Performing Allyship: Elite Allies, Social Movements and the Case of Violence Against Women in Morocco

Asma Ali Farah

Department of Politics and International Relations and Philosophy

Royal Holloway, University of London

Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Politics and International Relations by the University of London.

2017

Declaration of Authorship

I, **Asma Ali Farah**, hereby declare that this thesis and the work presented in it is entirely my own. Where I have consulted the work of others, this is always clearly stated.

Asma Ali Farah

22.09.2017

Abstract

In the literature on social movements, elite allies occupy an important place in conceptualisations of political opportunity structures. Yet the ways in which elite allyship is performed has not been systematically examined and remain under-theorised. In this thesis, I seek to remedy these shortcomings in the scholarship and further our understanding of the role of elite allyship for social movements. First, drawing on a meta-analysis, I find that elite allies are not a strong predictor of policy change favourable to social movements. I then draw on the case of violence against women in Morocco in the post-Arab Spring era, to uncover why this might be the case. I use content analysis and semi-structured interviews to examine how a range of elite actors interact with Moroccan women's groups and coalitions, and how the latter interpret their participation. I find that women's groups and coalitions in Morocco benefit from the presence of a range of elite actors that perform different acts of allyship. These include the articulation of claims aligned with those of women's groups and coalitions, the provision of moral resources and the use of double mobilisation. Despite these performances, women's groups and coalitions in Morocco do not perceive many of these actors to be performing elite allyship. Rather they see elite allyship as involving the provision of a wide range of resources, collaboration with activists and substantial leverage against other elite actors. Moreover, they see effective allyship as coming from representative and democratic institutions, rather than unelected and unaccountable ones. Thus, both the source of elite allyship and its characteristics matter.

Acknowledgements

I would like to start by thanking all those who provided research guidance, funding and facilities. I would like to thank my supervisors, Profs. Oliver Heath and Sandra Halperin, for their support and insightful comments. I would particularly like to thank Oliver for his confidence in me, enthusiasm in my research project, and support during stressful times. I am indebted to my advisor, Dr. Kaat Smets, for being extremely generous with her time. Kaat has helped me refine my meta-analysis and provided helpful suggestions for my research. Kaat has also been a source of emotional support. I am very grateful to have had her as an advisor. I would like to thank Royal Holloway, its department of Politics and International Relations, and the University of London, for their financial support, in the form of travel and research grants. I would particularly like to thank Royal Holloway for offering me a Reid Scholarship to pursue my research. I would also like to thank my research participants for their time and invaluable information, as well as the Scuola Normale Superiore (SNS), in Florence, for hosting me as a visiting student. I benefited immensely from the workshops on social movements at the SNS, as well as discussions with other researchers. I would like to express my deepest gratitude to the countless individuals who have provided me with much needed emotional support. Special thanks also go to Btissam Aboubichr, Huda Al Sahi, Evronia Azer, Sophia Tianyu Zang, Suelen Rocha, and Jamie (Kim Hyunmin). I am grateful for their support, encouragements and generosity. They are fantastic individuals and I wish them all the best in life.

Table of Contents

List of Tables and Figures

1. Introduction

1.1.Thesis Purpose and Contribution

In this thesis, I seek to develop our understanding of the concept of elite allies and its relevance to social movements mobilising for policy change. I do this by first systematically examining the influence of the presence of elite allies on policy change, controlling for social movement mobilisation. I then draw on the case study of the mobilisation for the criminalisation of violence against women in Morocco, to examine the types of resources elite political actors provide to activists, the ways in which they represent this issue, and the strategies they employ. I finally analyse activists' perceptions of these actors and performances to determine who they view as an elite ally and how they conceptualise elite allyship, thereby advancing knowledge of what it means to be an elite ally of a social movement.

Elite allies are a key dimension of the political opportunity structure (POS) model, which is associated with the Political Process (PO) theory, popularised by the works of Tilly (1978) and McAdam (1982). In this model, elite allies are treated as a background variable whose mere presence is assumed to be beneficial to social movements and protesters (Kitschelt, 1986; Brockett, 1991; Kriesi et al., 1995; Marks and McAdam, 1996; Rucht, 1996).[1] I challenge this conceptualisation and bring out agency to the fore by examining performances of elite allyship and how social movement actors interpret them. This is particularly important because despite mounting empirical research on the dynamics and outcomes of social movement mobilisation, we do not possess a solid understanding what it means to be an elite ally of a social movement and how allyship is performed and perceived.[2]

---

[1] A similar emphasis on elite allies can be found in the related Political Mediation (PM) model advanced by Edwin Amenta (Amenta, Caren and Olasky, 2005; Amenta, 2006).
[2] A notable exception is a recent volume edited by Wejnert and Parigi (2016) on the relationship between polity, political elites and mobilisation.

The POS model has been accused of being too 'movement-centric' by relegating other political actors to the background (Bosi, 2008, p. 244; McAdam and Boudet, 2012, p. 22). At the turn of the century, leading social movements scholars began criticising the discipline's tendency to neglect the various political actors that shape the outcomes of contentious episodes in which social movement actors are embedded (McAdam and Boudet, 2012, p. 2).[3]

Jasper (2004, p. 5) suggests adopting a strategic interaction perspective that 'treats protest groups and other players symmetrically, instead of reducing the latter to the "environment" of the former – a structural trick that reduces the agency of all players except protestors.' This strategic interaction approach to movement dynamics assumes that the key constraints on what social movements can achieve are influenced by other actors rather than by structural conditions (Jasper, 2015). I draw on this line of thinking in this thesis. However, Jasper's strategic interaction perspective (Goodwin, Jasper and Khattra, 1999; Jasper, 2004) does not theorise on the interactions between social movements and other political actors. I hope to address this theoretical gap by analysing how elite allyship is performed and which performances of elite allyship are perceived by women's rights activists as amplifying their efforts to bring about legal reforms on violence against women in Morocco.

I look at performances of allyship by elite actors at both the domestic and international level, to correct the state-centric bias that is pervasive in the concept of opportunities. For McAdam and Marks (1996), social movement analysis has historically been limited to the national arena because traditionally power was centralised by the state. Developments such as European integration have reduced the state's monopoly of formal political power, resulting in changes

---

[3] For criticisms of movement-centric bias in the field see also, McAdam et al. (2001) and McAdam and Tarrow(2010).

in the structure and locus of interest articulation by various challengers such as social movements and interest groups (Marks and McAdam, 1996).

Given that nations, individuals and flows are interconnected and interdependent in several ways, opportunities should not be solely restricted to the domestic sphere. Unlike studies of transnational social movements, the empirical literature on domestic social movements does not emphasise the potential influence of international factors on domestic-level processes. [4] As McAdam points out, this term has come to be 'almost universally' associated with the rules, structures and dynamics of national political systems since Eisinger first used it in 1973 (2004, p. 209). As a corrective, I incorporate in my analysis if and how international elite actors perform allyship and their perceived consequences on the activists they seek to support.

The empirical case selected for this study is the mobilisation for the criminalisation of violence against women in Morocco in the aftermath of the Arab Spring.[5] I am looking at this case study because it is puzzling that the post-Arab Spring period brought to power Islamists in Morocco, in the form of the Justice and Development Party (PJD), that introduced a draft bill and a bill – albeit unsatisfactory to activists - on violence against women in 2013 and 2016 respectively. After slow and stalled progress by the government on this issue between 2012 and 2013 and then again between 2013 and 2016, the draft law was subsequently stalled in Parliament in 2017. This was still the case as of September 2017, at the submission of this thesis, though a law was finally passed under a new government in early 2018. We can thus see that different elite actors proposed, suspended and ultimately passed the law. It is therefore interesting to examine the role of elite actors on this issue and the extent to which they performed allyship to

---

[4] While theoretical works recognise the significance of international factors for domestic social movements, empirical studies do not incorporate these insights into their analyses.

[5] Though Morocco did not experience the unrest and far-reaching changes that occurred in neighbouring Tunisia and Egypt in late 2010 and 2011, King Mohammed VI introduced some political reforms such as a new Constitution and early parliamentary elections in November 2011.

different segments of the Moroccan women's rights movement. How have different types of political elites engaged with domestic activists on this issue? Did the position of political elites converge with those of domestic activists? What elite actors did activists benefit from? To what extent have these elite actors contributed to supporting and constraining their efforts? How do social movement actors view their participation? Finally, what model of elite allyship do they believe amplify their efforts?

A non-Western case study extends the geographical scope of the field of social movements, a field which has based its findings predominantly on Western societies (Poulson, Caswell and Gray, 2014). Extending the field of enquiry in this way allows us to better understand the relationship between different types of political elites and domestic activists. Moreover, political elites at the international level, in the form of inter-governmental organisations such as the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU) and Western governments play an active role in the domestic politics of Morocco. This allows me to compare their participation in the mobilisation with those of domestic political elites. I focus on the mobilisation for the criminalisation of violence against women to extend our understanding of the Moroccan women's movement, as the literature focuses too much on its relationship with the reform of the Family Code in the 1990s and 2000s. We thus need to analyse this movement in relation to other campaigns it has been involved in, to better understand its relationship with political elites. Above all, this campaign contains the elements necessary to explore the relationship between social movements, elite actors and policy change: it involves a dynamic social movement with a long history, international and domestic political elites, and the introduction of a draft bill and for the first time in Morocco, a bill on combating violence against women. In the remainder of this chapter I discuss some of these themes to provide an overview of my research project.

First, I state my research questions. Second, I explain the concept of elite allies, summarise the limitations of the literature on the relationship between domestic social movements and elite allies, and state how I intent to address them. Third, I define the other concepts central to my thesis, notably that of opportunity, social movements and policy change. Fourth, I discuss the research design I employ, and provide some information on the data I draw on and how I analyse it. Fifth, I describe the case study I draw on to examine my research questions, and justify its use. Sixth, I provide an outline of the subsequent chapters in this thesis and the main arguments that I developed within each one.

1.2. Research Questions

In this thesis, I challenge the assumption that the mere presence of elite allies is a source of opportunity for social movements wishing to influence public policy, and suggest looking instead at performances of elite allyship. The four questions I ask are as follows:

1. To what extent is the presence of elite allies a strong predictor of policy outcomes favourable to a social movement, when the latter is mobilising?

2. To what extent do the claims of various political elites align with those of domestic activists in Morocco on the issue of violence against women?

3. Which strategies do these political elites employ and which resources do they provide to activists?

4. To what extent do domestic activists perceive these actors as being elite allies, and which type of elite allyship do they think is most conducive to helping them achieve their policy goals?

I draw on the literatures on social movements, political representation and transnational advocacy networks to examine these questions. In answering them, I hope to advance our understanding of elite allyship to social movements.

1.3. Elite Allies, Social Movements and Policy Change

In this section, I highlight the lack of theorisation of the relationship between social movements and elite allies in the literature and clarify how I intend to develop this by drawing on the suggestions provided in various research streams.

1.3.1. The Significance of Elite Allies for the Policy Outcomes of Social Movements

Since the late 1990s, several reviews have been written on the political outcomes of social movements (Giugni, 1998; Amenta, Halfman and Young, 1999; Amenta and Caren, 2004; Andrews and Edwards, 2004; Amenta et al., 2010). Though most empirical research on the impact of social movements examines the relationship between social movements and policy change, only a handful of scholars have thoroughly reviewed this sub-field. Using works published between 1990 and 2000, Burstein and Linton (2002) evaluate the relative importance of three types of political engagement – political parties, interest groups and social movement organisations – on the policy-making process. Uba (2009) extends this analysis by considering a greater number of scholarly studies and using a meta-analysis, though she chiefly concentrates on the mediating role played by public opinion and the nature of the political system. Thus, there is to date no systematic review of which opportunities matter most for social movement policy outcomes when these are mobilising, and what is the relative significance of elite allies.

In fact, a few studies cast doubt on the usefulness of elite allies. These find that they are either not useful or downright harmful for the social movements they are expected to support (Olzak and Uhrig, 2001; Olzak and Soule, 2004; Uba, 2005). I carry out a meta-analysis in Chapter 3 to systematically analyse the relationship between policy change favourable to a social movement, and aspects of the external environment associated with different models of

opportunity, including the presence of elite allies, controlling for social movement mobilisation.

1.3.2. Elite Allyship As Performance: Representation, Resources and Strategies

The literature on social movements does not offer a clear definition of what constitutes an elite ally. However, a small number of scholars have provided brief descriptions. According to Giugni (2004, pp. 169, 183) elite allies are political allies within institutional arenas, such as political parties. In an ideal scenario, elite allies use their power to produce policy changes that meet the movement's aims and demands (Giugni, 2004, p. 183). This is akin to Tarrow's conceptualisation of influential allies. According to Tarrow, influential allies can 'act as friends in court, as guarantors against repression, or as acceptable negotiators on their behalf (2011, p. 166). Elite allies therefore perform two functions: they occupy positions that allow them to influence policy and they also defend the interests of social movements (Giugni and Passy, 1998; Uba, 2005). In this thesis, I draw on Giugni's definition of elite allies of social movements, as actors 'who are responsive and who are in a position to be able to reform existing policies' (Giugni, 2004, p. 170).

In the literature, elite allies are treated as static variables whose mere presence is assumed to be of benefit to social movements. One of the four dimensions of political opportunities is 'the presence or absence of elite allies,' along with 'the relative openness or closure of the institutionalised political system,' 'the stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity,' and 'the state's capacity and propensity for repression'(McAdam, 1996, p. 27). To identify elite allies of a social movement, scholars draw on the extent to which the political leaning of political elites is in line with the goals of said movement. Thus, scholars do not measure who performs elite allyship but rather, who could be hypothesised to be an elite ally.

Social democratic parties are theorised to be potential elite allies of new social movements, such as women's movements, because they appeal to the same middle class constituency (Kriesi et al., 1995). However, hypothetical elite allies do not necessarily practice allyship. As Giugni (2004, p. 17) points out, there is no evidence to prove that a political party that is ideologically or socially compatible with a social movement will naturally support its claims. When a left-leaning party, like a social democratic party, is in power it might be less likely to support the mobilisation of similarly left-leaning social movements, as it is limited by existing policies and other societal forces (Giugni, 2004). If it is in opposition, it might instead be more willing to support them, to broaden its electoral base; though this also means that it is not able to make policy concessions to them (Giugni, 2004, p. 171). Thus, there is no such thing as a natural ally. I draw on the literatures on domestic social movements, transnational advocacy networks and political representation to demonstrate that allyship is performative[6] and hypothesise different ways in which political elites can perform allyship.

Since the definition of elite allies involves listening and responding to the needs of those to whom one is allied to, we could argue that one way of performing elite allyship is through political representation. We should expect elite allies to represent the interests of the social movement actors whose interests they are advocating for. One way to grasp this representation is by analysing the discursive interactions of such actors. Empirically, this means that we should expect elite allies to be aligned with the claims and frames used by social movement actors (King, 2004). Though powerful political allies are assumed to take up social movements' claims (Giugni, 2004; Tarrow, 2011), this assumption is not systematically tested. I carry out

---

[6] The notion of performance is linked to the philosopher and gender theorist Judith Butler who, in turn, was inspired by the philosopher Nietzsche (Salih, 2002). Butler (1990, p. 25) highlights the significance of agency when she argues that gender is not something that we are, but something that we do: 'Gender proves to be performance – that is, constituting the identity it is purported to be.' I apply this same broad logic to my argument: rather than speak of elite allies, we should speak of the performance of elite allyship.

a representative claims analysis (RCA), based on the concept of the representative claim put forward by Saward (2006, 2010) to evaluate the extent to which different types of elite political actors represent the interests of Moroccan women's groups and coalitions on the issue of violence against women.

A second way of performing elite allyship is through the provision of different types of resources. Elite allies are assumed to be a source of opportunity because they possess certain resources that they could potentially mobilise to support social movements (Silver, 1998). However, scholars have not fully explored what these resources are, even though a taxonomy of four types of resources has been offered by Cress and Snow (1996). They refer to these categories as moral, material, informational and human resources. I draw on this taxonomy to determine which types of resources different categories of political elites provide to women's groups and coalitions on the issue of violence against women in Morocco, and how these activists perceive them.

Elite allyship does not simply involve representing the interests of domestic social movements or provide resources directly to them. I take inspiration from the dominant theoretical framework in the literature on transnational advocacy networks - namely the Boomerang Pattern put forward by Keck and Sikkink (Sikkink and Keck, 1998; 1999) - and complement it with Wu's (2005) Double Mobilisation model, to suggest that elite actors use their position to exert leverage on other elites and collaborate with them to facilitate policy change.

Keck and Sikkink (1998) developed a theoretical model which argues that there is a boomerang pattern in the way that international agents act as an opportunity for domestic social movements. Domestic social movements are severely limited by the fact that their governments block political and judicial channels, preventing them from mounting a successful campaign. Therefore, they may search for non-domestic allies as a means of placing pressure on their

government. These networks or organisations target either the repressive government or a third-party organisation which, in turn, puts pressure on the target state.

In this theoretical framework, allies employ five political tactics to influence policy change in a target state (Keck and Sikkink, 1999). The first two – symbolic and information politics - are concerned with the provision of resources to domestic activists and third parties. Symbolic politics involves the exploitation of symbolic events, while information politics is concerned with providing an alternative source of information (Keck and Sikkink, 1999). The remaining three – material leverage, moral leverage and accountability politics – are concerned with the target of social movement mobilisation. Leverage politics involves naming and shaming the violator state (Keck and Sikkink, 1999). Material leverage involves the linking of cooperation with international norms to money, goods or prestige (Keck and Sikkink, 1999). Once a target has publicly endorsed said norms, actors within a transnational advocacy network resort to accountability politics to expose the difference between discourse and practice (Keck and Sikkink, 1999).

Seeking to relax the contentious bias in Keck and Sikkink's (1998) boomerang model of advocacy, Wu (2005) argues that elite allies also educate, mobilise and collaborate with both the target state and domestic social movements. They thus act as a bridge that reduces the antagonistic relationship between these opposing actors, improves communication between them, and offers new channels of participation. By engaging with the state in a non-confrontational way through collaborative projects, partnerships and making policy recommendations, these actors help change the state's attitude towards a certain idea. This perspective is based on the Habermasian view of power as the ability to obtain goals through consensual communication (Habermas, 2000), and suggests that the soft power exercised by elite allies allows social movement actors to win the support of state actors for their policy goals. In my thesis, I explore to what extent different political elites engage in leverage politics

and collaborate with other elites to influence other elites, and what activists think of these. Do they conceptualise effective elite allyship as being one which involves engaging in contentious or collaborative towards other political elites?

Elite allyship does not simply involve working on behalf of social movements, but also with them. The literature on domestic and transnational advocacy has defined two types of arrangements between social movements and their elite allies: coalitions and networks. Social movements and their elite allies can form coalitions to pursue a common goal; alternatively, while not part of a coalition with a social movement, elite allies can provide support for social movements by being part of the same network.

The particularity of a coalition is shared beliefs and coordination, though there may be heterogeneity in views, interests and types of organisations and networks one is part of (Barnes, van Laerhoven and Driessen, 2016). Coordination can be strong and involve establishing a common plan, or weak and involve only the sharing of information, the monitoring of action and the use of complementary strategies (Barnes, van Laerhoven and Driessen, 2016). This is like the advocacy-coalition framework model[7] put forth in the literature on policy-making. An example of an elite-social movement coalition is Almeida and Stearns' (2004) State Actor-Social Movement Coalition model.

Elite actors do not necessarily form coalitions with social movements. As Keck and Sikkink (1998) argue, domestic social movements are enmeshed in transnational advocacy networks comprised of both elite and non-elite participants. This includes anything from non-governmental organisations, research and advocacy groups, social movements, foundations, trade unions, consumer organisations, intellectuals, inter-governmental organisations, as well

---

[7] This model has been criticised for being mainly applied to North America and Western Europe (Henry *et al.*, 2014).

as certain branches of government (Sikkink and Keck, 1998). Participants in these networks carry out a variety of activities to influence state and non-state actors, including lobbying, exerting moral or material leverage, engaging in accountability politics, and sharing and distributing information, all with the view of helping develop policy. Unlike allies-social movement coalitions, these do not involve a set of actors coordinating their strategies, but are more simply a set of actors that are linked by shared values, common discourses and the exchange of information and services. They are thus an informal configuration. In this thesis, I examine the extent to which elite political actors engage in these two types of relationship with activists mobilising for the criminalisation of violence against women in Morocco. Similarly to the literature, I take coalitions are being a more effective arrangement than networks.

In sum, there are four ways in which elite political actors can perform allyship to help domestic social movements advance their policy goals. These are political representation, the provision of moral, material, informational and human resources, the use of leverage and collaboration with other elites; and working with movements through coalitions. I describe in Section 1.5. how I explore these performances of elite allyship in my thesis.

1.3.3. Elite Allyship As Perception: The Significance of Social Movements' Evaluation

It is not enough to look at the performances of political elites to determine if they can be labelled elite allies. We also must draw on social movements' assessment of their performances. Departing from Koopmans' (1999, p. 102) argument that opportunities are context-dependent, and Gamson and Meyer's (1996, p. 283) assertion that 'an opportunity unrecognised is no opportunity at all,' I argue that the identification of elite allies and acts of elite allyship requires drawing on social movement actors' perception.

It is increasingly recognised that defining opportunities in terms of objective changes in the external environment is problematic (Kurzman, 1996; Klandermans, 1997; Suh, 2001; Opp, 2009; Giugni, 2011). Nonetheless, perceived opportunities remain a neglected area of research because scholars assume that objective measures of opportunities are inevitably perceived and seized by social movement actors (Giugni, 2011, p. 277). However, opportunities may be overlooked or not perceived as such (Giugni, 2011, p. 277).

An example of the mismatch between objective and perceived opportunities can be found in Kurzman's (1996) analysis of the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Kurzman (1996, p. 164) finds that individuals interpreted the strength of opposition to the Shah's regime as a weakening of the state when, objectively speaking, the regime was not particularly vulnerable to challenging groups. This interpretation led challengers to create opportunities for themselves by courting the military and thereby neutralising it. Since opportunities are based on social construction, rather than on material facts, I contrast the objective measures of elite allyship I have described above with activists' assessment of them to determine who is an elite political ally and what constitutes elite allyship in the mobilisation for the criminalisation of violence against women in Morocco.

1.4. Opportunities, Social Movements and Policy Change: A Clarification

In this section, I explain what I mean by opportunities and which out of the numerous definitions offered I adopt. I do the same for the concepts of social movement and policy change. I have not defined these earlier because they each merit a thorough discussion.

In this thesis, I employ the term opportunity rather than political opportunity structure, which is the original concept that has been established by earlier scholars such as Brockett (1991), Kriesi et al. (1992), Rucht (1996), and synthesised into McAdam's (1996) four-dimensional

model, which I described above.[8] This is because the scholarship has advanced since this term was first coined, and models of opportunity have been developed that remedy the structural bias of this concept and stress the significance of non-political variables. These include the discursive (Koopmans and Statham, 1999), legal (Hilson, 2002), economic (Wahlstrom and Peterson, 2006), and supra-national or multi-level (Marks and McAdam, 1996; Della Porta and Tarrow, 2005) models of opportunities.

---

[8] The social movement literature is unclear as to whether the political opportunity perspective is a theory, a concept, or a general framework. Eisinger (1973), usually credited with first using the term 'structure of political opportunities' (Giugni, 2009b), does not explicitly label the expression, while two early key theorists Tilly (1978) and McAdam (1982) refer to it respectively as a component of a general model of collective action or of the political process. Many scholars have followed this direction, and are unequivocal that the term (political) opportunities, or (political) opportunity structure is essentially a concept, or basic idea that belongs to a broader theory; generally called political process theory (Amenta and Zylan, 1991; Gamson and Meyer, 1996; Klandermans, 1996; McAdam, 1996; Rucht, 1996; Suh, 2001). Others challenge this reading and instead adopt a more holistic view (Banazsak, 1996, p. 28). Meyer and Minkoff (2004, p. 1457) speak of a 'theory' of political opportunity structure, though they use this interchangeably with the word concept, while Zhan and Tang (2013, p. 383) prefer a more dynamic approach and shorten it to 'political opportunity theory.' Lichbach (1998, p. 401) suggests instead that the correct term is 'synthetic political opportunity theory' - which incorporates in addition to political opportunities, mobilizing structures and cultural frames. Still others adopt even more disparate labels. For Almeida and Stearns (1998) and Shekha (2011), it is a model, whereas Estelles (2010)describes it as a framework; and Kurzman (1996) refuses labelling altogether; thereby completely avoiding the dilemma of what term best describes the notion of (political) opportunity (structure). This confusion about how this term should be conceived is strengthened by the fact that it is sometimes confounded with political process theory (Caren, 2007). In their prominent reviews, Meyer and Minkoff (2004, p. 125) and Jasper and Goodwin (1999, p. 28) conflate political opportunity with political process. It is important to care about semiotics and be linguistically accurate, for the terminology used determines the boundaries that need to be set, and therefore guides how much importance should be accorded to an idea. The purpose of theories is to explain how and why certain relationships result in certain outcomes (Wacker, 1998). Theories describe and explain phenomena and make possible generalisations and predictions. If opportunity approaches are theories, then one would expect social movement dynamics to be explained above all in terms of changes in the level of opportunities (Koopmans, 1999, p. 97). That is, other factors are either unimportant or trivial in the absence of opportunities (Koopmans, 1999, p. 97). The same is true if opportunities are a framework; a system of assumptions and expectations about specific variables and their relationships that is more tentative than a theory (Maxwell, 2013). If, the term concept is used to refer to opportunities, the implication is that this is simply an abstract idea, and one has to look beyond opportunities to comprehend social movements. Given the lack of clarity surrounding opportunities, I follow most scholars of social movements in adopting a more conservative view and referring to opportunities as a concept.

The concept of opportunity was introduced by political process scholars to offer a more comprehensive overview of the impact of social movements than the dominant theory of resource mobilisation, championed by McCarthy and Zald (1977). It advances that political challengers such as social movements do not operate in a vacuum, but find their characteristics fashioned by the political context (Meyer and Minkoff, 2004). It has become so well established in social movement studies that it is now used to shed light on practically any and all features of social movements, from their development (Oberschall, 1996) to their tactical repertoires (Kitschelt, 1986), attributes (Della Porta and Tarrow, 2005) and consequences (Piven and Cloward, 1979). If one wishes to predict a social movement's prospect for mobilisation and its outcomes, understand why it promotes specific claims, establishes alliances, and employs certain strategies, one should look at variables external to the social movement (Meyer and Minkoff, 2004).

Despite the popularity of this concept, uncertainty remains with regards to the meaning and definition of opportunities, and some scholars lament that the term has become too inclusive and ultimately risks explaining nothing at all (Gamson and Meyer, 1996; McAdam, 1996; Rootes, 1999; Jenkins, Jacobs and Agnone, 2003). Many definitions of opportunities exist – perhaps even as many as there are scholars of social movements – ranging from broad explanations (McAdam, 1982; Koopmans, 1999), to more narrow ones (Kitschelt, 1986; Tarrow, 2011). Traditionally, the emphasis was on the structural and political features of opportunities. Eisinger (1973, p. 25) conceives of opportunities as 'the degree to which groups are likely to gain access to power and to manipulate the political system.' For McAdam (McAdam, 1982, p. 41), a (political) opportunity is 'any event or broad social process that serves to undermine the calculations on which the political establishment is structured.' Meanwhile, Piven and Cloward (1979) highlight the importance of changes in economic, social, and political institutions.

While it is evident that any process or event can affect movements' ability to affect change, such all-encompassing definitions have been criticised for turning the concept into a catch-all concept, ultimately stripping it of its theoretical usefulness (Gamson and Meyer, 1996). Highlighting the significance of perception, Klandermans (1988) sees opportunities as 'the external environment within which movement participants evaluate how effectively collective action can attain desired goals' (Suh, 2009, p. 50). In a similar vein, Tarrow (1994, p. 85) views them as 'consistent, but not necessarily formal or permanent - dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectation of success or failure.' Centring power relations, Kitschelt (1986, p. 57) sees them as 'configurations of resources, institutional arrangements, and historical precedents.' Brockett (1991, p. 254) emphasises the structure of power in the political system, by defining opportunities as 'the configuration of forces in a (potential or actual) group's political environment that influences that group's assertion of its political claims.' Strangely, Koopmans incorporates constraints in his definition of opportunity. For Koopmans (1999, p. 96), an opportunity is composed of 'constraints, possibilities, and threats that originate outside the mobilising group, but affects its chances of mobilizing and/or realising its collective interests.'

I synthesise Klandermans' and Koopmans' definitions of opportunities and define them as 'possibilities that originate outside the mobilising group, but affects its perceived changes of mobilising and/or realising its collective interests.' I drop the terms constraints and threats because I find that they make the definition incoherent. I add the notion of perception because an opportunity is only one if it is perceived as such.

Since I am examining the role of elite allies in the mobilisation for the criminalisation of violence against women in Morocco, I also need to consider policy outcomes. Social movement scholars speak of policy impact to highlight the link between mobilisation and policy-making. There is a lack of consensus regarding how impact should be defined and measured. Earlier

studies used various taxonomies of impact, such as Gamson's (1975) fourfold classification, wherein a social movement can achieve a full response through the acquirement of new benefits: the gaining of acceptance in public discourse, preemption if only the former goal is achieved, co-optation if the latter is attained, or full defeat, if neither goals are accomplished.

This conceptualisation of success has been criticised on a number of occasions, most notably by Amenta et al. (1994, p. 681), for limiting new advantages to political access, and failing to include the achievement of collective benefits for beneficiary groups. Schumaker (1975) sought to add more substance to Gamson's (1975) typology by subdividing acceptance into two dimensions, namely access responsiveness, the ability of a movement to get admission in the political system, and agenda responsiveness, the inclusion of the movement's concerns onto the political agenda. In this model, the gaining of new advantages takes three forms. The first one is policy responsiveness, defined as the adoption of new policies in light of the movement's demands. The second one is output responsiveness, defined as the execution of new policies following adoption. The third one is impact responsiveness, defined as the extent to which the movement's grievances have been alleviated.

Other typologies have been offered more recently. Giugni et al. (1999) take an alternative approach and focus more on whether the outcome directly follows from mobilization or takes on an indirect characteristic. In this thesis, I prefer speaking of policy outcomes or policy change, as I am not tracing the direct policy impact of social movements. I am instead looking at the role played by political elites in mobilisation for policy change.

Studies on the policy impact of social movements have increased exponentially in the last few decades (Uba, 2010, p. 97). Rather than offer yet another look at this question and testing models of impact, I prefer advancing our understanding of the role of elite allyship in this relationship, which is under-developed. I understand policy change as a change in the political agenda, policy enactment, policy implementation and policy repeal. The political agenda is

another term for political attention. It refers to 'the list of subjects or problems to which governmental officials, and people outside of government closely associated with those officials, are paying some serious attention at any given time' (Kingdon, 2003, p. 3). Policy enactment refers to the passing or successful formulation of policies, such as major legislations (Andrews and Edwards, 2004, p. 493). The third stage refers to the execution or enforcement of existing policies (Andrews and Edwards, 2004, p. 498). Finally, policy repeal refers to the repeal of an existing policy, though this is a less widely studied change than the previous three. In sum, policy change is simple a change in view by policy-makers.

I now turn to defining what I understand by the term social movement, and justify which terminology I use to guide my research. At first, it seems logical to use a social movement definition among the many that exist, as they all highlight conflict and interactions, which is relevant for my theoretical framework. I initially consulted definitions of social movements, and came across Diani's (1992) comparative assessment of the conceptualisation of social movements by the most influential authors at the time, namely McCarthy and Zald (1977), Touraine (1981), Turner and Killian (1987) and Melucci (1989). Despite their different interpretations, Diani (1992, p. 1) managed to find substantial convergence among them, allowing him to come up with a definition of social movements as 'networks of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organisations, engaged in political or cultural conflicts, on the basis of shared collective identities.' Although definitions of social movements remain quite varied and shift between being restrictive and broad, Diani's generalisation still holds (Meyer and Tarrow, 1998; Giugni, 2009a; Tarrow, 2011).

It is indeed possible to note that broadly speaking, social movements are collective efforts based on a shared identity and challenging or resisting the status quo, tough these efforts are no necessarily coherent. I use the social movement campaign as my unit of analysis instead because it best matches the phenomenon under study. As will be shown in subsequent chapters,

the mobilisation for the criminalisation of violence against women in Morocco brings together different types of actors, who organise in parallel with each other, rather than with one another, and who have different political leanings. In fact, the one thing that brings them together is the desire to improve the legislative framework concerning violence against women. My definition of a campaign is 'a thematically, socially, and temporally interconnected series of interactions that, from the viewpoint of the carriers of the campaign, are geared to a specific goal' (della Porta and Rucht, 2002, p. 3).

1.5. Research Design

In this study, I employ a mixed methods research design that incorporates quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis. Mixed methods have been used in social research for a long time because a single research method is restrictive and therefore significantly affects knowledge production (Torrance, 2012). I use a combination of a meta-analysis, representative claims analysis, and semi-structured interviews with representatives of social movement organisations, coalitions and informal groups. Combining these research strategies offers a more thorough exploration of my research questions.

To investigate the extent to which the presence of elite allies is a strong predictor of policy outcomes favourable to social movements, controlling for mobilisation, I use a meta-analysis. A meta-analysis can be defined as 'the statistical analysis of a large collection of analysis results from individual studies for the purpose of integrating the findings' (Haidich, 2010, p. 29). It is the systematic analysis of a body of literature to draw more reliable conclusions on the effect of a variable, or a set of variables on an outcome. In my research, I carry out a meta-analysis of the literature on the policy impact of domestic social movements, to assess the extent to which different types of opportunities are consistently associated with policy change favourable to a social movement, when the latter is mobilising.

To investigate the extent to which claims formulated by various elite political actors align with those of domestic activists on the issue of violence against women, and which resources and strategies the former use, I use representative claims analysis. Since my conceptualisation of opportunities is interactive and dynamic, and focuses on the relationship between elite allies and social movements, I need to use a method of data collection that will provide a means of mapping out these interactions. Such a method can be found in the form of representative claims analysis. This method is a form of content analysis that has been developed by de Wilde (2013) to link Saward's (2006, 2010) theorisation of the representative claim with Koopmans and Statham's (1999) methodology of political claims analysis.

To examine who domestic activists consider elite allies and what type of elite allyship they believe help them advance their policy goals, I draw on semi-structured interviews with representatives from women's rights organisations, groups and coalitions. Semi-structured interviews give 'rich descriptions of people and interaction as they exist and unfold in their native habitats'(Gubrium and Holstein, 1997, p. 6). They are a widely-used tool in social movement studies (Della Porta, 2014). In contrast to the rigidity of structured interviewing, it allows the researcher to delimit the topic under discussion while giving the interviewee some flexibility in the discussion (Blee and Taylor, 2002). Thus, it is more suitable for examining the perceptions of domestic activists on violence against women in Morocco, while at the same time enabling me to gain further information and clarification not obtained from the claims-analysis, such as the non-public ways in which elite political actors have engaged with activists. The interviews are necessary for understanding which actors are perceived as elite allies by domestic activists, and which actions they interpret as being acts of elite allyship. I explain each of these research methods in subsequent chapters.

1.6. Violence Against Women in Morocco

To explore three of my research questions, I use a single case study. The decision to focus on a single case is due to two methodological challenges which my theoretical framework raises. Firstly, I examine strategic interaction between different types of actors in this research. Second, my theoretical framework is not based on a specific theory, but on a rough set of propositions drawn from different literatures. A single case study provides a method of data analysis that can address these two methodological challenges.

Given that the purpose of my study is to analyse the dynamics between different sets of actors, a case study approach that uses thick description to address this causal complexity is highly suitable. As Yin (1994) argues, case studies help trace linkages through time and enable a contextual investigation of a research phenomenon. This is particularly important for phenomena where the development of events and actions plays an important role in forming explanations (Pettigrew, 1992). Besides, my research is above all exploratory. Not much literature exists that theorises the relationship between elite allies and other elite political actors, social movements and policy change. According to Eisenhardt (1989), case studies are helpful for theory building where existing knowledge is deficient and the focus of the study is unusual. A quantitative study would have required a well-specified theoretical model and hypotheses regarding how change in the independent variables affects change in the outcome variable (Ragin and Rubinson, 2009). While the use of case studies puts limits on generalisation and thus hinders hypothesis testing, it facilitates theory development, which is especially useful in under-studied areas such as the present one (Ragin and Rubinson, 2009).

Investigating my research questions in the context of North Africa provides several benefits. First, this is an under-explored area in social movement studies. Though various comparative

methodological approaches are now employed,[9] the field remains largely Western-centric. A few key studies such as Uba (2005), and Almeida and Stearns (1998) concentrate on non-Western countries, but the fact remains that the studies which have guided our knowledge of the impact of social movements are based on the United States and Western Europe. Poulson et al. (2014) have demonstrated through a content analysis of two prominent social movement journals that the field is dominated by the study of Western movements. Researchers on social movements are increasingly recognising this geographical imbalance and advocating 'a conversation about what we are doing, how we are doing it and what it is that we are not seeing' (Hayes, 2014, p. 243). I therefore contribute to broadening the scope of investigation and exploring the situation in a non-Western region.

I have selected Morocco because its characteristics provide a suitable testing ground for investigating the relationship between international and domestic political elites, social movements and policy change. Works on gender and women's rights activism in Morocco agree that reform on women's rights is the outcome of a combination of domestic and international opportunities, combined with advocacy, though with different degrees of emphasis placed on each of these factors (Wuerth, 2005; Sadiqi and Ennaji, 2006; Clark and Young, 2008; Cavatorta and Dalmasso, 2009; Bordat, Davis and Kouzzi, 2011). Morocco is a semi-closed political system that has long been regarded as 'an authoritarian state that kept people in line by intimidation and abuse' (Howe, 2001, p. 59). It is also a country whose political and economic development has involved international actors and institutions. In the 1980s, amid an economic crisis, Morocco became the first country in North Africa to be

---

[9] This includes the following: time-series analysis (Agnone, 2007; Giugni, 2007), comparative historical analysis (Cornwall, et al., 2007), qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) (Cornwall *et al.*, 2007), paired comparison (Stearns and Almeida, 2004), event history analysis (Kane, 2003), regression analysis (McCammon *et al.*, 2007). Some have even tried to triangulate between empirical methods, to test the strength of their hypotheses. Giugni and Yamasaki (2009) use QCA to revisit a question answered using time series.

embarking on the structural adjustment programmes of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (Layachi, 2000). Furthermore, the EU has long been involved in democracy promotion measures in the Mediterranean through schemes like the European Neighbourhood Partnership (ENP) Instrument and Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements, and has been using positive conditionality to reward progress (Kausch, 2009; Van Hüllen, 2012).

For instance, to reward Morocco for implementing the ENP Action Plan, the EU offered it an additional 75 million euros to carry out further projects under the Democracy and Governance Facilities scheme between 2006 and 2010 (Van Hüllen, 2012). Given Morocco's continued collaboration with its EU partners on a range of political, security, and economic issues, and its active engagement in the EU's democracy promotion efforts, it was upgraded to an Advanced Status in 2008, to further intensify bilateral and trade relations (Van Hüllen, 2012). However, scholars note that the EU has not been actively pushing for reforms, but has been far more concerned about meeting its security and economic interests such as controlling migration and securing energy supplies (Kausch, 2009; Van Hüllen, 2012). Morocco has been a key ally for the West, first as a bulwark against the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and more recently, as a stable ally in a volatile region (Cavatorta, 2005).

Besides other states and inter-governmental institutions, civil society groups – especially non-governmental organisations (NGOs) - have been pushing for more liberalisation. Since the political liberalisation of the late 1980s, NGOs have been proliferating in Morocco, though they do not all enjoy autonomy vis-à-vis the monarchy or other political parties (Sater, 2002). Specific strategies such as the cumulative production of reports, conferences and other resources, as well as an effective media offensive, over several years allegedly allowed women's rights activists in Morocco to exert increasing influence (Labidi, 2007). Catalano (2010) argues that the contribution of more conventional protest tactics such as marches and

petitions that gathered large numbers of people cannot be overlooked. Moreover, whilst the monarchy tries to influence human rights discourse, political parties have begun competing with associations,[10] following the opening of political power to broader segments of society (Catalano, 2010). Nonetheless, as political parties are weak and discredited by the population, civil society groups have taken on the role of the opposition, and act as the primary instigators of change (Cavatorta, 2009).

Besides advocacy, the changing fortunes of the Islamists – a key domestic opponent of reform on women's rights in Muslim-majority countries - explain why women's movements in North Africa have succeeded in achieving reforms. The weakening of political Islam as a key oppositional ideology has traditionally influenced how the political establishment has reacted to feminist advocacy, particularly in the early 2000s (Sadiqi and Ennaji, 2006; Labidi, 2007). For instance, the terrorist bombings in Casablanca in 2003 created an atmosphere of apprehension towards Islamism, which has contributed to making politicians and the monarchy more receptive to the secular legal reforms proposed by civil society actors (Sadiqi and Ennaji, 2006). I develop on the relationship between Islamists and the Moroccan women's rights movement in chapter 4.

Nonetheless, the first bill on violence against women in Morocco was passed after the Arab Spring, when the Parti de la Justice et du Développement (Justice and Development Party, PJD) came to power. Following uprisings in neighbouring Tunisia and Egypt, nationwide protests erupted in Morocco on 20th February 2011, calling for an end to corruption, the establishment of an independent judiciary, constitutional reforms, and the weakening of monarchical power (Maghraoui, 2011, p. 680). King Mohamed VI quickly moved to quell dissent by calling for a revision of the Constitution in March 2011 and moving legislative elections forward to November 2011. After the elections, the King appointed Abdelilah Benkirane, leader of the

---

[10] In Morocco, civil rights organisations are referred to as associations.

PJD as the Chief of Government. Subsequently, the PJD formed a first coalition government that lasted until July 2013, and then a second one that lasted until the parliamentary elections in 2016.

During the Prime Ministership of Benkirane, policies on violence against women have been introduced. The two most notable measures are the presentation of draft bill 103-3 on violence against women in November 2013 by Bassima Hakkaoui, Minister for Development, Women, and the Family, and Mustapha Ramid, Minister of Justice, as well as the adoption of a similar bill in March 2016 by the Council of Government, the first of its kind in Morocco. Subsequently, progress on this issue stalled in Parliament.[11] I thus examine the period between the legislative elections of 2011 and July 2016, when the bill passed the lower chamber of Parliament, to understand the interactions between the political elite in Morocco, domestic activists, intergovernmental organisations and other states in the development of this bill.

1.7. Chapter Outline

I have introduced the research questions under investigation in this thesis, and the broader theoretical and empirical issues at stake with regards to the relationship between opportunities, in the form of elite allyship, social movements and policy outcomes. I have spelt out that the scholarship on the concept of opportunity suffers from several deficiencies that need to be addressed. I thus suggested incorporating perspectives from related literatures to improve our understanding of the ways in which a form of opportunity – elite allies – mediates the relationship between social movements and policy outcomes. I have also explained the rationale for a case study approach, and justified the use of the mobilisation for the criminalisation of violence against women in Morocco to explore my research questions.

---

[11] At the writing of this thesis, the bill was still stalled in Parliament, but was passed in February 2018 under the Prime Ministership of Saadedine Othmani.

The concept of elite allyship and its relevance to social movements is explored through the remaining four chapters of this thesis, three of which are empirical. Chapter 2 lays out the theoretical assumptions that guide this thesis, and which are examined in the subsequent chapters. Taken together, these chapters advance our understanding of the interactions between elite political actors and social movements, and specifically contribute to our knowledge of what it means to perform elite allyship for a social movement.

In Chapter 2, I draw on the literatures on social movements, TANs and political representation to advance some theoretical arguments concerning how elite allies interact with social movements to affect their policy advocacy. I argue that there are various ways in which elite actors can perform allyship. These include the political representation of social movements' interests through claims-making, the provision of moral, material, informational and human resources, collaboration with social movement actors through coalitions, and the use of double mobilisation towards other political elites, in the form of leverage and collaboration.

In Chapter 3, I examine the concept of opportunity through a meta-analysis of 1384 independent tests from 47 selected articles to test the extent to which dimensions associated with different models of opportunity are consistently associated with policy change favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation. I specifically test the political, discursive, legal, socio-economic and supranational models of opportunity. I also assess the relative significance of one specific dimension of opportunity – elite allies. I find that most opportunity variables, and particularly those measuring hypothetical and actual elite allies, are not associated with favourable policy outcomes. I draw on these findings to argue the case for looking at the interactions of elite actors with social movements to determine who performs allyship and can therefore be a potential source of opportunity. In sum, this chapter examines the first research question.

Chapter 4 provides an overview of the development of the contemporary Moroccan women's rights movement, to provide some context to the case I analyse in chapters 5 and 6. I describe the three waves of the movement and discuss how the rise of Islamism has affected it. I also show that important sources of elite allyship came from the King, intergovernmental organisations and political parties. These actors performed allyship in different ways. Intergovernmental organisations provided moral resources to activists and exerted leverage on the Moroccan government. Kings Hassan II and Mohamed VI initiated reforms to the Moudawana (Family Code), with Mohamed VI going as far as publicly championing women's rights. Politicians provided moral and material resources. However, the case of the Moudawana shows the double-edged nature of elite allyship. Since the King is the highest authority and above all other institutions, his support means that reforms on women's rights can pass with little obstruction from other political actors. At the same time, since political parties do not have much political power, their support does not result in tangible results for activists. However, the involvement of an unelected and unaccountable actor and the bypassing of representative institutions reinforce authoritarianism and limit the implementation of new policies. In discussing the mobilisation for the reforms of the Moudawana, I show that activists were aware of these difficulties and ultimately switched from appealing to traditional representatives to the King, in the face of the rise of Islamism.

In chapter 5, I draw on representative claims analysis to address my second and third research questions. First, I provide an overview of the major groups of actors involved in the debate on violence against women in Morocco. This allows me to identify potential sources of elite allyship, and to compare these with those identified in my theoretical chapter. I also explore the issue of political representation by comparing the extent to which the claims made by various political actors align with those of domestic activists. The dimensions I use as the basis for comparison are the represented constituencies, the addressee of claims, the policy change

advocated, and the justification provided for the claims. I find that there is not much variation between the claims articulated by various types of elite actors and women's rights groups and coalitions. I thus find that the following actors perform allyship through representation: the Moroccan government, opposition political parties, the Moroccan Parliament, other types of politicians, bureaucrats, the judiciary, intergovernmental organisations and foreign governments. These categories are broadly in line with those identified in the theoretical framework.

In this chapter, I also examine how elite actors engage with social movements, by analysing the resources they provide to them and the strategies they employ towards other political elites. I examine who elite allies collaborated with on this issue and what activities they carried out between late 2011 and 2016. In terms of arrangement, I find that there is very little contact between elite actors and Moroccan women's rights groups and coalitions, suggesting that these two types of actors engaged on this issue as part of the same network, than as part of a coalition. The judiciary, intergovernmental organisations and foreign governments made joint claims with women's groups and coalitions. Support from these actors took the form of co-organising campaigns and meetings, and providing funding. With regards to resources, the most frequent type was moral, though elite actors also provided some material, human and informational support. With regards to strategies, elite actors engaged in both leverage politics and collaboration. They thus engaged in double mobilisation, as hypothesised by Wu (2005).

In chapter 6, I turn to the perceptions of the aforementioned performances of allyship by Moroccan women's rights groups and coalitions, to determine to what extent they can be perceived as such. Based on semi-structured interviews with representatives of Moroccan women's rights groups and coalitions, I find that few of the elite actors discussed above were perceived as facilitating mobilisation, and that there was a gulf between the actions of those they considered to be their elite allies and what they considered to be effective elite allyship. I

also find that activists preferred a model of elite allyship that involves leverage over other political elites, collaboration with activists, and the provision of a wider range of resources.

Finally, I summarise the main findings of my empirical research in Chapter 7, and juxtapose them against my expectations, to determine the extent to which they are in agreement. I also discuss potential implications for future research, based on the strengths and weaknesses of the theoretical framework and research design; and suggest follow up research, such as looking at the factors affecting the behaviour of hypothetical and perceived elite allies, and investigating why some actors can be perceived as elite allies despite not engaging in effective allyship.

2. Elite Allyship and Social Movements: A Theoretical Framework

2.1. Introduction

In the previous chapter, I have introduced the concept of opportunity, and explained that whilst elite allies form a key dimension of this concept, they have not been thoroughly theorised. More generally, I have criticised the tendency of social movements scholars to fail to clarify how opportunities, in the shape of elite allies, support social movements and amplify their policy advocacy. In this chapter, I offer a remedy to these limitations by integrating insights from the literatures on domestic social movements, political representation and transnational advocacy networks to clarify the concept of elite allies and the ways in which they can act as a source of opportunity. I start by situating the concept of elite allies in the literature on social movements and defining it. I then clarify to what extent elite allies have been hypothesised to be important, before discussing which kinds of actors could be potential sources of elite allyship. I then turn to the ways in which elite allies can amplify the efforts of social movements. I end by highlighting the significance of social movements' perceptions in determining who can be called an elite ally and what elite allyship means. Based on the insights of various bodies of literature, I argue that performances of elite allyship involve working with social movement actors, preferably as part of a formal arrangement such as a coalition, providing various kinds of resources, and engaging other political elites in specific ways. These expectations guide my empirical analysis.

2.2. Defining Elite Allies

The participation of 'rational' individuals, well integrated in society, and active in formal politics, in the historic social movements of the 1960s in the West, led to a major re-orientation in the study of collective action, and dislocated traditional perspectives that viewed social movement participants as irrational, emotional and socially dislocated actors (Canel, 1992). It is in this juncture that the the theory of resource mobilisation, which highlights the significance of the allocation of goods in the political sphere, emerged as a corrective paradigm (Canel, 1992). In essence, this perspective shifts the attention away from why individual actors choose to join movements, to how movements form and become capable of organising, obtaining strategic resources, and using them effectively (Pichardo, 1988, p. 98). It centres the practical aspects of social movements, by exploring which resources must be mobilised, what kinds of associations must be formed with other groups, and what types of external backing are important (McCarthy and Zald, 1977, p. 1213). Although there is no agreement on the types of resources that are necessary, this perspective introduced a crucial element in social movement research: the significance of outside support (Jenkins, 1983, p. 533).

Not content with the narrow focus of resource mobilisation theory, some scholars developed a model that would more powerfully highlight the extent to which the external environment conditions the success of social movements. This has resulted in the establishment of the concept of political opportunity structure. While this concept has been popularised by McAdam (1982) in his examination of the emergence of the civil rights movement in the United States, it was first systematically conceptualised by Tilly (1978). Previous scholars had already laid the basis for this concept. Lipsky (1970) and Eisinger (1973) stressed the significance of institutional features for protest activity.

Today, this idea has become so well established that it is used to explain everything about social movements. Put simply, this concept puts less emphasis on the agency of social movements than resource mobilisation theory and advances that political challengers do not operate in a

vacuum, but find their characteristics fashioned by the political context (Meyer, 2004, pp. 127, 128). If one wishes to predict a social movement's prospect for mobilisation and its outcomes, understand why it promotes specific claims, establishes certain alliances, and employs certain strategies, one has to look at exogenous variables and step outside of the realm of the social movement (Meyer, 2004, pp. 126, 127). These variables are commonly referred to as political opportunities. Initially, the term political opportunity structure was widely used, but its structural bias has encouraged a turn towards the use of the more flexible terminology of political opportunities. Several models emphasising the relevance of discursive, legal, socio-economic and supra-national opportunities have subsequently appeared, which suggest that opportunities need not be political.

To take into account these developments – which I describe in the next chapter - I simply use the term opportunity. Central to the concept of opportunity is the idea that elite allies matter. In Chapter 1, I stated that I define elite allies as actors 'who are responsive and who are in a position to be able to reform existing policies' (Giugni, 2004, p. 170). The concept of elite allies overlaps with that of institutional activists.[12] Starting from the premise that members of the political establishment and social movements are not necessarily distinct entities, Santoro and McGuire (1997, pp. 504–5) argue that those actors, such as civil servants and elected and appointed state officials, 'who occupy formal statuses within the government and who pursue movement goals through conventional bureaucratic channels' are institutional activists. In other words, they are social movement actors who have access to power and resources and take

---

[12]The term 'tempered radicals' has also been employed to refer more generally to actors whose membership cuts across social movements and other organisations (Meyerson and Scully, 1995).

advantage of their position by pressing for policies that advance the goals of a movement (Wald and Corey, 2002, p. 102).

Santoro and McGuire argue that the two criteria that differentiate between institutional activists and other institutional actors are ideology and mobilisation (1997, p. 505). If a state official also belongs to a social movement organisation and is involved in social movement activities, we can ascertain that this actor is an institutional activist for a particular social movement (Santoro and McGuire, 1997, p. 505). Pettinicchio (2012, p. 502) clarifies that to be considered an institutional activist, an actor needs to have some influence over the policy-making and implementation process, as well as believe in the cause promoted by a social movement and actively work on it, even after the decline of the movement, and without any push from the movement. However, institutional activists are constrained by their institutional environment and their relationship with social movement actors that mobilise outside the polity is not an easy one. Suh (2011, p. 444) illustrates this dilemma by drawing on the case of femocrats. Since femocrats simultaneously represent the interests of a women's movement and those of the state, they occupy contradictory identities (Suh, 2011, p. 444). This can result in their marginalisation from both institutional actors and a given women's movement, with the potential to stimulate conflict and competition (Chappell, 2003; Suh, 2011).

What differentiates an institutional activist from an elite ally is the existence of an overlapping membership. Thus, in this thesis, elite actors that perform allyship are those actors that occupy a position which allows them to directly influence policy-making and implementation and represent the interests of social movement actors, but who are not themselves part of a social movement organisation. They are alos perceived as representing the interests of social movement actors. I go into detail about the significance of perception in the last section of this chapter. I now move on to discussing the significance of elite allies for policy outcomes favourable to social movement actors.

2.3. Elite allies, social movements and favourable policy outcomes

My research was initially motivated by a desire to understand the link between social movement mobilisation and policy change. Interest in the policy influence of protest activities and, more generally, of social movements, began to arouse interest in the 1970s, waned, and then picked up again in the 2000s.[13] It is perhaps due to this sporadic interest that there is to date no comprehensive theory or set of theories connecting social movements and policy change (Kolb, 2007).

The modest evidence that exists is rather mixed. Several empirical works suggest that social movements either have little or no direct influence on policy. McAdam and Su (2002) find that while the anti-Vietnam war movement had a strong agenda-setting effect, it paradoxically had a negligible influence on policy-making. Another study argues that the framing of the Indiana Ku Klux Klan allowed it to achieve popularity but simultaneously prevented it from making more substantial political gains (McVeigh, Myers and Sikkink, 2004). An analysis of peace, anti-nuclear and environmental movements in the United States between 1975 and 1995 demonstrates that these movements have little or no weight on political decision-making (Giugni, 2007). A study of the women's suffrage movement reveals that legislators are rather conservative in their political responsiveness and only react favourably to the demands of challengers - such as social movements - that appear powerful (Cornwall et al., 2007). Another assessment of a selection of policy-oriented social movements leads its authors to the conclusion that such movements are ineffective because their activities are too few and too infrequent (Burstein and Sausner, 2005).

On the other hand, there is a considerable body of literature that shows a strong connection between social movement activity and policy outcomes. Yet, there is little if any agreement

---

[13] Many scholars explain that this lack of focus as due mainly to methodological difficulties (Kriesi *et al.*, 1995; Giugni, 1998; Amenta *et al.*, 2010).

about what factors facilitate this, and how and to what extent. The impact is seen as either considerable (Andrews, 2001) or small (Bush, 1992), long-term (Santoro, 2002, 2008; McCammon et al., 2007), or short-term (Dixon, 2008), or both (Amenta and Young, 1999b), direct and facilitated by the strategies and framing processes of the movement (Bush, 1992), or indirect and helped by opportunities (Amenta, 2006), or a combination of all these three factors (Burstein and Freudenburg, 1978; Cress and Snow, 2000; Pedriana, 2004). For the purposes of my research, I limit my discussion to the relationship between social movements, opportunities and policy change.

Opportunities act as mediating factors between social movement mobilisation and policy change (Amenta, Carruthers and Zylan, 1992; Amenta, Dunleavy and Bernstein, 1994; Giugni and Passy, 1998; Amenta and Young, 1999a; Cress and Snow, 2000; Kane, 2003). Burstein (1985) shows that legislation on equal employment opportunity was adopted in the United States thanks to a combination of changes in public opinion and local mobilisation. Costain and Majstorovic (1994) further add that Congressional behaviour on women's issues is jointly influenced by women' movements, public opinion and media coverage of the issue at hand. More generally, opportunity scholars all share as a core assumption that there may not be a linear relationship between political mobilisation and policy change. Soule and Olzak (2004) find that the impact of social movements on the Equal Rights Amendment was amplified by the presence of certain facilitating factors such as sympathetic political and legislative elites. As they conclude, 'policy outcomes are likely to be the result of a number of contingent and interactive forces over and above the main effects of movements' (2004, p. 479).

Synthesising this growing literature, several reviews have been written to trace the political and policy outcomes of social movements. Giugni (1998, 2008) traces long-standing debates and developments about the relative significance of internal and external variables, and discerns that whereas earlier studies concentrated on movement-controlled variables, the more

recent wave of research demonstrates that the political outcomes of social movements are conditional and contingent on the presence of facilitating factors in their social and political environments (Giugni, 2008, p. 1588). Amenta and Caren (2004) more narrowly focus on the conceptual, theoretical and methodological issues of what they consider to be the four major pathways through which social movement mobilisation is said to influence state outcomes.

Amenta et al. (2010) develop this, and through an assessment of 45 relevant journal articles, link the degree (strong, modest, weak, none), direction (positive or negative), and path (mediated or unmediated) of influence, of different kinds of movements by outcome type (structural, multiple policies, single policy, election/inclusion of movement). This systematic approach was preceded by Burstein and Linton (2002) who reviewed 53 articles in top sociology and political science journals to compare the relative impact of political parties, social movement organisations, and interest groups on policy, and determine whether this depended on public opinion. Uba (2009) extends this analysis by considering a greater number of scholarly studies, using a meta-analysis, and considering the mediating role of the nature of the political system alongside the role played by public opinion. While these scholars acknowledge the significance of external variables, there is to date no systematic review of which types of opportunities matter most for the policy outcomes of social movements. I address this lacuna by carrying out a meta-analysis in the next chapter to examine what specific types of opportunities are systematically associated with policy change favourable to a domestic social movement, when the latter is mobilising.

An important component of the external context is the presence of elite/ influential allies, understood as actors who are part of the polity (Tarrow, 2011). These are particularly important as they can use their position to act as brokers between protesting groups and those who hold power (Tarrow, 2011). This point is more aptly elaborated in Edwin Amenta's Political Mediation model, which argues that sympathetic elites and state bureaucrats are medium-term

sources of opportunities that can facilitate the policy goals of social movement organisations (Amenta, Carruthers and Zylan, 1992; Amenta, Dunleavy and Bernstein, 1994; Amenta, Caren and Olasky, 2005). Domestic bureaucrats whose mission is consistent with that of social movement organisations can be supportive in various ways, from proposing new legislation to enforcing laws that would benefit the constituency of a social movement organisation, though they should be in a position to implement these (Amenta, Caren and Olasky, 2005, p. 520). More generally, social movements benefit from the presence of a regime whose established policy orientation and plans are in line with their goals (Amenta, Carruthers and Zylan, 1992, p. 314). For scholars studying social movement organisations with left-leaning goals, elite allies come in the form of left-leaning figures in government or the overall strength of left-wing parties (Jenkins and Perrow, 1977; Kriesi et al., 1995).

For studies on American social movement organisations, the strength of the Left refers to the strength of the Democratic Party. Elite allies can also refer to figures in government that share the same characteristics as the mobilising group: when analysing the mobilisation of women, elite allies can come in the form of women in the legislature (Htun and Weldon, 2012). However, Giugni (2004, p. 171) argues that while the assumption that parties that are ideologically or socially closer to a social movement will naturally support their claims has good foundation, nothing proves that this happens. Social movements need allies who are responsive to their claims and willing to support them in institutional arenas to bring about policy change (Giugni, 2004, p. 170). In his comparative study of the structure of political alliances of the anti-nuclear, peace and ecology movements in the United States, Switzerland and Italy, he does this by looking at the number of public statements by elite figures on issues relevant to these movements (Giugni, 2004, p. 172).

Kriesi et al. (1995) add that elite allies can support social movement organisations (SMOs) in two additional ways: by participating in protest events and by providing material resources.

However, for left-leaning movements, the extent to which the Left facilitates protests by left-leaning SMOs depends on whether or not it is inside or outside of government.[14] When a left-leaning party like a Social Democratic Party is in power, it is less likely to support the mobilization of similarly left-leaning SMOs, as it is limited by existing policies and other societal forces, leading it to make concessions on their electoral pledges (Kriesi et al., 1995, p. 59). Yet, if it is in opposition, it is more willing to support them to broaden its electoral base, though this also means that it is not in a position to make policy concessions to them (Kriesi et al., 1995). I discuss these constraints in the following section.

Amidst the plethora of works that emphasise the significance of elite allies, are studies that cast doubt on their perceived usefulness, and find that they are either not useful or downright harmful for the social movements they are supposed to support. Soule and Olzak (2004, pp. 488–9) find that controlling for mobilisation in support of ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) in the United States, the percentage of Democrats in the state legislature and the percentage of female legislators are both negatively associated with the rate of ratification of the ERA between 1972 and 1982. However, there is an interaction effect between the percentage of Democrats in state legislature and the presence of the pro-ERA SMO, the American Association of University Women (AAUW) in a state (Olzak and Soule, 2004). This demonstrates that in each year, the rate of ratification of ERA increases fourfold when both the percentage of Democrats in the state legislature and the number of AAUW chapters are high compared to when they are at average levels (Olzak and Soule, 2004, p. 490).

A more recent study by Olzak et al. (2016) finds that pro-environmental legislators were less successful at passing environmental legislation favourable to the environmental movement

---

[14] As the literature on far-right movements demonstrates, social movements are not necessarily progressive or left-leaning. However, because my thesis focuses on a progressive movement, I draw on the literature on similar movements.

between 1973 and 1996 in the United States Congress than those with a more moderate stance. They explain this with reference to the concept of the 'median voter' (Olzak et al., 2016), which argues that if the supporter of a legislation differs considerably from the median position of Members of Congress, they will face more resistance and therefore were less success in getting their legislation approved. Thus, the relationship between domestic elite allies, social movements mobilisation and policy outcomes is more complex. I untangle this complexity in the next chapter, wherein I aggregate findings from quantitative works on the relationship between social movements and policy change, to systematically analyse the association between several dimensions of opportunity linked to different models of opportunity, and policy change, controlling for social movement mobilisation. I now turn my attention to identifying potential sources of elite allyship, and expand on the ways in which elite actors can support social movements in section 2.6.

2.4. Identifying sources of elite allyship

In this section, I describe the different types of domestic and international elite actors that have been identified in the literatures on social movements and transnational advocacy as being allies. I draw on these bodies of research to develop some expectations on the specific political actors that may perform allyship for domestic social movements wishing to bring about policy reforms. I also discuss what affects these actors' performance of allyship. I show that ideology, the institutional environment and strategic motivations influence the performance of elite allyship. In the next section, I draw on the case of Morocco to further highlight the constraints of the institutional environment on elite actors.

Different potential sources of elite allyship can be found in the literature on domestic social movements. On the one hand, we find scholars like Amenta who place a lot of emphasis on state agencies and bureaucrats. Drawing on theories of institutional politics, Amenta and Caren

(2007) argue that bureaucracies whose mission is aligned with that of a social movement, will promote legislation in favour of this group's constituency. Since these agencies are usually under-funded and politically weak (Stearns and Almeida, 2004, p. 480), they have an interest in supporting the expansion of state institutions and in meeting the goals of their own bureaus. They therefore exploit the mobilisation of like-minded groups to push for greater resources and status for themselves (Amenta and Zylan, 1991, p. 252). However, such actors face institutional constraints. Quoting Meyer and Rowan (1977), as well as Scott (2014), Harrison (2016, p. 2) argues that bureaucrats' institutional environments not only shape their practices and ideas, but also place material constraints on them. Moreover, organisations are not 'unitary actors developing strategic responses to outside pressures,' but 'pluralistic entities' in which conflicting institutional demands may be internally represented among staff and thus shape organisation practices' (Pache and Santos, 2010, pp. 456, 459; Harrison, 2016, p. 4). Thus, it is not enough to consider if bureaucrats are willing to support social movements, but also if they are capable of doing so.

