

**Efficacy, Openness, Ingenuousness:  
Micro-Foundations of Democratic Engagement**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy  
under the Executive Committee  
of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

2020

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## **Abstract**

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What drives civic engagement in weak democracies? What are the psychological processes responsible for overcoming post-authoritarian learned helplessness? This dissertation argues that in non-Western political contexts, traditional psychological predictors of individual engagement in civic affairs—openness to experience, high self-efficacy, and low political skepticism—do not align with previously established Western patterns. Building on the results of a large-scale field experiment on a demographically diverse sample of 1,381 respondents, as well as multi-year ethnographic observation of community engagement in Ukraine, this dissertation demonstrates that perceived self-efficacy and collective efficacy improve respondents' interest in civic engagement while suppressing their interest in running for office.

In the first chapter, I explore what factors prompt citizens' interest in joining an electoral commission, supporting a recycling campaign, establishing a civic council, and leading a homeowners' association. Using original experimental data, I demonstrate that individual empowerment constitutes a sufficient condition for civic engagement. Moreover, contrary to most theoretical expectations, the effects of individual empowerment on involvement in local civic activities are comparable to the effects produced by civic education. This study represents one of the first experimental contributions to support the theory of democratic learning and shows that citizens benefit from democracy by practicing it and trying various civic activities rather than by learning democratic values through civic education and top-down democracy promotion.

In the second chapter, I study the effects of personality traits on policy priorities and ideological preferences of Ukrainians. Previous research suggests that personality affects political attitudes by predisposing people to certain policies. Contrary to these findings, this chapter shows that personality predicts individual response to the revision of the status quo rather than preference for specific policies. I illustrate this logic by addressing one of the most counterintuitive associations between personality traits and political attitudes—the link between openness to experience and conservatism in Eastern Europe. Combining the results of open-ended coding and bootstrapped regression models, the analysis shows that openness to experience predicts *both* social liberalism and social conservatism. I build upon these findings to address the existing gaps in the personality theory of ideology by suggesting that those open to experience are, on average, more responsive to any policy suggestion that revises the status quo.

In the final chapter, I examine the problem of nascent political ambition in weak democratic states. Building on the results of my original field experiment, I show that higher efficacy discourages political engagement in Ukraine. Specifically, increasing respondents' collective efficacy, on average, disincentivizes them from running for city parliament. Most surprisingly, citizens with higher pre-treatment levels of internal political efficacy were the ones most dissuaded from running for office after the induction of collective efficacy. Their improved sense of collective efficacy might have discouraged them from political institutions that they consider powerless and inefficient.

Altogether, these findings challenge existing wisdom in comparative political psychology by demonstrating that (1) psychological pathways to collective action are more context-dependent than previously assumed; (2) previously established effects of personality traits and self-evaluations on political behavior do not travel well beyond Western European and North American contexts; (3) self-efficacy and collective efficacy do not differ in their causal effects on individual attitudes and behavior; and (4) politically sophisticated individuals are put off from political office when reminded of alternative non-political ways of achieving collective goals, with this running *from* office creating a trap of declining political ambition in weak democracies. Thus, democratic pro-

motion campaigns that increase self-efficacy or collective efficacy might suppress nascent political ambition when the population is skeptical of the quality of representative democratic institutions.

## Table of Contents

List of Tables . . . . .	vi
List of Figures . . . . .	x
Acknowledgments . . . . .	xiv
Dedication . . . . .	.xviii
Introduction . . . . .	1
Chapter 1: Efficacy . . . . .	10
1.1 Introduction . . . . .	10
1.2 Theoretical Framework . . . . .	15
1.2.1 Definitions . . . . .	15
1.2.2 Psychological Pathways to Civic Action . . . . .	16
1.2.3 Manipulating Self-Efficacy and Collective Efficacy . . . . .	21
1.2.4 Efficacy in Post-Soviet Ukraine . . . . .	28
1.2.5 Targeting Civic Action in Southern Ukraine . . . . .	41
1.3 Research Design . . . . .	44
1.3.1 Experimental Site . . . . .	44
1.3.2 Experimental Intervention . . . . .	45

1.3.3	Outcome Measures . . . . .	50
1.3.4	Treatment Assignment . . . . .	53
1.3.5	External Validity . . . . .	54
1.4	Empirical Results . . . . .	55
1.4.1	Model Estimation . . . . .	55
1.4.2	Results . . . . .	55
1.5	Limitations . . . . .	63
1.6	Discussion . . . . .	64
1.7	Conclusion . . . . .	66
Chapter 2: Openness . . . . .		68
2.1	Introduction . . . . .	68
2.2	Personality–Environment Interaction in Eastern Europe . . . . .	72
2.2.1	Personality in Non-Western Political Contexts . . . . .	72
2.2.2	Atypical Patterns in Eastern European Traits . . . . .	73
2.2.3	The Case of Ukraine . . . . .	78
2.3	Identification Strategy . . . . .	84
2.3.1	Participants . . . . .	84
2.3.2	Measures . . . . .	84
2.4	Data Analysis . . . . .	87
2.4.1	Personality Effects on Political Preferences . . . . .	87
2.4.2	Political and Civic Engagement . . . . .	96
2.5	Discussion . . . . .	97

2.5.1	Explaining Atypical Personality Traits Association . . . . .	97
2.5.2	Implications . . . . .	100
2.6	Conclusion . . . . .	101
Chapter 3: Ingenuousness . . . . .		102
3.1	Introduction . . . . .	102
3.2	Running for Office in Weak Democracies . . . . .	105
3.2.1	Challenges to Running for Office in Ukraine . . . . .	106
3.2.2	Psychological Pathways to Nascent Political Ambition . . . . .	110
3.2.3	Theoretical Expectations . . . . .	115
3.3	Research Design . . . . .	115
3.3.1	Participants . . . . .	115
3.3.2	Experiment . . . . .	116
3.3.3	Outcomes . . . . .	119
3.4	Data Analysis . . . . .	120
3.4.1	Pre-Treatment Efficacy and Past Candidacy . . . . .	120
3.4.2	Demographic Predictors of Expressive Political Efficacy . . . . .	124
3.4.3	Average Treatment Effects . . . . .	126
3.4.4	Bootstrap Confidence Intervals . . . . .	132
3.4.5	General Heterogeneity . . . . .	135
3.4.6	Specific Heterogeneity . . . . .	137
3.5	Discussion . . . . .	149
3.5.1	Summary of Empirical Results . . . . .	149



3.5.2	Limitations . . . . .	153
3.5.3	Implications for Democracy . . . . .	155
3.6	Conclusion . . . . .	159
Conclusion . . . . .		162
References . . . . .		191
Appendix A: Randomization . . . . .		192
A.1	Subjects Recruitment . . . . .	192
A.2	Organization . . . . .	192
A.3	Randomization Procedure . . . . .	193
A.4	Experimental Location . . . . .	194
A.5	Covariate Balance . . . . .	194
A.6	Block Random Assignment . . . . .	197
Appendix B: Experimental Intervention . . . . .		198
B.1	Self-Efficacy . . . . .	198
B.2	Collective Efficacy . . . . .	201
B.3	Combined Efficacy . . . . .	206
B.4	Attitudinal Responses . . . . .	206
B.5	Behavioral Responses . . . . .	207
B.6	Manipulation Check . . . . .	208
Appendix C: Treatment Outcomes . . . . .		210

C.1	Outcomes Statistics . . . . .	210
C.2	Tabular Forms of Main Results . . . . .	212
C.3	Intention-Behavior Inconsistency . . . . .	214
C.4	Summary of Randomization Inference Trials . . . . .	215
C.5	Added Variable Plots . . . . .	217
C.6	Generalized Random Forests . . . . .	220
Appendix D: Personality Traits and Political Preferences . . . . .		225
D.1	Summary Statistics . . . . .	225
D.2	Regressions with Open-Ended Responses . . . . .	225
D.3	Distribution of Open-Ended Responses by Ideological Position and Trait Expression	225
D.4	Voting Preferences . . . . .	225
Appendix E: Nascent Political Ambition . . . . .		234
E.1	Summary Statistics . . . . .	234
E.2	Association of Self-Efficacy with Collective and Internal Political Efficacy . . . . .	235
E.3	Uncertain and Certain Responses . . . . .	236
E.4	Generalized Random Forests Models of Political Engagement . . . . .	237
E.5	Tabular Forms of Interaction Analysis . . . . .	241
E.6	Power Analysis . . . . .	250
E.7	ATEs and Bell-McCaffrey Confidence Intervals . . . . .	251
E.8	Interaction of Past Political Experience and Treatment Conditions . . . . .	253
E.9	Mediating Effects of City Office on Higher Political Ambitions . . . . .	259

## List of Tables

1.1	The Dynamic of Helplessness in Ukraine . . . . .	30
1.2	Estimates of Self-Efficacy from a Nationally Representative Survey . . . . .	31
1.3	Estimates of Collective Efficacy from a Nationally Representative Survey . . . . .	40
1.4	Estimates of Collective Efficacy from the Pre-Treatment Sample . . . . .	40
2.1	Prior Data on Western and Eastern European Patterns of Personality Effects . . . . .	77
2.2	Open Qualitative Coding of Policy Priorities . . . . .	86
2.3	Reconstructing Ideologies from Policy Priorities . . . . .	87
2.4	Personality Effects on Ideology in Ukraine . . . . .	88
2.5	Ideological Orientations: Pew Center Items . . . . .	94
2.6	Attitudes towards the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan . . . . .	95
3.1	Predictors of Expressive Political Efficacy (Control Group) . . . . .	126
3.2	Average Treatment Effects on Joining a Political Party . . . . .	129
3.3	Average Treatment Effects on Running for Office in City Parliament . . . . .	130
3.4	Average Treatment Effects on Running for Office in Regional Parliament . . . . .	131
3.5	Average Treatment Effects on Running for Office in National Parliament . . . . .	132
A.1	Pre-Treatment Civic Engagement per Recruitment Group . . . . .	193

A.2	Covariate Balance Check . . . . .	197
C.1	Summary Statistics: Treatment Outcomes . . . . .	210
C.2	Bell-McCaffrey Confidence Intervals (Unadjusted Estimates) . . . . .	211
C.3	Bell-McCaffrey Confidence Intervals (Covariate Adjustment) . . . . .	211
C.4	Power Calculations . . . . .	212
C.5	Average Treatment Effects (Unadjusted Estimates) . . . . .	212
C.6	Average Treatment Effects (Covariate Adjustment) . . . . .	213
C.7	Time as Predictor of Behavioral Response (Control Group) . . . . .	213
C.8	Intention-Behavior Distribution . . . . .	214
C.9	Intention-Behavior Inconsistency . . . . .	214
D.1	Summary Statistics: Personality Traits . . . . .	225
D.2	Binomial Logit Regressions of Personality Effects on Social Liberalism . . . . .	225
D.3	Binomial Logit Regressions of Personality Effects on Conservatism . . . . .	226
D.4	Binomial Logit Regressions of Personality Effects on Reform Preferences . . . . .	226
D.5	Personality Traits and Electoral Choices in 2014 Presidential Elections . . . . .	232
D.6	Personality Traits and Electoral Choices in 2014 Parliamentary Elections . . . . .	233
E.1	Summary Statistics: Treatment Outcomes . . . . .	234
E.2	Association of Self-Efficacy with Collective and Internal Political Efficacy . . . . .	236
E.3	Average Treatment Effects on the Decision Not to Run . . . . .	236
E.4	Average Treatment Effects on the Decision to Run . . . . .	236
E.5	Interaction Effects of Pre-Test Self- and Collective Efficacy Levels with Experimental Conditions: Political Party . . . . .	242

E.6	Interaction Effects of Pre-Test Internal Political Efficacy Levels with Experimental Conditions: Political Party . . . . .	243
E.7	Interaction Effects of Pre-Test Self- and Collective Efficacy Levels with Experimental Conditions: City Parliament . . . . .	244
E.8	Interaction Effects of Pre-Test Internal Political Efficacy Levels with Experimental Conditions: City Parliament . . . . .	245
E.9	Interaction Effects of Pre-Test Self- and Collective Efficacy Levels with Experimental Conditions: Regional Parliament . . . . .	246
E.10	Interaction Effects of Pre-Test Internal Political Efficacy Levels with Experimental Conditions: Regional Parliament . . . . .	247
E.11	Interaction Effects of Pre-Test Self- and Collective Efficacy Levels with Experimental Conditions: National Parliament . . . . .	248
E.12	Interaction Effects of Pre-Test Internal Political Efficacy Levels with Experimental Conditions: National Parliament . . . . .	249
E.13	Power Calculations . . . . .	250
E.14	Average Treatment Effects on Joining a Political Party . . . . .	251
E.15	Average Treatment Effects on Running for Office in City Parliament . . . . .	251
E.16	Average Treatment Effects on Running for Office in Regional Parliament . . . . .	252
E.17	Average Treatment Effects on Running for Office in National Parliament . . . . .	252
E.18	Bell-McCaffrey Confidence Intervals (Unadjusted Estimates) . . . . .	253
E.19	Interaction Effects of Prior Experience with Experimental Conditions: Political Party	254
E.20	Interaction Effects of Prior Experience with Experimental Conditions: City Parliament . . . . .	255
E.21	Interaction Effects of Prior Experience with Experimental Conditions: Regional Parliament . . . . .	256
E.22	Interaction Effects of Prior Experience with Experimental Conditions: National Parliament . . . . .	257

E.23 Causal Mediation Analysis: The Effect on City Parliament on Regional Parliament  
(Interactive) . . . . . 263

E.24 Causal Mediation Analysis: The Effect on City Parliament on National Parliament  
(Interactive) . . . . . 264

E.25 Causal Mediation Analysis: The Effect on City Parliament on Regional Parliament  
(Additive) . . . . . 265

E.26 Causal Mediation Analysis: The Effect on City Parliament on National Parliament  
(Additive) . . . . . 265

## List of Figures

1.1	Expectations about the Quality of Life in Ukrainian Macro-Regions, 2012–2017 . . .	32
1.2	Approval of National Development in Ukrainian Macro-Regions, 2012–2017 . . . .	34
1.3	Individual and Social Well-Being Indices, 2012–2018 . . . . .	36
1.4	Social Well-Being Index in Ukrainian Macro-Regions, 2012–2017 . . . . .	37
1.5	Paper Handouts for Cognitive Intervention . . . . .	46
1.6	Visual Material for the Induction of Collective Efficacy . . . . .	48
1.7	Change in Reported Attitudes towards Civic Activities . . . . .	57
1.8	Change in Demonstrated Civic Behavior . . . . .	58
1.9	Generalized Random Forests: Predicted Treatment Effects (Leaflets) . . . . .	61
1.10	Generalized Random Forests: Predicted Treatment Effects (Intentions) . . . . .	62
2.1	Bootstrap Regression of Personality Traits on Social Liberalism . . . . .	88
2.2	Bootstrap Regression of Personality Traits on Economic Liberalism . . . . .	90
2.3	Bootstrap Regression of Personality Traits on Social Conservatism . . . . .	90
2.4	Bootstrap Regression of Personality Traits on Economic Conservatism . . . . .	91
2.5	Bootstrap Regression of Personality Traits on Non-Violent Reformism . . . . .	92
2.6	Bootstrap Regression of Personality Traits on Violent Actions . . . . .	93
3.1	Probability of Running as Candidate by Levels of Efficacy . . . . .	121

3.2	Change in Reported Attitudes towards Political Engagement . . . . .	128
3.3	Tests of Sharp Null Hypotheses . . . . .	133
3.4	Causal Forests for Predicted Individual Treatment Effects . . . . .	136
3.5	Conditional Average Treatment Effects by Recruitment Group . . . . .	138
3.6	Self-Efficacy Treatment and Prior Self-, Collective, and Political Efficacy . . . . .	143
3.7	Collective Efficacy Treatment and Prior Self-, Collective, and Political Efficacy . . . . .	145
3.8	Combined Efficacy Treatment and Prior Self-, Collective, and Political Efficacy . . . . .	146
3.9	Self-Efficacy Treatment and Prior Political Experience . . . . .	148
3.10	Collective Efficacy Treatment and Prior Political Experience . . . . .	150
3.11	Combined Efficacy Treatment and Prior Political Experience . . . . .	151
A.1	Randomization Procedure . . . . .	194
A.2	Experimental Location . . . . .	195
B.1	The Problem of Waste Management in Kherson Region . . . . .	202
B.2	Self-Governed Waste Management System for Recycling Plastic and Glass . . . . .	202
B.3	The Problem of Energy Efficiency in Kherson Region . . . . .	202
B.4	Self-Governed Solution on Building Maintenance . . . . .	203
B.5	The Problem of Transparency of Public Expenses in Kherson Region . . . . .	203
B.6	Self-Governed Civic Counseling of School Budgets . . . . .	204
B.7	The Problem of Dilapidated Common Property in Kherson Region . . . . .	204
B.8	The Activities of Self-Governed Homeowners' Association . . . . .	204
B.9	Brainstorming Sessions . . . . .	205
B.10	Leaflets . . . . .	208



C.1	Studentized Permutation Tests . . . . .	215
C.2	Randomization Inference Trials . . . . .	216
C.3	Sharp Null Hypotheses: Behavioral Outcomes . . . . .	217
C.4	Sharp Null Hypotheses: Intentions (Likert Scale) . . . . .	218
C.5	Sharp Null Hypotheses: Intentions (Binary Scale) . . . . .	219
C.6	Added Variable Plots: Behavioral Outcomes . . . . .	220
C.7	Added Variable Plots: Intention to Join an Electoral Commission . . . . .	221
C.8	Added Variable Plots: Intention to Establish a Civic Council . . . . .	221
C.9	Added Variable Plots: Intention to Join a Pro-Recycling Campaign . . . . .	222
C.10	Added Variable Plots: Intention to Lead a Homeowners' Association . . . . .	222
C.11	Generalized Random Forests: Intention to Join an Electoral Commission . . . . .	223
C.12	Generalized Random Forests: Intention to Establish a Civic Council . . . . .	223
C.13	Generalized Random Forests: Intention to Join a Pro-Recycling Campaign . . . . .	224
C.14	Generalized Random Forests: Intention to Lead a Homeowners' Association . . . . .	224
D.1	Predicted Ideological Preferences by the Degree of Openness to Experience . . . . .	227
D.2	Predicted Ideological Preferences by the Degree of Conscientiousness . . . . .	228
D.3	Predicted Ideological Preferences by the Degree of Extraversion . . . . .	229
D.4	Predicted Ideological Preferences by the Degree of Agreeableness . . . . .	230
D.5	Predicted Ideological Preferences by the Degree of Neuroticism . . . . .	231
E.1	Association of Self-Efficacy with Collective and Internal Political Efficacy . . . . .	235
E.2	Generalized Random Forests: Predicted Treatment Effects of Random Sample . . . . .	238
E.3	Generalized Random Forests: Predicted Treatment Effects of Activist Sample . . . . .	239

E.4 Generalized Random Forests: Predicted Treatment Effects of Facebook Sample . . . 240

E.5 Interaction of Pre-Treatment National Internal Political Efficacy and Self-Efficacy  
Induction . . . . . 253

E.6 Interaction of Pre-Treatment Self-Efficacy and Combined Efficacy Induction . . . . 258

E.7 Interaction of Pre-Treatment Social Activism and Self-Efficacy Induction . . . . . 258

E.8 Causal Mediation Effects of Running for City Parliament (Additive Models) . . . . 260

E.9 Causal Mediation Effects of Running for City Parliament (Interaction Models) . . . 260

## **Acknowledgements**

This dissertation emerged from close intellectual dialogue with my advisors.

Sheri Berman inspired me to challenge disciplinary conventions and build my own independent theoretical vision. I was lucky to learn from her unrivaled rhetorical talents and analytical clarity. Assisting Sheri in the legendary “Democracy and Dictatorship in Europe” course at Barnard College was one of the most humbling and rewarding experiences of my pedagogical career.

Timothy Frye was the most thoughtful, supportive, and encouraging academic advisor that I could possibly dream of. He showed an unconditional willingness to accept research creativity while balancing academic guidance, scientific rigor, and constructive criticism. Tim was always able to find ways to improve this dissertation and encourage me along a hard path to developing my own voice.

Donald Green fundamentally transformed my way of thinking about science, data, and academic virtues. I gained enormously from Don’s sharp, challenging, and surgically precise revisions of my work and his unparalleled intellectual mentorship. Don’s faith in my research agenda and his enthusiastic support of my academic goals made every stage of this work enjoyable and gratifying.

Jessica Pisano’s scholarship was my model for ethical and mindful fieldwork. Jessica’s feedback was always thought-provoking and eye-opening; it challenged my thinking from the least expected angle and pushed this dissertation in an exciting and unexpected direction. I felt privileged to sustain our intellectual dialogue and apply the prisms of interpretative methods to an otherwise experimental study.

Robert Shapiro bravely withstood my attacks on the generalizability of previous studies in political psychology. I greatly appreciate his openness to academic experience and willingness to learn, in painful detail, all about the politics of Southern Ukraine. I am also very grateful for his tolerance to applying the analysis of personality traits and self-evaluations to a previously understudied political context.

I owe my deepest gratitude to all psychologists who supported my first steps in their field. Peter Coleman's belief in my first inquiries in social psychology boosted my academic efficacy. His approval of my work was the primary reason for me to move forward. I also enjoyed a terrific opportunity to learn from John Jost and Eric Knowles. Their lectures at New York University were uniquely inspiring and intellectually stimulating. Their classes also gave me a convenient excuse to take frequent trips downtown and swing between the IFC Center and a ramen café near Washington Square.

Dmitry Roy was this dissertation's academic guardian angel from the first proposal to the final defense. He went above and beyond to realize my ambitious data collection project and was open to the wildest fieldwork suggestions. My fieldwork in Ukraine would have never been completed without his guidance and advice.

I am deeply indebted to the colleagues who invested their time and effort in reading these chapters closely. Brilliant suggestions made by Sarah Burns, Melani Cammett, Justin Key Canfil, Jaclyn Davis, Alessandro Del Ponte, Elise Giuliano, Matthew Graham, Sean Hiroshima, Ruchan Kaya, Tom Leavitt, Elijah Lokshin, John Marshall, Benjamin McClelland, Gwyneth McClendon, Sebastian Meyer, Olena Nikolayenko, Elvin Ong, Olga Onuch, Thomas Remington, Bryn Rosenfeld, Maria Snegovaya, Katerina Tertychnaya, and Gary Uzonyi improved this work greatly. Needless to say, all errors remain my own.

This project benefited greatly from the enlightening feedback that I was lucky to receive from Andre Assumpção, Elena Barham, Nazar Boyko, Ana Bracic, Tymofii Brik, Sarah Z. Daly, Paula Ganga, Bill Glod, Yana Gorokhovskaya, Jonathan Haidt, Henry Hale, Carolyn Heinrich, Cindy Kam, Timur Kuran, Noelle Lee Okoth, Noam Lupu, Jorge Mangonnet, Kristin Michelitch, Tamar

Mitts, Vello Pettai, Mark Pickup, Laura Resnick Samotin, Arturas Rozenas, Daniel Rubenson, †Alfred Stepan, Chiara Superti, Yamil Velez, Colleen Wood, and Liz Zechmeister. Their sharp remarks and productive suggestions were essential for developing the overarching narrative of the dissertation.

I am very grateful to the participants of annual conferences of the International Society of Political Psychology, the American Political Science Association, the American Psychological Association, the Midwest Political Science Association, the Association for the Study of Nationalities, the Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies, the Center for Experimental Social Science at New York University, as well as the participants of the Russian and Post-Communist Politics Graduate Workshop at the New York University Jordan Center for the Advanced Study of Russia and the Harriman Institute at Columbia University, the Toronto Political Behavior Workshop, the Harvard Experimental Political Science Graduate Student Conference, the Annual Graduate Workshop Series at the University of Pennsylvania's Andrea Mitchell Center for the Study of Democracy, and the Graduate Political Science Student Seminar at Columbia University for their generous feedback. I am also very grateful to my amazing academic network at George Mason University—Nigel Ashford, Bill Glod, and other colleagues—for providing me with a welcoming environment for discussing academic ideas, drawing inspiration for new projects, and enjoying the charming vibe of Washington, DC.

Columbia University's Department of Political Science provided resources that helped me finish this project on time. I am indebted to Gregory Wawro and Shigeo Hirano for their effective, considerate, and supportive leadership and to Holly Martis for always being there for her graduate students.

Valerie Bondura and Emily Rutherford spent hours training me to write well. I do not lose hope that the seeds that they planted will eventually grow into something minimally acceptable. Moreover, I would like to acknowledge the wonderful experience of Columbia University's writing groups and I am grateful to all my *Partnerinnen* in writing crimes for their audacious commitment to making this dissertation readable.

I am appreciative to the International Society of Political Psychology, the Columbia Global Policy Initiative, the Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies, the Earth Institute's Advanced Consortium on Cooperation, Conflict, and Complexity, the Harriman Institute, the Association for the Study of Nationalities, and the Higher School of Economics for their generous financial support.

My research assistants in Southern Ukraine showed a stunning level of devotion to this project. I felt lucky to see them in the field, mobilized, excited, and caring. My special gratitude is devoted to the 1,441 respondents who took part in the pilot and main experiments and invested their time and effort in helping me and my research assistants to gain a better understanding of the sophisticated nature of Ukrainian politics.

Finally, this project would have never been completed without the continuous support of my family. I am especially indebted to my spouse, Seba, and my mother, Lora. In the moments of self-doubt, their firm confidence in the value of my work was the reason that kept me going. For never ceasing to believe in me—thank you, dziakuj, shnorhokalutyun, dyakuyu, gracias, spasibo.

## **Dedication**

*To Nataliya and Oleksandr Deineha, for teaching by example.*

## Introduction

What are the psychological pathways to civic and political engagement in weak democracies? Political psychologists typically study political behavior through a conceptual lens derived from data from Western consolidated democracies. This dissertation challenges this approach, demonstrating that in a non-Western political context, traditional predictors of active civic and political engagement—openness to experience, high self-efficacy, and low political skepticism—do not align with established Western patterns.

In a sequence of three papers, I develop a new research agenda in comparative political psychology. I examine established psychological assumptions by replicating them in the context of Ukraine, a post-Soviet unconsolidated weak democracy. This exercise demonstrates that much of what we know about the effects of personality traits and self-evaluation parameters on political behavior is context-specific. These findings do not generalize well, and in some cases, do not generalize at all, beyond the institutional context of Western democracies.

Specifically, high self-efficacy—an individual's belief in the ability to achieve intended goals and a major predictor of civic and political engagement in consolidated democratic states—does not change civic intentions in Ukraine and *suppresses* interest in running for office at the local level. Increasing individuals' beliefs in the ability of people like them to achieve intended civic goals without an accompanying change in the quality of institutions leads to political frustration. Moreover, the effects of personality traits on ideological predispositions in Ukraine are different from the patterns detected in the US and Western Europe.

These findings do not cast doubt on the available observational data. They do, however, raise



concerns over the generalizability and replicability of established political psychological associations and suggest a new way of thinking about causal psychological pathways to civic action and nascent political ambition.

In the remaining part of the introduction, I summarize the overarching theoretical framework of the three papers and specify my contributions to the literatures on the psychology of collective action, comparative personality and social psychology, and the theory of democratic consolidation. I proceed by explaining the choice of Ukraine as an empirical field for the dissertation and addressing ethical dilemmas behind experimental manipulation of civic and political behavior in weak democracies. I conclude with a short summary of the dissertation papers.

## **Theoretical Framework**

This dissertation rests upon three underlying theoretical assumptions.

The first fundamental assumption of this dissertation is that psychological predispositions affect political and civic behavior through personality–environment interactions. The emerging literature in comparative political psychology has already accumulated sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the so-called universal patterns identified in stable Western democracies do not always explain political preferences in other institutional or temporal contexts [1, 2, 3, 4]. The specific meaning of the left–right or liberal–conservative distinction varies across political backgrounds [5, p.122]. Moreover, in some contexts, the fundamental ideological cleavage does not fit into the left–right continuum altogether. Following suggestions voiced by Mondak, Weinschenk, and others, I examine how personality and self-evaluation manifest themselves in the specific political context [6, 7]. Practically, it implies a mindful approach to Ukraine’s institutional and political environment and critical reflection over the ways in which this environment shapes psychological parameters and their expression.

Second, I am primarily interested in explaining the *dynamic* effects of psychological parameters on political behavior. Following the framework suggested by Fox and Lawless [8, p.443], I am interested in explaining the effects of changing self-evaluation and personality traits on politi-

cal behavior. Psychological research has been overwhelmingly focused on detecting associations between personality and behavior rather than uncovering the mechanisms that would explain the change in these associations over time. This is problematic because efficacy and identities are fluid, and even personality traits are not perfectly stable over the course of a lifetime. Existing research, with few exceptions, does not provide a good conceptual framework for studying intrinsic motivations and self-evaluations in dynamics and does not explain how their effects on nascent political ambition change over time. To address this gap, I use experimental methods to detect how the controlled change in self-evaluation affects individual civic and political predispositions. The randomization of these psychological parameters gives me a unique opportunity to explain their dynamic effects on individual willingness to join community development projects and run for office at the local, regional, and national levels, and thus sheds light on the mechanisms of dynamic political behavior [9]. For example, it explains how improvements of civic opportunities or changes in the quality of political representation might affect individual-level political behavior.

Finally, I strive to acknowledge the specific meaning that individuals assign to psychological concepts. Whenever possible, I use open qualitative coding to avoid forced placement of the respondents on ideological scales that may not make sense to them. If these data are not available, I build on prior studies by Vasiutynskyi and other Ukrainians psychologists to reconstruct the meaning of self-efficacy and collective efficacy in this particular society [10, 11, 12].

## **Contributions to the Literature**

This dissertation primarily contributes to the emerging field of comparative political psychology by testing the effects of personality traits and efficacy on civic and political behavior in the post-Soviet context. While some research has been done in post-communist countries, the post-Soviet block remains critically understudied. By foregrounding Ukraine's political context, I examine the role of personality in a weakly institutionalized polity where personality traits are likely to exhibit a direct effect on political preferences (unlike in countries such as the United States, where partisan affiliation has a strong moderating effect on personality traits and thus blurs our

vision of the interaction between personality and politics [13]). Moreover, this study uses offline research sites and invests additional efforts in reaching out to those respondents who do not use the internet often or at all. Finally, this study samples Ukrainian citizens aged between 18 and 83 years old, while previous studies of personality traits in Ukraine do not extend beyond college students and their social network [14, 15]. Thus, this dissertation sheds light on the personality traits and political preferences of a large demographically representative sample from an understudied location.

I contribute to the literature on psychological pathways to collective action in three ways. First, I join the few experiments that manipulate efficacy as a pathway to collective action [16]. Previous studies of psychological pathways to civic action have not investigated any causal effects of individual or collective efficacy on civic participation [17, 18, 19, 20]. Using original experimental data from Ukraine, I show that the effects of improved collective efficacy and self-efficacy on individual engagement in local civic activities are, on average, statistically indistinguishable. Moreover, my experiment measures the effect of efficacy on real-life outcomes and closely approximates the actual decision-making process behind civic engagement. Second, I move beyond the studies of protest and non-normative collective action to analyze why individuals commit to long-term institution building [21, 22]. Finally, I present one of the first experimental exercises in isolating the psychological pathways behind nascent political ambition in weak democracies, where efficacy does not positively affect political engagement due to extreme political skepticism and low state capacity [23, 24]. In this context, individuals avoid political engagement and turn instead to non-political ways of solving collective problems [25, 26].

Finally, I contribute to the literature on democratic consolidation and post-communist political development by integrating the analysis of micro-foundations of democratic engagement into a broader macro-level theoretical framework. I foreground the agential efforts of individuals to secure democratic survival through civic action, while prior accounts of democratic consolidation focus on macro-level factors such as favorable socio-economic conditions, controlled inflation, and a pro-democratic international environment [27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32]. I also move past voting be-

havior to bring attention to less-studied forms of political and civic engagement, such as becoming an electoral observer, joining a pro-recycling campaign, or running for office at the local level. This focus on a wider array of activities beyond voting is especially valuable in political contexts where electoral participation is viewed as a performative act rather than a meaningful way of expressing political and social will [33]. Moreover, this analysis adds to the much-needed research on Ukraine's political behavior beyond language and ethnicity [34].

## **Studying Ukraine**

This dissertation is based on empirical experimental results as well as ethnographic work in Central, Eastern, and Southern Ukraine. Ukraine was chosen as a case for this dissertation for a number of reasons.

First, post-Soviet countries are critically understudied in experimental political psychology. Ukraine is a typical post-Soviet state with respect to its administrative structures, political corruption, and vote-buying [35, 36, 37, 38, 39]. The results of this analysis may also be used to explain specific post-Soviet legacies in Belarus, Russia, Moldova, and, to some extent, Latvia and Lithuania. Ukraine's long history of authoritarianism makes it a particularly useful case for the study of civic engagement [40, 24, 41, 42].

Second, this study challenges the stereotypical portrayal of civic life in Ukraine as active. Ukraine's political development has been predominantly studied through the lens of political mobilization [43, 44]. Important empirical studies examine individual involvement in protests, revolutions, and riots [45, 46, 47, 48]. In this dissertation, I suggest a more balanced view of how Ukraine's undoubtedly active civil society co-exists with passive individual perceptions of collective efficacy on the ground [49, 42]. Moreover, by bringing scholarly attention to underexplored forms of collective action, I shed light on those forms of collective activities that are most conducive to institutional development and democratic consolidation.

Finally, Ukraine is a low-income country [50], and poverty is inherently tied to self-efficacy. The analysis of individual-level data on civic and political involvement allows me to advance our

knowledge on the interaction of efficacy, gender, language, and class in a low-income context.

## **Ethical Challenges**

This dissertation takes the ethical aspect of experimental manipulation of political behavior seriously. While organizing this experiment, I made some choices that might be considered excessively cautious by current conventions in the discipline, and I would like to disclose my considerations in this section.

My primary goal was to minimize risks to the respondents. Democracy promotion programs and experiments in political behavior encourage people to run for office at the local and regional levels often without assessing the potential risks that these activities entail. I tried to minimize potential harm caused by increasing respondents' sense of self-efficacy and collective efficacy. For example, there are easy and well-tested experimental ways to manipulate sense of efficacy through the provision of deceptive facts about one's past performance. The harm of using experimental deception regarding the success rates of civic and political activities in a context such as Southern Ukraine may be quite substantial, even with a debriefing afterward. I refused to use deception in my experimental treatments as I found these methods poorly applicable to my research context. Instead, I chose more expensive treatment alternatives such as cognitive therapy and role modeling. I also chose not to use follow-up surveys to avoid the collection and storage of personalized information.

Another goal was to maximize trust in the experiment and, generally, in academic research. Southern Ukrainians have low levels of trust in sociological survey firms, and these levels have been gradually dropping across the country [51]. Based on my prior ethnographic work and the results of the pilot experiment, I refused to ask the respondents about their stance on the policy questions related to the Crimea and Donbas conflicts because these questions were triggering respondents and could have made them unnecessarily uncomfortable. Also, the respondents were given an option to respond to all survey materials in any language they preferred (Ukrainian, Russian, or both) and could change the language of the survey at any time.

Finally, this experiment is an example of a “wise intervention” [52]. Wise interventions are mindful of the long-term benefits for the respondents. The interventions used in the study were designed to provide subjects with practical tools that could help them in other areas of their lives (for example, by teaching them about growth mindset and the foundations of cognitive therapy).

## **Summary of the Chapters**

### *Efficacy: Self-Efficacy and Collective Efficacy Pathways to Civic Action*

The opening chapter of the dissertation dissects the concept of efficacy as it applies to an individual interest in engaging in civic activities. Despite the critical role civic engagement plays in local political development, few studies have examined the psychological motivations behind civic actions in the context of weak collective capabilities. I organize an original large-scale field experiment in Ukraine to address this gap. The experiment uses directed cognitive therapy to randomly increase self-efficacy, collective efficacy, and a combination of both, and traces the effect of this manipulation on a wide range of civic activities such as joining a pro-recycling campaign, becoming an electoral observer, establishing a civic council, and leading a homeowners’ association. The results demonstrate that individual empowerment constitutes a sufficient condition for civic engagement. Moreover, contrary to most theoretical expectations, the effects of personal empowerment on individual involvement in local civic activities are comparable to the effects produced by increasing collective efficacy. This chapter contributes to our understanding of the underpinnings of civic culture by demonstrating that individual and collective empowerment form two distinct pillars of civic action, and higher individual efficacy compensates for weak civic culture. The results provide one of the first experimental tests of the theory of democratic learning by showing that local civic engagement increases through opportunities to try various civic activities rather than by inculcating democratic values through civic education and top-down democracy promotion. These findings have essential implications for understanding the effects of interventions directed at improving civic action. In the real world, individuals in democratizing states are exposed to new civic opportunities on a daily basis. The results of the experiment suggest that this exposure

generates long-term civic benefits if available opportunities for engagement are readily accessible and moderately challenging.

*Openness: Personality Traits and Political Ideologies in Post-Soviet Contexts*

The second chapter brings individual voices to the fore, examining the link between personality traits and individual policy preferences. Previous studies suggested that personal openness to experience predicts liberal political ideology. This connection, however, has been found to be reversed in Eastern Europe, where openness to experience prompts conservative beliefs. I focus on the phenomenon of the reversed Eastern European association between openness to experience and liberalism, and explain why the political effects of personality traits in Ukraine present a hard test for the personality theory of politics. I examine the effect of personality traits on social liberalism, social conservatism, economic liberalism, economic conservatism, support for government reform, attitudes towards seminal political events, and voting preferences. Uncovering political preferences from original open-ended responses of Ukrainian adults and matching them with their responses to standard political ideology inventories, I show that conscientious people in Ukraine are left-leaning and those open to experience prefer both social liberalism and social conservatism. I attribute these counterintuitive effects to Ukraine's path to democratization and the strategic electoral manipulation by Ukrainian elites who consolidate power through the nation-building project while simultaneously luring civil society toward European integration. This research contributes, both theoretically and empirically, to the studies of the personality origins of political ideologies. Moreover, this analysis demonstrates why contemporary political trends might reverse the established association between openness to experience and liberalism in Western samples.

*Ingenuousness: No Politics, Please! When Democracy Promotion Suppresses Political Ambition*

The final chapter explores the psychological drivers behind nascent political ambition in weak democracies. Democracy promotion aims to encourage citizens to run for office by convincing them that their voice matters and by combating post-authoritarian learned helplessness. How-

ever, very little is known about the individual-level effects of these programs. This chapter uses the results of a randomized controlled trial that approximates the effects of democracy promotion through the manipulation of individual efficacy. I start by exploring the potential problems associated with improving Ukrainians' sense of collective efficacy and explaining why running for office is, in general, a complicated matter in weak unconsolidated democracies. I proceed by experimentally examining how increasing self-efficacy and collective efficacy affects interest in joining a political party and running for office. I analyze the results by measuring the average treatment effects of the increase in efficacy and use machine learning to estimate the general heterogeneity produced by the treatments. I also examine a wide array of interaction effects between pre-treatment characteristics of the respondents and treatment conditions. Finally, I perform a mediation analysis to explore how the discouragement from running for city parliament might have affected regional and national-level ambitions of the respondents. The main empirical contribution of the analysis is showing that enhanced self-efficacy and collective efficacy do not translate into higher nascent political ambition. In other words, respondents who learn about collective successes in civic life lose interest in running for local political office. Moreover, I show that among more civically engaged subjects, the priming of collective and self-efficacy suppresses their desire to run for office at the local level at a higher rate. Altogether, democratic promotion campaigns that target self-efficacy or collective efficacy might suppress nascent political ambition when the population is skeptical of the quality of electoral institutions.



# Chapter 1: Efficacy

## 1.1 Introduction

What prompts citizens to undertake local civic actions in unconsolidated democracies—their sense of individual agency or their sense of community? On the one hand, individuals are expected to believe in their own ability to achieve an intended goal before engaging in costly civic action [53, 54, 55, 56, 57]. Efficacious, educated, economically secure individuals are more likely to join civic associations, monitor elections, and control bureaucrats. On the other hand, democracy is a collective endeavor, and strong collective efficacy might be more relevant for solving community-related problems [58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63]. It is not clear, however, how the sense of community affects civic behavior in the context of post-communist countries, where beliefs in collective capabilities are weak.

Surprisingly, no experimental study has attempted to empirically manipulate individual and collective motivations to clarify their effects on civic participation during democratic consolidation. Existing research in comparative politics has traditionally emphasized institutional parameters of democratic consolidation, leaving the interplay between individual and collective motivations largely unaddressed [64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70]. Yet, good institutions such as fair elections and efficient bureaucracies emerge from unsteady and poorly coordinated civic actions and concessions [71, 72, 73, 68, 74, 75]. The examination of democratic practices and skills on the ground is a way of dissecting macro-institutional changes that democratization brings [76]. By focusing on clearly identifiable micro-level motivations behind individual civic actions, we advance our understanding of the mechanisms through which individual attitudes and actions make democracy the only game in town [28].

The present study addresses this research gap, presenting among the first experimental tests

of the role of individual and collective motivations in civic engagement in weak democracies. I design a lab-in-the-field experiment that randomly manipulates these two motivations and identifies which one of them is more conducive to civic engagement: seeing oneself as an achiever (self-efficacy), or belonging to a potent and powerful community (collective efficacy). I expose my respondents to cognitive interventions, encouraging them to reflect on their personal experience of problem-solving and community successes in civic actions. Targeting respondents' beliefs about their efficacy as both individuals and members of local communities, I am able to causally identify the effect of self- and collective efficacy on civic behavior and intentions.

This experiment takes place in seven locations in Southern Ukraine, a region with high electoral abstention rates and relatively passive civic engagement [35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 77]. Ukraine's long history of authoritarianism makes it a particularly stark example for the study of civic involvement [40, 38, 24, 41, 42]. To account for potential preference falsification anticipated in these settings, I measure both intentions and actions [78]. The behavioral response records respondents' actual interest in learning about new community development projects and sharing this information with their friends and family. The attitudinal response measures respondents' interest in joining an electoral commission, campaigning for recycling, establishing a civic council to improve bureaucratic accountability, and leading a homeowners' association.

The results of the experiment show that in a post-communist context, individual and collective empowerment affect civic action in a similar manner. The induction of beliefs about one's capacity to achieve desired goals without any hint of civic education is sufficient to motivate higher levels of civic involvement. Against expectations derived from observational data [60, 61, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83], high individual self-efficacy and awareness of collective civic successes are equally important for civic mobilization. Moreover, contrary to most theoretical expectations, the experiment shows that the improvement in efficacy causes a direct behavioral change in civic involvement irrespective of the change in attitudes and intentions. This finding stands in contrast to the widespread assumption that attitudes are the exclusive driver of individual political behavior. Behavioral change does not require a shift in intention as long as individuals believe in their ability to achieve desired civic

outcomes.

This research contributes to the literature on the psychological drivers of collective action, the literature on comparative democratization, and the analysis of post-communist political behavior.

I make three contributions to the research on the psychological pathways to collective action.

First, I challenge some of the assumptions in the literature on the psychological pathways to collective action. Most of the previous studies of psychological pathways to civic action have not investigated separate causal effects of individual and collective agency on civic action or disaggregated specific facets of efficacy to find out its effect on pro-social behavior [17, 18, 19, 20]. Using original experimental data from Ukraine, I show that the effects of improved collective efficacy and self-efficacy on civic engagement are, on average, statistically indistinguishable. With this analysis, I join those few experiments that manipulate efficacy as a pathway to collective action [16]. Moreover, unlike most of the experiments, my analysis measures the effect of efficacy on real-life outcomes that closely resemble the actual decision-making process behind civic engagement.

Second, I contribute to the less-researched area of psychological pathways to routine normative collective action<sup>1</sup>. Very few theoretical accounts analyze why individuals commit to long-term institution building. Emotion- and identity-based theories succeed in explaining a spontaneous response to a collective grievance but their applicability to the context of a routine civic action is quite limited given how psychologically different are the processes of joining a one-off high-profile political protest and investing in several years of volunteer work to initiate a recycling system of waste management without any assistance from the state or with an active resistance of local bosses [21, 22].

Finally, this experiment is an example of a “wise intervention” [52] in the sense that it was de-

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<sup>1</sup>Following Nicole Tausch, I distinguish between non-normative and normative collective action [21, 22]. Normative collective action conforms to the norms of the existing social system, while non-normative collective action challenges such norms by, for example, employing violent means. There are, of course, notable limitations to this dichotomy. Participants might get mobilized to a normative civic protest before the violence erupts and transforms it into a non-normative event. There might be no societal consensus on the boundaries and inclusivity of “the existing social system.” Civic and political collective action might rely on completely opposite collective norms. Finally, an action can be acceptable but extremely rare, which makes its “normative” status unclear. For the purposes of this study, I focus on those civic actions that are socially acceptable (do not use violence) and ubiquitous (are not spontaneous rare events such as protests).

signed to create a self-enhancing cycle of changes in respondents and changes in social situations. It gives respondents practical tools that can help them to develop agile behavioral habits.

