Administratio Publica

ISSN 1015-4833

About the Journal

Administratio Publica is a double blind, peer-reviewed journal accredited with the South African Department of Higher Education and Training (DoHET) and produced four times a year and aims to promote academic scholarship in public administration and management and related fields. Analytical articles in the form of original theoretical and empirical articles, debates, research viewpoints, review articles and book reviews in English will be considered for publication. Nationally, only contributions of paid-up members of ASSADPAM will be published. International authors are welcome to submit articles for review but page fees must be paid before publication.

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V Jarbandhan
Chief Editor

The key attributes of good governance are crucial elements for development. In **'Evaluating the Role of Good Governance in Development: Evidence from Mauritius',** Damian Ukwandu argues that the key attributes of good governance have been paramount in the transformation of countries in different parts of the world. The purposes of his article are to provide a critical interrogation of the reasons for poverty and underdevelopment in sub-Saharan Africa, and to unfurl the relationship between good governance and development. The article demonstrates that the robust economy of Mauritius serves as a best practice for policy options in countries in sub-Saharan Africa. The article recommends the idea of a "negotiated network" as a solution to the problem of poor governance that has continued to stifle economic growth and development in sub-Saharan Africa.

Babette Rabie in **'The Most Influential Decision-making Criteria in South African Parliamentary Committees'** reviews research in the field of evidence-influenced policymaking to present an integrated decision-making model that balances evidence from alternative sources with pragmatic considerations, individual opinion and political party commitments. According to the author, evidence-based policymaking is advocated as an alternative to opinion-based policymaking, which prioritises the opinion of the policymaker and selects evidence to confirm the predetermined political stance of the policymaker which illustrates the complexity of policy decision-making. Evidence-influenced decision-making acknowledges that evidence is one of many factors.

The article offers valuable insight into the decision-making criteria that members of parliamentary committees regard as important adding that stakeholders engaging with the parliamentary committees can frame submissions to align with the decision-making criteria, enabling stakeholders to formulate compelling arguments that will resonate with the members of parliamentary committees and will more likely be considered during deliberations.

According to David Mwesigwa in **'The Potential of a Power-Sharing Government to Prevent Post-election Violence in Uganda: Perspectives from Mid-Western Region'** studies have revealed that a number of countries in the East African region have faced challenges in preventing post-election violence. His article examines the potential of a Power-Sharing Government (PSG) to preventing post-election violence in Uganda. PSG is emerging as an issue, seeing that the country has endured post-election violence since the 2006 elections.

His findings suggest that adopting the PSG approach facilitates a coalition to have authority to bargain in the interest of the country; a joint veto can lessen majority influence by allowing minority groups to prevent a change in policy; proportional representation can surpass the electoral system in a divided country; and equitable distribution of key positions in the national military can lead to sanity in the country's defence sector. The article concludes that PSG can succeed in mitigating potential post-election violence even if every ideal factor put forth by a consociational approach is not adopted in totality. It is recommended that political leaders and other stakeholders should seek possible means to achieving a comprehensive PSG.

Zandile Maqoko and Kwame Asmah-Andoh in their article, **'Overcoming the Uneasy Political and Administrative Interrelationship for Effective Governance in a Municipality'** analyse the relationship between councillors and appointed officials at the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality in the Eastern Cape, and its effect on service delivery and governance. They argue that the dichotomy of strictly classical political administration has been a challenging endeavour, especially within local government in exercising political oversight. The article contributes to the debate on the effects of the uneasy political and administrative relationship on a local government level. In an analysis of the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality, the authors found a fragmented public service system that has blurred lines between functional competencies and Human Resource Management (HRM). The uneasy political and administrative relationship seems to be further complicated by party-political contestations and the politicisation of the administration, as politicians interfere in the appointment of officials. This article contributes to the debate on the effects of the uneasy political and administrative relationship on a local government level. The authors contend that the cadre deployment strategy of the African National Congress (ANC) contributes to the uneasy political administrative relations in municipalities and suggest that a single professional public service could improve the working relationship between elected councillors and appointed administrative officials.

According to Sareesha Pillay the pressures facing the South African public sector have directed attention to raising the profile of responsiveness and interaction in governance and the democratic nature of South Africa; the role played by citizens in governance has come to the forefront. The author adds that continuous efforts are being made to involve citizens in the promotion of effective government processes and to ignite transformation in current government practices. The author states in **'Implications of Socio-economic Issues on the Practice of Co-creation and Governance in South Africa'** that with the paradigmatic shift towards co-creation, citizen participation now surpasses the former one-dimensional bottom-up approach to governance. The foundation of co-creation is key in explicitly giving equal importance to the contributions that citizens make as 'customers' to

the process-based framework of contemporary democratic governance in South Africa. According to the author, although co-creation is aimed at encompassing more collaborative efforts between citizens and their government, the practical aspects of co-creation in the South African context remains highly flawed and that the service-systems approach to co-creation that has been adopted is not structurally conducive to the socio-political and socio-economic climate of South Africa. Consequently, reform in the public sector and effective governance remains strained in view of the underlying challenges predominantly evident in the socio-economic environment, according to the author. The deeply entrenched triple challenge of poverty, inequality and unemployment together with infrastructural limitations continue to impact negatively on democratic participation. The article addresses the concept of co-creation in relation to participation and governance and highlights the socio-economic issues and their implications on governance in South Africa. Comparisons are made between the strengths and challenges of co-creation in practice within the South African context. The article provides recommendations to facilitate the improved practice of co-creation and effective governance in South Africa.

In **'Value-adding Activities of Operational Risk Management Methodologies: A South African Perspective'** Jacobus Young notes that operational risk management forms a crucial part of management and since the early 1990s this practice has escalated rapidly due to various reasons, such as an increase in the regulatory requirements and risk-related incidents. The financial legislative framework requires institutions to implement and maintain effective, efficient and transparent systems of risk management and control. In his article the author cites incidents, such as the fall of the VBS Mutual Bank, which indicated problems with adequate operational risk management. He argues that the development and implementation of operational risk management methodologies could add value to the management of operational risk exposures and adherence to specific regulatory requirements. According to the author, it seems that operational risk methodologies are currently only used for compliance and not used appropriately. The article investigates the value-adding activities of risk methodologies which can contribute to ensure an effective operational risk management. These activities are empirically confirmed by means of a survey which also identified a gap between the envisaged value and its current implementation by organisations.

According to Mogie Subban and Vain Jarbandhan, in their article '**Good Governance Perspectives in Public Administration and Cybersecurity'** the frequency of cyber-breaches, poses serious governance challenges facing the techno-economy. Government intervention around cybersecurity is pluralistic in nature as it focuses on areas such as sovereignty, terrestrial space and democratic governance, according to the authors. Their article examines technology-led public administration and information governance to ensure open, transparent,

efficient and effective service delivery. The authors state that it is important to grasp what constitutes good governance in cyber- security and to advance and regulate the cyberspace for responsible and sustainable practice. Their article proposes a framework that South Africa could follow in implementing a cybersecurity policy. One of the main findings of this article is the clarion call for increased accountability and transparency, together with new forms of resilience. As a value-add, the article explores cybersecurity regulation as an important aspect of good cybergovernance amidst the onslaught of the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR). The authors conclude that by introducing cybercentric measures in e-governance, a more reflective approach could bring about positive changes and measures in how information is managed, disseminated and governed while improving service delivery in the 21st century and beyond.

In **'Conceptualising South African Policy and Entrepreneurial Development: A Female Perspective'** Natanya Meyer argues that the full benefits from entrepreneurship cannot be utilised if proper policies and the effective implementation thereof is not present in a country. Her article aims to conceptualise the theoretical background on some of the supporting entrepreneurial and small business development policies in the South African context. According to the author, gender equality has been prominent in the formulation of recent policies and therefore some aspects within the discussed policies will also be addressed. According to her, entrepreneurship development has become a prominent term and focus area not only in social science research but also among various economic agents. She adds that it is considered, not only on a national level, but also internationally by policy formulators as a possible link to increased and sustained economic growth and development. Although entrepreneurship is considered important globally, the benefits to developing countries, such as South Africa, could have a significant impact on poverty alleviation and employment creation.

In **'New Public Management, Quick Fixes and Policy Churn in South Africa: A Case Study of Eastern Cape Hospitals'** Mziwonke Mpofana and Greg Ruiters examine policy issues in the context of New Public Management through a case study of two Eastern Cape hospitals from 2003 to 2012. According to the authors, after 2003, the Eastern Cape Provincial government introduced three institutional changes at its urban hospitals: the 'business-isation' of the hospitals; the amalgamation of large hospitals into mega-complexes; and the implementation of a performance management system. The article depicts various actors' understandings of these New Public Management reforms and found that the provincial government authorised hasty reforms and that changing policy paradigms and personnel created an unstable situation, where staff were caught between competing models, cultures and identities.

In **'Improving the Management of Inappropriate Use of Information Technology by University Students'** Sefoko Ramoshaba and Fanie Cloete

seek answers for the better management of inappropriate use of Information Technology (IT) by students. According to the authors IT brought with it ethical challenges, where human beings are tempted into using IT to commit crime and to engage in other forms of unethical behaviour. This has led to a need for IT ethics, and measures on how to manage these challenges. In recent years, ethical problems related to the inappropriate use of IT have been transplanted from society to the university environment. Universities are now experiencing the same, and in some cases even more, extreme forms of unethical behaviour, which have been committed through the inappropriate use of IT by students. This study sought answers for the better management of inappropriate use of IT by students.

The current literature on the issue was assessed to find out how students use IT to behave unethically, and about the types of IT devices students use to do this. Comparative analysis and assessment of selected university case studies were then employed to determine how those case studies deal with the issue. The main findings of the study indicated that universities have their own student disciplinary units and IT usage policies but that their respective IT management strategies can be improved to achieve better results.

In **'The Role of Street-Level Bureaucracy in Development Assistance Management in Third-World Countries: A Case Study of Selected Sports Development Activities in South Africa'** O C Dodo and E O C Ijeoma aim to explore the role of street-level bureaucracy and public policy to advance development assistance, by focusing on a case study of football and rugby development in South Africa. The current study applies street-level bureaucratic theory to explore stakeholders' perceptions and decision-making approaches to implementing institutional and public policies relating to sports transformation and development. More specifically, it focuses on whether policies translate into opportunities for target groups in the areas of football and rugby. Based on the interviews with stakeholders, the current study shows that there has been little progress in bridging the gap between the rich and poor segments of society since 1994. The study also found the street-level bureaucrats faced challenges that contributed to the slow progress in this area. The study recommends that a strategic stakeholders' management model be implemented, which employs a street-level bureaucracy policy approach (bottom-up principles) to advocate for effective sports development policy in South Africa.

In **'Formulation and Application of a Local Government Financial Health Index: The Case of the Sedibeng Region'**, J R Neethling and Danie Meyer argue that various academic scholars have attempted to measure financial health; however, these indexes have not comprehensively captured the full extent of financial management at the local government sphere. The primary objective of their article is to formulate and apply a Financial Health Index (FHI) for local government that includes all the main elements of financial health by means of

a quantitative methodology. This index focused on four sub-indexes of financial health namely (1) income and expenditure; (2) liquidity ratios; (3) solvency ratios; and (4) profitability ratios. The research setting is the Sedibeng District Municipal region, which includes the local municipal areas of Midvaal, Emfuleni and Lesedi. The article found that the Midvaal Local Municipality had the highest index score of 49 out of a maximum of 65 or a percentage index score of 75%, followed by Lesedi with 57% and Emfuleni with only 52%. According to the authors, the utilisation of this FHI could be useful in measuring the financial health of local municipalities in South Africa and assist policymakers in the identification of key financial issues for strategy development towards improvement of their financial situation.

Abel Kinoti Meru and M W Kinoti, in their article **'Public Sector Development under the New Constitutional Dispensation in Kenya'** investigate development-focused public leadership under the new Constitution of Kenya of 2010. The article aims to isolate development-focused public leadership on one hand, and shared national values and principles of good governance, as enshrined in the Constitution of 2010, on the other. The purpose of the article is to examine whether development-focused public leadership promotes national values and principles of good governance, as envisaged in the Constitution of Kenya of 2010 and empirically examines the interplay between these leadership foci, the eight factors advancing national values and the principles of good governance, as enshrined in the Constitution of Kenya of 2010.

In **'Improving Our Theory of Evaluation Through an African-made Process: An Ubuntu Answer to the Decolonising Question'** Steven Wallis argues that since the emergence of the Social/Behavioural Sciences, it has been assumed that researchers working in separate disciplines who generate more/better data would generate improved theory. He adds that despite the rapid increase in available data and scholarly publications, theory (and practice) has advanced at a slow pace and instead, most disciplines complain that this research approach has led to fragmentation and confusion – as evidenced by the many theories, sub-disciplines and differing curriculums of several evaluation programmes across Africa and the world. To address this problem, this article uses an emerging process related to an *Ubuntu* perspective to rigorously synthesise 19 evaluation theories. The author, from that new perspective, identified strengths and weaknesses along with general and specific research opportunities to accelerate the development of theory and practice. Additionally, a path is presented for developing a community of scholars to fast-track the benefits of evaluation to boost true sustainable development in Africa.

Chief Editor: Prof Vain Jarbandhan

Evaluating the Role of Good Governance in Development

Evidence from Mauritius

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ABSTRACT

Good governance is an essential component of development. This key attribute has been paramount in the transformation of countries in different parts of the world. Good governance was crucial in the remarkable transformation of Southeast Asian countries such as South Korea. This research article employed conceptual research methodology. The research methods entailed a literature review and desktop analysis to obtain information from journals, articles, theses, and publications to arrive at an objective conclusion. The objective of the article is to provide a critical interrogation of the reasons for the poverty and underdevelopment in sub-Saharan Africa, as well as to unfurl the relationship between good governance and development. The article submits that proof from the Indian Ocean country of Mauritius demonstrates that there is hope for countries in sub-Saharan Africa. This means that development can be achieved if the lessons are followed of how this Indian Ocean country transformed itself from a backwater country at independence into a flourishing economy today. Finally, the article provides conclusions, a summary, and recommendations that contain the policy options available to countries in sub-Saharan Africa. The article recommends the idea of a "negotiated network" as a solution to the problem of poor governance that has continued to stifle economic growth and development in sub-Saharan Africa.

INTRODUCTION

This article is divided into six parts. First, a succinct contextual background interrogates the possible reasons for sub-Saharan Africa's slow growth rate compared

to other parts of the world. To provide a firm theoretical background, contextual and conceptual descriptions of development, governance, and good governance are provided. The article also provides an exposition on the link between poor governance and underdevelopment. The article then interrogates the intrinsic link between good governance and development. It also examines the role of good governance in invigorating development. The author draws from the development trajectory of Mauritius as a possible policy option for countries in sub-Saharan Africa. The article concludes by providing vital recommendations that could bolster economic transformation in the sub-region.

CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND

Sub-Saharan Africa is the poorest region in the world. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD 2012:16), 33 African countries are presently classified as least developed countries (Ukwandu 2015). The primary components of these countries include a lack of inclusive development, poverty, and underdevelopment. It also includes the absence of basic necessities of life such as water and electricity, as well as limited housing and employment opportunities (UNCTAD 2012:35). It is no coincidence that most African countries are at the bottom of the Human Development Index (HDI) (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP] 2012:12). Published annually, the HDI presents a summary of all the global HDIs. Pakistani economist, Mahbub ul Haq, and Indian economist, Amartya Sen, jointly developed the HDI in 1990 (UNDP 2012:12). The template helps countries, organisations, and people to comprehend whether a country is developed or undeveloped (Ukwandu 2015). The HDI is published as it is believed that capturing people's living conditions is the best way to measure development, as "people are the real wealth of a nation" (UNDP 1990). Development template data is captured by factors such as "life expectancy, education, literacy and per capita gross domestic product (GDP)" (UNDP 2012:12).

Despite the tremendous natural resources and endowments available in the sub-Saharan African region, it continues to "wallow in poverty and deprivation" (Ukwandu 2014). There is no consensus among researchers on the reasons for poverty and underdevelopment in Africa (Ukwandu 2014:127). Some scholars are of the view that the treacherous geography in sub-Saharan Africa is responsible for its endemic poverty (Ukwandu 2014:128; Toynbee 1961:28). Encapsulated in these narratives is the idea that sub-Saharan Africa's geography and climate lead to diseases, a weak economy, and a high mortality rate (Diamond 1997:43; Sachs 2001:15; Machiavelli 1987:25; Montesquieu 1989:32). Scholars in the development and governance nexus postulate that the high incidence of diseases such as

HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis is related to poverty and underdevelopment in Africa (Bloom and Sachs 1998:211; Gallup and Sachs 2001:88).

The third reason indicated by researchers for Africa's poverty and underdevelopment postulates that slavery has derailed the region's productive ability and potential for centuries (Gemery and Hogendorn 1979:38; Manning 1981:508; Inikori 1992:500). This evocative legacy remains part of post-colonial Africa's narrative. The fourth dominant factor relates to the pernicious impact of colonialism on sub-Saharan Africa's developmental outcomes (Ukwandu 2014). Proponents of this narrative posit that colonialism led to poverty and underdevelopment in sub-Saharan Africa (Grosfoguel 2007:218; Fall 1993:22; Northrup 1988:44; Mehmet 1999:60).

The chief proponents of this narrative argue that "[w]e cannot hope to formulate an adequate development theory and policy for the majority of the world's population who suffer from underdevelopment without first learning how their past economies and societal history gave rise to their present underdevelopment" (Frank 1966:17). Rodney (1972:60) endorses this sentiment and advises that "in order to formulate a strategy and tactics for African emancipation and development, we have to understand how the present came into being and what trends are for the near future".

In conclusion, scholars point to the debilitating effects of globalisation on Africa. In essence, globalisation performs a dual role because it could lead to economic fragmentation and inclusiveness. In this case, globalisation is blamed for the dismal growth and development of the continent (Wallerstein 1974:68; Gutall 2007:528; Aksu and Camilleri 2002:29; Diehl 2001:41). Those who hold this view argue that globalisation has not benefited the poorest communities in sub-Saharan Africa. It has led to job losses, increased poverty, and unemployment (Ukwandu 2014:109).

CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS

Development

There is a deluge of expositions on the notion of development. It is imperative to elucidate on what development entails for communities who live in developing parts of the world such as South Africa (Ukwandu 2014:41). For people living in the leafy suburbs of Sydney, Australia, development could entail protecting animal rights and climate change. Conversely, for those living in poor informal settlements such as Alexandra, South Africa, development should and could connote the improvement of living standards. It could mean a struggle for the basic necessities of life such as food, shelter, a job, water, etc. (Ukwandu 2014:45). This

article endeavours to appraise the notion of development through the prisms of communities who live in poverty and underdevelopment in sub-Saharan Africa. Subsequently, it is crucial to distinguish the crux of development as it pertains to communities in sub-Saharan Africa. Rondinelli and Ruddle (cited in Rondinelli 1993:8) provide an apt elucidation of what development entails to the majority of Africans. While this definition is a bit dated, its main tenets constitute the essence of development for an ordinary African. The authors define development as follows: "The essence of development is the expansion of participation in economic activities through the creation of social and economic systems that draw larger numbers of people into processes of production, exchange and consumption, that involve greater numbers in entrepreneurship and employment, that increases levels of income for the poorest groups and reduce disparities between rich and poor so that a larger majority of people can obtain basic goods, save and invest and gain access to services necessary to enrich the quality of their lives. Development is a process of expanding the productive capacity of public and private organisations, large and small firms, in rural and urban regions of a country at a steady pace. It involves stimulating the use of potentially productive resources, adapting appropriate technologies and institutions to traditional as well as modern communities, transforming subsistence agricultural and rural sectors into employment- and income-generating elements of the national economy and providing social services and facilities that allow people not only to satisfy basic needs but also to develop their productive capacity and human potential" (cited in Rondinelli 1993:8).

Embedded in the definition is the central perception of development as making provision for basic human needs (Sen 1999:41). This means that all policies on development in the region should focus on enhancing opportunities for the poor, alleviating poverty, creating better health services, improving the quality of education, reducing infant mortality, etc. In summary, this can be referred to as "human development". This is contrary to the outdated conception of development outcomes grounded on GDP. The GDP-based evaluation of development is flawed. This is because authentic development that encompasses the goals enunciated by Seers (1969:12) still eludes many people in Africa. Despite huge improvements in the continent's economic growth figures during the past decade, employment opportunities in the region have been limited. This is due to the fact that a handful of politicians in power reap all the benefits of economic growth, without making any real difference in citizens' lives (Mills and Herbst 2012:65).

The World Bank (1991b) further enunciates this view with its much broader conceptualisation of the notion of development. The definition was broadened to incorporate other aspects such as education, health, the environment, and the social benefits of development (Ukwandu 2018). The World Bank (1991b) opines that economic development should pivot on a sustainable increase in

living standards. This encompasses material consumption, education, health, and environmental protection (World Bank 1991a); however, the World Bank is of the view that this narrow focus is insufficient. The World Bank provided a much more comprehensive and inclusive definition of development that included all segments of the population. This was encapsulated as follows: "Development in a broader sense is understood to include other important and related attributes as well, notably more equality of opportunity and political freedom and civil liberties. The overall goal of development is therefore to increase the economic, political and civil rights of all people across gender, ethnic groups, religion, races, regions and countries" (World Bank 1991a:31).

This brief overview of what development entails to the average person living in sub-Saharan Africa was provided in order to offer sufficient clarity on development.

Governance

The notion of good governance is similar to what Weber (1964:156) defines as "a modern state with a compulsory association with a territorial base claiming the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force" (Weber 1964:156). Albrow (1970:45) clarifies that "such a state and its instruments of governance must be run by an impersonal bureaucratic staff, in the context of a legal-administrative order, regulated and limited by legislation and representative government". The history of state formation and its legacy of colonialism mean that most states in sub-Saharan Africa are not similar to the Weberian ideal. Developed countries of the world, especially those in Europe, however, share these common characteristics. It is vital that states in Africa emulate policies and systems that have worked in other parts of the world, while adjusting them to suit their countries' unique socio-economic and political milieus.

Weber (1965:155) opines that "states that desire to reduce poverty, unemployment and underdevelopment should focus on activities that promote economic growth and development". Weber (1965:155) explains: "Principally there are no mysterious incalculable forces that come into play, but rather one can, in principle, master all things by calculation. This means that the world is disenchanted. One need no longer have recourse to magical means in order to master or implore the spirits, as did the savage, for whom mysterious powers existed, technical means and competence perform the service".

In Weber's (1965) view, states in sub-Saharan Africa should enact and implement policies that would stimulate commerce and industry, which, in turn, will bolster economic growth and development. Weber (1965) emphasises the key role of governance in development. According to the Asian Development Bank (ADB 1999), "governance means the manner in which power is exercised in the

management of a country's economic and social resources for development". This definition accentuates the role that the state plays in mobilising both the private and public sectors in the quest for development. This is the path undertaken by newly developed countries of Southeast Asia. Canada Corps (2005:25) defines governance as "the way that decisions are made in towns, cities, provinces and countries".

Governance encapsulates how government, civil society, and the private sector work together in harmony towards well-defined goals of development. Furthermore, it illuminates how a specific government functions, and which department is in charge of what sector in the policy process and formulation. It also interrogates how the merits and demerits of political activity are distributed within a country. The World Bank (1992:70) defines governance as "the exercise of political power to manage a nation's affairs". In line with this, Dwivedi (2001:36) defines governance as a "system of values, policies and institutions by which a society manages its economic, political and social interaction within and among the state, civil society and private sector".

In turn, the UNDP (1997:21) defines governance as "the exercise of economic and administrative authority to manage a country's affairs at all levels. It comprises the mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences".

The International Monetary Fund (IMF 2005:4) highlights the economic dimensions of governance by arguing that "governance is in two spheres: improving the management of public resources; and supporting the development and maintenance of a transparent and stable economic and regulatory environment conducive to efficient private sector activities". The Department for International Development (DFID 2001:11) highlights that "governance has to do with how the institutions, rules and systems of the state – the executive, legislature, judiciary and military – operate at central and local level and how the state relates to individual citizens, civil society and the private sector". The United States Agency for International Development (USAID 2005:1) reiterates this sentiment by stating that "governance relates to the ability of government to develop an efficient, effective and accountable public management process that is open to citizen participation and that strengthens rather than weakens a democratic system of government". Hyden, Court and Mearse (2004:16) regard governance as the formation and stewardship of formal and informal rules that regulate the public realm.

The concept of good governance

The concept of good governance has become popular globally (Kabumba 2005:6). Even though the concept of good governance has become a common

and frequently utilised concept, it varies depending on the context (Kabumba 2005:6). In developing countries, establishing good governance has become a fundamental requirement before the granting of aids and loans by the developed world. This means that international aid agencies and donor countries demand accountability and good governance as a key condition for aid assistance (Santiso 2001:1). This approach was initiated after the World Bank diagnosed the persistent poverty and underdevelopment that characterise countries of sub-Saharan Africa as a governance crisis.

Consequently, the World Bank identified good public management as a prerequisite of socio-economic development (Azmat and Coghill 2005:625). According to Romeo (2003:89), complying with the requests of donors, the governments of developing countries are able to develop participatory local government in order to support overall good governance. Bilney (1994:17) defines good governance as "managing of a country's economic and social resources in an effective manner that is accountable, equitable, open and transparent". The UNDP (1997:9) views good governance in the same way as "democratic forms of governance". These forms of government "depend on accountability, participation and transparency" (UNDP 1997:9). Other scholars state that good governance is defined as "the responsible and transparent management of resources of the public for the purposes of sustainable development" (Holtz 2000:10). The notion of good governance can be divided into two parts, namely political good governance and corporate good governance.

Political good governance refers to "ethical, effective and efficient management of public resources and affairs by democratically elected officials" (Kabumba 2005:9). This concept takes into consideration the idea that democratically elected leaders and appointed officials often mismanage the resources and affairs of a country. However, in the same sense, assuming that elections are fair and free, members of the public must blame themselves for wrong decisions (Kabumba 2005:10). Authoritarian governments can manage the affairs of a state in an efficient manner. Citizens find themselves in a dilemma where they have to choose between democratically elected leaders who mismanage the affairs and resources of the country and the self-imposed leaders who manage resources in an effective manner (Kabumba 2000).

Corporate good governance envisages the management of resources and affairs of an organisation in an effective, efficient, and ethical manner by individuals chosen in accordance with existing rules or laws (Kabumba 2005:10). This is most common in the non-state sectors. In this scenario, corporate good governance is applicable to the management of organisations. According to Ukwandu and Jarbandhan (2016:25), corporate governance has less to do with formal structures and institutions, and more to do with the overall system whereby private organisations and public organisations are controlled and directed. The principles

of openness, accountability, and integrity are often included in corporate governance (Ukwandu and Jarbandhan 2016:25).

According to Vu Thi (2012:17), six criteria of good governance exist in the public sector; namely:

- a political system that promotes input from all groups of civil society;
- credible and impartial electoral administration and active and informed citizenry;
- reinforced public sector administrative and legislative institutions;
- accountability, predictability, and transparency in decisions made by government;
- management of the public sector with macroeconomic conditions that are stable, resource mobilisation that is effective, and using resources in an efficient manner; and
- compliance with the rule of law in a manner that protects civil and personal liberties, gender equity, and ensures public safety and security with equal access to justice for all.

The system of good governance requires that the decision-making process and formulation of public policy be accountable and transparent (Naidoo 2011:32). It goes beyond the capacity of the public sector to make the rules that create a framework that is legitimate, effective, and efficient for the conduct of public policy (Naidoo 2011:32). It implies management of public affairs in a manner that is participatory, accountable, equitable, and transparent (Court 2006). Good governance entails participation that is effective in policymaking processes, the prevalence of an independent judiciary and rule of law, and institutional checks and balances through vertical and horizontal separation of power (Naidoo 2011:33). This discussion on the area of good governance as it relates to the public sector is very timely as the author is interrogating the link between good governance and development. This means that it is a type of good governance that is engineered through the good policies of the public sector institutions in Mauritius.

POOR GOVERNANCE AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

This article argues that without good governance, it would be difficult for sub-Saharan Africa to navigate away from the treacherous waters of poverty and underdevelopment. Conversely, it accentuates the deleterious effects of poor governance, which include a poor investment climate, slow economic growth, and overall lack of development in the sub-Saharan region (Ukwandu 2014:300). The article also argues that good governance helps to create jobs and spurs economic

growth and development. This raises the following question: Why do coffee-producing countries in Africa, such as Ethiopia, the Ivory Coast, Uganda, and Kenya, fail to follow suit and replicate the example of Mauritius? The answer is simple: the inveterate interests (political, economic, cultural, religious, etc.) of the ruling elite and poor governance are sabotaging development efforts in the region.

Poor governance has impeded development efforts in sub-Saharan Africa. Poor governance has hampered the economic growth, job creation, poverty alleviation, and overall development in the region. Mozambique serves as an example of a sub-Saharan African country that is subject to poor governance. International financial institutions often refer to Mozambique as the "beacon of hope and reform" (Ukwandu 2014); however, in reality, it takes six months to register a company in the country (Emery and Spence 1999:9). During this six-month-period, various government departments will demand permits, licences, and mandatory fees that amount to almost 10% of a company's budgeted costs (Emery and Spence 1999:9).

These corrupt practices characterise most government officials and institutions in the region. As such, it is almost impossible for small-scale business owners to obtain permits and start their businesses. Good governance will result in improved practices in the public sector of countries in sub-Saharan Africa. This means that the private sector would help reduce poverty and create jobs (Ukwandu 2014:300). Another illustration of poor governance in the region is evidenced in the high "transaction costs" that militate against entrepreneurial growth and development. It takes 153 days to register a company in Mozambique and 14 steps to complete the registration process. It takes three months and 16 processes to register a company in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (Ukwandu 2014:300).

A more detailed study showed that in Nigeria, 15 different types of taxes are paid to the local, state, and federal governments to register and start a company (Ukwandu 2014). Starting a new business in Nigeria is bedevilled by the dual problem of inadequate infrastructure and electricity (Ukwandu 2018). In addition, business owners must provide their own security, water, and electricity (Ukwandu 2014:218). It takes almost a year for an office telephone line to be installed in Ghana, Nigeria, Cameroon, the DRC, Sierra Leone, and Liberia (Ukwandu 2014).

Layers of different taxes and sometimes deliberate double taxation by the local and national government discourage people from starting small-scale businesses in Cameroon. In Malawi, it is far better to operate without registering a company, as the government charges all business owners prohibitive fees and taxes (BBC News 2006). This article has shown that poor governance is the most profound impediment to development efforts in sub-Saharan Africa. Poor governance stunts agricultural growth and production, and hampers job creation and poverty alleviation as well (Ayittey 2005:133). For example, poor governance has led to

the widespread exploitation and manipulation of peasant farmers in most of sub-Saharan Africa. National governments, not market forces, determine the prices farmers in Africa receive for their produce (Ayittey 2005).

This creates an avenue for the flourishing of corruption and exploitation. According to Ayittey 2005:133), "[o]n average, between 1964/65 and 1984/85, the peasants of Gambia were robbed of 60 percent of the international price of their groundnuts. For 20 years the Jawara government 'officially' took, free of charge, 3 out of every 5 bags, leaving the peasants with a gross of 2. With deductions for subsistence credit fertilizer, seeds, etc., the peasant would end up with a net 1 bag out of five".

GOOD GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT

The essence of capitalism is entrenched in the mutual exchange of goods and services in a free-market economy. This has led to the unparalleled wealth and prosperity in developed countries (Oskarsson, Svensson and Öberg 2009:175). Good governance and subsequent transparent transaction costs invigorate economic growth and development globally. This is well documented in the work of Milgrom and Roberts (cited in Oskarsson *et al.* 2009:175). The authors explain this key relationship as follows: "The cost of deciding, planning, arranging and negotiating the actions to be taken and the terms of exchange when two or more parties do business; the costs of changing plans, renegotiating terms and resolving disputes as changing circumstances may require; and the costs of ensuring that parties perform as agreed. Transaction costs also include any losses resulting from inefficient group decisions, plans, arrangements or agreements; inefficient responses to changing circumstances; and imperfect enforcement of agreements" (Milgrom and Roberts cited in Oskarsson *et al.* 2009:175).

As Milgrom and Roberts (cited in Oskarsson *et al.* 2009:175) and Ukwandu (2014:50) indicate, the pace of economic growth and development, a subsequent reduction in poverty, and overall economic growth and development depend on the smooth functioning of, and trust in, the regulations that govern business activities in a country.

Many scholars have interrogated the intrinsic link between good governance and development, and more specifically the correlation between transaction costs in a country and its economic growth and development (Martinez and Dacin 1999:80). Martinez and Dacin (1999:80) state that transaction costs play a significant role in a country's productivity, economic growth, and overall development. In cases where countries focus on stimulating economic growth and development, the transaction costs should ideally set out the terms of operation, rules, and regulations, as well as agreements between individuals and firms. The

aforementioned is of importance, as consistency and transparency help entrepreneurs and companies to plan accordingly. The high transaction costs of doing business in Africa are detrimental to businesses and companies and hamper the flow of commerce, as well as economic growth and development.

In order for the majority of people within a state to reap the benefits of capitalism, good governance must create an enabling environment. Ideally, it should energise entrepreneurial skills and the potential available in both the public and private sectors of the economy (North 1990:65). This means that sound government policies and programmes should encourage economic growth and development (Ukwandu 2018:50). Specifically, good governance helps in the production and exchange of goods and services in society. This is referred to as "transaction costs". These encompass the costs of doing business in a country. They need to be significantly minimised for commerce and industry to be able to flourish (North 1990:65).

In essence, the transaction costs of producing a product like plastic include the cost of electricity to power the machines and the cost of labour, transport, etc. that would help make the product a finished article. All these costs determine the total or final cost of producing a particular product. Manufacturers conduct a final cost estimation and analysis before deciding to build a factory in a particular country. This means that every government that desires economic growth and development should endeavour to minimise the transaction costs of products in their countries so as to attract foreign direct investment. These investments will in the long run translate into more factories being built and more jobs being created. The government can help stimulate socio-economic growth and development by simplifying the transaction costs involved in setting up a business in their countries through good governance. This is the link between good governance and development.

North (1990) stresses the key role that good institutions or good governance plays in stimulating a country's growth and development. Importantly, the aforementioned creates efficient and cheap transaction costs to bolster economic growth and development (North 1990:65). North (1990:65) clarifies the link as follows: "We have only to contrast the organisation of production in a Third World economy with that of an advanced industrial economy to be impressed by the consequences of poorly defined and ineffective property rights. Not only will the institutional framework result in high costs of transacting in the former, but also insecure property rights will result in using technologies that employ little capital and do not entail long-term agreements "... Moreover, such mundane problems as the inability to get spare parts or a two-year wait to get a telephone installed will necessitate a different organisation of production that an advanced country requires. A bribe sufficient to get quick delivery through the maze of import controls or get rapid telephone installation may exist, but the resultant

shadow transactions costs significantly alter relative prices and consequently the technology employed".

Adam Smith (cited in Rodrick, Subramanian and Trebbi 2002) elucidates certain rules that favour commerce and industry. He is of the opinion that governments that seek to alleviate poverty and bolster economic growth and development should regard these rules as a top priority. Smith (cited in Rodrick *et al.* 2002) further explains: "Commerce and manufacturing can seldom flourish in any state which does not enjoy a regular administration of justice in which the people do not feel themselves secure in their possession of their property, in which the faith of contracts are not supported by law, and in which the authority of the state is not supposed to be regularly enforced in the payment of debts from all those who are able to pay. Commerce and manufacturing cannot flourish in any state in which there is not a certain degree of confidence in the justice of government".

Sharma (2007:35) reiterates the important role of good governance in development. The author describes poor governance as a state of uncertainty, while good governance is characterised by certainty and clarity. Informal methods of conducting interpersonal exchanges or business, which are common among people in traditional societies, are unsuitable for complex, modern societies. Given the complex division of labour and specialised skills needed for economic growth and development within a globalisation-focused paradigm, good governance is crucial in the formulation and implementation of any development policy. The global economy is presently characterised by unparalleled globalisation. Most development experts agree that good governance plays an inextricable role in stimulating and solidifying any development initiative (Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton 2000; Knack 2003:32; Hall and Jones 1999:20; Henisz 2000:15).

THE MAURITIAN EXAMPLE

Arbache and Page (2008) interrogated the factors that influenced the growth and development of 44 countries in sub-Saharan Africa from 1975 to 2005. Their study found that Mauritius was an impressive example concerning the reduction of poverty, improvement in living standards, and overall development. The island nation was grouped alongside countries such as Botswana, South Africa, Cape Verde, Namibia, and the Seychelles. Arbache and Page's (2008) study found that Mauritius performed better than oil-rich countries such as Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria, and Angola. It also fared better than resource-poor countries such as Burundi, the Central African Republic, and Chad (Arbache and Page 2008).

Why did Mauritius perform so well between 1975 and 2005? The study found that good governance energised the growth and development of the country. This

fact was affirmed by the president of Mauritius, Sir Anerood Jugnauth (quoted in Zafar 2011:1), who stated: "There is no miracle here; it is due simply to hard work, discipline, and will." It is no coincidence that Mauritius defied the predictions of James Meade, a Nobel Prize recipient in economics, who in 1961 famously predicted a dismal future for Mauritius (Ukwandu 2014).

Meade was of the view that "the absence of natural resources, as well as its treacherous climate and geography, makes the country vulnerable to the vicissitudes of inclement weather, price shocks and absence of any viable alternatives for job creation outside the sugar sector" (1961 cited in Subramanian and Roy 2003). Against all these odds, Mauritius overcame severe developmental obstacles to make significant strides in its fight against poverty and underdevelopment. This small island nation in the Indian Ocean with approximately 1.3 million people transformed itself from a poor sugar economy into a country with one of the highest per capita incomes in Africa (Ukwandu 2014). The growth trajectory of the country accentuates the remarkable role of good governance in development.

Zafar (2011) succinctly captured the remarkable development trajectory of Mauritius by explaining that the country has made huge improvements as a result of good governance. Zafar (2011) explained that GDP per capita rose exponentially between 1970 and 2010, from less than US$500 to US$6 000. Crucially, the country was able to transform the main drivers of its economy from sugar to textiles. It later broadened the important drivers of the economy into a service economy comprising manufacturing and other sectors. As in Botswana, it was simply based on good governance and leadership that was focused on poverty alleviation and development, unlike most of sub-Saharan Africa, where government policies are geared towards the interests of a few elites in power.

What is very illuminating about Zafar's (2011) study on the development and economic growth of Mauritius is that the growth has benefited the majority of its citizens and has led to significant improvement in the HDI of the country. This is in contrast to the economic growth without development witnessed in resource-rich countries in Africa such as Nigeria, Angola, the DRC, and Equatorial Guinea. Zafar (2011) noted that life expectancy at birth in Mauritius increased from 62 years in 1970 to 73 years in 2008. Furthermore, the infant mortality rate decreased from 64 per 1 000 in 1970 to 15 per 1 000 in 2008 (Ukwandu 2014).

Mauritians living below the level of poverty, which was below 40% in 1970, was less than 2% in 2010, and primary school enrolment was close to 90% in the 2000s. These statistics show that the transformation of Mauritius was underpinned by good governance. The facts exemplify that irrespective of natural endowments, any country that desires to make significant changes in its development trajectories must adopt the principle of good governance. Resource endowment is

not a guarantee that a country will be able to overcome the problems of poverty and unemployment. This can be seen in the disastrous economic performance of many resource-rich countries in Africa such as the DRC, Nigeria, Angola, etc. In all these cases, good governance is sacrosant to development.

During a visit to South Africa, the former Brazilian president, Lula da Silva, remarked: "The biggest legacy of my presidency is not the programmes that took 30 million Brazilians out of absolute poverty and created 15 million jobs. It is the accountability of the public institutions and the real partnership with business, labour and civil society that brought hope to the people. We put the needs of the people first, not ours" (quoted in Naidoo 2012:15).

Kaufmann (2003:5) is of the opinion that "[g]overnance can be measured along six dimensions (voice and external accountability; political accountability and lack of violence, crime and terrorism; government effectiveness; lack of regulatory burden; rule of law; control of corruption". In line with this, Lula da Silva highlighted good governance as one of the main legacies he strived to instil in Brazil. As such, poor governance and the endemic corruption in public institutions are some of the greatest catalysts for growth and development.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Cubitt (2014:3) postulates that evidence indicates that "governance is not working for the majority of African populations who encounter every day the realities and consequences of ineffective government in their states. These include a model of democracy where citizens observe, but do not receive, the benefits of economic growth; the prevalence of violence, or threat of violence, and the paucity of law and order in every corner of the continent; a lack of opportunity, the continuance of deep poverty, and the persistent marginalisation and disempowerment of large sections of the population".

As previously mentioned, it is easy to blame external factors such as slavery, geography, and colonialism for the poverty and underdevelopment in sub-Saharan Africa. The fact is that poor governance has been a hindrance to socio-economic growth on the continent.

Mauritius was able to chart a new course in its developmental efforts because it has the kind of public governance that is fair, transparent, accountable, and responsible. There is good governance in its public institutions. Auriacombe (2019:117) posits that in order for governments in Africa to keep up with their changing role of promoting development in their societies, they need to adopt a type of public governance referred to as a "negotiated network". This involves a collaborative effort between the public sector, civil society, and business in order to accelerate service delivery in public governance. This kind of collaboration is

crucial if Africa is to ensure service delivery and socio-economic development. This entails building consensus between all the stakeholders in society before a policy is designed and implemented in a country. This is necessary because all parts of government are interconnected and interwoven. It is counterproductive to design policies for people without their input or to design policies for the registration and regulation of business without input from the business community. It is clear from the literature as discussed above that governance failure is an impediment towards the eradication of poverty and underdevelopment in the region

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The Most Influential Decision-making Criteria in South African Parliamentary Committees

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ABSTRACT

Evidence-based policymaking is advocated as an alternative to opinion-based policymaking, which prioritises the opinion of the policymaker. Countering practices, such as policy-based evidence-making that selects evidence to confirm the predetermined political stance of the policymaker, illustrate the complexity of policy decision-making. Evidence-influenced decision-making acknowledges that evidence is one of many factors considered by the policy-maker during deliberations and decisions.

This article reviews research in the field of evidence-influenced policymaking to present an integrated decision-making model that balances evidence from alternative sources with pragmatic considerations, individual opinion and political party commitments. The empirical section of the article adopts an exploratory design to capture the observations of content advisors and researchers who support the various portfolio committees and standing committees that support the South African Parliament. The observations are used to confirm and refine the integrated decision-making model and to identify the eight most prevalent decision-making criteria that inform the deliberations in various parliamentary committees.

This research offers valuable insight into the decision-making criteria that members of parliamentary committees regard as important. Considering this, stakeholders engaging with the parliamentary committees can frame submissions to align with the decision-making criteria, enabling stakeholders to formulate compelling arguments that will resonate with the members of parliamentary committees and will more likely be considered during deliberations.

INTRODUCTION

An increase in information availability escalates the importance of evidence use in policy decision-making. In early writings on evidence in policymaking, Davies, Nutley and Smith (1999) describe evidence-based policymaking as an approach that uses various evidence sources to take informed decisions on policies and public programmes, drawing lessons for practice from various policy sectors in the United Kingdom. The approach stands in contrast to earlier policymaking based on opinion and with heavy reliance on "the selective use of evidence […] or … the untested views of individuals or groups" (Segone 2004:27). This approach was inspired by elements such as ideological points of view, prejudice and even speculative conjecture.

Boaz, Davies, Fraser and Nutley (2019:1) maintain that evidence is integral not only to the process, but also the evaluation of policymaking. It also is important for understanding the practice, and improving on it. Dunn (2018:41) advocates that hidden "ideological, religious and political influences" often exert potentially harmful effects that may lead to policy failure. In South Africa, an introductory paper by the Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME) aims to instil an evidence-based approach in policy-making, advocating that policy-making based on research and evaluation evidence can assist policymakers and service providers to make better decisions and reach better outcomes (DPME & UCT 2014:1). This stance is again contrasted with opinion-based policymaking that bases decisions on ideology and political conviction (DPME & UCT 2014:1).

Evidence-based policymaking adopts a rational approach to policymaking. Using this approach, the policymaker views policymaking as an analytical process in which assumptions are developed that assist in systematising and programming the actions that need to be taken (Bekkers, Fenger and Scholten 2017:118). The approach further assumes that evidence arising from policies implemented in one setting can be applied to guide decision-making in other settings, but this becomes increasingly difficult when learning is transferred from one political or cultural setting to another (Peters 2015:139). The study of complex social interventions presents a range of "methodological difficulties, including uncertainty in demonstrating causation and the strictures of valid and reliable measurement" (Boaz *et al.* 2019:2). Practices such as policy-based evidence making, where evidence is deliberately selected to support the prior political stance of the policymaker, further serve to accentuate the complexities involved in policy decision-making.

Therefore, while evidence-influenced policy practice advocates that policy decisions should consider rigorous evidence as far as possible, it is unrealistic to expect that the availability of evidence will always give rise to policy decisions that are completely objective and rational (Cloete 2018:327). Aligned with this mindset, this article adopts a more balanced approach that acknowledges that

evidence is but one of many factors considered by the policymaker during deliberations and decisions.

This article reviews research in the field of evidence-influenced policymaking to present a comprehensive model of different criteria considered by policymakers during discussions. An integrated decision-making model, spanning both rational and ideological considerations, was developed. The empirical section of the article adopts an exploratory design. A semi-structured questionnaire was administered by an interviewer to solicit the insights of content advisors and researchers assigned to the various parliamentary portfolio committees and standing committees that support the work of parliamentarians. Given the large number of vacancies, the entire population was invited to participate in the research and 19 questionnaires were completed.

The analysis of the responses reveals the decision-making criteria considered most often during the portfolio and standing committee discussions in the South African Parliament as observed by the researchers and content advisors. This offers valuable insights on the decision-making criteria to which policy decision-makers are most likely to respond. This enables advocacy groups, community interest groups and academics to frame their policy arguments to address the decision-making criteria that parliamentarians regard most important.

EVIDENCE FOR POLICYMAKING

The origins of the evidence-based approach emphasised a rationality that the scientific community was "the producer of relevant, non-disputed and authoritative knowledge" (Bekkers *et al.* 2017:304). Rigorous research-based knowledge is derived from gathering and analysing empirical data in a manner that is systematic and transparent (Boaz *et al.* 2019), relying on "research/surveys, quantitative/ statistical data, qualitative data, and analysis thereof" (Strydom, Funke, Nienaber, Nortje and Steyn 2010:1). This supports the increase in the number of bodies involved in (health) policy research and advocacy, which have been increasing at a rate of about 17% annually since 2000 (Dunn 2018:40), and the establishment of dedicated research institutions, like the Cochrane Collaboration and the Campbell Collaboration, to present rigorously tested findings on policy outcomes (Dunn 2018:41).

The above rationality assumes a synergistic relationship between the scientific community and policymakers, where researchers present policymakers with policy-relevant information in the format and time when needed, and policymakers trust and respond to the available information (Choi *et al.* 2005:632; Marston and Watts 2003:144). However, in practice, several barriers complicate the relationship between policymakers and academic researchers, including "different

mentalities, … goals, attitudes towards information, languages, perception of time, … production processes and what [is considered] to be good evidence" (Strydom *et al*. 2010:1). The list of factors that impede the relationship between policy-makers and research experts seems unrelenting and includes systemic barriers; time constraints; unwillingness to learn or change; limited information analysis capacity; vested interests; the politicisation of senior officials; mistrust between political leadership, officials and experts; the subjectivity of research findings; and the academic communication and dissemination of findings (Cronin and Sadan 2015:1, 8; Marais and Matebesi 2013:357–358). While knowledge-brokering re-search tanks, policy advocacy groups and universities in the Global North delib-erately try to bridge these gaps, the absence or weak institutional capacity of such institutions in the Global South means that relevant information may not reach policymakers (Carden 2009:5).

Policymakers are presented with different knowledge claims with their own source of legitimacy, different from the traditional authoritative knowledge domain of scientific research (Bekkers *et al*. 2017:304). "Economic, attitudinal, behavioural and anecdotal evidence" offered by "lay persons, propaganda, judgements, insight/experience, history, analogies, local knowledge and culture" (Strydom *et al*. 2010:1) offers an alternative perspective to scientific research. Cronin and Sadan (2015:2) found that senior managers in South Africa identified four sources of evidence, namely personal networks such as friends, advisors or experts; administrative data; some use of research papers, syntheses or literature reviews; and international study tours or "benchmarking reports".

Routine departmental monitoring, evaluation reporting systems and informa-tion from departmental research units (Marais and Matebesi 2013:363–364) offer more customised and contextualised information to policymakers, though often characterised by reliability and consistency constraints (Cronin and Sadan 2015:2). Ultimately, the practices and procedures that govern information selection deter-mine the use of the available evidence (Head 2015: 473), although policymak-ers tend to find internally conducted or specifically commissioned consultancy research more likely to be relevant than academic research (Head 2015:478).

External to government, popular media reports, and both speculative and re-search articles, offer immediate perspectives, observations and varying degrees of reliable evidence on the societal challenges policymakers need to address. The mass media mobilises interest in and emotional responses from a large audience to either existing or new policy issues, which causes politicians to have greater interest in certain subjects and makes it "easier for that subject to gain access to the government and consequently get decision-making attention" (Bekkers *et al*. 2017:98).

The advent of social media has accelerated the rate at which groups of like-minded citizens can mobilise themselves on a large scale to put pressure

on political decision-makers who may change the direction of policy rapidly. Stakeholder consultations and outcomes of public consultations (Nutley *et al.* 2002) support an increasing awareness of "laymen's knowledge" or the "wisdom of crowds" (Bekkers *et al.* 2017:305). The Internet and online social networks enable citizens to create their own knowledge base, which Lievrouw refers to as "commons knowledge". This "provides an alternative and complement to the expert-driven, disciplinary, institutionalised and authoritative process of knowledge creation, distribution and gate-keeping" (Lievrouw, in Bekkers *et al.* 2017:305).

It is concluded that policy evidence is a multifaceted concept, encompassing defensible and value-neutral scientific evidence, contextualised internal monitoring data, observations of contemporary media reports and opinions, and an understanding of the 'commons', being the shared communal understanding of the issue at the grassroots level. While internal monitoring data, media reports and commons knowledge may be limited in generalisability or reliability of method, they offer the benefit of immediate, contextualised and value-laden insights and observations, in contrast to the delay that characterises the production of scientific evidence.

FURTHER POLICYMAKING CONSIDERATIONS

In moving from evidence-based policymaking to evidence-informed policymaking, policy analysts acknowledge the inherent limitations of the evidence-based approach. Choices are inevitably limited by the information that is available, the available time, and the capacity to process the information so that the costs and benefits of all the various alternatives can be assessed (Bekkers *et al.* 2017:45). Evidence often only presents description(s) of the situation as it is, rather than providing information on the basis of which strategic decisions can be made (Marais and Matebesi 2013:365). Choices are furthermore limited by practical circumstances and the complexity of decisions (Dunn 2018:50). Politics is concerned with "norms, values, ideology, power, influence, authority" and stands apart from scientific inquiry concerned with "facts, objectivity, and empirically warranted descriptions and explanations" (Mathison 2005:320).

Evidence rarely offers a single, uncontested solution to a complex public problem, but needs to be interpreted in the context of the political decision to be made (Shergold 2016:485). When policies are characterised by a variety of values, goals that conflict and causal processes that are uncertain, clear solutions to the problem are difficult and contentious (Peters 2015:9). Here, value clarification becomes the main focus of the policymaker, as captured in David Easton's (1953) conclusion that public policy is the outcome of an integrated political system that allocates value to groups, individuals and desirable commodities in society. Cronin

and Sadan (2015:3) concur that, in the South African context, evidence seldom provides a clear course of action, as "values, interests and ideology shape the collection and interpretation of evidence". Within the context of competing values, some evidence may be more relevant to underpin specific policy positions.

> *Policy scholarship has clearly demonstrated that the neutral and objective evidence of scientific knowledge does not, and cannot, drive policy in a democratic political system. Evidence is harnessed to competing arguments about ends and means, and the political decision-making process is inherently marked by conflicts, trade-offs, and compromises (Lindblom 1979, in Head 2015:472–473).*

Policy decision-makers therefore prioritise certain goals and specific information sources, or draw "on emotions, gut feelings, deeply held beliefs, habits, and what is familiar to them, to make decisions quickly" (Cairney, in Cairney and Weible 2017:622). Within the politics of policy decision-making, a mixture of science, value preferences and practical judgements on feasibility and legitimacy becomes relevant (Head 2010:13). This strong value orientation adopted in policymaking often stands in direct contrast with the accepted codes for ethical research, which demands objectivity from researchers when conducting scientific research. However, the policymaker is obliged "to take account of the ethical values, social mores, community attitudes, behavioural consequences, and political ideologies that influence government decisions" (Shergold 2016:485). The process of value clarification may at times mean that, while the policymaker concurs with research findings and proposed actions, pragmatic considerations, such as the available financial, institutional or human resources; the political and managerial buy-in required for successful implementation; and the inevitable trade-offs against other pressing priorities, may lead to decisions that seemingly contradict what the evidence dictates.

It therefore is important to consider the pragmatic, shared and individual ideological considerations that influence policy decisions.

Pragmatic considerations

Pragmatically, policy decisions consider the financial feasibility of the proposed policy, as well as the availability of other resources required (Cronin and Sadan, in Dayal 2016:5). Policies are long-term commitments, and the financial affordability and sustainability of funding over the course of the lifetime of the policy need to be considered. A second consideration is alignment with the Constitution and the existing legislative framework. Reflective policy-making should consider the role of law "as a shared set of beliefs that should be taken into consideration

when drafting and implementing policy programs" (Bekkers *et al.* 2017:310), but the proliferation of rules and norms complicates the policymaking space (Cairney, Oliver and Wellstead 2016:400). Where policies require support and resources from multiple government organisations, the policy decision is influenced by multiple actors and is the result of multiple decisions by sets of actors (Bekkers *et al.* 2017:10), thereby further restricting the manoeuvring space available to the policymaker.

Political party commitments

Commitments by the political party are informed by the political manifesto or election promises, and may also be directed in terms of prior agreements with local or international stakeholders, or even a path-dependence tendency, to retain a historical course of action. "Conflict and bargaining are ongoing features of a democratic political system and acknowledge [sic] the intrinsic role of values, ideologies, and economic interests in shaping policy making" (Head 2015:474). The design of policies is inherently a political exercise that considers the claims, interests and relative power of multiple actors in relation to a specific policy issue (Lasswell, Dhal and Lowi, in Bekkers *et al.* 2017:123), and makes choices that balance and allocate values to deal with societal challenges (Bekkers *et al.* 2017:6). Peters (2015:139) concludes that "all the evaluation and policy advice in the world will be of little utility if the decision-makers involved in policymaking have ideological blinders, or other blinders, that inhibit their use of the information generated". However, Head (2010:18) warns that both evidence and values may be mobilised "to support political objectives and to build coalitions of support" rather than promoting accountable decisions. The balance between values and evidence is not always straightforward.

Political party commitments reflect the commitment of the governing party to the policy at a particular point in time, and is aligned with the promises that need to be kept to ensure re-election. However, the policy agenda may also be driven by the press, or be in response to changing public opinion, incidents, or lobby groups (Cronin and Sadan 2015:6). Executive managers and political heads in the inner circle of decision-making also exert a strong influence on policy decisions. Furthermore, policies may be curtailed in terms of past policy decisions in relation to which the pursuit of existing norms and policies to maintain the status quo provide the parameters for future policies.

In politically contested policy decisions, contrasting sources of evidence may become a weapon in the power struggle to support preferred views, predetermined agendas and desired outcomes. "Based on political ideologies and preferences, but also in relation to electoral promises or political compromises that have been made", political parties adopt specific values that "act as criteria

that can be used to define what actions should be pursued, but they also help to prioritise these actions and help to formulate a hierarchy of goals to be achieved" (Bekkers *et al.* 2017:120).

Personal ideology and interests

The individual opinion of the decision-maker, which may manifest explicitly in defined interests or implicitly in considerations of access to power, resources or personal benefits (e.g. promotion), influences the policy decision adopted. On the one hand, "policy makers use two shortcuts – emotions and beliefs to understand problems and 'rational' ways of establishing the best evidence on solutions – to act quickly in complex, multilevel policy-making environments" (Cairney *et al.* 2016:399). Beliefs help to reduce ambiguity and enable policymakers to exercise a choice based on limited evidence. On the other hand, personal ideology and beliefs, however, may also lead the policymaker to reject research based on "method, metatheory, paradigm, the results or even simply because decision makers dislike the original researcher" (Marais and Matebesi 2013:370). Policymakers may use evidence in a selective manner to ensure a longer political career for certain individuals, or else to promote goals that are politically driven (Marais and Matebesi 2013:360).

