arms trade is also bound up with power status. The argument that the United Kingdom should play a significant role in the arms trade is part of its identity as a major power, member of the NATO alliance, member of the Permanent Five on the UN Security Council and leading EU power. The government argues that, as an important player in international community, the United Kingdom should be able to produce and export major conventional weaponry.[53] The ability to produce and export weaponry is a symbol of prestige and of the United Kingdom's supposed great power status on the world stage. As Mutimer argues, weapons production capability is "intimately tied to the core discourse of the modern world system: sovereignty and statehood."[54] Further, "the discursive construction of sovereignty and its relation to an arms industry contain an interest in supplying."[55] State sovereignty and the United Kingdom's status on the world stage form the backdrop to claims about U.K. involvement in the arms trade. As is argued later, narratives of state sovereignty and the relationship between the state and arms capital are intersecting and combine to produce powerful pro-export narratives.

U.K. involvement in the arms trade is also legitimised by a narrative of rigorous control. The government claims to exercise "very strict control" over exports under a "responsible" policy.[56] According to former Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, "Arms control is one of the key levers which allow us to act as a force for good in the world, making Britain more secure by helping to make the world more stable."[57] The main element of this control regime is the Consolidated Criteria. These form a politically (but not legally) binding code of conduct, although they have not in fact had a noticeable impact on the volume, nature or client-base of arms exports from the United Kingdom. They do not impinge on the business activity of the major companies in any significant way, and serve to legitimate the trade,

[53] A key feature of great power status is also the possession of nuclear weapons. The 2001 Strategic Defence Review does not question whether the United Kingdom should get rid of Trident; MoD (2001) *The Strategic Defence Review Process*, 6 August 2001, http://www.mod.uk/issues/sdr/process.htm (22 July 2004).
[54] Mutimer, David (2000) *The Weapons State. Proliferation and the Framing of Security* (Lynne Rienner, Boulder, Colorado), pp. 139-140.
[55] Ibid.
[56] DESO, "Why Export Defence Goods and Services?".
[57] FCO (no date) "Terrorism and Security – Defence Export Licensing", http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1031932545459 (7 June 2005).

making it appear responsibly regulated.[58] The Consolidated Criteria thus serve as an example of what Kurtz describes as "ritualized activity", that is, allowing the United Kingdom to create an impression of control whilst simultaneously maintaining high levels of exports.[59] More recently, the Export Control Act 2002, which updated previous legislation dating from 1939, has introduced extra-territorial controls on torture equipment and weapons of mass destruction, and on exports to embargoed destinations, but has failed to provide a rigorous legal framework that would restrain the state-sanctioned trade in weaponry.

The overall effect of such political and legal measures is to institutionalise an asymmetric control regime in which the emphasis on "proliferation" creates a technical, apolitical image that divides states into "suppliers" and "recipients", and means that suppliers define what counts as the destabilising accumulation of weaponry and act to exert control from the supply side.[60] The commitment to non-proliferation functions to keep global disarmament off the agenda, further entrenches the view that Western preponderance is the key to international peace and stability, and focuses attention on weapons that are supposedly inhumane, uncivilised or pariah.[61] This plays a role in the mutual constitution of the global North and South: the United Kingdom is discursively constructed as responsible and benevolent through its involvement in arms control regimes. Beyond the Consolidated Criteria, the U.K. government is particularly active in international efforts to control the illicit trade in small arms, and has been a leading actor in the push for an international Arms Trade Treaty through the United Nations. Such a discursive construction of responsibility has its counterpart in the construction of supposedly irresponsible players in the arms trade - states with a record of diversion and weapons proliferation, such as North Korea, Libya. Such a dichotomous construction facilitates high levels of U.K. arms exports such as those to the Middle East, which play a key role in the provision of the coercive backbone of the global capitalist system, without significant public criticism.

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[58] Cooper describes initiatives to curb arms exports as variously voluntary, weak, or "symbolic acts of tokenism that have little impact on the overall direction of the arms dynamic"; Cooper, "Putting disarmament back in the frame", p. 372. Phythian is also sceptical of the value of the EU Code, arguing that the final document "contained sufficient loopholes for the defence industry to refrain from objecting" and is effective only in peripheral cases; Phythian, *The Politics of British Arms Sales,*, pp. 293-300.

[59] Kurtz, *The Nuclear Cage,* p. 75.

[60]Mutimer, *The Weapons State.*

[61] Krause, Keith and Andrew Latham (1998) "Constructing Non-Proliferation and Arms Control: The Norms of Western Practice", *Contemporary Security Policy, Special Issue. Culture and Security: Multilateralism, Arms Control and Security Building,* 19(1): 23-54; p.25. Also Cooper, "The pariah agenda and New Labour's ethical arms sales policy."

The government's narrative facilitates high levels of arms exports. Given that any particular articulation has a "non-necessary character", that is, no representation ever corresponds to an objective reality and "alternative representations of objects and social relations are always possible", we must pay attention to the "interpretative labor" that goes into constructing them.[62] In particular, attention must be paid to the work required to sustain particular dominant narratives. However, whilst alternatives are always possible, they are not always successful. Support for arms exports continues, despite the challenge that can be made to each part of the argument. So the question becomes, why is this narrative so powerful and what are its effects? The rest of the chapter deals with these questions, arguing that the integration of arms capital into the state, with its concomitant support for arms exports, is a significant indicator of the presence of a military-industrial complex. More widely, the integration of arms capital into the state is indicative of twin processes of military globalisation and the internationalisation of the state. And the arms trade plays a significant role in hierarchical North-South relations.

The military-industrial complex (MIC)

Literature on the MIC is useful for thinking about the shared interests between the military, military industry, top-level government bureaucrats and legislators.[63] The result of these relationships is variously characterised as coordinated and mutually supportive influence that creates a shared interest in continued military spending,[64] "a set of commonly shared

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[62] Weldes, Jutta (1996) "Constructing National Interests", *European Journal of International Relations*, 2(3): 275-318, pp. 285, 279.

[63] Literature on the MIC is divided as to the extent, nature and implications of these relations; there are multiple names given to the phenomenon (e.g. Pentagon capitalism, warfare state, MIC). They are all included here under the label of "MIC literature". Cook, Fred J. (1962) *The Warfare State* (New York: Macmilan); Eisenhower, Dwight D. (1961) *Military-Industrial Complex Speech,* Public Papers of the Presidents, The Avalon Project at Yale Law School, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/presiden/speeches/eisenhower001.htm (10 June 2005); Lens, Sidney (1970) *The Military-Industrial Complex* (London: Stanmore Press Ltd); Melman, *Pentagon Capitalism;* Melman, Seymour (1985) *The Permanent War Economy. American Capitalism in Decline* (New York: Simon and Schuster); Moskos, Charles C. Jr. (1974) "The Concept of the Military-Industrial Complex: Radical Critique or Liberal Bogey?", *Social Problems,* 21(4): 498-512; Pursell, Carroll W. Jr. (1972) *The Military-Industrial Complex* (New York: Harper and Row); Rosen, Steven (ed.) (1973) *Testing the Theory of the Military-Industrial Complex* (Lexington: Lexington Books); Sarkesian, Sam (ed.) (1972) *The Military-Industrial Complex. A Reassessment* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications); Wright Mills, C. (1956) *The Power Elite* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

[64] Rosen, Steven (1973) "Testing the Theory of the Military-Industrial Complex", in Rosen, *Testing the Theory of the Military-Industrial Complex*, pp. 1-27; pp.2-3.

interests between the military and some major corporations,"[65] and a "self-serving accommodation between corporate elites, government bureaucrats, and the military hierarchy."[66] As Kurtz suggests, the MIC is like any other bureaucracy in its tendency towards expansion, but unique in that it has guaranteed profits.[67] That is, the ideological function of the labels of "defence" and "national security" mean that the arms industry thus has a unique ability to win concessions from the state.

Lens distinguishes between the "active" and "passive" components of the MIC in the U.S. context.[68] Applying these categories to the U.K. context, the active parts are the MoD, a civilian-militarist faction in Parliament, large corporate contractors who do business with the MoD, organisations that act as liaison between industry and military, MoD-subsidised research organisations/think tanks, private research and educational organisations, leadership of labour organisations/trade unions, and the academic community whose fate is tied to the MoD. The passive parts are veterans' organisations, trade associations, the fundamentalist wing of the church, and sections of the mass media (including scores of individual correspondents). The argument put forward here is that there is evidence of each component in the U.K. case (except for the church).

The first and central component of the MIC in the U.K. case is the integration of arms capitalists into the structures of the state. This integration occurs in two main ways: through a revolving door between the state and military industry; and through the high levels of arms company representation on military advisory bodies.[69] The "revolving door" refers to the traffic of personnel between military industry and the state (in particular the MoD), and vice versa. There is movement between the arms industry and both the civilian MoD bureaucracy and the military itself. For example, the head of DESO is traditionally drawn from the arms industry (and continues to draw pay from companies during their stint at DESO): the current

[65] Lieberson, Stanley (1973) "An Empirical Study of Military-Industrial Linkages", in Rosen, *Testing the Theory of the Military-Industrial Complex*, pp. 61-84; p. 61.
[66] Moskos, Charles C. Jr. (1972) "The Military-Industrial Complex: Theoretical Antecedents and Conceptual Contradictions" in Sarkesian, *The Military-Industrial Complex*, pp. 3-23, p. 4.
[67] Kurtz, *The Nuclear Cage*, p. 92.
[68] Lens, *The Military Industrial Complex*, pp. 39-40.
[69] Empirical evidence for the revolving door and military advisory bodies is provided in CAAT (2005) *Who Calls the Shots? How government-corporate collusion drives arms exports* (London: CAAT), http://www.caat.org.uk/publications/government/who-calls-the-shots-0205.pdf (10 May 2006).

head, Alan Garwood, in post since 2002, is on secondment from MBDA, which is part owned by BAE Systems.[70] Since the start of the 1990s at least three Defence Secretaries and three Defence Procurement Ministers and a number of other MoD staff have gone on to be employed by arms companies after their time in public office. There is also a pattern of secondments between military industry and the MoD (with the traffic going both ways), in part facilitated by the MoD's Interchange Programme.[71] A number of senior military personnel have gone to senior positions in arms companies. For example, Air Chief Marshall Sir John Day was appointed as a military advisor to BAE in December 2003; Edmund Burton, former Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Systems), became a consultant to TRW Inc. (owned by Northrop Grumman, one of the largest U.S.-based arms companies) in 2000; and Admiral Sir Jock Slater, First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff between 1995 and 1998, was appointed a non-executive director of Vosper Thornycroft Holdings plc in July 1999, and senior military advisor to Lockheed Martin in January 2000.[72] This demonstrates the movement of armed forces personnel to internationalising arms companies.

In addition to the revolving door, arms companies have a significant presence on military advisory bodies such as the National Defence Industries Council (NDIC), Defence Export and Market Access Forum (DEMAF), National Defence and Aerospace Systems Panel (NDASP), and Aerospace Innovation and Growth Team (AEIGT). Through these bodies, industry works in partnership with government to set policy priorities. For example, DEMAF was established to "maintain a strong dialogue with industry and other stakeholders" by addressing "export promotion issues and improved access for U.K. industry into key foreign markets."[73] Chaired by DESO, it comprises representatives from across industry and government. The NDASP claims to "have the ear of Government decision-makers at the highest levels" in order to "make sure that the U.K. defence and aerospace sectors are

[70] In late 2006 it was announced that Garwood's term as head of DESO would be extended by nine months to oversee the Eurofighter contract with Saudi Arabia. Upon leaving DESO, he will not return to MBDA but rather to BAE Systems itelf, which is one of the Typhoon consortium partners; Intelligence Online (2006) "Term extended for Ministry of Defence lobbyist", 24 November 2006, www.IntelligenceOnline.com (22 January 2007).
[71] CAAT, *Who Calls the Shots?*
[72] Examples all from CAAT, *Who Calls the Shots*, pp.17-8. These examples are illustrative: more generally, CAAT claims that between 1984 and 1994, 2,002 military officers received approval from the Advisory Committee on Business Appointments to take up positions with arms companies; there is no data for 1995-1998, but from 1999 to mid-2005, 614 had similarly got approval; ibid;, p. 14.
[73] MoD (2002) "Market Access", *Defence Industrial Policy*, 14 October 2002, http://www.mod.uk/issues/industrial_policy/market.htm (10 June 2005).

prepared for the challenges of the future, now."[74] Industry involvement in these advisory bodies means that the arms industry has access to very high ranking officials and politicians, at the expense of non-corporate actors. In addition, trade associations and organisations that act as liaison between industry and military, such as the Defence Manufacturers' Association and Society of British Aerospace Companies, serve to help their members build a positive relationship with government, further increasing industry access to elite decision-making processes.[75]

The integration of arms capital into state structures and advisory bodies helps create a pro-arms industry culture within the state. As Sklair argues, one of the most important ideological tasks of big business is "to persuade the population at large that 'the business of society is business' and to create a climate of opinion in which trade unions and radical oppositions ... are considered to be sectional interests while business groups are not."[76] The most recent Defence Industrial Strategy (December 2005), which announced "sustained real increases in the Defence budget arising from each Spending Review since the Government was elected in 1997," is the epitome of the close – indeed overlapping – relationship between the state and military industry.[77] The Strategy seeks to "share objectives, risks and rewards" between the two so as to be able to "maintain appropriate sovereignty and thereby protect our national sovereignty."[78] The Strategy uses the language of partnership and asks industry to make a parallel commitment for "planning more effectively and jointly for the long term ... including a greater commitment to joint education, staff development and interchange opportunities."[79] The language of partnership naturalises the relationship between state and industry, making it seem common-sense and making the demands of NGOs appear as special interests.

[74] NDASP (2003) "Objectives – Background", http://www.ndasp.org.uk/ (10 June 2005).
[75] For example, SBAC's Aerospace Defence & Homeland Security Board focuses on "influencing the relationship between MoD and Industry during DIS [Defence Industrial Strategy] implementation" and "shaping the relationship with the USA and the EU"; SBAC (no date) "Aerospace Defence & Homeland Security Board", http://mrm.sbac.co.uk/ngen_public/community/common/welcome.asp?id=126&Sat=00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000 (22 January 2007).
[76] Sklair , "Social movements for global capitalism," p. 526
[77] MoD, *Defence Industrial Strategy. Defence White Paper 2005.*
[78] Ibid., p.132.
[79] Ibid., p.11.

The integration of arms capital into state structures is the most significant indicator of an MIC. Labour, as represented through trade unions, is weakly or minimally integrated into decision-making structures and therefore has limited influence compared to the integral role of the industry in policy planning.[80] However, trade unions call for fundamentally similar measures as arms capital: given the mandate of trade unions to protect the jobs of their members, it is unsurprising that the unions call on the government to dedicate more resources to the arms industry. For example, Amicus is in favour of ECGD cover on arms deals, because the support facilitates orders and therefore protects British jobs; it also recommends an increase in defence spending.[81] The unions argue that British workers are discriminated against because European companies are often at least part-owned by the state and the U.S. state subsidises research to a greater degree.[82] Rather than trade unions arguing against arms capitalists and the state, therefore, we see them arguing for essentially the same thing, with the effect that it becomes difficult for discourses to be articulated that are simultaneously anti-export (or anti some exports) and pro-worker.

The remaining elements of the MIC that are key to the U.K. context are "a civilian-militarist faction" in Parliament, MoD-subsidized research organisations, and academic and media institutions. There are a number of MPs in whose constituencies arms factories or naval dockyards are situated. People working in the arms industry, or in military-related jobs, thus make up a significant proportion of these MPs' constituents, and they are on record speaking out in favour of the jobs argument – despite the critiques that can be made of it, as demonstrated earlier – and increases in defence spending.[83] A number of such MPs are

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[80] Currently, a representative from Amicus – the largest union to represent arms workers – sits on the Executive board of the Aerospace Innovation and Growth Team (AeIGT). Amicus members sit on two of the body's five Working Groups; Aerospace Innovation and Growth Team (no date) *Aerospace Innovation and Growth Team*, http://www.aeigt.co.uk (2 December 2005). And An Amicus representative also sits on the National Defence Industries Council (NDIC); Ingram, Adam (2005) "National Defence Industries Council", *Hansard*, Written Answers, 4 April 2005, Column 1111W.

[81] Wall, John and Rob Johnston (2004) *Maintaining A Critical Mass for UK Defence*, http://www.amicustheunion.org/pdf/Amicus_Defence%20final.pdf (16 May 2005).

[82] Amicus (2004) "Amicus Urge MPs to Support the UK Defence Industry", *PR Newswire*, 28 September 2004, http://www.prnewswire.co.uk/cgi/news/release?id=131032 (2 December 2005).

[83] These include Lindsay Hoyle, MP for Chorley, quoted as saying the SFO investigation into accusations of corruption against BAE Systems "puts thousands of jobs at risk"; Oakeshott, Isabel (2006) "MPs demand Blair save Saudi weapons deal," *The Sunday Times*, 3 December 2006, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2087-2483989,00.html. The late Rachel Squire, MP, whose constituency includes the Rosyth naval dockyard, is on record speaking in favour of increased defence spending and the importance of procurement decisions for Rosyth dockyard; Squire, Rachel (2002) *Hansard*, House of Common Debates, 17 July 2002, Column 352-355. John

members of the Defence Select Committee, giving them extra influence on defence issues.[84] There is thus cross-party support for high defence expenditure and the promotion of U.K. jobs, and a significant degree of pork barrel politicking around arms contracts.

The role of MoD-subsidised research organisations/think tanks, academic institutions and media outlets is important in naturalizing narratives surrounding national defence and arms exports, making them appear commonsensical. The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), the main MoD-subsidised research organisation, conducts research into defence and security issues and has extensive links to the military establishment and arms industry. It is headed by a Council that includes former BAE Chairman, John Weston, and retired military figures such as Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham (who was also the first U.K. President of EADS, a major European aerospace company), Admiral of the Fleet Sir Julian Oswald GCB (also director of SEMA Group Plc and Aerosystems International amongst others) and Lt Gen The Hon Sir Thomas Boyd-Carpenter KBE as Vice Presidents, for example.[85] Similarly, even those think tanks that are not directly MoD-sponsored feature arms companies as corporate members, such as Chatham House (the Royal Institute for International Affairs) and Wilton Park (a self-proclaimed academically independent executive agency of the FCO).[86] Amongst academic establishments, there are those that directly and indirectly serve state interests. The Joint Services Command and Staff College (part of the War Studies Group at King's College,

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Smith, MP, spoke of his "utter dismay" at the announcement that the Defence Aviation Repair Agency (Dara) fast jet operation at St Athan in his Vale of Glamorgan constituency would close; BBC (2005) "'Betrayal' over 500 defence jobs," 8 November 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/wales/4418912.stm. And Conservative MP Michael Jack's Fylde constituency includes 3,000 Eurofighter workers; Fylde claims to speak regularly to BAE Systems; Leigh, David and Rob Evans (2006) "Brutal politics lesson for corruption investigators," *The Guardian,* 16 December 2006, http://www.guardian.co.uk/armstrade/story/0,,1973421,00.html (all 19 January 2007).

[84] For example, current member Willie Rennie has spoken out in favour of the Crombie Defence Munitions Centre; Rennie, Willie (2006) "Defence Jobs," http://www.theyworkforyou.com/whall/?id=2006-07-18a.22.0&m=1823, 18 July 2006. Kevan Jones, MP for Durham North, is on record welcoming increased defence expenditure, in particular for its impact on procurement, which he claims is important for the defence industry, exports from which are important to this "vibrant and important sector;" Jones, Kevan (2002) *Hansard,* House of Commons Debates, 17 July 2002, Column 375. Robert Key, MP for Salisbury, is on record speaking in favour of highly skilled U.K. jobs; Key, Robert (2006) *Hansard,* Debates, 24 July 2006. Mike Hancock, MP for Portsmouth South, is on record promoting the supposed economic benefits of the armed forces and arms industry in the South East – he calls the defence industry "the glue that holds the economy of the South East together"; Hancock, Mike (no date) "Prosperity on Land and Sea", http://www.epolitix.com/EN/Publications/Regional+Monitor/10_1/cb6bd512-9085-43a3-9ce4-a4ca3b52f11c.htm (all 17 January 2007).

[85] RUSI (no date) "RUSI Council," http://www.rusi.org/about/council/ (17 January 2007).

[86] Wilton Park (no date) "Wilton Park Partners", http://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/general/partners.aspx; Chatham House (no date) "Press Archive", http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/index.php?id=190&pid=29 (both 18 January 2007).

London), for example, trains and educates military officers (both U.K. and foreign, as part of defence diplomacy), and contributes "research, analysis and advice to national and international thinking on the future international security environment."[87] Less explicitly tied to state agendas, the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at St. Andrews University features a representative of the RAND Corporation on its Advisory Council and was founded by a RAND expert in 1993; as Burnett and Whyte argue, the RAND Corporation, as the most important think tank to the U.S. military, has been at the forefront of the development of terrorism studies as an ideological formation since the attacks on the US of 11 September 2001.[88]

The final element of the MIC is the role played by the news media. Alongside the wider role of the mainstream news media in buttressing state and corporate power,[89] there are individual instances of the media playing a specific role in legitimising arms capital. For example, the left-of-centre periodical, *The New Statesman*, regularly features full-page advertisements for BAE Systems and Boeing, despite the obvious fact that its average reader is unlikely to purchase a warship or fighter jet for themselves. And when European Foreign Ministers approved the formation of the European Defence Agency in 2004, BAE Systems, Thales and EADS took out full-page newspaper advertisements in *Le Figaro* and the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (with extracts published in the *Financial Times* and *The Independent*) calling on EU states to boost military spending.[90] Such initiatives signal an attempt by arms companies to promote their activities amongst lay people and create an ideological atmosphere in which their activity is not questioned, indeed, is supported.

The cumulative impact of these component parts of the MIC is what Melman describes as cross-class support for military production: whilst the top echelon of state-management carries out planning and decision-making activities, crucial support is provided by

[87] Defence Academy (2006) "Our Work," http://www.defac.ac.uk/our-work (18 January 2007).
[88] Burnett, Johnny and David Whyte (2005) "Embedded Expertise and the New Terrorism," *Journal for Crime, Conflict and the Media,* 1(4): 1-18, p.8.
[89] See, for example, Herring, Eric and Piers Robinson (2003) "Too Polemical or Too Critical? Chomsky on the study of the news media and US foreign policy," *Review of International Studies,* 29, 553-568, and the Media Lens project, http://www.medialens.org/ (19 January 2007).
[90] Broek, Martin and Wendela de Vries (2006) *The Arms Industry and the EU Constitution* (Amsterdam: European Network Against Arms Trade), http://www.caat.org.uk/publications/government/ENAAT-EU-report_web.pdf (12 January 2007), p.22.

sub-managers, scientists and trade unions, creating a cross-class lobby for military spending.[91] In Gramscian terms, as argued in Chapter Two, we see key institutions of civil society – the media, trade unions, academia, research organisations – promoting pro-defence and pro-arms capital narratives, helping to create "certain modes of behaviour and expectations consistent with the hegemonic social order."[92] The "constellation of forces"[93] mobilised in support of pro-arms policies therefore pose considerable obstacles to NGOs, campaign groups and direct action activists concerned with the arms trade. That is, NGOs face opposition from the government, the arms industry and trade unions for their stance on arms exports, leaving them isolated. Whilst no articulation is inevitable or necessary, meaning any articulation "can potentially be transformed", what is at stake is the question of whether NGOs can rearticulate U.K. involvement in the arms trade "to break, contest or interrupt some of these tendential historical connections."[94] But they are structurally disadvantaged because arms capital is integrated into the state. Understanding the arms trade as a social process means that it "becomes more concrete and real than what it produces. It is linked to political aims and political careers, and never suffers from an examination of its underlying assumptions, *except by relatively powerless outsiders*."[95] This forms the context within which NGOs must operate and raises the question of the autonomy of the state.

The integration of arms capital into the state creates a network of relationships and shared interests between the military, arms industry and elite bureaucrats and politicians. This is not to argue that their interests are identical, or that *only* policies beneficial to the military and arms industry come into being. Rather, it is to argue that there is a structural bent towards pro-military and pro-industry policies. Given that representatives of arms capital sit, literally, side by side with state officials and often perform state functions themselves, the integration of arms capitalists into the state generates an attitude towards policy, if not the actual specific details of policy, that are functional for arms capital in a way that would not otherwise be. Nevertheless, there is not a complete elision of interests: there are vigorous and public disputes

[91] Melman, *Pentagon Capitalism*, p. 225.
[92] Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations"; also Morton, "Historicizing Gramsci", pp. 158-9.
[93] Jessop, Bob (1982) *The Capitalist State* (New York: New York University Press), p. 246.
[94] Grossberg, "On Postmodernism and Articulation," p. 54.
[95] Kurtz, *The Nuclear Cage*, p. 74 , emphasis added.

between fractions of the state and capital[96] and large companies claim to be discriminated against by excessively stringent U.K. export guidelines.[97]

The two departments most concerned with promoting the arms industry, the MoD and DTI, have regulatory as well as promotional arms. The Defence Export Services Policy (DESP) section of DESO is the focal point for arms export control activity, and the DTI is the key regulatory body of arms exports, through its Export Control Organisation (ECO). So arms companies do not have unfettered freedom to act, but are regulated by state rules, although these rules are shaped by industry's requirements. This means that companies "accept restrictions in return for export support: the competition between promotion and restraint is at the margins over individual licences."[98] There are competing tendencies within the FCO as well: whilst country desks and diplomats are concerned to promote U.K. interests in bilateral relationships, which includes trade promotion, the Human Rights Policy Department attempts to promote human rights and as such attempts to restrict particular arms exports to particular states.

These tensions in the state-capital relationship are indicative of the relative autonomy of the state.[99] The state needs a degree of autonomy from immediate capitalist interests if it is

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[96] e.g. the dispute between BAE Systems and the MoD over the role of the arms company in government arms contracts; Harrison, Michael (2004) "BAe chief warns MoD row may worsen", *The Independent*, 6 May, 2004; Hope, Chris (2004) "BAe Warns of All-Out War from Hoon", *The Daily Telegraph*, 3 May 2004. There was also dispute about the appropriate treatment of arms companies that was triggered by the stock market flotation of Qinetiq (which was itself formed from the part-privatisation of the Defence Evaluation Research Agency, DERA). In 2003 a 31% stake was sold to the Carlyle Group for £42.2m and the proposed sale of the government's majority stake and flotation on the stock market stands to generate profits of more than £20m for senior executives and Carlyle Group members; BBC (2006) "U.K. to float defence firm Qinetiq", 12 January 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/4604568.stm. The government claims £230m has been returned to taxpayers as a result but the MoD has been criticised for selling the stake too cheaply; Milner, Mark (2006) "Carlyle Group to reap huge profit from Qinetiq float" *The Guardian*, 26 January 2006. Whilst the government argues that increased competition will be introduced to the arms industry, it has been accused of giving the company a "flotation dowry" to soften the blow; Morgan, Oliver (2006) "A swift killing in the defence sector", *The Observer*, 29 January 2006. Anyway, talk of competition has a limited meaning in the arms trade because there is no real market for arms, the prices are decided politically, so even if they are "private" they are not operating on pure capitalist logic.

[97] For example, U.K.-based industry is keen on the idea of an Arms Trade Treaty because it believes it would create a level playing field for exports; Howells, Kim (2006) "International Arms Trade Treaty", *Hansard*, Written Answers, 4 May 2006, Column 1806W; Morris, Nigel (2005) "Straw pledges curb on £15bn arms trade", *The Independent*, 16 March 2005.

[98] Miller, *Export or Die*, p. 32.

[99] Miliband, Ralph (1982) *Capitalist Democracy in Britain* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 99. For an overview of the instrumental and structural positions see Aronowitz and Bratsis, *Paradigm Lost*; Cammack, Paul (1989)

to maintain a system that is conducive to the perpetuation of capitalism as a system. The developments in the arms industry are dependent on the legal, regulatory and political frameworks provided by states (as are developments in any industry). The role of the state under capitalism is to fulfil the (often contradictory) functions of accumulation and legitimisation, which means it must intervene to create the conditions for profitable capital accumulation but also maintain social harmony.[100] States in capitalist societies are never necessarily or essentially capitalist; mechanisms are tendential, effects are contingently necessary and overdetermined, and the state will not necessarily reproduce capitalist relations of production.[101]

The contemporary U.K. state is only relatively autonomous, however. At crucial moments, when the interests of the arms industry are deemed to be under threat, the state intervenes to protect it. For example, in late 2006 the government ended a Serious Fraud Office investigation into allegations of bribery against BAE Systems in relation to its dealings with Saudi Arabia. And as is argued in Chapter Five, DfID and the Treasury were opposed to the Tanzania deal; but DfID is the weakest department in the licensing process, wielding little clout and not involved in all aspects of arms policy. The Treasury, HRPD and DfID rarely win decisive battles over the MoD and DTI, often because Prime Minister Blair and Number Ten intervene. Arms manufacturers have "ready access" to Number Ten, and Blair is biased towards them, according to the Chair of the Quadripartite Committee that scrutinises arms export policy.[102] In September 1997 Chancellor Gordon Brown pledged that for the next two years U.K. export credits for poor, highly-indebted countries would only support "productive expenditure", signalling that the Treasury would act in the wider interests of the capitalist

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"Bringing the State Back In?", *British Journal of Political Science,* 19(2): 261-290; Held, David (1984) "Central perspectives on the modern state," in McLennan, Gregor, David Held and Stuart Hall (eds.) *The Idea of the Modern State* (Milton Keynes: Open University Press), pp. 29-79, pp. 52-3. Whilst Marx himself (in *The German Ideology*) viewed the state as a class instrument, as "nothing more than the form of organization which the bourgeoisie are compelled to adopt, both for internal and external purposes, for the mutual guarantee of their property and interests" (Sayer, *Readings from Karl Marx,* p. 131), a structural Marxist account understands the state to have relative autonomy, meaning that it may in particular instances work against the interests of the capitalist classes, but functions to promote the longer term interests of the capitalist system as a whole; Cammack, "Bringing the State Back In?".

[100] O'Connor, James (1973) *The Fiscal Crisis of the State* (St. Martins Press, New York), p. 6

[101] Jessop, *The Capitalist State,* pp. 218, 222, 254.

[102] Interview with Roger Berry MP, 24 February 2006.

system beyond the immediate interests of companies.[103] But these countries are unlikely to purchase expensive conventional weaponry anyway, which means that the pledge does not harm arms capital, serves to ensure poor countries' economies continue to function, and legitimates the government for the stand it claims to take in tackling poverty.

Part of the unique character of the arms industry is its hybrid nature, in that it is neither fully public nor private, and companies' success is almost entirely dependent on government contracts.[104] A significant feature of the military sphere is thus the extensive opportunity for companies to obtain capital from the state, notably in the form of a percentage of national GDP.[105] Companies are capitalist inasmuch as they dependent on profit for survival; but this is "paper profit", as "the price of armaments is an arbitrary political decision ... largely determined by a process of *political* bargaining between governments."[106] Large-scale military industry is "autonomous from the market and the logic of capital. The profits of private arms firms are ultimately dependent on the state's military purposes and on how its bureaucracies perceive its needs"[107] – and the integration of arms capitalists into those bureaucracies shapes how the state perceives those needs.

The MIC has not disappeared since the end of the Cold War; rather, it has "reorganized itself" and Cold War arms race discourses have been replaced by discourses of rogue states and terrorist threats.[108] In particular, the discourse of the "War on Terror" has facilitated increased levels of military spending; by 2005 global military spending was greater than at the peak of the Cold War, and the USA has been the main contributor to this rise. Military spending in European states, including the United Kingdom, has risen as well,

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103 Brown, Gordon (1997) "Debt 2000: The Mauritius Mandate", Statement to Commonwealth Finance Ministers Meeting: Mauritius, 16 September 1997, http://archive.treasury.gov.uk/pub/html/speech97/sp70915.html (10 June 2005).

104 O'Connor, *The Fiscal Crisis of the State,* pp. 15-17; Habermas, Jurgen (1976) "Problems of Legitimation in Late Capitalism", in Connerton, Paul (ed.) *Critical Sociology* (Harmondsworth: Penguin), pp. 363-387, p. 366.

105 Dunne and Surry, "Arms Production", p. 397; Melman, *Pentagon Capitalism,* p. 23, 25; Kurtz, *The Nuclear Cage,* p.94.

106 Kaldor, Mary (1982) "Warfare and Capitalism", in New Left Review (ed.) *Exterminism and Cold War* (London: Verso), pp. 261-288, p. 271, emphasis in original.

107 Shaw, *Dialectics of War,* p. 31.

108 Hartung, William D. (2001) "Military-Industrial Complex Revisited. How Weapons Makers are Shaping US Foreign and Military Policies", http//www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/papers/micr/introduction_body.html (16 May 2005).

although not by the same extent.[109] The discourse of the "War on Terror" has also facilitated a rise in arms exports, in particular to controversial recipients such as Algeria, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia.

The recent history of the U.K. arms industry demonstrates this hybrid nature of arms companies and the willingness of the state to intervene to protect industrial interests. Most U.K.-based arms companies were nationalised via the 1977 Aircraft and Shipbuilding Industries Act, "largely as key firms became potentially or actually bankrupt." Rolls Royce had already been nationalised in 1971 to protect it from bankruptcy.[110] Companies were (re)privatised in the mid-1980s during the Thatcher government, but this does not mean they were left to fend for themselves in a free market. State retention of a "golden share" on the grounds of "national interest" meant that state-industry relations remained close.[111] Companies remained dependent on government contracts, and British Aerospace (later BAE Systems) in particular was subsidised.[112] Despite privatisation and the introduction of more competitive forms of tendering in recent years,[113] the arms industry remains unlike any other in its relationships with the state. State subsidies through ECGD cover, payment of R&D costs, and the rise of public-private partnerships have ensured that arms companies retain what O'Connor refers to as a "permanent tap" on the state budget.[114] Although political and academic debates often revolve around the merits of private versus state ownership, the arms industry remains a peculiar one because the bulk of its products are purchased by government and there is a "fundamental uncertainty and asymmetry of information associated with military

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109 Dunne and Surry, "Arms Production", p. 397.

110 Edgerton, *Warfare State,* p. 268. Chomsky cites similar U.S. state interventions to save arms companies such as Lockheed Martin as indicative of a culture of corporate welfare; Chomsky, Noam (1998) "Power in the Global Arena", Amiel Lecture, London, http://www.chomsky.info/talks/199805--.htm (28 October 2006).

111 Bell, Michael (1994) "Defence Industry Privatization: The British Case", http://www.nato.int/docu/colloq/1994/eco9419.txt (12 October 2006).

112 Edgerton, David (1991) "Liberal Militarism and the British State", *New Left Review,* 185, pp. 138-169, p. 165.

113 See Cooper, *The Business of Death.* There has been a rise of private finance initiatives (PFI) in defence procurement since the mid 1990s; as a result of the 1998 Strategic Defence Review, a Smart Procurement Initiative was launched, which was renamed as a Smart Acquisition policy in October 2000. These policies mean that every procurement project is assessed at the outset for its viability under PFI; Taylor, Claire (2003) "UK Defence Procurement Policy," House of Commons Library Research Paper 03/78, 20 October 2003, http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2003/rp03-078.pdf (17 January 2007). In practice, whilst companies are supposed to bear the risks, as soon as they are in trouble, the state intervenes to bail them out.

114 O'Connor, *The Fiscal Crisis of the State,* pp. 154-5.

matters."[115] Dunne and Smith argue that "nationalised firms tend to be as expansionist and acquisitive as private ones", and there is nothing about nationalisation that would necessarily prevent the continuation of an MIC.[116]

BAE Systems plays a central role in the U.K. arms industry and is the company most heavily integrated into the state and the MIC. It is the prime contractor on the five projects running most over budget; it is also likely to supply the replacement for Trident.[117] The MoD Major Projects report for 2006 gives details of how overdue and over-budget projects are: for example, the Astute Class Submarine was due to be in service in June 2005 but is now expected in December 2008; it is expected to run £1,078m over budget. Type 45 Destroyers are currently two and a half years behind schedule and £1,110m over cost; Typhoon fighter aircraft (the Eurofighter) is currently four and a half years overdue; and, most spectacularly, the Nimrod Maritime Reconnaisance and Attack MK4 was originally expected in April 2003, but is now estimated to be in service in September 2010, at a cost of £703m higher than originally anticipated.[118] BAE Systems is a major contractor on all of these projects. The current estimated cost of the Typhoons are not published by the MoD on the grounds of commercial sensitivity, giving arms companies even further scope to extract capital from the state. As Dunne and Smith argue, "the most important skill for a defence producer" is "the ability to persuade governments to give it money."[119] They also suggest that the trade between companies and the U.K. government is itself significant and an important element in understanding arms exports because of the tap on the state budget that arms companies can achieve, and the political setting of prices of weaponry.

The argument put forward in this section is that the relationship between the state and arms capital is such that there is congruence of interests between the military, the arms industry and sections of the state, predominantly the MoD, DTI and Number Ten, to the

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[115] Dunne, Paul and Ron Smith (1992) "Thatcherism and the U.K. Defence Industry," in Michie, Jonathan (ed.) *The Economic Legacy 1979-1992* (London: Academic Press), pp. 91-111, p. 108.

[116] Ibid., p.109.

[117] Ingram, Paul (2006) Letter to *The Guardian,* 30 November 2006. See National Audit Office (2006) *Ministry of Defence. Major Projects Report 2006* (London: The Stationery Office), p.4, 6, for a table of cost and time over-runs on major projects, and National Audit Office (2006) *Ministry of Defence. Major Projects Report 2006. Project Summary Sheets* (London: The Stationery Office) for official explanations for the cost and time overruns.

[118] National Audit Office, *Ministry of Defence. Major Projects Report 2006,* p.4.

[119] Dunne and Smith, "Thatcherism and the U.K. Defence Industry," p. 101.

extent that the MIC label is warranted. The next section turns to the implications of this in terms of the internationalisation of the state and the integration of the global South into the world military order.

Internationalisation of the state and integration of the South into the world military order

The analysis thus far demonstrates the reliance of internationalising arms capital on the state for creating the conditions for its success. Understanding the internationalisation of capital to be dependent on the state means that "the state is not undermined or overwhelmed by globalization, but *transformed* by it, and as such becomes a critical *agent* of globalization."[120] As states are themselves "fields of class relations", the internationalization of capital means that "foreign capital becomes interiorized not only within a given territory but becomes a player on the field of the state."[121] In this case, state policy has been largely captured by a small number of capitalists – representatives of the six largest firms, in particular BAE Systems, which are themselves internationalising – orientating the state towards the interests vested in the globalisation process. Alongside processes of state capture[122] are processes of the internationalisation of the state, which Panitch and Gindin define as "a state's acceptance of responsibility for managing its domestic capitalist order in a way that contributes to managing the international capitalist order,"[123] which in turn signals the relative autonomy of the internationalising state.

Significantly, the integration of state and arms capital does not only occur at the national level but signals the internationalisation of U.K. policy through its Europeanisation and integration with the USA. For example, the European Advisory Group on Aerospace, established in 2001, is staffed by European Commissioners, industry representatives, MEPs

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120 Barkawi, "Connection and Constitution," pp. 159, emphasis in original; also Laffey, Mark and Jutta Weldes (2004) "Representing the International: Sovereignty after Modernity?", in Passavant, Paul A. and Jodi Dean (eds.) *Empire's New Clothes. Reading Hardt and Negri* (New York: Routledge), pp. 121-142, pp. 128, 132; and Panitch, Leo (1998) ""The State in a Changing World": Social-Democratizing Global Capitalism?", *Monthly Review* 50(5), http://www.monthlyreview.org/1098pan.htm, 16 May 2006.
121 Panitch, "The State in a Changing World."
122 On state capture, see Sklair, *Globalization*, p. 233, and Petras and Veltmeyer, *Globalization Unmasked*, p. 23.
123 Panitch and Gindin, "Global Capitalism and American Empire," pp. 17.

and an EU High Representative;[124] industry representatives were involved in the formulation of ideas about the role of defence issues in a future EU Constitution; industry representatives are part of the Group of Personalities in the Field of Security Research, to identify priorities for European security; and the New Defence Agenda, a lobbying institute at the EU level, includes some of the world's largest arms companies as partners and members. U.K. actors are quite prominent in these developments. The first president of the AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe was Mike Turner, CEO of BAE Systems[125] and first chief executive of the European Defence Agency (established in 2004 to promote collaboration within Europe and strengthen European industry),[126] Nick Whitney, is British (formerly of the MoD). This Europeanisation of state-capital integration can be understood as an expression of uneven internationalisation, paralleling the uneven internationalisation of arms capital.[127]

Integration across the Atlantic is the other strong trend in the internationalisation of arms capital and its integration into state structures, although it works in a different manner to Europeanisation. Rather than the proliferation of committees on which arms capital and EU officials work side by side, there is a direct relationship between the U.S. state and arms capital. This has prompted U.K.-based companies, notably BAE Systems, to buy up a number of smaller U.S.-based companies (such as United Defense Industries, maker of the Bradley Tank, and a variety of Lockheed Martin subsidiary companies) in order to increase their market share of U.S. military spending. BAE Systems North America is a major supplier to the Department of Defense, and its Board of Directors includes a range of former U.S. state and industry officials.[128] Qinetiq, the part-privatised U.K. Defence Evaluation Research Agency (DERA),

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124 European Commission (2002) *STAR 21: Strategic Aerospace Review for the 21st Century. Creating a coherent market and policy framework for a vital European industry*, July 2002, http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/aerospace/report_star21_screen.pdf (9 December 2005).

125 Slijper, Frank (2005) *The Emerging EU Military-Industrial Complex*, (Amsterdam: Transnational Institute).

126 European Defence Agency (no date) "Why the European Defence Agency?", http://www.eda.eu.int/ (9 December 2005).

127 The internationalisation of arms capital is geographically and technologically uneven. European and U.S.-U.K. integration are the most extensive and technologically sophisticated variants of internationalisation, but the use of licensed production overseas is a key form of North-South collaboration, and South-South collaboration is increasing in volume and importance in the wider trade. Within these processes, U.S.-based arms capital remains the strongest actor in the field.

128 The current Board of Directors features a former deputy director of the CIA; former Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology; a Director of Atlantic Aerospace Electronics Corporation and former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Technology and Director for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency; a former Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Central Command (General Anthony Zinni, who recently served as the United States Special Envoy to the Middle East); a former Director of the National Security

features George Tenet, former director of the CIA, as a Non Executive Director,[129] and its U.S. proxy board features a former BAE and Marconi executive, a former Raytheon and Lockheed Martin (both major U.S.-based arms companies) executive, and a retired U.S. military officer.[130] Projects such as the Joint Strike Fighter Project signal the internationalisation of the state and capital but also the tensions between national fractions: the project is a partnership between ten states, although only the United Kingdom and USA are "Tier One" partners, with the most significant access to technology and spending commitment. Rows over access to technology signal disputes between the major partners on the project but there is overall agreement on the importance of maintaining the arms industry and arms sales.[131]

Coercive protection for the internationalising capitalist system is dominated by the U.S. state, which "houses and exercises direct control over the principal military machine in the world"[132], even if its "dependence on the wider framework of western and global power networks has increased."[133] In the aftermath of World War Two, the "hub-and-spokes networks binding each of the other leading capitalist states to the intelligence and security apparatuses of the U.S." were institutionalised, furthering the incorporation of those states into a U.S.-dominated military organisation already undertaken through the establishment of NATO.[134] This created a "transnational apparatus for the organization of coercion that enabled U.S. domination of a decolonized periphery as well as a pacified core."[135] This is recognised in contemporary policy debates over U.K. military force: the U.K. Secretary of State for Defence recognises that "today, almost any sizeable operation in which we will be involved will be multi-national. We work closely with the forces of other countries in whatever combination

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Agency; a former U.S. Congressman; a retired U.S. Navy Admiral; and a former U.S. Army General; BAE Systems North America (no date) "Board of Directors," http://www.na.baesystems.com/board.cfm (22 January 2007).

129 Qinetiq (no date) "Board of Directors," http://www.qinetiq.com/home/aboutqq/our_business/qinetiq_holdings_ltd.html (20 January 2007).

130 Qinetiq (no date) "US proxy board," http://www.qinetiq.com/home_us/about_qinetiq/usproxyboard.html (20 January 2007).

131 Defense Industry Daily (2005) "U.K. warns USA over ITAR arms restrictions," 1 December 2005, http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/2005/12/uk-warns-usa-over-itar-arms-restrictions/index.php (20 January 2007).

132 Robinson, *A Theory of Global Capitalism*, pp. 138-9.

133 Shaw, Martin (1997) "The state of globalization: towards a theory of state transformation," *Review of International Political Economy*, 4(3): 497-513, p. 511.

134 Panitch and Gindin, "Global Capitalism and American Empire," p. 15.

135 Laffey and Weldes, "Representing the International," p. 132.

suits us best – through the United Nations, through NATO, through the EU, and indeed through any other ad hoc coalition of countries who share at any one time a common purpose."[136] This presentation of equality, and the wider rhetoric of the "Special Relationship" that ostensibly holds between the USA and the United Kingdom masks the subordinate role played by the United Kingdom; the U.K. state has been integrated, along with other major capitalist powers, into "an effective system of coordination under its [U.S.] aegis."[137]

The development of capitalism – both historically and in its contemporary forms – is reliant on military force to create the conditions for and underpin the spread of capital, in particular expropriation and the defence of private property.[138] More generally, coercion has historically been central to state formation: war and state-making are interdependent processes, with the organisation of a monopoly on violence as a key task for states.[139] Contemporary processes of globalisation show a "central dependence of capitalist economies, at home and abroad, on state regulation, ultimately backed up by 'legitimate' force," and this dependence has a history in European imperial expansion.[140] The integration of internationalising arms capital into the U.K. state is a key facet of military globalisation, and the arms trade serves as a key mechanism for transferring the means of coercion and facilitating wider processes of capitalist globalisation by facilitating the opening up of spaces for capital, and in clamping down on opposition to its circulation.

The arms trade has been central to the spread of the capitalist system into the periphery and the incorporation of non-arms producing states into the world military order.[141] The emergence of industrial armies in the global South was associated with industrialisation, the rise of urban elites, the spread of multinational manufacturing capital, and the development of authoritarian forms of rule.[142] Military and military-related technology transfers played a significant role in structuring patterns of wider technological development in the South: the

[136] Hoon, Geoff (2001) *Globalisation of Defence Industry*, Speech to Royal United Services Institute, 24 January 2001, http://news.mod.uk/news/press/news_speech.asp?newsItem_id=820 (15 September 2005).
[137] Panitch and Gindin, "Global Capitalism and American Empire," p. 13.
[138] Mann, Michael (1988) *States, War and Capitalism* (Oxford: Blackwell), p. 144
[139] Tilly, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime", pp. 170-1.
[140] Barkawi, "Connection and Constitution," p. 158; also Robinson, *A Theory of Global Capitalism*, p. 137, Panitch and Gindin, "Global Capitalism and American Empire," p. 29.
[141] Albrecht , Ulrich and Mary Kaldor (1979) "Introduction", in Kaldor, Mary and Asbjorn Eide (eds.) *The World Military Order. The Impact of Military Technology on the Third World* (London: Macmillan), pp. 1-16.
[142] Ibid., pp. 12-13.

import of capital-intensive technology and the establishment of arms production capabilities increased Southern dependence on Northern suppliers, and distorted wider patterns of development.[143] Arms purchases and the privileging of the role of the military have historically been important in providing a coercive backbone to state apparatuses, protecting elites against potentially restive publics and also providing the stability and predictability necessary for international capital to operate. In the aftermath of World War Two, new entrants to the state system generally followed a coercion-intensive path to statehood. Colonial powers left little accumulated capital behind, but did leave military forces that were drawn from and modelled on the repressive forces they had established to maintain their own administrations.[144]

Coercion has been central to both the development of capitalism and state formation. In these processes, the emergence of a relatively pacified core and violent periphery are inter-related. The extraction of surplus from the periphery and its redistribution in the core through imperialism functioned to "ameliorate in the advanced countries social contradictions germane to capital accumulation" and provide "the social conditions for relatively stable polyarchic political systems" based on consensual domination.[145] Whilst polyarchy is relatively stable in the core, it is less so in the periphery as capital accumulation is more fragile. Where subordinate groups can be bought off, stable and quite liberal polyarchy, or "relations of consensual domination," emerge; where they cannot, "coercive domination or authoritarian political forms (or its opposite, popular revolution)" results.[146] The development of authoritarian political systems in the global South is thus intrinsically related to the development of capitalism. Pacification of the core and unrest in the periphery are mutually constituted and bound up with processes of imperialism. As Barkawi and Laffey argue, "Imperialism in its many forms was essential in shaping the character of *both* Europe *and* the non-European world; it is their common history."[147]

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143 Lock, Peter and Herbert Wulf (1979) "The Economic Consequences of the Transfer of Military-oriented Technology", in Kaldor and Eide, *The World Military Order*, pp. 210-231; p. 211, 226.
144 Tilly, Charles (1990) *Coercion, Capital and European States, AD990-1990* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell), p. 199-200.
145 Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy*, p.347.
146 Ibid., p. 360. Mann argues that "capitalism has contained an institutionalised, relatively non-coercive core and an expropriated, militaristic periphery;" Mann, *States, War and Capitalism* , p. 138.
147 Barkawi and Laffey "Retrieving the Imperial," 113, italics in original. This is in contrast to Shaw, who has a Eurocentric understanding of the internationalisation of the state, in which state forms that originate in Europe spread outwards rather than themselves also being constituted through their interaction with the non-European world; Shaw, "The state of globalization." Charles Tilly displays a similar Eurocentrism, arguing that "European states formed in a certain way, then imposed their power on the rest of the world"; Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and*

Emergence of a global military culture

As well as facilitating the transfer of the means of force, the arms trade also fosters the emergence of a "global military culture"[148] that illuminates the imperial relationships between the global North and South. Colonialism played a significant role in establishing arms production capabilities in the global South. For example, facilities established in India and other areas of British control, with U.S. assistance, formed the basis for national arms production programmes in newly independent states.[149] The arms trade encourages the spread of particular modes of industrialisation and military doctrine, meaning that arms transfers do not take place in a vacuum. The arms trade is not just the export of finished weapons systems but also the transfer of technology and "production know-how."[150] The export of military technology, production equipment and personnel is accompanied by the transfer of ideas about military tactics and doctrine, for example.[151] These processes served to integrate Southern states into the world military order, which emphasised capital-intensive militarisation, professional armies and expensive weaponry.[152] The newly independent states that emerged from the decolonisation process chased the acquisition of modern armaments as a symbol of their modern statehood: by the mid to late 1960s jet fighters had become a defining symbol of their statehood.[153] And although many states had paid dearly to acquire such weaponry, they often lacked the strategic depth to operate the weapons systems, let alone defend themselves from all out attack.[154] This shows that arms acquisition is about more than a defensive response to an objective threat. Weapons proliferation is a social rather than merely military or functional phenomenon.[155]

European States, p.16. Such analyses display a "first in Europe, then elsewhere" form of historicist thinking; Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe,* pp. 6-7.

148 Wendt, Alexander and Michael Barnett (1993) "Dependent state formation and Third World militarization", *Review of International Studies,* 19(4): 321-347.

149 Lock and Wulf, "The Economic Consequences of the Transfer of Military-oriented Technology", p. 210.

150 Bitzinger, "The Globalization of the Arms Industry," p. 189.

151 Albrecht and Kaldor, "Introduction," p. 3; Krause, *Arms and the State,* p. 16.

152 Wendt and Barnett, "Dependent state formation and Third World militarization".

153 Phythian, *The Politics of British Arms Sales since 1964,* p. 10; van der Westhuizen, Janis (2005) "Arms over AIDS in South Africa: Why the Boys Had to Have Their Toys", *Alternatives,* 30, 275-295, p. 287.

154 Phythian *The Politics of British Arms Sales since 1964,* p. 21; Krause, *Arms and the State,* p. 30

155 Eyre, Dana P. and Mark C. Suchman (1996) "Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons: An Institutional Theory Approach", in Katzenstein, Peter J. (ed.) The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press), pp. 79-113, p. 81.

Weapons proliferation is not a one-way process. Supplier states play a heavy role in actively creating demand, through weapon development, marketing weapons around a global network of exhibitions, and by selling to regional rivals.[156] Supplier states' own pursuit of increasingly sophisticated weaponry for their own armies contributed to the valorising of capital-intensive militarisation strategies that states in the periphery had to follow if they were to remain in the club of "modern" states.[157] In addition, dominant supplier states have typically "give[n] access to technologies that will encourage dependent militarization", which means "making available arms and technology that will encourage capital-intensive militarization"[158], which further binds Southern states into the world military order. So the global military culture has historically favoured capital-intensive militarization and the acquisition of large, expensive conventional weaponry in pursuit of a professional, modern army.

