# Coherence for what? Policy coherence and the interconnections between migration and development in the EU's external policies 2015-2019

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Tiivistelmä – Referat – Abstract

Despite a stated commitment to the principle of policy coherence for development (PCD), which means taking development policy objectives into account in all policies likely to impact developing countries, the European Union (EU) has shown limited success in prioritising poverty reduction over other policy sectors' objectives. Especially since the migration crisis in 2015-16, development cooperation appears to be increasingly used for migration management. This thesis examines how migration and development are linked in EU external policy, how the concept of PCD has been considered, and what coherence means, in the context of EU external policies on migration and development.

The thesis analyses the concept of policy coherence and the interconnections between migration and development in the European Agenda on Migration (2015), the Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy (2016), and the New European Consensus on Development (2017) and their implementation reports and further communications about migration policy issued by the European Commission between the beginning of the refugee crisis in 2015 and the end of the Juncker administration in late 2019. The document data is triangulated with semi-structured expert interviews, and the data is analysed using qualitative content analysis.

Based on the analysis, EU policy considers migration and development linked mainly through the root causes of migration being development problems, although there is also a recognition that migration can contribute to development. Adding to the literature on the securitisation of migration and development, the study finds that migration management is considered a priority for which development cooperation can be used as leverage.

This conflicts with the principle of PCD, which the study finds to be largely absent from the policy documents, indicating it is not a priority for EU external policy. The conflict between the EU's stated normative principles and the instrumentalisation of aid can be considered normative incoherence and organized hypocrisy, which can undermine the EU's credibility as a global actor and supposedly normative power.

Although PCD is not found to be prominent anymore, 'coherence' is used across the documents as something to be enhanced. Based on the analysis, 'coherence' ascribes effectiveness, unity and credibility to the EU's holistic, integrated approach coordinating policies, instruments and actors in pursuit of the EU's overall interests, although these are adapted to each country context. The study suggests coherence may be understood as emblematic of a holistic approach used to legitimise the instrumentalisation of development cooperation for the EU's overall external policy objectives.

Tiivistelmä – Referat – Abstract

Euroopan unioni (EU) on sitoutunut kehityspoliittisen johdonmukaisuuden (PCD) periaatteeseen, joka tarkoittaa kehityspoliittisten päämäärien ottamista huomioon kaikissa kehittyviä maita todennäköisesti koskettavissa politiikoissa. Tästä huolimatta EU ei ole asettanut köyhyyden vähentämistä muiden politiikan alojen tavoitteiden edelle. Erityisesti vuosien 2015-16 pakolaiskriisin myötä vaikuttaa siltä, että kehitysyhteistyötä käytetään enenevissä määrin muuttoliikkeen hillitsemiseksi. Tämä tutkielma tarkastelee sitä, miten muuttoliike ja kehitys linkitetään EU:n ulkopolitiikassa, miten kehityspoliittisen johdonmukaisuuden käsitettä käytetään ja mitä johdonmukaisuus tarkoittaa EU:n muuttoliikettä ja kehitystä koskevassa ulkoisessa politiikassa.

Tutkielma analysoi politiikkajohdonmukaisuuden käsitettä sekä muuttoliikkeen ja kehityksen välille tehtyjä yhteyksiä Euroopan muuttoliikeagendassa (2015), Euroopan unionin ulko- ja turvallisuuspoliittisessa globaalistrategiassa (2016) ja Uudessa eurooppalaisessa kehityspoliittisessa konsensuksessa (2017) sekä näiden asiakirjojen toteutumista seuraavissa raporteissa ja muuttoliikepoliittisissa tiedotteissa, jotka Euroopan komissio julkaisi pakolaiskriisin alun ja Junckerin kauden lopun välillä 2015-2019. Asiakirja-aineistoa täydensivät asiantuntijahaastattelut, ja aineisto analysoitiin laadullisen sisältöanalyysin menetelmällä.

Analyysin perusteella muuttoliike ja kehitys nähdään EU:n politiikoissa linkittyneinä ensisijaisesti muuttoliikkeen juurisyiden kautta; muuttoliikkeen juurisyiksi nähdään kehitysongelmat. Kuitenkin myös muuttoliikkeen mahdollisuus edistää kehitystä tunnistetaan. Muuttoliikkeen ja kehityksen turvallistamista koskevaan kirjallisuuteen lisäten tutkimuksessa todetaan muuttoliikkeen hillitsemisen olevan prioriteetti, jota varten kehitysyhteistyötä voidaan käyttää.

Tämä on ristiriidassa kehityspoliittisen johdonmukaisuuden periaatteen kanssa. Tutkimuksessa todetaan, että periaatetta ei analysoiduissa asiakirjoissa juurikaan mainittu, mikä osoittaa ettei PCD ole EU:n ulkopolitiikassa prioriteetti. Ristiriita EU:n todettujen normatiivisten periaatteiden ja kehitysavun instrumentalisaation välillä voidaan nähdä normatiivisena epäjohdonmukaisuutena ja järjestäytyneenä tekopyhyytenä (organized hypocrisy), joka asettaa kyseenalaiseksi EU:n uskottavuuden globaalina toimijana ja normatiivisena valtana.

Vaikkei PCD-käsitettä tutkimuksen mukaan enää juuri käytetä, 'johdonmukaisuus' sen sijaan esitetään asiakirjoissa edistettävänä ominaisuutena. Analyysin perusteella johdonmukaisuus liittää tehokkuuden, yhtenäisyyden ja uskottavuuden ominaisuuksia EU:n holistiseen, integroituun lähestymistapaan, jossa politiikkoja, instrumentteja ja toimijoita koordinoidaan toimimaan EU:n yleisten intressien eteen, tosin nämä EU:n intressit vaihtelevat ja sopeutuvat maakohtaisesta kontekstista riippuen. Tulosten perusteella 'johdonmukaisuus' voidaan ymmärtää merkkinä holistisesta lähestymistavasta, jota käytetään oikeuttamaan kehitysyhteistyön käyttäminen EU:n yleisten ulkopoliittisten tavoitteiden saavuttamiseksi.

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## Abbreviations

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| ACP | African, Caribbean and Pacific |
| APF | African Peace Facility |
| DG | Directorate-General (in the European Commission) |
| (DG) DEVCO | Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development |
| (DG) ECHO | Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations |
| (DG) HOME | Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs |
| (DG) NEAR | Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations |
| EEAS | European External Action Service |
| EIB | European Investment Bank |
| ENP | European Neighbourhood Policy |
| EU | European Union |
| EUTF | European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa |
| GAMM | Global Approach to Migration and Mobility |
| HR/VP | High Representative (of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) and Vice President (of the European Commission) |
| IDP | Internally displaced person |
| IOM | International Organisation for Migration |
| NDICI | Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument |
| NGO | Non-governmental organisation |
| NPCD | Normative policy coherence for development |
| ODA | Official Development Assistance |
| OECD | Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development |
| PCD | Policy coherence for development |
| PCSD | Policy coherence for sustainable development |
| SDG | Sustainable Development Goal |
| UN | United Nations |

## 1. Introduction

### 1.1. Research questions and topic

Policy coherence for development (PCD) is a principle embraced by the European Union (EU) since the *Maastricht Treaty* (1992) and reinstated in various documents including the *European Consensus on Development* (2005), *Lisbon Treaty* (2009) and the *New European Consensus on Development* (2017). It means that the EU should take its development policy objectives into account in other policies that are likely to affect developing countries.[1]

However, the commitment to policy coherence for development may not always hold in practice. For example, Maurizio Carbone, a prominent scholar of PCD and EU development policy, notes: "despite rhetorical commitments made in various contexts, results have been modest, as governments in the North have found it difficult to go beyond their short-term political and economic interests." (Carbone 2012, 161.) PCD has been framed as a largely technical process, although it is inherently a political objective (Carbone 2012).

One policy area that would be affected by the implementation of policy coherence for development is that of migration policy. Migration and development have always been connected in multiple and complex ways, and indeed migration can be beneficial for social and economic development (see e.g. Sørensen, Van Hear and Engberg-Pedersen 2002). However, in recent years, especially as significant increases in the influx of asylum seekers into Europe in 2015 led to talk of a 'refugee crisis' or 'migration crisis'[2], the topic of migration has become highly securitised – that is, framed from a security perspective through discourse and action – and migration policy in Europe has become more restrictive (Fakhoury 2016). Since the migration crisis, development cooperation seems to be increasingly used to support migration

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[1] E.g. Article 208 of the consolidated *Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union* states: "Union development cooperation policy shall have as its primary objective the reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty. The Union shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries." (European Union 2016.)

[2] I recognise that the terms 'migration crisis' and "refugee crisis" have various connotations and are not wholly unproblematic, but I will use these terms in this thesis to describe the events of 2015-2016, as these are the terms mostly used in official documents, in the interviews, in the literature and in the media.

management or "tackle the root causes" behind mass migration: poverty, lack of opportunity and violence in the countries of origin and transit (Délkader-Palacios 2019).

Instrumentalising development cooperation for migration management sounds more like coherence for migration than for development. Rather than focus on the ways in which migration policy can contribute to development, which would be more in line with the principle of PCD, the EU currently seems to prioritise reducing migration, and using development cooperation as part of the approach. I became interested in how EU policy conceives of the interconnections between migration and development, and what happens when PCD is at odds with other political interests focused on security and migration – is PCD really taken into account in migration policy, does the EU present migration management as coherent with development policy, and what does the EU really mean when it talks about coherence?

This thesis will examine how migration and development are linked in EU external policy and how the concept of policy coherence for development (PCD) has been used and taken into account in the European Union's external policies focused on the interconnections between migration and development, from the beginning of the refugee crisis in 2015 until the end of the Juncker administration in late 2019.

The study seeks to answer the following research questions:

*How are the interconnections between development and migration presented in the EU's external (foreign, development and migration) policy strategies 2015–2019? To what extent are development and migration policies presented as coherent?*

*How is the concept of policy coherence for development used in the EU's external (foreign, development and migration) policies 2015–2019?*

*What does coherence mean in EU external (foreign, migration and development) policy?*

To answer these questions, the thesis will analyse the concept of policy coherence and the interconnections between migration and development in three different external policy agendas of the EU, namely the *European Agenda on Migration* (2015, hereafter Agenda on Migration, or Agenda), the *Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy* (2016, hereafter Global Strategy), and the *New European Consensus on Development* (2017, hereafter New Consensus on Development, or Consensus), as well as their implementation reports and further communications about migration policy issued by the European Commission. The document data is triangulated with semi-structured expert interviews, and the data is analysed using qualitative content analysis.

## 1.2. Relevance and context of the topic

The year 2015 was remarkable in many ways. Following the Commission's proposal, the year was officially designated the "European Year for Development", the first time a "European Year" was dedicated to external action and Europe's role in the world, and an opportunity to "showcase Europe's commitment to eradicating poverty worldwide and to inspire more Europeans to get engaged and involved in development" (EEAS 2015). It was also the year when the Millennium Development Goals came to a close, and a new set of objectives, the *2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development* and its seventeen Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), were adopted by the United Nations to guide efforts in the global South and North alike in the years to come. Indeed, it was in response to this that the *New European Consensus on Development* was written, seeking to implement the *2030 Agenda* in the work of the EU.

However, most people in Europe are more likely to associate 2015 with something else, namely the migration crisis. More than one million migrants came to Europe by land and sea in 2015, four times more than the previous year (BBC 2016). This included various types of migrants; so-called economic migrants as well as those fleeing persecution and entitled to a refugee status.[3]

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[3] The terms migrant, asylum seeker and refugee are sometimes misused in popular discourse. 'Refugee' refers to a person entitled to international protection because they face persecution

Although most applied for asylum, the number of those granted asylum was much lower (BBC 2016). According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2015), over 75 per cent of those arriving in Europe had fled conflict and persecution in Syria, Afghanistan or Iraq, while the rest were mainly from Kosovo, Albania, Pakistan, Eritrea, Nigeria, Iran, and Ukraine (BBC 2016). The migrants' journey to Europe was extremely dangerous, and in 2015, more than 3 770 migrants died trying to cross the Mediterranean, the deadliest migration route in the world (BBC 2016; HRW 2015). Furthermore, many migrants experienced violence, including torture or sexual violence during the journey. Many, if not most, asylum seekers and irregular migrants paid smugglers to help them reach Europe, although they were often lied to about the conditions in which they would be transported, and some also became victims of exploitation and human trafficking. (HRW 2015.)

In response to the crisis, the EU adopted the *Agenda on Migration* in May 2015, which, as well as providing guidelines for a more comprehensive approach to reduce irregular migration, aimed to, as an immediate concern, save lives at sea, target criminal smuggling networks, provide a relocation scheme to share the burden of the member states that were most affected, coordinate refugee resettlement, and cooperate with third countries to tackle migration upstream. The influx of migrants entering the EU decreased dramatically after the EU signed a controversial cooperation agreement with Turkey in March 2016, and in 2017 the number of migrants coming to the EU was below the pre-crisis level

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due to their origin, nationality, religion, social group or opinion, as defined in the Geneva Convention (1951). 'Asylum seeker' is a person who seeks protection in a foreign country; after the asylum application is processed, some asylum seekers are granted refugee status, while others may be given a right to stay on other grounds, and some are considered not to have a legal right to stay and may be returned.
There is no internationally recognised definition for 'migrant', but it is generally considered a catch-all term for any person (other than refugee or asylum seeker) who has moved to another country for whatever reason, for example in pursuit of employment, studies, love or family. 'Irregular migrant' usually refers to a migrant without a legal right to stay - either overstaying after a legal right has passed, not being granted a right to stay, or not having applied for any right to stay in the first place. An asylum seeker is not an irregular migrant as the right to seek asylum is a human right; however, their migration status may become irregular, if they stay in the country after their asylum application (and possible appeal) is rejected. The term 'economic migrant' is sometimes used to denote those (regular or irregular) migrants who have emigrated in search of economic opportunity. However, the reasons for emigration are often complex and multiple, and in reality those who are considered economic migrants may also be fleeing human rights abuses and violence in addition to seeking economic opportunity, or may become victims of human rights violations during the journey. (Amnesty International n.d.; FRC n.d.; HRW 2015.)

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(BBC 2018). However, the fatality of migrant crossings did not decrease in the same way, as there were more deaths recorded in 2016, a total of 5 096, compared to 2015, despite the radical reduction in migrant crossings (Ibid.).[4] On the one hand, the EU's response attracted critique from civil society for neglecting the humanitarian disaster and human rights abuses migrants were facing. On the other, particularly right wing groups were vocal about the supposed security threat and economic burden the migrants posed and called for closing all borders. Indeed, in September 2015, several European countries reintroduced border controls within the Schengen, prompting calls of a "Schengen crisis" (Colombeau 2019). Member states' division over the measures to be taken and especially the relocation and resettlement schemes made a coordinated and timely response by the EU challenging to achieve (Carrera et al. 2015).