These findings also have important implications for the research on comparative democratization. This paper is one of the first experimental studies to bring psychological motivations to the fore of democratic consolidation. It provides micro-level evidence of the transformative effect of individual and collective empowerment on civic engagement after democratization. It also sheds light on the relative importance of individual and collective pillars of civic engagement, demonstrating that confident citizens and capable communities are equally relevant to civic engagement. This perspective explains the connection between constitutional, attitudinal, and behavioral dimensions of democratic consolidation: democracy becomes the only game in town when constitutional changes allow for regular and spontaneous civic actions, which in turn result in attitudinal consolidation [28].

Moreover, I address the lack of experimental research on micro-level democratic learning by showing that civic intentions might change more slowly than practices. These findings provide strong empirical support to the literature on democratic learning and suggest that it might be even more behaviorally driven than the research has implied so far [84, 85]. This way, civic skill formation becomes a harbinger of the evolution of democratic institutions. This is consistent with recent observational studies that demonstrate how the experience of living in democracy itself endogenously forms pro-democratic preferences [86, 87, 88].

This perspective ties up some loose ends in the extant experimental research in democratic development, explaining why field experiments often result in an inconsistency between intention and behavior in treatment outcomes [89, 90]. Field experiments on civic engagement have traditionally focused on attitudes and assumed their downstream effect on behavior. This paper demonstrates that there might be multiple paths to action, one of them being perceived individual and collective capacity to achieve civic goals. During the initial stages of exposure to democratic principles, individuals might be adapting new civic habits without an immediate change in their declared intentions. While post-authoritarian attitudes are hard to change, citizens might be more

amenable and agile in their behavioral practices.

Finally, I address numerous gaps in the literature on post-communist political behavior by presenting one of the first experimental analyses of the psychological causes of civic engagement in a low-efficacy context of post-communist countries. Existing studies of collective action in Ukraine mostly focus on non-normative collective action. Most of the empirical studies pay attention to protests, revolutions, and riots while leaving normative forms of collective action severely understudied [45, 46, 47, 48]. This is problematic since ubiquitous forms of collective action conducive to institutional development and democratic consolidation are mostly normative and depend on efficacy more than on emotional mobilization. Moreover, opinion polls show that collective efficacy might be weak when applied to civic activism and engagement beyond non-normative events [91, 92, 12], because in the post-Soviet political context, plenty of seemingly independent civic activities are associated with or informally controlled by the state [49, 42, 33].

I step away from extensively researched identity-based, grievance-based, and anger-based explanations of civic action and bring an efficacy-based explanation in the analysis of causal factors behind the individual commitment to local civic action. The efficacy-based pathway to civic action has several benefits in the context of Southern Ukraine. When civic identities and attitudes are weak, stronger collective efficacy may be particularly important for motivating collective action. This analysis shows, however, that in Ukraine, the sense of individual efficacy is perceived inseparably from collective efficacy [10].

These findings have essential implications for understanding the effects of interventions directed at improving civic action in Ukraine. In the real world, individuals in democratizing states are exposed to new civic opportunities on a daily basis. The results of this experiment suggest that this exposure results in long-term civic benefits if available opportunities for engagement are easily accessible and moderately challenging. Citizens seem to be attracted by a moderately difficult opportunity to engage, and put off by abstract activities that entail longer commitment of energy and time. Behavior-driven pathways might be the way to encourage civic activity without inculcating values and beliefs that might not necessarily be shared by all subjects. This adds some optimism

in the perspectives of democratic learning in post-Soviet states [40].

## 1.2 Theoretical Framework

### 1.2.1 Definitions

I am specifically interested in the types of civic engagement that are conducive to institution-building and participatory governance in weak states such as Ukraine. Of all the activities that classify as civic, I focus on the activities that have a long-term goal of enhancing governance and that involve an organization that is administratively separate from existing authorities. Thus, institution-building civic action is a type of collective action that invests in *building and preserving civic institutions conducive to democracy independently from the state*.

The first restriction implies that civic action that is conducive to institution-building generates public benefits instead of, or beyond, selective private goods. Civic engagement oriented at establishing and enduring local democratic activities safeguards the survival of democratic institutions and has long-term benefits for state capacity [27, 28, 32]. The health of political institutions, especially in newly formed democracies, depends on civic groups that monitor the quality of elections, keep civil servants accountable, ensure government transparency, and publicly discuss the issues of shared importance. Similarly, the lack of civic involvement causes damage to the long-term quality of political institutions.

The second restriction is especially important for the post-Soviet political context where plenty of seemingly independent civic activities are organized or informally controlled by the state [42, 33]. For example, recent decentralization efforts in Ukraine demonstrated that most of the leaders of local communities<sup>2</sup> do not emerge from an independent pool of candidates. Instead, they are recruited from the same networks of local elites that had been in power before the reform began. External facilitation and low actual participation makes the reform futile and does not nurture long-term development of participatory governance [42]. Thus, I specifically refer to the activities that are driven by bottom-up individual efforts rather than orchestrated by the state.

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<sup>2</sup>Ukrainian: *hromady*.

This focus on this type of civic action implies some limitations. I do not cover civic activities that do not involve some anticipated enhancement of the institutional environment and quality of governance. Religious, cultural, and family-related associations are important for civic liberties, but they do not directly target the quality of administrative institutions and democratic practices. Similarly, problem-based organizations formed to target a particular grievance often dissociate once the problem is resolved. Instead, I am interested in individual activities that result in the establishment of an institution or contribute to the endurance of already existing institutions. Thus, problem-based organizations that do not target institutions are also peripheral to my research focus. Finally, I do not consider those organizations that use political violence. This, again, is made to keep the emphasis on institutional activities conducive to democracy- and state-building.

### 1.2.2 Psychological Pathways to Civic Action

What makes people commit to civic action that is conducive to institution-building? The theory of collective action assumes that individuals commit civic action when the benefits of cooperation and the costs of non-cooperation are sufficiently high [93, 94, 95]. This is achieved through the provision of selective incentives and the prevention of free-riding through intermediate-size group memberships. The main challenge for those who study the psychology of collective action is explaining why people with seemingly comparable benefits of cooperation pursue very different civic strategies.

Multiple theories within the psychology of collective action explore the interpersonal variation in attitudes and behavior conducive to collective action. Broadly, there are three conceptual mechanisms used to explain the variation in individual response to a collective grievance: identity-based, emotion-based (also known as grievance-based), and efficacy-based [96, 97]. Per disciplinary conventions, these mechanisms are studied together, within a coherent integrative framework, rather than as competing theories [22, 98].

*Identity-based* mechanisms imply that personal identification with a group increases the likelihood of committing to collective action on behalf of this group. Individuals who associate with

certain groups are more likely to step in against injustices experienced by the group [99, 100, 101, 98]. This mechanism is a powerful driver of collective behavior since it sets up group boundaries, facilitates intra-group cooperation and free-riding prevention, and increases subjective benefits from joining a protesting group [102, 96, 103].

However, the identity per se explains only *attitudes* towards a grievance. For a behavioral response, individuals should be able to feel mobilized or efficacious enough to join the action. People with a similar identity who experience similar levels of collective frustration pursue very different policy responses on their own. As van Zomeren, Spears, and Leach suggest, stronger relevance of group identity should “generate a stronger group-based emotional response to collective disadvantage, but not necessarily generate a stronger sense of group efficacy.” [101, p.356].

*Emotion-based* mechanisms of collective action assume that individual involvement in collective action is explained by the mobilizing effects of anger, resentment, and envy, as well as the demobilizing effects of fear and individually-expressed deprivation [104, 105, 106, 97, 107, 108]. At the same time, emotions rarely work independently from identities and are moderated by political attitudes and perceptions [80, 109]. Group-based mobilizing emotions such as angst, fear, and anger result in collective action when participants also have other parameters of their identity (i.e., distinctiveness) threatened [110]. For example, neuroticism interacts with partisan identification when predicting individual preferences and economic expectations [13].

Emotion- and identity-based mechanisms are most helpful in explaining a spontaneous response to a collective grievance. Theories that explain collective action as a form of coping with emotional distress are relatively successful in the context of “non-normative” activities such as protests, riots, and revolutions (see the review in [97]). They are less applicable, however, in the context of “normative” collective action [21, 22]. Very few theoretical accounts actually analyze why individuals commit to long-term institution building. This is a surprising omission, given how different are the processes of joining a one-off high-profile political protest and investing in several years of volunteer work to initiate a recycling system of waste management without any assistance from the state or with active resistance from local bosses. Indeed, most emotional mechanisms that



have a mobilizing effect on “non-normative” collective action lead to completely different and often demobilizing outcomes in a “normative” context [106]. And most importantly, non-normative collective actions and highly contentious events such as picketing and sabotaging imply the relative prevalence of emotion over group efficacy (as compared to less spontaneous and more regular civic events) [21].

*Efficacy* is an individual belief in one’s ability to have a meaningful impact on a desired social goal. Scholars distinguish between different types of efficacy depending on the context in which the action is pursued. The most general form of efficacy is self-efficacy (personal efficacy). It refers to individuals’ perceptions of their own personal agency and ability to achieve desired outcomes in life [53, 111, 55]. Abundant observational and experimental evidence suggests that self-efficacy lies at the core of civic engagement because it is associated with individual belief in the ability to cause meaningful changes in their environment [54, 56]. As a general expression of individual capability, it has a positive effect on various individual activities, ranging from the reported likelihood of future participation in voting and civic activism to stability of employment and parental involvement in their children’s education [55, 57, 56, 82, 112]. Self-efficacy is sufficient for making people recycle more if it directly affects intrinsic motivation that in turn increases interest in recycling [113]. Observational studies demonstrate a strong association between higher self-efficacy and pro-environmental recycling behavior [114]. High self-efficacy consistently predicts pro-environmental behavior in various social settings [115]. In the political realm, self-efficacy increases an individual’s desire to engage in politics and communicate requests to political representatives [116, 117, 23, 118]. Self-efficacy predicts political participation, turnout, and civic involvement better than individual values and political attitudes [57].

Self-efficacy, however, might be too broad of a concept when it comes to specific individual expectations from collective civic action. Scholars use the concepts of internal and external political efficacy to refer to specific beliefs about one’s ability to make a difference in politics and the extent to which one can keep the government responsible. Internal political efficacy is an individual’s own expected effectiveness in political participation [119, 120, 56]. External political efficacy is

the expected effectiveness of the governmental response to one's political demands [23, 121, 122, 123]. Participatory efficacy captures the individual belief that one can make a difference "through one's own contribution to the collective efforts aimed at achieving group goals" [80]. Finally, the concept of collective efficacy is used to specifically isolate individual beliefs about the ability of their in-group to reach desired outcomes and solve collective action problems [59, 60]. Collective efficacy is often linked to normative civic action as it implies a strong belief in the ability of one's neighborhood, civic group, or union to make significant impact on the collective well-being.

For normative types of civic action—the focus of the current study—specific emotional appraisals are less relevant than are the sense of individual identity and the beliefs about individual and collective efficacy [124, 22]. Higher group efficacy predicts individual inclination to join normative action and is negatively associated with extreme, non-normative action tendencies [22, 125]. To be clear, collective and group efficacy explain individual involvement in "non-normative" collective action as well [79, 97, 98]. However, this type of efficacy appears to have a stronger impact on the types of collective action in which emotion- and identity-based responses are weakened by the time and commitment required to pursue the action. While anger, envy, or other injustice-associated emotions and politicized identities are essential for some types of collective action, grit and persistence might be required to keep activists in play for a significantly longer time after emotion- and identity-based mechanisms attenuate.

The research on the effects of self- and collective efficacy on civic action has delivered mixed results.

One point of view, originally suggested by Bandura, considers self-efficacy as a fundamental behavioral driver that precedes other types of efficacy [53], including collective efficacy [59]. Several avenues of research are built on this assumption.

One avenue assumes that collective efficacy mediates the effect of self-efficacy on civic participation. Observational studies consistently find that self-efficacy explains a vast percentage of the variation in individually measured group efficacy [126, 127] and predicts collective action both directly and indirectly via political efficacy [128]. At the same time, there is some experimental ev-

idence to suggest that collective efficacy might affect civic action (in this case, pro-environmental behavior) *through* an increase in self-efficacy [129]. Jugert and colleagues demonstrate that individuals turn to efficacious ingroups to “regain a sense of control,” and thus collective efficacy affects civic action because, in fact, it improves self-efficacy. Studying individual responses to environmental crises, they suggest that environmental threats may activate behavioral responses (i.e., changing one’s mode of transportation to a more eco-friendly one) through the change in collective efficacy followed by a transformative change in self-perception, especially when “behavior is personally difficult” [129, p.16]. A similar analysis by Greenaway and colleagues also shows that self-efficacy mediates the effect of group identity on wellbeing [130].

Another avenue assumes that collective and self-efficacy are interchangeable or, in a more radical interpretation, are essentially the same thing. Some studies, especially randomized controlled trials, fail to detect any statistical differences between the effects of self- and collective efficacy on civic action. Experimental studies that randomly assign various types of efficacy show that the effects of its facets on political preferences are quite similar. For example, Feldman and Hart designed three different types of messages to target internal, external, and response efficacy beliefs about a specific policy problem (climate change). Efficacy was manipulated by providing the respondents with various news article messages on how other Americans (for internal efficacy) or the Environmental Protection Agency (for external and response efficacy) deal with the climate change threat. The authors find that all efficacy messages operate in a similar manner by reducing fear and improving hope among moderate and liberal respondents [131]. Some observational studies also find that both self-efficacy (perceived behavioral control) and “participative” efficacy predict intentions to recycle and participate in community-based pro-environmental initiatives [115].

Other scholars claim that due to the “collectivist” nature of any civic action, collective efficacy operates separately from self-efficacy. Chen demonstrates, with survey data on pro-environmental practices in Taiwan, that collective efficacy predicts respondents’ reported pro-environmental behavior better than self-efficacy [82]. Individual efficacy is less predictive, and adding collective types of efficacy to the model diminishes the predictive power of self-efficacy [80]. Some scholars

even drop self-efficacy altogether from the analysis of civic action and underscore the insignificant effect of self-efficacy on group efforts [132, 133]. Other studies of civic action do not examine self-efficacy separately from collective or group efficacy, because it is assumed to be highly correlated with other types of efficacy and other personality parameters [134]. Finally, collective efficacy is explained by both individual- and group-level characteristics and thus should have better explanatory potential for civic action in various political contexts.

Finally, most studies on the effects of self- and collective efficacy on civic action assume that the effect is positive and linear. At the same time, evidence from laboratory-based experiments on efficacy induction suggests that the relationship between individual efficacy and performance might be non-linear. Vancouver and colleagues show that over time, an unrealistically high self-efficacy may *decrease* performance. If individual self-efficacy is too high, individuals might experience overconfidence. This increases the likelihood of committing errors while performing tasks [135]. In a similar vein, Silvia demonstrates that self-efficacy affects respondents' interest in a challenging task quadratically: when self-efficacy is low, interest is low because the activity's outcome is certain; when self-efficacy is moderate, the task appears challenging enough; when self-efficacy becomes very high, success seems completely certain, and the task is thus uninteresting [136]. In the context of civic action, this means that *respondents with very low or very high self-efficacy will not be willing to consider civic action as it might be less appealing to them*. Similarly, in countries with corrupt and broken institutions, efficacious people avoid engaging in civic and political life [137]. This also means that respondents with previous negative expectations from their ability to achieve any goals might be more susceptible to the increase in self-efficacy, while those with lower expectations from their collective ability will be more open to collective efficacy induction.

### 1.2.3 Manipulating Self-Efficacy and Collective Efficacy

While these studies largely converge in detecting positive and significant correlation of efficacy and civic participation, very few of them are strictly causal [17, 20]. It is very hard to organize an experimental study of civic participation because few of the psychological parameters reviewed

above can be randomized. Moreover, the literature, in general, has not attempted to systematically investigate separate causal effects of individual and collective agency on civic action [19, pp.292–293], or disaggregate specific parameters of collective efficacy to find out its specific effect on civic behavior [18].

In this section, I review the few available studies that strive to manipulate efficacy experimentally. First, I combine several disciplinary avenues to show how scholars manage to manipulate efficacy in a laboratory and beyond. Second, I discuss how the evidence we receive in these experiments updates the conclusions that are made based on correlational data. Finally, I highlight existing theoretical and empirical gaps in experimental studies of efficacy induction and situate the current experiment in a wider academic debate on the differential effects of self-, collective, and group efficacy on individual engagement in normative collective action in weak democracies.

**Feedback Information** Individuals are wired to update their self-efficacy beliefs based on the information about their past performance [138]. Manipulating the specific content of the feedback by telling people that they did better or worse than other participants is one of the ways to affect self-efficacy in experimental settings [139]. For example, information on participants' athletic performance leads to differential affective responses during and after physical workouts [140].

Another way to manipulate the sense of efficacy is to give participants various information about their future potential. Van Zomeren et al. suggest that it is possible to manipulate the sense of group efficacy by informing students that their collective action can be helpful in curbing annual tuition fees [141]. This manipulation increased the reported intention to join a student protest against the raising of tuition fees which in turn improved reported collective efficacy. Providing information that targets implicit beliefs about group behavior changes the sense of collective efficacy [142]. Cui et al. manipulate the sense of group efficacy by informing their respondents that their action could be effective in addressing a collective grievance (university cafeteria food safety). Similarly, Bäck, Bäck, and Sivén manipulate information about the success of collective protest actions to randomly assign the belief about collective efficacy. They find that when participants are

informed of the high success rate of a collective protest (the “high efficacy” condition), they report stronger motivation to participate in future action.

These studies are problematic for several reasons. First, they deceive respondents by providing them with randomly assigned information on the success of certain types of collective action. While there is a limit to the harm caused by the deception about student cafeteria protests, the harm caused by experimental deception about the success rates of political protest in a hybrid or authoritarian regime may be quite substantial. Second, these studies ask respondents about their *potential* for collective action on the basis of the provided information and do not measure actual behavior caused by the manipulation of efficacy. This implies that the respondents are asked to evaluate the success of the future protest based on the provided information rather than based on their own spontaneous coping strategy. This is problematic because, for some respondents, efficacy might not necessarily be connected to the type of civic action suggested by the experimenter, leading to inflated estimates of the effect of efficacy on any type of civic action. Finally, Sitzmann and Yeo demonstrate in their meta-analysis of self-efficacy and temporal performance that self-efficacy per se has a moderate effect on future performance, and the main effect of past performance on self-efficacy was stronger than the effect of self-efficacy on performance [143]. This means that even if subjects internalize the information about their past performance, they might not necessarily use this information to improve their future performance.

**Role Modeling** A more ethically nuanced way to manipulate efficacy is to increase it indirectly by providing subjects with alternative coping mechanisms. Since individuals are remarkably good in learning from example, using successful role models can improve collective efficacy in a situation of recent violent conflict. For example, Bilali et al. improve the sense of collective efficacy and willingness to engage in collective action through a radio drama designed to create role models for conflict resolution [144]. Similarly, Bruton et al. demonstrate that observational learning via positive video footage of practice trials from an obstacle course task is a successful technique in improving collective efficacy in sports teams [145].

**Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy** Social learning improves efficacy by exposing respondents to role models with high self- or collective efficacy. An approach that is harder to implement but potentially more organic and ethical assumes that individuals can become their own role models through direct manipulation of their sense of efficacy with the help of cognitive-behavioral therapy. Behavioral-modeling workshops boost individual efficacy by providing feasible solutions to fear-inducing life circumstances. For example, a directed intervention that models the strategies of successful job search improves general self-efficacy that later spills over other life decisions such as searching for a job when being unemployed [146].

Cognitive self-guidance is helpful in restoring the beliefs in collective efficacy [147]. Imagery interventions—psychotherapeutic sessions that prompt patients to imagine various stressful situations in life and come up with practical ways to address and manage these stressful situations—boost collective efficacy in team sports. For example, a motivational cognitive-behavioral therapy that provides a 15-minute intervention of guided imagery with the sport psychology consultant once a week improves the perception of collective efficacy among young soccer players [148]. The therapy is based on the imagery of “adverse situations a young soccer player may encounter on the field during training and competition” and discusses potential responses that are available to the player who faces the adverse situation.

Purely behavioral therapy or intervention is equally successful if it teaches subjects to deal with challenges and restore control over their lives. Experiments on improving collective efficacy in the context of civic action (i.e., green actions and community water conservation) showed that even small pro-environmental actions such as water conservation during teeth brushing improves self-efficacy and subsequently increases the likelihood of future costly pro-environmental action [149]. Active engagement in political conversation, such as leaving comments on the Facebook page of the White House, boosts political efficacy more than leaving comments in the accounts of a low-activity federal agency where the engagement is lower [150].

**Structure of Tasks** The structure of tasks and the rules of performance directly affect self- and collective efficacy. In controlled laboratory experiments, groups that were primed to compete with other similar groups were found to improve group efficacy as compared to the groups that were primed to simply complete the assigned goal [151]. Task difficulty may non-linearly affect collective and self-efficacy associated with civic action. Reese and Junge demonstrate in an experiment on reducing the use of plastic in Germany that the assignment of a moderately complicated task increased collective and self-efficacy of the participants, while the tasks that were formulated as too easy or too difficult suppressed collective efficacy [152]. Finally, the management of the performance and the rules of the game have only been causally linked to the change in self-efficacy and collective efficacy. When the moderator of the group is task-oriented (i.e., strict to the point, purposeful, concerned with the efficiency of the group performance), group members experience an increase in both self- and collective efficacy. On the contrary, for groups with a moderator who is social-oriented (i.e., ignores the task for the sake of being funnier, more pro-social, rewarding any input), self-efficacy is negatively related to satisfaction (more self-efficacious participants are less satisfied with group performance) [153]. Applied to the context of civic action, these last studies would suggest that an organized and authoritative civic leader, a moderately difficult goal, and a competitive civic environment would be most conducive to higher collective efficacy.

**Social Norms** Besides the rules behind particular tasks, general social norms and political institutions also affect individual-level perceptions of self- and collective efficacy. In their experiments in rural Mexico and Tanzania, Kerr, Vardhan, and Jindal show that social norms favoring participation make incentives far less relevant than the theory of collective action would predict and increase self-efficacy in task performance [154]. Experimental interventions improve civic engagement in local civic actions by targeting selective incentives, improving satisfaction derived from norm compliance, and encouraging cross-cutting cooperation [62]. For example, Gerber, Green, and Larimer encourage individual participation in local elections by increasing the costs of absenteeism through social pressure [155]. The downside of this method is that social norms are also hard to manipulate



in the experimental setting and it is not clear if interventions like these last for long.

**Civic Education** Civic education is used as a tool for improving collective and political efficacy through the change in political and civic attitudes [72, 156, 67, 54, 157, 158, 159]. The mechanisms behind civic education imply that it is possible to get individuals more personally invested in civic activities such as electoral observation, electoral participation, or public property management via the change in their values and beliefs. Citizens who are aware of their rights and duties are found to be better prepared to engage in meaningful civic activities and derive higher utility from democratic transition. Modern bottom-up democracy promotion programs are based on educating citizens on the need to engage in pro-democratic civic activities such as homeowners' associations, civic anti-corruption campaigns, or recycling [160, 161, 162, 163, 164].

One of the frequently tried interventions informs respondents in the field setup about the opportunity to engage in civic or political life in the neighborhood. The results of these interventions were generally mixed. It seems that information about community-driven projects does not improve self-reported participatory efficacy [165]. However, if the information is personalized enough to target specific individuals, it might improve external political efficacy [122]. Note that the above-mentioned studies measure different types of efficacy in a different context, so the immediate comparison of the achieved outcomes and their effect sizes makes little sense.

However, as discussed in the previous section, attitudes and efficacy do not necessarily predict each other. Recent empirical studies put a strain on the unequivocally positive effect of civic education on subsequent civic involvement. Most citizens have basic information on the foundations of civic action but do not participate because they consider these actions insufficient, or in some cases, futile. Highly reflective individuals are not necessarily becoming more engaged citizens – they might also become skeptical, critical, and disengaged [166, 167, 168]. Individuals are not equally receptive to the same sessions of civic education and might consider this education as neo-colonial or inculcating foreign values altogether [169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174]. For example, the university classes on civic engagement and democracy promotion<sup>3</sup> currently organized in selected

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<sup>3</sup>A semester-long civic education course titled “Democracy: from Theory to Practice” [175].

Ukrainian universities are perceived by some students as a mere credit requirement. They report that “their involvement was only perfunctory,” and as a result, they learned “next to nothing.” [175, p.41]

**Macro-Level Policy Interventions** Finally, some interventions strive to improve collective and political efficacy by changing the environment around respondents. These macro-interventions improve group-level variables related to individual perception of collective efficacy [127]. Some evidence from natural experiments and quasi-experiments shows that collective efficacy may be *decreased* by certain neighborhood developments such as casinos [176]. Controlled randomized trials, however, deliver mixed results about the effect of macro-programs on individual-level collective efficacy. For example, Weisburd et al. study the effect of the infamous broken windows policing on the perceived community efficacy. They run randomized field trials to find out if this policy intervention against criminal activities has a detectable effect on the perception of crime, efficacy, and police legitimacy among residents of targeted hot spots. The results are mixed: the policy itself does not change the perception of collective efficacy [177]. However, later experiments found that a substantial increase in police presence only modestly improves collective efficacy [178].

Taken together, these studies suggest that high efficacy likely causes individual participation in civic action. The literature is unclear, however, about the specific causal effects of each of the facets of efficacy. It also does not properly address the challenges of studying the effects of efficacy, and especially collective efficacy, in the post-collectivist cultures of the former Soviet Union. Given how frustrated the perception of collective efficacy is in these countries, it hard to predict how self- and collective efficacy would interact in such a context.

From the experimental standpoint, the interventions based on role modeling and cognitive-behavioral therapy are most ethically appropriate, long-lasting, and feasible in the context of civic action in a weak institutional environment. Wherever possible, a selection of an authoritative

civic leader, a moderately difficult goal, and a competitive civic environment is helpful. Civic education delivers mixed effects and apparently does not affect civic activism directly. Macro-policy interventions are too broad and have a limited effect on individual-level efficacy. Finally, feedback-based interventions are poorly applicable in the context of a weak state, where providing information on fake successes of civil groups might put respondents in a precarious position in the future.

#### 1.2.4 Efficacy in Post-Soviet Ukraine

I now turn to the analysis of civic engagement in post-Soviet countries, where societal perceptions of individualism, collectivism, and efficacy reflect various elements of Soviet collectivist culture, a post-Soviet individualist culture of early capitalism, and the consequences of social and political transformations of the 1990s and 2000s. Before I begin, I would like to note that the main boundary conditions of the study are (1) the prevalence of post-authoritarian learned helplessness that poses a macro-level threat to the development of civic culture at the local level and (2) poor quality of the institutions of political representations at the local and regional level. Even though my data are primarily sourced from Ukraine, many of the trends described below can be traced in other post-Soviet countries.

By 2020, Ukrainians report low levels of self-efficacy and external political efficacy but enjoy one of the highest levels of internal political and collective efficacy in the post-Soviet space and higher than average post-Soviet levels of collective efficacy. These trends are also quite heterogeneous. High internal political and collective efficacy are distributed unequally and are only enjoyed by certain social, demographic, and regional groups. This section covers the reasons behind the diverging trends in external political, internal political, collective, and self-efficacy in Ukraine; discusses the geographic and social patterns of the distribution of efficacy; and unpacks the puzzle of collective efficacy in a post-collectivist society.

### *Self-Efficacy In the Post-Communist Context*

In post-communist Ukraine, a combination of political and economic factors has been detrimentally affecting individual self-efficacy.

Ukrainian society experienced a quick transformation of political and social views straight after the collapse of the USSR. Within the first two electoral cycles (1991–1998), public opinion vacillated from mass support for national independence and the decline in political trust in the Communist Party of Ukraine to the support for re-integration and restoration of political support of the Communist Party [179]. These challenging times resulted in a decline in social and political trust and a nationwide crisis of values and attitudes [180, 181]. Ukrainian scholars analogize these transformations with Durkheimian *l'anomie*, the absence of a fundamental cultural consensus on social or ethical standards [179]. This transformation of economic, political, and legal environment left Ukrainians perplexed about the values and fundamental principles behind their newly formed state. Several waves of unsuccessful reforms left people disenchanted and suppressed social initiative. Taken together, these developments resulted in the pertaining social crisis and the decline in individual initiative. These macro-level challenges have had a detrimental effect on the self-efficacy of Ukrainians: both public opinion polls and psychological studies register a decline in self-evaluations of average Ukrainians and detrimental effects of economic deprivation on their self-efficacy and mental health [182].

Another macro-level factor that suppressed the sense of self-efficacy is the dire economic situation in Ukraine. Within three decades of independence, the GDP per capita of Ukraine plummeted from USD 4,240 in 1989 to USD 3,100 in 2018. As of 2020, it has failed to reach the pre-independence values, despite the fact that the population has been shrinking rapidly and the economy of the rest of the world has been growing. In 1998–1999, 52% of the Ukrainian population reported that their household does not have enough money to buy food (this share dropped to 12% by 2017)<sup>4</sup> [183]. The economy was also struggling to bounce back from the financial

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<sup>4</sup>The share of poor households varies across the country. In the experimental location studied in this dissertation, 17% of residents could not afford to buy food and basic household items in 2018.

crisis of 2008–2009 and the political crisis of 2013–2016 that started within the country and was exacerbated by the Russian annexation of Crimea and military conflicts in two populous regions in the East. The majority of Ukrainians report significant concerns over their economic and social stability and possibilities. Altogether, these challenges to economic well-being consistently limit actual behavioral control of Ukrainians, especially in the South [180].

Perceived social and economic inequality is another challenge for self-efficacy if it cannot be resolved with available social policies and cements vulnerable social groups. Most scholars agree that despite revolutionary changes, the power structures of Ukrainian society did not transform and most of the elites were able to preserve their social status [179, 184]. While official inequality, measured as Gini index, is low, Ukrainian economists note that true economic inequality might be higher due to the large share of Ukraine’s informal sector and underreporting of true income by wealthier social strata (for further discussion on perceived income inequality in Ukraine, see [184]). 37% of Ukrainians name high prices and low income as their primary life concern, and 14.5% believe that the gap between rich and poor requires immediate policy changes (as compared, for example, to 1.7% who are concerned about the quality of democracy and freedom) [185]. 51% believes that mass pauperization poses a strategic threat to the nation [186], and 62% feel uncertainty about the future [187]. The income gap plays a key role in predicting subjective well-being and self-reported estimates of health: 21% of the poor report being in good health, as compared to 70% of the rich [188].

Table 1.1: The Dynamic of Helplessness in Ukraine

	2000	2005	2010	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Percentage of Ukrainians who reported feeling helpless over the past year	16	12	11	12	12	13	13	13	10	5

*Source: Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, 2019 [189, 190].*

Individual-level data show that up until the election of President Zelensky, Ukrainians named regular helplessness as their primary life concern along with a serious illness or death of loved ones [189]. After the 2019 presidential elections, the number of those feeling helpless dropped to 5%. This estimate is highly correlated with the wealth of the household, with 12% of the poorest group

and 1% of the wealthiest group reporting that they regularly felt helpless over the past year (Table 1.1) [189]. The moderate decline is consistent with a spike of optimism and hope reported in the country after the presidential elections. At the same time, indirect measures show that a significant minority of Ukrainians is dissatisfied with available opportunities to be independent (13.8%) and make an impact on the events of their own lives (19.1%) [187].

Another way to track efficacy in public polls is to see if subjects are satisfied with their sense of agency in private and public life. As Table 1.2 demonstrates, roughly 50% of Ukrainians are satisfied with the aspect of their self-efficacy responsible for having an impact on the events that happen in their lives. 19.1% are unsatisfied with their control over the events of their lives, and 13.8% are unsatisfied with their ability to be independent. As we have seen, only 5% admitted that they feel consistently helpless. Higher numbers in Table 1.2 might give a better understanding of the real dynamics of self-efficacy in the country than direct helplessness questions in Table 1.1.

Table 1.2: Estimates of Self-Efficacy from a Nationally Representative Survey

Are you satisfied with the opportunities...	Completely satisfied	Somewhat satisfied	Somewhere in between	Somewhat unsatisfied	Completely unsatisfied	Irrelevant, don't know
To be independent	30.9	26.6	17.5	9.3	4.5	11.1
To have an impact on what happens to you	24.4	25.1	21.7	11.4	7.7	9.8

*Source: Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, 2019 [187].*

Self-efficacy levels vary across time and space. Based on the Index of Social Well-Being constructed by Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, the South has lower levels of social and individual well-being of all Ukrainian macro-regions [12]. Within Ukraine, the South has experienced the worst dynamics of self-evaluation and self-efficacy. Southern Ukrainians report suffering from betrayal and vileness at higher rates than the rest of the country, and lower than average levels of economic well-being and life satisfaction [91, 191].

In 2010, 16.5% of Southern Ukrainians experienced helplessness compared to approximately 7% in the West and Center and 11.7% in the East [190]. Within five years preceding the experiment (2012–2017), the South was the only region that had its residents reporting consistently deteriorating perceptions of the future well-being [92]. The reported expectations from the future

quality of life have been worsening in the South compared to other macro-regions, as Figure 1.1 demonstrates.<sup>5</sup>




Figure 1.1: Expectations about the Quality of Life in Ukrainian Macro-Regions, 2012–2017

These conditions explain why Southern Ukrainians have a unique approach to defining self-efficacy. Vasiutynskyi interviewed 40 residents of Odesa, the capital of Southern Ukraine [192]. When thinking about learned helplessness (Ukrainian: *vyvchena bezporadnist'*), respondents defined it as the opposite of pragmatism. Self-efficacy, in the minds of Southern Ukrainians, means being able to develop personally *both* as a member of a group and an independently standing individual. When asked about the dark side of individualism, respondents note the feeling of being socially estranged and detached from the rest of the society [192, p.139]. I return to this important study below when discussing the perceptions of collective efficacy.

### *Internal and External Political Efficacy*

Ukrainians met the collapse of communism with historically low levels of political and collective efficacy [181]. The long-term authoritarian rule suppressed the institutions responsible for supporting social initiative. At the national- and group-level, post-communist countries in general, and Ukraine and Russia specifically, were consistently found to display lesser political engagement, low levels of political efficacy, and lack of interest in civic affairs [193]. The observers

<sup>5</sup>Note that the survey does not include the territories that Ukrainian authorities lack control of, and thus the estimates for the East might be biased and hard to interpret.

described the political culture in post-USSR Ukraine as “low levels of political involvement in legitimate forms of political life, increasing distrust of official power structures, low political efficacy levels, and popular readiness to support mutually contradictory political positions” [194].

Subsequent political transformations were not conducive to the improvement of external political efficacy. Political leaders failed to resist the temptation of corrupting the government and abusing power. Weak political parties and shattered political institutions prevented Ukrainians from developing a stronger form of external political efficacy [195]. Pervasive political corruption, especially top-level corruption, became a long-term inhibitor of external political efficacy. In late 2019, 83% of a nationally representative sample admitted that reforms designed to eradicate top-level corruption have not been successful [196]. Since the early 1990s up to the present day, surveys have been detecting that the majority of Ukrainians are “very dissatisfied” with the overall situation in their country [180, 196].

By 2004, the year of the Orange Revolution, 72% believed that ordinary citizens had more influence on politics in Soviet times [193]. Up to 64% of Ukrainians believed that their country is not democratic, and a majority of almost all major sub-groups expressed their preference for order over freedoms. [180]. 69% disagreed that “Voting gives people like you a chance to influence decision-making in our country” and 78% disagreed that “People like you can have influence on the decisions made by the government.” Disappointment with the outcomes of the Orange Revolution further exacerbated the distrust in the political system. Both the President and the Parliament failed to deliver the promised political and economic changes, and by 2006, Ukrainians retreated to the originally low levels of external and internal political efficacy [179, pp.19–21]. In 2017, one year before the experimental fieldwork, only 32% were satisfied with the opportunity to take part in a public life [187].

Similarly, internal political efficacy was originally suppressed by the fear of violence and potential threats from those in power. In 1995, 45% felt that engaging in politics entails getting yourself into trouble [194]. This attitude proves to be remarkably consistent over time, meaning that politics remains quite dangerous for an average citizen. In my experimental sample, 42.6%



admit that they are completely helpless in conflict with those in power (see Table 1.4).

The events of Euromaidan, however, improved the internal political efficacy of those who supported its cause. By 2017, the national-level internal political efficacy of Ukrainians was higher than their external political efficacy [197]. During the first years of the war in Donbas, civic engagement of Ukrainians became essentially the support for the army who struggled with providing resources for the Anti-Terrorist Operation [198, 38, 199].

At the same time, the levels of internal political efficacy vary quite significantly across the macro-regions of Ukraine. Southern Ukraine was the least skeptical macro-region—at least by Ukrainian standards—of the direction of national political development before the Euromaidan Revolution [92]. After the Euromaidan events, the annexation of Crimea, and the destabilization in Donbas, Southern provinces found themselves in between two military spots in a rapidly polarizing country. The disapproval of the direction of national development went even lower, reaching record low –85 points by the end of 2017 (Figure 1.2).




Figure 1.2: Approval of National Development in Ukrainian Macro-Regions, 2012–2017

After the Euromaidan, 60% of West Ukrainians expected the future of Ukraine to improve and 12% expected the situation to deteriorate. In the East, the numbers were the opposite: only 16% of Eastern Ukrainians expected the future of Ukraine to improve and 54% expected it to worsen [198, p.12]. 16% in the South do not consider themselves to be a patriot of Ukraine (25% in the

East<sup>6</sup> and 5% in the West) [198, p.12]. The South is close to the East in their geopolitical views: similarly to Eastern Ukrainians, they do not support the idea of joining NATO [183]

### *Collective Efficacy In a Post-Collectivist Society*

Studies are less clear about the state of collective efficacy in Ukraine. Some estimates show that Ukrainians enjoy high levels of collective efficacy as compared to Russians [197]. Others note that within Ukraine itself, the rates of participation in local civic initiatives and the trust in NGOs are low and thus civic efficacy of Ukrainians is not as high as it seems [38, 200, 41]. To understand the specifics of collective efficacy levels in Ukraine in general and Southern Ukraine in particular, we should pay attention to several macro- and micro-level factors of Ukrainian politics.

**What Does “Collective Efficacy” Mean for Ukrainians?** One challenge of studying collective efficacy in Ukraine is to define what Ukrainians mean by collective efficacy. As citizens of a post-communist country, Ukrainians have specific attitudes towards collectivism and individualism. When thinking about helplessness, Southern Ukrainians tend to bring collective solidarity as a solution [10]. When asked about the positive sides of collectivism, for example, Southern Ukrainians name mutual support<sup>7</sup>, social solidarity<sup>8</sup>, and shared values and ideas [192].

The values of altruism, civic activism, and readiness to help are equally important for both self-proclaimed individualists and collectivists [10, pp.89–91]. In his monograph, Vasiutynskyi shows that, at least in the mindsets of Southern Ukrainians, “individualism and collectivism do not constitute a psychologically harmonious, internally homogeneous dichotomous phenomenon” [10, p.91]. Another qualitative study shows that young Ukrainians in Kyiv have a vague understanding of the idea behind collective agency and associate it with a wide array of political and social activities ranging from volunteering and representing Ukraine abroad to political activism, turnout, and active citizenship [175]. Given how opaque the definitions of civic engagement, collectivism,

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<sup>6</sup>Note that those living on the occupied territories were not included in the sample and we should expect the numbers for the South and for the East to be even higher if the Crimea and the Donbas were included.

<sup>7</sup>Ukrainian: *vzayemodopomoha*.

<sup>8</sup>Ukrainian: *zhurtovanist*'.

and individualism are, we might expect to see the same variability in the definition of collective efficacy.<sup>9</sup>




Figure 1.3: Individual and Social Well-Being Indices, 2012–2018

**De Facto Collective Efficacy** Efficacy implies the ability to exercise behavioral control over events of individual and public life and thus depends on individual vitality and well-being. Kyiv International Institute of Sociology constructs two indices to measure self-reported well-being [91, 92, 12]. Individual Well-Being Index ranges between –100 and 100. It combines respondents’ evaluations of their level of happiness, state of health, family well-being, and financial situation. Social Well-Being Index, also ranging from –100 to 100, combines their evaluations of collective well-being. The variables combine responses to such questions as “*Is Ukraine going in the right direction?*”, “*How would you evaluate the state of Ukrainian economy?*”, and “*Would you expect the life in Ukraine to become better or worse next year?*”. For both indices, –100 refers to the most pessimistic evaluation of the current situation, and 100 refers to the most optimistic one. As seen in Figure 1.3, Ukrainians believe that their individual well-being is in better shape than their individual perception of collective well-being. The graph shows the dynamics of individual and

<sup>9</sup>As I show elsewhere, this is indeed the case, and the concept of efficacy encapsulates a number of very distant semantical categories [201].

social well-being in Ukraine within five years before the experiment. As we see, on average, the evaluations are moderately consistent, varying from  $-55$  to  $-39$  for social well-being and  $-8$  to  $8$  for individual well-being, and the gap between individual (relatively less pessimistic) and social (very pessimistic) evaluations remains consistently wide.

These indices have substantial regional variation (Figure 1.4). Repeating the trend that we have observed in the dynamics of future expectations (Figure 1.1), South Ukrainian respondents experienced the most significant drop in social well-being between 2012 and 2017 and transitioned from being the least pessimistic to becoming the most pessimistic macro-region. This dynamic suggests that de facto collective efficacy in Southern Ukraine might be lower than the country's average.




Figure 1.4: Social Well-Being Index in Ukrainian Macro-Regions, 2012–2017

**Self-Governance and Self-Organization** Despite the stereotypical depiction of Ukrainian civic life as active and efficacious, one should not assume that every Ukrainian has a high degree of collective efficacy at the local level. Since the 1990s, collective action on the ground has been suppressed by corruption, lack of legal consistency of the norms that regulate municipal and civic life, and inherited post-Soviet deterioration of social and civic organizations. Local communities

have inherited a centralized and highly bureaucratized structure of government with underfunded municipalities [42]. As Kvartiuk notes, civil society organizations are scarcely represented in the Ukrainian periphery, especially in rural areas [42], and most civil society organizations exist only on paper.

Despite the experience of successful collective transformations of power and unique intensity of war mobilization, Ukrainian collective efficacy is not visible in collective self-organization and civic governance on the ground. High collective efficacy is important because local governments need civil society to decentralize and democratize the decision-making process [202]. However, one of the main challenges of participatory governance reform in Ukraine is low participation rates [200, p.1131]. Moreover, rural community-based organizations in Ukraine—the organizations that are supposed to be driven, formed, and ruled by local civic initiative—are de facto established externally by local government who tried to attract donor money with a new and trendy structure of participatory government [42]. As a result, newly-established organizations “are disconnected from local inhabitants and are aligned with the fundraising incentives of local governments” [42], and do not improve collective efficacy and disseminate cooperative and democratic values [41].

Community councils and public discussions—another available form of civic engagement in local politics—do not always serve as an effective mechanism for participation in practice [203]. At the individual level, existing civic engagement is tightly connected with political activism [38]. This connection might also alienate those citizens who would like to join a civic organization but disapprove of the direction of the country’s political development (as the majority of Southern Ukrainians do). Even if citizens self-identify as a community and co-partners in governance, this identification does not always create local formal governance bodies [204]. And when it does, these local communities acquire the authorities of the state and become inculcated in the government system. For example, OSBB<sup>10</sup> was originally conceived as a managerial body that has nothing to do with the political process. However, it becomes de facto a political organization when local civic leaders engage in the fight over resources with national and regional authorities [205]. Those

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<sup>10</sup>OSBB stands for the Organization of Property Owners of Residential Apartment Housing, Ukrainian: *Ob’yednannya Spivvlasnykiv Bahatokvartyrnoho Budynku*.

citizens who are not willing to enter the political arena thus avoid engaging in civic action even if their collective efficacy is high.

**NGO Membership** Before the Orange Revolution, only 0.1% of Ukrainians were members of NGOs, and 24% did not know what an “NGO” stands for [180]. By 2014, the share of those who joined various NGOs amounted to 13%, a substantial increase within a decade. By 2015, the rate of civil organizations per 100,000 Ukrainians reached 370 (as compared to 273 in 2010) [206]. This increase, however, was mostly driven by specific demographic and regional groups. Younger activists who participated in democratic developments during the Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan exhibited high levels of collective efficacy [207, 182]. Of 16 to 35 years old Ukrainians, 74% took part in civic initiatives within a year after the Euromaidan [198]. For other age groups, the Euromaidan did not improve the sense of collective efficacy. The average Ukrainian’s civic life remained passive because of “disappointment with the post-Soviet transformation and low subjective social status” [38, p. 673].

**Individual Perceptions of Collective Efforts** Opinion polls show that collective efficacy might be weak when applied to civic activism and engagement beyond non-normative events. Even in the most socially mobilized group of 16–35-year-old Ukrainians, 31% report taking part in the development of local infrastructure and appealing to state authorities, 21% report participating in environmental events, 9% report joining civic fights against corruption, and a mere 5% reports participating in discussion of legislation drafts and budgets [198, p.16]. In in-depth interviews, Ukrainians express cynicism about non-governmental organizations, claiming that “such groups were often fronts for oligarchs or fraudsters, with many being active only around election time” [198, p.16].

This is a consistent social attitude: 56% of Ukrainians trust locals in their town but only 16% trust civil society organizations [183, 11]. Most importantly, as the last column of Table 1.3 demonstrates, 24.2% of respondents either do not know or do not care if they have sufficient opportunities to take part in public life. Given how widespread the opportunities for participatory governance

are, these numbers show that Ukrainians’ collective efficacy might be lower than stereotypes would suggest.

