

Performance and Dialogue – An Ethnographic Study
into Police Liaison Teams

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By

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Abstract

Scholarly discussions on public-order policing often centre on the role of paramilitary policing tactics, only recently has the role of dialogue become more prominent within the field. This thesis primarily focuses upon a dialogue-focused public-order policing tactic – the Police Liaison Teams (PLTs) – operating within the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) in London, England. The thesis draws on data collected over a 13-month ethnographic immersion in the MPS' public-order unit. This data was gathered during a doctoral studentship within the MPS over the period of 2015-2017.

This thesis is fundamentally concerned with understanding how dialogue impacts social order within a public-order policing setting. From a micro-sociological perspective, the research seeks to understand the structures behind dialogic behaviours that Police Liaison Officers (PLOs) engage in when attempting to establish a form of 'order'. The aim of the research is to consider the role dialogue plays during police-citizen interaction at public order policing events – specifically protests and a street-based carnival. This will be understood primarily through the perspective of uniformed officers and, more specifically, officers occupying the tactical role of PLO. Though reference will also be made to officers within other public order policing roles.

Applying a dramaturgical conceptual framework, this thesis provides new insights into a lesser studied area of public-order policing. Within PLT-citizen interaction the significance of performance when interpreting actions is central. Framing the interpretation of police work using Goffman's theories facilitates a more nuanced investigation into the 'everyday' behaviours within policing. My research develops our conceptual understanding of the policing of crowds still further, exploring on a micro level police-citizen interaction and the communicative structures that govern this.

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List of Abbreviations, Images and Tables:

ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers, now the National Police Chiefs Council
APP	Authorised Professional Practice
Bronze (Bx.)	Responsible for developing a tactical plan for specific geographical locations
Cadre	Officers Inspector or above who receive specialised training to plan public order operations
CCTV	Closed Circuit Television
CID	Criminal Investigation Department
Gold (Gx.)	Strategic lead for a public order operation
HMIC	Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary
Level-One	Highest form of specialist public order training available – TSG officers are Level-One trained. TSG is a full-time role and the officers are used in varying capacities, one of which is public order
Level-Two	Second standard of training – officers must be Level-Two trained to be able to respond to public disorder. These officers are drawn from reserves in boroughs and complete this role in addition to their daily duties.
Level-Three	Base standard of police training, all officers are Level-Three trained
MPS	Metropolitan Police Service
PCSO	Police Community Support Officer
PLOs (singular)	Police Liaison Officer
PLTs (plural)	Police Liaison Teams
PSU	Police Support Unit – units of officers which respond in a paramilitary formation as and when they are directed
Silver (Sx.)	Overall operational command
SLT	Senior Leadership Team
SPG	Special Patrol Group – the Level-One capability prior to the TSG
TSG	Territorial Support Group
UK	United Kingdom

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Part I: Introduction, Literature and Methods

Introduction

It is a Saturday. Trafalgar Square looks as it often does during my fieldwork: a mix of old and new architecture with the proud lions resting, watching the world go past; hordes of tourists bustling about their London activities; street artists; and protests. These iconic areas across any city, but for me, London especially, as England's capital, showcase the amazing and electric hub of activity within a metropolis. On this particular Saturday I stand and observe as two Police Liaison Officers (PLOs) calmly navigate the negotiation of space between a number of vegan protesters and a street artist (image one). Both the vegan protesters and street artist are angry with each other; both perceive the other as 'stealing' the hard-earned attention of the passers-by. All three groups (PLOs, vegan protesters and street artist) are performing to wider groups, trying to convince 'the other' of their point of view. To an inexperienced eye, the scene looks chaotic, but if you watch closely you can see the PLOs skilfully taking control of the unfolding argument. The officers understand each is frustrated, they acknowledge that each has the 'right' to be in this space, but how about they each move over just slightly and exist in the same area?

Image 1: Vegan Protest



Co-existence: a key ingredient to social order. It is not always easy and tensions will often escalate and de-escalate in a heartbeat. Occasionally, although thankfully not often, the co-existence of groups breaks down all together and we witness large-scale social disorder. Throughout all of this – even the times of disorder – co-existing and (re)establishing social order fundamentally relies upon dialogue. At the heart of many of these interactions, whether welcomed or unwelcomed, are police officers.

Dialogue is a practice that human beings engage in daily. Among an array of different things, dialogue is how we translate different emotions to others; how we gain insight into another's culture; and one way in which people can seek to negotiate resolutions to problems. Thus, dialogue with others is grounded in a broad array of contexts (Wilce 2017). How we are interacting with someone provides insight into who that person is, potentially their social standing in society, their access to formal education and their emotions. Police officers have to skilfully employ a range of dialogic skills in their daily role, quickly assessing all these different aspects within the interaction, in order to best approach the interaction to gain some form of influence and potentially neutralise any rising tensions.

The role of police officers as street-corner politicians has long been recognised (Muir 1977), with their role being pivotal in reproducing 'order'. An understanding of how officers operate upon the streets is essential to our wider understanding of police work as their decisions can often be made immediately on the spot and are entirely dependent on the context of that interaction. However, our understanding of these dialogic processes disproportionately focuses on the patrol officer/street-level operative (Banton 1964; Reiss 1971; Ker Muir 1979; Lipskey 1980; Ericson 1982). Instead, this thesis concerns itself with understanding the role of dialogue within a public order policing context, exploring how officers utilise and value dialogic skills in aiding them in executing their duties. Among other factors, public order policing literature adds value to our conceptual knowledge of how crowds interact and operate (Waddington 1989; Stott & Reicher 1998); how policing often conceptualises knowledge of protest (della Porta & Reiter 1998); or how the law is used and how policing organisations will utilise this to gain increased control (Waddington 1994). However, we are afforded less insight into the micro-interactional processes that occur on the streets during police-citizen interactions within a public order context. This thesis will address these specific gaps in research and knowledge.

Aims and Objectives of the Thesis:

This thesis is fundamentally concerned with understanding how dialogue impacts social order within a public order policing setting. From a microsociological perspective, I want to understand the structures behind dialogic behaviours that PLOs engage in when attempting to establish a form of 'order'. The aim of the research is to consider the role dialogue plays during police-citizen interactions at public order policing events – specifically protests and a street-based carnival. This will be understood primarily through the perspective of uniformed

officers and, more specifically, officers occupying the tactical role of PLO. Though reference will also be made to officers within other public order policing roles. To fulfil this aim, the research has three primary objectives: (i) to explore the role dialogue plays in the experiences of officers deployed at public order policing events; (ii) to explore the formal training of public order policing and consider the impact this has upon informal police practice; and (iii) to explore the extent to which police-citizen dialogic interaction is performative.

These objectives shape research questions that are core to this thesis:

1. *The role of dialogue for officers at public order events*: how do perceptions of dialogue manifest themselves within policing cultures? What are the interpretations of dialogue among officers and how do they operationally use these skills?
2. *Formal training and informal practice*: how central do officers perceive dialogue to their operational identity? What do officers train for? How does the skills taught during training manifest themselves when deployed? How are officers informally socialised into their roles?
3. *The extent to which dialogic interaction is performative*: is dialogue habitual for officers or perceived as a necessary piece of theatre to evidence an escalated approach to interacting with the public? What alternative perceptions of dialogue can be seen among different tactical approaches to policing?

Addressing these research questions, the thesis makes contributions from theoretical, methodological and policy-related perspectives. Firstly, my research aims to contribute and develop theoretical applications of a dramaturgical framework. Although the works of Goffman are utilised elsewhere in policing literature (Manning 1997; O'Neill 2005; Quinton 2009; De Camargo 2017), they have never before been used to interpret the use of dialogue by PLTs within a public order policing context. This framework facilitates a development in scholarly understanding of the behaviours and cultures of PLTs. By utilising a dramaturgical framework, I focus upon the microsociological interactions of the 'everyday', therefore gaining real insight into ordinary policing practice, as opposed to the extraordinary (for example, death in police custody). Second, this thesis applies an ethnographic approach, with long-term immersion into the largest metropolitan police force in the U.K. This approach has not been utilised within an MPS context for over 25 years and therefore contributes a unique data set. Finally, through the unique studentship structure of the research, this thesis will seek

to contribute to ongoing professional development within policing environments, directly seeking to contribute to policy shift in how police forces approach the policing of public order.

Conceptual Shift

The PLT tactical option, focused on increasing dialogue between police and crowd members, ideologically aligns with Western democracies' progressive shift away from 'escalated force', during the 1960s to a focus on 'negotiated management' during the 1980s and 1990s (McPhail et al. 1998; also see della Porta 1998, 2006; Noakes & Gillham 2000; Waddington 2000, 2003). However, dialogue policing remains little studied (Wahlström & Oskarsson 2006), a research gap which this thesis seeks to address in this area of scholarship.

Negotiated management demonstrates an increased use of more facilitative tactics – seeking the strategic aim of increased 'policing by consent'. It is proposed, as part of a negotiated management approach, that cooperation and dialogue are key for ensuring that tensions do not intensify between protesters and police, and that there has to be some recognition of the right to protest and a toleration of a disruption to the public's daily life (see, for example, Rosie & Gorringer 2009). Among senior ranking officers, at least within UK policing, it is now deemed advisable 'to slacken their authority so as to increase the predictability of protest events and minimise the risk of violence' (D. Waddington 2007, p. 10).

Contrary to escalated force, where only peaceful demonstrations are granted, negotiated management accepts a high level of community disquiet, with even illegal (albeit peaceful) activities tolerated, for example, symbolic displays of civil disobedience such as roadblocks. Although police will often try to navigate protesters to timings and routes that will cause the least disruption, it is widely accepted that disruption will be present (here, see also Waddington 1998, p. 3).

Escalated force and negotiated management exist within defined periods of time; however, it is equally important to understand policing 'styles' of public order like a pendulum drifting between paramilitary styles and more facilitating styles depending on the social context and political agenda. King & Brearley (1996) highlight that a number of momentous events created the environment for the pendulum to shift towards paramilitary policing. Since the 1960s, one can point to a continued reliance on paramilitary type tactical options and

responses. Notably, during the Miners' Strike of 1984-5, police found themselves outnumbered and significant waves of urban unrest in the 1980s led to improved protective equipment – riot shields, NATO helmets and flameproof clothing – and the creation of 'mutual aid' to form added strength among forces. Without denying the importance of acknowledging and responding appropriately to officer safety, symbolically these 'strong arm of the law' responses echo the work of public order being focused continually on reacting to public *disorder*, as opposed to the maintenance of order – symbolic in both attitudes and realities of tactical responses.

Academically one can see how public order policing has oscillated between paramilitary tactics and negotiated management. Therefore, despite the lack of extensive academic literature specifically demonstrating the success of the dialogue-policing model as a tactical option, it ideologically fits comfortably within the mould of negotiated management, as 'dialog [sic] breeds negotiated management' (Barker 2014, p. 84). Therefore, we can see how approaches to public order policing have continued to adapt and develop over many decades. The 1960s to 1990s were an era of *escalated force*, this was a time where officers used (at times) quite extreme force to disperse crowds, especially protest crowds (even those protesting peacefully). Perhaps the most visually representative example of escalated force would be the policing response to the Civil Rights protests in 1960s America. From the 1990s onwards, it suggested that police forces used a *negotiated management* approach to policing crowds – with the notable distinction being that police forces would contact the group or organisation prior to the event with the ultimate intention being to ensure any conflict with police was minimal.

From escalated force to negotiated management, one thing that hasn't changed is the formation and training of officers: a paramilitary structure with units of officers working together in pre-trained formation to quell early signs of escalating disorder. When we think of public order policing, many often focus on *disorder* – urban disorder, riots or protests. From here, most research focuses on the effectiveness of the different tactical responses public order units use during operations, or the theoretical reasons why crowds turn disorderly. Yet, little scholarly attention has been given to the (in)effectiveness of dialogue – a central component to negotiation. Following a number of different large-scale disorders, UK public order policing was brought into focus by many outside agencies and formal reviews, resulting in a shift in policing styles. Unlike their public order colleagues, PLTs work as small units of

two officers and, as such, challenge the long-standing paramilitary structure to public order policing.

An understanding of escalated force and negotiated management is essential for our conceptual understanding of public order policing and where the PLTs sit within the wider policing family. Yet the extent to which these distinctive groups effectively represent public order policing is questionable. Through the paramilitary structure of response used by police forces, to what extent can we truly say this response demonstrates negotiated management? It is the position of this thesis that the PLT model demonstrates one of the first genuine interpretations of ‘negotiated management’ than what preceded it under the same name.

Policy Shift

The PLTs were introduced as a tactical option into public order policing as a recognition that a more dedicated communicative approach was needed in this branch of operational policing. Initially, the tactic was entirely dedicated towards protest policing, in an attempt to proactively police protests as opposed to reacting to them. More latterly, they have been introduced as an additional resource at Notting Hill Carnival. Thus, our initial policy and scholarly insight into the PLTs was protest centric, this thesis develops our understanding of both protest but also introduces their use within different settings, Notting Hill Carnival.

From around 2009, we observed a growing ‘interest’ in communication as a tactic deployed within public order policing. Further, since the G20 Protests in 2009 and the death of Ian Tomlinson¹ as a result of an officer’s use of force, there have been considerable formal reforms to public order policing. *Adapting to Protest* (2009) outlines the main policing concerns of the G20 protest as: use of containment; the dispersal of peaceful protesters and the extent to which their use of force was proportionate; the ability to identify police officers clearly; and finally, the effectiveness of communication with protesters before, during and after the protest (see *ibid*, p. 7). It is from this final point – effectiveness of communication – that this thesis develops.

¹ A newspaper vendor and passer-by to the protest.

The revised Association of Chief Police Officers' (ACPO)² guidance manual *Keeping the Peace* (2010) puts at its core the idea that 'engagement and dialogue should be used, wherever possible, to demonstrate a no surprises approach' (ibid, p. 11). Within this manual, one can see the rhetoric of public order beginning to *formally* change – the word 'engagement' is used 33 times; 'communication' is used 85 times (often alongside the word 'effective'); and finally, 'dialogue' is used 15 times (ibid). This demonstrates to the reader that policy documents and those within the occupation have begun to adapt their language to reflect these changes. However, this gives us little insight into the cultural acceptance of dialogue as a tactical option within a public order policing context.

Despite these early indications of commitment to tactical changes in the policing of protest, there is no formal research conducted on how these tactics are being operationalised by ground-based officers. Furthermore, little is known about the attitudes and perceptions of the use of dialogue by ground-based officers – the officers who are charged with the front-line duty of accepting and utilising this tactical option.

Public order is predominately policed by police support units (PSU), comprised of one inspector, three sergeants, 18 constables and three drivers (College of Police 2016: Authorised Professional Practice), all of whom are Level Two trained.³ This is a strategic approach that has not changed for many years. The introduction of the PLTs – comprised of two PLOs, with multiple teams deployed at events – saw the introduction of a fundamentally counter-culture approach to policing public order. The PLTs operate within the heart of the crowd (while PSUs remain on the outskirts unless required to quell disorder within crowds); the PLTs establish dialogue early (well before the event), while a PSU will only interact with citizens in real-time. Ultimately, the role of the PLTs is to provide a dialogue link between the police and the groups that are being policed – most commonly protest groups. Notably, PLTs should not be used in an evidence-gathering capacity (College of Police 2016: Authorised Professional Practice), something that caused some controversy during the initial introductory stages.

² Now the National Police Chiefs Council

³ There are three levels of training within the MPS: Level-Three is the base standard required by all police officers; Level-Two is a higher level which enables an officer to respond to public-order situations; Level-One is a full-time public order policing capability.

The PLT model has its origins in Stockholm, where a dialogue police was created as part of wider reforms (see Stott et al. 2013). The model of dialogue police has at its core five principles: *negotiation* – facilitating compromise between groups and the police; *mediation* – providing a communication bridge between the police and the protest groups; *suggesting* – offering alternative strategies; *communication* – talking in an accessible manner; and, finally, *monitoring* – reading the mood of the event and interpret how that could impact police action (see Holgersson & Knutsson 2011).

This model has been adapted among different UK police forces as the PLT model (see Gorringe et al. 2012). Similarly, PLTs aim to offer a communicative bridge between members of the crowd and senior police leaders who are making the strategic decisions about how to police different events, offering a ‘non-repressive’, problem-solving mediation role (Stott 2011; Gorringe et al. 2012; Stott et al. 2013). Good practice dictates that ‘communication’ begins in the very early stages of planning and continues until after the event (College of Policing 2015).

