
Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2020-

2020

Improving Foreign Militaries – The Effects of U.S. Military Aid in the Form of International Military Education and Training Programs

Sandor Fabian
University of Central Florida

Find similar works at: <https://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd2020>
University of Central Florida Libraries <http://library.ucf.edu>

This Doctoral Dissertation (Open Access) is brought to you for free and open access by STARS. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2020- by an authorized administrator of STARS. For more information, please contact STARS@ucf.edu.

STARS Citation

Fabian, Sandor, "Improving Foreign Militaries – The Effects of U.S. Military Aid in the Form of International Military Education and Training Programs" (2020). *Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2020-*. 210.
<https://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd2020/210>

IMPROVING FOREIGN MILITARIES – THE EFFECTS OF U.S. MILITARY AID IN
THE FORM OF INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING
PROGRAMS

by

SANDOR FABIAN

MSc. U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, 2012

B.A. Miklos Zrinyi National Defense University, Hungary, 2001

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in the School of Politics, Security, and International Affairs
in the College of Sciences
at the University of Central Florida
Orlando, Florida

Summer Term
2020

Major Professor(s): Andrew Boutton

© 2020 Sandor Fabian

ABSTRACT

Great powers have often sought to achieve their strategic goals through the allocation of military aid. The United States is no exception, as it has frequently used military aid to influence the policies and military capacity of its allies and partners. However, our understanding of the effects of US military aid on the conflict behavior of recipient states—and especially the mechanisms underlying these effects—remains poorly understood. The results of previous studies of U.S. military aid are often contradictory, and are mostly based on over-aggregated, country-level data. In this dissertation, I argue that examining the individual-level effects will give us a better understanding of the mechanisms underlying country-level associations between US military aid and recipient behavior. I examine three research questions related to the manner in which military aid influences conflict in recipient countries. First, I explore the individual effects of U.S. IMET using semi-structured in-depth interviews and an original survey of Hungarian military officers and non-commissioned officers. This paper investigates the transmission of professional values and “democratic” norms to individual participants through the U.S. IMET programs. Second, I investigate the effects of U.S. IMET participation on civil conflict duration. I argue that government forces with more robust U.S. IMET participation will accumulate more and better military human capital, which incentivize rebels to hide and minimize their operations leading to a prolonged civil conflict. Finally, while exploring recipient states international conflict behavior I theorize that American educated and trained foreign military personnel return home with a better understanding about the role of the military as an instrument of national power, civil-military relations, the value of cooperation and the cost of war. I argue that these military personnel advise their political masters against the use of military force during international disputes leading to a decreased probability of MID initiation. I find support for each of the

main arguments presented in the dissertation. Overall, this dissertation represents one of the first attempts to move beyond country-level data and explore the micro-foundations of US military assistance.

This dissertation is dedicated to my wife, Beatrix, and my daughter, Bibor. Thank you both for always believing in me and supporting my dreams no matter what. Additionally, I dedicate this dissertation to my parents, Sandor and Julianna and my sister Nikolett. Thank you for raising me the way you did and never doubting any of my choices. To my sister I could have never wished for a better sibling.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

When after serving 24 years in the Hungarian military I decided to change my career to academia I was sure that the most difficult part of a PhD program will be the completion of my dissertation, but I was wrong. Appropriately acknowledging all those who supported me during this journey turned out to be even more difficult. Although many people might think that completing a PhD is very much an individual struggle I must say to them that you are as wrong as I was in my initial assessment. It is very much a collaborative and cooperative journey among many people, which would require me to express my greatest appreciation to so many of them, however the length of a dissertation would not be enough for that. For this reason, I am only acknowledging here those who made the most impact on this dissertation and on my professional development as a scholar.

First, my deepest appreciation goes to my dissertation chair, Dr. Andrew Boutton. His insights, guidance, and recommendations as well as his endless support to accommodate my extracurricular activities were all instrumental to the successful completion of this project. I am extremely grateful for all his support and mentorship. I am also in debt to the other members of my committee. The relentless work ethic, unlimited support, useful and timely feedback and professional guidance of Dr. Konstantin Ash, Dr. Nikola Mirilovic, Dr. Jonathan Powell, and Dr. Keenan Yoho very much improved the quality of this dissertation and helped me to improve into a formidable researcher. These professors served as professional examples challenging me day after day to do my best and try to become such diligent scholars as they are. In case of Dr. Yoho besides all of his professional direction and guidance I am also deeply grateful for all the kindness and support that his wife Sabrina and children Genevieve and Spencer provided to my family. Their amazing friendship and

support towards me, my wife and my daughter enabled me to better focus on my studies and my research.

Outside of my committee, I owe many thanks to several additional people. Dr. Thomas Dolan spent numerous hours listening and answering to my many questions. He provided quality guidance during the early stages of my doctoral studies and helped me navigating through the program and getting more familiar with the American academic life in general. Dr. Kerstin Hamann`s professional development course gave me invaluable skills and resources to improve both as a teacher and a researcher. I am also grateful all the professors with whom I had the privilege to work with as a graduate teaching assistant. I did not only become familiar with their courses, but through these interactions I learned a lot about teaching. Besides the faculty members of the program I must also say thank you to the members of the staff for their support and hard work. I am especially thankful to Ms. Kyrie Ottaviani who helped me meeting all administrative requirements of the program. Kyrie spent countless hours advising me on forms, deadlines and opportunities helping me to easily fulfil all the administrative requirements associated with the program.

Additionally, I could not have completed this program without my fellow PhD students in my cohort. From my classmates, Doreen Horschig deserves my greatest gratitude. I believe we became real good friends over the years and the challenges we endured together. Her intellect and work ethic inspired me all the time while her kindness and unconditional support helped me through some difficult phases of the program. Also, her friendship with my wife and daughter delighted my private life helping me achieve professional success much easier. I am also grateful to my other peers Tutku Ayhan, Davide Dell`isola, Jennifer Hudson, Michael Yekple, and Santos Sapkota for giving me the opportunity to get to know them and share so many memorable moments with them. Their friendship, dedication, critical comments, and

suggestions over the three years of this PhD program significantly contributed to the successful completion of this dissertation.

I could have never dreamed about completing this program without the support of Mr. Douglas Overdeer and LEIDOS. Doug gave me an opportunity to work for his team at LEIDOS as part of my curriculum related practical training during the second and third years of the program. Besides giving me peace of mind through a steady income and helping me to improve my research and teaching skills (and so many others) in a multinational environment Doug also became a close friend and mentor. I cannot find the words to express how much his support meant and continues meaning to me and my family. I will be in his debt forever. Additionally, although I am deeply grateful for all my colleagues at LEIDOS for their ongoing and unconditional support I must extend special recognition to Mr. Clinton Mead and Mr. John Valledor. Clint and John were my immediate supervisors, but beyond that my great friends and professional mentors. Their personal insights, professional guidance and mentorship over the years of my internship helped me becoming better both personally and professionally. John`s reminders to avoid becoming a “one-trick-pony” and strive for excellence stuck in my mind forever.

Great accomplishments cannot be done without the support of the family. Words cannot express my appreciation for my family`s unwavering love and support throughout this journey. To my sister, Nikolett. I could not wish for a better sister. Although we live ten thousand miles apart you have always been there for me without a question or doubt. You have been supporting me in all my adventures and always encouraged me when I doubted myself.

To my parents, Julianna, and Sandor. I wish everyone in the world had my parents. You have been unconditionally loving and supporting me since I was born. It did not matter what crazy ideas I came up with over the years you have always supported and encouraged me. You

have had only one question for me throughout all these years: “How can we support you?” I admire and love you to the most possible extent. You deserve way more thanks than I will ever be able to give, I love you both very much.

To my daughter Bibor. You have no idea how you changed my life to the better when you arrived at our family nine years ago. Having you in my life makes me smile every day and encourages me to try to be a better person in every minute of my life. Although you do not understand it yet, but you played a crucial role in the completion of this dissertation through your smiles and encouraging childish words. I love you very much.

Finally, to my wife, Beatrix. Simply, there are no words to express my love and appreciation to you. You have no idea what you mean to me and I will never be able to express it. You have been my lighthouse for over 22 years. I have traveled the world and done many things (some good and some bad), but you have always stood by me without a single doubt. There is no other woman and wife like you. It is impossible to describe and with that to appreciate how much you have sacrificed over the years to support me. I am extremely grateful and happy that you are part of my life. I am endless thankful for everything. I promise that I will always adore you; I will embrace you, and I will love you to the most possible extent as long as I can.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES	xiii
LIST OF TABLES	xiv
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER TWO: U.S. IMET PROGRAMS AND REVIEW OF PREVIOUS LITERATURE	7
CHAPTER THREE - IMPROVING FOREIGN MILITARIES – THE EFFECTS OF THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING PROGRAMS ON PARTICIPATING INDIVIDUALS	19
Abstract	19
Introduction	20
International Norms and U.S. IMET	22
Theoretical Argument	28
Research design.....	33
Dependent and Independent Variables.....	40
Control Variables	41
Estimation Method	42
Results and Discussion.....	43
Diffusion of Norms Within National Militaries.....	52
Limitations and Potential Criticism of the Study	55
Conclusion.....	58
References	61
CHAPTER FOUR: THE SMARTER THE SOLDIERS, THE LONGER THE CIVIL WARS – U.S. IMET PARTICIPATION AND CIVIL CONFLICT DURATION.....	65
Abstract	65
Introduction	65
Previous Research on Civil War Duration	68
Measures of State Military Capacity in Previous Literature	71
Improved Military Human Capital due to U.S. IMET Participation.....	73
Improved Military Human Capital and Civil Conflict Duration.....	75
Data Sources and Variables.....	77
Control Variables	78
Estimation Techniques	80
Results and Discussion.....	81

Interaction Between U.S. IMET Participation and Mechanization Levels	91
Case Illustrations – Uganda, India, and El Salvador.....	94
Potential Criticism.....	101
Conclusion and Implications.....	103
References	106
CHAPTER FIVE: TRAINING FOR PEACE – U.S. IMET AND MID INITIATION, 1976-2007.....	111
Abstract	111
Introduction	112
Theories of MID Initiation	114
Theory of U.S. IMET and MID Initiation.....	118
Research Design.....	122
Results and Discussion.....	126
Potential Criticisms and Alternative Explanations.....	135
Conclusion.....	138
References	141
CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION	145
APPENDIX A: SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE TO CHAPTER THREE.....	150
APPENDIX B: SURVEY CODEBOOK TO CHAPTER THREE	156
APPENDIX C: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS TO CHAPTER THREE	160
APPENDIX D: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES TO CHAPTER THREE	162
APPENDIX E: SUMMARY STATISTICS TO CHAPTER THREE.....	164
APPENDIX F: MILITARY SERVICE SPECIFIC RESULTS TO CHAPTER THREE	166
APPENDIX G: PROPENSITY SCORE MATCHING EVALUATION TO CHAPTER THREE.....	168
APPENDIX H: UCF IRB APPROVAL FOR SURVEY EXECUTION TO CHAPTER THREE.....	171
APPENDIX I: UCF IRB APPROVAL FOR INTERVIEW EXECUTION TO CHAPTER THREE.....	174
APPENDIX J: HUNGARIAN APPROVAL FOR SURVEY AND INTERVIEW EXECUTION TO CHAPTER THREE	176
APPENDIX K: SUMMARY STATISTICS TO CHAPTER FOUR.....	178
APPENDIX L: ADDITIONAL TESTS TO CHAPTER FOUR	180
APPENDIX M: ADDITIONAL TESTS TO CHAPTER FOUR	183
APPENDIX N: ADDITIONAL TESTS TO CHAPTER FOUR.....	186

APPENDIX O: ADDITIONAL TESTS TO CHAPTER FOUR.....	188
APPENDIX P: SUMMARY STATISTICS TO CHAPTER FIVE.....	191
APPENDIX R: ADDITIONAL TESTS TO CHAPTER FIVE.....	193
APPENDIX S: LIST OF MID INITIATOR COUNTRIES TO CHAPTER FIVE.....	196

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. U.S. Military Aid Funding Trends, FY 2006 – FY 2017	8
Figure 2. Number of Students Trained Compared to U.S. IMET Funding Appropriated, Fiscal Years 2000 and 2010	11
Figure 3. U.S. IMET funding appropriated, by Region, for Fiscal Years 2000 and 2010	12
Figure 4. Actual Survey Questions for the Dependent Variables	41
Figure 5. Average Effects of U.S. IMET participation on Democratic Values, Human Rights and Military Intervention.....	47
Figure 6. U.S. IMET participation and the Mechanization Variables	93
Figure 7. 5-year Sum of U.S. IMET participants, 1975-1997.....	97
Figure 8. The effects of U.S. IMET participation on MID Escalation, 1976-2007.....	134
Figure 9. IMET recipient countries from 1976 to 2007.....	136
Figure 10. Margins plot of interaction between Regime Type and U.S. IMET support, MID Initiation, 1976-2007	138

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Hungarian U.S. IMET graduates and Annual U.S. IMET Budget Dedicated to Hungary Per Fiscal Year	36
Table 2. The Effects of U.S. IMET participation on individual attitudes towards democratic values, human rights, and civil control	44
Table 3. Effects of U.S. IMET Participation, Models with Propensity Score Matching and Nearest Neighbor Matching	46
Table 4. The Effects of U.S. IMET type, social interaction and professional identity sharing on attitudes towards democratic values, human rights, and civil control	49
Table 5. Norm Diffusion Within National Militaries	53
Table 6. U.S. IMET Graduates` Effects on Individuals, Doctrine and Organization	55
Table 7. Accelerated failure time hazard analysis of the duration of civil conflicts, 1976-2003.....	82
Table 8. Logit Analysis of Civil War Termination, 1976-2003	85
Table 9. Logit Analysis of Civil War Types, 1976-2003	88
Table 10. List of U.S. IMET Courses Received by ESAF, 1988-1993	98
Table 11. Logit Analysis of Insurgency Occurrence, 1976-2003	102
Table 12. Frequency of MID Initiator variable.....	123
Table 13. Frequency of Hostility Level variable	124
Table 14. U.S. IMET participation and MID initiation, 1976 - 2007.....	127
Table 15. U.S. IMET participation and MID escalation, 1976 - 2007.....	132
Table 16. List of Interviewees	163
Table 17. Summary Statistics.....	165
Table 18. Military Service Specific Results.....	167
Table 19. Summary Statistics.....	179
Table 20. Accelerated failure time hazard analysis of the duration of civil conflicts, 1976-2003.....	181
Table 21. Logit Analysis of Civil War Termination, 1976-2003	184
Table 22. Logit Analysis of Civil War Types, 1976-2003.....	187
Table 23. Logit Analysis of Insurgency Occurrence, 1976-2003	190
Table 24. Summary Statistics.....	192
Table 25. U.S. IMET and MID initiation, 1976-2007	194
Table 26. List of MID Initiator Countries, 1976-2007	197

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Different forms of military aid have been used by donors to influence recipients` behavior since the beginnings of human history. The Greeks, the Romans, the Ottomans, and different European empires all employed different forms of military aid to achieve their political goals. (Mott, 1999). The United States is not an exception since it has been using different military aid programs to augment its military strategy and achieve its foreign policy goals since World War II. Mott (1999) argues that the U.S. military aid programs are traditionally “discrete, coherent, type or mode of international relations, not simply an obsolescent policy tool” (Mott 1999: xiv) and with that these programs have been and are central instruments in American military strategy and foreign policy.

U.S. military aid programs consist of arms and equipment transfers as well as foreign military education and training programs (Mott, 1999). This dissertation focuses on the latter version of U.S. military aid and investigates how these programs affect participating individuals and through them the recipient states` behavior both domestically and internationally. The scope of this project is limited to investigating the effects of only one of the fourteen¹ U.S. foreign military education and training efforts, the International Military Education and Training programs (hereafter, U.S. IMET).

¹ The U.S. foreign military education and training programs include the Foreign military sales, Foreign military financing, International military education and training, International narcotics and law enforcement, Global peace operations initiative, regional centers for security studies, Drug interdiction and counter-drug activities, Mine action programs, Disaster response, Regional defense combating terrorism fellowship program, Section 2282 Global train and equip, Service-sponsored activities, Foreign assistance act, Department of homeland security/U.S. Coast guard activities. I specifically explore the effects of U.S. IMET programs and collect data on these programs because as Savage and Caverley (2017) argue these programs are “the most transparent and receives the largest amount of scrutiny” (Savage and Caverley, 2017:548) meaning that they present the strongest test to my theory. Based on these characteristics I suggest that the relationship I find between the U.S. IMET programs and the participating individuals are likely to be the same for all other U.S. foreign military education and training programs as well.

Better understanding the effects of the U.S. IMET programs is important for several reasons. First, these programs have been the subject of several Congressional investigations since their establishment in 1976, because both individual graduates of these programs and recipient states have demonstrated quite a variance in their behavior which led to the questioning of the effectiveness of these programs. This still seems to be an ongoing issue since the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act codifies the requirement for the U.S. Department of Defense to evaluate the effectiveness of the different security assistance programs, including the U.S. IMET programs, however no such evaluation mechanism exists yet. Second, recent U.S. administrations have been giving a significant role in their national security strategies to activities through, by and with allied and partner militaries without a clearly established and effective feedback mechanism regarding the actual effects of the U.S. security assistance programs. Third, international relations literature investigating the potential effects of the U.S. IMET programs seem to leave some room for improvement and expansion due to challenges related to the availability of limited data, issues with research designs, limited theoretical contribution, weak empirical evidence, and contradictory results. Finally, collecting useful and coherent data that effectively demonstrates the value of the U.S. IMET programs has been a long-lasting challenge for researchers which presents an opportunity for major contribution.

Although this dissertation intends to address all of these issues its primary focus is policy relevance. The primary aim of this dissertation is to provide scientifically investigated and well-supported evaluation of the value and effectiveness of the U.S. IMET programs by answering the question how these programs affect the participating individuals and through them the recipient states` behavior. For this reason, rather than explaining the variation in a single phenomenon from different angles this project is connected through the independent variable. The dissertation answers the posed research question through the investigation of

three independent but interrelated sub-questions where all dependent variables are directly derived from the legislatures and policy documents codifying the goals of the U.S. IMET programs. Answering the three research questions provide evidence for policy makers whether the U.S. IMET programs are valuable and effectively fulfil their purposes. At the same time the project also offers an overarching theoretical framework by arguing that U.S. IMET participation improves the quality of the individual military personnel attending these programs and through them the recipient states` military human capital becomes better. This improvement in the quality of military human capital of the recipient states influences their international and domestic behavior.

The first paper investigates the individual level effects of the U.S. IMET programs and explores whether participation in these programs is associated with improvement in individual qualities. According to the 1978 and 1992 amendments to the 1976 International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act one of the main goals of the U.S. IMET programs is to transmit the U.S. military`s professional values and norms such as the respect of democratic values, human rights, and civil control to participating foreign military personnel and with that to improve their personal qualities. Although previous literature assumes that this transmission actually happens at the individual level only one of these studies offers a theory of norms transmission. Additionally, the literature does not seem to provide convincing empirical evidence demonstrating that the norm transmission actually happens. The first paper intends to address these issues by further improving the existing norms transmission theory and test the untested assumptions of prior literature. The study employs semi-structured, in-depth interviews and an original survey conducted in Hungary with 350 military respondents (140 U.S. IMET graduates and 210 Non-U.S. IMET graduates) to determine whether U.S. IMET participation is associated with an improvement in personal qualities. The results of the analysis of the responses demonstrate that the professional norms

and values of the U.S. military are indeed transmitted to participants and with that the military human capital of the recipient states improves. Additionally, the study provides initial evidence for further norm diffusion within the military as a whole.

The second study investigates how improved military human capital due to U.S. IMET participation affects recipient states' behavior during domestic conflicts. I theorize that participation in U.S. IMET programs improves the military human capital of the government forces. This improved military human capital makes the overall military more capable and effective which incentivizes rebels to disperse, hide and minimize their operations leading to a prolonged civil conflict. To test this argument, I use a new dataset that includes detailed information on insurgencies and U.S. IMET participation between 1976 and 2003. The results show that militaries with more U.S. IMET participation fights significantly longer civil conflicts. As further support to the theory I also find that more U.S. IMET participation corresponds with a higher probability of civil conflicts being fought in an irregular manner. To provide further support to the findings of the statistical analysis I illustrate the theoretical argument through a case study as well.

Finally, the third paper investigates the relationship between better military human capital due to U.S. IMET participation and the probability of recipient states international conflict behavior. The research question that is being explored in this paper is once again derived from the goals of the U.S. IMET programs related to the aim to improve regional stability and reduce the probability of interstate conflict. Investigating this question is also important because the potential effects of U.S. military aid in the form of foreign military education and training on states' international conflict behavior has never been investigated previously. In this paper I argue that military aid in the form of U.S. IMET acts differently than other forms of military aid and instead of increasing the probability of conflict initiation it rather restrains countries' from aggression. I argue that better military human capital due to

more U.S. IMET participation reduces the probability of the recipient states becoming an interstate dispute initiator because the American trained and educated military leaders advise their political masters against the offensive use of the military forces. I test this theory through the employment of several logistic regression models and find that the more U.S. IMET support a country receives the less likely it initiates interstate conflicts. Additionally, I find that more U.S. IMET participation is associated with decreased probability of escalating violence during ongoing conflicts. Besides providing support regarding the U.S. IMET programs effectiveness in reducing recipient states` aggression the findings also contribute to the ongoing debate about how U.S. military aid affects interstate conflict initiation.

Taken together, the results of this dissertation provide strong evidence that U.S. military aid in the form of U.S. IMET indeed fulfill the goals established by the U.S. Congress. The results show that military aid in the form of U.S. IMET improves the individual qualities of participating foreign military personnel and with that the military human capital of the recipient states. The improved military human capital affects the recipient states conflict behavior both domestically and internationally and with that supports the achievement of U.S. military strategy and foreign policy goals. Besides providing a direct feedback about the effectiveness of the U.S. IMET programs these findings might urge policy makers to consider paying more attention to this less tangible form of U.S. military aid and invest more efforts and resources to support the further improvement of these programs. In addition to the policy related benefits this dissertation makes significant contributions to the growing body of academic literature on the effects of U.S. military aid. First, the dissertation presents original, individual level data about the effects of the U.S. IMET programs. Next, the dissertation further develops the theory for international norm transmission at the individual level in a military setting and tests previously untested assumptions. Third, through the employment of a combination of qualitative exploration techniques and large-N statistical

analyses the dissertation further expands and improves previous literature by providing stronger empirical evidence in support of the findings of several prior studies. At the same time the dissertation presents novel insights on how U.S. military aid in the form of U.S. IMET programs affects the recipient states` domestic and international conflict behavior. Finally, through its findings the dissertation contributes to the wider international relations discussion about the effects of foreign aid as well.

CHAPTER TWO: U.S. IMET PROGRAMS AND REVIEW OF PREVIOUS LITERATURE

The first official U.S. military aid program started during World War II. with the Lend-Lease Act that authorized the transfer of American weapons, supplies and services to several countries² that were fighting against Nazi Germany (Mott, 1999). This program was terminated on 2 September 1945 after providing \$48.5 million in arms to 42 countries (Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Facts, 1967). The next major U.S. military aid program was initiated on 12 March 1947 when President Truman asked the U.S. Congress to authorize \$400 million worth of surplus arms to be transferred to Greece and Turkey, and in 1948 to China. The general framework for grant based foreign military education and training as an additional form of U.S. military aid was established in 1949 with the passing of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act.³

While during the next couple years the American military aid programs included both the transfer of surplus weapons from World War II⁴ and foreign military education and training programs the total value of U.S. military aid in the 1950s was still less than \$1 billion. However, with the developing communist threat and the need to contain the Soviet Union quickly raised the importance of military aid programs and their scope was also significantly extended. Till the mid-1970s the term military assistance was officially used to describe the military aid programs, which only referred to the transfer of “U.S. military weapons, equipment, and training to recipient governments” (Mott 1999:4). With the 1976 Congressional amendment of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 additional political and

² The Lend-Lease Act authorized military assistance for Great Britain and the British Commonwealth, Free France, the Soviet Union (after 1941) and China (after 1942).

³ This legislation is generally called the Military Assistance Program (hereafter, MAP), which allowed the U.S. government to provide military aid in the form of education and training to selected countries to help them defend themselves from aggression.

⁴ 4000 surplus Navy vessels were transferred to 60 countries during this time period (Mott, 2002).

economic aspects were added to these programs and a new term, security assistance⁵ was introduced. This same legislature also established a new framework for foreign military education and training in the form of International Military Education and Training Programs (hereafter, U.S. IMET). With the inclusion of political and economic aspects into military aid and with the reorganization of education and training efforts the U.S. military aid increased to an average \$12 billion per year by the end of the 1970s. The next decade saw an even more significant increase in these programs with a \$21 billion per year value. Although the end of the Cold War brought some serious reduction in U.S. military aid efforts the Global War on Terror that followed the events of 11 September 2001 once again has put a lot of emphasis on developing allied and partner countries` military capabilities through arms transfer and training. Although as Figure 1. demonstrates there has been significant fluctuation in the allocation of resources for the U.S. military aid programs, the overall average between fiscal year 2006 and fiscal year 2017 remained around \$20 billion annually which is very close to the Cold War years.




Figure 1. U.S. Military Aid Funding Trends, FY 2006 – FY 2017

⁵ From now on this study uses the term military aid and security assistance interchangeably. These terms contain all forms of military aid programs including weapons, equipment, training and education transfers and other political and economic activities.

Besides its significant annual dollar value over the last couple decades the better understanding the effects of U.S. military aid is important for several other reasons. First, recent U.S. administrations have been giving a significant role in their national security strategies to activities through, by and with allied and partner militaries, which includes significant military aid efforts. Second, since the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act requires the U.S. Department of Defense to evaluate the effectiveness of all U.S. security assistance programs the investigation of the effects of these programs carries an opportunity for significant policy relevant contribution. Third, international relations literature investigating the effects of these security assistance efforts demonstrate contradictory results. While some studies find positive relationship between U.S. military aid and the achievement of foreign policy goals, others argue that military aid in fact negatively affects U.S. strategic interest. Finally, the better understanding of military aid related considerations might also have some valuable contributions to the more general international relations discussion about the potential effects of foreign aid.

While the effects of U.S. military aid in the form of arms and equipment transfer have been studied extensively in international relations literature (Sylvan, 1976; Schrodt, 1983; Huth and Russett, 1984; Huth, 1988; Kinsella, 1994, 1995; Kinsella and Tillema, 1995; Kinsella and Tillema, 1995; Craft and Smaldone, 2002; Krause, 2004) much less attention has been given to explore the effects of the other type of U.S. military aid, foreign military education and training. This dissertation intends to contribute to the latter literature by focusing on improving our understanding of the effects of a specific version of the U.S. foreign military education and training programs, the International Military Education and Training programs.

Although there are fourteen programs providing military education and training for foreign military personnel the centerpiece of these efforts is the U.S. IMET programs. The

investigation focuses on these programs for several reasons. First, the author has personnel experience in these programs since he participated in three different U.S. IMET courses.⁶ Second, the most reliable and transparent data related to the U.S. foreign military education and training efforts is the U.S. IMET data. This is due to the ongoing Congressional interest in the effects of these programs.⁷ Third, all previous studies that have investigated the effects of U.S. foreign military education and training programs exclusively employed and analyzed U.S. IMET data. Finally, as Savage and Caverley (2017) argue due to U.S. IMET's size, budget and significance it is safe to assume that if one finds a relationship between U.S. IMET and the subject of the investigation than this same relationship is true for the entire U.S. foreign military education and training efforts.

While the U.S. Congress established the general framework for grant based foreign military education and training as early as 1949 with the Mutual Defense Assistance Act⁸ the U.S. IMET program was only born in 1976 when the 94th Congress passed the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act, which was an amendment for the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (Cope, 1995). Since its early days U.S. IMET has been overseen by the Department of State while most sub-elements are administered by the Department of Defense (Atkinson, 2010). From their beginnings the U.S. IMET programs have been seen as a fundamental instrument supporting broad national security goals through developing partner nations' military capabilities and promoting peace and stability both regionally and within the recipient states. Today the U.S. IMET programs provide education and training for foreign personnel in around 4,000 different courses both within the United States and

⁶ USMC Basic Officer School April 2004 – September 2004; USMC Infantry Officer School September 2004-December 2004; USMC Expeditionary Warfare School July 2005-May 2006.

⁷ Since its establishment in 1976 U.S. IMET programs have been a subject to numerous Congressional investigations due to their mixed empirical results.

⁸ This legislation is generally called the Military Assistance Program (hereafter, MAP), which allowed the U.S. government to provide military aid in the form of education and training to selected countries to help them defend themselves from aggression.

overseas. Although U.S. IMET focuses on Professional Military Education (PME) mostly conducted at higher level military educational institutions like the war and staff colleges it also includes short term practical training focused courses as well (Atkinson, 2010). The U.S. IMET programs do not seem to be a particularly expensive effort (especially when compared to the multi-billion-dollar arms and equipment transfers) since as Atkinson (2010) notes it only accounts for about 0.2 percent of the budget of the State Department. According to Savage and Caverley (2017) in Fiscal Year 2015 the program only cost \$876.5 million while about 76,400 students participated in it from 154 countries (Savage and Caverley, 2017).

Figure 2. shows the number of students trained in U.S. IMET compared to funding appropriated between 2000 and 2010.




Figure 2. Number of Students Trained Compared to U.S. IMET Funding Appropriated, Fiscal Years 2000 and 2010⁹

Although traditionally European and Eurasian countries have been receiving the majority of U.S. IMET support all other regions have seen a continuous increase in U.S.

⁹ Source: State Congressional Budget Justification.

IMET funding during recent years. Figure 3. demonstrates the changes in U.S. IMET funding per region between fiscal year 2000 and 2010.




Figure 3. U.S. IMET funding appropriated, by Region, for Fiscal Years 2000 and 2010¹⁰

The goals of the U.S. IMET program have evolved over time. When the 94th Congress established the original framework for U.S. IMET its primary goals were to avoid the controversies associated with the original Military Assistance Program (hereafter, MAP) and to support countries that could not afford to buy U.S. military education and training through the Foreign Military Sales (hereafter, FMS) Act (Cope, 1995). Congress assigned two goals to the U.S. IMET program in the 1976 International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act:

1. to encourage effective mutually beneficial relations and increased understanding between the United States and foreign countries in furtherance of goals of international peace and security.
2. to improve the ability of participating foreign countries to utilize their resources, including defense articles and defense services obtained from the United States, with maximum effectiveness, thereby contributing to greater self-reliance by such countries (Cope, 1995: 11).

¹⁰ Source: GAO analysis of Congressional Budget Justifications.

In 1978 the program goals were extended to improve the awareness of U.S. IMET participants about issues related to universal human rights (Goodman, 1990; Allen, 1982). Further legislations in 1991 authorized the expansion of the program leading to the creation of Expanded U.S. IMET (hereafter, E-U.S. IMET) that provides education and training for foreign non-military personnel to accommodate the defense related interest of foreign non-defense ministries and nongovernmental organizations. E-U.S. IMET courses specifically focus on:

1. Responsible defense resource management.
2. Greater respect for and grasp of democracy and civilian rule of law, including the principle of civilian control of the military.
3. Military justice systems in a democracy.
4. Better understanding of internationally recognized human rights (Cope, 1995: 12).

More recent policy documents as the Department of State and the Department of Defense Foreign Military Training Joint Report, Fiscal Year 2012 and 2013 summarizes the current official goals of the U.S. IMET program as to:

1. Further the goal of regional stability through effective, mutually beneficial military-to-military relations that culminate in increased understanding and defense cooperation between the United States and foreign countries.
2. Provide training that augments the capabilities of participant nations' military forces to support combined operations and interoperability with U.S. forces; and
3. Increase the ability of foreign military and civilian personnel to instill and maintain democratic values and protect internationally recognized human rights in their own government and military (U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Department of State, 2012/13).

The understanding of the U.S. IMET goals and their evolution are important because the few previous studies derived their research questions from these goals and the follow-on investigation also utilizes these goals when exploring the potential effects of U.S. IMET

programs both at the individual and state levels. To explain how previous literature is connected to the U.S. IMET programs` goals and identify potential areas for expansion and improvement, next, I review those studies that have investigated the effects of these efforts.

First, early studies are looking at the institutional effects of the U.S. foreign military education and training programs within the recipient states. Lefever (1976) investigates whether the early version of U.S. foreign military education and training called Military Assistance Program¹¹ (hereafter, MAP) met the goal of increasing interstate stability. Lefever (1976) argues that the MAP is a “low-cost, low-risk foreign policy instrument that has served the United States interest in interstate stability” (Lefever, 1976: 85). The author finds support for the achievement of one of the assigned goals and argues that MAP program increases the professional performance and readiness level of the participant countries` militaries leading more security and stability. Through the assessment of the effects of MAP in Latin American countries Fitch (1979) finds somewhat contradictory results. Although the author argues along similar lines as Lefever (1976) regarding the effects of the MAP on the military, he also suggests that MAP increases the political involvement of the military and institutionalizes the coup d`état as a form of political progress. Fitch (1979) finds that U.S. MAP increases the level of professionalism of the recipient states` military by improving technical skills, providing managerial and administrative experience, extensive training in nonmilitary matters and enhancing self-confidence. According to the author due to these factors the military might see itself as an alternative solution to the civilian government in times of political crisis which results in the institutionalization of coup d`état. These results seem to be contradictory with the stated goals of MAP, however in several Latin American cases (especially during the Cold War) encouraging military backed coups were indeed the

¹¹ In 1976 renamed as U.S. IMET.

interest of the U.S foreign policy. This contradiction between the goals included in legislature and “facts on the ground” created an ongoing interest from scholars even after the MAP programs were replaced by U.S. IMET.

Using the idea that U.S. IMET participation improves the military human capital of the recipient states as their theoretical foundation, Ruby and Gibler (2010) and Savage and Caverley (2017) explore whether U.S. IMET programs achieve the goal of creating domestic stability. According to Ruby and Gibler (2010) the U.S. IMET programs develop the recipient countries` militaries` human capital through the transmission of the U.S. military`s professional norms and values. According to the authors this improvement in military human capital leads to improved domestic stability because it decreases the probability of military backed coups in the recipient countries. The authors argue that foreign military personnel trained and educated in the United States absorb the idea of civilian control over the military and this is the primary casual mechanism behind the decreased probability of coups. On the other hand, Savage and Caverley (2017) argues that U.S. IMET actually leads to less domestic stability. While the authors use the same theoretical framework as Ruby and Gibler (2010) and argue that U.S. IMET participation indeed improves the military human capital of recipient states they suggest that this improvement has the opposite effects to what Ruby and Gibler (2010) suggest. According to Savage and Caverley (2017) the norm most likely to be transmitted through the U.S. IMET programs to the participating foreign military personnel is the U.S. military`s distinct and highly professional identity. Savage and Caverley (2017) argues that this improved professionalism increases the recipient militaries` capabilities relative to the regime in a way that no other foreign aids do (human capital cannot be redirected to coup-proofing), and this improved capability doubles the probability of military-backed coup attempts. Another set of studies investigating whether U.S. IMET programs

meet the stated goals focus on the exploration of the relationship between U.S. IMET participation and democratic values and human rights both at the individual and state levels.

