



**This electronic thesis or dissertation has been
downloaded from Explore Bristol Research,
<http://research-information.bristol.ac.uk>**

Author:

Dodds, Klaus-John

Title:

Critical geopolitics and the writing of foreign policy.

General rights

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author, unless otherwise identified in the body of the thesis, and no quotation from it or information derived from it may be published without proper acknowledgement. It is permitted to use and duplicate this work only for personal and non-commercial research, study or criticism/review. You must obtain prior written consent from the author for any other use. It is not permitted to supply the whole or part of this thesis to any other person or to post the same on any website or other online location without the prior written consent of the author.

Take down policy

Some pages of this thesis may have been removed for copyright restrictions prior to it having been deposited in Explore Bristol Research. However, if you have discovered material within the thesis that you believe is unlawful e.g. breaches copyright, (either yours or that of a third party) or any other law, including but not limited to those relating to patent, trademark, confidentiality, data protection, obscenity, defamation, libel, then please contact: open-access@bristol.ac.uk and include the following information in your message:

- Your contact details
- Bibliographic details for the item, including a URL
- An outline of the nature of the complaint

On receipt of your message the Open Access team will immediately investigate your claim, make an initial judgement of the validity of the claim, and withdraw the item in question from public view.

Critical Geopolitics and the Writing of Foreign Policy

Klaus-John Dodds

A thesis submitted to the University of Bristol in accordance with the requirements for the
degree of Ph.D. in the faculty of Social Sciences

September 1993

Abstract

The thesis presents an exploration of an emerging field within Anglo-American political geography called *Critical Geopolitics*. Specifically, the thesis explores the relationship between geopolitics and the inherently geographical practices of foreign policy. Furthermore, by drawing on research literatures in international relations, political theory and the specific work of Michel Foucault and Edward Said the thesis links up a discussion of critical geopolitics and foreign policy to discussions of identity and sovereignty. The thesis explores three case studies: Argentine national identity and state formation, Argentine geopolitical writings and the politics of the South Atlantic Treaty Organisation and finally the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War. In doing so, the research strategies of critical geopolitics have been utilised in order to demonstrate that critical geopolitics offers new research possibilities for geographical and international relations scholars. In sum, the thesis offers a substantial assessment of critical geopolitics and related fields in international relations and political geography.

Acknowledgements

I owe considerable thanks to Leslie Hepple for his advice and encouragement during the course of my doctoral research. In addition, the help and support that Paul Glennie and Nigel Thrift have given me was (and still is) considerable. Their willingness to be unofficial 'supervisors' needs to be gratefully acknowledged. Furthermore, the support and friendship of my fellow graduate students was invaluable. Outside of the Geography Department at Bristol University- individuals such as Terrell Carver, Simon Dalby, Marcus Doel, Felix Driver, Peter Hennessy, Timothy Luke, Gerard O Tuathail, Nick Rennegger, James Sidaway and Robert Walker were kind enough to comment and criticise sections of this doctoral thesis.

I am happy to acknowledge the financial support of the following: The Alumni Foundation Award, The Department of Geography (University of Bristol), The Economic and Social Research Council (one year studentship), Emporia State University Travel Fund and The University of Bristol Access Fund. I owe thanks to Richard Hodder-Williams for employing me as a research assistant in 1992 at a time when I was desperately short of money. In the Summer of 1993 I was fortunate enough to be awarded a short term fellowship at the Newberry Library in Chicago. I am grateful for their financial support.

Any research project that involves a considerable element of fieldwork needs a sizable amount of assistance. In London, the hospitality of Ian and Vivian Ward allowed me to carry out my research in London. In America, Jerome and Catherine Booth and Phil and Linda Kelly were generous in their offers of accommodation and advice. In Argentina, the kindness of Marcelo Escolar, Carlos Escude and Carlos Reboratti was considerable.

In the process of collecting primary and secondary records for my research I have depended on the assistance of the staff at the following institutions: in Argentina; Archivo General de la Nacion, Biblioteca Nacional, the Buenos Aires Herald, Consejo Argentino de Informaciones Cientificos y Technologicas, Instituto de Geografia (Universidad de Buenos Aires), and Ministerio de Relaciones Exterior Biblioteca. In Britain; Public Records Office, Royal Geographical Society, Institute of

Latin American Studies and the Scott Polar Research Institute. In the United States; Library of Congress, Inter-American Defence College Library, Inter-American Development Bank Library, National Defence University Library and the University of Kansas Library.

On a personal level, I have been fortunate to enjoy the companionship of Susan Armstrong-Brown. Finally, without the financial and personal support of my family, this doctoral submission would not have been possible.

Memorandum

This thesis is the original work of the candidate except where acknowledgement is given and has not been submitted for a higher degree in this or any other university.

Klaus Dodds

Klaus-John Dodds

September 1993

Contents

Abstract	
.....	i
Acknowledgements	
.....	ii
Memorandum	
.....	iv
Contents	
.....	v
List of Maps	
.....	ix
Preface	1
Chapter 1: Introduction	
.....	7
1.1 Introduction	
.....	7
1.2. Geopolitics and Discourse	
.....	12
1.3. A Genealogy of Geopolitics? Or Telling Stories?	
.....	25
1.4. Summary	
.....	40
Chapter 2: Criticising Conventional Geopolitics and Locating Critical Geopolitics	
.....	46

2.1. Introduction	46
2.2. Political Geography and the Cold War in the 1980s: A Revolutionary Moment?	48
2.3. The Ambivalent Position of 'Classical' Geopolitics	50
2.4. Critical Geopolitics: Research Strategies	73
2.5. Summary: Building a Counter-Hegemonic Critical Geopolitics	80
 Chapter 3: Critical Geopolitics and Foreign Policy	 86
3.1. Introduction	86
3.2. Foreign Policy as a Re-Presentational Practice	88
3.3. Rethinking Foreign Policy I: Political Space and State Sovereignty	93
3.4. Rethinking Foreign Policy II: Political Identity	98
3.5. Rethinking Foreign Policy III: Foreign Policy as a Boundary Producing Practice	102
3.6. Critical Geopolitics and the Making of Foreign Policy	105
3.7. Imaginary Boundaries	125
3.8. Summary	128

Chapter 4: Writing Sovereign Identities: Liminars, National Identity and the Nineteenth Century Argentine State	
.....	130
4.1. Introduction	
.....	130
4.2. The Argentine State: Identity, Liminars and Sovereignty	
.....	131
4.3. The Revolutionary Moment? The Birth of Argentina?	
.....	136
4.4. Post-Colonial Identity I: The Indian Other	
.....	144
4.5. Post-Colonial Identity II: The African Other	
.....	152
4.6. Post-Colonial Identity III: The British Other	
.....	156
4.7. Patriotic Education and the Argentine State	
.....	172
4.8. Summary	
.....	177
Chapter 5: Creating a Drama: The South Atlantic as a Strategic Arena	
.....	180
5.1. Introduction	
.....	180
5.2. Setting the Scene	
.....	187
5.3. Filling the South Atlantic with Dramas	
.....	193
5.4. Reading Identities from the 'South Atlantic Lake'?	

.....214
5.5. Summary

.....219

Chapter 6: Creating a Crisis out of a Drama: British Elite Narratives of the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War

.....221

6.1. Introduction

.....221

6.2. Narrating the War Story: Suez and WWII Scripts

.....225

6.3. Disciplining the War Narrative

.....238

6.4. Summary

.....253

Chapter 7: The Possibilities for a Critical Geopolitics?

.....256

7.1. Introduction

.....256

7.2. Resources for Resistance?

.....261

7.3. Gender and Geopolitics: Crossing Boundaries?

.....269

7.4. Endnote: Postmodern Geographies? Postmodern Geopolitics?

.....281

Bibliography.....285

List of Maps

Map 1.1. Saul Cohen's Geostrategic World Model	
.....	35
Map 4.1. The Viceroyalty of the River Plate	
.....	138
Map 5.1. Defining the South Atlantic	
.....	189
Map 5.2. The Importance of the Cape of Good Hope Route	
.....	196
Map 5.3. The Soviet Threat in Africa	
.....	197
Map 5.4. Kemp's New Strategic Map	
.....	198
Map 5.5. The Importance of the Falklands Islands	
.....	203

Preface to Thesis: Motivations, Methodologies and Sources

I have chosen to write a brief summary which aims not only to inform the reader about the proceeding chapters but also offer a brief discussion of methodology(ies) and source materials. I choose this technique in order to avoid a potentially rather 'dry' separate chapter on methodology and sources. That does not, however, imply that these issues are not important. Instead, I remain sympathetic to Elshtain (1987:xi) comment that "My method, if it can be called that, is not unlike Hannah Arendt's description of her own approach. She charmingly dubbed it *Perlenfischerei*, 'Pearl Fishing'. One dives in, she said, not quite knowing what one will come up with."

My initial interest in geopolitics and political geography was provided by a third year undergraduate course on political geography at the University of Bristol. One of the most interesting parts (for me) of that course was a section on South American geopolitical thinking. This stimulated my interest in geopolitics for a number of reasons: first, this particular literature was substantial and of considerable importance (in a historiographic sense) yet barely read by Anglo-American political geographers. Second, South American geopolitical thinking seemed to provide excellent case studies of academic ideas on the state or territory or resources being influential in specific political practices. In the case of Chile, for example, one could investigate how former President Pinochet (a former Professor of Geopolitics at the Chilean War College) drew on geopolitical theories to justify regional development policies and policies of internal repression over a period of seventeen years.

Initially, I had intended to carry out a research project on the importance of South American geopolitical thinking on the Antarctic policies of specific states such as Argentina and Chile. However, without a research grant an extensive period of overseas research was not financially possible. Instead over the next three years I have attempted to combine some field work research in America and Argentina with a rapidly expanding field in Anglo-American

political geography called *critical geopolitics*. I have been fortunate enough to be writing a doctoral thesis at the precise moment this field appeared on the academic scene.

As a consequence, an initial interest in the traditional concerns of geopolitics and geostrategy has given way to an approach influenced by French post-structural theory and post-modern writings in the social sciences. I felt that the materials I had collected on South American geopolitics and on British government sources on the South Atlantic and the Falklands War could form the basis for a reformulated project. By adopting the research strategies of critical geopolitics I hoped that my empirical material could contribute to contemporary debates within political geography. One of the most important aspects of the critical geopolitical literature that interested me was how space and place in the practices of foreign policy were actually constructed as 'foreign'. The influence of writers such as Foucault, Edward Said and IR scholars such as Robert Walker and Michael Shapiro lead me towards an interest into the geographical and geopolitical practices which constitute foreign policy.

Chapters 1, 2 and 3 attempt to analyse and discuss the recent debates within critical geopolitics, foreign policy analysis and IR theory. I have been heavily influenced by the work of the French philosopher/historian Michel Foucault and the reworking of his work on discourse/power-knowledge within human geography and the social sciences. In this respect the influence of Edward Said should be apparent (especially his work on *Orientalism*). As a consequence, I have in the first three chapters tried to work a Foucauldian interest into geopolitics, foreign policy and international relations. I have deliberately not entitled this thesis a Foucauldian analysis because I remain sceptical if one could ever (re)produce Foucault's work or be an ambassador for his work in the field of political geography (see the warning of Driver 1985). However, what I wish to convey is my interest and concern for boundaries, knowledge, power, discursive practices and the foreign/other.

Chapter 4 attempts a reading of the development and evolution of the nineteenth century Argentine state. I have tried to highlight how the creation of a sovereign identity and space for the Argentine state depended on two sets of foreign policies: first, in a more conventional sense, the development of a set of *international relations* between Argentina and other states was crucial in the performance of a sovereign state. Second, I suggest that through a number of *foreign* policies, the state was able to articulate a sovereign identity based on a white socio-political community. In my exploration of the latter, I have concentrated on a number of key liminal groups and the development of the education system in Argentina to illustrate how political (sovereign) identities were secured.

Methodologically, chapter 4 was written after a careful reading of a number of literatures (in English and Spanish) on the nation-state and political sovereignty, the Argentine state and Latin American studies and a selection of primary documents. Whilst in Argentina, for example, I had limited access to the following documents: *Boletín de Instituto Geográfico Argentino* (the records of the Argentine Geographical Institute founded in 1879), *La Nación* (the major Buenos Aires newspaper), the records of the *Ministerio del Guerra* for the Desert Campaign (1879-1885).

The problems facing the researcher in Argentina are sizeable. In some instances, access to primary material was either restricted (because of damage through fire or poor storage) or material is simply inaccessible because there are in places no catalogues of holdings. In the library of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), for instance, I had hoped to be able to read the records of the *Memoria* (the official summaries of the MFA). However, due to a recent fire and an over-zealous librarian a number of the *Memoria*(s) were not available! As a consequence, I have attempted to draw on the published literature (in English, German and Spanish) to supplement this chapter.

In Dodds (1994b, 1994d) I explore in greater detail (than in chapter 4) the geographical aspects of my interest in the nineteenth century Argentine state. In both cases, as a

'disciplinary technology' (in a Foucauldian sense) I argue that Geography has been an important technology in the mapping and surveying of the Argentine Republic. Following on from writers such as Driver (1992), O Tuathail (1993e) and Pratt (1992), I have attempted to locate geographical endeavours and travel writing within the apparatus (geo-optical) of imperial state.

In Chapter 5, I attempt to explore how Argentine (and other western) strategists and geopolitical thinkers analysed and described the South Atlantic region in the 1970s. By locating this chapter within the context of the politics of the South Atlantic Treaty Organisation (SATO) and the politics of the military regime of Argentina (1976-1983) I attempt to argue that these geopolitical writings have a particular significance (vis a vis foreign/security policies and political identities). Furthermore, following on from the work of critical geopolitical writers on 'geo-graphs' and scripts of places and peoples, chapter 5 aims to be a further case study.

The sources for this chapter were drawn in the main from geopolitical and strategic studies literature held in Britain and Argentina. By a careful reading of geopolitical journals such as *Geopolitica* and *Estrategia* (and a host of other geopolitical books and journals) I attempted to explore the sorts of writing strategies used by those writers. By adopting the insights of rhetorical studies (e.g. Jarosz 1992), I argue that the metaphors and tropes employed by these geopolitical writers were crucial in conceptualising the South Atlantic region in ways that were compatible with the wider discursive interests of anti-communism, geopolitical competition and regional hegemony. Existing studies of the geopolitics of the South Atlantic have neglected the rhetorical and physical importance of anti-communism *inside and outside* the Argentine state in the 1970s.

In both chapters, the aim was to explore themes previously neglected within Latin American Studies and geopolitical studies. More specifically, the existing contribution by geographers to Argentine state development or geopolitics in the South Atlantic region has neglected the

importance of the practices of mapping and surveying peoples and places (and the implications thereafter for state sovereignty and violence).

In chapter 6, my aim was to explore how British parliamentary elites had discursively (re)presented the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas crisis. Following the remit of critical geopolitics I was interested in exploring the practical geopolitical reasoning of those elites during that crisis. By carefully reading the summaries of debates in the House of Commons I aimed to focus on several themes: first, how was the invasion of the Falkland Islands represented. Second, how was Argentina represented. Third, as a consequence of the earlier theme how was the British nation-state to be represented within this war narrative. In doing so, I argue that the assumed collective memories of World War II were crucial to the representations of that crisis by British political elites.

The major documentary source was the *House of Commons Digest of Debates* (HMSO 1982), in conjunction with the source of British newspaper reports within papers such as *The Times*, *The Guardian* and journals such as *The Economist*. Furthermore, I draw on a United States Government publication: the *Department of State's Bulletin* to investigate how the American administration of Reagan (and the shuttle diplomacy of Alexander Haig) was scripting the 1982 South Atlantic War. In particular, in spite of US support for the British government there were important divisions between senior members of the Reagan administration.

In a supplementary role, I carried out a series of structured interviews with several figures involved in the 1982 Falklands War. These included Sir Rex Hunt (the former governor of the Falkland Islands), Lord Shackleton (former explorer and author of two government reports on the Falkland Islands) and Major Ron Stafford (Chairman of the Falkland Islands Association- an important pressure group). Most of the interview questions were focused on their roles during that crisis and their reactions to the unfolding dramas. Although I approached a number of individuals in politics such as Nicholas Ridley (former Foreign Office minister), Lord Carrington, Lord Pym, Keith Speed, Tam Dalyell, Lady Thatcher,

Lord Owen, Sir Anthony Parsons (former adviser to Mrs Thatcher): they all refused to grant me an interview about the 1982 Falklands War. Furthermore, as most of the interview requests were just after the ending of the 1991 Gulf War and the outbreak of the Yugoslav crisis, most claimed (not unreasonably) that their preoccupations lay elsewhere. The interview material that I do have was not taped (I was not allowed to tape any of the interviews) and are derived from notes taken immediately after each interview. I have used this material selectively as a consequence. In addition, it should be noted that the interviewers were extremely reluctant to allow me to cite quotations from those interviews (for a variety of reasons).

Chapter 1

1.1. Introduction

There are many voices in the discourse of geopolitics (see, for example, Parker 1985, Sloan 1988, Dalby 1990a, O Tuathail 1993b).¹ As a consequence of this diversity, discourses of geopolitical theory are often conflicting, contradictory and confusing. One approach in geopolitical thinking, which is tied to the disciplines and thinking of modernity, however, continues to inform contemporary discussions within academic and policy making. In spite of the attempts by world systems analysis (e.g. Taylor 1989a, Taylor 1989b), peace studies (e.g. Openshaw and Steadman 1982, Heske and O Loughlin 1991) and more recently critical geopolitics (e.g. O Tuathail 1989, Dalby 1990a) to reconceptualise geopolitics; classical geopolitics remains the dominant discourse in geopolitical discussions (e.g. Vitkovsky 1981, Hauner 1985, Morris 1986, Moodie and Cottrell 1987, Luttwak 1990, Cohen 1991, Joyner 1990, Gray 1990).

However, the linguistic or postmodern turn has been a relatively important influence in recent political geography (e.g. Dalby 1990a, O Tuathail 1989, Taylor 1990, Hepple 1992, Sidaway

1 . Within the Anglo-American world, the articles and reviews within a journal such as *Political Geography (Quarterly)* bare testament to the fact that there are many 'voices' within geopolitics. Geopolitics in South America (e.g. Glassner 1985, Morris 1986), Finland (e.g. Passi 1990), Germany (e.g. Hebb 1989), Sweden (e.g. Lunden 1986), Southern Africa (e.g. Sidaway 1992b).

1992a, Smith 1992). More specifically, the recent attempts to write critical forms of geopolitics have been located within contemporary post-positivist thought within human geography, international relations and the social sciences (Dalby 1991, Renegger and Hoffman 1993). As O Tuathail (1993d:438) notes "the focus of critical geopolitics is on exposing the plays of power involved in grand geopolitical schemes...Fundamental to this process is the power of certain national security elites to represent the nature and defining dilemmas of international politics in particular ways ... These representational practices of national security intellectuals generate particular 'scripts' in international politics concerning places, peoples and issues. Such 'scripts' then become part of the means by which hegemony (in a Gramscian sense) is exercised in the international system".²

But as O Tuathail (1993d:2) has later noted, "critical geopolitics ... is an emergent discourse of theoretical perspectives and agendas emerging in the wake of the aftershocks of postmodernism. The term has a seductive but problematic mode of existence within and across disciplinary boundaries. On the one hand, it promises the possibility of a new and exciting reconceptualisation of the traditional concepts, concerns and modes of thought that have defined the study of geopolitics for almost a century. Critical geopolitics promises to bring both a new degree of politicisation to understandings of geography and a new degree of radicalisation to the study of global politics. It seeks to transgress boundaries and challenge what are held to be essential identities, whether they be imagined communities or inherited philosophical essentialisms".

On the other hand, as writers such as Dalby (1990a,1991) and O Tuathail (1993d) have noted, critical geopolitics attempts to link together a critical questioning of power with a form of

2. O Tuathail (1993f:128) has argued that critical geopolitics attempts to distance itself from the "geopolitical speculations of Wallerstein (1991) ... (which) are marked by a similiar penchant for grand historical theorisation. Both perspectives maintain a detached aloofness from the empirical details of foreign policy practice, a methodological style that can also be found within political geography (Cohen 1991). Rarely are the particulars of a foreign policy relationship subjected to detailed empirical analysis".

geopolitics whose very mode of existence has often been about the usage of power in reactionary contexts. The 'critical' label signifies different connotations for different writers. Dalby (1990a,1990-1), for example, argues that 'critical' geopolitics asserts a linkage with critical social movements that challenge statecentrism and policy pronouncements for the state. Taylor (1990) has argued that 'critical' geopolitics should be compared and contrasted with 'vulgar' geopolitics of the sabre-rattling variety. Finally, O Tuathail (1989) in his earliest writings argued that 'critical' geopolitics should be a counter-hegemonic project which not only criticised statecentric geopolitics but which also appealed to social movements and moments of resistance.

One of the ironies of much of the recent writings on 'critical geopolitics' has been that the 'geopolitics' side of the term has been unproblematised (Dalby 1991, O Tuathail 1993c,1993d). This lapse has taken on added significance at a time when either some theorists are questioning the corporal identity of 'geopolitics' (e.g. Virilio 1986,1989; Luke 1993a) or when other writers are drawing on the term geopolitics to describe money (Corbridge, Martin and Thrift 1993), international financial relations (Corbridge 1988), arms sales (Hertsgaard and Williamson 1990), corruption (Dear 1990), genealogy (Ashley 1987), capitalism (Harvey 1985), environmentalism (Brown 1990), the US dollar (Ayanian 1989) amongst others. As O Tuathail (1993d:3) notes "The qualifier 'geopolitical' has an even greater range of usage. Now geopolitics presents itself to us with a critical face!"³

The question, therefore, that has been posed recently by writers such as O Tuathail (1993d) is a seemingly simple one: what is geopolitics? And what is meant by *critical geopolitics*? This thesis, however, does not attempt to answer those questions in a conventional way or a

3 . The 'critical' side of *critical geopolitics* I suggest has been the major preoccupation of most writers thus far. Dalby (1990a, 1990-1,1993a) or Taylor (1990), for example, have suggested that by either refusing the more exceptionalist (Agnew 1983, O Tuathail 1986) elements of geopolitics or aligning oneself with the political struggles of new (sic) social movements then geopolitics can be a useful site for analysing and contesting political power in *international* politics.

definitive sense. Rather than stabilise the meaning of geopolitics, writers such as O Tuathail and Dalby have sought (in different ways) to problematise the epistemological supports of geopolitics: uncovering truths, objective seeing and denotative/imperative surveys. Critical geopolitical writers have attempted to unravel the accepted threads of geopolitics which were used to sew and stitch geopolitical stories (Doel 1993a).⁴

In a wider setting, this thesis has been heavily influenced (and indebted) to the existing scholarship on international relations. In particular, to the important work which has problematised the conventional narratives of international politics (Der Derian 1987,1992; Campbell 1990,1992a; Dillon 1988,1989; Walker 1988,1993). These critics have (in their different ways) explored how linguistic and semiotic constructions have underwritten the analytical procedures, the taken for granted assumptions of policy advice and the theories of IR and foreign policy analysis (FPA). The aim of much of this research has been to investigate how conventional discourses on international politics foreclose on political possibilities and the struggles for alternative worlds (Walker 1988).⁵

In particular, this recent strand of IR theory has challenged the conventional categories and structures of research with a view towards "an interpretive view of theory as an endeavour at an ironic understanding the ambiguity, the uncertainty and the textuality of the world in which we live" (Hoffman 1991:170). The self-understanding of a discipline is an important topic of investigation (Walker 1989). Klein (1988a, 1988b) genealogical critique of strategic

4. The recent writings of critical geopolitics have begun to problematise *geopolitics* itself. O Tuathail (1993e) drawing on Derrida (and the important work of human geographers such as Doel (1991,1992,1993a,1993b) and Luke (1993b) drawing on Virilio have begun to explore the corporal identity of geopolitics (as opposed to the *critical* side).

5. As Walker (1988:82) argues "The state easily appears to be the great unchanging given of our collective existence ... the territorially bounded state has successfully claimed not only a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, but also a monopoly on how and where politics occurs".

studies, for example, is premised on the following: "If we accept the strategic studies vision of the world, then only a few strategies of peace and security are plausible...But what if the prevailing terms of security and peace turn out to be not necessarily true but merely normal or conventional?" Thereafter, in a careful genealogical reading, Klein (1988b) opens up the discipline of 'strategic studies' to demonstrate that there are a range of possibilities for reformulating and reconstructing understandings.⁶

The expressed purpose of chapter 1, however, is to tentatively explore geopolitical theory by drawing on the work of Michel Foucault. I aim to examine how geopolitics as a term has been appropriated and used in different ways.⁷ My discussion of geopolitics although broader in scope than many existing English language discussions does not claim completeness. (It could never achieve such an objective anyway). As I tell my story I hope that this discussion will form the foundation from which chapters 2 and 3 can be understood as a further investigation of contemporary writings on critical geopolitics and foreign policy. Consequently, I must choose my words carefully since these choices also constitute realities. As Dalby (1990a:168) noted "Thus, how one speaks to one's audience, how one practices a critical geopolitics that challenges the conventional modes of discourse has political consequences".

The pressure to redefine or reflect on the academic and other disciplinary dispositions of knowledge is part of the daily politics of the university or research centre- since employment, resources and research opportunities are involved (Bourdieu 1971, Johnson 1986). Critical geopolitics and the writers associated with this emerging literature are not immune from

6. Klein (1988b), for example, argues that strategic studies could be investigated in a *non-celebratory* manner.

7. I am acutely aware that my characterisation of some of Foucault's work will be contestable and partial (see warning of White 1986). I have on the whole been most influenced by his genealogy and power-knowledge works (e.g. Foucault 1977,1980).

these pressures to create new 'intellectual fields' (see Bourdieu 1971).⁸ There are a number of definitional strategies which one could adopt: geopolitics (for example) could be defined as an intellectual and political tradition, or in its relations with other disciplines, or in terms of its theoretical paradigms or finally in terms of its characteristic objects of study. As Bourdieu (1988:xvii-xviii) noted "It is not, as is usually thought political stances which determine people's stances on things academic; but their positions in the academic field which inform the stances that they adopt on political issues in general as well as academic problems".

1.2. Geopolitics and Discourse

The notion of geopolitics as a discourse has been recently used by critical geopolitical writers to highlight how various narratives, concepts and signifying practices reside within regularising collectivities (e.g. Dalby 1990a, O Tuathail and Agnew 1992). The origin of much of this theorising about discourse is derived from the work of Michel Foucault. Foucault argued that: "to analyse a discursive function is to 'weigh' the value of statements, a value that is not defined by their truth, that is not gauged by the presence of a secret content, but which characterises their place, their capacity for circulation and exchange, their possibility of transformation, not only within the economy of discourse, but more generally in

8. As Bourdieu (1971:161) argues "In order that the sociology of intellectual and artistic creation be assigned its proper object and at the same time its limits, the principle must be perceived and stated that the relationship between a creative artist and his (sic) work, and therefore his work itself, is affected by the system of social relations within which as an act of communication takes place, or to be more precise, by the position of the creative artist in the structure of the intellectual field (which is itself, in part at any rate, a function of his past work and the reception it has met)".

the administration scarce resources" (1972:120). Resources in this case are understood as resources of power that can be mobilised for specific ends (Rabinow 1984).⁹

I was attracted to the work of Foucault for a number of reasons. First, I felt that the sheer range of Foucault's work was extremely impressive: his command of diverse literatures and his concern not for whiggish or humanistic histories but rather for histories that focused on discontinuities, practices, genealogies, concrete details, spaces of dispersion. In particular, his concern for boundaries, networks and discursive practices I felt would be helpful in order to reconstitute and rethink geopolitics and foreign policy. Second, Foucault's work is replete with references to space and cartography (Jay 1986, Soja 1989, Diprose and Ferrell 1991, Philo 1992, Driver 1991, 1993). Although writers such as De Certeau (1986) have accused Foucault of using spatial metaphors uncritically and inconsistently, I would rather suggest that the interest for political geographers in the work of Foucault is precisely his concern for space.

Space was central to Foucault's concern for the analysis of power and discursive practices. In spite of the adoption of the spatial metaphors of terrains, colonisation and campaigns, Foucault was concerned with the effect of power on the body. When he argued that "space is fundamental in any exercise of power", he did so because he felt that the control of the body was fundamental whether in terms of particular institutions such as the prison or the hospital, or in terms of modern subjectivity (Foucault 1984). Driver (1993), however, has suggested

9. Foucault's theory of power was based on a rejection of what he called the juridico-discursive model of power with its three key assumptions: first, that power is possessed; second, that power flows from a centralised source from top to bottom; third, that power is primarily repressive in its exercise.

Foucault, however, argues that power cannot be understood from this model alone. Instead he argues that power at the micro-level of society has three characteristics: first, that power is exercised rather than possessed; second, that power is productive not necessarily repressive; third, that power is analysed as coming from the bottom up.

that these concerns for space were connected more to the spaces of the body than *geography* per se.

One of the central issues to be recognised is that Foucault's concern for the language of space and geography varied within the different contexts he was writing or speaking. Within his collection of interviews (published as *Power/Knowledge*), for example, Foucault seems to allow himself to be more wide ranging on the question of geography and geopolitics than in previously printed works. The interview with the editors of *Herodote*, for instance, in 1976 is perhaps the most candid moment. As he notes:

"I have enjoyed this discussion with you because I have changed my mind since we started. I must admit I thought you were demanding your place for geography like those teachers who protest when an educational reform is proposed ... Now I can see that the problems you put to me about geography are crucial ones for me. Geography acted as a support, the condition of possibility for the passage between a series of factors I tried to relate ... The longer I continue, the more it seems to me that the formation of discourses and the genealogy of knowledge need to be analysed, not in terms of types of consciousness, modes of perception and forms of ideology, but in terms of tactics and strategies of power. Tactics and strategies deployed through the implementations, distributions, demarcations, control of territories and organisations of domains which could well make up a sort of geopolitics where my preoccupations would link up with your methods ... Geography must indeed lie at the heart of my concerns" (Foucault 1980:77, emphasis added).

In that above passage, the concepts of power, knowledge and geopolitics are bound together by Foucault in an interesting and provocative way. What is suggested is that forms of power-knowledge operate geopolitically: a certain spatialisation of knowledge, a bounding and demarcation of a field of knowledge and the establishment of subjects, objects, rituals and boundaries by which a field is to be known (see O Tuathail 1989, Driver 1993).

As a consequence of this interest in geography, power and knowledge, the thesis has also been indebted to the work of Edward Said. In his seminal work *Orientalism* (1978), Said draws on Foucault genealogies of power/knowledge to explore how European scholars/travellers constituted the Orient as a field of knowledge. This extraordinary text remains one of the most important contributions to histories of power-knowledge and genealogy. Said's attempts to chart the 'imaginary geographies' of the Orient as it has been represented in a range of scholarly, popular and administrative texts has captured the interest of historians (e.g. Young 1990) and a number of historical and political geographers (e.g. Dalby 1990a, Driver 1992, Rogers 1992, Sidaway 1992b).

In subsequent chapters, the thesis will draw on Said's notions of 'imaginary geographies' to argue that these types of geographies are crucial to the practices of foreign policy. In *Orientalism*, Said points out that the recurring motif of the discourse of Orientalism is the binary divide between Europe (The West) and the Orient: the former is a site of rationality, is mature and a place of learning. The other a site of irrationality, depravity and backwardness. For Said, the construction of the discourse on the Orient was a process of appropriation not only in terms of colonialism but also through a colonisation of knowledge. As his recent text, *Culture and Imperialism* (1993a) demonstrates, important cultural, philosophical and imaginative processes within the West were crucial to the production and subordination of colonial spaces. The cultural supports of colonialism and imperialism were enabled by certain representations of the self and other. As Said (1978:39) argued "To say that Orientalism was a rationalisation of colonial rule is to ignore that extent to which colonial rule was justified in advance by Orientalism, rather than after the fact".

A number of recent studies have attempted to explore how certain 'imaginative geographies' were produced within the texts of exploration and travel (e.g. Bishop 1989, Jaoroz 1992, Dodds 1993c). Most of these studies have been concerned to explore how the images, fears and fantasies of the colonial world were created within the texts of geographers, explorers, missionaries and novelists. In particular, there has been an interest in the varied genres of

colonial writing: the rhetorical strategies of 'exploration' (e.g. lightness and darkness metaphors), gender plays (imperial masculine subjectivity) and the visual representations of maps, pictures and photographs (Driver 1992, Driver and Rose 1992, Ryan 1993).

There have been many criticisms of Said's work from *Orientalism* (1978) to *Culture and Imperialism* (1993a). These critiques range from criticisms over his attitude towards the humanism and the sovereign subject (see Clifford 1988) to the problem of *representation* to his appropriation of Foucault's genealogies of power-knowledge. In subsequent work and interviews it is evident that Said has adjusted his position (in some cases dramatically especially over his position on Foucault and resistance; see Said 1986, 1993b). However, in spite of those criticisms, Said's work provides geographers with many important insights into the historical production of geographical knowledge: its institutions, practices and concepts. Furthermore, the ways in which geographical knowledge is presented, represented, and misrepresented deserve attention from geographers in the future (Driver 1992). Throughout this thesis, my concern has been to grapple with some of the insights that Said raises within his work on colonial knowledges and the Orient.

Third, I felt that Foucault's work on 'governmentality' was an important element of his work which had received relatively little attention from political geographers (Foucault 1979). In a short article in the journal *Ideology and Consciousness*, Foucault outlines a theory of 'governmentality' (a theory of forms of knowledge and power often associated with the state) and not a theory of the state. In combination with his work on disciplinary power (in *Discipline and Punish*), Foucault argues that from the sixteenth century onwards the question of government revolves around questions such as "How to govern oneself, how to be governed, how to govern others, how to accept him who is to govern us, how to become the best possible governor etc ..." (1979:5). He did not propose, however, to investigate the power of the state or the fields of juridical sovereignty rather he suggested that "We must base ... our analysis of power on the study of techniques and tactics of domination" (1980:102). The

tactics and techniques (of surveillance, police and *oecomeny*) associated with the institutions such as the army, the school and the hospital over a specified territory.

Critical geopolitical writers such as Dalby or Sidaway have drawn on the work of Foucault to problematise the conventional understandings of geopolitics. For Foucault, as many have noted, has also problematised the foundations of Saussurian linguistics (e.g. White 1986). For a start, the Saussurian distinction between 'langue' and 'parole' omits a crucial element in language formation, which Foucault calls discourse. Within the 'apparent brace of words and things', Foucault argues that one can investigate the rules that determine and enable specific discursive practices. These rules determine the ordering of things/objects themselves rather than define reality or specific vocabularies. As Foucault (1972:49) argued " 'Words and Things' is the entirely serious title of a problem; it is the ironic title of a work that modifies its own form, displaces its own data, and reveals, at the end of the day a quite different task. A task that consists of not - of no longer - treating discourses as groups of signs (signifying elements referring to contents or representations) but as practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak. Of course, discourses are composed of signs, but what they do is more than use these signs to designate things. It is this *more* that renders them irreducible to language (langue) and to speech (parole). It is this 'more' that we must reveal and describe". For Foucault, as Colin Gordon has argued, structuralism was merely the last attempt to represent the world to consciousness 'as if the world was made to be read by man' (Gordon 1981).

In *The Order of Things*, Foucault (1970:xi) argued that his task was to "reveal a positive unconscious of knowledge". In other words, to reveal the discursive rules and categories "that are a priori constituent and formative part of any discourse, and so fundamental to its existence that they remain unvoiced and unthought" (Young 1981:10). In the case of his research into the realm of 'natural history', Foucault noted that history (or discourses) on the meaning of things was replaced by History, an order of knowledge with strict rules with special rules for observation and documentation. As Livingstone (1993) and O Tuathail

(1993e) note, geography by the classical age had also been subject to an epistemic change which replaced a textualist understanding of the subject with a universal, non-discursive description of nature.

The possibility for such a shift was identified by Foucault (1970:130) as being located within "the space (which) opened up in representation by an analysis which is anticipating the possibility of meaning; it is the possibility of seeing what one will be able to say, but what one could not say subsequently, or see at a distance, if things and words, distinct from one another, did not, from the very first, communicate representation". Natural history (or Geography) as O Tuathail (1993e:5) notes "was enabled by the assumption that on the one hand, words and things were separate yet, on the other hand, words could name things in a precise, neutral and objective manner". As Jay (1992) notes, central to this activity was the existence of various scopic regimes which enabled the ascendancy of sight in western epistemology. Language, Foucault (1970:132) suggested, had to be brought as close as possible to the gaze and the things observed as close as possible to words.

The object of 'archaeology', therefore, was to articulate the rules and procedures which determine different forms of knowledge. Within the context of the classical age, Foucault argued that the figure of 'Man', by the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, had emerged as the sovereign figure in western epistemology.¹⁰ 'He' became both the subject and object of modern knowledge: an objective recorder of things whilst being a subjective entity within things. Within a geographical context, writers such as Driver (1992, 1993), Pratt (1992) and Rose (1992) have argued that this sovereign 'seeing-man' was a European subject empowered to see and classify nature as an inventory of sites. The narratives of travel writing or

10 . As Driver (1993) has noted, Foucault's appeals for a decentred, anti-humanist, dispersed history was premised on his rejection of the transcendental subject. As Foucault (1982:17) notes "Nothing is fundamental. That is what is interesting in the analysis of society". As a consequence, Foucault's studies of sexuality or madness were offered as a means of criticising the past and the enlightened assumptions of those specific histories.

surveying were the sites from which the European subject familiarised and naturalised new sites/sights by incorporating them into the nomenclatures and grids of European knowledge. The European cartographical efforts at mapping the 'white, blank spaces' (whether in Africa, South America or Asia) is perhaps the most commented upon technique of representing and writing the earth by the trained European eye (e.g. Dodds 1993b; Harley 1988, 1990; O Tuathail 1993e; Stone 1988).¹¹

There have undoubtedly been shifts in his later work but Foucault remained wedded to this type of investigative terrain (see During 1992). Over time this involved an analysis of the relation between knowledge and power at the level of social practices within specific discursive/institutional apparatuses.¹² Stephen White (1986:420) has argued that "one way of locating Foucault's work is to see it as occupying an important position in that contemporary philosophical movement often referred to as 'textualism'" (see White 1986, 1988, 1991). The texts referred to here can be social and literary. The key moment in the textual turn is to challenge the positivist approaches to correspondence rules of truth and the excavation of real meanings (Shapiro 1984,1988). Rather than seeking to ascribe 'real' meanings to events or processes, the textualist position adopt a radical interpretive position (Renegger 1992). The dominance of certain interpretations over others in turn reflects certain relationships of power (Shapiro 1984, White 1986). For Foucault (1984:85) interpretation is "the violent or surreptitious appropriation of a systems of rules, which in itself has no essential meaning, in

11 . As Lacoste (1973:1) noted "Long before it was addressed to students, geography was addressed to kings, princes, diplomats and military leaders ... As a concise method of describing space, in both its human and physical characteristics, geography became transposed into terms amenable by the state, in the form of social organisation and control, and also of warfare".

12 . Foucault's historical inquiries into discourses, practices and effects rather than flows of individual intentions, actions and consequences have been characterised by Giles Deleuze as forms of maps rather than stories: about discursive spaces (*Madness and Civilisation*), exclusions and boundaries (*Archaeology of Knowledge*), figures of power (*Discipline and Punish*) and acts of seeing.

order to impose a direction, to bend it to a new will, to force its participation in a different game". Texts are, therefore, shot through with power (White 1988).

Discourses are practices of signification which not only enable and constrain but which are also exercises in power (Shapiro 1988, Dalby 1990a). A discourse constitutes the limits of inquiry and the sorts of questions that can be pursued (the types of questions posed determine possible answers). The power of defining fields of study is considerable, for in doing so we construct worlds we know in a world we do not know (Hoffman 1991). These boundaries or limits are not static rather they are contested and transformed over time. Discourses are also not limited to specific fields or disciplines, rather these practices are: "... linked to a whole range of usually complex modifications that can occur outside its domain (in the form of production, in social relations in political institutions), inside it (in its techniques for determining its object, in the adjustment and refinement of its concepts, in its accumulation of facts), or to the side of it (in other discursive practices" (Foucault 1977b:200).

There may exist hegemonic discourses (regimes of truth) within a discursive economy but these could well be challenged by a range of subjugated discourses (Shapiro 1984, Macdonell 1986, Kubalkova 1992).¹³ Foucault's research into medicine and the practices of psychiatry, however, suggested that hegemonic discourses are powerful on the basis of their ability to define objects of study and the rules by which behaviour is disciplined, regulated and ordered. The power of the doctor or the psychiatrist, for example, is based on their abilities to designate objects of study by determining who is reasonable and who is mad (see Daudi 1990). As Foucault (1977b:199) noted "Discursive practices are characterised by the delimitation of a field of objects, the definition of a legitimate perspective for the agent of knowledge, and the fixing of norms for the elaboration of concept and theories. Thus, each discursive practice implies a play of prescriptions that designates its exclusions and choice".

13 . The range of 'subjugated knowledges' involved the *local knowledges* of the mentally ill, women, children, and the sexually perverted.

Therefore, discourses are seen to influence the rules by which behaviour is structured, regulated and judged (Dalby 1990a, Shapiro 1984).

In geopolitical discourse the problem of the 'other' has been addressed by Dalby (1990a, 1990b) and O Tuathail (1989, 1993a). This is important given that the traditional fear of Anglo-American geopolitical writers has been the spectacle of Asiatic hordes (or the latter day Soviet Union) overwhelming European (or American) civilisation (Mackinder 1904, Spykman 1944). The location of a perpetual and evil Other in the *Heartland* remains a defining characteristic of classical geopolitical writing (e.g. Gray 1990, Lutwak 1990).¹⁴ The specification of otherness in terms of a geopolitically expansionist threat is a key element in much of classical geopolitics (Dodds and Sidaway 1993). As Gray (1977:28) notes "The United States cannot afford to tolerate the effective control of Eurasia-Africa by the Soviet Union. It must serve, in its own interests, as the functional successor to Great Britain as an active balancer of power on, and bearing upon, the rimlands of Eurasia". The fear of the Other provides a fertile source for classical geopolitics to write (and fantasize) about resource wars and territory.

In geopolitical discourse the practices that determine what is reasonable or realistic in their assessment of international affairs themselves embody power. If one examines Parker's (1985) survey of western geopolitical thought there is a glossary at the end of the book. A series of geopolitical terms (e.g. crush zone, heartland, rimland) are acknowledged and their meanings inscribed. As Cohn (1987) has noted, in the context of technostrategic discourse, there are a whole series of specialised languages that need to be learned and understood in order to commentate on 'geopolitics'. O Tuathail (1993d:5) notes "To be a geopolitican in an orthodox sense, is to be already familiar with a conceptual map of geopolitics, a map that

14 . As Mackinder (1904:425) noted "Asiatic nomads from the East ... Were the Chinese, for instance, organised by the Japanese, to overthrow the Russian Empire and conquer its territory, they might constitute a yellow peril to the world's freedom".

locates it in a system of binary oppositions, places it in domain of knowledge, and provides directions for travel within this domain".

I am sympathetic to the concerns of Foucault (1980:144) when he noted that the production of 'truths' and 'knowledges' are "linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power it induces and which extend it." The creation of geopolitical 'truths' and 'knowledges' depend on the continual struggle as to how those truths are defined, created and administered. Discourses represent the regularising continuities that mobilise specific codes, procedures and assumptions that enforce specific understandings (Shapiro 1984). As a consequence of their ability to order, classify and divide; such discourses are able to project 'truths' and knowledges' as part of their assumptions, procedures and codes of understanding.

In the case of geopolitics, these discursive relations of truth/knowledge production have been locked into wider relations of power (e.g. the East-West confrontation). Within such networks, 'specific' blocks of intellectuals operate these discourses of truth production, circulation and consumption. These discourses themselves coexist with "systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extends it" (Foucault 1980:133). The questions then that need to be posed include: What categories and concepts are used in geopolitics to classify and objectify peoples and places for particular states or regimes? How do specific intellectuals fit into these regimes of truths? What powers are producing what kinds of truth in contemporary geopolitical thinking?

The production and reproduction of these discourses are linked in turn to institutions. The possibilities of an individual is then shaped by an institution and the discourses adopted in turn depend on that positionality. As a consequence, the 'truths' that we construct depend crucially on our position within various cultural groups or institutions. Michael Shapiro (1990), for example, has argued that underwriting American security policy is a discursive economy which distributes different kinds of statements. He suggests that the increased

intervention of the media has altered what Shapiro calls *discursive economies* (economies which distribute and evaluate competing statements). The utterances of government officials and security intellectuals are increasingly having to 'compete' with possible counter-discourses of the media. Hence, Shapiro (1990) and O Tuathail and Agnew (1992) have noted discourses are bound up with capabilities by which readers/listeners and speakers/audiences are able to take what they hear/read and render it into a meaningful whole.

An understanding of geopolitics as a form of discourse has two important implications. First, I believe that it can be used to draw attention as to how geopolitics distributes and maps the world into strategic units or blocs (O Tuathail 1989, 1993a). Klein (1988a), in the context of strategic studies, has labelled these forms of (re)presentations as 'celebratory' with the ultimate aim of 'advising the prince' about the realities of international politics. Second, geopolitics participates in an discursive economy of representation which dictates how peoples and places are pacified, named and identified (Shapiro 1990). As writers such as Dalby (1990a) have noted, these representations of international politics are often antithetical to a more peaceful and just world (see also Walker 1988). Third, it draws attention to the sorts of strategies adopted by foreign policy professionals or academic experts to create geopolitical identities and insert them within the narratives of foreign policy.

However, in an important shift away from his earlier Foucauldian inspired work, O Tuathail (1993d) has turned to Derridean deconstructionism in his attempts to problematise the epistemological functions of geopolitics. Taking his inspiration from the recent writings of Doel (1991, 1993a, 1993b) on critical human geography, O Tuathail has raised the stakes by offering a reflexive critique of the existing efforts of critical geopolitics.¹⁵ As Lawson

15. However, O Tuathail's (1993e) appropriation of Derridean deconstructionism has been largely based on sympathetic readings of Derrida by scholars such as Christopher Norris. Other writers such as Fraser (1984), Ree (1984) and Wood (1990) have argued that deconstruction can be criticised on a number of grounds.

(1985:93) notes "Deconstruction at its simplest, consists of reading a text so closely that the conceptual distinctions on which the text relies, are shown to fail on account of the inconsistent and paradoxical employment of those very concepts within the text as a whole ... Its power comes from its claim that any text can be deconstructed, so long as, in Derrida's phrase, it remains within the 'metaphysics of presence'". This section, therefore, attempts not only to offer a (albeit brief) description of structuralism/post-structuralism but in addition locate how O Tuathail's recent writings differ from the Foucauldian approach favoured by this author and others such as Dalby (1990a, 1991) and Sidaway (1992a). In doing so I do not claim to be comprehensive rather I aim to provide some form of context for subsequent sections.

O Tuathail's (1993d) latest paper suggests critical geopolitics should adopt a deconstructive turn so that the discursive supports of geopolitics can be problematised - mapping, geography, surveying, panoptic vision, politics et Al.¹⁶ By adopting Derrida's metaphors of weaving and stitching, O Tuathail adopts the role of the weaver who unravels and unstitches the threads of geopolitical stories and text(ile)s. In particular, O Tuathail has sought to problematise the structuralist maps of meanings employed within classical and conventional geopolitical discourse. For O Tuathail (1993d:18) "To study geo-graphy is to study the production of geo-graphs striving for signification; it is to study the operation of writing, how it spaces and temporizes, borders and limits, defers and differs. The post-structuralist map of meaning is a geo-graph in the sense of it being a graphing/weaving/writing of a geo/world/system of signification, an interminable geo-graphing that never reaches a conclusion".

16 . As Harley (1990:13) has noted, for example, "Cartographers manufacture power: they create a spatial panopticon. It is a power embedded in the map. We can talk about the power of the map just as we already talk about the power of the word or about the book as a force for change. In this sense maps have a politics". See also Huggan (1989).

There have been a number of important insights, drawn by O Tuathail (1993c,1993d) in his Derridean critique of geopolitics. First, geopolitics is not granted an essential meaning or presence. It is a signifier that refers not to a stable signified but to the chains of other signifiers (see O Tuathail 1993c). In this case, it is suggested that there is no pure presence to fix meanings nor independent signified. Rather, all we have is a collection of meanings. The meaning, therefore, of geopolitics takes place within the play that is the web of language and (con)text (Lawson 1985, Wood 1990). Second, geopolitical discourse in global politics is understood to be the result of perpetual geo-graphing. The incessant production of maps of meaning (by statesmen and other sites of signification) are understood as aspiring to read the facts of geography and global politics or uncover the foundations that account for the stuff of geopolitics. Third, O Tuathail suggests that the task of critical geopolitics is to problematise the conventional maps of meaning within geopolitical discourse. In doing so, he suggests that challenging geopolitics means problematising the geo-optical supports (ways of seeing, sites of production) that underwrite or *undersee* the geopolitical tradition.

This doctoral thesis is concerned primarily with geopolitical discourses and the geographical foundations of the practices of foreign policy. In particular, my concern is to contribute to the recently emerging field of 'critical geopolitics' and the struggles of a few political geographers to create a new 'intellectual field' (see Bourdieu 1971). However, the themes that are pursued within this text have been heavily influenced by contemporary human geography and international relations theorists. As such the debates about postmodernism, post-positivist theories and discourse analysis (to name but a few) form the basis from which a discussion of geopolitics, foreign policy and various empirical illustrations are attempted.

1.3. A Genealogy of Geopolitics? Or Telling Stories?

I want to open my discussion with a series of observations about geopolitics and geopolitical theory. Although the standard (western) history of the term is recounted it is done in order to illustrate my unhappiness with this particular story of a term which for many provides the geographical logic behind territorial control. The self-understanding of a discipline or practice such as geopolitics is an important topic. For as Walker (1989:23) has noted "what counts as proper scholarship constitutes objects of inquiry". To be a geopolitican, therefore, is to be already familiar with the maps of meaning that are deemed to constitute the corpus of the discipline.

Whenever geographers attempt to tell a story about the term of 'geopolitics' they usually recount the history of a sign circulating through the twentieth century (Parker 1985, Sloan 1988, O Tuathail 1993a). Or to state the issue in another way, geopolitics as a form of 'travelling theory' has found its way into many disciplines and countries (Clifford 1990). In spite of the conflict and diversity within geopolitics there is a remarkable consensus on what constitutes the theoretical history of the sub-discipline (see Spencer 1988). The term 'geopolitics' is assumed as a stable 'signifier' which can then be appropriated by contemporary scholars in order to link a set of historical conjunctures, intellectual practices and geographical locales together over the twentieth century. As a result, there has been little appreciation of difference within these writings.¹⁷

In this respect, the recent revisionist trend towards more contextual studies of geopolitical history is particularly welcome (e.g. Smith 1984, Patterson 1987, Bassim 1987a, Heske 1986, 1987, Paterson 1987, Schultz 1989, O Tuathail 1992a, Dodds 1993d). The importance of

17 . Crang's (1990) article on the 'service society' provides a short but persuasive case for adopting a strategy of polyphony in order to account for differences within concrete studies. In doing so Crang (1990:34) argues that "it textually breaks away from linearity and makes difference a central principle of description rather than a barrier to it ... Theory becomes another voice in the polyphony, not a detached commentary from it".

these recent revisionist studies are two fold. First, they have successfully challenged some of the popular myths associated with geopolitics. The most blatant example appears to be the assertion that an Institute for Geopolitics existed in Germany in the 1920s which was in turn thoroughly implicated in the expansionist plans of the Nazi state. Peter Taylor's textbook *Political Geography*, for example, reproduces such an allegation in the first edition (1985) "the story starts in 1924 with the setting up of the Institute of Geopolitics" (1985:40) yet by the second edition (1989) acknowledges that "there never was an Institute of Geopolitics in Munich" (1989:49).

Second, these revisionist studies have initiated further reflection on the historicity of geopolitics. i.e. how things (e.g. German geopolitik) come to be represented and represented in our discourses (e.g. Heske 1986,1987; Bassim 1987a, 1987b, Paterson 1987, Henrik Hebb 1989, Schultz 1989). In this respect, Driver's (1991b,1992) appeals for more contextually sensitive accounts of geographical knowledges seem particularly apt for students of geopolitics. As he reminds us "The construction of historical knowledge is necessarily a contemporary project. History writing cannot be completely divorced from the realms of politics and ideology because, like all forms of knowledge, it is shaped in specific social circumstances" (Driver 1988:497). The histories of geopolitics might be constructed less from a whiggish position and more from a contextual position which explores geopolitics as a disciplinary practice which has been constructed and consumed over different time-space contexts (Driver 1991b).

An alternative to whiggish-type accounts, as O Tuathail (1989, 1993c) and Dalby (1990a, 1990b) have noted, is to investigate how the term 'geopolitics' has operated within a genealogical context. Instead of assuming 'geopolitics' as unitary and stable object, this thesis argues that the term does not have an agreed set of references or a singular meaning. A genealogical approach is 'patient' because it does not assume an underlying system of order rather it assumes that "every interpretation of the order is an arbitrary imposition or a violent practice" (Shapiro 1992:2). As Foucault (1984:127) has noted "We must not imagine that the

world turns towards us a legible face which we only have to decipher, the world is not our accomplice of our knowledge, there is no pre-discursive providence which disposes the world in our favour. We must conceive discourse as violence which we do to things, or in any case as a practice which we impose on them".

The concept of genealogy (the term itself was borrowed from Nietzsche) was developed by Foucault in his works *Discipline and Punish* (1977) and *The History of Sexuality* (1984). Genealogy is an *erudite* knowledge concerned with the forgotten memories and documents (and subjugated knowledges) erased by the play of power and dominant histories.¹⁸ Genealogy is concerned with locating the traces of the present in the past, not with reconstructing the past from a utopian or nostalgic perspective. The impetus of much of Foucault's genealogical interests emerged as a consequence of his political activities on behalf of the silenced 'other' (e.g. with *Group Information sur les Prisons*). A genealogy of geopolitics, therefore, is not simply a history of geopolitics rather it is an exploration of the shifts and ruptures within conventional narratives. However, that is not to imply that there is only one possible genealogical reading of geopolitics.¹⁹

The relevance of the genealogical method, and its underlying concern for power, to a concern for geopolitics is that it would suggest alternative readings to the whiggishness of some contemporary discussions. A *Genealogy of Geopolitics* has yet to be written. But if and when it is, it will be able to disclose how geopolitical discussions of the nature of international life have shifted in conventional narratives. As Der Derian (1989:8) has argued for international relations theory the purpose is to "interrogate present knowledge of international relations

18 . Foucault's turn towards genealogy was predicated on the belief that we needed to be liberated from the oppressive effects of the prevailing modes of self-understanding inherited through the humanist tradition (Sawicki 1991).


19 . A warning that Driver (1992) has already stated vis a vis writing genealogies of geographical knowledge.

through its past practices, to search out the margins of political theory, to listen for the critical voices drowned out by official discourses ... to investigate the textual interplay behind power politics".²⁰

Originally coined in Swedish by the geographer Rudolph Kjellen, the term 'geopolitics' was used in an article about boundaries and territory (see Lunden 1986). Kjellen (1917) defined geopolitics as "the science which conceives of the state as a geographical organism or as a phenomenon in space" (cited in Parker 1985:55). Kjellen's usage of the term was predicated on his unhappiness with existing legal discourses which he felt ignored the geographical realities of power politics (Kjellen 1899). A five-fold division of political space emerged within his writings: First, 'Ktrato-politik' was the study of the legal organisation of the power of the state. Second, 'Geopolitik' was the study of the state as a spatial organism. Third, 'Demo-politik' was the study of the various forms of political organisation. Fourth, 'Oeco-politik' the study of the forms of production and consumption of goods. The fifth and final element was 'Socio-politik'. Geopolitics was, according to Kjellen, "an empirical science of the state removed from the unilateral conceptions, depending on law, history or philosophy" (Kjellen 1899 cited in Kish 1942:636). The struggle for space was "the ambition of the state to become organically united with the soil. States try to choose geographical units, such as a

20. Some of the forgotten figures of Anglo-American geopolitics include individuals such as Peter Kropotkin (see Breitbart 1981). As Lowe and Short (1990:5) note, Kropotkin had a very different political agenda to his contemporary Halford Mackinder. The former was interested in theories of political cooperation and decentralisation (contrast with Mackinder's interest in the British imperial state). As Kropotkin notes, for example, on geography and education " ... the task of geography in early childhood is to interest the child in the great phenomena of nature, to awaken the desire of knowing and explaining to them. Geography must render moreover, another far greater service, it must teach us...that we are all brethen, whatever our nationality ... geography ... must counterbalance hostile influences ... creating feelings more worthy of humanity" (Kropotkin 1885:942 cited in Lowe and Short 1990:5).

However, as Driver (1992:36) has warned "Should we be suspicious of all attempts to construct countertraditions in which the the very notion of 'tradition' remains unchallenged?". I remain suspicious, therefore, of O Tuathail's (1992a) attempts to claim a counter-tradition for critical geopolitics.



region, to ally themselves with, and through this alliance transform themselves into natural units" (Kjellen 1917:61 cited in Kish 1942:638).

Thereafter, the term was appropriated and translated (from Kjellen 1917 *Der Staat als Lebensform*) into German by a number of specialists in international affairs. As Kish (1942:639) noted "the fourth edition of Kjellen's book appeared in 1924, and in the same year a periodical was founded in Germany, with a title borrowed by Kjellen, *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*". Later, the German writer Karl Haushofer (1942), for example, argued that "Geopolitik is a political technique based on the findings of geography - in particular political geography - history, anthropology, geology, economics, sociology, psychology, and many other sciences which, combined, are able to explain a given political situation" (cited in Kish 1942:639). However, even before Haushofer had popularised 'geopolitik' in the 1920s and 1930s there were complaints from Kjellen and others that the term had been misappropriated and misused (see Thermaenius 1938). As Thermaenius (1938:165) noted there were at least five different meanings and as a consequence "a certain amount of obscurity has accompanied its use."²¹

Anglo-American political geography during the 1920s and 1930s, however, was not isolated from these debates over 'geopolitics'. In 1927, for example, Carl Sauer argued that political geography *and* geopolitics constituted the "wayward child of the geographic family" (1927:207). Geopolitics according to Sauer was the troublesome offspring of an up and coming science. A 'child' that did not obviously submit to the disciplinary ambitions of its parents. Other geographers such as Isaiah Bowman, for example, writing in the *Geographical Review* in 1927 also criticised German geopolitik for its unscientific approach to political affairs. Political geography, however, was spared Bowman's wrath. In his text *The New World* (1921) Bowman sets out his agenda "To face the problems of the day, the man who

21 . These complaints over instability in the 'meaning' of geopolitics are discussed in O Tuathail (1993c).

compose the government of the United States need more than native common sense and the desire to deal fairly with others. They need above all, to give scholarly consideration to the geographical and historical materials that go into the making of the web of fact, relationship and tradition that we call foreign policy" (1921:iii). Shortly after World War II, however, Bowman's (and others such as Richard Hartshorne) characterisation of political geography/geopolitics dominated the agendas of scientific geography.

During the Second World War, the term 'geopolitics' was appropriated by English language commentators. As Chubb (1954:15) noted "In 1942, however, geopolitics suddenly became a widely used term in the English, or more accurately the American language". Such a move was aided by the migration of several German refugee professors such as Robert Strauss-Hupe, Hans Weigert and Fredrick Schuman. As Bowman (1942:652) noted "Geopolitics has migrated from Germany to America not from America to Germany". Within these discussions of the term, geopolitics was a term that signified two different meanings. On the one hand, a term that was associated with the evils of Nazi foreign policies. As Bowman (1942:646) noted "What was the position respecting geopolitics before general condemnation of Hitler and the Nazi program began? Did they foresee the evil consequences of German perversion of truth in the alleged new science of geopolitics ..." On the other hand a term that indicated a hard headed 'no-nonsense' approach to strategic affairs and foreign affairs (see Strauss-Hupe 1943, Jones 1955). As Robert Strauss-Hupe noted in the *Saturday Review of Literature* "Its smart to be geopolitical" (Strauss-Hupe 1943).

In spite of Bowman's reservations, another Anglo-American geographer, Nicholas Spykman adopted the term (geopolitics) for his treatises on *American Strategy in World Politics* (1942) and *The Geography of the Peace* in 1944. Even though he was soon to complain that "the fact that certain writers have distorted the meaning of the term geopolitics is no valid reason for condemning its methods and materials" (1944:7). The relationship between geopolitics and foreign policy was an important preoccupation within the work of Spykman. Starting from the premise that the territory of the state was legally defined by the concept of sovereignty,

Spykman (1944:5) argued that "It should be possible, then, to consider the security problems of a country in geographic terms in such a way that the conclusions can be of direct and immediate use to statesmen who formulate foreign policy. Just such an analysis is implied by the term geopolitics".

In the post-war period, Anglo-American political geography formally deserted 'geopolitics' in search of quantitative and scientific rigour (Jones 1948, Hartshorne 1950, Kristof 1960, Hepple 1986a). Richard Hartshorne, for example, after earlier appeals to reform the 'wayward child of the geographic sciences' (1935) had changed to condemnation of "this dangerous doctrine of geopolitics" (1950:102). Carl Troll (1949:128) noted "Geopolitics is a questionable branch of knowledge ... an offspring, and finally a degenerate offspring of geography". Stephen Jones (1948:447) urged political geographers to be "hewers of facts and drawers of maps". In spite of the labelling of the term 'geopolitics' as a 'pseudo-science' or 'intellectual poison' by political geographers such as Bowman, Hartshorne or Norman Pounds, the term never disappeared entirely from use. In the Anglo-American world writers such as Saul Cohen were actively engaged in research dedicated to reformulating the Heartland-Rimland model (Cohen 1964 reprinted 1973). However, Cohen was something of an exception rather than the norm. The story of the decline and revival of geopolitics was an Anglo-American experience (also in continental Europe) based on the tainted legacy of German geopolitik and the crude versions of realpolitik of earlier writers (e.g. Kristof 1960, Hepple 1986, Taylor 1989).²²

It is suggested that in the Anglo-American world there were a number of quite distinct conversations about 'geopolitics' in the post-war period. First, there remained the debates over

22. Hepple (1986a) has usefully reminded us that this decline in Anglo-American geopolitics was not replicated in other parts of the world. In South American geopolitical thinking, for example, Argentine writers such as Isola and Fraga (1950) had published *Geopolitica en la Argentina* which reviews Anglo-American and German geopolitics within a South American context.

the differences between 'geopolitics' and 'political geography' (e.g. Chubb 1954, Jones 1955, G Taylor 1957, Martin 1959, Pounds 1963). A debate that Hepple (1986a) argues can be traced back to 1905! In this respect, geopolitics provided a mirror from which the scientifically minded political geographer could gaze into (and know *himself*) without noticing the mirror in the first place. There were two important elements in this gaze: a methodological comparison and a historical context. As Martin (1959:441) argued "The term political geography and geopolitics have often been gravely misused during recent years. It is this malpractice that has driven this author to pen this article making clear the distinction that exists between the two disciplines". Political geography, Martin (1959) suggests was concerned with "the politically organised area. The discipline relates, describes, and analyses units and the interplay that takes place between these units ... A factual account of the world's political units, nation by nation, territory by territory, town by town ... furnishes the political geographer with traditional method" (1959:441-442). In contrast, geopolitics was "an instrument of government ... essentially a body of thought which seeks the maximisation of its own ends. The geopolitican sees all other groups through the spectacles of national interest, often becoming selfish to the point of greed, lust and violence. The core of this discipline is power; the quest for power provides the guide to method ... Geopolitics can never furnish the objective truth of political geography" (1959:443).


The second important element in critical pieces on geopolitics, such as Geoffrey Martin's (1959) article, was to critically invent a geopolitical tradition. For example, even though the following writers never used the term 'geopolitics' they have been located within a tradition: "Mahan postulated geopolitics in an era of naval supremacy; later, Mackinder's geopolitics displaced this system when land force and heartland were regarded as the vital and decisive factors; Severson developed geopolitics when it was apparent that airforces were becoming predominant in the power struggle".²³

23 . Inventing a geopolitical *tradition* was also an important tactic of those such as Saul Cohen (1964) who drew on such a tradition to legitimate and justify his studies of global geopolitics.

Other writers such as Griffith Taylor (1957:587) noted that: "Kjellen, a mystical Swedish writer ... seems to have been the inventor of the term Geopolitics ... It was one of the chief features of Nazi propaganda, and naturally was much discussed in other nations in an attempt to prove that the German arguments were unsound". Geopolitics, thus, was an unruly practice, which threatened the scientific and orderly identity of political geography. Taylor (1957) explicitly rejected the term 'geopolitics' and invented a new term 'geo-pacifics' to describe a place for geographical research in the promotion of world peace. Taylor (1957:606) notes that "Geo-pacifics is an attempt to base the teachings of freedom and humanity upon real geographical deductions; in a sense it is a humanized geopolitics. It shows for example, from the study of the World Plan, where the leading nations must arise; be it understood to lead not to conquer". Geo-pacifics was designed to teach students of civilisation, the evils of racism, war and national exceptionalism. However, Taylor (1957:607) argued that "Geo-pacifics has little in common with pacifist ideas. As long as we have thieves, we must have police; as long as Fascist and extreme national ideas persist, we need strong forces of an international type to check them".

Those writers who retained 'geopolitics' as a signifying term returned to the earlier preoccupations of writers such as Mackinder and Spykman. Geopolitics was perpetuated under (an)other name(s). Saul Cohen (1964) in *Geography and Politics in a World Divided*, for example, presents an interesting example of a 'geopolitical' writer committed to denotative and imperative surveys of the world. The first element (Denotative) is concerned with the production of the spaces and places deemed significant by the writer's foreign policy establishment. The second aspires (Imperative) to construct a series of statements which will guide foreign policy formulation. As Cohen (1983:296) later noted "political geographers have a responsibility to contribute to their national foreign policy grounds, rather than avoid the field of international relations".

Map 1.1. Saul Cohen's Geostrategic World Model



Cohen (1973) offers an 'objective' account of the distribution of world power based on his multipolar and hierarchical world model (see map 1.1.). Cohen divides the world into regions that either support the US led Trade Dependent Maritime World or the Soviet based Heartland and finally those that are considered unstable (shatterbelts). The events of international politics were deciphered and understood within the context of a teleological world model based on an hierarchy of development (Dodds 1991a,1991c). Furthermore, as Cohen (1973:29) noted "The essence of geopolitical analysis is the relation of international power to the geographical setting". Geopolitics, therefore, was assumed to be an essence - a core meaning and central identity. In addition, geopolitics was relational - situated between the domains of international political power and geographical setting.

The political context of Cohen's work has undoubtedly been sympathetic to US foreign policy (see Cohen 1983, 1991). The book reviews military strengths and present summaries of the strategic importance of each region. In essence, a playing field has been constructed and Cohen as the geopolitical theorist is reviewing the relative merits of the different players. In his discussion of South America, for example, Cohen's analysis has two purposes. First, to rapidly review the developments in the region considered of interest to US policy makers (e.g. West German investment in Brasil) and second, to provide a series of statements that will guide US policy makers (e.g. "Brasil is America's logical ally in the region"). Such a practice is based on the premise that the geographical and geopolitical realities can be identified and so that "American foreign policy must aim at the increased involvement of the other first order and key regional powers as partners in the search for world stability" (1964:13).

Hepple (1986a), however, argues that the writings and utterances of Henry Kissinger were extremely influential in propelling the term 'geopolitics' into mainstream Anglo-American

public discourse in the 1970s.²⁴ Hepple (1986a) cites Graham (1970:356) who noted that "Geopolitics are very big in Washington these days. I believe they were invented by Dr Kissinger, and they are certainly the last thing he thinks about before going to bed". Geopolitics as such emerged as a favourite term for those who wished to appear worldly wise and level headed (e.g. Walters 1975, Brzezinski 1986). As Northedge (1974:358-9) notes, within his study of British foreign policy "It is important to see this British decline first in what may be called its world geopolitical context, that is, in terms of the ever changing balance of world forces as a whole ... Because of the strength and ubiquity of these geopolitical forces hardly any action by a British government could have done anything to arrest or reverse the British decline...the decline of British power was too geopolitically based". The consequences of such a popularisation was as Taylor (1989:43) noted to "lessen[ing] geographer's inhibitions over their erstwhile child".

Within this context of revival, geopolitics as a form of grand strategy emerged as the dominant understanding of the term. Colin Gray was (and remains), for example, one of the most active writers in the 1970s and 1980s. Gray (1977) set out to re-examine the geopolitical context for US military action in the event of a nuclear war. Within the general context of arms control and the particular context of the SALT process, Gray argued that "looking at the word in the 1970s the theories of Mackinder and Spykman yield a common logic for policy. The United States cannot tolerate the effective control of Eurasia-Africa by the Soviet Union". Indeed one of the most remarkable developments in America during the 1980s has been the resurgence of geopolitics as a way of theorising grand strategy (Dalby 1988). In his innovative book, *Creating the Second Cold War*, Dalby (1990a) presents a skilful discursive analysis of the Committee for Present Danger (CPD), a right wing foreign

24 . Bull (1980), Hepple (1986a) and O Tuathail (1993c) have produced assessments of Kissinger's geopolitical writings. As with the case of Kissinger's writings on strategic weapons, most academics remain unimpressed with his theoretical readings of global politics.

policy think tank. The CPD were particularly active (and critical) during the Carter administration (1977-1981). With the election of Reagan in 1981 this group disbanded as many of its members took up positions in government.

One of the most interesting components of that analysis is Dalby's investigation of the writings of the British born strategist Colin Gray who has written extensively on arms control, geopolitics, strategic affairs, US foreign policy amongst other things. In three important books, *Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era* (1977), *Geopolitics of Superpower* (1988) and more recently *War, Peace and Victory* (1990) Gray sets out his vision of geopolitics. By drawing on Mackinder, Mahan and Spykman, Gray argues that US foreign policy has ignored or misunderstood the realities of Soviet expansionism and terrestrial features.

Dalby (1990a) and O Tuathail (1993) have usefully pointed out four aspects of Gray's geopolitical schema. First, geopolitics as we have already noted is about grand strategy and not about the day to day conduct of foreign policy. Second, geopolitics, for Gray, is about thinking how geography conditions national security. The key to understanding national security lies in the proper understanding of Spykman's dictum that 'geography is the most fundamental factor in strategy'. As Gray (1990:14) notes "Geography is the most fundamental of the factors which condition national outlooks on security problems and strategy solutions. Geography, treated properly in political and strategic analysis, is not a rigidly determining factor. But it conditions the outlook of an insular people, just as it conditions the outlook of a continental community. The influence of geography is truly pervasive, notwithstanding the fact that influence must vary in detail as technology changes." In short, geography marks out possibilities for national destiny and strategic culture.

Third, both Cohen and Gray explicitly locate their analyses within the tradition of Anglo-American geopolitical thought. As Gray (1988:213) notes "The great genius of Mackinder and Spykman is that not only did they identify geography as the most fundamental factor in international politics but they also discerned the operation of a set of 'enduring opposition'

(founded upon permanent geographical realities) which have defined the struggle for power throughout the ages. These oppositions are those between landpower and sea-power, heartland and rimland, centre and periphery, individualism and authoritarian/totalitarian values, and East and West." The dynamics of international relations are, therefore, reduced to a set of timeless oppositions.

Unable to see national boundaries or the inter-state system as the final determinate of power, Gray used binaries such as earth/water, heartland/rimland or continental/maritime in his reasoning about power and territory. As Luke (1993b:10-11) notes "The solidity of the Earth itself becomes an essential force working beyond/beneath/behind mere borders, compelling nations to follow maritime or continental strategies, seize or retreat from heartland, dominate or be dominated in peripheries." For classical geopolitical thinkers, terrestrial features rather than territorial formations are the determinate centres of political activity.