Besides bureaucrats and state institutions, political parties are also assumed to be a source of opportunity. Parties and social movements are closely intertwined and relate to one another in many ways. In the words of Zald and Garner (1987, p. 312), 'movements compete with parties. Movements infiltrate parties. Parties spin off movements, either deliberately, or in the process of factionalising. Movements appear within parties. Movements become parties.' Goldstone (2003, p. 4) goes as far as saying that parties and social movements are mutually dependent on one another: on the one hand, parties rely on social movements to win elections, while on the other, social movements cannot succeed and even exist without the sponsorship of political parties. The form of support varies from public statements to the provision of material resources, and even participation in protest (Giugni, 2004).

Like bureaucrats, the motivations for political parties to support social movements are both ideological and strategic. Firstly, there needs to be some coherence or overlap in the identity of a given social movement and political parties. Given that organisations strive to maintain internal coherence with respect to their identity, political parties are more likely to support those social movements that do not contradict with and in fact, align with their ideological and cultural identity (Piccio, 2015). For instance, because there is a close affinity between the constituencies of left-wing social movements and left-wing political parties, a political party on the left would see a leftist social movement's mobilisation as supportive of its policy agenda (Kriesi, 2014). Furthermore, party members also participate in social movement activities, leading to changing attitudes towards the aims of a social movement (Piccio, 2015). However, Giugni (2004, p. 171) reminds us that while the claim that parties that are ideologically or socially closer to a social movement will naturally support their claims has good foundation, nothing proves that this happens. As the case of the anti-globalisation movement demonstrates, the rise of a movement can be perceived as a threat to parties that could be potential allies on the Left, leading to repression and 'delegitimisation' of the movement (della Porta and Fillieule, 2004, p. 229).

The strategic decision of political parties to ally with social movements is due to a number of contextual factors. The first factor involves party divisions. According to Hutter and Vliegenthart (2016), political parties are more likely to respond to issues taken up by parties with whom they share an ideological affinity, as they compete for similar constituencies. For instance, in France, when the left was dominated by the Communist party until the end of the 1970s, the Socialists had to appeal to the working class to tackle the competition of the Communists, resulting in them being less reliable allies for the new social movements (Kriesi, 2007). The second factor involves electoral competition. It has been suggested that parties are

more likely to form alliances with social movements in times of electoral instability, as the winning of new votes becomes more important (Hutter and Vliegenthart, 2016).

The final factors concern whether or not the party is in government and whether or not it is a mainstream party. According to Hutter and Vliegenthart (2016), because parties in government and mainstream parties have to represent and be accountable to the general public, they are more constrained than niche and opposition parties in actively supporting social movements who represent particular interests. In fact, Kriesi et al. (1995) have found out in their study of new social movements in Europe that the Social Democrats were much less reliable allies when they were in government. However, when political parties are in government, they can bring the movement's demands in the political system, and if they have a strong position in the executive, they can meet those demands, if they are willing to do so (Giugni, 2004, p. 170).

Social movements also engage in litigation strategies to make their claims. If a number of judges are presented with a particular legal claim, they may take one of the following positions: uniformly reject the claim, uniformly accept the claim, or be divided among themselves (E. A. Andersen, 2005). Therefore, since the perspectives of individual judges affect the progress and outcomes of social movement litigation, judicial receptivity, in the form of support by judges and members of juries, is important for social movements (Mccammon and Mcgrath, 2015, p. 131). Activist lawyers can support social movements in various ways, such as helping with costs, devising legal strategies and filing legal documents (E. A. Andersen, 2005). Thus, as Epp (1998, p. 17) argues, as well as a willing and able judiciary, material support for the sustained pursuit of a campaign is also important. Besides judicial actors, state legal aid programmes can help with costs, and state institutions responsible for enforcing human rights and equality laws can act as strategic litigators (Evans Case and Givens, 2010, p. 225).

What the aforementioned discussion leads to is the suggestion that ultimately, the partisanship of the political regime or government in general is an important actor (Amenta, Caren and Olasky, 2005, p. 521). A new government may wish to strengthen its position by adoption policy positions that may be favourable to the constituency of a social movement (Amenta, Caren and Olasky, 2005). For instance, a reform-oriented regime where left-wing and centrist parties control the government would nurture its ties to pro-social policy groups, benefiting leftist social movements (Amenta and Halfmann, 2000, p. 510). Thus, a sympathetic government could perform allyship.

However, it has been argued that relations between mainstream political parties and social movements have soured in recent decades, following the behavioural and structural changes of political parties (della Porta, 2007). Political parties have evolved from being mass-based to professionalised, with a great deal of their efforts dedicated to campaigning to attract the median voter (della Porta, 2007). As they have shifted towards the centre of the political spectrum, they have become less supportive of social movements (della Porta, 2007).

In sum, the literature on social movements suggests that there are various types of powerful political actors in state institutions that could act as a source of opportunity for social movements wishing to influence policy.[15]

However, scholars acknowledge that the interests and capacities of these actors influence the extent to which these actors can act as allies. Stearns and Almeida (2004) add that the political and institutional environment shape the kinds of elite actors that are available as social movement allies. They explain that the degree of bureaucratisation and fragmentation of

---

[15] Scholars have also referred to business actors, trade unions, professional associations and experts, and religious institutions as potential elite allies for social movements (Van Dyke, 2003). However, because these actors do not directly influence policy-making, I do not include them in my conceptualisation of elite allies.

political authority, and the electoral system affect the likelihood that a coalition will form between a social movement and state agencies, opposition parties, local governments and the courts (Stearns and Almeida, 2004, p. 480).

First, the more bureaucratised the state apparatus, the more likely there is to exist a state agency receptive to the goals of a social movement (Stearns and Almeida, 2004, p. 480). This likelihood is strengthened if the function of the agency is to focus on social issues that help sustain the institutional credibility of the state, such as healthcare and anti-discrimination (Stearns and Almeida, 2004). Second, in a proportional representation system, opposition parties compete for constituencies with the dominant party and other opposition parties, increasing the incentives to align with a social movement (Stearns and Almeida, 2004, p. 481). Third, there is a greater likelihood of coalitions forming between a social movement and local government or the courts in democratic states where there is a fragmentation of political authority because these institutions are autonomous from the centre (Stearns and Almeida, 2004, p. 482).

All in all, we can hypothesise that bureaucrats in state agencies and institutions, as well as actors in the legislative, executive and judicial branch are potential sources of elite allyship for social movements advocating policy reforms.

Contrary to the literature on social movements, scholars on transnational advocacy networks focus on the significance of international allies. Keck and Sikkink (1998, p. 2) define a transnational advocacy network as an assemblage of 'those relevant actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services.' Keck and Sikkink (1999, pp. 91–2) identify the following possible actors in transnational advocacy networks: international and domestic NGOs, research and advocacy organisations, local social movements, foundations, the media,

churches, trade unions, consumer organisations, intellectuals, parts of regional and international intergovernmental organisations, parts of executive and/or parliamentary branches of governments. Scholars are increasingly expanding the boundaries of what constitutes a transnational advocacy actor, by incorporating such entities as diaspora and migrant networks (Werbner, 2002; Weyland, 2005), epistemic communities (Finnemore, 1993), corporations (Pattberg, 2005), and even religious organisations (Dalacoura, 2001).

International actors and domestic social movements are linked by a Boomerang Pattern. Risse and Sikkink (1999, p. 18) clarify that a Boomerang Pattern emerges when 'national opposition groups, NGOs, and social movements link up with transnational networks and INGOs who then convince human rights organisations, donor institutions, and/or great powers to pressure norm-violating states.' Through the provision of access, leverage, information and money, these networks amplify the claims of domestic challengers (Sikkink and Keck, 1998, p. 18). However, Keck and Sikkink's diagram of the Boomerang Pattern of TAN influence suggests that there are asymmetries of power within TANs: civil society groups such as NGOs provide information, while it is essentially intergovernmental organisations and other states that bring pressure on the target state (1998, p. 30). Transnational NGOs in Western countries are seen as neutral experts on global issues, especially the likes of Amnesty International, Greenpeace and Oxfam, which are perceived as 'independent sources of credible news' in North America and Western Europe (Ron, Ramos and Rodgers, 2005, pp. 557–8). Despite this, NGOs are dependent on the willingness of governments and IGOs to work with them, and are given weak formal recognition in international institutions, constraining their potential for policy influence (Sikkink, 2002, p. 304). They therefore engage in 'informal exercises of power and influence' (Sikkink, 2002, p. 305). Due to their lack of access to decision-making, I do not consider them to be elite actors.

Such cannot be said of international institutions. According to Smith (2004, p. 324) states increasingly resort to international institutions to address global issues such as human rights, peace and the environment, and even sign international agreements on these matters to demonstrate their commitment. This means that within these organisations, domestic social movements can find allies who uphold their values and are willing to provide symbolic and material resources to help them in their advocacy. From a strategic point of view, because such organisations lack natural constituencies that can provide them with political support, they themselves actively try to build direct links with more marginal groups (Smith, 2004).

Zajak's (2014) pathway model highlights international institutions are the driving force behind a global governance structure which determines the degree of international institutionalisation of a specific issue-area (Risse-Kappen, 1995). As Risse-Kappen (1995, p. 7) argues, 'the more the respective issue-area is regulated by international norms of cooperation, the more permeable should state boundaries become for transnational activities.' In other words, this global governance structure legitimises the activities of INGOs and domestic SMOs, thereby making the target state more vulnerable to their demands. International norms are diffused through formal processes which establish a shared social consensus on certain issues. International institutions act as authoritative bodies that reflect these shared norms. In my case, the international institution behind the global governance structure on women's rights, and therefore on violence against women, is the United Nations, through specific bodies like UN Women and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).

Another relevant institution is the EU. While the EU does not have the same level of authority as the UN, it is an important player in Morocco. In the 1990s, the EU introduced a systematic partnership programme with its Mediterranean neighbours through the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, with a focus on democratisation (Tommel, 2013). In 2005, it introduced the

European Neighbourhood Policy, with less emphasis on democratisation, through the events of the Arab Spring in late 2010 reverted this shift (Tommel, 2013). As of July 2009, Morocco was the largest recipient of EU aid within the European Neighbourhood framework, and subsequently achieved advanced status (Kausch, 2009). In fact, scholars claim that political reforms in Morocco have been affected by its relationship with the EU (Kausch, 2009). Thus, given this prominent role, the EU cannot be ignored of any analysis of Morocco. Given that its programmes aim to encourage Morocco to democratise, it can be assumed that it is another key transnational ally for domestic SMOs desiring to bring about policy reforms on violence against women.

There are limits to the extent to which international institutions can act as a source of opportunity. According to Sikkink (2005, p. 155), environmental and labour movements do not seek out the support of international institutions when they face blockage at home, because they fear that they will erode the rights they enjoy at home. More generally, how open or closed international institutions varies across issues, regions, and time: international institutions in the 1990s were more open than in the 1960s, those dealing with human rights are more open than those dealing with trade, and finally, regional institutions in Europe are more open than those in Asia (Sikkink, 2005). Sikkink (2005) offers a detailed model of the interactions between domestic and international opportunity structures,[16] to demonstrate this. In the first scenario, both domestic and international institutions are closed to domestic social movements, resulting in low activism and therefore fewer chances of success (Sikkink, 2005, p. 159). In the second scenario, a Boomerang Pattern emerges as domestic activists perceive domestic structures as

---

[16] According to Sikkink (2005, p. 157), the domestic opportunity structure refers to 'how open or closed domestic political institutions are to domestic social movement or NGO influence' while the international opportunity structure refers to 'the degree of openness of international institutions to the participation of transnational NGOs, networks, and coalitions' (Sikkink, 2005, p. 156).

closed and international ones as open, resulting in them seeking out transnational allies to bring about pressure on their government.

In scenario C, both international and domestic structures are relatively open, an inside-outside coalition emerges between domestic social movements and transnational actors, with the former using transnational activism in a complimentary manner to domestic activism. The difference with scenario B is that in this case, domestic social movements prioritise the domestic arena and use the international arena when needed. Finally, in scenario D, domestic structures are more open than international ones, and domestic social movements are forced into the international arena because their governments have signed international agreements that have given decision-making power to international institutions (Sikkink, 2005, pp. 163–4). They therefore engage in defensive transnationalisation and work towards resolving the democratic deficit of international institutions (Sikkink, 2005). Thus, international institutions are not always perceived as being a source of opportunity, and the extent to which their political clout translates into support for domestic social movements varies considerably.

While international institutions can serve as powerful allies for domestic social movements, they remain agents of governments, which ultimately control their budgets, agendas and leadership. In fact, because powerful states have substantial influence over these institutions, having access to the latter does not directly translates into real influence (Sikkink, 2005). The implication is that foreign governments, especially powerful states, are a more powerful international ally to domestic social movements. To sum up then, we can hypothesise that foreign governments and formal international institutions, in the form of intergovernmental organisations, can be potential sources of elite allyship for domestic social movements advocating policy reform in their country. At the domestic level, elite allyship comes in the form of government, political parties and parliament, bureaucrats or civil servants, and the

judiciary. However, as the next section shows, in authoritarian contexts, the sources of elite allyship can be radically different.

2.5. Elite Allyship in Morocco and Institutional Constraints

In the section above, I have drawn on the literatures on social movements and transnational advocacy networks to show that elite allyship comes from representative and democratic institutions. In this section, I argue that in authoritarian countries like Morocco, the best source of elite allyship comes in the form of the King and his associated networks. Democratic and representative institutions such as political parties and parliament are less useful because the political and institutional systems limit their power and consequently, the extent to which they can act as a source of opportunity. In sum, the institutional environment conditions who can perform elite allyship and to what extent.

Morocco is formally a constitutional monarchy in which the King is the overarching executive, through his roles as both the Head of State and the religious leader of the country, or Amir al Mu'minin, (Commander of the Faithful) (Madani, Maghraoui and Zerhouni, 2012). Terms such as 'authoritarian monarchy' (Pellicer and Wegner, 2014) or 'liberalised autocracy' (Brumberg, 2002) have been used by academics to highlight the undemocratic nature of the political system in Morocco.

This is does not seem obvious if we look at the formal structure of government. The Head of Government is the Prime Minister, aided by a Cabinet of Ministers, though as I mention below, these are appointed by the King. Since the mid-1990s, the country has had a bicameral parliament, composed of two houses, the lower Chamber of Representatives and the upper Chamber of Counsellors (Ketterer, 2001). While the lower chamber is elected through direct suffrage, the upper chamber is indirectly elected through local councils, professional associations and labour syndicates (Ketterer, 2001). According to article 107 of the

Constitution, the judiciary is independent, and the King has the responsibility to guarantee this independence (Ruchti, 2012).

However, the 2011 Constitution clarifies that the King is above all other institutions. As political and religious leader, he ensures that the Constitution and Islam, the religion of the state, are respected, as well as political institutions and international commitments (Madani, Maghraoui and Zerhouni, 2012). His powers are not checked by any institutions, and criticisms of his person are not constitutionally tolerated (Madani, Maghraoui and Zerhouni, 2012). His functions include the following: appointing the head of government, ministers and ambassadors, presiding over cabinet meetings, dissolving parliament, and overseeing the armed forces (Madani, Maghraoui and Zerhouni, 2012).

As the King is the Commander of the Faithful, he is the supreme institution in the country (Buskens, 2003). Coupled with his status as descendant of the Prophet Mohamed, he acts as a spiritual leader tasked with the responsibility of guiding believers and arbitrating on religious matters (Elliott, 2009). This confers him immense legitimacy, and as I discuss in chapter 4, he draws on his twin role as political and religious authority to settle debates and act as an arbiter between political forces in the country. However, it is important to understand that it is not just the person of the King that is important, but the institutions linked to him too. This apparatus is referred to as the Makhzen, or the informal alliance between the King and 'his advisers, selected businessmen, high-ranking bureaucrats and tribal chiefs' (Durac and Cavatorta, 2011, p. 57). Given these sweeping powers, I expect the King and the Makhzen more generally, to be sources of elite allyship, particularly if we consider the fact that the current King Mohamed VI has publicly championed women's rights.

Moroccan Kings resort to dividing political forces to maintain their authority. Hassan II who reigned between 1961, when his father Mohamed V died, until his own death in 1999,

implemented a strategy of divide et impera (Cavatorta, 2007a). This involved co-opting the political opposition, forming loyal parties to undermine powerful opponents, interfering in the internal affairs of political parties by exploiting tensions, and buying off people (Willis, 2002b). Hassan II also repressed those who opposed his authority, by eliminating political opponents, imprisoning them, and silencing dissent in general (Cavatorta, 2007a). Sater (2007) refers to this style of rule as neo-patrimony, because ultimately, segments of the Moroccan population were granted privileges in return for loyalty to the King.

Mohamed VI came to power in July 1999, and seemingly tried to move away from the overtly repressive methods of his father. In August 1999, he announced his support for equality between men and women and his commitment to integrating women in society (Buskens, 2003). Thereafter, he went on to frequently express his support for advancing women's status (Wuerth, 2005). During his reign, he has either initiated or backed several reforms to improve the situation of women, notably a new family code in 2004, a new nationality code in 2007 and reserved seats for women in parliament in 2002 (discussed in section 2.8. and in chapter 4). This has allowed him to present himself as a defender of women's rights (Cavatorta and Dalmasso, 2009).

He also initiated political and economic changes, in what appears as a move to democratise and develop the country. He gave greater powers to elected officials, allowed some degree of fairness and freedom in elections, gave Islamists – in the form of the PJD, a chance to participate in institutional politics (Cavatorta, 2015). Mohamed VI also freed political prisoners and increased freedom of the press and assembly (Cavatorta, 2015). To boost economic growth, he initiated reforms in agriculture, energy and tourism, increased ties with the United States and the European Union, and countries in sub-Saharan Africa to increase foreign investment in the country (Cavatorta, 2015). Despite these measures, the structure of political authority did not change, and repression continues. As I show in section 2.8. and in chapter 4 in the

context of human and women's rights, the King still bypasses representative institutions to make major changes, makes unilateral decisions and censors speech, a criticism levied at him by scholars shortly after his access to the throne (Maghraoui, 2001).

One way of continuing his father's authoritarian rule is his use of palace or royalist parties. In Morocco, political parties can be divided into three groups: royalist parties, that are established by or are loyal to the King, traditional opposition parties composed of long-standing left-wing and nationalist groups, and a new political opposition in the form of Islamists, which entered the party system relatively recently. In this section, I describe these parties and their ties to different segments of the Moroccan women's rights movement. I then move on to discuss how the institutional constraints placed on them have prevented them from helping women's rights activists reform the Moudawana (first referred to as the personal status code, and then as the family code) in the 1990s and 2000s.

Royalist parties have long been a fixture of Moroccan politics, though they have mostly been short-lived. After independence, Mohamed V co-opted the clandestine Mouvement Populaire (Popular Movement, MP) to offset the dominant Istiqlal (Independence) party (Willis, 2002a; Boussaid, 2009). This party was supported by rural Berbers as Istiqlal was predominantly urban and Arab (Willis, 2002a). His son Hassan II continued in his path and established a number of loyal parties, with varying degrees of success. In 1963, he approved a move by his Minister of the Interior to bring together pro-monarchy figures into the short-lived Front de Defense des Institutions Constitutionnelles (Front for the Defence of Constitutional Institutions, FDIC) (Boussaid, 2009). In 1978, he convinced his Prime Minister and brother-in-law to regroup royalist and technocrats into the Rassemblement National des Independents (National Rally of Independents, RNI), though this gave rise to a breakaway party a few years later (Boussaid, 2009). Through another Prime Minister, he created the Union Constitutionnelle (Constitutional Union, UC) in the 1980s, though tensions with the PM weakened palace support (Boussaid,

2009). Mohamed VI continued in this course with his establishment of Parti Authenticite et Modernite (Authenticity and Modernity Party, PAM) to offset the PJD, after the 2007 legislative elections showed its popularity with the electorate (Dalmasso, 2012). This party was founded by the most powerful advisor to Mohamed VI, El Himma, and ran on a populist and anti-political party platform (Dalmasso, 2012). However, the overriding goal of royalist parties is the protection of the monarchy's interests and the weakening of political opposition.

The traditional opposition to royalist parties is composed of the nationalist Istiqlal, the social democratic Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires (Socialist Union of Popular Forces, USFP), and the socialist Parti du Progres et du Socialisme (Party of Progress and Socialism, PPS) (Darhour and Dahlerup, 2013; Pellicer and Wegner, 2014). These parties formed a kutla (bloc) in the 1990s, alongside the Organisation de l'Action Democratique et Populaire (Organisation for Democratic and Popular Action, OADP), another left-wing party (Willis, 2002a), to resist the power of the Makhzen, though as we will see later in this section, their participation in politics also depends in them accepting the political authority of the King.[17]

A particularity of these parties is that they are closely linked to secular and left-wing associations of the Moroccan women's rights movement, through women's cells that later formed independent associations. The Association Démocratique des Femmes du Maroc (Democratic Association of Morrocan Women, ADFM) was formed in 1985 and grew out of the women's cell of the PPS, while the Union de l'Action Feminine (Union of Feminine Action,

---

[17] Istiqlal started off as the main independence party, and soon after independence, experienced a split. In 1959, the Union Nationale des Forces Populaires (National Union of Popular Forces, UNFP) broke away, and was supplanted by the Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires in the 1970s (Willis, 2002a).

UAF) in 1987 developed out of OADP (Sadiqi, 2017a). Istiqlal has an active women's cell, the Organisation de la Femme Istiqlalienne (Organisation of the Istiqlali Woman, OFI).

However, even though these parties gave birth to women's rights associations, they have proved unwilling or unable to help them reform the Moudawana in the 1990s and 2000s. After UAF and associated groups presented a petition for its reform in 1992, political parties refused to rally to their cause, because they believed this petition would create difficulties during the nascent yet limited political liberalisation introduced by the King (Cavatorta and Dalmasso, 2009). They thus decided to stay away from this debate that was dividing them, to focus on the negotiation of power (Bras, 2007). A few years later, in 1999 a Plan d'Integration pour la Femme au Developpement (Plan for the Integration of Women in Development, Plan) was proposed by the government of Youssoufi (USFP), with support from parts of the Moroccan women's rights movement (discussed in chapter 4). This Plan – that proposed revisions to the Moudawana - was later abandoned as it attracted opposition from the religious establishment and political parties. Istiqlal adopted an ambiguous approach, the PJD formed a counter initiative to challenge it, RNI and MP expressed support as long as it was in line with Islamic law, disagreement surfaced within the USFP, and the PPS decided to retreat from the issue (Bras, 2007). The fact that the counter committee created by the PJD brought together Islamists, nationalists and leftists shows that opposition to the Plan was not based on political affiliation (Ouali, 2008). Worst for secular women's rights activists, the government decided to not only drop the Plan, but also had to delegate the issue of reforming the Moudawana to the King, as only he can arbitrate on religious matters (Ouali, 2008). This inability and unwillingness of elected officials to help activists forced them to appeal to the King, as we will see in chapter 4 (Ouali, 2008).

Political parties' inability or unwillingness to perform allyship is in great part explained by the institutional constraints they face. In the three countries of the Maghreb (Algeria, Tunisia and

Morocco), political parties need to have official legal recognition to participate in elections and sit in representative institutions, a recognition that is not always granted, and can be retracted at any moment (Willis, 2002b). One condition of participation is the recognition of the primacy of the King (Cavatorta, 2009). Another is the establishment of restrictions on what parties can call themselves and pursue (Willis, 2002b). Coupled with the aforementioned interference from the monarchy, parties in Morocco occupy a vulnerable place. As the case of the reform for the Moudawana shows, the desire to maintain this participation in the political system influences their response to the Moroccan women's rights movement.

If we look at the case of Islamists, we can see the importance of the recognition of the King for participation in formal politics. The Islamist movement in Morocco is divided into two main group, those with a foothold in the legal and institutional arena, in the form of the PJD, and those without it, in the form of Al Adl wal Ihan (Justice and Charity, Al Adl) (Pellicer and Wegner, 2014). The Islamist movement first entered institutional politics in 1997, through the election of members of Al Tawhid wa Al Islah (Unity and Reform, Al Tawhid) into the lower chamber, after having contested the election through the Mouvement Populaire Democratique et Constitutionel (Democratic and Constitutional Popular Movement, MPDC) (Willis, 1999). The MPDC subsequently changed its name to Parti de la Justice et du Developpement (PJD) (Willis, 1999). However, it is important to note that the PJD was encouraged by the monarchy to take part in multi-party elections – to contain radical Islamism – in exchange for not questioning the religious legitimacy of the King and not directly challenging the rules of the game (Cavatorta, 2007b). If the PJD accepted this compromise, such was not the case with al Adl. Due to its refusal to abide by the rules of the game, Al Adl is officially banned from contesting elections, though this does not bother the movement, since it refuses to accept the authority of the King and the political system (Willis, 2002a; Cavatorta, 2007b).

However, as we shall see in chapter 4, both Al Adl and the PJD are staunch opponents of the secular current of the Moroccan women's rights movement, and supported the establishment of women's cells and associations within their ranks in the mid-1990s to counter them. In 1998, the women's section of Al Adl was established (Eddouada and Pepicelli, 2010). Women affiliated with the PJD launched in the mid-1990s, two associations – Muntada al Zahra (Forum of Zahra, Forum al Zahra) and Tajdid al Wa'I al Nisa'i, known as Renouveau de la Conscience Feminine in French (Renewal of Women's Awareness, RCF) (Eddouada and Pepicelli, 2010). As chapter 4 shows, these Islamist women's associations have strongly opposed proposals by secular activists to reform the Moudawana, not least because they perceive them to be against Islamic principles.

If political parties suffer from institutional weaknesses, so does the legislature, though successive constitutional changes have increased its powers. Morocco's first parliaments after independence acted as an institution that legitimised the monarchy and not challenge it (Ketterer, 2001). The 1992 Constitution increased its law making capabilities. This included such things as forcing the King to act on bills passed by Parliament within 30 days and mandating ministers to respond to the questions of members of parliament (Ketterer, 2001). The 2011 Constitution further increased its legislative powers, by enlarging the domain of law it can address, allowing it to initiate laws alongside the Head of Government, and giving it at least one day per month to examine proposed bills (Madani, Maghraoui and Zerhouni, 2012; Ruchti, 2012). In terms of government oversight, Parliament can also dedicate one day per year to evaluate public policies, ask policy questions to the Head of Government and high-ranking officials, and hold the government accountable through the Chamber of Representatives (Madani, Maghraoui and Zerhouni, 2012).

Despite these changes, the legislature is subordinate to the Head of Government and the King. The government can refuse the proposals of MPs if these threaten the economy and dissolve

the Chamber of Representatives, in concert with the Council of Ministers (Madani, Maghraoui and Zerhouni, 2012). The King's power over Parliament can be demonstrated by the fact that he sets the political and parliamentary agenda in his opening messages to the Parliament, and this forms the basis of discussion for MPs (Madani, Maghraoui and Zerhouni, 2012). These messages cannot be the 'object of any debate' (Ruchti, 2012, p. 16). The King can also dissolve the two chambers, has the sole authority to ratify political and military treaties, and can even demand Parliament to adopt a new reading of a proposed bill, which cannot be refused (Madani, Maghraoui and Zerhouni, 2012; Ruchti, 2012).

As if these constitutional limitations are not enough, Parliament also suffers from a lack of internal resources, preventing it from carrying out important duties. It lacks adequate infrastructure in the form of functioning standing committees, research staff and funding for fact-finding missions (Denoeux and Desfosses, 2007). The lack of research staff that could provide expert advice and data affects its ability to proactively initiate legislation and suggest amendments to bills (Denoeux and Desfosses, 2007). This lack of research staff creates a dependence on political parties, which possess such expertise (Denoeux and Desfosses, 2007)

In sum, there are limits to the power of representative and democratic institutions in Morocco, suggesting that they will not be able to perform allyship in a satisfactory manner. Moreover, the fact that the King is the higher authority means that getting his support radically affects the fortunes of a social movement. Nonetheless, as I show in section 2.8., women's rights activists in Morocco do not always target the support of the King, but also that of Parliament and the Prime Minister, because they perceive effective allyship as allyship that does not reinforce authoritarianism, but rather encourage democratic decision-making.

2.6. Performances of Elite Allyship

In this section, I discuss the various ways in which political elites can support domestic social movements. I argue that they should speak for and with social movements, provide a wide array of resources, and exert pressure over other political elites. I first draw on the literature on political representation and social movement coalitions to argue that elite allyship involves the political representation of social movements and working with them as part of a coalition. I then draw on resource mobilisation theory to argue that the provision of moral, material, human and informational resources is also important. Finally, I draw on the literature on transnational advocacy networks to argue that another way to perform allyship is the use of leverage on other political elites and simultaneously working with them.

2.6.1. Elite Allyship and Political Representation

Despite recognising the significance of domestic elite allies for domestic social movements, the literature on social movements neglects the crucial issue of how elite actors perform allyship, and what consequences this has for the mobilisation and policy impact of social movements. Whilst Keck and Sikkink (1998) have developed a model clarifying how international actors support domestic social movements, their model assumes that the former provides support in a way that is satisfactory to the latter.[18] Thus, neither literature provides an account of the extent to which elite allies represent the policy interests of the social movements they support. I draw on recent theoretical developments in the literature on political representation to argue that one dimension of elite allyship is the representation of the interests and claims of social movements, and that to measure representation, one needs to evaluate to

---

[18] Though studies on the rights of sex workers and children have confirmed that this is not always the case. See for instance Hahn & Holzscheiter (2013).

what extent the claims of elite actors align with those of social movements, through a claims-making approach.

The 'standard account' of political representation (Urbinati and Warren, 2008, p. 389) ties political representation to electoral democracy: elections enable a pre-defined constituency to authorise and hold accountable representatives (Kuyper, 2016, p. 209). This constituency is delimited by territory and therefore, where one lives determines who one can elect as a representative (Urbinati and Warren, 2008, p. 389).

This view can be most clearly seen in the literature on TANs, and particularly on the relationship between transnational civil society organisations and domestic social movements. Even though INGOs act and speak on behalf of disenfranchised groups, they have not been elected by them, and there are no democratic structures by which these constituencies can hold them to account, which means that INGOs are not legally bound to act in the interests of any given community (Collingwood and Logister, 2005). The primary function of intergovernmental organisations is to articulate the interests and preferences of their sovereign member states. There therefore appears to be no reason to examine their representativeness towards social movements. In fact, in the United Nations, the spokesperson for a member state may not even have been elected democratically (Rehfeld, 2006, p. 1).

However, recent years have witnessed a 'constructivist turn' in the conceptualisation of representation, which calls for a decoupling of representation from election (Näsström, 2015, p. 1). In a world where political interaction is not confined to the boundaries of nation-states and where there is decreasing trust in political parties, party membership and election turn-out in democracies, it makes little sense to restrict the concept of representation to formal political participation in a nation-state (de Wilde, 2013, p. 279). Instead, we need a conception of representation that is 'dynamic', 'claims-based' and 'performative' (Saward, 2006, p. 299), as

representation derives ultimately from events - notably claims – and not by fixed institutional presences (Saward, 2010). Indeed, a key point in this perspective is that there is no 'fixed, knowable sets of interests for the represented,' as these are articulated and defined by representatives (Saward, 2006, p. 301; Severs, Celis and Meier, 2013, pp. 433–4). Thus, a constituency and its interests are constructed through representative claims (Severs, 2010, p. 411). This means that anyone can claim to be a representative, though the legitimacy of these representative claims ultimately depends on the represented's acceptance thereof (Severs, Celis and Meier, 2013, p. 435).

Representative claims need to resonate with the audience they are intended for, and accepted by them (Saward, 2006, p. 303). Thus, representation is an interactive process whereby representatives choose their constituents and the represented choose their representatives, through the acceptance, rejection or ignorance of representative claims (Saward, 2010, p. 36). Representation is thus 'an ongoing process of making and receiving, accepting and rejecting claims – in, between, and outside electoral cycles' (Saward, 2010, p. 36). The general form of an ideal representative claim is as follows: 'a maker of representations ('M') puts forward a subject ('S') which stands for an object ('O') that is related to a referent ('R') and is offered to an audience ('A')' (Saward, 2010, p. 36). In other words, the Maker is the claimant, the Subject is the claimed representative, the Object and Referent relate to the represented, and the Audience is the recipient of the claim. Saward (2010, p. 37) offers the following example to illustrate this ideal type of claim: 'Antiglobalisation demonstrators (makers) set up themselves and their movements (subjects) as representatives of the oppressed and marginalised (object) to Western governments (audience).' Representative claims vary along several dimensions: singular or multiple, particular or general, implicit or explicit, internal or external (Saward, 2006, p. 309). In any case, because the object of a representative claim – the potential constituency of the claimant – is not seen as being a passive recipient, this claims-based

conceptualisation of representation allows us to analyse the extent to which representation is democratic in the absence of authorisation mechanisms.

Still, arguing that representation can take place outside of electoral politics tells us little about why elite allyhsip should take the form of political representation at all. However, because elite allies are political actors 'who are responsive and who are in a position to be able to reform existing policies' (Giugni, 2004, p. 170), we should expect some degree of ethical commitment towards constituencies whose interests one is advocating for.

One way to grasp this ethical commitment is by analysing the discursive interactions of such actors. Empirically, this means that we should expect elite allies to uphold 'narrative fidelity' with the claims and frames used by social movement actors (King, 2004). After all, the very fact of being an ally necessitates listening and responding to the needs of those to whom one is allied. Unfortunately, although it is implied in the literature that powerful political allies have a responsibility to take up social movements' claims (Giugni, 2004; Tarrow, 2011), this assumption is not systematically tested. This is all the more unfortunate when it has been shown that representatives – understood as makers of representative claims, based on Saward's conceptualisation – may in fact make claims that are not just unresponsive to the needs and interests of those they claim to represent, but could potentially be detrimental to them.

In their study of the representative role of members of Parliament (MPs) of ethnic minority origins in the Netherlands between 2002 and 2012, Aydemir and Vliegenthart (2016, p. 74) show that such MPs can engage in either 'suppressive representation' wherein such MPs 'adopt restrictive framings towards cultural and/or religious rights and freedoms of immigrant minorities,' or 'supportive representation' wherein they 'support cultural and/or religious freedoms of ethnic and religious constituencies.' I thus offer a corrective to the literature by

analysing in a systematic way the extent to which different political elites represent the interests of social movements.

2.6.2. Elite Allyship Through Coalitions

As I have discussed earlier, Keck and Sikkink (1998) argue that domestic social movements are enmeshed in TANs comprised of both elite and non-elite participants and that include anything from NGOs, research and advocacy groups, social movements, foundations, trade unions, consumer organisations, intellectuals, inter-governmental organisations, as well as certain branches of government. Participants in these networks carry out a variety of activities to influence state and non-state actors, including lobbying, exerting moral or material leverage, engaging in accountability politics, and sharing and distributing information, all with the view of helping develop policy.

These networks are simply a set of actors that are linked by shared values, common discourses and the exchange of information and services. They are thus an informal configuration. Moreover, there can be vertical relationships among actors in a network. In their Boomerang Pattern of advocacy, Keck and Sikkink (1998) argue that weaker actors in the network, such as domestic social movements, require the presence of mediators or middlepersons in the form of international civil society groups, to make their claims access more powerful actors such as governments and inter-governmental organisations. The latter can then use their position to exert some leverage on the target of mobilisation. This arrangement is similar to the concept of epistemic communities in international relations. Haas (1992, p. 3) came up with the concept of epistemic communities to denote 'a network of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area'. TANs are not essentially composed of experts, but are arranged in the same informal manner. The

relationship between elite allies and social movements in a network is not very dense, sustained and formal – it can be seen as being more surface-level, ad hoc, and informal, and can be extremely varied, with other actors in the network acting as bridges between social movement and elite actors.

Elite actors can alternatively interact with domestic social movements through coalitions. Almeida and Stearns (2004) argue that social movements enter strategic alliances with members of the polity who are sympathetic to their cause in order to advance their claims and influence the policy process. They term this relationship the State Actor-Social Movement Coalition model. In their study of Japanese anti-pollution politics between 1956 and 1976, they show that the environmental campaign against pollution managed to persuade the state to implement a series of favourable reforms in the face of a powerful opposition, thanks to the facilitating role provided by their alliance with organisations within the state. They argue that the courts, local government, state agencies and opposition political parties have on their own, very little influence on the policy-making process, but that by joining forces, they managed to overcome their adversaries.

This is similar to the advocacy-coalition framework model[19] put forth in the literature on policy-making. This framework has been established to provide a better understanding of coalition behaviour and its impact on policy-making and has been applied to social movements. Gronow and Yla-Anttila (2016) have used it to examine the role of environmental NGOs in Finland's climate change policy. They explain Finland's 'underperformance' in terms of the dominance of what they term the Treadmill Coalition, composed of business interests, labour unions and state actors, and the weakness of the

---

[19] This model has been criticised for being mainly applied to North America and Western Europe. See Nohrstedt, et al. (2014).

ENGO-state coalition, which was also the least resourceful, smallest, least linked to other coalitions, and not moderate.

The particularity of a coalition is shared beliefs and coordination, though there may be heterogeneity in views, interests and types of organisations and networks one is part of (Barnes, van Laerhoven and Driessen, 2016). Coordination can be strong and involve establishing a common plan, or weak and involve only the sharing of information, the monitoring of action and the use of complementary strategies (Barnes, van Laerhoven and Driessen, 2016). Gupta (2014) brings together this literature with the insights of the social movement literature to argue that the behaviour and strategies of a coalition are influenced by a variety of external factors. Due to the closer ties between actors in a coalition, and its horizontal character, elite allyship through participation in coalition is preferable to participation in a network.

In sum, scholars in the social movement literature have identified two arrangements between social movements and elite allies: coalitions and networks. Within these arrangements, relationships can be horizontal or vertical, deep or surface-level, sustained or ad hoc, and formal or informal. In Chapter 5, I investigate which of these two arrangement characterise my case study as a means of illuminating the level and nature of contact between Moroccan activists and elite actors on the issue of violence against women.

2.6.3. Elite Allyship and the Provision of Resources

The literature on social movements assumes that elite allies are a key dimension of political opportunity because of the various resources they possess and potentially mobilise to support social movements (Silver, 1998). In fact, the core assumption of Resource

Mobilisation theory is the assumption that resources are a key determinant of the incidence, development and outcomes of social movement activity (Pettinicchio, 2016). But what range of resources would elite allies be expected to provide to social movements? Scholars have not fully explored what these resources are, how they are used to support social movements, and what impact they have. In this section, I draw on empirical studies to explore which types of moral, informational, human and material resources they provide. I show that despite the emphasis on the provision of material resources in the literature, elite allyship also involves the provision of moral and informational resources.

Cress and Snow (1996) developed a taxonomy which groups resources relevant to social movements into four categories: moral, material, informational and human. Moral resources refer to external endorsements and include sympathetic support in the form of supportive statements by external parties, and solidaristic support in the form of participation in collective action of external parties. Informational resources refer to knowledge capital relevant for mobilisation and is composed of strategic support, technical support and referrals in the form of the provision of personal connections. Material resources refer to 'tangible goods and services' and include such things as supplies, meeting space, office space, transportation, employment and money. Finally, human resources denote 'people who donate resources, time and energy' and can take the form of

audiences, leaders and cadres.[20] Below, I discuss moral, informational, and material resources.[21]

A key moral resource that political and government institutions can provide to social movements is legitimacy. Legitimacy can be conferred on social movements through issuing supportive statements, but also by attending their events, appointing social movement actors to official positions, and providing them with access to and participation in government institutions. Political and government institutions can provide legitimacy to social movements through issuing supportive statements as, for instance, either recommending the introduction of legislation favourable to a given social movement or voting for it. In his study of the adoption of English-only law in the United States, Santoro

---

[20] Cress and Snow (1996, p. 1095). A slightly revised taxonomy defines resources in terms of four broad categories: moral, cultural, social-organisational, human, and material (McCarthy and Edwards, 2004). In this model, moral resources refer to 'legitimacy, solidary support, sympathetic support and celebrity;' cultural resources are 'artefacts and cultural products such as conceptual tools and specialised knowledge;' such as certain tactics, organisational models and technical or strategic expertise that help social movements perform essential tasks, such as establishing an organisation, running protest events, and holding press conferences. Socio-organisational resources are those resources that aid in social organisation and comprise of infrastructures, social networks and (formal) organisations. Human resources are the properties of individuals and include labour, experience, skills, and expertise, such as leadership. Finally, material resources are 'financial and physical capital' like money, property, space, equipment and supplies (Edwards & McCarthy, 2004, p.126). A key improvement of this model is that it specifies which types of resources can be obtained through patronage by external allies. External moral and cultural resources may take the form of widely respected individuals or groups publicly recognising the work or competences of social movement actors, through such things as awards and prizes, thereby increasing public confidence in them. External human resources could include providing skilled staff or technical help, for specific events for instance. External socio-organisational resources could take the form of providing the contact details of sympathetic individuals, while external material resources involve grants, donations and contracts. However, I stick to the terminology provided by Cress and Snow (1996) as it is more straightforward.

[21] While Resource Mobilisation theory hypothesises that external actors also provide human resources in terms of audiences and leaders, I have not come across empirical studies that show this, and so do not discuss them. This does not mean that such a resource is not provided.

(1999, p. 892) identifies Black state legislators who voted against the introduction of such a law as elite allies to Latinos and Latino advocacy groups. In the struggle for Black suffrage in the United States between 1691 and 1842, state governors who recommended bills to legislators, exerted some form of veto power over laws and amendments, or influenced the call for conventions to change constitutions, can be seen as elite allies (Budros, 2013, p. 385). The introduction of legislative bills is an important moral resource because, as Banaszak (1996, p. 84) argues, it indicates that an issue has achieved some degree of legitimacy. However, given that in some legislatures, there are relatively few consequences to introducing a bill, it can simply be a symbolic gesture designed to placate a social movement (Soule and King, 2006). Bureaucrats can also lobby for legislation or enforce laws or administrative rulings in favour of the constituency of a social movement (Amenta and Halfmann, 2000). The media can be used to display performances of support and to thereby show the degree of acceptance of activists' claims. Political elites can make public speeches, such as press conferences and interviews, to signal public support for protesters (Giugni, 2004, p. 172).

Political parties can confer legitimacy on social movements by endorsing the political demands of a social movement in their manifesto or other platforms (Amenta and Halfmann, 2000; Amenta, Caren and Olasky, 2005). For instance, in the 1980s, the Communist party of Italy adopted a revised version of the feminist plan of the women's movement and used it to push for limited reforms in favour of women (della Porta, 2003, p. 62). The judiciary can also provide moral resources by formulating decisions that are in line with a social movement's goals (Giugni, 2004, p. 186).

Elite allyship also involves the granting of legitimacy to a social movement through participation in the activities it organises. Kriesi et al (1995) measure the allyship of

political parties to new social movements in Western Europe through what they term their 'facilitation' of mobilisation, or participation in protest events, while Cress and Snow (2000) operationalise it as the presence of members of city councils to the meetings and rallies of social movement organisations. One such instance of facilitation occurred when then-senator Barack Obama and other officials spoke at an anti-war rally in 2002 sponsored by Chicagoans Against War in Iraq (Heaney and Rojas, 2011). Legitimacy can also come in the form of appointing or electing social movement activists to official positions. For instance, state agencies may become staffed with social movement activists (Mayer, 2000), and activists may be elected to Parliament as a member of a political party (Rao and Cagna, 2016).

Another key legitimating resource intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) and their constituent agencies provide is access, which refers to 'formal and informal mechanisms or procedures for inclusions and participation' (Sikkink, 2005, p. 157). This can take the form of UN agencies such as the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to providing consultative status to non-governmental organisations (NGOs), or allowing them to participate in their meetings, or even allowing them to present written recommendations (Sikkink, 2005, p. 157). However, such type of access is not provided by international financial institutions such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Sikkink, 2005, p.157).

Elite allyship also involves the provision of informational resources in the form of expertise or, more pro-actively, providing logistical support. Political elites have expertise in their respective policy area and are embedded in various policy networks. This gives them access to important information which they can share with social movements (Pettinicchio, 2016). They also can offer social movements an effective vocabulary for recruiting

members and participants. American state actors generated a framing for the issue of drunk driving which activists drew on at the early stages of their mobilisation (McCarthy, 1994). Legal experts can persuade social movements to select legal frames and legal repertoires to resist challenging views (Pedriana, 2006). An example is the oral dissent of Justice Breyer on the court case Parents Involved in Community Schools vs Seattle School District No. 1, which inspired local activists and their elected allies to explore more creative ways of mobilising (Guinier, 2008). Elite actors can also make their organisational structures available to social movements to facilitate mobilisation. In her study of the Italian women's movement, della Porta (2003, p. 61) finds that left-wing political parties allowed the movement to use their daily newspapers to make calls for actions/protests, and provided other resources to help coordinate mobilisation.

By far the most studied type of elite resource in the literature is material and, specifically, funding. The assumption is that social movements can only exist if they are supported by elite funders (Silver, 1998). Funding can come from government, intergovernmental organisations, foundations, and corporations. While the literature on Western social movements focuses on funding by local government and domestic foundations (Jenkins and Eckert, 1986), the literature on non-Western social movements emphasises the role of foreign governments and institutions and international foundations (Jalali, 2013).

Empirical studies show that governments provide quite extensive funding to social movements in some countries. For instance, the Canadian government provides considerable funding, directly through grants and indirectly through tax reliefs (Corrigall-Brown and Ho, 2015), while in Spain, the state provides subsidies to feminist groups (Valiente, 2003, pp. 40–1). Foundations play an important role in funding identity movements (Bartley, 2007). Private foundations have provided funding for the American

Civil Rights movement and the environmental movement (Jenkins and Eckert, 1986). International donors have, though partnership projects, provided funding to help domestic SMOs carry out certain initiatives. The European Union funds activities related to activism and capacity-building (Hicks, 2004, p. 225). Sometimes, international funders take on a more pro-active role. During the Colour revolutions of the early 2000s, European and American donors actively encouraged their recipient SMOs to engage in opposition movements against their governments (Jalali, 2013).

While funding provided by elite allies is a key type of support for social movements, the potential negative consequences of this funding has been the focus of a heated debate. Two hypotheses dominate this debate: The social control hypothesis contends that because sponsors prefer to fund professionalised organisations that have moderate goals and strategies, they ultimately encourage the de-radicalisation and de-politicisation of social movements (Cress and Snow, 1996). The channelling hypothesis agrees that patronage encourages the professionalization of social movements; but it claims that, rather than de-radicalising or de-politicising them, professionalization encourages greater mobilisation (Jenkins, 1998).

In sum, different types of political elites interact with social movements in different ways to provide moral, informational, and material resources. I now turn to a consideration of the strategies they employ towards other elites to support them in their goals.

2.6.4. Elite Allyship and Double Mobilisation

Elite allyship can also involve interacting with other political elites to support social movements. The literature on domestic social movements has not focused much on these ally-target interactions, but the literature on transnational advocacy has done so. I draw on

this body of literature to discuss these interactions. Three strategies can be used to influence the target of mobilisation: leverage politics, accountability politics, and double mobilisation. Incorporating the works of Keck and Sikkink (1998) and Wu (2005), I argue that the final dimension of elite allyship is the use of double mobilisation.

Leverage and accountability are key strategies that are hypothesised to influence the target of mobilisation. As described above, Keck and Sikkink's (1998) Boomerang Model of advocacy maintains that when government violation of, or refusal to recognise, the rights of its citizens blocks domestic political and judicial channels and severely limits their ability to mount a successful campaign, domestic social movements may search for international allies as a means of exerting pressure on their government. These allies then target either the local state or third party organisations which can exert pressure on the state. If a government remains unresponsive to the demands of a local group, international allies can aid that group by voicing their demands in the international arena and, in this way, amplify them.

International allies employ four political tactics to transmit a message to the international community and to place pressure on the target state (Keck and Sikkink, 1999). I have already introduced these in the introductory chapter, but to reiterate, they consist of symbolic, information and accountability politics and leverage. They use leverage politics through naming and shaming the violator state; information politics to constitute themselves as an alternative source of information; symbolic politics to exploit symbolic events; and material or moral leverage to link cooperation with international norms to money, goods, or prestige. Finally, once a state has publicly endorsed said norms, they use accountability politics to expose the difference between its discourse and its practice.

Risse and Sikkink (1999) show, through their five-stage Spiral Model, how leverage and accountability strategies work to change state policy. Using the human rights movement as an example they argue that, in the first phase, repression may be so high that resource-rich actors in a TAN are prevented from acquiring information on the human rights situation in the target state, which results in their inability to place the issue on the international agenda. Then, in phase two, internalisation ultimately takes place as a result of slightly lessening repression, making it possible for a coalition of human rights TAN challengers to start lobbying Western states and international organisations regarding the human rights norm they would like to see adopted by the target state. However, the latter denies charges against it and the validity of the norm itself. In phase three, with international pressure escalating, the target state either further escalates repression and risks engendering a popular movement or revolution, or makes tactical concessions to ward off criticism. Yet, this is also an indication that the target state commits to the norm, albeit rhetorically. In phase four, the target state more openly consents to the norm, though there is still a gap between discourse and practice.

Finally, phase five is characterised by long-term rule-consistent behaviour whereby the norm becomes fully institutionalised in the target state. Whereas resource-rich actors in a TAN are especially useful in the earlier stages by putting the norm-violating state on the international agenda by raising awareness of its violations, shaming, and empowering the weak domestic movement, the sustained activities of the latter become increasingly important in helping the transition from rhetorical responsiveness to norm institutionalisation. Elite allies then provide access, leverage, information, and even funding to local social movements, while at the same time improving their own international image as human rights champions (Sikkink and Keck, 1998).

The pressure-compliance assumption at the core of these conceptual models leads Keck and Sikkink to ignore the fact that the relationship between the target state and international actors need not be contentious. According to Wu (2005), powerful international actors collaborate with the target state because not all states are vulnerable to moral pressure and material sanctions – something which is not acknowledged by Keck and Sikkink's (1998) Boomerang Pattern. This collaboration involves persuasion, demonstration, research collaboration, negotiation and can take the form of project partnerships and policy recommendation amongst others. Wu (2005) suggests that TANs educate, mobilise and collaborate with both the target state and domestic social movements, and, thus, act as a bridge that reduces the contentious relationship between these opposing actors, improves communication between them, and offers new channels of participation.

Based on the Habermasian view of power as the ability to obtain goals through consensual communication (Habermas, 2000), this perspective claims that, in addition to using leverage to modify the behaviour of the violator state, TANs also mediate its relationship with domestic challengers in a more sustainable way. Resentful of TANs because of the loss of sovereignty they cause as a result of sates having to make important political decisions under external pressure (Hochstetler, 2002), states may be more responsive to persuasive techniques which give them a semblance of choice. Wu (2005) calls this strategy Double Mobilisation. Chapter 5 looks at how domestic and international elite actors attempt to persuade the Moroccan government to change its policy position on violence against women through leverage – moral or material, accountability politics – and through collaboration.

2.7. Perceptions of Elite Allyship

In this section, I draw on the literature in social movements to highlight the significance of perception to judge the performance of elite allyship. I develop on this theme in the next two sections when I address the usefulness of elite allyship for social movements in the context of Morocco.

Although opportunities can be external to the movement, their usefulness ultimately depends on whether they have been perceived by actors, and how they subsequently act on them. It may be difficult for a social movement actor, with not much access to information, to accurately determine changes in power structures and resources (Opp, 2009, p. 169).This means that a change in perception of the external environment can elicit different responses, the same degree of repression or inclusion can have different effects on a social movement (Opp, 2009, p. 53). In a way then, opportunities are 'made, perceived and seized by movements….Opportunities would not have had any impact had they not been seized' (Klandermans, 1997, p. 167). However, it is not always the case that the perception of expanding opportunities encourages mobilisation, for activists may well choose to act when they perceive opportunities to be contracting (Suh, 2009). For instance, in the 1960s in the United States, the infiltration and disruption of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of the organisation Students for a Democratic Society, may have been a form of deepening repression, but it increased sympathy towards the organisation because of the lack of trust in the FBI (Rohlinger and Gentile, 2017, p. 14).

Despite the plausibility of this perspective, this definition is seldom utilised and tested empirically, because as Kriesi points out, information about the beliefs of actors is extremely difficult to access (Kriesi, 2007). However, this has led scholars to make simplistic assumptions and expect actors to know what is best for them, and subsequently behave according to rational

principles (Kriesi, 2007). Another difficulty is the fact that social movements systematically over-estimate opportunities for mobilisation and influence for strategic purposes (Gamson and Meyer, 1996). In the first instance, this allows them to convince potential participants that action is desirable because change is possible. They also highlight the risk of inaction and exaggerate the windows of opportunities that exist. Activists exaggerate the sense of possibility to entice potential recruits. Thus, opportunities may be framed differently than how they are actually perceived (Johnston, 2011). Nonetheless, no analysis of the significance of elite allyship can be complete without taking into account how recipients of support feel about it. I thus look at this aspect in Chapter 6.

2.8. The Usefulness of Elite Allyship in the Middle East and North Africa

To understand why social movements in non-democratic settings such as the Middle East and North Africa need elite allies for mobilisation and policy change, one needs to understand what it means to be a social movement in such settings. In this section, I argue that the social control of civil society groups such as social movements, makes it necessary to possess wasta, in the form of connections with the regime simply to exist, but also to achieve favourable policy change. I explain that relations with the political system allow activists to obtain useful resources and avoid repression, allowing them to engage in mobilisation. However, I argue that cultivating such relations and working through the system reinforce authoritarianism, and sustain activists' dependence on un-democratic processes to achieve policy change. Thus, while support from unelected and unaccountable may be useful for mobilisation, it is also a less sustainable opportunity for policy change. I start this section by providing a brief overview of the situation of civil society groups, like social movements, in the MENA and particularly in Morocco. I then discuss how working with and through an authoritarian political system allows civil society groups to achieve their goals. I subsequently address the unintended consequences of elite allies for social movements in authoritarian systems. I show that

Moroccan women's rights activists are aware of the difficulties of drawing on the support of the King to achieve their goals. What transpires from this discussion is that while unaccountable actors are objectively speaking a better source of opportunity in authoritarian contexts, their support is not always perceived as being particularly helpful by activists.

2.8.1. Civil Society in the Middle East and North Africa

Though no standard definition of civil society exists, it can be broadly understood as a collection of institutions, organisations and individuals that are separate from the family, the state and the market, and which advance common interests voluntarily (Anheier, 2004). As civil society refers to associations of people that come together for a cause, it includes social movements. In the MENA, associational life has historically been restricted by the authoritarian nature of states (Bayat, 2013). Since the state controls the political, economic and social spheres, there is little space for an autonomous civil society to form (Bayat, 2013). This is particularly significant as the lack of a functioning political society[22] in the Arab world means that civil society is where opposition politics really take place (Cavatorta, 2008).

This restriction is enforced through laws and policies that place severe constraints on freedoms of expression, association and assembly, and through brutal crackdowns of individuals or groups that seek to violate these constraints. Reports by international NGOs such as Amnesty International and independent watchdogs such as Freedom House, show that little has changed after the wave of protests that shook the Arab world in late 2010, and which called for greater freedoms. Amnesty International's most recent report on the region states that offline and online freedom of expression is tightly controlled, that authorities still clampdown on human

---

[22] Brumberg defines this as 'an autonomous realm of self-regulating political parties that have the constitutional authority to represent organized constituencies in parliaments' (2002, p. 64).

rights activists, the press, and people from marginalised groups, such as the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) community (2018). Freedom House's Freedom in the Word report highlights that not only did Middle Eastern regimes keep on repressing dissent, some of them introduced even more repressive measures, such as Egypt which adopted a new law in 2017, to restrict international funding for NGOs (Abramowitz, 2018).

Morocco's 2011 Constitution allows freedom of association and assembly. Article 29 of the 2011 Constitution states that 'the freedoms of reunion, of assembly, of peaceful demonstration, of association and of syndical and political membership [appartenance], are guaranteed' (Ruchti, 2012, p. 10). Article 12 states that 'the associations of civil society and the non-governmental organizations are constituted and exercise their activities in all freedom, within respect for the Constitution and for the law' (Ruchti, 2012, p. 7). However, these freedoms come with caveats. Article 3 of the 1958 Decree on the Right to Establish Associations forbids organisations whose goals are 'illegal, contrary to good morals, [or which aim] to undermine the Islamic religion, the integrity of the national territory, or the monarchical regime, or call for discrimination' (International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, 2017). Moreover, arrests and unfair trials are rampant and independent human rights groups are harassed and experience restriction in their activities, through the denial of access to planned venues (Human Rights Watch, 2017b). Authorities also sometimes refuse to issue registration receipts, which are required for organisations to receive funds and carry out financial transactions (International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, 2017). They even delay issuing the licences necessary for domestic fundraising (International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, 2017). This can be illustrated through the treatment of Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the Association Marocaine des Droits Humains (Moroccan Association for Human Rights, AMDH).

AMDH, the biggest independent human rights organisation, reported that the Moroccan authorities directly and indirectly blocked 125 of its activities, such as meetings and conferences, since July 2014 (Human Rights Watch, 2017a). It further added that they also tried to obstruct the registration of local branches and refuse to issue a receipt, affecting their ability to carry out important functions (Human Rights Watch, 2017a). Besides, the Moroccan government expelled two researchers from Amnesty International in June 2015, and banned its research activities in the country, along with those of Human Rights Watch the following September (Human Rights Watch, 2017a). This 'de facto' ban on these organisations' research activities was still ongoing as of 2017 (Human Rights Watch, 2017b).

2.8.2. Managing Authoritarian Constraints

Associations that are harassed and denied permits and funds in Morocco are those that refuse to play by the rules of the game (Cavatorta and Dalmasso, 2009). Another strategy employed by the Makhzen is to ignore and deny the existence of active and independent associations, resulting in associations drawing on patronage politics to achieve their objectives such as changing policy (Cavatorta and Dalmasso, 2009).

For civil society groups in Morocco, close links with power-holders also means being given the status of utilite publique (public utility). The Ministry of the Interior – whose appointment is influenced by the King - can bestow upon an association this title, allowing it to raise funds, receive donations, own assets and benefit from fiscal immunities (Denoeux, 2007). Those that are not granted this status can only raise funds through members' dues, which prevents them from raising much money at all (Denoeux, 2007). Other benefits of the label include making available venues to hold meetings, funding for activities, and assistance by public officials (Denoeux, 2002). However, the granting of this label depends on the presence of executive members loyal to the regime in the association and the goals of the association (Denoeux,

2002). This means that civil society groups need to establish close links with the regime and work with and through the political system, by avoiding to address sensitive topics.

This use of personal connections in getting the label of public utility shows how significant wasta is in the associational sector. Wasta in a term that is specific to Arab societies and describes the use of connections to obtain resources that would otherwise be impossible or difficult to obtain (Ramady, 2015). Wasta is a derivative noun of the Arabic root wasaat, which means centre or middle. It concurrently refers to a process and a person: used in the abstract form, wasta is the practice of resorting to an intermediary to achieve ends, while a wasta is the person who acts as a go-between to help a party meet its objectives (Cunningham and Sarayrah, 1993, p. 1). Its associated verb yatawasaat means 'to steer conflicting parties towards a middle point or compromise' (Cunningham and Sarayrah, 1993, p. 1). Thus, wasta can be either intermediary – where the role of the go-between is to mediate and arbitrate between groups of people (mainly families and tribes) – or intercessory - where he or she instead intercedes on behalf of someone to a third party, to help them obtain resources or acquire an advantage they would not normally achieve (Cunningham and Sarayrah, 1993: 8-10). In any case, since wasta is a an informal process that bypasses established institutions, it plays a role in sustaining unequal access to resources through undemocratic means. It is believed to permeate practically all aspects of social life in Arab countries, and influence the outcome of virtually any decision. As Farouson (1970: 270) states,

'One needs a wasta in order not to be cheated in the market place, in locating and acquiring a job, in resolving conflict and legal litigation, in winning a court decision, in speeding governmental action, and in establishing and maintaining political influence, bureaucratic

procedures, in finding a bride, and in fact, for the social scientist to locate and convince respondents to give an interview.'[23]

In the context of Morocco, working with and through the system also means appealing directly to the King. This strategy has been employed by secular activists within the Moroccan women's rights movements in their campaign for the reform of the Moudawana, as well as by Islamists opposing their campaign. As I state in chapter 4, the stalemate reached after the government's presentation of a Plan d'Action National pour l'Integration de la Femme au Developpement (National Action Plan for the Integration of Women in Development, henceforth Plan) in 1999, led both Islamists and secular women's rights activists to appeal to Mohamed VI to defend their views (Buskens, 2003). Islamists, who were against the Plan believed that only the King and the religious establishment had the authority to change family law, whereas secular women's rights activists appealed to him because they felt threatened by Islamists, and the government seemed unable to help them (Buskens, 2003). Indeed, after the large protests of 12th March 2000 pitting Islamists against secular activists, the socialist government of Youssoufi decided to create a commission to study some of the proposals of the Plan and relegate the reform of the Moudawana to the King, as per constitutional provisions (Ouali, 2008).

Even though representative institutions are unable to channel demands, activists do appeal to them, though they cannot avoid the risk of the King appropriating the debate. In the early 1990s, the Union de l'Action Feministe (Union of Feministe Action, UAF) launched a petition to collect one million signatures to pressure Parliament and the Prime Minister to reform the Moudawana (Cavatorta and Dalmasso, 2009). UAF addressed elected officials rather than the King because it wanted the reform to be the outcome of a democratic parliamentary debate,

---

[23] Quoted in Al Ramahi (2008, p. 36).

rather than strengthen authoritarianism by appealing to the King, a view shared by many in the secular current of the Moroccan women's rights movement (Cavatorta and Dalmasso, 2009). Nonetheless, as I discuss in chapter 4, the King drew on his title as Commander of the Faithful to arbitrate on this issue and monopolise the debate.

However, bypassing democratically elected institutions and appealing to the King gets controversial policies passed. Not only was the Moudawana reformed in 2004, at the request of the King, but so was the Nationality Code a few years later. Leading associations within the secular current of the movement directly addressed Mohamed VI to reform the Nationality Code to allow Moroccan women married to non-Moroccan men to pass on their citizenship to their children (Yachoulti, 2015). After meeting with a group of Moroccan women married to non-Moroccan men who explained the difficulties faced by their children, during a royal visit in 2005, the King promised to address the situation (Yachoulti, 2015). True to his words, on 30th July 2015, during his speech from the throne, he announced that Moroccan women could pass on their nationality to children born to non-Moroccan men, and tasked the government with submitting proposals to allow this to happen (Yachoulti, 2015). Parliament and the cabinet subsequently adopted a draft bill to reform the Nationality Code in 2007 (Yachoulti, 2015). Though Moroccan women could not pass on their nationality to their non-Moroccan husbands, this was an important achievement, as in Arab and Muslim societies, nationality is transferred by the father. Another case in point is the introduction of reserved seats for women in Parliament. In 2002, Mohamed VI proposed a new law enshrining this, and Parliament subsequently approved it, designating 30 reserved seats for women (Wuerth, 2005).

2.8.3. Reinforcing Authoritarianism

Since reforms that challenge established values can be passed thanks to the King who can exploit his role as Commander of the Faithful and descendant of the Prophet, the latter is a key potential ally for policy change. However, cultivating wasta and appealing to the King reinforce authoritarianism, as I touched upon in the previous section. In her authoritative book on state-civil society relations in the MENA, Jamal (2007) argues that seeking out the support of public officials through informal channels legitimises authoritarianism and clientelism.[24] Granted state-sponsored associations receive short-term benefits and privileges not accorded to others, being clients reduces their autonomy, weakens their relationship with other civil society groups, and increases their dependence on non-democratic channels to exist and achieve their goals (Jamal, 2007). Their dependence on state resources and benefits means that they are more likely to support state-sponsored programmes, even if these are non-democratic (Jamal, 2007). In the long-term, this allows authoritarianism to persist.