Reynolds (2001) investigates whether U.S. IMET programs successfully improve individual participants' attitudes towards internationally recognized human rights. Through surveying actual U.S. IMET participants from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua Reynolds (2001) finds promising but inconclusive results suggesting that U.S. IMET participation facilitates improvement in individuals' respect for internationally recognized human rights. Along similar lines, but with the inclusion of democratic values into the scope of their investigation Jungdahl and Lambert (2012) present a study that explores the effects of U.S. IMET on participating individuals. Employing a pair of pre and post participation surveys for the international students of the 2010 U.S. National Defense University class the authors find that participation in this PME course significantly improves the foreign military personnel's appreciation for both democratic values and human rights.

In her two studies Atkinson (2010, 2015) argues that the U.S. IMET programs are effective soft power (Nye 1990; Williams 2004) tools in the hands of the United States since they effectively promote American values and help diffusing democratic norms. According to Atkinson (2010, 2015) U.S. IMET programs in general, but more specifically the professional military education element in it (hereafter, PMEs) achieves this goal, because it improves the participants' respect for democratic norms and human rights. Finally, using Reynolds (2001) and Atkinson's (2015) findings as their fundamental assumptions Omelicheva et al. (2017) investigate how U.S. IMET affects the probability of human rights violations in conflict at the state level. The authors find that more U.S. IMET participation is associated with less atrocities against civilians during conflict.

While arriving to contradicting empirical findings all the reviewed studies seem to share the same fundamental idea that U.S. IMET participation improves the professional

qualities of the participating military personnel through the transmission of the professional norms and values of the U.S. military and the improvement of personal qualities also leads to an improvement in the military human capital of the recipient states. While Lefever (1976), Fitch (1979), Ruby and Gibler (2010), and Savage and Caverley (2017), Omelicheva et al. (2017) all use the idea of norm transmission as their theoretical framework they provide neither a theory of norm transmission nor empirical evidence demonstrating whether this transmission happens. Reynolds (2001) and Jungdahl and Lambert (2012) actually offer a test to investigate whether norms are transmitted and how they change the U.S. IMET graduates' professional qualities. Although Reynolds' (2001) cross-national survey and Jungdahl and Lambert's (2012) pre and post-participation surveys at the U.S. National Defense University both make significant contributions to the ongoing debate by providing empirical evidence of attitude change among U.S. IMET graduates they do not explain the mechanisms through which the norms are transmitted. Atkinson (2010, 2015) seems to be the only one till now who proposes a theory for norm transmission and tests that theory. She argues that two factors influence the transmission of U.S. military norms and values to U.S. IMET participants. According to the author these conditions are the depth and extent of social contacts, and shared common identity. Atkinson (2010, 2015) argues that U.S. IMET programs allow foreign military personnel and their families to directly interact with the American society for an extended period of time which leads these soldiers and their families to absorb the American values resulting in participants' improved respect of democratic norms and human rights. Atkinson (2010, 2015) also suggests that these norms and values also diffuse in the home countries because upon the U.S. IMET graduates' return home they promote the learned values and norms to the rest of their society.

Although the reviewed studies provide significant contributions to better understand the effects of U.S. foreign military education and training programs both at the individual and

state levels they also leave room for expansion and further improvement. Further research can provide both theoretical and methodological improvements leading to a stronger theory of norms transmission and more convincing empirical evidence regarding the effects of U.S. IMET participation.

In better investigating the individual level effects of U.S. IMET, further research can address some of the research design limitations of previous studies (Reynolds 2001; Jungdahl and Lambert 2012; Atkinson 2010, 2015) by including comparing and contrasting U.S. IMET graduates with non-U.S. IMET graduates. To have a more comprehensive understanding about the effects of the U.S. IMET programs, the scope of the investigation can be extended from looking at the effects of U.S. IMET at the PME institutions (Jungdahl and Lambert 2012, Atkinson, 2010, 2015) or only within the E-U.S. IMET program (Reynolds 2001) to including all U.S. IMET courses.

All prior studies that investigate the effects of U.S. IMET at the state level look at domestic behavior and find contradictory results. This generates a need for further analysis that contributes to the ongoing discussion by providing stronger evidence in support of either side (Fitch 1979, Savage and Caverley 2017, and Ruby and Gibler 2010). At the same time, the prior focus on domestic behavior and the ignorance of international effects requires further investigation with regards to the effects of U.S. IMET on states' international conflict behavior. An assessment of such relationship is a major contribution to international relations literature.

The dissertation proceeds with the investigation of three independent but interrelated questions with the aim to improve and expand existing research along the discussed opportunities as well as to provide direct feedback to policymakers about the effectiveness of the U.S. IMET programs.

CHAPTER THREE - IMPROVING FOREIGN MILITARIES – THE EFFECTS OF THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING PROGRAMS ON PARTICIPATING INDIVIDUALS

Abstract

How do the U.S. IMET programs affect the participating individuals? While the studies that investigate the effects of the U.S. IMET programs at the participating individual level all seem to assume that participation in these programs improves the personal qualities of the participants through the transmission of the professional norms and values of the U.S. military such as respect for democratic values, human rights and civil control, no studies have provided either a strong theory of norm transmission or convincing empirical evidence whether this process actually happens. This study intends to fill this void. I theorize that the norms and values of the U.S. military are transmitted to U.S. IMET participants through the mechanisms of formal learning, direct exposure, and common professional identity and with that the personal qualities of participants indeed improve. I test the proposed theory through the employment of a survey conducted in Hungary with 350 military respondents and in-depth interviews of 14 Hungarian U.S. IMET graduates. The results of the analysis demonstrate that the professional norms and values of the U.S. military are indeed transmitted to U.S. IMET participants. Since graduates of these programs demonstrate higher respect for human rights, democratic values and civilian control than their non-U.S. IMET graduate peers the findings of this study support the argument that U.S. IMET participation is associated with improved personal qualities and with that better military human capital of the recipient states. I also find initial promising results showing that the transmitted values further diffuse within the participants' military organizations.

Introduction

How do the U.S. IMET programs affect the participating individuals? While one of the main goals of the U.S. IMET programs is to improve the military human capital of the recipient states through the transmission of the U.S. military's professional norms and values such as the respect of democratic values, human rights, and civil control to participating individuals (Cope, 1995; Atkinson, 2010; Ruby and Gibler 2010; Savage and Caverley 2017), whether and how this norm transmission to participating individuals actually happens has not yet been convincingly established in international relations literature. Besides the lack of a strong theory of norm transmission and convincing empirical evidence in support of the existence of such process, answering this research question is also important because the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act codifies the requirement for the Department of Defense to evaluate all security assistance programs, including the U.S. IMET programs to determine whether these programs effectively meet their assigned goals yet due to resource constraints this has not been done yet. Furthermore, the fact that the empirical records of U.S. IMET graduates' behavior regarding those three international norms demonstrate quite a variance makes this question even more interesting. While throughout the U.S. IMET programs' history graduates have demonstrated high level personal qualities by playing crucial roles in their home countries' democratic political transformations (Mali 1991), championing the cause of human rights (Thailand 1992) and putting down numerous attempts against democratically elected civil governments (Venezuela 1992, Guatemala 1993) one can easily find several unpleasant examples as well (Cope, 1995). The U.S. IMET programs graduated several Latin American officers who later became well known human rights abusers (Grimmett and Sullivan, 2001), leaders in coup attempts (Honduras, 2009 or Mali 2012) as well as infamous terrorist leaders like Abu Omar al-Shishani, the Islamic State terrorist group's "minister of war" (Savage and Caverley, 2017).

Additionally, besides all the discussed factors the fact that all recent U.S. administrations have been giving a significant role in their national security strategies to activities through, by and with allied and partner militaries, also increases the importance of better understanding the effects of the U.S. IMET programs on the participating individuals. Finally, a clearer understanding of U.S. IMET related considerations might also have some valuable contributions to the more general international relations discussion about the potential effects of U.S. foreign aid.

Prior studies (Lefever 1976; Cope, 1995; Miller, 2006; Atkinson, 2010, 2015; Ruby and Gibler 2010; Savage and Caverley 2017; Omelicheva et al., 2017) that evaluate the value and effectiveness of the U.S. foreign military education and training efforts all seem to assume that during the participation in these programs; the recipient states' military human capital is being improved due to the fact that the professional norms and values of the U.S. military are transmitted to the participating individuals. At the same time, none of these studies provide neither a strong theory of norm transmission at the individual level nor convincing evidence that these processes actually occur. This study intends to fill some of this void. Using prior arguments from the socialization literature I theorize that the professional norms of the U.S. military are indeed transmitted during the U.S. IMET programs through the mechanisms of formal learning, direct exposure, and common identity, and with that the military human capital of the recipient states improves. I test this theory by employing a survey conducted in Hungary with 350 military respondents and in-depth interviews of 14 Hungarian U.S. IMET graduates. Empirically, I find that U.S. IMET participants indeed show more respect for human rights, democratic values, and civil control than those who have not participated in such U.S. military education and training programs. Besides providing support for norm transmission the results also suggest that the U.S. IMET

programs meet those goals that Congress assigned to them and effectively improve the military human capital of the recipient states.

The paper proceeds in six parts. It starts with a short introduction of international norms and a review of the literature that has explored the effects of the U.S. IMET programs. Next, the study proposes a theory of norm transmission during the U.S. IMET programs and then proceeds with the introduction of the research design which includes the discussion of the data collection techniques and the method of analysis. Next, I discuss the results of the analysis. Using a sample of Hungarian military personnel I find that the professional norms of the U.S. military are indeed transmitted to U.S. IMET participants. Since graduates of these programs demonstrate higher respect for human rights, democratic values and civilian control than their non-U.S. IMET graduate peers the findings of this study support my argument that U.S. IMET participation is associated with improved personal qualities and with that better military human capital of the recipient states. Next, I address some potential limitations and criticisms. Then close the study with a short summary of the findings and discussion of contributions.

International Norms and U.S. IMET

Numerous studies in the international relations literature argue that norms cross over borders and influence behavior both at the individual and state levels. Scholars have offered several definitions of these international norms. Krasner (1983) and Cortell and Davis (1996) suggest that norms “represent standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations” (Cortell and Davis, 1996: 452). Farrell (2001) argues that “norms are intersubjective beliefs about the social and natural world which define actors, their situations and the possibilities of action. Norms are intersubjective in that they are beliefs rooted in, and reproduced through, social practice” (Farrell, 2001: 71). Towns (2012) argues that norms are “essentially about

value—they validate certain kinds of behavior for specific sorts of actors and devalue other sorts of behavior” (Towns, 2012: 187). Among many others, internationally recognized norms include free trade (Finlayson and Zacher, 1983), human rights (Risse and Sikkink, 1999), sovereignty (Kratochwil, 1989), and collective security (Ruggie, 1992).

There are also internationally recognized norms that are considered fundamental characteristics of a professional military. As Farrell (2001) notes these norms “are beliefs held by military officers, expressed and codified in military literature, reinforced in military education, and embodied in military practice about how militaries that aspire to be professional should organize themselves and act” (Farrell, 2001: 73) He also suggests that “military norms provide cognitive and normative frames to guide professional practice that are history contingent” (Farrell, 2001:78). When referring to these transnational military norms I do not talk about beliefs about specific tactics, techniques, and procedures, but rather fundamental norms and values that considered the core of transnational military practice.

As Avant (2000) argues transnational military norms were not developed during a natural, Darwinian evolution rather they were created through social interaction and collective learning during several centuries. Additionally, Avant (2000) suggests that the actual content of these norms and how this content is applied also evolved over these centuries. For the purposes of this study I focus on three of these transnational military norms: respect of democratic values, human rights, and civilian supremacy over the military.

These norms evolved over time in individual states and started becoming transnational military norms with the spread of the western style state from the 16th century onwards. The three norms in question experienced especially strong international diffusion and acceptance during the second half of the 20th century when they were codified in a series of international treaties (Farrell, 2001).

Based on Atkinson (2010) Ruby and Gibler (2010), and Savage and Caverley (2017) I argue that respect of democratic values, human rights, and civilian supremacy over the military are the core values of the U.S. military and integral part of its professional identity. The 1978 and 1992 amendments to the 1976 International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act specifically directs the foreign military education and training efforts, especially the U.S. IMET programs to spread these norms among the foreign participants. Prior studies exploring whether these norms are transmitted to the participating foreign military personnel (Lefever, 1976; Atkinson, 2010; Ruby and Gibler, 2010; Savage and Caverley, 2017) seem to leave some room for improvement and expansion because they neither provide a mechanism for such transmission nor present convincing empirical evidence to effectively support the existence of such processes.

In an early study Lefever (1976) proposes that U.S. foreign military education and training increases the personal qualities and professional performance of participating individuals but does not support his assertions with convincing empirical evidence. Based on his study that focuses on Latin American countries, Fitch (1979) also argues that participation in U.S. IMET programs increases the level of professionalism of the participants but suggests that this improvement in personal qualities lead to negative consequences. Fitch (1979) suggests that U.S. educated and trained foreign military personnel see themselves as an alternative solution to the civilian government in times of political crisis which results in the institutionalization of coup d'état. Similarly to Lefever (1976) Fitch's (1979) argument seems to require further supporting evidence to make their argument stronger because their scope is limited to only Latin America and explore the relationship in a very specific timeframe. Savage and Caverley (2017) presents a similar argument about the relationship between U.S. IMET and military backed coups. The authors argue that the norm most likely to be transmitted through the U.S. IMET programs to the participating foreign officers and non-

commissioned officers is the U.S. military's distinct and highly professional identity, which ultimately increase the recipient militaries' capabilities relative to the regime in a way that no other foreign aid does, by improving military human capital. According to Savage and Caverley (2017) because the improved military human capital cannot be redirected to coup-proofing by the regime, it doubles the probability of military-backed coup attempts. Although the authors present a convincing argument regarding the potential effects of the U.S. IMET program they do not discuss how the norms are transmitted and do not provide empirical evidence to support the existence of such process. Ruby and Gibler (2010) presents a challenge to Fitch's (1979) and Savage and Caverley's (2017) argument and suggest that U.S. IMET participation is associated with a decrease in probability of military backed coups. According to the authors U.S. IMET programs develop the recipient countries' military human capital because U.S. IMET participants absorb the professional norms and values of the U.S. military. While Ruby and Gibler (2010) argue that U.S. IMET graduates return home with better respect of democratic norms and civil control, which ultimately leads to decreased probability of military backed coups within the recipient countries similarly to Fitch (1979) and Savage and Caverley (2017) they offer neither a theory of norm transmission nor evidence for the existence of the process. Several studies that explore the individual level effects of U.S. IMET participation seem to address some of the theoretical issues and the lack of evidence of these studies.

While not offering an actual theory of norms transmission Reynolds (2001) investigates the relationship between U.S. Enhanced IMET program (hereafter, U.S. E-IMET) participation and respect of human rights. The author argues that U.S. E-IMET participation facilitates improvement in individuals' respect for internationally recognized human rights and test this assertion through cross-national surveys. Using a sample of actual U.S. E-IMET participants from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, Reynolds finds

promising but inconclusive results regarding the positive effects of U.S. E-IMET participation on attitudes towards human rights.

Along similar lines, but with the inclusion of democratic values into the scope of their investigation Jungdahl and Lambert (2012) present a study that explores the effects of U.S. IMET on participating individuals. Employing a pair of pre and post participation surveys for the international students of the 2010 U.S. National Defense University class the authors find that participation in this PME course significantly improves the foreign military personnel's appreciation for both democratic values and human rights. Although similarly to Reynolds (2001), Jungdahl and Lambert (2012) do not offer a theory of norms transmission their results provide a strong evidence that U.S. IMET participation indeed affects the participating individuals and positively changes their attitudes towards democracy and human rights.

Atkinson (2015) seems to be the only one who both proposes a theory of norms transmission and conducts empirical testing of her theory. Similarly to Jungdahl and Lambert (2012) Atkinson's (2015) investigation focuses on exploring how U.S. IMET participation affects individual level respect of democratic values and human rights. According to Atkinson (2015) U.S. IMET, especially the professional military education program (hereafter, PMEs) allows foreign military personnel and their families to directly interact with the American society for an extended period of time which leads these soldiers and their families to absorb the American norms and values resulting in participants' improved respect of democratic norms and human rights. Atkinson (2015) also suggests that upon their return to their home countries U.S. IMET participants promote the learned values and norms to the rest of their military and even the entire society. Using Reynolds (2001); Jungdahl and Lambert (2012) and Atkinson's (2015) findings as fundamental assumptions Omelicheva et al. (2017) investigate how U.S. IMET programs affect the probability of human rights violations in conflict. The authors argue that U.S. IMET participants "acquire a better

understanding of the ways in which the U.S. military operates, an appreciation of its foundational values, personal connections to the people espousing those values, and, possibly, even a desire to emulate them” (Omelicheva et al. 2017:129). The authors argue that due to this norms transmission more U.S. IMET participation is associated with less atrocities against civilians during conflict.

Although the reviewed studies provide significant contributions to better understand the effects of the U.S. IMET programs at the individual level they also leave room for expansion and further improvement. Further research can provide both theoretical and methodological improvements leading to a stronger theory of norms transmission and more convincing empirical evidence regarding the effects of the U.S. IMET programs on participating individuals.

First, while Reynolds (2001) makes significant initial contributions to the literature through his cross-national¹² investigation and finds promising results regarding the individual level positive effects of the U.S. IMET programs his limited scope generates a need for further improvement. The author limits his investigation only to participants of eight U.S. E-IMET courses with a very small sample size.¹³ These issues generate some opportunities to further improve Reynolds` (2001) research by offering a theory of norms transmission and including non-graduates into the sample to compare their attitudes with the U.S. IMET graduates. Finally, extending the scope of the investigation to all U.S. IMET courses can provide stronger evidence regarding the effect of these programs.

Additionally, while Atkinson`s (2015) study offers both a theory of norms transmission and empirical testing of this theory her work can also be further expanded. Both

¹² The author surveys E-U.S. IMET graduates from three Latin-American countries including El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua.

¹³ 68 respondents from El Salvador, 12 respondents from Guatemala and 35 respondents from Nicaragua bringing the total number of participants to 115 E-U.S. IMET graduates.

Atkinson (2015) and Jungdahl and Lambert (2012) investigate the effects of U.S. IMET participation by only looking at PME institutions. These studies only include U.S. IMET courses with very specific curriculum and high-ranking foreign participants. These factors generate potential selection bias by excluding a large number of U.S. IMET participants and with that their samples are also not representative. These factors limit the validity of the findings of these studies. Additionally, similarly to Reynolds (2001), both Atkinson (2015) and Jungdahl and Lambert (2012) only include U.S. IMET graduates in their assessment while missing the opportunity to compare and contrast the attitudes of U.S. IMET participants with those who never participated in the U.S. IMET programs.¹⁴ The expansion of the scope of these studies by including additional U.S. IMET courses and adding non-U.S. IMET graduates to the sample of the investigation generates an opportunity to provide a stronger theory of norms transmission and further empirical evidence regarding the individual level effects of the U.S. IMET programs.

The next section of this paper intends to expand and further improve these prior arguments by presenting a theoretical framework for norm transmission at the individual level and testing both this theory and some previously untested assumptions of previous studies with the aim to provide an evaluation of the effectiveness of the U.S. IMET programs.

Theoretical Argument

Farrell (2001) argues that militaries and individual military professionals admire the norms, ideas and procedures of those foreign militaries that have won victories in recent wars or have gone through major technological developments. According to Farrell (2001) military organizations emulate the norms and procedures of those victorious examples even if those

¹⁴ Jungdahl and Lambert's (2012) pre and post survey address this issue to a certain extent, but the inclusion of non-graduates can provide stronger support to the findings.

norms and procedures do not fit the strategic interest of the given countries. The author argues that the implementation of an American style military, following the U.S. dramatic victory in the Gulf Wars, in countries like Botswana, Monaco or Micronesia are clear examples of such norm emulation (Farrell 2001; Goldman 2003, 2006). Based on this argument I propose that most military and with that most individual military personnel around the world admire the recent victories and technical advancement of the U.S. military and want to emulate its norms and values.

According to several institutionalist studies (Katzenstein 1996; Farrell, 2001; Goldman 2003, 2006) transnational norms transmitted among the members of professional organizations when they socialize “in professional networks and come to share norms of appropriate behavior and identity” (Goldman, 2006: 72). Katzenstein (1996), Farrell (2001) and Goldman (2003) and Giraldi (2012) argue that military norms are shared in the same way through the process of learning¹⁵ and suggest that the worldwide spread of the norm of conventional warfare is one example of such diffusion through the learning process (Farrell, 2001). Atkinson (2010) proposes two additional mechanisms through which professional military norms are transmitted at the individual level. According to the author the success of norm transmission depends on the extent of social interactions between the U.S. IMET participants and the American society and the sense of common identity the participants share with their fellow American service members¹⁶ (Atkinson, 2010). Combining the arguments

¹⁵ Giraldi (2012) suggests that diffusion mechanisms can be categorized into four groups: coercion, competition, learning, and emulation. According to Giraldi (2012) norm diffusion through coercion happens when a strong country or an international organization forces policy change within a country. The author suggests that competition happens when the different countries influence each other either for economic or security reasons. In Giraldi's (2012) framework diffusion happens through learning when “experience of other countries can supply useful information on the likely consequences of a policy” (Giraldi, 2012: 13) while “emulation means that the normative and socially constructed characteristics of policies matter more than their objective consequences” (Giraldi, 2012: 13).

¹⁶ Atkinson (2010) also suggests a third condition, namely whether upon their return to their home countries the participants attain influential military or policy positions, but since this condition relates to the question whether the norms further diffuse within the recipient states' military organization I do not discuss that in this study.

of Katzenstein (1996), Farrell (2001), Goldman (2003) and Atkinson (2010) I theorize that the U.S. IMET programs are unique opportunities for the U.S. military to socialize its norms in a multinational professional network and to share appropriate forms of behavior and identity with foreign military personnel. I propose that the professional norms of the U.S. military are transmitted to the participating individuals through three mechanisms: formal learning, direct exposure, and common identity. These three mechanisms do not act in a vacuum, but rather reinforce each other`s effects. As Atkinson (2010) argues the U.S. IMET programs act as unique “socialization channel through which formal programs and informal interactions reinforce ideas on civil-military relations in a democratic state” (Atkinson, 2010: 6).

The first mechanism that enables the transmission of the three norms investigated here is formal learning. The U.S. IMET programs are education and training events that are uniquely designed to facilitate learning and demonstration of appropriate behavior. Although the majority of the U.S. IMET courses do not focus on the investigated three norms they still contain several short lectures, discussions and practical exercises that are designed with the sole purpose to educate participants about the importance of these fundamental beliefs and provide opportunities to U.S. military personnel to demonstrate appropriate behavior. Additionally, the E-U.S. IMET courses` curriculum`s single focus is to educate participants about the norms of respect of democratic values, human rights and civil control. Beyond these elements in the curriculum there are several other factors that makes the U.S. IMET program a unique platform for norm transmission compared to any other foreign military training efforts. First, U.S. IMET receives the largest number of foreign military personnel which creates a unique professional networking opportunity. Second, the execution of the U.S. IMET program`s curriculum and the achievement of its educational goals are supported by the world`s largest military education and training infrastructure, the biggest training

budget and the most experienced military education and training cadre (Savage and Caverley, 2017). Besides the learning specific factors of the U.S. IMET program, the norm transmission is also supported by a less formal factor, the so-called Informational Programs (hereafter, IP).

These programs are integral part of the U.S. IMET experience and exclusively focus on exposing foreign participants to the ideas of democracy and human rights (Cope, 1995; Atkinson 2015). The IP are purposefully designed to expose foreign military personnel to American social and cultural events such as visits to historical sites, culture centers and museums. During these events foreign military personnel and their families are exposed to U.S. society, culture, and history. Although the IP is not mandatory for U.S. IMET participants since they can take their entire families to these events for free of charge the majority of U.S. IMET participants take advantage of these events (Cope, 1995; Atkinson 2015). These IPs are important elements in the transmission of norms because as several studies from different disciplines find the type and extent of the social interaction between foreign participants and the host country influence the attitudes of these individuals toward the norms and values of that country (Selltiz et al. 1963; Sunal and Sunal 1991; Ye 2001; Miller 2006, Atkinson, 2010). Besides formal learning and direct exposure, the shared professional identity also plays a crucial role in the transmission of the norms of the U.S. military.

Atkinson (2010) argues that although the level of the individual-to-individual interaction matters, it is even more important with whom this interaction happens. Several studies from different disciplines (Selltiz et al. 1963; Ye 2001, Akerlof and Kranton, 2005) establish that sharing a common identity and belonging to the same professional community affects the participants` individual attitudes toward different norms and values. Akerlof and Kranton (2005) specifically argue that the U.S. military purposefully develops a common identity as a professional motivator and immerses foreign military personnel into them

completely during their U.S. IMET participation. According to Atkinson (2010) U.S. IMET programs “all share a deeply imbedded common identity” (Atkinson, 2010: 6) which incentivize foreign military personnel to emulate such norms.

The findings of Cope`s (1995) survey based study seems to provide some empirical evidence for the presented three mechanisms since he suggests that foreign military personnel learn about democracy, human rights and appropriate civil-military relationship during the U.S. IMET programs through dedicated courses, contact with U.S. service members and civilians, as well as just from living in the U.S. One of Cope`s (1995) respondent summarized the value of the U.S. IMET program participation as the “education, exposure and breadth of understanding” (Cope, 1995: 21).

Of course, these mechanisms do not affect everyone the same way. As the examples discussed in the introduction suggest U.S. IMET attendance might have an opposite effect or no effects at all on the participating individuals. No doubt, there are several U.S. IMET graduates whose actions do not reflect positive attitudes towards the investigated three norms. There may also be individuals who come to the U.S. from countries and cultures with strong traditions that cannot be changed through those mechanisms to which these individuals are exposed during their U.S. IMET participation. Cope (1995) argues that there always are U.S. IMET participants who have neither interest in learning the professional norms of the U.S. military nor are interested in sharing a common professional identity with their American peers. Additionally, the author also suggests that some foreign military participants might refuse to participate in programs that expose them to the American way of life. Although Cope (1995) suggests that these U.S. IMET students are atypical and represent only a small portion of the graduates of the U.S. IMET programs the existence of such examples makes the better understanding of the mechanisms of the norm transmission and the overall effects of the U.S. IMET programs even more important.

Based on the above discussion I propose that the norms of respect of democratic values, human rights and civil supremacy indeed transmitted to foreign military personnel during their participation in the U.S. IMET programs and this transmission happens through the mechanism of formal learning, direct exposure and shared professional identity. These assertions lead me to the following three testable hypotheses.

H1. In comparison of individual military personnel, U.S. IMET graduates demonstrate more respect for democratic values than non-graduates.

H2. In comparison of individual military personnel, U.S. IMET graduates demonstrate more respect for human rights than non-graduates.

H3. In comparison of individual military personnel, U.S. IMET graduates are less likely to support military intervention into domestic politics than non-graduates.

Research design

This study was conducted using a survey and semi-structured in-depth interviews on a sample of Hungarian military personnel.¹⁷ The survey was conducted in Hungary in Hungarian between 18 June and 8 July 2019. The in-depth interviews were conducted between 26 October and 15 November 2019. The survey's primary purpose is to measure whether a difference exists between U.S. IMET graduates and non-graduates' attitudes towards the investigated three norms and to identify potential mechanisms through which the U.S. military's professional norms are transmitted to U.S. IMET participants. The interviews are conducted to provide additional support to the findings of the survey and to help better understanding the mechanisms of norms transmission.

Hungary and the Hungarian military were chosen as a case for this research project for several theoretical and practical reasons. First, although following the end of the Cold War the U.S. has provided significant military aid to former Eastern Bloc countries in the

¹⁷ Military personnel who participated and did not participate in U.S. U.S. IMET programs.

form of international military education and training, these countries have never been the subject of U.S. IMET related research. Hungary is not only one of these countries, but it is an interesting case regarding democratic norms and human rights. Hungary played a crucial role towards the end of the Cold War in the democratization process of the former Eastern Bloc, and for years served as an example for the rest of the former Warsaw Pact countries in the implementation of international democratic values and respecting human rights. However, the country`s recent history has shown some serious backsliding in those universal norms (Agh, 2016). Hungary has been recently accused by several members of the international community of activities that violate basic democratic values and limit universal human rights (Agh, 2016). As Agh (2016) reports the European Union has initiated several investigations into these claims and is looking into whether recent Hungarian governmental actions indeed restrict the freedom of the press, limit the activities of civil organizations, or create unfair conditions for opposition parties.

Additionally, Hungary has participated in the U.S. U.S. IMET program since 1991. The almost 30 years of participation and the fact that the majority of the Hungarian senior military leaders are graduates of the U.S. IMET program provide an appropriate case for the purposes of this investigation. Furthermore, according to the U.S. Office of Defense Cooperation¹⁸ (hereafter, ODC) in Budapest approximately 3,000¹⁹ Hungarian military personnel has participated in the U.S. IMET program since 1991. From the 3,000 military personnel about 500 were female while the remaining 2,500 were male. While the male

¹⁸ According to the website of the U.S. Embassy in Budapest, The Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) is responsible for: “promoting, developing, coordinating and executing the following programs with Hungary: Security Assistance, Foreign Military Financing/Sales (FMF/FMS), International Military Education and Training (U.S. IMET), Defense Cooperation in Armaments (DCA), Engagement Activities, Hungary-Ohio State Partnership Program (SPP), Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP), Marshall Center, and Counter Terrorism Program” (<https://hu.usembassy.gov/embassy/budapest/sections-offices/defense-cooperation/>)

¹⁹ This study has exact data about the number of participants between 1991 and 2015. During this timeframe 2112 Hungarian military personnel attended U.S. IMET programs.

participants mostly attended combat arms courses, the females mostly participated in training and education events that were related to language training, logistics, defense management, communication, medical and air traffic controller occupational specialties. Command and staff college and military university level education has been exclusively attended by male military personnel till 2019, however this year the first Hungarian female officer is attending the U.S. National Defense University in Washington D.C.²⁰ Additional information about the specific number of Hungarian U.S. IMET graduates and the annual U.S. IMET budget dedicated to Hungary can be found in Savage and Caverley`s (2017) dataset and the U.S. State Department`s Archive website.²¹ Table 1. depicts the number of Hungarian U.S. IMET participants and U.S. IMET budget allocation between 1991 and 2015.

Although the curriculum of the courses, in which Hungarian military personnel have attended do not exclusively focus on the respect of democratic values, human rights and civil control all these courses included presentations and briefs regarding those three norms. Additionally IP events were integral part of all these programs meaning that most Hungarian participants²² and their families could participate in social and cultural events that were specifically designed to improve foreign participants appreciation of democratic values and human rights. These facts are important for the argument of this paper, because if I find support for my expectations than it means U.S. military norms transmitted to foreign participants *even if the formal education and training they received did not specifically focus on democratic values, human rights and civil control*. Besides Hungary being an interesting

²⁰ The information provided by the ODC in Budapest is approximate. ODC could not provide any additional details regarding the demographic data of the participants or the distribution of courses among different services. Additionally, the ODC informed me that it does not maintain a comprehensive dataset about the participants in the U.S. IMET programs and it does not have knowledge about the existence of such dataset in any U.S. records.

²¹ <https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/sat/c14562.htm>

²² Only 8 respondents out of the 140 U.S. IMET graduates reported that they did not participate in any IP event, while 111 respondents answered that they attended in three or more such activities.

case because of its 30 years of participation in the U.S. IMET program, it's close to 3,000 U.S. IMET graduates and its turbulent history with democratic values and human rights, some additional practical reasons also affected the case selection.

First, as a former Hungarian military officer accessing military personnel, sites and other necessary resources, securing approval for the execution of the survey and making sure that appropriate type and number of respondents were selected for the purposes of the study was easier for me than conducting the same type of research in other countries.

Table 1. Hungarian U.S. IMET graduates and Annual U.S. IMET Budget Dedicated to Hungary Per Fiscal Year²³

Year	Number of Students	Annual U.S. IMET Budget in \$Thousands
1991	18	334
1992	49	836
1993	60	892
1994	44	875
1995	35	975
1996	58	1243
1997	49	1198
1998	60	1573
1999	197	1314
2000	143	1576
2001	103	1536
2002	132	1940
2003	170	2006
2004	251	2109
2005	111	1985
2006	113	1632
2007	90	1372
2008	68	1088
2009	110	1014
2010	53	1060
2011	37	1077
2012	45	947
2013	42	1044
2014	37	1000
2015	37	1000

²³ Sources are Savage and Caverley (2017) dataset, State Department Archive Website and ODC in Budapest.

Second, as a native Hungarian speaker I could quickly and accurately respond to the questions of the respondents which prevented potential misunderstandings and helped minimizing potential measurement errors. The easier access to respondents and other resources also enabled me to conduct a pilot survey before the actual survey was fielded to address potential question design issues and give me a chance to modify questions if they were necessary further mitigating potential measurement errors.

The pilot survey was conducted on 16 June 2019 with 12 respondents. The respondents were handpicked from the author`s personal professional network and represented all demographic groups that were expected to participate in the main survey. These respondents were asked to fill out the survey through the internet and they were not re-surveyed in the actual data collection. The participants in the pilot did not report any concerns and suggested that all questions were clear and understandable which led me to field the survey unchanged.²⁴

The actual survey contains 37 questions, which can be divided into four parts. The first part focuses on gathering data from the respondents on their demographic details with the aim to collect information on potential control variables. The second part of the survey intends to gather information on how respondents consider their level of military skills and experience. The third part includes sensitive questions that are aiming to gather information for testing the above proposed hypotheses. The final part of the survey gathers U.S. IMET specific information to allow the identification of variance within the group of U.S. IMET graduates. The actual survey questionnaire can be reviewed in Appendix A while the code book for the questionnaire is included in Appendix B.

²⁴ The pilot was also useful to determine the average time needed for conducting the survey (7 minutes and 35 seconds). Based on the pilot results the time was set for 10 minutes. This information was included in the heading of the final questionnaire for respondents` awareness.