Recipient states are not passive in the process of military transfers; indeed, they often attempt to increase the volume of transfers.[159] Whilst Southern elites are active agents in these processes and therefore can be understood as part of the transnational capitalist class, they act under conditions of hierarchy; not all actors in the transnational capitalist class are equally powerful, as the relationships within it are shaped by hegemony. There is a fundamental asymmetry in the global military culture, a "mostly one-way process shaping Third World military development in ways different than would be the case in its absence."[160] The ongoing pursuit of ever more high-tech weaponry by dominant states pushes the global military culture further along capital intensive lines. There are thus two processes in train simultaneously: hegemonic relationships mean that not all agents are equally powerful and that the impetus to the global military culture comes more from dominant states. But dominant and subordinate agents are all shaped by the interactions between them: they are mutually constituted through their involvement in the arms trade. For example, the sale of Hawks to India demonstrates not only the mimicking of the former colonial power by the ex-colony, but also impacts on the strategic orientation of the U.K. military, as the RAF was forced to buy and operate Hawks

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156 Phythian, *The Politics of British Arms Sales since 1964*, p. 35.
157 Wendt and Barnett, "Dependent state formation and Third World militarization".
158 Ibid., p. 336.
159 Albrecht and Kaldor, "Introduction," p. 6.
160 Wendt and Barnett, "Dependent state formation and Third World militarization", p. 337.

itself, so as to promote the chances of exporting them, despite military leaders preferring a different aircraft.[161] And arms exports to Indonesia have not only significantly shaped the conflicts between Jakarta and the regions, but the backlash over the role of arms exports in East Timor in the late 1990s coincided with the announcement of an "ethical dimension" to U.K. foreign policy and was significant in tarnishing the U.K. government's reputation and encouraging the quiet death of the ethical tag.

Conclusion

In this chapter I analysed the government's justifications of its support for arms exports. I argued that in each case, the economic, strategic and security benefits are, at best, unproven. In order to explain the persistence of pro-export narratives in political debate, I examined the integration of arms capital into the U.K. state through the lens of a military-industrial complex. The relationship between arms capital and the state is thus the first significant feature of U.K. involvement in the arms trade. The second is the internationalisation of the state and provision of a coercive backbone to capitalist globalisation. The third is the perpetuation of hierarchical North-South relations via the arms trade. These are the key issues that NGOs need to address if they are to have significant counter-hegemonic potential. Understanding hegemony as consent backed up in the first and last instances by coercion, the analysis thus far raises the question of whether NGOs participate in creating consent for coercion, a significant ideological task. The next chapter introduces the six NGOs, discussing their objectives and strategies, before going into their activity in depth in the three case studies.

[161] Secretary of State for Defence, Geoff Hoon, decided to purchase Hawks against the advice of his own Permanent Secretary and other departments. In addition, the export and employment considerations associated with the deal reportedly cost the government £1bn more, not less, than it had anticipated; BASIC (2005) "Memorandum by the British American Security Information Council (BASIC)", in Trade and Industry Committee, *The U.K. Aerospace Industry*, Fifteenth Report of Session 2004-5. Volume II, Oral and Written Evidence (London: The Stationery Office) March 2005, Appendix 5, p.61. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmtrdind/151/151ii.pdf (12 December 2006).

Chapter Four: Introducing the NGOs

Introduction

Amnesty International, BASIC, CAAT, International Alert, Oxfam and Saferworld all work on arms issues, but they differ in their understandings of the arms trade and the problem it poses, and in their strategies for change. In this chapter I introduce the six NGOs, outlining their objectives, strategies and sources of funding. This situates the organisations in the context of the analysis put forward thus far, highlighting the similarities and differences between them and providing an early suggestion of their counter-hegemonic potential. Five of the six NGOs share a common set of objectives that revolve around better regulation of the arms trade; this is based on an understanding of existing control measures as genuine, and that the problem is one of implementation. Only CAAT is opposed to the operation of the trade *per se* and campaigns for its abolition rather than reform; this is based on an understanding that existing control measures are of primarily rhetorical value and that the relationship between the arms industry and government is what drives U.K. involvement in the arms trade.

These divergent objectives and understandings shape and are shaped by the NGOs' different strategies, which can be understood in terms of a spectrum of insider and outsider activity. Insiders attempt to establish a consultative relationship with government on policy matters, whilst outsiders are either unable or unwilling to; thresholder groups use a mixture of insider and outsider strategy. BASIC, International Alert and Saferworld operate a largely insider strategy, CAAT adopts an outsider strategy, and Amnesty and Oxfam combine the two as thresholder groups. Five of the six groups have formed a coalition, the U.K. Working Group on Arms; CAAT is excluded from this group. Analysis of the NGOs' funding sources situates their relationships to the U.K. state and private funders; BASIC, International Alert, Oxfam, Saferworld also have charitable status, whilst only elements of Amnesty and CAAT's work are eligible for charitable status. NGOs' strategies reflect and are shaped by their funding: the chapter discusses the disciplining effects of state and private funding, and of charitable status.

The argument put forward in this chapter is that CAAT and BASIC's understanding of the arms trade demonstrates the greatest counter-hegemonic potential. In highlighting the relationship between the government and arms industry CAAT's arguments against U.K. involvement in the arms trade have considerable purchase on the impetus to the scale of the trade and the nature of some of the recipients of U.K. arms. Whilst BASIC accepts the legitimacy of the arms trade, it critiques several elements of U.K. involvement in the arms trade that go beyond the dominant understanding, bringing domestic procurement into the frame through its critique of the government's Defence Industrial Strategy, for example. BASIC and CAAT's arguments thus cover some similar terrain and are mutually reinforcing, despite the differences in their strategy. This is in contrast to the majority of NGO activity on the arms trade, which serves to naturalise the operation of the trade through an acceptance of its legitimacy and the assumption of the benevolence of U.K. state policy. The remainder of the NGOs – Amnesty International, Oxfam and Saferworld (and International Alert through its membership of the U.K. Working Group, although it does not work on export control issues itself) – criticise the government for particular controversial exports, but remain on the same discursive terrain set out by the government.

In terms of strategy, insider approaches can broadly be linked to a liberal reformist attitude, whilst outsider approaches are suggestive of a more radical attitude. This is based on the understanding that insiders are more likely to be able to generate change, but that change will be incremental and has high potential for co-option. Outsiders make more radical demands that cannot be accommodated in the current state of affairs, but are less likely to be listened to by policymakers. Coalition work through the U.K. Working Group on Arms is a deliberate attempt by five of the six NGOs at generating cumulative impact through collaboration. I argue that in addition to this intended effect of the combined expertise and membership bases of the members, there is a secondary effect, namely the sidelining of CAAT as a serious political actor on arms issues and a narrowing of the political space available to generate change in U.K. arms export policy. CAAT's counter-hegemonic potential is thus muted from within the sphere commonly understood as global civil society.

NGO objectives

There is a broad distinction to be made between the NGOs' objectives: CAAT is opposed to the arms trade and wants to see it abolished, whilst the other five accept the legitimacy of the arms trade and want to see it better regulated. CAAT was established in 1974 by peace organisations concerned about the growth of the arms trade after the 1973 Middle East War.[1] It works for an end to the international arms trade, which it believes has "a negative effect on human rights and security as well as on global, regional and local economic development."[2] For CAAT, "high military spending is unacceptable, and only reinforces a militaristic approach to problems."[3] CAAT is thus opposed to the arms trade on broader grounds than simply that of controversial exports; its opposition is part of a wider concern with challenging militarism and promoting peace. Its understanding of the impetus to U.K. involvement in the arms trade has, in recent years, focused on the relationship between the government and arms industry: it argues that arms companies "wield immense influence and political power" in government as a result of their privileged access, and this "undermines democracy" by turning government policy into "arms company wish lists."[4]

CAAT's interim goals for ending the arms trade are an end to government support for and subsidies on arms exports, an end to exports to oppressive regimes, an end to exports to countries involved in armed conflict or region of tension, an end to exports to countries in which social welfare is threatened by military spending, and support for measures, in the United Kingdom and internationally, to regulate and reduce the arms trade and lead to its eventual end.[5] Such a position recognises that regulation of the arms trade is important, but can only be effective as a step along the path to the abolition of the arms trade. This is a transgressive approach, in that it makes a demand that would fundamentally alter the status quo but also identifies components of the issue that can be challenged individually as a means of reaching that goal.

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[1] These groups were: CND, Fellowship of Reconciliation, Pax Christi, Peace Pledge Union, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, Friends Peace and International Relations Committee, Greenpeace, London School of Nonviolence.
[2] CAAT (no date) "About CAAT", http://www.caat.org.uk/about/about.php (28 June 2005).
[3] Ibid.
[4] CAAT (no date) "Call the Shots. Take the arms companies out of government," http://www.caat.org.uk/campaigns/calltheshots/calltheshots.php (27 June 2006).
[5] CAAT, "About CAAT".

In contrast to CAAT, the other five organisations are not opposed to the operation of the arms trade. Amnesty, BASIC, International Alert, Oxfam and Saferworld all recognise the arms trade as legitimate on the basis of states' right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter.[6] Of the five, BASIC has an understanding of the arms trade that is closest to CAAT's. It emphasises the predominant role of the USA and Western Europe in the global arms trade: together they account for approximately 80% of the trade and "In consistent contradiction to the rhetoric of peace and security, these major supplier nations continue to fuel conflicts and undermine democracy with massive transfers of conventional weapons."[7] Labelling official language of peace and security as "rhetoric" is a considerable challenge to state representations of the arms trade. Whilst BASIC is not opposed to the arms trade, it is concerned at the "minimal coordination and control" of both light and heavy weapon sales; its goal is therefore tighter and more harmonised U.S. and EU regulation of the arms trade. Such an approach assumes that improved processes of control could generate significant change in the international arms trade; this is more in line with the other NGOs' understandings than CAAT's. BASIC was one of the first NGOs to work on small arms, which it understands as "a growing global security threat, fuelling conflict, threatening human rights and impeding development and the provision of humanitarian aid".[8] In recent years it has withdrawn from small arms work for its own financial and capacity reasons but also to avoid duplication of effort with other NGOs. It does occasionally comment on issues pertaining to the regulation of small arms transfers[9] and as a member of the U.K. Working Group on Arms endorses NGO efforts on the issue.

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[6] See Chanaa, Jane (2004) *Guns or Growth? Assessing the Impact of Arms Sales on Sustainable Development* (Amnesty International, the International Action Network on Small Arms, Oxfam; published in association with Project Ploughshares and Saferworld, London and Oxford); Saferworld (2004) *Update* 36, http://www.saferworld.org.uk/images/pubdocs/Update%2036.pdf, p.5; BASIC/Oxford Research Group (2005) "The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference: Breakthrough or Bust in '05?", http://www.basicint.org/nuclear/NPT/2005rc/brief09.htm; Oxfam (2001), *Up in Arms: Controlling the international trade in small arms*, Oxfam GB Paper for the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects July 2001, p.3, http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/issues/conflict_disasters/downloads/upinarms.rtf (all 19 February 2006).

[7] BASIC (no date), "Weapons Trade", http://www.basicint.org/WT/wtindex.htm (6 June 2005).

[8] Ibid.

[9] e.g. Davis, Ian (2002) "Implementing and Deepening the OAS Agenda on Small Arms and Light Weapons", presentation at Consultative Committee, Third Regular Meeting, Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials, 2 May 2002, http://www.basicint.org/WT/smallarms/OAS-IDpres-0502.htm; Paul Ingram (2003) "Brief Submission to the Biennial Meeting of States (BMS) on Small Arms and Light Weapons", July 2003, http://www.basicint.org/WT/smallarms/LPO.htm; BICC, BASIC, Saferworld, Small Arms Survey (2004)

According to its Executive Director, BASIC seeks to encourage responsible transfers rather than call for an end to the arms trade because denying transfers would encourage indigenous weapons production in non-producing or small-scale states.[10] Whilst not opposed to the arms trade *per se* and therefore embodying a qualitatively different organisational objective to CAAT, there is a potential affinity between the two organisations as BASIC explicitly points out the disproportionate role of the major capitalist powers and military spenders in the global arms trade; it argues that NATO and the U.S.-U.K. relationship "are the most influential but least critiqued entities in global politics."[11] According to BASIC, the USA and United Kingdom "are the nations we are part of and for whose actions we are as citizens ourselves accountable. In the matter of killing – especially the use and first use of weapons of mass destruction – the responsibility of the citizen to prevent the state carrying out crimes is clear both morally and legally."[12] The two organisations therefore share a commitment to holding the government to account for its disproportionate role in the arms trade. BASIC also criticises the domestic arms trade between companies and the U.K. state, arguing that the latest Defence Industrial Strategy, in December 2005, is "continuing the drive for ever-more sophisticated and expensive military platforms" as part of an "obsession with military capabilities."[13] As an organisation, BASIC's remit is wider than the trade in conventional arms; the majority of its work is on nuclear and WMD issues, and transatlantic security. This allows it to set its work on the conventional arms trade in a broader context, but the resources it has to devote to weapons trade issues is limited.

CAAT and BASIC take an explicitly political stance on the arms trade, in that they connect it to a critique of high military spending and the use of force in world politics. Saferworld, in contrast, understands arms exports as the "missing link" in U.K. foreign policy; it sees controversial arms exports as a contradiction in an otherwise benevolent foreign and

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"Disposal of Surplus Small Arms: A survey of policies and practices in OSCE countries", February 2004, http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Joint/2004OSCE.htm (all 19 February 2006).
[10] Telephone interview with Ian Davis, Executive Director, BASIC, 3 June 2005.
[11] Plesch, Dan (2001) "BASIC Values and Distinctive Qualities", BASIC internal operational style memo.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Schofield, Steven (2006) "The U.K. Defence Industrial Strategy and Alternative Approaches," BASIC Occasional Papers on International Security Policy #50, March 2006, http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Papers/BP50.htm (15 December 2006).

development policy.[14] Saferworld's approach thus operates on the assumption of government benevolence and on the assumption that the major problem of the arms trade is occasional, aberrant policy decisions. This is also a political approach, but a reformist rather than a radical one. Until 2004 Saferworld had a stand-alone U.K. export controls project, which was then submerged into a wider EU programme in response to the enlargement of the EU. Its objective in relation to U.K. export controls is to ensure that exports from the United Kingdom, which it acknowledges has long been one of the world's largest arms exporters, are "governed by an effective and rigorous export control system."[15]

Saferworld understands arms issues as part of a wider human security agenda: the trade "has a massive human impact, fuelling and sustaining conflict, destroying lives and undermining development."[16] Its work is divided according to geographical area and theme, and in addition to its work on U.K/EU arms exports, it does a significant amount of work on small arms issues.[17] Small arms work has become the flagship of Saferworld's reputation and is based on the understanding that "the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons fuels crime, exacerbates violent conflict and undermines development."[18] It works in a number of geographical regions, conducting small arms mappings or surveys (designed to provide "accurate information on the true nature and extent of the problem"[19]), and on improving national and regional small arms controls in the global South.

[14] Mepham, David and Paul Eavis (2002) *The Missing Link in Labour's Foreign Policy. The Case for Tighter Controls over UK Arms Exports* (London: ippr/Saferworld).
[15] Saferworld (no date) "UK arms transfer controls", http://www.saferworld.org.uk/en/uk_arms_controls.html (18 February 2006).
[16] Saferworld (no date) "International Arms Controls", http://www.saferworld.co.uk/iac/index.htm (28 June 2005). This was echoed by the organisation's director, who said that Saferworld has always had a broader security focus than just weapons issues; interview with Paul Eavis, Director, Saferworld, 25 May 2005.
[17] The geographical regions are: Horn of Africa and Great Lakes; Southern Africa; Eastern Europe and Russia; European Union; South Eastern Europe; small arms in Bangladesh; small arms in Sri Lanka; and South Asia regional small arms controls. The themes are: arms transfer control; conflict prevention and peace-building; conflict-sensitive development; security and justice sector development; and small arms and light weapons.
[18] Saferworld (no date) "Small arms and light weapons", http://www.saferworld.org.uk/en/small_arms_intro.html (18 February 2006).
[19] Saferworld (no date) "Small arms mappings", http://www.saferworld.org.uk/en/mappings.html (18 February 2006).

A focus on small arms is also evident in the work of International Alert, a peacebuilding organisation established in 1986.[20] It was set up by human rights advocates, led by the former Secretary General of Amnesty International, Martin Ennals, "in response to growing concerns expressed by those working in international development agencies, human rights organisations and those involved in the issues of ethnic conflict and genocide."[21] It has been working on small arms issues since 1994, when it "identified unregulated small arms proliferation and misuse as one of the world's most pressing security issues".[22] Its objectives are to assess the "progress made and challenges faced in the implementation of international small arms control measures" and to "strengthen the knowledge and expertise of policymakers in understanding and responding to small arms matters."[23] International Alert thus has a very specific interest in the arms trade: it is concerned with the unregulated spread of small arms as part of its focus on peacebuilding. It does not work on U.K. arms export control except as part of the U.K. Working Group on Arms.

Amnesty International and Oxfam also have a very specific interest in the arms trade, namely in its relationship to human rights and development, respectively. Amnesty International, a "worldwide movement of people" campaigning for universal enjoyment of human rights,[24] is concerned with the arms trade when arms transfers are used to commit or facilitate human rights violations or abuses.[25] Amnesty accepts the legitimacy of the arms trade on the basis of states' right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter and does not take a position on economic sanctions or punitive measures directed against any state, but does oppose "the transfer of military, security and police (MSP) equipment where such transfers can reasonably be assumed to contribute to human rights violations within AI's mandate i.e. gross

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[20] International Alert (no date) "What We Do", http://www.international-alert.org/about_alert/what_we_do.php (19 February 2006).
[21] International Alert (no date) "About Us", http://www.international-alert.org/about_alert/index.php?page=about (19 February 2006).
[22] International Alert (2006) "Small Arms and Light Weapons", http://www.international-alert.org/our_work/themes/small_arms.php (19 February 2006).
[23] Ibid.
[24] Amnesty International (no date) "About Amnesty International", http://web.amnesty.org/pages/aboutai-index-eng (28 June 2005).
[25] The difference between violations and abuses of human rights relates to the legal standing of the actor committing them: only states have obligations under international law and can thus be responsible for violations. Non-state actors thus commit abuses.

violations such as unlawful killings, torture etc."[26] Amnesty is thus concerned with the uses to which arms are put rather than their transfer *per se*. Key targets of Amnesty campaigning are military equipment used in torture, weapons that have indiscriminate effects, and weapons that can be linked to particular human rights violations, according to one U.K. section campaigner.[27] In practice, Amnesty focuses on small arms and certain types of conventional weaponry because of the frequency with which they are used in human rights abuses and violations of humanitarian law, according to one International Secretariat researcher.[28] As this researcher put it, this is part of an attempt to "make it more difficult for those who abuse human rights to get the equipment to do it."[29]

Amnesty's approach to the arms trade is part of its wider mission to promote the "impartial protection of human rights", independently of governments, political ideology, economic interest or religion.[30] This reputation for impartiality and non-political activity, taking "no stand on political questions," has been central to its development and success.[31] As Stephen Hopgood argues, Amnesty's authority is moral in nature and this rests on detachment and the characterisation of human rights as non-political. Hopgood quotes an International Secretariat staffer who describes Amnesty's work as "not grinding political axes" but rather "providing the information that others could grind political axes with if they wanted to."[32] However, there is a tension within Amnesty, between "keepers of the flame" and "reformers." The former are "the guardians of the Amnesty ethos" and proponents of moral authority, taking the position of witness; the latter are "more engaged, more of a movement", tapping

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[26] Email from Brian Wood, Manager, Research and Policy on Arms Control and Security, International Secretariat, Amnesty International, to author, 26 May 2006.
[27] Interview with Rob Parker, Arms and Security Trade Campaigner 2000-2004, Amnesty International, 5 December 2003.
[28] Telephone interview with Brian Wood, Manager, Research and Policy on Arms Control and Security, International Secretariat, Amnesty International, 18 April 2006.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Amnesty International, "About Amnesty International".
[31] Clark, *Diplomacy of Conscience*, p.12. Also Thakur, "Human Rights: Amnesty International and the United Nations". Martin Ennals, the first Secretary-General of Amnesty International, argues that AI has "been systematic in refusing to extend its methods of work into areas which might lead to political confusion, for example advocating boycotts or economic sanctions. This is not because AI opposes sanctions as such but because it feels that it is not the role of the organization to be involve in activity which would lead to allegations of bias against countries selected for sanctions and might have little impact other than providing publicity." Ennals, "Amnesty International and Human Rights", p. 76.
[32] Hopgood, *Keepers of the Flame*, p.14.

into "demonstrative protest, political solidarity, and social change," and acting as advocates.[33] Work on arms issues, a thematic issue that cuts across country programmes, exemplifies this tension within Amnesty's work. On the one hand, it is symbolic of the rise of reformers, who want a more political approach to human rights, moving beyond traditional political and civil rights, deploying truth in pursuit of social change, and challenging the "work on own country" rule.[34] On the other hand, Amnesty claims to take no position on the arms trade, and focuses on the suffering caused by the use of arms in human rights violations and abuses – in this sense, its work on arms is just like its wider work on human rights issues.

Amnesty has worked alongside Oxfam on arms issues for much of the last decade. Oxfam works towards finding "lasting solutions to poverty, suffering and injustice."[35] This includes a concern with conflict, and in 2002 the need to "Curb the flow of arms that fuel conflict" featured in Oxfam's ten-point plan for international action.[36] Between 2000 and 2002 Amnesty and Oxfam ran a campaign called "Aim Higher for Tough Arms Controls," calling for tougher legislation and a robust system of end-use monitoring on U.K. arms exports.[37] Once the Export Control Act became law in 2002, Oxfam started to withdraw from U.K. policy work in order to focus on the inter-NGO Control Arms Campaign (calling for an international, legally binding Arms Trade Treaty) and the community safety agenda in the global South.[38] This is emblematic of a wider shift in NGOs' focus, from U.K. export control to international controls, with a practical focus on small arms.

Oxfam argues that "easy access to arms increases the levels of human suffering", regardless of the history and causes of the conflicts in the countries in which Oxfam has been

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[33] Ibid., pp. 11-14.
[34] The "work on own country" rule means that members are not allowed to research or campaign on human rights issues in the state of which they are a citizen. This is a measure designed to promote impartiality. The U.K. section was involved in the development of arms work from the beginning and has undertaken work on U.K. arms issues (such as reviewing national arms export control legislation and work on the introduction of taser guns in the U.K. police), in an instance of the rule being watered down; interview with Alice Hutchinson, Advocacy Officer - UK Government & Parliament, Amnesty International U.K., 21 November 2006.
[35] Oxfam International (2005) "About Us", http://www.oxfam.org/eng/about.htm (28 June 2005).
[36] Oxfam (2002) *Words to Deeds. A New International Agenda for Peace and Security: Oxfam's 10-Point Plan*, http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/issues/conflict_disasters/bp14_peace.htm (28 June 2005).
[37] Amnesty International Kingston (no date) "Aim Higher – Tougher Arms Controls", http://www.amnestykingston.org.uk/armstrade.html (23 July 2006).
[38] Interview with Debbie Hillier, Policy Adviser on Conflict and Arms, Oxfam, 1 December 2003.

working for the past 60 years.[39] Its concern with the arms trade thus comes from its operational experience and is focused predominantly on small arms: its work in the field has shown it that "conflicts are fuelled by the international transfer of arms, *most notably* small arms and ammunition."[40] Addressing the demand for small arms, which includes factors such as "poverty, insecurity, lack of sustainable livelihoods, lack of equitable access to services, assets and opportunities"[41] is therefore an important part of its mission. Oxfam and Amnesty display a similar approach to the arms trade: they are concerned with the arms trade inasmuch as it relates to their core mission of promoting human rights and development, respectively.

This outline of the NGOs' objectives demonstrates some key similarities and differences between the organisations. The main difference is between CAAT and the other five organisations, in that CAAT wants to see the arms trade abolished and the others want to see it better regulated. However, BASIC, whilst not being opposed to the operation of the arms trade *per se*, has an argument that is compatible with CAAT's in that it challenges the role of dominant states such as the United Kingdom. This raises the question of whether counter-hegemonic struggle requires opposition to the arms trade or, more narrowly, its scale and effects. The argument put forward here is that NGOs' objectives must be transgressive in order to be counter-hegemonic: they must make demands that would, at the very least, significantly transform the scale of the trade. Thus, whilst CAAT is more radical than BASIC in its aims, both have counter-hegemonic potential. Activity that is also counter-hegemonic in postcolonial terms would require that NGO arguments do not simply argue for an end to exports to the global South: this would leave the military dominance of Northern states intact and do nothing to challenge hierarchical North-South relations. NGOs' arguments about arms exports to the global South are dealt with in the case study chapters; of the six NGOs, only CAAT and BASIC consider domestic procurement and military spending to be part of the problem. They are thus the only organisations whose vision would entail change at home as well as a change in export policy.

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[39] Oxfam GB (February 2002) *The Spoils of Peace. How can tighter arms export controls benefit both the poor and British industry*, Briefing Paper, p.3, http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/issues/conflict_disasters/bp13_peace.htm (28 June 2005).
[40] Oxfam *Up in Arms*, p.3, emphasis added.
[41] Ibid.

A core difference between the NGOs relates to the politics of their position on the arms trade. CAAT is seen as taking a political stance through its opposition to the trade *per se*; the other organisations claim not to take a position, accepting the principles of the UN Charter. However, acceptance of the legitimacy of the arms trade is as much a political position as denying it: but it is a reformist position rather than a radical position. As is argued later in the chapter, the claim that CAAT is political and the others are not plays a significant role in delegitimising CAAT as a serious political actor. The difference between reformist and radical positions is further exemplified in the NGOs' understanding of the problem posed by the arms trade. Amnesty International, Oxfam, Saferworld and, to an extent, BASIC, understand the problem of the arms trade to be controversial exports to sensitive regions or countries; accordingly, the solution is better policies and tighter implementation. This rests on an assumption that regulatory mechanisms are genuine and function (or at least, could function if they were properly implemented) to restrict the trade in arms. In contrast, CAAT understands controversial exports as part of a wider problem, and caused by the relationship between the arms industry and government. The difference between reformist and radical attitudes towards the arms trade shapes, and is shaped by NGOs' choice of strategy, to which I turn next.

NGO strategies: insiders and outsiders

The six NGOs use a variety of strategies for achieving their objectives, helpfully understood in terms of Wyn Grant's distinction between insider and outsider strategies.[42] The basic aim of an insider strategy is to "establish a consultative relationship whereby their views on particular legislative proposals will be sought prior to the crystallisation of the Government's position."[43] In contrast, groups that pursue outsider strategies "either do not wish to become enmeshed in a consultative relationship with officials or are unable to gain recognition as a group that should be consulted on matters within its terms of reference."[44]

[42] Grant, Wyn (1978) *Insider Groups, Outsider Groups and Interest Group Strategies in Britain*, Working Paper #19, Department of Politics, University of Warwick; Grant, Wyn (2001) "Pressure Politics: From 'Insider' Politics to Direct Action?", *Parliamentary Affairs*, 54, 337-348.
[43] Richardson, quoted in Grant, *Insider Groups*, p.2.
[44] Ibid.

Grant acknowledges that some groups use a mixture of both types;[45] such groups can also be labelled "thresholder groups" according to May and Nugent.[46] This conception of strategy types illustrates a spectrum of activity along which to situate the six NGOs.

Whilst Grant's insider/outsider typology is a useful starting point for an analysis of NGO activity, its pluralist assumptions are problematic. Grant (and his fellow pressure group writers) does not argue that all actors have equal access or influence or are equally well-endowed in terms of resources, but does proceed on the basis that "power in society is fragmented and dispersed" as well as non-cumulative.[47] This means that government "is not identified with any particular interest but rather acts as an independent arbiter between interests,"[48] such that policy is made through a "competition of viewpoints."[49] However, such a pluralist approach is inadequate for the study of arms export policy. As demonstrated in Chapter Three, the U.K. government does not act as an independent arbiter between interests as arms capital is structurally privileged. NGOs are in a disadvantaged position compared to arms companies and lobby groups. Arms capital is the ultimate insider group as it is integrated into the state (via the MoD and DTI) and exercises disproportionate influence compared to even the most insider NGOs, which are allied to weaker fractions of the state, namely DfID and elements of the FCO.

Amongst the NGOs, an insider strategy is best exemplified by Saferworld, which works "*with* governments and civil society internationally to research, promote and implement new strategies to increase human security and prevent armed violence."[50] Its approach is described by one staff member as putting itself in policymakers' shoes: making constructive proposals gives Saferworld access to, and the respect of, policymakers; such close engagement allows them to see behind-the-scenes debates.[51] Staff members claim this allows the organisation to "get taken seriously, get access you wouldn't otherwise get, and find points of

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45 Grant, *Insider Groups*, p.8; Grant, "Pressure Politics", p. 10.

46 May and Nugent, cited in Maloney, William A., Grant Jordan and Andrew M. McLaughlin (1994) "Interest Groups and Public Policy: The Insider/Outsider Model Revisited", *Journal of Public Policy*, 14(1): 17-38; p.28.

47 Grant, Wyn (1989) *Pressure Groups, Politics and Democracy in Britain* (London: Philip Allan), p. 26-7.

48 Marsh, David (1983) *Pressure Politics. Interest Groups in Britain* (London: Junction Books), p. 10.

49 Jordan, A.G. and J.J. Richardson (1987) *Government and Pressure Groups in Britain* (Clarendon Press, Oxford), p. 46.

50 Saferworld website homepage, http://www.saferworld.org.uk/ (28 June 2005), emphasis added.

51 Interview with Andrew McLean, Head of Southern Africa programme and Communications, Saferworld, 20 November 2003.

leverage."[52] Whilst "the amount you can shift government is less, the prospects for shifting them are greater."[53] Saferworld's main engagement with government on export control issues is with DfID and the FCO, with whom it has a "very good" relationship; it has a "reasonably good" relationship with the DTI and MoD but is "kept at arm's length" on licensing issues.[54] Saferworld thus backs up its advocacy efforts with media work, disseminating its findings from its annual audit of the government's report on arms export control to the press, for example.[55] This is intended as a dual strategy of simultaneously conducting confidential work with government and maintaining a climate for change, according to Saferworld's director.[56]

Saferworld's insider strategy is particularly pronounced in its small arms work in the global South. Its engagement in mapping exercises, the development of regional control agreements, the provision of advice to DfID and Southern governments, and its capacity-building work with local partners (discussed in more detail in Chapter Seven) are undertaken through a strategy of partnership with DfID and with elements of the state and civil society in the global South. The epitome of this insider strategy was reached in 2006 when the director of Saferworld was included as a member of the U.K. delegation to the UN Small Arms Review Conference; previously, in 2002, he was awarded an MBE for services to the prevention of armed conflicts.[57]

International Alert's work on small arms issues also proceeds via an insider strategy. It engages in "capacity building, mediation and dialogue" and "conduct[s] policy analysis and advocacy at government, EU and UN levels".[58] The particular activities it engages in include monitoring the implementation of arms proliferation agreements, making national and international policy recommendations on security issues, facilitating discussion of security issues between government and civil society (defined as NGOs, journalists, academics), and training civil society actors in security sector reform.[59] Advocacy and lobbying work are key

52 Interview with Roy Isbister, Project Coordinator, UK Arms Export Controls, Saferworld, 2 December 2003.
53 Ibid.
54 Interview with Liz Clegg, Arms Programme Manager, 29 January 2004.
55 Saferworld, "UK arms transfer controls".
56 Interview with Paul Eavis, 25 May 2005.
57 BBC (2002) "The Queen's Birthday Honours 2002. Diplomatic Service and Overseas", *BBC News*, 14 June 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/in_depth/uk/2002/birthday_honours_2002/2045257.stm (28 October 2006).
58 International Alert homepage, http://www.international-alert.org/ (7 December 2004).
59 International Alert (2006) "Security," http://www.international-alert.org/our_work/themes/security.php (19

features of staffers' workload.[60] This is a similar strategy to Saferworld's small arms work; indeed, the two organisations collaborate on the *Biting the Bullet* project, launched in 1999 in conjunction with University of Bradford to contribute to official small arms debates.[61] What the two NGOs' approaches share is an emphasis on expertise, credibility and constructive policy proposals: they are thus emblematic of an insider strategy.

BASIC also display elements of an insider strategy. Its director described its approach as "insider advocacy", doing research and acting as a think tank in order to engage in information-sharing and public education.[62] BASIC's Weapons Trade programme "tracks weapons sales, and conducts research, analysis, advocacy and publicity in partnership with other like-minded organizations to pressure governments to establish effective control and monitoring of conventional arms."[63] It does this in order to assist in "the development of global security policies, policy-making and the assessment of policy priorities" and to promote "public awareness and understanding of these policies and of policy-making in Europe and the US."[64] This is done through the publication of reports on aspects of the arms trade[65] and the provision of information via its email updates, *BASIC Notes* series, and its media work. This is a similar approach to Saferworld on export control issues: the provision of expertise backed up by media work and dialogue with other civil society actors.

At its inception, BASIC saw its role as translating the radical demands of CND and CAAT into something with which government officials could cope; so its insider role was predicated on more radicals being active as well.[66] This approach is echoed in the activity of one of its current staff members, Paul Ingram, who has a somewhat independent role, combining part-time consultancy for BASIC with work for the Oxford Research Group, political activity in the Green Party, chairing the Board of Directors of Crisis Action, and

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February 2006).

[60] Interview with Janani Vivekanandra, research consultant, International Alert, 24 July 2006.

[61] International Alert (2006) "Biting the Bullet", http://www.international-alert.org/our_work/themes/biting_the_bullet.php (19 February 2006).

[62] Interview with Ian Davis, 3 June 2005.

[63] BASIC, "Weapons Trade".

[64] BASIC (no date) "About BASIC", http://www.basicint.org/about.htm (6 December 2004).

[65] E.g. Ingram and Isbister, *Escaping the Subsidy Trap.*

[66] Interview with Kate Joseph, Conflict Advisor (Arms Control), CHAD, DfID, and former BASIC staffer; 25 May 2005.

involvement in an NGO-government liaison group on defence and security issues.[67] One of his key activities has been engagement with the Treasury on the issue of ECGD subsidies on arms exports, building relationships with staff in the Treasury, Number Ten and the Export Credit Guarantees Department in relation to the academic debate surrounding subsidies, with, he claims, "quite a lot of success."[68] He has sat on the CAAT Steering Committee in the past, thus bridging the insider-outsider divide. He believes that "You need a mix of public lobbying and private communication" as "the internal lobbying and teaching I do will only succeed with public pressure or heat."[69] This stems from his belief that arms exports are a "political battle not an intellectual one."[70] This is a combination of insider and outsider strategies: insider work is undertaken in an attempt to create space for more radical understandings of the problem posed by the arms trade and outsider work is done in an attempt to ensure the most radical solution is adopted.

Just as Paul Ingram combines insider and outsider strategies in a personal capacity, Amnesty International and Oxfam do this at the institutional level, combining mass, popular campaigning with insider advocacy. They can usefully be characterised as thresholder groups. However, as discussed above, they have a more reformist argument concerning the arms trade than does BASIC. Amnesty International believes that the most effective approaches to government take place "in an environment where it is possible to establish positive long-term relationships with individuals and institutions, even where major disagreements persist.... AI must be seen as a respected and credible organisation."[71] The emphasis on respect and credibility are typical of an insider strategy, and Amnesty's capacity to mobilise public pressure is understood as a key element of this credibility as a lobbying organisation.[72]

There are two elements to Amnesty's approach: research and campaigning. As one U.K. section campaigner put it, insiders (such as Amnesty) are those who provide constructive

67 The Oxford Research Group is an NGO/think tank that seeks to provide information, foster dialogue between policymakers and their critics, and promote accountability and transparency on issues of global security http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/. Crisis Action is An "independent, non-profit organisation which enables UK civil society organisations to respond more effectively to international conflict"; http://www.crisisaction.org.uk/about.htm (both 19 February 2006).

68 Interview with Paul Ingram, Senior Analyst, BASIC and Oxford Research Group, 2 December 2003.

69 Ibid.

70 Ibid.

71 Amnesty International (2001) *Amnesty International Campaigning Manual* (London: Amnesty International), p.265.

72 Ibid.

criticism, whilst outsiders are those who just provide criticism. In order to be listened to, organisations must give government a reason to listen: so they need a credible policy solution and mass public pressure.[73] One way in which Amnesty attempts this, according to an International Secretariat researcher, is through the use of existing international law as a base for arguments and interventions it thinks governments would respond to: "we start with existing law, and government's existing obligations, and ask why aren't you doing these? Or we say that these standards aren't good enough."[74] The use of existing law is thus also part of a wider standard-setting strategy. Setting standards and providing credible policy solutions are backed up with public pressure. The first Secretary-General of Amnesty International, Martin Ennals, argued that "The only power which an organisation such as AI can hope to exercise is that of publicity or the threat of publicity;" hence the importance of mass public opinion.[75] This was echoed by an Amnesty U.K. campaigner, who argued that public opinion can help "push issues up the agenda."[76] The combination of research and campaigning on arms issues is typical of Amnesty's wider work on human rights issues, and speaks to the tension between the "keepers of the flame" and "reformers" discussed earlier. It makes categorising an organisation such as Amnesty difficult, but it can usefully be understood as a thresholder group that uses a mixture of insider and outsider strategies. Central to both research and campaigning however, is the emphasis on impartial and credible research findings.

Oxfam can also be understood as a thresholder group in that it combines research with campaigning. However, Oxfam engages in advocacy more than bearing witness: its work has a more practical policy impulse than does Amnesty's. It aims to maintain pressure to create the political will so that the most ethical judgement is always made, according to one of its former staff members.[77] This is aided by the emergence of arms export scandals, which are good for media coverage and enrage local campaigners.[78] Advocacy and campaigning are mutually reinforcing: as one staffer put it, the campaigning aspect of Oxfam's work is complemented by

[73] Interview with Alice Hutchinson, 21 November 2006.
[74] Telephone interview with Brian Wood, 18 April 2006.
[75] Ennals, "Amnesty International and Human Rights", p. 79.
[76] Interview with Rob Parker, 5 December 2003.
[77] Interview with Julia Saunders, Policy Adviser on Conflict and Arms 2000-3, Oxfam, 15 January 2004.
[78] Interview with Debbie Hillier, 1 December 2003 ; interview with Oliver Sprague, Conflict and Arms Campaigner, Oxfam GB , 13 January 2004.

its advocacy work;[79] another framed it in terms of advocacy needing campaigning to be successful.[80] Because of its size and household name, Oxfam claims to be able to engage in both successfully.[81] One of Oxfam's claims to success has been in converting people at ministerial level and ensuring they internalise the Oxfam message.[82] One of the tensions in Oxfam's strategy relates to the balance between its work on arms issues and its other country programmes. For example, Oxfam fears being asked to leave the Occupied Territories if it protests against U.K. exports to Israel too loudly,[83] and it faces difficulties around attempting to remain politically neutral in conflict zones whilst also commenting on arms issues.[84] This demonstrates the flipside to a thresholder strategy: causing offence to governments through more confrontational strategies on arms export control can damage that credibility and put field programmes at risk.

The campaigning elements of Amnesty and Oxfam's work gives them something in common with CAAT. Whilst all three engage in campaigning, there is a fundamental difference between them, in terms of their attitude towards government and what they perceive to be the problem with the arms trade. Oxfam and Amnesty use their public campaigning as a means of backing up their advocacy message, which is based on an understanding that more effective policies and implementation would solve the problems posed by the arms trade. CAAT, in contrast, does not engage in advocacy with government because, as one staff member argued, "If it's not a logical situation ... it doesn't matter how many civil servants you talk to, because it's a political decision taken higher up."[85] According to this staffer, the best argument does not always become policy, especially when there are vested interests involved. As a result, the most appropriate avenue for action is the democratic process, to use public pressure and the media to try to force the government to change.[86] CAAT thus focuses on building grassroots

[79] Interview with Debbie Hillier, 1 December 2003.
[80] Interview with Julia Saunders, 15 January 2004.
[81] Interview with Oliver Sprague, 13 January 2004.
[82] Interview with Julia Saunders, 15 January 2004.
[83] Interview with Debbie Hillier, 1 December 2003; this is partly due to the predominance of Oxfam America, which is very pro-Israel, in the Oxfam family.
[84] Interview with Oliver Sprague, 13 January 2004. He gave the examples of DRC, Aceh and Colombia as contemporary examples of these sensitivities. The costs to Oxfam in terms of having to curb what it says on arms issues for fear of putting its country programmes at risk arose as a theme in several other interviews as well; interview with Debbie Hillier, 1 December 2003; interview with Rob Parker, 5 December 2003; interview with Alice Hutchinson, 21 November 2006.
[85] Interview with Ian Prichard, Research Coordinator, CAAT, 15 June 2004.
[86] Ibid.

opposition to the arms trade through education and awareness raising. A former staff member contrasted this to the work of groups such as Oxfam and Amnesty, which he understood as creating "consumers of campaigns" rather than educated citizens.[87] CAAT believes public opinion "has really changed over the last twenty years and is very anti-arms now",[88] and believes that only public opinion can force the government to change its ways. MPs and civil servants need a political reason to change policy: that is why public pressure is needed and arguments alone will not suffice.[89]

CAAT is best known for actions such as its shareholder activism and protests at arms company Annual General Meetings, even though this only makes up a part of what it does.[90] Protest activity distinguishes CAAT further from the other NGOs, not only because of its confrontational stance, but also because it is the only organisation to direct protest towards companies as well as the government. This strategy challenges the supposed separation between the economic and political realms: CAAT understands the problem to be one of state-industry relations, not just of government policy. CAAT has historically also worked with trade unions on defence issues, although peace organisations – especially those that were primarily religious or pacifist – have long been viewed rather suspiciously by unions[91] and, today, CAAT's work with trade unions is not so successful or extensive.[92] This points to the cross-class support for the arms industry as discussed in Chapter Three, highlighting the difficulty in challenging the arms trade.

One insider strategy that is not restricted to any particular NGO is work with the Quadripartite Committee, a parliamentary committee made up of representatives from the

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[87] Telephone interview with Chris Cole, Local Campaigns Coordinator 2000-3, CAAT, 9 March 2006.
[88] Interview with Ann Feltham, Parliamentary Coordinator, CAAT, 21 November 2003. This point was echoed by Chris Cole.
[89] Interview with Ian Prichard, 15 June 2004.
[90] In addition to protests at arms fairs and the BAE AGM, CAAT runs thematic campaigns focusing on different aspects of the trade, as well as annual Clean Investment campaigns (aimed at encouraging local authorities, charities, religious organisations, health organisations and universities to disinvest from arms companies). It also engages in media and parliamentary work.
[91] Sandy Adirondack, CAAT co-ordinator 1975-80, email to author, 23 February 2006.
[92] Ann Feltham, email to author, 5 August 2005. The futility of working with trade unions was echoed by Paul Ingram, interview 2 December 2003. Historically, CAAT was involved in the late 1970s in publicising and promoting the work of the Lucas Aerospace shop stewards, who published an Alternative Corporate Plan in 1976 to promote alternatives to arms production. Sandy Adirondack, email to author, 23 February 2006; also successive CAAT Newsletters between 1977 and 1979. On the Lucas Plan, see Wainwright, Hilary and Dave Elliott (1982) *The Lucas Plan – A New Trade Unionism in the Making?* (London: Allison and Busby).

Defence, Foreign Affairs, International Development and Trade and Industry committees. Saferworld takes the lead on liaising with and briefing the Quadripartite Committee, but other U.K. Working Group members have been involved in preparing written submissions and presenting oral submissions at evidence sessions. Since 1997 CAAT has placed more emphasis on engaging with the Committee,[93] although it does not do as much of this work as the U.K. Working Group. NGOs' work with the Committee is widely recognised by civil servants as a key influencing activity, in that it provides research and expertise to parliamentarians, allowing them to ask more incisive questions of government.[94] For the U.K. Working Group members, engagement with the Committee is one of the main ways in which they attempt to have a cumulative effect. The pooling of expertise across organisations and division of labour between them, combined with the legitimacy that Oxfam and Amnesty have through their mass membership, is understood by staffers as a key means of amplifying their message.[95]

NGO staff members are somewhat ambivalent about the effectiveness of engaging with the Quadripartite Committee, however. As one Amnesty staffer commented, the issues and language contained in NGO briefings appear in Committee reports, and the Committee is quite powerful because members are from across four parliamentary committees; "but then when the government ignores even them, then what more can we do?"[96] As a Saferworld staffer put it, "because the licensing process is so closed, it is difficult to know if listening to the QSC [Quadripartite Committee] is rhetorical or real."[97] According to CAAT, the Committee's role is to "tame the wilder elements" of government policy, but not much more.[98] This raises questions about the effectiveness of such as strategy if Parliament is seen as weak and the licensing system as flawed.

The strategies of Amnesty International, BASIC, International Alert, Oxfam and Saferworld share a focus on credibility, a relationship with government and the provision of

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[93] Interview with Ann Feltham, 21 November 2003.

[94] As one civil service interviewee put it, you can see NGO research in the questions the Committee asks; interview with Andrew Turner, Deputy Head, Counter Proliferation Department, FCO, 6 January 2004. Another interviewee argued that the Committee would not be effective without NGOs – it would have floundered because export control is complicated; interviewee AS16, 6 February 2004.

[95] Interview with Rob Parker, 5 December 2003; interview with Debbie Hillier, 1 December 2003; interview with Julia Saunders, 15 January 2004; interview with Andrew McLean, 20 November 2003.

[96] Interview with Rob Parker, 5 December 2003.

[97] Interview with Roy Isbister, 2 December 2003.

[98] Email to author from Nicholas Gilby, CAAT volunteer, 9 March 2005.

expertise. This means that even on issues where the NGOs do not agree with the government – as in the case of particular, controversial exports – they are still taken seriously. Opposing the government on specific issues and using mass campaigning (as Amnesty and Oxfam do) thus do not mean that a group is an outsider group. Indeed, as demonstrated above, Amnesty International and Oxfam believe that the ability to mobilise public opinion is a key means of legitimation and credibility, and backs up their advocacy message. Insider activity requires a "strategy of responsibility,"[99] which requires that an organisation engages with its target and is seen as responsible and reasonable. Whilst access to the machinery of government is an important part of an insider strategy, it generates constraints as groups have to show "tact and discretion" in their dealings with government.[100] In addition, an insider strategy carries the risk of "benign neglect" in which the government praises the aims of the group but does little to fulfil those aims.[101] Insider strategies thus run the risk of cooption or, in Gramscian terms, *trasformismo*, through the assimilation of challenge.

CAAT, in contrast, does not believe that the government can be persuaded by NGOs to change, because of the vested interests at stake. Its strategy is therefore more confrontational and is aimed at broad public education and mobilisation against the arms trade, rather than at persuading policymakers, who they believe will not listen to a message that threatens those interests. The biggest difference between CAAT and the other NGOs is its belief that fundamental change is necessary; the second is its belief that this will not occur by improving the technical processes of export control. It is for this reason that other groups and government tend to see CAAT as making a political point and failing to act constructively.[102] CAAT acknowledges this to an extent: "because we are anti the arms trade per se, it is difficult to say 'reform it'".[103] CAAT acknowledges that there are practical steps to be taken to end the arms trade but the primary issue is that of political will. CAAT therefore needs to act as "a mosquito biting an elephant."[104] In this view, "the Government is a law unto itself so we need to be as scandal-mongering as possible."[105]

[99] Grant, *Insider Groups*, p.6.
[100] Richardson, quoted in ibid., p.3.
[101] Grant, *Insider Groups*, p.2.
[102] Interview with Rob Parker, 5 December 2003; interview with Oliver Sprague, 13 January 2004.
[103] Interview with Ann Feltham, 21 November 2003.
[104] Interview with Nicholas Gilby, 9 July 2004.
[105] Ibid.

The differences in strategy between CAAT and the other five NGOs can be seen in a brief comparison of their current campaigns. CAAT's "Call the Shots" campaign, launched in March 2005, aims to challenge the impetus to exports as CAAT understands it, by exposing the relationship between arms companies and the government.[106] In contrast, the "Control Arms Campaign", launched by Amnesty, Oxfam and the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) with the support of other NGOs in October 2003, aims to better regulate the arms trade via an international Arms Trade Treaty that codifies states' existing obligations into law.[107] Saferworld, BASIC and International Alert also support the Control Arms Campaign; CAAT has formally signed up to it but does not actively support it as "it was felt it would further raise awareness of the arms trade, be a step towards greater controls and be another instrument to help persuade the U.K. government to adhere to its own criteria on arms exports,"[108] but would have limited success because of its failure to challenge the impetus to exports.[109]

CAAT's strategy in its Call the Shots campaign is to challenge the U.K. government on key issues such as the revolving door between industry and government, the existence of DESO, and the role of military-related advisory bodies. It does this through public pressure, encouraging supporters to lobby their MPs, and holding an "action day" in which supporters made a human chain around the DESO building in central London, designating it a "global danger zone" because of its promotion of arms exports.[110] This strategy is unique amongst NGO activity because of its focus on the relationship between state and corporate power. Whilst the integration of arms capital into the state is crucial to the promotion of arms exports and the contemporary configuration of U.K. arms export policy, wider issues of militarism, western use of force, state power and prestige are not addressed in CAAT's Call the Shots campaign. This is indicative of what Michael Mann calls the peace movement's tendency to

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[106] CAAT, "Call the Shots. Take the Arms Companies Out of Government".

[107] Control Arms (2003-2006) "Control Arms", http://www.controlarms.org/ (22 February 2006).

[108] Email from Ann Feltham to author, 13 December 2004. Part of CAAT's logic in supporting the Control Arms Campaign stems from the memory of the split within the NGO community at the time of the EU Code negotiations; CAAT split from the rest of the arms NGO community, and opinion is split as to whether this was a wise move depending on whether activists want to prioritise collaborative working or CAAT's principles.

[109] CAAT asks "Would an ATT have banned the export from the UK of spares for tanks Indonesia used in Aceh in 2002 and 2003? Would it prevent the vast flow of UK military equipment to the tyranny of Saudi Arabia?" CAAT (no date) "Arms Trade Treaty," http://www.caat.org.uk/issues/att.php (22 September 2006).

[110] D'Cunha, Beccie, Anna Jones and Stefan Luzi (2006) "Shut 'Em 'Down", *CAAT News*, December 2006 – January 2007, pp. 8-9.

conflate capitalism and militarism.[111] This signals an analytical weakness on the part of CAAT, but is also an issue of strategy. CAAT does not specify whether it wants a re-nationalisation of arms companies, or a re-articulation of the relationship between ostensibly private companies and the state: making broad vision statements can alienate segments of the campaign's support and so is largely avoided; the focus is on the more narrow goal of ending government support for the arms industry.[112] There is ongoing debate within CAAT about the extent to which it should focus on militarisation at home, and how that relates to arms exports and the wider arms trade.

The Control Arms Campaign combines a popular campaign aimed at securing a "Million Faces" petition to be sent to the 2006 UN Conference on the Illicit Traffic in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects, with insider advocacy at the Conference itself (discussed in more detail in Chapter Seven). The emphasis in this strategy is on the "unregulated" arms trade[113] and the U.K. state is a key ally of NGOs in the pursuit of a treaty. According to one Amnesty U.K. section campaigner, there was a conscious decision to work *with* the U.K. government on the issue of an Arms Trade Treaty;[114] this signals a deliberate attempt at an insider rather than an outsider strategy. The Control Arms NGOs start from where governments are at, talk to them on their own terms and try to generate change through the presentation of coherent policy proposals and demonstration of mass public support for their demands. The U.K. government has pledged support for an international arms trade treaty (but not necessarily in the form hoped for by the NGOs), as has the Defence Manufacturers' Association (a key industry lobby group), which argues that any treaty "would not bring new obligations for U.K. industry."[115] In welcoming this support, the Control Arms NGOs see the U.K. state and industry as part of the solution to the problem of unregulated arms transfers. This is a limited position that serves to legitimate the state-sanctioned arms trade, and also fails to ask why states' existing responsibilities are not *already* being observed, by leading arms exporting states as well as others. Whilst, in interviews, some staff members voice

[111] Mann, Michael (1988) "Capitalism and Militarism", in Mann, *States, War and Capitalism*, pp. 124-145, p. 125.
[112] Telephone interview with Ian Prichard, 16 November 2006.
[113] Macdonald, Anna (2006) "Impact of the Control Arms Campaign; Oxfam", video clip available at http://www.lokaalmondiaal.net/video/un/oxfam.wmv (19 September 2006).
[114] Interview with Alice Hutchinson, 21 November 2006.
[115] Defence Manufacturers' Association (2006) "Arms Trade Treaty," *DMA News*, Issue 35, January 2006, p.4, http://www.the-dma.org.uk/Intro/Newsletters/78.PDF (13 June 2006).

scepticism about the strategy – as one put it in relation to the idea of codifying states' universal responsibilities, away from political bias, "of course the reality's different but that's the idea"[116] – this is not translated into NGO strategy.

These brief snapshots of NGO strategies outline the contours of the debate about NGO activity. It is apparent that there are two sets of objectives in play in the NGO world: tighter regulation of the arms trade and the abolition of it. NGO strategies both reflect and help shape these objectives. The next section addresses the sources of NGO funding, explaining key funders, the role of charitable status, and the disciplinary politics of funding.

