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# SOCIAL SCIENCES

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***In This Issue:***

**V. Gel'man:** "How does one account for the 'divorce' between democratic and liberal ideas in post-Soviet Russia that occurred in the 1990s and their subsequent decline in 2000-2010? Was the present-day decline both of democratic and liberal ideas due to that divorce? The search for answers to these questions calls for a reconsideration of the role of ideas in Russia's modernization and the trajectories of democratic and liberal ideas over the past three decades... This article seeks to state the problems of the genesis and evolution of these two ideological trends of Russian modernization in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, the contradictions between them, the cleavages within the ranks of their supporters and the impact of the ideas of post-Communist modernization on the progress and results of social transformations in Russia."

**N. Tikhonova:** "Although the problems of social structure are of interest to scientists, there are practically no works in the literature in Russia that use the so-called gradation approach toward Russian society that distinguishes populations on the basis of life chances and risks... The purpose of this article is to describe some typical characteristics of members of principal Russian social strata and class aspects of these characteristics."

**A. Levinson:** "People tend to think that any discussion of the fate of the Russian Jewry and the 'Jewish Question' necessarily belongs to Judaic studies. In our case, being realized within the frames and the paradigm of studies of public opinion and public relationships in Russia, it falls under Russian studies... Here I will discuss the current stage of assimilation/dissimilation of Russian Jewry, the corresponding forms of identity or self-identity of those who identify as Jews, and what Russians think about those whom they believe to be Jews... I am prepared to discuss the already acquired results or, to put it differently, the formula applicable to the current stage of assimilation/dissimilation process."

**A. Suzdaltsev:** "On December 8, 2019, the Union State of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus entered its third decade... Even if by the end of the second decade of the new century the countries had not arrived at fruitful allied relationships, the project survived... In view of the fact that the Belarusian conception rested on access to Russia's maximally cheap energy and Russia's market, starting in 2018 everything that Moscow was doing to withdraw Belarus from its dependence was interpreted in the Belarusian and, later, European media as Moscow's pressure on the sovereignty of the Republic of Belarus."

**O. Shurygina:** "This is the first investigation into the Stalin Prize for architecture. With access to the primary sources that were out of reach of architecture

historians and Zholtovsky's biographers, I will try to sort out whether this high award was an unbiased assessment of his creative achievements or an act of political struggle."

**K. Troitskiy:** "At a certain stage in the conversation, those who object to the thesis that the moral ban on violence is absolute often challenge the adherent of non-violence to conduct a mental experiment in which the champion of an absolute ban sees a 'villain' threatening violence toward an 'innocent victim.' It is assumed that the 'villain' can only be stopped by killing him. After describing the experiment, the party that maintains that there is no absolute ban on violence asks triumphantly whether the champion of the ban would passively observe or implore the 'villain' who is in the process of maiming and killing 'the innocent victim'... The popularity and constant recurrence of attempts to justify violence and lying, usually accompanied by attempts to elevate them to the position of ordinary practice, makes the tasks of investigating the history of and... refuting the 'innocent victim' argument and criticizing the underlying scheme particularly relevant and important."

**V. Melnik:** "The relevance of the question of creative evolution varies for different writers. In the case of Ivan Goncharov, in spite of the rapid development of Goncharov studies in the past three decades and thorough treatment of particular problems, with a focus, among other things, on cultural studies, the essential philological problems of his legacy remain unsolved and present a research challenge... The question of the logic of the novelist's creative evolution has never been raised before."

**E. Zadorozhnyuk:** "Chizhevsky's creativity and its cultural, philological and philosophical scope demonstrate an important vector oriented toward the cultural unity of peoples of the Slavic area, Europe and the world. The fragmentary nature of many of his works... throws this vector into bolder relief. Everybody agrees that it is highly important to turn to his works today in a time of rifts caused by highly active factors that are alien to culture."

## **“Liberals” vs. “Democrats”: Ideational Trajectories of Russia’s Post-Communist Transformation**

*Vladimir GEL’MAN*

*Abstract.* This article analyzes the struggle between the conflicting ideas of modernization in Russia’s post-Communist transformation in the 1980s and 1990s. I concentrate on the genesis and evolution of two major ideational trends, namely, the “liberals” (who prioritized market economic reforms) and the “democrats” (who prioritized political freedoms and democratic institution-building). What are the sources of the contradiction between these trends? What are the causes and consequences of their divergence? And how did these ideas affect the outcomes of Russia’s transition? I argue that the ideational struggle and the political conflict between Russian “liberals” and “democrats” is rooted in the intergenerational tensions between the “men of the Sixties” and “men of the Seventies,” whose political attitudes, life experience and perceptions of the country’s problems differed in many respects. While the “democrats” (“men of the Sixties”) had a very vague understanding of the market reforms and paid scant attention to the economic aspects of transition, many “liberals” (“men of the Seventies”) were skeptical about democratization, which they saw as a threat to market reforms. These differences of priority and perception, multiplied by the political conflicts of the 1990s, led to the “divorce” between the two camps of Russia’s reformers. As a result, both the “liberals” and the “democrats” failed politically, which had a major impact on the political and ideational landscape in twenty-first century Russia.

*Keywords:* political ideas, post-Communist transformation, Russia, liberalism, democracy, market reforms.

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**V. Gel’man**, PhD (Political Science), professor, European University, St. Petersburg; University of Helsinki. E-mail: [vgelman@eu.spb.ru](mailto:vgelman@eu.spb.ru). This article was first published in Russian in the journal *Mir Rossii* (Universe of Russia). Vol. 29. No. 1, pp. 53-79; DOI: 10.17323/1811-038X-2020-29-1-53-79). The article was published as part of the *University Partnership* project of the National Research University Higher School of Economics to support the publication of authors at Russian educational and research institutions.

What is the role of ideas in modernization in general and in post-Soviet modernization in particular? There is no consensus among experts on the contribution of ideas to the building of new institutions and practices in various countries in various historical periods. They answer differently the question of whether ideas cause transformations or the other way around. However, when it comes to political, economic and social transformations in post-Soviet Russia, the prevailing view is that ideas were secondary to the interests of key players [68]. Does that mean that the role of ideas in Russia in the late 20th and early 21st century has been negligibly small and that political analysis should focus on the activities of opportunists—politicians and businesspeople driven exclusively by selfish motives, who achieve or fail to achieve their goals regardless of ideas, or using them solely for manipulative purposes? Although post-Soviet Russia offers many examples of this sort [37; 17; 7], it would be wrong to reduce the processes of economic and political change in the country to the struggle between opposing interests and to ignore ideas: in the course of transformations, these dimensions complement rather than supplant one another.

Meanwhile, ideas and ideologies (elsewhere these terms will be used interchangeably) in modern Russia differed markedly from ideas in a number of post-communist countries which, during the same period, faced a similar “dilemma” of simultaneous political and economic transformations [50]. In the East European countries, the ideas of building democracy (here and elsewhere referred to as democratic ideas) and a transition to the market economy (here and elsewhere referred to as liberal ideas) mutually complemented each other in the process of post-communist transformation from the fall of the former regimes until accession to the European Union [4], facilitating the solution of key tasks in a relatively short time. By contrast, in the 1990s, Russia liberal and democratic ideas (and their proponents) clashed. The notion that the country’s path toward economic prosperity could and had to do without democracy, which could hinder, if not reverse, economic reform, prevailed in public discourse and indeed influenced political decision-making. As a result, the ideas of building democracy were first excluded from the list of political priorities, then sacrificed to the ideas of the country’s economic modernization, and in 2000-2010 were dropped from the list of the ruling elite’s agenda altogether. By contrast, the ideas of building an effective market economy dominated the official narrative of the ruling groups and provided an important benchmark in charting the political course in the 1990s and 2010s, although their traction was diminishing over time. Finally, in the 2010s, they were stricken from the political agenda, such that today their influence on the political processes and the political course of Russia is insignificant.

How does one account for the “divorce” of democratic and liberal ideas in post-Soviet Russia that occurred in the 1990s and their subsequent decline in 2000-2010? Was the present-day decline both of democratic and liberal ideas due to that divorce? The search for answers to these questions calls for a reconsideration of the role of ideas in Russia’s modernization and the trajectories of democratic and liberal ideas over the past three decades. These ideas were promoted by their proponents—politicians, analysts and journalists (here referred to as

“democrats” and “liberals”)<sup>1</sup>—whose role in the late 1980s and early 1990s can hardly be overestimated. This article seeks to state the problems of the genesis and evolution of these two ideological trends of Russian modernization in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, the contradictions between them, the cleavages within the ranks of their supporters and the impact of the ideas of post-communist modernization on the progress and results of social transformations in Russia.

I maintain that the “divorce” of democratic and liberal ideas in 1990s Russia was not predetermined from the start; but the weakness and inchoate character of reformist ideas by the time of *perestroika*, the contradictions between the 60s and 70s generations, as well as false assumptions and expectations against the background of sweeping change, made an indelible imprint on the ideational trajectories of “liberals” and “democrats” and exacerbated the contradictions between them.

### **Ideas and Modernization: The Case of Russia**

The works devoted to Russia’s post-Soviet political and economic development proceed from the assumption that ideas played a limited role in these processes. Thus, Henry Hale believes that in their bid to gain and hold power, the authorities relied on mobilizing the patron-client networks while demand for and supply of ideas was low, due to the dominance of the client-patron policy over a programmatic idea [33]. Stephen Hanson, comparing the ideological landscape of post-communist Russia to that of Weimar Germany and the emergence of the Third Republic in France [35], noted that in the case of Russia ideas were insufficiently well formulated and structured which, in his opinion, stymied the formation of the party system in the country. This writer largely shared similar opinion, pointing out that after the collapse of the USSR ideas had little impact on the transformation of Russia’s political regime, whose outcome hinged on the character of the power struggle among the elites [27].

Does it mean that we can neglect ideas in analyzing post-communist modernization in Russia? Such a verdict would throw the baby out with the bathwater. Ideas have always been important in setting political priorities and state building in the country. They are very important at “turning points,” when politicians make a strategic choice in favor of this or that option of the country’s development. Indeed, the very fact that ideas have little influence on the process of change in the country calls for an explanation. If ideas influenced the behaviors of members of the elite and the masses in the course of modernization in other countries and were an important driver of change during *perestroika* when various ideas of reform were hotly debated in the USSR [71; 53; 59; 61], why was it that in the following decade and later, the significance of ideas plummeted?

To determine the place of ideas in Russia’s modernization, one first of all needs to clarify the concepts. In this article, the author considers ideas in an instrumental way, that is, not as a set of political doctrines but as a way of perceiving problems. Ideas matter for the modernization process owing to their pos-



itive and normative functions. They help the elites and the masses to formulate their notions of the desired social system and ways of achieving it [49, p. 49], to assess to what extent the status quo matches these notions and minimize the amount of information required for making decisions (which is particularly important under conditions of uncertainty). Thus, ideas enable the actors to form and support a picture of the world in accordance with which they act after receiving information. This was the approach Vadim Radayev used to analyze the change of economic ideologies in Russia in the 1980s and 1990s [52, pp. 276-306], and the team of authors, including this writer, used to analyze the ideology of reforming local government in Russia [31].

Such interpretation of ideas suggests that in routine conditions, there is little demand for ideas: the elite and the masses can follow former schemes for a long time, and the generators of ideas—politicians, experts and independent intellectuals—can repeat earlier judgments, modifying them only partially. However, in periods of rapid change characterized by radical transformations, like that of Russia in the 1980s and 1990s, demand for new ideas soars. They arise and are promoted by their producers and popularizers, who try to sell them to the elites and the masses and gain support in the market of ideas by ousting and/or taking over rivals. Sometimes it takes several decades for new ideas to be formed and promoted (as with Neoliberalism in the West) [65]), but sometimes they experience a boom much faster. Some ideas arise spontaneously and endogenously while others are imported from political and intellectual contexts and are modified by their recipients in line with their perceptions, often undergoing metamorphoses in the process. The combination of changing dynamics of demand and supply of ideas along with the impact of the activities of various agents aimed at promoting them go a long way to determine the outcome of the ideological struggle in periods of radical change.

The ideological situation in the Soviet Union as it entered the period of transformations in the second half of the 1980s was rather peculiar. For decades, the market of ideas had been monopolized by the dominant official version of Marxism-Leninism, while alternative ideas penetrated this market in a round-about way, facing the dogmatism of the establishment, which sought to suppress dissent [58; 14]. The official Soviet dogma was so outdated that in the period of “the long 1970s,” it was unable to perform positive functions: the life of Soviet society was in stark contrast with official norms, and knowledge based on official ideology could not offer valid answers to the country’s problems or possible solutions. In the absence of conditions for the development of social and human sciences, which could provide an intellectual environment for the development of new ideas for transformation, discussions of options for the country’s development were confined to narrow circles at the level of informal groups and seminars [62; 8; 16].

The USSR was immeasurably less exposed to external ideological influences than the socialist countries of Eastern Europe. The key figures of post-communist transformations, such as Václav Klaus and Leszek Balcerowicz, regularly traveled as exchange scholars or to attend conferences at US and West

European universities long before the start of reforms. Young Soviet economists had to secretly read articles by their Eastern European colleagues at restricted access libraries, while foreign travel for most of them was not allowed until the start of *perestroika* [62; 72]. That is why Soviet specialists had only fragmentary knowledge of the foreign experience of modernization and their contribution to international discourse was all but non-existent. As a result, the views of Russian intellectuals on the problems of political and economic development of their country and the world were, with few exceptions, inconsistent and prone to change in accordance with circumstances. Having been isolated from the international environment over many decades, Russian intellectuals embraced the idea of Russia’s “special way” and the uniqueness of its past, present and future, an idea, which to this day is prevalent in Russian social thought [67]. These trends manifested themselves in the rejection of the import of some ideas. Joachim Zweynert, who studied the struggle of economic ideas during the market reforms in Russia, came to the conclusion that in the 1990s, many Western ideas met with such fierce opposition within Russia that here (unlike Eastern Europe), they failed to take root in the decades that followed [81].

Small wonder that the collapse of the former monopoly on the Soviet market of ideas in the late 1980s was a “big bang” against the background of the rapidly changing situation in the country. The bans were dropped as demand for new ideas on the part of the elite, which was looking for ways out of the mounting crisis, and on the part of the public, soared [68, ch. 1]. Public debates among intellectuals took center stage while the discredited official dogmas were losing ground.

The resulting vacuum in the market of ideas was filled spontaneously: import of ideas from abroad quickened interest in their ideological heritage and fashions for ideas and their labels changed at a dizzying pace, while critical reflection on the ideas was often wanting. The sky-high barriers for entering the market of ideas dropped dramatically, paving the way for marginal ideas ranging from Eurasianism to geopolitics [16]. Those who produced and/or promoted these ideas had no difficulty gaining a foothold in the market to exert not one-off but systematic intellectual influence on political decision-making and on the hearts and souls of fellow citizens.

As the transformations in the country gathered pace, demand for new ideas diminished. Moreover, the range of problems changed dramatically: what was discussed in the late 1980s ceased to be relevant in the mid-1990s. The political agenda came to be dominated by the clash of group interests as ideas had less and less influence on political decision-making. After the authoritarian regime dug in in the 2000s, the Russian authorities, if they needed ideas at all, were interested in the political and technological aspects. Modern Russian authoritarianism is not anchored in a dominant ideology [27], and its leaders can pragmatically use various ideas to further their ends. The public, which responded enthusiastically to ideological struggle at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, was paying less and less attention to ideas and their proponents, who were also evolving. The monopoly on the market of ideas was supplanted by pluralism so that

in today's Russia, one can easily find advocates of the most diverse ideological trends. Unlike in the late 1980s and early 1990s, they tend to ignore one another and exist in parallel, rather like people in a restaurant sitting at separate tables with separate menus for different categories of clients [2], with nothing like an efficient dialog. Even so, ideas are an important filter for the perception of problems by the Russian elites and political leaders, who transmit their perceptions to fellow-citizens [63; 66], and the legacy of the ideological battles of the 1980s and 90s is still relevant to understanding the logic of this perception. Indeed, the ideological trends of that period are still on the Russian political map: they change over time but the experience of the 1980s and 90s is still an important reference point for understanding the current problems and trends and for recipes of further changes (or lack of them). Many producers of ideas were themselves involved in or witnessed transformations, knowledge which made a big imprint on their perception of the country's current problems.

Vadim Radayev notes that within a space of less than ten years (from the middle of the 1980s to the middle of the 1990s), the country saw a succession of four dominant ideological paradigms: from socialist to democratic, then to liberal and conservative [52, pp. 276-306]. Each of these pivots followed changes in the political arena: attempts to renew the Soviet economic system (1985-1987/88), *glasnost* and democratization in the USSR (1987/88-1990/91), crisis and collapse of the Soviet system and the launching of radical economic reforms (1990/91-1993), and reforms running out of steam followed by post-revolutionary stabilization (after 1993). However, one should not see the transformation of the ideological landscape solely as the projection of current political and economic transformations in the USSR and Russia. Each of the critical junctures of the 1980s and 1990s and their consequences were the results not only of the struggle among interest groups (significant as it was) but also of the struggle of ideas. This warrants a closer look at the ideas, which were oriented toward political and economic reform and envisaged the building of democracy and a market economy in the country. Such analysis is called upon to explain why (unlike in many East European countries) [4] in Russia the ideas of democratization and market reforms were in many ways juxtaposed, which had a serious impact on the outcome of political and economic transformations [6; 27].

Speaking about the clash of ideas in post-communist Russia, researchers paid considerable attention to communist and nationalist trends [74; 21; 16; 41]. At the same time, works devoted to democratic and liberal parties in Russia, which promoted the various ideas of the country's modernization in the 1990s [34; 28; 75], merely scratched the surface of their ideologies. Critical reflections of the "democrats" and "liberals" themselves [59; 62; 8], although they contain a fair amount of valuable data, only partially discuss the causes and consequences of the "divorce" of these two ideological trends. We therefore need to trace their genesis and mechanism of evolution against the background of tectonic changes in Russia.

From the start, let us make it clear that the "liberals" and "democrats" in Russia were rather like overlapping sets: the same politicians, analysts, journal-

ists and other producers of ideas sometimes were at once “liberals” and “democrats” and even publicly identified themselves with one or the other camp, and some of them switched sides. However, in the framework of this article the two categories are identified for analytical purposes as ideal typical specimens which helps us to gain an insight into the logic of the ideological landscape of post-communist Russia.

### “Democrats” without Liberalism: Lost Illusions

The main advocates of democratic ideas during the Soviet *perestroika* were active members of the 1960s generation, especially intellectuals and public personalities whose political views and professional and public careers were shaped in the period between the 20th Congress of the CPSU and the crushing of the Prague Spring in 1968.<sup>2</sup> Khrushchev’s Thaw and the hopes for successful development of the country it generated shaped or substantially changed the worldview of the “men of the 60s” [9]. However, subsequent stagnation under Leonid Brezhnev stymied the careers of many members of that generation and rendered irrelevant many ideas formed during the Thaw: the Sixties generation was “frozen” for twenty years [80, ch. 9]. When the “men of the 60s” moved to the forestage of social and political life during *perestroika*, it was as if the Soviet Union was briefly back in the Thaw period. “The children of the 20th Congress” moved into leading positions in the government structures, dominated the media and proposed the main ideas for society’s development. Those who joined the “democrats” in many ways took the cue from the “men of the 60s” and to some extent still adhere to the intellectual and ideological traditions they had established.

For the *perestroika* “democrats,” the main goal was to carry on the Thaw program: political pluralism in the media and in decision-making, condemning political repression, broader freedoms and lifting of the many Soviet-era bans (censorship, foreign travel restrictions). Initially, the proposed plans were modest [1], while the changes turned out to be too sudden: democratization and free elections quickly whetted appetites, and it briefly seemed that it was enough to remove the remaining barriers for Russia “to become Europe,” as one *perestroika* herald put it [11]. However, faced with real transformation problems, the “democrats” proved to be unable to formulate meaningful and realistic positive alternatives to the rapidly deteriorating situation [20; 59]. Their reading of the situation in many ways reflected the system of coordinates set by the collective experience of the Thaw, with all its good and bad characteristics. That system envisaged gradual and partial changes of the Soviet political and economic relations (with the former put above the latter) and not their total revision or replacement, something many “democrats” turned out to be unprepared for. It did not take account of the changes that had occurred in the country and the world since the times of the Thaw: “men of the Sixties” entered *perestroika* like the last battle of a (past) war, equipped with notions that were in many ways outdated. Not surprisingly, they eventually lost that battle and the ideas they proclaimed were

discredited. Their experience and worldview made them unfit for using the opportunities *perestroika* offered for transforming society.

What was holding back the evolution of the ideas of the “men of the Sixties” was above all lack of opportunities for translating words into deeds. The discussions about the transformation of the USSR, which had been conducted from the mid-1980s led nowhere. Articulating their position, setting forth their views and communicating them to a narrow circle of readers were becoming an end in itself. Disseminating ideas became more important than putting them into practice. “Men of the Sixties” probably never seriously thought about implementing their ideas because that seemed to be a very remote perspective. So they directed all their energy, talent and passion into outwitting the Soviet regime in order to air their views. When the hour of reform struck, many “democrats” failed to come up with a viable alternative to the course pursued by the country’s leaders, still less to implement it. Moreover, by no means all the “democrats” were ready to assume personal responsibility for making and implementing key decisions. Thus, for example, in 1992, looking for an authoritative figure to replace Yegor Gaidar as Prime Minister, members of the Yeltsin team turned to Academician Yury Ryzhov. A brilliant 1960s intellectual, appointed Russia’s ambassador to France in 1991, he turned down the offer, not wishing to trade his exalted position for the hard slog of taking the country out of its crisis [8]. Although many rank-and-file activists among the “democrats,” especially in the provinces, obviously fell short of the standard required for taking part in the making and implementation of important decisions [20; 43], the more capable of them later learned a lot and acquired considerable managerial experience (such cases though, were few and far between).

Experience of the Thaw and the collapse of the suddenly bestowed and later withdrawn freedoms engendered various complexes and syndromes. It was not only that *perestroika* “democrats” sought to solve problems by petitioning the authorities and rightly or wrongly were afraid to be deprived of freedoms. Many of them shuddered at the thought of any actions by radical communists and/or Russian nationalists, even though these trends had little support in the then nascent market of ideas. Presenting their ideas to the public the “democrats” reproduced the binary opposition of “the CPSU *nomenklatura* versus democracy,” prompting many critical remarks to the effect that they perceived democracy as the power of the “democrats” [43]. Although democracy was presented as the necessary condition for eliminating the current challenges, the “democrats” had a very vague idea of how to go about the job. For example, they proposed to solve the nationalities problems with a “let’s all be friends” attitude without a serious effort to understand the causes of these problems [55]. The slogan, “Russia is one, but it is divisible” put forward by Yury Afanasyev, one of the democratic leaders, in the fall of 1991 in response to the challenge of separatism, puzzled even the activists themselves [51].

The economic agenda of the “democrats” was marginal in their worldview. While supporting the country’s transition to the market economy (on the principle “for everything good against everything bad”) the “democrats” for the most

part had a vague idea about how the problem should be tackled. That is why they sometimes looked to outdated models (like Hungary’s “goulash socialism” or Yugoslavia’s workers’ self-management) and/or proposed a combination of incompatibles, and, taken as a whole, their perception of the mounting economic problems in the country could not stand up to criticism [64]. Thus, the program of the Democratic Russia bloc in the 1990 campaign to elect the People’s Deputies of the RSFSR combined calls for equality of all forms of ownership and the demand to freeze retail prices during the period of transition to market. According to Viktor Sheinis, one of the authors of the program, it was basically a compilation of the proposals put forward by various democratic candidates [59, vol. 1, pp. 255-259] without as much as a hint of the mechanisms of implementing it. The unrealistic character of such proposals even then met with justified criticism, but it was not discussed seriously. History has no use for the subjunctive mood and we shall never know what economic policy the “democrats” would have pursued if they had come to power levers back in 1991, but one has to go along with the claim that the “democrats’” ideas of economic reform (and not only that) were based on wishful thinking [73].

In fact, the “democrats’” political program was fulfilled in August 1991, and not so much through their own efforts as due to unintended consequences of ill-thought-out actions of the Soviet leadership under Mikhail Gorbachev. The collapse of the former leadership, which came out of the blue, put the “democrats’” ideas into question. The majority of them were obviously not equipped to work out a new agenda [53; 59, vol. 2]. Some “democrats” were deeply disenchanted with the first steps of the post-communist Russia [13], and the developments in the wake of 1993 pushed them in the direction of hardline opposition to the Russian regime [28]. Ideological leadership was snatched from the “democrats” by the representatives of the other trend, the “liberals,” whose baggage, priorities and approaches to cardinal problems differed from those of their predecessors: the Sixties “fathers” were replaced by the Seventies “sons.”

The dividing line between these generations was tenuous and although 1968—the crushing of the Prague Spring and the end of the Thaw in the USSR—was an obvious watershed, the shaping of personal priorities took a long time and was neither linear nor unambiguous, and the views of many Russians changed substantially over time [63]. Among the “men of the Seventies” there were some politicians, analysts and journalists whose perception of the world and the corresponding system of coordinates were closer to those of the “men of the Sixties” (the reverse happened much less frequently). The generation gap played a considerable role in further divergence of the trajectories of the Russian “democrats” and “liberals.”

### **“Liberals” without Democracy: Politics without Illusions**

“Men of the Seventies” came of age during the “long Seventies,” the period between the collapse of the Thaw and the start of *perestroika* transformations. This period was noted not only for the deficit of meaningful transformations in

the USSR, the wish to preserve the status quo in politics and economics, but also for a lack of hope for “a bright future” characteristic of the youth of the “men of the Sixties.” The new generation had to learn to live by the moment according to the ground rules set by the country’s leaders, which bred pragmatism and sometimes cynicism. Against the background of apathy and/or disdain of official communist ideology, pragmatism took diverse forms, and it was necessary not to dream of improving or worse, transforming the Soviet system, not to build “castles in the air,” but to achieve concrete results “here and now.” Very often a high-level skill set and successful career went hand-in-hand with indifference to the communist ideology [78; 32].

However, the fact that the “men of the Seventies” were indifferent toward official ideology did not mean that they were insensitive to all ideas. Simply, they perceived ideas through the prism of pragmatic interests, i.e., not in the normative but in the positive way, not as abstract benchmarks for the whole society but as a means of furthering their own ends. So, while the rhetoric of the 1960s “democrats” tended to juxtapose the authorities and society [1], the 1970s “liberals” barely mentioned society in their memoirs [62; 8]. They were concerned about the economy, while *politics* at best was seen as a set of conditions and obstacles for the conduct of *policy*, and at worst attracted no interest at all. A pragmatic perception of ideas determined the attitude to the transformations under *perestroika*: unlike the “men of the Sixties” with their ungrounded expectations, many “men of the Seventies” had no illusions from the start.

The “men of the Seventies” supported market reforms because they saw them as a way of getting rid of the inefficiencies of the Soviet economy and boosting living standards: these priorities along with acquired knowledge in the economic sphere made them “liberals.” The economic agenda dominated their discussions during *perestroika* [62; 72] and remained at the focus of debate in the decades that followed [8]. For the “liberals,” the rest of the system of coordinates (including but not limited to politics) was almost entirely linked with the categories of economic efficiency [40; 52, pp. 276-306]. Meanwhile, the ideas of democracy that had moved to the foreground in the late 1980s were seen in a strictly instrumental way and or at least with some reservations, which partially reflected the general trends of post-communist neo-liberalism [4]. While they approved of political liberalization as a means of lifting the more egregious and irritating bans (lack of access to information, restricted foreign travel), the “liberals” had mixed feelings about the ideas of democracy as the power of the people, the separation of powers and protection of the interests of minorities. Moreover, against the background of the worsening crisis of the former system during *perestroika*, they perceived the rambling and sometimes fruitless discussions on general political matters as a “gabfest” and many of the Soviet leadership’s economic policies as profoundly disappointing [5; 47].

In the late 1980s, differences over priorities (politics for the “democrats” versus economics for the “liberals”) caused an ideological rift. The “democrats” saw a clash of “good” and “bad,” seeing *perestroika* as a confrontation between its ideological supporters and enemies [79]. The “liberals” stressed the struggle

between “bad” and “very bad,” that is, the struggle between the reluctance to change anything about way the economy and the country were run, on the one hand, and incompetent attempts to fix the situation by half-measures, which merely worsened the crisis, on the other [25]. While the “democrats” saw the surge of social activism during *perestroika* as a sign of democracy, for the “liberals” it was a sign of “chaos” and a source of risk for the economy and state governance [26]. These different perceptions prompted the “liberals” to look for alternative solutions in the realm of politics. It is no accident that some “liberals” took up the idea of the need for market reform under a tough authoritarian regime as opposed to the “simultaneity dilemma.”

The idea that authoritarianism was necessary and even desirable as an instrument of reforming the Soviet system was introduced into the public domain by Andranik Migranyan (his joint interview with Igor Klyamkin published in *Literaturnaya gazeta* under the tell-tale headline “Is an Iron Fist Needed?” [46]). That discussion (like other episodes of the public debate of the time) did not have a meaningful impact on the political agenda and it would be an exaggeration to see it as a harbinger of an authoritarian pivot in Russia after the break-up of the USSR [56]. However, the taboo on discussing authoritarian decisions of the country’s problems was broken: while the 1960s “democrats” who had experienced Stalinism and saw it brought down during the Thaw, rejected authoritarianism in principle because it was associated with repressions, the 1970s “liberals” saw it as one of the possible options for implementing economic transformations.

In 1989, Sergey Vasilyev and Boris Lvin noted the widening gap between the pressing need for drastic and painful economic reforms and the intention of the authorities and the democratic public opinion to extend this process in time using soft and ineffective measures. In their opinion, the Soviet leadership was increasingly tempted to resort to authoritarianism for the sake of reform whereas the Soviet republics might be pushed toward democratization under nationalist banners [73]. In terms of policy recommendations, similar ideas informed *The Memorandum on the Concept of Transition to a Market Economy in the USSR* prepared in March 1990 by the Association of Social and Economic Sciences<sup>3</sup> [51]. The authors of that document proposed a wide range of authoritarian measures designed to prevent the danger of a populist economic policy and mass protests under anti-market slogans. They assumed that authoritarianism for the sake of market reforms was inevitable and had no alternative. This was not a combination of political and economic conditions characteristic of the majority of post-communist countries: authoritarianism had almost nowhere contributed to market successes [36; 23], as witnessed by the experience of market reforms in Eastern Europe unfolding before the “liberals’ ” eyes [62; 8]. It is also worth noting that the authors of the *Memorandum* saw the transition to a market economy as a one-off leap with a binary outcome (either success or total failure) while intermediate and/or compromise variants were not even discussed.

By that time, the models the “liberals” sought to emulate had begun to change. As early as 1989, Vitaly Naishul suggested that in implementing market



reforms, the USSR should emulate the examples not of Hungary and Yugoslavia, and not even of Western Europe with its over-regulated economies but rather the experience of the United States [48]. The search for models to emulate also inspired the trip of Russian “liberals” to Chile organized by Naishul in April 1991 (crowned by a meeting with Pinochet who by that time had been forced to resign under the pressure of democratization). Numerous positive references to the success of Chilean reforms reinforced by photos in the company of the former dictator went a long way to change the perception of Pinochet. In the eyes of the Soviet propaganda, the former villain turned into the chief reformer, while in reality, the Chilean experience was complex, multi-faceted, and in many ways, an exception from the rules [18; 69, pp. 587-600]. Although critics claimed that after the trip to Chile, future Russian reformers sought to use Pinochet’s experience in practice [38], it proved to be a passing fad to the extent that years later those who went on that trip recalled it without much emotion [62; 44]. However, the myth about Pinochet as a “model” reformer (and similarly about the “Chicago boys” as a role model for Russian “liberals”) acquired a life of its own. Russian “liberals” did not forget the brief infatuation with Pinochet and later some of them tried to detect the desired traits of a strongman-reformer in Vladimir Putin.

It would be no exaggeration to say that by the time of the start of economic reforms in Russia in the fall of 1991, the Russian “liberals” had an adequate idea of how to go about reform, what kind of economy was to emerge as a result of reforms and what political system was necessary and desirable. They saw democracy not so much as an obstacle in the way of market reforms as a luxury Russia should defer, while the inherent “defects” of democracy—reliance on elections, risks of a populist policy and a hamstrung government—were thought to be incompatible with market reforms. Subsequently, many “liberals” [70, p. 8; 15] retained and even strengthened their view of politics that prevailed on the eve of the collapse of the USSR. Moreover, that perception, which boiled down to the formula, “a firm yes to liberal economic reformism, generally yes to democracy in politics but not now and not as a priority,” surfaced in numerous programmatic documents of the Russian authorities (Strategy-2010, Strategy-2020, etc.) to which “liberals” contributed extensively.

### **Two Roads toward the Edge of One and the Same Cliff**

The year 1991 marked the start of a generational change in Russian politics. Gaidar’s reforms elevated many Seventies “liberals” to leading positions in government and in the public sphere while the Sixties “democrats” were going downhill, and not only because of age. The “democrats’” agenda seemed to have been fulfilled while the “liberals” appeared to be just the right people to solve the tasks of transformation. Without going into the argument as to whether the 1990s offered other options of economic and political reforms and whether they could have been implemented more successfully than did the Russian “liberals,” it has to be noted that many traits of the Seventies generation left a significant imprint

on the vector of transformations. While lengthy debates gave way to concrete measures, they chose priorities and means of achieving the aims based on a pragmatic agenda: ideas of what was desirable and what was possible, short-termism in planning, flexibility and a penchant for compromise were combined with an ability to get things done. Besides, the failure of the Sixties “democrats” who missed the last chance of transforming the former system during *perestroika* sent a clear signal to the Seventies “liberals” about how not to act. In this situation, the approaches of the “fathers” and “sons” could not but be diametrically opposite, including on the issue of prioritizing economic and political system transformations: the “liberals” sacrificed democracy for the sake of market reforms.

In late 1991, when Russia “froze” all the political institutions and the national state system, the number one priority for the political elites (and the public opinion) was implementing economic transformations. The “liberals,” who backed these moves, hoped that radical economic reforms would, within a relatively short span of time, rescue the country from its crisis, whereupon the turn would come of democratizing the political regime [8]. But these hopes were not destined to come true: the Russian government failed to bring about an early financial stabilization, economic reforms were greatly extended in time and the transformational decline of the economy was full of dramatic twists and turns and ended in default and devaluation of the Russian currency. The political context of economic transformations in 1990s Russia bore little resemblance to the experience of post-communist reform in Eastern Europe [3]. The difference was partly due to the state’s military and distributive potential in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union while the decline of production turned out to be more serious and prolonged than in the neighboring ex-communist countries.

Subjective factors, which had to do with the political tactics of reforms carried out by the “liberals” and their allies [60], also played a considerable role. It was effectively a series of tactical agreements not with the losers at the first stage of reform, but on the contrary, with those who benefited from it and were therefore not interested in further change [36], i.e., the oligarchs, regional leaders and other rent-seekers. The Seventies “liberals” (unlike “the men of the Sixties”) were prepared to adapt themselves to the changing circumstances and, if necessary, easily made compromises to achieve what was possible having in mind short-term tasks rather than starry-eyed dreams of “a bright future.”

This circumstance partly accounted for the phenomenon of 1990s Russian reforms noted by specialists and actors themselves [62; 8]: on a number of key issues of economic reform, the Gaidar team easily surrendered its positions, hoping to gain a tactical advantage from compromises and seeking to gain the desired result in other spheres. Thus, yielding to the pressure of powerful lobbies, it agreed to give up its anti-inflation policy arguing, among other things, that it needed to hold its ground on the issue of privatization of enterprises. However, the course for privatization [12] was also compromised, as a result of which the biggest beneficiaries, compared to the initial intentions, were insiders—the work collectives and directors of enterprises [10]. “Appeasement” of the narrow interest groups that sought to collect rent [6] led to high political costs of reforms

(both for reformers and for the country as a whole), while subsequent change of the government's policy in the 2000s prompted a revision of some results of transformations [76; 24]. In other words, the course the "liberals" pursued in the 1990s in many ways ran counter to their own ideas formulated before the start of economic reforms.

Part of the reason for such inconsistency was that initially, the "liberals" themselves assumed the role of reformer-technocrats and not independent actors on the Russian political scene and stayed out of the public struggle for power, which made them vulnerable [30]. When, in the course of 1993 parliamentary elections, they finally assumed a more active role, they discovered that their ideas and leaders had limited support, while facing competition on the part of the "democrats" who, in the wake of 1991, seemed to have been written off. Things came to a head in September-October 1993 when political polarization in the country, which had been mounting since 1990, reached its peak [54]. The "liberals," who approved of Yeltsin's actions, actively supported the dissolution of the Russian parliament and the use of force to suppress it because they felt that these measures removed the obstacles in the way of reform. At the same time, the "democrats," if not openly condemning Yeltsin's actions, dissociated themselves from them.

The ideological rift between the "liberals" and the "democrats" spilled into politics in the shape of differences between Russia's Choice bloc and its successor, Russia's Democratic Choice and the Union of Right Forces, on the one hand, and Yabloko on the other. Russia's Choice, which was formed by leading "liberals" and made a bid for power in the course of 1993 elections, managed to make use of the organizational resources of the former democratic movement but did not do very well in the elections [45]; after some of its representatives lost their posts, the bloc transformed itself into Russia's Democratic Choice. It was a typical "semi-opposition" [28], combining as it was moderate criticism of aspects of the government policy with unreserved support of the Kremlin on key issues while its representatives kept important posts in government. In the unfavorable economic context of the mid-1990s, such a strategy held no promise of dividends, and the costs were considerable. Not being able to influence key decisions, the "liberals" were seen by the electorate as being responsible for the government's failures, and their influence in the corridors of power waned. By contrast, Yabloko, initially a motley assemblage of politicians, managed to get across its programmatic principles and attitudes and attract a small but noticeable number of voters. Subsequent efforts by Yabloko's leader Grigory Yavlinsky and some other members enabled it to become a full-fledged political party [34; 75; 28].

Thus, the "liberals" and "democrats" became political rivals and their relations became strained. This happened because institutional and political incentives toward a coalition policy for the Russian parties were small even for ideologically close parties: the only option for coalition-building was "unfriendly takeover" of small entities by larger ones [57]. The difference of potentials of Russia's Choice—Russia's Democratic Choice—Union of Right Forces and Yabloko was not sufficient for such a takeover, and the claims of the pro-Krem-

lin RDC, which had clout to trangle Yabloko in its embrace, met with fierce criticism on the part of “democrats” [77]. If one looks at the way the two parties positioned themselves on the more significant issues, their approaches differed cardinally. During the December 1993 Constitution referendum, the “liberals” backed the Presidential draft of the constitution and actively supported Yeltsin’s re-election. The “democrats,” on the contrary, refused to back the draft Constitution [59, vol. 2], and in the 1996 elections, Yavlinsky himself ran for president. In the second round, Yabloko refused to back Yeltsin.

As regards strategic positioning, Yabloko “democrats” were torn between drawing closer to the “liberals” and distancing themselves from them. Sporadic attempts to shift Yabloko toward the “democratic left” niche never met with support from the “democrats.” Yabloko failed to clearly formulate an ideological alternative to the “liberals” as regards the political course. The party’s position on the whole was somewhat to the left of the rival “liberals,” especially on the issue of privatization [19]. These differences, however, were not always understood by the members of both trends or by rank-and-file activists, which is why the differences between the “democrats” and the “liberals” were perceived by observers as signs of personal conflicts. “Liberals” for their part were not a monolithic bloc; frictions in their ranks increased over time: today it is hard to imagine that Sergey Glaziev, a statist and advocate of the “Russian world” concept, and Andrey Illarionov, a radical critic of the policies of the Russian authorities, were both members of the “Gaidar team” in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Even when the “liberals’” programmatic positions remained more or less unchanged on economic policy they did not always follow their basic principles in practice.

Although the RDC suffered a debacle in the 1995 Duma elections, the “liberals,” far from dropping out of Russia’s political elite, increased their influence because they took an active part in the motley pro-Yeltsin coalition in the 1996 presidential elections and subsequently held a number of government posts [7; 22; 37]. After the 1998 financial crisis, which was blamed on the “liberals,” they managed to rally and form a new coalition, which did well in the 1999 elections as The Union of Right Forces. It is worth noting that by that time, the “liberals” had made a strategic decision to renounce the legacy of the “democrats” and positioned themselves as the Right throwing their weight behind Putin during the election campaign. Thanks to the Kremlin’s support, they managed to get back into parliament and score a crucial victory over the Yabloko rivals. The “democrats” in turn faced a profound internal crisis: Yabloko opposed the Kremlin’s initiatives, systematically refused to choose “the lesser of two evils” and ended up becoming an opposition that was, in principle, unable to take part in government, which hindered its efforts to broaden its electoral base. In the eyes of its supporters, Yabloko did not look like a party capable of implementing its plans. Attempts to reverse the situation failed and its poor performance in the 1999 elections demonstrated that the “democrats” electoral prospects were illusory [28].

As a result, in 2000-2003, both the “liberals” and the “democrats” were reduced to the status of a “semi-opposition.” For the “liberals,” it meant that the Kremlin only needed them as allies for tactical reasons, while the dividends from

the claims to a junior partner of URF were insignificant. Yabloko's crisis grew worse during the same period. Several prominent Duma deputies and regional activists resigned from the party, the demand for the "democrats'" former ideas dropped and no new ideas were offered. Against this background, the URF, which was the engine of the new wave of liberal reforms in the early 2000s and seemed to have perked up, made several attempts to strangle Yabloko in the embrace of the "democrats." During the 2003 Duma elections, the "liberals" sought not so much to garner votes as to get Yabloko rivals out of the way. The latter responded in kind, which undermined the positions of both parties to the conflict. Indeed, these elections were the "swan song" of both parties: the "liberals" and the "democrats" failed to win seats in the Fourth State Duma, which led the chief of the President's staff Vladislav Surkov to declare that these two parties had exhausted their historical mission in Russia.

Subsequent events demonstrated a dramatic decline of both political camps: the "liberals" split into "systemic" Kremlin loyalists and "non-systemic" critics of the Kremlin who drew closer to the "democrats," who in turn became more and more marginalized politically as authoritarian trends in the country increased. Over time, their confrontation became less and less important in the public eye, especially as a new generation of opposition politicians was emerging [29]. And yet, the causes and mechanisms of the ideological struggle between the "liberals" and the "democrats" in Russia, as well as its influence on the trajectories of transformation of the country and the prospects of reformist ideas in the future remain unclear.

### **In Lieu of a Conclusion: The Rise and Fall of Reformist Ideas in Russia**

Why do some ideas make an impact on the processes of social change and others do not? The answer to this question can be gleaned through the prism of demand and supply in the market of ideas. The demand grows in the periods when the situation in this or that society is perceived by the elites and by public opinion as one of crisis, but as uncertainty disappears, it may fall leaving those who produce and disseminate ideas out of a job. From that point of view, the rise of reformist slogans during *perestroika*, the decline of the "liberals" and "democrats" in the 2000s can be explained as the consequences of the dynamics of demand for ideas. Before the start of *perestroika*, interest in alternative ideas was artificially restricted, and after the post-communist transformation, as the new political and economic system in Russia took root, demand for liberal and democratic ideas disappeared. A new groundswell of demand in the market of ideas in the 2010s brought to the foreground concepts far removed from modernization while democracy and market reforms could find no niche in this market.