The sample size of for the survey was determined based on the actual size of the Hungarian military. While the authorized size of the Hungarian Defense Forces is 25,000, only about 18,000 positions are filled by military personnel because the remaining positions are either unfilled (around 4,500) or filled by civilians. Additionally, about 8,000 to 9,000 soldiers are enlisted who are normally not eligible to participate in U.S. IMET²⁵ leaving the potential population of this study around 9,000 officers and non-commissioned officers. Considering the number of potentially available U.S. IMET graduates and non-graduates during the time period when the survey was planned to be administered, and to make sure that the results of this analysis are robust the sample size for this study was set to 350 military personnel²⁶ including 140 U.S. IMET graduates and 210 non-graduates.

To ensure the validity of the survey results I used multi-level random selection method. First, I randomly assigned two-digit numbers to each Hungarian military organization in three categories: land forces (10-30), air forces (40-60), command and supporting organizations (70-90). After that I randomly chose one from each group by pulling out numbers from each group. Since the Hungarian special forces has only one unit I added this site without any random selection to the other three selected locations. This selection method enabled me to ensure that all three services of the Hungarian Defense Forces were represented in the sample as well as the higher-level command organizations that has oversight over all three services. In each location I was presented by all available personnel on the given day when I visited the organization. I asked individuals to tell me whether they participated in U.S. IMET training or not. After receiving their answers I selected individuals

²⁵ Enlisted personnel are usually only eligible to participate in U.S. IMET if they belong to “unconventional” formations such as Special Forces, where enlisted personnel act in similar capacity as non-commissioned officers in conventional formations. Their number is quite low in the Hungarian military and were ignored for the purposes of this study.

²⁶ The sample size represents approximately 3.9% of the entire population.

as respondents by tossing a coin (I changed the “winner” side at each location). In each case I originally over selected the potential participants to allow me to match U.S. IMET graduates and non-graduates based on their rank, gender, and age. Due to the fact that different group of people were available at the given times at the different locations and because in the Hungarian military the representation of different demographic groups are not balanced (disproportionately large number of older, male, senior officers; significant number missing from middle-aged mid-rank officers) the sample is not perfectly balanced on demographic information, however it does represent the actual characteristics of the Hungarian Defense Forces. The final distribution of U.S. IMET graduates in the sample is 47 from the Land forces, 18 from Special Forces, 30 from the Air force and 45 respondents from higher command. That brings the total number of U.S. IMET graduate respondents to 140. In the group of non-U.S. IMET graduates 69 Land forces representative, 27 Special Forces respondents, 46 Air force personnel and 68 respondents from higher commands were selected randomly bringing the total number of non-U.S. IMET graduates to 210. The numbers of both U.S. IMET graduates and non-graduates are proportional to the actual number of the members of these organizations within the Hungarian Defense Forces. The selected respondents represent between 5 and 10% of the manning of the organizations which makes the sample strongly representative.

The survey was fielded in four different physical locations at four different times (two days at each location). At three locations I administered the survey personally while at the fourth location it was administered by a Hungarian military officer who was personally trained by me. In all four cases the survey was conducted using a paper-based form. The respondents filled out the survey either in a classroom/briefing room or an office like setting.

The in-depth interviews contain 17 semi-structured questions. The first 8 questions focus on gathering demographic data from the respondents while the remaining 9 questions

collect information about the U.S. IMET graduates experiences during their participation in these programs. The goal of these latter questions was to help better understanding the mechanisms of norms transmission. The actual interview questions can be reviewed in Appendix C. The in-depth interviews were conducted via phone and social media platforms (Skype, Viber, WhatsApp, and Windows Messenger) with 14 Hungarian military personnel. The number of interviewees were determined as 10% of the overall Hungarian U.S. IMET graduates chosen for the survey. The 14 respondents were handpicked from the author`s personal professional network from those who participated in the survey. These participants were chosen to represent all demographic groups of the Hungarian U. S. IMET graduates including gender, rank and the three services. The individual information of the interviewees can be reviewed in Appendix D.

Dependent and Independent Variables

There are three dependent variables in this study. The first dependent variable is respect of democratic values. This variable is measured in a scale ranging from 1 to 10 where 10 is the highest respect for democratic values. The second dependent variable is respect for human rights and similarly to the first dependent variable it is measured on a scale from 1 to 10 with 10 being the most respect. The last dependent variable is respect of civil supremacy over the military also measured the same way as the previous two outcome variables. The actual wording of the questions related to each dependent variable can be reviewed in Figure 4. My main independent variable is U.S. IMET participation. This is a dichotomous variable which takes the value of 0 if the respondent has not participated in any U.S. IMET programs and 1 if he has attended such training.

Control Variables

Since the primary objective of this study is to measure individual level sentiments towards democratic values, human rights, and civil supremacy over the military the analysis controls for standard individual level variables including age, gender, and level of education. Several studies (Barro, 1999; Glaeser, LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2004; Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2005) suggest that older people, females, and more educated individuals are more likely to have higher respect for democratic values.

Dependent Variables	Question
DV#1: Democratic Values 1-10 (Strongly Disagree- Strongly Agree)	To what extent do you agree with the following statement? Freedom of speech, free elections, and justice for all must be respected under every circumstance.
DV#2: Human Rights 1-10 (Strongly Disagree- Strongly Agree)	To what extent do you agree with the following statement? Universal human rights must be respected under every circumstance.
DV#3: Civil Control 1-10 (Strongly Disagree- Strongly Agree)	To what extent do you agree with the following statement? The military should be involved in the formulation of domestic policies.

Figure 4. Actual Survey Questions for the Dependent Variables

I also include these same variables into the models that assess the level of respect of human rights and civil control. Age is divided into five age groups starting with 18 to 25, 26 to 35, 36 to 45, 46 to 55 and 55+ categories. The gender variable is binary and assumes the value of 0 for males and 1 for females. The education variable contains five categories including basic education, high school, college, university, and PhD level education. This variable is ranked from 1 (basic education) to 5 (PhD school). As an additional indicator for the level of education within the military I also control for the number of languages the individuals speak. To account for potential military specific effects I include control variables that measure the individuals` rank and their years of service. I use these control variables because I expect that

higher-ranking individuals with more rights and responsibilities should have more respect for the three norms and rank might serve as an alternative explanation independent from U.S. IMET participation. Duration of service is also used as a control variable because the more time a soldier spends in a military organization the more opportunities he might get where he can interact with soldiers from the U.S. (multinational exercises, mobile training teams, military-to-military events, etc.) which can serve as a reinforcing mechanism for the norm transmission. Finally, I include two additional binary variables to account for respondents' combat deployment and additional foreign training other than U.S. training. The former variable is included because Hungarian soldiers who have participated in combat deployment have always been deployed as part of a multinational force and most of the time alongside their U.S. peers. I argue that these deployments might also serve as reinforcement mechanisms to further deepen the individual attitudes towards the investigated three norms. Last, but not least the other foreign military training and education variable is included because the effective isolation of the effects of the U.S. IMET programs from other international education and training efforts can provide strong support to the findings of this analysis. Both of these variables assume the value of 0 if individuals did not participate in either combat deployment or other foreign training and the value of 1 if they did. The summary statistics of the variables can be reviewed in Appendix E.

Estimation Method

Since the participants of this survey were randomly selected the first set of models assess the effects of U.S. IMET participation on the three dependent variables using linear regression technique. However, since in observational studies one of the potential inferential issues is that the selection into the treatment group (in this case participation in U.S. IMET programs) might be influenced by the subjects' base line characteristics I also estimate the effects of

U.S. IMET participation by employing propensity score matching technique. This method was introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and designed to address selection bias and move researchers towards more casual estimates.

The first step of this method is the calculation of the probability (propensity score) of an individual experiencing the treatment, in other words being selected for U.S. IMET participation. The next step is using the calculated propensity scores and match individuals who has similar probability of participating in U.S. IMET. This allows one to have a more convincing comparison where the treated and untreated groups are similar on their observable characteristics. Next, it is necessary to evaluate the quality of the match by using statistical techniques to ensure that there is an acceptable level of balance of covariates. Finally, the process concludes with the evaluation of the effects of the treatment on the outcome variables (Pan and Bai, 2015).

Results and Discussion

Table 2. contains the results of nine linear regression models that assess the effects of U.S. IMET participation on individuals` attitudes towards democratic values, human rights, and civil control over the military. The first three models explore the relationship between U.S. IMET participation and individuals` level of respect for democratic values. The results of all three models support H1 and show that U.S. IMET graduates on average have higher respect for democratic values than those Hungarian soldiers who have not participated in U.S. IMET programs. Besides the key explanatory variable age seems to have a positive effect on the respect of democratic values, which supports the findings of previous literature (Barro, 1999; Glaeser, LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2004; Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2005). Next, participation in combat deployment seems to have a strong positive effect on individual attitudes towards democratic values.

Table 2. The Effects of U.S. IMET participation on individual attitudes towards democratic values, human rights, and civil control

VARIABLES	(1) Democratic values#1	(2) Democratic Values#2	(3) Democratic Values#3	(4) Human Rights#1	(5) Human Rights#2	(6) Human Rights#3	(7) Military Interv.#1	(8) Military Interv.#2	(9) Military Interv.#3
U.S. IMET	1.740*** (0.257)	1.587*** (0.264)	1.522*** (0.282)	0.883*** (0.245)	0.665*** (0.252)	0.523* (0.271)	-0.414* (0.225)	-0.520** (0.233)	-0.559** (0.251)
Rank		0.335 (0.280)	0.259 (0.280)		0.567** (0.267)	0.548** (0.269)		0.135 (0.247)	0.163 (0.248)
Age		0.441** (0.223)	0.413* (0.222)		0.133 (0.213)	0.140 (0.213)		0.230 (0.197)	0.248 (0.197)
Gender		0.414 (0.328)	0.162 (0.339)		0.255 (0.313)	0.215 (0.326)		-0.140 (0.289)	-0.0360 (0.301)
Edu		-0.192 (0.314)	-0.123 (0.312)		-0.348 (0.299)	-0.329 (0.300)		-0.271 (0.277)	-0.295 (0.277)
Language		0.627* (0.329)	0.524 (0.329)		0.339 (0.313)	0.321 (0.316)		0.495* (0.290)	0.536* (0.292)
Dur. of service		-0.308 (0.226)	-0.359 (0.228)		0.0995 (0.215)	0.0460 (0.219)		0.0473 (0.199)	0.0455 (0.202)
Deployment			0.841*** (0.318)			0.0237 (0.306)			-0.403 (0.283)
Non-US Train.			0.0166 (0.283)			0.376 (0.272)			0.181 (0.251)
Constant	6.095*** (0.163)	3.823*** (0.880)	3.807*** (0.874)	6.638*** (0.155)	4.746*** (0.840)	4.745*** (0.840)	3.529*** (0.142)	2.393*** (0.776)	2.401*** (0.776)
Observations	350	350	350	350	350	350	350	350	350
R-squared	0.116	0.149	0.167	0.036	0.070	0.076	0.010	0.028	0.035

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

This might be explained by the fact that Hungarian soldiers are exclusively deployed into combat as part of a multinational coalition and almost always together with the U.S. military which might act as an extra reinforcing mechanism to diffuse U.S. norms and values. Additionally, the models also suggest that while U.S. IMET participation significantly and positively influence individual attitudes towards democratic values, similar foreign education and training received in other countries do not have the same effects. This is an important finding because it suggests the uniqueness of the U.S. IMET programs compared to other foreign military training efforts. Models 4 to 6 explore how U.S. IMET participation effects individuals` respect of human rights. The findings of these models support H2 since as they demonstrate U.S. IMET participation is associated with higher respect of human rights. In these models besides the independent variable only respondents` rank show a statistically significant positive relationship with respect of human rights. Once again the models suggest that foreign military education and training programs received in other countries do not have a statistically significant effect on individuals` respect of human rights.

The last three models in Table 2. assess the relationship between U.S. IMET participation and respect of civil supremacy over the military. The findings of these models support H3 because as the results demonstrate U.S. IMET graduates are less likely to support military intervention into domestic politics than non-graduates. From the other assessed factors only the number of spoken languages demonstrate a slight negative relationship with the respect of civil supremacy, because those individuals who speak more languages are more likely to support military intervention into domestic politics.

I also run the same models to assess whether any variation exist among the members of the three services (Air Force, Land Forces and Special Forces) of the Hungarian Defense Forces. The results of the service specific models can be reviewed in Appendix F.

Next, Table 3. depicts the results of the models with matching techniques. Both the graphical and statistical evaluation of the level of matching can be reviewed in Appendix G. The first three models (10-12) show the results with basic propensity score matching while models 13 to 15 demonstrate the results of U.S. IMET participation when nearest neighbor matching is employed. The results in all these models confirm the findings of the linear regression analysis and support the three hypotheses proposed.

Table 3. Effects of U.S. IMET Participation, Models with Propensity Score Matching and Nearest Neighbor Matching

VARIABLES	(10) Democratic Values	(11) Human Rights	(12) Military Interv.	(13) Democratic Values	(14) Human Rights	(15) Military Interv.
U.S. IMET	1.127*** (0.284)	0.522* (0.291)	-0.605** (0.291)	1.267*** (0.295)	0.529* (0.285)	-0.701** (0.299)
Observations	350	350	350	350	350	350

Standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Additionally, Figure 5. provides a visual demonstration of the average effects of the U.S. IMET participation on the investigated three dependent variables. The average level of respect of democratic values within the Hungarian military is 6.095. U.S. IMET participation increases this level with 1.740 points on a 1-10 Likert scale. The average level of respect of human rights within the military is 6.638 which is increased by .883 when we compare U.S.IMET graduates to non-graduates. Finally, the average value of the willingness to militarily intervene into domestic politics is 3.529 which is already quite low within the Hungarian Defense Forces, but U.S. IMET participation even further decreases it with .701 points. These changes are quite significant when one considers the actual value of the attitudes towards the three examined norms.




Figure 5. Average Effects of U.S. IMET participation on Democratic Values, Human Rights and Military Intervention

Additionally, I test the three mechanisms presented in the theoretical section to better understand how the professional norms of the U.S. military are transmitted during U.S. IMET participation. In these models I use the same three dependent variables while employ four explanatory variables. Two of these variables proxy for the mechanism of formal learning. The first is a binary variable that take the value of 0 if U.S. IMET graduates did not participate in PME course and 1 if they did. The second variable measures participation in technical and tactical courses and coded the same way as the PME variable. The next explanatory variable serves as a proxy for social interaction and measures whether the U.S. IMET graduates participated in social activities. This variable is coded 0 if U.S. IMET graduates participated 1 or less social events and 1 if they participated in 2 or more events. The last independent variable accounts for shared identity. It measures on a 1 to 10 scale whether the U.S. IMET participants considered the U.S. IMET experience a professional development opportunity.

The models in the mechanism tests also control for additional factors that I propose effecting the stickiness of the investigated three norms. These variables include the number of U.S. IMET courses participated by an individual, the time since graduation, the duration of service, combat deployment, whether been commanded by another U.S. IMET graduate, and keeping in touch with American classmates from the U.S. IMET programs. Table 4. shows the results of these models.

The results show that the type of the U.S. IMET program has a significant effect on the participating individuals attitudes towards the three assessed norms. The analysis provide support to Jungdahl and Lambert (2012) and Atkinson`s (2015) previous arguments and show that PME graduates have a higher respect for democratic values and human rights than those who participated in other programs. At the same time, while the results are not significant they also demonstrate that tactically and technically focused training events are associated with a decrease in the respect of those investigated norms. The results of the in-depth interviews seem to provide additional support to these findings. While those interviewees who participated in U.S. IMET PME courses all report that they think these courses contain much more information (readings and practical exercises) regarding the investigated three norms when compared to similar Hungarian courses, those U.S. IMET graduates who attended only tactical level courses do not report significant differences. While for example Respondent#2, a U.S. IMET PME course graduate specifically reported that “I think U.S. IMET PME courses are doing a better job than the Hungarian courses that I have participated in making sure that their graduates leave the course with a lot of knowledge about democratic values human rights and civil control,” Respondent#10 a non-PME, tactical course participant reported that “I did not really find any difference between Hungarian course and U.S. IMET courses regarding what and how they teach about democratic values, human rights and civil control.”

Table 4. The Effects of U.S. IMET type, social interaction and professional identity sharing on attitudes towards democratic values, human rights, and civil control

VARIABLES	(16) Democratic Values	(17) Human Rights	(18) Military Interv.#1	(19) Democratic Values	(20) Human Rights	(21) Military Interv.#2	(22) Democratic Values	(23) Human Rights	(24) Military Interv.#3
Tech. Training	-0.727** (0.304)	-0.306 (0.318)	-0.00517 (0.332)						
PME				1.038*** (0.304)	0.642** (0.321)	0.170 (0.338)			
Social							0.0972 (0.372)	0.919** (0.375)	0.318 (0.398)
Constant	8.116*** (0.188)	7.640*** (0.197)	3.116*** (0.206)	7.473*** (0.180)	7.297*** (0.190)	3.055*** (0.200)	7.759*** (0.331)	6.793*** (0.334)	2.862*** (0.354)
Observations	140	140	140	140	140	140	140	140	140
R-squared	0.040	0.007	0.000	0.078	0.028	0.002	0.000	0.042	0.005

Standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

VARIABLES	(25) Democratic Values	(26) Human Rights	(27) Military Interv.#4	(28) Democratic Values	(29) Human Rights	(30) Military Interv.#5
Tech. Training				-0.168 (0.389)	0.0775 (0.410)	-0.0999 (0.446)
PME				1.037** (0.436)	0.635 (0.460)	0.0515 (0.500)
Social				-0.216 (0.391)	0.762* (0.412)	0.253 (0.448)
Professional	-0.159 (0.139)	0.0610 (0.143)	-0.0793 (0.149)	-0.167 (0.139)	-0.0214 (0.146)	-0.0911 (0.159)
Grad. time				0.692*** (0.248)	0.871*** (0.262)	0.633** (0.285)
Dur. of serv.				-0.324 (0.234)	-0.247 (0.247)	0.0934 (0.268)
Deployment				0.435 (0.396)	-0.635 (0.417)	-0.301 (0.454)
U.S. IMET_C2				-0.733 (1.008)	0.166 (1.062)	-0.339 (1.156)
Intouch				-0.104 (0.326)	0.520 (0.343)	0.606 (0.373)
Constant	9.263*** (1.257)	6.973*** (1.298)	3.828*** (1.352)	9.351*** (1.662)	6.156*** (1.751)	2.708 (1.905)
Observations	140	140	140	140	140	140
R-squared	0.009	0.001	0.002	0.182	0.143	0.064

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The results of the social interaction variable also demonstrate some promising results. Although the results are mixed and mostly insignificant, when they are significant, they demonstrate the expected relationship. Once again in-depth interview respondents seem to provide some support for the effects of social interactions. All 14 respondents report that they participated in IP programs and these programs not only positively changed their sentiments about the U.S. as a country and American society, but also improved their understanding about democratic values and the importance of human rights. Respondent#7 specifically states “IP programs were great. I had a lot of opportunity to visit historical sites and American landmarks. I also went to a military ball and was invited several times to dinner by my American peers. These events taught me a lot about how the American society is and what they value.”

The effects of the shared identity variable are mixed and not statistically significant. At the same time all in-depth interview respondents report that they think the U.S. military is a highly professional military organization and its norms and values should be emulated by all other militaries. For example Respondent#9 suggests “the behavior of the individual American soldier, the military’s acceptance of civil supremacy, their merit-based selection and promotion system and cutting-edge technology were very impressive to me. I think it is fair to say if you want to be a good military you should try to follow the American example.”

Among those variables that assess how long the transmitted norms affects individual attitudes only the time since graduation variable demonstrate significant results. While the more time spent since graduation is positively associated with both respect of democratic values and human rights it also seems to increase the probability of supporting military intervention into domestic politics. While the results of the initial models suggest that as argued the international norms of respect for democratic values, human rights and civil control that characterize the U.S. military are indeed transmitted to foreign participants

during the U.S. IMET programs the results of the mechanisms tests although promising in some cases do not provide a strong support to the overall argument. While the findings clearly demonstrate that the U.S. IMET programs are meeting their fundamental aims and improve the participants` attitudes towards the investigated three norms the actual mechanisms of norms transmission require further investigations.

Diffusion of Norms Within National Militaries

Although it is outside of the original scope of this study, the investigation whether the transmitted norms further diffuse within the U.S. IMET graduates` national militaries provide some valuable insights into the logic of the initially proposed theory. Since many studies investigating the effects of U.S. IMET (Lefever 1976; Fitch 1979; Ruby and Gibler 2010; Savage and Caverley, 2017) assume that this diffusion occurs but do not provide any empirical evidence to support it, therefore the empirical testing of norm diffusion can make significant contribution to the existing literature. If the professional norms of the U.S. military that are transmitted to the U.S. IMET participants indeed further diffuse throughout their national militaries, than one can expect that the respect of the three investigated norms is going to be higher among those non-U.S. IMET graduates who have been commanded and trained by U.S. IMET graduates than those who has never been led by U.S. IMET alumni. Table 5. shows the results of the analysis of the relationship between U.S. IMET graduates` leadership and their subordinate soldiers` attitudes towards the three investigated norms.

The results demonstrate that those non-U.S. IMET graduates who has been led and trained by U.S. IMET graduates indeed have more respect for both democratic values and human rights across all models. They also show a reduced probability of supporting the military`s intervention into domestic policy making when compared to those who have never been commanded by U.S. IMET alumni. Although the relationship demonstrated by the

models is exactly what the previous U.S. IMET literature suggests, these results are not statistically significant, which suggests that further investigation is needed to provide stronger evidence for norm diffusion.

At the same time in-depth interview respondents once again seem to provide some potential evidence in support of norm diffusion. All 14 respondents reported that they feel that they have been able to share what they learned with their fellow Hungarian soldiers. However, it is also clear that rank played a crucial role in the U.S. IMET graduates` ability to diffuse the learned skills among other soldiers.

Table 5. Norm Diffusion Within National Militaries

VARIABLES	(31) Democratic Values	(32) Human Rights	(33) Military Interv.#1	(34) Democratic Values	(35) Human Rights	(36) Military Interv.#2
U.S. IMET_C2	0.578 (0.580)	0.579 (0.539)	-0.485 (0.468)	0.192 (0.623)	0.648 (0.575)	-0.416 (0.504)
Rank				0.468 (0.401)	1.074*** (0.370)	0.250 (0.324)
Age				0.161 (0.319)	-0.0150 (0.294)	0.117 (0.258)
Gender				-0.337 (0.518)	-0.0605 (0.478)	0.795* (0.419)
Education				-0.567 (0.455)	-0.866** (0.420)	-0.410 (0.368)
Language				0.446 (0.451)	0.319 (0.416)	0.654* (0.364)
Dur_service				-0.278 (0.335)	0.110 (0.309)	0.0623 (0.271)
Deployment				1.017** (0.469)	0.192 (0.432)	-0.268 (0.379)
Non-US training				-0.141 (0.396)	0.311 (0.365)	0.259 (0.320)
Constant	5.583*** (0.546)	6.125*** (0.507)	3.958*** (0.440)	5.113*** (1.258)	4.720*** (1.160)	2.664*** (1.017)
Observations	210	210	210	210	210	210
R-squared	0.005	0.006	0.005	0.056	0.070	0.050

Standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

While higher ranking officers report that they feel they were very effective in sharing U.S. norms and values by including them into Hungarian manuals and training requirements, lower ranking soldiers seem to feel less confident in their ability to share the learned tactics, techniques and procedures with their peers. For example while Respondent#2 reports that “I managed to include the learned values and norms into our leader seminars, training manuals and exercises,” Respondent#8 suggests that “I talked with my immediate subordinates about what I learned during my U.S. IMET course, but still looking for the means to share it with more soldiers.”

To further investigate whether the professional norms of the U.S. military diffuse into the national militaries of the U.S. IMET graduates I assess the U.S. IMET participants` ability to positively influence individuals` professional improvement, organizational change within their military establishment and doctrinal improvement compared to those who never participated in the U.S. IMET programs. I propose that if U.S. IMET graduates demonstrate higher abilities in these categories than it would provide a strong support for relationships presented in Table 6 and through that for norm diffusion.

The results in Table 7. demonstrate the expected relationships. U.S. IMET participation significantly improves the individuals ability to influence other soldiers` individual professional qualities, implement doctrinal changes and contribute to positive organizational changes. The findings of the norm diffusion analysis provide support to those prior studies that argued beyond U.S. IMET`s positive effects on the participating individuals and suggested that these programs also positively affect the recipient countries` military as a whole. The results demonstrate that the professional norms and values of the U.S. military are not only transmitted to the U.S. IMET participants but through them they diffuse and positively affect the entire national military organizations as well.

Limitations and Potential Criticism of the Study

I foresee a number of potential criticisms regarding my study both from a theoretical and methodological point of view. First, the study might be criticized for its limited scope and focus on a single case study. Although Hungary is indeed only one case it is a valuable one for the purposes of this investigation due to all of those theoretical and practical conditions that I discuss in the research design section. Since this study is one of the first attempts to conduct a deep investigation into the individual level effects of the U.S. IMET programs the primary aim is rather the identification and testing of potential mechanisms than strong external validity.

Table 6. U.S. IMET Graduates` Effects on Individuals, Doctrine and Organization

VARIABLES	(37) Individuals	(38) Doctrine	(39) Organization	(40) Individuals	(41) Doctrine	(42) Organization
U.S. IMET	0.912*** (0.206)	2.510*** (0.251)	2.364*** (0.246)	0.465** (0.215)	2.073*** (0.271)	1.906*** (0.264)
Rank				0.542** (0.213)	0.496* (0.268)	0.107 (0.262)
Age				0.104 (0.169)	0.560*** (0.213)	0.693*** (0.208)
Gender				-0.459* (0.259)	-0.312 (0.325)	0.295 (0.317)
Edu				-0.428* (0.238)	-0.221 (0.300)	0.386 (0.292)
Language				0.529** (0.251)	0.358 (0.315)	0.136 (0.307)
Dur_service				-0.211 (0.174)	0.0187 (0.218)	-0.309 (0.213)
Deployment				1.029*** (0.243)	0.182 (0.305)	0.0648 (0.298)
Non-US train.				0.517** (0.216)	0.296 (0.271)	0.566** (0.265)
Constant	6.867*** (0.130)	3.476*** (0.159)	3.471*** (0.156)	5.054*** (0.637)	0.440 (0.801)	0.446 (0.782)
Observations	350	350	350	350	350	350
R-squared	0.053	0.223	0.210	0.192	0.292	0.286

Standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Since this study is one of the first attempts to conduct a deep investigation into the individual level effects of the U.S. IMET programs the primary aim is rather the identification and testing of potential mechanisms than strong external validity.

Second, due to the fact that the subjects of my study are military personnel critiques might suggest potential inferential issues regarding my survey. I address this potential criticism through several measures. First, since military professionals usually tend to do their best to please authority, whether it is formal command or academic authority I had to avoid potential measurement error due to such social desirability bias. To mitigate this potential issue during the introduction to the survey goals I highlighted the fact that the survey is anonymous without any chance of identification of the respondents and explained how important it is to answer the questions truthfully. Then I asked the participants whether they understood what I said, and would they answer all questions truthfully. I also made sure that the respondents sat in an order preventing them to see the answers of their peers.

Additionally, the survey was conducted in an environment in which immediate superiors and higher-ranking individuals were either not present or could not see which essay belonged to which respondent. Furthermore, to avoid any additional inferential issues like processing error, I personally coded the results of the survey and input the data into the dataset.

Additionally, since the survey was conducted with professional military respondents the chances of coverage errors (neither erroneous inclusion nor exclusion) were assessed as minimal.

The next criticism of this study might suggest that the results of my analysis are being driven by the fact that Hungarian military personnel who are being selected for U.S. IMET participation already has an increased respect for democratic values, human rights and civil supremacy over the military and these factors driving their selection into this program.

Although it is a valid concern it does not seem to be the case for several reasons. First, I

corrected for this potential bias via matching. Second, the Hungarian military does not collect data about its members' attitudes towards those three norms. Superiors who nominate their subordinates to U.S. IMET participation does not know about their level of respect towards democratic values, human rights, and civil control. Furthermore, the selection of the nominated individuals is a multilevel process that includes at least two Hungarian higher command and the U.S. ODC before the participant is cleared to participate in any U.S. IMET program. During my years of service I personally attended three U.S. IMET events and went through the selection process three times. Later I was responsible for three years for reviewing the nominated Special Forces soldiers' applications and select them for U.S. IMET participation. During all these years I never experienced that individual attitudes toward those three values played any role in the selection of U.S. IMET participant.

Another potential criticism relates to the role of the U.S. ODC in the selection process of U.S. IMET participants. The U.S. ODC in Budapest informed me that it has never tried to influence the selection process of Hungarian participants. The U.S. ODC does not require and does not have any information about the nominated individuals' attitudes towards the three norms in question and the approval of U.S. IMET participation has never been subject to these norms. Additionally, during Hungary's almost 30 years history in the U.S. IMET program and out of its roughly 3,000 U.S. IMET graduates, the U.S. ODC requested only three times that the Hungarian nominees be replaced by other soldiers. These replacements were requested because the nominees professional background (and expected future career path) and the training event they were selected for showed no justifiable connections.²⁷

Finally, some might argue that the research design overlooks some important variables that correlates with the selection of the Hungarian military personnel to participate

²⁷ One example for such replacement request was when a fighter jet pilot was nominated to attend the U.S. Army's armored reconnaissance course. Source: ODC representative.

in the U.S. IMET programs. This seems to be a valid concern especially because instead of their attitudes towards democratic values, human rights and civil control Hungarian soldiers are being selected to U.S. IMET participation based on two conditions: English language skills and physical requirements. It is indeed a valid concern that these variables might correlate with socioeconomic variables that this study does not account for. For example, one might argue that it is possible that individuals who are coming from wealthier families are more likely to speak English or be physically fit than those who are coming from less wealthy background. Although such criticism seems to be fair it does not seem to effect U.S. IMET selection for several reasons. First, individuals are not required to know English before they join the Hungarian military and they are provided with multiple opportunities to learn English throughout their career. Officers learn English in military college and cannot receive their commission before securing an intermediate level language certificate. For NCOs annual English courses are being run in every military base to provide equal learning opportunity to all members of the Hungarian Defense Forces. Finally, similar to the U.S. military`s Military Occupational Specialty (hereafter, MOS) code each position in the Hungarian military is associated with a unique code that includes specific language and physical requirements which everybody who fills the given position must meet regardless of the soldiers background. These “MOS” requirements are at least equal or in most cases higher than the requirements associated with eligibility for U.S. IMET participation meaning that everyone who is an active member of the Hungarian military should meet these requirements.

Conclusion

Although international relations literature has extensively explored the potential effects of U.S. military aid in the form of arms and equipment transfer it mostly overlooked the effects of U.S. military aid in the form of foreign military education and training programs. The

limited number of studies that have assessed the effects of the U.S. IMET programs mostly focus on country level outcomes and use the same dataset (Ruby and Gibler, 2010) where the key explanatory variables are simply the number of U.S. IMET participants per year and the annual cost of the U.S. IMET programs per country. These studies assume that the U.S. military's professional norms are transmitted to the U.S. IMET participants, but neither present a strong theory explaining how this transmission happens nor offer empirical evidence in support of the norms transmission assumption. Furthermore, although those studies that investigate the individual level effects of the U.S. IMET programs make some significant contributions to improve our understanding of the relationship between U.S. IMET participation and individual attitudes towards democratic values and human rights due to some research design issues and methodological limitations they leave some room for expansion and improvement. This study intended to address some of these issues and contributes to the research program of U.S. military aid in several ways.

First, it presents a novel dataset that contains individual level variables regarding U.S. IMET participation and with that enables other researchers to explore research questions that have been either overlooked in the literature or have not been studied due to lack of data.

Second, with the proposed theoretical framework and the findings of the statistical models this study provides support to prior literature both in case of international norms transmission and U.S. IMET specific studies. Furthermore, this analysis provides evidence in support of prior assumptions and strengthens the findings of several prior studies (Reynolds 2001; Atkinson 2010, 2015; Jungdahl and Lambert 2012).

Beyond its contributions to the research agenda the study has significant policy implications as well. Although the 1976 International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act clearly defines the goals of the U.S. IMET program there are no measures of effectiveness in place to provide objective feedback about the actual effects of these

programs to policy makers. The timeliness of this issue is clearly demonstrated in the fact that the 2017 National Defense Authorization Acts once again codifies the requirement to establish a functioning evaluation mechanism for the investigation of the effects of the U.S. security assistance programs. This study provide feedback directly for this requirement and proposes that the U.S. IMET programs indeed meet the goals established by Congress and with that effectively support the achievement of U.S. national security and foreign policy goals.

References

- Ágh, Attila. "The Decline of Democracy in East-Central Europe: Hungary as the worst-case scenario." *Problems of Post-Communism* 63.5-6 (2016): 277-287.
- Akerlof, George A., and Rachel E. Kranton. (2005) Identity and the Economics of Organizations. *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 19: 9-32.
- Allen, K. (1982). The international military education and training program—Rationale and justification. Unpublished Manuscript, Air Command and Staff College at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.
- Atkinson, Carol (2010) Does soft power matter? A comparative analysis of student exchange programs 1980–2006. *Foreign Policy Analysis* 6(1): 1–22.
- Atkinson, Carol “The role of US elite military schools in promoting intercultural understanding and democratic governance” *All Azimuth* 4.2 (2015): 19-29.
- Barany, Zoltan (2012) *The Soldier and the Changing State: Building Democratic Armies in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Barro, R. (1999). Determinants of democracy. *Journal of Political Economy*, 107, 158–183.
- Caverley, Jonathan D, and Todd S. Sechser. (2017) Military Technology and the Duration of Civil Conflict, *International Studies Quarterly* (2017) 61, 704–720
- Checkel, Jeffrey T. (1999) ‘Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe’, *International Studies Quarterly* 43: 83–114.
- Cope, John, A. (1995). International military education and training: An assessment, (DTIC No. 19990716 041) Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center.
- Cortell, A. and Davis, J. (1996) How Do International Institutions Matter? The Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms. *International Studies Quarterly* 40 (December): 451-478.
- Dana P. Eyre and Mark C. Suchman, 'Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons: An Institutional Theory Approach', in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), *Cultural Norms and National Security* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 79-113.
- DeRouen, Jr., Karl R. and David Sobek. 2004. “The Dynamics of Civil War Duration and Outcome” *Journal of Peace Research* 41(3): 303–20.
- Farrell, Theo. “Transnational norms and military development: Constructing Ireland's professional army” *European Journal of International Relations* 7.1 (2001): 63-102.
- Finlayson, J. A., and Mark Zacher. "The GATT Regime and the Regulation of Trade." (1983): 273-314.

Fitch, John. S. (1979). The political impact of US military aid to Latin America: Institutional and individual effects. *Armed Forces & Society*, 5(3), 360-386.