NGO Funding

The main funding sources for NGOs are governments, foundations, charitable trusts, individuals and trading.[117] BASIC, International Alert, Oxfam and Saferworld accept government funding, including from the U.K. government, in particular DfID and the Conflict Prevention Pools (pooled DfID, FCO and MoD resources for work on small arms issues – discussed in Chapter Seven).[118] They also accept funding from the Swedish, Finnish, Dutch and Canadian governments as well as the EU. Amnesty International does not accept money from governments for its work investigating and campaigning against human rights violations but it does occasionally seek money from government for other work as long as the funds "are free to be used without compromising our aims and principles".[119] CAAT does not seek government funding, U.K. or other, on principle. Although it is less clear whether CAAT boycotts EU funding, it has not received any to date.[120] In refusing government funding on principle, Amnesty and CAAT make a clear statement of independence and do not have to

[116] Interview with Henry Smith, Programme Manager, U.K. Export Controls and Southern Africa Programme, Saferworld, 8 December 2003.
[117] Of the six NGOs, only Amnesty International and Oxfam raise a significant proportion of their income through trading.
[118] FCO (no date) "Conflict Prevention", http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029393906 (19 February 2006).
[119] Amnesty International UK (no date) "AIUK's Finances", http://www.amnesty.org.uk/give/aiukfinances/index.shtml (24 February 2006). One IS staffer emphasised that funding would only be taken from "non-tainted" governments for human rights education materials and would not be used for staff salaries, overheads etc. He argued that Amnesty prides itself on being independent and impartial and would not be compromised – "it's not a consultant to the state." Telephone interview with Brian Wood, 18 April 2006.
[120] Kathryn Busby, Fundraising Coordinator, CAAT, email to author, 20 February 2006.

make the trade-offs associated with criticising a funder. Whilst the other NGOs maintain that they remain independent and impartial, they are more likely to be subject to the inherent disciplining of funding.

DfID is the biggest institutional funder of the U.K.-based NGO sector as a whole; Wallace describes the "strict frameworks" that "can only be signed when the work undertaken by the NGO fits tightly with DFID's agenda and policy approach. Over time these frameworks are becoming increasingly prescriptive".[121] In 2000/1 Oxfam was one of the five agencies that together accounted for 59% of all DfID's designated NGO funding, which is "tied to a range of conditionalities."[122] In 2005, DfID provided £7.2m of funding to Oxfam.[123] Oxfam itself admits that amongst the major donors, companies and trusts, "[t]here is an increasing tendency among givers of big gifts to want to fund specific programmes."[124] However, it maintains that "We are an independent agency and will not accept funding if that would reduce our independence."[125]

Significant levels of DfID funding raise the prospect of NGOs becoming "prisoner groups", that is, organisations that "find it particularly difficult to break away from an insider relationship with government either because they are dependent on government for assistance of various kinds ... or because they represent parts of the public service."[126] DfID funds over half of Saferworld's work, predominantly its small arms work but also its work on the Arms Trade Treaty, making it the most likely candidate for prisoner group status.[127] The main issues associated with significant levels of DfID funding are the trade-off between programmes, and the strategic rationale behind taking money from one of the world's largest arms exporting states to work for tougher controls on the arms trade. One effect of accepting DfID funding for small arms work is that NGOs are more reticent in speaking out on issues of national export controls. According to one senior Saferworld staff member, an NGO can either "slam

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121 Wallace, Tina (2003) "NGO Dilemmas: Trojan Horses for Global Neoliberalism?" in Leo Panitch and Colin Leys (eds.) *Socialist Register 2004. The New Imperial Challenge* (London: Merlin Press), pp. 202-219; p.206.

122 Ibid., p.207.

123 Oxfam (2005) *Annual Report and Accounts 2004/5*, p.32.

124 Oxfam (2003) *Strategic Plan 2004-7*, http://www.oxfam.org.uk/about_us/downloads/strategic_plan04-07.pdf, p.20 (17 February 2006).

125 Ibid., p.36.

126 Grant, *Insider Groups*, p.5.

127 Interview with Sue Maskell, Head of Operations, Saferworld, 7 June 2004

the government 100% and get nothing, or slam them 70% and get £2m from DfID, which lets you do your work in Eastern and Southern Africa." If Saferworld did not rely on DfID money for fieldwork, it could "hammer the government a bit more."[128] And NGOs' ability to push for a strong Arms Trade Treaty that will significantly restrict the operation of the arms trade must be questioned when their campaigning is partly funded by the U.K. government: NGOs are funded by the state that they hope to persuade to accept their proposals. Although funding comes through DfID, which is in favour of tighter arms control, DfID is in broad agreement with the rest of the state about the purposes of U.K. arms exports and arms control. In addition, much of the funding disbursed by DfID comes from the Conflict Prevention Pools, which are cross-governmental budgets, signalling agreement across departments as to the aims of U.K. policy.

In addition to governments, foundations and charitable trusts provide significant funding for NGO activity on arms issues. Key sources for the six NGOs include the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust (JRCT), Polden-Puckham Charitable Foundation, the Ploughshares, Ford and MacArthur Foundations, the Diana Princess of Wales Memorial Fund, Comic Relief, Community Fund, and Network for Social Change philanthropic organisation. All six of the NGOs also receive individual or membership donations; this is more significant for Amnesty, CAAT and Oxfam than the others.[129] Whilst membership subscriptions and donations from the general public generally count as unrestricted funding, which means they can be used to fund any aspect of work, gifts, donations and grants from major donors such as governments, foundations and trusts are likely to be restricted funding, meaning the money has to be used for a particular purpose.

Restricted funding is typically precarious, depending on funders' preferences and the wider financial and international climates. According to the Director of BASIC, the financial

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[128] Interview with Henry Smith, 8 December 2003. He acknowledged that others within the organisation would disagree with this view and view it merely as a tactical decision.

[129] Nearly half of Amnesty International U.K.'s income in 2004-5 came from membership contributions and subscriptions and over 25% came from appeal and donations; Amnesty International (2005) "Amnesty International UK's Finances 2004-5", http://www.amnesty.org.uk/give/aiukfinances/charts.shtml (13 February 2006). The majority of CAAT's income (approximately 80%) comes from individual donations, with a smaller proportion coming from contributions from groups; nearly all of CAAT's active campaign work is funded by individual donations; CAAT (no date) "Fundraising", http://www.caat.org.uk/fundraising" (1 July 2005). Over half of Oxfam's income in 2003-4 came from donations; Oxfam (no date) "Oxfam: Where the money comes from and where it goes", http://www.oxfam.org.uk/about_us/downloads/moneytalk0304.pdf (1 July 2005).

climate has been difficult for NGOs since a number of foundations lost money as a result of the dotcom bubble burst in 2000.[130] And since the attacks on New York in September 2001, many foundations have changed their priorities: the Ford Foundation, which had funded Saferworld to the tune of £60,000 a year previously, will now only fund arms work that focuses on nuclear issues, and the MacArthur Foundation has moved away totally from funding export controls projects.[131] This restricts the availability of funds for NGO work on particular issues and signals the disciplining of NGO work through the wielding of financial power. More generally, the availability of funding reflects the issues that are in fashion with grant-makers at any given time, and through the increase in activity on such issues as a result of the disbursement of funding, the fashionability of certain topics is reinforced.

There are differences between foundations; some are more progressive than others. Roelofs argues that funding from large foundations steers groups towards pursuing supposedly practical and reasonable goals, thereby restricting more radical change by fragmenting and dissipating radical activism. More generally, she argues that the non-profit world is a system of power which is exercised in the interest of the corporate world, employing the potentially restless children of the rich, producing goods that the market cannot and carrying out services that the state will not.[132] This raises the question of whether Ford Foundation funding (which Roelofs emphasises as one of the largest and most significant foundations) is fundamentally different from JRCT funding, for example. As described above, Ford and other large foundations have moved away from national arms exports controls since 9/11. JRCT is a Quaker organisation "committed to funding radical change towards a better world", in particular, organisations or individuals who are working on "control *or elimination* of specific forms of warfare and the arms trade."[133] And the Polden Puckham Foundation supports work to resolve conflicts and *remove the causes* of conflict.[134] Whilst JRCT and Polden Puckham are more radical in their aims than foundations such as Ford, it is noticeable that the NGOs accept funding from a variety of sources. International Alert and Saferworld accept funding from

[130] Interview with Ian Davis, 3 June 2005.
[131] Interview with Sue Maskell, 7 June 2004.
[132] Roelofs, Joan (2003) *Foundations and Public Policy. The Mask of Pluralism* (State University of New York Press, Albany).
[133] Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust (2006) "Peace Grants Policy", http://www.jrct.org.uk/text.asp?section=0001000200010003 (20 February 2006); emphasis added.
[134] Polden Puckham Charitable Trust (no date) website, http://www.polden-puckham.org.uk/ (20 February 2006), emphasis added.

JRCT, Polden Puckham and DfID, for example; Saferworld also accepts Ford and MacArthur funding, and BASIC accepts funding from Ford, Rockefeller Family Associates, JRCT and Polden Puckham. This suggests that NGOs are able to pitch their proposals in a manner that speaks to the interests of the various funders. The fashions or trends in what funders are prepared to devote resources to remain significant, however; the move of funders such as Ford and MacArthur away from national export control work signals a significant challenge to NGOs working in this area.

Amongst both government and foundation funders, small arms and conflict prevention in the global South are popular post-Cold War and post-9/11 issues; these are thus relatively easy issues for which to get funding, markedly more so than national export controls. However, as a senior Saferworld administrator noted, "donors won't fund the same thing forever", requiring NGOs to be innovative and "move forward" in the types of activity they carry out.[135] In the Saferworld case, for example, small arms projects have been metamorphosed into community safety and community policing projects. In contrast, its national arms export control work is less fashionable and is harder to fund.[136] This has implications for organisational survival: as the director of BASIC expressed it, Saferworld has been able to not only survive but also grow as a result of its funding from DfID, whilst BASIC and other NGOs are struggling.[137]

The argument put forward here is that disciplining is inherent to funding: NGOs have to persuade organisations or individuals to fund them, and thus seek to appeal to their goals, values and interests. More radical foundations such as JRCT and Polden Puckham are in the minority. The predominance of more mainstream funders creates the potential that NGOs "are inevitably drawn into supporting and even spreading many aspects of the dominant global agenda", becoming "carriers of these concepts, values and practices."[138] As is argued in Chapter Seven, however, NGOs are active participants in the shaping of these concepts, values and practices, rather than simply carriers of them.

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135 Interview with Sue Maskell, 7 June 2004.
136 Ibid.
137 Interview with Ian Davis, 3 June 2005.
138 Wallace, "NGO Dilemmas. Trojan Horses for Global Neoliberalism?", p.203.

A final issue to be raised in relation to NGO funding is charitable status. Of the six NGOs, BASIC, International Alert, Oxfam, Saferworld are all registered charities.[139] CAAT is not a charity as changing government policy – one of its fundamental aims – is deemed a "political" objective,[140] which is not deemed charitable by the Charity Commission. In order to facilitate its work and maximise the use of income, the Trust for Research and Education on Arms Trade (TREAT) was established in 1990 as a registered grant-making charity; its main, but not sole, beneficiary is CAAT.[141] Amnesty International (both the International Secretariat and U.K. Section) exists as both a company limited by guarantee and a charitable entity, in a similar financial move to CAAT. This allow Amnesty's research into the maintenance and observance of human rights, the relief of distress amongst needy victims of human rights violations, and work for the abolition of torture, extrajudicial execution and disappearances to benefit from the advantages of charitable status.[142] The other NGOs receive tax relief on their income, which helps them maximise their activity, but charitable status has a disciplining effect as it limits political activity, with the effect that "[c]harities constantly live in fear of opponents resorting to charity law to stop even mild criticisms of government policy."[143] This means there is a trade-off between maximising income and maintaining independence.[144]

Conclusion

This chapter discussed the six NGOs' objectives relating to the arms trade, their strategies and sources of funding. The analysis thus far suggests that CAAT has the greatest counter-hegemonic potential of the six NGOs. It has the most radical aims and most challenging strategy that mean it is least likely to fall into the trap of being satisfied with incremental gains that leave the status quo unchallenged. Its focus on the wider arms trade, beyond controversial exports, and its analysis of the relationship between the government and

[139] At its inception, Saferworld was not a charity, but the Saferworld Foundation was established as the name for the research arm, in order to be able to apply for foundation money. The two parts merged after about two years [around 1991]. Interview with Paul Eavis.
[140] Kathryn Busby, email to author, 20 February 2006.
[141] CAAT (no date) "Information for Trusts and Foundations", http://www.caat.org.uk/support/fundraising/trusts.php (1 July 2005).
[142] Amnesty International UK (no date) "Legal Structure of Amnesty International UK", http://www.amnesty.org.uk/amnesty/aiukstructure.shtml (2 June 2004).
[143] Curtis, Mark (2005) "Charity or Justice", *New Internationalist*, 383, October 2005, p.10.
[144] Ibid. The limiting effects of charitable status are quite widely recognised e.g. Stamp, "Oxfam and Development", p. 101; Black, *A Cause for Our Times. Oxfam the First Fifty Years*, p.270.

arms companies, has greater counter-hegemonic potential because it suggests that the problem is not simply one of implementation and challenges the assumption of the state's benevolence. BASIC, whilst it has an argument that challenges the U.K. government, has suffered from a lack of funding over the years and not been able to grow significantly. Its insider strategy and emphasis on expertise also does not challenge the elitism of policymaking. Even though CAAT and BASIC do not do a significant amount of work in trying to challenge high levels of U.K. military spending or militarisation at home, they are the only NGOs to mention these as part of the problem.

An outsider strategy gives an organisation the freedom to say what it wants because it does not fear losing access to policymakers. Outsiders are more free to make transgressive demands that cannot be accommodated by the status quo. Insiders, in contrast, can say less, but have greater prospects of influencing officials. Insider strategies are deemed to be more realistic, taking the government from where it is to where the NGOs want it to be. However, insider strategies aimed at incremental reforms can contribute to hegemonic understandings of the arms trade if they naturalise supposedly common sense representations that fail to challenge the operation of the trade. This raises the potential for NGOs to be understood as part of a hegemonic bloc rather than a counter-hegemonic force; from the analysis thus far, CAAT is the main potential exception from this. The case study chapters explore this proposition in more detail.

In terms of impact, the most basic indicator is a change in the scale and/or pattern of U.K. arms exports; this has not happened. In absolute terms, therefore, NGOs have not had any significant impact on U.K. arms export policy. However, insider organisations such as Saferworld played a major role in pushing for the EU Code of Conduct (which forms the basis of the Consolidated Criteria) and developing the policy content of it. However, these guidelines have not functioned to restrict arms exports; rather, they serve a predominantly legitimation function. Beyond the crude indicator of impact on the scale or pattern of exports, there are a variety of measures of NGO impact. For example, the activity of NGOs serves to keep arms exports on the media and political agenda; they thus act as a reminder to government that its behaviour is being scrutinised. In broad terms, NGO staffers' understandings of success correlate to the insider-outsider spectrum discussed. For example,

insiders count the use of NGO language by goverment when talking about the arms trade (Amnesty staffer), generating converts at ministerial level (Oxfam staffer), strengthening the hand of sympathetic actors working within government (BASIC staffer), and establishing policy frameworks (Saferworld staffer) as important; thresholders perceive letters from supporters as pushing issues up the agenda and making officials open to what NGOs have to say (Amnesty staffer); and outsiders count pushing issues up the agenda as important (CAAT staffer). These indicators can be understood as discursive measures, in which NGOs attempt to contest the authority of official narratives, draw on other available cultural narratives, and reinterpret official narratives.[145] Central to the counter-hegemonic potential of NGO activity is transgression: that is, making demands that cannot be met within the existing system. In the case of the arms trade, this requires a challenge to the relationship between the state and capital, narratives of national defence and security, and hierarchical North-South relations. NGOs' accounts of the arms trade, development, human rights and conflict prevention are analysed in light of this in the remainder of the thesis.

In addition to their individual strategies, insider groups undertake coalition work through the U.K. Working Group; this is a deliberate attempt at cumulative impact.[146] What is less deliberate and less obvious, however, is the marginalisation of CAAT through insider collaboration, and the implications of this for generating change in U.K. arms export policy. For all their misgivings about outsider approaches, the more insider organisations cite the need for more radical organisations such as CAAT to exist. One Oxfam staffer wondered, if CAAT "didn't demonstrate outside exhibitions, go to shareholder meetings, could we do what we do? Is it because of CAAT that we get access, because we're seen as the sensible end?"[147] An Amnesty campaigner felt that CAAT is important because "government needs to feel there's a public movement completely opposed to the arms trade ... CAAT can say 'Stop DSEi' [Defence Systems & Equipment International, a biennial arms fair held in London] in a way we can't."[148] He understood CAAT to be "valuable", if "slightly over the top."[149] Staffers from

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145 Milliken, "Discourse in International Relations", p. 245.

146 For example, an Amnesty campaigner described the U.K. Working Group as concentrating NGO voices and giving them wider reach, which is important as arms work is always under-resourced; interview with Rob Parker.

147 Interview with Oliver Sprague, 13 January 2004.

148 Interview with Robert Parker, 5 December 2003.

149 Ibid.

both Amnesty and Oxfam thought CAAT are "naïve".[150] And CAAT "create the political conditions for our insider work to have an effect," according to the director of BASIC.[151] Such a view was also echoed by a CAAT staff member.[152] This suggests that the more insider organisations benefit from the presence of more outsider organisations, who raise the political temperature. What is rarely taken into consideration is that outsider organisations are disadvantaged by the activity of insider organisations. Outsider groups may be rendered ineffective above and beyond their own weaknesses. By seeming reasonable and constructive, the more mainstream agencies monopolise political space available for NGO activity. CAAT looks unreasonable and destructive in comparison, and is thus not taken seriously as a political actor; insider organisations thus reduce the likelihood that outsider organisations can be effective.[153] The cumulative impact of NGO activity is explored in the case studies and assessed in Chapter Eight.

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150 Ibid.; interview with Oliver Sprague, 13 January 2004.

151 Interview with Ian Davis, 3 June 2005.

152 Telephone interview with Ian Prichard, 16 November 2006.

153 This argument was echoed by Mark Curtis, former director of the World Development Movement, author and critic of U.K. foreign and development policy; interview with Mark Curtis, 7 September 2004. The ways insider and thresholder NGO staffers talked about CAAT in interviews backs up this line of argument: one Oxfam staffer said it would not be wise for U.K. Working Group members to get CAAT on board because of the way it is perceived by policymakers; interview with Debbie Hillier, 1 December 2003. One Amnesty staffer described anecdotal tales of "MPs [saying] we're glad CAAT aren't with you, I'm glad you're not going to paintbomb my car;" interview with Rob Parker, 8 June 2004.

Chapter Five

Sustainable development concerns in the arms trade: the case of Tanzania

Introduction

In December 2001 the U.K. government issued a licence to BAE Systems for the export of a £28m air traffic control system to Tanzania, despite the opposition of DfID, the Treasury, the World Bank and the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). The case caused a public debate about the role of sustainable development concerns in arms export licensing, and CAAT, Oxfam and Saferworld spoke out publicly against the deal.[1] This chapter assesses NGO activity in relation to sustainable development concerns in arms export licensing through an examination of the Tanzania case. I argue that, whilst NGOs opposed the deal and criticised the government for contravening its stated policy, their arguments remained within the parameters set by the government. Whilst the NGOs used the government's publicly stated guidelines as a stick to beat the government, they treat the guidelines as genuine and the vision of development set out in the guidelines as adequate. They thus ally themselves with DfID, despite the problematic neo-liberal principles of its development agenda that does not challenge the causes of poverty. This applies whether the NGO in question uses an insider, outsider or thresholder strategy. NGOs can thus be understood to have contributed to hegemonic understandings of the arms trade and development in this case. The chapter proceeds in six parts, which analyse government declaratory policy and actual practice in this case, relations between branches of the state and capital, the view from Tanzania, the neo-liberal development agenda, NGO arguments against the licence, and NGO strategies and impacts.

Government declaratory policy and practice

The U.K. government claims that all export licence applications are assessed on a case by case basis against the Consolidated Criteria. In relation to sustainable development, Criterion 8 states that:

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[1] Amnesty International, BASIC and International Alert agreed with the Oxfam and Saferworld positions through their involvement in the U.K. Working Group on Arms.

> The Government will take into account, in the light of information from relevant sources such as ... World Bank [and] IMF ... reports, whether the proposed export would seriously undermine the economy or seriously hamper the sustainable development of the recipient country.[2]

The U.K. government has refused to publish two relevant World Bank reports, but Labour MP Tony Worthington drew attention in Parliament to the fact that "[t]he World Bank has condemned the proposal for being needlessly expensive and it says that what Tanzania needs could be obtained for $10 million", and that "[t]he proposal has also been turned down by the IMF."[3] According to press reports, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) deemed the system to have an unnecessary military capability and to be too expensive, adding to Tanzania's external debt burden.[4] In a letter to the World Bank, the ICAO stated that the system was "not adequate and ... too expensive".[5] In light of the World Bank, IMF and ICAO assessments, the licence could have been denied on the grounds of Criterion 8; nonetheless the licence was granted.

> Criterion 8 also states that:
>
> The Government will consider ... the recipient country's relative levels of military and social expenditure, taking into account also any EU or bilateral aid, and its public finances, balance of payments, external debt, economic and social development and any IMF- or World Bank-sponsored economic reform programme.[6]

Around the time of the deal, Tanzania was dependent on aid for almost 50% of its annual budget,[7] large amounts of which came from the U.K. state, one of its major donors. Over five financial years (1996/7 – 2000/1) DfID provided a total of £273.5 million in development

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[2] MoD et al, *The Consolidated Criteria*, p.415.
[3] Worthington, Tony (2001) *Hansard*, Debates, Column 393, 8 November 2001.
[4] Beattie, Alan and Roger Dean (2001) "$40m deal raises Tanzania debt concern," *Financial Times*, 12 August 2001.
[5] International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) (2001) Letter Dated 8 November 2001 from the Director of the Technical Co-operation Bureau addressed to the World Bank, "Subject: Tanzania Air Traffic Control Radar Project." The full ICAO report is not available for public scrutiny. As Clare Short pointed out, the report was sold by BAE Systems to the Tanzanian Government and therefore remains the property of the Tanzanian Government ; Short, Clare (2002) *Hansard*, Written Answers, Column 583W, 21 June 2002.
[6] MoD et al, *The Consolidated Criteria*, p.415.
[7] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2002) *SIPRI Yearbook 2002. Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford University Press, Oxford), p. 200. On Tanzania's aid status and relationship with donors, see Vener, Jessica I. (2000) "Prompting Democratic Transitions from Abroad: International Donors and Multi-partyism in Tanzania", *Democratization* 7(4): 133-162.

assistance to Tanzania through various mechanisms (project aid, programme aid, technical co-operation, grants and humanitarian assistance).[8] In November 2001 Tanzania reached Completion Point of the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) Initiative, qualifying for the irrevocable cancellation of most (but not all) of its bilateral debts, including those owed to the United Kingdom.[9] As a result, Tanzania's total debt stock was reduced by 54%.[10] It also received US$1,648m in multilateral debt relief but not the cancellation of these debts, and in March 2004 it still owed US$302m.[11] According to Jubilee Research, Tanzania still lacks the resources to meet the UN Millennium Development Goals, a set of eight internationally agreed development targets to be reached by 2015.[12] If Criterion 8 does not apply in this case, it is difficult to see when it would apply.

The last part of Criterion 8 stipulates that "states should achieve their legitimate needs of security and defence with the least diversion for armaments of human and economic resources."[13] The Tanzanian air force has nineteen combat aircraft whose serviceability is doubtful.[14] An air traffic control system is of little use to an air force whose small number of aircraft are in such poor condition. Tanzania's Minister for Transport and Communication, Mark Mwandosya, stated that the system would allow detection of aircraft flying into Tanzanian airspace and thus collection of aviation levies, assisting in the surveillance of Burundian and Rwandan airspace and helping combat illicit trade.[15] He also stated that the system would reduce aviation accidents and boost national revenue by its role in increasing

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[8] Short, Clare (2002) *Hansard*, Written Answers, Column 6W, 14 January 2002.
[9] DfID (2003) 'Debt Relief: Introduction', *Statistics on International Development 2003*, http://www.dfid.gov.uk/sid2003/ (14 January 2004). The HIPC Debt Initiative was proposed by the World Bank and IMF and agreed by governments in 1996. It aims to "reduce the external debt of the world's poorest, most heavily indebted countries" and place debt relief "within an overall framework of poverty reduction." World Bank (no date) "The HIPC Debt Initiative", http://www.worldbank.org/hipc/about/hipcbr/hipcbr.htm (15 March 2006).
[10] Greenhill, Romilly and Elena Sisti (2003) *Real Progress Report on HIPC* (Jubilee Research at the New Economics Foundation, London), p.65, http://www.jubileeplus.org/analysis/reports/realprogressHIPC.pdf (14 January 2004).
[11] Sinha, Ashok (2004) *Call for Change. How the UK Can Afford to Cancel its share of Third World Debt*, Jubilee Debt Campaign and World Development Movement, March 2004, p.15, http://www.wdm.org.uk/cambriefs/debt/callforchange.pdf (1 April 2004).
[12] Greenhill and Sisti *Real Progress Report*, p. 65.
[13] MoD et al, *The Consolidated Criteria*, p.415.
[14] Institute for Strategic Studies (2002) *The Military Balance 2002–2003* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p.215.
[15] Radio Tanzania (2002) "Minister defends government decision to purchase radar", text of report by Radio Tanzania, 22 January 2002.

tourism.[16] Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa defended the deal on the grounds that Tanzania needed to update its air traffic control technology because of safety fears;[17] this was backed up in a Letter of Intent from the Tanzanian government to the IMF in July 2000.[18]

Whilst recognising the "urgent requirements for the improvement of safety and efficiency of civil aviation navigation infrastructure within the Tanzanian airspace", the ICAO stated that "if it is to be used primarily for civil air traffic control purposes, the proposed system is not adequate and is too expensive" and that "[t]he purchase of additional equipment ... would be required to render it useful for civil air traffic control."[19] This means that, whilst there is a need for improved air traffic control, it remains unclear why the Tanzanian government purchased the BAE equipment, which represented poor value for money.[20] It also remains unclear how the Tanzanian government was able to negotiate a concessional loan with Barclays Bank to finance the deal. As the system had military application, the Tanzanian government was unable to finance it through bilateral or multilateral aid.[21] A World Bank official told British MP Norman Lamb that he had never before come across "a commercial organisation subsidising the purchase of military equipment by a heavily indebted country."[22]

In relation to all aspects of Criterion 8, it is clear that the licence should not have been granted. However, Criterion 8 states that the government will "take into account" and "consider" sustainable development concerns; it is possible that the government took into account the reasons not to licence the sale, but decided to grant the licence anyway. Yet the preamble to the Consolidated Criteria states that "An export licence will not be issued if the arguments for doing so are outweighed by ... considerations as described in these criteria."[23] The U.K. government claims to be committed to sustainable development; the DfID home

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[16] Ibid.
[17] Teng'o, Daniel (2001) "Radar Row", *World Press Review*, December 2001, http://www.worldpress.org/africa/0302tanzania.htm (13 December 2003).
[18] Government of Tanzania (2000) Letter of Intent to Hirst Köhler, Managing Director, IMF, 18 July 2000, http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2000/tza/02/index.htm (30 November 2004).
[19] ICAO, "Letter to the World Bank." It remains unclear when the equipment was delivered and what additional equipment, if any, was purchased, and from whom.
[20] See also Caulfield, "Executive Agencies in Tanzania: Liberalization and Third World Debt", p.210.
[21] Government of Tanzania Letter of Intent to Hirst Köhler.
[22] Lamb, Norman, quoted in Redfern, Neil (2002) "Tanzania; Watchman Radar Deal is a Disaster for the People of Tz," *The East African*, 8 July 2002.
[23] MoD et al, *The Consolidated Criteria*, p.416.

page states that it "works to get rid of extreme poverty" and the fact that it is headed by a Cabinet minister, one of the senior ministers in the Government, "reflects how important the Government sees reducing poverty around the world."[24] Whilst, as is argued later in the chapter, guidelines and policies are not objective responses to reality but intersubjectively created interventions that require representational practices to facilitate them, it is reasonable to assume that if the U.K. government were committed to sustainable development, it would have refused to issue a licence in this case. Granting this licence is therefore a seeming disjuncture between policy and practice. However, as the next section demonstrates, the Tanzania case reveals the government's commitment to sustainable development to be more rhetorical than real; a later section also demonstrates how it is constructed along neo-liberal lines.

Relations between branches of the state and capital

The granting of the Tanzania licence provoked a Cabinet split in the U.K. government, with Secretary of State for International Development Clare Short arguing against it[25] and Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown widely believed to oppose the deal.[26] Short stated publicly that she found it "very difficult to believe that a contract like that could have been made cleanly," admitting however that "I have no information to that effect."[27] Despite her opposition, Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon, and Trade and Industry Secretary Patricia Hewitt declared the project a good deal for Tanzania and it went ahead.[28] In January 2002 the DTI claimed that its Export Control Organisation, responsible for arms export control matters, "has received no representation from the International Civil Aviation Organization on Tanzania's export licences."[29] In contrast, Clare Short claimed to have sent the DTI, MoD and FCO a copy of a letter that the ICAO sent to the World Bank, and to have had "discussions

[24] DfID (no date) "About DfID", http://www.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/ (15 March 2006).
[25] Short, Clare (2002) *Hansard*, Oral Answers to Questions, Column 275, 6 March 2002.
[26] Cable, Vincent (2002) *Hansard*, Debates, Column 645–646, 24 June 2002; The Monitor (2002) "Opposition Rejects British Equipment", 19 June 2002, http://www.allafrica.com (1 October 2003).
[27] Short, Clare, quoted in Redfern, Paul (2002) "Short 'lobbying against Dar'," *The East African*, 20 May 2002, http://www.nationaudio.com/News/EastAfrican/28052002/Regional/Regional51.html (24 March 2006).
[28] Hencke, David, Charlotte Denny, C, Larry Elliott (2002) "Tanzania aviation deal 'a waste of money'", *The Guardian*, 14 June 2002.
[29] Griffiths, Nigel (2002) *Hansard*, Written Answers, Column 66W, 28 January 2002.

and correspondence with these Departments on the content of the ICAO letter."[30] This means that the DTI granted the licence despite its knowledge of expert advice against it. Clare Short's decision to speak out publicly against the Tanzania licence meant that the Quadripartite Committee on Strategic Exports (the parliamentary committee that scrutinises arms export policy and practice) could raise concerns about the deal before the licence was granted. To date, this is the only time this has happened, and yet it did not prevent the granting of the licence.[31]

Whilst DfID spoke out against the deal, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw claimed that "as a legitimate government of a sovereign state, the government of Tanzania had the right to decide what ATC [air traffic control] system it bought from whom"[32] and that the licence permits but does not oblige the Tanzania government to go ahead with the purchase.[33] A U.K. civil service official argued that it was not up to the U.K. government to say whether the system was bad value for money – this would display an element of "whitey knows best."[34] In addition, the Tanzanian government said it would not be dictated to by the West about its spending decisions.[35] But the argument—made by politicians on both sides of the deal—that state sovereignty prohibits external interference in decision-making ignores the fact that the U.K. government does not merely respond to demand for arms but actively promotes exports by lobbying foreign governments and through its economic subsidy on arms exports. It also ignores Tanzania's dependence on aid and international financial assistance, a perpetual feature since the end of British colonial rule, which itself saw foreign capital playing a key role in the evolution of the Tanzanian economy. The U.K. government's very narrow interpretation of

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[30] Short, Clare (2002) *Hansard*, Written Answers, Column 914W, 5 February 2002.

[31] Interview with Roger Berry MP, 24 February 2006. In addition, the government refused to provide the Quadripartite Committee with analytical information about the application and with the guidance given to officials on the interpretation of the sustainable development criterion; Defence, Foreign Affairs, International Development and Trade and Industry Committees (2004) *Annual Report for 2002, Licensing Policy and Parliamentary Scrutiny*, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmselect/cmfaff/390/390.pdf, p.8 (27 February 2006).

[32] Straw, Jack, quoted in Saferworld (2003) *Independent Audit of the 2001 UK Government Annual Report on Strategic Export Controls* (London: Saferworld), p. 41.

[33] Straw, Jack cited in MoD et al (2004) *Strategic Export Controls: Annual Report for 2002, Licensing Policy and Parliamentary Scrutiny. Response of the Secretaries of State for Defence, Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, International Development and Trade and Industry*, October 2004, http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/CM6357.pdf (19 May 2006), p.47.

[34] Interview with AS16, 6 February 2004.

[35] Tran, Mark (2003) "Tanzanian government deserves short shrift", *The Guardian*, 20 March 2003; http://www.guardian.co.uk/tanzania/story/0,11441,670922,00.html; IRIN (2002) Tanzania: Critics decry purchase of air traffic control system', 13 February 2002, http://www.irinnews.org (both 1 October 2003).

the guidelines shows that its commitment to sustainable development is not as strong as it proclaims, for it licensed an export that was bad value for money.

The variety of ways in which the Tanzania deal failed to meet the conditions of Criterion 8 raises the question of why the licence was granted. It emerged that at least part of the air traffic control system had been built on the Isle of Wight before the licence was granted, as a result of approval under the Form 680 process. This informal and opaque pre-licensing approval mechanism does not officially guarantee that a licence will be granted, but a minimal number of Form 680-approved deals are subsequently refused.[36] BAE Systems made an initial, unsuccessful Form 680 application in February 1993; in July 1997 a second application was made, which was approved in August 1997.[37] During this time there were ongoing discussions between British Aerospace (as it was then) and the MoD about the deal[38] and DfID was not involved in the F680 process. In October 2000 Clare Short was made aware of the formal licence application and in December 2001 two licences were granted for the export of air traffic control equipment to Tanzania.[39] Whilst the government claims to assess licence applications on a case-by-case basis, contracts are signed before licence applications are made and companies can gain what is effectively prior approval for exports. As such, the licensing process is not independent of the companies that are regulated by it. By the time NGOs find out about particular licences, contracts are already underway; they are therefore at a disadvantage in the export licensing process compared to the arms industry. This highlights the structurally preferential position of arms capital, as documented in Chapter Three. In addition, five years after the licence was granted, the U.K. Serious Fraud Office launched an investigation into allegations of bribery against BAE Systems in relation to the Tanzania deal.[40]

[36] Saferworld (2002) "Questions to QSC—Oral Evidence Session with Jack Straw", http://www.saferworld.org.uk/SubQSCQuest.htm (21 November 2003).
[37] MoD et al, *Strategic Export Controls: Annual Report for 2002, Licensing Policy and Parliamentary Scrutiny*, p.46.
[38] Interview with David Mepham, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Public Policy Research, 5 February 2004.
[39] MoD et al, *Strategic Export Controls: Annual Report for 2002, Licensing Policy and Parliamentary Scrutiny*, p.46. The vagaries of the licensing system are such that a single contract may require multiple licences; in addition, not every element of the Tanzania air traffic control system required a licence, which meant that the value of licences granted in 2001 (£19.5m) was lower than the actual cost of the system (£28m); MoD et al (2003) *Strategic Export Controls: Annual Report for 2001, Licensing Policy and Parliamentary Scrutiny*, September 2003, http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/CM5943_120903.PDF (10 March 2006).
[40] Coates, Sam (2006) "Fraud Office is investigating £28m deal agreed by Blair;" Leigh, David (2006) "Fraud Office inquiry into BAE Tanzania deal," *The Guardian*, 13 November 2006.

The investigation is not yet complete, but potentially raises questions about the activity of BAE and what the U.K. state knew about its behaviour.

Over two hundred jobs on the Isle of Wight were dependent on the contract being fulfilled by the time details of the deal became public, and this played a considerable role in debates about the deal.[41] However, whilst there are a set of "Other factors" that the government "may where appropriate also take into account," including "the potential effect on the U.K.'s economic ... interests", these other factors "will not affect the application of the criteria in the Code."[42] This means that the concern about sustainable development should have taken precedence over concerns about U.K. jobs. In addition, the jobs argument, commonly used to justify arms exports, fails to stand up to scrutiny, as argued in Chapter Three. Despite this, the jobs argument resonated in public debate about the licence and once criticism started to surface, the government repeatedly emphasised the importance of the deal for employment on the Isle of Wight. This is a typical tactic in public debate about arms exports; the jobs argument has a resonance and longevity beyond its factual content.

Apart from Form 680 approval and the rhetoric of the jobs argument, the licence was granted because sustainable development carries less weight within government than other issues. As one former Oxfam staff member argued, the government did not act as a neutral party but operated in the interests of manufacturers.[43] The deal was disputed within the Cabinet and generated ministerial correspondence,[44] but those in favour of sustainable development could not prevent it going ahead. The Tanzania deal became a public issue after details were leaked to *The Guardian* by DfID; the story was picked up by other newspapers.[45] Frustration within DfID about the department's weakness and inability to prevent the deal led actors to seek recourse outside of governmental channels.

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[41] Lamb, Norman (2002) *Hansard*, Debates, Column 231WH, 25 June 2002; Watkins, Kevin (2001) "This deal is immoral, Mr Blair," *The Guardian 21 December*, Hencke, David (2002) "Tanzania wants new deal on air system", *The Guardian*, 15 June 2002, http://www.guardian.co.uk/tanzania/story/0,11441,737902, 00. html (21 November 2003).
[42] MoD et al, *The Consolidated Criteria*, p.416.
[43] Interview with Julia Saunders, 15 January 2004.
[44] Interview with David Mepham, 5 February 2004.
[45] Interview with AS14, 5 February 2004.

As a result of the dispute surrounding the licence, the decision to grant it was taken at the very highest levels of government, at Deputy Prime Minister level and likely at Prime Ministerial level as well.[46] Prime Minister Tony Blair is known to have taken an active and personal role in promoting arms exports more generally; CAAT gives details of his involvement in promoting sales to India, South Africa and Zimbabwe, amongst others.[47] The involvement of the highest levels of government in this case is notable, especially as the sums of money involved were not large for a company such as BAE Systems. This suggests that the government is willing to intervene to secure the interests of its preferred companies at considerable cost and despite its publicly stated commitments. The split between DfID and other branches of the government is characteristic of what Clare Short refers to as an "institutionalised clash" between DfID and other departments that felt it was getting ideas above its station, and the wider phenomenon of "power ... being increasingly sucked into No. 10, [which means that] the Prime Minister and his entourage are making all the crucial decisions without consultation."[48]

Given the Labour government's purported desire for a responsible arms trade, debt relief and poverty alleviation, the granting of the Tanzania licence seems surprising. Understanding the government's pledges as rhetorical rather than real makes such licences less of a surprise. If the issues at stake were the interpretation of badly written guidelines or policy implementation, then the work of NGOs such as Saferworld, which provides detailed and accurate information and suggestions for improving the export licensing process, would have

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[46] The balance of evidence suggests that Blair probably did authorise the deal himself. One NGO staff member and one civil servant argued that, given the vocal opposition of Clare Short to the deal, the decision to grant the Tanzania licence probably came down to Prime Minister Blair; interview with Debbie Hillier, 1 December 2003; interview with AS10, 6 January 2004. An FCO civil servant stated that both the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister were involved; interview with Andrew Turner, 6 January 2004. A DfID official claims that meetings chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister, John Prescott, discussed the deal, but that Blair was not personally involved; interview with Geraldine O'Callaghan, Senior Adviser, Arms Control, CHAD, DfID, 6 February 2004. Clare Short's former special adviser claims that Prescott called a meeting on the issue, and a Cabinet paper on the deal came down very much in favour of granting the licence; there was also a meeting between Clare Short and Tony Blair on the issue; interview with David Mepham, 5 February 2004. In his autobiography the now late Robin Cook claimed that the allegation that Blair threw his weight behind the deal "sounds only too plausible;" Cook, *Point of Departure*, p.72. It is impossible to verify exactly what happened in this case, but it does demonstrate that the decision went to the very highest levels of government.

[47] Lambert, Mick, Judith Rattenbury and Ian Prichard (2003) *The Political Influence of Arms Companies* (CAAT, London), April 2003, http://www.caat.org.uk/publications/government/political-influence-0403.pdf (23 March 2006).

[48] Campbell, Bea (no date), "Interview with Clare Short MP about Labour Foreign Policy, Iraq and the Hutton Enquiry", http://www.epolitix.com/EN/MPWebsites/Clare+Short/B1E147D8-D5A9-4EAE-8911-D18C79FCE581.htm (9 March 2006).

had greater effect. NGOs and the government argue that Criterion 8 is particularly hard to operationalise as it is difficult to quantify harm to sustainable development.[49] Whilst policies always require interpretation, Tanzania is the most obvious case of recent years to fail the conditions of the guidelines. If the overall thrust of U.K. foreign and development policy was benevolent, it would be reasonable to expect the government to err on the side of caution in borderline cases: but the Tanzania contract was not a borderline case. Key members of the government defended the Tanzania licence even though it contravened Criterion 8. In addition, it cannot be the case that this particular licence slipped through an otherwise effective licensing system, because Short's opposition meant there were ample opportunities to reject BAE Systems' licence application. The fact that it went ahead despite opposition within the Cabinet demonstrates the configurations of power in the U.K. state that allows such deals to go ahead. As argued in Chapter Three, the relationship between arms industry and U.K. state is crucial to understanding the nature of U.K. arms export policy.

Given the direct involvement of the most senior politicians in the country, the Tanzania case serves as an expression of U.K. policy and demonstrates that sustainable development concerns do not carry significant weight in government whilst pro-arms capital concerns do. The case demonstrates the disagreements between branches of the state, the relative weakness of DfID as compared to the MoD, DTI and FCO, despite the World Bank intervening on its side, and the alliance between arms capital and these stronger branches of the state. However, whilst DfID is more likely than other departments to put obstacles in the way of arms capitalists acting as they please, its vision of development is a neo-liberal one that is itself problematic. This will be discussed in a later section; the next section addresses the role of the Tanzanian government in the deal.

The view from Tanzania

When the air traffic control system deal was first negotiated in the early 1990s, Ali Hassan Mwinyi's government was still in power in Tanzania. "[Q]uestions have been asked"

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[49] Interview with Andrew McLean, 20 November 2003; interview with Oliver Sprague, 13 January 2004; Quadripartite Committee (2002) *Strategic Export Controls – Annual Report for 2000, Licensing Policy and Parliamentary Scrutiny*, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmselect/cmfaff/718/718.pdf, pp. 48-50.

about the army's involvement in the deal, although little is known definitively.[50] Press reports claim that the Tanzanian government sought tenders on a new air traffic control system in 1992 after the failure of radars covering Dar es Salaam and Kilimanjaro. In November 1993 a bid from Siemens Plessey (bought by British Aerospace in 1997) was accepted.[51] Press reports also claim that the Tanzanian government – since 1995 headed by Benjamin Mkapa – tried to renegotiate the deal after the World Bank and ICAO spoke out against it.[52] Mkapa instituted an anti-corruption drive on coming into power, excluding many political heavyweights from his Cabinet, but there are indications that formerly powerful personalities "fairly rapidly began to re-assert their influence."[53] At the time of the granting of the licence, Tanzania was deemed to rank in the top ten most corrupt countries in the world and Mkapa's efforts were not seen to be paying dividends because of the threat of loss of political support.[54] Whilst Mkapa has been "strongly committed to the policies and reform programmes promoted by the international institutions,"[55] he was unable or unwilling to reverse the deal negotiated under his predecessor.

More generally, the deal must be understood in the wider context of Tanzanian civil-military relations and political life against the backdrop of its colonial past. From the 1880s until 1961 the area of East Africa known as Tanganyika was under German and then British colonial rule. Tanganyika was granted autonomy and then independence in 1960, and in 1964 merged with Zanzibar to form Tanzania under the Presidency of Julius Nyerere. The post-colonial state was governed under Nyerere's ideology of Ujamaa or familyhood, an African brand of socialism. The Tanzanian state enjoyed ideological hegemony as Ujamaa, based on the equality of human beings and developmentalism, enjoyed widespread popular support.[56] This meant that stability was achieved without the overt use of military force through a combination of the dominance of state/party organisations and the suppression of

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[50] Kelsall, Tim (2003) "Governance, democracy and recent political struggles in Mainland Tanzania", *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 41(2): 55-82; p. 62.
[51] Coates, Sam (2006) "Fraud Office is investigating £28m deal agreed by Blair."
[52] Hencke, "Tanzania wants new deal on air system," *The Times,* 13 November 2006.
[53] Kelsall, Tim (2002) "Shop windows and smoke-filled rooms: governance and the re-politicisation of Tanzania", *Journal of Modern African Studies* 40(4): 597-619; pp. 605-6.
[54] Pallister, David (2001) "The business of backhanders," *The Guardian,* 19 December 2001, http://www.guardian.co.uk/tanzania/story/0,11441,622434,00.html (24 March 2006).
[55] Cammack, Paul (2006) "Global Governance, State Agency and Competitiveness. The Political Economy of the Commission for Africa," *British Journal of Politics and International Relations,* 8(3): 331-350; p. 332.
[56] Shivji, Issa G. (1992) "The Politics of Liberalization in Tanzania: The Crisis of Ideological Hegemony", in Campbell, Horace and Howard Stein (eds.) *Tanzania and the IMF. The Dynamics of Liberalization* (Boulder: Westview Press), pp. 43-58; p.44-6.

autonomous non-state activity.[57] The state therefore acted as a unifying agent but also behaved in a paternalistic manner. Whilst governance was largely populist, those in control of the state consolidated their power as a class and the wider population could not challenge this by organising independently of the state, as the state followed the twin policies of "economic intervention and political demobilisation" (meaning the suppression of political activity autonomous from the state).[58]

These developments in Tanzania cannot be understood in isolation from its relations with aid donors, on whom the government was reliant. At independence, Nyerere asked the World Bank to send an investigative mission to give advice on development planning and policy. Despite the criticism of the World Bank by the Tanzanian state over the years, Tanzania's development policy "never strayed very far from modernization policy" as was espoused by the multilateral donors.[59] Post-independence, aid donors were "an important element in the social relations of the Tanzanian state."[60] As Samoff argues, "To ignore the conditioned character of capitalism at the periphery of a world capitalist system and the restricted autonomy of its local rulers is to lose sight of the international character of struggles for power in the Third World."[61] Understanding the "conditioned" nature of the Tanzanian state means taking seriously the complex set of relations between local elites, international capital and the majority population; those in power in Tanzania were an intermediary class between international capital and the country's citizens.[62] For example, the nationalisation of key economic activities under Ujamaa involved the state going into partnership with international capital as former owners retained shares and provided management services.[63]

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[57] Ibid.

[58] Kiondo, Andrew (1992) "The Nature of Economic Reforms in Tanzania", in ibid. pp. 21-42; p.34-5.

[59] Samoff, Joel (1982) "Theory and Practice in the Analysis of Tanzanian Liberalization: A Comment," in ibid., pp. 171-188; p.177.

[60] Campbell, Horace (1982) "The Politics of Demobilization in Tanzania: Beyond Nationalism", in ibid., pp. 85-108; p.88. Rugumamu goes as far as to say that "After three decades of uncontrolled aid flows, steadily aid dependence became part and parcel of the national economic culture" in Tanzania, to the point where "extreme aid dependence reduced the state virtually to the condition of powerlessness and indeed mendicant." Rugumamu, Severine (1997) *Lethal Aid. The Illusion of Socialism and Self-Reliance in Tanzania* (Asmara: Africa World Press), p. 10, 12.

[61] Samoff, "Theory and Practice in the Analysis of Tanzanian Liberalization", p. 182.

[62] Ibid., pp. 181-2.

[63] Kiondo, "The Nature of Economic Reforms in Tanzania," pp. 22-23.

The Tanzanian military has a history of being heavily politicised. Under British colonial rule, units of the King's African Rifles (KAR) were stationed in Tanganyika. Two battalions of the KAR became the Tanganyika Rifles upon independence in 1961, and a programme of Africanisation commenced. However, these troops remained under British command and British in orientation, and the army was geared to maintaining internal security as defined by the colonial regime.[64] After the 1964 Tanganyika Rifles mutiny, the army was disbanded and reformed, with the Youth League of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU – the sole legal party at the time) as the main base of recruits.[65] This newly formed army was named the Tanzanian People's Defence Force (TPDF). The military was politicised in order to promote national cohesion and remind the military of its duty to the nation, and to avoid a repeat of the 1964 mutiny. Military personnel had to join TANU and the military was understood as "part of the government and the party hierarchy."[66] This trend meant that by 1992 "the Tanzanian administration looked like a civilian-military coalition." [67] This continued after the introduction of a multi-partyism and a new constitution in 1992, which officially separated party from government, abolished the party in the army and prohibited the army from being involved in politics. However, the law was not implemented and as a result, civil-military relations remain as politicised as in the past.[68] As Baynham argues, the TPDF has been incorporated into the party/governmental system and "[t]he Tanzanian armed forces are, in fact, *part* of the governing elite."[69]

Traditionally, military spending decisions in Tanzania have been "a state security matter, excluded from public or even parliamentary discussion."[70] This certainly seems to have been the case in the air traffic control system deal. In contrast to the (albeit very limited) debate in the U.K. Parliament, the BAE Systems deal was not tabled in the Parliament of

[64] Lupogo, Herman (2001) "Tanzania: Civil Military Relations and Political Stability", *African Security Review*, 10(1), no pagination, http://www.issafrica.org/Pubs/ASR/10No1/Lupogo.html (20 March 2006).
[65] Ibid.; Omari, Abillah H, (2002) "Civil-military relations in Tanzania," in Williams, Rocky, Gavin Cawthra and Diane Abrahams (eds.) *Ourselves to Know. Civil-Military Relations and Defence Transformation in Southern Africa* (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies), pp. 89-16; p.94.
[66] Ibid. (both).
[67] Omari, "Civil-military relations in Tanzania", p.101.
[68] Ibid. pp. 102-3.
[69] Baynham, Simon (1992) "Civil Military Relations in Post-Independent Africa", *South African Defence Review*, 3; no page numbers; http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/ASR/SADR3/Baynham.html (14 March 2006); italics in original.
[70] Chanaa, *Guns or Growth? Assessing the Impact of Arms Sales on Sustainable Development*, p. 49.

Tanzania, nor reviewed by its Defence and Security Committee.[71] Once parliamentarians became aware of the deal – largely through U.K. press reports[72] – they became agitated about it, but eventually swung behind the government as "nationalist sentiment appears to have triumphed over concerns about propriety."[73] Parliamentary oversight of the military is difficult in Tanzania, partly because of the shortage of resources available to Parliament[74] and the close relationship between the executive and the armed forces.[75] Ironically for Tanzania's aid donors, since the introduction of multi-party politics in 1992 – partly in response to donor pressure – debate in parliament has become more muted, as MPs are more restrained by party discipline.[76]

Within Tanzania there was protest from opposition MPs, opposition supporters (who were allegedly dispersed with force by the police) and NGOs against the deal.[77] A common theme of their criticism was that the Tanzanian government had negotiated the deal in secret and failed to account for why this purchase should take precedence over other spending priorities. However, associational life in Tanzania is weak as "a result of the colonisation of civil society by the party-state in the post-independence period."[78] In the late 1990s Tanzanian civil society was "harassed by government, riddled with corruption, divided by in-fighting, and was institutionally weak," although there was an "elite stratum" of civil society, the emergence of which can partly be attributed to the HIPC initiative. [79] One element of this stratum is the Tanzania Coalition on Debt and Development (TCDD), formed in 1998; this was the leading

[71] Baregu, Mwesiga (2004) "Parliamentary oversight of defence and security in Tanzania's multiparty parliament", in Le Roux, Len, Martin Rupiya and Naison Ngoma (eds.) *Guarding the Guardians. Parliamentary Oversight and Civil-Military Relations: The Challenges for SADC* (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies), pp.33-43; http://www.issafrica.org/pubs/Books/guardiansaug04/Baregu.pdf (13 March 2006).
[72] Ibid., p.37.
[73] Kelsall, "Governance, democracy and recent political struggles in Mainland Tanzania", p. 71. This is echoed by Baregu, "Parliamentary oversight of defence and security in Tanzania's multiparty parliament", pp. 39-40.
[74] Kelsall, "Governance, democracy and recent political struggles in Mainland Tanzania," p. 64.
[75] Baregu, "Parliamentary oversight of defence and security in Tanzania's multiparty parliament," p.40, 42.
[76] Kelsall, "Governance, democracy and recent political struggles in Mainland Tanzania" p. 64.
[77] The NGOs are TCDD (Tanzania Coalition for Debt and Develepoment), TANGO (Tanzania Association of Non-Governmental Organizations, TADREG (Tanzania Development Research Group), PELUM (Participatory & Ecological Land Use Assocation) Tanzania, ACTIONAID Tanzania, The Leadership Forum, National Youth Forum, TGNP (Tanzania Gender Networking Project), IGODENI and OxfamGB Tanzania; Africa Action (2002) "Civil Society's Common Statement on the Government of Tanzania / BAe Radar issue", 26 January 2002, http://www.africaaction.org/docs02/mam0202.htm (14 March 2006). See also IRIN, "Tanzania: Critics decry purchase of air traffic control system" and The Guardian (Dar es Salaam) (2002) "Tanzania: Ruling party MPs concerned over plans to buy radar equipment from UK," 6 April 2002.
[78] Kelsall, "Governance, democracy and recent political struggles in Mainland Tanzania", p. 59. For a detailed analysis of civil society in Tanzania, see Tripp, Aili Mari (2000) "Political Reform in Tanzania: The Struggle for Associational Autonomy", *Comparative Politics*, 32(2): 191-214.
[79] Kelsall, "Shop windows and smoke-filled rooms: governance and the re-politicisation of Tanzania", p.601-2.

signatory in the Tanzanian "Civil Society's Common Statement on the Government of Tanzania/BAe [*sic*] Radar issue" that protested against the contract.[80] It is important to understand both the signing of the deal and the response to it within Tanzania in the context of the country's colonial and postcolonial history. State formation and civil society development in Tanzania must be understood in the framework of the hegemonic development agenda promoted by key bi- and multilateral donors, and the transnationalising capitalist economy of which it is a part.