Cloete (2018:328) concludes that, in practice, policy decisions are the result of normative judgements, emotional preferences or prejudice, and the rational consideration of data to present an acceptable compromise on the policy issue. Evidence and observations on world problems are explored through scientific methods to produce method-specific evidence. The political value-clarification process selects and filters the available information in terms of its appropriateness to the context, pragmatic feasibility, alignment with political priorities and personal ideology to inform the policy decision that will shape the world of the future.

AN INTEGRATED MODEL FOR POLICY DECISION-MAKING

Considering the literature that explores the complexity of policymaking, it is evident that a model to assess policy decision-making needs to consider evidence, pragmatic considerations, political considerations and individual preference to capture an acknowledgement of this complexity. A more comprehensive model – of different criteria considered by policymakers during discussions preceding their decisions – is proposed as a basis for assessing the relative importance of these factors in policy decision-making in South Africa.

This integrated decision-making model spans both rational and ideological considerations and is grouped into four quadrants, each including a series of

Figure 1: Proposed integrated model for policy decision-making

considerations or decision-making criteria that may be considered during discussions or decision-making. The four quadrants are:

A. Pragmatic considerations
B. Evidence
C. Political party commitments
D. Individual opinions

Quadrant A: Pragmatic considerations

This quadrant captures three decision-making criteria:

- Pragmatic considerations that reflect on the financial implications and feasibility of the policy decision.
- Alignment with the legislative framework, which includes consideration of the Constitution as well as prior policies and approved legislation on the issues.
- The alignment of the policy with the approved mandate of the department, given that policy typically has its origin in the executive sphere for further consideration by policymakers.

Quadrant B: Evidence

This quadrant provides for four additional decision-making criteria:

- Scientific research evidence produced by academics and researchers within the context of rigorous research principles that specify and promote the reliability and validity of findings.
- Internal monitoring data produced by departments through their routine quarterly and annual monitoring and reporting routines, or through research and evaluation studies.
- Media reports that may include rigorous research or emotive observations on the world, reflecting a particular viewpoint or perspective on reality for consideration by the policymaker.
- Grassroots understanding or 'commons' knowledge that may derive from community engagements, site visits or other outreach programmes, or from community discussions in popular media and on social media platforms.

Quadrant C: Political party commitments

Three decision-making criteria are added in this quadrant:

- Path dependence, determined by historical or past courses of action.
- Treaties with international donors or agreements with local civil society groups or stakeholders.

- Political party commitments, reflecting the formal party line on the issues, aligned with the political manifesto or election promises, or path dependency.

Quadrant D: Personal viewpoints

This quadrant concludes with the final three decision-making criteria:
- The personal opinion of the policymaker on the policy issue, which may or may not be aligned with the ideology of the party.
- Specific declared interests or pet projects that the policymaker pursues actively.
- The non-declared personal interest of the policymaker, which may include personal benefit or advancement.

DECISION-MAKING CRITERIA MOST RELEVANT TO PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES

The empirical section of the article adopts an exploratory design to test the relevance and appropriateness of the developed model to analyse discussions and decision-making in the committees of the South African Parliament.

The process of drafting relevant legislation in South Africa starts with the formulation of a bill by a government department under the direction of the relevant minister or deputy minister. The bill is introduced by a member of the executive to Cabinet, and then submitted to Parliament for processing. Once introduced, a bill is referred to the relevant committee, after which it is debated in detail, and amended if necessary (Parliament 2019a). The committee members are selected from different parties and tasked to consider and discuss bills and other matters referred to them (Parliament 2019b). The committee provides a platform for the detailed discussion of bills and is therefore regarded as the ideal case setting for exploring the decision-making considerations that shape the discussions, decisions or recommendations of the committees.

This study acknowledges the following limitations of the research given the chosen case study: The adopted policy mandate of government is captured in various documents, including policies, acts, regulations, guidelines, frameworks and strategies. This article focuses only on the decision-making criteria that inform discussions in the various committees, whose mandate includes oversight of departments within the relevant portfolio, and the discussion of proposed bills (Parliament 2019b). It is acknowledged that the decision-making considerations or prevalence of such considerations in the decisions and recommendations by the government departments that put forward sectoral policy may be different from what was found in this case study.

Data collection

A semi-structured questionnaire was designed to capture confidential responses to the following aspects:
- The relevant committee supported by the respondent, and the years of experience within this committee.
- Figure 1 and a brief introduction to the criteria, which informed a discussion of the relevance of the model and the identification of additional criteria that influenced the discussions or decisions and are not captured in the proposed model.
- The relative importance of the four quadrants in sharing the discussions, decisions or recommendations of the relevant committee.
- The five most prominent or most observed criteria across the four quadrants that influenced the work of the relevant committee.
- The dominance of each of the considerations in the work of the committee, by asking the respondent to indicate whether the consideration influenced few, some, many, most or all discussions or decisions.

The respondents shared specific examples as part of the questionnaire to support the ranking provided, or to reflect on exceptions to the standard practice observed. To maintain confidentiality, these examples are not shared in this article, but the context provided through these responses assisted in the interpretation of the responses and ratings.

The questionnaire was administered by an interviewer to capture the observations and insights of the content advisors and researchers assigned to the various parliamentary portfolio committees, including the 32 national assembly committees, nine (joint) standing committees and 11 national council of provinces committees that support the work of parliamentarians. The proposed organogram of the core business support, and the knowledge and information services decisions in Parliament, provides for a total of 52 content advisors to support these committees, and a total of 63 researchers. However, a substantial number of allocated positions are currently vacant, and existing content advisors and researchers support more than one committee.

Given the large number of vacancies, all the appointed content advisors and research advisors that support the committees were invited via e-mail from the office of the Division Manager: Core Business Support, to participate in the study. Questionnaires were administered from April to May 2019 during the parliamentary recess period prior to the 2019 national elections. While this period signalled a quieter period in Parliament that should have been ideal for the research, many staff members also used the period to take leave. Participation in the study was voluntary, and a final number of 19 respondents participated in the study.

Administering the questionnaires through an interviewer allowed for in-depth discussion of the respondents' observations of the developed model, its relevance in terms of observations on the discussions and decision-making in the supported committees, and sharing of examples that allowed deeper understanding into the respective considerations and criteria within the context of the South African parliamentary portfolio committees.

Findings

Analysis of respondents

The 19 content advisors and researchers who participated in the research support a wide range of parliamentary committees, organised into three categories representing 32 national assembly portfolio committees; nine national assembly committees, standing committees or joint standing committees; and 11 national council of provinces standing committees. The observations presented can therefore be seen to represent the diverse range of policy issues that are discussed in the various committees that support Parliament.

Table 1: Categorisation of parliamentary committees

Parliamentary committees categorised	Total number of committees in category	Number of respondents in category
National assembly portfolio committees	32	13
National assembly committees/standing committees/ joint standing committees	9	3
National council of provinces standing committees	11	3
Total	52	19

Source: (Author's calculations)

Of the respondents 13 were content advisors appointed to the respective committees, and six respondents were researchers assigned to the committees. There was only one committee where both the researcher and content advisor selected to participate in the research, all other committees are represented by one respondent only.

Of the respondents 15 had Master's degrees, generally related to the subject field of the committee to which they were assigned. One respondent had three honours degrees, and three respondents had doctoral degrees. In terms of experience with Parliament, one respondent had been appointed within the preceding year, while one had been with Parliament for 30 years. Removing these two

outliers, the mean number of years with Parliament for the remaining 17 respondents was 9,05 years.

The analysis of the respondents in terms of qualifications, experience with Parliament and representivity across parliamentary committees finds the respondents to be authoritative to reflect on the considerations that inform the deliberations and decisions within parliamentary committees.

Review of the model and additional decision-making criteria

The respondents were asked to identify other decision-making variables that influence discussions or decisions that were not captured in the model presented in Figure 1. The respondents confirmed that the proposed model was useful in capturing the complexity of the discussions and decisions, but emphasised that the discussions of the parliamentary committees were focused on drafting legislation and performing oversight of executive departments, while departments and ministers were responsible for proposing policies. It is important to interpret the responses and rankings within the responsibility frames of the committees.

Considering the model and the decision-making criteria employed by the committees during deliberations, the respondents proposed the following additional criteria to refine the model:

- Relating to the evidence quadrant, ***submissions from the public or interest groups*** are important for swaying the opinion of committee members. Oral submissions seemed to gain more traction than long or technically complicated, written submissions. Similarly, direct petitions or points raised in public hearings presented new information that the committee could consider during deliberations.
- Relating to the political party commitments quadrant, some respondents preferred to differentiate between the political manifesto and election commitments, which tend to be longer term in nature, and what they referred to as the 'party line'. The ***party line*** is a shorter term agreement that the party caucus reaches during the study group preparation in the days prior to the committee meeting. Members of the party will support the adopted stance during the committee's deliberations.
- Relating to the pragmatic quadrant, executive departments set the policy direction and often draft first versions of new bills. The ***policy direction proposed by executive departments***, led by ministers or senior managers who are also senior members of the political party, exert a strong influence on the adopted viewpoint and the deliberations of the committee.
- Relating to the political party commitments quadrant, some respondents recommended expanding the donor and international commitments to acknowledge ***commitments to local stakeholders***, such as promises to influential groups (e.g. unions) or local agreements (e.g. NEDLAC).

- Relating to the personal opinion quadrant, own interest or benefit may also relate strongly to the priorities of the constituency office of the member, or the *future political aspirations* of the member or chairperson within the political party or executive.
- Relating to evidence, the *research briefs* produced by the parliamentary support staff were also regarded as instrumental in informing the discussions of the committee.

These additional criteria were also considered when respondents were asked to select the five most prevalent decision-making variables observed in the deliberations of the committees.

Prevalence of the four quadrants

Respondents were asked to rank the four quadrants from one (most prevalent) to four (least prevalent) in terms of the extent to which considerations in the category were observed to inform the discussions and recommendations of the relevant committee. While the ordinal scale allows respondents to indicate which quadrant is more important, it does not indicate the degree of relative importance of one quadrant in relation to the next. Data analysis is therefore limited to descriptive statistics in terms of frequencies, which are grouped together in order to make sense of the data.

Of the 18 respondents who answered this question, eight selected quadrant C (political party commitments) as the *most prevalent quadrant* in informing the deliberations of the committee. Quadrant A (pragmatic considerations) was selected as the most prevalent factor by five respondents, followed closely by quadrant B (evidence), which was selected as the most prevalent by four respondents. This same trend also characterised the responses when considering the *top two quadrants* selected by the respondents. Again, political party commitments came out dominant (selected 14 times), this time followed by evidence, selected 12 times, and pragmatic considerations, 11 times.

The descriptive analysis indicates that political party considerations are dominant in informing the deliberations of the committee, followed closely by pragmatic considerations and the consideration of evidence. Only one respondent selected quadrant D (personal opinion) as the most important consideration in the deliberations of the committee, while all other respondents selected this as the third or fourth quadrant that characterises the deliberations of the committee. Most respondents, however, indicated that this ranking was difficult, as deliberations often adopted a more integrated combination of factors across the four quadrants, often not clearly demarcated due to implicit connections across the quadrants. For example, a person adopts an individual ideology based on life experiences that present evidence of the world. The individual joins a political party

Table 2: Most prevalent decision-making criteria

Counts per decision-making criterion	1st criterion	2nd criterion	3rd criterion	4th criterion	5th criterion	Count of top 3	Count of top 5
Quadrant A							
Financial feasibility	1	3	2	1	1	6	**8**
Legislative framework	3	2	4	0	1	9	**10**
Departmental mandate	2	3	2	3	2	7	**12**
Quadrant B							
Academic evidence	0	0	2	0	0	2	**2**
Internal monitoring data	2	1	1	3	1	4	**8**
Media reports	0	1	3	2	3	4	**9**
Grassroots	2	2	0	2	2	4	**8**
Quadrant C							
Pet projects	0	0	1	0	0	1	1
Personal opinion	0	0	1	2	1	1	4
Own interest	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
Quadrant D							
Path dependency	0	0	1	0	1	1	2
Donor commitments	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Political manifesto	4	4	1	1	0	9	**10**
Additional criteria							
Submissions to the committee	0	1	0	1	0	1	2
Party line	2	2	1	0	2	5	**7**
Policy direction proposed by executive	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Prior stakeholder commitments	0	0	0	1	1	0	2
Future political aspirations	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Internal research briefs	0	0	1	1	0	1	2

Source: (Author's calculations)

that shares these interests. The political party sets the direction of macro-level policy, forms departments and allocates resources that will promote the party's priorities. This direction is influenced by evidence for the financial, social, cultural and technical feasibility of the proposed direction. In an attempt to simplify what is inherently a complex decision-making process, the next section identifies the criteria across the various quadrants that respondents regard as the most important in shaping the deliberations and decisions of the committees.

The most significant decision-making criteria

The respondents were asked to select the five decision-making criteria most prevalent in shaping the deliberations of the committee, regardless of the quadrants that pre-grouped the criteria. The five variables were ranked from most prevalent to least prevalent. A simple count of the most prevalent decision-making criteria identified by the respondents in their individual list of 'top-five' decision-making criteria is presented in Table 2.

While slight variances are observed when considering either the top five or top three decision-making criteria, the same criteria are found to be dominant. Considering the count of the top five and top three rankings, as well as individual rankings as captured in the table, the eight decision-making criteria that respondents agreed to be dominant in shaping the deliberations across various portfolio committees are:

- the department's mandate
- alignment of the issue with the political manifesto of the party
- the existing legislative framework with which new legislation will align
- financial feasibility of the proposed decision
- grassroots observations and alignment with 'commons' thinking
- information from internal monitoring data
- information and viewpoints from media reports[1]
- alignment with the adopted party line on the issue

The more focused list of criteria presents a foundation for further research towards a refined model on the criteria that influence the deliberations and ultimately the decisions in the South African policymaking arena.

Dominance of the criteria in the work of the committee

In a final follow-up question on the five most dominant criteria selected, the respondents were asked to indicate whether the identified decision-making criteria were considered in a few, some, many, most or all of the deliberations of the committee. A first analysis of the responses does not reveal a clear alignment between specific criteria and their dominance in discussions, and further analysis in subsequent research will investigate potential relationships. Early analysis,

however, does indicate that even when a respondent ranked a decision-making criterion as the first or second criterion considered by the committee, this is only a generalisation and the relevance of the criterion may differ depending on the specific policy issue.

Further research and analysis are important to refine an understanding of the influence of the decision-making criteria on the deliberations of the committees.

CONCLUSION

Starting from a generic perspective on factors that influence the decisions of policymakers, this article presents a more focused list of key decision-making criteria that are instrumental in directing and influencing the deliberations of the committees of the South African Parliament. The refined list of eight criteria places the departmental mandate at the top. As the two critical responsibilities of the parliamentary committees are oversight of the executive and discussion of bills mostly proposed by ministers or deputy ministers, the departmental mandate becomes very significant in the deliberations of the committee. An important conclusion is that the stakeholders who wish to influence the direction of policies or bills may need to start engagement with the mandated department even before the issue is brought to the parliamentary committees for deliberation and referral.

This article differentiates between the political manifesto as the longer term goal of the political party, and the party line as the short-term, shared viewpoint on an issue. Most respondents discussed the important role of prior discussions in the party study groups in directing the decisions in the formal meetings of the committee, at times expressing regret that decisions were taken before they were formally debated in the committee, where there could be due consideration of further evidence and alternative viewpoints. Initial findings, however, identify the role of the manifesto of the political party as being more dominant in influencing the discussions than the short-term discussions in the study groups. Stakeholders engaging with Parliament should align arguments with the priorities in the manifestos of the dominant parties. Advice from the respondents is that submissions and research evidence that are not aggressive or politically adverse are more likely to receive traction, and may even open engagement with the study group members or chairperson of the committee, during which the party line may be influenced before it is adopted by the group.

The shortlist of criteria emphasises the importance of pragmatic criteria, such as the existing legislative framework or financial feasibility of proposed legislation or policy direction. The respondents shared a variety of examples of where failure

to consider the pragmatic criteria to promote party priorities resulted in delayed implementation or challenges in a court of law. From an evidence viewpoint, this criterion opens an important focus for submissions to the committees to discuss the pragmatic feasibility of proposed policies or legislation. However, the respondents advised that submissions that are overly technical or time intensive are less likely to be considered and advocated and that short, oral presentations are more likely to gain traction.

Three of the four sources of evidence included in the initial evidence model are also present in the shortlisted eight decision-making criteria, with academic evidence as the omitted evidence source. Committee members highly valued grassroots interactions with communities, citizen submissions and other channels that enable members to understand the position of the general public towards an issue. Stakeholders who wish to engage with committee members should include evidence and perspectives from the grassroots level, and use this to strengthen their arguments and submissions. This is a position that the popular media often understand well, which explains the strong influence of media reports in the list of criteria. Internal monitoring data encompasses a variety of government-produced reports, including those from oversight institutions like the Auditor-General. While the literature review briefly reflected on the poor quality of departmental monitoring data and research when compared to rigorous academic standards, committee members seemed to find internal information to be better aligned with their discussions. The respondents advised stakeholders to adopt a more responsive approach when engaging with committees. Instead of redirecting political priorities, engagements that offer evidence and arguments aligned with the information needs and immediate priorities of the committee are more successful.

It was also interesting to note the elements from the generic integrated model of policy decision-making that did not make the final shortlist of decision-making criteria. While respondents shared examples of decisions influenced by pet projects, personal opinion or own interest, these factors were not perceived as dominant in the deliberations and decisions of the committee. Path dependence and earlier stakeholder agreements also seem to have been less influential in recent years, with some respondents indicating that these were more dominant in earlier Parliaments soon after democratisation. Stakeholders engaging with committees should be cognisant of changing decision-making criteria over time.

NOTE

1. While media reports score high in the top 5, the respondents mostly ranked this as the fourth or fifth most important consideration, as captured in the table.

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The Potential of a Power-Sharing Government to Prevent Post-election Violence in Uganda

Perspectives from Mid-Western Region

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ABSTRACT

Studies have revealed that a number of countries in the East African region have faced challenges in preventing post-election violence. Therefore, this article examined the potential of a Power-Sharing Government (PSG) to preventing post-election violence in Uganda. PSG is emerging as an issue, seeing that the country has endured post-election violence since the 2006 elections. A qualitative approach was used for data collection from key informants that were selected from four districts in mid-western Uganda; personal interviews were conducted with 16 senior politicians, eight members of civil society and four elders. The findings suggest that adopting the PSG approach facilitates a coalition to have authority to bargain in the interest of the country; a joint veto can lessen majority influence by allowing minority groups to prevent a change in policy; proportional representation can surpass the electoral system in a divided country; and equitable distribution of key positions in the national military can lead to sanity in the country's defence sector. Consequently, the article concludes that PSG can succeed in mitigating potential post-election violence even if every ideal factor put forth by a con-sociational approach is not adopted in totality. It is recommended that political leaders and other stakeholders should seek possible means to achieving a comprehensive PSG.

INTRODUCTION

Over the last few decades, several countries around sub-Saharan Africa, such as Kenya, Uganda and Zimbabwe, have embraced key democratic reforms as a potential strategy to reversing the escalation of an insurrectional structure (Chege 2018:159). However, both intra-regime transitions and inter-regime transitions have been characterised by ambiguities regarding the quality of elections and the awareness about a range of choices exposed to voters, as well as the behaviour of political actors. Opposition parties have not been guaranteed by the ruling government's assurance, that the incumbent President will respect the resolve of the voters. While the incumbent party may seem to be compliant ahead of elections, it turns out to be non-compliant on taking power. Faced with this reality, opposition supporters resort to post-election violence. While post-election violence is costly, a government can seek to avoid the consequences by respecting the agreement between itself and opposition parties. Between 1980 and 2000, a number of communities in Uganda suffered post-election violence since 2000 (Cox and Ratnam 2016), election (Burchad 2016) to post-election violence (Olukya 2016). From 2000 to date, Uganda has witnessed continuous post-election violence, walk-to-work and arrest of opposition politicians by the country's police including, in some cases, house arrests. After the 2016 elections, one of the former presidential candidates, Dr Kizza-Besigye, was put under house arrest. Consequently, a number of opinion leaders proposed that the country needed to experiment with a PSG approach aimed to facilitate intra-state peace. Nassor and Jose (2014:255) describe PSG as one of the means to attaining national conciliation on important state interests by ensuring the respect, involvement and inclusion of a wider range of political views. PSG was useful in enhancing political stability in a number of African countries such as South Africa, Zimbabwe, Burundi, and Kenya. This way PSG is used to facilitate constitutionalism in communities that are divided on ethnic differences. While the PSG approach has been espoused by both the United Nations and the international community (Spears 2013:38), limited consideration has been given to its success in Uganda.

The outcomes of this study present views on the PSG in terms of preventing post-election violence in the country. Section two presents the background on governance by looking at three phases, namely; liberation, transformational and consolidation. Further, attempt is made to highlight the PSG and the consociational approach to PSG. Section three focuses on the problem, objective of the study and methodology. Section four presents the outcomes of the study by focusing on four aspects emerging from the con-sociational approach. Section five discusses the potential of adopting PSG in Uganda. To conclude, section six contends that the PSG can succeed in mitigating potential political violence in Uganda.

BACKGROUND ON GOVERNANCE IN THE EAST AFRICAN REGION

Since the 1980s, countries in the East African Region (EAR) have tried to walk the good governance trajectory (Kiir 2013:6). While there are six countries in the EAR, namely Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda, in three of the member states, namely Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda, change of government has metamorphosed through three overlying stages, that is: liberation, transformation, and consolidation. These countries and their circumstances are of interest to the current study seeing their direct geographical connection with Northern Africa, Southern Africa and Western Africa; this is essential for intra-continental trade, peace and security.

The liberation stage

This period involved struggles for freedom against authoritarians. Bradford and Clark (2014:12) note that the liberation phase is characterised by abuse of human rights in several forms, including massacres and persecution, leading to both internal displacement and cross-border migrations. Particular liberation groups in the EAR are the National Resistance Army (NRA) in Uganda and Rwandese Patriotic Front (FPR) in Rwanda. First, NRA rebels waged war against the Milton Obote regime that was perceived to have rigged the elections of 1981 (Katumba-Wamala 2007:160; Frkorich 2010:153). The NRA liberation struggle persisted for five years (1981–1986) and countless lives were lost in the infamous Luwero triangle. Second, the Alliance of democratic forces for the liberation of Congo rebels, fought and overthrew the Sese Seko Mobutu dictatorship in 1997 (Moore 2001:130). And third, FPR rebels fought against and removed from power the Hutu-led inclusive government (which involved a system that included both Hutu and Tutsi) of Javenero Habyarimana. This war culminated in one of the nastiest genocides in 1994 (Vandegiste 2014:265). Consequently, academic debates about the liberation phase suggest that a number of freedom struggles were dominated by armed hostility (Kanyangara 2016:4). In the field of regional peace and security, Vat Kamatsiko (2017:54) has classified such conflicts as regional based political processes.

The transformation stage

The end of the liberation chapter brought about the *transformation phase* which, in the case of EAR, involved transfer of state power from military rule to civilian leadership. In Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda the rulers transformed into civilian leaders; following nationwide elections (Mann and Berry 2016:128). While

the transformation phase would be expected to allow civilians to ascend to the Presidency, the three countries have witnessed the opposite.

The consolidation stage

The third phase involved the military rulers seeking strategies of securing life Presidency through manipulation of the constitutions and using *propaganda* (Harkness 2017:801). In their study, Tangri and Mwenda (2010:32) note that the legislative body of Uganda amended Article 102(2) of the National Constitution on Presidential term-limits to let the incumbent continue in office beyond the hitherto two constitutional terms. In Rwanda, the Legislative Assembly was used to legitimise the wishes of the incumbent including when his presidential tenure expires (Reyntjens 2018:528).

The three phases reveal that without adopting resolute strategies, some of the countries in the EAR are both in danger of remaining under military conquest for long and/or falling back into the conditions that led to liberation struggles in the first place. Scholars such as McCulloch (2017) have suggested adopting PSG as a potential exit strategy.

THE POWER SHARING GOVERNMENT (PSG)

According to McCulloch (2017), PSG is a method of managing conflict in peoples who are deeply alienated with a view to bring about unity. McCulloch (2017:419) looks at PSG as a transitional tool which is essential in dealing with deeply divided societies, it is expected to hinder the lasting objectives of attaining peace and democracy. McCulloch and McEvoy (2019) describe PSG as an approach to governance which is designed to build capacity of the state as well as its legitimacy. A study by Aeby (2018:870) reveals that the PSG allows parties to work together on policies of socio-economic and infrastructural domain. While democratic milestones might not be much, the PSG method allows the population to be united as well as facilitating negotiation among antagonistic political leaders. Although the PSG is perceived as one of the potential means to bringing about political sanity, which may have failed through other means, the ruling elites have tended to use it as an instrument for sharing wealth among themselves (Sun 2018).

In Kenya (between Kikuyu and Luo) as well as in Rwanda (between Hutus and Tutsi) who are involved in the engagements, the PSG guarantees that participants from each tribe gain access to public resources and amenities although it is said to weaken the working of democracy through executive control and rigid policies (Veenendaal 2019). In cases where PSG is decentralised to grass roots communities, it can reduce levels of hostility (Elfversson and Sjögren 2019).

That is why McCulloch (2019) notes that PSG should aim to guarantee active representation and involvement of both smaller groups and mainstream groups in the political administration. However, a study by Fort (2018:512) reveals that the ordinary people are likely to resist PSG in a number of cases. A key factor behind this resistance is the fear, by political parties, to give up their strategies and political programmes to a shared national strategy (Hinds 2010); this factor can be resolved by a con-sociational approach.

THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The theoretical framework adopted for this study is derived from the con-sociational approach which is perceived to be applicable. PSG by con-sociation has four aspects: authority by a coalition of leaders bargaining in the interest of the state; a joint veto, which lessens majority influence by allowing minority groups to prevent a change in policy; proportional representation, which goes beyond the electoral system; and, distribution of key positions in the armed forces followed by distribution of finances between warring powers as well as a quasi-independence aimed to allow groups to run their own issues (Traniello 2008:31). This study takes the above specific stance of PSG.

Nassor and Jose (2014:255) describe PSG in terms of a platform for attaining national compromise on key state interests, by ensuring respect and involvement as well as inclusion of the major political views in a country. This view presents PSG from the perspective of finding a middle ground especially when the country is descending in collapse; so that structures that form a state are allowed to function.

According to Cheeseman (2011:339), PSG involves establishing an inclusive government in which executive positions and supervisory authority are distributed between the main parties to the conflict. These descriptions agree that formal PSG denotes a kind of government formed by a group of parties during times of political emergency. Consequently, the product expected of PSG is an integrative approach to public issues on the understanding that internal processes based on common esteem and fair involvement in state affairs and development processes remain key (Wilson 2011:255). In view of the observation, an integrative approach demonstrates that government is driven on the basis of patriotism, rather than on the political affiliation of actors. This suggests that in times of national political crisis, political actors can collaborate to achieve the best interests of the citizenry, before looking at the interests of their political parties.

Other studies demonstrate that the PSG is characterised by division of power between different power axes, and participants in the 'power game' share management over scarce resources. Chigora and Guzura (2011:21) note that a PSG

regime holds all participating actors in the structures of government including the executive, civil service and ambassadorial placements aimed to balance participation, weaken further conflict, and boost hopes for national security, unity and development in the government.

Cheeseman (2011:337) reveals that more than one-third of African countries (including Burundi, DRC, Kenya, Angola, South Africa and Zimbabwe) have had some form of PSG. While conservative democrats do not support the PSG, a number of liberal democrats do not seem to consider the failure of PSG by consociation, which has not been successful in other African countries, such as South Africa, due to a single-dimensional view to the country's politics based on ethnic divide (Connors 1996); this calls for institutions of consensus (Qvortrup 2018).

A study by Hansen (2013:307) on the post-2007–2008 presidential election period in Kenya found that there was wide scale post-election violence in the country leading to high numbers of internally displaced persons as well as cross-border migrants. A separate study by Cheeseman (2011:337) identified two principals to the violence: Mwai-Kibaki of the Party for National Unity and Raila-Odinga of the Orange Democratic Movement. While Mwai-Kibaki was presumed to have lost the election, anecdotal evidence suggests that the election outcomes were manoeuvred in his favour. Consequently, leaders in the EAR facilitated by the Kofi Annan Foundation agreed to a PSG in the interests of the country. The arrangement culminated in a move towards undertaking a PSG government that would involve both Mwai-Kibaki and Raila-Odinga. Hansen (2013) notes that a transitional post of Prime Minister along with a coalition cabinet were established to accommodate Raila-Odinga as Mwai-Kibaki retained the Presidency. The temporal formation of the Prime Ministerial position aimed to accommodate Raila-Odinga was not a sustainable strategy seeing that the notion of veto power emphasised under con-sociationalism was never adhered to. Instead, the two issues raised by Cheeseman (2011); distribution of conflict and the degree of an elite structure filled by suspicion, conspiracy and bias took shape. A close analysis of the Kenyan PSG reveals two issues.

First, the idealists (such as Hansen 2013:309) indicate that it was a constructive action towards a democratic path which facilitated an end to post-election violence and restored the rule of law. Second, realists (such as Somerville 2009:528) reveal that the PSG was a scheme leading to abuse of the very principles of democracy due to failure to cohere with the principles of PSG by con-sociational such as distribution of key positions, proportional representation and a joint veto. Somerville (2009) shows that the Kenyan PSG did not attend to the issues that led to the election violence; for example, ethnic divide, the land issue, fragmentations within the wider society, and economic inequality. It can be submitted that Kenya experienced shortages of suitable instruments for implementing the PSG. The variance between the views held by idealists and those of the realists suggests that

while PSG can be workable among liberal democracies, the key issues that lead to post-election violence should be attended to.

According to Wantchekon (2000:342), the EAR has not been very successful as recent attempts suggest that PSGs were not designed to last longer than the end of post-election violence. Consequently, a recent study by McCulloch and Vandegiste (2019) suggests the need for an administrative framework which can interpret the functioning of a con-sociational arrangement. This view is informed by a mixture of veto power and the established institutions, as well as practices for power sharing; this formula succeeded in Burundi. Thus PSG becomes a medium-term strategy rather than a long-term strategy suggesting two cursors: the actors and the strength of the implementation system. The convergence between the above two cursors can bring about benefits in the democratic system and facilitate negotiations between major parties and ethnic groups through a PSG framework. This path succeeded in a number of countries such as Suriname, India, and Lebanon although the formula failed in countries such as Iraq, Cyprus and Afghanistan (Veenendaal 2019). It also failed to go beyond a decade in Northern Ireland after 2017 (McCulloch and McEvoy 2019:216). Nonetheless, the PSG should never become a last resort for election losers to join government. As adapted in this study, PSG by con-sociation can be used to influence the actions of stakeholders during negotiations, either during the pre-election or post-election. The authority by a coalition of leaders, joint veto, proportional representation in the armed forces and financial distribution adopted in the potential PSG talks, can influence the possibility of preventing post-election violence.

In Uganda, the theory can be used to explain PSG in a way that the council of elders along with the Inter-Party Coalition for Dialogue (IPOD) can design a strategy which can be debated in an open atmosphere with a view of having a coalition of leaders to represent the main political parties in the form of proportional representation. By doing so, the coalition can design strategies for attaining a joint veto for recruitment and promotion of armed forces as well as distribution of finances among key political parties and other sections such as the youth, women, trade unions, persons with disabilities, farmers, entrepreneurs, to name a few. This is plausible under a PSG by con-sociation seeing that the four aspects have contributed to post-election violence in the country since 2000. Country-based studies have attested to this such as apparent regional inequalities as well as deep impoverishment in the northern region (Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey 2010:1230); land and administrative authority which impact on livelihoods (Sjögren 2015:271); and, strategies to ensuring meaningful representation (Brett 2017). As noted by Lemarchand (2007), these illustrations reveal that PSG by con-sociation can succeed when group independence, proportional representation and alternative veto are addressed.

THE PROBLEM

The EAR is one of the most fragile regions as regards PSG as an approach to preventing potential post-election violence. Traniello (2008:38) investigated the case of Rwanda (1990–1994) which culminated in the Arusha Accord – but that PSG failed to deal with the emergent hostilities as the basic factors were either not adequate or not well defined. Issues of competent and dedicated leadership, a collective vision, and the resolve to work in concert were inadequate. Somerville (2009:528) explored the Kenyan PSG which was negotiated under the Kofi Annan Foundation in 2008, and found that it succeeded in reversing the short-term problem of post-election violence; nonetheless, the actors to the PSG failed to deal with the core issues that led to the violence.

Available studies have not given much attention to the PSG in Uganda. Instead, they focus on other issues such as extended incumbency as a possible source of despotism (Kahyana 2015:503); ethnicity and tribalism (Somerville 2009:528); state-sponsored violence (Kraetzschmar and Cavatorta 2010:327); corruption and election violence (Omotola, 2010:3); and, political behaviour and election violence (Batty 2015:379). A few studies have investigated the PSG experiment in Uganda (such as Hansen 2013; Cheeseman 2011; Somerville 2009; and Traniello 2008) but have not assessed its potential in preventing post-election violence yet that would contribute to filling the gap in the existing literature on election violence since 2001. Therefore, this study seeks to investigate the potential of the PSG (by con-sociational model) in preventing post-election violence in Uganda.

OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY

The outcomes presented in this article are premised on a single objective which sought to examine the potential of the PSG approach in preventing post-election violence in Uganda. The objective was examined using four study questions, *viz.*: (a) Does a coalition of leaders have the authority to bargain in the national interest? (b) How can a joint veto be adopted to lessen majority influence by allowing minority groups to prevent a change in policy? (c) How can proportional representation go beyond the electoral system in a divided country? And (d) what is the potential of distributing key positions in the national military?

METHODOLOGY

This study took a qualitative approach based on data from interviews conducted with selected participants in mid-western Uganda (Almalk 2016:291). Emphasis

was on gaining information about what stakeholders attribute to be the potential of PSG in thwarting post-election violence. The mid-western region was purposely selected seeing that it has a unique political history compared to other parts in the country. For example, the region experienced both primary colonialism by the British and secondary colonialism by Buganda who remain absentee landlords of vast lands. Consequently, the face-to-face interviews were conducted between November 2017 and March 2018 among 28 participants; these comprised of senior politicians, civil society activists and elders. Every participant was selected on the understanding that they had in-depth knowledge of the political path of Uganda. Four participants (two females and two males) were reached in each of the four districts purposely selected in the region, that is: Hoima, Kagadi, Kibaale, and Masindi. All the participants had considerable experience and exposure at national level, and could respond based on personal understanding of the PSG approach. Two participants were reached in each of the four civil society organisations (one in each participating district) and one elder in each of the districts. All interviews were semi-structured and the investigative issues were presented based on personal interviews with participants although they were not disaggregated on the basis of district.

OUTCOMES – ADOPTING A PSG BY CON-SOCIATION IN UGANDA

The search to adopt PSG in preventing post-election violence in Uganda is presented based on themes emerging from the con-sociational approach with a view to allow for a sequential process regarding: Increased authority of a coalition to bargain in the national interest, adopting a joint veto to lessen majority influence by allowing minority groups to prevent a change in policy, using proportional representation to go beyond the electoral system, and the potential of distributing key positions in the national military.

Increasing the authority of a coalition to bargain in the national interest

A number of political parties and/or presidential candidates (particularly Kizza Besigye and Amama Mbabazi) have challenged election outcomes since 2001 on the notion of either perceived or real election-related violence. In some cases, key opposition candidates have been put under house arrest after concluding presidential polls. In reaction, both international and regional peace-lovers have proposed embracing PSG to facilitate continuity of government and to prevent falling into post-election violence through a win-win or win-lose situation. Debates

on the pros and cons of the PSG approach have come to the fore in a number of political or quasi-political forums. While there are several claims presented by optimists of PSG, there have also been several reservations presented by pessimists as rebuttal to the adoption of PSG. Each of the groups propose a number of issues that are potential to the PSG in Uganda, as presented in the preceding sections.

Cooperation is one of the useful approaches in democratising Uganda; through con-sociational approach it can facilitate national interest. Bargaining for the PSG can guarantee that no ethnic group dictates the politico-economic and socio-cultural aspects under Uganda's multi-ethnic society. This arises from realising that Uganda is a multi-ethnic society and has had a small number of ethnic groups dominating the politico-economic space during the post-independence era; especially those in south western, central, and mid-northern regions. Since political power is linked to economic success, political dominance leads to economic dominance. The participants note that political dominance tolerates the ruling class to control many and varied elements leading to a decline in the provision of political goods including services, jobs, tenders and contracts, and other social benefits such as higher education and training in scarce skills. This coheres with what previous studies have revealed (Tangri and Mwenda 2008; Odokonyero 2011). Consequently, cooperation is professed to have the prospect to thwart ethnic dominance both at the executive and legislative level as noted by one participant:

> *"The anxiety of individuals with influence in the executive and the legislature can be controlled using a conscious PSG. While ethnic uncertainty can be built on the fear of dominion, a coalition of leaders can lead to a decline in the concentration of such fear,"* (Participant; Masindi).

Notwithstanding the view that the authority of the state in influencing fiscal strategy and in allocating resources puts it in a very influential position; a coalition of leaders can influence it to become less-involved among key political issues, rather being concentrated in the hands of a few influential members of the ruling party. Consequently, a coalition can promote the financial system in which the state hires a number of citizens from outside the party faithful to become effective compared to the state which has a single dominant party. For example, the participants noted that the executive authority of Uganda has become so powerful that it has overshadowed the Parliament in terms of legislation. It was also noted that in the interest of the state:

> *"Uganda can do better under a coalition of leaders, as both the executive and the legislature would not only be balanced but they would become more focused than is the case at the moment,"* (Participant; Kagadi).

This leads to the second view; the perceived widening of the multi-ethnic space as a result of the perceived multinational space in ethnically polarised communities hence leading to ethnic security among those ethnic groups that hitherto felt discriminated against. Participants noted that a coalition of leaders can accommodate a large number of multi-ethnic communities in positions of greater national significance, such as finance, defence and security, agriculture, and education. This allows a diversity of ideas to be generated from clusters using the multi-ethnic method, and to move into the apparatus of the state. In addition, participants noted that political and financial accountability can be addressed using coalitions, which, although not based on compromise, can sustain the promising democratic governance and reduce chances of democratic vulnerability. Regarding multi-ethnicity, one participant noted that:

> "Ugandan society, which has several ethnicities which can be segregated under fewer than ten ethnic divisions, would adopt coalitions as a sine quo non to greater socio-economic and political achievements of a united country," (Participant; Hoima).

A third view supporting leadership coalitions in Uganda is the likelihood to enrich democratisation in government. One of the crises of governance in the country, regardless of its wide-ranging devotion to the precepts of recognised democracy, is the perceived control of power by the ruling party and shortage of representatives from opposition in a number of political spaces. It is noted that coalitions in Uganda can succeed in dealing with tribal polarisation, which is perceived to be affecting the country in many aspects ranging from the military, civil-service, to political appointments in favour of the ruling party. This view supports an observation by Okurut (2015) regarding the same from 1962. One participant noted that:

> "I have seen a situation where children from certain tribes, unless their parents belong to the inner circles of the Ruling Party, cannot be shortlisted for any civil-service job interview," (Participant; Buliisa).

The above view suggests that Uganda is politically polarised, something that corresponds with the one-party dominance. This view further reveals that the passion of the ruling party to hold onto power to shield the perceived group in top leadership, translates into unsuccessful downward accountability. Thus,

> "Failure to have downward accountability can be solved through a formal coalition on condition that neither of the parties will have the benefit of dominance nor isolation from key political spaces and policy-making processes," (Participant, Hoima).

The above was underscored by the development partners regarding accountability systems in the country (Emorut 2016).

The fourth view of coalition is that it can let opponents of the ruling party get into proper government; meaning something that can prevent government from having the excuse that it is under attack and the rival claiming that its followers are politically discriminated against. With the different parties in the national executive, unity can be attained based on compromise as noted by one participant:

> *"When a government is formed on a coalition; pressure and accusations or counter-accusations are tamed, since every participant focuses on the electorate and service delivery, than what the other is not capable of doing right,"* (Participant, Kibaale).

Another participant said:

> *"Political parties have come together in form of the Inter-party organisation and development (IPOD) however, this structure falls since other stakeholders are not represented and only parties having representatives in Parliament qualify."* (Participant, Masindi).

A set of five issues were identified to support a formal coalition in Uganda, *viz.*:

- A few ethnic groups will be denied the opportunity to dictate every aspect in the politico-economic and socio-cultural spaces of the country;
- Authority of the state will become participatory among key political actors rather than being concentrated in a few influential members of the ruling party.
- The coalition will attract a multitude of multi-ethnic groups to key portfolios such as finance, defence and security, home affairs, agriculture, foreign affairs, and local governance.
- The process of democratisation will be enriched through a government of national unity.
- Opponents of the ruling party will attend official government meetings thereby contributing to national development as citizens rather than political parties.

The above suggestions speak to the tenets of a con-sociational approach, which is suitable for a PSG in Uganda, since increased authority of a coalition will facilitate bargaining in the national interest rather than few representatives of ethnic groups; a joint veto, in the form of popular involvement, will minimise majority influence by allowing minority groups to prevent a change in policy; proportional representation will guarantee a broad-based government between elections thereby replacing descent with compromise; and, the distribution of key positions in the

national military will reduce the higher expenditure on defence and security due to increased national patriotism.

Adopting a joint veto to lessen majority influence by allowing minority groups to prevent a change in national policy

While there is no doubt about the presence of veto, this power is dominated by top officials in government and/or the ruling party. Adopting a joint veto suggests a strategy aimed to allow views from minority groups into the ultimate policy. Consequently, four potential factors support adoption of a joint veto, as it facilitates: civic education, citizen empowerment, international collaboration, and use of institutional strength.

Civic education, rather than voter education, is one of the measures which:

- Enables both existing voters and potential voters who can identify quality leaders without being influenced by platforms of political parties besides reducing majority influence.
- Facilitates citizen empowerment as well as allowing existing and potential electorate to select future leaders on the basis of national issues.
- Allows the voters to veto national issues rather than being influenced by political parties. This view was emphasised by a participant:

> *"Civic education allows voters to desist from being threatened by the security agencies which have become a key player in the political landscape of Uganda. Civic education facilitates the voter to extend the same information to family members as a consequence, building a stronger political capital that can veto political power."* (Participant, Kakumiro)

Citizen empowerment is synonymous with social investment as well as a correlate of socio-economic and/or political participation. It brings positive implications for governance processes by encouraging minority voices to speak up against marginalisation by political elites along with preventing arbitrary change in national policy. Consequently, when citizens take part in vetoing, governance processes become more effective and efficient. One of the mechanisms through which citizen empowerment can work is monitoring of every government programme; this translates to better citizen welfare as noted by one participant:

> *"When citizens are empowered to take part in governance processes as a group, a number of socio-economic and political pitfalls can be identified and corrected since an empowered citizenry is a prevailing citizenry which cannot easily be compromised by majority influence in the name of political parties or elites."* (Participant, Hoima)

A different perception is that citizen empowerment is a positive form – and disempowerment is a negative form of social capital; hence preference to majority against minority. This understanding can be a spectrum to lessening majority influence as it allows minority groups to prevent change in policy for a common good. Citizen empowerment brings about an essential value which acknowledges intrinsic value in other individuals as a key factor to making decisions affecting development of a country or part of it. While citizen empowerment involves an integral value, a participant noted:

> *"We, as the voters, can mobilise ourselves, using our small numbers, without any form of inducement not only to participate in elections but to guarantee that our vote counts,"* (Participant, Hoima).

Another participant put it that:

> *"Even if we are very few under the secret ballot, through universal adult suffrage, we can ensure that no political party sways anyone outside official programmes and policies which contribute to the sustainable welfare of citizens,"* (Participant, Masindi).

Citizen empowerment is central to setting a desired but positive political climate where there is inclusion of every political player as opposed to favouring only the majority. When citizens are empowered, through legislation and practice, it becomes harder for majority groups to undermine them as the best practices will overshadow any effort to promote political dominance. This view was raised by a participant who noted that:

> *"As an electorate, we need to be empowered in every aspect of our lives, but we should also be empowered in the political realm; by so doing, we facilitate the process of distributing key factors of development in our country such as infrastructural projects and industrial parks,"* (Participant, Kibaale).

This view illustrates how an empowered citizen is a free-thinker who is liberated from political prejudices, aimed to benefit a select cohort at the expense of society.

International collaboration is presented as a correlate to regional bodies such as the African Union and East African Community (EAC). This facilitates member states to nurture common values which can act as a mechanism for realising peaceful regime change. While international collaboration is a promising mechanism among nations in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), it has produced

dismal results for EAR given the recurring conditions in all except two member states (Kenya and Tanzania). International collaboration can be a useful mechanism in a number of cases, and can facilitate similar processes in other regions when minority groups are permitted and listened to as a participant noted:

> "Commitment calls for consistent democratic values across the bloc such as presidential term limits and multiparty political system which is not achievable seeing a number of national leaders are not willing to take the democratic path," (Participant, Kagadi).

It can be noted that incumbent presidents who have relinquished power have done so due to the effectiveness of both majority and minority influence. For example, when opposition parties are prepared and cohesive, or when international partners use aid to demand democratisation, an incumbent can find it easier to surrender power. This reveals that the non-existence of such an environment and/or influence results in the establishment of President-For-Life (PFL). On the one hand, international collaboration is a potential alternative which can be adopted to balance civic education and citizen empowerment in young democracies like Uganda. On the other hand:

> "Uganda, which is donor-dependent, needs influence from the international donors as regards its democratic path since Donors giving support to finance a large portion of the national budget, encourage undeserved rulers to remain in office," (Participant, Kibaale).

Institutional force can be applied against incumbents who lose elections but decline to hand over power. While peaceful means to conflict resolution is favoured as opposed to use of force, institutional force can be applied as one of the mechanisms for compelling incumbents to leave power through PSG platforms of big and small parties. For example, the former President of Sudan (Omar al Bashir) was forced out of office by united groups of political parties and professionals:

> "While it is widely known that President al Bashir was very powerful, the use of joint citizen force compelled him to surrender the office," (Participant, Masindi).

In sum, allowing civic education, citizen empowerment, international collaboration, and use of institutional force fulfils the tenets of a con-sociational approach, which is suitable for a PSG in Uganda; by bargaining in the interest of the state and/or creating a joint veto aimed to enhance majority influence; thereby disallowing the majority to have absolute power over policy remains pertinent in Uganda.

Using proportional representation to rise above the electoral system

The system of proportional representation allows every political party that contests for power to have a share in the National Legislature (NL). Countries that have embraced the system, such as South Africa, have maintained the balance of power since every leader of the political party that takes part and wins a measure of votes is assured a seat in the NL (Farrell 2001). Consequently, the present system of multiparty democracy that was embraced by the citizens of Uganda through the 2005 national referendum is default. Uganda adopted a first-past-post-system, which suggests that despite having a few members in the NL as well as the local government councils, the system does not respect the performance of individual presidential candidates. According to a participant:

> *"If Uganda adopts proportional representation, every political sphere will be represented in the NL by its finest candidates,"* (Participant, Kagadi).

A different participant noted that

> *"Instead of having losing presidential candidates being left outside the NL, proportional representation can guarantee such members sit in the house and argue their policy alternatives therein,"* (Participant, Hoima).

Another participant said

> *"Proportional representation is notable because the NL becomes the battlefield for every political party with a proportionate number; implying that the overall policy outcome becomes a reflection of national consensus rather [than] a dominant position of the ruling party which controls the NL,"* (Participant, Masindi).

Proportional representation creates an assembly that is representative enough to reflect the support various parties enjoy from the voters since the voters have a preference of choosing one party. This fulfils the tenets of a con-sociational approach which is suitable for Uganda seeing that a number of good leaders are left out as a result of first-past-the-post system rather than distributing roles of governance.

The potential of distributing key positions in the national military

The first potential is that it can attend to some of the essential issues relating to post-election violence. This reveals a loose link between citizens and the military, which according to one participant

"Brings about consistent conclusions of human rights courts, human rights bodies and other human rights organisations with a pseudo-adjudicative function," (Participant, Hoima).

The political analysists besides the political observers will respect electoral processes and the electoral outcomes. It can be suggested that

"Such jurisprudent reactions lead to a new era which can initiate further a holistic relationship between human rights law and the politico-administrative structure," (Participant, Masindi).

A study by Odhiambo (2010:145:149) attests to the above in elections of both Kenya (2007) and Zimbabwe (2008).

Anxious communities desire equity in the distribution of key positions in the military; thus disallowing payoffs for both potential and existing radicals to launch violence against the state. Equitable distribution of positions in the military is preferred as a means of serving part of the populace that are perceived to be discriminated against, including issues of gender differences, as earlier revealed by Yeung *et al.* (2017:7).

"This strategy is favoured as an entry point which aims to avert perceived personal interests as well as strengthening the public claims," (Participant, Hoima).

Although equitable distribution is likely to prevent 'deals' within a small favoured group of individuals, which can prevent re-emergence of certain patterns of post-election violence within the nation's military establishment, Hippler (2008) reveals contradictions in the military institution. These are likely to impact on the success of PSG by con-sociation.

"Failure to bring on board all stakeholders in key positions of the military leads to certain elements therein turning to traditional means to achieve a measure of order," (Participant, Kagadi).

The outcomes presented above corroborate the inclination towards fair distribution of national values whose goal is to benefit the wider public rather than national leaders, thus fulfilling the con-sociational approach. From the findings, it is clear that a PSG con-sociation can benefit Uganda by; increasing the authority of a coalition to bargain in the national interest, facilitating adoption of a joint veto to lessen majority influence by allowing minority groups to prevent a change in policy, aiding proportional representation to go beyond the electoral system, and allowing the distribution of key positions in the national military.

DISCUSSION

In seeking the potential of the PSG by con-sociational approach to prevent post-election violence in Uganda, the study probed four aspects: a coalition of leaders bargaining in the interest of the state; a joint veto lessening majority influence in policy; proportional representation in a divided society; and distributing key positions in the military. While it is revealed that proportional representation would facilitate in the distribution of national values, that formula can hamper local responsibility of representatives in a governmental setting in which the administration fails to accommodate checks by representatives on the opposition; as is the case with Rwanda (Stroh 2010). The outcomes demonstrate the need for PSG by con-sociation as the coalition has authority to bargain in the national interest; that way, the study is supportive of the views held by Nassor and Jose (2014). Further, the outcomes support Cheeseman (2011) on establishing an inclusive government; Chigora and Guzura (2011) on holding every actor in the structures of government; Hansen (2013) on PSG as a constructive action to democracy in ending post-election violence and restoring the rule of law.

It is revealed that a joint veto is a positive aspect of PSG by con-sociation thus supporting Cooper and Hurley (1983) who established that governmental veto epitomises an adaptive reaction to protracted tensions in the administrative structure of the state. While the official strategy of veto power is important, McCulloch and Vandegiste (2019) emphasise the need for regulation to avoid misusing veto privileges, an issue likely to interrupt the operations of Con-sociational approach. The outcomes do not support the views held by Somerville (2009) regarding the possibility to thwart election violence. As a result, PSG by con-sociation is designed to last longer than ending post-election violence. This is possible when the voters select the actors to the PSG and ensure strength of the implementation system through a win-win situation.

CONCLUSION

This article aimed to examine the potential of PSG by con-sociation to preventing post-election violence in Uganda. In attempting to do so, four questions were answered: (a) Does a coalition of leaders have the authority to bargain in the national interest? (b) How can a joint veto be adopted to lessen majority influence by allowing minority groups to prevent a change in policy? (c) How can proportional representation go beyond the electoral system in a divided country? And (d) what is the potential of distributing key positions in the national military? From the outcomes generated using personal interviews, the study concludes that, regular elections alone cannot be relied upon to ensure non-violence in the political path of Uganda,

at least for the future. This calls for a PSG, to be weaved along a Con-sociational approach. The assumption of this article, from a number of interviews, is that PSG by con-sociation has the potential to prevent post-election violence in Uganda when; a coalition of leaders bargain in the national interest, a joint veto is used to disallow majority influence to change the policy, proportional representation is applied, and the key positions in the national military are distributed with equity.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The findings of this study suggest that:

- A strategy needs to be adopted on how leaders, including political, civic and religious, can use a variety of fora to bargain in the interest of every citizen.
- A mechanism should be developed towards a joint veto, above the current IPOD, aimed to lessen majority influence by allowing minority groups to veto a change in every policy.
- The NL can adopt proportional representation both within the electoral system and other forums, such as opportunities in the civil service.
- The system of recruiting potential candidates to the national security forces at every district can be enhanced by distributing key positions in both the national military and the police force.

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Overcoming the Uneasy Political and Administrative Interrelationship for Effective Governance in a Municipality

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ABSTRACT

This article analyses the relationship between councillors and appointed officials at the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality in the Eastern Cape, and its effect on service delivery and governance. Section 151(2) of the *Constitution of the Republic of South Africa*, 1996 (Act No. 108 of 1996) (the Constitution, 1996) provides a municipal council with both legislative and executive powers. It also envisages a working relationship between elected councillors and appointed administrative officials in local government. The dichotomy of strictly classical political administration has been a challenging endeavour, especially within local government. Thus, in exercising political oversight, the council needs to build a relationship of reciprocal coexistence with the professional administration to manage effective policy-making, policy implementation and public service provision. An analysis of literature and empirical research of the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality points to a fragmented public service system that has blurred lines between functional competencies and Human Resource Management (HRM). Furthermore, the uneasy political and administrative relationship seems to be further complicated by party-political contestations and the politicisation of the administration, as politicians interfere in the appointment of officials. This article contributes to the debate on the effects of the uneasy political and administrative relationship on a local government level. It contends that the cadre deployment strategy of the African National

Congress (ANC) contributes to the uneasy political administrative relations in municipalities. The article suggests that a single professional public service could improve the working relationship between elected councillors and appointed administrative officials.

INTRODUCTION

The Constitution, 1996, as amended, clearly outlines the roles, functions and responsibilities of both politicians and administrators in governing and administering the country effectively and efficiently. However, South African municipalities experience serious challenges in dealing with the interface between politicians and appointed officials. Inappropriate political interference in administrative matters and strained relations between key political and administrative officials are a daily occurrence on a municipal level. Municipalities handle delivering the basic services needed to reduce the high levels of poverty in the country. However, most municipalities have not been successful in this regard. Politicking and inappropriate interference in municipal administration has been the root cause of most municipalities' failure to deliver public services.

Although the political-administrative interface is a small component of a well-functioning government system, it plays a key role within the local government sphere. Tensions tend to arise between elected representatives, politicians and appointed administrators where there are overlapping functions or ill-defined roles. In South Africa, the situation is often exacerbated by party-political processes within local government. This is mainly ascribed to a lack of separation of powers between legislative and executive authority on a local government level. The major challenge in local government is that both politicians and administrators interfere in each other's roles and responsibilities, which results in major conflict in municipalities. This leads to frustration among municipality staff, since they are unable to fulfil their daily duties without interference.

The Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality is an example of a municipality that has been affected political-administrative challenges. This has resulted in administrative instability, with negative effect on governance and service delivery. In this regard, the Public Service Commission (PSC) (2014) notes that there should be a focus on building a professional public service that serves Government but is sufficiently autonomous to be insulated from political patronage. Furthermore, it argues that focus on skills and professionalism will be ineffective unless the political-administrative interface is clarified to ensure a clearer separation between the roles of the political principal and the administrative head. Despite the

measure of granted constitutional autonomy, the cadre deployment policy suggests an attempt by the National Government to subject municipalities to central party pressure and control. This article contributes to the debate on the challenges posed by an unclear delineation of administrative and political functions and the subsequent effects on the interrelationships in local government. The analysis of the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality supplies a practical representation of the uneasy relationship between politicians and administrators. The authors suggest the need to professionalise local government administration and to foster a single public service in the country.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITICIANS AND ADMINISTRATORS IN GOVERNMENT

As a tier of government, local government focuses local activities in relation to national policies and the provision of local services. In addition, it includes the relationships between political office-bearers and administrative officials in making and implementing local decisions (Pretorius 2017:1). Such relationships – whether underscored by ideological contestation or by a manifestation of the classical administration-politics dichotomy – have theoretical and practical significance in public administration due to the important role of local government (Jacobsen 2001:5).