Table 1.3: Estimates of Collective Efficacy from a Nationally Representative Survey

Are you satisfied with the opportunities...	Completely satisfied	Somewhat satisfied	Somewhere in between	Somewhat unsatisfied	Completely unsatisfied	Irrelevant, don't know
To take part in public life	23.5	20.8	18.1	9.4	4.1	24.2

Source: Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, 2019 [187].

To grasp the pre-treatment levels of collective efficacy and helplessness in my sample, I ask my respondents in Southern Ukraine if people like them are completely helpless in open conflict with those in power (Table 1.4). I chose this question for several reasons. First, collective efficacy in this context captures the identification with any collective that the respondents consider *people like them*. Second, it stresses out the efficacious component as it assumes the ability to self-organize and fight the abuse back. Third, it specifically confines efficacy to its *collective* facet while excluding internal political efficacy or self-efficacy. I also find this way of asking about collective efficacy more specific than the question about opportunities to make an impact in public life, and the specificity is crucial since we know about the tendency of Ukrainians to define collective efficacy in multiple mutually excluding ways. As we see, 42.6% report feeling somewhat or completely collectively helpless.

Finally, young Ukrainians see lower self-efficacy and collective efficacy as the major impediments to their country’s political development. 52% name “passivity and irresponsibility” of other Ukrainians as the factor that prevents future development, and 49% include in the same list of impediments the “lack of faith among citizens that they can bring about change” [198].

Table 1.4: Estimates of Collective Efficacy from the Pre-Treatment Sample

	Completely agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhere in between	Somewhat disagree	Completely disagree
People like me are completely helpless when in conflict with those in power	27.7	14.9	20.9	13.9	22.6

### 1.2.5 Targeting Civic Action in Southern Ukraine

This preliminary exploration suggests that improving self- and collective efficacy in Southern Ukraine might be the most direct way to facilitate individual civic engagement. The efficacy-based pathway to civic action has several benefits in the context of Southern Ukraine. The greatest advantage of the efficacy-based pathway to civic action is that it circumvents identities and emotions. When civic identities and attitudes are weak, stronger collective efficacy may be particularly important for motivating collective action [101]. Behavior-driven pathways might be the way to encourage civic activity without inculcating values and beliefs that might not necessarily be shared by all subjects. The efficacy-based pathway is most appropriate for normative collective action that requires a longer commitment to the civic cause and that relies on individual and collective agency more than on emotions and identities. Thus, even in the region where civic identities are frustrated and the dissatisfaction with the course of national development is high the induction of collective (and self-) efficacy might positively affect civic action.

Reviewed data on self- and collective efficacy in Southern Ukraine show that the macro-region has lower than average levels of self- and collective efficacy and higher levels of dissatisfaction with the quality of life. To understand if these levels might have an impact on civic engagement in local community-driven projects, I organize a field experiment that randomly increases the sense of self- and collective efficacy of participants and measure the effect of this manipulation on their intended and expressed interest in civic projects.

Both of the treatments that I develop for this experiment are designed to increase the sense of efficacy. No condition was designed to decrease these levels even in a laboratory setting. For ethical reasons, I restrained from replicating a deception experiment that changes the levels of efficacy by providing fake information about the anticipated success of individual or collective action. Instead, I chose to suggest a free session of cognitive-behavioral therapy to work on improving self-efficacy levels of my respondents and combined role-modeling with elements of civic education and cognitive-behavioral therapy to improve their collective efficacy.

There are virtually no experimental studies on the causal effects of efficacy on civic engagement



in the post-Soviet context. This prevents me from formulating specific expectations of the effect sizes in the sample and makes this study exploratory rather than confirmatory. I can, however, highlight some expectations from the general direction of the causal effect of self- and collective efficacy on civic engagement, judging from available evidence from laboratory experiments.

Because it is not clear if self- and collective efficacies have the same effect on civic engagement, but available experimental data show that their effect is largely the same, I hypothesize that self- and collective efficacies have, on average, a comparable effect on civic engagement. As shown above, in the post-Soviet context, self-efficacy means being able to exercise agency while being embedded in social networks. Thus, its practical influence on civic action might not differ from the effect of collective efficacy.

**Hypothesis 1** Self- and collective efficacies have, on average, a comparable effect on civic engagement.

Alternatively, consistent with some theories reviewed above, each facet of efficacy has a distinctive effect on civic engagement or collective efficacy mediates the effect of self-efficacy on civic engagement.

**Hypothesis 1a** Collective efficacy has, on average, a stronger effect on civic engagement.

**Hypothesis 1b** Self-efficacy has, on average, a stronger effect on civic engagement.

**Hypothesis 1c** Collective efficacy mediates the effect of self-efficacy on civic engagement.

Available psychological data on human behavior suggest that human intended (planned) behavior is explained by attitudes, social norms, and self-efficacy, or “perceived behavioral control” [208]. For example, individuals will commit to electoral observation if they have favorable attitudes towards electoral observation, perceive social norms to encourage electoral observation, and perceive their ability to become electoral observers as sufficiently high. When *perceived* behavioral control coincides with *actual* behavioral control (i.e., individuals can actually join electoral

commissions as observers), perceived behavioral control affects civic observation directly, circumventing attitudes, norms, and intentions. An individual with high behavioral efficacy, someone who feels efficacious enough to spontaneously engage in various available activities without overthinking their existential meaning, will likely get involved in civic associations. To put it bluntly, some individuals engage in civic actions because they happen to believe that they can do it, not because they care about the quality of democracy, government transparency, or efficiency of public service. Thus, the direct effect of self-efficacy on behavior is important for this study because it explains why we might observe individual involvement in civic action even if pro-democratic attitudes are not yet formed and social norms about civic engagement are not sufficiently enforced.

**Hypothesis 2** The manipulation of self-efficacy changes civic actions.

At the same time, collective efficacy implies direct interaction with individuals' self-identification as members of a group. Information about positive role models and success stories in the neighborhood might change individual attitudes about civic action in the collective efficacy condition. Higher collective efficacy strengthens ingroup identification because it increases the likelihood of group-based collective action [209]. Thus, I assume that the manipulation of collective efficacy changes both civic intentions and actions. Similarly, the induction of collective efficacy after the manipulation of self-efficacy changes both civic intentions and actions.

**Hypothesis 3** The manipulation of collective efficacy changes both civic intentions and actions.

**Hypothesis 4** The combined manipulation of self-efficacy and collective efficacy should change both civic intentions and actions.

## 1.3 Research Design

### 1.3.1 Experimental Site

The experiment was organized in Southern Ukraine in 2018. The choice of the research site takes into account my theoretical interest in the effect of self- and collective efficacy on normative local civic engagement and builds on the insights derived from previous field-based interventions. Some field experiments that manipulate civic participation in hybrid regimes are performed precariously since they put citizens at risk by pushing them towards closer interaction with the state. Exposing Southern Ukrainians to random induction of efficacy does not put them under immediate identifiable risk [46, 45]. Second, the novelty of experimental interventions is an important condition to ensure experimental success [210, 167]. Ukraine is undergoing swift political transformation, and most people remain unaware that many new features and institutional opportunities have been made available to them. The collective efficacy condition uses new role models and helpful information that is definitely new to most respondents. Third, organizing the experiment in Southern Ukraine offers a unique window to observe the micro-level dynamics of civic culture in the making. The experiment identifies the specific sequence of the update in intentions and actions that happens when individuals improve self- and collective efficacy in hybrid regimes. By doing so, the experiment provides a micro-level explanation of the variation in the survival of incomplete democratic regimes. Finally, the experiment creates a range of social benefits by encouraging civic engagement in a weak democratic environment [73, p.304].

The experimental location, a region of Kherson, is a typical province in Southern Ukraine. As we have seen, this macro-region is more economically deprived and civically and politically passive than the regions in Western and Central Ukraine, and Kherson region in particular reported very low levels of civic engagement and political turnout over the past two decades [35, 211, 212, 213].

The convenient advantage of Kherson in terms of the analysis of local civic action is that, unlike other regions of the South and the East, the region does not have a high level of ethnolinguistic

polarization. The contentious events of the Orange Revolution have not had a significant effect on Khersonian regional politics (relative to other regions of Ukraine) [36, 214]. In the presidential elections of 2004, Kherson featured the narrowest margin between Viktor Yanukovych and Viktor Yushchenko (52% to 48% in the second round), making it the least electorally polarized region of Ukraine [215]. The relatively low ethnolinguistic polarization<sup>11</sup>, as compared to other regions of Ukraine, makes it easier to develop a collective efficacy treatment that would be uniformly perceived by subjects who complete the study in different languages.

Civic engagement in the region is organized in a typical post-Soviet manner, featuring high involvement of local governments in participatory practices and the tensions between independent civic bodies and post-Soviet administrative structures [39, 200]. At the same time, it has no clear dominance of either political machines—post-Soviet political parties with access to administrative resources—or oppositional parties without such access [216, 217].

### 1.3.2 Experimental Intervention

To recreate the increase of efficacy in a laboratory setting, I randomly increase subjects' perception of their efficacy as individuals and as members of a collective. This intervention is not supposed to cause a long-term change, but it approximates the increase of efficacy well enough for the experiment's purposes, and it allows me to measure an average behavioral and intentional change associated with similar real-life changes.

Subjects in the first experimental condition received a cognitive intervention that manipulated their self-efficacy by priming their awareness of personal successes. Importantly, the treatment did not feature any information related to civic engagement. All examples were private (family relationships, personal or professional development). The only mechanism that the treatment is expected to work through is the induction of self-efficacy. Subjects in the second experimental condition were educated about recent community successes in recycling, infrastructure innovation, property management, and anti-corruption school budget reform. The improvement of collective

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<sup>11</sup>To be clear, this does not entail lower levels of other types of polarization.

efficacy is achieved through role modeling, learning from the success stories, and developing a plan to adopt these successes in their own neighborhood during a subsequent brainstorming session. Finally, in the third experimental condition, the combined treatment causes the simultaneous induction of self- and collective efficacy. The difference between the treatments decomposes the effect of self-efficacy per se (the one manipulated in the first treatment) and the effect of collective efficacy. Appendix B provides sample texts used in experimental interventions.

### *Self-Efficacy*

I use the standard protocol for cognitive-behavioral therapy to increase self-efficacy in the first and third experimental conditions. The intervention combines the manipulation of two interrelated aspects of self-efficacy: self-efficacy itself and internal locus of control.




Figure 1.5: Paper Handouts for Cognitive Intervention

The calibration of individual locus of control is a safety check before the manipulation of self-efficacy. First, and most importantly for the subsequent manipulation of self-efficacy, it reduces frustration by balancing unrealistic expectations. The concept of locus of control refers to the way that individuals attribute the outcomes of their performance to themselves or to external factors. Internal locus of control puts an emphasis on what one can change—what is “within one’s locus of control.” Civic engagement programs seem to boost citizens’ self-esteem without providing them with tools to calibrate their locus of control. As a result, the citizens develop unrealistic expect-

tations for democratic practices [218]. Second, the concept of internal locus of control correlates with higher political and civic engagement [219, 220] and higher political trust [221]. Third, it activates a sense of agency [222, 223] and overcomes learned helplessness in politics, since it is associated with less of a need for strong leadership and authoritarianism and with higher demand for self-governance and independence [224, 225]. Finally, the concept of internal locus of control orients citizens towards their immediate surroundings, reducing the pressure of polarized national politics and priming them to care about their community [226, 227].

With this experiment, respondents began by completing a quick introductory session that acquainted them with the ideas of internal locus of control and self-efficacy. The information was presented in a way that people with no psychological education could understand. At the end of this session, subjects were asked to consider several mundane life situations and decide which of the presented solutions were within the locus of control of the characters involved.

At this point, the treatment turned to the induction of self-efficacy. Respondents were asked to write short reflections (on a provided printed form) about some life concern of their choice (Figure 1.6). Most respondents chose topics related to health improvement, a job change, and family relationships. The form prompted them to outline some realistic solutions to their concern, providing nudges (such as *“What can you feasibly change in this situation?”* and *“How can you improve your control over this situation?”*). Research assistants checked the reflections for completion and accuracy to make sure that the respondents identified the solutions correctly. After that, respondents were asked to reflect upon their past successes and to identify personal strengths that helped them to achieve their goals in similar life situations. The treatment ended with respondents listing the traits of their personality that they are proud of and that help them to reach desirable outcomes in life. The intervention is discussed in detail in Appendix B.1.

To be sure, it is unlikely that this intervention generates a long-lasting cognitive benefit. At the same time, most respondents confessed that they had never thought about their lives through the lens of internal locus of control and high self-efficacy, and they stated that they enjoyed this new perspective.

In this condition, subjects were isolated from each other and did not have a chance to discuss their handouts with anyone but research assistants.

### *Collective Efficacy*

The second treatment primed the subjects regarding collective efficacy. The design of the treatment repeated the structure of the first one, prompting subjects to receive some information on the topic and then reflect on their efficacy in achieving desirable outcomes. At the same time, it focused on supporting the sense of belonging to an active community, sharing the skills for social action, engaging in deliberation, and pursuing public goals in collaboration with peers [117, 145]. Appendix B.2 features the description of the intervention.



Figure 1.6: Visual Material for the Induction of Collective Efficacy

Respondents began by watching four videos made specifically for the experiment by local TV presenters. The videos describe four original and successful real-life initiatives led by local people: a new, transparent system of school budgeting, an innovation in electricity infrastructure, the establishment of a homeowners' association, and a recycling campaign (see Figure B.2 in this section and other examples in Appendix B.2). The videos were designed to project a role model to subjects [144, 145]. After the videos, all respondents filled out a short questionnaire with comprehension questions. The results showed that most of the respondents correctly understood the content of the videos. Specifically, the comprehension rates (the number of correctly answered questions) were 76.8% and 75.3% in the groups that received this treatment. Up to this point,

subjects were isolated from each other.

Following the questionnaire, subjects were invited to a civic brainstorming session, guided by moderators (see Figure B.9). These moderators were recruited from local universities' psychology departments and were trained to lead the brainstorming group discussion. During the session, subjects were prompted to discuss the videos, share their opinion on other local initiatives, and think of potential tools of engagement that they could use to enhance the quality of their lives. The discussions used deliberative practices to improve collective efficacy [228, 229] and induced a growth mindset to prevent respondents from leaning toward negative thinking about past failures [230, 231]. For example, when one of the respondents shared a depressing story of a failed civic initiative, moderators helped respondents to critically evaluate the reasons behind the failure and to identify ways to overcome similar obstacles in the future. Similar to the reflection about personal strengths and successes in the self-efficacy treatment, the collective efficacy treatment incorporated a reflection on community achievements and highlighted the potential for success.

### *Combined*

In the third group, cognitive intervention and a civic brainstorming session were combined. The intervention preceded the civic treatment because it was essential to prime the respondents' efficacy before they were exposed to the information on community efficacy. An alternative design (democratic education before cognitive intervention) would also be appropriate if the researcher is interested in the effect of community potency on individual self-evaluation, but this dynamic is beyond the scope of this study. For this study, this design allowed me to decompose the effects of political information on civic engagement and to detect whether cognitive training provides a mediating mechanism through which democratic education works.

### *Control*

The control group had no cognitive or information intervention. I refrained from administering a placebo treatment because, in this case, it would be difficult to develop a single placebo for both



intervention and education treatments (as they were administered in different formats and ways).

### 1.3.3 Outcome Measures

#### *Intentions*

To differentiate between intended and actual civic engagement, I collect verbal (self-reported) and non-verbal (observed by experimenters) responses. From a psychological standpoint, all of these activities are behavioral [208]. However, I comply with political science conventions by referring to verbal responses as ‘attitudinal’ or ‘intentional’ (as they measure declared attitudes towards the action) and to non-verbal responses as ‘behavioral’.

Based on previous research on civic engagement, I focused on the following civic activities [232, 233, 69]: (1) regular volunteering for a pro-recycling organization; (2) working with others to exert civic control over rigged elections by signing up as an electoral observer; (3) running for a leadership position in a homeowners’ organization; and (4) establishing a civic council (a quasi-formal civic entity that allows for tighter control over public expenditures in municipal organizations).

These four activities were chosen to appeal to various audiences; they range from one-time commitments to regularly scheduled, costly commitments and from politically or socially desirable activities to slightly contentious ones. Appendix B.4 contains specific survey questions used to capture these outcomes.

For a socially desirable one-time activity, I chose the intention to campaign for a recycling program in the region. Pilot work showed that the majority of the local population supports the recycling of plastic, glass, and other reusable materials, and recycling generates virtually no backlash. This non-political and socially important activity was chosen as the easiest test for experimental manipulation.

For a socially contentious one-time activity, I chose the intention to join an electoral commission. Electoral observation is a crucial civic activity for the Southeast of Ukraine. The region is embedded in a wider clientelist network that Ukrainian politicians have actively used to manipu-

late elections. Ensuring the transparency of elections is critical for the survival of democracies in the former Soviet states [234, 235, 216], and civic engagement is essential for preventing electoral fraud and manipulation. Electoral observation is a relatively rare form of civic activism, and it is not yet universally widespread in the region. It requires a commitment to stay on electoral polls and confront the manipulations, but it is a one-time activity because the elections do not happen every day.

For a socially desirable regular activity, I chose the intention to lead a homeowners' organization (OSBB). This organization is a legal public body that can be formed to manage public property and make effective decisions on its exploitation. OSBB is a very hard organization to maintain as it requires significant accumulation of energy, technical, managerial, and financial skills necessary to process the paperwork, to maintain the house and adjoining territory, keep track of the financial income for condominiums, renovate dilapidated housing, raise funds, and control free-riding [236, p.43]. This activity demands substantial time commitment, but it does not entail any direct confrontation with authorities or implicit political significance.

Finally, for a socially contentious time-consuming activity, I chose the intention to establish a civic council<sup>12</sup>. Civic councils are permanent collegial elective public advisory bodies that can be set up to facilitate public participation in public policy. They are legally empowered to exercise public control over the activities of executive authorities; and by law, they “promote public opinion in the formation and implementation of public policy” [237]. Civic councils can be assigned to any public body to control budgetary expenses, advise civil servants, and resolve contentious matters around publicly funded projects such as the purchase of school supplies, infrastructure repair, and waste management.

This set of activities works well for the experiment for several reasons. They represent opportunities for engagement in the region that are non-military (do not allude to the military conflict in Donbas), and they are non-polarizing. The activities are also common, and the information on their implementation is publicly available. The willingness to join these activities is measured with

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<sup>12</sup>Ukrainian: *hromads'ka rada*.

a simple four-point Likert scale from ‘definitely not’ to ‘definitely yes,’ with the direction of the scale randomized across individuals.<sup>13</sup>

Immediately following the survey, and before the discussion, the respondents’ attitudinal outcomes were measured. For the collective efficacy and combined groups, I recorded the behavioral outcome after the group discussion to specifically detect the difference between the treatment effect induced by cognitive intervention, videos, and the combination of the two. At the same time, it should be noted that additional caution is required when interpreting my behavioral measure since it is not possible to distinguish between the separate effect of group discussion and educational videos.

### *Behavior*

To record a behavioral response that would be discreet enough not to be perceived as a response, I developed an informational leaflet in collaboration with local civic activists. Detailed information about the measurement strategy for behavioral responses can be found in Appendix B.5.

The leaflet featured a set of activities potentially available in the region (such as enrolling in an energy-saving program for one’s residential building from a local NGO or participating in a historical conservation program). The description was followed by an easily accessible action plan with steps the respondents would need to undertake to benefit from these programs. The leaflets were left on a separate table, and subjects could take the leaflets on their way out from the site of the discussion. We specifically told them that “the leaflets contain useful information about the opportunities for civic activism” in their city and that they “might consider circulating them with [their] friends and family.” The respondents were not asked about the exact number of leaflets they took, but my research assistants recorded it discreetly.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>13</sup>I measure the intentions to run for political office and discuss the effect of self- and collective efficacy on political participation in the third chapter.

<sup>14</sup>Although some respondents, being especially excited about what they learned during the experiment, became interested in sharing this information beyond their inner circle, and therefore requested a specific number of leaflets (usually some round number such as 40 or 50). Also, many respondents were seen or heard counting the number of leaflets they needed (e.g., “one for me, one for my colleague, three for my neighbors...”), so sometimes we could learn the exact number from them directly.

This behavioral response is meaningful in several ways. First, subjects were explicitly informed of the content of the leaflets and had a chance to examine the leaflets closely before committing to taking them. Some did just that, finding no use in taking the leaflets home. Most respondents, however, found the provided information on engagement opportunities valuable enough to circulate it to others. The act of taking a leaflet is thus a useful indication of initial interest in civic engagement programs. Second, taking more than one leaflet implies a stronger commitment to spreading useful information among friends and neighbors, and this social initiative is a crucial proxy for successful civic engagement. Moreover, taking leaflets might have been perceived as distributing a form of patronage resource<sup>15</sup> to immediate connections (and thus, the increase of self-efficacy or collective efficacy would be making respondents more willing to step up as a patron who distributes a resource [238]). Third, the response was completely spontaneous. The subjects knew that the experiment was over, and they were no longer expected to “comply” with the experiment’s rules. Thus, this act of civic commitment is a sensible proxy for a sincere intention to participate in a civic activity.

#### 1.3.4 Treatment Assignment

I recruited 1,381 respondents for the experiment after piloting the questionnaire without tracking the outcome measures. The subjects were recruited through three recruitment channels: (1) random demographically weighted recruitment on streets; (2) personal invitations distributed through mailing lists provided by local social activists; and (3) targeted online recruitment by way of social media. The resulting sample is more female than the general population (57.8% compared to 52.1%) and close to the population median of age (40.3 compared to 40.4). Linguistically, the sample is representative of Southern Ukraine<sup>16</sup>. The sample is diverse enough to detect heterogeneous treatment effects (Appendix A.1).

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<sup>15</sup>I am grateful to Jessica Pisano for suggesting this interpretation.

<sup>16</sup>16.4% of respondents speak Ukrainian as their preferred language, the rest are native speakers of Russian. 53.8% of the sample use both languages equally in their family. The languages that were actually practiced by respondents during the experiment, reported as their mother tongue (or one of their mother tongues), or used in their families do not induce heterogeneous effects of the treatments on either outcome.

A blocked randomization protocol was used on-the-spot to assign respondents to one of four blocks. These blocks were formed based on respondents' age and gender, reducing sampling variability and increasing the precision of ATE estimates (Appendix A.6). Chart A.1 summarizes the flow of the subjects from recruitment to treatment assignment. In addition, the treatment is balanced along other covariates (Appendix A.5).

As to the logistics of the experiment, the study was administered in seven locations – five in rural or suburban areas and two in the center of Kherson. All respondents received monetary compensation at the end of the survey. The experiment was set in a lab-in-the-field, and the treatment assignment resulted in the reception of the treatment by all subjects. Subjects had personal ID cards with a masked group identifier during the experiment, ruling out the possibilities of mistakenly treating a subject from the control condition or failing to administer the treatment to those in treated conditions.

### 1.3.5 External Validity

At first glance, the experimental manipulation of efficacy might appear quite far from real-world processes. I claim, however, that external validity of such intervention is sufficiently high and self- and collective efficacy do increase in response to real-life social and political transformations. In fact, young democracies such as Ukraine experience a rapid change in the individual efficacy of their citizens every time they democratize [239]. The costs of civic action are defined externally by legal restrictions and informal contracts (i.e., the possibility to arrange a non-violent rally without being detained by the police or the possibility to establish a civic association without preliminary permissive negotiations with government officials). These costs might change within a short period of time. For instance, they could change when a new democratic government comes to power and abolishes restrictive regulations of the Ancien Régime. Subsequent collective democratic empowerment is exogenous for most people in the sense that they have no control over the time or the exact way that the new government abolishes restrictive rules.<sup>17</sup> Civic engagement, on

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<sup>17</sup>For instance, democratization has an exogenous one-off effect on social outcomes such as infant mortality [240].

the contrary, is endogenous and idiosyncratic. By definition, it is impossible to civically engage people without their explicit consent.

## 1.4 Empirical Results

### 1.4.1 Model Estimation

I estimate intent-to-treat effects with a linear model:

$$Y_{i,j} = \gamma_1 * Self_i + \gamma_2 * Collective_i + \gamma_3 * Combined_i + X_i\lambda + \mu_j + \epsilon_{i,j}$$

where  $Y_{i,j}$  is an outcome measure, measured with a linear regression; the Self, Collective and Combined variables are treatment indicators of self-efficacy, collective efficacy, and combined treatments respectively;  $X_i$  is a vector of covariates which includes gender, language, education, age, and socioeconomic status;  $\mu_j$  is a block randomization dummy; and  $\epsilon_{i,j}$  is a disturbance term. The  $i$  subscript stands for individual subjects, the  $j$  subscript stands for blocks. The received treatments are the fact of the receipt of self-, collective, or both self- and collective efficacy intervention. Since the de-facto probability of assignment to treatment varies by block, I use inverse probability weights in all model specifications [241, p.76]. The standard errors are robust in all specifications [242].

### 1.4.2 Results

#### *Change in Reported Attitudes*

I start by examining the direct effects of three experimental conditions as they pertain to the respondents' declared intention to take part in four civic activities. Figure 1.7 shows the effect of experimental induction of efficacy on the reported intention to become involved in at least one of four civic activities. The left column shows the outcomes as absolute values and additionally denotes the outcome of the control group. The responses are displayed on a Likert scale from 1 to 4, where '1' is a definite refusal to join a civic activity and '4' is a definite intention to join a

civic activity. The graphs show that the control population was already very sympathetic towards pro-recycling civic campaigning. The least desirable activity in the control group was to lead a homeowners' organization. Complete summary statistics for the mean outcomes in the control group can be found in Table C.1.

The right column shows the estimated average treatment effects on four studied civic activities. As we see, the treatment does not cause any substantial changes. In all cases, the Bell-McCaffrey confidence intervals contain zero (Table C.2) [243]. In the case of electoral observation, the average effects are slightly negative for the self-efficacy treatment when measured by a simple linear regression (Table C.6). This result, however, does not hold true when tested against the sharp null hypothesis of no effect on any unit (see Appendix C.4).

The null effects are robust and confirmed in other model specifications (Appendix C.5). Ultimately, these treatments yielded only insignificant changes to the respondents' intentions to participate in civic activism.

### *Change in Demonstrated Civic Behavior*

The behavioral outcomes, however, deliver a strikingly different result. Figure 1.8 shows the effect of treatment assignment on the number of leaflets with community projects information that respondents took following the experiment. The left column shows the distribution of leaflets in all groups, the right column shows estimated average treatment effects.

In the control group, the mean number of taken leaflets was 2.81 per person. When subjected to the self-efficacy treatment, respondents took an average of 3.58 leaflets per person, 40 being the maximum number taken. A covariate-adjusted average treatment effect is 0.774 leaflets. Randomization inferences performed for the test statistics (in both covariate adjusted and unadjusted models) show that the results are verifiably robust (Figure C.3). Further, the studentized permutation test shows that the p-value of the simulated t-test is 0.01, while the sharp null hypothesis of no effect on any unit is rejected at the 0.01 level (see Appendix C.4). When exposed to an induction of collective efficacy, the subjects took, on average, 1.06 leaflets more than the control group. This



Figure 1.7: Change in Reported Attitudes towards Civic Activities






Figure 1.8: Change in Demonstrated Civic Behavior

result is significant at the 0.001 level (Appendix C.4). Finally, subjects in the combined treatment group took, on average, 1.03 leaflets more per person than their peers in the control group. The effect is significant at the 0.01 level (Appendix C.4).

The confidence intervals for three treatment effect estimates overlap, revealing that there was no statistical difference detected between the size of the three effects (Table C.2 and Table C.3). At the same time, the collective efficacy treatment yields results that are both robust in various specifications and confirmed at a higher level of significance than the self-efficacy and the combined treatments. Moreover, the self-efficacy treatment is marginally significant at the 0.1 level when tested with the Benjamini-Hochberg correction for the false discovery rate and proves insignificant when tested with the Bonferroni and Holm multiple comparison corrections.

### *Intention-Behavior Inconsistency*

The simultaneous absence of change in respondents' declared intentions and a strong positive change in actions is puzzling. At first glance, these results seemingly contradict much of what is known about the role of efficacy in civic engagement and the connection between intention and behavior. Whereas verbal and non-verbal measures frequently travel in different directions [89]—

thus making it essential to obtain both outcomes whenever possible—a *positive* change in a behavioral measure, combined with an *absent* change in attitudinal measures, is a rare phenomenon.

There are several alternative explanations of this phenomenon.

First, these results can be explained through the lens of the theory of planned behavior [208]. The exogenous empowerment increased subjects' perceived behavioral control and thus directly improved their behavior. A change in intention, however, did not happen: the null results are shown to be consistent across all civic measures, thereby proving that there was no experimental change in intention when compared to the control group. The only paths which could, therefore, explain these changes in behavior are the direct effect of perceived behavioral control and the indirect effect that such a change in perceived behavioral control could have caused via a change in the attitudes and subjective norms surrounding civic engagement.

The experimental design separates these two cases. Self-efficacy induction features no civically infused content (Appendix B.1), thus holding attitudes and norms around civic engagement constant. The only possible change in intention for this group would necessarily have had to happen through a change in perceived behavioral control (and, as we know, the change in intention did not happen). Therefore, the only remaining causal path is the direct effect of perceived behavioral control. Conversely, collective and combined groups did receive civic education, and, moreover, the treatment activated their attitudes and subjective norms. However, this did not cause a change in their average civic intentions either.

Second, the discrepancy of actions and intentions might be explained by a different weight that respondents assigned to both treatment outcomes. We know that efficacy is particularly relevant for attaining moderately challenging goals [152]. Given that efficacy affects performance quadratically, they might have considered the intention questions either too easy or too challenging. On the one hand, it might be that the intention questions featured costly intentions and respondents were serious and honest about their commitment to such actions. Some actions might be easier to make than to declare, and this would mean that the treatments only affected cheaper civic actions (i.e., taking a leaflet) and did not change costlier actions (i.e., declaring a commitment to join a

homeowners' association). On the other hand, it might also be the case that respondents considered the intentions *too easy* to declare. In this case, respondents believed that taking a leaflet and sharing it with their neighbors is a moderately challenging goal, and the declaration of intentions is an easy one.

Finally, questions about intentions were framed as hypotheticals (“*If you had some free time, would you consider joining X?*”). The conditional clause was added to make the question relatable even for those respondents who do not have time for such actions. Respondents, however, might have skipped the hypothetical part and focused on the time commitment entailed by the activities instead of thinking about their general attitudes about them.

Thus, these results do not provide clear-cut evidence either for or against intention-behavior inconsistency. For instance, the dispersion of treatment outcomes shows that while there was an average increase in the number of leaflets taken in all experimental conditions, it does not seem like either the control group or any treatment group displays a visible connection between the number of projects they intended to pursue and the number of leaflets taken. Future work might feature specific dyads of intentions and actions (one specific activity for both survey answers and behavioral responses) and suggest a wider array of questions to measure intentions. These changes would allow testing if respondents indeed perceived that the questions about intentions require a higher commitment than taking a leaflet.

### *Heterogeneous Treatment Effects*

Experimental interventions might have caused a heterogeneous effect on respondents' intentions to join in civic activity. To examine the heterogeneity of these effects, I have run a predictive model based on generalized random forests [244, 245]. Causal forests provide individual-level predicted estimates of treatment effects and further demonstrate whether the null effect on intentions is caused by a dispersion of treatment effects or rather a lack of effect altogether. I used all available pre-test covariates to build a causal forest (N=149) and subsequently train each model on a randomly drawn percentage of each sample (train models use 60% and test models use 40% of

initial samples for each experimental group).

Figure 1.9 shows the spread of individual-level predicted treatment effects, measured as a change in the number of leaflets taken. Most of these treatments caused relatively homogeneous effects on actual engagement. The highest observed variability came following a combined efficacy induction, while the lowest observed variability presented in the collective efficacy condition. This difference is explained by the presence of outliers in the combined group (few people took a large number of leaflets, and their predicted effects are visible in wide confidence intervals) and the complexity of the treatment. Note that the results confirm alternative estimations of treatment effects—that combined and collective treatments are more robust than self-efficacy treatment and also have a potentially stronger effect if we were to compare the upper bounds of their 95% confidence intervals.




Figure 1.9: Generalized Random Forests: Predicted Treatment Effects (Leaflets)

Figure 1.10 uses the same causal forest models to predict individual-level heterogeneous treatment effects for the number of declared intentions (please consult Appendix C.6 to access the results for each of the outcome variables). Here, three insights are especially intriguing. First, both collective and self-efficacy treatments present relatively homogeneous results, whereas the

combined treatment group demonstrates a higher degree of heterogeneity. This pattern is apparently visible in both verbal and non-verbal outcomes. Second, while the predicted outcomes for collective and self-efficacy groups are consistently spread around zero, some predicted effects for combined group subjects ended up in the negative zone. For some subjects in this group, the treatment might have actually had a *discouraging* effect on their expression of preferences. The estimated average treatment effect based on the forest estimates is  $-0.12$  for the combined group, suggesting that the intense double treatment might have actually discouraged subjects from expressing an intention to participate in civic activities. Finally, combined efficacy induction proves to be the treatment inducing the highest heterogeneity, mostly because it was designed to interact with a wider set of potential covariates (C.5).




Figure 1.10: Generalized Random Forests: Predicted Treatment Effects (Intentions)

These results suggest the following preliminary conclusions. First, the change in efficacy does not unilaterally affect intention and behavior towards civic engagement. Contrary to widespread stereotypes concerning the potential difficulties in affecting changes in behavior, a change in behavior, given an experimental setting with a well-controlled manipulation of varied planned human behaviors, might actually be attainable.

Second, all types of efficacy matter for individual civic engagement. Against expectations, self-efficacy and collective efficacy do not dramatically differ in their effect on civic engagement. The difference between average treatment effects resulting from the induction of self-efficacy, collective efficacy, and their combined version is negligible.

Finally, given a substantial difference in treatment induction, it makes sense to reconsider the literature regarding the facets of individual efficacy. The boundaries between collective and self-efficacy in the context of civic activism might be more blurred than we used to think.

## 1.5 Limitations

The interpretation of these results should be made with several limitations in mind.

One limitation of the experiment is the degree to which we can rely on the declared verbal responses in a political context with a long recent history of authoritarian rule. Even if the respondents experienced a change in their self-evaluation, they may have refrained from disclosing these changes altogether [78]. It is important to reiterate that respondents *were not aware of the recording of the results of the behavioral response*, as they were never directly asked about the number of leaflets they took, while they expected the results of the attitudinal survey to be “stored somewhere”. There is a chance that they might have suspected these results to be shared with political parties or local bosses (a widely shared concern that I tried to address while implementing the experiment). In this context, the behavioral measure might be the only measure that was not internally falsified.

Another limitation considers the so-called Hawthorne effect. The only authorities present at the experimental sites were experimenters themselves. Respondents might have felt obligated to take more leaflets the more time they spent with the experimenters. If that was true, then the control group subjects would have taken more leaflets the longer they stayed on experimental locations. In fact, though, the effect that time spent with experimenters may have had on the respondents was revealed to be the opposite. Rather, those who spent a longer time with the experimenters took fewer leaflets at the end of the survey (Table C.7). If time correlated positively with more leaflets

taken, we would also observe a sharper difference in treatment effects between the combined group and the other two groups because the respondents in the combined condition took a longer time to complete their tasks. This difference is not observed either.

While research assistants did their best to clearly communicate the content of the leaflets, it is possible that subjects did not intend to link the number of leaflets taken to participation in civic engagement projects. Instead, they might have merely expressed a determination to *share* the leaflets with their friends and family. That would mean that while they did not experience a change in their *own* interest in civic engagement projects, they nevertheless did experience a boost of confidence in influencing the behavior of *others*. While this shift might not be ideal from the hypothesis testing perspective, the spread of information about social projects might be considered a civic activity on its own. In fact, these actions imply a social dimension of civic engagement, because sharing the leaflet with friends and neighbors is a social activity while signing up for something on their own is not. Moreover, the blurred boundaries between individualism and collectivism previously detected in qualitative studies might be manifested in the experimental findings as an insignificant difference between the effects of self- and collective efficacy[10].

Finally, this experiment does not cover all possible types of costly civic actions and it does not study non-normative civic action. For example, I do not focus on violent protests or other types of contentious mobilization. I assume that the effect of individual and collective efficacy in such actions would be similar to the actions discussed in the study, but other psychological pathways—identity- and emotion-based—will be more pronounced than in normative civic action.

## **1.6 Discussion**

The results confirmed the main hypothesis of the comparable effect of self- and collective efficacies on civic intentions and actions. Given that other experimental studies found similarly indistinguishable effects of different facets of political efficacy [131], we might suggest that various types of efficacy do not differ in their effect on civic behavior. This conclusion challenges several decades of observational psychological studies and suggests that empirically, it makes little sense

to separate different types of efficacy. We also did not find any mediating effects of collective efficacy that were previously assumed in some observational data.

The manipulation of self-efficacy did change civic actions, confirming Hypothesis 2. Hypotheses 3 and 4 are only partially confirmed, as the change in civic intentions did not happen in any condition. This means that individuals might indeed commit pro-democratic civic action without necessarily *intending* to be good citizens. Most people do not have specifically defined opinions on the importance of civic cooperation, electoral observation, or effective management of public property. Thus, individuals with high perceived behavioral control may engage in civic activities irrespective of their actual civic attitudes.

These findings have important implications for research on democratic development and consolidation. This research avenue is characterized by a lack of experimental investigation of micro-level democratic learning. This chapter fills in the gaps by showing that civic intentions and attitudes might change more slowly than practices and that democracy consolidates through action. In other words, democratic culture is built by providing opportunities for people to engage in various civic activities rather than inculcating democratic values through civic education and top-down democracy promotion. These findings provide strong empirical support to the literature on democratic learning and suggest that it might be even more behaviorally driven than the research has implied so far [84, 85]. This way, civic skill formation becomes a harbinger of the evolution of democratic institutions. This is consistent with recent observational studies that demonstrate how the experience of living in democracy itself endogenously forms pro-democratic preferences [86, 87, 88].

The experiment has essential implications for understanding the effects of interventions directed at improving civic action in Ukraine. In the real world, individuals in democratizing states are exposed to new civic opportunities on a daily basis. The results of the experiment suggest that this exposure results in long-term civic commitments if available opportunities for engagement are easily accessible and moderately challenging. Citizens seem to be attracted by a moderately difficult opportunity to engage, and put off by abstract activities that entail a longer commitment of



energy and time. Moreover, high individual efficacy might circumvent the lack of clearly defined favorable attitudes toward civic behavior. These findings add some optimism in the perspectives of democratic learning in post-Soviet states [40].

The experiment exhibits several methodological innovations. It is the first randomized controlled trial that targets civic culture in a post-Soviet country. Unlike most previous experiments, I manage to measure both declared intentions and expressed actions. Finally, I induce a sense of self- and collective efficacy by implementing a series of cognitive and behavioral interventions that involve personal or collective empowerment through cognitive therapy, role modeling, and civic education. The random assignment of efficacy allows me to detect if self-efficacy and collective efficacy actually cause any change in individual civic intentions and actions.

Future research might shed light on these findings by including a wider range of behavioral measures and providing a deeper qualitative assessment of the respondents' perception of the questions about intentions. Also, it would be helpful to specifically target those individuals who would like to self-enroll in the experiment to improve their civic involvement or overcome activist burnout. The current intervention is unlikely to last long because subjects did not know what exactly they were recruited for (they were aware that the study was an academic experiment in political psychology and that they might be asked to complete certain cognitive tasks and exercises). Moreover, future studies might additionally identify the conditions under which respondents tend to overact (without declaring intentions) rather than overpromise (without delivering politically or civically valuable actions such as anti-corruption punishment [89]). Finally, it might be the case that the relative role of self- and collective efficacy vary across political domains and national cultures [246, p.140].

## **1.7 Conclusion**

This chapter identifies the psychological pathways to civic engagement during democratic consolidation based on a cognitive-behavioral experiment that randomly targets self- and collective efficacy of 1,381 subjects in Southern Ukraine. The experiment was designed to improve subjects'

intention to participate in civic activities such as electoral observation, activism in a homeowners' association, a pro-recycling waste management campaign, establishment of a civic council, and their actual engagement in spreading information about these civic opportunities.

The experiment delivers counterintuitive results that go against most theoretical expectations and previous observational data. The induction of efficacy does not unilaterally affect intentions and behavior towards civic engagement. While most subjects did not diverge from the control group in their declared intention to participate in civic activism, they de facto expressed a stronger behavioral response. Similarly, against expectations, self-efficacy and collective efficacy did not dramatically differ in terms of their effect on civic engagement. The boundaries between self-efficacy and collective efficacy in the context of civic activism might be more blurred than we usually think.

These results provide a strong causal test of the theory of democratic learning and challenge those scholarly approaches that overemphasize the importance of declared principles and attitudes. The direct way to improve civic engagement (or prevent its erosion) is to ensure behavioral freedoms and allow people to exercise various civic opportunities rather than targeting beliefs and intentions about actions.

Ultimately, the main takeaway of this study is that self- and collective efficacies are interchangeable in the development of civic engagement. Collective efficacy is not the only way to boost civic involvement in weak democracies. Moreover, cognitive changes might not be happening directly after democratization, and individuals might respond to changes in a democratic environment with the update in actions rather than beliefs. The focus on changing behavioral habits might be a better way to detect subtle behavioral changes that are not yet visible in explicitly declared political preferences.

## Chapter 2: Openness

### 2.1 Introduction

Personality affects political behavior. Abundant evidence from Western data links traits like openness to experience, introversion, and neuroticism to a liberal political orientation, while conservatives are found to be less open to experience, more conscientious, and more agreeable<sup>1</sup> [249, 250, 251]. These associations, however, often do not replicate beyond established Western democracies. Recent cross-national studies demonstrate drastic variation in the effects of personality on political attitudes [2, 3]. Still, we know surprisingly little about the mechanisms behind personality–environment interactions and thus can neither make sense of changing Western political landscapes nor adequately use the personality theory of politics to predict political preferences in non-Western countries.

Previous research suggests that personality affects political attitudes by predisposing people to certain policies. Contrary to prior findings, this chapter suggests that personality predicts individual attitudes toward the status quo rather than toward specific policies. I illustrate this logic by addressing one of the most counterintuitive associations of personality traits and political attitudes—the bond of openness to experience and conservatism in Eastern Europe [5, 252, 253]. Previous theories treated this counterintuitive association as an outlier, an exception that proves the rule. Instead, I argue that it is the combination of openness to experience and liberalism that is truly exceptional because it stems from decades of political and economic stability in Western democracies. Open-

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<sup>1</sup>These traits—Openness to Experience, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Emotional Stability—form “the Big Five” traits classification. This classification emerged inductively from factor analyses of personality traits performed on Western data in the 1950s–1980s. The first factor, Extraversion, refers to such traits as sociability, assertiveness, gregariousness, and warmth. Agreeableness refers to conformity, compliance, altruism, and trust. Conscientiousness contains such personal traits as will, dutifulness, competence, and achievement striving. Openness to Experience refers to novelty-seeking, curiosity, breadth of interests, and excitability [247, 1, 248]. Finally, Emotional Stability refers to low levels of neuroticism, anxiety, impulsiveness, and hostility.

ness to experience predicts openness to *any* novel experience that credibly challenges the status quo, and in some contexts, this experience entails support for right-leaning parties. By addressing these blind spots in the personality theory of politics, this chapter questions the universality of personality effects and contributes to the study of personality–environment interactions, providing an improved understanding of the political consequences of personality traits [6, p.91].

The main finding of the chapter is that, contrary to previous evidence, openness to experience in Eastern Europe predicts *both* social liberalism and social conservatism, while conscientiousness—a typical predictor of *conservative* political attitudes in Western countries—is associated with economic *liberalism*. Those open to experience are on average more responsive to any policy suggestion that revises the current state of affairs. Conscientiousness, on the other hand, prompts individuals to carefully evaluate the potential costs that the revision of the current status quo entails.

Theoretical explanations for the variability of personality–environment interactions are scarce. For instance, Fatke shows that the effect of openness to experience on economic policy preferences varies according to the level of democratic and human development [3, p. 892]. However, he does not suggest a specific theory that would explain why conscientiousness serves as a conservative trait in most political domains, while openness does not. In a similar vein, Weinschenk demonstrates with the example of 24 countries in the Western Hemisphere from the 2010 wave of the AmericasBarometer Study that personality traits have varied effects on voter turnout and political participation [7]. Weinschenk notes that the diverse effect of personality on political engagement might be explained by historical legacies, but does not provide specific explanations, considering them beyond the scope of his cross-national descriptive analysis. Finally, the level of WEIRDness<sup>2</sup> moderates most of the important associations between personality traits and ideology, economic preferences, and moral foundations, thus challenging some previous research that did not account for the country’s level of economic and political development [1, 4]. This relationship, however, entails unresolved endogeneity issues, because the connection between democracy and openness

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<sup>2</sup>Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic countries.

to experience runs in both directions, and countries where societies are high in average openness to experience tend to have more democratic institutions even controlling for potential confounders [2].