The analysis thus far demonstrates the constellation of actors involved in the deal and the debates surrounding it. Despite the secrecy that shrouds the deal and obscures its exact nature, it is possible to draw some tentative conclusions. The relationship between BAE Systems and the MoD was a crucial factor, as was (less definitively) the role of the Tanzanian military. Other branches of the U.K. state – the FCO, DTI and Number Ten – intervened on behalf of arms capital, against the opposition of DfID and the Treasury, who were supported by the World Bank and IMF. The position of the Tanzanian government remains unclear, but at some point Tanzanian elites were active agents in the process; the government was later torn between its prior commitments to the contract, its aid relationship with bilateral and multilateral donors, and the nationalist imperative that was activated by criticism over the deal. It eventually went ahead with the purchase, siding with arms capital and elements of the U.K. state (DTI/MoD/FCO), against one of its key bilateral aid donors (DfID), the World Bank, IMF, and its own opposition MPs and civil society activists. The analysis thus far therefore posits DfID as the champion of development concerns in the arms trade. The next section critically assesses this position, arguing that DfID's neo-liberal agenda has a problematic relationship to poverty and sustainable development, and that arms sales do not contradict this agenda.

The development agenda

DfID promotes a neo-liberal development agenda that claims to benefit the poor by promoting economic growth through measures such as privatisation and liberalisation. According to DfID, U.K. international development policy is aimed at "the elimination of

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[80] Africa Action, "Civil Society's Common Statement on the Government of Tanzania/BAe Radar issue."

poverty and encouragement of economic growth which benefits the poor", with "particular attention" to be paid to "human rights, transparent and accountable government and core labour standards."[81] The promotion of liberal democracy in development policy is part of the "good governance" agenda that has been dominant since the 1990s: the introduction of liberal democracy is deemed "a necessary precondition for sustainable economic growth and prosperity," according to Abrahamsen.[82]

Development, along with crime, drugs, the environment, human rights and terrorism, has become one of the major rhetorical themes of Labour's foreign policy and U.K. arms export policy is set within this ostensibly progressive framework. Yet the rhetoric of Labour's approach to international development and foreign affairs is belied by the actual practice of U.K. policy. The United Kingdom may well have a better record than other creditor governments on issues such as debt relief, but "not much debt relief has actually been granted" and relief is "conditional on countries pursuing policies under the global liberalisation project."[83] Whilst this does not prevent splits between different fractions of capital, especially national fractions, or shifting coalitions of capitalist actors, it does mean that alternative, or independent economic development must be prevented.[84] In the case of DfID, whilst it pushes for greater debt relief and development aid to the world's poorest countries than other states' development agencies, its overall agenda remains one of opening foreign markets to transnational capitalist investment.

The formation of DfID in 1997 has given greater institutional strength to development issues, but they are framed in a neo-liberal manner that has negative effects. DfID works with the private sector and NGOs as well as governments to implement its programmes, and NGO funding is increasingly tied to DFID's agenda and priorities.[85] One effect of this interaction between the state, private and non-governmental sectors has been to spread and naturalise a

[81] DfID (1997) *Eliminating World Poverty: A Challenge for the 21st Century*, White Paper on international development (The Stationery Office, London), pp. 6–7.
[82] Abrahamsen, Rita (2000) *Disciplining Democracy. Development Discourse and Good Governance in Africa* (Zed Books, London), p. 25. For details of key international donors, including the U.K. and World Bank, and their relationship to "good governance" in Tanzania, see Vener, Jessica "Prompting Democratic Transitions from Abroad."
[83] Curtis, Mark (2003) *Web of Deceit*, p. 231.
[84] Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy*, pp. 2, 33, 63; Curtis, *Web of Deceit*, ch. 9.
[85] Wallace, Tina (2003) "NGO dilemmas: Trojan horses for neoliberal globalization?," p. 207.

neo-liberal development agenda that claims to tackle poverty but functions to entrench it further in many parts of the world. The primary effect of DfID's policies is to open up new markets for private capital;[86] this is in line with the policies of the major multilateral donors, the IMF and World Bank.[87] Privatisation and liberalisation are a reason for the persistence of poverty in large parts of the world rather than a solution to it; they mean that state services are sold off to private companies, leaving local populations to pay for services or go without.[88] In this context, the growing emphasis on so-called "democracy promotion" as part of the good governance development agenda has the function of "reliev[ing] pressure from subordinate groups for more fundamental political, social and economic change."[89] Development policies therefore serve to strengthen the position of elites in relation to their populations, not to give the majority of people control over the resources necessary for running their own lives. The dominant neo-liberal development paradigm promoted by the World Bank, IMF and key bilateral donors such as the United Kingdom has strengthened particular elite interests in recipient countries and bolstered the structures of the global economy that privilege the interests of transnational capital. This is the case even in a country like Tanzania, which declared a strategy of socialism and self-reliance upon independence and resisted IMF measures until 1986.[90]

After independence, Tanzania remained heavily dependent on foreign aid, in particular from the United Kingdom, West Germany and the USA. Economic crisis in the late 1970s meant it was forced to seek aid to finance its current account deficits as well as for developmental projects. It entered into negotiations with the IMF, which insisted upon economic liberalisation as a condition for aid. The Tanzanian government refused this and Nyerere criticized the IMF for attempting to use aid as a means of turning the country away

[86] The emphasis on the role of private capital is one of "the most obvious points of difference between Labour government WPs [White Papers] past and present"; Burnell, Peter (1998) "Britain's new government, new White Paper, new aid?", *Third World Quarterly*, 19(4) 787-802, p. 792.
[87] On the World Bank, see Cammack, Paul (2004) "What the World Bank means by poverty reduction, and why it matters", *New Political Economy*, 9(2): 189-211.
[88] As Escobar argues, the "undesirable" consequences of development such as increases in poverty and unemployment, are "by no means peripheral to the models used but belonged to their inner architecture;" Escobar, *Encountering Development*, p. 80.
[89] Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy*, p. 6.
[90] Campbell, Horace and Howard Stein (1992) "Introduction: The Dynamics of Liberalization in Tanzania," in Campbell and Stein, *Tanzania and the IMF*, pp. 1-20; p. 1.

from Ujamaa and towards capitalist policies.[91] By 1983 major bilateral donors (including the United Kingdom) started to support IMF policies more explicitly and tied their assistance to Tanzania to the condition that it reach an agreement with the IMF.[92] The eventual 1986 agreement with the IMF is believed by many to be even more disadvantageous to the majority Tanzanian population than the proposed 1981 deal. Economic reform was instigated as a result of the pressure put on the state by the IMF and donor countries, but the IMF did have domestic allies that facilitated the implementation of the reforms, despite the opposition to them that arose.[93] The consolidation of a class of people in control of the Tanzanian state allowed the increasing secrecy surrounding changes in policy and their implementation.[94] As outlined previously, secrecy was a key feature of the air traffic control deal, with parliamentarians and civil society actors unable to find out about, let alone influence, the decision to purchase the BAE Systems equipment.

One of the heaviest ironies of the Tanzania case is that the Executive Agency Programme that created the Tanzania Civil Aviation Authority (TCAA), which negotiated the air traffic control system deal, was based on the United Kingdom's Next Steps agencies, and may actually exacerbate the problems of debt and governance in the country. This is because of a mismatch between a highly centralized core bureaucracy and political system, and a liberal reform programme of decentered authority and fragmented bureaucracy.[95] The Executive Agency Programme was part of a wider public sector reform programme in the 1990s and was sponsored by DfID "as a major component in Tanzania's wider, multilateral donor-assisted civil service reform programme."[96] This means that DfID and the World Bank were instrumental in creating the agencies that became part of the problem in the air traffic control system deal that both donors spoke out against. This reveals the dangers of donors treating recipient states as "*tabula rasa* for new reforms" and forgetting that "history matters."[97] It also demonstrates that "development discourse needs an object that appears to stand outside

[91] Kiondo, "The Nature of Economic Reforms in Tanzania," p.23-4.
[92] Ibid., p.25.
[93] Ibid., p.35.
[94] Ibid.
[95] Caulfield, "Executive Agencies in Tanzania," p.210.
[96] Caulfield, "Executive Agencies in Tanzania," p.209. "Agentisation" was a key part of World Bank support (via funding and technical assistance) for public sector reform programmes; Harrison, Graham (2005) "The World Bank, Governance and Theories of Political Action in Africa", *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 7, pp. 240-260; p. 245.
[97] Harrison, "The World Bank, Governance and Theories of Political Action in Africa," p.254.

itself.”[98] Tanzania is constructed as a poor country requiring assistance, but the representations are devoid of context, in particular its colonial and aid-dependent history.

An important aspect of the development agenda concerns military expenditure and its relationship to social spending and a state's security situation. As a result of the link made between good governance and development in the 1990s, the "process" or "governance" approach to military expenditure emerged.[99] This approach, which the United Kingdom played a significant role in promoting, focuses on reform of the processes by which military spending occurs in the global South, with a view to creating the stability necessary for development. This replaced an approach in which aid donors imposed upper limits on military expenditure as a condition for receiving aid.[100] Despite the apparent novelty of this approach, it shares with its predecessor the idea that military spending in the global South is too high, is beyond states' needs, and that donor states do not have excessively high military expenditure and are not themselves part of the problem. The military budgets of the USA (as the world's leading spender on the military and world's largest arms exporter), the United Kingdom or supposedly strategically important allies in areas such as the Middle East, are not deemed problematic in this view.

Mainstream development discourse therefore fails to address the question of the impetus to military spending in both the global South and North and the role of military spending in the larger global political framework. Answering this question involves arguments about the role of the arms trade in the spread of the capitalist system from core to periphery, as discussed in Chapter Three. Capital-intensive militarisation in the global South is a product of hegemony—the dominance of Western models of militarisation that have been exported to the global South and been consented to by elites—rather a response to an objective need for military efficiency. Mainstream approaches to development and military spending reinforce an imperial "not yet" attitude, in which Southern states are deemed too politically immature or

[98] Mitchell, quoted in Escobar, *Encountering Development*, p. 48.
[99] Omitoogun, Wuyi (2003) "The processes of budgeting for the military sector in Africa", in SIPRI (ed.) *SIPRI Yearbook 2003. Armaments, Disarmament and Security* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 261-278; pp. 262–263
[100] Ibid., p. 267.

poor to be able to define their own needs and interests, thus requiring the tutelage of enlightened donors.[101]

Military purchases are not the squandering of precious resources by profligate elites but activities sanctioned by the global military culture. The purchase of the air traffic control system served a purpose for the main actors involved in the deal: the Tanzanian elite, the U.K.-based arms industry and key elements of the U.K. government, and Barclays Bank. It is important not to perceive the air traffic control system as being simply foisted on the Tanzanian government. Elements of the government and/or military participated in the deal, albeit under structurally unequal power relations. Aid donors' focus on military expenditure in the global South assumes that it is unrelated to the relationship donor states have with recipients and to the wider phenomenon of militarisation and military expenditure. This obscures the legacy of colonialism and decolonisation processes, and the role of the transnational capitalist class in creating the situation that donors claim merely to be responding to. Simply demanding that Southern states refrain from purchasing weaponry because it is expensive and they cannot afford it, or it is bad value for money, therefore misses the point.

The issue of corruption provides a useful illustration of the politics of North-South relations in the arms trade. Clare Short suggested that bribery had been involved in the Tanzania deal; this was deemed problematic because of the aid relationship between the United Kingdom and Tanzania, in that corruption would undermine the promotion of good governance and the promotion of development measures. As noted earlier, the Serious Fraud Office has begun an investigation into allegations that BAE Systems paid bribes to members of the Tanzanian government to encourage them to make the purchase. This investigation was announced around the same time that the Serious Fraud Office inquiry into BAE's relationship with Saudi Arabia was dropped under political pressure. The intervention of the Prime Minister in a judicial matter in the Saudi case amounts to political interference in the rule of law, and means that BAE Systems is effectively above the law; precisely the issues addressed in the good governance agenda that Tanzania – but, it seems, not Saudi Arabia or the United Kingdom itself – is subject to. The outcome of the Tanzania investigation is still unclear, but

101 The "not yet" of colonialism and "now" of anti-colonial struggle is taken from Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*, p. 8.

the evidence thus far points to the dual impulse of Robinson's polyarchy argument: corruption is to be challenged as part of the good governance agenda, but only when it is not strategically risky to do so.

In writing about the prospects of the governance approach to military spending, Omitoogun cites the need to "wean countries from their old ways."[102] This chimes with a wider characterisation of Southern elites in development discourse as corrupt, manipulable or politically immature – a key representation of the global South in development discourse.[103] Such representations serve multiple functions: they hide the role of Southern elites' counterparts within the transnational capitalist elite and displace moral judgement on to the global South away from the North. They also ignore the fact that seemingly irrational practices are part of wider political strategies and cultures that stem from a particular set of historical global relations. Finally, such characterisations contribute to the image of the global South needing to be developed in the image of the North; they are a key means of facilitating intervention in the global South. Representations play a crucial role in (re)producing imperial relations: they create and entrench relations of hierarchy in which Southern actors are understood as somehow inadequate or inferior, and Northern actors as benevolent providers of solutions.

A critique of the neo-liberal development agenda and its approach to military spending shows that the task for NGOs – if they are to participate in counter-hegemonic struggle – must be to push the government beyond adherence to its stated commitments. Whilst developments such as the formation of DfID (which gives institutional strength to the branch of the state most likely to put obstacles in arms capitalists' paths) and the introduction of the Consolidated Criteria (which creates a public standard to which the government can be held accountable) have the potential to function as progressive steps in U.K. foreign relations, they will only have purchase if coupled with a wider critique of the power relations inherent in the arms trade and development. NGOs must therefore go beyond promoting governmental observance of already existing commitments if they are to challenge hegemonic representations

[102] Omitoogun, "The processes of budgeting for the military sector in Africa," p. 267.
[103] On the centrality of discursive representations to the development agenda, see Escobar, *Encountering Development.*

and practices. The Tanzania case is a good example of how U.K. arms export policy functions, showing that NGOs need to challenge the basis of this policy – the relationship between arms capital and elements of the U.K. state – if a more significant change is to occur. Their disadvantaged structural position compared to the arms industry makes this difficult.

To demonstrate counter-hegemonic potential, NGOs must also challenge the government's understanding of development, in order to push the government beyond a neo-liberal agenda. The most important task is not simply to get the government to stick to its stated international development commitments, but to radicalise the development agenda and push for measures such as debt cancellation for less industrialized countries, greater aid provision that is not linked to privatisation or liberalization measures, an end to the protection of industrialized country markets and subsidization of industrialized country exports, and increased protectionism of developing world markets. Whilst these are not postcapitalist measures in themselves, they are progressive measures that can be foreseen as part of a challenge to capitalist globalization and can thus be considered counter-hegemonic.[104] Such changes would necessarily have an impact on arms export policy in terms of who the U.K. state was prepared to export arms to, in what quantities and of what type. For example, if subsidies on arms exports were abolished, U.K. export levels would drop dramatically. For a nuanced analysis of NGO critiques of U.K. arms export policy, the question of their vision of sustainable development is important if we are to get purchase on the normative architecture being built and maintained. What models of political, economic and social relations are being promoted by NGO activity on arms export policy issues? In the next section, I analyse the responses of CAAT, Oxfam and Saferworld to the Tanzania deal and their position on development issues more generally, to explore the ways in which they engage with arms export policy. The NGOs share a common understanding of several of the issues at stake, to which I turn first.

104 See Sklair, *Globalization*, especially chapter 10, "Challenges to capitalist globalization," in which he discusses protectionism, subsistence and localization perspectives.

NGO arguments against the Tanzania licence

The first argument put forward by all three NGOs is that the Tanzania licence signals an inconsistency in the government's approach to development. CAAT argues that "[i]t is senseless of the U.K. government to preach about debt reduction and development when on the other hand it is enticing countries to purchase high-tech weaponry they can ill-afford."[105] This results in what Susan Willett, writing for CAAT, calls a "lack of coherence in the Labour government's current policies towards debt, development and the arms trade."[106] Similarly, Oxfam describes the Tanzania decision as revealing an absence of "joined-up government"[107] as the DTI was able to issue the export licence without consulting DfID or considering the implications for poverty in the recipient country. Saferworld describes the case as "cast[ing] doubt upon HMG's commitment to fully take into account impacts on development when licensing strategic exports."[108] For Saferworld, arms exports are the "missing link" in an otherwise progressive foreign policy agenda: "[t]he Government's wider objectives—on human rights, conflict prevention and sustainable development—are being undermined by a failure to effectively control arms exports."[109] All three NGOs highlight DfID's objections to the deal: one avenue for reform is therefore to push DfID's concerns higher up the government agenda.

As argued earlier, the nature of DfID's development objectives and practices are themselves problematic. The practice of U.K. arms export policy is consistent with the government's approach to development as they both revolve around support for foreign elites: claims of incoherence are therefore misplaced. There is no contradiction between the provision of aid and the supply of arms as they are two sides of the same coin of elite control and prevention of more thorough democratisation. There are two tendencies within the global military culture: whilst industrialised countries encourage military acquisition in the global

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[105]CAAT (2001) "CAAT Issues Condemnation of Arms Fair", 6 September 2001, http://www.caat.org.uk/information/press.php?url=060901prs (21 November 2003).
[106] Willett, Susan (1999) "The Arms Trade, Debt and Development", http://www.caat.org.uk/information/publications/economics/debt-and-development-0599.php (21 November 2003).
[107] Watkins, "This deal is immoral, Mr. Blair."
[108] Saferworld, "Questions to QSC—Oral Evidence Session with Jack Straw."
[109] Mepham, David, quoted in Saferworld "(2002) "Tighter controls on arms exports needed", 25 November 2002, http://www.saferworld.org.uk/PR1102.htm (21 November 2003).

South, they also have a longer-term interest in promoting Southern economies for wider trading relations. The Tanzania case shows the former tendency winning out at the expense of the latter. In accusing the government of inconsistency, the NGOs fail to address the impetus to exports such as the Tanzania air traffic control system and the wider operation of U.K. development policy. In addition, CAAT's claim that the U.K. government entices Southern governments into arms purchases resonates with the representation critiqued earlier of Southern actors as politically immature. Such a claim closes down the space needed to explore the connections between actors in the global North and South under conditions of hierarchy in a global capitalist economy and world military order.

The NGOs also make common arguments regarding the cost and nature of the air traffic control system. CAAT argues that the system is unnecessarily sophisticated and the £28m should have been spent on health, education and infrastructure in Tanzania, a country to which DfID contributed £64m in aid in 2000.[110] Oxfam says that the Tanzanian government's decision to purchase the BAE equipment "reflects misplaced priorities" and is "a decision it now regrets but cannot revoke without huge penalties."[111] According to Oxfam, "[e]xcessive or inappropriate arms purchases are a drain on social and economic resources which developing countries cannot afford."[112] Saferworld argues that, although the government is technically correct to state that Criterion 8 does not encompass questions of value for money,[113] "the development prospects of a country facing severe poverty are not well served by paying four-times [sic] the best-value price for a system of dubious utility."[114] The arguments put forward by the NGOs share a sense of skewed priorities and money being misspent. Whilst this is a valuable critique, it has problematic implications.

CAAT's argument is correct in a narrow sense: it is unclear what the need for such a system is, given the doubtful serviceability of the Tanzanian air force. Although the sale was also presented as being justified in terms of civil aviation control, the ICAO stated that

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110 Brown, Catherine, Nick Gilby and Simon Kearns (2001) "Arms to Africa", *CAAT Magazine*, December 2001, http://www.caat.org.uk/information/magazine/1201/africa.php (21 November 2003).
111 Watkins, "This deal is immoral, Mr. Blair".
112 Chanaa, *Guns or Growth?*, p.3.
113 Saferworld, *Independent Audit of the 2001 UK Government Annual Report on Strategic Export Controls*, p. 40.
114 Saferworld (2002) "The Missing Link? Arms Exports and Labour's foreign policy", May 2002, http://www.saferworld.org.uk/briefLabour.htm," (21 November 2003).

additional equipment would have to be bought to fulfil this function. This raises the question of why the Tanzanian government would buy a system that was inappropriate for its ostensible purpose. In this respect, CAAT's argument ignores the role of hegemony in promoting militarisation. Military purchases by Southern elites must be seen in the context of a global military culture that promotes capital-intensive militarisation and the acquisition of expensive equipment[115] and also corruption.[116] Tanzania is heavily dependent on aid and locked into a number of DfID, World Bank and IMF programmes, yet spent £28m on an air traffic control system. Rather than signalling profligacy, this reflects the nature of the Tanzanian and U.K. elites' priorities, namely the promotion of vested interests within government and business, and the dominance of militarised representations of status on the world stage. The purchase of the air traffic control system was functional for sections of the Tanzanian elite that claim to represent Tanzania. It must be seen as part of a political strategy as well as a product of hegemony in the global economy and world military order. CAAT's argument, therefore, perpetuates an image of Southern countries making military purchases that are beyond their needs. Without further analysis of the global military culture this is a discourse that further entrenches unequal North-South relations.[117]

Oxfam's position also furthers this discourse. On the one hand, reference to the "misplaced priorities" of the Tanzanian government shows that there is contestation over what money should be spent on and that elite definitions of what is worth spending on are not necessarily best. On the other hand, the question of how and why the Tanzanian government came to purchase the system brings the issue of the global military culture to the fore, yet Oxfam does not discuss it. This leaves the wider political issues surrounding the deal untouched. Prior to the Tanzania debate, as the EU Code of Conduct was being negotiated,

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[115] Even though an air traffic control system is not a weapon, the equipment for it required a licence as it had military application. Given the probable role of the Tanzanian military in negotiating the deal, the purchase remains a salient example of Southern militarisation.

[116] Analyst Joe Roeber argues that the arms trade is "hard-wired for corruption," with the effect of distorting procurement and enlarging the trade beyond its strategic necessity; he argues that removing or substantially reducing corruption would significantly reform the trade; Roeber, Joe (2005) "Hard-wired for corruption," *Prospect*, Issue 113, pp. 52-6, August 2005.

[117] As Gusterson argues in relation to nuclear weapons: the argument that states in the global South are too poor to afford expensive weaponry "are not necessarily wrong, but, read with a critical eye, they have a recursive effect that potentially undermines the rationale for military programs in the West as well. That is, Western countries have not solved their own social and economic problems; but if military Keynesianism works for "us" then it should work for "them" too." Gusterson, Hugh (2004) *People of the Bomb: Portraits of America's Nuclear Complex* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), pp. 27-8.

Oxfam called for a code that would "exclude arms sales to countries where military spending is far beyond what can be justified by the country's genuine defence needs."[118] Whilst the concern here is to see more resources directed towards health and education in the global South, such statements and the reference to misplaced priorities imply that NGOs like Oxfam (or aid agencies or donor states) are in the best position to judge what a recipient country's genuine needs – both military and developmental – are. This serves to depoliticize the processes and history of militarization and development in both the global South and North and to prioritise NGOs as agents of progressive change in the global South.

Whilst arms export codes are potentially useful control mechanisms, the focus of organisations such as Oxfam on development in the global South means they apply the stricture of "genuine defence needs" more to the South than the global North. Codes of conduct thus serve to regulate the global South, leaving the North to continue to act unfettered. For example, Oxfam and Saferworld do not discuss the USA's mammoth military budget or the history of military expenditure in the global South when considering the relationship between the arms trade and development.[119] They also mention, but fail to elaborate on the possibility that "the purchase of the system could have been intended to meet other objectives [than air traffic control needs], including political ties with the U.K., the supplier country."[120] This serves to entrench a discourse of development that ignores the role of the global North and the global capitalist system in the incidence of arms proliferation and poverty.

Saferworld's position on the Tanzania deal centres on the issue of value for money rather than need or cost. It argues that the poor value for money of the system is not in the interests of sustainable development in Tanzania. This again fails to capture a sense of why it is that a seemingly irrational deal would go ahead. In addition, Saferworld reproduced but did not challenge the basis of the government's argument, namely that state sovereignty prevents its intervention in the deal, as argued earlier. This argument sidelines the U.K. government's role

[118] Oxfam (1997) "Oxfam launches campaign to stop small arms falling into small hands," Oxfam GB News Release, 13 December 1997, http://www.oxfam.org.uk/whatnew/press/confl.htm (22 November 2003).
[119] Chanaa, *Guns or Growth?*
[120] Ibid., p. 53.

in supporting and promoting arms exports and means that the orthodox narratives about the arms trade continue to go unchallenged.

Having explored the arguments common to all three NGOs, I turn to those that signal differences between them. As a development organisation, Oxfam analyses Tanzania's purchase of the air traffic control system in its wider developmental context.[121] In 1998, Oxfam called for earlier and larger debt relief for Tanzania, as well as reform of the HIPC process itself, as the allocation of resources to debt servicing is so high that human development will inevitably suffer.[122] It cites a number of positive developments under the Labour government such as the Mauritius mandate, whereby "export credits for poor highly-indebted countries will only support productive expenditure."[123] Oxfam calls this decision not to underwrite sale of military weapons to 62 of the world's poorest countries a "turning point"[124] and calls on the U.K. government to "lead by example towards an international agreement which places a presumption against subsidies for the export of arms to all Least Developed Countries [LDCs] which are in violent conflict."[125] Whilst this appears to be a significant gesture, it further entrenches the view that arms sales and government subsidies are only problematic in relation to poor countries, and would have no significant impact on the volume of U.K. arms exports as LDCs are not major purchasers of weaponry. A more significant gesture would have been to announce a prohibition on *all* arms export subsidies.

As a development NGO, Oxfam is concerned with arms exports when they pose a threat to development, rather than with the issue of arms exports *per se.* This affords Oxfam the opportunity to consider the arms trade in its wider context. It misses this opportunity by allying itself with DfID and sidelining the role of the United Kingdom and other industrialised states in the arms trade and the role of states and supranational institutions in perpetuating

121 Oxfam has had a long-standing relationship with Tanzania, dating back to the 1960s, when its enthusiasm for the Ujamaa project was total. See Jennings, "'Almost an Oxfam in Itself'," Jennings argues that Oxfam's devotion to the *ujamaa* ideology was such that the NGO was blinded to the shortcomings of the Tanzanian government's reform programme.
122 Oxfam (1998) "Debt Relief for Tanzania: An opportunity for a better future," Oxfam International Position Paper, April 1998, www.oxfam.org.uk/policy/papers/tanzdebt/exec.htm (29 October 2003).
123 Oxfam (1998) "Small Arms, Wrong Hands," Oxfam UK Policy Paper, April 1998, http://www.oxfam.org.uk/policy/papers/smarms/exec.htm (29 October 2003).
124 Oxfam (2000) "Oxfam welcomes decision to stop underwriting arms sales to world's poor," Oxfam UK press release, 11 January 2000, http://www.oxfam.org.uk/whatnew/press/gordonbrown2.htm (29 October 2003).
125 Oxfam, "Small Arms, Wrong Hands."

poverty through neo-liberal development measures. Oxfam claims to "address the structural causes of poverty and related injustice"[126] and stresses that "peace and substantial arms reduction are essential conditions for development,"[127] but fails to address the relationships between the arms trade, poverty and capitalism, which means it is unable to make a persuasive argument about *ending* poverty and the impacts of the arms trade.

In addition, the air traffic control system case was not integrated into Oxfam's wider programme of work in Tanzania, which focuses on education, pastoralism, emergency assistance and livelihood protection.[128] Oxfam GB staff in Tanzania were not involved in formulating the Oxfam position on the air traffic control deal,[129] thus confirming this disjuncture within Oxfam's work, although Oxfam did include a statement from Mary Mwingira, Executive Director of TANGO (one of the Tanzanian civil society organisations that spoke out against the deal) in a press release relating to the status of development concerns in arms export legislation.[130] Oxfam aims to be politically neutral to protect its status as a humanitarian and development organisation; it was therefore unable to make a critique of the air traffic control system in terms of the economic and political structure of the Tanzanian state and its relations with aid donors.

The angle tackled by Saferworld is the nature of the licensing process itself: it focuses on the workings of the little-known Form 680 process. Whilst DfID is now included in Form 680 discussions as a result of the debate over the Tanzania deal, giving sustainable development institutional representation in the process, Saferworld remains concerned at the lack of transparency in the pre-licensing approval mechanism.[131] This technical analysis is an important part of scrutinising government activity and can contribute to a better understanding of how it is that controversial exports can be licensed. However, the wider political analysis with which Saferworld couples this information – the "missing link" argument – is

[126] Oxfam International (2001) *Towards Global Equity*, Strategic Plan 2001-4, January 2001, http://www.oxfam.org/eng/pdfs/strat_plan.pdf (28 June 2005).
[127] Ibid.
[128] Oxfam (2005) "Tanzania: programme overview", http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/where_we_work/tanzania/programme.htm, December 2005 (22 March 2006).
[129] Interview with Debbie Hillier, 1 December 2003. Oxfam's work in Tanzania is run by Oxfam GB.
[130] Oxfam GB (2002) "Government Removes 'Tanzania military radar' clause from Arms Bill," http://www.oxfam.co.uk/press/releases/armslaw210602.htm, 21 July 2002 (22 March 2006).
[131] Saferworld, "Questions to QSC."

problematic. According to Saferworld, compared to many others, the U.K. government does take its responsibilities to control arms seriously.[132] This assumption of benevolence prevents a harder hitting analysis of export policy. Without a critique of the underlying impetus to arms exports, Saferworld's technical analysis loses its purchase and means greater policy changes will not occur. In the Tanzania case, DfID was overruled in the licensing process despite the independent advice that it brought to the debate. Information and force of argument are therefore not the determinants of policy: the decision to grant the licence was a political one. This means that provision of advice and suggestions for improving the licensing process, Saferworld's main means of engagement, can only have a limited impact on policy.

In contrast to both Oxfam and Saferworld, CAAT draws explicit attention to the role of arms companies in arms deals and highlights Short's suspicion that the Tanzania deal could not have been made cleanly.[133] It states that "Western arms companies routinely bribe the political and military elite of countries into buying arms they may not need and certainly cannot afford".[134] Drawing attention to the role of arms companies in promoting this and other deals helps counter official rhetoric and provides an alternative to mainstream approaches to the arms trade. One of the key impacts for CAAT of the Tanzania case was that it reinforced the need to look at the links between arms companies and the government: without this, more codes and controls on exports will not provide a solution.[135] Since the time of the Tanzania case, CAAT's work on the political influence of arms companies has become the organisation's key campaign focus.[136] Such a campaign tackles one of the key issues underlying U.K. export policy. However, the idea that Southern governments can be enticed into actions ostensibly against their interests suggests that they are not fully rational and can be duped. Given the secrecy surrounding the deal, it is impossible to say definitively how much the Tanzanian government knew about the deal or if bribery was involved. Yet the suggestion of irrationality serves to subordinate Southern actors and obscures the possibility that the purchase served the interests of a section of the Tanzanian elite by furthering its relations with the transnational capitalist elite.

[132] Interview with Roy Isbister, 2 December 2003.
[133] CAAT (2002) "Clean Investment Campaign—BAe Systems 2002," http://www.caat.org.uk/campaigns/clean-investment-campaign/baes-2002.php (22 November 2003).
[134] Ibid.
[135] Interview with Ann Feltham, 21 November 2003.
[136] e.g. Lambert et al., *The Political Influence of Arms Companies.*

NGO strategies and impacts

NGO activity on the Tanzania case was reactive as a result of the way it came on to the political agenda. Details of the case were leaked to a major broadsheet newspaper and NGOs responded to it once it was already in the public domain.[137] There was little opportunity for insider advocacy on the case, even with DfID, as the contract was already agreed by the time NGOs found out about it. The NGO's strategies therefore aimed at embarrassing the government as there was no prospect of them stopping the sale. As argued earlier, NGOs' ability to affect the policy process is muted as a result of their structural disadvantage compared to the arms industry; the method in which the case came to light also shows that the press is deemed by politicians and bureaucrats to be a more effective means of challenging policy than NGOs.

The main way NGOs sought to challenge the deal was to speak out against it in the media and to their members via their respective websites. CAAT's efforts were directed at its own supporter base, whilst Oxfam also wrote an article in *The Guardian*, thus reaching a wider audience. Saferworld targeted its message much more towards interested MPs (via briefings to MPs and the Quadripartite Committee) and civil servants (via its Audit of the government's annual report on arms exports), demonstrating its more insider approach. Whilst the Audit is a potential means of critical engagement with those involved in the policy process, Saferworld does not engage with civil servants or politicians on its contents, thus losing the opportunity to use it to maximum effect. One DfID interviewee claimed that Saferworld's failure to challenge the government more strongly compromised its principles; she attributed this failure to its relationship with DfID on small arms work.[138] This points to a limitation of Saferworld's overall strategy: its desire for insider status muted its ability to act as an outsider organisation in this case.

CAAT, Oxfam and Saferworld failed to prevent the deal going ahead. The case provided useful lessons for them, however, and subsequent developments show the symbolic

137 Frustrated actors chose to leak the story to the press, but also passed it to Oxfam and Saferworld. However, the NGOs did not act quickly on the news; they commented once the news had been made public via the media. Interview with Oliver Sprague, 13 January 2004. NGOs were thus unable to generate a scandal, but rather, jumped on the bandwagon once a scandal had been created.
138 Interview with Geraldine O'Callaghan, 6 February 2004.

importance of the case. For Oxfam, it highlighted the importance of "scandalous" arms deals, as they can work as "policy shifters."[139] Such scandals have the benefit of putting Tony Blair under pressure.[140] For Saferworld, it reinforced the importance of the media, which was important in telling NGOs the value of the Tanzania deal in the absence of greater governmental transparency in publishing the value of particular arms sales.[141] For CAAT, it was an impetus to focus more specifically on the relationship between arms companies and government, as outlined earlier. The debate about the Tanzania case was an impetus to the inter-departmental review of Criterion 8, which was announced in September 2002.[142] As a result of the review, in which NGOs were not consulted, two changes in arms export licensing were announced. DfID is now included in the Form 680 procedure, giving sustainable development a stronger institutional representation in the licensing process, and licence applications for destinations on the list are now assessed in light of the cumulative impact of a country's imports, not just those from the United Kingdom.[143]

The review of Criterion 8 did not lead to a change in policy, address the relative strengths of the four departments involved in the licensing process, or challenge the nature of the government's development commitments. However, it made it easier for DfID to argue against a licence if it saw fit, according to one DfID official.[144] DfID's role in arms export control became more visible after the review, although at the time of interviewing (February 2004) there were only two civil servants within DfID dedicated to arms export control.[145] In

139 Interview with Debbie Hillier, 1 December 2003. This was echoed by Oliver Sprague, who argued that the aftermath of the Tanzania case was a great way of putting pressure on government on development issues, even though this particular licence was granted; interview with Oliver Sprague, 13 January 2004.
140 Interview with Oliver Sprague, 13 January 2004.
141 Interview with Andrew McLean, 20 November 2003.
142 Interview with Roy Isbister, 2 December 2003; interview with Andrew Turner, 6 January 2004. Patricia Hewitt MP announced the new process on 19 September 2002; Hewitt, Patricia (2002) *Hansard*, Written Answers, Column 309W-311W.
143 Hewitt, *Hansard*. Cumulative impact is assessed by reference to a non-exhaustive list of states where sustainable development is most likely to be an issue (in practice, states eligible for concessional loans from the World Bank's International Development Association). DfID assesses all licence applications to these countries that pass a certain value threshold. Assessments are made on the basis of a set of indicators that "take account of both the conditions prevailing in the importing country and the potential impact of the export". The indicators are: "relative levels of military and social expenditure and level of military spending as a percentage of GNP; aid dependency compared with the regional average; state of public finances; balance of payments; external debt sustainability; economic and social development, i.e. GNP/capita and Human Development Index; the status of any IMF or World Bank-sponsored economic reform programme." Hewitt, *Hansard*.
144 Interview with Richard Haviland, Export Control Policy Officer/ Small Arms Strategy Manager, CHAD, DfID, 6 February 2004.
145 They work in CHAD; ibid.

October 2003, the U.K. government refused an export licence on Criterion 8 grounds for first time, and claimed that the procedures that emerged from the Criterion 8 review "formed the basis of the analysis which contributed to this refusal."[146] The government's Annual Report does not give details as to the proposed exporter, recipient, nature of value of the equipment, making it impossible to verify these details. However, it appears that an application for the export of tear gas to Malawi was suspected of potentially being diverted to Zimbabwe (particularly as there were also two large orders for tear gas from other states), but in order to avoid the political sensitivities of making this public, the decision was taken to refuse the export on Criterion 8 and also Criterion 3 (internal situation) grounds.[147] This means that, despite the review, Criterion 8 still lacks teeth and the policy remains the same. The review signalled that the government was forced to react to concerns about arms export licensing in relation to sustainable development, and DfID (especially Clare Short) and the NGOs can take credit for raising the Tanzania case as a public issue. But the government made cosmetic rather than substantive changes, muting the success of their efforts.

As noted earlier, government and NGO representatives argue that quantifying the sustainable development criterion is difficult. Whilst the argument put forward here is that the Tanzania case was a clear candidate for a refusal if the government were serious about development, the claim does demonstrate an important problem in policymaking. The context of policy, what factors are taken into account and how development is quantified, are not objective indicators but rather, are intersubjectively created. Calculating how an export would "seriously undermine the economy" or "seriously hamper" sustainable development, as set out in Criterion 8, is not an objective task. Effects cannot simply be read off reality: decisions must be made as to what counts as evidence, how indicators are to be calculated, and what the relative weight between factors is. These are political rather than technical matters. In this sense Criterion 8 is a "mechanism of social production."[148] As expressions of ideas about development, Criterion 8 can be understood as a "symbolic technology,"[149] enabling the production of representations about development that have particular effects. For example, it

[146] FCO et al, *UK Strategic Export Controls. Annual Report 2003*, pp.5-6.
[147] Interview with AS5, 2 December 2003.
[148] Escobar, *Encountering Development*, p. 89.
[149] Laffey, Mark and Jutta Weldes (1997) "Beyond Belief: Ideas and Symbolic Technologies in the Study of International Relations," *European Journal of International Relations*, 3(2): 193-237.

is almost impossible for DfID to call for a refusal on small arms exports on development grounds because of the way the guidelines are worded; in practice Criterion 8 relates to the export of large conventional weaponry.[150] Whilst "NGOs would want us to refuse more", DfID officials are "bound by the wording of the criterion."[151] And, as argued earlier, exports to states such as the USA and Middle Eastern states are in practice exempt from the strictures of the guidelines.

The impact of the Export Control Act, passed in 2002, has been similarly mixed. The Tanzania case was instrumental in changing the Export Control Bill, according to one Oxfam worker.[152] It provided a potential opportunity for tighter export controls as MPs and Lords were able to use the case as an example of why the United Kingdom needed more stringent legislation than currently existed; there had not been legislative change since 1939. The Bill was a major focus of U.K. Working Group activity during its passage through the parliamentary process, and member NGOs committed significant resources both to insider activities (e.g. briefing MPs, the Quadripartite Committee and Lords) and outsider activities (e.g. press releases designed to raise public awareness of the Bill and thus pressure the government to make the Act as stringent as possible). However, the stance adopted by the NGOs was to focus on technical issues such as the relative strengths of phrases such as "have regard to" and "give consideration to."[153] The Quadripartite Committee questioned the government's decision to grant the licence and highlighted the Tanzania case as a key case study in sustainable development, but also reiterated its belief that "the Government *is* serious about its commitment to sustainable development" even though the terms of Criterion 8 are ambiguous and refer more to the "protection" than the "promotion" of sustainable development.[154] For MPs – and, given the nature of their involvement with the Quadripartite Committee, for NGOs as well – the issue was one of the implementation of policy rather than the nature of

[150] Interview with Richard Haviland, 6 February 2004.
[151] Ibid.
[152] Interview with Debbie Hillier, 1 December 2003.
[153] UK Working Group on Arms (2002), "Briefing: Export Control Bill: House of Lords debate on Sustainable Development", 23 July 2002 , http://www.saferworld.org.uk/government/briefLords23Jul02.htm (23 November 2003).
[154] Quadripartite Committee, *Strategic Export Controls: Annual Report for 2000, Licensing Policy and Prior Parliamentary Scrutiny*, p.49, italics in original.

the policy itself. This correlates with Oxfam and Saferworld's understandings of the Tanzania deal as discussed earlier.[155]

After an arduous drafting process and a series of battles over the legal status of development concerns, in which the government's arguments became "increasingly awkward" according to one Saferworld staffer,[156] the outcome of the process can be framed in different ways. On the one hand, the debate about the Tanzania deal pushed development issues further up the political agenda. It is now the only criterion to be named individually within the Act; this was a "small victory", according to one Saferworld worker.[157] Development now cannot be removed from the Act unless by further legislative change, although the actual implementation of it depends on political interpretation and whether the government is taking sustainable development seriously.[158] On the other hand, there is still no legally binding commitment on the government to refuse licences if development concerns surround a particular export. One DfID official referred to the naming of sustainable development in the Act as "window dressing," claiming that the DTI's "fatuous" responses to DfID's arguments won out, despite DfID's gathering of legal advice on the Bill.[159] For example, the government claimed that it was too problematic to define sustainable development in law, despite the fact that legal advice offered to the U.K. Working Group indicated that the wording of the International Development Bill could be used.[160] The government's behaviour demonstrates that the more powerful branches of the state – in particular the DTI – were more concerned about avoiding too tight a legislative framework that would restrict its actions than about promoting sustainable development.

The debate about the legislative status of sustainable development demonstrates the lack of room for manouevre that NGOs have. They had to fight hard to get development

155 CAAT did not contribute to Quadripartite Committee deliberations on the Tanzania case, although this was more for reasons of expertise than strategy. As stated in Chapter Four, CAAT has been doing more Select Committee work since 1997 and has made representations to the Quadripartite Committee on the issue of arms exports to Indonesia. The effectiveness of parliamentary opposition to arms sales in relation to human rights is discussed in Chapter Six.
156 Interview with Andrew McLean, 20 November 2003.
157 Ibid.
158 Interview with Julia Saunders, 15 January 2004.
159 Interview with Geraldine O'Callaghan, 6 February 2004.
160 UK Working Group (2002) "Export Control Bill: House of Lords Second Reading", January 2002, http//ww.saferworld.org.uk/Brieflordsecread.htm (21 November 2003).

considered at all, let alone have the chance to change the nature of the government's commitments.[161] The outcome of the Act is that there is no major legal impediment on the activity of the arms industry and the nature of the government's commitment to development has not changed. Understanding the institutional-legal order as a key expression of state activity,[162] the passage of the Export Control Bill shows the U.K. state to be only relatively autonomous of arms capital, as the legislative changes did not obstruct the operation of arms capital.[163] The arms industry relies on the state to create the legal, financial and regulatory conditions for its success; the Export Control Act shows that these conditions serve to empower rather than restrict the circulation of arms capital and accumulation of profit.

Conclusion

The arguments made by CAAT, Oxfam and Saferworld about the Tanzania licence and the relationship between the arms trade and development show some important points of convergence and divergence. The main point of agreement between the NGOs is that the government's development agenda is a benevolent one that is undermined by arms export policy. NGOs argue that, by granting the Tanzania licence, the government failed to live up to its obligations and contradicted its policy on development. Despite their opposition to the government's activity, in accepting the mainstream consensus on development and the arms trade, the NGOs fail to challenge both arms export policy and the sustainable development agenda. Paraphrasing Escobar, NGOs resisted the government's power at one level but left the power of the state and arms capital unchallenged explicitly.[164] Criticizing the government on its own terms is a valuable activity, but it is equally important to destabilize dominant narratives and effect a "strategic repositioning in the domain of representation" in order to change the discursive construction of both the arms trade and development and thus effect different practices.[165] The application of the development agenda to the sphere of military spending

161 This was in part due to the fact that this was a legal rather than a political process.
162 Benjamin, Roger and Raymond Duvall (1985) "The Capitalist State in Context," in Benjamin, Roger and Stephen Elkin (eds.) *The Democratic State* (University of Kansas Press, Lawrence), pp. 19-57; p. 28.
163 For example, legislative control on licensed production overseas was not introduced; such control would serve to restrict the further internationalisation of arms capital documented in Chapter Three. Measures such as controls on brokering, which were covered by the legislation, are favourable to the arms industry as they serve to legitimate the wider, legal trade and focus opprobrium and legal sanction on those operating outside the law.
164 Escobar, *Encountering Development*, p. 101.
165 Ibid., p. 100.

obscures the historical reasons behind the patterns of Southern military expenditure. NGOs' representations of the arms trade facilitate particular practices and foreclose the possibility of others.

In addition to their common arguments, each NGO focuses on different elements of the Tanzania case. Oxfam emphasises the government's aid programme and Tanzania's HIPC status, Saferworld highlights the workings of the Form 680 process, and CAAT draws attention to the role of bribery. These correlate to the NGOs' respective areas of interest and expertise, and their relationship with government. Saferworld has the closest relationship with government and acts as a provider of expertise to sympathetic elements within government and parliament, whereas Oxfam combines advocacy with mass campaigning, coupling its provision of expertise with the pressure of public opinion. Notably, Oxfam was the only organisation to publicise the opposition of civil society actors in Tanzania, although the leading voice in the chorus was that of the U.K.-based Oxfam representatives. CAAT is the most confrontational of the three NGOs, being opposed to the arms trade per se and bypassing issues of policy and process to focus on political will.

Whether in interviews or in public statements, all three NGOs highlight the role of the relationship between BAE Systems and the Labour Party as central to the Tanzania sale and exports more generally. Although they all recognise that it is (big) business as usual in the arms trade, only CAAT is free to pursue this line in its public campaigning, and the Tanzania case encouraged it to pursue such a strategy. Making controversial arguments does not carry a risk of losing access to policymakers as this is not what CAAT's strategy relies on. When the Tanzania story broke, all three NGOs acted in outsider mode, but the aftermath shows a divergence in strategy. Oxfam and Saferworld adopted a more insider strategy in relation to the Export Control Bill, whilst CAAT remained silent. The government's failure to engage with NGOs on the review of Criterion 8 demonstrates that it still effectively exercises control over the policy process as it can simply ignore NGOs where it feels necessary. NGOs are therefore reliant on the government creating the conditions for their success.

Between them, the NGOs have made the government aware that it is subject to scrutiny. A critical analysis of the development agenda shows that the task for NGOs must be

to push the government beyond its stated commitments and to change the frame of reference within which the arms trade and development are understood and acted upon. Whilst the positive benefits of minor victories and reform within the existing framework should not be underestimated, they must be coupled with a wider critique of arms export and development policy. Practical steps – which are always necessary for a change in policy – must be combined with a more fundamental, or transgressive, critique of the issue at hand and its social, political and economic context if they are to be counter-hegemonic. The Tanzania case shows CAAT, Oxfam and Saferworld making similar arguments concerning development despite the differences in their objectives and organisational strategies. These arguments function to reproduce dominant representations of development and its relationship to the arms trade. The NGOs failed to make an effective critique of U.K. arms export policy and the role of sustainable development concerns in it, failing to challenge state-capital relations, the U.K. state's role in creating the problems to which it claims merely to respond, or hierarchical North-South relations. NGOs thus contributed to hegemonic understandings and practices in this case.

Chapter Six: Human rights concerns in the arms trade: the case of Indonesia

Introduction

The United Kingdom has been a major supplier of arms to Indonesia since the 1950s; this relationship has been controversial as a result of the United Kingdom's role in facilitating the massacres of 1965 that led to the emergence of Suharto's New Order regime, Western support for the 1975 invasion of East Timor, and the role of U.K.-supplied weaponry in Indonesian repression of East Timor, West Papua and Aceh since the 1990s. This chapter assesses the activity of Amnesty International, CAAT and Saferworld in relation to human rights concerns in arms export licensing, with particular reference to the conflict in the province of Aceh.[1] There has been a long-term conflict in Aceh, with the Indonesian state security forces engaged in a military campaign against the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM, or Free Aceh Movement, an armed separatist group) since 1976. Following the breakdown of a peace agreement in December 2002, the Indonesian government declared martial law in the province on 19 May 2003. This lasted until May 2004, when martial law ended and a civil emergency was declared; despite the change in status, Indonesian troops remained in the province.[2] Conflict in the province came to an official end in August 2005 with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in Helsinki.[3]

The main argument put forward in this chapter is that whilst all three NGOs criticise the U.K. government for its record on arms exports to Indonesia, CAAT does the most to challenge the government's frame of reference in arguing that the wider policy of military support for Indonesia is problematic and suggesting that the government's commitment to human rights is more rhetorical than real. CAAT's more critical argument is reinforced by its more confrontational, outsider strategy. Amnesty and Saferworld, despite their criticisms of government policy, contribute to hegemonic understandings of the arms trade and human

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[1] BASIC, International Alert and Oxfam agreed common positions with Amnesty and Saferworld through their involvement in the U.K. Working Group on Arms.
[2] Hasan, Nurdin (2004) "Indonesia lifts martial law in Aceh but troops still active," Agence France Presse, 19 May 2004, http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/AllDocsByUNID/41635c3be815bc58c1256e990032226e (22 May 2006).
[3] Government of the Republic of Indonesia and Free Aceh Movement (2005) *Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement*, August 2005, http://www.cmi.fi/files/Aceh_MoU.pdf (6 June 2006).

rights as they remain on the same discursive terrain as the government. Whilst all three NGOs have been ineffective in terms of the crudest indicator of success, namely stopping arms exports to Indonesia, CAAT's activity has greater counter-hegemonic potential because of its attempt to unsettle dominant narratives concerning U.K. involvement in the arms trade and exports to Indonesia. The chapter proceeds in six parts, which analyse government declaratory policy and practice in this case, relations between branches of the state and capital, the view from Indonesia, the human rights agenda, NGO arguments against arms exports to Indonesia, and NGO strategies and impacts.

Government declaratory policy and practice

In its guidelines on arms export licensing, the U.K. government claims to pay attention to "The respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the country of final destination."[4] Criterion Two, as it is known, stipulates that an export licence will not be issued "if there is a clear risk that the proposed export might be used for internal repression." Internal repression is defined as:

> torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment; summary, arbitrary or extra-judicial executions; disappearances; arbitrary detentions; and other major suppression or violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms as set out in relevant international human rights instruments, including the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.[5]

The human rights situation in Aceh deteriorated as a result of the declaration of martial law in May 2003: extra-judicial killings, disappearances, excessive use of force, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, and sexual violence all increased.[6] According to official sources, over 1,100 people were killed in Aceh between May and December 2003, including approximately 470 civilians, although local human rights groups claim the number of civilians was much higher.[7] In December 2004 General Endriartono Sutarto of the Indonesian armed forces (Tentara

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[4] MoD et al, *Consolidated Criteria,* p.413.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Amnesty International (2004) "Indonesia", in *Annual Report 2004,* http://web.amnesty.org/report2004/idn-summary-eng; US Department of State (2004) "Indonesia," in *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2003,* http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27771.htm (23 May 2006); Human Rights Watch (2003) *Aceh Under Martial Law: Inside the Secret War,* December 2003, http://hrw.org/reports/2003/indonesia1203/indonesia1203.pdf (7 November 2006).

[7] Ibid.

Nasional Indonesia, TNI) claimed that 3,216 Acehnese had been killed by the military since the declaration of martial law.[8] In addition, movement and communication were severely restricted in the province by the Indonesian government,[9] making it harder for accurate figures on the number of people killed and displaced to be produced.

Internal repression as defined by the U.K. government was taking place in Aceh in 2003. For the government to refuse arms export licences, however, there must be a "clear risk" that proposed exports "might be used for internal repression," according to Criterion Two. Once martial law was declared, four Hawk fighter jets, produced by BAE Systems, were deployed to the province, as acknowledged in the U.K. Parliament. Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean stated that: "The Indonesian Government have confirmed that Hawk aircraft were used on the first day of action in Aceh, but they have given assurances that they were not used offensively."[10] The Hawks were used in "what were mostly choreographed manoeuvres rather than attacks on fighters of the Free Aceh Movement (Gam)," according to *The Guardian*, serving to intimidate the local population in areas already attacked with rockets dropped by other aircraft.[11] These arguments rest on a distinction between the direct use of equipment in human rights violations, and their broader supporting role in operations in which human rights violations occurred. Whilst an Indonesian military spokesman emphasised the psychological aspects of the May attacks, he did not rule out the use of Hawks in a direct attacking role.[12] Leaving aside the question of a narrow or broad interpretation of the role of military equipment in human rights violations, these examples demonstrate the deployment of U.K.-supplied Hawks and Scorpions as part of a military campaign that has facilitated human rights violations, targeting civilians as well as alleged GAM separatists and creating a climate of widespread fear. There is thus reason to believe that there was a "clear risk" that U.K.-supplied military equipment "might" be used for internal repression in Aceh in 2003.