Fourth, the Cold War (was) is read by Saul Cohen, Colin Gray or Brezezinski as a conflict between an insular USA and Heartland USSR, not as Kaldor (1990) has contended a war over ideology or even words.²⁵ The depiction of the USSR as a source of perpetual danger is largely based on the assumption that certain geographical realities have conspired to create the Soviet Union as the natural enemy of the West. As Brezezinski (1986:12) noted "the point of departure is the geopolitical struggle over Eurasia...Soviet-American rivalry is still the legatee of the old, almost traditional and certainly geopolitical clash between the great oceanic powers and the dominant land powers". Or as Gray (1988:195) notes "It is the still-landlocked continental superstate that has been bequeathed by its distinctive history a political culture and a strategic style which- when married to a permissive balance of power-

25 . Kaldor's (1990) *Imaginary War* draws on Foucault's notion of a 'disciplinary technology' to argue that this 'war of words' during the Cold War disciplined, legitimated and ordered militarism in western states.

is profoundly threatening to the security of the 'Marginal Crescent' of peripheral Eurasia and, ultimately, even to the insular democracy that is the United States."

Fifth, that the role of the geopolitical analyst was to advise the *statesmen* over the time-less realities of international politics. As Gray (1988:67) argued "Without the benefit of an appropriate frame-work neither the US policy makers nor the general public can be well equipped conceptually to make sense of the arguments about US interests in particular cases". Geopolitics, under Gray's schema, is taken to be a self-evident feature of the international system. As O Tuathail (1989) noted a legible reality and tradition that already formed and unproblematically knowable. The geopolitican's task is to produce 'readings' of those legible surfaces for wider audiences.

1.4. Summary

This opening chapter has attempted to lay a foundation for further discussions of geopolitics. A focus on the practices that constitute the term 'geopolitics' will be an important task for those who wish to reconceptualise geopolitics around 'geographical knowledge' and 'geographical reasoning' (Dalby 1991, O Tuathail and Agnew 1992). Not least because those who support 'critical geopolitics' aim to investigate how 'geopolitics' and 'geography' has been used to tell certain stories. i.e. what 'we' write about, how 'we' write and talk, how 'we' come to a judgement about what is good and bad (Shields 1992). Critical geopolitics is sensitive to the fact that geopolitics has been practiced in many different manners.

In a very broad sense most contemporary discussions of 'geopolitics' tell a story of a term coined by a Swedish geographer, taken up by German scholars in the 1930s and appropriated

by Anglo-American writers in the post-war period (see Parker 1985, Sloan 1988, Taylor 1989). There are several reasons to be sceptical of these types of stories. First, there are many other accounts of 'geopolitics' (with accompanying state histories) that are ignored (e.g. the South American states and their geopolitical writings). Even those writings that are well known such as the French school of Yves Lacoste and the journal *Herodote* are poorly treated by English speaking scholars. Second, the stories told about a 'western' tradition of 'geopolitics' appear to illustrate the dangers of 'chronocentrism' or 'whiggishness' (Klein 1986). Writers such as Thomas Mahan or Halford Mackinder who never used the term 'geopolitics' have simply been reclaimed by later generations of geopolitical writers (starting with Haushofer) who assume some sort of direct lineage. Yet as Parker's (1982) bibliography of Halford Mackinder makes clear, the latter, for instance, detested the term 'geopolitics' even if they were reproducing forms of 'geopolitics'.

The study of the (ab)use of geopolitics, therefore, requires the consideration of the social and intellectual contexts from which geopolitical theorising emerges. Foucault's observations about the specific position of each intellectual is important- a class position (serving capital or the proletariat), a professional position (the field of research, academic status) and social power/knowledge position.²⁶ The formal practice of geopolitics remains, as feminist writers such as Cynthia Enloe and Christine Sylvester have noted, the preserve of an university or military educated white male elite occupying positions in academies, the media and the political system.

One needs to recognise that geopolitical practices have been a product of definite authors with a direct (if localised) relation to the knowledge production process within the modern state (Foucault 1979, 1980). In that respect, Foucault's work on 'governmentality' seems to be

26 . In that respect Bourdieu's work contained within *Homo Academicus* would be a source of inspiration for those interested in the relation of the academic to the academy and the 'outside' world.

an appropriate point of interest (Foucault 1979). Geopolitics as a discursive practice is created (and reproduced) by specific intellectuals within the networks of power/knowledge in western states. As Yves Lacoste (1976:7) argued:

"Geography is first and foremost a strategic knowledge which is closely linked to a set of political and military practices; ... These strategic practices make geography necessary, primarily for those who control the machinery of state ... Geography is a strategic knowledge, a power".

The production of certain 'readings' of global politics, empowered by strategies of survey, help create and circulate certain 'truths' about world politics.

The work of the international relations theorist James Der Derian (1987,1992) on the genealogical context of diplomacy provides some pointers for future work in critical geopolitics. The crucial element will be the investigation of how geopolitics has shifted its explanations of international politics over time. Once again, Foucault has provided us with further insights into these genealogical concerns. As he noted in 1976 during an interview with the editors of *Herodote*:

"I have enjoyed this discussion with you because I have changed my mind since we started ... The longer I continue, the more it seems to me that the formation of discourses and the genealogy of knowledge need to be analysed, not in terms of consciousness ... but in terms of tactics and strategies of power. Tactics and strategies deployed through implementations, distributions, demarcations, control of territories and organisations of domains which could well make up a sort of geopolitics where my preoccupations would link up with your methods ... Geography must necessarily lie at the heart of my concerns" (1980:77).²⁷

27. Recently a number of geographers such as Soja (1989), Doel (1991), Philo (1992) and Driver (1993) have assessed Foucault's 'geographies' and or 'spatialisation' of language.

At this point I will close this 'introduction' with a brief resume of the chapters which comprise the thesis. The structure of the thesis is not organised around a simple linear structure. In some respects this has been forced upon this writer due to the difficulties of collecting research materials in three countries and in part due to the vagaries of the research production process. On the other hand, the broad sweep of the thesis is intentional and reflects the large number of issues that 'critical geopolitics' and critical human geographies have raised in recent years.

In chapter II, *Criticising Conventional Geopolitics and Locating Critical geopolitics*, I investigate how the recent attempts to write more critical forms of geopolitics have drawn heavily on recent international relations theory and postmodern insights. It is suggested that the recent concern for codes of geographical reasoning and for geopolitical economy offer a useful platform for future studies. In particular, the critical geopolitics agenda includes: how are regions and peoples depicted (with inscribed identities) by the mass media and area specialists in think tanks? How is geographical reasoning (both practical and formal types) produced and utilised in the practices of foreign policy? How important are the media, academic experts and foreign policy professionals as the state's privileged story tellers (Dodds 1993a)?

In chapter III, *Geopolitics and foreign policy*, I examine the existing literature on foreign policy analysis in order to contextualise later discussions of geopolitics and foreign policy. I believe that the recent attempts to reconceptualise the practices of foreign policy by international relations scholars offer excellent opportunities for critical geopolitics. This is the case for at least two reasons. First, recent interest in foreign policy has been directed towards how the state through the practices of foreign policy is located within the processes of identity formation. Second, and as a consequence, space is crucial to the operations of foreign policy. To construct the 'foreign' as 'foreign' requires the demarcation of certain

spaces. I believe that critical geopolitics can make an important contribution to this debate by investigating both the imaginary and the practical spaces of foreign policy.

In addition, I argue that it remains crucial that those who occupy the privileged positions in society vis a vis foreign policy have their claims to 'expertise' investigated. The ability to depict, as Hobbes noted, remains a crucial power of the modern state. In that respect, I attempt to use some of the insights generated by Michel Foucault on 'governmentality' and work of the political theorist William Connolly and international relations scholar Robert Walker.

In Chapter IV, *Writing Sovereign Identities: Liminars, National Identity and the Nineteenth Century Argentine State*, I attempt to achieve two aims. First, I use this empirically informed chapter to link up a discussion of foreign policy with questions of identity and difference (as discussed in chapter III). I identify two sets of 'foreign policies' which I believe were crucial to the creation of that particular nation-state. Second, the specific exploration of Anglo-Argentine relations is designed not only to introduce an important element in the creation of Argentina but also to prepare the ground for later chapters.

In chapter V, *Creating a Drama: Making the South Atlantic Strategic*, attention shifts away from practical elite reasoning to an investigation of the reasoning used by strategic and geopolitical experts in shaping the South Atlantic as a 'drama'. I draw on some of the issues raised in earlier chapters in order to provide an empirical illustration as to how formal geopolitical reasoning can and does have implications for political practice. I attempt to demonstrate that those codes of reasoning were influential in the 1970s and early 1980s in not only shaping certain security policies but also important in constituting *domestic* identities. The context of the *Dirty War* is stressed.

In Chapter VI, *Creating a crisis out of a drama: British Elite Narratives of the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War*, I aim to illustrate how British parliamentary elites represented the

1982 Falklands War. By drawing upon earlier discussions of story telling the chapter explores how the Thatcher government discursively fought the war by recourse to the scripts of the Suez Crisis and World War II. In doing so, I argue that such a narrative can be interrogated and the strategies used to secure certain identities and differences can be exposed to critique. I believe that the narratives of war represent one of the fruitful sources of case studies for critical geopolitics.

Chapter VII, *The Possibilities for a Critical Geopolitics?*, is not meant to be a set of firm conclusions. Rather, I use this final chapter to contemplate future research directions. First, following the recent challenges to the 'critical geopolitical project' by O Tuathail (1993d), it is suggested that there is need for further substantial amounts of theoretical restructuring. In particular, geopolitics as a signifying practice needs to be problematised still further. One important stage, I believe, is an engagement with the feminist literature and an acknowledgement of the gendered nature of geopolitical discourse.

Furthermore, the concluding comments of the thesis also acknowledge that the 1990s will be dramatic for the assumed geographical identity of the territorial state and for the collective identity of 'geopolitics' (Virilio 1986, Luke 1993a, Agnew 1993). The emergence of global networks information, production and circulation have further challenged modern theories of state sovereignty based on the demarcation of the inside/outside, foreign/domestic and ours/theirs (Luke 1993a). The processes of globalisation have meant that global politics cannot be adequately understood through the existing inter-state system (Corbridge 1993).

Chapter 2

Criticising Conventional Geopolitics and Locating Critical geopolitics

2.1. Introduction

One of the central ironies facing students of geopolitics or international relations (IR) has been noted by Philip Windsor (1987:185): "(IR) literally considers the fate of the world ... it is bound to be comprehensive by virtue of its preoccupation ... as such it has a unifying concern, but no unifying methodology or philosophy." Furthermore, Renegger (1990:361) has argued "International relations is a fearful sphere, whose centre is everywhere and whose circumference is nowhere". The result of such a situation is by nature a fragmented discipline (see, for example, Renegger and Hoffman 1991). This fragmentation is unavoidable. Indeed I shall suggest in the case of geopolitics (which faces similar dilemmas to IR) this is a desirable if unsettling state (see O'Loughlin 1991, Reynolds 1992).¹

In chapter 1, I aimed to set out the theoretical preoccupations of recent critical geopolitical writings. In addition, I attempted to explore how a Foucauldian inspired approach to geopolitics could promote research questions previously neglected by conventional geopolitics. Chapter 2, however, seeks to deepen a critique of conventional geopolitics and further explore the empirical strategies of critical geopolitics. As with chapter 3 on foreign policy, I have attempted to combine critique with a review of the existing literature. As will

1. Within international relations (IR) there have been a series of discussions about the nature and purpose of that discipline. It has been labelled by some scholars as the 'Third Great Debate' within IR (see Campbell 1989, Lapid 1990, Dalby 1991, Renegger 1992).

become apparent these attempts to construct new critical forms of geopolitics have been heavily influenced by recent dissident IR theory and various forms of postmodern thought (e.g. Der Derian and Shapiro 1989, Lapid 1989, Walker 1993). The appropriation and transformation of various currents of post-structural theory, semiology and critical theory has led to new forms of inquiry. There is some form of agreement that attention should be focused on various forms of languages, symbols and alternative discourses rather than goals, behaviour and attitudes. Rather than seeking to 'discover' meaning or significance, critical geopolitical writers have attempted to 'locate' meanings within discursive interpretations (see Dodds and Sidaway 1993).

One of the most interesting consequences of a discursive based geopolitics has been to change our sense of what counts as knowledge. The theoretical investigations of inherited languages, concepts and texts that have constituted our privileged discourses challenges the very nature of what is assumed to be 'geopolitics'. The ontological presumptions of realist and behavioural writers can then be contrasted with the approach of critical geopolitics which poses the question of what can be known and by whom rather than assume the world can be known. It is not, therefore, just a question of epistemology as Walker (1988:166) argues "To attempt to turn all theoretical disputes into differences over method and epistemology is to presume that we have acceptable answers to questions about the kind of world we are trying to know".

This chapter is composed of three major parts: first, I explore the context from which 'critical geopolitics' arose.² Second, recent critiques of classical geopolitics made by recent writers can be explored under a number of different headings- empiricist heritage, political realist agenda and the positionality of the geopolitical theorist. Third, I will explore the various

2. The origin of the term *critical geopolitics* probably lies within Agnew and O Tuathail's (1987) conference paper on American geopolitics. This paper was later published (with amendments) in *Political Geography* in 1992 (O Tuathail and Agnew 1992).

strands of critical geopolitics and the sorts of empirical studies currently being undertaken. Finally, in terms of a summary I discuss the sorts of strategies that critical geopolitics might adopt in the near future. The final theme is taken up again in chapter 7.

2.2. Political Geography and the Cold War in the 1980s: a revolutionary moment?

The attempts to come to terms with the complexities, uncertainties and opportunities of contemporary international life have been the starting point of much recent work in political geography (O'Loughlin 1990). The collapse of Cold War ideologies and geopolitical practices in 1989 and thereafter have caused anxiety and confusion in the western academy and policy arena.³ As Walker (1993:2) has noted "Structural rigidities and ideological certainties have given way to social revolutions and territorial fluidities." The consequences were according to some theorists (e.g. Der Derian 1992, Luke 1991a and Virilio 1986) that international politics was increasingly characterised by speed, temporal accelerations and deterritorialisation (Der Derian 1990, Luke 1989,1991a, Virilio 1986,1989). However, in spite of the persuasive arguments from scholars such as Luke (1991a) to the contrary, the 1991 Desert Storm campaign in the Persian Gulf seemed to suggest that struggles over territory and state power had not altogether disappeared into the realms of hyperreality.

It is not suggested that the ending of the Cold War was the only major stimulus of the recent interest in critical geopolitics. Throughout the 1980s political geographers were experimenting with a number of perspectives on the issues of peace, politics and violence (Hepple 1986a, Taylor 1990). Taylor (1989a) has identified three strands to this 'revived

3. Recently, there has been a number of important texts that have explored the implications for political geography in a post Cold War period. For example, Kliot and Waterman (1991), Taylor (1993a) and Demko and Wood (1993).

geopolitics'. First, there was a revival of interest in describing the global rivalries in world politics. Second, writers such as Colin Gray have introduced geopolitical discussions into neo-conservative thinking on the Cold War and militarism (Dalby 1990a). Third, and perhaps most significantly, there has been a sustained attempt to write more critical forms of geopolitics. As such there appeared to be some urgency in these writings given the context of the Second Cold War and the militarism of the Reagan and Thatcher administrations. Some scholars (Bunge 1983, Pepper and Jenkins 1985) have urged the creation of peace studies which would question and challenge militarism and Cold War geopolitics. Others such as O'Loughlin and van der Wusten (1986) urged that geography needed to focus more than ever on the nature of conflict and the possibilities for world peace. On a more systematic scale, geographer such as Taylor (1989a) and Taylor and Johnston (1989) were urging political geography to link local dangers to a host of global crises and threats.

Through the course of this chapter I want to demonstrate that although I am sympathetic to the efforts of the peace studies of O'Loughlin and van der Wusten (1986) and Isard (1980) and the world systems theories of Taylor (e.g. 1989a,1989b,1991d,1991e,1992c) I have doubts over these projects. Not least because there appears to be little recognition that theories are not 'external' to the 'real' world. As a consequence, the postmodern insistence that discursive practices are implicated in the construction of 'worlds' is hardly recognised (Barnes and Duncan 1992). As such, promising to add 'quantitative rigour' or 'peace as a variable' does not address the issue of how certain concepts assumed central to political geography such as the state, power and space are constituted and how these inherited understandings circumscribe the possibilities of debate.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the partition of central and eastern Europe has raised further profound questions for political geography. As Dalby (1992b:503) noted "The old certainties are no longer adequate; geopolitical rivalry and the politics of deterrence are no guide to the politics of the multipolar world." The questions that are being addressed by political geographers were several fold- first, if classical geopolitics had been complicitly

involved in legitimating Cold War geopolitics and violence then does it have any role for students interested in the post-cold war world (O Tuathail 1986,1989). Second, is there a need for a radical overhaul of geopolitical concepts and theories given the context of not only changing geopolitical but also theoretical landscapes (Dalby 1993b, O Tuathail 1993b). I believe that these sorts of issues have formed the backdrop for some of the most successful interventions in writing a critical geopolitics (e.g. O Tuathail 1989,1993a; O Tuathail and Agnew 1992; Dalby 1990a,1990b).

I have in this section raised a number of questions in a rather haphazard sort of way about the project of 'critical geopolitics'. In the following sections I try and explore the sorts of problems and issues posed by recent writings in political geography. Ultimately, although sympathetic to those who want to write 'critical geopolitical' accounts of international politics I remain cautious about some aspects of this work.

2.3. The ambivalent position of 'classical' geopolitics

The assumption that one could somehow sketch out some sort of lineage or tradition which is deemed to capture the essence of 'classical geopolitics' has been addressed in chapter 1. In spite of these reservations, scholars have continued to identify different traditions within geopolitics. O Tuathail (1989), for example, identified six genres: the nineteenth century Great Power strategies of Mahan and Mackinder, German Geopolitik, post-war II American geopolitics, a depoliticised tradition that tried to identify the role of geography in international relations (e.g. Cohen 1973,1983) policy orientated strategic studies (e.g. Gray 1977,1988,1992) and South American geopolitics. If one includes the work of French political geographers such as Yves Lacoste, one begins to capture the flavour of what some writers have called a western geopolitical tradition (see Parker 1985).

Within this section I address my comments mainly on the Anglo-American geopolitical tradition. In doing so I recognise that other important strands of geopolitical thinking are omitted from consideration. There are two possible justifications: first, that most of the critical geopolitical literature is located within an Anglo-American scholarly tradition. Second, that the range of writings on 'geopolitics' are so great that space would not permit a detailed consideration of important strands: South American geopolitical thinking, for example, spans nearly a hundred years of writings (see Child 1979, 1985). However, in the context of Anglo-American geopolitical writings, it is suggested that the hegemonic discourse of geopolitical discussions has been underwritten by a positivistic epistemology and a political realist perspective on international politics. In doing so, these understandings of world politics were encapsulated into a fixed agenda of international politics which amongst other things: privileged the state as the natural unit of international life, treated geography as merely a stage and suggested that the realities of international life were underwritten by the timeless plays of land and sea power.

2.3.1. A critique of the Empiricist Heritage

One of the interesting features of the debate over political realism in IR research is the relatively small numbers of academics at the 'cutting edge' of that debate. In the 1980s the term 'the third debate' was used in IR to delimit the possibilities of *developing social theories* that moved away from empiricism and positivism and towards either a critical theory (Linklater 1990) or a post-modern theory (Der Derian and Shapiro 1989) or a political theory of IR (Renegger 1992, Walker 1993). Within political geography, however, there has not been an inter-paradigm debate (see Dalby 1991). However, the sorts of critiques that could be developed of much of conventional geopolitics have been the subject of much debate within contemporary geography (e.g. Peet and Thrift 1990). It is suggested that there are three elements to such a critique: first, exposing the naive realist belief that the geopolitical

observer was simply recording the legible surfaces of international politics. Second, that language was a neutral tool of the observer. Third, that those observations about the world formed the foundation of all knowledge.

The assumption that geopolitical writers in the post-war period were simply recording events of a pre-existing world was underwritten by a form of epistemic realism. Campbell (1992a:4) has described such a disposition as "whereby the world comprises objects of existence of which it is independent of ideas or beliefs about them- both of these understandings maintain that there are material causes to which events and actions can be reduced ... Riven with various demands, insistences, and assertions that things 'must' be either this or that, this disposition is the most common metatheoretical discourse amongst practitioners of the discipline of international relations." Put another way, Luke (1993b:1) notes that "Realists working the fields of international relations theory are not an exception to the rule. Caught in the grip of such disciplinary normalisations, they see their language as neutral, their concepts as clear, their rhetoric as objectivity."

These sorts of assumptions have been labelled by O Tuathail (1989) as 'natural attitude' geopolitics. The supposition of the detached ahistorical observer developing techniques for the study and control over the object of international politics has been widely criticised for reifying the intellectual process in terms of a priori dualisms such as between theory and practice, subject and object et al. Instead of recognising these dualisms for what they are i.e. as historically constituted features; classical geopolitics (and behaviouralism) naturalised these dualisms. Geopolitics, according to O Tuathail (1993d) was thus understood by its writers as a stable signifying practice- an earthly reality prior to the social or a material constraint beneath international law or the discourse of politics.

The emergence of geopolitical thinking coincided with the final closure of political space as the European states established empires over the remaining parts of the uncolonized world (Kearns 1984, Parker 1985, O'Loughlin and Heske 1991, Said 1993a). The encapsulation of

the world into an interconnected totality prompted Mackinder to argue that a new post-Columbian epoch had materialised (Mackinder 1904). In a discursive sense, the bounding of the world initiated new perspectives on global thinking (Kearns 1984, 1993). Henceforth, the geopolitical theorist would have to consider the globe as the natural object of study. The visualisation of such new material realities was according to Mackinder the 'very essence of geographical power' (cited in O Tuathail 1993e).

An important element of the roaming eye of the geopolitician was the map or survey. The project of geopolitics was devoted to 'ways of seeing' and the observation of the world. In particular, the map was the cloth on which the geopolitical writer inscribed identities onto the blank spaces which were to be penetrated and occupied. As Foucault (1979:170-1) reminds us "The exercise of discipline presupposes a mechanism that coerces by means of observation; an apparatus in which the techniques that make it possible to see induces power, and in which, conversely, the means of coercion make those on whom they are applied clearly visible". Panopticism, therefore, was for Foucault one of the most important paradigms of modern disciplinary societies rather than an empirically verifiable phenomenon (Driver 1993).

The depiction of the world divided into heartlands, rimlands, pivot zones or inner crescents was underwritten by the epistemological assumption that the world could be flawlessly represented, save for the inherent impossibility posed by scale (Harley 1988, Natter and Jones 1993). As Hans Weigert (1942:2) noted "Let us see the world in the mirror of dynamic maps, instead of the static maps of times past". In effect the distance between the narrator (graphing) and the narrated (geo) had been collapsed. The knowledge gathered was important in defining agendas, establishing standards of intelligibility and creating social realities of the world. The pan-optical discipline of geopolitics occupied centre stage: 'eyes that see but are not seen'. One of the most striking elements of those maps is the representation of regions around the globe. The cartographic stability of the Heartland (USSR) and the maritime sphere of interests of sea powers such as the USA contrasts markedly with the instability of the

regions of the Third World. Kelly's (1986) review of shatterbelts implicitly illustrates the troubling nature of those regions judged to be outside the sphere of interest of the Heartland and Sea based powers. From Mackinder's *inner crescent* to Fairgrieve's *crush zone* to Spykman's *rimland* to Hoffman's *shatterzone* to Cohen's *shatterbelt*, geographers have sought to discipline and order the instability in the world and its cartographic representations.

The major surveys of writers such as Bowman, Spykman, Cohen or Gray were produced on the basis of an 'Archimedean point' from which the ambiguities and complexities of the world were disciplined and ordered into the conceptual frame-work of the Heartland-Rimland model. A privileged reading of global politics emerges based on the interplay of the Cold War dramas and the ability of the geopolitical theorist to distinguish between the operational environment (the world as it really is) and the psychological environment (the world as seen by human beings) (Gray 1977). These writers were (and remain) explicit in their political objectives: to advise US statesmen and foreign policy professionals (O Tuathail 1986, Dalby 1990a).

In more recent strands of geopolitical writing, the sorts of empiricist and positivist assumptions of modern epistemology remain important (see Taylor 1989a). The brief exchange between van der Wusten and O'Loughlin (1986,1987) and O Tuathail (1987) highlighted the metatheoretical differences between these writers. O'Loughlin and van der Wusten in a variety of publications have attempted to reconstitute a behaviouralist interest in war and peace research (1991, 1993a, 1993b). By drawing on behavioural/quantitative theory in IR and the computerised databanks of 'Correlates of War' project they have focused on the spatial elements of inter-state conflict and interaction. Their preferred approach is decidedly analytical-empirical and assumes that knowledge about war and peace are possible through systematic observation (see O'Loughlin 1984).

O Tuathail's response to their plea for "a more prominent place for war and peace research in the agenda of the discipline of geography" was to question their ontological presumptions. O

Tuathail (1987) argued that the uncritical and unanalysed assumptions built into their concepts of war and peace disabled their project. In particular, their presumption that the state was a natural unit and that war and peace could only exist within the inter-state context naturalised realist discourses. As such he argued that "such are the 'realities' or 'facts' of international politics, the natural states of affairs which are supposedly independent of human knowledge and practice. Such a discursive practice affects a closure; it denies alternative possible worlds...normalises the state system and subsequently debates the relative merits of various strategies of counsel to the state" (1987:197).

In defence, van der Wusten and O'Loughlin (1987:198) retreat to a typical empiricist claim-"As social scientists, we feel that our first role is to analyse the world as it is, was and evolves. We believe that the current discourse of international relations, which is also our preference correctly reflects the situation; the state system is by far the most important set of political units that exists, particularly with regard to war and peace issues". Their endeavours, thus, could be seen as a particular form of problem solving which takes the world for granted, offering suggestions for improvement or change.

Furthermore, O'Loughlin and van der Wusten (1993:65) argue that "We share the behaviouralist science principles that: (a) war and peace are forms of human behaviour (b) they can be studied scientifically (c) they must be viewed from a 'systems' perspective. Geography adds the specifics of place and the contingencies of contexts to that perspective". O'Loughlin and van der Wusten (1993) argue that their global perspective is a departure from conventional geopolitics. The vestiges of statecentrism are removed in favour of a systems approach which links conflict to "economic and power cycles, to explain why peace seemingly reigns in some places and not in other parts of the world" (1993:65). The twentieth century is characterised as the 'bloody century' even though it is admitted that the outbreak of wars are now increasingly confined to the non-western world. As they note (1993:69) "War, like deadly infectious diseases, famine and political repression, is increasingly a Third World phenomenon". As such O'Loughlin and van der Wusten (whilst claiming global pretensions)

return the reader to 'familiar' space: "From the perspective of Boulder or Amsterdam, it is easy to think of war as a distant phenomenon ... From the perspective of Kabul, Asmara, Mogadishu ... the image of peace looks very different".

I find much of O'Loughlin and van der Wusten's research decidedly ethnocentric. The description of the 'Third World' as a haven of war and disease is depressingly familiar. If one was to compare, for example, the work of Noam Chomsky, the differences are striking. Chomsky (e.g. 1969, 1973, 1991a) has on numerous occasions demonstrated that American subversion (or active intervention) has been responsible for a host of wars all over the 'Third World'. Furthermore, Chomsky has utterly destroyed the cosy myth that political repression is entirely a 'Third World' phenomenon.

The position adopted by O'Loughlin and van der Wusten implies a number stances: first, that the theorist can analyse events (outside of discursive structures) and violently impose an interpretative (principle seeking) scheme. Their criticism of conventional geopolitics for being "deliberately subjective" seems to indicate a rather naive realist approach (1993:72). Second, their understanding of war is decidedly partial and mono-casual. The 1991 Gulf War, for example, is analysed as a rather anachronistic ethno-territorial conflict. Third, the explicitly geographical component of their work is deterministic as is their typology of global, inter-state and local wars. Fourth, the teleological assumptions of O'Loughlin and van der Wusten's (1993) work are revealed when they seem to imply that democratic states do not indulge in violence as opposed to pseudo-states. As they conclude "The Fukuyama belief about the peaceful intentions of democratic states, fits neatly into one of the few general principles that seem to govern international relations" (1993:107).

The legacy of much political geography whether realist or behaviouralist is based on forms of naive empiricism. The appeal of behaviouralists to either scientific or non-nationalistic credentials does not disrupt my argument. These writers fail to appreciate the way discourses participate in the construction of 'worlds' or 'reality'. This has been an important theme in

recent IR and geographical scholarship (e.g. Der Derian and Shapiro 1989, Barnes and Duncan 1992). These actions, in turn, clearly challenge conventional notions of scholarship (i.e. based on objectivity and science) and political practice. These sorts of issues are confronted throughout this chapter and this thesis.

2.3.2. A Critique of Political Realism and Classical Geopolitics?

It has been argued by a number of writers (e.g. Gerace 1992) that geopolitics and international relations theory remains dominated by forms of political realism (also Dalby 1991). By building on an assumed tradition of classical statecraft (Sun Tzu, Machiavelli and Clausewitz) and inter-state conflict, political realism (whether realism or neo-realism) has dominated the agenda of the discipline of international relations (Banks 1986, Walker 1987). The central assumptions of political realism emerged from the context of World War I which led to a fundamental reappraisal of order and violence in the international system. Henceforth, the idealistic assumptions of conflict resolution or legal conventions underwriting the international system were widely condemned by realist writers. E H Carr (1946), for example, argued that the struggle for power was the defining element of the inter-state system.

Following the publication of Hans Morgenthau's (1948) *Politics Among Nations* the central tenets of realist thought had been codified: the state was the principle actor in international affairs; the role of power was crucial to the inter-system; and international politics was characterised by perpetual anarchy. As Morgenthau (1948:27) noted "International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim". In the post-war period, the major tenets of realism remained unchallenged by the rise behavioural and Quantitative International Relations

(QIR) theory (Dalby 1991, Walker 1993). In spite of QIR's adoption of positivistic methodologies and claims to scientific objectivity, the realist research agenda was assumed as paradigmatic. i.e. the state was still assumed the major actor and it was assumed that anarchy and violence occurred within the international arena. Although often labelled the 'Second Great Debate' in international relations, the possibilities of change were circumscribed by inherited understandings (Banks 1986).

This debate was sharpened considerably by the publication of Kenneth Waltz's (1979) neo-realist text on the state in international relations. Waltz's (1979) text is a response to the challenges of the international political economy (IPE) literature which claimed that not only was the authority of the state in the international realm being disputed by multinationals but that the defining characteristic of the international arena was capitalism not anarchy (e.g. Wallerstein 1974,1979). In response, Waltz (1979) argued for a reassertion of the concepts of 'power' and 'security' in international politics which took account of the changing circumstances of world-economy. The actor-structure relationship of neo-realism was based on the distribution of power which affected the interaction of states. As Waltz (1979:29) argues "International structure emerges from the interaction of states and then constrains them from taking certain actions while propelling toward others".

Although published over a decade ago, Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* remains the site from which there have been many and varied criticisms of realism/neo-realism (e.g. Ashley 1984, Walker 1984, 1990). For instance, critical theorists argue that Waltz's structural analyses of the state ignore the historical discontinuities and his analysis, is further compromised by the "ontological priority given to the state, which results in an 'atomistic' or 'reductionist' style of structural analysis" (Walker 1993:115). Luke (1993a, 1993b), for example, is another critical theorist who has invested considerable energy in exposing many of the tenants of (neo) realism to critique. As Agnew (1993b) has noted political geographers can contribute to these sets of critiques: .

In spite of the reservations expressed earlier about 'traditions' it is suggested, however, that classical geopolitics was (and remains) predicated on similar assumptions to that of political realism within IR research. As Walker (1993:107) "As it (realism) informs a rather large and influential literature on geopolitics and military affairs, for example, realism has often degenerated into little more than an apolitical apology for cynicism and physical force." The central question in classical geopolitics was the role of power in the international system and the influence of geography in facilitating or restraining the practices of state power. The relationship between power and the state was conceptualised in institutional and formal terms which ignored broader issues of contestation, dominance and dependency (see Driver 1992a).

It is suggested that there are several sets of dualisms that constitute classical geopolitics. First, unlike political realists, classical geopolitical writers established an almost divine set of binary oppositions based on land and sea or heartland and rimland. Cohen (1991:559), for example, employs a geological metaphor to convey the timelessness of these divides: "For the serious student of geopolitical analysis, then, ... as in earth processes, geopolitical plates are constantly moving. There are larger and smaller tremors ... " Geopolitics, therefore, was understood as relational; it is located at the intersection of two separate domains (international political power and geographical setting).

From Mackinder onwards, those dualisms have underwritten classical geopolitical discourse. In Mackinder's model, it is the 'Heartland' that is endowed with potential for world domination at the expense of the rimlands and outer crescents. As Rostow (1960:543) argued "The simple geographic fact that the combined resources of Eurasia, including its military potential, have been and remain superior to those of the United States ... The United States must be viewed essentially as a continental island off the greater land mass of Eurasia". The maritime based powers could only hope to contain the heartland powers. Thereafter, writers such as Nicholas Spykman (1942,1944) and Colin Gray (1977,1988) have undoubtedly altered the specificities of that basic world-model but the assumption remains that the land/continental/heartland is to be privileged above the sea/maritime/outer crescents. As Gray

(1977:64) concluded "The Mackinder-Spykman view of the world, reduced to its power related essentials, consists of a Heartland superpower that is locked in a *permanent* struggle with the off-shore, insular continental superpower, the United States, for effective control of the Rimlands ... "4

The second important dualism employed by classical geopolitical writers was to divide knowledge of the world into subjective (perceived) and objective (reality) environments (Sprout and Sprout 1956, Henrikson 1980, Cohen 1983, O'Loughlin and Grant 1990). The foreign policy professional created (on the basis of *his* subjective perceptions) images of places in the day to day business of foreign policy. The role of the geopolitical theorist seemed to be located in his (or her) ability to investigate those images and to distinguish between those two environments. By appealing to some geopolitical 'bed-rock' (Cohen 1983) or reality (Henrikson 1980), the geopolitical writer was able to bridge "the gap between 'objective' and 'subjective' environments" (Cohen 1983:296).

The third major assumption of classical geopolitics was to assume that geography (geographical setting) was the most permanent factor of international relations (Spykman 1944, Cohen 1964, Gray 1977). As Kristof (1960:19) noted "The modern geopolitican does not look at the world map in order to find out what nature compels us to do but what nature advises us to do, given our preferences". The geopolitical theorist, therefore, was positioned within the domain of hard headed realism, universal truths and material realities. As O Tuathail and Agnew (1992:194) conclude "Geography in such a scheme, is held to be a non-discursive phenomenon: it is separate from the social, political and ideological dimensions of international politics". Furthermore, as feminist geographers such as Bondi (1990) or Massey

4. There are undoubtedly variations within this realist drama. Cohen's (1973), for example, world model was complicated by a hierarchical schema which distributed power relationships amongst states. His usage of organist analogies and development teleologies is a crucial part to the predictive capability for his world model.

(1992) have noted, geographical space was compared and contrasted to history or time-passive to its dynamism, permanent to its fluidity, a stage to its drama.

In much of the realist inspired geopolitics geography is treated as merely a stage on which events occur (Taylor 1993b). In that respect, one might cite Smith (1984:66), who notes that "The problem of space of course lies in the assumptions that not unlike 'nature' the concept of space tends to be taken for granted, its meaning unproblematic, while in fact it is a vague concept with a multiplicity of sometimes contradictory meanings". However, Smith (1984), and Soja (1989) have (in their various ways) argued that space is socially produced and not natural. Furthermore, as Shapiro (1988), for example, has noted the cartographic designation of states and regions as geometric entities with precisely definable boundaries hypostatizes those entities and denies large parts of social realities.

The fourth important dualism within classical geopolitics was the assumption that political life could be characterised as two domains: the domestic realm of the state being constituted as a 'community' governed by state sovereignty and an international realm characterised by anarchy and disorder. As Spykman (1942a:23) noted "The first step from anarchy to order is not the disappearance of force but its use by the community of nations instead of by the individual members ... international life is dynamic and preserving the balance of power is a permanent job". The realist vision of the world destroyed "a romantic world of love and laughter, and peace ever after" and that "our danger is permanent ... our future will be determined by our willingness to have our young men stand guard upon the ramparts and our older men interpret the world and America ceaselessly and realistically" (Bowman 1942b:349).

This dichotomy has been criticised in a series of apparently devastating critiques by the IR scholar Richard Ashley (1984,1987) who has exposed this assumption as "The natural home of the modernist narrative- the multifaceted historical narrative rooted in Enlightenment, dominant in Western society, expressed in rationalist theory, and located in the progressive

unfolding of universalising reason and social harmony via science, technology, law and the state" (1987b:412). The depiction of the international system as an anarchical jungle effectively positions a boundary or frontier that divides the realm of the 'good life' (Wright 1966) from danger and disorder. This frontier then has to be policed and disciplined in order to preserve that condition. The realist assumption that the domestic community is "a timeless and universal identity...an autonomous and original social space" acts to foreclose the possibility of exploring community outside the state (Ashley 1987b:414).

The effect of such a move has two implications according to Ashley: first, it participates in the construction of an autonomous field called IR. Second, it administers a 'silence' over how boundaries have been produced and naturalised. As a consequence Ashley (1987b) argues that international politics has been constituted through the affirmation of an absence of community. I have two major reservations about these types of arguments. First, Ashley's reading of particular realist authors such as Morgenthau is contestable (and has been by IR theorists). In particular, the historically-sensitive studies of Morgenthau contrast markedly with the quantitative/structuralist readings of Waltz. As a consequence, a critique of realism has to be careful to differentiate between the many strands of realism. Second, Ashley's assertion that realists deny the possibility of a community beyond the realm of the state are not sufficiently justified vis a vis the varied strands of realism. However, I do think that Ashley does usefully draw attention to how geopolitics and realist IR research have been able to create boundaries for certain (geo)political categories which have disciplined the object of international politics.

Within IR research there has been a profusion of work adopting post-modern approaches which aim to challenge the accepted practices of international politics including the taken for granted assumptions and the silences which many of the realist constructs are based upon (e.g. Ashley 1984,1987b, Campbell 1992, Ruggie 1993, Shapiro 1988, Walker 1993). The appeal of the work of scholars such as Walker or Shapiro to political geography is that their insistence that the practices of international politics are historically constituted. By

acknowledging and challenging these practices we in the words of Walker (1988:88) begin to "engage with international relations theory ... in a way that opens up, rather than closes off, the possibility of rethinking and reconstituting political community."

2.3.3. The Problem of the state

One of the central omissions in geopolitics has been the failure to historicise and contextualise state formation. Indeed Dear (1986:5) argued that "Political geographers in particular seem to me to be unforgivably recalcitrant in coming to grips with what should be their central theoretical subject (the state) ... For example, in his major new text in the field, Taylor (1985) hardly involves himself in a serious conceptualisation of the theory of the state". As Dalby (1990a), Taylor (1993b) and Agnew (1993a) have later noted, the (European- British or French) state has simply been assumed rather than problematised (Luke 1993b). So much of classical geopolitics has simply assumed that the categories such as 'state', 'man' and the 'international system' are natural and proceeded to advise the state over the business of foreign and security policy. The first question this usually prompts is: what other categories could there be? But this sort of question according to Ashley (1984) and Walker (1993) reveals more about how the state and the interstate system have been constructed so that they are considered natural, normal and necessary than it does about a world of uncertainty, difference and contingency.

Within the earliest writings of political geography there have been two distinct genres: organicism (developmentalism) and functionalism (Taylor 1989a). The former owes its origins to social Darwinism and the usage of the biological analogy. The work of Friedrich Ratzel on the state was based on two elements: space and position. Space was "similar to the struggle for life, the basic aim of which is to gain space, the struggles of peoples are almost always struggles for the same object. In modern history the reward of victory was- or was

meant to be- a gain of territory" (Ratzel 1923:270). Geographical position, however, referred to "a certain area, its location being unchanged, always transmits the same impulse to states and nations just as a stream enters the turbulent section of its course, or resumes its quiet, even flow at the same location" (Ratzel 1923:180). The state, thus, conceptualised as organism which inhabited a world of perpetual struggle for space and resources. A successful state would be one that possessed "far sighted domination of space possessed by the statesman, mobility and adaptability of the people, these two are needed for complete success" (Ratzel 1923:266).

Ratzel's organic theory of the state was further refined by writers such as Otto Maull who proposed a model of universal state development based on environmental determinism (Kish 1942). Later Karl Haushofer was to popularise the organic theory of the state. The state was in perpetual "struggle for a more just distribution of vital spaces of the earth, a distribution based on the capacity to work and the cultural achievements of peoples rather than on settlements imposed by force". As such it was suggested that "Geopolitik will and must become the geographical conscience of the state" (Cited in Kish 1942:642).

The basic elements of a functionalist theory of the state were developed by the geographers Jean Gottman, Richard Hartshorne and Stephen Jones in the 1950s. Their interest in the state differed from earlier organicist theories. Hartshorne's (1950) functional approach argued that the fundamental purpose of the state was to bind together the social and territorial segments of the state. The binding of the nation-state depended on the state being able to discipline centrifugal (movement) and centripetal (iconography) forces. Territorial integration was the defining moment of the state. Following Gottman (1951) and Jones (1954), Hartshorne argued that the state formation can be understood as a series of stages: political idea, decision, movement, field and political area.

Driver (1991a) in a review of more contemporary theories of the state provides a useful starting point. A major contributor to these debates has been the politico-economic theories

of Johnston (1982,1984). Johnston (1981) opened up the debate on the state in political geography by tackling some of the deficiencies within the functionalist theories of the state. By asking 'what is the state?', Johnston (1981) acknowledged that the state is not self evident (as Hartshorne assumes, with the expressed purpose of territorial integration) and that there are *political* issues that need to be addressed (Johnston 1980). The state is not a natural unit and Johnston (1981,1982) argued that political geography needed to explore the links (material, symbolic etc..) between people, state and territory.

Furthermore, as Driver (1991a) argues, the functionalist theories of the state suffer from three sorts of weakness- first, essentialist assumptions which tend to play down the specificities of individual state forms and which underestimate the effects of conflict within the state itself. Thus, the major objection to the traditional narrative of the evolution of the state and the inter-state system is its whiggish assumptions. As one scholar argued "All evolution from primitive pre-state methods has been inexorably towards the establishment and consolidation of the state" (Hinsley 1986:219). Although Hinsley's tempers his narrative with the assertion that this process was a "long and reversible process" the teleological traces remain (Campbell 1992a:47). Finally, the Treaty of Westphalia has been depicted as the specific moment when anarchy gave way to the discrete spaces of the inter-state system. This moment laid the foundation for the discipline of IR. As a consequence, geographical and historical variation in state form is neglected as are issues of ideology, gender and nationalism (see Corrigan and Sayer 1985, Nairn 1988, Anderson 1990, Agnew 1993a).

Second, functionalist assumptions about the state either serving the interests of one class or a mode of production prevail. The consequences are such that issues such as human agency seemed to be subsumed under the hegemonic grip of structuralist-inspired functionalism. Driver (1991a:271) argues that " ... We have to specify the mechanisms which connect the interests of classes with the policies of states. The abstract world of functional logic must always be distinguished from the concrete world of multiple determinations and contingencies." Third, the 'economistic' assumptions (i.e. assuming that economic processes

have some sort of prior hold over other cultural or socio-political processes) of political-economy have been challenged by other scholars especially recent work in cultural geography.

These sorts of 'derivationist' accounts of the state have been contrasted with the 'autonomist' accounts (Driver 1991a). The main features of the 'autonomist' analysed are as follows: first, these accounts tend to employ a minimal definition of the state which is predominantly centred on the state's ability to exercise power over a given territory (Giddens 1985). The focus is primarily institutional rather than functional. Mann (1984), for example, distinguishes between 'infrastructural power' and 'despotic power'. The former is conceptualised as "the capacity to actually penetrate civil society and to implement political decisions throughout the realm" (Mann 1984:200). In contrast, 'despotic power' is understood as the ability of political elites to impose their will without in contrast to 'infrastructural power' any form of negotiation or restraint. The modern state is differentiated from the pre-modern state by the way those particular types of power overlap with another (see Giddens 1985). Second, the autonomist accounts of the state stress the importance of territoriality. The ability of the state to impose its will over a specific piece of territory is crucial to the articulation and codification of state authority. For example, questions of surveillance and the collection of information emerge as crucial dimensions of state power in the modern period.

The territorial basis of the nation-state raises two important general issues for political geographers. First, a state's relationship to the inter-state system is important because it raises the question as to the sorts of practices that a state has to perform in order to be considered a sovereign state by other states (see, for example, Weber 1992a). This clearly links up with contemporary discussions on issues such as sovereignty which many argue remains an essentially uncontested concept (e.g. Ruggie 1993, Walker 1993). At the individual state level, the ability of the state to control and integrate territory raises important topics for a discussion of state formation. Second, the major interest of autonomist accounts of the state is a focus on historical and geographical variations in state form. But as Driver (1991a) notes

there is little agreement on what form such studies of the state should take even if many theorists accept the need for more contextual accounts. As scholars such as Mann (1986), for example, have argued that the transfer of authority from the church to the state was haphazard and varied considerably over time and space. The experiences of absolutist monarchy in France, the constitutional monarchy in England and the loose confederations of German states meant that the experiences of statehood varied considerably. In chapter 4, for instance, I explore how Argentine state development was based on events and actions both inside and outside the nation-state. In doing so, I suggest that the state remains an important starting point for an understanding of the practices of foreign policy and their relationship to state sovereignty.

The one other major source of contemporary discussions on the state has emerged from the world systems theory of Wallerstein and, within political geography by Taylor (1989a). The advantages of world systems theory for political geography are several fold. First, because the discussions of the capitalist world-economy are historically and geographically sensitive. Second, spatial variabilities between the structures of the world system have been emphasised. Third, the interconnectedness of and between regions is stressed (Taylor 1991d). In spite of these advantages, however, world system analyses of the state have been accused of neglecting the European state system in favour of the imperatives of the modern world economy (Kearns 1988). The state as a consequence appears to be largely neglected both conceptually and historically (see Taylor 1993b). In the case of the latter, other writers such as Mann (1986) and Kennedy (1991) have argued that the technological revolutions of the sixteenth century had an important and lasting effect on the military organisation and hence state structures throughout Europe.

There has been detailed discussions which have attempted to theorise and historicise state formation in political geography and other disciplines (Corrigan and Sayer 1985, Giddens 1985, Mann 1990). Taylor's (1993a) attempt to explore a *contra political geography* seem to be an important step in challenging the position of the European state-system in the narratives

of political geography. As Taylor (1993a:83) argues "If this is so, we may claim its subdiscipline, political geography to be a European science par excellence ... As such, political geography remains a direct intellectual expression of the inter-state system, a codification of political practices that are Europe's legacy to the world". Taylor's (1991d, 1993a) *contra political geography* involves several stages: exploring the evolution of the inter-state system, highlighting the contradictions and pressures within the contemporary inter-state system and speculating on the future of the inter-state system with the help of world system theory and Braudellian time-scales. Taylor (1993a:89) confirms that his analysis is " ... concerned with the medium and long term patterns of change so that particular events, however important in themselves, become just part of an overall process". *Contra political geography* is about challenging the European legacy of political spatial structure (single scale authoritarianism) and the continued North-South divide within the world-economy (Taylor 1992a, 1992c).

Taylor's proposals, however, for a *contra political geography* have attracted mixed reviews (e.g. Nijman 1993, Rumley and Deans 1993).⁵ The state remains a problem for Anglo-American political geography and geopolitics because traditionally it has simply been an assumed 'natural unit' of analysis rather than a theorised and contextualised topic of discussion (see Taylor 1993a). Furthermore, as Driver (1991:277) concludes "the conceptual

5. Taylor's proposals for a *contra political geography* have been reviewed by other writers. Nijman's (1993) critique of Taylor's proposals seems to rest on his positivistic unhappiness with Taylor's *ideological* language and proposals. More importantly, Rumley and Deans (1993) remind Anglo-American political geographers that the state remains a theoretical problem for Anglo-American political geography not necessarily for the non-Western world. In so far as it has circumscribed understandings of politics. However, as Corbridge (1993) and Slater (1993) have noted, the state is increasingly being challenged from above by globalisation but also from below by local and regional nationalisms. Increasingly, these authors suggest that the state should be conceptualised as a nodal point of power, conflict and dissonance. For political geography, therefore, the traditional concern for nation-states and the inter-state system needs to be tempered with a concern with how social movements and global flows of capital or information are compromising state power.

reduction of politics and power to the state - which remains largely unchallenged within the subdiscipline, world systems theory apart."

2.3.4. 'Advising the Prince'

"It is the responsibility of intellectuals to speak the truth and to expose lies" Chomsky (1969:325)

One of the defining features of classical geopolitics has been the desire to practice geopolitics (O Tuathail 1986, Dalby 1990a). Or, as Taylor (1989a) has argued, geopolitics has always reflected the national biases of the writers and their desires to inform their state's foreign and security policies. As Karl Haushofer noted "As thus conceived, Geopolitik will furnish the implements for political action and be a guide to political life" (cited in Kish 1942:641). Or as Jorge Atencio (1965:41) noted "Geopolitics guides the statesman in the conduct of internal and external policy of the state and orientates the military in the preparation of the national defence and the conduct of strategy ... " From Mackinder to Ratzel to Bowman and to Gray, geopolitics has been an activity dedicated to aiding the practices of statecraft and furthering the power of the state (O Tuathail 1986, O Tuathail and Agnew 1992).

The starting proposition for much of critical geopolitics has been to adopt a Gramscian understanding of hegemony and ideology (e.g. Dalby 1990a, O Tuathail 1992e, 1993f). Gramsci (1971) argued that at a certain moments in history, a dominant class exercises authority over subordinate classes by social and cultural leadership rather than by force. The establishment of that hegemony is based on 'organic intellectuals' disseminating commonly accepted (common sense) conceptions of social reality, which portray the existing socio-political arrangements of society as natural or inevitable. The ideological role of these intellectuals is, therefore, to propagate rationales for certain political positions, which in turn

legitimate particular understandings of social reality. As Dalby (1992:95) notes " ... the security intellectuals, who formulate policy, study international politics, and pontificate on the television screens of an anxious world".

The Gramscian concept of hegemony suggests that these 'common sense' understandings are not natural but are ideologically produced and inscribed with power (Cox 1983). The condition of hegemony is never a static state rather it is challenged and disputed within society. Hegemony has to be produced and reproduced as a form of political and ideological practice. As Thompson (1990:94) notes "It is in this way ... that the dominant class secures 'hegemony': through the structuring of the ideological field based on the 'active consent' of subordinate classes and to integrate the various factions of the dominant class into a relatively stable power bloc". The concept of hegemony, however, as Thompson (1990) notes has been criticised on a number of fronts: assumptions about the integration of individuals into a particular social order, the relativisation of ideology and the relationship between ideology and various social classes. Furthermore, Thompson (1990:95) argues that " ... it seems to me essential to recognise that there are systematically asymmetrical relations of power which are based on considerations other than class: ... sex, age or ethnic origin".⁶

However, this Gramscian understanding of hegemony remains an important implicit assumption within the critical geopolitics literature. For the dissident (or critical geopolitical) intellectual there are two important issues. First, to challenge the agendas and the epistemological/ontological presumptions of the hegemonic discourses. Second, to ask the question: for whom are 'we' (i.e. as dissident intellectuals) writing for? This is an important issue for critical geopolitics. If, as I assume, this movement is hostile to the state and state-centric applied geopolitics then to whom are we addressing our comments? Is a movement which is composed of white, middle class European and American men able to effectively

6. In spite of those criticisms of Gramsci's concept of hegemony, the concept remains crucial to the work of critical geopolitics and its scepticism towards 'security intellectuals'.

write accounts of a world politics for others? This must include (re)presentation within the academy and the 'outside' world.

In the post-war period, the growth in expert knowledge of security intellectuals who codify, justify and legitimate certain practices has assumed particular importance (see Dalby 1992, Klein 1988a). The discursive strategies of those intellectuals appeared to be an odd mixture of obscure (technical) jargon on weapons systems coupled with rather simplistic depictions of the external 'enemy' (Cohn 1987, Klein 1988a). The geopolitical writer, Colin Gray epitomises that sort of tradition. His advice to the practitioners of statecraft has been descriptively thick and regular for a period of over twenty years (Dodds 1991c). Gray (1977:1), for example, urges American foreign policy to " ... aim above all at the improvement or at least the preservation of the relative power position of the state." Is this a desirable position?

The relationship between academic experts and political elites during the period of the Cold War has been problematic. It is as O'Sullivan (1982:57) reminds us "to ascertain the extent to which geopolitical ideas have directly influenced policy and action or whether they merely reflected the *Zeitgeist*, with both theories and actions manifesting ambient attitudes". However, the interesting element of such an analysis would be to explore how a successive number of 'experts' during the Cold War situated their work within the context of a particular set of foreign and security policies. Hence, Conrad's (1984) appeal for an 'Antipolitics' usefully reminds us of the problems- "A disturbing large proportions of our thinkers have become experts in the service of our leaders ... the intellectual specialists in the logic of atomic and ideological war get their money for deceiving others, leading them like lambs to the slaughter ... " (1984:98). Leaving aside the melodramatic note of the text, Conrad's appeal (in conjunction with writers such as Noam Chomsky 1973) to practice 'antipolitics' which is "the political activity of those who don't want to be politicians and who refuse to share in power" is a reminder of how issues such as research, politics, finance and audiences are inter-linked (Konrad 1984:230).

The issue of 'audiences', therefore, is critical. In the post-war period, political realism was the dominant discourse in IR and geopolitical research because it was seen to most clearly match up with the underlying reality of Cold War geopolitics (Dalby 1991, Hoffman 1977). Research money from government and private institutions was awarded to those who premised their work on war, power, nuclear strategy and the evilness of the Soviet Union. Colin Gray is a geopolitical writer who has earned a respected position within the American foreign and security policy establishment and also research monies for various institutes in the USA.

An engagement with the outside world has dangers and opportunities. In the first instance, Chomsky (1973:89-90) reminds us of the dangers: "Consider the often-voiced demand that the University serve the needs of the outside society- that is activities be 'relevant' to general social concerns. Put in this way this demand is justifiable. Translated into practice, however, it usually means that the universities provide a service for existing social institutions, those institutions that are in a position to articulate their needs and subsidise the effort to meet them. It is not difficult for members to delude themselves into believing that they are maintaining a neutral-free position when they are simply responding to demands elsewhere ... The Pentagon and the great corporations can formulate their needs and subsidise the kind of work that will answer to them. The peasants in Guatemala or the unemployed in Harlem are in no position to do so."

The opportunities for critical geopolitics is to broaden its remit and consider topics and issues excluded in existing accounts of geopolitics. A commitment to social and political criticism is welcome especially one which is committed to challenging state power, global inequalities under capitalism and war (see O Tuathail 1989, Johnston and Taylor 1989). In the context of war, for example, O Tuathail (1993a:4) has noted " ... Geographers have a moral and political obligation to confront and challenge the strategies by which the war (i.e. 1991 Gulf War) was given to be seen by politicians, 'experts' and the mass media within the 'western' world".

2.4. Critical Geopolitics: Research Strategies

The possibility of challenging existing discourses of geopolitics was very much influenced by the post-structuralist and postmodern threads in international relations and geographical theory (as mentioned in chapter 1). O Tuathail (1989) was one of the earliest scholars to explore the possibility of constructing a 'critical geopolitics' which challenged the realist inspired American writers of post-war geopolitics. As we have noted earlier, there have been two important strands to this recent work: first, a Foucauldian insistence towards discourse is adopted. Second, strategies of de-construction are employed to dismantle the geopolitical reasoning of policy professionals and academic experts.

Simon Dalby (1990a), for example, in an innovative book contributed to the process, with a discursive analysis of the Committee for Present Danger (CPD), an influential pressure group that supported American hawkishness towards the former Soviet Union during the Cold War. The book's purpose was to focus on " ... the ideological role of the CPD's discourse, and of how their discursive practices acted to reproduce the world of the 1950s a quarter of a century later" (1990a:16). Dalby demonstrates that the members of the CPD (which included the political geographer Colin Gray) drew on a number of discourses (including sovietology, nuclear strategy and realism) to construct the Soviet Union as the 'evil other' matched against the champion of liberty and democracy- the United States.

The second element of critical geopolitics' focus on geopolitical discourse has been to initiate de-constructive strategies. By de-construction, most critical geopolitical writers do not infer a Derridean 'understanding'. As Norris (1992:19) writes "Deconstruction is the vigilant seeking out of those aporias, blind spots or moments of self-contradiction where a text involuntarily betrays the tension between rhetoric and logic ... To 'deconstruct' a piece of writing is

therefore to operate a kind of strategic reversal, seizing on precisely those unguarded details (casual metaphors, casual footnotes, incidental turns of arguments) which are always ... passed over by interpreters of a more orthodox persuasion". Rather than grapple with the contested terrain of Derrida and deconstruction, critical geopolitics has, thus far, adopted the 'spirit' of deconstruction rather than a wholehearted adoption. It is only recently, however, that writers such as O Tuathail (1993d) have explicitly adopted deconstructive strategies.

Dalby (1990b:173) argues, for example, that "Geopolitics is about this ideological process of constructing spatial, political and cultural boundaries to demarcate the domestic space as separate from the threatening other". As a consequence, Dalby's (1990a,1990b) analysis of foreign policy and national security attempted to de-construct or un-pack the ideological processes that legitimated 'containment militarism'. Furthermore, Dalby's (1990a,1990-1) work has been dedicated to a de-constructive exploration of the bloc politics of the Cold War period. His analysis of the European peace movements, for example, presents a skilful analysis of how concepts such as security and identity can be unpacked and redefined in non-statecentric fashions. As Dalby (1990b:185) concludes "By asking questions such as 'security for whom?', the structures of power implicit in the conventional formulations of security can be exposed. In doing so a space is opened up for critical geopolitical inquiry that does not presuppose the state as provider of security".

To take another example, briefly, O Tuathail's (1993a) recent paper on the 1991 Gulf War argues that "Deconstructing the discursive strategies by which the Gulf Crisis was geographed necessarily requires one to develop a narrative of intelligibility about the spatiality of the Gulf Crisis" (1993a:5). O Tuathail (1993a) argues that critical geopoliticians are sensitive towards the particular narratives of intelligibility employed to describe or recount events. In this respect, deconstruction seems to imply that the American elite narratives of the Gulf War can be unpacked by the careful critical geopolitician to 'identify' inscription strategies. Having identified a number of inscription strategies (e.g. geopolitical hyper-realism, World War II and Vietnam), O Tuathail's deconstructive strategy relies upon exposing US inscription of the

Gulf Crisis as being ungrounded in either strategic realities or the 'reality' (note inverted commas 1993a:26) of the places specified. As O Tuathail (1993a:26) concludes "The spatiality of the Gulf Crisis is thus read as a distorted Western writing of the reality of place and politics in the 'Middle East' ... A nuanced and coloured local identity was effaced and erased by a crude monochromatic Western work-up of the region".

2.4.1. Spatialising International Politics

The ability of political elites (or intellectuals of statecraft) to depict international politics in certain ways has been an important topic for 'critical geopolitics'. O Tuathail (1989) and Dalby (1990a) have usefully pointed out that the reasoning process used by these elites is crucial to constituting world politics as a series of 'dramas'. Instead of seeing space or place as simply a setting or location, the depictions of space and place are seen as opening up a field of possibilities. As O Tuathail and Agnew (1992:196) note "Merely to designate an area as 'Islamic' is to designate an implicit foreign policy" (see Sidaway 1992a). These capacities to 'write' or 'constitute' international politics acknowledges that security intellectuals and foreign policy professionals have "The power to constitute the terms of the geopolitical order, an ordering of international space which defines the central drama of international politics in particularised ways. Thus not only are they able to represent particular regional conflicts, whose causes may be quite localised, in their own terms but they help to create the conditions whereby peripheral and semi-peripheral states selectively adopt and use geopolitical reasoning of the hegemon" (O Tuathail and Agnew 1992:195).⁷

7. The question of how peripheral or semi-peripheral states and or social movements contest forms of geopolitical reasoning/scriptings of the core states and their institutions deserves further attention. In particular, recent studies by Escobar (1988) and Popke (1993) suggest that strategies of resistance adopted by non-Western peoples need to be understood within the power-knowledge networks rubrics of development, resources, science et al.

The depiction of space and place in international politics has important implications for the demarcation of 'our' space and 'their' space. This in turn involves discourses of the Other which explain how 'their' place is different (and often inferior) to 'our' place. Rather than being simply a question of perception (which can be compared against some sort of objective reality), critical geopolitical writers recognise that the creation of political spaces delimits the possibilities of action (Dalby 1990a). Furthermore, the creation of an external other is seen as an important component of identity formation on the inside (Walker 1993).

One of the most crucial distinctions that O Tuathail and Agnew (1992) have made is between different types of geographical reasoning- practical geopolitical reasoning is the everyday/common sense reasoning of foreign policy elites. These codes are assumed to be grounded in highly dichotomous narratives which emphasise white and non-white, first world and third world, adult and child. In contrast, formal geopolitical reasoning is associated with strategic thinkers and academic experts who work within civil society and produce highly codified ideas and principles on foreign policy and statecraft. More recently, O Tuathail (1993d) has refined this division further to identify: disciplinary geopolitics (more nuanced understanding of formal geopolitics), practical geopolitics and popular geopolitics. The latter is a category which attempts to acknowledge the importance of films, architecture, cinema as popular sites of geo-graphs of world politics.

The most striking analyses of practical geopolitical reasoning have addressed US Cold War containment thinking (e.g. Dalby 1988, O Tuathail 1989, O Tuathail and Agnew 1992). In 1950 NSC 68, the key document in the initial formulation of Containment thinking reiterated Mackinder and Spykman's concerns of Eurasia being dominated by a single power (Sloan 1988, Dalby 1990a). As the NSC 68 document notes "On the one hand, the people of the world yearn for relief from the anxiety arising from the risk of atomic war. On the other hand, any substantial further extension of the area under the domination of the Kremlin would raise the possibility that no coalition adequate to confront the Kremlin with greater strength could

be assembled. It is in this context that this Republic and its citizens stand in their deepest peril" (cited in Dalby 1990a:105).

Furthermore, as Dalby (1990b) notes the term geopolitics was not mentioned because "it has no need to do so (i.e. NSC 68), its premises are understood". Rather than argue that geopolitics was in terminal decline in the Cold War period, Dalby (1990a) and O Tuathail and Agnew (1992) argued geopolitics was internalised. Containment thinking was implicitly geopolitical. A whole set of vocabularies associated with containment (e.g. domino theory) had emerged to spatialise understandings of international politics and security. Following on from the earlier work of geographers such as O'Sullivan (1982), the work of critical geopolitics has concentrated on the Cold War period and the immediate Post Cold War period (e.g. Dalby 1990a, O Tuathail 1992a 1992d, 1993b). In particular, they have drawn attention to "a clearly spatial understanding of politics: the containment doctrine explicitly used spatial metaphors of enclosure and limitation and discussed Soviet influence in terms of territorial control" (Dalby 1990-1:12). However, unlike O'Sullivan's demolition of domino theory, critical geopolitical writers such as Dalby (1990a, 1990b) have not attempted to reconceptualise the theoretical foundations of Cold War theories. Rather, O Tuathail (1989), Dalby (1990) and Taylor (1990) have explored how certain spatialised understandings of international politics create agendas, and which in turn discipline those who might want to dissent from such 'understandings'.⁸

2.4.2. Geopolitical Economy

8. Dalby's (1990-1, 1993c) papers on peace and feminist movements in Europe and New Zealand are important contributions to the recognition that certain 'understandings' of international politics are contested by social movements. A further project might be to explore how the Greenham Common peace movement discursively (and physically) challenged the elite Anglo-American utterances on nuclear weapons and peace.

The ability of political elites to represent a space or place in certain ways is an important part of the study of world politics. However, these depictions (as with discourses) have a material grounding (Agnew and Corbridge 1987, Taylor 1990, Corbridge and Agnew 1991). By drawing on the work of Wallerstein (1979) and Gramsci (1971), Agnew and Corbridge (1987) argue for a dynamic conception of geopolitics which recognises that throughout modern history there have been periods of distinct geopolitical orders, characterised by specific periods of geopolitical disorder and rivalry. Associated with each period of geopolitical order is a dominant (or hegemonic) discourse that spatially demarcates the world in regularised ways (Reynolds 1992).

The most important work within geopolitical economy has been the contributions of Harvey (1985), Agnew and Corbridge (1989), Corbridge and Agnew (1991) and Corbridge (1993). The context for geopolitical economy then was the disintegration of the classical geopolitical narratives of the Cold War. Since the 1970s, various writers have argued that the emergence of global Fordism and flexible production led to a period of geopolitical disorder in which the globalisation of capital, ideas and people disrupted the traditional narratives based on narrow inter-state rivalries. As such the approach of geopolitical economy attempted to "incorporate both the processes of economic and political change and the rhetorical understanding that gives a geopolitical order its appeal and acceptability" (Agnew and Corbridge 1989:268).

Agnew and Corbridge (1989:267), for example, even go as far as to suggest that "today geopolitical economy is replacing classical geopolitics as the fundamental context for the constitution of foreign policy" because the old certainties of the post-cold order are being replaced by new uncertainties in the capitalist world-economy. In spite of this incorporation in Agnew and O Tuathail's (1987) earliest paper on geopolitical reasoning, I remain unconvinced that dominant practical discourses on geopolitics and geopolitical order were fatally disrupted by the growing signs of geopolitical disorder in the 1980s. O Tuathail's (1993f) recent paper on geopolitical reasoning on the end of the Cold War suggests, that

American geopolitical reasoning remained surprisingly resistant to the force of events in Eastern Europe or the 1991 Gulf War. It begs the question as to whether geopolitical discourse need have material grounding in order to be effective.

In Corbridge and Agnew (1991:88) the concept of geopolitical economy is further specified as an approach "which builds upon uneven development theory and which affirms, once again, the insistent spatial foundations of capitalist production, exchange and regulation." In this vein, other geographers such as Harvey (1985) and Bond (1991) have argued that geopolitics needs to locate itself within a "theory of why the restructuring of trade, investment, and invisible financial flows is in large part emanating from the supranational strongholds of financial capital ... the subdiscipline of geopolitics will not easily trace the displacement of tensions in the capitalist mode of production from traditional superpower rivalries into other realms. Hence the transformations in the international division of labour and the diminishing power of peripheral states that stem directly from just this process may remain beyond the scope of geographers" (Bond 1991:325).

The value of geopolitical economy approaches to critical geopolitics is that it provides some theoretical and empirical opportunities for grounding the utterances of elite geopolitical reasoning within the material circumstances that elites found themselves. The work by Luttwak (1990), Reynolds (1992) and O Tuathail (1992a) have explored aspects of political economy with a view to relating changes in the world-economy to specific policies. In particular, it has been suggested that concepts such as power and security should be reconceptualised to account for economic and technological terms as well as geopolitical or military parameters. However, as writers such as Dalby (1992a,1992b) would argue this broadening of the concept of 'security' leaves the ontological presumptions of that concept unchallenged or criticised.

In that respect the work of Peter Taylor (1990) provides a useful illustration of how forms of practical geopolitical reasoning might be related to a material grounding in the world-

economy. Taylor's examination of the practical geopolitical reasoning of the Foreign Office between 1944-1946 seeks to investigate how British elites discursively created a geopolitical world order in response to a series of interlinked dilemmas (geoeconomic, geopolitical and geostrategic). The solution to these dilemmas, Taylor argues, was located in a number of actions (e.g. acquisition of nuclear weapons, loans from the USA) to discursively create a relationship for Britain based on supporting the USA against the USSR.

O Tuathail (1992b:978) has recently noted that "Critical geopolitics and geopolitical economy are new and emergent perspectives within political geography that seek to address the complex ideological and material changes of the contemporary world order. Neither is yet fully specified but it seems both have the potential to be complementary." Such a development would be helpful in providing the opportunities for critical geopolitics to ground the codes of geopolitical reasoning within the material circumstances that elites find themselves. However, it remains to be worked out as to whether these so called codes of geographical reasoning are sufficiently disciplined and ordered to 'reflect' the cycles of the world-economy. Furthermore, the identification (by the geopolitician) of material circumstances of states and their governing elites is problematic in an era of globalisation and interconnectedness (e.g. R Brown 1992).

2.5. Summary: Building a Counter-Hegemonic Critical Geopolitics

At the present, the literature of 'critical geopolitics' remains small. However, it is not unreasonable to ask the following questions- what is the purpose of 'critical geopolitics' and who is the literature addressing? These are important questions because these were issues that were not addressed by classical geopolitical writers such as Saul Cohen or Colin Gray. Saul Cohen, for example, implicitly addressed his work to American foreign policy makers who he believed were largely unaware of the geographical implications of post-war containment

policies. These issues were not dealt with in the sort of detail that a critical geopolitical stance might demand but they were at least addressed.

Thus far the most ambitious plans for 'critical geopolitics' has been articulated by O Tuathail (1989) who has suggested the need for a 'counter-hegemonic' geopolitics one which would not only challenge the assumptions of classical geopolitics but which would promote alternative strategies which contest the inter-state system and which promote more than just world orders. These proposals are ambitious and have received much impetus from the work of individuals in IR research (e.g. Walker 1988) and peace research (Kaldor 1986). Dalby's (1992a) vision of the 'critical geopolitics' project, however, is less ambitious than O Tuathail's counter-hegemonic project. By drawing on the work of scholars such as Walker (1988,1992) and Walker and Mendlowitz (1984), Dalby (1992a,1993b) has attempted to explore how political space and community might be rearticulated to take account of critical social movements, to acknowledge processes such as 'glocalisation' and to challenge the power of states and political blocs. Dalby (1992a:99) argues that "Political geographers of whatever critical persuasion would seem to have an obligation to contribute as global citizens to these attempts to remake politics, and to do so in ways that do not accept the inevitability of state structure, but explore the contemporary possibilities of political community in innovative ways."

The problem with such a strategy is that post-structural or post-modern stances cast doubt on the ability of deconstructionist readings to offer us an alternative reading of world politics rather than simply exposing dominant hierarchies or old caricatures. Ashley's concern, for example, has been to explore how the boundaries between domestic and international politics have been important to the creation of a space of action for *sovereign man*. The focus of *sovereign man* as Hoffman (1991:178) notes "necessarily places self-imposed limits on the potential for critique within modern epistemologies and, moreover, serves to reinforce these limitations". Ashley (1989:25) argues that post-structuralism refuses to take up a position within this regime of modernity or external to it: "The task of poststructuralist social theory is

not to impose a general interpretation, a paradigm of sovereignty of man, as a guide to the transformation of life on a global scale. In contrast to modern social theory, poststructuralism eschews grand designs, transcendental grounds, or universal projects of humankind".

The focus is then directed onto 'boundaries' and 'borderlines' and 'margins' of the practices associated with modernity. This implies as Hoffman (1991) and Renegger and Hoffman (1993) have noted a radical reinscription of what 'theory' is all about. Instead of seeing theory as a site for establishing grounds from which to ascertain meaning, Ashley argues that theory embraces a 'radical interpretive' or undecidability which is full of paradoxes and uncertainties. Instead of asking 'what' questions, Ashley asks 'how' questions: how is meaning fixed. how are practices replicated? Thus, as Hoffman (1991:178) notes "Post-structuralism does not refuse theory, but reinscribes it by locating theory at the 'margins' of its own discourse where boundaries are constantly being redrawn and transgressed".

Other international relations theorists such as Connolly (1991), however, have argued that the deconstructionist urges of post-structural theory have to be combined with a form of constructiveness. Radical interpretive projects face the problem of whether it is possible to construct a political agenda on the basis of an incredulity towards any given truth claims of agendas. Connolly (1989:336) proposes that theories should aim to "construct alternative hierarchies that do not demand the same relation to truth to enter into a field of conversation". The response of scholars such as Connolly (1989,1991) has been to insist that postmodern approaches attempt to "open up that which is enclosed, to try and think thoughts that try to stretch and extend the normal patterns of insistence ... while modernists attempt to apply a code of coherence and consistency to discourse based on the implicit faith that only this one code can save us, the postmodern thinks within the code of paradox because only attentiveness to paradox can loosen the hold monolithic standards of identity hold over life in the late modern age" (1991:338). There is, thus, an important distinction to be made between modernists and postmodernists who differ over the nature of the *problematique*.

An important stage of for critical geopolitics has to be 'conversation' (Renegger and Hoffman 1993). There has to an open-ended conversation with no fixed agenda which includes new issues and new participants who have previously been silenced. The tyranny of binaries calls for new modes of relational thinking which do not enclose or oppose possibilities. It is incumbent on those who wish to practise more critical forms of geopolitics to demonstrate tolerance and openness. Conversation is a two way process and this entails the mutual recognition of fragmentation both intellectually and politically. But is also raises the question of whether any 'conversation' will do and whether anyone or 'voice' can contribute. The aim of such 'conversations' is surely not to simply critique dominant discourses and *delimit new* and old intellectual fields for these foreclose on possibilities, rather conversation should be related to understanding (Dodds 1993d).