Miller and McTavish (2009:56) define the 'political-administrative interface' as "the intersection of leadership roles within a tradition of a dichotomous relationship between political and administrative realms". According to Overeem (2008:36), "…nothing is more central in thinking about public administration than the nature of interrelatedness of politics and administration. Nor are the nature of interrelations of politics and administration matters only for academic theorising. What is important in the day-to-day…operation of government than ways in which politics and administration are conceptualised, rationalised and related one to the other?" Although this definition implies that the roles of elected and appointed politicians are traditionally distinct from those of professional and career civil servants, this distinction is becoming increasingly blurred as the roles intersect at certain points in real life. Surty (2010:33) states that the relationship between politicians and administrators as generally underpinned by an undefined interface of guidelines, norms and values that the two groups have to employ and adhere. Therefore, where the political-administration interrelation is undefined in relation to certain fields of activities, the values and norms associated with the roles and responsibilities of the functionaries may serve as guidelines.

The 'politics-administration interface' also refers to the link between politics and administration. In this regard, the current study aims to establish the lines

of demarcation between these two spheres (Shazi 2016:1). In his theory of bureaucracy, Weber (1980) played a pioneering role in outlining the significance and conceptual foundations of the political-administrative interface. Weber (1980) argued that, to foster an effective relationship between politicians and administrators, there should be clear terms for roles and responsibilities. This view is based on Weber's (1980) conviction that bureaucrats (administrators) are supposed to be politically neutral, as their main role is to provide technical, non-partisan advice to politicians and execute decisions to the best professional standard. Thus, both in theory and in practice, the political-administrative interface is one of the most complex relationships to manage in any public institution.

The political-administration interface in South African local government

De Visser (2010:90) states that the lack of clarity about the division of roles and responsibilities between politicians and administrators often undermines the stability of leadership and management at a local government level. As a result, the political-administrative interface is characterised by tension and transgression of recognised roles and responsibilities. Often, administrative officials in local government are also office-bearers in the political parties contesting for power. This bias result in conflict in the day-to-day execution of duties between administrative officials and councillors (De Visser 2010:90).

Ngamlana-Guwa (2010:1) states that one of the reasons for a lack of differentiation between politics and administration at a local government level can be attributed to the pre-1994 culture and values of political activism. In a young democracy like South Africa, most people still carry political patronage or partisanship. Ngamlana-Guwa (2010:1) argues that nowadays, it appears to be beneficial to be politically active in one way or another. Also, the author argues that the notion of political patronage and partisanship among municipal administrators in policy making is inevitable (Ngamlana-Guwa 2010:1).

In addition to their roles as policy implementers, administrative officials play a key role in policy-making (Nzo 2011:36). Instead of being pre-occupied with gaining a dominant position in policy-making, politicians and appointed officials should exercise authority along with other actors, including the private sector and citizens (Bovaird and Loeffler 2009:398). Public servants, including municipal administrative officials, must be impartial in implementing government policies, programmes and projects (Pretorius 2017:212). Van Niekerk, Van der Walt and Jonker (2001:171) state that there are certain overlaps between different roles and responsibilities with regard to government functions. As a result, it is not always possible to separate administrative and political activities. In this regard, Miller and McTavish (2013:85) state that politics and administration are

intimately bound together and cannot be neatly or easily separated, as envisaged in the classical Wilsonian dichotomous relationship (especially at a local government level).

Wilson's Politics-Administration Dichotomy Theory

Wilson's 1887 essay, *"The Study of Administration"*, paved the way for social scientists to start investigating the relationship between politics and administration. Wilson (1887) outlined what later became known as Politics-Administration Dichotomy, a theoretical model that emphasises distinct functions of the public administration *vis-à-vis* politics. Politics-Administration Dichotomy theory rests on a functional-structural view of government, dividing governmental authority between elected representatives and administrative officials along functional lines. Wilson stressed that government is conceptualised as two discrete domains. Furthermore, the author argued that administration should be treated separately from politics because, "Administration lies outside the proper sphere of politics and that administrative question is not political question" (Issa 2016:174).

The debate among politics and administration theorists and local government practitioners has mostly centred on whether politics can be separated from administration and which key variables have affect the relationship between politics and administration (Tahmasebi and Musavi 2011:141). Some public administration practitioners and theorists such as Appleby (1949) note that the institutional arrangements of various political dispensations with different historical, cultural, geographical, situational and traditional variations have often managed to bridge the gap between politics and administration. Furthermore, these arrangements have significantly affected the relationship between political institutions and administrative operations (Gustira 2012). According to Tahmasebi and Musavi (2011:135), this has been used to further support criticism against the Political-Administrative Dichotomy Theory.

The political-administrative dichotomy was a conceptual distinction underlying a theory of democratic accountability. It was not intended to guide behaviour. Rather, it was intended as a behavioural prescription directed against contemporary practices of 'machine politics'. It is not conceptually possible to have a one-way dichotomy that keeps elected officials from being involved in administrative activities but allows administrators to be active in policy-making process. Therefore, a strictly Political-Administrative Dichotomy Model is impossible to implement (Svara 1998:51).

In addition to the criticism of the Political-Administrative Dichotomy Theory, developments in Public Administration Theory and Practice over the years have contributed to changes in the landscape of political-administrative

relations (Tahmasebi and Musavi, 2011:141). Recent literature on Public Administration and Management tends to emphasise the inter-connectedness, rather than the separation of, several actors. Thus, the way policies are formulated, are implemented and are evaluated, have changed from a strictly Weberian, Wilsonian and Hegelian bureaucratic dichotomy to a hybrid type of working practice. An increasing number of hybrid models, such as the Dichotomy-Duality Model have emerged in recent years. Key aspects of this model are discussed below.

Dichotomy-Duality Model

The Dichotomy-Duality Model is based on the notion that political and administrative office-bearers, along with other stakeholders, can work together in pursuit of good governance (Svara 2001 in Ndudula 2013:17). Svara (1999:648) states that the role of the administrative framework in the political process is a key issue in defining the scope and nature of public administration. The Dichotomy-Duality Model supports overlapping roles and mutual influence between elected and administrative officials, as well as other stakeholders, with regard to policy and administration. As such, public administrators are encouraged to assume a broader and more active role in the policy-making process. The Dichotomy-Duality Model offers a positive approach to examining the distinct contribution of political office-bearers and public servants to the democratic process. In this regard, elected officials continue to keep their rights in terms of formal policy-making and mission-formulation, which are two major tasks considered in the domain of politics.

However, critics of this approach question whether the Dichotomy-Duality Model gives administrators the opportunity to become involved in policy-making but prohibits elected council members from interfering in administrative management. This question is asked because, although the Politics-Administration Dichotomy Model could be understood to prohibit managers from venturing into the political side of policy-making, in reality these actors do so because of the advisory role they assume in the process (Montjoy and Watson 1995). In South Africa, this inter-connectedness and inter-dependency are illustrated by high-level politicians who depend on administrators to provide expert advice on policy-making. At the same time, politicians believe that it is their responsibility to exercise direct oversight and administrative control to ensure that implementation takes place in accordance with their party's policy objectives. Thus, the Dichotomy-Duality Model demonstrates the challenge of clearly separating roles in a political-administrative interface. Likewise, legislative stipulations do not always succeed in delineating these functions in practice.

LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR A POLITICAL-ADMINISTRATIVE INTERFACE IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT

The South African local government sphere entered a new era after the adoption of the Constitution, 1996. On a statutory level, municipalities were recognised as a constituent part of local government (Venter, Van der Walt, Phutiagae, Khalo, Van Niekerk and Nealer 2007:15). (The South African co-operative government structure includes the national, provincial and local spheres of government). Other key documents that prescribe the role of municipalities include the White Paper on Local Government (1998), the Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 and the Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998.

The Constitution, 1996, provides for the regulation of municipal administration in two ways. Firstly, it outlines the 'autonomy' of a municipality's internal affairs. Secondly, it supports a set of values and principles that guide municipal administration. The Constitution, 1996, requires municipalities to ensure that municipal services are delivered in a sustainable way. Section 151(2) of the Constitution, 1996, provides a level of power to both the executive and the legislative authority in the municipal council, unlike at the national sphere where there is a separation of powers and functions between the legislature and the executive. Section 178(1) of the Constitution, 1996, stipulates that local government must ensure that its administration is based on sound public administration principles, good governance and public accountability so as to render efficient services to the persons within its area of jurisdiction and effective administration of its affairs.

Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000

Section 53 of the Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 outlines the roles and responsibilities of politicians, political structures and municipal managers. Furthermore, it aims to clarify the duties of the municipal council, the municipal administration and local communities. Section 56 of the Act also outlines statutory provisions for the appointment of senior administrators. It clarifies the obligations of different parties and outlines important steps that should be taken to strengthen the democratic contract at the local level.

Notably, the Act addresses the issue of political interference in the civil service. More specifically, it refers to so-called 'cadre deployment'. In terms of the Act, municipal and senior managers are prohibited from serving in top positions in party structures on a regional, provincial or national level. There is an ongoing debate on whether senior administrative officials should be appointed based on loyalty to the political party in power to drive party agenda, or be appointed on pure merit to create a neutral administrative public service. Current legislative

instruments have not managed to settle this argument. This complicates issues on a local government sphere, where senior officials have hiring and firing authority over administrative staff.

The Local Government: Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998

The Local Government Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998 focuses on clarifying and strengthening the role of political and administrative leadership. The Act defines a municipality as an organ of state within the local sphere of government that consists of political structures office bearers that are responsible for the administration of the municipality, a geographical area and the community (Venter *et al.* 2007:5). The Act is designed to ensure the establishment of more representative and focused political structures with significant powers. Section 56 of the Act outlines the distinct powers and functions of the politicians and administrators (Mavhivha 2007:16).

Ideally, the Act seeks to create a harmonious relationship environment between municipal officials, the council, councillors and local communities by acknowledging complementary reciprocal rights and duties. Despite these legislative ideals, the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality is one of several municipalities with an uneasy relationship between councillors as politicians and appointed officials. Often, this situation is fuelled by party-political contestation.

Party-political and political-administrative contestations in local government

According to Overeem (2008:37), classical theorists such as Waldo (1887) believed that, "…the process of government analytically considered, consists of two parts only, decision and execution". The distinction between the functions of politicians and administrators presents several challenges in practice. In a constitutional democratic local government, politics and administration may be separated and fused simultaneously. This makes it difficult to have a complete separation of powers between decision-making and executive functions. Political contestation in such a situation could lead to functionaries competing by posing power against power.

Furthermore, the interface between political parties and the municipality on the one hand, and between the political and administrative parts of the municipality on the other, is a complex matter. 'Marrying' political goals and state priorities leads to political party contestation in municipal councils. In practice, this means that the municipality's administration has the difficult task of pushing a governmental agenda, while also advancing a political agenda by aligning the municipal resolutions with the priorities of the majority political party within the

municipal council. The key issue here is that any dominant political party in a municipality may be tempted to use that power to its advantage. In practical terms, the municipal budget (drawn by the administration) would mirror and address the political objectives of the majority party. This sometimes leads to role confusion, which in turn could lead to the abuse of state power and/or resources to pursue party-political interests.

The uneasy interrelationship between the political and administrative domains in the South Africa Public Service, in general, and local government service delivery, in particular, seems to be rooted in the apartheid era (Reddy 2016:5). Public servants of the apartheid regime were politically trained to serve the interests of the minority apartheid Government (Ndudula 2013:2). Hence, the politicisation of the South African Public Service can be traced to the rise of the National Party (NP) Government in 1948 (Mafunisa 2010:553). The NP staffed senior public service position with loyal party members who were willing to promote apartheid policy (Mafunisa 2010:553). Ironically, the apartheid civil service regarded itself as functioning according to the values of political impartiality and administrative competence (Cameron 2010:663). In its attempt to address the injustices of the past, the post-apartheid Government has unfortunately promoted the same values, even if unconsciously so.

Apart from the Western Cape, Tshwane, Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay Metros which are controlled by opposition parties, mainly the Democratic Alliance (DA), the majority of municipal councils in South Africa are controlled by South Africa's ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC). The ANC has tended to use its national power to contest election results in municipalities where they do not control the council. One such policy that the ANC has implemented relates to the 'spoils system', whereby party cadre deployment has become the norm. The spoils system has helped the appointment of ANC cadres in senior positions within municipalities' administrative arms. This created uneasy relationships when the ANC lost control of four major municipal metros in the 2016 Local Government Elections. Subsequently, cadres who were deployed often compete for political power with the newly elected officials in DA-controlled municipalities.

The major challenge in local government is that both politicians and administrators interfere in one another's roles and responsibilities, which leads to conflict and frustration among municipal staff. According to Spies (2018) the DA-led coalition government in Nelson Mandela Bay is facing its biggest battle to date, after a high-level delegation of senior members from the City's opposition parties met to discuss removing the coalition from power. The underlying politicisation of municipal administration due to nepotism, cronyism and cadre deployment by the ANC has been described as the root cause of mistrust in the municipality.

Party-political contestations and relationships between councillors and administrators in the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality

Political contestation leads to interference with functions and general mistrust, which has contributed to a problematic political-administrative interface. Many political commentators have asserted that these tend to have negative impact on service provision in the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality. Trust is one of the values that is deemed necessary to facilitate a productive working relationship between politicians and administrators in government. However, the contestation for power in the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality has resulted in tension and an uneasy relationship (Maqoko 2014:7). Whenever there is distrust between politicians and administrators, there is always a tendency to hold back vital information from one another, especially if such information is perceived to be politically valuable or harmful (Jacobsen 1999:839).

With the statutory recognition of the local sphere of government in the Constitution, 1996, municipalities as constituents of local government have become important in theory and in practice. However, political party contestation and the subsequent uncomfortable political-administrative interface have shifted the focus from quality service delivery to party ideology favouring local political elite. Many of Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality's challenges have been due to political parties that undermine the integrity and functioning of municipal councils through intra- and inter-party conflict that spill over into unnecessary interference in councils and administration.

Councillors' political interference in municipal administration has become a complex issue. In certain instances, councillors act on calls that relate to issues falling within the exclusive mandate of municipal departments. Often, councillors intervene in administrative procedures, causes a major conflict within the municipality. A study by Maqoko (2014) found that often councillors do not have the necessary insight into the type of situations that warrant intervention. In this regard, it should be understood that the politics and administration of local government should be based on citizens' needs, instead of councillors putting pressure on administrative officials to act in the interest of particular constituencies.

Managing the political-administrative interface within local government for effective service delivery

In South Africa, the existing framework of statutory law on the local sphere of government provides for a degree of separation between the legislative and executive authorities of the municipal government. In practice, it is left to the municipalities to manage the potentially complex interrelationship.

An Overview Report on the State of Local Government in South Africa (2009) reveals that the local government is characterised by weaknesses in governance. A key point of contention is cadre appointment, where political affiliation becomes the basis for appointment and promotion. The Municipal Systems Act 32 2000 provides for the Council to appoint municipal managers and other senior managers, as Section 152 of the Constitution, 1996, states that the council possesses both legislative and executive authority. This constitutional provision implies that the council is the employer of all municipal staff. However, tensions surface when individual councillors or political parties interfere in these and other appointments.

As the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality was formerly an ANC constituency, cadre deployment has exacerbated the uneasy relationship between councillors and the administration. Due to party loyalty, ANC cadre appointees are accused of functioning under the direction of the party. The situation is further aggravated when a senior political office bearer is appointed as a municipal staff member, and in some cases where such an appointee outranks the mayor in the political party hierarchy. In these instances, the cadre appointee ends up taking instructions from the ANC, not the DA (Seale 2014).

Politically, the local government scene in South Africa is dominated by the ANC, which controls most municipalities. However, the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality is governed by a coalition government, including of the DA, the United Democratic Movement (UDM), the Congress of the People (COPE) and the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP).

In the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality, complaints of cadre deployment or the appointment of political sympathisers are not limited to the ANC. Since coming into power, the DA has been accused of firing and suspending administrative officials who were seen as cadre appointees and replacing them with officials sympathetic to the DA. Thus, the ANC has complained that the DA politically interferes with administrative matters by appointing officials based on political loyalty. The problem not only lies with the political appointment of administrative officials, as the regulations allow the appointment and dismissal of officials for operational reasons (LRA). Rather, it is the negative attitudes of politically appointed administrative officials who refuse to take directives from the legitimate authority or political interference in lines of authority which often create difficulties in relationships. This has a visibly negative effect on morale of public servants, which in turn undermines citizens' confidence in the local government (National Development Plan (NDP): Vision 2030 2012).

Other effects and manifestations of this uneasy relationship include councillors' inability to deal with the demands of local communities; poor accountability and inadequate accountability measures; substandard information dissemination; a lack of inter-local governmental relations; politically driven deals in administrative

matters that affect the enforcement of disciplinary measures against officials who have transgressed; insufficient separation of powers between political parties and municipal councils; poor financial management; weak relationships with civil society grouping (where these groups are perceived to be aligned to opposition parties) (Maqoko 2014:42).

The strained relationship between the ANC and the DA in the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality is not conducive to an organisational culture that promotes good governance, operational efficiency and performance excellence. Kathyola (2010) asserts that good governance requires the separation of political and administrative/ technical functions, while simultaneously ensuring a clear point of connection between the two, since both functions are mutually reinforcing. Blurred lines of functional competencies resulting from political contestation or in-fighting in both the council and between the council and the administrative arm could pose a challenge to good governance and service delivery in the municipality (Ngamlana-Guwa 2011)

Political infighting and related clashes between the political and management components in South African local government have had a detrimental effect on municipal service delivery (Reddy 2016:1). In any government context, including local government, politics sets the task for the administrative component. However, administration should not be driven by partisan patronage or electoral politics and South Africa is no exception (Booysen 2012; Cameron 2010; De Visser 2010; Rosenbloom 2008:57).

As South Africa is a young democracy (Ndudula 2013:3), the local sphere of government plays a crucial role in grass-roots governance and facilitating meaningful community participation in government matters. To realise the above developmental goals, political representatives and the professional administration should co-exist by distributing authority and responsibilities. Administrative theorists view this political-administrative distinction as artificial in nature (Cameron 2003:56). This article therefore suggests the idea of a single, professional South African Public Service that includes the local sphere of government in order to overcome the uneasy political and administrative interface that continues to plague municipalities.

The continuous challenges South African municipalities face in dealing with the interface between politicians and officials is reflected in Wilson's (1887) classical viewpoint that there should be a clear distinction between politics and administration. The civil services of most Western countries are based on this doctrine, which also underpins the councillor-officer relationship at a local level. However, it has not yet been proved whether a single public service could help overcome inappropriate political interference in administrative matters and strained relations between key political and administrative officials in the municipalities (Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA) 2012).

The assertion is that having civil servants appointed by one central body could mitigate fragmented and narrow political patronage, encourage functional differentiation and to a certain extent follow the characteristics of Weber's model of selecting civil servants.

Wilson's (1887) views focused on reducing corruption and on de-politicising political parties in administrative affairs, while retaining political and executive oversight of the political party in power over the administrative arm of government (Svara 1998 in Cameron). Thus, Wilson (1887) did not seek rigid political-administrative separation, nor the removal of the oversight authority of the political and executive arm. Such arrangements could be applicable within the South African municipal framework.

A single public service

On a theoretical level, dividing local government into political and administrative arms may be less problematic than separating them in practice. However, the core issue is not to supply a description of political or administrative functions. Rather, it is the attempt at rigid institutional separation, which underlies interference that creates uneasy relationships. Some classical theorists posit that, in a constitutional democracy, political and administrative functions be separated and related simultaneously instead of separating them into watertight compartments (Overeem 2008). Overcoming the uneasy political-administrative interface in local government should therefore not focus on what is a seemingly unsolvable problem. Rather, there should be a focus on finding ways to remedy strained relationships to improve services delivery. Creating single public service and the professionalisation of the public service are two possible solutions to reducing the uneasy relationship between political representatives and appointed administrative officers (Maqoko 2014).

Ka Plaatjies (2013) states that the South African Public Service is divided into three spheres: National, provincial and local government. However, the conditions of employment, norms and standards, salary scale and career pathing differ. Although they serve the same government and the same public, they are rewarded and acknowledged differently. At the moment, there are different pension schemes, medical aid schemes, bargaining processes, Information Technology (IT) and Human Resource (HR) systems in place, especially between local government and national government (Ka Plaatjies 2013).

The South African Public Service has a single employer (the State), while in local government, each municipality is an employer (Abraham, Fitzgerald and Cameron 2009:1047). Because the various systems are not aligned, a municipal employee can be charged and resign, only to be appointed at a national or provincial government department. A public service and local government

administration with harmonious systems, conditions of service and norms will reduce fragmentation and promote more efficient co-ordination between the different spheres of government (DPSA 2012). In line with this, former Minister of Public Service and Administration, Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi (2004), stated that integrating the public service and local government under the same legislative framework will strengthen co-ordination between the spheres of government, eliminate fragmentation and help facilitate seamless service delivery.

According to the DPSA (2012), state machinery across the three spheres of government needs to be strategically aligned and harmonised to complement one another. This will support government in effectively fulfilling its developmental state-related goals and solving challenges relating to service delivery. A single South African Public Service will create a common service delivery culture based on the *Batho Pele* principles across the three spheres of government. However, Levin (2004:12) cautions that the move towards a single public service should not be seen as an administrative process but rather as a move towards integrated service delivery, including single access points of services for citizens.

Service delivery improvement requires the optimisation of HR, processes and technology at existing service delivery points and expanding access, especially in previously disadvantaged communities (Levin 2004:12). The ability constraints at a local municipal level militate against providing employees with the much-needed motivation to deliver services. Often, municipal employees do not make use of the training opportunities that are accessible through the National School of Government (NSG). Salary disparities result in tension and a resultant brain drain within a system that is supposed to serve the same people and that derives its mandate from the same government.

Moreover, a common public administration system also requires the establishment of HRM norms and standards to facilitate mobility and the best possible deployment of staff. Bolstering the mobility of staff between the spheres of government will facilitate the optimal deployment of skills and the allocation of functions. This approach will also facilitate better planning with regard to the application and assignment of human resource (HR) staff across the public service. The South African public Service has unfortunately gained a reputation for inefficiency, corruption and incompetence (Kroukamp 2011:32). Professionalising municipal administration might go a long way in addressing the issues of corruption and incompetence.

Professionalising administration in local government

According to Le Bris (1997:35), the concept of professionalism is, in part, borrowed from the private sector. It requires public servants to fulfil their roles efficiently, effectively and ethically. Before being considered a professional, a

person must first master a body of knowledge (theory and practice) and acquire operational skills through specialised education and career experience (Mafunisa 2001:327). The implementation of the Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 and the Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998 are important steps towards professionalising local government and curbing eroding political tendencies. The aim is to professionalise the local government system by fending off the undue influence of political officials or political parties over a municipality's administrative function. Furthermore, it also responds to some of the political tendencies like cadre deployment and political infiltration onto administration.

The Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality Turnaround Strategy (2010:13) identifies several institutional challenges relating to governance that impact service delivery. These challenges include the absence of plans and strategies for staff retention; a shortage of scarce and technical skills; the indiscriminate firing and suspension of officials, especially on a senior level; and politically driven deals on administrative matters that affect the enforcement of disciplinary measures against officials who have transgressed.

To stabilise the political-administrative interface in the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality, a bold step is needed to build a professional public service that serves the people. This requires administrative neutrality, a clearer separation between the roles of politicians and administrators, as well as the de-politicisation of administration.

CONCLUSION

A successful political-administrative interface within the public service lies at the core of effective public sector governance. In turn, this plays a critical role in improving public service delivery and achieving the goals set out in the NDP: Vision 2030. Kathyola (2010) states that well-managed political-administrative tensions could support productivity and inject a greater sense of professionalism with regard to service delivery. However, political-administrative relations remain one of the most challenging issues in South Africa, especially at a local government level. The major challenge in local government is that both politicians and administrators interfere with each other's roles and responsibilities, which results in conflict in municipalities and frustration among municipal staff. The ideal situation would be for politicians to refrain from interfering in administrative work and for administrative staff to carry out the municipal council's policy decisions diligently.

The Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality is one of the municipalities that have been affected by challenges of the political-administrative interface. This has resulted in administrative instability and sub-standard service delivery. The municipality can only function effectively and efficiently if both politicians and

administrators work together as a team in the interest of the people they serve. This can only be achieved if there is mutual trust and respect between politicians and administrators. Greater political stability, galvanised by a stronger and responsible opposition, may be just what is needed for the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality to focus on key responsibilities.

A productive political-administrative interface is the key to effective public sector governance and performance. This can only be achieved where there is a single public service. This will help ensure that the Government delivers on the promises made to the nation. The advantage of a single public service is that it ensures coherent and integrated planning, as well as mechanisms to monitor and evaluate public service holistically.

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Implications of Socio-economic Issues on the Practice of Co-creation and Governance in South Africa

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ABSTRACT

The pressures facing the South African public sector have directed attention to raising the profile of responsiveness and interaction in governance. In hindsight of the democratic nature of South Africa, the role played by citizens in governance has come to the forefront. Continuous efforts are being made to involve citizens in the promotion of effective government processes and to ignite transformation in current government practices. With the paradigmatic shift towards co-creation, citizen participation now surpasses the former one-dimensional bottom-up approach to governance. The foundation of co-creation is key in explicitly giving equal importance to the contributions that citizens make as 'customers' to the process-based framework of contemporary democratic governance in South Africa. Elements of integration come into play when co-creation is highlighted in the public sector. Although co-creation is aimed at encompassing more collaborative efforts between citizens and their government, the practical aspects of co-creation in the South African context remains highly flawed. The integrative nature of co-creation, however, bears dire consequences for the structural optimisation of government processes and the effective implementation of government functions and services. That is, the service-systems approach to co-creation that has been adopted is not structurally conducive to the socio-political and socio-economic climate of South Africa. Reform in the public sector and effective governance remains strained in view of the underlying challenges predominantly evident in the socio-economic environment. The deeply entrenched triple challenge of poverty, inequality and unemployment together with

infrastructural limitations continue to impact negatively on democratic participation.

The article focuses on the concept of co-creation in relation to participation and governance and highlights the socio-economic issues and their implications on governance in South Africa. Furthermore, comparisons will be made between the strengths and challenges of co-creation in practice within the South African context. The article concludes with recommendations to facilitate the improved practice of co-creation and effective governance in South Africa.

INTRODUCTION

As South Africa moves towards the third decade of its democracy, a number of issues and characteristics remain that influence the effectiveness of service delivery and governance in the country. The long-term repercussions of apartheid continue to be etched in the functioning of the state and the practice of governance. The evolving notion of participation has transcended to encapsulate a more active involvement of citizens in the creation of services and processes of government. While democracy remains intact in theory, a number of shortcomings come to the fore in practice. The extent to which discriminatory practice and inequality were entrenched prior to democratisation in 1994 has set the tone for gaps in participation and the precepts of transformation. As global states in developed constituencies are embracing innovation and high-level components of interaction in governance, South Africans are grappling with the rudiments of full participation and sustainable activity that are requisites for effective contemporary governance.

Co-creation as a contemporary activity for holistic governance requires the underlying and deeply entrenched challenges of inequality to be eliminated. The intersection of the socio-political and socio-economic environments and their associated challenges has created a foundation that is not conducive to equal participation. The limitations presented in the socio-political and socio-economic dimensions continue to pressurise the practices and processes of government.

As we head towards the achievement of innovation and sustainability in governance, strengthening the collaborative and value creation dynamics of co-creation is a requirement. In order to promote effective and innovative elements of contemporary governance in South Africa, action is therefore necessary in closing the gap between co-creation theory and practice.

A qualitative approach was thus employed to assess the implications that socio-economic issues have on the practice of co-creation and effective governance

in South Africa. Furthermore, the research methods utilised included political economy analysis (comprising problem-driven analysis) as well as a systematic review. These methods were chosen on the premise of understanding the political dimensions of the South African context in order to inform policy and government decisions.

The article will look at the concept of co-creation in relation to participation and governance. The socio-economic issues and their implications on governance in South Africa will then be highlighted. Furthermore, comparisons will be made between the strengths and challenges of co-creation in practice within the South African context. The article will conclude with recommendations to facilitate the improved practice of co-creation and effective governance in South Africa.

METHODOLOGY

The qualitative paradigm was employed for the study. The research methods that were utilised included political economy analysis and a systematic literature review. These methods were used to critically analyse the socio-economic challenges affecting effective South African government practice and to address the gaps between co-creation theory and practice in South Africa. Political economy analysis was found to be a useful method in highlighting factors, inter alia, the historical legacies, agency, power relations and structural conditions of South Africa. These factors primarily shape the socio-economic and socio-political environment of South Africa and profile the politics of development (Hudson and Leftwich 2014).

The problem-driven analysis framework was applied under political economy analysis. The problem-driven analysis framework consisted of the identification of the problem or issue, the mapping of institutional and governance weaknesses in relation to the problem and gaining clarity of the political economy drivers that influence progressive change (Departmental for International Development [DFID] 2009). The political economy analysis method was effective in analysing the factors and challenges unique to South Africa. This method offers institutional guidance to produce positive government outcomes (Hudson and Leftwich 2014).

The systematic literature review, on the other hand, has been effective in analysing the concept of co-creation. A systematic review takes the form of secondary analysis. The value of this method was found in its ability to bring new insights and perspectives on existing data and theory (De Vos, Strydom, Fouché and Delport 2011). The systematic review proved to be more relevant as a research approach, owing to its ability of being objective, systematic, transparent and replicable. The method provided a systematic presentation and synthesis of the study. In addition, the approach is explicit, enabling minimal bias during the

study. The systematic literature review therefore offered a more compressed overview by streamlining the parameters of the review to fit the study. The literature was chosen on the basis of understanding the socio-economic challenges facing South Africa and the nature of co-creation practice and governance. The choice of literature served as a basis to explain the consequences and challenges facing contemporary governance.

CONCEPT OF CO-CREATION IN RELATION TO PARTICIPATION AND GOVERNANCE

Co-creation is defined as making or producing something new together. Co-creation stems from the private sector with the integration of consumer participation in the supply chain. The value of the process is found in the action-orientation of customers to co-create their 'will' through dialogue (De Koning, Crul and Wever 2016:267). Vesterinen (2015:3) states that "…traditionally value creation is treated as something that a firm creates and that is usually linked to tangible goods". This tradition, however, is challenged by service logic through shifting towards intangible factors associated with resource and knowledge exchanges. Attention is directed to the interactive elements as a crucial factor in value creation and the co-creation process. Inds and Coates (2012) similarly highlight the importance of interaction and mutual contributions to generate value. They go on to state that a shift has occurred away from the "…organization as a definer of value to a more participative process" (Inds and Coates 2012:4).

Vargo and Lusch in Terblanche (2014) further define the concept of co-creation more holistically as comprising two components. The first part comprises the creation of value. The creation of value reinforces the value of joint activity that takes place during the process. The second component constitutes co-production. Whereas in the first component, the focus is on collaboration during the process, co-production in the second component emphasises greater collaboration in the initial stages, that is, designing of products and processes. Thus, co-production highlights customisation where collaboration takes place from inception to consumption. The interconnectedness of the creation of value and co-production encompasses co-creation as the achievement of unique value through 'dialogical interaction' and collaborative effort (Terblanche 2014).

Co-creation in governance takes the form of a service systems model. This model is facilitative of the integration of mutually beneficial resources between citizens and their government to create value. At the centre of effectiveness of the service systems model for value derivation is the focus on context for resource utilisation as opposed to exchange for embedded outputs (Vargo, Maglio and Akaka 2008). Integration is key in the service systems perspective. The integrative

aspect of co-creation reinforces a bottom-up approach to governance. With this approach, ongoing learning, iteration and solutions are woven into the process of governance and co-created by citizens (Muente-Kunigami 2013).

According to Voorberg, Bekkers, Timeus, Tonurist and Tummers (2017), co-creation in relation to governance encompasses citizens and public organisations working together to deal with social issues and societal challenges. The collaborative efforts between citizens and the government-of-the-day are viewed as a solution to a number of public service delivery challenges. Torfing, Sorenson and Roiseland (2016:6) similarly assert that successful co-creation in governance entails that "…public organizations and professionals work together across institutional boundaries". They propose that sectors be crossed to tap into a wealth of "…experiences, resources, energies, and ideas of citizens, civil society and other stakeholders" (Torfing *et al.* 2016:6). This is of significance in light of the word 'crisis' being increasingly attached to public institutions and the citizens' dissatisfaction with the representational role of government. The shortcomings in governance lie at its core where transformation is either non-existent or lagging behind. This transfers into social unrest and apathy towards the political system. Thus co-creation and its associated activities are aligned with the current debate regarding democracy, inter alia, what it should reflect in the 21st century and how it is to be optimally implemented (Mompo 2014).

Co-creation has the ability to fill the gaps in public administrations when public demands and needs are excessive. However, there is criticism of this in terms of governments' responsibility. Awareness has been raised of the flaw in the responsiveness of governments to public needs and demands. This shortcoming becomes apparent with the deliberate transfer of responsibilities and accountability to all stakeholders. However, collaborations through co-creation are shown to enable stakeholders to learn from each other and in turn promote a government which is more responsive to citizen needs. Without community involvement, standardised and isolated solutions have an unreliable predominance because they "…reduce the reliance on local knowledge and skill and limit the flexibility" of main consumers to solve the problems they encounter or contribute to the solutions to the problems (Leading Cities 2014:4).

Advocates of co-creation highlight that the stimulation of co-creating benefits the public sector. It is pronounced to raise awareness and greater satisfaction of citizens with the functioning of their municipalities. The incorporation of participation at the essential levels increases stakeholders' exposure in instituting change and the achievement of transformed public services. While this may create pressure on public institutions to change, it also serves to envisage the complexities that characterise change. A platform is provided for an opportunity for challenges to be confronted by a larger and more diverse set of previously overlooked solutions and stakeholder contributions (Leading Cities 2014).

Co-creation in governance subsequently goes against the traditional role of the public sector as the sole service provider. In effect, it provides a new viewpoint of the public sector. This is done by supplanting public service monopolies and public–private competition with the collaborative efforts of multi-actors (Torfing, Sorenson and Roiseland 2016). The measure of value in governance is defined by the holistic improvements in the systems model where value transpires from the fit between combined (collaborative) efforts and the environment for a proactive and diverse effect (Vargo, Maglio and Akaka 2008).

The connection between co-creation and participation is foundational in achieving open government. Massen (2017:8) maintains that the process of open government encompasses a "…multi-stakeholder process, with the active engagement of citizens and civil society". Hence, the active participation and the collaboration of citizens, civil society, political champions and other stakeholders are not only aligned with effective co-creation practices but are also critical in developing, executing and acquiring long-term open government reforms and processes (Mustak, Jaakkola and Halinen 2013). Co-creation processes therefore equate with and underpin the practices of open government which are inclusive of normative and instrumental elements of participation and collaboration. The normative and instrumental elements constitute cross-sectional actors that are critical in the synergistic governance system (Massen 2017:9).

Co-creation techniques have been facilitative in overcoming the limitations of time and geographical boundaries and have the potential to enable significant and influential advances in public involvement. Whereas participation is dependent on the number of citizens that participate, the masses remain highly dependent on the choices and decisions of public institutions. The degree of involvement is predominantly beneficial in enabling public institutions to inform and make decisions. Co-creative techniques, on the other hand, are more holistic and demand the involvement of all stakeholders. The integrative nature of co-creation incorporates the notion of sustainability (Leading Cities 2014). Citizens within the co-creation framework are no longer viewed as dependent consumers but as proactive citizens.

Proactive involvement of citizens promotes the all-compassing involvement of entire communities as opposed to parts of the communities indicative of participatory processes. The hierarchy flattening imposed by co-creation demands a degree of trust and transparency between government officials and other stakeholders. Citizen-centred and co-creative approaches facilitate independence in the citizenry, enabling the promotion of their own decisions, creating new stakeholder maps, developing open-ended civic processes and crafting capacities for self-government (Millar, Peters and Millar 2018).

Australia has achieved self-government practices to effect where citizens work alongside their government to develop new solutions to service challenges in the

public sector. The Australian government has reinforced this notion of self-government by creating networks of partnerships between the private sector, non-profit and community-based organisations (Alves 2013). The United States of America has similarly moved to the incorporation of a more active role of the citizenry in solving public service challenges. Whereas the focus formerly fell on the development of innovative solutions to problems, the focus has shifted towards citizens actively discovering and identifying root problems and the implementation of solutions thereto. The success of co-creation and self-government practice has largely been attributed to new technologies and well established infrastructures that facilitate easier access to public data, enhance government transparency, and reduce the gap between the citizen innovator and the government agency (Nambisan and Nambisan 2013).

The notion of self-government and collaborative governance are highlighted as the best practices on co-creation among developed counterparts. However, these best practices seem highly ineffective in South Africa in light of the stimuli and capabilities that characterise the country. Concerning context, the socio-economic context with its multifaceted challenges has impacted significantly on the practice of co-creation and government practice in South Africa.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA

The analysis of the problem constitutes the identification of the socio-economic issues in South Africa and the mapping out of the institutional weaknesses that characterise South Africa.

Identification of the Socio-Economic Issues Affecting South Africa

The major socio-economic issues in South Africa take the form of the triple challenge. The triple challenge consists of poverty, inequality and unemployment. The socio-economic challenges have been chosen due to the deeply entrenched repercussion and impact each issue has on the achievement of effective collaborative government and co-creation practices.

Unemployment
Mahadea and Kaseeram (2018) acknowledge that South Africa has made significant progress since the dawn of democracy in 1994. However, there has been a rise in the unemployment rate. Considering positive growth rates in the economy and the real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita from R42 849 in 1994 to

over R56 000 in 2015, employment growth has been lagging behind. Statistics South Africa (2018) reiterates that South Africa's unemployment rate is steadily increasing, with an increase of 6% in the past decade. The entrenched challenge concerning unemployment in South Africa, according to Statistics South Africa (2018), is that citizens who have been unemployed for long periods still remain unemployed. The long-term repercussions of unemployment extend the dependency of the citizenry on the state. Furthermore, the adversities facing youth unemployment transfer into an inability and failure to strengthen their skills and knowledge. The unemployment rate is further increased by the substantial skills shortages (Centre for Development and Enterprise 2017).

Unemployment in South Africa has an irrefutable structural character. Cloete (2015:515) states that "…structural unemployment implies the overall inability of an economy to provide employment for the total (or potential) labour force, even at the peak of its economic cycle". Unemployment is known to be higher among the poor. Owing to its nature, structural unemployment remains the most complex to address and features as one of the poverty traps inherent in the socio-economic situation in South Africa since democratisation in 1994. This is an extension of the assertion by Fields (2000) that South Africa's structured unemployment challenge is predominantly a skills challenge. Furthermore, the adoption of a neoliberal economic system and free trade policies has produced negative effects on employment in South Africa. Owing to the adopted economic system, the adverse effects of unemployment have ingrained a more intensive third-world character than evidently characterised the country in 1994 (Cloete 2015). This calls for complex decision-making that confronts the opportunity costs that face the government in light of the vast skills gap (far exceeding the available resources). The gap in skills bears consequences on governments in light of citizens being continuously submerged in a cycle of dependency. The limitation of lack of skills converges with the challenge of self-government and active participation contesting the practice of co-creation activities. Recognition must consequently be given to balancing the benefits versus costs of social and economic factors that affect all stakeholders in the government system.

Limited access to growth and inclusive environments continue to pose major implications for citizens who want to create self-sustaining opportunities. This has inhibited the ability of South African citizens to contribute to the service delivery and government practice in an active manner. In addition, knowledge and skills gaps persist and remain non-conducive to entrepreneurial initiatives. This negates the potential for effective collaborative governance. Poor education has subsequently led to skills mismatches, furthering limitations in employment. Lack of skills in the majority of citizens has forged limitations in South Africa's ability to effect open government. The uneven and deliberate inferior system of education for previously disadvantaged people as espoused by apartheid remains

a contributory factor to the divisive skills and abilities among citizens (Donisi 2017:2). The disconnection caused by South Africa's former political system promotes the extension and long-term repercussions of dependency and continuation of poverty and inequality.

Poverty

The 'social foundation' reflective of South Africa is inclusive of energy, water, sanitation, housing, education, health care, voice, employment, income, household goods, food security and safety. However, within the social foundation depicted for South Africa, a significant number of citizens are living below a decent social foundation. Moreover, areas such as employment, safety and income have deteriorated since the democratisation of South Africa. The pursuit of a growth rate of 5.4% in the GDP by 2030 is criticised in light of the majority of South African citizens left below the social foundation prescribed for the country. Significant growth is dependent on growth that is targeted for the poorest citizens and positively reduces inequalities (Cole 2015). Poverty is persistent in South Africa with a descriptor of high levels of chronic poverty. The economy is highly polarised with a relatively small middle class. To add to this complexity, poverty is higher in rural than in urban parts of the country. Furthermore, with rural areas covering large parts of the country, a high percentage of the population is characterised as chronically poor at the national poverty line. The gap continues to widen as the poverty headcount is not only higher in rural areas in comparison to urban counterparts, but also deeper and more unequal (The World Bank 2018).

Therefore poverty continues to have a direct bearing on inequality. The high levels of poverty evident in South Africa continue to transfer into unequal platforms among South African citizens. This in turn promotes long-term impacts and effects on the ability of citizens to participate equally and effectively in decision-making affecting government activities and service delivery.

Inequality

Inequality in South Africa is clearly evident along racial lines. The causation of the inequality challenge in South Africa is largely impugned on unemployment, poverty and a lack of service delivery as opposed to direct political failure. There have been only insignificant changes in South Africa's income inequality despite the introduction of social transfers. In addition, the number of jobs created since democratisation is lagging behind the growth in the labour force, keeping unemployment between 25 and 35% on average. Therefore, inequality in South Africa is so high both because of high wage inequalities within the workplace as well as the widening gap between those who are employed and those who are not (Keeton 2014). Mobius (2017) contends that South Africa's economy is the second

largest in Africa. It reflects a relatively high GDP per capita compared with its sub-Saharan Africa counterparts.

There are also entrenched disparities between urban and rural areas regarding inequality and poverty. In rural areas, 62% of the population is poor, compared with 13% in metropolitan areas and 25% in secondary cities (Gelb 2003). *The City Press* (2018) states that the Gini coefficient in South Africa sits at 0.66, ranking the country as one of the most unequal societies in the world. That is, inequality remains pervasive with extremities of wealth and poverty. The International Labour Organisation (2013:12) similarly asserted that the "…gap between rich and poor…create[s] inevitable pull and push factors" for urbanisation. This forges a movement from absolute poverty to income earners on the lowest scale, naturally maintaining the inequality cycle.

The de facto exclusion is not only indicative of discrimination, but also extends into wasted development opportunities holistically for society. Inequality of income inevitably translates into inequality of opportunity. It is thus consequently highly unlikely that inequality can be overcome or substantially reduced through the educational system if this is not accompanied by relevant policies to address the inequality issue. Essentially, the high inequality levels highlight the need for difficult but necessary policy decisions. At the core of the equality principle is the formulation of extensive social and economic policies to target the achievement of consensus on economic performance and welfare challenges facing South Africa (May, Sulla and Zikhali 2016; International Labour Organisation 2013).

Institutional Weaknesses of South Africa

The following section discusses the institutional weaknesses in South Africa.

Corruption

While corruption is a universal problem, it is more detrimental in a developing country such as South Africa. Corruption can holistically be referred to as an abuse of official authority with intent for personal advantage. The absence of accountable systems and transparency together with corruption in the form of fraud, bribery, misappropriated economic wealth as well as the lack of adherence to policies are commonalities to South Africa, where citizens are largely reliant on the government-of-the-day for service delivery and remain dependent on scarce resources (Munzhedzi 2016). South Africa is aware that corruption is one of the major obstacles to its effective development. Corruption directly affects the quality of governance. That is, corruption opposes the rule of law and accountability in South Africa by threatening the ethics of both government and society. In the calls for improved public administration, the challenge of corruption has intensified over the years. This intensification of corruption has had a diminishing

effect on public trust and an undermining effect on governance and state credibility. Furthermore, the current law enforcement framework has not prevented weaknesses from appearing in the public sector's internal capacity to effectively combat corruption. In its government-wide appraisal of the strategic policy priorities for South Africa, acknowledgement is given to the undermining effect of corruption on governance in light of an uneven response from the state (Naidoo 2017; Pillay 2004).

Corruption in South Africa manifests within a political landscape. The predominant causes of corruption are contextual. Taking these complexities into account makes it difficult to qualify corruption comprehensively. In addition, the roots of corruption are not standardised, but differ from one environment to another. The prevalence of limitations found in the application of legislation and oversight mechanisms, insufficient political will, political deployments, low wages, and an absence of meritocratic systems serves as the origin of corruption in the South African context (Manyaka and Nkuna 2014). Munzhedzi (2016:5) asserts that "…2022 government officials were found guilty by the Public Service Commission of misconduct related to corruption activities between September 2004 and March 2013". The severity of the cases in the government is compounded by the issue of capacity. In essence, most perpetrators of corruption in the South African public sector tend to get away without being punished. Munzhedzi further postulates that there is a lack of commitment, particularly in political leadership. South Africa does not reflect a positive track record in addressing fraud, corruption and financial misconduct over the years. Thus, the features of corruption in South Africa are crucial to the social and institutional dimensions of development and sustainability. If the rules and practices of accountability and transparency are not optimally applied and monitored, then the processes and practices of the South African government will continue to be compromised (Munzhedzi 2016).

Weak policy frameworks

In addition to corruption being rife within the South African Public Service, South Africa has weak policy frameworks that hinder the development process and governance within the state. South Africa experiences a conundrum of ineffective policy formulation on the one hand and ineffective policy implementation on the other hand. There is an absence of "a more direct democratic orientation" and a participatory approach being undertaken by policy-makers and practitioners (Govender and Reddy 2012:78). Attention is directed towards the one-dimensional practice of policy formulation and policy implementation. South Africa has a tendency to implement single policies to speak to single problems. This characteristic of the South African policy framework is deemed detrimental as policy implementation is reflective of multiple groups of citizens with diverse and competing needs. In addition, needs and challenges cut across multiple dimensions

and environments. Therefore policies are required to follow a continuous process and to cut across multiple disciplines, including the social, economic, political and physical spheres (Govender and Reddy 2012:78; Mthethwa 2012:37).

Despite a positive growth record in the post-1994 period, South Africa continues to suffer from significant economy constraints. The changing structure of the economy in which the manufacturing industry is essentially dormant, a homogenous export profile, and an unstable currency are only some of the growth dynamics which have besieged the economy. The upshot of the above growth pattern generates very particular employment, poverty and inequality outcomes for the economy, depicting gaps and shortcoming in the policy framework (Bhorat, Hirsch, Kanbur and Ncube 2014:3).

In relation to macro-economic policy, the key constraints to growth are reflective of low domestic savings, inadequate levels of foreign direct investment, crime, labour market rigidities, low skill levels, and restrictive monetary and fiscal policies (Pillay 2001). Policy formulation in South Africa is found to lack both the expertise and theoretical background, thus constraining the intended outcomes of the respective policies. Current policies are representative of informal, opportunistic, random and unsystematic decisions in different policymaking spaces and at varying levels. This challenging and weak policy framework is exacerbated by lack of coherence as well as limitations in capacity on the part of government officials and limited public involvement and public participation in the processes of policy- making. It is evident that South Africa needs a comprehensive response to deal with weak policy frameworks in order to meet its sustainability demands as evolved within the three dimensions, namely social, environmental and economic (Van der Walt 2015).

Education

Much of this joblessness is the result of the dismal state of the education system. This constitutes a throughput rate of 37% (Centre for Development and Enterprise 2017:19). The crises surrounding education in South Africa evolved during the 1990s and continues to form part of the wide debates in the socio-economic environment within the boundaries of South Africa as well as internationally. The main challenge facing the education system is attached to the quality of education that is intrinsically linked to equity levels in the system. Syntheses of the shortcomings in the education system are indicative of divisions in opportunity that facilitate gaps in equity and devolve into lower skills, inter alia, greater poverty and unemployment as well as ongoing inequalities (Chisholm 2011). The equality of access has not transferred into equality of opportunity (Center for Education Innovations n.d.).

Exclusionary practices negatively affect the prospective participation of citizens and active citizenship. Dialogues continually exclude parents and civil

society, adversely affecting the potential for collaborative efforts by civil society. Regardless of the recognition given to diversity as a central proponent of democracy, activity and participation in education are suggestive of failure to address the relationship and interdependence between diversity, quality and equity (Chisholm 2011). The elements of diversity, quality and equity are consequential to the 'process quality' and 'output quality' in education. Discrepancies between the aforementioned elements promote low-level skills or underperformance that proves detrimental to the economy. This is owing to these skills not being required by the employment market demands, forging the continuation of unemployment and poverty (Wolhuter 2014). It is of significance to investigate the underlying factors that appear to be unique to particular communities or ethnic groups in order to narrow or eliminate the equity gaps and enable citizens (Maarman and Lamont-Mbawuli 2017:267).

Limited Infrastructure

There is a pressing need for infrastructure development and investment in South Africa. Comparatively, South Africa is limited in its infrastructural development compared to its international counterparts. More importantly, infrastructure is pinpointed as a major lever to drive economic growth. However, a change in focus is required to leverage opportunities that will show immediate economic contributions in the short-term without compromising sustainability. In this way, a long-term vision of sustainable and inclusive growth can be attained (Du Plooy 2018). The investments in infrastructure require a shift from greater efforts in urban areas to greater efforts in rural areas. The limitations in infrastructure are predominantly found in rural localities. Infrastructural development in rural areas of South Africa is negligible. The divide between rural and urban areas is stark.

Alongside the limited infrastructure, capacity features as an additional inadequate element of the South African government. In rectifying inadequate capacities in the South African public sector, the government has adopted an incentive-based funding approach in pursuit of improving the efficiency and the capacity of officials in the infrastructural sector (National Government 2018).

Currently major infrastructure projects can take more than a decade to be implemented in an effective and efficient manner. Meeting the complex challenges of a diverse and geographically dispersed set of capital projects requires long-term planning, detailed analysis, and continual learning and adaptation. Government prioritises the most cost-effective projects that provide optimal long-term benefits. This predominantly benefits the urban areas in South Africa, where infrastructure is at optimal levels. This negates the upliftment and sustainable development of rural areas. Citizens are compelled to exit their rural areas owing to lack of development and the absence of opportunities (National Government 2018; National Treasury 2012).

The migration of citizens to urban areas deprives rural communities of skills that can facilitate rural development. The allocation of social grants, for example, as a mechanism to keep citizens in their rural communities offers a short-term solution to urbanisation. Social grants provide a minimal degree of security to rural citizens (both skilled and unskilled). It has been found that the allocation of grants does not inhibit entry into labour markets but rather seems to facilitate patterns of migration for increased incomes and opportunities (Todes, Kok, Wentzel, Van Zyl and Cross 2010). The movement of citizens from rural communities denies these communities the benefit of critical and innovative thinkers, subsequently extending the cycle of poverty and underdevelopment characteristic of rural areas. Potential industries in rural areas remain developmentally challenged owing to resource underutilisation in rural localities through urbanisation. Infrastructure and development remain limited owing to the absence of skills and knowledge to contribute towards growth and development (Mlambo 2018).

The socio-economic issues and institutional weaknesses prevalent in South Africa give effect to government practices and provide insight into the ability of the country to support the contemporary governance practices and principles that encapsulate co-creation.

CO-CREATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

The basis of co-creation has been pinpointed as an essential component for the South African government since the inception of democracy. The expectations of citizens were raised concerning economic payoffs when apartheid ended in 1994. The political transition brought with it improved absolute access to basic services and a massive investment in service delivery programmes (De Juan and Wegner 2017). Formerly, the focus had been limited, with voluntary degrees of participation of the citizens and partial policy frameworks that predominantly highlighted co-creation, but failed to effectively put plans into action.

The Department of Trade and Industry (2004) highlighted the importance of self-reliance, equality and ethical values as the basis of co-creation. Although South Africa has successfully encompassed integrative thinking into its planning and service delivery models, co-creation has been targeted as a mechanism to reinforce the principles of active citizenship and revitalise the traditional systems approach. In practice, however, the mutually accepted partnership between citizens and public officials in the provision of services remains strained and limited in effect.

The adoption of integration therefore gives effect to limited value creation through decision-making processes, problem-solving and transformed leadership and governance practices (SAICA 2016). Hence, the question raised, is whether

the approach to governance and service challenges via co-creation is shared by all stakeholders, inter alia, the citizens (Voorberg *et al.* 2017).

Co-creation aims to target factors including the lack of basic services, labour discrimination as well as to overcome limitations to service access and the lack of political and civil rights. In view of the plight of the impoverished in South Africa, the established norms, laws and standards remain challenging for the poor. Hence, the context is characterised by the prevalence of disadvantage regarding the informal sector (Mitlin 2008). The multifaceted and complex conditions that contextualise South Africa maintain a situation of disadvantage, harnessing the need for critical collaborative and sustainable state actions (Mitlin 2008).

Co-creation strategies in South Africa are, however, predominantly embryonic and fail to take a radical approach to social change. They have taken an incremental approach justified by social learning. Standardised strategies and arrangements are now explicitly criticised in consideration of the diverse realities in South Africa. According to Dugstad *et al.* (2019:10), "IT infrastructure and mobile network instability was the major and persistent technological barrier" in the South African context. In addition, the complex integration into the existing IT infrastructure increased frustration among stakeholders adversely, affecting the participation of citizens in public sector co-creation activities (Dugstad *et al.* 2019).

Emphasis in the South African perspective has envisioned sharing local knowledge and building resources to create sustainable efforts. The reality, however, is that community empowerment programmes are restricted to an extent where citizens are not given the 'stakeholder status and ability' prescribed by co-creation. Citizens compete instead against an engrained political culture of patronage (Watson 2014). This promotes a shift in poor communities between clientelism and rights-based claims, limiting the collaborative contributions from South African citizens as stakeholders. The presence of traditional features within the South African system questions the viability of modern adaptations to prevailing local conditions and circumstances. South Africa has not mastered how to make value co-creation successful in the public sector. This has been made evident by the South African government's predominant focus on direct interventions to encompass innovations into communities (Uppstrom and Lonn 2015). The interventions, however, remain detached from building capacities in communities by enabling and leveraging innovative abilities of citizens to contribute to government decisions and outcomes.

That is, the eclecticism of adapting international practices and models remains redundant without regard for the local issues and challenges (Watson 2014; Joshi and Moore 2004).

The decentralisation of fiscal, administrative, and political responsibilities and the facilitation of a collaborative relationship between the citizenry and government have been central to the transformation of local governments in South

Africa. Decentralisation is the foundation of effective co-creation activities. It has been found to enhance the communication of citizen preferences regarding services, promote accountability of local political representatives, improve fiscal management and decision-making, and expand economic growth and market security (Sujarwoto and Timur 2017).

The challenge to co-creation in South Africa is that strategies continue to be dependency- based. A patron-client relationship is still practised in current South African governance. The institutional framework is generally accepted by citizens. A common criticism of co-creation in South Africa is that the government focuses too much on internal operations, neglecting the benefits and constraints represented by other stakeholders, such as citizens and private companies. South Africa primarily evaluates co-creation in the public sector on the basis of achieving efficiency, integration, change, management, customer focus, and strategy, disregarding the unsatisfactory ability of citizens to adopt and implement innovative and collaborative practices and contribute actively to the delivery of services (Uppstrom and Lonn 2015). Citizens unavoidably seek more advanced opportunities and outcomes without challenging the structural constraints of their public institutions. The prevalence of the 'clientelist' perspective excludes the majority of the citizens within rural communities from the benefits of participating in the decisions on the distribution of public resources and particular services, extending their dependency. The socio-economic environment fosters dependency and hinders equal participatory models and collaborative efforts by reinforcing the impracticality of 'socially acceptable advancement and contributions' as equal citizens (Mitlin 2008).

DEDUCTIONS

It was found that the inherited and extended repercussions of apartheid have institutionalised inequality and poverty in South Africa and remain depictive of disparities between citizens in rural and urban areas.

Gaps between education levels and skills development and the contemporary economic structure and constraints impact the ability of citizens to be self-sustaining. Evident gaps in education and skills among citizens promote greater unemployment as the available education levels and skills sets do not meet the demands and the necessary skills required by the South African job market. This has a direct effect on the ability of citizens to effectively contribute to developments in their communities and to participate in the functions prescribed to transform their communities.