However, in the analysis of the struggle between various reformist trends, the study of demand in the market of ideas has to be complemented by an assessment of supply, not only in terms of the content of these ideas but also of the actions of those who produce and disseminate them. Although supply of concepts is not always directly linked with their impact on the current agenda [65],

one can hardly speak of the impact of concepts without articulated programs and active efforts of various agents. Supply on the part of “democrats” was too general and poorly articulated while its producers and disseminators were not equipped to meet the sudden surge of demand. The demand on the part of the “liberals,” although more coherent, focused on just one key aspect of the post-communist transformation (the building of a market economy) and was geared to one-off application in the concrete context of reforms. The “democrats” and even more so the “liberals,” both in the supply of ideas and their implementation, had in mind not the broad masses but rather narrow interest groups, which lost them the trust of the elites and of society. Although the “liberals” were able, due to a favorable concatenation of circumstances (change of generations amid disaffection with the democratic narrative), to score a tactical victory in the market of reformist ideas in the early 1990s, both the “liberals” and the “democrats” suffered a crushing defeat in the medium-term perspective.

Another important lesson of the Russian experience in the late 1980s and early 2000s was that what matters in the struggle is not only or largely the concepts as such, but their acceptance/non-acceptance by the elites and the public, multiplied by the perception of the figures of the producers and disseminators of these ideas. The Sixties “democrats” lost to their younger, better educated and more modern rivals, the Seventies “liberals.” However, they too failed to become the intellectual beacons of large groups of intellectuals, not to speak of the broad public (although some of them influenced the positions of the Russian elites in the 1990s) even though they played no small part in the preparation and adoption of significant decisions (the “liberals” still have some traction but only on a small scale).

The defeat of the “democrats” and the “liberals” does not mean that their ideas proved to be useless for Russia’s transformation in the late 20th century. The fact that Russia managed to build a market economy and proclaim itself to be a democracy, declaring (but not putting into practice) the principles of political and civic freedoms, was to a large extent the result of the promotion of reformist programs. Although the producers and disseminators of these ideas in the late 1980s and early 1990s would hardly find signs of implementation of their ideas in the 2020s Russia, the reformist ideas helped our country to come out of the impasse in which it found itself at the start of *perestroika* and helped to make this result irreversible. However, this fact in itself does not guarantee against new impasses in the future and neither the “democrats” nor the “liberals” were prepared for such a turn of events by the beginning of the 20th century.

By the early 2020s, the “men of the Sixties” had left the stage and even their successors, “men of the Seventies,” are unlikely to propose anything new in the market of ideas. But what can the new generations of “democrats” and “liberals” bring to the struggle of ideas that is distinct from their predecessors? Will their programs be met with demand in the foreseeable future, and if so, what will be their main thrust? The answer to this question is anything but obvious. Granted, after the debacle of the 2000s, the “democrats” more or less successfully switched to human rights activities to preserve the core of their producers and

distributors. But the “niche” character of their slogan, although making it possible to reproduce the former ideals, objectively leaves little chance that if fresh demand for democratization arises in Russia, the “democrats” will be in demand in this capacity. Attempts to transform the “democrats’” ideas by grafting populism from Aleksey Navalny [42] in the 2010s are questionable. Although these attempts are called upon to stimulate fresh demand in the market of ideas, it remains unclear to what extent supply will be integral and successful, or whether it will end up as another political technology ploy in the struggle against the current regime. It is more difficult to assess the prospects for the Russian “liberals” whose ideas (and proponents), after short-lived success, were in many respects (justly or unjustly) discredited in the eyes of the Russian public. The advent of the new generation has not changed the landscape in this political camp, and the new slogans need to be better articulated if they are to seriously battle for the hearts and minds of Russians.

Be that as it may, the programmatic ideas for the Russian modernization proposed by the “democrats” and the “liberals” in the late 20th century should not be thrown into the trash can. In the future, new attempts to move forward will need reform programs, which of course will differ from those that were prevalent 20 or 30 years ago. Their success in the market of ideas will go a long way to determine the agenda of the new round of Russia’s transformation, which is why the experience of the “democrats” and the “liberals” remains relevant in terms of Russia’s prospects.

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### Notes

<sup>1</sup> Here and elsewhere the terms in quotation marks are self-appellations. Whether the views and actions of the Russian “liberals” and “democrats” correspond to the respective doctrines is a question beyond the scope of this article (see critique in [40; 43]).

<sup>2</sup> Here and elsewhere the materials of an article published earlier are used [32].

<sup>3</sup> Founded in 1989 and headed by Anatoly Chubais.

## **Typical Views, Attitudes and Self-Identifications in Principal Strata of Today's Russian Society**

*Natalya TIKHONOVA*

*Abstract.* In this article, I analyze typical views, attitudes and self-identifications in the three principal strata of today's Russian society from the perspective of Max Weber's theory of positive and negative life chances. By analyzing the returns of two national surveys carried out by the Federal Sociological Research Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences in 2015 and 2018, I demonstrate that these strata differ from each other not only in terms of occupational structure and living and education standards but also in terms of their members' typical self-identifications, sets of principles and values, and views on the current situation in Russia.

While the lower and middle strata are relatively similar to each other, the upper stratum, which accounts for about 20% of the population, stands out with its majority's specific self-identifications, planning horizons, nonconformism and internal locus of control. Most upper-stratum members have greater ambitions and are more optimistic about the general situation in Russia than the rest of the population. The upper stratum also puts distinctive expectations on the state—it mainly wants the state to ensure a scientific and technological breakthrough for the country. Social solidarity is rarer while the stigmatization of the poor is more common in this stratum than in the other two strata. The upper stratum's principles and values manifest themselves in the behavioral strategies of its members.

I come to the conclusion that dividing Russian society into these three strata meets principal neo-Weberian criteria of class and that, within the limits of this social structure model, the upper stratum with its objective and subjective characteristics can be seen as the middle class.

*Keywords:* social stratification, social structure, life chances, stratification model, stratum, strata, social reproduction, self-identifications, social status.

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### **The Theoretical and Methodological Basis for the Study. General Characteristics of the Proposed Russian Society Stratification Model Based on Life Chances and Risks Criteria**

The structure model of Russian society brought about by the reforms of recent decades—its type and the character, roles and sizes of individual social groups—has regularly attracted scholarly interest (see [29; 22; 9; 15; 20; 23; 4; 16; 17]). However, although the problems of the social structure are of interest to scientists, there are practically no works in Russian literature that in structuring Russian society are using one of the versions of the so-called gradation approach which distinguishes populations on the basis of the specific chances of life of their members and the risks they experience. Exceptions are relatively few (see [1; 13; 21]), and they still generally fail to draw comparisons between the typical subjective characteristics of members of different groups. There are some studies of such characteristics in individual groups, but they normally have the bottom line idea that the Russians are united in terms of values they espouse [11; 10]. The purpose of this article was to describe some typical characteristics of members of principal Russian social strata and class aspects of these characteristics.

From the theoretical and methodological points of view, this approach follows the neo-Weberian tradition: it is owing to Max Weber's works that sociologists have been basing social stratification models on the life chances criterion. Weber saw life chances as the chief determinant of the status of the individual in the hierarchy of capitalist society [25]. He attached the main significance to life chances determining the individual's position in the system of economic relations, i.e., their being a member of a specific economic class, though he also paid serious attention to the specific character of life chances in other areas, e.g. consumption.

Weber distinguished between *positive* and *negative economic privileges*—the former representing meaning an advantageous status vis-à-vis a social norm and the latter standing for various kinds of privations and risks—and a *medium position* between them.

This inevitably implies the existence of three principal strata—a stratum enjoying positive privileges, a stratum having negative privileges, and a middle stratum [25]. These strata can be considered as classes in the proper sense if they have their own distinctive mentalities and behavioral patterns.

This modeling of stratification based on the life chances criterion has been developed further in the neo-Weberian tradition. Sociologists have clarified concepts of life chances and risks (see [3; 8; 14; 18]) and described what they believe are chances and risks specific to various spheres, e.g., economic security, occupations, and consumption (see [3; 5; 7; 14; 24]).<sup>1</sup> This approach enables a sociologist to more accurately indicate homogeneous groups and rank them vertically on the basis of the material status criterion instead of merely stating income levels or amounts and costs of property owned. It makes it possible to take account of a diversity of lifestyles with some people spending most of their money

on services and others on goods. Different degrees of rationality of expenditure should also come into account, as is the role of non-monetary resources such as social capital, cognitive abilities and noncognitive skills in addressing situations where there are unequal life chances and risks despite equal incomes.

Extensive studies in various countries have produced results that can be used in empirical studies of chances and risks in Russia. However, this is not an easy or trivial task due to methodological questions that Weber's life chances theory puts to the researcher. One of them is what are positive and negative privileges in a specific society (today's Russian society in our case) at a specific moment in time. To be able to answer, one needs to know what were the ordinary Russian's typical life chances and risks in the mid-2010s.<sup>2</sup> Chances and risks typical for a maximum of 45% of Russians were examined as indications of positive or negative privileges.

It was also quite a difficult question what specific life chances could be considered criteria to determine a group's place in the social hierarchy. But Russians normally use what is generally a standard set of values as social status criteria, and this made this question easier to answer [20]. This enabled us to primarily take account of opportunities in spheres of life that matter to the majority of Russians in determining indications of positive and negative privileges.<sup>3</sup>

Two sets of data formed the empirical basis for our study—returns of two large-scale monitoring surveys by the Institute of Sociology of the Federal Sociological Research Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences, one conducted in October 2015 and the other in April 2018.

Each survey involved questioning 4,000 people who were aged 18 or more and had been selected through a multistage region-by-region process, which guaranteed the representative character of the selected group. The first-stage selection was based on the economic territorial division of Russia used by the Federal State Statistics Service. The second stage involved selecting typical administrative territorial units within each economic territorial region. The third stage involved the calculation within each administrative unit of quotas for five types of populated areas: Moscow and St. Petersburg; administrative centers of federal constituent territories; administrative centers of districts; urban-type settlements; and villages. The fourth stage involved direct selection of respondents based on social, occupational and gender quotas and on five age quotas—ages 18 to 30, 31 to 40, 41 to 50, 51 to 60, and 60 or more.


We put together two scales—a positive privileges scale and a negative privileges one—to underlie a vertical stratification model of Russian society based on the life chances and risks criterion. Each scale comprised four subscales that were based on three positive privilege indicators and three negative privilege indicators (Table 1). Our analysis covered not only economic class characteristics such as employment aspects and disposable resources but also life chances in other spheres, e.g., consumption and leisure facilities. For this reason, we used stratum instead of class as the concept to base our analysis on and decided to assess the results that this analysis was going to lead to the class perspective. Hence, although we did use Weber's ideas as guidelines, our methodology was not unconditionally based on them and went beyond their limits.

Table 1

**Subscales and indicators used in building a Russian society stratification model based on the life chances and risks criterion**

Positive privileges scale indicators	Negative privileges scale indicators
<b>Economic Life Conditions subscale</b>	
Owning a second home suitable for year-round residence	Large debts
Simultaneous ownership of a second piece of real estate and a car	High inelastic current expenses, e.g. rent
Investments and savings sufficient to live on for a long time	Unstable income due to lack of stable occupation
<b>Job Situation subscale</b>	
Influence potential at work	Unfavorable employment conditions
Holding a job one wants (interesting etc.)	Law violation by employer, e.g., due to absence of formal employment contract
Availability of employee benefits package	Risk of prolonged unemployment (being permanently unemployed for more than 3 months per year)
<b>Subscale on Opportunities for Preservation and Enlargement of One's Human Capital</b>	
Accessibility and affordability of paid education for adults and children in a household	Inaccessibility of essential education for household members
Accessibility of paid health services	Likelihood of significant health deterioration due, e.g., to inaccessibility of essential medical assistance or hazardous work
Digital skills—regular and diversified use of Internet	Impossibility of everyday use of information and communication technology due to its inaccessibility or to lack of skills
<b>Consumption and Leisure subscale</b>	
Possibility of diversified consumption (number of durable goods items in household 0.25 higher than national median)	Limited range of consumer goods used (number of durable goods items in household 0.25 lower than national median)
Housing comfortability higher than average (large floor space and adequate amenities)	Poor housing conditions (lack of amenities, per capita floor space of less than 12 square meters)
Good vacation opportunities (possibility of vacationing outside one's home at least once a year)	Unsatisfactory nutrition (one's dissatisfaction with one's nutrition, e.g., due to saving on food)

The values of the Life Changes and Risks Index (LCRI) were obtained by adding the indicators of the positive privileges scale to those of the negative privileges scale with the latter indicators stated as negative numbers. The LCRI readings were used as the basis for a general model of stratification of Russian society, which is represented in Figure 1. This model has on the whole proven stable and worked under different economic situations, providing an essentially accurate picture of stratification.



*Fig. 1. The LCRI-based model of stratification of Russian society, 2015-2018, %.*

We carried out a statistical and theoretical analysis to detect boundaries on our scale between the middle stratum and the strata marked by the domination of negative and positive privileges. We used various methods to ensure greater accuracy, including two-stage cluster analysis based on the Jenks natural breaks classification method [1; 21].

The upper stratum as singled out via the use of these methods brings together about one-fifth of Russia’s population (19.6% of respondents in the 2018 survey belonged to it). The lower stratum makes up a little less than one-third (29.4% of respondents) and the middle stratum about half of (50.9% of respondents) of the population.

The occupational aspect of life chances in the positive privileges section shows the greatest polarization—differences in social security degrees, the nature and independence of work, etc. This is not surprising—the three strata show significant differences in occupation status and education levels (Table 2).



This suggests that the different life chances of the three strata are effectively class differences stemming from the place of each stratum in the economic relations system. Hence, each stratum with its combination of distinctive structural characteristics may be viewed as a class in the making. Income differences corroborate this: the average income in the upper stratum is practically twice the size of that in the lower stratum.

Table 2

**Education levels, income levels and occupational status in the three strata, 2018, %<sup>4</sup>**

Indicators	Lower stratum	Middle stratum	Upper stratum
<b>Education level</b>			
Holding postgraduate degree or being graduate of two or more higher education institutions	0.5	2.4	6.8
Holding higher education qualifications	14.6	30.2	52.9
Holding secondary specialized education qualifications	55.4	53.2	33.5*
Having general secondary education, complete or incomplete	29.5	14.2	6.8*
<b>Per capita monthly income, rubles</b>			
Average	18,689	23,631	34,732
Median	16,000	20,000	30,000
Modal	15,000	20,000	30,000
<b>Occupational status, % of the workers</b>			
Holders of traditional middle-class positions (chief executive officers, entrepreneurs, professionals)	14.3	35.3	69.9
Other non-manual workers	32.3	29.2	16.8
Manual workers	53.4	35.5	13.3**
<b>Additional information</b>			
Total proportion of non-workers, including:	33.7	28.6	15.5
Non-working pensioners	23.8	18.3	4.7
Students	1.6	7.5	9.8
Women on maternity leave	0.7	0.8	0.0
Other categories	7.6	2.0	1.0

\*Half of the working middle-stratum members without a higher education and half of manual workers belonging to the upper stratum have spouses with a higher education.

\*\*More than 70% of manual workers in the upper stratum belong to the "labor aristocracy," i.e., possess top skills in their occupation.

### **Self-Identifications, Social Self-Perceptions and Basic Principles in the Three Strata**

The existence or absence of specific self-identifications of individuals is one of the key criteria for determining whether a class in the making has or has not become a full-blown class with its distinctive class consciousness.

Due to the important role of self-identifications, sociologists have developed numerous methods to evaluate them. Among them are diagrams for a respondent to indicate what they consider their social status and requests for respondents to describe their status or to state how close they believe they are to various social groups. We used two methods in our study—a 10-point scale for a respondent to indicate their perceived place in society and a verbal test to determine how close a respondent thought they were to various social groups. Both methods showed the upper stratum to be characterized by self-identifications making it stand apart from the other two strata. For instance, in the verbal test, the upper-stratum respondents named more groups they identified themselves with than the respondents from the lower or middle stratum. Upper-stratum respondents normally named three or four of the 11 groups listed in the questionnaire. In the 2018 survey, the average number of instances of such self-identification by upper-stratum respondents was 3.6 compared with 2.7 among the lower-stratum and 3.3 among the middle-stratum respondents. Hence, the lower stratum was the least affected by the notorious “identity crisis.”

This does not disprove the point of Yelena Danilova and Vladimir Yadov that unstable social self-identifications are normal in today’s societies in general and in Russian society specifically [6]. However, typically, members of the Russian upper stratum stably feel close to people who are in the same occupation or pursue the same hobby or hobbies (Table 3).

*Table 3*

**Social groups that members of the three strata feel close to, 2015, %**

Perceived degree of closeness to group	Lower stratum	Middle stratum	Upper stratum
<b>People in same occupation</b>			
Significantly close	35.1	48.0	60.9
Somewhat close	49.1	41.3	35.9
Not close at all	15.8	10.7	3.2
<b>People pursuing same hobby/hobbies</b>			
Significantly close	43.1	55.0	63.2
Somewhat close	42.9	36.0	31.6
Not close at all	14.0	9.0	5.2
<b>The poor</b>			
Significantly close	10.6	8.9	6.2
Somewhat close	44.6	41.9	33.7
Not close at all	44.8	49.2	60.1
<b>Europeans</b>			
Significantly close	5.0	9.6	9.2
Somewhat close	32.3	37.0	43.9
Not close at all	62.7	53.4	46.9

The upper stratum is also marked by distinctive negative self-identifications, i.e., the complete impossibility of self-identification with a specific group. In the upper stratum, unlike in the other two strata, the majority do not identify themselves as poor, and nearly 60% do not identify themselves as members of the lower class either (Table 3). In fact, Russians have a rather peculiar concept of class. In any case, as Table 4 shows, self-identification as a member of a specific class only approximately shows where one stands vis-à-vis in respect of the life chances and risks hierarchy: the majority of members of each stratum feel that they belong to the middle class. Though self-identifications as middle-class members are more common in the upper stratum than in the other two strata and more common in the middle stratum than in the lower stratum, and self-identifications as members of the lower or working class show the opposite pattern of commonality, there are no significant statistical dependences between these variables. This means that class self-awareness is still in embryo in Russia.

Table 4


Self-identifications in the three strata with various classes, 2015, %

Perceived degree of closeness to class	Lower stratum	Middle Stratum	Upper stratum
<b>Lower class</b>			
Significantly close	10.7	9.1	6.1
Somewhat close	43.9	38.3	35.8
Not close at all	45.4	52.6	58.1
<b>Working class</b>			
Significantly close	22.0	22.9	17.7
Somewhat close	52.2	45.8	45.3
Not close at all	25.8	31.3	37.0
<b>Middle class</b>			
Significantly close	15.1	20.8	21.6
Somewhat close	50.5	51.3	54.8
Not close at all	34.4	27.9	23.6

Now let us go to our 10-point scale graphic test. It makes clear that, although in each stratum there are those feel at the top of society and those who feel at the bottom, each stratum shows a social status ladder different from that of the other two strata (Figure 2). About three quarters of the upper stratum put themselves in the top half of the hierarchy. In the middle stratum, in which typical self-identifications practically coincide with those in Russian society as a whole, only a minority put themselves in the top half of the hierarchy—45.9% of respondents did so. The lower stratum is characterized by low self-identifications. By the same token, the bottom four rungs of the ladder<sup>5</sup> are claimed by the majority

(55.5% of respondents) of the lower stratum, one-third (32.3%) of the middle stratum, and only every tenth member of the upper stratum.

Hence, stratum self-identification is quite distinct, unlike class self-identification. This means Russians have gone a long way in developing perceptions of their status: they intuitively identify themselves with a specific class but cannot yet clearly put that into words.



*Fig. 2.* Stratification models within the three strata based on self-identifications, 2018, %.

Upper-stratum characteristics include status reproduction: more than 60% of stratum members put not only themselves but also the family in which they grew up in the top half of the hierarchy. This contributes to the stability of status self-identifications in the stratum. This conclusion is objectively underscored by the fact that at least one of the parents of the majority of upper-stratum members (as was the case of 52.0% of respondents compared with 30.5% of middle-stratum and 15.5% of lower-stratum respondents) had a higher education. In the upper stratum, 71.3% of respondents aged 30 or less had parents at least one of whom had a higher education. As for respondents aged over 30, the older they were the lower this proportion was, which was a consequence of different generational patterns of education levels and an indication of increasing reproduction of the social group with higher education that forms the core of the upper stratum. It should be expected that self-identifications and principles that are typical of it will continue to spread through this stratum. It was no accident that 64.9% of respondents who came from families represented by the top half of the scale had clear occupational

self-identifications compared with only 49.3% of respondents who placed their parents on one of the bottom three rungs of the ladder. Those who did not identify themselves as European made up 48.0% of the former and 63.8% of the latter group. This not only reflects the role of one's social roots in one's self-identification but also means that people who are at least second-generation members of middle and upper sections of society are more European culturally.

Differences in ways in which members of the different strata perceive their social status are also reflected in their degrees of satisfaction with their status and with their life in general. Table 5 shows that the majority of upper-stratum members are definitely satisfied with both and that positive sociopsychological sentiments are dominant in this stratum.

On the other hand, the majority of lower-stratum members are dissatisfied both with their social status and with their life in general, and negative sentiments such as anxiety, annoyance, embitterment, and aggressiveness are typical in this stratum.

The middle stratum shows mixed sentiments: on the one hand, it is predominantly positive sociopsychologically but, on the other, the majority of its members are dissatisfied both with their social status and with their life in general.

These are the patterns of all age groups in each stratum.

Table 5

**Degrees of satisfaction with life, perceptions of one's status and dominant sentiments, 2018, %**

Indicators	Lower stratum	Middle stratum	Upper stratum
Those considering their life generally good	8.3	24.7	60.1
Those considering their social status good	8.3	25.8	55.0
Those emotionally upbeat or calm	41.8	61.9	84.4
Those indifferent or anxious, annoyed, embittered or aggressive	58.2	38.1	15.6

The upper stratum also has some values and principles that make it different from the other strata.<sup>6</sup> One of these principles is long-term life planning (Figure 3). In the 2018 survey, only 16.5% of upper-stratum respondents both of whose parents had a higher education did not make long-term life plans. The average proportion of upper-stratum respondents who made no plans was 25.5%.

Possibly, one reason why planning horizons are different in the different strata is that goals themselves differ from stratum to stratum. On the other hand, the three strata are similar to each other in terms of typical principal goals set in them and it is usually hopes for achieving them that vary. But there is one typical objective in the upper stratum that makes it significantly different from the other strata—the majority of its members seek to belong to a specific social group,

attain a position of influence, i.e., a specific place in the social hierarchy, feel that they play a significant role in society with the minimization of alienation common in modern societies. The strata also differ in terms of how much the possibility of good education, receiving a prestigious and interesting job, and achieving high professional standards matters to them (Table 6).




Fig. 3. Life planning horizons in the three strata, 2018, %.

To sum up, members of the upper stratum generally set themselves more ambitious objectives in life than people in the other strata. These ambitious upper-stratum objectives are usually professional goals—occupation is the main class criterion.

Table 6

Life goals of members of the three strata, 2018, %

Goals	Lower stratum	Middle stratum	Upper stratum
Interesting work	90.1	93.3	98.9
High standards in one’s occupation	88.4	93.4	98.1
Good education	75.5	83.6	93.2
Prestigious job	78.2	82.1	90.8
Visiting various countries	69.0	80.8	90.4
Successful career	54.8	62.9	79.4
Accession to specific social circle	38.7	44.0	54.6
Playing influential role in society	44.0	49.0	53.0

Goals such as leading an honest life, building a happy family, giving good upbringing to one’s children, having reliable friends, having a lot of leisure time and being able to spend it enjoyably, having good earnings, having a business of

one's own, becoming rich, or being no worse off financially than others have practically the same significance in all three strata.

The three strata also have similar ways of spending leisure time—there is practically the same desire to attend entertainment facilities such as clubs or discos, have regular meetings with friends, and spend a lot of time with one's children. But members of the upper stratum much more often want to read books, newspapers or magazines, pursue cultural activities such as going to the theater or to the movies or visiting museums or exhibitions, to regularly practice sports, e.g., going to gyms or fitness centers, and obtain knowledge and skills either related or unrelated to their work. In the 2018 survey, only 37.1% of upper-stratum respondents but the majority of the middle-stratum and two-thirds of the lower stratum respondents said that they had no desire to pursue one or more of these kinds of activities. The strong motivation of members of the upper stratum for such activities does not depend on their age or education level.

Upper-stratum distinctions also include a strong internal locus of control—the belief that one can control one's life. This was the conviction of 75.2% of upper stratum respondents in the 2018 survey. Members of the other two strata predominantly have a strong external locus of control: 50.8% of middle-stratum and 72.7% of lower-stratum respondents in the survey thought that one's life was mainly controlled by external factors. This is a hugely significant distinction in today's Russia, especially in combination with planning horizons, since these two factors plus one's state of health have been the chief determinants of the dynamics of one's material status over the past several years [19].

Differences in loci of control and life horizons are particularly striking among upper stratum members whose parents had higher education and held a high social status (Figure 4). It can be expected that these factors as combined with the above-mentioned upper-stratum reproduction will serve to widen the gap between the upper stratum, on the one hand, and the other two strata, on the other. At the same time, data in Figure 4 shows that one's wellbeing in today's Russia depends not only on one's personal characteristics but also on the position that one holds in the social hierarchy and that, in varying degrees, enables these personal characteristics to manifest themselves.

Nonconformism also places the upper stratum apart from the other strata. In the 2018 survey, 54.8% of upper-stratum respondents held the attitude that being different was better than being like everyone else. The rest of the population mostly takes the opposite attitude: 70.0% of lower-stratum and 60.9% of middle-stratum respondents in the survey believed that living as everyone else did was the better option. This was the dominant attitude in all age brackets of the two strata.




Fig. 4. Proportion of members of the three strata having a mainly internal locus of control with equal characteristics of the families they came from, 2018, %.

However, besides their indisputable advantages for members of the upper stratum, self-reliance and being different have their minuses as well. Solidarity with the disadvantaged is much less a feature of the upper stratum than it is of the middle or lower stratum while stigmatizing the poor is more common in the upper stratum than in the other two, although the majority of the upper stratum still blames poverty on the state (Table 7). Behind the upper stratum’s stigmatization of the poor is a belief that Russia is a meritocratic society while it is the dominant assumption in the other two strata that good luck and good connections are the main guarantees of success.

Table 7

Typical views in the three strata, 2018, %

Attitudes (choice in alternative statement pairs)	Lower stratum	Middle stratum	Upper stratum
Favorable status in Russian society is primarily the result of high education level and professional standards, effective work, and personal efforts	28.1	39.1	52.6
Favorable status in Russian society is mainly the result of good luck or good connections	71.9	60.9	47.4
One should seek material wellbeing by one’s own efforts, and let those who do not want to make an effort be poor—this is fair	37.2	48.3	53.4
One should be humane—the well-to do should help those who are poorer	62.8	51.7	46.6
The majority of the poor have the state to blame for their poverty (low wages and pensions etc.)	72.0	62.1	51.0
The majority of the poor have themselves to blame for their poverty—bad habits, laziness, unwillingness to change their way of life	28.0	37.9	49.0



### Views on the Situation in Russia in the Three Strata

In the 2018 survey, 53.6% of upper-stratum respondents considered the situation in Russia normal, while 56.7% of lower-stratum and 50.9% of middle-stratum respondents saw it as a crisis and many—considered it disastrous. Evaluations by respondents of the situation in their region, city and town showed even bigger gaps (Figure 5). It needs to be noted that behind those discrepancies are evaluations by upper-stratum respondents who came from high-status families or had parents both of whom had a higher education, i.e., by members of the core of the upper stratum, its wealthiest section, which largely explained their positive assessments.




Fig. 5. Evaluations in the three strata of the situation in one's region and city/town, 2018, %.

Moreover, the upper stratum, on the one hand, and the lower and middle strata, on the other, differ in the ways they look on changes in Russia over the past few years. In the 2018 survey, nearly 60% of upper-stratum respondents expressed approval of these changes, the majority of the lower-stratum respondents believed that the changes had harmed the country, while the middle-strata respondents showed no dominant attitude to them. Moreover, half the upper-stratum respondents expected that Russia would do well during the next year as well, the majority of the lower-stratum respondents thought the country was in for a hard time while most of the middle-stratum respondents expected no serious near-term changes.

The majority of the upper stratum, despite its optimistic view of the situation in Russia, believes the country needs major economic and political reforms. An analysis involving attitudes to the agenda represented by national projects proposed by President Vladimir Putin suggests that, by such reforms, the upper

stratum primarily means faster scientific and technological progress. More than 90% of upper-stratum respondents in the 2018 survey said that more rapid scientific and technological progress would be very important for them personally. Faster scientific and technological progress was advocated by 78.6% of lower-stratum and 86.6% of middle-stratum respondents, which means it is wanted by an overwhelming majority of Russians.

Much less significance is attached in all three strata to the ideas of boosting the role of small and medium-sized enterprises, reducing the role of the state in the economy, increasing freedom in all spheres of society, strengthening democratic institutions, and giving more powers to local government. At the same time, there is a strong desire in all three strata for accessible and high-standard medical services, for better regional and local roads, for higher real wages and pensions, for the construction of modern rural infrastructures, and for equal educational opportunities.<sup>7</sup>

The three strata are also nearly unanimous in what they see as the worst social inequalities—unequal access to medical services, education and employment opportunities, housing conditions, and general opportunities for children from different social backgrounds. However, there is no unanimity over inequalities affecting members of the three strata personally (Figure 6). The proportions of respondents who denied experiencing any of the nine types of inequality listed in the questionnaire also differed from stratum to stratum: 23.2% of upper-stratum, 7.8% of middle-stratum and 2.6% of lower-stratum respondents. The average numbers of what were perceived as personally painful types of inequality were 2.8 for upper-stratum, 3.3 for middle-stratum and 3.3 for lower-stratum respondents.




Fig. 6. Particularly painful personal inequalities of respondents from the three strata, 2018, %.

This concern about inequalities does not mean that Russia is a proegalitarian society—58.7% of respondents subscribed to the view that equal opportunities for self-realization are more important than equal incomes, social status and living conditions and only 41.3% took the opposite view. However, in

the lower stratum the majority put income equality above the equality of opportunity. Champions of income equality form practically the same proportions of working and non-working respondents in the lower stratum unlike in the other strata, where the majorities of equal income advocates belong to the economically inactive population.

Russians are quite tolerant of social and economic inequalities that they see as being in line with meritocratic principles. But this tolerance takes different forms in the different strata. Work effectiveness is the main criterion of equality/inequality (Table 8). It is accepted as such even in the lower stratum. However, most Russians believe that this criterion is ignored in Russia and that this makes the country's entire system of inequalities illegitimate. Only 14.1% of working respondents—or between 11.8% and 17.6% for all three strata—assumed that Russians were fairly remunerated for their work on the basis of their skills and their intellectual and energy input. Dissatisfaction with remuneration levels is particularly strong in the lower stratum: 53.1% of lower-stratum respondents in the survey felt that they were paid much less than their skills and input entitled them to while 45.2% of middle-stratum and 30.5% of upper-stratum respondents had such feelings.

Table 8

## Perceptions of justice, 2018, %

Statements	Lower stratum	Middle stratum	Upper stratum
It is fair that faster and more effective workers receive higher pay than less effective workers in same-kind jobs*	53.2	62.3	70.9
It is fair for some people to have more money than others if they have had equal opportunities to earn it*	43.7	51.1	59.9
It is fair that well-to-do people can afford better housing than people of modest means	35.6	47.4	58.9
It is fair that those with a higher level of education should earn more*	39.1	42.7	51.7
It is fair that one should give one's children better education if one can afford this	29.7	37.8	48.0
It is fair that higher wages should mean a higher pension*	25.4	29.6	41.0
It is fair that levels of remuneration should be different in different occupations*	19.1	23.1	32.9
It is fair that wealthier people should have access to better medical services	17.4	22.8	29.8

\*Data for working respondents.

Many of the respondents in the 2018 survey expressed the belief that opportunities for earning and improving one's status by one's own efforts had shrunk over the past five years, a serious setback given the importance attached

by Russians to effective work as a source of a higher income. That opportunities to make a better living had gone down was the opinion of 36.7% of working respondents while only 8.9% believed that the range of such opportunities had increased while the rest felt it had remained unchanged. Upper-stratum respondents had different perceptions—19.6% believed there were fewer opportunities in 2018 than there had been five years before and 27.8% thought the range of opportunities had grown. At the same time, 36.6% of middle-stratum and 48.2% of lower-stratum respondents thought opportunities had gone down and 16.0% of middle-stratum and 9.2% of lower-stratum respondents thought they had improved.

The views of people in the three strata and their principles, such as the internal locus of control, self-reliance, nonconformism and long-term planning, that stem from their resources and social status, affect their actual and planned social behavior. In any case, members of the upper stratum pursue more effective adaptation strategies, which are mainly focused on the labor market, if they need to improve their material status. Moreover, they can afford to choose the most convenient strategies, e.g., a sideline or overtime. This freedom of choice is practically non-existent in the middle and lower strata, with its absence being more striking in the lower stratum. This makes members of those strata, especially the lower stratum, more passive or opt for relatively ineffective strategies such as borrowing or farming on a family allotment [12].

It also depends on which stratum one belongs to whether one is prepared to defend one's rights as an employee. Every tenth working member of the upper stratum would take no action if they had their employee rights violated. In the working segments of the middle and lower strata, this would be the option of every seventh and every fifth person respectively. The most common form of employee rights defense is an attempt to reach a direct agreement with the employer—40.8% of upper-, 33.7% of middle- and 33.4% of lower-stratum respondents would have taken that route. Court action is the second-most common form—this would have been the option of 20.5%, 12.3% and 6.4% of respondents respectively. Acting through trade unions or the media would have been other forms of defense. Willingness to use any of these methods is more common in the upper stratum than in the other strata. Middle- or lower-stratum employees are more prone than their upper-stratum counterparts to put up with rights infringements or to react to them by looking for another job or taking part in collective protests.

The three strata also differ in terms of other forms of social behavior, e.g., pastimes and ways of human capital renewal. One-third of upper-stratum respondents had taken extra education or advanced training courses over the past three years with every fourth respondent taking paid courses. Among the middle-stratum respondents the extra education or advanced training was undertaken by 16.4% with 4.9% opting for paid courses, and the lower-stratum respondents had proportions of 11.5% and 3.4% respectively.

## Conclusions

Russian society can be divided into three principal strata on the basis of life chances and risks. The upper stratum accounts for about 20% of the population and is comprised of people having good life chances in various spheres—occupation, daily routines, ways of spending leisure, etc. The majority of this stratum are people with a higher education and with parents at least one of whom has had a higher education too. Occupationally, this stratum mostly consists of professionals, entrepreneurs and business executives.

The lower stratum, which makes up about 30% of the population, consists of people having living standards below average, a status that can essentially be described as poverty, even if not purely monetary poverty. Their lives are dominated by various kinds of privations and risks, and they have a very limited range of opportunities.

The middle stratum forms the majority of the population and in terms of composition and material status is rather similar to the lower stratum. Belonging to this stratum is potentially a volatile status that depends on specific life circumstances and may be altered easily by various factors.

An analysis of typical views in the three strata shows that the upper stratum, especially its core consisting of people from high-status families or families where at least one of the parents had a higher education, has a distinctive set of principles, values and views on what has been happening in Russia in recent years. Moreover, the upper stratum has all of what are traditionally considered middle-class attributes, which manifest themselves in every age, educational and occupational bracket within the stratum. People in this stratum, unlike members of the other two strata, tend to do long-term planning, are nonconformist, active, set themselves goals and are determined to achieve them by their own efforts. Those in the middle and lower strata predominantly espouse the philosophy of living “here and now” and being no different from anyone else and are convinced that one’s life is determined by external circumstances.

The three strata are not very different from each other in terms of goals their members set themselves, although the upper stratum stands out somewhat in this respect as well—its members tend to set themselves more ambitious goals.

The upper stratum is different in terms of self-identifications of its members too. Self-identification with occupational groups is the most common form of positive self-identification among them. Also, self-identification as Europeans is more common there than in the other strata. As regards negative self-identifications, the majority of members of the upper stratum do not identify themselves as belonging to the lower class or to the poor. They much more often see Russian society as meritocratic. Possibly because of this, solidarity sentiments are much less common and the stigmatization of the poor is much more common in the upper stratum than in the other two strata. The upper stratum is also more optimistic about the general situation in Russia than the other strata.

Summing up, the upper stratum is characterized not only by relatively high living standards based on its special role in the system of economic relations or by its members' satisfaction with their life and social status but also by principles and values that are passed from generation to generation and manifest themselves in behavioral strategies. For instance, belief in self-reliance in pursuing a goal is manifested in relatively intensive practical activity.

In all these respects, the middle and lower strata seriously differ from the upper stratum, although there are things they have in common. There are similarities between views, values and behavioral patterns although the three strata have different levels of wellbeing at specific moments depending on circumstances. At various points in their life, members of the middle and lower strata balance, sometimes more successfully and sometimes less so, between the typical life chances of the average Russian and the inability to maintain average living standards. Members of the upper stratum have a much more stable status.

The differences of status and views of the three strata are essentially class distinctions, i.e., they are based on each stratum's place in the economic relations system, primarily its employment and qualification characteristics. For this reason, the upper stratum can be considered a middle class in the making, a section of society characterized by a clear social reproduction trend, and the middle and lower strata can be regarded as the lower-middle class and the lower class. However, in view of our definition methods and the ideological meaning of the class notion in Russian sociology, it is preferable to use the term "stratum" for the three sections of society that we describe in this article. Moreover, these sections are classes in the making and class self-identifications existing in them are intuitive rather than conscious. It is only very gradually that they would evolve into full-blown classes. As a result of their increasing reproduction, each of them would develop a much clearer identity from the standpoint of the status, views, self-identifications, interests, and consequent behavioral patterns of its members. Then a class-based model would become the optimum instrument for analyzing the structure of Russian society.

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### Notes

- <sup>1</sup> For a detailed analysis of the history of the life chances concept in sociology (in economics the term “life capabilities” is normally used to denote this concept) see [2].
- <sup>2</sup> A team comprising Vasily Anikin, Anastasia Karavay, Yulia Lezhnina, Svetlana Mareeva, Yekaterina Slobodenyuk, and the author of this article developed a methodology for the analysis of life chances and risks.
- <sup>3</sup> We deliberately factored out assessments by Russians of their own place in the social hierarchy and of their degree of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with it, and of whether they were satisfied with their life in general—assessments that Weber considered important consequences of differences in life chances,—in order to be able to double-check our results (see below).
- <sup>4</sup> The gray background is used for indicators that significantly differ from stratum to stratum, i.e., indicators of higher than 50% for one of the strata and indicators of lower than 50% for the other strata. All connections mentioned in the text were statistically tested. Depending on the character of the variables, we used Pearson’s chi-squared test, the Pearson correlation coefficient or Spearman’s coefficient.
- <sup>5</sup> Point 6 from top represents the status claimed by most Russians and simultaneously a turning point, as it were. Therefore, we did not include this point in our calculations of data for either the top or the bottom half of the scale.
- <sup>6</sup> In this area of analysis we used chi-square automatic interaction detection (CHAID), one of the regression analysis techniques. CHAID is normally used to detect interactions among a large number of variables and build classification trees that can find combinations of factors having the strongest impact on the target variable. In our case, we used the first function of CHAID, which enabled us to detect from several hundred variables representing value systems, principles, social self-perceptions, and assessments of reality the most significant characteristics of the different strata and to focus on them in our subsequent analysis.
- <sup>7</sup> This list of concerns represents proportions of respondents who prioritized each of them in descending order.

*Translated by Andrey Skvarsky*



## Jews in Contemporary Russia: Assimilation and Dissimilation

Alexey LEVINSON

*Abstract.* Throughout its centuries-long history in Russia, the Jewish minority knew oppression, pogroms and genocide, as well as inclusion and tolerance demonstrated by the Russian majority. The Jewry responded with escape (Palestine/Israel, the U.S. or elsewhere) or assimilation in the course of which those who remained in the Soviet Union abandoned their faith, language, traditions and ways of life. They tried hard to look and behave like standard Soviet Russians with a slight tint of “Jewishness,” which helped them be very successful in chosen professions, science and art. During the last 20 years, those of the Jews who decided to stay have been enjoying unprecedented tolerance demonstrated by the authorities and common Russians. In this atmosphere, the dissimilation trends (back to Judaism and tradition) have flourished alongside with continued assimilation and emigration.

*Keywords:* Russian Jewry, assimilation, dissimilation.

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The constructs suggested here are fairly complicated. On the one hand, they rely on the studies of interethnic relations, attitude to the Jews, their principles, etc., and, in particular, on the results of the focus-groups organized by the Levada-Center in 2019, which represented the Jewish population of big and medium cities of Russia.<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, these constructs are offered as outlines of intended or planned projects. This means that my conclusions and assertions might spread to the problem fields of disciplines and branches of knowledge in which I am a dilettante and, therefore, need verification.

I know that many great Jewish and non-Jewish thinkers have offered their opinions on the “Jewish question” and Jewish identity, yet the volume and nature of this article do not allow me to skim, let alone to sum up their opinions. Here I offer just another opinion on the “Jewish question” without any claims to absolute prominence.

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People tend to think that any discussion of the fate of the Russian Jewry and the “Jewish Question” necessarily belongs to Judaic studies. In our case, being realized within the frames and the paradigm of studies of public opinion and public relations in Russia, falls under Russian studies. (The “Jewish Question” is not a question addressed to the Jews but to the society, in which Jews are present, a special element in some respects.)<sup>2</sup>

Here I will discuss the current stage of the assimilation/dissimilation of the Russian Jewry, the corresponding forms of identity or self-identity of those who identify as Jews, and what Russians think about those whom they believe to be Jews. These opinions will be presented below.

I, therefore, deemed it necessary to offer my opinion of the process of assimilation per se before discussing these particular elements.

### **Some General Comments on Assimilation**

The definition of assimilation that can be found in dictionaries and the author’s own definition aside, let us accept as truth that the process of assimilation of the Jews who lived and are living in Russia was and is ongoing.

I am prepared to discuss the already acquired results or, to put it differently, the formula applicable to the current stage of assimilation/dissimilation process. Here are several comments on those who are involved in the process; in other words, on those who look at themselves (or defined by others) as both Jews and Russians.<sup>3</sup> In which social formats are they involved in the process, and are they its subjects or objects?

Russians, as participants in the process of Jewish assimilation, look at themselves as a “people” to the extent to which they ponder on the process. Not an essentialist myself, I would like to point to the essentialist nature of this self-definition. By identifying themselves as a people, they associate themselves with the forces of nature, the essence of the world as the source of the absolute nature of their rights. The right to their own land/soil is one of these fundamental rights.<sup>4</sup> Land, as a space, is a “frame” within which all and everyone are “those who belong,” and where the rules and order should be observed or taken into account even by those who violate them. This might be different for nomads, for those who live on islands, in the mountains or in forests. For those who believe themselves to be Russians<sup>5</sup> or Jews an awareness/emotional perception of social space also means land or territory.

We all know that throughout centuries of Jewish dispersion, “their own” land was not the land on which they lived. It seems that their continued awareness of reference to “their land,” the Land of Israel, a virtual object, reconciled the Jews of the diaspora with living in enclaves, ghettos etc. on land that they could accept as “theirs,” the rights to which they interpreted as conventional, but not natural and not theirs from the very beginning.

Assimilation is a process of realization of mutual yet asymmetrical relationships. It seems that the asymmetry—the hegemony of Russians in their relations with Jews—rested, and still rests to a certain extent, on the idea of both sides of

land as the source of rights. Indeed, in Russia (and other countries) the rights of Jews were spatially limited by the Pale of Settlement and ghettos.<sup>6</sup> Emigration and repatriation of Jews from Russia is a spatial gesture that cuts down the process of (this) assimilation and sheds light on the key importance of space for the assimilation as a process. On the other hand, re-acquisition of “their land,” as represented by Israel as a state and a country with its own territory, slows down or reverses the process of assimilation of Jews in Russia. (More about this below.)