At the heart of much of the current debates within political geography and international relations lie ontological questions. i.e. what can be known? Or what are we trying to know? A common response to such questions is to raise the spectacle of relativism. The recourse to relativistic claims of degeneration (and chaos in a situation of no true knowledge) reveal more about the positivistic assumptions of objectivity and the transcendental subject which litter political geography. As Walker (1989:175) notes "The indictment is issued in the name of objectivity and universal standards, although it is the historically constituted nature of capacity to issue indictment in the first place that post-structuralism has sought to challenge".

The ontological questions posed by post-structuralist thinkers raise issues of relationship between practices, knowledge and power. It is not simply a case, for example, as Taylor (1991e) has suggested, methodological convergence around Braudelian time-scales (*longue, moyenne and court*). Rather, it is concerned with issues such as: what is our assumed object of study (a single planet or a world of states etc..), are there universal truths waiting to be discovered? Post-structuralist thinkers attempt, therefore, not to violently impose universalism or transcendental rationalism but rather to explore how certain discursive

practices have structured possibilities of debate. In that respect, it is a patient approach which does not promise some 'final' answer to questions of ontology.

The reformulation and reconstruction of political life is a varied project involving traditional questions such as the possibility of world politics and the inter-state system but also issues such as gender and race which entail redefining understandings of the 'political'. The consequences of such moves is to acknowledge as in IR research that geopolitics does not uncover or unlock the 'secrets of world politics'. This means abandoning assumptions such as that there exist 'key privileged problems' of international life to be solved and acknowledging that we have only just begun to think through the contextuality of our social and political circumstances. I return to this theme in the final chapter.

Critical geopolitics, therefore, is an important project which attempts to unmask the hidden, and the absences of existing accounts of geopolitics and international politics. In spite of replicating those 'absences' in some cases, it does represent an attempt to introduce not only some theoretical rigour but also continues the important critiques of positivist social and political theory. Furthermore, recent writings of Dalby (1992c, 1993b), Dodds and Sidaway (1993), Enloe (1993) are also addressing the gendered nature of geopolitics. However, critical geopolitical writers have yet to develop the range of perspectives that are currently on offer within the IR literature (e.g. Brown 1988, Runyan and Peterson 1991, Peterson 1992a, 1992b, Sylvester 1993).

The post-structural re-readings of classical geopolitical theory offer an important site from which to challenge existing assumptions and understandings of states, security, anarchy and power. Disrupting the dominant discourses which are usually premised on unitary and accepted understandings do ultimately contribute to the opening up of possibilities of

multiple politics and voices. In chapter 3 I want to explore the possibilities for geopolitics and foreign policy analysis.

Chapter 3

Critical Geopolitics and Foreign Policy

3.1. Introduction

This chapter represents a departure from existing studies of geopolitics and foreign policy (e.g. Spykman 1942, Cohen 1983, Henrikson 1980, Gorman 1982, Lacoste 1984, Kelly 1985).¹ Furthermore, this chapter engages with the recent literatures in international relations and foreign policy analysis which have thus far been neglected by other critical geopolitical writers. In doing so, I suggest that critical geopolitics can broaden its interest in the practices of foreign policy by linking the geographical specificities of foreign policies with identity formation.

As a consequence, the questions that will be posed will revolve around a number of issues. First, following a significant strand of international relations theory, I pose the question of "what is at stake when we attempt to screen the strange, the unfamiliar, and the threatening associated with the outside from the familiar and the safe, which are linked to the inside" (Campbell 1992a:42). As such the signifying boundaries (geographical and epistemological)

1. The classical geopolitical approach to foreign policy has been described by Kelly (1985:2) as concerned with " ... strategic choke-points, distance and location, power balances, resource attainment, and other geopolitical factors ... " Kelly (1985) identifies two major strands: first, the organic state thesis of Ratzel in which the practice of foreign policy was understood as the reaction of the organic state (for resources and territory) within the international *environment*. This remains of the most influential paradigms within South American geopolitical thinking (see Child 1990, Hepple 1992). Second, the geostrategic approach of Thomas Mahan which focused on geographical location, land and sea power and global strategy. Writers such as Spykman, Cohen, Meinig, de Seversky, Kissinger and others have drawn on this tradition in their writings on foreign policy.

which constitute the inside (the state) from the outside (the international realm) is an important theme to a discussion of foreign policy.² Second, the creation and maintenance of a state's identity through a series of exclusions need to be explored. In particular, I argue that foreign policy 'experts' are the state's privileged story tellers who discuss, define and secure identities and boundaries. Third, the practices of foreign policy are underwritten by geographical depictions. The recent work within the field of critical geopolitics is explored and the concept of the 'geo-graph' is related to an earlier discussion of identity formation.³

Recent work on foreign policy, therefore, has shifted away from the conceptualisation of foreign policy as simply a reaction of a state (with a fixed identity) to a pre-discursive international arena; towards a view of foreign policy as discursive practice which enables the specification of identity(ies) (see Shapiro 1988, Campbell 1990). As Campbell (1990:264-265) argues "If we can show that [for example] US foreign policy was constituted by dimensions other than external necessity, we have gone a long way toward suggesting that the traditional rendering of the Cold War needs to be reconsidered before we can

2. The concern for boundaries (inside/outside) has been an important strand in contemporary human geography (e.g. Sibley 1988, Boal and Livingstone 1983, Olsson 1984). More recently, the work of Shields (1991,1992), for example, has linked a discussion of the spatial demarcation of the inside/outside with the modernist conceptions of absence and presence. As Shields (1992:184) notes "These forms of spatial differentiation appear as a common tradition of concepts and metaphors from the Enlightenment onwards. First, inclusion and exclusion, inside and outside, or interiority and exteriority characterise foundational notions of the individual, the community and the nation-state ... Second ... presence and absence is closely bound up with conceptions of truth, being, contemporaneity and proximity".

3. The recent literature on foreign policy within IR has been an important source of inspiration. David Campbell (1989,1990,1992a,1993), for example, has been a leading figure in problematising the existing literatures on foreign policy. In particular, by relating the practices of foreign policy to identity formation and domestic audiences, foreign policy studies has begun to move away from the positivistic and behavioural strands that characterise much of the literature (e.g. Rosenau 1974, Waltz 1979).

satisfactorily contemplate what forms future global politics might take ... At the very least there is an important relationship between foreign policy and the domestic social order". It is suggested that an important feature of foreign policy is the creation and maintenance of a state's identity by transforming differences within society to differences between societies (Ashley 1987a).

The chapter is organised into four parts. First, I initiate a discussion on foreign policy which is understood as a (re)presentational practice. The importance of experts is noted for they are the state's privileged story tellers. Second, recent critical investigations into the existing field of foreign policy analysis are explored in three sub-sections: sovereignty, political identity, and boundary formation. I focus on the work of international relations scholars such as Richard Ashley, David Campbell, Michael Shapiro and Robert Walker. The third section, examines how critical geopolitics can link up with some of these debates within international relations theory. However, as importantly, critical geopolitics can initiate new discussions of seemingly familiar themes in political geography.

3.2. Foreign Policy as a Re-Presentational Practice

The importance of (re)presentational practices in the creation of 'worlds' have been a topic of expanding interest in human geography (e.g. Gregory and Walford 1989, Deutsche 1991, Barnes and Duncan 1992, Smith 1992, Watts 1992, Jarosz 1993). In particular, there has been a shift away from a naive realist position towards a position that treats representation as a major problematic within geography (see, for example, Jackson 1993, Jarosz 1993, Rose 1993). As Gregory and Walford (1989:2) note "Out texts are not mirrors which we hold up to the world, reflecting its shapes and structures immediately and without distortion. They are, instead, creatures of our own making, though their making is not entirely of our own choosing." There are several important consequences that follow from the above observation.

It is now increasingly recognised that geography is not simply about 'geo-graphing' or 'earth writing' per se. i.e. a practice whereby geographers simply record the already legible surfaces of the earth (O Tuathail 1989, Natter and Jones 1993).⁴ Such an observation challenges modernist conceptions of representation, which implied that an objective reality could be depicted through the agency of 'ideas' (Ryan 1988, Natter and Jones 1993). In doing so, such conceptions implicitly assumed that a separation could be drawn between an external reality independent of those 'objectively' observing it: an observer separate from what is being represented (Foucault 1972). As a consequence, the base or foundation for knowledge revolved around satisfying what Richard Bernstein has termed a 'Cartesian anxiety' towards the relative, the irrational and hence the unknowable.

Recently, other writers such as Marcus and Fisher (1986) have argued that there is no pre-existing reality that writing reflects. Thus, the (re)presentation of that reality reveals as much about prior interpretations as it does about the worlds represented (Barnes and Duncan 1992). As Jarosz (1992:105) notes, in the context of the metaphor of the Dark continent for 'Africa', it " ... reveals the power of discourse as a particular sort of 'violence' perpetuated through this particular geographic representation. The metaphor homogenises and flattens places and peoples, denies the actualities and specificities of social and economic processes which transform the continent ... " In order to understand such representations we need to be sensitive towards the factors that might influence their creation. In the case of foreign policy experts, for example, we would need to investigate their writings (or utterances) within the following context: the institutional setting, the genre of which it is part, the political position that sustains the authority of the author and the historical context that makes these types of conditions contingent to particular times and places (Clifford 1988, Barnes and Duncan 1992).

4. In the context of political geography, the term 'earth writing' was employed by O Tuathail (1989) to describe the practices of geopolitics/geography.

Furthermore, the practices of (re)presentation are important in establishing 'understandings': a way of seeing, knowing and speaking (Said 1978, 1981; Jackson 1991). In Foucault's terminology such practices possess a disciplinary power which can "train, rather than select or levy, or which can no doubt to train in order to select or levy" (Foucault 1984:188). The effect of representation is to discipline and to objectify ambiguity in reality.⁵ When western 'security intellectuals', for example, talked about 'arms races' (Derrida 1984) or 'nuclear deterrence' (Luke 1989) they were engaged in representational practices which script certain readings of world politics at the expense of others (Said 1981, Campbell 1989, Dalby 1990a, 1990b, O Tuathail 1989).

Shapiro's (1988) examination of US foreign policy depictions of Guatemala in the 1980s, for instance, provides an interesting example of how discursive practices of foreign policy emphasised "the modes of representation abetting this widely orchestrated form of domination by making it acceptable and coherent within the dominant ethos that constructs selves and exotic others" (1988:90). Shapiro (1988) notes in US foreign policy discourse how the complexity of Guatemala as a place is reduced to a 'fact' within a wider political code of Superpower rivalry (Dalby 1990a, O Tuathail and Agnew 1992, O Tuathail 1993a, Taylor 1990). These authorial depictions are often difficult to identify as contestable or problematic depictions. As Shapiro (1988:93) notes "The geographical 'knowledge' we invoke in our naming helps, in Foucault's term to put into circulation the tactics and strategies involved in the 'demarcations' and 'control of territories'. Thus, to the extent one accepts and

5. The problem of ambiguity within social science has been noted by Levine (1985:8) who argues that this failure reflects "(1) a trained incapacity to observe and represent ambiguity as an empirical phenomenon, (2) insufficient awareness of the multiple meanings of commonly used terms in the social sciences; and (3) where awareness exists, an inability to realise the constructive possibilities of ambiguity in theory and analysis". As Olsson (1984:74) notes "To define is to distinguish what is inside the boundary from what is outside it, to split open a natural whole; to split friend from foe like wheat from chaff".

unreflectively reproduces the security orientated geopolitical discursive practice, one engages in implicit acts of recognition of the existing power and authority configurations".⁶ Therefore, the critical analyst has to be sensitive to the terms of descriptions and the representational practices (such as cartography) which designate specifically bounded territories. The imposition of meaning over space is crucial (Diprose and Farrell 1991).

A further example of the epistemic authority of (western) foreign policy discourse was its ability to represent the 'post-war world' (another arbitrary imposition) as 'three worlds'. Underwritten by two important binary distinctions (traditional/modern and communist/free) the world was divided: "The First world is purely modern, a haven of science, a natural society unfettered by religion and ideology ... The Third World is the world of tradition, culture, religion, irrationality, underdevelopment, over-population, political chaos and so on" (Agnew 1989:15). Such a representational practice introduced a totalising logic that was premised on a rigid distinction between 'us' and 'them' (Ganguly 1992).

The power of inscription, therefore, has been increasingly recognised as vital to the practices of foreign policy (Campbell 1989, Dillon 1988, 1989b). Foreign policy could be considered to be at the heart of Foucault's concerns when he noted that "it is the entangled mass of documentation with which a society is always bound up which constitutes reality" (cited in Campbell 1989:145). The dominant practices of representation rely on state surveillance and information storage. This in turn enables foreign policy to be "the process of making the

6. Michel Foucault interest in space, spatialisation as *dispositif* led to Deleuze (1970:209) to call him a cartographer: "Foucault's conception of discourse as a fundamental unit in a spatiotemporal field which alters position by crossing thresholds and occupying various levels is a conception very close to the contemporary atomic structure ... Foucault's entire conceptualisation is spatial in nature ... Although most commentators viewed this space as flat and immobile ... in terms of cartography, topography or geology, a few reviewers recognise that ... (it) is three dimensional ... no longer in a plane but rather in a space" (cited in Shields 1991:40).

foreign or exotic, and thus different from the self, someone or thing. Given the usual esteem within which the self is constituted, the exoticising of the Other almost invariably amounts to the constitution of the Other as a less than equal subject" (Shapiro 1988:100).

British foreign policy, for example, could be considered as having a predilection for mass documentation (Clark and Smith 1985, Dillon 1988, Hennessy 1986,1990). The production of departmental summaries, Foreign Office briefing papers and intelligence reports constitute a series of textual practices which create 'realities'. The everyday cycle of intelligence assessments is perhaps one of the most obvious examples of a set of representational practices. As Shapiro (1989:11) has noted "The meaning and value imposed on the world is structured not by one's immediate consciousness but by the various reality-making scripts one inherits and acquires from one's surrounding cultural and linguistic condition. The pre-text of apprehension is therefore largely institutionalised and is reflected in the ready-to-hand language practices of historically produced styles - grammars, rhetorics and narrative structures - through which the familiar world is continuously interpreted and produced". Foreign policy discourse, thus, assumes that the familiar world of the state and the interstate system can be known and represented.

Foreign policy as a (re)presentational practice highlights the ability of those practices to violate the boundaries between being and non-being/absence and presence (Norton 1988, Shields 1992). The practices of foreign policy can be read as the (re)presentation of 'foreign' events for domestic audiences (Campbell 1990, Shapiro 1990). As Anne Norton (1988:97) notes "A representation then preserves things in their absence ... Each act of representation is a re-presentation, a presentation of something that has appeared before. It is repetitive. Yet each act of representation, occurring in a different context, attaches additional associations to the act or individual that is recalled, and disguises the significance of once-meaningful attributes. Thus representation shows itself to be at once endlessly repetitive and ever changing".

3.3. Rethinking Foreign Policy I: Political Space and State Sovereignty

For some time a number of international relations theorists such as Richard Ashley and Michael Shapiro have argued that the starting point for 'foreign policy' should be on the basis these practices help to produce and maintain sovereign identity. In particular, there has been much interest in examining how identity formation is created on the basis of a series of 'exclusions' which demarcate the boundaries of the state (domestic-inside) and the international system (external-outside) (see especially Walker 1993). As Walker (1993:167) has argued "As an historical construct, the principle of state sovereignty has been clothed in a widely accepted story. This story generally begins with the tribes; progresses to the Greek city states; becomes complicated with the age of empires, especially in the case of Rome; becomes muddled with the strange geography of European feudalism; flares into life with the emergence of the Renaissance and the early modern struggle for autonomy from empire; then becomes increasingly refined as the principle of state sovereignty becomes codified, and as the state meshes with the organisation of capitalist economic life, on the one hand, and with the fusion of cultural and social differences into national solidarity on the other".

The paradigm of state sovereignty has been the starting point of much of the recent work on foreign policy (see most recently Walker 1993). The motivation for such a point of departure has been to challenge certain 'stories' told by political realists about the 'state', the 'international system' and 'man' (e.g. Waltz 1959). As Waltz (1959:238) "Each state pursues its own interests, however defined, in ways it judges best. Force is a means of achieving the external ends of states because there exists no consistent, reliable process of reconciling the conflicts of interest that inevitably arise among similar units in a condition of anarchy. A foreign policy based on this image is neither moral or immoral, but embodies merely a reasoned response to the world about us".

Foreign policy under Waltz's scheme is conceptualised as a device used by states to react to the outside world. The reaction of a state to the 'realm of necessity'- contingency and violence beyond the state. According to Waltz (1959,1979), this realm is beyond the considerations of community and political discussion because it is unregulated. There is no community for political life to occur (Ashley 1987b). As a consequence, foreign policy like security policy is ultimately about force and violence in an anarchical world. As Waltz (1979:102) notes "Among states, the state of nature is the state of war ... Among men as among states, anarchy, or the absence of government, is associated with the occurrence of violence".

Waltz's (1959) *Man, the State and War* remains one of the most influential realist texts on international relations (but also Waltz 1967). His focus on the structures of inter-state relations provides the basis for much of realist discussion of foreign policy (which totally excludes the internal view of the state and assumes foreign policy to be based on the struggle for power). His assumptions about the territorial state and the international relations are three fold: first, the condition of anarchy characterises the international system. Second, the territorial state is assumed as the natural unit of analysis. Waltz's observations about the state are ahistorical and structural. There is little concern say for the distinctiveness of the modern international system with its roots in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as compared to the Greek city-state. Third, states all perform the same tasks in a world of unequal resources and capacities (see Agnew 1993a).

4

Luke (1993b), for example, has noted that *realism tells a particularly 'western' story about international politics in terms of how state power has evolved by enforcing order and control over designated territories. Luke (1993b:9) argues that "The behaviour of these states and the qualities of their collective interactions are explained by looking at the sovereign's state's domination of its territory as well as its tendencies to seek additional gains of territory, power or position through external expansion in a game of anarchical self-seeking". Furthermore, Renegger (1991:94) has argued that the realist model of international relations and the state "It is assumes that one can have a culturally independent way of seeing the world ... it is*

predicated on a particular western understanding of the problems of politics".⁷ The underlying assumptions of realism's statist story have been widely criticised as being based on some timeless exposition about the nation-state and modernity (Walker 1993). In particular, that the territorial state has been viewed as existing prior to and as a physical container of society.⁸

The effect of such stories has been to simply assume a reification of political space between the 'domestic' and the 'international' sphere. This has had the effect of dehistoricising the processes of state formation. The practices of foreign policy, thus, are just one part of a multifaceted process of inscription which defines and disciplines the spatial-temporal conditions for the inside and the outside (Walker 1990,1991). The definition and disciplining of the domestic could be understood as part of Foucault's analysis of 'macro-power' or 'governmentality': a type of power which operates at the level of 'the population' (see Burchill, Gordon and Miller 1991). In Foucault's analysis of discipline and the state, the collection of birth, death, marriage and health statistics signals the emergence of the population as an object of analysis, surveillance and intervention. The disciplining of that 'population' by a discourse of 'medical police' is seen as crucial to the construction of the social as a fixed and *calculated distribution* (Foucault 1979).⁹

7. Critiques of realism's stories about the state and sovereignty (and hence foreign policy) have been mainly directed at the neo-realist strands of Kenneth Waltz and John Ruggie.

8. Philo's (1992) 'Foucault's geographies' provides a useful overview of Foucault's interest in space, knowledge and power.

9. 'Governmentality' is a little studied theme of Foucault's work. Driver (1985,1990), for example, is one of the few to have explored 'governmentality' within human geography. The role of the doctor in improving the social 'body' and the art of governing has been a topic of Driver's (1988,1990) moral geographies on crime, poverty and health.

Thrift (1985:375) is another who has explored these Foucauldian themes: "The modern state is based upon the

The state, therefore, is not a natural or pre-existing entity. The state's colonisation of particular forms of political space was tied into the development of capitalism and the creation of property rights (Giddens 1985, Mann 1986). As Michael Mann (1984:212) has noted that prior to the modern period societies were not state-defined even though today "states are central to our understanding of what a society is". The creation of the modern territorial state system "resulted from the way expansive, emergent, capitalist relations were given regulative boundaries by pre-existing states" (1984:209). But the territorial state was 'prior' to and a 'container' of society only in this particular historical context. Moreover, the development and evolution of the modern state depended on the possibility of a reflexively monitored set of relations between states. As Giddens (1985) has noted discourses of sovereignty relied upon a set of '*international* relations'. As such recent work by scholars such as Walker (1993) has aimed to contest conventional realist wisdom that the logic of the international system (from the seventeenth century onwards) found meaning as a result of the prior existence of well bounded domestic societies. In opposition to the realists, the identification of the domestic/international divide was never a fixed polarity, rather it evolved over time.

The idea of state sovereignty, for example, is a relatively modern one (in spite of realists such as Waltz 1979 giving sovereignty relatively ancient roots). In medieval societies there were

various practices associated with surveillance (that is, the accumulation of information on the population, the supervision of the population, and the characterisation of the population in such a way that it can be supervised) and proceeds from the institution of regular armies and the systematic registration of births and deaths via the census and fingerprinting to modern computer databanks".

The discussion of 'governmentality' in Foucault's work is an important shift away from the micro-politics of power towards macro-politics and law. Foucault (1979: 19) once talked of a relationship between sovereignty (law), discipline (micro-politics) and government (molar power). The relationship between the three was never clearly specified.

few rigid boundaries between different political authorities. The regional networks of kinship and interpersonal loyalties left little space for a citizenship based on a geographically circumscribed territory. The eventual transfer of medieval principles of hierarchical subordination to the principle of the state sovereignty and citizenship was a lengthy process (Walker 1984,1990, Mann 1986, Agnew 1987, 1992b, 1993b). Furthermore, as scholars such as Wallerstein (1974), for example, remind us state building was part and parcel of the creation of the modern world-economy. States were a central component to this massive system of accumulation (Agnew 1987:37).¹⁰

As a consequence, sovereignty shifted from the person of the monarch to the territory of the state and its polis. As such the central problem facing seventeenth political theory was how to deal with political control once the subject had been released from its religious or monarchical obligations. As Kellner (1992:141-142) notes "In modernity, identity becomes more mobile, multiple, personal, self-reflexive and subject to change and innovation. Yet identity in modernity is also social and Other-related ... In modernity, identity therefore becomes a personal and a theoretical problem". The development of an alternative subjectivity had preoccupied a string of political theorists from Hobbes, Rousseau, Hegel, Kierkagaard et Al (Kellner 1992). As Kennedy (1991:144) argues about Hobbes " ... he develops a hypothesis about human nature that allows us to understand how governments come into existence and why sovereignty is necessary to peace in political societies...In constituting a sovereign power, individuals surrender all their natural liberties absolutely in exchange for protection from each other and those outside the commonwealth". Reconciling

10. This interest in identity formation has been replicated elsewhere in the social sciences. As Giddens (1991) has argued such a transformation can be explained in a number of ways: first, the decline of old sources of identity in the western world such as family or class. Second, the growth of social movements (such as Gay liberation groups) which are giving new significance to notions of personal/political identity and citizenship. Third, communication technologies are presenting individuals with more opportunities to redefine them(selves). Biographies are, thus, increasingly eclectic.

the claims of authority and obligation within particular political communities against the universalistic claims of Christianity emerged as a major preoccupation in the sixteenth century onwards.

In most cases these philosophical projects have involved the emergence of a self-conscious knowing subject within the context of the state's definition and enforcement of property rights (Connolly 1989). Within the boundaries of the state, the subject could emerge as an agent destined to pursue the good life (Walker 1984). As Gottman (1973:1) notes "Civilised people seem to have early aspired to universality, but they have always partitioned the space around them carefully to set themselves apart from neighbours".

3.4. Rethinking Foreign Policy II: Political Identity

The consequences for concepts such as 'foreign policy' or 'security' from the transfer of authority from hierarchical subordination to the territorially defined state were several fold. First, and most importantly, the identification of political identity was based on exclusively territorial terms (Walker 1993). Second, on the basis of that exclusiveness emerges the 'question of the other' (Todorov 1984). One of the major Foucauldian insinuations has been to explore how societies have done violence to the 'other' (Daudi 1990, Driver 1993). The creation of political identity based on the discursive and technical creation of 'others' emerges as one of the defining moments of modern political life (e.g. Foucault 1977). The identification of the 'barbarian' or the 'uncivilised' outside the domestic community has been recognised as important in the construction of moral and political boundaries (see Linklater 1990).

The claims to know the outside and the corresponding 'threats' and 'dangers' to the inside has been identified by Richard Ashley (1987a, 1987b, 1989) as constitutive to the practices of

political identity. As he notes "International politics is a practice of the inscription of the dangerous, the exteriorisation and totalization of dangers, and the mobilisation of populations to control these dangers: all in the name of a social totality that is never really present, that always contains a trace of the outside within and that is never more than an effect of the practices by which total dangers are inscribed" (Ashley 1989:304). Foreign policy could be understood, therefore, as a performative process which constitutes a political order. As Dillon (1990-1:114) notes "Securing something requires differentiation, classification and definition. It has, in short, to be identified".

The location of 'threats' in the external realm serves a particular interpretative and political purpose. The identification of 'danger' is crucial to the creation of political identity. The creation of notions of the self and the other depend upon the division of different spatial and temporal locations. Since Aristotle made a distinction between the Greeks on the inside of the polis and the orientals on the outside, the basis for political identity has depended such demarcations. At the axiological level (as identified by Todorov 1984), the characteristics we associate with conceptions of self/other or inside/outside are linked to characteristics such as good or bad. As Shapiro (1988:1) reminds us "The making of the other as something foreign is thus not an innocent exercise in differentiation. It is clearly linked to how the self is understood".

Once more Foucault's work on 'governmentality' provides foreign policy students with provocative possibilities. In a short (and remarkably clear!) article on 'governmentality' Foucault (1979) argues that from the sixteenth century to the eighteenth century political writings that had previously been written as advice to the prince were now being constructed as works on the 'art of government'. The concern of these texts was not confined to the needs or requirements of a sovereign state rather they focused on the general problematic of governance: the government of the soul, of the family, of oneself and the sovereign state. Such a problematic emerges at a particular moment of the intersection between central (and centralising) power relationships associated with the principles of law, sovereignty and

citizenship and those of individualising power relationships associated with the pastoral relationships of the church and the welfare state (see also Burchill et Al 1991, Campbell 1992a, Driver 1993).

As a consequence, Foucault argues that the state is characterised by a collection of centralising and individualising practices: "I don't think that we should consider the 'modern state' as an entity which was developed above individuals, ignoring what they are and even their very existence, but on the contrary as a very sophisticated structure, in which individuals can be integrated, under one condition: that this individuality would be shaped in a new form, and submitted to a set of very specific patterns. In a way we can see the state as a modern matrix of individualisation" (Foucault 1979:13).

The beginning of an era of 'bio-power' from the seventeenth century onwards, marked for Foucault, the development of numerous and various techniques for the subjugation and control of bodies and populations. Within this era, the 'art of government' revolved around a concern for the boundaries of identity as well as the borders of the territorial state. The development of the 'theory of police' signified a governmental mechanism or technology dedicated to the policing of the internal domain of the state. As Foucault (1979) argues, with reference to an eighteenth century work (Delamare's *Compendium*), the 'police' were dedicated to "all social relations carried on between men, and all living" (Foucault 1979:16).

The conduct of violence and war was also related by Foucault to the production and security of identity. As Foucault argued "Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilised for the purpose of slaughter in the name of life necessity" (cited in Burchill et Al 1991:27). The call to war by states, therefore, is to defend not the sovereign rulers but rather a nation and its peoples. As a consequence, whether in the context of the 'theory of police' or waging war, foreign policy/Foreign Policy can be understood as a preoccupation with order and security. Indeed, from the eighteenth century onwards, it could be argued that

security emerges as the major preoccupation of the state and structure the ethical and territorial boundaries of inside/outside, civilised/barbaric et Al. The identification of a 'population' and the theory of the police participate in a major shift from a sovereign's (in)security towards a population's (in)security. Thus, the 'state' is characterised more by the 'mobile effect of a multiple regime of governmentality' in which the practices of police or foreign policy are all part of than some ontological presence (Campbell 1992a).

The implications of thinking through some of Foucault's observations on 'governmentality' for the practices of foreign policy are complex. However, the focus on the production and reproduction of identity within foreign policy discourse contributes to the creation of ethical and territorial borders of the 'population' within a state of security. As a consequence, the epistemology of identity has been a major focus of concern for dissident foreign policy scholars. This relates to the boundary demarcations. Connolly (1989,1991) has argued, however, that there is a second dimension to identity that of depth, or the *ontology* of identity. Connolly (1989:331) argues that one such understanding would be that: "no identity is the true identity because every identity is particular and contingent...this position accepts the indispensability of identity and lives within the medium of identity while struggling vigorously to refuse to live its own identity as truth...this stance changes both the experience of identity and its possible range of relationships with other identities".

An important feature of identity formation are the position of 'liminal groups' who confuse those boundaries between identity/difference and the inside/outside. As Anne Norton (1988:54) has noted "Liminars serve as mirrors for nations. At once other and alike, they provide the occasion for the nation to constitute itself in reflection upon its identity". In the case of the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War, for example, the 'Anglo-Argentine' community was a classic example of a 'liminal' group. Neither accepted or rejected in Argentina they served as a source of identification for the Argentine state.

The stance of this chapter is then sympathetic to other foreign policy scholars who have

explored the connections between political (national) identity and foreign policy (e.g. Wallace 1991). Wallace's (1991) examination of British foreign policy and national identity is premised on the notion that "nationhood and national identity represent necessary myths which underpin foreign policy. They constitute the distinction between the 'national community' which the government represents abroad and the foreigners with whom it deals; more than that, they legitimate the actions of government in defence of the 'national' interest" (1991:66).

However, contrary to Wallace (1991), it is suggested that identity formation is a far more violent process (both epistemic and physical) than is traditionally assumed. It is not just a question of matching "the symbols and rhetoric of British national life to the constraints of national capabilities and the limitations of the international context" (Wallace 1991:80). The task of foreign policy, therefore, is to expel the differences *within* the state (i.e. liminal groups) to differences *between* states. In a rather different vein the Lacanian psychologist Žižek (1990), for example, has usefully noted how national identities depend on the projection of fantasies of difference onto other nation-states in order to create the idea that a harmonious community based on moral or racial purity exists. But as he notes "The nation-qua thing is determined by a number of contradictory properties. It appears to us as 'Our Thing', as something accessible only to us, as something 'they', the other, cannot grasp, but which is nonetheless constantly menaced by 'them'" (1990:52).

3.5. Rethinking Foreign Policy III- Foreign Policy as a Boundary Producing Practice

In a series of important articles Richard Ashley (1987a, 1987b, 1988) has initiated an important debate that has explored how paradigms (in a Foucauldian sense) such as the anarchy *problematic* or sovereignty have constituted objects of study such 'foreign policy' or 'national security'. In particular, Ashley argues that the paradigm of sovereignty has been

central to the creation of sovereign identity (which includes delimiting the realm of reasoning man and domestic society) at the expense of difference. As Walker (1991:253) has also noted "It is at least as important to understand it as a practice intended to inscribe the boundaries of 'normal' politics, a patrolling of the borders at home, a disciplining of claims to sovereign authority and national identity within".

One of the main purposes of Ashley's work has been to initiate a discussion of 'foreign policy' which moves away from a concern about relations between states (which occur across transhistorical and pre-given boundaries) to a concern with the establishment of boundaries that constitute the state and the international system (Campbell 1990). As he argues "foreign policy, according to this new thematization, is not so much behaviour across boundaries it is instead a specific sort of boundary producing political performance. It is a political performance taking place in a historically carved out social space, and having, amongst its important effects, the constitution and reaffirmation of socially recognizable boundaries separating fields of practice on a global scale" (1987a:51).

Much of the recent efforts to rethink foreign policy has been premised on a continued unhappiness with the realist inspired field of foreign policy analysis (FPA). One of the major theorists within FPA is the American scholar James Rosenau. In his important text, *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy*, Rosenau (1968) argues that foreign policy is a 'bridge' which links together the state and the international system. The metaphor of the bridge was later used to reiterate his belief that FPA " ... takes as its focus of study the bridges that whole systems called states build themselves and their subsystems to the ever more encompassing international system of which they are part" (1987:1). Or as Hill and Light (1985:164) suggest "Foreign policy, after all, is primarily to do with all things foreign. It is, therefore, essential to consider the ways in which the external environment determines foreign policy, or at least structures the possible choices".¹¹

11. As Ashley (1987a:52) notes "...while we routinely use these categories, the world of human practices less and less readily conforms to them. We try to impose them and yet the world is recalcitrant. At one time, human

The crucial question, however, for Ashley (1988:311) is not "where is the boundary" but "how, by the way of what practices, and in the face of what resistances is this boundary imposed and ritualised". The focus on foreign policy as a boundary producing practice shifts attention towards how the construction of the 'foreign' brings into existence the 'domestic'. As Schlesinger (1987:234) notes "the critical factor becomes the social boundary which defines the group with respect to other groups." This approach differs considerably from other studies of foreign policy that either highlight the importance of international structures in shaping domestic politics (e.g. Rosenau 1968, Wallace 1975, Clarke 1988) or stress the constraints of the changing international system (e.g. Northedge 1974, Frankel 1975, Wallace 1991) or studies which simply eschew theory altogether (e.g. Gore-Vidal 1984, Kennedy 1981).

Foreign policy, therefore, can be understood as a Boundary producing practice that enframes the state. It has been argued by Ashley (1988) that the representation of the domestic involves a double exclusion. The first exclusion is to create "differences, discontinuities, and conflicts that might be found within all places and times must be converted into an absolute difference between a domain of domestic society, understood as an identity, and a domain of anarchy, understood at once ambiguous, indeterminate and dangerous" (1988:257). The second exclusion is to hide the status of the first as an exclusion. Two different types of foreign policy have been identified. First, the practices of 'foreign policy' can be understood as referring to all practices of differentiation or exclusion which constitute their objects as 'foreign' in the process of dealing with them. In this context, foreign policy can be located anywhere from the individual negotiating particular identities to the confrontation of global orders. Second, and more conventionally, Foreign Policy has been understood as a state

practices seem to conform to these boundaries, taking on the cast of almost natural limits. But, increasingly, they are less and less conformed to and more and more the objects of dispute. This, the authors complain, seems to make our own work more complex, less tidy. The old conceits are no longer available to use".

based response to the international system. Campbell (1992a:76) has suggested that "Foreign Policy serves to reproduce the constitution of identity made possible by foreign policy and to contain challenges to the identity which results".

As a consequence, Ashley (1987a) argues that understanding the practices of foreign policy as a series of boundary producing political performances offers new research possibilities. As he argues "We can begin to question why the boundaries of domestic and international, economic and political are blurred and disputed, and we can examine how foreign policy practice has participated in the global orchestration of, and resistance to, these changes". In one example, Ashley (1987a,1987b) argues that Reagan administration's invasion of Grenada in 1983 was enabled by certain cultural resources (e.g. based on the experiences of World War II) to mobilise resources, silence domestic opposition and manipulate the media to carry out the invasion. As a political performance, the administration's foreign policy imposed certain interpretations of global political life which comprehend the state primarily in terms of its international legitimations: in a world of anarchic violence and warfare *not* as a performance recast as an exaggerated response to social developments on the small island of Grenada. The invasion was thus cast as a response to the threat of dictatorship and communism by political interpretation and practice.

3.5. Critical Geopolitics and the Making of Foreign Policy

The practices of foreign policy depend on difference and distinction between domestic and international politics in order to function. The existence of these spatializing operations have been drawing increasingly recognition from international relations scholars (e.g. Walker 1984, Campbell 1990). The creation of 'foreign affairs' requires a relentless recycling of an artificial division of space and the identification of spheres of interests. As Lerner (1991:407) this "conceptual space ... is becoming increasingly familiar to the discipline of international

relations". However, in the case of contemporary IR theory spatialised vocabularies have tended not to have led to any detailed interest in geographies of foreign policies.

The question that might be asked here is what sort of contribution can critical geopolitics make to these debates in international relations theory (Dalby 1990a, Dodds 1993b, O Tuathail 1989, Sidaway 1992a). Underlying the practices of foreign policy are geographical components. The depiction of the 'foreign' has self-evident connotations (Lacoste 1984, Dodds 1993a). However, if all of world politics is a stage (Der Derian and Shapiro 1989) then critical geopolitics can usefully investigate how that stage is underwritten by geographical depictions that are neither self-evident nor natural. This approach contrasts markedly with existing studies of geopolitics and foreign policy (e.g. Spykman 1944; Cohen 1973,1983; Gorman 1982, Lacoste 1984).

I think, therefore, that critical geopolitics has three major contributions to make to the study of foreign policy. First, the identification of various geographical codes of reasoning usefully draws attention to the importance of investigating the rhetorical utterances of policy professionals and experts. This section returns to some of the themes about foreign policy as a representational practice. Second, by using Edward Said's notion of 'imaginary geographies', and the metaphor of the script it is suggested that these geographical depictions are important to the constructions of foreign policy. Third, a focus on 'imaginary boundaries' draws attention to how the divide between the domestic and the international are articulated in foreign policy discourse.

3.5.1. Foreign Policy Expertise

The ability to inscribe or represent is an important defining feature of the author(ity) of foreign policy professionals. The sites of from which the practices of foreign policy emerge

are usually identified as official governmental agencies such as the Foreign Office or the State Department. Foreign policy professionals are usually men who use their expertise to explain the state of the world (O Tuathail and Agnew 1992, O'Loughlin and Grant 1990). In short they are the state's privileged story tellers (Campbell 1992b, Dodds 1993a). As Dalby (1992a:107) notes "Where not shrouded in state secrecy, within contemporary state matters of security are considered in terms of expert knowledge of the security analysts and the intellectuals who codify, justify teach, and explain these practices ... In the process, security discourse is limited to the coterie of security intellectuals".¹²

In this respect, my discussion of foreign policy expertise departs somewhat from strands of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) and conventional geopolitical studies which have been most interested in institutional and psychological context. Irving Janis (1972), for example, in his text *Victims of Groupthink* explored foreign policy around the principle of the cohesiveness of a group involved in foreign policy decisions. 'Groupthink' was defined as the activities "people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when members striving for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative course of actions" (1972:45). Janis analysed the workings of President Kennedy's inner circle prior to the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba.

The crucial dimension of Janis' work was that certain sets of foreign policy decisions could be attributed to a group's desire to contain dissent and promote group identity. In opposition to the Bay of Pigs fiasco, Janis suggested that the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis was handled

12. The interpretation of foreign affairs remains the preserve of the policy professionals (Hill 1981). Indeed with the growing number of sources of information on 'foreign affairs' (e.g. think tanks, media sources such as CNN) the problems of how that information is interpreted and who has access to the interpretation remains. In that respect, the work of Amin and Thrift (1992) and Thrift and Leyhon (1992) on interpretation and story telling in the global financial markets (especially the City of London) seems to indicate some parallels with foreign policy communities.

differently by that same group because there was real danger of nuclear warfare and because the executive procedures had been changed so that groupthink might be avoided. However, Der Derian (1989) has usefully pointed out that much of Janis' work on the Bay of Pigs fiasco and the Cuban Missile Crisis relies on the accounts of Henry Kissinger. Rather, than assuming that Kissinger's accounts within his book *A Thousand Days* were motivated by self-justification of the author's role and a vindication of Kennedy administration, Janis assumed that this text was a 'document' and capable of having a real meaning. Janis' work ignored the issue of how texts are reconstructions dependent on a variety of interpretations rather than simply recording certain life-events.

Further studies within FPA whether based on studies of misperception (e.g. Jervis 1976) or 'bureaucratic politics' (e.g. Allison 1971) or 'foreign policy implementation' (e.g. Clarke and Smith 1985) are constructed around models of rationality and the decision making environment. As Jervis (1976:187) noted "actors are more apt to err on the side of being too wedded to an established view and too quick to reject discrepant information than to make the opposite error of too quickly altering theories. People often undergo premature cognitive closure". The role of the analyst, therefore, is to investigate the inner workings of the foreign policy process in order to *discover* patterns and regularities in the practices that constitute foreign policy (Smith 1991).

Within conventional geopolitical studies, writers such as Henrikson (1980) and Cohen (1983) have argued that the rhetorical pronouncements of policy professionals can only be understood within the binary divide of objective/subjective policy environments. As Cohen (1983:296) notes "But if there is common acknowledgement of the existence of something like geopolitical reality, then at least there is a basis for negotiation and reconciliation of various interests, and of bridging the gap between 'objective' and 'subjective' environments". As a consequence, the utterances of policy makers are viewed as subjective judgements made on the basis of their perceived understandings of the 'objective' reality of international affairs.

The role of the analyst appears to be 'outside' this subjective/objective environmental divide. The geopolitical 'observer' is discursively able to decode, discipline, order and understand foreign policy pronouncements against the backdrop of the realities of international affairs. As Cohen (1991:552) notes "Geographers today have an unparalleled opportunity to dispel geopolitical illiteracy by focusing on the geo of geopolitics. It is not easy to convey to policy makers and the public the complexity of the spatial structures and relationships that knit together the world system. But if we do not address these complexities in the public arena, and in ways that are spatially theoretically grounded, we will be remiss in carrying out our scholarly and civic responsibilities".

Contrary to FPA studies and conventional geopolitics, it is suggested that the public displays of foreign policy professionals effectively constitute the practices of foreign policy.¹³ Whether speaking in conferences, parliaments or press briefings it is the discursive ability to make 'reasonable' pronouncements that matters. It is a practice employed at many sites on a regular if not daily basis. For many observers, it is part of the 'taken-for-granted'. The stories of the foreign policy professionals (and academic experts), like many other stories in everyday life, are assumed as a naturalised discourse, through which events 'seem to tell themselves'. As Sayer (1990:259) notes "its power derives from the way in which putting things in chronological order, in a story, gives the appearance of a causal chain or logic in which each event leads to the conclusion". At a time of crisis or war (e.g. the 1982 Falklands War or 1991 Gulf War) then the narrative function of foreign policy professionals takes on an added significance (see Campbell 1992b).

Foreign policy professionals, however, are not the only authoritative 'speakers' on international affairs. The role of foreign policy experts and their respective centres of

13. The stories that circulate about foreign affairs or foreign policy communities are important insofar as they constitute self-understandings.

research is a topic that is receiving increasing attention (Cohn 1987, Klein 1986, Sylvester 1989, Weaver 1989, Dalby 1990a, Haas 1992). Since the creation of the Royal Institute for International Affairs (in 1920) there has been a substantial growth in institutions dedicated to the study of foreign policy (with their own in house journals). The importance of the research institute has been usefully noted by Klein (1986:299) "In such institutions, an ongoing practice becomes formalised, reduced to observable rules: 'disciplined' in a double Foucauldian sense of being both subject to disciplinary intervention and coming under the guiding hand of a specialised complex of knowledge". As public governance and the international system have expanded so there has been a steady growth in foreign policy expertise.¹⁴

It has been well documented by researchers that in a practical sense there is a considerable degree of interaction between academic experts and policy professionals (e.g. Segalla 1978).¹⁵ In Britain, for example, the Foreign Office (FCO) periodically invites academics to

14. In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault (1977) conceptualises discipline as the practice of corrective training. Discipline as Klein (1986) infers was understood in a double sense: first, as the name for the regimentation of the body and second, it also the name for the bodies of knowledge (e.g. medicine, geography). Foucault argued that the emergence of the disciplinary societies during the classical age drew attention to the growth of institutions and bureaucracies of the state dedicated to control and observation. Discipline as Foucault notes trains individuals in particular habits of thoughts and ways of seeing. "It is the specific technique of power that regards individuals both as objects and as instruments of its exercise" (1977:170).

15. In an interview with a senior Foreign Office official, I was informed that "We see a fair amount of Chatham House publications, we have a research department that helps us do that...The numbers are rather few on the ground for this exercise...By and large we rely on our research departments greatly...I was very keen to have contact with academics because I felt that if we had a group of academics and met every few months to ongoing policy debates...I do feel we ought to be in regular contact...because dare I say it they are not so pressured by the day to day parliamentary driven work"

Interview with a Senior Foreign Office Official, South Atlantic and Antarctic Department, 2 May 1991 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London

seminars and policy discussions. There are specialised departments within the FCO which monitor academic writings on international affairs. In return, institutes such as the International Institute of Strategic Studies invite Foreign Office staff to participate within conferences and public (and private) discussions.

However, the relationship between the academic expert and the policy professional has important ontological implications for the identification of forms of geographical reasoning in the narratives of foreign policy. In particular, it raises the issue of how these 'codes' exist and whether they are inferred from one groups of experts to another. There is also the question of how these types of reasoning are identified. Is the critical geopolitical theorist implicated in these codes of reasoning? Or is it as Taylor (1989a:56) suggests "The solution is quite straight forward. We must make practical geopolitical reasoning the object of our analysis in formal geopolitical reasoning".¹⁶

The question of expertise is important because not only does it link back to the sort of issues I raised in the 'introduction' about the production of knowledge, but more specifically, it raises issues over the reflexive relationship between the foreign policy maker and the academic expert. They usually have to talk to one another (even if they do not want to) because they enlist each other's expertise and discourse. They use each other because they are forced to - for example, at select committee inquiries when academic experts are called to give evidence or in other circumstances when the academic expert 'needs' interviews with foreign policy professionals in order to convince other academic experts that his (or her) work is grounded in some sort of 'reality'.

16. Taylor's usage of the term 'codes of geographical reasoning' raise ontological difficulties. For instance, how are these codes to be known? Do these codes exist or do they have to be activated by the knowing subject trawling the corpus of geographical or political knowledges? If these codes of geographical reasoning are inferred from real-life events are they reflexively inferred by foreign policy professionals and academic experts.

3.5.2. Making Foreign Policy: Geographical Codes, Geo-Graphs and the Scripting of the 'Foreign'

One of the most important considerations of 'critical geopolitics' has been dedicated to exploring the official (practical) discourse of foreign policy professionals (e.g. Taylor 1990, O Tuathail and Agnew 1992, Dalby 1993a). The major focus of recent work has been to explore how foreign policy professionals (re)present the world in terms of a spatialised mosaic which identifies roles for political agents on the basis of their position within that world order. As O Tuathail (1993d:25) acknowledges "There is, however, good reason for treating the practical conduct of foreign policy by small groups of decision makers (usually white males) as a separate domain worthy of study in and of itself". Although O Tuathail (1993d) does not qualify the statement (with probable reference to the Anglo-American world), critical geopolitical writers have focused on the culture of foreign policy and specific practical geo-politics.

As a consequence, this work differs considerably from some of the earlier work by geographers such as Henrikson (1980) on the 'mental maps' of foreign policy makers (but also Sprout and Sprout 1956). For example, Henrikson (1980:495) opening proposition is that "Statesmen respond to the world as they perceive and imagine it- which may not be the way the world really is". By adopting the metaphor of navigation Henrikson proposed to investigate the 'mental maps' of US foreign policy officials to see if they are "accurate or distorted ... or piecemeal or sketchy" (1980:496). A two fold division is made between the *subjective* environment (in which political action is concocted) and the *objective* environment (in which it is conducted). Henrikson (1980) proposed that the mental maps of US foreign policy makers could be revealed by either focusing on what they see and say or by looking at what they actually do. There is, however, little recognition that the observer might be

implicated within these observations or that it might be reasonably problematic in assuming one could (re)present the activities of others.

Critical geopolitical writers do not promise to tell the 'real' stories about world politics. It is recognised that the common sense understandings of the world are now understood to be powerful resources which enable the specification of human action within particular worlds (e.g Barnes and Duncan 1992). Within political geography, there has been three major new contributions: Peter Taylor's usage of the term 'geographical codes' (Taylor 1990,1993b but also Corbridge 1993). Simon Dalby's exploration of 'geo-graphs' in discussions of security policies (Dalby 1990a, 1993a). Third, Gearoid O Tuathail's adoption of the metaphor of the script (O Tuathail and Agnew 1992 O Tuathail 1992b).

I have attempted in chapters 5 and 6 to adopt the notion of geo-graphs and scripts/story telling to illustrate the potential for such critical geopolitical analyses. In this respect the later chapters seek to expand upon the useful contributions of earlier authors to the critical geopolitics literature. More broadly, chapter 4 seeks to explore how the practices of *foreign* policy can be used to explore how identity and nation-state formation are bound up with one another.

3.5.2.1. Geographical Codes

Peter Taylor's (1990) book *Britain and the Cold War* was an important attempt to link up *Braudellian Theory/World-Systems Theory* with a discussion of practical geopolitical reasoning within the British Foreign Office during 1945. Taylor's understanding of the term 'practical geopolitical reasoning' is " ... the way in which governments conceptualise the distribution of political power beyond their boundaries as a precondition for conducting foreign policy in their own special interests" (1993b:36). His world-systems approach

elaboration of the Cold War as a geopolitical order within the *moyenne duree* pacification structure produced by the US hegemonic cycle.

O Tuathail (1992d) has usefully drawn attention to the important differences between Taylor's approach and the critical geopolitical writers. First, the notion of hegemony employed by Taylor differs from the Gramscian inspired concept of critical geopolitics. Hegemony, in world systems theory, is a condition between states rather than the management of an intellectual consensus within national and international societies. This is important because critical geopolitical writers do not assume that the United States is in terminal decline. The hegemonic power of US national security intellectuals to represent international politics remains an important topic of research. Second, Taylor's work on the Cold War is not related to the topics of discourse or ideology. Third, the methodology of world-systems theory tends to assume that differences within historical periods are neglected as a consequence critical geopolitics focuses on the contemporary events and utterances of foreign policy professionals and security intellectuals (at the expense of longer term context)

By drawing on the work of the historian John Lewis Gaddis (1982), Taylor (1993b:36) argues that "Through studying such statecraft we can identify the geopolitical codes that are the building blocks of geopolitical orders". The geographical codes are assumed in turn to overlay the changing political-economic circumstances of the inter-state system and capitalist world-economy (Taylor 1989a, 1989b). As Taylor (1989a:18) notes " ... it is impossible to understand any country in the modern world separately from its position within the capitalist world economy and geopolitical order". However, identifying such a hierarchy within the world-economy raises the issues of who is doing the identification, how are these states to be identified (given Wallerstein's vagueness over the category of 'semi-periphery') and the problems associated with development tautologies with the risk of highly deterministic statements (Gerace 1992).

However, the question that needs to be posed at this stage is who is this 'we'. Is this simply a

rhetorical style or does this imply some select band of individuals who can 'read' or 'understand' international politics. Furthermore, this raises another question over the term 'code': is it a linguistic code or a normative code (to judge deviancy)? Taylor (1989a:80) argues that these codes are "the set of strategic assumptions a government makes about other states in forming its foreign policy." However, this in turn raises the issue of how are these codes learnt or understood? Within Taylor's understanding of the codes of geographical reasoning (used by statesmen and their governments) lies the assumption that these codes are simply inferred and not written on 'tablets of stone' lying in the vaults of the Foreign Office or State Department. As such these codes are "at a general level, ... relatively straightforward and can be inferred from its foreign policies" (Taylor 1993b:37). In that sense, the term 'code' does not seem to imply that the geopolitical observer has to 'decode' any sets of circumstances or real-life events. Rather, it is simply a matter of 'reading' the already legible surfaces of *international* politics.

Furthermore, Taylor (1990,1993b) identifies a hierarchy of geopolitical codes based on geographical scale (size of state and geographical location). He notes "Every state, therefore, has its own local code. For the majority of states, the small ones, this constitutes the effective whole of their practical operations. For medium and large states, though, there is a wider range of salience which is termed regional ... Finally there are world powers whose codes are global in extent" (1993b:37). The backdrop for Taylor's observations on geopolitical codes are based on a sensitivity to institutional context (e.g. departments of the state, domestic political context) and a concern for existing political-economic circumstances. Taylor's adopted conceptualisation of foreign policy is based on the traditional assumption that 'foreign policy' in states such as Britain is part of 'high politics' (with its fixed agendas of allies/enemies and national interests) divorced from the contested sphere of domestic politics (e.g. Frankel 1975, Kennedy 1981).

Finally, the distinction that Agnew (1983) and Taylor (1990) have drawn between nationally exceptionalist (Agnew's phrase) or vulgar political geography (Taylor's phrase) and world

political economy (Agnew) or world-systems approach (Taylor) is an important strategic intervention. The depiction of conventional geopolitics as 'sabre-rattling' (Taylor) and or 'pandering to national conceit' (Agnew) performs a useful discursive distinction between the prejudiced conventional geopolitical writer and the reasoned geo-economic/geopolitical observer. The latter, who is assumed to be removed from national conceit and prejudice, can then proceed with the business of locating readings of international politics within the seemingly self-evident categories of global political-economy studies.

3.5.2.2. Geography and Geo-graphs

The introduction by O Tuathail (1989) of the term 'geo-graph' into discussions of political geography and foreign policy was an important intervention. The etymological roots of 'geography' (geo-graph) means that meaning lies in the descriptions of the world 'as it is found' (Natter and Jones 1993). As a consequence, the mirror model of reality implies that 'geo-graphs' are the self-evident/common sense geographical descriptions of the world. The narration of geographical features, therefore, is merely a 'technical' process from which the geographical writer transfers these geographical features/realities to either oral histories or written texts. Within the discussions of geopolitics and foreign policy, O Tuathail (1989) initiated a movement away from these seemingly 'natural attitudes' towards a more contextual and linguistically sensitive approach. By refusing the notion that 'the facts speak for themselves' O Tuathail (1989) and O Tuathail and Agnew (1992) drew attention to the issue that these 'facts' are *spoken* for by geographers and other writers. In the specific context of foreign policy, therefore, the geographical depictions employed by foreign policy makers or academic observers were not *natural* and thus could be problematised.

Simon Dalby's (1990a, 1993a) adoption of the term 'geo-graph' was one of the earliest attempts to investigate the geographical depictions within the elite narratives of foreign

policy. In *Creating the Second Cold War*, Dalby (1990a:39) argued that "geo-graphing is an ideological exercise which ... pits geographically defined political organisations against one another ... Images of places are crucial to the geopolitical scripts". However, the term 'ideological' raises questions as to whether the geopolitical theorist (e.g. Dalby) is going to metaphorically clear away 'noise' and 'smoke-screens' to reveal 'truths'. As a consequence, Dalby (1993a:5) later argued that " ... geo-graph is used to mean the ontological and geopolitical presuppositions that structure particular modes of peace, security and defense discourse". Thus, the traces of ideological smoke-screens have been swept away (contra to Reynolds 1992).

The term 'Geo-graph' refers to the specific descriptions of places contained within particular narratives. It is assumed that these descriptions are often "relatively simple and culturally resonant" (Dalby 1993b) or "anti-geographical" (O Tuathail and Agnew 1992) in order that those 'geo-graphs' can be easily effective in political narratives. However, recently critical geopolitical theorists have attempted to complicate and problematise the geo-scripts or geo-graphs of foreign policy rather than reveal 'better' or 'truer' stories. According to O Tuathail (1993d:20) this entails "not one of 'revealing' or 'uncovering' the deep, hidden geo-graphs of global politics (these moves assume a presence to be uncovered and revealed). This would make it complicitious with the very strategies, found in classical geopolitics and elsewhere..." Critical geopolitics aim to document the strategies by which geo-graphs are made by studying the multiple sites which produce geo-graphings of global politics.

The initial background for much of these discussions has undoubtedly been the work of Edward Said (1978,1981,1993a). The important contribution of Said has been to raise the issue of how the historical relation to others has been transformed into a totalising logic of 'us' and 'them'. In a densely detailed book (*Orientalism*), Said (1978) explored how the Europeans had represented the 'Orient'. As he notes "a collective notion identifying 'us' Europeans as against all 'those' non-Europeans ... the idea of European identity as a superior one in comparison with all the non-European peoples and cultures." As a consequence, Said's

Orientalism is an excellent illustration of the systematic creation of the 'Orient' by the discourses of writers, colonial authorities, scholar, travellers et Al. According to Said this discourse was based on the ontological distinction between East and West whereby the 'Orient' is essentialised and assigned a homogeneous character by the (Western) culture that produced it (Escobar 1984-5).

The strength (and popularity) of Said's work has been to combine a Foucauldian insistence over power/knowledge with historical specificity. The focus on the practices of domination is centred around the notion of discourse as used by Foucault. Said (1978:3) notes, for example, that "Without examining Orientalism as a discourse one cannot possibly understand the enormous systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage- and even produce - the Orient ... during the post-Enlightenment period". Said's is concerned, therefore, with the creation of the Orient rather than with the correspondence of the Orient to the views constructed about that particular locale. Within this book there is an important component that treats the conceptual categories of his work as contingent productions rather than ontologically given categories.

More generally, Said links many of Foucault's concerns over space, knowledge and power with the role of concepts with geographical connotations. As Foucault (1980:68) "Territory is no doubt a geographical notion, but first of all it a judicial-political one: the area controlled by a certain kind of power". Furthermore, Foucault (1980:69) notes that "There is an administration of knowledge, a politics of knowledge, relations to power which pass via knowledge and which, if one tries to transcribe them lead one to consider forms of domination designated by such notions as field, region or territory". Said attempts, therefore, to link the practices of *Orientalism* to academic forms of knowledge with the institutions of power.¹⁷

17. However, as Said (1986,1993b) has made clear his earlier Foucauldian sympathies have been replaced by an unhappiness with Foucault's seeming neglect of resistance and struggle within his works on power/knowledge and genealogies (see Said 1993b).

Said's concept of 'imaginary geographies' was used to illustrate how often arbitrary (always simple) depictions of peoples and places were crucial to representations of the Orient (Middle East). As he argues in a rather essentialist mode "This universal practice of designating in one's own mind a familiar space which is 'ours' and an unfamiliar 'space' beyond 'ours' which is 'theirs' is a way of making geographical distinctions that can be entirely arbitrary. I use the word 'arbitrary' here because imaginative geography of the 'our land-barbarian land' variety does not require that the barbarians acknowledge the distinction. It is enough for 'us' to set up these boundaries in our own minds; 'they' become 'they' accordingly, and both their territory and their mentality are designated as different from 'ours'".

There has been much debate within human geography as to how Said's geographical sensibilities (often metaphorical, see Said 1993a) can be appropriated (see Driver 1992 and Driver and Rose 1992). As Driver and Rose (1992:4) note "...We have found the work of Edward Said especially helpful, not least because of his emphasis on what he terms the 'imaginative geography' of the colonial project. Imagined geographies provide the maps of meaning through which the colonisers made sense of people and lands they had conquered, and such maps were made not only by the military and civilian authorities but also by novelists, anthropologists, linguists and, of course, geographers". Said's sensitivity to the spatial dimension of otherness has been a theme of much interest to geographers (e.g. Rogers 1992, Sidaway 1992b).

Within political geography, Dalby's analysis of 'geo-graphs', for example, in the debate over nuclear weapons in New Zealand during the 1980s is based on the premise that these 'geo-graphs' can be analysed, criticised and re-presented by the critical geopolitical observer (Dalby 1993a). The geo-graph (or worldly descriptions) as a concept aims to explore how the region was re-presented in terms of certain spaces (i.e. New Zealand as a site of Superpower

competition) and as a particular type of place populated by a range of characters (e.g. government, women, Maoris). Dalby's careful reading of policy statements and usage of interview material provides sufficient material to offer certain 'readings' of these debates. As with Edward Said, Dalby's 'readings' of the dissident (feminist, peace and Maori social movements) 'geo-graphs' aim to investigate the possibilities for interpreting nuclear weapons issues in New Zealand. Within this sort of context, I have attempted to draw on the notion of the geo-graph to explore how certain groups of influential policy makers and academic experts in Argentina produced 'geo-graphs' of the South Atlantic in the 1970s.

3.5.2.3. Scripting the 'Foreign'

The adoption of the metaphor of the script to describe how places are embedded in foreign policy narratives has usefully highlighted how complexity and ambiguity in international life are disciplined and ordered (Nathanson 1988, O Tuathail and Agnew 1992). O Tuathail's (1992a) reading of American foreign policy towards South Africa usefully (if schematically) drew attention to how certain descriptions of 'South Africa' were used by American policy makers to justify and legitimate US foreign policy in the Reagan era. In many ways, therefore, Dalby's usage of 'geo-graph' and O Tuathail discussion of 'script' overlap considerably.¹⁸

O Tuathail (1992a:156) defined script as "a set of representations, a collection of descriptions, scenarios and attributes which are deemed relevant and appropriate to defining a

18. However, O Tuathail's (1992a) appeal to Baudrillard's concept of hyperreality to exploring the scripting of 'South Africa' by American foreign policy makers rests somewhat oddly with his Foucauldian sympathies. There is a danger with such a strategy that everything within the remit of foreign affairs is reduced to strategic fantasies!

place in foreign policy". This appears to this writer a more helpful (and expansive) understanding of the notion of a script than Nathanson (1988:445) who refers to "a new a language, or script for interpreting the meaning of (Soviet) behaviour". Nathanson (1988) does, however, does provide a careful reading of how the threat based script of the Soviet Union was eventually preferred over the negotiation script. The key issue for critical geopolitical writers is to explore how certain scripts of international politics represent threats, dangers and enemies in highly regularised ways (O Tuathail 1992d). However, that commitment has to be tempered with an appreciation of the complexity of foreign policy itself and can only be appreciated by engagement with practical problem solving geopolitics in concrete instances (O Tuathail 1993d). .

Within their detailed investigations of US decision-making during the Vietnam conflict, Sylvan and Majeski (1987,1992) have explored the practical forms of geopolitics in a detailed way. In particular, they argue that US foreign policy decision making is a problem-solving culture which involves: first, establishing a range of recommendations. Second, choosing amongst those recommendations and third, reopening debates. At the centre of those series of suggestions are descriptions of situations - linguistically constituted descriptions of problems and solutions that apply to specific places. Sylvan and Majeski (1992:7) suggest that "Situations pertain to places: certain places will be deemed to involve the commitment of some sort or to be important enough to fight for, others will be characterised as not enjoying a US commitment or being hopeless to fight in. Places, however, are not unlikely to be reinscribed anywhere near as often as situations".

In a carefully historicised study of the construction of Indo-China as a strategically vital location, Sylvan and Majeski trace the progression of Indo-China as a place. In 1947, it was relatively unqualified place. In 1949 it emerged as a strategically important location related to issues of communism and raw materials. The details of the place were added later: that it contained communists, Europeans and anti-imperialists. However, the defeat of the French in Diem Bien Phu in 1953, dramatically altered the specificities of Indo-China. Thereafter, US

foreign policy makers understood Indo-China as a place in which they could understand themselves as having a commitment. Sylvan and Majeski (1992) later demonstrate how those place descriptions alter in the 1960s and 1970s as US involvement expanded in Indo-China.

Sylvan and Majeski (1987,1992) provide useful case studies from which to advocate an analysis of the practical forms of geopolitics which underwrite forms of foreign policy. The description of place within the foreign policy narrative can be far more nested (regions, states, sections), far more complex (people, history, borders), and far more subtle (locations, places, internal features) than the situation descriptions that critical geopolitics has investigated thus far. Foreign policy may be saturated with geographical politics and place descriptions and situation descriptions are important in the discussions of foreign policy makers. That does, however, mean that these constructed descriptions are necessarily set down by policy makers.

I depart slightly from O Tuathail (earlier work) and Dalby in that my preference is located within an investigation of the practices of elite story telling rather than specific scripts or geographers alone (Dodds 1993a). The preference for the notion of story telling is two fold: first, there is the danger that the focus on 'scripts' alone produces little more than a few interesting 'quotes' stitched together from the utterances of foreign policy professionals. However, a concern for story telling is understood as an every day mechanism used by people to make sense of particular experiences or worlds (Novitz 1989, Shapiro 1991). I specifically use the metaphor of the story to draw attention to the episodically 'violent' practices of foreign policy. The metaphors of the theatre are deliberately employed to highlight how the geopolitical discourses involve the writing of a setting (the stage), the construction of a 'drama' , the identification of directing forces (e.g. communism) and a range of subject-positions (e.g. heroes and villains). As Novitz (1989:61) notes "Without narratives, there is simply no way of emphasizing some events, marginalising others, *and* at the same time relating it all in a significant whole". Second, those stories can be related to a more nuanced understanding of the position of place within the foreign policy narrative.

By adopting the notion of story telling it is suggested that the practices of foreign policy can be linked to earlier discussions of authorial configurations, otherness, representation and geographs. The demarcation of the 'foreign' is never an innocent act or practice. Nor is it necessarily a simple or obvious act. In times of war or crisis, the representational practices or 'ways of speaking' adopted by policy professionals are critically implicated in world-making (Shapiro 1988). Story telling, thus, is understood to suffer from a tendency to under-specify causality, as the listener/reader is dragged along with the sequence of events. The representational practices of story telling are not assumed to be separate from the reality they seek to represent. As Hayden White notes that the narrative structure "already possesses a content prior to any given actualisation of it in speech and writing" (1987:xi). As a consequence, White (1978) has argued that narratives or stories impose continuity, coherency and meaning onto events that they describe (importance of *sequence*; Cohen and Shires 1988).

Thus, the key proposition, for this author, is that narratives or stories always imply or construct a position or positions from which they are to be read or viewed. Although as Haraway (1992) has noted that the concept of 'position' remains problematic (is it a set of cultural competences or simply a spatial metaphor), the insight is substantial. The argument, therefore, is that there are certain types of narratives (realist) which naturalise the means by which positioning is achieved. As a consequence, the connections between narration and reader subjectivities begin to emerge at the intersections.

However, the plots or dramas used by foreign policy professionals to depict 'others' may have historical precedent (e.g. Orientalist prejudices) or draw on the assumed collective memories (e.g. memories of World War II: Luke 1989) of a state (Middleton and Edwards 1990). This is not meant to imply a sort of monochromatic construction of the other or to imply seemingly essentialist explanations (e.g. that the minds of foreign policy makers gravitate towards simple binary oppositions or that there is a simple popular memory to be drawn

upon). Notions of collective memories or popular prejudices should be problematised but not abandoned. It is not unreasonable to claim that societies and states do produce the world and their position within it, in highly regularised ways.

Writers such as Paul Ricoeur have argued that stories tend to neglect synchronic relations (configurational dimension) at the expense of temporal (episodic dimension) successions. Ricoeur (1983) argues, however, that "the activity of narrating does not consist simply in adding episodes to one another; it also constructs meaningful totalities out of scattered events ... The act of narrating, as well as the corresponding art of following the story, therefore require that we are able to extract a configuration from a succession" (1983:145). Thus every story is in a state of competition between its episodic and configurational elements.

The difficulty in representing the configurational dimension of the story means that the episodic dimension tends to be the privileged element. As Sayer (1990:261) "But grasping the whole, the many things that happen at once, is harder than grasping what happens next in a story. The presentation of the unfolding story tends not to invite disputation or to pre-empt objections". The problem of closure is an important theme for critical geopolitical writers. By carefully examining the stories (how and which events get narrated) of foreign policy and international relations, the fields of pre-understanding can be problematised (Cohen and Shires 1988). As Darnovsky et Al (1991:17) argue "it makes it possible to begin to think more clearly about how to challenge it (stories) and how to develop effective counter stories".

The depiction of certain real-life events as 'foreign' or 'alien' is inherently violent. The focus on the war stories of the British political elites during the 1982 Falklands War, for example, is provided as an illustration of how events are encoded (i.e. in a linguistic sense) as 'foreign' and how certain stories are naturalised in order to justify violent action (Dodds 1993e). Furthermore, instead of writing about Britain and British actions as if the events in the South Atlantic were merely an example of crisis management, the analysis of British war stories is also an analysis of how identities (denial of difference) were created on the basis of distance

from the other.

I also believe that a focus on story telling is motivated by a belief that critical geopolitical theorists can recognise that "a story is a patchwork of truth and falsity, reliability and unreliability, fiction making and assertion" (Gregory Currie cited in Norris 1992:54). I implicitly adopt the position of writers such as Christopher Norris (1992) or Edward Said (1978) and argue that there are possibilities for not only carefully examining linguistic and narrative representations but also to make claims about the world. For it should still be possible as Norris (1992) to "perceive the various blind-spots, gaps, contradictions, manifest non-sequiturs and downright lies that punctuate 'official discourse'" (1992:59).

The narration of the 'foreign' within official discourses underwritten by a series of geographical depictions can be investigated and problematised. I do not claim a transcendental point from which to carry out this analysis rather I propose that within the conventions of scholarship there remain possibilities for critique (Natter and Jones 1993). To deny such a claim is to establish a false dilemma between the naive realist position and the textualist position. Solomon (1988) has argued, for example, that there do exist a series of inherent probabilities for going beyond various structures of linguistic and narrative representations. These possibilities arise out of a mode of probabilistic reasoning which best corresponds to the real-life course of events. As a consequence, Solomon (1988) argues that we should analyse truth claims within a story on the basis of its story telling capacity but also in relation to "our broader regularities that characterise human experience in general" (cited in Norris 1992: 57).

3.6. Imaginary Boundaries

Given the tenor of much of the recent work of critical geopolitics, it might seem to strange to

propose a return to the study of boundaries. As Taylor (1989a:144) has noted "Frontiers and boundaries have been the most popular topic in political geography" (e.g. Holdich 1916, Pounds 1963 and Glassner 1990). There has been a significant investment of intellectual energy in a number of issues: first, participation in the actual demarcation of boundaries of states (e.g. Sir Thomas Holdich in South America). Second, the construction of typologies to distinguish between frontiers (outward orientated) and boundaries (inward orientated) in the context of the territorial state and sovereignty (see Kristof 1959). Third, the development of various concepts of 'boundaries'. Jones (1959), for example, defined five types: natural, national, contractual, geometrical and power political.

I do not intend to propose a return to those sorts of studies even though I recognise this as an important component of geographical scholarship. Rather, I retain the interest in boundaries in order to suggest that the study of how the state constructs boundaries and constitutes exclusions are key issues. If this is so then the production of political identities is a continuously problematic process (Morley and Robins 1989). Furthermore, I believe that these concerns can be an additional contribution to the reconceptualisation of political identity based on the relations to, and differentiation from, other forms of identities. As O Tuathail (1993a:10) concluded "This takes the form of the relentless construction of imaginary geographical boundaries between the self and the other".

The depiction of boundaries as 'imaginary' is based on a belief that contemporary (since 1960s) technological developments (e.g. in global communications) have fundamentally altered the shape of international life (Luke 1989). In this respect the old claims of nation-states to particular territorially defined sovereign spaces have been challenged by a host of developments: global flows of capital, information and people, regional organisations and trading blocs (e.g. European Economic Community), environmental crises and satellite technology (Short 1993). As Morley and Robins (1989:22) note "new forms of bonding, belonging and involvement are being forged out of the global-local nexus". Or as Watts (1991:10) has concluded "Globalisation does not signal the erasure of local difference ... In a

strange way ... it revalidates and reconstitutes place, locality and difference".

In opposition to the fixed assumptions (e.g. sovereign states and the inter-state system) of realist research, it is suggested that the statecentric practices of foreign policy have been challenged by these developments. Contrary to the realist writer James Rosenau (1987:1-2) who appeals for - "Those who study foreign policy must concern themselves with politics at all levels ... It is in some profound sense a discipline with limitless boundaries: the discipline is imposed by the need to reorganise inquiry around the external behaviour of nation-states ... but insofar as its independent variables are concerned, the scope of the field is boundless" - I suggest that the identification and location of the 'foreign' has become even more problematic.