Weak policy implementation and limited service delivery in rural communities facilitate high levels of urbanisation. Increased urbanisation levels have negated the transformation and the sustainable development of rural areas. The

urbanisation process neglects the potential for citizens in rural areas to build their communities and actively develop positive service outcomes in rural areas.

Weak policy frameworks and government structures and limitations in state capacities in the form of single level policies and unqualified officials and corruption have adversely affected public trust and participatory levels in governance and service delivery. This consequently prevents citizens from willingly participating in a distrusting public sector.

The de facto exclusion of citizens has translated into inequality of opportunities and the dependency of citizens on the state. Exclusionary practices in South Africa have promoted the clientelist perspective. The clientelist perspective has reinforced the 'patron-client' relationship in current South African governance. Hence it has been found that citizens fail to challenge the structural constraints imposed by their public institutions, extending the precepts of poverty and dependency.

Co-creation remains in its embryonic stage as limited access to growth and inclusivity as well as limited infrastructure poses major challenges to an effective bottoms-up approach and the collaborative opportunities for citizens to contribute to effective government activities and service delivery.

Co-creation strategies have been adopted from international constituencies. Strategies are depictive of a 'one-size-fits-all' approach. Strategies are not reflective of the features and challenges unique to South Africa and are thus deemed defective.

Discrepancies exist between diversity, quality and equity, directly influencing the potential of citizens to effectively participate and collaborate as equal stakeholders in governance.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

It can be concluded that the socio-economic challenges that face South Africa have a direct impact on and implications for the ability of the state to effectively implement co-creation strategies and improve governance. This filters into a milieu that is not predisposed to co-creation. The divisive elements of South Africa's former political system present a number of evolving gaps and limitations that influence the success of governance. The ability and effectiveness of co-creation within governance has subsequently raised concern in light of the deeply entrenched divisions and environmental limitations that characterise South Africa.

The following are recommended to promote co-creation practice and improved governance:

- Redistribution strategies must be enhanced. These must be formulated in relation to the economic climate and the challenges facing the South African environment. The divide that exists between rural and urban areas in relation to citizen access must be highlighted during the formulation of the respective

strategies in order to close the gap between citizens and reduce inequalities. In addition to the enhancement of redistribution strategies, practical steps must be taken to build capacity in rural communities so that the inequality gap can be reduced and equitable participation can be reinforced.

- Education and skills development must be aligned with the demands of the market. The provision of appropriate skills sets will provide the required skills, subsequently enhancing employment rates and reducing the dependency of citizens on the state. Effective steps must be taken to develop skills in communities in conjunction with entrepreneurial opportunities that facilitate employment and sustainability within communities that are disadvantaged.

- Relevant and available skills possessed by qualified unemployed citizens are to be absorbed into and utilised in rural development projects and entrepreneurial opportunities in rural communities must be supported. This empowers citizens to be self-reliant and improves sustainability.

- Infrastructure must be advanced and prioritised in rural communities in South Africa. Infrastructural development has potential for sustainable development and the upliftment of communities. It has a positive effect on reducing large-scale urbanisation that very often extends underdevelopment in localities as citizens that have been urbanised are restricted to low-skill employment in urban areas.

- All stakeholders involved in the service delivery and governance process must be informed, educated and trained on all the processes involved in the practice of collaborative governance. This will promote mutual understanding and coordinated effort by all stakeholders in a collaborative manner to co-create services and functions in the public sector.

- Co-creation strategies must be adapted to or formulated in relation to the available resources and infrastructure in South Africa. The adoption of international practices to the South African communities proves to be ineffective in light of the limited infrastructure and resource availability. Recognition must also be given to the needs of the citizens and the potential of the respective environments in South Africa to support and implement the strategies.

- Accountability must be enhanced. Public officials must be held responsible for their actions and maladministration practices. More stringent measures need to be instituted to ensure corruption is eradicated and transparency is integrated into all governmental activities and practices. These stringent measures are a prerequisite to enhancing public trust in South African public institutions and reinforcing the willingness and pursuit of citizens to collaborate with the government as equal stakeholders on all levels and activities attached to governance and service delivery.

- Democratic principles and participatory practices must be strengthened and implemented to transform equity levels and provide a platform for inclusive participation. Regular public meetings are to be open and accessible to all

citizens. Inclusive participation and equal access opportunities promote more collaborative efforts on the part of citizens, directly enhancing co-creation practices and sustainable development. This supports ownership and reduces reliance on the government to solely provide all services.

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Value-adding Activities of Operational Risk Management Methodologies

A South African Perspective

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ABSTRACT

Operational risk management forms a crucial part of management and since the early 1990s this practice has escalated rapidly due to various reasons, such as an increase in the regulatory requirements and risk-related incidents. For example, the requirements of the Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 and the Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003, which require institutions to implement and maintain effective, efficient and transparent systems of risk management and control. Incidents, such as the fall of the VBS Mutual Bank, also indicated problems with adequate operational risk management. The development and implementation of operational risk management methodologies could add value to the management of operational risk exposures and adhere to specific regulatory requirements. However, it seems that operational risk methodologies are currently only used for compliance and not used appropriately. This article investigates the value-adding activities of risk methodologies which can contribute to ensure an effective operational risk management. These activities are empirically confirmed by means of a survey which also identified a gap between the envisaged value and its current implementation by organisations. It is foreseen that this research could support the enhancement of the operational risk management methodologies to improve the operational risk management of private and public organisations.

INTRODUCTION

The past decade saw operational risk management escalated into an established management discipline, especially as a result of the many loss incidents involving public and private institutions in South Africa. For example, the collapse of African Bank, where the Myburgh Commission determined that some of the reasons for the collapse could be linked to operational risk factors, and as reported by City Press (2016), the "directors were collectively in breach of their fiduciary and other duties to the bank." According to an investigation, the Chief Executive "fought with his auditors and co-directors on how to report risk and impairments on bad loans…" which can also be related to flaws in risk governance, which is a crucial part of operational risk management.

Another incident is the fall of the VBS Mutual Bank in March 2018. An investigation indicated that the Chairman and others caused the downfall where they allegedly defrauded depositors by fabricating accounts, creating fictitious deposits, bribing officials, transferring funds to themselves, and buying bank assets that were not recorded (Mkokeli and Bonorchis 2018). The looting of approximately R1.9 billion caused the Bank to collapse, and according to a report, "there is no prospect of saving VBS" (Henderson and Bonorchis 2018). It is clear that fraudulent activities were at the centre of this incident which could have been prevented by the implementation of an effective operational risk management process. Unfortunately, certain local municipalities had deposited funds with the VBS Mutual Bank, and when attempting to withdraw their funds in February 2018, found that the Bank could not honour the request and had been placed under administration (Bonorchis 2018). It seems that these municipalities deposited funds with VBS without considering the potential consequences, meaning it was not a sound risk-based decision. As it stands, it seems that there is a concern among South Africans regarding a general lack of financial management by municipalities leading to a general increase in corruption and misappropriation of government funds (Young 2018). Mileham (2014) stated that some of the factors creating the perception of corruption and maladministration, as identified by the Public Protector, are poor financial management and allegations of fraud and corruption. Adequate risk management, based on adequate risk information, could be one way to ensure sound risk-based decisions that could proactively address risk exposures.

The scandal involving Steinhoff International Holdings indicates alleged problems with risk governance. Since the resignation of the Steinhoff CEO, in December 2017, many questions have been raised from a risk governance perspective and the role that shareholders played in failing to identify any problems regarding "accounting irregularities" (Naude, Hamilton, Ungerer, Malan and De Klerk 2018:15). An investigation into the company's financial affairs caused a

drastic drop in the share price, while early indications revealed possible problems with risk governance and management.

There are many more cases that have resulted from a lack of adequate risk governance. One aspect related to effective governance and risk management is adequate risk reporting. According to Young (2015), risk reporting plays a crucial role in risk management and is vital to ensuring the provision of accurate risk information for decision-making. This risk information could be generated by the proper utilisation of operational risk management methodologies. Therefore, the research question for this article is: what are the value-adding activities of the operational risk management methodologies? As such, the purpose of this article is to identify and confirm the value-adding activities of the operational risk management methodologies which organisations can use to ensure an effective operational risk management process.

LITERATURE REVIEW

A literature review of the concepts related to an operational risk management process will be used to derive the value-adding activities of the relevant methodologies. The point of departure of this discussion deals with the concepts of risk governance, operational risk management and risk reporting.

Risk governance and operational risk management

Risk governance and operational risk management go hand-in-hand when managing organisations. A generally accepted definition of operational risk management is: a risk of loss due to inadequate or failed internal processes, people, systems or external events (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision [BCBS] 2006:144). According to the BCBS (2011:3), sound internal governance forms the basis of an effective operational risk management framework. Makiwane and Padia (2012) inferred that risk management forms an essential part of corporate governance, specifically aimed at identifying threats to the business in order to proactively take the appropriate action to protect the organisation. According to Van Wyk, Bowen and Akintoye (2008), operational risk management entails the identification, analysis, mitigation, monitoring and reporting of risk. Risk reporting, specifically, plays a crucial role during the management of risks.

Risk reporting

According to Ernst and Young (2005:5), a risk framework should offer a robust foundation of reference for organisations involved in risk management. Over

the past years many frameworks have been developed driven by internal controls and reporting. For example, the Cadbury Report (1992:40) recommended that reports should include the effectiveness of the system of internal controls, while the objective of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, was to provide a foundation for addressing risk across the organisation. The Australian/New Zeeland Standards (A/NS) 4360 developed a generic framework for identifying, analysing, evaluating, treating and monitoring and communicating risk, and the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) of the Treadway Commission provided a framework to serve as a platform for addressing risk across the organisation (Ernst and Young 2005:6). According to the International Standards Organisation (ISO) 31000 (2009:8), a risk management framework will ensure that information about risk is adequately reported and used as a basis for decision-making and accountability at all relevant organisational levels.

Hain (2009) mentioned that sound risk management depends on the support of employees and their willingness to provide adequate and true information. This can be achieved by effective risk reporting, which endeavours to communicate risk information to stakeholders (Young 2015). Dowd (2003:46) mentioned that an organisation must implement a system of internal reporting of risk, with the reporting adhering to the needs of the end user. Chapman (2011:342) added that risk reporting is a sub-goal of communication and reports must be prepared on a regular basis, advising of changes to the risk exposure and the degree of success being realised by risk-response activities. According to the COSO (2016:96), management is responsible for implementing appropriate controls in order to ensure that reporting is accurate, clear and complete. In addition, risk reports provide risk information that supports management decision-making in pursuit of business objectives (COSO 2016:93).

It is apparent that risk reporting plays a vital role in operational risk management and it is essential to ensuring the provision of adequate and accurate risk information. Young (2018) mentioned that according to the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) of 1999, section 38 (1)(a)(i), an accounting officer must, for example, include a fraud prevention plan as part of a risk management strategy. However, in order to formulate such a plan, it is essential to have adequate risk information, which can be ensured by effective risk reports. As a result, it seems that most organisations are moving closer to a risk-based management approach, not only to ensure proactive risk management, but also to adhere to certain regulatory requirements related to governance and risk management.

This gives rise to the following question: What value does the operational risk management methodologies add to provide risk information as an input for accurate risk reporting? This links up with the purpose of this article to identify and confirm the value-adding activities of these methodologies.

Theoretical perspective on operational risk management methodologies

To identify the operational risk management methodologies, it is necessary to understand the concept of a risk management process. According to the South African Government Association (SALGA) (2017:13), risk management is a systematic and formalised process to identify, assess, manage and monitor risks. British Standards (BS) ISO 31000 (2018:8) inferred that risk management entails the activities of communicating, establishing the context, assessing, treating, monitoring and reporting risks. According to the A/NS 4360 (2004:v), risk management involves a systematic method to identify, analyse, evaluate, treat, monitor and communicate risks that will minimise losses and maximise gains. Derived from the aforementioned, it seems that the main components of a risk management process can be regarded as: risk identification; risk assessment; risk mitigation and control; and risk monitoring. These components also become apparent from an operational risk management perspective. For example, Girling (2013:219) mentioned that an operational risk process is designed to identify, assess, monitor, control and mitigate operational risks. Therefore, this article endeavours to investigate those operational risk management methodologies applicable to each of these components.

The objective of the operational risk management methodologies is to provide qualitative and quantitative risk information. Quantitative analysis uses numerical values, while qualitative analysis uses descriptive scales for the consequences and likelihood of risk exposures, using a variety of sources (A/NS 3460 2004:19). Qualitative assessments are often used where risk exposures cannot be quantified or when it is neither practicable nor cost effective to obtain sufficient data for quantification. For risks that are more easily quantifiable, or where greater granularity or precision is required, a probability modelling approach is appropriate; for example, calculating the value at risk (COSO 2016:68). However, the fairly new concepts of operational risk modelling and the value of operational risk fall outside the scope of this study and could be dealt with in further research. As such, this study will investigate the following as identified by the BCBS (2011:11), which seems to be the most popular methods currently being used by most organisations in South Africa:

- Qualitative methods
  - Audit findings that are primarily focused on control weaknesses, but could also provide insight into inherent risk exposures.
  - Business process analysis identifies the key steps in a business process and determines the key risk points in the overall process that must be controlled.
  - Risk assessments which evaluate inherent risks, the adequacy of controls and the residual risks (risk exposure after controls are considered).

Figure 1: Operational risk management process and methodologies

- Scenario analysis is the process of obtaining the expert opinion of business managers and risk managers to identify potential operational risk events and to assess their potential outcome.
- Quantitative methods
  - Internal and external loss data which provides information for assessing operational risks and which is captured in a Loss Incident Database.
  - Risk indicators are risk metrics that provide insight into an organisation's current risk exposure.

Figure 1 presents a diagrammatical illustration of the above-mentioned method-ologies in perspective with the typical components of an operational risk management process.

Risk identification

According to SALGA (2017:26), risk identification aims to determine and under-stand the risks within the context of an organisation's objectives and to generate an inventory of risks based on threats and events that could negatively influence the achievement of objectives. This can be achieved by means of audit reports, historic data analysis and loss data, performance indicators, scenario analysis and reports of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts. According to COSO (2016:61), an organisation identifies and assesses risks that may impact the achievement of the organisation's strategy and business objectives.

Chapman (2011:159) stated that risk identification is a transformation process where a series of risks and opportunities are generated and recorded in a risk register. This activity involves the analysis of business processes in terms of its objectives and therefore requires information to identify the inherent risks. The methodologies to generate this information are as follows:

Business process analysis (risk mapping)
Business process analysis involves an analysis of the various business units, or-ganisational functions and business process flows to reveal areas of weakness and to help prioritise the subsequent management actions (BCBS 2003:8). In sup-port, COSO (2016:66) inferred that process analysis involves developing a better understanding of the interrelationships of its component inputs, tasks, outputs, and responsibilities. Once mapped, risks can be identified and considered against relevant business objectives.

Internal and external loss data
Loss data is an important method used by most organisations to quantify their exposure to operational risk. Historical loss experience could provide meaningful

information for assessing the organisation's operational risk exposure and to develop a policy to mitigate/control the risks. This is regarded as an effective way of using loss information to establish a framework for systematically tracking and recording the frequency, severity and other relevant information on individual loss events (BCBS 2003:8). According to COSO (2016:67), organisations may collect internal data on historical incidents and losses, which can be analysed to identify new, emerging and changing risks. Girling (2013:36) mentioned that risk management requires access to data on events that occurred internally (the organisation's own data) and externally (outside the organisation, but within the same business industry) to the organisation. It is imperative that the loss data is analysed carefully to ensure that it is of sound quality and can provide useful information on an organisation's risk exposure and threats. According to Nash (2003:29), a Loss Incident Database should be implemented to assist in improving risk management. Similarly, Chapman (2011:168) mentioned that a database can be used to capture loss information in a controlled and consistent way. It is apparent that a Loss Incident Database should contain accurate and reliable loss information which may be used to determine an organisation's risk exposures and trigger serious business decisions.

COSO (2016:67) inferred that tracking the data from past events could assist in forecasting future occurrences. These forecasts, based on loss data, can be valuable in making substantiated decisions to proactively address the identified risk exposures and threats.

Based on actual experience related to the severity of the risk exposure, internal and external historical data can also be used to develop causal models, which could inform the organisation of potential risks. The A/NS (2004:19) states that the quality of these models depends on the accuracy and completeness of the numerical values, and validity of the models. As such, it is imperative that internal and external loss data should be reliable and accurate and that inputs to loss/incident reports involve all employees to ensure that all incidents are captured on an Incident Database. Therefore, it can be stated that risk management is a bottom-up approach. Girling (2013:91) stated that an allocated responsibility will ensure that all data is captured and reported on and that these risk reports reach the appropriate management levels for decision-making. It is evident that loss/incident data can be used as the input to determining the inherent risks of an organisation when compiling the risk register (Young 2015). In addition, these risk reports could provide a platform for risk reporting to regulators (where applicable) and to all stakeholders.

A Loss Incident Database could add additional value by assisting in risk-financing in terms of the following:

- Cost of controls. A Loss Incident Database can provide management with accurate information regarding loss events which happened in the past and which might require mitigating activities. These control measures could raise a cost which should be part of a risk-financing programme.

- Third-party insurance. Valsamakis, Vivian and Du Toit (2010:312) mentioned that insurance is a method through which an organisation can meet the financial consequences of risk. These risks are usually unexpected, low frequency/high impact events and should be captured on a Loss Incident Database. Organisations are not always prepared to bear the total loss of these risk events and will opt to involve a third party to share this risk (insurance) at a certain premium. The past incidents and the involved losses captured on a Loss Incident Database could indicate to management which type of risk events need to be insured by a third party.
- Capital allocation. Certain circumstances require an organisation to allocate capital to a potential risk. This type if risk-financing is mostly a regulatory requirement and usually involves catastrophic types of risk incidents which could seriously affect an organisation's existence. A Loss Incident Database provides management with an indication of the type of risks the organisation is exposed to as an input to calculate a realistic capital allocation.

It is apparent that loss information plays an important role in identifying operational risk exposures, which can be accurately quantified.

Audit reports
According to Ernst and Young (2005:13), an internal audit is a powerful mechanism for understanding the full spectrum of risks facing an organisation and monitoring the effectiveness of related controls. Although audit reports and findings are not regarded as an operational risk management methodology, it is regarded as an important source of risk information, which could be used as a tool to identify the risk exposures.

Scenario analysis
According to Kalyvas and Akkizidis (2006:129), scenario analysis is a methodical way of obtaining professional opinions from business and risk managers to gain a rational evaluation of the probability and impact of operational losses. Blunden and Thirlwell (2013:196) mentioned that scenario analysis is an essential tool for an operational risk management process and should form part of the process to formulate a business strategy and objectives. Girling (2013:173) confirmed that scenarios can add value to the evaluation of the exposure to high-impact risk events. According to COSO (2016:68), scenario analysis is used to identify and assess risks that could have extreme impacts on an organisation.

Some organisations combine the internal and external loss data and audit findings to serve as the input for scenario analysis which is then used to identify operational risk exposures. Girling (2013:177) confirmed that external loss data and the Risk Control Self-Assessment (RCSA) results are some of the most important

inputs into the scenario analysis process. Blunden and Thirlwell (2013:196) stated that scenarios supplement other operational risk management approaches, such as RCSAs and Loss Incident Data and can challenge the equally subjective results of an RCSA process, which could confirm the identified risks and test the control measures. Girling (2013:176) mentioned that scenario data provides a forward-looking view of potential operational risk exposures, while Blunden and Thirlwell (2013:198) mentioned that scenarios could:

- assist in overcoming some of the limitations of models and historic data;
- support internal and external communication by being transparent and can enable staff to understand more fully top management's approach to operational risk;
- demonstrate the quality of the organisation's risk management;
- provide information for capital and liquidity planning; and
- assist an organisation to understand its limits when setting a realistic risk appetite.

Due to the subjectivity of scenarios and RCSAs, as well as many assumptions about the severity and frequency inherent to a risk management process, it is necessary to incorporate a stress testing exercise. Stress testing refers to the confirmation of the validity of scenarios and confirms that it is realistic. This can be achieved by, for example, testing the detail against the loss history, Key Risk Indicators (KRIs) and RCSAs.

Once the inherent risks have been identified, the next step in the operational risk management process is the assessment of these risks.

Risk assessment

The risks identified and included in an organisation's risk universe are assessed in order to understand the severity of each risk to the achievement of a business's strategy and objectives (COSO 2016:68). Chapman (2011:197) reasoned that risk assessment is to evaluate both the identified risks and opportunities to the business in terms of their aggregated impact on the organisation. A risk assessment process should include an ongoing analysis of the existing risks, as well as the identification of new emerging risks (BCBS 2015:27). According to Croitoru (2014), risk assessments have a dual purpose, namely, to detect vulnerable operations in the organisation and the probability of risk occurrences as a result of the vulnerability, and second, to determine the potential financial impact on the organisation. Therefore, risk assessment approaches may be qualitative, quantitative, or both, depending on the anticipated severity of a risk (COSO 2016:68).

According to SALGA (2017:29–30), risk assessments entail a three-stage process that aims to: assess the inherent risks and to determine the level of exposure; assess the residual risk to determine the actual remaining level of risk

after mitigating effects; and benchmark the residual risk against the risk appetite to determine the need for further management intervention. An operational risk management methodology to assess the risks is RCSAs.

Risk and control self-assessments

According to Girling (2013:37), RCSAs identify risks and assess the risks with the aim of controlling and mitigating unacceptable risks. In addition, Blunden and Thirlwell (2013:82) mentioned that the objective of an RCSA is to identify, measure, and monitor the risks and controls of an organisation.

RCSAs use current risk information to predict future risk exposures, threats and opportunities. As such, RCSAs aim to analyse business processes in terms of risk exposures, which are then subjected to an assessment in terms of the likelihood and impact of the risk event. Risks need to be controlled as close to the exposure as possible, and therefore an RCSA process is a bottom-up process and should involve all employees involved in the business processes. Blunden and Thirlwell (2013:82) stated that RCSAs performed at the activity level will identify a significant number of risks and controls. Once the inherent risks have been identified and assessed, the next step in the RCSA process is to identify control measures to mitigate the risks. Thereafter, the residual risks need to be determined as they will serve as inputs for the RCSA report and the risk register that will be distributed to the appropriate decision-makers to decide if the residual risks should be managed as key risk indicators.

According to Blunden and Thirwell (2013:83), the RCSA process can ensure the following:

- Accurate information regarding the risks facing the organisation.
- Comprehensive understanding of the business's operational risk profile by all employees and stakeholders.
- Communicating the organisation's view on risks and controls to all staff.
- Embedding a risk management process into the business processes.
- Documentation of risks and controls for use by external stakeholders, for example, regulators.

Although an RCSA is a way of identifying and assessing potential future risks, it remains a subjective approach, and should not be used in isolation, but in a mutually inclusive way with other methodologies. After the RCSA process has been completed, it is imperative that the relevant risk-mitigating and control measures be implemented.

Risk mitigation and control

According to Olson and Wu (2008:73), risk control is the activity of measuring and implementing controls to lessen or avoid the impact of risk elements. According to

the BCBS (2015), controls are designed to ensure that each key risk has a control measure that is effective. It is evident that risk mitigation and control form a crucial part of the operational risk management process. Therefore, it is necessary to monitor the risk controls on a continuous basis to ensure they are effective.

Risk monitoring

Chapman (2011:234) inferred that the aim of risk monitoring is to determine the performance of risk controls and to inform the need for a proactive risk management intervention. The objectives of risk monitoring are: to ensure a process of early warning of potential risk events; to identify opportunities; to ensure that the risk register is regularly updated in terms of new emerging risks, control measures and action plans. In addition, ISO 31000 (2009:8 – 21) states that risk monitoring is concerned with: analysing lessons from events, changes and trends; detecting changes in the internal and external environment; and ensuring that the risk control and treatment measures are effective.

Dowd (2003:46) stated that the result of the identification and assessment process is likely to generate a number of indicators through which operational risk may be monitored on an ongoing basis. The KRI process is a methodology that can be used for risk monitoring purposes.

Key Risk Indicators

The King IV Report (2016:62) states that the focus area during a risk reporting period is the key risk factors that the organisation faces; as well as undue unexpected and unusual risks outside of risk tolerance levels. KRIs are quantitative measures designed to identify changes to existing risks, and support a proactive approach to risk management (COSO 2016:67&95). According to Young (2015), KRIs can result from the RCSA process and should be managed on a regular basis in order to focus on the current risk exposures. Dowd (2003:46) also revealed that the result of a risk identification and evaluation process is most likely a number of risk indicators, which could assist with the continuous monitoring of operational risks. According to Girling (2013:38), KRIs can predict the dynamic nature of a risk and would allow for proactive intervention. In addition, these indicators tend to be reviewed on a periodic basis to serve as an early warning system to initiate proactive control or preventative measures for risk exposures. According to COSO (2016:95), KRIs should be reported to the management levels in the organisation that have the authority to manage the onset of a risk if necessary.

By managing KRIs, organisations can ensure that primary residual risks are managed during their effort to achieve their business objectives. An important principle of KRI management is to determine a tolerance threshold that must be approved by management. This threshold could give an indication of the organisation's risk

appetite; specifically if risk management is more aligned with the organisation's aim of accepting certain levels of risk (Young 2012). The Institute of Operational Risk (IOR) (2010) stated that, in terms of regulatory sound practice principles, it is generally accepted that every organisation needs a mechanism to measure and monitor its current levels of operational risk exposure, a process that KRIs can support.

In summary, it is important to incorporate all the identified methodologies into an operational risk management process, where:

- business process flow analysis provides information on business risk exposures;
- internal data provides information on the organisation's losses;
- external data provides appropriate information on loss data which is not internally available;
- audit reports provide risk information in terms of loss incidents and adequacy of control measures;
- scenario analysis provides information on potential high-level risk events;
- RCSAs provide information on the inherent risks that require control measures; and
- KRIs provide information on how risks are mitigated, monitor the performance of control measures, and serve as early warning of new emerging risks to encourage proactive management decisions.

It is also important that the methodologies be applied on an integrated basis to eliminate the subjectivity of the risk information generated for decision-making. In order to ensure the maximisation of the benefits of the operational risk management methodologies, it is essential that the value-adding activities are clear and understood by all stakeholders.

VALUE-ADDING ACTIVITIES OF OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT METHODOLOGIES

Derived from the literature, a list (although not exhaustive) of the value-adding activities of the operational risk management methodologies was identified, namely:

- Assist in identifying operational risk exposures.
- Assist in defining operational risk control measures.
- Contribute to a risk register.
- Serve as early warning regarding potential risk exposures and threats.
- Contribute to being proactive in managing risks.
- Contribute to setting a risk profile for the organisation.
- Contribute to determining a realistic risk appetite for the organisation.
- Contribute to compliance with regulatory requirements in risk management.
- Contribute to ensuring total involvement in risk management by all employees.

- Contribute to the disclosure of risk information to all stakeholders.
- Contribute to adequate and accurate risk information for reporting.
- Contribute to adequate and timely risk information for decision-making.
- Contribute to the risk-financing in terms of:
  - Control measures (cost of controls).
  - Third-party insurance.
  - Capital allocation for risk.

In order to confirm the value-adding activities and the current application of these methodologies, the above list was subjected to an empirical analysis by means of a survey. The survey only included four methodologies, namely Loss Incident Data, RCSAs, KRIs and Scenarios, because the value-adding activities of other methods (e.g. process flow analysis and audit findings) can be covered by these.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

As part of the empirical study on which this article is based, members of the public and private sectors were approached to participate in a survey. The key question to be answered by the survey, was: To what degree can the identified activities be regarded as value-adding activities that can be generated by the use of operational risk management methodologies? Therefore the aim of the survey was to confirm the value-adding activities of the identified operational risk methodologies and to determine the current status of implementation.

The respondents' views on the relevant questions were based on a 5-point Likert scale as follows: "1. To no degree; 2. To some degree; 3. To a moderate degree; 4. To a degree; 5. To a full degree". The data was collected by means of a closed-ended questionnaire. A total of 68 questionnaires were distributed to delegates from the public and private sectors attending an operational risk management seminar on 18 October 2018. Of the completed questionnaires 41% were returned and found acceptable for the purpose of this study based on the opinions and experience of the respondents.

The analysis followed a quantitative approach whereby the primary data was subjected to descriptive statistics according to the Data Analysis with Microsoft EXCEL, using the mean and standard deviation functions (Berk and Carey 2000:144, 151). The collected and analysed data sets were used to confirm the conclusions regarding the confirmation of the list of value-adding activities and the status of its current applications. These conclusions were then integrated with the assumptions and recommendations regarding the value-adding activities of the operational risk management methodologies, which can serve as a guideline for organisations during the application of an operational risk management process.

RESEARCH RESULTS

The responses were categorised into respondents from public departments (national and local government) (32%), State Owned Enterprises (18%) and financial organisations (banks and insurance companies) (50%).

The respondents' focus areas were indicated as risk management (68%), business management (5%), financial management (5%), auditing (9%) and compliance management (13%). The majority of the respondents' focus area was risk management and therefore it can be assumed that the responses are based on a sound knowledge-base and experience regarding risk management.

In terms of the question on the number of years employed in their current organisation, 32% of the respondents indicated that they have experience of more than 10 years, 18% between 5 and 10 years, and 18% between 3 and 5 years. As such, it can be deduced that the respondents have a high level of experience in their current organisations and have potential exposure to risk management.

Regarding the question on work experience in risk management, the response shows that 36% of the respondents have experience of more than 10 years, 32% from 3 to 10 years, and 32% below 3 years. Therefore, it can be assumed that the respondents representing their organisations do have ample experience in risk management to enable them to provide a meaningful response, which can be used to derive acceptable conclusions and recommendations in terms of the purpose of this study.

The responses to the question regarding the potential value-adding of the operational risk management methodologies versus the current implementation of these methodologies are illustrated in Figure 2. The responses related to the degree that the risk management methodologies should add value to an effective operational risk management process were as follows: the majority agreed to "a degree" and to "a full degree" that it should potentially add value.

The methodologies, Loss Incident Database, RCSAs and KRIs were rated above 80%, while Scenarios were rated at 52.5%. This could indicate that they are unfamiliar with Scenarios as a methodology and do not realise the value it could add to the organisation.

In terms of the question relating to the current use of operational risk management methodologies, the Loss Incident Database is the most popular method with a rating of 75.3%, which could be ascribed to the fact that this method uses loss data that is easily quantifiable to manage risks. The use of RCSAs was rated at 52.1% where respondents agreed to a "degree" and to a "full degree" that it is currently being used as a value-adding risk management methodology. This relative lower rating might be due to its subjectivity. It can also be deduced that organisations tend to use KRIs (66.5%) as a reporting tool, especially in an environment which is subject to fraud-related incidents. It seems that organisations are

Figure 2: Potential value-add versus current use of operational risk management methodologies

increasingly making use of KRIs to monitor the current risk situations and to report any irregularities as a matter of priority. This is especially apparent in lieu of the current investigations involving high-level public and private organisations.

The low response rating (36.1%) for Scenarios as a current operational risk management methodology, indicates that this method is still in a development phase, although most respondents seem to be aware of its potential to assist in identifying and controlling high-risk exposures. It is envisaged that the use of Scenarios as an operational risk management methodology will increase in future, especially during a strategic planning process in order to identify potential high-risk exposures.

Based on the above-mentioned responses, it can be confirmed that the operational risk management methodologies can add value to a risk management process and that most organisations are currently using these methodologies to some degree.

The survey also aimed to confirm the potential value-adding activities in comparison with the status of the current implementation and value that it adds to organisations (Refer to Figure 3).

Figure 3: Comparison of potential and current value-adding activities of operational risk management methodologies

Figure 3: Comparison of potential and current value-adding activities of operational risk management methodologies

The chart compares "Opinion" and "Current" values (%):

Activity	Opinion	Current
Identify risk exposures	92.2%	77.1%
Define risk control measures	93.9%	68.7%
Contribute to risk register	87.9%	72.3%
Early warning	74.2%	31.7%
Proactive risk management	74.2%	48.4%
Set a risk profile	87.9%	47.8%
Set a risk appetite	73.0%	50.0%
Comply with regulations	78.3%	39.1%
Ensure staff involvement	66.5%	26.4%
Disclosure to stakeholders	70.6%	64.5%
Information for reporting	97%	77.8%
Information for decision-making	91.0%	71.8%
Financing of risks	67.1%	40.2%

Axis heading (%)

The standard deviation was calculated between 0.8819 and 2.3401 for all the questions in terms of the potential value-adding activities of the operational risk management methodologies. This low variance supports the conclusion that all the identified activities can be regarded as value-adding. The standard deviation for the current applicability of these value-adding activities was between 0.8312 and 1.8683, which is an indication that all the identified activities are currently being experienced to a degree.

The variance between the potential and current value-adding activities shows five activities with a variance above the average, which leads to the assumption

Figure 4: Priority order of importance for the value-adding activities of operational risk management methodologies

Source: (Author's own data)

that they still require some development to ensure their fullest potential value. These include: early warning; set a risk profile; comply with regulations; ensure staff involvement; and financing of control measures. The activities with a low variance, indicating a reasonable level of acceptance relating to the value it can add, are: disclosure to stakeholders; identify risk exposures; contribute to a risk register; and information for risk reporting and decision-making.

The respondents were also requested to rate the potential value-adding activities of the methodologies in terms of importance in a priority order. This result is reflected in Figure 4, indicating that the current most important value-adding

**Figure 5: Value-adding of operational risk management methodologies
to risk-financing decisions**

activities are: information for decision-making; information for reporting; contribute to a risk register; identify risks; and define control measures.

Most of the respondents indicated that all activities resulting from the methodologies could add value to an operational risk management process to some degree. The most underrated value-adding activity is the contribution to risk-financing. The detail rating is indicated in Figure 5. This activity is related to the contribution to the decisions on the financing of risk mitigating measures in terms of cost of controls, third-party insurance and capital allocation. Although the respondents agreed that the methodologies should add value to the risk-financing decisions, there is still a large gap between the potential value and its current use. This is reflected by the respondents where they rated the Loss Incident Database as the methodology currently adding the most value to risk-financing decisions at an average rating of 3.6, followed by RCSAs (3.5), KRIs (3.2) and Scenarios (3.0). This is the same order for third-party insurance and capital allocation.

It is clear that the risk-financing decisions in terms of capital allocation are lagging, and thus it can be deduced that not many organisations, apart from the banking industry, are actually allocating capital to operational risks.

The next section presents the conclusion of the study and provides recommendations in order to contribute to the effective use of operational risk management methodologies, based on the literature review and the empirical analysis of the survey.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Various risk events that recently occurred in South Africa, indicated that there is a major concern regarding the risk governance and management of public and private organisations. This article aimed to provide an insight into operational risk management and the relevant methodologies which could assist in ensuring an effective and adequate operational risk management process. More specifically, the purpose of this article was to identify the value-adding activities which could be generated by the implementation of operational risk management methodologies. Therefore, a literature overview on the operational risk management methodologies was conducted to identify the value-adding activities which could be generated by implementing these methodologies. Thereafter an empirical analysis of a survey followed that aimed to confirm the potential value-adding activities and to indicate the current implementation status of the methodologies. As such, the variance between the confirmed value-adding activities and the current status of implementation was used to derive conclusions to serve as a platform for recommendations.

Based on the literature, four key operational risk management methodologies were identified for the purposes of this study, namely:
- Loss Incident Database.
- Risk and Control Self-Assessments.
- Key Risk Indicators.
- Scenarios analysis.

A more detailed analysis of the literature surrounding the risk methodologies resulted in 13 value-adding activities being derived which could benefit the organisation if implemented. The descriptive statistical analysis of the response to the survey confirmed the potential value-adding activities and its current applicability within the represented organisations. These activities in order of priority are indicated in Figure 4 above.

Ideally the four methodologies should be implemented and used in a mutually inclusive way to ensure the maximisation of the potential benefits to the organisation. The following conclusions and recommendations can be made to assist organisations to successfully embed the operational risk management methodologies and to ensure the realisation of the value-adding activities:
- The importance of the methodologies was confirmed, although it is apparent that the implementation thereof needs to be enhanced to ensure the realisation of the value-adding activities. In this regard, it is recommended that organisations develop and include specific processes to follow for each methodology and appoint and train staff members responsible for its implementation.
- The study showed that the methodologies were recognised as an early warning indicator for operational risk exposures; however, this value-adding activity

is currently not being exploited to its fullest potential. It is recommended that this value-activity be included in an organisation's risk management development plan, which can be useful especially for those organisations exposed to high-level risks.

- According to the survey, it was indicated that the operational risk management methodologies should support the organisation in its regulatory compliance. It seems that a more focused approach to operational risk management is being adopted and in future this might cause regulators to impose regulations to manage operational risks. It is therefore recommended that organisations be proactive and develop and embed the use of operational risk management methodologies that will support compliance with potential regulatory requirements.
- The survey indicated that employee involvement at all levels is not at an acceptable level. An RCSA process is a bottom-up approach and could be used to ensure the involvement of all employees in risk management.
- The disclosure of risk information to stakeholders is also becoming an essential part of risk management. However, it is crucial that the risk information is accurate and timeous as these stakeholders might make important decisions which could affect the future of the organisation. It is therefore recommended that the risk information generated by the operational risk management methodologies should be assessed by the board of directors and be approved before distribution to stakeholders. Although the survey indicated that the methodologies are positively contributing to the provision of risk information for reporting purposes, it is emphasised that risk reports should include adequate risk information to ensure sound risk-based decisions.
- The study found that the value-adding activity related to the contribution to risk-financing decisions was not at an acceptable level that was able to ensure its fullest value. Therefore, it is recommended that this activity be enhanced to such an extent that the risk information can be used to make sound decisions regarding the cost of controls, third-party insurance and capital allocation.

It is clear that the value-adding activities that can be generated by the implementation of operational risk management methodologies could benefit organisations by ensuring an effective operational risk management process. It is also apparent that the underlying principle is to generate accurate, adequate and timeous risk information for sound risk-based decision-making.

Although there might be additional value-adding activities that these methodologies could generate, this study dealt with only 13 activities which were confirmed as adding value. Therefore, these operational risk management methodologies could play a crucial role in providing risk information which could prevent risk-related breakdowns in organisations. In addition, the identified value-adding

activities could serve as a checklist for organisations when developing and implementing these essential operational risk management methodologies. Because operational risk is mostly a generic risk type for all organisations, this study can benefit all organisations and is not directed at any specific organisation or industry. In addition, it could serve as a platform for further research which might delve deeper into the detailed processes to embed the use of each methodology to maximise its potential value and benefits in terms of risk management.

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Good Governance Perspectives in Public Administration and Cybersecurity

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ABSTRACT

The governance of cybersecurity has come into sharp focus in recent times. The proliferation of events from the alleged cyberinterference in elections to the breaching of sensitive information, for example, health and personal records of users globally; has become an area of concern. South Africa has not been insulated from these attacks, with the City of Johannesburg being a case in point. The frequency of these cyberbreaches points to the seriousness of the governance challenges facing the techno-economy. Government intervention around cybersecurity is pluralistic in nature as it focuses on areas such as sovereignty, terrestrial space and democratic governance. This article attempts to critically examine technology-led public administration and information governance to ensure open, transparent, efficient and effective service delivery. It is important to grasp what constitutes good governance in cybersecurity. Moreover, it is important to advance and regulate the cyberspace for responsible and sustainable practice. This article utilises a meta-synthesis and draws on contemporary literature to explore the current knowledge, views, trends and approaches in acting pre-emptively to promote good governance in cybersecurity. The aim of this article is to propose a framework that South Africa could follow in implementing a cybersecurity policy. One of the main findings of this article is the clarion call for increased accountability and transparency, together with new forms of resilience. As a value-add, the article explores cybersecurity regulation as an important aspect of good cybergovernance amidst the onslaught of the Fourth Industrial Revolution. The practical implication is that by introducing

cybercentric measures in e-governance, a more reflective approach could bring about positive changes and measures in how information is managed, disseminated and governed while improving service delivery in the 21ˢᵗ century and beyond.

INTRODUCTION

Technology-driven societies require, *inter alia*, universal access to the internet, increased e-governance and digital government services. While governments strive to provide these services through e-platforms and to increase connectivity to foster economic growth, education and improve public participation through social media platforms, the threat posed through breaching these platforms remains real. Threats from foreign powers, cybercriminals and cyberterrorists remain a real challenge. While cyberspace is the domain of communication in 'real time', the governance of cybercentric citizens and cybersecurity has come into sharp focus in recent times. There is a growing proliferation of events such as cyberinterference and hacking into sensitive e-mail accounts, which points to the seriousness of the challenge facing cybercitizens and the public at large. A perusal of the current literature relating to cybersecurity in South Africa has started to gain momentum in recent years as an evolving aspect of information security and governance. However, internationally the topic has gained traction due to the numerous cyberattacks that have been launched against advanced information societies, thereby threatening both the public and private sector information systems.

The South African government's intervention around cybersecurity is pluralistic in nature, emerging in its focus on areas such as sovereignty, terrestrial space and democratic governance. Sovereignty, as is contextually understood within the physical domain is easy to police; however, in cyberspace sovereignty as it is traditionally understood, becomes a blurred concept. Strong democratic governance is important to protect the rights of cyber- citizens that could otherwise be trampled upon in the cyberinformation arena. It can be said that, control systems are increasing in complexity making them more difficult to secure (Wyman 2017:16).

Given the above background this article seeks to address the following practical questions to gain a greater insight into the governance issues related to cybersecurity.

- What constitutes good governance in cybersecurity?
- What is the role of government in relation to cybersecurity and governance?
- How can cybercitizens be protected?
- What is the future of public administration amidst the prevalence of cybersecurity?

The article has the potential to contribute to our understanding of the bigger discussion around cybersecurity, and calls for more deliberate and strategic action from public sector leaders, public institutions and the citizenry at large as all key stakeholders embrace the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) (Van der Steen, Van Twist and Bressers 2018:389).

The article commences with a discussion of cybersecurity in the South African context. Conceptual definitions are put forward regarding governance. Some key dimensions to addressing good governance *vis-à-vis* cybersecurity are explored. Information is a strategic resource and the need for integration of information is emphasised in the subsequent discussion. This is followed by a discussion of e-governance and cybersecurity. Next, the relationship between Public Administration, New Public Management and cybersecurity is described. A discussion of cyber-enabled governance and Public Administration follows. The 4IR contextualises the discussion with Public Administration in the latter part of the article. The 'new age' of cyberresilience in Public Administration is explored thereafter. Data protection and security information management precedes the recommendations put forward which includes a cybersecurity awareness toolkit and a cyberterrorism life-cycle model. The future of public administration in the cyberage is explored, followed by concluding remarks.

Relational aspects of cybersecurity, cybercitizens and governance

Below is a discussion of cyber-related concepts as it relates to governance.

Cybersecurity

Cyberattacks are regarded as one of the top global security risks of the highest concern over the next decade (World Economic Forum Global Risks Report 2019). Although government and the corporate sector are engaging in promoting effective cybersecurity measures and strategies, the budget spend on cybersecurity continues to escalate given the alarming rate of invasions and breaches. A three-pronged approach to addressing cybersecurity is advocated by the World Economic Forum as: Prevent, Detect, and Respond. Cybersecurity typologies significantly include a platform of resilience, cooperation and transparency towards cyber-stability (World Economic Forum Global Risks Report 2019).

Cybercitizens

Citizenship is a birthright. Equal participation in democratic processes is based on individual rights, which are founded on the constitution or other legal

enactments. In theory, at any rate, no distinctions, in this respect, can be countenanced. By contrast, the cash nexus governs a customer's access and relation to the market. The measure of worth depends on purchasing power. While both buyers and sellers may select one another accordingly, by contrast a citizen's access to services provided by the government is based on rights and needs. A democratic state is clearly not at liberty to favour or discriminate. It would be fair to argue, accordingly, that whatever its other merits, the market paradigm has serious limitations when it comes to public management in democratic societies (Argyriades 2003:526).

Governance

The term 'governance' has become a more or less neutral concept focusing on steering mechanisms in a certain political unit that could place emphasis on the interaction of the state, as an example. It can be said, that the concept of governance is used as a normative one in public administration discourse, often contextualised in various public institutional environments. It embodies a strong value judgement in favour of the state or government (Drechsler in de Graaf and Asperen 2016:406).

The concept of governance has four important dimensions which include: public sector management, accountability, legal framework for development, information and transparency meant for development (The World Bank 1989 in Kaur and Sitlhou 2017:252). Important features of good governance are ensuring accountability, establishing credibility of institutions and providing effective, efficient and responsive administration. "Good governance depends on administrative patterns, political will, citizens' awareness and participation. It follows then, that an effective and efficient governance pattern is the primary objective and foundational value of public administration" (The World Bank 1989 in Kaur and Sitlhou 2017:252).

The concept of good governance

From the early 1990s, the discourse on 'good governance' has become more prevalent (Bevir 2009 in De Graaf and Asperen 2016:406). What 'good governance' means can be contextualised in various aspects of public service delivery and public administration. The concept is used in many different ways, but most scholars agree that it was the World Bank in 1989 that introduced the concept into modern-day discourse that focuses on the promotion of economic development as a case in point. The purpose of good governance in the article, however, is the promotion of what can be called public service motivation, which is often equated with a desire to serve the public interest, or more generally with altruism (Dur and Zoutenbier

2014:145 in De Graaf and Asperen 2016: 417). Democratic governance is about the protection of the rights of citizens. Right to information is a tool in the hands of the citizens. They seek information from various government functions, processes and persons responsible to carry out specific tasks (Kaur and Sithlou 2017:259). The manner in which information is communicated, managed and protected is a vital aspect of good governance perspectives in public administration.

Definitions of good governance constantly shift, changing in response to and along with trends and circumstances. A review of public administration literature reveals four distinct governance perspectives that each highlights unique values: "Old" Public Administration, "New" Public Management, Network Governance, and Societal Self-organisation. These perspectives guide public sector leaders' perception of government's role in society and of its role more specifically as a civil servant. It influences the perception of politicians' responsibilities, and the value, place, and interplay of citizens with government (Bozeman 2007; Mosher 1982 in Van der Steen *et al.* 2018:388). Public sector leaders and public administrators play a significant role in the governance of information.

Within the traditional public administration perspective of governance, public goals are determined in political processes and policies are formulated for translating political decision into concrete actions. Public sector leaders subsequently execute and perform these policies in practice towards achieving defined goals. The bureaucracy ensures the standardisation of response by government. Public interest and objectivity are important values, as well as equality and equity (Hartley 2005; Kaufman 1967; Van Eijck 2011; Wilson 1989 in Van der Steen *et al* 2018: 91).

The second perspective of governance, which focused on efficiency and effectiveness of delivery output, was that of New Public Management (NPM) as discussed by authors such as Ferlie, Lynn and Pollit (2007). NPM represented a turn in the debate about governance, lamenting what is seen as widespread "waste" in traditional governmental bureaucracy. Legalistic values still matter, but are instrumental for achieving results (Osborne & Gaebler 1992). As NPM grew in prominence, many private-sector management techniques and instruments were introduced into public organisations, such as performance targets, deregulation, efficiency, contract management, and financial control. These are then translated into values for civil servants: a focus on measurable "SMART" results, and efficient and effective execution of policies (Eijck 2014; Pollitt & Bouckaert 2004 in Van der Steen *et al.* 2018:391).

The subsequent perspective is that of Networked Governance which focuses on the collaboration of government organisations and societal actors and reflects the displacement of government as the central actor (Ansell & Gash 2007). This is often related to the move from government to governance, and the "solving of wicked problems" (Christensen & Lægreid 2007) that typically

require cross-institutional action. That is why civil servants have to operate in networks. This inherently involves interaction, finding mutually acceptable definitions of the problem and looking for joint solutions. As a result, other actors become guiding factors in the process. In this perspective, a "good civil servant" is a networker who builds relations with other social actors to create and execute policies that are co-produced with others (Alford 2009; Dentchev & Heene 2004; Hartley 2005; Klijn & Koppenjan 2000; Pestoff 2006; Stoker 2006 in Van der Steen *et al.* 2018:391–2).

Lastly, the governance perspective of "societal self-organisation" has gained increased academic and practical attention (Bekkers 2007; Bourgon 2011, 2009; Van der Steen *et al.* 2016). This perspective centres the production of public value on a self-reliant citizenry. Societal actors produce public value for their own reasons, and are guided by their own preferences and priorities (Bourgon 2011 in Van der Steen *et al.* 2015). Citizens can undertake this independently, as well as through self-organised networks and cooperatives. It is important to note that this is still acknowledged as a role for government, but that it is a departure from other models in that societal actors are primarily responsible for producing value via a bottom-up relationship (Bovaird 2007; Pestoff 2009; Sørensen & Torfing 2016). This type of value production happens within the bounds of government responsibility, as self-organising citizens still have to follow the law and act according to norms and standards (Sørensen & Torfing 2016). Self-reliance is not an equivalent of a "laissez-faire" approach to government. The key point of this perspective is that the dynamics that produce public value start within society and that government relates to that; for example, do nothing, let go, block, facilitate, attempt to "organise" more self-organisation (Bekkers 2007; Boons 2008; Boonstra & Boelens 2011; Portugali 2000; Stoker 2006 in Van der Steen *et al.* 2018:392).

The four governance perspectives, as alluded to, in the preceding discussion, emphasise different answers to questions of what defines good governance and what it means to be a good public leader. They are significant to help address the type of role, purpose and function of a public leader when dealing with the onslaught of cybersecurity issues and the impact on citizens and society.

It follows then, that good governance is an ideal which may seem difficult to achieve in its totality. However, to ensure sustainable human development and enhance the quality of life of citizens, action must be taken to work towards this imperative. The right to information is one of the methods by which success may be achieved towards good governance. Right to information is a basic requisite of good governance and the key to strengthening participatory democracy and ushering in people-centred governance. It also increases the level of transparency and accountability in the administrative and management machinery of government and is a powerful mechanism to both citizens and the public sector. Being cognisant of cyber-security in managing information is therefore, fundamental to good governance.

Given that access to information can empower the poor and the weaker sections of society to demand and obtain information about public policies and actions, leading to their welfare, it requires people-centred governance which is conscious of cyber issues. "Without good governance, no amount of developmental schemes can improve the quality of life of the citizens. Good governance constitutes four important elements: transparency, accountability, predictability and participation. The more citizens are able to access government functions, the greater the responsiveness of the government system to the communities' needs" (Shamshad 2009:576).

Information integration and good governance

Managing information integration and governance thereof is of strategic importance because if you harness information effectively, it can present new opportunities on various levels and improve decision-making for the sustainable future. Government, the public sphere and citizens are in need of information as a strategic resource which makes information governance a necessity. Maximising the value of information while ensuring compliance with regulatory obligations, managing risks and protecting security; are desired outcomes for good governance. Sound information integration and governance therefore provides five important capabilities necessary for good governance, as highlighted by Hulme (2012:103). These are:

- Delivery of trusted information for greater insights and improved decision-making regarding service delivery agenda;
- Elimination of wastage of expensive resources associated with the cost of managing automated information;
- Protection of information through cost-effective technology platforms;
- Aligning of public institutions' key strategies through provision of timely information linked to government's broader vision; and
- Ensuring fulfilment of fiduciary responsibilities, legal and other mandates (Hulme 2012:103).

The above aspects would in effect, ensure that information is protected and secured. The authors are of the view that the above discussion emphasises the 'new' dimension of public administration practices in the context of good governance imperatives relating to information management.

eGovernance and cybersecurity

eGovernance concerns the use of information and communication technologies such as the Internet, Wide Area Networks, mobile phones and other forms of

engagement in order to deliver services to citizens, businesses, and government. A further definition is that of the transformation of the public sector's internal and external relationship through "enabled operations, information technology and forms of communication to optimise government's quest for service delivery while invoking participation and governance" (Sangita and Dash 2008:141). eGovernance then refers to the use by government agencies of information technologies (such as Wide Area Networks, the Internet, and Mobile computing) that have the ability to transform relations with citizens, businesses, and other arms of government. These technologies can serve a "variety of different ends: better delivery of government services to citizens, improved interactions with business and industry, citizen empowerment through access to information or more efficient government management and governance. The benefits can be less corruption, increased transparency, greater convenience, revenue growth and cost reductions" (Malick and Murthy 2001:238). The authors further concede that new means of involving citizens through wider access, knowledge about available systems and services, communication channels and the degree of involvement including information security are considered the greatest challenges facing the administration, technology providers and the citizenry in the cyberage. By introducing cybercentric measures in e-governance, a more reflective approach could bring about positive changes and measures in how information is managed and governed while improving service delivery in the 21st century.

Relationship between Public Administration, New Public Management and Cybersecurity

In the 21st century and beyond, the prerequisites of good governance are operationalised with rapid automation and technology. In order to achieve the ideals of NPM, technology upgrades, incorporating modem techniques of management to ensure effectiveness and efficiency, capacity building of public institutions (including training of public sector leaders and officials), with transparency and openness are deemed essential aspects of good governance (Minocha 1998:280).

Since e-governance has been heralded as a transformational improvement in the quality, efficiency and effectiveness of governance, it stands to reason that a governance strategy driven by information and communication must be developed and applied to give effect to openness, transparency and accountability as normative guidelines of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (*Constitution of the Republic of South Africa* 1996). It can therefore be said, that e-governance is a distinct dimension of NPM that has gained considerable prominence since the 1990s. Ongoing demands generated by political leadership, growing capacity building needs and perceived citizens' needs have contributed tremendously to the need for information technology innovation and governance.

It follows then, that the relationship between public administration and cybersecurity could be one of the most effective channels for protecting, accessing and dissemination of information and provide a customer-centric public service (Sapru and Sapru 2014:313–316). Malick and Murthy (2001:237) hold the view that unprecedented developments in information and communication technologies have opened new avenues for governance, thus introducing a new agenda, concepts and methodologies in the provision of information and services. Therefore, implementation by public institutions and public sector leaders requires more efficient government management of public service delivery. Minocha (1998:279) posits that the greater use of information technology and management techniques in revamping office-oriented systems with improved record-keeping, movement of files, space utilisation and adoption of other available automation has changed how public administration takes place in public institutions. Public offices have become more effective and efficient through the system of computerised information systems and innovative technologies. Reduction of excessive paperwork and the abolishment of unwarranted reports and returns have informed current terms of communication. Simplification and integration of office procedures, standardisation of job outputs and introduction of appraisals by technology-driven results helps boost efficiency levels. In other words, with the reliance on technology in recent years, public administration and service delivery have been affected by a new wave of security and information breaches that have resulted in a paradigm shift from the traditional citizenship-based model of public services, to a cyber-centric citizens' approach (Brewer 2007: 550). How cybersecurity can be regulated through a multisector approach is an important aspect of cybergovernance in protecting the rights of cybercitizens. A key challenge for public administrators though, is to ensure that good governance and accountability principles are incorporated into citizenship-oriented systems.

The relationship between public administration and cybersecurity leads to the focus of cyber-enabled governance in the subsequent discussion.

Cyber-enabled governance and public administration

With the current information revolution, citizens must be empowered to assimilate information and make value-added decisions concerning service delivery matters that affect them. In the same light, public sector leaders and officials must be able to deliver on their given mandate. Malik and Murthy (2000:239) consider that good governance in public administration means provision of quality services to the citizens and stakeholders with diverse interests, administrative independence and managerial autonomy. Moreover, Kapur (2000:388) states that, an opportunity exists to craft a new vision for governance, obliterate outdated systems that have now turned into anachronisms in the new global scenario, and make innovation

the 'life infusing force' in revitalising public sector organisations as a necessity in the information and cybersecurity age. With digital convergence, cyber-enabled governance entails developing awareness, creating access, generating feedback, sharing knowledge and implementing cybersecurity measures and cyberlaws as good governance perspectives in public administration (adopted from Rogers Okot Uma in Malik and Murthy 2000:241).

Another dimension of cyber-enabled governance in public administration is that of cyber- organising and cyberorganisations. In the context of public administration, social capital is the combination of resources where citizens engage with one another and with government in relation to service delivery matters. Through cybermeans, citizens are able to define their connection with organisations and themselves in a speedy manner. The form of social exchange poses important challenges, opportunities and questions for public administration, and what implications the role of cyberorganisations hold for the public administrator in a context dominated by technology (Brainard 2003:384). Communication via information is ostensibly devoid of face-to-face human interaction. Often people may not be looking for information in the form of data. Putnam (2000 in Brainard 2003:399) argues that organisational ties are eroding and that government should assume partial responsibility for revitalising them so that civic engagement and forms of social capital are not compromised in the cyberage. This discussion relates to both the social and political environment in which public administration takes place, and is explored further in the cybertoolkit under the recommendations put forward by the authors to this article.