Ideologically the PLTs represent a move towards a more facilitating tactical style of policing protest, where negotiation and dialogue are at the forefront of maintaining order, as opposed to more physically confrontational models. From a theoretical standpoint, PLTs – within a protest setting – represent an attempt to increase social cohesion between those representing the state (the police) and those who are protesting issues within the state, aiming to build bonds between people in a bid to increase cohesion and decrease the likelihood of disorder (Reicher & Stott 1998; Stott & Drury 2000; Stott et al. 2011). They represent an increased commitment to policing by consent and to enhance police legitimacy among protest groups. Additionally, one can draw significant links between PLTs and community policing initiatives – arguably, an attempt to introduce a community approach within public order policing.

Theoretical Framework

The PLT concept was specifically framed using the Elaborated Social Identity Model (ESIM). This model focuses upon crowd interaction with an out-group, exploring the identities and norms present within crowds and how police definitions can often be counter to how these groups perceive their own behaviours (Stott & Reicher 1998). It is accepted that, in order to encourage the most effective and constructive dialogue, policing agencies need to

appreciate the identities of those they are policing in order to best facilitate the event (Barker 2014, p. 100). This knowledge is important for a conceptual understanding of the PLT role within public order policing and will be explored in more depth within the Chapter Two.

Yet, for this research, it was the works of Erving Goffman (1959, 1963, 1967, 1971) that were most powerful when interpreting and understanding the data set. Within PLT-citizen interaction, the significance of performance when interpreting actions is central. Framing the interpretation of police work using Goffman facilitated a more nuanced investigation into the ‘everyday’ behaviours within policing. Although Goffman did not develop a distinct ‘theory’, his approach to understanding the social world has been used widely as an analytical tool (Manning 1992). ESIM evidenced our scholarly understanding of crowds advancing away through perceptions of mob mentality (Le Bon 1895) to a consideration of how dialogue exists within and between crowds. My research develops our conceptual understanding of crowds still further, exploring on a micro-level police-citizen interactions and the communicative structures that govern this.

Goffman’s theatrical metaphor can of course indicate negative perceptions – where interactions are being staged with some underlying manipulative tension, undesirable due to the fact police officers hold state-endorsed power. Yet, malicious intentions of performative action do not feature heavily within the data set. Instead, it became increasingly clear that increased dialogue encouraged an exchange of power, with negotiations from both sides being central to the maintenance of social order. How this dramaturgical framework is utilised within this thesis is explored in depth in Chapter Three.

Methodological Approach

This thesis presents findings from a 13-month immersion into the public order unit within the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS). For my fieldwork, I adopted a traditional ethnographic approach, spending an extended period of time integrated into the field. My thesis presents findings of the first study into police use of dialogue within a public order context, from inside the largest police force in England and Wales. At its core, this thesis is interested in understanding how increased dialogue impacts social order within a public order policing setting. As such, the research lent itself most appropriately to ethnography in order to be able to understand not only police talk of action, but how they actually behaved, acted and reacted in different policing contexts.

Through an established studentship, I was able to gain initial ‘formal’ access to the MPS, meaning I had access to relevant stations, systems and officers. Yet, despite this formal access, I still had to gain informal access to the officers who would form the bulk of my data collection. For this, I had to dedicate a significant amount of time and energy into building informal networks, rapport and trust. During the first year of my PhD, I spent a vast amount of time building these relationships. Although no time-stamp can be placed on gaining more trusted access to the organisation, I started to visibly notice a difference with how officers acted around me after consistent commitment to the field of around six to eight months. This meant that when I formally started fieldwork at the beginning of my second year, I had established networks to assist in data collection.

We know that the formal conversation around the policing of public order began to change around 2009, with *Adapting to Protest* (HMIC 2009). However, formal policy documents give us little insight into how practitioners are operationally adopting these processes on the ground. Furthermore, solely speaking with officers would again give only a partial insight into how dialogue was being adopted and operationalised by police officers. Adopting an ethnographic approach enabled me insight into the day-to-day occurrences within the public order unit. Through being there, I was able to observe naturally occurring events – therefore capturing not only how officers spoke about these events, but often witnessing them for myself.

This unique access into the largest force in England and Wales and the data collection this afforded significantly contributes to the originality this thesis offers to the field of policing scholarship. The use of dialogue, or more specifically the deployment of PLTs, has only benefitted from smaller scale studies. Conversely, my thesis adopted a methodological approach into the study of dialogue and PLTs previously not conducted. As such, this thesis has captured the fundamental shift in the operational approach to policing public order.

The MPS Context:

This thesis is an Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) funded Collaborative Award with the MPS. The collaborative basis of this thesis informed the context for the empirical research in London, specifically within the MPS. London is predictably a culturally and ethnically diverse city of over eight million people. Further to this, with it being a city and the

capital of England, the city experiences vast amounts of people travelling to, within and through it. This makes for a vastly interesting and complex network of citizens that police officers are charged with interacting with. Additionally – again, due it being the capital – London experiences a vast amount of protests, which occur on a daily basis. As such, the officers charged with policing these types of events are often some of the most experienced in the county. There are approximately 31,000 police officers in total within the MPS. From this number, there are 3,759 level-two officers and 517 level-one officers who form the main bulk of the response to public order events. The PLT tactic remains a smaller policing response, with 119 PLOs in total.⁴ For the purposes of this thesis what is important to note is the unusual context of both the MPS and London, a city and force that experiences a vast number of public order operations and enjoys higher levels of responding resources compared to other areas of the country.

Thesis Outline:

This thesis is broken into three parts, with eight chapters in total. Here, I briefly outline what each chapter covers.

Part One: Introduction to PLTs, methods and literature

- **Chapter One** introduces the PLTs. It explores how the PLTs were adapted from the Dialogue Policing, a Swedish model for policing public order. A public inquiry into the mass disorder at Gothenburg in 2001 found that the policing of the event was ineffective, as a result a new model of public order policing was established: the Special Police Tactic (SPT), a major component of which is Dialogue Policing. The convergence of this model in a UK context is considered and the chapter will also consider how it has been operationalised within the MPS.

- **Chapter Two** explores the wider public order policing literature. The PLTs are a contextually very different tactic deployed during crowd events, with previous reliance falling upon robust tactics. This chapter explores the main themes from previous research.

⁴All numbers received through personal correspondence in December 2018. From PLO resource, of the 119 the break-down is: 4 inspectors; 38 sergeants; 77 constables.

- **Chapter Three** considers the theoretical framework adopted for this thesis in more depth. Goffman is the sociologist of ‘everyday life’ (Branaman 1997) and fieldwork quickly identified his significance for framing my analysis. As identified, public order policing disrupts ‘business as usual’ for ‘regular’ operational policing and requires policing resources being pulled away from other areas of policing in order to police these events. Yet, protest in London occurs continuously (often requiring no policing response) and will often experience little or no ‘disorder’. So, what are the structures behind communicative behaviours that officers engage in to negotiate cooperation? Goffman’s work facilitates an understanding of social life as performance whereby interactions can be understood in regards to actors, staging and symbols. The chapter explores three central areas of Goffman’s work and explores both the original concept and how it has been applied within the literature. The theoretical framework is present throughout the empirical chapters, this shorter chapter provides a succinct introduction to the concepts.

- **Chapter Four** provides an overview of the methodological approach used during this thesis. It will begin by exploring the rationale behind why this approach was the most appropriate for the research aims and objectives. Exploring previous policing research and how this methodological approach was impacted by the knowledge expressed here. It will then reflect upon how the research methods were planned and implemented. Here the context of the research will also be considered, alongside a critical self-reflection of how the researcher impacted the field. Following this, an assessment of what worked and what challenges were faced is considered. The successes and failures of the research process are then deliberated in a holistic manner, exploring what lessons for the future can be taken from my experience in the field.

Part Two: Research Findings

- **Chapter Five** explores the back-stage setting of the wider policing performance in order to understand how police ‘fine-tune’ and ‘tweak’ their performance in order to manage wider public impressions. Given that a large percentage of PLOs are or have previously been involved in level-two training and given the

significance of level-tuos to public order policing (they are the main bulk of police resourcing), this chapter will begin by considering this area of training. From here, the chapter will then explore the training of PLTs, considering the differences between the two types of formal training. Lastly, the chapter will consider the role of informal socialisation in creating a PLT.

- **Chapter Six** explores the role of PLTs within protest policing. The chapter is structured in two parts: firstly, consideration is given to the significance of planning meetings within the wider events; secondly, the ‘front-stage’ setting of PLT-citizen interaction at protests is explored. The beginning of the chapter will presents how planning meetings, although a legal requirement, are performative in reality. Latterly the chapter explores dialogue in relation to space and miscommunication.

- **Chapter Seven** will explore my empirical findings from my fieldwork at the Notting Hill Carnivals over a period of three years. The chapter provides an insight into a non-traditional protest environment. Although carnival is presented in the media as a celebration of Afro-Caribbean cultures in London, there is a long history of animosity between the black attendees and those policing the event. Therefore, the carnival can be interpreted as a two-day protest, where black people dominate and occupy space. The chapter begins by exploring the ‘staging’ of the carnival, considering the significance of planning meetings and how the event is ‘framed’ by the MPS. Following this, the chapter will consider how officers operate within the confines of a ‘professionally spoiled’ identity. This means that they inherit weak and unpredictable communicative foundations. Despite this, the chapter also explores how PLT-reveller teamwork is experienced, with both collaborating to ensure a positive carnival experience.

Part Three: Research Conclusions

- **Chapter Eight** will draw together the main overarching arguments presented throughout this thesis, connecting the empirical findings with the theoretical framework, methodological approach and policy context. Finally, it will also present suggestions for future research.

Chapter I: From Dialogue Policing to Police Liaison Teams

Introduction

This chapter aims to provide an introduction, both ideologically and operationally, to the Police Liaison Team (PLT) model used within public order policing operations.

Traditionally, public order policing is viewed as being focused more towards the physical capabilities of units of officers (see, for instance, Waddington 1991) as opposed to dialogue and negotiation, which is the central ideology of the PLT model. However, since London's G20 summit protests of 2009 and the death of Ian Tomlinson⁵ (Greer & McLaughlin 2010; Greer & McLaughlin 2011), as a result of the use of robust police tactics, there has been intense pressure for public order policing to change within the UK (see Gorringe et al. 2012). After a review into the policing of protest – Adapting to Protest (AtP) – it was concluded, 'the police should seek to inform themselves about the culture and general conduct of particular protest groups' (Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary 2009, p. 73).

Since the publication of this review, there have been many reforms within police policy and training. The revised Association of Chief Police Officers' (ACPO)⁶ guidance manual *Keeping the Peace* (2010) now encapsulates the idea that 'engagement and dialogue should be used, wherever possible, to demonstrate a no surprises approach' (ibid, p. 11). Following this in 2012 we saw the first deployment of PLTs, which was subsequently included as a tactical option in Authorised Professional Practice (APP) in 2014. APP states that the role of the PLT is 'to provide a link through dialogue between the police and groups' deployed 'before, during and after events to establish and maintain dialogue with groups, adopting a community police style' (College of Policing 2016).

Much convergence of the PLT model is based on the Swedish model of 'Dialogue Policing', which was also created as part of wider policing reforms (see Stott et al. 2013). It is from this model that different UK police forces have adapted the tactical approach through PLTs (see Gorringe et al. 2012). PLTs aim to offer a communicative bridge between members of the crowd and senior police leaders who are making the strategic decisions about how to police different events, offering a 'non-repressive', problem-solving mediation role (Stott, 2011;

⁵Mr. Tomlinson was a newspaper vendor travelling through the protests on his way home.

⁶Now the National Police Chiefs Council.

Gorringe et al. 2012; Stott et al. 2013). Good practice of the model dictates that ‘communication’ begins in the very early stages of planning and continues until after the event (College of Policing 2015).

There is limited academic literature specifically on the process of convergence of the Swedish model to the UK. Therefore, little is formally known about how the model was adapted for a culturally different audience and practitioner, how different forces across the UK received and adapted the model, and what evidence suggested it would be fit to operate in a different environment. From early fieldwork, the researcher has identified that decisions based on the design and deployment of PLTs was predominately operational. As a result, the first part of this chapter relies on limited documented evidence and early field-based findings to explore the convergence.

Origin of the Police Liaison Team – ‘Dialogue Police’

Before exploring the PLT model in the UK, it is essential to gain some understanding of its key source of inspiration in Sweden. The ideology lies within the Dialogue Police model, which is part of a wider Special Police Tactic (SPT) that handles high-risk crowd events (see Holgersson 2010). As a result of large-scale disorder in Gothenburg in 2001, an inquiry (*Göteborgskommittén*) into its policing was conducted. The committee established three central concerns regarding the policing of a protest that took place in Gothenburg. First, the training of the officers was flawed. Second, there was evidence that ‘noted knowledge deficiencies among the police’ (Adang 2012, p. 326). Finally, there was an absence of general knowledge among police about the different tactical models used in different parts of Sweden, leading to a lack of coordination. This inquiry recommended that a national model of policing should be established. This resulted in the founding of the Special Police Tactic (SPT), a new public order policing model within Sweden aimed at addressing the policing issues articulated in the inquiry. SPT moved away from the reliance on resource heavy, armoured police officers that often focused on the crowds, towards specially prepared vehicles which instead focused on arresting the minority of people committing crimes. The SPT were considered to be more flexible, focusing on the rights of protest – utilising officers who were trained in conflict resolution (see Adang 2012, p. 327).

The SPT were introduced as a new way to approach the policing of crowds in 2004 with 1,200 trained officers – out of a total of 20,000 – enhancing their ability to be prepared for

risky situations, to cope with stressful situations and to have a mindset focused on communicative interactions, with an ‘ability to actively listen to counterparts and solve conflicts in de-escalating manners’ (Holgersson & Knutsson 2011, p. 195). They have six key principles for their role: facilitation; dialogue; counterpart perspective; differentiation; signal value; and state. These are elaborated in Table One below. It is the intention of the SPT to enhance police legitimacy among the public, encourage self-policing, alongside helping demonstrators to reach their lawful goals without conflict by ensuring all six principles work in union with one another.

Linking the six principles, we can identify a fundamental ideological change in how the policing of protest was approached. It is the intention of the SPT to enhance police legitimacy among the public, encouraging self-policing, alongside helping demonstrators reach their lawful goals without conflict. As part of the wider SPT, the Dialogue Police have as their central ambition to ‘facilitate freedom of speech and the right to demonstrate’ (Holgersson & Knutsson 2011, p. 201). The negotiation of space (see Herbert 1997) as opposed to the control of territory has become the central feature of the ideological change.

Table 1: Principles of the Special Police Tactic (Holgersson & Knutsson 2011, p. 196)

Principle:	Definition:
Facilitation	Support demonstrators to reach legitimate goals with aim to prevent conflicts and to achieve self-policing.
Dialogue	To communicate, make agreements and mediate between commanders and demonstrators.
Counterpart Perspective	To adapt police action by considering possible reactions in crowds, attempting to avoid escalation and to achieve de-escalation.
Differentiation	To differentiate police action according to conduct of subgroups and individuals in crowd.
Signal Value	Through various means, display to crowds police readiness to use force.
State	There are three states indicating moods of crowds and level of risk for confrontation: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Green – a relaxed and controlled situation with no confrontation 2. Yellow – a tense situation that may develop into a confrontation

	3. Red – confrontation with physical attacks and use of force.
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To establish a visible representation of ‘dialogue’ among vast numbers of crowds, the officers work in pairs while wearing yellow bibs marked ‘Dialogue Police’⁷ thus seeking to create communication links between the protesters and senior police leaders. Many of the early selected officers were trained tactical negotiators and so the roots of communication and negotiation were at the core of their skill base.

From the outset, Dialogue Police officers established working relationships with ‘right wing’ political groups, but had significantly more trouble with forming links with ‘left wing’ groups. It is suggested that this reluctance of ‘left representatives’ to engage with policing was historical: a reaction against the former heavy-handed approach of traditional policing (Holdersson 2010; Holgersson & Knutsson 2011; also see, Stott et al. 2013). Some protest groups also perceived the new tactical policing role to be intelligence gathering and a means for the police to take further control [for similar work, see Barker 2014]. Conversely, much like the police, ‘right wing’ groups often prove to be more hierarchically based, with clear organisational leadership positions for the police to approach (see, for instance, Holgersson 2010). Alongside traditional ‘right’ and ‘left’ wing protests, Dialogue Policing has also been utilised at festivals, football matches with underlying ethnic tensions and urban disorder (Adapting to Protest 2009, p. 75).