Furthermore, the introduction of new technologies have a capacity to transgress frontiers and disrupt boundaries in a continuous interplay of reterritorialisation and deterritorialisation (Virilio 1986, Swyngedouw 1989, Watts 1991). Henceforth, the idea of the stable boundaries of a state has been rendered problematical (Thrift 1992). Virilio (1987:21) argues it has become an osmotic membrane, through which information and communication flows pass". These global cyberspaces of communication and information overlay an abstract figuration over the territorial configurations of the inter-state system (Luke 1991). Contemporary debates in Britain over the prospects of Europe and the Single Market illustrate the difficulties for British elites in representing 'otherness'. In particular, Conservative administrations have attempted on the one hand to represent 'Europe' as inherently 'foreign' to British parliamentary democracy (and psyche) yet on the other hand acknowledging that Britain is culturally and politico-economically implicated in the affairs of Europe. Mrs Thatcher's attempt to appeal to the 'authentic' strands of British identity (to be protected from the contaminating elements of 'Brussels') whilst signing the 1986 Single European Act reflects these tensions (Wallace 1991). The question of 'Europe', thus, profoundly disrupts

notions of political citizenship based on a statecentric identity and fixed territory.¹⁹

3.7. Summary

The ending of the Cold War has been much heralded (Campbell 1990). In the post-war period, the practices of the western policy professional, for representing the Cold War were based on an interpretation of danger sustained by the objectifications of communism and the Soviet Union (Shapiro 1988). In a wider sense, the ending of the Cold War has produced a profound 'crisis of representation' as western security intellectuals search for new grounds from which to fix identities secured against the inscription of danger(s) (Campbell 1989, 1992a). One of the most important contributions to the debates over foreign policy has been the issue of identity (Campbell 1990, 1992a; Shapiro 1988, 1989). The modern international system depends on the assumption that identities based on the nation-state have dominion over professional, ethnic, family, tribal, gender or class (to name a few) loyalties (Connolly 1991). The discussion of identities within international relations theory, therefore, invites the play of plurality and differences. The aim is to challenge the political monopoly of the state to identity which has effectively hidden that such a monopoly has not always been, nor need it always be that way.

The practices of foreign policy, thus, have a major performative role to play for the state. It is those practices that confirm the state as sovereign and in control of a defined territory (Weber 1992a, Walker 1993). As Campbell (1990:266) notes "The outcome is that boundaries are constructed, spaces demarcated, standards of legitimacy incorporated, interpretations of

¹⁹ The desire, therefore, for a purified identity based on nostalgic notions of 'Englishness' has been investigated and problematised by a whole series of writers in the contemporary context of European integration and immigration disputes (e.g. Samuel 1989, Taylor 1991b).

history privileged and alternatives marginalised". I would argue that the conditions of possibility have altered as contemporary spatial practices (how space is used and produced) have changed significantly. The political and material conditions of different eras have important implications for foreign policy. The evolution of global capital and telecommunications, the rise of non-state actors and the ending of the Cold War have produced different conditions of existence. The flows and networks of information, resources and capital that permeate national territories are not without historical precedent (Rowlands 1992). However, as Luke (1991a) has noted the scale of these flows are considerably larger and more complex than before.

The new forms of spatiality are complex and varied in nature. These include the breakup of nation-states such as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, the failure in many parts of the world of the nation-state to marginalise regional, ethnic or religious movements and the glocalisation of everyday life has meant that political identities are less anchored in singular national-territorial identities. That is not to claim that national identity is an exhausted concept or a non-renewable resource. What it does imply is that concepts such as 'foreign policy' are becoming more problematical as the 'fixed' spaces of international politics begin to unravel Agnew 1993a, 1993b, 1993c; Corbridge 1993 .

Chapter 4

Writing Sovereign Identities: Liminars, National Identity and the Nineteenth Century

Argentine State

4.1. Introduction

This chapter aims to explore how Argentine state identity(ies) were constituted through a series of 'exclusions' in the nineteenth century. The discussion, however, does not claim to be comprehensive. Rather it attempts to draw on recent political theory and critical geopolitics to write about Argentine sovereign identities (Weber 1992b, Walker 1993). As a consequence, this chapter represents a departure from some of the existing studies of the Argentine state and national identity (e.g. Romero 1956, Gerassi 1964, Soler 1968, Alvarez 1970, Walter 1976, Ozlak 1983, Crawley 1984, Rock 1987, Priosto 1988, Escude 1990).¹

In doing so, I hope to achieve several things: first, to link up the discussion in chapter three on questions of foreign policy, the state and national identity. The chapter also attempts to

1. There is a massive literature on the Argentine state and Argentine political identity. The most recent texts include: M Gerassi (1964) *Argentine Nationalism of the Right*, R Soler (1968) *El Positvismo Argentino*, E Alvarez (1970) *El Nacionalismo Argentino*, O Ozlak (1983) *El Formacion del Estado Argentino*, A Priosto (1988) *El Discurso Criollista en la Formacion de la Argentina Moderna*, C Escude (1990) *El Fracaso del Proyecto Argentino* and N Shumway (1991) *The Invention of Argentina*.

One of the most striking aspects of many of the Argentine texts is the apparent ambivalence to the violent nature of Argentine state formation. It has been suggested that the narratives of Argentine national identity have yet to produce a "literature of self rebuke in connection with the subjugation and final extermination of these natives, but Argentines have not thought so" (Falcoff 1972:293).

link up my 'Foucauldian' concerns for the status of the 'other' within the context of nation-state formation. Second, to provide a historical context from which to locate the ambiguities of Anglo-Argentine relations (before and during the 1982 South Atlantic War) and subsequent dramas in the South Atlantic in the post-war period. Third, to offer a contextualised and historicised account of Argentine state formation. The account does, however, migrate into the twentieth century in order to provide further contextual material for later chapters (especially chapter 6 .

4.2. The Argentine State: Identity, Liminals and Sovereignty

In a recent text, Nicholas Shumway (1991) has suggested that the one of the problems facing the Argentine state in the nineteenth century was that "Whereas in Europe and to some degree in the United States, myths of peoplehood on which nations could be built were available before the nations themselves were formed, in Spanish America, civil strife following independence forced nations to emerge in areas that had no guiding fictions for autonomous nationhood" (1991:2). A difficulty that faced the other South American states in the nineteenth century. As Shumway (1991:3) notes "Nation formation was further complicated by civil wars in post-Independence Spanish America which eventually broke four viceroyalties into eighteen separate republics".

However, Shumway's (1990) account of the *Invention of Argentina* is largely preoccupied with examining the ideas of a few (important) nineteenth century Argentine nationalists (Domingo Faustino Sarmiento and Juan Bautista Alberdi . However, his account of state formation and political identity is located within the dominant historiography of Argentine state history. The difficulties facing the post-Independent Argentine state have been noted by many authors (e.g. Ozlak 1983, Rock 1987, Calvert and Calvert 1989 . The preferred mode of explanation of Argentine state formation has been to adopt a functionalist approach to state

formation (e.g. Hartshorne 1950, Gottman 1951, Jones 1954). As a consequence, the creation of the Argentine state has been 'read' as the struggle between centripetal and centrifugal forces (e.g. Merquiour 1986). In the case of Ozlak (1983), for example, a teleological narrative underwrites the triumph of centripetal forces (e.g. power of Buenos Aires province, national icons) over the centrifugal forces (e.g. Indian 'threat' and rival provinces) in a drama that occupied most of the nineteenth century.²

As a consequence, the construction and consolidation of Argentina was an inventive yet difficult process. Calvert and Calvert (1989) have recently suggested that this process was further complicated by two contradictory traditions - a Hispanic tradition of *Caudillismo* and a non-Iberian tradition of liberalism and free trade. The Independence Years of the 1820s have been interpreted as a period when Argentine national identity was caught up in two different sets of pressures- a 'nationalist' urge grounded on a sense of physical isolation from Europe and North America and an 'internationalist' urge which hoped to locate Argentina within the world-economy and the inter-state system.

The functionalist approach of most of these writers means that the processes of state formation are described in conservative and teleological terms. The question of territory, for example, is taken for granted and these writers tend to focus on the forces that seem to draw a state together or pull it apart. As Romero (1980:77) has noted "National government had to build the state almost out of nothing ... it was necessary to establish in space and in law, the jurisdiction of the provinces, as well as settle the thorny issue of their relations to Buenos Aires ... and so on and so forth." In that respect, the work of social theorists such as Anthony Giddens or Michael Mann and or political theorists such as Anne Norton or Robert Walker

2 . The decade of the 1880s is usually the moment that most Argentine writers judge to be the beginning of the modern day nation. As Sanz (1976:123) notes "You cannot strictly speaking talk about Argentina until the 1880s". Or as Ozlak (1983:256) notes "The city of Buenos Aires emerged in 1880 as the site from which the forces of national government and the province of Buenos Aires were to overlap".

have yet to thoroughly filter through into Argentine historical studies (e.g. Romero 1956, Gerassi 1964, Crawley 1984).

In terms of political identity, many of the existing writers on Argentine national identity tend to assume that an identity simply materialised over time. There has been little examination of how Argentine political or sovereign identities were constructed and contested (often in violent fashion). Indeed as Falcoff (1972) has noted that Argentine historians and political scientists have tended to gloss over the more violent episodes of nineteenth century Argentine history (e.g. Walter 1976 coverage (lack of) of the massacres of Indians). As a consequence, the contemporary discussions of political identity appear rather sanitised. Writers such as Shaw (1985) have concluded that Argentina remains "a headless chicken, scurrying about in quixotic search for an identifiable future ... Given ... the impossibility of getting Argentines to agree about anything, creating a new sense of Argentinity (sic) ... seems utopian" (cited in Calvert and Calvert 1989:211).

I do not aim to explore specific traditions such as *caudillismo* or *localismo* (see Lynch 1973, Crawley 1984).³ Rather it is suggested, however, that the constitution of the Argentine state emerged through the creation of a series of exclusions or boundaries that attempted to identify the 'domestic' from the 'foreign' (see Corrigan and Sayer 1985, Connolly 1991). Vogel's (1987,1991) careful studies of early Argentine conceptions of natural citizenship usefully illustrate how the Argentine state was being enframed on the basis of property rights, gender, race and age. The creation of national identity, therefore is constituted through the continuous repetition of a whole series of boundary producing practices not as a consequence of some founding moment (Campbell 1990, 1992a).

3 . *Caudillismo* has been usually understood as a system of localised rule or government centred around a charismatic leader. *Localismo* refers to the strong sense of localness and peoplehood usually created out folk traditions, ethnic mythologies and religious affiliations.

The Argentine state has like other states had an interest in shaping individual identities through institutions such as schools, the media and religion (e.g. Szchuman 1990, Vogel 1991, Escolar et Al 1992, Quintero 1992). The construction of narrative identities is of crucial importance to state politics. In a rather different way to recent studies of Argentine nationalism this chapter does not *solely* concentrate on issues such as the physical construction of the frontier in Argentine history or intra-regional conflict. Authors such as Hennessy (1978) and Calvert and Calvert (1989) have suggested that unlike in the case of America, the frontier " ... did not have the same impact on the development of a sense of national identity that it appears to have had elsewhere" (Calvert and Calvert 1989:209). In the case of Argentina there apparently did not exist a 'pioneering urge' to settle new regions (Hennessy 1978). Rather, the frontier was pushed southwards across the pampas mainly as a result of the pressures of cattle raising and the needs of an external market.⁴

It is also suggested, however, that there needs to be a greater sensitivity to not only the physical demarcation of the frontier (with the considerable tensions between Argentina and Chile/Paraguay/Brasil) but in addition there is a sensitivity towards specific practices of 'foreign policy' which it is suggested enabled the creation of an 'imagined political community' called Argentina. For it is through 'foreign policy' that Argentina (was) is defined by absence rather than presence (Norton 1988, Campbell 1992a). If the origins of the Argentine state are elusive then national identity can only be secured through the continual

4 . I think, however, Hennessy's (1978) account of the Argentine frontier neglects the ideological importance of those hinterlands to Argentine identity formation. In my discussion of liminal groups I attempt to redress Hennessy's rather economically functionalist account of the frontier regions.

The frontier regions were already discursively important in the pre-Independence days. Explorers such as Felix de Azara noted with disgust that the frontier lines in 1796 "because of a few annoying barbarians, are approximately the same as those which Garay took with sixty men 216 years ago" (cited in Slatta 1989:181). He suggested that serving soldiers on the frontier should be granted land rights so that they had an incentive in mounting rigorous offensives.

demarcation of those who are false or alien to the defining national ideals. As is the case for all republics, Argentina like America "has constantly confronted the dilemma of securing legitimacy and establishing authority in a culture which renders such ontological guarantees suspect" (Campbell 1992a:144).

One of the central components in the constitution of Argentine sovereign identities was the existence of a number of key *liminal* groups (Afro-Argentines, Indians, Gauchos, Women and the Anglo-Argentines).⁵ Following Norton (1988) liminal groups are understood to play a crucial role in the definition of national identity. Whether territorial, cultural or ideological-liminal groups represent the boundaries between the self and other. As Norton (1988:54) notes "The recognition of liminality provides for the differentiation of self and other, subject and object, by establishing a triadic relation: the self, an object of likeness, and an object of difference. Liminals serve as the mirrors for nations. At once the other and like, they provide the occasion for the nation to constitute itself in reflection upon its identity. Their likeness permits contemplation and recognition, their difference the abstraction of those ideal traits that will henceforth define the nation".

The territorial boundaries of the nation-state are usually regarded as providing its most fundamental definition (Norton 1988, Walker 1993). Those groups who occupy the hinterlands of the state represent ambiguity and contingency, as they live literally on the border between adjacent nation-states. Furthermore, those territorial liminal groups are often regarded as central import in the definition of the borders and frontiers of the state. As a consequence, their incorporation into the nation-state either leads the elites of the state to attempt to eradicate troublesome liminars or to incorporate them into the nation-state. As Campbell (1990:275) concludes "The demarcation of the self and the other is, however, not a simple process that established a dividing line between the inside and the outside. It is a

5. My discussion of liminal groups draws largely from Anne Norton's (1988) *Reflections on Political Identity* (chapter 3).

process that involves the gray area of liminal groups in a society ... outsiders who exist on the inside".

In the political context of the nineteenth century Argentine state, liminality was identified with the 'foreign' or as 'dangerous' by Creole elites in the province of Buenos Aires. Within this chapter, I examine several *liminal* groups (Afro-Argentine, Indian and Anglo-Argentine) in order to link up with contemporary discussions with geography, sovereignty and national identities.⁶ An earlier paper addressed the relationship between geography as a 'technology of power'/ Geography as an academic subject, state education and the nineteenth century Argentine state (Dodds 1994b, 1994d). As a consequence, my references to Argentine geographical practices are largely cursory.

4.3. The Revolutionary Movement: The Birth of Argentina?

"The success of government ... requires the acceptance of fictions, requires the willing suspension of disbelief, requires us to believe that the emperor is clothed even though we can see he is not. Governments require make-believe." (Morgan (1988:13) *Inventing the People*)

The Spanish-American Revolutions of 1808-1826 have been described by Lynch (1973:1) as a " ... long process of alienation in which Spanish Americans became aware of their own identity, conscious of their own culture, jealous of their own resources. This growing *conciencia de si* caused Alexander von Humboldt to observe: 'The Creoles prefer to be called

6. The omission of women in my interpretation of Argentine state formation and political identity is largely based on the sheer enormity of the task. The selection of three liminal groups reflect territorial, ethnic and wealth/intellectual liminality.


Americans ... since the year 1789, they are frequently heard to declare with pride, 'I am not a Spaniard, I am an American', words which reveal the symptoms of a long resentment." However, as Shumway (1991:2) has noted "The Spanish colonies were carefully designed to extend the Spanish Empire, to be culturally, economically, and politically dependent on their mother country".⁷

The Revolutions for independence in Spanish America were sudden and violent. As Merquior (1986) notes four vice-royalties fragmented into seventeen nation-states by the second decade of the nineteenth century. The prelude for such acts was the collapse of imperial power due to pressure from Napoleonic France and the new hegemonic imperial power: Britain. The collapse of Spanish authority in the first decade of the nineteenth century ignited the revolutionary potential of the American continent. The frustration and potential for such acts were located, however, in the previous century.

In response to declining colonial revenues, a growing sense of colonial identities and expanding intra-colonial trade, Spain attempted in 1765 to extend imperial control over the colonies. The policy of Charles III was to reconquer America. As Lynch (1973:7) noted "The second conquest of America was first of all a bureaucratic conquest." In 1776, as Scobie (1971) notes, the Viceroyalty of the River Plate was created which was further subdivided into eight dependencies; three of which covered Buenos Aires, Cordoba and Salta (see map 4.1). However, the challenge from British commercial imperialism and Brazilian territorial pressures to Spanish imperial authority also precipitated the 'Second Conquest'. The Argentine writer Sanz (1976:27) argued that the Viceroyalty was "The first great geopolitical

7 . I do not want to explore the machinations of the Spanish American revolutions in great detail. This partly reflects the quality of existing work (especially Lynch's classic study in 1973) and partly because my concern is more with how the new creole state attempted to secure a fragile national identity over reluctant provinces outside the Rio Plata. I want to suggest that the brittleness and sense of endangerment of the creole identity in post-colonial Argentina was expressed through the differentiation of the other, no matter how much they might have shared in common. In later sections I explore the example of the Indian and the African other.

Map 4.1. The Viceroyalty of the River Plate



Source: H Pittman (1981) *Geopolitics of the ABC Countries* p.158

initiative achieved in South America. This act of power represents the expression of profound understanding and of the intent to respond to the most radical and persistent geographical and political antagonism of the continent in the primary phase of development".

The policies of imperial Spain between 1765-1810 were designed to re-establish bureaucratic control of the continent with the aid a series of new viceroyalties (including the Viceroyalty of the River Plate) and other new units of administration . The object of such policies was to " ... undermine the position of the foreigners but also to destroy the self-sufficiency of the Creoles, to make the colonial economies work directly for Spain, to syphon off the surplus of production which for so long had been retained within America" (Lynch 1973:11). As Merqiuor (1986) notes, the Spanish imperial authorities through a policy of *libro commercio* attempted to create new trading networks around the River Plate basin. As Rock (1987) notes, traders in Buenos Aires were able to establish exclusive contracts with Spanish mercantile monopolies dealing with bullion, cowhide and meat (Platt 1978, Lewis 1984). As Scobie (1971:60) argued "The reforms envisaged by Charles III and carried out by his Viceroy in the River Plate set the stage for the predominance of Buenos Aires in the nineteenth century".

The 'second conquest' was reinforced by the inflow of immigrants from Spain. These immigrants were to be the bureaucrats and merchants who had been given the task of restoring political and economic hegemony. In this context, the Revolutions of 1808-26 could be interpreted as a violent reaction against this form of racial colonization which effectively excluded Creoles from the offices of state or the centre of commerce (Ozlak 1983, Rock 1987). This was hardly a novel process: racial discrimination in favour of the European over the Creole was of long standing. As von Humboldt observed "The lowest, least educated and uncultivated European believes himself superior to the white born in the New World". However, the scale and intensity of such a process was greater than before and reflected the

desperation of Imperial Spain. The 'second conquest' then was about conquering the Creole much as the first conquest had been about controlling the Indian.⁸

The racial differences identified between the Creole and the Spaniard were to form the basis for an incipient nationalism. When Bolivar recalled that "We are neither Europeans nor Indians, but a species midway between aborigines and Spaniards" it neatly recalls the pressures on the Creole states to construct national identities from positions of ambiguity (cited in Lynch 1973:38). (As we shall see those national identities had no space for the Indian or African). Ozlak (1983), however, argues that in the 1810s there was much conversation amongst Buenos Aires elites about "creating a unified state out of a moment of revolution (1983:243). In the face of economic monopolies and exclusion from important positions in government (and the church), the Independence movements were virtually inevitable by 1810 (Alvarez 1970, Merqour 1986).

On the eve of independence, the River de la River Plate which was later to form the basis of the future Argentina, was a remarkably hierarchical society. The whites (or near whites) enjoyed nearly complete control of offices, property and privilege. They carefully preserved these privileges from the Indian populations living within colonial jurisdiction and the African peoples (imported as slaves to work in houses and workshops). The fears of the 'non-white led the white elite to greater sensitivity over law and order, social status and public education. In the case of the latter, the *Telegrafo Mercantil* (a newspaper) noted in 1801, for example, that the castes "debased simply by their status and birth, are denied admission to the primary schools, in order to prevent their associating with children of Spaniards" (cited in Lynch 1973:38).

8 . The struggles by the white, christian Spanish settlers against the indigenous Indian populations started in the sixteenth century. Walter (1976), for example, notes that in 1541 a settlement founded by Pedro de Mendoza was attacked by Indians in Tucuman and Cuyo. The fight against the Indians continued until 1885.

The demands for independence in May 1810 had been precipitated by two earlier events. First, the repulsion by the Creoles of a British attempt to invade Buenos Aires in 1806 and 1807 (and Brazilian incursions in later day Uruguay) and second, the demands of Upper Peru in 1808 for its independence from Buenos Aires as well as Spain.⁹ The ability of the Creole elites to defend themselves against an imperial power (Britain) had given that elite (made up of intellectuals and military figures) the confidence to initiate military action on 18 May 1810 against a Spanish Empire engulfed in military action itself in the Iberian peninsula. By 22 May 1810 a general congress had meet to declare that they intended to depose the viceroy of the River de la River Plate and establish a new government.

The revolutionary regime of 1810 quickly employed several measures designed to demonstrate sovereign authority (Vogel 1987). First, as Vogel (1991:107) notes the regime "created and implemented a means for the naturalisation of Spaniards and other foreigners". The creation of rights of political citizenship was tied to a declaration of allegiance to the state.¹⁰ According to Vogel (1987) only those (white men) born in the River Plate region were automatically citizens.¹¹ Second, the Constitutive Assembly of 1813 decreed that the

9 . The attempted invasion of British forces in 1806-7 was based on a desire to incorporate the River Plate markets into the British Empire. Ferns (1960:19) notes that in 1804 the subject preoccupied the British cabinet. In a letter by Sir Home Popham to Viscount Melville (18 October 1804) noted that "The idea of conquering South America is totally out of question, but the possibility of gaining all its prominent points, alienating it from its present European connections, fixing on some Military position, and enjoyed all its Commercial advantages can be reduced to a fair calculation, if not a certain operation".

10 . The Congress was to be composed of 450 delegates. However, only 251 attended. The rest were deterred by rain, by disapproval (there was a strong French militant presence) and fear. The composition of such a Congress was elitist; 70 officials and ecclesiastics, 25 lawyers and professionals, 59 merchants, 59 military and 21 ordinary citizens (Lynch 1973:52).

11 . The creation of categories of political citizenship relied on a racial hierarchy descending from the white creole, free-American born, the European foreigner, African blacks and mulattos. See Vogel H (1987) *Elements of Nation Building in Argentina: Buenos Aires 1810-1828* Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Florida

bureaucratic organs of the state were to be employed only with Creole citizens. Third, in what Harvey (1989) has called the processes of deterritorialisation/reterritorialisation, the Argentine state established immigration procedures (for Europeans not at war with Argentina), laws on capital movement and trade restrictions. The frontiers and boundaries of the Argentine were to be controlled and policed by the new state. Fourth, 'Argentine' troops under San Martín were sent to assist Chilean elites in Santiago and later the two states signed a treaty for the liberation of the new state of Peru (Rock 1987).

The events of May 1810 were undoubtedly revolutionary as the Creole government rejected the imperial authority of Spain. As *El Censor* explained " In 1810 we only wished to preserve freedom against foreign domination ... But the Spaniards began to make war on us and tried to impose despotism on America. We still placed our hopes in Ferdinand. But these hopes were destroyed when he actually reached the throne, for he waged bloody war against America" (cited in Lynch 1973:56). Several days after the meeting of the congress in Buenos Aires, the government invited representatives from other provinces to meet in Buenos Aires. In addition, an expeditionary force was sent to spread the revolutionary message across the territory that was later to become *Republica Argentina* in 1826. In the same year, the new Republic signed a major treaty with Chile in November 1826 which stated that "The contracting Republics obligate themselves to guarantee the integrity of their territories and to work against any foreign power that seeks to change the boundaries of said Republics, recognised before their emancipation or later by virtue of special treaties" (cited in Pittman 1981:666).

The creation of a nation-state over these former Viceroyalty territories was a complex and violent process. Calvert and Calvert (1989:18) note "With victory, the only building force, a common enemy disappeared and centrifugal forces became overt."¹² The basic problem,

12. The nationalist thinker Mariano Moreno argued that Americans were automatically revolutionaries and hence were good citizens. As compared to the Spaniards were labeled 'contras' who were considered a danger to

Calvert and Calvert (1989), was that the authority of Buenos Aires was strongly challenged by the provinces in the interior and by the littoral provinces of Santa Fe, Entre Rios and Corrientes whose economic resources and potential matched those of Buenos Aires. Interprovincial feuding took place within the context of a shattered economy.¹³ The *Porteno* (a resident of Buenos Aires) merchant elites had looked to the British to supplement foreign trade revenues which had been devastated by the collapse of mining revenues. Local wealth had shifted to landowners and especially cattle ranching whilst continuing to tax the other provinces. As such later interprovincial struggle revolved around the struggle over customs control between the port city of Buenos Aires and the eastern provinces of Santa Fe, Entre Rios and Corrientes (Merquior 1986).

The period between 1810-1830 was characterised by inter-provincial disputes over sovereign claims. The Treaty of Benegas (November 1820) between Buenos Aires and Santa Fe, for example, attempted to create a Congress at Cordoba. The Buenos Aires delegates in 1821 were ordered to seek the promotion of a 'Grand Congress' to organise a federation composed on Peru, Chile and the Palatine provinces. However, as Scobie (1971) notes this congress disintegrated by 1822 and the provinces of Santa Fe, Cordoba, Mendoza and San Luis remain quasi-sovereign. The province of Buenos Aires, however, attempted to retain power to represent all of the provinces in foreign affairs.

the Argentine state. The failed conspiracy of Alzaga in 1812 seemed to confirm anti-Iberian sentiments (Vogel 1991).

13. The Argentine state created a Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Worship in 1820. The publication 'Memoria' was introduced to record the events of Argentine foreign policy and international affairs.

The *Memoria* documents are held at the library of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Buenos Aires.

The struggles between the provinces over trade and taxation erupted into violence on several occasions. In 1820, for example, the elites of Buenos Aires were defeated in Cepeda by the littoral provinces. In desperation, those elites called upon the *estancieros* in the Province of Buenos Aires to help defend the province from the littoral. The consequences of such a move were several fold as Merquior (1986:266) has noted " ... in the process (they) had to sacrifice the liberal, modernising politics of the enlightened *porteno* elite, best embodied in the short lived presidency of Bernardino Rivadavia (1826-7) ... it also became obvious that the autonomy of Buenos Aires could hardly dispense with *caudillo*-led forces ... " The consequences of *caudillismo* was that the ruralization of power had profound effects on the *gaucho* community and the Indian populations of the interior. The latter were a sizeable presence and largely unimpressed by the claims of Buenos Aires elites to governance. The battle to create Argentina then was not only a question of establishing political-economic authority amongst the provinces but it also involved constructing a 'national community' of (white) Creoles.

4.4. Post-Colonial Identity I: The Indian Liminar

The position of the Indian living in and around the province of Buenos Aires appeared to improve after the 1810 revolution (Lynch 1973, Rock 1987). The new government, guided by European enlightenment philosophies, had instituted a series of reforms designed to restore equality to the Indian. In June 1810, for example, the government informed the Indians of Buenos Aires that they were "equal and always ought to remain so." The Constitution of 1819 later enshrined these rights to equality and to civil rights. As many historians have noted, however, these 'rights' did not alter the status or condition of the Indian. Indeed the fears that the Indians outside the southern frontier would threaten the coherence of the new state led to a continuation of the sorts of massacres that the Spanish conquistadors had initiated in the sixteenth century (Walter 1976, Slatta 1989). Furthermore, the conflicting

sovereign claims of Argentina and Chile to the southern Patagonian lands complicated the position of the Indian 'other'.¹⁴

The fears of aggressive Indian tribes threatening the stability of the Argentine republic forced the government to forcefully recruit the gaucho for military manpower. In an economy increasingly driven by large *estancia* owners, the nomadic life (and identity) of the gaucho was curtailed. The gaucho represented a labour resource that was useful to the ranches of the pampas but was also a valuable resource for the struggle against the Indian.¹⁵ In 1815, laws were passed which attacked nomadism and which forced marginal populations to carry identity cards (*papeletas*) where ever they went. Failure to carry such a document could result in the punishment of five years of forced military service or two years forced labour (Slatta 1989). The ability of the Creole state to identify and regulate menaces and or 'others' was quickly tested by the government in the 1820s. Peace treaties were signed with Indian leaders in 1825 and 1826.

The governor of Buenos Aires province, Martin Rodriguez sent two expeditions to the southern frontier in the 1820s. In 1823, a fort was established near the settlement of Tandil (Walter 1976, Sarno 1989). With the help of the pampas Indians, Rodriguez was able to

14. The struggles against the Indian populations were complicated by two additional factors. First, there were competing claims over Patagonia with the Chilean state. Second, there were similiar fights with Indian populations within the sovereign territory of Chile. The border region, therefore, emerged as a important zone. Indeed these acts of violence against the Indian populations were also raising issues over sovereign jurisdiction.

Furthermore, the claims of the Buenos Aires elites to sovereignty were rejected by Paraguay in 1811, Bolivia in 1825, Uruguay in 1828 (after a bitter struggle between 1813-1828) and Upper Peru in the late 1820s (Ireland 1916, Rock 1987).

15. The gaucho has emerged as the cultural icon of modern Argentine identity. The frontiersmen or cowboys are seen to personify the national par excellence: the mythical representative of the Argentine state. The signifier of the ability of the Argentine people to conquer, to incorporate and to settle.

prepare the foundations for major offensives against the Ranqueles. Juan Manuel de Rosas was to use this alliance between Creole and Pampas Indian to launch a series of offensives in the 1830s and 1840s (Rock 1987, Merquior 1986). As governor of Buenos Aires, Rosas in 1828 proposed a series of assaults towards the River Negro.¹⁶ Later in November 1832 Rosas announced to the national legislature that "You know that the countryside and the frontier are now entirely free of enemy Indians...One more effort, and our wide plains will be free forever, and we will secure the foundations of our national wealth" (cited in Slatta 1989:182).

The Rosas approach to governance has been described by Lynch (1985:640) as "the *estancia* writ large" as if the populace were simply peons of the hacienda. The military expedition of 1833 (with Chilean co-operation) was organised into three parts. The western division from Cuyo was to march directly south towards the River Neuquen. The centre division from the provinces of Cordoba, San Luis and La Rioja attempted to clear the pampas up to the River Colorado. The southern led by Rosas was by far the most successful as Rosas' 2000 men swept to the River Neuquen and took control of the important island of Choele Choel (a centre for contraband trade). The results of such an expedition were successful in terms of allowing the owners of the large estancias to further consolidate their hold on the pampas and prepare the grounds for a ranch economy dedicated to the export of wool (Lynch 1981). In conjunction with a policy of subsidising Indian goods the ranchers were able to expand

16. Rosas enthusiasm for such an assault was driven by a degree of self-interest. In 1828, Indians had taken 12,000 head of cattle from the pampa many of them his! A policy to remove the Indians from the Pampa had its advantages. Furthermore, military expeditions occupy an important role in "mythology of a political culture and in the definition of a national identity. If the military is accepted as the sign of the nation, it may profit from the establishment of charismatic authority ... " (Norton 1988:157-158).

In his account of the voyages on the *Beagle*, Charles Darwin narrates his meeting in Patagonia with Juan Rosas. Darwin was clearly appalled by the ferocity of Rosas' campaign to clear the Indians from the desert but nonetheless hoped that Rosas might be able to engender 'prosperity and advancement'.

their holdings and the Argentine state was able to claim further territories and loyalties. Walter (1976) notes that some 2,900 square leagues of territory were added to the Buenos Aires province.

The relatively 'peaceful' situation established by Rosas in the 1830s lasted until about the 1850s when conflict broke out between the provinces and Buenos Aires. The consequences of such a dispute were that the sorts of institutional arrangements for policing the frontier collapsed. The inability of Buenos Aires to recruit manpower to protect the southern frontier was further exposed when in 1850s Indian tribes (aided by gauchos) launched a series of attacks in the province of Cuyo and even as far as Buenos Aires (Olascoaga and Racedo 1956, Walter 1976, Sarno 1989). Since 1853, however, article 23 of the Argentine Constitution had identified internal threats as a sufficient reason for the suspension of any constitutional guarantees (Scarpaci and Frazier 1993). The ability of the elites of Buenos Aires to counter internal threats was sorely tested when in 1867 a decree was issued ordering that the army occupy all national territory from the Atlantic to the Andes.

The Indian was to be removed beyond the River Negro. In conjunction with the 1867 Land Act, which was designed to transfer huge tracts of land into the hands of estancias, the government attempted to clear once and for all the pampas and the Patagonian desert of the 'Indian.' The 'Indian' was not only a threat to the continued agricultural development within the nation's economy but also a threat to claims of a 'national community' (Campbell 1990). The discursive justification for the pacification of the Indian was akin to the practices of *Orientalism*, as the Indian was described by Creole elites as impervious to the calls of civilisation and characterised by irrationality and lawlessness (Norton 1988).

The response to the decree of 1867 had been muted.¹⁷ It was not until 1872 that an expedition was launched by General Ignacio Rivas and which later resulted in a victory

17 . One of the reasons for the muted response to the 1867 decree was that Argentine forces were involved in a violent conflict with Paraguay (1867-1870). The cause of the war was over territorial claims in the Flores

against the Indians led by Calfucura. The victory led Rivas to announce that the triumph was "the most splendid that has been achieved to this day over these cruel enemies" (cited in Walter 1976:775). Rivas' victory was made possible, however, by an alliance with the Indians under Catriel and Coliqueo (Rock 1987).

The most dramatic period in the campaign against the Indian peoples came in the late 1870s when General Roca was ordered by the then government to 'clear' the desert up to the River Negro and Neuquen.¹⁸ As Roca had informed the Minister of War earlier in 1875 that "The best system for overcoming the Indians is to extinguish them and drive them beyond the River Negro by an offensive like that followed by Rosas" (cited in Hasbrouck 1935:212). The pretext for such a campaign had been laid by the introduction of the 1867 Land Act which was designed to transfer huge tracts of land into the hands of the *estancieros*. As a consequence the 'Indian' was an undesirable obstacle in the path of the development of a property owning elite and the general economic development of the country (which required greater tracts of land to support growing agricultural exports).

Roca's campaign in 1879 was a spectacular success as his army of 8,000 swept through the Patagonian desert (McLynn 1980). Within the space of a few months it was reported that 14,000 Indians had been captured, 480 Christians had been rescued and that 15,000 square miles of land had been pacified (Hashbrouck 1935). In his formal report to the Ministry of

region. The intervention by the US government in 1878 led to arbitration. Argentina was awarded territory in Misiones and in the Chaco. Paraguay was awarded the disputed territory between the Pilcomayo and Verde rivers.

18. The term 'Conquest of the Desert' reminds me of some Jean Baudrillard's (1988) observations on 'America' when he notes how representations of barren landscapes such as deserts have been used to inscribe ignorance of nature, culture and history. In the context of the massacre of the Indian population in the Argentine, the representation of the grassy pampa as a 'desert' seemed to have been an important step in the naming of a barbarious 'other' that had to be pacified.

War General Roca could conclude that "Not a single place is left in the desert where the Indians can now threaten colonists in the Pampas...Civilised populations will come and relieve our military forces of the simple although indispensable services of police which is still required today" (cited in Hashbrouck 1935:223). As such 20 million hectares of land was later turned over to private property to 500 of Roca's closest supporters (McLynn 1980).

The campaign to 'conquer the desert' had been successful not only because the Argentine state had invested huge military and financial resources (e.g. 1.5 million gold pesos) to ensure its success but also because negotiations with Chile in 1881 had successfully established a frontier that eliminated Chilean claims to Patagonia. The effective occupation of Patagonia had thus been vital to Argentine claims of territory vis a vis Chile. Indeed Argentine historians have argued that the eventual conquest of Patagonia was closely bound up with General Roca's ability to create a national government and a nation-state (Ozlak 1983). As Sanz (1976:123) has concluded "You cannot speak of Argentina, strictly speaking, until 1880" when the city of Buenos Aires was created as a national capital in the same year.

During (and after) the 'Desert Campaign' itself there was much official encouragement by the Argentine state for explorations to be mounted in the Patagonia (see Walter 1976). For instance, the War Ministry commissioned Colonel Manuel Olascoaga (Head of the Army Office of Topography) to undertake an exploration and topographic survey of the region between the rivers Neuquen and Limay and the mountains of the Andes. The importance of such surveys was acknowledged by General Roca in a report to the acting Minister of War: "The acquisition of geographical and topographical knowledge is of great importance ... Important results have been accomplished by the scientific investigations made by the professors from the University of Cordoba who accompanied the troops" (cited in Hashbrouck 1935:223).¹⁹

19. In Dodds (1994b,1994d) I have explored in further detail the importance of topographic surveys by geographers (and other surveyors) attached to the Argentine Geographical Institute (AGI).

The rationale for the final offensive to 'conquer the desert' was most clearly put by General Roca in 1879 "It is a law of nature that the Indian succumb to the impact of civilised man. In the struggle for existence ... the weaker race must perish in the face of the one favoured by nature" (cited in McLynn 1980:28). As a consequence, space was viewed as a vital component to the organic state and the fostering of the geographical imagination. The Indian populations were understood by Creole elites as inferior and irrational barbarians (totally ignoring the elaborate social structures of Indian societies) who would inevitably succumb to the civilised and rational Creole (e.g. Newsom 1986).²⁰

As other scholars have noted, however, these social Darwinistic claims to progress were supplemented by European fears that frontier settlements were being threatened by Indian raids. Thus the British governments made several complaints, following the raid on Bahia Blanca in 1870 and 1871 and those on the property of the Central Argentine Land Company at the end of 1872 (Graham-Yooll 1981a). Furthermore, the exploration and settlement of Patagonia by representatives of the Chilean state between 1840-1870 meant that Argentine elites were worried about sovereign claims to the region (Pittman 1981).²¹

20 . These manoeuvres were further empowered by the presence of the railway (by 1885 total mileage had reached 2,294 miles) and the telegraph which helped the civilised European integrate and pacify the barbarious Indian 'other' (Lewis 1983, Hodge 1984, Brown 1986). As Slatta (1989:190) has noted "Improved infrastructure tied the nation together and helped generate a greater sense of nationality." Or as Norton (1988:67-68) notes "The distance between the liminars and the centre- measured in the time necessary for the exchange of information and commodities- is, like the distance between the border and the centre, an indication of the nation's furtherest reaches".

21 . The creation of property rights in Patagonia was crucial to the territorial integration of Argentina. The 1867 Land Act, for example, was designed to transfer the allegiance of the ranchers to the nation-state and ensure that the colonised territory 'belonged' to Argentina (McLynn 1980).

By 1885, the clearance of Indian populations from the Patagonian Desert had been largely completed (Walter 1976, Sarno 1989). The national territories of La Pampas, River Neuquen, River Negro, Chubut, Santa Cruz and Tierra del Fuego had 'confirmed' that the administrative authority of the state stretched over those territories. After three and half centuries of conflict those "that remained impervious to the calls of civilisation" (Crawley 1984:9) had been eradicated. As General Roca noted in 1885 "As of today, then, all the absurd barriers of barbarism that confronted us in the north and those in the south, have been removed, and when we speak in the future of frontiers, we will mean the lines that divide us from the neighbouring nations and not those that have been for us the synonyms for blood, insecurity and discredit to the Republic" (cited in Slatta 1989:187).²²

The position of the Indian 'other', thus, was highly problematic for those Creole elites trying to build a nation-state called 'Argentina.' Rouquie (1981) has argued that there remains a reluctance to acknowledge the *Metizo* aspect of Argentina. The Indian blurred the boundaries of such a national community because they were thoroughly implicated in the early colonial settlements. Almost all the colonial (and post-colonial) settlements in the Argentine depended on Indian guides, advice on crops and general trade to survive (Walter 1976). In the post-independence context, the blurrings remained as the Indian was always present in subsequent attempts to colonize the 'marginal spaces' to the south of Buenos Aires (Patagonia) and to the

22 . The question posed by Slatta (1989:177) that "Had different strategic choices been made, perhaps the prolonged, bloody battle between 'civilisation' and 'barbarism' could have been shortened or mitigated" although interesting misses the point that the battle against the Indian was of great importance (indeed vital) in the struggle to construct a national self through the construction of an 'other.' It was thus more than just an issue over who controlled frontier resources.

Furthermore, the 'Conquest of the Desert' only succeeded because Argentina and Chile had signed a treaty in 1881 that established a frontier "from north to south to the 52 degrees of latitude as the Cordillera of the Andes" (Ireland 1916:45).

north west (Chaco).²³ In addition as Shumway (1991:5) has noted "White and European became relative terms, better for maintaining power and keeping family secrets than for describing factual genetic heritage." The Indian served as a useful point of differentiation in the construction of a national community where the boundaries between the self and the other were diffuse and multiple. As Anne Norton (1988:81) has noted "The Indian thus served as a personification of the anti-structural, liberty and lawlessness". The building of forts and the drive to 'conquer the desert' in the 1870s were symptomatic of those attempts to differentiate and secure fragile identities.

4.5. Post-Colonial Identity II: The Afro-Argentine Liminar

Creole elite concerns for those who threatened the boundaries of identity was substituted from one marginal group (The Indian) to another (The African) throughout the nineteenth century. The importation of slaves from Africa (1714 onwards) to work as domestic servants or in industrial workshops, provided the means for the incorporation of African slavery in the political economy of Argentine society. Although the descriptive encounters with the African were discursively similar to the Amerindian, the African was not encountered in the wildness as an obstacle to civilisation or Christianity but rather the African had been brought into the Buenos Aires and Argentine economies. Their civilisation as a consequence would emerge

23 . The racial heritage of the Argentine elites has been investigated by many writers. However, as Shumway (1991:5) notes "Even the ruling classes, despite their stubborn claims to racial purity, were more often than not product of some racial blending. White and European became relative terms, better for maintaining power and keeping family secrets than for describing factual genetic heritage".

In Spanish, as Stepan (1982) has noted, 'race' referred to 'defect' or 'guilt' people (originally the moors and christians) who were unable to overcome their racial failings and convert to christianity.

from within that political economy. The African constantly straddled the boundaries of inside and outside by being an important component of society yet excluded from membership of that society (Andrews 1979,1980). The ethnic liminal as Norton (1988:80) has noted "is made ambiguous by their cultural variance from the dominant group, their race, or the nationality of their ancestors".²⁴

The ambiguous position of the Afro-Argentine meant that post-colonial society made great efforts to inscribe the boundaries that kept them outside. The abolition of the slave trade by the revolutionary government in 1813 did not alter the lowly status of the Afro-Argentines. By the 1830s the emancipation process had produced a marked decline in the slave population with the result that there emerged a severe shortage in domestic labour. The Afro-Argentines were heavily represented (over 90%) in lowly service occupations at a time when the African represented a quarter of the Buenos Aires population in 1838. As Andrews (1979:22) notes "...black men and women performed the labour that the whites were either too few, too proud or too lazy to do."²⁵

The most dramatic movement was during the 1850s when Argentina introduced (along with other South American states) legislation designed to divide society into racial castes arranged in a well-defined hierarchy (Andrews 1979, 1980). The Afro-Argentine was differentiated from those with a pure European ancestry and a mixed racial ancestry. These racial codes were important not only in identifying 'others' but also the naming of the Afro-Argentine was indicative of their status. The term 'negro' or 'people of colour' unlike the labels of 'savages'

24 . However, careful research (e.g. Andrews 1980) has shown that some Afro-Argentines were able to hold professional positions (e.g. military officers, school teachers, small businesses) and skilled employment (e.g. coachmakers, journalists).

25 . This compares with the "English labourer does not, or will not, adapt himself to new conditions or face unaccustomed hardships. He is not content to 'rough it.'" (cited in Hennessy 1992:18).

or 'barbarians' did not seem to allow for the possibility of social mobility or transformation. In contradistinction the Creole Argentines were described as simply 'white' or 'European' (Andrews 1980, Shumway 1991).

The position of the Afro-Argentine, during the Rosas regime (1835-1852), was not helped when the governor of Buenos Aires province (in a series of conflicts with other provinces) issued a series of discriminatory draft decrees. The effects of such conflicts on the black community was disastrous as large portions of the black population were absent during the wars and many never returned to the province (Andrews 1980). Thereafter, the position of the working class Afro-Argentine underwent further decline as a result of large scale immigration from Southern Europe in the 1870s onwards (Solberg 1970). The effects of such a development were that the Afro-Argentine was excluded from a number of occupations that had previously been heavily represented by that group. The only occupation by the end of the nineteenth century that remained black dominated was domestic service. Indeed as Andrews (1979) has noted that it was considered fashionable in Buenos Aires for the white wealthy elite to have well-dressed black servants.

Perhaps the most dramatic example of a white community in Buenos Aires being able to construct and secure racially pure boundaries and identities was the treatment of the black middle class. The black elite in Buenos Aires had made considerable attempts to differentiate themselves from the black service class. The black middle class as Andrews (1979) has noted formed their own clubs (e.g. *The Argentine Hope*), created their own newspapers (e.g. *La Broma*) and courted the white elites of Buenos Aires in an attempt to join the upper echelons of white society. The attempts by young Afro-Argentines to learn the arts and sciences, to take up religion were in itself attempts to redefine the ascribed cultural characteristics of the black person. To a certain extent this optimism seemed well placed given that the 1853 Constitution had outlawed racial discrimination and later acts of legislation had ended segregation of public schools. Indeed the black newspaper *La Broma* in 1878 urged its

readers to overcome "the semi-barbarous vices and habits that come to us by racial tradition, that up to now we have not been able to restrain completely" (cited in Andrews 1979:32).

This response by *La Broma* appeared to be taken seriously by the black middle class as they tried to assimilate the norms of a white society. However, the disadvantaged position of the Afro-Argentine did not alter. The white *porteno* and for that matter white Argentines continued to discriminate against the black population (called 'people of colour') regardless of relative wealth or position. The wave of immigration from Southern Europe in the 1870s onwards merely extended this discrimination as white elites attempted to secure white identities through the continued exclusion of the Afro-Argentine from the affluent middle class and from political participation (Solberg 1970).

European immigration between 1870-1914 had gradually been responsible for the marginalisation of the Afro-Argentine. The city of Buenos Aires' dependence on black service employment had been removed as Italians and Spaniards filled those voids. By the 1880s and 1890s the black community had declined considerably so that it contributed only a minimal percentage to the population of Buenos Aires. The increasing numbers of white people within Buenos Aires and the provinces was an important aspect of nineteenth century Argentina. As Andrews (1979:39) noted "Argentine writers and thinkers announced that Argentina had become a truly white society, racially superior to the other South American republics, and therefore, the premier nation of the continent. Non-European realities in the country's past and present were ignored and eventually forgotten in the process of cultivating the myth of a white Argentina."

The position of the Afro-Argentine like that of the Indian played a crucial role in the construction of national identities through the articulation of a non-white 'other'. The development of the ideology of scientific racism in the nineteenth century further codified racial identities in Argentina. In the case of Argentina they were to serve two important roles:

first, in the imagination of a national community and second, in differentiating Argentina from other South American countries which had a stronger presence of non-white peoples.

4.6. Post Colonial Identity III: The Anglo-Argentine Liminar

The position of the Anglo-Argentine at first glance varies considerably from that of the Afro-Argentine or Indian in the imagination of Argentina (Hennessy and King 1992). In succinct terms the Anglo-Argentine community never suffered the discrimination and violence perpetuated against the black or Indian populations. Yet I shall suggest that the position of the British is a pivotal moment in the invention of Argentina and the articulation of Argentine national identities. The constitution of national identities for a place called 'Argentina' in the nineteenth century onwards was made possible to a certain extent by an engagement with the British 'other.' Even though as Ferns (1992:49) reminds us that "Argentina never received the British immigrants on a scale of seriously modifying the Latin or Mediterranean character of the community, or political culture."

The British in the narratives of Argentine history have had an ambivalent position. In the early days before Independence, British traders were scripted as 'heroic rebels' seeking to break the Spanish trade and commercial hegemony (Lynch 1973). As President Bartolome Mitre noted in 1887 the illegal trade was "a normal function of the economic organism a circumstance superior to the power of the King of Spain" (Mitre 1887:50). However, spurious these sorts of labels of British clandestine trade, such activities did contribute to a wider discourse which enabled the interplay of the market, the state and the firm (Jones 1992). Such a discourse seemed to be on hand in the 1890s, when the British banks during the Baring Crisis were cast in the role of evil institutes which had "strangled the government and the country, made gold rise and fall ... and made themselves masters of the market, impoverishing the country and producing crises ... " (cited in Jones 1992:68).

The transformation of Anglo-Argentine relations in the nineteenth and twentieth century needs to be explored within a context which acknowledges the diversity of that relationship—from exploration and colonisation in the south of Argentina, to violent competition over the Falkland Islands to the establishment of banking and railway interests in the Argentine (Graham-Yooll 1981a, Lewis 1984).²⁶ One of the most hotly disputed aspects of Anglo-Argentine writings is whether British interest in the Argentine during the nineteenth century was 'imperialist' by nature (e.g. Platt 1977, Jones 1980, Lewis 1984, Grivil 1985). There are undoubtedly complications: first, the colonising experiences of India or parts of Africa were very different from that of Argentina. Britain never established imperial rule in Argentina. Second, if one examines the experiences of the 'white' colonies of Australia or Ireland there do not appear to be many similarities (only ironies as I explain later).

However, I believe that the British intervention in the Argentine has similarities with American expansionism in the Pacific during the nineteenth century (see Stedman-Jones 1973). Neither imperial power appeared interested in formally colonising territory yet these relationships with other places do involve a considerable degree of economic imperialism which although in the case of Britain directly mediated by the state had a considerable influence on the Argentine state.

4.6.1. The Economic Dimension of the Anglo-Argentine Connection

26 . The Welsh and Irish settlers were extremely important in the context of contesting the sovereign claims of the Chilean nation-state to the region. In the case of disputed sovereignty, "the nationality of the liminars will be affirmed along with their liminality, which signifies the nation's expanding borders. Once the ambitiously expanding state has established a secure claim over the borderlands (usually through military control), the liminars may become exemplars of anti-national traits, negative referents in the definition of nationality" (Norton 1988:63).

The position of the British in Argentina was significant. In terms of sheer numbers the British community in Buenos Aires was the largest outside the Empire. As many scholars have noted the British imperial interests in Argentina were so substantial that the Argentine has been described as part of the 'informal empire' of Britain (e.g. Ferns 1954, 1992). From the earliest days of Independence in 1810 the British presence was substantial in the fields of commerce and finance. The British created the banking system, the railways and dominated the retail trade (Lewis 1983, Hennessy 1992). By the end of the nineteenth century British investment amounted to nearly 300 million pounds (see Gravil 1985). As Irazusta (1963:15) noted, however, "Like all aspects of national life, British influence in Argentina began before Independence. One has to unearth its antecedents in the colonial period".

The first decades of the nineteenth century were the prelude to the substantial trading interest and investment by the British in Argentina. As an anonymous writer noted in 1810 "A stranger seeing so many English faces would suppose it an English colony" (cited in Hennessy 1992:13). Subsequent decades were to confirm the British as an important element in the eventual colonisation of the pampas for the production and export of beef products and the creation of financial and business enterprises. A position that was to be virtually unchallenged until the first decade of the twentieth century when American and German capital began to challenge the British position (Gravil 1985). As a consequence, Ortiz (1934b:522) argued that 'Argentina's tragedy' lay in the fact that "Argentina lived in complete confidence of the unlimited possibilities it possessed for future development ... (Argentine leaders) wallowed in an optimism of plenty that they never sought to analyse. Nobody wanted to wait for the fruits of his labour. Instead they were tasted in advance in the forms of mortgages, bank credits and loans of every description".

The establishment of a coalition between the *estancieros* and political elites led by individuals such as Juan Manuel de Rosas provided the context from which Anglo-Argentine

trading developed. The British state's ability to provide international markets for Argentine exports such as meat and cereals substantially contributed to the creation of the state. The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation of 1824 between the British government and the *United Provinces of the River de la River Plate (Argentina)* codified that economic relationship. In addition, the implicit recognition of Argentine sovereign power was important in legitimating that particular state. Britain and Argentina recognised that any subject living in one or other of those countries was subject to the laws and courts of one another.

In the 1820s, the Argentine government which had negotiated that Treaty also attempted to encourage borrowing on the international capital markets. British investors were drawn to these plans and the Baring Brothers and Company became an important agent in the floatation of a bond issue with a face value of 1,000,000. The plan itself involved a series of misjudgements which as Ferns (1992:53) notes "The Baring Loan was in default from the moment the money was received, but not before the promoters had taken their cut and the British investors had bought the bonds." In spite of the failures on the British side, the federal government was able to borrow money to finance municipal development, railways and harbour developments. The Argentine government agreed to underwrite most of these developments and played an active role in encouraging further investment" (Ferns 1992:52).

Furthermore, the Anglo-Argentine Treaty of 1824 was later renegotiated in 1852 which enabled Argentina to ensure free navigation of the River Plate-Parana river systems which in turn improved Argentina's access to the international markets. The liberal trade policies of the Rosas regime in the 1840s and 1850s encouraged considerable commercial activity amongst cattle ranchers, meat processors and industrial enterprises in Argentina. British investment in Argentina, however, was not aided in any way by the British state which insisted as Lord Palmerston in 1848 noted "It is hitherto thought by successive governments of Great Britain

undesirable that British subjects should invest their capital in loans to foreign governments instead of employing it in profitable undertakings at home ... " (cited in Platt 1968:398).²⁷

The second half of the nineteenth century were punctuated by financial crises which effectively lay the foundation for the collapse of economic relations between British and Argentine oligarchies even though the British appeared to be successful in integrating themselves into the Argentine governing class. There was a surge of British investment in the later half of the nineteenth century. By 1889, for example, Argentina absorbed between 40 to 50 per cent of all British investment outside Britain (Ferns 1960). Yet the fall in commodity prices and the collapse of foreign capital in the 1870s onwards and most notably the 1890 Baring Crisis led to anti-British sentiments being expressed. As Ortiz (1934a:28) noted "On the one hand the whole nation, the whole people, without distinction as to rank or to class. On the other hand the English and North American capitalists and their Argentine representatives who are ... hoping to direct the outburst of national passion onto the innocent, defenceless, new immigrants who work side by side with native Argentines".

The Baring Crisis of 1890 which was precipitated by the collapse of that Company and the failure of the British government to intervene in the crisis. The crisis was eventually resolved by a deal between bankers and the Argentine authorities in which the Bankers agreed to lend money to the Argentine state so that it could pay on defaulted interest. Thereafter the deal was designed to allow the Argentine state to renegotiate the level of interest payments and sinking fund payments as and when the state of the economy allowed for repayments (Jones 1992). However, many Argentine revisionist writers argued that British imperialism was

27 . One of the ironies of the Rosas regime, for example, was that the terror campaigns launched by the President to irradicate political opponents had the effect of some of the wealthy Argentine oligarchy transferring their properties and monies to British merchant elites. In addition, the British and other foreign merchants were an important source of 'safe houses' during May 1842 when the dictator's private security forces roamed around Buenos Aires searching for enemies of the state (Rock 1987).

based "on the discovery that the first arm of economic domination is the loan" (Villafane 1943:274).

By the end of the nineteenth century, rivalry between America and Britain over Argentina had increased significantly and had the effect of dislodging Britain's hegemonic trading position. Following the Spanish-American Wars of 1895, American capital was anxious to achieve commercial expansion in Latin America (and elsewhere) in order to avert the effects of economic depression (Stedman-Jones 1973). By the end of the First World War, for example, American capital had removed the British from their hegemonic position vis-a-vis the meat trade and control of transport networks in Argentina. American supplies of farm machinery, consumer products, and as a source of investment funds further codified America's position as a major trading partner of Argentina.

Unfortunately for Argentina, on the one hand its exports of wool, meat and grain were unable to challenge American domestic suppliers because of the tariff barriers imposed by the American state. On the other hand, however, import substitution in Argentina was generating the sort of import savings needed to counter balance a fall in world exports (Gravil 1985). The heights of the 1880s and even the 1911 levels of investment of some 290 million pounds in the railways and meat trade never returned. Yet in spite of the changes, Anglo-Argentine relations remained cordial despite of the collapse of trade and commerce and the efforts of the Radical Party in 1916 onwards to challenge Anglo-Argentine political and economic power (Munck 1989). The Anglo-Argentine community of 30,000 remained important and indeed supported two English language newspapers in the early decades of the twentieth century. The British retained " ... important allies at cabinet and congressional level ... The British lobby ranked with the cattleman's association as the most powerful in the country" (cited in MacDonald 1992:81).

The visit of the Prince of Wales to Argentina in 1925, to celebrate the 100 year old Treaty of Friendship drew the following from President Alvear "The Prince is the representative of a

glorious dynasty ... and of a government which is the model of good sense and efficiency".²⁸ These sorts of sentiments barely lasted into the 1930s when trading relations between Argentina and Britain failed. The 1932 Ottawa Conference on Imperial Preference had confirmed that the British intended to replace imports of Argentine meat and wheat with those of its colonies and dominions (Australia, Canada and New Zealand). The reduction in British purchases of Argentine beef (from June 1932) was to be gradual: initially at 5% per quarter, increasing after nine months to 15%. Given that 99% of Argentina's beef exports went to Britain and that it accounted for half of Argentina's exchange revenue, Ortiz (1940b:203) argued that "the English will impede spontaneous development, foreclose industrial possibilities, and maintain us in the state of agricultural and stock producers".

The response of the Argentine president General Agustin Justo was to despatch a trade negotiation team headed by Julio Roca to London in 1932. After several months of negotiations, the Roca-Runciman pact of 1933 agreed that Britain would continue to import Argentine beef in exchange for trade concessions for British industry and investment in Argentina. Argentina was forced to grant trade concessions to the British not only because of the meat trade but also because it still depended in part on British imports of iron, coal and textiles (Crossley and Greenhill 1977). As Ortiz (1940b:6) noted "The Argentine Republic is an immense fly trapped and immobilised in the network of English economic domination".

The concessions granted to British imports in the treaty were attacked by nationalists as a sell-out of a wider national interest and confirmed that Anglo-Argentine relations were disintegrating over questions of geo-economics. Dissenters of the Agreement were further appalled when it emerged that the trade mission had assured the British that "Argentina is very like a British dominion ... an integral part of the British Empire (cited in Falcoff 1972:83). The Roca-Runicman Pact was widely condemned in Argentina for abusing

28 . Cited in *The Times* 16 May 1925

Argentine national interests. In one case, the Radicals organised a revolt in December 1933 in Buenos Aires calling for the "denunciation of all agreements contracted by the government since 1930, and the forced withdrawal from all public, representative and judicial or executive positions of persons who had or who might have had anything to do with foreign capital" (Ortiz 1940:65-66). The revolutionaries were eventually crushed by the forces of the military government in January 1934.

The consequences of the 1933 agreement were to secure the political-economic power of a small cattle-owning elite who had been previously been deprived of American markets by a cattle protectionist lobby in America and were dependent on the British market (Rock 1987).²⁹ The importance of the meat trade to Anglo-Argentine relations had been summed up by Sir Neville Henderson British Ambassador to Argentina "Our good or bad relations seem to depend entirely on the import duty which was levied on chilled beef ...", this situation was to sharpen anti-British sentiments in the 1930s onwards (cited in Henderson 1945:205). Ultimately, preparing the ground for the rise of Juan Peron and the collapse of the Anglo-Argentine trade connection (Gravil 1985).

The outbreak of the Second World War led to new financial and trade developments which meant that Argentina had to accept sterling balances held at the Bank of England for Argentine produce, secured on British assets in Argentina. These balances were later to be used by Peron to 'buy out' the British proprietors of the Argentine railways and public utility companies such as the telephone system. As Ortiz (1940a:144) suggested that the British had

29 . There has been a wide range of interpretations offered by Argentine scholars for the crisis of the 1930s. These include: A Galetti (1961) *La Política y Los Partidos*, C Fayt ed *La Naturaleza del Peronismo*, F Weil (1944) *The Argentine Riddle* and G di Tella and M Zymelman (1967) *Las Etapas del Desarrollo Economico Argentino*.

"extracted the richest veins of national wealth ... for the greater glory of England".³⁰ By the 1940s the Anglo-Argentine trade relationship had all but disappeared. Furthermore, disputes with Britain over sovereign claims to Antarctic territory had emerged as a major policy preoccupation for Argentina (Beck 1989, Child 1985). In the British case, the Churchill administration initiated Operation Tabarin (1943), on the pretext of fears of German shipping activities, to respond to Argentine claims (Dodds 1992a).

4.6.2. Colonising Argentina: the British Contribution

The mid-1850s were to witness a decisive shift in favour of promoting the colonization of the frontier territory on behalf of the Argentine state (Herring 1967, Williams 1979). The British (in particular the Irish and the Welsh) were important element in the colonization of Patagonia. This was an important moment in the creation of the Argentine nation-state. Patagonia, for example, had been subject to counter claims by Chile in the 1840s who planned to establish various settlements along the eastern seaboard of Patagonia. As Williams (1979:42) notes "It was the threat of Chilean encroachment on what it regarded as Argentine

30 . Peron acknowledged his intellectual debt to Scalabrini Ortiz in an interview in 1965 when he noted that "It was he who shaped the entire nature of the resistance to the usurpers (during the 1930s) elucidating what everyone else thought to discover- the causes of the Argentine 'defeat'...I am especially indebted to him for the original ideas..." (cited in Falcoff 1972:79).

In recognition of Ortiz's advice on the nationalisation of the railways, Peron invited him to the public ceremony in 1948 which recognised the 'repatriation' of those British owned railway lines (18,000 miles of track and 70% of railway stock).

territory that was mainly responsible for the nation's eagerness to establish and sponsor a settlement south of the River Negro" (See Bowen 1966).³¹

The Welsh and Irish settlers in Patagonia were important territorial liminal groups. As Norton (1988:57) noted "They live literally on the border, betwixt and between adjacent nations. They are most often physically removed from the capital and the centres of political and economic power, thus possessing the relative poverty and impotence characteristic of liminars. They are regarded, and regard themselves, as unconventional and egalitarian, as wanderers removed from the obligations of kinsmen and neighbours". The settlers were characterised as being within the nation-state but outside (or without) the law.

4.6.3. The Welsh Contribution

The liminality of those on the frontier enhances the metaphors of incorporation. Liminars as Norton (1988:61) argues "stand on the line that defines the state. Their inclusion within it is ambiguous. The desire of the state to enhance its power by expanding territory prompts the authorities to vociferously affirm the nationality of the ambiguous nationals on the frontier". In the case of Welsh settlements in Patagonia, the arguments over authority (between the Welsh and the elites in Buenos Aires) were centred over national identity and state power. The subsequent intervention of the Argentine state in the 'Conquest of the Desert' was

31 . The importance of the British in colonising a sovereign space called 'Argentina' has been commented upon by geographers (e.g. Bowen 1966, Williams 1969). However, the significance of those stories, for example, about Welsh colonisation can be placed within a context in which they were "...particularly germane to Euro-American identity because it linked individual experience to corporate significance. The conditions for exotic travel dictated that individuals would be privileged as sources of knowledges...as the spokesman...for an unfamiliar region" (Greenfield 1992:11).

designed to bolster territorial claims in the region. As Williams (1969:214) notes "This became apparent with the encroachment of Spanish (sic) officials on the political sector of the Colony's activities and was particularly obvious after the inauguration of the first Governor in 1884".

The settlement in the Lower Chubut Valley from 1865 onwards was an important element in not only Welsh history but contributed to the general attempts by Argentine government to extend the frontier in the nineteenth century (see Williams 1965,1969,1979,1992). The initial settlers (165) arrived at the Lower Chubut Valley in July 1865 with vague promises from the Argentine authorities that *some form of political independence might be possible*. The original aim had been to constitute a farming community with a legal and political framework to oversee that community. As Williams (1969:213) notes "It was the first permanent settlement to be established south of the River Negro, and laid the foundation for subsequent colonisation projects in Patagonia".

The relationship between the settlement and the British authorities in Buenos Aires was ambivalent. Although disdainful of the community in Patagonia, the British were pressurised by Welsh MP's in London to send ships from Montevideo southwards with supplies to assist the Welsh settlement. The community itself struggled initially because of the arid conditions of the Chubut valley. However, the development of systems of irrigation, successive waves of immigration (1865, 1874-6, 1881) and subsequent wheat cultivation set the foundation for a reasonable successful community. However, relations with the Patagonian Indians were initially uneasy but over time developed a trading relationship based on barter. Indeed as Williams (1965,1979) notes, the colony in the Lower Chubut often relied upon Indian expertise in hunting and farming in the initial years of the settlement (1865-1870). In conjunction with Indian guides, the Welsh settlers also launched significant explorations into the interior of Argentina in the hope that this would signify their independence from the Argentine state (Williams 1969).

The major problem facing the Welsh community in Argentina was its legal and political relationship to the Argentine state. There had been confrontations with various senior Argentine figures including the Chief of Police in Buenos Aires and the Administrator of Lands and Colonies. The most significant moment was during Roca's campaign to 'Conquer the Desert' in 1879. The pressures of cattle raising and the need to reward political allies with land grants prompted General Roca to launch a genocidal campaign against the Tehuelche Indians. The campaign prompted the Indians to contact the Welsh settlers and ask if they could intervene on their behalf (Williams 1979). The settlers wrote to the Argentine authorities and the British Counsel in Buenos Aires pleading that the campaign be halted. As a consequence of such intervention the Welsh were accused of treason and of impeding the Argentine state in its attempts to pacify the pampas.

One of the consequences of such a move by the Welsh on behalf of the Indians was that the Argentine government refused to acknowledge the Welsh community as autonomous- with the right to collect taxes, to oversee public works and establish sites of public education. Indeed as the newspaper *La Nacion* on 28 March 1879 the Argentine authorities had decided to send military officials to the colony "in order to re-establish respect for the Argentine authorities." The refusal of the Welsh to accept the authority of the Argentine state led to further threats of a military intervention in order "to defend the Argentine flag" with the apparent assistance of a British warship (Williams 1965).

The Welsh community eventually received recognition in 1884 when the Law of Territories which enabled the Welsh to enjoy certain rights previously denied during the Desert Campaign in 1879-1880. Although the relationship between the state governor and the Welsh settlers was largely co-operative, problems remained over the assimilation of the Welsh. As one governor recorded in 1898 "...We have the formation of eminently Welsh communities whose sessions are held in a foreign language, and which completely forget their common interests by busying themselves in opposing all available means of assimilation of the foreign elements to the motherland that gave them bread for their children and that from the pariahs

converted them into free men sheltered by the glorious shade cast by the flag of May" (cited in Williams 1992:116).

The Welsh control of the agricultural and transport economy of Patagonia gradually extended in the late and early twentieth century under the supervision of an Argentine bureaucracy resentful of Welsh insularity in contrast to the "progressive and patriotic Latins" (Williams 1992:117). The problems of local institutional conflict, assimilation and economic collapse during the early decades of the twentieth century effectively ended the Welsh community's ability to maintain a hegemonic grip of the Patagonian economy centred around the Chubut Valley. However, the subsequent decline of that community does not alter the issue that the Welsh community was an important component in the physical demarcation of the Argentine republic. The construction of the Welsh as 'outsiders' in the Patagonian region has been acknowledged recently as an important element in the creation of a sense of Argentine identity.

4.6.4. The Irish Contribution

One of the least documented dimensions of Anglo-Argentine relations has been the role the Irish played in colonising the Argentine. That does not imply that 'their contribution' was substantial but it does add a further dimension to the relations between Argentina and Britain (Korol and Sabato 1981, Keogh 1992). The basis for much of Irish immigration to Argentina appears to have been as a consequence of economic disaster in Ireland in the early nineteenth century. The paradoxes of Argentine-Irish relations have been recently noted by Keogh (1992). One interesting example cited in Keogh (1992:124) was an Irish embassy report of the 1950s which suggested that the Argentine government's decision to import Marino sheep in 1824 and encourage Irish settlers to the Argentine was an example "of one of history's little ironies that our emigrants came to Argentina to assist in the building up of a system and

a class the creation of which in Ireland had led to their own emigration." In spite of these ironies the Irish presence in Argentina was numbered at 4,500 by 1848 (Coghlan 1967).

The vast majority of Irish emigrants in the nineteenth century arrived in the Argentine in the post-famine period. The expansion of the wool economy in the 1850s onwards (the largest export earner up to 1900) encouraged many of the Irish to the pampas as "the rise of sheep farming helped break up the largest of the *estancias*, as the luckier shepherds- the Irish being the best example- gathered the capital to set themselves up as landowners" (Rock 1987:134). Those who did find themselves small holdings found employment as labourers as McCann (1853) noted they were "... particularly acceptable as they are willing to do the heavy manual labour which Creoles are reluctant to do ..." as such they were heavily employed in ditching on the pampas.

The position of the Irish as landowners in the pampas region appeared problematic for Argentine elites in Buenos Aires. *La Nacion* noted in September 1862, for example, that "On Saturday last sold by auction ... about three-fourths of a square league of land ... It is unnecessary to state that the purchaser was an Irishman ... (they) are becoming owners of some of the best lands of the Province. There are whole counties to the north belonging exclusively to Irishmen ... committed and prosperous ... Thanks to this the Irishmen for ten years back have been working an incredible revolution in the country."

The Irish unlike the Welsh were scattered across the Argentine and even in the Falkland Islands where there were persistent attempts made in the 1850s onwards to secure the services of priests for the 400 strong Irish community (Keogh 1992). In terms of their assimilation into the Argentine state, this process appears to have been considerably easier than that of the Welsh for several reasons:- first, they helped populate the pampas and were prepared to perform heavy manual tasks that had been the preserve of black slaves. Second, their Catholicism made them as an ethnic group relatively easy to accommodate. Third, Irish

forms of political activism were largely based on aiding their fellow citizens in mainland Ireland and not challenging the authority of the Argentine state.

The English, Irish and Welsh were important elements in the colonization of a space called Argentina. If as Hennessy (1992:120) argues that "Few Argentines of any standing were to question the dominance of the British until the great financial crash of 1890" few could have been unaware of the ambiguities of Anglo-Argentine relations. On the one hand British investment and emigration was undoubtedly aiding the rapid expansion of the Argentine economy and society in the nineteenth century. Yet on the other hand Anglo-Argentine rivalry and geopolitical competition was decisive in exposing those ambiguities still further as the next section makes clear.

4.6.5. Anglo-Argentine Conflict

As many scholars have noted, Anglo-Argentine relations were largely characterised by trade and commerce rather than conflict (e.g. Beck 1983, Metford 1968). The few British attempts to conquer territory in South America ended in failure (Ferns 1954). In 1806 and 1807, for example, the unofficial expedition led by Sir Home Popham which attempted to invade Buenos Aires was defeated by the Creole militia. These defeats were important events which were used first, to illustrate the ability of the Argentine state to secure loyalties and carve out a national identity. As Bartolome Mitre wrote in 1809 "The great victory of Buenos Aires had a resounding impact on the world, and above all in the hearts of all American, who were now made conscious of a force which had been previously unknown. They were given a new sense of identity" (cited in Lynch 1973:41). Second, after those defeats the British Prime-Minister issued a Memorandum on 1 May 1807 urging the encouragement of 'commercial penetration' with the co-operation of the Argentine state (cited in Ferns 1960).

The most dramatic example of the conflict within the Anglo-Argentine relations was in the 1830s when the British with American assistance disposed of the Argentine presence on the Falkland Islands in 1833. This event in itself is further compounded with extreme irony when one considers the anger expressed in Washington DC over British dominance in Latin America. As one American official in Buenos Aires wrote in 1840: "The extraordinary partiality, admiration, and preference for the English government and English men ... unaccountable and strange, in view of the arrogant and selfish policy, and the meddlesome and sinister influences, which the British government and peoples have always endeavoured to exercise in these countries" (cited in Hennessy 1992:34).

Anglo-Argentine relations were further strained in the 1840s when the British in conjunction with the French attempted to impose 'peace' onto the unstable provinces of the River Plate. In this case Anglo-French forces by attempting to block the port of Buenos Aires, seizing the island of Martin Garcia and sending a naval expedition to Montevideo attempted to prevent the Argentine President, Manuel de Rosas from accumulating territory north of the River Plate. The crisis resolved itself without the outbreak of war because de Rosas' never did commit his forces. However, the British were later forced to re-negotiate the 1824 Anglo-Argentine treaty and pay compensation to Argentina for the interference. Furthermore, as Ferns (1954:61) notes " ... the British ships in South American waters (were) obliged to salute the Argentine flag with 21 guns in ceremonial acknowledgement of Argentine sovereignty".