Thus, the context for the policies I will analyse is one of deep political divides and tension, particularly around the topics of migration, security and the EU's role in external policy more generally. This context affected the documents that were written at the time, not only migration policy, but also other external policy documents. For example, Hyötylä (2018) has analysed how the themes of migration and security became much more prominent in the *New Consensus on Development* (2017) compared to the old one, from 2005. This context makes EU external policy between 2015–2019 an interesting case for examining the securitisation of the policy nexus of migration and development.

On the other hand, the EU has also been dubbed a "normative power" and is considered to act based on certain moral liberal values and promote these values, for example human rights and democracy, also in its external action (Manners 2002). The European Union is collectively (that is, member states and EU combined) the largest donor of development assistance in the world, and it is also where the concept of policy coherence for development has gained the most prominence (Carbone 2012). Indeed, the principle of PCD has been

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[4] Furthermore, although the absolute number of deaths decreased in the following years, there were more deaths in proportion to the number of migrants who reached Europe: in 2015, there was one death for every 269 arrivals recorded; in 2016, this went up to one death per 72 arrivals, and in 2017 to one in 57 arrivals (BBC 2018).

inscribed in the European treaties since *Maastricht* (1992), and it is often referred to in the EU's development policy context. The EU's normative basis, which has also been linked to PCD (Stocchetti 2013; Häbel 2018), contrasts with the migration management measures which have prompted calls of "Fortress Europe", making the migration-development nexus particularly interesting to analyse from the perspective of policy coherence. The conflict between the EU's normative principles which it says it abides by, and its actual restrictive response to the migration crisis can be interpreted as 'normative incoherence' (Koff 2017a), and 'organised hypocrisy' (Lavenex 2018).

Indeed, this thesis research contributes to wider literatures on policy coherence for development and the securitisation of migration and development. It combines various theoretical strands to analyse the EU's external strategies on migration and development from a novel perspective. It explores the policy nexus between migration and development and the prominence of policy coherence for development in EU external policy documents to determine what policy coherence really means in the context of EU policy on the interconnections of migration and development.

This is a particularly topical area of research now that the Juncker Commission has just come to the end of its term and this research can provide a reference point for the new Von der Leyen Commission; this research helps better understand the EU's external policies following the migration crisis, in particular the coherence and dynamics between separate but closely interlinked policy fields. Furthermore, as the *Cotonou Partnership Agreement*, the treaty between the EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, is expiring this year and negotiations for a new agreement are underway, it is useful to examine the EU's commitment to the principle of PCD, especially as the migration clause was controversial in the previous negotiations already (see e.g. Van Criekinge 2015). Finally, the topic of migration has remained highly prominent since the refugee crisis and seems to remain so for the foreseeable future.

Shedding light on the principles according to which EU external policy is made and on the dynamics between interlinked policy sectors, this research also has

a societal impact as it helps better understand EU policymaking and thus also helps to influence EU politics. This is especially important as the EU, which has also been criticised for a lack of transparency and accountability, affects hundreds of millions of Europeans directly as well as billions of people in the wider world indirectly. Especially as this topic concerns migration policy and policy on developing countries, the EU's impact reaches a very large number of people. Therefore it is particularly important to understand EU politics and the political choices and dynamics behind EU policies. The thesis will explore how mutually contradictory policies may be presented as complementary or particular political interests may be pursued under a technical guise of policy coherence. Exposing this can enable an open debate about which values should guide policymaking, or how to approach sometimes clashing political priorities. Although this study is specifically about the coherence of EU external policy focusing on migration and development, I hope the research can prove useful more generally in the field of policy coherence both among different EU policies as well as between policies of different institutions.

There are countless topics to research, so choosing one is giving importance to that particular topic, a way to shed light on a potentially unresearched social problem, and a commitment towards gaining knowledge about it. My choice of topic reflected my own positive attitude towards the European project and my deep conviction that we as EU citizens can and should actively seek to improve the EU, as well as my concern for the EU's response to the migration crisis and the extent to which normative principles such as PCD were followed in the handling of the crisis. Although I recognise that my own position is by no means neutral and this normativity of course affected my topic choice, I do not see this as a problem. This kind of normativity is characteristic of the field of critical development studies and does not in itself affect the validity of the research. Rather, I see it as a motivating factor, which helped me put a lot of time and effort into this thesis and conduct a deep and careful analysis.

The following chapter will lay out the theoretical framework and previous research on the topic. Chapter 3 will explain the data and methodology used in the study, while chapter 4 will present the findings for each research question.

The findings will be discussed in chapter 5, and chapter 6 concludes with suggestions for further research and future implications.

## 1. Previous research and theoretical framework

In this chapter, I will review the relevant literature to place this thesis in the context of previous research and theoretical framework. Two main strands of literature are explored: first, policy coherence for development in EU external policy; and second, literature on the migration-development nexus and the securitisation of migration and development. Finally, the chapter will conclude with some considerations of normative incoherence and organized hypocrisy as explaining the gap between words and action in EU's external policy.

## 2.1. The concept of policy coherence for development and its evolution in EU external policy

### 2.1.1. What is PCD?

Since the 1990s, increasing attention has been given to the study of policy coherence. The OECD defines policy coherence as the "systematic promotion of mutually reinforcing policy actions across government departments and agencies with the purpose of creating synergies and complementarities so as to meet common and agreed objectives" (cited in Sørensen 2016, 63).

The notion of policy coherence for development (PCD) is similar but narrower, as it is focused on development. In PCD, the "common and agreed objectives" relate to development policy, hence "for development." Various definitions have been presented for PCD with slightly different implications.

In his influential report *Enhancing Policy Coherence for Development*, Guido Ashoff (2005, 1) formulates two possible definitions for PCD: "as a first definition, the absence of incoherences, which occur when other policies deliberately or accidentally impair the effects of development policy or run counter to its intentions. A second, more ambitious definition sees policy coherence as the interaction of all policies that are relevant in the given context with a view to the achievement of overriding development objectives." Ashoff's first definition is a negative definition, merely the absence of incoherences,

while the second one implies prioritising development objectives and actively making use of other policies to achieve development objectives.

Meanwhile, Sørensen (2016, 63) describes the concept as follows: "policies across a range of areas – such as for example migration – exploit positive synergies and spill overs or, at a minimum, avoid negative consequences." Sørensen's definition indicates that there may be different levels of coherence – from merely minimising negative consequences to actively maximising positive synergies – while Ashoff presents the negative and positive definitions as two possible but distinct conceptualisations.

Both of Ashoff's alternative definitions as well as Sørensen's definition are clearly focused on the interaction between development and non-development policies. This is what Maurizio Carbone (2008) calls "horizontal coherence", the coherence between development and non-development policies of a particular organisation. This is also the type of coherence that this thesis will analyse, in this case more specifically the coherence between migration and development policy of the European Commission.

However, other types of policy coherence have also been identified based on the actors involved. In addition to horizontal, there is also vertical coherence, i.e. the extent to which EU policies and member state policies are coherent. Internal coherence, on the other hand, refers to the consistency within a policy field within a country or organisation. Donor-recipient coherence refers to the interaction of policies that have been adopted in the donor country and those that have been adopted in the developing country. Finally, multilateral coherence means the coherence in the interaction between various international organizations, such as the EU and the UN. (Carbone 2008; Koff 2017a.)

In addition to Carbone's typology, other categorisations of PCD have also been made. For example, Hoebink (2004) makes a distinction between intentional and unintentional (in)coherence. Unintentional incoherence can result from policymakers' ignorance of certain policies' impacts on development policy, for example due to limited information or lack of coordination. However, a policymaker may even be conscious of negative impacts of a certain policy and

still decide to accept them if they believe that they come along with more significant positive impacts. (Hoebink 2004.)

More recently, a new concept of policy coherence for sustainable development (PCSD) has emerged, taking a broader scope compared to PCD. The idea is that policy coherence should take into account an even more comprehensive sustainability perspective, making sure to incorporate all aspects of sustainable development (Zeigermann 2018). The concept has gained traction especially among civil society and become prominent since the Agenda 2030 negotiations; for example Concord (the European confederation of development NGOs) has promoted the concept widely. However, some prominent academics, such as Maurizio Carbone, have defended sticking to PCD, expressing concern that the new concept of PCSD may dilute the PCD agenda and partly "hijack the ultimate goal of PCD, that is international development" (Carbone 2016, 19).


### 2.1.2. PCD in EU external policy

PCD as a principle was first enshrined in EU policy in the *Treaty of Maastricht* (1992), in the so-called triple-C principles: coordination, complementarity and coherence. Coordination referred to a pursuit of consistency and a single voice through consultation and coordination, while complementarity referred to the fact that development policy is a shared competence and the Commission's development programme should be complementary to those of the member states (Carbone 2017, 298). Coherence, which evolved into PCD, meant that the EU should take the interest and needs of developing countries into account in all its policies (Carbone 2007).

PCD was not adopted readily by most member states' aid departments, and within the Commission it was trampled by territorial and ideological battles between different DGs (Carbone 2017). From the start the most vocal proponents of PCD were European NGOs, particularly in the field of development. The first decade of the 2000s was the period when PCD grew and became more established as a major principle of EU external policy. In 2005, an ambitious agenda on PCD was initiated, including twelve different policy areas and biannual reporting on progress. In 2009, the policy areas were

cut down from twelve to five priority focus areas: trade and finance, food security, climate change, migration, and security. (Carbone 2017.)

However, Carbone (2017) notes that despite many member states gradually embracing PCD and adopting various mechanisms for it, progress has remained fairly limited and the initial enthusiasm has diminished. PCD has proven challenging, as it by definition implies coordination and consultation between different institutions and across policy fields, each with different interests and ideas. Even within the field of development, there are clashes due to different views on development policy and the concept of development itself. Carbone (2016, 18) concludes that the EU has been "high on mechanisms, but low on achievements", and that "the successful promotion of PCD is not so much a matter of bureaucratic arrangements but is primarily a political undertaking." Other scholars, such as Mark Furness and Stephan Gänzle agree; although PCD involves technical elements, it is inherently a political issue.

Indeed, Furness and Gänzle (2017) point out that policy objectives of different policy sectors may be mutually conflicting. Policy coherence therefore requires normative prioritisation of horizontal policy goals to determine the objectives with which policies should be coherent. The concept of PCD would suggest development policy should be prioritised, as other policies with potential impacts for developing countries should take into account development objectives. However, its limited success illustrates the lack of political will to actually prioritise development over other external policy objectives, such as those of trade, security, or migration.


### 2.1.3. Which coherence?

The pursuit of policy coherence has also attracted some critique, as it has been used by some donor organisations to push for a Western development model (Grabel 2007; Thede 2013). Whether or not the concept of PCD itself necessarily implies pushing this agenda, a neoliberal agenda and a Western conceptualisation of 'development' have been promoted under the guise of policy coherence. Nancy Thede (2013) identifies two distinct trends in

development policy promoted under the ambiguous concept of coherence. First, PCD is used to pursue policy coherence for the donor's security, trade and other interests, rather than for development, typically in the form of "whole-of-government" or "integrated" approaches. Secondly, within the OECD-DAC, the group composed solely of donors setting the rules on official development assistance, it is used to prescribe a certain development agenda based on market liberalisation as the key to development, effectively restricting the autonomy of governments in the global South to pursue any other model of development or alternative to development. (Thede 2013.)

Similar to Thede's and Grabel's analyses, Jussi Kanner's (2011) research on PCD in the case of the EU's sugar policy concluded that EU policy was more coherent towards trade policy objectives rather than towards development objectives. The policy intervention can be considered coherent for development primarily based on the expectations of development impacts from free trade, rather than from the perspective of the objectives of development cooperation. Yet by defining these policies as coherent for development policy, the EU has been able to legitimise its mainly free trade supporting initiatives. Thus, Kanner finds that PCD can be considered a tool in the fight between free trade and protectionism inside the EU's development policy. This is not because of some conspiracy by free trade exponents, but rather resulting from a political norm in the trade sector, where free trade and integration to global economy is generally considered the best possible path to development for developing countries. Kanner concludes that the question of how trade policy should take into account the objectives of development cooperation has turned into a question of how development cooperation should take into account the impacts of the EU's other policies. (Kanner 2011).

It should be noted that these findings do not necessarily constitute a critique towards the normative idea of policy coherence for development per se; rather they expose the use of policy coherence (for development) as a rhetorical tool to legitimise a neoliberal harmonisation and aid effectiveness agenda that is attached to policy coherence. This is essentially a case of (unconsciously) rendering the donors' political agenda technical, similar to Li's (2007) and Ferguson's (1994) analyses of development programmes in Indonesia and

Lesotho respectively. In this sense, the pursuit of policy coherence can be linked to a (neo)colonial pursuit to govern the global South, determining the meaning of development in development cooperation.

While the conventional approach to PCD taken by donor organisations such as the EU and OECD has been quite technical and weak rather than actively calling for the political prioritisation of development, and this has been critiqued by the critical approach to PCD (Grabel 2007; Thede 2013), Siitonen (2016) introduces a third, normative approach. Seeking to build on, and overcome the issues in PCD exposed by, the critical approach, the normative approach and its concept of normative policy coherence for development (NPCD) stresses the normativity inherent in the principle of PCD (Siitonen 2016; Koff 2017b; Häbel 2018). The normative approach sees PCD as a way to contribute to transformative development, which means processes of change that address the local needs of communities, integrating human rights and social justice at the local and national level, as well as tackling global power imbalances (Siitonen 2016; Koff 2017b). Thus it is a departure from the critical approach that considers PCD as inherently embedded in the Western tradition of development understood as modernisation and economic growth, and sees that PCD can be used to contribute to alternative development, if not quite an alternative to development.

Policy coherence for development, especially in this normative approach, has also been linked to the concept of normative power Europe (Stocchetti 2013; Häbel 2018). Coined by Manners (2002), normative power Europe means that the EU as a global actor promotes its core liberal values, such as human rights, democracy and liberty, also in its external action and sets them as a norm. This normative basis of the EU's external action is considered to arise from the EU's own nature as a contractually developed community of diverse states and actors (Manners 2002; Stocchetti 2013). However, normative power Europe has attracted criticism as the EU has often been considered to act in a rather self-interested manner; for example, Seeberg (2009), analysing the EU's inconsistent democracy-promotion in Lebanon calls the EU "a realist actor in normative clothes." Indeed, so far there has also been little evidence of the EU taking the normative approach in its implementation of PCD in practice. Instead,

migration and security concerns seem to be increasingly important for the EU's development policy, as the next section will show.