The structure of this particular type of assimilation, namely, assimilation of those who are aware that they live on the lands of another people, is fraught with important implications. Two trends in Eastern European, in particular Russian/Soviet Jewry that cropped up during World War II have been noted and repeatedly commented upon. On the one hand, heroism and valor of the Jews who fought in the ranks of the Red/Soviet Army, in the rear in partisans and Resistance units, in Jewish armed formations and the Israel Defense Forces. On the other, the Jews who found themselves on occupied territories demonstrated absolutely no willpower to take up arms (which makes the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising an episode rather than the rule).

In this context, identification with land was the key factor. Having accepted the Russian or any other land as their own, Jews joined the ranks of Russians and other peoples. Being aware that they were “on the right side of history” in the war against the occupants, the Jews poured their strength into it. In an absence of this identification, the Jews crowded in ghettos or concentration camps accepted the German occupational administration as legitimate and obeyed it without murmur, even if fully aware of the fatality of its actions. External observers were greatly amazed.

Assimilation is a combination of impulses of inclusion and exclusion, present in their own forms on the side of the hegemon and the side of the oppressed. This began when Jews came to the land that Russians (Poles, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, Moldovans, etc.) believed to be theirs. This is the moment of inclusion. Exclusion begins with hostility toward the newcomers and the desire to push them out of one’s own social space or keep them away from it. Inclusion can be conscious in the form of hospitality, friendship, peaceful coexistence or readiness (for a while) to demonstrate patience and tolerance. There is another type of inclusion much more typical of Russia today: inclusion in the form of indifference to the fact that neighbors are Jews or inattention to the differentiating features like appearance and everyday manners. This means that it has become impossible to identify Jews, that *they have become indistinguishable*. Inclusion means that the Jews have penetrated *our* milieu, that they are living in it and that they can no longer be identified as Jews. Have they retained the features that Russians interpret as Jewish? The more frequent answer is: yes, *they have preserved them in their hearts*.

This is the classic picture of the process of assimilation as seen by the hegemon. It should be said, however, that at least on one, yet key, point the picture as seen by the hegemon and the minority is identical, at least formally. This is the issue of Jewish identity at the stage when assimilation has already reached high levels.

In the course of our studies, we tried to find out what made Jews different when such features as appearance, speech and manners had become undistinguishable. The answers of Jews and non-Jews (including anti-Semites) were practically identical. All of them pointed to something that was present but could not be identified or especially important, rejected identification or any exact definition. This makes Jewishness the best (even if tautological) term.

All attempts at defining it in rational terms were reduced to “Jewish brains,”<sup>7</sup> “Jewish wits,” “flexibility” and “dodging.” “They keep together” is another frequent answer related to the social context.

These definitions point to a certain mystical quality that, according to a general accord, is still present even if the features described above are absent. According to some people, it cannot disappear; it is acquired by birth, “with blood,” no matter how much “Jewish blood” is in any given person. People are ready to detect it in completely secularized or even Baptized Jews. According to many Jews who observe all Jewish customs and rites, Jewishness disappears in converts. The Russians, especially those who do not like Jews, insist that Jewishness does not disappear: “*a convert cannot be trusted.*”

We formed our focus-groups out of those who identified as Jews when answering the question about nationality. In the course of group discussions, they were expected to answer the question “Why are you a Jew?” and substantiate their Jewish identity in an informal conversational manner.

Participants were asked separately, one by one, within the frames of a group discussion, which meant that every answer was correlated with the earlier or pre-supposed answers. This means that the answers—each of them separately and in their totality—can be interpreted as a collective opinion. The sum-total of several groups can be interpreted as a common opinion of this social category, viz. the Russian Jewry.

Kinship (“blood”) and self-consciousness (self-attribution) were two main foundations of self-identification: some of the respondents answered: “*Because my parents, my grandmas and grandads are Jewish,*” “*What do you think I am? All my relatives are Jews.*”

Many “not pure” Jews explained: “*My Mum is Jewish*”; “*I am Jewish by Halakha—my Mum is Jewish.*” Some referred to kinship in second generation along their mothers’ line: “*Our Gran was Jewish and I think that I am a Jew.*” There were those who referred to kinship by fathers’ line: “*My father was a Jew. He married a Russian. I am convinced that I am a Jew. Israel recognizes this.*”

Others spoke of their self-awareness and identified themselves by feelings: “*Why am I a Jew? I feel that I am a Jew*”; “*My feeling about the world is Jewish,*” “*I think that I am Jewish, that’s that!*”

There were answers that combined kinship and self-identification: “*I feel that I am a Jew; my parents and all ancestors are Jews...*” “*My Mum is Jewish and I also feel Jewish.*”

Some answers contained an important theme of time: some deemed it necessary to point out that they had always felt like Jews: “*From my childhood I knew that I was Jewish*”; “*In was in the kindergarten that they explained to me*

*in relevant terms that I was a Yid. So everything is correct”; “Well, my family was Jewish, so I had no choice for as long as I can remember.”*

What is important is the fact that there were indirect indications that not all of those who referred themselves to Jews had been aware of this before.

### **The Main Assimilation Frontier**

Assimilation is a two-line process, since the changes affect not only the assimilated but also the assimilating ethnicity. It is one of the variants of cultural contact and cultural exchange. The most prominent elements are borrowings the assimilated people accepts from the embracing majority. The majority, likewise, borrows certain cultural elements from the accepted minority. The Russian language (in most cases through the Odessa slang) borrowed certain expressions in Yiddish. What is more important is the fact that Russians paid attention to and marked as “Jewish” certain types of behavior, discursive practices and world outlooks. A considerable part of the process of assimilation unfolds as a conflict between ethnic groups; some of them might become chronic, others unfold as explosions. The practice of anti-Semitism in the Russian Empire increased cultural isolation hence the Jewish specifics within the Pale of Settlement. Assimilation was limited to those who, for different reasons, left the Jewish community and were living among Russians. As the Jewish enclaves were gradually opening up, assimilation spread to the entire Jewish population. From that time on, anti-Semitism of the Russian (Ukrainian, etc.) majority became an important factor of assimilation. Excesses—pogroms at the turn of the 20th century—reverberated in many ways, primarily through escape, emigration/repatriation of Jews. Under pressure of aggression, humiliation and mockery of certain features and symbolic elements of the image of a Jew, those who stayed behind rejected them as promptly as possible. To shorten the distance that separated them from the dominant ethnicity, Russian Jews, who were gradually leaving their settlements within the Pale, were gradually, one generation after another, rejecting the basic components of their culture—language, religion, everyday traditions, style of clothing, oral and musical folklore.

### **The Critical Frontier**

The process of Jewish assimilation in Russia crossed an important line: Jews lost their status and quality of a *people*. This deserves more attention. The Jewish population of *shtetlekh*, small towns in the south of Russia, in Ukraine, Poland, Moldavia, and Lithuania demonstrated the majority of the constitutive features of a people (nation, ethnicity). They had a language, religion, traditions and customs of their own; they lived compactly and formed, within *shtetlekh*, ethnically uniform communities. Pogroms (see [1]) organized by members of the dominant ethnicities in the course of the Civil War differed in their forms—from total liquidation of the Jewish population without plundering to total plundering without great loss of life. A combination of mass murders, total destruction of all

main means of life, houses and storages prevailed. There were other variants—*shtetlekh* were totally destroyed, with their former land ploughed.

Many authors pointed out that over the course of the Civil War, none of the political forces involved in it (White, Red, Green, etc.) were alien to pogroms. Commanders or chiefs played a double game: they banned pogroms but did not prevent them.

Eye-witness accounts, reminiscences and attempts at analysis of what was going on point to certain very important things. Not infrequently, the psychological state of the attackers was described as paranormal. Some authors wrote about inhuman automatism; eyewitness and participants frequently likened soldiers and armed militants to beasts. This cliché is an exact definition of the unhuman emotional state of these attackers. The comments describing them as “drunk with blood” or “intoxicated by murder” speak of the same. Those who had taken part in pogroms later shuddered as they spoke of them. The inhuman nature of these crimes was invariably mentioned. At the same time, they were purposeful and rational.

Pogroms are explained by different reasons stretching from psychological to political and economic, yet the clearest among them was proclaimed by thugs, “Beat up Yids!” They wanted or even craved the complete annihilation of Jews as a *people*: they physically exterminated all representatives of this people or, having left some of them alive, deprived them of any conditions of compact living on the land that was theirs, albeit temporarily. This explains houses set on fire and the ritual of ploughing up the land on which *shtetlekh* stood. In the Foreword to *The Book of Pogroms*, its compiler has pointed out that the pogroms of the Civil War time in Russia and Ukraine were an introduction of sorts to the Holocaust [1, p. XV]. In some respects, these processes are very close, yet there is something that keeps them apart. Pogroms and the actions later known as the Shoah, or the Holocaust, had only one purpose, viz. physical liquidation of Jews. The Holocaust, as a chain of planned and organized actions, pursued a clearly stated aim—physical extermination of Jews as a people in the places of their compact living. The Nazi bureaucracy transformed the process of liquidation of people into a process of searching for and liquidation of those Jews who no longer lived as one people, who had detached themselves from the Jewish people and joined the process of assimilation to the German and other hegemonic ethnicities.<sup>8</sup>

At the turn of the 20th century, partially or deeply assimilated Jewry living in big cities of the Russian Empire were, nevertheless, objects of pogroms. Pogroms of the Civil War period were aimed at *shtetlekh*, the zone of minimal assimilation. It is highly important to point out that pogroms differed from the Holocaust by their spontaneous and barely controlled nature, while the Holocaust was a bureaucratized and perfectly organized business. (It is known that in some regions and fairly frequently local forces began violent actions against Jews independently and spontaneously yet their share in the total process was small. Main actions proceeded according to plans and orders from the center.) The Holocaust was a rationalized bureaucratic plan and a state policy earlier realized through pogroms.

How can we describe this process? It was defined as spontaneous and as a genocide, but neither definition explains why certain uncontrolled, irrational and spontaneous actions were carried out to exterminate a certain people. The degree of rationality of those involved in the process varied greatly. The Zhitomir and Proskurov pogroms were carried out under the slogan of building a “national state” in which there was no place for Jews [1, p. 47]. In other cases, there were practically no ideological justifications—the participants were convinced that Jews should be liquidated or driven out.

Assimilation as viewed by the assimilating majority is a deliberate, controlled process. It begins with the penetration of small groups into the social space which the majority believes to be theirs and therefore, this intrusion should be ended either by physical extermination of the intruders or by squeezing them out. If the newcomers shed the specifics that the majority regards as important they cease to be intruders.

### **Society and Population**

Time has come to define the social status of the subject defined here as the majority or the hegemon. These definitions point to its role in the relations with the assimilated minority. Its qualitative state, which makes similar collective responses to the new situation possible, is highly important. These responses are defined as xenophobia, exclusion, discrimination, racism, Chauvinism and, finally, pogroms. They are identical in different subjects, in an absence of regulatory and administrative instances their actions are, nevertheless, spontaneously synchronized or organized. (The responses stirred up, led or organized by initiators or leaders of all sorts, by the media among others, were also frequent, yet it is much more interesting to analyze unanimous responses of huge crowds in an absence of a leader of any sort.)

I will not discuss here the negative attitude to external enemies outside “our” spaces. It seems that spontaneous responses to the appearance of aliens in “our” inner space are stirred up in populations as social entities by their systems of organization of collective actions. The living creatures that belong to the same population are mutually orientated without differentiation; they behave identically, they are driven by similar or even common impulses of protecting their integrity and, frequently, their space. The system of mutual orientation, types of collective fears and collective aspirations that determine collective behavior are rooted in the deep, pre-cultural layers. They are not regulated, therefore, by systems of social control that appear at the much higher levels of social organization. These are powerful drivers, their coercive and collective impulses strongly affect people. They exist outside social control, reflection and explanation. People hate aliens just because they are aliens. All other explanations are rational and, therefore, belong to different levels. This road leads to theological justification of the extermination practices, “scientific” racial theories and scientifically substantiated methods of extermination of those who have been defined as a hostile force. In their primary form, these drivers in a combination of certain

conditions can guide a pack, crowd, gang or a more or less organized group of people determined to raid and loot. Why should these people be raided? Because there is no place for them here (on our land).

If we talk not about populations in general but about populations of people, this behavior is not an everyday phenomenon. These ancient and deeply rooted programs of collective action (very much like many other “natural” drivers) were, on the whole, squeezed out or suppressed by more recent cultural layers. These, as well as all other deeply rooted processes, for that matter, burst out, from time to time, in their primitive forms (hence such definitions as “beastly” cruel, “zoological” anti-Semitism, etc.). They motivate what is called everyday anti-Semitism, crop up in jokes and slips of the tongue; they find their ways to art and state politics. If and when social upheavals squash the civilizational normative-axiological and institutional superstructure these pre-civilization forces may burst out.

Russian Jewry was exposed to the greatest extent to practically all possible forms of derailment: “Beat up the Yids!”, struggle against “rootless cosmopolitans” and international Zionism and imposed social reformatting. In old Russia, Jews were a *people*. Due to pogroms, the Holocaust, wars and state policies, the Jews who survived World War II were no longer a people, not even a “dispersed people.” They lost their religion, their language, their compact settlements and traditions. This was a huge, but not the last, step toward assimilation.

It is highly important from the theoretical and practical points to decide which sociological term should be chosen to define the community described at the everyday and literature level as “Russian Jewry.” The word “tribe” used in the 19th century is outdated. I have demonstrated that the Jews in Russia are neither a “people,” nor a “nationality”—they have no constituents of a nation. “Ethnicity,” “sub-ethnicity,” and an “ethnic group” are hardly applicable since there is too little ethnicity in what distinguishes Jews from the Russian majority. The term “minority” merely separates the group at hand from a certain “majority.”

At the same time, we know (our knowledge supported by the results of our studies) that many of the Jews living in Russia identify or started identifying as belonging to the “Jewish people,” while people of other nationalities define them as “nation.” This contradicts the old norm, according to which the word “Jew” meant “nationality” as registered in passports and questionnaires as well as the existing accounts in the questionnaires of population censuses and the official publications based on their results. The Jewish Autonomous Region registered in the Constitution as one of the subjects of the Russian Federation presupposes that there is a corresponding national subject.

It is not my intention to deprive the Russian Jews of the right to look at themselves as the people of the Covenant with God. I do not address Jews, either individually or as a community; I address anthropologists, sociologists and demographers. I point to the fact that Jewry as a phenomenon has not disappeared from Russian society, which is confirmed not only by those who speak of themselves as Russians but also by those who define themselves as Jews. Our experts should give their due to the community that plays an important role in many spheres of



life precisely thanks to their special qualities that avoid the common definition of “people,” “nation,” etc.

Sociological qualification of this phenomenon should better be left alone. Here I will limit myself to pointing to some common features of the contemporary Jewish diaspora. This category of people who live in different countries of the world, who build up their identities—the only one, the main or one of several—on their conviction that they are tied by kinship and blood to the people that once lived in Palestine/Israel. They had their own faith, language and statehood, were unjustly driven away from their land, were persecuted when living in exile as a dispersed people, and finally returned to their land. The conviction that the Jews are united by a common fate harmonizes with their conviction shared by their surrounding that because of the uniqueness of their souls and minds, they fell into the category of persecuted, as well as and highly successful in the countries where they live.

Jews scattered across many countries are at different stages of assimilations, loss of ties and blending with local societies and at different stages of preservation, restoration and development of their community and cultural-social specifics.<sup>9</sup>

### The Echo Effect

Today, the Jewry of Russia thinks of itself as a result of several completed and unfolding historical processes.

Group discussions and individual interviews with those who think of themselves as Jews showed that they had practically no information about how and when Jews had appeared in Russia and Ukraine and vague ideas about the Pale of Settlement and life in *shtetlekh*. Strange as it may seem, pogroms about which I have written above and the genocide of the Civil War time are vaguely remembered. The city pogroms of the turn of the 20th century are remembered better, albeit inadequately; the same can be said about the Holocaust. The memory of the wild outburst of post-war anti-Semitism is clearer but deliberately suppressed.

This is a direct echo of exclusion of these subjects from public discourse and family memory. Assimilation includes the disconnected translation of family reminiscences, one of the most important identity factors. Written and oral discussions of these subjects were banned for political reasons and excluded from school programs, literature, art and the media. These measures discouraged the Jews of older generations from telling their children and grandchildren about their personal tragic experience (and that of their relatives) as Jews. *It was wiser not to talk about this. And they never talked.*

I have already written that assimilation of the turn of the 20th century was developing mainly among those Jews who, having detached themselves from the places of compact settlement, found themselves in big cities of the Russian Empire. These relatively few groups regularly found themselves amid intensive and rapidly changing waves. One of them was a wave of assimilation per se as a consciously accepted and value-justified abandonment of the Jewish tradition,

faith, language, customs for the values seen as a duty and heroism. This time marked the emergence of a pattern of conscience, education and behavior that is still alive among the Jews. The Jew who demonstrates a lot of vigor when moving away from specifically Jewish characteristics to acquire the features of the majority to become a “true” Muscovite, Leningrader, a Soviet man, that is a Russian, is much more respected in the Jewish milieu. To be more Russian than the Russians, to be less Jewish than the Jews can be appreciated among these Jews as the highest achievement of a Jew.

This was common for assimilation unfolding among many ethnic groups in the zones of intensive contacts: the capitals of empires and the cities of the emerging American or Australian societies. The Jewish variant had certain specifics: universalist views and principles were formulated on the basis of certain principles of Judaism and the Rabbinical tradition, combined with certain Christian dogmas. These newly formulated views and principles served the foundation of ideologies and political doctrines (socialism and communism being the pertinent example) and of everyday ethics and practice. They served the axiological reason of the abandonment of the traditions, features and manners perceived as Jewish, that is, narrow nationalist/confessional for the sake of maximally wide traditions, features and manners marked as “common to all mankind,” “common to all people” or “class” (“proletarian”).

Waves of assimilation alternated with waves of revival of national and/or religious identity. The same urban Jewish elites (they were elite when compared with the Jewish population of the *shtetlekh*) started producing the ideas of liberation of the Jewish people as one of the peoples of the Russian Empire and/or liberated mankind. The ideas of Zionism were taking shape at the same time: they substantiated the right of the Jews to restore their autonomy and the statehood either on the equal rights with other peoples, or on the predominant rights of unjustly discriminated people or on the exclusive rights of the chosen people. The elements and the developed forms of these ideas are invariably present in the minds of the contemporary Russian Jewry. This was confirmed by different studies, including those in which I was personally involved.

### **Aliyah and Emigration**

The tragic events of the Shoah, the Catastrophe and the world war as well as the anti-Semitic campaigns of the late 1940s moved the Russian/Soviet Jewry into the dramatic epoch of the Aliyah.

According to our studies, today’s Jews interpret resettlement as the main event of the Jewish past per se. These reminiscences simultaneously include the unexpectedly meaningful idea of Israel as a homeland for some of them and the idea about Jews citizens of the world, for others. Those involved in our studies recalled how the Soviet/Russian Jews had suddenly realized that they differed from the rest of Soviet citizens. They acquired a chance to finally break away and become free on the other side of the Iron Curtain. They also spoke of the suddenly worsened relations with the country, which they had been prepared to call

their Motherland. Everyday life of those who were packing and those contemplating departure was filled with threats of anti-Semitism, refusals, repressions against those who protested against refusals. Friendly relations with neighbors and colleagues were severed, familiar jobs were lost—this affected the migrants and, to a certain extent, those who remained. These memories are still very much alive.

Jewish emigration perfectly fit the logic of the hegemon as a population and the aim of assimilation, namely, Jews as an alien element should either adjust to the new milieu or disappear. The latter was achieved either by liquidation, expulsion or, as in the case discussed above, by not preventing the emigration.

Historians have pointed out that the outflow of Jews who lived for centuries in Russia and the neighboring countries, on the whole, followed anti-Semitic outbursts. Statistically, the desire to return to the historical homeland was not the main driving force. In other words, the factor of expulsion (“push-factor”) was much stronger than the factor of attraction (“pull factor”).

It should be said that in Soviet conditions, the ideology of resettlement, making Aliyah, drew big numbers of Soviet Jews into the universalist humanitarian ideas of struggle for freedom against the Soviet repressive political regime. This idea united them with the dissident movement outside the prison walls while Jewish activist prisoners joined the ranks of all other repressed supporters of freedom and independence of other peoples and nationalities of the USSR (nationalists in Soviet terminology). This is one of the links with assimilation.

On the other hand, the policy of the Soviet leaders that allowed Jewish (and only Jewish) emigration made Jews the “chosen people,” Soviet style. They were put into a very special situation which, at a certain point, separated them from their allies mentioned above and undermined the foundations of universalism of their ideas of the world.<sup>10</sup> In some cases, this was a hint at ongoing dissimulation, that is, restoration of Jewish specifics or their creation from scratch and consolidation of Jewish identity.

The Soviet leaders, though ready to let Jews emigrate, were not ready to officially confirm this: they did not want to capitulate to the “Zionists” and the West, who sided with them, to accept the fact that many in the Soviet Union did not want to live under Soviet power. No Soviet leader wanted to make freedom of emigration a norm; every time, potential emigrants had to present weighty reasons to get a permission. Every permission was an act of humanity and a response to the request of relatives living in Israel in full conformity with the international humanitarian norm of reunification of families. The norm was observed even if everybody knew that the majority of the “requests of relatives” were fictional.

Assimilation that took, in particular, the form of liberating the hegemonic population from at least part of the hindering minority strongly affected the dominant population. Russian Germans followed the Jews to demand and receive the right to repatriation. The Iron Curtain was breached. The changes that inundated the Soviet system in the late 1980s had been accumulating for a long time. The freedom to leave Soviet power in its East European variants was the first freedom wrung from the Soviet regime that controlled the Soviet peoples and the

peoples of the socialist camp. Time has shown that the form of spatial control shattered by Jewish emigration was the key element of the political structure of the hegemon. Its erosion started by the Aliyah undermined in the shortest, by historical measures, times and destroyed the Soviet political structure.

### **The Inner Time of Assimilation**

Some of our respondents said more or less openly that their road to Jewishness had been a long one: *"Having retired, I started reading and visiting the synagogue and thus realized that I was Jewish"*; *"You ask why—let me tell you that understanding of who you are comes with age. It takes time"*; *"Today I know that I am Jewish. I never thought about this before. My Dad is Russian so I am probably Russian too"*; *"I was nobody, today I know that I am a Jew"*; *"When we married she married me as a Tatar and I married her as a Russian woman. We never thought about this. Later we discovered this—both of us"*; *"Having grown older he realized the he was Jewish, that's that. He is not bothered whether he was circumcised or not, whether he obeys Jewish customs or not."*

Our studies suggested that three factors were responsible for "acquisition of Jewishness" and Jewish identity not at birth but at a later age.

### **The Tolerant Milieu as a Factor**

The first and the most important of the three factors was a social and political atmosphere in Russia that was tolerant of Jews.

Some people spoke of this in moderate terms; others were highly enthusiastic: *"Today there is no state anti-Semitism, though it can be detected in everyday life. People are no longer afraid of being Jews"*; *"I can say only one thing about Putin—for some reason he is not an anti-Semite and this explains everything"*; *"Well, this is something out of the ordinary. Hanukah in the Kremlin! Sometimes I think—this is too much; this will not end well. So far the Jews use it and they are right."*

Part of the younger generation find this atmosphere (an absence of anti-Semitism) absolutely normal. They say: *"Today, there is a fashion for Jews"*; *"This became fashionable. People try to register as Jews. They search for Jewish ancestors among their great- and grand-mothers. Sometimes they just invent them"*; *"I love being Jewish."*

People explain that today, Jewishness brings certain rewards: *"Today despite numerous programs for the young people the younger generation is convinced that it is 'cool' to be a Jew since it opens many doors. There are many possibilities starting with employment and ending with travels"*; *"I was going to Moscow; the police checked documents everywhere. I carried a letter to the chief rabbi of Russia. I was the only person saluted by the policeman. It seems that today Jewishness is an advantage. Nobody will dare to harm you"*; *"Even if you apply for a U.S. visa you stand more chances as a member of a Jewish organization than a common man."*

There is another highly important observation: many, if not all believe that weakened or disappeared anti-Semitism as a state policy in Russia is an exceptional or even ad hoc and temporal phenomenon that has not come to stay. Jews are not euphoric at all.

### **Israel as a Factor**

I have already written that the vectors of the processes unfolding in the assimilated Russian Jewish elite at the turn of the 20th century were repeated half a century later, at the end of the 20th century, in different historical circumstances, in the form of the processes that engulfed the Soviet/Russian Jewry. One of the most important trends of the time (which unfolded into a powerful process) was reversed assimilation of a new Jewish identity on the basis of recreated nation-forming elements: religion, traditions, language and ties with the Land.

The Jews acquired an interest in Jewish history and Israel,<sup>11</sup> and started observing traditions and studying Judaism and Hebrew. The majority joined the process as the first step toward repatriation. Many of those who joined the process had no repatriation plans; they wanted to build up a new identity with a high level of Jewish self-awareness.

The friendly relations between Russia and Israel contributed a lot to the situation described above. The studies carried out by the Levada-Center among the population of Russia as a whole showed that the leaders of Russia steered the political course of the country toward friendly relations with Israel and it was approved by mass consciousness. At the same time, mass consciousness pushed away and blocked out the former anti-Israeli positions of the Soviet Union and their political and ideological justification; today, they do not crop up in the discourse.

It seems that the Russian public as a whole positively assesses Israel not as a “Jewish state”; it is a country in which Russian is understood; it is seen as a cultured and successful country with good healthcare and many tourist attractions, the visa-free regime is highly appreciated.

Russian Jews perceive Israel differently, yet an absence of animosity toward Israel in mass consciousness or even positive attitude toward it makes it easier for the Jews to formulate their own outlook on Israel.

The Jews can be proud of Israel’s successes in different fields; the fact that this no longer contradicts state policies and propaganda (as it did in the Soviet Union) helps develop Jewish identity in a way unlike its traditional form of opposition to the milieu..

### **Assimilation Reverse as a Factor**

Two different groups are involved in the process of recovering the Jewish roots: adults who experienced the primary and secondary socialization as “common Soviet people” alloyed with Jewishness. An awareness by these Jews of

their (vaguely understood) specificity created a level of minimal exclusiveness, a short distance from the common (for those around him) norm that betrayed itself as a higher level of sagacity, efficiency, adaptability or other achievements in the profession one shared with others. Today, these people much more energetically deepen their difference from others, intensify their communication with Jews and join Jewish communities at synagogues.

The second group consists of children, teenagers and young people involved in the Jewish tradition at the early stages of socialization. Their perception differs greatly from that of their parents. As Soviet or post-Soviet Jews, their parents, even if deeply immersed in "Jewish life," look at it from their inner Soviet "self." Young people look at the same from their inner Jewish "self."

Many of those who had tried as young people to conceal from others and, in some cases, from themselves their Jewishness arrived as adults to a new attitude to their national-cultural definition in the context of the changed attitude to Jews in the Russian Federation.

Changed personal situations can be described as another variant of the same; they might be indirectly related to the macro-processes unfolding in society and in the world. Emigration of children to Israel is one of the most frequent causes of change. In other cases, Jewish identity was recovered due to changes in personal life, such as resignation or retirement, that is, escaping close social control.

The above can be summarized as acquisition of freedom. It was for this reason that the Jewish movement first for the freedom of emigration and, later, for the freedom to demonstrate their identities corresponds, on the whole, with the vector of movement of certain strata of Russian society for a much wider sphere of personal and social freedoms in their country. Those who want to be immersed to a great extent or even completely in the Jewish tradition (while remaining in Russia) move away from secular political and social problems.

### **Three Types of the Assimilated**

The studies carried out by the Levada-Center suggested conventional classification of the Jewish types in Russia depending on the real assimilation/dissimilation level; today the following values are important, to different degrees, for Russian Jews:

- (1) specific (particular) Jewish values and their symbols;
- (2) universalist values common to all mankind and corresponding symbols;
- (3) specific (particular) Russian values and their symbols.

There are no ideal types that correspond to one of these orientations; all of them are combinations of these vectors.

The Soviet and post-Soviet Russian Jewry mainly oriented at universalist values (in Soviet time they might be presented as Soviet or Communist or imperial if the Soviet Union was an empire). Today, this orientation is gradually assuming the forms of common European and internationally recognized values. Within this orientation, the values and symbols of exact knowledge of (European) science and technology are, likewise, seen as universalist. In the past, they

served the road marks for the secularized Jews wishing to find a worthy place in Soviet/post-Soviet life.

There is no and cannot be a single orientation. The post-Soviet Jews differ by the relative share of “Jewishness” or “Russian” in their basic “universal”/“common to all mankind” orientations.

Assimilation betrayed itself (and continues to do so) in deliberate derogation of the presence of the symbols of Jewishness in everyday life of man, family or a group, as compared with the elements of the Russian. Dissimilation, that is, return to Jewishness means that this correlation moves in the opposite direction. In extreme cases, which are the most illustrative for this trend, people push the Jewish component to the center, subordinate to it the universalist component and reduce to the greatest extent the Russian. The opposite trend concentrates at its inclusion into Russian culture (high or base) and the maximally possible refusal of Jewish identity.

Today, the Russian Jewry is represented by those who did not reject their Russian identification and did not leave Russia. The majority stayed behind for many reasons of everyday or material nature or determined by philosophical and cultural considerations. (Sometimes assimilation in Europe and dissimilation in Israel are even more obvious).

### **Jewry in Fashion**

I have already written that the younger generation looks at life in Russia from inside their Jewish “selves.” They attended Jewish schools, they know Hebrew (to a certain extent); the Jewish traditions, bans and injunctions are neither an obligation nor exotics. They differ from the younger generation of the communities in Israel or the United States due to their involvement in another, external culture. In Russia, they differ from non-Jewish young men of the same age by their vast knowledge of the possibilities offered by various organizations operating in Israel and international Jewish organizations: they can travel free to Israel, rely on all types of privileges, study in Israel, etc. which raises their status among their non-Jewish friends. Jewishness is perceived as a value not only in their own circle but also outside it. Today, *Jews are in fashion*; this is one of the favorite formulas of young Russian participants in group discussions. Their parents, like all other Jews of their generation, rejoiced if they avoided negative discrimination.

The Russian Jews think of the last twenty years as exceptional, with no analogues in the country’s past. Never before have anti-Jewish manifestations been so weak or suppressed, never before has the “Jewish life” was equally flourishing for Jews and in its other forms open for the entire population of Russia.

The latter is an element of ongoing assimilation. I have already written that assimilation presupposes changes in the assimilating majority. Its responses to the presence of an alien element in its space are varied: either the level of alienation should be suppressed, or the cultural/symbolic elements brought by the minority should not be perceived as alien. In the last century, Russia passed several stages of habitualization of Jewishness in the public sphere of Russian cities.

Jews figure prominently in the media and art. This is perceived as a special talent confirmed by higher results and achievements on the scales by which they are compared to members of the majority; they can be explained by diligence, discipline and purposefulness, the qualities created by acute rivalry. This is a necessary yet insufficient condition. Their views and approaches slightly, yet meaningfully shifted against the standard allow them to discover or construct, out of available cultural elements, in cultural contexts (including science and art) all sorts of combinations the possibility of which previously remained undetected. This creates new meanings. The result, however, is not “Jewish” but European science, not “Jewish” poetry and painting but Russian poetry and painting. This makes assimilation mutual.

Our experience has told us that the noted measure of marginality with respect to mainland culture and the associated feature in its approach to it, which makes it possible to configure new meanings that are of value and interest for a dominant society, are characteristic of representatives of the first two, sometimes three generations, who left the Jewish cultural environment proper and immersed themselves in the environment of European (in our case, Russian) culture. They become famous scientists, businessmen, artists, composers, performers, and stars in many other fields of the recently embraced culture of the majority rather than in their own culture.

Elements of Jewish/Judaic heritage combined with the experience of any measure/form of discrimination create the above-mentioned measure of marginality/specificity. It should be said that this effect betrays itself in the second or third generation of those who left their ethnic and confessional milieus. In Russia, these are people with German or Armenian roots; in America, they might be of Chinese and Korean origin. As I have said above, it is highly important to find a definition of the social type, which cherishes its ties with the people of its origin to the same extent as ties with the people to which it now belongs. As everyday definition it is not enough to bring together ethnonyms to get a new one—a “Russian Jew” or a “Russified German.” Sociology and anthropology need a concept and a term that describes it.

### **Continued Assimilation**

Our studies have told us that Jewish assimilation continues today. In small towns, we met people who habitually responded to the context in which Jews lived and the Jewish question discussed by trying to escape these conversations in general and as applied to them in particular. They defined their identity as *Russian or, if you like, a Russian Jew*. They deemed it necessary to point out: *I am not a Zionist, I am internationalist*. They shared the suspicious typical of the Soviet epoch and their negative attitude to Israel as an “*artificial state*,” Hebrew as an “*artificial tongue*,” and Yiddish as a “*jargon*” that should be better pushed aside and forgotten. Russian was their native tongue, and they were proud of their impeccable knowledge of the Russian language and Russian culture. At the verbal level, they boasted of their rejection of Jewish traditions: I love pork!



They, however, had their share of Jewish vanity and boasted that, being Jews, they knew and understood Russian culture better than common Russians. They did not, therefore, completely reject their Jewishness, yet they said that their children would not think of themselves as Jews. There was not a shadow of regret when they said this: the life of their children would be much better than theirs.

The majority answered the question about their motherland with Russia; some of them pointed to the places in the Soviet Union/Russia where they were born as their “smaller motherland.” In rare cases, they spoke of Israel: *Russia is my motherland, Israel is my fatherland.*

### “The Jewish Question”

In every detailed discussion, we asked the respondents one and the same question What is the “Jewish Question”? It turned out that many, the younger of them in particular, had never heard this word combination. In this sense, we can say that there is no “Jewish Question” in Russia.<sup>12</sup>

Some respondents tried to explain this term in their own way:

—*I think that this the right, probably not the right but the possibility for the Jews to be Jews.*

—*Jews in any society have the right to profess or not to profess their religion, observe or not to observe their traditions. To be or not to be a religious Jew and remain part of the secular Jewish community, to be free from society and power...*

—*This is the right of the Jew to be a Jew.*

—*I think yes, that's right. The right of the Jews to be Jews.*

These answers confirm that today in Russia, there is no “Jewish Question” in its traditional interpretation. This does not mean, however, that the Jews think that their life in Russia is free of all problems: “*I think that all Jews keep in mind, in one form or another form, the dictum ‘beware of persecution’.*”

### Thirty Years Ago

Our polls included the questions intended to find out how people assessed the changes of the last 30 years in the life of Jews. In view of the special objectives of this particular investigation, we paid special attention to the current perception in the Jewish community of these three decades in the history of Russia: “*There were periods when people were afraid of admitting their Jewishness. Later came the time, today for example, when they are not scared...*”

As could be expected, some of the respondents associated this time (the late 1980s) with outcrops of state anti-Semitism. “*The year 1989 was very hard for me: they told me that I had relatives abroad (my dad had told me that we had nobody abroad); in the place where I worked they said: ‘Well, what are you doing here!’ and removed me from my post to a lower position*”; “*Well, I should say that everything was far from perfect. Well, when you tried to enter the university they*

looked at Point 5; many were pushed away”; “In Soviet times, many concealed their Jewishness, otherwise good jobs and the naval academy were out of reach.”

Many people spoke of everyday anti-Semitism: “The attitude to Jews was far from positive. We were keenly aware of this. We lived in a communal flat; our neighbors attacked us and even knocked out our door because there were ‘Yids behind it’.”

Jews responded with assimilation to state and everyday anti-Semitism. Some of them tried to conceal their Jewish roots: “I had a chief Konstantin Aleksandrovich. I knew that this was not his true name. When I entered his office, I invariably addressed him as Konstantin Abramovich...”

Assimilation went further than that. Our respondents told us that Russians preferred to Russify Jewish names of those with whom they closely communicated. “I used to work with David Isakovich Shekhtman whom all his colleagues called Dmitry Ivanovich. For some reason...”

The respondents said that 30 years ago, Jews were at a loss and very scared—this is how the atmosphere of the later stage of the Soviet Union is accessed today. A certain part of these concerns can be related to their Jewishness and the discomfort it created; the other, with the crisis of the late 1980s—early 1990s. It should be said that the respondents did not detach the fate of the Jews from the fate of all Russians. This means that the last thirty years are seen not only as flourishing of the life of Jews but a much more complicate picture.

### Contemporary Situation Assessed

Our studies have allowed us to conclude that many people admitted that anti-Semitism had weakened and the situation for the Jews improved. (There are those who prefer marginal opinions: *There was no anti-Semitism 30 years ago or anti-Semitism was real in the past, it is real today and will survive in future*). It is highly important to note that my elderly respondents find the current situation much worse than 30 years ago. Why? Because *life has become much harder for all than it was in the Soviet Union*.

Other are of a different opinion: “The year 1989 was equally hard for old-age pensioners and the younger generation. I mean the problems we had to cope with: shops were empty; the same can be said about the 1990s... It is much better in 2019. Pensions are big enough; we can cope more or less.”

There were opposite opinions: “Here is a smiling young man in 1989. Perestroika is at its first stage and he is still dreaming about something. He looks at the world and thinks that life will finally be settled, everything will change, etc. In 2019 he looks at the world with different expression in his eyes...”

Let me say this again: these examples, no matter how different, do not separate the Jews from the rest of the country’s population; in this context, Jewish identity was irrelevant.

This period was marked by a high popularity of small genres of mass culture—variety shows and bard songs created by highly assimilated Jews aware of their assimilation and of their special Soviet Jewishness. Let us discuss the coop-

eration between Arkadiy Raykin and Mikhail Zhvanetsky. It should be said that the public practically never discussed the Jewish origins of Raykin, its idol.<sup>13</sup> In fact, his Jewishness as an element of his talent allowed him to demonstrate a very special approach to fairly common phenomena to reveal their satirical elements. Mikhail Zhvanetsky wrote the texts of the most popular of Raykin's items. We can say the same about his talent yet Zhvanetsky did not conceal the Jewish (Odessa) roots of his humor. This explains his popularity with the Soviet and post-Soviet audience.

Two other Jews—Aleksandr Galich and Vladimir Vysotsky—demonstrated by their poetry what their level and their variant of assimilation to mainstream Russian culture can offer to the intellectual audience, how it discovers the recent history and explains the souls of common Soviet people.

Vysotsky who was highly popular in the widest possible social circles was never, as far as we can judge, perceived as a Jew. Even if the Jewish theme was present in his songs, many of them were jokes yet there is another and much more interesting example. I mean the “Ballad of Childhood” [6], full of reminiscences about life in a communal flat in Moscow during the Great Patriotic War. To my mind, this is one of his best creations [4], brimming with realities of the time and place. The names of those involved in the dialogue belonged to real people:

And sunlight beamed in three rays,  
sifted through the cracks in the roof—  
On Evdokim Kyrillich  
and Guisya Moiseyevna

She to him: “How are those sons of yours?”  
“Missing in action.  
Hey Guisya, we've suffered,  
we are all one family.

You've suffered, and that means  
that you all have been Russified.  
Mine—missing in action,  
Yours—guiltlessly lost their freedom.

What is highly important in the above are the two parallel tragedies very typical of the time and the country—his sons “missing in action” and her sons “guiltlessly lost their freedom”—is Vysotsky's invention. He did this to allow the Russian who addressed the obviously Jewish neighbor in the name of all Russians to give all Jews the right to be considered nearly Russian (Russified).

Vysotsky was fully aware of the importance of this gesture as well of his belonging to the Jewish minority and to the great Russian-Soviet people. He looks at the Russians as a suffering people and insists that the Soviet-Russian Jews have the right to count themselves its part. They paid for this right with suffering caused by unjust repression from the Russian-Soviet power. Hence the question: Should the permission to look at themselves as “Russified” (this term,

in fact, was practically never applied to Jews) be interpreted as an invitation from Russians (assimilation created by the hegemon) or as the hopes and dreams of Jews (who strove to assimilation) finally realized? The text suggests both variants which makes it poetically complete.

Any interpretation, any position that the poet occupies, any solution is another variant of complete assimilation as he sees it—through a far from simple lens; he transforms his personal approach into universally Russian and applies it to the Soviet-Russian-Jewry with which he identifies.

### **This is Not the End**

The comparison of the lives of Jews 30 years ago and today produced an obvious result—their position today is much more comfortable than in the late 1980s. More than that. It became obvious that the respondents compared not so much the living conditions of Jews there and now but looked at different conditions and changes in the lives of the population during perestroika and now. Some 30 years ago, there were hopes that life would improve and fears that everything would be lost. Today, there are no such hopes or fears. These were not specifically Jewish hopes and fears; they were joys and despondence that spread across the country, which Jews shared. (This means that the habitual anti-Semitic thesis—the Jews know how to find the best jobs and live better than the others—is no longer valid. Today, it has been changed into—*Jews live like all others and their lifestyle is indistinguishable.*)

Today, a young Jew is described in the following terms: “*He is relaxed, he is much freer, he has traveled and has seen the world, that is, he is very different from a young Jew thirty years ago.*” In 2019, “*a twenty-year old girl is much more modern. She is open, she reads a lot, she studies, she uses gadgets, she is open about her Jewish roots. She knows how to defend Jewish values.*”

This speaks of the dissimilation trend. In some cases, respondents were drawing contemporary Jews wearing payot. For them, it meant that today Jews do not fear to demonstrate their identity. Payot point to a religious Jews and dissimilation. In fact, this image was used mostly by those who had no chance to see real religious Jews. It seems that they borrowed this sign of Jewishness from anti-Semitic caricatures, that is, accepted, like in many other discussed cases, an impression of non-Jews. This speaks of a high level of assimilation very typical today.

Our studies have also revealed that this partly reproduces the specifically Soviet Jewish type of the 1960s when the acute phase of state anti-Semitism had passed leaving deep traces in national memory. Our investigation revealed that assimilation was going on: the typically Jewish features of culture and behavior by which Jews had been identified and discriminated against in the period of active anti-Semitism in Russia were lost or abandoned.

Our investigation shed light on the trends in recovering Jewish identity; the process became possible in the form of evolution from the Soviet man who denied any national identity to a Jew fully aware of his unique Jewish identity.

As could be expected, people associated their gradually emerging identity

either with the formal criteria of kinship or subjective self-consciousness or self-attribution. We have established that many people—encouraged by domestic policy that suppressed anti-Semitism, foreign policy that maintains friendly relations with Israel and Israel itself, by contacts with relatives and friends living there and much more active Jewish life in cities stirred up by revived Jewishness—started looking for Jewish roots and seeking more knowledge about all sorts of Jewish subjects.

The respondents that arrived at the revival of their Jewishness as adults and interpreted this as their duty pointed out that this was not simple yet they drew a program:

*To be Jewish means work that never ends, it is part of the image; self-perfection is an absolute must; self-identification is also important.*

*Yes, we should improve ourselves, upgrade our self-identification, popularize our history, language, culture, traditions, etc. This means that we should work—the community and each of us should pour their efforts into the common cause.*

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### Notes

- 1 This investigation was supervised by Mikhail Chlenov. Contributions of the respondents in our focus-groups are italicized.
- 2 To a great extent my analysis relies on the same theoretical-methodological foundations that are being consistently developed by the experts of the Levada-Center, therefore the main conclusions coincide in many respects. See, for example, the generalized article [2].