Glaeser, E., LaPorta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., and Shleifer, A. (2004). Do institutions cause growth? *Journal of Economic Growth*, 9, 271–303.

Goodman, Melvin A. *Gorbachev and Soviet Policy in the Third World*. National Defense University, Washington D.C., 1990.

Goldman, Emily O., and Leslie C. Eliason. The diffusion of military technology and ideas. Stanford University Press, 2003, 307.

Goldman, Emily O. "Cultural foundations of military diffusion." *Review of International Studies* 32.1 (2006): 69-91.

Grimmett, Richard F & Mark P Sullivan (2001) US Army School of the Americas: Background and Congressional Concerns. CRS issue brief for Congress (<https://fas.org/irp/crs/soa.htm>).

Groves, Robert M., Fowler, Floyd J., Couper, Mick P., Lepkowski, James M., Singer, Eleanor and Tourangeau, Roger. *Survey Methodology*. Wiley-Interscience, second edition, 2009

Hartung, William D. 1994. *And Weapons for All*. New York: HarperCollins.

Huntington, Samuel P. (1957) *The Soldier and the State*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Huntington, Samuel P (1968) *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Huntington, Samuel P. (1996) 'Reforming Civil–Military Relations', in Larry Diamond and Mark F. Plattner (eds) *Civil–Military Relations and Democracy*, pp. 3–11. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Jungdahl, Adam, and Paul Lambert. "Winning hearts by broadening minds: Measuring the impact of international military assistance at the National Defense University." *The DISAM Annual* 1 (2012): 153.

Katzenstein, Peter J. (1996) *Cultural Norms and National Security*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Klotz, Audie (1995) *Norms in International Relations*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Krasner, S., ED. (1983) *International Regimes*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Kratochwil, Friedrich V. (1989) *Rules, Norms, and Decisions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lefever, Ernest W., 1976, The Military Assistance Training Program, *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol 424, Issue 1, pp. 85 - 95

Legro, Jeffrey W. (1997) 'Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the "Failure" of Internationalism', *International Organization* 51(1): 31–63.

Long, Scott J. 1997. *Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables*. Advanced Quantitative Techniques in the Social Sciences Number 7. Sage Publications: Thousand Oaks, CA.

Long, J. S. and Freese, J. (2006) *Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables Using Stata*, Second Edition. College Station, Texas: Stata Press.

Miller, Arthur H. (2006) Promoting Democratic Values in Transitional Societies through Foreign Aid, presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting,

Mott IV, William, H., *Military Assistance: An Operational Perspective* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, (1999), xiv.

Nye, Joseph S. 1990. "Soft Power." *Foreign Policy*. 80: 153-171.

Omelicheva, Mariya, Brittnee Carter, and Luke B. Campbell. "Military aid and human rights: assessing the impact of US security assistance programs." *Political Science Quarterly* 132.1 (2017): 119-145.

Papaioannou, E., & Siourounis, G. (2005). Economic and social factors driving the third wave of democratization. Mimeo, London Business School.

Ramirez, Francisco O. and John W. Meyer (1980) 'Comparative Education', *Annual Review of Sociology* 6: 369–99.

Reynolds, Ronald H. "Is Expanded International Military Education and Training Reaching the Right Audience?" *The DISAM Journal* 25.3 (2003): 93-99.

Risse-Kappen, T., Risse, T., Ropp, S. C., & Sikkink, K. (Eds.). (1999). *The power of human rights: International norms and domestic change* (Vol. 66). Cambridge University Press.

Risse, Thomas, and Stephen C. Ropp. "International human rights norms and domestic change: conclusions." *Cambridge Studies in International Relations* 66 (1999): 234-278.

Risse, Thomas, and Kathryn Sikkink. "The socialization of international human rights norms into domestic practices: introduction." *Cambridge Studies in International Relations* 66 (1999): 1-38.

Ruby, Tomislav Z & Douglas Gibling (2010) US professional military education and democratization abroad, *European Journal of International Relations* 16(3): 339–364.

Ruggie, John Gerard. "Multilateralism: the anatomy of an institution." *International organization* 46.3 (1992): 561-598.

Savage, Dillon J. and Cavelrey, Jonathan D. 2017. "When human capital threatens the Capitol: Foreign aid in the form of military training and coups." *Journal of Peace Research* 2017, Vol. 54(4) 542–557.

Selltiz, Claire, June R. Christ, Joan Havel, and Stuart W. Cook. (1963) *Attitudes and Social Relations of Foreign Students in the United States*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Stepan, Alfred (1986) The new professionalism of internal warfare and military role expansion. In: Abraham F Lowenthal & J Samuel Fitch (eds) *Armies and Politics in Latin America*. New York: Holmes & Meier, 134–150.

Sunal, Dennis W., and Cynthia C. Sunal. (1991) Professional and Personal Effects of the American Fulbright Experience in Africa. *African Studies Review* 34: 97-123.

Towns, Ann E. "Norms and social hierarchies: Understanding international policy diffusion "from below"." *International Organization* 66.2 (2012): 179-209.

U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Department of State, Foreign Military Training Joint Report, Fiscal Years 2012 and 2013, pp. II-1, II-2.

U.S. State Department Archive Website, <https://20092017.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/sat/c14562.htm>.

Wendt, Alexander (1995) 'Constructing International Politics', *International Security* 20(1): 71–81.

Williams, Ronald A. (2004) The Daily Work of Democracy. *International Educator* 13: 36.

Ye, Weill (2001) *Seeking Modernity in China's Name: Chinese Students in the United States 1900-1927*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

CHAPTER FOUR: THE SMARTER THE SOLDIERS, THE LONGER THE CIVIL WARS – U.S. IMET PARTICIPATION AND CIVIL CONFLICT DURATION

Abstract

Why does civil conflicts` duration varies so widely? While some conflicts last for years others end in just days. Several studies have argued that foreign military aid provided to the incumbent governments plays a crucial role in civil conflict duration but always operationalized this military aid in the form of weapons and equipment transfers. In this paper I explore how a different type of military aid - U.S. IMET programs - affects the duration of civil conflicts. I theorize that participation in U.S. IMET programs improves the military human capital of the government forces. This improved military human capital makes the overall military more capable and effective which incentivizes rebels to disperse, hide and minimize their operations leading to a prolonged civil conflict. To test this argument, I use a new dataset that includes detailed information on insurgencies and U.S. IMET participation between 1976 and 2003. The results show that militaries with more U.S. IMET participation fights significantly longer civil conflicts. I also find that more U.S. IMET participation corresponds with a higher probability of civil conflicts being fought in an irregular manner.

Introduction

Although there were 50 active armed conflicts around the world as of 2015 only one was fought between states (India and Pakistan). The other 49 were intrastate civil conflicts that resulted in about 97,000 battle related deaths annually (Melander et al., 2016). Additionally, 40% of these conflicts were internationalized meaning that at least one of the combatants of these civil conflicts were supported by external states (Melander et al., 2016). These facts

suggest that civil wars are the dominant form of conflict of our days and external state support plays a key role in shaping the characteristics of these conflicts. One of these characteristics that have demonstrated a remarkable variation throughout the history of civil conflicts is their duration. While the Yemeni government defeated the rebels in 1994 in about two months and Libyan dictator, Muammar Gaddafi's forces were crushed by the insurgents in just eight months in 2011 insurgencies in Sri Lanka and Colombia lasted for decades. In addition to this dramatic variation in the duration of civil conflicts the fact that the U.S. has provided military assistance to over 140 governments since 1945 and it also has been involved in its history's longest war in Afghanistan create a strong incentive for better understanding the relationship between U.S. military aid and civil conflict duration.

Prior studies argue that the variance in civil conflict duration can be explained by factors that include regime type, government and rebel military capabilities, rough terrain, availability of natural resources, the difference in the belligerents' strategies and external support to the different sides (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000; DeRouen and Sobek 2004; Cunningham 2006; Buhaug et al. 2009; Wucherpfennig et al. 2012, Caverley and Sechser 2017). This paper contributes to this literature by further exploring how external support, more specifically U.S. military assistance to the incumbent government affects the duration of civil conflicts.

Previous studies (Mason et al, 1999; Lyall and Wilson, 2009; Lyall, 2010; Caverley and Sechser, 2017) assessing the effects of U.S. military assistance only focused on aid in the form of arms and equipment transfers while completely ignored the potential effects of the less tangible form of U.S. military aid the International Military Education and Training programs (hereafter, U.S. IMET). The primary goal of these programs is to improve the recipient states' military human capital and through these better trained and more capable military professionals improve the military capabilities of the incumbent governments.

Although the U.S. spends close to a billion dollars on these programs annually and trains over 70,000 foreign military personnel from more than 150 countries every year (Savage and Caverley 2017), whether these programs meet their fundamental goals have not been explored effectively in international relations literature. While scholars seem to have developed a good understanding of how U.S. military aid in the form of arms and equipment transfer affects the characteristics of civil conflicts the same cannot be said about the potential effects of the U.S. IMET programs.

Can better military human capital due to U.S. IMET participation be associated with swift conflict resolution or does it prolong the civil conflict? I argue that better military human capital due to U.S. IMET participation increases incumbent government's military capability and effectiveness, and with that it prolongs the civil conflict. Building on Hendrix and Young (2014) I theorize that improved military capability increases the cost of direct engagement for the rebels and incentivizes them to disperse and hide making it extremely difficult for the government forces to deliver a fatal blow to the rebellion and end the civil conflict. Additionally, improved military capability forces the rebels to switch their tactics from open military engagements to low level terrorist activities (Hendrix and Young, 2014) which also prolongs the duration of the conflicts. Based on this argument I propose that the availability of better human capital due to U.S. IMET participation is associated with longer civil conflicts.

To test my theory I employ a merged dataset (Caverley and Sechser 2017; Savage and Caverley 2017) containing detailed information on insurgencies and U.S. IMET participation between 1976 and 2003. The results of the analysis demonstrate that improved military human capital due to U.S. IMET participation is correlated with longer civil conflicts and when this variable is included into the investigation then all the hardware-based military capability variables used in previous studies lose significance. Additionally, my analysis also

demonstrates that more U.S. IMET participation corresponds with higher probability of civil conflicts being fought in an irregular manner.

These findings suggest that the availability of quality military human capital due to U.S. IMET participation might be more important factor than other tangible military capabilities in explaining the variation in civil conflict duration and the type of civil conflicts.

The paper proceeds in seven parts. It starts with a critical overview of previous literature on the duration civil conflicts. Next, the analysis reviews the previous measurements of military capability and introduces military human capital as an alternative to prior concepts. Then the paper discusses the relationship between U.S. IMET participation and military human capital. Next, I present my theory which is followed by the introduction of the research design, the data sources, and the empirical strategy. Then, the analysis presents the empirical results from a series of event-history models and logistic regressions and discusses the main findings. Next, I illustrate my argument through a case study. Finally, I offer a summary of my contributions and discuss the potential implications.

Previous Research on Civil War Duration

The growing literature that seeks to explore the factors influencing the duration of civil conflicts can be organized into four groups. The first group consists of those studies that theorize that civil war duration is affected by the rebels` abilities to evade government forces and sustain their operations. This literature includes rebel external support, rebel military capabilities and rebel strategy as critical factors that affect how long civil wars last. DeRouen and Sobek (2004) and Cunningham (2010) find that external support received by the rebels enable them to prolong civil wars. Fearon (2004) and Lujala (2010) argue along similar lines when they suggest that rebel access to primary commodities or natural resources result in longer civil conflicts. On the other hand, these findings are challenged by Humphreys (2005)

who finds that the availability of natural resources is associated with shorter civil conflicts. Other studies argue that rebel military capabilities (Cunningham et al., 2009; Hultquist, 2013) and guerilla strategies (Balcells and Kalyvas 2012) are also associated with longer civil war duration. Rebels` capacity to sustain their operations often measured through the availability of rough terrain. Bleaney and Dimico (2011) and DeRouen and Sobek (2004) argue that rebels` access to rough terrain enables them to better hide from the government forces and prolong the conflicts while Rustad et al. (2008) finds opposite association.

The second group of studies seems to focus on the role of information problems. Fearon (1995) and Walter (2009) argue civil wars many times happen due to the participants inability to agree on their relative power or resolve and as Walter (2009) suggests the lack of information about each other`s` power and resolve is especially acute during the initial phases of civil conflicts. Referring to Cunningham (2006); Nilsson (2008); Pearlman and Cunningham (2012); Caverley and Sechser (2017) argue that “the existence of multiple factions and outside actors can exacerbate the problem, making information about combatants difficult to obtain and quickly obsolete” (Caverley and Sechser, 2017: 705). The difficulty of information gathering in such a complex situation prevents government forces to resolve the conflict quickly leading to prolonged civil wars.

The next group of relevant literature contains those studies that explore how commitment problems affect the duration of civil conflicts. de Figueiredo, Jr. and Weingast (1999), and Walter (2002) argue that when the combatants cannot commit to uphold the agreements it becomes very difficult to end civil wars without one side`s` decisive victory. Additionally, Fearon (2004) argues that combatants will not be able to reach any settlements if the rebels expect the government forces to become stronger in the future and eventually abandon the peace deal. Some other scholars also suggest that the commitment problem is

stronger in ethnically diverse societies leading to longer civil wars (Collier et al. 2004; Kirschner 2010; Wucherpfennig et al. 2012).

The last group of studies consists of those works that are focusing on the role of state capacity. This literature includes such factors as regime type and incumbent government's military capacity as potential explanatory variables of the variation in civil conflict duration. Derouen and Sobek (2004) argue that autocratic regimes fight shorter civil conflicts due to their willingness to destroy the rebels quickly and fully. Caverley (2010) argues that democracies are less likely to fight long and costly civil wars due to their lower tolerance level for casualties. As a challenge to these arguments Fearon (2004) finds that regime type does not have significant effect on the duration of civil conflicts. Mason et al. (1999) argue that stronger state military capacity increases the duration of the civil conflicts while decreasing the chance of rebel victory. DeRouen and Sobek (2004) and Hendrix and Young (2014) argue along the same lines since both find that larger military capacity prolongs the civil conflict however it does not necessarily increase the likelihood of government success. Lyall and Wilson (2009), and Lyall (2010) offer another explanation and argue that more mechanized government military forces lead to longer civil conflicts because they are ill-equipped to fight unconventional wars. As one can see all these studies find that stronger military capacity is associated with longer civil conflict. Caverley and Sechser (2017) while provide further evidence to these arguments also make further contributions to the discussion by introducing the "combined arms" strategy as a new variable. They operationalize this concept as an interaction term between the land mechanization and air mechanization variables of the prior studies and find that the combined arms strategy is associated with faster conflict resolution leading to shorter civil wars.

Measures of State Military Capacity in Previous Literature

In the civil war literature states' military capacity seems to be mostly measured through indicators that capture capacity to wage conventional rather than civil wars (Hendrix, 2010; Kocher, 2010). Mason et al. (1999) and DeRouen and Sobek (2004) operationalize their military capacity variable as the number of soldiers in the military. Hendrix and Young's (2014) military capacity variable is an index that was derived from the number of military personnel, the annual military expenditure, and the military expenditures per soldier of the given governments. Lyall and Wilson (2009) and Lyall (2010) measure military capacity as the level of mechanization of the government's military forces. This variable is a scaled index showing the conflict onset soldier-to-mechanized vehicle ratio. The variable has four values from 1 to 4. It is coded 1 if the soldier-to-mechanized vehicle ratio is larger than 834 soldiers per vehicle. The variable assumes the value 2 if the ratio is between 288 and 833 soldiers per vehicle. It is coded 3 if there the ration is between 109 and 287 soldiers per vehicle, and 4 if the number of soldiers is between 11 and 108 per vehicle. Similarly, Sechser and Saunders also (2010) develop a hardware-based variable they call the National Mechanization Index which draws data from the International Institute for Strategic Studies' Military Balance series of publications (1968–2004). The value of the variable is based on the number of armored vehicles per one hundred soldiers. Caverley and Sechser (2017) further develops the mechanization-based approach. First, they separate the ground and air mechanization measure. They calculate the former by “dividing an army's number of motorized vehicles by the number of ground soldiers and then calculating the natural logarithm of the resulting figure” (Caverley and Sechser 2017:710) while the latter “represents the natural logarithm of a country's ratio of combat aircraft to soldier” (Caverley and Sechser 2017:710). The combined arms variable is an interaction term of the ground and air mechanization measures.

Although frequently used these variables do not seem to provide an effective measure for incumbent government's military capability. The way they are calculated seems to leave more questions open than they actually answer. I argue that measuring state military capacity through these indexes is a faulty approach for at least three reasons. First, the number of actual vehicles does not necessarily reflect the realistically available hardware. In many cases a large portion of the military vehicles and air platforms are not operational meaning that they cannot be part of a combined arms strategy since they cannot leave the barracks. Additionally, some small and poor countries maintain a large amount of 30 and 40-year-old equipment while others have small number of highly modern vehicles. It seems that in these indexes only the number of the mechanized vehicles determine the incumbent government's military capability and the quality of these vehicles are completely ignored.

Second, the indexes used in the material-based literature are calculated onset of civil conflicts and do not account for the changes in the vehicle-soldier ratio as the civil conflict progresses. For example, during long civil wars governments might lose many vehicles and aircrafts without the ability to replace them which causes that they might go from a heavily mechanized military at the beginning of the conflict to a much less mechanized military at the end of the conflict. The contrary also can happen. A government acquires a lot of new vehicles and aircrafts during the war which changes its forces early low mechanization index into a high index towards the end of the conflict.

Lastly, the fact that a military relies on and possesses a lot of hardware does not mean that it can use those capabilities effectively. A good example for this is the 1973 Yom Kippur War where the attacking Arab forces had ten times as many troops, eight times as many tanks and ten times as many artillery pieces than the Israelis their offensive still ended up as a complete failure (Pollack, 2004) This case clearly demonstrates the potential weakness of using hardware-based measures for military capability. To offer a potential remedy for these

issues and to explore the phenomena from a completely new angle I introduce a new measure for incumbent government's military capability in the form of military human capital.

Improved Military Human Capital due to U.S. IMET Participation

Biddle (2004) argues that military capacity depends not only on the tangible hardware capabilities of the military but also on other less tangible factors. One of these potential factors is the quality of the military's human capital. Biddle and Zirkle (1996) argue that the quality of the military's human capital is a key factor in how capable the military forces are. According to their argument the military forces that have limited access to quality personnel will be less capable to operate complex weapon systems and implement sophisticated tactics, techniques, and procedures than those militaries that have quality human capital. Toronto (2018) finds that the lack of quality military human capital prevents success in modern combat. He argues that neither sophisticated weapons nor the availability of resources matters if militaries cannot take the initiative, innovate, and exploit opportunities as they present themselves. Additionally, Biddle and Long (2004) argue that "troops with no meaningful formal education will find it harder to draft or carry out instructions for moving thousands of soldiers over multiple routes to converge on a distant point at the same moment" (Biddle and Long 2004: 531). They conclude that one can see stronger military performance from those militaries that have access to better human capital through effective formal education.

Building on these arguments and the works of economist Gary S. Becker I argue that one of the most important investment a military organization can do to improve its performance is to invest into its "workforce." As Becker (1994) suggests in his seminal work *Human Capital, A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis with Special Reference to Education* although the investment into the human capital can take multiple forms the best way is formal

education and training. Capitalizing on Becker (1994) and Biddle and Long's (2004) findings I argue that the best way to improve the military's human capital is through participation in formal education and training. Furthermore, I suggest that one of the best ways to obtain such formal quality education and training for military personnel is through participation in U.S. IMET programs.

The U.S. Congress established the general framework of foreign military education and training in 1961 when it passed the Foreign Assistance Act. The primary goal of these programs is to develop the military human capital of foreign military forces. As Savage and Caverley (2017) argue U.S. foreign military education and training is foreign aid "in a very specific form: an increase in the military's human capital" (Savage and Caverley, 545).

Savage and Caverley (2017) also suggest that U.S. military has accumulated such experience and knowledge in counterinsurgency operations that are not available in any other training and education programs and sharing such knowledge significantly increases the military skills of the U.S. IMET participants especially in case of fighting against insurgents. Additionally, the U.S. IMET programs provide a unique framework for military human capital development that cannot be compared to any other similar programs in other countries. These U.S. programs are unique not only because of the U.S. military's decades of war experience but the size of the U.S. training infrastructure, the presence of an experienced and combat focused training cadre, and the budget available²⁸ for education and training purposes (Savage and Caverley, 2017).

Huntington (2006) and Barany (2012) argue that the norm most likely to be transmitted through the U.S. IMET programs to the participating foreign officers and non-commissioned officers is the U.S. military's distinct and highly professional identity.

²⁸ According to Savage and Caverley (2017) the annual training budget of the U.S. military is bigger than entire defense budget of 117 countries.

Furthermore, Savage and Caverley (2017) suggest that trainees returning home with higher levels of military skills and professionalism and suggest that these training programs improve “the competence of the trainees within the military and consequently the larger military within the government” (Savage and Caverley, 2017: 545). Lefever (1976), Taw (1984), and Ruby and Gibler (2010) argue that the improvement of the capability of the military as a whole is due to the facts that the U.S. IMET programs graduates usually become either instructors in their national military training systems (Ruby and Gibler, 2010) or influential leaders who have the ability to implement changes in their militaries in accordance to the learned skills (Lefever, 1976). The authors also find that U.S. IMET programs graduates stay long enough in the military service to effectively share the skills they learned in the U.S. IMET programs with their peers (Taw, 1984; Ruby and Gibler, 2010). Based on these arguments I theorize that through the participation in the U.S. IMET programs the quality of the recipient countries` military human capital increases because foreign military personnel obtain such skills, knowledge and experience that fundamentally improves their professional competence.

Improved Military Human Capital and Civil Conflict Duration

Fearon (1995) and Walter (2009) argue that wars occur due to bargaining failure between two sides. According to these authors bargaining often fails because the two sides cannot agree about the balance of power. This disagreement is due to the fact that determining the balance of power between the two sides is difficult without fighting. The power of the different sides consists of material factors such as tanks, airplanes, artillery and troops; and also less tangible factors such as strategy, troop discipline and level of training and education (Caverley and Sechser 2017). While in civil conflicts both the government and the rebels are well aware of their own capabilities they mostly lack a clear understanding of the other side`s abilities.

While gaining information about the other side's material capabilities is quite easy due to these factors observable nature understanding the intangible factors takes much more time and only happens through actual engagements between the two sides.

I argue that U.S. IMET participation improves the quality of the military human capital of the incumbent government's forces. The better training and education materialize in better planned, supported, organized, and more effectively executed military operations over time. While at the beginning of the civil conflicts the rebels might choose to fight the incumbent government's forces in open engagements this changes over time due to the realization of the changing quality of the government forces. Rebels realize that challenging the government's military forces directly is becoming more costly than other, lower scale operations. This increased cost of direct engagement and the rebels' need to keep the rebellion alive incentivize them to disperse and hide from government forces. (Hendrix and Young, 2014). Additionally, the increased cost of direct engagement forces the rebels to switch their tactics from guerrilla warfare to low level terrorist activities (Hendrix and Young, 2014) and deters them from making any direct attempts at the capital or political centers (Bapat, 2011). Additionally, due to its improved military capability the incumbent government loses its incentives to agree to any settlement and sees an opportunity to fully destroy the rebellion. I argue that these conditions together lead to prolonged civil conflicts. Following this logic I propose my first hypothesis as:

H1: In comparison of incumbent governments, those whose military has access to more U.S. IMET participation will fight longer civil conflicts.

Additionally, if the logic of the above argument holds then the level of U.S. IMET participation must also affect the type of civil wars the incumbent government is involved in. According to the theory presented above more U.S. IMET participation improves the military effectiveness of the incumbent government's military forces, which incentivizes rebels to

switch their tactics, techniques, and procedures to irregular military methods. Based on this argument I propose that more U.S. IMET participation correlates with a higher probability of recipient government fighting an irregular war. This argument leads to my second hypothesis:

H2: In comparison of incumbent governments, those whose military has access to more U.S. IMET participation are more likely to fight irregular civil wars.

Data Sources and Variables

I employ the Uppsala Conflict Data Program/Peace Research Institute Oslo (UCDP/PRIO) Armed Conflicts Dataset, v. 3–3005 (Gleditsch et al. 2002) in which conflict-year is the unit of analysis and merge it with Savage and Caverley (2017) U.S. Foreign Military Training and Coup dataset. The dataset includes detailed information about 147 insurgencies that happened between 1976 and 2003.

My first dependent variable is civil conflict duration that is measured in days. UCDP data uses the twenty-five deaths per year rule to include a conflict in the dataset. The value of the dependent variable ranges from one day to 9,380 days. The mean value of the duration variable is 1,710 days. My second dependent variable is conflict termination. This variable is a binary variable and coded 1 if the civil conflict is terminated and 0 if it is still ongoing. The third dependent variable is type of civil war. This variable is a binary measure coded 0 if the civil conflict was fought in a conventional manner and 1 if the conflict was an irregular war.

To operationalize human capital through participation in U.S. IMET programs I selected data from Savage and Caverley (2017) U.S. Foreign Military Training and Coup dataset. The IMET programs were established by the U.S. Congress in 1976 by passing the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act (Savage and Caverley, 2017). IMET has been overseen by the Department of State while some sub-elements are administered by the Department of Defense (Atkinson, 2010). Today the U.S. IMET programs provide education and training for foreign personnel in around 4,000 different courses both

within the United States and overseas while it only accounts for about 0.2 percent of the budget of the State Department annually. I specifically selected the U.S. IMET programs as my independent variable since as Savage and Caverley (2017) argue this program “is the most transparent and receives the largest amount of scrutiny” (Savage and Caverley, 2017:548) meaning that they present the strongest test to my theory. I also chose the U.S. IMET program because although it contains several hands-on technical training events the majority of U.S. IMET programs belong to the so-called professional military education (hereafter PME) programs that are uniquely designed to improve organizational, operational planning, management and leadership skills of the participants.

Based on these characteristics I suggest that if I find any relationship in case of the U.S. IMET program then it is likely that the same correspondence exists for the U.S. foreign military education and training programs as a whole as well. To ensure the robustness of my findings I operationalize my first independent variable in two different ways. First, since increasing a country`s military capacity through the improvement of its human capital takes time I utilize the logged five-year sum of IMET students as one version of my first explanatory variable. Second, because the IMET programs differ in duration and in the program of instructions it is unlikely that participants receive the same type and amount of education and training. For this reason, as an alternative measurement for human capital improvement I also operationalize my independent variable as the logged sum of 5-year total IMET spending.

Control Variables

According to Fearon (2004) and DeRouen and Sobek (2004) there is no clear agreement in the civil conflict literature on which control variables should be used in formal models. I

derive my control variables directly from relevant literature. Overall I employ 18 control variables to assess the most widely cited alternative explanations.

First, to isolate the independent effects of the U.S. IMET programs from hardware-based U.S. military assistance efforts I employ a control variable for U.S. military aid other than IMET. This variable measures the amount of U.S. military aid as a percentage of the recipient country's GDP (Savage and Caverley 2017).

Next, I employ Caverley and Sechser's (2017) ground and air mechanization variables to assess the effects of the hardware-based approach in comparison to the human capital-based approach. They calculate the values of the former variable by "dividing an army's number of motorized vehicles by the number of ground soldiers and then calculating the natural logarithm of the resulting figure" (Caverley and Sechser 2017:710). The air mechanization variable "represents the natural logarithm of a country's ratio of combat aircraft to soldier" (Caverley and Sechser 2017:710). I also use their combined arms variable to control for the effects of combined arms doctrine.

Furthermore, I use several operationalizations of a conflict's geographic proximity to the state's capital. I employ a variable based on Buhaug and Gates (2002) to account for the distance between the capital and the conflict zone, another one denoting whether the civil conflict is being fought along international borders (Buhaug et al. 2009) and one that is the interaction term between these two. Furthermore, using data from Cunningham et al. (2009) I control for rebel fighting capacity and relative rebel strength. I also included a variable to account for the availability of lootable resources²⁹ in the conflict area (Lujala et al. 2007; Lujala 2009; Gilmore et al. 2005). Following Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Buhaug et al.'s (2009) arguments I control for rough physical terrain. This variable is binary and coded 1 if

²⁹ Lootable resources include diamonds and gemstones, illicit drugs, and petroleum deposits.

the area where the conflict is fought covered by either 60 percent forest or 60 percent mountains. Next, to account for the potential effects of regime type I employ the Scalar Index of Politics (Gates et al. 2006). The variable measures regime type on a scale from 0 to 1. Furthermore, based on the argument of Fearon (2004), and Balcells and Kalyvas (2012) I control for the potential effects of economic factors through the inclusion of the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. I also account for the potential effects of external assistance for both the government and the rebels (Cunningham et al. 2009). Lastly, I also include binary variables to account for Fearon's (2004) "sons of the soil" civil conflicts, assess the potential effects of the post-Cold War era and to explore how types of civil conflicts such as insurgency and irregular conflicts affect their duration (Lyall and Wilson 2009). The summary statistics of the variables are being presented in Appendix K.

Estimation Techniques

First, in order to assess the effects of U.S. IMET participation on civil conflict duration I employ two statistical methods. I use Weibull accelerated failure time regressions and then I employ several logistic regressions with time dependence controls. These approaches have been frequently used to assess civil conflicts' duration. While the Weibull technique is employed by Fearon (2004); Gates and Buhaug et al. (2009); Balcells and Kalyvas (2012); and Caverley and Sechser (2017) logistic regression models are used by Derouen and Sobek (2004); Cunningham (2006); and Caverley and Sechser (2017). Due to the fact that states can be involved in more than one civil conflict at the same time I estimate all my logistic regression models with robust standard errors clustered on country.

Finally, since the types of civil war dependent variable is binary I employ simple logistic regression models to estimate the effects of U.S. IMET participation on this variable.

Results and Discussion

Table 7. includes the results of my twelve Weibull accelerated failure time regressions models that estimate the effect of U.S. IMET participation on civil conflict duration.

In the models shown in Table 7. I use the actual number of U.S. IMET participants as my independent variable. The results can be interpreted simply as variables with positive coefficients are associated with longer civil conflicts while those that have negative coefficients are associated with shorter duration.

Model 1 contains only the measures of U.S. IMET participation (the actual numbers of U.S. IMET participants per country per year) and demonstrates that there is a statistically significant positive relationship between U.S. IMET participation and civil conflict duration. One unit increase in the number of U.S. IMET participants increases the duration of civil conflicts with .0794 days, on average. In order to isolate the effects of U.S. IMET participation from other forms of U.S. military assistance efforts Model 2 includes only the variable that accounts for the other types of U.S. military aid. The model shows that although other types of U.S. military aid seems to reduce the duration of civil conflict the result is not significant. In model 3 I include both the U.S. IMET participation variables and the other types of U.S. military aid variable. This model shows the same relationships as the first two models.

In the next 9 models I follow Caverley and Secher (2017) methodology and gradually incorporate different sets of controls based on prior civil conflict duration literature. In Model 12 I include all controls to estimate the effects of U.S. IMET participation while controlling for all prior explanations. When I introduce the different control variables the theorized relationship between U.S. IMET participation and civil conflict duration remains the same across all models which provides strong support to Hypothesis 1.

Table 7. Accelerated failure time hazard analysis of the duration of civil conflicts, 1976-2003

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	U.S. IMET	Other U.S. Aid	Total U.S. Aid	Armor	Geography	Fighting Capacity
U.S. IMET	0.0794** (0.0404)		0.120*** (0.0441)	0.102** (0.0437)	0.0938** (0.0408)	0.0971** (0.0468)
Other Aid		-1.289 (1.055)	-1.131 (0.969)	-1.468 (2.074)	-1.336 (2.152)	-1.865 (1.698)
Ground Mech.				0.626 (0.827)	0.866 (0.790)	0.701 (0.740)
Air Mech.				0.494 (0.940)	0.608 (0.914)	0.639 (0.873)
Combined Arm				-0.132 (0.138)	-0.157 (0.136)	-0.147 (0.127)
Distance to Capital					0.474*** (0.165)	
Conflict at Border					0.977** (0.423)	
Border X Distance					-0.463* (0.241)	
Rebel Fighting Cap.						-0.0254 (0.584)
Rebel Strength						-0.569 (0.915)
Constant	7.364*** (0.171)	7.543*** (0.249)	7.156*** (0.235)	4.831 (5.475)	0.0687 (5.220)	4.410 (4.999)
Observations	940	800	760	496	496	481

Standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

VARIABLES	(7) Terrain	(8) Regime type	(9) Economy	(10) External Factors	(11) Sons of soil	(12) All controls
U.S. IMET	0.108** (0.0494)	0.0901 (0.0651)	0.122** (0.0494)	0.0990** (0.0454)	0.113** (0.0467)	0.146** (0.0734)
Other Aid	-0.0350 (2.598)	-1.099 (2.358)	-4.326* (2.298)	-1.588 (2.057)	-1.207 (2.109)	-2.708 (2.564)
Ground Mech.	0.620 (0.881)	0.892 (0.961)	0.638 (0.800)	0.644 (0.813)	0.975 (0.935)	1.283 (1.152)
Air Mech.	0.556 (1.014)	0.644 (1.182)	0.361 (0.938)	0.507 (0.936)	1.037 (1.039)	0.985 (1.523)
Combined Arm	-0.134 (0.149)	-0.175 (0.170)	-0.0971 (0.137)	-0.133 (0.137)	-0.214 (0.161)	-0.202 (0.227)
Distance to Capital						0.615*** (0.186)
Conflict at Border						0.726 (0.452)
Border X Distance						-0.653** (0.304)
Rebel Fighting Cap.						0.230 (0.802)
Rebel Strength						-0.816 (1.175)
Natural Resources	0.532* (0.319)					0.320 (0.372)
Rough Terrain	0.615* (0.349)					0.433 (0.312)
Incumbent Democ.		0.247 (0.860)				-0.0870 (0.723)
Gdp per capita			-0.770** (0.348)			-0.666* (0.387)
Ext. support govern.				-0.280 (0.446)		-0.0836 (0.595)
Ext. support rebels				-0.0389 (0.323)		-0.0613 (0.320)
Sons of soil					1.433* (0.794)	1.005 (1.024)
Insurgency						0.478 (0.535)
Post-Cold War						-0.293 (0.555)
Constant	3.923 (5.931)	3.581 (6.402)	10.23* (5.998)	4.909 (5.428)	2.458 (5.983)	0.919 (9.027)
Observations	496	466	495	496	496	437

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Additionally, my models demonstrate that other forms of U.S. military aid do not have a significant effect on civil conflict duration. Furthermore, the results of my analysis demonstrate that when human capital in the form of U.S. IMET participation is included in models employed in prior analyses the “traditional” measures of state’s military capability (Mason et al, 1999; Lyall and Wilson, 2009; Lyall, 2010; Caverley and Sechser, 2017) although maintaining the direction of the relationship found in these studies but all of them lose statistical significance.