## 2.2. The security-migration-development nexus and the interconnections between migration and development policy in the EU

### 2.2.1. What is the migration-development nexus and how are migration and development interlinked?

Migration and development are two distinct yet interlinked phenomena with complex and multiple impacts on each other. The notion of "migration–development nexus" to describe the interconnected phenomena became prominent with the 2002 overview article on the topic by Sørensen, Van Hear and Engberg-Pedersen. The emergence of the concept was the result of a paradigm shift, from seeing migration as a failure or lack of development to seeing it as a potential contributor to development (Lavenex and Kunz 2008).

The main channels through which migration can potentially contribute to social and economic development are remittances, return migration and diaspora involvement or philanthropy (Koff 2017a; Espinosa 2016; Åkesson 2011). Indeed, remittances have become a major source of income for many households in the global South and far exceed the amount of official development assistance (ODA) donated each year (Lavenex and Kunz 2008).

On the other hand, migration has been considered to increase brain drain and inequality in the country of origin, which has adverse impacts on development. Furthermore, the positive impacts of remittances and return migration have been questioned. For example, the impact of remittances may be limited due to for example unattractive investment environments in countries of origin (De Haas 2005), while several factors make it challenging for return migration to produce the theorized gains (Åkesson 2011). First of all, migrants working in destination countries may not actually have the chance to acquire skills that would be useful for development in the country of origin, so returnees' skills and resources may not be adapted to the local situation in the country of origin (Ibid.). Furthermore, it typically takes decades to accumulate enough resources

for a successful return, so circular migration would actually require a much longer time frame than is originally envisioned (Ibid.). Adepoju, Van Noorloos and Zoomers (2010) also point out that circular migration may not work as intended without economic development and job creation in the country of origin, and indeed many labour migrants with temporary visas actually decide to overstay their visa even if that means living in irregular circumstances.

There is a consensus among scholars that in the short-to-medium-term, social and economic development typically increases migration (Sørensen 2016). This is because very poor people do not have the resources needed to migrate and thus development enables migration; and yet the push and pull factors for migration remain in place (Sørensen, Van Hear, and Engberg-Pedersen 2002).

### 2.2.2. Migration and development policies interlinked

In the 2000s, development aid has increasingly been tied to conditions on migration control and returnee readmission. This began with the *Cotonou Partnership Agreement* (2000), which included a clause on readmission, and similar agreements have since been signed with a number of countries (Adepoju, Van Noorloos, and Zoomers 2010; Carbone 2017). Furthermore, following the migration crisis in 2015, development policy documents often mention 'tackling the root causes of irregular migration'.

Critical scholars argue that combining migration and development policies seeks to make divisive and sensitive migration policy more digestible and harmonious. Geiger and Pécoud (2013, 373) note: "contrary to what notions such as 'cooperation' or 'triple-win' suggest, migration policies are characterised by deeply diverging interests between states. In such a context, Western states' efforts to steer the behaviour of sending and transit regions need apparently consensual issues to establish a common ground with governments in less-developed regions. By constructing migration issues in a certain way, this nexus thus provides a framework that enables cooperation between states." Especially at the international level, development can be seen as a deal sweetener. Skeldon (2008) posits that tying migration to development, a much more

consensual and less sensitive issue than migration, is a strategy to bring the topic to discussion at the multilateral level.

Similarly, politicians at the national level can use a normative discourse to legitimise restrictive migration policy. Studying the discourse on the migration-development nexus in European parliaments, Lauwers, Orbie, and Delputte (forthcoming) found that it was not just the development-oriented politicians arguing against more restrictive measures who brought up international norms. Mainstream politicians from centre-right and centre-left parties arguing *for* restrictive migration measures also used references to international norms and development policy institutions, such as the SDGs or the UN agency on migration IOM, but their aim was to legitimise the restrictive policy. For instance, Lauwers, Orbie, and Delputte (forthcoming) note the German government's justification: "Measures of migration management and migration control serve the containment and control of human smuggling and ensuring the framework conditions for an orderly, safe, regular and responsible effective migration and mobility of people, as is reflected in the Sustainable Development Goals in point 10.7[5]." Thus restrictive measures are justified through a language of development and international norms, making sustainable development and restrictive migration policy mutually compatible.

Similarly, the EU Commission refers to its approach to migration management as "a win-win partnership", thus using positive rhetoric seeking to present migration management and development objectives as mutually coherent, not contradictory. For example, as Mark Langan (2018, 163) notes, the *Valletta Action Plan* agreed in 2015 at the height of the refugee crisis, contextualises aid for border management "in terms of an overarching concern for human rights." Langan (2018, 164) posits: "EU action to help African states govern migration is therefore presented as a benevolent contribution to developing countries – preventing people smuggling and ensuring human rights throughout. Nevertheless, despite this development discourse, there is much concern that instruments such as the Valletta Action Plan represents the securitisation of

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[5] Sustainable Development Goal 10 is "Reduce Inequalities" and includes subgoal 10.7: "facilitate orderly, safe, and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies." (United Nations n.d.)

development in another form." In particular, there is concern that tying aid to migration control and capacity-building of border control diverts development funding away from genuine development or humanitarian programmes. (Langan 2018.)

The win-win partnership rhetoric is also questionable as EU and African governments tend to have conflicting interests when it comes to migration. De Haas (2006) states that many African countries have little genuine interest in curbing emigration due to the vital remittances and relief on internal labour market pressure it produces. The aid provided in exchange for migration control is often too limited to make a significant impact. Mouthaan's (2019) research on Senegal and Ghana illustrates this; remittances are more significant than ODA, and reintegrating returnees would bring even more challenges. In addition to the economic issues, cooperating with European countries on returns is also politically unattractive (Mouthaan 2019).

This has been the case in previous negotiations, too. For example, Van Criekinge (2015, 259–60) notes that "the insertion of a migration clause, Article 13, was amongst the most contentious issues during the Cotonou negotiations, highlighting the weight and importance of the issue for both the EU and the ACP. It defines the parameters of the EU-ACP dialogue on migration, and is essentially the result of a difficult compromise between the parties' different views and interests. While on the EU side, member states, under domestic pressure to reduce irregular migration stemming from Africa, strongly endorsed the integration of a readmission clause, instead the ACP was keen on securing the rights and protection of their migrants in the EU." She continues (2015, 262-3): "While developments in the external dimension of the EU's migration policy have tended to combine repressive measures with incentive instruments in order to incite cooperation from sending countries, African governments have instead focused largely on enhancing the developmental prospects that migration provides." For all the talk of "partnership", the reality seems to be more skewed, and although African states are by no means 'passive agents', European interests dominate in multilateral and bilateral agreements signed with migrant-sending countries of the South (Adepoju, Van Noorloos, and Zoomers 2010; Mouthaan 2019).

While this may have increased development assistance, Adepoju, Van Noorloos, and Zoomers (2010, 62) point out that "the increased link between development and migration policy may have harmful long-term effects. For example, making cooperation on migration a condition for gaining development funds could lead to an undesirable situation where the main countries of departure and transit of irregular migrants to Europe secure extra funds while other, possibly poorer, countries without direct migrants towards Europe are excluded from development aid." As migration to a certain extent increases with the level of social and economic development, the poorest and most vulnerable countries – those that would be the obvious recipients of development assistance with purely development aims, as the EU's stated primary objective in development policy is poverty eradication – do not pose a migration "threat" to the EU and may thus be sidelined when development assistance is tied to other concerns. Furthermore, this prioritisation on the basis of security and migration concerns can apply also within countries; for example in the case of Niger, Delkáder-Palacios (2019) found that development assistance was directed towards the mobility hubs within the country, not based on where it would be most effective from a development perspective.

Indeed, this seems to be a valid concern when one looks at where most of EU ODA is going: increasingly more has been spent in Turkey, a middle-income country that is key for migration control. Since 2009, the EU's aid spending within Europe has more than doubled while its aid for all other regions has remained more or less the same (Smith 2017). Smith (2017, 177) notes: "Among all aid recipients, Turkey is easily at the top of the list; the EU provided over 3 billion USD to that country in 2014, while all other EU aid recipients were in the range of several hundred million USD or less, according to OECD figures." This is indicative of the migration focus of aid, as European and neighbouring countries are not so poor but rather more important for the EU's security and migration interests.

Furthermore, this conditionality is not the case only when it comes to official development assistance, but other "carrots" the EU can provide as well, such as temporary labour mobility schemes or economic/trade partnerships. Moreover, many countries use ODA funds to cover humanitarian aid programmes for

repatriated migrants. Thus, ODA is used for a situation arising from the EU's migration policy, as it is EU migration policy that sends the migrants back in the first place. (Adepoju, Van Noorloos, and Zoomers 2010.)

### 2.2.3. Securitisation and the security-migration-development nexus

Although the phenomena of migration and development are connected in multiple and complex ways, in recent years one perspective has become increasingly prominent regarding both migration and development policy: security. This can be understood as a result of a process of securitisation of both development and migration. It has led to a triple nexus of security-migration-development, which has impacts on migration and development policy.

Securitisation is a concept developed by Ole Waever, Barry Buzan and Jaap de Wilde (the so-called Copenhagen School) in the 1990s as a departure from the narrow military-related notion of security to a constructivist conceptualisation, which considers how ideas of (in)security are socially constructed through speech acts (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 1998; Trombetta 2014; De Roeck, Delputte, Orbie 2017). Later on, the Paris School focused on the role of mundane practices such as policing and surveillance as drivers of securitisation, though the two approaches can also be combined (Trombetta 2014; Fakhoury 2016). Whether through discourse or practice, the phenomenon, for example migration, is framed as a security issue, which also legitimises addressing it from a security perspective (Fakhoury 2016; Pinyol-Jiménez 2012). In the case of migration, this can include the use of law enforcement, military, hard borders and other measures that criminalise or problematise migrants and portray them as a security threat to be disposed of. Securitisation thus prescribes and legitimises a particular response to the diagnosed problem by framing the phenomenon as a security issue rather than something else, for example a humanitarian issue requiring medical and social care. This is not to say migration could not have a security dimension, but securitisation reduces and simplifies the complex and multi-faceted phenomenon to a security threat and legitimises a particular type of response. It

also implies a priority for the security of the West over the security of the rest (Sørensen 2012).

Applied to the case of development policy, securitisation can be understood in several ways. It can refer to the legitimation of an exceptional, typically security-related, response to a perceived threat to Western countries posed by a development context, or more broadly a Western attempt to regulate the lives and activities of people in the global South (Fisher and Anderson 2015). It can also mean the "hijacking", or instrumentalisation, of aid and development policy by security and defence actors in pursuit of Western security interests (Ibid.). In the past 20 years, securitisation of development can be seen in the transformation of the linkages perceived by Western donors between security and development; indeed securitisation of development can be linked to the concept of security-development nexus (Keukeleire and Raube 2013.)

Before the 2000s, security and development were seen to be closely linked as insecurity and conflict would tend to hamper development gains while at the same time being typically caused by development problems. Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 and the ensuing War on Terror, insecurity in the global South began to be seen as a national security threat in the Western donor countries. Following this logic, development cooperation in fragile and conflict affected states began to be seen as a way to protect donors' own security. This securitisation of development is seen in how security considerations were brought into the mainstream of development cooperation, and donors' own security concerns were prioritised over developmental objectives. (McConnon 2019.)

The securitisation of EU development policy in the hard sense of using aid for militarised or law enforcement operations seems to have been limited by EU institutional arrangements (Gibert 2009; Keukeleire and Raube 2013; Gänzle and Furness 2016), although one instance can be considered in the case of the African Peace Facility (APF) which supports the African Union's mission in Somalia and Sudan and is funded entirely through EU development funds (Keukeleire and Raube 2013). However, the EU's overall relations with Africa are increasingly motivated by its own security interests (Gibert 2009, Keukeleire

and Raube 2013). Indeed, in the case of the EU, the securitisation of development can mostly be seen in the incorporation of development cooperation as part of a comprehensive, holistic and coherent approach to foreign and security policy.

Overall, Zwolski (2012) finds that the EU has gradually adopted a holistic security discourse, which considers development policy as part of larger, holistic security policy and aid as a potential strategic and security instrument. In particular, he sees that the incorporation of development into a more comprehensive and holistic foreign and security policy is reflected in the reforms that followed from the *Lisbon Treaty* (2009). Keukeleire and Raube (2013, 565) similarly note that the "new institutional arrangements installed after Lisbon can be seen as strengthening the link between security and development. Prior to Lisbon, 'security' and 'development' were largely viewed as worlds apart, separated by the EU's former pillar structure. -- The Lisbon Treaty formally disabled the pillar structure and, in theory, enables the formulation of a coherent and integrated foreign policy across former pillars and policy domains, including security and development." Both Zwolski (2012) and Keukeleire and Raube (2013) point to two institutional reforms in particular: the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the redefined role of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, now also Vice President of the Commission (HR/VP). External action is now more consistently under the EEAS, with the High Representative/Vice President ultimately responsible for its coherent coordination. As part of this reform, development policy became a more integrated part of EU foreign policy, and the EEAS got a mandate to promote consistency within EU external action policy and co-decide on aid programming (Bergmann et al. 2019). Indeed, in their analysis of key EU development policy documents, Bergmann et al. (2019) found that since Lisbon, there has been a shift in the way coherence is approached from a development perspective to a "policy coherence for external action" perspective.

At the same time, migration has also become securitised. Rooted in the 1980s already and accelerated after 9/11, the securitisation of migration in Europe is not a new phenomenon, as migration had been framed as a security issue for

years both through institutionalised migration-restricting policies and populist discourses (Huysmans 2000; Karyotis 2007; Fakhoury 2016). However, this increased after the Arab Spring in 2011 in the run up to the migration crisis in 2015–16 (Fakhoury 2016; Pinyol-Jiménez 2012). This included for example elite speech acts calling the inflow of displaced people from Tunisia an "invasion" of Europe, as well as securitising practices such as the construction of fences along borders and reintroducing border controls within Schengen (Fakhoury 2016).

In addition to the discourse and restrictive measures, Fakhoury (2016, 74) points out that the security focus is also present in the EU's refugee aid programmes: "By donating aid and declaring its intent to "tackle migration upstream" through partnerships with third countries, the EU adopts elements derived from the human security model while catering for its security interests – that is, controlling migration from a distance." Thus, although the aid has a human security objective, it is at the same time used to control migration for the EU's own security interests. The use of aid to control migration because migration is securitised shows how the securitisation of both migration and development produces a triple security-migration-development nexus.

The triple nexus is also analysed by Augusto Delkáder-Palacios (2019) in the case of migration-related conditionalities in EU development policy. Delkáder-Palacios analyses the *Agenda on Migration* and the *Partnership Framework* and conducts a case study of Niger to understand the context of securitisation under which migration-related conditionalities on development assistance are established and what their impacts on development policy are. Delkáder-Palacios finds that the EU uses conditionalities on aid to reward or penalise countries based on their cooperation on migration management in a context where migration is securitised. He finds that the subordination of development objectives and instruments to migration and security objectives has negative impacts on the effectiveness, efficiency and autonomy of development policy. (Delkáder-Palacios 2019).