Contextualising the 4IR and public administration

Nundkumar and Subban (2018:324) hold the view that the 4IR technologies create new forms of engagement. Caruso (2018 in Nundkumar and Subban 2018:324) further states that digitised information has become a strategic resource with the arrival of the 4IR, and is evolving at an exponential rate rather than a linear pace.

The 4IR has brought with it a range of technological advances and government is called upon to improve accountability and transparency, especially in the context of the public sector. In order to respond to the service delivery agenda with increased transparency and trust, government needs assistance. The rapid advances in technology relating to the 4IR could assist government (Van Heerden, Steenkamp and Van Heerden 2018:913–4). However, government has to deliver services smartly. Given the complexities of technology, the 4IR could assist government to effect improvements in service delivery (Van Heerden *et al.* 2018:923).

Developed and developing countries according to Shava and Hofisi (2017:204), are seemingly embracing the innovative technologies of the 4IR.

Trends in the 4IR can facilitate change in public administration, but they could also disrupt the engagement of citizens with public organisations thus compromising service delivery. According to Jarbandhan (2017:61) "the pressing question for policy-makers in the 4IR would be balancing state interventions to fulfil social needs without undermining the dynamism of the market system in times of rapidly developing technology".

The 4IR offers much to society from cheaper access to services to the dispersion of information at a rapid rate. It has also allowed for interconnectivity of devices and the cost-effective rendering of goods and services. However, the levels of interconnectivity allow for cybercriminals and syndicates to breach built-in security, and on occasion to misuse data or to even hold large organisations, individuals and governments to ransom. Consequently, it is important for governments to invest in securing their networks from cybercriminals. Investing in the design of state-of-the-art security systems is of paramount importance, so is the sharing of information on cyberthreats towards protecting information platforms. Data shows that cyber-attacks will continue to increase as technology rapidly becomes outdated in the 4IR; hence, striving to make cybercentric citizens more situationally aware of the information environment. Taking cognisance of the 4IR and ensuring a cybercentric approach both for citizens' protection and that of cybergovernance in leadership are fundamental prerequisites for good governance. The prospect of several systems competing for cybersecurity currently, indicates that it was possibly because cybertechnology remains one of the few areas attracting new government expenditure (Herrington and Aldrich 2013:301).

The South African government has recently emphasised the 4IR and its impact on public administration practices in the public sphere. Information technology implementation, management and governance are key aspects for due consideration to not impede sustainable service delivery. With the onslaught of the 4IR and growing awareness of cybersecurity, government must initiate the necessary legal and administrative steps to encourage and provide citizens with efficient, responsive and accountable public governance through information technology-enabled systems. The provision and protection of information of cybercitizens against any form of attack is ostensibly a constitutional imperative and right of citizens. A challenge faced by modern public administration, is that while technology has the potential – in keeping with government's current focus on digital access into the deep and semi-rural areas – for hands-on participation, it is equally important that technology-led public administration initiatives (Rattan and Rattan 2008:889) are effectively put in place to address the improvement, governance and protection of information. The information technology revolution would effectively require good governance strategies for public administration delivery systems amidst the 4IR.

With the 4IR, comes a rapid spate of technologies. With the rise in technology fusion, there is the need for security measures. A new approach is required to regulate the space. Of concern, is that space could play a persuasive and dominant role and there are growing concerns that the current mechanisms to regulate activities are no longer fit for purpose. In the global revolution and cyberwar, attack is easier than defence (Eide and Kaspersen 2015).

Shava and Hofisi (2017:205–6) state that the opportunities, challenges and effects of the 4IR on the functioning of public administration includes disruption of societal values and restructuring of the economy; and digitalisation and changing of the world order. Finally, the role of the state in a technology-driven environment must take cognisance of the following:

- The desire for public institutions to balance the power of technology and business with rules, codes and standards for safety, inclusion and respect for humanity.
- The ability of the state to adapt to technological advances.
- The realisation that the state is not static.
- The maintenance of public trust and safety when devolving new technology.
- Using technology ethically, especially in a cyberworld.
- It is important for the state to preserve the public interest, by adopting agile leadership and embracing the advantages of the 4IR (World Economic Forum in Jarbandhan 2017:64).

Linking the 'new age' of cyber-resilience in public administration

If one of the main focus areas of public administration is among others, the general welfare of the citizens, it stands to reason that the necessary measures should be put in place by government to ensure that it places the citizen at the forefront of its service delivery agenda. The modern repertoire is that, government, the private sector and citizens must work together to provide a cyberdefence that is less about barriers and more about resilience (Feakin 2011 in Herrington *et al.* 2013:303). The authors further maintain that, in the electronic age, security, risk and resilience have been cross-bred and present new challenges for cyber-governance. Over the next two decades, the main driver of information and communication technology will be an even closer connectivity of the Web and the individuals known as cybercitizens. When 'digital tsunamis' occur, citizens will invariably hold government to account for the failure of infrastructure which it no longer may be able to control, yet various sectors of government do not fully comprehend the magnitude of this calamity on service delivery. This interface therefore, requires the protection of infrastructure which is fundamental for good service delivery, and calls for resilience of stakeholders in public administration

practices. The author warns that the most alarming aspect of cyber-resilience is that it is a moving target to be factored in government's strategic plans. It is common knowledge that government projects and programmes have failed in the past not only because they were 'big-bang' solutions with poor capacity to embrace emerging technology, but also because the private sector moved at a faster pace than the public sector. The world of information and communication technology is accelerating at a rapid pace and the issues that confront government are growing in size and complexity. Therefore, government has to re-engineer its mindset in order to ensure that it is prepared to address the pace of the information revolution (Herrington *et al*. 2013:300–303). The World Economic Forum Report, (2019) states that strong cybersecurity has become fundamental to a resilient business.

Data protection and security information management

Data and information protection, authentication and privacy issues including citizen (consumer) protection is a prerequisite for the information society and for building confidence in the management and governance of information. A culture of cybersecurity needs to be promoted, developed and implemented in cooperation with all relevant stakeholders. Given the immediacy of cybersecurity issues, "it is important to enhance security measures and ensure protection of data and privacy is upheld. In the context of public administration, one must take into account social and economic development-oriented aspects of the information society" (Gazette, World summit on Information Society 2004:296).

The compilation and analysis of data protection and information governance is no easy task. In promoting new forms of citizen involvement, government can promote citizen co-creation in the arena of cybersecurity. In so doing, cybercitizens are protected and government will find that people would want to be part of the solution, especially for problems that directly affect them (Sapru and Sapru 2014:328–329). Rattan and Rattan (2008:901) list aspects of cyberstalking, cyberharassment, cyberterrorism, cyberdefamation, misuse of online transactions, misappropriation of information, information invasion and privacy issues as some of the serious violations that warrant the need for installing robust cybersecurity awareness for the protection of cybercitizens and creating a platform for technology-based good governance principles and practice in sustaining service delivery. Rattan and Rattan (2008:902) state categorically that, the liability of internet service providers must be strictly monitored regarding the service that is provided by them.

Figure 1 captures the related cybersecurity threats that South Africa potentially faces. They include information security breaches, abusive content, fraud, malicious coding, illegal information gathering, intrusions, etc.

Figure 1: Cybersecurity-related threats in South Africa

Information security
- Unauthorized access to information
- Unauthorized modification of information
- Ransomware

Fraud
- Unauthorized use of resources
- Copyright infringement
- Masquerade

Availability
- Denial of service
- Distributed Denial of service
- Sabotage

Intrusions
- Privileged account compromise
- Unprivileged account compromise
- Application compromise

Abusive Content
- Spam
- Cyberbullying
- Cyber stalking
- Child Pornography
- Violence

Malicious Code
- Viruses
- Worms
- Trojans
- Spyware
- Dialer

Information Gathering
- Scanning
- Sniffing
- Phising
- Spoofing
- Pharming

Intrusion attempts
- Exploitation of known vulnerabilities
- Login attempts
- New attack Signature

RECOMMENDATIONS

Some recommendations are put forward to address cybersecurity amidst good governance.

Effective cybersecurity governance should be underscored by a risk-based approach, according to Nundkumar and Subban (2018:324).

Authors Phahlamohlaka, Jansen van Vuuren and Coetzee, (2011:7) suggest the following recommendations in creating an awareness of cybersecurity:

- National public awareness and education campaign to promote cybersecurity;
- National strategy that touches all sectors and encourages widespread buy-in;
- Framework for research and development strategies on cybersecurity;
- Strategy to expand and train the workforce, including attracting and retaining updated cybersecurity measures;
- Expertise in government among public sector leaders and officials;
- Process between government and the private sector to assist in preventing, detecting and responding to cyberincidents;
- Mechanisms for cybersecurity-related information sharing that address concerns about privacy matters; and
- A Cybersecurity Awareness Toolkit (CyberSAT).

The Table presented in the discussion that follows highlights determinants of power elements associated with cybersecurity awareness. While the toolkit is based on policy elements from the South African environment and can be related to power issues, the kit could be easily adopted for cybersecurity awareness, suggests Phahlamohlaka *et al.* (2011:7).

Ramlackan, Subban and McArthur (2016:64) suggest that given the instantaneous nature of information, and that information is an essential part of any organisation, the confidentiality in information security is undisputed, making the CyberSat an essential platform for addressing cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities.

Cyberterrorism

Laraque (2016 in Shava and Hofisi 2017:211) notes that, "although new technologies appear to have been embraced by governments globally, as agents for social and economic change they have paved the way to global terrorism and cyberattacks". The authors further hold the view that, these effects of cyberattacks as raised in the article pose serious threats to the functioning of public administrations as governments are incurring huge costs in counter-terrorism security measures to ensure the safety of their citizens.

A proposed generic model to address terrorism in this context is that of a cyberterrorism life-cycle model. In addressing some of the critical aspects of

Table 1: The CyberSecurity Awareness Toolkit (CyberSAT)

Philosophical position		Determinants				
	Policy elements	Economic	Political	Military	Social	Information
Structures in support of cybersecurity	Cybersecurity breaches will happen regardless of structures established	Establish commercial and financial response structures	Establish a national security level institutional arrangement on cybersecurity	Establish military security	Build confidence in response and capacity of established institutions	Let the public trust in security of communication management and systems
Reduction of cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities	Threats and vulnerabilities exist but reduction thereof is key goal of good governance practice	Develop various economic breaches monitoring tools and techniques	Send regular political signals that cyber security is a priority	Develop monitoring tools and techniques on ongoing basis	Effectively communicate benefits of paying attention to threats and vulnerabilities	Effectively communicate cyber security as priority
Cooperation and coordination between government and private sector	Partnerships and cooperation across all sectors and society are critical	Build confidence that continued ICT use is competitive advantage than liability	Build public confidence that political leadership will take care of personal information	Create reasonable civil-military interactions within broader government framework	Clear lines of accountability and expected behaviours to contribute trust and confidence building	Build confidence in the public that political leadership will take care of personal information protection

Philosophical position		Determinants				
	Policy elements	Economic	Political	Military	Social	Information
International cooperation on cybersecurity	No country can do it alone	International partnerships and shared global spaces are necessary tools	Leaders need to develop relationships that extend across borders	Define standards of conduct in cyberspace	Establish reasonable precautions in relation to balancing secrecy and information sharing are necessary	Promote information sharing
Capacity building and culture of cybersecurity	Focus internally and on basics. Insider threats are more than external threats	Focus on public education and awareness	Behaviour of individual users is the single most important part of cybersecurity battle	Behaviour of individual users is the single most important part of cybersecurity battle	Behaviour of individual users is the single most important part of cybersecurity battle	Focus on public education and awareness
Compliance with technical and operational cybersecurity standards	Actively Participate in creation of international standards	Define standards of conduct in cyberspace	Articulate coordinated national information and communications infrastructure objectives	Define standards of conduct in cyberspace	Define standards of conduct and governance of cyberspace	Articulate coordinated national information and communications infrastructure objectives

Source: (Adapted from Phahlamohlaka et al. 2011:8)

Figure 2: CyberTerrorism Life-Cycle Model

cyberterrorism, five important steps must be considered in cybergovernance. These are Prepare, Acquaint, Choose, Execute and Deter (Ericksson and Penker in Veerasamy, Grobler and Von Solms 2012:2) in order to address and combat attacks online, as is outlined in Figure 2 that illustrates the CyberTerrorism Life-Cycle Model.

The authors submit that cyberterrorism (overt) has emerged as a new threat in information technology and information governance as opposed to cybercrimes (covert), and can be termed a convergence of terrorism and cyberspace. The model allows for the identification of future areas of research and development regarding emerging methods of attack and deterrence (Veerasamy *et al.* 2012:2).

THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN THE CYBERAGE

One of the considered and greatest challenges facing new forms of information technologies is the notion of privacy. The right to privacy of individuals is a significant Constitutional imperative of Chapter 2 of the Bill of Rights of the *Constitution of the Republic of South Africa*, 1996. Despite that, tracking and sharing of information is a crucial part of the new connectivity in the cyberage (Schwab 2016). Giving credence to good governance perspectives, the future of public administration in the cyberage poses interesting – yet challenging aspects for public organisations, government and citizens in their engagement with one another. In order to revitalise their role in governance matters, public administrators must reimagine themselves from being agents of regulation and control to becoming agents of

Figure 3: Government's role in cybersecurity

Key Cybersecurity Activities

Response
In the evemt of an attack, ensuring swift recovery of the functioning of critical information systems

Co-ordination
Co-ordination of all stakeholders

Vulnerability
Reducing the vulnerability of the cyberspace

Threats
Preventing cyber threats znd attacks in the first instance

Source: (Department of Telecommunications and Postal Services 2017)

the social bond (Vigoda & Golembiewski 2001 in Brainard 2003:401). In other words, public administrators must learn to be co-facilitators of social capital, and participate in the shared reality with citizens through cyberorganising so that they are able to effectively fulfil their roles and responsibilities in various institutional settings. Another perspective for the future of public administration practice is that the current systems of cybergovernance and cyber-resilience warrants collective human accountability because in the future state of public administration, the state demands increased transparency from the citizens. However, the state is also required to significantly increase its accountability and transparency to the citizens (Herrington and Aldrich 2013:308). Figure 3 captures the role of government in cybersecurity.

It is clearly evident that government will have to invest in creating and coordinating "cybersecurity activities and data protection across the whole of government, including sub-national levels (e.g., municipalities), independent agencies (e.g., regulators), and contractors (e.g., outsourced services)" (Chertoff 2008 in Sutherland 2017:1–3). These activities range from identifying cyberthreats, reducing vulnerabilities within cyberspace, coordinating with all stakeholders and responding to the threats effectively and efficiently.

CONCLUSION

In theorising and deconstructing cybersecurity and cybergovernance as key elements, the quest for enhancing service delivery and the future of public administration must be considered. In an era of growing interdependence and collaborative engagement, information management in a technology-driven world is for effective decision-making, strategic management and service delivery. Equally important, is shaping the mindset of government and cybercitizens alike in embracing the evolving cyberenvironment. Sovereignty, as is contextually understood within the physical domain is easy to police; however, in cyberspace, sovereignty as it is traditionally understood becomes a blurred concept. Knowledge, competence and commitment are vital aspects that could inform new approaches and nuances, giving credence to cybercrisis or risk management and the governance of cybersecurity systems becoming a fundamental imperative in the information revolution era. The formidable question is: who controls and directs the governance of information in the current decade and beyond? Finally, the authors highlight the need for further research into cybersecurity and protection of cybercitizens in the context of good cybergovernance, calling for greater accountability. The role of government has now come into sharp focus in addressing the challenge of cybersecurity. This is exacerbated by poorly trained public servants who do not have a deep enough grasp of the challenges of risks

posed by cybercriminals, cyberterrorists and the like. It is therefore incumbent on government to train and develop senior managers on cyber-related matters, to educate the public on being cybersmart and to implement cyberpolicies (which are already developed or which are currently being developed) so as to protect itself and society at large from cybercriminals.

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Conceptualising South African Policy and Entrepreneurial Development

A Female Perspective

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ABSTRACT

It is well-known that entrepreneurship development has become a prominent term and focus area not only in social science research but also among various economic agents. It is considered, not only on a national level, but also internationally by policy formulators as a possible link to increased and sustained economic growth and development. Although entrepreneurship is considered important globally, the benefits to developing countries, such as South Africa, could have a significant impact on poverty alleviation and employment creation. However, the full benefits from entrepreneurship cannot be utilised if proper policies and the effective implementation thereof is not present in a country. Therefore, the main aim of this paper is to contextualise the theoretical background on some of the supporting entrepreneurial and small business development policies in the South African context. In addition, gender equality has been prominent in the formulation of recent policies and therefore this aspect within the discussed policies will also be addressed. The methodology entails a desktop analysis of various sources and documents from the literature and specifically from various South African government department reports and policies to conceptualise the area of investigation. The article adopted a qualitative observational analysis by comparing, contrasting and analysing relevant and recent information pertaining to job creation and entrepreneurship development from a policy perspective. The research approach included specific unobtrusive techniques to eliminate bias and promote conceptual and contextual analysis.

INTRODUCTION

Entrepreneurship has been described by many as the cornerstone of economic growth and financial independence (Botha *et al.* 2007:163; Athayde 2012:709–710; Sivvam 2012:13; Ambrish 2014:225; Phillips *et al.* 2014:85). Despite this, the potential of entrepreneurship has not been fully realised in many developing countries, including South Africa. For centuries Africa has been considered as the 'lost continent', with several socio-economic problems being prevalent in most of its countries. For many years South Africa was considered one of the better performing economies on the continent but this situation is changing rapidly as other African countries such as Nigeria and Egypt are being revitalised by commercial vivacity and an increased economic drive (IT News Africa 2015). Enhanced economic performance experienced in these countries is explained by improved government action in the area of macroeconomic environments and microeconomic improvements, creating a healthier enabling environment for small businesses (Herrington & Kew 2013:18). South Africa is falling behind in terms of entrepreneurship intention and action when compared to sub-Saharan African averages; consequently, advances in this regard are necessary (Herrington, Kew & Kew 2015:5). This calls for the improvement and re-evaluation of some of the government departments and their specific policies aimed at job creation and support for entrepreneurial development. The purpose of this article is to conceptualise the theoretical background on some of the supporting entrepreneurial and small business development policies in the South African context.

METHODOLOGY

This study followed a qualitative research approach as it was considered most fit considering the main purpose. A desktop analysis making use of several documents and sources was used to collect information specifically from government departments and related policy documents. This method allowed for a critical examination of the content within the collected material as documents compiled by government departments were deemed to be trustworthy and reliable. This method allows for a systematic procedure where various material and documents are viewed and assessed to identify and extract important content linking to the problem or question under investigation (Bowen 2009). In addition, Corbin and Strauss (2008) opine that this approach can assist in improving the understanding of the topic under investigation. This method may potentially reduce interviewer bias or sampling errors that can be problematic when collecting primary data (Stent, Hooks & Bradbury 2010). Document analysis is perceived as a social

research method and one of the biggest benefits from using this method is the triangulation of information (Bowen 2009).

As document analysis is unobtrusive it reduces the possible bias from interaction and promotes deeper conceptual and contextual investigation (Babbie 2001; Webb, Campbell, Schwartz & Sechrest 1999; Huysamen 1994). This study mostly made use of peer reviewed articles and government issued reports and documentation. Bowen (2009) recommends that the selection of documents should be made based on the contribution they could offer to the study objectives. Thus, documents that could be deemed credible, authentic, complete and representative and of which the origin is known should be selected.

SOUTH AFRICAN POLICY ANALYSIS

The South African government deems entrepreneurship to be an essential driver of job creation and growth as its economic policy places emphasis on the development and promotion of entrepreneurs (SBP 2013:1). Furthermore, it promotes gender equality; hence a great deal of policy formulation has been implemented to support female development and reduce the gender gap (Wessels 2014). This section briefly examines the National Development Plan (NDP) which forms the basis on which the various South African government departments formulate their policies. In addition, four of the many South African government departments are analysed in brief to highlight their focus on entrepreneurship, small business and development of females. These departments were chosen on the basis that they have a direct and significant role to play in job creation, economic growth and development and gender equity. This is not to say that the departments not discussed in this study do not also play an important role in the sustainability of the South African economy.

National Development Plan

The NDP was compiled in 2011/12 by the National Planning Commission (NPC), consisting of 26 expert advisory board members. The main aim of the NDP is to address nine primary challenges many South Africans face on a regular basis. These include high unemployment, a low quality of education, poor and undermaintained infrastructure, the spatial divide, an unsustainable resource economy, a poor public health system, the poor quality of public services, high corruption levels and the racial divide (Alexander 2017:1). The main aim of the NDP is to reduce poverty and inequality by the target date of 2030 (The Presidency 2012:24). In the context of this study, only aspects of the NDP that address entrepreneurship, small business development and gender equality are discussed. It should be

noted that the plan addresses many other issues as listed in the aforementioned nine challenges.

Among its many goals, the NDP lists job creation and reduction of unemployment as its number one priority (The Presidency 2012:25) to increase economic growth, reduce poverty and ensure better equality for South Africans. Emerging from this challenge, the NDP places ample emphasis and attention on small business and entrepreneurship development (The Presidency 2012:30, 35, 86, 156, 226). As in many other South African policies and initiatives flowing from the main vision of the NDP, entrepreneurship and small business development are mentioned numerous times. The following focus areas are pointed out concerning small business and entrepreneurship development:

Ensure that life-skills and entrepreneurship training among the youth is improved in order for them to identify opportunities and act upon them (The Presidency 2012:30, 86, 143);

Ensure that South Africans unite by means of various achievements such as the creation of fertile conditions for entrepreneurship (The Presidency 2012:35);

Transform ownership to include previously disadvantaged groups by creating an enabling environment for black-owned small businesses with emphasis on black females. It is proposed that this can be done by redistribution (Black Economic Empowerment), local procurement and the creation of supply chains ensuring new growth in black-owned businesses (The Presidency 2012:58, 139, 141, 468);

Promote entrepreneurship in schools, reducing the cost of doing business in the country and lowering entry barriers which may aid in the development of new small businesses (The Presidency 2012:114, 139, 143, 469);

Promote skills development within new and underutilised sectors of the economy, specifically focusing on technology and innovation improvement (The Presidency 2012:144, 327);

- Ensure that Further Education and Training (FET) colleges identify scarce skills and introduce entrepreneurship training programmes (The Presidency 2012:144);
- Improve and promote skills development in the agriculture and tourism sectors with entrepreneurial training as a key focus area (The Presidency 2012:226);
- Provide financial support and ease administrative and regulation loads (The Presidency 2012:140) thus creating an enabling environment for small businesses to grow in and for new start-ups to enter the market (The Presidency 2012:41, 109, 135, 142);
- Ensure support for small businesses by ensuring better coordination of government agencies, creation of finance institutions and the establishment of private incubators (The Presidency 2012:40);
- Amend its 'one-size-fits-all' support programme outlook and introduce custom made support networks as entrepreneurs have different needs (The Presidency 2012:141);

- Promote entrepreneurship in sectors with high economic potential such as tourism, agro-processing and fisheries (The Presidency 2012:216); and
- Initiate incentives for small businesses and entrepreneurs who increase job creation through employment (The Presidency 2012:380).

The NPC acknowledges that in the short- to medium-term, most employment is created by the private sector (The Presidency 2012:140). It further asserts that public policy support should be given to these small business entrepreneurs by decreasing entry barriers and reducing unnecessary 'red-tape' regulation (The Presidency 2012:115, 156). In addition to entrepreneurship and small business development, the NPC also emphasises gender equity. Although the NPC emphasises female development, the bulk of this is from a socio-economic perspective. Issues such as access to education, discrimination, women abuse, prevention of mother-to-child HIV/AIDS infection, and nutrition for young and pregnant poor women, women's rights, equality, access to social services and safety are predominantly focused on (The Presidency 2012:29, 30, 33, 35, 36, 43, 280, 387). In addition, emphasis is placed on females being absorbed into the labour market in the form of public employment, empowerment through increased leadership and management positions as well as an increased earnings ratio compared to males (The Presidency 2012:42, 43, 132, 156). Very little focus is placed on females starting new businesses and entrepreneurship development among the members of this cohort.

The NDP forms the foundation upon which the various South African government departments develop their policies and frameworks. As there are numerous such departments, analysing each department could be included in numerous studies and the detail of this would not be relevant to the scope of this specific study. However, it is necessary to point out the contribution and emphasis being placed on entrepreneurship and gender equality by the following selected departments: Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), the Department of Economic Development (EDD), the Department of Small Business Development and the Department of Women's Affairs.

The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)

The DTI has as its mission the promotion of structural transformation in order to create a vibrant globally competitive economy, to create an enabling environment conducive to investment trade and business development. In addition, the DTI strives to increase participation in the economy, thus strengthening economic development. It conducts various studies on an annual basis, from which detailed publications in the form of reports are regularly published. Some of these, among others, include 'A guide to doing business', 'Guidelines for good

business practices', 'Industrial Policy Action Plan', 'Small Business Connect', 'Young Enterprise Development Strategy' and 'South Africa Business Incubation Handbook'. As the DTI has a broad development scope, this section just highlights some of the main entrepreneurial and business promotion initiatives and publications. The first of these publications is the 'Integrated Strategy on the Promotion of Entrepreneurship and Small Enterprises'. This document was completed in 2005 with a specific focus on creating an enabling legal framework for businesses, streamlining regulatory environments, facilitating access to information, marketing and procurement, finance and affordable physical infrastructure. In addition, training in entrepreneurship, skills and management is focused on, improving the labour environment, encouraging joint ventures and introducing differential taxations and financial incentives (Republic of South Africa 2005b:3). This document concentrates mainly on small business and entrepreneurship development, but attention to female entrepreneurship development is also emphasised. The South African Women Entrepreneurs Network (SAWEN) and the Technology for Women in Business (TWIB) emanated from the DTI. The TWIB supports the development of females in business, particularly through the encouragement of and application of innovative science and technology. Other female business development initiatives and networks include SAWIC (South African Women in Construction), WOESA (Women in Oil and Energy Sector Association), and SAWIMA (South African Women in Mining Association) (Republic of South Africa 2005b:10). Another report issued by the DTI during 2011, 'Towards an Enabling Environment for Women Economic Empowerment in South Africa', focuses specifically on female economic empowerment, with the following strategies being linked to achieving this. First, to increase the number of females who own, manage or control businesses; second, to develop female resources and skills; third, to achieve equal representation of females in occupational positions and the workforce; fourth, to ensure female preferential procurement; and finally to promote private investment in businesses that are owned or managed by females (Republic of South Africa 2005b:9).

The Department of Economic Development

The EDD has as its main purpose the mandate to improve the quality of life among South African citizens. A key responsibility of this department is that of job creation and economic development. Although the department recorded approximately 204 000 newly created jobs during 2015/2016, the number of unemployed citizens grew by 179 000, due to job creation not keeping up with growing numbers of job seekers. The number of employed citizens in 2016 was estimated at around 15 600 000 while the unemployment rate stood at 26.7 per cent (Republic of South Africa 2016b:10). The EDD offers four main programmes,

with programmes 2, 3 and 4 addressing aspects pertaining to entrepreneurship. Programme 1 mostly deals with factors pertaining to administrative issues. The main purpose of Programme 2 is to strengthen economic development policy. As part of this programme one of the key focus areas includes the facilitation of increasing the number of black female entrepreneurs in an attempt to create access to employment (Republic of South Africa 2016b:42, 46). Programme 3 promotes economic planning and coordination including aspects such as investment, competition and trade. Under this programme, the EDD commenced promoting investment, industrial funding and entrepreneurship as key drivers of job creation, economic and social inclusion (Republic of South Africa 2016b:47, 48). Programme 4 focuses on the promotion of social dialogue, implementation of strategic frameworks, capacity building and the promotion of increased entrepreneurship, innovation and productivity. The promotion of small- and medium-sized enterprises is central to economic growth and the creation of employment. The purpose of the entrepreneurship sub-programme is therefore solely to develop and promote policy framework with a view to increasing and improving innovative entrepreneurship. The EDD deems it necessary to create partnerships with other government departments such as the DTI, the Department of Higher Education, the various SETAs and FET institutions in order to promote a culture of entrepreneurship in South Africa (Republic of South Africa 2016a).

The Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) reports directly to the EDD ministry; during the financial year, 2015/16, it managed to save and create a total of 15 272 jobs. This was done through the provision of funding, predominantly earmarked for black industrialists (R2.9 billion), and female and young entrepreneurs (R1.2 billion) (Republic of South Africa 2016b:48). Although there is still much attention needed to increase entrepreneurship development in South Africa, initiatives such as those presented by the IDC have provided immense support and growth, especially to previously disadvantaged groups.

The Department of Small Business Development

The Department of Small Business Development (DSBD) was established for the primary purpose of creating a favourable environment for small business entrepreneurs in which to grow and develop. In order for this goal to be reached, the following four sub-goals were developed: economic growth, partnership formation, regulation and radical transformation. The aim of the first sub-goal, economic growth, is to facilitate the growth and development of small businesses in order to effectively contribute to job creation and economic growth. The second sub-goal is aimed at facilitating partnership formation in all domains of the government as well as in the private sector, which will in turn benefit the establishment of small businesses. The third sub-goal is to ensure an encouraging regulatory environment

that will assist small businesses to obtain market access, investment, finance and trade opportunities. Lastly, the fourth sub-goal is to target previously disadvantaged groups and to facilitate the radical economic transformation of these groups into mainstream economic activity (Republic of South Africa 2016c).

The DSBD has devised three incentives and one strategy with which it plans to achieve its goal and sub-goals. The National Informal Business Upliftment Strategy (NIBUS) was developed to address the void experienced in small to medium semi-informal businesses. NIBUS specifically concentrates on uplifting informal small businesses and providing support to local business chambers and associations, as well as assisting Local Economic Development (LED) offices within local municipalities. The strategy is mainly targeted at pre-designated groups such as females, young and disabled individuals who are situated in rural areas and townships throughout South Africa. Since the informal economy contributes significantly to the survival of many rural and township families, the government has identified this area as a key development zone in order to reduce poverty, increase employment and create equality. The outcomes of NIBUS link directly to those formulated in the NDP, and five key economic sectors needing intervention have been identified: retail, manufacturing, services, agriculture and construction and maintenance. Five strategic intervention pillars were developed to achieve the aforementioned outcomes. The outcome of Pillar 1 is to create an enabling legal and regulatory environment, while Pillar 2 aims to uplift enterprise development. Pillar 3 focuses on the facilitation of intergovernmental relations whereas Pillar 4 aims to create partnership and stakeholder engagement. Finally, the fifth pillar focuses on empowerment through knowledge information (Republic of South Africa 2016c).

The first of the three incentives is called the Black Business Supplier Development Programme (BBSDP). The BBSDP is an initiative structured around a cost-sharing grant that offers black-owned small businesses assistance to improve competitiveness and sustainability, in order to create employment and to increase the growth potential of these specific businesses. The programme provides grants up to R1 million for tools, machinery and equipment at a 50:50 cost sharing ratio, as well as for business development to improve skills at an 80:20 cost sharing ratio. The second initiative, the Co-operative Incentive Scheme (CIS), is explicitly intended to assist co-operatives by improving the viability and competitiveness of these businesses. This is done by a grant of up to 100 per cent that could lower the cost of doing business through offering an incentive that supports and promotes Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE). The last of the three incentives, the Shared Economic Infrastructure Facility (SEIF), is a basic crowdfunded investment scheme. The SEIF aims to create public sector investment to create funding for much needed infrastructure. Typical infrastructure provision includes warehouses, storage facilities, shared facilities, lighting, water and ablution, paving, shelter, exhibition space and similar business-related infrastructure. In creating this type of infrastructure,

especially in townships, rural and inner city areas where increased business activity takes place, an enabling environment for small businesses is created (Republic of South Africa 2016c).

The Department of Women's Affairs

The Department of Women's Affairs was established with the mandate of promoting the advancement of women, with a particular focus on socio-economic empowerment and gender equality (Republic of South Africa 2015). The department issued a number of special reports, of which the South African Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) report and the Status of Women in the South African Economy report are the most recent. The CEDAW report was developed to critically scrutinise the conditions South African females find themselves in and to point out achievements, challenges and best practice regarding female empowerment. Significant progress has been made since the first report in 1998, stating that government was on track regarding female inclusion in the public sector; however, many challenges still remained to increase female representation in the corporate and private sector (The Presidency 2009:7). The report once again places its main focus on female socio-economic challenges and the incorporation of females into management positions. The document does, however, make specific reference to the facilitation and development of female entrepreneurs. The report found that the number of female-owned small businesses exceeded that of male-owned ones in the informal sector, predominantly due to females starting small survival-type businesses (The Presidency 2009:96, 131). However, the opposite was reported in the formal sector. In addition, there is a tendency for female-owned businesses to remain smaller, less formal and have lower growth potential than male-owned businesses. Various measures have been promoted by the Department of Women's Affairs to improve this situation. These include:

- Special attention being given to access finance for female entrepreneurs. Several special funds were created in order to promote female empowerment, one of which is the Women's Entrepreneurs Fund. This fund provides loans and specific business advice and support for the establishment of female-owned small businesses. Loans, in the form of bridging finance, start from R50 000 and range up to R1 million. This fund also provides micro finance opportunities to female entrepreneurs (The Presidency 2009:103);
- Promoting the availability and access to funding or credit for female entrepreneurs and small business owners, thus increasing the chances for females to start new ventures (The Presidency 2009:11);
- Initiating of agreements based on incentives with major financial institutions to grant loans to female entrepreneurs (The Presidency 2009:129);

- Promotion of skills training and development for both urban and rural potential female entrepreneurs (The Presidency 2009:129);
- Providing learnership and mentorship opportunities for females who plan to become entrepreneurs (The Presidency 2009:129);
- Promoting and encouraging female students to take business and entrepreneurial training courses in school and during their tertiary education (The Presidency 2009:129);
- Transferring of information and communication to females regarding successful female entrepreneurs who can act as role models (The Presidency 2009:129);
- Ensuring that female entrepreneurs have access to information and data pertaining to the future growth potential of the South African economy (The Presidency 2009:129) and
- Encouraging the private sector to allocate and direct spending patterns, on social investment, towards female entrepreneurs (The Presidency 2009:129).

The department also initiated three programmes to assist with its overall mandate and objectives: the administration programme, the social transformation and economic empowerment programme and the policy, stakeholder coordination and knowledge management programme. The first of the three programmes, administration, has the core purpose of assisting the department with administrative tasks such as strategic leadership and management support. Three sub-sections are associated with this programme, i.e. departmental, financial and corporate management. The second programme, of social transformation and economic empowerment, focuses mainly on facilitating and promoting socio-economic empowerment and gender equality among females. This programme also consists of three sub-programmes: social empowerment and transformation, economic empowerment and participation and governance transformation, justice and security. Lastly, the third programme addresses policy and stakeholder coordination and knowledge management. Its goal is to conduct research, evaluate and review policies, monitor and evaluate changes in socio-economic empowerment and gender equality and to ensure stakeholder participation and coordination. This programme is made up of four sub-programmes: research and policy analysis, information and knowledge management, stakeholder coordination and outreach and lastly, monitoring and evaluation (Republic of South Africa 2015).

FEMALE ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN SOUTH AFRICA

As females have only formally started entering the field of entrepreneurship in recent decades and the literature on the topic of entrepreneurship historically focused on men, the current research on female entrepreneurship as a separate

field of study is sometimes inadequate. This had, however, already been identified by leading experts in the field of female entrepreneurship at the start of the 21st century (Bird & Brush 2002; Greene, Hart, Gatewood, Brush & Carter 2003; OECD, 2004; De Bruin, Brush, & Welter 2006). The need for supplementary research on female entrepreneurship further extends to developing and emerging countries where culture still plays a huge role in lack of development and empowerment of females. Many cultures still believe that females are solely responsible for home- and family-related tasks as well as reproductive purposes (De Bruin *et al.* 2006:586; Karanja & Bwisa 2013:34, McAdam 2013:5). This perspective on a female's role in the community could restrict women from starting a new business or hinder the growth potential of an existing business. Many African cultures continue to believe that women should not own any assets and that everything they own actually belongs to their husbands; this creates structural and cultural challenges for female entrepreneurs (Chitsike 2000:73; Mungai & Ogot 2012:175–176).

Former Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) reports have indicated that the male to female early-stage entrepreneurial activity ratio varies considerably over different countries owing to various differences in cultures and customs (Herrington & Kew 2016:34). However, one constant remains: men are more likely to start new businesses than women. Female business owners may be influenced by many of the same elements and factors which male entrepreneurs face. Conversely, the assumption can also be made that they face a set of unique gender issues contributing to their lower early-stage entrepreneurial rates (Minniti & Arenius 2003:3). Various studies recognise that women do face greater and different constraints when it comes to starting new businesses (Herrington & Kew 2016:34; Poggesi, Mari & De Vita 2015:736–737; Minniti & Arenius 2003:2). Some of these constraints include lack of education, lack of work experience, comparative earning levels, networking constraints, motivation, family obligations, lack of capital and other assets as well as cultural stigmas (Matiwane 2005:7).

The aforementioned constraints are also relevant to South African females but, furthermore, race discrimination and HIV/AIDS can also be added as constraints (Matiwane 2005:2). A real concern for South African women is that there has been an increase in the gender gap regarding entrepreneurship from 2014 to 2015. During 2014, eight females engaged in early start-up entrepreneurship for every 10 males, but in 2015 this ratio decreased to six for every 10 males (Herrington & Kew 2016:5). According to the GEM South Africa 2014 report (Herrington *et al.* 2015:25), South Africa's rate of entrepreneurial activity is still relatively low compared to other developing nations. Although it is still considered minimal in relation to other sub-Saharan African countries, it has increased slightly over the last decade. A typical South African entrepreneur is usually a male, aged between 25 and 44 years, and normally resides in an urban area. Hence, a typical South

African entrepreneur is not considered to be from a rural background or a female, thus leaving much room for development in this regard. Matiwane (2005:9) found that there is a concentration of women business owners in the fields of crafts, hawking, services (such as hairdressers) and in the retail sector. Many of these businesses are classified as informal survival businesses and have little growth potential. Considering the aforementioned, it is crucial that appropriate government policies be developed and properly implemented to assist with reducing the specific barriers female entrepreneurs face.

South Africa's male and female TEA rates

The TEA rates define the number of adults who are actively involved in a start-up business or who are in the process of starting one (Herrington & Kew 2013:22). As mentioned before, the gender gap for entrepreneurial activity in South Africa is widening. This is of concern for the following reasons:

- Studies from the International Labour Organisation (ILO 2015) have demonstrated that countries with a high female labour force are more robust and experience lower declines in economic growth;
- Females in the workforce act as powerful anti-poverty tools because women tend to spend their income on their households thus mitigating poverty levels (ILO 2015); and
- Larger gender gaps tend to lead to substantial losses in income and lower levels of economic development. Countries with the highest gender labour participation gaps could have income losses of up to 30 per cent of GDP per capita (ILO 2014).

South African female TEA is less than half if compared to the averages of other African and efficiency-driven economies. The African average female TEA, since the inception of GEM, was reported at 17 per cent, which is 10 per cent higher than South Africa's 2015 reported rate (Herrington & Kew 2016:35). The average rate for efficiency-driven economies for the same period was 13 per cent, which is almost double that of South Africa's 2015 reported rate. Even at the highest reported South African rate of 9 per cent in 2013, global comparative female TEA rates still outperformed South Africa. Considering the entrepreneurial pipeline, it is clear that intention needs to be prevalent for action to take place. In terms of the low entrepreneurial intention rate for South Africa, the corresponding low TEA rates for both males and females are not surprising. Kelley, Brush, Greene, Herrington, Ali and Kew (2015:16) state that both female and male entrepreneurial intentions in South Africa are rated the lowest of all participating African countries and in the bottom five countries of all efficiency-driven economies. Female entrepreneurial intentions are high throughout Africa, with the exception of South

Africa. This leads to lower levels of TEA and even lower levels of established business ownership rates. When the South African female TEA rate is compared to the rest of Africa, South Africa is once again ranked second last, with just Algeria slightly below. Africa and South-east Asia are considered the two regions where gender equality regarding early-stage entrepreneurship is the highest, with some countries reporting higher female TEA than that of males. Since these two regions are prone to biased social and cultural norms when it comes to women, the high female TEA rates are exceptional (Kelley *et al.* 2015:18).

Government and private entrepreneurial initiatives are available and aimed at new and expanding entrepreneurs; both male and female entrepreneurs may apply for this support. The following organisations operate initiatives aimed solely at female entrepreneurship and business owners: Businesswomen's Association of South Africa (BWASA), SAWEN, Organisation for Women in Science in the Developing World (OWSD), the Way Women Work (TWWW) and Africa Businesswomen's Network (ABWN).

BWASA was originally established in 1979 under the name Executive Women's Club, the National Association of Women Business Owners. One of the main aims of this association is to ensure the advancement of women who are active in the business environment. It plays a crucial part in campaigning for the importance of women being actively needed to have a role in the transformation of the economic and business environment. BWASA provides an interactive and important platform for women in the form of capacity building, inspiration and opportunities through various initiatives. The following are some of the programmes and initiatives run by it:

- The Economic Women Empowerment Programme (EWEP) was developed to reinforce the role women play in the economic environment. One of the initiatives is the Economic Gender Advocacy Programme, which is aimed at improving and amending the content of the new Women Empowerment and Gender Equity Bill (WEGE) as well as establishing a Charter for Women's Empowerment (CWEP). These initiatives are geared towards the establishment of a female-oriented supply chain which fast tracks opportunities for women and assists in levelling the playing field in the business environment.
- The 'South African Women in Leadership Census' is a publication examining gender equality in corporations in South Africa. The census ultimately aims to determine how many women hold leadership positions in state-owned enterprises and companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). Some additional research included in this report comprises examining the status quo of government procurement policies, and competitiveness concerning businesswomen. In order to achieve this, primary research to determine the challenges faced by female entrepreneurs regarding opportunities within government procurement and tender processes is conducted. Support in the form of knowledge

and skills transfer to women, for them to better understand the government supply chain and procurement systems, is included in this initiative.

- BWASA also offers a range of corporate courses providing opportunities to women to stimulate further interest in the field of business by linking and partnering with institutions involved in education. These corporate courses are aimed at, but not limited to, improving personal leadership, networking, coaching, as well as finance and risk management.
- In order to create additional supply chain diversity, the initiatives VALUE, ADVANCE and WIRED were set up. The Value Chain Development for Women Enterprise Programme (VALUE) is also aimed at advancing economic development among women. This is done by enabling opportunities for businesswomen to advance their businesses, to improve the business environment for female entrepreneurs and to ensure an increase in the roles which women play during public policy planning. The ADVANCE Training Programme is aimed at women entering the government supply chain. The Women Invested in Responsible Enterprise Development Programme (WIRED) is specifically aimed at accelerating women-owned businesses which have been operating for more than two years. This programme focuses especially on coaching, advising and training to ensure that the businesses are at a stage to apply for finance.
- The International Trade and Investment Programme (ITIP) is aimed at assisting female business owners to obtain better access to trade opportunities as well as being part of trade negotiations and agreements.
- BWASA also runs various Corporate Social Investment (CSI) projects and awards a number of bursaries for qualifying women students who wish to pursue a postgraduate degree (BWASA 2017).

SAWEN, as an initiative established by the DTI, is a platform created for all existing and potential women entrepreneurs operating in the small- medium-enterprises (SME) sector in South Africa. Its main mission is to determine the social-economic barriers which women entrepreneurs face, and in turn monitor improvements in this area. Its purpose is also to determine the positive impact of women entrepreneurs in South Africa. Some of the objectives set by SAWEN include:

- Striving to provide a platform that brings female entrepreneurs together to discuss barriers and challenges faced by them.
- Initiating discussion between public, private and government organisations on issues and challenges faced by female entrepreneurs.
- Aligning with other organisations on national and international level that have similar goals to SAWEN.
- Facilitating access for female entrepreneurs to resources, opportunities and information which could assist in improving global participation.
- Profiling businesswomen in leadership positions.

SAWEN provides a range of services including networking platforms such as monthly information sessions, quarterly provincial gatherings and annual general meetings. It offers skills training such as workshops and seminars, courses and special programmes. Furthermore, it provides a platform for female entrepreneurs to link to existing opportunities; this is done by introducing its members to exhibitions, trade fairs, initiatives and missions. It also offers mediation, legal and general advice and access to business information (The Presidency 2009:103; DTI 2017).

The OWSD was established in 1987 and although it is not specifically focused on women in business, it was started to assist in promoting women in the sciences sector and to assist in leadership formation. These objectives are carried out through training, networking and career development; all aimed at women scientists specifically in developing countries (OWSD 2017).

Another businesswomen's initiative, TWWW, was established in 2010 to assist businesswomen from emerging and developing countries including Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Latin America. This initiative complements and works in collaboration with similar organisations such as BWASA in providing career and business advice to women in need, especially in the light of cultural and social backlogs among women in these countries. TWWW makes use of online, free and self-managed coaching through webinars and other interactive media. It aims to decrease the gap between the level of education attained by women and successful career and business involvement (TWWW 2017). Lastly, the ABWN was launched in 2009 with the purpose of assisting in the acceleration of economic growth and improving women's general quality of life. ABWN strives to promote development of its local partners through providing quality services and programmes to businesswomen (BWASA 2017). These programmes are aimed at assisting women entrepreneurs to advance their business careers; the role they play in improving gender and business equality in South Africa is immense. Without organisations such as these, many female small business owners would not have existed.

The presence of strong networks is an important element in entrepreneurship and particularly in female entrepreneurship development. Female entrepreneurs may have different expectations when considering business and social networks and, in some cases, females lack informal social networks or may have much smaller networks than males. They may also prefer to be part of female networks and if there is a shortage of these types of networks it could potentially mean that these entrepreneurs may not be part of any network. As a result of the aforementioned, it can be recommended that more female-oriented business networks be developed. This can be done either by local government initiatives, business incubators or even through private initiatives. Although many female-driven business networks do exist in South Africa (SAWEN, SAWIMA, TWIB, OWSD and BWA) these networks are large and formal in size and may exclude smaller

female-owned businesses. Having smaller and similar network opportunities, for example: similar industry networks, business size, mothers in business groupings; on a local level could prove much more successful than large nationally-driven networks, although their roles are also very important for the bigger development picture of female entrepreneurship development. A possible way of initiating this could be by establishing small female entrepreneurial groups under the leadership of a successful female business owner from the local community in order to exchange advice, experience and problem solving mechanisms. This can also assist in promoting confidence for increased business growth. Several such initiatives have been successfully implemented in some of the European Union countries.

CONCLUSION

Entrepreneurship development is an important aspect within economic growth and development. Entrepreneurship and the many activities linked to it have been evident in the writings of many major economists, dating back centuries. In addition, numerous research studies emphasise the importance of developing female entrepreneurs, not only to contribute to the economic growth and development of a country, but also to assist with the development of females and the reduction of the socio-economic challenges faced by this cohort. From the aforementioned analysis it is evident that the South African government emphasises small business and entrepreneurship development and that a considerable amount of money, time and effort has been expended in the formulation of strategies, policies and initiatives. Although entrepreneurship and small business development is an important focus area for a country which is struggling with high unemployment levels and socio-economic challenges, such as South Africa, the implementation and success rates of these initiatives is sometimes questionable. One possible critique of the many comprehensive strategies, policies and initiatives by these various government departments could be that they repeat great amounts of similar information, creating confusion and a situation of 'information-overload' in many instances for people with low skills levels. In addition, the information is sometimes outdated and not transferred to the intended parties in a timeous manner. In conclusion, the South African government has nevertheless made much progress on the theoretical topic of female empowerment and small business development and, with improved implementation efforts, the aforementioned department's initiatives and programmes may result in even better outcomes.

South Africa may possibly be one of the leaders in the development of gender equality policy. However, the implementation and success rates of some of these policies and initiatives are sometimes questionable. Another concern regarding South African policies and initiatives stemming from them is that they are not

adequately promoted and many entrepreneurs are not aware of the possibilities for potential mentorship and financial assistance. In light of this, a further recommendation could be that government implements stricter guidelines in following up assistance that was provided to entrepreneurs to determine the effectiveness of these policies and initiatives. Regarding the implementation aspects, special roadshows or campaigns could be held on an annual or bi-annual basis to promote the support offered by government departments. In addition, government policies that may assist in the promotion of female entrepreneurship should include: fostering a more gender neutral legal framework, especially in business, reducing red-tape, which includes aspects such as lesser administrative obligations, relaxing regulatory restrictions, increasing access to finance especially for female entrepreneurs, improving financial, literacy and business management skills training for young females, particularly in rural areas, and promoting more family-friendly policies. This can be achieved through greater stakeholder and even public private partnership (PPP) cooperation, enhancing policy outcomes and principles and promoting and studying best practice case studies as benchmarks. In addition, many of the current policies are aimed at entrepreneurship in general. If specific policies that solely target female-owned small businesses can be developed, the effect of these may be greater in achieving success. Policies such as these have already been implemented in the USA and South Korea with marked success rates.

NOTE

*   This article is based on the doctoral thesis of the author for the degree Doctor in Philosophy in Entrepreneurship at the North-West University titled: "South African female entrepreneurs' intention to remain in business".

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New Public Management, Quick Fixes and Policy Churn in South Africa

A Case Study of Eastern Cape Hospitals

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ABSTRACT

This article examines policy churn in the context of New Public Management through a case study of two Eastern Cape hospitals from 2003 to 2012. After 2003, the Eastern Cape Provincial government introduced three institutional changes at its urban hospitals: the 'business-isation' of the hospitals; the amalgamation of large hospitals into mega-complexes; and the implementation of a performance management system. Using mainly primary sources (in-depth interviews with key informants in management, frontline staff and labour organisations involved in these changes), the authors researched various actors' understandings of these New Public Management reforms. The article found that the provincial government authorised hasty reforms and that changing policy paradigms and personnel created an unstable situation, where staff were caught between competing models, cultures and identities. The contribution of this article also lies in reflecting on the literature on New Public Management and bringing a labour perspective to the under-researched topic of policy churn in South Africa.

INTRODUCTION

In the last few decades, governments globally have tended to reinvent policies and re-structure organisations on a startlingly regular basis. For example, a 2017

United Kingdom (UK) Report titled *All change,* noted that in "further education since the 1980s there have been 28 major pieces of legislation, 48 Secretaries of State with relevant responsibilities, and no organisation has survived longer than a decade … Churn highlights some persistent weaknesses in government" (Norris and Adam 2017:3). The short-term costs of such instability are often significant, but the longer-term costs of institutional churning are substantially higher. Chopping and changing policy paradigms and personnel creates an unstable state, caught between competing models, cultures and identities. This also leads to policy vacuums, opens the door for systematic corruption and uncertainty. New Public Management (NPM) which specifically calls for a radical departure from the "old model of public administration has been blamed for such churn and instability which leads to the erosion of a public ethos" (see Hood and Peters 2004 and Newman and Clarke 1997 for an account of the paradoxes of NPM). South Africa is not an exception to this trend.

In South Africa, the National Planning Commission (NPC), launched in 2010, lamented the "instability resulting from repeated changes in policy" (or policy churn) as a major obstacle "to building a sense of professional common purpose in the public service" (NPC 2011:260). The National Development Plan (NDP) (Chapter 13) warned that the "temptation of quick fixes has diverted attention from more fundamental priorities, particularly the deficit in skills and professionalism affecting all elements of the public service" and "unnecessary turbulence in senior posts in the public service and reduced confidence in the leadership, which undermines the morale of public servants and citizens' confidence in the state" (NPC 2011). The NPC (2011 Chapter 13) also noted that for senior bureaucrats "policy work becomes about commissioning consultants and managing contracts, not engaging directly in policy analysis. This is likely to lead to a widening gap between policy formulation and implementation". While state capture and rampant corruption and the fragmented nature of the state have been at the centre of debates in the last few years under former President Jacob Zuma's leadership (Pillay and Mantzaris 2017; Rispel, Jager and Fonn 2015), institutional instability, an equally corrosive process that enables corruption, has seen much less scholarly attention. One of South Africa's biggest and perhaps least understood problems therefore may be policy churn.

The focus of this article is a case study of various understandings about the extent and effects of policy churn and paradigm shifts linked specifically to NPM. Although there are many good examples of policy churning in SA, this article specifically looked at three NPM-style 'innovations' in the Eastern Cape (EC) public hospitals sector. These were: the 'business-isation' of the public-sector hospitals (2003-2011); the implementation of a performance management system called the Personnel Management and Development System (PMDS) in 2007; and the amalgamation of large hospitals into mega-complexes which would then be put

under business leadership (2003-2011). Taken together these three changes were part of a 'paradigm shift'.

The article raises larger questions about the nature of the state, weaknesses in policymaking institutions and approaches to collective action problems in South Africa. It addresses the literature on NPM in South Africa which has largely understated the corrosive impact of policy churn. NPM-inspired consultancy and outsourcing is itself a mega global industry (Stone 2004). NPM and its resultant irrational policy churning have devastating consequences for the poor and for the country.

This article is based on in-depth interviews with managers, frontline staff and labour organisations. Labour and frontline managers have been seen as being resistant to change in the NPM literature. The article has a context-setting section covering NPM and the EC and methodology, followed by three sections dealing with NPM experiments at the case study sites. The final section draws a broader balance sheet in light of debates about the nature of the state in South Africa. The contribution of the article lies in bringing a labour perspective to a major weakness in South Africa's policy landscape.

POLICY CHURN AND THE UNSTABLE STATE IN NPM CONTEXT

In policy analysis, churning or spinning was an idea developed by Hess (1997; 2011) to refer to an endless stream of new initiatives. Policy churn can be seen as an "unnecessary transition to a new policy instrument rather than solving the underlying cause of the problem" (Monios 2017:352). Newman and Clarke (1997) refer to churn as 'policy proliferation' which they associate with the 'unstable state' and high staff turnover. This in turn is linked to a proliferation of dispersed actors (state, private and NGOs) who speak for the 'public'– itself fragmented into customers, clients or users (Newman and Clarke 1997). Generally speaking, sustainable and stable public institutions embody distinctive competencies, stable career paths and a well-integrated normative structure (Ansell, Boin and Kuipers 2016). Strong institutions have deep-rooted ways of doing things, often established through extensive experience. While these elements may produce inertia, they also produce "a high degree of collective and reflexive agency" (Ansell *et al.* 2016:423). Repeatedly disrupting routines and established patterns (churning) can erode effective institutions (Ansell *et al.* 2016).

One of the key reasons for institutional instability and policy churn, according to Peck (2001:452), is a neoliberal dynamic of almost "perpetual reform… there is always another solution over the hill". Additionally, as Beetham (2013:4) notes, instead of governments controlling the excesses of the corporate sector in the public

interest, they have become increasingly its "chief promotional agent". The dismantling of public institutions under neoliberalism, called "creative destruction" (Harvey 2007) allows for the unprecedented opening up to markets. But since much of this is authored by the state, this article calls it 'creative self-destruction'.

NPM advocates specific changes such as restructuring of civil service departments into arms-length agencies or corporate entities mainly through contracts and competitive mechanisms such as contracting-out and internal markets and performance-based accountability (Polidano 1999). In general, NPM sees the state as an 'enabler' rather than as implementer with bigger roles for consultants and external agents. NPM typically depicts organised labour as inflexible and resistant to change while presenting its 'partnerships' with capital and selected non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in glowing terms.

Stone (2004:561) argues that, the 'new public management' (NPM) was spread around the globe because of the existence of a global 'fashion-setting' network of management consulting firms and growth in the use of external consulting services by governments (and) large consulting firms such as PriceWaterhouseCoopers, KPMG or Andersen Consulting established 'government consulting divisions' advocating the adoption of a more managerial approach in government.

The literature on policy churn and policy transfer has pointed to the role of commercial interests in the often ineffective transfer of 'best' practice (Holden 2009). Policy churn in the form of the inappropriate transfer/change of policies allows for enormous profits for an ever expanding consultant industry and top bureaucrats who receive bonuses and subsequent appointments in the private sector in what is termed 'a revolving door' (Beetham 2013).

The paradox, however, is that for NPM not to veer out of control, it requires stable Weberian state institutions. Thus, as Pollitt (2007) noted, "[I]it appears that the NPM works best when it is built on the secure foundations of a stable Weberian bureaucracy. It can have very negative effects when injected into situations where the civil service is highly politicised and un-professionalised, the 'public service ethic' is hardly known, budgets are unstable and accountability is weak. The paradox, then, is that the NPM needs its enemy – traditional bureaucracy – in order to succeed" (Pollitt 2007:113).