For Cavatorta and Dalmasso (2009), the reform of the Moudawana through un-democratic means in 2004 poses two important problems, even if women's rights activists appealed to the King. First, the bypassing of elected institutions by an unelected and unaccountable King stifled public discussion and prevented political elites from gauging what people thought about the proposed reform (Cavatorta and Dalmasso, 2009). Second, it led to an unsatisfactory implementation of the law, because the Makhzen has little interest in enforcing the legislation, since it could stir up opposition and political unrest (Cavatorta and Dalmasso, 2009). Thus, the king may be more useful as an ally that helps pass policies and laws, rather than an ally that helps enforce them. Based on the aforementioned discussion, I expect Moroccan women's

---

[24] Clientelism is a practice that 'provides clients with paths to exclusive services and influence in return for their support of their patron' (Jamal, 2007, p. 14).

rights activists to nurture relations with both unelected and elected political actors to obtain reforms to combat violence against women. I expect them to perceive the King as he is the supreme decision-maker. He either initiates reforms or approves them. However, as I have mentioned above, some activists care about the mechanisms through which reforms are implemented. Thus, I also expect them to appeal to, and look favourably on an alliance with parliament, political parties, and the government. It would be interesting to see if in the case of combatting violence against women, which is not as controversial as reforming family relationships, activists feel the need to involve the King in the debate.

2.9. Conclusion

In conclusion, in this chapter, I have described the ways in which elite actors at the domestic and international level can act as a source of opportunity for social movements, particularly with regards to their policy influence and mobilisation. I have drawn on the literature on domestic social movements, political representation and transnational advocacy networks to formulate some theoretical questions that I will examine in subsequent chapters. More specifically, I have argued that there are four specific ways in which different types of political elites interact with domestic social movements with important implications for their policy influence.

Firstly, they provide symbolic support by speaking on behalf of domestic social movement organisations in the public sphere; in other words, by representing their interests to other publics. Secondly, they provide moral, material, human, and informational resources, to help them survive and have an impact. Thirdly, they can take a more pro-active role and use their position to engage with the target of change through to persuade it to change its position on an issue-area. Elite actors can also work with social movements as part of networks or coalitions.

Finally, to be considered as such, elite allies rely on domestic social movements' evaluation of their performances. I explore these issues in the ensuing empirical chapters.

Through an exploration of the political system in Morocco and state-civil society relations, I have shown that the sources of elite allyship may be different under authoritarian political systems. I have argued that in Morocco, the sweeping powers of the King make democratic and representative institutions less useful as potential sources of elite allyship, because they are constrained in their behaviour and choices. However, I have also touched upon the unintended consequences of elite allyship from unaccountable and unelected actors. I have shown that the King of Morocco has provided support to Moroccan women's rights groups and coalitions, particularly in the context of the reform of the Moudawana. However, I have also highlighted that his support risks deeping authoritarianism, as he draws on undemocratic means to effect change. I have also pointed out that activists in Morocco are conscious of the dangers of support from authoritarian institutions, and have attempted at times to appeal to representative institutions. As we will see in my case study in chapters 5 and 6, activists do not seek to appeal to the King to criminalise violence against women. In fact, the King does not play a major role in this debate, unlike the contentions issue of the reform of the Moudawana in the 1990s and 2000s. Before addressing these issues, I turn to the literature on social movements in my next chapter to uncover the extent to which different types of opportunities, and particularly the presence of elite allies, influence policy change favourable to social movements.

3. Opportunities, Mobilisation and Policy Change: A Meta-Analysis

3.1. Introduction

In the previous chapter, I have demonstrated that the concept of opportunity forms a core tenet of the political process model, which advances that social movements do not operate in a vacuum, but find their characteristics fashioned by the political context (Meyer and Minkoff, 2004). Uncertainty with regards to the meaning of opportunities has led experts to lament that it has become so inclusive that it risks explaining nothing at all (Gamson and Meyer, 1996; Jenkins, Jacobs and Agnone, 2003; Kriesi, 2007).

In addition to this ambiguity and overreaching, Goodwin et al. (1999) have called out the structural bias prevalent in most discussions of political opportunities. In their critique, they condemn the prominence given to structural variables – 'factors that are relatively stable over time and outside the control of movement actors' – and the tendency to analyse non-structural variables as structural ones (Goodwin, Jasper and Khattra, 1999, p. 29). Amongst other things, they suggest paying a greater attention to cultural dynamics and strategic processes, and disaggregating opportunities into specific dimensions, to allow for a clearer distinction between the different kinds that exist (Goodwin, Jasper and Khattra, 1999, p. 53). Scholars have since attempted to remedy this structural bias by stressing dynamic and/or cultural features in their interpretations. More restricted approaches have been developed, such as discursive, legal, economic, and supra-national opportunities.

In this chapter, I examine the explanatory strength of these different models of opportunity through a meta-analysis. A meta-analysis is 'an analysis of analyses' (GLASS, 1976, p. 4). In

this method, the findings of existing studies are integrated and analysed statistically, to provide a more precise view of the relationship between different phenomena. By systematically analysing existing knowledge, a meta-analysis helps to highlight areas of bias and neglect in the literature (Cancela and Geys, 2016). This chapter is concerned with systematically analysing the relationship between policy change and aspects of the external environment associated with the political, discursive, legal, socio-economic and supranational opportunity models, controlling for the presence of social movement mobilisation. This allows me to examine how important different types of external factors are for social movements wishing to influence policy, and to what extent the presence of elite allies is significant. I do not simply examine whether a variable representing an opportunity is associated with policy change, but also goes some way towards offering an idea of its potential effect size, by using combined test techniques using proxy values, based on whether the outcome is a success, a failure or an anomaly; a procedure borrowed from Smets and van Ham (2013) and Geys (2006). I test measurements of opportunities in 1384 independent tests from 47 quantitative empirical articles published in academic journals in English between 1978 and 2014. My findings show that most dimensions of opportunity are not strong predictors of policy outcomes favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation. This is particularly true with regards to variables measuring the presence of potential or actual elite allies. Despite expectations in the literature, elite allies do not seem to be particularly relevant for policy change, controlling for social movement mobilisation.

3.2. Data

I used three literature search methods to identify relevant sources: 1) database searching, 2) citation search and 3) bibliographic screening of review articles on the political and policy outcomes of social movements (Figure 1). The review articles include Burstein and Linton (2002), Uba (2009), Amenta et al. (2010), Andrews and Edwards (2004), and Giugni (Giugni,

1998). I also searched four relevant databases: Applied Social Sciences Index and Abstracts (ASSIA), International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS), Sociological Abstracts, and Worldwide Political Science Abstracts. The text word strategy employed the following search terms: (SOCIAL MOVEMENTS OR PROTEST) AND (POLICY OR REFORM OR EFFECTS OR OUTCOMES OR IMPACT). Initially, I screened the title and abstract of all retrieved results to identify potentially pertinent articles. I further inspected those kept to determine if they met the inclusion criteria. The final sample includes 47 studies (Table 1).

Figure 1: Literature Search Diagram[25]

Records identified through database searching
(n = 2730)

Databases used:

Applied Social Science Index and Abstracts
(ASSIA)
International Bibliography of the Social Sciences
Sociological Abstracts
Worldwide Political Science Abstracts

Additional records identified through citation
search and bibliographic screening of review
articles
(n = 422)

Articles used: Giugni (1998), Burstein and Linton
(2002), Andrews (2004), Uba (2009), Amenta et
al (2010)

Records after exact duplicates removed
(n = 3122)

Records screened
(n = 549)

Records excluded
(n = 2573)

Reason: not relevant

Full-text articles assessed for
eligibility
(n = 549)

Full-text articles excluded
(n = 501)
Reason: irrelevant, duplicates, not
accessible

Studies included in quantitative
synthesis (meta-analysis)
(n = 47)

Identification

Screening

Eligibility

Included

---

[25] Template adapted from (Moher *et al.*, 2015).

Table 1: Included Studies

Author	Year	Journal
Paul Burstein, William Freudenburg	1978	American Journal of Sociology
Larry Isaac, William R. Kelly	1981	American Journal of Sociology
Linda L. Fowler, Ronald G. Shaiko	1987	American Journal of Political Science
Edwin Amenta, Bruce G. Carruthers, Yvonne Zylan	1992	American Journal of Sociology
Alexander Hicks, Joya Misra	1993	American Journal of Sociology
Theda Skocpol, Marjorie Abend-Wein, Christopher Howard, Susan GoodrichLehmann	1993	American Political Science Review
Michael Patrick Allen and John L. Campbell	1994	Social Forces
Edwin Amenta, Kathleen Dunleavy, Mary Bernstein	1994	American Sociological Review
Nancy K. Cauthen, Edwin Amenta	1996	American Sociological Review
Scott P. Hays, Michael Esler, Carol E. Hays	1996	Publius
Richard C. Fording	1997	American Journal of Political Science
Wayne A. Santoro, Gail M. McGuire	1997	Social Problems
Francisco O. Ramirez, Yasemin Soysal, Suzanne Shanahan	1997	American Sociological Review
Ryken Grattet, Valerie Jenness, Theodore R. Curry	1998	American Sociological Review
Edwin Amenta, Drew Halfmann, Michael Young	1999	Mobilization
David John Frank, Elizabeth H. Mceneaney	1999	Social Forces
Regina Werum	1999	Social Forces
Sarah A. Soule, Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, Yang Su	1999	Mobilization
Edwin Amenta, Drew Halfmann	2000	American Sociological Review
Kenneth Andrews	2001	American Sociological Review
Richard C. Fording	2001	American Political Science Review
David Jacobs, Ronald Helms	2001	Social Forces
Holly J. McCammon, Karen E. Campbell, Ellen M. Granberg, Christine Mowery	2001	American Sociological Review
Wayne A. Santoro	2002	Social Forces
Sarah A. Soule, Susan Olzak	2004	American Sociological Review
Paul Ingram, Hayagreeva Rao	2004	American Journal of Sociology
Edwin Amenta, Neal Caren, Sheera Joy Olasky	2005	American Sociological Review
Brayden G. King, Marie Cornwall, Eric C. Dahlin	2005	Social Forces
Laurel S Weldon	2006	Political Research Quarterly
Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro	2006	Latin American Research Review
Sarah A. Soule, Brayden G. King	2006	American Journal of Sociology
Jon Agnone	2007	Social Forces
Anthony S. Chen	2007	American Journal of Sociology
Marie Cornwall, Brayden G King, Elizabeth M. Legerski, Eric C. Dahlin, Kendra S. Schiffman	2007	Mobilization
Susan Olzak, Emily Ryo	2007	Social Forces
Holly J. McCammon, Courtney Sanders Muse, Harmony D. Newman, Theresa M. Terrell	2007	American Sociological Review
Brayden G. King, Keith G. Bentele, Sarah A. Soule	2007	Social Forces
Wayne A. Santoro	2008	Social Forces
Erik W. Johnson	2008	Social Forces
Susan Olzak, Sarah A. Soule	2009	Social Forces
Holly J. McCammon	2009	Mobilization
Erik W. Johnson, Jon Agnone, John D. McCarthy	2010	Social Forces
Art Budros	2011	Mobilization
Stefaan Walgrave and Rens Vliegenthart	2012	Mobilization
Mala Htun, S. Laurel Weldon	2012	American Sociological Review
Art Budros	2013	Sociological Perspectives
Justin Peter Steil, Ion Bogdan Vasi	2014	American Journal of Sociology

When carrying out the literature search for this meta-analysis, it quickly became evident that as Giugni (2004, p. 20) notes, 'the field is not as empty as several observers have maintained.' I applied some restrictions. In terms of the nature of the sources, this consisted in including only peer-reviewed journal articles published in English. Given the selectivity of journal publishers, using peer-reviewed materials gives some assurance that the research is of sufficient academic standard. For pragmatic reasons, I considered only one type of source and one language. Reviews on the subject demonstrate that a great majority of the works are authored by American scholars and communicated mainly via articles (Burstein and Linton, 2002; Uba, 2009). Thus, it can safely be assumed that a significant proportion of relevant studies is not overlooked.

The analysis of only peer-reviewed works has been argued to cause bias, due to the 'file drawer' problem, a term coined by Rosenthal (1979) to suggest that statistically non-significant findings are less likely to be published. However, studies conducted by Dalton et al. (2012) to check this assumption, demonstrate that selecting only peer-reviewed works for meta-analyses does not inflate results and does not undermine the validity of conclusions drawn by such types of analysis.

A second condition in the research involved the use of studies that draw on quantitative methods. This is because qualitative investigations do not allow an appreciation of the statistical significance of explanatory variables, and do not therefore, allow comparisons across studies to be made, making them unsuitable for a meta-analysis.

Third, I only included positive policy change for social movements, again for the sake of comparability, as the factors that are associated with favourable and unfavourable policy changes may not necessarily be the same.

Fourth, a crucial aspect for consideration was the inclusion of models containing at least one explanatory variable measuring an aspect of the external environment, in conjunction with variables measuring protest activities. This is because my study is only interested in the relationship between opportunities and policy change under the presence of mobilisation.

Fifth, the sample only includes opportunity variables for which there is some information on their expected relationship with policy, based on the literature. I placed this limitation to ensure that there is reasonable confidence that a given variable measures a dimension of opportunity.[26]

Finally, included in the sample are only those studies with enough information on the level of statistical significance used, and on the operationalisation of variables, to help with hypothesis testing. Further, only independent relationships are included, not interaction effects, to help determine the independent impact of variables on policy.

3.3. Method

I use a meta-analysis of relevant quantitative works in this chapter because it can help determine which model(s) and dimension(s) of opportunity have the greatest explanatory power, and highlight biases and neglects in the literature. A meta-analysis is an analytical method that uses statistical methods to integrate findings from different independent and comparable studies to offer a more objective review of the literature than traditional, narrative approaches (Egger and Smith, 1997). Contrary to a literature review, a meta-analysis allows us to quantify the impact of an independent variable on a given outcome, and thereby understand which variables contribute to systematic differences across and within studies (Imbeau, Pétry and Lamari, 2001).

---

[26] Because of this limitation, I did not include the following control variables: time, mayor-council government and environmental degradation.

Since the studies in this sample employ different statistical estimations, I use a simplified meta-analytical technique borrowed from Imbeau et al (2001), Geys (2006), and Smets and van Ham (2013), and which involves vote counting and combining tests. Vote counting is used to calculate the success rate of a hypothesis and involves counting the number of times a given hypothesis is a success, a failure, or an anomaly. Each test of a hypothesis is assigned a category. A test is a success (+1) if the coefficient is statistically significant and in the expected direction, a failure (0), if the coefficient is in the expected direction but is not statistically significant, or an anomaly (-1) if the coefficient is statistically significant, but follows an unexpected direction (Geys, 2006).

For each hypothesis, the modal category is established, depending on whether or not most tests of this hypothesis are successes, failures or anomalies (Geys, 2006). Finally, the success rate is calculated by dividing the number of successful tests by the total number of tests of a given hypothesis (Geys, 2006). The higher the success rate, the higher the confidence in a hypothesis. In this research, this means that the higher the success rate of an opportunity variable, the higher the confidence that it has a significant and positive association with policy change favourable to a social movement.

This procedure is not just calculated at the test level, but also at the study level. This is because since one study can include multiple tests, the outcomes of tests cannot be taken as being independent of one another (Imbeau, Pétry and Lamari, 2001; Geys, 2006; Smets and van Ham, 2013). To do this, each test within a study is assigned a weight, and this is used to establish the modal category and the average success rate of the study (Imbeau, Pétry and Lamari, 2001; Geys, 2006; Smets and van Ham, 2013). To summarise, the following equation is used to calculate the success rate at the test and study level:

Success rate = (successes/number of tests) *100

Since the success rate does not help determine the effect size of a variable, I follow previous scholars (Imbeau, Pétry and Lamari, 2001; Geys, 2006; Smets and van Ham, 2013) in using a simplified 'combined test'[27] to obtain a proxy measure of the average effect of an independent variable on an outcome variable based on test statistics. This involves initially calculating the proxy effect size for each test, by assigning a weight of +1 if the test is a success (i.e. the relationship is significant and in the expected direction), a weight of 0 if the test is a failure (i.e. the relationship is in the expected direction but not significant), and a weight of -1 if the tests is an anomaly (i.e. the relationship is significant but in another direction). I use the following formula to calculate the proxy effect size at the test level:

$r = $ (successes-anomalies)/number of tests

The average effect size for each independent variable across the sample is calculated using the following formula:

$r_{av} = \Sigma r_i$/number of studies

This formula gives a value between +1 and -1 and a one sample t-test is undertaken to measure if it is statistically different from zero. This value measures by how many units of standard deviation the outcome variable changes if the independent variable changes by one standard deviation. It thereby allows us to determine if an independent variable has a statistically significant effect on an outcome variable.[28] In this analysis, the significance level is taken to

---

[27] Combined tests refer to procedures that involve statistically summarising the results of different tests by drawing on significance levels or weighted test statistics (Wolf, 1986).

[28] For more information on this approach, see Imbeau et al. (2001), Geys (2006) and Smets and van Ham (2013).

be at least $p < 0.05$,[29] as this is the cut-off most commonly used in the studies under investigation. Since the average effect size is a standardised measure, it can be used to compare magnitudes.

3.4. Measurement of Concepts

In this meta-analysis, I group opportunity variables based on whether or not they form a dimension of the following models: a) political, b) discursive, c) legal, d) socio-economic, or supra-national level.[30] I operationalise the different dimensions of opportunities, types of mobilisation strategies, and stages of the policy-making process with guidance from the literature on social movements and I describe them in the empirical section.

The outcome variable of interest is change in policy. However, as policy change is measured in relation to the issue at hand, it is not possible to combine and compare results using these precise measurements.[31] Thus, I disaggregated policy change into four categories - agenda-setting, policy passage, policy implementation and policy repeal. The first one refers to commitment, or the 'list of items which decision-makers have formally accepted for serious

---

[29] Scholars in various disciplines have begun moving away from using the p value as an indication of statistical significance, towards other methods, such as using confidence intervals (Gardner and Altman, 1986; Johnson, 1999). However, since different papers report different additional measures of statistical significance, I use instead their common denominator – the p value.

[30] The full breakdown is detailed in the codebook in the appendix.

[31] I have selected these categories because the dependent variables used in the studies fit nicely into them. I do not assume in this research that there is a linear relationship between these stages, nor that these are the only or the most important stages of the policy-making process.

consideration' (Cobb, Ross and Ross, 1976, p. 126), and includes hearings, bills, and roll call votes (Theriault and Shafran, 2013, p. 57). The second refers to the enactment or successful formulation of policies, such as major legislations (Andrews and Edwards, 2004, p. 493). The third stage refers to the execution or enforcement of existing policies (O'Toole, 2000; Andrews and Edwards, 2004, p. 498). Finally, policy repeal refers to the repeal of a policy harmful to a social movement.

In terms of mobilisation, I take institutional and non-institutional protest as being two different forms of political persuasion, which are differentiated from one another with regards to their engagement with the political system. Whereas I conceptualise the first as being a strategy that emphasises bargaining and negotiation, I conceptualise the second as being a more disruptive way of voicing concerns, such as demonstrations (Rucht, 2001, p. 126). Since it is not always possible to directly measure protest activity on an issue, scholars sometimes draw on membership to social movement organisations to measure social movement activity. Such measures are also used as representing social movement mobilisation. I constructed a codebook, inspired by Smets and van Ham's (2013) to describe the characteristics of the sampled tests and studies, and clarify how the independent variables are grouped (see Appendix).

3.5. Sample Overview

Table 1 suggests that the systematic analysis of the relationship between opportunities, mobilisation and policy change is a recent phenomenon, as most studies in the sample were published in the 2000s. Most of this analysis was published in top sociology journals (Table 2). This over-representation of sociology journals is in line with criticisms that the literature on social movements suffers from a lack of engagement with a broader body of related

disciplines.[32] Additionally, despite not restricting the sample, studies predominantly come from top American journals, which is also in line with the assessment of existing literature reviews (Burstein and Linton, 2002; Amenta and Caren, 2007; Amenta et al., 2010).

Furthermore, in the same vein as a preceding meta-analysis by Uba (2009), findings on this subject matter are largely based on the American experience, with very few attempts at cross-national comparisons, despite greater calls for such approaches (Giugni, 1998).

Women's issues are particularly well represented, with twelve out of 47 studies focusing on them. The least represented issues are those focused on pensioners, peace and LGBT+ people, which account for less than three studies each. With regards to policy change, the modal category is policy passage, followed by policy implementation and agenda-setting. Based on Table 2, the socio-economic opportunity model is the most widely used one, followed by the discursive, political, legal and supra-national opportunity models. Thus, despite the political opportunity model being the first one to be popularised in the literature on social movements, it is not the one that is the most systematically analysed.

---

[32] See the Fall 2013, Spring and Fall 2014 issues of *Critical Mass Bulletin*, the newsletter of the Section on Collective Behaviour and Social Movements of the *American Sociological Association*.

Table 2 - Sample Description

Aspects		Tests	Studies
Issue	Ecology/environmental	219	6
	Labour	106	5
	Pension	24	2
	Civil Rights	270	11
	Women	465	12
	Peace/Anti-war	2	1
	LBGT+	6	1
	Welfare	259	8
	Several	33	1
	Total	1384	47
Geographical Location	North America	1139	42
	South America	13	1
	Europe	33	1
	Asia	0	0
	Africa	0	0
	Oceania	0	0
	Cross-regional	199	3
	Total	1384	47
Dependent Variable	agenda setting	249	12
	policy passage	715	24
	Policy implementation	408	19
	Policy repeal	12	1
	Total	1384	56*
Theoretical Framework	Political Opportunity Model	276	33
	Discursive Opportunity Model	376	41
	Legal Opportunity Model	210	28
	Socio-economic Opportunity Model	397	33
	Supra-national Opportunity Model	125	15
	Total	1384	150*
Mobilisation	Membership	487	21
	Non-institutional protest	216	8
	Institutional protest	39	4
	Several	642	20
	Total	1384	53*

3.6. Empirical Findings

This section outlines the basic assumptions behind each model of opportunity and the findings of the meta-analysis. I do not report findings for opportunity variables that are included in two or one studies, as this low number did not allow a one sample t-test to be carried out on them (Smets and van Ham, 2013).

3.6.1. The Political Opportunity Model

The dimensions of the political opportunity model relate to political institutions, and specifically to the degree of access to the political system. A general conceptualisation has been offered by McAdam (1982, p. 41), for whom a political opportunity is 'any event or broad social process that serves to undermine the calculations on which the political establishment is structured.' In this section, I look at the following dimensions hypothesised to affect access to the political system: the party of the executive, the degree of political openness, election year, electoral competition, the ruling political party, whether or not politicians share the same socio-economic status as that of protesters, the presence of open political parties, administrative capacity, and endorsement of a social movement or protesters by political figures. The results of the meta-analysis for these variables are presented in Table 3.

Table 3 - Political Opportunity Model

Variable		Success (1)	Failure (0)	Anomaly (-1)	Modal Category	Success Rate	Effect size	P value
Executive (left)	Tests (54)	9	43	2	Failure	16.67	.13	***
	Studies (9)	1	8	0	Failure	11.11	.09	
Political Openness	Tests (36)	23	13	0	Success	63.89	.64	***
	Studies (8)	5	3	0	Success	62.50	.59	***
Electoral Competition	Tests (31)	7	22	2	Failure	22.58	.16	***
	Studies (12)	1	10	1	Failure	8.33	.12	
Election Year	Tests (30)	20	6	4	Success	66.67	.53	***
	Studies (5)	3	1	1	Success	60.00	.25	
Government (left)	Tests (26)	9	16	1	Failure	34.62	.31	***
	Studies (9)	1	8	0	Failure	12.50	.20	**
SES Politicians	Tests (24)	9	15	0	Failure	37.50	.38	n/a
	Studies (6)	1	5	0	Failure	16.67	.25	
Open Political parties	Tests (13)	5	8	0	Failure	38.46	.38	***
	Studies (4)	1	3	0	Failure	25.00	.33	
Administrative Capacity	Tests (10)	9	1	0	Success	90.00	.90	***
	Studies (3)	2	1	0	Success	66.67	.83	**
Political Endorsement	Tests (7)	1	6	0	Failure	14.29	.14	***
	Studies (3)	0	3	0	Failure	.00	.08	

Note: *** = statistically significant at the 99% level, ** = statistically significant at the 95% level.

Executive and Government (Left)

A left-wing or progressive executive is theorised as being a key ally in power (Olzak and Ryo, 2007), though this is due to the literature's focus on left-wing social movements. The predominance of studies focusing on US-based social movements means that this is measured as the presence of a Democratic president in this sample. Democrats are hypothesised as being liberal on key social issues, and therefore as being generally more sympathetic to rights-focused social movement, such as women's rights movements (Soule et al., 1999), civil rights movements (Santoro, 2008), environmental movements (Johnson, 2008; Johnson, Agnone and McCarthy, 2010). Based on these expectations, I hypothesise that the years in which a Democratic president - or one coming from a left-wing part - is in power as having a significant and positive effect on policy change, controlling for said movement's mobilisation.

Much like a left-wing executive, a left-wing government is hypothesised to have a positive influence on policy change favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation. Again, due to the dominance of American-based social movements, the measure of government that is used in this sample is Democratic party dominance in both the legislative and the executive branches of government. In general, whether it is seen as being a centrist or a left-wing party (Cauthen and Amenta, 1996, p. 430), the Democratic party is argued to be 'reform-oriented' (Amenta, Caren and Olasky, 2005). I thus expect that governments controlled by left-wing or progressive parties to be positively associated with policy change.

With regards to left-wing executive, Table 3 shows that this variable is the most widely tested one, appearing in 54 tests in 9 studies. However, the modal category is failure and the success rate at the test and study levels is below 20%. The average effect size is only 0.13 at the test level and 0.09 at the study, but also only statistically significant at the test level. Two tests are anomalies and suggest that the presence of a non-left-wing executive may be associated with

policy change favourable to a social movement. This suggests that controlling for social movement mobilisation, the presence of a left-wing executive does not have an influence on policy change favourable to a social movement.

Similarly, with regards to left-wing government, the modal category is failure. Out of 26 tests, 16 are failures, whereas out of 9 studies, 8 are failures, which is also reflected in the fact that there is a large difference between the success rate at the test level and the success rate at the study level. Moreover, while the effect size is relatively small – at 0.31 at the test level and 0.20 at the study level - it is statistically significant at both levels.

The fact that a left-wing government or executive does not act as a source of political opportunity lends credence to the idea that because parties in government and mainstream parties have to represent and be accountable to the general public, they are more constrained than opposition and niche parties in actively supporting social movements (Hutter and Vliegenthart, 2016).

Political Openness

Political openness refers to the level of democratisation, and is hypothesised as encouraging social spending (Amenta, Carruthers and Zylan, 1992; Amenta and Halfmann, 2000). It is based on the premise that political openness is driven by a willingness to expand democratic rights (Cornwall et al., 2007). It is also based on the belief that the expansion of welfare provision follows the expansion of social and political rights (Fording, 2001). Functioning democratic institutions encourage political representatives to support social support to citizens (Cauthen and Amenta, 1996, p. 429). Thus, I hypothesise a significant and positive relationship between political openness and policy change favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation.

The meta-analysis shows that political openness appears in 36 tests in 8 studies, most of which are successes. The success rate is relatively high, nearing 64% and 63% at the test and study level respectively, and the effect size is statistically significant and moderately large, at 0.64 and 0.59 at the test and study levels respectively. We can thus deduce that political openness is a good predictor of policy change favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation.

Electoral Competition

Competitive elections are hypothesised to be associated with the passage of progressive public policies because they encourage greater debate, which in turn increases voter interest and turnout (Olzak and Soule, 2004). Since a wide variety of interests are represented, politicians face more political uncertainty, and therefore try to court mass support and champion policies that are more inclusive (Skocpol and Abend-Wein, 1993; King, Bentele and Soule, 2007). In fact, politicians will particularly try to appeal to pressure groups and consider new issues and interests (King, Bentele and Soule, 2007). Therefore, greater levels of electoral competition can be expected to be associated with policy change favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation.

In the meta-analysis, electoral competition is included in 31 tests within 12 studies. The modal category is failure because out of these, 22 tests and 10 studies are failures. The success rate is 22.58% at the test level, and significantly lower at the study level, at 8.33%. Additionally, the effect size is low, and stands at 0.16 and 0.12 at the test and study level respectively, though it does not appear to be statistically different from zero in the latter case. It can thus be deduced that electoral competition is not a good predictor of policy change, under the presence of social movement mobilisation.

Election Year

Scholars expect increased attention towards social issues during an election year because politicians want to be (re)-elected (Agnone, 2007). They therefore try to portray themselves favourably to the electorate and try to satisfy public pressure (Ibid). Legislative activity, especially that concerning bill or law passage, therefore increases during an election year (Johnson, Agnone and McCarthy, 2010). It is thus possible to expect election year to be positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation.

In my meta-analysis, election year appears in 30 tests and 5 studies and the modal category is success. The success rate is relatively high at both the test and study level – at 66.7% and 60.0% respectively. However, the effect size at the test level is roughly twice as large than the effect size at the study level, with the former being 0.53 and the latter being 0.25, and only statistically significant at the test level. Overall, the results confirm the hypothesis, and consequently, election year is a good predictor of policy change favourable to a mobilising social movement.

SES Politicians

Politicians who belong to the constituency of a social movement are assumed to be more receptive to its claims. Elected female officials are argued to support pro-women policies, such as the Equal Rights Amendment (Soule et al., 1999; Olzak and Soule, 2004; Weldon, 2006). Elected Latino officials are hypothesised to be potential allies of pro-immigrant policies in the United States (Steil and Vasi, 2014). Therefore, we can hypothesise that there is a positive association between the presence of politicians who share the same socio-economic status as a movement and policy change favourable to said movement, controlling for mobilisation.

In the meta-analysis, this hypothesis is examined in 24 tests within 6 studies. However, the modal category is failure, with 15 tests and 5 studies being failures. The success rate is not very high, at 37.5% at the test level and 16.67% at the study level. The effect size is equally low, at

0.38 and 0.15 at the test and study level respectively. These findings challenge the assumptions of the literature and suggest that the presence of politicians who share the same socio-economic status of a social movement are not supportive of policy change that is good for them. This failure could be linked to the institutional environment which places material constraints on institutional actors, or their strategic decisions. As I have discussed in the theoretical framework, elite actors' support for social movements is influenced by their ideology, the constraints on their behaviour, or their unwillingness to use their privileged position to help them.

Open Political Parties

Patronage-oriented political parties are argued to be negatively associated with progressive public policies. This is because they are biased towards individualistic and discretionary policies than social programmes (Amenta, Carruthers and Zylan, 1992; Cauthen and Amenta, 1996). Such parties are said to be closed to social programs (Cauthen and Amenta, 1996). It can thus be expected that open political parties, which are not patronage-oriented, to have a positive effect on policies favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation.

This variable is examined in 13 tests within 4 studies in my meta-analysis. The modal category is failure, as 8 tests out of 15 and 3 studies out of 4 are failures. Both the success rate and the effect size are relatively small. The former is 38.46% and 25.00%, while the latter is 0.38 and 0.33 at the test and study level respectively. Thus, there is no positive and significant relationship between the lack of patronage-oriented parties, or the presence of open parties, and policy change favourable to a social movement.

Administrative Capacity

The strength of public administration is argued to influence the ability of implementing policies (Amenta and Halfmann, 2000). More specifically, bureaucrats who work on an issue aligned with the interests of a social movement may even try to advance their goals (Ibid). However, such actors can only do this successfully in political systems where there are centralised political institutions and a strong state organisation (Ibid: 506). We can thus expect administrative strength to have a positive and significant association with policy change favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation.

This variable is only examined in 10 tests and 3 studies, and these are overwhelmingly a success. The success rate is 90% at the test level and 66.67% at the study level. The effect size, which is about 0.9 and 0.8 at the test and study level respectively, is statistically significant and therefore different from zero. We can thus claim that administrative strength is a strong indicator of policy change.

Political Endorsement

Political endorsement is a direct measure of the presence of elite allies, for it refers to politicians and political parties that publicly endorse a social movement. It is present in 7 tests and 3 studies, though the modal category is failure. Six tests and all 3 studies are failures. The effect size is 0.14 and 0.08 at the test and study level respectively, though it is only statistically significant at the test level. This suggests that political endorsement is not a strong predictor of policy change favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation. This suggests that the presence of actual elite allies is not a strong predictor of policy change favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation.

3.6.2. The Discursive Opportunity Model

Koopmans and Olzak (2004, p. 202) suggest that our attention should turn towards the discursive opportunity structure, or 'the aspects of the public discourse that determine a message's chances of diffusion in the public sphere,' which includes media attention. According to Koopmans (2004), the diffusion of messages and ideas influences the interaction between social movements and the political establishment. The political establishment reacts to protests if and as they are portrayed in the mass media, while protesters get cues on opportunities and constraints through the media's relaying of information on the reaction of third parties and their targets (Ibid). In this section, I look at whether or not there exists a supportive political agenda or policy, a weak counter-movement, supportive public opinion towards a social movement's goals, media attention to the policy issue at hand. I also look at the popularity of left-wing and progressive ideas among the public, and the ideology of the state. The results of the meta-analysis are presented in Table 4.

Table 4: Discursive Opportunity Model

Variable		Success (1)	Failure (0)	Anomaly (-1)	Modal Category	Success Rate	Effect size	P va
Agenda/Policy (supportive)	Tests (117)	62	42	13	Success	52.99	.42	**
	Studies (15)	7	7	1	Failure	46.67	.46	**
No/Weak Counter-movement	Tests (81)	19	55	7	Failure	23.46	.15	**
	Studies (14)	2	10	2	Failure	14.29	.11	
Public Opinion (favourable)	Tests (80)	16	60	4	Failure	20.00	.14	**
	Studies (14)	3	11	0	Failure	21.43	.21	**
Media Attention	Tests (47)	17	29	1	Failure	36.17	.34	**
	Studies (7)	2	5	0	Failure	28.57	.26	
Political influence (left/liberalism)	Tests (30)	15	13	2	Success	50.00	.43	**
	Studies (12)	4	8	0	Failure	33.33	.45	**
State Ideology (left/liberal)	Tests (9)	3	6	0	Failure	33.33	.33	**
	Studies (3)	0	3	0	Failure	.00	.36	**

Note: *** = statistically significant at the 99% level, ** = statistically significant at the 95% level.

Agenda/Policy (Supportive)

Previous policy change and attention favourable to a social movement may signal that there is political interest in an issue affecting a social movement (Soule et al., 1999, p. 244). Policy-making is a process and not an event that occurs at one specific moment in time (King, Cornwall and Dahlin, 2005). It is the result of an accumulation of small changes over time. Thus, previous attention to an issue paves the way for greater change, though some scholars

claim that this may simply be a symbolic gesture to discourage more tangible changes (Cornwall et al., 2007, p. 243). Despite this disagreement, we can hypothesise that the presence of a supportive policy or political agenda is positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation.

The meta-analysis shows that this variable is examined in 117 tests within 15 studies, which indicates a strong attention to the existing policy climate in analyses of the relationship between opportunities, social movements and policy changes. As 62 tests out of 117 and 7 studies out of 14 are successes, the modal category is success. The success rate is about 53 and 47% at the test and study levels respectively. The effect size is less than 0.5, even though it is statistically significant and different from zero at both levels. Thus, a supportive agenda or policy is somewhat positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement, in the presence of mobilisation, especially when tests are looked at independently and not aggregated by study.

No/Weak Counter-Movement

Counter-movement activity, and particularly repression by opponents, is said to affect the calculations of policy-makers, though opinion is divided on the direction of this relationship. On the one hand, are scholars of the American civil rights movement who argue that white violence against Black civil rights activists made policy-makers and the general public sympathetic towards the latter, though they argue that this was only true when there was national attention towards the issue (Andrews, 1997; Santoro, 2008). On the other hand, are those scholars who argue that counter-movement activity decreases a movement's chance of achieving favourable policy change because powerful opponents can weaken public support for the movement (Olzak and Ryo, 2007). Since counter-movements take many forms and may engage in counter-framing and funding opposing views, rather than inflict physical pain on

protesters, which is more socially unacceptable, I adopt the second perspective and hypothesise that the existence of no or weak counter-movement activity has a positive influence on policy change favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation.

In my sample, counter-movement activity is examined in 81 tests within 14 studies. The modal category is failure, as 55 tests out of 81 and 10 out of 14 studies are failures. The success rate is 23.46% at the test level and 14.29% at the study level, and the effect size, which is less than 0.5 at both levels, is moderately small. However, it is only statistically significant at the test level.[33] Thus, a weaker counter-movement is not necessarily a strong predictor of policy change favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation.

Public Opinion (Favourable)

Democratic representation theory argues that political officials are rational actors who are attentive to public opinion because their position depends on it (Agnone, 2007). Failure to respond to public preferences may jeopardise a politician or a political party's chances of re-election (Chen, 2007). A wealth of empirical material has been gathered by political scientists to demonstrate that public opinion influences policy-making (Jacobs and Shapiro, 1994).We can then deduce that public opinion on a policy issue affects political decision-making on it. One can thus hypothesise a positive and significant correlation between favourable public opinion on an issue relevant to a social movement and policy change favourable to the goals of said movement.

---

[33] In my meta-analysis, there is a pattern of finding significant results at the test level but not at the study level. This must be due to the differences in sample size, which is always smaller at the study level.

In my sample, 80 tests in 14 studies examine the relationship between favourable public opinion and favourable policy outcomes. However, the great majority are failures, and the success rate is quite low, at both the test and study level (20% and 21.43% respectively). While the effect size is small – at 0.14 and 0.21 at the test and study level respectively - it is significantly different from 0. We can thus safely assume that favourable public opinion is not a strong predictor of favourable policy outcomes, controlling for mobilisation.

Media Attention

The mass media focuses public attention on an issue, and therefore affects the policy-making process by raising its salience (Agnone, 2007; Johnson, Agnone and McCarthy, 2010). Based on empirical evidence, Walgrave and Vligenthart (2012, p. 134) conclude that 'it is a matter of days before political actors adjust their attention and adopt media issues.'

In my sample, 47 tests in 7 studies examine the relevance of this variable. Out of these, 29 tests and 5 studies are failures, making failure the modal category. The success rate is 36.17% and 28.57% at the test and study level respectively. However, the effect size, which is 0.34 0.26 at the test and study level respectively, is only statistically significant in the first case. We can thus deduce that media attention is not a strong predictor of policy outcomes favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation.

Political Influence (Left/Liberalism)

The popularity of the Left or progressive political parties among the electorate could be argued to represent a discursive opportunity for left-wing social movements. This is because support of left-wing parties signifies receptivity to left-wing ideas in general. We can thus expect that greater support of the Left among the electorate to be positively associated with policy outcomes favourable to (left-wing) social movements, controlling for mobilisation.

Thirty tests in 12 studies examine this variable in my sample, though its influence is difficult to ascertain. At the test level, there is only a marginal success rate, with 13 tests being failures and 15 being successes. At the study level, the overall success rate is 33.33%. Overall, the modal category is a failure, as 8 studies are failures and 4 are successes. The effect size is statistically significant and not that small, standing at 0.45 at the test level and 0.33 at the study level. Thus, the influence of left-wing or progressive ideologies in society is not a strong predictor of policy outcomes favourable to a progressive social movement, controlling for mobilisation.

State Ideology (Left/Liberal)

The final dimension of the discursive opportunity model is state ideology, which is a measure of potential elite allyship. Whereas the previous variable looks at the ideology of the citizenry, this one looks at the ideology of politicians and parties. Since there are degrees of variations in political leaning within parties, it is helpful to look at the specific ideology of political actors. I expect left-wing or liberal states or politicians to be positively associated with policy outcomes favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation.

In my meta-analysis, state ideology is examined in 9 tests and 3 studies. The modal category is failures, with 6 tests and 3 studies being failures. At the study level, there are no successes, resulting in a success rate of 0%, while the success rate at the test level is 33.33%. The effect size is statistically significant at both levels, though it is quite small – at 0.33 and 0.36 at the test and study level respectively. We can thus deduce that favourable state ideology is not a strong predictor of policy outcomes favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation. This reinforces my earlier finding that the presence of potential or actual elite allies is not as relevant as assumed to be.

3.6.3. The Socio-Economic Opportunity Model

Incorporating the literature from corporate social responsibility, Wahlstrom and Peterson (2006) argue that the structure of economic institutions, as well as economic actors, are important factors in their own right, and need to be clearly distinguished from the concept of political opportunities. Whilst they recognise that 'the specific contents of the EOS [Economic Opportunity Structure] have still to be elaborated' (Wahlstrom and Peterson, 2006, p. 372), they nonetheless come up with a tentative typology composed of five dimensions. These are: the availability of cognitive and economic resources, the multiplicity of stake seekers/holders (allies), the capacity for counter-mobilisation, the vulnerability of the target to pressures from the movement, and the consistency between the goals of the movement and their target (dependency) (Wahlstrom and Peterson, 2006, pp. 372–3).

In this section, I look at the presence of women in workforce and education, spending on relevant policy issues, domestic productivity, the level of unemployment, the degree of ethnic and racial diversity, net profit, the percentage of the population in the secondary industry, national income, population density, the crime rate, the degree of ethnic and racial equality, the level of poverty, the age distribution of the population, and the degree of urbanisation. The results of the meta-analysis for variables associated with this model are presented in Table 5.

Table 5- Socio-economic Opportunity Model

Variable		Success (1)	Failure (0)	Anomaly (-1)	Modal Category	Success Rate	Effect size	P value
Women in Workforce/Education	Tests (55)	8	46	1	Failure	14.55	.13	***
	Studies (9)	2	7	0	Failure	22.22	.25	
Spending (relevant vs other)	Tests (51)	27	19	5	Success	52.94	.43	***
	Studies (6)	3	2	1	Failure	50.00	.39	**
Domestic Productivity	Tests (41)	7	33	1	Failure	17.07	.15	***
	Studies (5)	1	4	0	Failure	20.00	.18	
Unemployment	Tests (32)	11	19	2	Failure	34.38	.28	n/a
	Studies (7)	5	1	1	Success	71.43	.62	**
Ethnic/Racial Diversity	Tests (20)	0	12	8	Failure	.00	-.40	***
	Studies (6)	0	4	2	Failure	.00	-.30	
Net Profit (=revenue)	Tests (7)	3	4	0	Failure	42.86	.43	***
	Studies (5)	2	3	0	Failure	40.00	.40	
% Secondary Industry	Tests (20)	1	19	0	Failure	5.00	.05	***
	Studies (3)	0	3	0	Failure	.00	.17	
National Income	Tests (19)	13	6	0	Success	68.42	.68	***
	Studies (10)	6	3	0	Success	60.00	.61	***
Population Density	Tests (18)	11	2	5	Success	61.11	.33	***
	Studies (6)	2	2	2	Failure	33.33	.00	n/a
Crime Rate (low)	Tests (18)	11	7	0	Success	61.11	.61	***
	Studies (4)	2	2	0	Failure	50.00	.50	
Ethnic/Racial Equality	Tests (14)	12	0	2	Success	85.71	.71	***
	Studies (3)	2	0	1	Success	66.67	.33	
Poverty	Tests (10)	6	4	0	Success	60.00	.60	***
	Studies (4)	1	3	0	Success	25.00	.50	
Age	Tests (7)	4	1	2	Success	57.14	.29	***
	Studies (3)	1	1	1	Failure	33.33	.22	
Urbanisation	Tests (5)	3	2	0	Success	60.00	.60	***
	Studies (3)	1	2	0	Failure	33.33	.67	

Note: *** = statistically significant at the 99% level, ** = statistically significant at the 95% level.

Women in Workforce/Education, Ethnic/Racial Equality, Ethnic Racial Diversity

Socio-demographic changes are relevant for the relationship between social movement mobilisation and policy outcomes in various ways. First, the political inclusion of a social movement's constituency in society could be argued to be positively associated with policy outcomes favourable to said movement. This is because it suggests that decision-makers have committed to improving the situation of said constituency. Thus, higher levels of racial and ethnic equality may be associated with policy outcomes favourable to progressive social movements, especially those pertaining to immigrants or ethnic minorities.

Moreover, the achievements of members of a constituency may encourage decision-makers to grant them more rights. For instance, increasing proportions of women in the labour force, and specifically in areas traditionally perceived as men's realms, have been argued to have persuaded decision-makers to extend rights to women (Cornwall et al., 2007).

Finally, ethnic or racial diversity may be particularly useful for policies related to minority rights, because of two mechanisms. Contact theory argues that interactions with members of an out-group increase positive attitudes towards said group, as it decreases stereotypes and prejudice (Sturgis et al., 2014). Greater levels of ethnic diversity also mean that there is a higher number of potential supporters of policy favourable to ethnic minorities.

The modal category for the proportion of women in the workforce or education is failure, with 46 failures out of 55 at the test level, and 7 failures our of 9 at the study level. The success rate and the effect size are rather small at both levels. The success rate is only 14.55% and 22.22% while the effect size is 0.13 and 0.25 at the test and study level respectively. The latter is only statistically different from zero at the test level. Thus, the proportion of women in the workforce or in education is not a strong predictor of policy outcomes favourable to social movements.

Ethnic and racial equality and diversity are examined in fewer studies. The former constitutes 14 tests in 3 studies, while the latter constitutes 20 tests in 6 studies. Ethnic and racial equality is a success in 12 tests and an anomaly in 2 at the test level. At the study level, it is a success in 2 studies and an anomaly in one. The modal category is therefore success. The success rate and the effect size are rather high at both levels. The success rate is 85.71% and 66.67% while the effect size is 0.71 and 0.33 at the test and study level respectively, though it is only statistically significant at the test level. We can draw from these findings that ethnic and racial equality is positively associated with policy outcomes favourable to a social movement.

In contrast, the modal category for ethnic and racial diversity is failure. Out of 20 tests, 12 are failures at the test level, while the proportion is 4 out of 6 at the study level. The success rate is zero at both the test and study level, while the effect size is -0.4 and -0.3 at the test and study level respectively, though this is only statistically significant at the test level. This suggests that at the very least, there is not a positive and significant association between ethnic and racial diversity and policy outcomes favourable to social movements, which in this sample is composed of progressive social movements.

Spending (Relevant vs Other)

Based on assumptions about the relevance of the current agenda and policy – described above – we can expect the level of spending on an issue to be positively associated with policy outcomes on said issue, controlling for mobilisation. Drawing on theories of policy incrementalism, it could be argued that spending signifies political interest in, and commitment to said issue, and this spending could lay the groundwork for more radical policy changes. On the other hand, spending on competing issues would thwart further policy development on the policy issue of interest.

In this meta-analysis, spending is examined in 51 independent tests within 6 studies. The modal category is success, with 27 out of 51 tests and 3 out of 6 studies being successes. The success rate is 52.92% and 50.00% at the test and study level respectively. The effect size is 0.43 and 0.49 at the test and study level respectively, and is statistically significant on both occasions. Thus, existing spending on a policy area is positively associated with policy outcomes on said area, controlling for mobilisation.

National Income, Domestic Productivity, Net Profit

The richer the state, the better its ability to adopt policy favourable to a social movement. Richer states can afford to spend resources on social issues affecting the electorate. We can thus hypothesise that all three measures of a state's economic development – national income, domestic productivity and net profit – are associated with policy outcomes favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation.

National income is the most examined dimension across studies. It accounts for 19 tests in 10 studies. Domestic productivity accounts for 41 tests in 5 studies, while net profit is examined in 7 tests within 5 studies. While the modal category for national income is success, it is failure for both domestic productivity and net profit. Thirteen tests out of 19 and 6 studies out of 10 are successes for national income. For domestic productivity, 33 tests out of 41 and 4 studies out of 5 are failures. For net profit, 4 tests out of 7 and 3 studies out of 5 are failures.

With regards to the success rate, it is the highest for national income, while it is the lowest for domestic productivity. At the test level, the success rate is 68.42%, 42.86% and 17.07% for national income, net profit and domestic productivity respectively. At the study level, the success rate is 60.00%, 40.00% and 20.00% for national income, net profit and domestic productivity respectively. Turning to the effect size at the test level, it is .68, 0.43 and 0.15 for national income, net profit and domestic productivity respectively. It is statistically significant

at the 99% confidence level. At the study level, it is .61, .40 and 0.18 for national income, net profit and domestic productivity respectively, though it is not statistically significant in the latter two cases. In sum, national income is a strong predictor of policy outcomes favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation, while other measures of economic development are not.

Percentage Secondary Industry

The proportion of the workforce in manufacturing industries is one of the several measures of the class composition of a society used in my sample, though it is the only one that appears in 3 or more studies. It is expected to be positively associated with policy outcomes favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation. This is because people in manufacturing industries belong to lower social classes. They therefore are more likely to support progressive policies, especially in the presence of mobilisation.

In the sample, the proportion of the labour force in manufacturing industries is examined in 20 tests within 3 studies, though these are overwhelmingly failures. Nineteen independent tests and all 3 studies are failures. The success rate is 5% and 0% at the test and study level respectively. The effect size is extremely small at the test level, standing at 0.05, though it is statistically significant. At the study level, it is slightly higher and stands at 0.17, though it is not statistically significant. Thus, the proportion of people employed in manufacturing industries is not a good predictor of policy change favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation.

Crime Rate (Low)

A low crime rate can be hypothesised to be positively associated with policy outcomes favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation. This is because higher crime rates direct attention and resources towards law and order.

In the meta-analysis, crime rate is examined in 18 tests within 4 studies. The modal category at the test level is success, while it is failure at the study level. Seven tests out of 18 and 2 studies out of 4 are failures. The success rate is moderately high, standing at 61.11% at the test level and 33.33% at the study level. The effect size is 0.61 at the test level and 0.50 at the study level though it is only statistically significant at the test level. Thus, lower crime rates have an ambivalent effect on policy outcomes, controlling for mobilisation.

Poverty, Unemployment, population density, age

Poverty, unemployment, population density and age all measure the size of the needy population, which is hypothesised to be positively associated with policy outcomes favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation. This is based on the premise that politicians are more likely to adopt social democratic policies where they are in high demand in society.

Poverty is examined in 10 tests within 4 studies. Age is examined in 7 tests within 3 studies. Unemployment is examined in 32 tests within 7 studies. Population density is examined in 18 tests within 6 studies. Age and population density are successes at the test level and failures at the study level, while the opposite is true for unemployment. For age, 4 tests out of 7 are successes, while it is 11 tests out of 18 for population density, and 6 tests out of 10 for poverty. On the other hand, 19 tests out of 32 are failures for unemployment. With regards to the study level, the modal category is mostly failure. One study out of 3 is a failure for age, while it is 2 out of 6 for population density, and 3 out of 4 for poverty. In contrast, for unemployment, the modal category at the study level is success, with 5 studies out of 7 being successes.

The success rate at the test level is 57.14%, 61.11%, 60.00%, and 34.38% for age, population density, poverty and unemployment. The success rate at the study level is 33.33% for age and population density, while it is 25% for poverty and 71.43% for unemployment. With regards to the effect size at the test level, it is .29, .33, .60, and .28 for age, population density, poverty and unemployment respectively, and is statistically significant in the first three instances. At the study level, the effect size is .22, .00, .50 and 0.62 for age, population density, poverty, and unemployment respectively, though it is only statistically significant at the study level for unemployment. Thus, poverty appears to be a good predictor of policy outcomes favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation. In contrast, the other three dimensions have an unclear influence on the dependent variable.

Urbanisation

Urbanisation is a measure of modernisation. Since modern state are richer and have more capacity, it can be argued that higher levels of urbanisation encourage policy outcomes favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation.

In this meta-analysis, urbanisation appears in only 5 tests within 3 studies. The modal category is success at the test level, with 3 out of 5 tests being successes, and a failure at the study level, with 2 out of 3 studies being failures. The success rate is 60.00% at the test level and 33.33% at the study level. The effect size is .60 and .67 at the test and study level respectively, though it is only statistically significant in the first instance. Urbanisation thus has an unclear relationship with policy outcomes favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation, though this lack of clarity could be due to the different sample size at the test and study levels.

3.6.4. The Legal Opportunity Model

Explaining that democratization has encouraged the revitalization of national and supranational courts, and that these have consequently become active participants in the policy-making process, Wilson and Cordero (2006) prefer instead to shift attention towards the legal opportunity structure, which is argued to consist of both structural and contingent factors, thereby reflecting perspectives within the political opportunity structure approach (Hilson, 2002). According to Andersen (2005), dimensions of legal opportunity are no different than those typically used in the political opportunity model, and include access to the formal apparatus of the law on a particular claim, the configuration of power among decision-makers with regards, the nature of alliances and conflicts surrounding a claim, and the availability of relevant legal and cultural frames.

In this section, I look at the existence of supportive laws, the proportion of legislators that belong to a left-wing political party, and the presence of supportive legislators. The results of the meta-analysis for variables associated with this model are presented in Table 6.

Table 6 - Legal Opportunity Model

Variable		Success (1)	Failure (0)	Anomaly (-1)	Modal Category	Success Rate	Effect size	P value
Law (supportive)	Tests (84)	26	57	1	Failure	30.95	.30	***
	Studies (14)	4	10	0	Failure	28.57	.21	
Partisanship of Legislators (Left)	Tests (56)	16	37	3	Failure	28.57	.23	***
	Studies (12)	3	8	1	Failure	25.00	.32	**
Supportive Legislators	Tests (31)	30	1	0	Success	96.77	.97	***
	Studies (3)	2	1	0	Success	66.67	.67	
Court Decisions (positive)	Tests (12)	3	9	0	Failure	25.00	.25	n/a
	Studies (5)	2	3	0	Failure	40.00	.40	

Note: *** = statistically significant at the 99% level, ** = statistically significant at the 95% level.

Law (Supportive)

Since current legislation and policy is contingent on previous decision-making, it could be argued that previously enacted laws supportive of a movement's goals act as a legal opportunity (Agnone, 2007). This is based on the idea that cost and benefits calculations encourage policy-makers to make small, incremental policy changes rather than one large one (Rajagopalan and Rasheed, 1995). This results in the incrementalistic development of public policy. As such, we can expect existing favourable laws as being positively associated with policy outcomes favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation.

The meta-analysis shows that 84 tests in 14 studies examine the relationship between existing laws and policy. However, the modal category is failure, as 57 tests and 10 studies are failures.

The success rate is relatively low, standing at 30.95% at the test level and 28.57% at the study level. The effect size is also relatively small and stands at .30 and .21 at the test and study level respectively, though it is only statistically significant in the first instance. Thus, existing supportive laws are not a strong predictor of policy outcomes favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation.

Partisanship of Legislators (Left) and Supportive Legislators

Much in the same way as for the partisanship of government and the executive, we can hypothesise that the presence of lawmakers from a left-wing or progressive party is positively associated with policy outcomes favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation. We can also hypothesise that legislators who actively support the goals of a social movement are positively associated with policy outcomes favourable to said movement. In sum, these two variables capture the presence of potential and actual elite allies in the legislature.

In the meta-analysis, 56 tests and 12 studies are concerned with the partisanship of legislators. However, the modal category is failure at both levels, with 37tests and 8 studies being failures. The success rate is 28.57% and 25.00% at the test and study level respectively. Though the effect size is statistically significant at both the test and study levels, it is relatively small, and is .23 and .32 in these two instances respectively. Supportive lawmakers are examined in 31 tests within 2 studies, and the modal category is success, as in this sample, 30 tests and 2 studies are successes. The success rate is relatively high and stands at 96.77% and 66.67% at the test and study level respectively. The effect size is .97 at the test level, which is relatively close to 1, but it is only .67 at the study level.

Comparisons between these two measures of elite allyship may not be useful, as one is examined in a significantly smaller number of cases. Nonetheless, based on these results, we can say that the presence of supportive legislators is a strong predictor of policy outcomes

favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation, though the same cannot be said of the presence of left-wing legislators.

Court Decisions (Positive)

Court decisions favourable to a social movement may draw political attention on an issue and signal legislative support to the movement (Santoro, 2002). In a way, this could be a measure of indirect elite allyship in the legal arena. We can thus expect positive court decisions to be positively associated with policy outcomes favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation.

The findings suggest that this dimension of legal opportunity is not widely looked at, as it only appears in 12 tests within 5 studies. The modal category is failure, as 9 tests and 3 studies are failures. The success rate is 25% at the test level and 40.00% at the study level. The effect size is .25 and .40 at the test and study levels respectively, and is not statistically significant. This challenges the afore-mentioned hypothesis. Positive court decisions are therefore not a strong predictor of policy outcomes favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation.

3.6.5. The Supra-national Opportunity Model

Finally, another set of scholars, many influenced by Europeanisation theories, emphasise that opportunities exist on multiple levels. Marks and McAdam (1996) argue that the historical rationale for limiting social movement analysis to the national arena emanates from the fact that traditionally, power was centralised by the state. Yet, with the advent of transnational governance systems such as the European Union, which are engendering the erosion or decline of the nation-state, such a restrictive approach no longer makes sense (Ibid). Tarrow (2005, p. 26) argues that more generally, it is transnationalism, which he defines as 'a dense, triangular structure of relations among states, non-state actors, and international institutions, and the

opportunities this produces for actors to engage in collective action at different levels of this system,' which allows expanding opportunities for social movements.

In this section, I look at whether or not the change is taking place during a period of war or conflict. It also looks at the existence of a movement supportive policy or law in neighbouring states, and the existence of a supportive regional or global ideology. The results of the meta-analysis for variables associated with this model are presented in table 7.

Table 7 - Supra-national Opportunity Model

Variable		Success (1)	Failure (0)	Anomaly (-1)	Modal Category	Success Rate	Effect size	P value
War Period	Tests (61)	39	13	9	Success	63.93	.49	***
	Studies (9)	4	4	1	Failure	44.44	.28	
Supportive Policy/Law in Neighbouring States	Tests (24)	13	11	0	Success	54.17	.54	***
	Studies (8)	3	5	0	Failure	37.50	.47	**
Supportive Regional/Global Ideology	Tests (19)	11	8	0	Success	57.89	.58	***
	Studies (3)	1	2	0	Failure	33.33	.39	

Note: *** = statistically significant at the 99% level, ** = statistically significant at the 95% level.

War Period

War is an opportunity for progressive social movements for three different reasons. First, during wartime, politicians enjoy high levels of public support (Campbell and Allen, 1994, p. 171), perhaps due to the imperative to rally behind the state in times of conflict. Thus, there is weakened challenge to social policies that would benefit a left-wing social movement from counter-movements (Ibid). Second, involvement in the war effort from a social movement may

make it more appealing to politicians (Budros, 2013, pp. 385–6). Third, as war is justified in terms of democracy and human rights, decision-makers become confronted with an untenable position, that makes them more receptive to the claims of a social movement: claiming to fight for moral values while restricting them at home (Ibid). We can thus hypothesise that (hot or cold) war years are positively associated with policy outcomes favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation.

In this meta-analysis, war is examined in 61 tests within 9 studies. While the modal category is success at the test level, it is failure at the study level. The success rate is 63.93% and 44.44% at the test and study level respectively. The effect size is .49 at the test level and .28 at the study level, though it is only statistically significant in the former. Based on these findings, it can be argued that war period is a good predictor of policy outcomes favourable to a social movement only at the test level, controlling for mobilisation.

Supportive Policy /Law in Neighbouring States, Supportive Global/Regional Ideology

Theories of policy diffusion[34] argue that policy innovation in a locality is positively associated with previous policy innovation in another locality, particularly a close one. For instance, the adoption of a law in a state increases the likelihood that neighbouring states will adopt a similar policy (Chen, 2007). This suggests that there is a contagion effect among neighbouring legislatures (Cornwall et al., 2007). Based on this body of literature, it can be expected that supportive policies and laws in neighbouring states and a global or regional ideology supportive

---

[34] Policy diffusion can be understood as 'processes (rather than outcomes) that might result in increasing policy similarities across countries, hence leading to policy convergence' (Knill, 2005, p. 766).

of a policy, are positively associated with policy outcomes favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation.

In this meta-analysis, supportive policies and laws in neighbouring states constitute 24 tests in 8 studies, while a supportive global or regional ideology is examined in 19 tests within 3 studies. The modal category for both variables is success at the test level and failure at the study level. The success rate at the test level is 54.17% and 57.89%, while at the study level it is 37.50% and 33.33% for supportive policy or law in neighbouring countries and supportive regional or global ideology respectively. The effect size at the test level is .54 and .58, while at the study level it is .47 and .39 for supportive policy or law in neighbouring countries and supportive regional or global ideology respectively. Based on these observations is that supportive policies and laws and a supportive regional or global ideology are not strong predictors of policy outcomes favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation.

3.7. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have employed a meta-analysis to systematically analyse the association between different dimensions of opportunity linked to different models of opportunity, and policy change, controlling for social movement mobilisation. I have done this to determine systematically which models and dimensions of opportunity have the greatest explanatory power. I have also done this to assess how relevant elite allies are for policy-making on an issue relevant to a social movement. I wanted to test the assumption that the presence of elite allies is a source of opportunity for social movements. I have found out that neither potential nor actual elite allies are strong predictors of policy outcomes favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation. This finding puts into question the veracity of the claim that social movements benefit from the presence of allies in power. In the next few chapters, I consider in more detail the relationship between elite allies and social movements, through a case study of

the mobilisation for legislative reforms on violence against women in Morocco, to better understand exactly what the former contributes to the latter.

Based on an examination of the proportion of successful relationships within each model, almost all models fail to be strong predictors of policy change favourable to mobilising social movements. Out of the 9 dimensions included in the political opportunity model, 3 (33%) are positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation, at both the test and study level. Out of the 6 dimensions included in the discursive opportunity model, 2 (33%) are positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation, though only at the test level. Out of the 14 dimensions included in the socio-economic opportunity model, 3 (21.4%) are positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation, at both the test and study levels. A further 3 (21.4%) are also positively associated with favourable policy change, at either the test or study level. Out of the 4 dimensions included in the legal opportunity model, 1 (25%) is positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation, at both the test and study levels. Out of the 3 dimensions included in the supra-national opportunity model, 2 (66%) are positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation, though only at the test level.

Out of these models, the dimensions of opportunity that are significantly associated with favourable policy change at both the test and study levels are: political openness, election year, administrative capacity, spending, national income, ethnic/racial equality, poverty, and supportive legislators. Of these, the success rate at both the test and study levels is above 50% for political openness, administrative capacity, national income, poverty, and supportive legislators. The effect size is statistically significant at both levels for political openness, administrative capacity, spending, national income, and ethnic or racial equality. These

findings question the significance of opportunities for social movements mobilising for policy influence, though they highlight the relevance of structural opportunities, at a time when dynamic opportunities are becoming increasingly popular in studies of social movements. The next chapter begins my case study of the Moroccan women's rights movement and its campaign to criminalise violence against women. I use this case study to show the importance of looking at agency, by focusing on performances of allyship, rather than the presence of elite allies, to understand why elite actors may not be a good source of opportunity for social movements.

4.Elite Allyship, Islamism and The Moroccan Women's Rights Movement

4.1. Introduction

In this section, I trace the ways in which the contemporary women's rights movement in Morocco has evolved, and the relationship it has had with political elites and Islamists.[35] I borrow Fatima Sadiqi's division of the movement into three distinct waves, as we can see major turning points in its life and circumstances in the 1940s, 1980s and 2000s (2017b). I show that the movement focused most of its efforts on reforming the Moudawana, in the face of fierce opposition by Islamists and the religious establishment. In this context, they have principally benefited from the support of the monarchy, as King Mohamed VI, in his role as arbiter, initiated the most extensive reform on this matter. Besides the King, elite allyship came in the form of intergovernmental organisations, as the second wave of the movement benefited from the UN's focus on women's rights. IGOs were particularly useful in exerting leverage over the Moroccan government. Figures from left-wing parties also provided moral support by championing the causes of secular activists. However, their lack of clout encouraged secular activists to appeal to the King.