Additionally to these primary findings the models yield two additional interesting results. The distance to capital variable is consistently significant and shows a positive relationship with civil conflict duration. This finding seems to provide support to the argument of Rustad et al. (2008) and Buhaug et al. (2009) who suggested that the further the conflict takes place from a country’s capital the longer it lasts. Furthermore, according to the results those countries that have higher gdp per capita should expect shorter civil conflicts.

Another interesting finding is that those factors that previous literature has argued to affect civil conflict duration do not seem to demonstrate reliable effects in my analysis since none of them show statistical significance.

As a robustness check of the results of my analyses, I conduct several additional tests. First, I estimate 12 additional models where I use the same independent and control variables as in my first set of models but this time I use conflict termination, a binary variable as my dependent variable. In these models I include three time-dependence variables to control for potential effect of conflict duration. The results of these 12 models are shown in Table 8. The results once again provide support to the proposed theory since as these models show more U.S. IMET participation is associated with a decreased probability of conflict termination.

Table 8. Logit Analysis of Civil War Termination, 1976-2003

VARIABLES	(13) U.S. IMET	(14) Other U.S. Aid	(15) Total U.S. Aid	(16) Armor	(17) Geography	(18) Fighting Capacity
U.S. IMET	-0.0588** (0.0284)		-0.0826*** (0.0290)	-0.0756** (0.0323)	-0.0751** (0.0307)	-0.0769** (0.0330)
Military Aid		0.951 (0.760)	0.843 (0.703)	0.785 (2.031)	0.283 (2.424)	1.338 (1.879)
Ground mech.				-0.701 (0.649)	-0.920 (0.666)	-0.841 (0.665)
Air mech.				-0.491 (0.758)	-0.658 (0.797)	-0.703 (0.791)
Combined arms				0.126 (0.112)	0.155 (0.117)	0.156 (0.118)
Distance to capital					-0.326** (0.145)	
Conflict at border					-0.747** (0.304)	
Border x Distance					0.299 (0.188)	
Rebel fighting capacity						-0.121 (0.488)
Rebel strength						0.581 (0.816)
Constant	-0.887*** (0.172)	-1.034*** (0.217)	-0.766*** (0.205)	2.265 (4.294)	5.995 (4.502)	3.126 (4.480)
Observations	940	840	760	496	496	481

Robust standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

VARIABLES	(19) Terrain	(20) Regime Type	(21) Economy	(22) External Factors	(23) Sons of Soil	(24) All controls
U.S. IMET	-0.0739** (0.0347)	-0.0732* (0.0425)	-0.0952*** (0.0319)	-0.0736** (0.0324)	-0.0871*** (0.0325)	-0.101* (0.0524)
Military Aid	-0.290 (2.166)	0.867 (2.256)	2.974 (2.330)	1.011 (2.118)	0.334 (2.134)	1.754 (3.148)
Ground mech.	-0.695 (0.702)	-0.819 (0.782)	-0.650 (0.662)	-0.741 (0.642)	-0.802 (0.677)	-1.612 (1.122)
Air mech.	-0.540 (0.827)	-0.504 (0.962)	-0.334 (0.803)	-0.535 (0.752)	-0.724 (0.790)	-1.333 (1.486)
Combined arms	0.126 (0.122)	0.142 (0.142)	0.0927 (0.119)	0.131 (0.111)	0.157 (0.119)	0.258 (0.219)
Distance to capital						-0.488*** (0.184)
Conflict at border						-0.657** (0.312)
Border x Distance						0.535** (0.255)
Rebel fight cap.						-0.554 (0.691)
Rebel strength						1.186 (1.139)
Natural resources	-0.383 (0.251)					-0.362 (0.339)
Rough terrain	-0.348 (0.252)					-0.346 (0.276)
Incum. Democ.		-0.0837 (0.583)				0.00103 (0.652)
Gdp per capita			0.500** (0.231)			0.456* (0.263)
External sup. Govt.				0.331 (0.311)		0.308 (0.420)
External sup. Reb.				-0.0308 (0.246)		-0.0474 (0.263)
Sons of soil					-1.189** (0.538)	-1.098 (0.896)
Insurgency						-0.270 (0.440)
Post-Cold War						0.272
Constant	2.879 (4.726)	2.729 (5.116)	-1.616 (5.094)	2.327 (4.287)	3.145 (4.423)	8.570 (8.550)
Observations	496	466	495	496	496	437

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Once again, similarly to the original 12 models neither the other types of U.S. military variable nor the traditional military capability variables show significant relationship with civil conflict duration. The findings of these models are consistent with those in Table 7. While better military human capital due to U.S. IMET participation is associated with longer civil conflicts neither the other forms of U.S. military aid nor the traditional military capability measures show significant effects.

Next, to conduct some more robustness checks and provide additional support to my theory I run the same two sets of models as in Table 7. and Table 8. but using a different operationalization of my independent variable. In these models I use the logged sum of 5-year total U.S. IMET spending as my independent variable. The results of these models once again show the same relationships and statistical significance as the first two sets of models. The actual tables containing these results can be reviewed in Appendix L and M.

As I suggested earlier if the logic of my theory holds than the level of U.S. IMET participation must also affect the types of civil wars incumbent government fight. If the better military human capital due to U.S. IMET participation incentivizes rebels to disperse, hide and minimize their operations than more U.S. IMET participation should lead to a higher probability of civil conflicts being fought in an irregular manner rather than conventionally. To test this argument I once again run the same 12 models as in the previous analyses but this time using civil war type as my dependent variable. The results of my analysis are shown in Table 9.

As the results in the table demonstrate U.S. IMET participation is associated with an increased probability of irregular civil conflicts across all 12 models. One unit increase in the number of U.S. IMET participants increases the probability of irregular civil conflict with .146, on average.

Table 9. Logit Analysis of Civil War Types, 1976-2003

VARIABLES	(25) U.S. IMET	(26) Other U.S. Aid	(27) Total U.S. Aid	(28) Armor	(29) Geography	(30) Fighting Capacity
U.S. IMET	0.146*** (0.0212)		0.185*** (0.0259)	0.239*** (0.0597)	0.265*** (0.0690)	0.180** (0.0749)
Military Aid		-2.864*** (0.606)	-2.445*** (0.643)	-5.288** (2.070)	-3.340 (2.175)	-6.534*** (2.418)
Ground mech.				1.182 (0.869)	1.422 (0.867)	2.083** (1.047)
Air mech.				2.540** (1.220)	3.550*** (1.262)	3.145** (1.429)
Combined arms				-0.369** (0.168)	-0.489*** (0.174)	-0.508** (0.205)
Distance to capital					-0.485 (0.324)	
Conflict at border					-0.130 (0.559)	
Border x Distance					1.309*** (0.422)	
Rebel fighting capacity						-0.621 (0.562)
Rebel strength						-2.949*** (1.044)
Constant	0.901*** (0.0898)	1.629*** (0.104)	1.004*** (0.129)	-6.341 (5.979)	-6.097 (6.140)	-9.009 (7.162)
Observations	1,014	869	832	284	284	281

Robust standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

VARIABLES	(31) Terrain	(32) Regime Type	(33) Economy	(34) External Factors	(35) Sons of Soil	(36) All Controls
U.S. IMET	0.211*** (0.0616)	0.172** (0.0738)	0.205*** (0.0658)	0.245*** (0.0599)	0.270*** (0.0633)	0.465*** (0.166)
Military Aid	-4.139* (2.233)	-1.217 (2.409)	-3.472 (2.436)	-5.190** (2.121)	-4.746** (2.087)	1.739 (4.759)
Ground mech.	1.209 (0.898)	0.140 (1.059)	1.395 (0.915)	1.303 (0.910)	1.132 (0.861)	1.783 (2.173)
Air mech.	3.288** (1.324)	2.831** (1.347)	2.996** (1.324)	2.746** (1.275)	2.885** (1.240)	5.345* (3.091)
Combined arms	-0.437** (0.178)	-0.292 (0.195)	-0.445** (0.187)	-0.390** (0.175)	-0.389** (0.167)	-0.703 (0.454)
Distance to capital						-0.600 (0.620)
Conflict at border						1.234 (1.169)
Border x Distance						0.534 (0.948)
Rebel fighting capacity						-1.113 (0.993)
Rebel strength						-5.543* (2.836)
Natural resources	0.749 (0.518)					-0.697 (1.418)
Rough terrain	-0.746 (0.466)					1.871 (1.258)
Incumbent democracy		2.643*** (0.969)				1.708 (1.604)
Gdp per capita			0.481 (0.359)			2.060** (0.988)
External support govt				-0.507 (0.449)		-1.591 (1.037)
External support rebels				0.155 (0.407)		-0.171 (0.800)
Sons of soil					1.271 (0.837)	0.784 (1.891)
Insurgency						-0.497 (0.863)
Post-Cold War						-2.992** (1.200)
Constant	-7.854 (6.181)	-4.167 (6.708)	-11.07 (7.235)	-7.227 (6.266)	-7.150 (5.960)	-21.11 (16.99)
Observations	284	263	283	284	284	254

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Other type of U.S. military aid seems to decrease the probability of irregular conflict however this relationship loses significance in several models and even changes direction when all controls are included in the analysis. From the traditional military capability variables air mechanization and combined arms strategy demonstrate statistically significant effects on the type of civil conflicts. While higher level of air mechanization is associated with higher chances of civil conflicts being fought in an irregular manner the use of combined arms strategy by government forces seems to result in a lower probability of irregular conflicts. These results make sense because air supremacy by the government`s military forces rebels to disperse and conduct operations in smaller scale and in a faster pace to avoid exposure and potential destruction by government air platforms. The use of combined arms strategy might lead to more conventional conflicts because as Caverley and Secher (2017) argue this strategy leads to swift conflict resolution where the rebels do not have time to switch to irregular methods, because they are quickly destroyed by the government forces.

From the other variables only rebel strength shows consistent and significant effects on the type of civil conflict. These results seem to be logical because it makes sense that the stronger the rebels the less likely they use irregular methods but rather challenge the government using conventional warfare methods.

Finally, to conduct robustness checks for these results I once again rerun the same models included in Table 9. but using the other operationalization of my independent variable. The results of these models once again show the same relationships and statistical significance as depicted in Table 9. The actual results of these additional models are shown in Appendix N.

Interaction Between U.S. IMET Participation and Mechanization Levels

The overall results of my analysis seem to support not only my theory but also other prior theories (Biddle and Zirkle, 1996; Biddle, 2004; Toronto 2018) arguing that who operates the military technology (human factor) might be more important than the military technology itself. To provide further support to these arguments I run several additional models where I assess the effects of interaction between my military human capital variable and the traditional military capability variables. Figure 6. visually demonstrates the results of the analyses of the interactions between U.S. IMET participation and the three different mechanization variables.

As Figure 6. demonstrate U.S. IMET participation has a significant effect on civil conflict duration even when its interaction is assessed with the traditional mechanization variables. All three graphs in Figure 6. once again demonstrate that as U.S. IMET participation increases the duration of civil conflicts also increases. Furthermore, the graphs show that the level of ground mechanization and the level of combined arms strategy only matters if quality military human capital is available for the government forces.

The first graph shows that when U.S. IMET participation is low then the level of ground mechanization does not make a significant difference in civil conflict duration. At the same time when U.S. IMET participation is high then there is a significant difference in the effects of the level of ground mechanization on civil conflict duration.

The graph shows that when both U.S. IMET participation and ground mechanization level are high then incumbents government are more likely to fight shorter civil conflicts while high U.S. IMET participation and low ground mechanization level are associated with longer civil wars. These results suggest that if the better trained and educated soldiers are provided with appropriate number of ground equipment they can end the civil conflict earlier.

Next, the second graph demonstrates the effects of U.S. IMET participation and air mechanization on the duration of civil conflicts. This graph shows that difference in the level of air mechanization has a significant effect on civil conflict duration even if the U.S. IMET participation is low. High level of air mechanization is associated with shorter civil conflicts than low air mechanization when the U.S. IMET participation is low. When the number of U.S. IMET participants increases the difference between the effects of the air mechanization levels decreases. Low level of air mechanization and high level of U.S. IMET participation are still associated with longer civil conflicts; however the improved military human capital seems to be closing the gap between high and low level of air mechanization.

Finally, graph three shows the effects of U.S. IMET participation and the combined arms strategy on civil conflict duration. This graph shows that when U.S. IMET participation is low then the use of a combined arms strategy does not make a significant difference in civil conflict duration. At the same time when U.S. IMET participation is high then there is a significant difference in the effects of the combined arms strategy on civil conflict duration. The graph shows that when U.S. IMET participation is high and combined arms strategy employed then incumbents government are more likely to fight shorter civil conflicts while high U.S. IMET participation and low levels of combined arms strategy are associated with longer civil wars.

These results demonstrate that when the quality of military human capital due to U.S. IMET participation is introduced into the analysis then higher levels of ground and air mechanization are actually associate with shorter civil conflicts which seem to contradict the findings of several previous studies (Mason et al, 1999; Lyall and Wilson, 2009; Lyall, 2010).






Figure 6. U.S. IMET participation and the Mechanization Variables

At the same time the results of the last analysis lend support to Caverley and Sechser`s (2017) arguments and shows that more effective use of a combined arms strategy is indeed associated with faster conflict termination.

Case Illustrations – Uganda, India, and El Salvador

To provide further support to the theory proposed in this paper it is important to illustrate the argument through actual cases as well. Caverley and Sechser`s (2017) dataset includes 147 unique civil conflicts from 1976 to 2003. The duration of these conflicts varies between one day and 9,380 days with a mean of 1,710 days.

Although the availability of better military human capital through the participation in U.S. IMET programs seems to be a strong predictor of civil war duration across most cases there are several particular cases that demonstrate the difference in explanatory power between the traditional military capability measures and military human capital. Two examples that challenge the prior explanations while providing support for the theory of this paper are Uganda`s civil conflicts in 1972 and between 1978 and 1991, and the civil wars in India between 1967 and 1972, and between 1978 to 2003.

According to Caverley and Sechser`s (2017) dataset both of these two countries experienced a short (shorter than the mean value of the civil conflict variable) and a long civil war while both countries` militaries` land mechanization, air mechanization and combined arms indexes (and all other features captured in the control variables) remained almost exactly the same. The lack of variation in these variables means that they cannot explain the variation in the duration of the civil conflicts and present an opportunity to explore a better explanation.

When looking at U.S. IMET participation for both countries one can find that they significantly vary between the short and long civil wars. Since the U.S. IMET programs did not exist before or during the short conflicts they could not improve the military human capital of Uganda or India and with that their effects could not prolong the civil conflict. However, before and during the long civil wars both Uganda and India have received U.S. military aid in the form of U.S. IMET training which ultimately led to longer civil wars. Although these conflicts provide some statistical examples of how land mechanization, air mechanization and combined arms indexes are all poor predictors of civil conflict duration while U.S. IMET participation is strongly associated with longer conflicts more evidence is needed regarding the mechanism through which U.S. IMET participation effects civil conflict duration. To provide such evidence I present a detailed analysis of another case from Caverley and Sechser`s (2017) dataset, the El Salvador civil conflict that lasted from 1979 till 1991 (Wood, 2003). Since this civil war lasted for 12 years and the El Salvador military received significant U.S. military aid in both the forms of arms transfers and education and training I argue that this conflict is an appropriate case to further assess the relationship between civil conflict duration and U.S. IMET participation.

Following the overthrow of General Carlos Humberto Romero`s military regime on October 15, 1979 a weak civil-military junta took the power in El Salvador. The new regime that included centrist and leftist political parties and some reform-minded, young military officers pledged to reduce human rights violations, to create a more equal distribution of national wealth, to hold free elections and to rewrite the constitution (Ladwig, 2016). While these promises never materialized demands for change quickly grew and became more radical among students,

peasants and labor unions producing five revolutionary organizations.³⁰ As Ladwig (2016) notes “large-scale demonstrations, organized strikes, occupation of foreign embassies, bank robberies, kidnapping for ransom, and bomb attacks became weekly occurrences” (Ladwig, 2016:218). While the regime struggled for survival, Cuba’s communist leader Fidel Castro brought the five revolutionary organizations’ leaders together in Havana in December 1979 when they joined their ranks and formed a unified insurgent organization the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (hereafter, FMLN) (Onate, 2011).

At the beginning of the civil conflict the FMLN could field 4,000 guerilla fighters whose operations were supported by an additional 5,000 part-time militia members (Bosh, 1999). By 1983 the number of guerrilla fighters reached 12,000. The FMLN received advice, arms and training from communist countries including Cuba, Nicaragua, the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, and East Germany (Byrne, 1996). On the other side, the El Salvador Armed Forces (hereafter, ESAF) consisted of the 8,000 men strong army and the 8,500 men strong Public Security Corps (Woerner, 1981). Th ESAF entered into the civil conflict with a non-existent noncommissioned officer corps, with low skilled, short-service conscripts, with military equipment that was in extremely poor condition and with an officer corps that was not suited for combat operations (Ladwig, 2016). The ESAF also lacked intelligence gathering capabilities as well as adequate communication equipment (Ladwig, 2016). Given these conditions during the initial years of the conflict the FMLN engaged the government forces in open battles and fought more like a conventional army than a guerilla force. From the early days of the conflict till 1983 using such

³⁰ These organizations were the Central American Workers’ Revolutionary Party, the People’s Revolutionary Army, the Farabundo Martí Popular Liberation Forces, the Armed Forces of National Resistance, and the Communist Party of El Salvador’s Armed Forces of Liberation.

conventional tactics the FMLN could capture ESAF military installations and outposts, close down important transportation routes, temporarily capture villages and departmental capitals, force ESAF to be on the defensive (Childress, 1995) and annihilate medium-sized ESAF units (Ladwig, 2016). However, by the end of 1983 changes in the capabilities of the ESAF slowly started changing the way the war was fought on both sides. By this time large number of U.S. IMET educated and trained military officers returned to El Salvador bringing their newly learned skills into the fight.

Besides a short 3-year period at the end of the 1970s when President Carter suspended all U.S. military aid programs due to serious human rights violations, El Salvador received extensive U.S. IMET support from the beginning of the civil conflict. As Childress (1995) notes “over \$1 billion in military aid has been provided to the ESAF [El Salvador Armed Forces] since 1980. In terms of actual training expenditures, El Salvador has received more IMET resources than any other Third World country, and only two other Third World countries have had more student trained through IMET since 1980” (Childress, 1995: 21). Figure 7. depicts the changes in the sum of ESAF participants in the U.S. IMET programs 5 year prior to any given year.




Figure 7. 5-year Sum of U.S. IMET participants, 1975-1997

Such a large U.S. IMET support was due to the realization that without a well-trained officer corps the war cannot be won (Woerner, 1981). To swiftly increase the number of well-trained junior officers more than a thousand ESAF officers were brought to the U.S. IMET programs in 1981 (Ladwig, 2016) and by the end of the civil conflict over half of the ESAF officer corps and each officer under the rank of captain received U.S. IMET education and training in the U.S. (Childress, 1995).

These officers received training in “individual leadership, small-unit operations, and counterinsurgency theory” (Ladwig, 2016:245) as well as additional skills that were paramount to be able to plan, organize, execute, and sustain effective military operations against the insurgents. Table 10. lists the specific U.S. IMET courses and the number of ESAF participants.

Table 10. List of U.S. IMET Courses Received by ESAF, 1988-1993

<u>Course</u>	<u>Number of Students</u>
Combat Armor Officer	520
Training Management Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO)	483
Commando Operations	285
Officer Candidate Course	283
Basic NCO Course	168
Infantry Officer Basic Course	192
Psychological Operations Officer Course	116
Instructor Training	103
Specialized English Language Training	94
English Language Course	79
Training Management Officer	66
Command and General Staff	39
Battle Staff Operations	30
Security Assistance Training and Orientation Course	26
Sapper Course	23
Operations Training	20
TOTAL	2527

Although as several studies note (Childress, 1995; Bosh, 1999; Ladwig, 2016) the returning officers met significant pressure from older ESAF officers to ignore U.S. training and

conduct operations employing ESAF's traditional conventional approaches the new knowledge and skills brought home by the U.S. IMET graduates still started to effect ESAF's overall combat effectiveness. I argue that although it is true that ESAF did not immediately implemented the American way of fighting insurgencies, but the U.S. IMET graduates' newly obtained leadership skills, tactical proficiency, better understanding of how to plan and execute military operations and how to sustain a force significantly improved the effectiveness even ESAF's conventional approach and slowly turned it into a more American counterinsurgency strategy. This is clearly shown in an assessment conducted by the U.S. General Accountability Office which found that by the mid-1980s the ESAF clearly became both technically and tactically more professional due to U.S. IMET training (Childress, 1995). Besides these factors U.S. IMET graduates' leadership skills also added to the improvement of the combat effectiveness of the ESAF. Abandoning ESAF's old centralized decision-making processes and switching to more decentralized command and control practices gave the freedom of action to tactical unit commanders to take the initiative and decide how to execute their missions (Ladwig, 2016). Due to these improvements generated by the U.S. IMET participants FMLN also needed to implement changes in their approach to the war if they wanted to keep the rebellion alive.

Castellanos (1991) argues that due to the improvements in ESAF's combat effectiveness FMLN could not sustain large-unit conventional combat operations and was ultimately forced to switch to guerilla type hit-and-run tactics. According to Castellanos (1991) a guerilla leader referred this switch in tactics a very significant turn in the conflict. Ladwig (2016) argues that as the combat effectiveness of the ESAF improved both the insurgents' morale and prospect for victory quickly plummeted. Referring to the opinion of a rebel leader Childress (1995) suggests that due to the improved combat effectiveness of the ESAF the FMLN was beat down by 1985.

As Childress (1995) find FMLN could not capture territory anymore and to survive it was forced to switch its *modus operandi* to hit-and-run guerilla tactics. By this time, as Villalobos (1986) notes FMLN no longer tried to win the war through militarily defeating ESAF but trying to break the El Salvadorian economy just to be able to sustain the civil conflict. During the upcoming years FMLN operations focused on low-level harassing activities such as severing power lines, attacking plantations, destroying bridges, and damaging economic productions. These activities led to a several years long military stalemate.

Following the 1989 national elections the new El Salvador government became more open to negotiations with the FMLN and new President Cristiani called for peace talks two days after he took office (Ladwig, 2016). FMLN saw the President's initiative as a major opportunity and to strengthen their negotiating positions launched a major combat operation against San Salvador and some other areas across the country on 11 November 1989. Although the operation was a major surprise for the ESAF, its forces regained control after a three-week campaign where they mostly employed American counterinsurgency tactics (Schwarz, 1991). While from a military perspective the offensive became a complete disaster for the FMLN because it was quickly driven out of the capital while losing 50 percent of its fighters (Thomson, 1994) from a political perspective it seems to have achieved its goal. Soon negotiations were initiated between the government and the leadership of FMLN which resulted in an UN-brokered peace-agreement signed on 16 January 1992 ending the 12-year long civil conflict (Ladwig, 2016).

Beyond the statistical support found in the Uganda and the India cases the detailed analysis of the El Salvador civil conflict demonstrates how improvement in military human capital due to U.S. IMET participation prolongs civil conflict duration. The better leadership and technical skills as well as the better tactical proficiency of the government forces due to U.S.

IMET participation indeed incentivize rebels to change their modus operandi, to hide, minimize their operations and avoid engaging government forces in open conventional battles.

Potential Criticism

Some critics might be concerned that potential selection effects are driving the results of my analysis. They might suggest that incumbent governments have an incentive to try to get access to more U.S. IMET programs if they see the rise of a strong domestic challenger or if they are expecting a longer civil war. It is also possible that the U.S. government allocates more U.S. IMET in support of those governments who are being threatened by potential insurgencies or are already engaging in civil conflicts. To address these concerns I run several models assessing the relationship between the occurrence of insurgencies and U.S. IMET participation. In these models my dependent variable is insurgency. This variable is coded 0 if a country is not involved in an insurgency and 1 if it does. For my independent variable I once again use the actual number of U.S. IMET participants and derive my control variables from relevant literature (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Blimes, 2006; Thies 2010; Fearon, 2011). The results of these models can be reviewed in Table 11.

The results in the table demonstrate across all models that the more U.S. IMET support an incumbent government receives the less likely it becomes involved in a civil conflict and with that suggest that no selection effects are driving the results of the earlier analysis. As a robustness check I run the same models with the secondary operationalization of my independent variable and find the same relationship. The results of these models can be reviewed in Appendix O.

Table 11. Logit Analysis of Insurgency Occurrence, 1976-2003

VARIABLES	(37) U.S. IMET	(38) Total U.S. Aid	(39) All Controls
U.S. IMET	-0.0861*** (0.0180)	-0.160*** (0.0228)	-0.134*** (0.0511)
Other U.S. Aid		-0.344 (0.683)	-3.278** (1.342)
Military Expenditure			-2.18e-08* (1.18e-08)
Military Personnel			-8.78e-06 (8.06e-06)
Population			-0.268** (0.105)
Regime Type			-1.650*** (0.500)
GDP per Capita			-0.144 (0.258)
Natural Resources			0.731** (0.308)
U.S. Affinity			1.296*** (0.444)
Oil Exporter			-0.0960 (0.446)
Ethnic Fractionalization			-1.755** (0.723)
Constant	0.503*** (0.0835)	0.799*** (0.127)	7.384*** (2.244)
Observations	945	761	378

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Another potential challenge to the presented argument might be why the civil conflict drags on when the insurgents realize that the incumbent government's military is becoming more effective and impose more cost on them. In this situation the insurgents would be incentivized to look for settlement as soon as possible which would be associated with shorter civil wars. This argument has some merit; however I suggest that the incumbent government also realizes the improvement in its military capabilities, and it is not interested in resolving the conflict through settlement rather through the complete destruction of the rebel movement to avoid the

reemergence of the insurgency. The insurgents will try to keep the rebellion alive as long as possible through dispersion, hiding and small-scale operations and try to secure external support or wear the government out over time which will be associated with an increase in the duration of the civil conflicts.

Finally, critics might suggest that this study overlooked several additional factors that might affect the duration of civil conflicts. These might include prior war experience of the incumbent government's forces, military skills and experience gained by both sides during the actual civil conflict, changes in the external support of the rebels due to U.S. support to the government and the specifics of the U.S. IMET training received by the government military personnel. I acknowledge that these factors can have significant effects on civil conflict duration, but due to the very limited availability of such data and space limitations of this paper they could not be considered in appropriate extent. They will be subjects of my future data collection efforts and topics for upcoming papers.

Conclusion and Implications

Several studies have already argued that external support and more specifically military aid to the incumbent governments affects the duration of civil conflicts. Prior literature suggested that foreign military aid improves the military capability of the government which prolongs civil conflict duration. These prior studies always operationalize this improved military capability through tangible, hardware-based measures (Lyall and Wilson, 2009; Lyall, 2010; Friedman, 2011; Caverley and Secher, 2017). In this paper I introduce a new measure for state military capacity in the form of military human capital and argue that it is rather the availability of highly trained and educated military personnel than military technology that effects the duration of civil

conflicts. I theorize that better military human capital due to U.S. IMET participation increases the government military's capability which incentivize rebels to hide and minimize their operations leading to a prolonged civil conflict. To test this argument, I use a new dataset that includes detailed information on insurgencies and U.S. IMET participation between 1976 and 2003.

The results of my analysis contribute to the literature of civil conflicts in four ways. First, my results support the previous claim (Lyall and Wilson, 2009; Lyall, 2010; Friedman, 2011) that better military capability is associated with longer civil wars. Second, I show that when military human capital is included in the models than neither military mechanization (Lyall and Wilson, 2009; Lyall, 2010; Friedman, 2011) nor the combined arms strategy (Caverley and Secher, 2017) are significant predictors for civil conflict duration. This result clearly suggests that who is operating the military hardware is more important than the hardware itself. Third, I find that better military human capital is not only associated with longer civil wars, but it also increases the probability of incumbent government's fighting civil conflicts in an irregular manner. Lastly, by using U.S. IMET data as a proxy for availability of quality military human capital I provide feedback about the potential effects of these education and training programs and with that I contribute to the literature of U.S. foreign military aid.

In addition to assessing civil conflict duration my study also shed some light on the importance of bringing military human capital into the research programs of armed conflicts in general. While many studies have explored the effects of military technology (Lyall and Wilson, 2009; Lyall, 2010; Friedman, 2011) and strategy employed by the belligerents (Biddle 2004; Balcells and Kalyvas 2012; Caverley and Secher, 2017) on the duration and outcome of civil conflicts the question assessing the effects of who is employing those technologies and strategies

has remained mostly unexplored. Bringing the military human capital into the analysis offers several questions that might be answered by future research.

Additional research could help us understand the effects of better trained and educated military personnel and the level of both military casualties and civilian collateral damage. Further research could isolate the relationship between military human capital and civil conflict outcomes. To address these questions better data is needed about military human capital. Although U.S. IMET participation seems to be a strong proxy for quality military human capital even more reliable new data would enable researchers to better assess the effects of military human capital in civil conflicts.

On a similar note, my study only assessed the military human capital available for the incumbent government while ignored the same variable in case of the rebels. Since in many conflicts the insurgents are coming directly from the military or have previous military experience including a variable that accounts for how educated and trained the rebel forces are would make an important addition to research. New data about rebel military human capital would enable scholars to specify the relationship more effectively between human capital and the duration of civil conflicts.

In sum, the findings of this analysis underscore the significance of including military human capital into the theoretical models of civil conflict research programs. An effective explanation of the dynamics of civil conflict requires researchers to better understand how the human factor interacts with military technology, terrain, political and economic factors. Further exploring the role of military human capital is likely to highlight several new insights helping scholars to better understand the dynamics of civil conflicts and potentially enable policymakers to make more informed decisions when preparing or involved in such wars.

References

- Atkinson, Carol (2010) Does soft power matter? A comparative analysis of student exchange programs 1980–2006. *Foreign Policy Analysis* 6(1): 1–22.
- Balcells, Laia, and Stathis N. Kalyvas. 2012. “Does Warfare Matter? Severity, Duration, and Outcomes of Civil Wars.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 58 (8): 1390–418.
- Balch-Lindsay, Dylan, and Andrew J. Enterline. 2000. “Killing Time: The World Politics of Civil War Duration, 1820–1992.” *International Studies Quarterly* 44 (4): 615–42.
- Bapat, Navin A. "Transnational terrorism, US military aid, and the incentive to misrepresent." *Journal of Peace Research* 48.3 (2011): 303-318.
- Barany, Zoltan (2012) *The Soldier and the Changing State: Building Democratic Armies in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Becker, S. Gary. 1994. *Human Capital, A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis with Special Reference to Education*, Third Edition.
- Bleaney, Michael, and Arcangelo Dimico. 2011. “How Different Are the Correlates of Onset and Continuation of Civil Wars?” *Journal of Peace Research* 48 (2): 145–55.
- Biddle, Stephen, and Robert Zirkle. "Technology, civil-military relations, and warfare in the developing world." *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 19.2 (1996): 171-212.
- Biddle, Stephen. 2004. *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Biddle, Stephen, and Stephen Long. "Democracy and military effectiveness: A deeper look." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48.4 (2004): 525-546.
- Blimes, Randall J. "The indirect effect of ethnic heterogeneity on the likelihood of civil war onset." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50.4 (2006): 536-547.
- Bosch, Brian J. *The Salvadoran officer corps and the final offensive of 1981*. McFarland, 1999.
- Buhaug, Halvard, Scott Gates and Peaivi Lujala. 2009. “Geography, Rebel Capability, and the Duration of Civil Conflict.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53 (4): 544–69.
- Byrne, Hugh. *El Salvador's civil war: a study of revolution*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996.
- Castellanos, Miguel. *The Comandante speaks: memoirs of an El Salvadoran guerrilla leader*. Westview Pr, 1991.

Caverley, Jonathan D, and Todd S. Sechser. (2017) Military Technology and the Duration of Civil Conflict, *International Studies Quarterly* (2017) 61, 704–720

Childress, Michael. *The Effectiveness of US Training Efforts in Internal Defense and Development. The Cases of El Salvador and Honduras*. RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CA, 1995.

Collier, Paul, Anke Hoeffler, and Måns Söderbom. 2004. “On the Duration of Civil War.” *Journal of Peace Research* 41(3): 253–73.

Cunningham David E. 2006. “Veto Players and Civil War Duration.” *American Journal of Political Science* 50 (4): 875–92.

Cunningham, David E., Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Idean Salehyan. 2009. “It Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53(4): 570–97.

Cunningham, David E. 2010. “Blocking Resolution: How External States Can Prolong Civil Wars.” *Journal of Peace Research* 47 (2): 115–27.

De Figueiredo, Rui J. P. JR. and Barry R. Weingast. 1999. “The Rationality of Fear: Political Opportunism and Ethnic Conflict.” In *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention*, edited by Barbara F. Walter and Jack Snyder, 261–302. New York: Columbia University Press.

DeRouen, Jr., Karl R. and David Sobek. 2004. “The Dynamics of Civil War Duration and Outcome.” *Journal of Peace Research* 41(3): 303–20.

Fearon, James D. 1995. “Rationalist Explanations for War.” *International Organization* 49 (3): 379–414.

Fearon, James & David Laitin, 2003. 'Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War', *American Political Science Review* 97(1): 75-90.

Fearon, James D. 2004. “Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others?” *Journal of Peace Research* 41(3): 275–301.

Friedman, Jeffrey A. 2011. “Manpower and Counterinsurgency: Empirical Foundations for Theory and Doctrine.” *Security Studies* 20 (4): 556–91.

Gates, Scott, Havard Hegre, Mark P. Jones, and Havard Strand. 2006. “Institutional Inconsistency and Political Instability: Polity Duration, 1800–2000.” *American Journal of Political Science* 50 (4): 893–908.