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[8] Roosa, John (2005) "Aceh's Dual Disasters: The Tsunami and Military Rule," Indonesia Alert, 11 January 2005, http://www.indonesiaalert.org/article.php?id=89 (23 May 2006).

[9] Amnesty International, "Indonesia"; US Department of State, "Indonesia"; Human Rights Watch (2003) "Aceh Under Martial Law: Human Rights Under Fire," Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, June 2003, http://hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/aceh060503bck.pdf (7 November 2006).

[10] Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean (2003) *Lords Hansard*, 21 May 2003, Column 830.

[11] Aglionby, John (2003) "Indonesia uses UK Hawks in Aceh offensive," *The Guardian*, 20 May 2003.

[12] Ibid.

The U.K. government position rests on the argument that the absence of concrete evidence of the direct use of U.K.-supplied equipment in individual acts of human rights violations means that there is no reason to deny licences for arms exports. According to one interviewee, the use of Hawks in 2003 was "a showcase event so it wasn't even really a contravention of Criterion Two".[13] This interviewee argued that, despite the problematic behaviour of the Indonesian military in the past, it is improving now, and so the U.K. government operates on the basis of "innocent until proven guilty."[14] These statements demonstrate a very narrow interpretation of Criterion Two, which refers to the risk that equipment might be used. In addition, Criterion Two states that "evidence of the use of this *or similar* equipment"[15] will trigger a refusal. This suggests that the government should not wait until U.K.-supplied equipment is used in internal repression to refuse licences: the use of domestically procured or other foreign-supplied equipment should trigger a refusal.

One of the U.K. government's key public defences of its arms relationship with Indonesia revolves around a set of "assurances" provided by the Indonesian government, which ostensibly guarantee that U.K.-supplied equipment will not be used in contravention of the United Kingdom's arms export guidelines. On the basis of these supposed assurances, the government claims that U.K.-supplied military equipment is not being used in human rights violations and, further, that the deployment of U.K.-supplied equipment does not constitute internal repression. By this logic, the deployment of Scorpions to Aceh in May 2003 was not deemed by the FCO to constitute a violation of the assurances, as it was a measure designed to protect supply routes.[16] Evidence from Indonesian military officials suggests that the assurances did not play a role in restricting the use of U.K.-supplied equipment, however. In May 2003 Air Force chief-of-staff, Marshall Chappy Hakim, stated that the possibility of using Hawks in Aceh was discussed with the British Ambassador two months previously and no objection had been raised.[17] A senior military spokesman in Aceh, Colonel Ditya Sudarsono, stated that Scorpion tanks would be used offensively as "a key part of our campaign to finish

[13] Interview with AS34, 7 March 2005.
[14] Ibid.
[15] MoD et al, *Consolidated Criteria;* emphasis added.
[16] Letter to Carmel Budiardjo, Tapol, from Mike O'Brien, Foreign Office Minister, 10 July 2003.
[17] Cited in *Antara*, Kompas, *detik* (Indonesian daily newspapers), 28-29 May 2003; accessed via Tapol (2003) "The use of British military equipment in Aceh: the case for a military embargo against Indonesia," 2 July 2003, http://tapol.gn.apc.org/news/files/st030702.htm (19 April 2003).

off the separatists ... Maybe later the British foreign minister will have a fit."[18] It seems no such anticipated apoplectic reaction resulted. In November 2005 the U.K. government conceded that the assurances were unenforceable and that it no longer accepted them.[19] The assurances are best understood as a legitimation mechanism rather than a regulatory mechanism: they facilitated the continued export and deployment of U.K.-supplied equipment whilst allowing the government to maintain that it is committed to the protection of human rights.

In light of the evidence of the use of U.K-supplied equipment in a military campaign that involves widespread human rights violations, the licensing of components for aircraft machine guns, components for combat aircraft, components for tanks and technology for the use of combat aircraft in 2003 and the first half of 2004[20] constitutes a breach of the U.K. government's guidelines on arms exports. These licences are problematic as the types of equipment they cover can be used in Hawk jets and Scorpion tanks. Indonesia last imported complete Hawk jets from the United Kingdom in 2000[21] and continues to use Saracen armoured personnel carriers, and Ferret and Saladin armoured cars imported in the late 1950s. The licensing of components for combat aircraft, technology for the use of combat aircraft, and components for tanks during the period of martial law in 2003 are thus likely to facilitate the continued operation of Hawk jets and various armoured cars and tanks, which can remain in use for many years. Military helmets, gun silencers and body armour were also licensed in this period[22] and could be used by troops engaged in the military campaign. However, the government gives no information as to the end-users of the equipment and does not publish the dates on which equipment was licensed, preventing outside observers from independently

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[18] Quoted in Aglionby, John and Richard Norton-Taylor (2003) "Scorpions move in on rebels as Indonesia reneges on weapons pledge to Britain," *The Guardian*, 24 June 2003.
[19] Pearson, Ian (2005) *Hansard*, Written Answers, 22 November 2005, Column 1902W.
[20] FCO et al, *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2003*, pp.196-7; FCO et al (2005) *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Quarterly Report January –March 2004* (London: The Stationery Office), p.52; FCO et al (2005) *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Quarterly Report April – June 2004* (London: The Stationery Office), pp.85-7.
[21] The UN Register of Conventional Arms lists the export of 62 armoured combat vehicles and between 19 and 34 combat aircraft to Indonesia since 1997. Of the combat aircraft, five were exported in 2000 after the EU embargo - belatedly imposed in relation to events in East Timor – was lifted; transfers were therefore postponed rather than cancelled. UN, UN Register of Conventional Arms. There is a discrepancy between the Indonesian and UK reports, hence the lack of clarity in the figures.
[22] Ibid.

evaluating its policy.[23] Whilst the end-users of the equipment remain unknown, it is evident that the U.K. government did licence military equipment for export to Indonesia during the period of martial law, and licensed several types of equipment that have application in internal repression, thus contravening its own publicly stated criteria.

Assessing the government's behaviour on its own terms demonstrates it to have contravened its own publicly stated policy. However, the government's case-by-case approach to licensing it itself part of the problem. As outlined in Chapter One, export licences are generally valid for two years and equipment can be physically exported at any point during this period. The equipment licensed in 2003-4 thus may not have been exported during the period of martial law. A case-by-case approach requires that officials assess licence applications against the current situation in the proposed recipient country. Yet the inevitable time delay between licensing and export means that the situation in the recipient country may well have changed dramatically by the time equipment is actually exported and used.[24] The argument put forward thus far is that during the period of martial law, U.K.-supplied equipment was deployed in Aceh by the Indonesian security forces as part of a military conflict in which human rights violations against suspected separatists as well as civilians escalated significantly. During this time, licences for body armour, components for combat aircraft, gun silencers and military helmets were granted, which contravene the government's publicly stated guidelines. A wider problem with the guidelines is that the time delay between licensing and export means that, even if licences had been refused during the period of martial law, the Indonesian security forces would already be in possession of significant amounts of military equipment that have application in internal repression. The government's publicly stated guidelines therefore do not function to restrict arms exports in any meaningful fashion. The next section addresses a key question raised by the analysis thus far. How it is that, despite the claim to assess licence

[23] The government only released data on licences granted for exports to Indonesia during the period of martial law after a Freedom of Information Act request by CAAT. The figures show that no arms exports were licensed for export to Indonesia in June 2003, and between July and September 2003 the number of licences was lower than at other times. Yet, during the overall period of martial law, licences were granted for equipment such as body armour, components for combat aircraft, gun silencers and military helmets. Letter to Nicholas Gilby, CAAT, from Glyn Williams, Director, Export Control Organisation, DTI, 4 May 2005.

[24] In addition to the licences that were granted during the period of martial law, the U.K. government states that £2.31m worth of military equipment was actually exported to Indonesia during 2003, but gives no information as to the type, quantity or end-user of the equipment; FCO et al, *Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2003*, p.22. It is therefore impossible to say whether equipment physically exported during the year was used in human rights violations.

applications against the guidelines on a case-by-case basis and a public commitment not to export equipment that might be used for internal repression, arms exports to Indonesia continue to be licensed?

Relations between branches of the state and capital

The key government department of interest in relation to arms exports to Indonesia is the FCO, which is the lead department on bilateral United Kingdom-Indonesia relations and also human rights concerns in U.K. foreign policy. Within the FCO, three sections participate in export licensing: the Counter Proliferation Department (CPD, which coordinates the FCO response on arms export licence applications); the relevant country desks (in this case, the Indonesia, Philippines and East Timor Team); and the Human Rights Policy Department (HRPD).[25] CPD, country desks and HRPD all comment on licence applications before a single FCO recommendation is collated and sent back to the DTI, which has overall responsibility for the licensing process. In the event that sections disagree as to whether a licence should be granted, they make a written submission to the FCO minister under whose geographical remit the licence application falls and s/he then decides whether or not the licence should be granted. In addition, given the sensitivity of Indonesia as a recipient of U.K. arms, every licence for exports to Indonesia requires ministerial approval.[26] The licensing process thus features the involvement of a department whose remit relates to the promotion of human rights and high levels of ministerial control over the outcome of the process.

HRPD officials understand themselves to be the "guardians of Criterion Two."[27] They assess licence applications in terms of their implications for human rights, whilst CPD has a dual role of providing prompt advice to the DTI to ensure companies receive a good service, and ensuring that decisions are properly based on the criteria,[28] and country desks have a wider bilateral relationship with the partner country to consider. Only a small number of refusals

[25] HRPD was renamed the Human Rights, Democracy and Good Governance Programme (HRDGG) in September 2004 as part of a wider FCO restructuring. In this chapter, reference will be made to HRPD as this was the name of the section during the time of the Aceh crisis in 2003-4.
[26] Interview with AS34, 7 March 2005.
[27] Interview with FCO official AS25, 16 June 2004.
[28] Interview with Andrew Turner, 6 January 2004.

called for by HRPD are upheld by ministers.[29] In interviews, HRPD officials emphasised that their opinions are put forward during the process, but that HRPD has an "advisory role" and calls for more refusals than are upheld.[30] The result is that, in the majority of cases it deals with, HRPD's advice and recommendation is not taken up as the FCO position and licences are granted that HRPD would rather were refused.

Within the FCO there is a system of checks and balances and an internal audit process to ensure the process is carried out correctly and that departments are accountable.[31] This means that the granting of licences is not a failure of policy; rather, the ongoing granting of licences to Indonesia *is* the government's policy. As Davina Miller argued in relation to arms transfers to Iran and Iraq in the 1980s, it is necessary to "distinguish policy, the decisions of Ministers, from failures to implement policy, errors or wrong-doing by civil servants."[32] Although human rights concerns are officially incorporated into arms export licensing, in practice, HRPD has little institutional authority or weight compared to country desks or CPD, and is routinely over-ridden by ministers. Despite the efforts of the officials working in HRPD and regardless of their intentions, the function of HRPD is primarily to provide lip-service to human rights in the arms export licensing process.

A key issue raised by government interviewees concerns interpretation: officials acknowledge that the guidelines require interpretation and can be applied in different ways.[33] Assessing licence applications against the government's publicly stated criteria is not a neutral task, and officials' and ministers' interpretations are affected by their position and role, amongst other things.[34] As the analysis of HPRD demonstrates, some officials' and

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[29] Interview with FCO official AS25, 16 June 2004. AS25 estimated that 80% of licence applications that cross HRPD's desk go to submission; interviewee AS26 disagreed that it was that high a proportion, but the former was adamant that it was more than half. Interview with AS25, AS26, 16 June 2004.

[30] Ibid.; FCO official AS26 agreed with this sentiment.

[31] Interview with AS39, 22 March 2005.

[32] Miller, *Export or Die*, p.23.

[33] Interviews with: AS18, 6 February 2004; AS26, 16 June 2004; AS35, 15 March 2005; AS36, 16 March 2005; AS16, 17 March 2005; AS39, 22 March 2005.

[34] In political science this is known as Miles' law ("where you stand depends on where you sit"); there is a large literature on governmental politics and foreign policymaking that deals with Miles' law and other approaches to the study of policymaking. See, for example, Stern, Eric and Bertjan Verbeek (eds.) (1998) "Whither the Study of Governmental Politics in Foreign Policymaking? A Symposium," *Mershon International Studies Review*, 42, pp. 205-255; Allison, Graham T. and Philip Zelikow (1999) *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2nd edition (New York: Longman).

departments' interpretations carry more weight than others. In addition, in practice, interpretation of the guidelines is permeated by a presentism that facilitates the continued licensing of exports. One interviewee claimed that "yes, there were massacres in the 1960s and the NGOs remember East Timor, but we have to make our assessment on the basis of now, and what our government is doing now."[35] Claims by activists, NGOs and the media regarding the past use of equipment are thus not sufficient evidence to deny licences. Part of the difficulty NGOs face, therefore, is that officials and politicians work with a different frame of reference. Changing this frame of reference is a significant challenge for NGOs, and they try to do this using a variety of strategies, ranging from insider tactics of trying to generate a consultative relationship with sympathetic officials, to outsider tactics of attempting to embarrass the government into changing its policy. This raises the question of what the target of NGO activity is: much of the work that NGOs do with officials and parliamentarians is with sympathetic, but institutionally weak, partners. Meanwhile, arms capital's consultative relationship with the MoD and DTI continues and the overall policy is a pro-export one.

Interpretation of the guidelines is also coloured by a pro-export stance to policy, even amongst those officials not embedded with arms capital. Government officials stress the importance of ensuring that judgments are legally defensible in terms of the guidelines because of the availability of an appeals procedure to companies and the potential for legal challenge.[36] As one interviewee put it, the government has made it clear that there has to be a clear risk, it cannot be a supposition.[37] This is stated in the government's Annual Report itself: "Decisions to refuse licences are not taken lightly. Only in those cases where refusal is clearly justified is a final decision taken to refuse."[38] Although the guidelines are politically rather than legally binding, and the final right to grant, refuse or revoke licences remains with the government, in practice the system is designed to facilitate exports wherever possible. The burden of proof is such that HRPD and NGOs must establish beyond any doubt that U.K. equipment would be directly used in human rights violations, despite the language of the guidelines that refers to "risk".

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[35] Interview with AS37, 17 March 2005.
[36] Interviewee AS26, 16 June 2004; interview with Andrew Turner, 6 January 2004.
[37] Interview with AS34, 7 March 2005.
[38] FCO et al, *Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2003*, p.15.

The existence of Criterion Two and the institutional resources put into assessing applications against it must be understood in the context of wider governmental support for arms companies' relationships with Indonesia. In addition to the integration of arms capital into the state as detailed in Chapter Three, DESO had an office in the U.K. embassy in Jakarta between at least 1991 and 2000[39] and a Regional Directorate for the Far East and Australasia that includes promoting arms exports to Indonesia.[40] ECGD support for Indonesia meant that the 1997 Indonesian financial crisis, which forced the country to reschedule with its creditors, did not harm arms-producing companies. It also meant that Alvis received £93m of U.K. taxpayers' money in payment for Scorpion tanks exported to Indonesia;[41] a further £400m was paid to BAE Systems when Indonesia was unable to finance sixteen Hawk jets it had purchased.[42] The high levels of institutional support given to the arms industry – in particular BAE Systems, which produces much of the equipment exported to Indonesia – makes exports to states such as Indonesia less surprising as they serve to orient policy towards the interests of arms capital.

In any policy decision, "part of what is at issue … is the question of which values to pursue and which to sacrifice."[43] In the case of the arms trade, the dominant values being pursued relate to commercial gain for arms companies and the maintenance of relationships with transnational capitalist elites in other states, whilst values relating to the right to life of those in those states are of less concern. The challenge for NGOs is not to make the licensing process more efficient, but to change the values that inform policy and the licensing process. The analysis of Criterion Two undertaken here demonstrates that, whilst there is a licensing process in which human rights concerns are aired, the actors trying to promote human rights are institutionally weaker than the branches of the state dedicated to promoting arms exports. In addition, the wording of the guidelines and the case by case approach makes it harder for human rights concerns to carry weight.

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[39] Spellar, John, *Hansard* Written Answers, 3 November 1999, Column 214. Phythian documents the opening of the DESO office in 1991; Phythian, *The Politics of British Arms Sales*, p.148. *Hansard* searches show that the office existed until 2000 but no evidence of its existence after 2000 is available.
[40] DESO (2006) "Regional Directorates," http://www.deso.mod.uk/rd.htm (19 April 2006).
[41] Leigh, David, Rob Evans and David Pallister (2004) "Tank deal that blew a hole in ethical policy," *The Guardian*, 7 December 2004, http://www.guardian.co.uk/indonesia/Story/0,,1368014,00.html (19 April 2006).
[42] Evans, Rob (2004) "Taxpayers paid £400m to BAE for failed arms deals," *The Guardian*, http://www.guardian.co.uk/indonesia/Story/0,,1377390,00.html (19 June 2006).
[43] Barkawi, Tarak (1998) "Strategy as a Vocation: Weber, Morgenthau and modern strategic studies," *Review of International Studies*, 24, 159-184; p.170.

The argument put forward thus far is that, despite the existence of guidelines that the government claims protect human rights and the actions of officials tasked with implementing them, U.K. arms export policy towards Indonesia is to export wherever possible. Since 2000 no complete weapons systems have been exported, but components and spare parts for equipment already exported have been licensed, thus maintaining the military capacity of a state engaged in internal repression and carrying out human rights violations. Part of the explanation for this lies in the relationship between arms capital and the U.K. state; the next section addresses civil-military relations in Indonesia and the relationship between the United Kingdom and Indonesia in the context of global capitalism.

The view from Indonesia

The history of the United Kingdom's relationship with Indonesia and the latter's post-colonial experience provide a context to contemporary arms exports, demonstrating the centrality of military force and relations with major capitalist powers in post-independence Indonesian history and social relations.[44] Under Sukarno, the military came to play a key role in the politics of the newly independent republic. Whilst the military already had a politicised orientation as a result of the nationalist struggle against Dutch colonial rule,[45] the major expansion of military involvement in the economy occurred in 1957, when Sukarno introduced military rule, giving managerial control of newly nationalised enterprises to the military.[46] The United Kingdom struck up an arms relationship with the Sukarno regime, selling a range of military equipment in the 1950s and 1960s, including armoured vehicles, aircraft and tanks.[47]

Sukarno's economic policies and political strategy of allowing the participation of parties of the left (including the Indonesian Communist Party, PKI) rang alarm bells in the USA and United Kingdom, which began to support elements of the Indonesian military that

[44] This historical account starts at Indonesian independence. This is not to deny the importance of colonial rule in terms of interaction with the West or the role of organised violence in social life. For reasons of space, Sukarno's presidency of independent Indonesia is taken as the starting point.
[45] Crouch, Harold (1985) "Indonesia," in Ahmad, Zakaria Haji and Harold Crouch (eds.) *Military-Civilian Relations in South-East Asia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 50-77; p.50.
[46] Hadiz, Vedi R. (2004) "The rise of neo-Third Worldism? The Indonesian trajectory and the consolidation of illiberal democracy," *Third World* Quarterly, 25(1): 55-71; p. 65.
[47] For details, see Phythian, *The Politics of British Arms Sales since 1964*, p. 183, footnote 14, and Ball, S.J. (2002) "The Macmillan Government, British Arms Exports and Indonesia," *Contemporary British History*, 16(2): 77-98.

saw the growing strength of the PKI as a threat.[48] Covert activities by the USA and United Kingdom during the 1950s and 1960s were to have a lasting effect on Indonesian politics. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) infiltrated arms and personnel in support of regional rebellions against Sukarno in 1957-8[49] and U.K. intelligence agencies and propaganda specialists carried out covert operations against Sukarno "from at least 1963 to 1966."[50] An attempted coup in 1965 sparked massacres of around half a million people as part of an effort to eliminate left-wing forces from Indonesian political and social life.[51] U.S. military aid and training for the Indonesian military and CIA covert operations were crucial to the mass extermination of the PKI and other groups.[52] In particular, the U.S.' role in compiling lists of PKI activists and passing them to the Indonesian military was of central importance.[53] For its part, the United Kingdom "incited hostility to the communists and at least implicitly encouraged the mass murder of thousands of people" in 1965 through its propaganda activities, and throughout the October 1965 massacres, "London did all it could to encourage the destruction of the PKI and strengthen the Indonesian military leaders."[54] The United Kingdom, acting as junior partner to the USA, was thus instrumental in changing the course of Indonesian politics. Interaction with the West played a crucial role in turning Indonesia into a repressive authoritarian state.

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[48] Crouch, "Indonesia," p.60; Hadiz, "The rise of neo-Third Worldism?", p. 65.
[49] Scott, Peter Dale (1985) "The United States and the Overthrow of Sukarno, 1965-1967," *Pacific Affairs,* 58: 239-264; p. 246; On post-World War Two US foreign policy towards Indonesia, see Kahin, Audrey R. and Gerorge McT. Kahin (1995) *Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia* (Seattle: University of Washington Press), and Conboy, Kenneth and James Morrison (1999) *Feet to the Fire. CIA Covert Operations in Indonesia, 1957-1958* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press). On Indonesia as an example of the use of covert operations during the Cold War, see Barkawi, Tarak (2001) "War Inside the Free World: The Democratic Peace and the Cold War in the Third World," in Barkawi, Tarak and Mark Laffey (eds.) *Democracy, Liberalism and War: Rethinking the Democratic Peace Debate* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner), pp. 107-128;
[50] Lashmar, Paul and James Oliver (1998) *Britain's Secret Propaganda War 1948-1977* (Stroud: Sutton Publishing), pp. 1-2.
[51] Dale Scott, "The United States and the Overthrow of Sukarno," pp.239-240. There is considerable debate amongst scholars and commentators over the role of the USA and other Western powers in the events in Indonesia of the mid-1960s and their responsibility for the massacres and extermination of the PKI. Easter, for example, argues that whilst Western involvement "may have encouraged" the massacres, Western states were not responsible for the coup attempt or the massacres; Easter, David (2005) "'Keep the Indonesian Pot Boiling': Western Covert Intervention in Indonesia, October 1965 – March 1966", *Kolektif (i)nfo Coup d'etat '65* website, http://www.progind.net/modules/wfsection/article.php?articleid=27 (7 June 2006). The argument put forward in this chapter is that Western states encouraged the Indonesian military in its campaign of terror, helped materially via the covert supply of arms, intelligence and propaganda, and were thus complicit in them.
[52] Chomsky, Noam and Edward S. Herman (1979) *The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism. The Political Economy of Human Rights: Volume I* (Boston: South End Press), pp.205-9.
[53] Phythian, *The Politics of British Arms Sales,* p.147.
[54] Easter, David (2004) *Britain and the Confrontation with Indonesia 1960-66* (London: Tauris Academic Studies), p. 168-9.

Once Suharto's New Order regime came to power, an alliance between Indonesian generals and foreign investors facilitated a development programme to open the economy further to foreign capital and ensure its domination by military-controlled and military-connected enterprises.[55] By the late 1970s, economic growth as a result of the rise in oil prices facilitated a large increase in arms purchases from Western states.[56] Indonesia was known as the greatest strategic prize of South East Asia[57] and high levels of U.S. and U.K. intervention facilitated its orientation towards the global capitalist economy. In this sense Indonesia-U.S.-U.K. relations, and the events leading to the emergence of the New Order regime in particular, can be understood as an "informal empire in a sovereign states system and the use of clients, proxies, and foreign forces to rule and wage war in that empire."[58] Through arms exports and military training, Indonesia became one of the Third World spaces that was part of the "transnational apparatus for the organisation of coercion that enabled U.S. domination of a decolonized periphery as well as a pacified core."[59]

Military support was central to the New Order regime. The concept of *dwifungsi*, or "dual function", legitimised the role of the military (into which the police was integrated in 1966) in a "socio-political mission to promote national development and to ensure political stability" as well as maintain national security and defence.[60] The New Order regime combined "a powerful coercive apparatus with potent state-centred narratives of national unity, anti-communism, *Pancasila* [the five principles central to post-colonial Indonesian nationalism: belief in God, humanitarianism, national unity, democracy, and social justice[61]] and national development."[62] This was a mix of ideological justification and coercion – the means of which were supplied by the United Kingdom and other states – which legitimated widespread political repression and ideological surveillance. Under the New Order, security operations against separatists in Aceh, East Timor and Irian Jaya became "standard practice", as did

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55 Crouch, "Indonesia," p. 66
56 Ibid., pp. 73-4.
57 Richard Nixon, cited in Ransom, David (1975) *Ford Country: Building An Elite for Indonesia*, accessed from http://www.cia-on-campus.org/internat/indo.html (6 July 2004).
58 Barkawi, "War Inside the Free World", p.111.
59 Laffey and Weldes, "Representing the International: Sovereignty After Modernity?," pp.121-142; p.132.
60 Honna, Jun (2003) *Military Politics and Democratization in Indonesia* (London: Routledge), p.3.
61 Ibid., p.212.
62 Berger, Mark T. (1997) "Old state and new empire in Indonesia: debating the rise and decline of Suharto's New Order," *Third World Quarterly*, 18(2): 321-361, p. 335.

military repression of the press, students and Islamic groups in urban areas.[63] Whilst Vatikiotis describes Suharto's power as "not so much the power of the gun, but rather the power of the purse.,[64] the importance of military power to the Suharto regime meant it relied on the power of both the gun and the purse, a combination of coercion and consent in securing hegemony.

One of the most significant events of the New Order period was the 1975 invasion and occupation of East Timor while it was in the process of declaring independence from Portugal. The invasion occurred with the knowledge and support of the USA[65] and the United Kingdom's actions were "of critical importance."[66] From 1975 a campaign of aerial bombing, deliberate starvation and the destruction of villages ensued.[67] A key moment came with the first export of Hawk jets from the United Kingdom in 1978.[68] Konis Santana, a leader of the East Timorese resistance army, claims that "The war in East Timor would have taken another course if the Indonesians had not received military support from abroad, including the Hawks that Great Britain offered during the crucial period after the invasion."[69] The Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR), investigating the invasion of East Timor, found that "like the United States, by sanctioning the sale to Indonesia of arms which were used against the Resistance and the civilian population in Timor-Leste, the U.K. and France were directly involved in supporting an illegal occupation and suppressing the right of the people of the territory to self-determination."[70] CAVR estimates that between 100,000 and 180,000 Timorese were killed or starved to death between 1975 and 1999 after the invasion.

The 1980s and 1990s saw competing tendencies in Indonesian politics, in the direction of both increased political liberalisation and a continued repressive response to autonomous

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63 Honna, *Military Politics and Democratization in Indonesia*, p.9.
64 Vatikiotis, cited in Robertson-Snape, Fiona (1999) "Corruption, collusion and nepotism in Indonesia," *Third World Quarterly*, 20(3): 589-602; p. 592.
65 Phythian, *The Politics of British Arms Sales*, p. 147; Curtis, *Web of Deceit*, p. 404-5. See also Chomsky and Herman, *The Washington Connection*, pp. 129-204.
66 Dowson, Hugh (no date) "Declassified British Documents Reveal UK Support for Indonesian Invasion and Occupation of East Timor, Recognition of Denial of Self-Determination, 1975-1976," The National Security Archive, George Washington University, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB174/indexuk.htm, (3 April 2006).
67 Curtis, *Web of Deceit*, p. 403.
68 Phythian, *The Politics of British Arms Sales*, p.149.
69 Quoted in Curtis, *Web of Deceit*, p.406.
70 Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (2006) "Responsibility and Accountability", in ibid., *Chega!*, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB176/CAVR_responsibility.pdf (3 April 2006), p.93.

activity and criticism. The New Order regime began to lose legitimacy in the mid 1980s as the generation of military officers involved in the war of independence retired. The growing perception that Suharto was using the military for his own personal political and economic interests, alongside friction within the military and between the military and Suharto, created space for criticism of the regime – a phenomenon known as *keterbukaan*.[71] *Keterbukaan* was sparked by a comment in May 1989 by Paul Wolfowitz, then retiring as U.S. ambassador to the country, who argued that Indonesia needed to achieve political openness in line with its increasing economic openness and deregulation[72] – another example of interaction with the West affecting the development of Indonesian politics. In the 1990s political liberalisation was increasingly seen as a means of promoting economic development; in addition, post-Cold War international criticism of human rights violations by the Indonesian military was on the rise[73] and there were calls for an end to Aceh being designated as a Military Operations Area.[74] There was thus a combination of internal and external pressure for reform. During the same period however, Indonesia continued to import large quantities of weaponry from abroad. The United Kingdom was Indonesia's second largest arms supplier after the USA between 1986 and 1990; in the 1990s, the United Kingdom was its largest supplier.[75] Whilst political liberalisation made a repressive response by the military more difficult, it did not make it impossible. The Indonesian military used force against students in south Sulawesi and protestors in Bandung in April and June 1996 respectively, and against street protestors in May 1997 – and in each instance used U.K.-supplied weaponry to do so.[76]

These twin developments of political liberalisation and repression can be understood with reference to William Robinson's "promoting polyarchy" thesis. Robinson argues that, in the post-Cold War period, "democracy promotion" or political liberalisation came to be the U.S. state's preferred method of promoting capitalist growth in the global South, rather than support for authoritarian regimes. Whilst polyarchy is the preferred route, authoritarian regimes will be supported if to do otherwise is perceived as too risky. As Robinson argues:

[71] Honna, *Military Politics and Democratization in Indonesia*, p.12, 35.
[72] Ibid., p.12.
[73] Ibid., p.4.
[74] Sulistiyanto, Priyambudi (2001) "Whither Aceh?", *Third World Quarterly*, 22(3): 437-452; p. 444.
[75] Phythian, *The Politics of British Arms Sales*, p. 148.
[76] Curtis, *Web of Deceit*, pp.193-4; Zelter, Angie (2004) "Civil Society and Global Responsibility: The Arms Trade and East Timor," *International Relations*, 18(1): 125-140, p.130.

"US preference for polyarchy is a general guideline of post-Cold War foreign policy and not a universal prescription ... As a general rule, authoritarian regimes are supported *until* or *unless* a polyarchic alternative is viable and in place."[77] Indonesia is an example of where both political liberalisation and authoritarian repression were encouraged by the USA and also the United Kingdom.

The Suharto regime fell in May 1998 as a result of popular protests, in part against Suharto's cronyism but also against IMF austerity measures imposed in response to the Asian financial crisis.[78] Under the Habibie presidency (1998-9), the police was formally separated from the military,[79] and the Military Operations Area label was lifted in Aceh, although a riot led to troops being ordered to remain.[80] In the first months of Abdurrahman Wahid's presidency (elected October 1999), the military leadership formally abandoned the *dwifungsi* doctrine.[81] Despite these changes, the military used force against protestors in Jakarta in May and November 1998, against workers in Surabaya in February 1999, and in Ambon in December 1999 and July 2000. In each of these cases, U.K.-supplied equipment was used by the Indonesian military.[82] The worst episode came in the run-up to the referendum on independence in East Timor, when the Indonesian military ran a campaign of murder, destruction and intimidation in an attempt to disrupt the vote. U.K.-supplied Hawk jets were used in the campaign, and Bishop Carlos Belo called on the United Kingdom not to sustain "a conflict which without these [arms] sales could never have been pursued in the first place, nor for so very long."[83] The Labour government claimed that licences granted under the Conservatives could not be revoked; but the government retains the power to revoke licences

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77 Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy.*, pp. 112-3.
78 See Bullard, Nicola, Walden Bello and Kamal Mallhotra (1998) "Taming the Tigers: the IMF and the Asian Crisis," *Third World Quarterly*, 19(3): 505-555; and Pincus, Jonathan and Rizal Ramli (1998) "Indonesia: from showcase to basket case," *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, 22: 723-734.
79 Honna, *Military Politics and Democratization in Indonesia*, p.216.
80 Sulistiyanto, "Whither Aceh?", p.444.
81 International Crisis Group (2000) *Indonesia: Keeping the Military Under Control*, Asia Report No.9, 5 September 2000, executive summary available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1466&l=1, (5 April 2006).
82 Curtis, *Web of Deceit*, pp.193-4.
83 Quoted in Pilger, *Hidden Agendas*, p.312. See also Pilger, John (1999) "Jakarta's godfathers," *The Guardian*, 7 September 1999, http://www.guardian.co.uk/indonesia/Story/0,,200808,00.html (16 May 2006).

at any time.[84] A belated EU embargo followed, which postponed rather than cancelled weapons deliveries.[85]

Since 2001 the discourse of the "War on Terror" has functioned to justify arms sales to Indonesia and promote a repressive over a pacific orientation of state security forces, especially after the bombings in Bali in October 2002 and at the Australian embassy in Jakarta in September 2004.[86] The post-9/11 U.S. security agenda – supported by the United Kingdom – has given the Indonesian government increased latitude in defining opponents as security threats and/or terrorists: in June 2003 the government notified its intention to have GAM branded as a terrorist organisation.[87] Aceh's strong Islamic identity[88] makes a repressive response by the Indonesian government even easier to legitimate. The USA has also spent millions of dollars on "anti-terrorism programmes" in Indonesia[89] and International Military Education and Training (IMET) was resumed in February 2005, having been formally suspended in 1992 after civilian protestors were massacred in East Timor (although troops continued to be trained under other programmes).[90]

Repression in Aceh in 2003 thus appears as one of the more recent episodes in a long line of incidents and as part of a policy of military repression intimately linked to the incorporation of Indonesia into the global capitalist economy. The Indonesian military still

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[84] Phythian, *The Politics of British Arms Sales,* p. 295; also Purton, Tony (MoD director of contracts 1988-93) (2003) "Ethics and the Arms Trade," *The Guardian,* 30 June 2003, http://www.guardian.co.uk/indonesia/Story/0,,987577,00.html (20 April 2006).

[85] In 2000 the UK supplied 5 Hawk aircraft that had been delayed by the EU arms embargo; United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.

[86] Havely, Joe (2003) "Indonesia's war on terrorism," *CNN News,* 10 September 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/09/09/indonesia.terror/index.html; BBC (2004) "Massive blast at Jakarta embassy," 9 September 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/3639922.stm (29 May 2006). See also Berrigan, Frida (2004) "Ignoring Indonesian Repression for the War on Terror," Foreign Policy in Focus, 28 October 2004, http://www.antiwar.com/orig/berrigan.php?articleid=3866 (29 May 2006).

[87] Hadiz, "The rise of neo-Third Worldism?", p. 67.

[88] Sulistiyanto, "Whither Aceh?", p. 438.

[89] Gedda, George (2002) "US, Indonesia in Anti-Terror Plan," 3 August 2002, http://www.westpapua.net/news/02/08/020802-nkrius.htm (29 May 2006).

[90] Isenberg, David (2005) "US back in step with Indonesia," *Asia Times,* 3 March 2005, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/GC03Ae01.html (20 April 2006); Perlez, Jane (2005) "Indonesia welcomes U.S. plan to restore military training program", *International Herald Tribune,* 1 March 2005; Federation of American Scientists (2002) "US Arms Clients Profiles – Indonesia," http://fas.org/asmp/profiles/indonesia.htm (7 November 2006); Berrigan, Frida (2001) ***Indonesia at the Crossroads: US Weapons Sales and Military Training,*** Arms Trade Resource Centre report, October 2001, http://www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/reports/indo101001.htm (30 May 2006).

raises approximately 75% of its expenditure "through business enterprises and other means" and exercises political influence as a result.[91] There is continued military resistance to government policy, especially in unstable areas such as Aceh.[92] The conflict is functional for elements of the Indonesian military: the Aceh campaign is referred to as a "project" by the security forces, through which "money is made, reputations are built and promotions gained."[93] Ongoing conflict in the province – in part a result of soldiers selling weapons to insurgents[94] - justifies the retention of the TNI's territorial structure, and allows it to extract funds from local sources and continue to be paid by companies that it protects such as ExxonMobil and Pertamina.[95] It is therefore not clear that the Indonesian military is dedicated to ending conflict in Aceh. The tsunami of December 2004 devastated Aceh and played a role in the peace negotiations between the Government of Indonesia and GAM, which resulted in a Memorandum of Understanding being signed in August 2005 and an Aceh Monitoring Mission being deployed to oversee it. Whilst there were continued reports of human rights violations in the aftermath of the tsunami, by the end of 2005, over 30,000 police and military personnel had left the province, and GAM weapons were being decommissioned. In May 2005, Aceh's Civil Emergency status was downgraded to Civil Order status, but military operations continued, although human rights violations were fewer in number after this.[96]

This section put the United Kingdom's arms relationship with Indonesia in its historical context, of the establishment and maintenance of military rule, extensive human rights violations, and the orientation of the Indonesian economy to the global capitalist economy. There is a double trajectory at work: one the one hand, U.K. arms sales seem to be lessening as the Indonesian military already has complete weapons systems and only requires

[91] International Crisis Group, *Indonesia: Keeping the Military Under Control.*

[92] Ibid.

[93] International Crisis Group (2001) "Aceh: Why Military Force Won't Bring Lasting Peace," *ICG Asia Report No.*17, 12 June 2001, p.12, http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/report_archive/A400308_12062001.pdf (27 April 2006).

[94] Berrigan, *Indonesia at the Crossroads.*

[95] ICG, "Aceh: Why Military Force Won't Bring Lasting Peace," pp.12-15.

[96] For allegations of continued violations after the tsunami, see: Laweueng , Suadi Sulaiman (2005) "This is the moment to take action," Interview with Green Left Weekly, 20 April 2005, http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?ItemID=7696; Vltchek, Andre (2005) "Aceh: Take Action Now," *ZMag*, 30 May 2005, http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?ItemID=7975 (7 November 2006). For details of the improvement in the human rights situation in Aceh after the Memorandum of Understanding, see Amnesty International (2006) "Indonesia", *Amnesty International Report 2006,* http://web.amnesty.org/report2006/idn-summary-eng (7 November 2006).

spares and/or components for weapons systems imported in the past, and because political liberalisation makes a repressive military response more difficult. On the other hand, Indonesia is seeking to import weaponry from Russia instead of the USA and United Kingdom.[97] Developments since 2003, notably the resumption of International Military Education and Training (IMET) by the USA in February 2005, can in part be understood as an attempt to get back into the frame for orders for weaponry that Russia is currently winning. The case of Aceh demonstrates that, whilst there is an overall trend to promote liberal democracy and political liberalisation, where it is deemed necessary to protect the interests of the state and capital, the military will engage in repressive activity. The next section analyses the U.K. government's human rights agenda in this light.

The human rights agenda

The Labour government entered power in May 1997 promising to "put human rights at the heart of our foreign policy."[98] This was part of a wider set of ostensibly ethically driven commitments to play an active role in the international community (that is, "complying with its rules and cooperating with its institutions") and to "use its influence to protect and strengthen liberal and social democratic values of human rights, democracy, poverty reduction and good governance."[99] In relation to the arms trade, Robin Cook stated explicitly that "Britain will refuse to supply the equipment and weapons with which regimes deny the demands of their peoples for human rights."[100] Although the tagline of the "ethical dimension" to U.K. foreign policy was rapidly dropped – in part because of the political storm caused by the export of Hawks to Indonesia at the time of the East Timor crisis, another example of the mutual constitution of the global North and South through the arms trade – the discourse remained similar after Robin Cook's tenure as Foreign Secretary. Jack Straw announced in 2003 that "good governance, respect for the norms and obligations of international law, and human rights are not ... addons; but key to the work of the British government abroad."[101] The Labour government therefore demonstrates a discursive emphasis on human rights as a central

[97] For example, it imported twelve armoured combat vehicles, four combat aircraft and two attack helicopters from Russia in 2002 and 2003; UN Register of Conventional Arms.
[98] Cook, "Mission Statement for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office."
[99] Wheeler and Dunne, *Moral Britannia?*, pp. 6-7.
[100] Cook, "Human Rights into a New Century."
[101] Straw, Jack, quoted in Wheeler and Dunne, *Moral Britannia?*, p. 14.

tenet of its foreign policy. In this construction, human rights are linked to other key elements of what Robinson describes as polyarchy, such as good governance, poverty reduction and democracy promotion.

The emphasis on human rights is belied by two key factors, however. First, whilst the Labour government strengthened the Human Rights Policy Department, increasing its size by one third on coming into power,[102] the analysis in this chapter demonstrates that HRPD remains institutionally weak. Those elements within the U.K. state that seek to implement tough human rights standards lose out to more institutionally powerful elements such as the country desks within the FCO, and the MoD and DTI, which have a close, indeed often overlapping relationship with the arms industry. Second, there is a remarkable continuity of rhetoric between Labour and Conservative governments concerning arms sales to Indonesia that suggests the discursive commitment to human rights serves a primarily legitimatory function. Under a previous Conservative government it was also publicly stated that "we have guarantees from the Indonesians that the aircraft would not be used for internal repression," a phrase echoed by the Labour government.[103] More generally, the Conservative government claimed that "All applications to export defence equipment are carefully scrutinised on a case-by-case basis,"[104] that the United Kingdom "would not grant an export licence if we thought that the equipment was likely to be used for purposes of repression,"[105] and that "We do not allow the export of arms and equipment likely to be used for repressive purposes against civil populations."[106] Whilst the Labour government has improved the system of arms export control by formulating a national version of the EU Code of Conduct and making statutory provision for the publication of an annual report on arms exports, the same patterns of behaviour and justification are being repeated. Despite its vocal opposition to policy on Indonesia prior to 1997, calling for the suspension of aid to Indonesia and the imposition of an arms embargo after the Dili massacre in November 1991,[107] once in power Labour has

102 Foley, Conor and Keir Starmer (1998) "Foreign Policy, Human Rights and the United Kingdom," *Social Policy and Administration,* 32(5): 464-480; p. 472.
103 Archie Hamilton, MP, who was also a junior minister in the MoD, cited in Phythian, *The Politics of British Arms Sales*, p. 146.
104 Government response to opposition MP George Foulkes, cited in ibid., p. 159.
105 Letter from Lord Belstead to Labour MP Terry Davis, 1982, cited in ibid., p. 151.
106 Earl of Caithness, cited in ibid., p. 160.
107 Phythian, *The Politics of British Arms Sales*, p.159

continued the policy of arming the Indonesian security forces despite their record of repression.

In addition to the relative strength of human rights concerns in government and the continuity of rhetoric between governments, there is a wider issue of how human rights are conceptualised. The FCO's mandate is to promote U.K. interests abroad; it is thus expected to promote both BAE Systems and human rights. The government's conceptualisation of human rights must therefore by necessity avoid any suggestion that the two are incompatible. The wider context of arms sales, that is, the argument that they serve to maintain a repressive military capability in Indonesia intrinsically linked to the integration of the country into the global capitalist order, must be sidelined. The argument put forward here is that human rights violations cannot be adequately understood outside of the social, political and economic context in which they occur. As Robinson argues, structural violence (across the global South but also in parts of the global North) generates collective protest, which is met by the state with repression, which transforms "structural violence into direct violence. The structural violence of the socioeconomic system and violations of human rights are different moments of the same social relations of domination."[108] Understanding human rights violations in this way requires us to focus on the systematic oppression that is a necessary feature of capitalism as a system, rather than the violation of individual (mainly civil and political) rights, and to understand that "[r]epressive practices are a means to an end, the end being the maintenance of some form of political power."[109] Oppression in Indonesia is intrinsically linked to the state's integration into the global capitalist economy (particularly in light of its abundance of natural resources, many of which are located in Aceh, East Timor and West Papua), nationalism and the relations between Jakarta and the regions.[110]

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[108] Robinson, William I. (1999) "Latin American in the Age of Inequality: Confronting the New 'Utopia'", *International Studies Review,* 1(3): 41-67; p. 62.

[109] Desmond, *Persecution East and West,* p.40, 76, 129. Desmond's argument is particularly interesting as he is a former Director of the British section of Amnesty International.

[110] Ross, Michael L. (2004) "What Do We Know About Natural Resources and Civil War?", *Journal of Peace Research,* 41(3): 337-356; Human Rights Watch (1999) "Violence and the Indonesian Elections," http://hrw.org/english/docs/1999/03/18/indone5567_txt.htm (8 November 2006); Aspinall, Edward and Mark T. Berger (2001) "The break-up of Indonesia? Nationalisms after decolonisation and the limits of the nation-state in post-cold war Southeast Asia," *Third World Quarterly,* 22(6): 1003-1024.

Just as the United Kingdom played a key role in facilitating Indonesian military repression during the Suharto era, it has also been involved in post-Suharto transformations. The Foreign Office Annual Report for 2003 states that "serious problems" in the security forces remain, despite improvements in their reputation and professionalism. [111] The U.K. government "continue[s] to help the Indonesian security forces become more professional and democratically accountable through projects funded by our Global Conflict Prevention Pool,"[112] including projects on security sector reform, conflict reduction and conflict prevention in East Timor,[113] human rights training programmes for the Indonesian military, and funding for Peace Brigades International to safeguard NGOs on the ground in Aceh.[114] In addition, a bilateral counter-terrorism relationship involves "capacity building assistance, including training in counter-terrorism crisis management skills."[115] The United Kingdom thus simultaneously encourages professionalisation, security sector reform and NGO activity while transferring weapons to maintain Indonesia's military capability and its ability to carry out operations in Aceh and West Papua.

U.K. human rights initiatives in relation to the Indonesian military and ongoing arms exports can be understood as "controlled demilitarization," that is, as part of a controlled transition from repression to persuasion, which "should not be confused with an intent to eliminate ... coercive capability."[116] Controlled demilitarization is intended to "make military authority subordinate to civilian elites, but *not* to do away with a repressive military apparatus."[117] Militaries are streamlined and brought under greater control but serve as "constabularies able to suppress popular demands and protests against neo-liberalism."[118] This process is underway in Indonesia but, as the example of Aceh demonstrates, the repressive element is still quite dominant.

Interpreting the human rights agenda and changes in Indonesian civil-military relations through the lens of Robinson's polyarchy argument casts a different light on U.K. arms

[111] FCO (2004) *Human Rights Annual Report 2004* (London: The Stationery Office), p.42.
[112] Ibid.,
[113] Rammell, Bill (2002) *Hansard* Written Answers, 6 November 2002, Column 330W.
[114] Bell, *The Global Conflict Prevention Pool*, pp.21-2.
[115] O'Brien, Mike (2003) *Hansard* Written Answers, 23 October 2003, Column 715W.
[116] Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy*, pp. 65-6.
[117] Ibid., p. 66, emphasis in original.
[118] Ibid.

transfers and Criterion Two. It requires that the history of U.K. support for the Suharto regime be brought back into the equation, and that the changes in Indonesia since the fall of Suharto be understood as part of a wider phenomenon, that of promoting political liberalisation rather than military repression in order to facilitate the circulation of capital. The discourse of security sector reform and military professionalisation that is being promoted by international donors such as the United Kingdom thus takes on a different hue, as a newer means of achieving the same end. The human rights agenda and arms sales are two sides of same coin: they are part of a policy of promoting capitalist development peacefully where possible and with force where deemed necessary by elites. Indonesia demonstrates the competing tendencies of capitalist development in terms of the means used to achieve particular ends. Both the promotion of human rights and support for repressive regimes - persuasion where possible, repression where necessary - are therefore aimed at the same goal, namely the protection and promotion of transnational capitalism. In light of this critique of the human rights agenda, the next two sections of the chapter analyse NGO arguments against U.K. arms exports to Indonesia, and their strategies and impacts. NGO arguments revolve around three issues: the role of U.K.-supplied equipment in internal repression; a critique of the "assurances"; and the relationship between arms sales and human rights violations.

NGO arguments against arms exports to Indonesia

Amnesty, CAAT and Saferworld all argue that U.K. arms exports to Indonesia run the risk of being used in internal repression. Amnesty documents the rise of arrest, torture and ill-treatment in Aceh as a result of military rule in 2003[119] and argues that "Military equipment from the U.K., including Hawk jet aircraft and Scorpion tanks, could be used for internal repression in Indonesia."[120] Saferworld cites the use of Scorpions in Aceh in 2003 as a cause for concern and lists the licences granted by the government during the year that are particularly problematic on the government's own terms, including licences for body armour,

[119] Amnesty International (2004) "Indonesia: Human rights sacrificed to security in NAD (Aceh)," 11 May 2004, http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA210182004?open&of=ENG-IDN (10 May 2006).
[120] Amnesty International UK (2003) "Indonesia: UK Equipment could be used for repression," 18 May 2003, http://www.amnesty.org.uk/news/press/14543.shtml (15 May 2006).

components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters and gun silencers.[121] CAAT argues that the FCO knows that equipment such as Alvis Scorpions has been used, and that extra-judicial killings occurred, yet according to Labour, "because no one can *prove* that U.K. equipment *actually* killed people, there is apparently no *risk* that Alvis equipment *might* be used for internal repression."[122]

The three NGOs all situate U.K. arms exports in the wider context of a repressive Indonesian military; of the three, CAAT's argument goes furthest in linking arms exports and repression to capitalist development. In 1997 Amnesty argued (in relation to East Timor) that the Indonesian armed forces "are focused primarily on combating internal dissent rather than external threats" and "play a prominent role in quelling peaceful dissent and, in their handling of violent dissent, they have frequently committed serious human rights violations."[123] However, it did not reiterate or follow up on this argument in 2003 at the time of the Aceh crisis, although it did argue that the United Kingdom had "followed suit" in the U.S.-led "War on Terror" by increasing arms sales to Indonesia between 2000 and 2002.[124] Saferworld calls the rise in licences granted from £2m in 2000 to over £40m in 2002 "very concerning"[125] as it occurred in spite of the "systematic human rights violations" that took place during 2001 and 2002.[126] CAAT argues that U.K. arms exports to Indonesia are not only involved in human rights violations but also help maintain a repressive military capability that has long been in action in East Timor, West Papua and elsewhere in Indonesia, as well as in Aceh, thus linking the events in Aceh in 2003 to longer processes of repression.[127] CAAT concludes that the government is willing to licence spares for equipment used in internal repression; that "past

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121 Isbister, Roy and Elizabeth Kirkham (2005) *An Independent Audit of the UK Government Reports on Strategic Export Controls for 2003 and the first half of 2004* (London: Saferworld), p.50-1.

122 Gilby, Nicholas (2001) "Labour, Arms and Indonesia: Has Anything Changed?" July 2001, http://www.caat.org.uk/publications/countries/labour-indonesia-0701.php (16 May 2006), emphasis in original.

123 Amnesty International (1997) "Indonesia and East Timor: Arms and security transfers undermine human rights," 3 June 1997, http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA210391997?open&of=ENG-390 (27 November 2006).

124 Hillier, Debbie and Brian Wood (2003) *Shattered Lives. The Case for Tough Arms Control* (London and Oxford: Amnesty International and Oxfam), p.42, http://www.controlarms.org/documents/arms_report_full.pdf (30 May 2006).

125 Norton-Taylor, Richard (2003) "Ministers back 20-fold rise in arms sales to Indonesia," *The Guardian*, 2 July 2003, http://www.guardian.co.uk/indonesia/Story/0,,989308,00.html (16 May 2006).

126 Isbister, Roy (2004) *An Independent Audit of the 2002 UK Government Annual Report on Strategic Export Controls* (London: Saferworld), p.142; Saferworld, *An Independent Audit of the 2001 UK Government Annual Report on Strategic Export Controls*, p. 89.

127 CAAT and Tapol (2005) "Arms To Indonesia. CAAT-Tapol Factsheet," December 2005, http://www.caat.org.uk/publications/countries/indonesia-0604.php (15 May 2006).

use by TNI of U.K. or foreign equipment for internal repression has no bearing on licence decisions"; and that "the historic UK policy (Labour and Conservative) of arming the Indonesian military has not changed."[128] The three NGOs share an understanding of a wider context of a repressive military apparatus, but only CAAT links events in East Timor to longer processes and historical U.K. support for the Indonesian military.

The three organisations make a variety of demands on the government as a result of their arguments. In light of reports of U.K.-supplied equipment, Amnesty calls on the U.K. government "to take action *if* export conditions are broken and U.K. arms are used for internal repression or counter-insurgency," although no details of what this action should consist of are given.[129] This call was made in 2003 and the past evidence of the use of U.K.-supplied equipment in internal repression in East Timor begs the question of why Amnesty expects the government to act differently this time. Saferworld argues that, in light of the "high levels of instability and violence occurring across several Indonesian provinces", it would have expected a "selective embargo on the export of all military and police equipment with an obvious application for use in internal repression and a presumption of denial of all other categories of equipment that could be used to facilitate human rights violations" to have been in force in 2003 and the first half of 2004.[130] Saferworld uses the government's own criteria to demonstrate how it believes the government should have acted. This is a strong statement, showing the gap between the rhetoric and practice of U.K. policy but, as is argued later, Saferworld does not follow up with officials to investigate why its anticipated policy was not adopted and why its recommendations are not taken up. CAAT, alongside Tapol, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign, has been calling for a full U.K. and international embargo on military exports to Indonesia since 1976 (when CAAT was formed).[131] It calls for the most

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128 Ibid.