4.2. The First Wave: Confronting Patriarchal Nationalists

In this section, I discuss the first wave of the Moroccan women's rights movement. This wave was between the 1940s and 1970s, and consisted of upper class Moroccan women that had ties

---

[35] Since not all actors that mobilise through women's organisations in Morocco do not identify as feminists, I follow Amy Young Evrard (2014) in speaking of the Moroccan women's rights movement rather than the Moroccan feminist movement in this thesis.

to nationalist figures. Though their early demands were influenced by nationalist priorities and Islam, some of their claims defied social norms. I show that nationalists provided a platform for the ideas of women's rights activists, but their patriarchal values and turn to Islam restricted the discourse these activists could have. As we will see in the next section, this limiting effect of political elites ultimately led activists to form their own independent associations.

The contemporary Moroccan women's rights movement developed when Morocco was a French protectorate (1912 – 1956).[36] It began as a secular movement that consisted of educated, urban, upper-class women linked to the national liberation movement through male relatives (Sadiqi, 2008a, p. 457, 2017a). At first, these educated women discussed gender issues in the nationalist press through the publication of articles on education and women's legal rights. It was not until the mid-1940s that the first women's political associations were formed. The elites of the Moroccan liberation movement allowed some space for women's issues because, anxious to challenge France's construction of Moroccan women, they promoted legal and educational reforms for women within an Islamic legal system (Wyrtzen, 2016, p. 220).

The Union of Moroccan Women, the woman's section of Istiqlal (Independence) – the main party calling for independence – was formed in 1944 (Naciri, 2003, 2014). The women's association Akhawat al-Safa (Sisters of Purity), was established in 1946, and stemmed from

---

[36] In the Treaty of Fez of 30th March 1912, France pledged to 'protect' Morocco, turning the latter into a protectorate ('French Protectorate Established in Morocco', 1912) . Another Treaty was subsequently signed between France and Spain on 27th November 1912, delegating Spanish protection in the north and south, with France remaining the main protecting power ('Treaty Between France and Spain Regarding Morocco', 1913). On 2nd March 1956, France ceded its control (Ismael, 1986). Spain followed suit, and ceded its northern and southern protectorates on 7th April 1956 and 1st April 1958 respectively (Ismael, 1986).

the rival Parti Democratique de l'independence (Democratic Independence Party) (Wyrtzen, 2016). These women mobilised for women's education, independence and provided support to the families of nationalist victims (Sadiqi, 2017a). Their goals were influenced by the ideology of Moroccan nationalists. With regards to education, Modern Standard Arabic was promoted to challenge French, while with regards to belief systems, Islam was promoted to challenge French modernity (Sadiqi, 2017a). In fact, Shari'a, or Islamic law, played an important role as a symbol of national identity (Buskens, 2003). Different factions of the independence movement were drawn to it because it acted as a bulwark against the legal pluralism promoted by France, and which divided the territory into areas administered by Islamic law, or into areas administered through Berber customary law (Buskens, 2003)

In the face of the Islamisation of political discourse, Akhawat al-Safa issues in 1946 a public document, called Al Wathiqa (The Document) containing a list of secular legal demands, which ushered in the era of the first wave of the Moroccan women's rights movement (Sadiqi, 2017a). These demands included the abolition of polygamy, as well as dignity at home and in the public sphere (Sadiqi, 2017a). The strategies of members of this organisation included writing press articles, and holding public speeches and private or public meetings (Sadiqi, 2008a). As these first organisations assumed that independence would bring about their emancipation, they did not accord much importance to challenging the status of women in Morocco (Sadiqi, 2008a).

However, the post-independence period witnessed the legalisation of the subordination of women to men in Morocco through the Moudawana (Personal Status Code). Nationalists had decried France's promulgation of the Berber Dahir (decree) ever since its promulgation in 1930 (Wyrtzen, 2016). This decree had sought to keep the Berber people distinct from Muslim Arabs by stating that the former were to be administered by their own customary law and tribal councils in their areas, while the latter were to be subject to Islamic law (Hart, 1997). From

that date onwards, family law became a recurring topic of discussion, and most nationalist elite favoured the application of a uniform Islamic family law (Charrad, 2001). Leaders of the independence movement, such as the founder of Istiqlal Allal Al Fassi, sought the Islamisation of the legal system of Morocco, and to this end, Berber customary law was abolished, and Islamic law became codified in the Moudawana (Buskens, 2003).[37]

 At the request of the King, Mohamed V, an all-male committee composed of ulemas (religious scholars), legal figures and ministers elaborated a Moudawana, inspired by the Maliki school of Sunni Islam, between 1957 and 1958 (Harrak, 2009). Its central tenets included the establishment of wilaya (tutorship) for marriage, the supremacy of the husband over the wife, the obedience of the wife towards the husband, the wife's right to maintenance, the right of the husband to divorce through unilateral repudiation, the right of the husband to marry up to four wives, and the wife's right to initiate divorce under certain conditions (Harrak, 2009). In addition, the minimum age for marriage was set at fifteen for girls and eighteen for boys, though judges could grant exemptions (Charrad, 2001; Harrak, 2009). This conservative Moudawana reflected King Mohamed V's alliances. At the onset of independence, he had found valuable allies in the form of the rural elite who held patriarchal ideas (Charrad, 2001).

As soon as the Moudawa was introduced, calls for its reform ensued. Attempts were made in 1961, 1962, 1965, 1970, 1974, 1979, 1981 and 1982 (Harrak, 2009). However, all of them failed (Buskens, 2003). In 1965, an official commission was established to correct shortcomings in the Code (Buskens, 2003). The project fell through after one meeting. A royal commission was set up in 1981 to prepare a draft amendment, though it never reached Parliament (Buskens, 2003). In 1986, a draft Pan-Arab Personal Status Code proposed by the

---

[37] The Jewish community retained its own family law and courts, and Christians were not bound by the polygamy and repudiation tenets of the Islamic *Moudawana* (Buskens, 2003).

Council of Arab Ministers of Justice, also failed to lead to any change in the existing Moudawana (Buskens, 2003). To channel women's demands, the government established official women's organisations. In 1969, it launched the Union Nationale des Femmes Marocaines (National Union of Moroccan Women, henceforth UNFM), an official women's group to represent Moroccan women (Naciri, 2014). In 1971, the Association Marocaine de Planning Familial (Moroccan Association of Family Planning, AMPF) was created, to advance the state's policy on family planning (Naciri, 2014). Thus, Moroccan women were restricted to official structures to express themselves (Naciri, 2014).

This restriction, coupled with the political liberalisation of the mid-1970s meant that women increasingly began organising themselves through political parties (Naciri, 2003). From 1975 onwards, the political climate became more open towards opposition political parties, encouraging the latter to resume their activities, including trying to recruit more women within their ranks (Naciri, 2014). However, this increasing integration within left-wing political parties such as Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires, Parti du Progres et du Socialisme, and Organisation de l'Action Democratique et Populaire (Organisation for Democratic and Popular Action, OADP), meant that initially, women gave priority to democratic ideals, rather than gender equality (Naciri, 2014).

On the other hand, international developments such as the United Nations (UN) Decade for Women between 1975 and 1985 and the proclamation of the Convention Against all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 1979, encouraged discussion on the status of women in these political parties (Naciri, 2003). Themes such as the liberation of women, their legal status, and their political representation, were raised by women, though the Moudawana was treated differently, depending on the degree of autonomy they had vis-à-vis their political parties, and their dedication (Naciri, 2003). This established two trends within the Moroccan women's movement. On the one hand are those who managed to navigate their partisan and

feminist identities, and on the other are those who were strictly loyal to their political organisation (Naciri, 2003). Besides political parties, women also mobilised within the Union Nationale des Etudiants du Maroc (National Union of Moroccan Students, henceforth UNEM), a powerful union that trained and recruited university students for left-wing political parties (Naciri, 2014). This resulted in the entry of young university-educated women in left-wing political parties (Sadiqi, 2017a). However, the two failed military coups in the early 1970s resulted in increasing authoritarianism and repression, which in turn increased militancy within left-wing organised groups (Sadiqi, 2017a).

4.3. The Second Wave: Confronting the rise of Islamism

In this section, I discuss the second wave of the Moroccan women's rights movement. This wave emerged in the 1980s and lasted until the end of the 1990s. This era was characterised by the rise of Political Islam – or Islamism[38] - in the Middle East and North Africa. This development affected the Moroccan women's rights movement in two ways. On the one hand, Islamists acted as a fierce counter-movement, challenging the discourse and goals of secular women's rights activists. On the other hand, some women became attracted to their discourse on Islam, leading to the establishment of an Islamist current within the Moroccan women's rights movement. In this wave, an unlikely source of opportunity came in the form of King Hassan II, who initiated limited reforms to the Moudawana. Political parties proved unwilling to rally behind secular women's rights activists both in terms of reforming the Moudawana, and passing the national plan to integrate women in society. In the face of rising Islamism, the

---

[38] Islamism is a concept difficult to entangle, as there are many dimensions to it. In this thesis, I adopt Valentine Moghadam's definition and see it as 'a movement of movements' whose basic goal is 'the establishment or reinforcement of Islamic laws and norms as the solution to economic, political, and cultural crises' (Moghadam, 2013a, p. 99)

first socialist government of Youssoufi proved unable to pass the plan. It delegated the question of reforming the Moudawana to the new King, Mohamed VI.

If the 1960s and 1970s were marked by the integration of women activists within political parties and unions, the 1980s witnessed the creation of a multitude of independent women's associations. Noting that affiliation to political parties reduced women activists' margin of freedom, the second generation of the Moroccan women's rights movement organised itself into autonomous structures. In 1985, was born the Association Democratique des Femmes du Maroc, which developed out of the PPS (Sadiqi, 2017a). This was followed in 1987 by Union de l'Action Feminine[39], which developed out of the OADP (Sadiqi, 2017a). In the 1990s, three other big feminist associations were established, notably, Association Marocaine des Droits des Femmes (Moroccan Association for Women's Rights, henceforth AMDF) in 1992, the Ligue Democratique des Droits des Femmes[40] (Democratic League for Women's Rights, LDDF) in 1993, and Jossour, Forum des Femmes (Jossour, Women's Forum, Jossour) in 1995 (Naciri, 2014). Since the 1980s, other feminist associations have been established, in different geographical locations, and with different areas of specialism (Naciri, 2003). To this day, even though most women's associations are in big cities such as Casablanca, Rabat, a host of smaller associations now exist in more remote cities and towns, to tackle the problems specific to those areas.

Thanks to foreign criticism and pressure, the political and intellectual climates became more liberalised at the end of the 1980s (Buskens, 2003). Not only did it become more acceptable to

---

[39] The association is now called *Union de l'Action Feministe* (Union of Feminist Action).

[40] The association has since become a federation, and has been rebranded the *Federation de la Ligue Democratique des Droits des Femmes* (Federation of the Democratic League for Women's Rights, henceforth FLDDF).

advocate for the reform of the Moudawana, it also became possible to draw on international conventions and therefore use secular arguments rooted in human rights (Buskens, 2003).

These early organisations enjoyed the support of international organisations such as the UN, which had launched a worldwide effort to promote women's rights (Sadiqi and Ennaji, 2006). Thanks to pressure by Moroccan women's rights groups, the government was constantly asked to send official delegates to address women's issues at UN meetings, such as those of the UN Decade for Women in Mexico City between 1975 and 1985 (Sadiqi and Ennaji, 2006). The first World Conference on Women took place in Mexico City in 1975, followed by one in Copenhagen in 1980, and Nairobi in 1985 (Friedman, 2003). These conferences were important for three reasons. First, they focused attention on women's legal status and tasked states with guaranteeing women's human rights (Friedman, 2003). They also turned discrimination against women into a global problem that should be a subject of discussion within all states (Friedman, 2003). Finally, they resulted in the formation of several international non-governmental organisations, such as the International Women's Tribune Centre and the International Women's Rights Action Watch, which became avenues for the global institutional expression of women's rights (Friedman, 2003). After the UN Decade for Women, Morocco ratified CEDAW in August 1993, though with reservations to Articles 2 and 16 about marriage and the woman's ability to pass on her citizenship, as they conflicted with Morocco's Moudawana (Sadiqi and Ennaji, 2006).

Besides exploiting these international opportunities, women activists took to academic and journalistic writing to condemn the condition of women in Morocco (Naciri, 2006). Feminist magazines such as 8 Mars (8th March) and Kalimat (Word) were created in the 1980s, and argued that there was nothing natural about gender roles and the sexual division of labour (Sadiqi and Ennaji, 2006). Other publications were later established, such as Femmes du Maroc and Citadine in French, and Nisaa min al Maghreb (Women of Morocco) in Arabic (Naciri,

2006). These successfully allied feminist writings with commercial awareness. In the same period, academic writings by Fatema Mernissi and Leila Abouzeid began calling out the exclusion of Moroccan women from politics and economics, and the disregard for women's issues in the post-independence period (Sadiqi and Ennaji, 2006). Mernissi remains an important feminist figure in Morocco, thanks to works such as The Veil and the Male Elite: A Feminist Interpretation of Islam (1992), which helped establish a reformist feminist current in Morocco. Academics also set up regional and national research groups to complement their feminist writings. Academic research on women was further enhanced in the 1990s, research centres on women, as well as graduate degree programmes in gender and women's studies were created in public universities in Rabat, Fes and Meknes (Sadiqi and Ennaji, 2006).

These activists did not just dedicate themselves to women's issues, but also addressed human rights causes in general. Women contributed to setting up women's sections in the first human rights organisations in Morocco. Such was the case with the Association Marocaine des Droits Humains (Moroccan Association of Human Rights, AMDH), and the Organisation Marocaine des Droits Humains (Moroccan Organisation for Human Rights, OMDH), established in 1979 and 1988 respectively (El Bouhsini, 2015). Moroccan women have participated in a range of social and political issues, from social development, to democratisation, which has resulted in the visibility of women's issues in the public sphere (El Bouhsini, 2015).

Nonetheless, the focus of the second generation of the Moroccan women's rights movement remained the improvement of the Moudawana. The first large-scale mobilisation occurred in March 1992, during International Women's Day, when in coalition with other associations, UAF presented a petition to collect one million signatures to pressure Parliament and the Prime Minister to reform it, and guarantee legal equality between men and women (Cavatorta and Dalmasso, 2009). UAF had launched this petition in 1990, at a time when the government was seeking to reform the Constitution and political institutions (Wuerth, 2005). In 1994, ADFM

launched in collaboration with Collectif 95-Maghreb Egalite[41] (Collective 95-Maghreb Equality, henceforth Collectif), a template Family Law, based on universal human rights values (Eddouada and Pepicelli, 2010).

Islamists strongly opposed UAF's petition, while secular political parties accused the women's rights movement of hindering the nascent political liberation in Morocco through this challenge (Cavatorta and Dalmasso, 2009). Islamists and the religious establishment more generally, challenged this campaign through a counter-petition opposing any changes to the Moudawana (Wuerth, 2005). This counter-petition was circulated in mosques, that were under the authority of the Ministry of Religious Endowments and Islamic Affairs (Elliott, 2009). The Ministry also encouraged mosque preachers to attack the campaign (Elliott, 2009). A fatwa (a non-binding religious pronouncement) was also issued, by professor of Islamic jurisprudence associated with the Islamist organisation Al Islah wal Tajdid (Reform and Renewal), calling participants heretics that should be killed (Wuerth, 2005).

King Hassan II appropriated this divisive issue, and in his 20th August 1992 speech, stipulated that modifying the Moudawana was a royal prerogative and that it was his responsibility as Amir al Mu'minin (Commander of the Faithful), to interpret and implement religion (Ouali, 2008). He created a commission composed of male ulemas and judges to address the demands of women activists, and provide recommendations (Ouali, 2008). Subsequently, the King announced changes to certain articles of the Moudawana, which would have for effect of modestly increasing women's agency with regards to marriage, polygamy and divorce (Sadiqi, 2008a). Changes included amongst others, allowing a woman over the age of 21 to have a

---

[41] This group had been formed in 1992 by women's associations and academics, to campaign for equality between men and women in the three Maghreb countries: Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia (Mahfoudh, 2014).

marriage contract without a tutor, allowing a woman to refuse her husband to take other wives, and obliging a husband to present his case for divorce in front of notaries and his wife (Sadiqi, 2008a). These limited changes were disappointing to women's rights activists in Morocco, though they also suggested that laws rooted in religion could be opened to public debate (Sadiqi and Ennaji, 2006).

An Islamist counter-movement restarted in the late 1990s, when the women's rights movement benefited from a political opening to renew its fight to reform the Moudawana. This political opening was the alternance (alternating) government established by Hassan II in 1998. Hassan II decided to integrate longstanding opposition parties into the political system (Cavatorta and Dalmasso, 2009). As such, a deal was reached, allowing the King to retain significant executive prerogatives, and simultaneously affording the chance to govern to opposition parties, some of which were left-wing and linked to women's associations (Cavatorta and Dalmasso, 2009). In March 1999, this government presented a plan to improve the position of women in Morocco, the Plan d'Action National pour l'Integration de la Femme au Developpement (National Plan of Action for the Integration of Women in Development, henceforth the Plan) (Elliott, 2009). The drafting of this Plan had involved the participation of women's associations such as ADFM, AMDF and UAF, with funding from the World Bank, and was based on CEDAW, which Morocco had ratified with reservations in 1993 (Cavatorta and Dalmasso, 2009; Elliott, 2009).

The Plan identified four areas to improve on. These were literacy, reproductive health, the integration of women in economic development, and the strengthening of women's legal status, with changes in the Penal Code, the Nationality Code, and the Moudawana (Buskens, 2003). These proposed legal changes were supposed to combat violence against women, allow women to grant nationality to children they had with foreign partners, and grant women better rights in marriage, child custody and divorce (Buskens, 2003; Elliott, 2009). The two left-wing parties

in government – the PPS and the USFP – supported the Plan. Istiqlal, the third main partner in government, was more ambiguous (Buskens, 2003). Istiqlal's stance on religion was more conservative, as it draws inspiration from Allal Al Fasi's Salafi approach (Buskens, 2003).

The religious establishment strongly opposed the Plan. On the one hand, was an officially unrecognised Islamist group, Al Adl wal Ihsan (Justice and Charity), which opposed the Plan because it felt that the suggested reforms were coming from the West, rather than from within Islam (Wuerth, 2005). The Parti de la Justice et du Developpement (Party of Justice and Development, henceforth PJD) - which had split from Harakat At Tawhid Wal Islah,/Mouvement de l'Unicite et de la Reforme (Movement of Unity and Reform, henceforth MUR) in 1997 (El Sherif, 2012) – organised an important demonstration through a specially devised committee for the protection of the family (Bras, 2007). Strong opposition also came from the Minister of religious foundations and Islamic affairs, Abdelkebir M'Daghri Alaoui. Alaoui claimed the Plan opposed Islamic law, and charged a commission of ulemas to write a report against the Plan (Buskens, 2003).

These tensions culminated into two opposing marches on 12th March 2000, after the Plan was announced. The March for Women was organised by women's associations such as UAF and ADFM, and supported the Plan, whereas the march against the Plan took place in Casablanca, and was organised by the PJD and Al Adl (Elliott, 2009). Though both marches each outnumbered over 200, 000 participants, the one organised by the Islamists against the Plan was bigger (Wuerth, 2005; Cavatorta and Dalmasso, 2009). Eventually, the Plan was withdrawn by Mohamed VI, who had now become King, upon the death of his father Hassan II, in 1999. Scholars argue that the Plan was withdrawn because of this deadlock, and the show of force by Islamists and conservative figures in the political system (Sater, 2007; Cavatorta and Dalmasso, 2009). Nonetheless, individual elements of the Plan were adopted by some

government ministries, while a royal commission was charged with addressing proposals related to the Moudawana (Cavatorta and Dalmasso, 2009).

Islamists were a strong reactionary force because Islamism had become a popular global ideology in the 1980s. According to prominent feminist scholar and activist, Valentine Moghadam, the emergence of Islamist movements in the Middle East and North Africa is linked to socioeconomic developments in the region (1991). Industrialisation and urbanisation meant that beginning in the 1960s, women were experiencing a dramatic improvement in education and on the job market, increasing their visibility and participation in the public sphere (Moghadam, 1991).This development was occurring alongside a debt crisis, and its concomitant economic hardships. By 1977, Morocco was in substantial debt, following a period of extensive foreign borrowing (Seddon, 1989). Between 1983 and 1992, it aggressively pursued economic liberalisation, through structural adjustment programs, aided by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Maghraoui, 2002).

Morocco's attempt to stabilise the situation in the 1980s did not do much to improve rising unemployment and the deteriorating conditions of the urban poor (Seddon, 1989). Unsurprisingly, this created a lot of discontent, which was expressed through frequent public demonstrations and strikes (Seddon, 1989). Together, women's increased visibility in the public sphere and the economic crisis resulted in young unemployed men flocking to Islamist movements, under the belief that economically active women were robbing them of opportunities (Sadiqi, 2014b). As Moghadam states, support for Islamist movements comes from lower social classes, and the first generation of the educated middle class (1991). On the other hand, the upper middle class and the aristocracy tends to be found in liberal or left-wing groups (Moghadam, 1991).

However, modernisation and socioeconomic changes cannot single-handedly explain the rise of Islamism.[42] This development was aided by the geopolitical context. The end of the Cold War, with the fall of the Soviet Union and the associated weakening of communist parties in the developing world left a political and ideological vacuum, which Islamists populist leaders and discourses could fill (Moghadam, 1993). Since the 1960s and 1970s, regimes in the MENA region had sought to prop up Islamist parties to neutralise the growth of left-wing parties, resulting in the spread of Islamic ideas and education (Moghadam, 2003).

Besides challenging the discourse of secular women's rights activists, Islamist groups have also successfully managed to enlist women within their ranks, to act as a counter-movement. Women's cells were introduced in Islamist parties by women. In 1998, Nadia Yassine created a women's section in Al Adl, which had been founded by her father Sheikh Abdesalam Yassine (Eddouada and Pepicelli, 2010). Women affiliated with the PJD also launched in the mid-1990s, two associations – Muntada al Zahra (Forum of Zahra, Forum al Zahra) and Tajdid al Wa'I al Nisa'i, known as Renouveau de la Conscience Feminine in French (Renewal of Women's Awareness, as RCF) (Eddouada and Pepicelli, 2010). Forum al Zahra is a network of 113 associations throughout Morocco, which work on women's issues and on the family (Forum al Zahra, 2016). It believes that the most effective way to ensure respect for women's rights, is to improve their status within the family (Forum al Zahra, 2016). RCF is focused on preserving Islamic identity and authenticity and strives to make sure that women's rights are in line with Shari'a (Eddouada and Pepicelli, 2010).

---

[42] This is a simplification of the complexity of the rise of Islamism in the Middle East and North Africa. As Moghadam notes, various approached have been offered, from a historical, cultural, global, or even sociological standpoint, amongst others. See Moghadam (1993).

Islamism not only appeals to men from lower social classes, but also to young educated women from poorer social milieus (Naciri, 1998). Universities have been controlled by Islamists from the 1990s onwards, replacing left-wing parties (Naciri, 1998). This was the result of a crisis in the educational system and rising graduate unemployment, and the ensuing creation of a social class of disaffected youth with little trust in traditional political institutions (Naciri, 1998). It could be argued that in the face of this social and economic crisis, some women chose to ally themselves with Islamist political groups to get protection in exchange for being submissive and respectable; a passive strategy of resistance that is referred to as a 'patriarchal bargain' (Kandiyoti, 1988).

4.4. The Third Wave: Confronting Fragmentation

In this section, I turn my attention to the third wave of the Moroccan women's rights movement. The third wave began in the 21st century, and can be characterised by even more fragmentation within the movement, because in addition to the divide between seculars and Islamists, groups that were until now marginalised, such as the youth and Amazigh women, started their own associations[43] and networks. It is thus difficult to speak of a unified Moroccan women's rights movement. What had started off as a relatively coherent movement turned into a cluster of groups that do not necessarily mobilise together on similar issues. In this wave, tensions between Islamists and secular women's rights advocates increased. In the light of strong opposition to the reform of the Moudawana, secular activists appealed to the new King, Mohamed VI, in his role as arbiter. Mohamed VI also introduced other reforms, such as the

---

[43] In Morocco, local civil society organisations are referred to as 'associations'. As demonstrated in this chapter, several women's organisations use the term 'association' in their name.

nationality code and the women-friendly Constitution of 2011. However, these were not introduced through democratic means.

The aforementioned tensions between Islamist groups and secular women's rights activists over the Plan continued unabated into the twenty-first century, as the Moudawana was still on the agenda. After the proposal of the Plan, then Prime Minister, Youssoufi, created a commission to study some parts of the Plan and solicited the arbitration of the new King Mohamed VI, with regards to reforming the Moudawana to (Ouali, 2008). This decision was supported by all political actors, from Islamists to left-wing figures in government (Bras, 2007). In fact, Islamists and secular women activists appealed to the King to intervene on the matter in his role as Commander of the Faithful, except followers of Adl, who reject the authority of the monarchy (Buskens, 2003; Mir-Hosseini, 2007).

Mohamed VI subsequently received a coalition of women's rights organisations called the Spring of Equality, and established a consultative commission in 2001 to reform the Moudawana (Bras, 2007; Elliott, 2009). This commission was composed mostly of ulemas and conservative judges, in addition to three women, a progressive lawyer, and figures loyal to the monarchy (Bras, 2007). Not only did the King include representatives of women's rights organisations in this royal commission, he also took counsel from additional women's rights organisations (Wuerth, 2005).

The first report of the commission came out in 2002, albeit with disagreements (Bras, 2007). The King subsequently replaced the head of the commission with a reliable ally – the former head of Istiqlal, M'hammed Boucetta – in January 2003, and communicated his desire to adopt the recommendations of the commission in 10th October 2003, during the Fall session of Parliament (Wuerth, 2005; Bras, 2007; Elliott, 2009). A few months later, the parliament voted in favour of the reforms, and in October 2004, at the Fall session of Parliament, Mohamed VI

promulgated a new Family Code through a royal decree (Elliott, 2009; Murgue, 2011). As the King in Morocco is not only the Commander of the Faithful, but also a descendant of the Prophet Mohammed, it is necessary to make legal changes within an Islamic framework (Wuerth, 2005). Consequently, Mohamed VI made sure to justify the reforms with Islamic arguments (Wuerth, 2005).

Besides the King, secular women's rights activists drew on Islamic rhetoric to campaign for the reform of the Moudawana, though this was influenced by the rising power of the Islamists. At the turn of the twenty-first century, Islamists were the only credible political force, and could mobilise at least five hundred thousand people (Ouali, 2008). Not only were Islamists represented in Parliament through the Justice and Development party, they were also supported by more semi-clandestine movements, such as Adl (Ouali, 2008). However, the turning point was the show of force of Islamists in Casablanca in 2000, as it made secular women's rights activists tone down their secularism and base their arguments on a re-interpretation of Islamic legal sources (Elliott, 2009). This use of Islam to counteract Islamists was complemented with coordination at the international level. In May 2000, women's associations in Morocco, Belgium, Spain, France and the Netherlands met to establish a support network for the Plan (Ouali, 2008). In 2003, the regional network, Collectif Maghreb-Egalite published a guide for equality in the family in the Maghreb, which sought to demonstrate that it is possible to arrive at a reform that is in line with Islamic law, international law, and the evolution of society (Bras, 2007).

While the secular segment of the women's rights movement Islamised its discourse, Islamists moderated theirs. Islamists still mobilised against modernisation and secularism, which owing to Morocco's past as a protectorate of European powers, perceived them as instruments of Westernisation (Ouali, 2008). However, rather than reject any reform of the Moudawana, Islamists called for culturally sensitive changes (Elliott, 2009). Members of Adl argued that a

truly Islamic order gives rights to women, and the representative of the women's section, Nadia Yassine even welcomed the proposals of the King, on the grounds that it was influenced by an intelligent re-reading of the sacred texts (Bras, 2007). This moderation could be due to Islamists' weakening power after terrorist attacks and their threat to the inclusion of Islamists in the political arena. On 16th May 2003, deadly terrorist bombings by Jihadists took place in Casablanca, prompting decision-makers to see the need for social, political and legal reforms (Ouali, 2008). This weakened Islamists, as their inclusion in the political system had depended on their ability to act as a bulwark against Islamic terrorism (Bras, 2007). Anxious about their image, they halted their public opposition to the reform and did not hold public demonstrations when the King made his speech in October 2003 to recommend a new Family Code (Moghadam and Gheytanchi, 2010). Secular women activists not only benefited from the weakening power of Islamists, they also used this event to get back at their opponents (Sadiqi, 2008b).

Regardless of Islamists' moderation of their discourse, the debate over the Moudawana was made within an Islamic framework, and opposing camps disagreed more over whose interpretation was more legitimate. While secular women activists accused Islamists of being ignorant on Islamic tradition, Islamists accused them of substituting the Moudawana with pieces of legislation inspired by different Islamic schools of thought, and taken out of their context (Bras, 2007).

Ultimately, the new Family Code reached a middle ground between religious and secular segments of Moroccan society. It contained several provisions that satisfied secular women's rights activists. These included the end of male guardianship, mutual responsibility for the household, the use of a judge for marriage contract or dissolution, the regulation of divorce through new laws and a family court, the establishment of the minimum age for marriage to 18 for both boys and girls, the sharing of assets after a divorce, and the right to child custody to

women upon re-marriage (Ennaji, 2016). Thus, not only did the Code increased women's rights in marriage and divorce, its abolition of male guardianship allowed them to carry out civic duties as free and autonomous agents. Women no longer needed male authority to exercise a job, become member of a trade union or a political party, or even to travel (Ouali, 2008).

Scholars note that the Code contain many restrictions and loopholes that dilute its value. It still maintains four important institutions: polygamy, divorce through repudiation, separation by compensation and unequal inheritance between men and women (Ouali, 2008; Sadiqi, 2008b). Referring to articles 231, 235 and 236, Elliott (2009) argues that fathers are still considered to be the legal representatives of children and are entrusted with managing the affairs of the household, including religious education. Furthermore, articles 80, 102 and 194 encourage the notion of complementarity in obligations, while article 20 allows a legal tutor to marry off girls before the age of 18 (Elliott, 2009). Sadiqi (2008b) adds that the Code is essentially about married women and leaves out single women, as well as those who are not Moroccans, but married to Moroccans.

This reform of the Moudawana is perceived by Eddouarda and Pepicelli (2010) to be part of Mohamed VI's strategy of state-sponsored Islamic feminism. After the 2003 Casablanca bombings, Mohamed VI transformed religious institutions, by encouraging the recruitment of women to positions of authority, to stop radicalisation and control the religious sphere (Eddouada and Pepicelli, 2010). This led to the feminisation of religious professions in the 2000s. Female academics were invited in religious circles to discuss religion, and in 2006, the Ministry of Islamic Affairs recruited several female preachers and theologians (Eddouada and Pepicelli, 2010). For Wuerth (2005), Mohamed VI's commitment to improving the situation of women in Morocco had more to do with satisfying external actors. Wuerth (2005) argues that free trade agreements with the United States and the European Union contained clauses that called for the improvement of social and economic issues.

Regardless of the reasons for this reform, the fact remains that very little had changed on the ground, due to cultural traditions, lack of access to information, and lack of democracy and development. More specifically, women are prevented from invoking their rights because male judges hold conservative values that prevent them from applying the Code, the reforms are poorly known in some areas, such as rural ones, patriarchal values are deeply ingrained in society, and women suffer from social injustices and higher rates of illiteracy than men (Sadiqi, 2008b; Ennaji, 2016). Ignorance about the new Family Code and its content is attributed to the lack of a nationwide campaign to educate all sectors of society about it, and the fact that the media reports official news in modern standard Arabic, which many Moroccans are not fluent in (Elliott, 2009).

The secular segment of the third wave of the Moroccan women's rights movement did not limit its campaigning to the reform of the Family Code, but drew on a wide range of strategies to mobilise for various goals. The Ligue Democratique pour les Droits des Femmes (Democratic League for Women's Rights)[44] carried out a campaign since 2002 to encourage women to vote for legislative candidates that supported their claims, which culminated in several political parties including their demands on their platforms (Ouali, 2008).

Two other nationwide efforts include the campaigns to end sexual harassment and to introduce quotas for women in politics. In 2001, female parliamentarians from the main political parties, such as Istiqlal, USFP, PPS and MP, established a network to campaign for a quota system (Sater, 2007). They sought to insert this goal in the electoral reforms proposed by Driss Jettou, who was Minister of the Interior at the time (Sater, 2007). With regards to sexual harassment,

---

[44] The League has since expanded and now incorporates various organisations. It is now called the *Federation de l*a *Ligue Democratique des Droits des Femmes* (Federation of the Democratic League for Women's Rights). I henceforth refer to it as the Federation in this thesis.

women have drawn on new technologies to mobilise for their right to occupy the public sphere (Monqid, 2012). Online platforms, such as blogs and social networks like Facebook, have allowed women to provide a collective voice to speak out against the violence they face (Monqid, 2012).

The Democratic Association organised events, including an online petition to the Prime Minister, to pressure the government to withdraw its reservations to CEDAW and to ratify the optional protocol (Ouali, 2008). This effort was part of a regional campaign called Equality Without Reservations, which was officially established in 2006 in Rabat, and brought together women's rights organisations from Arab states, to call on governments all reservations to CEDAW, to fully commit to non-discrimination (Moghadam and Gheytanchi, 2010).

The secular Moroccan women's rights movement was also involved in another regional campaign, called Arab Women's Rights to Citizenship. This campaign started on 8th March 2002, under the supervision of the Lebanese NGO, the Collective for Research and Training on Development-Action (Habib and Abou-Habib, 2003). The aim was to pressure Arab states to commit to Article 9 of CEDAW, which calls for women to be granted nationality rights on the same terms as men (Habib and Abou-Habib, 2003). The campaign particularly called for women to be able to pass on their nationality to their children and husbands, if their husbands are from a different nationality (Habib and Abou-Habib, 2003).

These campaigns were followed by favourable policy and legal changes. In May 2002, the government of Youssoufi approved a proposal backed by the King, to have reserved seats for the legislative elections of September 2002 (Sadiqi, 2008b).The Labour Code was reformed in 2004 and included articles that made sexual harassment in the workplace a serious misconduct, and increased maternity leave (Ouali, 2008). A new nationality code was passed in January 2007, which enabled Moroccan women married to foreign husbands to pass on their nationality

to their children (Sadiqi, 2010b). However, this does not extend to those married to non-Muslim men and those married abroad (Sadiqi, 2010b). In December 2008, Mohamed VI stated that Morocco would lift its reservation to CEDAW, and in particular, articles 2 and 16, which respectively call for gender equality in national legislation, and to eradicate discrimination against women in the family (Elliott, 2009).

The watershed moment for the Moroccan women's rights movement was the Arab Spring, as it led to a series of events that radically changed the political environment, and brought with it great opportunities, but even greater challenges. The Arab Spring refers to a series of protests that shook the Middle East and North Africa, in late 2010, following the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, a Tunisian street vendor, in protest at the injustices he was suffering (Ajami, 2012; Moghadam, 2013b). The protests spread to Morocco in February 2011, during which was born the 20th February Movement, which included civil society actors, such as women's rights associations, youth groups, and left-wing groups (Moghadam, 2013b). On that day, several thousand people rallied on the streets in cities and towns across Morocco, to demand political and economic changes, such democratic institutions, better access to jobs and higher wages, and the recognition of Tamazight as a national language (Salime, 2012). To provide logistic support and legal advice to the movement, left-wing political parties, trade unions and human rights organisations set up a National Council of Support (Salime, 2012).

Mohamed VI quickly moved to quell dissent by calling for a revision of the Constitution in March 2011 and early legislative elections were held in November 2011 (Madani, Maghraoui and Zerhouni, 2012; Ruchti, 2012). After the elections, the King appointed Abdelilah Benkirane, leader of the Party of Justice and Development, as the Chief of Government, as Article 47 of the 2011 Constitution requires the King to appoint a Head of Government from the largest party in Parliament (Ruchti, 2012). Subsequently, the PJD formed a first coalition government, composed of the conservative Istiqlal Party, the royalist Mouvement Populaire

(Popular Movement Party, henceforth PM), and the leftist Progress and Socialism Party (PPS). Following the resignation of Istiqlal from the ruling coalition in July 2013, a new coalition government with the centre-right National Rally of Independents (NRI) was approved by the King in October 2013 and lasted until the parliamentary election of October 2016, which saw the re-appointment of Benkirane as Chief of Government.

A royal commission was established for the constitutional changes. The Constitution did not change the King's role as powerful arbiter between the various political forces in the country (Bergh and Rossi-Doria, 2015). The King also retains his royal prerogatives. He is still the Commander of the Faithful and the Head of State, and is not accountable to any other institution (Madani, Maghraoui and Zerhouni, 2012). He appoints the head of government and the ministers, presides over Cabinet meetings, has the power to dissolve parliament, commands the armed forces, and appoints ambassadors (Madani, Maghraoui and Zerhouni, 2012).

Despite this, the Constitution contains many positive changes, such as the recognition of Tamazight as an official language, advanced regionalisation, and a consultative council on youth issues (Bergh and Rossi-Doria, 2015). Other notable changes of relevance to the women's rights movement include participatory governance, commitment to parity between men and women, and the harmonisation of national legislation with international conventions.

The Constitution promotes participatory governance through an enlargement of the scope of civil society actions and the development of participatory mechanisms. Article 12 states that civil society groups and non-governmental organisations can operate freely, as long as they respect the Constitution and the law, and 'may not be dissolved or suspended by the public powers except by virtue of a decision of justice' (Ruchti, 2012). It further states that they must 'conform to democratic principles' and encourage them to contribute in 'the enactment, the implementation and the evaluation of the decisions and the initiatives [projets] of the elected

institutions and of the public powers' (Ruchti, 2012). Article 13 calls on public authorities to work towards the creation of 'instances of dialog [concertation], with a view to associate the different social actors with the enactment, the implementation, the execution and the evaluation of the public policies' (Ruchti, 2012). Article 14 declares that citizens have the right to present motions on legislative issues, while Article 15 states that citizens have the right to present petitions to public authorities (Ruchti, 2012). Article 27 states that citizens have the right to access information held by public administration, elected institutions and other public services, while Article 139 calls on regional councils to develop participatory mechanisms (Ruchti, 2012).

Article 19, is of greater relevance to the Moroccan women's movement, as it calls for parity between men and women, and the creation of an Authority for parity and equality to this effect. According to this article:

'The man and the woman enjoy, in equality, the rights and freedoms of civil, political, economic, social, cultural and environmental character, enounced in this Title and in the other provisions of the Constitution, as well as in the international conventions and pacts duly ratified by Morocco and this, with respect for the provisions of the Constitution, of the constants [constantes] of the Kingdom and of its laws. The State works for the realization of parity between men and women. An Authority for parity and the struggle against all forms of discrimination is created, to this effect' (Ruchti, 2012).

Finally, the preamble of the Constitution states hat Morocco has as one of its objectives, 'To comply with the international conventions duly ratified by it, within the framework of the provisions of the Constitution and of the laws of the Kingdom, within respect for its immutable national identity, and on the publication of these publications, [their] primacy over the internal

law of the country, and to harmonise in consequence the pertinent provisions of national legislation' (Ruchti, 2012).

When the PJD won a plurality of the votes in the 2011 elections, it quickly moved to appoint to government positions, women who belonged to Islamic associations. The only woman in the first Benkirane cabinet was Bassima Hakkaoui, who was appointed as Minister of Solidarity, Women, Family and Social Development. Hakkaoui had been a parliamentarian for the PJD, and belonged to RCF (Eddouada and Pepicelli, 2010). This association's aim with regards to women's rights is to 'preserve authenticity and Islamic identity' and make sure that they conform with Islamic law (Eddouada and Pepicelli, 2010). Another woman who worked for the ministry for relations with Parliament and civil society in this cabinet, was the president of Forum al Zahra.

4.5. Towards Fragmentation

After the Arab Spring, the secular branch of the Moroccan women's rights movement frequently resorted to coalitions and networks as mobilisation strategies. A prominent coalition is the Printemps de la Dignite (Spring of Dignity), which though formed before the Arab Spring, in 2003, garnered momentum in the years that followed it (Initiative pour la Protection des Droits des Femmes, IPDF 2016). It took shape a few years later, under the leadership of the AMDF, ADFM, Association Marocaine de Lutte contre la Violence Faite aux Femmes (AMVEF), and FLDDF (Printemps de la Dignite, 2010). From 2010 onwards, it expanded to include other women's rights associations (Printemps de la Dignite, 2010). As of 11th February 2016, the coalition was composed of 24 associations (IPDF, 2016). A representative of the coalition affirmed in an interview that, upon realising that the problem was the whole justice system, its initial goal of wanting to reform of the criminal code expanded to a more comprehensive goal of reforming all relevant legislation (IPDF, 2016).

Two other major coalitions are the Coalition Civile pour l'Application de l'Article 19 (Civil Coalition for the Implementation of Article 19, Coalition Civile) and the Printemps Feministe pour la Democratie et l'Egalite (Feminist Spring for Equality and Democracy, Printemps Feministe). The first one brings together female journalists, as well as associations campaigning for women's rights and the rights of the Amazigh people, and fights for the implementation of Article 19 of the Constitution, described above (Moho, 2014). The second one describes itself as an alliance of women's rights' associations, which convened on 16th March 2011, to constitutionalise equality between men and women in political, economic, civil and cultural rights (Printemps Féministe pour la Démocratie et l'Egalité, 2011). Added to these coalitions is ANARUZ, a national network for centres of listening and legal advice, that was established in April 2004 (Sadiqi, 2010a). It is composed of centres that provide psychological, social and legal assistance to women victims of domestic violence, to help them cope with their situation (Sadiqi, 2010a). The network also organises training seminars and campaigns to raise awareness of domestic violence (Sadiqi, 2010a).

Soon enough these collective efforts experienced tensions and splits, leading to instances of parallel mobilisation on similar issues. The Printemps de la Dignite witnessed the exit of four actors: AMVEF, UAF, Jossour, and FLDDF. This departure is a result of grievances about its leadership and organisation. According to a representative for Jossour, a key reason for leaving the coalition was the existence of 'manipulation' and 'hegemony' by a specific entity (2016). AMVEF left because it disagreed with the internal organisation of the coalition, as well as its inability to handle being part of the coalition and independently pursuing its goals as an association (2016). A representative of UAF in Agadir declared in an interview that key grievances were the lack of a democratic process, and monopoly over the decision-making process (2016). According to them, 'We cannot call for democracy and be un-democratic in our actions' (2016). The rabat section of FLDDF similarly pointed to management and

communication problems as reasons for leaving, but also added that they left because the coalition expanded into areas that were not within its expertise, weakening their activities (2016). Though some interviewees maintained that they still have good relations with the coalition and participated in some events with them, one admitted that in March 2016, these four organisations were organising a press conference to react to the draft law on violence against women, in parallel to the one planned by the Spring of Dignity (UAF Rabat, 2016).

Through an interview with a representative of El Amane in Marrakesh, I also learnt that parallel mobilisation could also be driven by geographical marginalisation and the character of associations. This organisation chose to mobilise independently on violence against women, with a coalition of ten regional field organisations because it disagreed with the project presented by the Spring of Dignity, and preferred to present an alternative one based on their grassroots work (2016). According to this organisation, the Spring was mostly composed of associations based in Rabat and Casablanca that were more into carrying out lobbying activities than working with women on the ground (El Amane, 2016).

Besides regional associations, young women also formed their own structures because they were not given a voice in mainstream organisations. A young female representative of Collectif Aswat, an LGBT association that also mobilises on women's rights, shared that older associations dominate lobbying efforts, and that when they recruit young feminist women, these are not given any decision-making power, and are instead expected to follow the direction and vision of the association (2016). Moreover, this representative complained that they were not given access to their activities because according to them, these networks and coalitions care more about consolidating their position than opening to others and fear relinquishing their power (Collectif Aswat, 2016). The establishment of the Union Feministe Libre (Free Feminist Union, UFL) in 2016 confirms these fears. According to a representative of this association,

forming an independent NGO was the most effective way of getting the voice of young women heard within the women's rights movement (2016).

Finally, organisations dedicated to the plight of Amazigh women have also been established, with close links to Amazigh networks and organisations. A representative for Voix de la Femme Amazighe (Voice of the Amazigh Woman, henceforth VFA), argued that associations focused on women from this specific ethnic group were needed because despite being doubly oppressed, they are overlooked by human rights organisations, including those focusing on women's rights (2016). According to this informant, despite inviting civil society actors to their events, only those with some sort of relationship with the Amazigh cause turn up, whereas their association shows solidarity with other marginalised groups (2016). This allegation of marginalisation is backed up by feminist and Amazigh scholar, Fatima Sadiqi. According to Sadiqi, the new century – and particularly the period after the Arab Spring - has witnessed the emergence of Amazigh feminist organisations to address issues of language, culture, identity and ruralness that were neglected by mainstream women's rights' associations (Sadiqi, 2016).

Despite this fragmentation, these networks and associations have all focused their efforts on combating violence against women in the post-Arab Spring era. As chapters 5 to 7 demonstrate, these actors have mobilised both for legal reforms on violence against women broadly-speaking, and also campaigned for more specific changes, such as the decriminalisation of abortion, the repeal of article 475 of the Criminal Code, that allows a rapist to escape prison by marrying his victim, the fight against sexual harassment and domestic violence. Furthermore, though Sadiqi states that strategies of mobilisation in this era have included cyber feminism, scholarship and journalism (2017b), my case study shows that public meetings, such as press conferences, have also been prominent.

4.6. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have traced the development of the Moroccan women's rights movement. I have shown that what started as a unified and coherent secular movement turned into a larger, yet fragmented and dispersed one, with the entry of new categories of women, such as the youth and Amazigh women. Its development has been affected by the political strength of Islamists, which not only directly opposed secular activists by staging counter-protests, but also indirectly challenged them through Islamist women's associations. I have also shown that the secular current of the movement has consistently exploited political opportunities to advance its key goal of reforming the Moudawana. It has also sought to reach out to both national and international elite actors, such as inter-governmental organisations, political parties and the King of Morocco. Besides seeking the support of powerful actors, activists drew on a variety of mobilisation strategies, such as petitions, demonstrations, journalism, scholarship, and conferences. Nonetheless, given the prominence of Islam in Morocco, secular activists do not directly challenge religion, and in fact, draw on it to make their case.

I have also discussed the role of political elites and the ways in which they have engaged with women's rights activists. I have shown that the King has played a major role in women's rights issues in Morocco. The Moudawana been introduced and changed by successive kings. In contrast, representative institutions has played a lesser role, either due to a lack of will or a lack of capability.

In the first wave, nationalists allowed women's rights activists to address women's issues on their platform. However, this material support was hindered by the fact that the political discourse during the independence movement increasingly became Islamised. Furthermore, the focus on independence also meant that there could not be enough focus on gender equality. In the post-independence period, women's rights activists benefited from the moral support of

intergovernmental organisations, as international discourse began addressing women's liberation. IGOs. In spite of this, the political parties that these activists belonged to were not always receptive to their goals, and made it difficult for them to navigate their political and feminist identities. Political parties were therefore less useful as a source of elite allyship.

The restrictions placed on women's rights activists within political parties encouraged the formation of independent women's associations in the second wave of the movement. This era witnessed increasing international pressure on Morocco to liberalise, resulting in the acceptability of secular discourse to advance women's rights. Furthermore, thanks to the championing of women's rights by the UN, women's issues were put on the agenda and Morocco eventually ratified CEDAW to combat gender discrimination. More importantly, the second wave saw the first major mobilisation for the reform of the Moudawana. Political parties proved unwilling to support the cause, though King Hassan provided limited reforms on this issue in 1993. Furthermore, political parties also proved unwilling to rally behind the national plan proposed by the government in the late 1990s, in spite of the increased liberalisation of the political system. When the first socialist government entered politics in the alternance government, it proved unable to pass the national plan, due to strong opposition. Ultimately, it dropped the plan and delegated the reform of the Moudawana to the new King, Mohamed VI.

In the third wave, King Mohamed VI initiated the most extensive reforms to the Moudawana in 2004. Furthermore, he included them in decision-making by ensuring that he included women in his advisory commission. The King also made other notable changes, such as agreeing to remove all reservations to CEDAW and backing quotas for women in politics. Furthermore, the 2011 Constitution, initiated by the King includes is more women-friendly and commits to gender equality.

In the next chapter, I will go into detail about mobilisation on violence against women, as well as on the legal and policy achievements in this area. I will discuss the types of claims made by women's rights' activists and other political actors, to analyse the extent to which they align.

5.Performances of Elite Allyship

5.1. Introduction

As I have demonstrated in previous chapters, elite allies form a core dimension of the concept of opportunity in the literature on social movements. However, my meta-analysis in chapter 3 shows that the presence of elite allies is not a strong predictor of policy change favourable to social movements. To better understand the relationship between elite allies and social movements, one needs to move away from examining their presence, to examining their performances. As I have argued in previous chapters, we can assess the quality of these performances by analysing the extent to which they perform four functions.

First, they need to represent the interests and claims of social movements. To measure effective representation, one needs to evaluate the substantive representation of social movements' interests by potential elite allies, through a claims-making approach (see Chapter 2). This means that elite allies cannot be determined a priori, but only a posteriori. Elite allies also need to have some ties with social movement actors and provide resources to them. Finally, they need to mobilise other elites by engaging in specific strategies towards them.

These performances of elite allyship are investigated in this chapter through a dataset of representative claims on violence against women in Morocco, taken from the Moroccan newspapers Liberation and Aujourd'hui Le Maroc. I draw on a form of content analysis called representative claims analysis to provide a systematic analysis of the extent to which different sets of elite political actors and non-elites articulate claims that represent the interests of social movement actors mobilising on this issue, and to provide a thick description of their opinions, actions and interactions.

With regards to representation, I stated in chapter 2 that I expect intergovernmental organisations, foreign governments, the Moroccan King and the government, political parties, bureaucrats and the judiciary to be potential sources of elite allyship. Findings from my representative claims-analysis, are broadly in line with these expectations, though I find that Parliament as an institution engages in representative claims-making, as well as other types politicians.

I do not find the judiciary to be particularly well engaged in claims-making. I also find that there is no one type of elite actor which consistently aligns with the claims of Moroccan women's rights groups and coalitions. Furthermore, I find a lot of similarity between the interest representation of Moroccan women's rights groups and coalitions and the Moroccan government, challenging the assumption in the literature on social movements that opposition political parties can be more reliable potential allies because they are less constrained. Additionally, the relevance of both Moroccan bureaucrats and intergovernmental organisations suggests that geographical and power distance may not necessarily affect the extent to which elite actors can become potential allies.

More importantly, elite actors prefer to speak on behalf of the constituencies represented by Moroccan women's rights groups and coalitions, rather than directly represent women's rights groups and coalitions in Morocco. By neglecting the role of these actors in the debate, they limit the extent to which they engage in effective representation.

With regards to arrangements, I expect the presence of networks or coalitions involving political elites and social movement actors, to be instances of elite allyship, though the latter arrangement is preferable as it is deeper and more horizontal. I find that there is very little evidence of co-ordination and joint action with elite actors, though most elite actors shared the same broad beliefs as activists with regards to violence against women. This suggests that the

mobilisation for reforms on violence against women is one involving loosely coupled networks rather than elite-social movement coalitions.

As I discussed in chapter 2, I expect I expect a third performance of elite allyship to be the direct provision of moral, material, informational and human resources to women's rights activists. My findings show that the most frequent type of resource is moral, though elite actors also provide some material, human and informational support. Moral resources in this sample involve the use of claims that express support for tackling violence against women in Morocco. Along with the presence of loose networks, this suggests that there is not only little contact between elite actors and Moroccan women's rights activists, but also a lack of commitment to engage deeper on this issue.

The final dimension of elite allyship I consider in this thesis is the use of double mobilisation towards other political elites. Double mobilisation, which I explain in chapter 2, involves the use of both pressure and collaboration to persuade other elite actors to support Moroccan women's rights activists. I find that few elite actors do perform this strategy through the simultaneous use of moral leverage and persuasion. Elite actors might be unwilling or unable to engage in riskier activities to support activists because of the institutional constraints placed on political actors in Morocco.

5.2. Data

To carry out my claims analysis, I collect data from newspaper articles. The advantage of newspapers is that compared to other types of media, they are comprehensively recorded on digital news archives (Deacon, 2007). The preferred digital news archives in social movements studies are Lexis Nexis and Factiva. In fact, Lexis Nexis is regarded as being 'the media archive of choice for many academic and political sources across North America and Europe' (Deacon, 2007, p. 7). However, these two archives proved to be inadequate for my research due to

restrictions on institutional membership and the limited availability of Moroccan newspapers. I thus settled for using Maghress, a digital archive of Moroccan newspapers, to identify and code representative claims pertaining to violence against women issues in Morocco.[45] Maghress lists newspaper articles in both French and Arabic. However, due to language restrictions, I limit my coding to French language sources.

My selection of newspapers was influenced by the degree to which they covered the issue of violence against women in Morocco. As, the goal is not to compare coverage of violence against women in different types of newspapers, but rather to get newspapers that cover this topic in the most comprehensive and consistent way, I settled on two prominent, but complementary daily newspapers.[46] The newspapers are Liberation (affiliated with Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires and the independent Aujourd'hui Le Maroc (henceforth ALM). The time frame is restricted to the period between 29th November 2011 and 31st July 2016. The start date refers to when the current government came to power, while the end date has been selected as Bill 103-13 on Violence against Women passed in the Lower House of Parliament on 21st July 2016.

These newspapers complement one another because Liberation belongs to the traditional partisan media that has long dominated Moroccan society, whereas ALM belongs to the new wave of independent and privately-owned media. Liberation is based in Casablanca and is the French-language daily of the left-wing USFP, the Arabic one being Al Ittihad al Ichtiraki. The readership of the USFP's press reflects the urban and educated character of the USFP's constituency of USFP. It appeals to university students, young professionals and government employees (Rugh, 2004). Circulation figures for Liberation are quite low, standing at 1 713 in

---

[45] http://www.maghress.com/fr

[46] As I was also the sole coder, I did not have the time to consider more than two newspapers.

2016-7 according to academic sources and Morocco's audit bureau on the press (Organisme de Justification de la Diffusion, no date; Rugh, 2004). Liberation's total circulation progressively declined every year since 2005 when it stood at 4093 (Organisme de Justification de la Diffusion, no date). This decreasing circulation is not surprising if we consider the fact that Moroccan society is alienated by traditional newspapers because they are financially dependent on subsidies by the government and represent party lines (Cropf, Benmamoun and Kalliny, 2012). However, if we look at the dailies with the highest circulation, these are the two independent Al Akhbar (The News) and Al Massae (The Evening), and the two royalist Assabah (The Morning) and Le Matin du Saharah et du Maghreb (The Morning of the Sahara and the Maghreb, henceforth Le Matin). In 2016, the total circulation of Al Ahbar and Al Massae was 45 240 and 33 362 respectively (Organisme de Justification de la Diffusion, no date). Assabah and its French counterpart, Le Matin had a circulation of 32 558 and 20 092 respectively in the same period (Organisme de Justification de la Diffusion, no date).

Al Akhbar and Al Massae are new arabic language dailies that were launched in 2007 and 2009 respectively, and which are widely seen as being professional and liberal (Benchenna, Ksikes and Marchetti, 2017). However, their usefulness for this research was affected by the fact that due to their popularity, they have been subject to repression by the authorities (Benchenna, Ksikes and Marchetti, 2017). I decided against using Le Matin because Maghress only had a handful of articles on women's rights in the period under study.

I used ALM, which is an independent daily that was established in 2001 (Rugh, 2004). ALM is part of a new wave of independent and privately-owned newspapers that surfaced in the 21st century. Its circulation considerably fluctuated between 2006 and 2016. Its highest was 7 739 in 2010 and its lowest 2 274 in 2013 (Organisme de Justification de la Diffusion, no date). It is owned by ALM Publishing, which now belongs to the group Caracteres, and is based in Casablanca (Reporters Without Borders, 2017). The founder of ALM is Khalid Hachimi Idrissi,

a close ally to the regime, and the largest shareholder is the Akwa Group which belongs to Moroccan billionaire Aziz Akhannouch, who has been involved in politics as member of the royalist RNI (Reporters Without Borders, 2017). It is therefore not suprising that despite its officially independent line, ALM is popular among pro-monarchy readers interested in national and regional politics (Skalli, 2011).

In analysing these two newspapers, it is important to bear in mind that they operate under institutional constraints. Morocco's press is not free, as the authorities frequently intervene to censor and exert editorial pressure (Freedom House, 2017). Journalists themselves engage in self-censorship by staying clear of sensitive topics, to avoid repression in the form of fines, imprisonment, intimidation and physical violence (Freedom House, 2017). Topics that cannot be addressed include criticism of Islam, the King, the monarchy, Morocco's authority over Western Sahara, as well as discussion of sex and anything that would affect the 'public order' (Freeman, 2017, p. 3145).

5.3. Measurement of Concepts

To code instances of claim-making, I use the delimitations offered by Koopmans (Koopmans, 2002, pp. 5–7). Like Koopmans, I only code claims that contain an explicit action. An example of a representative claim would be: 'The organisers of the regional conference on violence against women spelled out that the phenomenon of violence against women is universal and that since it presents socio-economic costs to society, it is logical that everyone participates in its eradication.' Similarly to Koopmans (Koopmans, 2002), speculations about opinions or action of others do not count as claim-making, nor do the attribution of motives to other actors.

However, I do code claims by journalists in opinion articles, though I code these as claims reflecting their position on policy on violence against women. Furthermore, if the statement is only a statement of fact without explicit normative connotation, it is not coded as a claim.

Finally, to capture the current discourse on policy on violence against women, I only code claims made within the last two weeks of the document publication date, or otherwise presented in present tense or ongoing form.

Existing codebooks adopt a 150-200 words search strategy (Koopmans, 2002). Put simply, whether or not an article is relevant is determined according to whether or not the first 150/200 words contain relevant claims on an issue area. However, this approach is not gender-sensitive. During my pilot study, I have noticed that when relating speeches of government figures on various issues, women's issues tend to be discussed towards the end of the speech and also tend to be reported towards the end of an article by the journalist relating the event. This means that relevant claims by important actors might not be identified because they appear after the word limit set by the coder. I thus decided to read the whole article instead.

The data collected for this research includes 604 representative claimants from 207 newspaper articles. These claimants sometimes raised one distinct issue, sometimes more. Out of these 604 claimants, 383 are single claimants. I collected several variables about each claimant, though for this chapter, the ones that are discussed relate to the form of a claim, the function of the claimant, the represented constituency, and the prognostic and diagnostic frames they used in their claims (i.e. the policy change they advocate, who they hold responsible for implementing their claim, and why). These variables are summarised in Appendix 2. The values in the variable CLAIMANT_FUN and ADDRESSEE_FUN are grouped in such a manner that they help to differentiate between Moroccan and non-Moroccan representatives, and between state and non-state actors in Morocco.[47] An addressee must be explicitly

---

[47] I have made slight amendments to the coding used in existing codebooks, by coding certain values differently or including other variables. Here, I clarify the most important ones. In my research, intergovernmental organisations refer to both these entities as a whole, and their constituent agencies. I have not used separate values to differentiate between them, as this is not relevant for my research. International civil society refers to international non-

mentioned in the claim and must be a concrete actor, and is coded whenever a claimant calls upon another actor to change their position on a certain topic. This is even done when this reference is a form of criticism, without an explicit call for change of position.

I use the definition provided by Haunss and Kohlmorgen (2008, p. 29) in their codebook, and define an addressee as 'the actor at whom the claim is directly addressed in the form of a call or appeal to do or leave something.'[48] The represented constituency, denoted by the OBJECT variable, needs to include actors living in Morocco. For instance, I assume that a representative speaking on behalf of women all over the world is also speaking on behalf of women living in Morocco, including migrant women in Morocco. I do not include instances where a claimant is speaking exclusively on behalf of Moroccan women that reside abroad, because such women are not affected by political developments in Morocco in the same way as those residing in

governmental organisation or not-for-profit organisations such as NGOS, labour unions, indigenous groups, charitable organisations, faith-based organisations, professional associations, and foundations. Foreign Governments refer to foreign embassies or other representative functions for a foreign government. Moroccan government refers to governing political parties, as well as national and local governments in Morocco, individual Moroccan Ministers and their official representatives, such as ambassadors, and the Moroccan polity as a whole. Opposition political parties refer to parties in Parliament that are not part of the governing coalition, whereas other politicians refer to actors that do not hold elected office in Morocco, such as political parties that are not represented in Parliament. Parliament refers to this the Moroccan parliament or legislatives as an institution. Bureaucracy refers to local and national-level state institutions like ministries, departments, institutions created by the 2011 Constitution, and agencies of the Moroccan government. The judiciary denotes all actors in the Moroccan legal system from courts to prosecutors and lawyers presented in the framework of a specific case. The police/security/military refers to any formal state organisation with a monopoly on violence, like the Moroccan police and army. Women's rights groups/coalitions refers to such groups and coalitions in Morocco whose key goal is the advancement of women's rights, whereas other social movements refer to groups that do not primarily mobilise on women, or for which such information is not available.

[48] I draw on Koopmans's (2002) priority rules, in prioritising organisations and institutions over unorganised groups.

Morocco.[49] The policy change advocated by the representative claimant – PREFPOLICY – is used to measure the degree of discredit to the status quo. The values used for this variable represent different degrees of policy change. Borrowing Peter Hall's (1993) terminology, first order change is denoted by the value label 'Amendments to the content of existing policy.' This could refer to non-substantial revisions to a piece of legislation. Second order change is denoted by the value label 'Amendments to the implementation of existing policy.' It essentially refers to procedural changes, such as calling for the Moroccan government to involve civil society actors in decision-making process on violence against women. Third order change is denoted by 'New Policy.' This refers to calls for a new piece of legislation, or a new policy. For instance, calling for a specific law on violence against women, or calling for the criminalisation of certain actions would fall under this category. I also include in this category calls for adopting a gender-sensitive approach. The category 'Unclear appraisal of policy'

---

[49] The represented constituency always refers to a group of people that is attributed a shared characteristic in the claim, and is always passive. An object is only coded when the claimant explicitly mentions a constituency as intended beneficiary of the claim, other than themselves. If, however, there are two different objects mentioned in the claim, I code the one who is the ultimate object of the claim. Consider the following representative claim, 'To remedy the exclusion of women's rights groups from decision-making, and to counter violence against women in Morocco, the Spring of Dignity coalition calls for a real partnership with the government, and is ready to share its expertise with the relevant state agencies, to help establish a law that would meet Morocco's international obligations in this area.' Though the Spring of Dignity coalition speaks on behalf of women's rights groups, its ultimate goal is to counter violence against women in Morocco. Therefore, the represented constituency is women. This approach differs from that of Koopmans' (2002) codebook for the Europub project. Thus, the methodological difference is threefold. First, I only code an object if it is explicitly mentioned. Second, I do not code an object if the claimant defends their own interests. Third, I prioritise positively evaluated constituencies over negatively evaluated ones. I similarly draw on de Wilde et al's (2014) coding of the different categories of objects, which correspond to major cleavages in society, as well as broader and narrower social groups relevant for my research project. In case there are several object actors whose interests are represented by the claim, I code the ultimate object of the claim as the object. If there is no Object, the Object variable is coded as 'None.'

refers to situations where representatives do not make a clear policy proposal. Only one value can be selected, so to determine which one, look at the frequency with which a claimant calls for a particular type of policy, or alternatively, which type of policy change is mentioned first. JUSTIFICATION identifies the idea that underlies the claim formulated by a representative, and FORM identifies the characteristics of the claim. Justifications can be instrumental, based on notions of collective identity, or highlight universal or moral principles. The form of the claim - which I look at in the second part of this chapter - can take the form of political decisions, executive action, judicial action, verbal or written statements, meeting, direct democratic action, petitioning, protest.

Finally, it is important to mention that in this study, I depart from de Wilde et al's (2014) approach by only coding frames mentioned by the claimant, whether explicit or implicit. In other words, instances where the claimant formulates a demand in the form of 'I want X because of Y' or where the claimant articulates a demand, alongside a goal or value without explicitly connecting the two. If there is more than one frame present of the same type, I code the one that is considered the ultimate goal. These variables are then used to construct simple crosstabs to compare the interest representation of women's rights groups and coalitions and other actors.