- Gilmore, Elisabeth, Nils Petter Gleditsch, Paivi Lujala and Jan Ketil Rod. 2005. "Conflict Diamonds: A New Dataset." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 22 (3): 257–72.
- Gleditsch, Nils, Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Margareta Sollenberg and Havard Strand. 2002. "Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset." *Journal of Peace Research* 39 (5): 615–37.
- Hendrix, Cullen S. "Measuring State Capacity: Theoretical and Empirical Implications for the Study of Civil Conflict," *Journal of Peace Research* 47, no. 3 (2010): 273–85.
- Hendrix, Cullen and Young, Joseph. 2014. "State Capacity and Terrorism," *Security Studies*, 23:2, 329-63.
- Hultquist, Philip. 2013. "Power Parity and Peace? The Role of Relative Power in Civil War Settlement." *Journal of Peace Research* 50 (5): 623–34.
- Huntington, Samuel P (2006) *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Humphreys, Macartan. 2005. "Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution: Uncovering the Mechanisms." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49 (4): 508–37.
- Kirschner, Shanna. A. 2010. "Knowing your Enemy: Information and Commitment Problems in Civil Wars." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 54 (5): 745–70.
- Kocher, Matthew Adam. "State Capacity as a Conceptual Variable," *Yale Journal of International Affairs* 5, no. 2 (2010): 137–45.
- Ladwig III, W. C. (2016). Influencing Clients in Counterinsurgency: US Involvement in El Salvador's Civil War, 1979–92. *International Security*, 41(1), 99-146.
- Lefever, E. W. (1976). The military assistance training program. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 424(1), 85-95.
- Lujala, Paivi, Jan Ketil Rod and Nadja Thieme. 2007. "Fighting Over Oil: Introducing a New Dataset." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 24 (3): 239–56.
- Lujala, Paivi. 2009. "Deadly Combat Over Natural Resources: Gems, Petroleum, Drugs, and the Severity of Armed Civil Conflict." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53 (1): 50–71.
- Lujala, Paivi, 2010. "The Spoils of Nature: Armed Civil Conflict and Rebel Access to Natural Resources." *Journal of Peace Research* 47 (1): 15–28.
- Lyall, Jason. 2010. "Do Democracies Make Inferior Counterinsurgents? Reassessing Democracy's Impact on War Outcomes and Duration." *International Organization* 64 (1): 167–92.

Lyall, Jason, and Isaiah Wilson. 2009. "Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars." *International Organization* 63 (1): 67–106.

Macdonald, Paul K. 2013. "Retribution Must Succeed Rebellion': The Colonial Origins of Counterinsurgency Failure." *International Organization* 67 (2): 253–86.

Mason, T. David; Joseph Weingarten Jr. & Patrick Fett, 1999. 'Win, Lose, or Draw: Predicting the Outcomes of Civil Wars', *Political Research Quarterly* 5 2(2): 239-268.

Melander, Erik Therése Pettersson & Lotta Themnér. 2016. "Organized violence, 1989–2015." *Journal of Peace Research* 53(5): 727–742.

Nilsson, Desire`e. 2008. "Partial Peace: Rebel Groups Inside and Outside of Civil War Settlements." *Journal of Peace Research* 45 (4): 479–95.

Pearlman, Wendy, and Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham. 2012. "Nonstate Actors, Fragmentation, and Conflict Processes." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56 (1): 3–15.

Pollack, Kenneth M. *Arabs at war: military effectiveness, 1948-1991*. U of Nebraska Press, 2004.

Rustad, Siri Camilla AAS, Jan Ketil Rod, Wenche Larsen and Nils Petter Gleditsch. 2008. "Foliage and Fighting: Forest Resources and the Onset, Duration, and Location of Civil War." *Political Geography* 27 (7): 761–82.

Savage, Dillon J. and Caverley, Jonathan D. 2017. "When human capital threatens the Capitol: Foreign aid in the form of military training and coups." *Journal of Peace Research* 2017, Vol. 54(4) 542–557.

Schwarz, Benjamin. *American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador: The Frustrations of Reform and the Illusions of Nation Building*. Rand Corporation, 1991.

Secher, Todd S., and Elizabeth N. Saunders. 2010. "The Army You Have: The Determinants of Military Mechanization, 1979–2001." *International Studies Quarterly* 54 (2): 481–511.

Smith, Niel A., and Nathan W. Toronto. 2010. "It's All the Rage: Why Mechanization Doesn't Explain COIN Outcomes." *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 21 (3): 519–28.

Taw, Jennifer M. *Thailand and the Philippines: Case studies in US IMET training and its role in internal defense and development*. RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CA, 1994.

Thies, Cameron G. "Of rulers, rebels, and revenue: State capacity, civil war onset, and primary commodities." *Journal of peace research* 47.3 (2010): 321-332.

Thompson, Leroy. *Ragged war: the story of unconventional and counter-revolutionary warfare*. Arms and Armour, 1994, P. 79.

Toronto Nathan W. 2018. *How Militaries Learn Human Capital, Military Education, and Battlefield Effectiveness*. Rowman and Littlefield.

Oñate, Andrea. "The Red Affair: FMLN–Cuban relations during the Salvadoran Civil War, 1981–92." *Cold War History* 11.2 (2011): 133-154.

Villalobos, Joaquin. *The War in El Salvador* (San Francisco: Solidarity Publications, 1986), p. 17.

Walter, Barbara F. 2002. *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Walter, Barbara F. 2009. "Bargaining Failures and Civil War." *Annual Review of Political Science* 12: 243–61.

Woerner, Frederick Frank. *Report of the El Salvador Military Strategy Assistance Team:(draft)*. 1981.

Wucherpfenning, Julian, Nils W. Metternich, Lars-Erik Cederman, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. 2012. "Ethnicity, the State, and the Duration of Civil War." *World Politics* 64 (1): 79–115.

CHAPTER FIVE: TRAINING FOR PEACE – U.S. IMET AND MID INITIATION, 1976-2007

Abstract

How does U.S. military aid in the form of U.S. IMET programs affect the likelihood of recipient states becoming involved in militarized interstate disputes (hereafter, MIDs)? While the relationship between U.S. military aid in the form of arms and equipment transfer and MID involvement has been studied extensively in international relations literature the effects of U.S. military aid in the form of foreign military education and training on the same phenomena has been completely ignored. This study intends to fill some of this gap by systematically assessing the effects of this latter form of U.S. military aid on the recipient states' international conflict behavior. I theorize that American educated and trained foreign military personnel return home with a better understanding about the role of the military as an instrument of national power, civil-military relations, the value of cooperation and the cost of war. These military personnel advise their political masters against the use of military force during international disputes leading to a decreased probability of MID initiation. To test this argument I use data from the Correlates of War Project's MID data set (version 4.3) and the most prominent U.S. foreign military education and training program the International Military Education and Training (hereafter, U.S. IMET) and I find that more U.S. IMET support a country receives the less likely it initiates MIDs. I also find that countries that receive U.S. IMET support are less likely to escalate ongoing MIDs to higher levels of hostility.

Introduction

How does U.S. military aid in the form of U.S. IMET programs affect the likelihood of recipient states becoming involved in MIDs? While the relationship between U.S. military aid in the form of arms and equipment transfer and MIDs has been studied extensively in international relations literature the effects of U.S. military aid in the form of foreign military education and training on the same phenomena has been completely ignored. Besides leaving this less tangible, but important variable out from previous studies this research agenda requires further exploration due to the contradicting results of prior research. While theoretically all previous studies agree that U.S. military aid improves the military capabilities of the recipient states some studies argue that this improved military capability is associated with higher probability of interstate conflict initiation (Sylvan, 1976; Schrodt, 1983; Brzoska and Pearson, 1984; Pearson, Brzoska, and Crantz, 1992; Kinsella, 1994; Hartung, 1994; Craft and Smaldone, 2002) while others find the opposite relationship (Huth and Russett, 1984; Huth, 1988; Kinsella and Tillema, 1995). Additionally, Durch's (2000) analysis suggest that there is no relationship between arms and equipment transfer and armed conflict involvement.

This paper intends to contribute to this ongoing debate about the relationship between military aid and conflict involvement by systematically assessing how U.S. military aid in the form foreign military education and training programs influence the probability of recipient states becoming interstate conflict initiators. The scope of this investigation focuses only on militarized interstate disputes (hereafter, MID) and one of the fourteen U.S. foreign military education and training programs³¹, the International Military Education and Training programs

³¹ The U.S. foreign military education and trainings programs are: the Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET), International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, Global Peace Operations Initiative, Department of Defense Regional Centers for Security Studies,

because the U.S. IMET programs are the most prominent of these efforts. It is the largest in size and budget; has the most clearly defined goals and subject to continuous scrutiny from policymakers and the U.S. Congress. Given these facts I suggest that the relationship found between the U.S. IMET programs and MID involvements also applies to the U.S. foreign military education and training effort as a whole.

Since one of the goals assigned to the U.S. IMET programs by Congress is to support regional stability and decrease the likelihood of armed conflict between countries³² this investigation does not only contribute to the ongoing scholarly debate about the effects of U.S. military aid on MIDs but potentially provides direct feedback to policy makers whether the U.S. IMET programs meet the goals assigned to them by Congress.

To be able to investigate the research question and provide policy feedback related to the U.S. IMET programs I build on the general theoretical frameworks of the previously listed studies and suggest that military aid in the form of U.S. IMET programs also improves the military capabilities of the recipient states. However, I propose that while military aid in the form of arms and equipment transfer improves the more tangible, hardware related elements of the recipient states` militaries, the U.S. IMET programs improve a less tangible factor, the military human capital. I argue that the improvement in the military human capital acts differently than capability improvement through the reception of arms and equipment. I propose that the more education and training foreign military personnel receive in the U.S. IMET programs the better

Section 1004 – Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Training Support, Mine Action Programs, Disaster Response, Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program, Section 2282 – Global Train and Equip Program, Service-Sponsored Activities, Foreign Assistance Act and the Department of Homeland Security/U.S. Coast Guard Activities Program.

³² Department of State and the Department of Defense Foreign Military Training Joint Report, Fiscal Year 2012 and 2013.

understanding they will have about the role of the military as an instrument of national power, civil-military relations, the value of cooperation and the cost of war. Based on this improved understanding the graduates of the U.S. IMET programs advise their civilian masters against the offensive use of military force in case of an interstate dispute, which reduces the probability of interstate conflict initiation. Empirically I find that indeed the more U.S. military aid countries receive in the form of U.S. IMET participation the less likely that they initiate interstate conflicts. Additionally, the results of my analysis also show that more U.S. IMET participation is also associated with a decreased probability of escalating ongoing MIDs to the higher levels of hostility. The study proceeds in six parts.

To establish a strong foundation for the further discussion this paper starts with a review and discussion of the most significant previous literature that explores the causes of conflict initiation. Next, the paper proceeds with the development of a theoretical argument to explain how participation in the U.S. IMET programs improves the military human capital of the recipient states and why this improved military capability is associated with a decreased probability of interstate conflict initiation. Next, I discuss the research design, the data sources, measurements, and my empirical strategy. Then, the study presents the empirical analysis and discusses the main findings. The analysis concludes with a short summary of the findings and contributions alongside with some potential policy implications and ideas for further research.

Theories of MID Initiation

Militarized interstate disputes are military conflicts among two or more sovereign states involving nonaccidental, government-sanctioned, overt, and explicit threats, displays, or uses of military force, with the potential of escalating to war (Jones, Bremer, and Singer, 1996). In

international relations scholarship the question of why some countries are becoming involved in such conflicts has been studied extensively. Some scholars suggest that the variation in this phenomenon can be explained by the difference in countries` regime types (Snyder 1991; Downs and Rocke, 1994; Van Evera 1994, Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, 1995; Reiter and Stam, 2002; Caverley, 2014). Other experts argue that changing power balance due to different growth rates of states are the possible sources of conflict and might lead to MIDs (Organski and Kugler, 1980; Gilpin, 1981; Maoz, 1982; Wallerstein, 1984; Midlarsky, 1990; Geller, 1992). Furthermore, building on Vasquez`s (1993) argument Huth (1996) and Krause (2004) argue that countries that are involved in territorial disputes are more likely to initiate MIDs. Others argues that alliances play a crucial role in states` international conflict behavior. While according to the findings of several studies membership in alliances increase the probability of countries becoming aggressive others suggest that certain types of alliances prevent its members to become instigators of MIDs (Morrow, 1994; Fearon, 1997; Leeds, 2003; Benson, 2011). Additionally, several researchers find that military capabilities that states possess determine whether a country becomes involved in MIDs (Waltz 1981; Mearsheimer 1984, 1993; Jervis 1989; Blair 1993; Sagan 1994; Kapur 2005; Bell and Miller, 2015). In relation to the military capabilities argument several studies also investigate the effects of foreign military aid on MIDs. This study intends to contribute to this latter literature by exploring their theoretical arguments from a different angle and expanding on their empirical methods and findings.

The studies that assess the relationship between foreign military aid and probability of the recipient countries` international conflict involvement can be divided into two groups from a theoretical perspective: the encouragement and the discouragement arguments. Those studies that belong to the former group (Sylvan, 1976; Schrodts, 1983; Brzoska and Pearson, 1984;

Pearson, Brzoska, and Crantz, 1992; Kinsella, 1994; Hartung, 1994; Craft and Smaldone, 2002) argue that more foreign military aid in the form of arms and equipment transfer increases the probability of MID involvement. According to these studies several mechanisms might drive this relationship. First, Pearson, Brzoska, and Crantz (1992) suggest that “arms deliveries are a factor in decisions to go to war because of considerations of military superiority” (Pearson, Brzoska, and Crantz, 1992: 399). Additionally, Craft and Smaldone (2002) argue that “the importation of weapons may increase the perceived military capability of the state in the minds of its leadership, making it more confident of a favorable military-political outcome in armed confrontations, and therefore more likely to initiate or participate in them” (Craft and Smaldone, 2002: 704). Finally, Craft and Smaldone (2002) also propose that “weapons acquisitions may heighten the prestige and institutional role of the military in society and government policy determination and lead to more aggressive responses to perceived security threats” (Craft and Smaldone, 2002: 704). These studies find empirical support to their claims and argue that more foreign military aid in the form of arms and equipment transfer increases the probability of MID involvement.

Contradictory to these arguments the restraint literature (Huth and Russett, 1984; Huth, 1988; Kinsella and Tillema, 1995) proposes that military arms and equipment transfer reduces the probability of MID involvement of the recipient states. These studies suggest that this type of military aid improves the recipient countries` military capabilities and with that improves the military balance with potential adversaries (Kinsella and Tillema, 1995). Furthermore, this improved capability enables the recipient states to deter potential foreign aggressors and increases the recipient states` perception of security. According to the restraint studies the increased perception of security reduces the incentive to initiate MIDs and because of that the more military aid a country receives in the form of arms and equipment transfer the less likely it

will be involved in MIDs (Kinsella and Tillema, 1995). Finally, Durch (2000) argues that both groups of studies are wrong because there is no relationship between arms and equipment transfer and recipient states' involvement in armed conflicts.

Although all these studies make significant contributions to the overall research agenda they also leave some room for potential improvement and expansion. I suggest that the contradicting results of the previous studies are due to their different research designs (case studies versus large-N analysis) and their use of different proxies for foreign military aid. Furthermore, the authors' limited regional scopes and the small number of cases compared to "world-wide" large-N studies might also contribute to the contradicting empirical findings. Besides these challenges all of these studies only assess the relationship between foreign military aid in the form of arms and equipment transfers and MID involvement, while systematically ignore the potential effects of U.S. military aid in the form of foreign military education and training. The inclusion of this variable into this research agenda is important for several reasons.

First, the U.S. foreign military education and training effort makes up quite a substantial part of the overall U.S. military aid efforts since for example in fiscal year 2015 the U.S. provided \$876.5 million worth of IMET training to about 76,400 students from 154 countries (Savage and Caverley, 2017). Second, Biddle and Zirkle (1996) argue that without well trained and educated military personnel the availability of complex modern weapons or large military budget are not sufficient to increase a country's military capabilities. Furthermore, Biddle (2004) suggests that state military capabilities do not only depend on tangible factors such as number of military personnel, number of major weapon systems (tanks, airplanes, ships, etc.), possession of nuclear capability (Waltz 1981; Mearsheimer 1984, 1993; Jervis 1989; Blair 1993; Sagan 1994; Kapur 2005) or military expenditure (Hendrix, 2010; and Kocher, 2010) but also on less tangible

elements including the availability of well trained and educated military personnel. Finally, Toronto (2018) suggests that without highly trained and educated military personnel states' military forces cannot be successful in modern conflict.

Through the introduction of the U.S. IMET programs into the investigation of the relationship between U.S. military aid and MID involvement and focusing on the effects of military human capital this study establishes a new approach within this research agenda. Furthermore, the introduction of a different type of military aid might also help decide the debate between the encouragement and the discouragement literature or sides with Durch's (2000) argument by providing further empirical evidence to either side. Next, besides its contributions to the ongoing scholarly debate assessing the effects of U.S. IMET programs on the recipient states' international conflict behavior also has significant policy implications. Since one of the major goals of the U.S. IMET programs is to support regional stability and minimize the probability of interstate conflict initiation the results of this study can provide direct feedback to policy makers whether the U.S. IMET programs meet the assigned goals.

Theory of U.S. IMET and MID Initiation

The U.S. military aid is being delivered to the recipient states in two forms: arms and equipment transfers and foreign military education and training programs. One of the main goals of both types of U.S. military aid is to improve the military capabilities of the recipient states so they can deter foreign aggression and defend themselves in case of an armed conflict (Cope, 1995; Atkinson, 2010; Savage and Caverley, 2017). While U.S. military aid in the form of arms and equipment transfer improves the recipient states' military capabilities through better hardware the U.S. IMET programs improve the recipient states' military human capital (Savage and

Caverley, 2017). Since as Biddle and Zirkle (1996); Biddle (2004) and Toronto (2018) argue without well trained and educated military personnel the availability of complex modern weapons is not sufficient to increase a country`s military capabilities countries that rely on U.S. foreign military aid are incentivized to also improve their military human capital to U.S. IMET participation. These programs provide a unique framework for foreign militaries to improve their military human capital for several reasons.

Atkinson (2010) and Savage and Caverley (2017) argue that the U.S. military is currently the best military force in the world and possess the best military educational and training programs. Additionally, the U.S. IMET programs are unique because the U.S. military accumulated decades of war experiences. Furthermore, the size and modernity of the U.S. training infrastructure, the availability of an experienced and combat focused training cadre, and the size of the budget available³³ for education and training purposes cannot be compared to any other country`s similar programs (Savage and Caverley, 2017). Besides these factors foreign military also send their military personnel to the U.S. IMET programs, because as Farrell (2001) argues militaries around the world admire the professional norms, values and procedures of those foreign militaries that have won victories in recent wars or have gone through major technological developments. According to Farrell (2001) military organizations emulate the norms and procedures of those victorious examples even if those norms and procedures do not fit the strategic interest of the given countries. The author argues that the implementation of an American style military, following the U.S. dramatic victory in the Gulf Wars, in countries like Botswana, Monaco or Micronesia are clear examples of such norm emulation (Farrell 2001;

³³ According to Savage and Caverley (2017) the annual training budget of the U.S. military is bigger than entire defense budget of 117 countries.

Goldman 2003, 2006). Based on this argument I propose that most foreign militaries admire the recent victories and technical advancement of the U.S. military and want to emulate its norms and values.

Savage and Caverley (2017) suggest that the foreign military personnel who participates in the U.S. IMET programs absorb the U.S. military's distinct and highly professional identity as well as its core values, which significantly improves the professionalism of the recipient states' military as a whole. Furthermore, Stepan (1986), Huntington (2006), and Barany (2012) argue that the more professional a military considers itself, the higher the temptation to be involved in state affairs both domestically and internationally. Furthermore, Atkinson (2010) argues that the U.S. IMET programs teaches participants about the role of the military as an instrument of national power, about appropriate civil-military relations and the potential cost of an interstate war. Additionally, as a part of their training U.S IMET graduates learn about the importance of quality military advice in the foreign policy making process and how even low or mid-level military leaders can indirectly affect high level decisions³⁴. Finally, based on interviews conducted with U.S. IMET graduates from the country Georgia, Phadnis (2019) finds that these graduates are catalyzing and leading their country's defense transformation and argues that U.S. IMET graduates' "impact at the highest levels of the Georgian Ministry of Defense and General Staff cannot be overstated" (Phandis, 2019).

Based on these arguments I theorize that U.S. IMET program graduates return home as more professional and more capable soldiers with the ability and willingness to influence

³⁴ Based on the National Security Act of 1947 which was amended by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 the highest-ranking military leader, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff acts as the "principal military advisor" to the President of the United States. However, the advice delivered by the Chairman is based on the assessment and analysis of numerous low and mid-level military leaders who all provide input into this product.

political leaders` decisions directly or indirectly. Due to their participation in the best and most respected military education and training programs (Atkinson, 2010; Savage and Caverley, 2017) U.S. IMET graduates improve the military`s respect within their home society and increase the military`s role in government policy determination. In support of this assertion Lefever (1976) suggests that the graduates of the IMET programs do not only become more professionals, but also senior military leaders with significant political influence and responsibility.

I also suggest that recipient states` political leaders listen more to the military advise of the U.S. IMET graduates than those military leaders who has never attended American education and training. This is the case because the political leaders send military personnel to the U.S. with the goal to obtain better educated and trained military human capital. They understand that the U.S. IMET programs are the best military education and training opportunity in the world and because of that they listen to the advice of the U.S. IMET graduates more than those who were never educated or trained in the U.S. The military advice given by the U.S. IMET graduates are driven by the norms and values they learn in these programs. They return home with a better understanding about the role of the military as an instrument of national power, about appropriate civil-military relations, the importance of diplomacy and international cooperation, and the potential cost of an interstate war. Due to these factors when time comes to advise political leaders regarding the potential use of military force in an international dispute U.S. IMET graduates are more likely to caution their political masters against such aggression than those military leaders who has not participated in such U.S. education and training programs. These assertions lead to my first two hypotheses:

H1: In comparison of countries, those receiving U.S. IMET support are less likely to initiate MIDs.

H1a: In comparison of countries, the more U.S. IMET support a country receives the less likely it initiates MIDs.

If the U.S. IMET graduates are less likely to promote the use of military in case of an international dispute than those military leaders who has never participated in such programs than it is also logical that they will advise against escalating ongoing MIDs to higher levels of hostility. According to Jones, Bremer, and Singer (1996) MIDs can be divided into five categories based on the level of hostility in an ongoing conflict. These five categories include no militarized action, the threat of use of force, display of force, use of force and full war (Jones, Bremer, and Singer, 1996). I argue if the politician leaders of the recipient states indeed listen to the advice of the U.S. IMET graduates and these military personnel based on the norms and values they learn in the U.S. IMET programs advocate for the use of military force only as the last resort in international disputes than U.S. IMET participation must be associated with less likelihood of conflict escalation. Based on this argument I propose two additional hypotheses:

H2: In comparison of countries, those receiving U.S. IMET support will be less likely to escalate interstate conflicts to the higher levels of hostility.

H2a: In comparison of countries, the more U.S. IMET support a country receives the less likely it escalates interstate conflicts to the higher levels of hostility.

Research Design

To assess the effects of the U.S. IMET programs on MID involvement and escalation I employ large-N statistical analysis through a series of logistic regression models. The interpretation of these models is being discussed in detail in Long (1997).

To conduct a rigorous assessment of the effects of U.S. IMET programs on the recipient states` international conflict behavior and to ensure to include all potential alternative

explanations presented in the previous studies I generate a new dataset by merging five frequently used datasets. First, I use the Correlates of War (hereafter, COW) Militarized Interstate Dispute data set version 4.3 (Glenn, et al, 2015) and the COW National Material Capabilities dataset version 5.0 (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, 1972). Next, I derive my regime type variable from Boix et al. (2012). and my U.S. IMET related variables from Savage and Caverley (2017) whose IMET data ranges from 1976 to 2007. Finally, I use several variables of the COW Formal Alliances dataset version 4.1 (Gibler, 2009). The new dataset contains 3558 observations. The unit of analysis is country-year.

To operationalize my first dependent variable, conflict initiation I use the COW MID dataset initiator variable. This is a dichotomous variable which is coded 0 if a country did not initiate the given conflict within a given year and 1 if it did initiate the MID. The frequency of occurrence of conflict initiators can be reviewed in Table 12.

Table 12. Frequency of MID Initiator variable

Initiator	Frequency	Percent	Cum
0	320	8.99	8.99
1	3,238	91.01	100.00
Total	3,558	100.00	

My second dependent variable is COW MID dataset`s levels of hostility variable. This variable is coded from 1 to 5. 1 is being no militarized action, 2 is the threat of use of force, 3 is display of force, 4 represents the use of force and finally 5 is full war. The frequency of the hostility level variable can be reviewed in Table 13.

My key explanatory variable is participation in U.S. IMET programs. I use Savage and Caverley`s (2017) IMET variables. To ensure the robustness of my findings I operationalize the

U.S. IMET variable three different ways. My first independent variable is a binary variable coded 0 if the country does not receive any U.S. IMET support and 1 if the country does receive military education and training from the U.S. My second independent variable is the number of U.S. IMET students. Since increasing a country's military capacity through the improvement of its human capital takes time I use the logged five-year sum of U.S. IMET students measuring the total number of U.S. IMET participants of a given country during the five years prior before the actual MID started. Finally, since the U.S. IMET programs are different both in their content and their duration I employ a different measure as well to account for this variance. I use the logged sum of 5-year total U.S. IMET spending as my second operationalization.

Table 13. Frequency of Hostility Level variable

Hostility Level	Frequency	Percent	Cum.
1	914	25.69	25.69
2	71	2.00	27.68
3	1,320	37.10	64.78
4	1,220	34.29	99.07
5	33	0.93	100.00
Total	3,558	100.00	

Next, I aggressively control for potential confounding variables and derive my controls from the most widely cited literature addressing the potential causes of militarized interstate dispute initiation and escalation. The first alternative explanation I control for is other types of U.S. military aid. I use Savage and Caverley's (2014) military aid variable to account for the effects of U.S. military aid in the form of arms and equipment transfer. This variable measures the amount of U.S. military aid as a percentage of the recipient country's GDP. Savage and

Caverley (2014) generated this variable by including “US Military aid (USAID), deflated to 2005 dollars and divided by total GDP” (Savage and Caverley, 2014: 549) of any given country.

My next control variable is regime type (Snyder 1991; Downs and Rocke, 1994; Van Evera, 1994; Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, 1995; Reiter and Stam, 2002; Cavelrey, 2014;) To account for the potential effects of regime type I utilize the regime type variable of Boix et al. (2012). This variable was developed through the consideration of multiple factors using information from 219 countries between 1800 and 2007. This binary variable is coded as 1 if the regime qualifies as democracy based on the authors` requirements and 0 if it does not.

I derive my next control variable from the literature that argues that alliances play a crucial role in states` international behavior (Morrow, 1994; Fearon, 1997; Leeds, 2003; Benson, 2011). To account for the potential effects of different alliances this analysis employs three alliance variables (defense, nonaggression, and entente) from the Correlates of War Formal Alliances dataset version 4.1 (Gibler, 2009) and also accounts for neutrality. All three alliance variables are dichotomous and coded as 0 if a country is not a member of the given alliance and 1 if it is a member. The neutrality variable is also binary coded 0 if a country not neutral and 1 if it is. Since it is also being argued in previous literature (Krause, 2004) that U.S. affiliation might improves states` security perceptions and reduces their incentives to initiate interstate conflict I also control for this potential effect. This variable is continuous and measured on a scale between -1 and +1 where -1 means no U.S. affiliation, while +1 means U.S. security guarantee for the given state.

The next variable controls for the possession of nuclear capabilities (Waltz, 1981; Mearsheimer, 1984, 1993; Jervis, 1989; Blair, 1993; Sagan 1994; Kapur, 2005) I use a binary variable to control for the effects of the possession of nuclear capabilities. The variable is coded

0 if the country does not have nuclear weapons and 1 if the country possesses such capabilities. Additionally, following the controls used in previous studies I control for the potential effects of national capabilities. I use the gdp, the iron and steel production ability, the total population size, the military expenditure, and military size data from the Correlates of War National Material Capabilities dataset version 5.0 (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, 1972). All of these variables are interval variables. Last, but not least to address potential endogeneity problem I included Savage and Caverley`s (2017) ongoing conflict variable as well among my controls. This variable is coded 0 if a country is not involved in a civil war and 1 if it does. The summary statistics for all my variables can be reviewed in Appendix P.

Results and Discussion

Table 14. exhibits the findings from eleven logistic regression models assessing the effects of the U.S. IMET programs on the probability of becoming the initiator of MIDs. In the models I use the three different operationalization of U.S. IMET participation. The results can be interpreted simply as variables with negative coefficients are associated with a decreasing probability of becoming an interstate conflict initiator. Model 1 includes only the binary measure of U.S. IMET participation. In the second model I include the actual number of U.S. IMET participants while the third model assesses how changes in the annual IMET spending effects the probability of MID initiation. In Model 4 I show how the other form of U.S. military aid (arms and equipment transfer) variable effects the recipient states` international conflict behavior. In Model 5 through 8 I assess the different U.S. IMET variables and the other form of U.S. military aid variable when I control for all the factors that previous literature argues having significant effects on becoming the instigator of an interstate conflict.

Table 14. U.S. IMET participation and MID initiation, 1976 - 2007.

VARIABLES	(1) IMET Binary	(2) IMET Students	(3) IMET Spending	(4) Other Aid	(5) IMET Binary	(6) IMET Students
IMET	-0.722*** (0.121)				-0.745*** (0.178)	
IMET(stud.)		-0.105*** (0.0183)				-0.133*** (0.0276)
IMET(spend.)			-0.0708*** (0.0135)			
Other Aid				2.948*** (1.132)		
Defense					-0.182 (0.191)	-0.201 (0.191)
Non-aggr.					0.173 (0.161)	0.177 (0.162)
Entente					-0.179 (0.155)	-0.143 (0.156)
Neutrality					-0.325* (0.191)	-0.347* (0.192)
Military Exp.					1.52e-08** (6.68e-09)	1.29e-08* (6.69e-09)
Army size					-0.000639* (0.000345)	-0.000626* (0.000348)
Iron/Steel					1.25e-05 (8.25e-06)	1.54e-05* (8.31e-06)
Total Pop.					4.58e-06*** (1.70e-06)	4.56e-06** (1.79e-06)
GDP					-0*** (0)	-0*** (0)
Democracy					-0.0973 (0.198)	-0.0377 (0.199)
Civil war					0.856*** (0.161)	0.960*** (0.165)
Nuclear Cap.					-0.437 (0.328)	-0.526 (0.330)
U.S. Affinity					-0.922*** (0.218)	-0.997*** (0.220)
Constant	2.705*** (0.0947)	2.431*** (0.0654)	2.493*** (0.0720)	2.115*** (0.0730)	2.305*** (0.238)	1.972*** (0.209)
Observations	3,558	3,558	3,558	2,863	2,696	2,696

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

VARIABLES	(6) IMET Students	(7) IMET Spending	(8) Other Aid	(9) IMET Binary	(10) IMET Students	(11) IMET Spending
IMET				-0.821*** (0.180)		
IMET(stud.)	-0.133*** (0.0276)				-0.144*** (0.0278)	
IMET(spend.)		-0.0765*** (0.0202)				-0.0847*** (0.0204)
Other Aid			3.634** (1.533)	4.801*** (1.664)	4.980*** (1.715)	4.735*** (1.684)
Defense	-0.201 (0.191)	-0.181 (0.191)	-0.287 (0.192)	-0.278 (0.195)	-0.299 (0.195)	-0.273 (0.195)
Non-aggr.	0.177 (0.162)	0.189 (0.161)	0.177 (0.161)	0.107 (0.162)	0.113 (0.163)	0.128 (0.162)
Entente	-0.143 (0.156)	-0.162 (0.155)	-0.231 (0.153)	-0.192 (0.156)	-0.151 (0.156)	-0.170 (0.156)
Neutrality	-0.347* (0.192)	-0.342* (0.191)	-0.391** (0.187)	-0.274 (0.191)	-0.302 (0.192)	-0.294 (0.191)
Military Exp.	1.29e-08* (6.69e-09)	1.39e-08** (6.60e-09)	1.73e-08*** (6.39e-09)	1.45e-08** (6.76e-09)	1.19e-08* (6.75e-09)	1.29e-08* (6.66e-09)
Army size	-0.0006* (0.0004)	-0.0006* (0.0004)	-0.0006* (0.0003)	-0.0007** (0.004)	-0.0007** (0.0004)	-0.0007** (0.0004)
Iron/Steel	1.54e-05* (8.31e-06)	1.31e-05 (8.25e-06)	1.04e-05 (8.10e-06)	1.88e-05** (8.45e-06)	2.20e-05*** (8.53e-06)	1.92e-05** (8.45e-06)
Total Pop.	4.56e-06** (1.79e-06)	4.51e-06*** (1.74e-06)	3.92e-06** (1.52e-06)	5.02e-06*** (1.76e-06)	5.01e-06*** (1.88e-06)	4.93e-06*** (1.81e-06)
GDP	-0*** (0)	-0*** (0)	-0** (0)	-0*** (0)	-0*** (0)	-0*** (0)
Democracy	-0.0377 (0.199)	-0.0914 (0.198)	-0.108 (0.201)	0.0391 (0.206)	0.111 (0.208)	0.0445 (0.206)
Civil war	0.960*** (0.165)	0.887*** (0.162)	0.786*** (0.157)	0.895*** (0.164)	1.008*** (0.168)	0.928*** (0.164)
Nuclear Cap.	-0.526 (0.330)	-0.425 (0.326)	-0.146 (0.303)	-0.530 (0.328)	-0.608* (0.328)	-0.507 (0.325)
U.S. Affinity	-0.997*** (0.220)	-0.948*** (0.217)	-0.880*** (0.217)	-0.811*** (0.221)	-0.900*** (0.222)	-0.849*** (0.220)
Constant	1.972*** (0.209)	2.045*** (0.214)	1.638*** (0.221)	2.061*** (0.250)	1.677*** (0.229)	1.778*** (0.231)
Observations	2,696	2,696	2,696	2,696	2,696	2,696

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

In the last three models I combine the U.S. IMET variables with the other U.S. military aid variable while keep controlling for the alternative explanations.

The results of my models provide evidence for the proposed theory and support H1 and H1a. All three forms of U.S. IMET variables show the expected negative relationship with MID initiation and all results are statistically significant. This means that those countries that receive U.S. IMET support are less likely to become the initiators of MIDs. Besides demonstrating that U.S. IMET participation is associated with a decreasing probability of interstate conflict initiation my models also show some additional interesting empirical findings.

First, across all my models the other U.S. military aid variable demonstrates a statistically significant positive relationship with interstate conflict initiation. These findings provide support the arguments of the encouragement literature (Sylvan, 1976; Schrod, 1983; Brzoska and Pearson, 1984; Pearson, Brzoska, and Crantz, 1992; Kinsella, 1994; Hartung, 1994; Craft and Smaldone, 2002) and suggest that U.S. military aid in the form of arms and equipment transfer indeed associated with a higher probability of MID initiation. The difference between the effects of the two types of the U.S. military aid might be explained by the two different potential interpretation of how their effects on the recipient states' military capabilities. At one hand, the presence of state-of-the-art American weapons and equipment might "increase the perceived military capability of the state in the minds of its leadership, making it more confident of a favorable military-political outcome in armed confrontations and therefore more likely to initiate or participate in them" (Craft and Smaldone, 2002:704). On the hand, U.S. IMET participants change the military capabilities of the recipient countries through a different way. Due to their American education and training they have a better understanding about the role of the military as an instrument of national power, about appropriate civil-military relations, the importance of

diplomacy and international cooperation and the potential cost of an interstate war. Due to these factors U.S. IMET graduates are more likely to caution their political masters against military aggression than those military leaders who has not participated in such U.S. education and training programs decreasing the likelihood of MID initiation.