The effects of the blockade in 1845-6 for the Rosas government were severe. In the first place several of the *estancieros* dumped livestock on the Buenos Aires market in protest of the Rosas' attempts to maintain the trade hegemony of the port of Buenos Aires. The result of such a move was to depress the price of meat and improve the living standards for those living in the cities. However, other *estancieros* launched a revolt against the Rosas regime. The subsequent efforts of Rosas to enlist an army to defend his government against the revolt caused not only inflation but also labour shortages in the rural economy which affected Rosas

traditional allies - the *estancieros*. The cost of the military campaign also forced Rosas to tighten the monopoly of trade centred on the River Plate.

The reluctance of British governments to intervene on behalf of British investors in the Argentine (especially after the events of the 1845-6 Blockade) caused at times considerable friction. When in 1856, for example, the government of Buenos Aires province was negotiating with a representative of the Baring Company about the repayment of the loan made in 1825, a British minister suggested to the then British Foreign Secretary that sending a naval task force to Buenos Aires might speed up matters! (Ferns 1960). This suggestion was refused but was typical of the British state's unwillingness to intervene after the fiascos of 1806 and the 1840s.

Thereafter, conflict between Britain and Argentina in the mid-nineteenth century onwards was largely absent. The question of the Falkland Islands, for example, did not emerge as a point of violent dispute even though the Argentine government refused to accept British sovereignty. A number of measures were taken to ensure that the Argentine state did not prejudice its claims to those islands: any letter bearing Falkland Islands stamps was not accepted for posting in the Argentine, ships which had left Port Stanley bound for Argentine ports were refused entry and in another case the Military Geographical Institute insisted that all maps produced in Argentina showed the Falklands as the *Islas Malvinas* (Dodds 1993b). Furthermore, President Peron (in 1943) ordered that all Argentine maps also had to depict the South Orkney Islands, the South Sandwich Islands and a part of the Antarctic peninsula as part of the Argentine Republic.

4.7. Patriotic Education and the Argentine State

In the 1870s and 1880s, the ruling elites of Buenos Aires decided to introduce patriotic forms of education in the light of new fears that rising immigration (from Southern Europe) in the late nineteenth century would fundamentally alter the *La Patria* (Solberg 1970). As Ramos Mejia (1899:255) noted an immigrant (especially one from Southern Europe) was "A gross person, one of those low things that future scientists will study with curiosity in order to establish the linkage of the successive types of our evolution. With their cheap, sensual tastes and their love of bright colours, raucous music and gaudy clothing, they are simply inferior".

The wider institutionalisation of state education in the late nineteenth century was assuming considerable importance.³² The arrival of vast numbers of immigrants placed new pressures on the Argentine state. The growth of agricultural exports and a desire to create a 'white' Europeanised community led to the sorts of educational and cultural reforms vital to cultivating mythologies about the Argentine state and its peoples (see Andrews 1979, Szuchman 1990, Vogel 1991). Educational reform in the late nineteenth century and in the early twentieth century was of great importance in aiding these imaginative processes. As Escude (1992:5) notes "Thus the state had to step in to rapidly compensate for this lack of 'natural' identity, improvising myths and, more importantly, generating negative images of their immediate neighbours." The 'making of the citizen' (Charles Merriam's phrase) emerged as a major preoccupation of the late nineteenth century Argentine state.

One of the most interesting components of state education were teachings in history and geography which emphasised that Argentina had been 'mutilated' by its territorial competitors after the Wars of Independence in the early decades of the nineteenth century (Escude 1987). The depiction of a 'vulnerable' state has important consequences. First, the question of

32 . As Agnew (1987:39) has noted that "...Gramsci argued that the dominance of state building elite rests in the perpetuation of a 'hegemony' or cultural form through which its dominance is defined as legitimate...It is sustained only through great difficulty and through the control over major educational, cultural and political insitutions".

citizenship (and the need for vigilance) becomes tied up with the issue of state security. Second, this seems to me to offer an excellent illustration of how geography through the school system was used to underwrite a discourse which described Argentina as a vulnerable state which had been threatened by the Indian and which had suffered losses at the hands of the Bolivians, the Chileans, the Paraguayans and the British to name but a few.

One of the great ironies that Escude's work (1987,1990) raises is how the elites who controlled public education in Argentina were able to perpetuate a mythology of territorial mutilation and racial impurities that had (either) no material (or) moral grounding whatsoever. As we have seen Argentina was remarkably successful in colonizing vast tracts of territory to the south and to the north in the nineteenth century. The only 'loss' as Escude (1987,1988) notes was the Falklands (Las Malvinas) to the British in 1833. Yet the remaining part of the nineteenth century was characterised by an Argentine state acquiring additional territory in virtually every direction away from the national capital Buenos Aires (Dodds 1994b).

However, the subsequent restructuring to the education system in the 1880s incorporated the geographical mythologies of the Argentine state under the title of 'patriotic education'. The introduction of patriotic education was, as the *Ministerio de Justicia e Instruccion* noted in 1886 designed to "preserve its institutions from the degenerations that would arise from immigration." By 1888, for example, a decree had been issued that at least six weekly hours had to be devoted to Argentine history at primary school. In addition both geography and history had to be taught at all six primary grades (See Spalding 1972). Thereafter an 1899 decree established that only an Argentine citizen could teach Argentine history and geography. In 1902 a decree had been issued stating that the Argentine flag had to be exhibited at all schools. These changes to the pedagogical system were recorded in the *Monitor de la Educacion Comun* (until 1949).³³

33 . The records of the *Monitor de la Educacion Comun* are held at the National Library in Buenos Aires.

The processes that were to lead to the eventual institutionalisation of geography (at school and university level) in Argentina were put in place by the end of the nineteenth century. In 1904, a National Teachers Institute was created which was the prelude to qualifications for geography teachers. In the following year the Lainez Act led to the creation of the federal schools throughout Argentina. The fears of immigration and or foreign invasion were used to hasten the creation of forms of 'patriotic education.' As Escude (1992:13) has noted that " ... the perception of an invasion...was a cause of and a motivation for an extremist educational policy that was officially established in 1908 whose objective was to Argentinize (sic) the children and immigrants."

The election of Maria Ramos Mejia 1908 as President of the National Council for Education was perhaps the prelude to the most dramatic changes in Argentine primary school education and to geography as an academic discipline. The Patriotic Education plan announced by Mejia was designed to create an educational system that " ... shall emphasize how rich our country is in all of these dimensions and how even its poorest inhabitants are thus provided with foodstuffs, comforts and pleasures which innumerable peoples of the world are deprived of" (cited in Escude 1990:27). Furthermore, Mejia ordered that school children should be taught that "In conversation, in all grades, issues of a patriotic character must be frequently included: the flag, the coat of arms, the monuments, the national anthem, the national heroes ... Scrap books of a patriotic character should be made by all school children" (Cited in Escude 1990:33).

Geography was to be central to the attempts to create a 'civic education' in 1908. Mejia, in earliest pieces of writing, had already stated that geography was particularly suitable to the " ... influence in the formation of patriotic sentiments" and in the general descriptions of the nation's resources and 'natural beauties' (Mejia 1899 cited in Quintero 1992:258). These utterances were further supplemented by appeals for geographical training to instil "the first

and most important duty of an individual and a citizen is to love, honour and serve his fatherland, working for its prosperity and for its greatness abroad".³⁴

The teaching of history and geography at the primary level of state education were tied to patriotism, collective memories and state formation. As the *Monitor* (in June 1910) noted school children should be reminded that "San Martin, Moreno, Belgrano, Rivadavia, illustrious fathers of the Argentine Republic who dwelled (sic) in the glorious regions of historical immortality, founders of the Liberty and Independence of the Fatherland, glorified be thy memory for the present and future generations!" (cited in Escude 1990:40). The military leaders of the Argentine state were to be celebrated and remembered by Argentine school children. The militarisation of the education system, Escude (1987) argues, enabled the Argentine state to discipline and order its citizens to the demands of the Republic. As the *Monitor* later concluded in September 1930 "The Argentine school, from the first grades to the university, must propose to develop in the Argentines the fervent conviction that their nationality's manifest destiny consists of creating a civilisation of its own of an eminently democratic character, heir to the rectified spiritual values of western civilisation ... The Argentine school proposes to contribute to the formation of a race capable of materialising the nationality's manifest destiny".³⁵

The collapse of Anglo-Argentine relations and the military coup overthrowing Yrigoyen during the 1930s led to further attempts to 'Argentinise' (*Argentinidad*) school children (Escude 1990, Rock 1987). President Justo, for example, noted in 1932 that the development of "a collective ideal and only one soul" depended on the education system (cited in Escude 1992:25). The school children were to be instructed, for instance in 1932, that "The patriotism of the men in 1810 gave us our political freedom; that of the men in 1932 will give

34 . Cited in *Monitor* 30 June 1904

35 . Cited in *Monitor* 16 September 1930

us our economic freedom, without which the former will not be sustained".³⁶ In doing so, school children were to be instructed on *foreign* presences within the state which compromised that freedom. As Jose Costa (a member of the Education *Consejo*) noted in 1932 " ... some foreign groups are unwilling to dissolve themselves into a common mass. Such an opposition engenders an undeniable danger...The cracks and crevices of the social body are patiently widened ... patriotism ... is a categorical imperative, an undeniable imperative" (cited in Escude 1992:27).

The depiction of the Argentine state within the education system as a vulnerable 'organism' had important implications for the sovereign identities of the state. The Argentine state, from the late nineteenth century onwards, assumed an active role in promoting narratives of the state in terms of which citizens were encouraged to see themselves. They offered ideals of personhood or citizen identities. As in other states, those narratives perpetuated within the education system were pernicious and directed towards liminal groups considered un-Argentine (e.g. Indians, blacks, Anglo-Argentines). As a consequence, the Minister for Public Education in 1932 noted that "In an old country, with ancient traditions and firmly rooted customs, it is the family that shapes..the infant soul ... But we, with an independent life of less than a hundred years old and with a population that has doubled in less than the span of time ... cannot yet entrust the family that intense and noble task. Here the nationalist bulwark must inevitably be the school. It is the school that must create in the soul of the children and grandchildren of foreigners, a clear and firm national feeling" (cited in Escude 1990:67). Henceforth, the *mestizo* and Afro-Argentine traces of the nation-state were eradicated from the teachings to the school children (Rouquie 1981).

4.8. Summary

36 . Cited in *Monitor* 21 June 1932

The creation of the Argentine state was a highly imaginative process that has been grounded in a series of boundary making practices that have attempted to secure an 'imagined political community.' The identification of 'dangers' or 'others' are important examples of the modalities of foreign policy which establishes the boundaries of inside/outside. By examining some of the pivotal moments in the constitution of Argentina- which continue to be represented in the more contemporary era as defining 'Argentina'- this chapter has attempted to show the practices of 'foreign policy' have been vital for the (re)production of Argentine identity. Within that task, however, this chapter has not laid claims to comprehensiveness.

One of the key moments for much of Argentine nationalist historiography has been the collapse of the Viceroyalty in 1810 and the subsequent encoding of Argentina as a 'vulnerable state' (Escude 1984,1988,1992). The preoccupation with territorial losses in the nineteenth century to neighbouring South American states has formed the basis for much of these writings (e.g. Villegas 1968, Sanz 1976). As Whitaker (1976:28) has noted " ... they all relate in one way or another to Argentina's claim that its boundaries of right included the whole late colonial viceroyalty of Buenos Aires, that is to say, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Southern Bolivia, as well as modern Argentina. Almost an obsession then, this viceregal complex was a factor to be reckoned with in the twentieth century".

The importance of 'patriotic education' in Argentina in the late nineteenth century was considerable. In the first place, pedagogical doctrines explicitly confirmed questions about how the white Argentine citizen was going to be defined and educated. The series of exclusions that constituted Argentine national identity in the nineteenth century were most damaging for the Indian and the Afro-Argentine. The Anglo-Argentines were gradually incorporated into the education and political-cultural systems of the state. The creation of national identities in Argentina, thus, has a long and violent history. This chapter departs markedly from scholars such as Lewis (1984:11) who have claimed that "National identities were forged in the heat of the revolutionary upheavals and former colonies emerged as sovereign states co-equal with the countries of the Old World ..." Rather this chapter has tried

to explore how the articulation of national identities, as with the general processes of state-building by elites was drawn out, ambiguous and violent. Linking the centre or dominant place to the other places incorporated by the state was a fundamental problem in the development of the Argentine state (Agnew 1987).

Chapter 5

Creating a Drama: The South Atlantic as a strategic arena

5.1. Introduction

The 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War transformed the South Atlantic into an area of major international concern (Hayes 1983, Hurrell 1983, Max 1983, Moneta 1983, Van Sant Hall 1983, Coutau-Begarie 1985, Gamba-Stonehouse 1987, Moodie and Cottrell 1987, Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse 1990).¹ As the editors of *Revista Cruz del Sur* in 1982, for example, noted "(we) consider that the conflict in the South Atlantic constitutes a transcendent landmark in the life of the Southern Hemisphere. It is somewhat comparable to the fall of Constantinople, which marked the demise of one era and the birth of another" (cited in Hepple 1988:232). More recently, however, Argentine writers have explored the possibilities

1 . For example, the French geostrategist Coutau-Begarie (1985) in *Geostrategie de l'Atlantique Sud* argued that the 1982 Falklands War had revealed the 'suicidal blindness' in Western strategic thinking. This neglect emerged for two reasons. First, ideological indifference because the region was characterised by military regimes in the west and a racist regime in the east. Second, the South Atlantic region was considered to be sufficiently removed from the ongoing East-West struggle. Such 'complacency' drew scathing reviews from South American strategists such as Salgado Alba (1984) who argued that the South Atlantic was "an intellectual vacuum of Western geo-strategic thinking" (cited in Ceresole 1988:56).

There is a massive South American geopolitical literature on geostrategy and the South Atlantic. For the most recent studies, see for example, Maria Llaver (1991) 'Hacia una nueva vision de las relaciones en el Atlantico Sur' *Geosur* 133 22-32; Alberto Sosa (1989) 'El Atlantico Sur: OTAS o zona de paz?' *Geosur* 113 36-43 and Mariano Bartolome (1991) 'Conflictos en el Atlantico Sur en la decada del 90' *Geopolitica* 43 56-67. The 'Zone of Peace' proposals according to Sosa (1989:41) would promote "and facilitate communication, cooperation and coordination between the countries and peoples of Latin America and Africa".

of the South Atlantic being declared as a 'zone of peace' (e.g. Sosoia 1989, Bartolome 1991, Llaver 1991) in response to the militarisation of the region by British forces.

This chapter aims to examine the South Atlantic in rather different ways to conventional analyses (e.g. Moneta 1983; Child 1985,1988; Coutau-Begarie 1985; Foucher 1986; Hepple 1988). There are two major elements: First, I have chosen to examine the debates over the possibility of creating a South Atlantic Treaty Organisation (SATO) in the 1970s (e.g. Gualco 1977, Tremayne 1977, Hayes 1978, Parker 1982, Hurrell 1983, Heitman 1985).² In particular, the writings of South American and Western geopolitical and strategic experts will be investigated in order to highlight how certain scenarios were crucial to creating a strategic drama. Second, it is suggested that the South Atlantic acted as an important 'sea of signs' in which South American states have looked into in order to construct themselves (see Weber 1993).³ The South Atlantic has been an important container which has been filled with those signifiers which have privileged geopolitical readings of the region over others.

The focus on geopolitical readings/writings is a deliberate strategy. Within South America, the geopolitical utterances of the military have been a topic of considerable attention (e.g. Pittman 1981, Child 1988,1990, Kelly and Child 1988). As Child (1979:89) noted "If there is one part of the world where geopolitics is a flourishing subject it is in southern Latin

2 . The debates over the creation of a South Atlantic Treaty Organisation were not limited just to the Southern Hemisphere. The strategist Richard Bissell (former CIA agent), for instance, provided an important summary of the South Atlantic region in 1975. He noted that "Prior to the 1960s the South Atlantic caused few anxieties. The countries of Latin America had more than enough problems to handle. Africa was an apparently quiet continent, ruled by colonial powers that were members of NATO." The decolonisation of Africa, Soviet intervention in Angola, the Middle East crisis of 1973, fear of 'access to resources' and Latin American resurgence meant that many strategists were reexamining the region (e.g. Balmaceda 1980, Wall 1977).

3 . I have taken the expression 'sea of signs' from the work of Cynthia Weber (1993) on US foreign policy in Caribbean.

America" (see Hepple 1986a). The importance of geopolitical thinking within South America has been well documented: within the education system (Pittman 1981), the practices of foreign and security policy (e.g. Comblin 1980, Gorman 1982, Pittman 1988, Pion-Berlin 1988, 1989b), the national security state (Child 1990, Pion-Berlin 1989a, Hepple 1992), territorial conflicts (Child 1985, Glassner 1985), national development strategies (e.g. Hepple 1986b, Allen 1992) and cartography (Child 1988, Dodds 1993b).⁴

Within this chapter, however, my approach to the South American geopolitical literature is somewhat at odds with the existing treatment of these writings. Instead of merely noting that geopolitical interest in the South Atlantic region increased markedly after the 1970s, I attempt to examine how those interests were discursively represented and for what purposes (discursive and political).⁵ Following Dalby's (1993b) recent paper on nuclear issues in New Zealand, it is suggested that various geo-graphs of the South Atlantic can be identified: the conventional strategic geo-graph (favoured by American and British writers), the geo-graph implicitly constructed by the South African regime and the South American geopolitical geo-graph favoured by Argentina and Brasil. The geo-graph, therefore, is employed to draw

4 . The English language literature on South American geopolitics is now of a considerable size. This condition is largely due to the sterling role that scholars such as Jack Child and Philip Kelly have played in providing summaries of that work (e.g. Child 1985, 1988 and Kelly and Child 1988). However, there remains much work to be done in actually contextualising those writings within the machinations of the national security state. In addition, I believe that this material demonstrates how geography was (and is) used as a discursive tool from which certain interpretations (e.g. Argentina as a geopolitically 'vulnerable' state) could be grounded and justified (see Dodds 1993b).

5 . As Hepple (1988:226) notes in a review article "No one factor explains this geopolitical shift. It was the result of a series of interacting and reinforcing factors. Notable among them were (1) The changing power balance with Brasil (2) the disputes and negotiations with both Chile and Britain (3) the militay takeover in Argentina in 1976 (4) the growing role of naval officers in geopolitical writing (5) the positive evaluation of resource potential in both offshore waters and Antarctica".

attention to the weaving, fixing and framing, sketching and stitching, situating and scripting strategies of geopolitical writers in South America.

The identification of geo-graphs of the South Atlantic has been based on a close reading of various literatures within geopolitics, international politics and security studies. As a consequence, it is suggested that the concept of 'geo-graphs' can be used to explore how various authors represented specific places or regions. In doing so, this chapter attempts to challenge the empiricist assumptions of the detached geopolitical intellectual based on an 'objective' reading of a region from a detached 'subject' position. Rather, it is suggested that the language of analysis helps create rhetorical, narrative and cartographic structures that create value, bestow meaning and constitute the subjects and objects that emerge in the process of inquiry. The creation of the South Atlantic as zone of strategic crisis by a variety of authors has had important political consequences as the chapter goes on to explore.

5.1.2. Identifying Geo-Graphs of the South Atlantic

The conventional geo-graph of British and American writers analysed the importance of the South Atlantic in the wider context of the Cold War and bipolar politics (e.g. Hanks 1980,1981). An important study by Wall (1977), for example, acknowledges the existence of a Soviet threat to western oil routes around South Africa and recognises the importance of strategic minerals in Southern Africa. Hanks (1980:24) noted, for example, that "a concerted Kremlin drive for domination over the entire southern portion of the African continent" but there is no mention whatsoever of the South-West Atlantic. There were exceptions such as Tremayne (1977) who asserted the geopolitical significance of the South-West region but this was very atypical and not representative of the literature (Coutau Begarie 1985, Hepple 1988). As Tremayne (1977:156) noted "During the last five years we have watched Soviet extensions of this kind in the Indian Ocean and in those parts of Africa where it would serve

instead of proxy war; it has already begun, and will soon be equally visible, in the South Atlantic".

In the South African geo-graphs of the South Atlantic, however, the focus was concentrated on four items: first, writers stressed the importance of the South East Atlantic to overall Western security (Heitman 1977, Bowman 1982). As Captain Johnson of the South African Navy warned in 1978 "The strangulation of the merchant shipping flow across the South Atlantic by the Russian Navy would have been completely impossible ten years ago. At present this must be considered a viable possibility" (cited in Bowman 1982:163). Second, the specific importance of South Africa to the global fight against communism was acknowledged (Bissell 1978, Coker 1979, Bowman 1980). As Bowman (1982:162) notes "The white buffer states that used to guard South Africa's northern frontiers have collapsed one by one, and the Republic stands more exposed than ever before as the last bastion of white minority rule on the continent". Third, the location of strategic minerals within Southern Africa was held to be of vital importance to the western world (see O Tuathail 1992b). As Chester Crocker (1981:278) acknowledged "The area contains immense deposits of many strategic minerals which are vital to industrial economies ... vital to western defense and high technology industries". Finally, the concerns over communist infiltration in and around the South-East Atlantic were linked to fears of a 'total onslaught' against South Africa by the black frontline states of Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe (Hanlon 1986, Sidaway 1992b, Sidaway and Simon 1993).

Finally, the South American geo-graph of the region differed considerably from South African or Western analyses of the South Atlantic (e.g. Gualco 1977, Balmaceda 1980, Moneta 1983). The most notable difference is simply the geographical scale of analysis. Both the South West and the South East sections of the South Atlantic were considered of great strategic importance to western security (Coutau-Begarie 1985, Hepple 1988, Gamba-Stonehouse 1989). As Ullman (1984:671-672) acknowledged, in a major review of the region in the journal *Revista de Publicaciones Navales*, "The South Atlantic is a major strategic

zone stretching from the Equator to the Antarctic territories ... it is the primary site of the commercial routes between Europe and South America, between Europe and Southern Africa or Asia and the Caribbean territories- North America and West Africa and Asia". South American writers not only drew on the existing analyses of the South East Atlantic but also invented new scenarios for the South West Atlantic (Dodds 1992b). It is within this literature that the chapter is most concerned.

More specifically, the chapter concentrates on the Argentine geopolitical literature during the military regime (1976-1982). In particular, the articles and books written by military and civilian writers attached to the Instituto de Estudios Geopoliticos and the Instituto Argentino de Estudios Estrategicos de las Relaciones Internacionales have been examined. During that period, a number of high ranking geopolitical writers (e.g. General Osiris Villegas) and the editor of the geopolitical journal *Estrategia* (General Juan Guglielmelli) enjoyed a close relationship with the Defence and Foreign Affairs Ministries (Child 1985).⁶ It is suggested that the Argentine geopolitical analyses of the South Atlantic were significant in inserting danger (based on the mastercode of anti-communism) into the drama of international politics.

Furthermore, the initiation of a violent campaign against communist subversives in the mid 1970s (The Dirty War) meant that the political identities of the Argentine state were being simultaneously fashioned out of the struggle against communism both inside and outside the

6 . General Juan Guglielmelli was head of the Escuela Superior de Guerra and the Centro de Altos Estudios, commander of the Fifth Army Corps and was a secretary to the Consejo Nacional de Desarrollo under the government of Juan Onganía between 1966-1971 (for details see Kelly 1994).

In 1969 Guglielmelli created the Instituto Argentino de Estudios Estrategicos y de las Relaciones Internacionales (INSAR). The journal *Estrategia* was published between 1969-1984. A journal which drew heady praise from Jack Child who noted that *Estrategia* was "clearly Latin America's (and possibly the world's) most sophisticated and penetrating journal of geopolitics".

state.⁷ As a consequence, of these violent struggles, the militarisation of the political system in the mid 1970s onwards was considerable. In the case of military spending, for example, the figure increased from 9% of total government spending in 1975 to 64% of spending in 1981 (Pion-Berlin 1989). As Rouquie (1982) has noted the Navy dominated the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and as a consequence much of the spending was directed towards naval activities. However, as Russell (1984:173) noted "During the authoritarian period, the military high command took all decisions concerning political issues relating to international affairs at a supra ministerial level". The proposals for a SATO-type organisation, therefore, were strongly supported by an Argentine navy dedicated to "a forward line of defense in the South Atlantic" (Gugliamelli 1979:35).

This chapter is organised into three parts. First, I examine how the South Atlantic was created as a geopolitical container. This I suggest was a crucial move, designed to aid a certain 'reading' of the region. In turn the various geo-graphs are examined.⁸ Second, I examine how

7 . The 'Dirty War' was the name given to the national security policy launched by the Argentine regime of General Viola which attempted to irradicate so called 'communist subversives' in Argentina. These fears of subversion led to a purge of thousands of 'suspects' (including students, doctors, teachers and other professionals) being kidnapped or killed (Graziano 1992). It is estimated by Amnesty International that upto 30,000 'disappeared' between 1976-1982 (Guest 1990). For further details see, for example, Pion-Berlin (1989) on the ideology of the national security state; Hepple (1992) on the linkage between geopolitical theorising and the national security state and; Graham-Yooll (1980) for a very personal account of the horrors committed during that period.

I suggest that the fears of communism (which also were prevalent during discussion of proposals for a SATO) can be seen as a crucial component of a strategy designed to secure a (masculine) state identity. Not least in the perpetual use of the metaphor of cancer (see Sontag 1980) to describe communism and, therefore, the need to fight that disease.

8 . The chapter aims to be a slightly different type of contribution to critical geopolitics' interest in how certain groups of experts are (were) able to represented in geopolitical codes of reasoning. The concept of the 'geo-graph' is used in Dalby's (1993a, 1993b) work on nuclear weapons policies in New Zealand to illustrate how various groups (both 'official' such as that of the Lange government and 'unofficial' such as peace

that container was filled by Argentine writers with dramas and scenarios. In this section I explore how the importance of the Cape Routes, the Panama Canal and the Soviet threat were used to 'fill' the South Atlantic. Finally, I argue that the 'South Atlantic lake' effectively performed as a mirror image from which strategists could 'read' and secure certain identities. In conjunction with the writings and experiences of the 'Dirty War' I suggest that those identities were based on anti-communism and a desire for regional hegemony. Ultimately, it is hoped that the chapter will highlight some of the possibilities for analysing formal codes of geographical reasoning.

5.2. Setting the Scene

The demarcation of a South Atlantic region has been a matter of contention. Since the late 1950s, when the prospects for the creation of a South Atlantic Treaty Organisation (SATO) were first raised, writers have argued over the demarcation of the region.⁹ In July 1956, for

movements) geographically (re)present the region. In order either to support or contest the Reagan's government hopes that the US (nuclear armed) navy could enter New Zealand waters.

In the case of the South Atlantic, the strategic (re)presentations (including the plans for a SATO) made by military officers and other geopolitical writers were virtually uncontested. Within the media, for example, there was substantial support for such proposals. In *La Nacion* (9 April 1976), for instance, an article on 'estrategia naval en el Atlantico Sur' argued that "It is evident that the navies of the Southern Cone are preoccupied with countering the maritime interests of the Soviet Union...There is now an urgent need for a naval alliance between Argentina, Brasil and South Africa in order to protect the region".

This in turn undoubtedly reflects the brutality of those military regimes in South America and their restrictive practices on freedom of speech and political opposition.


9 . Since 1956, however, there has been a 'South Atlantic Pact' between Argentina, Brasil, Paraguay and Uruguay which has involved regular joint training exercises.

example, Argentina (after a recommendation from the Inter American Defense Board) suggested that naval co-operation in the South Atlantic should form the basis for "preparatory talks to study the bases for an organisation for the defense of the South Atlantic" (Hayes 1978:598). In the process it was agreed that the South Atlantic would be defined as the region south of the Tropic of Cancer, the southern limit of NATO (see map 5.1). In spite of another conference in Buenos Aires in May 1957 little progress was made towards the formation of any pact or alliance. Golbery do Couto y Silva, for example, warned of the dangers in 1957: "We must take it upon ourselves vigilantly to observe what takes place along the whole of the west coast of Africa, for it is incumbent upon us by self-interest and even tradition to preserve it from domination by aggressive imperialist forces" (1957:27-28).

In the 1960s, political developments in South Africa meant that the idea of a South Atlantic defensive pact did not disappear entirely. A central theme in South African foreign policy has been to stress the importance of South Africa to the West in terms of two key elements (see Coker 1979, Barber 1980). First, on the basis of South Africa's holdings of strategic minerals (Haglund 1986, O Tuathail 1992b). Second, on the basis that the Cape of Good Hope is a major point from which thousands of western ships pass through on their way to Europe and North America each year. Within the general context of increased isolation because of its apartheid policies, South African governments (especially Vorster post-1966) sought to improve linkages with other southern hemispheric nations. In 1967, for example, the South African government began a series of 'exchanges' with the Argentine and Brazilian armed forces with the hope of exploring the possibilities of creating a defensive pact (Hurrell 1983).¹⁰ As Bartolome (1991:58) notes, the impetus for such exchanges was the fear

10 . The South African Navy leaked in 1969 a report which suggested that a naval pact had been signed between South Africa, Argentina, Brasil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Taiwain and Israel. This was later denied. *Latin American Weekly Report* (London) WR 82-18:3 (1982).

Map 5.1. Defining the South Atlantic



Source: Front Cover of *Revista Geopolitica* (Argentina) 28 (1984)

of the Soviet Navy and the comments of Admiral Gorshkov that the navy would "defend the interests of our state at all times on any point on the globe".

In the 1970s there was renewed speculation about the possibilities for the creation of a SATO in the wake of further fears of a Soviet threat to the South Atlantic and Southern Africa (e.g. Bissell 1975, Bartolome 1991). There were a series of influential events: the oil crisis of 1973-4, the Soviet intervention in Angola and the withdrawal of the British from Simonstown in South Africa. As Admiral James Johnson of South Africa noted in 1976 "The communists are turning the area into a Soviet lake...On any day you can see 30-35 Soviet ships pass by here and there's nothing we can do. We are all alone."¹¹ In the same year, the Argentine foreign minister, Admiral Cesar Guzzetti, also expressed concern that "the South Atlantic might be the object of a modification ... that could endanger our sea communications." Those military officers who were writing about the South Atlantic in the 1970s were convinced that without a defence pact the Soviet Union would overrun the region. By 1981, a conference in Buenos Aires was specifically designed to discuss, in the words of the Argentine foreign minister Carlos Pastor, the possibilities of "an alliance against world communism and a South Atlantic defence pact".

The identification of a South Atlantic basin or container had been a matter of some debate. South American writers such as General Juan Guglielmelli, Maria del Carmen Llaver and Carlos Meirra Mattos argued that any SATO should be delimited by two lines running from Brasil to the Ivory Coast and South Africa to Argentina.¹² As Llaver (1980:42) noted that

11. The 1974 Simonstown Agreement between Britain and South Africa effectively ended the commitment of the British navy in the South-East Atlantic. The fear of strategists thereafter was that without a SATO the South African navy would not be able to cope with the Soviet blue water navy 'threat'. See Adrian English (1981) 'The South Atlantic: Achilles heal of the West' *Navy International* June 1981.

12. The journals *Estrategia*, *Geopolitica* and *Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra* have carried a number of articles since 1976 on the 'South Atlantic region'.

"There are no agreed definitions of the South Atlantic. However, the one we adopt here is those oceanic waters which are south of a line between north east Brasil and north western Africa." The South Atlantic zone was defined by these writers as considerably further south of the Tropic of Cancer (NATO's southern limit) than first imagined by the earliest proponents of SATO. The effect of such a demarcation was to essentially to fuse the coastlines of South America and Africa which until the 1970s had been considered separate locales.

The creation of a 'South Atlantic lake' had important effects. First, the creation of a basin or container meant that the events which might impede or confuse South American military regimes could be controlled and managed. Flowing through the South Atlantic was oil and other natural resources, tourism and, most importantly, communism. The SATO initiative promised to restore political and economic stability whilst interrupting the flows of communism. The stakes appeared considerable as one Argentine newspaper noted "There does exist a will for mutual support and cooperation in the defence of the South Atlantic...the Soviet presence in West Africa and in the South Atlantic in general must be given a strategic response in order to preserve our national security".¹³

Second, the creation of the 'South Atlantic lake' enabled South American strategists to argue that the shores and borders of that 'lake' needed to be patrolled. In the case of Argentina, for example, Cosentino (1970) had suggested that the Falklands/Malvinas Islands were a strategically important site from which the Argentine Navy could patrol the Drake Passage and surrounding seas in order to counter the Soviet navy. In another case, de la Cruz (1976-7) suggested that Argentine Antarctic claims had to be defended vigorously so that the Antarctic

13 . Editorial of the Argentine newspaper, *La Prensa* 5 July 1980 (held at the National Library, Buenos Aires).

peninsula would neither emerge as a possible site from where the Soviet navy (or even ballistic missiles) might threaten the shipping lanes of the West and the South Atlantic itself.

The demarcation of the South Atlantic as a discrete zone encoded the region as a site of possibilities. In other respects, the Argentine military had already encouraged a study by Admiral Milia (1978:1) who had suggested the influential concept of *Atlantartida* to signify Argentine maritime space (Milia 1978, Gamba-Stonehouse 1989). Such a region would also confirm Argentina's long standing interest in "the geopolitical space which integrates Eastern South America, Western South Africa and the Antarctic continent and the vast sea that these lands would delimit". As a consequence, the concept of '*Atlantarida*' itself emerged as an important theme in Argentine foreign policy and built on the extensive interest in resources and maritime space in the 1970s.¹⁴

However, the debates over SATO in the 1970s raised the importance of identifying a number of features of physical geography which were encoded with potential possibilities. As Meirra Mattos (1988:214) recalled "When we consider the wide extent of the Atlantic Basin, including the seas and the connecting routes to this ocean, we find that nine of the these fourteen (choke) points are associated with this basin: In the South Atlantic: the Straits of Magellan, the Cape of Good Hope and the Mozambique Passage. In the North Atlantic: the Straits of Gibraltar and Panama, the Caribbean, the Mediterranean, the North and the Norwegian seas." In the next section I explore a number of scenarios that emerged in the 1970s which were designed to confirm that the South Atlantic region was of great strategic importance (on the basis of geographical criteria).¹⁵

14 . One such study was by Italo Luder (1974) (*La Argentina y sus claves geopolíticas*) who addressed concerns over resources and urged the Argentine military regime to pursue resource evaluation in "Patagonia-Malvinas-Antarctic triangle" (1974:56)

15 . The geographer, (and former political official at the US State Department and Ambassador to Columbia) Lewis Tambs has had an important effect on South American geopolitical writings. In particular, his study of

5.3. Filling the South Atlantic with Dramas

The heightened interest in the plans to create a SATO between the various South Atlantic powers in the mid-1970s was the culmination of a considerable shift in policy priorities. Since the late 1960s, various military writers had been arguing that the South Atlantic was a strategically important arena for South American states. In Argentina, for example, General Juan Guglielmelli (1975-6) argued that Argentine foreign policy had to shift away from an obsession with the Brazilian threat to the north towards the South Atlantic. A number of Argentine (and South American) strategists argued that a number of important factors account for this shift: first, the Cape of Good Hope shipping route was imperiled because of an expanding Soviet presence. Second, that in the event of the closure of the Panama Canal, the Cape Horn route would assume great importance to western shipping. Third, the strategic importance of the Falklands/Malvinas had grown considerably. Fourth, the Soviet presence in Africa threatened the region and meant that Argentina (and Brasil) had to act as regional buffers in order to prevent communism spreading (see Sidaway 1992b). Fifth, strategic minerals in South Africa and Antarctica were threatened by the Soviet blue water navy. These scenarios clearly overlap with one another. However, what this chapter attempts to do is to unpack those depictions and explore each a little more closely.

5.3.1. The Cape of Good Hope Scenario

the 'choke points' which effect global maritime commerce have been appropriated by South American writers to suggest that these 'choke-points' have important implications for South American strategic policies. See his 1977 testimony on the 'Panama Canal Treaties' before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, pt III page 154.

The strength of the scenario based around the Cape of Good Hope lay on the basis of four elements. First, that the Cape was a natural 'choke point' from which western shipping lanes could be disrupted by a hostile power (e.g. Bissell 1978, Bowman 1982, Meirra Mattos 1988). Second, the use of the term 'lifeline' implied that if that passageway was blocked western economies could be effectively strangled (see Hanks 1981). The trope of the body, therefore, was an important discursive resource to be drawn upon by strategists.¹⁶ In addition, the use of maps depicting a series of 'lifelines' aided such a discursive representation often used to depict so-called 'objective realities'. Third, the introduction of the supertanker meant that such shipments of oil could no longer travel through the Suez Canal (O Tuathail 1992b). As a consequence, the Cape Route had emerged as an important shipping route which was responsible for "an ever higher absolute volume of goods and an ever higher percentage of imports to the United States and to Western Europe" (Bowman 1982:161). Fourth, recent Soviet advances in 'black Africa' meant that the Soviet Union had access to naval bases which could be used to threaten and harass western shipping. As Sidaway and Simon (1993:7) noted "The collapse of the Portuguese empire transformed the geopolitical map of Southern Africa and the sub-continental balance of power shifted to the decisive disadvantage of the white minority-ruled states in Rhodesia, South Africa and Namibia".

The identification of the Cape of Good Hope as a major seaway was underwritten by the powerful metaphor of the 'lifeline'. For example, the geopolitical writer, Hugh Balmaceda (1980:8) suggested that "The Atlantic ocean has been an important lifeline to European


16. Robert Hanks' (1981) book *The Cape Route: Imperiled Western Lifeline* was one of the most influential texts on the subject. As O Tuathail (1992b:160) has argued "This fetish with 'lifelines', a consequence of geopolitical discourse's historical representation of space as organic, leads policy planning and scenario reconstruction into sado-masochistic theme."

civilisation which is now threatened by foreign powers ... " Other writers such as Gualco (1977) in an analysis of the proposals for a defensive pact in the South Atlantic draws on the organic metaphor of the 'lifeline' to convey the impression that the West could be 'strangled' by a foreign presence blocking that shipping lane.


The identification of a 'threat' to a major sealane had several further implications. First, it continued the long standing Argentine geopolitical interest in the sea and the control of movement over that medium. As Admiral Storni (1916:18) noted "The sea is a vehicle and the substance of our fortune and of our glory." More recently, the writer Jorge Atencio (1965:340) has noted that "the sea is one of the geographical elements which has a major influence on the life of the state." Second, the scenario of an imperiled Cape of Good Hope was popular amongst senior Naval officers who held positions within the Argentine military regime (Child 1985, Hepple 1988).

The fears over the blocking of the Cape of Good Hope were further supplemented by the use of maps which were used to depict 'sealanes', 'choke-points' and 'vulnerabilities'. The maps of the Argentine (and western) strategists were designed to 'persuade' readers that these lifelines were imperiled by Soviet Union. Balmaceda (1980), for example, in an important article on the strategic importance of the South Atlantic uses several maps to depict vulnerabilities. First, a map is used to depict vital sealanes in and around the South Atlantic. In spite of their perceived vulnerability, the sealanes are thickly marked (in black) and spread into the northern Atlantic Ocean, the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean (see map 5.2.). Second, a map is used to show the political situation in Africa. It is pointed out within the text that South Africa is encircled by hostile (Marxist leaning) states (see map 5.3.). In addition, possible defences such as the South African naval base at Simonstown have been marked on the map.

Map 5.2. The Importance of the Cape of Good Hope Route




Map 5.3. The Soviet Threat in Africa




Map 5.4. Kemp's New Strategic Map

Map 1: The Southern Seas 1965



Map 2: The Southern Seas 1976



Azimuthal Equidistant Projection centred on Cape Town, South Africa. All distances from the centre of the projection are correct.

Furthermore, Balmaceda (1982) has marked on the map additional 'choke-points' in the Mediterranean, the Suez Canal and the Baltic Sea to highlight Western vulnerabilities.

Balmaceda's (1980) 'maps of vulnerabilities' were, however, part of a wider cartographic project of Western strategists in general. Kemp's (1977) 'new strategic map' is just one example of cartographic 'persuasion'. Having redrawn his maps from a so called 'southern perspective' he suggests that "They (i.e. his maps) show the pivotal geographical position of Southern Africa, and identify, small islands in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans which may be of strategic importance in the future" (1977:53). This appears to be rather a self-fulfilling prophecy! (see map 5.4.).

The use of maps (and their associated colour schemes) has been an important element in Argentine (and Western) geopolitical and strategic thinking on the South Atlantic. It is widely assumed that the maps are 'innocent' contributions to the discussions within the texts. However, as Harley (1988,1992) has demonstrated 'maps' are never 'innocent' rather they are bound up with the claims to knowledge and power. The subjects depicted in these maps were based on political choices underwritten by the assumption that maps are seemingly neutral mediums for (re)presenting 'realities'. For every map that depicts Western vulnerabilities and Soviet 'advances' in Africa, alternative maps could have been drawn which 'showed' Western military strength or the dependencies of other states in the South Atlantic region.

5.3.2. The Panama Canal Scenario

The depiction of the South West Atlantic region as an important strategic arena was a major preoccupation of Argentine geopolitical writings (e.g. Fraga 1978, Milia 1978 Llaver 1980). As such these writings were in sharp contrast to European and North American writers who invested far more intellectual energy on the South Eastern part of the Atlantic Ocean (e.g.

Wall 1977, Hanks 1981). However, one of the favourite themes for those writers was to contemplate the importance of the South West Atlantic if the Panama Canal were ever to be closed due to Soviet aggression or terrorist activity. As the American geopolitical writer, Jack Child (1980:47) noted "The Canal is vulnerable to threats ranging from nuclear weapons to guerilla warfare and political pressures" which could force western shipping to be diverted southwards through the Drake's passage.

The Panama Canal emerged as a major topic of strategic debate in the 1970s. In the United States, for example, discussions over the Panama Canal were dominated by the US-Panamanian negotiations over sovereignty (especially under President Carter). For American strategists, the proposed transfer of sovereignty over the Panama Canal was 'read' as a 'loss of (phallic/political) power' (Weber 1992).¹⁷ As Lucier (1974:35) noted "the Panama Canal is essential to our nationhood" and "the lifeline of trade and of national security". Or as Child (1980:48) argued "The Panama Canal is of profound psychological significance as a symbol of US power."

In South America, however, the discussions over the Panama Canal followed a different agenda. Although the focus remained on the potential blocking of the Canal, Argentine strategists such as Llaver (1980:3) argued that "the Magellan-Drake's Passage would take on great importance if conflict (whether local or general in nature) broke out in the Panama zone." The effects of such a scenario are several fold. First, the South West Atlantic is underwritten by a powerful drama which emphasises the importance of the Cape Horn passage to western shipping (even if most American and European strategists ignored the

17. Cynthia Weber (1992) in a psychoanalytical reading of the US invasion of Panama (1989), has argued that the Panama Canal has historically been scripted as a feminine object which Bush needed to secure his phallic power.

region). The use of maps to graphically depict that importance was a crucial component in these discussions (see Dodds 1993b).

Second, such a scenario was used by writers such as Villegas (1980) to legitimate and justify Argentina's position over the Beagle Channel controversy with Chile. The Beagle Channel dispute had by the 1970s nearly erupted into conflict (in 1978) as the two states argued over ownership of several islands in the Beagle Channel and the associated territorial claims. After years of contention, the dispute was placed under arbitration in 1971. In 1977 the arbitration committee decided that the boundary established in the Beagle Channel would effectively award the islands to Chile. Argentina refused to accept that decision, as the Argentine Foreign Minister Montes (1978) noted: "The Argentine government reaffirms sovereignty over the insular territories, maritime spaces and continental platforms and seabed that are located in the Atlantic Ocean east of Cape Horn."

The reasons for Argentine intransigence over the Beagle Channel dispute have been related to concerns over maritime space and long-standing assumptions over the Bi-oceanic' principle (see Pittman 1988). Another important theme, however, which has been largely neglected is the concern that the Argentine military regime (1977-1981) carried over the strategic importance of the Cape Horn passageway. The chief negotiator over the Beagle Channel dispute was the geopolitical writer Osiris Villegas. Villegas (1978), for example, makes these connections between the local importance of the Beagle Channel to Argentine sovereignty and the global importance of the passageway to western shipping (in the event of the closure of the Panama Canal).

5.3.3. The Falklands/Malvinas Islands: A Strategic Base in the South West Atlantic?

The Falklands/Malvinas dispute has a lengthy (and hotly disputed) history (see, for example, Bologna 1982, Bluth 1987, Beck 1988). In an earlier paper, I explored the competing stories of heroic discoveries, legal claims and allegations of violence (Dodds 1993e). In most of the contemporary discussions of the Falklands/Malvinas, the roots of the controversy undoubtedly lie in the events and counter-events that led to the British occupation of the Islands in 1833. One hundred and fifty years later, Argentine writers remain pre-occupied with claims and counter claims over sovereignty (e.g. Bologna 1982, Gamba 1987). The concern here, however, is not with legal claims rather the focus is on how the Falklands/Malvinas Islands were transformed into an important strategic site within Argentine geopolitical discourse in the 1970s as part of a wider interest in the South Atlantic region. As Guglielmelli (1977:10) noted the Argentine navy needed " ... among other measures, the complete exercise of sovereignty in the Malvinas Islands, South Georgia, South Sandwich, and islands and coasts of the Argentine Antarctic sector".

One of the first articles in the 1970s to explore the strategic importance of the Malvinas Islands was by a naval captain, Benjamin Cosentino writing in *Estrategia*. Cosentino (1970) reminded readers that Admiral Storni in 1916 had argued that the islands had lost their global strategic importance because of the opening of the Panama Canal which meant that shipping no longer had to travel around the Cape Horn in order to traverse the Atlantic-Pacific Oceans. As such the Malvinas Islands only retained a local importance to the Argentine state.

Such a position, according to Cosentino (1970:77) had changed markedly because of the new threats (whether it be the Soviet Navy or Cuban sponsored terrorism) to the Panama Canal. Cosentino (1970:82) argued that "In the event, the Panama Canal would be considered indefensible to an attack of intercontinental missiles or nuclear bombers". As a consequence, there was a 'real' danger that the Panama Canal could be blocked and that western shipping would be diverted around the Cape Horn.

Map 5.5. The Importance of the Falkland Islands




GRAFICO Nº 2

Source: B Cosentino (1970) *El Valor Estrategico de las Malvinas* p.79

The Malvinas Islands, then, would emerge as a major strategic base from which the shipping could be disrupted in the event of war. Cosentino's arguments were supplemented by several maps which purported to demonstrate the strategic importance of the islands (see map 5.5.).

Thereafter, the Malvinas Islands were not only transformed into a vital base from which to ward off potential threats to shipping but also a site from which to exploit maritime resources.¹⁸ Within Argentine military circles, these concerns assumed considerable importance as the editor of the influential journal *Estrategia* noted "Argentina urgently requires development of integrated national power in order to maintain a bargaining capability on priority sea questions" (Guglielmelli 1976:5-6). In the case of the Malvinas Islands, a wide range of geopolitical studies emerged purporting to deal with the strategic and resource potential of the Islands (e.g. Hernandez and Chitarroni 1977, Pocovi 1978). The significance of the Islands was largely underwritten by familiar organic themes as Casellas (1974:737) noted "The Islas Malvinas are an important because of their proximity to Argentina's umbilical cord in the South Atlantic."

Furthermore, influential geopolitical writers such as Admiral Milia and Admiral Fraga (a former Director of the Direccion Nacional del Antartico) initiated substantive studies on the South Atlantic region in response to two fears. First, the threat of the Soviet blue water navy

18 . The United States government had invited the Institute of Foreign Policy Analysis in 1977 to conduct a confidential investigation into the strategic importance of the Falklands/Malvinas Islands. The Report (1977:xiii) argued that "The archipelago still offers a good strategic position in the South Atlantic although it is not as important as in earlier years...the waters surrounding the islands are rich in krill, blue whiting and other fish...oil reserves around the islands have been estimated at more than three times the size of the North Sea reserves."

Report held at the National Defence University (US Army funded), Washington DC

to the Cape Horn shipping route. Second, and more importantly, the 1976 Shackleton Report commissioned by the British Labour controlled government was seen as evidence of increased British resource and strategic interest in the Malvinas Islands.¹⁹ However, writers such as Hepple (1988:229) have argued that there was little British interest in the strategic value of the Islands (during the 1970s).²⁰ By the mid 1970s, a significant current of Argentine (and South American) geopolitical thinking was shifting towards a view that British possession of the Falklands/Malvinas Islands was preventing the development of a NATO like organisation (see Mastorilli 1977, Palermo 1978). As a consequence, Ceresole (1988:56) argued that "would have presumed an automatic commitment on the part of Argentina to jointly transform the Islands into a military base against the growing Soviet naval presence in all the oceans of the world".²¹ The growing frustration of geopolitical writers over this issue of ownership was epitomised by Guglielmelli (1980:67) when he suggested that "we should prepare the political and military conditions, in the national and

19. The Shackleton Report (1976) contained a number of important recommendations. These included: first, an expansion of the docking facilities at Port Stanley harbour. Second, an extension to the airport railway so that larger planes could land at the Islands. Third, the encouragement of overseas investment both in the wool economy and possible resource exploitation offshore. Fourth, the promotion of co-operative ventures with Argentina (Beck 1988).

20. There were several examples of declining British interest in the South Atlantic in the 1970s. For example, the Argentine takeover of the (British) island of Thule in 1976 went unreported in the British media for two years. In addition as Beck (1988) has noted successive governments had reduced funding for British Antarctic Survey.

21. Rigoberto (1982:32) also argued that the Falklands were important because their location would enable "communication with geo-stationary satellites 35km above the orbit, high above the South Pole and which could enable military operations in Antarctica and the South Atlantic".

international sphere, to occupy by force the Falklands/Malvinas, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, at the most opportune moment for the Argentine government."

The depiction of the Falklands/Malvinas Islands in Argentine geopolitical discourse changed dramatically after the 1982 Falklands War. Before the conflict, the Argentine geopolitical writer Rigoberto (1982:32) argued that the view of the "majority of US and British specialists was that Antarctica and the Falkland Islands are only of marginal importance." However, after the 1982 South Atlantic War, Argentine writers devoted many pages to the thesis that the violent response of Britain to the Argentine invasion meant that Britain (and NATO) had aspirations to secure the Falkland Islands as a major base in the South Atlantic (see special issues in *Geopolitica* and *Estrategia* 1982, Gamba 1982).

5.3.4. Representing the Soviet Threat (and the Importance of Local Leviathans)

The depiction of the Soviet Union as a 'threat' to Western interests has been a central element in the strategic representations of the South Atlantic (e.g. Gualco 1977, Bissell 1978). These analyses in turn reflected broader trends. The political landscape of South America was dominated by military regimes which were largely based on a political ideology on anti-communism (amongst other things). Indeed, under the Nixon administration the states of Argentina, Brasil and Chile had been 'read' by the United States as important 'local leviathans' dedicated to stopping Soviet (or Cuban) inspired communism spreading into Latin America (Litwak 1984). The infamous National Security Study Memorandum 39 (the so called Nixon Doctrine) encapsulated that principle (Bissell 1978, O Tuathail 1992b).²²

22 . The metaphor of disease has been a powerful representation in Latin American strategy. In particular, the Spanish medical term *Foco* has been used to infer the point at which an infectious germ enters the human body (Child 1980).

In April 1969, as part of Nixon's attempts to review US foreign policy priorities, Kissinger initiated a major survey on Southern Africa. The review (later known as NSSM 39) delineated a range of options towards the region. The starting premise was that "The whites are here to stay and the only way that constructive change can come about is through them. There is no hope for the blacks to gain the political rights they seek through violence, which will lead only to chaos and increased opportunities for communists" (NSSM 39 cited in Cohen and El-Khawas 1975:66-67). However, the favoured approach towards Southern Africa was as Litwak (1984:176) notes "to maintain public opposition to racial oppression but relax political isolation and economic restrictions on the white states".

In the Nixon/Kissinger period it was possible as Hurrell (1983:190) has noted "to discern the beginnings of what might have been a more tightly-knit system of South Atlantic defence. Both South Africa and Brasil were viewed under the Nixon Doctrine as strong regional powers which should be encouraged to play a larger part in the defence of Western interests". In 1971, for example, the Brazilian President (General) E Medici visited Washington DC and met with President Nixon who later noted that "We know that as Brasil goes, so will go the rest of that Latin American continent" (cited in Litwak 1984:138). However, as Silva (1989:85) recalls "So most of the time Brasil has adopted a policy of 'automatic alignment' (alinhamento automatico) towards the United States...the almost constant attempt by Argentina to limit US influence in its own development as well as in the rest of Latin America" stifled US sponsored regional plans (Grabendoff 1982).

Thevelent (1987) in his remarkable psychoanalytical analysis of the Freikorps has noted that the red flood was a powerful element in fascist mythology. The powerful metaphor "engenders a clearly ambivalent state of excitement. It is threatening but also attractive..." The response of the Freikorps was to create firm, erect dams against this anarchic degeneration of society.

However, as other scholars (such as Coker 1979) have noted, that successive US governments did little to encourage South African involvement (Ford and Carter administrations continued bans on sales of naval reconnaissance aircraft) or Argentine involvement (Carter administration banned arms sales) in any South Atlantic pact. This drew angry responses from some strategists who argued as Bissell (1975:42) did that "Both (Brasil and South Africa) profess to be democratic, and yet both are under attack from many parts of the world for allegedly repressive policies towards democratic opposition". Furthermore, the American and Brazilian governments clashed frequently over Brasil's unilateral claims to 200 mile territorial waters (Gilbert 1972).

Within the Argentine geopolitical literature of the 1970s and early 1980s, for example, there were numerous analyses of the Soviet threat in Latin America, Southern Africa and the surrounding oceans (e.g. Guglielmelli 1979, Villegas 1978). In spite of US reservations about a regional hegemony policy, Argentine strategists continued to pursue such themes. I want to highlight two themes. First, how the Soviet 'threat' was read by Argentine strategists. Second, on the basis of that 'threat', how Argentine (and other South American writers) geopolitical writers addressed the ongoing debates over SATO and defensive pacts. In particular, how Argentine writers resented the preferential treatment accorded to Brasil under the provisions of the Nixon Doctrine.

The discursive representation of the Soviet 'threat' rested either on the metaphor of disease or flood/tide. In this respect, both metaphors have been important in representing danger. In addition, such metaphors are primarily underwritten by appeals to topography. Adjectives such as 'diffuse' or 'spread' play an important role in sustaining a vision of space as simply a container waiting to be filled or contaminated by a foreign presence (O Tuathail 1992b). The Argentine geopolitical writer Mastorilli (1977), for example, argues that Soviet communism is like a "Red tide" which will swamp the "Free World". Other writers such as Guglielmelli (1977) employed the metaphor of disease to represent communism as a disease which would

attack the healthy cells of the South American states unless counteracted (see Sontag 1980, Montgomery 1991).

Furthermore, it has been suggested by other writers such as O Tuathail (1989, 1992b) that a sexual metaphor underwrote western fears of Soviet 'expansionism'. In particular, tropes such as 'penetration', 'naked aggression' and 'rape' have preoccupied many strategic analyses (see Llaver 1982).²³ The victory of the MPLA in Angola, the presence of Cuban troops in that country and the growth of the Soviet navy in and around the South Atlantic heightened fears of spreading communism (Bissell 1978, Sidaway and Simon 1993). The Argentine writer Henning (1976:34), for example, noted "In times of peace: A higher level of ideological penetration and greater infiltration of agitators mainly via diplomatic and commercial missions ... In a war situation: the transformation of Angola into a communist country represents a very considerable increase in the aggressive power that can be levelled against South Africa and South America ... " (cited in Hurrell 1983:185). Llaver (1982:5) was worried that Soviet strategy was "dedicated to diplomatic penetration and the establishment

23 . The term 'intervention by consent' was coined by by the Intern-American Defense Board to describe the Soviet-Cuban intervention in Angola in 1975. *Inter-American Defense Board Documents S-1299* 18 June 1976 National Defense University, Washington DC

In a major review of Soviet foreign policy and military objectives, MccGwire (1986) does not have any discussion of the South Atlantic. The events in Angola (1975) are described as: "...substantial Cuban forces were only committed in response to the South African invasion, and the initiative appears to have come from the Cubans rather than the Russians" (1986:223).

One of the earliest sceptical reports of the Soviet 'threat' in southern Africa was by Spence (1970) who argued that such arguments were effectively smoke-screens to maintain ties with South Africa.

of a series of orbit states in Africa". Indeed as Sidaway and Simon (1991) note, the mid-1970s represented 'the high water mark of diverse socialist experiments' in the Third World.

The period between 1975-77, thus, was a crucial period for most of the geopolitical analyses in South America. In Africa, for example, it was noted that "with the independence of Angola by the *Movimento Popular de Libertacao Total de Angola* (MPLA) in 1975 with the help of the Soviets and the Cubans has produced a shock to the West" (Gualco 1977:28). As a consequence as Gualco (1977:29) noted that the continent (and especially white southern Africa) was threatened by "los negros y los comunistas". The following year, a meeting was held by the military staff of several South American states (but which included two US admirals Ellis and Sagerholm) to discuss collective defence for the South Atlantic (see Hurrell 1983). The stakes appeared to be substantial given that as Gualco (1977:28-29) noted, "The Soviet military were involved in the movements of liberation in Africa ... the search for a new strategy in the South Atlantic is fundamentally motivated by the incorporation of the Angola into the Soviet block". The need existed, therefore, "to construct a military alliance in the South Atlantic with the objective of creating a new equilibrium of power" (Gualco 1977:30).

The consequences of such endeavours within the geopolitical literature and within the military regimes of South America was that states such as Argentina and Brasil saw themselves as regional buffers against world communism. Events such as the decolonisation in Africa, Soviet and Cuban activities in countries like Angola, international pressure on the apartheid regime in South Africa meant that South American states would act as a 'buffer' to Soviet expansionism. As the Brazilian Navy Minister da Fonseca noted in 1980 "In reality the greatest danger that faces us comes from outside our continent and we must unite to confront it ... in no other moment was the unity of the nations of our continent and particularly of our navies as important as it is now" (cited in Hurrell 1983:186).

In spite of such utterances, however, Argentine writers such as Gualco (1977:32) consistently retained a concern that Brasil (which enjoyed a closer relationship with the United States) would attempt to turn the South Atlantic into a "Brazilian lake" on the pretext of establishing a SATO pact. Guglielmelli (1976) in a scathing article on the Brazilian geopolitical writer Carlos Meirra Mattos noted that there were 'disturbing' elements of Brazilian expansionism within his writings. In another context, Hurrell (1983) reminds us that the differences between the South American and South African states remained sizeable in spite of their mutual anti-communist commitments.

5.3.5 Strategic Minerals: Antarctica and South Africa

The preoccupation with organic spaces (including lifelines) in geopolitical and strategic studies creates a vision of resources as natural, non-political substances vital to the well being of the Western world (e.g. Harrigan 1977, Hanks 1980, Heitman 1985). As Van der Wyk and Von Below (1986:159) note "Access to strategic minerals is certain to remain a major preoccupation in international political relations". The fear of South American (and Western) strategists was that the supply of strategic minerals was imperiled by the Soviet threat in Africa and the South Atlantic region. In addition, the unstable nature of the regimes in South Africa was a cause for considerable concern (e.g. Bissell 1975, Balmaceda 1980, King 1982).

The major focus for most of western strategic thinking in the South Atlantic has been the strategic mineral supply within South Africa. In the 1970s given the fears over 'resource wars' it was not untypical for observations such as by Harrigan (1977:151) that "the resources of the region (Southern Africa) are an integral part of the industrial system of the West, including Japan, and contribute to the overall strength of our civilisation". Or as Hanks (1980:v) argued "The West is critically dependent on natural resources from overseas ... The threat is manifested primarily in the appearance of a large modern blue water navy wearing

the hammer and sickle of the Soviet Union". The oil prices rises introduced by the OPEC states in the 1970s combined with increased superpower confrontation and demands for a new international order produced a series of discursive rounds on resources war and cold wars (Halliday 1989).

One of the more popular scenarios was to imagine what would be the effect on mineral supplies if a white regime was to be overthrown by black majority rule. The underlying assumption was that Soviet advances in black Africa coupled with growing international pressure on South Africa threatened the white regime. As a consequence, a black (pro-Soviet) regime might be unwilling to sell strategic minerals to the West. However, as analysts such as Price (1981,1982) have noted that these types of scenarios were grounded more in fantasy than the given facts of mineral production and supply. As Price (1982:64) notes "Any government in power, whatever, its ideological slant, would be locked into selling its industrial raw materials to the West just as the West is locked into buying them". In this respect, it may well be the case that South Africa is far more dependent on the West than vice versa (As would be the case with Angola: oil and diamonds). The other issue that was consistently neglected by these analyses was that these fears reflect have more to do with choices that are made by industries and transnational companies than the constraints imposed upon the earth (O Tuathail 1992b).

In the case of the discussions of Antarctica, 'strategic minerals' type arguments have been characterised by two features. First, most of the debate has taken place within South America as geopolitical writers considered how the mineral potential of Antarctica might effect geostrategy in the South Atlantic (see Child 1988,1990). Second, unlike in the case of South Africa, the resource potential of Antarctica remains largely based on speculation because the system for the management (the Antarctic Treaty System, ATS) of the continent prohibited mineral exploitation (de Wit 1986, Beck 1986,1989). However, one of the underlying features of much of the debates was the consistently mistaken fears that the ATS was going to expire in 1991 (e.g. Fraga 1979,1983). As a consequence, it was considered important to

heighten South American interest in the region not only to deter Soviet expansionism but also to make 'good' claims to resources and territory (Child 1985, Dodds 1993b).

The position of Antarctica, therefore, in geopolitical analyses of the 1970s was based on geostrategic and resource scenarios. As de Castro (1976:116) noted "Antarctica is fated to be constituted as the cornerstone of our destiny, thanks to its importance as a base of warning, interception and departure in whatever emergency might occur to affect the defense of the South Atlantic". In the case of geostrategy, Antarctica was 'read' as a strategically important place which would be of extreme importance, in the event of western shipping being diverted southwards to the Cape Horn passageway. Fraga (1979), in a major review of the geopolitical importance of Antarctica, argues that the continent was also a potential base for the Soviet navy and a site for intercontinental missiles which could threaten the South American continent. Fraga (1980:256) later argued that there had to be a "permanent and effective Argentine presence in all of our sea and our Antarctica". In addition, the Argentine military regime was adamant that the Antarctic continent was geopolitically bound up with territorial concerns in the Beagle Channel and the Falklands/Malvinas dispute (see de la Cruz 1977, Asseff 1980).

In terms of resource potential, Antarctica was increasingly 'read' as an empty space filled with resources simply waiting to be exploitation. However, it should be noted that Barreda Laos (1948:29) had argued several decades earlier that "The security, defense and free transit of the southern routes of the Straits of Magellan and Cape Horn, require that the territories of the South American Antarctic are not kept from their true owners by force by overseas powers, nor utilised in service of designs that could be incompatible with the rights and interests of the South American brotherhood". Luder (1974:56), for example, later estimated that 15 billion barrels of gas/petroleum reserves lie within the Patagonia-Malvinas-Antarctic triangle. The major preoccupation of much of Argentine Antarctic policies under the military regime (1976-1982) was based on increasing their 'presence' on the region in order to improve legal (and hence resource) claims. An important feature of these resource debates

was that one of the most influential authors on geostrategy and Antarctica was Admiral Jorge Fraga. During the military regime, Fraga was Director of the *Dirección Antártico Argentino* and successfully campaigned for substantial funds to establish various Antarctic policies (see Wynia 1986).

One of the interesting features about the discussions of Antarctica and its geostrategic importance in the 1970s was how the interests of South American states clashed with the wider aim of denying the continent to Soviet expansionism. As Palermo (1981:5) noted "In 1976 Chile, the US, Britain and the Soviet Union had established a total of 29 bases in our sector". In the case of territorial claims to the region, Argentine and Chilean claims overlap with Britain. One of the central stumbling blocks to the creation of any SATO like organisation was Argentine opposition to extensive Chilean involvement in the South West Atlantic (Bacchus 1986, Gamba-Stonehouse 1989).

5.4. Reading Identities from the 'South Atlantic Lake'?

The feminist writer Luce Irigaray has suggested that the feminine functions in psychoanalytic discourse as a "faithful, polished mirror" which reproduces masculine identities but which itself is not represented (cited in Weber 1993:8). Cynthia Weber (1992b,1993) has used Irigaray's writings to suggest that just as in psychoanalytical discourse where the feminine is simply present to function without identity, so the depiction of regions in US foreign policy discourse is predicated on feminine 'shipping lanes'/'waters' complimenting and representing masculine 'empires'/'hegemons' (Weber 1992b,1993).²⁴

24 . Irigaray has been criticised by many other feminist writers for her essentialist arguments which ignored non-heterosexual and non-white women.

I want to suggest that we can also adopt some of the ideas of Weber (1993) to suggest that the military writers (masculine subjects par excellence) gazed into the mirror of the South Atlantic seeing themselves but not noticing the mirror which generated their reflection in the first place.²⁵ Thus the scenarios used to generate a strategic arena called the 'South Atlantic' were effectively hidden even though they contributed to generating a particular form of Argentine identity based on an anti communist regional hegemon. The South Atlantic was encoded as a site of generative possibilities. As Lanzarini (1982) noted "The importance of the South Atlantic to Argentina is based on the fact that first, from its bases in Africa the Soviet Union can operate on our territory or that of our neighbours, and second, through the South Atlantic flows maritime traffic vital to the Free World". Lanzarini (1982) argued that Argentina had to tackle these problems so that "the Argentine nation might survive and become a viable nation".

The discussions over the SATO proposals in the 1970s performed an important function in stabilising the South Atlantic as a strategic region. The identification of the South Atlantic as a possible site of communist insurrection was made possible by the delimitation of a basin or container. The prospect of a 'communist lake' was troubling to Argentine (and other South American) writers because it effectively disrupted subjectivities and identities. The South Atlantic had emerged as an important site of identity. Argentine writers could gaze at the waters and see regional hegemony and a 'national project' based on defending the 'West'

25. As Ingaray argued the female mirror functions as a fixed and placid mirror without which "the erection of the subject might thereby be disconnected and risk losing its elevation and penetration. For what would there be to rise up from and exercise his power over (cited in Weber 1993: 9)

from Soviet communism.²⁶ The appeal of such a 'national project' has, however, been a defining feature of Argentine political life since the 1930s (Escude 1987, Shumway 1991).

Given the context of the period this appears to be a reasonable supposition. As a consequence of its appalling human rights record, Argentina was diplomatically isolated in the late 1970s (see Maechling 1981, Escude 1984). The foreign policy priorities of the Argentine military regime (1976-83) has been characterised by four major themes: first, a strong ideological acceptance of the East-West confrontation. Second, the adoption of a low profile within the South American region (except when the Argentine regime intervened in Bolivian politics in 1980). Third, a reduced presence in international organisations and forums. Fourth, an increased pragmatism in commercial and economic matters (Puig 1984, Russell 1984a, 1984b, Silva 1989). The proposals for a SATO or South Atlantic defense pact appeared to chart one possible way forward for a state racked by international condemnation and possible conflict with its neighbours (e.g. Chile over the Beagle Channel). Within those debates over SATO, however, the recapture of the Falkland Islands occupied centre stage. As Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse (1990:4) note "The Falklands issue was coming to be seen as central to Argentina's future position in the South Atlantic, as well as being the only major foreign policy issue upon which it could act in 1982". In any case, by the middle of 1982, observers such as Parker (1982) noted that President Galtieri has ruled out the possibility of a South Atlantic Pact involving South Africa.

26 . The idea of a 'national project' has been a major theme in Argentine geopolitical writing. The central assumption has been that Argentina's can only recover its former 'glory' with major development projects. Ballester et al (1983), for example, proposed a national and continental project based on several themes: Latin American integration, Argentine geopolitical dominance in the South Atlantic, the promotion of civilian nuclear energy projects and finally industrialisation based on multinational investment.

In the 1970s, a project based on anti-communism dominated Argentine military politics (Pion-Berlin 1988,1989; Rock 1987). The violent campaign (with the creation of the *Alianza Anticomunista Argentina*) against so-called communist subversives within the state had as Pion-Berlin (1989) has noted profound implications for politics and security. As General Videla noted in 1975 "Subversion is not a problem that requires only a military intervention, it is a global phenomenon demanding a global strategy covering all areas".²⁷ Alves (1985:23) summarises the principle tenets of the national security doctrine: "The planning and running of the national security state involves the development of government directives for determining policies and structures for the control of every area of political and civil society. To carry out the program, it has been necessary to take full control of state power, centralise it in the executive branch, and place those closest to the information network and programming of internal security policy in key positions in government".

The organic metaphor of the state emerged as an important component of this doctrine which in turn emphasised the vulnerability of the state to cancerous (communist) cells (Comblin 1980, Alves 1985, Child 1990, Hepple 1992). Osiris Villegas' (1969) *Políticas y Estrategias para el Desarrollo y la Seguridad Nacional*, for example, was an important text which emphasised that the state had to have a loyal group of administrators, planners and soldiers in order for the Argentine state to survive and prosper. Later, General Goyret (1980) *Geopolítica y Subversión* and his journal *Armas y Geoestrategia* pursued the theme of internal development based on repression and national security.²⁸ As Silva (1989:89) noted

27 . Quoted in *La Nación* 14 April 1976. The records of *La Nación* are held in the National Library, Buenos Aires.

28 . The introduction of national security ideologies into the Southern Cone states has been traced to the influence of French counter-insurgency thinking during the Indo-China conflict in the 1950s and US sponsored training in Latin America (Trinquier 1954).

"In this new Argentine foreign policy the concept of *occidentalidad* or the Western nature and orientation of the country was reformulated. In the recent past the military governments had utilised this principle to legitimate their active anti-communism on the international scene".

The location of danger both inside and outside the state played an important role in sustaining the military regime in power (Milensky 1980). As David Pion-Berlin (1989:102) notes "It was geographically comprehensive, reaching into the remote corners of the nation. From the tropical province of Misiones, to the wind swept and sparsely populated expanses of Patagonia, no part of the country was left unaffected. The armed forces established a set of security zones, and areas that effectively parcelled the territory into increasingly smaller units". Furthermore, as I have already argued, it is suggested that those fears of communism have important implications for state identities and memories (Timerman 1981, Scarpaci and Frazier 1993).

The fears of communism were metaphorically underwritten by appeals to features such as 'lifelines' or 'red tides' or domino-like reasoning as applied to Africa. In the case of the 'lifeline', for example, used to depict the Argentine state or the 'West' as an organism dependent on certain arteries or lines of supply has in turn important ramifications for identity formation. In particular, as Campbell (1992:87) notes "the trope of the body is central

In a communication with the US School of the Americas (Fort Benning, Georgia) I was informed by the Directorate of Training and Doctrine that between 1962-1977 (the latest figures publically available) 496 Argentine officers had attended courses at the School on military intelligence, counter-insurgency, logistics et al. Letter from Colonel Luis Cartagena (US Army School Secretary) March 25 1991

Furthermore, the Inter-American Defense College and National Defence University in Washington DC also provide training facilities for Latin American military officers.

to the moral space of identity." In this case, I suggest that such a trope sets up a discursive economy which provides resources to represent a 'threat' at the presumed healthy body of the state. Such a figuration enables and empowers the representation of danger to the social body in terms of representation of danger to the physical body.

The Argentine Foreign Minister Admiral Cesar Guzetti in August 1976 explained the repression in terms of: "My idea of subversion is that of left wing terrorist organisations. Subversion and terrorism of the right is not the same thing. When the social body of the country has been contaminated by a disease that corrodes its entrails, it forms antibodies. These antibodies cannot be considered in the same way as germs. As the government controls and destroys the guerilla, the action of the antibody will disappear, as is already happening" (cited in Scarpaci and Frazier 1993:6). As a consequence, the fears of contamination or 'red-tides' meant that policies of containment and vigilance were crucial to the stabilisation of boundaries. Mackinder once wrote that the 'ideal geographer' could amongst other things "visualise the play and the conflict of the fluids over and around solid forms" (cited in O Tuathail 1993e). The same might be said for the geopolitical writers who supported the proposals for a SATO. The discussions over the South Atlantic defense pacts allowed conflicting interpretations of regional events to be disciplined and allowed writers to imagine Argentina as a regional hegemon (e.g. Llaver 1982).