129 Amnesty International UK, "Indonesia: UK Equipment could be used for repression," emphasis added.

130 Isbister and Kirkham, *An Independent Audit of the UK Government Reports on Strategic Export Controls for 2003 and the first half of 2004*, p. 51. Saferworld instituted a change in the format of the *Audit* in 2005. Instead of a lengthy report detailing with a broad range of licences of concern, the *Audit* now pinpoints those cases that give greatest cause for concern. In the 2005 *Audit*, arms exports to Indonesia are analysed under Criterion Three (internal situation) and Criterion Seven (diversion and end-use) but not Criterion Two (human rights). In previous years, exports to Indonesia were analysed under Criterion Two and it can be assumed that, were the extended format still in place, this would be the case for 2003 and 2004.

131 CAAT (no date) "Indonesia", http://www.caat.org.uk/issues/indonesia.php (16 May 2006). For details of what the organisations believe the embargo should cover, see Tapol (2003) "Call for an international military embargo against Indonesia," 23 June 2003, http://tapol.gn.apc.org/news/files/st030623.htm (16 May 2006); email from Ann Feltham to author, 25 May 2006.

drastic response of the three organisations, based on the nature of its understanding of the function of arms exports. In 2003, alongside 89 other signatories, led by Tapol, CAAT renewed its call for an international arms embargo on Indonesia (covering military, security and police equipment and with retrospective application).[132] As an outsider organisation, CAAT does not seek to persuade the government through the provision of expert advice; rather, it attempts to pressure the government into changing by generating scandal about its activity and calling for drastic measures.

The three NGOs occupy a variety of positions on the issue of an arms embargo on Indonesia; CAAT has called for the most comprehensive embargo for the longest time. In 1997, in relation to East Timor, Amnesty called for "a halt to the transfer of a range of military and security equipment and training to Indonesia, including armoured personnel carriers, assault rifles and sub-machine guns, and lethal training for the special forces" because of human rights violations that occurred during the quelling of dissent, the impunity that surrounded this, and the "high potential for misuse" of transferred equipment.[133] In 1999 Amnesty called for "an immediate moratorium on the sale and supply of military equipment and training to Indonesia that could be used to commit human rights violations."[134] In 2000 Amnesty argued that the EU should not lift its arms embargo on Indonesia, belatedly imposed in relation to the security services' behaviour in East Timor; it argued that the ban must not be lifted "for now" and that the EU "must not resume the sale of arms or security equipment likely to be used to commit human rights violations in Indonesia."[135] However, three days after Amnesty made this call, the embargo was lifted.[136] As noted in Chapter Four, Amnesty International is not opposed to arms sales *per se* and only opposes the transfer of military, security and police equipment and other items "where such transfers can reasonably be

132 The organisations also called for the withdrawal of all internationally-supplied military equipment from Aceh, the suspension of all military and police cooperation with Indonesia, and international pressure on the Indonesian government to end the military operations in Aceh and Papua and seek a peaceful resolution to the conflicts there. Tapol (2003) "Call for an international military embargo against Indonesia," 23 June 2003, http://tapol.gn.apc.org/news/files/st030623.htm (16 May 2006).
133 Amnesty International, "Indonesia and East Timor: Arms and security transfers undermine human rights."
134 Amnesty International (UK) (1999) "East Timor: UK Arms Moratorium Needed Now," 7 January 1999, http://www.amnesty.org.uk/news_details.asp?NewsID=13133 (24 May 2006).
135 Amnesty International (2000) "Indonesia: EU ban on military and security exports to Jakarta must not be lifted, for now", 14 January 2000, http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA210042000?open&of=ENG-IDN (27 November 2006).
136 BBC News (2000) "EU lifts arms embargo on Indonesia," 17 January 2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/607230.stm (6 December 2006).

assumed to contribute to human rights violations within AI's mandate."[137] Amnesty thus "does not call for 'comprehensive' arms embargoes unless it can make a reasonable assumption that 'all' the arms likely to be transferred will be used for serious human rights violations."[138]

Saferworld follows a similar approach to Amnesty – in 1999 it called for an immediate EU arms embargo on Indonesia unless it agreed to the deployment of an international peacekeeping force in East Timor. In the Audits of the government's 2000 and 2001 Annual Reports, it states that it would have expected a full embargo to have been in place in relation to exports to Indonesia.[139] In contrast, in 2003 it would have expected a "selective embargo" to have been in place, as noted above. In its analyses of U.K. export policy as a whole, Saferworld seldom calls for a full embargo; this is not its *modus operandi*.[140] Saferworld focuses on specific transfers and on what is happening at a particular time, "but an embargo is a broader brush."[141] Saferworld therefore avoids calling for embargoes as this is deemed overly political.

The question of an arms embargo highlights the differences between Amnesty and Saferworld on the one hand, and CAAT, on the other. In carrying out its campaigning, Amnesty needs to be able to link specific types of equipment to particular human rights violations in order to be able to protest against their use.[142] This has always been a core feature of Amnesty's work on arms issues, and tallies with its wider approach to campaigning, which stipulates that information must be credible and impartial. Saferworld does not have a stated policy of impartiality on arms questions in the way Amnesty does, yet in practice it works in a similar manner, matching types of equipment to violations and calling for restrictions on arms exports tightly matched to the level of violations. The East Timor crisis highlighted the tensions in such an approach. Amnesty faced the difficulty of obtaining reliable evidence of the use of Hawks in East Timor, much of which only emerged two or three years after the atrocities. As one senior Amnesty International Secretariat staffer argued, it was hard to win

137 Email to author from Brian Wood, Manager, Research and Policy on Arms Control and Security, International Secretariat, Amnesty International, 26 May 2006.
138 Ibid.
139 Saferworld (2003) *Independent Audit of 2001 UK Government Annual Report on Strategic Export Controls*, p.91; Saferworld (2002) *Independent Audit of 2000 UK Government Annual Report on Strategic Export Controls* (London: Saferworld), p.87.
140 Telephone interview with Roy Isbister, 25 May 2004.
141 Ibid.
142 Interview with Robert Parker, 5 December 2003.

over parliamentarians: "you have to 'reasonably demonstrate' that it might be used – that's a political reality NGOs have to deal with. Just because we assert it doesn't mean the government should believe it."[143] NGOs such as Amnesty and Saferworld work within the same frame of reference as the government to try to convince it to change its behaviour. This is the essence of an insider approach, demonstrating a "strategy of responsibility", as discussed in Chapter Four, in which NGOs attempt to be taken seriously by government officials, to be understood as reasonable and constructive.[144] A significant effect of such an approach is to replicate the dominant framework for understanding arms export licensing, namely the insistence on hard evidence that U.K.-supplied equipment has actually been used, rather than that there is a risk it might be used, or that supplying a repressive military regime with weaponry at all is problematic. Such an approach leaves NGOs like Amnesty and Saferworld unable to challenge the causes of the suffering they seek to prevent.

Amnesty and Saferworld perpetuate the government's evidence-based approach. In addition, all three NGOs fail to question the wisdom of a case-by-case approach to licensing, even though the Indonesia case is an excellent example of the paucity of such an approach in terms of preventing the use of weaponry in human rights violations. Amnesty and Saferworld themselves use something akin to a case-by-case approach by trying to match particular exports to specific instances of abuses. This is a double-edged sword strategically: it can show the contrast between the government's stated policy and its actions, showing the government's commitments to human rights to be more rhetorical than real; but it also entrenches the idea that such an approach to licensing is adequate. CAAT does not pay any attention to the licensing process itself because it believes it to be politicised and illogical. As one CAAT staff member argued, "If it's not a logical situation it doesn't matter how many civil servants you talk to, because it's a political decision taken higher up."[145] Whilst this signals a refusal to become enmeshed in the government's way of talking about arms exports, the flipside is that CAAT's assertion that human rights concerns play no role in export licensing is easily rebuffed by government and its critics, as it does not address the fact that a consideration of the human

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[143] Telephone interview with Brian Wood, 11 April 2006.
[144] Grant, *Insider Groups*, p.6.
[145] Interview with Ian Prichard, 15 June 2004.

rights implications of licence applications is built in to the licensing process via the role of HRPD.

Political will is the crucial issue and CAAT is right to focus on it. However, whilst CAAT is correct in claiming that the practice of U.K. arms exports does not match the stated policy, the situation is only illogical if one considers the promotion of human rights and restriction of the arms trade to be the real goals of the policy. Understanding policy to be the maximising of exports wherever possible and supporting repressive regimes, the situation is perfectly logical, and Ministers' actions are in line with the policy. As argued earlier in the chapter, the licensing process is perfectly rational and logical in terms of attaining a particular set of values: it is just that CAAT's values are different to those of the elements of government in favour of promoting exports. As one CAAT interviewee argued, "there is a basic moral choice – do you participate in evil? If you sell arms to killers or help them maintain their killing operations then you bear some responsibility for their crimes."[146] Such a statement sums up CAAT's approach on arms exports to Indonesia, signalling an attempt to change the values that inform policy, rather than attempt to improve the processes through which policy is carried out.

In addition to their common argument that U.K. arms exports to Indonesia run the risk of being used in internal repression, Amnesty, CAAT and Saferworld are all critical of the government's claim regarding the "assurances" by which the Indonesian government ostensibly abides. In July 2003 Amnesty wrote to the Trade and Industry Secretary, Patricia Hewitt, asking her to "reveal exactly what end-use commitments were sought before licences were granted for arms exports to Indonesia" and what monitoring of exports takes place.[147] The organisation argues that "We've always suspected that the U.K. government's end-use controls weren't worth the paper they were written on. Now we hear that they are not even written down at all. It is naïve in the extreme if the British government is relying on a 'gentleman's agreement' to ensure that U.K.-supplied arms aren't used for repression in Indonesia."[148] The accusation of naïvete can be taken at face value, in which case it suggests

[146] Email to author from Nicholas Gilby, 13 June 2005.

[147] Amnesty International UK (2003) "Indonesia/Aceh: UK arms may still be used for repression if assurances 'forgotten the next day'," 25 July 2003, http://www.amnesty.org.uk/news/press/14744.shtml (10 May 2006).

[148] Ibid.

that Amnesty itself is naïve to assume that the government does not know what arms exports are being used for; it is more likely that this is mock naïvete, designed to embarrass the government into tougher action. Saferworld lists occasions on which equipment has been used and says that "abuses took place despite the claim by the U.K. Government that assurances had been received from the Indonesian Government that U.K.-built equipment would not be used to commit acts of internal repression."[149] It goes on to argue that Indonesia's track record of use of U.K.-supplied equipment is "a matter of considerable disappointment" and, alongside the military's comments about end-use, "it cannot be expected that existing or further assurances given by the Indonesian Government would be honoured."[150] The expression of disappointment by an insider group is designed to inculcate shame in the government and suggest that tougher action is needed. CAAT goes a step further than both Amnesty and Saferworld and explicitly argues that the assurances are "worthless."[151] It sees them as "a cynical device used to disregard the concerns of human rights groups and victims of Indonesian military violence so that arms companies could continue with business as usual."[152] The NGOs share a common position of scepticism towards the Indonesian government's assurances, challenging one of the U.K. government's key defences of its export record. Of the three, CAAT goes the furthest in its condemnation and is most explicit about the government's wrongdoing.

The third key argument that all the NGOs make is that the sale of weapons to Indonesia undermines the U.K. government's commitment to human rights. Amnesty uses U.K. arms exports to Indonesia between January 2003 and June 2004 as an example of how "G8 member states are undermining their commitments to poverty reduction, stability and human rights with irresponsible arms exports to some of the world's poorest and most conflict-ridden countries."[153] Previously, in 2000 Amnesty argued that, without end-use monitoring of transfers, arms exports to Indonesia "risks making a complete mockery of the

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[149] Isbister and Kirkham, *An Independent Audit of the UK Government Reports on Strategic Export Controls for 2003 and the first half of 2004*, p.75.
[150] Ibid., p. 76.
[151] CAAT (2004) "MPs accuse Government of failing to investigate claims that British arms used to violate human rights in Indonesia," 18 May 2004, http://www.caat.org.uk/press/archive.php?url=180504prs (15 May 2006).
[152] CAAT, "Arms to Indonesia. CAAT-Tapol Factsheet."
[153] Amnesty International (2005) "New report exposes arms exports from UK and other G8 nations fuelling poverty and human rights abuses," 22 June 2005, http://www.amnesty.org.uk/news_details.asp?NewsID=16184 (24 May 2006).

Government's manifesto commitment to a human rights-centred foreign policy."[154] Saferworld makes a similar argument, asking "whether the Government's human rights foreign policy is being undermined by increased arms sales to countries with dubious human rights records."[155] This is in line with the "missing link" argument, detailed in chapters Four and Five. Saferworld argues that: "[c]hanging the approach to arms exports does not require a seismic shift. It is a natural conclusion of the Government's existing policies on human rights and development."[156] Amnesty and Saferworld's arguments assume U.K. foreign policy to be genuinely centred on human rights concerns; in this understanding, a generally benevolent U.K. foreign policy is occasionally and mistakenly marred by controversial exports. Such an understanding is problematic given the United Kingdom's role in events in Indonesia in the last forty years. It also assumes that a radical change in arms export occurred when Labour got into power in 1997, despite the continuity demonstrated earlier in the chapter.

In contrast to Amnesty and Saferworld, CAAT does not assume the U.K. government's foreign and arms export policies to be benevolent. It argues that Labour has made rhetorical commitments to human rights but continued to promote the arms trade to Indonesia, "breaking almost all its 'ethical' guidelines".[157] CAAT emphasises the continuities in British policy between Conservative and Labour governments, which neither Saferworld nor Amnesty address, and understands this as part of an effort to maintain the Indonesian state's territorial integrity and suppress internal dissent in a state rich in natural resources in which Western powers such as the United Kingdom have heavily invested.[158] Although the Suharto regime fell in 1998 and Indonesia now has electoral democracy, the underlying necessity for Indonesia's elite to purchase foreign arms remains intact, according to CAAT, as the vested interests of Indonesian and Western elites remain in place.[159] This claim is the basis of CAAT's understanding of why exports to Indonesia continue to be licensed. As one CAAT volunteer argued, the Indonesian military is "doing a job for Britain," that is, making sure "nothing too

[154] Amnesty International UK (2000) "Urgent Need for UK Arms Export Legislation – Government's Human Rights-Centred Foreign Policy Being Undermined," 20 January 2000, http://www.amnesty.org.uk/deliver/document/14093.html (10 May 2006).
[155] Saferworld (2003) "Government human rights report - Arms sales undermining human rights policy," 18 September 2003, http://www.saferworld.org.uk/PRhumanrights03.htm (20 May 2004).
[156] Saferworld, "The Missing Link?".
[157] Gilby, "Labour, Arms and Indonesia".
[158] Gilby, "Arms Exports to Indonesia."
[159] Interview with Nicholas Gilby, 9 July 2004.

radical" happens, such as Acehnese independence, economic autonomy and nationalisation of its oil companies. In this sense the military "keeps a lid" on the situation in Indonesia and "keeps the capitalist wheel ticking," despite recent moves towards political liberalisation.[160] CAAT thus does more than Amnesty and Saferworld to situate U.K. arms exports in the context of global capitalism, and the importance of coercion to state projects.

NGO strategies and impacts

NGO activity in relation to U.K. arms exports to Indonesia reveals a mix of strategies across organisations. All three NGOs engage with the Quadripartite Committee (the parliamentary committee that scrutinises arms export policy), providing information and opinion in an attempt to influence parliamentary debates about the arms trade. They also all engage in press work, using exports to Indonesia as an example of how government practice does not live up to stated policy. Amnesty and Saferworld engage with civil service officials in an attempt to get their concerns incorporated into the licensing process; this is a mark of their more insider strategy. The key difference between CAAT and the other two organisations is in the outsider elements of its strategy, notably its sustained call for an embargo on arms exports to Indonesia and its support for a judicial review application against the government's arms export policy in relation to Indonesia. This section explores each of the NGOs' strategies in more detail.

Amnesty, CAAT and Saferworld all provide written evidence to the Quadripartite Committee as part of their strategy. In addition, Amnesty and Saferworld (along with Oxfam as another key member of the U.K. Working Group on Arms) have been called as witnesses to give oral evidence to the Committee.[161] This can be characterised as an insider tactic, as it attempts to convince parliamentarians that NGOs have expertise and should be listened to on the issue of arms exports. The Chair of the Committee sees NGOs' role as providing both information and opinion; in doing this, they fill an important resource gap for an under-staffed

[160] Ibid.
[161] NGOs can offer themselves as witnesses, but the Committee chooses who it calls. CAAT has not been excluded from this process; it has not been able to meet the deadline on a couple of occasions. More recently, CAAT has begun to question the effectiveness of the QSC; email to author from Ann Feltham, 1 June 2006.

committee.[162] The Chair argued that the Committee and NGOs are often exercised about the same issues; of the three NGOs, Amnesty and Saferworld have more influence, however, as the Committee "often pursues the U.K. Working Group line word for word."[163] This is proof of success in insiders' terms: it is evidence of what one Amnesty campaigner identified as the main job of the U.K. Working Group, namely providing the government with workable policy solutions.[164]

The Quadripartite Committee has been critical of the government on the issue of arms exports to Indonesia. It found there to be a lack of clarity about the purpose and remit of the supposed assurances, concluding that "without more legal or political backbone, end-use assurances are not worth the paper they are written on."[165] This is a strong statement for a parliamentary committee and NGOs were instrumental in providing evidence and argumentation to the Committee to enable it to reach this conclusion. However, the Committee has limited impact: the Government simply said that it "does not accept" the Committee's conclusion on its explanation of the change in assurances from Indonesia.[166] The role of the Committee is to scrutinise policy rather than make it; to ensure that exports are consistent with the EU Code and with the government's stated policy; to check whether the policy is correct; and to see if monitoring and enforcement provisions are adequate.[167] This retrospective review means Committee intervention cannot stop exports,[168] so its role should be to make sure the government learns lessons from past mistakes, although its ability to do so is limited as the government simply rejects its findings if they are uncomfortable. This signals a key weakness of the Committee.[169] As early as 2000 the Committee stated that under the Labour government there was an absence of "radical or demonstrable change" in policy

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[162] Interview with Roger Berry MP, 24 February 2006.
[163] Ibid.
[164] Interview with Alice Hutchinson, 21 November 2006.
[165] Quadripartite Committee (2004) *Strategic Export Controls – Annual Report for 2002, Licensing Policy and Parliamentary Scrutiny* (London: The Stationery Office), p.30.
[166] MoD et al (2004) *Strategic Export Controls: Annual Report for 2002, Licensing Policy and Parliamentary Scrutiny. Response of the Secretaries of State for Defence, Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, International Development and Trade and Industry*, October 2004, http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/CM6357.pdf (19 May 2006).
[167] Interview with Roger Berry MP, 24 February 2006.
[168] Even on the rare occasion when details of the Tanzania sale emerged prior to the granting of licences, the Committee could not prevent licences being granted.
[169] Relating this to the argument about an MIC in Chapter Three, it suggests that the "civilian-militarist faction" within Parliament (associated with the Defence Committee and individual pro-defence and pro-export MPs) is stronger than the more ambivalent Quadripartite Committee, which is made up of representatives of the Defence, Foreign Affairs, International Development, and Trade and Industry Committees.

towards Indonesia compared to the Conservatives.[170] As argued in Chapter Four, questions must be asked about the effectiveness of the strategy of engaging with the Committee given its weakness and the wider flaws in the licensing system of which it is a part.

In addition to engaging with the Quadripartite Committee, Amnesty and Saferworld also have a limited amount of contact with civil service officials. The FCO consults Amnesty on the human rights situation in a particular country, for example.[171] Saferworld has regular contact with officials across departments who work on arms export control issues. But it does not make the most of these contacts: every year it publishes its *Audit* of the government's annual report, which points out tensions between the governments publicly stated policies and actions, but it does not engage in any follow-up activity with officials to promote its recommendations or attempt to understand why they are not implemented. Amnesty and Saferworld's approach is an insider strategy of bolstering those elements of government most likely to push for the changes they want to see. Through insider strategies, they provide information and policy suggestions about U.K. arms exports to government and parliament, but this information does not translate into policy because the political actors they work with are institutionally weaker than those that set the parameters of defence industrial and export policy. Of the three organisations, CAAT has the least contact with civil servants, mainly because of its emphasis on cultivating public opinion as a means of change. In June 2004, however, CAAT, along with Tapol, was invited to the FCO to discuss arms exports to Indonesia because the controversy surrounding them was politically embarrassing for the government.[172] This is an indicator of the irritant effect that CAAT's outsider strategy has had on government, in that civil servants felt the need to meet with campaigners to try to explain the civil service view and satisfy their concerns so they would stop challenging the government. However, the meeting did not generate change in either the policy or process of arms export licensing.

All three organisations also undertake media work, which can serve as an element in either an insider or outsider strategy. They all use examples of particular exports, or the

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[170] Norton-Taylor, Richard (2000) "MPs hit at weapon exports policy and secrecy," *The Guardian*, 12 February 2000, http://www.guardian.co.uk/ethical/article/0,,192036,00.html (16 May 2006).
[171] Interview with Rob Parker, 5 December 2003.
[172] Interview with Nicholas Gilby, 9 July 2004.

occasion of the publication of the government's Annual Report, as an opportunity to register concern at the continued export of weaponry to Indonesia that can be used in internal repression. The language of press releases gives a guide to their strategies they are part of. For example, in a typically-worded press release, Saferworld says: "It is simply not joined-up government that we can be authorising some of these exports to the very countries whose human rights performance we are so strongly criticising. The Government must take greater responsibility for where weapons end up after they leave these shores."[173] This serious yet restrained wording is in line with Saferworld's insider approach; media work is thus used to create pressure for Saferworld's technical suggestions to be implemented. Amnesty says of arms exports to Indonesia that "There will be more blood on British hands, if reports are correct and U.K. arms are being used for repression by one of the world's most notorious armed forces in Indonesia."[174] This invokes U.K. responsibility for violations committed far away, and is a stronger political statement that Saferworld's; it is also quite an emotive statement for Amnesty, which further suggests that arms campaigning is indicative of the tensions between keepers of the flame and reformers within the movement. As Martin Ennals, first Secretary-General of Amnesty International argues, "The only power which an organization such as AI can hope to exercise is that of publicity or the threat of publicity."[175] Media work, based on credible, evidence-based arguments, is thus one of the most powerful tools at Amnesty's disposal, and is used to back up the insider work done through engagement with the Quadripartite Committee. CAAT says the government is "openly breaching" the principles it claims to abide by[176] and has "ignored" human rights in the relaxation of assurances.[177] This is an outsider strategy that directly challenges the government's representation of the issue. Regardless of the strategy, the messages broadcast by NGOs through the media signal to government that its behaviour is being monitored; the wording and tone of the messages coming from Amnesty and CAAT are more confrontational than that of Saferworld.

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173 Saferworld (2005) "Arms sales undermine human rights and anti-proliferation policies of Government," 21 July 2005, http://www.saferworld.org.uk/pressresult.php?id=251&lang=en (1June 2006).
174 Amnesty International (2003) "Indonesia: UK equipment could be used for repression."
175 Ennals, "Amnesty International and Human Rights," p.79.
176 CAAT (2006) "New government report shows UK sold arms to 80% of world's conflict zones in 2005", 31 March 2006, http://www.caat.org.uk/press/archive.php?url=310306prs (1 June 2006)..
177 CAAT (2004) "Government ignored human rights when relaxing conditions for use of UK arms in Indonesia", 26 October 2004, http://www.caat.org.uk/press/archive.php?url=261004prs (1 June 2006).

One tactic adopted by CAAT but not Amnesty or Saferworld was its support for an application for judicial review of U.K. arms exports to Indonesia in 2004.[178] The application was made by Aguswandi, an Acehnese human rights defender working in the United Kingdom for Tapol, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign. Aguswandi sought to challenge the U.K. government's actions, arguing that it "is not complying with its own stated policy and that the grant of export licences is unlawful".[179] CAAT supported this action by providing evidence to back up the application for judicial review. However, the application was dismissed from the High Court as the judge claimed to be "satisfied that, in reviewing each export licence application, Patricia Hewitt, the trade and industry secretary, was committed to granting licences only if the criteria were met."[180] This assumes the government's statements about how it regulates arms exports to be true and the process to be effective, rather than test both these issues. The failure of the application shows the power of the government in defining problems: the government claims to act in good faith and does not provide evidence of how it operates; therefore it claims there is no reason to doubt it. CAAT's outsider strategy of challenging the government on its own terms failed; however, bringing it to court imposed costs on the government and brought the issue to media and public attention.

CAAT's participation in the judicial review attempt is indicative of its long-standing relationship with Tapol, a U.K.-based human rights organisation established by a former Indonesian political prisoner, with links to Acehnese movements such as Kontras (Commission for the Disappeared and Victims of Violence, a Jakarta-based human rights organisation). All three NGOs obtain information from Tapol, but CAAT has the closest relationship with it. Although Amnesty is a self-styled transnational social movement, it has no section in Indonesia, and the Asia Pacific section has no office there. The International Secretariat conducts field research: country researchers, and sometimes MSP researchers, go "on mission" to gather testimony and talk to local NGOs.[181] But the Indonesia and Timor

[178] CAAT had also previously made its own application for judicial review in 1996, alongside Tapol and World Development Movement. This was the first ever legal challenge to U.K. arms export policy, and it failed. This chapter uses the 2004 attempt as an example as it focused on the Aceh case. One of the differences between the two attempts was that in 2004, there was direct evidence of the use of U.K.-supplied equipment in Aceh.
[179] The Queen on the Application of Aguswandi vs. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Additional Material for the Claim Form, 2003.
[180] Press Association, "High court rejects challenge to UK arms sales to Indonesia", 29 March 2004, *The Guardian*, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk_news/story/0,,1180541,00.html (15 May 2006).
[181] Interview with Alice Hutchinson, 21 November 2006.

Leste team have not done much work on MSP in the last ten years – the current team has never conducted research on MSP and there are no plans to do so before at least 2008.[182] So Amnesty does not have as much contact with Indonesian activists as we might expect it to; CAAT does the most to enact practical grassroots solidarity.

The impact of NGO activity on U.K. arms exports to Indonesia has been mixed. The most obvious indicator of impact is the level of arms sales to Indonesia. Indonesia has long been a significant customers of U.K. arms exports; as argued earlier in the chapter, any drop in licences is related in part to the fact that Indonesia has already imported large amounts of weaponry and only need components and spares to maintain its existing arsenal. Given that licences for equipment that might be used in internal repression continues to be licensed to Indonesia, NGOs cannot be said to have challenged the operation of U.K. policy. However, NGO activity has helped bring the issue of arms exports into the public domain. Indeed, much of the material in the first section on U.K. exports to Indonesia comes from the NGOs. They have also forced the government to justify its exports and can take credit for ensuring that arms exports to Indonesia remain politically controversial. The fact that ministers have to sign off on all licences to Indonesia is an indication of the sensitivity of Indonesia as an arms destination. NGO pressure ensures that the government knows its activity is being monitored. This serves the important function of making it costly for the government to do what it wants to do.

Not all types of pressure have the same effect, however, and Saferworld and Amnesty have significant reputational capital amongst civil servants and policymakers that CAAT does not have. Amnesty, for example, is seen by civil servants as credible because it "has checks and balances" that mean its information can be trusted, whereas Tapol (and by extension, CAAT) "isn't the same sort of information."[183] Raising the profile of exports to Indonesia and planting them firmly on the political agenda is an important first step in significantly reducing or ending U.K. arms exports to Indonesia. Yet it is only a first step, and the atrocities in East Timor, and the ferocity of Indonesian repression in Aceh and West Papua combined with years of NGO

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182 Email to author from Francesco Guzzardi, Research and Campaigns Assistant, Indonesia and Timor Leste, Asia Pacific Programme, International Secretariat, Amnesty International, 23 November 2006.
183 Interview with AS37, 17 March 2005.

activity have failed to generate a significant change in U.K. export policy. Whilst Amnesty and Saferworld attempt to use the existing policy process to push for incremental change, they have no critique of why their detailed arguments have not had any effect. CAAT, in contrast, aims to have impact on government through public pressure rather than predominantly through engagement in the policy process, attempting to use the democratic process to force the government to change.

The reputational capital that Amnesty and Saferworld have with government is directly linked to their claim of a non-political approach to the arms trade. That is, the relationship between arms exports, military repression and the global capitalist system – even if it were articulated as such in interviews, which it was not – is not something Amnesty and Saferworld would focus on in their work, because of their supposedly apolitical approach and insider strategy that attempts to take policymakers from where they are to where NGOs want them to be. Thus, whilst there are potential affinities between Amnesty and Saferworld's arguments, and those of CAAT, such as the agreement between them that the Indonesian military has a history of systematic human rights violations and internal repression, these cannot be made explicit because of the differences in the NGOs' broader understandings and their strategies. Amnesty and Saferworld's claim to a non-political approach to the arms trade is itself a political position, but CAAT's stance puts it beyond the pale for other NGOs and civil servants. This signals a significant disciplining of civil society: Amnesty and Saferworld cannot, or will not, discuss the wider context of arms exports because of the loss of reputation and access (and funding in the case of Saferworld) this would entail – even if they were to want to make such an argument. CAAT's strategy, in contrast, does not rely on kudos with, access to, or funding from the state. Whilst CAAT has been as unsuccessful as the other NGOs in stopping arms exports to Indonesia, its arguments and strategy demonstrate greater counter-hegemonic potential.

In return for its efforts, CAAT has been subject to considerable political interference. During the 1990s, around the time that CAAT was campaigning against the export of Hawks to Indonesia, spies were infiltrated into the campaign group by Evelyne Le Chene, who was paid to do so by BAE Systems. Thus, when CAAT instructed solicitors to seek judicial review against the government for its arms exports to Indonesia, "BAE was alerted to the contents of

a letter sent by the firm to the then trade minister, Ian Lang" and a letter by Foreign Office minister Jeremy Hanley to CAAT regarding arms sales to Indonesia was also obtained by BAE, which then used the information to remain one step ahead of campaigners when lobbying in parliament.[184] Thus, whilst the Director of Saferworld gets an MBE for his efforts, CAAT gets infiltrated by one of the world's largest arms companies. This has a dual effect: it obviously dents the ability of the campaign group to be effective, as arms companies (and by extension, the state, given the relationship between them) know what they are planning; and infiltration creates suspicion and mistrust within campaign groups, a likely secondary aim of such activities. But it also signals the effectiveness of CAAT in one sense: that a major corporation, with unparalleled access to the state apparatus, felt the need to infiltrate a small, transparent, non-violent campaign group is a signal of the political sensitivity of what CAAT is doing.

Conclusion

The arguments made by Amnesty, CAAT and Saferworld about U.K. arms exports to Indonesia show a number of points of convergence. All three NGOs argue that exports run the risk of being used in internal repression, that the assurances given by the Indonesian government do not function to restrict the use of weaponry, and that exports undermine the government's declared policy on human rights. CAAT takes its argument furthest, linking arms exports to the wider context of a repressive Indonesian military operating in the interests of transnational capital, and motivated by its opposition to the arms trade *per se*. This is reinforced by its outsider strategy, in which it uses confrontational language, calls for more drastic measures (such as an embargo) and takes more challenging measures (such as supporting the judicial review attempt) than either Amnesty or Saferworld, which are unable or unwilling to do the same. For example, whilst Amnesty similarly points to the responsibility of the U.K. government for human rights violations in Indonesia because of its arms export policy – thus challenging commonplace understandings of North-South relations that assume the problems of the South to be unconnected to the North and the interaction between the two – it does not explicitly articulate the capitalist context as part of the problem. This is part of its attempt at an impartial approach to the problem of human rights abuses. Whilst Amnesty and Saferworld

[184] Insight (2003) "How the woman at no. 27 ran spy network for an arms firm", *The Times Online*, 28 September 2003, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/printFriendly/0,,1-523-833505,00.html (6 December 2006).

challenge the government, they do not step significantly outside the parameters of its argument. Their approach reinforces the assumption that the problem of the arms trade is one of the implementation of existing policy and that human rights violations in Indonesia are unconnected to the development of the capitalist system. They thus separate human rights violations from the capitalist system and Indonesia's interaction with the global North, contributing to hegemonic understandings of both the arms trade and human rights. This is in contrast to CAAT, which has greater counter-hegemonic potential based on the nature of its arguments and the strategy it uses to operationalise them.

Chapter Seven

Conflict prevention concerns in the arms trade: the case of small arms and light weapons

Introduction

Small arms and light weapons (SALW)[1] emerged as an issue on the international security agenda in the 1990s and since then, significant efforts have been made by states, intergovernmental organisations and NGOs to combat their spread and misuse. One of the dominant themes of international action on SALW is that of conflict prevention; the spread of SALW is widely understood to hamper development, which is said to threaten security and make conflict more likely. The U.K. state and U.K.-based NGOs – in particular Saferworld and International Alert, but also Amnesty International and Oxfam – are key actors on SALW issues, funding and implementing numerous projects in the global South and pushing for stronger international controls on their supply. Simultaneously, the United Kingdom is a second-tier producer and exporter of SALW, licensing weapons, components and ammunition to states around the world including, in some instances, those engaged in conflict. This chapter analyses the role of conflict prevention concerns in both the export of SALW from the United Kingdom and the SALW control programmes that the government runs abroad, and examines NGO arguments, strategies and impacts in relation to this.

The argument put forward in this chapter is that there are two sets of practices associated with SALW and conflict: the ongoing export of SALW to states engaged in internal conflict; and SALW clean-up programmes in various parts of the global South, particularly Sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe and Asia. These practices are facilitated by a discourse that associates the illicit spread of SALW with underdevelopment and the increased potential for, and lethality of, conflict. The emphasis on the *illicit* trade keeps the legal trade, possession and use of weapons off the agenda; this silence facilitates the ongoing export of SALW to states deemed to be facing an internal threat. The liberal assumptions on which this discourse is based serve to delegitimise non-state violence in the global South and facilitate intervention

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[1] The term "small arms and light weapons" covers military-style weapons and commercial firearms and includes weapons that can be carried and used by either a single person or several people serving as a crew. This follows the guidelines set out in the 1997 UN *Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms;* Small Arms Survey (2001) *Small Arms Survey 2001. Profiling the Problem* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p.8.

by states and NGOs. The two sets of practices associated with SALW are not contradictory; rather, they are both elements of an attempt to maintain transnational capitalist hegemony. The removal of weapons from societies is one element of the promotion of good governance and polyarchic social relations in some parts of the global South; however, where this is deemed too risky, militarily repressive capabilities are maintained in order to stabilise state regimes and/or promote transnationalising capitalism. Analysis of NGOs' arguments and strategies on SALW issues demonstrates that they share the government's understanding of conflict prevention. Indeed, a number of them contribute significant intellectual and practical resources to this understanding. NGOs are integrated into state practices to a significant degree, much more so than on issues in the wider arms trade. NGOs' role in buttressing, and often significantly extending, a liberal understanding of conflict prevention that simultaneously tries to contain conflict in the South, transform Southern societies, and maintain repressive state capacities, is evidence of their limited counter-hegemonic potential. The chapter proceeds in five parts, analysing government declaratory policy and practice with regard to conflict prevention concerns in SALW export licensing and SALW clean-up programmes in the global South, relations between branches of the state and capital, a critique of the conflict prevention agenda, NGO arguments in relation to SALW, and NGO strategies and impacts in this case.

Government declaratory policy and practice

The Labour government claims to be committed to preventing the spread of SALW because "easy access to these weapons exacerbates conflicts, facilitates violent crime and terrorism, thwarts post-conflict reconstruction and undermines long-term sustainable development."[2] It established a Small Arms Policy Committee on coming into power in 1997, comprising representatives from FCO, MoD, DTI, DfID and HM Customs and Excise. The Committee has the objectives of "combating illicit trafficking in SALW ... pursuing a responsible and transparent policy on legal transfers ... promoting the removal and, where possible, destruction of surplus weapons from affected societies."[3] In addition, the United

[2] DfID, FCO, MoD (2002) *Small Arms and Light Weapons. A Policy Briefing* (London: DfID), p. 2.
[3] Ibid., p. 5; FCO (no date) "The Global Problem of Small Arms and Light Weapons – The contribution of the UK Government", http://www.fco.gov.uk (28 July 2004).

Kingdom has pledged to assist other countries in reducing demand for weapons.[4] Government declaratory policy on SALW thus revolves around three core issues of supply, availability and demand.

The U.K. government presents its commitments on SALW as part of its "wider conflict prevention, poverty reduction and defence diplomacy policy and programmes."[5] There is a common understanding of the threat posed by SALW across government departments: they are deemed to "fuel conflict, crime, terrorism, human rights abuses and pose a major obstacle to sustainable development," with the demand for weapons often "symptomatic of the underdevelopment of society."[6] In this understanding, poverty is linked to the emergence of conflict, which in turn further hampers development. SALW, whilst not the cause of conflict, are understood to exacerbate it and fuel drug smuggling, criminality and terrorism, and to be linked to resource exploitation.[7] According to the government, it is important to check the spread of SALW not only because of the suffering it causes in the developing world but because it is in western interests as well: "We are all linked up in the turbulence and disorder and criminality and suffering that results from this flow of small arms and light weapons across the world."[8] SALW are thus understood to pose a threat not only to those living in the global South but also to those in the global North via the spillover of conflict and violence.

The U.K. government has made public commitments to address the supply of SALW, pursue a responsible policy with regard to its own exports and refuse licences for exports which would provoke, prolong or aggravate armed conflict. Criterion Three of the

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4 FCO, "The Global Problem of Small Arms and Light Weapons." See also DfID (no date) "UK Policy and Strategic Priorities on Small Arms and Light Weapons 2004-2006", http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/policysmallarmsweapons.pdf; and FCO (2006) "Conflict Prevention – Small Arms and Light Weapons," June 2006, www.fco.gov.uk (both 28 June 2006).
5 FCO, "Conflict Prevention – Small Arms and Light Weapons."
6 Amos, Valerie, Jack Straw and Adam Ingram (2003) "Ministerial Foreword", in DfID, *Strengthening International Export Controls of Small Arms and Light Weapons. Implementing the UN Programme of Action*, Lancaster House, London, 14-15 January 2003, (London: DfID), p.3; FCO (no date) "Small Arms and Light Weapons – A Serious Global Problem", http://www.fco.gov.uk (28 July 2004); DfID et al, *Small Arms and Light Weapons*, p. 3.
7 FCO, "Small Arms and Light Weapons – A Serious Global Problem"; DfID et al, *Small Arms and Light Weapons;* Short, Clare (2003) "Small Arms and Light Weapons", Speech, Lancaster House, 14 January 2003, http://62.189.42.51.DFIDstage/news/Speeches/files/sp14jan03.html (28 July 2004); DfID et al, *Small Arms and Light Weapons*, p.3.
8 Short, "Small Arms and Light Weapons", Lancaster House Speech.

government's arms export guidelines states that "The Government will not issue licences for exports which would provoke or prolong armed conflicts or aggravate existing tensions or conflicts in the country of final destination."[9] This commitment applies to SALW as much as to other categories of military and dual-use equipment. The table below details number of SALW licensed and delivered between 1997 and 2005.

Table 2: SALW licences and exports 1997-2005[10]

Year	**No. of SALW licensed under SIELs**	**No. of OIELs covering SALW, components and/or ammunition**	**Number of SALW exported[11]**
2005	35,940	217	7,226[12]
2004	64,565	440	28,765
2003	18,166	310	5,505
2002	50,227	1,017	2,727[13]
2001	33,473	686	8,160
2000	39,661	947	8,564[14]
1999	No information	793	14,471[15]
1998	No information	650	6,749
2 May-31Dec 1997	No information	92	12,548

Table 2 demonstrates the overall levels of SALW licences and exports under New Labour. Whilst the number of weapons licensed (second column) is considerably higher than the number of weapons exported (fourth column), the former is indicative of the levels of

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9 MoD et al, *The Consolidated Criteria*, p. 413.

10 Information compiled from country destinations listed in U.K. Government *Strategic Export Controls. Annual Reports.* Data for SIELs covers permanent licences for complete weapons; data for OIELs covers permanent licences for complete weapons, replicas, components, technology, equipment and ammunition.

11 These figures are listed by the government as exports of "Other weapons including Small Arms" and so may be an over-estimation.

12 Includes 3,200 AK47s transferred to the Iraqi Security Forces as a gift from the U.K. government (alongside two million rounds of ammunition) through the Global Conflict Prevention Pool, and eight MP5 pistols gifted to the Iraqi police through the Police Mentoring contract, as part of a £2.5m package; FCO et al, *UK Strategic Export Controls. Anual Report 2005* (London: The Stationery Office), p.33

13 Includes 50 general purpose machine guns exported to Sierra Leone under a Government to Government deal; details of this are given separately in FCO et al, *UK Strategic Export Controls. Anual Report 2002* (London: The Stationery Office).

14 Includes 4,550 surplus self-loading rifles exported to Sierra Leone in a Government to Government deal; details of this are given separately in the FCO et al, *UK Strategic Export Controls. Anual Report 2000* (London: The Stationery Office).

15 Includes 10,000 surplus self-loading rifles exported to Sierra Leone in a Government to Government deal; details of this are given separately in the FCO et al, *UK Strategic Export Controls. Anual Report 1999* (London: The Stationery Office).

weaponry the government is prepared to export: it is thus a good indication of policy. There is also a transparency issue, in that export data is calculated on the basis of EC tariff codes, and not the Military List codes used by the government to present data on licences. Figures for licences and exports are thus not directly comparable. More significant than the number of SALW licensed under SIELs, however, is the large number of open licences (OIELs) granted (third column). These licences have no upper limit on the number of SALW transferred. Since 2003, the government has given details of dealer-to-dealer OIELs, which authorise U.K.-registered firearms dealers to export certain categories of firearms and ammunition to other registered firearms dealers in the EU. These are not listed under each destination but significantly increase the number of OIELs for SALW being granted.[16]

The number of SALW licensed is thus likely to be considerably higher than the figures in Table 2 suggest. The *Small Arms Survey* labels the United Kingdom as the world's second largest exporter of military SALW through customs in 1999, when pistols and revolvers worth US$565,831 and military weapons worth US$32,897,040 were exported.[17] This is despite claims that the United Kingdom is not a major producer of SALW and that its exports are "miniscule".[18] It thus seems that there are unknown, but potentially high, levels of SALW exports from the United Kingdom. The scale of exports is also unclear because of a lack of transparency regarding the trade in components. Oxfam identified a four-fold increase in the granting of SIELs and 11-fold increase in OIELs for components for assault rifles between 1998 and 2002.[19] However, SALW components are not included in data on physical exports from the United Kingdom.[20] Selective reporting means that "British involvement in the small arms trade may appear less significant than in fact it is," according to Oxfam.[21]

In addition to the (potential) scale of exports, there are recipients of U.K.-produced SALW that are problematic on the government's own terms but which are excluded from the

[16] In 2003, 29 OIELs were issued and were valid for the 14 EU member states; in 2004, 6 OIELs for 14 states were issued in the first quarter of the year, prior to EU enlargement, and 22 OIELs for 24 states were issued for the remaining three quarters of the year; in 2005, 26 OIELs, valid for 24 EU states, were issued.
[17] Small Arms Survey (2002) *Small Arms Survey 2002. Counting the Human Cost* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p.116.
[18] Interview with AS29, 12 July 2004.
[19] Sprague, *Lock, Stock and Barrel*, p.4, 14-5.
[20] Ibid., p.15.
[21] Ibid., p.6

conflict prevention agenda because it is claimed they are fighting insurgencies or terrorism. Exports to states such as Turkey, Morocco and Nepal, for example, continue, with human rights violations deemed an unfortunate side-effect rather than an intrinsic part of the conflict: this is not the type of conflict the conflict prevention agenda is designed to prevent. Details of the government's export record to these states can be found in Appendix 2. The Labour government has supplied SALW, components and/or ammunition (as well as other major conventional weaponry) to Turkey every year since 1997, often under OIELs, despite armed conflict between the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and Turkish government between 1984 and 1999, and ongoing human rights violations by the Turkish military and repression of the Kurdish population since 1999.[22] Morocco receives U.K. SALW despite its occupation of Western Sahara since 1975, an act that the U.K. government does not recognise.[23] The FCO emphasises the right to "self-determination of the people of Western Sahara" and has "called upon the Morocco parties to deal with outstanding human rights issues" in 2003, the same year that it licensed 200 submachine guns to Morocco.[24] Earlier, in 1998, the government granted a licence for the refurbishment of Moroccan guns in Western Sahara (supplied by Royal Ordnance in 1977-8, a company at the time state-owned but privatised and sold to BAE Systems in 1987), despite the existence of a UN-sponsored ceasefire between the Moroccan state and the Polisario Front. The U.K. government stated that "The UN told FCO officials in April 1999 that refurbishment could be considered as neutral",[25] a claim subsequently denied by the United Nations.[26] And U.K. exports of SALW (and other military equipment) to Nepal continue despite conflict between the Nepalese state and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN (M)), and high levels of human rights violations committed by state security

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[22] See, for example, Amnesty International (2002) "Turkey", *Amnesty International Annual Report 2002,* http://web.amnesty.org/web/ar2002.nsf/eur/turkey!Open, and US Department of State (2001) "Turkey", http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/eur/8358.htm (28 July 2006). On Turkey's conflict with and human rights abuses against the Kurdish population, and US diplomatic and military support for this, see Chomsky, Noam (1999) *The New Military Humanism. Lessons from Kosovo* (London: Pluto Press), pp. 52-62.

[23] Western Sahara Campaign UK (2000) "Memorandum submitted by the Western Sahara Campaign UK", Defence Select Committee Minutes of Evidence, 3 November 1999, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199899/cmselect/cmdfence/541/9110332.htm (1 August 2006).

[24] FCO (2003) *Human Rights. Annual Report 2003* (London: The Stationery Office); p.139

[25] Wilson, Brian (2001) "Arms Exports (Western Sahara)", *Hansard,* Written Answers 1 March 2001, Column 735W-736W.

[26] BBC (2001) Transcript of "Newsnight investigation into arms sales", 8 March 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/events/newsnight/1211849.stm (1 August 2006).

forces.[27] In 2001, the government licensed 6,780 assault rifles for export to Nepal.[28] Since September 2001, SALW exports to Nepal have been facilitated by the discourse of the "War on Terror" and the construction of internal conflict in Nepal as an issue of terrorism.[29]

Given the U.K. government's proclaimed commitment to conflict prevention and recognition of the particular threats posed by SALW, continued exports of SALW to states such as Turkey, Morocco and Nepal seem anomalous. If we understand state engagement in armed conflict against its own population to be excluded from the discourse of conflict prevention, however, then these exports are explicable. State sovereignty allows states to engage in conflict with sections of their own population and be supported in this by other states via the supply of weaponry. Rather than mistakes in the implementation of policy, exports to these states are exempt from the discourse of conflict prevention. As the next section demonstrates, the SALW agenda is aimed largely at removing weapons from non-state actors across Sub Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe and Asia and shoring up states' hold on the means of violence.

U.K. government practice on SALW control in the global South occurs largely under the umbrella of the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons, in All Its Aspects (hereafter, Programme of Action), and the U.K. government's Global and Africa Conflict Prevention Pools. The Programme of Action was agreed at the 2001 UN Conference on the Illicit Traffic in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects (hereafter, UN Conference) and forms the main reference point

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[27] On conflict in Nepal and SALW see Amnesty International (2004) *Undermining Global Security: the European Union's arms exports* (London: Amnesty International), Amnesty International (2005) *Nepal: Military assistance contributing to grave human rights violations*, http://www.amnesty.org.uk/news_details.asp?NewsID=16170, and Amnesty International (2003) *Catalogue of Failures: G8 Arms Exports and Human Rights Violations* (London: Amnesty International), pp. 48-9.

[28] It appears that this licence may have been granted to take advantage of the German government's decision to refuse a licence the export of rifles to Nepal on human rights grounds; Amnesty International (2004) *Undermining Global Security*, pp. 4-5.

[29] Small Arms Survey (2003) *Small Arms Survey 2003. Development Denied* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 97. Exports of equipment other than SALW have also been legitimised by the "War on Terror" discourse. For example, between 2000 and 2005, helicopters, spare parts for Ferret Scout cars, and short take off and landing (STOL) aircraft were transferred to Nepal by the U.K. government as a gift under the Global Conflict Prevention Pool; Alexander, Douglas (2005) *Hansard*, Written Answers, 8 February 2005, Column, 1460W. There have been suggestions that Blair rushed the proposal through parliament just before its recess because of dispute over the transfer within the Cabinet. Hencke, David (2002) "Blair 'sneaked aid to Nepal military'", *The Guardian*, 5 August 2002.

around which debate regarding SALW is structured. The parameters of debate at the Conference were limited by states such as the USA, with its insistence that the conference only tackle the illicit transfer of military-style weapons, keeping both the legal trade and civilian possession off the agenda. The USA also vetoed any discussion of restrictions on transfers of SALW to non-state actors.[30] Agreement on the Programme of Action only came about after a number of African states backed down over the need to regulate civilian possession and transfers to non-state actors. States such as China, Cuba and several Arab states also stymied the conference, but the USA was the most vocal and inflexible of critics.[31] The Programme of Action thus frames the threat posed by SALW as emerging from the trade in illicit weapons.[32] As part of its commitments under the UN Programme of Action, the U.K. government has undertaken international advocacy and research on SALW issue,[33] but its main activity is assistance to other states in implementing the Programme of Action, such as funding weapons and ammunition destruction and training in Latin America, East Africa, the Caribbean, Southern Africa and South Eastern Europe.[34]

The Global and Africa Conflict Prevention Pools were established in 2001 to facilitate joint policies and coordinate work across government departments.[35] As part of the government's efforts at coherent, cross-departmental working, SALW control programmes are closely associated with the promotion of good governance and poverty reduction initiatives. The Global Pool takes the lead on policy development and "works closely with NGOs, governments, regional organisations and the UN to develop and implement targeted strategies

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[30] Stohl, Rachel (2001) "United States Weakens Outcome of UN Small Arms and Light Weapons Conference", *Arms Control Today*, September 2001, pp. 34-35; p.34; Krause, Keith (2002) "Multilateral Diplomacy, Norm Building, and UN Conferences: The Case of Small Arms and Light Weapons", *Global Governance*, 8, 247-263; p.247.

[31] Stohl, "United States Weakens Outcome of UN Small Arms and Light Weapons Conference"; Krause, "Multilateral Diplomacy, Norm Building, and UN Conferences", p.247.

[32] United Nations (2001) *Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects,* http://disarmament.un.org/cab/poa.html (2 August 2006).

[33] For example, it has sought international agreement on common standards on export, import and transhipment of SALW, through the Transfer Control Initiative meeting held January 2003; United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations (no date) "UK Implementation of and Support For the UN Programme of Action on SALW", http://www.ukun.org/UNPoA.pdf (16 June 2006); Johnson, Simon (2005) "UK Implementation and Support For the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons", April 2005, http://disarmament.un.org/cab/nationalreports/2005/UKCover%20note%20for%20SALW%20RETURN%20 2005%20II.pdf (1 August 2006).

[34] Kytömäki, Elli and Valerie Yankey-Wayne (2006) *Five Years of Implementing the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons* (Geneva: UNIDIR), p. 166.

[35] Bell, *The Global Conflict Prevention Pool,* p. 3-5.

for reducing the damage caused by armed violence and gun misuse"[36] as part of a "comprehensive and sustained response from the international community" across issues such as human rights, humanitarian aid, post conflict reconstruction, development programmes, security sector reform, gun control and law enforcement.[37] The Global Pool provides financial support to the UN Development Programme (UNDP) for weapons collection, management and destruction programmes in places as diverse as Albania, Niger, Congo Brazzaville, Somalia, the Balkans, the Great Lakes, Angola, Central African Republic, Chad, Macedonia and Papua New Guinea.[38] The Pool is also used to support the development of National Focal Points and National Action Plans on SALW in Mozambique, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, which are designed to monitor the illicit trade, improve stockpile management and security, and improve national legislation on the domestic manufacture, production, export, import and transfer of SALW.[39]

The analysis put forward in the chapter thus far demonstrates two trends in U.K policy regarding SALW: ongoing exports to states engaged in internal conflict and attempts to remove weapons from societies and create a state monopoly on violence in regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe and Asia. The dominant discourse on SALW situates them as a threat within a wider conflict-development nexus, from which states such as Turkey, Morocco and Nepal are excluded by definitional fiat. These two trends are not contradictory, however. First, echoing Cooper's argument about conflict goods, action on the illicit trade in SALW is "constructed within the same statist paradigm that legitimizes the sale of arms to governments on the grounds that states have a right to self-defence."[40] Second, in line with Robinson's argument concerning polyarchy, weapons will be exported where a repressive capacity needs to be maintained for regime stability, and removed from society where polyarchic alternatives are preferred by aid donors. Attempts to control the illicit trade in

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[36] Ibid., p.33.
[37] DfID et al, *Small Arms and Light Weapons,* p.4.
[38] DfID, "UK Policy and Strategic Priorities on Small Arms and Light Weapons 2004-2006"; FCO et al (1999) *Annual Report on Strategic Export Controls 1998* (London: The Stationery Office), p. 5; FCO (no date) "UK Small Arms and Light Weapons Projects", http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1041606196605 (28 June 2006)
[39] United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations, "UK Implementation of and Support For the UN Programme of Action on SALW"; DfID (no date) "UK Policy and Strategic Priorities on Small Arms and Light Weapons 2004-2006."
[40] Cooper, Neil (2002) "State Collapse as Business: The Role of Conflict Trade and the Emerging Control Agenda", *Development and Change,* 33(5): 935-955, p. 948.