- Idem see bibliography of works on the subject by VTsIOM researchers (until 2003) and the Levada-Center including the present author.
- <sup>3</sup> Relationships between Jews and other peoples and nationalities of the Russian Federation are not discussed here due to their specifics.
  - <sup>4</sup> Russians rarely refer to Jews as “people”; the generalizing definitions if used in general are limited to “nation” (the most frequent) as well as “tribe,” “the Seed” and others that tie the defined community with certain natural, inborn principles and qualities. These definitions have no spatial characteristics.
  - <sup>5</sup> What is said here and further about the correlation of themselves as a “people” with its own “land,” was probably typical, to the same extent for all other peoples of Europe, on whose lands Jews were settling compactly or were dispersed. Probably, on other continents the “land” issue was of a different importance for autochthonous populations.
  - <sup>6</sup> In the Russian Empire there were other spatial aspects of discrimination of Jews or Yehudim: a synagogue should be separated from a Christian church in the same street by 100 sazhen. See [3].
  - <sup>7</sup> Synonyms—bias to irony, sense of humor or, vice versa, sadness, etc.
  - <sup>8</sup> Specialists of the Levada-Center, in particular Lev Gudkov, have discussed in detail, the different nature of anti-Semitism aimed at the “traditional Jews” living in small settlements and at highly assimilated members of the Jewish intelligentsia who lived in big cities. See, for example, [2].
  - <sup>9</sup> Some of what is said here is related to the Jews who live in Israel, yet the nature and the highly complicated ties inside its population differ radically from the contacts among the “Jews of dispersion.” It seems that it is methodologically correct to include Israel in this picture as an object of reference for the “Jews of dispersion,” not as one of this category.
  - <sup>10</sup> It should be said that there were people in the Jewish movements for the freedom of immigration to Israel or any other country who insisted that the right to leave/enter should belong to all citizens of the Soviet Union. There were other people, one of them Natan Sharansky, who insisted on a different interpretation: human rights and freedoms in conformity with these demands related to any state of the world.
  - <sup>11</sup> The first outburst of interest of Soviet/Russian Jews in Israel and a feeling of an emotional ties with it happened in 1948; the second, in 1967. The highly impressive victory in the Six-Day War reversed part of the assimilatory trends in Soviet Jewry that had taken the form of highly ironic attitude to Israel and its army.
  - <sup>12</sup> Nobody can say that this will not repeat itself. Ilya Ilf and Evgeniy Petrov [5] in the novel they wrote in 1931 offered a convincing formula “There are Jews but no question” as said by one of the characters. Two decades later the campaign of denouncing “Zionist conspiracy,” etc. began unfolding in the USSR.
  - <sup>13</sup> He also said that “a certain party official in Leningrad could not leave me alone”; once somebody from the audience called him a Yid and he immediately left the stage.

*Translated by Valentina Levina*

## Crisis of the Union State of Russia and Belarus

*Andrey SUZDAL'TSEV*

*Abstract.* The author has analyzed the current crisis of the Union State of Russia and Belarus and identified the main problems and obstacles on the road of further development of this integration project, defined the stages of the crisis and assessed possible scenarios of its settlement. He has pointed at the mistakes made by the sides in the early 21st century when the Union State had been still a project which cropped up in the crises of 2008 and 2014. The author sees the roots of the crisis in the substitution of economic and political integration by their interests, which, even if balanced, could not and did not guarantee further development of the integration project. Russia's extensive aid in money and resources that has been going on for years means that there is no real economic integration: Russia's subsidies have replaced an alliance of two economics. At the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century, Minsk refused to support Moscow's military strategy which in an absence of common foreign policy destroyed the balance of interests, and the very foundations, for that matter, of the Union State. Russia wants to reformat the allied relations to revive economic integration while the Belarusian leader is clinging to the system of subsidies that his country has been using throughout the 20-year-long history of the Union State. The crisis between Russia and Belarus has not yet reached its peak.

*Keywords:* Union State of Russia and Belarus, Russian-Belarusian integration, Aleksandr Lukashenko, balance of national interests, Russian-Belarusian crisis.

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On December 8, 2019, the Union State of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus entered its third decade. The Union Treaty signed twenty years ago created the only post-Soviet object of political integration—the Union State of Russia and Belarus. However, over the past two decades, a full-fledged union entity did not arise. After what looked as the first steps toward unification of social legislation of the Union State made in the early 2000s the development of the Union State has been stalling.

### **Stagnation**

Today, the Union State as a relic of the 1990s has neither a state emblem, nor a flag, nor executive and legislative powers, nor recognized borders, nor a financial and taxation system. The functions of institutes set up in the first years of the 21st century are very limited hence their insignificant impact on integration, its course and development. In 2010, the project lost its economic component that was transferred to the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). After two decades of stagnation, the Union State missed its chance to become a subject of international law; it remains a negotiation platform of sorts on which Russia's financial and resource assistance to Belarusian economy are regularly discussed.

Even though by the end of the second decade of the new century the countries had not arrived at fruitful allied relationships, the project survived. Since 2018, the future of the Union State has been attracting the gradually increasing attention of Russian and international public due to the approaching presidential elections of 2024 in Russia. The political and expert communities of the European Union and the United States have been actively discussing a possibility that the Union State can serve a “platform” of the next presidential term of President Putin.

Formally, the subject of Russian-Belarusian integration was stirred up in 2018 by Moscow's attempt to rectify the Union State, stimulate (“deepen”) economic integration and do away with one-sided dependency. Russia's aid to Belarusian economy was steadily increasing from the early 2000s to top the figure of \$100 billion [27].

According to my calculations, by January 1, 2019, the total volume of subsidies and preferences in the form of Russian energy fuel supplies and other types of Russia's economic assistance to Belarus amounted to \$126 billion. The IMF, in its turn, calculated that between 2005 and 2015, the Republic of Belarus had received about \$106 billion from the Russian budget, that is, practically \$10 billion every year (20% of the republic's GDP or 50% of its budget) [24]. In view of the fact that throughout these years the Russian-Belarusian integration was supported by Russia's money, we can say that the volumes of subsidies are without precedence in the history of international relations.

The Belarusian leaders deny the fact of subsidies from the Russian budget and consider the present status of the Union State the most optimal for their state. On March 1, 2019, speaking at a press conference, Aleksandr Lukashenko said: “You have no idea about our problems. Do not accuse us of sponging. We have never been your boarders and will never be. When our people hear such accusations, I do not want unions of any sort” [15].



### **The Problem of Reorganization of the Union State**

When Vladimir Putin was elected to his presidential term (March 2018-2024), the issue of Russian-Belarusian integration and its stagnation came to the fore. At first, Moscow was convinced that the problems of rectification should and could be settled by talks. In September 2018, on the eve of one of his meetings with Lukashenko, Putin said that they had “to synchronize our watches” on certain issues [22].

The Belarusian leaders who in the last 20 years learned to look at Russia’s subsidies as a routine or even a tradition painfully reacted to the intention of their Russian colleagues to optimize the financial and resource relations within the Union State. Lukashenko preferred to save the status quo including the Union Treaty that in twenty years had lost much of its adequacy. On the eve of his meeting with Putin, the Belarusian president said: “Any revision of the treaty will destroy everything that has been achieved so far” [14]. He said that “the presidents decided that the treaty should not be revised and that they should instead work out a document, materials or a program of further integration of Belarus and Russia within the Union Treaty. We have identified the frames, points, road signs, and flags within which we intend to stay, leaving out everything that cannot be realized today” [14].

In view of the fact that the Belarusian concept relied on access to Russia’s maximally cheap energy fuels and Russia’s market, all attempts by Moscow since 2018 to put an end to the Union State’s dependence principle were interpreted in the Belarusian and, later, European media as Moscow’s infringement on the sovereignty of the Republic of Belarus.

In particular, on December 14, 2018, speaking in Minsk to Russian journalists, Lukashenko accused the Russian leaders of trying to use the prices of fuel supplied from Russia to his country as a leverage to incorporate Belarus in Russia. “Some of them say in so many words: we are not ready to incorporate your six regions in Russia, and that’s that. They could have said the same in simpler terms: here is our oil, now you should destroy your country and join Russia. How will this look in our country and in your country, for that matter? What will the international community say when a country is incorporated in another country by unseemly means?” [16].

Meanwhile, the EU and the U.S. interpreted as a “threat to the sovereignty” of the Republic of Belarus the prospect that Putin, whose presidential term “will end in 2024 ... could bypass these restrictions by creating a new nation through a union with Belarus to appear as the head of the united Russian-Belarusian power—the Union State” [3].

### **Systemic Errors**

In the early 21st century, the Treaty on the Creation of the Union State of Belarus and Russia that formed the foundation of the Union State (1999) was presented to the peoples of both countries and the world public as a logical con-

clusion of both countries' consistent economic and political drawing closer together. Four years earlier (1995-1999), the two neighbors with the common Soviet past were steadily moving by stages (the stages of a single customs zone (1995), Community of the RF and the RB (1996) and the Union of RF and RB (1997) to the Union State that appeared in 1999). This fast movement through consecutive stages of a supra-national alliance can be explained by the need to legitimize the system of support of Belarusian economy with money and resources at the expense of the Russian budget described, for propaganda purposes, as economic integration.

The economic stage of integration came to a halt at the common customs zone. Practically immediately, it became a channel of smuggling from Europe to Russia via Belarus alcohol, cigarettes, chicken leg quarters, expensive electronics and furniture under cover of The Esambaev World Welfare Fund and Torgek-sport set up for the purpose [7]. By 1999, when Russia had to restore customs points at its border with Belarus, economic integration between the two countries was discontinued. From that time on, the fast-developing system of budgetary subsidies replaced economic integration and revealed the fact that the economic systems of the two countries were different and that, therefore, no integration was possible without cardinal structural reforms of Belarusian economy.

It was expected that by the end of the 20th century the political stage of the actively promoted Russian-Belarusian integration project would change the parasitical format and create "from above" with the help of the structures of the Union State a common market and, later, an economic union with common currency. While holding forth about the need of integration, its "architects" ignored the fact that it was incompatible with authoritarian regime. More than that, the Union State stagnated because Moscow and Minsk had different ideas of integration and its goals.

### **The Crisis and Its Cause**

At first integration meant the balance of interests of the two countries that took into account the political and economic situation in the world, in the region and in the states-founders of the Union State at the turn of the century.

In the early 21st century, Russia looked at the allied relations as a chance to preserve military-strategic stability in the western sector, to ensure secure transit of Russian energy fuels to European market and to halt continued disintegration of the post-Soviet space. Moscow that needed the Belarusian statehood as a buffer between Russia and NATO (Poland) was ready to support the republic with money and resources. It was expected that allied relations would lay the foundation of the two countries' coordinated foreign policy.

Belarus initially saw in allied relations with the Russian Federation the way of gaining unlimited access to Russian energy and the financial support market that were supposed to provide economical stability for its authoritarian political regime.

It was expected that the Union State (that, as it turned out, after 20 years had remained at the stage of declarations) would serve a political screen for this high-

ly complicated political and economic balance of interests of the two countries with a common past yet different sizes, economic potentials and economic systems. The balance of interests of the two countries, in fact, did not presuppose integration as a natural and objectively developing process. From the very beginning, its future depended on the political will of the presidents, the main deficiency of the Russian-Belarusian project.

### Contradictions Are Piling Up

The first decade of the 21st century turned out to be highly favorable for Belarusian economy. On the one hand, Belarus relied on the Union Treaty to prosper on Russian money and resources (up to \$10 billion in certain years) and, on the other, to exploit the union balance of interests to practically ignore integration. In fact, under the slogan of integration with Russia, Minsk extracted from its budget a geopolitical rent.

To preserve the balance of interests as the cornerstone of the Union State, the Belarusian leaders were expected to consolidate, as much as they could, their allied status in military-strategic respect and support the RF on the international arena by coordinating its foreign policy with Russia's. It turned out, however, that allied foreign policy failed to materialize while the common positions of the Union State founders on foreign policy issues were limited to concerted voting at the UN GA the decisions of which were just recommended measures.

At first, the relations between the two states were purely political due to the huge gap between their sizes and economic potentials. However, the "integration from above" formula looked realistic.

**It was expected that the balance of interests** as a compromise between the two neighboring countries tied together by deep-rooted historical, cultural, economic, and political relations would create, sometime in future, a political foundation of their full-scale integration. This was explained by the logic of the widening and partly inherited from the Soviet times economic contacts and mutual understanding between the ruling circles expected to gradually lead the two countries to the eventual solution of the strategic task—a political union between the two countries in the format of a Union State resting on the practically united and deeply integrated economy. (It seems that finally the sides would have arrived at a maximally soft confederation). The Union Treaty of 1999 was seen as a roadmap of sorts of the transfer/evolution of the initial balance of interests of the two countries into a real integration project. The successful experience of the European Union and Russia's positive image in Belarus inherited from the Soviet times (when seen from Russia, Belarus looked the closest state) served the project's cornerstone.

It turned out, however, that the roadmap was mission impossible of sorts. Moscow missed an important factor, viz., the provincial "anti-Moscow" sentiments typical of the Belarusian establishment which rejected the market reforms carried out in the early 1990s in the Russian Federation; certain segments of Belarusian society nurtured at the same time deep anti-Russian instincts.

Moscow, likewise, missed the fact that in the wake of 1991 Belarusians began to see Russia as a loser, the country that lost the Cold War and was pushed to the periphery of the contemporary world. As could be expected, independence inspired a fast growth of nationalist sentiments and an emergence of the authoritarian regime of Lukashenko who wanted ideological expansion and cheap resources rather than integration. At first, these trends slowed down the process of rapprochement between the two countries while Belarusian nationalism and authoritarianism blocked integration with Russia.

From the very beginning, anti-Russian and anti-integration trends in the republic's domestic policies not only shed doubts on the future of the Union State as a real integration project; they allowed Minsk to balance between the West and Moscow on the international arena. The Belarusian leaders demonstrated their skills on the domestic political field where the administration of Lukashenko combined declarations praising integration with another anti-Russian propaganda campaign linked to another bout of aggravation of the bilateral relations. In the mid-term perspective, this finally split the Belarusian society by geopolitical preferences. At the same time, this foreign policy course allowed Minsk to move away from real integration with Russia in economy and foreign policy. The Union State lost its foundation created, as had been imagined, by the balance of interests of its founders while everything that the Russian leaders had done to stimulate integration failed completely.

The gap between the national interests of the two countries and the tasks of real integration made crises between their leaders inevitable. Conflicts accompanied by public scandals followed one another practically throughout the entire history of the Union State. On the one hand, they discredited the idea of integration between Russia and Belarus, but on the other, increased Lukashenko's authority in the West where he was seen as a consistent fighter for Belarusian sovereignty.

The conflicts were mostly stirred up by Minsk that continued to insist on the old conditions of energy fuels supplies or demand even more favorable ones, to secure access to the Russian market and bargain for further economic concessions, preferences, grants, and subsidies. Not infrequently Lukashenko deliberately fanned scandals by emotional statements about the Russian leaders, Russia as a state and Russian people.

### **The Socio-Economic Crisis of the Union State**

Economic problems and contradictions that were steadily piling up throughout the history of the Union State proved to be resistant to the efforts of governments or even presidents to settle them. After 2011-2012, when the level of Russia's annual support in money and resources reached the total sum of \$10 billion (later it dropped to \$6-7 billion), it turned out that Russian subsidies had done nothing good to Belarusian economy and the standards of living of its population. In the last decade, its GDP remains within the \$55-60 billion (\$77.8 billion in 2014) [5] while production assets are at the Soviet technological level of the 1980s.

In the second decade of the 21st century, Belarus registered a gradual drop of its exports to Russia despite the unhampered access for Belarusian products to the Russian market. It had a negative impact on the popular assessment of Lukashenko's economic policies and on the prospects of further integration with the Russian Federation.

The negative trade balance between the two countries within the Union State became a tradition and continued to grow. In particular, in 2016 it was comparatively small—\$4.7 billion. In 2017, it increased by 33.9% (to reach the figure of \$6.3 billion). The year 2018 registered a drop of \$3 billion against the previous year to minus \$9.7 billion [6]. Belarus has entered a period of deindustrialization: very much like Ukraine, it is gradually slipping from the status of an industrial-agrarian to an agrarian state.

Its semi-state economy (Andranik Migranyan has written that in 2011 state enterprises were responsible for nearly 70% of GDP [18], the state sector produced up to 87% of products) that for over 20 years functioned on Russian energy fuels it was getting for preferential prices was stagnating. The oligarchs from the “closest circle” of President Lukashenko acquired more weight in the country's economy.

The standards of living dropped against the early 2000s. According to the experts of the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus, the share of those who negatively assessed their material status dropped from 34.2% in 2002 to 19.1% in 2008 only to increase to 30.2% in 2016 [25] probably under the pressure of the effects of the 2011 socio-economic crisis.

The living standards that remained for a long time much lower than in Russia, as well as the widening export of workforce (up to 1 million in 2018) to the Russian Federation [2]), made people feel relatively disenchanted about the prospects of integration. In this context, Belarus came close to what is called “Ukrainian syndrome,” one of the main factors behind the Ukrainian crisis.

The “Ukrainian syndrome” in Belarus has so far defied exact sociological identifications. It is a “sudden transfer” in the minds of common people from many years of expectation of higher living standards due to more active economic ties with Russia and its support to disillusionment in it as the main sponsor of their statehood and the guarantor of the steadily improving living standards. In these conditions, the political classes of East European countries start looking for sponsors (Belarus saw China in this role) instead of analyzing in earnest their own national socio-economic models. They accuse Russian Federation of unwillingness to pour more money and resources into Belarus and intensify anti-Russian propaganda, which stimulates a geopolitical turn to the West. The ruling establishment escaped responsibility for its failed social and economic policy and for privatization of the lion's share of Russia's economic assistance. On the whole, the “Ukrainian syndrome” served the social foundation of the coup d'état on the Maidan in Kiev.

It should be said that the model of mixed economy with an obvious presence of the state [18] that Lukashenko built in Belarus throughout the years of its independence runs from one crisis into another. The country's leaders, however,

look not so much for possible variants of structural reforms but for all sorts of pretexts to increase Russia's support. This destroyed the strategic balance on which, as had been expected, the Union State should have been functioning.

### **The Broken Balance**

At the frequent and regular summits, the Russian leaders that have been supporting Belarus for nearly a quarter of a century invariably suggested that the Union State should be transformed into a real union of two states. On the one hand, the Belarusian part of the balance was gradually growing increasingly burdensome. The Russian political class, the expert community and internal opposition started paying more attention to the steadily growing subsidies to Belarusian economy against the background of stagnating integration. On the other hand, the Russian shoulder, so to speak, of the strategic balance between the two states was steadily shortening while the national interests of the Russian Federation in the Union State were not supported and, therefore, not realized. This affected first of all the military-strategic aims of Russia at the West European sector, the problem of transit and international positions of the founders of the Union State.

After the Georgian-Ossetian war of 2008, Russia launched a wide-scale modernization of its armed forces which, as could be expected, changed the role of Belarus in Russia's defense strategy. The rearmament of the Russian Aerospace Forces and commissioning of the S-400 air defense system removed from the agenda the problem of approach time from Poland across Belarus. Increased attention to the military group in the Kaliningrad Region that protected Belarus and Russia in the west and modernization of the Navy changed the situation in the western sector.

The Minsk contradictory policy in the military sphere and balancing on the international arena undermined confidence in Lukashenko as Commander-in-Chief of the allied army which lowered the prospects of Russia's involvement in the modernization of the Belarusian armed forces. Regular joint military exercises reveal the lowering battle-worthiness of the Belarusian army and degradation of its technical equipment.

Lukashenko's unexpected refusal, contrary to the preliminary agreement of October 2015 to station a base of Russian Aerospace Forces at Bobruisk, marked a "point of no return" in the military-strategic cooperation between the two countries. The level of Moscow's confidence in Minsk dropped even lower; the Russian Federation lost a lot of its previous interest in coordinating its military policy with the Republic of Belarus. This made the Military Doctrine of the Union State of 2017 (endorsed by the Supreme State Council of the Union State on 26.12.01, No. 8) [21] a mere declaration no longer perceived as a serious argument in favor of continued economic aid.

On November 6, 2018, at a meeting with American analysts, President of Belarus gave the following answer to the question about the military-strategic relations with the Russian Federation: "Our army can effectively oppose, if needed, an aggression or conflict on the territory of Belarus. Today, I see no reasons

to invite any state, including Russia, to our territory, to fulfil our functions. This was why we resolutely opposed stationing, let alone setting an air base on our territory. The approach time of any type of aircrafts from the territory of Russia, if this is needed at all, is from 3 to 5 minutes. Any base here is useless; it will attract a possible aggressor; there is no need to move an air base to the frontline” [17].

By the end of the second decade of the 21st century, the problem of Russian transit across East European countries lost some of its former urgency. The attempts of East European countries to complicate land and air transit provoked Russia to respond with partly symmetrical measures: a network of bypassing gas pipelines is nearing completion while the capacities of oil and LNG terminals in Russian ports are steadily increasing.

The Georgian-Ossetian war of August 2008 complicated the foreign policy situation in which Russia badly needed support from its CSTO allies and the Union State. Minsk, however, moved away from Russia when the conflict was still going on; it refused to recognize independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia; later, it joined the European Eastern Partnership program, refused to recognize reunification of Crimea with Russia, sided with Kiev that wanted to exterminate the “fighters” of Donbass [12]. In October 2018, Lukashenko raised the relationships with the Poroshenko Administration to even a higher level. Minsk supplies the Armed Forces of Ukraine (including the units stationed along the demarcation line with the armed units of the Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics) with oil products [8].

The co-founders of the Union State organize regular consultations at the foreign ministries level on foreign policy issues and coordination of their policy in international organizations frequently with inefficient results. In particular, on July 9, 2017, the Belarusian parliamentary delegation at the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly held in Minsk supported the so-called Minsk Declaration in which Russia was branded as an “aggressor” that had “occupied” part of the Ukrainian territory. At the same session, Lukashenko formulated his international initiative (not coordinated with Moscow) to hold in Minsk a European summit Helsinki-2.

Today, the Belarusian political class and expert community are convinced that everything that the leaders of Belarus are doing on the world arena contrary to the interests of Russia, its status ally, indicates that the Republic of Belarus is a sovereign and independent state. Minsk has moved away from Moscow; this undermined integration and trust between the countries’ leaders.

By the end of 2018, Moscow specified its main claims to Minsk. On December 25 in particular, Vice Premier of Russia Anton Siluanov pointed out that Moscow “was no longer prepared to distribute gifts in the form of subsidies without getting anything in return. Russia invariably fulfilled its obligations in the form of camouflaged subsidies and direct credits while Russia’s neighbor and ally prefers one-sided gains. We say: it is impossible to be self-centered and to expect one-sided favors. You are our neighbor, our ally in the Union State, but recently confidence was lost” [26].

As a result, the Russian part (military-strategic, transit and international issues) became considerably devalued; the balance on which the Union State had been set up was tipped which made a crisis of allied relationships inevitable. By 2018, the Russian establishment as well as a considerable part of Russian society, had concluded that the allied relations needed reorganization which meant serious changes in the present parasitical format of the Union State and return to the sources of the integration project—the Treaty on the Union State and economic integration.

### **The “Grey Schemes” in Allied Relationships**

At all times, Belarusian leaders did not hesitate, and do not hesitate today to rely on all sorts of “grey schemes” to extract even more money from their preferential economic relations with Russia. In December 2018, Siluanov formulated several claims to the Belarusian leaders who had organized wide-scale smuggling across the Russian border of European “sanctioned” and Ukrainian foodstuffs. He pointed out that Minsk consistently refused to pay export dues on the oil products refined out of “union” oil and exported to the world markets. The vice premier mentioned the smuggling of “low quality cigarettes” to the Russian Federation, expressed his doubts about the Belarusian customs and invited to tune up exchange of relevant data [26].

The “grey schemes” within the Russian-Belarusian economic cooperation are an indirect indication that Minsk is no longer satisfied with the large-scale system of subsidies set up and functioning under the cover of the Union State for the simple reason that Russian money and resources play the role of primary accumulation of capital in the Republic of Belarus. In the second decade of the 21st century, “grey privatization” there had been completed which allowed the local oligarchs to occupy the main role in the republic’s economy on a par with the state.

Conflicts that regularly sprang up around the Belarusian “grey schemes” were gradually destroying the confidence between the ruling circles on both sides of the border and fanned a crisis in the Russian-Belarusian integration project. Combined with the disagreements on the international arena, the “grey schemes” became Moscow’s most important argument in favor of reformatting the allied relations with Minsk.

### **The Non-Existing Allied Foreign Policy**

If the states-founders of the Union State want to save it, they should radically change the integrational format so that to restore the balance of interests. The Belarusian side looks at military-strategic cooperation and interaction with Russia on the international arena through the prism of its sovereignty and independence, that is why the above task is difficult. For Russia it means that it must pay more and receive the same, that is, no guarantees.

I have already written that the foreign political course of the Republic of Belarus excludes stationing Russian air bases on its territory or recognition of



independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, reintegration of Crimea and support of Russia's military-technical aid to Syria, etc. Foreign Minister of Belarus Vladimir Makey and Lukashenko did a lot to improve, to an extent, the image of their country in the West. On October 18, 2018, Assistant Secretary of State Aaron Wess Mitchell said that "today it is the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of frontier states like Ukraine, Georgia, and even Belarus, that offer the surest bulwark against Russian neo-imperialism" [28], which meant Washington's direct support of Belarus in the crisis with Moscow.

He confirmed that the United States interprets the rejection by Minsk of Russia's attempts to renew and reformat the allied relations as an opposition to Moscow's pressure and a natural element of the architecture of confrontation between the West and Russia after 2014. Lukashenko went even further—he asked Washington for support: "We are convinced that security of the entire continent depends on cohesion of its countries and preservation of the United States' military-political role in European affairs. This is not an exaggeration. Without America, we will not solve any problem here including the Ukrainian conflict" [20]. On October 26, 2018, the President of Belarus offered the President of Ukraine his service of an "honest broker" between Kiev and Moscow. On October 31, he promised Mitchell that "Belarusians will be your most reliable, honorable and sincere partners. If we agree, if Belarusians promise you something, even contrary to their interests, we will keep our word" [10].

While talking about allied relations with the Russian Federation, the Republic of Belarus is pursuing its own foreign policy course unrelated, to the greatest extent, to Russia's priorities. This means that economic integration, that is, "deepening" the processes that connect the economies of both countries is the only remedy for the Union State. This might revive and consolidate the relations between Russia and Belarus and, at a certain stage, remove the problem of Russian subsidies.

### **The Problem of Maintaining the Subsidy System**

Russia's financial and resource support of Belarus as an indicator of stagnating economic integration was and remains the most important factor that, on the one hand, is steadily destroying the Union State and, on the other, stimulates reorganization of relations.

Minsk was greatly concerned with the latest rhetoric and actions of the Russian leaders that speak of Moscow's intention to abandon the subsidies in the near future. In fact, the Belarusian leaders painfully reacted to the problem of Russia's assistance with money and resources. In the past, Minsk was holding forth about its invaluable services to Moscow that should be compensated for with subsidies. Starting with 2018, the Belarusian expert community and the country's leaders deny even the fact of Russian subsidies and preferences: "Contrary to the opinions and conclusions made by certain analysts, Belarus never pleaded with Russia for subsidies or preferences. This is a lie and a wrong interpretation of the agenda. In Sochi [September 21, 2018—A. S.], our delegation was not a beggar" [9].

At the fifth Forum of Russian and Belarusian Regions in October 2018, Speaker of the Upper Chamber of the Parliament of Belarus Mikhail Myasnikovich deemed it necessary to revive the subject of economic dependence: “This interpretation is harmful both for Belarus and Russia and is not objective.” He argued that Belarus “is not building up its external debt” (“Since these operations are open, the uninformed public might imagine that Belarus is increasing its debt burden from year to year”) [19] while “it is refinancing” its debts. He spoke of Russia’s subsidies as credits and pushed aside the fact that the Belarusian side enjoys preferences while importing Russian oil and gas for domestic Russian prices and exporting its products to Russia for market prices. The Belarusian media habitually interpreted these economic subsidies from the Russian budget as Moscow’s permanent and unconditional obligations to Minsk.

On December 19, at his press conference, President Putin used the term “subsidies” when talking about the natural Russian gas supplied by pipelines; he pointed out that they mirrored the specifics of bilateral economic relations: “First, Belarus has the lowest prices among our foreign partners—\$127 per 1,000 [cubic meters], whereas the price for Europe is \$200. The difference in return on sales to Europe and Belarus for Gazprom is four-fold. The weighted average gas price in Russia is \$70 per 1,000 cubic meters, and the gas subsidy depends on the location. Smolensk enjoys the largest gas price subsidies. Smolensk consumes around 2 billion cubic meters of gas, whereas we sell to Belarus 20 billion. If we fully subsidize the Belarusian economy that means that Russia subsidizes gas for the whole country” [23].

The Republic of Belarus when getting a regular annual credit to service the earlier credits from the Finance Ministry of the RF (in September 2018, Russia had agreed on a credit of \$600 million to be issued in 2019 that was never issued) habitually does not repay the earlier credits—it is accumulating them. It can be assumed that the Belarusian leadership expects that in the future Moscow will annul the debts of Belarus as “the only ally.”

### **“The Point of No Return”**

In 2018-2019, the crisis of the Union State was unfolding amid the unusually warm relations between Moscow and Minsk interrupted from time to time by emotional outbursts of the president of Belarus or by another scandal. Mikhail Babich, Ambassador of Russia to the Republic of Belarus and Special Representative of the Russian President in the RB, was recalled after speaking out about the main problems in the relationships within the Union State. This said a lot about the true positions of Minsk on the issue of putting an end to the dependent format of the Union State and echoed at the next Russian-Belarusian summit.

The St. Petersburg meeting of two presidents on July 18, 2019 summed up their year-long discussion on how to get the Union State out of stagnation. By July 18, the working group set up in December 2018 and headed by Maksim Oreshkin, RF Minister for Economic Development, and the Belarusian group presented a partially agreed Program of the Realization of the Union State Treaty of 1999 (further, the Program).

A week before the St. Petersburg summit, President Lukashenko deemed it necessary to say that it was Russia “that slows down integration” and that “today there is nothing to discuss” [11]. On July 18, 2019, he refused to sign any documents and argued that all complicated problems between Russia and Belarus should be first settled: “I would like to say the following. I think that Vladimir Vladimirovich will agree. In December, our Union Treaty [December 8—A. S.] will be 20 years old. I believe we cannot leave any unsolved issue behind by that time. What achievements are we going to talk about as we will celebrate the 20th anniversary? There will be nothing for us to say if we fail to settle all the issues and do not sign the program shaping the strategy of our joint actions. Therefore, I suggest that we decide all the issues by that date and approve a program that will determine the strategy of our actions and remove current problems within the framework of the High State Council or any way we agree” [13].

In this way, Minsk outlined the limits of a dialogue: it was prepared to sit at the negotiating table to discuss the Program if Russia resolved before December 8 certain “current problems.” From the summer of 2018, Lukashenko has been trying to impose on the Russian leaders so-called obligations including “compensation” (about \$10-11 billion) for the tax maneuver in oil extraction in Russia and the breakdown at the Druzhba transit oil pipeline (August-May 2019). He also expected a credit of \$600 million and \$200 million of the last tranche of an earlier credit paid to the Belarusian Finance Ministry. Minsk demanded that the price on Russian natural gas should be lowered from \$127 per 1 thousand cubic meters (2019) to \$70 per 1 thousand cubic meters (as is paid by the Smolensk Region), and that the sanitary control for meat and milk products that Belarus sells to Russia should be abandoned (the Russian Sanitary Control Service identified part of these products as produced in the EU and Ukraine and, therefore, banned in the Russian Federation).

The total cost of the “current problems” is tens of billions dollars to be paid from the Russian budget.

In 2019, Belarus agreed to sign the Program on the following conditions: Russia should extend all compensations and subsidies and agree on new preferential gas prices according to its political timetable. In 2020, Lukashenko plans to become president for the sixth time, the country is expected to adopt a new variant of the Constitution of the Republic of Belarus.

To pass these highly important political tests with flying colors, Lukashenko needs exhaustive financial and resource support from Russia symbolized by the commissioned first block of the Belarusian nuclear power plant built by the JSC AtomStroyExport (subsidiary of Rosatom State Corporation) on the Russian credit of \$10 billion. In anticipation, Minsk demanded that the credit agreement on construction of the atomic power plant should be revised in its favor [1].

By the end 2019—early 2020, tension between the founder-states had become unbearable because, first, reorganization of the relations between the allies was not started; there were doubts that the Program of “deepening” the Russian-Belarusian integration would be realized even if signed.

Second, the economic problems in the RB during the election period require that its leaders should find and present to the public within the maximally short

time resources (of which Russia is the only source) needed to legitimize Lukashenko's sixth presidential term. The election timetable will force Minsk to intensify its talks with Moscow that includes stronger information pressure on the Russian leadership.

Third, when commissioned, the republic's and the region's biggest nuclear object—the Belarusian nuclear power plant (2019-2020)—will radically change the political situation not only between Russia and Belarus but also their relations with the neighboring Baltic states and Poland. Since Belarus is determined to continue its balancing trick between the EU and Russia, the nuclear power plant might become a small change in the dialogue between Moscow and Brussels or between Minsk and Warsaw, Minsk and Vilnius.

Fourth, we should bear in mind that the EU and the United States have increased their attention to the relations between Russia and Belarus. In November 2018, Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, published a report entitled *Civil Society Under Russia's Threat: Building Resilience in Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova* [4] which identified the status of Belarus, as well as that of Ukraine and Moldova, as the most vulnerable to Russia's pressure (supported by a direct analogy with the reunification of Crimea with Russia). The commissioned Belarusian nuclear power plant is negatively assessed as another factor of stronger dependence on Russia.

These factors might stir up negative responses, which might freeze the Russian-Belarusian integration project.

This means that the Union State approached its 20th anniversary with highly unsatisfactory results that, however, could be improved if its leaders had enough political will to do this. On the other hand, this fact might exacerbate the relations between the two states which might draw the most interested external players—the U.S., Poland, Lithuania, and Ukraine—into the crisis.

In view of the very low level of ability of the Belarusian leaders to reach any agreement, Russia will have to address, at a certain stage, the public of both countries. European experience has demonstrated that to become successful, integration should suit the interests of millions of citizens.

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*Translated by Valentina Levina*

## The Stalin Prizes of Architect Ivan Zholtovsky (1940-1953)

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*Abstract.* This article presents the first study of the Stalin Prize for Architecture. It focuses on a specific episode: the 1950 award of this prize to one of the best known architects of his time, Ivan Zholtovsky (1867-1959). The author draws on archive materials to show the ambivalent attitude to Zholtovsky on the part of his colleagues—architects and members of the Committee on Stalin Prizes for Literature and Arts. The documents cited make it possible to trace the metamorphoses of the assessments of Zholtovsky's works in 1940-1953, the period when Stalin Prizes, the highest government honor, were awarded, and to understand whether Zholtovsky's Stalin Prize was an unbiased assessment of the master's creative merit or an instance of political struggle.

*Keywords:* Ivan Zholtovsky, Stalin Prize, architecture, struggle against cosmopolitanism.

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On March 8, 1950, a list was published of the winners of the Stalin Prize “for outstanding work in the field of arts and literature for 1949.” Among the winners was Ivan Zholtovsky (1867-1959) [20], a prominent architect. At first glance, his biography and creative legacy are well known. Early publications about him appeared during his lifetime [2; 4; 41; 37]. Thus, 1955 saw the publication of what is to this day the definitive work devoted to Zholtovsky [42]. In recent years, interest in the architect's life, notably in connection with his 150th birthday anniversary, has been growing, as witnessed by the appearance of dissertations and biographical articles about him [10; 12; 14; 7; 18; 29; 30; 16; 19; 28].

However, the paradox is that in most instances (even if the texts are critical), they contain a general description of his life, while many important details and issues are left out. Biographers invariably note the award of the highest government prize, but its circumstances have still not been revealed. Art scholar Anas-

tasia Firsova merely mentions the award [10, p. 74]. Architecture historian Selim Khan-Magomedov, who touched on the episode, wrote about its importance: “For the first time in the 20th century, the Stalin Prize was awarded for a work of architecture without any official or careerist considerations” [12, p. 217]. His colleague Dmitry Khmelnskiy, on the contrary, described the award of the prize to Zholtovsky as a political act [13, pp. 270-271]. However, his account of the award was scarcely more detailed. He just mentioned that Zholtovsky’s colleagues, builders of the Moscow metro, were also among the winners.

The authors of these works drew mainly on sources in the public domain (contemporary periodicals, etc.). Khan-Magomedov openly told the reader that he would “repeatedly quote Oshchepkov’s album as an important source of data” [12, p. 27]. Archive documents were invoked much less frequently and they were confined to the Zholtovsky stock of the Russian State Archive of Literature and Arts (RSALA) and the stock at the Shchusev State Museum of Architecture.

Although the history of the awarding of Stalin Prizes has often been the topic of historical and art history publications, awards in the field of architecture were never specifically studied (unlike the awards for literature, fine arts or cinema [40; 11; 3; 35; 36]). In general, works about the prizes were just overviews [32; 1]. Part of the reason is that “a large part of the stocks of the Stalin Prize Committee (personal files and other personal documents) are classified” [39, p. 315].

This is the first investigation into the Stalin Prize for architecture. With access to the primary sources that were out of reach of architecture historians and Zholtovsky’s biographers, I will try to sort out whether this high award was an unbiased assessment of his creative achievements or an act of political struggle.

The Stalin Prize was instituted under the resolution of the Council of People’s Commissars in December 1939 to mark Joseph Stalin’s 60th birthday. Each year representatives of science and art were awarded 16 prizes in recognition of their major scientific, cultural, engineering- and organizational-technical contribution. The prize was awarded by the government, while the candidates were nominated by the government’s Committee for Stalin Prizes in the Field of Science, Military Knowledge and Invention and the government’s Committee for Stalin prizes in the Field of Literature and Arts specially set up for the purpose. They were to accept the works nominated for the Prize by October 15 and submit their proposals to the Council of People’s Commissars not later than December 1.

The Prize was awarded not for the recipient’s entire work record but for specific achievements. Only new works completed in the year of the award were accepted. Because the Prize was seen as a material incentive, the recipients were mainly young or middle-aged. The number and monetary value of prizes were changed more than once. They were financed out of Stalin’s royalties for the publication of his works in and outside the country. Three First Class prizes (100,000 rubles each) and five Second Class prizes (50,000 rubles each) were given each award season. Rulings of the Council of People’s Commissars (later, the Council of Ministers) on the award of Prizes in 1941-1952 were published in the press. In March 1953, following the Leader’s death, the official source of financing for



the Prize fund was abolished and no prizes were awarded after 1954 (for more details see, for example, [32]).

In 1950, the Architecture nomination for the First-Class Prize was awarded to the husband-and-wife duo Grigory Zakharov and Zinaida Chernysheva for architectural décor of Moscow Metro's Kurskaya Koltsevaya station. The Second-Class Prize was shared by Leonid Polyakov for the design of Kaluzhskaya (now Oktyabrskaya Koltsevaya station) and Ivan Zholtovsky "for the architecture of residential building at 11 Kaluzhskaya Street" in Moscow. The Third-Class Prize went to Aleksey Miminoshvili for residential building at 3 Marti Street in Tbilisi, Victor Andreyev for administrative building at 11 Gorky Street in Moscow, the team led by Zinovy Rosenfeld and Arnold Suris for residential building at 4/10 Sadovo-Triumfalnaya Street in Moscow and Evgeny Rybitsky for residential building at 46-48 Chkalov Street in Moscow [20, p. 2] (the latter, incidentally, was stripped of his laureate title in 1955 [21, p. 1]).

According to archive materials, the awarding of the prize to Zholtovsky was preceded by a dramatic episode in which new candidatures cropped up and were rejected, members of the Stalin Prize Committee made sharp statements, and a peculiar mechanism was revealed of selecting and promoting nominees for the top government award. I have used the documents from the funds of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR at the State Archive of the Russian Federation (SA RF, stock Д-5446), the Committee for Stalin Prizes in the Field of Literature and Arts and its visual arts and architecture section at the RSALA (stock 2073). The latter contains transcripts and minutes of the plenary sessions of the Committee and meetings of its sections, records of voting results, lists and personal files of the candidates, letters from the nominating organizations, abstracts and reviews of the nominated works of art and literature. Practically all the documents requested from the archive storage rooms had empty order sheets. This means that none of my colleagues have looked at them.

At the SA RF, I studied the case of "The award of Stalin Prizes for outstanding works in the field of literature and arts for 1949" [34], which contains information on how Zholtovsky's candidature appeared on the list. It begins with the minutes of the final plenary session of the relevant Committee of January 18, 1950. The placings in the Architecture nomination were as follows: First Class to the Zakharov-Chernysheva tandem and the team led by Yakov Belopolsky "for the architecture of the monuments to the Soviet Army soldiers who died in the battles against fascism in Berlin"; and Second Class to L. Polyakov. The Committee chairman, author Aleksandr Fadeyev, wrote to Stalin that "those who failed to gain the majority of votes or were not, for one reason or other, on the list voted on but came to the attention of the Committee during the discussion" formed an Additional List. It included the above-mentioned Andreyev and Miminoshvili [34, pp. 122, 128, 80]. Zholtovsky's name is not on any of the lists.

On February 11 of that same year, the Council of Ministers of the USSR issued Ruling No. 564 instituting the Stalin Prize Third Class (25,000 rubles); pursuant to this ruling, six section and two plenary sessions of the Committee's special session were held [33, p. 74]. In the nomination that concerns us here, the

placings were as follows: Miminoshvili (28 votes), Andreyev (27 votes), Rosenfeld and Suris (24 votes), Rybitsky (17 votes), and Zholtovsky at the bottom of the top five (17 votes). The minutes of the session were sent to Stalin and, on February 18, to Lazar Kaganovich. In the latter's copy there was a cross in black ink next to Zholtovsky's name. On February 22, the joint list of the candidates of all the Classes left the offices of Stalin and Kaganovich; in it there was also a mark next to Zholtovsky's name but not next to any other names [34, pp. 65, 76, 72, 57, 49].

It was still unclear what events took place between February 22 and March 7 (the date when the Committee's final decision was signed and published) that led to the award of the Prize Second Class to Zholtovsky. The documents give no answer to this question. To fill that gap, I turned to the materials of the Committee's stock in the field of literature and arts, which enabled me to reconstruct the chronology of the events starting from the fall of 1949.

The story behind the architect's promotion to the top of the list emerges from the minutes of the general meeting of the creative staff of the Academician Zholtovsky's Architectural Workshop-School of Architecture of November 30, 1949 (chairman Boris Lazarev, Secretary Pyotr Skokan, attended by 30 members). The secretary of the workshop's party cell Georgy Sevan told those present that "the Board of the Moscow Branch of the Soviet Architects' Union [MOSSA—*O. S.*], yielding to the pressure of the All-Union Board of the Soviet Architects' Union on November 29, repealed its earlier decision on nominating for the Stalin Prize the residential building of the Administrative Directorate of the Council of Ministers of the USSR at 11 Kaluzhskaya Street in Moscow designed by Academician of Architecture I. V. Zholtovsky." This announcement, if one is to believe the minutes, was met with a stormy reaction of those present. Among the speakers were chairman of the MOSSA section Vsevolod Voskresensky, deputy chief of the Workshop-School Grigory Tarasevich, Nikolay Sukoyan, Georgy Lebedev, Vladimir Kuybishev, and Georgy Minervin. As a result, the meeting voted unanimously to nominate the candidature of its chief for the Stalin Prize. On December 1, a letter to that effect was sent to the Stalin Prize Committee. It was signed by Tarasevich, Sevan, Voskresensky, and the local trade union chairman P. Batrakov [25, file 34, pp. 18, 17]. Zholtovsky was also backed by the Committee members: President of the USSR Academy of Arts Aleksandr Gerasimov, Academicians Igor Grabar and Vera Mukhina, arts scholar Vladimir Kemenov and sculptor Yuozas Mikenas [23, file 39, p. 62].