5.1. Method

In chapter 2, I argued that Saward's (2006, 2010) concept of the representative claim can be a useful tool to analyse the political representation of activists on violence against women in Morocco by a range of political actors. I have explained that Saward's performative approach to representation suits my conceptual framework, which views elite allyship as a performance. RCA allows researchers to capture interactions between actors, as well as the alliances and networks that exist (Koopmans and Statham, 1999). In contrast to other methods of media

content analysis, such as protest event analysis, it provides more information on interactions and contention in public communication (de Wilde, 2013, p. 288). Furthermore, 'by focusing on actors, their speech acts and issues, the concept of 'event' is expanded beyond description of "what happened" to a focus on the 'meaning that was attributed to what happened'' (de Wilde, 2013, p. 288). The RCA is thus a suitable method to investigate the relationship between different types of political elites and domestic activists, as well as the actions of the former, because it provides a thick description of a range of opinions, actions and interactions.

Despite having gained currency among scholars, Saward's conceptualisation has been applied to relatively few studies, which can be divided into those that adopt a Critical Frame Analysis (CFA) and those that use Representative Claims Analysis (RCA). In the first category, we find Severs et al.'s (2013) study of the substantive representation of Muslim women on the headscarf debate in Dutch-speaking Belgium between 2004 and 2009. This study draws on representative claims made in the public sphere, such as televised journals and shows, legislative documents, manifestos, press releases, conference proceedings, magazines and websites. The authors refer to Meier's (2008) arguments to explain why they adopt CFA, a form of content analysis which starts from the premise that all political acts are problem driven, to locate within instances of political acts, the definition of a problem (diagnosis), the proposed solution to the problem (prognosis) and the responsible actor for providing this solution (Severs, Celis and Meier, 2013, p. 437). First, it helps to map out implicit and explicit representations of a policy problem. Second, it allows for the identification of who has a voice in defining the policy problem and offering a solution to it.

In this methodology, claims are broken down into policy problems (Severs, 2012, p. 177). This starts with scrutinising claims-makers' public interventions for the presence of a 'substantive core,' which is a claim that denounces a situation that is disadvantageous for the represented, formulates a proposal to improve the situation of the represented, or claims a right to improve

the situation of the represented (Severs, 2012). The claim is then broken down into a principal and an interest dimension. Assessing the principal dimension of the claim allows for the identification of the problem-holder, whereas the interests dimension involves locating the problem diagnosis (i.e. what is presented as the problem and why?), the causality (i.e. What or who is seen as a cause of that?), and the problem prognosis (i.e. Which action is deemed necessary, why, and who is included in solving the problem?) (Severs, 2012). The final step involves comparing the overall problem frame by looking at the issue raised and the interest formulated (Severs, 2012).

As an alternative, de Wilde (2013) proposes to analyse representative claims through a more systematic method of qualitative content analysis called Representative Claims Analysis (RCA). De Wilde (2013) came up with this idea to bridge between the empirical method of Political Claims Analysis (PCA) developed by Koopmans and Statham (1999) and Saward's (2006, 2010) theoretical framework of the representative claim. PCA originates within the field of social movement studies and has been developed to bring together Protest Event Analysis (PEA) and Political Discourse Analysis (PDA), and thereby integrates frames and contentious actions, two different dimensions in political contention (Koopmans and Statham, 1999).

As Koopmans and Statham (1999) point out, as forms of protests have become more sophisticated and evolved, simply measuring the physical mobilisation of protesters no longer provides a good indication of the level of contention. Thus, to make sure that as many forms of actions and types of actors are included, the unit of analysis used instead is instances of claims-making, whether routine or non-routine, institutional or non-institutional (Koopmans and Statham, 1999). Koopmans (2007, p. 189) describes a political claim as 'a unit of strategic action in the public sphere that we define as: the purposive and public articulation of political demands, calls to action, proposals, criticisms or physical attacks, which, actually or potentially, affect the interests or integrity of the claimants and/or other collective actors.' Put

simply, claims are units in which the claimant(s) present a single political demand on an issue. For a claim to be political, it must contain a political statement, meaning that they should relate to collective social problems and not a personal problem (Koopmans, 2002, p. 6).

A political claim can be broken down into the following constituent units: the location of the claim in time and space (i.e. when and where is the claim made?), the actor making the claim (i.e. who makes the claim?), the form of the claim (i.e. how is the claim inserted in the public sphere?), the substantive issue of the claim (i.e. what is the claim about?), the addressee of the claim (i.e. at whom is the claim directed?), the object actor (i.e. whose interests are affected by the claim?), and the justification for the claim (i.e. why should this action be undertaken?). In summary, a political claim is composed of WHERE and WHEN (location), WHO (claimant) makes a claim, on WHAT (issue), addressing WHOM (addressee), for/against WHOSE interests (Object) and WHY (frame) (De Wilde, Koopmans and Zürn, 2014).

In practice, each time an actor makes a claim, this is manually coded in a dataset, along with other relevant variables that contain information about the claimant, the addressee, the object, and the frame, amongst others. The slight difference that de Wilde makes is that he uses the Object variable to denote the constituency that is explicitly represented by the claimant, instead of using it to measure whose interests will be affected more broadly as Koopmans does. De Wilde also uses the Addressee variable to specifically operationalise actors with some degree of authority (i.e. 'which authority is called upon to act and/or whether its actions thus far are evaluated positively or negatively') (De Wilde, Koopmans and Zürn, 2014, p. 2).

In fact, the main criticism of PCA by de Wilde is the neglect of the variables Addressee and Object in the reporting of findings, which are important variables that capture accountability and delegation mechanisms as well as the production of imagined communities (de Wilde, 2013, p. 291). Thus, RCA goes beyond voicing preferences and coding representative claims

in which someone publicly links themselves as champion of a set of ideas or interests belonging to a particular in-group (de Wilde, 2013, p. 288). This allows us to see how '[t]rough the act of claiming, this group is both constructed and represented at the same time' (de Wilde, 2013, p. 288).

Similarly to PCA, RCA also draws on media sources such as newspaper articles as it focused on interactions and contention in public communication (de Wilde, 2013, p. 288). However, since the most important issue for claims-analysis is to capture publicly visible claims-making (Koopmans and Statham, 1999, p. 668), it is not necessary to limit data collection to media sources, and de Wilde (2014) does draw on transcripts of parliamentary debates alongside newspaper articles.

There are two main challenges to measuring the success of representation via RCA. First, the response to representative claims ought to be measured in direct relation to those claims being made. Second, representative claims need to be translated into policy (de Wilde, 2013, p. 289). Indeed, this would allow us to measure whether and to what extent citizens or constituencies have been exposed to the claims made by other actors or institutions and directly respond to these claims as opposed to other stimuli. To achieve the first aim, de Wilde (de Wilde, 2013, p. 290) suggests making use of the comments section of the websites of newspapers to capture the responsiveness of representative claims detailed in newspaper articles, though he admits that it would still not allow us to know if readers that do not post comments accept these comments. With regards to the second aim, de Wilde (2013) suggests taking into account the addresses of claims, and their responses as they are often the ones in a position to translate claims into policy.

Despite these challenges and the fact that RCA is labour-intensive, I use this methodology for my case study because ultimately, RCA allows me to examine the visibility of violence against

women in the public sphere, the positions of various actors on this issue, their tactical repertoires and their frames (Beyeler and Kriesi, 2005). This method also allows me to capture interactions between actors and to understand what alliances and networks exist and how they shift, as well as the relative positioning of different actors, and the weight of each type of actor in claims-making in a field (Koopmans and Statham, 1999). This is helpful in helping me gauge the ties between a range of elite actors and Moroccan women's rights activists, as well as the resources exchanged and the strategies employed. In sum, the characteristics of RCA are particularly useful for the relational approach used in this thesis.

Though scholars using PCA or RCA use the claim as the unit of analysis, I use instead the individual claimant. This is because I am interested in the types of representative claimants on the issue of violence against women in Morocco and the character of their interactions. A representative claimant (or representative) is an actor who makes a representative claim; a claim which is political in nature and represents a particular constituency. For my case study, such a claim needs to contain at least the following dimensions: a claimant, an action form, an issue related to violence against women in Morocco,[50] a position on this matter (a criticism, an

---

[50] With regards to violence against women, I use the definition provided in the UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, signed by the UN General Assembly in 1993. This is because the UN defines what constitutes discrimination against women and sets the agenda with regards to how to end such discrimination. Article 1 of this Declaration defines VAW as: 'any act of gender-based violence, that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life' (Article 1). I divide violence against women into several dimensions, each belonging to one of the following three forms: violence in the family, violence in the community, state-sanctioned violence against women. Coding of the various VAW categories starts with the UN Declaration, but is done in an open manner, extending the codes when necessary whilst preventing overlaps between the categories, like Mario Diani and Kousis (2014, p. 393).

agreement or a call for change), and a represented constituency. If any one of these variables is missing, I do not code a claim.

However, given that one single representative claim can be made by various representatives, I allow for multiple representative claims. For instance, if three representatives make a claim together, I code this as three separate claims, as the claimant varies. Similarly, if a claimant raises two different issues, these are coded as two different claims, as the issue area differs. Thus, claims are not necessarily independent of each other, and in practice there is often a high degree of overlap between who is making the claim, the issue, and the object.

For this project, I draw on de Wilde et al.'s (2014) codebook on representative claims for their research as well as on the PCA codebook developed by Koopmans (2002).[51] As noted by previous researchers, the keywords used influence the type of debate captured in the sample (De Wilde, Koopmans and Zürn, 2014). Unfortunately, while Lexis Nexis and Factiva allow for a sophisticated search query, Maghress only allows users to use the search function to make a simple query. The search terms I used are therefore quite general: 'violence + femme' While this means that I am less likely to omit relevant articles, as the search term is quite general, it also means that I have to sift through more irrelevant articles. To limit this, I screened the title first and if it looks irrelevant, I move on to the next. However, if the title is quite ambiguous, I read the whole article to see if there are any claims on violence against women. I saved the search results in a Word document and only coded those articles that contained representative claims on violence against women.

5.2. Sample Overview

Before presenting the data on representative claims made by different sets of political actors

---

[51] I essentially reproduce the questions asked, with some amendments for my research project.

on violence against women in Morocco, it is useful to provide an overview of the sample. I do this by discussing the distribution of claimants by publication, genre of article, topic, location and year. Table 1 shows that Liberation allowed me to locate no less than 87.7% of the representative claimants in my sample, compared to 12.3% by Aujourd'hui Le Maroc. Both are daily newspapers, though the latter's articles are shorter and less detailed than Liberation. Nonetheless, the latter covered events that were not addressed by Liberation in the period under study, notably the fact that the lower chamber of Parliament adopted Bill 103-13 on violence against women in July 2016.

Moreover, some political actors, notably women's rights groups and coalitions, only appeared in Aujourd'hui Le Maroc. These include the coalition La Force des Femmes, its partner Italian NGO Progetto Mondo, and the Union for the Mediterranean. Thus, despite its less regular coverage, Aujourd'hui le Maroc makes visible some actors Liberation rendered invisible. Most representative claimants are reported in news stories, with very few reported as part of an interview, analysis article, or commentary. News stories report on 88% of representative claimants, or 529 out of 604. This suggests that journalists prefer to report on violence against women in Morocco when it is part of an event, and not discuss it at length.

With regards to the location of claimants, we can see that most of these are located in Morocco, suggesting that the debate centres local actors. These claimants were more active during 2016, where 145 of them, or 24%, expressed themselves on violence against women. It is not surprising that the fewest claims were articulated in 2011, as the sample only starts on the autumn of that year. We can see that claimants were also less active in 2012. Thus, most of the debate occurs between 2013 and 2016.

Finally, concerning the main issues discussed, Table 1 shows that claimants were not very specific. Out of 604 claimants, 364, or 60%, articulated claims about violence against women

as a general concept. The second and third most frequent categories are forced or child marriage and various forms of state-sponsored violence, accounting for 58 and 57 claimants respectively, or less than 10%. Family exploitation, honour-based violence and trafficking were all articulated by one claimant each. The fact that forced and child marriages remain an important topic of discussion, after the reform of the Moudawana in 2004 suggests that perhaps not much has changed on the ground.

Table 1: Distribution of Claimants

Variable		Frequency	Percentage
Publication	Liberation	530	87.7
	Aujourd'hui Le Maroc	74	12.3
	Total	604	100.0
Genre of Article	News Article	529	87.6
	Analysis Article	6	1
	Interview	36	6
	Opinion/Commentary	33	5.5
	Total	604	100.0
Location of Claimant	Morocco	516	85.4
	Other	88	14.6
	Total	604	100.0
Date	2011	3	.5
	2012	88	14.6
	2013	124	20.5
	2014	132	21.9
	2015	112	18.5
	2016	145	24
	Total	604	100.0
Main Issue Addressed	Battering	4	.7
	Marital Rape	2	.3
	FGM and other cultural practices	9	1.5
	Family Exploitation	1	.2
	Honour-based Violence	1	.2
	Forced or Child Marriage	58	9.8
	Other Family Violence	22	3.6
	Rape	16	2.6
	Sexual Abuse	1	.2
	Sexual Harassment	21	3.5
	Trafficking and Forced Prostitution	1	.2
	Other Community Violence	10	1.7
	Forced Pregnancy	14	2.3
	Discrimination in Criminal Sentences	2	.3
	Other state-sponsored violence	57	9.4
	Other Form of VAW	18	3.0
	VAW in General	364	60.3
	Other	3	.5

5.3. Empirical Findings

In this section, I use contingency tables, or crosstabs, to look at the congruence in representative claims between Moroccan women's rights groups and coalitions and a range of international and domestic political actors.[52] I determine congruence with regards to the represented constituency, proposed policy change, addressee and justification, by comparing the proportions of claims made by each type representative claimant. If a type of claimant differs with Moroccan women's rights groups and coalitions in the level of attention granted to a specific issue, I view it as a lack of congruence. I use congruence in claims between elite actors and Moroccan women's rights activists to determine the extent to which the former represent the interests of the latter, and are therefore performing allyship.

5.3.1. Representatives on Violence Against Women in Morocco

Figure 1 shows the actors that are most commonly reported as making representative claims on VAW in Morocco between November 2011 and July 2016. The most visible representatives are Moroccan women's rights groups and coalitions, as they account for about 200 of the reported 604 representatives. These include the most visible Moroccan women's rights organisations, based in Rabat or Casablanca. In this category, we find some of the biggest associations I discussed in previous chapters, such as ADFM, AMDF, FLDDF, AMVEF, Jossour and UAF. Added to these are smaller associations based in Rabat or Casablanca, such as, Ennakhil Fondation Ytto, Association Insaf, Solidarite Feminine (Feminine Solidarity), Association Marocaine de Lutte contre l'Avortement Clandestin (Moroccan Association Against Clandestine Abortion, henceforth AMLAC), and Union nationale des

---

[52] I do not report extremely low figures that represent less than 5% of claimants in the tables.

femmes du Maroc de Tanger-Madina (National Union of Moroccan Women of Tanger-Madina).

Women's rights organisations based outside of Rabat and Casablanca also make claims on violence against women. We find in this group Association Amal, based in Al Hajeb, Association Chaml, based in Kenitra, Association Karama and Association Tawaza, both based in Tanger, Initiative pour la Protection des Droits des Femmes, based in Fez, and Association de bienfaisance feminine El Khir, based in Essaouira.

Other claimants in this category include national coalitions and networks. Among them is the network of listening centres for violated women, Anaruz. Another network related to violence against women is the Reseau Solidaire des Femmes Contre la Violence (Women's Solidarity Network against Violence), and the Comite National de Soutien des Victimes de Viol et d'Agressions Sexuelles (National Support Committee for Victims of Rape and Sexual Assault).

With regards to coalitions, we find those mentioned in chapter 4, such as the Coalition Civile pour l'Application de l'Article 19 (Civil Coalition for the Implementation of Article 19), a coalition of organisations that wants to ensure the application of Article 19 of the 2011 Moroccan Constitution. We also find the Printemps de la Dignite (Spring of Dignity) coalition, which regroups women's rights organisations whose goals are linked to ending violence against women in Morocco. A related coalition is the Printemps Feministe pour la Democratie et l'Egalite (Feminist Spring for Democracy and Equality), whose goals is to fight against gender discrimination. Also included is Marche des Femmes Libres du Maroc (Free Moroccan's Women's March), an ad-hoc campaign group formed in relation to article 475 of the Penal Code which until recently allowed a rapist to marry a minor victim to escape prison. Force des Femmes (Women's Strength) an EU-supported coalition also made representative claims. Finally, we also find in this category, a network of organisations based in the Laayoune-Sakia

Al Hamra region, called Reseau Feminin de Lutte contre la Violence a l'Egard des Femmes (Feminine Network to Combat Violence against Women) .

Activist research centres and observatories also appear in this group. We find among them Centre d'Information et d'Observation des Femmes Marocaines (Information and Observation Centre for Moroccan Women), part of the FLDDF, the ISIS Centre for Women and Development; and Oyoune Nissaiya, an observatory that monitors violence against women.

The next most visible representatives after Moroccan women's rights groups are bureaucratic actors in Morocco, international civil society actors, and intergovernmental organisations, which constitute 60 representative claimants each, which accounts for less than 10% of all claimants.

Bureaucratic actors mainly come in the form of constitutional institutions, such as Conseil National des Droits de l'Homme (National Human Rights Council) and Conseil Economique, Social et Environnemental (Economic, Social and Environmental Council). Other bureaucratic actors include national and regional development agencies and human rights councils, commissions for the protection of women and children victims of violence, the ministry of justice, and the observatory for children's rights.

International civil society actors include NGOs and federations such as the International Federation for Human Rights, Mobilising for Rights Associates, The Advocates for Human Rights, Amnesty International, Global Rights, Progetto Mondo, Medecins Sans Frontieres, and Human Rights Watch.

The international petition site AVAAZ also made claims, as well as transnational political organisations such as Socialist International Women and International Christian Democratic Women. Research centres and universities include the South African Council for Medical

Research, the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, McGill University, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

British and German foundations acted as representatives notably, the Westminster Foundation, the Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung Foundation, and the Frederic Ebert Foundation. Finally, the British Daily Mail is the only international newspaper that is included in my two selected sources. Intergovernmental organisations include the European Union, the Council of Europe, the Union for the Mediterranean, the World Bank Group, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and the United Nations and associated agencies such as the World Health Organisation, the Working Committee on Gender Discrimination and Violence against Women, UN Women, the Children's Fund, and the Population Fund.

The third most visible representative is the Moroccan government, which encompasses actors that belong to the monarchy, especially Mohamed VI, governing political parties and other government representatives, such as ministers. This category accounts for about 40 of the reported representatives, or about 7%. In this sample, the key representatives are ministers such as Bassima Hakkaoui, the Minister for Solidarity, Family and Social Development, Abdelilah Benkirane, the Prime Minister, Mustapha Ramid, the Minister for Justice and Public Liberties, Mostafa Khalfi, the Minister for Communication, the Minister for Health, Ali Alaoui Belghiti, Nezha Skalli and Charafat Afilal, parliamentarians for the Parti du Progres et du Socialisme (PPS).

The least prominent actors are private actors, such as multi-corporations, religious actors, such as the coordinator of the women's unit of the Ulema Council of Tanger, politicians not represented in Parliament, the general public, and Parliament, as they are each composed of less than ten representatives, or less than 2%. Ulemas' low visibility in this debate contrasts

sharply with their prominent role as opponents in the debate on the reform of the Moudawana, discussed in chapter 4. As we will see in this section, this lack of engagement by religious figures is accompanied by a lack of religious discourse on this debate.

Foreign governments, the judiciary, Moroccan academics, the media, as well as other political parties and social movements make up between 10 and 35 of the reported representatives each, averaging between 2 and 6%.

Claims by opposition political parties come from parliamentarians from the USFP, PAM and Groupe Socialiste. Judicial actors include courts of first instance and prosecutors. Academics include the Institut International des Langues et Cultures, Cadi Ayyad university and the faculty of law at the university of Tanger.

Moroccan news media that participated in the debate include Liberation, the newspaper of the USFP, and journalists from Aujourd'hui le Maroc. Other social movements come in the form of local human and civil rights groups such as the Centre des Droits des Gens (Centre for People's Rights), the Moroccan branch of Amnesty International. They also include miscellaneous groups. These include Association Marocaine de planification familiale (Moroccan Association for Family Planning), an organisation for family planning. Two other actors in this category are Association des jeunes avocats de Khemisset (Association of Young Lawyers of Khemisset), and Tofola Chaabia, an organisation focusing on disadvantaged children.

Foreign governments involved in the issue of violence against women are the UK, France, and delegations from Arab, African and Asian countries. Embassies that took part are the Canadian and Finnish ones. Development and intercultural agencies also got involved, in the form of the German IFA Institute for Cultural Relations and the Spanish Agency for International Cooperation and Development.

These findings confirm assumptions in the literatures on social movements and transnational advocacy networks that both domestic and international elite political actors are relevant for social movements. The high visibility of bureaucrats and intergovernmental organisations suggests that these two types of actors are the most likely potential elite allies for women's rights organisations and coalitions in Morocco mobilising on violence against women.

The presence of non-elite representatives in the form of the media and academics, amongst others, confirms that potential sources of allyship can come from non-powerful actors (Amsterdamska, 1987; Strang and Soule, 1998; Tarrow, 2005), even though these actors are not traditionally associated with interest representation (Marien, Schouteden and Wauters, 2017). On the other hand, expected representatives like labour unions, do not make representative claims on violence against women in Morocco.

The high proportion of representatives from international civil society, the Moroccan bureaucracy and Moroccan women's rights groups and coalitions demonstrates that most representative claims on VAW in Morocco are articulated outside elected assemblies. This in in line with Weldon's (2002) and Marien's (2017) findings that the representation related to socially disadvantaged groups such as women and the poor occurs mostly in extra-parliamentary arenas, and that organisations and state agencies that are relevant for such groups are indeed of great importance for their representation.

However, the most interesting finding is the low visibility of Islamist representatives outside of the ruling PJD. As I have stated in my discussion of the Moroccan women's movement, secular activists faced intense opposition from Islamist movements, from the 1990s onwards, and especially with regards to its successive efforts for the reform of the Moudawana. Islamists have been the traditional opponent of the secular current of the Moroccan women's rights movement, and not only opposed them directly through protests, journalism and even fatwas,

but also mobilised against them indirectly, by drawing on the support of Islamist women's associations. This could suggest that there is little conflict on the issue of tackling violence against women because it is not as controversial as reforming laws that violate Islamic principles.

In sum, we can see from Figure 1 that there is a variety of representatives speaking on violence against women in Morocco, though these are mostly non-elected actors. Surprisingly, parliamentary actors are under-represented in claims-making, despite being expected to engage in representation. In contrast, intergovernmental organisations, which are not expected to act as the representatives of social groups, engage prominently in interest representation on violence against women in Morocco.

Figure 1: Representative Claimants on VAW

5.3.2. Represented Constituencies

Table 2 shows that representatives – both elite and non-elite - overwhelmingly speak on behalf of women. Claims that speak on behalf of women take various forms. On the one hand are claims that portray women as victims of specific types of violence that need to be saved. For instance, in the context of article 475 of the Penal Code that allows a rapist to avoid jail by marrying his victim, Fatiha Saidi, a socialist Belgian senator claimed that '[female] victims of rape need to be helped and protected. The last thing that could help them overcome their trauma is forcing them to marry the man who raped them' (Bouhamida, 2012). On the other hand are claims that speak on behalf of women with regards to violence against women in general. For instance, addressing bill 103-3 on violence against women, journalist Nezha Mounir exclaimed that 'Women are associated to children! This project of law must be reviewed by a ministerial commission. Will it even fulfil the expectations of women?' (Mounir, 2013a)

In this sample, women constitute between 100 and 50 per cent of claimants from each group. The lowest figure belongs to religious actors, while the highest one belongs to the media, the general public and miscellaneous actors. Women also form the most prominent constituency of Moroccan women's rights groups and coalitions, with 92% of representatives speaking on their behalf. We can thus infer that there is a certain degree of congruence in interest representation between elite actors and activists on this issue.

This pattern suggests that representatives are more likely to make claims for women in general, than address specific subgroups of women, such as migrant women, disabled women and non-straight women. Since violence against women is perceived as being a phenomenon that affects women as an abstract group, the specific interests of women that face multiple forms of oppression are overlooked. In sum, there is little evidence of intersectionality in interest representation on VAW in Morocco.

If Moroccan women's rights groups and coalitions only substantially represent women, such cannot be said of other political actors. For several types of representatives, VAW affects a variety of actors besides women. Five per cent of claimants from the Moroccan government speak respectively on behalf of the family and other miscellaneous constituencies. Five per cent of generational groups are represented by academics, while this figure is 12 % for opposition political parties. Fourteen per cent of academics also speak on behalf of organised political actors. Finally, the public is represented by other social movements and religious actors.

In this sample, an example of a claim speaking on behalf of a generational group is the criticism 475 of the Penal Code by Latifa Jbabdi, member of the USFP, in terms of its traumatic effects on underage girls (M Taleb, 2012). An example of a claim representing an organised political actor is the suggestion by representatives of intergovernmental organisations to include civil society in debates and decision-making on violence against women in Morocco (Salaheddine, 2012). An example of a claim representing the family is the statement by Mustapha Ramid, the Minister of Justice, that the legal arsenal on women has been strengthened by new measures to protest all members of a family (Liberation, 2013a). Examples of claims involving other constituencies include Attajdid, the newspaper of PJD, questioning the democratic credentials of a TV programme for failing to include ulemas in a debate on a rape case (Liberation, 2012d). Finally, an example of a claim representing the public is the call by the Moroccan Association for Family Planning to turn rights to sexual and reproductive health into fundamental rights for all, regardless of religion, culture or social class (Mounir, 2014a).

Political elites at the domestic and international level neglect the direct representation of Moroccan women's rights groups and coalitions, preferring instead to speak on behalf of the constituencies that these actors represent – women. This could have the potential of marginalising from the debate and reduces their significance, which could be particularly

problematic if we consider the fact that Moroccan women's rights groups and coalitions are the most prominent representatives on VAW. Despite this lack of direct representation, elite actors have the same major constituency as Moroccan women's rights groups and coalitions – women. There is thus some degree of alignment with regards to who is primarily affected by VAW in Morocco.

Table 2: Represented Constituencies (%)

	Women	Subgroups of women	Organised Political Actor	Generation	Family	Public	Other	N
International Actors	**93**							**157**
Intergovernmental Organisation	91							70
International Civil Society	95							73
Foreign Governments	93							14
Domestic Political Actors	**83**							**77**
Moroccan government	86				5		5	42
Opposition political parties	85			12				26
Parliament	67							6
Other politician(s)	67							3
State Actors	**91**							**91**
Bureaucracy	91							75
Judiciary	94							16
Social Movements	**90**							**228**
Women's rights groups and coalitions	92							197
Other social movement	81					6		31
Civic Groups	**86**		**6**					**49**
Media	100							22
Academics	71			14	5		10	21
General public	100							4
Religious actor	50					50		2
Other	**100**							**2**
N	**543**	**10**	**20**	**7**	**4**	**11**	**9**	**604**

5.3.3.   Solutions and Lack Thereof

With regards to the solution offered by different actors to tackle violence against women in Morocco, we can see from Table 3 that representatives are not clear on how best to respond to violence against women. Forty-two per cent or 255 out of 604 representatives, do not advocate a clear form of policy change. Twenty-six per cent - 157 representatives - supports the introduction of a new policy, while amendments to the content of existing policy and amendments to the implementation of existing policy are advocated by 84 and 108 representatives, which represent 14% and 18% respectively.

In this sample, examples of claims for a new policy include calls for a comprehensive policy that prevents violence against women and protects them, a law that criminalises domestic violence; a framework law on violence against women, and a specific law on violence against women. Examples of claims for amendments include calls for a reform of the Penal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the Family Code. Finally, examples of amendments to the implementation of policy include such actions as improving existing legal provisions to justice to violated women and the application of the 2011 Constitution.

 The fact that in general, interest representation on VAW in Morocco does not involve the formulation of explicit policy changes suggests that the debate is not so much about providing a clear prognosis to the problem. This could be due to a lack of clarity on the best policy to tackle this phenomenon, as reflected in the tendency of each type of claimant to advocate for different responses.

Slightly over half of representatives from women's rights groups and coalitions do not advocate a clear change in policy. This is strange because as discussed in chapter 4, the Moroccan women's rights' movement has traditionally focused its efforts on reforming the law and changing policies, to improve the status of women, particularly within the family. Moreover,

given their role as activists and their access to Moroccan women, we would expect them to be the most knowledgeable about how to tackle VAW in Morocco, and therefore propose concrete changes. In the next chapter, when I discuss activists' perceptions of elite actors, I uncover that there is a lack of agreement on the type of policy change desired. This lack of agreement could explain why there is not more enthusiasm in advocating for concrete changes.

In contrast to Moroccan women's rights groups and coalitions, academics, other social movements, as well as elite political actors such as Moroccan bureaucrats, opposition political parties, and the judiciary mostly advocate for concrete policy changes. Except academics, of which 57% advocate for changes in the implementation of existing policy, the other groups primarily advocate for a new policy to tackle violence against women in Morocco. These actors are therefore more critical of existing policy.

The fact that bureaucrats are quite proactive in pushing for radical policy change confirm Amenta and Caren's (2004) suggestion that like-minded bureaucracies have a tendency to promote legislation benefiting a social movement's constituency. The issue of opposition political parties is slightly more puzzling. As we have seen in chapter 3, in the discussion on the Moroccan political system, political parties have tended to refrain from taking a strong stance on issues affecting women, so as not to jeopardise their participation in institutional politics. Perhaps this boldness is due to the fact that tackling violence against women is not a controversial topic, as we have seen above. Therefore, advocating a new policy on this issue is far from being a risk.

Another interesting finding is the marginal difference in the proportion of representative claims that advocate a new policy between the Moroccan government and opposition political parties. This challenges the assumption that because governing parties are more constrained when in government, they are less likely to call for radical solutions in favour of a social movement

(Lorenzini, Hutter and Kriesi, 2016). Perhaps this observation is based on democratic systems, as the case of Morocco shows that there are limits as to how much opposition the political opposition can engage in (see chapter 3).

Table 3: Policy Change Advocated (%)

	Amendments to the content of existing policy	Amendments to the implementation of existing policy	New policy	Unclear appraisal of policy	N
International Actors	**8**	**20**	**25**	**47**	**157**
Intergovernmental Organisation	11	23	26	40	70
International Civil Society	6	12	29	53	73
Foreign Governments		50		50	14
Domestic Political Actors	**21**	**19**	**29**	**31**	**77**
Moroccan government	12	26	29	33	42
Opposition political parties	34	8	31	27	26
Parliament	17	33	17	33	6
Other politician(s)	33		33	33	3
State Actors	**21**	**16**	**44**	**19**	**91**
Bureaucracy	20	12	49	19	75
Judiciary	25	37	19	19	16
Social Movements	**15**	**14**	**22**	**49**	**228**
Women's rights groups and coalitions	15	12	21	52	197
Other social movement	13	32	29	26	31
Civic Groups	**6**	**29**	**8**	**57**	**49**
Media		4	14	82	22
Academics	5	57	5	33	21
General public	50	25		25	4
Religious actor				100	2
Other			**50**	**50**	**2**
N	**84**	**108**	**157**	**255**	**604**

5.3.4. Actors Responsible for Implementing Claims

Table 4 demonstrates that out of the 604 representatives, only 238 specify an addressee. By far, the most called upon addressees are domestic political actors, such as the Moroccan government, other politicians, and opposition political parties, with 163 of the representatives addressing them. Non-social movement civic groups, international actors, and Moroccan state institutions, are mentioned by 27, 21, and 20 representatives respectively. At the other extreme, we find that social movements are addressed twice, while other miscellaneous groups are mentioned by 5 representatives. International actors, state actors and social movements in Morocco figure prominently among those who call upon someone to realise their claims, with each representing 58, 48 and 77 of claimants respectively. On the other hand, only 26 representatives from civic groups and 28 domestic political actors call upon someone to realise their claims.

To some extent, these observations are in line with de Wilde's (2013, p. 290) assertion that the actors making representative claims are not necessarily the ones who are able to implement them. In this case, while women's rights groups and coalitions are the most visible representatives, they are only addressed by two claimants. Given that the addressee is the actor with the formal capacity to realise the claims voiced by representatives (de Wilde, 2013, p. 286), it is understandable why Moroccan state actors are among the most prominent addresses, while social movements are the least prominent ones.

Civic groups are called upon by several representatives such as international actors, domestic political actors and state actors, as well as social movements, despite the fact that they are not the highest authority. There could be two main explanations for this. First, claimants could believe that VAW is a societal problem that requires a societal answer, and not just a political one. Second, civic groups could be perceived as having the skills and expertise necessary to

help solve the problem. As we have seen in chapter 3, institutions like the Moroccan parliament are under-resourced and lack the funding necessary to hire staff trained in policy-making. Looking at some examples of claims addressing civic groups suggests that the first assumption is the most plausible one. Indeed, a typical addressee that comes under the umbrella term of civic group, is the general public. For instance, one claim criticises the mentality of Moroccan citizens for teaching girls to cover up and avoiding men (Friguech, 2013). Another involves an awareness-raising campaign targeting Moroccan citizens and encouraging them to authenticate their marriage acts, to ensure they align with the dispositions of the Moudawana (Bouhamida, 2014). Finally, another claim also involves an awareness-raising campaign by the FLDDF, though this one is about sexual harassment and targets young people (Liberation, 2012c).

Moreover, the fact that women's rights groups and coalitions in Morocco mostly address Moroccan political actors instead of international actors defies Keck and Sikkink's (Keck and Sikkink, 1999) Boomerang Model of transnational activism. As described in chapter 3, their model claims that domestic activists call on international actors to put pressure on their own government if opportunities for change at home are restricted. The fact that this does not happen in this case could suggest that either the domestic arena is not perceived as being restricted for women's rights activists on the issue of VAW, or international actors are not considered to be useful, or both.

However, for a more plausible explanation, we need to go back to the attitude of segments of the Moroccan women's rights movement. Even though Morocco is an authoritarian state wherein the King is above all other institutions, associations like UAF have at times preferred to appeal to Parliament and the Prime Minister to bring about policy change to ensure that reform comes through democratic means (Cavatorta and Dalmasso, 2009). As discussed in chapter 4, activists are not always keen on bypassing official channels of representation to achieve their goals, to avoid reinforcing authoritarianism. In this sample, there is a similar

preference for addressing democratic institutions. Though the King is included in the category of government, only one claimant addresses him. This representative is the Moroccan Social and Economic Council which gave a rapport to the King highlighting the lack of implementation of certain laws that could help tackle widespread violence against women (Liberation, 2012a). The most frequent addressees in my sample are ministers associated with members associated with the ruling PJD party, notably Benkiran, Hakkaoui El Khalfi, Ramid. The fact that the King is not invoked to arbitrate on this issue reinforces my earlier claim that tackling VAW in Morocco is not a controversial issue. As I have discussed in chapters 2 and 4, the King appropriates divisive debates in the country and is even sometimes directly appealed to by opposing parties.

Ultimately, there is broad consensus among elite and non-elite actors, and women's rights groups and coalitions with regards to who is responsible for realising their claims on VAW. Moroccan political actors are perceived as being the overarching authority with the ability to realise claims, suggesting that claimants see VAW mostly as a political problem.

Table 4: Addressees Calle Upon (%)

	International Actors	Domestic Political Actors	State Actors	Social Movements	Civic Groups	Other	N
International Actors	**17**	**64**	**5**		**9**	**5**	**58**
Intergovernmental Organisation	9	82			9		22
International Civil Society	19	55	10		6	10	31
Foreign Governments	40	40			20		5
Domestic Political Actors	**18**	**54**			**14**	**7**	**28**
Moroccan government	29	47		6	18		17
Opposition political parties		67				33	6
Parliament		50			50		2
Other politician(s)		67	33				3
State Actors		**92**					**48**
Bureaucracy		95					43
Judiciary		60	20		20		5
Social Movements		**69**	**14**		**13**		**77**
Women's rights groups and coalitions		72	15		10		67
Other social movement	10	50	10		30		10
Civic Groups	**15**	**50**	**12**		**23**		**26**
Media		67	8		25		12
Academics	36	18	18		27		11
General public		100					3
Other	**100**						**1**
N	**21**	**163**	**20**	**2**	**27**	**5**	**238**

5.3.5. Justifications

Table 5 suggests that that there are stark differences between representatives with regards to the use of frames to justify their claims. On the one hand, we find that most representatives from women's rights groups and coalitions (58%), foreign governments (57%), international civil society (48%), opposition political parties (50%), Parliament (50%), other politicians (67%), the Moroccan media (59%) and the general public (74%), use arguments rooted in moral principles and rights. Frames rooted in principles and rights mostly address women's human rights. An illustrative example is the open letter drafted by the FLDDF to call on the government to pass a framework law on violence against women, because the different forms of violence women face in Morocco are instances of gender-based violence, which are rooted in discrimination and male domination (Rerhaye, 2012a).

On the other hand, we find a handful of representatives that overwhelmingly provide no arguments. These are intergovernmental organisations (50%), the Moroccan government (62%), the bureaucracy (60%), the judiciary (44%), and other social movements (52%). Two notable exceptions are religious actors and academics. While the former is equally split between using no frames at all and resorting to arguments rooted in collective identity, the latter mostly draw on instrumental frames (43%).

The aforementioned figures suggest that those representatives most in line with women's rights groups and coalitions are civic groups and international actors. However, since Table 5 shows that moral principles and rights are at least the second most prominent category for all groups, it can be argued that violence against women in Morocco is mostly discussed using moral arguments, based on universal human and women's rights.

Instrumental frames are also quite prominent amongst the major groups, accounting for 29 to 10 per cent of their claimants. Thus, there are only slight variations in the extent to which this

type of frame is important. Instrumental frames are those claim that are concerned with state effectiveness and efficiency An example includes an instance where representatives of UN bodies called on Morocco to introduce legal changes to fight gender-based discrimination and protect women from violence because of deficiencies in the existing legal arsenal (Liberation, 2012b). However, many instrumental frames refer to economic development. For instance, Socialist International Women issued a document calling for the introduction of a goal tackling gender-based violence in the Millennium Development Goals because sexual violence negatively impacts on the realisation of all other development goals (Rerhaye, 2013).

The least prominent frame among all representatives is collective identity, such as Moroccan, masculine or Islamic identities. It is least prominent for international actors and social movements, with less than 5% of claimants from these groups drawing on it. It is most prominent for civic groups and domestic political actors, respectively accounting for 8 and 7 per cent of their claimants. Unsurprisingly, this frame is used by the Moroccan government, the judiciary and religious actors. If we consider the fact that a conservative judiciary has prevented the proper application of the new Family Code in 2004 and that the Moroccan government was led by the Islamist PJD in the first government after the Arab Spring (see chapter 4), these findings come as no surprise. An example of an argument rooted in collective identity is Prime Minister Abdelilah Benkirane's claim that it is necessary to adopt an Islamic framework to tackle violence against women, because Islam has given women a better place in society and Islamic culture is the only culture that states that Paradise is at the feet of the mother (Salaheddine, 2012).

With regards to the issue of violence against women in Morocco, most representatives underplay the role of collective identity, and prefer instead to draw on universal moral frames and instrumental arguments to justify their claims. This suggests that there is tacit agreement that collective identity is not relevant for this topic. This finding challenges the argument that

the rising popularity of Islamists in Morocco has entailed an Islamisation of the discourse on women's rights. As I have discussed in chapter 4, the secular current of the Moroccan women's rights movement has Islamised its discourse, particularly at the turn of the century, to respond to the challenge of Islamism. Islamism had become such a potent force in the 2000s that as we have seen in chapter 2, King Mohamed VI established a royalist party after the parliamentary elections of 2007, to placate it. The rise of their historical opponent encouraged secular activists within the movement to tone down their secularism and revisited the sacred to show that their goals were in line with Islam (Bras, 2007; Elliott, 2009).

The prominent use of moral principles and rights in this debate can be understood through the prism of the Arab Spring, which promoted ideas surrounding democracy and civil liberties rather than Islamic tradition or Moroccan identity. Following the wave of protests that had started in neighbouring countries, Moroccans started protesting on 20th February 2011, demanding amongst others greater democracy, better rights for the Amazigh people, lower food prices and the release of political prisoners (McKanders, 2014). Women played a key role in the ensuing 20th February Movement, by inscribing their agenda on the movement. Such is the case of Amina Boughalbi, the founder of the movement, who did not allow religious, sectarian and political slogans in the ranks of this 'youth dynamics' that was 'secular, modernist, democratic and independent of all foreign agendas or political affiliations' (Salime, 2012, p. 102). Furthermore, the increasing difficulty of Islamising secular thought or secularising Islamic thought in the last few years has led to an increasing divergence between the secular and religious currents of the Moroccan women's rights movement (Sadiqi, 2014a). The next chapter lends credence to this claim, as it highlights the stark differences in discourses between representatives of secular and Islamist women's associations.

Table 5: Justification (%)

	No argument provided	Instrumental	Collective identity	Moral principles and rights	N
International Actors	**44**	**11**		**44**	**157**
Intergovernmental Organisation	50	13		37	70
International Civil Society	41	8		48	73
Foreign Governments	29	14		57	14
Domestic Political Actors	**45**	**16**	**7**	**32**	**77**
Moroccan government	62	12	9	17	42
Opposition political parties	27	19		50	26
Parliament	33	17		50	6
Other politician(s)		33		67	3
State Actors	**57**	**10**		**29**	**91**
Bureaucracy	60	11		27	75
Judiciary	44	6	13	37	16
Social Movements	**25**	**17**		**55**	**228**
Women's rights groups and coalitions	21	19		58	197
Other social movement	52	10		35	31
Civic Groups	**20**	**29**	**8**	**43**	**49**
Media	14	23		59	22
Academics	24	43	9	24	21
General public	25			75	4
Religious actor	50		50		2
Other			**0**	**100**	**2**
Total	**224**	**92**	**19**	**269**	**604**

5.4. Discussion

In this section, I have drawn on representative claims analysis to analyse one way in which elite allyship can be performed – interest representation. I have uncovered that overall, elite allyship is performed by a range of actors in the context of the debate on VAW in Morocco. This is because the claims of various elite political actors align with those of Moroccan women's rights groups and coalitions on the dimensions I have examined. First, intergovernmental organisations, foreign governments, the Moroccan government, opposition political parties, Parliament, bureaucracies and the judiciary agree with Moroccan women's rights groups and coalitions that the primary constituency affected by VAW is women. Second, similarly to Moroccan women's rights groups and coalitions, most claimants from intergovernmental organisations and the Moroccan government do not suggest a clear policy change. This contrasts with Moroccan bureaucrats, opposition political parties, and the judiciary who mostly advocate for concrete policy changes. Third, similarly to Moroccan women's rights groups and coalitions, most claimants from intergovernmental organisations, the Moroccan government, opposition political parties, other politicians, bureaucracies and the judiciary, believe that domestic political actors in Morocco are primarily responsible for tackling VAW. Fourth, foreign governments, opposition political parties, Parliament and other politicians use arguments rooted in moral principles and rights to discuss VAW in Morocco, in the same vein as Moroccan women's rights groups and coalitions. Nonetheless, there is no one type of elite actor which aligns with Moroccan women's rights groups and coalitions across all four dimensions. Nonetheless, going back to my second research question, my findings suggest that a range of elite actors and Moroccan women's rights groups and coalitions speak on VAW in Morocco in broadly similar terms.

5.5. Alliances: Networks Rather than Coalitions

In this section, I draw on other aspects of the RCA to discuss the form and content of claims made by the elite political actors introduced above and domestic activists. To determine to what extent various types of political elites make claims with domestic activists, and to what extent these joint claims involve an element of co-ordination, I look at joint claims between different types of representatives. This is to help me determine if the relationship between elite actors and domestic activists takes the form of a coalition or a network.

In Chapter 2, I argued that coalitions involve shared beliefs and co-ordination, and are more formalised and sustained than networks. As I explained earlier, I view the latter as being ad-hoc arrangements bringing together actors that may share similar beliefs, but do not act together in a concerted manner. In practice, I expect that if there is there is evidence of co-ordination in joint claims between different types of actors, the arrangement is that of a coalition. If two actors make joint claims together, but there is not enough evidence to suggest that there is some co-ordination, I assume them to simply be part of the same network, as joint claims assume shared beliefs. As I have stated in chapter 2, I expect participation in a coalition to be a more useful form of elite allyship as coalition work involves more collaboration and cooperation and therefore more contact with the recipient of support.

I find that the types of actors that make joint claims with Moroccan women's rights groups and coalitions are the Moroccan judiciary, intergovernmental organisations and foreign governments. At least half of the joint claims these actors make with domestic activists involve some degree of coordination, rather than just expressing a similar point together. However, these cannot be referred to as coalitions because they do not constitute much of the joint claims expressed by political elites. Most joint claims involving domestic and international political elites involve other political elites or other civil society actors. This suggests that political elites

prefer to engage with one another, and are inaccessible to domestic activists. In sum, referring to my theoretical framework, the joint claims analysed in this section suggest that the most dominant type of relationship between domestic activists and elite actors is that of the network, as suggested by Keck and Sikkink (1998), rather than the elite actor-social movement coalition suggested by Almeida and Stearns (2004).

Table 6 shows the form of claim used by single claimants. We can see that most claimants (214 out of 383, 56%) express themselves through verbal or written statements, which take the form of interviews, public speeches, communiques and letters, online comments or publications such as reports, books or leaflets. This is followed by 139 out of 383 (36%) claimants who express themselves as part of meetings, including amongst others, conferences, seminars, party congresses, parliamentary sessions, roundtables, and public education meetings. Protest, direct democratic actions, political decisions and petitions come a long way behind, comprising respectively 13, 7, 6 and 4 claimants out of 383. This suggests that individual representatives do not express themselves in a confrontational manner for the most part.

If we look more closely at political elites, we can see that there are very few individual claimants from foreign governments, the judiciary, the Moroccan Parliament, and politicians from parties not represented in Parliament. In contrast, individual representatives from the Moroccan bureaucracy, intergovernmental organisations, the Moroccan government and opposition political parties are highly involved in this debate, constituting respectively 61, 43, 32 and 26 claimants. These actors do not engage in protest behaviour, or judicial action like lawsuits. They also do not make executive decisions, including material support, nor do they draw on repressive measures.

Though this is not shown in table 6, the particular actions taken by claimants include making verbal or written statements, taking part in meetings, making political decisions that take the

form of decrees, producing government reports and proposals, holding hearings; proposing legislation, holding parliamentary votes and motions, making court rulings and administrative decisions, adopting resolutions, and making binding agreements and personnel decisions.

Table 6: Form of Claim (%)

	Political Decisions	Verbal/Written Statements	Meetings	Direct Democratic Action	Petitioning	Protest	N
International Actors		68	23				95
Intergovernmental Organisation		51	40				43
International Civil Society		82	10				51
Foreign Governments		100					1
Domestic Political Actors		30	64				61
Moroccan government		16	71				32
Opposition political parties		50	50				26
Parliament	100						2
Other politician(s)			100				1
State Actors		74	22				66
Bureaucracy		80	20				61
Judiciary			80				5
Social Movements		41	46				128
Women's rights groups and coalitions		41	45				124
Other social movement		50	50				4
Civic Groups		91					32
Media		100					22
Academics		88					8
General public						100	1
Religious actor			100				1
Other			100				1
N	6	214	139	7	4	13	383

These representatives also make joint claims. In this section, I describe the claimants involved in these joint claims and their content. Table 7 shows that out of the 604 claims, 221 are joint. Among elite political actors, opposition political parties, bureaucratic actors and the Moroccan government have the smallest proportion of joint claimants. Opposition political parties do not make joint claims. For bureaucrats, the figure is 19%, while for the Moroccan government, it is 21%. In contrast, foreign governments have the highest proportion of joint claimants, with 95% claimants being part of joint actions. This is followed by the judiciary, whose proportion of joint claimants is 69%. Two thirds of other politicians are joint claimants, while the figure for Parliament is half of claimants. Elite actors thus make joint claims with domestic activists. In what follows, I describe the content of these joint claims and the actors they involve.

Table 7: Percentage of Joint and Individual Representatives

	Joint Representatives	Individual Representatives	N
International Actors	**40**	**60**	**157**
Intergovernmental Organisations	37	63	70
International Civil Society	32	68	73
Foreign Governments	93	7	14
Domestic Political Actors	**18**	**82**	**77**
Moroccan government	21	79	42
Opposition political parties	**0**	**100**	26
Parliament	50	50	6
Other politician(s)	67	33	3
State Actors	**27**	**73**	**91**
Bureaucracy	19	**81**	75
Judiciary	69	31	16
Social Movements	44	56	**228**
Women's rights groups and coalitions	38	62	197
Other social movement	**87**	**13**	31
Civic Groups	**37**	**63**	**49**
Media	5	95	22
Academics	62	38	21
General public	75	25	4
Religious actor	50	50	2
Other	**50**	**50**	**2**
Total	**224**	**92**	**604**

Judicial actors take part in several joint claims with domestic activists, alongside other civil society actors. One of them involves a symbolic tribunal organised by the Union de l'Action Feministe, and bringing together other politicians and the judiciary, to highlight the negative impact of underage marriage and call for the revision of articles 20 and 21 of the Family Code, as well as Article 475 of the Penal Code (Mohammed Taleb, 2012a). The Association Karama for Women's Development, as well as judicial figures and researchers highlighted in a conference that the law cannot end violence against women, and that this necessitates raising awareness about harmful practices among the public (Liberation, 2014a). Chaml Association for the Family and Solidarity organised an event in Kenitra involving judicial figures and academics to condemn violence against women working in agriculture (Liberation, 2015d). Finally, the committee in charge of women and children at the district court of Ouarzazate co-organised with a women's rights NGO – the Federation de la Ligue Democratique des Droits des Femmes – a roundtable to call for a participatory approach to tackle violence against women, the simplification of judicial assistance for women victims of violence, a fast treatment of complaints related to violence against women, and the organisation of meetings between the committee and civil society (Liberation, 2016a).

Besides judicial actors and other civil society groups, international actors also make joint claims with domestic activists. A campaign against violence against women was launched, co-financed by the EU, and with the support of an Italian NGO, Progetto Mondo, and involving a coalition of NGOs working on this issue (Zerrour, 2014). The ISIS centre for women and development, as well as the German institute for cultural relations and the international institute for languages in Fes, organised a workshop on strategies to tackle violence against women and called on the media to take an active role in this matter, as well as highlighting the significance of families, schools, communities and the State (Liberation, 2016b). Oyoune Nissaiya, a Moroccan women's rights NGO, with the help of the Spanish agency for international

cooperation and development (AECID) presented a report highlighting that women victims of violence experienced obstacles in accessing justice due to discriminatory legal provisions and the absence of a law on violence against women (Tabet, 2014). It also called for the involvement of democratic women's rights groups in the elaboration of laws and policies on violence against women (Tabet, 2014). The Ytto Foundation, a women's rights group based in Casablanca, co-organised with UNICEF and the embassy of Finland, an 'Equality Day' to raise awareness on the phenomenon child marriage in a creative way (Liberation, 2014a). In Marrakesh, Annakhil, a women's rights organisation, UNFPA and the embassy of Canada in Morocco preferred calling on the government and civil society to fight effectively against child marriage (Liberation, 2014b).

As the aforementioned discussion suggests, joint claims between elite political actors and domestic activists essentially comprise of international organisations, foreign governments and judicial figures. We can see that there is some co-ordination between international actors and domestic activists, and between the judiciary and domestic activists. However, most political elites articulate claims with other political elites, and sometimes with other civil society groups, rather than with activists involved in the mobilisation. I discuss these instances of collaboration in section 5.9.2.

These joint claims between political elites and Moroccan women's rights groups and coalitions suggest that the most dominant form of relationship between Moroccan activists and elite political actors on violence against women was that of the network, rather than the elite actor-social movement coalition suggested by Almeida and Stearns (2004). This is because while there is evidence of shared beliefs, there is very little evidence for systematic coordination. Only a few joint claims involving women's rights activists and elite actors involve coordinated efforts. Surprisingly, many joint claims involve elite actors only, and occasionally, civil society actors such as academics. This is very telling and suggests that there may be challenges for

domestic activists with regards to accessing political elites. In the next section, I examine more thoroughly the different types of resources provided by political elites to domestic activists.

5.6. Resources

In chapter 2, I have argued that two other ways to perform elite allyship is the provision of resources to social movements and interacting with other political elites on their behalf. I have identified four types of resources, based on Cress and Snow's (1996) taxonomy. These are moral, material, informational and human resources. I have clarified that moral resources refer to external endorsements, such as supportive statements and participation in events alongside social movements. Material resources refer to goods and services, and includes such things as supplies, space, transportation, jobs, and money. Informational resources refer to the provision of relevant knowledge, and include strategic and technical support, as well as personal connections. Finally, human resources refer to 'people who donate resources, time and energy,' such as audiences, cadres and leaders (Cress and Snow, 1996, p. 1095).

I have also identified in my theoretical chapter, three types of strategies that elite allies use towards other elite actors they perceive to be the targets of mobilisation, to support social movements. Based on Keck and Sikkink's (1998) Boomerang Model of transnational advocacy, I identified two strategies: leverage and accountability politics. Leverage politics is composed of moral and material leverage. Moral leverage involves naming and shaming actors for their actions, while material leverage involves linking the provision of money or goods to a stance on an issue (Keck and Sikkink, 1999, p. 97). The second strategy – accountability politics – involves holding an actor accountable to their pledges, by highlighting the gulf between what they say and what they do (Keck and Sikkink, 1999, pp. 97–8). The final strategy included in my theoretical framework draws on Wu's(2005) Double Mobilisation thesis (see Chapter 2). Wu's (2005) theory is part of a body of works that challenges the assumptions of

the Boomerang Model, and highlight the complexity of interactions between transnational advocacy networks and target states. Wu (2011) argues that Keck and Sikkink's model is biased in favour of contentious politics, because it assumes that confrontational strategies, such as leverage and accountability politics, are the only political dynamics that exist between target states and international actors. Referring to the relationship between international elite actors and states, Wu (2005; 2011) argues that actors do not necessarily disengage when others behave in a way that frustrates them. They still communicate, and may resort to non-confrontational strategies such as persuasion, education, recommendation, and socialisation (Fengshi, 2011). TANs thus collaborate with the target state, and do not just work with domestic social movements. I draw on these insights to examine if elite actors engage with other elite actors, and specifically with domestic political and state actors in Morocco, on behalf of activists mobilising for the criminalisation of violence against women.

In this section, I draw on RCA to determine which resources and strategies are associated with which type of elite actor. I have shown above that the judiciary, intergovernmental organisations and foreign governments make joint claims with domestic activists. Support from these actors takes the form of co-organising campaigns and meetings, and providing funding. This suggests that with regards to resources, such actors provide informational, human and material support. In this section, I show that other elite actors provide resources to activists. The most frequent type of resource is moral, though elite actors also provide some material, human and informational support. With regards to strategies, elite actors engage in both leverage politics and collaboration. They thus engage in double mobilisation. In this section, I describe these performances in greater detail. I divide it into sub-sections discussing a specific type of resource, as it makes the discussion more coherent. I introduce the identity of actors, before discussing the form of their claims as they relate to the resources they provide and the strategies they employ.

5.8.1. Moral Resources

Domestic Political Actors

Domestic political actors mostly provide moral resources to activists. Prominent actors that perform acts of allyship include senior Ministers, like the chief of state; parliamentarians from the Party of Progress and Socialism (PPS), which is part of the coalition government; parliamentarians from the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP), an opposition political party, and the King.

Regarding government actors, one the one hand, we have claims articulated in the form of political decisions, verbal and written statements and as part of meetings by three leading figures: Abdelilah Benkirane, the Prime Minister of Morocco, Mustapha Ramid, the Minister of Justice, and Bassima Hakkaoui, the Minister of Solidarity, Women, Family and Social Development. These three figures are all members of the Justice and Development Party, the leading conservative party in the two coalition governments formed after the Arab Spring.

The moral resources provided by government actors include: pledges to reform the Penal Code to strengthen provisions against violence against women (Aujourd'hui le Maroc, 2012a; Rerhaye, 2012a), assurances to improve access to justice to women victims of violence (Aujourd'hui le Maroc, 2012b), and a call to the media to help fight violence against women (Friguech, 2013). The two most notable measures are the presentation of a draft law on violence against women in November 2013 by Bassima Hakkaoui, Minister for Development, Women, and the Family, and the adoption of a revised version of this draft law in March 2016 by the Council of government, the first of its kind in Morocco. Bassima Hakkaoui even addressed women's rights activists telling them: 'I am working towards what you want, your message has been received' (Salaheddine, 2012).

The aforementioned measures were complemented with denials that violence against women is as high as reported by the Haut Commissariat au Plan, a governmental initiative tasked with investigating the prevalence and characteristics of this phenomenon. One claim involves Benkirane denying the existence of underage marriage in Morocco and maintaining that 'it is not always minors that are married against their will, but young girls between 16 and 17 that want to get married themselves' (Ouassat, 2015). Benkirane also made a claim that led to a sit in by women's rights activists; notably a claim to parliamentarians that Moroccan women 'have a more important role to play inside the family for the education of children…their role inside the family should be made sacred, instead of treating them in a condescending manner, because they have a more important role to play inside the family than inside enterprises and administrations' (Rerhaye, 2014b).

Members of other parties in the coalition government also engage in this debate. A visible PPS figure is Nezha Skalli, former Minister for the Family, who expressed herself on the issue of abortion, calling for its legalisation under certain conditions. Skalli also lamented the obstacles she faced when she tried to present a law on violence against women to Parliament in 2010, and explained the rise in child marriage in terms of the ideologies and culture of Morocco (Mounir, 2013b; Rerhaye, 2014b).

Opposition political parties involved in this debate include the USFP, the Socialist Union of Popular Forces. USFP figures, Khadija Yamlahi and Driss Lachgar also called for a framework law (Liberation, 2014a). The call for a framework law, rather than a specific law is at odds with the type of policy change supported by other elite actors. While Lachgar also called for changes to discriminatory provisions in existing legal texts such as the Family Code, and the liberalisation of abortion, Yamlahi added that national laws should be in line with international conventions, and that both the Penal Code and Family Code should be rewritten to stop

underage marriage, but also to achieve equal rights between men and women in marriage (Mohammed Taleb, 2012b).

The Femmes Ittihadies, a group of female parliamentarians associated with the USFP party similarly called for a revision of the Family Code, for judicial justice, the abolition of all discriminatory laws, the right to have an abortion, and the promulgation of a framework law (Liberation, 2013b).

King Mohammed VI also contributed to the debate on violence against women, by calling for its elimination in general, during the Rabat Declaration, but particularly female genital mutilation, forced and child marriage (Rerhaye, 2012b). Moreover, the King played a key role in the debate on abortion between liberal and conservative figures, by calling for a consultation with the view of introducing a draft law to liberalise abortion.

State Actors

The state actors that perform acts of allyship are Morocco's national human right's institution, national commissions, as well as jurists, legal bodies, and ministries. These actors provide mostly moral resources, but also human and informational. The national human rights commission, the Economic, Social and Environmental Council and legal figures are particularly critical of the government and engaged in moral leverage, though, alongside other state actors, provide recommendations.

As stated above, the key individual claimants associated with state institutions, such as the judiciary and the bureaucracy are the ministry of justice, figures from the National Council for Human Rights, the Economic, Social and Environmental Council, the Social Development Agency and national development institutions such as l'Entraide Nationale, deputy

prosecutors, lawyers, judges, tribunals, the regional commission on supporting cells for women and children victims of violence.

These actors express themselves through verbal or written statements and meetings. Those claimants associated with the judicial area make claims calling for a better legal process to support women victim of violence (Khallad, 2012), criticised current legal provisions and notably Article 20 of the Family Code that makes underage marriage permissible; called for the application of the law; and made recommendations on the content of bill 103-13. One claim involves the declaration of a new process by a procurer: the ending of the regulation of acts of marriage that do not have a notarised certificate, while another involves the declaration that a new fast process had been implemented in Ouarzazate with regards to court decisions (Mounir, 2014b).

Individuals associated with the National Council for Human Rights - a constitutional institution created by Royal decree in 2011 - account for the most claims on this issue. These actors called for the liberalisation of abortion laws (Khallad, 2012; Mounir, 2014b; Liberation, 2016c; Tabet, 2016a), presented recommendations on possible amendments to bill 103-13, including harsher punishments for certain crimes; called for the redefinition of concepts such as rape to be aligned with international standards; and recommended better institutional support for women victims of violence (Zerrour, 2014).

National development commissions called for legislation to tackle this problem, as well as the adoption of 'ambitious measures,' collaboration between different actors, and the multiplication public awareness campaigns (Liberation, 2015a). Finally, the ministry of justice made a claim agreeing with the decision of a parliamentary group to remove a provision in Article 475 of the penal code that allows a rapist to escape punishment if he marries his underage victim.

International Actors

The last set of elite actors that make individual claims come from inter-governmental organisations (IGOs) or their agencies. When speaking by themselves, these actors perform allyship by providing moral resources in the form of statements supportive of women. They engage in moral leverage, though they also seek to educate governments, such as Morocco, on the need to tackle violence against women.

Several individual claimants from IGOs come from the United Nations and its associated agencies, programmes and working groups. These include the working group on human rights, UNICEF, the UN special rapporteur, the commission on the status of women and its spokesperson Joy Ngozi Ezeilo, the Committee on economic, social and cultural rights, UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon, UN Women and UN Women Maghreb's spokesperson Leila Rhiwi, ECOSOC, UNFPA and its spokespersons Mieko Yabuta and Abdelilah Yaakoubd, and the executive director of the UN, Phumile Mlambo Ngcuka. Other IGOs claimants come from the OECD, the Union for the Mediterranean, the World Health Organisation and its spokesperson Claudia Garcia-Moreno, Jim Yong Kim, president of the World Bank Group, and Abdelwahad Radi from the Inter-parliamentiary Union.

These claimants express themselves through conferences, communiques, and campaigns to highlight deficiencies in the Moroccan legal system with regards to violence against women, and call on the Moroccan government and associated institutions to make quick progress on this matter (Liberation, 2012b).

The UN addresses issues not prevalent in the debate. For instance, it raises the issue of women's reproductive and sexual health and their right to their bodies, specifically calling for governments to decriminalise abortion, and ensuring that vulnerable women such as sex

workers have access to sexual health services, alternative economic opportunities, and get protection from violence and discrimination (Bouithy, 2016a).

The World Health Organisation further highlight the link between health and violence against women when it called on health professionals to take this issue more seriously (Mounir, 2013c). The UN also raised the issue of sexual violence during conflicts and its impact on society (Mounir, 2014c) and the negative consequences of child marriage (Liberation, 2015b).

5.8.2. Material Resources

International Actors

I have not been able to identify many instances of material support to Moroccan women's rights groups and coalitions, though this is mostly because this type of support cannot be easily discerned by newspaper articles. Nonetheless, I have been able to identify such few instances, though they all involve international actors.

Intergovernmental organisations like the EU, helped finance specific campaigns, such as one involving combatting violence against women (Zerrour, 2014). Branches of governments, such as the Spanish agency for international cooperation and development helped a Moroccan women's rights NGO, Oyoune Nissaiya, to produce a report on the legal obstacles faced by women victims of violence (Tabet, 2014).

5.8.3. Informational Resources and human resources

State Actors

Drawing on joint claims between political elites and Moroccan women's rights groups and coalitions, we can see that judicial actors provide human and informational resources to

Moroccan women's rights groups and coalitions. The judiciary and politicians took part in activities organised by UAF to raise awareness of the harmful consequences of underage marriage (Mohammed Taleb, 2012a). Other activities include co-participation in conferences, roundtables and other meetings on violence against women (Liberation, 2014a, 2015d, 2016a).

International Actors

As seen above, intergovernmental organisations and foreign governments helped finance the activities of Moroccan women's rights groups and coalitions. They also directly participated in them, to increase their reach to the population. A notable example is the co-organisation of a campaign raising awareness of child marriage by UNICEF, the embassy of Finland and the association Foundation Ytto. Additionally, UNFPA and the embassy of Canada helped Annakhil, a women's rights association, amplify their claim to warn against the phenomenon of child marriage (Liberation, 2014b).