The Dialogue Policing model is theoretically aligned with the Elaborated Social Identity Model (ESIM) (Reicher 1984, 1996; Stott & Reicher 1998; Stott & Drury 2000). The model highlights the significance of police forces being educated about the cultural norms of groups and recommends tactical options that are not exclusively dominated by robust threats of force, but instead are centred on the facilitation of the groups’ legitimate intentions. ESIM puts forward the idea that, within crowds, people do not lose their identity, thus falling into a cycle of mass irrationality (see Le Bon 1895), but rather, people shift identity, moving from a personal identity (what makes an individual distinctive from others) to a social identity (what makes one group distinctive from another – Catholic/nurse/student) (see Reicher et al. 2004). Significant to ESIM is both ‘the normative limits of action (what people do) and the extent of

⁷ PLTs wear blue bibs with ‘Police Liaison Officer’ on.

participation (who joins in)' (Stott & Drury 2000, p. 248). Central to this theory is the ability of policing organisations to have a complex understanding of crowds and ensure they are not viewed as a homogenous entity. The model suggests that crowd events are intergroup encounters, meaning there are a variety of perceptions as to the identity of a given crowd, depending on the in-group (the crowds) or the out-group (within this theory, this predominately relates to the police), and whether or not behaviours are deemed to be legitimate or illegitimate.

It is this variation in perception that has the potential to develop into conflict. Drury, Stott and Farsides (2003) articulate that clashes between in-groups and out-groups can occur where there is an irregularity between the in-group's understanding of their own social identity compared to the out-group's perception of the in-group's identity upon them. Then:

Once conflict has begun, the ESIM suggests that it can escalate through the change in the social location of crowd members that comes about through out-group action. In the first place, where the out-group action towards in-group members is perceived by the in-group as indiscriminate, then the in-group members will define themselves as a common social category sharing a common relationship of threat in relation the out-group (ibid, p. 1481).

Thus, unlike how the crowd initially distinguished themselves depending on their specific social identity (for example, the many different sub-groups that attend large demonstrations), the in-group may begin to view themselves increasingly as a single unit, which is then treated again as such by the out-group, potentially creating a violent cycle of escalation.

The theory identifies that the most common 'out-group' within public order is the police, due to their state-assigned authority to use force when necessary. There is an inherent imbalance of power between the crowd members and the police. Therefore, the police have the ability 'to impose their definition of legitimate practice' (Drury & Reicher 2009) upon the other. (For discussion on a linked theoretical argument of police action inciting crowd behaviour, see Klein 2012.) Operationally, one can see how the model of Dialogue Policing has utilised this theoretical positioning.

Dialogue Policing: Operational Structure

The dialogue policing model has three stages: pre-event, during event and post-event, where communication is expected to be maintained throughout. Adang & Stott (2004) have argued

that traditionally public order events have been viewed as isolated incidents,⁸ therefore harming the ability to build relationships with protest communities over a long-term period. Dialogue Policing and the PLT model deal with this shortcoming with communication being established pre-event and continued during and after the event. Thus, it could be viewed in an almost circular rotation, with each communication stage of the operation being interconnected.

Table 2: Five Fundamental Elements of Dialogue Policing (Holgerson & Knutsson 2011, p. 202)

Function:	Definition:
Negotiation	Facilitate compromises and agreements between the police commanders' interest in getting the preferable tactical conditions and the demonstrators' interest to get more preferable terms for their goals.
Mediation	Explain the police point of view to groups of demonstrators and the demonstrators' view to the police in order to increase mutual understanding and to avoid negative stereotyping.
Suggesting	Come up with possible solutions to avoid or minimise risk for conflicts and confrontations.
Communication	In an accessible way, act as link between demonstrators and commanders in exchanging information.
Monitoring	Read moods and preparedness for action in the group of demonstrators and how that is affected by police activities, and inform commanders of consequences of different courses of action in a short and long-term perspective.

Pre-event:

To established long-term, continuous dialogue with protest groups, pre-event contact is essential. It is suggested that early contact and understanding of the requirements of protest groups minimises the opportunity for police officers to formulate negative stereotypes.

⁸Unlike football, protest is not categorised. Within MPS, football police will categorise a game dependent on risk – category A-C. This does not happen within protest policing, although informally ‘police knowledge’ is formed, there is no formal process for categorising the ‘type’ or risks associated with the protest groups.

Equally, early understanding by protesters of the police operational requirement seeks to reduce the potential for conflict. This overall approach has the strategic intent of establishing police legitimacy. Historically, tactical options of policing public order had involved very limited communication between groups (see, for example, della Porta 1998), meaning that little mutual understanding of the protest group or policing operation was experienced, thus enhancing the likelihood that knowledge gaps would be filled with stereotypes and assumptions. Arguably, both are more likely to lead to confrontation, consequently increasing the potential for conflict.

During event:

Relations during an event are important, as it is at this point where, if relationships are mishandled, there is an increased likelihood of confrontation or disorder. In order to minimise misunderstanding, Holgersson (2010) suggests that it is easier to build strong foundations with protest groups who have formally applied to the police to protest. When no application is submitted, there is a potential risk of officers (formally and informally) filling the knowledge gap with their own perceptions of group identity due to the loss of pre-event engagement. This is likely to have a problematic impact on the overall execution of the operation.

Post-Event:

Post-event communication strategies allow for the continuation of relationship building, meaning both groups have the opportunity to articulate to the other their thoughts about the event. Additionally, Holgersson (2010) found that post-event dialogue with protesters identified that police media statements sometimes added to the perception that protest groups were stereotyped by the police and that this damaged their legitimacy with the protesters – something they were able to address.

Research into the effectiveness of the Dialogue Police model is still young. However, early indications point to a growing positivity associated with the tactic. Conducting a field-based study from 2007 to 2010, Adang et al. (2010) saw a development in the efficiency of their use during events, noting the significance of conflict-reducing tactics mentioned in documents and also being applied more regularly. During the team's 2009 observations, Adang et al. (2010) state that more information was given in briefings about different groups, demonstrating a complex picture of different protesters being continually developed by the

police. Further, they comment that officers only used a tactical intervention once it was clear that both organisers and stewards had been unsuccessful in calming potential violence. Hence adding to the picture of police utilising their powers in a manner that was capable of differentiating ‘types’ of protest and protesters, while at the same time seeking to increase their legitimacy with protest groups.

The Dialogue Policing model addresses the universal nature of some aspects of protest by seeking to emphasise the positive impact that effective communication [pre, during and post event] has in avoiding unnecessary conflict. It arguably has the potential for deployment in the UK policing context. However, little academic literature is available about the transitional stage of adoption and adaption of this method for the UK public. Despite this, the Dialogue Policing model and Police Liaison Team both fit within the negotiated management trend, which is proving ascendant within public order policing in Western democracies (see, for example, Della Porta & Reiter 1998; Wahlström & Oskarsson 2006).

Adapting to Protest

Within the UK, one can identify more political attention being given to negotiated management as opposed to escalated force following the enquiry by Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary (HMCIC) into a national review of the policing of protest – *Adapting to Protest* (2009). This came as a result of the death of Mr Tomlinson who died as a result of a baton hit by a member of the MPS.

The G20 protests made visible the problematic relationship the police (predominately, in this instance, the MPS) had with some areas of the protest community. This was largely as a result of ineffective interaction and the use of controversial methods such as containment – known within the protest community as ‘kettling’ (see, for instance, Greer & McLaughlin 2010; Greer & McLaughlin 2011). It is suggested that these more robust methods are commonplace within protests (see, for instance, Rosie & Gorringer 2009). However, it is unclear what the authors’ assertion of ‘commonplace’ means within protests experiencing disorder or everyday peaceful protests. HMCIC estimated that ‘95% of protest activity involves organised, declared, planned protest in the form of demonstrations, processions and static assemblies which are notified to the police’ (*Adapting to Protest* 2009, p. 21). As such, without denying the challenges of policing some particularly problematic groups (5% if ATP’s statistics are correct), it would follow that a more facilitating tactical option was

required to improve the policing of public order and, in the long term, to also enhance legitimacy.

The review recognised the challenging position facing the police, trying to maintain a balance of rights for those protesting (on all sides) and those who wish to go about their daily lives unobstructed. ATP came to a number of different conclusions about the effectiveness of policing protest focused on: training – both tactical and legal; use of powers; inconsistencies in tactics; and inappropriate use of powers, among others. It was suggested that the findings from ATP were ‘eerily similar to those reached 8 years before by the Gothenburg Committee in Sweden’ (Adang 2012, p. 327).

With regards to dialogue and communication, ATP highlighted that with the continual dominance of social media, the police had to ensure they were developing strong dialogue with the public and media. It argued, ‘at times, the police have been deficient in communicating with protesters’ (Adapting to Protest 2009, p. 73) and referenced the need for a dialogue policing model within the UK.

Good Practice for Dialogue and Communication (GODIAC) Project

One of the largest academic projects into researching how dialogue and communication are being used across Europe following ATP is the GODIAC (2013) project, conducted by both academics and practitioners. GODIAC held the specific purpose to ‘identify and spread good practice in relation to dialogue and communication as strategic principles in managing and preventing public disorder...’ (GODIAC 2013: 3). It was structured by ten field-based observations of public order events in nine different countries.⁹ During the observations, specific attention was given to four conflict-reducing principles: knowledge, communication, facilitation and differentiation (Reicher et al. 2004, 2007; also see GODIAC 2013, p. 36).

The GODIAC project demonstrates an overwhelming unification within European policing to increase communication and facilitation. Notable within the project were factors such as the symbolic image of ‘force’ with many police forces keeping their robust units out of sight and ensuring a visibly low-level uniform response; the level of confidence officers felt when

⁹Germany, Portugal, Austria, UK, Spain, Hungary, Denmark, Slovakia and Sweden.

communicating with groups they felt they had more control over; and the significance of disseminating messages via social media platforms.

An area that was not given a huge amount of significance in the UK, but was mentioned in Vienna and Wendland, was the need for effective *internal* communication. Research in both settings highlighted that, for operations to be executed well, liaison among different operational staff was paramount to enhance and facilitate decision making. Interestingly, within Vienna, communication with the protesters was not mentioned, one of the few observations that didn't consider this role at all.

Recommendations following the project focused on: professional development from previous success/failures; significance of pre-event contact, highlighting how essential it was for building trust and confidence among groups; the significance of maintaining positive dialogue during challenging periods; and post-event debriefs with organisers. Attention was also given within the project to units specifically focused on dialogue, such as the PLT model. The authors comment that it is worthwhile to have a wide level of diversity within the units, allowing for a complex interactional knowledge base of officers from different groups. The authors also commented that, when first introducing a dialogue unit, a common experience is for other officers to use this as an excuse not to engage anymore (ibid, p. 40).

Although a significant proportion of the observations mentioned consideration of increased dialogue, only Stockholm and Liverpool had a dedicated tactical option formalising this cooperative method within public order. It is significant to consider this as, within only three years, every police force in the UK has, in some form, a PLT capability. Despite its operational popularity, outside of this project and a limited number of publications, extensive research into the effectiveness and deployment of PLTs is narrow, demonstrating the valuable and original contribution this thesis makes.

Police Liaison Team Structure

The PLT tactic was formally introduced into the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) in February 2012 after the then Assistant Commissioner (AC) for Specialist Crime and Operation (SC&O), Lynne Owens, learnt about Operation 'Obelisk' in South Yorkshire Police, through an internal policing conference. Chief Superintendent Colin Morgan was charged with operational control (Morgan 2013) over the tactic.

A PLT comprises of two PLOs who work together throughout the event, communicating with different people, but predominately trying to engage with visible leaders – both formal (group organisers) and informal (influential people within the crowds). The number of teams deployed at an event can vary, depending on numbers and perception of risk. The PLT structure is far more dynamic than the traditional command and control structure; PLTs are encouraged to speak directly with Silver in their command suite (or their associated staff), ensuring the information is in its original state and provided quickly.

Within the MPS they also have ‘The Gateway Team’, which during fieldwork was a team of approximately four officers, latterly growing to around six, who work full-time in the liaison role. This team is based in the same area as the MPS Public Order Planning, which is also occupied by senior public order officers, allowing for continual internal communication. The team use different social media outlets, established relationships with protesters and word-of-mouth to learn of the upcoming protest. They will then seek contact with the organisers or representatives of that group to liaise and gain an understanding of their intentions and what they want to achieve from the protest. From here, depending on the level of involvement the organiser or representative would like to have, suggestions with regards to timings, dates, routes and other logistical aspects will be negotiated, with involvement from the Command team. Although the MPS weren’t included, research into PLTs in other areas of England suggested the early contact with protesters was of most importance as it built the foundations of a two-way relationship – ‘if you get the pre-event part right, you’ll make the event part go much more smoothly’ (College of Policing 2015, p. 7). The MPS are in the unique position of being the only force in the UK to have a dedicated Gateway Team and should, in theory, be able to build very strong relationships with protest groups. It is the Gateway Team’s responsibility to make continued efforts to maintain relationships post-event.

PLT Deployment

Research into the deployments, impact and effectiveness of PLTs is limited. Based on conversations with senior commanders and limited field observations, the research can be best characterised as anecdotal and lacking in rigour. However, there are a small number of papers that explore the use of PLTs.

The operation for the 2011 Liberal Party Spring Conference in Sheffield, Operation ‘Obelisk’, South Yorkshire Police (SYP), saw the first implementation of PLTs. Due to the

previous rioting in London, there was high tension surrounding the protest and it was believed that the PLTs would ‘show a break from the past’ (Stott & Gorringe 2014, p. 247) in policing public order. More notable in this break is the fact that, despite having traditional PSU response, SYP were using the PLT tactical option as their primary method for the protest (Gorringe et al. 2012, p. 122), with the two leading PLOs, who were both trained negotiators, given responsibility for developing the teams. Although it was initially unknown how some protest groups would engage with the team, once conversation began, the PLTs were cited as being able to give Silver relevant information that made them more confident of the plan. The event resulted in two notable outcomes: the ability to challenge police decision-making with regards to the erection of some temporary gates; and enhancing police legitimacy, with PLT acting as ‘invisible observer’ (Gorringe et al. 2012, p. 119) while facilitating the self-policing of crowds.

There have also been some limited observations within London, looking at the policing of an Occupy protest, where the Bronze Commander used the PLTs as the primary tactic, with PSU officers readily available in side streets. Significantly, of most deployments of PLTs that have been academically recorded, all note the primary objective of the police was to regain and enhance legitimacy due to the recognition of the tensions that have developed over a number of years. Evidencing, at least in senior positions, a need for cultural change within the policing of public order.

The placement of small numbers of officers into the crowds allows for legitimacy to be built between the protesters and the officers – the occupational ‘risk’ of having officers within a potentially challenging crowd creates a very human level of interaction and allows for the building of a more realistic picture of the actual risks involved. However, the internal cultural change this requires is significant, where senior officers were perhaps likely to feel they were sending officers into a large crowd unprotected, this internal friction was also noted in Sweden (Holgerson 2010).

Challenges and Future for the PLT Role

Stott et al. (2013) express the challenges of policing groups such as Occupy, due to the fact they do not have hierarchies in the same way as traditionally ‘right-wing’ groups, but instead experience loose affiliation and consensus decision making. This reluctance to speak to

police about their intentions is suggested to come from a deep-rooted mistrust due to previous questionable relationships (See Gorringe et al. 2011; Gillham 2012).

Preliminary research into groups such as Occupy highlight the challenges PLTs are likely to face with groups that are perhaps less likely to want to engage with any form of police (see, for instance, Gillham & Noakes 2007). The operational complexity of balancing the right to protest and right to not engage, alongside Silver gaining appropriate knowledge of the protest intention, demonstrates the continually conflicting nature of facilitation vs. control within the policing of protests (see, for instance, Waddington 1994).

Looking at PLT use within Scotland, the issue of the tactical option simply being added onto the 'old' ways of policing protest is evident. During the 2009 Edinburgh NATO protests, there was difficulty engaging with direct action groups whose intentions could be deemed illegitimate. The detriment of using PLTs inappropriately or, more likely, not understanding the intricacies of the role is evident, within Gorringe et al.'s (2011) research (for example, appearing to act as an intelligence gatherer). However, there were also experiences of facilitation within this research, demonstrating the impact a blurring of operational boundaries depending on how officers adopt the role.

The challenge of facilitation vs. control is one that has been identified in some academic work (see Gorringe & Rosie 2013), with the concern that facilitation simply becomes a stalling tactic for the police, therefore the extent to which the tactic is being met positively by those already suspicious in the protest community is questionable. Similarly, it is suggested that the increased use of dialogue within policing being 'symbolic theatre' and 'ritualistic' (Barker 2014).

With the PLT model now being in operation for a number of years, a recent document was formulated internally with suggestions for the future of the PLT tactical option. Within the report, it acknowledges that there is still no national lead or guidance for the PLT model. Instead, 'best practice' is informally established through working relationships between different forces (Morgan 2016). Overarching recommendations in the document suggest that PLOs must be fully deployable, therefore warranted officers, and must have knowledge of public order. Additionally, the document recommended a formalisation of two roles: PLT Coordinator and PLT Team Leader.