Furthermore, since variables employed to account for different alliances do not demonstrate any clear and significant association with MID initiation my results do not seem to support those arguments suggesting that alliances play a crucial role in a state becoming a MID initiator (Morrow, 1994; Fearon, 1997; Leeds, 2003; Benson, 2011). At the same time close affinity to the U.S. seems to be a strong predictor for a decreased probability of initiating a conflict. This might be explained either by states being afraid of U.S. punishment in case they initiate an interstate conflict or by trusting U.S. protection, which reduces the incentives for affiliated states to take preventive actions against potential adversaries.

Additionally, regime type related arguments are not supported by the results of my models because my regime type variable show mixed results. From those variables that are used to account for the effects of states` national capabilities all seems to have some significant effects on the probability of MID initiation. The analysis suggests that as a country`s military expenditure, population size and iron and steel production capability increase the likelihood of being a MID initiator also increases. These findings can be explained in several ways. Larger military expenditure, iron and steel production, and population size are necessary resources of war making and when more is available from these essential resources the more likely that decision maker elites become more aggressive in disputes. At the same time countries with larger army size seems to be less likely to become the instigators in interstate conflicts. This might be the case, because countries with larger military forces can be more successful in pre-conflict

bargaining due to the deterring effects of the sheer size of their military. Furthermore, wealthier countries with higher GDP seems to be associated with a decreasing probability of MID initiation.

Next, while the results of my models do not support those arguments (Waltz, 1981; Mearsheimer, 1984, 1993; Jervis, 1989; Blair, 1993; Sagan 1994; Kapur, 2005) suggesting that the possession of nuclear weapons effects whether a state becomes the instigator in interstate conflicts they do provide support to the findings of prior research suggesting that ongoing civil wars make it more likely that countries become involved in MIDs. This result might be explained by the fact that in many cases leaders who struggle with an internal conflict try to get their countries involved in an international conflict in order to deviate the domestic audience`s attention away from the internal issues and try to unify the population against a foreign enemy. Finally, as argued by Krause (2004) U.S. affiliation is associated with a decreased probability of MID initiation because close relationship with the U.S. might improve the security perception of the countries.

Since COW MID dataset is frequently criticized for including a lot of low level disputes that do not really qualify as interstate conflicts I re-run all my models to ensure the robustness of my findings after dropping the low levels of disputes and including only those conflicts in which military forces are actually used.³⁵ These models demonstrate the same relationships as the original models and their results can be reviewed in appendix R.

Next, I run another 11 models (Model 14 to 24) to assess the relationship between U.S. IMET participation and MID escalation. The results of these models are shown in Table 15.

³⁵ Level1 - no militarized action, Level2 - the threat of use of force, Level3 - display of force, Level4 - use of force and Level5 - full war. In this case I run my models by using only level 3, 4 and 5.

Table 15. U.S. IMET participation and MID escalation, 1976 - 2007.

VARIABLES	(14) IMET Binary	(15) IMET Students	(16) IMET Spending	(17) Other Aid	(18) IMET Binary
IMET	-0.127** (0.0618)				-0.130 (0.0806)
IMET (stud.)		-0.0390*** (0.00966)			
IMET (spend.)			-0.0215*** (0.00697)		
Other Aid				0.519 (0.441)	
Defense					0.0124 (0.0934)
Non-aggr.					0.138 (0.0903)
Entente					-0.0624 (0.0828)
Neutrality					-0.385*** (0.0959)
Military Exp.					-1.62e-08*** (2.69e-09)
Army size					0.001*** (0.0002)
Iron/Steel					-1.52e-05*** (2.45e-06)
Total Pop.					-1.45e-07 (2.71e-07)
GDP					0*** (0)
Democracy					-0.0628 (0.108)
Civil war					0.254*** (0.0842)
Nuclear Cap.					-0.0857 (0.149)
U.S. Affinity					-0.0409 (0.116)
Constant					
Observations	3,558	3,558	3,558	2,863	2,696

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

VARIABLES	(19) IMET Students	(20) IMET Spending	(21) Other Aid	(22) IMET Binary	(23) IMET Students	(24) IMET Spending
IMET				-0.128 (0.0806)		
IMET (stu.)	-0.0730*** (0.0133)				-0.0729*** (0.0133)	
IMET (spend.)		-0.0379*** (0.00965)				-0.0378*** (0.00965)
Other Aid			-0.526 (0.541)	-0.507 (0.543)	-0.509 (0.549)	-0.503 (0.547)
Defense	0.0237 (0.0936)	0.0239 (0.0936)	0.0137 (0.0935)	0.0189 (0.0936)	0.0301 (0.0939)	0.0302 (0.0938)
Non-aggr.	0.121 (0.0906)	0.128 (0.0904)	0.156* (0.0908)	0.148 (0.0910)	0.131 (0.0912)	0.139 (0.0911)
Entente	-0.0508 (0.0829)	-0.0548 (0.0828)	-0.0623 (0.0828)	-0.0614 (0.0828)	-0.0497 (0.0829)	-0.0538 (0.0828)
Neutrality	-0.333*** (0.0960)	-0.349*** (0.0961)	-0.420*** (0.0956)	-0.397*** (0.0967)	-0.344*** (0.0967)	-0.360*** (0.0969)
Military Exp.	-1.99e-08*** (2.76e-09)	-1.86e-08*** (2.76e-09)	-1.54e-08*** (2.65e-09)	-1.62e-08*** (2.70e-09)	-1.98e-08*** (2.76e-09)	-1.85e-08*** (2.76e-09)
Army size	0.00142*** (0.000165)	0.00137*** (0.000164)	0.00131*** (0.000164)	0.00132*** (0.000164)	0.00141*** (0.000165)	0.00137*** (0.000165)
Iron/Steel	-1.40e-05*** (2.38e-06)	-1.45e-05*** (2.41e-06)	-1.55e-05*** (2.48e-06)	-1.53e-05*** (2.47e-06)	-1.42e-05*** (2.40e-06)	-1.46e-05*** (2.43e-06)
Total Pop.	-3.07e-07 (2.72e-07)	-2.21e-07 (2.71e-07)	-1.33e-07 (2.71e-07)	-1.31e-07 (2.71e-07)	-2.93e-07 (2.72e-07)	-2.07e-07 (2.72e-07)
GDP	0*** (0)	0*** (0)	0*** (0)	0*** (0)	0*** (0)	0*** (0)
Democracy	-0.00740 (0.108)	-0.0330 (0.108)	-0.0864 (0.108)	-0.0708 (0.108)	-0.0153 (0.108)	-0.0410 (0.108)
Civil war	0.361*** (0.0865)	0.312*** (0.0856)	0.228*** (0.0827)	0.252*** (0.0842)	0.359*** (0.0865)	0.311*** (0.0856)
Nuclear Cap,	-0.128 (0.149)	-0.0953 (0.149)	-0.0853 (0.149)	-0.0969 (0.149)	-0.139 (0.149)	-0.106 (0.149)
U.S. Affinity	-0.0907 (0.116)	-0.0696 (0.116)	-0.0455 (0.116)	-0.0510 (0.116)	-0.101 (0.117)	-0.0793 (0.117)
Constant						
Observations	2,696	2,696	2,696	2,696	2,696	2,696

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Besides the hostility level as the dependent variable the eleven ordered logistic regression models contain the same explanatory and control variables as the models in Table 14. Once again, I find the expected negative relationship between U.S. IMET participation and escalation, which provide support to H2 and H2a. I visually demonstrate the effects of U.S. IMET participation on all 5 levels of MID escalation in Figure 8. To build this graph I grouped the number of students in three categories. The first category shows the cases with less than or equal to 500 students, the second category shows the cases with students between 500 and 1000, and the final category is all the cases with more than 1000 U.S. IMET participants. Additionally, besides the U.S. IMET related findings the models also demonstrate some additional interesting results. They show that the other U.S. military aid variable does not have significant effects on conflict escalation and the results are mixed. Furthermore, while alliance membership has no effect on whether a country escalates on going MIDs to higher levels of hostilities neutral countries are less likely to escalate interstate disputes.




Figure 8. The effects of U.S. IMET participation on MID Escalation, 1976-2007

The same relationship seems to exist between the size of military expenditure and iron and steel production and MID escalation. capability and total population size. At the same time states with larger armies and higher Gdps seems to be more likely to escalate MIDs once they are involved in a conflict. Finally, those countries that are involved in civil wars are also more likely to escalate MIDs.

The results of the two sets of analyses provide strong support to the proposed theory. U.S. IMET participation consistently and significantly decreases the probability of MID initiation as well as conflict escalation. However, to further support the argument it is necessary to discuss some potential criticisms related to the proposed theory and the used methodological approach.

Potential Criticisms and Alternative Explanations

It might be argued that the results of my models are simply statistical artifacts, or the U.S. simply provides more aid in the form of U.S. IMET programs to countries that are less conflict prone. In other words, states might not be less aggressive because they are getting US military aid in the form of U.S. IMET programs, but rather they are getting U.S. IMET support because they are less likely to initiate conflict anyway. However, this explanation does not seem to be plausible, because empirical evidence suggests that U.S. military aid has been allocated to both aggressive countries as well as states that have never initiated interstate conflicts. Simply looking at a map with those countries who have received IMET between 1976 and 2007 one can conclude that no clear pattern can be established regarding whether only peaceful countries receive U.S. IMET support or countries that are located in peaceful regions. Figure 9. shows the geographic location of those countries that have received IMET sometimes between 1976 and 2009. For further evidence, I include a list with the names of MID initiators in Appendix S.

Other critics might argue that recipient countries simply do not initiate or escalate interstate conflicts because they do not want to lose the free and the best military education and training available to them.



Figure 9. IMET recipient countries from 1976 to 2007

This argument indeed seems appealing, however if one looks at the number of students of these programs even in case of the largest recipient only a small percentage of its military personnel goes through the U.S. IMET programs. The same is true when the dollar value of the U.S. IMET programs is compared to the recipient states' overall military expenditure (Savage and Caverley, 2017). These factors make it highly unlikely that countries would not pursue their foreign policy goals in fear of losing some seats in these programs. However, this argument brings up another challenge. If indeed only several officers and non-commissioned officers attend the U.S. IMET programs from the recipient countries than how realistic it is to claim that U.S. IMET programs have significant effects on the recipient countries' political decision-making process. I argue that indeed the U.S. IMET

programs can potentially have such effects on the recipient countries behavior for several reasons.

First, the idea behind the U.S. IMET programs are the so called, train-the-trainer concept. The idea behind this concept is to train people who can train and educate additional personnel when they return to their home countries about the norms and values they learn in the U.S. IMET programs. This process can be imagined as the spread of a disease. One contract the virus, spreads it to others and soon many people are infected. Second, a major part of the U.S. IMET programs is focusing on professional military education for senior level military decision makers. Additionally, as Lefever (1976) argues U.S. IMET graduates frequently return to their home countries to assume key policy positions (senior advisors to politicians, Chief of Defenses, Service Commanders, etc.) which enables them to inject themselves into foreign policy related decision-making process. Furthermore, based on several interviews she conducted with Georgian military personnel who participated in different U.S. IMET programs Phadnis (2019) finds these graduates are catalyzing and leading their country`s defense transformation and argues that U.S. IMET graduates` “impact at the highest levels of the Georgian Ministry of Defense and General Staff cannot be overstated” (Phandis, 2019). In addition, there is a selection process preceding U.S. IMET participation. Countries usually send (and the U.S. accepts) participants who are candidates of key positions upon their returns, which once again allow U.S. IMET programs to influence foreign militaries and through them the behavior of countries.

The next criticism might suggest that my argument is not specific enough, because asking for and listening to military advise is conditional on regime type. According to this argument U.S. IMET graduates are only able to influence political decision makers in democratic countries and effect the probability of MID initiation and escalation. To address this potential criticism I run several models where I include the interaction term between U.S.

IMET participation and recipient states' regime type. Figure 10. visually demonstrates the effects of this interaction on MID initiation.




Figure 10. Margins plot of interaction between Regime Type and U.S. IMET support, MID Initiation, 1976-2007

As Figure 10. demonstrates democracies are less likely to initiate MIDs than autocracies regardless of receiving U.S. IMET support or not. Additionally, the graph also shows that when U.S. IMET support is provided to both regime types than the probability of conflict initiation decreases in both autocracies and democracies. This means that the effects of U.S. IMET participation on MID initiation is independent from the recipient countries' regime type.

Conclusion

Foreign military aid programs have been used for decades to influence recipient states' behavior in support of U.S. foreign policy goals. Understanding the effects of U.S. military

aid has attracted some scholarly attention but this interest has been mostly limited to the exploration of how military aid in the form of arms and equipment transfers influence the behavior of recipient states` international conflict behavior. This paper contributes to the literature of U.S. military aid but approaches the question from a new angle. It assesses the effects of U.S. military aid in the form foreign military education and training programs (more specifically the U.S. IMET programs) on recipient states` international conflict behavior.

Besides finding support to the proposed argument that U.S. IMET support is associated with decreasing probability of MID initiation and escalation the results also show that U.S. IMET participation effects both democracies and autocracies the same way. Additionally, the findings of the analysis also provide some support to several prior studies` arguments while also refuting some previous findings. While I find that U.S. military aid in the form of arms and equipment transfers is indeed associated with an increased probability of recipient states becoming the instigators of MIDs no support is found for the potential role that alliances play in conflict initiation. The results of the analysis provide support to those earlier works arguing that there is a positive relationship between national capabilities and the presence of civil conflicts; and the probability of becoming MID initiator. The findings also show that wealthier countries are less likely to start interstate conflicts. In addition to these contributions to the ongoing debate the findings of this study also have some significant policy implications.

Although the results are initial they still present strong evidence in support of the argument that U.S. military aid in the form of U.S. IMET programs fulfill their goals that were established by the U.S. Congress. The results of this analysis show that U.S. IMET programs improve the military human capital of the recipient states and with that it supports the achievement of U.S. military strategy and foreign policy goals of supporting regional

stability and preventing interstate wars. These findings might urge policy makers to consider paying more attention to this less tangible form of U.S. military aid and invest more efforts and resources to support and to further improve these foreign education and training programs.

Since this study is the first in assessing the relationship between the U.S. IMET programs and the recipient states' international conflict behavior there is much more research needed to be done on this topic. Future studies may expand and improve this research agenda through better data collection efforts, by introducing country-level case studies and exploring the conditions of how the U.S. allocates IMET program support to the recipient states. These and many other questions need to be addressed to improve our understanding of the effects of different forms of military aid on the recipient states' behavior and to help policy makers make better informed decisions regarding the allocation and the content of foreign military aid packages.

References

- Atkinson, Carol (2010) Does soft power matter? A comparative analysis of student exchange programs 1980–2006. *Foreign Policy Analysis* 6(1): 1–22.
- Barany, Zoltan (2012) *The Soldier and the Changing State: Building Democratic Armies in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Bennett, Douglas W. *Military Advice and Civil-Military Relations*. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES, 2010.
- Benoit, Kenneth. "Democracies Really Are More Pacific (in General) Reexamining Regime Type and War Involvement." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40.4 (1996): 636-657.
- Benson Brett V. "Unpacking Alliances: Deterrent and Compellent Alliances and Their Relationship with Conflict, 1816—2000." *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 73, No. 4, October 2011, Pp. 1111–1127.
- Boix, Carles, Michael Miller, and Sebastian Rosato. "A complete data set of political regimes, 1800–2007." *Comparative Political Studies* 46.12 (2013): 1523-1554.
- Brzoska, Michael and Frederic Pearson. 1994. *Arms and Warfare: Escalation, De-escalation, and Negotiation*. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press.
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and Randolph M. Siverson. 1995. "War and the Survival of Political Leaders: A Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political Accountability." *American Political Science Review* 89 (December): 841-55.
- Cartwright, James E. "Best military advice." *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 9.3 (2015): 13-18.
- Caverley, Jonathan. 2014. *Democratic militarism: Voting, wealth, and war*. Cambridge University Press (selection)
- Cheibub, José Antonio, Jennifer Gandhi, and James Raymond Vreeland. 2010. "Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited." *Public Choice*, vol. 143, no. 2-1, pp. 67-101.
- Cook, Martin L. *The proper role of professional military advice in contemporary uses of force*. ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA, 2002.
- Craft, Cassady, and Joseph P. Smaldone. "The arms trade and the incidence of political violence in sub-Saharan Africa, 1967-97." *Journal of Peace Research* 39.6 (2002): 693-710.
- Downs, George W., and David M. Rocke. 1994. "Conflict, Agency, and Gambling for Resurrection: The Principal-Agent Problem Goes to War." *American Journal of Political Science* 38(May): 36280.
- Fearon, James. 1995. "Rationalist explanations for war" *International Organization* 49(3): 379-414

Fearon, James D. 1997. "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands Versus Sinking Costs." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41(1):68–90.

Feaver, Peter D. *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005.

Finer, S. E. *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*. New York, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc, 1962.

Gibler, Douglas M. 2009. *International military alliances, 1648-2008*. CQ Press.

Glenn, Palmer, D'Orazio, Vito, Kenwick, Michael, and Lane, Matthew. 2015. "The MID4 Data Set: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description." *Conflict Management and Peace Science*. Forthcoming.

Hartung, William D. 1994. *And Weapons for All*. New York: HarperCollins

Huntington, Samuel P (2006) *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Huth, Paul, and Bruce Russett. "What makes deterrence work? Cases from 1900 to 1980." *World Politics* 36.4 (1984): 496-526.

Huth, Paul K. "Major power intervention in international crises, 1918-1988." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42.6 (1998): 744-770.

Kinsella, David. "Conflict in context: Arms transfers and third world rivalries during the cold war." *American Journal of Political Science* (1994): 557-581.

Kinsella, David, and Herbert K. Tillema. "Arms and Aggression in the Middle East: Overt Military Interventions, 1948-1991." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 39.2 (1995): 306-329.

Krause, Volker, 2004. Hazardous Weapons? Effects of Arms Transfers and Defense Pacts on Militarized Disputes, 1950-1995. *International Interactions*, 30(4), pp.349-371.

Leeds, Brett A., Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes, *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 47, No. 3 (Jul. 2003), pp. 427-439.

Lefever Ernest W., 1976, The Military Assistance Training Program, *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol 424, Issue 1, pp. 85 - 95

Long, Scott J. 1997. *Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables*. Advanced Quantitative Techniques in the Social Sciences Number 7. Sage Publications: Thousand Oaks, CA.

Long, J. S. and Freese, J. (2006) *Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables Using Stata*, Second Edition. College Station, Texas: Stata Press.

- Morrow, James D. 1994. "Alliances, Credibility, and Peacetime Costs." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 38(2):270–97.
- Mott IV, William, H., *Military Assistance: An Operational Perspective* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1999), xiv.
- Nye, Joseph S. 1990. "Soft Power." *Foreign Policy*. 80: 153-171.
- Pearson, Frederic S., Michael Brzoska, and Christer Crantz. 1992. The effects of arms transfers on wars and peace negotiations. In *SIPRI Yearbook 1992: World Armaments and Disarmaments*, pp. 399-415.
- Reiter, Dan, and Allan C. Stam. 1998b. "Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory." *American Political Science Review* 92(2): 377–90.
- Ruby, Tomislav Z & Douglas Gibler (2010) US professional military education and democratization abroad. *European Journal of International Relations* 16(3): 339–364.
- Savage, Dillon J. and Cavelrey, Jonathan D. 2017. "When human capital threatens the Capitol: Foreign aid in the form of military training and coups." *Journal of Peace Research* 2017, Vol. 54(4) 542–557.
- Schrodt, Philip A. "Arms transfers and international behavior in the Arabian Sea area." *International Interactions* 10.1 (1983): 101-127.
- Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. (1972). "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965." in Bruce Russett (ed) *Peace, War, and Numbers*, Beverly Hills: Sage, 19-48.
- Snyder, Jack. 1991. *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Souva, Mark, and Brandon Prins. "The liberal peace revisited: The role of democracy, dependence, and development in militarized interstate dispute initiation, 1950–1999." *International Interactions* 32.2 (2006): 183-200.
- Stepan, Alfred (1986) The new professionalism of internal warfare and military role expansion. In: Abraham F Lowenthal & J Samuel Fitch (eds) *Armies and Politics in Latin America*. New York: Holmes & Meier, 134–150.
- Sylvan, Donald A. "Consequences of sharp military assistance increases for international conflict and cooperation." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 20.4 (1976): 609-636.
- U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Military Training Joint Report, Fiscal Years 2012 and 2013*, pp. II-1, II-2.
- Van Evera, Stephen. 1994. "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War." *International Security* 18(Spring):5-39.

Weeks, Jessica. 2012. "Strongmen and straw men: Authoritarian regimes and the initiation of international conflict" *American Political Science Review*, 106(2)

Williams, Ronald A. (2004) *The Daily Work of Democracy*. *International Educator* 13: 36.

CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION

This dissertation aimed to explore how U.S. military aid in the form of U.S. IMET programs affect the participating individuals and through them the recipient states' domestic and international conflict behavior. The dissertation answered this research question through investigating three independent but interrelated sub-questions.

First, the dissertation investigated the individual level effects of the U.S. IMET programs and explored whether participation in these programs is associated with improvement in individual qualities. While the studies that had investigated the effects of the U.S. IMET programs at the participating individual level all seem to assume that participation in these programs improves the personal qualities of the participants through the transmission of the professional norms and values of the U.S. military such as respect for democratic values, human rights and civil control, no studies have provided either a strong theory of norm transmission or convincing empirical evidence whether this process actually happens. In the first study I argued that the norms and values of the U.S. military are transmitted to U.S. IMET participants through the mechanisms of formal learning, direct exposure and common identity and with that the personal qualities of participants indeed improve. I tested the proposed theory through the employment of an original survey conducted in Hungary with 350 military respondents and in-depth interviews of 14 Hungarian U.S. IMET graduate. The first contribution this study makes is an original dataset on the individual level effects of the U.S. IMET programs, which can be used for further research by other scholars interested in this research agenda. Next, my analysis of this dataset demonstrated that the professional norms and values of the U.S. military are indeed transmitted to U.S. IMET participants. Since graduates of these programs demonstrated higher respect for human rights, democratic values and civilian control than their non-U.S. IMET graduate peers the findings of this study

supported the argument that U.S. IMET participation is associated with improved personal qualities and with that better military human capital of the recipient states. The data analysis also provided some promising initial results regarding whether the U.S. military's norms and values further diffuse within the recipient country's military organization.

Beyond its contributions to the research agenda about the effects of U.S. military aid the study has significant policy implications as well. Although the 1976 International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act clearly defines the goals of the U.S. IMET program there are no measures of effectiveness in place to provide objective feedback about the actual effects of these programs to policy makers. The timeliness of this issue is clearly demonstrated in the fact that the 2017 National Defense Authorization Acts once again codifies the requirement to establish a functioning evaluation mechanism for the investigation of the effects of the U.S. security assistance programs. This study provided feedback directly for this requirement and proposes that the U.S. IMET programs indeed meet the goals established by Congress and with that effectively support the achievement of U.S. national security and foreign policy goals.

Second, the dissertation also explored how improved military human capital due to U.S. IMET participation affects recipient states' behavior during domestic conflicts. In this part I introduced a new measure for state military capacity in the form of military human capital. In contradiction to previous literature I argued that it is rather the availability of highly trained and educated military personnel than military technology that effects the duration of civil conflicts. I theorized that better military human capital increases the government military's capability which incentivize rebels to disperse, hide and minimize their operations leading to a prolonged civil conflict. To test this argument, I analyzed a new dataset that included detailed information on civil conflicts and military human capital between 1976 and 2003 and employed several statistical models. To provide further support

to the findings of the statistical analysis I also illustrated the theoretical argument through a case study of the civil conflict in El Salvador between 1979 and 1991. The findings of my analysis contributed to the literature of civil conflicts in several ways. First, my results supported the previous claim (Lyll and Wilson, 2009; Lyll, 2010; Friedman, 2011) that better military capability is associated with longer civil wars. Second, I showed that when military human capital is included in the models than neither military mechanization (Lyll and Wilson, 2009; Lyll, 2010; Friedman, 2011) nor the combined arms strategy (Caverley and Secher, 2017) are significant predictors for civil conflict duration. Furthermore, my analysis suggested that the level of ground mechanization and the level of combined arms strategy only matters in determining the duration of civil conflicts when quality military human capital is available for the government forces. Third, I find that better military human capital is not only associated with longer civil wars, but it increases the probability of the civil conflict being waged in an irregular manner. Fourth, by using U.S. IMET data as a proxy for availability of quality military human capital I once again provided feedback about the potential effects of these U.S. education and training programs and with that I contributed to the literature of U.S. foreign military aid. Fifth, my study also shed some light on the importance of bringing military human capital into the research programs of armed conflicts in general. While many studies have explored the effects of military technology (Lyll and Wilson, 2009; Lyll, 2010; Friedman, 2011) and strategy employed by the belligerents (Biddle 2004; Balcells and Kalyvas 2012; Caverley and Secher, 2017) on the duration and outcome of civil conflicts the question assessing the effects of who is employing those technologies and strategies has remained mostly unexplored. Bringing the military human capital into the analysis offers several questions that might be answered by future research. Finally, the findings of this paper underscored the significance of including military human capital into the theoretical models of civil conflict research programs. An effective

explanation of the dynamics of civil conflict requires researchers to better understand how the human factor interacts with military technology, terrain, political and economic factors. Further exploring the role of military human capital is likely to highlight several new insights helping scholars to better understand the dynamics of civil conflicts and potentially enable policymakers to make more informed decisions when involved in such wars.

The last paper in my dissertation was the first attempt to investigate the relationship between U.S. military aid in the form of U.S. IMET programs and the recipient states' international conflict behavior. In this paper I argue that American educated and trained foreign military personnel return home with a better understanding about the role of the military as an instrument of national power, civil-military relations, the value of cooperation and the cost of war. These U.S. IMET graduates advise their political masters against the offensive use of military force during international disputes leading to a decreased probability of MID initiation. I tested this argument by merging U.S. IMET data with data from the Correlates of War Project's MID data set (version 4.3). The results of my analysis supported the proposed argument that more U.S. IMET support a country receives the less likely it initiates MIDs. I also found that countries that receive more U.S. IMET support are less likely to escalate ongoing MIDs to higher levels of hostility. Additionally, the findings of the analysis also provided support to several prior studies' arguments because I found that U.S. military aid in the form of arms and equipment transfers was indeed associated with an increased probability of recipient states becoming the instigators of MIDs.

Taken together, the results of this dissertation provided strong evidence that the U.S. IMET programs indeed fulfill the goals established by the U.S. Congress. The results of my analysis showed that participation in these programs improves the individual qualities of participating foreign military personnel and with that the military human capital of the recipient states. The improved military human capital affects the recipient states conflict

behavior both domestically and internationally and with that supports the achievement of U.S. military strategy and foreign policy goals.

There is still much to learn about the specifics of the effects of U.S. IMET programs. Conducting similar surveys and interviews in other countries, addressing potential confounding variables, assessing additional cases and collecting better individual and aggregate level data about the U.S. IMET programs are just some potential future directions for scholars interested in further exploring this research agenda. Although dissertation made some significant steps forward the road ahead is still long and full of interesting challenges.

APPENDIX A: SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE TO CHAPTER THREE

Greetings Survey Participant,

This questionnaire is part of a research project aiming to identify the effects of military education and training programs on the individuals participating in those programs. Your professional and honest input is very important to me and would be much appreciated. Your active participation is expected to last no more than 10 minutes and your answers will remain completely anonymous.

Please complete the following survey.

1. In which rank category do you belong? (NCO stands for Non-commissioned Officer)

Junior NCO (enlisted-ssgt) Senior NCO (sfc-WO) Junior Officer (2ndLt-Cpt) Mid-level Officer (Maj-Col) Senior Officer (Generals)

2. In which age group do you belong?

18-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 55+

3. What is your gender?

- a. Male
- b. Female

4. What is your highest education level?

Elementary school Highschool College (Bachelor) University(Master`s) Doctorate

5. What is your branch of service?

- a. Army
- b. Airforce
- c. Special Operations

6. Where are you serving at this moment?

- a. Land Unit
- b. Special Forces Unit
- c. Air Force Unit
- d. Hungarian Defense Forces Command
- e. Ministry of Defence
- f. Military Educational Institution
- g. Support Establishment
- e. Other

7. Including your mother tongue, how many languages do you speak?

1 2-3 4-5 more than 5

8. How many years have you served in the military?

Less than 5 between 5 and 15 between 16 and 25 more than 26

9. Have you done any combat deployment during your military career (Iraq, Afghanistan, Balkans, etc)?

- a. Yes
- b. No

10. To your best knowledge have you ever served under the command of an officer/non-commission officer who graduated from an American military school?

- a. Yes
- b. No

11. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:

I have had a chance through my career to positively affect doctrinal change within my military.

Strongly Disagree.....Strongly Agree									
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

12. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:

Based on the training and education I received during my career I feel confident in my military skills that are relevant in a conventional war.

Strongly Disagree.....Strongly Agree									
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

13. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:

Based on the training and education I received during my career I feel confident in my military skills that are relevant in a counterinsurgency (intrastate war).

Strongly Disagree.....Strongly Agree									
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

14. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:

My military knowledge and skills make me completely interoperable with foreign military personnel.

Strongly Disagree.....Strongly Agree									
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

15. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:

My English language skills are adequate to make me completely interoperable with foreign military personnel.

Strongly Disagree.....Strongly Agree									
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

16. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:

I have had a chance through my career to positively affect the professional development of my peers through training and educating them.

Strongly Disagree.....Strongly Agree									
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

17. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:

I have had a chance through my career to positively affect organizational change within my military.

Strongly Disagree.....Strongly Agree									
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

18. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:

During my military education and training my instructors always made sure that me and my fellow soldiers had a good understanding of human rights and democratic values such as freedom of speech, free elections, and justice for all.

Strongly Disagree.....Strongly Agree									
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

19. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:

Freedom of speech, free elections, and justice for all must be respected under every circumstance.

Strongly Disagree.....Strongly Agree									
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

20. To what extent do you agree with the following statement:

If the government does not respect democratic values domestically then it is a responsibility of the military to intervene.

Strongly Disagree.....Strongly Agree									
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

21. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:

Universal human rights must be respected under every circumstance.

Strongly Disagree.....Strongly Agree									
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

22. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:

If the government does not respect Human Rights then it is a responsibility of the military to intervene.

Strongly Disagree.....Strongly Agree									
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

23. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:

The military should be involved in the formulation of domestic policies.

Strongly Disagree.....Strongly Agree									
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

24. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:

The government should use the military more frequently domestically to support the police in solving domestic issues.

Strongly Disagree.....				Strongly Agree				
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

25. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:

The military should be involved in the formulation of foreign policies.

Strongly Disagree.....				Strongly Agree				
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

26. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:

The government should use the military more frequently in international disputes.

Strongly Disagree.....				Strongly Agree				
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

27. Have you participated any education and training programs that you would consider “outside” of your own service (a navy course for army guys, an army school for air force guys, etc.)?

- a. Yes
- b. No

28. Have you ever participated in any foreign education and training programs other than an American program?

- a. Yes
- b. No

29. Have you ever participated in U.S. International Military Education and Training program (U.S. IMET)?

- a. Yes
- b. No

30. When did you finish your latest American education or training event?

More than 10 years ago Less than 10 years but more than 5 years ago Less than 5 years ago

31. If you answered YES for the U.S. IMET participation question, please answer the following question: How many U.S. IMET programs did you participate?

- 1
- 2-3
- 4-5
- more than 5

32. If you answered YES for the U.S. IMET participation question, please answer the following question: What type of U.S. IMET program did you participate last?

Language training Technical training NCO training Junior Officer Mid-level Officer Senior Officer

33. If you answered YES for the U.S. IMET participation question, please answer the following question: How many times were you invited to attend a breakfast/lunch/dinner with American families?

1 2-3 4-5 more than 5

34. Do you still keep in touch with any of your American classmates?

No Yes

35. If you answered YES for the U.S. IMET participation question, please answer the following question: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:

During my American education and training program there was more emphasis on human rights and democratic values than during my national education and training.

Strongly Disagree.....Strongly Agree									
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

36. If you answered YES for the U.S. IMET participation question, please answer the following question: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:

I have successfully shared the knowledge and skills that I acquired during my American military education and training with my fellow Hungarian soldiers who has not participated in American education and training.

Strongly Disagree.....Strongly Agree									
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

37. If you answered YES for the U.S. IMET participation question, please answer the following question: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:

The participation in the U.S. IMET program(s) improved my military skills.

Strongly Disagree.....Strongly Agree									
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

This is the end of the survey.
Thank you very much for your time and input.

Very respectfully,

Sandor Fabian

APPENDIX B: SURVEY CODEBOOK TO CHAPTER THREE

Variable#1 – Rank (ordinal variable) (*Rank*)

Range from 1 to 5.

Responses are coded based on which rank category the participant belongs.

Junior Non-Commissioned Officer – 1

Senior Non-Commissioned Officer – 2

Junior Officer – 3

Mid-level Officer – 4

Senior Officer – 5

Variable#2 – Age (ordinal variable) (*Age*)

Range from 1 to 5.

Responses are coded based on which age group the participant belongs.

18-25 – 1

26-35 – 2

36-45 – 3

46-55 – 4

55+ – 5

Variable#3 – Gender (binary variable) (*Gender*)

Responses are coded based on which gender the participant belongs.

Female – 0

Male – 1

Variable#4 – Education level (ordinal variable) (*Edu*)

Range from 1 to 5.

Responses are coded based on the highest education level of the participant.

Elementary school – 1

High school – 2

College – 3

Masters – 4

PhD – 5

Variable#5 – Military Service (nominal variable) (*Service*)

Range from 1 to 3.

Responses are coded based on which military service the participant belongs.

Army – 1

Air Force – 2

Special Forces – 3

Variable#6 – Military Unit (nominal variable) (*Unit*)

Range from 1 to 8.

Responses are coded based on which type of military unit the participant belongs at the time of the survey.

Land Forces – 1

Special Forces – 2

Air Forces – 3

Higher Command – 4

Ministry of Defense – 5

Military Educational Institution – 6

Support Establishment – 7

Other – 8

Variable#7 – Language (ordinal variable) (*Language*)

Range from 1 to 4.

Responses are coded based on how many languages the participant speaks.

1 – 1

2-3 – 2

4-5 – 3

5+ – 4

Variable#8 – Duration of Service (ordinal variable) (*Dur_service*)

Range from 1 to 4.

Responses are coded based on how many years the participant has served in the Hungarian military.