Thus, while there is growing evidence of the variability of personality–environment interactions across the globe, we lack an in-depth assessment of the mechanisms behind this interaction, particularly in non-Western cases. By foregrounding Ukraine’s political context, I explain why conservatism and liberalism in Eastern Europe correspond to a different set of personality values and expose the mechanisms behind their interaction. The focus on one particular country provides a couple of important methodological benefits: it allows for an in-depth examination of political preferences and traits while holding political institutions constant, and it allows for a nuanced examination of how personality traits shape political behaviors [7, p.1419].

Caprara and Vecchione point out that “a broad debate on the personalization of politics is long overdue,” and personal characteristics of individuals are as important as their group identities and affiliations [5]. I contribute to the personality theory of politics by examining the role of personality in weakly institutionalized political contexts where personality traits are likely to exhibit a direct effect on political preferences (unlike countries such as the United States, where partisan affiliation has a strong moderating effect on personality traits and thus blurs our vision of the interaction between personality and politics [13]). I consider a unique context of Ukraine, where the elites are not ideologically consistent and political parties do not have strong bonds with any specific electorate. As a result of political turmoil in Ukraine and the exile of a large fraction of the political elite including former President Yanukovich, the Russian-speaking East effectively lost its political leadership. The region has lower turnout rates than the rest of the country and shows record rates of political and civic abstention. I leverage this political situation to explore the effect of personality traits on political orientations for those groups which lack official institutional representation.

The primary methodological contribution of this paper is the use of qualitative coding to estimate political preferences. Since personality effects vary across political contexts, we cannot

adequately evaluate them while using the same questions as those used to generate Western data, because the items would not exhaustively capture context-specific effects. Thus, I combine standard survey questions with political ideologies reconstructed from open-ended responses. I invite respondents to openly discuss the issues of their immediate political concern and then reconstruct their political ideologies from these responses. The open coding shows that the ideological dimensions of Ukrainian citizens differ from the usual two-dimensional ideological space. The comparison of personality effects, as detected in standard inventories and reconstructed ideologies, shows that respondents cannot adequately express their ideological beliefs on a rigid scale that researchers usually provide them with; it also shows that individuals can combine socially liberal and socially conservative values. These nuanced ideological profiles would have never been detected if the respondents were forced to self-locate either on the left or on the right side of political spectrum.

Moreover, I expand our understanding of personality effects beyond convenience samples. Most studies of personality traits in Ukraine do not extend beyond college students or their social network. For instance, Van Hiel and Kossowska use students and their circles, while Schmitt et al. use student samples [14, 15]. This chapter is based on a large, demographically representative sample that covers Ukrainian citizens aged between 18 to 83, and thus the effects detected in the sample feature the effects of personality that might be observed in the general population.

This chapter unfolds in the following way. First, I explain why the personality–environment associations remain largely unaddressed in the political psychology literature. Second, I focus on the phenomenon of the reversed Eastern European association between openness to experience and liberalism and explain why the political effects of personality traits in Ukraine present a hard test for the personality theory of politics. Third, I examine the effect of personality traits on social liberalism, social conservatism, economic liberalism, economic conservatism, support for government reform, attitudes towards seminal political events, and voting preferences. Finally, I highlight future directions for personality–environment research.

## 2.2 Personality–Environment Interaction in Eastern Europe

### 2.2.1 Personality in Non-Western Political Contexts

There are at least three possible reasons behind the failure to replicate the associations found in Western data in other cross-national samples [2, 3].

First, the pioneering papers on the personality theory of politics did not address the potential interaction of personality and environment. The seminal paper by Jost and colleagues on political conservatism as motivated social cognition emphasizes the connection between individual threat perception and the preference for conservative policies [254]. Right-wing ideology is embraced because “it serves to reduce fear, anxiety, and uncertainty; to avoid change, disruption, and ambiguity; and to explain, order, and justify inequality among groups and individuals” [254, p. 340]. This passage is embedded in the Western political context, where conservatives indeed historically opposed social and economic redistribution since the French Revolution [75].

Second, it is unclear to what extent the left–right or liberal–conservative distinction has the same meaning across political contexts [5, p.122]. Analogs of Western liberals and conservatives can be found in any context if we believe that this distinction is ingrained in human biology and those with a higher perception of threats are naturally leaning toward conservation rather than exploration [255, 256]<sup>3</sup>. Even if being true, this distinction is too broad to be helpful; what is the “old” to be conserved and what is the “new” to be embraced vary across political contexts. Few traits affect political behavior unilaterally, regardless of political contexts and other individual socio-economic parameters.

Third, the real drivers of individual ideology are rooted in the interaction between individual predispositions and specific social environments and contexts [258, 256, 259]. To uncover the causal effects of personality predispositions on political preferences, we need to pay closer attention to environmental factors that condition the realization of these predispositions. This much-needed research avenue has not enjoyed sufficient attention, because the majority of cross-national

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<sup>3</sup>Although previous findings about the genetic origins of human conservatism do not seem to replicate [257].

studies do not dive deeply enough into the null effects of personality traits on political preferences in non-Western contexts [3].

### 2.2.2 Atypical Patterns in Eastern European Traits

Eastern European political preferences are a hard test for the personality theory of politics. Previous studies suggested a inverted association between openness to experience and liberalism in the Eastern European context, thus challenging the theories that explain ideological preferences through the selection of political values suitable for one's motivated cognition [254]. Additionally, cross-national studies that include Eastern European countries demonstrate that the associations between personality traits, political values, and political behavior that were confirmed in Western and non-communist contexts do not necessarily replicate in Eastern European data.

In this chapter, I review theoretical explanations behind non-Western patterns of political outcomes of personality traits and test their explanatory power against evidence from Ukraine. I use the case-study approach to isolate country-specific mechanisms that are responsible for the atypical political outcomes of Eastern European personality traits. Ukraine is a particularly fitting case for the hard test. It is an outlier in most cross-national studies [5], and there has been no detailed explanation of why this might be the case. The explanations that do address Eastern European trait association patterns overemphasize long-term factors (i.e., historical background, communist legacies) instead of paying closer attention to how various personality traits meet individual demand for belongingness and provide mental shortcuts for political orientation. Ukraine has been also going through rapid political changes, and thus we can trace the direct effects of personality traits on political preferences in a context in which the relative effect of partisanship or rigid institutional structures on political ideologies is negligible.

#### *Openness to Experience*

In Western data, openness to experience is strongly associated with liberalism [254]. In the US context, openness to experience is associated with higher levels of political engagement and po-



litical knowledge [260], and with individual support for the Democratic Party [248]. Openness to experience is found to be linked to a liberal political orientation (social liberalism) and high preference for redistribution (economic liberalism) [249, 260]. In the Western European context, those open to experience prefer pro-environmental and post-materialist policies [261]. They tend to oppose populist leaders and are more influenced by political discussion [262, 250]. Thus, in Western countries, openness to experience predicts high political engagement, high political competence, and social and economic liberalism.

In Western samples, the effect of openness on specific policy preferences is moderated by partisan affiliation [13], racial identity [260], and individual income [263]. Johnston, Lavine, and Federico find that openness to experience predicts opinions on redistribution, but strength of political engagement and partisanship moderate this effect. Among politically disengaged citizens, personality traits directly predict political preferences. Those who are less open to experience (i.e., more vulnerable to risk and uncertainty) prefer to be secured by a social safety net to obtain the degree of social and economic security that they need. On the other hand, for politically engaged Americans, personality serves as a political self-selection mechanism: engaged citizens “organize themselves into parties by personality” [13, p.4]. Those who are politically engaged and less open to experience prefer Republicans on personality grounds, and thus, counterintuitively, back up their political leaders in their demands for lower levels of economic redistribution. Similarly, in Western European data, low income moderates the association between economic ideology and openness to experience [263].

In Eastern European data, openness has a weaker association with political orientation, and in some countries predicts conservative views [264, p.53]. Thorisdottir, Jost, Liviatan, and Shrout find that the effect of cognitive closure and need for security on political liberalism varies in Western and Eastern Europe [252, p.176]. They also find that non-cognitive predictors of political conservatism in Western Europe (such as traditionalism and rule-following) make Eastern Europeans lean left socially but do not affect their economic policy views. Other studies, however, do find an association between individual-level need for closure, traditionalism, and economic liberalism

[265, 253], thus giving further evidence for the mixed and conflicting association of individual openness to experience and political, social, and economic liberalism in Eastern Europe.

### *Conscientiousness*

In Western data, conscientiousness predicts political conservatism [266]. In the U.S. context, it is associated with social and economic conservatism, lower demand for redistribution, and lower interest in politics [249, 260]. In Western European contexts, those higher in conscientiousness are more supportive of populist parties [262], endorse economic conservatism [263], and take part in civic engagement when they consider civic activities meaningful [6].

There are few specific studies on conscientiousness in Eastern Europe, but openness to experience is apparently a better predictor of political conservatism than conscientiousness [267]. At the same time, Putin supporters in Russia have high levels of conscientiousness [268], although it is unclear which parts of his political project are the most appealing to them.

### *Extraversion*

Studies deliver mixed results on the effects of extraversion, agreeableness, and emotional stability on political behavior in WEIRD countries. In the US data, extraverts are found to be slightly more conservative in general, slightly more socially conservative, and support less redistributive political preferences [249]. However, earlier studies found that some extraverted traits such as life-loving and sensation-seeking are associated with political liberalism [266, p.816]. Eastern Europe has among the highest extraversion levels in the world [15, p.198], but evidence for the effect of extraversion on political preferences is mostly absent [267].

### *Agreeableness*

Agreeable people in the US data are slightly more inclined to prefer conservative policies and vote for socially conservative but economically liberal politics. Gerber, Huber, Doherty, and Dowling associate agreeableness with social conservatism, economic liberalism, partisanship, and

lower political competence [249]. In Germany, agreeableness is associated with favorable opinions about socially and economically liberal parties such as the Greens and the SPD and disapproval of right-wing parties [269]. In other Western European contexts, agreeable people oppose populist politicians—a trend that has been explained by the congruency model of political preferences (individuals sympathize with those politicians who resemble their own personality traits) (see [262, p.303] and [270]).

In Eastern Europe, on the other hand, agreeableness is associated with support for populist politicians. Greene and Robertson find that President Putin supporters in Russia are more agreeable than those who did not vote for him [268]. The interpretation of these results, however, should be cautious, because in authoritarian contexts important political contenders are not allowed to participate in elections, and agreeable people might simply be the most susceptible to preference falsification when it comes to public polls and survey answers. While Greene and Robertson claim that authoritarians should be more “agreeable,” an alternative interpretation of this finding would link agreeableness with political trends: agreeable people support whatever the mainstream is. This political fluidity of agreeable people makes sense if we view them as those who try to stick to the political mainstream as they understand it. This sensitivity to mainstream trends explains why agreeableness is one of the most context-specific personality traits: “agreeableness is clearly and strongly moderated toward more liberal social attitudes in democratic systems, and in fact more conservative attitudes in authoritarian systems” [3, p.895]. I return to this sensitivity to the political mainstream in my analysis of empirical patterns when closely examining personality effects in Ukrainian data, because the interaction between agreeableness and openness to experience is key to understanding the stability of authoritarian and post-authoritarian transformation [271].

### *Emotional Stability and Neuroticism*

Finally, emotional stability is correlated with economic conservatism in Western data, while its antipode – neuroticism – is frequently linked to political and economic liberalism [263]. People with higher emotional stability are more conservative in general, more socially conservative, and

display lower preferences for redistribution [249]. At a state-level, states with people with higher average emotional stability prefer the Republican party, although the mechanism behind this connection is unclear [272]. Some research suggests that emotionally stable people engage in a wider range of political and civic activities because they are more willing to “overcome the natural tendency of most people to discuss politics with close, intimate ties such as family and friends” [250, p.621]. Furnham and Fenton-O’Creevy report an interaction of agreeableness and neuroticism with social class, claiming that class moderates the effect of personality on the left–right self-placement: for higher social class in the UK, higher neuroticism correlates with leaning left, while for lower social class, it correlates with leaning right [273]. In Eastern Europe, emotional stability is a weak predictor of ideological orientation [267, 3].

Table 2.1 summarizes the effects of personality traits on political preferences in Western and Eastern (post-communist) Europe and empirical predictions of the direction of personality effects on liberalism, conservatism, and their economic and social subtypes. As expected, personality traits drive ideological affiliations in diverging directions.

Table 2.1: Prior Data on Western and Eastern European Patterns of Personality Effects

Dimensions	Western Europe			Eastern Europe		
	Left–Right	Social	Economic	Left–Right	Social	Economic
Openness to Experience	Left	Liberal	Liberal	Right	Conservative	Conservative
Conscientiousness	Right	Conservative	Conservative	Right	–	Conservative
Extraversion	Left (UK), Right (US)	Conservative*	Conservative*	–	–	–
Agreeableness	Left	Conservative	Liberal (US)	Right	–	–
Emotional Stability	Right	Conservative	Conservative	–	–	–

\* Weak or inconclusive association.

Although political context affects personality effects in Western and Eastern Europe, it is unclear what the mechanisms behind this effect are. The rest of this chapter examines the competing explanations behind the flipped effects of personality traits on political preferences in the case of Ukraine.

### 2.2.3 The Case of Ukraine

Why do the personality traits of Eastern Europeans exhibit an unusual effect on their political preferences? To explain the Eastern European personality traits associations, scholars have explored three potential mechanisms: (1) the influence of the communist legacy; (2) the variation in the agents of democratization; and (3) the dynamics of post-communist political values. I contribute to this research suggesting a fourth explanation, a cognitive one, that diverts the attention from historical paths and institutionalized politics and instead prioritizes the role of current political trends and personal responses to fluid political changes.

#### *Communist Legacy*

Because of the communist past, *conservative* values in post-communist regimes are expressed as a sympathy towards *left-wing* policies. Thorisdottir and colleagues attribute unique Eastern European empirical patterns to the communist legacy and emphasize the role of egalitarian communist parties in meeting the demand for security. Because communist parties had an explicit egalitarian (i.e., economically liberal) ideological component, those who share post-Soviet nostalgia regret the simultaneous loss of the sense of security and egalitarian economic policies. Their conservative cognitive orientation thus makes them more left-wing [252, p.196]. Kossowska and Van Hiel demonstrated that the need for closure—a cognitive feature that in the Western context is associated with the political right—correlates with left-wing orientation and post-Soviet nostalgia in the post-communist space [253, p.513]. Similarly, Piurko, Schwartz, and Davidov show that preserving the traditional heritage in the post-communist context means restoring or protecting the past order – that is, the socialist past [274, p.542].

The same logic can be traced at the party level. Party structures in Eastern Europe had to develop on different ideological grounds than in Western Europe. Thus, in post-communist countries such as Poland, right-leaning parties adopt left-leaning policies on either economic or social issues [267].

The attention to communist legacy, however, does not account for the fluidity of post-communist

political views and fluctuating ideological preferences after the collapse of the Soviet Union. As Evans and Whitefield show in what may be the first paper that actually addresses the unusual associations of Eastern European traits and political orientations, there were “pronounced differences in the initial character of left and right, but also [...] equally striking changes in its character over time” [275, p.1036]. Tracing Russians’ left–right self-placement, they show that these affiliations dramatically change in the short period from 1993 to 1996, by the end of which a new socio-economic cleavage had been formed to shape the left–right debate.

An alternative micro-level approach looks at the socialization effect of communism. This explanation assumes that top-down ideological labels are less important than the specific generation of people who were socialized in Soviet/communist societies and thus have a different perception of political values and beliefs than their younger compatriots. Roets, Cornelis, and Van Hiel examine the effect of openness to experience on left–right orientation and find a weak negative effect on liberalism (although the effect is not consistent in some years). Importantly, they claim that age plays a moderating role in the effect of personality on political orientation, with people born in 1977 or later demonstrating the same patterns of association between openness to experience and left–right political orientation as respondents in Western samples [264]. The same argument is expressed by Pop-Eleches and Tucker, who suggest that post-communist legacies can be translated through both individual-level memory (socialization, socio-demographic landscapes) and macro-level institutional legacies, and show that years of communist experience correlated with opposition to democracy and capitalism [276, 277].

Finally, another alternative approach in the post-communist family of explanations looks at the cultural and ideological spillover of European political culture that communism prevented. Caprara and Vecchione speculate that, since Ukraine exhibits an even weaker effect of personality on political preferences than Poland and Slovakia, the differences might be explained by Russian political influence and historical isolation from the European intellectual tradition that gave birth to left–right and liberal–conservative ideologies [5, p.134]. This explanation accounts for the strength of European influence and can explain why post-Soviet patterns do not approximate European ones,

but does not account for the shared European heritage and cannot explain the specific direction of the contemporary association patterns.

### *Agents of Democratization*

The second family of explanations suggests a mechanism based on the party structure and the ideological alignment of the main agents of democratization. Kostelka and Rovny examine the structure of political competition in Central and Eastern Europe and suggest that the combination of ethnolinguistic composition and degree of federalization explains why in some countries liberal ideas are expressed by the left (the “Western pattern”) while in others, liberal ideas are endorsed by the right (the “Eastern pattern”) [278]. The key explanation revolves around the agents of democratization—the societal groups who originally demand democratization. In Western Europe, the main challengers of the regime were coming from the left, because the main democratization cleavage concerned redistribution [75]. In Eastern Europe, on the contrary, most of these groups emerged out of nationalist opposition to the Soviet regimes, and thus, these policy contenders had to place themselves to the right of the left status quo and use nationalist rhetoric to distinguish themselves from local communist elites. This process resulted in an ideological alignment of liberalism and right-wing ideologies in such countries as Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. Ukraine also fits the pattern, as the most vocal opposition to the Communist Party of Ukraine was coming from the country’s nationalist underground. Here, the emphasis on Ukrainian identity is used as a way to form a distance from Soviet experience and underscore the national independence from Soviet and Russian influence.

This approach, however, cannot explain the emerging gap between ideological preferences of Ukrainian elites and ideological values endorsed by the society at large. As a recent attempt to match political preferences of Ukrainian elites with the ones shared by average online users shows, while the elites continue to endorse nationalist, statist, or “national-socialist” programs, the rest of society is heavily leaning left [279].<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>Although the sample is not perfectly representative, as it oversamples upper social classes. This suggests that in a representative sample these estimates can be even more pro-socialist and left-leaning.

## *Values Gap*

The third family of explanations challenges the very idea of ideological similarities between Eastern and Western Europe. Van Hiel and Mervielde show that the value that society assigns to economic issues affects the political manifestation of personality traits [247]. Studying the political attitudes of Ukrainians and Poles, Van Hiel and Kossowska argue that “in Eastern European countries such as the Ukraine, it is possible that [right-wing authoritarianism], cultural conservatism, and economic conservatism constitute one single dimension” [14, p.18]. Another critical dimension for Western European politics, the “freedom versus order” dilemma, is not expressed in the same way in non-Western contexts. As Caprara and Vecchione note, in post-communist countries, the values for law, order, and universalism do not contradict each other like they do in European data [5, p.192]. Universalism is not necessarily related to liberalism, and law and order are not immediate political proxies for political conservatism.

What this means practically is that applying a Western ideological framework (be it the left–right distinction or the liberalism–conservatism spectrum) to Eastern Europe’s political context might not work at all since the underlying political cleavages are different. As a result, the predictions of null effects for personality traits might point to something more important than just the lack of effect. As in the classic problem of the drunkard’s search for his lost keys, the effect is present, but somewhere else—not under the street light where researchers are trying to find it [280].

From this perspective, when Piurko, Schwartz, and Davidov suggest that “political ‘right’ and ‘left’ have coherent meanings in both liberal and traditional European countries but not in post-communist countries”, what they actually claim is that political right and left *as it is understood by Western Europeans and North Americans* do not express or manifest themselves in an expected way in the post-communist context [274, p.558]. Political dimensions and values certainly exist beyond WEIRD countries, but their meaning differs from the one that Western scholars try to assign. For instance, the use of openness and conscientiousness as two political ideology predictors reflects the main political conflict in Western countries – between openness to experience and



preservation. These traits are made important by the left–right continuum of Western politics. In Eastern Europe, however, the key political conflict may rather be along the lines of agreeableness and extraversion, because for the most part of its political history, political authorities demanded obedience from civil society.

Thus, it is essential to let these societies speak for themselves and avoid forced ideological self-placement along scales that do not make sense to most respondents. To counteract this tradition of Western-biased ideological self-placement, I combine two different measures of political ideology. The first uses universal survey items of social and economic liberalism and conservatism. The second directly asks respondents about their opinion on political issues and then codes all the variety of open-ended answers into 13 distinct semantic categories.

#### *Current Political Trends in Ukraine*

Most of the explanations reviewed above overemphasize the effects of historical paths and legacies while discounting the influence of current political trends. These trends, however, might be especially important in the case of Ukraine. The country went through a series of political transformations, engaging in multiple regime changes within three decades of independence [194, 179]. In this unstable institutional context, personality traits come to the fore of political behavior. While historical legacies explain available policy choices and partisan ideologies, individual-level reactions are better understood through the fluid individual reaction to current political trends (in the same way that individual threat sensitivity serves as a compass of political identity [251]). Personality traits define how individuals perceive the challenge to the political status quo [254]. Thus, in Western countries, where historically most challengers were coming from the left of the political spectrum, those open to experience were embracing liberal values. However, in those contexts where the status quo is challenged from the right, those open to experience are the first to adapt to the trend.

A simultaneous accounting of for both historical legacies and constraints and current political changes makes more sense when it comes to the political effects of personality traits. The

expression of political preferences is conditioned by existing political institutions and established ideological values; however, in a changing political context, the personality traits serve as political orienteers and facilitate individual navigation of tumultuous political life.

In turbulent political contexts such as Ukraine's, the main political cleavage refers to the need to agree on basic rules of the game and legitimacy of the political system. Thus, personality traits predict the individual response to the changing political trends. For instance, openness to experience predicts a prompt and supportive response to the revision of the status quo. With Ukrainian society leaning toward more nationalist policies, those higher in openness to experience are the first to embrace the trend, while in Europe and the US, openness to experience usually corresponds to less nationalist and more globalist attitudes, corresponding to the recent societal trend in these countries.

Conscientiousness is associated with endorsement of the status quo and resistance to policy extremes on social issues. Depending on the extremity of the status quo challenger, it might predict both moderate policies and any ideological status quo consensus. Agreeableness is a perfect mainstream proxy – those who are very high in agreeableness are likely to be active supporters of the current political regime, and the nature of the regime is reflected in their specific political orientations and preferences. Extraversion, as Caprara and Vecchione show, is a conservative/right-leaning version of agency, and thus it should predict right-wing orientations when the sense of agency is violated by excessive government regulation or social pressure [5, p.82]. Neuroticism in a turbulent political environment might increase the demand for political and social stability, thus potentially increasing the demand for economic safety (economic liberalism).

This approach allows us to formulate predictions for those personality effects that were not yet covered in the empirical literature. Openness to experience should be associated with a conservative political orientation in Ukraine and predict social conservatism (traditionalism, demand for order, and nationalism). Conscientiousness should be associated with moderate status quo and pragmatic avoidance of political extremes. In Ukraine, these attitudes would be linked to moderate social and economic policy proposals without extreme endorsements of either social liberalism or

social conservatism. Extraversion should predict individual resistance to quasi-socialist policies (social welfare). Agreeableness should be associated with support for the political mainstream and current political regime. Finally, neuroticism should predict higher demand for economic security and a social safety net (social liberalism).

## **2.3 Identification Strategy**

### 2.3.1 Participants

The sample includes 1,381 adults recruited from Southern Ukraine. As discussed in the first chapter, Southern Ukraine displays typical patterns of post-Soviet political and economic culture, which facilitates the comparison of the results from this sample to the ones reported by Greene and Robertson [268]. The sample is demographically representative of the region. All respondents used computers. Individual technical assistance was made available upon request. The respondents had full command over the language of the survey and chose their preferred language themselves. Most respondents used the same language in their self-selected computer settings, survey questionnaire, and open-ended answers.

### 2.3.2 Measures

Personality traits are measured with the Ten Item Personality Inventory [281].

Recovering political preferences of the respondents from their electoral choices is nonsensical as 71% of the sample either did not vote, or could not vote due to internal displacement from the ATO zone, or did not disclose their voting choice. To reconstruct their policy preferences, I use three measures of political affiliation: the liberalism–conservatism scale from the Pew Research Center survey questions; self-reported information on voting in elections (or abstention) and political events of the past; and open-ended data on the subjective salience of various political and social issues that I manually coded to infer their political orientations.

To reconstruct actual policy preferences, I asked respondents a set of open-ended questions on their primary policy priorities if they were hypothetically elected the President of Ukraine or

city head of their locality. The answers were manually coded and classified into 13 independent categories that cover an exhaustive range of the issues that respondents cared about (Table 2.2). By design, this classification shows both the salience of specific issues and their relative priority to the respondents.

I proceed by collapsing these categories into six groups (Table 2.3). The first is labeled as **social liberalism** and includes all categories that mention human rights, equal rights for women, and the disabled, support for political prisoners, free speech, minority rights (such as same-sex marriage), a better quality of education, and political equality. The second one is labeled as **economic liberalism** and is assigned to all responses that mention social benefits such as pensions, social welfare, fellowships, free education, free healthcare, monetary transfers to the poor. The third is labeled as **social conservatism**, where I include all responses that mention traditional values (family, religion), Ukrainian nationalist policies (the legal ban on other languages, religious reform, nationalist education policies), demand for a strong leader, the strengthening of the armed forces, and demand for order. The fourth one labels all categories related to the endorsement of the free market, business-friendly environment, flat tax rates, and improvement of the investment climate as **economic conservatism**. Finally, two remaining groups cannot be adequately mapped on the left–right continuum since they refer to the quality of government and state capacity. As Feldman and Johnston demonstrate, political attitudes cannot be reduced to a single dimension, and thus I pay special attention to those categories that were generated by respondents and endorsed as important policy issues [282, p.338]. I label all suggestions for institutional reforms, anti-corruption regulation, and the change in elites and establishment as **reformist** ideology, and all suggestions for property confiscation, capital punishment for corruption, assassinations, and cleansing of political enemies (be it civil servants, oligarchs, Russians, or Jews) as **violent actions**. Omitted categories include foreign policy suggestions related to joining NATO and EU or restoring the friendly relations with Russia, as they were mentioned as an immediate policy priority by 0.6% and 1.3% of the respondents.

Table 2.2: Open Qualitative Coding of Policy Priorities

Policy categories	Key nodes	Examples
Social reforms	Redistribution, Better medical care, Sick children, Pensions	“To make everyone happy”; “To raise the standard of living of the people, free medical treatment, education and re-education, raise the standard of living of pensioners”
Peace and security	ATO, Weapons, Army	“We have to restore peace at all costs”; “I would recognize voluntary battalions at the state level”
Post-material	Disabled, LGBT, Animals, Ecology	“To solve environmental problems in the country—air quality, environmental pollution”; “To accommodate all stray animals in shelters, homes”
Education	Modernization of education, Personal awareness, Better quality or access	“I think [the reform] would be associated with the retraining of old schoolteachers. This retraining would concern [their] mindsets and perception of the modern world and its tendencies”; “Make the education system autonomous [independent] from the state”
Government change: elites	Dismissing the President, Dismissing the government, Firing civil servants	“Replace deputies of the Verkhovna Rada with computers. They [computers] will not lobby the interests of the syndicates and thus will not take bribes and will deal with the primary issues of the nation”; “Dismiss the Verkhovna Rada”
Government change: institutions	Judiciary reform, Deputies’ immunity	“To remove immunity from all branches of government”; “I will order to reduce the salaries of the deputies of the Verkhovna Rada, and transfer these salaries to average workers of our country”
Corruption	Investigation of corruption, Punishment for corruption, Anti-bribery regulations	“I would introduce several bills. First, on removal of parliamentary immunity. Second, on prohibition of withdrawal of funds to offshore economic zones”; “Exterminate corruption”
Economic development	Investment climate, Industry development, Jobs, Taxation, Support businesses, Roads construction	“A decree to modernize and restore state-owned enterprises, introduce new technologies to improve living standards”; “Improving the investment climate in Ukraine”
Pro-Ukrainian	Ukrainian culture, Language, Integration to Europe	“I would create a plan for a new, modern Ukrainian identity. This would include the cultural focus on small-town architecture”; “To establish more demanding conditions for those applying for the citizenship of Ukraine”
Pro-Russian	Anti-ATO, Pro-Russian measures	“Unblock Yandex and VKontakte”, “Friendship between all Slavic peoples”
Traditional values	Religion, Tradition	“The Bible should be taught in schools. The destruction of the false disciples of Antichrist”; “To raise moral, patriotic and spiritual values of the young generation with appropriate censorship”
Violent actions	Confiscation, Dictatorship	“Bring Stalin back. I would confiscate everything wrongly acquired by the oligarchs”; “Shoot all Ukrainian intelligence”
Don’t know	Hard to say, Refuse to answer	“I don’t want to be the President”; “This question is too hard. I need to think more”

Table 2.3: Reconstructing Ideologies from Policy Priorities

Ideology	Categories included
Social liberalism	Post-material, Education
Economic liberalism	Social reforms
Social conservatism	Peace and security, Pro-Ukrainian, Traditional values
Economic conservatism	Economic development
Reformism	Government change: institutions, Government change: elites, Corruption
Violent action	Violent actions

## 2.4 Data Analysis

### 2.4.1 Personality Effects on Political Preferences

#### *Open-Ended Responses*

I start by testing the effect of personality traits on the ideological categories that I manually coded from the open-ended data. As shown in Table 2.4, contrary to my hypotheses, openness to experience predicts the support for social liberalism in Ukraine, replicating the patterns from Western data. Human rights are primarily appealing to those open to experience. A person with the maximum openness to experience would name human rights as a priority with a 49% probability, while there was only a 3% chance that those with the lowest openness to experience would bring them up.

I use bootstrapped regression models with 10,000 simulations of the regression coefficient to find out if the difference between higher and lower personality traits expressions has a significant effect on the support for social liberalism or if it is caused by chance. I code a trait value as high if it is higher than the median<sup>5</sup> and as low if the value is lower than the median. As Figure 2.1 shows, higher than median levels of openness to experience, extraversion, and conscientiousness lead to substantially different levels of support for social liberalism; this difference is unlikely to happen

<sup>5</sup>The median values of personality traits are: 5 out of 7 for Openness, Extraversion, and Conscientiousness, and 4 out of 7 for Neuroticism and Agreeableness. See Table D.1 for descriptive statistics.

Table 2.4: Personality Effects on Ideology in Ukraine

	Liberalism		Conservatism		Reform	
	Social	Economic	Social	Economic	Peaceful	Violent
Agreeableness	0.06 (0.13)	0.13** (0.06)	0.03 (0.07)	-0.005 (0.07)	-0.13** (0.06)	-0.17 (0.16)
Conscientiousness	-0.18 (0.12)	0.07 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.07)	-0.09 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.13 (0.15)
Openness	0.53*** (0.13)	-0.11* (0.06)	0.12* (0.07)	-0.05 (0.06)	0.08 (0.05)	0.09 (0.14)
Extraversion	-0.37*** (0.12)	-0.05 (0.06)	0.03 (0.07)	0.05 (0.06)	0.10* (0.05)	-0.04 (0.14)
Neuroticism	-0.19* (0.11)	0.09* (0.05)	-0.06 (0.06)	0.01 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.08 (0.12)
Constant	-1.54 (1.35)	-0.91 (0.61)	-2.95*** (0.72)	-0.85 (0.65)	-1.49*** (0.55)	-6.78 (204.52)
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	1,375	1,375	1,375	1,375	1,375	1,375
Log Likelihood	-219.06	-747.59	-595.00	-680.87	-899.43	-186.84

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01  
 Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
 Covariates: gender, language, education, age, SES.

by chance. The solid red lines mark the effects that are statistically significant at the 0.05 level and the gray dotted lines show that the estimated effect is not distinguishable from random chance.




Figure 2.1: Bootstrap Regression of Personality Traits on Social Liberalism

For example, the change from lower to higher than median values of conscientiousness is associated with a 4 percentage point decrease in the chance of mentioning socially liberal policy

suggestions as a primary policy priority. This confirms that for those higher in conscientiousness, contentious issues such as same-sex marriage might be perceived as politically extreme. Those higher in extraversion are also less likely to prefer socially liberal policies, while introverts appear to be more interested in social justice and guaranteed human rights for everyone.

At the same time, unlike in Western data, openness to experience predicts resistance to economic liberalism (Figure 2.2). Johnston, Lavine, and Federico would likely interpret this finding as suggesting that those who are more open to experience in Southern Ukraine are more tolerant of the free market, express lower demand for state intervention in social policy, and carry policy preferences which are not distorted by party orientations [13]. This finding contradicts the negative association between need for closure and economic conservatism found in Polish samples by Kossowska and Van Hiel [253]. Neuroticism is associated with a higher demand for social welfare, adding confidence to the mixed results derived from Western data. Although agreeableness is not significant based on the bootstrapped estimates, narrowing down the sample to very agreeable (7 out of 7 on the scale of agreeableness) and very conflictious (1 out of 7) people shows that highly agreeable people have a 50.4% probability of prioritizing social rights such as the increase of social guarantees (pensions, financial transfers to families with multiple children, support for students and the unemployed) in their first presidential decree, compared to a 31.5% probability for those low on agreeableness.<sup>6</sup>

Similar to the findings from Western data, extraverted people lean right on social issues. Those higher in openness to experience display strong support for social conservatism, confirming the atypical associations of personality and politics in Eastern Europe. These effects are driven by support for Ukrainian nationalism rather than the demand for order or traditional values. This confirms the explanations that favor the agents of democratization and the support for current political appeals of the nationalist elites. Contrary to the patterns observed in Western data, conscientiousness does not predict social conservatism (also, as can be seen in Figure 2.3, the data show some right-leaning tendencies).

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<sup>6</sup>See also Figure D.4 for evidence of a weak upward trend in the effect of agreeableness on economic liberalism.



### Personality and Economic Liberalism

Bootstrap Models, 10,000 simulations




Figure 2.2: Bootstrap Regression of Personality Traits on Economic Liberalism

### Personality and Social Conservatism

Bootstrap Models, 10,000 simulations




Figure 2.3: Bootstrap Regression of Personality Traits on Social Conservatism

The most surprising result is the lack of an effect of personality traits on economic conservatism (Figure 2.4). The null results are confirmed in other model specifications (including various sets of included covariates). I return to these puzzling findings in the analysis of alternative specifications.




Figure 2.4: Bootstrap Regression of Personality Traits on Economic Conservatism

Finally, I consider the coding categories that do not exactly match the liberalism–conservatism continuum but were named as policy priorities by 42.47% of respondents. The most frequent node in this category is the reform of the Ukrainian government. I also include a category of responses that implies a call for political and ethnic cleansing. Although it is a marginal category (with 4% of respondents endorsing these policies), it serves as a notable and worrisome counterpoint to non-violent civic demand for government reforms.

In Western data, populist voters tend to score low on agreeableness, while in Eastern Europe, agreeable people tend to support populist leaders such as Vladimir Putin [262, 283, 268]. In my sample, agreeable people are less likely to appeal for reform than those lower on agreeableness. These patterns can be interpreted as supporting the empirical findings of Bakker and colleagues, although they challenge the authors' theory on the personality-driven self-selection of conflictious




Figure 2.5: Bootstrap Regression of Personality Traits on Non-Violent Reformism

people to the electorate of similarly conflictious politicians (such as Donald Trump). Bakker and colleagues equate the demand for institutional change and government reform with support for specific types of leaders. In my sample, however, no respondent ever mentioned any politician (or party) as the leaders of the proposed anti-establishment governmental change. Instead, they noted the importance of breaking with the past and establishing transparent, responsible, and accountable political institutions. Agreeable people, apparently, are less prone to challenging established social routines.

Neuroticism has a marginally significant negative effect as well: those who are more neurotic are less interested in prioritizing political reforms (Figure 2.5). While bootstrapped estimates showed that extraversion does not have a significant effect on the policy issue, Table 2.4 suggests that it might have a very weak positive effect on non-violent policy reforms.

Finally, no personality traits predicted the endorsement of violent political actions, suggesting that personality traits are not necessarily predictive of all policy priorities named by the respondents (Figure 2.6).




Figure 2.6: Bootstrap Regression of Personality Traits on Violent Actions

### *Alternative Specifications*

To test models with alternative specifications, I use the inventory developed by the Pew Research Center. I select three categories that were most relevant for South Ukrainians in 2018: attitudes toward gun control (the country is flooded by illegal weapons from the ATO zone in Donbas), the poor and the welfare state (64.5% of my sample reported to be “extremely poor” or “poor”); and the balance between strong armies and wise diplomacy (Ukraine’s Southeast is located right between the Crimean peninsula and the war zone in Donbas).<sup>7</sup>

Table 2.5 shows that openness to experience does not predict individual stance on Western policy issues, confirming previous studies that stated the lack of effect in Eastern European samples. At the same time, based on this inventory, conscientious people in Ukraine lean left on economic liberalism. People with the highest conscientiousness have a 65.7% likelihood of sug-

<sup>7</sup>Respondents were asked if “the poor can work themselves out of poverty without the help of society” (10—“the society has nothing to do with poverty”—is coded as economic conservatism; 0—“the poor need the help of society”—is coded as economic liberalism); if “guns should be legalized” (10—social conservatism); and if “wise diplomacy is better than military force” (10—social liberalism).

Table 2.5: Ideological Orientations: Pew Center Items

	Poor Must Work	Legalize Guns	Wise Diplomacy
Agreeableness	-0.02 (0.08)	-0.003 (0.06)	0.24** (0.09)
Conscientiousness	-0.34*** (0.09)	-0.07 (0.06)	-0.16* (0.10)
Openness	-0.01 (0.08)	0.04 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.08)
Extraversion	-0.01 (0.08)	-0.13** (0.06)	0.09 (0.09)
Neuroticism	-0.01 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.08)
Constant	4.83*** (0.86)	2.65*** (0.58)	2.79*** (0.93)
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	1,374	1,374	1,374
Log Likelihood	-460.62	-828.63	-397.65
AIC	947.24	1,683.26	821.31

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01  
 Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
 Covariates: gender, language, education, age, SES.

gesting that poor people cannot help themselves out of poverty without societal support; for people with the lowest conscientiousness, this likelihood is 49.8%. Note that the weak positive leaning of those with higher conscientiousness toward economic liberalism was found insignificant in previous specifications. Here, the effect is strong enough to claim that in Ukraine, conscientiousness might be a left-wing political predictor – another result that diverges from the patterns detected in Western data. Moreover, extraversion is associated with lower social conservatism (contrary to my previous findings based on open-ended responses). Finally, agreeable people predictably support wise diplomacy over a strong military.

These findings confirm the importance of using open-ended, qualitative data in psychological studies. Even though I selected the most comprehensible and salient issues from the Pew Center political ideology inventory, the effect of personality traits detected in the Ukrainian sample is different both from the patterns in Western samples and the effects established based on open-ended responses. The takeaway points are as follows: (1) openness to experience should be measured in the context of relevant socioeconomic trends; (2) agreeableness has an apparent universal effect on the preference for wise diplomacy over strong armies across the globe; and (3) conscientiousness might have a weak effect on social conservatism and more data are needed to tease out the specific items that conscientious people care about.

*Specific Political Issues*

Finally, I asked my respondents a set of questions about their stance on contentious political issues from recent Ukrainian history. While it is hard to unambiguously match attitudes toward these events with specific Western political ideologies, it is a helpful exercise in reconstructing the effects of personality on attitudes toward recent political transformations and revolutions.

I consider two seminal political events: the Orange Revolution of 2004–2005, an event led by nationalist elites which became the first iteration of the Ukrainian sovereign nation-building project, and the Euromaidan of 2013–2014, the second revolution that reinforced the demand for European integration, decommunization, and further political and economic distancing from Russia’s political influence. The ideology of the leadership of the Orange Revolution (i.e., the elite discourse and the policy priorities of the Yushchenko government) can be approximately described as socially conservative, with its emphasis on nation-building, Ukrainian language and culture, and symbolic reconstruction of a united Ukrainian nation based on past glories. On the other hand, the Euromaidan had a stronger liberal component, underscoring the need for European political integration, cultural emancipation, and universal respect for human rights.

Table 2.6: Attitudes towards the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan

	Orange Revolution Ordered Logit (1)	Euromaidan (2)	Approves both Binary Logit (3)
Agreeableness	0.22*** (0.09)	0.22*** (0.07)	0.17* (0.10)
Conscientiousness	0.02 (0.09)	-0.03 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.09)
Openness	0.11 (0.08)	0.18*** (0.06)	0.37*** (0.09)
Extraversion	-0.09 (0.08)	-0.16** (0.07)	-0.12 (0.09)
Neuroticism	-0.11 (0.07)	-0.07 (0.06)	-0.08 (0.07)
Constant	1.58* (0.84)	0.78 (0.71)	-6.48*** (0.99)
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	1,366	1,375	1,373
Log Likelihood	-454.98	-593.21	-394.76
AIC	935.97	1,212.41	815.53

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

These findings suggest that highly agreeable people appear to be more politically conformist

(Table 2.6). Those with a higher tolerance for conflict (lower agreeableness) are more likely to initiate an institutional change in government, and those who are highly agreeable prefer to approve of the current political consensus. Of those with the highest level of agreeableness, 11.8% jointly approve of both the Euromaidan and the Orange Revolution, while among those with the lowest value of agreeableness the rate of approval is just 4.5%. Openness to experience predicts higher support for both events (with a 13.2% chance of approval compared to a 1.6% chance for those who are extremely low in openness to experience), and as expected in light of its recency predicts support for the Euromaidan. The Orange Revolution is apparently a matter of the past for those interested in seeking novelty, despite its socio-conservative values, which might make it appealing to those higher in openness to experience.

#### 2.4.2 Political and Civic Engagement

As previously noted, the majority of my respondents do not vote, which complicates the interpretation of personality effects on electoral choices. Further, most Ukrainian politicians and parties have inconsistent policies that they strategically remake for political gain. In Appendix E.12, I explore the effect of personality on voting preferences and find that conscientiousness predicts both the vote for right-leaning Petro Poroshenko and moderate reformist Yulia Tymoshenko, and lower levels of conscientiousness predict electoral abstention. These findings are weak and do not always hold after controlling for age, gender, language, and education.

The personality effect on political and civic engagement is similar to those found in the literature on Western democracies [6]. Extraversion is the most reliable predictor of political and civic engagement. Extraverts select activities that imply active social interaction: more than 1 in 10 individuals with the highest degree of extraversion would run as a candidate in elections, while for those with the lowest degree of extraversion, the likelihood of running for office is only 1.54%. Extraverts are more likely to join a political party, volunteer as an electoral observer or a social activist, and initiate a neighborhood-based association (such as a homeowners' association). Those open to experience are more likely to join a political party, protest, and participate

in social movements. The effect remains highly statistically significant after controlling for age, gender, language, education, and socio-economic status. Agreeableness has no effect on most political or civic activities, except for a marginal increase in the likelihood of joining a political party. Conscientiousness is marginally related to the likelihood of volunteering as an electoral observer (the effect is weaker than in US data, where conscientiousness is associated with higher political engagement and interest in politics). As reported in some earlier studies, neuroticism has no detectable effect on political and civic engagement [284, 251].

## 2.5 Discussion

### 2.5.1 Explaining Atypical Personality Traits Association

The data confirm that openness to experience predicts the endorsement of social conservatism (nationalist and traditional values) and resistance to economic liberalism (social benefits and the welfare state) in Ukraine. However, contrary to previous findings from Eastern Europe, I find that openness to experience does predict social liberalism as well. The likelihood of selecting human rights and social justice as a primary policy goal increases from nearly 0% to 6.5% when we compare those with the lowest and highest values of openness to experience. Contrary to some previous studies involving Eastern European data, I find no association between openness to experience and economic conservatism and do not detect any influence of openness to experience on Western-based measures of social and economic liberalism [253]. Those open to experience support recent political trends, such as the Euromaidan, but their interest in previous political revolutions fades as time passes even if the political goals of this event align with their ideological preferences.

Conscientiousness has not been extensively studied in Eastern European contexts. However, close examination of its effect on political preferences suggests that it might also be a part of the Eastern European reversed associations of personality traits and political ideologies and that there might be a *positive* effect of conscientiousness on economic liberalism. At the same time, as shown in Western data, higher conscientiousness is associated with lower support for social liberalism.



The combination of lower demand for social liberalism, higher demand for economic liberalism, and responsible voting patterns shows that conscientiousness in Eastern Europe is associated with the old left and serves as a status quo stabilization mechanism.

Extraversion, as in Western data, predicts lower support for social liberalism and higher support for social conservatism.

Western and Eastern data show mixed predictions regarding the effect of agreeableness on political populism (positive in Russia, negative in other Eastern and Western European countries). My analysis shows that *agreeableness should be interpreted as an alignment with the political mainstream and the resistance to potentially contentious revisions of the status quo*. In Ukrainian data, agreeableness has a strong and negative effect on support for non-violent institutional reforms or anti-corruption campaigns, thus reinforcing the empirical results presented by Bakker and colleagues [262, 283]. It also has a slightly left-leaning effect on economic policy preferences and prompts respondents to prioritize wise diplomacy over a strong army.

Finally, neuroticism also aligns with Western data, leading to a higher demand for the welfare state (economic liberalism) and resistance to the changing of the status quo. Fatke, however, suggests that in undemocratic systems neuroticism might also be associated with socially liberal attitudes [3].