On December 28, 1949, a plenary session of the Prizes Committee discussed the candidatures for architecture prizes. Head of the visual arts and architecture section Grabar told those present that between December 2 and 28, his section "held 8 meetings, and went to see the works put up for nomination on the spot. The section discussed the works. Recommendations were worked out" [23, file 35, pp. 179-193, 186]. The works were sent for expert examination to the USSR Academy of Arts and for the opinion of the state bodies for control of architecture: The Ministry of Urban Construction, The Council of Ministers Directorate for Architectural Affairs and, for facilities located in Moscow, to the Architec-

tural Affairs Directorate of the Moscow City Executive Committee. The Section took into account their opinions and the results of expert examination in making its recommendations.

Zholtovsky's project was among those recommended for Prize Second-Class. The inclusion of this nominee elicited this notable comment from Fadeyev, who headed the Committee: he said that Zholtovsky "had not been put forward at all, but there is strong support for him." Grabar took the floor to say that "there is no unanimous opinion on the Zholtovsky Building we saw on Kaluzhskaya Street," and that "the majority of the Section members are against [the nomination]" [23, file 35, pp. 187, 189]. The minutes have a transcript of the following exchange:

Fadeyev: We should cut the list of candidates for the Second Prize. There are too many of them... Is anyone for nominating Zholtovsky's house? ... Does anyone insist on Zholtovsky's house?

Voices from the floor: No, we don't.

Fadeyev: Does anyone support any candidatures rejected by the Section?

Khrennikov: Zholtovsky's house leaves a pleasant impression.

Fadeyev: No, it does not make an impression.

Goldenweiser A.V.: A very good impression inside but on the outside it is a barracks [23, file 35, pp. 189, 191-192].

Zholtovsky's name was not mentioned at either the January 11, 16, or 19, 1950 meetings of which the minutes reached the archives. On February 15, the Committee plenum discussed the candidatures for the Third Prize in connection with the government decision to institute such a prize. Much of the time was devoted to an exchange of opinions on the architect's candidature [23, file 36, pp. 49-74, 104-110, 164-168, 196-206]. The majority of those present still had a negative attitude to the candidature despite the fact that Fadeyev made it clear to those present that the country's top leadership had a particularity for this nominee. "Before we discuss the architecture candidatures, I would like to inform you that there is an interest in the government in the issues of housing construction. I was summoned and asked about the Zholtovsky residential building and about its merits and shortcomings. We have been asked to think about this issue and perhaps give some tips so that these matters could be encouraged. We are not suggesting that it should be encouraged even if it is bad, just because it is a residential building, but see if *you can find some achievements that need to be encouraged* [my emphasis—O. S.] because we are interested in the development of this construction." And further: "We have to revisit the issue of the Zholtovsky house. We did not like the appearance (looks like a barracks, no balconies, doesn't fit into this thoroughfare). What does it look like inside? People said that the long hallways are not aired, that the kitchen is unhappily positioned and so forth. Still, perhaps we can think again? When I was summoned I was told... it sometimes happens that when a person was criticized in the past, it may haunt him. We should set it aside. We should get real: is it a good or bad house to live in?" [23, file 36, pp. 196, 198-199].

It is clear from the minutes that composers Tikhon Khrennikov and Aleksandr Goldenweiser took the most favorable stand on Zholtovsky's candidature.

Grabar and Kemenov were ambivalent, hinting, after Fadeyev, that the architect had “support.” But his colleagues were adamant. Arkady Mordvinov said: “The building provoked a big discussion among architects. The building’s plan met with harsh criticism... Concerning the façade, it was said that the image of a residential house has not been found, some said it was a beautiful barracks. Other comrades considered the house in terms of details: excellent cornices. Some positive features were noted; they said in terms of artistry, it should be put up for the Prize, while others said the image of a residential house has not been captured. It is still a debatable work.” The chief architect of Moscow, Aleksandr Vlasov, was equally categorical: “In terms of artistry, the house has nothing in common with Russian art as far as the façade is concerned. This house tries to look like an Italian *palazzo*, but it does not have a single balcony on the main façade. This strips the building of the elements that are so natural for a residential building, for the sake of an abstract, purely aesthetic task. That is why this building is not characteristic of Moscow. The creator misconceives the image of a residential house” [23, file 36, pp. 199, 202].

The writer Sergey Mikhalkov also spoke out against Zholtovsky: “I like Rosenfeld’s building very much and I don’t like Zholtovsky’s building at all. I looked at it from the outside and from the inside. From the outside, it is a large barracks and from the inside, it is a very tasteless arrangement of the rooms. I think it has nothing in common with comfortable flats in which people live and must live in comfort, and the solution offered by Zholtovsky with all these strange roosters and hens in the rooms. It feels like the museum of toys in Leontiyevsky Lane” [23, file 36, p. 203]. We see a recurring comparison of Zholtovsky’s house with a barracks, stressing that the look lacks color.

During the course of the discussion, it was decided—not without some pressure from Fadeyev—to nominate five candidates for four prizes: “Andreyev—an administrative building, Miminoshvili—residential house in Tbilisi, Rosenfeld and Suris—residential house on Sadovo-Triumfalnaya Street, Rybitsky—residential house on Chkalov Street and Zholtovsky—residential house on B. Kaluzhskaya Street” [23, file 36, p. 206]. The minutes of the final meeting on February 16 show that Rybitsky and Zholtovsky each won 17 votes, placing fourth and fifth respectively [23, file 38, pp. 29, 36, 37].

In addition to the closed sessions of the Committee, Zholtovsky’s work was discussed in the trade press, where assessment of the house on Bolshaya Kaluzhskaya drifted from sharply negative to moderately positive and finally glowing. In February 1949, it was discussed, along with other residential buildings, at the Central Architect’s House. The journal *Arkhitektura i stroit’stvo* (Architecture and Construction) declared that “the work is in irreconcilable contradiction to the practice of the majority of Soviet architects who stand on the positions of Socialist Realism... Zholtovsky has compromised the truthful image of a residential house” [8]. The newspaper *Sovetskoye iskusstvo* (Soviet Art) wrote: “Residents’ comfort has been sacrificed for the sake of a beautiful cornice ... Zholtovsky compromised the truthful image of a residential house” [31].

Such behavior of fellow architects can be explained if one turns to the ideological and political context of the late 1940s. Since it has been described in

detail in the book by D. Khmel'nitsky [13, pp. 263-274], I will confine myself to a general remark: Zholtovsky was caught between the millstones of the notorious "struggle against cosmopolitanism," the scorching publications being part of the campaign to discredit him [9]. Khmel'nitsky draws attention to the biased and partisan character of the assessments, which were disguised as professional critique but in reality expressed the Leader's will. The minutes of the Stalin Prize Committee, while confirming the overall thesis about the token role of that body in the making of decisions on awards, reveal the phases of the change from "minus" to "plus." Characteristically, even after the Prize had been awarded and the assessment of the house on Bolshaya Kaluzhskaya had been reversed, Ya. Kornfeld couched his essay about Zholtovsky in a way that stressed his controversial overall record while praising the specific work ([15]; see also [6; 5; 17; 27; 38]).

But was the nomination that was crowned with the award the only one in Zholtovsky's biography? I found the answer to this question in the materials of the Stalin Prize Committee fund at the RSALA. It turns out that he was nominated more than once—in 1940, 1943-1945 (award of prizes was suspended in 1943-1945 and the winners for these years were not announced until 1946), 1947 and 1953. Unfortunately, it is unclear from the materials who nominated Zholtovsky for the Prize in 1940. I found only a letter of recommendation dated January 15, 1941, signed by the director of the Moscow Architecture Institute, Mikhail Ostapenko, in support of an earlier nominated candidate. Attached to the document were a copy of Lunacharsky's famous note to Lenin recommending Zholtovsky (1918), the architect's autobiography and a personal file from the personnel department [25, file 2, pp. 94-96, 97-100].

Apparently, the nomination for the 1940 prize was based on the totality of earlier works. At any rate, we find a similar formula in the documents filed in the 1943 competition. On January 31, 1944, the Presidium of the Soviet Architects' Union at a meeting chaired by Karo Alabyan discussed the candidates in the Architecture competition. The meeting was attended by Academicians Aleksey Shchusev, Boris Iofan, Lev Rudnev, Sergey Chernyshev, and Corresponding Members David Arkin and Viacheslav Shkvarikov. It was decided to nominate Zholtovsky and Viktor Vesnin "for outstanding services and many years of fruitful activity in the field of architecture." The relevant documents were sent to the Committee on January 31 and February 2, 1944. On February 28, 1945 the Board of the Soviet Architects' Union confirmed its recent choice, and the documents dated March 25, 1946, added Shchusev's candidature to the two earlier approved candidates [25, file 14, pp. 119, 121-122, 121, 120]. However, the Committee did not discuss Zholtovsky's candidature either in 1940, or in 1945, or in 1946.

In 1947, on the occasion of Zholtovsky's 80th birthday, he was again nominated for the Prize in accordance with the "jubilee" formula "for many years of outstanding activity." The nominators, as before, were the Architects' Union in the person of Alabyan and the Council of the Moscow Architecture Institute in the persons of Ivan Rylsky and Viktor Kokorin [25, file 23, pp. 138-142]. This

time around, refusal to consider Zholtovsky's candidacy was motivated and formalized: "The candidature was not considered because the prize for many years of activity does not exist" [23, file 29, p. 60]. The lesson was apparently learned and the 1949 prize nomination indicated a concrete house, the residential building of the USSR Council of Ministers' Administrative Directorate at 11, Bolshaya Kaluzhskaya Street.

It is worth noting that the successful nomination encouraged his well-wishers to make another try. The next nomination took place in January 1954. This time it was for the residential building of the Administrative Directorate of the USSR Interior Ministry on Smolenskaya Square (then Chkalovsky Street), which was described as "an architectural work marked by a high level of craftsmanship, manifested in the composition of the building as a whole and especially the tower part, in the elaboration of architectural art details as well as in the inner layout of dwelling and service spaces" [26, file 12, p. 144]. The initiators were the Architects' Union and its Moscow Branch.

Unlike the house on Bolshaya Kaluzhskaya, the circumstances of the building of the house on Smolenskaya Square were confusing. What is known is that on October 31, 1944, at the suggestion of the Chief of the Main Directorate of Military-Industrial Construction under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR Andrey Prokofiev, the Chief of the Central Directorate of Military Design (Voyenproekt) Movshovich, sent a proposal to Zholtovsky to rework an earlier design of the building at 13, Smolenskaya Square to house the staff of Glavvoenstroy [23, file 165, p. 32]. Thus, initially the building was to be administrative, not residential. Acceptance of the building by the government commission was to be piecemeal, and the construction and finishing work was completed in the summer of 1953 [26, file 12, p. 146]. The documents I have examined have no indication as to when the building changed hands and its function was changed.

However, it was not these metamorphoses that triggered the discussion that flared up at the Visual Arts and Architecture Section of the Prizes Committee. The attendees were practically the same, with the exception of Fadeyev, who was absent, and the Secretary of the Board of the Architects' Union G. Zakharov, who joined the proceedings. Member of the Section, Vlasov, addressing the meeting on March 23, 1954 said: "The house on Kaluzhskaya and the house on Smolenskaya were started simultaneously, they have the same layout, the same sections and the same architecture with the exception of some details. In one house, Ivan Vladislavovich, because of the great length of the building, chose another cornice, otherwise the houses are the same. It would be embarrassing if we put it to the vote and it is voted down." After hearing these remarks those present started to discuss whether Zholtovsky could be awarded the prize, as an exception, not for a concrete project but for the totality of his works. Mordvinov objected, reminding them of the failed past attempts to award the Stalin Prize on the same grounds [24, file 31, p. 141].

On March 29, 1954, because the architect's name was not on the list of candidates for the Prize, the Moscow Branch of the Architects' Union, represented

by deputy chairman of its Board, N. Kurochkin, again asked the Committee to put Zholtovsky on the list of candidates as designer of the house on Smolenskaya Square and “on the basis of the entire record of his creative, scientific and pedagogical activities” [26, file 12, p. 145]. The next session of the Visual Arts and Architecture Section on April 2 decided, after all, to nominate the candidate. Kemenov provided the background for it: “We may ask the Government, considering his age, as an exception, to give the prize without waiting for the end of construction. Such a precedent exists; the authors of high-rise buildings were awarded prizes for the designs. This is the only correct way. I think this palace [Trade Union House] is very interesting, and also the hippodrome which is very impressive. Or we can put forward one or two prefab buildings which would be easy to defend” [24, file 31, pp. 285-286; 26, file 12, pp. 137-138].

The final documents read in part: “Because the architectural solution of the residential building on Smolenskaya Square is merely a variant of the solution of the house on Bolshaya Kaluzhskaya for which Zholtovsky has already been awarded the Prize Second Class, the Committee deems it possible to nominate it for the Prize. Noting the great services of Zholtovsky to Soviet architecture, the Committee has decided to award him the Prize, as an exception, for the architectural projects: Trade Union building on Krymskaya Embankment, the structures of the Moscow Hippodrome currently under construction, projects of prefabricated panel residential house and the design of the Gorny sanatorium in Yalta” [24, file 35, p. 101; 26, file 12, p. 134]. The Visual Arts and Architecture Section recommended putting these three works in the ballot for Prize Second Class. Zholtovsky’s candidature won 51 votes out of 54, of which 38 votes were cast for the First Prize, 11 for the Second and 2 for the Third Prize [24, file 35, p. 111; file 35, p. 112; file 39, p. 101; 26, file 12, p. 134]. Thus, the architect was submitted as a candidate for Stalin Prize First Class on the strength of a new formula [24, file 34, pp. 34, 65].

Thus, officially, Zholtovsky was awarded a Stalin Prize First Class in 1954. The text of the ruling was written [24, file 34, pp. 53-80; 32, pp. 633-650, 641], but it remained unfinished, like the ruling on prizes for 1952-1953 (prizes for these years were combined).

Having studied the archival documents, I have come to the following conclusions. Zholtovsky was repeatedly nominated for the Prize, which looks quite natural considering his special status in the architectural hierarchy: by the time of his first nomination (1940), he was established as the chief theoretician and practitioner of architecture. What made the situation unusual was the age of the nominee (he turned 83 in 1950), as well as the fact that he was nominated on the strength of his record accumulated since the early 1930s. It was only in 1949 that he was nominated according to the rules, i.e., for a concrete creative achievement. (Incidentally, A. Shchusev, Zholtovsky’s colleague and almost a coeval (1873-1949), was awarded four Stalin Prizes (1941, 1946, 1948, 1952), see [33]).

In Khmelnitsky’s opinion, awarding the prize to Zholtovsky shortly after a brief period of baiting was Stalin’s way of mocking his minions who were

ready to berate or praise anyone on his directions. The documents on the 1949 prize do not contradict this assessment. The “debates,” which were full of innuendo, add shades to the colorful canvas. The political nature of the verdict is clear from the remarks of Fadeyev and other Committee members. Repeated attempts to honor the grand old man of architecture by awarding him the Stalin Prize on the strength of his total record indicate that Zholtovsky had little chance of getting the prize without support in the top echelons of power. A probable reflection of such support was the correctly formulated application for the 1949 Prize and the lifting of persecution. However, it has proved impossible to identify the concrete individuals and the mechanism that supported the architect’s candidature. It cannot be ruled out that behind-the-scene agreements were not reflected in any documents or materials. One thing is clear: the unexpected lenience toward Zholtovsky fit into the scenario of another episode of intra-party struggle.

Another telltale event occurred after the Prize was awarded: a USSR Council of Ministers ruling, signed by Stalin on September 5, 1951, included Zholtovsky’s Workshop-School in the Architectural Planning Directorate of Moscow as a Study and Design Organization First Category financed out of the government budget. It was charged with “designing buildings and structures in Moscow as well as creative and production education, in the design and construction process, of highly skilled masters of architecture” [22, p. 13]. As a consequence, when nominating Zholtovsky for the 1953 Prize, the Committee members (including his peers) were more favorably disposed toward his candidature.

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*Translated by Yevgeny Filippov*

## Leo Tolstoy and Non-Resistance to Evil by Violence: The History and Critique of the “Innocent Victim” Argument

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*Abstract.* In this article I defend the non-violence position, assert the immutability of the absolute ban on violence and demonstrate that Leo Tolstoy’s criticism of the “innocent victim” argument is valid and relevant. The article describes the first appearance of the “innocent victim” argument in Tolstoy’s novel *Anna Karenina*, critically analyses the subsequent modifications of this argument by Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Vladimir Solovyov, Ivan Ilyin and Anatoly Lunacharsky and sums up Tolstoy’s objections to the argument. In addition to describing the historical context of the discussion about non-violence, the article offers a critical analysis of the structure of the argument. The “innocent victim” argument has a number of flaws that concern both its idea, internal structure, and practical orientation. As a result of these defects this argument should be regarded as immoral. The structure of the “innocent victim” argument aimed at refuting the idea of non-resistance to evil by violence, is not unique and occurs in other ethical discussions that took place in Tolstoy’s lifetime and after his death. The popularity and constant recurrence of attempts to justify violence makes the task aimed at researching history and criticizing the “innocent victim” argument important and relevant.

*Keywords:* Leo Tolstoy, non-violence, non-resistance to evil by violence, morality, ethics, the “innocent victim” argument.

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## Introduction

Ethical discussions of non-violence at scientific conferences as well as arguments about non-resistance in daily life frequently lead to the discussion of one and the same imaginary “case.” At a certain stage in the conversation, those who object to the thesis that the moral ban on violence is absolute often challenge the adherent of non-violence to conduct a mental experiment in which the champion of an absolute ban sees a “villain” threatening violence toward an “innocent victim.” It is assumed that the “villain” can only be stopped by killing him. Ending the description of the experiment, the party that maintains that there is no absolute ban on violence asks triumphantly whether the champion of the ban would passively observe or implore the “villain” who is in the process of maiming and killing “the innocent victim.”

Thus, the classical version of the argument describes a situation in which the “villain” or “group of villains” (for example, “robbers” or “drunks”) threatens to commit terrible violence against an “innocent victim” (for example, “a helpless virgin” or “a child”). Before presenting the argument, the question is asked: what would he/she do if the only way to prevent the terrible act of violence were to kill “the villain”? Following some other Russian scholars, let us call it the “innocent victim” argument (see, for example, [3; 8]). The underlying scheme of the “innocent victim” argument is not unique, it is used in other arguments aimed at dismantling other absolute bans, for example, a ban on lying and torture. A similar scheme is examined by Immanuel Kant in his famous essay *On a Supposed Right to Lie Because of Philanthropic Concerns*, and much later under the “ticking bomb” scenario. Variations consisted in a change of the initial conditions of the imaginary situation, that is, the type of action indicated by the presenter of the argument as being “necessary” to stop the villain’s evil designs. The aim of the variations was to prove that the moral ban on lying and torture is not absolute.

The popularity and constant recurrence of attempts to justify violence and lying, usually accompanied by attempts to elevate them to the position of ordinary practice, makes the task of investigating the history of and, most importantly, refuting the “innocent victim” argument and criticizing the underlying scheme particularly relevant and important.

### Dostoyevsky, Solovyov, Ilyin, and Lunacharsky vs. Leo Tolstoy

The remarks of Konstantin Levin in *Anna Karenina*, the most autobiographical of Tolstoy’s novels, anticipate his teaching on non-resistance to evil by violence, with the objections raised by Sergey Koznyshev, Levin’s brother, being the first presentation to a large audience of the “innocent victim” argument. It happens in the final part of the novel, the part that barely got past the censors. In it Levin learns that Vronsky intends to go to Serbia to fight against the Turks, which triggers an argument in which Koznyshev, unlike Levin, approves of his intention.

Koznyshev frowned at Katavasov's words and said something different.

'The question shouldn't be put that way. There is no declaration of war here, but simply the expression of human, Christian feeling. They're killing our brothers, of the same blood, of the same religion. Well, suppose they weren't even our brothers, our co-religionists, but simply children, women, old men; indignation is aroused, and the Russian people run to help stop these horrors. Imagine yourself going down the street and seeing some drunk beating a woman or a child, I don't think you'd start asking whether war had or had not been declared on the man, but would fall upon him and protect the victim.'

'But I wouldn't kill him,' said Levin.

'Yes, you would.'

'I don't know. If I saw it, I would yield to my immediate feeling, but I can't say beforehand. And there is not and cannot be such an immediate feeling about the oppression of the Slavs' [11, pp. 387-388; 12, p. 541].

**Fyodor Dostoyevsky**, who was reading Tolstoy's novel as it was being serialized in the issues of the *Russky vestnik* (Russian Herald) journal, reacted angrily to the above-quoted extract in a lengthy entry in his diary. Dostoyevsky believed that the argument was presented "with the intent of winding it up with Levin's victory," and that Koznyshev's "drunken man" argument was not very convincing: "he speaks nonsense, since who, when helping a woman beaten by drunken men, is going to kill them?" [1, p. 259; 2, p. 808]. Dostoyevsky needed a justification for the war that was starting and to construct the argument in a way that would "wind up" with the necessity to kill. To this end, he cited descriptions of Turkish atrocities with regard to the Slavs. These were more cruel than in the drunks examples, and besides, for Dostoyevsky the Turks were "them" and not "us," the Slavs, for whom he had more sympathy even if they were drunk and violent. On the basis of these accounts Dostoyevsky constructed an imaginary situation of the blinding of a child:

This means that he does not know how he would act! And yet he is a susceptible man, and as such he is afraid to kill... the Turk. Let us imagine the following scene: Levin stands still with a rifle and bayonet, and two steps from him a Turk is voluptuously getting ready to pierce the eyes of an infant whom he holds in his arms. The seven-year-old little sister of the boy screams and like an insane person rushes to tear her brother away from the Turk. And here stands Levin in doubt, wavering:

'I don't know what to do. I feel nothing. I am the people myself. No immediate sentiment for the oppression of the Slavs exists or can exist' [1, p. 261; 2, p. 809].

And in the same diary entry, Dostoyevsky, describing the Turks as "blood-suckers," "a deceitful and vile nation," and "tyrants," called for disarming them so that instead of committing atrocities "they will be manufacturing and selling morning-gowns and soap—even as our Kazan Tartars" [1, pp. 262-263; 2, pp. 810-811]. Thus, Dostoyevsky was one of the first Russian writers to link the imaginary case on violence with regard to an "innocent victim" with testimony on atrocities of some representatives of a nation, and proceed on that basis to berate that nation ending up with a call to use violence against a whole people.

Twenty years after Dostoyevsky made this diary entry **Vladimir Solovyov**, who in his youth was himself planning to go to the Russo-Turkish war, developed his argument in his work *Three Conversations about War, Progress and the End of World History*. Here we are talking about a tradition since Solovyov's ideas are probably closely linked with Dostoyevsky's version of the argument, as witnessed by the context and the details of his variation of the "innocent victim" argument.

In *Three Conversations*, the Prince (a follower of Tolstoy) argues with Mr. Z., whom Solovyov uses as his mouthpiece. Mr. Z., challenging the Prince, suggests imagining a situation in which a murder is necessary. Which elicits the following reaction from the Prince. "This is something quite unintelligible. But I think I guess what you mean: you refer to that famous case in which a father sees in a lonely place a blackguardly ruffian trying to assault his innocent (and, to enhance the effect, it is added, his 'little') daughter. The father, unable to protect her in any other way, kills the offender. I have heard this argument at least a thousand times." To this Mr. Z. responds: "What is really remarkable is not that you have heard it a thousand times, but the fact that nobody has ever heard from any one of those holding your view a sensible, or even only plausible, answer to this simple argument." The Prince then points out that the argument is unrealistic and that it fails to justify the war. Mr. Z. then weakens his argument: "Let us take not a father but a childless moralist before whose eyes some feeble being, strange and unfamiliar to him, is being fiercely assaulted by a hefty villain." And he asks the question: "Would you suggest that the moralist should fold his arms and preach the glory of virtue while the fiendish beast is torturing his victim?" [9, pp. 653-654; 10].

Through his character, Mr. Z., Solovyov promptly decided to cast aside ungrounded hopes for God, considering the facts of villainy in the world and responsibility to the imaginary "victim." At that point, the General joins the conversation, telling the story of the atrocities he had seen being committed by a unit of Bashi-Bazouks: "One scene will remain forever vivid in my memory. A poor woman lay there on the ground, her head and shoulders securely bound to the cart's axle, so that she could not move her head. She bore no burns, no wounds. But on her distorted face was stamped a ghastly terror—she had evidently died of sheer horror. And before her dead, staring eyes was a high pole, firmly fixed in the ground, and to it was tied the poor little naked body of a baby—her son, most likely—a blackened, scorched little corpse, with protruding eyes. Nearby also was a grating in which lay the dead ashes of a fire" [9, p. 661; 10].

The General describes how he and his Cossacks made short shrift of the Bashi-Bazouks with relish and without mercy, to the approval of all the participants in the conversation with the exception of the confused Prince. It has to be noted that while Dostoyevsky tried to justify the escalating Russo-Turkish war, perhaps sincerely believing that the Russian army, about which he had heard "nothing but the most humane acts," was "an army of gentlemen" [1, pp. 262-263; 2, pp. p. 810-811], Solovyov admitted that some Cossacks were veritable brigands." Having said that, for him the point was that the Bashi-Bazouks were brigands "of quite a different sort" [9, pp. 664-665; 10].

In Solovyov's reasoning, criticism of the teaching on non-resistance to evil by violence invoking the recent Russo-Turkish war, is not only central to the "first conversation" out of three, but is a prologue to his visions of the future, notably his description of an allegedly imminent apocalyptic war. Unlike Dostoyevsky's diary entry, the "innocent victim" argument is adduced not only as an instrument of justifying the Russo-Turkish war, which Solovyov considers to be a minor passing episode, but as an attempt to mobilize those he identifies with the "forces of good" against those he appoints to be "the forces of evil" in a future apocalyptic world war. And, like Dostoyevsky, he distinguishes "the good" from "the evil" in accordance with discriminatory criteria of national and religious affiliation.

**Ivan Ilyin**, in his 1925 book *On Resistance to Evil by Force*, also made an attempt to justify violence by invoking the "innocent victim" argument. By his book he tried not only to justify the violence of the Whites toward the Reds and vindicate the meaningless catastrophe of the Civil War, not only to support the pockets of the bloody conflict, but to kindle a new massacre. Criticizing Tolstoy's teaching, Ilyin modifies the child example to make it sound as follows: "This is precisely why a moralist of this type, if he is consistent, will during his life find himself in monstrous situations. Indeed, what will be his answer to himself and to God if, witnessing a raging crowd abusing a child and being armed, he chooses to dissuade the villains by appealing to the obvious and to love and, after allowing the evil act to take place, to live with a sense of being morally impeccable?" [6, p. 93]. Right off, one should point out two things in this version: (1) Ilyin writes not about one "villain" but about "villains," even an anonymous crowd; (2) unlike Solovyov, he no longer pretends to see this situation as something exceptional.

A year before Ilyin, a similar attack was launched on Tolstoy's teaching on non-resistance to evil by violence by **Anatoly Lunacharsky**, in his case to justify the violence perpetrated by the Bolsheviks. With Ilyin and Lunacharsky, the attack strategies coincide down to the tiniest detail, except that Lunacharsky's "innocent victim" argument casts the Whites as "villains." In an attempt to justify "Red Terror" Lunacharsky recalls precisely the child episode from *Three Conversations*. He is undeterred by the fact that by that time Solovyov's works had been banned and removed from the Soviet libraries as "counter-revolutionary and anti-art literature." Indeed, this was done by the agency which Lunacharsky himself headed up (see [28]).

Lunacharsky ranges himself with Solovyov in the idea and tactics of criticizing Tolstoy's teaching on non-resistance to evil by violence and in his wish to justify violence. He writes: "Vladimir Solovyov asked Tolstoy, what will you do when you see a child being tortured? We say: how can one be indifferent when humanity has risen up for the final battle to wrest itself, in its countless millions and the future generations, from the horror of untruth which you, Tolstoy followers, yourselves condemn? Can one, if the struggle has begun, get in the way and say, stop struggling, why struggle?" [7].

Lunacharsky's demagoguery leaps out at you and his elaboration of Solovyov's thoughts highlights the anti-moral and anti-humane potential of the "inno-

cent victim” argument, whatever its modifications. Lunacharsky, like Solovyov, does not hesitate to move from the lonely figure of the “villain” and the “innocent victim” to declaring a huge number of real people to be “villains” and the future generations to be “innocent victims.” In the narrative of Dostoyevsky, Solovyov, Ilyin and Lunacharsky, and of some contemporaries, invocation of the sufferings of a child, a girl or any other person is merely a trigger, a weapon against the absolute moral ban on violence. In their works, booklets and speeches, the imagined argument played the role of an instrument to justify the mass madness of war and brutalization of groups of people on national, religious, social or class grounds.

Dostoyevsky used the argument to try to prove the necessity of the escalating war between the Russian and Ottoman empires, Solovyov to bolster a “moral” sanction of the past war and imaginary future apocalyptic wars, Ilyin and Lunacharsky who supported opposite sides in the Civil War, as a sanction of the past slaughter and a future bloody confrontation. For all of them the imaginary situation of “the villain” and “the innocent victim” was a weapon to pull down the edifice of non-resistance to evil by violence to promote their diverging and sometimes directly opposite ideas of who are the “villains” and who are the “innocent victims,” and how to order the good world they sought to achieve, not stopping short of mass murder. To use Ilyin’s expression with which Dostoyevsky, Solovyov and Lunacharsky would probably have agreed, if a Tolstoy follower in this imaginary situation sacrifices “his righteousness” and “perpetrates an evil deed” through resisting “by violence” then “if he understands and recognizes this higher idea then it needs to be formulated... And if it is formulated what will remain of the notorious ‘non-resistance’ doctrine?” [6, pp. 93-94].

In other words, Tolstoy’s opponents were looking for a formula that would accomplish the impossible and justify the base and inhuman system of coercion, violence and murder in the name of this or that “higher” goal, while the “innocent victim” served as an instrument and an important part of this monstrous formula. A real, and most importantly, moral alternative to the above positions of Dostoyevsky, Solovyov, Ilyin, and Lunacharsky was put forward by Tolstoy who maintained that the moral ban on violence was absolute, which in his case was necessarily linked with a ban on dehumanization of the individual and any social, religious, national, class or other group.

### **Leo Tolstoy’s counter-arguments**

Thus, **Leo Tolstoy** did not only initiate a discussion around the “innocent victim” argument in his novel *Anna Karenina*, but later noted that the main argument to justify violence boils down to the “imaginary robber, who injures and kills innocent people before your eyes” [26, p. 212; 27, p. 127]. Tolstoy was aware of Solovyov’s wish to justify violence, including the death penalty, and he knew Dostoyevsky’s above-quoted diary note. Thus, in an 1882 letter to Tolstoy, the young revolutionary-minded journalist Mikhail Engelgardt, who shared the views on violence with the conservative and anti-revolutionary Dostoyevsky,



wrote about the diary note of the latter. Tolstoy replied to Engelgardt: “What Dostoyevsky writes and what I find repugnant I heard from monks and metropolitans, namely, that making war is allowed, that it is defense—laying down one’s life for brothers—and I always replied: to shield with one’s body, exposing oneself, yes, but to shoot at people from a rifle is not defending but killing” [23, p. 114].

The self-sacrifice motive and a commitment to changing the inhumane scheme will be considered below, in the meantime, it has to be noted that each time he faced the “innocent victim” argument which was advanced frequently by various people Tolstoy categorically refused to accept it as refutation of the absolute nature of the ban on violence. He believed that attempts to contemplate an exception to this ban were wrong in themselves and entailed irreparable consequences since an exception becomes the rule of action that does not end violence but maintains and strengthens it.

Tolstoy refuted the “innocent victim” argument in his correspondence, literary, journalistic and philosophical writings. A detailed philosophical critique of the “innocent victim” argument is contained in Tolstoy’s letter presumably written in January 1888 to the social-revolutionary Mikhail Chernavsky [24], and in a January 1896 letter to the American writer Ernest Crosby [22]. Pointing to a possible link between these two events, in that same year (1888) Tolstoy wrote about his intention to write a story about “a murderer who was horrified of non-resistance” [13, p. 583], which would be a literary criticism of the “innocent victim” argument. Since then Tolstoy expressed the same intention in his diary notes during many years, until in 1904 he finished the story *The Forged Coupon*, in which one story line implements this plan.

In *The Forged Coupon*, the character by the name of Semyon commits several gruesome cold-blooded murders that form a chain of cause-and-effect acts which starts with a quarrel with his father and the forging of a coupon by an indebted high-school student who until last remains totally ignorant of the consequences of his lie. Semyon’s last victim, a woman living the life of an ascetic, by her dying words stirs up his dormant conscience. In prison and then in a hard labor camp, the brutal murderer drastically changes his life becoming a repentant sinner who does not only renounce violence himself, but by his acts, humility and conviction changes for the better people from various social strata. At the end of the story, Semyon brings about a reconciliation between a high-school student and his father [15].

The message Tolstoy wanted to bring home to his reader was that a lie told by a child can set in motion a circle of violence. That he who has committed an evil deed may have previously been a victim. That a “brigand” can be formed by the violence and callousness of the people around him. That one cannot understand an evil deed outside a broader perspective and he who has committed an evil deed may become a virtuous person, but not as a result of violence towards him, but through an attempt to persuade and instill “horror of non-resistance.”

Tolstoy builds his philosophical criticism of the “innocent victim” argument encountered in many letters, notes and articles around a group of interconnected

counter-arguments; among them I distinguish four main counter-arguments which I tentatively call empirical, structural, consequential, and anti-epistemological.

What I call an **empirical counter-argument** consists in recognizing that encountering the “innocent victim” situation in real life is highly unlikely. In a letter to Chernavsky, Tolstoy writes: “Justifications of this kind always assume the imaginary robber who has nothing human about him, who kills and tortures innocents, and this imaginary beast who seems to be constantly in the process of killing innocents provides grounds for the reasoning of all abusers about the need for violence; yet such a robber is the most exceptional, rare and even impossible case. Many people can live hundreds of years, as I have lived 60, never encountering a fictional robber in the act of committing his crime” [24, pp. 143-144]. In a letter to Crosby, Tolstoy writes: “No one has yet seen the imaginary robber with the imaginary child” [22, p. 21].

Thus Tolstoy stresses that encountering such an imaginary concatenation of events is not only problematical, but criticizes the possibility of encountering in real life an imaginary “robber” who possesses, in the imposed fictional situation, incompatible characteristics. Thus, “the robber,” who has some human features, is reduced by the “innocent victim” argument to having nothing human and existing solely by abusing innocent people.

In the *Introduction to the Biography of a Garrison*, Tolstoy elaborates this idea: “Having lived seventy-five years, I have never, except in discussions, encountered that fantastic brigand, who, before my eyes desired to kill or violate a child, but that perpetually I did and do see not one but millions of brigands using violence towards children and women and men and old people and all the labourers in the name of the recognized right of violence over one’s fellow” [14, p. 98; 17]. Thereby Tolstoy asserts not equality, but the fundamental difference between real brigands and the imaginary “brigand” and refers to numerous facts of the use of violence that are vastly different from the scheme of the “innocent victim” argument.

Tolstoy stresses that behind real violence stands not the “brigand” of the argument but those who in this argument put themselves in the position of “the third participant” who defends the “innocent victim,” however, this leads them not so much to protection as to violence, including violence toward innocent people. Tolstoy sees the way out of the situation of self-perpetuating violence in total rejection of violence which can never be justified regardless of what brigand and in defense of what “innocence” uses it. Tolstoy writes: “One should endeavor to replace violence by persuasion. That this may become possible it is necessary first of all to renounce the right of coercion” [14, p. 98; 17].

Tolstoy also notes that the “innocent victim” argument does not reflect or generalize reality, but distorts and deforms it by imposing a certain scheme constructed not from understanding reality but from personal immersion in violence and inability or reluctance to imagine a world without violence. In his work *Neizbezhniy perevorot (Inevitable Upheaval)*, Tolstoy, addressing the Russian elite of the time, notes that many of its members who put forward this argument

show no signs of disapproving the violence perpetrated by Russia's state apparatus while being extremely concerned about the attitude to an imaginary child. This attitude, Tolstoy writes, shows that in reality "these people who seek to justify violence, are concerned not about an imaginary child, but about their own fate, their whole life which is based on violence" [16, p. 92].

What can be described as a **structural counter-argument** is contained in the same letter to Chernavsky and is repeated in Tolstoy's other works forming the main thrust of the criticism of violence. Tolstoy asserts, on the one hand, unconditional acceptance of responsibility for everything, including evil done by "villains," and on the other hand, maintains that it is impossible in principle to conquer violence by violence. He writes: "When discussing real life and not fiction, we see something quite different: we see people and even ourselves performing the cruelest of deeds, first, not alone, like the imaginary robber, but always in association with other people, and not because we are beasts who have nothing human about them, but because we are steeped in delusions and temptations" [24, p. 144]. Tolstoy's message is that in real life there can never be an impartial observer (third participant in the "innocent victim" argument) separate from the others. Every person is from the start involved in the world of violence and is linked with those who perpetrate violence, and is often involved in it, therefore a moral deed consists in accepting responsibility not only for saving "the victim" but for preserving the life of "the villain." Thereby Tolstoy points to yet another structural flaw of the "innocent victim" argument, viz. restricting the space of the event to three figures (villain, innocent victim, observer), stressing the need to bring in a broader perspective which would do away with the schematic fiction and put into question the right to use any kind of violence.

Tolstoy demonstrates the feebleness and falsehood of the "innocent victim" argument in a letter to Engelgardt in an attempt to make the young revolutionary change his thinking about violence. In the letter, Tolstoy slightly modifies the imaginary situation of the argument presenting a mother who "whips her child to death." Thus the mother of the "innocent victim" becomes the "villain" and Tolstoy asks: "Does it make sense to use violence with regard to the mother who whips her child? If a mother whips her child, then what is it that gives me pain and that I consider to be evil? The fact that the child feels pain or the fact that the mother, instead of the joy of love experiences the torment of anger?" Tolstoy offers a non-violent answer to both questions. "I think there is evil in both. One person cannot do evil. Evil is disunion of people. So if I want to act it is only for the purpose of putting an end to disunity and restoring communication between mother and child" [23, p. 114]. Thus Tolstoy offers a perspective totally strange to the consciousness that is used to violence, a perspective in which the very use of the "innocent victim" argument, which imposes an inhuman choice, is not a solution, but a serious problem, which can only be solved through an absolute renunciation of violence expressed in his call "you shall not kill anyone" and through love. Tolstoy demonstrates that the "villain," depersonalized in the argument in order to transpose a fictional scheme to real life and to arbitrarily appoint a "villain," becomes a person with his/her own problems and probably misfor-

tunes; a person who may happen to be a mother, a relative of the victim or, elaborating Tolstoy's idea, a relative of the person who is rashly asked to answer an amoral question. And what if one puts in the place of the imaginary and impersonal "villain" the father of the one who is faced with the question of killing a "villain?" Or the father of someone who tries to smuggle in this argument? Would the critic of non-violence just as readily accept even an imaginary murder of his father as an answer? Would he be able to bring himself to say that it is moral to kill one's father, even in an imaginary situation and in order to save an innocent victim? Would not such a person become convinced that the argument is inhuman and hopelessly immoral?

In what can be tentatively described as a **consequentialist argument**, Tolstoy looks at the gruesome consequences of adopting and following the imaginary "innocent victim" situation. In a letter to one of his émigré followers, Tolstoy writes: "One cannot tolerate the slightest compromise in an idea. A compromise inevitably occurs in practice, all the more reason not to tolerate compromises in theory. If I want to draw a line close to the mathematical straight line I should not allow for a second that a straight line can be anything but the shortest distance between two points" [25]. Elsewhere Tolstoy notes that if a person, who is oriented towards non-resistance to evil by violence, suddenly encounters a situation which reminds to this person that of the "robber-villain," the chances are that he would treat "the robber in a different way than he who has all his life been seething with anger against a robber without ever seeing one" [24, p. 144]. Thereby Tolstoy points to the dangerous consequences of asserting even a hypothetical right to violence because it brings evil into life by the mere fact of preparing for a possible use of violence, introduces a predisposition for violence and impedes the establishment of a non-violent attitude to the people around one. In a real situation, which would remind a person who has accepted the argument of the imaginary situation, he would more readily agree to use violence and would be less able to resolve the conflict without using violence than someone who has not, from the outset, contemplated using violence. In other words, those who accept and pursue the "innocent victim" argument usually seek to form a certain attitude, character and worldview which include, presuppose and allow for the use of violence.

Furthermore, those who uphold the "innocent victim" argument sometimes say that violence towards the robber who is *predisposed* to violence is merely a *reaction* to his inhuman intention and a *forced prevention* of a hideous evil deed, but Tolstoy argues that in reality the person who has accepted the argument is *proactively predisposed* to violence and *seeks* to place within the argument involving violent life situations that are inevitably unique, unclear and different from the scheme. In other words, the "innocent victim" argument, if accepted, may start serving as a scheme from which violence is *actively* introduced into the world and in accordance with which the surrounding world is organized and built. The above-cited arguments of Dostoyevsky, Solovyov, Ilyin, and Lunacharsky who pursue it not so much to justify violence perpetrated in the past as to promote violent and military actions in the future are vivid examples of this monstrous unfolding of the argument.

What I call Tolstoy's **anti-epistemological counter-argument** is his contention that it is impossible to subordinate morality to cognition and to derive a moral act from cognitive schemes. It would be wrong, however, to say that Tolstoy had opted to renounce value judgments and passively accept injustice. The second half of Tolstoy's life demonstrates that he exposed and struggled against everything he perceived to be evil. However, he considered violence to be the key manifestation of evil and he saw the gravest mistake in using violence to fight violence, including attempts to justify violence. Tolstoy repeatedly asserted that there is no transition from the cognitive schemes that distinguish and introduce criteria of good and evil to the justification of violence which is the main manifestation of evil. For a moral person, morality does not depend on cognitive schemes that seek to separate justified from unjustified violence, but vice versa, cognitive schemes depend on morality whose essence is renunciation of any violence.

Another aspect of the anti-epistemological argument is that cognition and the ability to predict another's actions are relative. Tolstoy points out that *in reality* one person can never know for sure what a real and not imaginary situation will end up with. He writes: "Apologies for violence used against one's neighbor in defense of another neighbor from greater violence are always untrustworthy, because when force is used against one who has not yet carried out his evil intent, I can never know which would be greater—the evil of my act of violence or of the act I want to prevent." Tolstoy reflects on the example with the ruffian: "I see that a man I know to be a ruffian is pursuing a young girl, I have a gun in my hand—I kill the ruffian and save the girl. But the death or the wounding of the ruffian has positively taken place, while what would have happened if this had not been I cannot know" [18, p. 29; 19, p. 15].

In the letter to Crosby, Tolstoy again puts into question the limited and false perspective set by the "innocent victim" argument. Tolstoy elaborates his thought spreading the uncertainty situation from the active or passive participants in the situation to include the incalculable consequences if the violent scheme is used in real life. He writes: "If a non-Christian does not recognize God's will, it is only calculation, that is, the consideration as to what is more profitable for him and for all men, the continuation of the robber's life or that of the child, which guides the choice of his acts. But to decide this, he must know what will become of the child which he saves, and what would become of the robber if he did not kill him. But that he cannot know. And so, if he is a non-Christian, he has not rational foundation for saving the child through the death of the robber" [22, p. 19]. In this way, Tolstoy opens a truly moral perspective fundamentally different from that which deifies cognition, asserting that moral responsibility is unlimited and the ban on violence is absolute while admitting the limitations and imperfections of cognition.