SALW in the global South and the promotion of SALW exports to authoritarian states are two sides of the same coin. Maintenance of states' repressive capabilities and control of the illicit trade both contribute to stability in the global South, defined as the creation of conditions conducive to the circulation of capital.

Relations between branches of the state and capital

This section examines the relationships between the state and arms capital, and between branches of the state in order to understand U.K. involvement in the SALW trade and its control. The extent and nature of the SALW industry and trade – in its legal, illicit and illegal forms[41] – is incredibly difficult to assess. Not only is there extensive craft production and illicit trade, but data on legal, state-sanctioned production and transfers is also hard to come by. The Small Arms Survey, a Geneva-based academic think tank, estimates that SALW are legally produced in at least 95 countries by between 385 and 600 companies.[42] Whilst the number of companies and countries producing SALW has increased since the end of the Cold War, the absolute size of the industry has shrunk as processes of consolidation and fragmentation of the SALW industry have occurred across the world. SALW production is increasingly internationalised: companies export components, or import them for incorporation into their own products, and several companies engage in licensed production overseas.[43] The United Kingdom is a second-tier producer and exporter of SALW, in line with

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[41] Legal transfers occur "with either the active or passive involvement of governments or their authorized agents, and in accordance with both national and international law"; illicit transfers occur when "governments, their agents, or individuals [exploit] loopholes or intentionally circumventing national and/or international laws or policies"; illegal transfers are "In clear violation of national and/or international laws and without official government consent or control", and "may involve corrupt government officials acting on their own for personal gain." Legal production occurs through the use of legally acquired parts/components, or production with a licence from a competent government authority; illicit production is production from illicitly acquired parts/components, or without a licence; craft/homemade production is when small private workshops make weapons without any legal authorization. Small Arms Survey, *Small Arms Survey 2001*, p. 9.

[42] Ibid., pp. 9-10.

[43] Royal Ordnance has been involved in licensed production since 1970, when the U.K. Secretary of State for Defence signed an agreement with Heckler & Koch, then a German company. Accuracy International, FN Herstal and Manroy Engineering make rifles, machine guns and pistols for the U.K. military and/or for export; British Army (2003) "Small Arms and Support Weapons", http://www.army.mod.uk/equipment/pw/index.html (13 July 2006). Also Stavrianakis, Anna (2004) "United Kingdom", in Faltas, Sami Faltas and Vera Chrobok (eds.) *Disposal of Surplus Small Arms: A survey of policies and practices in OSCE countries*, (London/Bonn/Geneva: Saferworld/BICC/BASIC/Small Arms Survey, 2004), pp.31-40; p.32; and NISAT (no date) "U.K. Small Arms Industry and Products", http://www.nisat.org/database_info/country_industry.asp?Key=182 (2 August 2006). Several Europe- and North America-based companies also produce weapons under licence in the United Kingdom (as well as elsewhere); Small Arms Survey, *Small Arms Survey 2001*, p.18-21.

its position in the arms trade as detailed in Chapter Three. There are approximately 92 U.K.-based companies engaged in SALW production, many of them employing only 50-100 people.[44]

In one sense, the SALW industry is simply a sub-set of the wider arms industry; several of the trends in it are compatible with wider trends in the industry. However, SALW production capability is increasingly widespread around the globe as the technology is mature and most states can produce at least some types of SALW. The United Kingdom and other leading arms-producing states thus do not have a monopoly on SALW production. U.K.-based arms production is largely focused on cutting-edge technology and more sophisticated weapons systems, so the government and companies are not as concerned about exports of SALW as they are about exports of other types of weaponry and military equipment. Despite this, the government continues to facilitate the production and export of SALW as this is integrated into the work of large arms-producing companies. The clearest example of this is Royal Ordnance, the most significant SALW-producing company with connections to the United Kingdom. Established in 1804 as a state arms production company, the Royal Small Arms Factory became part of the Royal Ordnance Factories after World War Two. In 1987 the state-owned munitions factories were privatised, and Royal Ordnance was bought by British Aerospace (later BAE Systems) and renamed Royal Ordnance Defence. In 1991, it bought the German company Heckler & Koch, which gave it access to 74% of the European SALW market and a significant share of the world market, and allowed British Aerospace to regain a SALW research and development base.[45] In 2002 Heckler & Koch was sold to Germany-based Heckler & Koch Beteiligungs GmbH; since then, Royal Ordnance Defence has been subsumed into BAE Land Systems (Munitions & Ordnance) Ltd and continues to design, develop and manufacture ammunition for SALW, mortars, tanks, and land and naval artillery for over fifty countries.[46]

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[44] The Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms (NISAT) lists 92 companies engaged in SALW production; NISAT, "UK Small Arms Industry & Products".
[45] Small Arms Survey (2004) *Small Arms Survey 2004. Rights At Risk* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 49.
[46] BAE Systems North America (no date) "Business Units", http://www.na.baesystems.com/landArmaments.cfm (8 September 2006).

Government and industry attempts at the regulation of SALW are firmly aimed at the illicit and illegal trade, which has the effect of safeguarding the profits that can be made from sales of SALW and legitimating arms companies' activity by making them appear reasonable and concerned about the illicit spread of SALW. The vast majority of SALW in circulation across the globe are held and traded legally, and most illicit SALW start off as legal. This suggests that any serious attempt to check the spread of weaponry needs to take the legal trade into account.[47] Even though only an estimated 0.2% of known global firearms are held by insurgents and non-state forces, these are the weapons deemed "most likely to be used to harm" and to be the most destabilising.[48] According to the Small Arms Survey, "It is the illicit trade in small arms, more than any other aspect of the global arms business, that exacerbates civil conflict, corruption, crime, and random acts of violence."[49] The focus on the illicit trade as the main problem – shared by government, NGOs and industry alike – has the effect of legitimising the legal, state-sanctioned trade.

A good example of the facilitation of the legal trade in SALW is via promotion of licensed production. This means that, even if physical exports are not being licensed from the United Kingdom, U.K.-based companies are still involved in the production of weapons overseas.[50] For example, the 2002 Export Control Act requires that the government licence the equipment and technology to be exported under the terms of any licensed production agreement, but does not require it to licence the agreements themselves. This was despite calls from the Quadripartite Committee and NGOs for such extra-territorial controls.[51] Whilst the trade in torture equipment and WMD materials are regulated by extra-territorial legislation, the conventional arms trade is not, demonstrating that the government is willing to countenance it in some areas but not others.

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[47] The Small Arms Survey estimated in 2001 that 55.4% of known global firearms were legally, privately owned; 41.1% were held by government armed forces; 3.3% were held by police forces; and 0.2% were held by insurgents and non-state forces; Small Arms Survey, *Small Arms Survey 2001*, p.88.
[48] Ibid., p.2, 77.
[49] Ibid., p. 165. See also Lumpe, Lore, Sarah Meek and R.T. Naylor (2000) "Introduction to gun-running", in Lumpe (ed.) *Running Guns. The Global Black Market in Small Arms* (London: Zed Books), pp. 1-12, p.2.
[50] See Amnesty International, *Undermining Global Security*, for more examples.
[51] MoD, FCO, DfID, DTI (2003) *The Government's Proposals for secondary legislation under the Export Control Act. Response of the Secretaries of State for Defence, Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, International Development and Trade and Industry*, October 2003 (London: The Stationery Office), p.13.

Attempts to curtail the illicit trade in SALW feature a high degree of cross-departmental consensus. Whilst the FCO is the lead department on SALW issues,[52] DfID has played a significant role in promoting the understanding that SALW are a development, and hence, conflict, issue.[53] Initiatives such as the Global Conflict Prevention Pool are understood by officials as examples of effective interdepartmental working.[54] However, as one official pointed out, the wording of Criterion 8 (the development guideline) makes it "almost impossible" to recommend a refusal on a small shipment of SALW, although it could recommend a refusal on Criterion 3 (internal conflict) grounds.[55] It is impossible for independent analysts to ascertain whether any refusals of SALW exports have been issued on Criterion 3 grounds because of the presentation of licensing data. Overall, whilst DfID is a prominent actor on SALW clean-up issues, in the Tanzania case it was simply sidelined. And the departments and sub-departments most heavily involved in SALW work – CHAD within DfID, and the Security Policy Department within the FCO – are not those most heavily involved in the U.K. state's wider involvement in the arms trade. Thus, DfID and weaker elements of the state are allowed influence and room to manoeuvre on those issues that more powerful elements of the state – within the MoD and DTI – are prepared to allow them to. Indeed, their activity on SALW issues plays a significant legitimating role for the U.K. state's activity in the wider arms trade.

The conflict prevention agenda

SALW have only featured as an issue on the international security agenda since the end of the Cold War. The dominant Cold War narrative of state security and military threats, with an emphasis on nuclear weapons and major conventional weaponry, relegated SALW to the margins.[56] In the aftermath of the Cold War, SALW did not appear suddenly: in the renegotiation of the traditional security studies agenda, arms control still referred to state-

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52 Telephone interview with AS43, 1 June 2005.
53 Interview with Kate Joseph, 3 May 2005.
54 Interview with AS29, 22 March 2005.
55 Interview with Richard Haviland, 6 February 2004.
56 Walt, Stephen M. (1991) "The Renaissance of Security Studies", *International Studies Quarterly* 35(2): 211-239; Garnett, John (1987) "Strategic Studies and its Assumptions" in Baylis, John, Ken Booth, John Garnett and Phil Williams, *Contemporary Strategy* (New York: Holmes and Meier), pp. 3-17.

based, major conventional forces[57] and the UN Register of Conventional Arms, established in 1992 as a transparency-enhancing measure, does not include SALW as a category of weapons.[58] Although "a handful of governments in the South had sought for several years to focus the United Nations on the dangers of the illicit small arms traffic," SALW did not feature on the UN agenda until UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali called for "micro-disarmament" in 1995, giving the issue "traction."[59] That is, SALW did not gain status as a security issue until articulated as such by an actor with the symbolic and representational power to do so.

Boutros-Ghali's 1992 *Agenda for Peace* and the 1995 *Supplement* to it were significant in legitimating the post-Cold War security agenda within which SALW are understood as a security threat, alongside "drug trafficking, international crime, and bloody civil wars raging around the globe."[60] There are a variety of ways in which SALW can be articulated as a problem, including as an issue of arms control and disarmament, human rights and humanitarian law, public health, economic development, post-conflict disarmament, terrorism, criminality or conflict prevention.[61] After extended negotiations, the agreed text of the Programme of Action states that the "illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects sustains conflicts, exacerbates violence, contributes to the displacement of civilians,

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[57] Chipman, John (1992) "The future of strategic studies: beyond even grand strategy", *Survival*, 34(1): 109-131; Booth, Ken (1994) "Strategy", in Groom, A.J.R. and Margot Light (eds.) *Contemporary International Relations: A Guide to Theory* (London: Frances Pinter), pp. 109-127.

[58] The Register catalogues seven categories of major conventional arms: battle tanks; armoured combat vehicles; large-calibre artillery systems; combat aircraft; attack helicopters; warships (including submarines); and missiles and missile-launchers. Since its inception in 1992, 170 states have reported to the Register one or more times; United Nations, "United Nations Register of Conventional Arms".

[59] Lumpe, et al, "Introduction to gun-running", p.7.

[60] Ibid., p.1; Boutros-Ghali (1995) *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations,* 3 January 1995, http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agsupp.html (6 November 2006). More generally, the emergence of SALW as a security issue also exemplifies that argument put forward by critical, post-positivist scholars that security agendas are not objective but are produced and reproduced through representation and discourse. The threats that dominate the post-Cold War state security agenda, and the policies that emerge to combat them, are a result of social and intersubjectively created understandings of the world that simultaneously enable particular types of practices and constrain others; Laffey and Weldes, "Beyond Belief," p. 210. Thus, the articulation of SALW as a security issue, and the *sort* of security issue they are, was neither natural not inevitable. For critical accounts of international security, see e.g. Mutimer, David (1997) "Reimagining Security: The Metaphors of Proliferation", in Krause, Keith and Michael C. Williams (eds.) *Critical Security Studies. Concepts and Cases* (London: UCL Press), pp. 187-222; Campbell, David (1998) *Writing Security. United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press); Gusterson, Hugh (1999) "Missing the End of the Cold War in International Security", in Weldes, Jutta, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson and Raymond Duvall (eds.) *Cultures of Insecurity. States, Communities, and the Production of Danger* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), pp. 319-346; Weldes, Jutta (1999) *Constructing National Interests. The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press).

[61] Small Arms Survey, *Small Arms Survey 2001*, p.2.

undermines respect for international humanitarian law, impedes the provision of humanitarian assistance to victims of armed conflict and fuels crime and terrorism", as well as being closely linked to "terrorism, organized crime, trafficking in drugs and precious minerals."[62] This narrative is simultaneously wide-ranging in scope – given the wide range of threats with which SALW are associated – and narrow – it is the *illicit trade* in SALW that is deemed to be the core problem.

The international consensus on the problem posed by SALW focuses on the illicit trade and the proliferation of weaponry in areas of conflict, weak governance and poverty. The U.K. state has been at the forefront of efforts to promote an understanding of SALW as a conflict prevention and development issue.[63] Such an approach is congruent with the post-9/11 emphasis on countering terrorism: the political salience of the argument that poverty is a significant cause of terrorism means that SALW programmes are understood not just as a benevolent act but also in Western states' interests as well.[64] In this way the SALW agenda is emblematic of the merging of security and development, which "now qualifies as an accepted truth of the post-Cold War era," according to Mark Duffield.[65] The construction of the illicit trade in SALW as a contributory factor to conflict, insecurity and underdevelopment is illustrative of the ways in which conflict has been incorporated into mainstream development policy. In this understanding, development cannot take place without security, and security cannot be achieved without development.[66]

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62 United Nations, *Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects.*

63 See DfID (2003) *Tackling Poverty by Reducing Armed Violence. Recommendations from a Wilton Park Workshop, 14-16 April 2003*, (London: DfID), http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/poverty-armed-violence.pdf (28 June 2006), p.12.

64 Hewitt, Patricia (2003) "Terrorism: The Price we Pay for Poverty", *The New Statesman,* 3 February 2003. In a statement to the 2006 UN Review Conference, the U.K. representative pitched the development aspects of SALW issues in terms of preventing crime and conflict; Thomas, Gareth, M.P. (2006) "U.K. Statement at the 2006 Review Conference of the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects", 26 June 2006, http://www.un.org/events/smallarms2006/pdf/arms060626uk-eng.pdf (7 December 2006).

65 Duffield, Mark (2005) "Getting Savages to Fight Barbarians: Development, Security and the Colonial Present", *Conflict, Security and Development,* 5(2): 141-159; p.142.

66 Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars.* Of interest here is the change in name of the DfID department that leads on SALW issues, from the Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department (CHAD) to the Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department (CHASE) in late 2006, signalling the further entrenchment of this.

Importantly, underdevelopment is understood very broadly, as "a social malaise resulting from the combination of various forms of scarcity (deep-seated poverty, environmental decline, uncontrolled population growth) with unrepresentative public institutions and weak civic culture (endemic social exclusion, widespread abuse of government office, economic mismanagement)."[67] In response, a broad good governance approach has emerged, meaning that SALW projects are articulated as one measure in a broader programme of social transformation. Whilst dangerous, underdevelopment is deemed "open to remedy and demands engagement."[68] Whilst this approach is understood by its proponents as progressive and holistic, the effect of it is to obscure legal transfers of SALW, wider state-based and Northern-supported violence (which is usually more technologically sophisticated), and the structural violence of the global capitalist economy. This serves to criminalise and delegitimise violence committed by non-state actors in the global South by disconnecting their violence from wider international processes and histories and casting it as pre-modern, rather than a particular response to modernity. This facilitates intervention by states and NGOs to remove weapons from society without addressing political grievance.

Whilst the illicit trade in SALW is associated in policy and much academic discourse with crime and underdevelopment, it is not clear that conflict does destroy development. As Duffield argues, "the transborder networks that support organized violence in one location have encouraged autonomous and resistant processes of *actually existing development* in other areas", in the "spaces and lacuna created by structural adjustment and globalization."[69] This means that, rather than signaling an absence of development, such seemingly criminal activities are a form of development, albeit not one recognised as progressive by aid donors. Such development is intimately connected to processes of state formation, the legacy of colonialism, and the global capitalist economy.[70] Economic globalization as promoted by state and capitalist elites has been significant in creating the conditions to which alternative development is a response. These "decentralized shadow economies" foment "destabilizing forms of global

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[67] Ibid., p. 115
[68] Ibid., p. 114
[69] Duffield, Mark (2002) "War as a Network Enterprise. The New Security Terrain and its Implications", *Cultural Values,* 6(1&2): 153-165; p. 160, emphasis in original.
[70] See also Cramer, Christopher (2006) *Violence in Developing Countries. War, Memory, Progress* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press). Cramer argues that "Violence and war should not ... be seen as oddities, distortions or distractions but should be regarded as closely connected to progress and development;" p.45.

circulation"[71] but rather than signifying social regression, the violence associated with this is better understood as "a type of ambiguous 'reflexive modernisation'." Although they are non-liberal, the types of social relation being formed are those of "autonomy, protection and social regulation."[72] For example, writing about SALW proliferation in the Ilemi Triangle (a disputed area of land in East Africa, claimed by Ethiopia, Sudan and Kenya), Simala and Amutabi emphasise the arbitrariness of state boundaries, especially for pastoralist communities, the legacy of Cold War arms availability and the presence of rebel encampments in the continuation of conflict. The influx of SALW has made conflict more bloody, and has contributed to the changing nature of cattle rustling as a custom, which is now increasingly associated with youths asserting themselves and wealth creation.[73]

Such processes do not signal an absence of development or governance; rather, they are "actually existing" processes, even though they are understood as regressive by donors. Violence committed with SALW is widely understood as a "weapon of the weak": taken to signal barbarity, this is better understood as a strategic choice given a lack of access to more sophisticated weaponry. The distinction between "cheap war" based on violence with SALW and "expensive wars in which civilians are maimed or destroyed with sophisticated laser-guided weapons" has political but not analytical value.[74] Much of the development literature views conflict as "temporary and a universally bad thing for everyone involved."[75] Organised violence has devastating effects on its victims, but "for those groups in whose name it is carried out, actors are saviours and protectors rather that criminals or manipulative elites."[76] Thus, whilst violent conflict is undoubtedly occurring, it can only be understood with

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[71] Duffield, Mark, "Getting Savages to Fight Barbarians", p.143, 156. Also Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars*, p. 5.

[72] Beck 1992, quoted in Duffield, "Social Reconstruction and the Radicalization of Development," p. 1055; Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars*, p. 5. See also Sörensen, Jens Stilhoff (2002) "Balkanism and the New Radical Interventionism: A Structural Critique", *International Peacekeeping*, 9(1): 1-22; p.13, 16.

[73] Simala, Kenneth I. and Maurice Amutabi (2005) "Small Arms, Cattle Raiding, and Borderlands. The Ilemi Triangle", in Abraham, Itty and Willem van Schendel (eds.) *Illicit Flows and Criminal Things. States, Borders, and the Other Side of Globalization* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press), pp. 201-226. More generally, the emergence of new or "small" wars in the global South is linked to crises in post-colonial patrimonial states; Richards, Paul (1996) *Fighting for the Rainforest: war, youth and resources in Sierra Leone* (Oxford: International African Institute, in association with James Currey), p. xviii.

[74] Richards, *Fighting for the Rainforest*, p.xx. Also Barkawi, Tarak (2004) "On the pedagogy of 'small wars'", *International Affairs*, 80(1): 19-37; p. 23, p. 29.

[75] Jackson, Paul (2003) "Warlords as Alternative Forms of Governance," *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 14(2): 131-150; p.148.

[76] Duffield, "Social Reconstruction and the Radicalization of Development," p. 1060.

reference to the context within which it occurs. The use of force in such contexts may well have a very different meaning to that imputed to it by donors, but this should not in and of itself mean that it is illegitimate or senseless. Whilst not recognised as "good" governance, violence plays a role in forms of governance nonetheless. Violent, illiberal social relations are a *form* of governance, rather than the absence of it.

The discursive trick of the conflict prevention discourse is to separate shadow globalization from state- and capital-sanctioned globalization, which has the effect of delegitimising the former and facilitating measures against it on the understanding that the reasons for violence are internal to the South. Understanding the illicit trade in SALW as criminal activity, removes the need to engage with it. A failure to understand the context of SALW in the global South "denies a moral space to other modernities"[77] and generates profoundly unequal rights to access to the means of violence. That is, it functions to withdraw weapons from the periphery, preventing actors from enacting their ambiguous, reflexive modernity, whilst state-sanctioned physical and structural violence carries on unabated. Such a response is based in part on a liberal horror of particular forms of violence that ignores the violence (physical and structural) of the wider environment, and fails to recognise non-state violence as part of governance relations.

Rather than simply a description of the world, the primary function of the conflict prevention agenda is to facilitate and legitimize intervention in the global South. Descriptions of the new wars, for example, "establish ... a formative contrast between *borderland* traits of barbarity, excess and irrationality, and *metropolitan* characteristics of civility, restraint and rationality," according to Duffield.[78] The borderlands and the metropolis are "imagined geographical space[s]" set up in contrast to each other.[79] In practice, the spatial metaphor of the borderlands is operationalised to refer to much of Sub Saharan Africa, as well as parts of Eastern Europe and South Asia; these are, not coincidentally, the main areas of U.K. government, international, and NGO engagement. The emphasis on the *illicit trade* in SALW is a key way in which the global North and South are differentiated from each other: "we" have

[77] Ibid., p. 1068.
[78] Ibid., p. 1052, emphasis in original.
[79] Ibid.

control over state borders and weapons stockpiles in our supposedly modern, Weberian states, whilst "they" have criminal and insurgent networks, anarchy, corruption and a general absence of good governance.

The contrasting images of the global North and South constructed through such representations facilitate intervention and mean metropolitan actors forego the need to assess their own role in creating problems. Policy responses to parallel trade and violence address "superficial elements of society rather than deep structures or systemic issues," in that capitalism is "erased as a factor that deserves scrutiny when it comes to tackling the problem."[80] So even though the FCO, DfID and NGOs claim to tackle root causes, addressing both supply and demand issues, they still take the global capitalist economy, the inequality it generates and the role of military spending within it as given. The problems of the global South are thus understood as internal to the region, and the South is constituted as a "site of Western good intentions, of humanitarian intervention and development assistance" as part of a wider process through which the global North and South are mutually constituted.[81] Not only do these narratives legitimise interventions that shape the South, they also help shape perceptions of the North as benevolent and charitable. These narratives function as a "bugle call for collective mobilisation", playing "a symbolic rather than an informational role"[82] and legitimising a "will to govern" that is linked to the "long-established reforming urge within liberal societies," according to Duffield.[83] The conflict prevention agenda is a central component of what Duffield refers to as liberal peace, and goes hand in hand with the good governance agenda, attempts at security sector reform, initiatives to strengthen civil society in the global South.

The SALW control agenda is a counterpart to the wider U.K. arms export agenda. The benevolent image created by U.K. state and NGO activity on SALW issues in the global South not only masks the state's own history of SALW exports, but also legitimises its involvement in the wider arms trade. Paralleling the arguments put forward in Chapters Five and Six, the conflict prevention agenda and arms exports are thus two sides of the same coin. In this case,

80 Sörensen,"Balkanism and the New Radical Interventionism", p.15, 18.
81 Barkawi and Laffey (2002) "Retrieving the Imperial," p. 112-3.
82 Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars*, p. 116.
83 Duffield, "Social Reconstruction and the Radicalization of Development," p. 1052-3.

the U.K. state can be understood simultaneously to attempt to contain conflict in parts of the global South and contribute to the maintenance of repression elsewhere. Both of these activities are aimed at creating stability within the global capitalist economy. Controlling SALW in the borderlands is an attempt at the containment of conflict and the "[transformation of] the dysfunctional and war-affected societies" of the South into "cooperative, representative and, especially, stable entities."[84] This is an attempt to prevent poverty and marginalisation from fuelling revolt amongst the "supernumeraries" who are "of no *direct* use to capital."[85] Elsewhere, where it would be too risky to attempt such measures, more repressive incorporation is preferred, through the export of weaponry to states. SALW clean-up programmes thus tend not to be carried out in states to which the U.K. state has a record of exporting weaponry, such as Turkey.

The argument put forward in this section is that donor concerns regarding SALW reflect a liberal concern with the supposed connections between conflict, security and development. Efforts to combat the illicit trade in SALW have become symbolic of the post-Cold War security agenda. However, whilst it is understood by its proponents as progressive, the SALW agenda reinforces a number of traditional concerns: it reinscribes state sovereignty through the emphasis on the illicit trade and attempts to create or shore up states' monopoly on violence; it buttresses a conventional understanding that the problem with the arms trade is the illicit trade, as producing and exporting states do not address their own, legal use and transfer of SALW; and it promotes a conventional understanding of the capitalist economy which posits that shadow globalization is unconnected to wider processes of economic globalization. The major effect of the conflict prevention agenda is thus to delegitimise non-state violence in the global South, whilst allowing state-sanctioned use of force and structural violence (which creates the conditions for the changing governance relations that give rise to violence) to carry on unchallenged. This facilitates and legitimises intervention in the South through aid policy and NGO activity, which also shapes the North's self-image as benevolent and charitable.

[84] Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars*, p. 11.
[85] Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy*, p. 377-8, emphasis in original.

All six NGOs have made arguments regarding SALW at some point in their activity on the arms trade. The remainder of this chapter focus on Amnesty International, International Alert, Oxfam and Saferworld. BASIC was instrumental in early NGO work on SALW but has since moved on to work on other issues, and so is dealt with in less detail than the other organisations.[86] CAAT has an argument relating to SALW but does not actively campaign on SALW issues. This is mainly because it does not want to duplicate existing efforts and because of a lack of resources; there is a strategic rationale as well however, because CAAT wants to focus on the forces driving the trade as a whole. Rather than being active as an outsider organisation, CAAT is largely inactive on SALW issues. The NGOs share a common understanding of several of the issues at stake, which I turn to first; these are the links between conflict, security and development, the importance of the illicit trade, and the need for holistic solutions.

NGO arguments regarding SALW

The discourse linking conflict, (in)security and (under)development is central to NGOs' arguments concerning SALW. International Alert describes SALW as "a barrier to peace", in that they "fuel conflict ... and are used indiscriminately to kill, injure and intimidate civilians."[87] In post-conflict situations SALW undermine efforts to build peace and development as "they are used for criminal purposes, violence and as threatening instruments of power."[88] BASIC argues that "the issue at hand is frighteningly obvious: light weapons kill, maim and destroy; they cause instability and prolong wars; they promote a culture of violence which is gaining momentum around the world; and they divert much-needed resources away from social and economic development."[89] Saferworld claims that "The proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons fuels crime, exacerbates violent conflict and

[86] BASIC's Project on Light Weapons consisted of approximately 200 organizations and individuals around the world at its height in the late 1990s and the project's membership directory "served as an invaluable tool in jump-starting the IANSA network," which is now one of the organisations leading the Control Arms Campaign calling for an international Arms Trade Treaty. Plesch, Dan (2001) "Past Practice – How BASIC works", BASIC internal operational document.
[87] International Alert, "Small arms and light weapons".
[88] Ibid.
[89] Dyer, Susannah L. and Natalie J. Goldring (1996) "Controlling Global Light Weapons Transfers: Working Toward Policy Options," http://www.basicint.org/WT/plw/96-controlling_global.htm (28 July 2006)

undermines development."[90] Amnesty International and Oxfam emphasise "the abuse of arms which fuels conflict, poverty, and violations of human rights"; whilst this applies to all categories of weapons, "small arms have a particular role in play in contributing to poverty and suffering."[91] The effects of the misuse of arms "increase poverty and derail development" in the long run as part of a "vicious circle" of arms abuse in which, citing Paul Collier's work on the relationship between the relationship between conflict and development, "Poverty fuels conflict ... [and] conflict fuels poverty."[92] And CAAT argues that SALW "contribute to the initiation of violent conflict" and are "instrumental in perpetuating it"; their widespread availability "can erode negotiated peace settlements, hampering conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction."[93] All six NGOs understand SALW as key contributors to conflict and poverty, undermining development and facilitating human rights abuses. They thus share and contribute to the dominant understanding of the threats posed by SALW. NGOs – predominantly International Alert, Oxfam and Saferworld – have been instrumental in promoting a developmental frame of reference for understanding SALW issues and have worked in tandem with DfID to try to naturalise this understanding, recommending, for example, a change in language from "small arms proliferation" to "armed violence reduction."[94] Working with DfID and academics based at the University of Bradford's Centre for International Cooperation and Security, NGOs have played a significant role in making the development aspects of SALW issues more explicit, that is, pushing the agenda further in the direction critiqued earlier.[95]

NGO arguments perpetuate the dominant understanding of the threat posed by SALW in two additional ways, through their emphasis on the illicit trade and their attempt at holistic solutions. NGOs have an operational focus on the illicit trade in and use of SALW. For

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[90] Saferworld, "Small arms and light weapons".
[91] Hillier and Wood, *Shattered Lives*, pp. 4, 19.
[92] Ibid., p. 35, 24.
[93] CAAT (no date) "Small Arms, Mass Killing", http://www.caat.org.uk/issues/smallarms.php (17 July 2006).
[94] DfID, *Tackling Poverty by Reducing Armed Violence.*
[95] There is extensive co-production of the narrative of conflict, security and development between academia, the non-governmental sector and government. One of the key academic centres involved in SALW research is the Centre for International Cooperation and Security (CICS) at the University of Bradford. This centre is a significant actor in the provision of intellectual resources on SALW issues, including work on armed violence and poverty, and plays a key role in facilitating NGO seminars and providing expertise at official meetings. In Gramscian terms, the Centre plays a role in providing intellectual and practical resources for the maintenance of dominant understandings of the relationship between SALW and conflict.

example, International Alert argues that "A key issue to improving conflict prevention and management is the challenge of curbing the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons", but in a field study in West Africa, it conducts "an overview of *illicit* small arms and light weapons (SALW) proliferation" in the region.[96] Saferworld's work in the Horn of Africa and Great Lakes region is based on the understanding that the proliferation and illicit trafficking of SALW fuels regional conflicts and increasingly violent cattle rustling, and contributes to high levels of crime, violence and insecurity.[97] Saferworld and Oxfam both work on conflict prevention issues with pastoralists in East Africa; although the pastoralists are not insurgents engaged in armed struggle against the state, NGOs have intervened to try to mitigate conflicts caused by pastoralist movement, resource shortages and weak state security, which the proliferation of SALW makes more deadly.[98] This focus again shows a liberal desire to mitigate violence by taking weapons out of society, addressing the symptom before the cause.

All the NGOs that work on SALW issues emphasise the importance of holistic solutions. For example, BASIC describes SALW as "symptoms of other problems, such as disputes over resources and borders. To reduce the killing, we must understand and overcome many obstacles. While some are political and military in nature, others are economic, social, and even psychological."[99] A resource pack produced jointly by International Alert, Oxfam and Saferworld argues that "tackling the demand for small arms covers a broad range of issues, including structural and deep-rooted problems such as poverty, inequality, bad governance, and underdevelopment, in addition to more specific measures to tackle the weapons themselves."[100] A joint project between International Alert, Saferworld and the Bradford University Centre for International Cooperation and Security emphasises the importance of

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[96] Ebo, Adedeji with Laura Mazal (2003) *Small Arms Control in West Africa*, Monitoring the Implementation of Small Arms Controls (MISAC) West Africa Series No.1, October 2003, http://www.international-alert.org/pdfs/MISAC_west_africa_english.pdf (17 July 2006), pp. 7-8, emphasis in original.

[97] Eavis, Paul (2002) "SALW in the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes Region: Challenges and Ways Forward", *The Brown Journal of World Affairs*, 9(1): 251-260; p. 251.

[98] Waqo, Halakhe D. (2003) "Peacebuilding and Small Arms: Experiences from Northern Kenya", presentation to workshop at UN Biennial Conference of States on Small Arms Programmes of Action, New York, www.iansa.org/un/notes/peacebuilding_and_small_arms.doc (28 July 2006); Mkutu, Kennedy (2001) *Pastoralism and Conflict in the Horn of Africa* (London: APFO/Saferworld, University of Bradford).

[99] Dyer and Goldring, "Controlling Global Light Weapons Transfers: Working Toward Policy Options."

[100] Coe, Jim and Henry Smith (2003) *Action Against Small Arms. A Resource and Training Handbook* (London/Oxford: International Alert, Oxfam GB, Saferworld), p.21.

linking SALW measures to security sector and governance reform programmes, arguing that "In post-conflict situations, action on SALW is crucial to supporting governance and building security."[101] Amnesty and Oxfam's Control Arms Campaign emphasises the need for both supply-side and demand-side measures, using the analogy of mopping up the floor and turning off the tap.[102] This is ostensibly a progressive impulse, a move away from state-based security towards human security that also contributes to wider international security by removing the causes of conflict.

Whilst these solutions are holistic in that they seek comprehensive solutions, the understanding that they are based on is a partial one in terms of its relation to the global capitalist economy and wider international relations. There is no critique of the structures of global capitalism that have affected state transformation: no mention is made of the role of market liberalization as a key factor in the emergence of conflict, for example. As Reno argues, "reform that emphasizes economic and political liberalization further undermines weak-state rulers' incentives to pursue conventional strategies for maximising power through generating economic growth and, hence, state revenues,"[103] meaning that externally driven reforms are part of the problem to which NGOs claim to respond. But NGO programmes understand the problem to be internal to these states rather than systemic. Many parts of the global South feature non-liberal models of political authority and because these often involve violence, they attract the attention of aid donors and NGOs, who understand it through liberal lenses. Their conception of violence as a pathology leads them to favour solutions involving social transformation: whole packages of measures ranging from the psycho-social to the community level and national good governance strategies. But understanding the emergence of weapons trading, drug trafficking and money laundering as "a consequence of long histories of colonial and postcolonial interaction with the West"[104] means that the spread of SALW and armed violence are better understood as responses to modernity and globalisation. NGOs want to end violence and mop up the symptoms of this interaction and of globalisation without addressing the causes.

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[101] Biting the Bullet (2006) *Reviewing Action on Small Arms 2006. Assessing the First Five Years of the Programme of Action* (London/Bradford: International Alert/Saferworld/University of Bradford), p. 231.
[102] Hillier and Wood, *Shattered Lives*, p.5.
[103] Reno, William (1998) *Warlord Politics and African States* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner), p.4
[104] Barkawi, Tarak and Mark Laffey (2006) "The Postcolonial Moment in Security Studies", *Review of International Studies*, 32(2): 329-354, p.347.

Having explored the arguments common to all three NGOs, I turn to those that signal differences between them. In its early work, BASIC linked domestic and international gun control, working with the Gun Control Network and acting "as a bridge between traditional small arms control organizations and domestic gun control organizations".[105] It worked with the Labour Party in opposition on "the discrepancies between domestic legislation banning civilian possession of handguns and export policies which continued to allow these weapons to be sold abroad," and provided them with information once in power.[106] This is a noticeable difference to the other NGOs, linking up what are traditionally seen as discrete areas, of domestic gun control and foreign/development policy SALW work. It demonstrates counter-hegemonic potential in that it sought to connect up practices at home with those abroad: gun control is not a problem "over there" but one that resonates at home as well. However, its success was muted by the organisation's lack of funds – itself indicative of the failure of the project to resonate politically in that early form – and by the acceleration of the international SALW agenda premised on conflict prevention concerns. This line of work has since been discontinued as BASIC has moved to focus on WMD and transatlantic security, and struggled to win funding to facilitate organisational growth.

Through its annual Audit of the U.K. government's report on strategic export controls, Saferworld has the leeway to criticise the government for granting licences for SALW to states where Criterion 3 is an issue, that is, where there is internal conflict within a country. Saferworld indicates where it believes there should have been restrictions on arms exports to states that experienced conflict during the year for which the government issues arms export licences. It thus outlines how it would have expected the government to behave, based on the government's own publicly stated commitments. Saferworld identifies states such as Morocco, Nepal and Turkey as states of concern with regard to SALW exports in relation to Criterion 3[107] and is willing to criticise the U.K. government for SALW exports to states with which it is

105 Plesch "Past practice". The Gun Control Network campaigns for "tighter controls on guns of all kinds and a greater awareness of the dangers associated with gun ownership and use;" http://www.gun-control-network.org/ (24 February 2006).
106 Plesch "Past practice".
107 See successive Saferworld Audits.

working on SALW clean-up programmes, for example, Kenya and Tanzania.[108] However, writing these latter entries in the Audit were subject to a higher degree of managerial scrutiny because of the potential to damage the relationship with the recipient state and DfID on SALW clean-up issues.[109] Through its Audits, Saferworld demonstrates the discord between the government's stated policy and actual practice. However, it does not carry out detailed advocacy work on the basis of the Audit, missing the opportunity to press officials on the issue of why such exports continue and how this relates to the government's wider commitments on SALW issues.

The Control Arms campaign, led by Amnesty, Oxfam and IANSA, uses the idea of arms being in the "wrong hands" to articulate the problem of the arms trade: whilst "weapons in too many hands risk increasing violence, weapons in the wrong hands pose an even greater risk that they will be used to abuse human rights."[110] In this, the NGOs make no distinction between state forces or armed groups; their concern is the use of weapons to inflict human rights abuses, particularly likely in conflict zones. Amnesty and Oxfam witness the use of arms in human rights abuses around the world, "whether in conflict, crime, law enforcement, state repression, or violence in the home."[111] In practice, however, the focus is on non-state actors. As one Oxfam staffer put it, SALW are an important focus because "small arms kill the most people. They have the most impact on ordinary people." They are also "very campaignable" and "there's already a UN process on small arms so it's persuasive, and governments are more likely to control small arms than other types, they feel less threatened."[112] Such an approach is echoed by Amnesty International, which has a tendency to focus on SALW because they are the weapons used in human rights abuses and violations of humanitarian law.[113]

An issue on which NGOs are attempting to shift state agendas in relation to conflict prevention is gender. A major component of International Alert's work on SALW relates to gender: it argues that the UN Programme of Action "loses sight of the human involvement in

108 E.g. Saferworld, *An Independent Audit of the 2001 UK Government Annual Report on Strategic Export Controls*, pp. 106-8, 163-6.
109 Author participant observation during 2002.
110 See e.g. Hillier and Wood *Shattered Lives*, p. 18.
111 Hillier and Wood *Shattered Lives*, p.24.
112 Interview with Debbie Hillier, 1 December 2003.
113 Telephone interview with Brian Wood, 18 April 2006.

small arms use and control" and "makes the common mistake of identifying women only as victims, whereas in reality women and girls play diverse and multiple roles as combatants, weapons carriers for traffickers and in a more positive sense as peacebuilders and agents of change."[114] This is an example of NGOs trying to push a state-led agenda in a more nuanced and multifaceted direction. Already in 1998, BASIC identified gun killing as "overwhelmingly a problem of male violence."[115] The gender theme is taken up by Oxfam and Amnesty as well, through the Control Arms campaign: they argue that "Women are particularly at risk of certain crimes because of their gender - crimes such as violence in the home and rape ... most direct casualties of gun violence are men, women suffer disproportionately from firearms violence, given that they are almost never the buyers, owners or users of such weapons."[116] Through their focus on gender, NGOs attempt to shift the state-led agenda to focus more on gender roles as social constructs rather than simply women's rights.

Having examined NGOs' arguments about SALW, it is evident that they largely share and perpetuate the dominant understanding of the weapons as a contributory factor in the persistence of conflict, poverty and underdevelopment. As such, NGOs share a set of assumptions with the U.K. government, which is centrally involved in international action on SALW. The next section analyses NGOs' strategies for implementing these arguments; it demonstrates that NGOs have become significant sub-contractors to the U.K. state and play an active role in attempting to reinforce state capacity and cultivate civil society in the global South. They are thus intimately involved in struggles over state transformation and governance relations in the global South.

NGO strategies and impacts

NGOs have been key actors in international action on SALW since the 1990s. There are competing views as to the point at which they became involved, whether they were agenda-setters or followed a trend started by states. Some analysts point to the activity of NGOs in the

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[114] International Alert (2006) "Gender and the Programme of Action," http://www.international-alert.org/our_work/themes/gender_action.php (21 July 2006)
[115] Remarks by Daniel Plesch, 25 September 1998 at the BASIC Seminar in the United Nations on "Stopping the Spread of Small Arms: International Initiatives"; BASIC internal document.
[116] Control Arms (no date) "Women under Fire", http://www.controlarms.org/the_issues/women-under-fire.htm (17 July 2006).

early 1990s, prior to Boutros-Ghali's call for micro-disarmament, as evidence of their agenda-setting role.[117] Others argue that NGOs were slow to react to Boutros-Ghali's call, as in 1992 there were only two NGOs addressing SALW issues, 12 in January 1998, but over 200 by February 2000.[118] Further, some analysts argue that "state sponsorship was critical to the success of NGO initiatives", downplaying the independent role played by NGOs.[119] My understanding is that a very small number of NGOs were trying to raise concerns about SALW in the early 1990s – for example, International Alert claims to have been working on SALW issues since 1994, "when we identified unregulated small arms proliferation and misuse as one of the world's most pressing security issues"[120] – but the issue did not capture the international security imagination until 1995, when it was articulated by Boutros-Ghali.

NGOs thus did not have the discursive power to articulate a new agenda, but played a role in creating the conditions for its emergence. Once SALW were on the agenda, governments and an increasing number of NGOs became more involved. Given the similar understanding of NGOs and governments interested to stem the illicit spread of SALW and, as will be detailed below, the significant operational interaction between them, Cattaneo and Krause's conclusion that "the question of how NGOs affect state policies, as if the two groups always interacted from positions that are by way of principle far and opposed, misses the point," has significant purchase. As they argue, "The real question becomes how the politics of states and those of NGOs feed into each other, how they help each other develop, in the construction of a novel model of governance."[121] The rest of this section discusses this idea in relation to NGOs' strategies. NGO work on SALW issues is carried out through insider strategies involving research, advocacy, policy work and the training of officials and civil society representatives. Saferworld and International Alert are the best examples of this type of strategy, doing all of these types of work. Amnesty and Oxfam engage in mass campaigning to

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117 Anders, "NGOs and the Shaping of the European Controls on Small Arms Exports", p. 179; Lumpe et al, "Introduction to gun-running," p.7; and Joseph, Kate and Taina Susiluoto (2002) "A role for verification and monitoring in small arms control?", *Verification Yearbook*, pp. 129-143; p. 129, 132. Also interview with Kate Joseph, 3 May 2005.

118 Laurance, Edward and Rachel Stohl (2002) *Making Global Public Policy: The Case of Small Arms and Light Weapons*, Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper No. 7 (Geneva: Small Arms Survey), December 2002; p.4, 27.

119 Cattaneo, Silvia and Keith Krause (2004) "A Voice for Whom: Legitimacy, Representation and Advocacy in the International Action Network on Small Arms", paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, Montreal, March 2004; p.20.

120 International Alert , "Small arms and light weapons."

121 Cattaneo and Krause, "A Voice for Whom", p.2.

back up their research and advocacy; since 2003 this has occurred mainly through their Control Arms Campaign. Oxfam also incorporates SALW issues into its peacebuilding and conflict management work in some of its field programmes. NGOs' strategies fall broadly into three categories, each dealt with in turn: research and advocacy, policy work, and capacity building and training.

Amnesty International, International Alert, Oxfam and Saferworld all engage in research and advocacy on SALW issues as part of a strategy of providing expertise to the state on policy making and project implementation. For example, International Alert and Saferworld are involved in the "Biting the Bullet" project in collaboration with Bradford University's Centre for International Cooperation and Security, which aimed to "contribute to a better-informed debate on small arms issues" in preparation for the 2001 UN Conference.[122] Since the conference, NGOs and academics have worked to promote implementation and create "opportunities to discuss critical issues that proved controversial" at the Conference.[123] Some of the research from this project fed directly into the U.K. presentation at the 2006 Review Conference, in particular on the impact of SALW on development, governance and security.[124] NGOs have also documented and analysed the impacts of SALW proliferation in order to back up their call for an international, legally binding Arms Trade Treaty via the Control Arms Campaign.[125] A notable development in the role of NGOs as advocates on SALW issues came in 2006 when the director of Saferworld, Paul Eavis, was invited on to the U.K. delegation to the UN Conference. This signals the ultimate insider role of Saferworld based on its expertise and respectability, and the willingness of the U.K. state to act in tandem with NGOs on SALW issues.

As well as research and advocacy work, several of the NGOs also undertake policy work in a number of regions and countries in the global South, predominantly in sub-Saharan

[122] International Alert, *Biting the Bullet.*
[123] Ibid.
[124] Biting the Bullet, *Reviewing Action on Small Arms 2006,* pp. 226-232.
[125] Control Arms reports include: *The AK-47: The World's Favourite Killing Machine,* http://www.controlarms.org/find_out_more/reports/AK_47.pdf; *The Call for Tough Arms Controls. Voices from Sierra Leone;* http://www.controlarms.org/downloads/Control-Arms-Sierra-Leone-signedoff6106.pdf ; *The Impact of Guns on Women's Lives,* http://www.controlarms.org/documents/small-arms-women-report-final2-1.pdf; *Guns and Policing. Standards to Prevent Misuse,* http://www.controlarms.org/documents/guns_and_policing_report.pdf (all 15 July 2006).

Africa, Eastern Europe and Asia. As part of its peacebuilding programme, International Alert conducts mappings and consultations on SALW proliferation, misuse and control in Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal. In these projects, weapons in the hands of "major insurgent groups" are singled out for attention.[126] The programme is based on the premise that "Lasting peace has to be built in a continuing process that encourages the attitudes, the behaviour and the structural conditions in society that lay the foundations for peaceful, stable and prosperous social and economic development,"[127] exemplifying Duffield's argument that NGOs play a role in attempts at the transformation of societies in the global South.

Saferworld also conducts regional field programmes, currently in Southern Africa, the Horn of Africa and Great Lakes, Eastern Europe and Russia, South Eastern Europe, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Its work in the Horn and Great Lakes region is most indicative of its conflict prevention approach: it supports the National Focal Points in Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Namibia and Malawi,[128] helping them to develop "their roles, responsibilities, programmes of work and day-to-day operating procedures."[129] Saferworld also supports the National Focal Points in their development of National Action Plans, which are "comprehensive programmes to tackle all aspects of the small arms problem."[130] These are arrived at after a process of "small arms mapping" (research into the nature of the problem in each country and means to address it[131]), which is undertaken with Saferworld's partner organisation, SaferAfrica, and in partnership with government and civil society representatives in each country.[132] In addition to this work at the national level, Saferworld also supports

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[126] International Alert (2006) "Small arms and light weapons in West Africa," February 2006, http://www.international-alert.org/our_work/regional/west_africa/small_arms.php (21 June 2006).
[127] International Alert (2006) "Our Work", February 2006, http://www.international-alert.org/our_work/index.php?page=work (21 June 2006).
[128] These were established as a result of the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa, which came out of the 2000 Nairobi Declaration). The Protocol focuses on stopping illicit proliferation and improving state capacity; Nairobi Protocol (2004) *Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa*, http://www.smallarmsnet.org/docs/saaf12.pdf (15 August 2006).
[129] Saferworld (no date) "National small arms control" http://www.saferworld.org.uk/en/nat_sa_policy.html (16 August 2006)
[130] Ibid.
[131] Saferworld, "Small arms mappings".
[132] The naming of SaferAfrica is an example of hegemonic power within the NGO world: the organisation was established in 2001 and whilst there is no institutional link between SaferAfrica and Saferworld, there is a sense in which the former trades on Saferworld's reputation and attempts to create the impression of a direct link through its name. Angus Urquhart, Team Leader, Africa Programme, Saferworld, personal communication to author, 31 July 2006.

regional SALW control in the Horn of Africa and Great Lakes and Southern Africa. For example, it supports the Nairobi Declaration through the provision of financial support and echnical expertise on best practice and legislation, partnering with, and building the capacity of, the Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA).[133]

Oxfam is also involved in SALW and conflict prevention work in East Africa through its conflict and peacebuilding programme in Kenya and involvement in a UNDP project on SALW and development; it often works alongside Saferworld in these instances.[134] Oxfam's work in Kenya is a country programme of Oxfam GB and revolves around peacebuilding and conflict management in northern Kenya, working with pastoralists, the government, NGOs and "communities vulnerable to insecurity."[135] This work is based on Oxfam's observation that cattle rustling is made lethal by the influx of SALW; the organisation aims to develop a culture of peace, reduce demand for arms, and promote police training and firearms collections.[136] Oxfam also funds national initiatives through the National Steering Committee for Peacebuilding and Conflict Management, which was established in 2001 and, with the help of Oxfam GB, had its secretariat functioning by early 2003. One of its key activities is the "reduction of illicit small arms and light weapons in the country."[137] In this instance we see Oxfam supporting the National Steering Committee, within which the National Focal Point (supported by Saferworld) sits.[138]

In addition to the research, advocacy and policy work discussed thus far, NGOs – in particular International Alert and Saferworld – play an important role in building capacity for action on SALW issues in the global South, funding and training Southern organisations. According to Saferworld staff, the challenge is to find partner organisations with a broad

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[133] Saferworld (no date) "Regional small arms control," http://www.saferworld.org.uk/en/regional_sa_control.html (16 August 2006).
[134] Interview with Angus Urquhart, 24 July 2006.
[135] Oxfam GB (2006) "Kenya: programme overview", January 2006, http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/where_we_work/kenya/programme.htm (27 July 2006). See also Waqo, "Peacebuilding and Small Arms: Experiences from Northern Kenya".
[136] Mungai, Roselyn (2006) "Demand reduction in action," http://www.iansa.org/un/review2006/presentations/Oxfam-GB-Kenya-Demand.pdf (27 July 2006)
[137] Oxfam GB (2003) "Oxfam GB-funded Peacebuilding Initiatives in the Arid Districts of Kenya. Lessons and Challenges", March 2003, p.56, http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/issues/pastoralism/downloads/peacebuildingkenyafinal2004.pdf (28 July 2006).
[138] Interview with Angus Urquhart, 24 July 2006.

constituency, links to the local community and the capacity to have people on the ground and coordinate activities.[139] Considerable effort is put into maintaining a sense mutual benefit between partners, although the existence of power relationships is acknowledged by interviewees.[140] Sustainability is a key challenge, in terms of ensuring partners have a degree of ownership of programmes. As one Saferworld staff member stated, it can be difficult to work out whether organisations are genuinely committed; Saferworld is a Northern NGO with money, so Southern organisations see working with it as an opportunity to increase their profile, capacity and access to funding.[141] As another staffer argued, "we're not there to build civil society organisations," but capacity building is required so that Southern organisations can fulfil the functions required of them.[142] Staff have found that the process of building capacity is often slower than the project allows due to the need to improve financial management skills, individual staff members' capacity, and organisational management systems. [143] Similarly, International Alert staff are aware of the risks involved, namely "that you end up inviting the same old suspects – the articulate groups, those fluent in English."[144] According to one staff member, "voices from the field are vital and in demand – their word gets taken as gospel – so it's important not to always get a member of the elite from the capital." But when it comes to choosing partners to participate in an important conference, staff do not "take a gamble", so they rely on tried and tested partners.[145]

In addition to civil society-specific capacity-building efforts, NGOs are also involved in training other actors in the global South. These include government officials, international development and donor agencies, and multilateral institutions; in addition, International Alert train businesses and Saferworld train police officers, journalists and parliamentarians.[146] Alongside Oxfam, the two also produce training resources for distribution such as the *Small Arms Resource Manual*, which "provides the necessary tools to help build partnerships, with and

[139] Interview with Angus Urquhart, 24 July 2006.
[140] Ibid.
[141] Ibid.
[142] Interview with Peter Cross, Team Leader, South Asia Programme, Saferworld, 24 July 2006.
[143] Interview with Angus Urquhart; interview with Peter Cross, both 24 July 2006.
[144] Interview with Janani Vivekanandra, Research Consultant, International Alert, 24 July 2006.
[145] Ibid.
[146] International Alert (2006) "Training", http://www.international-alert.org/our_work/training/index.php?page=work&ext=se; Saferworld (no date) "Training", http://www.saferworld.org.uk/en/training.html (21 July 2006).

between governments and NGOs, in order to maximise impact on SALW issues."[147] The organisations put considerable effort into designing their training; Saferworld for example claims its training is needs-driven, participatory, culturally and geographically sensitive, focused on measurable learning objectives, and learning from experience.[148] The role of training is to multiply the effect of work on SALW and conflict prevention.[149]

Further research would be required to document and understand the relations between Northern NGOs and Southern actors more fully; but the findings thus far corroborate the argument put forward by Duffield and others regarding the nature of transformation in the global South. NGOs look for actors in the South that they perceive share their goals and values and are socially engaged. This necessarily rules out working with some of the actors engaged in actually existing development (and potentially violence). In practical terms, NGOs can only work with those organisations that they identify as progressive and (at least potentially) capable, but in so doing they operationalise the liberal argument put forward by academics such as Mary Kaldor, who argues that: "Cosmopolitanism tends to be more widespread in the West and less widespread in the East and South. Nevertheless, throughout the world, in remote towns and villages, both sorts of people are to be found."[150] This is an enactment of the tendency to look for analogues to western civil society when operating in postcolonial societies, discussed in Chapter Two.[151] Whilst NGOs do the best they can to take power relations and cultural difference into account, "[e]ither they do not find this representation of society and thus create one ... or they may find groups mirroring Western society that suddenly emerge and claim this label."[152] In interviews, NGO workers brought up the issue of briefcase NGOs[153] and so they are aware of the power relations within civil society, but the wider phenomenon of funding and training civil society actors was not understood as

[147] Saferworld (no date) "Action Against Small Arms", http://www.saferworld.org.uk/publications.php?id=59 (21July 2006).
[148] Saferworld (no date) "Training Approach", http://www.saferworld.org.uk/en/training_approach.html (21 July 2006).
[149] Interview with Catherine Flew, Project Coordinator, Africa Programme, Saferworld, 24 July 2006.
[150] Kaldor, *Old and New Wars*, p. 89.
[151] Garland, "Developing Bushmen," p. 74.
[152] Pouligny, Béatrice (2005) "Civil Society and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Ambiguities of International Programmes Aimed at Building 'New' Societies," *Security Dialogue*, 36(4): 495-510; p.498.
[153] Interview with Janani Vivekananda; interview with Peter Cross, both 24 July 2006. A "briefcase NGO" is one that is set up for the purpose of getting access to money, has the ability to write good proposals that are meaningless in practice.

problematic. As such, the key issue may not be sensitivity or conscientiousness of NGOs in finding and working with partners, it may be the will to help or, as Duffield prefers to call it, the "will to govern,"[154] and the nature of their understanding of SALW that is the issue.