## 2.3. Normative Incoherence and Organised Hypocrisy?

As we have seen, the EU's development policy is considered to have a normative, liberal value basis and the EU is officially committed to policy coherence for development. However, the implementation of normative policy coherence for development has been lacking, as the EU's development policy is increasingly driven by other concerns, such as migration and security, and the EU is seeking coherence in its external action. This can create an incoherence between the EU's commitments to PCD and its actual policy practice. This is what Koff (2017a, 11) considers "normative incoherence", meaning the "incoherence between policy strategies in development and non-development policy arenas and core values of liberal democratic societies."

One example of normative incoherence is analysed in Sandra Häbel's (2018) PhD thesis, where she examined the EU's normative policy coherence for development in the case of Vietnam. She found that the normative issues were a political concern at the multilateral level, but they did not translate into practice at the bilateral level in development or trade practices, leading to normative incoherence.

However, the EU may not acknowledge the existence of such incoherence. The EU may have a number of policy objectives which it presents as complementary, while in reality they may be contradictory, or not interlinked enough for certain action to have a positive impact for both objectives. In such cases, the less prioritised objectives may in the end be pure rhetoric to perform the role of a normative actor while the action taken is driven by the more prioritised policy objectives.

One example related to migration and development was the EU's Blue Card directive – a labour mobility scheme seeking to promote development gains through circular migration. In her thesis, Kukka Korhonen (2012) found that the initiative had only limited impact on development. For it to benefit the poorest countries, such as Malawi, the directive should have taken into account the local conditions in countries of origin, which are known to largely determine the development impacts of migration. However, this was not possible, as the main objective of the directive was to address the EU's internal interests. The

development impact of the policy rested on a false assumption that circular migration would alone be sufficient to guarantee development benefits from migration. Therefore the principle of PCD was not achieved, and any use of the concept of PCD in the policy was rather simplifying rhetoric. (Korhonen 2012.)

Another case of incoherence between objectives can be found in the case of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which is declared to promote both effective and democratic governance. Börzel and van Hüllen (2014, 1033) note that "while the ENP conceives of the two objectives as complementary, the democratization of (semi-)authoritarian countries entails the risk of their destabilization at least in the short run. As a result, promoting effective and democratic governance become conflicting objectives." Börzel and van Hüllen (2014, 1044) find that "the lower the level of political liberalization and the higher the instability of a country, the more ineffective the EU is in asserting a democratic reform agenda in the ENP Action Plans, clearly favouring stability over change." These clashes between the EU's own interests undermine the effectiveness of the ENP. Börzel and van Hüllen (2014, 1045) conclude: "When dealing with non-democratic countries, the democratization-stabilization dilemma forces the EU to choose among its conflicting objectives and it seems unlikely that it will suddenly prioritize democratization over stabilization. However, the least the EU could do is to acknowledge that all good things do not necessarily go together and that its declared objectives may come into conflict."

Organisational sociology and Brunsson's (1989) concept of "organized hypocrisy" can help explain this failure to acknowledge the incoherence between declared objectives and actual policy action. Lavenex (2018) draws on this concept in her analysis of the EU's response to the refugee crisis and the gap between the EU's words and action.

Organisational sociology considers organisations as a reflection of their environments: the technical or strategic environment, i.e. the actors' interests and interaction, material and institutional constraints; and the normative or moral environment, i.e. the ideational pressures of the social norms and values perceived as appropriate in the wider societal context. Both environments

produce expectations for the organisation, which can be mutually contradictory. "Organized hypocrisy" refers to a situation where the strategic environment and the normative environment lead to mutually contradictory expectations, and the organisation deals with this contradiction by trying to distance and decouple the normative core and discourse from strategic action. (Lavenex 2018.)

In the case of the EU's refugee crisis the result is "a cleavage between what the EU says it is doing - its espoused goals and ideals (the protective acquis) - and what it actually does (restrictive practices preventing access to protection)." (Lavenex 2018, 1200). Lavenex (2018, 1200) notes that "'hypocrisy' does not flow from intentional action but is the result of complex organizations' struggle to uphold expected norms and values on the one hand while responding to the priorities and contingencies expressed by their technical environment. -- The attempt to satisfy incompatible demands without giving in on either of them results in incoherent action and a sense of hypocrisy."

Lavenex (2018, 1208) notes that in some ways, organized hypocrisy is a necessity for the EU, as the normative standards are enshrined in law, but the technical constraints posed by member states unwilling to budge on the question of refugees create a very real limit to action: "As Brunsson (1989, p. 33) has argued, decoupling normative ambition from political action can be the only way organizations can manage inherently conflictual demands in their environments, which cannot be reconciled. In other words, decoupling allows the EU to uphold its normative standards of appropriateness at the level of 'talk' and 'decision' while at the same time in 'action' respecting the limits imposed by recalcitrant Member States (Brunsson, 1989)."

However, though it may be a way to deal with the issue of conflicting demands in the short term, this organized hypocrisy may have adverse consequences at least in the long term as it can undermine the organisation's credibility. Lavenex (2018, 1208) explains that organized hypocrisy "creates a capabilities-expectations gap which, in times of political pressure, slowly undermines the organization's credibility." Lavenex (2018, 1209) points out an example of how the response to the refugee crisis has undermined the EU's actorness in international negotiations: "in the third (and latest) round of negotiations [for the

UN Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration], it was no longer the Commission who spoke 'on behalf of the European Union ', but Austria who spoke 'on behalf of 27 European States', while Hungary spoke on its own." Lavenex (2018, 1209) concludes that "the incapacity to bridge normative expectations and political action may, in the long run, challenge the very idea of a common European policy."

## 2.4. Conclusions of the literature review

This literature review has provided a context and a theoretical framework to help explain and interpret the findings of this research. The literature has shown that migration and development are connected in multiple and complex ways, but it seems that in recent years, as both phenomena have been securitised, the EU's development cooperation is increasingly being used for migration management. This is conflicting with the inherently normative principle of policy coherence for development which the EU has committed to. However, this is not surprising as the literature indicates the EU has always been reluctant to prioritise development over other policy objectives, and the concept of policy coherence has also been used to push a neoliberal agenda. Still, the conflict between normative principles and the instrumentalisation of aid can lead to normative incoherence and organized hypocrisy, which can undermine the EU's credibility as a global actor and supposedly normative power. The findings of this thesis can further illuminate how the interconnections between migration and development are considered in EU external policy, to what extent the EU is committed to PCD and what is actually meant by coherence in EU external policy, and to what extent the EU's affirmations of commitment to PCD are indicative of development-oriented policy action or normative incoherence and organized hypocrisy.

## 2. Data and Methods

### 3.1. Research design

Research methods should be selected based on the research questions, choosing the most suitable type of data and analytical method for the questions, following the particular epistemological approach the research questions are set in.

This thesis takes a constructivist approach, whereby meaning is not a given but rather socially constructed. This approach is clear in how the thesis is concerned with how words and concepts are used to construct particular ideas – how policy coherence (for development) and the interconnections between migration and development are presented in the EU's external policy. On the other hand, the questions also require analysis of the substance of policy documents and expert views, not just the discourse or frames used, and therefore I decided to use content analysis instead of discourse analysis as my analytical method.

The thesis uses two sources of data: policy documents and expert interviews. Policy documents are the main source of data, but data from expert interviews is used to triangulate the results of the document data in order to increase the reliability and validity of the findings.

Triangulation in research refers to the use of two or more approaches to study a question, making the findings more comprehensive and reliable. Triangulation can result in converging, complementary, or diverging results from the approaches used. Heale and Forbes (2013, 98) note: "Converging results aim to increase the validity through verification; complementary results highlight different aspects of the phenomenon or illustrate different phenomenon and divergent findings can lead to new and better explanations for the phenomenon under investigation." Despite some concern over the comparability of different types of data, triangulation is "generally considered to promote a more comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon under study and to enhance the rigour of a research study", according to Heale and Forbes (2013, 98).

Triangulation can be done by using more than one way to gather data, or more than one analytical method. In this thesis, I am using two different sources of data, while the analytical methods for them are similar, with only slight differences. A critical content analysis of the document data allows me to study how concepts are presented and what they mean in EU external policy documents. This is complemented with a content analysis of interview data, which provides more context for the policy documents and the practice of coordination and policy coherence in the EU.

Content analysis can be considered a "flexible" research method, as the practical approaches vary quite a lot, with the uniting feature being the interpretation of textual data through a process of coding and identifying themes or patterns. Content analysis allows the researcher to adapt the specific analytical technique and approach to their particular research questions, theoretical framework and data. Essentially qualitative content analysis entails closely reading, interpreting and re-contextualising pieces of text. Beach et al. (2009, 130) note that "[w]hat makes a study "critical" is not the methodology but the framework used to think within, through, and beyond the text." (Beach et al. 2009.)

Indeed, this flexibility to adapt content analysis was also useful in my thesis due to the differences in the nature of the two types of data. Thus, there are slight differences in the methods used to analyse the different data due to the type of data involved; the enormous amount of document data requires first a systematic screening to filter hundreds of pages of documents into passages of text relevant for the research questions, whereas the interview data in the form of interview notes is more manageable from the outset. After the initial phase of filtering out irrelevant parts, the analytical process of close reading of passages, summarising their meaning and grouping passages together based on themes or keywords and analysing those, was basically the same for both sets of data. The focus in both document data analysis and interview data analysis was on what was said, rather than how it was said. However, the approach taken in the document analysis was more critical and included scrutinising the text passages for word choices, absences of particular terms, and nuances that affect the

conveyed meaning beyond the substance.

## 3.2. Document data gathering and analysis

My primary data consists of the policy strategies and documents issued by the European Union on EU foreign, migration and development policy from 2015 until the end of the Juncker administration in 2019. Specifically, I am analysing the *Agenda on Migration* (2015), the *Global Strategy* (2016), and the *New European Consensus on Development* (2017), as well as their implementation reports and further communications about the implementation of the *Agenda on Migration* issued by the European Commission. All of these documents are readily available online.

The reason for choosing these particular documents was that they are documents of the Commission and the EEAS, the institutions which are primarily concerned with the EU's own agenda, rather than the Council, which represents the member states, or the Parliament, which represents the people. The Commission is also the institution that has had the most significant role in promoting PCD in the EU (Carbone 2012). Thus the documents of the Commission and EEAS are the ones most suited when analysing EU policy. However, it should be noted that the *New European Consensus on Development* was a joint consensus adopted by all three institutions – the Commission, Council, and Parliament.

For each of the three strategies, the entire document was carefully read and analysed, taking notes and reading key passages several times in order to ensure familiarity with these strategies and their contents on policy coherence and links between development and migration. I also copied all relevant paragraphs into a spreadsheet.

After becoming familiar with the overall strategies, I went through the implementation reports and further communications based on them, in total 131 documents. Systematically, for each of these documents, I searched (using basic software, the find function ctrl+f) for any mention of "policy coherence for development", "PCD", "policy coherence for sustainable development", "PCSD",

"development", "policy coherence", "coheren*" (i.e. capturing "coherence" and "coherent"), and "migration-development nexus". I discarded those documents with no mention of these words, or using the word in another context (for example, development not in the sense of development assistance or cooperation but e.g. as the evolution or establishment of something). For each document with any of these words used, I read and analysed each mention carefully, and copied all potentially relevant paragraphs into the spreadsheet, thus producing a dataset. A list of all documents with relevant paragraphs can be found in the appendix, in total 23 documents.

After gathering the data in this way, I had produced a dataset of all the potentially relevant paragraphs from the documents, grouped based on the search words mentioned in the paragraph, as well as "other" for other potentially relevant paragraphs from the overarching strategies. I then created a new spreadsheet with a tab for each research question and went through all the paragraphs copying relevant paragraphs into the new spreadsheet under the research questions. At this point, I also left out some of the text that I had included in the initial dataset from the new spreadsheet, as now under closer reading I deemed some passages irrelevant for the research questions. However, I kept those passages in the initial dataset so that I could find them again later if needed.

Then, I analysed and summarised the meaning of each paragraph in a few words and grouped the passages of text into categories based on themes or keywords that emerged, for example "root causes", "positive contribution of migration", "leverage". Carefully analysing the meanings of the grouped passages, I formulated the messages conveyed by the groups of text into sentences. I reviewed the document analysis after analysing the interview data, checking again that I had not left out anything that might later turn out to be more relevant and that the findings I had were still relevant.

### 3.3. Interview data gathering and analysis

In addition to the document data, I also conducted semi-structured interviews with key informants. The interview data was used to triangulate the results of the document analysis.

I sought interviewees from all the relevant EU institutions, which I determined to be EEAS, DG DEVCO and DG HOME. In addition, I sought some external experts – people who have worked closely on the topic of PCD and EU development policy for years in the academic and public sphere but are not EU officials. After coming up with a list of people to contact, I sent them emails requesting an interview for thesis research. For the EU officials, I sent emails to potentially suitable interviewees or division heads asking if they or someone from their division would be available for an interview, and many of them kindly forwarded the request to someone in their division, who either agreed to an interview or again redirected me to someone else. I sent gentle reminders and new requests until I had at least one interviewee from each relevant institution. In the beginning of each interview, I asked the interviewee to briefly describe their work and their familiarity with the topic of research, just to make sure they were all suitable interviewees, and that I would better know which questions were more or less relevant for each interviewee.

| Codename | Affiliation[6] | Date and place of interview |
|---|---|---|
| Interviewee 1/ H1 | EEAS | 28th Feb 2020 (phone) |
| Interviewee 2/ H2 | Development Policy Committee of a member state | 9th Mar 2020, Helsinki |
| Interviewee 3/ H3 | EEAS | 23rd Mar 2020 (phone) |
| Interviewee 4/ H4 | Civil society | 24th Mar 2020 (phone) |
| Interviewee 5/ H5 | DG DEVCO | 15th Apr 2020 (phone) |
| Interviewee 6/ H6 | DG DEVCO | 17th Apr 2020 (phone) |
| Interviewee 7/ H7 | DG HOME | 22nd Apr 2020 (phone) |

Table 1. Anonymised list of interviewees.

The acquired interviewees represent the relevant policy-making instances in the EU as well as external experts in EU development policy and policy coherence for development. Thus there is both internal perspective of the EU and an external aspect of experts following EU policy from the outside. Although the number of interviews is relatively low, this diversity of perspectives adds value to the interview data. As the research is mainly focused on the document analysis and the interview data is only used to triangulate the results of the document analysis, this data was sufficient. It also became saturated.