BACKGROUND TO NPM IN POST-1994 SOUTH AFRICA

The ruling African National Congress (ANC) inherited a fragmented, racialised state which provided quality public goods and services primarily for a privileged white minority. Following the first democratic elections in South Africa in 1994, "a host of foreign governments, donors and think tanks descended on South

African shores to offer advice" and NPM ideology was oversold to a government keen to rapidly transform the old state and deliver public services to all (Steinberg 2011:349). As Ruiters (2007:128) showed, service delivery was hampered because "over five years from 1997, the state reduced the overall size of the civil service by 13%, down to 1.1 million workers". Numbers of personnel in national state departments were reduced even more drastically by 39% over the same period. By 2003, however, the government admitted the shakeout of the civil service had been severe and even counter-productive (Ruiters 2007). 'Transformation fatigue' became a euphemism for the shakeout and ad hoc-ism that characterised changes since 1997. Not surprisingly, by 2001, hundreds of expensive consultants had to be employed to make up the personnel deficit in policy development, service delivery management and information technology. These consultants were, in the government's words, beginning to form a "parallel state" (Department of Public Service and Administration 2001:6).

Moreover, in South Africa, the NPM paradigm was combined with other policies such as preferential procurement for black-owned companies, anti-union measures such as outsourcing or labour brokering, affirmative action promotions, the cultivation of a black bourgeoisie, a get-rich-quick mindset and 'cadre deployment'. For the ANC, handing public services over to the 'private' sector looked especially attractive, particularly to private firms hastily assembled by the ANC's own 'comrades'. Consequently, South Africa became a major site for policy churn, class formation and neoliberal institutional experiments without building strong Weberian foundations (Pollitt 2007; Von Holdt and Murphy 2007) despite the later rhetoric about a 'capable state' and a professional civil service (NPC 2011).

A further aspect in South Africa was that the ANC had been in an unstable alliance with the labour movement and the South African Communist Party and this alliance became embittered especially in the public sector as the ally was also the employer. As Cameron (2009:12) noted, "The current South African context is characterised by sudden changes in political control of the state. President Thabo Mbeki was 'recalled' by the ruling African National Congress (ANC), prior to the impending 2009 general election". The significant influence of NPM as a destabilising factor was downplayed by the Minister (Fraser-Moleketi 2006). Yet, the South African approach as Sanders and Chopra (2006:76) noted, was "in line with new public management policies that focus on a slimmed down state, reduced levels of public expenditure, increased efficiency in the provision of public services through mechanisms such as outsourcing and competition, and an extension of the private sector's role".

However, a capable state requires trained career-minded professionals and policy and institutional stability. Stability in public institutions, however, has been elusive.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The primary research for this article was done over a four-year period, from February 2014 to October 2018. The authors interviewed the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs), senior managers and frontline staff at Cecilia Makiwane Hospital (CMH) and Frere Hospital. Site visits complemented the analysis of key informant information.

The shop stewards were interviewed in person (face-to-face in three cases and one telephonically). At the time, they were senior local leaders of the National Education, Health and Allied Workers' Union (NEHAWU) since they were all branch chairpersons with knowledge of the hospital and changes. Further telephonic interviews were conducted after a two-year period with a NEHAWU official at CMH and an administrative official at Frere Hospital, to verify consistency of earlier interviews. Each hospital which was researched had enough members to constitute a branch. NEHAWU had operated at these sites for more than two decades. Founded in June 1987 by workers from the education, health, government and social welfare sectors, NEHAWU has been affiliated to the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), an ANC-aligned body. Unionised employees who are also ANC members often exert informal power in hospitals and have often found ways to close the power gaps in managerial hierarchies.

Interviews at the two hospitals took place on site in a private setting. Shop stewards had no strong preferences about anonymity indicating that they were not afraid that the substance of interviews could lead to harassment by management. An interview schedule was used, allowing for standardised questions.

Institutional mergers and changes in the size of organisations: From complexing to de-complexing

The first institutional policy shift examined in this article is the 'complexing policy' whereby certain functions at two major hospitals (Frere and CMH) were to be centralised in 2005. At the time of the research (2015-2018), Frere Hospital was a former white, large, provincial, government-funded facility located in the coastal city of East London, with about 700 beds serving about 260 000 people. CMH on the other hand, was a large, provincial, government-funded facility located 25 km away from East London in Mdantsane – a former *bantustan* town. It had about 800 beds serving a similar sized population.

The context for this case study is that the EC has been among the administratively weakest, most under-resourced and unstable of the nine provinces in South Africa. Created from the amalgamation of the former Transkei and Ciskei bantustans and areas that fell within the Cape Provincial Administration (CPA), the EC Province faced formidable administrative and political problems in amalgamating

various institutions into a single provincial system after 1994. In the mid-2000s it employed close to 150 000 civil servants – mostly teachers and health workers (about 35 000 were health workers who for the most part were unionised) (Ruiters 2011).

Fiscal austerity in the EC, as in the rest of South Africa imposed during the Thabo Mbeki presidency (1999-2008), saw large hospitals become deeply stressed (more staff shortages and stock outs) while the government effectively disempowered hospital managers by over-centralising decision-making (Von Holdt and Murphy 2007).

The Health Department argued that these two hospitals ought to be combined into one complex (the East London Hospital Complex) under single management. Complexing required setting up a new Corporate Services Centre based at Eastern Beach in East London some 25 km from one of the hospitals. The centre would centralise 'transversal functions' such as clinical services, facility management, Human Resources (HR) and Information and Communication Technology (ICT).

The complexing policy was based on Chapter XIII Section 24 of the Eastern Cape Health Act of 1999 which provided for an Integrated Provincial Health System (Eastern Cape Department of Health 2004). The policy objective was to consolidate, revitalise and modernise all hospitals to provide an effective service delivery platform. The 2003/04 Strategic Plan of the Department pronounced that there would be a new organisational design and this would improve the management echelon and at the same time optimise the utilisation of scarce resources and pool together the scarce resources (cited in Allan, Overy, Somhlaba, Tetyana and Zepe 2004). It was also pronounced that there would be a shared support services programme on a *pilot basis* in the first year (Eastern Cape Department of Health Strategic Plan 2003/04 as cited in Allan *et al.* 2004).

The EC Health Member of the Executive Council (MEC), Dr Bevan Goqwana, championed the pooling of resources by arguing that the two major East London hospitals should be combined. Other hospitals in Umtata and Port Elizabeth would also be 'complexed'. The formation of these complexes was also designed to overcome apartheid discrepancies. According to Dr Goqwana, it would "end duplication of resources, to improve and rationalise the standard of service provision and cut costs" (Fengu 2011a). He further explained, "having (different) CEOs for these hospitals will mean double payments. The Department has had financial constraints, shortages of staff and this also means they are reverting to the apartheid system, where CMH offered a lower standard of services to that of Frere" (Fengu 2011a).

The Frere administrative clerk, and trade union member, however, noted, "it involved the relocation of personnel from both hospitals to the newly-acquired office complex in Eastern Beach. The personnel that were relocated from CMH and redeployed to Frere Hospital and the Eastern Beach office complex complained

about inconvenience and financial implications this move would have on them as their monthly travelling costs would increase without any increase in their salaries or without getting any travelling allowance. What I can remember is that the whole process was a logistical nightmare, which caused instability" (Interview, Frere Hospital administrative clerk 19 October 2018).

The Frere Hospital CEO, who recently received major awards for turning the hospital around, shared her retrospective understanding of complexing, as "the challenge is that if the staff have not been taken through a change management process, you are going to run into problems. For instance, the staff did not take it kindly because some felt they were being second-guessed and management offices were now located far from the facility and you will find that even for approval of requisitions, the staff had to go from the facility to the Corporate Services Centre" (Interview, Frere Hospital CEO, 27 November 2015).

The shop steward at CMH noted that organisational and travel arrangements were a logistical nightmare, "besides the medical services, all transversal functions such as human resources and supply chain were centralised at Eastern Beach office complex, which was about 27 km from CMH and 5 km from Frere Hospital. This new arrangement meant that even for personal HR matters employees had to sign forms to request transport to go and visit the HR section, which impacted negatively on the time and productivity of the employees. It also meant unnecessary rental costs of about R100 000 per month for the acquired office complex and all this constituted wasteful and fruitless expenditure in terms of the Public Finance Management Act" (Interview, CMH shop steward, 27 May 2015).

Staff had a diametrically opposite view of the workings of the policy (see Pressman and Wildavsky 1973 for classic examples of this). For instance, a CMH shop steward interviewed for this research commented that "this policy was first introduced in Chris Hani Baragwanath Hospital in the Gauteng Province. Actually, the Eastern Cape Health Department just copied it from Gauteng where it had failed … It was never thoroughly examined to determine whether it will work in the Eastern Cape Province. We were not even consulted as organised labour. It was just imposed upon us" (Interview, CMH shop steward, 27 May 2015).

The CMH shop steward further revealed that the complexing policy did not reverse apartheid inequalities but paradoxically made matters worse for some black patients. He felt that it was an affront to black people, since a lower standard at CMH resulted. He further asserted, that **"**this whole exercise was intended to *downgrade* CMH, which is located in Mdantsane, serving predominantly black African patients by taking away some Level 1 services and functions such as orthopaedics and urology to Frere Hospital, which is located in a historically white area and to a certain extent still serving the white population. Also, you must remember that urological ailments (the result of lifestyle and diet) and orthopaedic services (due to accidents) affect mainly the black African community living

in Mdantsane and surrounding areas. You can see this from the high number of patients visiting or who are admitted in these sections, compared to the others" (Interview, CMH shop steward, 27 May 2015).

The Frere Hospital administrative clerk had this to say about the consultative process around the complexing policy, "We were simply told it was a directive from the Head Office. Evidently it was discussed only with the Senior Management. As a member of the union, I know even our labour representatives and leadership were not involved in the conceptualisation and introduction of this policy" (Interview, Frere Hospital administrative clerk, 19 October 2018).

Illustrating the practical implications of this policy at the hospital, the Frere Hospital administrative clerk further commented that, "any personnel who required to see HR had to ask the transport section at Eastern Beach office complex (where the fleet management function was located) telephonically to provide a vehicle to fetch the concerned officials. The Eastern Beach office complex in turn would send a messenger with a government vehicle to fetch those officials from the hospital and take them to the office complex and back again. Can you see the logistical madness and unnecessary financial implications? This is the reason organised labour vehemently rejected this policy" (Interview, Frere Hospital administrative clerk, 19 October 2018).

Moreover, the CMH shop steward provided further penetrating analysis: "As organised labour, the removal of these sections from CMH meant two things: first, bringing these services to the historically white area to continue serving the white population without inconvenience and to serve black African elite who have moved into these areas. Secondly, the poor have to spend money they don't have to go to Frere which is about 20 km away, only to sustain the Frere Hospital" (Interview, CMH shop steward, 17 October 2018).

On a related topic, the Frere Hospital administrative clerk noted the role of highly paid consultants in implementing the policy, "We have also noted that in government lately, there is a prominence of the use of consultants and yet there are government officials that are employed to do that work. But the management will talk about insufficient budget when workers demand certain things such as employment of more staff, improved benefits and service delivery-related matters" (Interview, CMH shop steward, 27 May 2015).

Moreover, the *Daily Dispatch* reported, that "The Health Department was the biggest spender on consultants at R1 151 *billion* in 2011-12. The Auditor-General (AG) revealed during the 2010-11 financial year that consultants were appointed to perform core departmental functions. They are not adequately monitored even though staff are paid to monitor them. Furthermore, reliance on consultants is not accompanied by an appropriate level of skills transfer" (Zuzile 2012).

In this fraught context, the union therefore started the "Save our Makiwane Campaign". According to the shop steward, this complexing was eventually reversed

because of the "Save our Makiwane Campaign" (Interview, CMH shop steward, 17 October 2018). The wasteful, protracted complexing exercise came to an abrupt halt in 2011 when the national government (under then President Zuma) reversed this policy. Workers saw the reversal of complexing as their victory. The then Minister of Health, Dr Aaron Motsoaledi (champion of more social democratic, welfarist policies such as the National Health Insurance (NHI) and opponent of the marketising of health care) remarked: "An absurd centralisation of powers by provincial authorities has created a situation where hospital managers have lacked the authority to perform basic functions such as getting windows repaired" (Paton 2011).

The Frere Hospital CEO noted that the seemingly rational idea of centralising transversal functions (complexing) eventually had to be reversed, "Now, again we are going through a process of de-complexing, thus moving away from that complexing process. In my experience, I have found that in government, policies are not tested before being implemented and when they are not working, we abandon them just like throwing out the baby with the bath water" (Interview, Frere Hospital CEO, 27 November 2014).

The de-complexing process saw Frere Hospital and CMH once again being run as separate entities. Interestingly, the question of hospital management and complexing was discussed in parliament at the same time. In a written reply to parliament the Minister of Health announced, "The Department also needed to complete the de-complexing process for the East London Hospital Complex, as well as for the other two hospital complexes in Mthatha and Nelson Mandela Bay Metro. The completion of the de-complexing process resulted in Frere Hospital and Cecilia Makiwane Hospital being managed as separate hospitals (de-complexed)" (RSA 2011).

Appointing business leaders to run public sector hospitals on business principles

After 1994, the government sought to rapidly transform the demographics of the public service. Inexperienced managers were placed in senior positions. These hasty changes often resulted in loss of institutional memory. It also coincided with the hegemony of the NPM in South Africa (as explained earlier). The EC government became the first provincial government to appoint CEOs with 'business' backgrounds to lead public hospitals (Allan *et al.* 2004). These appointees were meant to introduce private sector 'culture' and practices to major hospitals. Dr Bevan Goqwana (EC Health MEC and a medical doctor) championed the business-isation of the EC public service (Allan *et al.* 2004). Likewise, the ANC nationalist stalwart and the second post-apartheid EC Premier, Reverend Arnold Stofile expressed similar antipathy towards the civil service in general when he remarked that the "civil service was unable to master the art of managing hospitals" (Allan *et al.* 2004:29). Stofile and the EC ANC leadership preferred governance

through private companies. Not all provinces went this far to shift the paradigm to the NPM: some appointed school teachers to run hospitals.

But by 2005, four of the five tertiary hospitals in the EC had appointed private sector managers as hospital CEOs (ECDoH 2007). This was combined with externalising/privatising (mostly security, laundry and catering) by signing two-year contracts with private management companies while the government retained responsibility for personnel, budget and provision of care with the expectation that there would be skills transfer[1] (Allan *et al.* 2004). Inadequate supplies of linen, outdated infrastructure, tender fraud and the appointment of contractors not up to the task, as well as water shortages, were some of the challenges (Allen 2004). The labour movement and the medical doctors' association, the South African Medical Association (SAMA), noted that, "corruption in procurement processes has led to tenders for services such as laundry being awarded to unqualified service providers" (COSATU 2011).

At that time, Frere hospital and CMH, as explained earlier, were merged into one East London Hospital Complex (ELHC). A non-medical manager, Vuyo Mosana was appointed in December 2005 to lead the complex. Mosana, a former trade unionist, ANC activist, former councillor and Mayoral Committee member in the Buffalo City municipality, had a degree in political science and paradoxically very little business experience (Paton 2011) This appointment attracted almost universal derision.

In 2007, during Mosana's tenure, Frere Hospital made headline news after hundreds of new-born babies were dying every year in the hospital's overburdened maternity section – many because of negligence (Forde 2007). Mosana was ill-qualified for the job but so too were the contractors brought in to deliver hospital services.

In 2011 the new Minister of Health, Aaron Motsoaledi criticised the appointment of unqualified hospital CEOs as a combination of bad policy and political patronage. Motsoaledi, however, argued that, "though patronage happened on a wide scale, it was never ANC policy to deploy its members to positions in hospitals. ANC structures do not see hospitals as an employment agency for friends" (Paton 2011). The matter was raised in national parliament. Mosana was finally pressured to resign after a massive public outcry and was 'redeployed' at similar pay to the Eastern Cape Department of Health in 2011. Paton (2011) also noted that the Mosana case showed that it was hard to dislodge people who had secured high-paying jobs based on their political credentials.

The appointments policy (of recruiting business people) was then reversed in 2011 along with the ill-fated 'complexing policy'. The *Daily Dispatch* reported, "The controversial head of East London Hospital Complex Vuyo Mosana was replaced by Dr Kobus Kotze who had been a medical doctor since 1999. We now have Kotze as an Acting CEO to drive the de-complexing of the complex" (Fengu 2011b).

In 2012 new criteria for appointing hospital CEOs were published in the Government Gazette stating that, "CEOs needed to be from healthcare backgrounds and needed at least five years' experience in middle and top management of a health institution" (SAPA 2013).

THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT

The third related change is the case of the institution of a PMDS introduced in 2007 in the EC hospitals. As noted by Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi, former Minister of Public Service and Administration, 1999-2008, "human resource and financial management practices were adopted that were associated with the New Public Management. This included the emphasis on issues of output and outcomes under the label of 'Performance Management" (Fraser-Moleketi 2006:63).

Performance measurement and management are integral to NPM. Formal reviews of performance became fundamental aspects of managing performance in hospitals (DPSA 2007). This was a framework applied to all hospital employees. Priorities are translated into a work-plan and performance agreements. In theory, this also enables employees to be involved in the management of their own performance. According to the policy, training should constitute an integral part of the PMDS. Managers, supervisors and employees receive training in specific elements of the system such as communication, problem-solving and conflict resolution to manage the system more effectively.

The CMH CEO noted, "There are various indicators that are used. These include clinical indicators such as bed utilisation, time spent on the patient and death rate; finance indicators such as time taken to pay suppliers (20-day turnaround time) as well as budgeting and expenditure patterns. PMDS implementation is now enforced and those who refuse to contract will not be paid and will be charged for misconduct. PMDS is not yet fully functional and the reason is that the whole policy was not properly inducted. In my experience, PMDS is associated with monetary rewards only. Compliance has up until recently been driven by motivation to get monetary rewards" (Interview, CMH CEO, 15 November 2015).

The CEO stressed how difficult it was to implement the PMDS, by indicating that PMDS implementation in the public sector has complexities because there are no objective measures of performance. Some key performance areas and outputs are unquantifiable and unmeasurable in some categories of employment. In some instances, these policies have to be adapted and customised to the organisational environment. Some of these policies bring unintended consequences" (Interview, CMH CEO, 15 November 2015).

The complexity of indicators and the fact that all functions are interrelated means that power outages may affect patient death rates (a clinical indicator). According to a Senior Professional Nurse at CMH, the PMDS was not properly implemented and management themselves did not understand it. The shop steward argued that the main problem was that basic requirements such as the Labour Relations Act, the Public Servants Act and the Employment Equity Act and basic discipline were not implemented properly. The SAMA reported that basic issues such as the non-payment of benefits to doctors undermined the system, "For the past five years, the [provincial] Department of Health has not provided any career paths for doctors. Doctors have not received the 1% performance-related notch increases; bonuses for doctors with exemplary service performance have been refused. The Cosatu-affiliated doctors' association, SAMA (South African Medical Association) has resorted to the courts and morale is at an all-time low" (SAMA 2013).

The CMH CEO also expressed his misgivings about the value of PMDS, "most employees' understanding of PMDS is problematic. It is focused on performance bonus and pay progression, disregarding the achievement of organisational goals and personal development. There is politicisation of PMDS which renders the implementation of the system and disciplinary procedures ineffective" (Interview, CMH CEO, 15 November 2015).

Following a review and evaluation in 2012 by the Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA 2012), which included feedback from both workers and managers, it was found that the PMDS did not fit in well given the absence of other basic conditions (such as having enough staff and equipment supplies) and that it should be reviewed. A significant finding was that the PMDS needed to be simplified as indicators were too complex and had multiplied (DPSA 2012).

This echoes Pollitt's (2000) warning about indicators 'wearing out' and being in constant need of updating as users learn to manipulate the system and a host of motivational problems related to perverse incentives. The PMDS saga points to a more general problem when professional accountability and trust is replaced by mechanistic quantitative performance measures (Pollitt 2000). In South Africa, as in the UK, "the development of performance management in the context of the 'new public management' has been primarily 'top-down' with a dominant concern for enhancing control and 'upwards accountability' rather than promoting learning and improvement" (Sanderson 2001:297).

RESISTING NPM

The EC health crisis invited intense critical media and public scrutiny. A Special Investigations Unit (SIU) inquiry into corruption disclosed that in the 18 months

between January 2009 and June 2010, officials and their allies in the provincial department stole more than R800 million (SAPA 2012). Despite the self-evident problems of the application of NPM in the EC, some elements of NPM were, however, retained after 2012 and by 2018 were still being resisted by trade unions. In a massive day of action that took the form of marches around the public health crisis, NEHAWU "wanted a full investigation into cases of fraud and corruption. It also wants the insourcing of all outsourced services in the Eastern Cape Provincial Administration and safe and secure workplaces" (Times Live 25 October 2018).

It was no surprise that a powerful coalition of social movements, trade unions and NGOs emerged, exposing the dire state of the EC public health services (Health-E News 2013). The Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) with the human rights organisation, SECTION27 have been key actors in the Eastern Cape Health Crisis Action Coalition – a coalition of over 20 partner organisations including doctors, unions and patient groups. The coalition campaigned for the removal of former MEC for Health, Sicelo Gqobana (Treatment Action Campaign 2018).

The NEHAWU EC provincial leaders in 2019 perceived that, "… current relations between NEHAWU and the Eastern Cape ANC Government are not good at all. NEHAWU in their thousands had staged a successful march against the EC Provincial Administration to elevate workers' issues to the attention of the Head of Government Administration but … it was all in vain as no response to the memorandum was ever provided by the Premier of the Eastern Cape. The ANC Government in the Eastern Cape is not able to change the present direction…. This is evidenced by a number of projects that are aimed at enriching individuals through the tender system at the expense of improving the service delivery through the filling of the vacant funded posts and insourcing all services. The current ANC leadership has not been able to adequately crack the whip to its deployees in Government" (NEHAWU 2019).

The trust that might have existed between labour and the state (and in the tripartite alliance) was badly eroded. As NEHAWU observed, the national ANC leaders seemed incapable of reining in its own provincial mandarins. These forces have twisted the meaning of the 'public interest' into crony forms of public administration and capitalism. NPM in this form particularly destabilised public institutions and undermined professionalism and a public service ethos.

The problems associated with policy/institutional churning in an NPM and class accumulation project context are not confined to the EC or the public health sector (NPC 2011). Von Holdt and Maserumule (2005:438) argued in the case of Baragwanath Hospital that "the breakdown of managerial structures and disciplinary relations in hospitals … (leads to) … a slow unravelling of workplace relations". Many institutions such as the Revenue Service, Social Security Agency, and Home Affairs (ironically cited by the NPC as examples where improvements occurred) have been highly compromised by churn and corruption (Bond 2014).

A 2017 report on public hospital institutions noted a number of persistent negative features (DoH 2017), "… the ongoing instability of management appointments and political office bearers and an apparent environment characterised by uncertainty and at times interference in the line functions of appointed officials at the hospitals".

Weber, as noted in Du Gay (1996), had argued that public office is, "… a particular moral institution and that the ethical attributes of the bureaucrat must be viewed as the contingent and often fragile achievements of that socially organised sphere of moral existence … access to office is dependent upon lengthy training in a technical expertise, usually certified by public examination; and that the office itself constitutes a 'vocation', a focus of ethical commitment and duty, autonomous of and superior to the bureaucrat's extra-official ties to class, kin or conscience" (Du Gay 1996).

Such moral existence, however, is inimical to the class project of the South African elite and old-order capital (Bond 2014).

CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RELEVANCE

First, this article has argued that in the mid-2000s the EC provincial government authorised hasty reforms based on NPM policy paradigms creating an unstable situation. Neoliberal ideas as espoused by EC leaders in the health sector were premised on the normative assumption of the inherent *incapacity* of the state, and the *apriori* superiority of the market and a preference for governance through experts, lawyers, accountants and private companies. An openly adversarial 'business' approach that sought to marginalise labour unions was advocated by policy-makers. Staff members were caught between competing models, cultures and identities. This led to increased levels of workplace conflict and lack of institutional cohesion.

The second contribution of this article was also to bring a grassroots perspective to South Africa's policy analysis scholarship through a detailed, concrete analysis of a bureaucratic system and relations between civil servants and politicians at two major hospitals. In particular, the article outlined the views of well-placed key informants and shop stewards to reveal the gap between policy intentions and implementation.

A third conclusion of the article is that the literature (Cameron 2009; Fraser-Moleketi 2006; Gasper 2004; Harrison 2006; NPC 2011; Von Holdt and Murphy 2007) and the NPC have largely papered over the corrosive impact of top-down neoliberal experiments based on the NPM paradigm on the public sector.

Looking ahead in the light of NHI reforms for a much stronger, unified health sector (Ruiters and Van Niekerk 2012), it is suggested that successful policy and its

implementation first needs to be locally relevant, well-resourced and fit the actual conditions rather than work from ideological over-simplifications or fashionable ideas. It should be informed by institutional memory and be democratic and open to learning, inclusive, participatory and citizen-centred. The implementers of policies (the frontline workforce) need to be thoroughly consulted, valued and involved to avoid unnecessary mistakes and ensure the continuity of care and public service. This calls for a more incremental and democratic approach based on local knowledge of what works and local workplace and service delivery dynamics.

Broad assumptions behind policy need to be tested by careful collection of evidence or conducting feasibility studies within the prospective recipient environments to determine the appropriateness of perceived best practices in given contexts.

NOTE

* This article is based on a completed thesis with the title, *Transferability of Policies and Organisational Practices across Public and Private Health Service Delivery Systems: A Case Study of Selected Hospitals in the Eastern Cape: Exploring Lessons, Ambiguities and Contradictions*, under the supervision of Prof G Ruiters.

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Improving the Management of Inappropriate Use of Information Technology by University Students

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ABSTRACT

Information technology (IT) brought with it ethical challenges, where hu-man beings are tempted into using IT to commit crime and to engage in other forms of unethical behaviour. This has led to a need for IT ethics, and measures on how to manage these challenges. In recent years, ethical problems related to the inappropriate use of IT have been transplanted from society to the university environment. Universities are now experiencing the same, and in some cases even more, extreme forms of unethical be-haviour, which have been committed through the inappropriate use of IT by students. This study sought answers for the better management of inap-propriate use of IT by students.

The current literature on the issue was assessed to find out how students use IT to behave unethically, and about the types of IT devices students use to do this. Comparative analysis and assessment of selected university case studies were then employed to determine how those case studies deal with the issue. The main findings of the study indicated that universities have their own student discipline units and IT usage policies but that their respective IT management strategies can be improved to achieve better results.

INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT

IT devices such as mobile phones, telefaxes, radios, television, computers, tablets and the ever-increasing innovation of new and more powerful computer-related

technologies have changed the way we live. The IT revolution has brought about many global changes, revolutionising the world in terms of the way people live and interact with one another (Omonijo 2012:387).

The IT revolution also led to the development of a new discourse on IT ethics. This affects universities in that they must develop strategies to deal with unethical IT-related activities by students (Ison 2014:274; Stabingis, Sarlauskiene & Cepaitiene 2014:689–690). The IT revolution has expanded the ways in which students can engage in unethical behaviour (Ison 2014:274). This complicates the management of the inappropriate use of IT by students. An improvement in the response by universities to the inappropriate use of IT by students is needed for the development and improvement of a culture of more ethical behaviour by students on campuses.

This article summarises the results of a research project that was undertaken to investigate and assess how the negative or inappropriate use of IT by students can be better managed at universities. Student ethics management models and their implementation processes and practices at selected universities are also assessed to find better ways of managing this problem. Universities need to manage students' unethical behaviour to maintain law and order, to protect their reputations as stable universities and to teach and to improve or inculcate cultures of ethical behaviour among their students.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The first research objective was to evaluate how IT is or can be used by university students to commit unethical activities. The second objective was to review current management approaches and practices related to the use of IT by students at selected universities. The third objective was to present policy proposals for the improvement of student behaviour management in an era of increasingly sophisticated IT development and applications at universities.

The qualitative case study research design and methodology used comprised of a literature assessment of the IT revolution in the public service and higher education, student IT behaviour, cyberethics and the general management of inappropriate student activities by universities. The research design and methodology also included documentary analyses and assessment of misconduct cases reported and their trends; as well as university policies and procedures (Yin 2014:105–122).

A purposive sampling technique was used for the study to select student ethics managers as interviewees. This sampling approach is based on the premise that, as student ethics managers, they have the best knowledge about the nature and management of student behaviour at their individual universities (Etikan 2015:2).

The units of analysis were organisational case studies of four selected universities. A cross-case, or comparative analysis of case studies was employed to link the collected data to the research question and objectives. Yin identifies the following main elements of good case study research: a case study's questions, propositions, unit of analysis, the way the data will be linked to the propositions, and the way the findings will be interpreted (Yin 2014:29).

The comparative university data about the management of inappropriate IT use include policies, practices, and the type of IT-related misconduct committed by students between 2012 and 2015, and how the cases have been managed. The identities of the universities have been kept confidential to provide anonymous reporting of data as required by the research ethics approval conditions.

The following criteria were applied to select the four case study universities:

- Inclusion of one traditional and two comprehensive universities as well as one University of Technology.
- Location of institutions in two different provinces.
- Two institutions with few students (approximately 24 000) and two with many students (approximately 76 500 students). The total number of students was approximately 100 500.
- Institutions with a racial and academic diversity of students and disciplines.
- Institutions familiar and new to the researcher.
- Institutions in relative proximity to the researcher for purposes of ease of access to minimise the costs of the research.

Together, the four selected case studies constitute a relatively accurate reflection of the existing range of higher education institutions in South Africa.

THE IT REVOLUTION AND GOOD GOVERNANCE IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR

The IT revolution is an increasingly important variable in the theories of good governance in the public sector. The integration of the IT revolution into management practices has led to a positive impact on service delivery by the public sector. The IT revolution has also led to the organisational restructuring of the public sector in terms of developing potentially better administrative and service delivery systems and strategies. It further allows governments to design improved public service goods to suit their constituencies and assists governments in understanding their constituencies and marketing their services to their communities better. The IT revolution further allows governments to easily receive feedback from communities with built-in IT feedback system designs. It has also led to the enhancement of governments' performances in their service delivery obligations to the public.

The integration of IT into the public sector can result in improved government efficiency, standardisation of public services and the delivery of automated services to the public. It has also led in many cases to the minimisation of government business risk related to security threats and to better compliance with service standards (Altemimi & Zakaria 2016:88–89).

Good public sector governance principles and practices are crucial elements to achieve improved decision-making, efficient use of resources, production of good quality services, enhancing accountability and transparency in the use of public resources. The principles of good governance include: commitment to integrity, ethical values, the rule of law, transparency, accountability, capacity development, engagement, risk management, and achieving desirable and sustainable outcomes. This also includes good governance in the management of IT and the integration of IT in all public sector activities. Good governance and management therefore include the design, integration and implementation of IT strategies in public service business models to enhance public services delivery (Juiz, Guerrero & Lera 2014:9–12).

The age of the internet has led to the growth of e-governance in the public sector. This was significant progress in terms of the IT revolution in the public sector at the time. There are good reasons why governments are delivering their services online unlike before the IT revolution. Governments aspire to provide seamless services to their population in the comfort of their homes, and to improve access to these services, using online government access platforms. The IT revolution facilitates the modernising or transforming of public sector services by creating easy access. Citizens can also utilise self-service websites using mobile IT devices such as laptops and mobile phones linked to internet technologies (Kernaghan 2014:296–301).

From a negative perspective, however, the advent of IT has also created ethical challenges for the public sector. One of the main challenges of the IT era is the issue of privacy in this age of government intelligence gathering services, information sharing and matching services. Critical questions on integrity and honesty of public servants have also been raised by the IT revolution. These relate to moral problems or dilemmas in situations where IT or computer technology devices can be used for unethical activities.

The ethical dilemmas relate to public officials, as employees, using government internet services to search internet sites for personal gain or satisfaction, browsing pornographic websites, disseminating public and private information without due authority, conducting private political activities, accessing internet sites that promote racism, hatred, militancy and extreme political views outside the main social stream, viewing videos online while on duty, committing theft or fraud using employer IT services, extortion, and looking for other job opportunities while on duty. Many employees are regularly subjected to disciplinary hearings and risk suspension, fines or dismissal from their jobs. Many government agencies already

had to update their codes of conduct to include IT-related ethical breaches committed by their employees (Kernaghan 2014:301–310).

The potential and real impacts of IT on the public higher education sector are enormous. It covers wide areas of the sector from administrative activities to classroom education offerings. There have been numerous changes in the way classroom teaching is conducted ranging from physical, residential classrooms characterised by chairs, tables, note taking, books, pens, pencils and chalkboards; to online group discussions, laptops, desktop computers and internet-based communications systems (Sarkar 2012:31). IT also helps universities in detecting plagiarism and infringement of copyright laws through the deployment of antiplagiarism software (Sarkar 2012:37).

IT AND ETHICS

Virtue ethics has a role in the character development of a person. It provides a framework for individuals to behave ethically. It relates to living an honest life in terms of prescribed ethics (Bright & Winn 2014:445–446). Virtue ethics is at the centre of the ideal conduct in life that we should aspire to, including societal and family values. Virtue ethics is therefore about what is deemed proper conduct of behaviour and how human beings should live their lives. It also has important educational significance. This includes the development of policies by educational institutions and organisations which define university culture, including the conduct of students. Codes of conduct for student behaviour at universities are therefore supposed to promote positive character development (Gray 2015:1–10).

University students' conduct is also related to the social contract theory of ethics. The social contract theory of ethics always requires that students do not commit any unethical behaviour that may harm the good name of the university. Social contract theory requires students to do good or not to harm others (Jones 2016:34). Students must conduct what is perceived by society as acceptable behaviour. This applies to universities as well as their communities. Universities therefore design codes of conduct or policies that serve as a social contract between an individual student and a university and the interaction between a student and the entire university population.

Information Communication Technology (ICT) ethics is increasingly regarded as an important part of any social contract document designed to manage student behaviour on campus (Jones 2016:34). ICT ethics relates to the social contract that determines the ICT behaviour that is acceptable or unacceptable at university. ICT ethics also influence community ethics, in the short-term for the student community and in the medium-term for the workplace and family as students leave university to start their own careers and families.

Inappropriate or illegal ICT behaviour negatively affects ideal conduct and may lead to criminal or civil proceedings against perpetrators. This may result in disciplinary hearings if occurring in the workplace or school, where such behaviour is against the prescribed rules of conduct. Young people might use cell phones, online chat forums, social networking sites or instant messaging services to commit fraud and plagiarism by using crib notes stored on their cell phones (Omonijo 2012:391).

Internet-based chatrooms or social media interactions are some of the commonly used methods of interaction at personal level by people all over the globe. Many young people harass others or are harassed online. This includes cyberbullying, cyberattacks, the dissemination of insulting messages using cyberspace and cyberstalking. The availability of the internet has increased opportunities and threats of abusing IT for wrongdoing. This threat is huge and widespread, and the associated dangers and risks are significant. One of the main problems is that the internet provides opportunities for individuals to act anonymously. They can hide their identity or use fictitious identification. The internet has introduced new forms of criminal or unethical behaviour (Omonijo 2012:387–388–390).

The most common inappropriate or unethical abuses of ICT include e-cheating. This refers to academic misconduct like unauthorised copying during tests, students helping each other during formal academic assessments, assignments, experiments and research papers, and the falsification of academic papers (Paapa & Boakye 2017:4–7). Online plagiarism consists of intentional or accidental plagiarism. Intentional plagiarism involves direct cutting and pasting of complete online documents, copying the work of classmates or other learners, downloading a whole online document, falsifying bibliographies, and replacing texts in a sentence. Accidental plagiarism involves lack of research skills such as citation and paraphrasing skills, studying with a fellow student too closely and copying similar materials and submitting them as an assignment (Mohan, Swapna, Musalaiah & Nagasree 2014:194–185). Intentional plagiarism at universities is the result of unethical conduct. This refers to students who intentionally fail to give recognition to the original authors or originators of ideas. Unintentional plagiarism may be the result of poor research skills and/or lack of understanding by some students of what is defined as plagiarism.

ICT, cyberspace and the internet and its associated digital devices have made electronic plagiarism simpler and easier. Students use advanced technological devices to commit plagiarism. Students can just copy and paste work from internet sites and submit it as their own academic work (Ison 2014:274). The most common websites typically used by students for plagiarising include Google, Wikipedia, www.answers.yahoo.com, www.appapers.co, www.medlibrary.org, www.scribd.com, www.coursehero.com and www.slideshare.net (Shrivastava 2017:2 & 3).

Increasingly advanced and sophisticated digital communication devices and IT programmes are constantly developing and improving. Especially younger individuals, including students, like to experiment with the latest hardware and software,

sometimes in inappropriate or unethical ways like academic dishonesty, security and privacy crimes, phishing, online bullying, and copyright crimes at universities (Kilis and Uzun 2018:31 & 39). Advanced cameras, cell phones, electronic pens, portable radios, watches, cigarette lighters and ultra-violet lights, wristwatches, portable wireless devices, calculators, pen-input devices, calculators with tape recorders, electronic writing pads, calculators on cell phones, laptops and pagers can store information and provide access to opportunities for students to facilitate or commit academic cheating during formal academic assessments, for example, to store and use crib notes unobtrusively (Omonijo 2012:392).

Students also frequently use internet-based websites to commit academic cheating where they can download information that will help them in their academic work in an improper manner. Some websites provide students with techniques to improve their skills at academic cheating. These and other websites can help students to commit unethical actions like online plagiarism, cyberstalking, cyberbullying, cyber vandalism, online crimes that threaten economies of nations, computer network crimes, online auction crimes, hacking, short messaging software, cyber gambling, invading the privacy of others, stealing or faking other people's identities and general cyber harassment (Omonijo 2012:390–391). Students can also download pornographic material which they can use outside the bounds of the law (Paapa & Boakye 2017:4–7).

IT devices, applications and other programs are sometimes used to bully or stalk other students by sending threatening messages (Sargolzaei & Nikbakht 2017:138). Students increasingly create online blogs on their websites with the aim of using them to fight cyberwars with their enemies and engaging other people in their cyberwars (Sullivan 2011:63). They also download software illegally from internet websites (Sargolzaei & Nikbakht 2017:138).

Various management strategies are available to university authorities to manage and improve ethical behaviour among students, including the ethical use of IT by students. The main general strategies for this purpose are summarised below, followed by a summary and assessment of how the selected case study universities deal with student contraventions.

GENERAL MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES TO MANAGE UNETHICAL BEHAVIOUR BY UNIVERSITY STUDENTS

Employees responsible for student discipline

Universities normally employ networks of staff members to explicitly manage student ethics on their campuses. These employees include faculty administrators, lecturers, student disciplinary committee members or specific personnel (Shrivastava 2017:1).

Student ethics management

Student ethics management at universities serves as one tool for maintaining student discipline. It further manages and attempts to regulate, or preferably to reduce, unethical behaviour by students. Student ethics management therefore comprises a management approach and tool to assist universities to achieve their respective visions of creating highly literate, skilled entrants of high integrity to the labour market (Stabingis *et al.* 2014:691–699).

Universities frequently experience scandals related to unethical activities committed by students. These incidents have detrimental implications for the scholarly reputation of such institutions of higher learning and led to the issue of student ethics management receiving increasingly serious attention at universities. More effective ways of promoting academic integrity and ethos are increasingly placed at the centre stage at universities (Stabingis *et al.* 2014:690).

Codes of conduct

The code of conduct is one of the main instruments used by universities to manage students' unethical behaviour. It provides guidelines to students to comply with the ethical standards that these institutions would like to adhere to (Jones 2016:33 & 44). A code of conduct normally contains rules of behaviour which students must subscribe to, along with behaviour which students must refrain from committing. Students who are found guilty of breaching a code of conduct are disciplined through the procedures set out in the code of conduct. The penalties may range from reducing marks if a student has committed academic dishonesty during an assessment, and if it is a very serious transgression, a student may be subjected to more severe sentences, such as suspension or expulsion from the university (Ochollo & Ochollo 2016:7–8 & 13; Stabingis *et al.* 2014:691–694).

Ethics promotions

Ethics promotion is needed to provide awareness and training to students about ethics to empower them to make ethical decisions. Ethics should ideally be introduced in first year students' orientation programmes (Stabingis *et al.* 2014:691–692).

Online plagiarism

The IT revolution created the opportunity to develop anti-plagiarism software to tackle the scourge of plagiarism at universities. Anti-plagiarism software is used to detect levels of similarities between a newly drafted academic document and a previously submitted text (Shrivastava 2017:1). The software program Turnitin

(www.turnitin.com) is currently the most popular internet-based scholarly anti-plagiarism application to check potential similarities between a written document prepared by a student, and other possible sources of the content of that document, that are in the program's database. If applied correctly, it can assist very effectively with both the prevention and detection of plagiarism (Ison 2014:272; Louw 2017:116–120). Ithenticate is also used by one of the case study universities for undergraduate students (Mohan *et al.* 2014:196).

IT security upgrades

Electronic security systems have been introduced as part of upgrading physical security systems into electronic systems such as biometric controls, and CCTV cameras as part of the digitisation of the security systems to strengthen security control. Biometric controls may be linked to students' thumbprint/fingerprints (Mhlaba & Masinde 2017:4–5).

Integrated tertiary software

Some universities are using the Integrated Tertiary Software (ITS) application to enforce punitive measures against students for behaving unethically. This software can be used to deny a student access to certain privileges or take away specific rights from a student. A student can also be blocked from registering with a university for a specific period for serious violations of academic rules, such as possession and use of unauthorised notes during formal academic assessments like tests and examinations. The student's registration can be cancelled, a specific module can be cancelled, marks or academic credit for a specific module can be deleted using the ITS program. The ITS program is used by officials dealing with student discipline to enforce decisions or sentences by a Student Disciplinary Committee (SDC) (Molepo 2009).

IT guidelines

University policies normally classify IT-related unethical behaviour at universities as student misconduct. Some universities have specific policies that deal with the usage of computers and computer networks. This misconduct which is common in policies relating to computers and their usage, includes unauthorised installation of computer hardware, access, endangering of university computer operating systems, computer networks, computer services, computer programs, stored data and networks; illegal removal of files; the misuse or unauthorised use of emails, social networking sites or chat rooms, telephones, and faxes; computer hacking, the use of university computer networks to conduct illegal or private business; the

use of university communication networks to disseminate hate speech or derogatory language. It can also include illegal or practical jokes, the use of university computers and networks to commit copyright crimes or transgressions such as plagiarism or breaking software agreements, the posting, printing or sending of obscene or abusive messages (Louw 2017:116–117; Sing & Ramenyi 2016:1–4).

Possible sanctions

Different possible sanctions have been imposed for violations of university rules and regulations, depending on the seriousness of the transgression. The SDC may impose one or more of the following penalties: a first written warning; a final written warning; temporary expulsion from the university; temporary expulsion from university accommodation; permanent expulsion from the university; permanent expulsion from university accommodation; recommendation to the senate for the withdrawal of a conferred qualification; a monetary fine; it may also include some conditions; refusal to give a student a certificate of conduct; endorsement of a student's academic record for a permanent or specific period; withdrawal of the results of a test, assignment or examination; cancellation of registration for a specific module; imposition of a monetary amount needed to replace the damage/s that might have been caused by a student; suspension of any student rights or privileges as a member of the university for a certain period; imposition of a certain condition/s; and any penalty deemed suitable by the SDC under the circumstances (Sing & Ramenyi 2017:5).

SPECIFIC MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES TO DEAL WITH INAPPROPRIATE STUDENT IT USE AT SELECTED UNIVERSITIES

There are a number of significant similarities and differences among the management approaches used by the four selected universities in their attempts to regulate the inappropriate use of IT by students on their campuses. As indicated earlier, the case study universities are for purposes of protecting sensitive information, not identified by name but purely as Universities A (UA), B (UB), C (UC) and D (UD).

Main similarities

All four universities have codes of conduct that outline misconduct behaviours that are not allowed at the university concerned. These cases relate to other students, academic dishonesty during assignments, test and examinations, plagiarism, demonstrations or protest activities, day-to-day access to the campus, access to information

held by the university, usage of IT services, theft or fraud, university property, campus traffic management, and students' biographical information. These codes of conduct therefore cover very comprehensive ranges of possible misconduct.

All students who commit misconduct are subject to disciplinary procedures outlined in the code of conduct concerned. Student disciplinary hearings are conducted by the SDC. The SDC may impose one or more of the following penalties depending on the seriousness of the transgression: a verbal warning, a written warning, a final written warning, a temporary or permanent expulsion, a monetary fine, referral to student counselling, an apology to the offended party, community service, cancellation of the assessment results, payment for damages, withdrawal of a qualification or any other penalty deemed suitable by the SDC.

All four universities have their own IT user policies which govern proper use of universities' ITS and networks. Students are expected to behave in a responsible and professional manner; respect the intellectual policy and copyright legislation. These policies indicate that students are not allowed to use university ITS and devices to commit unethical behaviour. Various forms of unethical behaviour are listed in the policies and their breach is punishable through the SDC.

All four case studies use various forms of IT devices and software to detect or prevent misconduct by students. They use ITS software in their normal student disciplinary office administration. It helps them in accessing students' academic records and biographical information. ITS software is also used to block students' future registration for the period of the student's expulsion. All four universities routinely have access to Turnitin anti-plagiarism software to detect and prevent plagiarism.

All four case studies use digital electronic detecting gates and doors, which provide easy access for students using their student cards. It gives security officers a chance to determine who is a visitor or not. They also use CCTV cameras to monitor their campuses. Student disciplinary officers use electronic Microsoft Office tools for their day-to-day basic office administration.

All universities further use Turnitin software as a major electronic tool in their respective anti-plagiarism management strategies, which helps them in the detection and prevention of plagiarism. UA in addition uses Authenticate for undergraduate students. All the selected universities use security-related technologies like CCTV devices and automated access control systems with student cards. There are IT cases of misconduct that have been detected and processed through the student disciplinary process.   Punishments that include warnings, fines, payment for the damages, final written warnings, suspensions and expulsions have been meted against guilty students depending on the seriousness of the offence. This has happened at all the sampled universities.

The inclusion of restorative justice (mediation process as an alternative form of student discipline) in student discipline models at all selected universities is a strategic shift in 21st century student disciplinary practices.

The different universities have all provided various suggestions on how they think their student discipline management can be improved. These suggestions include that student discipline units should compile reports which must be shared with academic faculties so that they can note the high levels of academic transgression cases. This will help faculties to develop more effective academic integrity strategies and/or ethics-related teaching and learning modules for their students. More emphasis should also be placed on the promotion of the academic ethos of universities. Universities should also organise more ethics seminars, which will promote better student ethics and academic integrity.

Main differences

UA, UB and UC have anti-plagiarism policies which focus on the promotion of academic integrity. Plagiarism is regarded as an act against academic scholarship and convention. Academic scholarship is centred on trust, honesty, integrity, respect and responsibility towards universal academic excellence. The policies underpin academic ethical standards of teaching and learning. Their main aim is to manage all acts of plagiarism by students. These policies cover all forms of plagiarism including transgressions by first year students, senior students and postgraduate students. Educational remedies are used for first year students, while punitive measures are used for repeat offenders and serious cases of plagiarism by first years, senior students and postgraduate students.

Greater emphasis on plagiarism education for first year students at UA, UB and UC is a good point of departure in introducing good academic writing techniques and skills for students.

The specific experiences of the respective universities are as follows:

University A

UA was established after the merger of two previously advantaged universities and two campuses of a previously disadvantaged university. The merger of the different institutions resulted in a comprehensive university with vocational training, and traditional academic university education and training.

UA had the following misconduct cases connected to the inappropriate use of IT: the abuse of Facebook, cyberbullying, copying and pasting of academic work and submitting it for academic assessment, students downloading papers from internet-based websites, students texting each other test questions or answers from inside test venues to those outside test venues, students storing unauthorised notes on their cell phones or programmable calculators, while some students write notes on the back of their calculators, or inside the covers of their calculators.

A total of 51 cases was reported in 2011, 12 cases in 2012, 83 cases in 2013, 85 cases in 2014, and 41 cases from January to September 2015. The high number of cases may be an indication that the students have not yet received the ethics promotion message of academic integrity, or about the punitive measures that can be meted against them if they are caught committing academic dishonesty. The university indicated that more cases are normally reported during the examination period. More academic misconduct cases were also reported than general student misconduct cases in 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015. Plagiarism made up 19% of the academic cases.

UA has a Resolution Through Agreement (RTA), a formal policy instrument that provides guidelines on how to resolve disputes among two or more students. Its main aim is to facilitate conflict resolution. Students participate fully in the resolution of their disputes and they may also provide suggestions on the possible outcome of the dispute. It is centred on students acknowledging their involvement in a particular case of misconduct. It promotes forgiveness from the aggrieved student, or the complainant, and the accused student taking responsibility for their actions. The RTA includes cases related to inappropriate use of IT.

UA has a specialised unit that promotes preventative student ethics. This is a great stride forward from many practices of reactive student discipline, such as waiting for students to commit transgressions and then penalising them.

The university uses Authenticate for undergraduate students and Turnitin for postgraduate students.

University B

UB came into existence after the merger of a previously advantaged university, a previously advantaged technikon and a campus of a previously disadvantaged university. The merger was a result of the national government's higher education transformation agenda. UB has the combination of normal university programs and traditional technikon educational programs.

UB was only prepared to provide 2015 statistics of IT-related cases of misconduct committed by students. This made comparative trend analysis to determine the effectiveness of the student ethics management policy in terms of the number and possible reduction of reported cases impossible. The statistics provided indicate that there were 17 cases relating to the inappropriate use of IT by students. The students received sentences that ranged from a one-year expulsion, to R300–R3000 fines and suspended expulsions on condition that they did not commit similar transgressions during the remainder of their studies. The sentences indicate that the university is serious about punishing students who behave unethically. UB was very reluctant to divulge any detailed information about other transgressions. Turnitin is used for plagiarism detection at all levels.

University C

UC is a previously advantaged university, which did not merge with another university under the government's transformation of higher education agenda.

UC reported 12 cases in 2013, 16 cases in 2014 and five cases in 2015. There was a high rate of inappropriate use of IT-related cases in 2014, but these were mostly related to less serious IT transgressions, which did not warrant punitive measures like suspension or expulsion from the university. These transgressions did not warrant more than 75 hours of community service. The cases were finalised through admissions of guilt. There was only one case of possession of crib notes using a cell phone, and the student concerned was expelled for two years from the university, suspended on condition that the student does not commit a similar transgression again. The cases decreased rapidly in 2015, from 16 in 2014 to five in 2015. This may be a sign that the application of the student ethics management model is effective.

UC is the only case study university that has a disciplinary committee designated in their student disciplinary code to deal explicitly with minor IT transgressions that do not require a sentence exceeding 75 hours of compulsory service. UC uses Turnitin for plagiarism detection at all levels.

University D

UD was originally established as an Advanced College of Technical Education. It became a technikon. It later became a university of technology as part of the government's transformation of the higher education landscape in South Africa in 2004.

UD reported six cases related to the inappropriate use of IT in 2013, and one serious case of hacking the ITS program and changing marks of four students. This case was still in progress at the time of writing. Attempts to obtain more information about these and other pending cases in 2014 and 2015 were unsuccessful. UD was clearly very sensitive about divulging any detailed information about such transgressions. UD uses Turnitin for plagiarism detection at all levels.

ASSESSMENT

There is an accepted culture of policymaking that promotes ethical behaviour at all case study universities, including student disciplinary codes, IT network services rules, plagiarism policies and copyright policies. These policies are relatively standardised and written in a clear, simple and concise manner. The policies are user-friendly because they have been created to be easily understood by all students from different study disciplines without difficulty. These policies all indicate what acceptable behaviour is required from students. The inclusion of punitive measures

in the policies for very serious transgressions indicates that these universities are committed to curbing the inappropriate use of IT by students on their respective campuses. These policies also form part of risk management practices at the respective universities, to contribute to the reduction of misconduct. It is therefore clear that all the case studies have relatively effective ethical behaviour management policies related to students in place and that they apply these policies. The literature review supports the development of policy instruments when managing students' unethical IT behaviour at universities (Stabingis *et al.* 2014:691–692).

The research findings clearly indicate that all universities manage unethical IT behaviour as part of inculcating a culture of ethics among their students and maintaining law and order, or student discipline. All universities invested resources in student ethics policy formulation and implementation, carrying the cost of employing staff members who manage student ethics or discipline, and purchasing IT technology and devices to prevent and detect IT-related unethical behaviour. The information above indicates the serious approach taken by the universities in stopping or minimising the risks posed by the abuse of IT technologies by students. One of the important reasons for this is probably that the risks associated with unethical behaviour can have a negative impact on the quality of the qualifications and the public standing of universities (Louw 2017:116–220; Mhlaba & Masinde 2017:4–5).

This may contribute to the reduction of IT-related cases reported by universities. All universities therefore need to put more emphasis on the promotion of student ethics. This could enhance the maintenance of law and order, teaching and learning, academic integrity, and the efficient and effective governance of universities. The research findings support the development of effective policy instruments for managing students' unethical IT behaviour at universities (Stabingis *et al.* 2014:691–696).

The most important recommendations to assist institutions of higher learning in the improvement of the management of the inappropriate use of IT committed by students and to assist in enhancing student ethical behaviour, that have emanated from this research project, include the following:

- **Policy instruments:** Universities need to design and effectively implement comprehensive policies which are easily understandable, to manage the inappropriate use of IT by students in the most effective and efficient manner (Jones 2016:44; Stabingis *et al.* 2014:691).
- **Proactive student ethics management:** Universities need to find proactive student ethics management strategies that will help in the management of the inappropriate use of IT and its associated devices by students. Academic ethics and good academic writing education and training can play a central role for this purpose. Universities should further include student ethics modules in their qualification program mixes as compulsory modules for all students. This

will help universities in the promotion of a culture of ethics among students (Stabingis *et al.* 2014:691–696)

- **ICT software:** There is ICT software which universities can use to detect and prevent plagiarism by students. Turnitin (**www.turnitin.com**) is currently the most popular internet-based scholarly anti-plagiarism application to check potential similarities between a written document prepared by a student and other possible sources for the content of that document that are in the program's database. There are also other electronic search engines that can be used to detect potential plagiarism in student research papers or assignments, for example, Cross Check, ithenticate, Viper, eTBLAST, WCopyFind, Google, Yahoo! (Mohan *et al.* 2014:196).
- **ICT security upgrades:** Universities need to digitise their security systems to new electronic trends that involve biometrics which allows students to use their thumbprint to control access (Mhlaba & Masinde 2017:4–5)
- **Alternative conflict resolution:** The student disciplinary process should not be used as the main or only form of resolving student disputes or conflicts. Universities need to introduce other forms of resolving student conflicts, disputes or misconduct in a less adversarial form than the current disciplinary process approach. These alternative strategies may include plea bargaining, student counselling, peer helpers like cyber mentors, conflict resolution and other relevant forms of alternative conflict resolution (Blattman, Hartman & Blair 2014:102 & 104–05).
- **The student discipline staffing structure:** Generally, all university staff members need to be empowered to manage student discipline at their areas of work or work stations, mostly on less serious cases. If cases are serious, they must be sent to a central point dedicated to managing student ethics services. The structure needs to take into consideration the imperatives of student ethics management, which contain an educational element, student counselling, student mentoring, student development, restorative justice elements, and the legal element of the application of the principles of fairness during disciplinary hearings (Shrivastava 2017:1).
- **Benchmarking and research:** Universities need to conduct research and benchmarking exercises in order to develop the most effective student ethics management model or practices for their campus' specific needs (Ison 2014:272 & 279).

CONCLUSIONS

There are student ethics management models at the universities studied. The models include policy formulation, staff members responsible for managing student

ethics and IT technologies. They are utilised to manage IT-related unethical behaviour. There is, however, a great need to improve the current student ethics management models at universities. The universities will become better equipped to respond to the challenges posed by the scourge of IT abuse by students. The transformation of the student ethics management models must be based on enhancing the maintenance of law and order, teaching and learning, academic integrity, and the efficient and effective governance of universities.

NOTE

*   This article comprises an extract from a full D Phil thesis completed by the first author (Ramoshaba 2017) in the Department of Public Management and Governance at the University of Johannesburg under the supervision of Prof F Cloete.