Elsewhere Tolstoy shifts the emphasis still more to stress that one can only be sure of one's own, and not another man's act, which is why it is so important not to allow the evil of violence in the name of some good ends: "A rogue has

raised his knife over his victim. I have a pistol in my hand and kill him. But I do not know, and cannot possibly know, whether the purpose of the raised knife would have been implemented. The rogue may not have carried out his evil intention, whereas I certainly commit my evil deed. Therefore, the only thing that a person can and must do in this and similar instances is what he must always do in all possible circumstances: he must do what he believes he ought to do before God and before his own conscience. A man's conscience may demand that he sacrifice his own life but not that of another person" [20, pp. 206-207; 21].

Solovyov, for example, considers the above argument unconvincing because the imaginary situation does not envisage such a development since it posits only two possible scenarios: either the observer (the third participant) kills the villain or the villain kills the innocent victim. But the point is that Tolstoy seeks to bring the imaginary situation closer to the real one, on the one hand, and on the other hand to the moral situation where a truly *moral* choice is possible. Instead of the "observer," Tolstoy introduces a moral subject who is unable to and must not try to make judgments for the other, to act for him or try to impose his will on him. The above extract is directly connected with Tolstoy's appeal that follows: "Understand that the assumption that a man may organize the lives of others is a crude superstition that people have only accepted because of its antiquity" [20, p. 210; 21]. It is important to note that Tolstoy speaks about "organizing" the lives of others at one's discretion, which always involves coercion. And of course he does not deny, but on the contrary, urges people to help and do good to others and to try by words and non-violent actions to prevent what is perceived as evil. Here morality sets limits to cognition and will, which must not be based on and use violence. All this leads Tolstoy to change the conditions of the imaginary situation and propose his version of the deed which transcends the "active" (killing the villain) versus "passive" (allowing evil to be done) dichotomy imposed by the "innocent victim" argument.

Tolstoy's version is self-sacrifice, that is, taking the place of the victim. He writes in the much-quoted passage of the *Life Path* collection: "If I see that a person intends to kill someone, the best thing I can do is try to help the victim by: putting myself in his place, or by trying to save him by getting him to safety, or by hiding him, or by trying to ward off the blow—much the same way that I would risk my life trying to save a person from fire or drowning" [26, pp. 222-223; 27, p. 133]. Moreover, Tolstoy's above-quoted letter to Chernavsky has a sentence that looks at the imaginary situation from a different angle. He writes: "Speaking about love, no examples of villains can justify the murder of another person, and would lead only to the simplest and inevitable conclusion that follows from love,—that a person would shield another with his body, give her own life rather than taking the life of another person" [24, p. 142]. Tolstoy rises to a fundamental philosophical-ethical level reinterpreting and thus changing the imaginary situation. In this extract, the word "the other" used in the singular refers equally to the villain and to the victim. The new situation no longer has clearly assigned roles with predetermined behaviors, it is open-ended and has a real tragic collision in which the moral task is to try to save the Other without

resorting to the killing of the Other. Tolstoy (wittingly or unwittingly) moves from the cognitive level where the “villain” and the “innocent victim” and what will be and even what ought to be are clearly indicated, to the fundamental moral level of I and the Other. At this level it is unknown whether the Other is initially bad or good, there is no “third participant” (“the judge and savior”) and the I is defined via responsibility for the Other who is not cognitively categorized.

### Conclusion

The “innocent victim” argument derives moral significance from the premise that violence is evil since it is violence in its hideous form that threatens the “victim,” but the answer imposed by the argument (agreeing to a murder) refutes the premise. Accepting the argument leads not to the criticism of violence, but on the contrary, includes it in individual, social and political practices by gradating violence on a scale of inevitably different people into “acceptable” and “unacceptable” forms. This gradation stems from the desire to categorize people into “good” (“innocent victims”), with regard to whom violence is condemned, and “bad” (“villains”) with regard to whom violence is not only allowed but is required in certain situations. He who accepts the argument deems himself to be the “judge-savior” who decides who is “good” and who is “bad” and claims the right to use violence toward the latter. As Abdusalam Guseynov writes, in this case “the argument for violence boils down to presenting oneself as the bulwark of good and the opposite side as absolute evil incarnate” [5, p. 516]. Another prerequisite of the argument is asserting the need to combat violence epitomized by the *imaginary* “villain,” but in terms of its conclusion and intent the argument is actually aimed at combating non-violence which a *true* adherent of the absolute ban on violence upholds. In other words, the conclusion the argument propounds destroys the prerequisites from which it acquires moral significance. This is *immoralism*, which neither upholds nor ignores morality, but deliberately destroys it.

The “innocent victim” argument distorts time, protagonists and the relations among them, which are not derived from reality, but are introduced according to predetermined, limited and fixed roles of “villain” and “victim” whose behavior is predetermined. Thereby characteristics of the past or extra-temporal schematized reality are imposed on the future, which is never pre-determined and cannot be predicted with absolute accuracy. As a result, the argument does not contain a real moral choice made under conditions of uncertainty since it precedes and not follows the assignment of roles. The argument is so constructed as to leave no room for observing the “thou shalt not kill” commandment because either the “third participant” intervenes and kills “the villain” or the “villain” kills the “innocent victim.” The figures are like constants in a soulless and merciless equation. The argument is called upon not to lead man out of the circle of violence, but to bring him into it, not to humanize the relations among people, but to dehumanize “the villain,” not to liberate but to put man into shackles of necessity. If the “innocent victim” argument proves anything it is the fact that

one can construct an argument in which moral choice is impossible, but coercion to such a choice, even in an imaginary situation (coercion is implied in the very question of the “innocent victim” argument) is morally admissible, which is further proof of the argument’s immoralism.

Tolstoy countered any principle that allows coercion, which is a kind of violence, with the principle of non-resistance to evil by violence, the principle that has one fundamental difference: it negates violence not only as a means toward achieving any ideal, but also as a means of self-assertion. He writes: “The principle of non-resistance is not a principle of coercion but of concord and love, and therefore it cannot be made coercively binding upon men. The principle of non-resistance to evil by violence, which consists in the substitution of persuasion for brute force, can be only accepted voluntarily” [14, p. 98; 17]. In other words, he is referring to the key difference which applies also to the participants in the discussion on violence and non-violence. Thus, he who allows “justified” violence allows it, under certain conditions, to be used toward his interlocutor while he who upholds an absolute ban on violence recognizes that he cannot force his interlocutor to even follow the principle of non-violence thus recognizing that under no conditions can he treat a person as not being a human being. The aim of the champion of an absolute ban on violence is to create a situation when coercion is impossible, thus creating a growth point for the social spread of the idea of non-violence and for ending violence. This perspective has tremendous importance for philosophical thought and social practice, which, in spite of its long history, is only beginning to be widely recognized and applied (see, for example, [4]).

He who is presented with an imaginary villain-and-innocent-victim situation is invited to identify himself with the third participant (“observer” or “judge-savior”). If somebody is offered the predetermined role of “the third participant” such a person may control the argument, but control is exercised not through consent to amoral identification and an illusory choice of one or other manner of killing, but through immediate renunciation of any murder, a refusal to shed one’s uniqueness and unlimited responsibility for the life of any Other and a refusal to assume the predetermined role of “the third participant” and accept the immoral argument. The true choice is not about a choice between two proposed ways of killing, but about the possibility of not accepting the argument aimed at stripping a person of his/her subjectivity, unlimited responsibility and a non-violence position.

Organizing life without violence calls for an abrupt rejection of the “innocent victim” argument examined above, for an absolute ban on violence and recognition of non-violence as the essence of any moral act and an abiding element of a moral decision.



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*Translated by Yevgeny Filippov*

## The Logic of Ivan Goncharov's Creative Work: Stating the Problem

*Vladimir Melnik*

*Abstract.* This article deals with the logic of the evolution of Goncharov's creative work and the main idea he had worked out by the late 1830s and early 1840s and subsequently developed in his trilogy of novels (*A Common Story*, *Oblomov* and *The Precipice*). It has to do with the problem of the preservation of the modern man's religious consciousness in the context of a dramatic turn in history and mankind's parting with "infantile faith" and myth-and-poetic consciousness against the background of rapid development of science. The sources and reasons are considered of Goncharov's profound interest in the development of science and technology, especially astronomical discoveries. Goncharov determined the object of his artistic inquiry while still a student, when he studied Dante's *Divine Comedy*. The logic of the evolution of the trilogy of novels shows that all three novels were conceived at one and the same time as parts of a single whole. The novelist's historical optimism springs from his notion that scientific and technological progress, far from being at odds with God's Providence for humanity, on the contrary, contributes to its realization. This proposition is based on the idea of "beauty" as a self-sufficient power with which God had imbued human nature.

*Keywords:* Ivan Goncharov, science, religion, crisis, trilogy, Dante, logic of creative work.

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In my opinion, to reveal the logic of a writer's creative work, one has to define and analyze the development of the main idea that guided him throughout his life. For all the diversity of the themes, motifs, images and poetic devices in various works of a major writer, across a multitude of specific tasks, his/her work always has a "core" idea which forms the unique content of his/her world. The uniqueness of the writer's perception of life and human nature is manifested in the choice and handling of this main idea. While the study of specific aspects of artistic work gives insights into the main focus of the writer's work, sooner or later it is necessary to generalize in order to see the author's work as a whole and reveal the logic of his/her evolution. The generalization is never final, reflecting as it does the current state of studies of a given writer.

The relevance of the question of creative evolution varies for different writers. In the case of Ivan Goncharov, in spite of the rapid development of Goncharov studies in the past three decades and thorough treatment of particular problems, with a focus, among other things, on cultural studies, the essential philological problems of his legacy remain unsolved and present a research challenge. These problems include, above all, the periodization of his work, explaining why the thirty-year-old author conceived of the three novels (*A Common Story*, *Oblomov* and *The Precipice*) simultaneously in the 1840s, determining the artistic nature of his trilogy as a single whole and identifying the philosophical and other sources of his work. The question of the logic of the novelist's creative evolution has never been raised before, and yet it is only at first glance that his was a path typical of a 19th-century Russian realist, starting with translations and early verses and ending with "senile" essays generally thought to be weak [47, pp. 299-300].

It has to be said for fairness sake that of late, attempts have been made to capture the underlying links between the writer's novels and explain the phenomenon of the somewhat unusual trilogy of novels<sup>1</sup> (cf. [44; 32, pp. 31-34; 30, pp. 280-284; 6; 4; 5]). Quite a few works have been devoted to the search for recurring motifs and characteristics of the protagonists in Goncharov's trilogy [50; 27; 7; 8]. However, they fail to identify the main idea that guided the young Goncharov. And yet he had determined the main direction of his evolution for many years ahead and conceived simultaneously not of one, but three novels, the last of which was only published in 1869.

This article will consider not so much Goncharov's attempts to describe his ideal (cf. [34, pp. 45-108; 31]), as the idea that stands behind it (although the borderline between the two concepts is tenuous).

Goncharov was one of the few Russian writers who gravitated toward conceptual thinking and completeness of the artistic picture of the world. The epic sweep of his thought, his predilection for the genre of the big novel—all this stemmed from his need to formulate the idea that adequately expressed the dominant spiritual and moral features of his epoch. The author of *Oblomov* is known for his sweeping generalizations. Valentin Nedzvetsky has rightly noted that "a fundamental feature of Goncharov's realist typification is the ever-growing wish not only to take a broad and summary view of diverse and transient social details,

but to trace them to ‘basic’ and ‘root,’ ‘tribal’ foundations of life as a whole—in Russia and world” [37, p. 66]. However, this feature tells us nothing about the idea that guided Goncharov in his work. And yet the breadth of artistic typification stemmed from the scope of Goncharov’s philosophical thought as he tried to give a systemic answer to what he thought to be the pivotal question of the time, i.e., how to preserve the religious foundation of life in the face of a dramatic change of history and humanity’s emergence from “infancy.”

Traditionally, the religious idea has been associated exclusively with *The Precipice* (1869), which, of course, has been categorized as an “anti-nihilistic novel.” But in Goncharov’s work, the anti-nihilistic idea manifests itself not through opposition to nihilism (this is largely beside the point) but through opposition to the progressive cooling and indifference toward religion under new historical conditions when the 19th-century man’s consciousness changes: while not rejecting religion, he loses the seriousness, depth and immediacy of the religious experience. Goncharov wrote about the cooling of society’s attitude to religion in *An Uncommon Story*:

Man, life and science—all are in a position of discord, struggle against each other: work, i.e., struggle, is going on with a vengeance, and no one knows the outcome of this struggle. The phenomenon is here, we live at the center of this whirlwind, at the moment of a fierce clash, and we can neither see nor predict its end!

But a prolonged wait turns into fatigue, into indifference. This is the enemy to be fought: indifference. But there is no possibility, and no means by which to fight. There is neither a moral nor a material weapon against it! It does not argue, or resist or object, it keeps silent and merely sinks lower and lower below zero, like mercury in a thermometer. The thousand-year-old papacy fell because of indifference before our eyes! [25, p. 272].

It is commonly thought that Goncharov first depicted the clash between the traditional religious worldview and the positivist philosophy of the late 1860s in the novel *The Precipice* [31, pp. 76-114]. However, he noticed the influence of the burgeoning natural sciences on the change of traditional religious and moral values much earlier, back in the 1830s.

He wrote in his article (1876) “The Intent, Tasks and Ideas of the Novel *The Precipice*”: “In our time... human society is emerging from childhood and is noticeably becoming more mature... science, crafts and industry are making serious strides” [13, pp. 210-211]. In wobbly minds, it triggered an epidemic of the loss of “infantile faith”—not only in miracles, in the supernatural in general, but also in the ideal. This process was reflected already in his first novel, *A Common Story* (1847), which portrayed for the first time a proponent of the positivist philosophy in the character of Pyotr Ivanovich Aduyev. He is not a nihilist, but he epitomizes the stifling “indifference” toward ideals and religion in life.

Goncharov imbues with broader meaning the clash of two philosophies of life, as represented by the Aduyev uncle and nephew, a clash that is already evident in *The Frigate Pallada* and *The Precipice*. The artist turns his gaze to more than just a specific conflict of the time, an attitude noted by Vissarion Belinsky

in a letter to Vasily Botkin (March 17, 1847): "I am sure you will like this story very much. And how it will benefit society! What a crushing blow it will deal to romanticism, dreaminess, sentimentality, and provincialism!" [3, p. 352]. He was referring to a global conflict, a thousand-year-old cleavage occurring before the eyes of Goncharov's 19th century contemporaries. The novelist was able to feel the tragedy of his time, with consequences beyond conjecture. In his mind, human history was divided into two unequal parts: from the patriarchal "golden age" to the modern times in which something new was being born: something based on a rational perception of life and a scientific worldview.

Goncharov was acutely aware of this historic cleavage at a time when Russian society was still unaware of the scale of what was taking place. Contemporary literature was focused on the pressing issues of the day (serfdom, emancipation of women, press freedom, etc.). Goncharov did not ignore the sharp conflicts of his time, but he presented them in his works in a calmer and more objective tone (some spoke about his "indifference") because he saw and portrayed them from an angle which was not noticed by others but was very important to him in the light of the millennial change of history. This tone was dictated by his perception of the historical dimension of events, as expressed, for example, in the following passage from *Oblomov*: "Though at the house of the widow Pshenitzyn, in Vyborg, days and nights passed peacefully without any sudden violent changes in its monotonous existence, and though the four seasons followed each other as regularly as ever, life did not stand still, but was constantly undergoing a change; but the change was slow and gradual as are the geological changes of our planet: in one place a mountain slowly crumbled away, in another the sea was washing up silt or receding from the shores and forming new land" [17, p. 374; 21, p. 368].

According to Goncharov, "sentiments" were banished from personal and social consciousness because, owing to the rapid development of science and society, "the childishness of faith" had been lost. This idea was best expressed in the unsent letter to the philosopher Vladimir Solovyov after reading his book *Lectures in Divine Humanity*. The aging Goncharov wrote: "Yes, human society cannot live by the results obtained by Positivism... you say (and all of us too)... that one must turn to religion... one must turn to a different authority from which arrogant brains have fled, the universal authority. But how? The sense of infantile faith cannot be given back to a grown-up society: the foundations of some Biblical tales and mythological fables of the Greek and other mythologies (not to speak of the latest science) have undermined faith in miracles and the developed human society has cast aside everything called metaphysical, mystical and supernatural" [20, pp. 348-349].

To prove that Goncharov's main idea was the same from the 1840s until the end of his creative path, let us quote a seldom noticed passage from *A Common Story*. Characteristically, Goncharov uses the same vocabulary as in his letter to Vladimir Solovyov, probably written in 1881-1882. Let us recall that Alexander Aduyev, disappointed in Petersburg, returns to his family estate of Grachi, walks into a church and muses:

'So long as the vital forces of man are at their height,' thought Alexander, 'so long as his desires and passions have free play, he lives the life of the senses, fleeing the soothing, profound and solemn contemplation to which religion leads us. He turns to it for consolation with exhausted, fading powers, vanished hopes and the burden of years.'

Gradually the sight of so many familiar objects aroused reminiscences in Alexander's soul. He passed in review his childhood and youth up to his departure for Petersburg, remembered how, as a child, he had repeated the prayers after his mother, how she had told him of the guardian angel who watches over the human soul, ever warring against the Evil One, how, pointing to the stars, she had told him that they were the eyes of God's angels who looked down at the earth and counted the good and bad deeds of human beings, and that the dwellers in heaven weep when the account shows more evil than good deeds and rejoice when the good exceeds the evil. Pointing to the blue distance of the horizon she used to tell him it was Zion... Alexander emerged from these reminiscences with a sigh.

'If only I could still believe all that!' he thought. '*The infantile faith has been lost* [my italics—*V. M.*]. What new, true things have I learned? None. I have found doubts, interpretations, theories... and am still further than before from the truth. What's the good of this dissension, this philosophizing! My God! When the warmth of faith no longer warms the heart, how can one be happy?' [15, pp. 443-444; 24, pp. 388-389].

Aduyev's meditations are autobiographical: Goncharov perceived the loss of "infantile faith" as a personal as well as a social drama. His sentiments erupted most strikingly in his letter to Anatoly Koni of June 30, 1886: "I look with tenderness at the old men and women broken in spirit and crushed by life who nestle against the wall in a church or in their tiny rooms under an icon lamp, bearing their cross quietly and without a murmur—they see life and high above life, only the cross and the Gospel, it alone they believe in and hope for. Why are we not like this? 'They are foolish. They are blessed,' say wise men and thinkers. No, they are the people to whom is open what is hidden from the wise and reasonable. Theirs is the kingdom of heaven and they will be called God's children!" [25, p. 499]. Let us note that throughout his life, Goncharov, as a Christian, never lost his ultimate link with "infantile faith" although he studiously hid it from other people, preferring to talk about other aspects of modern religious consciousness. The last time he portrayed a bearer of "infantile faith" was in the character of sexton Yegor in the story *Fish Soup (Ukha)*, written several weeks before his death [33].

The writer touches on the same problem in *The Frigate Pallada* (1855-1858), where the question of the end of a thousand-year history of the dominance of "myth" and "faith," on the one hand, and the beginning of a new (scientific-industrial) era of human history are seen from a cultural-civilizational perspective. Goncharov tentatively divides human history into two periods: "myth-poetic" ("childhood") and "cultural-civilization" or "creative" ("emergence from childhood").

This historiosophy is mentioned in the first chapter of *Pallada* in which the writer explains the motive of his sudden decision to go on a voyage around the

world: "Everything seemed mysterious and fantastic in the enchanted distance: fortunate people went and returned telling enticing tales, but deaf to the wonders of the world, giving *childish explanations for the secrets of the earth* [my italics—*V. M.*]. But then came a man, a wise one and a poet, and he threw light into the secret recesses. He went with a directional compass, a spade, a drawing compass, a measuring line [with a heart full of faith in the Creator and love for His cosmos]. He brought life, reason, and experience into the stony desert, the darkness of the forest, and with a clear head showed the way to thousands who came after him. 'The Cosmos!' More urgently than before I yearned to look with my living eyes to the living cosmos. 'Trustingly,' I thought, 'I would hold the hand of such a wise man, like a child to a grown-up, I would listen to him attentively, and if I understood him to the extent that a child understands a grown-up, I would be rich even with such scant explanation'" [16, p. 10; 19, pp. 5-6].

In his book, Goncharov observes simultaneously all the historical epochs from the ancient "golden age" (idyllic life on Lycian Islands, "sleepy" Japan, etc.) to the modern developed state (England, Americans in various parts of the world), which leads him again and again back to his pet idea of a turn in millennial history occurring before the eyes of his contemporaries. However, owing to the special genre of *The Frigate Pallada*, which makes it necessary to describe the journey, the problem of the crisis of religious consciousness is not treated as explicitly as in *A Common Story* or in *The Precipice*. But instead, it gives the finishing touches to the historiosophic argument in favor of Goncharov's optimistic view of the new stage in human history. The novelist's historical optimism springs from his conviction that scientific and technological progress, far from contradicting God's Providence for humanity, contributes to its realization. He elaborates the philosophy of history in the spirit of the Russian Silver Age philosophers who see man as a co-worker of the Creator Who commanded man to "plant the earth" and "turn the desert into a garden."

The book's optimistic tone is due to the fact that, unlike in his novels, here Goncharov speaks not about man, but about mankind. The problem of the loss of "infantile faith," "ideals" and "sentiments," of the primary, "maternal" basis of existence (which comes back with a vengeance in *Obломov*) is touched upon indirectly in *The Frigate* although it is not stricken off the agenda (the portrayal of "civilizational excesses in London). On the other hand, the important idea that tops the architecture of Goncharov's reflections on "man and God" gains concreteness. It is the idea of "God's Providence" for man and for mankind, of the ultimate goals of historical activity within man's intellectual reach, the idea that mankind is called upon to perform an important mission: "to plant Beauty" in God's Garden and fulfill himself as a co-worker and co-Creator of God or, to use Goncharov's words, "to return the fruits grown from the seeds that once were given to him."

In his travelogue, Goncharov shows the awakening of humanity to ennobling activity, to the enhancement of the Earth and of the human soul. Speaking about the opening up of Siberia by the Russian people Goncharov elaborates this idea, attaining the level of religious philosophy: "And when such a region is ready, set-



tled, and of cultural standing—a region formerly obscure, unknown, but now standing before the astonished world, asking to have a name and rights, then one searches for the pioneers who erected this edifice... They are the same people who, in one corner of the Earth, raised their voice against Negro slave trade and in another taught the aborigines of the Aleutian and Kuril Islands to live and to pray to God, who imagined and created Siberia, settled and educated it, and now want to return to the Creator the fruits grown from the seeds that once were given them” [16, pp. 677-678; 19, p. 597]. That is why the theme of missionaries civilizing the world looms large in the book. A broad picture is unfolded before us of the changing world, of ever-spreading Christianity and its external, European (Christian) civilization because, according to Goncharov, “there is no civilization other than the Christian one, all the other religions give mankind nothing but gloom, darkness, ignorance and confusion” [13, p. 71]. During his journey, Goncharov sensed more acutely than ever the unity of Christianity and civilization, of culture.

In depicting states and peoples at various stages of civilizational development, Goncharov is confident that mankind as a whole will inevitably “awaken from its slumber” and “grow up” to leave behind the era of “mythology.” He is interested not only in geography, but also in the philosophy of the Cosmos as understood by Alexander von Humboldt (by that time, Goncharov had certainly read the first two or three volumes of *Kosmos: Entwurf einer physischen Weltbeschreibung*—the first volume was published in 1845).<sup>2</sup> Perhaps Humboldt, who commanded unassailable authority in world science, was “the sage and poet” whom Goncharov would have liked to take by the hand and follow in cognizing the world. But the Cosmos reveals not so much Goncharov’s undoubted love of astronomy as his philosophy of life which for him is based on religion and a heart “full of faith in the Creator and love for His universe.” Let us recall that “when Plato, Xenophon, and Aristotle speak of the heaven as a κόσμος, they do not have in mind the immediate spectacle of the night sky, but an all-embracing order of things, of which the celestial motions offer only the most conspicuous and most noble manifestation” [26, pp. 223-224]. Setting forth contemporary ideas of “the Cosmos” is one of the most important spiritual and philosophical objectives of the author of *The Frigate Pallada*, which draws on the whole diversity of the author’s observations. The word “cosmos” here is put in an earthly context: the traveler wants, following Humboldt, to fathom the unity, universal interconnection of the elements of his native planet’s “cosmos,” to see it as a whole and become conscious of the unity of the historical processes taking place. This was accomplished in *The Frigate Pallada*, all of whose parts are joined by the image of the author and by the constantly promoted historiosophic idea of which the starting point is “faith in the Creator and love of His universe.”

Goncharov in many of his works juxtaposes two global epochs in mankind’s development and refers to this juxtaposition in his letters and articles, his reflections evoking sometimes hyper-optimistic and sometimes dramatic tones. The spread of the themes and problems the writer touches upon is extremely wide, covering philosophy, history, esthetics, morality, science, religion, psychology, society, etc. He even considers genre systems in literature from this perspective.

Thus, in his article “The Intent, Tasks and Ideas of the Novel *The Precipice*,” he wrote: “*European literatures have emerged from childhood*—such that now no one would be impressed not only by some idyll, sonnet, hymn, picture or lyrical outpouring of feelings in verse, but even a fable would not be enough to teach the reader a lesson. All this retreats into the novel which accommodates large episodes of life, sometimes a whole life and in which, like in a large painting, every reader will find something close and familiar to him. That is why the novel has become almost the only form of *belles lettres* into which fit not only the works of Walter Scott, Dickens, Thackeray, Pushkin, and Gogol, but also non-fiction writers choose this form, accessible to the broad public, in order to reach out to the majority of readers with various topical issues or their favorite tasks—political, social and economic” ([13, p. 211]; my italics).

The study of the main object of Goncharov’s artistic investigation shows that he kept tabs more than other contemporary writers on the development of science and technology and profoundly analyzed its influence on the minds and morality of the contemporary man paying particular attention to the changes in religious consciousness. The writer’s serious interest in science and technology owes something to his godfather Nikolay Nikolayevich Tregubov, who acted as a father for the orphaned Goncharovs. Evgeny Lyatsky noted in his time that “although Tregubov said he was a Freemason, his nature was hardly inclined toward mysticism. On the contrary, from what we know about him he was a man of a highly positive frame of mind who preferred the exact sciences, definite and demonstrative knowledge.” Lyatsky writes that Tregubov was a “good mathematician” and liked maths-based “applied sciences: physics, astronomy and cosmography” [29, pp. 15, 16]. In his essay *At Home*, Goncharov remembered: “His education was not confined to technical knowledge of seafaring acquired in the marine corps. He complemented it with constant reading in all departments of knowledge, spared no money to subscribe to journals, books and pamphlets published in the capital cities.” Tregubov concerned himself with the education of little Vanya and tried to pass on to him his love for technical knowledge: “His conversations about mathematical and physical geography, astronomy, cosmogony in general and also seafaring were particularly clear and invaluable to me. He acquainted me with the map of the starry sky, vividly explained the motion of the planets, rotation of the Earth, all that my school mentors were unable or unwilling to do... He had some seafaring instruments, a telescope, a sextant, a chronometer. Among his books were descriptions of all the round-the-world journeys, from Cook to the latest times. I listened avidly to his stories and devoured travel books” [13, pp. 234, 238].

Undoubtedly, by the 1830s and 40s, Goncharov was impressed by scientific and technological progress and throughout his life watched the ambivalent results of social progress as well as concrete discoveries and novelties. And there was plenty to watch. The 19th century brought more discoveries and inventions than all the preceding centuries combined. They numbered more than 8,500, and what discoveries they were! The power of steam was tamed to bring about an industrial revolution and enable manual production to be replaced by industrial production. Europe and North America were covered with a network of railways,

and countries and continents began “to draw closer together.” In *The Frigate Pallada*, Goncharov notes these changes at every step. Thus he writes: “The parts of the world quickly come nearer to each other; from Europe to America, one shakes hands; they say that you will be able to get there in forty-eight hours,—pouff!—a mere joke, but a pouff in its time, alluding to the gigantic improvements yet to come in seafaring” [16, p. 13; 19, pp. 8-9]. The writer noted the advantage of steam over wind power. Shortly before the clash with the navies of England and its allies he makes this observation about the sailing ships which formed the basis of the Russian Navy: “The case rests. Sails remain the lot of little boats and less successful enterprises; all other have adopted steam. There is no one naval shipyard that constructs sailing ships any more; even old ones are refitted for steam” [16, p. 26; 19, p. 21].

The 19th century saw the introduction of synthetic materials and artificial fibers. Discoveries in the field of physics, chemistry, biology, astronomy, geology, and medicine were made one after another. Michael Faraday discovered the electromagnetic arc, and James Maxwell launched the study of electro-magnetic fields and developed the electromagnetic theory of light. Antoine Becquerel, Pierre Curie and Maria Skłodowska-Curie, who studied radioactivity, questioned the former concept of the law of energy preservation. In 1869, Dmitry Mendeleev discovered the periodic table of chemical elements. Biologists came up with the theory of cellular structure of all organisms and the basic principles of genetics were developed. Based on research in the physiology of the higher nervous activity, Ivan Pavlov developed his theory of conditional reflexes. At the same time machine-building in the true sense appears (production of machines by machine-tools). Iron and steel replace wood everywhere. As early as 1803, the first steam-powered automobile appears and about the same time the first steamships, and before long humanity starts using electrical telegraph and telephone. The first underground railway (“metro”) appears in 1863 and by the end of the century there is a metro in London, Paris, New York, Budapest and other cities.

Special mention should be made of Charles Darwin, whose works *On the Origin of Species* and *The Descent of Man* revolutionized science. These books treated the origin of the world and man in a different way than the Christian teaching. They triggered a Europe-wide discussion, which Goncharov did not miss. Significantly, Goncharov objectively assessed Darwin’s important discoveries. He wrote in his article “On the Usefulness of History”: “The new science... through Darwin and others discovered the laws of heredity of which all thinking people had been aware all along... The same spiritual law of heredity runs through all history” [22].<sup>3</sup> It is notable that along with “material” heredity discovered by the English scientist Goncharov speaks about “the spiritual law of heredity.”

Thus, the 19th century brought a dramatic change to human life. Man had more control over space and time, and the very philosophy of life, including the attitude to traditional religious values, was changing before people’s eyes.

From the books Goncharov read it is clear that he was above all interested in natural history. His personal library (of which only a small part has survived),

now in the custody of the Book Palace in Ulyanovsk, contains books by fairly prominent European scientists and popularizers of science in the 19th century: Dominique Arago, John Tyndall (his books were in Dostoyevsky's library, too), Louis Figuier, Camille Flammarion, John Draper<sup>4</sup> and others (cf. [38]).

Goncharov was most of all interested in discoveries in the field of astronomy. His library contained not only popular science, but also hard science books on astronomy, for example, by the Italian astronomer Angelo Secchi on the Sun surface (1870; cf. [38, p. 117]). Interestingly, the space theme is mentioned in one of the writer's last works, called *The Month of May in Petersburg*: "For the last ten years or so he has been engaged in compiling a glossary of Oriental languages and besides is studying astronomy, having read all the authorities from Newton, the Herschels to Flammarion and is anxious to know whether there are inhabitants on Venus, Mars<sup>5</sup> and other planets, what they are like, what they do, etc." [12, p. 426]. These latter questions were suggested to Goncharov by the reading of Flammarion, who had published a series of wonderful popular science books such as: *Real and Imaginary Worlds* (1865), *The Wonders of the Heavens* (1865), the first astronomy textbook, *A History of the Heavens* (recreational history of astronomy, 1867) etc.

Incidentally, Goncharov's interest in astronomy is not fortuitous: he might have found his own thoughts about mankind's religious crisis in Flammarion's works. They articulate thoughts about the religious crisis of mankind in almost the same words as Goncharov. The question of whether there is life beyond Earth, along with other questions, was sure to engender a crisis of religious consciousness. However, scientists who had not lost their faith sought an answer to this question that would not destroy traditional religious thinking and would reconcile it with science, something the author of *The Precipice* gave much thought to. Witness the following passage in his preface to the novel: "Interpretation of religion, even negation of religion began simultaneously with religion and has proceeded in parallel. Only ardent youth can imagine that these two parallel streams have already merged under its feet. The arguments about it bring out truths, benefit science, thought, philosophy, while religion retains its power over the majority" [13, pp. 156-157]. In the introduction to his book *The Plurality of Inhabited Worlds* (1862), Flammarion, like Goncharov, reflected on the contemporary crisis (pretty much in the style of Goncharov in *A Common Story* and in his letters): "If we take a close look at the spiritual life of modern humanity we shall see that man has lost his former faith, and with it the undisturbed peace of mind he once enjoyed; that we live amidst a struggle of conflicting thoughts and that the troubled humanity is searching for a philosophy that would provide a solid religious basis for its development and the fruition of its hopes... The spirit of the modern mankind is riven with contradictions. Natural science, the mighty ruler of our time that controls progress, has never been as far removed from any philosophy as it is today. Natural sciences are led by people who deny in the most arbitrary fashion the existence of God" [11, pp. 3-4].

Part of the reason why Goncharov was conversant with the development of science was the fact that he had to follow all these things in his capacity as an

official censor. He was, however, interested not only in individual discoveries but above all in the philosophy of contemporary science and its influence on the traditional social institutions: religion, morals and so forth. While recognizing scientific and technological progress as a positive phenomenon, he was well aware that the power of science was relative and that it by no means canceled out religious values although it had an influence on immature minds. He wrote in the preface to *The Precipice*: “One should not sacrifice serious practical sciences to craven fears of an insignificant part of the harm that may come from the freedom and breadth of scientific activities. Even if there are among young scientists some whom the study of natural or exact sciences has led to extreme materialistic and negative conclusions, etc. These convictions will remain their personal business while their learned efforts will enrich science” [13, p. 156].

In principle, Goncharov solved the question of whether modern science could coexist with religion even before he wrote *A Common Story*. His views did not change in any important way after this. In 1881, the above-mentioned book by Solovyov, *Lectures on Godmanhood*, was published. In it Goncharov found thoughts which he shared, prompting him to write a letter to the philosopher. Solovyov stressed that the key feature of contemporary spiritual life was “the wish to organize mankind outside the unconditional religious sphere,” and that “this wish informed the entire modern civilization” [45, p. 3]. The book logically led to the conclusion that it was no longer possible to strengthen the shaken foundations of traditional religious thought by bluntly rejecting the achievements of the natural sciences and positivism. *Lectures on Godmanhood* was an attempt to marry religion and scientific empiricism to promote the Christian ideal on Earth. In this marriage religion, although “equipped with science,” was in the ascendant [28, p. 186].

Judging by his letter to Solovyov, Goncharov in any case agrees that religion and science should not oppose each other. He maintains that

Faith does not mind any ‘don’t knows’ and finds everything it needs in the boundless ocean. It has one weapon that is all-powerful for the believer, and that is feeling.

(Human) reason has nothing but the primary knowledge required for domestic, earthly life, i.e., the ABC of omniscience. In a very foggy, uncertain and distant perspective the bold pioneers of science hope some day to reach the secrets of the cosmos by the reliable road of science.

Contemporary science flickers with such feeble light that so far it merely gives an idea of the depth of our ignorance. Like an air balloon it rises over the Earth surface only to impotently fall back to Earth [20, p. 348].

It is interesting that Dostoyevsky described the state of contemporary science in a similar way: “Human science is still in its infancy—actually, it is only beginning its work” [9, pp. 191-192].

Let it be stressed that Goncharov’s worldview and his attitude to science and religion took shape not later than in the mid-1840s and did not change in princi-

ple, contrary to the view, prevailing among Goncharov scholars, that the writer “veered to the right” in the 1860s-1870s. What is surprising is Goncharov’s early religious and philosophical maturity: he was ahead of many of his contemporaries in his approach to the key 19th-century problem: how to live when “feelings of infantile faith cannot be brought back to the adult society” [20, p. 349].

While still at Moscow University, Goncharov pondered the co-existence of science and religious consciousness as a social problem that captured in its orbit not recent years or decades, but a whole millennium. The foundations of Goncharov’s worldview began to be laid when he was at university. There, attending the lectures of Stepan Shevyrev, he had a chance to reflect on the artistic experiment of Dante Alighieri in his three-part *Divine Comedy*: the great Italian’s work presented the perception of the current universe, corresponding to the latest scientific achievements of the time, and expressed the author’s ideal in its architectonics. Shevyrev had every reason to write: “He presents the world in accordance with the provisions of the Cosmology of his time. His thoughts about the Earth and the sky are not figments of his imagination or beliefs of common people, but knowledge accepted by the scientists of his age” [44, p. 142]. Shevyrev was undoubtedly a fan of Dante, having written a dissertation about him, which was the first in Russia (1833-1834). However, a complete change of the attitude to Dante’s work had occurred only a short while before. As early as 1822, professor Aleksey Merzlyakov of Moscow University wrote in his textbook about a “faulty composition of *Divine Comedy* that was often at odds with common sense” [36, p. 219]. These were echoes of pejorative references to *Divine Comedy* by representatives of Western Enlightenment, including Voltaire, who repeatedly criticized Dante. Mikhail Alekseyev wrote: “For Voltaire... the Middle Ages were an epoch of the decline of intellectual activity, of darkness, prejudice and fanaticism; not surprisingly, he considered *Divine Comedy* to be devoid of ‘taste’ and full of ‘fancy stuff,’ a view shared by the majority of his contemporaries” [1, pp. 158-159].

In his student years, the future writer first thought about creating not individual works, but a trilogy hinting at “Inferno” (Russian *Ad*—“hell” hinting at Aduyev), “Purgatory” (hinting at Oblomov related to the Russian word *oblomok* meaning “a chip off something,” neither inferno nor paradise) and *Rai* (the Russian word for “Paradise” hinting at Raisky). I already had occasion to write about the “Dantean” architectonics of Goncharov’s trilogy of novels [32, pp. 31-34; 30, pp. 140-144], but that was outside of the present reflections about early maturing of the conceptual and complete picture of the world at the center of which, according to Goncharov, is God the Creator and His relationship with man and humankind. We are here concerned not so much with Goncharov’s personal faith as with the foundations of his worldview; while his personal faith changed noticeably during the period between the 1830s and 1890s his worldview as a whole remained unchanged and was merely supplemented with a new set of themes and problems thrown up by Russia’s life. These themes and problems were particular in the complete picture of the Cosmos fitting neatly into this picture without changing the principles and foundations of Goncharov’s philosophy of life.

Going back to the essence of his artistic philosophy, let us say that the point is not only or largely that Goncharov was just about the only person in the first half of the 19th century who became aware of the important problem of rapid development of science and technology, and the cleavage of world history (“the loss of infantile faith” and precipitous “maturing” of mankind). What is important is that he aimed to work out his “program” of action to change the consciousness of his generation. Harbingers of this “program” are to be found in his early essay *Ivan Savich Podzhabrin* (1842), and later in his artistic-philosophical essay *Letters from a Metropolitan Friend to a Provincial Bridegroom* (1848).

Goncharov's historical optimism and his hope that humanity would survive “the whirlwind, the moment of a fierce clash,” would overcome the historical “precipice” and stick to its religious values are based not only on his faith in the good God's Providence for mankind, but also on his idea of the role of “beauty” in man's life. This idea was also conceived early on, during his time at university, above all the lectures of Nikolay Nadezhdin who, according to Goncharov, was worth “a dozen professors.” It was there, studying the monuments of ancient culture and its interpreters, above all Johann Winckelmann, that Goncharov became aware of the moral power and philosophical essence of plastic harmony, symmetry and sense of proportion attaching universal meaning to beauty and believing in its creative power. Religious consciousness, according to Goncharov, is inseparable from unconscious and (in advanced individuals) conscious striving for harmony and beauty. This is very evident in the novel *The Precipice*, especially the character of the artist Raisky. He experiences recurrent fits of ecstasy at the sight of beauty, more often of the plastic kind, but at peak moments of his spiritual life also spiritual beauty getting an inkling of the link between his desire for harmony and beauty and the involvement of the Creator in this wish, an understanding of His direct spiritual “guidance”: Raisky “looked and listened with horror to the wild impulses of his animal blind nature, himself condemned it and penned new laws, destroyed ‘the old man’ within himself and created a new one... With a throbbing heart and quiver of pure tears, he overheard, amidst filth and noise of passions, the quiet underground workings, within his human self, of some mysterious spirit which was sometimes drowned out by the crackling and smoke of impure fire, but did not die and woke up again, calling him, first quietly and then louder and louder, to the difficult and never-ending work on himself, on his own statue, the ideal of man.” Seeking to build his own “statue,” i.e., approximate the “ideal,” Raisky is guided by a sense of beauty: “He saw with a secret breath-taking horror of happiness, that the work of pure genius is not destroyed by the fire of passions, but merely pauses and once the fire is over, it moves forward, slowly and laboriously, but it moves... Tracing the thread of his life in his mind he recalled the fiendish pain that tormented him when he fell, how he slowly rose again, how gently the pure spirit woke him up nudging him to continue his endless work, helping him to his feet, cheering and consoling him and restoring his faith in the beauty of the truth and goodness and the strength to get up and go further and higher” [18, pp. 553, 554].

Here, Raisky is portrayed as a man who, in his quest for the ideal, is guided by the Holy Spirit (the process of man being guided by the Holy Spirit is what Goncharov describes here) and by his own need for beauty. The underlying theme of the novel is the creation of a human "statue," "the ideal," "the destruction of 'the old man' within himself and the creation of a new one." In that sense *The Precipice* is the most passionate of Goncharov's works directly corresponding to Paradise in Dante's *Divine Comedy*. Before finishing the novel, the writer confessed in a letter to Mikhail Stasyulevich: "In my novel Raisky's dreams, desires and prayers end like a triumphant chord in music, with an apotheosis of women, then Mother Russia and finally, God and Love. I... fear that my humble pen will not endure, will not measure up to my ideals and artistic and religious sentiments. But, God willing, my Faith will save me!" [13, p. 426].

For Goncharov, the supreme kind of beauty is spiritual beauty although even the best of his characters, being ordinary people, seldom soar to such heights, and more often fall and seek beauty beclouded by passions, self-deceit etc.

Goncharov began to reflect on the concept of beauty—initially under the influence of Nikolay Nadezhdin and then independently—as early as the 1830s proceeding from the works of Winckelmann [34, pp. 112-117], Schiller and Schelling. However, the works of the English thinker Anthony Shaftesbury<sup>6</sup> probably proved to be more important for him. He was the first to articulate what was the key idea for Goncharov, the idea that morality is inherent in human nature, in particular, in man's aesthetic leanings. Friedrich Schiller's influence on him was equally powerful. In Schiller's opinion, "there exists in his nature only a moral predisposition, which can be developed through the understanding, but rather even in his sensuous rational, i.e., human nature, an *aesthetical* tendency thereto" [42]. Goncharov's abiding attention to Schiller's interpretation of the moral ideal was manifested, for example, in his letter to Sofia Nikitenko of August 21, 1866: "You... look at human nature in a holy and exalted way, Schiller-like. May God help you to carry your beliefs to the end" [13, p. 362].