The aim of semi-structured interviews is to gather information, and thus the focus is on the interviewee and the interaction is not a naturally flowing conversation (Hirsjärvi and Hurme 2011). The focus being on the interviewee's perspective and interpretations is useful in trying to get perspectives from different institutions. In semi-structured interviews, some questions are fixed, but not all. Thus, semi-structured interviews were the most appropriate type of data gathering for expert views in my research.

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[6] I decided not to disclose more detailed information of the interviewees, such as their position or unit, in order to ensure full confidentiality. However, I would like to note that the interviewees at EEAS and at DG DEVCO were from different units. In addition, it should be noted that although I am listing here only their current work place to ensure full confidentiality, in the case of some interviewees I am also aware of some other background information which can add to their relevance as interviewees, such as a relevant academic background or having previously worked at a different but relevant EU institution.

A basic list of pre-determined questions which were the same for every interviewee ensured that all the relevant areas were covered. My questions were more specific than is perhaps typical in semi-structured interviews, because I had already conducted document analysis and the findings of that influenced the questions – I formulated the questions in order to get supporting or contradicting views and background information on the findings from the document analysis. However, although the basic questions were the same for everyone, I asked different additional or clarifying follow-up questions based on the interviewee's answers, in order to elicit more information. This was also useful due to the diversity of interviewee positions, as interviewees in different positions had more knowledge on different aspects, and thus it varied slightly which questions were most relevant for each interviewee. However, the answers were very complementary in the end, despite the diversity of positions. Thus the data was actually saturated with these interviewees.

The interviewees gave their consent to participate in this study through replying positively via email to my request for an interview for this thesis, agreeing to participate in an interview. Prior to the interview, I gave each interviewee information on the topic of research and, where asked, the main questions for consideration. I noted that the interviews were confidential and any quotes would be used without revealing the interviewee's identity.[7] I also notified each interviewee of their right to stop the interview at any point without consequences. I also gave the interviewees my contact details and informed them that they could contact me at any time should they have questions regarding the research later on.

As the interviews were conducted to triangulate the results of the document analysis and the method of analysis was content analysis, I did not consider it necessary to produce full litterations of the interviews. The document data had already been analysed for the most part, so what I was looking for in the interviews was more general and focused on content, so it was not necessary to

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[7] Table 1 above presents the list of anonymised interviewees, but in addition to this anonymisation, when presenting the results, I decided to avoid singling out which interviewee said what and rather say e.g. "one interviewee" or "some interviewees" or "interviewees at DG DEVCO", only revealing which interviewee said something when it is relevant.

record every pause and utterance from the interviews, but rather record the main things the interviewees said. Six out of seven interviews were conducted over the phone and were not recorded, but I took comprehensive notes during the interviews. One interview was conducted in person and was recorded just in case, but I also took extensive notes and deleted the recording after making sure my notes covered everything. The interviews lasted between 50 minutes to 90 minutes each.

I analysed the interview data using content analysis as my method. In practice, I had the same spreadsheet I had used for the document analysis, with different tabs for each research question. I went through all the interview notes and copied sentences or paragraphs onto the spreadsheet, pasting them under what I deemed to be the relevant research question, or under several research questions, if the sentence or paragraph seemed relevant for more than one research question. Of course, not all text was relevant for the research questions; thus I discarded pieces of text that were not relevant for any of the research questions but kept them in the notes of the interview so I could find them again later if needed.

I then analysed and summarised the meaning of each piece of text (sentence or paragraph) and grouped the pieces of text into categories based on themes or keywords, similarly to the document analysis. I went through each theme, re-reading paragraphs closely, noting similarities and differences in the pieces of text as well as links to other themes or findings from the documents. I formulated the messages conveyed by the groups of text into short sentences and then edited and put those together to form the findings for each question. Of course, there were many more things that emerged from the data than these findings, but I focused on the things that were relevant for my particular research questions.

## 3.4. Ethical considerations

All research has to contend with ethical considerations that are particular to the research at hand. In the case of this thesis, the main ethical consideration in the data gathering phase involved the interviews: informed consent, which was

secured as discussed above. As the documents analysed were public documents, publically available on the Commission's website, there were no ethical issues in acquiring this data.

The next ethical question was concerned with the proper handling of the data. Interview data was handled with respect for anonymity and confidentiality of interviewees as promised when they consented to the interviews, and data was used solely for the purpose of scientific research and not for any other purpose. The research process is always vulnerable to the biases and failings of the researcher, especially as content analysis as a method involves interpreting data in a particular context, perhaps re-contextualising what was said. Although another researcher might have focused on other things in the same data, indeed formulating a wholly different set of research questions, this does not invalidate my findings, as they were the result of a rigorous and respectful analysis of the data, carefully reflected upon and contextualised in a theoretical framework informed by previous research.

The last ethical consideration of the writing process was that of standard scientific referencing. My research was produced in a certain context with previous research and theoretical literature helping me form my topic and research design and put my findings in context. My work and its failings are my own but I have cited previous work where I have used them to show credit where credit is due.

Finally, ethics do not end once the thesis is finished. The confidentiality and proper handling of the data continues, and the next step after submitting the thesis is to spread the knowledge gained. I will send the finished thesis to all my interviewees as well as anyone else interested. I will put the knowledge and skills I have gained to use, both as an employee as well as in my capacity as an active (EU) citizen. I believe it is important to make knowledge accessible and use the knowledge we have, thus popularising science and advocating for change in order to make the world a better place.

## 4. Findings

### 4.1. Findings on the interconnections between migration and development and perception of coherence between development and migration policy

This chapter will present the findings of the data analysis on each of the research questions. This first section looks at the findings on the first two, interlinked, research questions: How are the interconnections between development and migration presented in the EU's external (foreign, development and migration) policy documents; and, to what extent are development and migration policies presented as coherent?

The policy documents link development and migration mainly through the so-called root causes. Many of the root causes of irregular migration that are identified in the documents are traditional development problems, such as poverty and conflict. Similarly, several of the interviewed experts noted that the root causes of migration tend to be very similar to the root causes of poverty or other complex development problems. The documents also present development cooperation as a way to tackle the root causes of migration. For example, the *Agenda on Migration* states:

> "Many of the root causes of migration lie deep in global issues which the EU has been trying to address for many years. -- Civil war, persecution, poverty, and climate change all feed directly and immediately into migration, so the prevention and mitigation of these threats is of primary importance for the migration debate. -- With a budget allocation of EUR 96.8 billion for the 2014-2020 period, EU external cooperation assistance, and in particular development cooperation, plays an important role in tackling global issues like poverty, insecurity, inequality and unemployment which are among the main root causes of irregular and forced migration. This includes support in regions of Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe where most of the migrants reaching Europe originate from. As well as addressing long-term root causes, the EU helps to mitigate the impact of crisis at a local level." (European Commission 2015a, 7-8.)

This quote illustrates how development problems are considered driving factors of migration and therefore addressing them both preventively and reactively through development cooperation is considered important also from the point of view of migration management. In this sense, migration and development

policies are presented as coherent, as the issues development policy is designed to address are also causing migration. However, it is clear the focus is on reducing irregular migration, as this tackling the root causes is part of the Agenda's section on "reducing the incentives for irregular migration".

However, although the phrase "tackling the root causes of irregular migration" comes up frequently in the policy documents, among the people working on these topics in the EU, there is an understanding of the complexity of these phenomena and that development does not decrease migration. This came up in interviews with the EEAS, DG HOME and DG DEVCO. It is a politically attractive idea, but actually development cooperation used to tackle the root causes of migration is not very effective. One interviewee says: "No one has the patience with migration; everybody expects to see results in the first six months, and development cooperation doesn't work like that, it's long term. -- Development is not going to stop migration, it's not the right tool, clearly."

The policymakers know this. Therefore the point of "tackling root causes" is only one part of the whole approach. Another interviewee says: "We know from studies that actually providing support for the root causes, paradoxically, increases the drive for people to migrate. So clearly if it was just for our own interests, we would not have done that." The interviewee explains how there are various different interests, and everything is put together in a package that has something for everyone. This is similar to another interviewee's note that development policy is sometimes used as part of a deal. The interviewee explains that development cooperation can be used to make an agreement "win-win"; "it can be a kind of deal softener or deal sweetener."

Using development cooperation to tackle the root causes of irregular migration does not necessarily mean development cooperation is instrumentalised for migration management. As noted above, the root causes of migration that are mentioned in the documents include poverty, inequality, conflict, climate change and other complex phenomena which (or the impacts of which) development cooperation is designed to address in the first place. The root causes can be so broad that using development cooperation for that could mean much the same kinds of projects as before, simply packaged as tackling migration.

However, there were also a number of explicit references to using development cooperation, among other policy instruments, as "leverage" for migration management. For example, in *Communication on the state of play* (02/2016), Commission recommendations for the Council include:

> "To help manage the refugee crisis effectively, leaders at the February European Council should commit to: -- A major stepping-up of all efforts to ensure effective returns and readmission and to address the root causes of migration by maximising all forms of leverage, including trade preferences and development, to secure third countries' commitment to concrete outcomes." (European Commission 2016a, 3-4.)

Later that year, the *Communication on establishing a new Partnership Framework with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration* (06/2016) states:

> "the European Council is invited to endorse: The establishment of a new Partnership Framework to mobilise and focus EU action and resources to better manage migration with third countries. The full range of EU and Member States' policies and instruments should be used to achieve this objective. A mix of positive and negative incentives will be integrated notably into the EU's development and trade policies to reward those countries willing to cooperate effectively with the EU on migration management and ensure there are consequences for those who do not cooperate." (European Commission 2016b, 17.)

Migration management and migration policy objectives such as returning irregular migrants to countries of origin are considered a priority here, for which development cooperation can be used as leverage. Leverage here means using development assistance to give a positive incentive rewarding those countries that are cooperating with the EU on this question and negative incentives in case the country is not cooperating. Given that development assistance thus very concretely depends on the cooperation (or lack thereof) of partner countries on migration questions, it is clearly not given based on developmental concerns but rather based on migration concerns. In this case, development can be considered to be instrumentalised for migration management.

The above examples are from migration policy. However, the same approach is also found in development policy. The *New European Consensus on Development* (2017, 17–19) states:

"The EU and its member states will take a more coordinated, holistic and structured approach to migration, maximising the synergies and applying the necessary leverage by using all relevant EU policies, instruments and tools, including development and trade. Through these strengthened efforts, the EU and its Member States will actively support the further implementation of the joint 2015 Valletta Action Plan and the elaboration of the UN Global Compacts on Migration and Refugees, as called for by the 2016 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants. -- Through development policy, the EU and its Member States will address the root causes of irregular migration and will, inter alia, contribute to the sustainable integration of migrants in host countries and host communities and help ensure the successful socioeconomic integration of returning migrants in their countries of origin or transit."

Thus also the development policy documents talk of using development as leverage for migration management and to address the root causes of irregular migration.

Indeed, the interviews highlighted that the way in which development and migration are linked has shifted since 2015, towards focusing more on how development cooperation can be used to support migration management. Whereas before 2015, migration and development were linked in a different way (for example supporting developing countries that are struggling with migration), since the crisis the only link that is politically feasible is how development cooperation can be used for migration management, and considering migration only in the sense of immigration into the EU. One interviewee from DG DEVCO says:

"Before 2015 we didn't even have a lot of funding for migration at DEVCO. Then in 2015, all of a sudden, big crisis, trust funds... enormous amounts of money came into play. Before that we worked with other countries on migration that didn't even have to do with the EU, like Thailand or South Africa. Then, in 2015, migration into the EU is the priority. In DEVCO, one of the things we are doing is we are supporting countries receiving migrants from Venezuela. Since 2015, people are asking why are we working with these, if they have nothing to do with the EU. Member states are asking why are we spending any money on any other countries. That [stopping spending on any other countries] is luckily not happening but there are demands. -- That is an extreme and it is illegal and we are not doing that, but there are certainly demands and proposals. Before 2015, it used to be the 'usual suspects', but since 2015 it's all countries, even the 'good countries', it's Germany, France, Sweden. It has become okay to demand that."

Similarly, from another perspective, DG HOME was not so interested in the migration-development nexus before the crisis. An interviewee from DG HOME says:

> "They [migration and development] may have been linked all the time but we didn't realise that it would be necessary to make use of them. That came with the crisis. Before, things were under control, it [migration-development nexus] didn't really impact on the European Union, so us as [DG] HOME, we wouldn't be that concerned with that. So that's why I think it was really the migration crisis that really triggered this migration-development nexus and made us realise how important it is."

DG DEVCO, on the other hand, has been working on migration and development since the early 2000s, so this was not a new topic for them. However, the focus has changed over the years, as the crisis forced DG DEVCO to also focus on migration into the EU.

On the other hand, there is now better coordination within the Commission, which has also improved coherence, interviewees from both DG DEVCO and DG HOME attest. An interviewee from DG DEVCO says:

> "The only good thing about the crisis in 2015 was that now we have weekly coordination meetings, and this is something that is taken very seriously, these are high level meetings. The crisis triggered this. The meetings are chaired by Sec-Gen, so neutral. All the services (so DEVCO, ECHO, HOME, NEAR, EEAS…) have to be there. It has led to a better understanding, for for example ECHO and HOME to understand our mandate and why we cannot do certain things. They of course also have a perfectly legitimate mandate. -- [It has increased] understanding that DEVCO cannot for example pay for return flights with development funding. In the past, HOME would have a hardline negotiation with one of our partner countries regarding migration, which would hamper development and other things. Now they have a much better understanding on the overall cooperation and relations. These things are discussed in these meetings, whether migration is a priority or trade relations. And returns are always important."

An interviewee from DG HOME has similar ideas, saying coordination has improved because everyone had to work together due to the crisis. The interviewee says:

> "Before, it was that we have different objectives, and development is for development, and it cannot be linked with everything else or leveraged because it's development. That I think impaired our leverage when we were discussing our parts with third countries. We would have our own

challenges, let's say returns, and we would say [to third countries] you should do this and this. And they would just note it. But we had no leverage, we couldn't link it to development projects or something."

This shows that coordination and coherence has improved. However, development never seems to be a priority - rather, migration has become a priority, and while development assistance cannot be directly used for migration, it is used as leverage for migration management.

Finally, in addition to these linkages of root causes and using development cooperation as leverage, the documents also include a recognition that migration may have a positive contribution to development. For example, the *Agenda on Migration* has a section on "Maximising the development benefits for countries of origin", which includes promoting migration-related targets for the Sustainable Development Goals (which at the time had not yet been adopted), various funding initiatives e.g. to support South-South labour mobility, and facilitating the cheaper, faster and safer transfer or remittances. Similarly, *Towards a reform of the Common European Asylum System and enhancing legal avenues to Europe* notes:

> "Smart management of migration requires not only a firm policy in addressing irregular flows while ensuring protection to those in need, but also a proactive policy of sustainable, transparent and accessible legal pathways. In line with the global 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, we recognise thereby the positive contribution of migrants to inclusive growth and the multidimensional reality of migration requiring a coherent and comprehensive response." (European Commission 2016c, 14.)