5.5. Summary

I believe the debates over SATO within the Argentine geopolitical literature can be related to long standing concerns over 'national identity' and 'national projects' (Pittman 1981, Child 1985, Tulchin 1987). The search for a 'national project' which would end the "profound sense of lost status and continuing national crisis" (Milensky 1978:27) has been an important theme

in Argentine writings (Pittman 1981).²⁹ As Villegas (1975) has noted these 'projects' have included ambitious plans to link river systems, create huge artificial lakes, move the national capital inland and transfer large portions of the population southwards (see, for example, the critique of Reboratti 1986).

The military regime in Argentina between 1976-82 was based on a political ideology of anti-communism (Pion-Berlin 1988,1989b).³⁰ The regime's obsession with subversion and communism was reflected not only with events such as the 'Dirty War' but also with the discussions of South Atlantic pacts within the geopolitical and military literatures (Child 1985). In the case of the latter, the identification of a vulnerable region (the South Atlantic) was crucial to the efforts of influential geopolitical writers (and the military regime's) to create and secure identities based on anti-communism.

29 . Milensky's (1978) major survey of Argentine Foreign Policy identified two major strands of foreign policy: the 'statist-nationalist' and 'classical liberal' foreign policy. The former views Argentina as a non-aligned, strictly Latin American developing country. The latter views Argentina as a nearly developed, Western, Christian nation with violently anti-communist tendencies.

30 . Arriagada (1979:7) "The anti-communism of the armies of the Southern Cone is not a new phenomenon on the contrary, it is a constant force, with roots in the 1920s ... Never before has anti-communism become a military theory within the armed forces of the region".

Chapter 6

Creating a Crisis out of a Drama: British elite narratives of the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War

6.1. Introduction

"Without war stories there would be fewer stories to tell" Elshtain (1987:x) *Women and War*.

The final empirical chapter faces a daunting task after ten years of many and varied accounts and representations of the 1982 Falklands War. A further study faces the simple question of 'what is new to say?'¹ In spite of that caveat, this analysis of the 1982 South Atlantic War attempts to link up the themes discussed in the earlier chapters on geopolitics and foreign policy. In particular, I want to draw on some of the critical geopolitical literature concerned with the practices of story telling within foreign policy. In the case of war or conflict, it is suggested that story telling is a crucial component to the operation of foreign and security policies.

This is not a trivial subject, for any war or crisis that results in the death of nearly a thousand people (as did the 1982 Falklands War) needs to be examined closely in order to explore how particular stories were used to justify and legitimate military action. In that respect, The outbreak of war is perhaps the defining moment of this type of mobilisation of stories about

1 . In order to avoid unnecessary repetition I have switched title descriptions of the 1982 Anglo-Argentine conflict: Falklands War, the South Atlantic War and the Falklands/Malvinas War. This should not be taken to indicate my political preferences! Furthermore, the term 'War' needs to be used with caution given that there never was a formal declaration of war (ditto in the 1991 Gulf War).

boundaries (Ashley 1987, Campbell 1992a). The identification of 'threats' or 'dangers' in the international realm helps to constitute 'domestic' society in ways that mutually constitute the inside and the outside as a consequence of the ontological status attributed to each category (Walker 1993). This places a premium on borders and their ability to demarcate political spaces. Therefore, the appeal of discourses on sovereignty and security is in their discursive capacities to secure those boundaries of political life (between domestic identity and international anarchy). Within international relations theory, one of the most interesting strands has been an investigation of sovereignty and intervention (Weber 1992a, Walker 1993). Robert Walker has argued, for example, that the concept of sovereignty is an essentially uncontested concept because it has been coupled with the concept of intervention. As a consequence, the concept of sovereignty tends to be granted an ontological status which is then disrupted by the practices of intervention (Walker 1993).

Recent attempts to problematise the concept of sovereignty have started from the premise that "sovereignty is regarded as a set of practices that differ across time and space. With respect to statehood, sovereignty refers to what a state must do in order to be a sovereign state" (Weber 1992a:200). The practices that constitute displays of sovereign behaviour differ over particular historical eras and geographical locales. It is suggested that the theorisation of sovereignty, therefore, should begin on the assumption that is created rather than grant it a pre-discursive existence. For the myth of sovereignty to be believable, the sovereign state needs to control how 'the people' are written or constituted. As Weber (1992:216) notes "Only by maintaining control over the depiction of its people can the state authoritatively claim to be an agent of the people ... one must analyse how foundations and boundaries are drawn- how states are written with particular capacities and legitimacies at particular times and places".

For the purposes of this chapter, however, I think it is important (in the first instance) to try to contextualise some of the academic contributions.² At least five different types of studies could be identified: first, the 1982 South Atlantic War has been examined within the context of Britain's long term post imperial decline (e.g. Barnett 1982, Verrier 1983, Gamba 1987, Freedman 1988, Gibran 1990, Robins 1991). Second, others have explored the inconsistencies *a la Chomsky* within the official 'moral' legitimisation of the 1982 War by British policy elites (e.g. Bluth 1987, Calvert 1982, Middlebrook 1985, Tulchin 1987, Dillon 1989). Third, some scholars have looked at how the British foreign policy making system failed to react to the crisis and to how British behaviour contributed to the outbreak of hostilities (e.g. Beck 1988; Dalyell 1982,1983; Seymour-Ure 1983, Hennessy 1986; House 1983; Ponting 1985; Freedman and Gamba 1990). Fourth, a number of studies have examined the diplomatic, legal and military implications of the 1982 South Atlantic War (e.g. Coutau-Begarie 1982, Steele 1982, Child 1983, Beach 1986, Coll and Arend 1985, Furlong and Albiston 1985, Train 1988). Fifth, a few scholars have investigated how British elites discursively fought the war campaign (e.g. Aulich 1992, Dillon 1989, Fermentia 1991, Geraghty 1984, Ossendorf 1987).

The contributions of political geographers, however, to these studies have been slight.³ House's (1983) paper, for example, was one of the few instances where geographers engaged

2 . There is a huge literature on the Falklands War. I have personally read over a hundred references to the 1982 South Atlantic War written in four different languages held at the Library of Congress in Washington DC. As a consequence, the five types of studies that I identify are not exhaustive! There is, for example, a large literature on the media and the 1982 Falklands War. e.g. Harris 1983, Adams 1986, Morrison and Tumber 1988, Aulich 1992.

3 . There has been some brief commentary on the Falklands War by political geographers such as Peter Taylor. As Taylor (1989:24) noted "...Britain was able to bring off a military victory on the other side of the globe. Britain could claim to be a 'world power' once again...The Falklands cannot compare to India as a new centre of empire but the resonances of the past were clear for all to see as the naval force returned to Portsmouth in triumph and celebration". One specific article by Song (1988), however, dealt with the issue of fisheries and conservation around the Falkland Islands.

in analyses of the 1982 Falklands War. House's systems approach, however, underestimates and underplays the geographical components to the 1982 War. The (re)presentation of the 1982 Falklands War campaign by the Thatcher government presents an interesting example of how events in the South Atlantic were explained, ordered and disciplined by reference to discourses on security, national identity and sovereignty. The depictions of the Falkland Islands were rarely geographically specific. i.e. its remote location in the South Atlantic, British government subsidies and the small wool based economy, the declining population or its economic dependencies on South American states. Indeed one of the few specific geographical references during the immediate period after the War was by Paul Rogers of Bradford University who noted (29 March 1983) that "I think the problem though is not just a question of sovereignty, it is a question of the geo-political position of the Falklands. In other words, they are very close to Argentina and a very long way from the United Kingdom" (HMSO 1983 Defence Committee Report). The effacement of the material realities of the Falkland Islands, therefore, allowed the discourse of sovereignty to reclaim a deterritorialised site of British sovereign identity (see O Tuathail 1993a).

If one accepts Dillon's (1989:230) conclusions that "there were no material interests at stake ... nor was the conflict part of a wider global or ideological struggle" then one realises that the war stories as told by the Thatcher government had a considerable amount of work to perform: to transform a group of islands 8,000 miles away into a place that emerged as a signifier of British identity. The Falkland Islands in the British elite war narrative was not a specific place, rather a free floating signifier that (re)presented British territory. As Mrs Thatcher noted on 3 April 1982 "For the first time in many years, British sovereign territory has been invaded by a foreign power".

The chapter is organised in two major parts. First, the major part of the chapter is devoted to an examination of the war stories as told by British political elites. The scripts of World War

II and the Suez Crisis are highlighted. The second section explores how that script was disciplined and ordered so that circumstances and events that might have contradicted the official narrative were marginalised. In particular, I highlight several circumstances: the events leading up to the crisis, the identification of human rights abuses in Argentina and the reporting of the war.⁴

6.2. Narrating the War Story: Suez and World War II Scripts

There were few wars in recent times that were scripted in such a stark manner as the 1982 Falklands War. The debates that surrounded the announcement of the Argentine invasion in early April were filled with ethical condemnation and moral outrage.⁵ On the first Saturday sitting of the House of Commons since the 1956 Suez Crisis, parliamentarians were swift to denounce Argentina. As Mrs Thatcher noted on 3 April "We are talking about the sovereignty of British territory ... We cannot allow the democratic rights of the Islanders to be denied by the territorial ambitions of Argentina". Or as John Silken, the then Labour Shadow Defence Secretary noted "The aggression of a fascist dictatorship and a fascist Junta, whose leader, Galtieri is probably the worst of the bunch of its leaders, a man who wears his medals upon his chest the medals he won from repressing his own people". A position that drew criticism from Tam Dalyell (1982b:17) "Crucially, Labour's Defence Spokesman, John

4 . The chapter is an altered version from an article that is to appear in *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* in 1994. In particular, this chapter includes interview material and draws upon US primary documents such as the *Department of State Bulletin*.

5 . The major documentary source is the HMSO (1982) *The Falklands Campaign: A Digest of Debates in the House of Commons*. As the title implies it is not comprehensive. There were a significant numbers of omissions. For instances, Tony Benn's speeches in Parliament during the 1982 War were edited.

Silkin, went onto the important *World at One* radio programme and seemed to commit the Opposition to belligerent action".

The story of the Falklands War campaign had thus effectively began on the 2 April with the Argentine invasion. The list of characters to emerge included a deeply unpopular Prime Minister, Mrs Thatcher (the leading woman); ranged against her the brutal Junta composed of General Galtieri, Admiral Anaya and Brigadier Dozo, whose regime had demonstrated the bankruptcy of spatial expansionism by invading the hapless Falkland Islanders (led by a colonial governor, Rex Hunt) living in idealised rural communities.⁶ As Francis Pym noted on 7 April 1982 "Harassed by political unrest at home, and beset by mounting economic difficulties, the regime turned desperately to a cynical attempt to arouse jingoism among the people. The Falkland Islanders have thus become the victims of the unprincipled opportunism of a morally bankrupt regime".

Within five days of the invasion, Mrs Thatcher had launched a task force to recapture the islands. In spite of a UN resolution urging negotiation and the combined efforts of Secretary of State Haig and the Peruvian government, Mrs Thatcher seemed bent on marshalling multilateral support for military action. Britain's justification for sending a task force was based on the right to self-determination against aggression (Article 51 of the UN Charter): British territory had been seized, the islanders' rights to self-determination had been

6. In an interview with Sir Rex Hunt, the former governor reiterated his belief that the British Foreign Office had misunderstood the position of the Falkland Islanders: "There was a long history of suspicion by the Falkland Islanders of the Foreign Office...and with due cause...the Foreign Office had been actively trying to get rid of the Falklands and push them into the lap of Argentina...They (i.e. Foreign Office) seemed to think that my job was to persuade the islanders to accept lease back...I did not see that as my role". Sir Rex Hunt later described his role in 1982: "I was very much a colonial person rather than a diplomat...basically the Foreign Office never understood the position of a governor of a colony...the colonial governor wears two hats not only does he represent the government for which he works but he also represents that colonial government back to his own government. You can see the seeds of conflict". Interview with Sir Rex Hunt, 21 November 1991

suspended by the Argentine invasion and in the process the principles of international law had been overturned.

The principle of self-determination emerged as the central element in the British elite war narrative.⁷ Put simply, the Thatcher government argued that the Falkland Islanders (Kelpers) were British and wanted to remain British. As Winston Churchill told the House of Commons on 7 April 1982 "Nor should they (ie Argentina) be in any doubt as to our resolve as a nation to restore British sovereignty and rule to the Falkland Islands and liberate our people who live there". As a consequence, the ability of the British government to 'speak' and 'represent' the Kelpers was crucial to the articulation of a violent response to the Argentine invasion and to the creation of British sovereign identities.

The decision, however, to send a task-force to recover the Islands was at first underwritten by fears that the Falklands might as *The Guardian* (2 April 1982) noted: "be almost certainly beyond military recovery". The specific fear, however, was that not technological or logistical rather it was whether the nightmare of 'Suez' would return. As Lord George-Brown reminded readers of the *Daily Express* (5 April 1982) "For the second time in a quarter of a century they (the Conservatives) made such a cock up that they have made us the laughing stock of the world. The previous time was Eden, Selwyn Lloyd and Anthony Head, set out to topple Nasser and capture Suez. They made such a mess of it that our forces didn't arrive in time". As in the Suez Crisis, the role of the Americans (would they cause a 'run' on the pound again) was crucial to any British response to the Falklands Crisis. As David Lambie noted in the House of Commons on 7 April "If the Americans intervened in this dispute, there would

7. The principle of self-determination has not always been rigorously applied by British governments. The case of Diego Garcia (a British colony) in 1965 is a case in point. The inhabitant of the Islands were forcibly removed by the British in order to make way for an American naval base.

only be one result: the Argentines would withdraw from the Falkland Islands and there would be a return to normality".⁸

In the pre and post war speeches Mrs Thatcher maintained that we were confronting evil for the sake of a land far away and where few in Britain cared about or knew where it was on a world map.⁹ As Denis Healey on 7 April 1982 noted "Others say, as said in 1938, that the Falkland Islands is a far away country that is indefensible". Statements made by the Prime Minister and others demanded firm action against the Argentines were often dismissed as war rhetoric, but that sort of statement ignores how a story was being constructed and naturalised by the Prime Minister and her colleagues on both sides of the House of Commons. Mrs Thatcher appeared to be a woman obsessed with reversing not only the invasion but also the general affront to the British people. As she noted on 3 April "We are here, because, for the first time in many years, British sovereign territory has been invaded by a foreign power". Combined with the oft-repeated comparisons with Hitler and or Mussolini, these discursive and political strategies reproduced scripts of World War II: the last unambiguously 'good war' in British social memory- with its clearly defined protagonists and unquestionably noble cause (Fussell 1989, Luke 1991, Cummings 1992).¹⁰

8 . The position of the US government on 2 April 1982 was that "We have made it clear to the government of Argentina that we deplore the use of force to resolve this dispute. We have called on Argentina to cease, immediately, hostilities and to withdraw its military forces from the Falkland Islands". Cited in *Department of State Bulletin* Volume (1982) 82 Number 2063

9 . A good example of official ignorance on the position of the Falkland Islands is given by Hennessy (1990:16) when he notes how "When official papers for 1954 were released at the Public Records Office in 1986...Admiralty files were declassified dealing with the response required should General Peron launch an assault on the islands. They prompted one senior Admiralty civil servant to recollect a ministerial meeting at which First Sea Lord J P L Thomas was asked by a colleague where, exactly, the Falklands were. With supreme self-confidence, Thomas drew a ring around St Helena and tossed the map across the table."

10 . I do not claim that there is an essential World War II script, rather that it was something that was stitched together as and when needed (Luke 1989,1991). The recent work by Fussell (1989) and Cummings

The operationalisation of the WWII scripts involves the construction of cultural identities which are defined by their relation to, and differentiation from, other cultural identities. As Sir Bernard Braine reminded us on April 3 1982 "We are dealing here not with a democratic country ... but with a Fascist, corrupt and cruel regime ... " The 'national identity' itself is based on the selective processes of memory, so that a given group recognises itself through the recollection of a common past. As Sir Hector Monro noted "Never, at any time since the last war, has there been a more important period during which the nation should stand together". Nations cannot be understood, therefore, as simply in terms of their own essential features rather they must be thought of in relational terms. Difference is at the heart of the matter. By drawing on the images of World War II, the British government in 1982 hoped that a collective memory could be reconstructed and that the invasion of the Falklands could be interpreted as the penetration of boundaries that differentiate identity and order with disorder and disintegration.¹¹ As Michael English told the House of Commons on 8 April 1982 "We are defending civilisation against barbarians as our ancestors did centuries elsewhere.."

(1992) have drawn attention to the importance of World War II in British and American social memories as a 'good and just war'. As Fussell (1989:164) notes it "served a generation of Britons and Americans as a myth which enshrined purity, a parable of good and evil". Or as Cummings (1992:148-149) notes "Television was in its infancy during the war, and Hollywood constructed Korea in the patriotic, heroic modes of World War II". An appeal that was to prove useful again during the 1991 Gulf War (Campbell 1992a, Luke 1991).

11. The construction of Argentina as the 'other' act as sources of social fantasies that offer pleasure by allowing 'Us' to experience internal harmony in spite of the staggering unemployment, social deprivation and unpopularity of the Prime Minister at the time. Argentina as the 'other' activates a displacement of social antagonism onto the outside. In turn this enables the sorts of statements made by MPs such as Julian Amery who noted on 20 May that "The crisis is a catalyst of the basic values of our society...What is happening is not jingoism...It is the expression of the deep feeling of a proud and ancient nation and of the most mature democracy in the world." As a consequence this aided the process of allowing British citizens the impossible idea that a harmonious community based on 'moral and racial' purity exists (see Zizek 1990).

As a consequence, the invasion of the Falkland Islands was depicted in familiar terms. As John Nott, then Defence Secretary noted on the 20 April "When one stops a dictator, there are always, as my right hon. friend the Prime Minister said the other day, there are greater risks in not stopping a dictator- a lesson which this nation has learnt before." This self-evident lesson of history was considered a timeless feature of diplomacy. The depiction of the Falkland Islands as a hapless victim and the Argentine state as a brutal dictatorship set up a script which ensured that there would have to be a violent response in order to stop the perpetual brutality of the dictator. The 'lesson' of appeasement was also recycled. As English noted in the House of Commons "Argentina illustrates its bad faith by claiming far more. It wants all of the South Atlantic, it wants the Chilean South Atlantic" (7 April 1982).

Given the distances involved, the recycling of familiar Churchillian rhetoric was also crucial in (re)creating 'nearness.' When newspapers such as *The Times* argued that 'We are all Falkland Islanders now', it was essentially a response to the vexing issue of how to create the Falkland Islands as a place in which the British could identify with closely (geographically and psychologically). Richard Luce, for example, on 8 April 1982 told Parliament that "I believe that it matters not whether the invasion took place 80 or 8,000 miles away. It matters not whether it is 18,000 miles or 1,800 or 18 million citizens have been invaded." But distance was crucial in the narrative and a response to the Argentine invasion was further compromised by the fact that the 1981 Nationality Bill had in the words of one MP Frank Hooley made the Falkland Islanders into "second class British citizens and denied them the right to come back to the United Kingdom ... " (8 April 1982).

Furthermore, the discursive (re)presentation of the Islands and the response of the British to that invasion relied upon gendered vocabularies of war.¹² As John Nott noted on 7 April

12. As Susan Jeffords (1991:xi) notes "Although war might at first be seem to be a man's world and therefore of little relevance to a discussion of relations between men and women, the arena of warfare...in which (the) enemies are depicted as feminine, wives and mothers and girlfriends are justifications for fighting, and

1982 that the Falkland Islanders rights had been " ... taken away by naked aggression". Or as Francis Pym noted on 20 April "The Falkland Islanders, victims of unprovoked invasion by a powerful and covetous neighbour ... have reacted with courage and dignity to the rape of their Islands". Or as Michael Ancram told the House of Commons on 7 April "the Kelpers are prisoners in their own houses and their property and land have been raped". Furthermore, Ancram then proceeded to masculinise the British elite response- "I ask myself: if that was my family, would I stand back from using whatever means were necessary to try and protect them?" (April 7 1982).

In addition, the gendering of the Task Force fleet, for example, was also part of a gendered strategy which further feminised the Falkland Islands and masculinised the British armed response. As the *Daily Express* noted (6 April 1982) when it ran a story under the headline of "A wren waves goodbye and good luck as the Fleet sails out". In the same issue the paper reported that "The Hermes ups anchor and heads for the Falklands - with the hopes and hearts of all the girls left behind." Other papers such as *The Sun* ran campaigns such as 'knickers to the Argentines' where apparently "thousands of women with loved ones aboard the Navy's Task force are sending the defiant message: Knickers to Argentina" (16 April 1982). What might appear to be frivolous is actually rather important. The gendering of conflict is crucial to operationalising "the fighting fantasies of boy-culture" and the masculinity of the British task force (Johnson 1986-7:59).

Whilst the tasking force was steaming towards the South Atlantic, Secretary of State Alexander Haig was appointed by President Reagan as a mediator.¹³ By 8 April 1982 Haig

vocabularies are sexually motivated". Or as Johnson (1986:59) has noted "As if on the prompter's cue, the Falklands conflict crystallised both these forms (fighting fantasies of boy-culture and the narrative forms of epic) and conjoined them in a particularly dramatic and real public spectacle".

13 . However, Haig maintained that "From the outset of this crisis, the United States has viewed its role as that of assisting two sides in finding a peaceful solution. Our ability to do this is based on Our long standing

had been to London and Buenos Aires in order to assess the positions of the Prime Minister and the military Junta. By 12 April, a plan had been announced by Haig which called for the immediate withdrawal of military forces, the establishment of a tripartite administration and a commitment to negotiate the long term future of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands. Mrs Thatcher was reluctant to negotiate until Argentina had complied with UN Resolution 502 which called for the withdrawal of Argentine forces.¹⁴ However, at the same time the *Washington Post* announced that the American government were supplying Britain with sidewinder missiles, military intelligence and had even offered the services of an aircraft carrier (BBC Timewatch 1992).¹⁵ Unsurprisingly, the Argentine Junta had begun to lose faith in Haig's shuttle diplomacy.

In spite of the earlier efforts of Secretary of State Al Haig's televisual diplomacy (to mediate between Argentina and Britain) throughout April 1982, British diplomacy was effectively limited to withdraw unreservedly or else face the consequences.¹⁶ Having recaptured the

relations with both the United Kingdom and Argentina...Since the onset of the crisis, the United States, therefore, has not acceded to requests that would go beyond the scope of customary patterns of cooperation based on existing bilateral agreements". Statement by Secretary of State Haig 14 April 1982 Cited in *Department of State Bulletin* (1982) Volume 84 Number 2063

14 . There were, however, disagreements between the then Foreign Secretary Francis Pym and the Prime Minister Mrs Thatcher. The former was far more committed to a negotiated settlement and had conceded a role for the UN in the Falkland Islands future administration, a concession that Thatcher smacked of 'appeasement' (see Sharp 1991).

15 . The role of the American government during the period between late April and early May 1982 was varied in nature. First, support for Britain was championed by the then Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger. However, Jeanne Kirkpatrick (US Ambassador to the United Nations and a distinguished Latin American scholar) and Thomas Enders (Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs) were against wholesale support for the British government.

16 . The degree of US support for Britain was sizeable. First, the US offered their airbase to Britain on Ascension Island and substantial amounts of aviation fuel. Second, military intelligence was passed onto Britain

South Georgia Islands on 25 April 1982, the British government set out to narrow the diplomatic options. Mrs Thatcher argued that "I think the vast majority of our people, whatever their political views, are firmly behind the action that the Government are taking. Whatever ever their political views, they are delighted that Britain is firmly standing up again for the principles in which she believes, while the world is watching" (29 April 1982). Whilst the Americans seemed to be publicly reiterating support for Thatcher, the Leader of the Opposition Michael Foot had "demanded that Mrs Thatcher send her Foreign Secretary, Francis Pym, to meet with Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar at UN headquarters in New York before nay further military action was undertaken" (Jenkins 1982:15). The first signs that bipartisanship was becoming fragile were overturned with the confusion of events in early May 1982.

The sinking of the battle-cruiser ARA *General Belgrano* on May 2 by a nuclear powered submarine on the eve of a new Peruvian peace proposals could be read as a highly provocative move designed to sabotage further diplomatic endeavours (Dalyell 1982,1983; Gavshon and Rice 1984).¹⁷ But Mrs Thatcher had warned that "It would be totally inconsistent to support the despatch of the task-force and yet be opposed to its use ... Argentina would doubt our determination and sense of purpose" (29 April 1982). The ship at the time was sailing towards Argentina and was outside of the British (self-declared) total exclusion zone. As John Nott confirmed on 4 May 1982 "We believe that the action took

from US satellites and listening posts. The sinking of the ARA 'General Belgrano', for example, was made possible by information passed onto the HMS Conqueror by an American satellite link up (Gavshon and Rice 1984). Third, a number of weapon systems were offered to British forces (e.g. sidewinder missiles). Cited in *The Economist* 'America's Falkland War' March 3 1984

17 . The Peruvian proposals of President Belaunde contained the following items: an immediate cease-fire, concurrent withdrawal and non-introduction of forces, administration of the Falklands by a contact group pending a definitive settlement, and an undertaking by both parties to reach a definitive agreement by 30 April 1983 (cited in *Department of State Bulletin* (1982) Volume 82 Number 2064)

place just outside - about 35 miles - the total exclusion zone".¹⁸ An issue that *The Times* (3 May 1982) felt could be ignored given that "Argentina is in the grip of uncontrollable desires, fuelled by impossible fantasies forced to the surface by a legacy of terrific tensions in its society".

Shortly after the sinking of the *General Belgrano*, the British Government issued a short pamphlet entitled 'The Falkland Islands: The Facts' which reviewed the historical and legal background to the present dispute. Furthermore, the diplomatic offensive of the British government was to remind readers that Argentina was a place where "Militarism has deep roots in Argentina. The military see themselves as 'creators of the nation, defenders of its culture' and guarantors of the cohesion of the state. They have not hesitated to intervene and suspend the democratic process in the face of what they considered an ineffectual civilian government and a drift towards anarchy ... In contrast the Falkland Islands, contrary to Argentine claims that the Islanders are second class citizens, are free and democratic ... " (HMSO 1982:7). In the final paragraph, the British government reiterated its belief that "The Argentine invasion is an act of unprovoked aggression. History provides many examples where the international community's failure to take action over such acts by aggressive powers led to a much worse crisis later" (HMSO 1982:10).

The most dramatic period of the war narrative was on 5 May 1982. The announcement that HMS *Sheffield* had been sunk by an Exocet missile produced a passionate debate in the

18. The sinking of the *Belgrano* has been the subject of much controversy. In an interview with a 'respected' political journalist I was told that the British believed that the *Belgrano* was a 'spy ship' seeking to pin-point the movements of British ships (28 May 1992, London). This, however, does not mitigate the British decision to sink the battle cruiser at a delicate moment of the negotiations. The reaction to the event raised some angry responses in the House of Commons in May 1982. For example, Denis Healey asked "I hope that he (i.e. Francis Pym) will be able to reassure the House by telling us precisely how urgent a threat to the Task Force the 'General Belgrano' represented, and in particular how far away the Task Force was...so that we can form a judgement on whether it was necessary to sink it" (13 May 1982).

House of Commons. As John Stokes noted "As someone who has been in the House for only twelve years but spent six years fighting in the war, I found signs of panic on both sides of the House." Subsequent appeals from opposition MPs for the British forces withdraw from the Falklands were met with Government resolve, as Francis Pym noted "The Argentine is under obligation to withdraw its forces ... We are suffering from the act of aggression. It is the Falklands that has been invaded."

The sinking of the HMS *Sheffield* in early May transformed the discursive context of the conflict. David Owen on 29 April 1982 warned the House of Commons that "Let us not make it like Suez. Let us not have what happened in 1956, when Service men went into Suez against a background of bitter party political debate." After the sinking of HMS *Sheffield*, Francis Pym noted on 5 May 'We are in business to prevent a military dictatorship and an undemocratic Government from imposing on a smaller country, by aggression and invasion, a type of government that the people do not want." At the same time the Prime Minister was claiming that "We are doing everything possible to pursue the diplomatic path ... We have now the total support of the United States ... The important thing is that we should get the Argentines off the islands they still occupy" (6 May 1982).

The possibility then of a 'Suez' occurring seemed to be receding. The Americans had agreed their support and the discursive frame-work of the WWII script had reaffirmed the mythology of sovereignty. As Mrs Thatcher noted on 18 May "Our objective in the South Atlantic is not only to ensure that the Argentine troops withdraw from the Falklands ... and to see that territorial boundaries are not, and cannot be changed by force ... no military action can be held up in any way." Spaces of identity are in the process clearly demarcated as a product of the sovereign state. As Mrs Thatcher noted on 11 May 1982 "Our people are robust and the heart of Britain is sound." The British identity appeared fixed and stable in the script as the uncertainties caused by time-space compression, global electronic flows and transnational capitalism which have disrupted territorial and ethical boundaries of the state were banished

from the story line. The purified identities of Empire were quickly drawn upon as British policy elites set about scripting the fighting of the Falklands War (Robins 1991).

The rapid depiction of Argentina as just another fascist regime within British official discourses underlies the point of reference which anti-Galtieri rhetoric was based upon. Buenos Aires in turn became like Berlin, full of grandiose architecture, mindlessly large crowds and filled with pretentious and pompous atmosphere. Argentina became the modern day equivalent of fascist Germany or Italy which like Argentina demonstrated the ethical and moral bankruptcy of spatial expansionism and the domination of place. As Ken Weetch reminded the House of Commons on 20 May 1982 "Times change, but in essence the aggression that we have seen by the Argentines is the same species of aggression as we saw in Britain in the 1930s." Indeed the 1991 Gulf War further has further highlighted how National Socialism has become the global referent of evil and the most convenient embodiment of evilness. The irony, perhaps here, is that the sorts of strategies used by the people (i.e. Nazis) we would most like to distance ourselves from, are part of the projections used by British policy elites to label 'Argentina' as evil or morally bankrupt. As the foreign secretary Francis Pym noted on 14 April "The whole House and the country are struck by the appalling nature of the aggressive action the Argentine regime has committed ... The Falkland Islanders have thus become the victims of the unprincipled opportunism of a morally bankrupt regime."

The month of May 1982 was effectively spent arguing over whether the British government should change tack over its insistence that the Argentines should comply with Resolution 502 and withdraw from the Falkland Islands. The attempts by MPs such as Andrew Faulds to question the value of the islands- "We should frankly admit that for twenty years we have been trying to withdraw from this outpost of empire" (20 May 1982)- was met with accusations that "faint hearts and cold feet" (David Atkinson 20 May 1982) had to be overcome in order to retake the islands. The announcement that the British forces had secured a base on the Falkland Islands on 24 May provoked John Nott to note that "The

whole House has been delighted to the expression of delight on the faces of the islanders and their children." After much patience so the story went the British government had decided to act to restore liberty to the islanders.

The identification of the Falkland Islands as British sovereign territory and as a matter of defending international standards/norms of behaviour was crucial to engineering support for the military action.¹⁹ As Christopher Murphy (24 May 1982) told the House of Commons " ... that the Union Jack flying again on the Falkland Islands is not merely the symbol of our sovereignty, but is the frontline banner for international freedom, justice and democracy." A point reiterated by John Nott who noted "We are doing more than possessing the Falkland Islands which are British territory ... We are standing for a principle which is vital for the future peace of the world" (24 May 1982).

The Falklands campaign was an important signifier of British elite determination to resist aggression and defend democratic right. Peter Temple-Morris's assertion that "The only real option that we have now is to press on for the victory that will make their supreme sacrifice worth while ... " reveals more about the sorts of discursive frame-works which had been used to explain the conflict than the sorts of options available to British political elites in the last weeks of that conflict. The attempts of Tony Benn, for example, to halt the "imaginary journey of Victorian imperialism" (29 April 1982) or to urge " ... an immediate and unconditional cease-fire" were rapidly marginalised in the House of Commons (Dillon 1989).

Depicting Argentina as a great threat to British sovereignty and to the international system in general was crucial to the justification for the British military campaign. As Mrs Thatcher noted "They risked their lives to defend British sovereign territory, the British way of life and the rights of British people to determine their own future ... We went to recapture what was

19. Cited in *Department of State Bulletin* (1982) Volume 82 Number 2067

ours. We had to do it by military means because the Argentines would not leave peacefully. We condemned their military adventurism" (15 June 1982). Principles of 'democracy', 'human rights', 'civilisation' and 'liberty' were all identified by Parliamentarians as issues worth fighting over and which was ultimately worth the loss of lives. As David Owen concluded on 14 June 1982 "The sacrifice of their loved ones (i.e. servicemen/women) was a sacrifice which was necessary for all." Or as Mrs Thatcher noted on 15 June 1982 "We were perfectly right to repossess what was already ours and to look after and defend British subjects ... I hope the hon. Member thinks that the money spent was worthwhile".²⁰

6.3. Disciplining the War Narrative

The depiction of the invasion as a moral and political outrage by British foreign policy professionals was an important element in the war narrative. It is suggested, however, that if one examines the war campaign in closer details it is not so readily apparent that the inscription of Britain (representing good) and Argentina (representing evil) could be made so easily.²¹ As Tony Benn warned on April 22 1982 "The poison of nationalism and militarism,

20 . An opposing view to Mrs Thatcher's was provided by Thomas Enders (US Under Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs) in a major review of the crisis in August 1982: "By 14 June, when the Union Jack was again raised over Port Stanley, what Horace Rumpole had in 1770 called 'a morsel of rock that lies somewhere at the very bottom of South America' had become the improbable scenario of bitter fighting. More than 1,000 men and women were dead. Billions of dollars had been expended". Cited in *Department of State Bulletin* (1982) Volume 82 Number 2067

21 . Important (if ultimately unsuccessful) sources of critique during the Falkland War included the newspaper *The Guardian* (and its cartoonist Steve Bell) and parliamentarians such as Tony Benn and Tam Dalyell. Their critiques focused on a number of themes: the militarisation of the conflict after the Belgrano sinking, the possibility of nuclear weapons being deployed in the South Atlantic, the possibility of a military campaign and the excessive secrecy of the Thatcher government. Other journals such as *The Economist* shifted from scepticism towards support of the Thatcher government over April to June 1982. On 10 April 1982, for

which has already been released in Britain will go on spreading...The crude war mongering which is being encouraged by the Cabinet and the media has to stop. Lets do not support the use of the task force to make war". The complexities of the crisis, therefore, need to be carefully examined so that the dominance of the political narratives of outrage can be critically examined.

As a consequence, this section examines a number of issues that were not addressed during the Falklands War campaign. These include: fermenting grievances behind the Argentine invasion, the importance of human rights abuses in constructing Argentina as an 'evil other', and the reporting of the Falklands War itself. I do not, however, lay claim to comprehensiveness. An important feature of the War narrative, for example, was selective historical recall especially over the question of competing claims to sovereignty. The arguments over legal claims reside within a context of a bitterly disputed history stretching from the initial 'discovery' and 'naming' of the Islands to the establishment of the earliest settlements and to the most contested event of all: the British invasion/recovery in 1833 (at the expense of the Argentine state). Thereafter, the next one hundred and fifty years have been depicted as either a period of continuous British sovereignty or a period of claims/counter-claims and British imperialism (see, for example, Goebel 1927, Bluth 1987, Beck 1988).

I do not wish to recount those contested histories. Unlike many of the earlier writers on this crisis, I do not claim to be able to recount 'the' story. Furthermore, this third section does not have the implicit aim of stitching together further sub-stories in order to (re)present a truer or

example, the journal noted that "The immediate military objective is negotiation, not permanent re-occupation of a colony on the far margins of an empire on which the sun has set". By 19 June 1982 *The Economist* concluded "Britain has said something to itself, and to others, in its pocket war to recover the Falkland Islands. To itself it has shown a steadiness of will that, properly used, may steady its hand in other ways at home and abroad".

better story (see Doel 1993a). Rather it attempts to attention to how the war narrative of British elites marginalised events which disrupted the story or (re)presented events in such a way that the narrative was disciplined and ordered around the notion of a 'good and just war'. As O Tuathail (1993a:17) has noted (in respect to the 1991 Gulf War) "Complex histories and the realities of place were overwhelmed and effaced by a script which lifted the conflict from its actual geographical and historical co-ordinates".

6.3.1. Fermenting Grievances

On the first sitting of the House of Commons after the invasion was announced, parliamentarians were swift to condemn the Argentine actions as 'unjust' and a 'flagrant' abuse of international law. At the emergency meeting only two MP's counselled against military action (George Foulkes and Ray Whitney). Whenever advocates of military action spoke of the events of April 1982 their utterances were littered with phrases such as 'unprovoked aggression' and so on. As Michael Foot noted "We should not see foul brutal aggression succeed in our world." Or as John Nott noted on 7 April 1982 "We have no wish to shed blood, but we shall not acquiesce in an act of unprovoked aggression- undertaken, presumably in the false belief that we lacked the courage and the will to respond". These tropes were crucial for operationalising WWII scripts which could depict the event as a complete surprise and an event without context. As Francis Pym noted on 3 April 1982 "The whole House and the country are struck by the appalling nature of the aggressive action the Argentine regime has committed".

The appeal of the phrase 'unprovoked aggression' was that it clearly implies that the other party initiated the incident (without cause) with self-evident violent behaviour. Furthermore, MPs attempted to link a local dispute in the South Atlantic to wider (global) preoccupations with justice and legality. As Douglas Jay on 3 April noted "If one gives way to this sort of

desperate, illegal action, things will not get better, and other countries might follow". Or as Mrs Thatcher noted on 20 April 1982 "a very important principle, not only for the Falkland Islands but for the people of many other territories who may be invaded if unprovoked aggression in this case succeeded".²²

I think it is important that we contextualise the invasion in a way that is more historically sensitive than the parliamentary discussions of April 1982. The Argentine claim to the Falkland Islands as many commentators have noted is a long standing one (Carill 1982, Beck 1988). However, it was Juan Peron in the 1950s, who raised most strongly the issue of sovereignty over the islands. Having refused the British offer of placing the matter before the International Court, he sought to raise the Argentine presence in the region. In the process this caused great alarm amongst British policy elites who in 1951 fearful that Peron was contemplating an invasion, ordered that a company of British infantry be sent to deter any invasion (Dodds 1992a). In the event no such invasion materialised. Yet the British clearly were not that concerned given the fact that a few years later the Foreign Office were discussing proposals to sell an aircraft carrier to the Argentines (Dodds 1994c).

In the 1960s, in spite of winning a diplomatic victory in the UN, the British were reluctant to discuss the Falklands as a 'colonial' issue. Indeed in a general context of indifference (e.g. Duncan Report confirmed the Latin American region as of low importance), Anglo-Argentine trading and diplomatic links were on the decline. However, given that the 1959 Antarctic Treaty had effectively 'frozen' rival Antarctic claims, the clash over the sovereignty of the Falklands/Malvinas Islands took on added importance for the Argentines. In 1965 the UN passed resolutions 2065 and 3160 explicitly declaring that the Falklands was a colonial

22 . In an interview with the former governor of the Falkland Islands, Sir Rex Hunt noted that "There was a long history of suspicion by the Falkland Islanders of the Foreign Office (FO)...and with due cause...the FO had been actively trying to get rid of the Falkland Islands and push them into Argentina. The Foreign Office's policy was one of benign neglect." Interview with the author, 21 November 1991 Sunningdale

situation. That implied the need for a decolonising settlement. The Franks Report (1983) notes that "In March 1967 the British government for the first time stated formally to Argentina that they would be prepared to cede sovereignty over the Islands under certain conditions, provided that the wishes of the Islanders were respected" (para 22). In the 1970s, the Foreign Office actively encouraged the increased dependency of the islands on Argentina through legislation such as the 1971 Communications Act and through ignoring the recommendations of the 1976 Shackleton Report which had advised further investment in the islands (Beck 1988). Indeed by the late 1970s proposals were advanced sufficiently for it to be reasonable to assume that the eventual transfer of sovereignty to the Argentines was possible (Beck 1988).

The most dramatic incident in the 1970s over the Falklands was when the Callaghan Government ordered the despatch of a nuclear powered submarine in order to deter potential Argentine aggression (Callaghan 1987). This, however, did not prevent the Argentines from occupying and claiming the island of Thule (British claimed) in 1976 (an event that went unrecorded in Britain for nearly two years). What is interesting about that incident of the nuclear submarine is how it was turned by the Conservative government in 1982 into a piece of evidence that suggested that the dangers of appeasement had not disappeared. In spite of the apparent success of the Callaghan decision, the sovereignty issue remained unresolved by the turn of the 1980s. As Lord Callaghan (1987:370) recalled "The verdict of history must be that the Labour government kept the peace and the Conservative government won the war".

By 1981-2, Argentine grievances were well known within the Foreign Office, yet little progress had been made on the issue of solving the problem of sovereignty (HMSO 1983). The leaseback plans put forward by Nicholas Ridley were crushingly defeated in the House of Commons in December 1980 and the British government was to offer in the next two years little to pacify Argentine grievances.²³ The Franks Report (1983) clearly states that

23 . When asked in an interview with the author about the 1980 December parliamentary debate on leaseback, Sir Rex Hunt noted that "I was horrified. Nicholas Ridley (the then Junior FO minister) went back

lack of interest: in the case of the Cabinet Overseas and Defence Committee government policy towards Argentina and the Falklands was not formally discussed after January 1981. In addition the Latin American Current Intelligence Group met 18 times between July 1981 and March 1982 but failed to discuss the Falklands once. In July 1981 the Argentine foreign minister issued a statement warning of dangerous consequences if the British government refused to discuss sovereignty. The Thatcher administration did not respond (Kennedy 1991). In December 1981, a party of Argentine 'scrap dealers' had landed (illegally) on South Georgia did not draw a note of protest from the British Foreign Office. In the early 1980s, therefore, it was assumed that British interest in the Falklands would have been trivial compared to dealing with issues such as nuclear weapons and the Euromissile controversy, Rhodesia and the EEC (Sharp 1991).

Whilst the British were making little effort to support alternative solutions to the sovereignty crisis, a range of events in Britain and the South Atlantic were to signal further British disinterest and errors of judgement. First, the 1981 Defence Review submitted to Parliament by John Nott proposed a massive reduction in the surface fleet of the Royal Navy. The proposed reduction included the Antarctic survey ship HMS Endurance, which many have noted was the symbolic commitment of Britain to defend British sovereign territories in the South Atlantic (e.g. Speed 1983, Beck 1986, Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse 1990).²⁴ In spite of the protestations of the Navy and specifically the captain of the ship, Nick Barker who had warned that this would give the wrong type of signals to the Argentines the MOD

and said things that were totally false about the islanders attitude to lease back...saying that they were divided...the only division in the Falkland Islands was whether the talks should continue". Interview with Sir Rex Hunt, 21 November 1991 Sunningdale

24 . As Callaghan (1987:3760 recalled "She (ie Mrs Thatcher) did not grasp the value of HMS Endurance was as a deterrent, a symbol that Britain would resist armed attack, and a visible sign of British sovereignty". Callaghan had raised the issue of HMS Endurance in the House of Commons on 9 February 1982.

was unrepentant (1992:BBC2 Warstories). The outbreak of hostilities, however, earned the ship a recall.

Second, in an interview with *The Times* in April 1992 Colonel Stephen Lowe, a Defence attache with the British Embassy in Buenos Aires recalled that the Embassy had repeatedly (along with Nick Barker) tried to warn the Foreign Office that an invasion was likely. His warnings along with others appeared to have been ignored, the Foreign Office clearly believed that the Argentines were bluffing and hence warnings from British intelligence where it existed were ignored.²⁵ Edward Pearce writing in 1982 characterised the Foreign Office view in the following fashion: "An invasion was thinkable precisely because the thought of Englishman whom the Argentines dealt with were long sighted, interested in good trade and commerce, and deeply sceptical about irrational sentiments of nationalism" (1982:44).

The Argentine invasion of April 2 was the culmination of several decades of governmental neglect. The refusal to take seriously the UN resolutions of the 1960s, the policies of increasing the dependency of the islands to Argentina in the 1970s and the apparent disinterest of the early 1980s had convinced an Argentine military government that an invasion of the islands in 1982 would result in the British government handing over the islands. What is remarkable is that the official Franks Report into the British government's handling of the 1982 War still felt able to conclude that "We believe that the government had no reason to believe before 31 March (1982) that an invasion of the Falkland Islands would take place" (HMSO 1983).

25. The depiction of Argentina as an irrational and dangerous other was rooted in long standing British prejudices about the 'Latin' personality (Gooch 1990a, 1990b). As a consequence, the decision not to take Argentine intentions over the Falkland Islands seriously may be more a product of British elite prejudice rather than simply a misreading of 'signals' (Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse 1990).

6.3.2. Pointing the Finger: Human Rights Abuses in Argentina

The subject of human rights was swiftly used by parliamentarians in favour of an armed response to depict Argentina as a morally repugnant place. Sir Bernard Braine, for example, noted on 29 April 1982 that " ... We are dealing with a Fascist state where thousands of people have disappeared without trace in recent years." The Dirty War of the 1970s was mentioned by a number as evidence that Argentina had an appalling human rights record.²⁶ This in itself is hardly unreasonable given that a report by Amnesty International in 1977 had concluded "In Argentina, thousands of people have been abducted by the security forces and taken to secret camps throughout the country, where they are usually tortured..." (Amnesty 1977 cited in Graham-Yooll 1981a). In response to these reports, the then Labour government had decided to temporarily suspend arms sales to Argentina.²⁷

However, what few managed to recall was the general indifference shown by Parliament in the 1970s to these abuses in spite of a number of reports by Amnesty International and the efforts of journalists such as Andrew Graham-Yooll (1981) to document the abuses of that regime (Burns 1988). With the return of the Thatcher administration in 1979, the suspension of arms sales to Argentina was reversed. In 1980, for example, Britain supplied Argentina

26 . The Dirty War was a concerted campaign initiated by the military regime in Argentina (1976-1982) designed to exterminate suspected 'subversives'. It is suspected that upto 30,000 people simply 'disappeared'.

27 . One small irony was that periodically it is recalled that the Labour government of Callaghan suspended arms sales to Argentina during the late 1970s. The instigator of such action was the then Foreign Secretary, David Owen who coincidentally wrote a book on human rights in 1977 and which amazingly fails to mention any of the appalling abuses committed by South American military regimes (Owen 1977)! Even though during the crisis of 1982 Owen reminded Parliament on 3 April 1982 that "We knew of the horror of the military Junta in the Argentine and we knew of its action."

with type 42 destroyers, Seacat missile systems, Lynx naval helicopters, and small arms. Furthermore, British involvement in projects such as 'Condor' (the development of an intermediate ballistic missile with Argentina, Egypt and Iraq) has been well documented (Barrow 1982, SPRI Year-books). In 1980 the then Trade Minister Cecil Parkinson summed up the Thatcher's government's commitment to civil trade- "I believe civil trade with other countries should be determined by commercial considerations and not by the character of the governments concerned" (cited in Burns 1988:69).

Having paid little attention to human rights abuses in Argentina during the 1970s, parliamentarians swiftly suggested means by which the fascist regime could be punished. These included the suggestion from Sir Nicholas Fisher on the 3 April that "I understand that the people of the Argentine are great football enthusiasts. The very least we should do is to ensure the exclusion of the Argentine from the World Cup." Yet during the height of the human rights abuses in the 1970s, as writers such as Graham-Yooll (1981) have noted, no one in Parliament had suggested that Argentina should not have been able to host the World Cup in 1978.

Furthermore, when MPs attempted to raise the complicity of the British in supplying the Argentines with military equipment, Mrs Thatcher's government was dismissive. As one MP (Ioan Evans) noted on 7 April 1982 "The two ships that have invaded the shores of the Falkland Islands are British made and were sold by the Government to the Argentines ... I hope the Government will not in future sell arms to the Argentine or train Argentine sailors, as they have in recent weeks, to fight against British forces ... " When asked by another MP (Michael Thorne) whether Mrs Thatcher would stop the supply of arms to 'fascist states', she was unable to give such an assurance: "As the Honourable Gentleman knows we look at each and every order (for arms) as it comes. There is no general rule".

A rule that had been firmly set aside in British dealings with the Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet. Having rapidly secured American support for her war effort, Mrs Thatcher sought

to secure the support of the Chilean regime. Anglo-Chilean relations in spite of the infamous Cassidy case in the mid 1970s remained cordial. The Conservative government had dispatched to Chile the then trade Minister Cecil Parkinson in 1980 who remarked favourably on Chile's market-led economic policies (in spite of the misery caused to the majority of the Chilean people). Mrs Thatcher's government clearly saw Pinochet an ideological ally in the southern hemisphere (Sir Alan Walters former economic adviser to Thatcher also made regular visits). As a consequence, parliamentarians felt able to gloss over the human rights abuses in Chile during the war campaign itself. In return for suspected logistical support and military intelligence during the 1982 War, the Chileans were rewarded with the opportunity to purchase further weaponry.

By May 1982, however, the human rights issue had become a stronger component in Parliamentary discourses. Mrs Thatcher (11 May 1982) depicted the differences between the British and Argentine governments in stark terms: "Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands in violation of the rights of people to determine by whom and in what way they are governed. It was executed by a government with a notorious record in suspending and violating those same rights." However, it was that same military government in the 1970s that British governments had been encouraging through arms sales and through legislation designed to increase the dependency of the Falkland Islands on Argentina.

6.3.3. Reporting the War

The television pictures of the 1982 Falklands War were perhaps at their most striking in early April, when the Thatcher government (after a stormy session in the House of Commons on 3 April) decided to launch a task force to retake the Falkland Islands. Surrounded by the noise of cheers, flag waving and classical music in the background the television viewer was greeted with the sort of fanfare that might have reminded some of World War II and the

Allied response to the German invasion of Eastern and Central Europe. Indeed the television (and news media) coverage at the beginning of the Falklands campaign played an important role in creating a collective experience.²⁸ The depiction of Argentina in stark terms was important in order to justify and legitimate the subsequent military action. As Mrs Thatcher noted on 11 May 1982, " ... I hope that his words (i.e. Chairman of the BBC) will be heeded by the many who have responsibilities for standing up for our task force, our boys, our people, and the cause of democracy."

The scene of flag waving and cheering, for example, was a timely reminder that the flag has always been a privileged sign in the constitution of 'oneness'. As Alan Glyn noted in the House of Commons on 14 April "A great deal of nonsense is talked about flags. There is only one flag. There is no place or justification for the Argentine flag". More importantly, I believe that these scenes of the Task fleet leaving for the South Atlantic were the opening scenes of a travel story: the outward journey. As de Certeau (1984,1986) reminds us there are three parts to a particular type of travel story: the outbound journey, the description of the savage society and the return voyage. The central question facing British elites was not only how the Falkland Islands were going to be composed as a place but also how the savage 'Argentina' was going to be known.

In this respect, the recent literature on the 1991 Gulf War would seem to provide a 'window of opportunity' to explore how the media (re)presentations of events were co-opted by political elites (e.g. Der Derian 1992, O Tuathail 1993, Taylor 1992). However, the death free videographic image of the 1991 Gulf War differs greatly from the media images of the Falklands War for at least two major reasons. First, there appeared to exist substantial technological difficulties in transmitting pictures from the South Atlantic to the studios in

28. Schulte-Sasse and Schulte-Sasse (1991) have recently addressed the issue of 'oneness'. In particular, how societies use representations of war as a means of unifying the body politic on the basis of excluding others. They provide a psychoanalytical analysis of the 1991 Gulf War.

London. The consequences were that the 1982 Falklands conflict was "the worst reported war since the Crimea" (Harris 1983:56). Second, it became abundantly clear that initially the armed forces were very reluctant that any members of the media should accompany the task force.²⁹ After the intervention of the Prime Minister's then Press Secretary, Bernard Ingham, the military were ordered to allow journalists to accompany the task force. Apart from Reuters, only British media teams (30 journalists in total) were given access to the Task force. Although several accounts by journalists of the war itself, suggest that very little effort was made by the military to accommodate their needs during the voyage itself to the South Atlantic and thereafter (see analyses of Adams 1986, Morrison and Tumber 1988).³⁰

One of the most important issues raised by the 1982 Falklands War was how did the media act in response to a distant other? This is important for several reasons. First, the media may be crucial in creating new opportunities for action for individuals and governments in response to temporally and spatially distant others (Thompson 1990). In the case of the Falklands War, the reporting of the Argentine invasion and the last ditch defence of government house in Port Stanley by the Governor Rex Hunt and the 70 Royal Marines on April 2 provided the backcloth for a 'concerted form of responsive action.' Second, the distance of the conflict meant that the MOD were able to control the coverage of the war by the media to a remarkable degree because of the difficulties of sending material from the South Atlantic to the television screen in Britain (Adams 1986). Third, given the paucity of television pictures during the Falklands conflict, the reports of the newspaper and the radio took on an importance unforeseen in, for example, the 1991 Gulf War. In many cases the

29 . Bernard Ingham (1992:283) recalled that "Nothing I did as a Government information officer was more difficult, more nerve racking and ultimately more rewarding than trying to maintain relations between the Government and the Press...during the Falklands campaign".

30 . A total of 29 journalists accompanied the task force in 1982. Ingham (1992) notes, however, that a 1977 MOD media contingency plan suggested that 12 media places was adequate.

newspapers reported incidents from the conflict often a week or several weeks before any accompanying television pictures.³¹

Where television or photographic pictures of the war were shown on British television, the war was presented as a mixture of spectacular images such as the blowing up of HMS Antelope combined with images of a professional British army marching ever onwards towards Port Stanley which as Michael Colvin MP noted in the House of Commons made a pleasant change after " ... weeks of pictures of howling, hysterical Argentines ... "32 War in the process was presented in a sanitised manner, in which we were asked to celebrate the smart technologies of the military and the pictures of dead soldiers were kept to a minimum even though over a thousand people died. There were exceptions, however, such as the sinking of the *Sir Galahad*, and the subsequent horrific injuries to former soldier Simon Weston remain a telling sign of the brutality of war. However, one can sympathise with Anthony Barnett (1982) who noted that there was 'little visible brutality.'

The control of information during the war by the MOD was quite remarkable. As *The Guardian* reported on 6 April, for example, "The movements of the Royal Navy Task Force will be kept secret by the MOD until it arrives in the South Atlantic in two or three weeks

31 . To that end, photography was carefully controlled. The task force sailed in April with no facilities for transmitting black and white photos. By June the two press photographers had been able to return just two batches of film. Although many journalists were swift to accuse the government of censorship and of sanitising war, it was later revealed that even when pictures of casualties were reaching the editors they decided not to use them (Harris 1983).

32 . Paterson and Schlesinger (1983), for example, examined how the SAS were represented during the Falklands campaign. As they note (1983:68) "The SAS's image as super-soldiers was enhanced by their exploits during the Falklands campaign...To promote their heroics, the SAS made their own satellite communications system available to a sympathetic journalist, the Standard's Max Hastings, circumventing the Ministry of Defense 'minders', especially after the loss of 18 men in a helicopter accident and their need for 'good news' to boost morale".

time. Although television pictures of the HMS Invincible steaming purposefully out of Portsmouth harbour may be useful as a political signal to the Argentines." After the Task Force had arrived in the South Atlantic, the Press in Britain were kept informed of the progress of the war in a series of non-televised briefings by the MOD's Press Officer, Ian MacDonald. In spite of the remarkable governmental control of the televised media and the support of jingoistic newspapers such as *The Sun*, Mrs Thatcher could still complain that the coverage by the BBC was unpatriotic (Harris 1983). As she noted in the House of Commons on 6 May 1982 "I understand that there are occasions when some commentators will say that the Argentines did something and then the 'British' did something. I can only say that if this is so it gives offence and causes great emotion among many people."

In another example, the Conservative party dominated media committee concluded that the BBC Panorama programme 'Can we avoid war' was unpatriotic. Sally Oppenheim, for example, noted on 11 May 1982 that "Is she (i.e. Mrs Thatcher) aware that for the most part, but not all, it was an odious, subversive, travesty in which Michael Cockerell and other BBC reporters dishonoured the right of freedom of speech of this country." Echos of the Second War were everywhere with Mrs Thatcher warning that 'careless talk costs lives' (27 May 1982) and this apparently included the armchair strategists (employed by the television to comment on military matters) who were then accused by some in the government of giving secret information away to Argentina.

In the aftermath of war the Select Committee of the MOD sat in judgement on the coverage of the war. Parliamentarians summoned people from the media and the military in order to clarify the rules on censorship and the place of the media in military planning for future wars. It was intended to question the extent and machinery for censorship in this country. The committee were concerned that the images of television and photographs were determining elite and mass reactions to war. Indeed during the war the commanders of British forces were adamant that journalists had to be restricted from showing badly wounded or dead British soldiers because that "would be distressing to the families and would be upsetting to morale."

It was feared that the photographic or television image would expose the war narrative of a 'clean war.'³³

There appears to have been a remarkable alliance between the military and the upper echelons of the media as to what constituted an acceptable presentation of the war. Ingham (1992) recalled a number of incidents in which the media agreed to the MOD's demands not to report certain events (e.g. the loss of two harrier jets on 6 May). The Defence Committee were later to conclude that the absence of 'unpleasant scenes' were because of the 'good taste' of the journalists and their professional ability to meet the demands of the newspaper audience. The committee also concluded that the public had "good taste ... (which) will ultimately impose standards of taste and decency on the media if any elements are tempted to concentrate on the more lurid and distressing imagery of war." As a consequence war (like electoral campaigns) was presented as a highly sanitised and packaged media presentation (see de Certeau 1986).

The ability of the MOD to control media coverage of the 1982 Falklands War raises fundamental issues. First, it enabled the construction of a reasonably restrictive war story. Those who pointed out the inconsistencies at the time were rapidly marginalised- including the celebrated incident on *Nationwide* when a housewife from Surrey hounded the Prime

33 . The Ministry of Defence outlined its information policy to the House of Commons Defence Committee: "Our general policy is based on the assumption that the public has both an interest and a right to know about defence. But we do not regard these rights as unlimited. Thus, while we maintain the fullest possible flow of information about the services, their activities and the policies of the Ministry of Defence as a whole, this must be compatible with the overriding dictates of national and operational security and the protection of lives of our servicemen and servicewomen. We also have a duty to protect their privacy. During the military operations to recover the Falklands, our policy was to tell the truth as quickly and accurately as we could...We did not work in a vacuum...With the speed of modern communications, the publishing and broadcasting of all this created additional pressures and difficulties...At no time were Government Information Services involved in psychological operations of 'disinformation'". Cited in *House of Commons First Report from the Defence Select Committee* Session 1982-3 Volume 2 page i para 2

Minister over the sinking of the *Belgrano* on May 3 which had been sailing away from the Falkland Islands at the time. In other cases the sorts of errors that did materialise were lost from the story: the loss of nuclear weapons, the suspected killings of prisoners and the incidents on South Georgia to name a few were omitted.³⁴ This is not simply a result of clichés such as 'the fog of war' or 'truth being the first casualty of war' rather it is a far more deliberate process of story telling than is previously acknowledged.

Second, the Falklands War like the Vietnam War before it reminds us of how the development of mass communication has introduced a fundamentally important theme into social and political life. However, unlike the Vietnam War, the transmission of messages via the media, and especially television did not provoke mass concerted action, which overwhelmed the mechanisms of state power. Even though the Ministry of Defence's memorandum to the House of Commons Defence Committee acknowledges those sorts of problems "With the speed of modern communications, the publishing and broadcasting of all this created additional pressures and difficulties. Sometimes we were obliged to release information about the operation sooner than security or family considerations would otherwise have dictated" (HMSO 1982-83:1). The Falklands War unlike the Vietnam War or the 1991 Gulf War was not a televisual war.³⁵

6.4. Summary

34 . The operation to retake South Georgia in late April 1982 was almost a disaster when an advanced party of troops helicoptered onto a glacier got stuck. Two helicopters crashed whilst trying to rescue the troops. These mishaps were kept secret (see Middlebrook 1985).

35 . Bernard Ingham (1992:296), as Mrs Thatcher's former Press Officer, recalled that "There were two other problems, both affecting television coverage, during the crisis. One was the plenitude of pictures from the Argentine for much of the period and the other was that posed by British television coverage of the war itself. Television has completely changed the rule of war."

By adopting some of the recent research strategies of critical geopolitics and international relations theory attempted to explore how certain war stories were recounted by British elites during the 1982 Falklands War. The chapter has not attempted to (re)present a better story of that particular war. Rather following Norris' (1992) and O Tuathail's (1993a) recent accounts of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, I believe that there are historical and critical resources which as writers can be drawn upon to consider and criticise real-life events. As Norris (1992:59) argues "For it is still possible to perceive the various blind spots, gaps, contradictions, manifest non-sequiturs and downright lies that punctuate 'official discourse' ... " The question about how and what gets narrated in war narratives are as important as any real life events whether they be in the South Atlantic or in the Persian Gulf.

One of the major contribution critical geopolitics offers is a sensitivity towards the depiction or enframement of place within foreign policy narratives. One of the most striking consequences of the 1982 Falklands War was how the British elites were able to draw on discourses of sovereignty and national identity to inscribe the invasion as a breach of British sovereign space. This seems important in the transformation of the Falkland Islands as a place within the war narrative. Ted Rowland on 3 April 1982 had described the place as " ... a piece of rock in the most southerly part of the dependencies which is totally uninhabited and which smells of large accumulation of penguin and other bird's droppings" to a place which has cultural and political value. A place that Mrs Thatcher described as a site from which " ... once again restored Britain's dominance and have let every nation know that British sovereign territory will be well and truly defended" (15 June 1982). Subsequent speeches from Mrs Thatcher and others after June 1982 reiterated a belief that British identities and pride have been transformed (Saunders et Al 1987, Gamble 1988, Long 1988, Young 1989).

Furthermore, writers such as Young (1989) and Sharp (1991) have noted that the success of the Falklands campaign had important consequences for domestic politics. The 'Falklands

factor' emerged as an important discursive resource used to deal with what Mrs Thatcher referred to as 'the enemy within' (by this she meant primarily the trade unions). The militarism of the British state in the 1980s (whether in the context of overseas wars or general rearmament) coincided with an administration determined to discipline and order the domestic populace (Edgerton 1991, Sharp 1991). Tony Benn in the House of Commons April 29 1982 had already identified linkages between the domestic and the international "They see in this a diversion from the issues of unemployment and the destruction of the Welfare State. It is not only General Galtieri for whom the Falklands war is a diversion from domestic failure".

The example of the 1982 Falklands War or the 1991 Gulf War provide useful (and tragic) examples of how discourses of sovereignty, security, national identity are inseparable. By drawing attention to the fact that the appeals to sovereign spaces are historically and geographically contingent we acknowledge that the claims of states are contestable (as is the state's politics of identity). There may not be anything terribly post-modern about war and violence, but by challenging the violent claims of states' to define security and sovereignty we at least prepare the grounds for the articulation of alternative conceptions of community, political identity and security (Dalby 1992, Walker 1993).

Chapter 7

The Possibilities for a Critical Geopolitics?

7.1. Introduction

Over a range of different topics I have attempted within this thesis to explore the possibilities of conducting research on the basis of the recent writings in political geography and international relations theory. This thesis was written at a time not only of great international political change but also of great theoretical upheaval. The debates within political geography and international relations theory in the 1980s, were closely related to the theoretical and methodological presumptions and purposes of these disciplines. Conventional geopolitics and neo-realism in IR have been attacked by many scholars for their theoretical inadequacies and their tendencies to function as apologies for the status quo.¹

In my exploration of critical geopolitics and its related research agendas, I have resisted the temptation to precisely define the objects under study. As Treichler (1987:279) notes "the existence of a name plays a crucial role in providing a coherent and unified signifier- a shorthand way of signifying what may be complex, incoherent or a little understood concept". Rather, I have tried to understand geopolitics as a site of performances which seek to assert presence/truth telling performances. There has not been any intention of assuming

1 . The recent exchange between Peter Taylor and Peter Slowe in *Area* in September 1992 is an interesting (if very brief!) example of the sorts of debates that surround conventional and critical/radical geopolitics and political geography. In a short article (Dodds 1993d) I have attempted to use this exchange to highlight issues of positionality.

that there exists a possibility of developing a single alternative theory to conventional understandings of geopolitics. Geopolitics remains a multiple, fragmentary and often contradictory intellectual field. A field to paraphrase Donna Haraway (1992) which is a series of 'situated knowledges' part factual and part fictional, which are artifactual.² The comments that follow, thus, are not meant as set of firm conclusions, instead they are offered for two reasons: first, to remind readers of the 'conversational projects' of critical geopolitics. Second, to use this chapter as an opportunity to explore the possibilities for further research. Within this context, therefore, a number of themes of particular interest to this writer have been identified.³

Critical geopolitics has since the earliest writings of Agnew and O Tuathail (1987), O Tuathail (1989) and Dalby (1990a) been a multifaceted project. There have, however, been several important themes: constructing informed critiques of the spatialising practices of power, investigating the power of geopolitical writings and discursive practices, investigating how these discourses construct realms of subjugation and finally, examining if these realms can be challenged and resisted. As Dalby (1991a:274) argues "What is being argued here is nothing less than a recognition of the importance of studying the political operation of forms of geographical understandings, recognising that geo-graphs are specifications of political reality that have political effect. To construct critical political geographies is to argue that we must not limit our attention to a study of the geography of politics within the pregiven, taken for granted, common sense spaces, but to investigate the politics of the geographical specification of politics. That is to practice critical geopolitics" (Dalby 1991b, 1993a).

2 . Donna Haraway's articulation of the concept of 'situated knowledges' has been an important theme in her work on cyborgs, feminism and science.

3 . Future research plans include an investigation of British elite scripting strategies and the 1991 Gulf War and the changing geopolitical/geographical specifications of Iraq and Kuwait as places.

Within this broad remit, critical geopolitics (and this doctoral thesis) has pursued a number of topics. Chapter 1, for example, attempted to further problematise the 'geopolitical tradition' itself. As a consequence, instead of writing simple whiggish histories of 'geopolitics', the chapter stressed that Anglo-American geopolitical knowledge has been constructed in specific ways: i.e. the assumption of the transcendental observer, the importance of particular dualisms, the importance of German *geopolitik* and the rules of inclusion/exclusion. The self-understanding of a sub-discipline, therefore, is important in constituting fields of research and for that reason, it was felt that the opening chapter of this thesis should address this theme.

Following on from chapter 1, I attempted in chapters 2 and 3 to locate critical geopolitics within the wider developments of critical human geography, international relations theory and political geography. In some respects, chapter 2 attempted to up-date and expand upon Dalby's (1991) important review of 'critical geopolitics'. In particular, by developing a critique of aspects of conventional Anglo-American geopolitical writings and in addition investigating the theoretical problems a Foucauldian inspired 'critical geopolitics' raises. Chapter 3, however, reflects my specific interest in the practices of foreign policy and was intended to complement the existing work of Dalby and O Tuathail on security policies. By drawing on the recent work of critical international relations theory and by identifying the various strands of critical geopolitical interest in foreign policy, the chapter intended to both review developments and propose new research avenues.

The empirically informed chapters (4,5 and 6) were intended as contributions to other important strands of critical geopolitics. First, it was hoped chapter 4 would be understood as a study which attempted to explore the boundaries of sovereignty, political identity and the practices of foreign/Foreign policies. By attempting an ambitious reading of the creation of the nineteenth century Argentine state, it was intended that the importance of borders and liminality would be apparent. Furthermore, in the specific context of Latin American studies, I felt that existing studies did not fully appreciate that the identification of liminal groups and the creation of a *sovereign* Argentine state depended not only on controlling internal spaces

(and pacifying peoples within the state) but also on developing a set of reflexively monitored *international* relations. It is suggested that the creation of Argentine political identities were enabled by the specification of difference.

Chapters 5 and 6 were devoted to explorations of the official scripting strategies of geopolitical experts and the foreign policy professionals [or political elites]. The identification of formal and practical geopolitical reasoning was an important starting point. Chapter 5 focused on the formal geopolitical reasoning of western and more specifically Argentine geopolitical/military writers writing on the South Atlantic during the 1970s. I argued that these writings were important for a number of reasons: first, because of the long-standing importance of geopolitical writing in Argentina. Second, because of the official encouragement given to geopolitical writers within the Argentine military regime of 1976-1982. Third, during this period the discussions over the possible creation of a South Atlantic pact added significance to these writings. Finally, I related these geopolitical writings on the South Atlantic to the internal policies of the Argentine military regime (1976-1982). The crucial connection was the codes of anti-communism employed by the military regime and the geopolitical writers. It was suggested that these codes were important to the military regime as it attempted to articulate state identities in the 1970s based on anti-communism, national projects and regional hegemony in the South Atlantic.

In chapter 6, however, I attempted to explore the practical scripting strategies of the Thatcher government during the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas conflict. I hoped to demonstrate that the strategies used by the Thatcher government to naturalise a particular version of events of that conflict can be unravelled by a careful reading of official war narratives. It was suggested that the scripts associated with World War II and the Suez Crisis were crucial to the creation of a 'good and just war'. There was, however, no implicit claim to re-tell a 'better' story rather the chapter attempted to weave together a number of connections obscured by and excluded from the official narrations of events and processes.

The employment of terms such as 'narratives' and 'stories' has been guided by the evolving research agendas of 'critical geopolitics'. Critical geopolitics engages with the textuality of contemporary world politics by investigating who (re)presents global politics and how those (re)presentations materialise. Within this thesis, I have focused attention on the discursive practices and the scripting strategies used by academics, experts, foreign policy professionals and political elites in their 'readings' of international or global politics. Cartographic metaphors (e.g. map, boundary) and the vocabulary of the theatre (e.g. script, stage) have been employed within these discussions of geopolitics and foreign policy.

The materiality of geopolitics is an important if neglected theme within critical geopolitics. One of the criticisms writers such as O Tuathail (1992b) has raised is whether a discourse-centred critical geopolitics neglects the materialist dimensions of geopolitical discourse. I had in chapter 2 already mentioned the work of writers such as John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge who have been developing an *geopolitical economic* approach (Corbridge 1988, Agnew and Corbridge 1989, Corbridge and Agnew 1991). The prospects for critical geopolitics drawing on geopolitical economy (and vice versa) have yet to be fully specified but as O Tuathail (1992b:978) argues "Critical geopolitics needs to be situated within a materialist context whereas geopolitical economy needs a means to deepen its analysis of 'the active process of constituting the world order'. Critical geopolitics offers the means to do this by the analysis of and deconstruction of competing forms of reasoning in global politics and the means by which certain forms become persuasive and others are subordinated or rendered ineffective. A comprehensive geopolitical economy approach should have a place for the ideological deconstructionism of critical geopolitics within its larger project of developing a coherent account of the material and institutional dimensions to global change".

Taylor's (1990) account of the practical geopolitical reasoning of the Foreign Office in 1945 is an important illustration of a political geographer attempting to tie together the scripting strategies of foreign policy professionals with the changing material circumstances. As he notes (1990:11) "...the products of geopolitical reasoning are social, the meanings given to

the world cannot be understood separately from the society in which it is produced...But these geopolitical orders are also historical. The meanings attributed to places change as the contexts in which the meanings are made change...We can say, therefore, that a geopolitical transition must involve a fundamental re-evaluation of places as security commodities". Taylor's exploration of *geopolitical transition* whether in 1945 or 1989 is an important contribution to an analysis of how places are reinscribed (sometimes with dramatic consequences) by foreign policy professionals or academic experts over time.

This doctoral thesis has aimed to contribute to these on going debates about the possibilities for a 'critical geopolitics'. It has not been possible to comprehensively deal with all these issues. I have tended to concentrate more on the discursive practices associated with geopolitics and foreign policy at the expense of a more materially grounded account. Furthermore, the elements of future research that I identify tend to reflect my own research interests with an associated emphasis on discursive practices, crossing discursive/textual boundaries and the possibilities of contesting and resisting the scripting strategies of political elites. In particular, I focus on two items: the possibilities of building alternative critical political geographies and, gender and geopolitics. Finally, an endnote attempts to discuss the implications for geopolitics in the post(late?)-modern period.