PLTs and Legitimacy:

We can begin to see a restructuring of tactical efforts from reactive policing (paramilitary tactics) to pro-active policing (PLTs). Fundamental to this change is a reliance upon community-based relationships to co-produce solutions to evolving problems. The community definition within a protest sense is, of course, complex, as communities will change, adapt and evolve. However, this same challenge can be directed towards community policing as a whole as; ‘community’ as a homogenous entity is a myth (Cosgrove 2011, p. 21; also see Manning 1988; Klockars 1988; Brogden and Nijhar 2005).

Working with the protest (or crowd) communities in a co-produced order, PLTs are operationally exhibited as something ‘different’ to the wider public order policing family. The PLTs rely upon cooperation with the public(s) they police and, as such, cannot use coercive force in the same manner that is displayed within traditional paramilitary tactics. Alternatively, they have to rely upon ‘craft’ skills of negotiation, communication and conflict management – elements of their operational charge that align them with community policing and PCSOs (Cosgrove 2011, p. 91). The PLTs refocus public order policing away from a preoccupation with *reacting* to disorder, instead focusing on the systematic use of partnerships and problem solving (COPS Office 2009, p. 3) in establishing order.

Perceptions of legitimacy are clearly identifiable with the introduction of the PLT tactic. By working more dynamically with those being policed, we can identify how the PLTs are attempting to bring an enhanced feeling of cooperation between the organisation and those they interact with – with the aim of increased peaceful compliance within the policing of an event. Thus, taking ideological roots in the ‘peace-keeping’ mandate of police work (Ericson 1982; Bittner 1990). Perceptions of legitimacy are central to the overarching policing mandate (Jackson et al. 2014) – and its importance is no less significant within the public order policing family.

As can be seen by literature of street policing, much of what officers deal with day-to-day has little to do with the law-enforcement mandate and more to do with peacekeeping and order maintenance. People often seek police assistance for support in a civil dispute – during a police-public interaction, it is likely that control of one member of the public will indirectly offer support to another (Cumming et al. 1965). This is extremely relevant for protest

policing where ‘sides’ can often appear completely opposing (for example, left-wing vs. right-wing), impacting crowd reactions depending on perceptions of where police ‘support’ is falling. A common chant in protests from left-wing groups is, ‘the police protect the Nazis’ (Field note 1), relating to police facilitation of right-wing protests, which is perceived as illegitimate.

These complex interactions demonstrate the necessity of balance within policing – a dual performance, where an officer acts as both enforcer *and* protector. For Cumming et al. (1965) it may be, ‘impossible to perform acts of support and control simultaneously, [but] support without control is overprotection and invites passivity and dependency, while control without support is tyranny and invites rebellion. While the agent may specialise in one aspect of the social control of deviance, the other must, nevertheless, be part of his [sic] repertoire’ (ibid, p. 277).

Hence, law enforcement is a partial fulfilment of the police role – for example, arresting an abuser for domestic violence offences must be balanced with support (providing relevant details of safe houses, offering a comforting word). Without the role of support the police-public interaction is incomplete. Although, in the strictest sense, the officer has achieved their legal mandate, they have not, in the eyes of the public or victim (and likely in their own professional opinion) solved the problem in full, by offering further information in the form of guidance and advice. It is here that the officer shifts their role changing ‘from professional to an amateur’ (ibid, p. 277). Cumming’s et al. refer to the officer’s social worker role as ‘amateur’, as it is not strictly within the policing mandate and therefore, supposedly, not within their professional remit or specialist skills.

It is from this perspective of ‘officer as support worker’ that policing, in the eyes of the public, gain’s legitimacy (Rock 1973), though this can be perceived as frustrating for some officers, as it is not in keeping with their image of ‘real police work’ (Reiner 2010). Thus, although performing what might be termed a ‘social work’ role, one that the officer didn’t expect to perform when joining, ‘it may nevertheless be essential for him [sic] to satisfy those demands in order for him to continue to function as an effective agent of control’ (ibid, p. 184).

The role of legitimacy in policing has more recently been associated with trying to understand why people comply with the law, an academic shift away from focusing on what specifically triggers offending and what sanctions can be put in place to deter people from committing crime (Tyler 2008; Schulhofer et al. 2011; Bradford et al. 2014). For many contemporary authors, ideas of legitimacy centre on the fundamental core of ‘policing by consent’, arguing that people are more likely to comply with the law and act within the confines of social control if they perceive the treatment they receive from state agencies (predominately the police) as ethical, fair and in line with their values (Sunshine & Tyler 2003; Tyler & Huo 2002; Jackson & Sunshine 2007; Hug et al. 2011).

Legitimate authority encompasses: *legality* – follow and be seen to follow its own rules; *shared values* – morals and values match those of wider society (see also Jackson & Sunshine 2007); and *consent* – those who are being policed feeling a moral obligation to follow the rules (Bradford et al. 2014: 81; also see Beetham 1991). It is suggested that legitimacy is the basis upon which police authority is built (Tyler 2011a, 2011b), centred on why access and exercise of power is rightful and why people have a duty to obey (Jackson et al. 2013, p. 151). Legitimacy in this context is often explored with relation to street policing, yet is absolutely relevant for wider areas of policing.

We can see the mandate of policing being divided into a legal mandate (following rules) and a moral one (shared values and consent). Perceptions of shared values and the subsequent consent granted by the public is central in police-public interaction. There is an expectation, from both parties, about how the interaction will be performed and the success of it will depend on the commitment of both the officer and the member of the public (Goffman 1959). Hence, those are most closely associated with the moral order of police officers are likely to have the most successful interaction. Further, this interaction is heavily dependent on, at the very least, recognition of the officer’s authority.

The PLT model demonstrates a commitment away from paramilitary methods within public order, with legitimacy being sought through a means of negotiation as opposed to enforced rule or instruction. However, the extent to which PLTs are deployed during operations that are perceived to be more troublesome is still noteworthy.

Arguably, perceptions of legitimacy, when looking at policing overall, can be centred on defining *what* the police are there to do: are the police there simply to fight crime¹⁰, are they there to provide a sense of security and reassurance, or is there a mixture of both? A rise of Evidence-Based Policing (EBP), dominated within Cambridge University and thus the (often) singular focus the College of Policing places on EBP, puts forth a strong argument for police as simply crime fighters. Problem-orientated policing, hot-spots policing (randomised control trials) and zero-tolerance policing all echo a clinical perception of policing being centred on algorithms and science to determine '*What Works*' (College of Policing).

One can perhaps empathise with the near obsession of this focus from police forces that battle to survive the extreme austerity cuts they have recently faced. Contrasting to this policing as a provider of security and reassurance, (Loader & Walker 2007) quashes the almost mythical legend that police are effective in 'fighting crime' (Loader 2014) and instead acknowledges their role in working with communities and the amount of time spent on non-crime-related issues (Reiner 2010). Ultimately, the police are there as a sounding board for maintaining a specific standard of order within society. Thus, whatever discourse of thinking holds dominance within academia, government and in the organisation has significant impact on definitions of what makes policing 'legitimate'. The former would suggest that low crime rates enhance legitimacy, however, the latter would pay little notice to this as a measure, due to their acknowledgment that police as 'crime-fighters' is largely ineffective and mythical.

This is also significant within public order policing. The questions to be asked are two-fold: is the legitimacy of policing measured through the absolute execution of the law - meaning, high arrest rates for low-level law-breaking present at protests; alternatively, is the legitimacy of policing measured through the execution of high levels of tolerance to enable protesters to voice their message – meaning high levels of discretion accompanied by low arrests rates and significant levels of effective negotiations. One is a legal centred definition of success; the other, a social cohesion approach.

Ideologically the PLT model is situated within the latter. As Bradford et al. (2014) articulate: legitimacy is increasingly being tied to social cohesion (see Jackson and Sunshine 2007; Jackson et al. 2012), with research suggesting that the public do not blame the police for

¹⁰ '*I have given you just one objective – to cut crime*' (Theresa May, July 2011).

the presence of crime, but do hold them accountable for a lack of order (for example, unruly teenagers drinking in a local park) in their community (see Jackson et al. 2012; Sindall et al. 2012). This is extremely interesting for public order policing, demonstrating the challenges associated in defining success. Differing definitions of attainment are contradictory in nature and public order policing has to seek a position that placates both ends of the spectrum.

Yet, we must problematise this perspective. Legitimate to whom? How members of the general public perceive legitimate police action compared to how seasoned protesters perceive legitimate police action are likely to be extremely different. Although the PLT model might be viewed by police, members of the general public and researchers as a commitment to more democratic and facilitatory methods to policing protest, members of the protest community might view it with cynicism and suspicion. Due to previous illegitimate behaviour by some officers, such as the *Spy Cops* scandal, some within the protest community might view the new tactical model as an attempt to gather information and infiltrate protest groups. Therefore, the issue of definition is present, who defines legitimacy and as stated earlier, legitimate for whom?

Conclusion

The primary aim of this chapter is to introduce the PLT model: its origins, ideology and how it is situated within the literature. First, an introduction was given to the origins of the model, the Dialogue Police in Sweden. This was then followed by a consideration of the PLT model and how the convergence had been realised. The period of convergence and implementation within UK policing was widely understudied and therefore much reliance is placed upon early fieldwork. Yet much similarity between the two models is evident; both have been adopted following major policing inquiries – *Göteborgskommittén* and *Adapting to Protest*; both focused on the significance of continual dialogue pre-event, during and post-event; and both used ESIM as the theoretical premise.

This chapter also considered the significance of legitimacy within our understanding of PLTs. Here we considered the transition of over-reliance upon reactive policing (paramilitary tactics) to the introduction of a proactive policing tactic within public order (PLTs). This transition focuses on creating a co-produced order with the different communities being

policed within public order events. Yet there are challenges around the definition of community and legitimacy – as for whom?

This first chapter demonstrates how a public order policing tactical option, with dominant focus on dialogue to quell any rising tensions, is academically under explored. Operationally, one can see within Sweden and the UK that senior police have positively responded to the alternative approach to policing public order, with most protests formally incorporating the tactic. However, there is still little understanding of how the tactic is utilised by those operating within the role, a gap in knowledge this thesis will address.

Chapter II: Locating Dialogue Policing and PLTs Within Policing Literature

This ethnographic study is looking to understanding how increased dialogue impacts social order within a public order setting. Although the focus specifies a public-order policing context, the interest in social order evidences the cross-over with broader policing literature. As such, it is essential to situate this study within the traditional understandings of the cultural arena within which policing is performed.

Chapter One offered an introduction to how negotiation and dialogue have been used in different contexts, but it did not explore the fundamental question regarding the purpose of policing, it is this question we shall explore within Part I of Chapter Two. It is axiomatic that without thought to what policing is meant to achieve, one can only gain partial insight into the work they do. Although much of this literature is generally dependent on insight into street patrol policing, reflections and considerations on how this knowledge can advance our comprehension of the specific aspects of public order policing is central to the approach. Ultimately, the tactical approach adopted by Police Liaison Teams (PLTs) moves the focus of their policing from enforcing order to negotiating order, demonstrating a formal legitimisation of the everyday skills police practitioners utilise in order to settle disputes with the public in a non-confrontational manner.

Part I: What Do the Police Do? The Policing Mandate

A clear starting point when trying to establish what the policing mandate is, is reference to Sir Robert Peel's nine principles of policing. From an operational point of view, police officers regularly quote the Peelian Principles as the dominant mandate regulating their duties, despite it being suggested that the principles were not written in 1829 or, indeed, by Sir Robert Peel (Emsley 2014). Whilst the question around historic accuracies of who wrote Peel's principles and when remains academically interesting, the reality of their significance among operational staff is undeniable and therefore they carry substantial policing capital. What does seem certain is the notion that from the inception of the English¹¹ policing model in 1829, crime prevention and the necessity to maintain public order were driving forces

¹¹ I use the term English here, as this is the term used most regularly in policing history texts. I recognize that this omits Wales and is done so intentionally to be consistent with the literature. When not referring to historic texts, England and Wales will be used.

behind the bill (Hurd 2008; also see Brown 2014; Emsley 2003), factors that remain central to the policing mandate debate today.

The English policing model, ‘the child of centuries of conflict and experiment’ (Lee 1901, p. xiii) was believed to be different from its European counterparts, given that reliance upon members of the general public becoming warranted officers was at the core of its establishment, as opposed to a military styled force such as a gendarmerie (Emsley 2014). In England, ‘the police were merely ‘citizens in uniform’’ (Reiner 1998, p. 41). In line with this, the Principles gave significant emphasis to the maintenance of order but avoiding, where possible, the use of force all while maintaining the support of the public – ‘the historic tradition that the police are the public and that the public are the police’ (cited in Mayhall 1985, p. 426).

The Peelian Principles - preventing, not reacting to crime and disorder and doing so with minimal force and within the public favour - demonstrates that from its inception the ‘new’ police had at its ideological core, public-order policing tactics that did not reflect paramilitarisation. The public police, the ‘citizens in uniform’ were seen as a positive alternative to military suppression. Previously, the most relied upon response to collective protest or disorder was the utilisation of the army or different forms of citizen force: the militia; the yeomanry; and, the special constabulary (Reiner 1998). From an ideological perspective, this non-militarisation approach is significant, as it demonstrates that from the very formation of the ‘new’ English police, the focus was a public centred approach to policing, one based on consent. Indeed, today, this is still perceived to be at the core of the British policing model.

It has long been recognised that the involvement of the military style forces in an attempt to quell disorder often has the opposite effect, inciting crowds into further direct actions (see for instance, McPhail 1991 Stott & Reicher 1998; Stott & Drury 2000; Tilly 2004; Klein 2012; Miller 2016). Contrastingly, the ‘art of policing a free society or a democracy is to win by appearing to lose’ (Sir Robert Mark, Metropolitan Police Commissioner 1972-1977) has been (and continues to be) the core approach of public policing in Britain. Despite the appearance of the enhanced militarisation of the police during the 1970s and 1980s with, for example, the improved protective operational uniform (such as shields, helmets and flame proof overalls) it would appear that tactics such as the PLTs and more generally the use of dialogue and

negotiation fall far more within the ideological remit of historic ideals of how to prevent disorderly conduct. This is not to say the police did not recognise dialogue's role within public order policing previously however academically this tactic is often seen as 'Machiavellian manipulation' (Reiner 1998: 46; also see Waddington 1994) in order to gain compliance.

Policing Mandate – Law Enforcement/Crime Control

It is fair to say that the Peelian principles, however popular, do present a specific political mandate of policing. Despite the debate over the author of the Principles, it is undeniable that they were utilised by consecutive governments to provide ideological grounds for the 'new' police. It is from this political perspective that we also see modern debates over the policing mandate as being centred on crime control. Currently, there is a dominant image of officers as solely crime fighters – the thin blue line protecting society from lawlessness (Waddington 1999; also see, Cain 1973, Smith & Gray 1985; Loftus 2009). Loader (2014) also identifies that the introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) to 'ensure that the police concentrate on the crimes that most affect people's quality of life' (Forsyth 2009) and the suggestion that the police have 'just one objective – to cut crime' (Home Secretary Theresa May, July 2011) demonstrates the pendulum shift, politically situating police mandate within the remit of 'crime control'.

This interpretation of the purpose of policing as solely centring on the reduction of crime demonstrates a partial understanding, a 'sociologically illiterate account of what the police do, and a reductive, impoverished conception of why the police matter' (Loader 2014, p. 44). It is argued that the evidence has continued to show that police can only control arrests rather than crime levels and that the image of police as crime fighters is nothing more than mythical (Reiner 2000).

Nevertheless, the mythical image of police officers as the ultimate protectors is one that is widespread within society, no doubt enhanced by the excessive amount of crime shows on television. As such, the policing mandate develops an informal common-sense perception and expectations of what the police can achieve and the speed in which they can achieve it. This is further problematised by the fact that officers heavily rely on public perceptions of legitimacy in order to succeed in their daily roles (Jackson et al 2014). This dialectic creates an 'impossible' task for policing practitioners because they are conscious that they are unable

to live up to both their own and the public's expectations of a policing success story (Manning 1978; also see Reuss-Ianni 1983). This is perhaps what makes public-order policing such an interesting focus for academic study: this is the type of policing whereby officers are most likely to be seen in encounters where there is likely a breakdown of established norms by confronting, for example, football hooligans or direct-action protesters all of which lead to the potential for mass disorder. This gives some officers the chance to confirm their perceived role by demonstrating 'their unique ability to quell disorder' (O'Neill 2005, p. 67); however, this image is also mythical with so much time spent within public order operations doing nothing.