SALW has been a major growth area for NGOs in the last decade and is the arms trade issue on which they have cultivated the closest relationship with government. NGOs have had a significant impact on international and regional efforts to combat the proliferation of SALW. According to one civil service interviewee, NGOs have more space to discuss SALW with government than other security issues because the smaller the weapons, the easier an issue it is to 'sell'.[155] Another reason for the success of NGOs on SALW issues, according to another civil service interviewee, is that SALW "can be a humanitarian issue, a women's rights issue, as well as a security issue, and these are areas where the government is more open."[156] This is resonant of the argument put forward in Chapter One that NGOs have influence on issues that are not deemed to be "hard" security issues or issues where there are significant corporate interests at stake.

NGO activity on SALW issues has two main, inter-related effects. First, it functions to remove weapons from non-state actors in the global South. Efforts to remove weapons from non-state actors in the North are not attempted, partly because of the U.S. state's absolute refusal to consider controls on civilian possession, and through a narrative of the SALW-conflict link that only pertains to the South.[157] Second, their work is an attempt to shore up, or create, Weberian ideal-type state sovereignty. NGO activity in helping Southern states develop legislation, control their borders and manage weapons stockpiles signals an attempt to instantiate modern, national territorial states that have a monopoly on violence. But this activity occurs in post-colonial contexts where the modern national territorial state has never been in operation. SALW programmes demonstrate the emergence of a networked form of governance in which NGOs act alongside states: whilst states control the overall agenda,

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[154] Duffield, "Social Reconstruction and the Radicalization of Development," p. 1052-3.
[155] Interview with Richard Haviland, 3 May 2005.
[156] Interview with Kate Joseph, 25 May 2005.
[157] In the United Kingdom, for example, whilst there has been rising political and media concern over gun-related violence in cities, and the emergence of domestic NGOs such as the Gun Control Network in response to the 1996 Dunblane and 1987 Hungerford shootings, the NGOs in this thesis do not work on U.K. gun control issues (with the temporary exception of BASIC, noted above).

NGOs have become key intellectual and project partners. In a sense, this represents the privatization and de-territorialization of state influence, as argued by Duffield.[158] It also represents the uneven internationalisation of public policy in the global South: NGOs such as International Alert and Saferworld are heavily involved in shaping state policy and promoting implementation in countries across East and West Africa, Eastern Europe and parts of Asia.

NGOs are conscious of this transformation, although they would not describe it in the same terms. Their efforts at advocacy and capacity building are based on the argument that: "Assistance is slowly beginning to move away from typical models of Northern patrons assisting developing and transitional states – towards a stronger web of co-operative assistance relationships at all levels."[159] NGOs are therefore actively participating in the transformation of governance relations, celebrating what they understand as the end of western imposition and a process of partnership between governments and NGOs in the global North and South. Whilst their activity may not signal western imposition, there is nonetheless a process of the diffusion and promotion of liberal values and practices. One of the implications of this merging of relationships between NGOs and governments is that the narrow question of whether NGOs influence states or vice versa becomes less of an issue. It is more productive to analyse the co-production of SALW as a problem and the cooperative measures to tackle them. Importantly, this interaction happens on SALW issues but not the wider trade in conventional arms.

Conclusion

The argument put forward in this chapter is that there is a dual impulse in the U.K. government's approach to SALW. It will ignore its own stated commitments to combat SALW proliferation if it deems it necessary; in this sense, this chapter is much like the other case studies. Thus, the evidence presented above that the United Kingdom will export SALW to states such as Turkey, Morocco and Nepal despite the existence of conflict demonstrates that the guidelines that the government claims govern its behaviour are selectively applied. On the other hand, the government undertakes interventionary SALW control programmes in some

[158] Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars*, p. 72
[159] Biting the Bullet, *Reviewing Action on Small Arms 2006*, pp. 235-6.

parts of the global South, to try to both get weapons out of the hands of non-state actors and shore up states' capacities to handle such weaponry. NGOs have been active partners in this project, prioritising SALW programmes over U.K. arms export control programmes. Thus, in the case of Tanzania, DfID and NGOs are leading actors in addressing the country's SALW problem, and Tanzania has had a "pioneering experience" on SALW, becoming the first government in the Horn of Africa to develop a National Plan.[160] Yet DfID and the NGOs were powerless to prevent the air traffic control system deal discussed in Chapter Five.

SALW measures promoted by the U.K. government are part of a wider project that incorporates security sector reform, good governance and other such initiatives that signal an attempt to remodel the global South in the image of the North, depoliticising the reasons for the spread of SALW. SALW clean-up programmes allow states such as the United Kingdom (and other leading arms exporting states) to appear benevolent and legitimise the wider trade in arms. SALW control efforts and the ongoing export of weaponry (in the form of SALW and other conventional weaponry) are thus two sides of the same coin: the maintenance of repressive capabilities, especially where regime stability must be maintained; and conflict prevention as a pacifying, pro-capitalism measure. NGOs are key actors in these processes, reproducing dominant discourses and acting as sub-contractors to the state. This activity has three key effects: naturalising and operationalising dominant liberal understandings of conflict that fail to take political grievance seriously; facilitating intervention in the global South in the form of SALW clean-up programmes and associated attempts at good governance; and facilitating the construction of a benevolent and charitable Northern identity, part of the mutual constitution of the global North and South through SALW issues.

160 Eavis, "SALW in the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes Region", p.258.

Chapter 8: Conclusion

Introduction

This thesis analyses NGO activity in relation to U.K. involvement in the arms trade through the lens of debates about global civil society. There are four, inter-related arguments that form the core of the thesis, as indicated in Chapter One. The purpose of this chapter is to draw together the research findings and explicate these four arguments. The chapter explores each argument in turn, examining the existence of dual networks of state, capital and NGO actors on arms issues; the largely limited counter-hegemonic potential of the NGOs because of their understanding of the arms trade and their reproduction of liberal understandings of development, human rights and conflict prevention; power relations within the NGO world and the marginalisation of CAAT; and the challenge that these findings pose for liberal accounts of global civil society. The last part of the chapter considers areas for future research.

Dual Networks

The analysis of U.K. involvement in the arms trade and NGO activity in relation to it demonstrates that there are two networks of actors on arms issues, both comprised of representatives of the state, the market and civil society. Chapter Three discussed the ways in which arms capital has been integrated into the structures of the U.K. state, primarily via DESO, the revolving door and military advisory bodies, with the effect that the parameters of defence industrial and arms export policy are set by an elite group of state (in particular MoD and DTI) and industry actors. This significantly weakens the relative autonomy of the U.K. state and forms the core of a military-industrial complex that operates in favour of higher military spending, support for arms companies and arms exports. Meanwhile, NGOs have made alliances with DfID, in particular CHAD, and secondarily those elements of the FCO and MoD concerned with preventing SALW proliferation. NGOs have formed relationships with weaker elements of the state, and these relationships are not institutionalised to anything like the same degree as arms capital's relationship with the DTI and MoD. Hence I refer to the integration of state and arms capital, but alliances between NGOs and the state. These dual networks suggest that the state allows NGOs access and influence on those issues where its

key strategic and economic interests are not perceived to be at stake. Indeed, state collaboration with NGOs on SALW issues plays a role in legitimating the United Kingdom's involvement in the wider arms trade and allows it to be understood as a benevolent actor in international relations.

The operation and effects of these dual networks are seen in the case studies. In the Tanzania case, the Form 680 process led to BAE Systems equipment being built before the licence was granted in 2001. The licence was granted despite the opposition of DfID, the Treasury, the World Bank and IMF, all of whom are involved in Tanzania's aid programme. Key ministerial interventions (including, it seems, the Prime Minister) led to the granting of the licence despite the arguments against it. It has since been revealed that allegations of bribery have been made against BAE Systems in this case which, if true, would raise questions about the knowledge the U.K. government had of this and the reasons for its continued support for the deal. In this case, and in the debates about developments and arms exports subsequent to it, NGOs called for DfID's concerns in arms export licensing to be taken more seriously. However, they did not work with DfID in the case itself, which was powerless to prevent the deal. Regardless of their strategy, NGOs were marginalised as political actors in this case. In the Indonesia case, arms exports continue despite the efforts of HRPD within the FCO. The political sensitivity of exports to Indonesia – in part a result of NGO pressure – is such that there is a high level of ministerial control over the licensing process. Exports are thus the expression of government policy, not an aberration. The case demonstrates the importance of state financial support – in the form of export credits via ECGD – and political support – in terms of the defence of the supposed "assurances" that govern the use of military equipment by the Indonesian military – provided by the U.K. state for exports to Indonesia. In this case, NGOs made similar arguments to HRPD officials, providing expert opinion to the Quadripartite Committee, which attempts to iron out the worst excesses in U.K. export policy. The SALW case shows the strongest relationship between NGOs and elements of the state: there is a network of actors concerned to prevent illicit SALW proliferation, comprising elements of the MoD, FCO and DfID (all institutionally united via the Conflict Prevention Pools) and insider NGOs, most notably Saferworld and International Alert. This is widely taken as a signal of NGO success – a small number of NGOs have established a consultative relationship with elements of the state concerned to prevent illicit SALW proliferation – but

must be contextualised in terms of the integration of arms capital into the state, which creates a permissive attitude for the production and export of SALW and other types of weaponry. In addition, exports of SALW are not highly profitable for U.K.-based companies; the state can therefore afford to appear concerned to regulate the trade in such weapons.

The activities of these dual networks are complementary rather than antagonistic. They demonstrate the ongoing significance of coercion in backing up state and capital, and the simultaneous operation of both imperial and liberal forms of power. In the Tanzania case, a deal initiated under an earlier regime went ahead despite the anti-corruption and good governance measures of the Mkapa government and revised aid package from donors including the United Kingdom. The Indonesia case exemplifies the significance of the arms trade in backing up processes of integration into the global capitalist economy, and developments since the fall of Suharto demonstrate the promotion of polyarchy as a different means to the same end of stability for capitalist growth. The SALW case study also demonstrates the twin impulses of liberal forms of power through conflict prevention efforts and the removal of weaponry from the population, and the ongoing support for repressive regimes elsewhere in the world through the supply of SALW. Conflict prevention measures in relation to SALW are a good example of what Duffield calls strategic complexes of global liberal governance: constellations of actors drawn from the spheres of the state, capital and civil society, operating in tandem to promote liberal forms of social relations. Duffield argues that "Development assistance is no longer concerned with helping support an often conservative pro-Western alliance of Southern elites; it is now in the business of transforming whole societies,"[1] although he acknowledges that geopolitics and biopolitics are "complementary, interdependent and work together to lesser or greater degrees."[2] This tendency is demonstrated in the SALW case study, but the continued supply of weaponry to states where deemed necessary and the other case studies demonstrate that these efforts at liberal transformation are paralleled by efforts to support repressive regimes elsewhere in the world.

[1] Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars*, p.39
[2] Duffield, Mark (2005) "Getting savages to fight barbarians", p. 143.

The promotion of polyarchy and support for repressive regimes through ongoing arms exports are both aimed at the maintenance of the global capitalist system. As Robinson argues, moves towards polyarchic social relations never entail the complete demilitarisation of society; the state always retains its coercive capacity.[3] This is most evident in the Indonesia case in which, despite moves towards political liberalisation, repression remains the order of the day in resource-rich and restive areas such as Aceh, West Papua and East Timor. The SALW case study also demonstrates these two tendencies: SALW control programmes are aimed at containing conflict and also shoring up states' coercive capacities; and SALW exports continue to states that claim to be defending themselves against internal threats. The promotion of polyarchy and the maintenance of repressive state apparatuses are both activities that are themselves increasingly being internationalised. As argued in Chapters One and Three, processes of the internationalisation of the state under the U.S.' aegis have been accelerating in recent decades, to the point where Robinson believes we are witnessing the emergence of a transnational state. Robinson refers to polyarchy promotion as "a *U.S.* policy and simultaneously a policy response to an agenda of a *transnational* elite," with the U.S. state playing a "leadership role on behalf of a transnational hegemonic configuration."[4] During the 1990s other Northern states and a number of supranational institutions took on the task of promoting polyarchy, which Robinson claims is likely to "increasingly become a policy practiced by the transnational elite."[5] There is thus a process of the transnationalisation of policy via the "coordination of the promotion and defense of polyarchy among Northern states" and the "use of multilateral and supranational institutions."[6] The extent to which internationalisation is giving way to the emergence of a transnational state remains unclear, especially given U.S. dominance in the coercive sphere, but this distinction is not the key issue here. What is evident is the tendency towards a form of internationalisation in U.K. involvement in the arms trade.

For example, in its efforts to combat the illicit proliferation of SALW, the U.K. state provides financial and staff support for UNDP programmes, and its advocacy of a development frame for understanding SALW at the UN Conference make the U.K. state a

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[3] Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy*, pp. 65-6.
[4] Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy*, pp. 363-4, emphasis in original.
[5] Ibid., pp. 363-4.
[6] Ibid., p.365.

leading actor within an international formation. In terms of more traditional support for repression, here too we see international activity through the historical U.K. support for U.S. policy in Indonesia, and continued military support for the Indonesian regime in its activities in areas such as Aceh. More generally, the military-industrial complex is itself internationalising, with Europeanisation and integration with the USA on the rise. Despite increasing internationalisation, there remain occasions of "disjuncture" between the actions of particular fractions of national states and the agenda and policies of the transnational elite.[7] As demonstrated in the Tanzania case, senior U.K. politicians pushed the deal through against the advice of the World Bank. The arms trade and arms control thus demonstrate some of the competing tendencies of an internationalising capitalist and states system.

NGOs' limited counter-hegemonic potential

The analysis of the arms trade put forward in Chapter Three provided three indicators of counter-hegemonic potential to be applied to the NGOs, namely: whether they challenge state-capital integration, narratives of national defence and security, and hierarchical North-South relations. Analysis of NGO activity in Chapter Four and the case studies demonstrates that, overall, they display limited counter-hegemonic potential. All six NGOs agree that there is a problem with the international arms trade. They also agree on its effects: they understand it to hamper development, harm human rights and exacerbate conflict. Amnesty International, BASIC, International Alert, Oxfam and Saferworld agree that the solution to these problems is better regulation: they are not opposed to the existence or operation of the trade and seek to improve the processes of control that regulate it. CAAT is the only organisation to be opposed to the trade *per se* and campaigns for changes that will lead to its abolition. CAAT thus seeks to identify and challenge the factors that facilitate the continued operation of the trade, rather than seeking remedial mechanisms to regulate it.

Saferworld's "missing link" argument is emblematic of the regulatory approach of five of the six organisations. In this understanding, occasional controversial exports mar an overall benevolent agenda. Problems of the arms trade are thus seen as aberrations that can be ironed out through improved regulation, rather than logical outcomes of the state's support for arms

[7] Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy*, p.329

capital that cannot be fully resolved until something fundamental changes in this relationship. In contrast, CAAT believes the problem to be wider than simply controversial exports: for CAAT, the government's pro-export stance (created by the integration of arms capital into positions of state power) is the problem and controversial exports are its most extreme manifestation. Whilst CAAT does not articulate an anti-capitalist argument, it does pinpoint one of the key loci of the perpetuation of the arms trade. Alongside BASIC in its earlier days, CAAT is also the only organisation to consider domestic procurement and militarization as part of the problem; however, neither organisation works on these issues to any considerable extent. In terms of the counter-hegemonic potential of the NGOs' approaches, only CAAT (and to a lesser degree, BASIC) issues a transgressive challenge to dominant narratives surrounding the arms trade.

In addition to their understanding of the arms trade as a whole, the NGOs also make arguments about its relationship to sustainable development, human rights and conflict prevention. These are of interest in terms of their articulation of North-South relations. Saferworld's "missing link" argument rests on an understanding of wider U.K. foreign and development policy as benevolent and aimed at the achievable goals of the eradication of poverty and promotion of human rights, rather than as an expression of capitalist development that necessarily includes the creation and spread of poverty, and abuse of human rights in the global South in the process. More specifically, on the issue of sustainable development, the NGOs active on the Tanzania case (CAAT, Oxfam and Saferworld) all criticise the government for contravening its publicly stated commitments. However, whilst they are critical of the government's actions in this case, their representation of Tanzanian agency and of the development agenda serves to further hierarchical North-South relations, as it casts the Tanzanian government as politically immature, reproducing one of the key binary oppositions between the global North and South in development thinking.

On the issue of human rights, Amnesty, CAAT and Saferworld all criticise the U.K. government for contravening its publicly stated commitments. Despite this, Amnesty and Saferworld's arguments reproduce a liberal understanding of human rights, severing human rights violations from their capitalist context and the role of arms exports in providing the coercive capability of the Indonesian military to carry out its task. CAAT, in contrast, seeks to

link human rights abuses to capitalist development in Indonesia and thus does the most to understand the generating mechanism of abuses and the role of the arms trade in human rights abuses, although it does not make an explicitly anti-capitalist argument. On the issue of conflict prevention, NGOs such as Amnesty, Oxfam and Saferworld criticise the government for issuing export licences for SALW to countries in conflict. However, beyond this, all the NGOs active on SALW issues share a liberal understanding of conflict. International Alert and Saferworld do the most to perpetuate this understanding through their significant levels of work with and for DfID on SALW clean-up programmes in the global South; they are enmeshed in the operationalisation of the conflict prevention agenda. Overall, NGOs tend to reproduce liberal conceptions of development, human rights and conflict prevention. This means that, despite their role in criticising the government for particular actions, they play a part in legitimating, buttressing and further entrenching liberal understandings. NGOs are thus part of a hegemonic constellation of social forces.

In addition to analysing their understandings, NGOs' strategies must also be assessed if we are to get a handle on their counter-hegemonic potential. The NGOs use a variety of strategies to mobilise their arguments and try to generate change in U.K. arms export policy, which I have analysed in terms of a spectrum of insider-outsider activity. The most insider organisation is Saferworld as it has established itself as an expert on arms trade issues and generated a consultative relationship with elements of the U.K. state. It is most closely linked to government on SALW issues, as it works in tandem with DfID (and also those other elements of the state that are involved in the Conflict Prevention Pools) to develop and implement policies and projects on SALW control in the global South. Whilst it poses more of a challenge to the government on arms export licensing issues, it is still listened to by those weaker elements of the state that are sometimes in favour of tighter controls, such as DfID and weaker parts of the MoD and FCO. On SALW issues, International Alert has also established itself as an insider organisation, working with the U.K. government and providing expertise. However, its expertise is restricted to SALW issues and it is not active on wider arms trade issues other than through its membership of the U.K. Working Group on Arms.

BASIC has historically played an important role in NGO activity on arms trade issues. Its strategy, similar to Saferworld, is one of insider advocacy based on research. It has not

developed as significant a consultative relationship with government as Saferworld and has struggled to generate funding and remain active. One of its staff members, Paul Ingram, has used an insider strategy to get a more radical message across but he does this on the basis of personal networks rather than via BASIC as an organisation. In this, he has worked with CAAT in the past, which is the most outsider organisation of the six. CAAT does not seek to establish a consultative relationship with government. This is in part due to its understanding of the impetus to the arms trade: its understanding of the vested interests at stake in the arms trade means it does not believe arms export policy to be a matter of rational decision-making in which NGOs armed with information can change policy. CAAT thus directs its efforts towards public education and protest, as part of an attempt to educate the wider population about the interests involved in the arms trade and the effects of it, and to signal to government and industry that their activities are not sanctioned by the whole population.

Amnesty and Oxfam use some of the same methods as CAAT but are best understood as thresholder organisations. They engage in mass public campaigning, standing outside of government and trying to create pressure on the government to change its behaviour. But they also put forward policy proposals, often through their work with other organisations in the U.K. Working Group on Arms, which emphasises expertise, credibility and constructive suggestions, all indicators of an insider strategy. The combination of research and insider advocacy, backed up by public pressure to attempt to make the government take their concerns seriously, is what makes Amnesty and Oxfam thresholder organisations. As one Oxfam staffer put it, "Advocacy is obviously more nuanced than campaigning, which needs a simple message and a baddie. The two are complementary strategies." [8]

NGOs' efforts to promote an international, legally-binding Arms Trade Treaty through the United Nations is a good expression of insider activity. They have worked hard to convince the U.K. government publicly to express support for such a treaty and have

[8] Interview with Debbie Hillier, Oxfam, 1 December 2003. In a 2006 document, Oxfam GB gave advice to supporters on how to challenge the "myth" that "Oxfam is too close to the Government to criticise its policies", arguing that: "Yes, we believe in constructive engagement with decision-makers, and giving praise when it's due. But we're not puppets of ANY government – and we're not afraid to slam them when they get it wrong (as we did over the Iraq war). When it comes to confronting powerful governments with vested interests in arms or unfair trade, our hard-edged campaigning gets results." Oxfam (2006) "The Art of Self-Defence for Oxfam Supporters. How to rid the world of those annoying myths about Oxfam," http://www.oxfam.org.uk/about_us/asd.htm?ito=1712&itc=0# (13 June 2006).

generated workable policy solutions through research and advocacy. NGOs have a history of working in this way; as one Saferworld staffer said, NGOs "have had a fair bit of influence in establishing policy frameworks" through the provision of ideas for the U.K. government annual report, the EU Code of Conduct and controls on brokers originated in the NGO community. NGOs have thus been successful in getting new issues on the agenda.[9] This staffer acknowledged, however, that there has not been a decrease in the number of exports of concern; as he put it, better policy has not led to better implementation.[10] This suggests that NGOs can influence policy frameworks as long as this does not threaten the government's support for the arms industry and its position as a major arms exporter. It also suggests a pluralist understanding of the policy process on the part of NGOs: that better information should lead to better policies and fewer controversial arms exports. One of the arguments of this thesis is that this is an inadequate basis for understanding arms export policy. The integration of arms capital into the U.K. state generates a pro-industry lean to policy that will not change no matter how many policy proposals NGOs make.

A significant risk in an insider strategy is that of "benign neglect"[11] or what Gramsci called *trasformismo.*[12] This is where powerful social actors – in this case the state and arms industry – incorporate potential challengers and their arguments, and use them to further bolster hegemonic understandings and practices. This has happened to a significant extent in the case of U.K. involvement in the arms trade. The public support by the U.K. government and major arms industry trade associations such as the Defence Manufacturers' Association for an Arms Trade Treaty – one that "would not bring new obligations for U.K. Industry"[13] – has been welcomed by those NGOs pushing for the Treaty[14] but signals their co-option into a pro-industry narrative. In its 2002 Corporate Social Responsibility Report, BAE Systems quotes a "human rights campaigner" as saying that "Arms are perfectly legal and necessary, but the company making and selling them has to have principles. The more dangerous your products,

[9] Interview with Andrew McLean, 20 November 2003.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Grant, *Insider Groups*, p.2.
[12] Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*, p. 58-9; Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations," pp. 166-7.
[13] Defence Manufacturers' Association, "Arms Trade Treaty."
[14] Control Arms (2005) "Key Players in Defence Industry throw weight behind an Arms Trade Treaty," 11 June 2005, http://www.controlarms.org/latest_news/key-players.htm (13 June 2006).

the more important it is to have values and principles."[15] The company uses this as the eye-catching headline to an article entitled "Open to debate," which features the reproduction of an email exchange with Paul Eavis, the Director of Saferworld.[16] Such "engagement" with NGOs allows BAE Systems to claim to be progressive and willing to engage in dialogue, significantly legitimising its activity and further buttressing the dominant understanding of the problem of the arms trade as unregulated exports to unscrupulous regimes. This have the effect of co-opting NGOs into industry-led definitions of the problems of the arms trade and allows industry to dominate the discursive terrain of struggle.

In terms of the impact of NGO activity, the most basic indicator is their impact on the volume of U.K. arms exports and the destinations of those weapons. As Table 1 in Chapter Three demonstrates, there has been no change in this regard: the volume and pattern of U.K. arms exports has remained fundamentally the same since New Labour came to power. Beyond this basic indicator, and in line with a postcolonial Gramscian approach that emphasises North-South relations and the potential role of NGOs in counter-hegemonic struggle, analysis of NGO impact must consider the extent to which they have proved able to disrupt dominant discourses and create space for more progressive action. Key ways in which they could do this include contesting the authority of the official myth, drawing on other available cultural myths, and reinterpreting the official myth.[17] The analysis in this thesis demonstrates that NGOs have been able to contest governmental myths, but do not have the reputational power to be able to make this challenge gain widespread currency. For example, NGOs have challenged the government's use of the jobs argument in several studies but this has not prevented the government and industry from deploying this argument in debates about arms exports. NGOs have only partially reinterpreted official myths of the arms trade, however. For example, the insider and thresholder groups' emphasis on controversial exports and the primacy of improved regulation leaves the wider structures of the arms trade, state-capital relations, militarism and capitalist globalisation untouched, leaving stronger elements of the state and arms capital to act unfettered. And through their reproduction of dominant liberal narratives

[15] BAE Systems (2002) *Corporate Social Responsibility Report 2002* (Farnham: BAE Systems), p.10.
[16] Ibid., pp.12-3.
[17] Milliken, "Discourse in International Relations", p. 245.

of development, human rights and conflict prevention, they further entrench, rather than challenge hegemonic conceptions. This has a significant impact on naturalising the status quo.

Power relations within the NGO world

CAAT is the partial exception to the role of NGOs in buttressing hegemonic social formations. However, it is important to understand the cumulative impact of NGO activity, as the NGOs do not work in isolation. As detailed in Chapter Four, collaborative working is a feature of NGO activity on the U.K. arms trade. This is done predominantly through the U.K. Working Group on Arms, which features a broad division of labour between the members. For example, Saferworld specialises in policy work and contacting government officials, whilst Oxfam and Amnesty specialise in getting their constituencies to lobby ministers.[18] The distinct competencies of the member organisations and their complementarity give the Working Group its strength, according to one Oxfam staffer, and the combination of mass membership organisations and detailed policy and research work is particularly valuable, according to a Saferworld staffer.[19] The members of the U.K. Working Group share an insider ethos of credibility and expertise. They are wary of having – or being seen to have – a relationship with CAAT: as one Oxfam staffer put it, Oxfam is nervous about CAAT because of policymakers' perceptions of what CAAT stands for.[20] Nevertheless, staffers from across the organisations (including CAAT) argue that the distinct strategies of CAAT and the U.K. Working Group members are complementary, as detailed in Chapter Four.

In contrast to NGO staffers' understanding of this complementarity, one of the arguments put forward in this thesis is that insider activity dominates the space available for NGOs, rendering CAAT ineffective in a manner distinct from any of its own shortcomings. Whilst transformatory change requires incremental steps in order to be realised, the ideas behind policy proposals must be transgressive if they are to contribute to counter-hegemony and the realisation of alternative social relations. Yet the policy solutions put forward by insider and thresholder groups necessarily take the existing framework as given and thus

[18] Interview with Andy McLean, 20 November 2003.
[19] Interview with Debbie Hillier, Oxfam, 1 December 2003; interview with Roy Isbister, Saferworld, 2 December 2003.
[20] Interview with Debbie Hillier, Oxfam, 1 December 2003.

naturalise it. This relates both to their strategy of generating a consultative relationship with government (starting where government is at and taking it with them) and to their liberal understanding of the problems associated with the arms trade. The dynamic of insiders' consultative relationship with institutionally weak elements of the state combined with CAAT's confrontational stance that challenges the integration of arms capital into institutionally stronger elements of the state, is thus ultimately to be found wanting politically. The insider and thresholder groups are more likely to be able to generate change, but this change is liable to be cosmetic; the operationalisation of the outsider group's vision would signal a fundamental change in U.K. arms export policy, but is unlikely to be realised.

This speaks to a wider issue of insider and outsider activity. As a self-identified outsider group, CAAT does not want to generate consultative relationships with government; as a result, it will not be taken seriously as a political force. It remains outside of what Chomsky labels the realm of "'responsible criticism'," and instead occupies the position of "'sentimental,' or 'emotional,' or 'hysterical' criticism," and is excluded from debate because it transgresses the boundaries of accepted discussion.[21] In addition, CAAT's outsider stance has generated suspicion from other NGOs, as outlined above, but also from the state and arms industry: the infiltration of CAAT by agents paid by BAE Systems, discussed in Chapter Six, speaks directly to this. In this sense, being excluded from open debate signifies that a group is doing something right: it has made an argument that is uncomfortable for the status quo and would require a fundamental change of policy to rectify. The categories of insider and outsider are thus mutually constituted: both are dependent on the existence of the other for their resonance. This raises the question of the implications of this research for NGO activity: would it be a politically progressive development if the insider and thresholder groups were to move to CAAT's position? It is impossible to prove that if the other NGOs did not exist, or moved to an outsider strategy, CAAT's arguments would have greater political purchase, although it would create more pressure on the government. What is clear is that this is unlikely to happen because of the capitalist context of civil society and the disciplining of NGOs via the promise of access to funding and state officials, and their strategy of enacting "responsible" criticism. NGO activity on U.K. involvement in the arms trade tells us

[21] Chomsky, Noam (1967) "The Responsibility of Intellectuals," *New York Review of Books*, 23 February 1967, http://www.chomsky.info/articles/19670223.htm (22 January 2007).

something about the conditioned nature of NGOs as global civil society actors and raises the important sociological question of how policy and social change happen. The findings from this research suggest that incremental change is always necessary to effect political transformation, but this must stem from a transgressive rather than a liberal reformist impulse.

The example from Chapter Six concerning an arms embargo on Indonesia is a good illustration of this argument. Amnesty and Saferworld, which are seen as respectable, credible and responsible organisations, do not make sustained calls for an embargo on arms exports to Indonesia. CAAT's long-term call for an embargo can thus be ignored by officials and politicians because it is seen as an unsophisticated position that is too radical and unrealistic. Engaging with Amnesty and Saferworld, with their weaker demands, allows the state to claim that it is listening to civil society. CAAT is marginalised amongst NGOs, officials and politicians because of its outsider strategy. As such, its call for a full military embargo on Indonesia – which the analysis in Chapter Six suggests is an appropriate policy demand – is undermined. If Amnesty, with its large membership and reputation, and Saferworld, with its reputation for detailed policy analysis and expertise, were to join CAAT's call, the impact would be much greater. Yet Amnesty and Saferworld's mandates, strategies and understandings of the arms trade mean they will not join CAAT: insiders thus render outsiders ineffective.

Implications for the literature on global civil society

The arguments put forward concerning NGO activity in relation to U.K. involvement in the arms trade poses a challenge to the dominant liberal literature on global civil society. As discussed in Chapter Two, there are four key features of this liberal literature: a conceptual separation civil society from both the state and market, the attribution of progressive or emancipatory values to global civil society, a particular understanding of the global linked to globalisation, and an emphasis on non-violence. The analysis in this thesis challenges liberal approaches on each of these four counts. First, the dominant liberal literature takes the separation between the state, market and civil society to be real rather than purely methodological. The analysis of this thesis, in contrast, demonstrates the importance of appreciating the capitalist nature of civil society. Thus, whilst the thesis focuses on NGOs as

global civil society actors, this is in the Gramscian spirit of a methodological separation of civil society from the state and market, without forgetting the capitalist context in which all three actors operate. Thus, arms capital is structurally privileged due to its relationship with the state, and NGO effectiveness must be considered in light of this relationship and the disciplining of NGOs to work in largely non-threatening ways.

Second, the dominant liberal literature identifies civil society as a key locus of progressive values. Using the Gramscian concepts of hegemony and counter-hegemony casts a different light on NGO activity, as they largely play a role in buttressing dominant conceptions of the arms trade, development, human rights and conflict prevention. This conforms to Gramsci's argument that consensual domination is exercised from within civil society. NGOs can thus be understood as a cultural transmission belt for hegemonic ideas, naturalising the status quo. The (partial) exception to this is CAAT, with its more critical argument concerning the impetus to U.K. arms exports, and its critique of arms exports to Indonesia, both of which transgress the parameters of mainstream debate. There is a particular irony in this study of NGO activity given its empirical focus on the arms trade: Gramsci understood consensual domination to be backed up by coercion, and here we see NGOs playing a role in generating consent *for* coercion. This is a significant ideological task.

A major challenge for counter-hegemonic activity on the arms trade is to make arguments that do not enact a message of "not yet"[22] to the global South. That is, to avoid constructing a position on arms exports that effectively freezes the status quo, ending or significantly reducing arms exports to the global South but leaving Northern states' massive and sophisticated arsenals untouched. CAAT and BASIC, whilst they are critical of U.K. defence industrial policy, do not do enough to enact a thorough postcolonial position on this issue. They would need to do more work linking up the military might of the U.K. state to questions of the arms trade, giving questions of domestic procurement equal weight as arms exports, for example, but their arguments signal the potential for such positions to be developed.

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[22] Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*, p.8.

Third, liberal claims that we are witnessing the emergence of a *global* civil society look rather different from a postcolonial perspective: what liberals label global, is better understood as imperial. That is, the arguments made by NGOs concerning the arms trade are largely reproductive of imperial relations, or hierarchical North-South relations. Echoing Hopgood, this is testament to the fact that "The only practices that can plausibly be called international norms in the modern era are ... those that accord with liberalism and the hegemony of the West."[23] The liberal claim to universalism is not a disinterested claim but its greatest success has been in presenting itself as such. Thus, the arguments concerning development, human rights and conflict prevention would be understood in a liberal framework as demonstrating the emergence of a global consciousness and a spreading concern to mitigate international ills and promote progressive values. Understood through a postcolonial Gramscian frame, NGO representations of these issues serve to reproduce imperial relations.

The fourth key element of liberal accounts of global civil society is an emphasis on non-violence. The effect of this is to marginalise violence to the fringes of international relations, rather than understand it as playing a central role in the historical and contemporary development of capitalism and state formation. This naturalises the violence of the state and arms capital and means that debates about the arms trade start from the position of accepting the status quo, which brackets the violent history of international relations. Whilst NGOs and civil society actors are expected to be non-violent, the state and capital are not. This theoretical preference is borne out in empirical practice: even the most outsider of the NGOs, CAAT, is explicit about its adherence to a code of non-violence.[24] There are moral as well as strategic reasons why this should be so; in particular, the argument that an attempt to challenge the hegemony of violence must itself be non-violent, in order to transcend that which it seeks to challenge and sow the seeds of a genuinely counter-hegemonic movement. However, the emphasis on non-violence in global civil society usually rests on the acceptance of common definitions of violence as including violence against property (such as weapons themselves, and

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[23] Hopgood, *Keepers of the Flame*, p. 216.
[24] Participation in CAAT actions is dependent on a commitment to non-violence, defined as refraining from physical violence or verbal abuse towards persons See CAAT (no date) "Guidance for involvement in CAAT actions", http://www.caat.org.uk/Action%20guidelines.php (28 June 2005). Violence against property is not mentioned in the guidance. According to one CAAT staff member, the document tends towards the most non-violent end, with the aim of being acceptable to all – some people think that shouting is violent, others are opposed to violence against people but not against property. As part of the peace movement, CAAT is by definition a non-violent organisation. Interview with Ian Prichard, 15 June 2004.

the headquarters of arms-producing companies). These definitions are infused with the spirit of capitalism: adopting and propagating a different definition of violence that does not protect private property in such a way is arguably one of the tasks of a counter-hegemonic movement.[25] Yet such a task, and the use of violence as a tool of activism, are marginalised by the emphasis on the non-violent character of global civil society.

Areas for future research

There are a number of potential areas for future research that emerge from this thesis. These fall into three broad categories of comparative study, ethnographic study, and a focus on violence. A comparative study of NGO activity (in particular Amnesty and Oxfam) across issues, comparing military globalisation to economic and political globalisation (via the Control Arms, Make Poverty History and Irrepressible.Info campaigns, for example), would allow an analysis of the issues on which NGOs are granted access and influence and whether NGOs' counter-hegemonic potential is variable. Is the arms trade a special case or are its lessons more widely generalisable? This speaks to the question of how change happens, and whether some issue areas are harder to generate change on than others.

Another fruitful avenue, following scholars such as Carol Cohn, Hugh Gusterson and Stephen Hopgood,[26] would be to undertake an ethnographic study of an organisation in order to explore the production and reproduction of meanings about how NGOs operate or how the arms trade is maintained as a social practice. For example, an ethnographic study of NGO activity on SALW issues in the global South would advance the documentary analysis and interviews carried out for Chapter 7, and allow deeper investigation of the integration of

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25 See Mueller, Tadzio (2004) "What's Really Under Those Cobblestones? Riots as Political Tools, and the Case of Gothenburg 2001," *Ephemera,* 4(2): 135-151; Sullivan, Sian (2005) "'We are heartbroken and furious!' Violence and the (anti)globalisation movement(s)," in Eschle, Catherine and Bice Maiguaschca (eds.) *Critical Theories, International Relations and 'the Anti-Globalisation Movement'. The Politics of Global Resistance* (Abingdon: Routledge) pp.174-194. More broadly, Herbert Marcuse argues that the debate about non-violence "should not, from the beginning, be clouded by ideologies which serve the perpetuation of violence;" Marcuse, Herbert (1969) "Repressive Tolerance", in Wolff, Robert Paul, Barrington Moore Jr., and Herbert Marcuse, *A Critique of Pure Tolerance* (London: Jonathan Cape), 93-187; p. 116. That is, moral or strategic arguments about the use of violence by global civil society actors should not start from the premise that non-state violence is illegitimate, which leaves the violence carried out and sanctioned by the state and capital unchallenged.

26 Cohn, Carol (1987) "Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals," *Signs,* 12(4): 687-718; Hopgood, *Keepers of the Flame;* Gusterson, Hugh (1996) *Nuclear Rites. A Weapons Laboratory at the end of the Cold War* (Berkeley: University of California Press).

NGOs into state activity and their role in the emergence of strategic complexes of global liberal governance. Saferworld's activity in East Africa is a good example of this, as it participates in the transformation of both the U.K. and East African states through its partnership with DfID and its role in training East African state officials. Such a study would investigate further the North-South relations and processes of state transformation that are effected by NGO efforts to shore up Southern states' monopoly on violence. Alternatively, ethnographic study of an arms company and a direct action group campaigning against it (such as EDO MBM and the SmashEDO campaign in Brighton) would explore the construction of meanings about both the arms trade and direct action activism, and the interaction between the two worlds.

A third, related, key potential avenue relates to the study of violence and non-violence within civil society. This would involve further theoretical exploration of the concept of global civil society, in particular its capitalist nature, and of the role of coercion in international relations. In light of this, an analysis of the tactics used by protestors involved in direct action against arms companies and state arsenals would focus on the ways in which disarming weapons or damaging arms company premises are understood as violent or non-violent actions. Each of these three areas of future research would draw on and significantly extend the theoretical and empirical findings of this thesis, speaking to a variety of concerns in international relations literature.

Appendix 1

The Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria

(26 OCTOBER 2000 – HC 199-203W)

An export licence will not be issued if the arguments for doing so are outweighed by the need to comply with the UK's international obligations and commitments, by concern that the goods might be used for internal repression or international aggression, by the risks to regional stability or by other considerations as described in these criteria.

Criterion One

Respect for the UK's international commitments, in particular sanctions decreed by the UN Security Council and those decreed by the European Community, agreements on non-proliferation and other subjects, as well as other international obligations.

The Governments will not issue an export licence if approval would be inconsistent with, inter alia:

a) the UK's international obligations and its commitments to enforce UN, OSCE and EU arms embargoes, as well as national embargoes observed by the UK and other commitments regarding the application of the strategic export controls;
b) the UK's international obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention;
c) The UK's commitments in the frameworks of the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement;
d) The Guidelines for Conventional Arms Transfers agreed by the Permanent Five members of the UN Security Council, the OSCE Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers and the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports;
e) The UK's obligations under the Ottawa Convention and the 1998 Land Mines Act;
f) The UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.

Criterion Two

The respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the country of final destination.

Having assessed the recipient country's attitude towards relevant principles established by international human rights instruments, the Government will:

a) not issue an export licence if there is a clear risk that the proposed export might be used for internal repression;
b) exercise special caution and vigilance in issuing licences, on a case-by-case basis and taking account of the nature of the equipment , to countries where serious violations of human rights have been established by the competent bodies of the UN, the Council of Europe or by the EU.

For these purposes, equipment which might be used for internal repression will include, inter alia,

equipment where there is evidence of the use of this or similar equipment for internal repression by the proposed end-user, or where there is reason to believe that the equipment will be diverted from its stated end-user and used for internal repression.

The nature of the equipment will be considered carefully, particularly if it is intended for internal security purposes. Internal repression includes, inter alia, torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment; summary, arbitrary or extra judicial executions; disappearances; arbitrary detentions; and other major suppression or violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms as set out in relevant international human rights instruments, including the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the International Covenant on civil and Political Rights.

The Government considers that in some cases the use of force by a Government within its own borders, for example to preserve law and order against terrorists or other criminals, is legitimate and does not constitute internal repression, as long as force is used in accordance with the international human rights standards as described above.

Criterion Three

The internal situation in the country of final destination, as a function of the existence of tensions or armed conflicts.

The Government will not issue licences for exports which would provoke or prolong armed conflicts or aggravate existing tensions or conflicts in the country of final destination.

Criterion Four

Preservation of regional peace, security and stability.

The Government will not issue an export licence if there is a clear risk that the intended recipient would use the proposed export aggressively against another country or to assert by force a territorial claim. However a purely theoretical possibility that the items concerned might be used in the future against another state will not itself lead to a licence being refused.

When considering these risks, the Government will take into account inter alia:

a) the existence or likelihood of armed conflict between the recipient and another country;
b) a claim against the territory of a neighbouring country which the recipient has in the past tried or threatened to pursue by means of force;
c) whether the equipment would be likely to be used other than for the legitimate national security and defence of the recipient;
d) the need not to affect adversely regional stability in any significant way, taking into account the balance of forces between the states of the region concerned, their relative expenditure on defence, the potential for the equipment significantly to enhance the effectiveness of existing capabilities or to improve force projection, and the need not to introduce into the region new capabilities which would be likely to lead to increased tension.

Criterion Five

The national security of the UK, of territories whose external relations are the UK's responsibility, and of allies, EU Member States and other friendly countries.

The Government will take into account:

a) the potential effect of the proposed export on the UK's defence and security interests or on those of other territories and countries as described above, while recognising that this factor cannot affect consideration of the criteria in respect of human rights and on regional peace, security and stability;
b) the risk of the goods concerned being used against UK forces or on those of other territories and countries as described above;
c) the risk of reverse engineering or unintended technology transfer;
d) the need to protect UK military classified information and capabilities.

Criterion Six

The behaviour of the buyer country with regard to the international community, as regards in particular to its attitude to terrorism, the nature of its alliances and respect for international law.

The Government will take into account inter alia the record of the buyer country with regard to :

a) its support or encouragement of terrorism and international organised crime;
b) its compliance with its international commitments, in particular on the non-use of force, including under international humanitarian law applicable to international and non-international conflicts;
c) its commitment to non-proliferation and other areas of arms control and disarmament, in particular the signature, ratification and implementation of relevant arms control and disarmament conventions referred to in sub-para b) of Criterion One.

Criterion Seven

The existence of a risk that the equipment will be diverted within the buyer country or re-exported under undesirable conditions.

In assessing the impact of the proposed export on the importing country and the risk that exported goods might be diverted to an undesirable end-user, the following will be considered:

a) the legitimate defence and domestic security interests of the recipient country, including any involvement in UN or peace-keeping activity;
b) the technical capability of the recipient country to use the equipment;
c) the capability of the recipient country to exert effective export controls.

The Government will pay particular attention to the need to avoid diversion of UK exports to

terrorist organisations. Proposed exports of anti-terrorist equipment will be given particularly careful consideration in this context.

Criterion Eight

The compatibility of the arms exports with the technical and economic capacity of the recipient country, taking into account the desirability that states should achieve their legitimate needs of security and defence with the least diversion for armaments of human and economic resources.

The Government will take into account, in the light of information from relevant sources such as United Nations Development Programme, World Bank, IMF and Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development reports, whether the proposed export would seriously undermine the economy or seriously hamper the sustainable development of the recipient country.

The Government will consider in this context the recipient country's relative levels of military and social expenditure, taking into account also any EU or bilateral aid, and its public finances, balance of payments, external debt, economic and social development and any IMF- or World Bank-sponsored economic reform programme.

Other Factors

Operative Provision 10 of the EU Code of Conduct specifies that Member States may where appropriate also take into account the effect of proposed exports on their economic, social, commercial and industrial interests, but that these factors will not affect the application of the criteria in the Code.

The Government will thus continue when considering export licence applications to give full weight to the UK's national interest, including:

a) the potential effect on the UK's economic, financial and commercial interests, including our long-term interests in having stable, democratic trading partners;
b) the potential effect on the UK's relations with the recipient country;
c) the potential effect on any collaborative defence production or procurement project with allies or EU partners;
d) the protection of the UK's essential strategic industrial base.

In the application of the above criteria, account will be taken of reliable evidence, including for example, reporting from diplomatic posts, relevant reports by international bodies, intelligence and information from open sources and non-governmental organisations.

Appendix 2

SALW, components, equipment and ammunition licensed by the U.K. government (1997-2005) that generate concerns about conflict prevention: Morocco, Nepal, Turkey.*

Country/ Year	Equipment licensed	Type of licence (SIEL unless stated as OIEL)
MOROCCO		
1997	25 pounder guns, shotguns, sporting rifles, submachine gun and spares	
1998	General purpose machine guns, revolvers, rifles, semi-automatic pistols, shotguns, sporting rifles, submachine guns, vintage shotgun	
	Small arms ammunition, crowd control ammunition, CS grenades	
	Sporting rifles, sporting pistols, shotguns, telescopic sights	OIEL
1999	Rifles, submachine guns, anti-riot guns	
	Components for: heavy gun, submachine gun	
	Technology and equipment for the use of heavy gun	
	Tear gas/irritant ammunition, crowd control ammunition	
	Shotguns, sporting rifles	OIEL
2000	Blank ammunition	
2001	Blank ammunition	
2002	200 submachine guns	
	Components for submachine guns	
	Technology for the use of submachine guns	
2003	200 submachine guns	
	Components for submachine guns	
	Technology for the use of submachine guns	
	Blank ammunition	
2004	2 shotguns	
2005	Blank ammunition	

NEPAL		
1997	Shotguns and spares/equipment; shotgun cartridges	
	Sporting rifles, veterinary rifle	
	Ammunition	
1998	Air rifles/pistols, assault rifle, revolver, semi-automatic pistols, shotguns, sporting rifle	
	Components for assault rifle, submachine gun	
	Equipment for the use of semi-automatic pistol	
	Sporting ammunition	
1999	Rifle, shotgun, sniper rifles, sporting rifle	
	Equipment for the use of and component for: rifle, sniper rifle	
	Technology for the use of sniper rifle	
	Sporting gun ammunition	
2000	320 semi-automatic pistols, 15 shotguns, 3 sporting rifles, 1 air gun	
	Technology for the use of and components for semi-automatic pistol	
	Sporting gun ammunition	
2001	6,780 assault rifles, 11 semi-automatic pistols, 4 shotguns	
	Components for assault rifles	
	Technology for the use of: assault rifles, semi-automatic pistols,	
	Equipment for the use of: assault rifles, general purpose machine guns, semi-automatic pistols, sniper rifles, submachine guns,	
	Sporting gun ammunition	
2002	1 sporting rifle	
	Sporting gun ammunition	
2003	1 combat shotgun	
	Components for combat shotguns	
2004	Weapon sights and night sights	
2005	2 rifles, 1 semi-automatic pistol	
	Components for assault rifles	
	Non-sporting shotgun ammunition	

TURKEY		
1997	Shotguns, pistols, air rifles, sniper rifles, rifles	
	Shotgun cartridges	
	Ammunition	
	Combat sights	OIEL
1998	Air rifles/pistols, semi-automatic pistol, shotguns	
	Smoke ammunition, sporting gun ammunition	
	Equipment for the use of small arms guns	OIEL
	Small arms ammunition and components for small arms ammunition	OIEL
	Sporting ammunition, air rifles/pistols ammunition	OIEL
1999	Shotgun	
	Sporting gun ammunition	
	Air weapons, components for and equipment for the use of air weapons	OIEL
2000	1 rifle, 1 shotgun	
	Components for submachine gun	
	Small arms ammunition, sporting gun ammunition	
	Sniper rifle training equipment	
	Components for general purpose machine gun, equipment for the use of general purpose machine gun, components for mortar, equipment for the use of mortar	OIEL
	Air guns, components for air guns	OIEL
2001	Equipment for the use of general purpose machine guns	
	Small arms ammunition, sporting gun ammunition	
	Sporting gun ammunition	OIEL
2002	12 heavy machine guns, 20 sniper rifles, 1 shotgun	
	Equipment for the use of and components for: heavy machine guns, sniper rifles	
	Sniper rifle maintenance equipment	
	Small arms ammunition, sporting gun ammunition	
	Components for heavy machine guns, components for general purpose machine guns	OIEL
2003	Components for: general purpose machine guns, heavy machine guns	
	Small arms ammunition, sporting gun ammunition	
	Assault rifles, general purpose machine guns, machine pistols, pistols, rifles, semi-automatic pistols, submachine guns, air guns	OIEL
	Anti-riot guns, crowd control ammunition, tear gas/irritant ammunition, CS hand grenades, stun grenades, training hand grenades, smoke ammunition, smoke hand grenades	OIEL
	Components for: assault rifles, general purpose machine guns, machine pistols, pistols, rifles, semi-automatic pistols, submachine guns, air guns	OIEL
	Components for air guns	OIEL
	Sporting gun ammunition, components for sporting gun ammunition	OIEL

	Smoke ammunition, training tear gas/irritant ammunition, tear gas/irritant ammunition, crowd control ammunition, CS hand grenades, stun grenades, training small arms ammunition	OIEL
	OIEL for "military, security and para-military goods and arms, ammunition and related material" for the use of the US Government in Turkey	OIEL
2004	648 sniper rifles, 2 shotguns	
	Equipment and technology for the use of, and components for sniper rifles	
	Sniper rifle maintenance equipment	
	Military small arms training equipment	
	Small arms ammunition, sporting gun ammunition	
	General purpose machine guns, heavy purpose machine guns, air guns	OIEL
	Components for: heavy machine guns, general purpose machine guns, mortars, air guns. Equipment for the use of, and maintenance equipment for: heavy machine guns, general purpose machine guns, mortars.	OIEL
	Technology for the use of components for heavy machine guns	OIEL
	Gun silencers, components gun silencers	OIEL
	Sporting gun ammunition, components for sporting gun ammunition	OIEL
	Gun mountings, components for gun mountings	OIEL
2005	3 shotguns, 1 shotgun, 1 heavy machine gun	
	Components for heavy machine guns	
	Sporting gun ammunition	
	Air guns, components for air guns	OIEL
	Small arms components	OIEL
	Training small arms ammunition	OIEL
	Assault rifles, general purpose machine guns, machine pistols, pistols, rifles, semi-automatic pistols, submachine guns	OIEL
	Components for: assault rifles, general purpose machine guns, machine pistols, pistols, rifles, semi-automatic pistols, submachine guns	OIEL

* Explanatory note: only permanent licences are counted. Equipment is licensed under SIELs unless it is noted that OIELs were granted. The type of equipment that was licensed is documented, but not the number of licences granted, as this gives no indication of the quantities of equipment the government is prepared to export. The basic distinction between SIELs, which place no upper limit on the amount of equipment that can be exported, and OIELs, which do not, remains valid. Between 1997 and 1999 (inclusive) the government gave no information as to the numbers of SALW licensed; hence the lack of data on this in the table.

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