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The Role of Street-Level Bureaucracy in Development Assistance Management in Third-World Countries

A Case Study of Selected Sports Development Activities in South Africa

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ABSTRACT

Although South Africa is generally viewed as one of Africa's most developed countries (South Africa History Online (SAHOL) 2011), it is classified as one of the most unequal societies in the world (World Bank 2018). The contemporary situation in South Africa can be ascribed to a legacy of colonialism and apartheid, which marginalised the country's non-white population. This study aims to explore the role of street-level bureaucracy and public policy to advance development assistance, by focusing on a case study of football and rugby development in South Africa. The current study applies street-level bureaucratic theory to explore stakeholders' perceptions and decision-making approaches to implementing institutional and public policies relating to sports transformation and development. More specifically, it focuses on whether policies translate into opportunities for target groups in the areas of football and rugby. Based on the interviews with stakeholders, the current study shows that there has been little progress in bridging the gap between the rich and poor segments

of society since 1994. The study also found the street-level bureaucrats faced challenges that contributed to the slow progress in this area. The study recommends that a strategic stakeholders' management model be implemented, which employs street-level bureaucracy policy approach (bottom-up principles) to advocate for effective sports development policy in South Africa.

INTRODUCTION

Street-level bureaucratic theory is used to theoretically underpin the study in order to explore stakeholders' perceptions and decision-making approaches in implementing institutional and public policies, and consequently how it affects the end-users and the overall policy goals of sports for transformation and development. In addition, this study aims to determine whether or not rule-bound approaches translate into perceived policy actions or inactions to impact the end-user's life and life opportunities in football and rugby in the selected sports.

The research questions formulated for the purposes of this study are:

- What are the selected federations' transformation policies used for addressing social inequality and racial discrimination in South Africa?
- How closely related are these policies in terms of the prescribed affirmative action plan of the transformation policy in South Africa?
- Do these two models complement or conflict each other in terms of the relationship between an ideal public bureaucracy and a street-level bureaucracy?
- Is a street-level bureaucratic model possibly more effective, efficient and appropriate than the ideal public bureaucracy model?
- Can the two models work if integrated on a high-level of collaboration with partnerships to advance policy objectives symbiotically for developmental purposes and the attainment of public goods?

The study explores the use of street-level bureaucracy theory and the strategic stakeholders' management theory, in terms of policy implementation interventions for sports development in an adverse situation, in spite of the challenging nature of sport. The study provides a practical case study of sport transformation policy implementation in South African rugby and football federations. A total of 23 stakeholders were interviewed in four provinces to establish whether the implementation of sports transformation policy has helped reduce social inequality and improved development in the selected provinces.

CONCEPTUALISING AND CONTEXTUALISING THE STUDY

Street-level bureaucratic theory entails an interplay of policy and action regarding policy-implementation management among stakeholders (Durose 2011; Hupe and Hill 2007). Sector-level practitioners aim to achieve 'consensual governance'. The term 'consensual governance' refers to managing the expectations of key stakeholders and public servants at a policy-implementation level without compromising the aims and objectives of the given policy. In the current study, this partnership and networking between the public sector and community groups refers to specific sports federations and unions (Eliss 2011). To facilitate collaboration, it is fundamental to decentralise public services to reduce the end-user's dependence on a welfare state. Through a system of 'activation of policies', policy networking and collaboration provide those at the policy implementation stage with a level of autonomy (Rice 2011). These improved outcomes lead to sustainability and institutionalisation within South Africa's sports environment.

The state has a different set of values and strategic leadership principles than the private sector (Moore 1995). In this regard, the public sector's primary role in society is to strike a balance between efficiency, equity and responsiveness. Lipsky (2010:18) acknowledges that a highly functioning work environment provides a reasonable balance between job requirements and successful outcomes despite challenges like limited resources and customer demands. Government employees must be responsive, as they are responsible for implementing government directives or policies. Ellis (2011) highlights the following four prerequisites for street-level bureaucrats:

- There must be a balance between professionalism and managerialism.
- The degree of formality and informality regarding the legitimacy of discretionary power exercised must be determined.
- Responsiveness determines whether the employee acts as state or as client agent, which further explains the value and understanding of its legitimacy.
- It interprets rules as either vertical through political lines with a strong focus on bureaucratic accountability or through bureaucratic responsiveness towards the target community.

How street-level bureaucrats exercise these discretional powers are determined by structural/ environmental situations within the workplace, rather than through acts that focus on self-gain. This discretionary choice is described as 'public choice' (Downs 1967; Niskanen 1971). On the other hand, Ellis (2011) argues that, as street-level bureaucrats have a broader work environment, they cannot be blamed for the public's lack of access to public services. In this regard, Lipsky (2010) states that street-level bureaucrats constantly have to field challenges associated with "the corrupted world of service" in order to fulfil their duties. As

such, street-level bureaucrats cannot simply apply their ideals on a practical level due to the fear of being held bureaucratically accountable. This lowers the practitioner's personal expectations as well as that of the community that they serve. This type of situation is described as the "dilemma of an individual in the public service" (Lipsky 2010:15)

Studies have shown that street-level bureaucrats do not oppose or deliberately subvert policy aims. Rather, they have first-hand knowledge of the fact that certain policies are incompatible with community needs (Brodkin 2012). Lipsky (2010) states that street-level bureaucrats' behaviour is justified as they face challenges such as resource constraints, workload pressure, policy ambiguities, bureaucratic efforts to exert greater control and structural influences within communities.

A study by Loyens and Maesschlck (2010) identified the following four major areas that mitigated street-level bureaucrats' behaviour:

- **Individual decision-maker characteristics:** Professional norms, personal interests, moral values, gender, ethnicity/race and role definition.
- **Organisational characteristics:** Workplace pressure, internal structures, rules and constraints, and organisational routines and culture.
- **Client attributes:** Level of needs or target groups' perceptions.
- **Extra-organisational factors:** The broader community, laws and regulations, the media and other service agencies.

Certain scholars believe that the target setting, incentives and technology are responsible for street-level bureaucrats' weak discretionary power (Brodkin 2012). Furthermore, a low self-esteem and norms based on fairness influence street-level bureaucrats' personal judgements and their ability to exert strong discretion as "citizens' agents" (May and Winter 2007; Marinetto 2011; Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2000). Evans (2010) argues that favours and professional status influence street-level bureaucrats' commitment to client-focused values and a focus on facilitating greater decision-making discretional autonomy. Durose (2011) argues that street-level bureaucrats' behaviour is influenced by in-depth knowledge of the local situations within which they operate. Behind the organisational setting is the web of vertical and horizontal relations that steer street-level bureaucrats' behaviour in a particular direction (Hupe and Hill 2007). This particular direction is mainly influenced by three aspects, namely citizen-client fellowships, fellowships between street-level bureaucrats, and the domains within which they work, such as that of elected officials and media representatives (Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2000; Marinnetto 2011).

Despite its challenging nature, street-level bureaucracy can conform to higher public service expectations. Within this context, street-level bureaucrats can become independent moral actors. However, their roles are dichotomous in nature. Their interaction with target groups can bring about a sense of accomplishment

and fulfilment or serve as a personal threat. In turn, interaction with peers as a pri-mary reference group creates a sense of solidarity and mutual support (Halliday, Burns, Hutton, McNiell and Tata 2009).

Due to the difficulties associated with managing policy-implementation inter-ventions at a grass-roots level, the purpose of street-level bureaucracy is to reflect on significant policy developments. Furthermore, street-level implementation aims to align decision-making relating to public policy with governmental or organisa-tional objectives. To fulfil their mandates, street-level bureaucrats are required to deal directly with the public policy, understand and interpret the policy correctly and have the discretional ability to act as representatives in the implementation of government development policy interventions or programmes (Lipsky 2010).

Facilitating a flexible, mutually beneficial donor-recipient dialogue increases the likelihood of effective aid interventions (Dalgaard, Hansen and Tarp 2004). However, aligning development assistance agencies' goals with that of host com-munities or governments can be a cumbersome endeavour (Clemens, Radelet and Bhavnani 2004). Challenges include no common ground for collaboration, the lack of agreement on a specific policy direction, conflicted or duplicated interventions, insufficient resource mobilisation, inadequate human resources and financial capital to achieve public or policy goals (e.g. poverty alleviation or reducing inequality) (Lipsky 2010). In certain instances, resources that are al-located for development purposes are misappropriated, which is often the case in developing regions – especially in sub-Saharan Africa. This approach to the development agenda could lead to a lack of continuity and sustainability issues or projects can be abandoned altogether (Calderisi 2006:163). Scholars like Easterly (2006) argue that interventions can only succeed if policies are customised to meet the specific needs of recipient communities.

Street-level bureaucracy argues that public service agents are under enormous pressure to deliver services. It highlights that ambiguous agency and policy goals, socio-cultural challenges, economic factors and inadequate resources are some-times unattainable (Lipsky 2010). The difference between government policy in theory and in practice can be substantial and troubling when combined with sub-stantial discretionary authority and the need to interpret policy on a case-by-case basis (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson and Morrow 2003). However, in some parts of sub-Saharan Africa it is marginally manageable (Morrissey 2006).

Street-level bureaucrats must support end-users in making implementation-related decisions on the basis of the relevance and appropriateness of individual and community needs (Moyo 2009). However, the functional structure of agency or public policy requirements might make this impossible (Lipsky 2010). Instead, they are forced to adopt practices such as rationalising resources, screening appli-cants for qualities that organisations favour (e.g. 'rubberstamping' applications and routinising client interactions). It imposes regulation-based uniformities that might

make decision-making nearly impossible in situations that require an element of human response (Ayittey 2005). Occasionally, such strategies work in favour of the end-users or agencies, depending on the street-bureaucrats' discretional ability. But the cumulative effect of street-level decisions made according to routine specifications and generalisations about target groups can reroute the intended policy direction. This could undermine citizens' expectations and perceptions of distributive justice and equity (Frazer 2008).

The current study has observed a pattern of defiance and self-imposed policies among street-level bureaucrats to promote sports development. They are incongruent with the institutional/public policy position on transformation and administration of sports development. However, Lipsky (2010) maintains that these problems are not insurmountable. To remedy the situation public managers and stakeholders should develop strategies to align street-level performance with objectives relating to agency and institutional policy objectives.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The current study follows a mixed-methods approach that combines qualitative and quantitative data collection and analysis methods to understand the challenges associated with bureaucracy at a policy implementation level. The study explores qualitative data relating to street-level bureaucratic theory to gain insight into the level of transformation policy implementation that aims to address inequality and social inclusion in rugby and football in selected provinces of South Africa.

Participants were randomly selected from four provinces (Gauteng, the North-West, the Northern Cape and the Eastern Cape) to represent the clubs, federations and government officials who were key stakeholders in the administration of football and rugby in all spheres of administration. Table 1 outlines the provinces, club teams, and players that were selected for the quantitative survey, as well as the in-depth interviews that were conducted with stakeholders from the football and rugby domains.

An in-depth interview technique was adopted for qualitative data collection: The sampling size was n=23 in total. Nine stakeholders were selected from each of the two federations, while five directors/managers were selected from the National, Provincial and Municipal Departments of Sport and Recreation. To select participants a combination of snowballing and stratified purposive sampling methods of data collection was used. The adopted approach allowed the researcher to make independent judgements for referral purposes in terms of identifying the relevant stakeholders. The sample selection criteria were based on the following quality traits: experience, strategic position, educational/

professional qualifications, and contribution to the ongoing debate on transformation in the country.

A total of 23 stakeholders were interviewed for the study. The breakdown of the sample size is as follows: two participants were selected from the local/regional football and rugby club structures and two officials from the local, regional and provincial federation structures of the South African Rugby Union (SARU) and the South African Football Association (SAFA) in each of the four provinces. Each province had four selected officials that represented the clubs and federations. In this way 16 officials from football and rugby clubs and federations were selected for the in-depth interviews. Two national SAFA and SARU representatives, four provincial government sports officials and one national government official from the Department of Sport and Recreation were interviewed. The four provinces were selected using ballot casting (See Table 2).

Table 1: Stakeholders who participated in the study

Province	Qualitative section of the research						The quantitative section of the research				
	Stake-holders	Gvt	Saru	Safa	RC	FC	R/F	F/F	RP	F/P	Total
Gauteng	7	1	2	2	1	1	60	60	30	30	187
North-West	6	2	1	1	1	1	60	60	30	30	185
Northern Cape	5	1	1	1	1	1	60	60	30	30	185
Eastern Cape	5	1	1	1	1	1	60	60	30	30	185
Total	23	5	5	5	4	4	240	240	120	120	720
Gvt: Government; RC: Rugby Club; FC: Football Club; R/F: Rugby Fan; F/F: Football Fan; R/P: Rugby Player; and F/P: Football Fan											

Table 2 shows the demographic distribution and representation of participants. The study selected participants based on their exposure to, or their experience of, social inequality and discrimination in sport. Known as purposive or purposeful sampling, this type of sampling technique helps ensure that a rich corpus of data is gathered (Fossey, Harvey, McDermott and Davidson 2002). After samples are selected, specific themes emerge from the data analysis. Based on the data, the researcher explored these themes and resultant sub-themes to gain more insight into the topic under investigation.

The process used for gathering relevant information was in line with general best practice in data collection-based research design (Darbyshire, MacDougall and Schiller 2005). The study made use of a number of data collection strategies,

Table 2: Demographic characteristics of participants

Stake-holders	Age	Marital status	Gender	Race	Years of service	Qualification	Position
NAGO1	40–45	M	Female	B	20	Honours	Deputy Director
GAPGO1	30–35	M	Male	B	10	Honours	Asst. Director
NWPGO1	40–55	M	Female	B	37	Honours	Asst. Director
NCPGO1	40–50	M	Male	B	25	Diploma	Asst. Director
ECPGO1	30–35	M	Male	C	10	Diploma	Senior Manager
NARO2	45–55	M	Male	W	30	PhD	CEO
GAPRO2	30–40	M	Male	W	15	Honours	General Mgr
NWPRO2	50–60	M	Male	W	35	Diploma	General Mgr
NCPRO2	45–50	M	Male	W	20	Diploma	Director Sport Dev
ECPRO2	40–50	M	Male	C	25 years	P Q	Deputy President
NAFO 3	40–50	M	Male	W	20 years	P Q	Technical Director
GAPRO 3	50–65	M	Male	B	40 years	Diploma	President
NWPFO3	40–50	M	Male	B	25 years	Diploma	President
NCPFO3	40–50	M	Male	B	30 years	Bachelors	President
ECPRO3	40–50	M	Male	B	30 years	Bachelors	Provincial Secretary
GAPFO4	30–40	M	Male	B	20 years	Diploma	Club Chairperson
GAPRO 5	30–40	M	Male	B	10 years	Bachelors	Team Manager
NWPFO4	45–50	M	Male	B	25 years	Matric	Club Chairperson
NWPRO5	30–35	M	Male	W	15 years	Bachelor	Director of Rugby
NCPFC)4	35–45	M	Male	C	25 years	Bachelor	Club Chairperson
NCPRC 5	40–50	M	Male	C	20 years	PQ	Chairperson
ECPFC 4	35–45	M	Male	B	20 years	Honours	Chairperson
ECPRO 5	35–45	M	Male	B	22	Diploma	Chairperson

B: Black; C: Coloured; W: White and I: Indians; M: Married. S:Single, PQ: Professional Qualifications National Government Official (NAGO); National Football Official (NAFO); National Rugby Official (NARO); Gauteng Provincial Rugby Official (GAPRO); Gauteng Provincial Football Official (GAPFO); North West Provincial Rugby Official (NWPRO); North-West Province Football Official (NWPFO); Northern Cape Provincial Rugby Official (NCPRO); Northern Cape Provincial Football Official (NCPFO); Eastern Cape Province Rugby Official (ECPRO); Eastern Cape Province Football Official (ECPFO)

which included non-numerical questionnaires with open-ended questions, semi-structured and unstructured interviews, participant observation, written text (e.g. diaries, emails and historical or contemporary documents). The study primarily focused on discussions as a data collection method.

According to De Vos, Strydom, Schulze and Patel (2013), data analysis is the process of bringing order, structure and meaning to collected data in a continuous and iterative fashion (Frank 2012). It consists of identifying, coding and categorising results. To ensure trustworthiness and reliability, a rigorous process of data analysis was adopted. According to Salkind (2012:115), the data analysis process must be dependable, consistent, stable, trustworthy and predictable. The qualitative research methods elicited in the current research offered the researcher an 'insider perspective' of respondents' real-world experiences (Mouton 2001:271). It provides a deeper understanding of respondents' emotions and perceptions, and this helped to provide insight into their life-world. Rather than looking at the level of association, the qualitative researcher explains the underlying factor of this association through a series of interactions. A discussion of the key themes and sub-themes of the current research are presented below.

DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

The current study critically examines the implementation output of both federations to determine whether there is congruency or not. It is argued that a balance between policy coherence and execution leads to policy efficiency. Thus, the higher the level of congruence between the proposed policy and implementation, the higher the level of policy efficiency (Farrel 1957; Barros and Gracia-Del-Barrio 2011). This section focuses on whether rugby and football federations meet their policy requirements based on transformation and social inclusion. Table 3 presents a summary of findings based on the interviews with key stakeholders.

Table 3: Summary of findings relating to stakeholders

Pro-gramme	Cate-gory	SARU	SAFA	Government	Challenges
Township/Rural Development	Developmental	Low in townships due to limited human resources, facilities receptivity within the community. Interest is growing in rural villages around agricultural settlements.	Fastest-growing sport in townships and rural areas. Faces infrastructure, mobility and administrative challenges.	Focus on township development programmes, particularly in previously disadvantaged communities.	Limited/ lack of infrastructure in townships to practice both sports. Overuse and limited space were a challenge in urban areas.

Pro-gramme	Cate-gory	SARU	SAFA	Government	Challenges
Club Development	Organisational	The policy favours educational sports development in suburban former Model C schools. It is generally a facility-based programme. Club development is slow but consolidated in most cases.	A greater focus on league-based club structures. Mostly concentrated in townships. No presence in suburbs except for the use of facilities.	Government provides support to federations and unions. They do not engage in the club directly except in isolated cases. A government-gazetted pilot programme is being rolled out in selected clubs around the country for sponsorship.	The economic meltdown is affecting community-level club rugby. A lack of financial support is destroying football clubs. Rugby clubs are not supported in townships, while low community participation affect football club owners.
Community-based Programmes	Community participation and partnerships	Community inclusion in setting up high-level activities Coaching clinics, corporate social responsibility (CSR) and promotional activities.	Non-community-based club setting, with some degree of CSR and promotional programmes.	Government is not active on the ground.	About 50% of CSR noted in rugby, while 95% of football clubs do not benefit from CSR.
League Structures	Administration/management	Leagues are managed effectively on a provincial and national level. Very low on a local level except for schools.	Well-structured across all spheres of government. Includes professional level, national division one; national second division; ABC Motsepe at the regional and provincial level; national third division league at a regional level; and the fourth-division league, known as the Local Football Association (LFA) at a community and municipal level. Limited involvement at the local and school levels.	Administered on a national, provincial and municipal level through the corresponding federations and sporting codes structures.	Rugby governance is solid within club and union structures. Football is struggling with governance issues at a club level, as well as well at lower- and middle-level SAFA structures. As such, unofficial community-based leagues are more prevalent at a community and municipal level in football.

Pro-gramme	Cate-gory	SARU	SAFA	Government	Challenges
Human Resources and Training	Capacity building	Talent identification programmes have been created, which provide educational support to previously disadvantaged athletes, medical aid to cover their injuries and ensure their safety, coaching and management training and setting up high-performance centres to cater of skills gaps.	Limited talent identification programmes and a lack of scholarships. Coaching and education are provided but at the participant's cost.	A focus on municipal, provincial and national team building for local and international competitions.	Enough human resources but insufficient funding to sustain development activities in rugby and football.
Social Integration	Community engagement and mobilisation	Regarding rugby, great effort is put in community engagement and participation (particularly in the township schools and communities) to create public awareness and integration.	Few community-level activities except for the league's competition, with little community participation.		Rugby is gaining inroads in townships, while football is losing ground more developed suburbs.
Financial Aspects	Funding and sustainability	Clubs rely on self-generated income through membership fees, sales, social networking and old boys' clubs. Sometimes unions subsidise transport fees and give subventions to developing clubs.	Financial support	Sustainability	
Selection Methods	Affirmative action (AA) is prescribed	Selection is broadly based on merit but has programmes in place to develop previously disadvantage players to acquire the necessary skills exposure.	Firmly upholds AA and quota selection criteria in the selection of athletes. No plans are in place to reach excluded communities in suburbs.	Prescribed AA for selection to provide an equal playing field. Enforces required sporting codes targets for federations.	Rugby representation is growing but falls short of the prescribed quota requirement. Minority representation is fading in football on all levels.

Bureaucratic rules versus street-level implementation

SARU, SAFA and Sports and Recreation South Africa (SPRSA) have certain observable bureaucratic rules and regulations which are often in contradiction with the implementation of street-level bureaucracy. Before discussing the pros and

Table 4: A cross-tabulation of demographic representation in sport (race)

Sport	Racial group						Total
	1.00	**2.00**	**3.00**	**4.00**	**5.00**	**Missing**	
Rugby	90	112	37	3	0	0	242
Football	180	4	46	2	7	1	240
Football Fans	102	2	14	0	0	0	118
Rugby Fans	97	9	13	0	0	0	119
Total	**470**	**127**	**110**	**5**	**7**	**1**	**720**
1: Black, 2: White, 3: Coloured; 4: Indian, 5: Other							

cons of public bureaucracy versus street-level bureaucracy, it is imperative to outline the following policy guidelines relating to football and rugby:

- Football structures are not permitted to operate outside the rules and regulations outlined by SAFA and Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), the international governing body of association football. However, some stakeholders running football clubs are engaged in local programmes. Non-registered football clubs and unofficial leagues or tournaments running parallel to SAFA structures are not recognised, regardless of the talent they may possess. Registered SAFA clubs and players are not allowed to participate in such unofficial structures. Sponsorships of registered clubs are done centrally for SAFA-run leagues. This makes it difficult for clubs to get direct corporate sponsorships.
- Rugby protocol is guided by the International Rugby Union (IRU) and SARU. Structures are more flexible, and competitions take place under the franchises of registered unions. As such, rugby clubs can organise matches to generate funding. SARU permits direct club sponsorships and supports specific initiatives that are in line with SARU's goals.

The above policies define the operational framework for intervention procedures in a given context. In practical terms, this creates specific challenges for street-level bureaucrats in their field of operation. Often, these potential challenges were not foreseen during the initial contextual and conceptual design of the draft or the challenges may not have been fully articulated during the policy diagnosis. This imbalance between theory and practice could have a detrimental effect on the policy's ability to achieve its long-term goals. Positivist and post-positivist perspectives of policy analysis are critical in the evaluation of street-level bureaucracy activities. With street-level bureaucracy, discretionary decision-making relates to compliance or non-compliance. Thus, the efficacy

of street-level bureaucracy can often be negated by the discretional limitations, practical political challenges and ethical implications in a given situation (Clemons and McBech 2001:47).

Clemons and McBech (2001:47) state that critics of street-level bureaucracy must differentiate between practicality and rationality in the evaluation of policy implementation. The authors argue that, before any policy can be evaluated, it must first be applied in the field. As such policy practitioners must be able to apply the policy on a practical level. Furthermore, the authors stress that policy is not only evaluated quantitatively and technically. It involves an understanding of the conflict over interests and values, which require political power to resolve these policy issues (Clemons and McBech 2001:47). On a practical level, this conflict of interests has become a "dilemma or ambition" for street-level bureaucrats (Molliex, Lonoiselce and Bruckert 2019). Resolving the conflict between interest and values requires political networking and mutual understanding between the policy-makers and the street-level bureaucrats at the forefront of policy implementation.

Efficiency is regarded as an output that requires less input-related wastage to produce an outcome (Espitia-Escuer and Gracia-Cebrian 2010). To determine policy efficiency, the current study compares policymakers' intended policy goals with intended/unintended policy outcomes based on street-level bureaucrats' actions. SPRSA policy prescribes 50/50% demographic representation for rugby and 80/20% black-to-white or other minority group representation for football by 2020. According to the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) on Sports Transformation (2014; 2018), SARU must ensure 50% black representation either at club level or departmentally, while football must ensure 80% minority representation to meet their transformation benchmarks. However, there are various challenges to meeting these requirements, as outlined below:

While rugby administrators (street-level bureaucrats) face challenges concerning SPRSA's representation benchmarks, the following initiatives are in place to help meet policy requirements:

- **Selection broadly based on merit:** There are programmes in place to develop previously disadvantaged players so that they can acquire the necessary skills and exposure.
- **Lack of human resources:** Talent identification programmes have been created, which provide educational support to previously disadvantaged athletes, medical aid to cover their injuries and ensure their safety, coaching and management training and setting up high-performance centres to cater for skills gaps.
- **Lack of management capacity among previously disadvantaged groups:** Administrative structures for leagues were established in provinces and districts to accommodate previously underprivileged communities.

- **Limited community participation in townships:** Due to the socio-cultural perceptions, rugby is seen as a symbol of apartheid. Other factors include a lack of human resources and facilities. However, interest is growing in rural villages around agricultural settlements.
- **Limited funding for disadvantaged communities and previously disadvantaged players:** Clubs rely on self-generated income through membership fees and sales, social networking and old boys' clubs. Sometimes the unions subsidise transport fees and give subventions to developing clubs.

To achieve 20% minority representation in predominantly white and coloured suburbs, street-level bureaucrats face the following challenges:
- **Lack of intervention:** SAFA firmly upholds AA principles and supersedes its target criteria in the selection of players. But no clear structures are in place to reach the excluded communities in the suburbs. However, in Nelson Mandela Bay, street-level bureaucrats created a model of isolation for the white community to run under-age leagues without considering demographic representation. The stakeholder who was interviewed pointed to the success of this approach.
- **Football clubs are not supported by the community:** In most cases, football clubs are supported by club owners with limited financial resources, which affects the sustainability of their endeavours. Often the clubs are not situated near suburban businesses and small businesses in townships do not have the resources to assist financially. As a rule, the federation provides no direct support to clubs. Only successful clubs that win their divisional leagues receive small sums.
- **Lack of visible club and league structures in suburbs:** League-based club structures are mostly concentrated in the townships. Unlike rugby, there are almost no school development programmes in place for football.
- **A lack of talent identification programmes:** There is a lack of available scholarships for talented players. Players have to pay for coaching, which affects skills development.

Based on the above findings, it is clear that neither SARU nor SAFA have managed to meet policy requirements concerning representation. In its 2018 report on sports transformation, the EPG reported that SARU did not meet its representation benchmarks. SAFA was praised for superseding its target, with over 80% black representation (EPG 2018). However, a random quantitative sample analysis of 240 players and 120 fans distributed evenly among the sports established that more black people were demographically represented in club rugby than in club football.

Similarly, several researchers argue that policy interventions will fail if public and private stakeholders do not form partnerships (Moyo 2009). In this regard, collaborative efforts should focus on social inclusion and be characterised by a

respect for different ideologies, viewpoints, identities and values so that stake-holders work towards a common goal. Only then can good governance come into play, which will help improve the effectiveness of organisational policies (Abzug and Galaskiewicz 2001; Balser and McCuskey 2005; Brown 2005; Herman and Renz 2008; Studer and Von Schnurbein 2012). Brown (2005) advises that stake-holders' measurements and perceptions of effectiveness should be determined. The author states that this will provide insight into organisational governance, as well as the quality of policy implementation (Brown 2005).

Freeman (2010) states that, for any club or organisation to operate efficiently, it must act and plan its actions on a strategic level. This involves identifying and gathering accurate information on stakeholders and their respective demands (Frooman 1999). Within this context, stakeholders need to understand that, as frontline managers in policy implementation, street-level bureaucrats face certain challenges in pursuing public policy goals. In the area of sport, this enhances cor-porate collaboration towards achieving developmental objectives. For the broader public good, it is better to advance individual and collective goals regarding sports development rather than focusing on bureaucratic accountability to politi-cal stakeholders. In this regard, the research results of the current study illustrate the unsustainable nature of a one-size-fits-all approach to sports development (Hardina 2011; Packard 2010).

In addition to the individual characteristics of different sports, socio-economic factors, cultural orientation, financial obligations, environmental factors and indi-vidual preferences play a role in policy implementation, as highlighted in the study. In line with this, Freeman (2010) refers to 'diversity-led organisations' that consist of different configurations of ideologies, as well as individuals or groups who share similar and dissimilar objectives and interests in a cross-pollinated or interrelated form within the organisational setting. As such, multiple ideologies and modalities cannot be ruled out within the public policy domain, as well as in the bureaucratic framework of frontline managers who are responsible for policy implementation.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The study explored the use of the Street-Level Bureaucracy and Strategic Stakeholder Management theories to underscore and understand policy imple-mentation interventions regarding sports development. It included a practical case study of transformation policy implementation within South Africa's rugby and football federations to test the effectiveness of management assistance pro-grammes at a grass-roots level.

Based on the research findings, it is imperative for international aid agencies, donors, politicians and public bureaucrats to engage in broader networking and

collaboration to foster effective policy implementation to advance social inclusion in sports development. In this regard, street-level bureaucrats involved in sports must integrate the principle of fairness and objectivity in their pursuit of developmental interventions.

Through the management of development assistance, sport can serve as a tool that can bring together various races and ideologies (Beutler 2008; Kidd 2013). The study recommends that a strategic stakeholder integration management model for sport and social transformation be implemented in a heterogeneous, multicultural environment. The use of this strategic stakeholder management model will enshrine bottom-up principles for effective sports development policies in South Africa.

NOTES

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Formulation and Application of a Local Government Financial Health Index

The Case of the Sedibeng Region

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ABSTRACT

The vast majority of municipalities in South Africa are experiencing a number of serious issues including poor service delivery, limited provision and maintenance of infrastructure and inadequate financial management. The measurement of local government financial health may be seen as one of the main components of the overall well-being of a specific municipality. Various academic scholars have attempted to measure financial health such as the Brown's "ten-point test" and other indexes. Notwithstanding, these indexes have not comprehensively captured the full extent of financial management at the local government sphere. The primary objective of this study was to formulate and apply a Financial Health Index (FHI) for local government that includes all the main elements of financial health by means of a quantitative methodology. This index focused on four sub-indexes of financial health namely (1) income and expenditure; (2) liquidity ratios; (3) solvency ratios; and (4) profitability ratios. The study area is the Sedibeng District Municipal region, which includes the local municipal areas of Midvaal, Emfuleni and Lesedi. Annual financial statements for the three local municipalities were obtained from National Treasury and analysed and applied to the newly created index. Overall, it was found that the Midvaal Local Municipality had the highest index score of 49 out of a maximum of 65 or a percentage index score of 75%, followed by Lesedi with 57% and Emfuleni with only 52%.

The utilisation of this Financial Health Index (FHI) could be useful in measuring the financial health of local municipalities in South Africa and assist policymakers in the identification of key financial issues for strategy development towards improvement of their financial situation.

INTRODUCTION

Local government in South Africa is synonymous with poor service delivery of essential services, inadequate infrastructure development and maintenance, low levels of economic development and most importantly the lack of sustainable and proper financial management (Managa 2012:3). The major difficulties facing municipalities are collection of sufficient revenue from basic services and the implementation of adequate financial management (Sebola and Chauke 2016:3). A significant number of municipalities in South Africa have monetary and financing constraints which hinder the execution of service delivery, infrastructure expansion, as well as Local Economic Development (LED) (Meyer 2014:5). Local government is seen as the first and critical sphere of the government in addressing service delivery problems as well as social and economic development issues (Koma 2014:9). Financial problems faced by local government includes insufficient management practices, incompetent financial officials, high debt burdens and ineffective revenue collection (South Africa 2019). The Rural Community Assistance Partnership (RCAP 2011:1) defines financial management as follows:

> "The term financial management simply means effectively managing your utility's financial functions. The financial functions of your utility include accounting, your policies and procedures, record-keeping and reporting systems, planning and forecasting practices, budgeting procedures, and financial-oversight responsibilities. The goal of good financial management is to ensure that your utility is operated as a financially sustainable enterprise".

Mazibuko and Fourie (2013:134–138) state that there are numerous factors which contribute to the challenges of municipal financial management and administration such as the under and overspending of the municipal allocations, underspending of capital allocations and the over/under spending of provisional grants, low revenue collection, consumer debts as well as creditors and accounts payable. Legislation provides the framework for effective financial management, however, measuring the shortcomings of local government in South Africa remains a

daunting task, considering the various factors which may have an impact on the financial well-being (South Africa 1999:85). The tools used to govern institutional structures in South Africa such as the Municipal Finance Management Act (Act 56 of 2003) (MFMA), are used to develop the financial management in South Africa.

In South Africa, the Auditor-General has a constitutional role of oversight, liability and guidance in the public sector through the process of auditing (Van der Nest and Thornhill 2008:551). The 2017 and 2018 annual *MFMA (Municipal Finance Management Act)* audit statement showed that a mere 8 percent of all the municipalities in South Africa had accredited clean audits, which is only 22 municipalities out of 278 municipalities (Auditor General 2019:2). The root source of financial problems ingrained within the financial environment of local government includes the deficiency in boosting internal jurisdiction and attending to risk areas (Chauke 2016:136). Various policies and legislation play a significant role on the overall financial management of local government in South Africa and the foundation is laid to build constructive financial management within local government.

The objective of the study was to formulate and apply a comprehensive Financial Health Index (FHI) for local government which includes all the main elements of financial health in a quantitative manner. The specific index was formulated to assess the overall condition of local government finances and focused extensively on four sub-indexes including income and expenditure ratios, liquidity ratios, solvency ratios and profitability ratios. The utilisation of a FHI could be useful in measuring the overall financial health of local government in South Africa and provide valuable insights on key aspects of financial issues.

LEGISLATION OF FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT

The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996

According to the *Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,* local government consists of municipalities which "has the right to govern, on its own initiative, the local government affairs of its community, subject to national and provincial legislation, as provided for in the Constitution" (South Africa 1996:74). The basic objective of local government is to ensure the provision of services such as water, electricity, refuse removal and sanitation services, the provision of an accountable and democratic government for communities and encouraging economic and social development (Fuo and Du Plessis 2015:2; South Africa 1996:74). In chapter 7 of the Constitution (South Africa 1996:74) it is stated that municipalities control and shape its budgeting and management of financial resources in such way that the wants and needs of local communities are structured to elevate economic

and social development and follow the rules and regulations as presented in the provincial and national programmes. Finances within local government are administrated independently and municipal by-laws are administrated by each municipality on its own initiatives (Fuo 2017:325).

The Municipal Systems Act (Act 32 of 2000)

The *Municipal Systems Act* has been formulated and proclaimed to assist on the improvement of the financial sustainability of municipalities through the facilitation of municipal services by protecting the financing of the specified services, operating costs and initial capital disbursements (South Africa 2000:7). This act is therefore the foundation for other finance management acts in South Africa such as the MFMA.

The Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA) (Act 56 of 2003)

The act plays a significant role in the management of local government finances in South Africa. The MFMA accommodate all the predominant legislation needed to apply constructive financial management practices for municipalities (South Africa 2003). The key to financial management at the local government sphere is to set financial objectives followed by planning, carrying out the financial plans, comparing it to the actual plan, establishing the objectives and redesign the policy objectives (Botlhoko 2017:29). According to the Act, financial management in municipalities should be adopted in such way that it is able to safeguard resources of municipalities in an efficient and effective manner while maintaining effective and explicit structures for risk and financial administration; exercising audit internally with the stipulated quality and standards; controlling irregular, fruitless and uncertified disbursement and other supplemental losses (South Africa 2003:74). The objective of the MFMA is therefore to establish public finances in such a way that it would grant financial growth and development while maintaining a degree of accountability. Financial management systems are the foundation for liability, transparency, effective and efficient service distribution in all municipal entities in South Africa (Mantzaris 2014:91).

ASSESSMENT OF EXISTING FINANCIAL HEALTH STUDIES.

The formulation of a FHI is a difficult task due to the number of factors that need to be considered. Various studies have focused on establishing of a FHI based on a couple of elements which authors deem important. The following section

analysed and evaluate the existing literature on municipal financial health index development.

Some of the earliest international municipal financial health studies started in 1993 with utilizing a ten-point test based on the test of financial conditions (Maher and Nollenberger 2009). McDonald (2017:5) outlines that there is a considerable amount of work done in terms of evaluating fiscal health at the local government sphere. However, the ten-point test may be seen as one of the most important measurement tools of financial health. This tool includes aspects of revenue, operating position, debt and unfunded liabilities. Chitinga-Mabugu and Monkam (2013) assessed the fiscal capacity at the local government level in South Africa. The focus was on consolidated policy-making firmness or alternatives with consideration on the expenditure and revenue side. The methodology included the Representative Revenue System as well as the Revenue Expenditure System to evaluate the comprehensive fiscal capacity with particular emphasis on revenue volume, revenue attempts as well as the disbursement needs of all the municipalities in South Africa. The indicators and elements used for assessment included both financial management and economic development indicators which included the social, economic, demographic differences, national grants, capital expenditures, annual per capita income and municipal operating revenues, HDI and Gini coefficient (Chitinga-Mabugu and Monkam 2013:16).

Ncube and Vacu (2013) used a comprehensive approach to measure the fiscal distress in the the local government sphere in South Africa. The principle of the fiscal strength includes contrasting account ranges such as fiscal neutral (0–5), fiscal watch (6–7) and fiscal distressed (8–11) (Ncube and Vacu 2013:122). The analysis included aspects such as long term indicators which include aspects of compliance, service delivery, financial management and economic performance indicators. According to Cabaleiro, Buch and Vaamonde (2013) the measurement of financial health in local government is based on four separate variables which include sustainability, flexibility, viability and vulnerability. The focal point of viability was more on the budgetary revenue and the long term debt for each institution while flexibility was in relation to the on-going financial performance and vulnerability focused more on the direct and indirect contributions.

Coleman *et al.* (2014:3) utilised a municipal health index based on municipal health diagnostics in California. The index was based on a checklist to assess the adjacent financial strength of the municipalities' natural endowment and other general activities. The checklist is used to measure the community's financial well-being which are then used by policymakers to evaluate the crucial inquiries surrounding financial health which are then adopted to detect early warning signs. The principle of the municipal health diagnostics is sublime due to the fact that it is easy to use and accessible, however, it doesn't include important

aspects of municipal health such as income and expenditure ratios, profitability or liquidity ratios.

Ritonga (2014:53–54) developed a model for local government financial conditions in Indonesia. The index focused primarily on the environmental and financial factors such as short and long term durability, budgetary solvency, financial sovereignty and pliability. The aim of the research was to develop a tool to estimate the financial condition of municipalities in Indonesia and furthermore to regulate factors influencing the financial health of municipalities. The concept of the Financial Conditions Measurement Framework (FCMF) includes a wide variety of aspects in identifying and analysing the financial municipal conditions. The disadvantage of utilising the Ritonga FCMF is that it does not allow for rapid analysis based on indicators which are easily accessible. Kleynhans and Coetzee (2019) adopted a framework based on Ritonga's FCMF. The index utilised by Kleynhans and Coetzee focused primarily on the social factors of local government and the financial status influencing the financial state of municipal entities. The objective of the indicators used in this article was to evaluate the financial conditions management index (FCMI) and the composite financial conditions index (CFCI) of 43 municipalities in Kwa-Zulu Natal. The purpose of the study was to utilise an existing index, however, and to apply an econometric model by evaluating the financial conditions.

The South African Cities Network (SACN) 2018 and Lehohla (2017) focused on the financial census of municipalities and the state of city finances in South Africa. The central focus of the study was on the various financial illustrative analytics such as history of own revenue, expenditures and audits of the various municipalities in South Africa with limited basis on progressive elements and financial ratios. SACN (South African Cities Network) 2018 focused on descriptive statistics of all the major municipalities in South Africa based on factors such as: city revenue, city operating expenditure, city borrowing, consumer debtors, cash management as well as audit outcomes. Lehohla (2017) focused primarily on the purchases of the different utilities, employee related costs as well as liquidity management ratios. National Treasury (2018) published a report based on the state of local government aim at a report to classify financial risks in municipal finances. The purpose of the report was therefore to identify the various local government entities that are in financial difficulties.

The analysis of the literature indicates the shortcomings of existing municipal health indexes for example the studies did not create indexes with scoring systems based on the result of selected indicators. The uniqueness of this study is that it is able to actively measure each indictor based on the data provided in the context of South African municipalities. The approach in which this index was developed and based on factors which are the most problematic in municipalities relating to their income and expenditure, profitability, solvency and liquidity, and in this way

applied an improved approach in identifying key risk areas of local government financial health.

METHODOLOGY

The methodology used in the study is based on a quantitative approach. The main objective of the study was to formulate financial health index that calculates the features of financial health management in a perceptible manner at the local government sphere. The development of the index was based on a literature review of existing research on financial health and the development of similar indexes. The index used in this article consists of four sub-indexes with a total of 13 indicators. Indicators were also categorising and a scoring system was developed as indicated in Tables 1 to 4. The quantitative segment of the research was fulfilled by means of extracting data from Audited Financial Statements as published by National Treasury for the 2017/18 financial year as the latest financial statements as provided by the Auditor General report (National Treasury 2019a).

The Sedibeng municipal region is situated in the southern-most part of Gauteng province and approximately 55km south of Johannesburg and consists of three local municipalities including the Midvaal Local Municipality (MLM), Emfuleni Local Municipality (ELM) and the Lesedi Local Municipality (LLM) (Neethling 2016:7). The Midvaal Local Municipality, is one of the top-performing municipalities in Gauteng, with a fifth consecutive clean audit for the 2017/18 financial year (Seleka 2019). The other local municipality, Emfuleni has major backlogs in terms of the provision of basic services to local communities and haven't been successful in attaining a clean audit for the last five years

A comprehensive approach was employing in selecting financial indicators to measure financial health for local government. According to the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD 2008) an index should be combined and arranged according to the underlying philosophical structure, and therefore it should be positioned along the lines of the literature framework. The approach used in this study is reliant on an equal weighting (EW) system, whereby all variables are accustomed with the same weight (OECD 2008:31). All of the indicators used in this study are given the same weight due to the limited factual and statistical basis e.g. when there is limited insight of the relationships between the variables. The estimate used in the scoring criteria of the Financial Health Index (FHI) are based on a scoring criteria ranging from 0 (inferior score) to 5 (exceptional score). The objective is therefore to get the highest score in order to obtain the highest points. The FHI was constructed by including four main sub-indexes which measures various financial indicators within financial management practices. The sub-indexes are constituted of a total of 13 financial

indicators consisting of income and expenditure components; liquidity ratios; solvency ratios; and profitability ratios. The indicators used within each sub-index, are assigned a score from zero (0) to five (5) based on a similar study adopted by Meyer & De Jongh (2018:105) which measured economic development on a regional level. The indicators adopted in this study is mainly for the use of local government. The FHI as developed in this study is based on the aforementioned sub-indexes. The financial indicators were obtained by means of data from Audited Financial Statements as published by National Treasury (2019a). The usage of audited financial statements included the statements of financial performances *(SFper),* the statements of financial position (*SFpos*) as well as the key notes to the financial statements. The data obtained for the population sizes were abstracted from Regional Explorer (Global Insight 2019). The four sub-indexes with the indicators included in the study are explained below:

Sub-index 1: Income and Expenditure Indicators

This sub-index focuses extensively on income and expenditure variables which predict the financial performance of a municipality and eight indicators were selected:

- *Total revenue per capita:* The total revenue per capita is equal to the total revenue from both the exchange and the non-exchange transactions divided by the population size of the municipality, however, it eliminates capital ventures (due to annual variations) (Maher & Nollenberger 2009:63).

$$\text{Total Revenue per capita} = \frac{\text{Total Revenue (SFper)}}{\text{Population size (Global Insight)}}$$

- *Total revenue per capita growth rate:* Acemoglu *et al.* **(2010:179) assert that** such analysis provides the framework for comparing one municipality to another in terms of growth in revenue collection, however, revenue per capita will tend to differentiate due to changes in population size. The higher the revenue per capita in terms of revenue collection, the better the fiscal health of the municipality will tend to be, since inflated revenue from local government is associated with inflated income per capita (Chitinga-Mabugu and Monkam 2013:17).

$$\text{Total Revenue per capita growth rate}$$
$$= \frac{\text{Total Revenue per capita 2018} - \text{Total Revenue per capita 2017}}{\text{Total Revenue per capita 2017}} * 100$$

- *Total Expenditure per capita:* The total expenditure per capita is identical to the total expenditure of the municipality in a financial year divided by the size

of the population (Mahar and Nollenberger 2009:63). Calculating the total expenditure per capita, one has to analyse the total expenditure for all government funds divided by the size of the population (McDonald, 2017:5). This is based on existing disbursement for total government funds (with the exclusion of capital projects assets being changed in annual variations) due to population adjustments.

$$Total\ Expenditure\ per\ capita = \frac{Total\ Expenditure\ (SFper)}{Population\ size\ (Global\ Insight)}$$

- *Total Expenditures per capita growth rate:* Rising expenditure per capita should be an indicator that manages and evaluate the importance of the growth, and formulate a policy to deal with the matter. The conclusive goal is to see whether the total expenditure per capita will broaden or reduce from the current year to the following year and the goal is to formulate policy to deal with the matter.

Total Expenditure per capita growth rate

$$= \frac{Total\ Expenditure\ per\ capita\ 2018 - Total\ Expenditure\ per\ capita\ 2017}{Total\ Revenue\ per\ capita\ 2017} * 100$$

- *Service Obligation (operations ratio):* The purpose of the operations ratio is to manifest the coherence of an institutions management by balancing the total revenues with the organisations total expenditure (Hill *et al.* 2010:784). The purpose of the Service Obligation (operations ratio) is to indicate that a governments annual revenues were sufficient to pay its annual operations. A ratio of one or higher indicates the municipal entity is able to cover its expenses with its revenues.

$$Service\ Obligation = \frac{Total\ Revenue\ (SFper)}{Total\ Expenditure\ (SFper)}$$

- *Intergovernmental revenue as a percentage of total revenue:* The intergovernmental revenue to total revenue can be described as the percentage of governmental revenue in relation to the total revenue (Dye 2008:8).

Intergovernmental revenue % total revenue

$$= \frac{Transfer\ revenue\ (Grants\ and\ subsidies)}{Total\ Expenditure\ 2018} * 100$$

- *Employee related costs*: Employee related costs to total costs identifies the proportion of the how much the total employee related costs are linked to total expenditure. The employee related costs are associated with all secondary and direct personnel charges such as salaries and training.

$$Employee\ related\ costs = \frac{Employee\ related\ costs}{Total\ Expenditure\ 2018} * 100$$

- *Irregular, Fruitless and wasteful and unauthorised expenditure as percentage of total operating expenditure*: The goal of this ratio is to ensure that irregular, fruitless, wasteful and unauthorised expenditure is halted. The ratio is expressed in terms of the percentage of irregular, fruitless and wasteful expenditure to the total operating expenditure.

$$Employee\ related\ costs = \frac{Employee\ related\ costs}{Total\ Expenditure\ 2018} * 100$$

Table 1: Sub-index 1: Income and Expenditure: scoring criteria

Index score	0	1	2	3	4	5
Total revenue per capita (R)	Less than R2000	R2000 – R4999	R5000 – R7999	R8000 – R10999	R11000 – R13999	Above R14000
Total revenue per capita growth rate (%)	Less than 0%	0.1 – 2.5%	2.6 – 5.0%	5.1 – 7.5%	7.6 – 10%	Above 10%
Total expenditure per capita (R)	Less than R2000	R2000 – R4999	R5000 – R7999	R8000 – R10999	R11000 – R13999	Above R14000
Total expenditure per capita growth rate (%)	Less than 0%	0.1 – 2.5%	2.6 – 5.0%	5.1 – 7.5%	7.6 – 10%	Above 10%
Service Obligations (ratio)	<0.00 – 0.60	0.61 – 0.7	0.71 – 0.8	0.81 – 0.9	0.91 – 1.0	Above 1.0
Intergovernmental revenue as percentage of total revenue (%)	Above 51%	41 – 50.9%	31 – 40.9%	21 – 30.9%	11 – 20.9%	0 – 10.9%
Employee related costs (%)	Above 51%	41 – 50.9%	31 – 40.9%	21 – 30.9%	11 – 20.9%	0 – 10.9%
Irregular, fruitless and wasteful expenditure as percentage of total operating expenditure (%)	Above 51%	41 – 50.9%	31 – 40.9%	21 – 30.9%	11 – 20.9%	0 – 10.9%

Sub-Index 2: Liquidity Ratios

The second sub-index includes the investigation of liquidity i.e. the method in which organisations or entities have the capacity to commend their short and long term commitments. The objective of the liquidity ratio is to analyse how the

entities debts are covered from the overall assets and the sub-index consists of two indicators:

- *Current Ratio:* The current ratio quantifies the capability of an organisation/ government entity to compensate ongoing liabilities (loans due and creditors) with the ongoing assets (bank deposits, cash) (Murray and Dollery 2006:27). Brand (2016:100) suggest that a higher ratio demonstrates a significant perimeter of safety in that the organisation covers their short term debts. The indicator illustrates that a higher ratio is equivalent to the ability of an organisation to meet its short term obligations. The ratio should always be greater than 1 which suggest that its assets is greater than its liabilities and that the company will be able to pay off its obligations of they come due at that point.

$$Current\ ratio\ Sfpos = \frac{Current\ Assets}{Current\ Liabilities}$$

- *Quick Ratio (Acid Test Ratio):* The asset test ratio is derived by dividing the difference between current assets and inventories by current liabilities (Sulaiman *et al.* 2001:104). A propitious relationship is anticipated between the value of this ratio and the financial health of the institution. The quick ratio will enable an entity to know whether they can spend their current account, excluding to sell their inventories and prepayments (vat receivables) (Eriotis, Vasiliou & Ventoura-Neokosmidi 2007:95). A high ratio suggest that the government is able to meet its short term obligations.

$$Quick\ ratio\ Sfpos = \frac{Current\ Assets - Inventories}{Current\ Liabilities}$$

Table 2: Sub-index 2: Liquidity ratio scoring criteria

Index score	0	1	2	3	4	5
Current Ratio	0 – 0.399	0.4 – 0.799	0.8 – 1.199	1.2 – 1.599	1.6 – 1.999	Above 2
Quick ratio (Acid test ratio)	0 – 0.399	0.4 – 0.799	0.8 – 1.199	1.2 – 1.599	1.6 – 1.999	Above 2

Sub-Index 3: Solvency Ratios

The third sub-index includes the solvency ratio which is based on the ability of an entity to meet the long term obligations (Henry, Robinson and van Greuning 2012:292). Solvency ratios (SR) are also known as the "long term debt" or "leverage". The solvency ratio is very important as it measures the long term

sustainability of the government entity. The solvency ratios include the following two indicators:

- *Debt-to-Worth ratio*: In order for an organisation or institution to be sustainable, the debt-to-worth ratio assess the financial strength of the institution. The goal of the debt-to-worth ratio is to quantify the specific point to which an organisation is financing its operations via liabilities against the holistic funds. The goal of the ratio is therefore to precisely indicate the propensity of equity shareholders against all pending debts on the assumption of an institutional decline. A lower ratio is necessary since a higher debt-to-worth ratio indicates the organisations ability to lend more than it is worth.

$$Debt - to - Worth \; Sfpos = \frac{Total \; Debt}{Total \; net \; Worth} * 100$$

- *Total-Debt-to-total-assets ratio:* The total-debt-to-assets ratio is an indicator used to explain the organisation's corresponding assets that are being financed through liabilities (Yuan and Motohashi 2008:6). The solvency ratio is used to explain the stability of the continual financial strategies. The higher the total debt-to-total-assets are the more the entity needs debt to finance the total equity.

$$Debt - to - total \; assets \; Sfpos = \frac{Total \; Debt}{Total \; Assets} * 100$$

Table 3: Sub-index 3: Solvency ratio scoring criteria

Index score	Solvency Ratios					
	0	1	2	3	4	5
Debt-to-worth ratio	Above 1.5	1.2 – 1.499	0.9 – 1.199	0.6 – 0.899	0.3 – 0.599	0 – 0.299
Total-debt-to-total-assets ratio	Above 1.5	1.2 – 1.499	0.9 – 1.199	0.6 – 0.899	0.3 – 0.599	0 – 0.299

Sub Index 4: Profitability Ratios

The fourth and final sub-index includes the profitability ratio which is based on the ability of the organisation to achieve profit from its assets (resources) and consists of only one indicator:

- *Return-on-assets:* The return on assets ratio or also known as the (ROA) is a ratio that are used to explain the relationship between the organisations profit and the total assets. Khadafi *et al.* (2014:103) explains that the ratio gives a manifestation of the return on total assets after interest costs and excise. A high

return on assets ratio is needed since it shows that the organisation is able to acquire profit from the valuable assets within the entity.

$$Return-on-assets = \frac{Net\ income}{Total\ assets} * 100$$

Table 4: Sub-index 4: Profitability ratio scoring criteria

Index score	Profitability Ratios					
	0	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
Return-On-Assets	< 0.00	0 – 0.299	0.3 – 0.599	0.6 – 0.899	0.9 – 1.199	Above 1.2

RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

Table 5 contains a summary of the comparative analysis of the three local municipalities within the Sedibeng District Municipality. Data were derived from both Global Insight Regional Explorer data sets as well as the 2017/18 audited financial statements from National Treasury.

In terms of sub-index 1, the income and expenditure ratios indicate that Midvaal has the largest share of total revenue per capita of R9 543 per person, indicating a higher revenue rate than that of both Emfuleni and Lesedi Local Municipalities. The total revenues per capita grew the fastest at Lesedi Local Municipality with an increase of 10.4% from the previous financial year, compared to 7.6% in Emfuleni. The largest expenditure per capita was achieved in the Midvaal Local Municipality at R9 081 per capita followed by Emfuleni at R8 611 per capita, while Midvaal had an average growth of 4.28% in the total expenditure per capita compared to negative growths at the other two municipalities. In terms of the service obligations (i.e. Total revenue divided by total expenditure), best results were achieved by the Lesedi Local Municipality with a ratio of 1.11. Total government grants and subsidies as a percentage of total revenue are relatively average within the three municipalities with an average of 17.9% of provincial and national revenue as a percentage of the total revenue, but Lesedi again had the highest percentage of 22%. Employee related costs plays a significant role in the total expenditure of a region, indicating that a higher percentage of employee related costs are associated with lower revenue for other basic operational procedures. Emfuleni enjoyed the lowest score for employee related costs as percentage of total expenditure with a percentage of 15% of the total expenditure categories. In terms of irregular, fruitless and wasteful expenditure the Midvaal Local Municipality had the lowest percentage of irregular and fruitless expenditure of 0% of the total expenditure within the municipal entity

while Emfuleni and Lesedi had significant high percentages of 33% and 20% respectively. Midvaal achieved the highest score for this sub-index of 28 followed by Lesedi on 24 and Emfuleni with only 23 out of a total of 40.

In terms of the sub-index: liquidity ratios, such as the current ratio and the quick ratio (acid test ratio) the Midvaal Local Municipality performed the best with an average score of 2.16 indicating that the municipal entity is able to cover its short term obligations with its current assets. The Emfuleni Local Municipality had the lowest score of 0.23 indicating that the municipality is unable to cover its short term obligations with the given short term assets. Midvaal achieved the highest score for this sub-index of 10 followed by Lesedi on 4 and Emfuleni with 0 out of a total of 10.

In terms of the sub-index: Solvency ratios, which indicates the ability of the municipal entity to cover its debt in proportion with its total assets, with the target of the solvency ratio to be as low as possible since a high numerical value are associated with higher debts to cover the overall assets within the organisation, Midvaal achieved the highest score with a numerical value of 0.159 while Lesedi showed the lowest score of 0.262 meaning that the entity uses more debt to cover its assets both in the short and the long term. Midvaal achieved the highest score for this sub-index of 10 followed by Emfuleni on 9 and Lesedi with 7 out of a total of 10. Lastly, in terms of the sub-index: Proftability, and the Return-On-Assets ratio, the municipality with the highest score was Lesedi Local Municipality indicating that they are able to maximize profit with their given assets. Lesedi had the highest sub-index score for profitability.

Based on the scoring structure of the four sub-indexes and thirteen indicators, the overall results indicate that Midvaal Local Municipality achieved the highest score of the three municipalities, with a score of 49 out of 65 indicating a financial health of 75 percent which is in constrast with the two other local municipalities which scored 52 percent and 57 percent respectively. Table 5 therefore provides a detailed analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the three municipalities for 13 financial health indicators. If a score of less than 3 has been achieved for a specific indicator, a strategy needs to be develop to improve the situation.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Research on the measurement of local government financial health is an important field of study in the understanding of the underlying issues that local government face. Quality financial management is one of the solutions to the many problems that municipalities face in South Africa. Municipalities should apply more effort in interpreting municipal budgets and financing which will eventually result in improved service delivery and socio-economic development at the local sphere of government (Pahwa *et al.* 2006:2).