The centrality of crime control within the policing mandate, at least from a political perspective, presents complexities within public order policing. Waddington (1994) highlighted how arrests for law-breaking were extremely unlikely to occur during public order operations such as protest, due to the potential for escalating surrounding crowd tension. This also highlights a continued operational belief in Peel's Principles, as arrests for low-level or petty crime in front of large crowds will hardly 'secure the willing cooperation of the public'. Thus, crime control becomes contextual, what is contextually acceptable within the everyday experiences of patrol operatives are perhaps overlooked in other 'special' circumstances.¹²

The image of policing is complex, for it has to balance both the peaceful negotiation of disputes with the more dynamic characteristics of a law enforcement approach. Within this often-contradictory approach, policing practitioners manage their policing persona, 'the dialectic process balancing what the public expects of the police and how the police respond to and manage these demands' (Manning 1977, 2010). Thus, the police mandate is centred on symbolism, a front-stage performance and a back-stage reality of planning that performance whilst juggling political, social and economic pressures.

This consideration of the policing mandate is far more in line with public order policing, where officers have to very publicly manage the competing demands of groups in dispute, all of whom wish to achieve their own aims within the parameters of the law. Although the extent to which police officers utilise the law within their role is disputed (Bittner 1990), their

¹² For example, the 'blind eye' to mass cannabis consumption during Notting Hill Carnival.

access to the threat of its use remains a constant authority held over other people (Bayley 1994, p. 31, also see Herbert 2019, p.592). As such, the law is better understood as an instrument in maintaining order (Skolnick 2011, p. 6).

Policing Mandate – Social Control

If crime plays a lesser part in the role of police officers, what are they doing? For Bayley (1994, p. 30) the answer is simple – ‘restoring order and providing general assistance’. In this context the role of policing needs to consider whether social control is a necessary safeguard for social order (functionalism); its role in contributing to the reproduction of the existing social order, or its role within an oppressive system that ultimately benefit those in positions of privilege (Marxism) (Reiner 2010, p. 4).

Different forms of social control are integral to the everyday functioning of any society and have been widely explored within social sciences (Foucault 1973, 1977, 1978, 1980; Goffman: 1959, 1961, 1967; Cohen 1985; Garland 2001; Innes 2003). Social control can be understood as ‘the organised ways in which society responds to behaviour and people it regards as deviant, problematic, worrying, threatening, troublesome or undesirable’ (Cohen 1985, p. 1-2). Thus, the idea focuses on considerations of ‘normal’ behaviour and the extent to which society will go to protect these ‘norms’. One can immediately begin to appreciate the difficult position of traditional protests (such as those explored in Chapter VI) or symbolic protest (such as Notting Hill Carnival explored in Chapter VII) when considering this definition, as by its very nature protest is a desire to challenge the status quo often through methods of disruption (road blocks, occupation), or in extreme examples direct action (increased violent means) to bring about different types of ‘order’.

Garland (2001) depicts how debates around crime control have developed from contemporary political and cultural values such as moral panics over teenage pregnancies, single parent families, welfare dependencies towards the perceived decline in ‘British values’ and how this has led to a perceived need of increased control. In essence we have developed ‘obsessive attempts to monitor risky individuals, to isolate dangerous populations, and to impose situational controls on otherwise open and fluid settings’ (ibid, pp. 194). Of course, in the wide realm of social control, the public police are just one agent whose mandate is to ensure social order is maintained (Newburn 2005, p. 129). However, it is perhaps fair to say that they are the visible and publicly accountable agent in British society.

The public policing mandate centred on wider considerations of social control can be traced back to its inception, whereby the ‘new’ police are seen to act with an environment that required increased demand for order in society (Silver 1967). The increased fears of declining morality in society led to a panic by the establishment reacting to growing crime rates, which were perceived to be ‘a deeper threat to the social order’ (Reiner 1998, p. 37) by the dangerous under class. Reiner comments that these concerns were aligned to a broader economic debate that recognised the rapid systematic changes happening within an industrial society, that required increased order and routine in order to function within the emerging competitive capitalist market place.

Interestingly, Garland (2001) suggests the existence of a similar argument during the 1980s and 1990s where ‘a return to restraint, a retrofitting of controls, an attempt to put a lid back on a newly disordered world’ (ibid, pp. 195) was perceived by the establishment to be paramount to economic and social growth. The policing mandate being closely aligned with the maintenance of social control and therefore increased order seems somewhat undisputed, with the real question being ‘order from whose standpoint?’ (Cain 1973, p. 21). The maintenance of social order is arguably the main legitimiser for the police, ensuring protection for weak, vulnerable and respectable people ‘from the few who are neither decent nor respectable’ (ibid).¹³ However, to push Cain’s point further - unrespectable to whom?

Social control on behaviour deemed inappropriate is disproportionately defined by middle class people, who deem control necessary for ‘dangerous’ offenders and ‘undeserving’ claimants whose conduct leads some to suppose they are incapable of discharging the responsibilities of the late modern freedom’ (Garland 2001, p. 195). Thus, one bears witness to more and more controls upon disempowered people in society (the poor, immigrants, ethnic minorities, women) to ensure ‘order’ is re-imposed. For Whyte (1943, p. 138), the police support certain groups, whilst ‘cracking down’ on others, acting as a buffer between middle-class and working-class values (for contemporary considerations here see, Fassin 2014). Within this complex model of modernity, policing has to negotiate a space in order to operate appropriately. On the one hand, they do not want to be seen as simply the enforcers

¹³ “And maybe just remind the few, if ill of us they speak, that we are all that stands between the Monster’s and the Weak” a popular line from a poem by Michael Marks that is often displayed in police stations or quoted by officers. Interestingly, this poem is actually a military poem.

of the established view of the day, nor can they operate independently of government requirements. The social control mandate is thus problematic for both front line practitioners and their strategic leaders.

This notion of social order is of course interesting and relevant to all aspects of policing (such as stop and search) however, public order policing arguably presents one of the most widely exposed display of the obsession with maintaining a very contested definition of 'order' (in terms of numbers in attendance and media interest). From the earliest point of interaction between policing and protesters, one can see pre-emptive attempts to control behaviour (thus, enhancing police perception of order) from just within the planning of protest. From the very beginning of planned protest, the police hold disproportionate structural power to organise and control behaviours: they require an application for protest to be made; they hold pre-meetings with leading demonstrators within police premises; and, they suggest preferred routes to be taken during the protest, often to fit with the policing need to be visibly seen to control the event (see for instance, Waddington 1994).

From a policing perspective these pre-demonstration meetings evidence their attempts at negotiating and listening to demonstrators, attempting to offer a flexible strategy that balances the need for maximum safety of those taking part as well as the requirements of the general public who wish to return to 'normality' as soon as possible. Conversely, many would also highlight that it is within this very ordered and controlled structure of planned protest that the message and cause is potentially lost and the protest itself emasculated (Jefferson 1987, 1990, 1993). Is there ever a way of balancing liberty and order (Reiner 1998)?

As such, sociologically we can understand social control as a concept that is achieved by far more than simply law-enforcement via 'the police'. Instead, social control is built through customs of a society, the informal patterns of behaviour (training children into accepted codes of practice) or, informal sanctions for breaking these codes (social pressures, gossip). Hence, the police's role is centred on oiling the machinery of society (Banton 1964, p. 2). Within public-order policing, where the underenforcement of the law is common-place (Waddington 1994), it is clear that 'order' is being negotiated based upon far more than the legal mandate. Juxtaposing the PLTs as the 'street-level' negotiators and paramilitary tactics such as PSUs, one can surmise that PLTs are adopting the less punitive role and instead are principally

‘peace-officers’ (Banton 1964: 7), negotiating social control over citizen. As such, the law, in relation to policing is a ‘supportive’ mechanism to be utilised by police officers, as previously identified, when we actually consider what the police do ‘law enforcement is something that most of them do with the frequency located somewhere between virtually never and very rarely’ (Bittner 1990, p. 237).

Policing Mandate - The Moral Order

Closely aligned to the analysis situating policing as an agent of social control and order, is the discourse that emphasises their role in maintaining the moral order of society. The role of policing in defining, structuring and enforcing morality is not a new one (see for instance, Van Maanen 1978; Herbert 1997; Fassin 2014). The moral order explores the role of police officers as peace-keepers as opposed to morals being enforced through law (for example, see Skolnick 2011, Chapter Ten) and the ‘moral mission’ many officers feel within their daily role (Loftus 2009, p. 90).

The moral mandate has existed since the inception of the ‘new’ police, who were painted as the ‘moral entrepreneur of public property’ (Cohen 1979, p. 128) to convert people from ‘savage street dwellers to respectability and decency’ (Reiner 1999, p. 38). Unlike private policing, or private industry more generally, Manning (2014) comments on how the public police do not have clients or customers with whom they work for, and alongside this, the public cannot refuse or discontinue to pay for the public police services. The public police work on *behalf* of the public putting police officers, and arguably in particular constables, in a very unique position of power, as ‘they actively patrol the edges of order on our behalf’ (ibid, pp. 28).

As outlined above, there is little correlation between the active role of policing and the decline of crime rates (Reiner 2010). As such, police officers become the moral arbiters of society, peacekeepers in the daily disagreements of partners, neighbours, colleagues, and associates.¹⁴ Thus, although the ‘official’ mandate is that of law enforcement ‘the public ‘calls the cops’ for all kinds of problems that have nothing to do with this mandate’ (Bittner 1990, p. 8). This reliance from the public upon police officers to resolve issues that do not

¹⁴ Here I am not belittling the policing role, simply highlighting the ‘cops and robbers’ image is often excessive.

concur with the official law enforcement mandate entangle the organisation in webs of conflict regarding issues that are rarely as formalised as the legal system. Consequently, rather than upholding some form of legal mandate to which officers are exposed to from the very outset of their police training, the constable is more regularly required to execute a large amount of creative problem solving and discretion whilst interacting with the moral disputes of the general public.

Officers therefore get exposed to an everyday reality that is somewhat shielded from wider society, regularly engaged 'in a state of perpetual trouble, labour and disquiet so that other folks may enjoy their rest' (John Wilson Croker cited in, Hurd 2007, p. 105). As such, officers often find themselves settling disputes whereby they have become defenders (and definers) of contextually 'appropriate' behaviours. The mandate therefore arguably merges with a sense of occupational 'mission' to protect (Reiner 2010), separating the public into the 'good guys' and 'the assholes' (Van Maanen 1974) and tying in with an abundance of literature aligning the perception of the policing role as crime fighters (Cain 1973; Smith & Gray 1985).

This sense of mission within policing is however problematic because it is often contextual and self-defined by policing practitioners within their own moral mandate. For example, Fassin (2014) comments that the mission of the anti-crime squad was charged with was far removed from the informal activities of the officers within the unit. Thus, we see the repeated issue being raised throughout the policing discourse: a conflict between the 'official' mandate and the reality of the actions from those charged with that mission. This mission can be aligned with a 'working personality', where unique experiences develop a specific way of looking at the world, with their starting point being suspicion therefore creating differing 'norms' (Skolnick 2011).

Morality thus becomes closely entwined within the remit of what the officers should be guarding and achieving from the mandate. One could argue that given the lack of formal training provided to officers on the peacekeeping areas of their role it is natural for them to reflect upon their own moral positioning of how one should act. However, one must also consider the problematic nature of this, as immoral behaviour does not always align with illegal behaviour and state agents could soon become to be perceived as repressive if they begin to guard morals too tightly.

In public-order policing, as with street policing or other areas of focus, we observe police-officers spending a large proportion of their professional time dealing with peace-keeping, often within environments they deem to be hostile and even volatile; it is for this reason an officer's definition of 'order' is often enforced upon citizens, perhaps even whilst violating their rights (Manning 1978, p. 16). It is this discretionary power of achieving just ends using coercive means that taps into the individual moral order of a police-officer (Ker Muir 1979, p. 3). Police dominance over defining 'order' – inclusive of moral order – is argued to come as a result of a 'demand' by citizens for order, where expectations have become higher and have also expanded. Through a dissolution of 'local' powers and a nationalisation of civil rights (for example, such as housing) we continue to observe an infringement of policing powers outside of the legal mandate (see Silver 1967, p. 22: for similar, also see Vitale 2017).

As this introductory section demonstrates, this thesis aligns itself closely with the informal 'order maintenance' focus of police-work as opposed to law enforcement. Where order maintenance concerns itself with disputes amongst citizens who deem each other at fault, law enforcement arises out of the victimisation of an innocent party by a guilty party (Wilson 1969, p. 223). Within a public-order context, this thesis will explore how increased dialogue impacts social order, from a micro-perspective it aims to understand how officers negotiate 'order' through dialogue as oppose to enforce it through law.

Part II: Locating Dialogue Policing and PLTs Within Public Order Policing Literature

PLTs are specifically a public-order policing tactical option and as such, Part II of this chapter will now explore the literature within the field of public-order policing and its significance in our wider understanding of where the PLTs fit and how they are conceptualised within a much larger framework.

Although we can perhaps accept that the PLT model fits soundly within a democratic policing ideology, they still remain a very small percentage of the tactics deployed in London. During fieldwork I observed a planning meeting where Silver requested the availability of fifty Police Support Units (PSUs) readily deployable – this equates to 1,400

police officers. Comparatively, during fieldwork there were only eighty to one-hundred Police Liaison Officers (PLOs) in total. Thus, the tactic remains a very small addition to the public-order policing field.

As such, we need to understand the previous literature and themes that are present within this field of academic research. We will begin by considering two ideological themes that consistently appeared within the literature: control and coercion, both of these themes will be considered in reference to ‘order’. Following on from here the chapter will explore the theme of ‘violence’ and militarisation. Violence and its use will be explored from both the perspective of ‘police violence’ and the use of violence by crowds. We will also explore the continued debates and concerns around the increased militarisation of police across democratic countries. The latter part of the chapter will explore the literature of ‘negotiated management’ a central element within the public-order policing literature. Within this section we will explore more focused literature on communication.

Control

Order and the maintenance of it is a fundamental value of any society (Body-Gendrot 2017). As such, there are certain acts within a society which threaten a socially defined sense of ‘order’ in which general public consensus accepts the police will robustly take control and potentially use force to exert authority (Terrill 2019). Examples of this could be the police action following the Boston Marathon bombings in 2013 or police response to the London riots in 2011 – this is not to suggest police action will not subsequently come under public scrutiny, but to identify that in the short-term, immediate response the police seize control. This could involve weaponry such as: CS spray, tear gas or water cannon; or ritualised displays of control such as: large quantities of deployable officers, public order uniform (such as protective pads, helmets); and/or the deployment of animals (dogs and horses).

Equally, ‘order’ is a subjective notion – a political matter that one might not fully grasp until they witness *disorder* (Body-Gendrot 2014, p. 244). The policing role within this definition is inherently conservative as they are understood as acting on behalf of the state (Loader and Walker 2007) and it is only if societies definition of order or accepted orderly behaviours begins to change that the police change their practices (Body-Gendrot 2014). The most relevant reference for that could be seen in the reviews into policing following the death of

Ian Tomlinson in 2009, which resulted in the establishment of the PLTs and a commitment from the MPS to deploy less robust responses within a public order context.

Different forms of social control are integral to the everyday functioning of any society and have been widely explored within social sciences (Foucault 1973, 1977, 1978, 1980; Goffman: 1959, 1961, 1967; Cohen 1985; Garland 2001; Innes 2003). Social control can be understood as ‘the organised ways in which society responds to behaviour and people it regards as deviant, problematic, worrying, threatening, troublesome or undesirable’ (Cohen 1985, pp. 1-2). Thus, the idea focuses on considerations of ‘normal’ behaviour and the extent to which society will go to protect these norms. One can immediately begin to appreciate the difficult position of protests when considering this definition, as protest by its very nature is a desire to challenge the status quo, often through methods of disruption (roadblocks, occupation) or, in extreme examples, direct action (increased violent means) to bring about different definitions of norms and social order.

Although not focusing on public order policing, Routledge (2017) considers the significance of the ‘politics of space’ within protest. He comments how space becomes politicised as it is occupied by competing social movements wishing to express a grievance, with the space itself often holding ‘meaning’ (such as protesting outside the Houses of Parliament in London). Additionally, and very much in relation to perceptions of control, spatial inequalities exist. As a result of this, social movements are influenced by the political systems available to them (ibid, p. 7). For example, we might consider the exposure a protest in the capital of a city gains compared to a protest taking place in a more isolated part of a country. Relatedly, when protesters assemble, they are exercising their right to appear and be seen (ibid, p. 14) – the politics of space impacts the extent to which social movements are seen.