7.2. Resources for Resistance?

One of the central issues facing a Foucauldian inspired critical geopolitical project is whether there are the intellectual resources to contest and resist the present inter-state system, war and general global crisis. Norris (1992) recent treatise against left wing intellectuals during the 1991 Gulf War reminded readers of the dangers facing those who advocate that there is no "higher (meta-narrative) voice of authority and truth that treated them as mere unreliable narrators subject to correction from outside and above ... For there would be no arguing on

reasoned or principled grounds against anyone who held a false, irrational or morally offensive belief, provided they managed to maintain it with sufficient conviction and rhetorical-persuasive force"(1992:87-88).⁴

For sceptics such as Norris (1992) or Habermas (1987), post-structuralist thinking about language, discourse and representation leaves no grounds for truth telling and reference (Renegger 1992, White 1986,1991). In the context of Foucault's work, other theorists such as Connolly (1991) have accused Foucault of providing no means from which to distinguish between on the one hand the strategies of resistance of the women's movement or the Polish Solidarity movement from on the other hand the Jim Jones' People's Temple. In one respect, perhaps on a facetious level, Connolly (1991) provides no reasons why we might want to make this distinction in the first place. However, on the other hand, such an accusation perpetuates a widespread criticism of Foucault's work. As Norris (1992:163) notes "It seems to me that Habermas is right about Foucault, whose flatly Hobbesian equation of power/knowledge has various unfortunate consequences, among them the failure to draw any significant (historical, social or ethico-political) distinction between utterly diverse orders of collective existence, from the Gulag Archipelago- his favourite explanatory model- at the one extreme, to liberal democracy or socialist state planning at the other".

Furthermore, Habermas (1987) has issued a stinging critique of Foucault's concept of subjugated knowledge (which might challenge various hegemonic regimes of power/knowledge or truth) and forms of resistance. For Habermas, critical social theory has

4. But as Sawicki (1991) in an important (and sympathetic) assessment of Foucault notes "Despite Foucault's neglect of resistance in *Discipline and Punish*, in *The History of Sexuality* he defines power as dependent on resistance. Moreover, emphasis on resistance is particularly evident in his more recent discussions of power and sexuality" (1991:24).

Furthermore, Dews' (1989) article on the return of the subject in Foucault's later work argues that this change was in response to the earlier inconsistencies and omissions in Foucault's work.

the task of assessing the existing institutions and power-knowledge interests against a regulative standard whose criterion is that of an 'ideal speech situation'- a public realm of free and equal access to information (Norris 1992:164). In part, these forms of critiques levelled against Foucauldian genealogies of power-knowledge reflect Foucault's reluctance to espouse manifestos of action. i.e. Foucault, as Gandal (1990:121) notes, rarely tells us what to do.

However, Foucault's genealogical methodology opened the way for a historical knowledge of struggles (an 'insurrection of subjugated knowledges'). These forms of knowledge or experiences included those that "have been disqualified as inadequate to their task, or insufficiently elaborated: naive knowledges, located low down the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity" (cited in Sawicki 1991:26). These forms include: low ranking knowledge of the criminal, the hysteric, the housewife et al. Furthermore, Foucault argued that these types of 'popular knowledges' were particular, local, differential knowledge capable of resisting forms of oppression and domination (Foucault 1982).

Yet as Dreyfus and Rabinow (1984) and Gandal (1990) note, Foucault's politics and historical projects were cast in terms of an investigation into 'problematizations'. In spite of his involvement in prison reform, social security reform, Polish Solidarity in France, and the Asian 'boat people', his political activism was not based on a manifesto of a progressive politics. Rather, his analyses of the mentally ill, the criminal or the deviant were motivated by a belief that these local histories could play a tactical role in on going political struggles: not necessarily to produce a vision of how things should be but rather to articulate what was intolerable or unacceptable. As Foucault (1980:85) argued the task of the intellectual was to develop "The union of erudite knowledge and local memories ... allows us to establish a historical knowledge of struggles and to make use of this knowledge tactically today".

There is, however, much force in Habermas' (1987) claims that Foucault's attempts to develop 'erudite or local knowledges' remains hopelessly wedded to romantic claims of non-relativism by those 'specific intellectuals' working in particularly well-defined fields of local

expertise (Norris 1992). Furthermore, as Habermas and others such as Chomsky have noted, Foucault's critique against the 'universal intellectual' (and the associated assumed moral and intellectual arrogance) amounts to a polemical move designed to castigate those who aim to appeal to standards of truth, reason and enlightened thinking without necessarily assuming the condescending, self-authorising arrogance of the 'universal intellectual' (Norris 1992:106). However, I think in Foucault's case, his suspicion towards universal moral or political judgements was based on historical evidence of local or particular struggles which suggested that what looks like an improvement may have unfortunate consequences.

There has also been important feminist critiques of Foucault and his seeming endorsement of a politics of despair rather than resistance (Hartsock 1987, McNay 1992). In that respect, Norris's (1992) recent critique of Foucault and other post-structuralist writers ignores the feminist critiques of writers such as Nancy Fraser, Meegan Morris, Nancy Hartsock, Jana Sawicki and Linda Nicholson. Nancy Hartsock (1990), for example, has been an important figure in exploring the implications of Foucault's position on power. Hartsock (1987:190) has argued that "For those of us who want to understand the world systematically in order to change it, postmodernist theories at their best give little guidance. I should note that I recognise that some postmodernist theorists- Foucault, for instance - are committed to ending injustice. But this commitment does not come through in their theories" The major point of contention has been Foucault's ambivalence towards resistance and exposure of systems of power relations. Hartsock (1990:167) contends that Foucault remained vague as to whether we should "entertain the claims of the subjugated knowledges or bring them into play". Such vagueness is perhaps inevitable given Foucault's assertion that power is literally everywhere. As a consequence, it becomes difficult to identify either inequalities which exist within local material situations and more importantly a platform for resistance.

This, in turn, reflects Foucault's pessimism over whether counter-discourses could evade the all embracing grip of power and its discourses. As Foucault (1977:151) noted "Humanity does not gradually progress from combat to combat until it arrives at universal reciprocity,

where the rule of law finally replaces warfare, humanity installs each of its violence in a system of rules and thus proceeds from domination to domination". At the heart of this scepticism, however, lies Foucault's ambivalence over (humanistically informed) normative questions. Nancy Fraser (1983:59) has suggested, for instance, that *Discipline and Punish* gets its political force " ... from the reader's familiarity with and commitment to modern ideals of autonomy, dignity and human rights". Furthermore, as Charles Taylor (1984) has noted, Foucault attempted to limit the power of his critique by arguing that the unmasking of power can only disrupt rather than transform.

This confusion over normative questions has been well stated by Nancy Fraser in her book *Unruly Practices* (1981). Her central theme was to explore why Foucault evades questions such as why struggle? or why resist domination? In part Fraser concludes that is because Foucault's understanding of power was very heterogeneous and unlike Weberian social theory did not distinguish between authority, force, domination or legitimation. In addition, because there are ways of distinguishing different forms of power Foucault ends up rejecting modernity without any notion of what might replace it. This may seem surprising given Foucault's long standing commitment to gay rights, prison reform or more generally human rights. But as Fraser (1981:33) this situation arises because Foucault does not present any " ... normative criteria for distinguishing acceptable from unacceptable forms of power."

However, in a recent study Jana Sawicki (1991) has provided an important feminist investigation of Foucault's work on sexuality. In particular, Sawicki (1991:26) rejects the notion that Foucault ignores resistance. As she notes (1991:26) Foucault in his later work on sexuality did argue that "Where there is power there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power" and in addition: "I'm not positing a substance of power. I'm simply saying: as soon as there's a relation of power there's a possibility of resistance. We're never trapped by power: it's always possible to modify its hold, in determined conditions and following a precise strategy" (Foucault 1978:95). As a consequence, Sawicki argues that Foucault's description of power

involves a notion of free subjects facing a field of possibilities: their actions structured not forced.

The identification of oppression and unacceptable forms of power has to be a central components of any feminist project (Hartsock 1987, Nicholson 1990). Butler (1990) and McNay (1992) have both explored (in different ways) how Foucault's concern for discourse and power relations can be used to explore women's oppression in ways that recognise the historically specific nature of sexuality and the category of 'women'. As a consequence, interest is focused on how the body is objectified in discourse and how feminine identities are circumscribed within discourse (Sawicki 1991). The body is then seen as a product of power and is inscribed by cultural rather than 'natural' practices. Such a theory does not imply a universal subject rather it is to admit that to understand oppression and resistance one needs to acknowledge that "individuals are not docile bodies but self-determining agents who are capable of challenging and resisting structures of domination" (McNay 1992:45). Furthermore, Butler (1990) argues that various forms of identities have to be understood as emerging through (in a dialectical sense) various practices of subjection and regimes of power rather than through docility.

I think, however, that some of the charges laid against Foucault over his nihilism or despair towards to resistance can be contested. In some respects, Foucault as writers such as de Certeau (1986) have argued, was vague and famous for shifting direction in regards to the ideas laid out in previous books. On the other hand, Foucaults' scepticism towards universal theories or foundations meant that his concern for a politics of difference should appeal to many who write with post-colonial or feminist concerns. In this respect, the comments of Gandal (1990:122) may seem appropriate: "The perception of a contradiction between Foucault's politics and his intellectual work is due to a misunderstanding of both. There is no discrepancy between theory and practice with Foucault: one of his achievements was to establish a new and effective relations between the two". For Foucault, resistance could not stand in pure opposition to the powers that be, rather, change was possible through co-option

because, in the events leading up to co-option, the terms of power change (Gandal 1990). As a consequence, those who expected to find Foucauldian manifestos of resistance or acceptable forms of power would be disappointed.

However, the accusations over normative confusion by writers such as Fraser (1981) need to be understood within the context of Foucault's politics. Foucault, as Dreyfus and Rabinow (1984) note, did establish normative criteria for distinguishing between practices: Foucault protested against practices of power that involved either marginalisation and or the submission of individuals. Foucault (1985:211-212) suggested that his own work was part of: "a series of oppositions which have developed over the last few years: opposition to the power of men over women, of parents over children, of psychiatry over the mentally ill, of medicine over the population, of administration over the way people live". The task of the critical intellectual was, therefore, to resist or contest the dominant relations of instituted forms of power-knowledge.

Critical geopolitical writers, by and large, have attempted to subject the rhetorical utterances/power-knowledge interests of either foreign policy professionals or the writings of academic (or other) experts to critical scrutiny. However, in the process these writers have not attempted *a la Chomsky* to locate their work within a 'political economy truth'. Rather as Dalby (1993b), for example, in his analysis of the competing geo-graphs of the South Pacific during the 1980s notes: "A post-structuralist approach suggests that political geographers cannot provide 'the answer' to geopolitical 'problems'. What we can do, as this paper tried to do in just one case, is to explicate the power of geographical discourse and show how geopolitical imaginations are intertwined with the specification of worlds, the attempts to 'fix' sovereignty, and define political identity" (1993b:456).

Other writers such as O Tuathail (1993a) and O Tuathail and Agnew (1992) have argued that critical geopolitical analyses can explore how foreign policy narratives 'efface' the geographical complexities of places and peoples. The abjuration of 'genuine' geographical

knowledge is an important sub-text of the O Tuathail and Agnew paper. A tension with that paper, however, would be how would anyone be able to judge what was 'genuine' geographical knowledge. According to writers such as Habermas (1987) or Norris (1992) there would be no way (under a post-structuralist format) of making such a judgement between the competing discourses and power-knowledge interests.

O Tuathail's (1993a) exploration of the 1991 Gulf Crisis adopts the position that seeks to deconstruct the scripting strategies of US political elites during the Gulf Crisis- to challenge the depictions of place and peoples and the strategies of foreign and security policies. In that respect, dissident claims will to a certain extent be caught up with existing power-knowledge interests. However, as Norris (1992) argues that under a post-structural rubric there would be no resources to allow such an intellectual task. O Tuathail's critique of the US foreign policy during the 1991 Gulf War could only be part of a wider critical discourse circulating around with official discourses of the conflict. In that respect, those claims by Norris (1992) have some foundations. However, writers such as O Tuathail (1993a) and Der Derian (1992) have explored how the media (re)presentations of the 1991 Gulf crisis problematised the very possibility of making appeals to better stories or truth claims for contesting the behaviour of the US-led coalition forces.

These are, however, important if largely unconsidered problems with a Foucauldian stance towards genealogies and power-knowledge equations. In particular, this question has been evaded by existing critical geopolitical writers who have either made appeals to critical social movements (as their sources for resistance e.g. Dalby 1990-1,1991) or have proposed counter-hegemonic projects (e.g. O Tuathail 1989) without exploring the sorts of critiques that have been made against Foucault and his politics of 'despair'. More recently, however, critical geopolitical writers have recast their claims to resistance: Dalby (1992a,1992b,1993c), for example, has shifted towards reconsidering security and environmental issues. O Tuathail (1993c,1993d), for example, has moved towards reconceptualising the practice of geopolitics as a signifying practice rather than seeking to

attempt further empirical studies of the scripting strategies of US foreign policy elites (e.g. O Tuathail 1992b, 1993a but see O Tuathail 1993f).

7.3. Gender and Geopolitics: Crossing Boundaries?

Following the impressive gendered agenda for political geography set by Kofman and Peake (1990), critical geopolitics has recently launched a discussion of gender and geopolitics (e.g. Dalby 1992c, 1993; Dodds and Sidaway 1993). By drawing on nearly ten years of research of feminist geography (e.g. Women and Geography Study Group 1984, Bondi 1990, Rose 1993) and the new feminist literature on international relations and political theory (e.g. Sylvester 1989, Brown 1989, Whitworth 1989, Runyan and Peterson 1991, Peterson 1992a, 1992b), critical geopolitical writers have just begun to investigate how the gendered nature of international politics or the gendered nature of the analytical categories employed by geopolitics has important consequences for the self-understanding of that discipline.

The purpose of such an (gendered) exploration has been several fold: First, there has been a reflexive recognition by critical geopolitical writers that as white, middle class European or North American men there is little to differentiate that group from those writers who have been labelled 'conventional' or 'classical' geopolitical writers. The turn towards feminist studies has been further provoked by a recognition that 'ways of seeing' are already implicated with a politics of 'position'. As Rose (1993) has recently reminded readers, geography (which includes geopolitics) has "historically been dominated by men, perhaps more so than any other human science" (1993:1).

In the sub-discipline of political geography, for example, there have been few female political geographers (an exception is Margaret Sprout) and there have been few commentaries by established feminist geographers compared to the coverage on social,

historical or cultural geographies (e.g. Bondi 1990, McDowell 1992). There may be several important reasons for such an omission: first, the small number of feminist geographers in the academy means that there are not enough researchers to cover every major sub-field. Second, the exclusion of commentary on international affairs/political geography may reflect the discipline's neglect of women or gender as worthy of investigation. In the field of IR, for example, inter-state relations or security studies were considered gender neutral (Brown 1989, Whitworth 1989). As Halliday (1991:159) notes "By neglecting the dimensions of gender, international relations implicitly supports the thesis that international processes themselves are gender neutral". Third, much of the early work on feminist geography in the 1980s informed by political economy and various socialist-feminist concerns, has tended to concentrate on issues of production-reproduction rather than peace, international conflict or war (e.g. Bowlby et al 1989, Whatmore 1990).

Second, a consistent feminist theme within IR has been to highlight an important paradox: on the one hand in the conventional narratives of IR or geopolitics women or gender has not been a topic of debate (see Grant and Newland 1991, Tickner 1992). As Brown (1989:464) notes "The assumptions that women need to be brought into international affairs is largely a liberal-feminist concern which assumes women were not there in the first place". On the other hand, a number of empirical (materially situated) studies by feminist scholars have demonstrated that women and gender are important components of international politics (e.g. Enloe 1987,1989; Isaksoon 1988). Critical geopolitics has tried to recognise these distinctions and contribute to those debates. Simon Dalby (1993a, 1993b) papers on gender and geopolitics and feminist peace groups in New Zealand, for example, is a recent example of a writer who have attempted to address the issues raised by feminist research both within human geography and IR theory.

In this section, therefore, I want to explore the possibilities of writing gendered accounts of geopolitical discourse. In these analyses by critical geopolitical writers, gender as an analytical category has been understood under the terms proposed by Joan Scott. First,

"Gender is a constitutive element of social relationships based upon the perceived differences between the sexes ... gender is a primary way of signifying relationships of power" (Scott 1988 cited in Montrose 1991:1). Second, Scott argues that gender is a fundamental mode in which ideological and material reality are organised. Established as an objective set of references, concepts of gender structure perception and, the concrete and symbolic organisation of life ... To the extent that these references establish distributions of power (differential control over or access to material or symbolic resources), gender becomes implicated in the conception and construction of power itself" (Scott 1988 cited in Montrose 1991:1). This analytical model has the advantage of historicising gender representations and acknowledges the myriad of local and individual sites of social reproduction, variation and change.

However, one of the problems for any gender sensitive analyses revolves around the highly contested nature of feminism and gender as an analytical category. One only has to read black feminist writers such as bell hooks, postcolonial writers such as G C Spivak to realise that 'feminism' or 'gender' cannot easily represent such diversity: postcolonial, radical, standpoint, liberal, socialist, postmodern or psycho-analytical approaches. There are important and creative tensions between the various feminist approaches as most anthologies on feminism acknowledge (e.g. Nicholson 1990, Butler and Scott 1992). Given the political tensions within the feminist literature, the possibilities for research into geopolitics and gender will be difficult and subject to much controversy within the discipline of political geography.

7.3.2. (En)gendered Geopolitics: Possibilities for Research

The practices that constitute geopolitics or the discursive foundations that enable geopolitics to be a signifying presence can be located within the feminist critiques of the construction of geographical knowledge (e.g. Bondi 1990, McDowell 1991, Rose 1992,1993). One such

approach to questions of gender and geopolitics might be to problematise how 'geopolitics' is employed within geographical and political discourse. Instead of seeking to restore masculine meaning (stable, secure or a presence), a gendered account of geopolitics might explore how it is articulated in order to be a presence within a series of different texts: a gathering point for meaning and identity and a holder of signification.

In these series of explorations, it is suggested that there are a number of important features of feminist critiques of epistemology that could be employed in a gendered study of geopolitical discourse. First, feminist analyses on the importance of dualisms in western philosophy (and more specifically geography) could be brought to bear on geopolitical discourse. In particular, the characterisation of space and time which as Massey (1993:71) argues "takes the form of a dichotomous dualism". Second, feminist literatures on the gaze and visualisation could be usefully employed in an investigation of geopolitical discourse. Third, feminist writings on the materially embedded dynamics of international politics provide useful sources for dislocating or disrupting the conventional understandings. The recent papers of Simon Dalby (1992c, 1993b) have explored some of these themes.

7.3.3. Epistemologies of Knowledge and Dualisms

In a recent review article Bondi (1990:161) reminds geographers that western thought has defined "women as non-men, as other, as unknowable" and that "the coding of knowledge/non-knowledge or representable/unrepresentable as masculine/feminine is closely entwined with issues of time and space". Or as Massey (1993:71) has noted, western philosophy/thought is characterised by dualisms (e.g. mind-body, nature-culture, Reason-emotion) that have enabled the transcendental rational subject to be the speaker in Enlightenment philosophy. The creation of a devalued other was the necessary precondition for the rational subject (Memmi 1972, Hartsock 1987, Young 1990).

Within international relations theory, for example, feminist writers such as Spike Peterson (1992a:185) have also explored the problems of dualisms or 'oppositional thinking': "What is most familiar about metaphysics is its binary logic, which engenders Western philosophy's characteristic dualisms. Post-positivists criticise this 'structuring' of paired opposites that at once differentiates one from another, prefers one to the other, and arranges them hierarchically, displacing the subordinate term beyond the boundary of what is significant and desirable. Hierarchical dichotomies profoundly shaping Western thought and practice include: culture-nature, mind-body, reason-affect, subject-object, fact-value, self-other, order-anarchy, and masculine-feminine". The dichotomies, therefore, maintain a certain kind of order (Hartsock 1987, Bondi 1990).

The consequences of dualistic thinking in western thought has been to privilege some terms (e.g. time, culture) over others (e.g. space, nature). Feminists such as Nancy Jay (1981:47) argue that "Hidden, taken for granted, A/Not A distinctions are dangerous, and because of their peculiar affinity with gender distinctions, it seems important for feminist theory to be systematic in recognising them". In particular, feminists have argued that in the case of space and time: time has been encoded as 'A' and space as 'Not A'. Time has been encoded as change, movement, dynamism; whilst space to cite Foucault (1980) was " ... treated as the dead, the fixed, the undialectical, the immobile. Time on the contrary was richness, fecundity, life, dialectic" (cited in Soja 1989:10).

In recent geographical studies, however, feminists have argued that "it is not entirely a matter of coincidence that space and the feminine are frequently in terms of dichotomies in which each of them is defined as not-A" (Massey 1993:73). The recognition that space has been treated as stasis and passivity has led geographers (both feminists and others such as Soja 1989) to argue that space needs to be both de-naturalised and reconstituted as a central element in social theory (e.g. Smith 1990). The consequences of such a move, however, as Massey (1993:73) notes is " ... not to argue for an upgrading of the status of space within the

terms of the old dualism, ... but to argue that what must be overcome is the very formulation of space/time in terms of this kind of dichotomy".

One of the major sources of feminist criticisms, however, remains the failure of many geographers to consider the coding of space as feminine and time as masculine (Bondi 1990). Within the context of critical geopolitics, for example, in spite of a whole range of articles purporting to demonstrate that the spatialising moves of political elites are crucial to the dramas of international politics (e.g. Agnew and Corbridge 1989, Dalby 1990a, O Tuathail and Agnew 1992) there has been little or no consideration of how space and time have been (en)gendered within geopolitical discourse.

However, more recently, papers by Dodds (1993c), Dodds and Sidaway (1993), O Tuathail (1993e) and Taylor (1993a) have focused on how Anglo-American geopolitical discourse has encoded space as simply a stage on which events occur as against time which is empowered with dynamic qualities. From Mackinder (1904) onwards, classical geopolitical writers have suggested that geopolitics has been assumed to be the study of geographical settings which are created and changed by the time-less plays of international politics. The encoding of space as a stage was part of a well established Western tradition of positioning space (and nature) as a feminine object to be conquered and dominated (O Tuathail 1993e). Geopolitics could be considered as a 'manly science', a regime of truth (and gaze) of white, European and North American men who conceived themselves as the reporters/scribblers of earthly realities (e.g. Mackinder 1904).⁵

5. Halford Mackinder was a member of the Visual Instruction Committee created by the Colonial Office in 1902 in order to improve the imperial knowledge of the British populace. As James Ryan (1993) has noted, Mackinder was active participant of lecture tours, foreign travels and the use of photography/lantern slides (*black and white photography*).

One area of research within geopolitical discourse, therefore, could be an investigation of how space and time have been encoded and engendered. In doing so, such a project would need to be located within a broader investigation of geographical discourse (e.g. Driver 1992, Livingstone 1993). As O Tuathail (1993e:15) notes "The ability to instinctively place entities onto a stage suggests not only that the physical environment is a passive stage upon which an active human drama is played out but that the geographer's position is that of a removed and detached observer of the spectacle (drama) of human affairs".

7.3.4. The Power of the Gaze: Geopolitics as 'the very essence of power'?

The statement 'the very essence of power' was employed by Halford Mackinder to explain the power of sight and the concept of visualisation within geography (cited in O Tuathail 1993e). In an implicit vein, I have attempted throughout this thesis to highlight the importance of visualisation within geopolitical discourse. The surveying, mapping and cataloguing of the earth is a central feature of geopolitics. As Taylor (1948:141) has reminded political geographers "In one shape or another, the idea of the maps as a means of presenting to the eye this totality of features has been continuously in the background of this discourse". To produce geopolitics signified an ability, therefore, to create a comprehensive survey of political space, to read its innate features and to comment on its features and likely future trends. Geopolitics signified the ability to survey the globe and identify the supposedly divine or time-less features of global politics (Dodds and Sidaway 1993, Luke 1993a, O Tuathail 1993c).

The ability to 'see' and 'survey' worlds has been an important feature of geographical discourse (e.g. Driver and Rose 1992, Livingstone 1993, Rose 1993).⁶ From the fifteenth century onwards, western explorers/writers have measured, recorded and defined the world within western systems of signification. Indeed, as Jay (1992) has noted the 'scopic regimes' that evolved in the modern period were central to the epistemological foundations of western thought. From the seventeenth century onwards, seeing was increasingly equated with knowing (Foucault 1970,1972). As Rose (1993:86) notes "The absence of knowledge, which is the condition for continuing to seek to know, is often metaphorically indicated in geographical discourse by an absence of insight ... conversely, the desire for full knowledge is indicated by transparency, visibility and perception. Seeing and knowing are often conflated". A summary that echoes much of Foucault's concern for *ocularcentrism* in western philosophical discourse and the power of *le regard*.⁷

As a consequence, recent writings have suggested that are two important features to this process: first, the separation of subject from object. This according to Foucault (1970) enabled the creation of disciplinary projects such as 'natural history': things were separated from words, history was constituted as natural. The making of 'reason' or 'science' was enabled by such cartesian separations (with the sort of gendered overtones mentioned earlier). Second, the separation of knowledge from the unreliability of bodily senses (e.g. smell, sound) emerged as a central element in western thought from the seventeenth century onwards. The eye, however, emerged as the passive recorder of an external world. However, as Keller and Grontkowski (1983:215) note "Having made the eye purely passive, all intellectual activity is reserved to the 'I', which, however, is radically separate from the body

6. For instance, the cultural geographer Carl Sauer (1956:296) argued that "Geography is first of all knowledge generated by observation...The mode of locomotion should be slow, the slower the better, be often interrupted by leisurely halts to sit on vantage points and stop at question marks".

7. Foucault's work on *le regard* was primarily directed towards a consideration of discipline and surveillance in various institutions such as the prison, the hospital and the school.

which houses it". This Keller and Grontkowski (1983) was a crucial move (to separate intellect from the eye) of writers such as Desecrates in order to retain an understanding of the accession of knowledge as an active process. The gaze, therefore, could be distanced and disembodied (Rose 1993).

Recent feminist work within human geography has emphasised how the gaze of the geographer was central to geographical epistemology. Most of this work, however, has concentrated on the concept of landscape or nature within geographical discourse (e.g. Fitzsimmons 1989, Rose 1993). More widely, feminists have argued that this masculine gaze is bound up with claims to rationality and pleasure. This gaze at the landscape has been labelled a 'visual ideology' by feminist writers to emphasise the power of the seeing subject over the surveyed. The representation of nature as 'feminine' or as woman herself has been a powerful element within various literatures (e.g. Montrose 1991).

Geopolitics as a technology for the visualisation of global politics depended on an unmediated gaze. The geopolitical representations of global politics were enabled by the removal of the geographer within hegemonic geopolitical discourse. The distanced authority of the geopolitical observer over the passive/feminised spaces of global politics could be problematised by reference to the phallogentric gaze: the transcendental, pure and universal gaze. The consequences are that geographers such as Deutsche (1991) have argued (in the context of the contemporary city) that the masculine gaze operates within an phallogentric economy of meaning which encodes possibilities for knowledge.

This short section has not attempted to provide a strategy for disrupting masculine gazes (although many feminists have attempted such a project). Rather, I think that recent feminist work (in geography and elsewhere) provides useful resources for the consideration of the power of the geopolitican's gaze and whether that gaze has engendered connotations. The visualisation of global politics is an everyday practice of professionals (whether politicians or academics or media professionals) which enable readings of global politics. The conventions

of seeing/knowing are only rarely problematised. As a type of utterance or way of seeing, it has been argued by critical geopolitical writers that geopolitics is part of an elite's conventions and self-legitimizing author(ity).

7.3.5. Feminist Readings of International Politics

In a series of recent articles Simon Dalby (1992c, 1993b) has attempted to draw on the work of feminist IR scholars to propose an '(en)gendered geopolitics'. One of the leading feminist writers on international politics is Cynthia Enloe (e.g. 1987,1989,1992,1993). Her task has been to explore how "the conduct of international politics has *depended* on men's control of women" (1989:3). Enloe suggests that women have been central to the dramas of international politics: as diplomat's wives, as prostitutes 'serving' US bases in the Third World, wearing 'khaki' (e.g. nearly 50% of women in the US Army are black- because of free medical insurance) and as assemblers of commodities for export.

Within the scripts of international politics, Enloe (1989) has argued that women (and children) have been depicted and relegated to certain roles. In the case of the 1991 Gulf War, for example, Enloe (1992) focused on the taken for granted constructions of gender within the scripts of US policy makers and the media. She suggests that there were a number of important 'silences' concealed within those constructions: the role of 'diplomatic wives' and their challenges to the patriarchal assumptions of the diplomatic corps, the role played by feminist groups within various Arab states and the media coverage of Arab women which tended to 'orientalise' them once again (Said 1978, Schulte-Sasse and Schulte-Sasse 1991). Other writers such as Joni Seager (1993) have explored the gendered constructions of the environment during the 1991 Gulf War.

The exclusion of women from the events of international politics leads Enloe and others to argue that politics is not just about the dramas of high level 'dignitaries', national security and statesmen (sic) (Dalby 1992c). Instead, it is suggested that the narratives of the 'victims' or those engaged in everyday struggle should be considered forms of *international* (sic) politics. In doing so, Enloe suggests that how geopolitics or international politics is written and understood deserves further attention (see Mitchell and Smith 1991). In this respect, feminist writers such as Cohn (1987) and Sylvester (1989), Jeffords (1991) have focused on the gendered vocabularies (employed by foreign policy professionals and academic experts) of national security planning, nuclear weapons and war (see also Shapiro 1989 on the sport/war intertext). These gendered languages are important insofar as they relate to broader assumptions about boundaries between the public and private realms but also concepts such as security (Dalby 1992b, Dalby 1993b). Unravelling those categories and their metaphysical constructions has been the primary task of many feminist writers (e.g. Harding 1986, Peterson 1992b).

In doing so, there have been important debates on a number of themes. First, a renewed engagement with the public/private dichotomy and state sovereignty (Pateman 1988, Gobetti 1992). As Keohane (1989:247) notes "From this perspective, it would be worthwhile to ask the question: does the concept of territorial sovereignty, so fundamental to the modern state system, have anything to do with gender?". The assumptions of western philosophy (from Aristotle, Hobbes, Locke onwards) that there existed clearly defined private and public spheres (which have regulated the spaces of action for men and women) have been challenged by feminist writers (Kofman and Peake 1990, Scarpaci and Frazier 1993). Pateman (1988), for example, notes how the creation of citizenship within the state on the basis of property rights or military service had important implications for the participation of women in the public sphere. In a more broader vein, Runyan and Peterson (1991) have argued that the construction of the sovereign space of the political in the Athenian polis was inextricably linked to the gendered polity (and a gendered metaphysics which presupposed

such a division). The implications of such studies is to highlight that the categories such as the political, state sovereignty or security are intrinsically gendered constructions.

Second, the concept of security has been problematised by feminist writers who have argued that patriarchal violence and unjust social relations within the state present more pressing problems to women than spatially defined 'outsiders' (Dalby 1993a, Peterson 1992a). The appeals of the sovereign state to be able to provide 'security' for its citizens is being increasingly challenged by feminist writers (e.g. Sylvester 1987,1992; Tickner 1992). The challenge for many feminists has been to explore how political citizenship could avoid the violence of sovereignty and militarism which, as a state of order, renders many insecure (Enloe 1993). By posing the question of 'security for who?' feminist writers have argued that the territorial presumptions of the state and the Hobbesian state of nature need to be problematised because of its neglect of unjust social relations, patriarchy and male violence (Runyan and Peterson 1991).

One of the most powerful insights that a feminist writer such as Enloe (1992), for example, offers to critical geopolitics is her concern for the relationship between women and militarism, war and gender. For a subject that has been so closely bound up with violence, militarism, imperialism, nation-states, there has been little reflection on the gendered heritage(?) of geopolitics (see, for example, O Loughlin and Heske 1991). As Kofman and Peake (1990:326) conclude "Considering the roots of Anglo-political geography in the discovery, exploration and consolidation of the British Empire, it is astonishing that these geographical activities have not been addressed by political geographers as gendered activities".

However, it is not simply a question of encapsulating feminist research on international politics into the practices of (critical) geopolitics (Bondi 1992, Walker 1992, Dalby 1993c). In order to avoid accusations of 'gender tourism' (Moore 1988), political geographers have to recognise that feminism and gender research offer a series of interesting

arguments/reflections on the nature of international politics. These debates have important implications for a critical practice of geopolitics. Investigating the gendered heritage of the nation-state, for example, is an important step forward for political geographers concerned with politics, territory and sovereignty (Dear 1986b). The calls of Pratt (1993), for example, to investigate the local determinants of political identity among women at different places both in terms of their lived experiences and local political possibilities for building political coalitions is sensitive to geographical variations in locales. The insistence of the importance of 'situated knowledges' and 'local resistance' challenges the epistemological and political presumptions of international relations/geopolitics. In doing so the politics of boundary construction and the politics of knowledge construction are called into question.

7.4. Endnote: Postmodern Geographies? Postmodern Geopolitics?

The debates in human geography and other disciplines over the structural changes in advanced capitalist societies have been intense (e.g. Harvey 1989, Swyngedow 1989, Dicken 1992, Thrift and Leyshon 1992). In some cases these descriptions have been characterised by hyperbolic claims such as 'the ending of geography' in these postmodern times (O'Brien 1992). The arguments over flexible accumulation, post-Fordism and globalisation, however, have important implications for the study of geopolitics (Luke 1993a). In this context, the traditional demarcations between local-global and political-economic governance at the national level have been problematised (e.g. Morley and Robins 1989, Watts 1991).

The implications for collective and political identities in the late twentieth century are potentially immense. On the one hand, the fundamental principle of political identity based on state sovereignty and citizenship is being challenged by transnational flows and interactions (R Brown 1992, Robertson 1992). The emergence of both enlarged (European) and restricted (regional and local) forms of citizenship and identity are being forged out of

the global-local nexus. On the other hand, the recent and enduring conflicts in Yugoslavia and or the Middle East suggest that the nation-state remain a compelling (if deadly) political unit. In this context, many authors have argued that the informational and communication technologies are playing an important role in the emergence of new spatial structures, relations and orientations (Luke 1989, Virilio 1989, Poster 1990, De Landa 1991). Within the intersections of global electronic information flows, media corporations (such as CNN) are creating new relationships between place and space, power and knowledge, and interplays of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation (O Tuathail 1993a). As Lyotard (1984:5) has argued "Knowledge in the form of an informational commodity indispensable to productive power is already, and will continue to be, a major- perhaps the major- stake in the worldwide competition for power".

The very nature, for example, of boundary or frontier (so central to traditional geopolitical discourse) has become increasingly problematical. As Virilio (1987:21) suggests the boundary has become "an osmotic membrane, through which information and communication flows pass". These global systems whether information networks or satellite transmissions overlay abstract spatial grids over territorial configurations. Increasingly, O Tuathail (1993c) has argued, the practices of foreign policy will be concerned with monitoring those cybernetic systems rather than places and peoples themselves.

One important avenue of inquiry for a critical geopolitical project, thus, would be towards an exploration of global electronic spaces and the implications for *international* politics (based on the principle of state sovereignty and national identity). The possibilities for local and regional identities in response to emerging global networks may "throw up new possibilities for more efficacious, and self-conscious, participation in world affairs by people in local communities" (Morley and Robins 1989:24). The investigation of these new micro-territories and communities is an interesting topic of research. Within Europe, for example, the geopolitical construction of Fortress Europe (in line with the Single European Act and

regional market) is creating new pressures both within Europe and beyond as international capital, nation-states and local communities adjust to the new politics of space and place.

For geographers such as Castells and Henderson (1987) or Watts (1991) these interplays of territorialisation and deterritorialisation have (perhaps ironically) led to a resurgence of locality and local politics (see, also Cooke 1989). As Swyngedow (1989:32) suggests "New spaces of production and consumption as well as radically altered spatial politics emerge out of the womb of the global/local interface". The blurring of spatial boundaries has according to writers such as Watts (1991) has the effect of reinforcing particular identities. The compression of space has had the effect of reasserting and reinforcing distinctiveness. How people define themselves, how identities are created and contested in order to act are important topics of investigation. Furthermore, questions such as how are places forged from spaces (Agnew 1987), who has the power to forge, how is it contested and what is at stake in these contestations are topics worthy of further study.

The appeal of writers such as Dalby (1990-1,1991) for a critical geopolitical interest in critical social movements is a useful starting point. Dalby's analysis of the peace movements in Western Europe and human rights movements in Eastern Europe was a timely reminder that local peoples or social movements constitute (and contest) forms of community, solidarity, identity and difference. The basis for those identities and differences, however, as writers such as Massey (1991,1993) have noted has become increasingly problematical as the divisions between 'metropole' and 'periphery' have become unhinged. The forging of identities on specific yet globalised sites promises to further complicate the geo-graphs of global-local politics that individuals and or groups mobilise in order to construct (often through struggle) forms of politics.

Finally, the 1991 Gulf War has provided a tragic reminder that the investigation of how the medium of television creates maps of meaning about friends or enemies or the local/regional/global interface deserves more attention from critical geopolitics (O Tuathail

1993a). Cummings (1992) and Paul Taylor (1992), for example, have explored how television created stage managed spectacles which attempted to enframe and locate the watching viewers into particular worlds (Mann 1991). In that respect, television and film are perhaps the most powerful techniques of geo-graphing in the twentieth century- television is geo-graphy at an intense speed; a projection of televisual worlds that site and situate, scene and script, dramatise and stage a world. As Virilio (1989) notes, film and the shooting camera were right from the start a weapon of war- a technology of sight which enabled the watching state to be a warring state (Poster 1990). All these (whether popular forms of geo-graphs such as television or the formal geo-graphs of foreign policy professionals) deserve more attention from critical geopolitics.

References

- Adams V (1986) *The Media and the Falklands Campaign* London, Macmillan
- Adamthwaite A (1984) 'Britain and the world 1945-9: the view from the Foreign Office' *International Affairs* 61 223-235
- Adler E and Haas P (1992) 'Conclusion: epistemic communities, world order, and the creation of a reflective research programme' *International Organisation* 46 367-390
- Agnew J (1983) 'An excess of national exceptionalism: Towards a new political geography of American foreign policy' *Political Geography Quarterly* 2 151-166
- Agnew J (1987) *Place and Politics: The Geographical Mediation of State and Society* London, Unwin Hyman
- Agnew J (1989) 'The devaluation of place in social science' in Agnew J and Duncan J eds *The Power of Place* London, Unwin Hyman
- Agnew J (1992a) 'The US position in the world geopolitical order after the Cold War' *Professional Geographer* 44 7-9
- Agnew J (1992b) 'Representing space: space, scale and culture in the social sciences' in J Duncan and D Ley eds *Representing Culture* London, Routledge
- Agnew J (1993a) 'Trading blocs or a world that knows no boundaries' in C Williams ed *Readjustment in Europe and America* London, Belhaven Press
- Agnew J (1993b) 'Timeless space and state-centrism: the geographical assumptions of international relations theory' in S Roscow ed *Global Political Economy* New York, Columbia University Press
- Agnew J and S Corbridge (1989) 'The new geopolitics: the dynamics of geopolitical disorder' in R Johnston and P Taylor eds *A World in Crisis* Oxford, Basil Blackwell
- Agnew J and Duncan J eds (1989) *The Power of Place: Bringing Together Geographical and Sociological Imaginations* London, Hyman Unwin

- Albertson N (1988) 'Postmodernism, post-Fordism and critical social theory' *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 6 339-365
- Alcorta J (1983) 'La defensa del trafico maritimo en el Atlantico Sur' *Revista de la Escuela de Defensa Nacional* 32 113-132
- Allen E (1992) 'Calle Norte: military development in Brazilian Amazonia' *Development and Change* 23 71-99
- Allub L (1980) 'El colapso de la democracia liberal y origenes del fascismo colonial en Argentina' *Revista Mexicana de Sociologica* July-September 735-788
- Alvarez E (1970) *El Nacionalismo Argentino* Buenos Aires, La Bastilla
- Alves M (1985) *State and Opposition in Military Brasil* Austin, University of Texas Press
- Ames B (1988) 'Military and society in Latin America' *Latin American Research Review* 23 157-169
- Andersen M (1988-9) 'The military obstacle to Latin Democracy' *Foreign Policy* 73 94-114
- Anderson B (1990) *Imagined Communities* London, Verso
- Anderson E (1993) *An Atlas of World Political Flashpoints* London, Pinter Reference
- Andrews G (1979) 'Race versus class association: Anglo-Argentines in Buenos Aires 1850-1900' *Journal of Latin American Studies* 11 19-39
- Andrews G (1980) *The Afro-Argentines of Buenos Aires 1800-1900* Madison, University of Wisconsin Press
- Appignanesi L ed (1989) *Postmodernism* London, Free Association Books
- Arriagada G (1979) 'Ideology and politics in the South American military' Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars Working Paper Number 55, Washington DC
- Ashley R (1984) 'The poverty of neo-realism' *International Organisation* 38 225-286

Ashley R (1987a) 'Foreign policy as political performance' *International Studies Association Notes* 13 51-54

Ashley R (1987b) 'The geopolitics of geopolitical space: towards a critical social theory of international politics' *Alternatives* 12 403-444

Ashley R (1988) 'Untying the sovereign state: a double reading of the anarchy problematique' *Millennium* 17 227-262

Ashley R (1989) 'Living on borderlines: Man, post-structuralism and war' in Der Derian J and Shapiro eds *International/Intertextual Relations* Lexington, Lexington Books

Ashley R (1993) *Statecraft as Man-craft* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press

Ashley R and R Walker (1990) 'Speaking the language of exile: Dissidence in international relations' *International Studies Quarterly* 33 259-416

Assef A (1980) *Proyeccion Continental de la Argentina* Buenos Aires, Editorial Pleamar

Atencio J (1965) *Que es Geopolitica?* Buenos Aires, Editorial Pleamar

Auburn F (1982) *Antarctic Law and Politics* Bloomington, University of Indiana Press

Ayanian R (1989) 'Geopolitics and the dollar' *Journal of International Money and Finance* 8 391-399

Azara F (1809) *Viajes por la America Meridional* (Revised Edition 1941) Madrid, Espasa-Calpe

Baachus W (1986) 'The South Atlantic War as a 'tip of the iceberg': Expansionist interests in the Southern Atlantic region' Working Paper, University of Connecticut, Stamford

Ballester H (1983a) 'Poder militar y poder civil' *Revista Cruz del Sur* 3 9-21

Ballester H et al (1983b) 'Proyecto nacional y continental' *Revista Cruz del Sur* 1 9-13

Balmaceda H (1980) *Tendencias geopolíticas en el Atlántico Sur* Discussion Paper, Universidad de Cuyo (Mendoza)

Banks M (1986) 'The inter-paradigm debate' in M Light and A Groom eds *International Relations* London, Frances Pinter

Baretta S and J Markoff (1978) 'Civilisation and barbarism: cattle frontiers in Latin America' *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 20 587-620

Barnes T (1992) 'Reading the texts of theoretical economic geography' in T Barnes and J Duncan eds *Writing Worlds* London, Routledge

Barnes T and Duncan J eds (1992) *Writing Worlds: Discourse, Text and Metaphor in the Representation of Landscape* London, Routledge

Barnett A (1982) *Iron Britannia: Why Britain Waged its Falklands War* London, Allison and Busby

Barros Gonzales G (1987) 'La armada y la Antartida' *Revista de Marina* 781 626-634

Barrow S (1982) 'Europe, Latin America and the arms trade' in J Rodrick and P O'Brien eds *The European Challenge: Europe's New Role in Latin America* London, LAB Books

Bartolome M (1991) 'Conflictos en el Atlántico Sur en la década del 90' *Geopolítica* 43 56-67

Bassim M (1987a) 'Imperialism and the nation-state in Friedrich Ratzel's political geography' *Progress in Human Geography* 11 473-495

Bassim (1987b) 'Race contra space: the conflict between German Geopolitik and National Socialism' *Political Geography Quarterly* 6 107-114

Baudrillard J (1988) *America* London, Verso

Baudrillard J (1990) *Seduction* London, Macmillan

Baudrillard J (1991) *La Guerre du Golfe. N'a pas de lieu* Paris, Editions Galilee

British Broadcasting Corporation (1992a) '*Timewatch*' BBC 2 11 March 1992

British Broadcasting Corporation (1992b) '*War Stories: 1982 Falklands War*' March-May 1992

Beach H (1986) 'British defense policy and the South Atlantic' *South Atlantic Council Occasional Papers* No.2 May 1986

Beck P (1983a) 'Britain's Antarctic dimension' *International Affairs* 59 429-444

Beck P (1983b) 'Securing the dominant "Place in the wan Antarctic Sun" for the British Empire: the policy of extending British control over Antarctica' *The Australian Journal of Politics and History* 29 448-461

Beck P (1985) 'Preparatory meetings for the Antarctic Treaty 1958-1959' *Polar Record* 22 653-664

Beck P (1986) *The International Politics of the Antarctica* London, Croom Helm

Beck P (1987) 'A Cold War: Britain, Argentina and Antarctica' *History Today* 37 16-23

Beck P (1988) *The Falkland Islands as an International Problem* London, Routledge

Beck P (1989) 'A Cold War' *Falkland Islands Journal* 36-43

Beck P (1990) 'International relations in Antarctica: Argentina, Chile and the Great Powers' in M Morris ed *Great Power Relations in Argentina, Chile and Antarctica* London, Macmillan

Beck P (1991) 'Imprisoned by the a past, deluded by a future' *The Times Higher* November 29 1991

Beck P (1992) 'Argentina and Britain: The Antarctic Dimension' in A Hennessy and J King eds *The Land That England Lost: Argentina and Britain, a Special Relationship* London, British Academic Press

- Berdoulay V (1989) 'Place, meaning and discourse in French language geography' in Agnew J and Duncan J eds *The Power of Place* London, Unwin Hyman
- Berger J (1972) *Ways of Seeing* London, Penguin
- Berger M (1982) *El Rescate de las Malvinas* Buenos Aires, Bruguera
- Bessone J (1950) 'Ubicacion geopolitica de la Republica Argentina' *Revista de la Facultad de Ciencias Economicas* 52-53 34-42
- Bhabha H (1988) 'The commitment to theory' *New Formations* 5 5-23
- Bhabha H ed (1990a) *Narrating the Nation* London, Routledge
- Biles R ed (1988) *Inter-American Relations* Boulder, Lynne Rienner
- Bishop P (1989) *The Myth of Shangri-La* London, Athlone Press
- Bissell R (1975) 'New waves in the South Atlantic' *Air University Review* March-April 38-44
- Bissell R (1978) 'Southern Africa: Testing Detente' in G Kirk and N Wessell eds *The Soviet Threat* New York, Praeger
- Black J (1986) *Sentinels of Empire: The United States and Latin America* New York, Greenwood Press
- Blij de H (1981) *Geography: Regions and Concepts* New York, Wiley
- Blij de H (1991) 'Political geography of the post cold war world' *Professional Geographer* 44 16-18
- Blij de H and M Glassner (1980) *Systematic Political Geography* New York, Wiley
- Bluth C (1987) 'The British resort to force in the Falklands/Malvinas Conflict 1982' *Journal of Peace Research* 24 5-20

- Boal F and D Livingstone (1984) 'The frontier in the city: ethnonationalism in Belfast' *International Political Science Review* 5 161-179
- Boggio-Marzet P (1982) 'El nuevo espacio maritimo Argentino' *Geosur* 11 (35) 33-38
- Boletin de Instituto Geografia Argentino 1881-1923* Buenos Aires, Instituto Geografia Argentino
- Bolsi A (1988) 'Geographie en der Argentinischen' *Geographische Zeitschrift* 76 238-255
- Bond P (1991) 'Geopolitics, international finance and national capital accumulation: Zimbabwe in the 1980s and 1990s' *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie* 82 325-337
- Bondi L (1990) 'Feminism, postmodernism and geography: Space for women?' *Antipode* 22 157-167
- Bondi L (1992) 'Gender and dichotomy' *Progress in Human Geography* 16 98-104
- Bondi L and M Domosh (1992) 'Other figures in other places: on feminism, postmodernism and geography' *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 10 199-213
- Bonorino F (1991) 'Conflictos en el Atlantico Sur en la decada del 90' *Geopolitica* 43 56-67
- Bonturi O (1988) *Brasil and the Vital South Atlantic* Washington DC, National Defense University Press
- Bourdieu P (1971) 'Intellectual field and creative project' in M Young ed *Knowledge and Control* London, Collier-Macmillan
- Bourdieu P (1988) *Homo Academicus* London, Routledge
- Bowen E (1966) 'The Welsh colony in Patagonia 1865-1885' *Geographical Journal* 132 16-32
- Bowman I (1921) *The New World* New York, World Book Company
- Bowman I (1942a) 'Geography versus geopolitics' *Geographical Review* 32 646-658

- Bowman I (1942b) 'Political geography of power' *Geographical Review* 32 349-352
- Bowman L (1982) 'The Strategic Importance of South Africa to the United States' *African Affairs* 81 159-191
- Bramley V (1992) *Excursions from Hell* London, Bloomsbury
- Breitbart M (1981) 'Peter Kropotkin, the anarchist geographer' in D Stoddart ed *Geography, Ideology and Social Concern* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
- Briano P (1966) *Geopolitica y Geostrategia Americana* Buenos Aires, Editorial Pleamar
- Brown C (1992) *International Relations Theory* London, Harvester Wheatsheaf
- Brown J (1986) 'The bondage of old habits in nineteenth century Argentina' *Latin American Research Review* 21 3-33
- Brown N (1990) 'Planetary geopolitics' *Millennium* 19 447-460
- Brown R (1992) '*The new realities? Globalisation, culture and international relations*' Paper presented to the Annual Conference of the British International Studies Association Swansea 14-16 December 1992
- Brown S (1988) 'Feminism, international theory and international relations of gender inequality' *Millennium* 17 461-476
- Brunn S and K Mingst (1985) 'Geopolitics' in M Pacione ed *Progress in Political Geography* London, Croom Helm
- Buleon P (1992) 'The state of political geography in France in the 1970s and 1980s' *Progress in Human Geography* 16 24-40
- Bull H (1977) *The Anarchical Society* London, Macmillan
- Bulmer-Thomas V ed (1989) *Britain and Latin America: a Changing Relationship* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press

- Bunge W (1983) *The Nuclear War Atlas* Victoriaville, Quebec, Society for Human Exploration
- Burchell G, C Gordon and P Miller eds *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality* London, Harvester Wheatsheaf
- Burke P ed (1992) *Critical Essays on Michel Foucault* Andover, Scolar Press
- Burns J (1987) *The Land That Lost its Heroes: Argentina, The Falklands and Alfonsin* London, Bloomsbury
- Burns J (1988) 'A small colonial war' in *The Thatcher Years: Britain and Latin America* London, LAB Books
- Bush W ed (1982) *Antarctica and International Law* London, Oceana Publications
- Busser C (1987) *La Guerra Inconclusa* Buenos Aires, Ediciones Fernandez Reguera
- Butts K (1992) 'Minerals and national security' Paper presented to the Annual Conference of the Association of American Geographers San Diego April 1992
- Butts K (1993) *The Department of Defense Role in African Policy* Carlisle PA, Strategic Studies Institute US Army War College
- Buzan B (1987) *An Introduction to Strategic Studies* London, Macmillan
- Buzan B (1991) *People, States and Fears* Boulder, Lynne Rienner
- Byrd P ed (1988) *British Foreign Policy Under Thatcher* Oxford, Philip Allan
- Calhoun C (1980) 'Community: towards a variable conceptualisation for comparative research' *Social History* 5 105-129
- Callaghan J (1987) *Time and Change* London, Collins
- Calvert P (1982) *The Falklands Crisis* New York, St Martins Press
- Calvert P (1985) 'Demilitarisation in Latin America' *Third World Quarterly* 7 31-43

- Calvert S and Calvert P (1989) *Argentina: Political Culture and Instability* London, Macmillan
- Campbell D (1989) *Security and Identity in United States Foreign Policy* Unpublished PhD Thesis, Australian National University, Canberra
- Campbell D (1990) 'Global inscription: How foreign policy constitutes the United States' *Alternatives* 15 263-286
- Campbell D (1992a) *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* Manchester, University Press
- Campbell D (1992b) 'Politics without principle: Narratives of the Persian Gulf War and the ethicality of operation Desert Storm' Paper presented to the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Atlanta April 1992
- Campbell D (1993) *Politics Without Principle: Narratives of the Persian Gulf War and the Ethicality of Operation Desert Storm* Boulder, Lynne Rienner
- Cardoso P, R Kirschbaum and E Van de Kooy eds *Falklands: The Secret Plot* East Moseley, Preston Editions
- Casellas A (1974) *El Territorio Olivado* Buenos Aires, Instituto de Publicaciones Navales
- Caviedes C (1988) 'Fronteras, fronteras colonizables y fronteras geopolíticas en los países del Cono Sur' in *International Symposium of Latin America*, Varsovia (Poland) Volume 1 45-65
- Ceresole N (1988) 'The South Atlantic: War hypothesis' in P Kelly and J Child eds *Geopolitics of the Southern Cone and Antarctica* Boulder, Lynne Rienner
- Ceresole N (1989) *La Tablada y la Hipotesis de Guerra* Buenos Aires, Ediciones Pleamar
- Charlton M (1983) *The Price of Victory* London, BBC Books
- Chaturvedi S (1990) *Dawning of Antarctica* New Delhi, Segment Books

Child J (1979) 'Geopolitical thinking in Latin America' *Latin American Research Review* 14 89-111

Child J (1980) 'Military aspects of the Panama Canal issue' *US Navy Proceedings* January 46-51

Child J (1981) 'Pensamiento geopolitica y cuatro conflictos en Sudamerica' *Revista de Ciencia Politica* 1-2 71-104

Child J (1985a) *Quarrels Amongst Neighbours: Geopolitics and Conflict in South America* New York, Praeger

Child J (1985b) 'South American geopolitical thinking and Antarctica' Paper presented to 26th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Washington DC

Child J ed (1987) *Regional Co-operation for the Developement and Peaceful Settlement of Disputes in Latin America* Amsterdam, Martinus Nijhoff

Child J (1988) *Antarctica and South American Geopolitics: Frozen Lebensraum* New York, Praeger

Child J (1989a) 'Antarctica: the South American geopolitical literature' *Inter-American Review of Bibliography* 39 21-43

Child J (1989b) 'Geopolitical thinking' in L Goodman and J Rial eds *Civil-Military Relations in Latin America* Lexington, Lexington Books

Child J (1990) 'Status of South American geopolitical thinking' in G Pope Atkins ed *South America into the 1980s* Boulder, Westview

Chomsky N (1969) *Language and Responsibility* Brighton, Harvester

Chomsky N (1973) *For Reasons of State* Brighton, Harvester

Chomsky N (1991a) *Deterring Democracy* London, Verso

Chomsky N (1991b) *Terrorising the Neighbourhood: American Foreign Policy in the Post Cold War Era* Stirling, AK Press

- Chubb B (1954) 'Geopolitics' *Irish Geography* 3 15-26
- Clarke M (1988) 'The foreign policy making process' in Smith S et al eds *British Foreign Policy* London, Unwin Hyman
- Clarke M and S Smith (1985) 'Introduction to foreign policy implementation' in S Smith and M Clarke eds *Foreign Policy Implementation* London, Allen Unwin
- Clifford J (1988) *The Predicament of Culture* Berkley, University of California Press
- Clifford J (1989) 'Notes on theory and travel' *Inscriptions* 5 177-187
- Cloke P, C Philo and C Sadler (1991) *Approaching Human Geography* London, Guildford Press
- Cohan S and Shires L (1988) *Telling Stories: A Theoretical Analysis of Narrative Fiction* London, Routledge
- Cohen B and M El-Khawas (1975) *The Kissinger Study of Southern Africa* Westport, Lawrence Hill and Company
- Cohen J and Rogers J (1991) 'Knowledge, morality and hope: social thought of Noam Chomsky' *New Left Review* 187 5-27
- Cohen S B (1973) *Geography and Politics in a World Divided* New York, Oxford University Press
- Cohen S B (1982) 'A new map of global geopolitical equilibrium' *Political Geography Quarterly* 1 223-242
- Cohen S B (1983) 'American foreign policy for the Eighties' in N Kliot and S Waterman eds *Political Geography of Conflict* London, Croom Helm
- Cohen S B (1984) 'Asymmetrical states and global geopolitical equilibrium' *SAIS Review* 4 193-212

- Cohen S B (1990) 'The world geopolitical system in retrospect and prospect' *Journal of Geography* 81 2-12
- Cohen S B (1991) 'Global geopolitical change in the post-Cold War era' *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 81 551-580
- Cohn C (1987) 'Sex and death in the rational world of the defense intellectuals' *Signs* 12 687-718
- Coker C (1979) 'South Africa's strategic importance' *RUSI* 124 22-26
- Coll A and Arend A eds (1985) *The Falklands War: Lessons for Strategy, Diplomacy and International Law* Boston, Allen and Unwin
- Collier D ed (1979) *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America* Princeton, University Press
- Comblin J (1981) *The Church and National Security* New York, Orbis Books
- Connell R (1987) *Gender and Power* Cambridge, Polity Press
- Connolly W (1983) 'Discipline, politics and ambiguity' *Political Theory* 3 325-341
- Connolly W (1989) 'Identity and difference in world politics' in J Der Derian and M Shapiro eds *International/Intertextual Relations* Lexington, Lexington Books
- Connolly W (1991) *Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox* Ithaca, Cornell University Press
- Cooke P (1989a) 'Nation, state and modernity' in Peet R and Thrift N eds *New Models in Geography (Vol 1)* London, Unwin Hyman
- Cooke P (1989b) 'The contested terrain of locality studies' *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale* 80 14-29
- Coombs G (1948) 'Antarctic claim' *Contemporary Review* 173 216-220
- Corbridge S (1988) 'The asymmetry of independence' *Studies in Comparative Development* 23 3-29

Corbridge S (1993) 'Maximising entropy? New geopolitical orders and the internationalisation of business' in G Demko and W Wood eds *Political Geography: An International Perspective* Boulder, Westview

Corbridge S and Agnew J (1991) 'The US trade and budget deficits in global perspective: an essay in geopolitical economy' *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 9 71-90

Corbridge S, R Martin and N Thrift eds (1993) *Money, Power and Space* Oxford, Blackwell

Corner J and Harvey S eds (1991) *Enterprise and Heritage* London, Routledge

Corrigan P and D Sayer (1985) *The Great Arch: English State Formation as Cultural Revolution* Oxford, Basil Blackwell

Cortese E (1981) 'La Argentina: el pais geopoliticamente agreidido' *Geopolitica* 21 47-50

Cosentino B (1970) 'El valor estrategico de las Malvinas' *Estrategica* 6 76-87

Coutau-Begarie (1982) 'Apres les Falkland ... Quel avenir pour les flottes de surface' *Politique Estrangere* 47 701-716

Coutau-Begarie H (1984) 'L'Antarctique, derniere terre a prendre' *Defence Nacional* December 85-98

Coutau-Begarie H (1985) *Geostrategie de L'Atlantique Sud* Paris, University of Paris Press

Cox R (1983) 'Gramsci, hegemony and international relations: an essay in method' *Millennium* 12 162-175

Crang P (1990) 'Contrasting images of the new service society' *Area* 22 29-36

Crawford L (1982) 'Por un club Antartico Ibero-Americano' *Geosur* 33 34-43

Crawley E (1984) *A House Divided: Argentina 1880-1980* London, Hurst

Crocker C (1981) 'Western security interests in Southern Africa' *Survival* 23 277-281

- Cromley R (1958) 'We're losing the Antarctic' *American Mercury* 87 5-11
- Crossley C and R Greenhill (1977) 'The River Plate Beef Trade' in D Platt ed *Business Imperialism 1840-1930* Oxford, Clarendon Press
- Crush J (1991) 'The discourse of progressive human geography' *Progress in Human Geography* 15 395-414
- Culwick A (1974) 'Southern Africa: A strategic view' *Strategic Review* Summer 30-37
- Cummings B (1992) *War and Television* London, Verso
- Dabat A and Lorenzano L (1983) *Argentina: The Malvinas and the End of Military Rule* London, Verso
- Dalby S (1988) 'The Soviet Union as the other' *Alternatives* 13 45-58
- Dalby S (1990a) *Creating the Second Cold War: the Discourse of Politics* London, Pinter
- Dalby S (1990b) 'American security discourse: the persistence of geopolitics' *Political Geography Quarterly* 9 171-188
- Dalby S (1990-1) 'Dealignment discourse: thinking beyond the blocs' *Current Research in Peace and Violence* 13 140-154
- Dalby S (1991a) 'Critical geopolitics: discourse, difference and dissent' *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 9 261-283
- Dalby S (1991b) *Rethinking Security: Ambiguities in Theory and Policy* Working Paper, Canberra ANU Peace Research Centre
- Dalby S (1992a) 'Security, modernity and ecology: the dilemmas of post cold war security discourse' *Alternatives* 17 95-134
- Dalby S (1992b) 'Ecopolitical discourse: environmental security and political geography' *Progress in Human Geography* 16 503-522

Dalby S (1992c) '*Reading gender, reading geography and reading the Gulf*' Paper presented to the International Geographical Congress, Washington DC 24-27 August

Dalby S (1993a) 'Post Cold War security in the new Europe' in J O'Loughlin and H van der Wusten eds *The New Political Geography of Eastern Europe* London, Belhaven Press

Dalby S (1993b) 'The Kiwi Disease: geopolitical discourse in Aotearoa/New Zealand and the South Pacific' *Political Geography* 12 437-456

Dalby S (1993c) '*Gender and geopolitics: discourse, silence and violence in the new world disorder*' Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Association of Geographers, Ottawa May 31-June 3 1993

Dalyell T (1982a) *One Man's Falklands* London, Cecil Woolf

Dalyell T (1982b) 'A Falkland's polemic' *London Review of Books* 20 May-2 June 1982 19-20

Dalyell T (1983) *Thatcher's Torpedo* London, Cecil Woolf

Darnovsky M (1991) 'Overhauling the meaning machines: An interview with Donna Haraway' *Socialist Review* Summer 65-85

Daverede A (1988) 'La supuesta terminacion del Tratado Antartico' *Boletin del Centro Naval* 107 752-753

Day R (1970) 'Troubled reflections of a TV journalist' *Encounter* 34 78-88

Dear M (1986a) 'Postmodernism and planning' *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 4 367-384

Dear M (1986b) 'Thinking about the state' *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 4 1-5

Dear M (1990) 'Geographies of corruption' *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 8 249-253

De Castro T (1976) *Rumo a Antartica* Rio de Janiero, Livaria Freitas

- De Certeau M (1984) *The Practice of Everyday Life* Berkeley, University of California Press
- De Certeau M (1986) *Heterologies* Manchester, Manchester University Press
- Der Derian J (1987a) *On Diplomacy* London, Basil Blackwell
- Der Derian J (1987b) 'Mediating estrangement: a theory for diplomacy' *Review of International Studies* 13 91-110
- Der Derian J (1990) 'The (s)pace of international relations: simulation, surveillance and speed' *International Studies Quarterly* 34 295-310
- Der Derian J (1992) *Anti-Diplomacy: Speed, Spies and Terror in International Relations* Oxford, Basil Blackwell
- Der Derian J and Shapiro M eds (1989) *International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics* Lexington, Lexington Books
- Derrida J (1984) 'No apocalypse, not now- full speed ahead, seven missiles, seven missive' *Diacritics* 20-31
- Deutche R (1990) 'Expertease' *Artforum* February 21-23
- Deutche R (1991) 'Boy's town' *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* D 9 5-30
- De Wit M (1985) *Minerals and Mining in Antarctica* Oxford, University Press
- Diaz V (1989) 'Restless na(rra)tives' *Inscriptions* 5 165-177
- Dicken P (1992) *Global Shift* London, PCP
- Dickenson J (1916) 'The Empire's outpost in the South Atlantic' *United Empire* 7 161-172
- Dillon M ed (1988) *Defence Policy Making* Leicester, Leicester University Press
- Dillon M (1989a) *The Falklands, Politics and War* London, Macmillan

Dillon M (1989b) 'Modernity, discourse and deterrence' *Current Research in Peace and Violence* 10 90-104

Dillon M (1990-1) 'The alliance of security and subjectivity' *Current Research in Peace and Violence* 13 101-124

Diprose R and R Ferrell (1991) *Cartographies: Poststructuralism and the Mapping of Bodies and Spaces* Sydney, Allen and Unwin

Di Tella G and D Cameron Watt eds (1989) *Argentina Between the Powers 1939-1946* London, Macmillan

Dodds K-J (1991a) 'Geopolitica global: Avanzando mas alla de Mackinder y Spykman' *Geopolitica* 42 33-40

Dodds K-J (1991b) 'Much ado about nothing?: Cholera, local politics and public health in nineteenth century Reading' *Local Historian* 21 168-177

Dodds K-J (1991c) 'La geografia del mundo pos guerra fria: Hacia una nueva geopolitica' *Geopolitica* 44 20-26

Dodds K-J (1992a) '*Britain and Antarctica 1958-61: A view from the Foreign Office*' Conference Proceedings published in *The Congress of America's Handbook* (4 Vols) Lima, Peru

Dodds K-J (1992b) 'Geopolitica, estrategia y libertos de los expertos: Haciendo estrategico el Atlantico Sur' *Geopolitica* 45 30-35

Dodds K-J (1992c) 'Geopolitica, expertos y formulacion de politica exterior' *Geopolitica* 47 36-40

Dodds K-J (1993a) 'Geopolitics, experts and the making of foreign policy' *Area* 25 70-74

Dodds K-J (1993b) 'Geopolitics, cartography and the state in South America' *Political Geography* 12 361-381

Dodds K-J (1993c) 'Eugenics, fantasies of empire and inverted whiggism: An essay on the political geography of Vaughan Cornish' *Political Geography* 12 (Forthcoming)

Dodds K-J (1993d) 'The need for conversation: A response to the Slowe and Taylor exchange' *Area* 25 (Forthcoming)

Dodds K-J (1993e) '*Warring Stories: British narratives of the 1982 Falklands War*' Paper presented to the Annual Conference of the Institute of British Geographers Egham January 1993

Dodds K-J (1994a) 'War stories: British elite narratives of the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War' *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 12 (Forthcoming)

Dodds K-J (1994b) 'Cartography, Geography and the Nineteenth Century Argentine State' *Bulletin of Latin American Research* (Forthcoming)

Dodds K-J (1994c) 'Anglo-Argentine relations in the 1950s: A view from the Foreign Office' Submitted to *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*

Dodds K-J (1994d) '*Geography, the Argentine state and the Conquest of the Desert*' Paper to be presented to the Annual Conference of Institute of British Geographers Nottingham January 1994

Dodds K-J and Sidaway J (1993) 'Locating critical geopolitics' Submitted to *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*

Doel M (1991) *Between a Carcinogen and a War Machine: Deconstruction, Post-Structuralism and the Writing of Human Geography* Unpublished PhD Thesis, Department of Geography, University of Bristol

Doel M (1993a) 'Proverbs for paranoids: writing human geography on hollowed ground' *Transactions of Institute of British Geographers* (Forthcoming)

Doel M (1993b) 'Something resists: reading- deconstruction as ontological infestation' in P Cloke et al eds *Readings of Rural Change* London, Paul Chapman

Domosh M (1991) 'Towards a feminist historiography of geography' *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 16 95-104

- Driver F (1985a) '*Geography and power: the work of Michel Foucault*' Paper presented to the Annual Conference of Institute of British Geographers January 1985 (Reprinted in P Burke ed *Critical Essays on Michel Foucault* 1992)
- Driver F (1985b) 'Power, space and the body: a critical assessment of Foucault's Discipline and Punish' *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 3 425-446
- Driver F (1988) 'The historicity of human geography' *Progress in Human Geography* 12 497-506
- Driver F (1990) 'Discipline without frontiers' *Journal of Historical Sociology* 3 272-293
- Driver F (1991a) 'Political geography and state formation: disputed territory' *Progress in Human Geography* 15 268-280
- Driver F (1991b) 'Henry Morton Stanley and his critics' *Past and Present* 133 134-166
- Driver F (1992) 'Geography's empire: Histories of geographical knowledge' *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 10 23-40
- Driver F (1993) 'Bodies in Space: Foucault's account of disciplinary power' in C Jones and R Porter eds *Re-Assessing Foucault* London, Routledge
- Driver F and Rose G eds (1992) *Nature and Science: Essays in the History of Geographical Knowledge* Historical Geography Research Series Number 28, Cheltenham
- Dumm T (1988) 'The politics of postmodern aesthetics' *Political Theory* 16 209-228
- Dunleavy P et al eds (1990) *Developments in British Politics* 3 London, Macmillan
- During S (1990) 'Postmodernism or post-colonialism today' in A Milner, P Thompson and C Worth eds *Postmodern Conditions* New York, St Martin's Press
- During S (1992) *Foucault and Literature* London, Routledge
- East G and J Prescott (1975) *Our Fragmented World* London, Macmillan

- Edgerton D (1991) 'Liberal militarism and the British state' *New Left Review* 185 138-169
- Edwards D (1989) 'Mad mullahs and Englishmen: Discourse in the colonial encounter' *Society for Comparative Study of Society and History* 31 649-670
- Eco U (1983) *Travels in Hyperreality* New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich
- Elliot D (1988) 'Antarctica: Is there any oil or natural gas' *Oceanus* 31 32-38
- Elshtain J (1987) *Women and War* New York, Basic Books
- Elshtain J (1992) 'Sovereignty, identity and sacrifice' in V Spike Peterson ed *Gendered States* Boulder, Lynne Rienner
- English A (1982) 'The Chilean Navy' *Navy International* April 966-970
- Enloe C (1988) *Does Khaki Become You?* London, Pandora
- Enloe C (1989) *Bananas, Beaches and Bases* London, Pandora
- Enloe C (1992) 'The gendered Gulf' in C Peters ed *Collateral Damage* Boston, South End Press
- Enloe C (1993) '*Feminist thoughts on the end of the Cold War*' Paper presented to BISA Gender and International Relations Conference London, 15 May 1993
- Escobar A (1984-5) 'Discourse and power in development' *Alternatives* 10 377-400
- Escobar A (1988) 'Power and visibility' *Cultural Anthropology* 3 428-443
- Escobar M, S Quintero and C Reboratti (1992) 'Geography, territorial identity and patriotic representation in Argentina' in D Hooson ed *Geography and National Identity* London, Basil Blackwell
- Escude C (1983) *Gran Bretana, Estados Unidos y la Declinacion Argentina 1942-1949* Buenos Aires, Editorial de Belgrano

Escude C (1986a) 'Contenido nacionalista de la enseñanza de la geografía en la República Argentina 1879-1986' *Ideas en Ciencias Sociales* (Universidad de Belgrano) 9 3-43

Escude C (1986b) *La Argentina vs. las Grandes Potencias* Buenos Aires, Editorial de Belgrano

Escude C (1987) *Patología del Nacionalismo: el Caso Argentino* Buenos Aires, Instituto di Tella

Escude C (1988) 'Argentine territorial nationalism' *Journal of Latin American Studies* 20 139-165

Escude C (1990) *El Fracaso del Proyecto Argentino* Buenos Aires, Instituto de Torcuato Di Tella/Editorial Tesis

Escude C (1992) *Education, Public Culture and Foreign Policy: the case of Argentina* Working Paper Series of Duke-UNC Programme of Latin American Studies

Esteban J (1991) 'El conocimiento geográfico en Argentina. Siglos XIX y XX' *ERIA* 23-28

Etchepareborda R (1981) 'Estado de la ciencia geopolítica en los Estados Unidos: Intento de balance' *Geopolítica* 22 16-23

Etchepareborda R (1983) 'La cuestión Malvinas en perspectiva histórica' *Revista de Historia de América* 96 27-67

Falcoff M (1972) 'Raul Scalabrini Ortiz: The making of an Argentine nationalist' *Hispanic American Historical Review* 47 74-101

Fairlie H (1982) 'What the Falklands teaches us' *The New Republic* 12 July 1982 8-12

Feminists and Feminism in the Academy (1992) 'Women and Geography Study Group Meeting' *Antipode* 24 218-237

Fermentia N (1991) *WWII script as organising metaphor for British construction of the enemy-image in the Falklands War* Working Paper, Program on the Analysis and Resolution of Conflicts, Syracuse University