Thus there is a recognition of a positive contribution of migration for development, particularly linking this to the Sustainable Development Goals, and a commitment to maximise the development benefits of migration. However, this is mentioned much less frequently than the linkages of development being used to stop migration and development issues causing migration.

In conclusion, migration and development are presented as interlinked phenomena. The main linkage is in development issues being the root causes of migration and thus development cooperation being considered a way to tackle the root causes in the long term. The term migration-development nexus

is not used in the documents, but the positive contribution of migration for development is also mentioned, although this is much less prominent compared to the connection of the root causes. Migration and development policy are considered coherent, as development cooperation can be used to tackle the underlying issues causing migration as well as to tackle irregular migration as part of a coherent, holistic approach, and on the other hand there is a commitment to maximise the development impacts of migration.

## 4.2. Findings on Policy Coherence for Development in the EU's external (foreign, development and migration) policy strategies 2015-2019

This section will present the findings concerning the second research question - how the concept of Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) is used in the EU's external (foreign, development and migration) policy strategies 2015-2019. The documents show that PCD is not used much at all anymore in the strategies; it is clearly not as prominent as before. This indicates that PCD, although still a treaty obligation, is not a political priority in EU external policy.

This can be clearly seen in the external policy documents. There was not a single mention of the term policy coherence for development (or PCD, or PCSD, policy coherence for sustainable development) in the entire *Agenda on Migration* or any of the following communications on migration policy. PCD requires development objectives to be taken into account in all EU policies with potential impacts for developing countries. PCD being left out of migration policy documents is not because migration policy is not considered to be linked to development, as linkages between development and migration are made extensively in the documents (as found above in response to the first research question). However, the discussion is much more about how development policy can support migration policy rather than the other way round or the development impacts of migration policy. Thus PCD is simply not a priority for migration policy.

In the overarching *Global Strategy*, which is the policy strategy for foreign and security policy, PCD is only mentioned once, towards the end (page 50 out of 56), in a very general and vague phrase:

> "A more prosperous Union requires economic priorities to be set in
> relations with all countries and regions, and integrated into the external
> dimensions of all internal policies. A more prosperous Union calls for
> greater coordination between the EU and Member States, the EIB and
> the private sector. The Sustainable Development Goals also represent
> an opportunity to catalyse such coherence. Implementing them will
> generate coherence between the internal and external dimensions of our
> policies and across financial instruments. It allows us to develop new
> ways to blend grants, loans and private-public partnerships. The SDGs
> also encourage us to expand and apply the principle of policy coherence
> for development to other policy areas, and encourage joint analysis and
> engagement across Commission services, institutions and Member
> States." (EEAS 2016, 50.)

This reference to PCD is made in a context of economic prosperity and
economic priorities to be integrated into the external dimensions of all internal
policies, and blending of finance. Thus, PCD is primarily linked to trade and
finance rather than other policy areas such as migration. PCD is also firmly
linked to the Sustainable Development Goals. Although the term is used in a
positive vein, as something that is encouraged, the vague phrasing does not
express a firm commitment to PCD and shows that PCD is not a priority. The
implementation plan and annual reports of the strategy do not contain any
mention of the concept, which further underlines that the concept is not
considered a priority in EU external policy.

In the *New European Consensus on Development*, policy coherence for
development is also mentioned only towards the end (pages 52-3, paragraphs
109-112). The EU reiterates its commitment to the principle:

> "The EU and its Member States reaffirm their commitment to Policy
> Coherence for Development (PCD), which requires taking into account
> the objectives of development cooperation in policies which are likely to
> affect developing countries. This is a crucial element of the strategy to
> achieve the SDGs and an important contribution to the broader objective
> of Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development (PCSD). The 2030
> Agenda provides new impetus for the EU and its Member States to
> formulate and implement mutually reinforcing policies." (European
> Commission 2017, 52.)

Thus, the commitment to PCD is reaffirmed and reiterated to require taking into
account development objectives in other policies. Similarly to the Global
Strategy, PCD is here again firmly linked to sustainable development and the
2030 Agenda; sustainable development is used to justify PCD and the need for

coherent policy. Indeed, the entire section is titled "Policy coherence for development to achieve the SDGs."

PCD is to be applied across all policies and areas covered by the 2030 Agenda, but six areas are singled out here:

> "The Consensus will guide efforts in applying PCD across all policies and all areas covered by the 2030 Agenda, seeking synergies, notably on trade, finance, environment and climate change, food security, migration and security. Particular attention will be given to combating illicit financial flows and tax avoidance, and to promoting trade and responsible investment." (European Commission 2017, 53.)

This is similar to the five focus areas determined for PCD in 2009: trade and finance, food security, climate change, migration, and security. However, particular attention is given to finance and trade, suggesting they are the most notable focus areas. Furthermore, the *Consensus* is said to guide the efforts in applying PCD. It should be noted that, as analysed above, the *Consensus*' section on migration mentions using development cooperation as leverage in a coordinated approach to migration and to tackle the root causes of irregular migration. Thus, in the case of migration, this application of PCD does not indicate the kind of prioritisation of development that achieving PCD would require.

The last two paragraphs of the section give some more indication of how PCD is used to achieve the SDGs in practice:

> "Sustainable development requires a holistic and cross-sector policy approach and is ultimately an issue of governance which needs to be pursued in partnership with all stakeholders and on all levels. The EU and its Member States will therefore promote whole-of-government approaches and ensure political oversight and coordination efforts at all levels for SDG implementation. In order to better support policy formulation and decision-making, they will ensure the evidence base of policy impacts on developing countries through consultations, stakeholder engagement, ex-ante impact assessments and ex-post evaluations of major policy initiatives." -- "The EU and its Member States will moreover strengthen their dialogue with partner countries on policy coherence and support partner countries in their own efforts to put in place enabling frameworks for policy coherence for sustainable development. They will take the lead in promoting policy coherence at international fora such as the UN and the G20, as part of their overall

support of the 2030 Agenda in their external action." (European Commission 2017, 53.)

This seems a rather technical approach to PCD. Coordination, consultations, impact assessments and the other mechanisms listed here are all useful tools that can support the achievement of PCD and the SDGs. However, in order for them to work, a political will and commitment to prioritise sustainable development is required. Without that, the promotion of PCD in the EU risks continuing on the path of "high on mechanisms, low on achievements" (Carbone 2016). The final remarks on promoting policy coherence at the multilateral level and with partner countries rather highlight the EU's support for PCD as long as it does not require trade-offs in the EU's own policy agenda, similar to Häbel's (2018) findings on Vietnam.

Overall, PCD is regarded as important enough to reaffirm as a principle of EU external policy. However, it is mentioned in rather vague and general terms and only at the end of the *Consensus*, not referred to throughout the document, and thus it lacks significance in practice.

PCD is very firmly linked to sustainable development and Agenda 2030. It is also notable that in the same section, the *Consensus* also mentions the newer, related concept of policy coherence for sustainable development (PCSD). PCD is considered an important contribution to the broader objective of PCSD. However, PCSD is likewise not mentioned elsewhere in the document, and the reference here is similarly vague and general without much practical significance. This suggests that PCSD is not a priority for the EU either.

My interviews with EU officials further illustrate how PCD is not a priority in EU external policy on the migration-development nexus. For example, the EEAS is clearly not working closely on PCD. When asked how familiar they are with the concept and whether it was something they encountered much in their work, an interviewee from EEAS said: "Familiar in broad strokes, but it's not something that is encountered on a daily basis. Not constantly repeated to be frank." Similarly asked about their understanding of PCD, another interviewee at EEAS only talked about coherence between different development actors (EU, member states, the World Bank and the UN) without any mention about other

policies taking into account development objectives. Thus, although displaying some knowledge of the concept, this showed an understanding of the concept that seemed to be limited to (or at the very least prioritising) what the literature would call vertical and multilateral coherence, not including the kind of horizontal coherence between development and non-development policies that would be relevant for EU external policy if it truly were a priority.

For DG DEVCO, PCD is still an important part of their work. Both interviewees from DEVCO agreed on this. One of them says:

> "Policy coherence for development is a treaty obligation, not something we have a choice to do; we need to ensure that all EU policies are not hampering our efforts in developing countries. It's not something we can choose to do, it's something we need to do."

However, it has changed since 2015 and they have less influence on the topic now. The same interviewee continues on the topic of migration and PCD reporting:

> "Migration is one of the five priority policy areas for PCD. -- We have to do biannual policy reporting, how PCD has been implemented in our policy area. The situation is a lot different now than before 2015. It's an important part of our work. It's part of an internal system - we have to approve them. Before 2015, this is certainly how it worked, whenever a new migration policy was launched it would come to our DG and we would review it and note if there were some negative consequences. Before 2015, this was an honest exercise, and quite a lot of work for us to go through to make sure there were no negative consequences, but after 2015 it has changed a lot, it rather became policy coherence for migration than for development. We are not necessarily consulted, or if we are, only very lightly. It's very clear that the priority is migration and not development. We are still doing our work but we are perhaps not heard as much. Even if it's not the case in the treaties, politically migration is more important and development concerns are not so much listened to."

Since 2015, DEVCO is not consulted in the same way anymore; the standard inter-service consultation procedure through which new policies would normally go through has been cancelled for many migration policies due to them being so urgent; in practice this means cancelling the scrutiny from other DGs that policies usually go through.

In most interviews[8], I also pointed out that PCD is no longer prominent in the policy documents like it used to be, giving the example that there is no mention of the concept in the *Agenda on Migration* although it was mentioned in the *Global Approach to Migration and Mobility* (GAMM) in 2011. When I asked what the interviewees thought of this, many interviewees (H2, H4, H5) noted that it is very telling. An interviewee from DG DEVCO said:

> "It goes with everything. I was there during the GAMM days and those were the good days, it [PCD] was a serious exercise back then. Migration then became a priority and it changed."

Another interviewee noted that it has a lot of significance, how things are written in political documents. They said: "If it's not written down somewhere, it doesn't exist. Text does not come from the sky, it's people who write it." These quotes further illustrate that if PCD is no longer in the documents, it is no longer a priority.

However, there were also other views. One interviewee from EEAS noted they were not involved in drafting those documents and therefore could not say why the term is not so prominent anymore, but noted that there are several possible explanations. They said that perhaps when more has been achieved and is taken for granted, there is not so much need to repeat the term, and suggested it could just be that "buzzwords come and go."

The interviewee from DG HOME also did not consider it telling of any dramatic change, but rather that it reflects on EEAS and DG HOME looking at foreign policy from a different perspective than development policy. Thus for them it might not be so obvious that the term should be included and therefore it sometimes is and sometimes isn't. Somewhat similarly, H4 commented that "sometimes discussions do not meet" - as in, when there are silos, one sector may not be so familiar with the jargon of another sector, which might explain why migration officials might not use terms like PCD. I would conclude that even if that is the case, it is still telling of PCD lacking priority and DEVCO having

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[8] This question was not asked in interview 2 as it was not included in my pre-defined set of interview questions. In interview 1 it was an additional follow-up question which I later decided useful to ask each interviewee, but only after missing it in the second interview.

limited influence on this, as otherwise PCD would be more familiar and significant for other DGs as well and be included in the documents.

## 4.3. Findings on the meaning of coherence in EU external policy

This section presents the findings on the final research question - what does coherence mean in EU external (foreign, migration and development) policy. Based on the analysis of policy documents as well as expert interviews, I find what is actually meant by coherence and what it is for.

Although the concept of policy coherence for development (PCD) is not so prominent anymore, and its newer iteration PCSD is likewise largely absent from the policy documents, coherence in itself is something that the EU does seem to emphasise in its external policy. "Coherent" was a positive attribute used widely across the documents, signalling effectiveness, unity, and credibility as a global player.

Having analysed all the paragraphs where coherence (or coherent) is mentioned, the term is typically associated with being coordinated, joined-up, comprehensive, effective or united in a context where there are a number of different but interlinked policy sectors and actors at different levels. Coherence means coordinating different policies, instruments and actors to pursue a common objective, ensuring effectiveness and credibility. Coherence is clearly seen as positive; it is only mentioned as something worth striving for.

For example, in the *Agenda on Migration* (2015, 6), a need for coherence is noted:

> "As outlined by President Juncker in his Political Guidelines, a robust fight against irregular migration, traffickers and smugglers, and securing Europe's external borders must be paired with a strong common asylum policy as well as a new European policy on legal migration. Clearly, this requires an enhanced coherence between different policy sectors, such as development cooperation, trade, employment, foreign and home affairs policies."

Here, coherence seems to refer to the coordination between the EU's policy sectors, including development, in pursuit of common aims, i.e. the fight against

irregular migration, traffickers and smugglers and securing Europe's external borders, and coherence is hoped to be increased.

Similarly, a later communication on migration policy states:

> "The ultimate aim of the Partnership Framework is a coherent and tailored engagement where the Union and its Member States act in a coordinated manner putting together instruments, tools and leverage to reach comprehensive partnerships (compacts) with third countries to better manage migration in full respect of our humanitarian and human rights obligations." (European Commission 2016b, 6.)

Here, coherent again seems to be attached to using different channels for the pursuit of a common aim, which is the better management of migration whilst respectful of humanitarian and human rights obligations. The same communication goes on:

> "Increasing **coherence between migration and development policy** is important to ensure that development assistance helps partner countries manage migration more effectively, and also incentivises them to effectively cooperate on readmission of irregular migrants. Positive and negative incentives should be integrated in the EU's development policy, rewarding those countries that fulfil their international obligation to readmit their own nationals, and those that cooperate in managing the flows of irregular migrants from third countries, as well as those taking action to adequately host persons fleeing conflict and persecution. Equally, there must be consequences for those who do not cooperate on readmission and return." (European Commission 2016b, 9, bold in original.)

In practice, thus, coherence here means using development assistance as leverage for migration policy. It is regarded as important to ensure effectiveness.

The *Global Strategy* highlights unity and acting together in a "joined-up" way in external action, and coherence is mentioned several times in relation to this. For example, the *Global Strategy* (2016, 17) notes on "Unity as a guiding principle of external action":

> "Our shared interests can only be served by standing and acting together. Only the combined weight of a true union has the potential to deliver security, prosperity and democracy to its citizens and make a positive difference in the world. The interests of our citizens are best served through unity of purpose between Member States and across

institutions, and unity in action by implementing together coherent policies."