5.9. Strategies

5.9.1. Leverage

In this section, I describe the ways in which political elites exerted leverage on one another to combat violence against women in Morocco. I show that criticism is mostly directed at the Moroccan government. I have shown in chapters 2 and 4 that the Moroccan King has played a critical role in debates on the reforms of the Moudawana. In this chapter, other elite actors do not particularly address the King, but instead engage with representative and democratic institutions.

Domestic Political Actors

Opposition political parties involved in this debate include the USFP, the Socialist Union of Popular Forces. These claimants make rather critical comments towards the government. In the

lower chamber of parliament, Rachida Benmessaoud exclaimed: 'Enough talk, we want concrete actions. We want a framework law on violence against women. Tell us how and when such a text will be promulgated' (Rerhaye, 2012b).

Lachgar also called for changes to discriminatory provisions in existing legal texts such as the Family Code, and the liberalisation of abortion, while Yamlahi added that national laws should be in line with international conventions, and that both the Penal Code and Family Code should be rewritten (Mohammed Taleb, 2012b). Once the bill 103-13 had been presented, USFP politicians engaged in harsh criticism about it. Abdelkebir Tabih argued that the bill looked more like a bill to amend the Penal Code than a comprehensive bill on violence against women, given its emphasis on criminal provisions (Tabet, 2016b). Tabih also lamented the fact that the bill limited violence to its physical aspect in general, and neglected other forms of violence (Tabet, 2016b). More worryingly for Tabih, the bill contained provisions that could be used against women themselves. In sum, this bill 'has nothing to do with a bill on violence against women' (Tabet, 2016b).

State Actors

Mostapha Naoui, from the CNDH criticised the bill presented by the government for being well below what activists had been campaigning for, and accused it of being a subterfuge (Tabet, 2016b). Criticism extended to the lack of a satisfactory law that prevents, protects and punishes, and the lack of protection of domestic workers, most of whom are women. For Rabea Naciri, women victims of violence should not burdened with proving that they have been subject to violence. Instead, the state should prevent and investigate acts of violence, and an effective political strategy should be put in place (Rerhaye, 2014a).

The Economic, Social and Environmental Council similarly produced reports criticising deficiencies in dealing with this topic, and specifically the lack of implementation of relevant

legislation, and explained the prevalence of violence against women to be the result of living in a patriarchal society (Liberation, 2012a). National development commissions have a less critical tone, but nonetheless also called for legislation to tackle this problem, as well as the adoption of 'ambitious measures,' collaboration between different actors, and the multiplication public awareness campaigns (Liberation, 12th December 2015).

International Actors

Whilst acknowledging development in the field of human and women's rights in Morocco, these actors nonetheless repeatedly deplore slow progress and make a series of recommendations, such as amending discriminatory provisions in the Penal Code on rape, amending the Family Code to forbid underage marriage, and introducing a specific law on violence against women that is aligned with international standards (Liberation, 2015c).

UN bodies such as ECOSOC criticised the provisions of Bill 103-13 elaborated by the Moroccan government, and specifically the failure to criminalise marital rape and extra-marital relations, and a proposal to set the minimum age for marriage to 16. The World Bank Group preferred to call for a global application of punishment for rape and spousal violence. In fact, several claims by IOs targeted governments in general, and not just Morocco (Mounir, 2013b).

5.9.2. Collaboration

International actors engage with one another and with Moroccan political elites. The UN, Morocco's Programme Tamkine and Amnesty International took part in a public awareness campaign on violence against women in educational institutions. The spokesperson for the Council of Europe and the European Union ambassador made a claim calling for the government to involve civil society in decision-making (Salaheddine, 2012). UN Women co-organised a parliamentary meeting with the Interparliamentary Union in New York, to identify

parliamentary strategies to combat violence against women and girls (Liberation, 2013c). The Moroccan government signed a UN declaration alongside other governments to condemn violence against women and girls and highlight the significance of putting in place multi-sectorial services for victims of violence, in the field of healthcare and psychology (Mounir, 2013d). The National Observatory for Children's Rights and the UN co-organised a meeting in Rabat, under the patronage of the King and Princess Lalla Meryem, which culminated in the Rabat Declaration calling for an end to all forms of violence against women and girls, the adoption of a law to criminalise these acts, the eradication of all harmful practices such as underage and forced marriage, but also economic exploitation of young girls (Bouithy, 2015). Finally, UN Women, the Communal Council, the local province and the Spanish Development Agency AECID organised a seminar to make the city of Marrakesh safer for women through awareness raising (Bouithy, 2016b). Finally, there is one claim solely involving Moroccan state actors, in the form of the judiciary and agencies. The regional commission on supporting cells for women and children victims of violence and the regional commission for Human Rights of Tanger-Tetouan organised a study group on violence against women, and called for Morocco to adopt a strong law that tackles violence against women and conforms to universal standards on human rights, to ensure that victims are well protected (Aujourd'hui le Maroc, 2014).

5.10. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have used RCA to offer an insight into how political elites at the national and international level interact with domestic activists on the issue of violence against women in Morocco. This was done to determine to what extent these elites facilitated their mobilisation for the criminalisation of violence against women, and therefore uncover who performs elite allyship. In the first part of this chapter, I have uncovered that generally speaking, the claims

of political elites aligned with those of Moroccan women's rights groups and coalitions. They therefore performed allyship through interest representation.

In the second part of this chapter, I looked at the form of the relationship between Moroccan activists and political elites. I found that there is very little evidence of co-ordination and joint action with elite actors, though most elite actors shared the same broad beliefs as activists with regards to violence against women. This suggests that the mobilisation for reforms on violence against women is one involving loosely coupled networks rather than state-social movement coalitions. Second, I looked at the types of resources provided by elite actors to determine who could be considered to be engaging in acts of allyship. I found that all types of elite actors – domestic political actors, state actors, and international actors – provide moral resources in the form of articulating claims that express support for progress on tackling violence against women in Morocco. This comes as no surprise, as the previous section already highlighted that there is little public opposition to combating violence against women. I also found that foreign governments and IGOs provided the most diverse range of resources.

I have found little involvement of King Mohamed VI, even though I have shown in chapter 4 that the monarchy has historically played a role in debates on women's rights. This could suggest that VAW is not a divisive issue that requires the King to appropriate the issue and perform his role as arbiter. Moreover, other political elites address actors from representative and democratic institutions, rather than the monarchy, in spite of Morocco's authoritarian political system. This suggests that there is tacit understanding about political actors that change should happen democratically and through formal channels of representation. In the next chapter, I show that this attitude is adopted by Moroccan women's rights groups and coalitions.

6. Perceptions of Performances

6.1. Introduction

In this section, I look at domestic activists' perceptions of the afore mentioned actors and performances. I juxtapose these findings with my observations from chapters 4 and 5. I have clarified in Chapter 1 that my definition of opportunity is, 'possibilities that originate outside the mobilising group, but affect its perceived chances of mobilising and/or realising its collective interests.' Thus, it is not possible to determine who is an elite ally and what is good elite allyship without drawing on the perceptions of social movement activists. I capture the perceptions of activists mobilising for the criminalisation of violence against women in Morocco through semi-structured interviews with representatives of coalitions, women's rights organisations, and non- women's rights groups involved in the mobilisation.

I find that their assessment is mostly negative, very few of the elite actors that perform elite allyship are perceived as being allies. Moreover, even perceived allies are harshly criticised for not doing more, which involves amongst others, engaging in mobilisation, and exerting leverage. Additionally, I find that activists perceived effective elite allsyhip to possess the following characteristics: the provision of a wide range of resources, the use of moral leverage over other political elites and collaboration with activists. With regards to domestic political actors, activists preferred allyship from representative and democratic institutions.

6.2. Data

This section is based on 15 semi-structured interviews that I carried out between January and May 2016 in the following cities in Morocco: Rabat, Casablanca, Marrakesh, Fez, Agadir and el Hajeb. These interviews did not solely involve women's groups, but also other actors that participated in the various debates on violence against women. Activists were drawn from both

secular and religious groups. I also included participants from formal organisations and informal groups, as well as those from women and non-women centred groups. Finally, I have not restricted my sample to the Rabat-Casablanca area, but have also carried out interviews in the Moroccan provinces. I have done this to make sure that I obtained a variety of viewpoints, and was not just interviewing the activists from the most visible groups and coalitions.

I have interviewed the Rabat and Casablanca sections of major women's associations such as Federation de la Ligue Democratique des Femme (FLDDF), Association Marocaine des Droits des Femmes (AMDF), which is based in Casablanca, and Jossour, Forum des Femmes Marocaines (Jossour). As we have seen in chapter 4, these associations have historically played a major role in debates on women's rights in Morocco. Besides these, I have interviewed smaller organisations based in Rabat and Casablanca, such as Woman Action, Solidarite Feminine (Feminine Solidarity), Association Marocaine des Femmes Progressistes (Moroccan Association of Progressive Women, Femmes Progressistes), and Union Feministe Libre (Free Feminist Union). I have also interviewed a representative for Forum al Zahra, which we have seen in chapter 4, is linked to the PJD. In the Rabat-Casablanca area, I have spoken to two female representatives from associations that do not solely focus on women's rights, but have participated in the debate. These are Collectif Aswat (Aswat), which is an LGBT association, and Mouvement Alternatif pour les Libertes Individuelles (Alternative Movement for Individual Freedoms, MALI), an informal group that focuses on individual freedoms. Outside of the Rabat-Casablanca region, I have interviewed Initiative pour la Protection des Droits des Femmes (Initiative for the Protection of Women's Rights), based in Fez, which was managing the Spring of Dignity coalition in 2016. I have also interviewed Association Amal, based in El Hajeb, to include the voice of associations from more remote areas of Morocco. Below, I provide a brief overview of these associations below.

For this section, I have interviewed IPDF in its capacity as the managing association of the coalition Printemps de la Dignite in 2016. As we have seen in chapter 4, this coalition started a few years before the Arab Spring and brings together more than 20 associations. Its original goal was the reform of criminal legislation to combat violence against women in Morocco. However, today its goals have expanded because it realised that the problem was the whole justice system that needed an overhaul (IPDF, 2016). The coalition has participated in international forums to communicate its vision and produced a number of memoranda on violence against women. It has staged protests to protest violence against women, though a significant proportion of its actions involve conferences and meetings. Though this coalition is highly visible and benefits from the membership of well-resourced associations such as ADFM, it has witnessed the breakaway of AMVEF, UAF, Jossour and FLDDF due to its organisation. Nonetheless, several associations in my sample, such as Solidarite Feminine, Femmes Progressistes and AMDF, are still part of it. I now turn to discussing individual associations and informal groups.

An alternative network to the Printemps is Forum Al Zahra. Chapter 4 has already discussed Forum al Zahra, the only Islamic association in this sample. As we have seen earlier, this forum addresses women's rights in the context of the family. This forum is not visible in mainstream debates on violence against women, though as we will see in the section below, it has also campaigned for a law on violence against women. It is marginalised from the secular current of the women's rights movement due to its religious approach to women's rights. However, the real reason for its lack of visibility is also due to its emphasis on social work, in the form of listening centres for women victims of violence (Forum Al Zahra, 2016). Moreover, whereas the other associations communicate in both French and Arabic, this network predominantly communicates in Arabic.

One of the oldest associations in this sample is Solidarite Feminine. Solidarite Feminine was founded in 1985 by Aicha Ech Chenna, and focuses primarily on single mothers, a group that is marginalised in Moroccan society, due to the stigma of being an unmarried mother and an illegitimate child (Solidarite Feminine, no date; Marshall, 2009; Zouak, 2015). Solidarite Feminine seeks to bring an end to children abandoned by unmarried mothers and empower these women through social work and traineeships (Marshall, 2009). Solidarite Feminine also engages in advocacy and is part of the coalition Printemps de la Dignite.

The 1990s saw the establishment of even more associations. Among them are AMDF and Femmes Progressistes, that started in 1992, FLDDF that was created in 1993, and Jossour that was established in 1995. As we have seen in chapter 4, AMDF has been an important player in debates on women's rights in Morocco. It was involved in the drafting of the plan for the integration of women in the late 1990s (Cavatorta and Dalmasso, 2009; Elliott, 2009). AMDF has also been one of the founding members of the Printemps de la Dignite coalition in the 2000s, along with ADFM, AMVEF and FLDDF (Printemps de la Dignite, 2010).

FLDDF is a major network for women's rights in Morocco and posseses branches in several cities. FLDDF was officially established in 1993 and engages in both advocacy to criminalise violence against women, and grassroots work (FLDDF, 2016a). With regards to grassroots work, it provides psychological and legal support to women victims of violence (FLDDF, 2016a). Like UAF and ADFM discussed above, it started as a group of women that broke away from a political party and has sought to fight violence against women from the beginning (FLDDF, 2016a). FLDDF is a federation of associations that work on different, yet complementary aspects, to help women. It is composed of an observatory on women's rights, a residential centre for women victims of violence, and other associations that engage in awareness-raising campaigns (FLDDF, 2016a). A particularity of FLDDF is that it focuses on

overcoming taboos such as virginity, abortion and equal inheritance rights between women and men (2016a).

Like FLDDF, Femmes Progressistes has been addressing violence against women from the beginning, though it has been biased towards economic violence (Femmes Progressistes, 2016). It engages in both advocacy and grassroots work as well, though it primarily works with marginalised women such as housewives as well as factory and agricultural workers, as it considers violence towards these groups to be the most affected by Morocco's economic crisis (Femmes Progressistes, 2016). Though it works with the Printemps de la Dignite, its major criticism is that the coalition exclusively targets elite women (Femmes Progressistes, 2016).

Jossour's main goal is to increase the visibility of women in all aspects of Moroccan society. It has combined advocacy and grassroots work, and has sought to increase women's economic empowerment, in the face of economic, cultural and societal challenges (Jossour, 2015). Jossour has played an active role in campaigning for gender equality in Morocco, and has worked with other associations to submit memoranda to influence policy (Jossour, 2016). Jossour is highly involved in international forums and even enjoys a consultative status with the UN (Jossour, 2016).

Among the smaller women's associations in Rabat, we find Woman Action and Union Feministe Libre. UFL was officially formed in 2016, thought it had been a project in the making in the last 5 years (UFL, 2016). It was spurred by a case of sexual harassment that the founder had been fighting since 2014 (UFL, 2016). UFL stands out for being ran by educated and internet savvy young women. Indeed, unlike other women's associations in Morocco, it focuses heavily on social media to promote its events and mobilise, and communicates in English, French, Arabic and Darija. As we have seen in chapter 4, UFL was established to allow young women to have an independent voice within the Moroccan women's rights movement, which

is still dominated by figures that had been mobilising on this issues for decades. Its focus is on combating sexual violence and particularly harassment, though it has also taken part in campaigns against child marriage. UFL has a good relationship with more established secular women's associations and has worked with them on the campaign to criminalise violence against women. However, it has also mobilised independently on this issue and carried out more confrontational tactics.

Unlike UFL, Woman Action is more concerned with development and empowering women. It has worked with foreign governments and national networks to train women and educate them on their rights (2016). It has carried out campaigns to combat violence against women in the private and public spheres. We have seen in chapter 4 that the Family Code has not been communicated to all sectors of society, after its reform in 2004. Woman Action is one of those associations that address this problem by teaching women about the provisions of the code.

Another small women's rights association is Association Amal, which is based in El Hajeb, and was established in 2002 (Amal, 2016). It has focused on marginalised groups not addressed by bigger associations, such as sex workers. It works directly with vulnerable women, by educating them on their rights, but also campaigns for greater rights for women (Amal, 2016). It also engages in capacity-building for other associations (Amal, 2016). Unlike other associations in this sample, it is part of a regional network that involves local NGOs and the Rabat-based international NGO Mobilising Rights Associates (Amal, 2016). This network has worked separately on the formulation of a law to combat violence against women.

Besides women's associations, I have also interviewed female figures from Collectif Aswat and MALI, to grasp the involvement of other civil society actors in this debate. MALI is an informal network rather than an association. MALI has faced a lot of repression from the authorities because of its criticisms of sensitive topics such as religion. Nonetheless, it has

engaged in controversial actions, such as breaking the fast during Ramadan, to protest forced fasting. Due to its inability to exist as a formal structure, it works with established associations to mobilise. It turns to social networks and the foreign media to communicate its ideas (MALI, 2016).

Collectif Aswat was established in 2012 and fights discrimination towards sexual minorities in Morocco. It acts as a source of information for the LGBT community in Morocco, but also engages in political campaigns that target decision-makers, civil society and the general public (Lacroix, 2016). Its focus is the repeal of article 489 of the Penal Code which criminalises homosexual relations (Lacroix, 2016). Though it is an LGBT association, Aswat more generally campaigns for individual liberties, such as freedom of conscience, sexual freedom and religious freedom (Lacroix, 2016). In spite of its interest in women's rights, members of Aswat have found it difficult to participate in the activities of women's rights groups and coalitions on the issue of violence against women in Morocco (Aswat, 2016).

In sum, my sample is composed of a variety of women's rights associations and coalition. With regards to coalitions, we can see that Forum Al Zahra, Printemps de la Dignite, MRA and its network of regional NGOs, and FLDDF have worked in parallel on the issue of violence against women. With regards to associations, we can see that they cannot be easily grouped into advocacy or grassroots organisations, as several of them work with women and campaign on women's rights.

6.3. Method

In this section, I draw on interviews to juxtapose the performances of elite actors on the issue of violence against women in Morocco, with how activists mobilising on this issue interpret the impact of their performances on their mobilisation. I have chosen to carry out semi-structured interviews because they are helpful for research that is not well documented (Blee

and Taylor, 2002). Since I am studying a relatively recent campaign, there is not much primary or secondary information I could draw on to determine the perceptions of elite actors by women's rights activists. Due to the lack of Internet use by the groups and coalitions in question, there are not many digitised versions of their organisational documents and not much maintenance of their websites. While there are interviews of them online, these do not draw on their beliefs about different types of elite actors. I thus had to carry out a period of fieldwork in Morocco to speak to activists and observe first hand their interactions with one another and with other actors. I also draw on semi-structured interviews because of their ability to help me learn about the emotions, beliefs, and identities of activists, and therefore their ability to 'bring human agency to the centre of movement analysis,' as Blee agues (Della Porta, 2014, p. 229). Understanding the identities of activists is also important because it allows me to understand how ideologies and relationships affect perceptions of allyship and perceptions of different external actors. Having described my methods, I now turn to examining my empirical findings.

6.4. Empirical Findings

6.4.1. Domestic Political Actors

In chapter 2, I have suggested that representative and democratic institutions might be not be perceived as being effective sources of elite allyship in Morocco. I have argued that this is due to the fact that Morocco is not a democratic country, and the King has extensive powers, which he has drawn on to maintain his power. This lack of democracy means that representative bodies have limited powers and cannot exercise their free will. On the other hand, because the King is above all other institutions, he can make reforms happen. Moreover, having connections with the regime means that an association can exist and carry out its functions.

However, I have also shown that in previous campaigns, some associations preferred to address elected officials and avoided appealing to the King, so as not to deepen authoritarianism.

My findings so far align with this latter approach. My RCA shows that the main interlocutors of Moroccan women's rights groups and coalitions are the Moroccan Cabinet and other politicians, rather than the King, despite the fact that the Cabinet is dominated by Islamist figures from the PJD. My interviews show that though the PJD was seen as a major obstacle to criminalising violence against women, this has not resulted in associations courting the support of the King. I develop on these issues below.

As shown in chapter 5, publicly, the government supports and even proposes legal reforms on violence against women – as evidenced by the proposition of a draft bill in November 2013 and the vote on bill 103-3 in March 2016 to tackle this issue. However, reflecting on the slow progress of these texts, as well as the way in which they were developed and their content, activists report that the ruling party in government – the PJD - actively resists progress on this issue. Activists also report that resistance is displayed through the handling of funding on this topic and character assassination. With regards to left-wing parties in the coalition – such as the PPS - activists perceive them as allies, but deplore the fact that they only provide moral resources in the form of rhetorical support. Nonetheless, in spite of perceived resistance by the PJD, activists kept engaging with it rather than appeal to the King, as has happened in the early 2000s with the debate on the reform of the Moudawana (chapter 4).

Interviewees lamented the slow pace on this matter, and were taken aback by the fact that the draft bill was neglected and surfaced again only in March 2016, at the end of the government's term (FLDDF, 2016a; AMDF, 2016; Femmes Progressistes, 2016). As one interviewee put it, this law project had been 'locked in a drawer' since November 2013 (Woman Action, 2016). The slow progress was particularly worrisome because the 2011 Constitution required the

government to pass and implement its proposed laws and align all legal texts with its own dispositions (FLDDF, 2016a; Jossour, 2016). There were thus fears that such a law would never see the light of day and that the government could get away with not respecting the new Constitution. Another reason why slow progress was worrisome was because activists relied on the law to educate society. As one interviewee said, 'laws have a pedagogic role which contributes to changing mentalities' (IPDF, 2016).

The slow progress on this matter is observed to be a general characteristic of the government towards projects concerning women's rights (Amal, 2016). In more detail, one interviewee declared that:

'There are many law projects that they neglected all these years and only started looking into last year. Last summer, they started introducing bills in bulk. It was very hard. For instance, we had elections on 4th September 2015 and it was only towards June, July 2015 that relevant electoral laws that specified the status of women, were promulgated. There was only a bit of time. We could not discuss and raise women's awareness on this issue. It was horrible. It was very difficult.' (FLDDF, 2016a)

Another interviewee further reported that since the coming to power of this government, existing developments on women's rights had been frozen, exemplified by the failure to promulgate an Authority for Parity and Equality as directed in Article 19 of the 2011 Constitution, and the neglect of the project on domestic work (Jossour, 2016).

Interviewees interpreted these delays as a lack of concern for women's rights and as exemplifying that women are simply not a priority for the government. As one of them put it,

'the priority is not the cause of women. It is not equality. It is not a law on violence against women. They have another agenda. They have other priorities in their governmental plan' (Jossour, 2016).

This resistance was also expressed through denying access to information and participation to women's rights groups and coalitions in the development of the draft bill and the bill. An interviewee I spoke to in early March 2016 reported not having heard anything between the presentation of the draft bill on 7th November and that of the final version that was adopted by the government on 17th March 2016:

'This [proposed] law was presented during a council of government meeting to be discussed and adopted on 7th November 2013. We have not heard anything about it since. We are told that it is in the legislative arena now, but we do not anything. All we know is that the last stage was what happened in 2013 during the Council of Government' (FLDDF, 2016a).

For Femmes Progressistes (2016), this was a deliberate strategy to sideline women's right groups and coalitions, while a spokesperson for the Association Marocaine des Droits des Femmes went so far as qualifying this refusal to consider their position as an anti-democratic move (2016).

Denying access to information on the development of the bill and restricting access to women's rights groups and coalitions were criticised by interviewees for breaching articles of the new Constitution, which promoted participatory governance. By wanting to be involved in decision-making, activists also wanted to ensure that the government respected the positive developments they had gained following the Arab Spring. According to an activist, participation should take the following form:

'The women's rights movement has given its opinion on the [draft] law, on some articles, on some amendments. All of this should be taken into account by all parties responsible for formulating it. A national commission should be put in place that brings together the viewpoints of civil society, the women's rights movement, the National Council for Human Rights, the government and also political parties, to design a clear and precise law' (Jossour, 2016).

This focus on participatory governance is not surprising if we consider that the post-Arab Spring era has witnessed the popularity of discourses centring democracy.

Even Islamist women's groups were kept in the dark about the bill. According to a spokesperson for Forum Al Zahra (2016), it had asked to speak to the Prime Minister, following the long silence after the presentation of the draft bill in November 2013, but was rebuffed. This denial of participation was apparently not just limited to this law project. For the Printemps coalition, under the previous government, there was a mixed committee composed of individuals from this coalition and state actors from the Ministry of Justice to examine the penal code, but this no longer existed (2016). This no longer existed.

Besides the process surrounding the formulation of the draft bill and the bill on violence against women, their content also posed problems to activists. The draft bill 103-13 contained 19 articles and had a definition of violence against women that acknowledged and punished physical, sexual, moral and economic violence (Media24, 2013). Its focus was mostly on punishing violence, though it proposed the creation of instances to take care of women and children victims of violence (Media24, 2013). It also proposed the creation of a national commission and sub-national commissions presided by a magistrate and composed of representatives from the ministries of justice, interior, health, children's affairs, youth, women and the police, with the aim of coordinating for the protection of women and children against violence (Media24, 2013). The bill suggested amendments to the Penal Code to criminalise

certain acts like the refusal to reinstate a spouse previously expelled from the marital home, forced marriages, breaching the integrity of a woman's body, and the deliberate squandering of the household's money (Media24, 2013). Sexual harassment was criminalised and considered as such if it involved colleagues, authority figures and relatives (Media24, 2013). Revenge porn was somewhat also criminalised, as using recordings and images of a woman in her private environment and against her consent faced penalties (Media24, 2013).

The following acts not addressed in the Penal Code were criminalised: breach of trust, fraud and theft towards a spouse. Worsened penalties were put in place for violence involving pregnant women, or done in the presence of children or parents (Media24, 2013). Protective measures included the removal of the violent spouse, the interdiction to access the wife or children and to manage household resources (Media24, 2013). The bill contained more general provisions such as making threats and refusing to help someone in danger, when reasonable and safe to do so (Media24, 2013). The bill that was voted on at the council of government in March 2016 contained 17 articles and many of the same provisions, though a few were withdrawn. It still contained sentences for the aforementioned forms of violence, including aggravating sentences for violence perpetrated towards women in special circumstances such as pregnant women, and still proposed institutional mechanisms such as central and local cells and committees to support women victim of violence. However, fraud and theft towards a spouse were removed.

Undoubtedly, the lack of involvement and participation of women's rights groups prevented the demands of religious and secular women's rights groups from being met. Speaking on behalf of the Printemps, one interviewee argued that this bill was a bill against violence against women only in name, given that it contained provisions that focused on violence against minors, parents and children (AMDF, 2016). Another key critique involved the fact that the bill did not have a preamble that determined the objectives, clarified the socio-political context

and referenced key international and domestic legal frameworks (AMDF, 2016). In fact, due to its lack of breadth, the bill was perceived to go against international conventions like the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (AMDF, 2016).

It was even seen as a regression from the draft bill in many ways. First, not only was violence not defined clearly (Forum Al Zahra, 2016), the bill no longer contained the provision that psychological violence was a form of violence, thereby preventing moral harassment from being criminalised (AMDF, 2016). The specific needs of marginalised women, such as those from rural areas and Amazighe women were not taken into consideration (Voix de la Femme Amazighe, 2016). Criticism also revolved around the removal of several acts as acts of violence against women, such as marital theft and fraud, light violence against women, and breaching the integrity of women, and the legitimacy of a medical certificate (AMDF, 2016).

Added to that were the fact that marital rape was not included in both texts and rape not defined within a human rights framework (AMDF, 2016; Amal, 2016; Woman Action, 2016). Though the criminalisation of certain acts such as expelling a woman from the marital home and refusing her access, as well as forced marriage and squandering the money of the household, were welcomed, the fact that these necessitated a complaint from the victim was deplored, as the state has a duty to stop violence (AMDF, 2016). What interviewees agreed on was that the bill was nothing more than amendments included in the draft bill of the Penal Code. As one of them said,

'The criminal provisions in this bill already exist in the draft bill of the Penal Code and the draft bill on the Code of Criminal Procedure. There is nothing new in this draft legislation. So, if we move the dispositions of this bill to the Penal Code, there is nothing left. There are no

autonomous dispositions solely reserved for this bill. When the Penal Code will be amended, this bill will become void. It does not have a raison d'etre' (AMDF, 2016).

This view was also shared by Islamic women's groups, which were against simply having amendments to the Penal Code. According to Forum Al Zahra, 'we would like to have a specific law, rather than amendments to the Penal Code. We would like a legal framework that fights violence against women before it even reaches women, what we call prevention' (2016).

Unlike secular activists, Forum Al Zahra saw the bill presented by the PJD as being a progression, given the fact that it was the most comprehensive draft legislation on violence against women in Morocco unlike previous draft legislations presented by Yasmina Baddou in the cabinet of Driss Jettou between 2002 and 2007 and Nezha Skalli in the cabinet of Abbas el Fassi between 2007 and 2012 (2016). Moreover, the Forum had a more nuanced attitude towards the bill, pointing out positive measures such as its recognition that violence is not just physical, its institutionalisation of commissions and instances that tackle violence against women, and the fact that the perpetrator needs to be removed from the victim (Forum Al Zahra). However, it lamented that this removal only started after a court decision, and not immediately upon the victim's complaint. It also complained about the fact that the definition of violence was not comprehensive and that the text did not consider treating the person that commits violence, amongst others. Nonetheless, the Forum was more positive about the bill because this question had been discussed under 3 governments, and it was the first time this draft legislation finally reached Parliament (Forum Al Zahra). In fact, the Forum stated that, 'the fact that it reached Parliament is a very good thing, regardless of its content, because we can hope that the Parliament can help improve this text' (Forum Al Zahra, 2016). Thus, for the Forum, the bill was far from being an obstacle to the claims of women's rights groups and coalitions. This contrasted with the more rigid position of secular groups and coalitions mobilising on this issue.

More important for women's rights groups and coalitions was the fact that civil society's role was extremely restricted in both the draft bill and the bill. The first version required civil society groups to have the status of organisations of public utility, if they wanted to be civil parties in criminal proceedings (AMDF, 2016). However, women's rights groups fighting against violence did not have such a status, and were therefore excluded (AMDF, 2016). The second version which was voted by the Council of government in March 2016, changed this disposition and allowed for only a private audience for criminal proceedings, rather than a public one, and now required the victim's authorisation (AMDF, 2016).

It was perceived that civil society's role was not firmly established, in spite of the Constitution's call for participatory governance. As one interviewee lamented,

'The composition of this bill totally ignores civil society that works on this domain. Civil society worked on combatting violence against women before the government joined it in its efforts. We have groups that have pioneered refuge centres. Civil society has acquired expertise in this domain and contributed a lot. We think that this text only calls upon these groups when it deems suitable. In 2011, we got a constitution that opened a great door to participatory democracy. This constitution requires all instances to engage civil society in the adoption of public policies, in monitoring. We find that this text ignores all of this' (Forum Az Zahra, 2016).

What this discussion shows is that while the government presented draft legislation on violence against women, it actively sought to sideline Moroccan women's rights groups and coalitions. It is not surprising that the PJD-led Cabinet has been resistant to the vision of the secular current of the movement. This party has been their traditional opponent, staging counter-protests against their proposals to reform the Moudawana in the early 2000s (chapter 4). What is

surprising is that it has equally sidelined Forum Al Zahra, which is associated with the party. This shows the limits of ideology in ensuring effective allyship.

Despite restricting the participation of women's rights groups, the government provided material resources, though these were deemed insufficient and discriminator. First, organisations with a public utility status had more access to state funding, while others were forced to search for projects supported by other national actors (Woman Action, 2016). Representatives from several organisations reported not receiving any funds from the government, leading them to look for funding abroad. However, even those organisations that received material support admitted that this was so low that they had to resort to other sources of funding to carry out their activities. As one noted,

'We receive very little from the government. It does not even represent one percent of our overall budget. Other organisations also receive very little. Without the support of our international partners, we would be struggling' (Solidarite Feminine , 2016).

Members of the Spring of Dignity even reported that those women's groups associated with the dominant political party, the PJD, received favourable treatment. For instance, one reports that only 10 women from amongst the groups unaffiliated with this party could afford to participate in a meeting organised by the UN commission on the status of women in New York, whereas many more women from PJD-affiliated groups could travel there (AMDF, 2016). However, I also came across groups that were independent, yet also received funding for human rights projects through a competitive process (Amal, 2016).

Besides slowly progressing on the topic of violence against women, denying women's rights groups and coalitions participation in drafting legislation, and providing limited material support, the government also directly attacked activists and engaged in character assassination. This took the form of making personal attacks on them or their claims. Examples include the

government mocking their recommendation to criminalise marital rape and the minister for Justice, Mustapha Ramid stating that the husband can do whatever he wants with his wife (Amal, 2016). Another reported that some elements within the government accuse women's rights groups of not only attacking Islam (FLDDF, 2016b), but also of serving a foreign agenda, which has led some to spend time to defend themselves against these allegations. As one interviewee said,

'We work so hard, to say that it's us working for us, not other beliefs or Western ideas, or perversion, because this is what people think, especially the Islamic government. They exploit each occasion there have. They don't let it slip' (UFL, 2016).

These interviews are in line with my findings from the claims-analysis. Indeed, prominent figures within the PJD denied the existence of violence against women, questioned official statistics on the matter, and even stated that women play a more important role in the family.

Alongside their tenuous relationship with individuals with the PJD, secular activists lamented the failure of liberal and left-wing political parties within the government, such as the National Rally of Independents and the PPS, to take advantage of their position and exert pressure. Even though interviewees recognised the contribution of the former Minister for the Family, and member of the PPS - Nezha Skalli – some complained that such energy and willingness were not shared by other members (Woman Action, 2016). As a representative of the Spring of Dignity coalition exclaimed,

'Our traditional allies are left-wing and liberal parties. However, with regards to the Left, the Party of Progress and Socialism and the Communists, at the beginning, were strategic allies, including the former Minister for the Family, who was a member of this party. Often, they will not go beyond having a principled position. If they are in government, it means that they can put a veto on certain things, which has not happened. This is the same thing with the liberals,

such as the National Rally of Independents. The First Chamber is headed by a member of this Rally. Their position and engagement before and after being in government, which happened following a reform, is quite different. I know that the president of the Parliament can delay things, but we are not seeing this. So, saying that they are for equality as a principled position is ok, but it does not go beyond that. This poses a problem (2016).

This quote is in line with the social movement's literature's assumption that being in government constraints political parties because they have to balance different interests and responsibilities. As we have seen in chapter 2, because parties in government and mainstream parties have to represent and be accountable to the general public, they are more constrained than niche and opposition parties in actively supporting social movements who represent particular interests (Hutter and Vliegenthart, 2016).

What activists needed was more pressure and resolve. As one interviewee put it, 'there needs to be a great willingness and determination, and even bang fists on the table to make progress (Woman Action, 2016).

To illustrate this lack of willingness, one interviewee referred to the fact that many ministers and female parliamentarians failed to take responsibility and seize the opportunity to vote against the version of bill 103-13 discussed at the Council of Government in March 2016:

'Even though the PPS is a progressive political party with lots of great ministers, it does not assume its responsibility. Most ministers were absent for the meeting of the Council of Government… They knew about the meeting, but they were too busy. There was also the issue of the Sahara and Ban Ki Moon. There were many absences. Ministers, especially women that were in Morocco did not want to take responsibility. They did not insist' (AMDF, 2016).

In sum, in the public sphere, government actors were overwhelmingly committed to combating violence against women, as demonstrated by their pledges and proposal of legislation. They provided moral resources to women's rights activists. However, interviews with activists reveal a different reality. First, the dominant party in the coalition government – the PJD – was seen as being a key obstacle to having a satisfactory law on violence against women by secular activists. Activists pointed to the slowness of progress on this matter, their lack of participation in drafting legislation, and the content of the draft bill and the bill, as evidence of opposition to combating violence against women. While Islamic women's rights groups shared similar grievances, they did not qualify the PJD as being an obstacle, and were more positive about its efforts. Second, even though secular activists regarded left-wing and liberal parties in government, such as the PPS and the RNI as their traditional allies, they claimed that their support once in government, was essentially rhetorical, and they criticised their lack of pressure on the PJD. We can thus see that for allies in government, moral resources are not enough. What is needed was exerting leverage over the perceived target and opposition to mobilisation, which in this case was the PJD. I now turn my attention to another type of domestic political actor: opposition parties.

Despite the opposition putting public pressure on the government to make progress on the issue of violence against women, activists perceived them to not be doing much. Much like political parties in government, they saw them as not doing more than providing moral resources in the form of rhetorical support. Further, political parties were widely perceived to have a lack of interest in women's issues and to be engaging in violence against women themselves, irrespective of their ideology.

In fact, there was a sense that women's issues were of secondary importance to political parties and male politicians (Femmes Progressistes, 2016), leading them to providing ad hoc support, though the commitment of Nabila Mounib who led the Unified Socialist Party was noted

(Woman Action, 2016). Some reported that political parties held meetings with them, though while they asked questions, they were perceived as not following through with more concrete actions. In the words of an interviewee,

'When we speak with a political party, or a local or national actor, they say "we agree, this is a good initiative, we will see what we can do." However, the reality is different. Nobody disagrees. Everybody agrees and says it is a good initiative' (Amal, 2016).

If we consider the fact that the RCA shows that all political elites agree with combating violence against women in Morocco, this could suggest that opposition does not take the form of direct repression, but neglect of the issue and inconsequential moral support. Political parties provided rhetorical support without exerting pressure. In the words of an interviewee,

'The support is oral. There is agreement with the principles we defend. Political parties come up with a satisfactory program, but one needs to see the implementation. What sort of pressure are they exerting in Parliament? What pressure are they exerting in government? This is what we need, not oral support. Oral support is good, but we need something more effective' (Solidarite Feminine, 2016).

Others reported that some political parties did propose legislation and participated in their actions (Mains Libres, 2016), but would only lobby for limited change. According to an interview, political parties were fine with their law proposal and did ask questions to the relevant ministry and inside parliament during relevant oral sessions (Amal, 2016). However, they failed to push the Minister for the Family to come up with a law, justifying it with the lack of political will from the Ministry (Ibid). Moreover, the interviewee deplored the fact that some political parties suggested proposing a modified version of their project though they did not follow suit, and only showing real support to amending specific provisions in existing texts,

such as modifying articles 16 and 20 of the Family Code, amending article 475 of the Penal Code (Ibid).

Before the government adopted a bill on violence against women at a meeting of the Council of Government in March 2016, the lack of enthusiasm from other political parties to adopt and defend the proposals of women's rights groups and coalitions, was noted and was explained as being the result of a lack of enthusiasm. What was needed was more mobilisation on the part of political parties:

'As civil society, our role is to propose, we do not have the power to promulgate a law. This is the role of Parliament. This is the problem. We already made a proposal, but a political party needs to adopt and defend the draft legislation, so that the government agrees to pass it' (Amal, 2016).

Not only were political parties perceived as being uninterested and uncommitted to women's issues in general, they were also thought to be directly in violence against women themselves, making political parties an unsafe arena for women. As one interview who used to be part of a liberal party complained,

'We do not talk about political violence inside political parties. There is a lot of violence. Some women prefer to work inside associations [civil society groups] instead of becoming members of a political party because you are penalised for not conforming to traditional views and for making remarks or observations. This is a form of violence for which there is no punishment. […] Even though there are structures for women inside political parties, we do not have this freedom to provoke a discussion on the theme of women. When this is talked about, it is usually before the elections; it is for external consumption. I have never ever been in a political party that had a debate about women's issues, including violence against women and equality. […] Women that are now in Parliament through a quota system, it is thanks to militant women that

have fought. However, these women are penalised by political parties for daring to provoke a discussion and going beyond political parties. In other words, for not obeying them. And to penalise them, political parties have put other women in place and pushed aside militant ones. So, women that dare to speak do not have a place inside political parties. It is only when a law is on its way that political parties want to appropriate it. However, thematic areas and important questions concerning us have never been areas of interest of political parties generally speaking' (Woman Action, 2016).

This quote is in line with my discussion of the role of political parties for women's rights activists in Morocco. As I have shown in chapter 4, political parties strongly criticised UAF's petition to reform the Moudawana in the 1990s, as it came at a time when the political environment was becoming more liberalised. Parties did not want women's rights activists to frustrate this liberalisation by addressing a divisive topic. In fact, the formation of the first women's associations in Morocco were encouraged by their inability to act on their interests within the structures of political parties (chapter 4).

Furthermore, political parties distorted and fragmented the efforts of institutional female activists through their exploitation of the quota system. Female parliamentarians mobilised together for quotas to mobilise for women's rights inside the political establishment (Woman Action, 2016). However, political parties exploited quotas to increase the presence of women that were not invested in women's issues, but instead were there because of connections and opportunism (Woman Action, 2016). This reduced the scope for activism inside political parties and reduced the chances of a homogeneous mobilisation inside politics (Woman Action, 2016).

These assessments of political parties align with their public performances. The RCA has shown that political parties, and particularly the left-leaning PPS and USFP provided moral

resources, but not much beyond that. They did not provide material, informational or human resources. However, parties in the opposition did try to exert moral leverage over the government on its attitude towards the criminalisation of violence against women.

Besides political parties, the King was also seen as a key potential source of allyship, though his participation was not particularly welcome. In speaking about reforms, interviewees did not emphasise the role of the King. Their interlocutors remained representative institutions. They revealed writing countless memoranda, holding press conferences and even demonstrating to encourage politicians to make progress on the criminalisation of violence against women in Morocco. As one interviewee mentioned,

'If the King decides to change things, they change immediately the day after. […] We should not need to resort to the King. If we are going to resort to the King, then why not get rid of Parliament? Why not get rid of ministers? What would be the point of these structures then? We should be a parliamentary monarchy. We should not be in a monarchy where the King settles debates and decides everything (MALI, 2016).

In conclusion, even though opposition political parties pressured the government to draft a satisfactory law on violence against women that conformed to international standards, this support was not particularly visible to activists. Interviewees perceived them as unwilling to provide more than moral resources. Not only were political parties perceived as being uninterested in the topic, they were also criticised for engaging in violence against women themselves. In spite of the less than satisfactory role of political parties and resistance from the PJD, interviewees did not call for greater involvement of the monarchy. This contrasts with previous efforts, wherein women's rights activists sought the arbitrage of the King in the face of fierce opposition from Islamists in the beginning of the 21st century (chapter 4).

6.4.2. State Actors

In chapters 2, I have argued that since democratic and representative institutions have no power and since the monarchy is the supreme institution, we should not expect other institutions to be perceived as useful sources of elite allyship. In fact, if we go back to the discussion in chapter 4 about the reform of the Moudawana, we can see that state institutions did not play a major role. Chapter 5 has contradicted this and shown that constitutional institutions, particularly in the form of the CNDH, performed allyship through the provision of moral resources and exerted leverage over other domestic elites.

My interviews reveal that though constitutional institutions only perform an advisory role, they were perceived as facilitating the mobilisation of secular activists for legal reforms on violence against women, and specifically, members of the Spring of Dignity coalition, thanks to its production of expert publications. As one spokesperson for the coalition declared,

'I think one of the greatest strengths of the Spring of Dignity coalition is that it has managed to ensure that national institutions, and particularly the National Council for Human Rights and the Social and Economic Council, have a similar position to the Spring with regards to violence against women, gender issues, and penal legislations more globally. I think this is an asset' (2016).

Interviewees also recognised the important role of the National Council for Human Rights producing reports and memoranda, particularly on issues such as abortion to advise decision-makers (AMDF, 2016). The CNDH was considered to be willing to be part of the solution, and particularly engaged on the matter, going so far as amplifying the voice of activists (Jossour, 2016).

In sum, the previous chapter has shown that while the judiciary, ministries and constitutional institutions all made recommendations on tackling violence against women, the CNDH was

the strongest critic of the government, with some of its members adopting a particularly antagonistic tone towards the government. Though interviewees did not pronounce themselves much on these institutions, the CNDH was the key actor that was noted as being particularly supportive. It was seen as offering explicit recommendations in line with the broad aims of the most visible secular women's rights groups and coalitions. However, it is not surprising that the actors praising the CNDH are, or have been, associated with the Printemps coalition. A representative from this institution revealed in an interview that while there were other coalitions, they essentially worked with the Printemps (CNDH, 2016).

6.4.3. International Actors

Chapters 2 and 4 have shown that IGOs and foreign governments have historically played a major role in promoting women's rights in Morocco. Chapter 5 has revealed that these international actors provide the most diverse range of resources, engage in leverage politics, but also collaborate with domestic political actors. They therefore engage in double mobilisation. In this section, I show that though activists did not perceive all of these forms of support, they nonetheless saw international actors as being important sources of opportunities. This supports Keck and Sikkink's (1998) Boomerang Pattern of advocacy, wherein international allies can help alleviate the constraints activists face at home.

Interviewees recognised the important role of foreign governments and intergovernmental organisations.They saw great potential in them, and recognised their efforts, but were ultimately disappointed in their approach. These actors were praised for providing a range of resources, but criticised for providing support that frustrated their advocacy efforts, and for not being more consistent in their assistance.

Interviewees also acknowledged that international actors could exert a lot of influence on Moroccan decision-makers and that mobilisation at the national level could not succeed

without international support. Moreover, activists argued that they exploited mutual interests between countries to bring to light the issue of human rights (Woman Action, 2016). As a spokesperson for Femmes Progressistes claimed,

'I think for Morocco, international pressure is very important, and even more important than pressure at the national level. This is because the intervention of the UE and and the UN gives more results than pressure at the national level, due to the various economic interests. So international pressure is more beneficial and important' (2016).

Activists also justified this on the basis of previous efforts to effect legal changes in Morocco with regards to women's rights. For instance, the reform of the Family Code in 2004 that was hailed as being progressive, though not emancipatory, was perceived as being the result of mobilisation at the national level, and pressure and action at the international level (Woman Action, 2016). Other outcomes included nationality rights for children from a mixed couple and quotas for women in politics (FLDDF, 2016a).

Moreover, activists recognised that Moroccan political institutions such as the Ministry of Justice received funding from the European Union to implement certain political programs, and that this was tied to making progress on certain issues (IPDF, 2016). However, some lamented the fact that despite funding from the European Union, the governmental plan for equality between 2012 and 2016, otherwise known as the plan Ikram plan, was not implemented (FLDDF, 2016a).

Finally, another reason why interviewees saw international actors as potentially useful was because Morocco had signed several international treaties related to women's rights, such as the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and that Morocco had to demonstrate that it was acting in line with the terms of the treaties.

International conventions were regarded as being particularly important because the 2011 Constitution recognised the need to harmonise national laws with international conventions (Federation de la Ligue Democratique des Droits des Femmes, 2016a). Indeed, the preamble states that Morocco has as one of its objectives,

'To comply with the international conventions duly ratified by it, within the framework of the provisions of the Constitution and of the laws of the Kingdom, within respect for its immutable national identity, and on the publication of these publications, [their] primacy over the internal law of the country, and to harmonise in consequence the pertinent provisions of national legislation' (Ruchti, 2012).

To some extent, international elite actors were regarded as facilitating the mobilisation for reforms on violence against women in Morocco. A key resource was that they provided access to their structures and legitimacy to their claims. For instance, a couple of organisations presented reports to the UN Committee Against Torture, and the UN Committee for Human Rights, both in Geneva calling on Morocco to have a comprehensive law on violence against women, and that these recommendations were subsequently adopted by these committees.

Interviewees argued that access to these international institutions was made possible by the accreditation from the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) that their organisations enjoyed. Many Moroccan non-governmental organisations that work on the issue of women's rights have ECOSOC consultative status, which permit them to access the ECOSOC, but also its subsidiary bodies and UN human rights structures. One interviewee even reported that each time they participated in UN meetings, women's rights was one of the thematic issues that had the support of everyone (Woman Action, 2016).

Activists further argued that Morocco's signing of human rights conventions led to a situation of rhetorical entrapment, which worked to their advantage. They hoped to exploit the normative

commitments made by the Moroccan government to these international bodies, to push for their claims. In other words, they hoped that it would entrap itself in its own rhetoric. As one interviewee described,

'The government has to face the [UN] Human Rights Council in front of everyone. Human rights mechanisms are a great opportunity for us. The government accepts the recommendations in a spontaneous manner. It says "Yes, I accept this." So when it comes back home, we remind the government that it has accepted out of its own will and had the choice of not accepting, so it has to apply the recommendations and not have a double talk. It is a way of negotiating rights here' (FLDDF, 2016).

However, intergovernmental organisations were perceived as doing more than just provide moral resources through granting legitimacy. UN Women was praised by members of the Spring of Dignity coalition for providing the experiences of its cadres, such as Leila Rhiwi, though she used to be part of a Moroccan women's rights NGO before joining the UN (AMDF, 2016). The UN's ability to engage the Moroccan government was also commended. Besides the UN, interviewees declared enjoying relations with EU bodies such as the European Parliament and Euromed – a Euro-Mediterranean partnership program, and Western European and North American governments, to exert pressure on the Moroccan government (IPDF, 2016; Femmes Progressistes, 2016; MALI, 2016). These relations were done through foreign embassies and competitive grants from these countries for advocacy projects, such as the US's Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) (Woman Action, 2016; Jossour, 2016).

Despite reporting the positive role of intergovernmental organisations and foreign governments, interviewees were quick to point out the limits of their facilitation. Grievances included the lack of leverage and accountability politics, the lack of support for political work, the rigidity of support, the emphasis on material support, and favouritism. These factors were

regarded as limiting the extent to which these actors could act as a source of opportunity for legal reforms on violence against women in Morocco.

A key critique of interviewees was that while these international actors helped with specific programs, they would go so far as exerting pressure on Moroccan decision-makers and holding them accountable. Though the EU once threatened to pull back its funding from governmental projects, this was rare, and the demands of Moroccan women's rights groups and coalitions to exert more pressure often fell on deaf ears (Solidarite Feminine, 2016).

One interviewee also claimed that 'the European Union helps. It provides material support amongst other things. However, it does not hold Morocco accountable with regards to how it spends EU funding' (AMDF, 2016). What was needed particularly from the European Union, the Council of Europe, the United Nations and rapporteurs on violence was political support (AMDF, 2016). This was because these actors had presented their remarks to Morocco with regards to the Penal Code, the Code for Criminal Procedure, and their awaited law on violence against women (AMDF, 2016). They therefore had a responsibility to monitor progress on these matters and exert pressure (AMDF, 2016).

Interviewees also reported that international actors preferred supporting public awareness campaigns to prevent violence against women and structures such as helping manage listening centres for women victims of violence, instead of helping with policy advocacy. This has resulted in women's rights groups and coalitions being on a constant lookout for international organisations that would help them with their advocacy efforts (Mains Libres, 2016).

Besides, the bureaucratic procedure underlying these partnerships slowed their work. One interviewee complained about the fact that there was too much administrative work to undertake, as well as tasks irrelevant to the project, which prevented them from getting on with the project (Woman Action, 2016). In fact, the whole structure between international supporters

and women's rights NGOs in Morocco was considered inadequate, as priority areas were perceived as being imposed by funders, which had for effect of diverting attention away from pressing problems. As one interviewee testified,

'Now, there is some degree of awareness that priorities should be shaped by local realities. However, there are still some priorities that are imposed by funders. It is done in a subtle manner. There are diagnostic workshops that determine the issues we will be working on. These issues may be important when a funding request is made, however, the context changes and other priorities appear. Unfortunately, organisations are trapped in their contracts, their partnership, and the results they need to show, even if they are not relevant. There is a rigidity with funders, especially with regards to the EU. They are really rigid concerning the terms of the contract they establish (Collectif Aswat, 2016).

Interviewees also wanted more than funding, though they welcomed it. There was a perception that the support of international actors such as foreign governments and IGOs was essentially financial (MALI, 2016; Solidarite Feminine, 2016). However, they declared wanting them to invest themselves more in various ways, such as lobbying the Moroccan government on their behalf. Lobbying from foreign goverments and IGOs, particularly the EU, was considered particularly important because of they perceived that the various interests between countries, which I mentioned above, would mean that Morocco would be more attentive to the demands of other states and of international institutions (FLDDF, 2016a, 2016b). As one interviewee recommended that they should not only hold the Moroccan government to account, but also make integrate lobbying in their partnerships:

'We are not asking for much. Our funders should be in line with us, and also lobby our governments, because when decision-makers claim in front of international institutions that they are defending women's human rights and achieved a lot of progress, their files on this

matter need to be shown to tell them that there is much to do still. [...]. I would not sign a partnership agreement purely based on money. No, I would also want you to support me by doing advocacy on my behalf to my government. If things were like this, we would have progressed a lot' (Solidarite Feminine, 2016).

Finally, less visible organisations reported that IGOs were not acting in a fair and honest manner, due to their penchant for supporting certain organisations, generally the bigger ones, to the detriment of others. One interviewee argued that there were clientelistic connections between figures in well-known Moroccan women's rights groups and some IGOs such as the United Nations, resulting in a form of favouritism that marginalised smaller organisations, especially those from the South of Morocco (Woman Action, 2016). Thus, while this is evidence that IGOs provided informational resources, it also shows that there stark inequalities in their provision.

In sum, we can see that there is a gulf between the public actions of foreign governments and IGOs in the debate on violence against women in Morocco, and how these actors were perceived by Moroccan women's rights groups and coalitions. Firstly, an analysis of the claims articulated by these actors in the public sphere suggests that they engaged in leverage and accountability politics, by calling on the Moroccan government to reform various legal codes, criticising its slow progress on the issue of violence against women, and shaming the content of its draft legislation. However, my interviewees argued that such pressure was not forthcoming. Moreover, they claimed that their relationship with them was fraught with difficulties and that they were not facilitating their efforts in a way that was satisfactory to them. While they recognised the fact that these actors provided the widest range of support out of all elite actors involved in this debate, they deplored their unwillingness to challenge the Moroccan government, their emphasis on material support, and the management of their partnership with them.

6.5. Conclusion

In this chapter, I sought to offer an insight into how political elites at the national and international level were perceived to interact with domestic activists on the issue of violence against women in Morocco. This was done to determine to what extent these elites were perceived as facilitating their mobilisation for the criminalisation of violence against women, and therefore uncover what effective elite allyship looks like. I have found that constitutional institutions such as the CNDH were seen as being helpful domestic elite actors because unlike politicians and political parties, they were perceived to be providing more than inconsequential moral support. We can better understand why activists thought that providing moral resources was not enough, if we consider the case of the PJD. Figures within the ruling political party provided public support for their aims, but resisted them in private. International elite actors were also perceived as being good sources of opportunity because of their provision of a range of resources. However, though these actors engaged in moral leverage towards domestic political actors, this was not perceived by activists. Nonetheless, based on the insights by interviews, we can deduce that effective elite allyship possesses the following characteristics: the provision of a range of resources, the use of moral leverage over other political elites and collaboration with activists. However, an interesting finding is that activists also preferred allyship from representative and democratic institutions. In the early 2000s, activists appealed to the King, in the face of fierce opposition by Islamists. However, in this campaign, activists preferred to ignore the King, even though the PJD-led government was perceived as being an obstacle to their claims, and political parties in general were seen as being uninterested in the issue. This suggests that even in non-democratic settings, elite allyship from representative and democratic institutions is preferred.

7. Conclusion

7.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I reflect on my findings, as well as their significance and limitations. The key driver for my research was a desire to develop our understanding of elite allyship. As I have explained in the introductory chapter, elite allies occupy a key position in the (political) opportunity literature. However, the role of elite allies in helping social movements has not been rigorously examined, nor is there sufficient theorisation on the interactions between elite allies and social movements. We know little beyond the fact that elite allies are useful for social movements. Moreover, our understanding of the role of elite allies for social movements is based on democratic countries. I thus systematically examined the extent to which elite allies are a good predictor of policy change favourable to a social movement, when the latter is mobilising. I also drew on the case study of the mobilisation for the criminalisation of violence against women in Morocco, to explore the many ways in which elite allyship can be performed, and what performances are perceived as acts of elite allyship by social movements, in a non-democratic setting. I drew on theoretical insights from the literatures on social movements, transnational advocacy and political representation, to examine the relationship between elite allies and social movements.

I brought to the fore the agency of political elites to remedy the movement-centric bias in the literature. External actors are often neglected in analyses of social movements, because they are assumed to be little more than the context of a social movement (Jasper, 2004). One cannot make sense of social movements if one omits from the analysis other relevant actors participating in the same issue. This observation rests on my assumption that external actors impose constraints on, and provide possibilities to, social movements (Jasper, 2004). I sought to clarify what it means to perform elite allyship towards a social movement, by examining

how acts of allyship are performed and perceived. Before looking at these interactions, I sought to determine if elite allies are even relevant for the study of the relationship between social movement mobilisation and policy change. Below are my research questions and my findings.

1. To what extent is the presence of elite allies a strong predictor of policy outcomes favourable to a social movement, when the latter is mobilising?

In my theoretical framework, I explained that to understand favourable policy outcomes to social movements, one needs to understand the context of their mobilisation. I have provided an overview of the literature on the relationship between social movements, opportunities and policy. This showed that amidst the plethora of works that highlight the significance of opportunities in general, and elite allies in particular, are a few exceptions that cast doubt on these orthodoxies.

To untangle this relationship, I carried out a meta-analysis of quantitative academic papers on the subject. I have employed a meta-analysis to systematically analyse the association between different dimensions of opportunity linked to different models of opportunity, and policy change, controlling for social movement mobilisation. I have drawn on this method because I wanted to determine which models and dimensions of opportunity have the greatest explanatory power, and where elite allies fit in this assessment.

In this chapter, I have employed a meta-analysis to systematically analyse the association between different dimensions of opportunity linked to different models of opportunity, and policy change, controlling for social movement mobilisation. I have done this to determine systematically which models and dimensions of opportunity have the greatest explanatory power. I have also done this to assess how relevant elite allies are for policy-making on an issue relevant to a social movement. I wanted to test the assumption that the presence of elite allies

is a source of opportunity for social movements. I have found out that neither potential nor actual elite allies are strong predictors of policy outcomes favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation. This finding puts into question the veracity of the claim that social movements benefit from the presence of allies in power. In the next few chapters, I consider in more detail the relationship between elite allies and social movements, through a case study of the mobilisation for legislative reforms on violence against women in Morocco, to better understand exactly what the former contributes to the latter.

Based on an examination of the proportion of successful relationships within each model, almost all models fail to be strong predictors of policy change favourable to mobilising social movements. Out of the 9 dimensions included in the political opportunity model, 3 (33%) are positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation, at both the test and study level. Out of the 6 dimensions included in the discursive opportunity model, 2 (33%) are positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation, though only at the test level. Out of the 14 dimensions included in the socio-economic opportunity model, 3 (21.4%) are positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation, at both the test and study levels. A further 3 (21.4%) are also positively associated with favourable policy change, at either the test or study level. Out of the 4 dimensions included in the legal opportunity model, 1 (25%) is positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation, at both the test and study levels. Out of the 3 dimensions included in the supra-national opportunity model, 2 (66%) are positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement, controlling for mobilisation, though only at the test level.

Out of these models, the dimensions of opportunity that are significantly associated with favourable policy change at both the test and study levels are: political openness, election year,

administrative capacity, spending, national income, ethnic/racial equality, poverty, and supportive legislators. Of these, the success rate at both the test and study levels is above 50% for political openness, administrative capacity, national income, poverty, and supportive legislators. The effect size is statistically significant at both levels for political openness, administrative capacity, spending, national income, and ethnic or racial equality. These findings question the significance of opportunities for social movements mobilising for policy influence, though they highlight the relevance of structural opportunities, at a time when dynamic opportunities are becoming increasingly popular in studies of social movements.

The dimensions measuring the presence of potential or actual elite allies in my meta-analysis are: left-wing or ideologically progressive legislators, supportive legislators, liberal states, left-wing or progressive executive, left-wing or progressive government, politicians with a similar socio-economic status as the constituency of a social movement, political endorsement by politicians or political parties, and court decisions in favour of a social movement. Out of these, only the presence of supportive legislators is consistently associated with policy change favourable to a social movement, in the presence of mobilisation. This suggests that potential elite allies and the performance of elite allyship may not be sources of opportunity for social movements wishing to influence public policy.

This finding has a key implication for the literature on social movements. It suggests that despite the assumptions of the (political) opportunity literature, elite allies may not be a source of opportunity for social movements. We may be over-stating the relevance of these actors. This assessment is in line with research that highlights that elite allies do not play a significant role in helping social movements influence the policy-making process. Uba's (2005, p. 391) study of anti-privatisation mobilisation in India shows that elite allies do not have a direct

impact on privatisation policy.[53] However, my findings do not go as far as supporting those of Soule and Olzak's (2004), which show that the presence of elite allies may be negatively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement.

To investigate why the presence of elite allies is seemingly unhelpful for social movements seeking to influence policy, I examined in detail their interactions with social movements in the case study of the mobilisation for the criminalisation of violence against women in Morocco. In what follows, I lay out the research questions associated with this case study, as well as my findings, and their implications.

2. To what extent do the claims of various elite political actors align with those of domestic activists in Morocco on the issue of violence against women?

In my theoretical framework, I have argued that it is not enough to look at the presence of elite allies to determine the extent to which they act as a source of opportunity. Drawing on a definition of elite allies that centres on performance, and which I have borrowed from social movement scholars (Kriesi *et al.*, 1995; Giugni, 2004; Uba, 2005), I argue that to determine if an elite political actor is a potential ally, we need to look at the extent to which that actor performs acts of allyship. Based on the assumption that elite political allies have a responsibility to take up social movements' claims (Giugni, 2004; Tarrow, 2011), I expected elite allies to be those actors that engage in the political representation of social movements, by articulating claims that align with theirs in the public sphere.

I explored this expectation through a specific type of content analysis called representative claims-analysis. I have selected this method for three reasons. First, a claims-analysis allowed

---

[53] See also Olzak and Uhrig (2001).

me to examine the policy positions of various actors on the issue of violence against women in Morocco. It also allowed me to identify their tactical repertoires, as well as the frames they drew on to justify their positions (Beyeler and Kriesi, 2005). It further allowed me to capture the interactions between actors, and to understand the networks that exist (Koopmans and Statham, 1999). I limited my examination of claim-alignment between elite political actors and Moroccan activists on violence against women to four variables. The first one refers to the constituency represented by an array of representatives. The second one refers to the policy position of said representatives. The third one refers to the addressee called upon by representatives to advance their position. The fourth one refers to the justification that underlies representatives' claims. I have limited my analysis to these dimensions to capture alignment on the object of representation, and on diagnostic and prognostic frames, which respectively refer to the reason for a problem, and the solution to a problem.

I have uncovered that overall, elite allyship is performed by a range of actors in the context of the debate on VAW in Morocco. This is because the claims of various elite political actors align with those of Moroccan women's rights groups and coalitions on the dimensions I have examined. First, intergovernmental organisations, foreign governments, the Moroccan government, opposition political parties, Parliament, bureaucracies and the judiciary agree with Moroccan women's rights groups and coalitions that the primary constituency affected by VAW is women. Second, similarly to Moroccan women's rights groups and coalitions, most claimants from intergovernmental organisations and the Moroccan government do not suggest a clear policy change. This contrasts with Moroccan bureaucrats, opposition political parties, and the judiciary who mostly advocate for concrete policy changes. Third, similarly to Moroccan women's rights groups and coalitions, most claimants from intergovernmental organisations, the Moroccan government, opposition political parties, other politicians, bureaucracies and the judiciary, believe that domestic political actors in Morocco are primarily

responsible for tackling VAW. Fourth, foreign governments, opposition political parties, Parliament and other politicians use arguments rooted in moral principles and rights to discuss VAW in Morocco, in the same vein as Moroccan women's rights groups and coalitions. Nonetheless, there is no one type of elite actor which aligns with Moroccan women's rights groups and coalitions across all four dimensions.

Taken together, these findings suggest that overall, the claims of elite political actors align with those of domestic activists - in the form of women's groups and coalitions - in Morocco on the issue of violence against women. I thus found international elite actors, domestic political actors and state actors to be performing allyship through representation. However, there is no one type of elite ally whose claims consistently align with that of Moroccan women's groups and coalitions. The most aligned elite actors appeared to be the Moroccan government and intergovernmental organisations, as they closely matched the claims of women's groups and coalitions on three out of the four dimensions discussed above.

The key implication is that since there is not one type of potential elite ally that consistently articulates claims that closely match those of social movement actors, the latter should not rely on any one set of elite actors as these may not be supportive on all their claims. This also means that in studying elite allyship, the scholarship should consider a broader constellation of elite actors, and not limit their analysis to one type. For instance, Minkoff (1997, p. 788)measures elite allies as the number of Democrats in the House of Representatives in the USA. Including in the analysis potential elite allies in other branches of government would have provided a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship between the presence of potential elite allies and protest dynamics (van Dyke, 2003, p. 231). However, besides political representation, elite actors can perform allyship by working with social movements, providing certain resources, and employing certain strategies. I explored these in the following research question.