Policing and the police are the most obvious example of a formalisation of the maintenance of social order enacted by the state. However, as Reiner (2010) states, its effectiveness in this is continually debated. For some, policing only ensures a certain ‘type’ of order is maintained, one that is defined by those in elite positions; thus, the police arguably obtain a ‘middle person’ position in the conflicting interests of different social groupings. Public order policing operations specifically carry much increased risk through their complexity and size, and by their very nature challenge social control.

Leading on from Routledge's politics of space we can also see within the literature how the control of space is considered essential by the police for wider public order. Territoriality considers the multiple police strategies in place that exist in order to create boundaries of public order, largely revolving around restricting space and the creation of a political geography (Herbert 1997, p. 11). Understanding the police's ability to control the occupation of space is twofold: having the potential to make people feel safe through an establishment of limits; but inevitably creating a friction between the police and some members of the public. Front-stage control of streets assists in creating an image of professional strength, symbolising an operational mandate of the police to be in charge where necessary (Manning 1994).

O'Neill (2005) considers variations of 'space' or 'regions' within her research into football supporters, including that of 'symbolic space'. Here she considers the legal authority afforded to police officers to encroach into the 'private' spatial boundaries of supporters at football matches – for example, the searching of an individual and their property if deemed necessary (she also gives the example of gaining access to personal information about an individual). With regards to the police-citizen interaction during the encroachment of this symbolic space, O'Neill comments that supporters would often use the interaction to contest the legitimacy of such treatment and control. Further, football spotters (a tactic dedicated to gaining information/intelligence on supporters) were observed to swear at supporters or even physically touch supporters, again examples of behaviour that would not be accepted from supporters of police officers (ibid, p. 123). These behaviours are highlighted as police control of 'symbolic space', in addition to other controls. O'Neill comments that to try to 'level the playing field' during this interactional imbalance, some supporters would use a variety of techniques, such as purposefully annoying different police officers (overtly moving in front of the spotter's cameras and so on). This reactionary behaviour acted as a means by which supporters could contest the police control of the space. However, it was evident that within the setting of symbolic space, although supporters could creatively seek to take some form of control back from the officers, this was only possible to a limit and was always dependent upon the officer's perception of the behaviour.

For Bittner (1990) policing is made up of two halves: law enforcement and peacekeeping. He argues that there are many circumstances where law enforcement is not required but police attention is still necessary. During these encounters, discretion plays a significant role in

ensuring ‘order’ is regained, highlighting that discretion is rarely ever a decision *not to act*, but ‘is most often a decision to act alternatively’ (ibid, p. 36). It is essential to recognise that law enforcement is only one half of the policing mandate and much police work is concerned with resolving a variety of civil disputes. The law is a ‘fall-back’ option if the constable fails to regain the necessary order – it should be seen as assistance for the officer, but not their immediate response. Thus, peacekeeping can be seen as an officer’s ‘bottom-line’ and, despite always having the law to use if needed, it is widely accepted within liberal democracies that the police task is to resolve issues using the path of least social conflict, which commonly resolves ‘keeping the peace’ without actually invoking the law (Bowling, Reiner & Sheptycki 2019, p. 7).

We can understand these multiple pathways to resolving social conflict as multiple pathways of coercion. Coercion is an interesting consideration as it requires us to question the role of the police – for instance, are the police a service or a force? The definition of coercion is varied, for example, a way of controlling people through threat to harm (Muir 1977, p. 37); physical force for coercive purposes (Klockars 1995, p. 12); or any behaviours that enable submission in another (Williams and Westall 2003, p. 471). Yet the term is not necessarily always meant negatively. Within complex interactions (such as those represented during police-citizen encounters) each is often trying to ‘convince’ the ‘other’ to do as they wish or to understand/perceive a situation as they do – interaction is strategic where people are trying to get what they want (Jasper 2013, p. 1262). However, it is only the police who have access to ‘legitimate’ monopoly of violence/force. This monopoly of force is significant in relation to discrimination.

Within literature on police use of force, control or the policing of public order are considered in relation to discrimination. As previously stated – whose order and for whom?

Discrimination can take vastly different forms – racial, gender, socio-economic, age and many more besides. Within a public order policing context we can understand discrimination to take place in policing responses based upon perceptions of how ‘risky’ a particular group may be. For example, due to the fluid power structure of many left-wing protest groups, it has been suggested that the police struggle to get as effective pre-event dialogue established compared to with right-wing groups (who are often hierarchical, structured like the police). As such, the police may deem the protest group as ‘riskier’ due to an absence of knowledge about the group’s intentions and so on (Waddington 1994). Alternatively, within football,

specific fan groups or allegiances may be perceived as requiring extra police action to ensure 'order' and 'control' is maintained, even if the extent of this can be disputed (see O'Neill 2005, p. 68).

Perceived (or actual) discrimination can be understood in relation to the 'moral' mandate of police work. The role of policing in defining, structuring and enforcing morality is not a new one, arguably existing since the inception of the 'new' police, who were painted as the 'moral entrepreneur of public property' (Cohen 1979, p. 128) to convert people from 'savage street dwellers to respectability and decency' (Reiner 1998, p. 38). Yet with such immense powers of discretion, considerations of morality become challenging – one could suggest that by under enforcing, the law officers utilise their own sense of justice (Reiss 1971). But this of course means that they are measuring against their own sense of morality – so what happens when behaviours fall outside the perimeters of an officer's moral acceptance? As such, officers often find themselves settling disputes whereby they have become defenders (and definers) of contextually 'appropriate' behaviours. Policing therefore can become interconnected with an occupational sense of 'mission' (Reiner 2010) to protect – separating the public into the 'good guys' and 'the assholes' (Van Maanen 1974).

The problematic nature of this is clearly evident within Fassin's (2011) research. He notes that police officers would sometimes watch middle-class students who were drunk and disorderly not to complete their 'stop' quotas but instead to 'ensure that they were able to enjoy themselves without fear that the other youth, from the nearby projects, would intrude and spoil the party with thefts or fights' (ibid, p. 101). The anti-crime squad would therefore categorise those they deemed behaving appropriately using their own definition, without acknowledging their discriminatory attitudes nor that their own intervention among the immigrant working-class youth was often the reason the situation got worse and disorder increased (ibid, p. 102). This discriminatory perception was often excused by the suggestion that the officers were regularly focusing their attention upon those who had been involved in the criminal justice system. Arguing the officers were required to take this moral stance on behaviour due to the lack of support and trust granted to them by judges – as one anti-crime squad officer described it, 'we catch thieves and, the judges set them free' (ibid, p. 196). As such, the officers were enforcing a 'particular form of social order' (ibid, p. 199), one that often took the form of harassment and humiliation. Due to discretionary powers, officers are able to categorise what they deemed as worthwhile to police and the type of interaction that

person receives. Just as some groups are spared, others experience differing levels of harassment.

Within a public order policing context, this approach to policing also carries high risk alongside it, as communities can retaliate against the perceived illegitimate police attention – attributing police action as a catalyst to disorderly conduct. Fagan (2012) identified from routine stop-and-search data in America that, from 2004 to 2012, African Americans and Hispanics made up 84% of cases in New York City – resulting in anger and distrust in the NYPD. Similarities of over-policing ethnic minorities exist within France (as explored above in Fassin’s research) and are suggested as a central reason for disorderly clashes between the police and ethnic minority youths in France in 2005 (see Body-Gendrot 2007).

Understanding the complexity of these interactions becomes increasingly convoluted when the police become the minority within public space. Notting Hill Carnival in London, explored in Chapter Seven, is considered one of the most racially sensitive and challenging public order policing operations each year. Officers are well aware of the problematic relations they have with ethnic minority communities and recognise the precarious nature of ‘controlling space’ during this event. As was identified by an officer: “Carnival is their [the black communities’] day. For the rest of the year the police would be stopping them in ones and twos on the street where they would be a minority. But for one weekend they were the majority, and they took over the streets” (Hernon 2006, p. 183). Here, we can also identify the problematic nature of the word ‘their’ – there is never any consideration that police officers may occupy these communities or that these communities are represented within policing; ‘they’ are separate, a factor that is not new within policing literature (Banton 1959, p. 172).

Police/Crowd Violence and Militarisation

Central to public order policing literature is police use of force or violence against persons. As such, it is essential to give some attention to this theme within this chapter. Although perhaps a misplaced sentiment, many within the public associate policing most closely with crime control. However, from its inception the Metropolitan Police (particularly) was heavily concerned with the maintenance of public order. This was due to a large amount of social unrest as a result of excessive social inequality creating a ‘revolutionary era’ from around 1780 to 1850 (Skolnick & Fyfe 2010, p. 67). As a result of this, continued threats to ‘order an

organised means of social control began to seem essential' (ibid, p. 70). As such, despite being identified as separate from the army and focused on approval from law-abiding citizens, we can see that from its establishment, police response to public *disorder* with use of force was at the core of the public order policing ideology.

The police remain one of the most visible reminders in society of state-imposed coercive power; as such, for many citizens, the police are worthy of much suspicion (Herbert 2006, p. 481). There is perhaps no other area of policing so regularly deployed, where this representation of state power is so visible, than during public order policing, where for a multitude of reasons (such as increased attendance of the press), the public are more likely to see this access to force in action. It is of course important to remember that even when state violence is deemed proportionate and legitimate by the state (for example, during times of mass disorder witnessed in the London riots 2011), the 'violence' enforced is no less fierce in its power upon the recipient groups or individuals.

From McPhail & McCarthy (2004) we can understand the coercive use of power by police as 'repression' (this is contrasted with facilitation). They argue that repression should be explored upon a continuum, with deadly use of force being the most severe form. Other extreme methods of repression are discussed as rubber bullets, baton charges or tear gas; these uses of force are considered more escalated compared to other repressive tactics, such as cordons, barricades or pre-event arrest orders (such as those used within the Notting Hill Carnival).

This form of 'reactive' policing can be most closely aligned with that of escalated force, which is a stylistic approach to policing largely grounded in threats of use of force (Stott 2011, p. 30). Escalated force was the most common policing approach for public order events until approximately the 1980s. Within the escalated force model, McPhail et al. (1998, pp. 51-53) highlight the challenging and conflicting nature of police-citizen interaction. They outline how first amendment rights of protesters were either ignored or disregarded by the police; there was little tolerance by police of protests that were deemed anything but having peaceful intentions; minimal police-citizen communication; draconian execution of the law, arrest of persons following any violation (even when minimal); and a high use of state-sanctioned force. Escalated force begins by police confronting demonstrators as a show of

force, then continues to increase levels of force until the protesters disperse (Schweingruber 2000, p. 378).

Perceptions of the crowd as inherently violent or a ‘mob’ is core to the escalated force approach. Lohman (1947) identified a three-stage model of ‘the mob’ and appropriate police actions using an escalated force model. Firstly, the initial stage where individuals are in the milling process – the response from police should be to immediately gain facts, take action and isolate issues; secondly, the stage of collective excitement – where an adequate show of force from the police would be to gather sufficient uniformed resources and disperse crowds; finally, the contagion stage where the ‘crowd’ will accumulate innocent bystanders – police response would be to cordon the affected area and use loud speakers to break up the crowd. Although there are aspects to this model that are different, we can still see an essence of this approach within the police’s approach to public order within the UK.

Although the examples given by Lohman (1947) in his model are quite low-level force, the policing approach places at its core an ideology that violence is inevitable and therefore a police violence response is legitimate. This approach encompasses a perception of the policing mandate suggesting the state (and therefore the police) must be in control of social order at all times. It is undeniable that violence is one of the ways in which the state can remain in ‘control’, but as ‘order’ is so subjective, it becomes inherently problematic to understand the clear relationship between order and violence (Manning 1980, p. 136).

The considerations of escalated force policing style align with explorations (and expressed concern) in the literature around the continued paramilitarisation of public order policing. Although the formal establishment of a police force was identified as being distinctly different from their military counterparts in the army, the similarities cannot be ignored. Most policing organisations exist in a formal command-and-control hierarchy and report to not a ‘manager’ or ‘supervisor’, but a ‘sergeant’ or ‘lieutenant’ (Skolnick & Fyfe 2010, p. 113).

Within a UK context, debates on paramilitary policing were dominated by two academics; PAJ Waddington (1987; 1991; 1993a, 1993b; 1994a, 1994b; 1999) and Tony Jefferson (1987; 1990; 1993). This debate continued for some time between the two leading academics and both contributed immensely to the literature. For Waddington, paramilitary methods – such as the tactics of level-two trained PSUs and (within the MPS) level-one trained Territorial

Support Group (TSG) officers – are essential for a professional police service dependent upon legitimacy. Through a strict command-and-control styled policing, senior officers ensure rank-and-file officers are coordinated and supervised, safeguarding against any unacceptable levels of use of force. Alternatively, Jefferson interprets the paramilitary tactics of the police from a different standpoint (Jefferson 1993, p. 374). Where Waddington (1993) identifies paramilitary tactics within policing as a ‘superior’ approach to policing public order, Jefferson (1990, p. 102) argues that a police force cannot adopt such methods without fundamentally altering the nature of policing.

Applying Chatterton’s (1979) ‘trouble’ framework within a public order context, Waddington (1994) highlights how senior commanding officers negotiated which ‘battles’ to lose to ensure they did not ‘die in a ditch’ which would create ‘trouble’ for them. Chatterton (1979) refers to ‘*on the job trouble*’ as the more predictable ‘troubles’ police officers are likely to face within their daily interaction with the public: making arrests, minor challenges to authority, minor disorder, such a breaking up fights. Although not ‘simple’ in their solution, officers are often well equipped to deal with these troubles and are professionally expected to do so. ‘*In the job troubles*’ refers to internal interactions that arise as a result of the relationship between rank-and-file officers and senior ranking officers. For Waddington (1994, p. 43) senior command seek to have maximum control over the event (hence a strict command-and control-structure) in order to increase the likelihood of avoiding *both* causes of ‘trouble’. One could simplify this to understanding public order policing as micromanagement of teams.

Waddington (1994b) further argues that as a result of trying to avoid ‘trouble’, officers utilised *both* accommodating and coercive tactics; he uses the example of the anti-poll tax protests following the riots. Within this area of his fieldwork Waddington identifies a number of areas of coercion: potential to ban the march (it was decided that this could invoke the very violence police were trying to avoid, so was dismissed); impose conditions on the march (this can be legally challenging to obtain); and, increased preparation (increase in numbers of officers requested for aid, specifically TSG who spent two days specifically training for the protest). Waddington notes that the police were trying to “avoid locations where disorder would be difficult to contain *if it occurred* ... [which] lay outside the scope of strict legal justification” (ibid, p. 372, emphasis original)

In addition to these tactics, the police also used ‘accommodating’ (or negotiated) tactics. Waddington notes: the police offered to close a specific road for the protesters, knowing the group were unable to afford the costs of hiring a park and complying with council regulations; officers also took the lead on strong intervention with the council after they began to challenge the use of a particular park for the rally. Through a negotiated approach of both tactical styles, it is argued that a ‘carrot and stick’ policy was used in an attempt to ‘win over’ protesters and avoid all forms of ‘trouble’. The extent to which critical policing academics would agree that this is negotiation is, of course, questionable. Waddington’s research highlighted that police officers were executing both coercive and accommodating tactics, however, he advocated that the most effective way of controlling public order policing was through paramilitary methods.

Conversely Jefferson (1987; 1990; 1993) puts forth a case against paramilitary policing, challenging the acceptance of the continued growth in increasingly robust methods utilised by the police. He defines paramilitary methods as, ‘the use of specially trained and specially protected groups of officers, operating as highly mobile, quasi-military units, engaged in “search and destroy” missions against “enemy trouble-makers” or ringleaders”’ (Jefferson 1990, p. 2).

Jefferson found that paramilitary police tactics and specialist squads such as the SPG, (which have now been disbanded but are ideologically similar to the TSG), were considered by policing as a more ‘professional’ and ‘effective’ means of policing potential disorder through ‘impartiality’ and ‘restraint’. This was a popular notion due to the rise of confrontations during the 1970s and 1980s when groups such as the National Front were gaining momentum. However, Jefferson disputes this, suggesting that impartiality was in fact strongly aligned with the political nature of discretion and that the ‘effective’ paramilitary methods actually amplified levels of disorder.

Jefferson (1990, pp. 84-86) highlights a ‘typical sequence’ of events identifiable within most public order operations. Firstly, *preparation* involves large groups of officers being trained and equipped for the worst-case scenario where they remain on standby until perceived by the senior officers as being needed, a time when nerves, frustration or anger can develop, fortified by disparaging stories and rumours about the enemy. The second stage of the model identifies the need for a *control of space*, identifying specific locations where crowds might

congregate. This stage is described as provocative, with the potential to incite the very behaviour from crowds that the police predicted and wish to avoid. Thirdly, the need for an increased *control of crowds*, who as a result of stage two now need further order – creating an escalating cycle of provocation and response. Finally comes *the clearance*, where a dispersal is required following the end of the demonstration (defined by the police).