Thus, coherence here seems to refer to consistency and complementarity in policies between member states and different EU institutions, and it is needed to boost unity and effectiveness. Furthermore, the *Global Strategy* (2016, 49–50) states on a joined-up union:

> "Finally, our external action will become more joined-up. Over the years, important steps have been taken to this effect: these include institutional innovations, such as the Lisbon Treaty's creation of the double-hatted High Representative and Vice President of the European Commission (HRVP) and the European External Action Service (EEAS). A strong EEAS working together with other EU institutions lies at the heart of a coherent EU role in the world. Efforts at coherence also include policy innovations such as the "comprehensive approach to conflicts and crises" and joint programming in development, which must be further enhanced."

Again, coherence in external action is seen as something to be promoted. Coherence makes the EU's global actorness stronger and more united.

The interviews also shed light on what exactly policy coherence is for and why the EU would seek to pursue coherence. Based on the interviews, policy coherence is particularly associated with credibility, efficiency and maximising impact (avoiding duplication and making sure one policy does not undermine impacts of another), and legitimacy.

Credibility is highlighted as a key benefit of policy coherence by two interviewees. Interviewee 1 says that the EU is seen as more credible to third countries, which helps deliver better partnerships: "The more coherent you are, the more credible and the better partnerships you can forge with third countries". Interviewee 2 also mentions credibility, as well as legitimacy, saying policy coherence is an essential part of open partnership and brings legitimacy to the EU's role in the multilateral system and as a global player. H2 also notes policy coherence is even more topical now in the context of Agenda 2030 and promoting sustainable development.

Another benefit seems to be efficiency and maximising impact. Interviewee 2 says that from a rational economic point of view, if the EU gives a big sum of money for development cooperation, it makes sense to review their own actions

to ensure "one hand is not taking away what the other one is giving". Similarly, H6 says: "In the context of Agenda 2030, it [policy coherence] is in the interests of our partner countries but also in the interests of the EU. We need to make sure we are spending money on the right things and not something that is not compatible. It's making sure that we are doing things correctly." Related to this is also avoiding overlap and duplication, which both EEAS interviewees mention as key benefits of policy coherence.[9]

If coherence means effectiveness, unity and coordination in pursuit of a common aim, which objectives and whose interests are the ones pursued? H1 says: "EU objectives and interests. Sometimes of course even our own interests do not align, and then it's a matter of priorities. And of course it's not only EU interests, also the interests of the third country need to be taken into account; where do our interests align and where do they not align." Similarly, H5 says it's the "overall relations". H2 takes a more realist view, though it does not contradict the others: "Human rights and development policy objectives are not the first priority. At the level of principle they may be but then on a practical level, it's the political interests, for example the security interests and so on, which are the biggest factor." This idea of overall EU interests, where security interests may typically be prioritised in practice, also fits with the comprehensive approach conveyed by the analysed policy strategies.

What also emerges from the interviews is that policy strategies and communications are written on a general level, but the practical implementation of policy is always context-specific. Different countries have different situations affecting the EU's interests and priorities there and the practical policy implementation. One illustration of this is H3's description of to what extent different policy objectives are complementary or contradictory:

> "It depends, for example when it comes to migration, it depends on the country, so for example Morocco is also a destination country, and a

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[9] Avoiding duplication and maximising impact is also mentioned in the policy documents, e.g. the *EU Action Plan against migrant smuggling (2015 - 2020)* (05/15) states: "Increasing coherence and impact of EU action in third countries Acting together, combining funds, expertise and respective strengths will help amplify the impact of EU action against migrant smuggling abroad. Improving the coherence between the external actions of the EU, Member States and relevant stakeholders is a precondition for maximizing impacts and avoiding duplication." (European Commission 2015b, 9.)

transit country. So how we approach it is very different from, say, Myanmar. There are also different cultural aspects, for example the Maghreb countries are more proximate with the EU compared to Asian countries. There's no contradiction for me, it's very complementary, but it also depends on how the country is approaching this. -- How we work is always based on values. When we have policy dialogue with a country, we always try to push for these values to be respected. -- In a country, everything has to be coordinated. It's not one or the other, but together. Economic, peace, other elements... you have to have these elements together."

Similarly, H5 notes:

"The EU is a political organisation rather than just a donor. For example in the case of Bangladesh or Pakistan, there is irregular migration [into the EU] and problems with returns, but with Pakistan there are also security concerns. Many member states would like to put conditions, seeing only their own part, but the security cooperation would be hampered. So it depends on the countries, but overall with all countries it's a holistic approach. So I wouldn't say there is a hierarchy [regarding objectives]."

Thus it seems coherence must be taken as emblematic of a holistic approach: striving for coherence for EU interests overall and adapted to each country context specifically.

## 5. Discussion

### 5.1. Interconnections between migration and development and the security-migration-development nexus

In the EU external agendas analysed, migration and development are presented as highly interlinked phenomena. The main linkage is in development issues being considered the root causes of migration, although the positive impact of migration for development is also recognised. Development cooperation is presented as a way to tackle the root causes of migration and as an instrument that can be used as leverage for migration management.

The prominence of phrases about development policy tackling the root causes of migration is curious considering the literature suggests development may actually increase migration (Sørensen 2016). There could be a number of possible explanations. Firstly, it may be that politicians and policymakers are unaware of the empirical evidence and academic literature and follow a politically attractive idea. Secondly, development assistance to tackle root causes may actually refer to various aid programmes for displaced people, thus referring to more immediate causes of transnational migration rather than the underlying root causes. Thirdly, the phrase may refer to development cooperation tackling underlying causes of migration, such as poverty, as part of a comprehensive and long-term approach, rather than being the only measure or in the short term.

Based on the interviews, it became clear the policymakers are generally aware that development can actually increase migration, although they noted some high-level officials or politicians may not want to hear it as the root causes phrase is politically attractive. It seems that the two other explanations are more relevant in this case: using development assistance to tackle root causes of migration can refer to tackling both immediate causes (i.e. aid for refugee protection and so on) as well as long-term causes as part of a comprehensive approach. In any case, the phrase entails the idea of development cooperation being used for migration management, and whether or not addressing the root causes is effective, the aim is clear, as it is presented as part of a plan to reduce the incentives for irregular migration.

Although development funding cannot be used for migration management measures directly – for example, it cannot be used to pay for flights to return irregular migrants – it is used to support migration policy indirectly. Development cooperation is used as leverage and to incentivise third countries to cooperate on migration issues. Here, the analysis gives further support to the concerns expressed by Langan (2018) and Adepoju, Van Noorloos, and Zoomers (2010) that development cooperation is not used effectively for development. Development cooperation is directed to areas and issues based on migration concerns rather than what makes most sense from the poverty eradication perspective.

Furthermore, some of those development issues, such as reintegration, would not necessarily exist were it not for the migration policy, and there might be other development concerns which would otherwise be prioritised were it not for this focus on migration management. Despite not acknowledging any responsibility for it, the EU is actually contributing to the need for that development aid going into reintegration of returned migrants and refugee protection in the first place. This boils down to the EU seeking to limit immigration and send migrants back. Prioritising migration management, which is a nice way to say restriction of migration, or trying to keep away unwanted people, is a political choice rather than some objective feat. This is not to say that this choice is somehow wrong, but merely to point out that it is a political choice made out of a range of options.

Migration is a highly sovereignty-sensitive policy area, because it always touches upon the concepts of national identity and citizenship, and immigration regulation is held to be a "prime expression of the sovereignty of states" (Roos 2013, 2). Because of this, immigration policy is a particularly sensitive issue at the EU level and very tricky to resolve (Roos 2013). Although countries wish to retain their sovereignty on immigration, 2015 posed such a crisis that it was clear coordination of efforts was necessary — particularly as the Schengen agreement enables the free movement of people within the area. Roos (2013, 33) notes that "EU policies on asylum migration actually extended the states' power over their combined territories by widening control over people's entry, residence, and deportation." However, the right to seek asylum is a human right

established in international law including Article 14 of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (1948), and all EU member states are bound by it. Furthermore, the *non-refoulement* principle prohibits states from returning migrants to a country where they may be subjected to persecution, torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or other human rights violations (European Commission 2020a).

The literature reviewed has indicated that migration became increasingly securitised in Europe in the run-up to and during the crisis (see e.g. Fakhoury 2016). Both through discourse and action, migration was framed mainly from a security perspective, which also affected the solutions prescribed to deal with the issue. EU policy seeking to reduce migration for example through border controls and targeting human smuggling networks can also be understood in this light.

Although migration is a broad and complex phenomenon, the policy documents do not always distinguish clearly between different types of migrants. The *Agenda on Migration* actually points out at the very beginning that there are many different reasons for migration and different types of migrants with different impacts and each requiring different responses. A duty to protect refugees and a need for legal migration to support with the EU's long-term demographic challenges are noted. Still, most of the policy documents focus on managing 'irregular migration', implying that the vast majority of those entering Europe during the crisis were irregular migrants.[10] Actually, most of the migrants

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[10] Irregular migrant, or irregular migration, are not clearly defined in the Agenda, but the Commission's glossary website provides definitions for both. Irregular migrant is defined in the EU context as "a third-country national present on the territory of a Schengen State who does not fulfil, or no longer fulfils, the conditions of entry as set out in the Regulation (EU) 2016/399 (Schengen Borders Code) or other conditions for entry, stay or residence in that EU Member State (European Commission 2020b)." Irregular migration is defined as "[m]ovement of persons to a new place of residence or transit that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving countries (European Commission 2020c).
Furthermore, the glossary notes that defining the terms has been the subject of considerable debate, and the EU has also used different terms. "The term 'irregular' is preferable to 'illegal' migrant because the latter carries a criminal connotation, entering a country in an irregular manner, or staying with an irregular status, is not a criminal offence but an infraction of administrative regulations. Apart from this, juridically and ethically, an act can be legal or illegal but a person cannot. Thus more and more the term 'migrant in an irregular situation' or 'migrant with irregular status' is preferred (European Commission 2020b)." Furthermore, the glossary notes the distinction made by the Council of Europe between illegal migration and irregular migrant: "'illegal' is preferred when referring to a status or process, whereas 'irregular' is preferred when referring to a person (European Commission 2020c)."

entering the EU by land and sea in 2015 sought asylum (BBC 2016), and asylum seekers are not irregular migrants, although they may become irregular if their asylum application is rejected. Focusing on irregular migration in this context seems to undermine asylum seekers' credibility and discredit the insecurity and persecution most of them were fleeing, further underlining the securitisation of migration.

Furthermore, using the terms 'irregular migrant' and 'irregular migration' still groups together a large and heterogeneous group of people without taking into account their diversity or that of their circumstances. This may also relate to the securitisation of migration. A generalised mass of people, or irregular migration as a faceless process, is easy to portray as a security threat or an 'invasion' as populists in Europe have done. Thus migrants are seen as a security threat to be disposed of, not as individual human beings that are more likely to be victims of, rather than a cause of, insecurity. As Sørensen (2012, 63) aptly notes: "The vulnerability, uncertainty and insecurity that individual journeying migrants face in their quest to cross ever more securitized borders and seas seldom enter the equation. Rising death tolls and disappearances of migrants en route make it clear that policy discussions related to the migration–security nexus need to take broader security issues on board." Migration is considered primarily, and sometimes only, from the perspective of national security of the West.

Thus, overall, the way EU policy documents portray the interconnections between migration and development represents a triple nexus of security-migration-development. The securitisation of migration implies considering migration as a security issue, while the securitisation of development leads to its instrumentalisation for security, i.e. migration management. This is similar to Delkáder-Palacios' (2019) findings on the Partnership Framework and migration conditionalities on aid.

There is also a recognition that migration can have positive development impacts and a commitment to maximise these benefits in migration and development policy, indicative of the migration-development nexus paradigm (Sørensen, Van Hear, and Engberg-Pedersen 2002). However, this is much

less prominent compared to the other linkages of migration and development.

## 5.2. PCD, normative incoherence and organised hypocrisy

Regarding the concept of policy coherence for development, the analysis shows that PCD is not used much at all anymore in EU external policy agendas, apart from some fairly empty-meaning rhetoric commitments coupled with descriptions of using development cooperation for migration management. This indicates that PCD, although still a treaty obligation, is not a political priority in EU external policy. Its newer iteration PCSD is likewise largely absent from the policy documents, apart from the *New Consensus on Development*, indicating it is considered mainly relevant for development policy rather than overall external policy. The prominence and positive meanings attached to coherence, as well as the strong linkages made between development and migration, go on to show that the issue with PCD, or the reason for its diminished popularity and prominence, is not due to the "policy coherence" but the "for development".

This is indicative of the lack of political will to prioritise development over other concerns in external policy, and it is unsurprising given previous research and theoretical exploration (e.g. Furness and Gänzle 2017; Carbone 2017). Development policy having to adapt to other policies rather than the other way round is nothing new, as noted in many cases before (e.g. Kanner 2011; Korhonen 2012). This can be considered normative incoherence, as coined by Koff (2017a), as the EU's normative principles enshrined in treaties are detached from the policy practice.

Interviews further shed light on this, showing that despite treaty obligations and the legal framework not having changed and PCD still being there officially, there is enormous pressure from member states and a political priority to manage migration and use development for migration management. This also fits well with Lavenex's (2018) discussion of organized hypocrisy. In the case of the policy nexus of migration and development, the moral and technical expectations are clearly conflicting. On the one hand, there are the expectations coming from member states posing the technical constraints of what can be done and on the other the normative commitments in treaties. The concept of

organised hypocrisy helps to explain the EU's words and action here: the EU has decoupled the words catering to the moral expectations from the action reacting to technical expectations, which enables the EU to uphold its normative commitments and identity of normative power with liberal values at the rhetorical level while at the same time acting in accordance with the constraints posed by member states. This tactic results in a sense of hypocrisy due to the gap between the EU's normative words and restrictive action. However, the gap between them is not quite as big as was perhaps anticipated, as PCD is simply not used much at all anymore in the documents. This reduces the gap between words and action (and the ensuing sense of hypocrisy) to some extent, but the EU's normative base is still undermined, as the EU is still officially committed to PCD while not taking it into account in migration policy.

As noted in the literature review, several different types of policy coherence can be identified. The formulation of PCD in EU treaties, i.e. all policies with potential impacts on developing countries should take into account development policy objectives, is most clearly referring to what Carbone (2008) calls horizontal policy coherence: coherence between development and non-development policies. While this type of PCD does not seem to be a priority for the EU, as migration policy does not take into account development policy objectives, other types of coherence may be easier to achieve. Indeed, vertical and multilateral coherence do seem to be something the EU is pursuing, based on interviews and policy documents.

This is perhaps because vertical or multilateral or donor-partner-coherence are politically easier, as they are more concerned with efficiency and consistency, whereas horizontal coherence really requires making development a priority over other policies such as migration, which is politically much more challenging. When it comes to multilateral or donor-partner-coherence, the EU can more easily follow its normative principles as there is less conflicting pressure from the member states' non-development sectors. Applying Brunsson (1989) and Lavenex (2018) here, the expectations produced by the technical environment here are not so strong or conflicting with the normative expectations as they are in the case of horizontal coherence. This results in less of a gap between the normative discourse and the action dictated by the

technical environment, and thus no hypocrisy.