The aesthetic approach to human morality was first expressed in a vivid and almost conceptual manner in Goncharov's *Letters from a Metropolitan Friend to a Provincial Bridegroom* in the 1940s. The genre of "letters about beauty" can be traced to Schiller's *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man* and to *Sensus Communis, An Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour in a Letter to a Friend* by Shaftesbury. The latter also clearly assimilated along with the principle of the unity of morality and beauty specific ideas of plastic beauty as symmetry, proportion in ancient esthetics, something Goncharov felt a particular affinity with. In *An Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour in a Letter to a Friend* Shaftesbury, anticipating Goncharov's *Letters from a Metropolitan Friend to a Provincial Bridegroom*, writes about "the beauty of sentiments, the grace of actions, the turn of characters and the proportions" [43, p. 62]. In this curious work, genre-wise (it is reminiscent of a typical "physiological essay" but is essentially a philosophical essay in the spirit of Shaftesbury and Schiller) Goncharov tries to tackle head-on the problems that are left between the lines in his first novel, *A Common Story*.



The writer hopes that mankind will be able to deal with the weakening of the religious feeling caused by the scientific and technological breakthrough, for the religious feeling is inseparable from the quest of beauty, which is inherent in human nature. In the above-mentioned letter to Sofia Nikitenko he notes: "This is a lofty need characteristic only of human nature that animals do not have" [14, p. 316].<sup>7</sup>

Beauty is "a bridge" between the external and internal, "the biological" and spiritual in man. Goncharov believes that spiritual beauty is connected with bodily beauty. In *Letters from a Metropolitan Friend...* he shows that every person has a sense of beauty although they interpret it in different ways depending on their level of development: from vulgar "fashion" to spiritual beauty ("non-human," angelic). Goncharov insists that man is capable of developing and improving and can therefore "graduate" toward a spiritual, ideal feeling of beauty.

As I have said, beginning from the 1830s Goncharov does not merely state that religion is in a crisis, but dedicates himself to the task of working out an antidote exhibiting a didactic streak. He might have said, together with Raisky: "Though I shall not put on the frock, I can preach—sincerely and wherever I notice falsehood, pretense and malice—in short, the lack of beauty—even though I am sometimes ghastly myself" [18, p. 38]. In that sense the long-running dispute about the novelist's extraordinary objectivity,<sup>8</sup> on the one hand, and his well-disguised didacticism, on the other, must be resolved in favor of the latter. Without a doubt, there is a strong element of unconscious and even "creative" epicureanism in Goncharov's work, as he admitted on more than one occasion: "Creative work is a kind of epicureanism, pleasure derived from art is sensuous pleasure—whatever you might say, creative work is the highest irritation of the nervous system, intoxication of the brain and an intense state of the whole organism" [14, p. 285]. And elsewhere: "With... conscious writers the brain makes up for what the image has failed to convey—their works are often dry, bland, and incomplete; they appeal to the reader's brain and say little to imagination and feeling. They persuade, teach and assure us but they do not touch us. By contrast, when fantasy is excessive and there is less brain the meaning, the idea; the picture speaks for itself and the writer often becomes aware of the meaning with the help of some subtle interpreter, such as, for example, Belinsky and Dobrolyubov" [13, pp. 69-70].

Positioning himself largely as an absolutely "unconscious artist" (he constantly turned to Belinsky's definition), Goncharov is obviously exaggerating here. In another place, also exaggerating, he notes: "He would also cease to be an artist in case he distances himself from the image and takes the position of a thinker, a highbrow or moralist and preacher" [13, pp. 211-212]. Not surprisingly, such utterances from Goncharov elicited this response from Ivan Turgenev: "Incidentally, I cannot help expressing my opinion about 'unconscious and conscious creative work,' about 'preconceived ideas and tendencies,' about 'the use of objectivity, ingenuousness and naïvité,' about all these 'pitiful' words [the expression 'pitiful words' betrays the addressee of criticism, Zakhar in *Oblomov*

speaks about 'pitiful words'—*V. M.*], which, from whatever authoritative mouth they may come, have always struck me as commonplace, rhetorical small change which is not considered false only because too many take it to be genuine... We have recently seen a proliferation of pen-pushers who consider themselves to be 'unconscious authors' and choose 'living' plots; and yet they are riddled through and through with the much-maligned 'tendency' " [49, pp. 309-310].

On the other hand, Goncharov was himself a thinker, a "preacher" and felt irritated when people saw his work as nothing but "pictures": "Some did not see or did not want to see my images and pictures as anything but more or less vividly painted portraits, landscapes, perhaps accurate copies of mores—and nothing more. What is there to praise?" [13, pp. 69-70]. The article "The Intent, Tasks and Ideas of the Novel *The Precipice*" shows that Goncharov was a born preacher: "Art has a serious duty of softening and improving man... it must hold up an unflattering mirror to him with all the stupidities, incongruities and passions, with all the consequences, in short, it must shed light on all the depths of life, lay bare its hidden foundations and the whole mechanism—then knowledge of how to steer clear of all this will come with consciousness" [13, p. 212]. Nikita Prutskov writes in his monograph about Goncharov: "Every now and again the novelist approaches the borderline beyond which the domain of art gives way to... plain preaching. Goncharov's entire novelistic system is marked by a unique blend of amazing poeticism in plastic reproduction of characters and situations and rationality of methods, devices and forms of portrayal and assessments. One gets the impression that he wrote on inspiration but put the results of his inspirations in rational poetic forms" [40, pp. 7, 224].

Goncharov began to seriously portray "incongruities" and "passions" in *Ivan Savich Podzhabrin*. It seems to be a light-hearted comedy of manners readily revealing the clichés of plots and poetics of the "natural school" (a civil servant who rents flats and is "enjoying life"). In fact, like in *Letter from a Metropolitan Friend*, he touches upon a question he feels strongly about: a person's hankering after beauty while having a perverted idea of it (at the lowest, "zoological" level of spiritual development, as his name, related to the Russian word for "gills," suggests). Goncharov has a fascination for the image of Don Juan whom many of his characters resemble. The image of Don Juan in Goncharov's writings should be seen not only as proof of his remarkable ability to typify and elevate his local "types" to universal level, but also as a sign of his constant attention to the problem of beauty and man's ascent, through beauty, from "a pitiful creature" to "a decent person." There are many Don Juans in Goncharov's works, each with his own balance between dramatic and comical parody elements [35; 39, p. 20; 41]. Ivan Savich, like Alexander Aduyev, inhabits the "Inferno" created by Goncharov as early as the 1840s. Yet even in *Raisky* the serious aspect of Don Juanism goes hand-in-hand with a comical perception of his "search for beauty." Goncharov, following the design of *Divine Comedy*, preserves only the main trend of which he himself had this to say in the article *Better Late than Never*: "It was not until I had finished my novels and had put some distance and time between them and myself that their hidden message, meaning and idea became

clear to me. In vain did I wait for someone beside myself to read between the lines and, falling in love with my characters, bring them together and see what this whole is trying to say. But that did not happen" [13, p. 67].

Now that we know the logic of Goncharov's creative evolution that was already apparent in the 1830s and 1840s it is clear that "the idea" of the trilogy he refers to was already in his mind before he wrote *A Common Story*. Boris Engeldardt realized that Goncharov's *The Frigate Pallada* was also written before his journey, having in mind a certain idea: "Even before he left Petersburg, Goncharov knew what he would write and how." Although the scholar refers to a more specific matter ("He conceived of the essays about his journey as a sequel to *Oblo-mov*") and reduces everything to a literary hoax ("The literary meaning of the hoax was the struggle against Romanticism" [25, p. 16]), he was dead on regarding the spirit of *The Frigate Pallada*: the book expresses Goncharov's worldview more broadly and more openly than any other works, so its "philosophical part" was already in the author's mind long before the journey and was merely fleshed out with concrete observations. Goncharov had formed the "idea" long before, which does not only turn his novels into a trilogy, but lends integrity and completeness to his entire body of work. The challenge facing modern Goncharov scholars is to read between the lines and "link all the characters in one whole."

Goncharov hoped that the millennial turn in history (the change of modern man's religious consciousness under the influence of burgeoning science) would be overcome by the force with which the Creator invested human nature, and that is the quest for beauty. He devoted his work to portraying man's ascent, through progressive "humanization," from the "inferno" of faithlessness and passions toward the higher, spiritual beauty of Christ.

In my article, I have touched upon only some aspects of the whole complex of problems facing those researching the theme indicated in the title. Revealing the main motive force of Goncharov's work and creative plans of the 1830s and 1840s makes one think about reassessing Goncharov as a 19th-century literary figure and about reinterpreting many established ideas about his work.

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### Notes

- <sup>1</sup> The term "trilogy" appears in Goncharov bibliography since 1927 [48], but mainly as a summary reference to all the writer's novels.
- <sup>2</sup> The remark in a letter to Konstantin Kavelin of March 25, 1874 to the effect that "in a rigorous approach even Humboldt could do with more thorough training than he had" [13, p. 464], suggests that Goncharov was familiar with the German scholar's work, most probably with *The Cosmos* written in a popular style. Goncharov's reservation was prompted by the fact that Humboldt was a spontaneous materialist who attributed the development of nature to its internal forces and causes, something Goncharov could not agree with because he believed that the paths of faith and science were "parallel and infinite" and that science could never replace faith.
- <sup>3</sup> Goncharov's ideas are in some ways similar to those of the poet Aleksey Tolstoy's poem *A Message to M. N. Loginov on Darwinism* (1872), in which the poet does not defend Darwinism, but speaks about free self-expression of science and argues that rather than juxtaposing faith and science, they should be combined in the quest of the truth.
- <sup>4</sup> Goncharov was undoubtedly familiar with John Draper's *History of the Conflict Between Religion and Science* (1874). He probably read his *History of the Intellectual Development of Europe* (1862), which was popular in Russia in the mid-1860s and was translated into Russian (1866). Draper was a follower of the evolutionary ideas of Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer.
- <sup>5</sup> Flammarion devoted much effort to the study of Mars and wrote a book about the conditions for inhabiting it [10].
- <sup>6</sup> Although Goncharov never mentions his name he was undoubtedly familiar with Shaftesbury's philosophical works as witnessed by his essay *Letters from a Metropolitan Friend to a Provincial Bridegroom*.
- <sup>7</sup> This remarkable formula is a verbatim quotation from Goncharov's contemporary Hermann Ulrici, a German philosopher, natural scientist and theologian whose books were translated into Russian: "only man has the ability to intuit beauty, animals do not have it..." (quoted from [46, p. 192]).
- <sup>8</sup> This trend was initiated by Vissarion Belinsky: "He is a poet, an artist –nothing else. He has neither love nor hostility toward the characters he draws... he offers no moral lessons to us or to the reader, he seems to think: he who is in distress has to answer, it is none of my business. Of all the modern writers, he and he alone approaches the ideal of art for art's sake... Goncharov has nothing except talent; he is more of a poet and artist than anyone today" [2, pp. 326-327].

*Translated by Yevgeny Filippov*

## “Nestor of Slavic Studies”: 125th Birth Anniversary of Dmitry Chizhevsky

*Ella ZADOROZHNYUK*

*Abstract.* I have posed myself the task to reveal the richness of Dmitry Chizhevsky's ideas related to Slavic cultures and the importance of their mutual enrichment. His studies of Slavic philology and, to a lesser extent, German-Slavic philology convinced him that different ethnic forms of manifestation of the truth of beauty, sanctity and justice are assessed by the degree of their peculiarities. These individual traits shed light on absolute values from different angles which means that the national constants of the Slavic peoples and their cultures are individual, self-sufficient and equal only in the universal context.

*Keywords:* history, Slavic cultures, Slavic philology and German-Slavic philology, cultural unification, universal context, Comeniology, Chizhevsky studies.

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On April 4, 2019, the world of Slavic studies and a large part of the Slavic world marked the 125th birth anniversary of Dmitry Chizhevsky known, and with good reason, in academic circles as “Nestor of Slavic studies.” The high value of his works in many spheres of Slavic studies were discussed and appreciated in tens of books and hundreds of articles written in scores of different tongues. Ukrainian researchers, working in Ukraine and outside it, are the leaders with the greatest number of works to their names. In the first twenty years of the new century, fundamental works by Chizhevsky and about him have already appeared in Russia in the Russian language: in her article [7, p. 124], Irina Fedoriv uses the Ukrainian term (that has already been accepted in its own right) “chizhevskoznavstvo” to discuss and assess his works including *Hegel in Russia* [3], the first volume of his three-volume biography edited by Wladimir Yanzen [5] and the monograph of late Nina Nadyarnykh [11]. One should also mention

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Chizhevsky's other works, including his first publications (in particular, four volumes of his philosophical works in Ukrainian) [4], and numerous articles about him that appeared in journals dealing with scores of different subjects.

In Russia, the interest in Chizhevsky and his creative legacy is gradually albeit slowly reviving without so far any noticeable results. Russian experts in Slavic studies have justly pointed to this and deemed it necessary to say that he “belongs to the elite of world Slavic studies” [10, p. 83].

This anniversary marked an important turn to comprehensive revival. These efforts were expected and very much needed by the academic circles since even purely academic studies of the subtlest philological aspects of Chizhevsky's works echo in politics. Throughout his life, he remained immersed in his analysis of Slavic cultures and the processes of their interaction during the far from favorable times when they existed under pressure (of Germany in the first place) during two world wars. In 1919 and 1945, they left the Slavic world and its cultures in the state of cultural “micro-wars” between neighboring peoples.

In his works, Chizhevsky brought together the strictly scientific approach and a vehement protest against external pressure and internal wars. His works are a convincing argument in favor of interaction of these cultures which diachronically and synchronically enriches the cultures of all other European peoples and mankind as a whole. Irina Fedoriv has written with a great deal of reason that Chizhevsky avoided excessive emphasis on “resemblances and differences” of Slavic (including Russian and Ukrainian) cultures and insisted that they were not just additions to or copies of European culture and that without them Europe would have never been Europe [7, p. 131].

The authors of books and articles about Chizhevsky and of introductions to his books invariably write that the richness of his ideas stands in bolder relief against the background of his biography that can be described as tragic for any scholar. Contrary to the disastrous living circumstances or, probably, thanks to them, Chizhevsky was faithfully performing his duty to the science of culture, Slavic, in the first place, and the cause of mutual understanding between all peoples. He promptly caught up and deciphered the ethnically colored specifics of this culture; he worked with the deepest cultural layers and their philosophical meanings related to the subtleties of philological material.

Nobody of those who study Chizhevsky and his works or even those who turn to his works in search of adequate materials (there is a rich choice) would have disagreed with what N. Nadyarnykh wrote, in her time, about his authority of a scholar: “At first I could not imagine the scope of his intellectual grandeur. I was lucky to have Husserl to rely on. When recommending Dmitry Chizhevsky to a teaching post at the University of Halle, he wrote: ‘This is a highly educated philosopher who thinks independently on the basis of his *Slavic studies*; he is interested mainly in *Hegel*; at the same time, he is highly interested in phenomenology and demonstrates an amazing scope of erudition in highly varied fields of culture’ [11, p. 3]. The italicized words were meant to disclose the specifics of perception of both Hegel and *phenomenology* by representatives of the Slavic peoples. For example, they were the first to successfully perceive and pro-



foundly interpret the achievements of Western thought, say, of German classical philosophy; French and British were trailing behind.

Edmund Husserl said this late in the 1920s; late in the 1960s, Hans-Georg Gadamer, the leading German philosopher of the latter half of the 20th century who had done a lot to help Chizhevsky acquire a post in Heidelberg University, said at the celebration of Chizhevsky's 75th birthday: "Long ago, Friedrich the Great allegedly said about Leibnitz that he was the entire Academy personified; you may, within the narrower and wider frames of our century, claim the same" (quoted from [5, p. 401]). Long before that, some of the Western scholars called him "Nestor of Slavic studies"; others spoke of him as a highly original philologist of the phenomenological and hermeneutic philosophical schools, still others, as a humanitarian-universalist. Prior to the early 1980s, the Soviet Union deliberately ignored him, mainly for ideological reasons, even if many of the prominent scholars were aware of the impact of this giant.

His life was far from easy; it was burdened by circumstances of his personal life. The great scholar could repeat at each and every turn of his fortunes the words of St. Matthew: "Foxes have dens and birds have nests, but the Son of Man has no place to lay his head" (Matthew 8:20). Some of his problems were created by circumstances, while others, by his Baroque personality. His creative, albeit frequently antithetic, power of creative synthesis defined his life and his scholarly trajectories as well as the trajectories of prominent thinkers that he had studied in depth. Here are their names: Jan Amos Komensky (Moravia-Germany-Poland-Holland-England-Sweden-Transylvania-Holland); Theophan Prokopovich (Rome-Germany-St. Petersburg) and Gregory Skovoroda (St. Petersburg-Moscow-Hungary-Vienna plus travels across Ukraine, his native land). Chizhevsky covered a more or less similar road. He spent his youth in the Kherson Gubernia where he was born; he studied in St. Petersburg and later in Kiev; in 1921, he had to emigrate to Poland and later, in 1924, to Prague where he lived and worked till his move to Halle in 1932. During the hard times, he worked on the problems of German-Slavic philology at the University of Halle (where he found the lost text of Czech Jan Amos Komensky). His emigration continued in Marburg from 1945; in Harvard between 1949 and 1956, where amid practically total rejection he laid the foundations of contemporary Slavic studies. His creative and physical life ended in Heidelberg where he died on April 18, 1977.

In his work "On the Problems of Baroque" published in the literary journal *Zagrava* in Augsburg in 1946, he wrote: "Frequently, it is hard to say why Baroque people are attracted to other countries—whether by their own desire or they are driven by disorder and poverty" [4, p. 75]. This is true. Let's have a look at the American period of his life and creative activities. He knew about ten foreign tongues but never learned English. He stirred up hardly explainable conflicts even with those of his colleagues who were well disposed to him—Roman Jakobson and other Slavists, with the administration of the University and students who did not bother to learn the subject. The problems were further exacerbated by poor living conditions, low salary, etc. Manfred Schrubba wrote that "Chizhevsky did not find his place in Harvard; the American academic com-

munity remained highly alien to him” [14, p. 64]. Judging by his vast correspondence, Chizhevsky perceived America as culturally alien despite the fact that it offered refuge to his wife who was a doctor and his daughter who became a prominent expert in Slavic studies. It was separated from the Slavic and German worlds dear to his heart. America responded by refusal to recognize his authority of a scholar even though later many of his former colleagues accepted it.

His relations with the Ukrainian émigré diaspora were far from simple; he avoided its highly politicized and biased groups while the touching respect of the Ukrainian national cultural values was obvious in his works. Starting with the 1920s, he had been avoiding the highly politicized slogans of Ukrainian émigré circles. On the one hand, elected in 1918 to the Central Rada from the Russian Social-Democratic Workers’ Party (Mensheviks), he voted against Ukrainian independence and supported the principles of federalism. On the other, he was contemplated, for some time, as a possible minister of labor in the government of the Ukrainian People’s Republic and as such came close to being executed by Bolsheviks in 1918. In 1921, they sentenced him to death for the illegal crossing of the Soviet-Polish border. In emigration, tired of politics, he moved away from Menshevism and Ukrainian nationalism to concentrate on academic studies. His studies of the deep roots of Ukrainian culture strongly affected all those who studied Ukraine in Prague and in Germany; he raised Ukrainian studies to the high and practically inaccessible level while working in Harvard. His daughter Tatyana Chizhevsky followed in his footsteps first in Harvard and later in the Wayne University.

It should be said that he was steadily widening the scope of his research within the frames of Slavic studies as a whole through comprehensive analysis of cultures of practically all Slavic peoples. His works raised the status of German-Slavic philology as a field of studies in its own right. He, however, carefully avoided any publications on this subject during the war in order not to invite disclosures of any, even if real, German impacts on Slavic culture and, by the same token, highly politicized discourse. At the same time, he was never shy to criticize unifying totalitarian trends in culture in its Soviet and Nazi variants. In the hardest conditions in Nazi Germany, he demonstrated a lot of ingenuity to support inmates in concentration camps, Jews and Slavs brought to Germany as slaves.

He remained loyal to his principles of deciphering cultural codes especially in places of their intersection, despite his personal problems that could have been easily settled by compromises. His firm uncompromising position on everything related to science made him the target of base lies and denunciations. This is amply confirmed by the materials of his autobiography, reminiscences and letters.

In July 1945, he answered the request of the American military administration with a concise autobiography: “My life brought me from Russia to Poland, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Holland, Sweden, etc. In all these places, I could see that the borders, into which history squeezed these countries, do no good to the economies and cultures of these countries and their peoples. A clear lesson of what Europe would be without reconciliation of peoples was given to us by Hitler’s Europe with its human horrors and material poverty” [5, p. 57]. In 1953,

he wrote that he had been suffering because of denunciations: “Two years ago those who wanted to harm somebody denounced that he was a ‘Nazi’; today, the accusation of being a Communist is preferred” [5, p. 153]. He could not find a job worthy of his genius in Germany because of denunciations; for the same reason it took him a lot of time to depart to the United States; having arrived there, he was confronted with suspicions of his colleagues.

He described his hardships in an epic and somewhat humorous style; they were a background noise of his scholarly studies. He plunged deep into the cultural codes of different peoples and discovered the sources of mutual understanding between their carriers.

He was engrossed in these studies at the harshest of times. On June 2, 1942, he wrote to Alfred Böhm: “I am arranging the *Slavic* department of the *Hungarian* institute in *Berlin* where I discovered several extremely rare *Czech* books of the 16th-17th centuries and even several lost or totally unknown books: *Psalms of Netolický* (1562) so far known from the index of banned books; one primer of the 18th century, two collections of *Czech* poems published by Count Sporn, several (about ten) *Czech* and *Polish* greeting poems published in the 17th-18th centuries in Wittenberg by *Czech* exiles, etc. There are manuscripts, which I have not yet studied” [11, p. 20]. The italicized words in the letter written in *Russian* reflect the widest range of his work.

Chizhevsky identified the legacy of Jan Amos Komensky as the central Bohemistic subject discovered and rediscovered by *Czechs*. “Looking back at what has been done, I admit that *Czechs* will be probably more interested in my works and for a longer time: discovery of manuscripts of Komensky, studies of Church-Slavonic literature in the *Czech* lands and, probably, commentaries to *Czech* mediaeval songs and my work on the *Czech* Baroque literature. My studies of *Russian* and *Slovak* poets and thinkers will be probably neglected in both countries as being far removed from Marxist ideology” [12, p. 26].

Jan Amos Komensky was born in 1593 in South Moravia and died in 1670 in Amsterdam, far from his native land very much like Chizhevsky several centuries later. This was not his choice; his ancestors had moved from Slovakia to *Czechia*, he studied at Heidelberg University (where Chizhevsky worked during his last years). Like Chizhevsky, he left his hostile native country for Poland where he was successfully engaged in pansophy (teaching everything to everyone); he personally realized his pedagogical ideas in England and Hungary; in 1656, he moved to Amsterdam. It was in the archives of Halle (where he taught Slavic literatures and languages since 1932) that Chizhevsky discovered the manuscript of *Pansophy* of four thousand pages that had been believed to be irretrievably lost. He personally typed it, supplied with commentaries amid the raging destructive war. In his commentaries “On the Comeniological Works of Dmitry Chizhevsky,” Jan Patočka wrote: “All of us who study the works of Komensky should be grateful for all times to Chizhevsky” [5, p. 330].

Seven years later after the discovery of *Pansophy* (in 1941, the year of German aggression against the Soviet Union), Chizhevsky published in Prague his book *Ukrainian Literary Baroque* in which he interpreted the Slavic Baroque as

an important phenomenon of world culture. He was convinced that *Pansophy* was another evidence of the universal and comprehensive nature of the Baroque. The discovery of this manuscript can be interpreted as an awakening of a generation of Slavists dedicated to the studies of how this style manifested itself in their cultures and the cultures connected not only with the Slavic peoples. Having comprehensively studied the creative works of Gregory Skovoroda as a representative of the Baroque, he placed this Ukrainian thinker between German mystics and representative of the pre-Romanticism. He connected Skovoroda with the bucolic motives in poetry of the Western and Southern Slavs. He detected certain pansophic traits in the Skovoroda's instructions to future generations also noted by Russian Slavists [18]. The parallels drawn by Chizhevsky between the ideas of Komensky and Ukrainian spiritual writer Ivan Vyshensky (about 1550—after 1621) deserve special mention.

The all-Slavic nature of the Baroque is the main concept of Chizhevsky's, the deciphering of which leads to an analysis of interactions of cultures of practically all Slavic nations, including Russian, Belorussian and Ukrainian. Referring to the Ukrainian culture, Chizhevsky pointed out that it had been Simeon of Polotsk (born in Belorussia) who brought the Baroque poetry to Moscow. This thought is invariably present in the works of the scientists of the Institute of Slavic Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences [1; 15; 16].

Coming back to Chizhevsky's ideas about Baroque and their impact on Czech scholars, it should be said that he launched vast debates of this subject by opening a highly fruitful discussion of the subject with historians of literature S. Souček and J. Vašica, F. Šalda and A. Novak; later, this created a generation of baroque students. In one of his letters to Alfred Böhm, he pointed out that in 1942 he had got 12 letters from Czechs and only two from Russians and two from Ukrainians [11, p. 24]. Later, he did not abandon his active correspondence with Czechs, not necessarily agreeable. Back in 1933, he had published in a German journal his highly critical opinion about a book by Ferdinand Pelikán on contemporary Russian philosophy. Boris Yakovenko defended the author by accusing his compatriot of “defamation” [2, pp. 52-52].

In 1968, Chizhevsky had been ready to present his paper on all-Slavic Baroque at the Slavic Congress in Prague yet on August 18, 1968 when big groups of Slavists had already gathered in the auditorium he suddenly announced that he would not present his paper since his works had been for many years ignored in the Soviet Union. Three days later, his amazing statement acquired political dimensions when armies of its neighbors entered Czechoslovakia. Chizhevsky, meanwhile, resumed his academic studies and never demonstrated any vehement anti-Soviet sentiments. His demarche at the congress in Prague was an outcrop of his rejection of Soviet power and the threats that had forced him to move from Halle (the Eastern zone of occupation) to Marburg (in the Western zone) and lose once again his archive and library. He had no intention to join the ranks of political fighters or accusers; he was deeply immersed in his studies. Hence is an extremely ambivalent attitude to him among the radical-minded members of the Ukrainian diaspora.

It was in Czechoslovakia or, to be more exact, in Prague that

(a) Chizhevsky established close or even friendly relations with Russian thinkers, Semyon Frank in the first place, and, to a much lesser extent, with Ukrainians;

(b) he cooperated with the Prague Linguistic Circle by planning for some of his members (Jan Mukařovský in particular, whom he taught Russian and Ukrainian and who after the war became rector of Charles University in Prague) an exit beyond the dominant structural-functional paradigm;

(c) he relied on narratology to identify the trend of his studies as moving to phenomenology and, in particular, to the phenomenological personality theories by which he meant the scope of phenomena embraced by personality—and the manifestation of the world through the subject-ness of the personality (presentation of “Self” through the world and the world through “Self”). Jan Patočka, his Czech colleague, worked on this set of problems; Polish phenomenologist Roman Ingarden developed the same line in aesthetics. All of them were Husserl’s students.

Chizhevsky not only maintained contacts with Ingarden but also organized a group of Polish Slavists to conduct a comprehensive analysis of *Pan Tadeusz* by Adam Mickiewicz. In Slovakia, he was interested in Ludevít Štúr and his ideas which he analyzed in a voluminous work. In Bulgaria, he carefully studied the Tyrnovo School of theology and literature of the 14th-15th centuries close to hesychasm and spreading it across the Slavic world. Chizhevsky analyzed the cultures of other South Slavic nations—Serbs and Croats in the first place as well as Macedonians and Slovenes and pointed out that the traditions of euhemerism (the interpretation, according to which mythological accounts are presumed to have originated from real historical events) were present in the cultures of all peoples of the Slavic South. Translations of Greek authors, condemnation of heretics, hagiography as cultural phenomena came to the Eastern Slavic world from Bulgaria and, to a lesser extent, Serbia.

In the 19th century, wrote Chizhevsky, there had been an opposite movement. He indicated that euphony and musicality typical of Shevchenko’s poetry was successfully recoded by Croatian poets Vladimir Nazor and Miroslav Krleža and Slovenians Oton Župančič and Srečko Kosovel [6, p. 58].<sup>1</sup>

It was on the materials of Slavic studies and, to a slightly lesser extent, German-Slavic philology that Chizhevsky arrived at one of his fundamental conclusions: different ethnic forms of manifestations of absolute truth of beauty, sanctity and justice are assessed by degrees of their specifics. Their individual specifics shed light on absolute values from new, hitherto absent, angles. “It is absolutely clear how the question of the relationships between nation and mankind, between the national and the common to all mankind should be approached from this point of view: each nation discloses one of the sides while the ideal common to all survives thanks to these specific individually realized disclosures. This explains why each nation in its specifics and originality, in its ‘one-sidedness’ and ‘restrictions’ is eternally and universally important in the same way as varied human individuals are alive in society, as highly varied

nations are united in mankind. Mankind can exist through them and in them” [11, pp. 41-42]. National constants in culture are individual, self-sufficient and equal precisely in the common historical context, wrote Chizhevsky.

He relied on genuinely humanistic foundations to interpret the content of many concepts of Ukrainian philosophy, such as cardiocentrism, which points to the heart rather than mind as the source of meanings. He discovered corresponding ideas in works of German mystics. His ability to hear the quietest word hidden behind false scholarly constructs allowed him to arrive at the boldest conclusions.

He demonstrated the same “delicacy” at the crossing points of different thought-forms. His brilliant essay “G. S. Skovoroda and German Mysticism” published in 1929 is the best example.<sup>2</sup> Chizhevsky indicated that cardiocentrism was present in the works of German mystics Sebastian Franck and Jacob Böhme, while the mysticism of “the Teutonic genius” can be found in the thoughts of the Ukrainian “old man” (how Skovoroda was called).<sup>3</sup>

The comparison of the Judaizers with the Czech Hussites in Muscovite Rus in his paper “West European Philosophy in Old Ukraine (the 15th-18th centuries)” read in Berlin in 1927 deserves special mention. Both were heretics from the points of view of the Catholic and Orthodox Churches respectively. The latter demonstrated a lot of activity in Novgorod and Moscow in the late 15th—early 16th centuries; the teaching developed, in particular thanks to the efforts of diplomat Fyodor Kuritsyn. Many other names were lost—their bearers were exterminated “with fire and sword” [4, p. 99].

Chizhevsky’s work on the philosophy of Hegel [3] that was recently published in Russia is part of his impressive project “Hegel and the Slavs,” the initiative beyond the potentials of many others. His book *The Philosophy of Life of Ludevít Štúr* (1941) in Slovak and the fundamental article “Hegel and the Slovaks” (1961) in German faithfully reflected his perception of the leading representatives of the Slovak thought. His materials on the perception of the philosophy of Hegel by other Slavic peoples are still waiting for careful and attentive researchers. The project should be presented in its entirety as an important or even the most important element of German-Slavic studies and the decoding of the moment of meeting of varied cultures. So far, enigmas predominate or even multiply.

Dmitry Chizhevsky defended his thesis in Germany in 1933. His book *Hegel in Russia* was first published in German in 1934; its second edition appeared in 1961. It was published in Russian in Paris in 1939; its Ukrainian translation was part of the four-volume edition [4]. It betrayed the typically Chizhevsky method of discovering philosophy on philology and vice versa, later borrowed as a creative instrument by Mikhail Bakhtin, Georgy Gachev, Sergej Averintsev, etc.

Chizhevsky presented Hegel as an important or even dominant figure who changed the Slavic world which he short of despised and showed us that demonstrative<sup>4</sup> inattention to this world did not exclude that any system of thought could exist in wide social and cultural contexts. The Slavic world was not an exception: J. G. Herder [8] spoke of it as a culture-creating part of Europe.<sup>5</sup>

Chizhevsky was one of the first to describe direct contacts, in February 1830, between the German philosopher and Russian thinkers, in particular, with Ivan Kireyevsky, the future leader of Slavophiles. Andrzej Walicki has pointed out that in Russia (and in Poland) Hegel's philosophy was much more important than the ideas of any other Western thinker, hence the phenomenon of "Orthodox Hegelianism." Orientated at revolution rather than preservation, it never became the dominant trend [17, p. 339]. Tomáš Masaryk had said this before Walicki and even earlier than Chizhevsky. He insisted that Ivan Turgenev was obliged to Hegel for his interest in the philosophy of history and for his understanding of the laws of historical development and progress which made the word "forward" his philosophical and socio-political slogan [9, pp. 297-298]. I should add that it was Chizhevsky who offered the most comprehensive characteristics of one of the "Hegelians" described by Turgenev and of the "nihilists" who replaced them in his novel *Fathers and Sons*.

It should be noted that Chizhevsky disagreed with Masaryk who had said (and was supported by Russian émigré researchers) that Slavophiles had been impressed by Schelling, while Westerners tended to Hegel. Chizhevsky had the following to say on this score: "To a great extent, the ideas of Herder about the historical mission of each nation, about a special place of Slavs in history together with a wide range of concepts, schemes and words ('Spirit,' 'World Spirit' and 'Spirit of the Nation') that are clear and acceptable to each Hegelian arrived to Russia in the form created by Slovak Slavophile Ján Kollár in his articles on 'Slavic reciprocity' in 1830-1843. The idea of Slavic mission, as we will see later, was not, by far, the main idea of Russian Hegelians and never moved to the center of their ideas. Russian Hegelianism was and remained a theory. The turn to Slavophilic 'practice'—in the same way as the turn to the 'philosophy of deed' of radical politicians was practically invariably interpreted by Russian Hegelians as a retreat not only from Hegel but also from philosophy in general. Russian Hegelians never expected *direct* solution of practical questions from philosophy" [3, p. 27].

Chizhevsky detected a trepidation of sorts in the texts by Slavic thinkers (not only Russians and Ukrainians, but also Slovak Štúr and Pole August Cieszkowski) about Hegel, an attitude absent in the Roman and Anglo-Saxon worlds. It was Chizhevsky who registered this attitude to Hegel in a variety of texts, which is his indisputable merit.<sup>6</sup>

Chizhevsky supported the opinion that perception of Hegel's ideas in Russia was somewhat warped with a multitude of examples and observations that made him a unique past-master of decoding mutual influence of cultures and, what is even more important, the moment of their compatibility. This requires an awareness of national specifics of details which creates new perspectives from which the qualities of cultures are seen and are not deprived of their identities. Generally, Chizhevsky was convinced that the values of mankind's common culture should be assessed not by "either... or" but by "and... and." An assessment of his contribution to the analysis of these values will require some time.

We can even say that Chizhevsky's *Hegel in Russia* raises the level of studies of the assimilation of other prominent Western thinkers by the world of Russian or, wider, Slavic culture, be it emotionless Kant, fiery Nietzsche, and even Marx. Chizhevsky's works stand apart from what has already been written on the subject: they open new horizons of thinking.

I turned to this purely historical-philosophical subject—Hegelianism in Russia and the Slavic countries—because Chizhevsky had revealed, much clearer than others, this philosophic trend as a historical-cultural phenomenon comparable in its universality with the Slavic Baroque in the past centuries and Futurism in Slavic literatures.<sup>7</sup> These observations are substantiated in many of his texts and are waiting for deciphering by future Russian scholars.

When marking the 125th birth anniversary of Chizhevsky, we should point to the great importance for contemporary culture of his rich ideas on the cultures of Slavic peoples and the methods of their mutual enrichment for the Slavic world as well, while its peoples are temporarily experiencing a period of mutual misunderstanding. This phenomenon is alien to the very nature of this world which is confirmed by Chizhevsky's selfless life and his incredibly rich creative work.

Chizhevsky's creativity and its cultural, philological and philosophical scope in the first place demonstrate an important vector orientated at cultural unity of peoples of the Slavic area, Europe and the world. The fragmentary nature of many of his works (mainly caused by his fate that forced him to move from one place to another) throws this vector into bolder relief. Everybody agrees that it is highly important to turn to his texts today at the time of numerous fault lines enforced by factors that are alien to culture. Chizhevsky who lived through many periods of this sort (in particular during the enmity between the German and the Slavic worlds which forced him to postpone the publication of his works on German-Slavic philology) was never tired of saying that in any historical time there is no alternative to cultural unity. “Nestor of Slavic studies” interpreted this as identical to historical existence.

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### Notes

- <sup>1</sup> Chizhevsky did not exhaustively studied the extent to which Shevchenko influenced the Slavic world; his impact was extremely wide and fruitful (for more detail, see [19, pp. 242-267]. He preferred to compare the ideas of the Ukrainian poet not so much with the works of P. J. Šafárik as, for example, with the works of Left Hegelian David Strauß leaving the contacts of the first type, as if deliberately, to future German Slavists.
- <sup>2</sup> For extracts from the paper read in 1929, see [13].
- <sup>3</sup> There is another, according to Chizhevsky, personified and distanced in time meeting place of these elements: poetry of Rainer Maria Rilke that successfully combined mysticism and cardiocentrism.
- <sup>4</sup> Or carefully concealed if we remind our readers the well-known quote from the letter of Hegel to Berend Johann von Uexküll: "You are happy, because you have a Fatherland that occupies a considerable space in world history... Other contemporary states, it seems, have already mostly reached their development aims and, probably, have left the highest point of their devel-

opment behind and entered the stationary stage. Russia is probably has become the most powerful among all other states; internally it has huge development potentials of its intensive nature. You are lucky to claim by birth and due to your wealth, talents and knowledge not only a subordinate position in this huge building” [3, p. 26].

- <sup>5</sup> The German thinker predicted great future to the Slavic peoples and was convinced that Ukraine “would become a new Greece.” Chizhevsky liked to quote Herder’s statements and deliberations of this type.
- <sup>6</sup> It is interesting in this respect to quote Chizhevsky as saying that August Cieszkowski who had perceived the ideas of Hegel to the extent that there appeared an apocryphal story that the German thinker had handed the Polish philosopher a ring as his successor. This could not have happened because the Pole was 17 when the German thinker died.
- <sup>7</sup> There is another cultural phenomenon shared by all Slavs and diligently analyzed by Chizhevsky and R. Jakobson—the elements of Slavic mythology in poetry of Velimir Khlebnikov and Nikolay Aseev as well as Czech and Polish Futurist poets (see [11, p. 317]).

*Translated by Valentina Levina*

## Russia-XXI: A View from the Near Abroad

*Alexander LUKIN*

Reviewed book: А. К. НУРША. Путинская Россия: Геополитический реванш или агрессивная оборона? Алматы: Gerona, 2018. 672 с.

A. K. NURSHA. *Putin's Russia: Geopolitical Revenge or Aggressive Defense?* Almaty: Gerona, 2018. 672 p.

*Keywords:* Russia, foreign policy, Russian studies, Central Asia, Kazakhstan.

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The Soviet Union's collapse, among other consequences, led to an interesting phenomenon in the field of social sciences: the emergence of Russian-language research independent of Russia in the former Soviet republics. This made Russian a really international language in social sciences: it is used by scholars in Ukraine, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kirgizia, and Azerbaijan. This should not mean that social sciences in national languages are stalling. Yet, first of all, not just anyone, at least in some of the new independent states, have a good command of those national languages, which means that in some of the multinational republics, Russian still remains the language of inter-ethnic communication and, second, the audience of publications in Russian is much bigger than that of the works written in the tongues of the post-Soviet republics. English can be used for this purpose, yet so far, command of Russian in the post-Soviet space is much better. English-language publications are addressed to a very different audience while the majority of authors in the post-Soviet states seek recognition in the post-Soviet space. Today, we can watch how Russian-language humanitarian studies are taking shape outside Russia's borders.

This phenomenon is not unique: there is English-language academic writing

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and fiction in India, Pakistan and South Africa, all of them independent from Britain; and there is French-language literature in the former French colonies in Africa. In Russia, we are more interested, for obvious reasons, in the non-Russian studies of Russia written in Russian. Even though they have some specifics and are not completely developed, they offer us a view of ourselves from a very close distance. Our history and many of our problems shared by the post-Soviet states are much better understood there than anywhere else in the world.

The reviewed book, written by a well-known Kazakhstani political scientist and expert in international relations Askar Nursha who deals with the Putin's period of the political history of Russia, is one of the best examples of the trend discussed above. It is not only evidence of the high quality of political science in Kazakhstan but also a truthful reflection of the situation over there.

The author has pointed out in Introduction that he does not provide an exhaustive coverage of all aspects of Russia's political realities but concentrates on the general trend of Russia's post-Soviet history, its main directions and possible repercussions for his country. "I have posed myself the task to look at everything that is going on in Russia and at its relations with the other post-Soviet countries. As its closest neighbor, Kazakhstan, first of all, interacts with Russia on a wide range of bilateral, regional and international issues. Second, Kazakhstan exists in their common information and linguistic communicative spaces. Third, it is involved in building an integrational project and a common regional defense space. In these capacities, Kazakhstan affects, to a certain extent, Russia's policy, while being an object of interest of its external policy" (pp. 14-15). A. Nursha formulates his main foreign policy issue in his book's subtitle: Has Putin taken a geopolitical revenge (as many of Russia's opponents in the West see it) or forcefully defended his country (as people in Russia define it). The answer supplied by the author (who does not belong either to Russian or Western academic communities) is especially interesting.

The book is arranged in chronological order; its main part is divided into historical stages. Chapter One, Domestic and Foreign Policy of V. Putin in 2000-2008, covers his first presidential term. The title of Chapter Two, Medvedev as President (that covers the period from 2008 to 2012), means that the author includes Medvedev's presidency in the Putin period. Chapter Three, Putin Returns: Was He Expected?, covers the years 2012-2014. The final chapter deals with the post-Crimea period, which, according to the author, stands apart from the previous periods. Each chapter is divided into three parts covering the three issues which the author finds most interesting: the relations between Russia and the United States and the West; Russia's policy in the post-Soviet space; and the evolution of Russia's internal policy.

While analyzing in Chapter One, the colder relations between Russia and the West, Askar Nursha talks about the simultaneous effects of the internal and external factors. The former stemmed from bitter disappointment in the Yeltsin period that, on the whole, was negatively assessed by the Russian society, because "Russia lost a considerable share of the Soviet Union's international positions and weight and a considerable part of the territory previously under geopolitical

and military-strategic control of the Union center.” As a result, “the Russian society and the political elite painfully reacted to the loss by their country of the superpower status” (p. 19). The external factor was created by highly contradictory experience of cooperation with the West in the 1990s. The Yeltsin period “remained in public consciousness of Russians as a time of geopolitical disillusion, the country’s political weakness on the international arena and its continued retreat from the old strategic positions including its concessions to the West.” The author offers a comprehensive answer to the question why Russia had dropped its attempts to join the Western international system and moved to confrontation: this happened due to two reasons, i.e., because the West was hostile and because the Soviet anti-Western political culture was revived.

Assessing Russia’s policy in relation to the post-Soviet states, the author has pointed out that even when Eurasian integration was not very important for Moscow, the latter “was demonstrating increasing coolness toward the CIS and the gradually growing awareness that the center of activity should be transferred to the CSTO and the Customs Union, which was taking shape” (p. 131).

Analyzing the political situation inside the country, the author has described in detail the mechanism and stages of consolidation of the vertical power structure created due to objective necessity to streamline the system of governance and factor in the interests of the new elite. This is especially interesting since, according to the author, it is wrong to say that by the end of the 1990s, the political system of Russia was completely unbalanced and to “ascribe the achievements of political stabilization to the next generation of the country’s leaders” (p. 133). He has written that confrontation between Vladimir Putin and the oligarchs was inevitable, “since the president’s course at stronger central power meant that the influence of the clans and groups of pressure on the Kremlin would be limited.” The author has also written that “Vladimir Putin began actively building up a new system of checks and balances, he moved his own team to the top and increased the distance between himself and those of the oligarchs who had done nothing to consolidate his presidential positions” (p. 135). The author has pointed out that the Kremlin established control over the State Duma and the Federation Council which did nothing good to the status of the parliament and its role in politics. By the same token, the presidential administration gathered more weight to become “a de facto center of political decision-making” (p. 140). While taking note that the West was very critical of these changes, the author has chosen to avoid assessments and stick to facts and events. Regional politics that brought a new and more centralized model of federative relations are discussed in one of the parts of Chapter One (p. 179).