Thus, *atypical associations found in Eastern European data are largely contained in two personality effects: socially conservative effects of openness to experience and economically liberal effects of conscientiousness*.

These reversed effects should be attributed partially to the specifics of the path to democratization that made nationalist elites the harbingers of a new liberal agenda in the 1990s [278]. On the other hand, as Jost notes, ideological preferences result from the combination of the ideological offerings of political elites and the psychological and cognitive demands of individuals [285]. The recurrent demands for European integration show that Ukrainian civil society is particularly attracted to social liberalism. Thus, Ukrainian elites strategically combine social liberalism and social conservatism, because they consolidate power through the nation-building project while si-

multaneously leading civil society toward European integration.

Those open to experience embrace the bond between social liberalism and European integration as an electoral promise, while also accepting social conservatism as a de facto state-building strategy. The combination of the legacy of democratization and the strategic use of contemporary nationalism to secure the future prospects of European integration leads to the curious simultaneous endorsement of social liberalism and social conservatism by Ukrainian elites. Elites are confronted by those with higher conscientiousness, who care, just as their conservative peers do in Western countries, about the social costs of this unlikely combination. Because of the troubling social outcomes of the early post-communist reforms in most post-Soviet countries, conscientious people associate political stability with economic liberalism and civic engagement rather than with potentially contentious social liberalism. The strategic framing of the socially conservative nation-building project in terms of social liberalism, which appeals to those open to experience while being suspicious to those higher in conscientiousness, is the key mechanism of this atypical traits association between traits and policy preferences.

In other words, *openness to experience does not necessarily entail support for liberalism*. What it predicts is *support for a new status quo, a revised policy proposal*. Those open to experience are more responsive to any policy suggestions that revise the current state of affairs. Conscientiousness, on the other hand, prompts individuals to carefully weigh the potential costs of the status quo revision. This logic still binds conscientiousness with stability and openness with plasticity [286], however, it implies that every society might have a different version of what it aspires to stabilize or change.

Further studies might gain from using various personality inventories, such as “boundaries in the mind” [247], to test the extent to which the results are driven by question wording or are affected by semantic subtexts that vary by language [15, p.198]. Also, given that values and personality traits account for a small share of personal political preferences [274], it would be helpful to explore the variation in the direct predictive capacity of personality traits as compared to their interaction with socio-economic predictors of political behavior [267, 263]. Also, while I focus

on the Ukrainian Southeast, because Ukrainians from the West are more likely to demonstrate “Western” patterns of personality effects, it would be helpful to juxtapose the results reported here against a West Ukrainian sample.

### 2.5.2 Implications

This chapter demonstrates that we can learn a great deal about the effects of personality on political preferences by carefully studying the interaction of personality and environment in non-Western political contexts and paying attention to the original ideological preferences shared by non-Western respondents. The very idea of a left–right continuum might be irrelevant in some non-Western contexts. The divergence of the empirical results observed from responses to open- and closed-ended questions shows that in an unconsolidated political context, political self-identification can be misleading.

These findings raise substantial concerns about the external validity of the current consensus in the political psychology literature, because in the reported data, liberals are not open to experience; conscientious people are not right-leaning; and conservatism is manifested differently than in Western Europe and the United States. In the Eastern European context, right-wing authoritarianism might be predicted by lower conscientiousness and higher openness to experience, challenging our understanding of the mechanisms behind authoritarian inclinations [5, p.128].

Finally, the results of this study prompt us to reevaluate the role of personality in current political trends in Western democracies. In Europe and the United States, openness to experience has been traditionally associated with globalist attitudes, mirroring recent trends in these countries. These trends, however, might be reversed with the emerging critique of the status quo from the right [283]. It would be helpful to test whether social liberalism and social conservatism could be strategically merged by populist leaders to attract those interested in government reform from both sides of the current political spectrum.

## 2.6 Conclusion

This chapter explores the phenomenon behind the atypical association between personality traits and political ideologies in Eastern Europe: a curious correlation between openness to experience and conservative attitudes that contradicts existing evidence from Western countries. Uncovering political preferences from original open-ended responses of Ukrainian adults and matching them with their responses to standard political ideology inventories, I show that the effect of personality on political attitudes is more context-specific than previous studies have suggested. Contrary to the evidence from the United States and Western Europe, conscientious people in Ukraine are left-leaning and those open to experience prefer both social liberalism and social conservatism. The reasons for these reversed effects stem from the specifics of the Ukrainian path to democratization and the strategic electoral manipulation of Ukrainian elites who consolidate power through a nation-building project while simultaneously luring civil society toward European integration. This research contributes, both theoretically and empirically, to studies of the personality origins of political ideologies. This chapter demonstrates that the associations between personality traits and political ideologies which were identified in Western data in the 2000s may not be detected in other political contexts. In sum, these findings suggest that contemporary political trends might reverse the established association between openness to experience and liberalism.

## Chapter 3: Ingenuousness

*“[T]he list of ... assassins or gravediggers of democratic rule ... includes ... disenchanted populations who may become tired of a democracy that has not delivered, in material terms, much more than economic hardship and social inequality.”*

—Andreas Schedler, *What Is Democratic Consolidation?* [287]

*“Running for office is, in many ways, the utmost form of political participation; thus, political trust and cynicism likely affect candidate emergence.”*

—Jennifer L. Lawless, *Becoming a Candidate* [288]

### 3.1 Introduction

Democratic development is often hindered by a lack of political candidates at the local and regional level [289]. Low political ambition poses a severe challenge to democratic consolidation, as it distorts the descriptive representation of women and minorities, impairs the accountability of political institutions, and prevents elite rotation. Most democracy promotion programs worldwide appeal to the political ambitions of ordinary citizens, trying to encourage their expressive political engagement. This encouragement, however, is deeply problematic in the context of weak democracies, where most government offices entail high personal risk. Still, few empirical studies examine the causal link behind democracy promotion, individual efficacy, and the subsequent decision to run for office in demographically representative samples.

This chapter deals with the problem of individual political representation at different levels of power. I am primarily interested in three interrelated research questions. First, how do sense of efficacy affect one’s decision to run for office in weak democracies? Local and regional offices

in such regimes are underfinanced and overwhelmingly corrupted. Holding positions in these offices entails numerous personal risks for those who are committed to “draining the swamp” and are not engaged in rent-seeking. What are the intrinsic psychological mechanisms behind running for office at the local level, and are they different from those driving political engagement in regional and national politics? Second, do individuals with higher self-efficacy and higher collective efficacy run for different offices at different levels of power? Third, how does prior political and civic experience affect nascent political ambition, that is, would-be candidates’ initial interest in seeking elective office [290]?

I suggest a psychological micro-mechanism through which individual and collective empowerment, which takes place during democratization affects individual political behavior. I test it with novel experimental data from Southern Ukraine, a macro-region with record-high abstention rates and widespread skepticism toward the national government. The experiment is organized as an independent large-scale democratic education campaign (N=1,381) on a demographically representative and diverse sample of adults. To my knowledge, it is the first randomized controlled trial on individual-level political behavior in Ukraine. To avoid political priming of any sort, I limit the experimental manipulation to the induction of self-efficacy and collective efficacy. As a result, the experiment has the advantage of political neutrality, avoiding interference into Ukrainian politics. Instead, it focuses on providing ordinary respondents with feasible tools of democratic participation, and increasing their efficacy as individuals and as members of local communities.

The experiment has a two-by-two design which randomly manipulates self- and collective efficacy. The first treatment manipulates self-efficacy through cognitive therapy by teaching respondents how to identify the potential for change in their lives and exercise their opportunities for personal growth. The second treatment manipulates collective efficacy through civic education. Respondents are randomly assigned to self- or collective efficacy induction, to their combined version, or to the control group. The setting of the experiment replicates real-life democracy promotion campaigns by boosting individual efficacy through personal or collective empowerment. The outcomes measure expressed interest in joining a political party and running for local, civic,

regional, and national offices.

The experiment shows that enhanced individual and collective efficacy does not translate into higher political engagement. Increasing respondents' collective efficacy discouraged them, on average, from running for city parliament and did not affect their interest in other political activities. Also, increasing their self-efficacy had similar average treatment effects on their political participation. The conditional effects, however, reveal an interesting nuance in the way that the induction of collective or self-efficacy interacts with prior political experience and self-evaluation. Citizens with higher pre-treatment levels of internal political efficacy were the ones who experienced the strongest disengagement from running for office after the induction of self-efficacy, potentially because the improved sense of efficacy averts them from political institutions that are considered powerless and futile. On the other hand, the induction of collective efficacy was most beneficial for those with the lack of prior political or civic experience but high levels of pre-treatment self-evaluation.

I contribute to existing research on democratic political engagement and literature on the dynamic development of political ambition by showing how nascent political ambition can fluctuate depending on the levels of self-efficacy and collective efficacy [290, 288, 291]. I also push this research one step further by presenting one of the first experimental studies which isolate the psychological pathways behind political ambition [8].

The broader implications of this research extend to the literature on comparative democratization and democracy promotion. First, I demonstrate that, on average, either learning about community successes or reflecting on individual victories in the past averts individuals from running for office at the local level. This suppression of nascent political ambition happens because Ukrainians do not consider local parliaments efficacious enough, especially once they are reminded of alternative methods of collective action problem-solving. When expectations from political institutions are low, one's sense of agency does not activate the potential for collective action [292]. Second, the analysis reveals that subjects with prior experience in civic activism and higher internal political efficacy are discouraged from running for office at a higher rate after the induction of self-efficacy,

exposing the existing tension between efficacious activist communities and ineffective local political institutions. Finally, less politically sophisticated people with higher self-reported subjective potential were the only group that increased their interest in running for office after the induction of collective efficacy. This suggests that subjective potential might be the only component of generalized self-efficacy that predicts increased political engagement and higher political ambition. Those with higher self-control and self-evaluation but lower levels of subjective potential do not change their political ambitions after learning about collective successes in their region.

I start by exploring the potential problems that democracy promotion generates when improving people's sense of collective efficacy in weak unconsolidated democracies. Next, I review the available data on the psychological drivers of nascent political ambition and examine why running for office is a complicated matter in Ukraine. I proceed by experimentally examining how the manipulation of individual and collective efficacy affects the interest in joining a political party and running for office. I analyze the results by measuring average treatment effects of increased individual and collective efficacy, estimating general heterogeneity that the treatments entail by automatic machine-learning analysis, and comparing the results of random forest models to the interaction effects detected from pre-treatment characteristics of the respondents. I conclude by discussing why democracy promotion programs should pay closer attention to the interaction between various levels of government and whether the improvement of self- and collective facets of efficacy is helpful for individual political engagement in weak democracies.

### **3.2 Running for Office in Weak Democracies**

Descriptive representation is assumed to have important benefits to a democratic society [293]. Weak democracies rely on political engagement, especially at the local and regional levels, but it is exactly in these regimes that political engagement entails too much risk for too little reward. People in weak democracies avoid running for office for reasons that extend beyond their demographic characteristics. In this section, I review macro-level factors that affect nascent political ambition in Ukraine: the corrupt and precarious electoral system; low political trust; post-authoritarian



legacies of political disengagement; poor political knowledge; the existence of para-parliamentary structures of collective negotiation; and unstable electoral legal frameworks. Then, I discuss intrinsic motivations that may overcome a lack of nascent political ambition, examine how higher levels of self-efficacy and collective efficacy might affect political ambition under these conditions, and suggest how we can experimentally test the effect of self-efficacy and collective efficacy on political ambition.

### 3.2.1 Challenges to Running for Office in Ukraine

#### *Administrative Resources and Political Machines*

Electoral institutions remain the weak spot of Ukraine's state-building project. For years, local bosses and oligarchs have used political machines to buy votes in relevant constituencies, while elected politicians have engaged in state capture and the use of administrative resources to ensure re-election [49, 294]. Professionalized bureaucracy coexists with electoral corruption, and "mitigating incentives for state capture is a major challenge for democratization" [295, p.601]. Political parties are active participants of state capture and act as patronage networks [296, p.221]. Observers note that elections are extensively financed by oligarchs [297]. The proportion of Ukraine's GDP that is regularly spent by political bosses on electoral campaigns is one of the highest in the world [298]. Vote-buying is extremely widespread in Ukraine and most businessmen who run for office use it at all levels of elections. If elected, deputies represent influence groups and oligarchs rather than actual constituencies [296, 294].

Taken together, this means that running for office in Ukraine entails financial obligations and political strategizing to which most people are not capable of committing. This also makes an experiment on nascent political ambition and electability a hard task, since most respondents associate running for office with having to manipulate local constituencies, corrupt electoral processes, and buy votes from people like themselves.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Especially as of 2018, when the experiment took place. Since then, there have been some positive developments in Ukraine's institutional environment that remain beyond the scope of this dissertation.

### *Post-Authoritarian Democratic Deficit*

The second macro-level factor that prevents Ukrainians from developing nascent political ambitions is the legacy of authoritarianism and repeated failures in overcoming it at the national level. The degree of dissatisfaction with the quality and pace of democratic transformation has been consistently high in Ukraine's post-independence history [299]. Normally, democracies are prone to political skepticism, since it is inculcated in the institutions of political representation and competitive political life. This skepticism, however, might pose a problem for democratic survival when the disenchantment with the democratic regime's performance in practice transforms into dissatisfaction with democracy as a system of government [300, p.139]. Weak developing democracies like Ukraine often struggle with poor democratic performance and are thus especially prone to backlash dynamics. Besides corrupting democratic culture altogether, the lack of trust in democratic institutions is a reason behind the lack of initiative in running for office. Multiple studies demonstrate that cynicism, skepticism, and political mistrust all suppress political efficacy (see the review in [8]).

The post-Soviet legacy of irresponsive elites and low political accountability has created a bad equilibrium in Ukrainian politics, with most people being disappointed in political institutions, skeptical of democracy, and mistrustful of political elites [33, 301, 302]. Analysts describe the average Ukrainian's civic life as passive because of the "disappointment with the post-Soviet transformation and low subjective social status" [38, p.673] and underscore the limited role of civil society organizations in disseminating values of cooperation and democracy [41]. Younger people in post-communist countries have lower levels of efficacy as compared to their Western European neighbors [303]. The situation is even worse for older generations that were exposed to communism as adults and thus manifest the highest levels of democratic deficit [48, p.104].

During the period from 2013 to 2018, Ukrainians went through a rapid transformation from the political hopes and aspirations accompanying the Euromaidan political protest to large-scale political turmoil and civil war [199]. As observers note, even after Euromaidan, "[the] political culture [of elites], composed of clientelism, secretive deals and quota based nominations to gov-

ernment positions continues to operate” [299, p.349]. The rapid decline in democratic expectations reinforced attitudes of alienation and learned helplessness. The fleeing of a large fraction of the political elite, including President Yanukovich, eroded political trust especially in the East and South of Ukraine [304]. Thus, the recent political experience of Ukrainians, especially in these macro-regions of Ukraine, have undermined their political, collective, and individual efficacy.

### *Non-Electoral Representation*

Back in 2000, democracy promotion experts noted that the critical importance of active civil society to democratization has become a new mantra in aid and diplomatic circles [305, p.6]. Two decades later, most bottom-up democracy promotion programs continue to exploit “the Putnam effect,” assuming that active civic life would automatically lead to the consolidation of democracy [65, 67]. Yet, at the macro-level, democracy promotion by means of supporting of civil society actors failed to produce tangible outcomes [306, 307, 171].

One of the reasons behind these failures is that a strong civil society does not necessarily result in strong political institutions. The successes of non-normative civic actions such as protests, revolutions, and manifestations do not translate into a professionalized bureaucracy and transparent electoral system. High social trust and strong social capital, including active voluntary associations and civic engagement, are not predictive of political engagement. At the individual level, membership in voluntary organizations is not related to political trust [308]. Moreover, as Norris argues, civic activities, in general, do not help build political trust per se [166]. As Caprara and Vecchione note when talking about general political engagement in contemporary democracies, “[r]ational citizens may find no reason to expend the energy, intelligence, and passion that political involvement may require when involvement in other forms of civic engagement [...] may better reward their participatory and agentic needs” [5, p. 312].

This logic is especially applicable to the case of Ukraine. Ukrainian civic society is among the strongest in the post-Soviet space, as it essentially replaced the less-efficacious state in a wide range of civic activities, ranging from school management and water supply to providing essential

material support to the army battalions fighting in the ATO zone [200, 309]. Communities throughout the country are actively involved in integrating internally displaced people from Donbas and providing social support to wounded soldiers [310]. By going through a process of decommunization and democratic development, Ukraine demonstrated impressive levels of self-organization and civic engagement [311, 199, 38]. These successful civic developments, however, were not backed up by a comprehensive transformation of post-Soviet clientelist networks, did not reduce economic inequality, and did not institutionalize as inclusive structures of political representation [238, 299]. What emerges is the co-existence of a civil society that captures some functions of the state with an absence of meaningful available opportunities in the electoral arena. This availability of alternative engagement options lowers the attractiveness of ineffective political institutions.

### *Scarcity of Local Resources*

The actual capacity to effect political changes varies across levels of government. Specifically, elective local office implies a combination of low rewards and high expectations from constituencies, higher-level authorities, regional bosses, and oligarchs. Moreover, in the previous 2015 and upcoming 2020 elections<sup>2</sup>, mayors of small cities<sup>3</sup> and deputies of rural and settlement councils<sup>4</sup> are elected through the first-past-the-post system [312]. Candidates for mayors of cities with a population of 90,000 or larger have to secure an absolute (50%+1) majority in a single-member constituency. Thus, local politicians are interested in securing a relative or an absolute majority, depending on their constituency type [313].

As a result, unless they have access to administrative resources, large party budgets, or political machines, would-be deputies and mayors of small towns have to collaborate with communities and stand accountable before active civil society groups [314, 315]. Moreover, their obligations and immediate duties are increasing steadily as the decentralization reform progresses, and the

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<sup>2</sup>Note, however, that Ukraine's 2019 Electoral Code comes into force on December 1, 2023, and changes the current mixed electoral system with closed party lists into a fully proportional system with open party lists.

<sup>3</sup>Chosen as rural, settlement, or village heads by means of elections (see Ukrainian: *vybory sil's'koho, selyshchnoho, mis'koho holovy*).

<sup>4</sup>Ukrainian: *sil's'kykh, selyshchnykh rad*.

resources available at the local level are insufficient to meet these high expectations [313, 315]. Therefore, despite the government's efforts to encourage citizens to run for local office, satisfactory performance upon being elected into these positions necessitates a degree of embeddedness into high-resource networks that most political newcomers do not possess [296].

### *Electoral Rules*

Finally, to evolve into running for office, nascent political ambition requires a level of advanced planning and long-term preparation that is hardly possible in Ukraine's ever-changing electoral environment [314]. Ukraine has tried almost all existing electoral rules within its first thirty years of independence, and it is unlikely that any of the systems managed to encourage wider political representation [316]. On the contrary, most of these changes strengthened the electoral performance of the ruling party while weakening the opposition<sup>5</sup>, and suppressed women's political representation [317]. As Kovalov notes, "[the change from proportional to mixed majoritarian system] enabled the ruling party to engage in manipulation and fraud during campaigning and on election day by suppressing competition, crowding out the races with 'technical' parties and 'clone' candidates, and manipulating the composition of electoral commissions." [318, p.781]. Thus, the nascent political ambition of Ukrainians is suppressed by inconsistent electoral rules, to the particular detriment of minority candidates.

## 3.2.2 Psychological Pathways to Nascent Political Ambition

### *Intrinsic Motivations*

Given how extremely challenging Ukraine's political environment is, what might encourage individuals to run for office? The literature on political ambition and expressive participation splits all individual motives into extrinsic motivations, intrinsic motivations, and political opportunities [319]. Extrinsic motivations correspond to the tangible social or material benefits acquired

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<sup>5</sup>Note that the 2019 Electoral Code improves the representativeness of elections by restoring the proportional system and enabling open party lists.

through political office [319]. When the tangible benefits are not appealing, intrinsic motivations are key to the internal decision-making process of potential candidates, as they refer to the subjective psychological benefits derived from running for office. In this chapter, I focus exclusively on the causal effects of intrinsic motivations—holding extrinsic motivations and political opportunities constant—because I am interested in the psychological processes that lead people to run for office, or at least to consider running for office, in a low-efficacy political context such as Ukraine’s.

Extensive research shows that intrinsic motivations are key predictors of nascent political ambition [320, 321]. Some scholars claim that psychological factors predict political engagement better than social or demographic ones. Sense of efficacy mediates the relationship between demographic factors and political activity [270, 1, 57, 267, 5, 321]. A similar mediating effect is exerted by personality traits and identities [291], such as civic identity and sense of civic duty [319]. Similarly, intrinsic motivations are essential for explaining why different people with similar political opportunity structures vary in their nascent and actual interest in running for office [8]. For example, similarly qualified women tend to view themselves as being less qualified than men do because of their suppressed levels of self-efficacy [322].

The most challenging part of researching intrinsic motivations is explaining their change over time. Sense of efficacy and non-essential identities can be rather fluid, and even personality traits can vary within some narrow margin. Existing research, with very few exceptions, does not provide a good dynamic conceptual framework for studying intrinsic motivations for running for office over time, and does not explain how intrinsic motivations’ effects on nascent political ambition change over the course of a lifetime [8].

With this chapter, I strive to address this gap in the study of nascent political ambition by experimentally identifying the effect of efficacy on political behavior. Extensive observational evidence suggests that by elevating levels of self- and collective efficacy we can improve individual propensity to run for office. However, these studies are mostly based on data from the US and other consolidated democracies. There is also a noticeable gap in experimental studies on nascent politi-

cal ambition, even in the better-studied US context, and there are virtually no experimental studies on the controlled effect of efficacy on ambition in weak or non-democratic contexts. I proceed by reviewing how changing levels of efficacy might affect political engagement and nascent political ambition and conclude by developing a set of theoretical expectations regarding the causal effect of efficacy on running for office.

### *Self-Efficacy as Intrinsic Political Motivation*

Potentially, increasing internal political efficacy might be the most direct way of improving nascent political ambition [116]. However, in contexts such as Ukraine's, where political institutions are discredited, generalized induction of internal political efficacy is empirically and ethically problematic. It is virtually impossible to develop an internal political efficacy treatment that would be beneficial and non-problematic to all respondents, even in the least polarized region of Ukraine. Therefore, I propose paying closer attention to generalized self-efficacy—the expected ability to achieve individual goals—and collective efficacy—the expected ability of the social group to which the individual belongs to solve collective action problems [60, 61, 63, 124].

Self-efficacy is shaped by the “highly contextualized knowledge structures regarding one's own abilities to face specific challenges” [5, p.65]. It influences political agency via self, collective, and political facets [81, 56, 323, 324]. Self-efficacy has been linked to nascent and actual political ambition in observational data from democratic environments.

One approach suggests a direct effect of self-efficacy on individual self-perception and level of self-esteem. A general sense of self-efficacy predicts interest in running for political office as well as a politicized upbringing does [290]. Self-efficacy has a consistently positive impact on expectations of becoming more actively involved in politics in the future [321].

Another approach suggests that the general sense of efficacy affects nascent political ambition because it improves internal political efficacy and thus increases individuals' expectations of their own ability to cause political changes [303]. Those people who are high in self-efficacy are also high in internal political efficacy, as internal political efficacy can be seen as being related to the

more general notion of self-efficacy [53, 59, 303].

Observational data expose a strong association between prior political experience, partisanship, and sense of internal efficacy. Caprara et al. show that political efficacy is higher for elected officials and that stronger political views are associated with higher efficacy [56]. Party membership increases future nascent political ambitions even among politicians who already hold some office [325]. The combination of high levels of political interest *and* self-efficacy is associated with the highest levels of political engagement [321]. Some scholars even suggest that political interest fully mediates the effect of self-efficacy on expected political engagement [303].

In a rare experimental study on the effects of efficacy, Preece runs two survey experiments on increasing interest in politics through the improvement of self-efficacy [326]. By treating respondents with deceptive positive information regarding their performance on a quiz, she demonstrates that efficacy induction improves women's political interest. This same treatment, however, does not affect the self-evaluation of male participants, which accounts for the average strength of this treatment being low.

There are two important nuances that are relevant to the case of Ukraine.

First, higher self-efficacy stemming from prior civic activist experience does not unambiguously increase interest in political office. Crowder-Meyer shows that the experience of community participation and civic efficacy has no direct effect on one's individual decision to run for political office [327].

Second, it is important to note that these data come from democratic regimes. When political engagement is legitimate and non-contentious, more efficacious citizens will be more involved in political activities as compared to their less efficacious peers. In some contexts, however, political activism is not socially desirable [328]. In autocracies, civic activism becomes *de facto* political, because existing institutions of political representation are controlled by the authoritarian government and are only efficient for those who support the incumbent [329, 330, 123]. In hybrid regimes, political engagement might be culturally discredited as a dirty business that legitimizes the government rather than challenges its course of action. Even in democracies, citizens may con-



sider their political participation effective but meaningless [331, 332, 120]. Comparative studies of political skepticism demonstrate that efficacious and emancipated citizens withdraw from voting and running for office if their political efficacy is not met with adequate performance on the part of democratic institutions [333, 166]. This dual effect of efficacy is similar to educated citizens' decision to vote: in advanced democracies, more educated people have a better sense of agency and turn out more [334, 159], while in electoral authoritarian regimes such as Mugabe's Zimbabwe educated citizens avoid electoral participation because of its futility [137].

### *Collective Efficacy as Intrinsic Political Motivation*

Collective efficacy is a belief in the ability of 'people like me' to achieve political goals and affect politics. Evidence for the effect of collective efficacy on political ambition is mixed, mostly because there are very few studies that strive to isolate the effect of individual-level collective efficacy on interest in running for office. At the macro-level, democratic citizens tend to have both high collective efficacy and nascent political ambition [56]. Observational data on aggregate collective efficacy show that it corresponds to various democratically-friendly outcomes and levels of political participation, but these findings are not helpful if we are interested in individual-level causal effects [335, 132, 127, 209, 321].

Individual-level observational data show that collective efficacy might be related to political engagement if it is linked to the sense of civic duty, expressive concerns, or trust in the political system [101, 321]. Survey results from a sample of local politicians in the US and a sample of Conservative Party MPs in the UK demonstrate that the intense feeling of civic duty and engagement in the affairs of their communities—two proxies for high collective efficacy—drove respondents to public office [320, 319]. Other studies suggest, however, that higher collective efficacy and prior experience in activism do not necessarily predict political efficacy [336]. Basically, if running for office is perceived as a way of solving a collective problem, higher collective efficacy will predict nascent political ambition. As Barrett and Pachi note, "the perceived effectiveness of particular actions is distinct from external efficacy" [321, p.32]. Therefore, while collective efficacy might

predict an individual's belief about their ability to ensure a desired political change, it does not affect their perception of how suitable certain political institutions are for achieving this change.

### 3.2.3 Theoretical Expectations

The available data suggest several alternative expectations involving the potential effect of self-efficacy on interest in running for office, assuming that Ukraine follows the democratic pattern outlined above.

First, higher levels of self-efficacy should encourage subjects to run for office. If respondents do not perceive political office as a socially appropriate activity, and the democratic pattern does not hold, they will disengage after their self-efficacy is increased.

Second, higher levels of collective efficacy should encourage subjects to run for office. If respondents do not perceive political office as a socially appropriate activity, and the democratic pattern does not hold, they will disengage after their collective efficacy is increased.

Third, the interaction of self- and collective efficacy should lead to the largest increase in nascent political ambition.

Fourth, if efficacy quadratically affects political engagement, then those with very high pre-treatment levels of self-efficacy and political efficacy will dissociate from the task.

Finally, if individuals have low outcome expectancies from running for office, then this action is unlikely to be taken [53, 59, 303].

## 3.3 Research Design

### 3.3.1 Participants

In 2018, I recruited 1,381 participants from Southern Ukraine. Running a field experiment in Southern Ukraine presents an opportunity to test the microlevel effect of self- and collective efficacy on nascent political engagement in the context of frustrated political agency. The region is more economically deprived and politically disengaged than the West, the North, and the Center (sampling in the East was not possible due to the war zone restrictions). The study is set in Kherson

oblast, a typical province of the Ukrainian South. As in the whole country, its electoral landscape is diverse and highly competitive, but suffers from elite capture and clientelism in electoral politics, learned helplessness and alienation from politics, and exposure to violence and an influx of internally displaced people. Political engagement of Southern Ukrainians has been suppressed by the collapse of the national government, political and ethnolinguistic polarization, and exacerbated by the Russia-backed military invasion and annexation of Crimea. The population remains skeptical of the actual benefits of democratic reforms. Most Khersonians do not know their local deputies [211]. The province features one of the lowest turnout rates in the country [212]. Most respondents in my sample either do not vote or refuse to disclose their political preferences.

A blocked randomization protocol was used on-the-spot to assign respondents to one of four blocks, which were formed based on their age (18–34, 35+) and gender, thus reducing sampling variability and increasing the precision of ATE estimates. The treatment is balanced across other covariates (language, education, and socioeconomic status).

The study was administered in seven locations, five of them in rural and suburban areas and two in the center of Kherson. All respondents received a small amount of monetary compensation at the end of the survey. The experiment was set in a lab-in-the-field, and the treatment assignment resulted in the reception of the treatment by all subjects. Subjects had personal ID cards with a masked group identifier during the experiment, ruling out the possibility of mistakenly treating a subject from the control condition or not administering the treatment on those in treated conditions.

### 3.3.2 Experiment

To measure the effects of self-efficacy and collective efficacy on nascent political ambition, I developed two experimental treatments to target a subjective sense of efficacy in a controlled laboratory condition. The experimental design isolates the specific effect of induced sense of efficacy by separately manipulating self-efficacy and collective efficacy.

Subjects in the first experimental condition (**self-efficacy**) received cognitive therapy which manipulated their self-efficacy by priming their awareness of personal successes. Importantly, the

treatment did not feature any political information with all examples being private (family relationships, personal or professional development). The only mechanism through which the treatment was expected to work is through the induction of self-efficacy. The treatment was delivered individually, both on screen and on paper. The details of the intervention are given in Appendix B.1.

Subjects in the second experimental condition (**collective efficacy**) were educated about recent community successes in recycling, infrastructure enhancement, property management, and anti-corruption school budget reforms. The design of the collective efficacy treatment repeated the structure of the self-efficacy one, prompting subjects to first receive some information on the topic and then reflect on their efficacy in achieving desirable outcomes. It targeted the most important aspects of collective efficacy: supporting one's sense of belonging to an active community, sharing skills for social action, engaging in deliberation, and pursuing public goals in collaboration with peers [117]. Respondents watched four videos commissioned specifically for the experiment and produced in partnership with local TV presenters for production quality and authenticity. The videos describe four original and successful real-life initiatives led by local residents: a new and transparent system of school budgeting, renovation of electricity infrastructure, the establishment of a homeowners' association, and a recycling campaign. All respondents filled in a short questionnaire with comprehension questions after they watched the videos which revealed that most of them watched the videos and correctly understood their content. The details of the intervention are given in Appendix B.2.

In the third group, cognitive therapy and videos were **combined**. The combined treatment caused the simultaneous induction of self- and collective efficacy. The difference between the treatments decomposes the effect of self-efficacy per se (the one manipulated in the first treatment) and the effect of collective efficacy. The interventions were merged to induce a sense of self- and collective efficacy. First, the respondents went through self-efficacy induction. Then, they proceeded to collective efficacy induction. The therapy preceded the videos because it was essential to prime the respondents' personal efficacy before they were exposed to the information

on community efficacy. An alternative design (civic education before cognitive therapy) would also be appropriate to a researcher interested in the effect of community potency on individual self-evaluation, but this dynamic is beyond the scope of this study. The design allowed me to decompose the effects of these two types of efficacy on nascent political ambition.

The **control group** had no cognitive or information intervention. I refrained from administering a placebo treatment because, in this case, it would be difficult to develop a single placebo for both self- and collective efficacy treatments (as they were administered in different formats). A separate design concern involving the control group was the between-group variation in the length of the experiment. However, the within-group variation in survey length was surprisingly high, and the length of the survey does not predict treatment outcomes or experimental compliance. The details of the experimental setup are discussed in Appendix A.

This experiment has high internal validity, since it specifically addresses the relevant concepts—in this case, self-efficacy and collective efficacy—while avoiding confounding their effects with, for example, information on government performance or indirect induction of internal and external political efficacy.

One of the potential pitfalls of similar experiments is low ecological validity, since in real life respondents would generally not be able to receive cognitive therapy to improve their self-efficacy. I claim that successful democracy promotion has externality effects similar to the ones achieved by directed cognitive therapy [337, 338, 164]. By enhancing the sense of agency, overcoming learned helplessness, and spreading information on the opportunities for political and social control over policy outcomes, democracy promotion improves sense of efficacy. Previous evidence shows that democracy promotion campaigns that provide political information without targeting efficacy fail to improve civic and political engagement [339, 210, 340], while successful democracy consolidation is associated with strong effects on political efficacy and political participation [86]. Ecological validity is also high because, as the research findings from US data consistently demonstrate, there is a connection between intentions to run for office and actual engagement. Fox and Lawless refer to nascent political ambition as the fundamental component of individual political motivation

[290]. Thus, making people declare their nascent political ambition is already an important step in evaluating their potential for running for office in the real world. Moreover, the experiment is ecologically valid because changes in self-efficacy were directly linked to individual-level changes in political ambition [8, p.457].

External validity, however, might be suppressed by the unique political context of the Ukrainian South. The experiment might deliver different results in the West of the country or if administered in convenience samples. The section on specific heterogeneity (Section 3.4.6) provides some preliminary assessment of how the potential directions of the effects might vary across various subsamples and demographic groups. Moreover, the respondents took the survey before the electoral campaign of 2019 began, such that their most recent electoral experience at that time was with the 2014–2015 cycle of snap presidential, parliamentary, and local elections. These elections suppressed political engagement in the East and South of Ukraine and reduced participation and turnout [341].

### 3.3.3 Outcomes

To evaluate nascent political ambition, I measure respondents' willingness to run for office at the city, regional, or national parliament, or to join a political party "to better defend their interests." I use a four-point Likert scale to measure their responses. I do not add questions about their intention to vote for several reasons. First, the voting ritual in the region is contentious. Pisano provides a comprehensive account of why voting in Ukraine is perceived as a ritualized theater rather than as a meaningful tool of political representation [33]. Second, adding a question about the intention to vote in the questionnaire could contaminate other responses, as respondents could have perceived the survey as a screening tool before the beginning of the 2019 presidential campaign. Third, narrowing political engagement to voting diverts our attention from those activities that imply more committed and frequent forms of political participation [24].

Following the framework suggested by Lawless and Fox, I focus on nascent political ambition, treating it as an important "precursor to expressive ambition and the strategic factors associated

with it” [290, p.644]. Nascent ambition—general interest in considering a candidacy—is essential for predicting the decision dynamics involved in transitioning “from potential candidate to actual officeholder.” [288, p.18].

### **3.4 Data Analysis**

#### **3.4.1 Pre-Treatment Efficacy and Past Candidacy**

I start by examining whether there are any associations between individual levels of efficacy and the experience of running for office in the past. This information is important for a couple of theoretical reasons. First, it is helpful to get a baseline estimate of the political experience of the respondents in my sample. Second, this exercise gives a sense of how various facets of individual efficacy might be associated with political experience in this sample.

I measure internal political efficacy as the belief about one’s opportunity to exert control over politics. My approach is nuanced because I ask my respondents to evaluate their degree of internal political efficacy at national, regional, city, and local levels of power separately. The subjective control over various levels of government is measured with a simple seven-point Likert scale from ‘definitely cannot exert control’ to ‘definitely can exert control,’ with the direction of the scale randomized across individuals.

Collective efficacy estimates the extent to which people such as the respondent are able to fight back against the abuse from authorities. This question indirectly addresses recent events in Ukrainian history— such as the Euromaidan—where civil society groups organized to defend their civil rights. This question also captures a vaguely defined category of ‘people like me’ and emphasizes the efficacious component, as it assumes the ability to self-organize and fight back the abuse. Collective efficacy was measured with a simple five-point Likert scale capturing agreement or disagreement with the statement that “people like me are completely helpless when in conflict with those in power.” The scale was later reversed to capture collective efficacy rather than collective helplessness.

Self-efficacy was measured in several ways. For the purposes of measuring its association




Figure 3.1: Probability of Running as Candidate by Levels of Efficacy



with propensity to run for office, I used three self-efficacy components that are directly related to self-described ability to achieve life goals. First, I asked respondents to estimate, on a five-point Likert scale, the strength of their control over the desired outcomes of their life. Higher values correspond to higher subjective ability to achieve self-defined goals. Second, I asked respondents to evaluate their potential to achieve goals. Respondents evaluated their subjective potential from low to high. Finally, they evaluated their ability to exercise self-control over high-commitment goals such as ‘sticking to one’s diet’ or ‘quitting smoking.’ Respondents also evaluated how often they abandoned their goals because they could not make themselves exercise self-control and grit. The scale is reversed to represent higher levels of self-control when achieving high-commitment goals.

Of my sample, 16.1% reported that they ran for public office in the past. I did not ask whether the office was at the local, regional, or national level out of privacy concerns and in anticipation of response falsification. The levels of reported past political engagement are similar across all three subsamples (Table A.1).

I proceed by estimating the effect of these facets of efficacy on the likelihood of having been a candidate in the past. Figure 3.1 reports the marginal effects of various forms of efficacy on the likelihood of having been a candidate. While this exercise is purely correlational and does not give us any information on how levels of efficacy affect the likelihood of running for office, it still reveals a number of surprising associations present in the data.

First, the associations of internal political efficacy at all levels of government are remarkably consistent. In all cases, the respondents who had an experience of running for office as a candidate display higher levels of internal political efficacy. The transition from the lowest level of internal political efficacy to the highest possible level is associated with a likelihood almost twice as high of the respondent having been a candidate in the past. At the national level, the difference between the likelihood of being a candidate is statistically significant when comparing the lowest level of efficacy (a 14% chance of being a candidate) with the highest level of efficacy (a 25% chance). At the regional and local levels, the shift from the lowest to the highest level of efficacy is associated

with a 9 percentage point change in the likelihood of being a candidate. At the city level, the shift from the lowest to the highest level of efficacy is associated with a 13 percentage point change. All of these comparisons are significant at the 0.001 level.

Second, there is a sharp contrast between the universally positive associations between the status of the candidate and the levels of internal political efficacy and a moderate, if not weak, association of the levels of collective efficacy and past candidacy. Respondents with the highest levels of collective efficacy are only 5 percentage points more likely to run for office than those with the lowest level of collective efficacy.

Third, and most surprisingly, the association between efficacy and candidacy disappears in the case of self-efficacy. Respondents with the highest self-described ability to achieve life goals are as likely to run for office as those who have no belief in their subjective ability to achieve self-defined goals (15% vs. 16%). A similar lack of difference is observed for people with various levels of subjective potential. Finally, there are zero differences in the marginal effects of the ability to exercise self-control over high-commitment goals—a truly unexpected result, given that political campaigning is one of the examples of a high-commitment goal.

Due to the observational nature of the data, it is hard to make any causal inference. I can, however, flag some irregularities that manifest themselves in the analysis. First, the absence of any connection between self-efficacy and candidacy goes against reliable findings from decades of research that I reviewed in the previous section. This suggests that either Ukrainians have a unique way of thinking about self-efficacy—I develop this argument in the first chapter of this dissertation—or, alternatively, that the experience of running for office lowers the self-efficacy of candidates, or else calibrates it to realistic levels. It would be helpful to evaluate whether the levels of efficacy of those who actually ran for office was different before and after their campaign, and, in case they won, during and after their term in office. Second, if the causation runs from being a candidate to internal political efficacy, then it is unclear why this experience has such similar effects on the perception of efficacy at all levels of government. Finally, in all cases where a significant association was detected, it was linear and positive. Thus we lack evidence for potentially non-

linear associations between efficacy and performance.

Two takeaways are especially helpful. First, in the sample presented, the difference between various facets of efficacy in the context of running for office is present, consistent, and clearly manifested. Respondents with previous experience of political campaigning report high levels of internal political efficacy, moderately high levels of collective efficacy, and do not differ from their less politically engaged peers in their levels of self-efficacy. Second, it is not clear if the experience of running for office damaged the perceptions of self-efficacy of past candidates. An additional analysis shows that only the self-control component of self-efficacy consistently predicts internal political and collective efficacy. This connection might suggest a mediating effect of internal political and collective efficacy in the link between self-control and subsequent political engagement (Figure E.1 and Table E.2). Thus, the experimental manipulation of self- and collective efficacy might shed light on the specifics of this association and the role of self-efficacy in fostering democratic participation.

### 3.4.2 Demographic Predictors of Expressive Political Efficacy

Another exercise available with observational data is exploring the predictors of expressive political efficacy in the control group (Table 3.4.2).

The results are somewhat similar to Western data in several regards. First, female respondents were less willing to run for office at all levels of government and slightly less likely to join a political party. This gender gap reinforces previous evidence for the consistent deficit of women's intentions to run for office [342, 343, 344, 326, 327]. The current Ukrainian sample, however, demonstrates a wider gender gap than the one reported in most US-based studies. Second, although Ukrainian speakers are a minority in the South, Ukrainian is the only official language of Ukraine, and thus Ukrainian speakers demonstrate a higher interest in running for regional and local offices than the national linguistic minority (Russian speakers)<sup>6</sup> [288, 347]. The association is reversed

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<sup>6</sup>There is an ongoing debate on whether language practice and ethnic identity predict political attitudes and behavior in Ukraine. Some scholars question the direct effect of ethnicity on voting patterns and policy issues [34], while others note its increasing relevance [345]. There is no consensus on whether the new nationalist turn in Ukrainian politics led to a shift in identities among Russian-speaking Ukrainians [47], and some approaches underscore the

for party membership, however, due to a variety of reasons: the higher acceptability of party membership among native Russian speakers; the recent ban on the Communist Party of Ukraine, a party that was popular in the region among Russian speakers; and relatively high incentives to run for office through the party system. Third, similarly to the available US data, people with previous experience in social activism and volunteerism were more interested in running for local parliament or joining a political party [347]. Finally, educated Ukrainians were more likely to express their interest in running for office, similarly to previous demographic studies [320, 348, 319, 322].

Some differences are present as well. First, unlike in US data, younger Ukrainians are much more willing to run for office for the national and regional parliament. This effect is likely to be cohort-based, since this particular generation of young Ukrainians is more politically savvy than their parents and grandparents, with previous studies finding similar effects in national samples [349, 350, 207, 198, 48]. Older people who socialized under communism have been shown to be less satisfied with democracy and less supportive of the new Ukrainian political regime [351, 48].

Second, past experience with electoral observing, running for office, and leading a civil society association does not predict intention to run for office. This is a surprising finding, given how important previous experience with political and civic engagement is for nascent political ambition [290, 8, 288, 352, 347]. Social activists were willing to consider city parliament as their potential career avenue, while past protesters were more interested in joining a political party.

Altogether, these findings suggest that demographically, Ukraine's likely political candidates are not dramatically different from the rest of the democratic world: they are likely to be male, well-educated, wealthy, experienced in social activism, and from the linguistic majority. At the same time, the connection between collective efficacy and expressive political efficacy seems to be more complicated than in US and Western European data, as individuals with past experience in

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rapidly changing meaning of Ukrainianness and Russianness altogether as well as the dual effect of ethnic identity on polarization and political attitudes [77, 346]. Onuch suggests that Ukrainian civil society leans toward moderate policy proposals and prioritizes the development of a unifying civic identity [46].

electoral observation, association leadership, and political activism are similarly likely to have an interest in political elective office as the rest of the sample.

Table 3.1: Predictors of Expressive Political Efficacy (Control Group)

	National Parliament	Regional Parliament	City Parliament	Party Membership
Activists Pool <sup>1</sup>	0.049 (0.177)	-0.041 (0.180)	0.037 (0.170)	0.214 (0.182)
Facebook Pool <sup>1</sup>	-0.172 (0.191)	0.151 (0.186)	-0.023 (0.183)	0.188 (0.180)
Past Electoral Observer <sup>2</sup>	-0.086 (0.164)	0.007 (0.161)	0.181 (0.157)	-0.016 (0.162)
Past Candidate <sup>3</sup>	0.286 (0.175)	-0.139 (0.190)	0.057 (0.188)	0.256 (0.185)
Past Association Leader <sup>4</sup>	0.102 (0.208)	-0.143 (0.203)	0.175 (0.203)	0.212 (0.212)
Past Social Activist <sup>5</sup>	0.063 (0.191)	0.340* (0.192)	0.503*** (0.185)	0.003 (0.188)
Past Protester <sup>6</sup>	0.143 (0.168)	-0.100 (0.171)	-0.028 (0.163)	0.345** (0.152)
Past Volunteer <sup>7</sup>	0.008 (0.186)	0.295 (0.183)	0.138 (0.178)	0.261 (0.170)
Female <sup>8</sup>	-0.451*** (0.149)	-0.527*** (0.156)	-0.444*** (0.149)	-0.282* (0.145)
Ukrainian Speaker <sup>9</sup>	0.042 (0.195)	0.380* (0.198)	0.377** (0.187)	-0.407** (0.190)
Higher Education <sup>10</sup>	0.144* (0.087)	0.243*** (0.091)	0.162* (0.085)	0.137* (0.078)
Age <sup>11</sup>	-0.015*** (0.005)	-0.011* (0.005)	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.0002 (0.005)
Middle Class <sup>12</sup>	0.058 (0.096)	0.195** (0.095)	0.201** (0.091)	-0.094 (0.091)
Constant	-0.395 (0.416)	-1.226*** (0.454)	-1.197*** (0.424)	-0.229 (0.378)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01. Binary probit models. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

Reference categories for predictors: 1: recruited by random sampling on streets; 2: has never been an electoral observer; 3: has never been a candidate; 4: has never been an association leader; 5: has never been a social activist; 6: has never volunteered; 7: has never protested; 8: male; 9: Russian speaker; 10: college degree; 11: 18 y.o.; 12: lower middle class.