Table 5: Application of the FHI: A Comparative analysis

Indicator	Midvaal Local Municipality			Emfuleni Local Municipality			Lesedi Local Municipality		
Sub-index 1: Income and Expenditure ratios	**2017**	**2018**	**Score out of 5**	**2017**	**2018**	**Score out of 5**	**2017**	**2018**	**Score out of 5**
Total Revenue per capita (R)	8 909	9 543	3	7 496	8 066	3	6 659	7 352	2
Total revenues per capita growth rate (%)		7.1%	3		7.6%	4		10.4%	5
Total expenditure per capita (R)	8 708	9 081	3	8 716	8 611	3	6 641	6 561	2
Total expenditure per capita growth rate (%)		4.3%	2		-1.2%	0		-1.2%	0
Service obligation (ratio)	1.02	1.05	5	0.86	0.90	3	1.01	1.11	5
Government grants & subsidies to total revenue (%)	14%	15 %	4	15%	15%	4	19%	22%	3
Employee related costs	22.2%	22.2%	3	17%	15%	4	21%	22%	3
Irregular fruitless and wasteful expenditure (%)	0%	0%	5	18%	33%	2	22%	20%	4
Sub-index 1: total score	–		28			23			24

Indicator	Midvaal Local Municipality			Emfuleni Local Municipality			Lesedi Local Municipality		
Sub-index 2: Liquidity ratios	2017	2018	Score out of 5	2017	2018	Score out of 5	2017	2018	Score out of 5
Current ratio	2.08	2.32	5	0.39	0.35	0	0.82	1.00	2
Quick ratio (acid test ratio)	1.96	2.16	5	0.28	0.23	0	0.78	0.96	2
Sub-index 2: total score			10			0			4
Sub-index 3: Solvency ratios	2017	2018	Score out of 5	2017	2018	Score out of 5	2017	2018	Score out of 5
Debt-to-worth ratio	0.16	0.19	5	0.28	0.35	4	0.42	0.36	4
Total debt to total assets ratio	0.14	0.16	5	0.22	0.26	5	0.29	0.26	3
Sub-index 3: total score			10			9			7
Sub-index 4: Profitability	2017	2018	Score out of 5	2017	2018	Score out of 5	2017	2018	Score out of 5
Return-on-assets ratio	0.251	0.262	1	0.3210	0.3280	2	0.486	0.4720	2
Sub-index 4: total score			1			2			2
Total Index Score	49 / 65 = 75%			34 / 65 = 52%			37 / 65 = 57%		

Source: Own compilation from National Treasury data (2019).

The objective of the study was to formulate and apply a comprehensive Financial Health Index (FHI) that successfully quantify all the elements of financial health in a quantitative manner, given the problems that local government face in determining risk areas of financial health. The specific index was depicted to assess the overall condition of local government and focused extensively on four sub-indexes including income and expenditure ratios; liquidity ratios; solvency ratios; and profitability ratios. The utilisation of a simplified Financial Health Index (FHI) could be very useful in measuring the overall financial health of local government in South Africa and provide valuable insights on key aspects of financial issues. The results indicated that Midvaal Local Municipality which is characterised as one of the top performing municipalities in Gauteng, achieved a score of 75 percent compared to a mere 52% and 57% scored by Emfuleni and Lesedi local municipalities within the Sedibeng District Municipality.

The limitations to the study is the fact that it is not always possible to predict the financial health of government due to external factors which could play a significant role in the performance of a municipality, some of which include more complex socio-economic problems influencing the performances of government in an indirect manner by means of revenue collection and adequate service delivery. Future research may focus on further development of this index by allocating different weights to indicators and to do more comparative analysis, as well as to add possible economic development indicators. It is therefore an ongoing process by government to always identify factors and key risk areas which may potentially influence the position of financial health in local government. The significance of this index is that it is a comprehensive measurement tool for academics, government officials and policymakers to identify and possibly eliminate risk areas within the financial environment of municipalities in South Africa.

NOTE

* The article is partly based on a PhD thesis titled: "An analysis of the financial health of local government in South Africa", under the supervision of Prof D Meyer.

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Public Sector Development under the New Constitutional Dispensation in Kenya

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ABSTRACT

This article sets out to investigate development-focused public leadership under the new Constitution of Kenya of 2010. The article aims to isolate development-focused public leadership on one hand, and shared national values and principles of good governance, as enshrined in the Constitution of 2010, on the other. The purpose of the article is to examine whether development-focused public leadership promotes national values and principles of good governance, as envisaged in the Constitution of Kenya of 2010. The study empirically examines the interplay between these leadership foci, the eight factors advancing national values and the principles of good governance, as enshrined in the Constitution of Kenya of 2010.

The article presents an overview of public leadership for development in Kenya, along with the research question and hypothesis. Hereafter, research method and data collection methods are presented. Both qualitative and quantitative data sources were deployed for the study. This is followed by the findings and discussion of the empirical studies. In conclusion, the implications of the studies on public leadership for development in Kenya are explored.

BACKGROUND, RATIONALE AND PROBLEM STATEMENT

Although public governance mechanisms play a key role in service delivery, there are limited empirical studies on public management (Anderson 2010), in terms of

good governance practices and public leadership (Van Wart 2013). Regardless of governance structures set by diverse government regimes, public leaders whether political, administrative, civil, judicial or military, pass through varying assessment criteria (Hart 2011). Both the public and private sectors are required to perform, develop, follow and align institutional goals (Van Wart 2003), as well as foster mutual development agendas. Leadership can be explained as a set of practices where the outcome is visible after some time (Chapman, Getha-Taylor, Holmes, Jacobson, Morse and *Sowa* 2015). However, measuring such outcomes longitudinally may be futile where data availability is unreliable, particularly in the public service sector.

As such, Hughes, Ginnett and Curphy (2015) note that leadership researchers have defined the concept in varying ways, owing to the complex phenomenon of the leader/agent (personality), followers/group members (cohesiveness) and situation/task (environment). Furthermore, most leadership studies have been conducted discretely (Chapman *et al.* 2015). For some countries like Kenya, there is a general lack of public leadership studies guiding research and practice. Public sector leadership (administrative/bureaucratic) or public service studies are commonly discerned in leadership studies (Van Wart 2013). In an evaluation of public leadership studies over the last 25 years, Chapman *et al.* (2015) found a dire need for studies addressing the relationship between public leadership and effective, equitable governance principles.

It remains challenging to interpret study findings that focus on the success or failure of public leadership. Wide-ranging evaluation methods and tools often lead to contradictory and unreliable findings (Hart 2011). Furthermore, public leadership is influenced by other factors (Hart 2011) such as the institutional and environmental context, governance systems, individualistic tendencies, information technology, networks and partnerships (Chapman *et al.* 2015), as well as multilateral agreements in donor-dependent countries.

Van Wart (2003) delineates 'epochs' of mainstream leadership theory and research into five categories. Prior to 1900, 'great' leaders like Martin Luther took centre stage. This was followed by trait theory (1900–1948), contingency theory (1948 -1980), transformational leadership theory (from 1979 onwards), servant leadership (1977 to present) and multifaceted leadership theories (1990s onwards). Although certain leadership theories overlap, Van Wart (2003) presents a comprehensive and useful framework for mapping out studies on leadership theories. To date, leadership theorists and practitioners have focused on creating an inclusive leadership model that links transactional and transformation models (Van Wart 2003). Furthermore, theorists have tried to create a unified general theory that links numerous fragmented theories and diverse variables that underpin leadership studies. However, there are several reasons why developing such a unified theory can be challenging. In an assessment of leadership as an

organisational process, rather than a function from the supervisory to executive level, Van Wart (2013) observes that leadership theories are complex and difficult for practitioners to understand.

In an assessment of leadership studies from 1987 to 2012, Chapman *et al.* (2015) found that most studies focused on character, function (accountability, collaboration, entrepreneurial culture and strategic direction). Furthermore, different methodologies were used. Over 62% of research applied a quantitative approach, while qualitative methods were used in 50% of research. In turn, multiple methods were used to a lesser extent. Chapman *et al.* (2015) isolate administrative levels, suitable values for public leaders and leadership that cuts across jurisdictional situations as areas that affect leadership studies. Furthermore, Chapman *et al.* (2015) note that there is no single theoretical framework for defining and underpinning public leadership studies. Nonetheless, most studies are biased towards transformational and collaborative leadership, which both focus on leadership as a dependent variable. Chapman *et al.* (2015) also recommend that future research should focus on leadership outcomes to gain a deeper understanding of the public service.

This is further supported by Stone, Russell and Patterson (2004), who studied the differences and similarities between transformational leadership, which mainly focuses on task/organisational objectives/accomplishments, and servant leadership, which focuses on people/followers. It was observed that leadership encompasses influence, vision, trust, respect, credibility, risk sharing, delegation, integrity and modelling. Furthermore, Stone *et al.* (2004) observe that, although transformational leadership is widely researched, both transformative and servant leadership offer robust conceptual dimensions for examining leadership dynamics. Van Wart (2013) merged constructs of unified leadership variables, namely results (management theory), followers (transactional leadership theory), change (transformative leadership theory), systems (collaborative and horizontal leadership theory), and ethics (ethical leadership theory), as the key determinants of a leader's focus.

In Kenya, public leadership for development has been integrated in several semi-autonomous public institutions with diverse mandates, such as management development institutes, universities and education management institutes. Furthermore, public leadership for development is also prominent within training institutions for the judiciary, legislative, military, diplomatic corps and maritime staff. Over the last 50 years, these institutions have deployed different approaches to foster public leadership for development that are centred on management, transactional, transformative, collaborative and ethical leadership theories. Notably, the adopted models were dependent on the leader, situation and public-sector administrators (followers) of the day.

To further strengthen public-sector leadership, Articles 10, 73 and 232 of the Constitution of Kenya of 2010, enshrine the national values and principles of governance, leadership and integrity, as well as public service, respectively.

These values and principles bind all state organs, state officers and the citizenry to observe good governance or leadership. In line with this, the article empirically examines the interplay between public leadership's focus on results, followers, change, systems and ethics and the national values and principles enshrined in Kenya's new constitutional dispensation (governance, transparency and accountability; diversity leadership; fair competition; efficiency and effectiveness; sustainable development; responsive, prompt and equitable service; participation of the people and professionalism and ethics in public service).

PUBLIC LEADERSHIP FOR DEVELOPMENT IN KENYA

For the last five decades, Kenya has been under constant pressure to change its perspective of public service. As a result, one political regime after the other was forced to design, redesign or transform public leadership, albeit with minimal positive change. This resulted in a public outcry over a lack of essential public goods and services. Since its independence in 1964, major changes have taken place in Kenya, particularly in the public service sector. From the onset, the focus shifted from taking over public administration and management from the former colonial regime, to reforms geared towards enhancing efficiency, integrity and effectiveness in public service provision. Despite changes, public service delivery has been characterised by several challenges. After the country gained its independence, it became apparent that most public servants had developed personal interests in real estate, banking and farming. Undeniably, this compromised public service delivery and undermined government's goals and objectives. By the 1970s, public servants' personal interests were overshadowing their duties, which necessitated further training and a policy refocus (Kenya Investment Authority (KIA) 2011).

From the mid-1980s to the late-1990s, there was a focus on Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), which emphasised private sector participation to ensure a leaner, efficient public service. From 2003, the government adopted several reform strategies to enhance public service delivery. This included institutional capacity building, values and ethics, rapid results initiative, performance contracting, service delivery charters and transformative leadership. In 2005, the government formulated a human resource development (HRD) training policy, whereby public servants are required to undergo intensive induction training, annual training, as well as policy formulation and project implementation training for managerial-level employees (The Newslink 2011).

As mentioned earlier in the article, several semi-autonomous government-owned training and management institutions have been involved in leadership development since the 1960s. However, the Kenya School of Government (KSG) (formerly KIA) is responsible for most leadership development initiatives. (See Table 1).

Table 1: Development of management training and development (1961–2012)

Name	Period	Gains/challenges in management and leadership development
Jeanes School	Prior to 1961	Training teachers as supervisors of rural schools, among others.
	1958–1960	Focused on training provincial administration officers and assistant secretaries in ministry as a prerequisite for advanced public administration courses.
Kenia Institute of Administration (KIA)	1961–1966	As a fully funded government department, KIA was responsible for training Africans as part of the Africanisation policy. District and labour officers from all professions had access to pilot training courses that would make them eligible for senior administrative and executive positions within the civil service.
	1966–1972	The mandate was expanded to incorporate training of lay district magistrates, including court officers. However, the initiative was terminated in 1973.
	1970–1972	By then, it had dawned on many that good governance did not merely entail a "changing of guards" but included numerous sacrifices, including HRD. The first *Wamalwa* Training Review Committee decried the poor quality of public service delivery due to low level entry grades to KIA programmes. By 1971, 6 577 public servants had benefited from various training initiatives. The Africanisation policy was hugely successful and most posts were filled by Africans.
	1979–1980	The second Wamalwa Committee assessed the role and future of KIA. In 1980, the *Waruhiu* Civil Service Review Committee was set up to provide clear guidelines for KIA by consolidating the two Wamalwa Committee reports.
	1985–1988	An attempt to make KIA part of the University of Nairobi (UON) is unsuccessful. The UON School of Business takes over part of KIA (previously Jeanes School).
	1996	The KIA Act of 1996 defines KIA as "a management development institute giving new impetus on institutional development (state of the art facilities) and capacity building".
	1999 onwards	Performance contracting was officially introduced incrementally. KIA was mandated to train public servants on modalities of implementing the results-based management system (2003 onwards).
KSG	2012 onwards	KSG is established under Act No 9 of 2012 as a state corporation in line with the Constitution of Kenya of 2010 and Kenya's Vision 2030.

Source: (Authors' own compilation)

Table 1 highlights that the Jeanes School, a precursor to the KSG, was established to deal with low education standards in rural schools. The initiative transformed tremendously in July 1961 when KIA was set up as a fully funded government department to prepare Africans for self-governance. In 1996, through an Act of Parliament, it became a state corporation mandated with improving public service delivery and promoting national values of transparency, accountability, good governance and integrity. For instance, between 2006 and 2009, over 19 316 trainees had undergone training in various courses (The Newslink 2011; KIA 2011). Despite numerous policy changes and interventions over the years, few – if any – public leadership for development initiatives have been successful. The lean workforce is associated with negative attributes (ineptness, cronyism, corruption, indifference), deplorable working environments, limited positive change and stringent bureaucratic systems.

To build public confidence and spearhead growth and development in the country, the Constitution of Kenya of 2010 highlights that state public officers and leadership development programmes should subscribe to the national values and principles of good governance. Articles 10 and 232 of the Constitution of Kenya of 2010 focus on governance-related national values and principles, and public service values and principles, respectively. To substantiate the values and principles outlined by the Constitution of Kenya of 2010, the Public Officers and Ethics Act of 2003, the Leadership and Integrity Act of 2012 (Leadership and Integrity Regulations of 2015), Public Service Values and Principles Act of 2015 (Public Service Code of Ethics and Conduct) and the Fair Administrative Action Act of 2015 typify the model of public service leadership. Furthermore, the Code of Governance for State Corporations, commonly known as *"Mwongozo"* and County Public Service Boards (CPSBs) and County Assembly Service Boards (CASBs), among other guidelines, engendered the much needed public leadership transformation in Kenya.

The fundamental guiding principles of public leadership include personal integrity, competence, suitability, objectivity and impartiality in decision-making, selfless service, accountability, discipline and commitment. These principles are further outlined by the Leadership and Integrity Act of 2012. Due to changes brought about by the Constitution of Kenya of 2010, KIA was remodelled as the state corporation, KSG, in 2012. The former KIA, Kenya Development Learning Centre (KDLC) and four other campuses outside Nairobi City County were absorbed by KSG. Notably, the KSG is tasked with providing training and consultancy, as well as conducting research to inform and promote national development, competence and integrity in the public service. Furthermore, it is mandated with assessing how schools' activities influence national leadership and development. Table 2 outlines the KSG's 2016–2017 training calendar for selected leadership and governance courses.

Table 2: KSG's training calendar 2016–2017 (selected courses)

Executive Leadership programmes	Duration
Master of Public Administration (MPA) in conjunction with UON	3–4 semesters
Strategic Leadership Development Programme	6 weeks
Innovative Leadership for Growth and Excellence Seminar	1 week
Leadership, Ethics and Integrity Course	3 weeks
The Women Executive Leadership Programme	1 week
Leading with Emotional Intelligence Seminar: From IQ to EQ for Effective Leadership	1 week
Senior Management Course	4 weeks
Corporate Governance Seminar	1 week
Institutional Re-engineering and Change Management Seminar	1 week
Strategic Planning and Management Seminar	1 week
Balanced Score Card Seminar	1 week
Policy Formulation, Implementation and Analysis Seminar	1 week
Strategic Negotiations Course	1 week

Source: (KSG 2016)

Table 2 highlights that the KSG offers a Master of Public Management (a require-ment for being promoted to senior leadership and management levels) and one-to six-week short courses on leadership development and governance, among others, to a range of public service officials. The Public Service Commission (PSC) 2014/2015 Annual Report indicates that, of the 2 287 public officers who participated in leadership training, 64% were male and 36% female. Of the 4 608 public officers who took part in management training, 44% were female and 56% were male (PSC 2015). The KSG Strategic Plans for 2012/2013 to 2016/2017 isolate providing thought leadership in public sector leadership and governance as a key strategic objective (KSG 2012).

Visionary, transparent, innovative and results-driven public leadership incor-porating national and local stakeholders/communities is a catalyst for socio-eco-nomic development. Kenya's public service reforms have been geared towards shifting from process-based to results-based public leadership. Key aims are to enhance shared ethical values and competency, develop youth leadership and adopting a public service delivery model that follows a "red carpet" as opposed

to a "red tape" approach (KIA 2011). Thanks to greater access to the internet, social media, mobile phones, FM radio and TV stations, the general public has greater access to information on public leaders. This helps inform their judgement on public service delivery. According to Van Wart (2013), understanding the current leadership situation provides useful insights and the confidence required to champion effective development-focused public leadership in Kenya.

State officers, public officers and public entities are bound to the values and principles of good governance, integrity, transparency, accountability, sustainable development. This helps to ensure that Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) and public servants use public resources effectively and efficiently. The PSC 2014/2015 Evaluation Report of 242 MDAs classified under Ministries; State Corporations; Constitutional Commissions and Independent Offices; and Statutory Commissions and Authorities; with over 184 000 employees, shows significant progress in terms of compliance to national and public service values.

CONTEXUALISING THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

The article strives to determine whether public leadership focus areas for development focus on results, followers, change, systems, and ethics to promote national values and principles of good governance and whether it has a positive association with national values and principles of good governance. In a review of lessons from leadership theory and contemporary challenges of leaders, Van Wart (2013) focuses on public organisational leadership in terms of career administrative position instead of political or policy leadership. Public leadership at times focuses on political leadership and is broader than public service leadership (Chapman *et al*. 2015). However, for the purposes of this study, the two are used interchangeably.

Hart (2011) observes that leadership studies without leadership assessment are "leadership prescriptions without a diagnosis". Although no uniform criteria are used, there is a need for well-grounded systematic leadership evaluation processes. According to Chapman *et al*. (2015), there is a need to deploy research instruments from the existing leadership research base to facilitate the widespread application of research findings. However, due to contextual differences, such studies would still yield different results. Most public leadership studies examine leadership as an independent variable (outcome) in the public sector by using survey data from individual respondents across administrative hierarchies, interviews and document analysis (Chapman *et al*. 2015). However, this is not the case with public leadership studies in Kenya. Thus, this study examines leadership as an outcome of suitable national values and principles of good governance in Kenya.

Chapman *et al*. (2015) note that research has assessed how public leadership influences performance management, organisational commitment, ethical

Figure 1: Public leadership for development under Kenya's constitutional dispensation

decision-making, collaboration, crisis management, implementing change and administrative reforms. However, very few studies address the relationship between public leadership and principles of effective, equitable governance. To address this gap, this study utilises a survey-based research design to gather information from public servants occupying varying administrative levels and not from politicians. The aim is to empirically investigate how public leadership for development interplays with national values enshrined in the new constitutional dispensation in Kenya (see Figure 1).

As shown in Figure 1, public leadership for development (results, followers, change, systems and ethics) is the independent variable, while the Constitution of Kenya of 2010 and national values and principles of good governance constitute the dependent variable. To ensure uniformity, the study adopted an approach by Chapman *et al.* (2015), which summarises operationalisation of public leadership as follows:

- Results: The high expectations of leaders to get results and constantly upgrade skills.
- Followers: Providing direction and support; upgrading skills on a continuous basis; facilitating diversity; and ensuring inclusive decision-making processes.
- Change: A focus on managerial competencies; the ability to alter mission, vision, values and culture; and making strategic choices.

- Systems: Providing a high-quality professional environment; and delegation, empowerment and collaboration.
- Ethics: A focus on integrity; and leading through service, spirit, sacrifice and sustainability.

Similarly, the national values and principles of good governance, as enshrined in Articles 10 and 232 of the Constitution of Kenya of 2010 constitute the dependent variables. There are over 39 national values and principles of good governance. However, for the purposes of the study, the following eight values and principles were adopted from the PSC Evaluation Report of Kenya's Public Service (2015):
- Good governance, transparency and accountability: Current policies, laws, procedures and transparency in executing public services.
- Diversity leadership: Current guidelines on non-discrimination based on religion, sex, race, gender, disability in provision or access to public service.
- Fair competition and merit in appointments, training and promotion opportunities: Current public service recruitment and policy guidelines.
- Efficiency and effectiveness: Current policies on using minimal resources to attain optimal outputs and outcomes by using the right tools, skills and personnel.
- Sustainable development: Current measures on cost sharing and equitable distribution of public resources, including sustainability plans to reduce donor-dependency.
- Responsive, prompt and equitable service delivery: A commitment to providing prompt high-quality public services throughout the country.
- Public participation in policymaking and implementation: Current policies guiding public participation in policymaking.
- Professionalism and ethics: Current guidelines promoting professionalism and ethical standards in the public service (PSC 2015).

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

The study followed a survey-based research approach. The questionnaire consisted of four parts that sought background information; focus areas in public leadership training; awareness of national values and principles of good governance; and how the former promotes the latter. To measure each of the variables, a five-point Likert scale was used, where 5 reflects "to a large extent" and 1 "not at all".

Seasoned career civil servants working in Kenya's national or county governments, who were pursuing degree programmes at the UON's School of Business, College of Humanities and Social Sciences, were targeted. The specific study

population included students enrolled for Module 11 programmes in relevant disciplines during the May to August trimester of the 2015/2016 academic year. Sampled respondents were clustered based on the common core courses. Most respondents attended evening and weekend lectures from 4 to 9 July 2016.

To minimise bias in information gathering and government hierarchies, Chapman *et al. (*2015) reiterate the need for carefully selecting the unit of analysis in empirical public leadership studies. Initial analysis indicated that most of the participants had taken leadership and governance courses at KSG in recent years. Furthermore, student registration records indicated that a sizeable number of students worked as middle- to senior-level personnel within the Kenyan public service.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The survey was administered to 125 public service employees studying at the School of Business on the UON's main campus. A total of 92 employees returned fully completed questionnaires, which constitutes a response rate of 73.6%. The surveys were completed by 51.7% male employees and 48.3% female employees. Of the respondents 97% worked within national government, while the remainder were from three different counties.

Concerning degree programmes, 39% of respondents were pursuing a Bachelor of Commerce (BCom) degree, 24% a PhD in Business Administration, 22% a Master's in Business Administration (MBA), while the remainder pursued other degrees. This infers that the respondents were well educated.

In terms of work experience, 37.4% had worked for less than four years at their current place of employment. This implies that 62.6% of respondents had witnessed changes in the public service after the Constitution of Kenya of 2010 was promulgated.

Interestingly, the Likert scale rating respondents' level of understanding of national values and principles of good governance in the public service shows that respondents ""to some extent"" understood these principles, with a cumulative mean score of 3.32. The national value of diversity in leadership (current guidelines on non-discrimination based on religion, sex, race, gender, disability in provision or access to public service) had the highest mean score of 3.59. This was followed closely by the value of professionalism and ethics in public service (current guidelines on promoting professionalism and ethical standards in the public service), with a mean score of 3.57.

The national value of good governance, transparency and accountability (current policies, laws, procedures and transparency in executing public services) had a mean score of 3.31, while the national value of enhancing efficiency and

effectiveness (current policies on using minimal resources to attain optimal outputs and outcomes by using the right tools, skills and personnel) had a mean score of 3.28. This was followed closely by the value of public participation in policymaking (current policies guiding public participation in policymaking), with a mean score of 3.25. The national values of sustainable development practices (current measures on cost sharing and equitable distribution of public resources, including sustainability plans to reduce donor-dependency), fair competition and merit in appointments, training and promotion opportunities (current public service-recruitment and policy guidelines) and responsive, prompt and equitable service (commitment to providing prompt high-quality public services throughout the country) had mean scores of 3.21, 3.20 and 3.19, respectively.

This correlates well with a cumulative mean score of 3.20 from the responses on the extent to which sampled public service employees had been trained on diverse focus areas of leadership, ranging from ethics (integrity and leading through service, spirit, sacrifice and sustainability), with a mean score of 3.46, to a mean score of 3.23 for both a focus on followers (providing direction and support; upgrading skills on a continuous basis; facilitating diversity; and ensuring inclusive decision-making processes) and a focus on systems (providing a high-quality professional environment; and delegation, empowerment and collaboration). A focus on change (managerial competencies; the ability to alter mission, vision, values and culture; and making strategic choices) and a focus on results (high expectations of leaders to get results and constantly upgrade their skills) had the lowest mean scores at 3.07 and 3.05, respectively.

Table 3 summarises the results on the extent to which focus areas of leadership (results, followers, change, systems and ethics) have promoted national values (good governance; transparency and accountability; diversity in leadership; fair competition and merit in appointments; enhancing efficiency and effectiveness; sustainable development practices; responsive, prompt and equitable service delivery; public participation in policymaking; and professionalism and ethics in the public service).

Table 3 highlights that all the focus areas of leadership "to some extent" promoted the national values and principles of good governance in the Kenyan public service, with overall mean scores of 3.33 and above. Ethics-focused leadership for development leads with a mean score of 3.43, followed by a focus on followers, at 3.40. Finally, a focus on systems, results and change showed mean scores of 3.36, 3.34 and 3.33, respectively.

All the focus areas of leadership "to some extent" promoted professionalism and ethics in the public service (current guidelines promoting professionalism and ethical standards in the public service). A focus on followers had the highest mean score at 3.68. This was followed by a focus on ethics at 3.64. A focus on results, systems and change had a mean score of 3.58, 3.51 and 3.41, respectively.

Table 3: Leadership foci and national values and principles of good governance

National values and principles of good governance	Focus areas of leadership				
	Results focused	Follower focused	Change focused	Systems focused	Ethics focused
Good governance, transparency and accountability (current policies, laws, procedures and transparency in executing public services).	3.13	3.23	3.16	3.15	3.31
Diversity in leadership (current guidelines on non-discrimination based on religion, sex, race, gender, disability in provision or access to public service).	3.31	3.26	3.39	3.40	3.35
Fair competition and merit in appointments, training and promotion opportunities (current public service recruitment and policy guidelines).	3.21	3.51	3.22	3.38	3.66
Enhancing efficiency and effectiveness (current policies on using minimal resources to attain optimal outputs and outcomes by using the right tools, skills and personnel).	3.42	3.44	3.42	3.43	3.19
Sustainable development practices (current measures on cost sharing and equitable distribution of public resources, including sustainability plans to reduce donor-dependency).	3.40	3.39	3.32	3.21	3.35
Responsive, prompt and equitable service (current service delivery statements committing to providing prompt high-quality public services throughout the country)	3.47	3.43	3.47	3.41	3.52
Public participation in policymaking (current policies guiding public participation in policymaking).	3.22	3.29	3.31	3.42	3.45
Professionalism and ethics in public service (current guidelines promoting professionalism and ethical standard in the public service).	3.58	3.68	3.41	3.51	3.64
Mean score	3.34	3.40	3.33	3.36	3.43

Source: (Authors' own compilation)

Surprisingly, although all focus areas of leadership "to some extent" promoted good governance, transparency and accountability (current policies, laws, procedures and transparency in executing public services) it was rated lowest among the eight factors investigated. A focus on ethics obtained a mean score of 3.31, followed by followers at 3.23, change at 3.16 and systems at 3.15. A focus on results obtained the lowest mean score at 3.13.

The findings of the current study corroborate the PSC's evaluation of public service compliance with national values for the 2014/2015 fiscal year (PSC 2015). The report was compiled using both qualitative and quantitative data from 251 government ministries, departments and agencies, while 151 indicators were applied. Results showed good progress in promoting the national values, as enshrined in the Constitution of Kenya of 2010. Results confirm that despite numerous policy, constitution, and leadership training programmes; governance, transparency and accountability remain critical in public leadership for development in Kenya. The issues that dogged public service in the 1960s still challenge the sector today. Much effort is needed to change systemic corruption and the looting of government coffers.

Multivariate regression analysis was used to ascertain whether public leadership for development (results, followers, change, systems, and ethics) has a positive association with national values and principles of good governance, as hypothesised. The regression analysis results indicate that results-focused public leadership is positively correlated to national values and principles of good governance, with a beta coefficient of .414, followed by change-focused leadership, with a beta value of .168, while follower- and ethics-focused leadership rendered beta values of .129 and .121, respectively (see Table 4).

Table 4: Results of multivariate regression analysis of public leadership for development and principles of good governance

Model summary				
Model	R	R-square	Adjusted R-square	Std. Error of the estimate
1	.708ᵃ	.501	.472	.51902

ANOVAᵇ					
Model	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Regression	23.031	5	4.606	17.100	.000ᵃ
Residual	22.897	85	.269		
Total	45.929	90			

Coefficients					
Model	**Unstandardised Coefficients**		**Unstandardised Coefficients**	**t**	**Sig.**
	B	**Std. Error**	**Beta**		
(Constant)	.831	.281		2.957	.004
A Focus on Results Focused	.393	.123	.414	3.198	.002
A Focus on Followers	.128	.138	.129	.928	.356
A Focus on Change	.159	.130	.168	1.223	.225
A Focus on Systems	−.050	.132	−.055	−.377	.707
A Focus on Ethics	.110	.128	.121	.858	.393
a. Predictors (Constant): A Focus on Results Followers, Change, Systems and Ethics b. Dependent Variable: National Values					

However, Table 4 highlights that systems-focused leadership is negatively correlated to national values. The R-square of the regression model is .472, which implies that 47.2% of change in national values can be explained by public leadership focused on results, followers, change, ethics and systems. The F-value is 17.100, with a significant value of α.000. This implies that the relationship between public leadership for development (results, followers, change, ethics and systems) and national values is statistically significant.

Finally, Table 5 presents other measures that can greatly enhance public service delivery in Kenya.

The results from Table 5 reveal that greater emphasis should be placed on training, leadership and skills enhancement seminars (14.8%), followed by motivation of staff (11.9%) and better payment/remuneration policies/promotions (7.39%), as important measures for improving public service delivery in Kenya

CONCLUSIONS

It is encouraging to see that public service leaders "to some extent" understand the national values and principles of good governance (diversity in leadership; professionalism and ethics; good governance; transparency and accountability; efficiency and effectiveness; public participation policymaking; sustainable development; fair competition and merit in appointments; training and promotion opportunities; and responsive, prompt and equitable service delivery). Furthermore, results reveal that public service employees had "to some extent" been trained on the diverse leadership foci (ethics, followers, systems, change, and results).

Table 5: Measures that could greatly enhance public service delivery in Kenya

	Measure	Mentions	%
1	Training, leadership & skills enhancement seminars	26	14.77
2	Motivation of staff	21	11.93
3	Professionalism / right people for the right job	16	9.09
4	Better payments / remunerations policies/promotions	13	7.39
5	Integrity	12	6.82
6	Effective and use of advanced technology	8	4.55
7	Checking in public resources / training on corruption	8	4.55
8	Shunning tribalism	6	3.41
9	Good working tools and evaluation	6	3.41
10	Avoiding favouritism and nepotism	4	2.27
11	Performance measure control	4	2.27
12	Result-oriented	3	1.70
13	Responsibilities	3	1.70
14	Transparency in service delivery	3	1.70
15	Employee involvement	3	1.70
16	Enhancing public participation & forums	3	1.70
17	Clearing channel of communication	2	1.14
18	Maximum labour utilisation	2	1.14
19	Upholding merit	2	1.14
20	Merit-based appointments of parastatal boards	2	1.14
21	Gender equality & equity	2	1.14
22	Conducive working environment	2	1.14
23	Enforcement of the Constitution	2	1.14
24	Regular lifestyle audits	2	1.14
25	Job rotation and placement	2	1.14
26	Being eco-friendly and focused on cultural change	2	1.14
27	Empowering and proper orientation of employees	2	1.14
28–41	Providing overtime pay; adoption of rights policies; being responsive to customer complaints; adoption of right policies; enhanced paradigmatic practices; measurement of performance results; strategic performance; prosecution of economic crime offenders; entertaining ethical behaviour; entrepreneurship; offer departmental help; harmonisation of salaries; customer-supplier relationships; ethics and corporate governance; autonomy to perform; upholding social justice.	One each	0.57 each
Total		176	100.00

However, further measures should be taken to deepen the awareness of effective public leadership and national values.

Equally encouraging is that all the focus areas of leadership (ethics, followers, systems, change and results) have "to some extent" promoted national values and principles of good governance in Kenya's public service. The leadership foci "to some extent" promoted professionalism and ethics in public service. This was followed by leadership focused on followers, results, systems and change, respectively. Surprisingly, although all leadership foci "to some extent" promoted good governance, transparency and accountability, it was the lowest-rated variable among the eight factors under investigation. This confirms the fear that governance, transparency and accountability remain a major challenge in public leadership for development in Kenya and tough measures should be developed to fully address them.

Findings reveal that government-led, results-based initiatives are yielding results, as the regression analysis indicated that results-focused public leadership is positively correlated to national values and principles of good governance. This is followed by leadership focused on change, followers and ethics, respectively. Notably, the ethical dimension is tied to the issue of good governance, transparency and accountability, which infers more interventions should be put in place to address the dual issues. In numerous instances, lack of proper systems or respect for systems are endemic to government circles. Bearing this in mind, it is unsurprising that leadership focused on systems is negatively correlated to national values. The system can be turned around through relevant training, leadership and skills enhancement, motivating public sector employees through better payment/remuneration, and clarifying promotion policies.

Nevertheless, overall results show a statistically significant relationship between public leadership for development and national values and principles of good governance. Although it is not a call for celebration it does highlight that the Constitution of Kenya of 2010, has helped create an enabling public leadership environment.

Future research should be conducted using these variables, but longitudinally to ascertain how the focus areas of public leadership for development promote the eight values discussed in the article, as well as the 31 additional national values.

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Improving Our Theory of Evaluation Through an African-made Process

An Ubuntu Answer to the Decolonising Question

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ABSTRACT

Since the emergence of the Social/Behavioral Sciences, it has been assumed that researchers working in separate disciplines who generate more/better data would generate improved theory. Despite the rapid increase in available data and scholarly publications, theory (and practice) has advanced at a slow pace. Instead, most disciplines complain that this research approach has led to fragmentation and confusion – as evidenced by the many theories, sub-disciplines and differing curriculums of several evaluation programmes across Africa and the world. To address this problem, this article uses an emerging process related to an Ubuntu perspective to rigorously synthesise 19 evaluation theories. From that new perspective, strengths and weaknesses are identified along with general and specific research opportunities to accelerate the development of theory and practice. Additionally, a path is presented for developing a community of scholars to fast-track the benefits of evaluation to boost true sustainable development in Africa.

INTRODUCTION, BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE

At a national level, policies continue to fail at an alarming rate, while strategic plans fail to meet their goals at an organisational level. Certainly, the academic world is working diligently to understand and resolve such problems by applying the scientific practice of evidence-based research. Despite the exponential increase of available data and the number of academic papers published in peer-reviewed journals, there have not been a corresponding increase in the effectiveness of

the Social and Behavioural Sciences. As societal challenges such as poverty and racism continue unabated, it raises the question of whether scientific research is approached correctly.

In the face of Africa's serious problems, those limitations supported calls for the decolonisation of science in the field of programme evaluation to stop doing things according to Western or Northern thinking and develop a 'Made in Africa' approach. However, Cloete and Auriacombe (2019:8) note that, "The current decoloniality as discourse is largely rhetorical, negative and ineffective". They present a clear and compelling case for developing the field of evaluation: Not by throwing out or ignoring all Western value-system-based science but by developing improved evaluation methods including trans-disciplinary, mixed methods and context-specific planning and evaluation.

Notably, such a call would not have been welcomed a century ago. So, while science is universal, what counts as 'science' is still evolving. One approach to this type of evolution is to transcend (without excluding), Western data-based approaches be supporting "the development of transformative, trans-disciplinary, developmental, culturally and context specific and sensitive, mixed research and evaluation approaches, designs and methods" (Cloete and Auriacombe 2019). Such a perspective may be reflected in the philosophy of *Ubuntu.*

According to Chilisa, Major, Gaotlhobogwe and Mokgolodi (2015), Ubuntu tells us that communities and ecosystems are stronger and more resilient when they are more complex and interconnected. In addition to natural and social systems, it is important to note that there is also an ecology of knowledge involved (Bateson 1985; Disessa 2002). Within this context, concepts with their own systemic structures are seen to interact and form theoretical models. While a social system is made of people, a theory is made of concepts. Where people in a social system are connected through communication, family ties and exchanges, theoretical concepts are connected through causal relationships. These concepts and their causal connections are referred to as a network or structure.

By understanding the specific structure, we can more easily and rapidly develop our theories by making them more complex (including more concepts) and more interconnected (improving relationships between concepts). Importantly, theories with more structure are more useful for teaching and in practical application because they minimise the 'inferential' leap needed to move from theory to practice. This is similar to understanding how a social system (such as a village) is more resilient (having a greater chance of overcoming problems) when there are more residents who communicate with one another more effectively.

For the purposes of this article, a theory may be understood as a set of interrelated propositions. These networks of concepts or conceptual systems are useful in helping us to understand our world and support meaningful change to reach

desired goals. From that broad and inclusive perspective, we may understand that the general category of conceptual systems includes constructs such as theories, models, metatheories, middle-range theories, as well as social science theories of change and evaluation process theories.

In recent years, thousands of theories have been developed. Unfortunately, scholars tend to be disconnected from each other. They work in disciplinary homes and are unable and/or unwilling to visit and speak with those in other homes of the shared academic village. Even within their disciplinary homes, many scholars have retreated to their individual rooms and pursue increasingly narrow topics. While this has led to many interesting insights, it has also led to the creation of theories that are disconnected from one another. Thus, many (perhaps all) fields of the Social/ Behavioural Sciences suffer from fragmentation (Bakker 2011; Ledoux 2012; Lewis and Kelemen 2002; Newell 2007). Fragmentation is problematic because many theories are generated. This causes confusion, making it difficult for practitioners and professors to choose which theories to use, thus reducing the overall effectiveness and status of the field.

Knowledge and structure

We may understand and evaluate the potential usefulness of knowledge (in the form of theories) along three dimensions: Data, meaning/relevance and logical structure (Wright and Wallis 2019). It is generally accepted that a theory is more useful when it has more data that shows a correspondence between theoretical concepts and real-world phenomena. Without data, a theory becomes fiction and loses its real-world relevance. It is also accepted (often tacitly) that a theory is more useful when it is more meaningful or relevant to stakeholders. For example, an evaluation theory is more useful to evaluators and an electronics theory is more useful to an engineer designing cell phones. Less known is the dimension of logical structure.

Because of concerns around improving theory by finding more/better data along with greater relevance to stakeholders, the current article focuses on the issue of structure. One example of structure may be found in text. Text without structure is nonsensical, as illustrated by Figure 1 below.

Multiple streams of research show that knowledge (represented by theory) is more useful when it has more logical structure. That is to say, it is more systemic – with more concepts and connections between those concepts. In Education and Psychology, for example, it is generally accepted that, as people grow and learn, many of the pieces of information they gain along the way fit together much like pieces of a puzzle. Thus, older persons are better at solving problems than children and experts are better at solving problems than novices. Importantly, we may evaluate the structure of that knowledge using 'systematicity' as a measure to

Figure 1: Structure and clarity in text

this is a clear sentence

sentence a is clear this

si tsih a cetsenen lcera

(scrambled letters: s r l c h t i a e s c e n s e t l a e n i a)

Higher structure

Lower structure

show how much our children are learning and/or differentiate between novices and experts (Gray, Zanre and Gray 2014; Novak 2002; Novak 2010).

Another measure is 'integrative complexity', which has been used to show that individuals and groups with more structured knowledge are more successful in business and politics (Suedfeld and Rank 1976; Suedfeld, Tetlock and Streufert 1992; Wong, Ormiston Tetlock 2011). Similarly, in university, improvements in students' knowledge may be evaluated (and improved) by observing the structure of knowledge maps they make in class (Goltz 2017). Another stream of research that is more focused on academic theories is Integrative Propositional Analysis, as discussed below (Wallis 2015; Wallis 2019a; Wallis and Wright 2019).

Integrative Propositional Analysis

The Integrative Propositional Analysis method was developed to analyse the systemic structure of conceptual systems (theories, models, strategic plans, etc.) (Wallis 2016). Like other streams of research, Integrative Propositional Analysis

shows that theories are more useful in practical application when they have more structure. This analysis method has been applied to evaluate and improve theories in a wide range of fields, including technology (Panetti, Parmentola, Wallis and Ferretti 2018), systems (Wallis 2008), complexity (Wallis 2009a), poverty (Wallis and Wright 2019), entrepreneurship (Wright and Wallis 2015), cross-cultural entrepreneurship (Cannavale, Piana, Laurenza and Wallis 2018), ethics (Wallis 2010a), policy (Wallis 2010b, 2011), interdisciplinary studies (Wallis 2018) and strategic planning for academic institutions (Wallis 2019a).

It is worth considering a relationship between Integrative Propositional Analysis and *Ubuntu*. As a philosophy, *Ubuntu* reminds us that "I am because we are" (each person is defined by others) (Sulamoyo 2010). Similarly, from a structural perspective of theory, each concept is understood or defined only in relation to other concepts in the theory. This differs vastly from the normal perspective of Western science that focuses on the relationship between the concept and real world. Such a data-based perspective is certainly important, just as it is important that each person has a name. Structure and data are not mutually exclusive – both are needed to develop better theory. Just as each person in a village has both an individual identity and lives in a harmonious, mutually beneficial relationship with others.

This article uses Integrative Propositional Analysis to evaluate a range of theories of evaluation. It includes several interrelated goals. Firstly, to determine whether the field of evaluation theory is as fragmented as has been suggested. Secondly, to seek more structured theories that are more useful in practical application. Thirdly, to synthesise several theories into one holistic theory. And, finally, to set the stage for developing a better, more useful 'African-made' framework, which has been suggested as a way to improve the field of evaluation in Africa (*Chilisa et al.* 2015).

METHODS AND DATA

Wright and Wallis (2019:146–149) outline the following six-step process for the Integrative Propositional Analysis:
- **Step One:** Identify the propositions from one or more theories.
- **Step Two:** Create a diagram from those propositions with one circle (or box) for each concept and arrows showing causal relationships between them.
- **Step Three:** Identify redundancies and combine circles.
- **Step Four:** Identify the total number of circles (concepts) to find the 'Breadth' or conceptual reach of the theory.
- **Step Five:** Identify the number of 'Transformative Concepts' (circles with two or more causal arrows pointing directly at them).

Figure 2: Simple abstract diagrams (knowledge maps, or maps) of theories

- **Step Six:** Divide the number of 'Transformative Concepts' with the 'Breadth' to find the Depth' (structural level expressed as a percentage).

For example, the text of one theory might say, "Our research shows that when we do more A, we find we get more B". The text of another theory might say, "B is reduced by having more C." The above examples are depicted in Figure 2:

Evaluating the structure of the synthesised theory in Figure 2 using Integrative Propositional Analysis highlights three concepts (A, B, C) and one of them (B) is transformative. A Transformative Concept has two arrows pointing directly at it (similar to a dependent variable with more than one independent variable). A theory with more Transformative Concepts is more useful, as more concepts lead to a deeper understanding of subject matter and is therefore more applicable in real-world practice.

In this example, the Breadth of the theory is three (3), the number of Transformative Concepts is one (1) and the Depth of the theory is 33% (the result of one divided by three). With Integrative Propositional Analysis, we can show improvements in the potential usefulness of theories as they are synthesised. Figure 2 shows two theories synthesised into one. Both Theory #1 and Theory #2 have two concepts, so Integrative Propositional Analysis would argue that each has a Breadth of two (2). Neither theory has any Transformative Concepts, so the Depth of each theory would be zero. This reflects a very low likelihood that either theory will be useful in practical application. The synthesised theory has a Breadth of three (3) (this is an improvement compared to Theory #1 or Theory #2 because it covers more conceptual ground). Also, the synthesised theory has one Transformative Concept (again, more than either of the other theories). Finally, the synthesised theory has a Depth of 33%. Although this is not very high, it is certainly an improvement compared to the component theories (which both have a Depth of zero).

Data

For this analysis, evaluation theories are used as data. For the present analysis, no discrimination is made between social science theories of change and evaluation process theories. Instead, a more inclusive perspective is followed, which acknowledges that all theories may add something to this ecology of ideas. Those theories were chosen using a Google Scholar™ search, seeking the most highly cited theories of evaluation authored by African researchers and/or where the studies were conducted in Africa. These 19 publications provided a reasonable example for the study (Basheka and Byamugisha 2015; Bhola 1998; Birckmayer and Weiss 2000; Carden and Alkin 2012; Chilisa 2015; Chilisa *et al.*, 2015; Cloete 2009; De Kock Van Biljon and Pretorius 2009; Field and Louw 2012; Jackson 2013; Kincaid, Delate, Storey and Figueroa 2012; Mouton 2010; Mukumbang Van Belle, Marchal and Van Wyk 2017; Podems 2010; Rogers and Weiss 2007; Tarsilla 2014; Van Belle, Marchal, Dubourg and Kegels 2010; Weiss 1997; White 2009).

Each theory was evaluated without interpretation, staying close to the original authors' views. While other scholars may interpret their text differently, it is expected that reasonable interpretations will be substantively similar.

RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

Applying Integrative Propositional Analysis to analyse each theory individually, generally low levels of structure were. For one 'worked example', Figure 3 shows a causal diagram or map of a theory of change created by using Integrative Propositional Analysis Steps One to Three.

In Figure 3, each circle represents a concept. Each concept may be relatively simple (e.g., programme cost) or complex (e.g., where interrogating the theory of change covers validity, appropriateness, relevance and accuracy). Concepts with shaded circles (e.g., programme cost) are 'Transformative' (as explained above – each concept with more than one causal arrow pointing directly at it). Also, a solid arrow indicates a causal relationship and direction or 'causes more', while a dashed arrow indicates 'causes less'. For example, in the upper right-hand corner of the map, it may be seen that more evaluation of unforeseen factors and actors will lead to more modifications to the program.

Continuing with Integrative Propositional Analysis for this example, Step Four focuses on identifying the total number of circles to find the Conceptual Breadth of the theory. Figure 4 shows eight (8) circles, so the Breadth is eight (8). Step Five identifies the Transformative Concepts (shown in Figure 4 as three shaded circles). Step Six entails dividing the number of Transformative circles by the Breadth to find the Depth. For this example, the Depth is 0.38, or 38% (the result of dividing

**Figure 3: Causal diagram (knowledge map or map)**

three transformative by eight total concepts). The results of repeating this process with all 19 theories in the sample are reflected in Figure 4.

Most theories are clustered in the lower-left quadrant. This is typical of theories in the Social/ Behavioural Sciences, where individual scholars creating theories in small niches has led to a profusion of theories, each of which is unlikely to be useful in practical application. Please note that this is not to cast a negative view on any scholar; it is only to understand the field as a whole. Hypothetically, a scholar may have presented a small theory because he/she was conducting a study of only a few conceptual elements.

Drawing on the idea that a good theory is like a good village (many people with beneficial connections between them), we may draw a parallel between our hypothetical villages and the clusters of theories in Figure 4. In the lower-left quadrant, we have villages with few people who do not communicate often. In the lower-right quadrant, each village has many people, but they still do not communicate effectively. None of those theories will show much resilience.

In the upper-left quadrant of Figure 4, we have an interesting outlier (namely, Kincaid *et al.* 2012): A village with a few people who are quite well connected.

Figure 4: Structure (Breadth and Depth) of the 19 theories of evaluation


While small, their village will be quite resilient. As a theory, this is likely to be highly useful in practical application. So, as a start, that theory is generally recommended above other individual theories. However, its low level of Breadth (few concepts) means it might not be applicable in all situations. There is a large blank space in the upper right-hand quadrant of Figure 4, where one might expect to find highly useful theories with many concepts (a wide conceptual breadth, covering many areas of application) that are well connected (highly useful in practical application).

In some sense, this may be seen as a type of 'periodic table' of theories – the first of its kind for evaluation theories of Africa. Each quadrant of Figure 4 represents a space where we might find different types of theories according to their structure. Although there are no theories in the upper-right quadrant, it is worth asking if we, as a field, are moving in that direction. Are we travelling towards facilitating success for our clients and our continent?

Using Integrative Propositional Analysis measures of Breadth and Depth, we can identify trends in theory development. Focusing on the conceptual Breadth of those theories, we may see that, over time, there is a slight upward trend (see Figure 5). This may be seen as a positive development because it is anticipated that a theory reflecting complex social situations should contain many concepts. Although, it is not yet known 'how many' that should be.

It seems troubling that the growth rate is so low; requiring about 20 years to double. At this rate, we will have to wait 40 years to gain theory of sufficient Breadth to address Africa's highly complex problems. However, by working in unison, it is certainly possible to accelerate that process.

Figure 5: Number of concepts (Breadth) in theories of evaluation over time

The Integrative Propositional Analysis measurement of Depth, Figure 6 shows that there too is a slight improvement over time.

Again, the growth rate is slow, which suggests that it will take decades before we have access to highly useful theories. As with the opportunity to increase the

Figure 6: Depth (structural indicator of potential usefulness) of theories of evaluation over time

Figure 7: An Integrative Propositional Analysis-based synthesis of 19 theories of evaluation

Breadth of theories, there are ways to work together to accelerate pace of theoretical development.

One of the quickest ways to improve a theory's potential usefulness is by improving its Depth. One way to improve theoretical Depth is by synthesising multiple theories to create more Transformative Concepts. As illustrated in Figure 1, it is possible to have two theories with no Transformative Concepts. However, if they have one or more concepts in common, Transformative Concepts may emerge when they are synthesised.

Another aspect of Integrative Propositional Analysis is the rigorous and objective synthesis of theories. This is an important point, because most literature reviews and related syntheses involve a process of selecting a few concepts from a variety of existing theories to create a new theory. Thus, increasing fragmentation within the field. Instead, Integrative Propositional Analysis draws on the entire theory to ensure a more inclusive and comprehensive process and result. The results of that synthesis are shown in Figure 7:

In Figure 7, concepts are represented by small shaded circles. The large dashed ovals indicate approximate areas of the outer, middle, and core of the theory, as explained below. The synthesised theory has a Breadth of 218 concepts, 19 Transformative Concepts and a Depth of 12%. These results suggest that there is

little overlap between the component theories. This provides empirical support for the idea that the field of study under investigation is highly fragmented. If there were more overlaps between the component theories, the resulting theory would have fewer concepts (as the redundancies would have been dropped).

Lakatos (1970) suggested that there is a solid core to every theory and that researchers provide a belt of concepts to protect the core. Conversely, Wallis (2009b) suggests that the core may be seen as concepts with more causal connections, while the belt consists of concepts that are less connected. When looking at the structure of Figure 7 above, it is possible to see a core and a belt and differing layers of belts.

While the theory contains 218 concepts, 90 of those are in the outer belt. Those orphan' concepts may be of interest to some stakeholders but have no causal connections. Thus, they are not expected to be of great use in guiding us in more effective practical application. In the middle belt', there are 68 concepts that have at least one causal connection with another concept. However, there are no Transformative Concepts in the middle belt. Once again, these concepts are expected to be of limited use in practical application. When focusing only on the highly connected concepts at the core, a much more manageable theory emerges: Breadth = 60; Transformative concepts = 19; and Depth = 32%.

Moving beyond the basics of Integrative Propositional Analysis to more recent innovations, it is also worth noting that the core has three 'feedback loops'. This is important because, "It is generally accepted that (within some context) a better map (as theory or knowledge) is one that presents more loops" (Wallis 2019b:1).

CONCLUSION

Rather than avoiding good science in an attempt to decolonise the field of evaluation, the present article focused on recent advances that are more closely related to the philosophy of *Ubuntu* to accelerate the development of the field. Working on the assumption that theories of evaluation published in reputable peer-reviewed journals are supported by sufficient data, sufficient expert insight and that they are relevant and meaningful to evaluation practitioners, this article focused on analysing the internal causal logic structure of those theories. This structure was used to objectively evaluate and rigorously synthesise those theories to accelerate the development of a better 'African-made' theory of evaluation.

Integrative Propositional Analysis was used to identify propositions within 19 theories and to rigorously synthesise those into a new and more inclusive theory. The process helps shed light on the useful interrelationships between concepts in a theory, much as the philosophy of *Ubuntu* helps us to appreciate and improve relationships in communities.

This analysis found that, as with typical Western theories, most theories of evaluation have a very low level of structure (mostly under 20%). While common for theories of the Social/ Behavioural Sciences, this level is far below the 100%-level of structure found in highly useful Laws of Physics. This provides a new, structural, explanation for why our theories and evaluations do not work as well in practical application as we would like them to. This also provides a new structural 'compass' to guide us in developing more useful theories.

Drawing on the *Ubuntu* parallel, theories can be likened to small villages where inhabitants rarely speak to one another. Such communities lack resilience and are unlikely to thrive. Thus, members the Social/Behavioural Sciences community needs to start communicating more effectively with one other.

One notable exception is the theory by Kincaid *et al.* (2012). The Depth of that theory is 86%, which is a far better structure than the other theories that were analysed. If the current study was to recommend one present theory for use, this would be the one. However, the theory contains only seven concepts. Thus, its limited conceptual Breadth means it may not be applicable in some situations.

When synthesised into a single theory, the results found: Breadth = 218, Depth = 12%, Loops = 3, Transformative Concepts = 19. While that may be seen as an improvement (the village is larger, but people are still not talking much), there is still much work to be done.

While Integrative Propositional Analysis was applied to evaluate, synthesise and develop theories across multiple disciplines, it is still an emerging methodology. The current research analysed and synthesised only 19 theories from the field of evaluation about Africa and/or by African authors. Expanding the number and diversity of the sample could yield different and/or improved results.

Following the process presented in this article, one direction for research would be to synthesise the present results with additional theories. However, given the low level of Depth found thus far, it is expected that such an approach will not provide highly effective results. Instead, by focusing on the core (Figure 7), the article suggests the following options for future research:

- Investigate the existing wider body of theory from many disciplines to identify new causal connections between existing concepts found in the above synthesised theory to develop a better interdisciplinary theory of evaluation.
- Access African experts (knowledgeable scholars and highly experienced practitioners). Interview them (and/or facilitate them) through a process of surfacing their tacit knowledge to identify new causal connections between existing concepts within the above synthesised theory.
- Coordinate efforts of scholars across Africa to conduct primary research to identify new causal connections between existing concepts within the above synthesized theory.

More specifically, with reference to the synthesised theory in Figure 7, researchers should seek to improve the systemic structure of the theory by focusing efforts on the core. Ultimately, improving the Depth of that core is the fastest way to improve the usefulness of the theory. Thus, this process serves as a 'science accelerator' with related benefits for the evaluation field, for students and clients, and for Africa and the world.

The present approach retains the best of good science (good data and good relevance, while avoiding dogmatic claims), while adding Integrative Propositional Analysis as an *Ubuntu*-related methodology for evaluating and improving the structure of theory and an Ubuntu-inspired process of building a network of scholars and practitioners working to advance the theory and advance the field.

By working together as a community, scholars and practitioners can rapidly improve evaluation processes to bolster development by local and regional organisations (e.g., churches, schools, universities and hospitals), as well as transnational organisations such as the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD). This shared focus of improving theory using the methods and directions under the legitimating auspices of recognised organisation such as the African Evaluation Association will help create a more resilient Africa.

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