Jefferson articulates that order maintenance relies heavily upon human decision making and not an idealistic view of the impartiality of law. Thus, from this human decision-making process one must question *who* is defining what order maintenance is, as those who gain the most amount of policing attention is more than likely to be delegitimised minorities (as discussed within Fassin's work). Hence, these problematic and incomplete definitions, aligned with limited access to information and resourcing issues, mean police are unable to police *all* potentially disorderly situations, thus any senior commanding officer 'is forced to police partially' (Jefferson 1987, p. 48).

For Jefferson, there is a disconnect between the 'idealised' version of paramilitary policing and the reality of it. He identifies that there are certainly times where the strict command-and-control structure of directly controlling and ordering large numbers of officers to do something is sound – he offers the example of ordering officers to remain in the canteen or carrier. However, it is when orders such as 'take the street', 'hold the line' or 'arrest troublemakers' are given that the reality of contextual complexity comes into play. This is due to the fact that the order has to be translated into action and during that translation the independent office on constables takes over (Jefferson 1990, p. 50).

It is suggested that the contemporary policing approach is more fitting with a negotiated management style (considered next). Yet the continued militarisation of tactics within policing, both nationally and internationally, is undeniable. Within a North American context, access to very robust tactics, such as rubber bullets and tasers, are relatively normalised in protest and are actually classified as 'less-lethal' options (Wood 2014, pp. 29-30). The problematic nature of this language is immediately identifiable as, if we think of police force on a continuum, putting 'less-lethal' suggests that one needs to begin at the worst-case scenario of killing someone and work backwards, as opposed to escalating force upwards from the bottom of the continuum. If force was approached in this method, tactics such as tasers or rubber bullets would be classified as 'progressively more lethal' options.

Within a UK context, from around the mid 1970s onwards, policing large-scale events has been dominated by PSUs. These are specially trained public order officers with specialist equipment and can be used as a 'mutual aid' capability across the country. For example, during the 2011 London riots the MPS requested mutual aid from across the country. If we adopt Waddington's (1994) argument, this should mean that nationally officers are responding to the same instructions. However, in reality – from Jefferson's (1990) perspective – the individual office of constable is likely to problematise this. PSUs remain the main 'bulk' of a public order policing capability and demonstrate how structurally police organisations have not adapted greatly in response over the past 49 years. PSUs represent a structurally more paramilitary and 'tougher' approach in terms of resourcing, weaponry and equipment; as such, we can understand the response to order maintenance in this context as Darth Vader replacing Dixon (Reiner 2010, p. 87)

Police access to and use of violence – whether formally legitimised or illegitimate – and the growing militarised approach of policing is one area for consideration of the relevant literature. Yet it is not only the police who use violence during public order policing events. For Adang (2011, p. 47), every society experiences some form of collective violence, with differing levels of intensity, whether it be at a football match or urban riots.

Tilly, Tilly and Tilly (1975) argue that incidences of violence develop in a sequence: one group expresses a grievance about something, this is then resisted by a second group or representative of that group. During this sequence, both groups can repeat their role within it and, as a result, an escalation of violence can ensue. It is not that either group came to the interaction with violent intentions, but that violence occurred as a result of their interaction and their desire to resist the other group (see McPhail & McCarthy 2004, p. 16). The complexity of this interaction becomes increasingly clear when we consider the diversity of groups who attend crowd events (especially protests) and the diversity of demands that might exist. Furthermore, the responding group (the police) also have access to a diversity of tactics which, depending on their own planning, perceptions and stereotypes will change depending on any given operation. Within this model, collective crowd violence can be understood as mobilisation and repression in a circular sequence (Tilly 2004, p. 213), but provides less insight into individual violence.

The role of the individual is explored within the work of the Elaborated Social Identity Model (ESIM). Within this social-psychology model, it is argued that crowd members bring with them to crowd events individual identities and norms which are not fixed and can be transformed during interaction with an 'out-group', who are often the police. From the position of ESIM, it is argued that the police are likely to assume identities of crowd members that differ from how people identify themselves. Furthermore, the police are suggested as identifying crowd action alternative to how individuals within the crowd identify their own behaviour. Through increased access to legitimate authority, the police have a higher likelihood of their definition of a situation or 'group' enforced upon the crowd; this (perceived illegitimate) action then creates the environment when crowd members start to identify with others within the crowd with whom previously (before police action) they may not have identified with (Reicher & Stott 1998). We can see here similarities with Tilly, Tilly and Tilly's (1975) model where an appreciation of the escalation sequence of violence could prevail.

Negotiated Management and Communication

Negotiated management as a policing style replaced escalated force during the 1990s and is most commonly associated with communication, negotiation and increased dialogue. As with escalated management, McPhail, Schweingruber & McCarthy (1998, pp. 53-54) identify the five dimensions of this policing approach. Within negotiated management: the protection of the first amendment rights (US context) are core; an expectation of an acceptable level of disruption is understood; communication is perceived as necessary; under enforcement of the law is expected; and minimum necessary force is used. Within a UK context, communication has been identified as key for ensuring that tensions do not intensify between protesters and police, along with that there has to be some recognition of the right to protest and a toleration of a disruption to the public's daily life (Rosie & Gorringer 2009). Additionally, among senior ranking officers, at least within UK policing, it is now deemed 'sensible' for senior command 'to slacken their authority so as to increase the predictability of protest events and minimise the risk of violence' (Waddington 2007, p. 10).

McPhail & McCarthy (2004) highlight that there are both positives and negatives to the increased use of negotiated management. Positively, they point out that through negotiation a 'mutually agreed-upon game plan' (ibid, p. 6) can be established. This means that both the protest and police organisations have a basic foundation of understanding about what the

other wants to achieve and the extent to which they will go to achieve it. Waddington (1994) also points out what could be termed ‘mutual manipulation’ (suggesting a particular route) or even deception (not informing of every detail of the protest, perhaps not notifying about a roadblock), but McPhail (2004) points out that this is part and parcel with the nature of policing protest, where each side has an often contradictory aim to achieve. Despite these operational problems, negotiated management has ‘yielded a dramatic reduction in disorder, damage, and death for challengers and a significant reduction in media, political, and bureaucratic problems for the police’ (ibid, p. 6). As such, it presents a positive solution to a very complex situation, if for no other reason than the sharp decline in street confrontations between protesters and the police under negotiated management (Gillham & Noakes 2007, p. 342).

Waddington (2014) echoes the positive nature of the agreed ‘game-plan’. From his work on the anti-Lib Dem protest of 2011, he comments that the pre-event liaison between the South Yorkshire PLTs and the student protests dramatically advanced relationships and understanding between the two groups. Some of the negotiation was akin to the traditional MPS style displayed in the 1990s (Waddington 1994a), being more in line with subtle manipulation. One of these tactics utilised by SYP was ‘selling’ a particular route, using a negotiating tactic known as ‘bunches of five’ (having five appealing reasons why the police suggestion was the strongest and ‘selling’ that idea to the protest group, instead of enforcing it). Waddington (2014) highlights that, in addition to trying to ‘win over’ protesters, this was used as a means of ensuring a ‘no-surprises’ approach on the day.

Stott & Gorrings’s (2014) work suggests that where the PLT communication differed from previous public order tactics was the *maintenance* throughout the event, meaning that leaders in the crowds would continue to recognise ground-based officers who they could go to for assistance. This allowed a unique insight if trouble began to arise as, through their established communication, the officers were able to provide a real-time dynamic risk assessment, negotiate solutions and solve problems (ibid, p. 247). Waddington (2014) echoes this with established relationships of trust, even before the event resulted in rapport building, and a more open interaction between the two, noting that even the PLTs’ uniform (a blue bib as opposed to the traditional yellow) made the officers appear ‘kinder’, compared to the ‘real police’ (ibid, p. 46).

This differentiation and recognition of the ‘blue-bibbed’ officers continued elsewhere. Conducting participant observation research in two different forces during six separate protests, Stott, Scothern & Gorringe (2013) also argue that the crowds began to differentiate between the tactics, with many citing the different ‘friendly’ demeanour of the blue-bibbed officers, enhancing police legitimacy among many in the crowd. They argue that it was through this differentiation that officers were also able to separate themselves from the dominant body of officers, acting as mediation to avoid arrest allowing for ground-based real-time problem solving.

Interaction and communication are also a central feature of the *Flashpoints Model of Public Disorder* (shortened here to ‘Flashpoints’) which is widely influential within the literature, a model that was developed to explain why some incidents result in disorder and others do not (Waddington et al. 1987; also see Waddington 1992, 1996). Flashpoints work to a framework which enabled insight into multiple factors that may impact levels of conflict. The framework has six incorporated variables: structural (referring to macro-sociological factors, such as inequality); political/ideological (the degree of legitimacy afforded to the group in question to demands/requests from those in positions of power); cultural (shared conditions and experiences); contextual (amount of communication leading up to the event); situational (significance of geography); and interactional (the amount of police-citizen face-to-face activity).

King & Waddington (2004) highlight the complexity of these interrelated factors within the wider framework of public order policing. Within this research in Burnley (England) the authors evidence how the police ignored significant contextual issues of racial conflict, meaning they did not adequately respond to the rising fear of the Asian communities discussed in the research and, as such, the communities felt isolated and ignored. Through lack of attention and focus on these issues, there was not the establishment of adequate communication. An example of this is, a community worker trying to dissuade younger populations from using violence against the police was misidentified and alleged he was hit in the face with a shield. As such, the author concluded the police missed significant and relevant opportunities to engage in specific ‘flashpoint’ areas which would have encouraged more proactive interpersonal governance of the event; instead the police resorted to a ‘crowd-management’ response.

The interaction part of flashpoints also proved to be significant within Canada. Analysing the events of two different protests: Quebec City protests and Ottawa G8 Summit, King & Waddington (2005) found drastically different interactional approaches. Following disorderly conduct from a small percentage of the protest crowd (a group known as Black Bloc, who are politically active internationally, including London), the police (made up of multiple different police forces) responded robustly and indiscriminately. Tactics included rubber bullets, tear gas and water cannon – so tactically, a very escalated approach. The Ottawa G8 protests experienced a vastly different approach. But there was a key contextual difference; the summit was being held very far away and therefore the police did not feel they had to ‘die in a ditch’ to protect the event (ibid, p. 274). The authors categorise this as an ‘ideological/political’ difference. During this event, officers were ordered to remain out of their carriers and were deemed approachable, in normal beat-duty uniform; there were even plain-clothed officers among the crowds marked ‘police liaison’ (Allen 2003). There were some potential flashpoints, but they did not ignite in disorder or excessive conflict. The authors argue this was due to the vastly different policing approach and the direct aims of the police to ‘crowd manage’ the event as opposed to control it.

Despite being widely cited, the flashpoints model is not without criticism. Waddington (1994, p. 159) argues that the model is not analytically useful nor testable. Furthermore, Otten et al. (2001) argue that the model needs to have more temporal and spatial sensitivity within it, which they themselves addressed and developed in the model seeking to facilitate a more dynamic understanding of how police and protesters interact.

‘Type’ and ‘style’ of interaction have also proved to be significant in other research. As with the UK-based development of the PLTs, in Canada, Davies & Dawson (2018) explored the ‘Meet and Greet’ public order strategy. This strategy involved high-visibility patrols with officers smiling, engaging and welcoming people to the event, ensuring early and positive interaction. They surveyed 460 police officers, exploring perceptions of effectiveness of this strategy. 75.8% of respondents found that the strategy was generally useful for policing large crowds, however, follow-up interviews differentiated some of these respondents where they further identified that, although it was a generally good tactic, it only worked on certain types of crowds. In addition to this, the authors found that a smaller number of respondents had starkly contrasting views, perceiving this strategy to actually contributing towards causing disorder at events. Notably, although a higher percentage of respondents perceived this

‘friendlier’ approach to be effective, they commented that it should only be part of the strategy – not the whole strategy. This is supported by their earlier research, that identified public order policing cannot be a ‘one size fits all’ and that the characteristics of an event must reflect the resourcing (Davies & Dawson 2015).

Dialogue as means of interaction is therefore evident internationally and fits into our wider understanding of democratic policing, aligning itself more closely with ‘negotiated management’ tactics. Yet, as the initial discussions at the beginning of this chapter around ‘coercion’ demonstrated, increased communication in itself does not evidence a wholly ‘innocent’ approach to public order policing. As we have witnessed an ever-growing commitment to this ‘style’ of policing, we are beginning to see more critical reflection on its potentially coercive consequences, which we turn to now.

Critical Reflections on Communication

As Davies & Dawson (2015) identify, the ‘friendlier’ style of policing may not ‘work’ in all public order settings – one of which may be ‘transgressive protests’ (Stott et al. 2013, p. 7). This is where the group in question does not structure itself around a formal hierarchy and therefore may not have a group leader or organiser (a sound contemporary example of this is Extinction Rebellion). Here, it is more effective to explore the perspectives of ‘the policed’.

The literature recognises communication and increased use of dialogue in the police-public interaction as largely in line with negotiated management. But it is important to reflect that McPhail & McCarthy (2004) argue that we need to view negotiated management on a continuum of repression. Despite the model being a more democratic policing style, police forces disproportionately have the power of definition: defining where the ‘line in the sand’ is, or defining what civil disobedience will be tolerated (use of discretion). Furthermore, this style of policing also risks making protest seem ineffective or even boring, as they achieve little else than a ‘feel-good solidarity’ (ibid, p. 6). Ultimately, if police forces do not achieve their set objectives, they have the authority to revert back to more robust tactics – identified as a ‘carrot and stick’ tactic, where the police are willing to negotiate, but still identify their preparedness ‘to enforce the law and use force whenever negotiations are breached’ (Baker 2011, p. 46; also see Gillham & Noakes 2007).

Gilmore, Jackson & Monk (2019) found evidence that this carrot and stick policy was largely in effect at the Barton Moss protests. The research utilised data collected during ethnographic work with a protest group in addition to 24 interviews from protesters (also see Jackson et al. 2016, 2017). The authors argued that with these more challenging protests where there was no hierarchical structure, police officers struggled to achieve early and effective communication with the groups. Instead, they found that police were using dialogue as a velvet glove to their supporting iron fist of mass arrest (Gilmore, Jackson & Monk 2019, p. 43).

Gilmore et al.'s research is important to the literature as it provides insight into the experiences of liaison officers by the policed. The authors argue that despite the potential utility of a tactical option founded in dialogue, the deployment of PLTs did not result in effective communication at Barton Moss for the entire duration of the protest. The PCC Panel also recognised that communication failed during this operation, however, suggested this was due to the unwillingness of protesters to engage with police, proposing that protests in the future should ensure they are responsible for increased dialogue and highlighted the need to define behaviours that are acceptable during protest. Gilmore et al. (2016) argue that this fails to recognise the role played by the PLOs, assigning blame solely on protesters. They go on to comment that some protesters felt they were 'marked for it [arrest]' (see *ibid*, p. 20), intensifying feelings of distrust. A key and interesting finding from the report was the fact that protesters' sense of mistrust continued largely due to the feeling that PLOs were not independent from their colleagues. Despite forces operationally perceiving PLTs as there to negotiate with the protesters, due to the fact they continue to work with other (more robust) tactical options within the force, protesters felt PLTs were simply an extension of the Tactical Aid Unit (TAU).¹⁵

Their work takes a very critical stance on the use of PLOs within protest and the wider acceptance of dialogue policing as more open and democratic. They instead argue that

¹⁵ The TAU was defined by the GMP through a FIO as: 'GMP's Tactical Aid Unit are deployed and designed to assist integrated Neighbourhood Policing Teams to keep the communities of Greater Manchester Safe. The Tactical Aid Unit do this by providing a core function of skills and often work alongside and in partnership with other specialist departments to assist all of Greater Manchester.' They are also used in crowd control instances and could be aligned with the MPS' TSG.

broader perceptions of the tactic as legitimate displaces the significance of the discretionary nature of the role and how this is impacted by the remarkable power imbalance between police officers and the policed. The authors highlight that with the introduction of PLTs, protest groups are now expected to be open to dialogue and negotiation from the outset and, if they do not engage, they are likely to be viewed as problematic, which is actually likely to escalate interactions. Further, this is intensified by the fact the police are able to ‘maintain the monopoly to decide which groups fall outside of the parameters of the dialogue model’ (Gilmore et al. 2017, p. 13).