### 3.4.3 Average Treatment Effects

The experiment manipulates sense of self- and collective efficacy to estimate their causal effects on political engagement. First, I estimate average intent-to-treat effects with generalized linear models of the following format:

$$Party_{i,j} = \gamma_1 * Self_i + \gamma_2 * Collective_i + \gamma_3 * Combined_i + X_i\lambda + \mu_j + \epsilon_{i,j}$$

$$City\ Parliament_{i,j} = \gamma_1 * Self_i + \gamma_2 * Collective_i + \gamma_3 * Combined_i + X_i\lambda + \mu_j + \epsilon_{i,j}$$

$$Regional\ Parliament_{i,j} = \gamma_1 * Self_i + \gamma_2 * Collective_i + \gamma_3 * Combined_i + X_i\lambda + \mu_j + \epsilon_{i,j}$$

$$National\ Parliament_{i,j} = \gamma_1 * Self_i + \gamma_2 * Collective_i + \gamma_3 * Combined_i + X_i\lambda + \mu_j + \epsilon_{i,j}$$

In each of the models,  $Party_{i,j}$ ,  $City\ Parliament_{i,j}$ ,  $Regional\ Parliament_{i,j}$ , and, finally,  $National\ Parliament_{i,j}$  are outcome measures, estimated with linear least squares, binomial logistic, and ordered logistic regressions; Self-, Collective, and Combined Efficacy are the indicators of treatment assignment to each of the experimental groups;  $X_i$  is a vector of covariates that includes gender, language, education, age, and socioeconomic status;  $\mu_j$  is a block randomization dummy; and  $\epsilon_{i,j}$  is a disturbance term. The  $i$  subscript stands for individual subjects, the  $j$  subscript stands for blocks. I use inverse probability weights and robust standard errors in all model specifications [242].

I start by examining the average treatment effects of three experimental conditions as they pertain to the respondents' declared intention to run for office as an independent candidate or as a member of a political party. Figure 3.2 shows the effects of the experimental induction of self- and collective efficacy on reported political intentions. The left column shows the distribution of responses in all treatment groups and in the control group. The responses are displayed on a Likert scale from 1 to 4, where '1' is a definite refusal to run for office (displayed in a dark red color) and '4' is a definite intention to run for office (displayed in a dark blue color). The right column shows the estimated average treatment effect of the induction of efficacy on four political activities with corresponding Bell–McCaffrey confidence intervals (Table E.18) [243].

The graphs show that, on average, the control group was skeptical of any political activities except joining a political party. Complete summary statistics for the mean outcomes in the control group can be found in Table E.1.




Figure 3.2: Change in Reported Attitudes towards Political Engagement

Table 3.2: Average Treatment Effects on Joining a Political Party

	<i>Dependent variable: Intention to Join a Political Party</i>					
	OLS		Ordered Logit		Binary Logit	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Self-Efficacy	-0.064 (0.071)	-0.059 (0.070)	-0.132 (0.199)	-0.125 (0.200)	-0.170 (0.149)	-0.161 (0.150)
Collective Efficacy	0.006 (0.069)	0.009 (0.069)	0.283 (0.225)	0.290 (0.226)	0.018 (0.156)	0.019 (0.157)
Combined	-0.016 (0.071)	-0.006 (0.071)	-0.049 (0.206)	-0.028 (0.207)	0.013 (0.153)	0.032 (0.155)
Female		-0.092* (0.053)		0.171 (0.156)		-0.199* (0.117)
Ukrainian		-0.106 (0.070)		-0.055 (0.204)		-0.409*** (0.150)
Higher Education		0.089*** (0.027)		0.120 (0.078)		0.196*** (0.060)
Constant	2.612*** (0.048)	2.339*** (0.146)	1.695*** (0.141)	0.925** (0.421)	0.375*** (0.103)	-0.254 (0.322)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

Neither self-efficacy, collective efficacy, nor their combined condition, caused any changes in interest in joining a political party. The null effects are consistent across various model specifications (Table E.14). The models with covariates (2, 4, and 6) show that of all demographic groups, Russian-speaking educated males were most interested in joining a party. In the control group, the average interest in joining a political party was 2.74 out of 4 for Russian-speaking males and 2.55 out of 4 for Ukrainian-speaking females. These characteristics, however, do not interact with the receipt of the treatment.

The case of the city parliament, however, delivers a striking result. Both self-efficacy and collective efficacy conditions *suppressed* the intention to run for city parliament. Moreover, as shown on Figure 3.2, both treatments increased the share of those respondents who *definitely* would refuse to run for office at the city level, and apparently, most of them came from the group of those who would have been slightly negative towards the idea of running for city office.

The results of six models with different types of estimators shed light on the specifics of this effect (Table E.15). In models that estimate the average difference in the intention to run for city office (1 and 2), both self-efficacy and collective efficacy negatively predict the outcome. In the control group, the average level of interest in running for city office was 2.22 out of 4 (note that the baseline is not high enough to cause a ceiling effect). The assignment to the self-efficacy con-



dition decreases this value to 2.06, and the assignment to the collective efficacy condition trims it as low as 2.01. Similarly, adjusted and unadjusted ordered logistical regressions show that ordered log-odds estimates comparing treatment subjects to control subjects on expected intention to run for city office given the other variables are held constant are  $-0.308$  and  $-0.405$ . Being in the self-efficacy treatment group increases the probability of *definitely* refusing to run for office from 34.77% to 42.05%, and being in the collective efficacy condition increases this probability to 44.42%, all else held constant. That is, an increase in self-efficacy corresponds to an increase in the probability of *definitely* refusing to run for local office by 5 percentage points, and an increase in collective efficacy does the same for the probability of *definitely* refusing to run for local office by 7.3 percentage points.

Table 3.3: Average Treatment Effects on Running for Office in City Parliament

	<i>Dependent variable: Intention to Run for City Parliament</i>					
	OLS		Ordered Logit		Binary Logit	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Self-Efficacy	-0.155*	-0.149*	-0.308**	-0.311**	-0.180	-0.179
	(0.081)	(0.078)	(0.152)	(0.155)	(0.153)	(0.157)
Collective Efficacy	-0.212**	-0.195**	-0.405***	-0.397**	-0.233	-0.217
	(0.083)	(0.080)	(0.157)	(0.161)	(0.160)	(0.163)
Combined	-0.115	-0.088	-0.264*	-0.232	-0.024	0.027
	(0.083)	(0.081)	(0.155)	(0.160)	(0.154)	(0.159)
Female		-0.266***		-0.314***		-0.404***
		(0.062)		(0.120)		(0.121)
Higher Education		0.169***		0.256***		0.349***
		(0.030)		(0.061)		(0.067)
Age		-0.009***		-0.019***		-0.015***
		(0.002)		(0.004)		(0.004)
Constant	2.218***	2.110***	0.629***	0.722**	-0.455***	-1.040***
	(0.056)	(0.174)	(0.107)	(0.333)	(0.104)	(0.356)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

These effects, however, disappear in the binary logit model specifications (5 and 6)<sup>7</sup>. When we measure the effect as a binary variable that combines *definite* and *possible* response choices together, the effects are no longer visible. Indeed, the main negative shift happened in the increased share of the respondents who decided that they *definitely* do not plan to bother running for city office and those respondents who decided to add some uncertainty in their decision to definitely run. The induction of collective efficacy also suppressed the share of the respondents who definitely

<sup>7</sup>The effect, however, is present when using unmodified standard errors.

wanted to run for office at the local level. Models E.3 and E.4 contain additional estimations of these dynamics.

As in the case of joining a political party, in general, educated men are most interested in running for office. In the case of the city parliament, we also see that younger people were more interested in running for office. Language does not predict the outcome variable but has a negative interaction effect with collective and combined conditions (the interaction effects are marginally significant at the 0.01 and 0.1 levels). Both Russian and Ukrainian speakers responded negatively to the collective efficacy treatment, but the negative shift was relatively stronger in the case of Ukrainian speakers. None of the remaining tested covariates significantly interacts with the treatment.

Surprisingly, while the priming of self- and collective efficacy *decreased* the intention to run for city office, the combined condition did not result in any significant effects. I return to this phenomenon in the discussion section (3.5).

Table 3.4: Average Treatment Effects on Running for Office in Regional Parliament

	<i>Dependent variable: Intention to Run for Regional Parliament</i>					
	OLS		Ordered Logit		Binary Logit	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Self-Efficacy	-0.064 (0.079)	-0.060 (0.076)	-0.114 (0.150)	-0.111 (0.153)	-0.200 (0.160)	-0.208 (0.166)
Collective Efficacy	-0.111 (0.081)	-0.095 (0.078)	-0.237 (0.155)	-0.227 (0.160)	-0.132 (0.165)	-0.120 (0.170)
Combined	-0.079 (0.081)	-0.057 (0.079)	-0.213 (0.152)	-0.185 (0.157)	-0.219 (0.163)	-0.193 (0.170)
Female		-0.322*** (0.061)		-0.373*** (0.119)		-0.695*** (0.128)
Higher Education		0.129*** (0.029)		0.218*** (0.061)		0.288*** (0.068)
Age		-0.012*** (0.002)		-0.024*** (0.004)		-0.024*** (0.004)
Constant	2.071*** (0.054)	2.259*** (0.164)	0.413*** (0.104)	0.870*** (0.329)	-0.702*** (0.108)	-0.562 (0.361)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

In the case of the regional parliament, none of the treatments resulted in any significant change in the intention to run for office, although visually both the self- and collective treatments seem to suppress the outcome variable. Demographically, the most interested respondents were, as in the case of city parliament, younger, more educated, and male. Similarly, the collective and combined

treatments negatively interacted with the condition of being a Ukrainian speaker. None of the remaining tested covariates significantly interacts with the treatment.

The results for the national parliament are similar. None of the treatments resulted in any significant change in the intention to run for office. Demographically, the most interested respondents were, as in the case of city and regional parliament, younger, more educated, and male. Additional analysis shows that the fact of being a Ukrainian speaker negatively interacted with the combined treatment, and this covariate is the only one that significantly interacts with the treatment.

Table 3.5: Average Treatment Effects on Running for Office in National Parliament

	<i>Dependent variable: Intention to Run for National Parliament</i>					
	OLS		Ordered Logit		Binary Logit	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Self-Efficacy	-0.005 (0.086)	-0.0002 (0.082)	-0.143 (0.148)	-0.146 (0.154)	0.091 (0.158)	0.107 (0.169)
Collective Efficacy	-0.005 (0.088)	0.011 (0.083)	-0.096 (0.154)	-0.081 (0.161)	0.174 (0.163)	0.207 (0.174)
Combined	0.043 (0.088)	0.067 (0.083)	-0.049 (0.151)	-0.017 (0.158)	0.129 (0.160)	0.184 (0.171)
Female		-0.437*** (0.066)		-0.510*** (0.119)		-0.825*** (0.127)
Ukrainian		-0.143* (0.084)		-0.352** (0.155)		-0.248 (0.172)
Higher Education		0.127*** (0.031)		0.200*** (0.061)		0.245*** (0.067)
Age		-0.016*** (0.002)		-0.028*** (0.004)		-0.032*** (0.004)
Constant	2.060*** (0.058)	2.558*** (0.178)	0.254** (0.102)	1.171*** (0.331)	-0.800*** (0.110)	-0.065 (0.362)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01  
Robust standard errors (Lin) are in parentheses.

### 3.4.4 Bootstrap Confidence Intervals

This initial analysis leaves us with several puzzles. First, how strong and reliable are the revealed negative effects of self-efficacy and collective efficacy? How heterogeneous are these observed effects? Second, do null average effects for all treatments on joining a party and running for regional and national parliament also imply a lack of causal effect on any unit? Do null average treatment effects also entail the lack of any predicted individual causal effect? Finally, *why* do self- and collective efficacy treatments cause a negative average treatment effect while the combined treatment does not?




Figure 3.3: Tests of Sharp Null Hypotheses

I start by running a series of sharp null hypothesis tests. The hypotheses assume that the treatments of interest have no effect on any respondent. To test the hypotheses, I generate a number of sampling distributions of the test statistics under the sharp null hypothesis by simulating 10,000 random assignments for each treatment. P-values for each of the test statistics are calculated by comparing the observed test statistic to the distribution of test statistics under the null hypothesis of no treatment effect [241].

Figure 3.3 illustrates the idea behind the test. The left column shows the density plots generated from the simulated average treatment effects under the sharp null hypothesis. The right column shows the same simulated average treatment effects in a histogram form. Each histogram has three shaded areas that correspond to the proportion of average treatment effects under each treatment condition that are observed by random chance.

The observed average treatment effects are not different from the random assignments for the intention to run for national office and interest in joining a political party. For both variables, this test cannot reject the sharp null hypothesis of no effect on any unit for any treatment condition.

The results of the simulations generated for city parliament confirm the results obtained from simple regression estimates. The average treatment effect estimated for the collective efficacy condition is very unlikely to be obtained by pure chance (the calculated two-sided p-value is 0.01). The average treatment effect in the self-efficacy condition is also quite unlikely to be attained randomly (the two-sided p-value is 0.05). I conservatively report the two-sided p-values even though my original hypotheses on the effects of efficacy assumed a positive direction of the effect. The results of the analysis for the combined condition cannot rule out the sharp null hypothesis of no effect on any unit.

Finally, the results for the regional parliament are quite interesting. On the one hand, the observed ATEs might be obtained by chance in 18% of trials—a number large enough to fail to reject the sharp null hypothesis. The one-sided p-value, however, is less than 10%, and the patterns of average treatment effects very closely resemble the ones observed for city parliament in the same treatment condition. The suppressing effect can be seen in Figure 3.2 as well.

Primary conclusions from the sharp null hypothesis tests are as follows. First, if the treatments indeed caused a significant change in the world, then this change would almost certainly be negative. The induction of two separate facets of efficacy suppressed willingness to run for local and, potentially, regional parliament. Second, there is no detectable effect exerted by any of the experimental conditions on the intention to join a political party and to run for national office. Third, it seems that the priming of collective efficacy has the strongest negative effect on nascent political ambition.

### 3.4.5 General Heterogeneity

To explore potential heterogeneity in these results, I run predictive generalized random forest models [244, 245]. These models are based on a supervised learning algorithm that predicts the expected difference between the control and the treatment groups and accounts for the treatment assignment. First, I randomly split each treatment-control sample into two subsets: a training one (60% of each sample) and a testing one (40% of that same sample). Then, I use available pre-treatment covariates to build a causal forest model and test this model on a testing subset, calculating individual predicted treatment effects for otherwise demographically identical respondents by comparing the results of the treatment assignment for those who were randomized to the treatment group to the results for those who were randomized to the control group. The outcome looks like a sequence of predicted individual treatment effects, and I sort them by value to demonstrate the whole potential range of predicted treatment effects. Note that this exercise does not provide causal inference. Instead, it is a way to get a better sense of potential dispersion in the response of respondents with different pre-treatment covariates to the treatment.

Figure 3.4 shows the results of this exercise bounded by 95% confidence intervals. Note that the intervals are wide because my testing subsets are very small, and thus should be interpreted accordingly.

First, some of these caterpillars cross the zero line. This means that for some respondents with some combination of pre-treatment characteristics, the treatment caused a positive effect, while for




Figure 3.4: Causal Forests for Predicted Individual Treatment Effects

others the effect was negative. The stark examples include the predicted effects of the self-efficacy treatment on the intention to run for national parliament and the effect of combined efficacy on the intention to run for regional and national parliament.

Second, it seems that the collective efficacy treatment resulted in negative predicted individual treatment effects for intentions to run for city and regional parliament but caused some positive predicted effects in the case of joining a political party and running for national parliament. This suggests that the negative average treatment effects caused by the collective efficacy treatment are also observed at the individual level, and it is unlikely that this treatment caused any increase in the intention to run for city or regional parliament for any of the respondents. At the same time, the treatment is not entirely suppressing: some individual treatment effects were in the positive zone for intention to join a political party or run for national government.

Finally, while we cannot use the available experimental data to explain this divergence, since these characteristics are endogenous and the predicted models are not precise enough, it makes sense to look into conditional average treatment effects for specific subgroups to get a better understanding of the interaction of the treatments with pre-treatment covariates.

### 3.4.6 Specific Heterogeneity

#### *Activists vs. the People*

Out of all the pre-treatment information collected from the respondents, one covariate is less prone to biased reporting and falsification. I recruited subjects in three completely different ways. Some of them were randomly sampled from streets, some were approached via emails distributed among active members of homeowners' associations, and some were recruited online via a targeted Facebook ad through local news feeds. The subjects from each recruitment group never mixed with other recruitment groups. Thus, we can be fairly certain that those belonging to the subsample of activists are *actually* active in local politics and those recruited via Facebook are *actually* interested in local politics in Southern Ukraine.

Figure 3.5 shows conditional average treatment effects measured by ordinary least squares






Figure 3.5: Conditional Average Treatment Effects by Recruitment Group

regressions and calculated separately for each recruitment group (“streets,” “activists,” and “Facebook”). The outcome variables are binary variables with Bell–McCaffrey confidence intervals. We see that there are some moderate differences in the ways each recruitment group responded to the treatment. For the change in reported interest in joining a political party, activists showed a marginally significant negative effect upon the induction of self-efficacy. That is, after being primed to think about their potential and self-esteem, activists expressed a marginally lower interest in political parties than the rest of the sample. Neither collective nor combined efficacy treatments had a similar effect. In Section 3.4.6 below, I look into specific prior civic experience to get a better understanding of this phenomenon.

We know that self-efficacy and collective efficacy treatment inductions suppressed average interest in running for city parliament. The partitioning of the sample shows that this negative effect was especially pronounced in the subsamples recruited through activist listservs and Facebook ads. For the subjects recruited from the streets, the effect was seemingly null.

The expressed change in interest in running for regional parliament is very similar to the expressed change in interest in running for city parliament in the self-efficacy group. After reflecting on their self-efficacy, both activists and, especially, Facebook users expressed lower interest in running for office as compared to the control group.

The results for change in intention to run for national parliament are inconclusive, although some alternative specifications of the model suggest a negative interaction of activist status with the combined treatment. The only clear takeaway here is that the least sophisticated group without a clear activist background and lesser online activity apparently did not change its attitudes at all and most of the negative effects that we observe come from two politically sophisticated groups. Two explanations are plausible here. First, it might be that activists and Facebook users already had a higher level of individual efficacy and the induction of the treatment caused a backlash. This explanation, however, does not clarify why self-efficacy was the most suppressing treatment of all three, nor why the city and, partially, regional parliaments were the targets of the highest defection. Second, the knowledge that activists and active consumers of local news possess regarding local

politics might have interacted with the treatments in a way that did not happen in the street sample. I suggest several qualitative explanations for this effect in Section 3.5.

The analysis of heterogeneous treatment effects in these subgroups confirms the above findings. Figure E.2 in Appendix E.4 shows that the respondents from the street sample remained largely unaffected by the treatments when deciding to join a political party or run for city parliament. Their efficacy, however, improved their interest in the regional and national parliaments, and did so in the way that one would expect: the collective efficacy condition caused positive marginally significant individual treatment effects, and some of the combined condition's individual treatment effects are positive. In other words, the combination of individual and collective empowerment caused some reevaluation of political ambitions in the street sample and made them more interested in running for regional or national parliament.

The opposite happened among two politically sophisticated samples (see Figure E.3 and Figure E.4 in Appendix E.4). Generalized random forest models for the activist samples show that all negative treatment effects are homogeneous and consistent—especially in the case of the observed negative effect of collective efficacy on interest in running for city parliament (Figure E.3). The very same predicted individual treatment effects are seen in the local news consumers sample (a completely different set of people!), with a negative shift in the case of city parliament for all treatment groups and in the case of regional parliament for self- and combined efficacy conditions (Figure E.4).

The partitioning of the sample shows that the negative average treatment effects observed in the collective efficacy condition for city parliament may be predominantly driven by the responses from the subsamples of activists and local news consumers. This is a crucial insight that has larger implications for the analysis of political efficacy in Southern Ukraine and indeed any regime with a long-term history of political apathy and corruption within political institutions. Something about the prior knowledge about local politics made civically engaged people less willing to run for city and regional parliament when reminded about their self- and collective efficacy, leaving their interest in political parties and national parliament mostly unchanged. Moreover, the groups of

activists and active Facebook users responded to the treatment in a very similar way. This shows that it is not the activist experience per se but rather the engagement and immersion into the local political context that might explain their response to efficacy-inducing treatments.

### *Prior Self-, Collective, and Political Efficacy*

Another way to explain the differences between more and less politically sophisticated groups is to examine the interaction effects between prior levels of self-, collective, and political efficacy and the treatment assignment. The logic of this analysis is straightforward: given what we know about the quadratic effect of efficacy on performance, it may be the case that the negative effects of self- and collective efficacy, especially among activists, are explained by the treatments moving their efficacy too high to consider local political opportunities as a worthwhile endeavor.

Figure 3.6 shows the results of 32 ordered logistical regression models with robust standard errors<sup>8</sup>. For each outcome variable (running for national, regional, and city parliaments as well as joining a political party), the table shows the extracted interaction coefficients of self-efficacy treatment assignment with eight facets of individual efficacy: subjective potential, self-control, control over desired outcomes, collective efficacy, as well as local, city, regional, and national political efficacy. The facets are the same that were used for the pre-treatment efficacy analysis in section 3.4.1. Self-efficacy is measured as subjective potential, self-control, and control over desired outcomes that refers to the ability to achieve self-defined goals. “National political,” “regional political,” “city political,” and “local political” correspond to four levels of internal political efficacy. “Collective” refers to collective efficacy. A negative coefficient assumes that with each subsequent level of a certain type of efficacy, the likelihood of switching to a higher value of intention to run for office or join a political party in the treatment group decreases more than in the control group, all else equal. A positive coefficient assumes that with each subsequent level of a certain type of efficacy, the likelihood of switching to a higher value of intention to run for office or join a political party in the treatment group increases more than in the control group, all else

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
<sup>8</sup>The tabular forms of all 96 models used in Figures 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8 are available in Appendix E.5

equal. As a rule of thumb, the interaction terms are statistically significant when their confidence intervals do not straddle zero.

First, pattern of the interaction between the type of efficacy and the self-efficacy induction is similar to the one that we observed in the pre-treatment correlational analysis. Again, political and non-political efficacies behave differently. In the case of the self-efficacy treatment, those with higher levels of internal political efficacy, and especially with higher levels of national and regional internal political efficacy, were *less* likely to run for national, regional, and city parliaments after the treatment. Note that the results are not present for local internal political efficacy and do not extend to the intention to join a political party.

To get a better sense of this effect, I look at the interaction effect of national-level internal political efficacy and the self-efficacy treatment when applied to the intention to run for city parliament (Figure E.5). Not only does the likelihood of agreeing to run for city parliament decrease in the self-efficacy group as compared to the control group, but also this decrease manifests itself in a more pronounced way with each subsequent level of national-level internal political efficacy. This is unlikely to be a result of the bottom effect—those with the lowest levels of internal political efficacy still have enough room below their current interest in running for city parliament. What might be happening here is a calibration of prior expectations. Those with very high pre-treatment levels of internal political efficacy after the boost of self-efficacy might have felt that they are less interested in running for local office as compared to their peers in the control group. As in the case of collective efficacy, those who are efficacious both politically (pre-treatment) and personally (post-treatment) felt less interested in running for local office.

The induction of collective efficacy, however, did interact with one component of self-efficacy—subjective potential (Figure 3.7). The respondents with higher levels of subjective potential reported higher intentions to run for national parliament, city parliament, and marginally — for regional parliament. Figure E.6 illustrates this effect. For example, 32% of the control group's respondents with a high subjective potential expressed their interest to run for national parliament (95% CI: 25% to 40%)—a number similar to the 29% of the respondents with the lowest sub-




**Interaction Effects of Pre-Test Efficacy Levels and Self-Efficacy Induction**

Figure 3.6: Self-Efficacy Treatment and Prior Self-, Collective, and Political Efficacy

jective potential who also decided to run for national parliament in the control group (95% CI: 17% to 40%). The induction of collective efficacy and combined efficacy primarily affected those with a higher subjective potential—42% in the collective efficacy group expressed an interest in running for national parliament after the treatment (although the confidence intervals partially overlap). Moreover, those with lowest subjective potential were *discouraged* from running for office as compared to the control group, and the differences between lower and higher potential subjects are significant in both collective and combined efficacy groups. What this means is that the information regarding collective successes increased the relative political ambitions of those who were already high-achievers. The induction of collective efficacy—either in its pure form or combined with self-efficacy—differentially affected those with various levels of pre-treatment self-efficacy.

On the contrary, pre-treatment political efficacy does not interact with the induction of collective efficacy when predicting intention to run for office (Figure 3.7). National-level internal political efficacy has a negative interaction with collective efficacy in the context of joining a political party. Pre-treatment collective efficacy does not interact with the induction of collective efficacy.


Finally, the treatment of combined efficacy displays similar interaction patterns with all efficacy covariates, albeit with interaction terms that are less significant than in the case of the collective efficacy induction. For example, subjective potential interacts with the treatment in the context of running for national parliament and, marginally significant at the 0.1 level, in the context of running for regional parliament. Internal political efficacy displays the same weak tendency to negatively interact with the treatment, although the results are only marginally significant and are detectable only for some types of internal political efficacy (the most surprising of all interactions being the negative interaction of city-level internal political efficacy with combined efficacy in the context of running for the city office). Collective efficacy and other components of self-efficacy do not interact with the treatment. None of the interactions played any role in affecting intention to join a political party.



**Interaction Effects of Pre-Test Efficacy Levels and Collective Efficacy Induction**

Figure 3.7: Collective Efficacy Treatment and Prior Self-, Collective, and Political Efficacy





**Interaction Effects of Pre-Test Efficacy Levels and Combined Efficacy Induction**


Figure 3.8: Combined Efficacy Treatment and Prior Self-, Collective, and Political Efficacy

### *Prior Political and Civic Experience*

Finally, to rule out the hypothesis of mediating effects that are imposed by previous civic or political experience, I report the results of the models that estimate the interaction between treatment conditions and reported civic and political experience. Given that activists displayed a lower interest in politics after the induction of collective efficacy, I start by testing the effects of being a homeowners' association leader; attending a public protest, rally, or demonstration; having volunteer experience; creating an initiative group or social movement; being a member of an electoral commission or an electoral observer with an enhanced legal status; and taking part in elections as a candidate. The tabular forms of the data below are given in Appendix E.8.

Figure 3.9 displays the interaction terms from 24 ordered logistic regression models, produced as described in the previous section. All the covariates, in this case, are binary ('1' stands for being a candidate, and '0' stands for not being one), and thus the magnitude of the interaction effects is different from the figures in the previous section. For this reason, direct comparisons of the interaction effects should not be made. As we can see, self-efficacy induction does not interact with any of the covariates in its effect on running for national parliament. With regard to regional and city parliaments, the patterns are very similar: being a social activist in the past negatively interacts with the self-efficacy treatment.

Figure E.7 shows what this association looks like more specifically. Activists and non-activists had a distinctive pre-treatment gap in the likelihood of running for regional and city parliaments. Exposure to self-efficacy treatment in any form—separately or as part of the combined efficacy condition—essentially closes the gap, reducing activists' intentions to run for office. The collective efficacy treatment did not induce any changes. One explanation might be the enforcement of self-reliability that happens during the self-efficacy treatment. To be clear, the treatment does not make people believe blindly in their invincibility. Instead, it helps them to evaluate how they can constructively achieve *realistic and feasible* goals using their own energy and efficacy. This would explain why social activists, volunteers, and protesters became less excited about the opportunity to join a political party—either being a party member does not help them in their desired goal,



**Interaction Effects of Past Experience and Self-Efficacy Induction**

Figure 3.9: Self-Efficacy Treatment and Prior Political Experience

or they feel empowered enough to realize political ambitions outside of the available institutional structure.

The induction of collective efficacy does not significantly interact with any covariates except for the experience of having been an electoral observer (Figure 3.10). Past observers or/and members of electoral commissions became more willing to run for office at the national and regional level upon being exposed to the information on community successes. In other words, people with past experience of ensuring electoral transparency were nudged towards higher political ambitions by collective efficacy induction.


Surprisingly, no interaction effect was detected between combined efficacy and past experiences (Figure 3.11), although Figure E.7 suggests that collective efficacy also suppressed the desire of social activists to run for office.

## 3.5 Discussion

### 3.5.1 Summary of Empirical Results


The primary results of the analysis suggest that efficacy matters for political engagement, albeit not in the way that observational data from Western contexts would predict. The evidence presented above shows that higher self-efficacy and collective efficacy separately lead to increased skepticism in local political institutions and *suppress* the intention to run for city parliament. The identified negative effects of self- and collective efficacy induction on the intention to run for city parliament are reliable and unlikely to be observed by chance. For a typical respondent (a Russian-speaking 40-year-old female), an increase in self-efficacy or collective efficacy suppresses the desire to run for city parliament.

The induction of self- and collective efficacy does not, on average, change the intention to join a political party or run for national and regional parliaments. The null hypotheses of no causal effect on any unit were not rejected in the case of joining a political party and running for regional and national parliament. The mediation analyses, however, suggest that the decrease in the intention to run for city parliament might cancel out the positive average direct effect of efficacy induction on



**Interaction Effects of Past Experience and Collective Efficacy Induction**

Figure 3.10: Collective Efficacy Treatment and Prior Political Experience



**Interaction Effects of Past Experience and Combined Efficacy Induction**

Figure 3.11: Combined Efficacy Treatment and Prior Political Experience

attitudes towards the national parliament (see Appendix E.9).

### *Collective Efficacy*

The induction of collective efficacy by the exposure to local success stories and civic role models made the subjects less interested in running for city parliament. Given that conditional average treatment effects and individual predicted treatment effects for activists, Ukrainian-speakers, the civically engaged, and politically sophisticated respondents were more negative than those of their counterparts, several explanations might be in play.

The analysis of the interaction effects between collective efficacy treatment and pre-treatment covariates shows that baseline values of self- and collective efficacy are predictive of the treatment heterogeneity. For instance, people with high pre-treatment subjective potential had a strong and positive conditional average treatment effect produced by the induction of collective efficacy and reported higher interest in running for national parliament, city parliament, and, marginally, for regional parliament.

First, it might be the case that the induction of collective efficacy reminded respondents that they can achieve feasible civic results without necessarily being integrated into the existing structures of the local political system. In this case, higher collective efficacy came in conflict with their internal political efficacy. Second, it might also be the case that politically sophisticated respondents found the videos either less convincing or plainly naïve. Then, the negative average effects in the context of city parliament are the results of a backlash in their local-level internal political efficacy. Further examination with causal random forest models suggests that self- and combined efficacy treatments might have resulted in heterogeneous individual responses. The predicted individual treatment effects of politically sophisticated subsamples of activists and active local news consumers are consistently negative in the case of city parliament for all treatment groups and in the case of regional parliament for self-efficacy and combined efficacy conditions.

### *Self-Efficacy*

The induction of self-efficacy exerted similar effects on political engagement, suggesting that, on average, two types of non-political efficacy acted as substitutes. The treatments that involved the induction of self-efficacy induced more heterogeneous responses than did the induction of collective efficacy. The perception of the induction of self-efficacy interacts with pre-treatment levels of political efficacy. Those with higher levels of national and regional internal political efficacy were *less* likely to run for national, regional, and city parliament after the receipt of the self-efficacy treatment. The exposure to self-efficacy treatment, separately or as part of the combined efficacy condition, reduced intentions to run for office among social activists and volunteers. Either being a party member does not help them in their desired goal, or they feel empowered enough to realize political ambitions outside available institutional structures.

Vancouver et al. show that higher-than-realistic self-efficacy leads to overconfidence [135]. Preece, in another experiment on self-efficacy induction, finds a similar effect, as the treatment closed the gap between activists and non-activists after she provided her subjects with adequate information on their performance. I do not think my experiment's self-efficacy treatment made respondents overconfident, as its locus of control component should have primed them to make decisions within the constraints of their actual abilities. However, it might be the case that individuals with high internal political efficacy decided not to run for regional and local parliament because they considered these outlets as unworthy or because they preferred to control deputies and could not picture themselves as the ones being controlled. For the same reason, those who had higher pre-treatment self-efficacy levels accepted the challenge of running for all levels of government after the induction of collective efficacy: it added the necessary collective component to those who believed in their opportunities in life.

#### 3.5.2 Limitations

As with any large-scale experimental endeavor, the limitations are many. Most importantly, this experiment reflects the political aspirations of Southern Ukrainians in 2018. In the ever-changing



political landscape of Ukraine, the same respondents might have updated their expectations from national and regional political offices after the landslide victory of Volodymyr Zelensky in the 2019 Presidential elections (for example, Kherson oblast demonstrated among the highest lifts in turnout rates between the 2014 and 2019 Presidential elections). The new electoral code will make political representation more proportional starting in 2023, potentially improving the perception of political efficacy on the ground. Also, the results might be different in the regions where collective efficacy is as frustrated as political efficacy (the East of Ukraine) or where local political institutions are favored over regional and national offices (the West and the North of Ukraine).

This experiment tries to encourage nascent political ambition through the induction of collective efficacy. In the context of Ukraine, however, it is not clear what the ‘collective’ body might be at the regional and national levels. Two Eastern regions and one Southern region of Ukraine are currently not controlled by the state, and it is not clear what their definition of collective efficacy is at the moment. As Linz and Stepan note [28], democracy needs a well-defined state, and while the boundaries of this state are contentious to some citizens, the induction of collective efficacy among these groups might suppress their political enthusiasm.<sup>9</sup>

Second, sense of efficacy might be mediated by other variables. Future research would gain from zooming in and identifying the mediators of efficacy effects on political activism. It might be that higher efficacy activates nascent political ambition through personality traits such as Machiavellianism and narcissism [291]. Some of the results give credit to this hypothesis, as people with higher subjective potential demonstrated a higher interest in running for national parliament under the collective efficacy condition. Another potential mediator is anger. There is some evidence for the role of anger in political protesting and engagement [209, 353, 347, 108]. Studying specific emotive mediators that transform the sense of efficacy into nascent political ambition is the next step in this research agenda. Bielashko notes that “the public activity of Ukrainian politicians is directed mainly not on persuasion, but on emotional mobilization of the target audiences of [the] electorate” [296, p.242]. If this is the case, then respondents might associate political activity with

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<sup>9</sup>I am grateful to Benjamin McClelland for this suggestion.

emotional appraisals more than with the realization of high political efficacy.

Third, the data do not allow me to specifically estimate the functional relationships between efficacy and running for office. Given that those with high pre-treatment levels of political efficacy refused to run for office after the treatment at a higher rate than in the control group, efficacy might be quadratically affecting political engagement. It would be helpful to study the functional relationships more specifically in a controlled laboratory setting.

Finally, while my theory does not specifically consider gender, the data demonstrate a wide gap in nascent political ambition between men and women in my sample, and this gap does not narrow down in post-treatment data. A separate intervention intended to specifically target women would be beneficial for improving the quality of democratic engagement in Ukraine.

### 3.5.3 Implications for Democracy

The broader implications of this research extend to the literature on comparative democratization and research on democratic promotion. Three specific implications are especially relevant to the analysis of Ukraine's democratic consolidation: the difference in political effectiveness assigned to local and national institutions; the impact of prior political and civic experience on the interest in running for office; and the tension between a strong civil society and futile institutions of political representation.

#### *Futile Local Politics*

The analysis shows that Ukrainians do not consider running for office as a way of solving a collective problem. Increasing collective efficacy, on average, resulted in decreased interest in running for office, suggesting that individuals might have low outcome expectancies from running for office, especially at the city level [53, 59, 303]. Moreover, negative attitudes towards the city-level politics contaminate the decision to shoot for a higher political goal. Only those with high pre-treatment subjective potential were able to improve their nascent political ambition after getting to know about civil society's success stories at the local level.

Why does the city-level parliament stand out in the results? The city politics in the Ukrainian South is quite corrupt and dangerous. Less than a month after the completion of the experimental fieldwork, a Kherson-based activist affiliated with the city head was murdered by poison because of her political activism at the local and regional level. Her activities were illustrative of the violent and complicated dynamics between active members of civil society groups, deputies affiliated with local and regional elites, and party representatives in the region: for example, she was actively lobbying for the creation of civic councils to ensure that the city head, who had limited influence over the city parliament, would be able to exert control over city politics with the help of these councils. For someone with no party or activist resource, participation in local politics would entail the need to navigate these waters on their own.

Also, it may be the case that the increased self- and collective efficacy did not translate into an interest in running for office, because the problems and grievances that respondents would consider addressing as deputies are too grave to be solved. A recent study by Cohen-Chen and van Zomeren detected an interesting connection between efficacy, hope, and collective action. By manipulating group efficacy beliefs and expectations about the solvability of a protracted problem, they were able to show that group efficacy predicts collective action on behalf of the group only when the hopes for social change are high. When hope is low, sense of efficacy does not activate the potential for collective action [292]. In a similar way, hope might have mediated the effect of efficacy on political engagement and suppressed interest in running for office in the context where the problems were most intractable of all.

Why does regional-level office not gain similar attention? Pre-treatment data expose very low levels of interest in regional politics in the sample. When presented with a list of eight similarly-looking last names and asked to identify political figures among them, 26% of respondents recognized the head of regional parliament, and 27% identified the head of regional administration. Not surprisingly, individuals with higher efficacy avoid these positions as they consider them potentially powerless. Experimental studies of political engagement would gain from paying closer attention to the meanings that individuals assign to political institutions of representation as well

as acknowledging that some respondents might consider democratic institutions as illegitimate, contested, or more responsive to markets and elites than to average citizens [354].

### *Para-Parliamentary Institutions*

The analysis reveals a curious heterogeneity caused by prior political and civic experience. Those who had prior activist experience or higher subjective internal political efficacy were discouraged from running for office at a higher rate after the induction of self-efficacy. These results tell us two stories; a good one and a bad one. The good story is that active individuals are capable of managing their public lives by means of self-organization. The bad story is that the experience of being an activist in Ukraine makes people less willing to run for office once their self-efficacy increases.

In consolidated democratic societies, the boundaries between political and civic engagement are rather porous [232, p.57]. In Ukraine, however, these boundaries are clearly demarcated. Civic activists are engaged in building independent institutions of representation that are efficacious and get the work done. The problem is that, unlike idealtypus democratic institutions, these para-parliamentary structures are not equal, transparent, or accountable. In the hyperpolarized context of Ukraine's domestic politics, these para-parliamentary structures create a long-term problem for democratic consolidation. As Bielashko notes, "Ukraine needs urgently a new social contract based on a system of compromises regarding the most acute, and contradictory issues" [296, p.244]. This social contract cannot be sealed without equally accessible parliamentary institutions. Democracy-building takes a lot of time, and one of the main challenges is finding institutional means of mutual communication between the active forces of civil society and regime in power [75]. Given that civil trust does not translate into the quality of political institutions, this tension between civil society and available opportunities in the electoral arena will further deteriorate the quality of democratic institutions [166, 308].

## *Ingenuousness*

Another challenge to democratic consolidation is the tension between citizens with higher and lower levels of political sophistication. Those with higher levels of sophistication avert from political office because their efficacy allows them to achieve public goals without being formally elected to office. Those with lower levels of sophistication do not run for office because they lack subjective potential and belief in the political system. This collective running *from* office creates a trap of declining political ambition. This process is similar to what Svobik calls the “trap of pessimistic expectations,” a phenomenon wherein the disappointing performance of individual politicians leads to the widespread disillusionment with democracy as a political system [235]. The open question for political theorists is whether citizens should keep a normal degree of ingenuousness and political naiveté to keep democracy consolidating or whether it is unethical to demand political engagement in electoral campaigns when other forms of participation are less risky and more collectively efficacious.

These findings have implications for the literature on the political psychology of democratic promotion. Previous research on democratic education programs encourages tailoring political information based on the specific political needs that citizens fulfill, assuming that citizens who run for office or are involved in actual policy-making know more than those who are less committed to public service [355]. This chapter shows that in some contexts, democratic educators might want to leave well-informed citizens alone, especially if the supply side of politics is of a worse quality than the demand side aspires to have. Increasing sense of efficacy without an adequate change in the quality of democratic institutions leads to further political frustration. Democracy promotion that does not account for these dynamics might create polarizing side-effects for democratic consolidation.

This chapter also contributes to the literature on comparative democratization, showing that a large-scale induction of collective efficacy generates heterogeneous attitudinal responses. While in some countries this heterogeneity benefits the political opposition and less efficacious social groups [122], in other political contexts the long-term change in political power after the treatment

is less obvious. Improved collective efficacy alone might have a limited positive effect among the least engaged groups but will not have a lasting effect on those citizens whose experience with democratic outcomes falls short of expectations.

### **3.6 Conclusion**

Abundant evidence from consolidated democracies attributes nascent political ambition to the elevated sense of internal efficacy. This chapter builds on the results of a large-scale experiment conducted in Southern Ukraine, where support for democracy has been historically unsteadfast, to test whether increases in self- and collective efficacy improve nascent political ambition. Challenging existing observational data that often demonstrate that high individual efficacy, confidence, and self-esteem are associated with the intention to run for office, this chapter joins a growing body of experimental data that suggest otherwise.

The main empirical contribution of the analysis is showing that enhanced self-efficacy and collective efficacy do not necessarily translate into higher nascent political ambition. Moreover, I show that among more civically engaged subjects, the priming of collective and self-efficacy suppresses the desire to run for office at the local level, confirming the findings on diminishing participation of educated citizens in authoritarian regimes and failing democracies [166, 332, 137]. Respondents who learn about collective successes in civic life lose interest in running for local political office. Therefore, democracy promotion campaigns that increase the sense of self-efficacy or collective efficacy might suppress nascent political ambition if the population is skeptical about the quality of representative democratic institutions.

This research has broader implications for the study of comparative democratization, the political psychology of skepticism and abstention, and the experimental study of democratic consolidation. The chapter contributes to the literature on comparative democratization by exploring the heterogeneous effects of individual empowerment on political engagement. The research also contributes to the literature on political skepticism and abstention by explaining why democracy promotion has a limited ability to overcome political skepticism in regimes with futile political

institutions [356]. Finally, this chapter shows that increasing individuals' sense of efficacy without an accompanying change in the quality of democratic institutions leads to political frustration. Democracy promotion that does not account for these dynamics might cause adverse effects for democratic consolidation.

## Conclusion

The examination of psychological motivations behind civic and political engagement in Ukraine presents a number of lessons for democratic consolidation in post-communist countries and worldwide.

First, the effects of personality traits and self-evaluations on individual political and civic behavior that are established in Western data may not travel well in predicting political attitudes and behavior in other contexts. Using a variety of experimental and observational data, I show that the effect of personality on political attitudes and behavior is more context-specific than previous studies suggested. Contrary to evidence from the US and Western Europe, conscientious people in Ukraine are left-leaning and those open to experience are open to both social liberalism and social conservatism. The direction of these effects stems from the specifics of the Ukrainian path to democratization and the strategic electoral manipulation by Ukrainian elites who consolidate power through the nation-building project while simultaneously luring civil society toward European integration.

Second, when the boundaries between civil society and the political regime are clearly demarcated while formal institutions of representation are weak, civic activists are engaged in building independent institutions of representation that are effective and functional, yet unequal, non-transparent, or non-accountable. This tension between civil society and available opportunities in the electoral arena might lower the quality of democratic institutions in young democracies.

Third, the dissertation suggests that there are no significant differences in the causal effects of self-efficacy and collective efficacy on individual attitudes and behavior. Thus, civic action in



weak democracies benefits equally from individual and collective empowerment. If individuals assume that a civic activity is worth the effort, they will be equally inclined to pursue it when their self-efficacy is high as when they have high expectations from their community.

The enhanced sense of efficacy, however, does not improve political engagement if the institutions are considered weak and ineffective. Efficacious people might abstain from politics if they believe that available political institutions are ineffective or illegitimate. These results suggest that self-efficacy and collective efficacy *do* affect individual propensity towards civic and political activism, but the exact direction of this effect depends on the specific value assigned to proposed activities and on individual expectations from available institutions of representation.

These insights shed light on the failures behind democracy promotion in societies with widespread dissatisfaction in democratic institutions. Individuals with higher levels of political sophistication are dissuaded from political office when reminded of alternative well-functioning ways of achieving public goals without being formally elected as politicians. This collective running *from* office creates a trap of declining political ambition in weak democracies. Moreover, negative attitudes towards city-level politics contaminate the decisions to aim for a higher political goal. These findings also imply that individual engagement in politics in weak democracies needs some degree of political naiveté and a high—potentially, unrealistically high—belief in one's subjective potential.