- Ferns H (1954) 'Britain's informal empire in Argentina' *Past and Present* 4 60-75
- Ferns H (1960) *Britain and Argentina in the Nineteenth Century* Oxford, Clarendon Press
- Ferns H (1969) *Argentina* London, Ernest Benn
- Ferns H (1992) 'Argentina: part of an informal empire?' in A Hennessy and J King eds *The Land That England Lost* London, British Academic Press
- Ferrari G (1980) 'La politica exterior Argentina a traves de la bibliografia' *Revista InterAmericana de Bibliografia* 30 133-147
- Ferrero A (1982) 'Las Islas Malvinas: un camino Ingles a la Antartida' *La Nacion* (Buenos Aires) 21 April
- Ferrero A (1984) 'La Antartida como fin de una estrategia' *Antartida* 13 18-30
- Figari G (1987) *Teoria, Epistemologia y Metodologia de las Relaciones Internacionales* Rosario, Promopea
- Fitzsimmons M (1989) 'The matter of nature' *Antipode* 21 106-120
- Flax J (1981) 'Why epistemology is important' *Journal of Politics* 43 1006-1024
- Foucault M (1967) *Madness and Civilisation* London, Tavistock
- Foucault M (1970) *The Order of Things* London, Tavistock
- Foucault M (1972) *Archaeology of Knowledge* London, Tavistock
- Foucault M (1977a) 'Nietzsche, genealogy and history' in D Bouchard ed *Language, Counter-Memory and Practice* Ithaca, Cornell University Press
- Foucault M (1977b) *Discipline and Punish* London, Penguin
- Foucault M (1979) 'Governmentality' *Ideology and Consciousness* 6 9-21

Foucault M (1980) *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977* Brighton, Harvester Press

Foucault M (1982a) 'Space, knowledge and power' *Skyline* March 1-23

Foucault M (1982b) 'The subject and power' in H Dreyfus and P Rabinow eds *Michel Foucault Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* Brighton, Harvester Press

Foucault M (1984) 'The order of discourse' in M Shapiro ed *Language and Politics* New York, New York University Press

Foucault M (1986) 'Of other spaces' *Diacritics* (Spring) 22-27

Foucher M (1988) *Fronts et Frontieres: Un Tour de Monde Geopolitique* Paris, Fayard

Fraga J (1979) 'El mar en la geopolitica Argentina' *Revista de la Escuela Guerra Naval* 11 27-28

Fraga J (1983) *La Argentina y el Atlantico Sur* Buenos Aires, Institution de Publicaciones Navales

Fraga J (1985) 'Antartida 1991: el factor economico' *Revista Escuela Superior de Guerra* January 25-32

Frazer N (1984) 'The French Derrideans: politicizing deconstruction or deconstructing the political' *New German Critique* 33 127-154

Freedman L (1982) 'The war for the Falklands Isles' *Foreign Policy* 61 196-210

Freedman L (1988) *Britain and the Falklands War* London, Basil Blackwell

Freedman L and Gamba-Stonehouse V (1990) *Signals of War* London, Faber and Faber

Fussell P (1989) *Wartime* New York, Oxford University Press

Galjart B and Silva P eds (1989) *Democratization and the State in the Southern Cone* Amsterdam, CEDLA

- Gamba V (1984) *El Peon de la Reina* Buenos Aires, Editorial Sudamericana
- Gamba-Stonchouse V (1987) *The Falklands/Malvinas War* London, Allen and Unwin
- Gamba-Stonchouse V (1989) *Strategy in the Southern Oceans: A South American View* London, Pinter Publishers
- Gamble A (1988) *Free Economy and the Strong State* London, Macmillan
- Gandle K (1986) 'Michel Foucault: intellectual works and politics' *Telos* 55 121-134
- Garcia R (1982) *La cuestion de las Malvinas* Stockholm, Institute of Latin American Studies
- Geertz C (1973) *The Interpretation of Cultures* New York, Basic Books
- George B and W Little (1985) 'Options in the Falklands-Malvinas dispute' *South Atlantic Council Occasional Papers* No. 1
- Gerace M (1988) 'Between Mackinder and Spykman' *Comparative Strategy* 10 347-364
- Gerace M (1992) 'Transforming the pattern of conflict: geopolitics and post-cold war Europe' *Comparative Strategy* 11 373-407
- Geraghty C (1984) 'National fictions' *Screen* 24 94-96
- Gerassi M (1964) *Argentine Nationalism of the Right* Unpublished PhD thesis, Department of History, Columbia University
- Gibert S (1972) 'Implications of the Nixon doctrine for military aid policy' *Orbis* 16 660-671
- Gibran D (1990) *Strategic Imperatives, UK Defence Policy and the Case of the Falklands War* Unpublished PhD thesis, Centre for Defense Studies, Aberdeen University
- Giddens A (1982) *Profiles and Critiques in Social Theory* London, Macmillan
- Giddens A (1985) *The Nation-State and Violence* Cambridge, Polity Press

Giddens A (1990) *Modernity and Self-Identity* Cambridge, Polity Press

Giddens A and Held D eds (1982) *Classes, Power and Conflict* London, Macmillan

Girbal de Blacha N (1983) 'Aportes bibliograficos el estudio de un area marginal: El Gran Chaco Argentino y la eploracion forestal 1880-1914' *Revista InterAmericana de Bibliografia* 33 331-354

Girot P and Kofman E eds (1987) *International Geopolitical Analysis: A Selection from Herodote* London, Routledge

Glass P (1987) 'Polar issues: Their implication for East/West stability' *Seaford House Papers* 1-21

Glassner M (1985) 'The view from the near north: South Americans view Antarctica and the Southern Ocean geopolitically' *Political Geography Quarterly* 4 329-342

Glassner M (1986) 'The new political geography of the sea' *Political Geography Quarterly* 5 6-8

Gleason P (1981) 'Americans all: World War II and the shaping of American identity' *Review of Politics* 43 483-513

Gobbi H (1977) 'Problemas Australes Argentino-Chilenos' *Estrategia* 48 27-36

Goebel J (1971) *The Struggle for the Falkland Islands* New Haven, Yale University Press

Goicoechea H (1970) *El Instituto Geografico Argentino* Departamento de Historia, Universidad de Resistencia, Argentina

Goldblat J and V Millan (1983) *The Falklands/Malvinas Conflict* Stockholm, Stockholm Peach Research Institute

Goldwert M (1972) *Democracy, Militarism and Nationalism in Argentina 1930-1966* Austin, University of Texas Press

Gooch A (1990a) 'The Falklands War and a very special relationship: The Hispanic world and the Anglo-Saxon world: Part One' *Contemporary Review* 257 225-233

Gooch A (1990b) 'The Falklands War and a very special relationship: The Hispanic world and the Anglo-Saxon world: Part Two' *Contemporary Review* 257 285-296

Goodman L ed (1989) *The Military and Democracy* Lexington, Lexington Books

Gore-Booth P (1974) *With Great Truth and Respect* London, Constable

Gorman E (1961) *The Invention of America* Bloomington, University of Indiana Press

Gorman S (1982) 'Geopolitics and Peruvian foreign policy' *Inter-American Economic Affairs* 36 65-88

Gottman J (1950) 'Geography and international relations' *World Politics* 3 151-173

Gottman J (1973) *The Significance of Territory* Charlottesville, University of Virginia Press

Goyret J (1980) *Geopolitica y Subversion* Buenos Aires, Ediciones Depalma

Grabendorff W (1982) '*Inter-state behaviour and regional potential for conflict in Latin America*' Working Paper Number 116, Woodrow Wilson International Centre Washington DC

Graham J (1988) 'Postmodernism and marxism' *Antipode* 20 60-66

Graham-Yooll A (1981a) *The Forgotten Colony: A History of the English-Speaking Communities in Argentina* London, Hutchinson

Graham-Yooll (1981b) *Portrait of an Exile* London, Junction Books

Gramsci A (1971) *Selection from the Prison Notebooks* New York, International Publishers

Gravil R (1975) 'Anglo-US trade rivalry in Argentina and the D'Abernon mission of 1929' in D Rock ed *Argentina in the Twentieth Century* London, Ducksworth

Gravil R (1985) *The Anglo-Argentine Connection 1900-1939* Boulder, Westview Press

- Gravil R (1992) 'The denigration of Peronism' in A Hennessy and J King eds *The Land That England Lost* London, British Academic Press
- Gray C (1977) *The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era: Heartland, Rimlands and the Technological Revolution* New York, Crane and Russak
- Gray C (1988a) *The Geopolitics of Superpower* Lexington, University of Kentucky Press
- Gray C (1988b) 'Ocean and containment in global strategy' *Comparative Strategy* 7 439-444
- Gray C (1990) *War, Peace and Victory* New York, Simon and Schuster
- Graziano F (1992) *Divine Violence: Spectacle, Psychosexuality and Radical Christianity in the Argentine 'Dirty War'* Boulder, Westview Press
- Gregory Derek (1981) *Ideology, Science and Human Geography* London, Hutchinson
- Gregory Derek (1988) 'Postmodernism and the politics of social theory' *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 5 245-248
- Gregory Derek (1989a) 'Areal differentiation and postmodern human geography' in D Gregory and R Walford eds *New Horizons in Human Geography* London, Macmillan
- Gregory Derek (1989b) 'The crisis of modernity? Human geography and critical social theory' in N Thrift and R Peet eds *New Models in Human Geography* London, Unwin Hyman
- Gregory Derek (1990) 'Editorial' *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 8 1-6
- Gregory Derek (1991) 'Interventions in the historical geography of modernity' *Geografiska Annaler* 73B 17-45
- Gregory Donna (1989) 'The dictator's furnace: metaphor and alchemy in national security discourse' *Current Research on Peace and Violence* 12 47-52
- Greenfield B (1992) *Narrating Discovery* New York, Columbia University Press

Gualco J (1977) 'Analysis de un pacto defensivo en el Atlantico Sur' *Geopolitica* 7/8 28-36

Guedalla P (1932) *Argentine Tango* London, Hodder and Stoughton

Guest I (1990) *Behind the Disappearances* Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press

Guglielmelli J (1975-6) 'Argentina, politica nacional y politica de fronteras' *Estrategia* 37-38 5-21

Guglielmelli J (1976a) 'Golbery do Couto e Silva, el destino manifesto brasileno y el Atlantico Sur' *Estrategia* 39 5-24

Guglielmelli J (1976b) 'Argentina insular o peninsular' *Estrategia* 41-42 5-25

Guglielmelli J (1977) 'Geopolitica en el Argentina' *Estrategia* 46-47 5-14

Guglielmelli J (1979a) 'Argentina: geopolitica y fronteras' *Estrategia* 57 5-15

Guglielmelli J (1979b) *Geopolitica del Cono Sur* Buenos Aires, El Cid Editor

Guglielmelli J (1980-1) 'Islas Malvinas: Exigir definiciones a Gran Bretagna en las negociaciones sobre soberania' *Estrategia* 67-68 5-17

Gutierrez G (1992) 'Search for identity' *Latin American Perspectives* 19 61-66

Haas P (1992) 'Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy coordination' *International Organisation* 46 1-36

Habermas J (1987) *The Philosophical Consequences of Modernity* Boston, MIT Press

Haglund D (1986) 'The new geopolitics of minerals' *Political Geography Quarterly* 5 221-240

Halliday F (1989) *Cold War, Third World* London, Century Hutchinson

Hanks R (1980) *The Unnoticed Challenge: Soviet Maritime Strategy and the Global Choke Points* Washington DC, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis

Hanks R (1981) *The Cape Route: The Imperiled Lifeline* Washington DC, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis

Hanlon J (1986) *Beggar your Neighbour* Bloomington, University of Indiana Press

Haraway D (1988) 'Situated knowledges: the science question in feminism and the privilege of partial perspective' *Feminist Studies* 14 575-599

Haraway D (1992) 'The promises of monsters: a regenerative politics for inappropriate/d others' in L Grossberg, C Nelson, P Treichler eds *Cultural Studies* London, Routledge

Harding S (1986) *The Science Question in Feminism* Ithaca, Cornell University Press

Harley J B (1988) 'Maps, knowledge and power' in D Cosgrove and S Daniels eds *The Iconography of Landscape* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press

Harley J B (1990) 'Deconstructing the map' *Cartographica* 26 1-20

Harrigan A (1977) 'Strategic minerals problem in Southern Africa' in P Wall ed *The Southern Oceans and the Security of the Free World* London, Stacey International

Harris C (1991) 'Power, modernity and historical geography' *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 81 671-683

Harris R (1983) *Gotcha! The Media, the Government and the Falklands Crisis* London, Faber and Faber

Hartshorne R (1950) 'The functional approach in political geography' *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 40 95-130

Harvey D (1985) 'The geopolitics of capitalism' in D Gregory and J Urry eds *Social Structures and Spatial Processes* London, Macmillan

Hasbrouck A (1935) 'The conquest of the desert' *Hispanic American Historical Review* 15 198-228

Hauner M (1985) 'Seizing the third parallel: Geopolitics and the Soviet advance into Central Asia' *Orbis* 29 5-31

Hawthornthwaite M (1989) 'Knowers, knowing, known: feminist theory and claims of truth' *Signs* 14 533-556

Hayes M (1983) 'Brasil y el Atlantico Sur' in C Moneta ed *Geopolitica y Politica del Poder en el Atlantico Sur* Buenos Aires, Editorial Pleamar

Heitman H-R (1977) 'South Africa's strategic importance to the West' in P Wall ed *The Southern Oceans and the Security of the Free World* London, Stacey International

Heitman H-R (1985) 'The South Atlantic: NATO's unprotected communications zone' *Navy International* February 103-107

Hennessy A (1978) *The Frontier in Latin American History* London, Edward Arnold

Hennessy A and King J eds (1992) *The Land That England Lost* London, British Academic Press

Hennessy P (1986) *Cabinet* London, Basil Blackwell

Hennessy P (1990) *The Intellectual Consequences of the Peace* Glasgow, Strathclyde Papers on Government and Politics No. 70

Hennessy P and C Anstey (1990) *MoneyBags and Brains: The Anglo-American 'Special Relationship' Since 1945* Glasgow, Strathclyde Papers on Government and Politics No. 72

Henrikson A (1979) 'All the world's a map' *Wilson Quarterly* Spring 164-167

Henrikson A (1980) 'The geographical mental maps of US foreign policy makers' *International Political Science Review* 1 495-530

Hepple L (1986a) 'The revival of geopolitics' *Political Geography Quarterly* (Supplement Issue) 5 S21-S36

Hepple L (1986b) 'Geopolitics, generals and the state in Brasil' *Political Geography Quarterly* (Supplement Issue) 5 79-90

Hepple L (1992) 'Metaphor, geopolitical discourse and the military in South America' in T Barnes and J Duncan eds *Writing Worlds* London, Routledge

Herman M (1989) '*The role of military intelligence*' Paper presented to the Institute of Historical Research, University of London July 1989

Hertsgaard M and J Williamson (1990) 'Geopolitics: Arms and the man' *New Statesman and Society* 2 November 1990

Heske H (1986) 'German geographical research in the Nazi period: a content analysis of the major geographical journals 1925-1945' *Political Geography Quarterly* 5 267-281

Heske H (1987) 'Karl Haushofer: his role in German Geopolitik and Nazi politics' *Political Geography Quarterly* 6 135-150

Hill C (1981) 'Public opinion and British foreign policy since 1945: Research in Progress?' *Millennium* 10 53-62

Hinsley F (1986) *Sovereignty* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press

HMSO (1981) *The United Kingdom Defense Programme: The Way Forward* London, HMSO

HMSO (1982a) *The Falkland Islands: The Facts* London, HMSO

HMSO (1982b) *The Falklands Campaign: A Digest of Debates in the House of Commons* London, HMSO

HMSO (1982-3) *House of Commons First Report from the Defense Select Committee Session 1982-3* London, HMSO

HMSO (1983) *Falkland Islands Review: Report of Privy Counsellors* London, HMSO

Hobsbawm E and T Ranger eds (1983) *The Invention of Tradition* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press

Hodge J (1984) 'The role of the telegraph in the consolidation and expansion of the Argentine Republic' *The Americas* 41 59-80

Hoffman M (1987) 'Critical theory and the inter-paradigm debate' *Millennium* 16 231-250

Hoffman M (1991) 'Restructuring, reconstruction, reinscription and rearticulation: Four voices in critical international theory' *Millennium* 20 169-188

Hoffman S (1977) 'An American social science: international relations' *Daedalus* 51 41-59

Holdar S (1992) 'The ideal state and the power of geography: the life-work of Rudolph Kjellen' *Political Geography* 11 307-323

Hook G (1984) 'The nuclearisation of language: nuclear allergy as political' *Journal of Peace Research* 21 259-275

House J (1983) 'Political geography of contemporary events: Unfinished business in the South Atlantic' *Political Geography Quarterly* 2 233-246

Hudson B (1977) 'The new geography and the new imperialism' *Antipode* 9 12-19

Huggan G (1989) 'Decolonising the map' *Ariel: A Review of International English Literature* 20 115-131

Hurrell A (1983) 'The politics of South Atlantic security' *International Affairs* 59 179-193

Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (1977) *US Maritime Interests in the South Atlantic* Final Report for Contract No. NOOO14-76-C-1160, United States Navy

International Service of Argentine Publications (1952) *The Argentine Antarctic* Buenos Aires, ISAP

Irazusta J (1963) *La Argentina y la Imperialismo Britanico* Buenos Aires, Editorial de Belgrano

Ireland G (1916) *Boundaries, Possessions and Conflicts in South America* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press

- Isaksson E (1988) *Women and the Military System* New York, St Martins Press
- Isola E and J Fraga (1950) *Introduccion a la Geopolitica Argentina* Buenos Aires, Editorial Pleamar
- Janis I (1972) *Victims of Groupthink* Little Rock, Little Brown Publishers
- Jarosz L (1992) 'Constructing the dark continent: metaphor as geographic representation of Africa' *Geografiska Annaler* 74B 105-115
- Jarpa S (1990) 'The defence of shipping of South America' *Naval War College Review* XLIII 62-77
- Jay M (1986) 'In the empire of the gaze: Foucault and the denigration of vision in twentieth century French thought' in D Couzens Hoy ed *Foucault: A Critical Reader* Oxford, Blackwell
- Jay M (1992) 'Scopic regimes of modernity' in S Lash and J Freidman eds *Modernity and Identity* Oxford, Blackwell
- Jenkins P (1982) 'Britain's dilemma' *The New Republic* May 12 1982 14-16
- Jeffords S (1991) *The Remasculinisation of America* Bloomington, University of Indiana Press
- Jervis R (1976) *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* Princeton, Princeton University Press
- Johnson R (1986-7) 'What is cultural studies anyway?' *Social Text* 16 38-80
- Johnston R J (1980) 'Political geography without politics' *Progress in Human Geography* 4 439-446
- Johnston R J (1982) *Geography and the State* London, Macmillan
- Johnston R J and P J Taylor eds (1989) *A World in Crisis: Geographical Perspectives* Oxford, Basil Blackwell

Jones C (1980) 'Business imperialism and Argentina 1875-1900: a theoretical note' *Journal of Latin American Studies* 12 437-444

Jones C (1992) 'British capital in Argentine history' in Hennessy A and King J eds *The Land That England Lost* London, British Academic Press

Jones S (1948) 'Field geography and postwar political problems' *Geographical Review* 35 446-455

Jones S (1954) 'A unified field theory of political geography' *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 44 111-123

Jones S (1955) 'Global strategic views' *Geographical Review* 42 492-508

Jorgensen K (1992) 'On Story-telling in international relations' *Cooperation and Conflict* 27 215-224

Joyner C (1985) 'Polar politics of the 1980s' *International Studies Notes* (Special Issue) 11 1-5

Joyner C (1990) 'Antarctica and Indian Ocean States: The interplay of law, interests and geopolitics' *Ocean Development and International Law* 21 41-70

Kaldor M (1986) 'The global political economy' *Alternatives* 11 431-460

Kaldor M (1990) *The Imaginary War* Oxford, Basil Blackwell

Katz C (1992) 'All the world is staged: Intellectuals and the projects of ethnography' *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 10 495-511

Kearns G (1984) 'Closed space and political practice: Fredrick Jackson Turner and Halford Mackinder' *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 1 23-34

Keith M (1992) 'Angry writing: (re)presenting the unethical world of the ethnographer' *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 10 551-569

Keller E (1985) *Reflections on Gender and Science* New Haven, Yale University Press

Kellner D (1992) 'Popular culture and the construction of postmodern identities' in S Lash and J Freidman eds *Modernity and Identity* Oxford, Blackwell

Kelly P (1985) '*Geopolitics as a foreign policy approach: the case of US relations towards Latin America*' Paper presented to Southwestern Political Science Association Conference, Houston 21-23 March 1985

Kelly P (1986) 'Escalation of regional conflict: testing the shatterbelt concept' *Political Geography Quarterly* 5 161-180

Kelly P (1994) *South American Geopolitics* Austin, University of Texas Press

Kelly P and D Henderson (1984) '*Maritime straits and strategic minerals*' Working Paper, Department of Political Science, Emporia State University

Kelly P and Child J eds (1988) *Geopolitics of the Southern Cone and Antarctica* Boulder, Lynne Rienner

Kemp G (1977) 'The new strategic map' *Survival* 19 50-59

Keenan T (1987) 'The 'paradox' of knowledge and power: Reading Foucault on bias' *Political Theory* 15

Kennedy E (1991) 'Towards a theory of state and sovereignty' in L Freedman and M Clarke eds *Britain in the World* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press

Keogh D (1992) 'Argentina and the Falklands: The Irish connection' in A Hennessy and J King eds *The Land That England Lost* London, British Academic Press

Keohane R (1989) 'International relations theory: contributions of a feminist standpoint' *Millennium* 18 245-253

Kettering S (1988) 'The historical development of political clientalism' *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18 419-447

King A (1982) 'The strategic minerals problem: Our domestic problems' *Parameters* XII,3 44-53

Kirby A (1986) 'Le Monde braudellian' *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 4 211-219

Kjellen R (1899) *Staten som Lifsform* Stockholm, Gebers

Klavern von A (1984) 'The analysis of Latin American foreign policy: theoretical perspectives' in H Munoz and J Tulchin eds *Latin America in World Politics* Boulder, Westview Press

Klein B (1988a) 'Hegemony and strategic culture' *Review of International Studies* 14 133-149

Klein B (1988b) 'After strategy: The search for a post-modern politics of peace' *Alternatives* 13 293-318

Kliot N and S Waterman eds (1991) *The Political Geography of Conflict and Peace* London, Pinter Publishers

Klotz F (1990) *America on the Ice: Antarctic Policy Issues* Washington DC, National Defense University Press

Kobayashi A and S Mackenzie eds (1989) *Remaking Human Geography* London, Unwin Hyman

Kofman E and L Peake (1990) 'Into the 1990s: a gendered agenda for political geography' *Political Geography Quarterly* 9 313-336

Kolodziej E and R Harkavy eds (1982) *Security Policies of Developing Countries* Lexington, Lexington Books

Konrad G (1984) *AntiPolitics* New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich

Kovol J and Sabato H (1981) *Como fue la Inmigracion Irlandesa en la Argentina* Buenos Aires, Editorial del Belgrano

Krause J (1993) 'Thinking about gender, identity and difference in international relations' Paper presented to BISA Gender and International Relations Conference London 15 May 1993

Kristof L (1959) 'The nature of frontiers and boundaries' *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 49 269-282

Kristof L (1960) 'The origin and evolution of geopolitics' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 4 15-51

Lacoste Y (1973) 'An illustration of geographical warfare: bombing of the dikes on the Red River, North Vietnam' *Antipode* 5 1-14

Lacoste Y (1976) *La Geographie ca sert d'abord a faire la guerre* Paris, Maspero

Lacoste Y (1984) 'Geopolitics and foreign policy' *SAIS Review* 4 213-227

Lapid Y (1989) 'Quo vadis IR' *Millennium* 18 77-88

Laqueur W (1981) 'Foreign policy and the English language' *Washington Quarterly* 4 3-12

Lawson H (1985) *Reflexivity* London, Hutchinson

Leal J (1987) 'Latinoamerica en la Antartida: Hacia un futuro posible' *Revista Militar* 718 29-35

Lee N (1993) '*The problems of dualisms*' Paper presented to the BISA Conference on Gender and International Relations London 15 May 1993

Lefebvre H (1976) 'Reflections on the politics of space' *Antipode* 8 30-37

Legg J (1973) 'Antarctic epic' *British Empire* 62 1709-1718

Lerner A (1991) 'Transcendence of the nation: National identity and the terrain of the divine' *Millennium* 20 407-427

Levine D (1985) *The Flight from Ambiguity* Chicago, University of Chicago Press

Lewis C (1977) 'British railway companies and the Argentine government' in D Platt ed *Business Imperialism 1840-1930* Oxford, Clarendon Press

- Lewis C (1983) *British Railways in Argentina 1857-1914* London, Atlone Press
- Lewis C (1984) 'Latin America from Independence to Dependence' in P Morris ed *Africa, Asia and Central Asia: Formal and Informal Empire in the Nineteenth Century* University of Exeter Studies in History Number 9
- Ley D (1989) 'Modernism, postmodernism and the struggle for place' in J Agnew and J Duncan eds *The Power of Place* London, Unwin Hyman
- Lienhard M (1992) 'Writing and power in the conquest of America' *Latin American Perspectives* 19 79-85
- Light M and A Groom eds (1986) *International Relations: A Handbook of Current Theory* London, Francis Pinter
- Linklater A (1990) *Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations* London, Macmillan
- Little W (1975) 'The popular origins of Peronism' in D Rock ed *Argentina in the Twentieth Century* London, Duckworth
- Little W (1984) 'The Falklands affair: a review of literature' *Political Studies* 32 296-310
- Little W (1987) 'International conflict in Latin America' *International Affairs* 64 589-601
- Llaver M (1982a) 'Las superpotonecias y la politica de poder en el Atlantico Sur' *Geosur* 33 3-17
- Llaver M (1982b) 'Atlantico Sur' *Geopolitica* 24 82-95
- Llaver M (1984) 'La incidencia del conflicto Malvinas en el subsistema del Atlantico Sur' *Geopolitica* 28 35-46
- Llaver M (1987) 'Atlantico Sur: Situacion actual y perspectivas futuras' *Geopolitica* 36 50-54
- Llaver M (1991) 'Hacia una nueva vision de las relaciones en el Atlantico Sur' *Geosur* 133-134 22-32

Long B (1988) '*Place, perception and nationalism in the Falkland/Malvinas Islands*' Discussion Paper No.95, Department of Geography, Syracuse University

Lovell W (1986) 'Rethinking Conquest: The colonial experience in Latin America' *Journal of Historical Geography* 12 310-317

Lowe M and J Short (1990) 'Progressive human geography' *Progress in Human Geography* 10 1-11

Lucier J (1974) 'Panama Canal: Focus of power politics' *Strategic Review* Spring 34-43

Luckham R (1984) 'Of arms and culture' *Current Research on Peace and Violence* 7 1-64

Luder I (1974) *La Argentina y sus Claves Geopoliticas* Buenos Aires, Editorial Pleamar

Luke T (1981) 'The meaning of development: Theory and doctrine since 1945' *Journal of Political Studies* 24 1-26

Luke T (1984) 'History as ideo-political commodity: the 1984 D-Day spectacle' *New Political Science* 13 65-98

Luke T (1989a) *Screens of Power* Urbana, University of Illinois Press

Luke T (1989b) 'What's wrong with deterrence? A semiotic interpretation of national security policy' in J Der Derian and M Shapiro eds *International/Intertextual Relations* Lexington, Lexington Books

Luke T (1991a) 'The discipline of security studies: Learning from Kuwait' *Alternatives* 16 315-344

Luke T (1991b) 'The discourse of development: a genealogy of 'developing nations' and the discipline of modernity' *Current Perspectives in Social Theory* 11 271-293

Luke T (1993a) 'Discourse of disintegration, texts of transformation: re-reading realism in the new world order' *Alternatives* 18 229-258

Luke T (1993b) '*Beyond leviathan, beneath lilliput: geopolitics and glocalisation*' Paper presented to the Annual Conference of the Association of American Geographers Atlanta April 1993

Lunden T (1986) 'Swedish contributions to political geography' *Political Geography Quarterly* 5 181-186

Luttwark E (1990) 'From geopolitics to geo-economics' *National Interest* 20 17-24

Lynch J (1973) *The Spanish-American Revolutions 1808-1826* London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson

Lynch J (1981) *Argentine Dictator: Juan Manuel Rosas* London, Oxford University Press

Lynch J (1992) 'The institutional frame-work of colonial America' *Journal of Latin American Studies* 24 69-83

MacDonald C (1985) 'The United States, the Cold War and Peron' in C Abel and C Lewis eds *Latin American Economic Imperialism and the United States* London, Atlone Press

MacDonald C (1986) 'The United States, Britain and Argentina in the years after the Second World War' in G Di Tella and D Platt eds *The Political History of Argentina* London, MacMillan

MacDonald C (1992) 'End of empire: the decline of the Anglo-Argentine connection 1918-1951' in A Hennessy and J King eds *The Land That England Lost* London, British Academic Press

Macdonell D (1986) *Theories of Discourse: An Introduction* Oxford, Basil Blackwell

Mackinder H (1904) 'The geographical pivot of history' *Geographical Journal* 23 421-444

Mackinder H (1905) 'Man-power as a measure of national and imperial strength' *National Review* 45 136-143

Mann M (1984) 'The autonomous power of the state' *Archives Europeenes de Sociologie* 25 185-213

- Mann M (1986) *Sources of Social Power Volume 1* Cambridge, Polity Press
- Marazzi J (1952) 'La Soberania Argentina en la Antartida' *Argentina Austral* 23 13-18
- Marcus G (1992) 'More critically reflexive than thou: the current identity politics of representation' *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 12 489-495
- Marcus G and M Fisher (1986) *Anthropology as Cultural Critique* Chicago, Chicago University Press
- Marini J (1982) *El Conocimiento Geopolitico* Tucuman, Universidad Nacional de Tucuman
- Martin R (1959) 'Political geography and geopolitics' *Journal of Geography* LVIII 441-444
- Marull F (1972) *Introduccion a la Geopolitica* Buenos Aires, Editorial Pleamar
- Massey D (1991) 'A global sense of place' *Marxism Today* June 24-29
- Massey D (1993) 'Questions of locality' *Geography* 80 142-149
- Mason P (1990) *Deconstructing America: Representations of the Other* London, Routledge
- Mastrorilli C (1977) *La Cuestion del Atlantico Sur* Buenos Aires, Editorial Pleamar
- Mattos Meirra C (1988) 'The strategic importance of the South Atlantic' in P Kelly and J Child eds *Geopolitics of the Southern Cone and Antarctica* Boulder, Lynne Rienner
- Max A (1983) 'Defensa del Atlantico Sur' *Politica y Geoestrategia* 30 113-131
- MccGwire M (1986) *Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy* Washington DC, The Brookings Institution
- McCann W (1852) *Two Thousand Miles Ride Through the Argentine Provinces* London, Smith Elder and Co.
- McCloskey D (1990) 'Ancient and moderns' *Social Science History* 14 289-301

McDowell L (1991) 'The baby and the bathwater: deconstruction and feminist theory in geography' *Geoforum* 22 123-133

McDowell L (1992) 'Multiple voices: speaking from inside and outside the project' *Antipode* 24 56-72

McLynn F (1980) 'The frontier problem in nineteenth century Argentina' *History Today* January 28-32

McLynn F (1982) 'The political thought of Juan Domingo Peron' *Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies* 32 15-32

McQuail D (1990) *Mass Communication Theory* London, Sage

Meija R (1899) *Las Multitudes Argentinas* Buenos Aires, Editorial del Blegrano

Merrett C and Grivil R (1991) 'Comparing human rights: South Africa and Argentina 1976-1989' *Society for Comparative Study of Society and History* 31 255-287

Mendlowitz S and R Walker eds (1987) *Towards a Just World Peace: Perspectives from the Social Movements* London, Butterworths

Merchant C (1980) *The Death of Nature* San Francisco, Harper Row

Merquior J (1986) 'Patterns of state building in Brasil and Argentina' in J Hall ed *States in History* Oxford, Basil Blackwell

Metford J (1968) 'Falklands/Malvinas? The background to the dispute' *International Affairs* 44

Middlebrook M (1985) *Operation Corporate: The Falklands War* London, Viking

Middleton D and D Edwards eds (1990) *Collective Remembering* London, Sage

Mikesell M (1983) 'The myth of the nation-state' *Journal of Geography* 82 257-260

Milensky E (1980) 'Arms production and national security in Argentina' *Journal of Interamerican Affairs* 22 267-288

- Milia F ed (1978) *La Antartida: Un Espacio Geopolitico* Buenos Aires, Editorial Pleamar
- Milia J (1990) 'Avances conceptuales y metodologicos de la geografia politica en las ultimas decadas' *Boletin de Estudios Geograficos* 86 67-82
- Milenky E (1978) *Argentina's Foreign Policies* Boulder, Westview Press
- Miller N (1987) *Soviet Relations with Latin America* Cambridge, University Press
- Mitchell B (1981) 'Cracks in the ice' *Wilson Quarterly* Autumn 69-87
- Mitchell D and Smith N (1991) 'Comment: The courtesy of political geography: Introductionary textbooks and the War against Iraq' *Political Geography Quarterly* 10 338-341
- Mohanty C (1988) 'Under Western eyes, femenist scholarship and colonial discourses' *Femenist Review* 30 60-88
- Moncayo G (1986) 'El sistema Antartico: evolucion y desafio' *Revista de Estudios Estrategicos* 3 113-125
- Moneta C (1975) 'Antartida Argentina: los problemas de 1975-1990' *Estrategia* 31-32 23-36
- Montgomery S (1991) 'Codes of combat in biomedical discourse' *Science as Culture* 12 341-390
- Montrose L (1991) 'The work of gender in the discourse of discovery' *Representations* 33 1-41
- Moodie M and A Cottrell (1987) *Geopolitics and Maritime Power* London, Sage
- Moore S (1988) 'Getting a bit of the other- the pimps of postmodernism' in R Chapman and J Rutherford eds *Unwrapping Male Order* London, Lawrence and Wishart
- Moreno J (1952) *Nuestras Malvinas, La Antartida* Buenos Aires, El Ateneo

Moreno J (1960) *Historia de las Relaciones Exteriores Argentinas 1810-1955* Buenos Aires, Editorial del Belgrano

Morgan E (1988) *Inventing the People* New York, Norton

Morgenthau H (1948) *Politics Among Nations* New York, Alfred Knopf

Morgenthau H (1974) 'Henry Kissinger' *Encounter* 48 November 57-61

Morley D and K Robins (1989) 'Spaces of identity: communication technologies and the reconfiguration of Europe' *Screen* 30 10-34

Moro R (1989) *The History of the South Atlantic Conflict* New York, Praeger

Morris M (1986) 'Maritime geopolitics in Latin America' *Political Geography Quarterly* 5 43-55

Morris M ed (1990) *Great Power Relations in Argentina, Chile and Antarctica* London, Macmillan

Morrison D and Tumber H (1988) *Journalists at War* London, Sage

Morzone L (1978) *Soberania Territorial Argentina* Buenos Aires, Ediciones Depalma

Moussey de M (1869) *Atlas de la Confederacion Argentina* Paris, Librairie de Femin Didot Freres

Munck R (1989) *Latin America- The Transition to Democracy* London, Zed Books

Munoz H and J Tulchin eds (1984) *Latin American Nations in World Politics* Boulder, Westview Press

Nathason C (1988) 'The social construction of the Soviet threat' *Alternatives* 13 443-486

Natter W and J P Jones (1993) 'Signposts towards a post-structuralist geography' in J P Jones, W Natter and T Schatski eds *Postmodern Contentions* London, Guildford Press

Nelson J et al eds (1987) *The Rhetoric of the Human Sciences* Madison, University of Wisconsin Press

Newman K (1986) 'Politics and the media' *Political Studies* 34 696-703

Newsom L (1985) 'Indian population patterns in colonial Spanish America' *Latin American Research Review* 20 41-75

Nicholson L ed (1991) *Feminism/Postmodernism* London, Routledge

Nijman J (1992) 'The limits of superpower: the United States and the Soviet Union since World War II' *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 82,4 681-695

Nijman J (1993) 'Contra wishful thinking' *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie* 84 91-92

Norris C (1992) *Uncritical Theory: Postmodernism, Intellectuals and the Gulf War* London, Lawrence and Wishart

Norton A (1988) *Reflections on Political Identity* Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press

Novitz D (1989) 'Art, narrative and human nature' *Philosophy and Literature* 13 57-74

O'Brien R (1992) *Global Financial Integration: The End of Geography* London, Routledge

O'Hanlon R and D Washbrook (1992) 'After orientalism: Culture, criticism and politics in the Third World' *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 34 141-167

O'Loughlin J (1984) 'Geographical models of international conflict' in P J Taylor and J House eds *Political Geography: Recent Advances and Future Directions* London, Croom Helm

O'Loughlin J (1989) 'World power competition and local conflicts in the Third World' in R Johnston and P Taylor eds *A World in Crisis?* Oxford, Basil Blackwell

O'Loughlin J (1990) 'Political geography: attempting to understand a changing world order' *Progress in Human Geography* 14 420-437

- O'Loughlin J (1991) 'Political geography: returning to basic conceptions' *Progress in Human Geography* 15 322-339
- O'Loughlin J (1992) 'Ten scenarios for a new world order' *Professional Geographer* 44 22-28
- O'Loughlin J and R Grant (1990) 'The political geography of Presidential speeches 1946-1987' *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 80 504-530
- O'Loughlin J and Anselin L (1991) 'Bringing geography back to the study of international relations: spatial dependence and regional context' *International Interactions* 17 29-61
- O'Loughlin J and H Heske (1991) 'From Geopolitik to Geopolitique: converting a discipline for war to a discipline for peace' in N Kliot and S Waterman eds *The Political Geography of Conflict and Peace* London, Belhaven Press
- O'Loughlin J and H van der Wusten (1993a) 'Political geography of war and peace' in P J Taylor ed *Political Geography of the Twentieth Century* London, Belhaven Press
- O'Loughlin J and H van der Wusten (1993b) *Geography of International Relations* London, Francis Pinter
- O'Sullivan P (1982) 'Antidomino' *Political Geography Quarterly* 1 57-64
- O'Sullivan P (1986) *Geopolitics* New York, St Martin's Press
- O Tuathail G (1986) 'The language and nature of the 'new geopolitics': the case of US-El Salvador relations' *Political Geography Quarterly* 5 73-85
- O Tuathail G (1987) 'Beyond empiricist political geography: a comment to Van der Wusten and O'Loughlin' *Professional Geographer* 39 196-197
- O Tuathail G (1989) *Critical Geopolitics: The Social Construction of Space and Place in the Practice of Statecraft* Unpublished PhD thesis, Department of Geography, Syracuse University
- O Tuathail G (1992a) 'Pearl Harbour without the bombs: A critical geopolitics of the US-Japan FSX debate' *Environment and Planning A* 24 975-994

O Tuathail G (1992b) 'Foreign policy and the hyperreal: The Reagan administration and the scripting of South Africa' in T Barnes and J Duncan eds *Writing Worlds* London, Routledge

O Tuathail G (1992c) 'Putting Mackinder in his place' *Political Geography Quarterly* 11 473-495

O Tuathail G (1992d) 'The Bush administration and the 'End of the Cold War': a critical geopolitics of US foreign policy in 1989' *Geoforum* 23 437-452

O Tuathail G (1993a) 'The effacement of place: US foreign policy and the spatiality of the Gulf Crisis' *Antipode* 25 1-30

O Tuathail G (1993b) 'Japan as a threat: geo-economic discourses on US-Japan relations in US civil society' in C Williams ed *The Political Geography of the New World Order* London, Belhaven

O Tuathail G (1993c) '*Problematizing geopolitics*' Paper presented to the Annual Conference of American Geographers Atlanta April 1993

O Tuathail G (1993d) 'Radicalising geo-politics' *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* (Forthcoming)

O Tuathail G (1993e) 'Imperial incitement: Halford Mackinder, the British Empire and the writing of geographical sight' in K Fierk, J Milliken and D Sylvan eds *Gender, Race and Empire* London, Blackwell

O Tuathail G (1993f) 'The new East-West conflict? Japan and the Bush Administration's New World Order' *Area* 25 127-135

O Tuathail G and J Agnew (1987) '*Problematizing American geopolitics*' Paper presented to the Annual Conference of Association of American Geographers Portland April 1987

O Tuathail G and J Agnew (1992) 'Geopolitics and discourse: practical geopolitical reasoning in American foreign policy' *Political Geography* 11 190-204

Olascoaga M and E Racedo (1956) *La Conquista del Disierto* Buenos Aires, Editorial Americana

Olsson G (1984) 'Towards a sermon of modernity' in D Gregory and R Martin eds *Recollections of a Revolution* London, Macmillan

Openshaw S and P Steadman (1982) 'On the geography of the worst case nuclear attack on the population of Britain' *Political Geography Quarterly* 1 268-278

Ortiz Scalabrini R (1934a) 'Argentina's tragedy' *Living Age* (New York) August 522-535

Ortiz Scalabrini R (1934b) 'Who owns Argentina' *Living Age* (New York) September 25-32

Ortiz Scalabrini R (1940a) *Politica Britanica en el Rio de la Plata* Buenos Aires, Reconquista

Ortiz Scalabrini R (1940b) *Historia de los Ferrocarriles Argentinos* Buenos Aires, Reconquista

Osterud O (1988) 'The uses and abuses of geopolitics' *Journal of Peace Research* 25 191-199

Ozlak O (1983) *La Formacion del Estado Argentino* Buenos Aires, Editorial del Belgrano

Owen D (1977) *Human Rights* London, Jonathan Cape

Owen D (1991) *Time to Declare* London, Michael Joseph

Paggi L and P Pinzauti (1985) 'Peace and security' *Telos* 63 3-40

Palermo V (1978) 'Latinoamerica puede mas: geopolitica del Atlantico Sur' in F Milia ed *Atlantarida* Buenos Aires, Editorial Pleamar

Parker G (1985) *Western Geopolitical Thought in the Twentieth Century* London, Croom Helm

Parker R (1981) 'The defence gap- the South Atlantic' *Navy International* February 68-71

- Parker W (1982) *Mackinder: Geography as an Aid to Statecraft* Oxford, Clarendon Press
- Parkinson F (1985) 'Latin America and the Antarctic: an exclusive club' *Journal of Latin American Studies* 17 433-451
- Passi A (1990) 'The rise and fall of Finish geopolitics' *Political Geography Quarterly* 9 53-66
- Pateman C (1988) *The Sexual Contract* Cambridge, Polity Press
- Paterson R and P Schlesinger (1983) 'State heroes for the eighties' *Screen* 29 55-72
- Peet R ed (1977) *Radical Geography* London, Methuen
- Pepper D and Jenkins A eds (1985) *The Geography of Peace and War* Oxford, Blackwell
- Perl R (1983) *The Falkland Islands Dispute in International Law and Politics* London, Oceana
- Peterson M (1980) 'Antarctica: the last great land rush on earth' *International Organisation* 34 377-403
- Peterson S (1991) 'Feminist theory and gender studies in international relations' *International Studies Association Notes* 18 32-38
- Peterson S ed (1992a) *Gendered States: Feminist (Re)Visions of International Relations Theory* Boulder, Lynne Rienner
- Peterson S (1992b) 'Security and sovereign states: What is at stake in taking feminism seriously' in S Peterson ed *Gendered States: Feminist (Re)Visions of International Relations Theory* Boulder, Lynne Rienner
- Peterson S (1992c) 'Trangressing boundaries: Theories of knowledge, gender and international relations' *Millennium* 21 183-206
- Philip G (1985) *The Military in South American Politics* London, Unwin Hyman

Philo C ed (1991) *New Words, New Worlds* Conference Proceedings of the Social and Cultural Geography Study Group Edinburgh 10-12 September

Piertz W (1988) 'The post-colonialism of Cold War discourse' *Social Text* 19/20 55-75

Pion-Berlin D (1985) 'The fall of military rule in Argentina 1976-1983' *Journal of InterAmerican Studies* 27 58-77

Pion-Berlin D (1988) 'The national security doctrine, military threat perception and the 'Dirty War' in Argentina' *Comparative Political Studies* 21 382-407

Pion-Berlin D (1989a) *The Ideology of State Terror* Boulder, Lynne Rienner

Pion-Berlin D (1989b) 'Latin American national security doctrines: hard and softline themes' *Armed Forces and Society* 15 411-429

Pittman H (1981) *Geopolitics in the ABC Countries: A Comparison* Unpublished PhD thesis, The American University

Platt D eds (1973) *Business Imperialism 1840-1930* Oxford, Clarendon Press

Platt D and G di Tella eds (1985) *Argentina, Australia and Canada: Studies of Comparative Development 1870-1965* London, Macmillan

Platt D and G di Tella eds (1986) *The Political Economy of Argentina 1880-1946* London, Macmillan

Pletsch C (1981) 'The Three Worlds, or the division of social scientific labour circa 1950-1975' *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 23 565-590

Poole R (1992) 'On national identity' *Radical Philosophy* 62 14-19

Poniatowska E (1992) 'Memory and identity: Some historical-cultural notes' *Latin American Perspectives* 19 67-78

Ponting C (1985) *The Right to Know: The Inside Story of the Belgrano Affair* London, Sphere

Popke J (1993) *'The discursive scripting of the International Monetary Fund'* Paper presented to the Annual Conference of the Association of American Geographers Atlanta 6-10 April 1993

Poster M (1990) *The Mode of Information* Cambridge, Polity Press

Pounds N (1963) *Political Geography* New York, McGraw Hill

Pratt M (1992) *Imperial Eyes* London, Routledge

Price R (1981) 'Can Africa afford not to sell minerals?' *New York Times* 18 August 1981

Price R (1982) 'US policy towards Southern Africa' in G Carter and P O'Meara eds *International Politics in Southern Africa* Bloomington, University of Indiana Press

Puig J (1984) 'La politica exterior Argentina' in J Puig ed *America Latina: Politica Exteriores Comparadas* Buenos Aires, Grupo Editor Latinoamericano

Pym F (1983) 'British foreign policy: constraints and opportunities' *International Affairs* 59 1-6

Quintero S (1992) *Geografia y Education Publica en Argentina* Tesis de Licenciatura en Geografia, Universidad de Buenos Aires

Rabinow P ed (1984) *The Foucault Reader* New York, Vintage Books

Raymont H (1982) 'Errors all around us' *The New Republic* 28 April 1982 9-10

Reboratti C (1983) 'El encanto de la oscuridad: notas acerca de la geopolitica en la Argentina' *Desarrollo Economico* 23 137-144

Record J (1982) 'The Falklands War' *Washington Quarterly* 5 43-51

Ree J (1984) 'Metaphor and metaphysics: the end of philosophy and Derrida' *Radical Philosophy* 35 29-33

Ree J (1992) 'Internationality' *Radical Philosophy* 670 3-11

- Reichert D (1992) 'On boundaries' *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 10 87-98
- Renegger N (1990) 'The fearful sphere of international relations' *Review of International Studies* 16 361-368
- Renegger N (1992) 'No time like the present? Postmodernism and political theory' *Political Studies* XL 561-570
- Renegger N and Hoffman M eds (1991) *Beyond the Inter-Paradigm Debate* Brighton, Harvester Press
- Renegger N and M Hoffman eds (1993) *International Relations Theory* Aldershot, Elgar Publishing
- Retamar R (1989) *Caliban and Other Essays* Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press
- Reynolds D (1992) 'Political Geography: Thinking globally and locally' *Progress in Human Geography* 16 393-405
- Rice D and Gavshon A (1984) *The Sinking of the Belgrano* London, Seckler and Warburg
- Ricoeur P (1983) *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences* Cambridge, Polity Press
- Ricoeur P (1992) 'Interview with Jonathan Ree' in *Talking Liberties* London, Channel 4 Publications
- Robertson R (1992) *Globalisation: Social Theory and Global Culture* London, Sage
- Robins K (1991a) 'The mirror of unreason' *Marxism Today* March 1991 42-44
- Robins K (1991b) 'Tradition and translation: national culture in global context' in J Corner and S Honey eds *Enterprise and Heritage* London, Routledge
- Robinson D (1989) 'The language and significance of place in Latin America' in J Agnew and J Duncan eds *The Power of Place* London, Unwin Hyman
- Rock D ed (1975) *Argentina in the Twentieth Century* London, Duckworth

- Rock D (1987) *Argentina 1516-1987* London, I B Tauris
- Rogers A (1992) 'The boundaries of reason: The world, the homeland and Edward Said' *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 10 511-527
- Rogers P (1982-3) *Peace Studies Briefings: 1982 Falklands War* School of Peace Studies, University of Bradford
- Romero J (1956) *Las Ideas Politicas Argentinas* Buenos Aires, FCE
- Romero J (1980) *La Experiencia Argentina* Buenos Aires, Editorial de Belgrano
- Rorty R (1987) 'Thugs and theorists: a reply to Bernstein' *Political Theory* 15 564-580
- Rose G (1991) 'Book review of Ed Soja (1990) *Postmodern Geographies* and David Harvey (1989) *Condition of Postmodernity*' *Journal of Historical Geography* 17 118-121
- Rose G (1992) 'Geography as a science of observation: the landscape, the gaze and masculinity' in F Driver and G Rose eds *Nature and Science* Cheltenham HGRG No. 28
- Rose G (1993) *Feminism and Geography* Cambridge, Polity
- Rosenau J (1967) *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy* New York, Columbia University Press
- Roseanau J (1968) *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy* New York, Columbia University Press (Reprinted 1974)
- Roseanau J (1987) 'Introduction' in C Hermannn, C Kegley and J Roseanau eds *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy* Boston, Allen and Unwin
- Rouseanau P (1990) 'Once again into the fray: International relations confronts the humanities' *Millennium* 19 83-110
- Rouquie A (1981) *Pouvoir Militaire et Societe Politique en Republique Argentina* Paris, Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques

Rowlands I (1992) 'Environmental issues in international politics' in J Bayliss and N Renegger eds *Dilemmas in World Politics* Oxford, Clarendon Press

Ruggie J (1993) 'Territoriality and beyond: problematising modernity in international relations' *International Organisation* 47 139-174

Rumley D and P Deans (1993) 'Beyond the European inter-state system' *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie* 84 93-97

Runyan A and Peterson S (1991) 'The radical future of realism: feminist subversions of IR theory' *Alternatives* 16 67-106

Russell R ed (1984a) *America Latina y la Guerra del Atlantico Sur* Buenos Aires, Editorial de Belgrano

Russell R (1984b) 'La politica exterior Argentina' *America Latina/Internacional* 1 1-11

Ryan M (1988) 'Postmodern politics' *Theory, Culture and Society* 5 550-568

Ryan J (1993) '*Images of the exotic: the Colonial Office Visual Instruction Committee 1902-1914*' Paper presented to the Annual Conference of the Institute of British Geographers Egham January 1993

Said E (1978) *Orientalism* New York, Pantheon

Said E (1981) *Covering Islam* London, Routledge and Kegan Paul

Said E (1983) *The World, The Text and The Critic* Cambridge Ma., Harvard University Press

Said E (1990) 'Narrative, geography and interpretation' *New Left Review* 180 81-101

Said E (1993a) *Culture and Imperialism* London, Chatto and Windus

Said E (1993b) 'Orientalism and after: an interview with Edward Said' *Radical Philosophy* 63 22-32

Salgado A (1984) *Politica y Estrategia en el Atlantico Sur* Madrid, Instituto de Cuestiones Internacionales

Sampay A (1951) *La Soberania Argentina Sobre la Antartida* Rosario, Universidad Nacional de la Plata

Samuel R ed (1989) *Patriotism Volume 1* London, Routledge

Sant Hall M (1984) 'Argentine policy motivations in the Falklands War and the aftermath' *Naval War College Review* 36 21-35

Sanz P (1976) *El Espacio Argentino* Buenos Aires, Editorial Pleamar

Sarno H (1989) 'La incorporacion del Desierto del Sur' *Geopolitica* 38 56-72

Sauer C (1956) 'The education of a geographer' *Annales of the Association of American Geographers* 46 287-299

Saunders D and H Ward and D Marsh (1987) 'Government popularity and the Falklands War: a reassessment' *British Journal of Political Science* 17 281-313

Sayer A (1979) 'Epistemology and conceptions of people and nature in geography' *Geoforum* 10 19-44

Sayer A (1989) 'The new regional geography and problems of narrative' *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 7 253-276

Sayer A (1992) *Method in Social Science* London, Routledge (Second Edition)

Sawicki J (1991) *Discipling Foucault* London, Routledge

Scarpaci J and L Frazier (1993) 'State terror: ideology, protest and gendering of landscapes' *Progress in Human Geography* 17 1-21

Scholter P (1989) 'Historians and discourse analysis' *History Workshop Journal* 27-28 37-65

Schulte-Sasse J (1988) 'Electronic media and cultural politics in the Reagan era' *Cultural Critique* 8 123-152

Schulte-Sasse J and L Schulte-Sasse (1991) 'War, otherness and illusionary identifications with the state' *Cultural Critique* 19 67-95

Schultz H (1989) 'Fantasies of *Mitte*: Mittellage and Mitteleuropa in German geographical discussion in the 19th and 20th centuries' *Political Geography Quarterly* 8 315-339

Schuman F (1942) 'Let us learn our geopolitics' *Current History* 2 161-165

Scobie J (1971) *A City and a Nation* New York, Oxford University Press

Scobie J (1974) *Plaza to Suburb 1870-1910* New York, Oxford University Press

Seager J (1993) '*Gender, environment and the 1991 Gulf War*' Paper presented to the Annual Conference of the Association of American Geographers Atlanta April 1993

Seed P (1991) 'Colonial and postcolonial discourse' *Latin American Research Review* 26 181-200

Seelstrang A (1881) 'La Patagonia y la Tierra del Fuego' *Boletin de Instituto Geografica Argentino* 1 81-88

Segalla M (1978) 'What foreign policy makers want from foreign policy researchers' *International Studies Quarterly* 22 435-461

Selcher W (1984) 'Recent strategic development in South America's Southern Cone' in H Munoz and J Tulchin eds *Latin American Nations in World Politics* Boulder, Westview Press

Shackleton Lord (1976) *Economic Survey of the Falkland Islands* London, Economic Intelligence Unit

Shapiro M ed (1984) *Languague and Politics* Oxford, Basil Blackwell

Shapiro M (1988) *The Politics of Representation* Madison, Wisconsin University Press

Shapiro M (1989) 'Representing world politics' in J Der Derian and M Shapiro eds *International/Intertextual Relations* Lexington, Lexington Books

Shapiro M (1990) 'Strategic discourse/discursive strategy: The representation of 'security policy' in the video age' *International Studies Quarterly* 34 527-540

Shapiro M (1991) '*Manning the frontiers: The politics of human nature in Blade Runner*' Paper presented to American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Washington DC August 29 to 1 September 1991

Shapiro M (1992) *Reading the Postmodern Polity* Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press

Sharma R ed (1986) *Growing Focus on Antarctica* New Delhi, Rajesh Publications

Sharp P (1991) 'Thatcher's wholly British foreign policy' *Orbis* 37 395-410

Shields R (1991) *Places on the Margins: Alternative Geographies of Modernity* Andover, Routledge, Chapman and Hall

Shields R (1992) 'A truant proximity: presence and absence in the space of modernity' *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 10 181-198

Short J (1993) *An Introduction to Political Geography* London, Routledge (Second Edition)

Shumway N (1991) *The Invention of Argentina* Berkeley, University of California Press

Sibley D (1988) 'Survey 13: Purification of space' *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 6 409-421

Sidaway J (1992a) *Geopolitics, geography and terrorism in the Middle East* Discussion Paper No.7, Department of Geography, Reading University

Sidaway J (1992b) 'Mozambique: destabilisation, state, society and space' *Political Geography* 11 239-258

Sidaway J and D Simon (1990) 'Spatial policies and uneven development in the Marxist-Leninist states of the Third World' in D Simon ed *Third World Regional Development: A Reappraisal* London, Routledge

Sidaway J and Simon D (1993) 'Geopolitical transition and state formation: the changing political geographies of Angola, Mozambique and Namibia' *Journal of Southern African Studies* 19 6-28

Silva P (1989) 'Democratization and foreign policy: the cases of Argentina and Brasil' in B Galjart and P Silva eds *Democratization and the State in the Southern Cone* Amsterdam, CEDLA

Silverstein B and C Flamenbaum C (1989) 'Biases in the perception and cognition of the actions of enemies' *Journal of Social Issues* 45 51-72

Slater D (1992) 'Theories of development and politics of the post-modern: exploring a border zone' *Development and Change* 23 283-319

Slater D (1993) 'The geopolitical imagination and the enframing of development theory' *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* (Forthcoming)

Slatta R (1983) *Gauchos and the Vanishing Frontier* Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press

Slatta R (1989) "'Civilisation" battles against "barbarism": Argentine frontier strategies 1516-1880' *Revista InterAmericana de Bibliografia* XXXIX 177-194

Sloan G (1988) *Geopolitics in US Strategic Policy 1890-1987* Brighton, Harvester Press

Smith N (1984) 'Isaiah Bowman: political geography and geopolitics' *Political Geography Quarterly* 3 69-76

Smith N (1992) 'History and the philosophy of geography: real wars, theory wars' *Progress in Human Geography* 16 257-271

Smith S (1986) 'Theories of foreign policy: an historical overview' *Review of International Studies* 12 13-29

Smith S (1991) 'Foreign policy analysis and the study of British foreign policy' in L Freedman and M Clarke eds *Britain in the World* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press

Smith S and M Clarke eds (1985) *Foreign Policy Implementation* London, Allen Unwin

Smith W ed (1991) *Towards Resolution? The Falklands/Malvinas Dispute* Boulder, Lynne Rienner

Soja E (1985) 'The spatiality of social life: towards a transformative retheorisation' in Derek Gregory and J Urry eds *Social Relations and Spatial Structures* London, Macmillan

Soja E (1989) *Postmodern Geographies* London, Verso

Sola J (1987) 'Argentina el la Antartida: hacia un futuro mejor' *Revista Militar* 716 5-10

Solberg C (1970) *Immigration and Nationalism: Argentina and Chile 1890-1914* Austin, University of Texas Press

Soler R (1968) *El Postivismo Argentino* Buenos Aires, Paidos

Solomon J (1988) *Discourse and Reference in the Nuclear Age* Norman, University of Oklahoma Press

Song Y (1988) 'The British 150 mile fishery conservation and management zone around the Falklands (Malvinas) Islands' *Political Geography Quarterly* 7 183-196

Sontag S (1978) *Illness as Metaphor* London, Penguin

Sosa A (1989) 'El Atlantico Sur: OTAS o zona de paz?' *Geosur* 113/114 36-42

Spalding H (1972) 'Education in Argentina 1890-1914' *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 3 31-61

Speed K (1982) *Sea Change: The Battle for the Falkland Islands and the Future of Britain's Navy* London, Bloomsbury

Spegele R (1992) 'Richard Ashley's discourse for international relations' *Millennium* 21 147-182

- Spence J (1970) *The Strategic Importance of Southern Africa* London, Royal Institute for International Affairs
- Spencer D (1988) 'A short history of geopolitics' *Journal of Geography* 87 42-48
- Spykman N (1942) *American Strategy in World Politics* New York, Harcourt and Brace
- Spykman N (1944) *The Geography of Peace* New York, Harcourt and Brace
- Stanworth P and A Giddens eds (1974) *Elites and Power in British Society* Cambridge, University Press
- Stedman-Jones G (1973) 'The history of US imperialism' in A Giddens and J Turner eds *Social Theory Today* Oxford, Blackwell
- Steele G (1982) 'Warnings from the South Atlantic' *Orbis* 26 573-578
- Steiner Z (1987) 'Decision making in American and British foreign policy' *Review of International Studies* 13 1-18
- Stepan N (1982) *The Idea of Race in Science: Great Britain 1800-1960* London, Hamden
- Stewart W and W Fench (1940) 'The influence of Horace Mann on the educational ideas of Domingo Faustino Sarmiento' *Hispanic American Research Review* 20 12-31
- Stone J (1988) 'Imperialism, colonialism and cartography' *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 13 57-64
- Storni S (1916) *Intereses Argentinos en Mar* Buenos Aires, Centro Naval (Instituto de Publicaciones Navales)
- Stratton J (1989) 'Deconstructing the territory' *Cultural Studies* 3 38-57
- Strausz-Hope R (1943) 'Its smart to be geopolitical' *Saturday Review of Literature* 6 4-5 and 20-21

- Sullivan W (1961) *Assault on the Unknown: The International Geophysical Year* New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company
- Swyngedouw E (1989) 'The heart of the place: the resurrection of locality in an age of hyperspace' *Geografiska Annaler* 71B 31-42
- Sylvan D and S Majeski (1987) 'Intervention and neutralisation: the 1961 decisions in Vietnam and Laos' Paper presented to the Annual Conference of the International Studies Association Washington DC 14-18 April 1987
- Sylvan D and S Majeski (1992) 'Rhetorics of place characteristics in high level US foreign policy making' Paper presented to the Annual Conference of the International Studies Association Atlanta 1-4 April 1992
- Sylvester C (1987) 'Some dangers in merging feminist and peace projects' *Alternatives* 12 493-509
- Sylvester C (1989) '*Feminist postmodernism, nuclear strategy and international violence*' Paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Meeting, London March 1989
- Sylvester C (1992) 'Feminists and realists views on autonomy and obligation in international relations' in V Spike Peterson ed *Gendered States* Lynne Rienner, Boulder
- Symmonds-Symonolewicz K (1985) 'The concept of nationhood: toward a theoretical clarification' *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* 12 215-222
- Szuchman M (1990) 'Childhood education and politics in nineteenth century Argentina: the case of Buenos Aires' *Hispanic American Historical Review* 70 109-138
- Tambs L (1965) 'Geopolitical factors in Latin America' in N Bailey ed *Latin America: Politics, Economics and Hemispheric Security* New York, Praeger
- Tambs L (1979) 'The changing geopolitical balance of South America' *Journal of Social and Political Studies* 4 17-35
- Tapson A (1962) 'Indian warfare on the pampa during the colonial period' *Hispanic American Historical Review* 42 1-35

Taussig M (1990) 'Violence and resistance in the Americas: The legacy of conquest' *Journal of Historical Sociology* 3 209-224

Taylor C (1984) 'Foucault on freedom and truth' *Political Theory* 4 152-183

Taylor C (1989) *Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press

Taylor E (1948) 'Geography in war and peace' *Geographical Review* 35 132-141

Taylor G (1957) 'Geopolitics and geopacifics' in G Taylor ed *Geography in the Twentieth Century* London, Methuen

Taylor Paul (1992) *War and the Media* Manchester, Manchester University Press

Taylor P J (1985) 'The value of a geographical perspective' in R Johnston ed *The Future of Geography* London, Methuen

Taylor P J (1989a) *Political Geography: World-Economy, Nation-State and Locality* London, Longman (Second Edition)

Taylor P J (1989b) 'Britain's changing role in the world-economy' in J Mohan ed *The Political Geography of Contemporary Britain* London, Macmillan

Taylor P J (1990) *Britain and the Cold War: 1945 as Geopolitical Transition* London, Pinter Publishers

Taylor P J (1991a) 'A distorted world of knowledge' *Journal of Geography in Higher Education* 15 85-90

Taylor P J (1991b) 'The English and their Englishness: a curiously mysterious, elusive and little understood people' *Scottish Geographical Magazine* 3 146-161

Taylor P J (1991c) 'The crisis of the movements: the enabling state as quisling' *Antipode* 23 214-228

Taylor P J (1991d) '*Contra political geography*' Paper presented to Institute of British Geographers' Conference, Sheffield

Taylor P J (1991e) 'If Cold War is the problem, is hot peace the solution?' in N Kliot and S Waterman eds *Political Geography of Peace and Violence* London, Belhaven Press

Taylor P J (1992a) 'The tribulations of transition' *Professional Geographer* 44 10-13

Taylor P J (1992b) 'Nationalism, internationalism and a 'socialist geopolitics' *Antipode* 24 327-336

Taylor P J (1992c) 'A theory and practice of regions: the case of Europe' *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 9 183-195

Taylor P J (1993a) 'Contra political geography' *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie* 84 81-90

Taylor P J (1993b) 'Geopolitical world orders' in P J Taylor ed *Political Geography of the Twentieth Century* London, Belhaven Press

Tedin D (1907) 'La geografica Argentina y a la luz de la historia y de la economica politica' *Revista de Derecho, Historia y Letras* XXVI 534-542

Thermaenius E (1938) 'Geopolitics and political geography' *Baltic and Scandanavian Countries* 4 165-177

Theweleit K (1987) *Male Fantasies* Volume 1 Cambridge, Polity Press

Theweleit K (1989) *Male Fantasies* Volume 2 Cambridge, Polity Press

Thompson J (1990) *Ideology and Modern Culture* Cambridge, Polity Press

Thrift N (1985) 'Flies and germs: a geography of knowledge' in D Gregory and J Urry eds *Spatial Structures and Social Processes* London, Macmillan

Thrift N (1992) 'Muddling through: world orders and globalisation' *Professional Geographer* 44 3-7

- Thrift N and A Leyshon (1993) *Making Money* London, Routledge
- Timmerman J (1981) *Prisoner Without a Name, Cell Without a Number* New York, Vintage Books
- Todorov T (1984) *The Conquest of America* New York, Harper and Row
- Train H (1982) 'An analysis of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands Campaign' *Naval War College Review* XLI 33-50
- Treichler P (1987) 'Aids, homophobia and biomedical discourse' *Cultural Studies* 1 263-305
- Tremayne P (1977) 'The Falkland Islands' in *Brassey's Yearbook* London, International Institute for Strategic Studies
- Trilly C ed (1975) *The Formation of Nation-States in Western Europe* Princeton, Princeton University Press
- Trinquier R (1954) *Modern Warfare: A French View of CounterInsurgency* New York, Praeger
- Troll C (1949) 'Geographical science in Germany during the period 1933-1945' *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 39 99-137
- Tulchin J (1987) 'The Malvinas War of 1982: an inevitable conflict that should never have occurred' *Latin American Research Review* 22 123-142
- Turner F (1983) 'The aftermath of defeat in Argentina' *Current History* February 58-87
- Ullman J (1984) 'La situacion estrategica e importancia del Atlantico Sur' *Revista de Publicaciones Navales* 631 671-682
- United States Government Printing Office: *Department of State Bulletin* 1982 and 1983 (Volumes 82 and 83) Washington DC
- Valdes J (1989) *National Security: The Dual State and The Rule of Exception* Rotterdam, University of Erasmus Press

- Verrier A (1983) *Through the Looking Glass* London, Jonathan Cape
- Villegas O (1969) *Políticas y Estrategias para el Desarrollo y la Seguridad Nacional* Buenos Aires, Editorial Pleamar
- Villegas O (1982) 'El conflicto Anglo-Argentino' *Geosur* 35 5-8
- Virilio P (1986) *Speed and Politics* New York, Semiotexte
- Virilio P (1987) 'The overexposed city' *Zone* 1/2 16-22
- Virilio P (1989) *War and Cinema* London, Verso
- Vital D (1968) *The Making of British Foreign Policy* London, George Allen and Unwin
- Vitkovskiy O (1981) 'Political geography and geopolitics: a recurrence of American geopolitics' *Soviet Geography* 22 586-593
- Vogel H (1987) *Elements of Nation Building in Argentina: Buenos Aires 1810-1828* Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Florida Gainesville
- Vogel H (1991) 'New citizens for a new nation: naturalisation in early independent Argentina' *Hispanic American Research Review* 71 107-131
- Waldermann P (1990) 'Beagle conflict and the Falklands War' *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 31 185-186
- Walker R ed (1984) *Culture, Ideology and World Order* New York, Mentor
- Walker R (1986) 'Culture, discourse and insecurity' *Alternatives* 11 485-504
- Walker R (1987) 'Realism, change and international political theory' *International Studies Quarterly* 31 65-86
- Walker R (1988) *One World, Many Worlds: Struggles for a Just World Peace* Boulder, Lynne Rienner

Walker R (1990) 'Security, sovereignty and the challenge of world politics' *Alternatives* 15 3-27

Walker R (1991) 'On the spatial-temporal conditions of a democratic practice' *Alternatives* 16 243-262

Walker R (1992) 'Gender and critique in the theory of international relations' in V Spike Peterson ed *Gendered States* Boulder, Lynne Rienner

Walker R (1993) *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory* Cambridge, University Press

Wall P ed (1977) *The Southern Oceans and the Security of the Free World* London, Stacey International

Wallace W (1991) 'Foreign policy and national identity in the United Kingdom' *International Affairs* 67 65-80

Wallerstein I (1974) *The Modern System* New York, Academic Press

Wallerstein I (1979) *The Capitalist World-Economy* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press

Walter J (1976) *La Conquista del Desierto* Buenos Aires, Circulo Militar

Waltz K (1959) *Man, the State and War* New York, Columbia University Press

Waltz K (1967) *Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics* London, Longmans

Waltz K (1978) *Theory of International Relations* Reading Ma., Addison-Wesley

Watts M (1991) 'Mapping meaning, denoting difference, imagining identity: Dialectical images and postmodern geographies' *Geografiska Annaler* 73B 7-16

Watts M (1993) 'Development 1: power, knowledge, discursive practice' *Progress in Human Geography* 17 257-272

- Weaver R (1989) 'The changing world of think tanks' *Political Science and Politics* 22 563-578
- Weber C (1992a) 'Reconsidering statehood: examining the sovereignty/intervention boundary' *Review of International Studies* 18 199-216
- Weber C (1992b) '*Something's missing: Male hysteria and the US invasion of Panama*' Unpublished Manuscript
- Weber C (1993) '*Shoring up a sea of signs: How the Caribbean Basin Initiative framed the US invasion of Grenada*' Paper Presented to the Annual Conference of the Association of American Geographers, Atlanta April 1993
- Weigert H (1942) *Generals and Geographers* New York, Oxford University Press
- Weigert H ed (1949) *New Compass of the World* London, George Harrap
- Whigham T (1988) 'Cattle raising in the Argentine North East' *Journal of Latin American Studies* 20 313-335
- Whitaker A (1976) *Argentina's Upheaval* London, Atlantic Press
- White H (1978) *Tropics of Discourse* Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press
- White H (1987) *The Content of the Form* Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press
- White J (1986) *The Southern Cone and the Antarctic: Strategies for the 1990s* Unpublished MA Thesis, University of Florida, Gainesville
- White S (1986) 'Foucault's challenge to critical theory' *American Political Science Review* 80 419-432
- White S (1988) 'Poststructuralism and political reflection' *Political Theory* 16 186-208
- White S (1991) *Political Theory and Postmodernism* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
- Whittlesey D (1942) *German Strategy of World Conquest* New York, Farrar and Rinehart

- Whitworth S (1989) 'Gender in the Inter-Paradigm debate' *Millennium* 18 265-272
- Wiarda H (1981) 'The ethnocentrism of the social sciences: implications for research and policy' *Review of Politics* 43 163-197
- Williams G (1965) *The Desert and the Dream: A Study of Welsh Colonisation in Chubut 1865-1915* Cardiff, University of Wales Press
- Williams G (1979) 'Welsh settlers and native Americans in Patagonia' *Journal of Latin American Studies* 11 41-66
- Williams G (1992) 'Neither Welsh nor Argentine: the Welsh in Patagonia' in A Hennessy and J King eds *The Land That England Lost* London, British Academic Press
- Windsor P (1982) 'Dimensions diplomatiques de la crise des Falkland' *Politique Etrangere* 47 685-700
- Windsor P (1987) 'Introduction to the Special Issue' *Millennium* 16 185-189
- Wolfenson G (1987) 'Argentina: democracy and international relations' *Political Science Review* 20 679-684
- Wood D (1990) *Philosophy at the Limit* London, Unwin Hyman
- Wusten van der H and T Nierop (1990) 'Functions, roles and form in international politics' *Political Geography Quarterly* 9 213-231
- Wusten van der H and J O'Loughlin (1986) 'Claiming new territory for a stable peace: how geography can contribute' *Professional Geographer* 38 18-28
- Wynia G (1986) *Argentina: Illusions and Realities* New York, Holmes and Meier
- Wyk Van K and M Below (1988) 'The debate on South Africa's minerals revisited' *Comparative Strategy* 7 159-182
- Young R ed (1981) *Untying the Text* London, Routledge Keagan and Paul

Young R (1990) *White Mythologies* London, Routledge

Zeballos E (1916) 'La decada de oro de la mentalidad Argentina' *RDHL, Tomo IV*
November 537-550

Zimmerman W (1945) 'The land policy of Argentina, with particular reference to the
conquest of the southern pampas' *Hispanic American Historical Review* 25 3-26

Zizek S (1990) 'Eastern Europe's Republic of Gilead' *New Left Review* 183 50-62