3. Which strategies do these elite political actors employ and which resources do they provide to activists?

In my theoretical framework, I argued that there are three additional ways in which elite actors may perform allyship. These include working in conjunction with activists, providing different types of resources, and engaging other political elites. Drawing on the taxonomy of Cress and Snow (1996), I hypothesised that one form of elite allyship is the provision of moral, material, human, and informational resources. Still drawing on the social movement literature, I also hypothesised that a second way of performing elite allyship is working with social movements, preferably as part of a formal arrangement, such as a coalition. Based on Keck and Sikkink's (1998) Boomerang Model of transnational advocacy, I hypothesised elite allyship to consist of exerting moral or material leverage over those elite actors responsible for realising claims, and to consist of holding them accountable. However, based on Wu's (2005) Double Mobilisation thesis, I hypothesised that elite actors can also adopt non-confrontational strategies, and collaborate with other elites to persuade them to change their position.

I drew on representative claims analysis to examine the form and content of the representative claims on violence against women articulated by the elite political actors identified in the previous research question. I selected RCA because it allowed me to capture interactions between actors, alliances, networks, and positions. It thus provided me with a thick description of a range of actions and interactions. My claims analysis showed that elite actors were overall committed to working towards positive reforms on VAW, and to support women's groups and coalitions on this issue.

I have shown that the judiciary, inter-governmental organisations and foreign governments made joint claims with women's groups and coalitions. Support from these actors took the form of co-organising campaigns and meetings, and providing funding. This suggests that with regards to resources, such actors provided informational, human and to a lesser extent, material

support. The relationship between these and other elite actors and women's groups and coalitions, took the form of the network. This is because claims-making was generally not joint, and when it was, it did not involve consistent co-ordination.

My RCA also showed that the most frequent type of elite resource was moral, though elite actors also provided some material, human and informational support. With regards to strategies, elite actors engaged in both leverage politics and collaboration. They thus engaged in double mobilisation, as hypothesised by Wu (2005).

Prominent domestic political actors included senior Ministers, like the chief of state, parliamentarians from the Party of Progress and Socialism (PPS), which was part of the former coalition government, and parliamentarians from the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP), an opposition political party. These actors mostly provided moral resources to women's groups and coalitions. Concerning strategies, members of the opposition were the ones that engaged in moral leverage towards government figures.

State actors that performed relevant acts of allyship included Morocco's national human right's institution, national commissions, as well as jurists, legal bodies, and ministries. These actors mostly provided moral resources, but also human and informational. The national human rights commission, the Economic, Social and Environmental Council, and legal figures were particularly critical of the government, and engaged in moral leverage. They also provided recommendations alongside other state actors. State actors then engaged in double mobilisation.

International elite actors included intergovernmental organisations. Prominent among these were the United Nations its associated agencies. Other IGOs claimants came from the OECD, the Union for the Mediterranean, the World Health Organisation, the World Bank Group, and the Inter-parliamentiary Union. These actors performed allyship by providing moral resources in the form of statements supportive of women. They mostly engaged in moral leverage. They

also sought to educate governments, such as Morocco, on the need to tackle violence against women. In sum, these actors also engaged in double mobilisation.

These findings suggest that the range of resources provided by elite actors was limited. Since moral resources involve less commitment than material, human and informational resources, it could be argued that elite actors prefer to perform allyship in parallel to, rather than with, activists. However, elites engaged heavily with one another on this issue. Some of them took risks, such as criticising the Moroccan government, and potentially antagonising their relationship with the target of their claims. Nonetheless, they also collaborated with their target, through the provision of recommendations and through education. Thus, elite actors performed acts of allyship that de-centred social movements.

The implication of these findings is that research on the relationship between social movements and their allies should look at the provision of a broader range of elite resources, and move away from the standard focus on one type of resource. As I have stated in my theoretical framework, material resources are examined more thoroughly in the literature on domestic social movements. Since there is more interaction between potential elite allies and other elite actors, than between potential elite allies and social movements, research should focus more on how elites interact in institutional arenas to further the claims of social movements.

What do social movements think of the ways in which elite actors perform allyship? Are these performances enough to be considered an elite ally? I explored these issues in my last research question.

4. To what extent do domestic activists perceive these actors as being elite allies, and which type of elite allyship do they think is most conducive to helping them achieve their policy goals?

My thesis was guided by the assumption that an opportunity must be perceived as such to deserve this label. The definition of opportunity I have used is 'possibilities that originate outside the mobilising group, but affect its perceived changes of mobilising and/or realising its collective interests.' This is in line with my definition of elite allies as actors 'who are responsive and who are in a position to be able to reform existing policies' (Giugni, 2004, p. 170). To investigate the perceptions of women's groups and coalitions on the performances of elite actors, I drew on semi-structured interviews with representatives from various women's organisations and coalitions, in several cities in Morocco. I used this method because activists are the best source of information on their perceptions. Moreover, there is limited online data on the perceptions of elite actors by Moroccan women's groups.

My interviews revealed that few of the elite actors discussed above were perceived as facilitating mobilisation, and that there was a gulf between the actions of those they considered to be their elite allies and what they considered to be effective elite allyship. The ruling party, the Justice and Development party was perceived as being a key opponent. Those that were perceived as being elite allies included left-wing and liberal parties and politicians in Morocco, inter-governmental organisations, Western governments, and national institutions. These were criticised for not working with women's groups and coalitions, not providing enough resources, and not engaging in leverage and accountability politics.

Activists then preferred a model of elite allyship that involves leverage over the target of their claims, rather than a model of elite allyship that involves persuasion and collaboration. Another key criticism revolved around the lack of collaboration with elite allies. Thus, activists saw the parallel participation of elite allies – demonstrated by the RCA - as not being particularly useful. My interviews also also revealed that activists wanted elite allies to provide informational resources to help them mobilise effectively. In sum, women's groups and coalitions saw elite allies as not really being a good source of opportunity. More importantly,

my interviews showed that the source of elite allyship mattered greatly. Though the ruling party was perceived as being a key opponent, and political parties in general were perceived as unwilling to do much, activists did not consider appealing to the King, as they had done in the past. From my interviews, it appears that activists courted representative and democratic institutions because they wanted to make sure that change happens through democratic means. Even though the King is the highest authority in Morocco, his help was not sought-after.

To answer the research question, constitutional institutions and intergovernmental organisations were perceived as being elite allies, particularly because they provided different types of resources and worked with activists, not alongside them. We can thus deduce that effective elite allyship includes the following characteristics: the provision of a range of resources, the use of moral leverage over other political elites, collaboration with activists, and the use of democratic methods.

7.2. Theoretical and Empirical Contribution

In terms of theoretical contribution, my research highlights that though there are different sources of elite allyship in democratic and non-democratic contexts, there is not much difference in those that are perceived as being more useful. My case study shows that even though the King is the highest authority in Morocco, and can therefore make change happen, activists were more proactive in courting the support of democratic institutions, in spite of fierce opposition by the Islamist-led government and neglect by political parties. Moreover, if we go back to my discussion of the mobilisation for the reform of the Moudawana in chapter 2, we can see that activists were not always willing to resort to the King to achieve their goals. Thus, they did not always seek the support of those most capable of bringing about change, particularly in the post-Arab Spring era and the popular discourse on democracy. This challenges the assumption in the literature on civil society in the MENA that civil society

reinforces authoritarianism because it plays by the rules of the game to achieve its goals. Clearly the case of Morocco shows that this is not always the case, as activists in my case study refused to bypass democratic institutions to achieve the criminalisation of violence against women.

My findings lend support for the thesis that there is a difference between objective opportunities and perceived opportunities. Based on various measures of elite allyship in the literature on social movements, transnational advocacy and political representation, my findings suggest that several elite actors in my study could be considered elite allies. However, when I questioned activists about these actors, they painted a different picture. The public performances of elite actors do not align with their private interactions with activists. The implication is that, we should not limit our analysis of elite allyship to public displays. We should also not assume that elites whose ideological leaning is close to that of activists necessarily perform better allyship. As my interviews have revealed, despite being perceived as being allies, left-wing and liberal parties showed a lack of interest in the matter.

7.3. Limitations and Future Research

My research has helped shed light on the complex ways in which potential and perceived elite allies interact with social movements. However, it has some limitations. The first weakness is related to my research design, and specifically, to my use of a case study to explore three of my research questions. I used a case study because case studies allow researchers to answer 'how' questions. However, the use of a case study means that my research findings might not apply in other contexts. I cannot generalise my findings to other countries, movements, and even time-periods. A potential avenue for future research could be drawing on comparative research methods to determine to what extent my findings are specific to my case. I could compare the interactions between elite allies and women's groups and coalitions in Morocco,

Algeria, and Tunisia, three countries in the Maghreb region. Much like Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria also experienced mobilisation for the criminalisation of violence against women in the post-Arab Spring era. Unlike Morocco and Tunisia, which have only passed a bill on the matter, Algeria recently passed a law criminalising violence against women. Comparing the role of elite allies in these different scenarios would extend my research.

In my research, I have not investigated why elite actors offered the kind of support that they did. I have alluded to these issues in my theoretical framework, to explain which types of actors should be considered potential elite allies. I argued that there may be strategic, ideological and structural justifications for elite allyship. However, I have not delved on these issues as they were beyond the scope of my analysis. I have found that elite allies did not have much contact with women's groups and coalitions, and were even perceived by the latter as not being invested in fighting violence against women. This begs the question of why did elite allies engage on this issue in the way that they did? Given that the context of my study was a non-democratic state, it would be interesting to uncover to what extent the form of elite allyship was influenced by the political environment, and to what extent it was influenced by factors related to elite allies themselves, such as their strategic needs, their ideology, and their perception of women's groups and coalitions. Skrentny (2006) highlights the role of policy-makers' perceptions of social movements in policy outcomes. Skrentny's (2006) study suggests that the inclusion of social movements in the policy process is affected by how political elites attribute meaning to the constituency represented by them. This meaning-making involves how the constituency is defined, to what extent it is perceived as deserving its plight, and to what extent it poses a threat to wider society (Skrentny, 2006). In the future, I would like to expand on this and compare the relevance of the external environment and of the characteristics of elite allies to the form of elite allyship they adopt.

7.4. Conclusion

To conclude, my research has sought to bring clarity to the concept of elite allies, by investigating its usefulness for the policy outcomes of social movements, and by drawing on a case study to examine the interactions between a range of elite allies and women's groups and coalitions in Morocco in the post-Arab Spring era. I have demonstrated that elite elites are not a strong predictor policy change favourable to social movements. I have also demonstrated that in the context of violence against women in Morocco, elite allies articulated claims that were overall aligned with those of women's groups and coalitions, provided moral resources, and both exerted leverage over elite targets and collaborated with them. I finally found that despite these acts of elite allyship, women's groups and coalition in Morocco did not perceive all of these actors to be elite allies. Moreover, they preferred a model of elite allyship that involves more partnership with them and greater leverage against other elite actors.

If we combine my findings, we can see that they provide support for my argument that it is important to examine the agency of elite allies, and not just their presence, to determine to what extent they can be considered a source of opportunity. My meta-analysis showed that the presence of elite allies does not matter much in influencing the policy-making process. My case study suggests that one reason for this failure could be the fact that they do not exert greater leverage over those responsible for implementing the claims of social movements. My RCA showed that many elite actors were not critical of the Moroccan government or parliamentarians. Moreover, there was no use of material leverage or accountability politics. Inter-governmental organisations and foreign governments did not link progress on violence against women in Morocco to continued funding. Those elite actors that did criticise and shame the Moroccan government for failing to come up with a satisfactory law on violence against women, did not do this consistently. This lack of effective leverage was perceived by women's

groups and coalitions as being a key reason why elite allies failed to help them advance their policy goals.

Another reason why elite allies fail in amplifying the efforts of social movements could be their lack of contact with them. My RCA showed that elite actors do not speak on behalf of women's groups and coalitions in Morocco, nor do they really work alongside them. They tended to mostly interact with one another on this issue. Representatives from Moroccan women's groups and coalitions deplored this parallel participation, and argued that elite allies' engagement limited their usefulness as a source of opportunity.

Bibliography

Abramowitz, M. J. (2018) *Democracy in Crisis*, *Freedom in the World 2018*. Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2018 (Accessed: 1 May 2018).

Agnone, J. (2007) 'Amplifying public opinion: The policy impact of the US environmental movement', *Social Forces*, 85(4), pp. 1593–1620. doi: Doi 10.1353/Sof.2007.0059.

Ajami, F. (2012) 'Tha Arab spring at one: A year of living dangerously', *Foreign Affairs*. doi: 10.1080/15348423.2010.500967.

Al-Ramahi, A. (2008) 'Wasta in Jordan: A distinct feature of (and benefit for) Middle Eastern Society', *Arab Law Quarterly*, 22(1), pp. 35–62. doi: 10.1163/026805508X286794.

Almeida, P. and Stearns, L. B. (1998) 'Political Opportunities and Local Grassroots Environmental Movements: The Case of Minamata', *Social Problems*, 45(1), pp. 37–60. doi:

10.1525/sp.1998.45.1.03x0156z.

Amenta, E. (2006) *When Movements Matter*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Amenta, E. *et al.* (2010) 'The Political Consequences of Social Movements', *Annual Review of Sociology*, 36(1), pp. 287–307. doi: 10.1146/annurev-soc-070308-120029.

Amenta, E. and Caren, N. (2004) 'The legislative, organizational, and beneficiary consequences of state-oriented challengers', in Snow, D. A., Kriesi, H., and Soule, S. A. (eds) *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movement*. Malden: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, pp. 461–88.

Amenta, E. and Caren, N. (2007) 'The Legislative, Organizational, and Beneficiary Consequences of State-Oriented Challengers', in *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, pp. 461–488. doi: 10.1002/9780470999103.ch20.

Amenta, E., Caren, N. and Olasky, S. J. (2005) 'Age for leisure? Political mediation and the impact of the pension movement on U.S. old-age policy', *American Sociological Review*, 70(3), pp. 516–538. doi: 10.1177/000312240507000308.

Amenta, E., Carruthers, B. G. and Zylan, Y. (1992) 'A Hero for the Aged? The Townsend Movement, the Political Mediation Model, and U.S. Old-Age Policy, 1934-1950', *American Journal of Sociology*, 98(2), pp. 308–339. doi: 10.1086/230010.

Amenta, E., Dunleavy, K. and Bernstein, M. (1994) 'Stolen Thunder? Huey Long's ``Share Our Wealth,'' Political Mediation, and the Second New Deal', *American Sociological Review*, 59(5), p. 678. doi: 10.2307/2096443.

Amenta, E., Halfman, D. and Young, M. P. (1999) 'The Strategies and Contexts of Social Protest: Political Mediation and the Impact of the Townsend Movement in California',

Mobilization, pp. 1–23.

Amenta, E. and Halfmann, D. (2000) 'Wage Wars: Institutional Politics, WPA Wages, and the Struggle for U.S. Social Policy', *American Sociological Review*, 65(4), pp. 506–528. doi: 10.2307/2657380.

Amenta, E. and Young, M. P. (1999a) 'Democratic States and Social Movements: Theoretical Arguments and Hypotheses', *Social Problems*, 46(2), pp. 153–168. doi: 10.1525/sp.1999.46.2.03x0183a.

Amenta, E. and Young, M. P. (1999b) 'Making an impact: Conceptual and methodological implications of the collective goods criterion', in Giugni, M., McAdam, D., and Tilly, C. (eds) *How social movements matter*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 22–41.

Amenta, E. and Zylan, Y. (1991) 'It happened here: Political opportunity, the new institutionalism, and the Townsend movement', *American Sociological Review*, 56(2), pp. 250–265. doi: 10.2307/2095783.

Amnesty International (2018) *Middle East and North Africa 2017/2018*. Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/middle-east-and-north-africa/report-middle-east-and-north-africa/ (Accessed: 1 May 2018).

Amsterdamska, O. (1987) 'Intellectuals in Social Movements: The Experts of "Solidarity"', in *The Social Direction of the Public Sciences*. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, pp. 213–245. doi: 10.1007/978-94-009-3755-0_9.

Andersen, E. (2005) *Out of the Closets and into the Courts*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. doi: 10.3998/mpub.17550.

Andersen, E. A. (2005) *Out of the Closets and into the Courts: Legal Opportunity Structure*

and Gay Rights Litigation. University of Michigan Press. Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3998/mpub.17550.

Andrews, K. T. (1997) 'The Impacts of Social Movements on the Political Process: The Civil Rights Movement and Black Electoral Politics in Mississippi', *American Sociological Review*, 62(5), p. 800. doi: 10.2307/2657361.

Andrews, K. T. (2001) 'Social Movements and Policy Implementation: The Mississippi Civil Rights Movement and the War on Poverty, 1965 to 1971', *American Sociological Review*, 66(1), p. 71. doi: 10.2307/2657394.

Andrews, K. T. and Edwards, B. (2004) 'Advocacy Organizations in the U.S. Political Process', *Annual Review of Sociology*, 30(1), pp. 479–506. doi: 10.1146/annurev.soc.30.012703.110542.

Anheier, H. (2004) *Civil Society: Measurement, Evaluation, Policy*. London: Civicus.

Aujourd'hui le Maroc (2012a) 'La promotion des droits de la femme, une préoccupation politique et sociétale majeure au Maroc', *Aujourd'hui le Maroc*, 25 December. Available at: http://aujourdhui.ma/actualite/la-promotion-des-droits-de-la-femme-une-preoccupation-politique-et-societale-majeure-au-maroc-100145 (Accessed: 5 May 2018).

Aujourd'hui le Maroc (2012b) 'Le ministere de la justice s'attache a renforcer le droit d'acces a la justice pour la femme violentee.', *Aujourd'hui Le Maroc*, 20 December. Available at: http://aujourdhui.ma/actualite/le-ministere-de-la-justice-sattache-a-renforcer-le-droit-dacces-a-la-justice-pour-la-femme-violentee-100054 (Accessed: 5 May 2018).

Aujourd'hui le Maroc (2014) 'La lutte contre les violences faites aux femmes en debat a Tetouan', *Aujourd'hui Le Maroc*, 22 March. Available at: http://aujourdhui.ma/societe/la-lutte-contre-les-violences-faites-aux-femmes-en-debat-a-tetouan-108636.

Aydemir, N. and Vliegenthart, R. (2016) 'Minority Representatives' in the Netherlands: Supporting, Silencing or Suppressing?', in *Parliamentary Affairs*, pp. 73–92. doi: 10.1093/pa/gsv009.

Banazsak, L. A. (1996) *Why movements succeed or fail: Opportunity, culture, and the struggle for woman suffrage*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Barnes, C., van Laerhoven, F. and Driessen, P. P. J. (2016) 'Advocating for Change? How a Civil Society-led Coalition Influences the Implementation of the Forest Rights Act in India', *World Development*, 84, pp. 162–175. doi: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2016.03.013.

Bartley, T. (2007) 'How Foundations Shape Social Movements: The Construction of an Organizational Field and the Rise of Forest Certification', *Social Problems*, 54(3), pp. 229–255. doi: 10.1525/sp.2007.54.3.229.

Bayat, A. (2013) *Life as politics: how ordinary people change the Middle East*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Benchenna, A., Ksikes, D. and Marchetti, D. (2017) 'The media in Morocco: a highly political economy, the case of the paper and on-line press since the early 1990s', *Journal of North African Studies*, 22(3), pp. 386–410. doi: 10.1080/13629387.2017.1307906.

Bergh, S. I. and Rossi-Doria, D. (2015) 'Plus ça Change? Observing the Dynamics of Morocco's "Arab Spring" in the High Atlas', *Mediterranean Politics*, 20(2), pp. 198–216. doi: 10.1080/13629395.2015.1033900.

Beyeler, M. and Kriesi, H. (2005) 'Transnational protest and the public sphere', *Mobilization*, 10(1), pp. 95–109.

Blee, K. M. and Taylor, V. (2002) 'Semi-structured interviewing in social movement

research', in Klandermans, B. and Staggenborg, S. (eds) *Methods of Social Movement Research*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 92–117. doi: Londen.

Bordat, S. W., Davis, S. S. and Kouzzi, S. (2011) 'Women as agents of grassroots change: illustrating micro-empowerment in Morocco', *Journal of Middle East Women's Studies*, 7(1), pp. 90–119. doi: 10.2979/jmiddeastwomstud.2011.7.1.90.

Bosi, L. (2008) 'Explaining the emergence process of the civil rights protest in Northern Ireland (1945-1968): Insights from a relational social movement approach', *Journal of Historical Sociology*, 21(2–3), pp. 242–271. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-6443.2008.00337.x.

Bouhamida, L. (2012) 'Fatiha Saïdi, sénatrice socialiste belge d'origine marocaine : "Les victimes de viol doivent être protégées plutôt qu'obligées d'épouser l'auteur du viol"', *Liberation*, 28 March. Available at: https://www.libe.ma/Fatiha-Saidi-senatrice-socialiste-belge-d-origine-marocaine-Les-victimes-de-viol-doivent-etre-protegees-plutot-qu_a26224.html (Accessed: 4 May 2018).

Bouhamida, L. (2014) 'Nouvelle campagne d'authentification d'actes de mariage à Essaouira', *Liberation*, 13 January. Available at: https://www.libe.ma/_a45842.html?print=1 (Accessed: 4 May 2018).

El Bouhsini, L. (2015) *Maroc : Acquis et limites du mouvement des femmes*. Louvain-la-Neuve. Available at: https://www.cetri.be/IMG/pdf/edr_maroc.pdf.

Bouithy, A. (2015) 'Mettre fin a toutes les formes de discrimination a l'egard des jeunes filles', *Liberation*, 15 September. Available at: http://www.libe.ma/Mettre-fin-a-toutes-les-formes-de-discrimination-et-de-stigmatisation-a-l-egard-des-jeunes-filles_a66425.html .

Bouithy, A. (2016a) 'Faire de l'egalite des sexes un objectif autonome et un critere d'integration', *Liberation*, 21 June. Available at: http://www.libe.ma/Faire-de-l-egalite-des-

sexes-un-objectif-autonome-et-un-critere-d-integration_a76018.html (Accessed: 5 May 2018).

Bouithy, A. (2016b) 'Faire de Marrakech une ville sans violence a l'egard des femmes et des filles', *Liberation*, 10 June. Available at: http://www.libe.ma/Faire-de-Marrakech-une-ville-sans-violence-a-l-egard-des-femmes-et-des-filles_a75662.html (Accessed: 5 May 2018).

Boussaid, F. (2009) 'The Rise of the PAM in Morocco: Trampling the political scene or stumbling into it?', *Mediterranean Politics*, pp. 413–419. doi: 10.1080/13629390903346954.

Bras, J.-P. (2007) 'La Reforme du Code de la Famille au Maroc et en Algerie: Quelles Avancees pour la Democratie?', *Critique Internationale*, 4(37), pp. 93–125.

Brockett, C. D. (1991) 'The Structure of Political Opportunities and Peasant Mobilization in Central America', *Comparative Politics*, 23(3), pp. 253–274. doi: 10.1111/j.1749-6632.2009.05415_3.x.

Brumberg, D. (2002) 'The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy', *Journal of Democracy*, 13(4), pp. 56–68. doi: 10.1353/jod.2002.0064.

Budros, A. (2013) 'The State Giveth and the State Taketh Away? The Antislavery Movement and the Black Franchise in the United States, 1691–1842', *Sociological Perspectives*, 56(3), pp. 377–402.

Burstein, P. (1985) 'On equal employment opportunity and affirmative action.', in Marrett, C. B. and Leggon, C. (eds) *Research in race and ethnic relations*. Greenwich: JAI Press, pp. 91–112.

Burstein, P. and Freudenburg, W. (1978) 'Changing Public Policy: The Impact of Public Opinion, Antiwar Demonstrations, and War Costs on Senate Voting on Vietnam War

Motions', *American Journal of Sociology*, 84(1), pp. 99–122. doi: 10.1086/226742.

Burstein, P. and Linton, A. (2002) 'The Impact of Political Parties, Interest Groups, and Social Movement Organizations on Public Policy: Some Recent Evidence and Theoretical Concerns', *Social Forces*, 81(2), pp. 381–408. doi: 10.1353/sof.2003.0004.

Burstein, P. and Sausner, S. (2005) 'The incidence and impact of policy-oriented collective action: Competing views', *Sociological Forum*, pp. 403–419. doi: 10.1007/s11206-005-6595-4.

Bush, D. M. (1992) 'WOMEN'S MOVEMENTS AND STATE POLICY REFORM AIMED AT DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: A Comparison of the Consequences of Movement Mobilization in the U.S. and India', *Gender & Society*, 6(4), pp. 587–608. doi: 0803973233.

Buskens, L. (2003) 'Recent debates on family law reform in Morocco: Islamic law as politics in an emerging public sphere', *Islamic Law and Society*, 10(1), pp. 70–131. doi: 10.1163/15685190360560924.

Butler, J. (1990) *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion*. New York: Routledge.

Campbell, J. L. and Allen, M. P. (1994) 'The Political-Economy of Revenue Extraction in the Modern State - a Time-Series Analysis of United-States Income-Taxes, 1916- 1986', *Social Forces*, 72(36268), pp. 643–669.

Cancela, J. and Geys, B. (2016) 'Explaining voter turnout: A meta-analysis of national and subnational elections', *Electoral Studies*, 42, pp. 264–275. doi: 10.1016/j.electstud.2016.03.005.

Canel, E. (1992) 'New social movement theory and resource mobilization theory: The need

for integration', in Carroll, W. (ed.) *Organizing Dissent*. Toronto: Garamond Press, pp. 22–51.

Caren, N. (2007) 'Political Process Theory', in *The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology*. Oxford, UK: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. doi: 10.1002/9781405165518.wbeosp041.

Catalano, S. L. (2010) 'Shari'a reforms and power maintenance: The cases of family law reforms in Morocco and Algeria', *Journal of North African Studies*, 15(4), pp. 535–555. doi: 10.1080/13629387.2010.496233.

Cauthen, N. K. and Amenta, E. (1996) 'Not for Widows Only: Institutional Politics and the Formative Years of Aid to Dependent Children', *American Sociological Review*, 61(3), pp. 427–448. doi: 10.2307/2096357.

Cavatorta, F. (2005) 'The international context of Morocco's stalled democratization', *Democratization*, 12(4), pp. 548–566. doi: 10.1080/13510340500226101.

Cavatorta, F. (2007a) 'More than repression: The significance of divide et impera in the Middle East and North Africa - The case of Morocco', *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 25(2), pp. 187–203. doi: 10.1080/02589000701396223.

Cavatorta, F. (2007b) 'Neither participation nor revolution: The strategy of the Moroccan Jamiat al-Adl wal-Ihsan', *Mediterranean Politics*, 12(3), pp. 381–397. doi: 10.1080/13629390701639923.

Cavatorta, F. (2008) 'Civil Society, Democracy Promotion and Islamism on the Southern Shores of the Mediterranean', *Mediterranean Politics*, 13(1), pp. 109–119. doi: 10.1080/13629390701862582.

Cavatorta, F. (2009) '"Divided they stand, divided they fail": Opposition politics in

Morocco', *Democratization*, 16(1), pp. 137–156. doi: 10.1080/13510340802575882.

Cavatorta, F. (2015) *Authoritarian stability through perpetual democratisation*, *New-Med research network.*

Cavatorta, F. and Dalmasso, E. (2009) 'Liberal outcomes through undemocratic means: The reform of the Code de statut personnel in Morocco', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 47(4), pp. 487–506. doi: 10.1017/S0022278X09990164.

Chappell, L. (2003) *Gendering government: Feminist engagement with the state in Australia and Canada.* Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.

Charrad, M. (2001) *States and Women's Rights: The Making of Postcolonial Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Chen, A. S. (2007) 'The Party of Lincoln and the Politics of State Fair Employment Practices Legislation in the North, 1945–1964', *American Journal of Sociology*, 112(6), pp. 1713–1774. doi: 10.1086/512709.

Clark, J. A. and Young, A. E. (2008) 'Islamism and Family Law Reform in Morocco and Jordan', *Mediterranean Politics*, 13(3), pp. 333–352. doi: 10.1080/13629390802386663.

Cobb, R., Ross, J.-K. and Ross, M. H. (1976) 'Agenda Building as a Comparative Political Process', *The American Political Science Review*, 70(1), p. 126. doi: 10.2307/1960328.

Collingwood, V. and Logister, L. (2005) 'State of the Art: Addressing the INGO "Legitimacy Deficit"', *Political Studies Review*, 3(2), pp. 175–192. doi: 10.1111/j.1478-9299.2005.00022.x.

Cornwall, M. *et al.* (2007) 'Signals Or Mixed Signals: Why Opportunities For Mobilization Are Not Opportunities for Policy Reform', *Mobilization*, 12(3), pp. 239–254.

Corrigall-Brown, C. and Ho, M. (2015) 'How the State Shapes Social Movements: An Examination of the Environmental Movement in Canada', in Ramos, H. and Rodgers, K. (eds) *Protest and Politics*. Vancouver: UBC Press, pp. 101–117.

Costain, A. N. and Majstorovic, S. (1994) 'Congress, Social Movements and Public Opinion: Multiple Origins of Women's Rights Legislation', *Political Research Quarterly*, 47(1), pp. 111–135. doi: 10.1177/106591299404700106.

Cress, D. M. and Snow, D. A. (1996) 'Mobilization at the Margins: Resources, Benefactors, and the Viability of Homeless Social Movement Organizations', *American Sociological Review*, 61(6), p. 1089. doi: 10.2307/2096310.

Cress, D. M. and Snow, D. A. (2000) 'The Outcomes of Homeless Mobilization: The Influence of Organization, Disruption, Political Mediation, and Framing', *American Journal of Sociology*, 105(4), pp. 1063–1104. doi: 10.1086/210399.

Cropf, R. A., Benmamoun, M. and Kalliny, M. (2012) 'The role of Web 2.0 in the Arab Spring', in *Cases on Web 2.0 in Developing Countries: Studies on Implementation, Application, and Use*. IGI Global, pp. 76–108. doi: 10.4018/978-1-4666-2515-0.ch004.

Cunningham, R. B. and Sarayrah, Y. K. (1993) *Wasta : The Hidden Force in Middle Eastern Society*. Westport: Praeger.

Dalacoura, K. (2001) 'Islamist movements as non-state actors and their relevance to international relations', in Josselin, D. and Wallace, W. (eds) *Non-State Actors in World Politics*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 235–250.

Dalmasso, E. (2012) 'Surfing the Democratic Tsunami in Morocco: Apolitical Society and the Reconfiguration of a Sustainable Authoritarian Regime', *Mediterranean Politics*, 17(2), pp. 217–232. doi: 10.1080/13629395.2012.694045.

Dalton, D. R. *et al.* (2012) 'Revisiting the file drawer problem in meta-analysis: An assessment of published and nonpublished correlation matrices', *Personnel Psychology*, 65(2), pp. 221–249. doi: 10.1111/j.1744-6570.2012.01243.x.

Darhour, H. and Dahlerup, D. (2013) 'Sustainable representation of women through gender quotas: A decade's experience in Morocco', *Women's Studies International Forum*, 41, pp. 132–142. doi: 10.1016/j.wsif.2013.04.008.

Deacon, D. (2007) 'Yesterday's papers and today's technology: Digital newspaper archives and "push button" content analysis', *European Journal of Communication*, 22(1), pp. 5–25. doi: 10.1177/0267323107073743.

Denoeux, G. P. (2002) 'Le mouvement associatif marocain face a l'Etat: autonomie, partenariat, our instrumentalisation', in Nefissa, B. (ed.) *Pouvoirs et associations dans le monde arabe*. Paris: CBRS Editions, pp. 27–55.

Denoeux, G. P. (2007) 'Corruption in Morocco: Old forces, new dynamics and a way forward', *Middle East Policy*, 14(4), pp. 134–151. doi: 10.1111/j.1475-4967.2007.00329.x.

Denoeux, G. P. and Desfosses, H. R. (2007) 'Rethinking the Moroccan parliament: The kingdom's legislative development imperative', *Journal of North African Studies*, 12(1), pp. 79–108. doi: 10.1080/13629380601099526.

Diani, M. (1992) 'The concept of social movement', *The Sociological Review*, 40(1), pp. 1–25. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-954X.1992.tb02943.x.

Diani, M. and Kousis, M. (2014) 'The duality of claims and events: the greek campaign against the troika's memoranda and austerity, 2010-2012', *Mobilization: An International Journal*, 19(4), pp. 387–404. doi: 10.17813/maiq.19.4.d865w28177575673.

Dixon, M. (2008) 'Movements, Countermovements and Policy Adoption: The Case of Right-to-Work Activism', *Social Forces*, 87(1), pp. 473–500. doi: 10.1525/sp.2007.54.1.23.

Durac, V. and Cavatorta, F. (2011) *Civil Society and Democratization in the Arab World: The Dynamics of Activism*. Routledge, *Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics*. Routledge. Edited by V. Durac and F. Cavatorta. Abingdon.

van Dyke, N. (2003) 'Protest Cycles and Party Politics: The Effects of Elite Allies and Antagonists on Student Protest in the United States, 1930-1990', in Goldstone, J. A. (ed.) *States, Parties and Social Movements*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 226–245.

Eddouada, S. and Pepicelli, R. (2010) 'Maroc : vers un « féminisme islamique d'État »', *Critique internationale*, 46(1), p. 87. doi: 10.3917/crii.046.0087.

Egger, M. and Smith, G. D. (1997) 'Meta-Analysis. Potentials and promise.', *BMJ (Clinical research ed.)*, 315(7119), pp. 1371–1374. doi: 10.1136/bmj.315.7119.1371.

Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989) 'Building Theories from Case Study Research.', *Academy of Management Review*, 14(4), pp. 532–550. doi: 10.5465/AMR.1989.4308385.

Eisinger, P. (1973) 'The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities', *American Political Science Review*, 67(1), pp. 11–28. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/1958525.

Elliott, K. Z. (2009) 'Reforming the Moroccan Personal Status Code: A revolution for whom?', *Mediterranean Politics*, 14(2), pp. 213–227. doi: 10.1080/13629390902987659.

Ennaji, M. (2016) 'Women, Gender, and Politics in Morocco', *Social Sciences*, 5(4), p. 75. doi: 10.3390/socsci5040075.

Epp, C. (1998) *The rights revolution: lawyers, activists, and supreme courts in comparative perspective*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Estellés, I. S. (2010) 'The Political-Opportunity Structure of the Spanish Anti-War Movement (2002–2004) and its Impact', *The Sociological Review*, 58(2_suppl), pp. 246–269. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-954X.2011.01972.x.

Evans Case, R. and Givens, T. E. (2010) 'Re-engineering legal opportunity structures in the European Union? The Starting Line Group and the Politics of the Racial Equality Directive', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 48(2), pp. 221–241. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-5965.2009.02050.x.

Evrard, A. Y. (2014) *The Moroccan Women's Rights Movement*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.

Fengshi, W. (2011) 'Strategic state engagement in transnational activism: AIDS prevention in China', *Journal of Contemporary China*, 20(71), pp. 621–637. doi: 10.1080/10670564.2011.587162.

Finnemore, M. (1993) 'International organizations as teachers of norms: the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cutural Organization and science policy', *International Organization*, 47(04), p. 565. doi: 10.1017/S0020818300028101.

Fording, R. C. (2001) 'The political response to black insurgency: A critical test of competing theories of the state', *American Political Science Association*, 95(1), pp. 115–130. Available at: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0003055401000090.

Freedom House (2017) *Morocco*, *Freedom of the Press 2017*. Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2017/morocco (Accessed: 3 May 2018).

Freeman, B. C. (2017) 'Access to Rabat: De Jure Policies and De Facto Realities in Moroccan Newspaper Coverage of the February 20 Movement and Constitutional Reforms, 2011–2012', *International Journal of Communication*, 11, pp. 3141–3161.

'French Protectorate Established in Morocco' (1912) *The American Journal of International Law.* American Society of International Law, 6(3), pp. 699–702. Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2187068.

Friedman, E. J. (2003) 'Gendering the Agenda: The impact of the transnational women's rights movement at the un conferences of the 1990s', *Women's Studies International Forum*, 26(4), pp. 313–331. doi: 10.1016/S0277-5395(03)00077-3.

Friguech, N. (2013) '"Art. 475 : trêve de silence"', *Liberation*, 16 April. Available at: https://www.libe.ma/Art-475 -treve-de-silence_a37129.html (Accessed: 4 May 2018).

Gamson, W. A. (1975) *The strategy of social protest*. Homewood: Dorsey Press.

Gamson, W. A. and Meyer, D. S. (1996) 'Framing political opporunity', in *Comparative perspectives on social movements: political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and cultural framings*, pp. 275–290. doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511803987.

Gardner, M. J. and Altman, D. G. (1986) 'Statistics in Medicine Confidence intervals rather than P values: estimation rather than hypothesis testing', *British Medical Journal (Clinical research ed.)*, 292(6522), pp. 746–750. doi: 10.1136/bmj.292.6522.746.

Geys, B. (2006) 'Explaining voter turnout: A review of aggregate-level research', *Electoral Studies*, 25(4), pp. 637–663. doi: 10.1016/j.electstud.2005.09.002.

Giugni, M. (2004) *Social Protest and Policy Change Ecology, Antinuclear, and Peace Movements in Comparative Perspective*. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Giugni, M. (2007) 'Useless Protest? A Time-Series Analysis of the Policy Outcomes of Ecology, Antinuclear, and Peace Movements in the United States, 1977-1995', *Mobilization: An International Quarterly*, 12(1), pp. 53–77. doi: 10.17813/maiq.12.1.b05j1087v7pxg382.

Giugni, M. (2008) 'Political, Biographical, and Cultural Consequences of Social Movements', *Sociology Compass*, 25(10), pp. 1582–1600. doi: 10.1111/j.1751-9020.2008.00152.x.

Giugni, M. (2009a) 'Political Opportunities: From Tilly to Tilly', *Swiss Political Science Review*, 15(2), pp. 361–68. doi: 10.1002/j.1662-6370.2009.tb00136.x.

Giugni, M. (2009b) 'Political Opportunities: From Tilly to Tilly', *Swiss Political Science Review*, 15(2), pp. 361–367. doi: 10.1002/j.1662-6370.2009.tb00136.x.

Giugni, M. (2011) 'Political opportunity: still a useful concept?.', in Hanagan, M. and Tilly, C. (eds) *Contention and Trust in Cities and States*. Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 271–283.

Giugni, M. G. (1998) 'Was it Worth the Effort? The Outcomes and Consequences of Social Movements', *Annual Review of Sociology*, 24(1), pp. 371–393. doi: 10.1146/annurev.soc.24.1.371.

Giugni, M., McAdam, D. and Tilly, C. (1999) *How social movements matter*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Giugni, M. and Passy, F. (1998) 'Social Movements and Policy Change: Direct, Mediated, or Joint Effect?', *ASA Section on Collective Behaviour and Social Movement*, p. 48. Available at: http://www.nd.edu/~dmyers/cbsm/vol1/geneva98.pdf.

Giugni, M. and Yamasaki, S. (2009) 'The policy impact of social movements: A replication through qualitative comparative analysis', *Mobilization*, 14(4), pp. 467–484. Available at: http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?eid=2-s2.0-76549115550&partnerID=tZOtx3y1.

GLASS, G. V (1976) 'Primary, Secondary, and Meta-Analysis of Research', *Educational Researcher*, 5(10), pp. 3–8. doi: 10.3102/0013189X005010003.

Goldstone, J. A. (2003) 'Introduction', in Goldstone, J. A. (ed.) *States, parties and social movements*. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–26.

Goodwin, J., Jasper, J. M. and Khattra, J. (1999) 'Caught in a Winding, Snarling Vine: The Structural Bias of Political Process Theory', *Sociological Forum*, 14(1), pp. 27–54. doi: 10.1023/A:1021684610881.

Gronow, A. and Yl??-Anttila, T. (2016) 'Cooptation of ENGOs or Treadmill of Production? Advocacy Coalitions and Climate Change Policy in Finland', *Policy Studies Journal*. doi: 10.1111/psj.12185.

Gubrium, J. F. and Holstein, J. A. (1997) *The new language of qualitative method*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Guinier, L. (2008) 'Foreword: Demosprudence through dissent', *Harvard Law Review*, pp. 4–137.

Gupta, K. (2014) 'A Comparative Policy Analysis of Coalition Strategies: Case Studies of Nuclear Energy and Forest Management in India', *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice*, 16(4), pp. 356–372. doi: 10.1080/13876988.2014.886812.

Haas, P. M. (1992) 'Introduction: Epistemic communities and international policy coordination', *International Organization*, 46(1), pp. 1–35. doi: 10.1017/S0020818300001442.

Habermas, J. (2000) *On the pragmatics of communication*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Habib, R. and Abou-Habib, L. (2003) 'The Denial of Citizenship The case of Arab women's rights to pass on their nationality', *Al Raida*, 20(100), pp. 84–86.

Hahn, K. and Holzscheiter, A. (2013) 'The Ambivalence of Advocacy: Representation and

Contestation in Global NGO Advocacy for Child Workers and Sex Workers', *Global Society*, 27(4), pp. 497–520. doi: 10.1080/13600826.2013.823914.

Haidich, A. B. (2010) 'Meta-analysis in medical research.', *Hippokratia*, 14(Suppl 1), pp. 29–37. doi: 10.5005/jp/books/10519.

Hall, P. A. (1993) 'Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of Economic Policymaking in Britain', *Comparative Politics*, 25(3), p. 275. doi: 10.2307/422246.

Harrak, F. (2009) *The History and Significance of the New Moroccan Family Code*. 09-002. Evanston.

Harrison, J. L. (2016) 'Bureaucrats' Tacit Understandings and Social Movement Policy Implementation: Unpacking the Deviation of Agency Environmental Justice Programs from EJ Movement Priorities', *Social Problems*, 63(4), pp. 534–553. doi: 10.1093/socpro/spw024.

Hart, D. M. (1997) 'The Berber Dahir of 1930 in Colonial Morocco: Then and now (1930-1996)', *Journal of North African Studies*, pp. 11–33. doi: 10.1080/13629389708718294.

Haunss, S. and Kohlmorgen, L. (2008) *Codebook for the analysis of political claims in conflicts on intellectual property rights in Europe*. Available at: http://www.ipgovernance.eu/publications/IPGovCodebook.pdf (Accessed: 3 May 2018).

Hayes, G. (2014) 'Social Movement Studies, Social Movement Studies, and the Challenges of Parochialism: A Rejoinder to Poulson, Caswell and Gray', *Social Movement Studies*, pp. 243–247. doi: 10.1080/14742837.2014.883965.

Heaney, M. T. and Rojas, F. (2011) 'The partisan dynamics of contention: Demobilization of the antiwar movement in the United States, 2007-2009', *Mobilization: An International Journal*, 16(1), pp. 45–64.

Henry, A. D. *et al.* (2014) 'Policy Change in Comparative Contexts: Applying the Advocacy Coalition Framework Outside of Western Europe and North America', *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice*, 16(4), pp. 299–312. doi: 10.1080/13876988.2014.941200.

Hicks, B. (2004) 'Setting agendas and shaping activism: EU influence on Central and Eastern European environmental movements', *Environmental Politics*, 13(1), pp. 216–233. doi: 10.1080/09644010410001685218.

Hilson, C. (2002) 'New social movements: The role of legal opportunity', *Journal of European Public Policy*, pp. 238–255. doi: 10.1080/13501760110120246.

Hochstetler, K. (2002) 'After the Boomerang: Environmental Movements and Politics in the La Plata River Basin', *Global Environmental Politics*, 2(4), pp. 35–57. doi: 10.1162/152638002320980614.

Howe, M. (2001) 'Fresh Start for Morocco', *Middle East Policy*, 8(2), pp. 59–65. doi: 10.1111/1475-4967.00018.

Htun, M. and Weldon, S. L. (2012) 'The Civic Origins of Progressive Policy Change: Combating Violence against Women in Global Perspective, 1975-2005', *American Political Science Review*, 106(3), pp. 548–569.

Van Hüllen, V. (2012) 'Europeanisation through Cooperation? EU Democracy Promotion in Morocco and Tunisia', *West European Politics*, 35(1), pp. 117–134. doi: 10.1080/01402382.2012.631317.

Human Rights Watch (2017a) *Morocco: Obstruction of Rights Group*. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/02/20/morocco-obstruction-rights-group (Accessed: 1 May 2018).

Human Rights Watch (2017b) *Morocco/Western Sahara*. Available at:

https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/morocco/western-sahara

(Accessed: 1 May 2018).

Hutter, S. and Vliegenthart, R. (2016) 'Who responds to protest? Protest politics and party

responsiveness in Western Europe', *Party Politics*, p. 135406881665737. doi:

10.1177/1354068816657375.

Imbeau, L. M., Pétry, F. and Lamari, M. (2001) 'Left-right party ideology and government

policies: A meta-analysis', *European Journal of Political Research*, 40(1), pp. 1–29. doi:

10.1023/A:1011889915999.

International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (2017) *Moroccan Flag Civic Freedom Monitor:*

Morocco. Available at: http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/morocco.html (Accessed: 1

May 2018).

Ismael, T. (1986) *International relations of the contemporary Middle East : a study in world*

politics. 1st edn. New York: Syracuse University Press.

Jacobs, L. R. and Shapiro, R. Y. (1994) 'Questioning the Conventional Wisdom on Public

Opinion toward Health Reform', *PS: Political Science and Politics*, 27, pp. 208–214. doi:

10.2307/420272.

Jalali, R. (2013) 'Financing Empowerment? How Foreign Aid to Southern Ngos and Social

Movements Undermines Grass-Roots Mobilization', *Sociology Compass*, 7(1), pp. 55–73.

doi: 10.1111/soc4.12007.

Jamal, A. A. (2007) *Barriers to Democracy: The Other Side of Social Capital in Palestine*

and the Arab World. Princeton University Press. Available at:

http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7szck.

Jasper, J. M. (2004) 'A strategic approach to collective action: Looking for agency in social-movement choices', *Mobilization: An International Quarterly*, 9(1), pp. 1–16.

Jasper, J. M. (2015) 'Introduction', in Jasper, J. M. and Duyvendak, J. W. (eds) *Players and arenas: the interactive dynamics of protest*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, pp. 9–32. Available at: http://en.aup.nl/download/Look Inside Players and Arenas.pdf.

Jenkins, J. C. (1983) 'Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements', *Annual Review of Sociology*, 9(1), pp. 527–553. doi: 10.1146/annurev.so.09.080183.002523.

Jenkins, J. C. (1998) 'Channeling social protest: Foundation patronage of contemporary social movements', in Clemens, E. S. and Powell, W. W. (eds) *Private action and the public good*. New Heaven: Yale University Press, pp. 206–16.

Jenkins, J. C. and Eckert, C. M. (1986) 'Channeling Black Insurgency: Elite Patronage and Professional Social Movement Organizations in the Development of the Black Movement', *American Sociological Review*, 51(6), pp. 812–829. doi: 10.2307/2095369.

Jenkins, J. C., Jacobs, D. and Agnone, J. (2003) 'Political Opportunities and African-American Protest, 1948–1997', *American Journal of Sociology*, 109(2), pp. 277–303. doi: 10.1086/378340.

Jenkins, J. C. and Perrow, C. (1977) 'Insurgency of the powerless: Farm worker movements (1946-1972)', *American Sociological Review*, 42(2), p. 249. doi: 10.2307/2094604.

Johnson, D. (1999) 'The insignificance of statistical significance testing', *The Journal of Wildlife Management*, 63, pp. 763–772. doi: 10.2307/3802789.

Johnson, E. W. (2008) 'Social Movement Size, Organizational Diversity and the Making of Federal Law', *Social Forces*, 86file:///(3), pp. 967–993. doi: 10.1353/sof.0.0006.

Johnson, E. W., Agnone, J. and McCarthy, J. D. (2010) 'Movement organizations, synergistic tactics and environmental public policy', *Social Forces*, 88(5), pp. 2267–2292. doi: 10.1353/sof.2010.0038.

Johnston, H. J. (2011) *States and social movements*. Cambridge: Polity.

Jossour (2015) *Presentation*. Available at: http://www.jossourffm-maroc.com/presentation/ (Accessed: 7 May 2018).

Kandiyoti, D. (1988) 'Bargaining with patriarchy', *Gender & Society*, 2(3), pp. 274–290. doi: 10.1177/089124388002003004.

Kane, M. (2003) 'Social movement policy success: Decriminalizing state sodomy laws, 1969–1998', *Mobilization: An International Quarterly*, 8(August), pp. 313–334. Available at: http://mobilization.metapress.com/index/Q66046W34WU58866.pdf.

Kausch, K. (2009) 'The European Union and Political Reform in Morocco', *Mediterranean Politics*, 14(2), pp. 165–179. doi: 10.1080/13629390902983757.

Keck, M. E. and Sikkink, K. (1999) 'Transnational advocacy networks in international and regional politics', *International Social Science Journal*, 51(159), pp. 89–101. doi: 10.1111/1468-2451.00179.

Ketterer, J. P. (2001) 'From One Chamber to Two: The Case of Morocco', *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 7(1), pp. 135–150. doi: 10.1080/714003853.

Khallad, A. (2012) 'Des contraintes empechent l'application des dispositions du Code de la Famille: 300 000 cas de violence contre les femmes traites annuellement par les tribunaux', *Liberation*, 1 March. Available at: http://www.libe.ma/Des-contraintes-empechent-l-application-des-dispositions-du-Code-de-la-famille-300-000-cas-de-violence-contre-les-

femmes_a25525.html (Accessed: 7 May 2018).

King, B. G., Bentele, K. G. and Soule, S. A. (2007) 'Protest and Policymaking: Explaining Fluctuation in Congressional Attention to Rights Issues, 1960-1986', *Social Forces*, 86(1), pp. 137–163. doi: 10.1353/sof.2007.0101.

King, B. G., Cornwall, M. and Dahlin, E. C. (2005) 'Winning Woman Suffrage One Step at a Time: Social Movements and the Logic of the Legislative Process', *Social Forces*, 83(3), pp. 1211–1234. doi: 10.1353/sof.2005.0037.

King, M. (2004) 'Cooptation or Cooperation: The role of transnational advocacy organizations in the Zapatista Movement', *Sociological Focus*, 37(3 Special: Social Movements in the New Century), pp. 269–286. doi: 10.1080/00380237.2004.10571246.

Kingdon, J. W. (2003) *Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies*. Harlow: Longman.

Kitschelt, H. P. (1986) 'Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies', *British Journal of Political Science*, 16(01), p. 57. doi: 10.1017/S000712340000380X.

Klandermans, B. (1996) 'The Formation and Mobilization of Consensus', in *International Social Moment Research, Vol. 1*, pp. 173–196.

Klandermans, B. (1997) *The Social Psychology of Protest*. Cambridge: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Knill, C. (2005) 'Introduction: Cross-national policy convergence: Concepts, approaches and explanatory factors', in *Journal of European Public Policy*, pp. 764–774. doi: 10.1080/13501760500161332.

Kolb, F. (2007) *Protest and Opportunities: The Political Outcomes of Social Movements*.

Frankfurt/New York: Campus Verlag.

Koopmans, R. (1999) 'Political. Opportunity. Structure. Some Splitting to Balance the Lumping', *Sociological Forum*, 14(1), pp. 93–105. doi: 10.2307/685018.

Koopmans, R. (2002) 'Codebook for the analysis of political mobilisation and communication in European public spheres', *Political Mobilization and Communication in European …*, 4(2), pp. 203–222. Available at: http://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&btnG=Search&q=intitle:Codebook+for+the+analysis+of+political+mobilisation+and+communication+in+European+public+spheres#0, http://europub.wzb.eu/Data/Codebooks questionnaires/D2-1-claims-codebook.pdf.

Koopmans, R. (2004) 'Movements and media: Selection processes and evolutionary dynamics in the public sphere', *Theory and Society*, pp. 367–391. doi: 10.1023/B:RYSO.0000038603.34963.de.

Koopmans, R. (2007) 'Who inhabits the European public sphere? Winners and losers, supporters and opponents in Europeanised political debates', *European Journal of Political Research*, 46(2), pp. 183–210. doi: 10.1111/j.1475-6765.2006.00691.x.

Koopmans, R. and Olzak, S. (2004) 'Discursive Opportunities and the Evolution of Right-Wing Violence in Germany', *American Journal of Sociology*, 110(1), pp. 198–230. doi: 10.1086/386271.

Koopmans, R. and Statham, P. (1999) 'Political Claims Analysis: Integrating Protest Event and Public Discourse Approaches', *Mobilization. An International Journal of Research in Social Movements, Protest, and Contentious Politics*, 4(4), pp. 203–221. doi: 10.17813/maiq.4.2.d759337060716756.

Kriesi, H. *et al.* (1995) *New Social Movements in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis*.

Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.

Kriesi, H. (2007) 'Political Context and Opportunity', in *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, pp. 67–90. doi: 10.1002/9780470999103.ch4.

Kriesi, H. (2014) 'The Political Consequences of the Economic Crisis in Europe: Electoral Punishment and Popular Protest', in Bermeo, N. and Bartels, L. M. (eds) *Mass Politics in Tough Times: Opinions, Votes and Protest in the Great Recession*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 297–333.

KRIESI, H. *et al.* (1992) 'New social movements and political opportunities in Western Europe', *European Journal of Political Research*, 22(2), pp. 219–244. doi: 10.1111/j.1475-6765.1992.tb00312.x.

Kurzman, C. (1996) 'Structural Opportunity and Perceived Opportunity in Social-Movement Theory: The Iranian Revolution of 1979', *American Sociological Review*, 61(1), p. 153. doi: 10.2307/2096411.

Kuyper, J. W. (2016) 'Systemic Representation: Democracy, Deliberation, and Nonelectoral Representatives', *American Political Science Review*, 110(2), pp. 308–324. doi: 10.1017/S0003055416000095.

Labidi, L. (2007) 'The Nature of Transnatioal Alliances in Women's Associations in the Maghreb: The Case of AFTURD and ATFD in Tunisia', *Journal of Middle East Women's Studies*, 3(1), pp. 6–34. doi: 10.2979/MEW.2007.3.1.6.

Lacroix, J. (2016) *'Les agressions homophobes sont le quotidien de la population LGBTI au Maroc' selon Aswat*, *Tetu*. Available at: http://tetu.com/2016/04/08/entretien-collectif-aswat-maroc/ (Accessed: 7 May 2018).

Layachi, A. (2000) 'Reform and the politics of inclusion in the Maghrib', *Journal of North African Studies*, 5(3), pp. 15–42. doi: 10.1080/13629380008718402.

Liberation (2012a) 'Dans son rapport annuel : Le CES appelle les pouvoirs publics à faire mieux et différemment', *Liberation*, 4 October. Available at: https://www.libe.ma/_a31240.html?print=1 (Accessed: 4 May 2018).

Liberation (2012b) 'Groupe de travail des Nations unies sur la discrimination à l'égard des femmes : Le gouvernement appelé à mettre en place l'Autorité pour la parité', *Liberation*, 22 February. Available at: https://www.libe.ma/Groupe-de-travail-des-Nations-unies-sur-la-discrimination-a-l-egard-des-femmes-Le-gouvernement-appele-a-mettre-en-place_a25337.html (Accessed: 4 May 2018).

Liberation (2012c) 'Le mouvement féministe appelle à l'adoption d'une nouvelle loi contre le harcèlement sexuel : Tous égaux en dignité et en liberté Non à l'impunité', *Liberation*, 4 December. Available at: https://www.libe.ma/Le-mouvement-feministe-appelle-a-l-adoption-d-une-nouvelle-loi-contre-le-harcelement-sexuel-Tous-egaux-en-dignite-et-en_a32816.html (Accessed: 4 May 2018).

Liberation (2012d) 'Quand Attajdid s'en prend à 2M : La télévision qui fait peur aux islamistes', *Liberation*, 27 March. Available at: https://www.libe.ma/Quand-Attajdid-s-en-prend-a-2M-La-television-qui-fait-peur-aux-islamistes_a26208.html (Accessed: 4 May 2018).

Liberation (2013a) 'Acquis juridiques au profit de la famille et de l'enfance au Maroc', *Liberation*, 12 February. Available at: https://www.libe.ma/Acquis-juridiques-au-profit-de-la-famille-et-de-l-enfance-au-Maroc_a35073.html (Accessed: 4 May 2018).

Liberation (2013b) 'Les femmes ittihadies appellent a la mise en place d'une Constitution

democratique consacrant l'egalite pleine et entiere entre les deux sexes', *Liberation*, 25 December. Available at: http://www.libe.ma/Les-femmes-ittihadies-appellent-a-la-mise-en-place-d-une-Constitution-democratique-consacrant-l-egalite-pleine-et_a45248.html (Accessed: 7 May 2018).

Liberation (2013c) 'Radi a la 10eme reunion de l'Union Interparlementaire', *Liberation*, 8 March. Available at: http://www.libe.ma/Radi-a-la-10eme-reunion-de-l-Union-interparlementaire_a35919.html (Accessed: 6 May 2018).

Liberation (2014a) 'La violence a l'egard des femmes dissequee a Tanger', *Liberation*, 24 December. Available at: http://www.libe.ma/La-violence-a-l-egard-des-femmes-dissequee-a-Tanger_a57457.html (Accessed: 6 July 2018).

Liberation (2014b) 'Le mariage des mineures cause de tous les maux', *Liberation*, 24 February. Available at: http://www.libe.ma/_a47383.html?print=1 (Accessed: 6 May 2018).

Liberation (2015a) 'La lutte contre la violence a l'egard des femmes recquiert l'adoption de mecanismes institutionnels', *Liberation*, 12 December. Available at: http://www.libe.ma/La-lutte-contre-la-violence-a-l-egard-des-femmes-requiert-l-adoption-de-mecanismes-institutionnels_a69424.html (Accessed: 7 May 2018).

Liberation (2015b) 'Mariages de mineures en Afrique: l'UNICEF tire la sonnette d'alarme', *Liberation*, 2 December. Available at: http://www.libe.ma/Mariages-de-mineures-en-Afrique-L-UNICEF-tire-la-sonnette-d-alarme_a69063.html (Accessed: 7 May 2018).

Liberation (2015c) 'ONU-Femmes salue les avancees du Maroc et preconise davantage d'efforts', *Liberation*, 25 November. Available at: http://www.libe.ma/ONU-Femmes-salue-les-avancees-du-Maroc-et-preconise-davantage-d-efforts_a68814.html (Accessed: 7 May 2018).

Liberation (2015d) '"Rencontre a Kenitra sur les violences a l'encontre des femmes su secteur agricole."', *Liberation*, 16 December. Available at: http://www.libe.ma/Rencontre-a-Kenitra-sur-les-violences-a-l-encontre-des-femmes-du-secteur-agricole_a69570.html (Accessed: 6 May 2018).

Liberation (2016a) 'Divers', *Liberation*, 23 March. Available at: http://www.libe.ma/Divers_a72938.html (Accessed: 6 May 2018).

Liberation (2016b) 'La violence basee sur le genre est l'une des violations les plus repandues des droits humains', *Liberation*, 12 January. Available at: http://www.libe.ma/La-violence-basee-sur-le-genre-est-l-une-des-violations-les-plus-repandues-des-droits-humains_a70483.html (Accessed: 6 May 2018).

Liberation (2016c) 'Prise en charge des femmes et enfants victimes de violences', *Liberation*, 26 February. Available at: http://www.libe.ma/Prise-en-charge-des-femmes-et-enfants-victimes-de-violence_a72091.html (Accessed: 7 May 2016).

Lichbach, M. I. (1998) 'CONTENDING THEORIES OF CONTENTIOUS POLITICS AND THE STRUCTURE-ACTION PROBLEM OF SOCIAL ORDER', *Annual Review of Political Science*, 1(1), pp. 401–424. doi: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.1.1.401.

Lipsky, M. (1970) *Protest in City Politics*. Chacgo: Rand McNally and Company.

Lorenzini, J., Hutter, S. and Kriesi, H. (2016) 'The Restructuring of the Western European Party Space in the Crisis: A Comparative Study of Austria, France and Germany', in *After the Financial Crisis*. Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 269–302.

Madani, M., Maghraoui, D. and Zerhouni, S. (2012) *The 2011 Moroccan Constitution: A Critical Analysis*. Stockholm.

Maghraoui, A. (2001) '"Political Authority in Crisis: Mohammed VI's Morocco"', *Middle East Report*, 218(Spring), pp. 12–17.

Maghraoui, A. (2002) 'Depoliticization in Morocco', *Journal of Democracy*, 13(4), pp. 24–32. doi: 10.1353/jod.2002.0070.

Maghraoui, D. (2011) 'Constitutional reforms in morocco: Between consensus and subaltern politics', *Journal of North African Studies*, 16(4), pp. 679–699. doi: 10.1080/13629387.2011.630879.

Mahfoudh, D. (2014) '"Le collectjf maghreb-Egalite 95: Pour un mouvement feministe maghrebin"', *Nouvelles Questions Feministes*, 33(2), pp. 132–135. doi: 10.3917/nqf.332.0132.

Marien, S., Schouteden, A. and Wauters, B. (2017) 'Voting for women in Belgium's flexible list system', *Politics and Gender*, 13(2), pp. 305–335. doi: 10.1017/S1743923X16000404.

Marks, G. and McAdam, D. (1996) 'Social movements and the changing structure of political opportunity in the European union', *West European Politics*, 19(2), pp. 249–278. doi: 10.1080/01402389608425133.

Marshall, K. (2009) *Discussions with Aicha Ech-Channa, Founder and President, Association Solidarité Féminine, Casablanca, Morocco*. Available at: https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/interviews/discussions-with-aicha-ech-channa-founder-and-president-association-solidarite-feminine-casablanca-morocco (Accessed: 7 May 2018).

Maxwell, J. A. (2013) *Qualitative Research Design: An Interactive Approach*. 3rd edn. Los Angeles: Sage Publications Ltd.

Mayer, M. (2000) 'Social Movements in European Cities: transition from the 1970s to the

1990s', in Bagnasco, A. and Le Gales, P. (eds) *Cities in Contemporary Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 131–52.

McAdam, D. (1982) *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

McAdam, D. (1996) 'Conceptual Origins, Current Problems, Future Directions', *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*, pp. 23–40.

McAdam, D. (2004) 'Revisiting the U.S. Civil Rights Movement: Toward a More Synthetic Understanding of the Origins of Contention', in Jasper, J. M. and Goodwin, J. (eds) *Rethinking Social Movements: Structure, Meaning, and Emotion*. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, pp. 201–232.

McAdam, D. and Boudet, H. (2012) *Putting social movements in their place: Explaining opposition to energy projects in the United States, 2000–2005*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

McAdam, D. and Su, Y. (2002) 'The War at Home: Antiwar Protests and Congressional Voting, 1965 to 1973', *American Sociological Review*, 67(5), p. 696. doi: 10.2307/3088914.

McAdam, D. and Tarrow, S. (2010) 'Ballots and Barricades: On the Reciprocal Relationship between Elections and Social Movements', *Perspectives on Politics*, 8(2), pp. 529–542.

McAdam, D., Tarrow, S. and Tilly, C. (2001) *Dynamics of Contention*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511805431.

McCammon, H. J. *et al.* (2007) 'Movement Framing and Discursive Opportunity Structures: The Political Successes of the U.S. Women's Jury Movements', *American Sociological*

Review, 72(5), pp. 725–749. doi: 10.1177/000312240707200504.

Mccammon, H. J. and Mcgrath, A. R. (2015) 'Litigating change? Social movements and the court system', *Sociology Compass*, 9(2), pp. 128–139. doi: 10.1111/soc4.12243.

McCarthy, J. D. (1994) 'Activists, Authorities, and Media Framing of Drunk Driving', in Laraña, E., Johnston, H., and Gusfield, J. (eds) *New Social Movements: From Ideology to Identity*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, pp. 133–67.

McCarthy, J. D. and Zald, M. N. (1977) 'Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory', *American Journal of Sociology*, 82(6), pp. 1212–1241. doi: 10.1086/226464.

McCarthy, J. and Edwards, B. (2004) 'Resources and social movement mobilization', in Snow, D. A., Soule, S. A., and Kriesi, H. (eds) *The Blackwell companion to social movements*. New Malden: Blackwell Publishing, pp. 116–152.

McKanders, K. M. (2014) 'Anatomy of an Uprising: Women, Democracy, and the Moroccan Feminist Spring', *Boston University International Law Journal*, 32, pp. 147–184. Available at: https://www.copyright.com/ccc/basicSearch.do?