The main conclusion of this study is that increased efficacy is not a panacea for civic and political engagement. An induction of efficacy generates heterogeneous effects and leads to political frustration, unless it is accompanied by an adequate change in the quality of democratic institutions. Democracy promotion that does not account for these dynamics might cause adverse effects for democratic consolidation and suppress nascent political ambition.

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## **Appendix A: Randomization**

### **A.1 Subjects Recruitment**

I recruited subjects in three ways. The first group (733 subjects) was invited through random sampling on the streets. Those younger than 18 years were disqualified from participation. The second group (334 subjects) contacted us after we circulated an announcement of the experiment in a listserv of local activists. The third group (314 subjects) was recruited through Facebook ads targeted at adult citizens in Khersonska region.

Table A.1 shows the differences in pre-treatment civic engagement levels among the groups, confirming an oversample of activists and electoral observers in the second group. Active Facebook users are engaged less than activists but more than those sampled on streets. The wide variety of pre-treatment civic engagement confirms that the experiment does not test the hypotheses on civic engagement only on those who are already sufficiently engaged. Subjects from each group never met on the site of the experiment. Research assistants invited them to experimental labs with those recruited in the same way.

### **A.2 Organization**

The experiment is approved by the Columbia University Institutional Review Board (IRB-AAAR8352). The research assistants were hired from two sources. Moderators were local psychologists or social workers, and research assistants were hired from the student pool of local psychology departments. I organized training sessions with moderators and research assistants before the experiment to strengthen their knowledge of local civic engagement initiatives and practice the delivery of the cognitive intervention. The experimental laboratories were developed on the basis of computer classes in local schools and universities. Respondents were free to choose

Table A.1: Pre-Treatment Civic Engagement per Recruitment Group

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
Run for Political Office	1,381	0.161	0.367	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000
<i>Random Sample</i>	733	0.156	0.363	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000
<i>Activists Listserv</i>	334	0.178	0.382	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000
<i>Facebook Users</i>	314	0.157	0.363	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000
Joined Electoral Commission	1,381	0.307	0.460	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000
<i>Random Sample</i>	733	0.256	0.436	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000
<i>Activists Listserv</i>	334	0.436	0.495	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000
<i>Facebook Users</i>	314	0.289	0.452	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000
Joined/Started Homeowners' Association	1,381	0.150	0.356	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000
<i>Random Sample</i>	733	0.060	0.238	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000
<i>Activists Listserv</i>	334	0.384	0.486	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000
<i>Facebook Users</i>	314	0.109	0.311	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000
Joined Civil/Social Movement	1,381	0.449	0.497	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000
<i>Random Sample</i>	733	0.406	0.491	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000
<i>Activists Listserv</i>	334	0.485	0.499	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000
<i>Facebook Users</i>	314	0.512	0.499	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000
Protested	1,381	0.496	0.499	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000
<i>Random Sample</i>	733	0.452	0.498	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000
<i>Activists Listserv</i>	334	0.551	0.497	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000
<i>Facebook Users</i>	314	0.538	0.498	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000
Launched Civil/Social Movement	1,381	0.253	0.434	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000
<i>Random Sample</i>	733	0.204	0.403	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000
<i>Activists Listserv</i>	334	0.331	0.470	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000
<i>Facebook Users</i>	314	0.285	0.451	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000

whichever language they preferred when working with questionnaires, paper handouts, and group discussions, and the design of the experiment accommodated their needs with the highest possible flexibility. Computer assistance on the spot was available for all respondents who had additional accommodation requests.

### A.3 Randomization Procedure

Figure A.1 describes the stages of the experiment. After subjects showed up at experimental locations, research assistants confirmed their age (18–34 or older than 35), detected their block, and assigned them to experimental conditions according to a block-specific randomization protocol. The protocols were designed to slightly oversample the subjects in the control group because I wanted to ensure an adequately powered statistical comparison between control and treatment conditions. After subjects were assigned to experimental groups, they were only staying in rooms with people with the same experimental condition.

No attrition happened in the experiment. The treatment assignment resulted in the reception of the treatment by all subjects.



All subjects are treated as compliers. There was no variation in the treatment ‘dose’ received by subjects. Subjects had personal ID cards with a masked group identifier during the experiment, ruling out the possibility of mistakenly treating a subject from the control condition or not administering the treatment on those in treated conditions.




Figure A.1: Randomization Procedure

#### A.4 Experimental Location

#### A.5 Covariate Balance

Table A.2 displays the summary statistics for five main covariates and the significance of F-statistics from covariate balance checks. Age and gender were used for block randomization. For these variables, the table shows simple means and standard deviations. Weighted means and



Figure A.2: Experimental Location

weighted standard deviations are calculated for language (1 for Ukrainian, 0 for Russian), education, and socio-economic status.

Education is measured as an ordered categorical variable where 1 stands for primary school or below and 5 stands for a doctoral degree and postgraduate education. Socio-economic status is measured as an ordered categorical variable where 1 stands for being very poor (responded positively to “*We have troubles buying food and basic household items*”) and 4 stands for being wealthy (responded positively to “*We can afford to buy whatever we want*”).

The last column has the p-values of F-statistics which were extracted from regressions of treatment assignment on covariates. For each variable, I test if different levels of this covariate predict the likelihood of treatment assignment.

The first model (Control) tests if the covariate predicts the assignment to any treatment condition as compared to the control group. For instance, the p-value of the test statistics from a linear model that regresses the assignment to any treatment on the fact of being a Ukrainian speaker is 0.871. This means that respondents’ language does not predict their assignment to either of the treatment groups compared to the control group.

The remaining models (Self-Efficacy, Collective Efficacy, and Combined) regress the assignment to the corresponding treatment group as compared to control on the covariate of interest. For instance, the p-value of the test statistics from a linear model that regresses the assignment to Collective Efficacy group on the respondent’s educational attainment the 0.287. This means that respondents’ education does not predict their assignment to Collective Efficacy condition compared to the control group.

The covariate balance tests show that all p-values are higher than the 0.001 threshold recommended for covariate balance checks [241, p.432]. The randomization did not result in covariate imbalance and the results of the experimental analysis are not jeopardized.

Table A.2: Covariate Balance Check

Statistic		N	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max	$P >  z $
Age		1,381	40.301	15.976	18	83	
	<i>Control</i>	389	40.584	15.628	18	81	0.680
	<i>Self-Efficacy</i>	353	40.051	15.596	18	83	0.643
	<i>Collective Efficacy</i>	308	39.916	16.365	18	81	0.583
	<i>Combined Efficacy</i>	331	40.592	16.467	18	73	0.994
Female		1,381	0.578	0.494	0	1	
	<i>Control</i>	389	0.578	0.494	0	1	0.979
	<i>Self-Efficacy</i>	353	0.598	0.491	0	1	0.594
	<i>Collective Efficacy</i>	308	0.584	0.494	0	1	0.873
	<i>Combined Efficacy</i>	331	0.550	0.498	0	1	0.442
Statistic		N	Weighted Mean	Weighted S.D.	Min	Max	$P >  z $
Ukrainian Speaker		1,381	0.164	0.370	0	1	
	<i>Control</i>	389	0.165	0.371	0	1	0.871
	<i>Self-Efficacy</i>	353	0.176	0.380	0	1	0.710
	<i>Collective Efficacy</i>	308	0.138	0.345	0	1	0.323
	<i>Combined Efficacy</i>	331	0.171	0.376	0	1	0.845
Education (Primary School to Doctorate)		1,381	3.226	0.955	1	5	
	<i>Control</i>	389	3.276	0.924	1	5	0.213
	<i>Self-Efficacy</i>	353	3.237	0.985	1	5	0.577
	<i>Collective Efficacy</i>	308	3.200	0.962	1	5	0.287
	<i>Combined Efficacy</i>	331	3.170	0.951	1	5	0.127
Socio-Economic Status (Poor to Wealthy)		1,381	2.237	0.773	1	4	
	<i>Control</i>	389	2.206	0.789	1	4	0.484
	<i>Self-Efficacy</i>	353	2.249	0.756	1	4	0.842
	<i>Collective Efficacy</i>	308	2.270	0.782	1	4	0.863
	<i>Combined Efficacy</i>	331	2.160	0.753	1	4	0.084

## A.6 Block Random Assignment

Since we assigned subjects to groups based on randomization protocols that were designed before each randomization occurred, we had to follow the procedure even when by chance some groups were ending up having fewer people from certain blocks. De-facto probability of assignment to treatment varies by block (from 0.199 to 0.295), and I account for this variation by using inverse probability weights in all model specifications [241].

## Appendix B: Experimental Intervention

### B.1 Self-Efficacy

The treatment is delivered individually, on screen and on paper. Respondents receive paper handouts before the experiment begins. They read educational information on the screen and respond either electronically or by writing on the handouts. The excerpts of the intervention are given below.

#### *Part 1. Internalizing locus of control*

The part explains the concept of internal locus of control. It calibrates respondents' causal attribution to focus their mental energy on the things that they can change. First, respondents make themselves acquainted with a very simple explanation of the concept of locus of control. To better memorize the concept, they are prompted to read through a series of ubiquitous life situations and complete an interactive assignment.

#### **Assignment excerpt**

*Now, let's practice a little bit. Imagine a young man who cannot find a job. Which of his circumstances are external? Which of his circumstances are internal and can be changed?*

— *Low demand for his profession*

— *Lack of education required for work*

— *Positions of interest are available only by an acquaintance and he has no powerful connections*

— *He does not have enough money to start his own business*

— *He has no work experience*

— *He is not happy with his choice of profession*

— *His family does not approve of his professional choice*

*Press “next” when you are ready to proceed.*

Respondents independently reflect on the internal and external circumstances and classify the circumstances on the screen. Then they proceed to the next page and compare their answers to suggested responses.

**Assignment excerpt**

*The man cannot change external circumstances:*

- 1. The behavior of other people (all good places are available only by acquaintance)*
- 2. Attitudes of other people (the family does not approve his professional choice)*
- 3. Objective constraints (low demand for his profession)*

*Instead, he can change internal circumstances:*

- 1. Lack of education required for work: Professional retraining is often provided for free by large companies; there are also free online options available at websites such as Coursera (provides official certificates of completion) and on the YouTube channels of the world’s best universities.*
- 2. He does not have enough money to start his own business: There are grant programs to support small and medium-sized businesses (run by the Ukrainian government, the European Union, or the local government program).*
- 3. He has no experience: he can acquire it by signing up for an internship or taking advantage of the skillset that he already has.*
- 4. He does not like the profession he received in university: he can work with a psychologist or by himself on the art of prioritization and self-discipline or work through the list of professions that appeal to him.*

Respondents repeat the assignment with other examples to practice before proceeding to the next part.

*Part 2. Sorting out internal and external circumstances*

In this part, respondents identify the life concerns that they want to address and work on selecting feasible solutions within their locus of control.

### **Assignment excerpt**

*Now, let's classify external and internal circumstances for your own life goal that you specified above. In your handout, formulate the circumstances that affect the achievement of the goal. Write down all the possible solutions you can think of. Now, let's circle out those solutions that you have control over. Which of them are based on external circumstances? Which of them are internally controlled? The moderator can help you if you are not sure.*

### *Part 3. Feasible solutions and growth mindset*

In this part, respondents continue working with their handouts. They write down specific, feasible action plans to overcome the concerns and find feasible solutions.

### **Assignment excerpt**

*Look at the list of internal circumstances. It is within your power to change them. On your handout, spell out at least one specific action you can undertake to change the internal circumstances.*

Respondents work with their handouts with the assistance of moderators.

### **Assignment excerpt**

*So, we realized that the key to solving any problem is focusing on internal processes that can be changed in the future. However, the future is unpredictable! What if some of our actions will not bring fruits? It is fine. Progress happens to those who make mistakes and learn from them. Errors are out of our control. Learning from them is within our control. In your handouts, refer to Table 3. Write down the challenges that you anticipate to encounter when performing your action plan. In the next column, specify how you will face those challenges and overcome them.*

Respondents work with their handouts, envision potential obstacles and reflect on their response actions.

#### *Part 4. Self-efficacy induction*

In the final part, respondents think of the examples of successful problem-solving in their past and identify those character traits that helped them to overcome these problems. This mood induction exercise makes their self-efficacy more salient and restates their ability to solve problems and face challenges. The textual analysis of the traits that the respondents used to boost their sense of self-efficacy is available in a separate paper [201].

Complete scripts are available for replication upon request.

### **B.2 Collective Efficacy**

The treatment is delivered individually on-screen and collectively (via group discussion). First, respondents watch videos and respond to clarifying questions on the screen. Then, they proceed to group discussion. The excerpts of the intervention are given below.

#### *Part 1. Civic education*

In the first part, respondents watch educational videos about civic projects in their city. Each video states a civic problem, identifies feasible solutions, and demonstrates the example of collective efficacy.

The first video discusses the problem of waste management in Kherson region (Figure B.1) and explains how civic activists are solving the problem by launching an innovative waste management system for recycling plastic and glass (Figure B.2).

The second video discusses the problem of energy efficiency (Figure B.3). Old buildings do not store heat well enough because of the lack of exterior thermal protection. The video shows how activists are solving the problem by making civil servants work on proper building maintenance (Figure B.4).

The third video discusses the transparency of public expenses using school budgeting as an example. Parents have few tools of actual control over school expenses and funding priorities.





Figure B.1: The Problem of Waste Management in Kherson Region



Figure B.2: Self-Governed Waste Management System for Recycling Plastic and Glass




Figure B.3: The Problem of Energy Efficiency in Kherson Region



Figure B.4: Self-Governed Solution on Building Maintenance

Civic counseling of school budgets is a feasible way of exerting financial control and ensuring fiduciary transparency. The video shows how civic councils driven by a parental initiative solve the problem by creating a system of financial auditing available to all parents (Figure B.6).




Figure B.5: The Problem of Transparency of Public Expenses in Kherson Region

The fourth video discusses the problem of dilapidated common property in residential buildings. In most post-Soviet countries, public space ownership structures (the ownership of spaces such as basements, halls, and elevators) vary, and often building owners do not exert actual control over the way in which public property is used. As a result, public property is often not taken care of (Figure B.7). The video shows how a homeowners' association formed by apartment building residents solves the problem by repairing public property and equipping a newly repaired basement with fitness gear (Figure B.8).

At the end of this part of the experiment, respondents see a number of questions that measure



Figure B.6: Self-Governed Civic Counseling of School Budgets



Figure B.7: The Problem of Dilapidated Common Property in Kherson Region



Figure B.8: The Activities of Self-Governed Homeowners' Association

their comprehension of video materials.

### **Sample question**

*What is this video about?*

- a. The role of local media in ecological campaigns*
- b. The energy saving program run by OSBB activists*
- c. Family mortgage available at discounted rate*
- d. The role of civil servants in crediting local business*

### *Part 2. Spelling out feasible solutions*

In the second part, respondents proceed to separate rooms to discuss the solutions presented in the videos and explore the potential ways of replicating these practices in their communities (Figure B.9). The discussions are moderated and follow the same script.



Figure B.9: Brainstorming Sessions

### **Group Discussion Script**

- 1. You have just watched videos about successful civic initiatives that were enacted by local people like you. Let's discuss these success stories. How did they make you feel?*
- 2. Which of these stories did you like most?*
- 3. What made these initiatives so successful?*
- 4. Which of the topics best suit the needs of your community?*

5. *What is so special about these civic activists? (How do they address their failures?)*
6. *Suppose you have some time and energy to get involved in a civic project. What would it be?*
7. *If you need to choose one of the projects as a group, what would it be?*
8. *Together, you picked up a (PROJECT). What could you do to make it work?*
9. *What kind of challenges you might encounter? How could you overcome them?*
10. *Whom would you identify as potential allies in the (PROJECT)? Where would you solicit resources from?*
11. *What will help you to succeed? What are the stronger sides of your community?*

### **B.3 Combined Efficacy**

The interventions were merged to induce the sense of both self- and collective efficacy. First, the respondents went through the induction of self-efficacy. Then, they proceeded to the induction of collective efficacy.

Complete scripts of all interventions are available for replication upon request.

### **B.4 Attitudinal Responses**

The intentions to participate were measured with the following questions:

- If you had some free time, would you consider joining the activists who demand the improvement of waste management and recycling in Kherson?
  - 1 — *definitely not*
  - 4 — *definitely yes*
  
- If you had some free time, would you consider joining electoral observers or becoming a member of electoral commission?
  - 1 — *definitely not*

- 4 — *definitely yes*

- If you had some free time, would you like to establish a civic council?

- 1 — *definitely not*

- 4 — *definitely yes*

- Would you like to lead an OSBB (a homeowners' organization)?

- 1 — *definitely not*

- 4 — *definitely yes*

The direction of the scale was randomized across individuals.

## **B.5 Behavioral Responses**

After the experiment was over, research assistants read the following script to each respondent: "Thank you so much for your participation. By the way, there are some leaflets on the table at the exit, they contain valuable information on civic engagement opportunities in Kherson. Please feel free to grab some for yourself and share them with your family and friends if you are interested. Have a nice day." The number of taken leaflets was discreetly recorded by research assistants after the respondent left the laboratory. The leaflets looked as colored A4-sized dense paper sheets (Figure B.10). The title page featured a bright word "Act" (*Diy*) and invited subjects to improve their environment with civic action.

The leaflets contained detailed information on specific community projects and featured a local contact number (hosted by one of the research assistants) for those who needed more information. The contact details are blurred for privacy reasons.



Figure B.10: Leaflets

## B.6 Manipulation Check

I restrain from asking direct questions about perceived self- and collective efficacy after administering the treatments. First, an array of questions that directly asks about the individual perception of self- or collective efficacy right before measuring the outcomes would make the intervention too obvious for respondents. For cognitive treatments of this kind, manipulation check might be interpreted as just another form of treatment induction. Thus, it would make it harder to separate the effect of administering the treatments and the effect of administering subsequent manipulation check questionnaires.

Alternatively, a difference-in-difference comparison would require administering self-efficacy questionnaires before and after the treatment induction. The pre-treatment assessment would have programmed the respondents, especially in the self-efficacy condition, to think about their efficacy before reflecting on their locus of control. This would jeopardize the administration of the treatment. Finally, for a sophisticated personalized treatment of this type, qualitative responses contain much more realistic and accurate assessments of self- and collective efficacy as compared to a generic self-efficacy questionnaire.

To measure efficacy post-treatment, I would have to ask subjects from each experimental group about both self- and collective efficacy to keep the comparison of experimental outcomes from all

three groups consistent, and this would lead to the unnecessary contamination of the types of efficacy in first and second experimental groups. Instead, I check the increase of efficacy based on the responses to cognitive intervention and based on individuals' activity during brainstorming sessions. This provides me with a good measure of the factual receipt of the treatment. In the self-efficacy condition, respondents focused on the available ways to improve energy management in their neighborhood. While reflecting on these ways, they considered civil servants, bureaucrats, and energy providers as external circumstances beyond their control. In the collective efficacy condition, however, these actors were perceived as something that respondents are capable of controlling, because the induction of collective efficacy targets individual capabilities as members of communities, and thus improves their control over officials. Complete text-as-data analysis of these data is provided in a separate paper.



## Appendix C: Treatment Outcomes

### C.1 Outcomes Statistics

Table C.1 contains summary statistics for all experimental outcomes.

Table C.1: Summary Statistics: Treatment Outcomes

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
Campaigning for Recycling	1,381	2.949	0.803	1	3	3	4
<i>Control</i>	389	2.992	0.814	1	3	4	4
<i>Self-Efficacy</i>	353	2.960	0.814	1	3	3	4
<i>Collective Efficacy</i>	308	2.919	0.772	1	3	3	4
<i>Combined Efficacy</i>	331	2.912	0.806	1	3	3	4
Establishing a Civic Council	1,381	2.447	0.907	1	2	3	4
<i>Control</i>	389	2.437	0.927	1	2	3	4
<i>Self-Efficacy</i>	353	2.445	0.891	1	2	3	4
<i>Collective Efficacy</i>	308	2.464	0.882	1	2	3	4
<i>Combined Efficacy</i>	331	2.444	0.927	1	2	3	4
Joining an Electoral Commission	1,381	2.700	0.981	1	2	3	4
<i>Control</i>	389	2.774	1.003	1	2	4	4
<i>Self-Efficacy</i>	353	2.632	0.980	1	2	3	4
<i>Collective Efficacy</i>	308	2.734	0.938	1	2	3	4
<i>Combined Efficacy</i>	331	2.656	0.992	1	2	3	4
Leading a Homeowners' Organization	1,381	2.096	1.112	1	1	3	4
<i>Control</i>	389	2.121	1.093	1	1	3	4
<i>Self-Efficacy</i>	353	2.110	1.127	1	1	3	4
<i>Collective Efficacy</i>	308	2.088	1.131	1	1	3	4
<i>Combined Efficacy</i>	331	2.057	1.104	1	1	3	4
Leaflets Taken	1,381	3.474	5.154	0	1	3.8	50
<i>Control</i>	389	2.809	3.637	0	1	3	31
<i>Self-Efficacy</i>	353	3.580	5.024	0	1	3.6	40
<i>Collective Efficacy</i>	308	3.806	5.022	0	1	4	50
<i>Combined Efficacy</i>	331	3.834	6.662	0	1	4	50

Table C.2 contains confidence intervals for unadjusted models (with treatment assignment as the only predictor).

Table C.3 contains confidence intervals for adjusted models.

The power analysis shows that all measures of intentions have the highest possible power (Table C.4). The likelihood of receiving a false negative outcome is extremely low for these variables. The behavioral measures in the self- and collective efficacy groups are also powered enough. At the

Table C.2: Bell-McCaffrey Confidence Intervals (Unadjusted Estimates)

Statistic	Self-Efficacy	Collective Efficacy	Combined Efficacy
Leaflets Taken			
<i>Estimated ATE</i>	0.757	1.066	1.049
<i>Robust Standard Error</i>	0.321	0.352	0.415
<i>Bell-McCaffrey confidence interval (lower)</i>	0.127	0.367	0.235
<i>Bell-McCaffrey confidence interval (upper)</i>	1.387	1.75	1.863
Establishing a Civic Council			
<i>Estimated ATE</i>	0.01	0.024	0.012
<i>Robust Standard Error</i>	0.067	0.069	0.07
<i>Bell-McCaffrey confidence interval (lower)</i>	-0.121	-0.111	-0.125
<i>Bell-McCaffrey confidence interval (upper)</i>	0.142	0.158	0.149
Joining an Electoral Commission			
<i>Estimated ATE</i>	-0.14	-0.042	-0.109
<i>Robust Standard Error</i>	0.073	0.074	0.075
<i>Bell-McCaffrey confidence interval (lower)</i>	-0.283	-0.187	-0.255
<i>Bell-McCaffrey confidence interval (upper)</i>	0.003	0.104	0.037
Leading a Homeowners' Organization			
<i>Estimated ATE</i>	-0.01	-0.042	-0.071
<i>Robust Standard Error</i>	0.082	0.085	0.082
<i>Bell-McCaffrey confidence interval (lower)</i>	-0.171	-0.209	-0.233
<i>Bell-McCaffrey confidence interval (upper)</i>	0.15	0.125	0.09
Campaigning for Recycling			
<i>Estimated ATE</i>	-0.031	-0.07	-0.078
<i>Robust Standard Error</i>	0.06	0.061	0.061
<i>Bell-McCaffrey confidence interval (lower)</i>	-0.15	-0.189	-0.197
<i>Bell-McCaffrey confidence interval (upper)</i>	0.087	0.049	0.041

Table C.3: Bell-McCaffrey Confidence Intervals (Covariate Adjustment)

Statistic	Self-Efficacy	Collective Efficacy	Combined Efficacy
Leaflets Taken			
<i>Estimated ATE</i>	0.774	0.992	1.056
<i>Robust Standard Error</i>	0.318	0.349	0.405
<i>Bell-McCaffrey confidence interval (lower)</i>	0.15	0.307	0.26
<i>Bell-McCaffrey confidence interval (upper)</i>	1.399	1.676	1.851
Establishing a Civic Council			
<i>Estimated ATE</i>	0.015	0.026	0.027
<i>Robust Standard Error</i>	0.066	0.068	0.069
<i>Bell-McCaffrey confidence interval (lower)</i>	-0.115	-0.108	-0.109
<i>Bell-McCaffrey confidence interval (upper)</i>	0.145	0.16	0.163
Joining an Electoral Commission			
<i>Estimated ATE</i>	-0.137	-0.039	-0.109
<i>Robust Standard Error</i>	0.072	0.073	0.073
<i>Bell-McCaffrey confidence interval (lower)</i>	-0.278	-0.183	-0.253
<i>Bell-McCaffrey confidence interval (upper)</i>	0.005	0.104	0.035
Leading a Homeowners' Organization			
<i>Estimated ATE</i>	-0.007	-0.033	-0.056
<i>Robust Standard Error</i>	0.081	0.085	0.082
<i>Bell-McCaffrey confidence interval (lower)</i>	-0.167	-0.2	-0.218
<i>Bell-McCaffrey confidence interval (upper)</i>	0.152	0.134	0.106
Campaigning for Recycling			
<i>Estimated ATE</i>	-0.031	-0.07	-0.081
<i>Robust Standard Error</i>	0.06	0.06	0.06
<i>Bell-McCaffrey confidence interval (lower)</i>	-0.148	-0.187	-0.199
<i>Bell-McCaffrey confidence interval (upper)</i>	0.087	0.047	0.037

same time, the likelihood of making a Type II error is higher in the combined efficacy group (there is a 31% chance of not rejecting the null hypothesis when there is a significant effect). The reason behind the relatively underpowered result is an unexpectedly high spread of treatment outcomes in this group that I have not accounted for in my pre-treatment power analysis. However, given that the treatment effect was found in all other model specifications, the false-negative alternative is not an issue.

Table C.4: Power Calculations

Comparison of Control vs.	Recycling	Civic Council	Electoral observation	Homeowners' association	Leaflets taken
Self-Efficacy	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.867
Collective Efficacy	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.855
Combined Efficacy	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.684

## C.2 Tabular Forms of Main Results

The tables below show the results of the linear regression models which were used to produce the graphs in the main texts. Table C.5 shows the results for unadjusted models (without covariates). Table C.6 shows the outcomes of covariate-adjusted models. Covariates include gender, language, education, age, and socioeconomic status.

Table C.5: Average Treatment Effects (Unadjusted Estimates)

	Leaflets Taken	Electoral Observation	Civic Council	Recycling Campaign	Homeowners' Organization
Self-Efficacy	0.757** (0.321)	-0.140* (0.073)	0.010 (0.067)	-0.031 (0.060)	-0.010 (0.082)
Collective Efficacy	1.058*** (0.352)	-0.042 (0.074)	0.024 (0.069)	-0.070 (0.061)	-0.042 (0.085)
Combined	1.049** (0.415)	-0.109 (0.074)	0.012 (0.070)	-0.078 (0.061)	-0.071 (0.082)
Constant	2.804*** (0.183)	2.768*** (0.051)	2.435*** (0.047)	2.989*** (0.041)	2.123*** (0.055)
Covariates	No	No	No	No	No
Control Mean	2.809	2.774	2.437	2.992	2.121
Outcome Range	[0;50]	[1;4]	[1;4]	[1;4]	[1;4]

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. No covariates included.

Table C.6: Average Treatment Effects (Covariate Adjustment)

	Leaflets Taken	Electoral Observation	Civic Council	Recycling Campaign	Homeowners Organization
Self-Efficacy	0.774** (0.318)	-0.137* (0.072)	0.015 (0.066)	-0.031 (0.060)	-0.007 (0.081)
Collective Efficacy	0.992*** (0.349)	-0.039 (0.073)	0.026 (0.068)	-0.070 (0.060)	-0.033 (0.085)
Combined	1.056*** (0.405)	-0.109 (0.073)	0.027 (0.069)	-0.081 (0.060)	-0.056 (0.082)
Constant	2.812*** (0.185)	2.767*** (0.050)	2.430*** (0.046)	2.990*** (0.041)	2.116*** (0.056)
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Mean	2.809	2.774	2.437	2.992	2.121
Outcome Range	[0;50]	[1;4]	[1;4]	[1;4]	[1;4]

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Covariates include gender, language, education, age, and socioeconomic status.

Table C.7: Time as Predictor of Behavioral Response (Control Group)

	Leaflets Taken
Second Quartile	-1.149** (0.460)
Third Quartile	-1.402** (0.574)
Fourth Quartile	-1.476*** (0.526)
Constant	3.470*** (0.259)
N	389
F Statistic	4.475*** (df = 3; 385)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

Reference category: those who finished the assignment within the first quartile of time.

### C.3 Intention-Behavior Inconsistency

To uncover the reasons behind the inconsistency, I explore the general pattern of intention-behavior inconsistency at the level of experimental groups. In a strict sense, an intention-consistent behavior would be to take any amount of leaflets if declared any interest in any civic project. Table C.8 explores the patterns of intention-behavior consistency defined in this way. Most subjects demonstrate intention-behavioral consistency: they expressed an interest in at least one project and took at least one leaflet (88.92%). The second group showed behavior-intention inconsistency: they expressed no interest in any civic project but took at least one leaflet (9.34%). The rest are minor groups of cheap-talkers who expressed an intention to participate in at least one project but took no leaflet (1.38%) and quitters who expressed no interest in civic projects either verbally or non-verbally (0.36%).

Table C.8: Intention-Behavior Distribution

	Action	No Action
<b>Intention</b>	Activists (Consistent): 88.92%	Cheap-talkers (Inconsistent) 1.38%
<b>No Intention</b>	Makers (Inconsistent): 9.34%	Quitters (Consistent): 0.36%

The experimental conditions do not predict the ratio of inconsistent and consistent subjects. As Table C.9 shows, the distribution of activists, makers, cheap-talkers, and quitters, is extremely uniform across all experimental conditions. The treatment did not change the intention-behavior consistency defined in a broad sense.

Table C.9: Intention-Behavior Inconsistency

	Cheap-Talkers	Activists	Makers	Quitters
Self-Efficacy	-0.009 (0.009)	0.008 (0.023)	0.003 (0.022)	-0.003 (0.003)
Collective Efficacy	-0.008 (0.010)	0.003 (0.025)	0.001 (0.023)	0.004 (0.005)
Combined	-0.012 (0.009)	0.015 (0.023)	-0.007 (0.021)	0.004 (0.005)
Constant	0.021*** (0.007)	0.882*** (0.016)	0.094*** (0.015)	0.003 (0.003)
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

Covariates include gender, language, education, age, and socioeconomic status.

## C.4 Summary of Randomization Inference Trials

I sum up the results of the Studentized permutation tests that compare the t-statistic of the ATE with its empirical distribution under random reassignments of treatment [243, 357]. The results of 10,000 simulations show that the two-tailed p-value for the ATE of the combined efficacy treatment, collective efficacy treatment, and self-efficacy treatment are all within the significance level of 0.05 (C.1). Of all attitudinal measures, the only marginally significant ATE is the one for electoral commission observation. This effect, however, is not significant in alternative model specifications.




Figure C.1: Studentized Permutation Tests

To test the sharp null hypotheses of no treatment effect on any unit, I generate the sampling distribution of the test statistic under the null hypothesis by simulating 10,000 random assignments for each treatment. P-values are calculated by comparing the observed test statistic to the distribution of test statistics under the null hypothesis of no treatment effect [241]. Figure C.2 summarizes the results of 15 trials (five outcome variables, three experimental conditions). Simulating each random assignment 10,000 times, I find that for behavioral outcomes, the generated average treatment effects are larger than the observed average treatment effects in less than 5%

of simulations (the obtained two-tailed p-values of the observed average treatment effects are less than 0.05). However, for all attitudinal outcomes, the observed average treatment effects are not different from most of the random assignments generated under the null hypothesis of no effect.




Figure C.2: Randomization Inference Trials

These results confirm the original findings on the positive effects of all treatments detected in behavioral outcomes but challenge the significance of the negative effect of the treatments on the expressed intention to join an electoral commission. We cannot reject the sharp null hypothesis on no effect on any unit for the expressed intentions to engage in electoral observation.

Figure C.3 shows distributed treatment outcomes based on 10,000 simulations per experimental group within four randomization blocks. Three distributions correspond to three differences in means: self-efficacy condition and control; collective efficacy and control; and combined treatment and control. To detect the p-value under the sharp null hypothesis, we look at the values of observed ATEs as compared to the generated distribution of simulated ATEs under the hypothesis of no treatment effect on any unit. The visualization demonstrates the strong positive effect obtained under all conditions on the actual behavior of respondents. Even though the average treatment effect of the self-efficacy treatment is lower than the ones of other groups, we cannot confidently

distinguish the treatment effects because their confidence intervals largely overlap.




Figure C.3: Sharp Null Hypotheses: Behavioral Outcomes

Figure C.4 and Figure C.5 show the results of the randomization inference tests for the responses that capture the intention to engage. Figure C.4 features the outcomes that are measured on a four-point Likert scale. For each variable, 1 stands for “*definitely do not intend to act*” and 4 stands for “*definitely intend to act*”. Figure C.5 has the outcomes measured as binary variables (1 – intends to act, 0 – otherwise). The binary way of measuring the outcomes allows detecting the shift between present and absent intentions to engage rather than a gradual change. As the graphs suggest, we cannot reject any of the hypotheses of null effects on any unit.

### C.5 Added Variable Plots

The added variable plots visualize the treatment effects controlled for covariates. The plots show the relationships between the residuals from the regression of treatment outcomes on the covariates and the residuals from the regression of treatment assignment on the covariates. The plots below show the relationships for three experimental conditions and leaflets taken (Figure C.6) and the intentions to engage in civic activities (Figures C.7, C.8, C.9, C.10), controlling for






Figure C.4: Sharp Null Hypotheses: Intentions (Likert Scale)




Figure C.5: Sharp Null Hypotheses: Intentions (Binary Scale)

participants age, gender, education, socio-economic status, and language. The results of covariate control show that the behavioral responses still reflect a positive change, while the results for the verbal responses are not dramatically different from alternative specifications.




Figure C.6: Added Variable Plots: Behavioral Outcomes

## C.6 Generalized Random Forests

I run several predictive models based on generalized random forests [244, 245]. Causal forests provide individual-level predicted estimates of treatment effects and further demonstrate whether the null effect on intentions is caused by dispersion of treatment effects or rather a lack of effect altogether. I used all available pre-test covariates to build a causal forest ( $n=149$ ) and subsequently train each model on a randomly drawn percentage of each sample (train models use 60% and test models use 40% of initial samples for each experimental group).




Figure C.7: Added Variable Plots: Intention to Join an Electoral Commission




Figure C.8: Added Variable Plots: Intention to Establish a Civic Council




Figure C.9: Added Variable Plots: Intention to Join a Pro-Recycling Campaign






Figure C.10: Added Variable Plots: Intention to Lead a Homeowners' Association



Predicted Treatment Effects: Intention to Join an Electoral Commission

Figure C.11: Generalized Random Forests: Intention to Join an Electoral Commission



Predicted Treatment Effects: Intention to Establish a Civic Council

Figure C.12: Generalized Random Forests: Intention to Establish a Civic Council




Figure C.13: Generalized Random Forests: Intention to Join a Pro-Recycling Campaign




Figure C.14: Generalized Random Forests: Intention to Lead a Homeowners' Association

## Appendix D: Personality Traits and Political Preferences

### D.1 Summary Statistics

Table D.1: Summary Statistics: Personality Traits

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
Openness	1,381	5.243	1.181	1	5	6	7
Conscientiousness	1,381	5.372	1.122	1	5	6	7
Extraversion	1,381	5.123	1.170	1	4	6	7
Agreeableness	1,381	3.996	1.061	1	3	5	7
Neuroticism	1,381	4.025	1.288	1	3	5	7

### D.2 Regressions with Open-Ended Responses

Table D.2: Binomial Logit Regressions of Personality Effects on Social Liberalism

	Human Rights	Education	Welfare
Agreeableness	0.19 (0.17)	-0.12 (0.19)	0.13** (0.06)
Conscientiousness	-0.01 (0.16)	-0.39** (0.17)	0.07 (0.06)
Openness	0.55*** (0.17)	0.56*** (0.19)	-0.11* (0.06)
Extraversion	-0.40*** (0.15)	-0.28* (0.17)	-0.04 (0.06)
Neuroticism	-0.15 (0.14)	-0.25* (0.15)	0.09* (0.05)
Constant	-4.28** (1.86)	-0.71 (2.04)	-0.52 (0.63)
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	1,375	1,375	1,375
Log Likelihood	-146.91	-121.23	-749.33
AIC	315.82	264.46	1,520.66

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

Covariates: gender, language, education, age, SES.

### D.3 Distribution of Open-Ended Responses by Ideological Position and Trait Expression

### D.4 Voting Preferences



Table D.3: Binomial Logit Regressions of Personality Effects on Conservatism

	Economic De- velopment	Traditional Values	Security Order	and Ukrainian Na- tionalism
Agreeableness	-0.005 (0.07)	0.37 (0.26)	-0.07 (0.08)	0.16 (0.14)
Conscientiousness	-0.09 (0.07)	-0.11 (0.25)	0.03 (0.08)	-0.16 (0.14)
Openness	-0.05 (0.06)	0.19 (0.23)	0.04 (0.07)	0.35** (0.14)
Extraversion	0.05 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.24)	0.05 (0.08)	-0.10 (0.13)
Neuroticism	0.01 (0.05)	0.07 (0.20)	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.20* (0.12)
Constant	-0.85 (0.65)	-11.15 (333.21)	-2.74*** (0.80)	-4.72*** (1.42)
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	1,375	1,375	1,375	1,375
Log Likelihood	-680.87	-82.34	-500.52	-201.07
AIC	1,387.74	190.68	1,027.03	428.13

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

Covariates: gender, language, education, age, SES.

Table D.4: Binomial Logit Regressions of Personality Effects on Reform Preferences

	Reforming Elites	Reforming In- stitutions	Anti- Corruption Policies	Violent Action
Agreeableness	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.16** (0.07)	-0.05 (0.08)	-0.17 (0.16)
Conscientiousness	0.04 (0.07)	-0.09 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.08)	-0.13 (0.15)
Openness	0.08 (0.07)	0.12* (0.06)	0.06 (0.07)	0.09 (0.14)
Extraversion	0.10 (0.07)	0.09 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.14)
Neuroticism	0.02 (0.06)	-0.10* (0.05)	-0.01 (0.06)	-0.08 (0.12)
Constant	-2.54*** (0.74)	-2.69*** (0.68)	-2.97*** (0.78)	-6.78 (204.52)
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	1,375	1,375	1,375	1,375
Log Likelihood	-569.00	-662.33	-547.82	-186.84
AIC	1,164.01	1,350.65	1,121.63	399.68

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

Covariates: gender, language, education, age, SES.




Figure D.1: Predicted Ideological Preferences by the Degree of Openness to Experience




Figure D.2: Predicted Ideological Preferences by the Degree of Conscientiousness




Figure D.3: Predicted Ideological Preferences by the Degree of Extraversion




Figure D.4: Predicted Ideological Preferences by the Degree of Agreeableness




Figure D.5: Predicted Ideological Preferences by the Degree of Neuroticism

Table D.5: Personality Traits and Electoral Choices in 2014 Presidential Elections

	Poroshenko		Timoshenko		Did not vote		Won't say	
Agreeableness	0.05 (0.06)	0.06 (0.07)	0.09 (0.09)	0.08 (0.10)	-0.01 (0.06)	0.002 (0.06)	-0.07 (0.07)	-0.09 (0.07)
Conscientiousness	0.14** (0.06)	0.01 (0.06)	0.23** (0.09)	0.11 (0.10)	-0.25*** (0.05)	-0.04 (0.06)	0.16** (0.07)	0.12* (0.07)
Openness	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.08)	-0.03 (0.09)	0.05 (0.05)	0.04 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.06)	-0.004 (0.06)
Extraversion	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.07 (0.09)	-0.07 (0.09)	0.01 (0.05)	0.01 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.06)
Neuroticism	0.05 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)	-0.10 (0.07)	-0.11 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)
Age		0.04*** (0.005)		0.02*** (0.01)		-0.06*** (0.01)		0.002 (0.005)
Female		-0.19 (0.14)		0.13 (0.22)		-0.04 (0.14)		0.26* (0.15)
Ukrainian		0.39** (0.17)		-0.08 (0.28)		-0.33* (0.18)		0.06 (0.19)
Education		0.27*** (0.08)		0.07 (0.11)		-0.28*** (0.07)		-0.05 (0.07)
Lower Middle		0.30 (0.25)		-0.32 (0.38)		0.04 (0.24)		-0.22 (0.26)
Middle		-0.23 (0.20)		0.17 (0.31)		0.04 (0.19)		0.21 (0.21)
Upper Middle		0.08 (0.13)		-0.39* (0.20)		0.09 (0.12)		0.01 (0.14)
Constant	-1.85*** (0.54)	-3.97*** (0.65)	-3.12*** (0.85)	-3.66*** (0.96)	0.41 (0.50)	2.63*** (0.61)	-1.99*** (0.61)	-1.70** (0.67)
N	1,375	1,375	1,375	1,375	1,375	1,375	1,375	1,375
Log Likelihood	-782.00	-726.00	-405.00	-390.00	-862.00	-742.00	-666.00	-660.00
AIC	1,576.00	1,479.00	821.00	806.00	1,735.00	1,509.00	1,343.00	1,347.00

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

Table D.6: Personality Traits and Electoral Choices in 2014 Parliamentary Elections

	Pro-Poroshenko		Pro-Timoshenko		Samopomosch'		Did not vote		Won't say	
Agreeableness	-0.06 (0.10)	-0.04 (0.10)	0.02 (0.09)	0.01 (0.09)	0.12 (0.10)	0.15 (0.10)	0.01 (0.06)	0.01 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.07)
Conscientiousness	0.12 (0.09)	-0.003 (0.10)	0.29*** (0.09)	0.19** (0.09)	-0.04 (0.09)	-0.16 (0.10)	-0.24*** (0.05)	-0.10 (0.06)	0.12* (0.06)	0.15** (0.07)
Openness	-0.01 (0.09)	0.001 (0.09)	-0.03 (0.08)	-0.04 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.09)	0.02 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.06)	0.02 (0.06)	0.03 (0.06)
Extraversion	-0.001 (0.09)	-0.01 (0.10)	-0.04 (0.08)	-0.04 (0.09)	0.05 (0.09)	0.05 (0.10)	-0.02 (0.05)	0.02 (0.06)	-0.005 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.06)
Neuroticism	-0.03 (0.08)	-0.03 (0.08)	-0.12* (0.07)	-0.13* (0.07)	0.02 (0.08)	0.03 (0.08)	0.02 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)	0.002 (0.05)
Age		0.05*** (0.01)		0.03*** (0.01)		0.03*** (0.01)		-0.05*** (0.005)		-0.01 (0.005)
Female		-0.37* (0.22)		0.13 (0.21)		-0.26 (0.22)		-0.13 (0.14)		0.21 (0.15)
Ukrainian		0.63** (0.25)		-0.07 (0.27)		0.47* (0.25)		-2.44*** (0.27)		0.55*** (0.17)
Education		0.27** (0.13)		0.07 (0.10)		0.41*** (0.13)		-0.12* (0.07)		-0.14* (0.07)
Lower Middle		0.23 (0.41)		-0.42 (0.43)		-0.07 (0.37)		-0.20 (0.25)		0.22 (0.24)
Middle		-0.39 (0.33)		-0.33 (0.34)		0.17 (0.30)		0.03 (0.20)		0.03 (0.19)
Upper Middle		0.13 (0.21)		-0.19 (0.20)		-0.05 (0.20)		-0.01 (0.13)		-0.07 (0.13)
Constant	-2.67*** (0.89)	-5.05*** (1.04)	-3.10*** (0.82)	-3.94*** (0.93)	-2.77*** (0.86)	-5.03*** (1.01)	0.53 (0.50)	2.59*** (0.62)	-2.03*** (0.59)	-1.55** (0.65)
N	1,375	1,375	1,375	1,375	1,375	1,375	1,375	1,375	1,375	1,375
Log Likelihood	-377.00	-351.00	-431.00	-420.00	-387.00	-367.00	-872.00	-730.00	-694.00	-685.00
AIC	766.00	728.00	875.00	865.00	785.00	759.00	1,755.00	1,487.00	1,400.00	1,396.00

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.



## Appendix E: Nascent Political Ambition

### E.1 Summary Statistics

Table E.1 contains summary statistics of all experimental outcomes.