Less than 5 years – 1

Between 5 and 15 years – 2

Between 16 and 25 years – 3

25+ years – 4

Variable#9 – Combat Deployment (binary variable) (*Deployment*)

Responses are coded based on whether the participant has participated in combat deployment.

No – 0

Yes – 1

Variable#10 – U.S. IMET C2 (binary variable) (*U.S. IMET_C2*)

Responses are coded based on whether the participant has been commanded by an U.S. IMET graduate.

No – 0

Yes – 1

Variable#11 – 26 are all interval variables measured through a 1-10 Likert-scale, where 1 represent strongly disagree while 10 means strongly agree. (*Doctrine, Conventional, Unconventional, Inter_Ops, Inter_Lan, Change_others, Org_change, Nat_Democ, Always_Democ, Milint_no_democ, Always_human, Milint_no_human, Domestic_mil, Gov_mil_domestic, Foreign_mil, Gov_mil_foreign*)

Variable#27 – Outside training (binary variable) (*Outside_training*)

Responses are coded based on whether the participant has participated in national training outside of their respective military service.

No – 0

Yes – 1

Variable#28 – Other Foreign Training (binary variable) (*Non_UStraining*)

Responses are coded based on whether the participant has participated in international training that was not provided by the U.S.

No – 0

Yes – 1

Variable#29 – U.S. U.S. IMET training (binary variable) (*U.S. IMET*)

Responses are coded based on whether the participant has participated in U.S. U.S. IMET training.

No – 0

Yes – 1

Variable#30 – Time since graduation from U.S. U.S. IMET training (ordinal variable) (*Grad_time*)

Range from 1 to 3.

Responses are coded based on how long ago the participant graduated from U.S. U.S. IMET training.

Less than 5 years ago – 1

Between 5 and 10 years ago – 2
More than 10 years ago – 3

Variable#31 – Number of U.S. U.S. IMET training (ordinal variable) (*Num_U.S. IMET*)

Range from 1 to 4.

Responses are coded based on how many U.S. U.S. IMET training events the participant attended.

1 – 1

2-3 – 2

4-5 – 3

5+ - 4

Variable#32 – Type of U.S. U.S. IMET training (binary variable) (*PME*)

Responses are coded based on whether the participant has participated in PME or not.

No – 0

Yes – 1

Variable#33 – Participation in social events (ordinal variable) (*Social*)

Range from 1 to 4.

Responses are coded based on how many times they participated in social events during their U.S. U.S. IMET training.

1 – 1

2-3 – 2

4-5 – 3

5+ - 4

Variable#34 – Keeping contact with peers (binary variable) (*Intouch*)

Responses are coded based on whether the participant still keeps contact with his U.S. classmates/peers.

No – 0

Yes – 1

Variable#35 – 37 are all interval variables measured through a 1-10 Likert-scale, where 1 represent strongly disagree while 10 means strongly agree. (*U.S. IMET_Democ, Diffusion, Prodev*)

APPENDIX C: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS TO CHAPTER THREE

The following questions were asked to learn about the participants` experience regarding their participation in the U.S. IMET programs.

1. What is your rank?
2. What is your age?
3. What is your gender?
4. What military service do you belong to?
5. What is your highest education?
6. How long have you been serving in the Hungarian military?
7. How many languages do you speak besides Hungarian?
8. Have you ever been deployed in combat? If yes, where were you deployed?
9. How many U.S. IMET course have you attended?
10. When did you graduate from your last course?
11. Did you participate in organized social events during your U.S. IMET participation? If yes, how many such events did you participate?
12. Did you think that the U.S. military was a professional organization? If yes, explain, why you thought that?
13. Do you think the U.S. IMET programs contain more democracy and human rights related curricular content than your national training courses?
14. Did your participation in the U.S. IMET programs improve your professionalism? If yes, please explain how?
15. Do you think you were able to share what you learned during the U.S. IMET programs with your fellow Hungarian soldiers after your return home?
16. What are the most memorable events about your U.S. IMET participation and why?
17. Anything else you would like to tell about your U.S. IMET experience?

APPENDIX D: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES TO CHAPTER THREE

Table 16. List of Interviewees

	Rank	Gender	Service	Date of the Interview
Interview I.	Colonel	Male	Special Forces	10/26/2019
Interview II.	Major	Male	Special Forces	10/28/2019
Interview III.	Second Lieutenant	Male	Special Forces	11/01/2019
Interview IV.	Warrant Officer	Female	Special Forces	11/01/2019
Interview V.	Sergeant First Class	Male	Special Forces	11/05/2019
Interview VI.	Colonel	Male	Land Forces	10/30/2019
Interview VII.	Major	Male	Land Forces	11/08/2019
Interview VIII.	Second Lieutenant	Female	Land Forces	11/12/2019
Interview IX.	Warrant Officer	Male	Land Forces	10/28/2019
Interview X.	Sergeant First Class	Male	Land Forces	11/08/2019
Interview XI.	Colonel	Female	Airforce	10/30/2019
Interview XII.	Major	Male	Airforce	11/08/2019
Interview XIII.	Second Lieutenant	Male	Airforce	11/12/2019
Interview XIV.	Warrant Officer	Male	Airforce	11/01/2019

APPENDIX E: SUMMARY STATISTICS TO CHAPTER THREE

Table 17. Summary Statistics

Variable	Observations	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
Democracy	350	6.791429	2.50488	1	10
Human Rights	350	6.991429	2.285481	1	10
Military Intervention	350	3.362857	2.066874	1	10
U.S. IMET	350	.4	.4905993	0	1
Rank	350	2.645714	.9516515	1	4
Age	350	2.737143	.7790545	1	5
Gender	350	.1771429	.3823361	0	1
Edu	350	2.888571	.8440832	2	5
Language	350	1.96	.4056902	1	3
Dur_service	350	2.514286	.7709418	1	5
Deployment	350	.7685714	.4223494	0	1
Non-US Training	350	.5685714	.4959847	0	1
Land Forces	350	.5571429	.4974351	0	1
Air Forces	350	.3028571	.4601518	0	1
Special Forces	350	.14	.3474838	0	1

**APPENDIX F: MILITARY SERVICE SPECIFIC RESULTS TO
CHAPTER THREE**

Table 18. Military Service Specific Results

VARIABLES	(1) Democracy Land	(2) Democracy Air	(3) Democracy SOF	(4) Human Rights Land	(5) Human Rights Air
U.S. IMET	1.535*** (0.282)	1.550*** (0.283)	1.505*** (0.283)	0.541** (0.269)	0.575** (0.270)
Rank	0.249 (0.279)	0.246 (0.280)	0.263 (0.280)	0.535** (0.267)	0.526** (0.267)
Age	0.391* (0.221)	0.375* (0.224)	0.433* (0.223)	0.110 (0.212)	0.0704 (0.214)
Gender	-0.191 (0.339)	-0.167 (0.339)	-0.179 (0.340)	-0.256 (0.324)	-0.225 (0.324)
Edu	-0.137 (0.312)	-0.134 (0.312)	-0.123 (0.313)	-0.350 (0.298)	-0.350 (0.298)
Language	0.470 (0.329)	0.444 (0.335)	0.561* (0.331)	0.245 (0.314)	0.173 (0.319)
Dur_service	-0.383* (0.228)	-0.364 (0.228)	-0.372 (0.228)	0.0118 (0.217)	0.0370 (0.217)
Deployment	0.884*** (0.318)	0.878*** (0.319)	0.838*** (0.318)	0.0831 (0.304)	0.0910 (0.305)
Non_UStraining	0.00419 (0.282)	0.0115 (0.283)	0.0123 (0.283)	0.358 (0.270)	0.366 (0.270)
Land	-0.457* (0.255)			-0.644*** (0.244)	
Air		0.357 (0.285)			0.654** (0.272)
SOF			0.342 (0.363)		
Constant	4.492*** (0.883)	4.166*** (0.849)	3.830*** (0.849)	5.697*** (0.843)	5.321*** (0.811)
Observations	350	350	350	350	350
R-squared	0.175	0.171	0.169	0.094	0.091


Standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

VARIABLES	(6) Human Rights SOF	(7) Intervention Land	(8) Intervention Air	(9) Intervention SOF
U.S. IMET	0.511* (0.272)	-0.552** (0.251)	-0.557** (0.252)	-0.581** (0.251)
Rank	0.551** (0.269)	0.158 (0.248)	0.162 (0.249)	0.169 (0.248)
Age	0.154 (0.214)	0.237 (0.197)	0.245 (0.199)	0.274 (0.198)
Gender	-0.227 (0.327)	0.0207 (0.302)	0.0356 (0.302)	0.0145 (0.301)
Edu	-0.329 (0.301)	-0.303 (0.278)	-0.296 (0.278)	-0.295 (0.277)
Language	0.346 (0.318)	0.508* (0.293)	0.530* (0.298)	0.583** (0.293)
Dur_service	0.0367 (0.220)	0.0327 (0.203)	0.0451 (0.203)	0.0282 (0.202)
Deployment	0.0212 (0.306)	-0.381 (0.283)	-0.400 (0.284)	-0.408 (0.282)
Non_UStraining	0.373 (0.272)	0.174 (0.251)	0.180 (0.252)	0.175 (0.251)
Land		-0.240 (0.227)		
Air			0.0281 (0.254)	
SOF	0.237 (0.349)			0.438 (0.322)
Constant	4.865*** (0.816)	2.639*** (0.786)	2.380*** (0.756)	2.187*** (0.752)
Observations	350	350	350	350
R-squared	0.077	0.038	0.035	0.040

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

**APPENDIX G: PROPENSITY SCORE MATCHING EVALUATION TO
CHAPTER THREE**

Propensity Score Matching Evaluation for Democracy, Human Rights and Military Intervention Variables



```
. psmatch2 IMET Rank Age Gender Edu Language Dur_service Deployment Non_UStraining, out (Domestic_mil) common
Probit regression                               Number of obs   =       350
                                                LR chi2(8)      =       75.28
                                                Prob > chi2     =       0.0000
Log likelihood = -197.91403                    Pseudo R2      =       0.1598
```

IMET	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Rank	.3749269	.1676916	2.24	0.025	.0462575	.7035964
Age	.0924252	.1361162	0.68	0.497	-.1743576	.359208
Gender	.2106959	.2045384	1.03	0.303	-.1901919	.6115837
Edu	-.2584831	.1886502	-1.37	0.171	-.6282308	.1112645
Language	.2949328	.208557	1.41	0.157	-.1138314	.7036971
Dur_service	.0098498	.1358255	0.07	0.942	-.2563632	.2760628
Deployment	.1429939	.1936219	0.74	0.460	-.2364979	.5224858
Non_UStraining	1.045202	.1573607	6.64	0.000	.7367811	1.353624
_cons	-2.154858	.5412127	-3.98	0.000	-3.215616	-1.094101

psmatch2: Treatment assignment	psmatch2: Common support		Total
	Off suppo	On suppor	
Untreated	0	210	210
Treated	5	135	140
Total	5	345	350

**APPENDIX H: UCF IRB APPROVAL FOR SURVEY EXECUTION TO
CHAPTER THREE**



UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL FLORIDA

Institutional Review Board
FWA00000351
IRB00001138Office of Research
12201 Research Parkway
Orlando, FL 32826-3246

APPROVAL

April 22, 2019

Dear Sandor Fabian:

On 4/22/2019, the IRB reviewed the following submission:

Type of Review:	Initial Study
Title:	Building Foreign Military Human Capital - The effects of the U.S. Foreign Military Education and Training Programs
Investigator:	Sandor Fabian
IRB ID:	STUDY00000116
Funding:	None
Grant ID:	None
IND, IDE, or HDE:	None
Documents Reviewed:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Protocol, Category: IRB Protocol; • Translation Verification, Category: Translation Verification; • Faculty Advisor Review Document, Category: Faculty Research Approval; • Local Approval Procedures, Category: International; • Consent Form in Hungarian, Category: Consent Form; • Survey Questionnaire Hungarian Verison, Category: Survey / Questionnaire; • Consent Form , Category: Consent Form; • SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE_Sandor Fabian.docx, Category: Survey / Questionnaire;

The IRB approved the protocol from 4/22/2019 to .

In conducting this protocol, you are required to follow the requirements listed in the Investigator Manual (HRP-103), which can be found by navigating to the IRB Library within the IRB system.

If you have any questions, please contact the UCF IRB at 407-823-2901 or irb@ucf.edu. Please include your project title and IRB number in all correspondence with this office.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Gillian Morien". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

Gillian Morien
Designated Reviewer

**APPENDIX I: UCF IRB APPROVAL FOR INTERVIEW EXECUTION
TO CHAPTER THREE**



UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL FLORIDA

Institutional Review Board
FWA00000351
IRB00001138
Office of Research
12201 Research Parkway
Orlando, FL 32826-3246

EXEMPTION DETERMINATION

October 21, 2019

Dear Sandor Fabian:

On 10/21/2019, the IRB determined the following submission to be human subjects research that is exempt from regulation:

Type of Review:	Initial Study, Exempt Category
Title:	Building Foreign Military Human Capital - The effects of the U.S. Foreign Military Education and Training Programs
Investigator:	Sandor Fabian
IRB ID:	STUDY00000962
Funding:	None
Grant ID:	None

This determination applies only to the activities described in the IRB submission and does not apply should any changes be made. If changes are made, and there are questions about whether these changes affect the exempt status of the human research, please contact the IRB. When you have completed your research, please submit a Study Closure request so that IRB records will be accurate.

If you have any questions, please contact the UCF IRB at 407-823-2901 or irb@ucf.edu. Please include your project title and IRB number in all correspondence with this office.

Sincerely,

Kamille Chaparro
Designated Reviewer

**APPENDIX J: HUNGARIAN APPROVAL FOR SURVEY AND
INTERVIEW EXECUTION TO CHAPTER THREE**

10th April 2019

To the **Institutional Review Board of University of Central Florida**

I would like to inform you that based on Hungarian national requirements, **Mr. Sandor Fabian's** research, titled "Building Foreign Militaries: The Effects of the U.S. Foreign Military Education and Training Programs, does not require IRB approval from a Hungarian University.

Respectfully,


Prof. dr. József Kadányi Eng. Major General
Vice-Rector for Science

APPENDIX K: SUMMARY STATISTICS TO CHAPTER FOUR

Table 19. Summary Statistics

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Conflict Termination	1,562	.1581306	.3649803	0	1
Civil War Type	1,466	.7755798	.4173423	0	1
U.S. IMET (Students)	7,651	1.710107	3.718991	-2.302585	11.11419
U.S. IMET (Spending)	7,651	3.046359	4.837627	-2.302585	11.10763
Other U.S. Aid	7,021	.0753487	.1254612	0	2.223215
Distance to Capital	1,562	5.698553	1.296719	1.609438	8.121183
Conflict at Border	1,562	.7816901	.4132312	0	1
BorderXDistance	1,562	.0130604	1.016943	-4.090562	2.421183
Population	1,561	10.11732	1.552068	5.342334	13.86401
Regime Type	1,459	.4365789	.3597569	0	.9589228
GDP per Capita	1,552	6.824206	1.212623	3.871201	10.00951
Post-Cold War	1,562	.3975672	.4895518	0	1
Rebel Fighting Capacity	1,518	1.294466	.5169338	1	3
Rebel Strength	1,523	.1300066	.3364211	0	1
Insurgency	1,040	.5682692	.4955557	0	1
Natural Resources	1,054	.6982922	.459217	0	1
Rough Terrain	1,054	.4108159	.4922155	0	1
Ground Mechanization	783	6.466517	1.082524	3.218876	9.493095
Aircraft Mechanization	865	4.558787	1.14137	.5978368	7.388728
Combined Arms	693	29.13171	9.535191	8.168157	60.31901
External Support Rebel	2,612	.4728178	.4993562	0	1
External Support Government	2,612	.5451761	.4980503	0	1
Oil Exporter	1,400	.1457143	.3529456	0	1
Ethnic Fractionalization	1,400	.5809832	.2708404	.0355107	.9016318
Sons of Soil	2,905	.0595525	.2366966	0	1
Military Expenditure	6,784	3328235	1.35e+07	0	3.18e+08
Military Spending per Soldier	6,409	16706.56	42491.64	0	1722499

APPENDIX L: ADDITIONAL TESTS TO CHAPTER FOUR

Table 20. Accelerated failure time hazard analysis of the duration of civil conflicts, 1976-2003

VARIABLES	(40) U.S. IMET	(41) Other U.S. Aid	(42) Total U.S. Aid	(43) Armor	(44) Geography	(45) Fighting Capacity
IMET (Spend.)	0.0640** (.0305)	-1.289 (1.055)	0.0903*** (0.0338)	0.0776** (0.0334)	0.0712** (0.0315)	0.0744** (0.0363)
Other Aid			-1.224 (0.968)	-1.535 (2.060)	-1.422 (2.143)	-1.930 (1.684)
Ground Mech.				0.640 (0.825)	0.884 (0.789)	0.702 (0.739)
Air Mech.				0.547 (0.938)	0.659 (0.912)	0.668 (0.872)
Combined Arm				-0.136 (0.138)	-0.163 (0.136)	-0.149 (0.127)
Distance to Capital					0.481*** (0.169)	
Conflict at Border					0.971** (0.425)	
Border X Distance					-0.476* (0.248)	
Rebel Fighting Cap.						-0.0512 (0.593)
Rebel Strength						-0.541 (0.930)
Constant	7.294*** (0.181)	7.543*** (0.249)	7.078*** (0.243)	4.566 (5.448)	-0.223 (5.213)	4.275 (4.978)
Observations	940	800	760	496	496	481

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

VARIABLES	(46) Terrain	(47) Regime type	(48) Economy	(49) External Support	(50) Sons of Soil	(51) All controls
IMET (Spend.)	0.0827** (0.0373)	0.0696 (0.0494)	0.0905** (0.0375)	0.0753** (0.0348)	0.0866** (0.0355)	0.114** (0.0545)
Other Aid	-0.0930 (2.593)	-1.184 (2.361)	-4.304* (2.266)	-1.650 (2.044)	-1.277 (2.095)	-2.683 (2.438)
Ground Mech.	0.624 (0.882)	0.890 (0.961)	0.653 (0.799)	0.658 (0.810)	0.983 (0.932)	1.221 (1.136)
Air Mech.	0.604 (1.017)	0.673 (1.181)	0.429 (0.933)	0.561 (0.932)	1.091 (1.037)	0.922 (1.492)
Combined Arm	-0.137 (0.149)	-0.176 (0.170)	-0.104 (0.136)	-0.137 (0.137)	-0.218 (0.161)	-0.192 (0.223)
Dist. to Capital						0.637*** (0.178)
Confl. at Border						0.708 (0.460)
Bord. X Dist.						-0.686** (0.290)
Rebel Fight Cap.						0.217 (0.787)
Rebel Strength						-0.793 (1.175)
Natural Res.	0.544* (0.323)					0.331 (0.371)
Rough Terrain	0.617* (0.353)					0.437 (0.325)
Incumb. Democ.		0.229 (0.854)				-0.0742 (0.756)
Gdp per capita			-0.747** (0.341)			-0.658* (0.337)
Ext. support gov.				-0.273 (0.449)		-0.0727 (.820)
Ext. support reb.				-0.0382 (0.325)		-0.0727 (0.320)
Sons of soil					1.441* (0.789)	1.000 (1.004)
Insurgency						0.505 (0.541)
Post-Cold War						-0.335 (0.573)
Constant	3.694 (5.942)	3.440 (6.390)	9.776* (5.940)	4.639 (5.399)	2.196 (5.964)	0.973 (8.843)
Observations	496	466	495	496	496	437

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

APPENDIX M: ADDITIONAL TESTS TO CHAPTER FOUR

Table 21. Logit Analysis of Civil War Termination, 1976-2003

VARIABLES	(52)	(53)	(54)	(55)	(56)	(57)
	U.S. IMET	Other U.S. Aid	Total U.S. Aid	Armor	Geography	Fighting Capacity
IMET (Spending)	-0.0476**	0.951	-0.0628***	-0.0577**	-0.0571**	-0.0586**
	(0.0214)	(0.760)	(0.0221)	(0.0245)	(0.0235)	(0.0255)
Other Aid			0.920	0.825	0.332	1.365
			(0.700)	(2.021)	(2.419)	(1.865)
Ground Mech.				-0.715	-0.936	-0.846
				(0.652)	(0.668)	(0.666)
Air Mech.				-0.540	-0.706	-0.737
				(0.763)	(0.801)	(0.792)
Combined Arm				0.130	0.160	0.159
				(0.113)	(0.118)	(0.118)
Distance to Capital					-0.328**	
					(0.145)	
Conflict at Border					-0.740**	
					(0.304)	
Border X Distance					0.306	
					(0.191)	
Rebel Fighting Cap.						-0.0996
						(0.493)
Rebel Strength						0.565
						(0.822)
Constant	-0.831***	-1.034***	-0.706***	2.496	6.228	3.271
	(0.174)	(0.217)	(0.204)	(4.306)	(4.538)	(4.476)
Observations	940	800	760	496	496	481

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

VARIABLES	(58) Terrain	(59) Regime type	(60) Economy	(61) External Support	(62) Sons of Soil	(63) All controls
IMET (Spend.)	-0.0566** (0.0262)	-0.0557* (0.0321)	-0.0701*** (0.0245)	-0.0557** (0.0250)	-0.0671*** (0.0245)	-0.0736* (0.0418)
Other Aid	-0.250 (2.151)	0.917 (2.260)	2.919 (2.310)	1.039 (2.104)	0.368 (2.123)	1.639 (3.133)
Ground Mech.	-0.703 (0.706)	-0.824 (0.784)	-0.674 (0.665)	-0.755 (0.643)	-0.818 (0.679)	-1.601 (1.136)
Air Mech.	-0.584 (0.833)	-0.542 (0.965)	-0.410 (0.804)	-0.584 (0.755)	-0.781 (0.794)	-1.353 (1.497)
Combined Arm	0.130 (0.122)	0.145 (0.142)	0.101 (0.119)	0.136 (0.112)	0.162 (0.119)	0.259 (0.221)
Dist. to Capital						-0.486*** (0.184)
Confl. at Border						-0.635** (0.323)
Border X Distance						0.540** (0.253)
Rebel Fighting Cap						-0.535 (0.706)
Rebel Strength						1.188 (1.154)
Natural Resources	-0.391 (0.253)					-0.363 (0.340)
Rough Terrain	-0.347 (0.252)					-0.343 (0.280)
Incumb. Democ.		-0.0763 (0.576)				-0.0214 (0.655)
Gdp per capita			0.480** (0.229)			0.434* (0.262)
Ext. support gov.				0.323 (0.313)		0.302 (0.422)
Ext. support reb.				-0.0312 (0.247)		-0.0398 (0.266)
Sons of soil					-1.206** (0.535)	-1.091 (0.900)
Insurgency						-0.270 (0.446)
Post-Cold War						0.293 (0.468)
Constant	3.076 (4.755)	2.893 (5.129)	-1.152 (5.086)	2.558 (4.293)	3.415 (4.433)	8.727 (8.573)
Observations	496	466	495	496	496	437

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

APPENDIX N: ADDITIONAL TESTS TO CHAPTER FOUR

Table 22. Logit Analysis of Civil War Types, 1976-2003

VARIABLES	(64) U.S. IMET	(65) Other U.S. Aid	(66) Total U.S. Aid	(67) Armor	(68) Geography	(69) Fighting Capacity
U.S. IMET	0.108*** (0.0157)		0.181*** (0.0442)	0.133*** (0.0193)	0.198*** (0.0515)	0.149*** (0.0565)
Military Aid		-2.864*** (0.606)	-5.677*** (2.029)	-2.559*** (0.646)	-4.052* (2.130)	-6.925*** (2.366)
Ground mech.			1.164 (0.862)		1.385 (0.858)	2.058** (1.047)
Air mech.			2.518** (1.206)		3.526*** (1.247)	3.080** (1.431)
Combined arms			-0.366** (0.167)		-0.484*** (0.172)	-0.501** (0.205)
Distance to capital					-0.501 (0.333)	
Conflict at border					-0.147 (0.562)	
Border x Distance					1.303*** (0.429)	
Rebel fighting capacity						-0.683 (0.566)
Rebel strength						-2.875*** (1.044)
Constant	0.805*** (0.0978)	1.629*** (0.104)	-6.368 (5.922)	0.907*** (0.140)	-5.909 (6.096)	-8.826 (7.171)
Observations	1,014	869	284	832	284	281

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

VARIABLES	(70) Terrain	(71) Regime Type	(72) Economy	(73) External Factors	(74) Sons of Soil	(75) All Controls
U.S. IMET	0.160*** (0.0456)	0.131*** (0.0544)	0.156*** (0.0483)	0.184*** (0.0442)	0.205*** (0.0469)	0.365*** (0.128)
Military Aid	-4.596** (2.198)	-1.508 (2.438)	-3.742 (2.416)	-5.571*** (2.078)	-5.188** (2.044)	1.405 (4.678)
Ground mech.	1.193 (0.893)	0.0782 (1.062)	1.387 (0.908)	1.281 (0.900)	1.094 (0.854)	1.334 (2.254)
Air mech.	3.276** (1.315)	2.793** (1.346)	2.983** (1.310)	2.722** (1.259)	2.847** (1.224)	4.298 (3.129)
Combined arms	-0.435** (0.177)	-0.284 (0.196)	-0.444** (0.185)	-0.386** (0.173)	-0.383** (0.165)	-0.581 (0.465)
Dist. to capital						-0.441 (0.601)
Confl. at border						0.904 (1.154)
Border x Distance						0.366 (0.907)
Rebel fight cap.						-1.344 (1.040)
Rebel strength						-5.109* (2.729)
Natural resources	0.740 (0.520)					-1.175 (1.470)
Rough terrain	-0.755 (0.468)					1.813 (1.213)
Incumb. democ		2.701*** (0.971)				1.719 (1.617)
Gdp per capita			0.502 (0.356)			2.212** (1.004)
External sup. govt				-0.487 (0.451)		-1.590 (1.059)
External sup. reb.				0.163 (0.408)		-0.303 (0.807)
Sons of soil					1.316 (0.840)	0.337 (1.945)
Insurgency						-0.540 (0.866)
Post-Cold War						-3.205*** (1.230)
Constant	-7.871 (6.134)	-3.973 (6.717)	-11.26 (7.163)	-7.253 (6.194)	-7.097 (5.901)	-18.59 (17.48)
Observations	284	263	283	284	284	254

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

APPENDIX O: ADDITIONAL TESTS TO CHAPTER FOUR

Table 23. Logit Analysis of Insurgency Occurrence, 1976-2003

VARIABLES	(76) U.S. IMET	(77) Total U.S. Aid	(78) All Controls
U.S. IMET	-0.0722*** (0.0140)	-0.137*** (0.0182)	-0.140*** (0.0428)
Other U.S. Aid		-0.186 (0.696)	-3.548*** (1.360)
Military Expenditure			-2.35e-08** (1.16e-08)
Military Personnel			-1.02e-05 (7.91e-06)
Population			-0.249** (0.106)
Regime Type			-1.695*** (0.505)
GDP per Capita			-0.146 (0.264)
Natural Resources			0.719** (0.311)
U.S. Affinity			1.303*** (0.452)
Oil Exporter			-0.0284 (0.453)
Ethnic Fractionalization			-1.738** (0.725)
Constant	0.592*** (0.0927)	0.987*** (0.143)	7.608*** (2.299)
Observations	945	761	378

Standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

APPENDIX P: SUMMARY STATISTICS TO CHAPTER FIVE

Table 24. Summary Statistics

Variable	Observations	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Initiator	3,558	.9100618	.2861334	0	1
Hostility level	3,558	2.827712	1.182454	1	5
IMET (Binary)	10,436	.4535263	.4978594	0	1
IMET (students)	10,436	.4414376	3.098447	-2.302585	10.42976
IMET (spending)	10,436	1.615719	4.253173	-2.302585	9.887631
Other Aid	8,435	.0651867	.1165006	0	2.223215
Defense	3,558	.292018	.4547544	0	1
Non-aggression	3,558	.6231029	.4846769	0	1
Entente	3,558	.589095	.4920672	0	1
Neutrality	3,558	.3302417	.4703661	0	1
Military Expenditure	8,589	2.07e+07	5.28e+07	0	3.18e+08
Army Size	3,558	1071.714	1240.27	-9	4300
Iron and Steel Production	3,558	43750.88	55506.38	0	489712
Total Population	3,558	136880.3	202262.7	63	1334344
GDP	8,435	2.14e+11	4.31e+11	1.60e+07	4.75e+12
Democracy	8,946	.4632238	.4986735	0	1
Civil War	10,436	.2363933	.4248868	0	1
Nuclear Capability	3,558	.5056211	.5000387	0	1
U.S. Affinity	9,218	-.303984	.4351709	-1	1

APPENDIX R: ADDITIONAL TESTS TO CHAPTER FIVE

Table 25. U.S. IMET and MID initiation, 1976-2007

VARIABLES	(25) IMET Binary	(26) IMET Students	(27) IMET Spending	(28) Other Aid	(29) IMET Binary	(30) IMET Students
IMET	-0.416*** (0.139)				-0.514** (0.217)	
IMET(stud.)		-0.0438** (0.0217)				-0.0781** (0.0335)
IMET(spend.)			-0.0348** (0.0157)			
Other Aid				3.306** (1.501)		
Defense					-0.180 (0.243)	-0.187 (0.243)
Non-aggr.					0.103 (0.201)	0.118 (0.201)
Entente					-0.319 (0.196)	-0.295 (0.196)
Neutrality					-0.302 (0.236)	-0.334 (0.236)
Military Exp.					4.00e-09 (9.20e-09)	3.06e-09 (9.23e-09)
Army size					-0.000405 (0.000459)	-0.000370 (0.000459)
Iron/Steel					2.91e-05** (1.22e-05)	2.99e-05** (1.23e-05)
Total Pop.					3.30e-06** (1.66e-06)	3.16e-06* (1.68e-06)
GDP					-0*** (0)	-0*** (0)
Democracy					-0.435* (0.245)	-0.414* (0.247)
Civil war					1.368*** (0.206)	1.433*** (0.210)
Nuclear Cap.					-0.0433 (0.402)	-0.0613 (0.403)
U.S. Affinity					-0.965*** (0.248)	-1.007*** (0.250)
Constant	2.534*** (0.101)	2.360*** (0.0718)	2.401*** (0.0782)	2.168*** (0.0893)	2.066*** (0.297)	1.802*** (0.262)
Observations	2,573	2,573	2,573	2,023	1,882	1,882

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

VARIABLES	(31) IMET Spending	(32) Other Aid	(33) IMET Binary	(34) IMET Students	(35) IMET Spending
IMET			-0.660*** (0.221)		
IMET(stud.)				-0.101*** (0.0342)	
IMET(spend.)	-0.0544** (0.0244)				-0.0710*** (0.0248)
Other Aid		5.569*** (2.122)	6.892*** (2.245)	6.990*** (2.290)	6.967*** (2.290)
Defense	-0.172 (0.243)	-0.363 (0.251)	-0.377 (0.253)	-0.386 (0.253)	-0.365 (0.253)
Non-aggr.	0.122 (0.201)	0.0685 (0.202)	0.00946 (0.204)	0.0267 (0.203)	0.0329 (0.203)
Entente	-0.299 (0.196)	-0.393** (0.196)	-0.370* (0.199)	-0.339* (0.199)	-0.343* (0.199)
Neutrality	-0.320 (0.236)	-0.325 (0.233)	-0.241 (0.237)	-0.282 (0.237)	-0.263 (0.237)
Military Exp.	3.31e-09 (9.20e-09)	4.28e-09 (9.04e-09)	3.32e-09 (9.33e-09)	1.90e-09 (9.35e-09)	2.24e-09 (9.32e-09)
Army size	-0.000399 (0.000459)	-0.000411 (0.000453)	-0.000462 (0.000460)	-0.000425 (0.000461)	-0.000453 (0.000460)
Iron/Steel	2.98e-05** (1.22e-05)	3.15e-05** (1.23e-05)	3.68e-05*** (1.23e-05)	3.79e-05*** (1.24e-05)	3.77e-05*** (1.24e-05)
Total Pop.	3.26e-06* (1.68e-06)	3.16e-06* (1.64e-06)	3.74e-06** (1.70e-06)	3.54e-06** (1.72e-06)	3.67e-06** (1.73e-06)
GDP	-0*** (0)	-0** (0)	-0** (0)	-0** (0)	-0** (0)
Democracy	-0.438* (0.245)	-0.423* (0.248)	-0.263 (0.254)	-0.231 (0.256)	-0.265 (0.253)
Civil war	1.400*** (0.208)	1.344*** (0.205)	1.407*** (0.209)	1.490*** (0.214)	1.448*** (0.210)
Nuclear Cap.	-0.0434 (0.402)	0.122 (0.378)	-0.234 (0.407)	-0.247 (0.407)	-0.231 (0.406)
U.S. Affinity	-0.978*** (0.248)	-0.862*** (0.250)	-0.822*** (0.252)	-0.889*** (0.252)	-0.845*** (0.251)
Constant	1.885*** (0.269)	1.505*** (0.275)	1.830*** (0.304)	1.487*** (0.278)	1.598*** (0.281)
Observations	1,882	1,882	1,882	1,882	1,882

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

APPENDIX S: LIST OF MID INITIATOR COUNTRIES TO CHAPTER FIVE

Table 26. List of MID Initiator Countries, 1976-2007

Afghanistan	Ghana	Romania
Albania	Grenada	Russian Federation
Algeria	Greece	Rwanda
Angola	Guinea	Saudi Arabia
Argentina	Guinea-Bissau	Senegal
Armenia	Hungary	Sierra Leone
Australia	India	Slovakia
Azerbaijan	India	South Africa
Bangladesh	Indonesia	Spain
Belarus	Iran, Islamic Republic Of	Sudan
Benin	Iraq	Swaziland
Bosnia And Herzegovina	Israel	Syrian Arab Republic
Bulgaria	Italy	Tajikistan
Burkina Faso	Jordan	Togo
Burundi	Kazakhstan	Tunisia
Canada	Kenya	Turkey
Cameroon	Korea, Republic Of	Turkmenistan
Central African Republic	Kuwait	Uganda
Chad	Kyrgyzstan	Ukraine
China	Latvia	United Arab Emirates
Chile	Lebanon	Uzbekistan
Republic Of Congo	Liberia	Vietnam
The Democratic Republic Of Congo	Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	Zambia
Cote D'Ivoire	Lithuania	
Croatia	Mali	
Czech Republic	Malta	
Egypt	Mauritania	
Equatorial Guinea	Moldova, Republic Of	
Eritrea	Morocco	
Ethiopia	Mozambique	
Finland	Niger	
France	Nigeria	
Gambia	Pakistan	
Georgia	Poland	
Germany	Qatar	