The chapter dealing with Medvedev’s presidency, supplied with the telltale subtitle “new wine in new bottles,” contains a detailed and, on the whole, objective picture of the country’s external and internal life. The author mainly blames Washington for the failure of the so-called reset of relations between Russia and the United States and points to the reaction of the anti-Western part of the Russian elite to what it assessed as “excessively pro-Western” opinions of the president of Russia.

The first years of the second presidency of Vladimir Putin are described as “dangerous maneuvering” of Russia and the West. In the domestic policy of Russia, they are defined as the “conservative-patriotic turn.” In the last chapter that covers the “post-Crimea period,” the author uses the term “Ice Age” to define Russia’s relations with the West. For obvious reasons, his analysis of Russia’s relations with the post-Soviet republics is limited to the Ukrainian crisis. His criticism of Russia is very moderate; this can be expected from an analyst of the neighboring post-Soviet state. He has also written that “Russia was taken by surprise by the earthquake events in Ukraine and so far has not yet found an adequate response. In dealing with the revolutionary powers in Ukraine, Russia is guided by negative assessments of risks and threats rather than by the task to maintain good-neighborly relations. It should be said in all justice that the new people in power in Ukraine, their actions and statements are not blameless for making it inevitable” (p. 472). The author is obviously convinced that, no matter what, Russia should not interfere in what is going on in the neighboring states. It should tune up relations with the new people in power in Ukraine despite their clearly anti-Russian policy. There are people in Russia who think the same.

Describing the conflict in the East of Ukraine, the author has admitted the active or even organized activities of “citizens of Russia,” yet says nothing about the involvement of regular units of the Russian army in the conflict. He has come to the very interesting conclusion that, as the conflict was unfolding, the Russian supporters of the “Russian World” and the Moscow leaders parted ways. The Russian leaders started talking to Ukraine because continued confrontation was, among other things, loaded with nationalist riots. This is highly interesting because it indicates that the Kremlin sincerely wants an acceptable agreement. The majority of Western analysts, on the other hand, are convinced that Moscow uses the talks to bide its time and promote its own interests.

Having assessed the annexation of Crimea in the part called *Krymnash* (Crimea Is Ours), the author concludes that the Ukrainian crisis seriously affected the political situation in Russia; it deprived it of the alternatives that had survived the previous “conservative turn.” “Annexation of Crimea was not merely an important event but evidence of the changed modality of political thinking and behavioral imperatives. The Kremlin’s position on the Crimean issue signified a determined strategic choice of the country’s foreign policy that influenced its domestic policies. It represented a much more rigorous strategy for Russia’s relations with the West, on the one hand, and the extrapolation of foreign policy challenges to the domestic political agenda, on the other” (p. 610).

I can say that A. Nursha, who has offered a detailed and well-grounded exposition of the material, demonstrated a good knowledge of Russian literature on which he relies for his analysis. He relies on English-language or any other post-Soviet works, to a much lesser extent; this is not a shortcoming—the level of such publications is rather low.

The last part of his book—Lessons for Kazakhstan—is highly interesting as a clear confirmation of his position. He has written that Kazakhstan cherishes friendship with Russia, yet close neighborhood and close ties with it are fraught

with serious risks and challenges. He traces these risks and challenges to Russia's refusal to reconcile with its past and accept its present. "Having lost their great power statuses and vast colonial possessions, many great European powers, with repentance and regret for their politics in the period of colonialism, navigated the fairly painful stage of recognition of independence of the countries that detached themselves from their metropolies. But not Russia. The Russian political elite look at Russia as the descendant of the Russian Empire and the USSR and are still far away from the recognition of the faults of Russian czars and Soviet leaders. The Russian leaders interpret the USSR collapse as the 'biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the century' thus giving Russian society the reason to doubt whether the breakup and separation of the Soviet republics were legally justified" (p. 647).

This means that the author looks at tsarist Russia and the USSR as common colonial empires and at contemporary Russia as their successor that should, very much like Britain or France, confess to the "errors" of colonialism. This is a historically incorrect, but indicative interpretation. It is incorrect, because the Soviet Union was not a colonial empire. Its leaders never pumped riches from its components in favor of the colonial power. They, instead, tried to raise their development levels to those of the more developed regions. This means that even though more developed republics (the Baltic states, in particular) could have reasons to complain, Kazakhstan, as a backward territory, received much more from the Union than returned to it. There was no discrimination by nationality. On the contrary, residents of national republics had certain privileges when enrolling in higher educational establishments.

What was meant by "errors"? The Soviet Union may have been an unpleasant and repressive state, yet repressions, as a rule, did not target specific ethnic groups. All repressions were illegal to an equal extent in relation to all Soviet nationalities. Contemporary Russia is not, nor was the Soviet Union a successor of tsarist Russia, either formally or factually, of its policy or the legal system. We should not forget that the independence of the majority of Soviet republics (Kazakhstan being one of them) became possible only due to the position of Yeltsin and the government of Russia that never opposed the process and even hailed it.

The point of view presented in the book is highly illustrative: it betrays the post-colonial conscience of the national elite of Kazakhstan present in all newly founded states, including post-Soviet ones. The central message is—everybody had wronged us; our standards of life are not high enough because of the errors or even crimes of "colonialists." This type of consciousness creates myths of the past or a myth of contemporary life allegedly destroyed by the invaders. It is not by chance that Askar Nursha accuses Russia of denying the ancient Kazakh statehood that, allegedly, existed in the 15th century, and even quotes Vladimir Putin [7]. Without going into detail, let me say that it is enough to visit Kazakhstan to realize that it is retroactively building up a "glorious past." Many Western authors, likewise, have noticed this [5; 3; 4, p. 182]. In fact, excessive glorification of the historical role of the Kazakhs in the multinational state can hardly promote national agreement and stability in the country [1].

Everything that the author has written about the predominance of the Russian media in the Kazakhstani media space and about the need to fight it even to the point of limiting broadcasting of news from Russia casts doubts on his true attitude to Russia as a friend and ally of Kazakhstan, which, in fact, it is. Impacts of friendly, even if foreign, media should hardly be feared. Indeed, Canada hardly fears the American media or, for example, Belgium is hardly apprehensive of the French media.

The author, however, is concerned with the content of the Russian news programs and their impact on the population of Kazakhstan. There is another aspect: Can the impact of the media of a member of the Eurasian Economic Union, in which the freedom of information is ensured by the agreements, be blocked off by its another member? It seems that it is much wiser to ponder the higher popularity of the Russian media and create professional Kazakhstani Russian-language TV channels that will probably gain popularity in Russia due to the specifics of its own media.

The author's deliberations about Eurasian integration contain latent criticism of the leaders of his own country. Here are several pertinent quotes: "The gradual narrowing down of the post-Soviet space of economic integration first to the EAEU and, later, to the absolute minimum—the 'integrational trio' of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan—devalued, to a great extent, post-Soviet economic integration and trimmed the idea of a free access to the markets of the CIS countries to an access to the Russian market. Despite this, Kazakhstan has chosen to remain involved in the post-Soviet integration processes: it is focused at its relations with Russia and the present Russian leaders" (p. 656).

The author is obviously opposed to deeper Eurasian integration; he believes that Kazakhstan is guided not so much by its own economic considerations as by its relations with Russia and is acting under its pressure. We all know, however, that the EAEU was initiated by the first President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev. On April 2, 2019, in an interview to the *Rossiyskaya gazeta*, the new President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev confirmed: "Kazakhstan consistently supports and will support the integration processes in the Eurasian space and in wider scopes" [8]. Are the leaders of Kazakhstan acting against the economic interests of their country? It seems that they are of a different opinion.<sup>1</sup>

Further on, the author becomes even more outspoken: "It seems that, despite mounting criticism, the leaders of Kazakhstan still trust Russia and have more confidence in integration and its potentials to a much greater extent than Russia itself. It seems that in the Ak Orda<sup>2</sup> they think in the categories: the prospects of post-Soviet economic integration and how Kazakhstan will profit from it.... The advance that the leaders of Kazakhstan paid to Eurasian integration remains outstanding" (p. 657). In plain words, the author has written that, having joined the EAEU, Kazakhstan had paid a certain advance that was not reciprocated. Despite this and in spite of the rising wave of criticism, its political leadership still trusts Russia, that is, demonstrates political blindness.

What does the author disapprove of in Russia's approaches? He is convinced



that the Russian leaders have not abandoned the imperial style of thinking and might claim territories of its neighbors (the Ukrainian crisis is the latest confirmation) as its historical lands. It might flirt with nationalists or use them (with the help of its media) for its own purposes.

The author has further written that Russia's confrontation with the West and the alleged transformation, under Russia's influence, of the CSTO into an anti-NATO organization, do not correspond either to the political interests of his country (it would have preferred to balance between Russia, China and the West) or its economic interests (since it becomes a de facto object of anti-Russian sanctions).

The Russian leaders should take these clearly stated sentiments into account. Russia has found itself in a situation when even the closest post-Soviet states are not prepared to support it unconditionally on all political issues, while the NATO allies are always ready to join ranks with the United States. This is caused by Russia's relative economic weakness, which explains why these states want to extract as much as possible not only from it but also from the United States and China, two other centers of power. They do not need Russia's confrontation with the West; they prefer to avoid siding with one of the sides and to continue their multifaceted cooperation. They are even more concerned about the policy designed (as they imagine) to weaken the political regimes in the post-Soviet states and undermine their territorial integrity. These situations are invariably seen as a real threat to any of them. The Russian leaders should take this into account.

On the other hand, Kazakhstan should bear in mind that the Ukrainian crisis was caused by the coup that brought to power extreme nationalists and by their infringement on the rights of the Russian-speaking population that stirred up a rebellion in the country's East. Russia had no choice but to somehow help its compatriots.

If the same happens in Kazakhstan, the response in this multinational state might be even more catastrophic. It is much wiser not to fan fears but to do everything to prevent similar developments. So far, the leaders of Kazakhstan are successfully coping with the task.

In Conclusion, the author gives Putin his due for consolidating the Russian statehood and points out that his epoch (that has not yet been completed) cannot be fully assessed. He is convinced that Russia shares with the West the responsibility for eroding the international order and that "what has been happening in the relations between Russia and the West is, in fact, an expected result of the last three decades of their relations and their inability to patch up a dialogue" (p. 662).

He is also convinced that the political regime in Russia, which "has little in common with the Western model of democracy" and that protects similar regimes and economies in the other post-Soviet states with their corrupt and oligarchic structures "creates a symbiosis of Russia's economy and even less successful post-Soviet economic and management models" (p. 664). This is practically the only assessment of Russia's political system; regrettably, the author has

not offered us a profound theoretical and typological analysis. In fact, he has failed to provide a clear answer to the question formulated in the subtitle: *Putin's Russia: Geopolitical Revenge or Aggressive Defense?*

Generally, this is an interesting and useful book for the Russian reader. It can be used as a textbook or a reference book by those who study Russia's politics of the last twenty years. In Russia, similar publications are few and far between; the majority of the available publications are highly politicized and, therefore, extremely biased. The last pages of the reviewed publication offer enough food for thought to those who want to understand the trends of the political assessment of Russia by the expert communities of the post-Soviet states.

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### Notes

- <sup>1</sup> In Kazakhstan, the role of the CSTO and the EAEU is much more positively assessed. See, for example, [2; 6].
- <sup>2</sup> The residence of the President of Kazakhstan.

*Translated by Valentina Levina*

## ACADEMIC JOURNALS

Editorial note: We continue to inform you about the contents of the leading RAS journals specialized in Social Sciences and the humanities, which are published in Russian and confirm our readiness to help our readers order translations of any article mentioned below.

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**No. 4, 2019: Scientific Session of the General Meeting of the RAS Members:** Opening Speech of the President of RAS Academician A. Sergeev; Speech of the Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation T. Golikova; Speech of the First Deputy Minister of Science and Higher Education of the RF G. Trubnikov; **V. Fortov.** Priority of Scientific and Technological Development "The Transition to an Environmentally Friendly and Resource-Saving Energy, Increasing the Efficiency of Extraction and Deep Processing of Hydrocarbons, the Formation of New Sources, Methods of Transportation and Storage of Energy"; **O. Aksyutin.** Science & Technology Issues Associated with Natural Gas Production Transmission and Processing; Kashin A. Distributed Generation Based on Cutting-Edge Technology and Digital Systems; Petrenya Yu. Development of Gas-Turbine Technologies in Russia; **Yu. Olenin, V. Ilgisonis.** The Actual Scientific and Technical Problems of Nuclear Energy; **Discussion on the Priority:** Speeches of RAS Academicians A. Kontorovich, S. Filippov, S. Alekseenko, V. Bukhtiyarov, S. Aldoshin; **I. Kalyaev.** Priority of Scientific and Technological Development

“The Transition to Advanced Digital, Intelligent Manufacturing Technologies, Robotic Systems, New Materials and Methods of Design, the Creation of Systems for Processing Large Amounts of Data, Machine Learning and Artificial Intelligence”; **V. Voevodin**. Supercomputing Technologies in the Digital World: Theory, Practice, Education; Speeches of S. Chernyshev and A. Shiplyuk, etc.; **I. Sokolov**. Theory and Practice in Artificial Intelligence; **A. Dynkin**. Social and Humanitarian Measurement of Responses to Grand Challenges; **V. Naumkin**. Root Causes and Ways of the Settlement of Ethno-Political Conflicts; **F. Voitolovsky**. Deep Changes in External Environment Affecting Russia's National Security; **B. Porfiriev**. Economic Dimensions of the Climate Change Challenge for Sustainable Development in Russia; **V. Tishkov**. Russia's Identity: Challenges from Within and from Without.

### NOVAYA I NOVEYSHAYA ISTORIYA

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**No. 3, 2019:** **A. Smirnov, V. Lektorsky, A. Kokoshin** et al. Vyacheslav S. Stypin (August 19th, 1934—December 14th, 2018); **A. Chumakov, A. Korolev.** Learning to Be Human in the Global World (On the Results of the XXIV World Philosophical Congress); **M. Stepanyants.** Learning to Be Human; **B. Pruzhinin, T. Shchedrina.** International Congress of Philosophy as a Phenomenon of Another Globalization; **T. Shchedrina, I. Shchedrina.** First International Philosophical Congress in Letters of Organizers and Participants (At the Beginning of the Intellectual Community of the 20th Century); **G. Kiselev.** Christianity as a Problem; **A. Kovelman.** Exaltation, Burnt Offering and Binding: On the Genealogy of Holocaust; **I. Yablokov.** Problems of Religion in the Sociology and Philosophy of Pitirim Sorokin; **T. Samarina.** Eclectic Phenomenology of Religion: The Case of G. van der Leeuw; **M. Babkova.** The Meaning of The Notion Hô in 26th Volume of Konjaku Monogatari Shû; **N. Trubnikova.** Regular Miracles: Buddhist View of the Wondrous in Konjaku monogatari-shû. Part II; **V. Petrovsky.** The Algebra of Cogito; **V. Bazhanov, E. Kudryashova.** Diversity of Approaches towards Comprehension of Realism. Review Article on the Book “Perspectives of Realism in Modern Philosophy”; **G. Orekhanov.** The

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**No. 4, 2019:** **A. Korol**. Silence in the Dialogue as a Problem of the Philosophy of Education; **Kerimov A.** Capitalism and Democracy; **L. Baeva**. The Existentials Theory of M. Heidegger and M. Boss and the Analysis of Human Existence in the Conditions of Electronic Culture; **L. Markova**. Materialization of Thought in the Language and Drawing; **T. Shiyan**. On Schematization, Artificial Languages and Subject Closure of a Philosophic and of a Scientific Discourses; **I. Karpenko**. Interpretation of the Several Corollaries of the Second Law of Thermodynamics in the Context of Relevant Physical Research; **N. Avtonomova**. The Translation Issue in Gustav Shpet: History, Criticism, Practice; **T. Shchedrina**. The Fate of Gustav Shpet’s Translation of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (Methodological Remarks); **S. Horuzhy**. Stages of a Big Path: 1917 as a Landmark of the Historical Decline of Russia; **Yu. Pushchaev**. Soviet Platonism (II): Platonical Features of Soviet Reality by A. F. Losev; **I. Kanaev**. Comparative Analysis of Buddhism and Ancient Chinese Philosophy; **A. Zelnitsky**. On the Historical and Cultural Context of the Forming of the Li Family Legend; **I. Belaya**. “Female Practice of the Internal Alchemy” in the Seven Poems of Sun Bu-er; **N. Rudenko**. Li Zhi “Discourse on Husband and Wife” (Fu fu lun): Two against One or Yin-Yang vs. the Supreme Ultimate; **D. Dubrovskaya**. Vision as a Speculum: European Visual Theories, and Jesuit Artists’ “Accomodative” Style in China; **V. Meskov**. Matetika and the Future of Pedagogy: A Paradoxological Approach to Analysis of Problems Considered at the Conference; **Yu. Gromyko**. Consciousness as an Archivist. On the Way to Psychosomatics: The Discipline that Discovers New Intellectual and Spiritual Functions; **K. Dolgov**. East, Russia, West and Slavdom: The Problems of World Geopolitics; **I. Pavlov**. Three Centuries of Christian Enlightenment in Russia: Becoming of Russian Europeanism (from the Reforms of Peter the Great to the Neo-Religious Renaissance of the Beginning of the Twentieth Century) (Conference Review).



**CHELOVEK**  
(*Human Being*)

**No. 6, 2019:** **P. Rabinow.** Sociobiology and Biosociality; **S. Shevchenko.** The Meanings of Biosociality: From Risk Groups to “Genetic Nocebo”; **R. Belyaletdinov.** Biobanks in the Context of Techno-Scientific Biosociality: Ethics of Genetization or Genetization of Ethics?; **E. Bryzgalina.** Medicine in the Optics of Artificial Intelligence: The Philosophical Context of the Future; **E. Grebenshchikova.** Biological Citizenship: From Patient Organizations to Consumer Genomics; **D. Mikhel.** The Politics of Breast Cancer: Disease, Personal Experience and Social Activism in the Modern World; **G. Yudin.** The “Genetic Body”: Politics of Genetic Reductionism in Contemporary Natural Sciences; **A. Kurlenkova.** “Naturally, Children”: Bio-Politics / Bio-Responsible Parenthood at a Medico-Genetic Consultation; **K. Petrov.** Public and Private in the Study of Biosociality and Biocapitalism; **E. Shkomova.** Transformation of the Ethical Regulations in the Context of the Medical Genetic Counseling Improvement; **O. Popova.** Orphan Diseases: Biosocial Loci and Regulatory Practices; **A. Antipov.** Biopolitics, Biocapitalism and Biosociality: Formation and Development of the Concepts.

**PSYKHOLOGICHESKIY ZHURNAL**  
(*Psychological Journal*)

**No. 3, 2019:** **E. Sergienko.** Dynamics of Problems of Developmental Psychology in the Publications of Psychological Journal; **Yu. Bykhovets, N. Kazymova.** Modern Domestic Researchers of Psychological Factors of Terrorist Threat Experience; **M. Padun.** Emotion Regulation and Psychological Well-Being: Individual, Interpersonal and Cultural Factors; **R. Apressyan.** Moral-Philosophical Basis for Psychological Studies of Conscience. Part II. Conscience in Moral Philosophy; **R. Muhamedrahimov, L. Astamazova, E. Vershinina.** The Role of the Program of Psychological Support in Attachment Disorder Behavior among Children in Substitute Families; **A. Veraksa, M. Gavrilova, D. Bukhalenkova.** Association between Language Development and Executive Functioning in Preschool Age; **N. Almaev, S. Skorik et al.** Resource-Oriented Approach in Psychoacoustics; **A. Savenkov, V. Gorban.** Modern Psychology of Law and Legal Beliefs of L. I. Petrazhitsky; **A. Zhuravlev, L. Pochebut.** To 60th Anniversary of the Beginning of Discussion on Social Psychology Subject; **A. Yurevich.** Psychological Factors of Confidence in Banks; **T. Zhalagina, E. Korotkina.** Global Psychology: From History to the Development Perspectives.

**No. 4, 2019:** **G. Vilenskaya.** To 40th Anniversary of “Psychological Journal”; **H. Starovoytenko, V. Koltsova, E. Maximova.** Unresolved Contradictions of Personality in Life Movement towards Maturity; **N. Bogacheva, E. Pavlova,**

**T. Komilova.** Cognitive and Personality Regulation of Medical Risk Perception in Practicing Doctors; **E. Gavrina, E. Shchelkushkina, D. Sochivko.** Deformation of Interpersonal Relations in Law Enforcement Officers Who Have Committed Crimes; **V. Tolochek.** Mental Performance Dynamics: P. I. Psychological Features of Month and Oneyear Cycles; **G. Soldatova, E. Rasskazova.** Following Communication Rules Online and Offline: Intergenerational Analysis; **O. Smyslova, A. Voiskounsky.** Cybersickness in Virtual Reality: Phenomenology and Measurement; **A. Chernyshev, S. Sarychev** et al. Socio-Psychological Laboratory of the Kursk State University: History of Creation and Development Trends; **N. Borisova.** Sergey L. Rubinstein at the Turn of the Millennia.

### **OBSHCHESTVENNIYE NAUKI I SOVREMENNOST (ONS)**

*(Social Sciences and Contemporary World)*

**No. 5, 2019:** **O. Antipina.** How Much is the Digit? On the Nature of Value in the Digital Economy; **L. Lykova.** Tax Incentives for Innovation in Russia; **E. Pain.** Nation-Phobia and National Populism in a Globalizing World; **S. Pshizova.** Digitally-Mediated Political Participation in a Comparative Perspective; **A. Zavoronkov, S. Patrushev, L. Philippova.** Political Field and Zone of Power: An Attempt at Empirical Verification; **P. Orekhovsky.** Metropolitan Science by the Eyes of a Native (A Marginal Note for the Discussion “Russia in Western Science”); **T. Zhukova, V. Tishchenko.** Volunteer Computing in Russia: The Empirical Model of Motivation Factors for Participation in VC-Projects; **S. Chernozub.** On Scientific Transactions, Communities and Academic Freedom (Reflections on the Book by A. N. Oleinik); **R. Abramov.** Attitude to the Late Soviet Past as an Object of Sociological Research; **Meleshkina A.** Specificity of Gender Institutional Changes in Justice System; **V. Komarovskiy.** The Concept of Migration Policy and Labor Migration: What Can or Should Be Done?; **L. Bombieri, N. Lebedeva, V. Galyapina.** The Impact of Teachers’ Pro-Social Attitudes on Attitudes of Their Pupils towards Migrants in Italy and Russia; **E. Balatsky.** General Theory of Social Development and Cycles of Coercion; **O. Koshovets.** Where Modern Economics is Heading? Horizontal Progress, the Superiority of the Method and the Replacement of Theory with Discourse.

**No. 6, 2019:** **D. Asaturyan, L. Kosals.** Organizational Social Capital as Factor of the Survival of Russian Industrial Enterprises in a Crisis; **T. Chubarova.** Modern Paternalism as a Product of Mainstream: Social Problems, Individual Solutions; **N. Lapin.** On the Alienation of Citizens from the Right to Participate in the Proceeds of the Use of National Assets and Possibilities to Overcome It in Russia; **A. Gofman.** On the Theoretical Reconstruction of Durkheim’s Interpretation of Morality; **P. Pavlov.** Economic and Political-Economic Factors of Regulatory Activity in Russia: Analysis in the Context of the Rule-Making Initiative Subjects; **K. Yanovsky, S. Zavoronkov.** Unlimited Government Endorsed by

“Scientific Consensus”; **S. Pshizova**. Digitally-Mediated Political Participation in a Comparative Perspective. Article 2; **A. Kiva**. Newly Industrialized Countries: The Asian Model. What Could Russia Borrow Here?; **S. Lourie**. The National Script and Private Life in Contemporary Russia (Dynamics and Features of Interethnic Marriage at the Post-Soviet Period); **K. Velkova, N. Lebedeva**. The Role of Liking and Social Identities in the Attitudes of Russians toward Other Nations; **V. Titov**. The Legacy of M. Heidegger and A. Schutz in the Context of the Development of Interpretative Sociology; **D. Davydov**. Socially Necessary Work in Discussions about the Post-Capitalist Future: “Cancel” Can Not Be Socialized?

### POLITICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA (POLIS)

*(Political Studies)*

**No. 4, 2019:** **A. Solovyov**. Political Agenda of the Government, or Why the State Needs the Society; **N. Savin**. Between Substance and Procedure: Two Traditions in Deliberative Democratic Theory; **E. Fidrya**. Factors and Justification of Reconstructing Meaning of Political Texts under Conditions of Cognitive and Interpretative Uncertainty; **T. Inoguchi**. The Development of Political Science in Japan; **V. Avdonin, Ye. Meleshkina**. What Do Ratings Say? Political Sciences Journals in the RSCI System; **V. Voynikov, E. Entina, M. Entin**. Prospects, Needs and Pitfalls of Constitutionalization of the EU and the EAEU; **Yu. Pustovoyt**. How the Regime is Created? Power Coalitions in Siberian Cities; **A. Salmina**. Perception and Attitudes toward Democracy in Russia and Europe; **V. Barsegyan**. Models of Career Trajectories of the Heads of Russian Regions; **A. Neklessa**. Sinews of War & Nerves of Peace: Hybrid Metamorphosis. Methodological and Prognostic Aspects of the Post-Modernity Co-Existence; **E. Egorova-Gantman, E. Egorova**. Character Assassination. Three Chronicles of the Soviet Period; **A. Glukhova, R. Savenkov**. New Authoritarianism in Polish Vestment.

### GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO

*(The State and Law)*

**No. 1, 2019:** **I. Bartsits**. Constitutional Mythology: Origination, Purpose and Practice of Application (Part 2); **K. Agamirov**. The Compelled Deviations and Predictive Gaps as Categories of Jurisprudence; **Y. Buravlev**. Public Servant Viewed as the Official and the Subject of Administrative Responsibility; **V. Zhukov**. Demography: National Interests, Morality and Law; **I. Levakin**. The Fundamental Principles of Modern Constitutional Regulation of Religion; **A. Chashin**. Doctrinal-Legal Standards in Russian Judicial Practice; **V. Tolstik**. The Problem of Evaluation of Scientific Results: Fetishization of Bibliometrics or Common Sense; **L. Hongyan**. The Theoretical Paradigm of Ecological Jurispru-

dence: Transit from Modern to Postmodern; **D. Garbatovich**. Forms of Criminal Law of Russia; **E. Ashmarina**. The Structure of Economic Law as a Criterion of Classification of Judicial Economic Expertise (JEE); **N. Turishcheva**. Pre-Election Agency in the System of Legal and Social-Political Regulation of Elections; **A. Polukarov**. Administrative Enforcement as a Method of Fighting Corruption in the Social Sphere; **N. Lisina**. Principles of Legal Protection of the Environment in Cities; **A. Chernyavsky, N. Chervyakov** Updated Theory of State (Search for New Concepts); **S. Chedgemov**. N. M. Karamzin on Legal Acculturation as a Means of Consolidating State Power in Multinational Russia; **K. Rodionov**. History of One Delusion. Part one; **A. Petrov**. Responsibility in the Workplace: The History of Legal Regulation; **M. Buyanova**. Features of Insurance of Sportsmen against Accidents at Production and Occupational Diseases.

**No. 2, 2019:** **E. Svinin**. Theoretical and Methodological Issues of the Conceptual Abstraction of Series “Law and Order”; **V. Eremenko**. About Activity of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation in the Field of Intellectual Property; **A. Osavelyuk**. The Concept and Place of Canons in Church Law (On the Example of the Rank of Consecration); **A. Yasinskaya-Kazachenko**. History and Scientific Forecasting of Development of Relationships on the Resolution of Collective Labor Disputes; **V. Vinokurov**. General Regulatory Criminal Legal Relations as the Content and Limits of the Object of the Crime; **A. Khalikov**. Conclusion of a Pre-Trial Cooperation Agreement: Criminal Procedural and Forensic Problems; **D. Bachurin**. Directions of Reforming the System of Legal Regulation of Value Added Taxation; **T. Polyakova, A. Minbaleev, N. Krotkova**. Formation of the Information Law System as a Scientific Direction: Development Stages and Prospects; **K. Belsky**. Professor I. T. Tarasov is a Herald and the First Developer of the Functional System of Administrative Law (To the 170th Anniversary of the Birth); **G. Luparev**. Proverbs and Sayings as a Source of Customary Law; **A. Nikandrov**. Failed *res publica restituta* 1948: The Origins of Changes in the Basic Principle of the State System of the USSR in the Soviet Political Discourse of the 30s; **A. Smykalin**. “Unknown” form of Ownership in the USSR; **S. Burmagin**. Court Proceedings in Criminal Procedure: Concept and Types; **O. Fomicheva**. The Author Legislative Ideas as a Special Party in the Legislative Initiative Implementation; **A. Guryanov**. New Independent State at the Turn of XX-XXI Centuries (The Problem of Accidents and Patterns of Education); **E. Subbotin**. From the Legal Institution “Fixed-Term Employment Contract” to the Legal Institution “Employment Contract for the Work for the Fixed Period” (The Comprise Analysis of the Legitimation of Ukraine and Russian Federation with the Sentence *de lege ferenda*); **T. Yasnykh**. Institute of Military Personnel of the Armed Forces of the RF Outside the Russian Federation as a Phenomenon of International Human Rights Law.

**No. 3, 2019:** **A. Savenkov**. The Values of the Constitution of the Russian Federation in a Changing World; **N. Krotkova, Y. Shulzhenko, E. Vinogradova, I. Danilevskaya**. A Quarter of a Century of the Constitution of Russia: Under-

standing Experience (for Results of All-Russian Scientific Conference “XXV Anniversary of the Constitution of the Russian Federation: Transformation of the Paradigm of Rights in the Civilization Development of Mankind”); **M. Klean-drov**. On the Radical Transformation of the Mechanism of Assigning the Academic Title Professor; **R. Makuev**. The Application of the Law as a Process of Realization of the Right of a Particular Form; **A. Grishchenko**. Problems of Regulation in Area of Providing the State Services in the Field of Internal Affairs; **V. Zhukov**. Anthropology in the Philosophy of Law: Problem Statement; **O. Martyshin**. The Debate about a Secular State in Russia; **A. Salomatin**, **A. Malko**. State and Legal Life of the Society under Globalization; **O. Gorbunova**. Transparency and Respect for Private Property—the Basic Legal Principles that Should Be Present in the Management of a Democratic State; **A. Myslivchenko**. Social State: Genesis, Formation and Perspectives; **S. Polenina**. “The Woman Question” in the 21st Century; **M. Alieskerov**. Realization of the Legal Social State Principles in Civil Procedure Law Method; **O. Smolina**. The Expert’s Opinion as Evidence on Economic Disputes in the Arbitration Process; **L. Thabisimova**, **M. Tsapko**. Taking into Account People’s Opinion when Changing Borders or Transforming the Territories of Municipalities and Subjects of the Russian Federation; **E. Frolova**. B. A. Kistyakovsky as a Methodologist, Philosopher and Sociologist of Law; **Z. Yenikeev**. Historical and Legal Prerequisites of Establishment of the Republic of Bashkortostan; **A. Zryachkin**. Departmental Legal Nihilism: Reasons and Sources; **S. Burmistrova**. Legitimate Interests, Subjective Rights and Freedoms as Legal Opportunities: The Ratio of the Structure, Content and Implementation; **A. Ivanov**. The Order of Wearing and Use of Hunting Weapons: Implementation Problems; **M. Veniaminova**. Reception of French Approaches in Spanish Law (On the Example of Nationality); **A. Snegireva**. International Arbitration and Global Mechanisms of Law Enforcement in the Sphere of Criminal Procedure.

## VOPROSY EKONOMIKI

*(Problems of Economics)*

**No. 6, 2019:** **B. Zamarayev**, **A. Kiyutsevskaia**. Inflation Targeting in the World Economy and in Russia; **M. Mamonov**. Depleting Net Worth of Russian Banks: Changes in Banks’ Risk-Taking and the Interest Rate Policy of the Bank of Russia; **O. Kuznetsova**, **S. Merzlyakov**, **S. Pekarsky**. Shaping Public Confidence as a Way to Overcome a Liquidity Trap; **M. Giltman**, **N. Obukhovich**, **O. Tokareva**. Active and Passive Labor Market Policies on the Russian Labor Market: Centralization or Regionalization?; **M. Ivanova**. The Demand for Older Workers and Age Discrimination: International Experience and Russian Realities; **K. Rozhkova**, **S. Roshchin**. Does Knowing Foreign Language Pay off in the Russian Labor Market?; **A. Buzgalin**. “Capital” as the Key to Solving Modern Economic Problems (Offline Addition to the Discussion on the Revival of a Special Seminar on Karl Marx’s “Capital”).

**No. 7, 2019:** **V. Radaev.** Urban and Rural Millennials: Heterogeneity of the Young Adult Generation; **N. Kosareva, T. Polidi.** Housing Affordability in Russia and Foreign Countries; **A. Mishura, E. Shiltsin, S. Busygin.** Social Aspects of Impact of School Quality on Housing Prices in Regional Center of Russia; **M. Deryabina.** Theoretical and Methodological Foundations of Self-Organization of Socio-Economic Systems; **D. Katukov, V. Malygin, N. Smorodinskaya.** The Factor of Creative Destruction in Modern Economic Growth Models and Growth Policy; **R. Kapeliushnikov.** Contra Pan-Institutionalism. Part I; **S. Trofimov.** Arctic Shelf as a Strategic Region of Development of the Russian Economy.

**MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNIYE OTNOSHENIYA**  
(*World Economy and International Relations*)

**No. 7, 2019:** **M. Strezhneva, D. Moiseeva.** After the Elections: The Limit to Growth of Political Influence of Eurosceptics; **L. Khudyakova.** Launching a Sustainable Financial System in the European Union; **I. Dezhina, T. Nafikova.** Evolution of “Internet of Things” Concept and State Policy; **Ye. Domnich.** China’s Industrial Statistics; **A. Mal’tsev, A. Mordvinova.** Old Industrial Areas Revitalization: Foreign Experience; **G. Khetagurov.** Effectiveness of Card Payment Systems: International Experience and Russian Practice; **S. Volkov, A. Tkachenko.** Economic Collaboration of Russian Federation with North African Countries; **K. Tur’inskaya.** East Africa: Regional Political Integration; **A. Zagosky.** China Accepts Rules in the Arctic; **Kuang Zengjun, Ou Kaifei.** China’s New Arctic Policy; **P. Koshkin.** Think Tanks: Challenges and Opportunities in the Era of “Fake News” and Digital Technologies; **T. Rovinskaya.** The Crisis of Political Correctness in Western Media Space; **A. Shumilin.** Middle East: Window of Opportunities or a Trap for the Atlantists?

**No. 8, 2019:** **V. Dvorkin.** Impact of Missile Defense Systems on Strategic Stability and Prospects for Nuclear Disarmament; **V. Obolensky.** Stumbling Stones in the Way of WTO Reformation; **N. Rozanova.** Evolution of a Firm in a Digital Economy; **M. Ershov.** Russian Economic Prospects with Low Inflation; **A. Zimakov.** European Strategic Approaches to Heating Decarbonization; **D. Chumakov.** Prospects of Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline; **O. Barabanov, E. Maslova.** The Concept of “Global Commons” as a Factor of Global Instability; **E. Burkova.** Ecological Modernization in an Age of Globalization: The Role of Environmental NGOs; **A. Semenov, A. Tsvyk.** The “Community of a Shared Future for Humankind” Concept in China’s Foreign Policy Strategy; **A. Chikhachev.** French Defense Policy under Emmanuel Macron: Major Trends; **N. Goffe, G. Monusova.** Misperception of Social Realities: Political Implications; **K. Gadzhiev.** On Fragmentation of World Order in the Era of Globalization.

**SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA (SOTSIS)**  
*(Sociological Studies)*

**No. 1, 2019:** **V. Karacharovsky, O. Shkaratan.** Different Goals of the Same Society; **A. Buzgalin, A. Kolganov.** Transformations of the Social Structure of Later Capitalism: From the Proletariat and the Bourgeoisie to the Precariat and the Creative Class?; **O. Yanitsky.** Challenges and Risks of Globalization. Seven Theses; **L. Keesman, D. Weenink, V. Barsegyan.** Sociologizing with R. Collins: An Interview about Emotions, Violence, Attention Space and Sociology; **V. Mikhailov, J. Runge.** Identification of Individual. Territorial Communities and Social Space: An Attempt of Conceptualization; **O. Bessonova.** Civil Complaints as a Democratic Feedback Form; **V. Vasilkova, V. Minina.** Communication Barriers in Practices of Providing Public Services to Citizens; **O. Bezrukova, V. Samoylova.** Guidance for Foster Families or How to Decrease Risks of Secondary Abandonment; **V. Kuzmenkov.** Criminal Anomie as a Social Problem; **P. Korotkov, E. Zagaynova.** Suicide Rate and Time Use in Daily Life and Leisure; **V. Yumaguzin, M. Vinnik.** Assessment of the Real Rates of Homicides and Suicides in the Regions of Russia; **V. Zvonovsky, M. Grigorieva, J. Solovieva.** Contemporary Practices of Telephone Surveys in the World; **E. Popov.** The Place of Sociology of Law in the Training of Future Sociologists; **Yu. Tolstova.** On A. A. Chuprov's Contribution to Sociology and Statistics.

**No. 2, 2019:** **A. Andreev.** Face to Face with Modern World; **N. Pokrovsky.** Against the Backdrop of Niagara Falls, International Sociology Marches Left; **O. Yanitsky.** The 19th ISA Congress: Reflections of an Outsider Observer; **Yu. Yepikhina.** Stratification Research: Between Past and Future; **S. Kravchenko.** The Many Faces of Metamorphoses: About Innovations of Two Canadian Sociologists; **B. Mironov.** The Fate of the Jewish Diaspora in Post-Soviet Russia (The Case of Saint Petersburg); **S. Ryzhova.** Religiosity, Ethno-Confessional Identity and Problems of Interethnic Accord; **V. Volkov, V. Poleshchuk.** Current State of Interethnic Communication in Latvia and Estonia; **A. Danilov, D. Rotman.** Soft Power Priority in Destabilizing Contemporary Socium (The Case of the Republic of Belarus); **O. Mikhaylenok, G. Malysheva.** Political Effects of Social Networks in Russia; **N. Aldoshina, J. Vaskina.** Human Rights in Mass Consciousness: A Regional Case; **E. Dolgova, E. Streltsova.** "Welcome to the Club": Position of Women in Soviet Science in the 1920s; **I. Antoshchuk, V. Ledeneva.** From Russia to the UK. On Migration of Young Russian Computer Scientists; **G. Abdiraimova, K. Biekenov et al.** Young Scientists in Kazakhstan: Experiences of Building an Academic Career; **I. Obratsov.** Reading Interests of the Red Army Soldiers in the 1920s (An Empirical Analysis); **E. Khlebtsevich.** Studying of the Red Army Men Reading Interests; **A. Kiva.** National Interests as They Are Understood in China and Russia.

**VOSTOK**  
(*Oriens*)

**No. 1, 2019:** **N. Kradin.** Contemporary Discussion on Politogenesis among the Nomadic Pastoralists; **A. Alikberov.** “Land” as Territorial State: Cross-Cultural Analysis of the Early State Forms; **S. Kuzmin.** The Problem of Vassalage in the West and the East: Relations of the Qing Empire with Mongolia and Tibet; **D. Mishin.** Banû Kinda in Hadjar in the Second Half of the Sixth Century; **A. Zakharov.** The Angkor Borei Inscription K. 557/600 from Cambodia: An English Translation and Commentary; **P. Lapin.** Essay on the History of Teaching Russian Language in Xinjiang during the Qing Dynasty since the Late Eighteenth to the Early Twentieth Century; **L. Stezhenskaya.** Revisiting Liu Xie’s Concept of the Genre and Its Place in the Early Medieval Chinese Literary Theory; **A. Korotayev, K. Meshcherina** et al. Value Orientations of the Afrasian Zone of Instability: Gender Dimensions; **E. Zelenev, M. Iliushina.** Islamic Education and Social Mobility in the Circassian Sultanate (1382-1517); **E. Kosevich.** China’s Place in Priorities of Mexico’s Foreign Economic Policy; **R. Gimatdinov, I. Nasyrov.** Group of Strategic Vision “Russia—Islamic World” as a Soft Power Tool in the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation; **M. Zhantsanova, M. Khaidarova.** To the Question of a Term “Cultural Space of Chinese Hieroglyphics”; **S. Malykh.** Innovations in the Study of Egyptian Ceramics 3rd Thousand B.U.: Problems and Perspectives.

**VOPROSY LITERATURY**  
(*Problems of Literature*)

**No. 1, 2019:** **M. Amusin.** Trifonov’s and Makanin’s Eternal Themes; **N. Godenko.** Archaic Constructs in French Lessons, a Short Story by V. Rasputin; **V. Tyupa.** “Literary Theory Two” as a Threat to Humanities; **Yu. Shcherbinina.** People Bound: A History of the Anthropomorphic Bibliometaphor; **G. Shulpyakov, I. Duardovich.** “I Can Relate to the Invisible Man...”; **T. Gordon.** *Gusev, The Bishop, The Death of Ivan Ilyich*: Comparing Stylistic Systems; **B. Tarasov.** The Historiosophical and Journalistic Legacy of Fyodor Tyutchev in the Mirrors of Interpretations; **S. Korolyova.** Byron and the Russian Silver Age (1900s): The Protestant Cain as “Native” and “Foreign”; **V. Serdechnaya.** Not in Marshak’s Style. Little-Known Russian Translations from William Blake in the Early 20th Century; **Zhou Lu.** Lermontov’s and Baratynsky’s Poetry in China: The Past and the Present; **A. Kholikov.** Compiling the 20th Century: The Compiler’s Marginalia; **A. Lavrov.** D. E. Maksimov; **E. Abdullaev.** V. A. Chudovsky; **E. Pogorelskaya.** V. P. Polonsky; **E. Andrushchenko.** D. S. Merezhkovsky; **A. Filatov, G. Filatova.** A. D. Kamegulov.



**No. 2, 2019:** **V. Kantor.** Imperial Europeanism, or Mikhail Katkov's Truth vs. Russian Society; **A. Kolesnikov.** Postmodernism is Dead, and I'm not Quite Yet; **D. Ereemeeva.** A Doubting Avvakum. Sergey Petrov (1911-1988); **R. Katsman.** A Chaos Novel. Aleksandr Goldstein; **E. Safronova.** A Poet of Oxymora. Sergey Gandlevsky; **P. Ryzhakov.** Notes on Easter in Ansali; **A. Pavlovsky.** On Pavel Ryzhakov's Notes on Easter in Ansali; **A. Bokarev, T. Kuchina.** Bella Akhmadulina and the Sixtiers: Contacts, Contexts, and Poems; **P. Glushakov.** "I See the Divine Will in Culture." A 1994 Questionnaire Filled out by Boris Chichibabin; **D. Zakharov.** Truman Capote in Russian Translations; **L. Egorova.** On Translations and Translators. The Masters of Artistic Translation Series; **A. Urakova.** "Injin Gifts": Interracial Exchange and the Image of the White Avenger in Frontier Fiction; **O. Osovsky.** Bakhtin in Shanghai. "Chinese Lessons" for Bakhtin Studies; **I. Duardovich.** Yury Dombrovsky: Myth versus "Agonizing Truth."

#### IZVESTIYA ROSSIYSKOY AKADEMII NAUK. SERIYA LITERATURY I YAZYKA

*(The Bulletin of the Russian Academy of Sciences: Studies in Literature and Language)*

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