McVeigh, R., Myers, D. J. and Sikkink, D. (2004) 'Corn, Klansmen, and Coolidge: Structure and Framing in Social Movements', *Social Forces*, 83(2), pp. 653–690. doi: 10.1353/sof.2005.0019.

Media24 (2013) 'Projet de loi : dragueurs, harceleurs, hommes violents, voici ce que vous risquez', *Media24*, 5 November. Available at: https://www.medias24.com/DROIT/5913-Projet-de-loi-dragueurs-harceleurs-hommes-violents-voici-ce-que-vous-risquez.html (Accessed: 7 May 2018).

Melucci, A. (1989) *Nomads of the Present: Social Movements and Individual Needs in*

Contemporary society. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Meyer, D. S. (2004) 'Protest and Political Opportunities', *Annual Review of Sociology*. Annual Reviews, 30, pp. 125–145. Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/29737688.

Meyer, D. S. and Minkoff, D. C. (2004) 'Conceptualizing Political Opportunity', *Social Forces*, 82(4), pp. 1457–1492. doi: 10.1353/sof.2004.0082.

Meyer, D. S. and Tarrow, S. (1998) *The Social Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New Century*. Rowman & L. Edited by D. S. Meyer and S. Tarrow. Oxford.

Meyer, J. W. and Rowan, B. (1977) 'Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony', *American Journal of Sociology*, 83(2), pp. 340–363. doi: 10.1086/226550.

Meyerson, D. E. and Scully, M. A. (1995) 'Tempered Radicalism and the Politics of Ambivalence and Change', *Organization Science*, 6(5), pp. 585–600. doi: 10.2307/2634965.

Minkoff, D. C. (1997) 'The Sequencing of Social Movements', *American Sociological Review*, 62(5), pp. 779–799. doi: 10.2307/2657360.

Mir-Hosseini, Z. (2007) 'How the Door of Ijtihad Was Opened and Closed: A Comparative Analysis of Recent Family Law Reforms in Iran and Morocco', *Washington and Lee Law Review*, 64(4), pp. 1499–1511. Available at: http://heinonline.org/HOL/Index?index=journals/waslee%5Cn&collection=journals.

Moghadam, V. M. (1991) 'Islamist Movements and Women's Responses in the Middle East', *Gender & History*, 3(3), pp. 268–286. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0424.1991.tb00131.x.

Moghadam, V. M. (1993) 'Rhetorics and Rights of Identity in Islamist Movements', *Journal of World History*, 4(2), pp. 243–264. Available at:

http://www.jstor.org/stable/20078562%5Cnhttp://www.jstor.org.ep.fjernadgang.kb.dk/stable/ pdfplus/20078562.pdf?acceptTC=true.

Moghadam, V. M. (2003) *Modernizing Women: Gender and Social Change in the Middle East*. Second. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Moghadam, V. M. (2013a) *Globalization and Social Movements:Islamism, Feminism, and the Global Justice Movement*. Second. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Moghadam, V. M. (2013b) 'What is democracy? Promises and perils of the Arab Spring', *Current Sociology*, 61(4), pp. 393–408. doi: 10.1177/0011392113479739.

Moghadam, V. M. and Gheytanchi, E. (2010) 'Political Opportunities and Strategic Choices: Comparing Feminist Campaigns in Morocco and Iran', *An International Journal*, 15(3), pp. 267–288. doi: 10.17813/maiq.15.3.n248564371645v14.

Moher, D. *et al.* (2015) 'Preferred reporting items for systematic review and meta-analysis protocols (PRISMA-P) 2015 statement', *Systematic Reviews*, 4(1), p. 1. doi: 10.1186/2046-4053-4-1.

Moho, F. (2014) *Une marche à Rabat pour l'application de l'article 19, le360*. Available at: http://fr.le360.ma/societe/une-marche-a-rabat-pour-lapplication-de-larticle-19-13059 (Accessed: 28 April 2018).

Monqid, S. (2012) 'Violence against women in public spaces: the case of Morocco', *Égypte/Monde arabe*, (9), pp. 105–117. doi: 10.4000/ema.3011.

Mounir, N. (2013a) 'A violence quotidienne, mobilisation tout aussi quotidienne', *Liberation*, 28 November. Available at: https://www.libe.ma/A-violence-quotidienne-mobilisation-tout-aussi-quotidienne_a44395.html (Accessed: 4 May 2018).

Mounir, N. (2013b) 'Entretien realise avec Nouzha Skalli, deputee PPS et ancienne ministre du Developpement social, de la Famille et de la Solidarite', *Liberation*, 13 March. Available at: http://www.libe.ma/Entretien-realise-avec-Nouzha-Skalli-deputee-PPS-et-ancienne-ministre-du-Developpement-social-de-la-Famille-et-de-la_a35990.html (Accessed: 7 May 2018).

Mounir, N. (2013c) 'Plus du tiers des femmes sont victimes de violence a travers le monde', *Liberation*, 15 June. Available at: http://www.libe.ma/Plus-du-tiers-des-femmes-sont-victimes-de-violence-a-travers-le-monde_a39483.html (Accessed: 7 May 2018).

Mounir, N. (2013d) 'Pour que le droit des femmes a vivre sans violence devienne une realite', *Liberation*, 18 March. Available at: https://www.libe.ma/Pour-que-le-droit-des-femmes-a-vivre-sans-violence-devienne-une-realite_a36220.html (Accessed: 6 May 2018).

Mounir, N. (2014a) 'Intégrer la santé sexuelle et reproductive dans les droits fondamentaux', *Liberation*, 16 May. Available at: https://www.libe.ma/Integrer-la-sante-sexuelle-et-reproductive-dans-les-droits-fondamentaux_a50183.html (Accessed: 4 May 2018).

Mounir, N. (2014b) 'Le Code de la Famille dans le collimateur des praticiens', *Liberation*, 31 March. Available at: http://www.libe.ma/Le-Code-de-la-famille-dans-le-collimateur-des-praticiens_a48570.html (Accessed: 7 May 2018).

Mounir, N. (2014c) 'Violences sexuelles et conflits, un tandem d'enfer', *Liberation*, 29 April. Available at: http://www.libe.ma/Violences-sexuelles-et-conflits-un-tandem-d-enfer_a49580.html (Accessed: 7 May 2018).

Murgue, B. (2011) 'La Moudawana : les dessous d'une réforme sans précédent', *Les Cahiers de l'Orient*, 102(2), pp. 15–29.

Naciri, R. (1998) *The women's movement and political discourse in Morocco*. 8. Geneva.

Naciri, R. (2003) 'The Women's Movement in the Maghreb: with emphasis on Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria', *Al Raida*, 20(100), pp. 20–28.

Naciri, R. (2006) *LE MOUVEMENT DES FEMMES AU MAROC*, *50 ans de développement humain au Maroc et perspectives pour 2025*.

Naciri, R. (2014) 'Le Mouvement des Femmes au Maroc', *Nouvelles Questions Feministes*, 33(2), pp. 43–64.

Näsström, S. (2015) 'Democratic Representation Beyond Election', *Constellations*, 22(1), pp. 1–12. doi: 10.1111/1467-8675.12123.

O'Toole, L. J. (2000) 'Research on policy implementation: Assessment and prospects', *Journal of public administration research and theory*, 10(2), pp. 263–288. doi: 10.1093/oxfordjournals.jpart.a024270.

Oberschall, A. (1996) 'Opportunities and framing in the 1989 revolts', in *Comparative perspectives on social movements : political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and cultural framings*, pp. 93–121.

Olzak, S. *et al.* (2016) 'Friends or Foes? How Social Movement Allies Affect the Passage of Legislation in the U.S. Congress', *Mobilization: An International Quarterly*, 21(2), pp. 213–230. doi: 10.17813/1086-671X-21-2-213.

Olzak, S. and Ryo, E. (2007) 'Organizational Diversity, Vitality and Outcomes in the Civil Rights Movement', *Social Forces*, 85(4), pp. 1561–1591. doi: 10.1353/sof.2007.0076.

Olzak, S. and Soule, S. (2004) 'When do social movements matter? The politics of contingency and the Equal Rights Amendment', *American Sociological Review*, 69, pp. 473–497. doi: 10.2307/3593061.

Olzak, S. and Uhrig, S. C. N. (2001) 'The Ecology of Tactical Overlap', *American Sociological Review*, 66(5), p. 694. doi: 10.2307/3088954.

Opp, K.-D. (2009) *Theories of political protest and social movements: A multidisciplinary introduction, critique, and synthesis*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Organisme de Justification de la Diffusion (no date) *Chiffres*. Available at: http://www.ojd.ma/Chiffres/(category)/payante (Accessed: 3 May 2018).

Ouali, N. (2008) 'LES RÉFORMES AU MAROC : ENJEUX ET STRATÉGIES DU MOUVEMENT DES FEMMES', *Nouvelles Questions Feministes*, 3(27), pp. 28–41.

Ouassat, M. (2015) 'Benkirane devoile son indecrottable antifeminisme aux Espagnoles', *Liberation*, 5 June. Available at: https://www.libe.ma/Benkirane-devoile-son-indecrottable-antifeminisme-aux-Espagnols_a62984.html (Accessed: 7 May 2018).

Pache, A. C. and Santos, F. (2010) 'When worlds collide: The internal dynamics of organizational responses to conflicting institutional demands', *Academy of Management Review*, pp. 455–476. doi: 10.5465/AMR.2010.51142368.

Pattberg, P. (2005) 'The institutionalization of private governance: How business and nonprofit organizations agree on transnational rules', *Governance*, pp. 589–610. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0491.2005.00293.x.

Pedriana, N. (2004) 'Help Wanted NOW: Legal Resources, the Women's Movement, and the Battle Over Sex-Segregated Job Advertisements', *Social Problems*, 51(2), pp. 182–201. doi: 10.1525/sp.2004.51.2.182.

Pedriana, N. (2006) 'From Protective to Equal Treatment: Legal Framing Processes and Transformation of the Women's Movement in the 1960s', *American Journal of Sociology*,

111(6), pp. 1718–1761. doi: 10.1086/499911.

Pellicer, M. and Wegner, E. (2014) 'Socio-economic voter profile and motives for Islamist support in Morocco', *Party Politics*, 20(1), pp. 116–133. doi: 10.1177/1354068811436043.

Pettigrew, A. M. (1992) 'The character and significance of strategy process research', *Strategic Management Journal*, 13(2 S), pp. 5–16. doi: 10.1002/smj.4250130903.

Pettinicchio, D. (2012) 'Institutional activism: Reconsidering the insider/outsider dichotomy', *Sociology Compass*, 6(6), pp. 499–510.

Pettinicchio, D. (2016) 'Elites, Policy, and Social Movements', in *On the Cross Road of Polity, Political Elites and Mobilization*, pp. 155–190. doi: 10.1108/S0895-993520160000024006.

Piccio, D. R. (2015) 'How Social Movements Impact Political Parties', in Giugni, M., Bosi, L., and Uba, K. (eds) *The Consequences of Social Movements*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 263–284.

Pichardo, N. A. (1988) 'Resource Mobilization: An Analysis of Conflicting Theoretical Variations', *The Sociological Quarterly*. Routledge, 29(1), pp. 97–110. doi: 10.1111/j.1533-8525.1988.tb01245.x.

Piven, F. F. and Cloward, R. A. (1979) *Poor People's Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail*. New York: Vintage Books.

della Porta, D. (2003) 'Continuities and Change in the Italian case', in Banazsak, L. A., Beckwith, K., and Rucht, D. (eds) *Women's movements facing the reconfigured state*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 48–68.

della Porta, D. (2007) 'The global justice movement in context', in della Porta, D. (ed.) *The

global justice movement: cross-national and transnational. Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, pp. 232–251.

Della Porta, D. (2014) 'In-depth interviews', in Della Porta, D. (ed.) *Methodological practices in social movement research*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 228–261.

della Porta, D. and Fillieule, O. (2004) 'Policing social protest', in Snow, D. A., Soule, S. A., and Kriesi, H. (eds) *The Blackwell companion to social*. New Malden: Blackwell Publishing, pp. 217–241.

della Porta, D. and Rucht, D. (2002) 'The Dynamics of Environmental Campaigns', *Mobilization*, 7(1), pp. 1–14. Available at: http://search.proquest.com/docview/60435965?accountid=14643%5Cnhttp://mlbsfx.sibi.usp. br:3410/sfxlcl41?url_ver=Z39.88- 2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&genre=article&sid=ProQ:ProQ:socabsshell &atitle=The+Dynamics+of+Environmental+Campaigns&titl.

Della Porta, D. and Tarrow, S. (2005) 'Transnational processes and social activism: An introduction', *Transnational protest and global …*, pp. 1–18. doi: 10.1177/009430610503400551.

Poulson, S. C., Caswell, C. P. and Gray, L. R. (2014) 'Isomorphism, Institutional Parochialism, and the Study of Social Movements', *Isomorphism, Institutional Parochialism, and the Study of Social Movements*, 13(2), pp. 222–242.

Printemps de la Dignite (2010) *Qui sommes-nous*. Available at: https://pdmaroc.wordpress.com/qui-sommes-nous/ (Accessed: 28 April 2018).

Printemps Féministe pour la Démocratie et l'Egalité (2011) *Qui sommes nous*. Available at: https://pfdemaroc.wordpress.com/qui-sommes-nous/ (Accessed: 28 April 2018).

Ragin, C. and Rubinson, C. (2009) 'The Uses of Comparative History in Macro-social Theory', in Landman, T. and Robinson, N. (eds) *Comparative Studies in Society and History*. SAGE. London, pp. 13–84.

Rajagopalan, N. and Rasheed, A. M. A. (1995) 'Incremental Models of Policy Formulation and Non-incremental Changes: Critical Review and Synthesis', *British Journal of Management*, 6(4), pp. 289–302. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8551.1995.tb00101.x.

Ramady, M. A. (2015) 'Overview', in Ramady, M. A. (ed.) *The Political Economy of Wasta: Use and Abuse of Social Capital Networking*. New York: Springer International Publishing, pp. viii–xxvii.

Rao, N. and Cagna, P. (2016) *Feminist Mobilization, Claims Making and Policy Change: Insights from Asia*. Available at: http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/search/B6101E91FE8A2201C125803E0036D414?OpenDocument.

Rehfeld, A. (2006) 'Towards a general theory of political representation', *Journal of Politics*, 68(1), pp. 1–21. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2508.2006.00365.x.

Reporters Without Borders (2017) *Aujourd'hui le Maroc*. Available at: https://maroc.mom-rsf.org/en/media/detail/outlet/aujourdhui-le-maroc/ (Accessed: 3 May 2018).

Rerhaye, N. (2012a) 'Le chef de gouvernement interpellé après le suicide d'Amina et sit-in ce samedi devant le Parlement : Pour qu'une victime de viol ne soit plus jamais contrainte d'épouser son bourreau', *Liberation*, 17 March. Available at: https://www.libe.ma/Le-chef-de-gouvernement-interpelle-apres-le-suicide-d-Amina-et-sit-in-ce-samedi-devant-le-Parlement-Pour-qu-une-victime_a25958.html (Accessed: 4 May 2018).

Rerhaye, N. (2012b) 'Le chef du gouvernement interpelle sur la situation des Marocaines et

la violence familiale: A la Chambre des Representants, Benkirane tord le cou au principe de l'egalite', *Liberation*, 26 December. Available at: http://www.libe.ma/Le-chef-du-gouvernement-interpelle-sur-la-situation-des-Marocaines-et-la-violence-familiale-A-la-Chambre-des_a33465.html (Accessed: 7 May 2018).

Rerhaye, N. (2013) 'A Istanbul, l'ISF recommande la parité dans les Objectifs du millénaire et rend justice aux femmes du Printemps arabe', *Liberation*, 19 November. Available at: https://www.libe.ma/A-Istanbul-l-ISF-recommande-la-parite-dans-les-Objectifs-du-millenaire-et-rend-justice-aux-femmes-du-Printemps-arabe_a44114.html (Accessed: 4 May 2018).

Rerhaye, N. (2014a) 'La lecon d'egalite et de non-discrimination de Driss El Yazami a Bassima Hakkaoui', *Liberation*, 7 March. Available at: http://www.libe.ma/_a47774.html?print=1 (Accessed: 7 May 2018).

Rerhaye, N. (2014b) 'Un sit-in pour protester contre les propos de Benkirane sur la place des Marocaines dans la societe', *Liberation*, 24 June. Available at: http://www.libe.ma/Un-sit-in-pour-protester-contre-les-propos-de-Benkirane-sur-la-place-des-Marocaines-dans-la-societe_a51544.html (Accessed: 7 May 2018).

Risse-Kappen, T. (1995) 'Bringing transnational relations back in: an introduction', in Risse-Kappen, T. (ed.) *Bringing transnational relations back in: non-state actors, domestic structures, and international institutions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 3–33.

Risse, T. and Sikkink, K. (1999) 'The socialisation of international human rights norms into domestic practices: an introduction', in Risse, T., Ropp, S., and Sikkink, K. (eds) *The power of human rights, international norms and domestic change*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–38.

Rohlinger, D. A. and Gentile, H. (2017) 'Sociological Understandings of Social Movements: A North American Perspective', in Roggeband, C. and Klandermans, B. (eds) *Handbook of Social Movements Across Disciplines*. Cham: Springer International Publishing, pp. 9–32. doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-57648-0_2.

Ron, J., Ramos, H. and Rodgers, K. (2005) 'Transnational information politics: NGO human rights reporting, 1986-2000', *International Studies Quarterly*, pp. 557–587. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2005.00377.x.

Rootes, C. (1999) 'Political opportunity structures: Promise, problems and prospects', *La Lettre de la maison Francaise d'Oxford*, (10), pp. 75–97.

Rosenthal, R. (1979) 'The file drawer problem and tolerance for null results.', *Psychological Bulletin*, 86(3), pp. 638–641. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.86.3.638.

Rucht, D. (1996) 'The Impact of National Contexts on Social Movements Structures: A Cross-Movement and Cross-National Comparison', in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Oportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*, pp. 185–205.

Rucht, D. (2001) 'Lobbying or protest? Strategies to change EU environmental politics', in *Contentious Europeans: Protest and politics in an emerging polity*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, pp. 125–42.

Ruchti, J. J. (2012) 'Morocco's Constitution of 2011'. Available at: https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Morocco_2011.pdf.

Rugh, W. A. (2004) *Arab Mass Media: Newspapers, Radio and Television in Arab Politics*. Westport: Praeger.

Sadiqi, F. (2008a) 'Facing challenges and pioneering feminist and gender studies: Women in post-colonial and today's maghrib', *African and Asian Studies*, 7(4), pp. 447–470. doi: 10.1163/156921008X359614.

Sadiqi, F. (2008b) 'The central role of the family law in the Moroccan feminist movement', *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 35(3), pp. 325–337. doi: 10.1080/13530190802525098.

Sadiqi, F. (2010a) 'Domestic Violence in the African North', *Al-Raida Journal*, Fall/Winte, pp. 17–27. Available at: http://www.alraidajournal.com/index.php/ALRJ/article/view/37.

Sadiqi, F. (2010b) 'Women's Rights in the Middle East and North Africa: Progress Amid Resistance: Morocco', *Women's Rights in the Middle East and North Africa: Progress Amid Resistance*, pp. 1–26.

Sadiqi, F. (2014a) *Moroccan Feminist Discourses*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Sadiqi, F. (2014b) 'Women's NGOs and the struggle for democracy in Morocco', in Golan, G. and Salem, W. (eds) *Non-State Actors in the Middle East: Factors for Peace and Democracy*. New York: Routledge, pp. 42–53.

Sadiqi, F. (2016) 'Emerging Amazigh Feminist Nongovernmental Organizations', *Journal of Middle East Women's Studies*, 12(1), pp. 122–5. Available at: muse.jhu.edu/article/611000.

Sadiqi, F. (2017a) 'The Moroccan Feminist Movement (1946 - 2014)', in Badri, B. and Tripp, A. M. (eds) *Women's Activism in Africa: Struggles for Rights and Representation*. Zed Books.

Sadiqi, F. (2017b) 'The Moroccan Feminist Movement (1946 - 2014)', in Badri, B. and Tripp, A. M. (eds) *Women's Activism in Africa: Struggles for Rights and Representation*.

London: Zed Books.

Sadiqi, F. and Ennaji, M. (2006) 'THE FEMINIZATION OF PUBLIC SPACE: WOMEN'S ACTIVISM, THE FAMILY LAW, AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MOROCCO', *Journal of Middle East Women's Studies*, 2(2), pp. 86–114. doi: 10.2979/MEW.2006.2.2.86.

Salaheddine, A. (2012) 'Conférence régionale sur la violence contre les Femmes', *Aujourd'hui le Maroc*, 25 December. Available at: http://aujourdhui.ma/societe/conference-regionale-sur-la-violence-contre-les-femmes-98218 (Accessed: 4 May 2018).

Salime, Z. (2012) 'A new feminism? Gender dynamics in Morocco's February 20th movement', *Journal of International Women's Studies*, 13(5), pp. 101–122. Available at: http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?eid=2-s2.0-84875089100&partnerID=tZOtx3y1.

Santoro, W. A. (1999) 'Conventional Politics Takes Center Stage: The Latino Struggle against English-Only Laws', *Social Forces*, 77(3), pp. 887–909. doi: 10.1093/sf/77.3.887.

Santoro, W. A. (2002) 'The Civil Rights Movement's Struggle for Fair Employment: A "Dramatic Events-Conventional Politics" Model', *Social Forces*, 81(1), pp. 177–206. doi: 10.1353/sof.2002.0059.

Santoro, W. A. and McGuire, G. M. (1997) 'Social Movement Insiders: The Impact of Institutional Activists on Affirmative Action and Comparable Worth Policies', *Social Problems*, 44(4), pp. 503–519. doi: 10.1525/sp.1997.44.4.03x0234z.

Santoro, W. a (2008) 'The Civil Rights Movement and the Right to Vote: Black Protest, Segregationist Violence and the Audience', *Social Forces*, 86(4), pp. 1391–1414. doi: 10.1353/sof.0.0042.

Sater, J. (2002) 'The dynamics of state and civil society in Morocco', *Journal of North*

African Studies, 7(3), pp. 101–118. doi: 10.1080/13629380208718476.

Sater, J. N. (2007) 'Changing politics from below? Women parliamentarians in Morocco', *Democratization*, 14(4), pp. 723–742. doi: 10.1080/13510340701398352.

Saward, M. (2006) 'The Representative Claim', *Contemporary Political Theory*, 5(3), pp. 297–318. doi: 10.1057/palgrave.cpt.9300234.

Saward, M. (2010) *The representative claim*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Schumaker, P. D. (1975) 'Policy Responsiveness to Protest-Group Demands', *The Journal of Politics*, 37(02), p. 488. doi: 10.2307/2129004.

Scott, W. R. (2014) *Institutions and organizations: ideas, interests and identities*. 4th edn. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications Ltd.

Seddon, D. (1989) 'The Politics of "Adjustment" in Morocco', in Campbell, B. K. and Loxley, J. (eds) *Structural Adjustment in Africa*. Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 234–265.

Severs, E. (2010) 'Representation as claims-making. Quid responsiveness?', *Representation*, 46(4), pp. 412–423. doi: 10.1080/00344893.2010.518081.

Severs, E. (2012) 'SUBSTANTIVE REPRESENTATION THROUGH A CLAIMS-MAKING LENS: A STRATEGY FOR THE IDENTIFICATION AND ANALYSIS OF SUBSTANTIVE CLAIMS', *Representation*, 48(2), pp. 169–181. doi: 10.1080/00344893.2012.683491.

Severs, E., Celis, K. and Meier, P. (2013) 'Representative claims and beyond: a study of Muslim women's inclusion in the Flemish headscarf debate', *Politics, Groups and Identities*, 1(3), pp. 433–450. doi: 10.1080/21565503.2013.816633.

Shekha, K. R. (2011) 'Determinants of Latin American activism: Domestic and transnational

political opportunities and threats', *Sociology Compass*, 5(8), pp. 747–762. doi: 10.1111/j.1751-9020.2011.00396.x.

El Sherif, A. N. (2012) 'Institutional and Ideological Re-construction of the Justice and Development Party (PJD): The Question of Democratic Islamism in Morocco', *The Middle East Journal*, 66(4), pp. 660–682. doi: 10.3751/66.4.15.

Sikkink, K. (2002) 'Restructuring World Politics: transnational social movements, networks, and norms', in Khagram, S., Riker, J., and Sikkink, K. (eds) *Restructuring world politics: transnational social movements, networks and norms*. University. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 301–17.

Sikkink, K. (2005) 'Patterns of dynamic multilevel governance and the insider-outsider coalition', in della Porta, D. and Tarrow, S. (eds) *Transnational protest and global activism*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 151–73.

Sikkink, K. and Keck, M. E. (1998) *Activists beyond Borders; Advocacy Networks in International Politics*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Silver, I. (1998) 'Buying an Activist Identity : Class Through Reproducing Social Movement Philanthropy', *Sociological Perspectives*, 41(2), pp. 303–321. doi: 10.2307/1389479.

Skalli, L. H. (2011) 'Constructing Arab Female Leadership Lessons from the Moroccan Media', *Gender & Society*, 25(4), pp. 473–495. doi: 10.1177/0891243211411051.

Skocpol, T. and Abend-Wein, M. (1993) 'Women's associations and the enactment of mothers' pensions in the United States.', *American Political ...*, 87(3), pp. 686–701. doi: 10.2307/2938744.

Smets, K. and van Ham, C. (2013) 'The embarrassment of riches? A meta-analysis of

individual-level research on voter turnout', *Electoral Studies*, 32(2), pp. 344–359. doi: 10.1016/j.electstud.2012.12.006.

Smith, J. (2004) 'Transnational processes and movements', in Snow, D. A., Soule, S. A., and Kriesi, H. (eds) *The Blackwell Companion to social movements*. New Jersey: Blackwell Publishing, pp. 311–35.

Solidarite Feminine (no date) *A Propos*. Available at: https://solfem.wordpress.com/about/ (Accessed: 7 May 2018).

Soule, S. *et al.* (1999) 'Protest events: cause or consequence of state action? The US women's movement and federal Congressional activities, 1956-1979', *Mobilization: An ...*, 4(2), pp. 239–256. Available at: http://mobilization.metapress.com/index/V01017723M8P2W04.pdf.

Soule, S. A. and King, B. G. (2006) 'The Stages of the Policy Process and the Equal Rights Amendment, 1972–1982', *American Journal of Sociology*, 111(6), pp. 1871–1909. doi: 10.1086/499908.

Stearns, L. B. and Almeida, P. D. (2004) 'The Formation of State Actor-Social Movement Coalitions and Favorable Policy Outcomes', *Social Problems*, 51(4), pp. 478–504. doi: 10.1525/sp.2004.51.4.478.

Steil, J. P. and Vasi, I. B. (2014) 'The new immigration contestation: Social movements and local immigration policy making in the United States, 2000–2011', *American Journal of Sociology*, 119(4), pp. 1104–1155. doi: 10.1086/675301.

Strang, D. and Soule, S. A. (1998) 'Diffusion in Organizations and Social Movements: From Hybrid Corn to Poison Pills', *Annual Review of Sociology*, 24(1), pp. 265–290. doi: 10.1146/annurev.soc.24.1.265.

Sturgis, P. *et al.* (2014) 'Ethnic diversity, segregation and the social cohesion of neighbourhoods in London', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 37(8), pp. 1286–1309. doi: 10.1080/01419870.2013.831932.

Suh, D. (2001) 'How Do Political Opportunities Matter for Social Movements?: Political Opportunity, Misframing, Pseudosuccess, and Pseudofailure', *The Sociological Quarterly*, 42(3), pp. 437–460. doi: 10.1111/j.1533-8525.2001.tb02409.x.

Suh, D. (2009) *Political protest and labor solidarity in Korea: White-collar labor movements after democratization (1987 - 1995)*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Suh, D. (2011) 'Institutionalizing social movements: The dual strategy of the Korean women's movement', *Sociological Quarterly*, 52(3), pp. 442–471. doi: 10.1111/j.1533-8525.2011.01214.x.

Tabet, M. (2014) 'La violence économique exercée contre les femmes commence à prendre de l'ampleur', *Liberation*, 24 December. Available at: https://www.libe.ma/La-violence-economique-exercee-contre-les-femmes-commence-a-prendre-de-l-ampleur_a57331.html (Accessed: 6 May 2018).

Tabet, M. (2016a) 'Le Mystérieux enterrement du projet de loi relatif à la lutte contre la violence à l'égard des femmes', *Liberation*, 15 February.

Tabet, M. (2016b) 'Le pourquoi du comment d'un volte-face gouvernemental', *Liberation*, 6 July. Available at: http://www.libe.ma/Le-pourquoi-du-comment-d-une-volte-face-gouvernementale_a76579.html (Accessed: 7 May 2018).

Taleb, M. (2012a) ''Reuni a Casablanca: Un tribunal symbolique condamne la legalisation du mariage des mineures', *Liberation*, 9 April. Available at: http://www.libe.ma/Reuni-a-Casablanca-Un-tribunal-symbolique-condamne-la-legalisation-du-mariage-des-

mineures_a26521.html (Accessed: 6 May 2018).

Taleb, M. (2012) 'Latifa Jbabdi, membre du Conseil national de l'USFP : "Nos filles ne doivent pas payer le prix de l'échec des politiques sociales du gouvernement"', *Liberation*, 11 April. Available at: https://www.libe.ma/Latifa-Jbabdi-membre-du-Conseil-national-de-l-USFP-Nos-filles-ne-doivent-pas-payer-le-prix-de-l-echec-des-politiques_a26595.html (Accessed: 4 May 2018).

Taleb, M. (2012b) 'Plaidoyers en marge du 13eme tribunal de la femme', *Liberation*, 12 April. Available at: http://www.libe.ma/Plaidoyers-en-marge-du-13eme-tribunal-de-la-femme_a26611.html (Accessed: 7 May 2018).

Tarrow, S. (2005) 'The New Transnational Activism', *Cambridge University Press*, p. 258. doi: 10.1353/cjs.2006.0074.

Tarrow, S. (2011) *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*. 3rd edn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Theriault, S. and Shafran, J. (2013) 'Reintroducing the policy process into studying Congress', in La Raja, R. (ed.) *New Directions in American Politics*. New York: Routledge, pp. 43–60.

Tilly, C. (1978) *From Mobilization to Revolution*. Reading: Addision-Wesley.

Tommel, I. (2013) 'The Presidents of the European Commission: Transactional or Transforming Leaders?', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 51(4), pp. 789–805.

Torrance, H. (2012) 'Triangulation, Respondent Validation, and Democratic Participation in Mixed Methods Research', *Journal of Mixed Methods Research*, 6(2), pp. 111–123. doi: 10.1177/1558689812437185.

Touraine, A. (1981) *The Voice and the Eye*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

'Treaty Between France and Spain Regarding Morocco' (1913) *The American Journal of International Law*. American Society of International Law, 7(2), pp. 81–99. Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2212275.

Turner, R. H. and Killian, L. M. (1987) *Collective Behavior*. 3rd edn. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.

Uba, K. (2005) 'Political Protest and Policy Change: The Direct Impacts of Indian Antiprivatization Mobilizations, 1990-2003', *Mobilization. An International Journal*, 10(3), pp. 383–396. doi: 10.17813/maiq.10.3.004857754441n353.

Uba, K. (2009) 'The Contextual Dependence of Movement Outcomes: A Simplified Meta-Analysis', *Mobilization: An International Quarterly*, 14(4), pp. 433–448. doi: 10.17813/maiq.14.4.m8477j873p47p546.

Uba, K. (2010) '" Save Our School!" What kinds of impact have protests against school closures in Swedish local politics?', *Statsvetenskaplig tidskrift*, 112(1), pp. 96–104.

Urbinati, N. and Warren, M. E. (2008) 'The Concept of Representation in Contemporary Democratic Theory', *Annual Review of Political Science*, 11(1), pp. 387–412. doi: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.053006.190533.

Valiente, C. (2003) 'The Feminist Movement and the Reconfigured State in Spain', in Banazsak, L. A., Beckwith, K., and Rucht, D. (eds) *Women's movements facing the reconfigured state*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 33 – 47.

Wacker, J. (1998) 'A definition of theory: research guidelines for different theory-building research methods in operations management', *Journal of Operations Management*, 16(4), pp.

361–385. doi: 10.1016/S0272-6963(98)00019-9.

Wahlstrom, M. and Peterson, a. (2006) 'Between the State and the Market: Expanding the Concept of "Political Opportunity Structure"', *Acta Sociologica*, 49(4), pp. 363–377. doi: 10.1177/0001699306071677.

Wald, K. D. and Corey, J. C. (2002) 'The Christian Right and Public Policy: Social Movement Elites as Institutional Activists', *State Politics and Policy Quarterly*, 2(2), pp. 99–125. doi: 10.1177/153244000200200201.

Walgrave, S. and Vliegenthart, R. (2012) 'The Complex Agenda-setting Power of Protest: Demonstrations, Media, Parliament, Government, and Legislation in Belgium, 1993-2000', *Mobilization*, 17(2), pp. 129–156. doi: 10.17813/maiq.17.2.pw053m281356572h.

Wejnert, B. and Parigi, P. (2016) *On the Cross Road of Polity, Political Elites and Mobilization*. Edited by B. Wejnert and P. Parigi. Bangley: Emerald Group Publishing Limited.

Weldon, S. L. (2002) 'Beyond bodies: Institutional sources of representation for women in democratic policymaking', *Journal of Politics*, pp. 1153–1174. doi: 10.1111/1468-2508.00167.

Weldon, S. L. (2006) 'Women's Movements, Identity Politics, and Policy Impacts: A Study of Policies on Violence against Women in the 50 United States', *Political Research Quarterly*, 59(1), pp. 111–122. doi: 10.1177/106591290605900110.

Werbner, P. (2002) 'The place which is diaspora: Citizenship, religion and gender in the making of chaordic transnationalism', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 28(1), pp. 119–133. doi: 10.1080/13691830120103967.

Weyland, K. (2005) 'Theories of Policy Diffusion Lessons from Latin American Pension Reform', *World Politics*, 57(02), pp. 262–295. doi: 10.1353/wp.2005.0019.

de Wilde, P. (2013) 'Representative claims analysis: Theory meets method', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 20(2), pp. 278–294. doi: 10.1080/13501763.2013.746128.

de Wilde, P. (2014) 'The Operating Logics of National Parliaments and Mass Media in the Politicisation of Europe', *Journal of Legislative Studies*, 20(1), pp. 46–61. doi: 10.1080/13572334.2013.871484.

De Wilde, P., Koopmans, R. and Zürn, M. (2014) 'The Political Sociology of Cosmopolitanism and Communitarianism: Representative Claims Analysis', *WZB Discussion Paper*, SPIV 2014-.

Willis, M. J. (1999) 'Between alternance and the Makhzen: At-Tawhid wa Al-Islah's entry into Moroccan politics', *The Journal of North African Studies*, 4(3), pp. 45–80. doi: 10.1080/13629389908718373.

Willis, M. J. (2002a) 'Political parties in the Maghrib: Ideology and identification. A suggested typology', *Journal of North African Studies*, 7(3), pp. 1–28. doi: 10.1080/13629380208718471.

Willis, M. J. (2002b) 'Political parties in the Maghrib: The illusion of significance?', *Journal of North African Studies*, 7(2), pp. 1–22. doi: 10.1080/13629380208718463.

Wilson, B. M. and Rodríguez Cordero, J. C. (2006) 'Legal Opportunity Structures and Social Movements: The Effects of Institutional Change on Costa Rican Politics', *Comparative Political Studies*, 39(3), pp. 325–351. doi: 10.1177/0010414005281934.

Wolf, F. (1986) *Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences: Meta-analysis*. Newbury

Park : Sage Publications Ltd. doi: 10.4135/9781412984980.

Wu, F. (2005) *Double-mobilization: Transnational Advocacy Networks for China's Environment and Public Health*. University of Maryland. Available at: https://drum.lib.umd.edu/handle/1903/2970.

Wuerth, O. (2005) 'The reform of the moudawana: The role of women's civil society organizations in changing the personal status code in Morocco', *Hawwa*, 3(3), pp. 309–333. doi: 10.1163/156920805774910042.

Wyrtzen, J. (2016) *Making Morocco: Colonial Intervention and the Politics of Identity*. New York: Cornell University Press.

Yachoulti, M. (2015) 'The Feminist Movement in the Moroccan Spring: Roles, Specificity, and Gains', *Sociology Study*, 5(12). doi: 10.17265/2159-5526/2015.12.001.

Yin, R. K. (1994) *Case Study Research: Design and Methods, Thousands Oaks, CA: International Educational and Professional Publisher*. Thousand Oaks: International Educational and Professional Publisher.

Zajak, S. (2014) *Pathways of transnational activism: a conceptual framework*. Cologne. Available at: http://www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de/pu/mpifg_dp/dp14-5.pdf.

Zald, M. N. and Garner, R. (1987) 'Social Movements in Organizations', in McCarthy, J. D. and Zald, M. N. (eds) *Social Movements in an Organisational Society*. New Brunswick: Transaction, pp. 121–142.

Zerrour, L. (2014) 'Violence contre les femmes: un collectif d'ONG s'insurge contre le gouvernement', *Liberation*, 7 February. Available at: http://aujourdhui.ma/societe/violence-contre-les-femmes-un-collectif-dong-sinsurge-contre-le-gouvernement-107703 (Accessed: 6

May 2018).

ZHAN, X. and TANG, S.-Y. (2013) 'POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES, RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS AND POLICY ADVOCACY OF ENVIRONMENTAL NGOs IN CHINA', *Public Administration*, 91(2), pp. 381–399. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9299.2011.02011.x.

Zouak, S. (2015) *Portrait de AICHA ECH-CHENNA – La Mère des enfants abandonnés du Maroc*, *Women0s World Wide Web*. Available at: https://www.w4.org/fr/wowwire/aicha-ech-chenna-mere-des-enfants-abandonnes-maroc/ (Accessed: 7 May 2018).

Appendix 1

1.1. Codebook Dataset Meta-Analysis Opportunities, Mobilisation and Policy Impact[54]

Study Characteristics

Variable	Variable Label	Value Label	Note
ID_ART	Id number article		
AUTHOR	Author(s) name		*String*
YR_PUB	Year of publication		
JOURNAL	Journal	1 = American Journal of Sociology 2= American Sociological Review 3= Mobilization 4 = Social Forces 5 = Sociological Perspectives	

---

[54] This is a replication of the codebook used by Smets and van Ham's (2013) for their meta-analysis. As this is the most suitable codebook for my study, and has been tested and approved, I have kept it as it is, but simply adapted the categories for my case study.

| | | 6 = American Political Science Review

7 = American Journal of Political Science

8 = Latin American Research Review

9 = Political Research Quarterly

10 = Social Problems

11 = Publius

12 = Journal of Politics | |

Sub-study Characteristics

Variable	Variable Label	Value Label	Note
ID_SUB	Id number sub-study	e.g. 2.004 (ID_ART = 2, sub-study 4)	Each model should get its own sub-study number.

		etc	
CROSS_NAT	Cross-national study	0 = Not cross-national study 1 = Cross-national	
UNIT_1	Geographical unit 1		If not cross-national, code country name in UNIT_1,
DATA_ANA	Statistical technique (OLS, Logit)	1=Logistic regression 2=Probit regression 3=Scobit regression 4=Conditional logit regression 5=Ordered logit regression 6=Multi-level logit (MCMC/HLM logit; or GLS/MLE) 7=OLS	If new type of data analysis, add new number and data description in Codebook.

		8=Ordered probit regression	
		9=Structural Equation Model (SEM)	
		10=Two Stage Least Squares (2sls)	
		11=Markov Chain /Bayesian (MCMC)	
		12=Multi-level probit/random-effects probit	
		13=Two-stage selection bias model	
		14=Poisson Regression	
		15=Generalised Least Squares	
		16=Negative binomial regression	
		17=Cox/Proportional hazards regression	
		18=Heterogeneous diffusion model	

Variable Characteristics

Variable	Variable Label	Value Label	Note
DEPVAR_DESCR	Dependent Variable Description		
DEPVAR	Dependent variable	1 = agenda setting 2 = policy passage 3 = policy implementation 4 = policy repeal	
IV	Independent variable name		*String*

IV_N	Independent variable number		see below for IV_N and IV_OPERA combinations
IV_OPERA	Operationalizatio n independent variable		*String*
T_Political_Opportunity_Model	Political Opportunity Model	1 = Yes 0 = No	Follow my own coding detailed below
T_Discursive_Opportunity_Model	Discursive Opportunity Model	1 = Yes 0 = No	Follow my own coding detailed below
T_SEconomic_Opportunity_Model	Socio-economic Opportunity Model	1 = Yes 0 = No	Follow my own coding detailed below

T_Legal_Opportunity_Model	Legal Opportunity Model	1 = Yes 0 = No	Follow my own coding detailed below
T_Supranational_Opportunity_Model	Supranational Opportunity Model	1 = Yes 0 = No	Follow my own coding detailed below
MOBILISATION_VAR_NAME	What is the name of the variable(s) measuring mobilisation?		*String*
MOBILISATION_TYPE	What is the type of this mobilisation?	1 = membership 2 = incidence of non-institutional protest 3= incidence of institutional protest	

		4= several	
EFF_HYP_GEN	Hypothesized direction effect independent variable on dependent variable as generally expected in literature	1 = positive 2 = negative 3 = both or none	Hypotheses as expected generally in the literature, see list of hypotheses I constructed below.
EFF_HYP_AUTH	Hypothesized direction effect independent variable on dependent variable as stated by authors	1 = positive 2 = negative 3 = Both 4 = No hypothesis formulated	If no explicit hypothesis but expectations about effects formulated, coded as 1 or 2. Only if really needed use category 3 or 4.

EFF_HYP_ME	Hypothesized direction effect independent variable on dependent variable as stated by me	1 = positive 2 = negative	
EFF_REAL	Found direction effect variable independent variable on dependent variable	1 = positive 2 = negative	
EFF_SIGN	Significance found effect at p-value < .05	1 = significant 0 = not significant	
EFF_SIZE	Effect size proxy of independent variable based on our/general hypotheses	-1 = anomaly 1 = success 0 = failure	Anomaly - significant but in wrong direction

	(EFF_HYP_GEN)		Failure – insignificant Success - significant & expected direction
CONTROL	Variable of interest or control variable	1 = control variable 0= variable of interest	
INTERACT	Variable main effect of an interaction	1 = Main effect of an interaction effect 0 = Normal/non- interaction effect	

VARTOTAL	Number of variables included per test		Count of number of variables included per Test. Interaction variables not counted, collapsed (categorical) variables counted as 1.

Theoretical Models

Political Opportunity Model

IV_OPERA Variable name/description	IV_NO Variable Number
Election year	1.01

Electoral competition	1.02
Accessibility of the polity	1.03
Political openness	1.04
Administrative capacity	1.05
State centralisation	1.06
Bureaucratic paternalism	1.07
Open Political Parties	1.08
State founding	1.09
Government (left)	1.10
Social corporatism	1.11
Executive (Left)	1.12
Political alignment	1.13
Political endorsement	1.14
SES politicians	1.15
Relevant policy machinery	1.16
Turnout	1.17

No	Variable	Direction	Hypothesis
1.01	Election year	Positive	Controlling for social movement mobilisation, an election year is positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement.
1.02	Electoral competition	Positive	Controlling for social movement mobilisation, higher electoral competition is positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement.
1.03	Accessibility of the polity	Positive	Controlling for social movement mobilisation, higher accessibility of the

			polity is positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement.
1.04	Political openness	Positive	Controlling for social movement mobilisation, higher levels of political openness is positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement.
1.05	Administrative capacity	Positive	Controlling for social movement mobilisation, administrative capacity is positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement.

1.06	State centralisation	Positive	Controlling for social movement mobilisation, state centralisation is positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement.
1.07	Bureaucratic paternalism	Positive	Controlling for social movement mobilisation, bureaucratic paternalism is positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement.
1.08	Open Party organisation	Positive	Controlling for social movement mobilisation, the presence of open party organisations is positively

			associated with policy change favourable to a social movement.
1.09	State founding	Positive	Controlling for social movement mobilisation, late state founding associated with policy change favourable to a social movement.
1.10	Government (left)	Positive	Controlling for social movement mobilisation, left dominance in government is positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement.
1.11	Social corporatism	Positive	Controlling for social movement

			mobilisation, social corporatism is positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement.
1.12	Executive (Left)	Positive	Controlling for social movement mobilisation, a left-wing executive is positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement.
1.13	Political alignment	Positive	Controlling for social movement mobilisation, political alignment positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement.

1.14	Political endorsement	Positive	Controlling for social movement mobilisation, political endorsement of the movement is positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement.
1.15	SES of political representatives	Positive	Controlling for social movement mobilisation, the presence of political representatives with SES similar to the constituency of a social movement is positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement.

1.16	Relevant policy machinery	Positive	Controlling for social movement mobilisation, the presence of a relevant policy machinery is positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement.
1.17	Turnout	Positive	Controlling for social movement mobilisation, high levels of political participation, through turnout, are positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement.

Discursive Opportunity Model

IV_OPERA	IV_NO
Variable name/description	**Variable Number**
Agenda/Policy (Supportive)	2.01
No/Weak Countermovement	2.02
Public Opinion (Favourable)	2.03
Media attention	2.04
Political Influence (left/liberalism)	2.05
State ideology (left/liberal)	2.06
Support (other actors)	2.07
Incumbent support	2.08

No	Variable	Direction	Hypothesis
2.01	Agenda/Policy (Supportive)	Positive	Controlling for social movement mobilisation,

			favourable policy/agenda on a relevant issue is positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement.
2.02	No/Weak Countermovement	Positive	Controlling for social movement mobilisation, no/weak counter-movement is positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement.
2.03	Public Opinion (Favourable)	Positive	Controlling for social movement mobilisation, favourable public opinion is positively associated with policy change

			favourable to a social movement.
2.04	Media attention	Positive	Controlling for social movement mobilisation, media attention is positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement.
2.05	Political Influence (left/liberalism)	Positive	Controlling for social movement mobilisation, higher support for left/liberal parties is positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement.
2.06	State ideology (left/liberal)	Positive	Controlling for social movement mobilisation, left/liberal state

			ideology is positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement.
2.07	Support (other actors)	Positive	Controlling for social movement mobilisation, support from private actors, like corporations, is positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement.
2.08	Incumbent support	Positive	Controlling for social movement mobilisation, incumbent support is positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement.

Socio-Economic Opportunity Model

IV_OPERA Variable name/description	IV_NO Variable Number
Women in Workforce/education	3.01
Spending (relevant vs other)	3.02
Domestic Productivity	3.03
Unemployment	3.04
Ethnic/Racial Diversity	3.05
Net Profit	3.06
% Secondary Industry	3.07
National Income	3.08
Population Density	3.09
Crime Rate (Low)	3.10

Ethnic/Racial Equality	3.11
Poverty	3.12
Age	3.13
Personal Income	3.14
Immigration	3.15
Budget	3.16
Education	3.17
% Primary Industry	3.18
Cost of Living	3.19
State Employees	3.20
Tax rate	3.21
% Tertiary Industry	3.22
Land Ownership	3.23
Industrialisation	3.24
Religious Population (low)	3.25

No	Variable	Direction	Hypothesis
3.01	Women in Workforce/education	Positive	Controlling for social movement mobilisation, higher levels of women in the workfoce and at school, are positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement.
3.02	Spending (relevant vs other)	Positive	Controlling for social movement mobilisation, higher spending on an issue relevant to a social movement is positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement.

3.03	Domestic Productivity	Positive	Controlling for social movement mobilisation, higher domestic productivity is positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement.
3.04	Unemployment	Positive	Controlling for social movement mobilisation, higher unemployment is positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement.
3.05	Ethnic/Racial Diversity	Positive	Controlling for social movement mobilisation, higher ethnic diversity is positively associated with policy change

			favourable to a social movement.
3.06	Net Profit	Positive	Controlling for social movement mobilisation, higher state profit is positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement.
3.07	% Secondary Industry	Positive	Controlling for social movement mobilisation, higher levels of people in secondary industry are positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement.
3.08	National Income	Positive	Controlling for social movement mobilisation, higher

			national income is positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement.
3.09	Population Density	Positive	Controlling for social movement mobilisation, a greater population is positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement.
3.10	Crime Rate (Low)	Positive	Controlling for social movement mobilisation, low rates of crimes are positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement.
3.11	Ethnic/Racial Equality	Positive	Controlling for social movement

			mobilisation, higher ethnic equality is positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement.
3.12	Poverty	Positive	Controlling for social movement mobilisation a higher level of poverty is positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement.
3.13	Age	Positive	Controlling for social movement mobilisation, higher levels of older people is positively associated with policy change

			favourable to a social movement.
3.14	Personal Income	Positive	Controlling for social movement mobilisation, higher personal income is positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement.
3.15	Immigration	Positive	Controlling for social movement mobilisation, higher levels of immigration are positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement.
3.17	Budget	Positive	Controlling for social movement mobilisation, higher state budget is

			positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement.
3.18	Education	Positive	Controlling for social movement mobilisation, higher levels of education are positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement.
3.19	% Primary Industry	Positive	Controlling for social movement mobilisation, higher % of people in primary industry is positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement.

3.20	Cost of Living	Positive	Controlling for social movement mobilisation, higher cost of living is positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement.
3.21	State Employees	Positive	Controlling for social movement mobilisation, higher numbers of state employees are positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement.
3.22	Tax rate	Positive	Controlling for social movement mobilisation, higher tax rate is positively associated with policy change

			favourable to a social movement.
3.23	% Tertiary Industry	Positive	Controlling for social movement mobilisation, higher % tertiary industry is positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement.
3.24	Land Ownership	Positive	Controlling for social movement mobilisation, higher % of landowners are positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement.
3.25	Religious Population (low)	Positive	Controlling for social movement mobilisation, low

			levels of religious individuals are positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement.

Legal Opportunity Model

IV_OPERA Variable name/description	IV_NO Variable Number
Law (supportive)	4.01
Partisanship of legislators (left)	4.02
Supportive legislators	4.03
Court decisions (positive)	4.04
Court Cases (relevant)	4.05
Legislative Apportionment	4.06
Capacity of the Legislature	4.07

Legislative Process (efficient)	4.08
Legislative Professionalism	4.09

No	Variable	Direction	Hypothesis
4.01	Law (supportive)	Positive	Controlling for social movement mobilisation, the existence of a supportive law on a relevant issue are positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement.
4.02	Partisanship of legislators (left)	Positive	Controlling for social movement mobilisation, the presence of left-wing legislators is positively associated with policy change

			favourable to a social movement.
4.03	Supportive legislators	Positive	Controlling for social movement mobilisation, the presence of supportive legislators is positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement.
4.04	Court decisions (positive)	Positive	Controlling for social movement mobilisation, positive court decisions are positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement.
4.05	Court Cases (relevant)	Positive	Controlling for social movement

			mobilisation, relevant court cases are positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement.
4.06	Legislative Apportionment	Positive	Controlling for social movement mobilisation, legislative apportionment is positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement.
4.07	Legislative Process (efficient)	Positive	Controlling for social movement mobilisation, an efficient legislative process is positively associated with policy change

			favourable to a social movement.
4.08	Legislative Professionalism	Positive	Controlling for social movement mobilisation, legislative professionalism is positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement.

Supra-national Opportunity Model

IV_OPERA	IV_NO
Variable name/description	**Variable Number**
War period	5.01
Supportive Policy/law in neighbouring states	5.02
Supportive regional or global ideology	5.03
Regional Diffusion	5.04

Geographical Location (Western)	5.05
International Participation on Issue	5.06

1. Supra-national Opportunity Model

No	Variable	Direction	Hypothesis
5.01	War period	Positive	Controlling for social movement mobilisation, war period is positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement.
5.02	Supportive Policy/Law in neighbouring states	Positive	Controlling for social movement mobilisation, existing laws/policies favourable to a social movement in neighbouring

			countries is positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement.
5.03	Supportive regional or global ideology	Positive	Controlling for social movement mobilisation, a supportive regional or global ideology is positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement.
5.04	Regional Diffusion	Positive	Controlling for social movement mobilisation, the spread of relevant policies and values is positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement.

5.05	Geographical Location (Western)	Positive	Controlling for social movement mobilisation, a Western status is positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement.
5.06	International Participation on Issue		Controlling for social movement mobilisation, international participation on an issue is positively associated with policy change favourable to a social movement.

N.B. Hypotheses related to socio-economic opportunities share the common assumption that the more developed a state, the easier it is for it to be responsive to the demands of social movements. Moreover, the size of the needy population in a state signals to the state that liberal reforms are needed, which works to the advantage of social movements.

1.2. Excluded Variables

Table 1 - Political Opportunity Model (Excluded Variables)

Variable		Success (1)	Failure (0)	Anomaly (-1)	Modal Category	Success Rate	Effect size	P value
Effective Policy Machinery	Tests (22)	14	8	0	Success	63.64	.64	***
	Studies (2)	1	1	0	Failure	50.00	.35	n/a
	Tests (6)	5	1	0	Success	83.33	.83	***

Accessibility of the polity	Studies (1)	1	0	0	Success	100.00	0.83	n/a
Bureaucratic Paternalism	Tests (3)	3	0	0	Success	100.00	1.00	n/a
	Studies (1)	1	0	0	Success	100.00	1.00	n/a
State centralisation	Tests (3)	3	0	0	Success	100.00	1.00	n/a
	Studies (1)	1	0	0	Success	100.00	1.00	n/a
Social Corporatism	Tests (3)	3	0	0	Success	100.00	1.00	n/a
	Studies (1)	1	0	0	Success	100.00	1.00	n/a
Turnout	Tests (3)	3	0	0	Success	100.00	1.00	n/a
	Studies (1)	1	0	0	Success	100.00	1.00	n/a

Variable		Success (1)	Failure (0)	Anomaly (-1)	Modal Category	Success Rate	Effect size	P value
Political Alignment	Tests (3)	0	3	0	Failure	.00	.00	n/a
	Studies (1)	0	1	0	Failure	.00	.00	n/a
State Founding (younger)	Tests (2)	1	1	0	Failure	50.00	.50	n/a
	Studies (1)	0	1	0	Failure	.00	.50	n/a

Table 2 - Discursive Opportunity Model (Excluded Variables)

Variable		Success (1)	Failure (0)	Anomaly (-1)	Modal Category	Success Rate	Effect size	P value
	Tests (10)	3	4	3	Failure	30.00	.00	n/a

		Success (1)	Failure (0)	Anomaly (-1)	Modal Category	Success Rate	Effect size	P value
Support (Other actors)	Studies (2)	1	1	0	Failure	50.00	-.09	n/a
Incumbent Support	Tests (2)	0	2	0	Failure	.00	.00	n/a
	Studies (1)	0	1	0	Failure	.00	.00	n/a

Table 3 - Legal Opportunity Model (Excluded Variables)

Variable	Success (1)	Failure (0)	Anomaly (-1)	Modal Category	Success Rate	Effect size	P value

Court Cases (relevant)	Tests (6)	0	6	0	Failure	.00	.00	n/a
	Studies (1)	0	1	0	Failure	.00	.00	n/a
Legislative Apportionment	Tests (2)	0	2	0	Failure	.00	.00	n/a
	Studies (2)	0	2	0	Failure	.00	.00	n/a
Capacity of the Legislature	Tests (6)	4	2	0	Success	66.67	.67	***
	Studies (1)	1	0	0	Success	100.00	1.00	n/a
Legislative Process (efficient)	Tests (11)	0	10	1	Failure	.00	-.09	***
	Studies (2)	0	2	0	Failure	.00	-.07	n/a
	Tests (2)	2	0	0	Success	100.00	1.00	n/a

Legislative Professionalism	Studies (1)	1	0	0	Success	100.00	1.00	n/a

Table 4 - Socio-economic Opportunity Model (Excluded Variables)

Variable		Success (1)	Failure (0)	Anomaly (-1)	Modal Category	Success Rate	Effect size	P value
Personal Income	Tests (17)	6	8	3	Failure	35.29	.18	***
	Studies (2)	1	1	0	Failure	50.00	.16	n/a
Immigration	Tests (14)	0	14	0	Failure	.00	.00	n/a
	Studies (2)	0	2	0	Failure	.00	.00	n/a
Budget	Tests (11)	1	6	4	Failure	9.09	-.27	***
	Studies (2)	0	1	1	Anomaly	.00	-.40	n/a
Education	Tests (10)	8	2	0	Success	80.00	.80	***
	Studies (2)	1	1	0	Failure	50.00	.50	n/a

% Primary Industry	Tests (8)	0	8	0	Failure	.00	.00	n/a
	Studies (1)	0	1	0	Failure	.00	.00	n/a
Cost of Living	Tests (6)	3	1	2	Success	50.00	.17	***
	Studies (2)	1	0	1	Anomaly	50.00	.17	n/a
State Employees	Tests (5)	5	0	0	Success	100.00	1.00	n/a
	Studies (2)	2	0	0	Success	100.00	1.00	n/a
Tax rate	Tests (3)	3	0	0	Success	100.00	1.00	n/a
	Studies (1)	1	0	0	Success	100.00	1.00	n/a
% Tertiary Industry	Tests (2)	0	2	0	Failure	.00	.00	n/a

	Studies (1)	0	1	0	Failure	.00	.00	n/a
Land Ownership	Tests (2)	0	2	0	Failure	.00	.00	n/a
	Studies (1)	0	1	0	Failure	.00	.00	n/a
Industrialisation	Tests (1)	0	1	0	Failure	.00	.00	n/a
	Studies (1)	0	1	0	Failure	.00	.00	n/a
Religious Population (low)	Tests (1)	0	1	0	Failure	.00	.00	n/a
	Studies (1)	0	1	0	Failure	.00	.00	n/a

Table 5 - Supra-national Opportunity Model (Excluded Variables)

Variable		Success (1)	Failure (0)	Anomaly (-1)	Modal Category	Success Rate	Effect size	P value
Regional Diffusion	Tests (17)	13	4	0	Success	76.47	.76	***
	Studies (1)	1	0	0	Success	100.00	.50	n/a
Geographical Location (Western)	Tests (2)	1	0	1	Anomaly	50.00	.00	n/a
	Studies (1)	0	0	1	Anomaly	.00	.00	n/a
International Participation Issue	Tests (2)	1	1	0	Failure	50.00	.50	n/a
	Studies (1)	0	1	0	Failure	.00	.50	n/a

Appendix 2

Table 1: Variables Used

Dimension	Variable Name	Variable Label	Value Labels	Notes
Claimant	**CLAIMANT _FUN**	**Function of claimant**	*International Actors* 1 = Intergovernmental Organisation 2 = International Civil Society 3= Foreign Governments *Domestic Political Actors* 4 = Moroccan government 5 = Opposition political parties 6 = Parliament 7 = other politician(s) *State Actors* 8 = Bureaucracy 9 = Judiciary 10 = police/security/military *Social Movements* 11 = Insurgent Group/rebels	If a claim has more than one claimant, I apply the following priority rules, which have also been used in the Europub project: 1) actors mentioned as leaders/spokespersons /organisers take precedence, 2) organisations have priority over unorganised collectivities, 3) active actors or speakers have priority over passive audiences and rank and file participants. If there are several claimants and none has priority according to these

			12 = Women's rights groups/coalitions	criteria, the order with which they are mentioned in the article decides. If one actor has two functions mentioned, the highest level capacity in terms of the geographical scope variable should be selected.
			13 = Other social movements	
			Civic Groups	
			14 = Pressure Group	
			15 = Media	
			16 = Academics	
			17 = general public	
			18 = religious actor	
			Other	
			19 = Central Bank of Morocco	
			20 = Private Finance	
			21 = Other	
Represented Constituency	**OBJECT**	**Object actor whose interests are represented by the claims.**	0 = No object	
			1 = Organised political actor (i.e. political party, civil society groups)	
			2 = Polity (i.e. Morocco, the EU etc)	
			3 = Territorial Group (i.e. territorial groups not referred to as polity such as	

			the Middle East, North Africa, humanity)	
			4 = Ethnic Majority (i.e. the majority or dominant ethnic group in the polity discussed, Arabs in Morocco)	
			5 = Ethnic Minority (i.e. groups that are ethnic minorities such as Blacks or Amazighs in Morocco, etc)	
			6 = Religious Majority (i.e. the majority or dominant religious group in the polity discussed such as Muslims in Morocco)	
			7 = Religious Minority (i.e. the minority religious group in the polity discussed such as Jews in Morocco)	
			8 = Elites (i.e. political or cultural elites)	

			9 = Citizens (i.e. references to ordinary people)	
			10 = Workers (i.e. a group of people united by lower socio-economic class, like workers and the poor)	
			11 = Owners (i.e. rich people with money or private sector activity as key characteristic)	
			12 = Other Sectoral (i.e. groups sharing a certain occupation other than capitalists and workers)	
			13 = Specific Organization (i.e. the group is a specific named organisation. Examples include Parliament, the UN, etc)	
			14 = Women (i.e this includes girls and young women).	
			15 = other gender	
			16 = Generation (i.e. children, future	

			generations, pensioners. This category is concerned with generational groups in general). 17 = Individual (i.e. individually-named persons). 18 = family 19 = society 20 = specific group of women 21 = other	
Prognostic Framing	**ADDRESSEE_FUN**	**Function of addressee**	Same as **CLAIMANT_FUN**	The addressee of the claim refers to "the actor who is held responsible for implementing the clam or at whom the claim is directly addressed in the form of a call to do or leave something" (Koopmans 2002: 42). Therefore, addressees are explicitly

				mentioned in the claim and must be concrete actors. An addressee is coded when a claimant calls upon another actor to change their position on a certain topic. This is even done when this reference is a form of criticism, without an explicit call for change of position.
	PREFPOLICY	**Policy change advocated by claimant(s)**	1 = Amendments to the content of existing policy 2 = Amendments to the implementation of existing policy 3= new policy 4= Unclear appraisal of policy	
Diagnostic Framing	**JUSTIFICATION**	**First justification or**	0 = None (no argument provided)	

		argument given or implied by the subject actor with respect to the claim	*1* *Instrumental/pragmatic/utilitarian/goal-oriented arguments* 11 = general or public interest 12 = economic interest 13 = social-political interest 14 = individual interest 15 = state effectiveness and efficiency 16 = domestic security 17 = international security 18 = procedural/strategic argument 19 = other cost/benefit argument *2 arguments about collective identity* 21 national identity (general) 211 = specific national traditions	

			212 = arguments related to sub-national identity	
			22 cultural traditions and norms	
			221 = specific norms part of indigenous community	
			222 = family-related norms	
			223 = religious identity and norms	
			3 Arguments about universal moral principles and rights (including legal arguments)	
			31 human rights	
			311 = individual freedom/emancipation	
			312 = freedom of expression	
			313 = equal treatment	
			314 = privacy	

			315 = religious rights 316 = sexual (expression) rights 317 = women's rights 32 Moral principles (or absence thereof) 321 = tolerance (as universal principle) 322 = good governance (i.e. fair procedure) 323 = respect for other persons and groups	

Appendix 3

List of Interviews

Federation de la Ligue Democratique des Droits des Femmes, Rabat, 1st March 2016

Federation de la Ligue Democratique des Droits des Femmes, Casablanca, 20th January 2016

Association Marocaine des Droits des Femmes, Casablanca, 30th March 2016

Woman Action, Rabat, 18th March 2016

Jossour, Forum des Femmes Marocaines, Rabat, 2nd March 2016.

Printemps de la Dignite, Fez, 11th February 2016.

Association Marocaine des Femmes Progressistes, Casablanca, 5th May 2016

Forum Az Zahra, Rabat, 27th April 2016

Solidarite Feminine, Casablanca, 7th March 2016.

Association Amal, El Hajeb, 26th January 2016.

Association Mains Libres, Marrakech, 29th April 2016.

Union Feministe Libre, Rabat, 1st May 2016.

Mouvement Alternatif pour les Libertes Individuelles, Rabat, 23rd April 2016.

Collectif Aswat, Rabat, 24th April 2016.

Conseil National des Droits de l'Homme, Rabat, March 2016