Table E.1: Summary Statistics: Treatment Outcomes

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
Running for City Office							
<i>Control</i>	389	2.216	1.107	1	1	3	4
<i>Self-Efficacy</i>	353	2.059	1.084	1	1	3	4
<i>Collective Efficacy</i>	308	2.013	1.065	1	1	3	4
<i>Combined Efficacy</i>	331	2.115	1.100	1	1	3	4
Running for Regional Office							
<i>Control</i>	389	2.064	1.067	1	1	3	4
<i>Self-Efficacy</i>	353	2.000	1.069	1	1	3	4
<i>Collective Efficacy</i>	308	1.971	1.050	1	1	3	4
<i>Combined Efficacy</i>	331	2.006	1.104	1	1	3	4
Running for National Office							
<i>Control</i>	389	2.054	1.142	1	1	3	4
<i>Self-Efficacy</i>	353	2.045	1.179	1	1	3	4
<i>Collective Efficacy</i>	308	2.068	1.147	1	1	3	4
<i>Combined Efficacy</i>	331	2.121	1.200	1	1	3	4
Joining a Political Party							
<i>Control</i>	389	2.614	0.947	1	2	3	4
<i>Self-Efficacy</i>	353	2.547	0.967	1	2	3	4
<i>Collective Efficacy</i>	308	2.627	0.877	1	2	3	4
<i>Combined Efficacy</i>	331	2.598	0.946	1	2	3	4

## E.2 Association of Self-Efficacy with Collective and Internal Political Efficacy




Figure E.1: Association of Self-Efficacy with Collective and Internal Political Efficacy

Table E.2: Association of Self-Efficacy with Collective and Internal Political Efficacy

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
		Collective Efficacy			Internal Political Efficacy	
Control over Outcomes	0.0004 (0.0003)				0.001*** (0.0002)	
Subjective Potential		-0.010 (0.010)				-0.005 (0.007)
Self-Control			0.058*** (0.010)			0.022*** (0.007)
Constant	0.496*** (0.027)	0.547*** (0.020)	0.430*** (0.019)	0.273*** (0.015)	0.335*** (0.014)	0.290*** (0.013)
Observations	1,377	1,377	1,377	1,378	1,378	1,378
R <sup>2</sup>	0.002	0.001	0.024	0.009	0.0004	0.008

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

The outcome variables are normalized and range from 0 to 1 to facilitate the interpretation. All models are simple OLS regressions with robust standard errors and sample weights added for enhanced representativeness of the results.

### E.3 Uncertain and Certain Responses

Table E.3: Average Treatment Effects on the Decision Not to Run

	As a party member	For city office	For regional office	For national office
Self-Efficacy	0.019 (0.027)	0.072** (0.036)	0.027 (0.036)	0.036 (0.037)
Collective Efficacy	-0.034 (0.026)	0.092** (0.037)	0.050 (0.038)	0.015 (0.038)
Combined	0.009 (0.027)	0.055 (0.036)	0.043 (0.037)	0.005 (0.037)
Constant	0.154*** (0.018)	0.350*** (0.024)	0.401*** (0.025)	0.440*** (0.025)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

Robust standard errors are in parentheses.


Table E.4: Average Treatment Effects on the Decision to Run

	As a party member	For city office	For regional office	For national office
Self-Efficacy	-0.005 (0.028)	-0.041 (0.027)	0.005 (0.025)	0.010 (0.029)
Collective Efficacy	-0.029 (0.028)	-0.060** (0.027)	-0.023 (0.025)	-0.016 (0.029)
Combined	-0.012 (0.028)	-0.029 (0.028)	0.024 (0.027)	0.035 (0.030)
Constant	0.175*** (0.019)	0.177*** (0.019)	0.136*** (0.017)	0.185*** (0.020)


\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

Robust standard errors are in parentheses.


## **E.4 Generalized Random Forests Models of Political Engagement**




Predicted Treatment Effects of Random Sample: Intention to Join a Political Party



Predicted Treatment Effects of Random Sample: Intention to Run for City Parliament




Predicted Treatment Effects of Random Sample: Intention to Run for Regional Parliament




Predicted Treatment Effects of Random Sample: Intention to Run for National Parliament


Figure E.2: Generalized Random Forests: Predicted Treatment Effects of Random Sample




Predicted Treatment Effects of Activist Sample: Intention to Join a Political Party



Predicted Treatment Effects of Activist Sample: Intention to Run for City Parliament




Predicted Treatment Effects of Activist Sample: Intention to Run for Regional Parliament




Predicted Treatment Effects of Activist Sample: Intention to Run for National Parliament


Figure E.3: Generalized Random Forests: Predicted Treatment Effects of Activist Sample




Predicted Treatment Effects of Activist Sample: Intention to Join a Political Party



Predicted Treatment Effects of Activist Sample: Intention to Run for City Parliament



Predicted Treatment Effects of Activist Sample: Intention to Run for Regional Parliament



Predicted Treatment Effects of Activist Sample: Intention to Run for National Parliament

Figure E.4: Generalized Random Forests: Predicted Treatment Effects of Facebook Sample

## **E.5 Tabular Forms of Interaction Analysis**



Table E.5: Interaction Effects of Pre-Test Self- and Collective Efficacy Levels with Experimental Conditions: Political Party

	<i>Intention to Join a Political Party</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Self-Efficacy	-0.387 (0.518)	0.111 (0.459)	-0.573 (0.451)	-0.191 (0.385)
Collective Efficacy	-0.121 (0.580)	0.397 (0.527)	0.454 (0.553)	0.622 (0.495)
Combined Efficacy	0.502 (0.609)	0.007 (0.476)	-0.285 (0.446)	-0.341 (0.386)
Control over Outcomes	0.037 (0.093)			
Self-Efficacy:Control over Outcomes	0.067 (0.134)			
Collective Efficacy:Control over Outcomes	0.119 (0.159)			
Combined Efficacy:Control over Outcomes	-0.149 (0.152)			
Subjective Potential		0.087 (0.143)		
Self-Efficacy:Subjective Potential		-0.126 (0.213)		
Collective Efficacy:Subjective Potential		-0.059 (0.249)		
Combined Efficacy:Subjective Potential		-0.029 (0.229)		
Self-Control			-0.120 (0.163)	
Self-Efficacy:Self-Control			0.255 (0.235)	
Collective Efficacy:Self-Control			-0.095 (0.276)	
Combined Efficacy:Self-Control			0.131 (0.225)	
Collective Efficacy				-0.040 (0.084)
Self-Efficacy:Collective Efficacy				0.022 (0.122)
Collective Efficacy:Collective Efficacy				-0.117 (0.152)
Combined Efficacy:Collective Efficacy				0.111 (0.129)
Constant	1.561*** (0.359)	1.528*** (0.305)	1.907*** (0.323)	1.799*** (0.264)

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table E.6: Interaction Effects of Pre-Test Internal Political Efficacy Levels with Experimental Conditions: Political Party

	<i>Intention to Join a Political Party</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Self-Efficacy	0.006 (0.375)	0.066 (0.384)	-0.120 (0.378)	0.172 (0.370)
Collective Efficacy	0.439 (0.438)	0.822* (0.445)	0.549 (0.431)	0.940** (0.422)
Combined Efficacy	0.043 (0.372)	-0.147 (0.379)	-0.244 (0.372)	0.150 (0.397)
IPE (Local)	0.085 (0.093)			
Self-Efficacy:IPE (Local)	-0.053 (0.128)			
Collective Efficacy:IPE (Local)	-0.059 (0.151)			
Combined Efficacy:IPE (Local)	-0.033 (0.128)			
IPE (City)		0.247** (0.117)		
Self-Efficacy:IPE (City)		-0.101 (0.163)		
Collective Efficacy:IPE (City)		-0.251 (0.179)		
Combined Efficacy:IPE (City)		0.078 (0.173)		
IPE (Region)			0.134 (0.111)	
Self-Efficacy:IPE (Region)			-0.005 (0.160)	
Collective Efficacy:IPE (Region)			-0.123 (0.173)	
Combined Efficacy:IPE (Region)			0.125 (0.167)	
IPE (National)				0.316** (0.130)
Self-Efficacy:IPE (National)				-0.169 (0.178)
Collective Efficacy:IPE (National)				-0.347* (0.189)
Combined Efficacy:IPE (National)				-0.097 (0.205)
Constant	1.473*** (0.270)	1.165*** (0.267)	1.405*** (0.266)	1.099*** (0.260)

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table E.7: Interaction Effects of Pre-Test Self- and Collective Efficacy Levels with Experimental Conditions: City Parliament

	<i>Intention to Run for City Parliament</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Self-Efficacy	-0.510 (0.394)	-0.719** (0.354)	-0.272 (0.338)	-0.183 (0.278)
Collective Efficacy	-0.791* (0.405)	-1.185*** (0.370)	-0.676** (0.340)	-0.300 (0.289)
Combined Efficacy	0.052 (0.408)	-0.717** (0.360)	-0.434 (0.327)	-0.292 (0.277)
Control over Outcomes	0.076 (0.068)			
Self-Efficacy:Control over Outcomes	0.050 (0.100)			
Collective Efficacy:Control over Outcomes	0.109 (0.104)			
Combined Efficacy:Control over Outcomes	-0.090 (0.103)			
Subjective Potential		-0.128 (0.115)		
Self-Efficacy:Subjective Potential		0.210 (0.164)		
Collective Efficacy:Subjective Potential		0.403** (0.173)		
Combined Efficacy:Subjective Potential		0.233 (0.169)		
Self-Control			0.053 (0.124)	
Self-Efficacy:Self-Control			-0.023 (0.177)	
Collective Efficacy:Self-Control			0.160 (0.179)	
Combined Efficacy:Self-Control			0.097 (0.169)	
Collective Efficacy				0.215*** (0.064)
Self-Efficacy:Collective Efficacy				-0.064 (0.092)
Collective Efficacy:Collective Efficacy				-0.052 (0.096)
Combined Efficacy:Collective Efficacy				0.002 (0.094)
Constant	0.357 (0.264)	0.881*** (0.250)	0.538** (0.237)	0.094 (0.186)

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table E.8: Interaction Effects of Pre-Test Internal Political Efficacy Levels with Experimental Conditions: City Parliament

	<i>Intention to Run for City Parliament</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Self-Efficacy	0.087 (0.280)	0.262 (0.291)	0.207 (0.279)	0.173 (0.283)
Collective Efficacy	-0.009 (0.289)	-0.039 (0.306)	-0.252 (0.297)	-0.019 (0.298)
Combined Efficacy	0.122 (0.284)	0.226 (0.294)	-0.007 (0.279)	0.147 (0.289)
IPE (Local)	0.303*** (0.074)			
Self-Efficacy:IPE (Local)	-0.156 (0.100)			
Collective Efficacy:IPE (Local)	-0.155 (0.102)			
Combined Efficacy:IPE (Local)	-0.146 (0.102)			
IPE (City)		0.416*** (0.094)		
Self-Efficacy:IPE (City)		-0.277** (0.120)		
Collective Efficacy:IPE (City)		-0.176 (0.130)		
Combined Efficacy:IPE (City)		-0.225* (0.126)		
IPE (Region)			0.359*** (0.086)	
Self-Efficacy:IPE (Region)			-0.251** (0.116)	
Collective Efficacy:IPE (Region)			-0.076 (0.127)	
Combined Efficacy:IPE (Region)			-0.107 (0.121)	
IPE (National)				0.425*** (0.099)
Self-Efficacy:IPE (National)				-0.259** (0.131)
Collective Efficacy:IPE (National)				-0.202 (0.140)
Combined Efficacy:IPE (National)				-0.209 (0.139)
Constant	-0.139 (0.201)	-0.273 (0.212)	-0.130 (0.199)	-0.193 (0.204)

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table E.9: Interaction Effects of Pre-Test Self- and Collective Efficacy Levels with Experimental Conditions: Regional Parliament

	<i>Intention to Run for Regional Parliament</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Self-Efficacy	-0.235 (0.391)	-0.242 (0.347)	-0.225 (0.332)	-0.224 (0.278)
Collective Efficacy	-0.598 (0.402)	-0.796** (0.362)	-0.356 (0.336)	-0.277 (0.288)
Combined Efficacy	0.041 (0.398)	-0.780** (0.352)	-0.604* (0.321)	-0.218 (0.274)
Control over Outcomes	0.116* (0.066)			
Self-Efficacy:Control over Outcomes	0.027 (0.098)			
Collective Efficacy:Control over Outcomes	0.102 (0.103)			
Combined Efficacy:Control over Outcomes	-0.075 (0.100)			
Subjective Potential		-0.069 (0.110)		
Self-Efficacy:Subjective Potential		0.066 (0.161)		
Collective Efficacy:Subjective Potential		0.289* (0.170)		
Combined Efficacy:Subjective Potential		0.298* (0.166)		
Self-Control			0.033 (0.119)	
Self-Efficacy:Self-Control			0.063 (0.173)	
Collective Efficacy:Self-Control			0.070 (0.175)	
Combined Efficacy:Self-Control			0.229 (0.165)	
Collective Efficacy				0.149** (0.061)
Self-Efficacy:Collective Efficacy				0.032 (0.090)
Collective Efficacy:Collective Efficacy				0.009 (0.094)
Combined Efficacy:Collective Efficacy				-0.005 (0.090)
Constant	-0.005 (0.257)	0.548** (0.239)	0.356 (0.229)	0.035 (0.184)

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table E.10: Interaction Effects of Pre-Test Internal Political Efficacy Levels with Experimental Conditions: Regional Parliament

	<i>Intention to Run for Regional Parliament</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Self-Efficacy	0.161 (0.271)	0.296 (0.276)	0.384 (0.269)	0.342 (0.272)
Collective Efficacy	0.039 (0.282)	-0.133 (0.295)	-0.177 (0.290)	0.006 (0.290)
Combined Efficacy	0.085 (0.275)	0.189 (0.277)	0.136 (0.269)	0.243 (0.273)
IPE (Local)	0.229*** (0.065)			
Self-Efficacy:IPE (Local)	-0.102 (0.092)			
Collective Efficacy:IPE (Local)	-0.102 (0.096)			
Combined Efficacy:IPE (Local)	-0.108 (0.094)			
IPE (City)		0.294*** (0.078)		
Self-Efficacy:IPE (City)		-0.188* (0.106)		
Collective Efficacy:IPE (City)		-0.044 (0.119)		
Combined Efficacy:IPE (City)		-0.177 (0.110)		
IPE (Region)			0.331*** (0.076)	
Self-Efficacy:IPE (Region)			-0.235** (0.106)	
Collective Efficacy:IPE (Region)			-0.025 (0.121)	
Combined Efficacy:IPE (Region)			-0.152 (0.110)	
IPE (National)				0.371*** (0.087)
Self-Efficacy:IPE (National)				-0.234** (0.120)
Collective Efficacy:IPE (National)				-0.118 (0.132)
Combined Efficacy:IPE (National)				-0.227* (0.123)
Constant	-0.186 (0.192)	-0.250 (0.195)	-0.303 (0.188)	-0.326* (0.191)

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table E.11: Interaction Effects of Pre-Test Self- and Collective Efficacy Levels with Experimental Conditions: National Parliament

	<i>Intention to Run for National Parliament</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Self-Efficacy	-0.112 (0.389)	-0.485 (0.346)	-0.199 (0.329)	-0.310 (0.277)
Collective Efficacy	-0.390 (0.401)	-1.064*** (0.368)	-0.255 (0.335)	-0.215 (0.287)
Combined Efficacy	0.008 (0.397)	-0.789** (0.354)	-0.297 (0.320)	-0.078 (0.273)
Control over Outcomes	0.113* (0.065)			
Self-Efficacy:Control over Outcomes	-0.014 (0.098)			
Collective Efficacy:Control over Outcomes	0.083 (0.103)			
Combined Efficacy:Control over Outcomes	-0.022 (0.100)			
Subjective Potential		-0.108 (0.111)		
Self-Efficacy:Subjective Potential		0.175 (0.161)		
Collective Efficacy:Subjective Potential		0.501*** (0.172)		
Combined Efficacy:Subjective Potential		0.389** (0.167)		
Self-Control			-0.007 (0.118)	
Self-Efficacy:Self-Control			0.030 (0.170)	
Collective Efficacy:Self-Control			0.093 (0.174)	
Combined Efficacy:Self-Control			0.141 (0.164)	
Collective Efficacy				0.079 (0.060)
Self-Efficacy:Collective Efficacy				0.056 (0.089)
Collective Efficacy:Collective Efficacy				0.042 (0.093)
Combined Efficacy:Collective Efficacy				0.006 (0.088)
Constant	-0.154 (0.255)	0.465* (0.240)	0.265 (0.228)	0.050 (0.183)

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table E.12: Interaction Effects of Pre-Test Internal Political Efficacy Levels with Experimental Conditions: National Parliament

	<i>Intention to Run for National Parliament</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Self-Efficacy	0.075 (0.269)	0.095 (0.273)	0.178 (0.266)	0.219 (0.273)
Collective Efficacy	0.292 (0.279)	0.060 (0.288)	-0.086 (0.285)	0.239 (0.285)
Combined Efficacy	0.229 (0.275)	0.240 (0.275)	0.302 (0.268)	0.369 (0.273)
IPE (Local)	0.234*** (0.064)			
Self-Efficacy:IPE (Local)	-0.078 (0.089)			
Collective Efficacy:IPE (Local)	-0.144 (0.093)			
Combined Efficacy:IPE (Local)	-0.096 (0.094)			
IPE (City)		0.275*** (0.075)		
Self-Efficacy:IPE (City)		-0.112 (0.103)		
Collective Efficacy:IPE (City)		-0.064 (0.112)		
Combined Efficacy:IPE (City)		-0.120 (0.109)		
IPE (Region)			0.301*** (0.074)	
Self-Efficacy:IPE (Region)			-0.149 (0.104)	
Collective Efficacy:IPE (Region)			0.003 (0.116)	
Combined Efficacy:IPE (Region)			-0.151 (0.110)	
IPE (National)				0.391*** (0.086)
Self-Efficacy:IPE (National)				-0.185 (0.119)
Collective Efficacy:IPE (National)				-0.162 (0.127)
Combined Efficacy:IPE (National)				-0.201* (0.122)
Constant	-0.366* (0.190)	-0.375* (0.192)	-0.407** (0.186)	-0.533*** (0.192)

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.



## E.6 Power Analysis

The power analysis shows that all measures of political intentions have the highest possible power (Table E.13). The likelihood of receiving a false negative outcome is very low for these variables.

Table E.13: Power Calculations

Comparison of Control vs.	City ment	Parlia- ment	Regional Parliament	National Parliament	Par-	Political Party
Self-Efficacy	1.000		1.000	1.000		1.000
Collective Efficacy	1.000		1.000	1.000		1.000
Combined Efficacy	1.000		1.000	1.000		1.000

## E.7 ATEs and Bell-McCaffrey Confidence Intervals

Table E.14: Average Treatment Effects on Joining a Political Party

	<i>Dependent variable: Intention to Join a Political Party</i>					
	OLS		Ordered Logit		Binary Logit	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Self-Efficacy	-0.064 (0.071)	-0.059 (0.070)	-0.132 (0.199)	-0.125 (0.200)	-0.170 (0.149)	-0.161 (0.150)
Collective Efficacy	0.006 (0.069)	0.009 (0.069)	0.283 (0.225)	0.290 (0.226)	0.018 (0.156)	0.019 (0.157)
Combined	-0.016 (0.071)	-0.006 (0.071)	-0.049 (0.206)	-0.028 (0.207)	0.013 (0.153)	0.032 (0.155)
Female		-0.092* (0.053)		0.171 (0.156)		-0.199* (0.117)
Ukrainian		-0.106 (0.070)		-0.055 (0.204)		-0.409*** (0.150)
Higher Education		0.089*** (0.027)		0.120 (0.078)		0.196*** (0.060)
Constant	2.612*** (0.048)	2.339*** (0.146)	1.695*** (0.141)	0.925** (0.421)	0.375*** (0.103)	-0.254 (0.322)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

Omitted insignificant covariates include SES and age.

Table E.15: Average Treatment Effects on Running for Office in City Parliament

	<i>Dependent variable: Intention to Run for City Parliament</i>					
	OLS		Ordered Logit		Binary Logit	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Self-Efficacy	-0.155* (0.081)	-0.149* (0.078)	-0.308** (0.152)	-0.311** (0.155)	-0.180 (0.153)	-0.179 (0.157)
Collective Efficacy	-0.212** (0.083)	-0.195** (0.080)	-0.405*** (0.157)	-0.397** (0.161)	-0.233 (0.160)	-0.217 (0.163)
Combined	-0.115 (0.083)	-0.088 (0.081)	-0.264* (0.155)	-0.232 (0.160)	-0.024 (0.154)	0.027 (0.159)
Female		-0.266*** (0.062)		-0.314*** (0.120)		-0.404*** (0.121)
Higher Education		0.169*** (0.030)		0.256*** (0.061)		0.349*** (0.067)
Age		-0.009*** (0.002)		-0.019*** (0.004)		-0.015*** (0.004)
Constant	2.218*** (0.056)	2.110*** (0.174)	0.629*** (0.107)	0.722** (0.333)	-0.455*** (0.104)	-1.040*** (0.356)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

Omitted insignificant covariates include language and SES.

Table C.2 contains confidence intervals for unadjusted models (with treatment assignment as the only predictor).

Table E.16: Average Treatment Effects on Running for Office in Regional Parliament

	<i>Dependent variable: Intention to Run for Regional Parliament</i>					
	OLS		Ordered Logit		Binary Logit	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Self-Efficacy	-0.064 (0.079)	-0.060 (0.076)	-0.114 (0.150)	-0.111 (0.153)	-0.200 (0.160)	-0.208 (0.166)
Collective Efficacy	-0.111 (0.081)	-0.095 (0.078)	-0.237 (0.155)	-0.227 (0.160)	-0.132 (0.165)	-0.120 (0.170)
Combined	-0.079 (0.081)	-0.057 (0.079)	-0.213 (0.152)	-0.185 (0.157)	-0.219 (0.163)	-0.193 (0.170)
Female		-0.322*** (0.061)		-0.373*** (0.119)		-0.695*** (0.128)
Higher Education		0.129*** (0.029)		0.218*** (0.061)		0.288*** (0.068)
Age		-0.012*** (0.002)		-0.024*** (0.004)		-0.024*** (0.004)
Constant	2.071*** (0.054)	2.259*** (0.164)	0.413*** (0.104)	0.870*** (0.329)	-0.702*** (0.108)	-0.562 (0.361)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

Omitted insignificant covariates include language and SES.

Table E.17: Average Treatment Effects on Running for Office in National Parliament

	<i>Dependent variable: Intention to Run for National Parliament</i>					
	OLS		Ordered Logit		Binary Logit	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Self-Efficacy	-0.005 (0.086)	-0.0002 (0.082)	-0.143 (0.148)	-0.146 (0.154)	0.091 (0.158)	0.107 (0.169)
Collective Efficacy	-0.005 (0.088)	0.011 (0.083)	-0.096 (0.154)	-0.081 (0.161)	0.174 (0.163)	0.207 (0.174)
Combined	0.043 (0.088)	0.067 (0.083)	-0.049 (0.151)	-0.017 (0.158)	0.129 (0.160)	0.184 (0.171)
Female		-0.437*** (0.066)		-0.510*** (0.119)		-0.825*** (0.127)
Ukrainian		-0.143* (0.084)		-0.352** (0.155)		-0.248 (0.172)
Higher Education		0.127*** (0.031)		0.200*** (0.061)		0.245*** (0.067)
Age		-0.016*** (0.002)		-0.028*** (0.004)		-0.032*** (0.004)
Constant	2.060*** (0.058)	2.558*** (0.178)	0.254** (0.102)	1.171*** (0.331)	-0.800*** (0.110)	-0.065 (0.362)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

Omitted insignificant covariates include language and SES.

Table E.18: Bell-McCaffrey Confidence Intervals (Unadjusted Estimates)

Statistic	Self-Efficacy	Collective Efficacy	Combined Efficacy
<b>Joining a Political Party</b>			
<i>Estimated ATE</i>	-0.063585091	0.006044849	-0.015854346
<i>Robust Standard Error</i>	0.07062294	0.06946718	0.07090723
<i>Bell-McCaffrey confidence interval (lower)</i>	-0.20222979	-0.13034529	-0.15506411
<i>Bell-McCaffrey confidence interval (upper)</i>	0.07505961	0.14243499	0.12335542
<b>Running for Office in City Parliament</b>			
<i>Estimated ATE</i>	-0.1547094	-0.2122039	-0.1145905
<i>Robust Standard Error</i>	0.08068539	0.08270006	0.08265603
<i>Bell-McCaffrey confidence interval (lower)</i>	-0.313108395	-0.374575129	-0.276866306
<i>Bell-McCaffrey confidence interval (upper)</i>	0.003689582	-0.049832637	0.047685256
<b>Running for Office in Regional Parliament</b>			
<i>Estimated ATE</i>	-0.06397628	-0.11111771	-0.07851143
<i>Robust Standard Error</i>	0.07894517	0.08087581	0.08144641
<i>Bell-McCaffrey confidence interval (lower)</i>	-0.21895893	-0.26990728	-0.23841241
<i>Bell-McCaffrey confidence interval (upper)</i>	0.09100636	0.04767186	0.08138954
<b>Running for Office in National Parliament</b>			
<i>Estimated ATE</i>	-0.004800378	-0.004776382	0.043205265
<i>Robust Standard Error</i>	0.08581887	0.08761641	0.08765389
<i>Bell-McCaffrey confidence interval (lower)</i>	-0.1732773	-0.1768003	-0.1288827
<i>Bell-McCaffrey confidence interval (upper)</i>	0.1636765	0.1672475	0.2152932

## E.8 Interaction of Past Political Experience and Treatment Conditions




Figure E.5: Interaction of Pre-Treatment National Internal Political Efficacy and Self-Efficacy Induction

Table E.19: Interaction Effects of Prior Experience with Experimental Conditions: Political Party

	<i>Intention to Join a Political Party</i>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Self-Efficacy	-0.115 (0.218)	-0.070 (0.232)	0.065 (0.233)	0.254 (0.257)	0.296 (0.260)	-0.101 (0.211)
Collective Efficacy	0.229 (0.239)	0.339 (0.258)	0.415 (0.256)	0.527* (0.278)	0.524* (0.272)	0.274 (0.235)
Combined	-0.092 (0.225)	-0.047 (0.233)	-0.037 (0.232)	0.032 (0.252)	0.168 (0.258)	-0.110 (0.216)
Candidate	0.094 (0.378)					
Self-Efficacy:Candidate	-0.100 (0.538)					
Collective Efficacy:Candidate	0.779 (0.851)					
Combined Efficacy:Candidate	0.263 (0.563)					
Electoral Observer		0.607* (0.327)				
Self-Efficacy:Electoral Observer		-0.198 (0.461)				
Collective Efficacy:Electoral Observer		-0.120 (0.536)				
Combined Efficacy:Electoral Observer		0.187 (0.510)				
Social Activist			0.422 (0.337)			
Self-Efficacy:Social Activist			-0.741 (0.458)			
Collective Efficacy:Social Activist			-0.534 (0.547)			
Combined Efficacy:Social Activist			0.024 (0.508)			
Volunteer				0.945*** (0.304)		
Self-Efficacy:Volunteer				-0.942** (0.416)		
Collective Efficacy:Volunteer				-0.555 (0.483)		
Combined Efficacy:Volunteer				-0.129 (0.448)		
Protester					1.323*** (0.309)	
Self-Efficacy:Protester					-1.026** (0.420)	
Collective Efficacy:Protester					-0.383 (0.509)	
Combined Efficacy:Protester					-0.472 (0.444)	
Association Leader						0.677 (0.427)
Self-Efficacy:Association Leader						0.087 (0.698)
Collective Efficacy:Association Leader						0.960 (1.129)
Combined Efficacy:Association Leader						1.072 (0.858)
Constant	1.679*** (0.154)	1.517*** (0.163)	1.587*** (0.160)	1.308*** (0.174)	1.124*** (0.176)	1.592*** (0.151)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

Table E.20: Interaction Effects of Prior Experience with Experimental Conditions: City Parliament

	<i>Intention to Run for City Parliament</i>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Self-Efficacy	-0.307*	-0.250	-0.146	-0.185	-0.339	-0.296*
	(0.166)	(0.184)	(0.175)	(0.204)	(0.218)	(0.164)
Collective Efficacy	-0.415**	-0.482**	-0.272	-0.200	-0.453**	-0.396**
	(0.169)	(0.188)	(0.178)	(0.207)	(0.218)	(0.170)
Combined	-0.333*	-0.267	-0.175	-0.317	-0.394*	-0.325*
	(0.170)	(0.185)	(0.177)	(0.207)	(0.220)	(0.169)
Constant	0.295					
	(0.293)					
Self-Efficacy:Candidate	0.007					
	(0.419)					
Collective Efficacy:Candidate	0.282					
	(0.490)					
Combined Efficacy:Candidate	0.399					
	(0.429)					
Electoral Observer		0.172				
		(0.227)				
Self-Efficacy:Electoral Observer		-0.176				
		(0.326)				
Collective Efficacy:Electoral Observer		0.309				
		(0.348)				
Combined Efficacy:Electoral Observer		0.051				
		(0.342)				
Social Activist			0.935***			
			(0.265)			
Self-Efficacy:Social Activist			-0.652*			
			(0.365)			
Collective Efficacy:Social Activist			-0.432			
			(0.398)			
Combined Efficacy:Social Activist			-0.303			
			(0.384)			
Volunteer				0.613***		
				(0.217)		
Self-Efficacy:Volunteer				-0.239		
				(0.309)		
Collective Efficacy:Volunteer				-0.409		
				(0.321)		
Combined Efficacy:Volunteer				0.186		
				(0.320)		
Protester					0.303	
					(0.214)	
Self-Efficacy:Protester					0.081	
					(0.305)	
Collective Efficacy:Protester					0.185	
					(0.319)	
Combined Efficacy:Protester					0.312	
					(0.314)	
Association Leader						0.291
						(0.282)
Self-Efficacy:Association Leader						0.053
						(0.444)
Collective Efficacy:Association Leader						0.079
						(0.468)
Combined Efficacy:Association Leader						0.474
						(0.440)
Constant	0.580***	0.572***	0.394***	0.343**	0.467***	0.577***
	(0.116)	(0.130)	(0.122)	(0.145)	(0.156)	(0.118)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01  
 Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

Table E.21: Interaction Effects of Prior Experience with Experimental Conditions: Regional Parliament

	<i>Intention to Run for Regional Parliament</i>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Self-Efficacy	-0.124 (0.164)	-0.082 (0.183)	0.060 (0.174)	-0.042 (0.203)	-0.200 (0.216)	-0.175 (0.163)
Collective Efficacy	-0.232 (0.167)	-0.395** (0.187)	-0.092 (0.177)	-0.197 (0.206)	-0.399* (0.216)	-0.285* (0.168)
Combined	-0.264 (0.168)	-0.246 (0.183)	-0.057 (0.176)	-0.179 (0.206)	-0.272 (0.219)	-0.288* (0.167)
Constant	0.169 (0.278)					
Self-Efficacy:Candidate	0.074 (0.407)					
Collective Efficacy:Candidate	0.052 (0.467)					
Combined Efficacy:Candidate	0.281 (0.406)					
Electoral Observer		-0.084 (0.218)				
Self-Efficacy:Electoral Observer		-0.106 (0.319)				
Collective Efficacy:Electoral Observer		0.543 (0.341)				
Combined Efficacy:Electoral Observer		0.099 (0.332)				
Social Activist			0.845*** (0.248)			
Self-Efficacy:Social Activist			-0.659* (0.352)			
Collective Efficacy:Social Activist			-0.472 (0.383)			
Combined Efficacy:Social Activist			-0.571 (0.362)			
Volunteer				0.398* (0.209)		
Self-Efficacy:Volunteer				-0.125 (0.302)		
Collective Efficacy:Volunteer				-0.018 (0.316)		
Combined Efficacy:Volunteer				-0.041 (0.308)		
Protester					0.155 (0.209)	
Self-Efficacy:Protester					0.185 (0.301)	
Collective Efficacy:Protester					0.418 (0.315)	
Combined Efficacy:Protester					0.139 (0.306)	
Association Leader						-0.095 (0.264)
Self-Efficacy:Association Leader						0.464 (0.433)
Collective Efficacy:Association Leader						0.349 (0.453)
Combined Efficacy:Association Leader						0.460 (0.408)
Constant	0.384*** (0.114)	0.441*** (0.128)	0.191 (0.121)	0.222 (0.143)	0.329** (0.154)	0.431*** (0.115)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

Table E.22: Interaction Effects of Prior Experience with Experimental Conditions: National Parliament

	<i>Intention to Run for National Parliament</i>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Self-Efficacy	-0.115 (0.162)	-0.264 (0.181)	-0.066 (0.173)	-0.343* (0.203)	-0.172 (0.215)	-0.192 (0.161)
Collective Efficacy	-0.117 (0.166)	-0.332* (0.186)	-0.031 (0.176)	-0.224 (0.207)	-0.170 (0.215)	-0.103 (0.167)
Combined	-0.057 (0.167)	-0.119 (0.183)	0.035 (0.175)	-0.226 (0.206)	-0.026 (0.218)	-0.131 (0.166)
Constant	0.286 (0.276)					
Self-Efficacy:Candidate	-0.153 (0.401)					
Collective Efficacy:Candidate	0.387 (0.480)					
Combined Efficacy:Candidate	0.031 (0.402)					
Electoral Observer		-0.358* (0.216)				
Self-Efficacy:Electoral Observer		0.354 (0.316)				
Collective Efficacy:Electoral Observer		0.758** (0.339)				
Combined Efficacy:Electoral Observer		0.167 (0.330)				
Social Activist			0.601** (0.235)			
Self-Efficacy:Social Activist			-0.259 (0.341)			
Collective Efficacy:Social Activist			-0.111 (0.376)			
Combined Efficacy:Social Activist			-0.262 (0.354)			
Volunteer				-0.013 (0.205)		
Self-Efficacy:Volunteer				0.454 (0.298)		
Collective Efficacy:Volunteer				0.318 (0.313)		
Combined Efficacy:Volunteer				0.403 (0.305)		
Protester					0.161 (0.206)	
Self-Efficacy:Protester					0.069 (0.297)	
Collective Efficacy:Protester					0.211 (0.312)	
Combined Efficacy:Protester					-0.028 (0.304)	
Association Leader						-0.099 (0.261)
Self-Efficacy:Association Leader						0.360 (0.423)
Collective Efficacy:Association Leader						-0.001 (0.446)
Combined Efficacy:Association Leader						0.508 (0.408)
Constant	0.205* (0.112)	0.377*** (0.127)	0.089 (0.120)	0.260* (0.144)	0.166 (0.152)	0.272** (0.114)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.






Figure E.6: Interaction of Pre-Treatment Self-Efficacy and Combined Efficacy Induction




Figure E.7: Interaction of Pre-Treatment Social Activism and Self-Efficacy Induction

## E.9 Mediating Effects of City Office on Higher Political Ambitions

In general, I assumed that the outcome variables are independent of each other. However, they were not asked in random order, and all respondents saw the question about running for the city parliament prior to the questions about regional and national parliaments. Moreover, the questions about different levels of potential political engagement appeared next to each other on the survey screen. Given that the decision to run (or, rather, *not* to run) for the city parliament might have affected the respondents' decision to commit to higher levels of power, it is possible that the change in efficacy affects the desire to run for regional and national parliaments through the change in the interest in running for the city parliament. Although the average treatment effects for the national and regional parliaments are not distinguishable from zero, the absence of total effect does not prove the absence of causation. I am interested in the potential average direct effect of the induction of efficacy on these outcomes, especially given the evidence for the heterogeneous treatment effects detected in previous sections.

At least two alternatives are possible here. First, the self-efficacy and collective treatments might have suppressed the interest in running for the city parliament, and the decision not to run for the city parliament further worsened the interest in regional and national parliaments. In this case, those with lower interest in the city parliament will also do worse on regional and national parliaments. Alternatively, those who refused to run for city office because they considered it futile or powerless might have decided to run for regional and national parliaments instead. In this case, we will observe a positive average direct effect of the treatment on the intention to run for regional and national parliaments.

I build on the mediation framework proposed by Imai and Yamamoto and use the **mediation** R package to evaluate the mediation effect of the intention to run for city parliament on the subsequent intention to run for regional and national parliaments [358, 359]. I test both interactive and additive models as I do not have a strong reason to assume that the ACME takes different values depending on the baseline treatment status. The results in Figure E.8 are presented without




Figure E.8: Causal Mediation Effects of Running for City Parliament (Additive Models)




Figure E.9: Causal Mediation Effects of Running for City Parliament (Interaction Models)

an interaction term between the treatment and mediator. The interaction models deliver similar results (Tables E.23, E.24 and Figure E.9). All models are linear least squared models and the outcome variables are measured with a four-point Likert scale. Alternative models with differently coded outcome variables and other model specifications deliver the same findings as those reported below.

Figure E.8 sums up the results of the analyses and displays the average causal mediation effects of the intention to run for the city parliament (ACMEs), average direct effects (ADEs) of each of the three treatment conditions and total effects on the intention to run for regional and national parliaments. The estimates demonstrate the shift on a four-point Likert scale in the intention to run for the regional or national parliament. The 95% confidence intervals are plotted from the quasi-Bayesian Monte Carlo simulations. The alternative nonparametric bootstrap confidence intervals deliver similar results.

First, I consider the mediation effects in the case of the regional parliament. ACMEs, in this case, are the indirect effects of the induction of the corresponding facet of efficacy on the intention to run for the regional parliament that goes through the mediator (the intention to run for the city parliament). In both self-efficacy and collective efficacy conditions, the estimated ACMEs of the intention to run for the city parliament are negative and statistically different from zero. The negative ACME of the collective efficacy treatment has the lowest p-value, confirming our previous conclusions on the consistent negative effects of this treatment condition. ADEs are average direct effects of the induction of efficacy on the intention to run for regional parliament, and they are not statistically significant. Total effects stand for the combined, direct and indirect, effect of the treatment on the intention to run for the regional parliament. Total effects are not significantly different from zero. These results suggest that the increase either in self-efficacy or collective efficacy may have decreased the interest in running for the city parliament, which in turn made respondents less likely to run for the regional parliament. The intention (not) to run for the city parliament fully mediates the effect of self- and collective efficacy treatments on the intention to run for the regional parliament.

Next, I consider the mediation effects in the case of the national parliament. Once again, ACMEs are the indirect effects of the induction of the self, collective, or combined facet of efficacy on the intention to run for the national parliament that goes through the mediator (the intention to run for the city parliament). The estimated ACMEs are significant and negative for self-efficacy and collective efficacy treatments. ADEs are average direct effects of the induction of efficacy on the intention to run for the national parliament, and they are marginally significant but *positive* both for combined and collective efficacy (recall the share of positive individual predicted treatment effects on Figures 3.4 and E.2). This is the most important finding of the mediation analyses: it suggests that a direct effect of collective efficacy (and, marginally, combined) on the intention to run for the national parliament may be positive if we account for an indirect suppressing effect of the city parliament. However, the positive effects of collective and combined treatments on the interest in running for the national parliament are insufficient to cancel out the negative effect of the city parliament. And while total effects are not significantly different from zero, there might be a positive causal relationship between collective efficacy and national-level political ambitions.

Table E.23: Causal Mediation Analysis: The Effect on City Parliament on Regional Parliament (Interactive)

	Estimate	Quasi-Bayesian Confidence Intervals		p-value
<i>Self-Efficacy Treatment</i>				
ACME (control)	-0.1136	-0.2266	0.00	0.045**
ACME (treated)	-0.1237	-0.2453	0.00	0.045**
ADE (control)	0.0611	-0.0273	0.15	0.189
ADE (treated)	0.0510	-0.0372	0.14	0.269
Total Effect	-0.0625	-0.2080	0.09	0.404
Prop. Mediated (control)	1.2960	-10.1703	11.88	0.363
Prop. Mediated (treated)	1.4122	-11.2705	13.03	0.363
ACME (average)	-0.1186	-0.2349	0.00	0.045**
ADE (average)	0.0561	-0.0320	0.15	0.228
Prop. Mediated (average)	1.3541	-10.7255	12.40	0.363
<i>Collective Efficacy Treatment</i>				
ACME (control)	-0.1390	-0.2556	-0.03	0.017**
ACME (treated)	-0.1400	-0.2574	-0.03	0.017**
ADE (control)	0.0564	-0.0422	0.15	0.268
ADE (treated)	0.0553	-0.0415	0.15	0.273
Total Effect	-0.0836	-0.2336	0.07	0.272
Prop. Mediated (control)	1.3671	-7.2786	11.96	0.259
Prop. Mediated (treated)	1.3731	-7.3669	11.89	0.259
ACME (average)	-0.1395	-0.2559	-0.03	0.017**
ADE (average)	0.0559	-0.0412	0.15	0.266
Prop. Mediated (average)	1.3701	-7.3294	12.03	0.259
<i>Combined Efficacy Treatment</i>				
ACME (control)	-0.0678	-0.1829	0.05	0.25
ACME (treated)	-0.0725	-0.1939	0.05	0.25
ADE (control)	0.0214	-0.0742	0.11	0.64
ADE (treated)	0.0167	-0.0799	0.11	0.71
Total Effect	-0.0511	-0.2050	0.10	0.51
Prop. Mediated (control)	0.8846	-7.2103	7.33	0.36
Prop. Mediated (treated)	0.9470	-7.5874	7.85	0.36
ACME (average)	-0.0701	-0.1870	0.05	0.25
ADE (average)	0.0191	-0.0777	0.11	0.68
Prop. Mediated (average)	0.9158	-7.2858	7.71	0.36

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01. Simulations: 5000.

Table E.24: Causal Mediation Analysis: The Effect on City Parliament on National Parliament (Interactive)

	Estimate	Quasi-Bayesian Confidence Intervals		p-value
<i>Self-Efficacy Treatment</i>				
ACME (control)	-0.08285	-0.16586	0.00	0.048**
ACME (treated)	-0.10834	-0.22275	0.00	0.048**
ADE (control)	0.10616	-0.02450	0.23	0.107
ADE (treated)	0.08066	-0.04944	0.21	0.216
Total Effect	-0.00218	-0.16432	0.15	0.987
Prop. Mediated (control)	0.43127	-19.57253	14.53	0.942
Prop. Mediated (treated)	0.56713	-25.12715	18.49	0.942
ACME (average)	-0.09559	-0.19275	0.00	0.048**
ADE (average)	0.09341	-0.03657	0.22	0.154
Prop. Mediated (average)	0.49920	-22.28365	16.48	0.942
<i>Collective Efficacy Treatment</i>				
ACME (control)	-0.10474	-0.19556	-0.02	0.017**
ACME (treated)	-0.11672	-0.21758	-0.02	0.017**
ADE (control)	0.13390	-0.00645	0.27	0.060*
ADE (treated)	0.12192	-0.01773	0.26	0.095*
Total Effect	0.01718	-0.15302	0.18	0.822
Prop. Mediated (control)	-0.45267	-19.61837	20.21	0.838
Prop. Mediated (treated)	-0.49632	-22.11442	23.68	0.838
ACME (average)	-0.11073	-0.20517	-0.02	0.017**
ADE (average)	0.12791	-0.01067	0.26	0.074*
Prop. Mediated (average)	-0.47449	-20.82109	21.96	0.838
<i>Combined Efficacy Treatment</i>				
ACME (control)	-0.0506	-0.1374	0.04	0.264
ACME (treated)	-0.0553	-0.1507	0.04	0.264
ADE (control)	0.1235	-0.0118	0.26	0.077*
ADE (treated)	0.1187	-0.0169	0.25	0.085*
Total Effect	0.0682	-0.0951	0.23	0.422
Prop. Mediated (control)	-0.2636	-8.4110	8.36	0.673
Prop. Mediated (treated)	-0.2887	-9.4003	9.06	0.673
ACME (average)	-0.0530	-0.1431	0.04	0.264
ADE (average)	0.1211	-0.0150	0.25	0.081*
Prop. Mediated (average)	-0.2761	-8.8535	8.59	0.673

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01. Simulations: 5000.

Table E.25: Causal Mediation Analysis: The Effect on City Parliament on Regional Parliament (Additive)

	Estimate	Quasi-Bayesian Confidence Intervals		p-value
<i>Self-Efficacy Treatment</i>				
ACME	-0.1151	-0.2325	0.00	0.057*
ADE	0.0560	-0.0348	0.15	0.230
Total Effect	-0.0590	-0.2078	0.09	0.427
Prop. Mediated	1.3415	-11.4244	13.47	0.376
<i>Collective Efficacy Treatment</i>				
ACME	-0.1401	-0.2588	-0.02	0.024**
ADE	0.0562	-0.0405	0.15	0.254
Total Effect	-0.0839	-0.2368	0.07	0.273
Prop. Mediated	1.3769	-8.9414	11.49	0.251
<i>Combined Efficacy Treatment</i>				
ACME	-0.0693	-0.1911	0.05	0.26
ADE	0.0191	-0.0753	0.11	0.70
Total Effect	-0.0502	-0.2022	0.10	0.51
Prop. Mediated	0.8993	-5.6427	8.12	0.36

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01. Simulations: 5000.

Table E.26: Causal Mediation Analysis: The Effect on City Parliament on National Parliament (Additive)

	Estimate	Quasi-Bayesian Confidence Intervals		p-value
<i>Self-Efficacy Treatment</i>				
ACME	-0.0951	-0.1907	0.00	0.058*
ADE	0.0919	-0.0344	0.22	0.150
Total Effect	-0.0032	-0.1620	0.16	0.958
Prop. Mediated	0.6739	-17.0593	20.88	0.906
<i>Collective Efficacy Treatment</i>				
ACME	-0.10908	-0.20261	-0.02	0.019**
ADE	0.12809	-0.00784	0.26	0.064*
Total Effect	0.01901	-0.14571	0.18	0.826
Prop. Mediated	-0.42722	-23.19646	23.75	0.845
<i>Combined Efficacy Treatment</i>				
ACME	-0.0527	-0.1449	0.04	0.251
ADE	0.1208	-0.0131	0.26	0.078*
Total Effect	0.0681	-0.0946	0.23	0.408
Prop. Mediated	-0.2800	-9.3665	10.41	0.646

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01. Simulations: 5000.