## 5.3. Coherence as a holistic approach for EU interests

Although PCD is no longer prominent, coherence in itself is something that the EU does seem to emphasise in its external policy. "Coherent" and "coherence" are mentioned widely across the documents and without exception used as a positive attribute or something to be enhanced. While the concept of PCD has been explored in the literature quite extensively, coherence in itself has been not been theorised as such.

Based on the analysis, coherence in the case of EU external policy means coordinating different policies, instruments and actors to pursue a common objective, ensuring effectiveness, unity and credibility. It can be understood to refer to a holistic approach to pursue the EU's overall interests, although the objectives are adapted to each country context specifically. However, it seems development is not a priority; rather, development cooperation is used for other external policy objectives such as migration management.

An interesting parallel may be found in Canadian development policy. Stephen Brown (2016) analyses the securitisation of Canadian foreign aid, specifically how the way the donor government's framing and allocation of foreign aid changed in the mid-2000s. An increased focus on security-related issues privileged certain aid recipients and modified the relationships between the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and other Canadian government bodies. One key concept which played a role in this was the "whole-of-government approach", which was used as "a rationale and a mechanism for using ODA funds in support of Canadian foreign policy objectives that were not primarily motivated by development concerns." (Brown 2016, 113.) Thus applying the concept helped the Canadian government instrumentalise CIDA and use development funds for non-development-related purposes, notably security, and justified the use of security actors to deliver aid, in ways that contradict the Western donor consensus on aid effectiveness. Brown (2016, 114) notes that "this securitization process sought to make aid more effective in realizing Canadian foreign policy objectives, though in

Afghanistan it had limited success in that regard and actually decreased the effectiveness of Canadian ODA from a developmental point of view." After 2011, Canadian foreign aid appeared to be decreasingly aligned with the country's security interests and increasingly with its commercial ones. (Brown 2016.)

The Canadian experience provides an interesting reference point for the EU, as the whole-of-government approach is similar to the integrated or comprehensive approach presented in the *Global Strategy*. It includes the idea of integrating development cooperation, which has traditionally been more separate, into foreign and security policy and using it as part of a range of foreign policy instruments for overall external policy objectives. It is also notable although by no means surprising that the development effectiveness of aid used in this way was lower. Brown notes that since 2011, securitisation seemed to wane but rather than give space for development objectives, there were signs of instrumentalisation for trade and finance objectives. Similarly in the case of the EU, it's not that security or migration is always the priority; rather the priority is context-specific, and in the bigger picture it is the overall relations – what could be called "coherence for the EU". However, it seems that poverty reduction, which remains the stated primary aim of EU development cooperation, is not a priority for overall EU interests. From the point of view of development policy, the holistic approach mainly seems to legitimise the instrumentalisation of development assistance for other external policy objectives.

Prioritising the EU's own interests can be understood as realist, further undermining the idea of a normative power Europe. Of course, *realpolitik* may also include promoting liberal values, as that can sometimes also be in the realist interests of the EU (Youngs 2016). In any case, the EU's approach to its relationships with third countries is based on the EU's interests rather than the needs and interests of the partner country. This is a far cry from the idea of normative PCD contributing to transformative development, and rather similar to Thede's (2013) findings on PCD being used to pursue policy coherence for the donor's security, trade and other interests, typically in the form of "whole-of-government" or "integrated" approaches. Although PCD is no longer prominent, it seems this holistic, integrated or comprehensive approach is now used to

justify diverting development cooperation from its own aims to the pursuit of other policy objectives.

In conclusion, 'coherence' denotes the EU's holistic, comprehensive, integrated approach described in the *Global Strategy.* It coordinates the whole range of policies and instruments in pursuit of the EU's external policy objectives, and although the objectives vary and are context-specific, development is not a priority. The analysis here further suggests that 'coherence' as an emblem of the holistic approach is used to legitimise the instrumentalisation of development cooperation for the EU's overall external policy objectives.

## 5.4. Concluding reflection

Reflecting on these findings as a whole, the EU's approach to the policy nexus of migration and development is largely securitised, and as a result, poverty reduction is not prioritised, but migration management is considered a priority of EU external policy. In the same vein, the normative principle of PCD has been all but replaced with a rather more realist discourse of coherence, signalling a comprehensive, integrated approach that legitimises the instrumentalisation of development cooperation for the EU's overall external interests.

To conclude this discussion, it is useful to take a step back from the details of the Commission's external policy documents prepared in the midst of the migration crisis. The extent to which the EU is even able to achieve policy coherence (whether for development or not) is limited by the nature of the EU. It is a massive multi-level community with pull and push in different directions. What started out as a project to end wars between France and Germany and became an economic community has turned into a deeply integrated and multidimensional political, economic and socio-cultural project. However, the path has not been a simple one and there are very different opinions about the EU's role and future. Although the EU has been considered a normative power, liberal values such as democracy, human rights and non-discrimination that the EU is meant to exude in its external action are increasingly questioned even within the Union.

The EU is between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, there is the normative basis, the values upon which the EU was built and which it is treaty-bound to promote. On the other hand, it is facing pressure to restrict migration, and lack of solidarity between member states as well as disagreement over questions of national sovereignty which have always been tough. Migration has historically not been an EU competence but a national one, although following the Lisbon Treaty the external aspect of migration has also become more integral to EU policy. Although the reaction to the migration crisis was one of further securitisation and division, crises caused by imperfect integration in the Union's history have sometimes actually furthered integration - as Scipioni (2018) notes, the EU has been "failing forward." However, the EU can only ever be what the member states let it be, and at the moment, the winds are not very liberal.

## 6. Conclusion

### 6.1. Conclusions of the research

This thesis has studied how the interconnections between migration and development and the policies related to them are presented, how the concept of policy coherence for development is used, and what coherence means, in EU external (foreign, migration and development) policy from the beginning of the migration crisis in 2015 to the end of the Juncker administration in 2019.

The study has found that migration and development are presented as highly interlinked phenomena in EU policy documents. The main linkage is in development issues being the root causes of migration and thus development cooperation being a way to tackle the root causes in the long term. The term migration-development nexus is not used in the documents, but the positive contribution of migration for development is also mentioned, although this is much less prominent compared to the connection of the root causes. Coordination and coherence between development and migration policy has improved, however it is mainly coherence for migration. Adding to the literature on the securitisation of migration and development, the study finds that migration management and migration policy objectives such as returning irregular migrants to countries of origin are considered a priority for which development cooperation can be used as leverage. Although poverty eradication remains the primary objective of the EU's development policy, development cooperation is also used for other policy sectors' objectives, such as managing irregular migration. This supports previous research showing that the EU's development cooperation is increasingly being used for migration management.

This is conflicting with the inherently normative principle of policy coherence for development which the EU has committed to. However, this is not unexpected as the literature indicates the EU has always been reluctant to prioritise development over other policy objectives. However, whereas before the concept of PCD was only implemented weakly or used to legitimise market liberalisation policies, it is now simply not used as much anymore. Wholly absent from the *Agenda on Migration* and only briefly mentioned in the *Global*

*Strategy*, PCD is mainly addressed in the sector of development cooperation, indicating it is not a priority for EU external policy. The conflict between the EU's stated normative principles and the instrumentalisation of aid can be considered normative incoherence and organized hypocrisy, which can undermine the EU's credibility as a global actor and supposedly normative power.

Although the concept of policy coherence for development (PCD) is not so prominent anymore, and its newer iteration PCSD is likewise largely absent from the policy documents, coherence in itself is something that the EU does seem to emphasise in its external policy. "Coherent" and "coherence" are mentioned widely across the documents and without exception used as a positive attribute or something to be enhanced. In the policy documents, coherence means coordinating different policies, instruments and actors to pursue a common objective, ensuring effectiveness, unity and credibility. The common objective refers to the EU's overall interests, although these are adapted to each country context specifically. This study suggests coherence can be understood as emblematic of a holistic approach used to legitimise the instrumentalisation of development cooperation for the EU's overall external policy objectives.


## 6.2. Further research

This thesis has barely scratched the surface of policy coherence and the security-migration-development nexus in EU external policy, leaving open a number of exciting questions for further research and theoretical exploration.

Firstly, this research has focused on horizontal coherence - coherence between development and non-development policies of the EU itself. An important avenue for further research, especially considering the conflicting pressures on the EU coming from the member states, would be to research vertical coherence, between the EU and member states, on migration and development policies. Furthermore, the EU is not alone in being subject to securitisation pressures. For example, one interviewee noted that what is "DACable", i.e. what is accepted as ODA by the OECD-DAC, has changed over the years to include

more migration or security related objects. Thus multilateral and donor-partner coherence related to the migration-development nexus would also be interesting areas for future research, to examine how the securitisation of migration has affected other development actors and how partner countries are dealing with this.

Moreover, while this research has been on a general level on PCD and the policies on migration and development in the EU, for further research it would be useful to focus on a specific case study in more depth. For example, the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) which is currently being negotiated would provide a very interesting case for future research, as an interviewee pointed out that PCD is mentioned in the proposal for the instrument, but NDICI may well prove controversial as it combines different policy objectives, including migration and development, as well as EU neighbourhood policy.

Finally, from a theoretical standpoint, the EU's holistic or integrated approach could be studied more critically. In particular, the connection between the EU's integrated approach and policy coherence could be further explored. In addition, this research suggests a need for further theorising of (policy) coherence. Perhaps connecting policy coherence to the Foucauldian concept of governmentality could help explore how "coherence" may be used to govern.


## 6.3. Future implications and final remarks

This research considered the time frame between the beginning of the migration crisis in 2015 and the end of the Juncker administration in late 2019. Now there is a new Commission led by Ursula Von Der Leyen, a new HR/VP and a new college of commissioners. How the new commission approaches PCD and the interconnections between migration and development policy remains to be seen. We can speculate based on certain changes, such as the lack of a Commissioner for Development - Jutta Urpilainen's title is Commissioner for International Partnerships. Her mission letter does not mention PCD (European Commission 2019a). This is notable to consider not least as a new EU-ACP

Partnership is currently being negotiated. The lack of PCD in the mission letter does not bode for a development-oriented partnership but in this light rather more self-interest from the side of the EU.

Furthermore, Von der Leyen's college of commissioners was to include a portfolio entitled "Protecting our European Way of Life." The commissioner in question, Margaritis Schinas, is in charge of migration policy. His mission letter notes:

> "The European way of life is built around solidarity, peace of mind and security. We must address and allay legitimate fears and concerns about the impact of irregular migration on our economy and society. This will require us to work together to find common solutions which are grounded in our values and our responsibilities. We must also work more closely together on security, notably on new and emerging threats that cut across borders and policies." (European Commission 2019b, 4.)

This was immediately criticised by NGOs and politicians, for example Amnesty International said that "linking migration with security in the portfolio of the 'Commissioner for Protecting our European Way of Life' risks sending a worrying message", while Friends of the Earth tweeted that "the idea that 'Europeans' need to be shielded from external cultures is fascist thinking that shouldn't be near migration policy" (Euronews 2019). Following the criticism, the portfolio title was changed to "Promoting our European way of life" (European Commission 2019c). Still, considering these, the security-migration-development nexus and analysis of European external policies will remain relevant during the Von der Leyen Commission. The findings of this thesis will help put the new commission's speeches and actions in context.

Of course, the few months that the commission has now been in place have shown a rapidly changing and unforeseeable future. The extraordinary pandemic during which this thesis was written poses challenges for the EU which may surpass those of the migration crisis. Whether the pandemic makes us all see global interdependencies in a new light and whether our reaction is one of increased securitisation, protectionism and denialism or of solidarity and conviviality is yet to be determined.

## 7. References

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APPENDIX.

## List of documents analysed

| Institution | Title of the document | Date published | Available at |
|---|---|---|---|
| EEAS | The European Union's Global Strategy | Jun 2016 | https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eugs_review_web_0.pdf |
| EEAS | Implementation Plan on Security and Defence | Nov 2016 | https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eugs_implementation_plan_st14392.en16_0.pdf |
| EEAS | Implementation Report "From Shared Vision to Common Action: Implementing the EU Global Strategy Year 1" | Jun 2017 | https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eugs-report-full_brochure_year_1.pdf |
| EEAS | "From Shared Vision to Common Action: A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy Implementation Report Year 2" | Jun 2018 | https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eugs_annual_report_year_2.pdf |
| EEAS | Implementation Report "The European Union's Global Strategy Three Years On, Looking Forward" | Jun 2019 | https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eu_global_strategy_2019.pdf |
| European Commission | New European Consensus on Development | Jun 2017 | https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/system/files/european-consensus-on-development-final-20170626_en.pdf |
| European Commission | A European Agenda on Migration | May 2015 | https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf |
| European Commission | EU Action Plan against migrant smuggling | 27/05/2015 | https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation- |

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| European Commission | Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and to the Council: EU Action Plan on return | 09/09/2015 | https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package_en |
| European Commission | Communication on Addressing the external dimension of the refugee crisis | 09/09/2015 | https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package_en |
| European Commission | Communication on a State of Play on the Implementation of the Priority Actions under the European Agenda on Migration | 10/02/2016 | https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package_en |
| European Commission | Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council: Next operational steps in EU-Turkey cooperation in the field of migration | 16/03/2016 | https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package_en |
| European Commission | Communication: Towards a reform of the Common European Asylum System and enhancing legal avenues to Europe | 06/04/2016 | https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package_en |
| European Commission | Communication on establishing a new Partnership Framework with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration | 07/06/2016 | https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package_en |
| European Commission | Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: The protection of children in migration | 12/04/2017 | https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda- |

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| European Commission | Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and Council: Fifth Progress Report on the Partnership Framework with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration | 06/09/2017 | https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package_en |
| European Commission | Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the Delivery of the European Agenda on Migration | 27/09/2017 | https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package_en |
| European Commission | Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council - Progress Report on the European Agenda on Migration | 15/11/2017 | https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package_en |
| European Commission | Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council - Commission contribution to the EU Leaders' thematic debate on a way forward on the external and internal dimension of migration policy | 07/12/2017 | https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package_en |
| European Commission | COM(2018) 471 - Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Asylum and Migration Fund | 12/06/2018 | https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package_en |
| European Commission | COM(2018) 798 - Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, and the Council on managing migration in all its aspects: progress under the European Agenda on Migration | 04/12/2018 | https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package_en |
| European Commission | Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Progress report on the Implementation of the European Agenda on Migration COM | 6/3/2019 | https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda- |

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| | (2019) 126 | | migration/proposal-implementation-package_en |
| European Commission | Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Progress report on the Implementation of the European Agenda on Migration COM (2019) 481 | 16/10/2019 | https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package_en |