Baker (2011, p. 2014) also found a critical perspective to communication among protesters at a protest camp for climate change in the UK where the police were criticised for being ‘heavy-handed’. During these environmental protests, Baker (2014) questions whether police-public communication is truly meaningful or instead adopts a form of ‘ritualistic dialog (sic)’ (ibid, p. 93). He comments that many within the protest, both protesters and police, were very wary and untrusting of the other, leaving a limited foundation to establish dialogue. As a result of this, there appears to be no authenticity to the dialogue, but instead becomes an objective to gain an advantage over the other – how many camp sites, how many protesters, what tactics to expect.

A feeder problem to the ritualistic dialogue is suggested to be the lack of chain of command for many protest groups (mentioned previously). In his works on environmental protest, Barker (2011) comments that the police would often look to organisers for definitive answers and decisions, expecting the same strict command-and-control hierarchy structure as the police (Baker 2010). This led to frustrations on the part of liaison protesters who saw themselves merely as a conduit between the police and the protest group. These challenges were further intensified with the realisation that the protesters who acted as a conduit were neither representative nor authoritative within the wider social order of the protest group (Baker 2011). These joint frustrations could often lead to dialogue as ‘akin to “a smoke and mirror chess game... we’ve spoken to you, you’ve spoken to us, we’ve played friendly”’ (Baker 2010, p. 11). As such, the extent to which the communication can be described as *meaningful* is questionable.

Similar findings were discovered in other UK-based research. In their participant observation research with two different police forces into the early deployments of the PLTs, Stott,

Scothern & Gorringe (2013) found that the PLOs struggled to achieve meaningful dialogue with groups who did not have a hierarchical structure and therefore were unable to mediate and establish boundaries of behaviour with these groups (for example, Occupy). These groups often had deep mistrust for police, which resulted in the PLTs' attempts to gain communication with groups being perceived as an evidence-gathering capacity, further undermining the legitimacy of the tactic among the groups. This was also experienced in Holgersson & Knutsson's (2011) work in Sweden. They found that right-wing groups often engaged far more actively in communication with officers due to the fact they often needed protection from left-wing groups, but also their structure was hierarchical (like the police) with defined leaders who could influence the behaviour of the group. This was not the same with the left-wing groups, who distrusted the police after years of robust policing tactics and the transgressive structure of their groups with no defined leaders. Therefore, as with Stott, Scothern & Gorringe's (2013) research, there is a genuine issue of the police not having another to engage with.

Gorringe et al. (2012) also considered the extent to which dialogue among PLTs was meaningful or, like Baker's (2014) research, dialogue as ritualistic. They found within their research that officers would sometimes perceive dialogue as a means of incapacitating the protest – thus, an extension of police control, using a request for personal details (such as name or planned route for their protest) as a wager for the police giving them their assistance (see *ibid*, p. 121).

The theme of increased dialogue risking manifesting as each group trying to 'one-up' the other in preparedness, or what could be termed an 'exchange relationship' (Waddington 2013, p. 30) is perceived critically by many, but is in fact not a new policing tactic. Waddington (1994a) cites how pre-event liaison has always been central to public order policing operations. Senior police staff would use many techniques of trying to gain a 'home advantage' (such as negotiating with protesters on police premises, facilitating increased police control) and would take advantage of the inexperience or disorganised protest organisers by putting forth police preferred proposals (such as a specific route). Further to this, police organisations require much information from the event which provides the planners with relevant knowledge to assist in arranging specific requirements (expected numbers, event organisers name and contact details). Lastly, the police enjoy the advantage that being expert in event planning brings them. Although some protest organisers may have

copious experience, many will not and as such will turn to the police (who experience these events weekly) for advice and guidance. All of these factors enhance the level of control the organisation is able to gain over any given event. What's suggested as 'new' within the public order literature (although challenged in critical perspectives) is that the PLT tactic brings access to continued channels of communication with those in positions of senior command (Waddington 2013; 2014).

Police Knowledge:

Throughout public order policing literature, regardless of tactical approach, of continued significance is the consideration of police knowledge. There is potentially a gap between the reality of the situation and the perception police officers have of that reality, where police might see potential risk, citizen's might only see bravado. As such, police knowledge refers to the knowledge held by police about their role and the external challenges they are asked to face within their role (della Porta 1998, p. 229). In her research with Italian police, della Porta has explored policing knowledge through two avenues: professional culture – how officers understand their own role; and environmental culture – perceptions of external reality.

Della Porta's work established four routes by which police officers would approach the policing of protest. Firstly, officers perceived their role within protest as a means of defusing situations. However, the policing approach was dependent upon *who* was protesting – radical groups were perceived by the officers as posing more risk and therefore the policing response was altered. For large-scale events, the police were likely to adopt a *cooperative model* where the organisers and the police would seek to work together. Within this model the police would seek a 'softer' approach, viewing the protesters as 'targets of risk', meaning that people not involved within the protest might target the protesters and the police view it as their duty to 'protect' them to ensure their freedom of expression is fulfilled. The third model considers a *ritualised stand-off* which is a model used for protests by younger or autonomous groups. Police numbers are in some cases higher and they are dressed in 'combat' uniform – both factors are strategic decisions to symbolise their ability to use robust force if necessary. The final route is based upon a *total isolation* of perceived 'troublemakers', meaning a total control over the movement of persons considered to be risky.

How police react to a specific protest and thus which route they adopt is largely based upon the knowledge they have of the protesters. Within this, della Porta deconstructs how officers

perceived a distinction between ‘political’ protesters which were perceived as positive by officers and ‘non-political’ which were perceived as simply being motivated by the desire to engage in violent encounters for fun. Issues arise when officers struggle to predict the actions of crowd members and therefore are unable to refine the crowds based upon their policing knowledge.

Waddington too found within his work a stereotyped distinction between ‘genuine demonstrators’ and ‘the opposition’. Here, we can see similarities with ‘real police work’ centring on ‘genuine victims’ (Charman 2017), or ‘ordinary decent people’ as opposed to ‘slags’ (Waddington 1994), or ‘regular’ supporter and ‘hooligan’ (O’Neill 2005). As we see with della Porta’s (1998) work, so Waddington (1994) found that senior officers would use their common sense or experience (as in, their policing knowledge) to classify if the event was a major or minor event, which would then impact the ‘style’ of policing response.

From wider policing literature, Bittner (1990) also identified police knowledge as ‘essential’ for officers when informing them whether to act, not to act or the decision to act alternatively. Bittner argues that, without knowledge of whom the officer was policing, they were unable to know what and who is unusual (the ‘outsiders’) or what doesn’t fit the usual context (the behaviour deemed ‘normal’ for that area). This knowledge of their community assisted officers in exercising discretionary power that best suited the knowledge of who was appropriately to blame for any given circumstance as opposed to who the law might define as guilty.

Skolnick (2011) also argues that knowledge is essential to the efficiency and effectiveness of an officer and that this knowledge is built through a socialisation process that is founded in the traditional street policing role of a police constable. He comments that, unlike other similar organisations (military), policing requires new recruits to begin at the bottom, learning their skills on the street before (and if) branching out to a specialism.¹⁶ This socialisation requires officers to ‘notice the normal ... he (sic) must come to know the people in is area, their habits, their automobiles and their friends ... only then can he decide what

¹⁶ This is of course beginning to change with Direct Entry, however, notable is the level of resistance this initiative is being met with by active officers, mostly due to the belief that DE officers will not know ‘the job’ from the ground up.

persons or cars under what circumstances warrant the appellation “suspicious” (ibid, p. 45). Their training therefore leads them to begin from the point of interpreting ‘difference’ as ‘suspicious’.

What the wider patrol-focused literature identifies is that both formal training and informal socialisation influence perceptions of the public. Within this informal socialisation process is the role of stories (Shearing & Ericson 1991). This too has been explored specifically within the socialisation of officers within public order policing by Wood (2014), where stories of urine or faeces being used as weapons have been repeated by officers who have not themselves experienced it. Further, she argues that, through story-telling, alongside other informal socialisation and formal training, public order police officers encapsulate all of this knowledge into their ‘police habitus’, impacting their perceptions of the people they are then policing.

Police knowledge is also identified as significant to police perception of crowds. Historically, crowds have been explored assuming that individuals within the crowds are a homogenous entity who became ‘irrational’ when in a group setting and were as such inherently dangerous (Le Bon 1987). For Le Bon, it was the collective actions of a group that was of central focus for crowd theory with the assumption that a ‘contagion’ influenced overly emotional people within crowds, leading to their psychology within a social gathering unifying. We can see how crowds became negatively stereotyped and, as such, their actions were perceived as illegitimate.

Despite the dated nature of the theory, ‘classical’ crowd theory remains influential within police knowledge. Within an Istanbul context, Çelik (2017) comments how police riot training echoes the Le Bonian crowd theory, identifying that crowds tend to be full of people who act against the law (see Atak 2017, p. 703). Furthermore, Karahan et al. (2011) identify how, within police training manuals, only illegal activity is cited by protesters (such as violence) with no consideration given to legitimate actions of crowd members (see ibid, p. 704).

Within a UK context, we also see problematic perceptions of crowds within policing knowledge. Although police in England and Wales have been identified as recognising how crowds are heterogenous, they do still differentiate those within the crowd as ‘extreme

minorities' and 'gullible majorities' (Stott & Reicher 1998). Due to police knowledge being structured in this manner, it becomes challenging for the police to identify and act upon intra-group dynamics, which contributes to escalating collective conflict (ibid, p. 509).

As such, police knowledge (in whatever form) directly impacts the type of interaction police have with members of the public. Further, as legitimate power holders, police knowledge likely impacts the 'style' or 'type' of policing response someone receives. If we think back to the section that considered discrimination, one could question a policing response to a protest by Black Lives Matter compared to an environmental protest. Through problematic regular interactions with ethnic minority communities, would this lead a police force to perceive this group as 'higher risk' than that of Extinction Rebellion?

Conclusion

The relevant scholarship for the PLTs is broad and, as such, we can understand the literature in both that of Chapter One and this chapter in relation to one another. This chapter provides insight into where the PLTs sit within the wider framework of public order policing. As was identified in this chapter, considerations of control and coercion are central to policing both within public order policing and policing studies more widely. Ultimately, the police are charged with the maintenance of order within society and as such a certain level of authority is handed to the actors in order to – within the parameters of the law – secure this 'order'. However, the extent to which control becomes coercion is, of course, continually debatable.

This chapter provided insight into the long-established debate within public order policing between 'escalated force' and 'negotiated management'. As the name would suggest, 'escalated force' seeks to 'take' control of public spaces using a variety of levels of force. It is within this structure that we can see much police training still taking influence from. Seeking to adapt and advance the policing of large-scale events, negotiated management is perceived as a more 'democratic' approach to policing. Here, police interaction with the public is less focused on responding to particular crowd issues and instead proactively seeks to negotiate and 'manage' an event. However, as identified within this chapter, this is on a continuum of repression and therefore also needs critical engagement. Within both these areas of literature, 'police knowledge' is important to reflect upon. As state actors with access

to legitimate authority to use force and control space, the knowledge police officers have of people/groups/events is central to our understanding of how they are subsequently policed.

This chapter also reflected upon the continued debates of paramilitary policing. Although 'negotiated management' is largely agreed as the 'style' of policing western democracies now experience, the continued paramilitary nature of policing is equally undeniable. As we see in the introduction of the PLTs, we also acknowledge the access police have to weapons such as CS spray and rubber bullets. Furthermore, the uniform of many public order police officers reflects the robustness of some deployable tactics. As such, the extent to which escalated force and negotiated management are distinctive, separate groups is questionable.

Chapter III: Finding the Right ‘Frame’ – Goffman and Policing

Introduction:

This thesis is fundamentally concerned with understanding how dialogue impacts social order within a public order policing setting. From a microsociological perspective, I wanted to understand structures behind communicative behaviours PLOs engage in when attempting to establish some form of ‘order’. Public order policing concerns itself with many different types of ‘order’: football, rioting, ceremonial, protest, urban disorder, to name but a few. From an outside eye looking in at these types of events, police-citizen interaction can appear chaotic, fractured and, in some sense, even disorderly. However, from a microsociological perspective, it soon becomes clear that officers create a sense that these interactions are largely routine, perhaps even at times predictable and based on a core foundation of communicative principles. Significantly, dialogue becomes a performative tactic utilised by officers to try to gain the best results for a policing operation. As such, the interpretative framework that most aided my analysis of data was Goffman’s social theory exploring microsociological understandings to social interaction and order.

Erving Goffman has been suggested as the ‘quintessential sociologist of everyday life’ (Branaman 1997, p. xlv), alongside a ‘dispassionate observer who sees through our day-to-day performances and self-presentations’ (Manning 1992, p. 1). Police interaction (like any interaction) is fundamentally performative, seeking to present a specific reality to another. Within this research, the Police Liaison Officers (PLOs) sought to establish a perception of the ‘everyday’ during their interactions with others. In scenes of chaos and conflict they can be perceived as seeking to reaffirm the everyday moral duty citizens have with others to maintain a socially defined public order or cohesion.

Reference to Goffman will continue to feature within chapters six to eight, but within this shorter chapter, an overview of the main analytical principals from Goffman’s sociology most applicable during my research analysis will be considered. This thesis was specifically influenced by the works *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (1959); *Stigma* (1963); *Interaction Ritual* (1967) and *Relations in Public* (1971). These works all complement one another and show Goffman’s development in his sociological thinking.

Goffman's sociology, although widely cited and often read within popular literature not solely academic literature, also faces challenge for being contradictory and inconsistent. Despite this criticism, it is argued that it is this tension between his attempts to theorise the everyday and his doubts that such a theory actually exists that provoke such debate about his work (Manning 1992, p. 2). Goffman's work is often cited in isolation to one another (Branaman 1997, p. xlv), neglecting its thematic unity. For my data analysis, I found Scott's (2015) work the most coherent and insightful understanding of Goffman's sociology and will apply the thematic structure employed, further supported by Branaman's (1997) insights into his social theory. Firstly, we will consider the concept of '*managing faces*' – where we will see the how the self is developed and moulded. Secondly, the chapter will explore how people '*relate to others*' in public – thus introducing the significance of 'the other' during social interaction. Finally, the '*spoiling*' of one's character will be explored – where we begin to understand the structures that impact and develop the self and how one can be confined.

Managing Faces: Roles, Performance and Self-Presentation

Social life can be understood as a performance where actors, staging and symbols (both material and non-material) present 'reality' in a specific manner to influence an audience. This theatrical metaphor facilitates a way of seeing different aspects of the world (in this case, policing) considering what and how actors communicate to an audience, shaping social interaction (Manning 2003, p. 4).

For Goffman, a performance is 'all the activity of a given participant on a given occasion that serves to influence in any way any of the other participants' (1959, p. 26). For a performance to be successful, the actor must present with real conviction that what is being presented is the reality. Actors achieve this through the 'setting', which are 'expressive equipment' (such as a police uniform) and the 'personal front' of an actor (attitudes, poise and expressions). These can be used intentionally or unconsciously in order to construct a certain image of themselves or team they belong to (Fine & Manning 2003). An actor's front can of course change depending on the audience – therefore the 'front' of an officer while dealing with an incident compared to writing up their notes later will be different.

This performance can then be further divided into 'appearance' and 'manner'. The former tells the audience of the performer's status – are they at work? Is this a formal activity? The latter 'warns us of the interaction role the performer will expect to play in the oncoming

situation' (Goffman 1959, p. 35). Thus, what is their body language? Are they closed off and aggressive, or open and animated? If applying a superficial consideration of the PLT performance here, we can see their appearance as professional (for example, at work) but different from their public order colleagues (identifiable through their blue bib). Further, PLTs' manner is presented as more open, friendly and approachable than their level-two colleagues.

The physical staging area for the performance can then be broken down into front-stage and back-stage regions. The front-stage region refers to everything that an audience can see, while the back-stage region is the area that can only be accessed by the performance team (or actor/s). Within a policing context (and for ease of example), the front-stage region can clearly be identified as the entrance area to a police station. What is significant about this front-stage area, compared to other areas of the station (for example, the custody suite) is its continued exposure to the public eye. Any member of the public, at any time, can walk into the front-stage area of the police station. Contrasting to this, 'the further you move from this small public area into the increasingly private world of the police station, the further you penetrate police-controlled space' (Holdaway 1983, p. 23).

The back-stage region refers to an area that is relative to the front-stage performance, where 'the impression fostered by the performer is knowingly contradicted', where 'suppressed facts make an appearance' (Goffman 1959, p. 114). It is within this region that one's mask 'slips' and people become less concerned about their personal front (costumes and props) altering the appearance and manner – where the image one tries to present to an audience is relaxed and altered. This back-stage region identifies the strategic crafting of the self-presentation – highlighting how there is a thinking agent behind a character, one that manages an other's impression of them (Scott 2015, p. 83). Further, we can identify that, through the differing regions, the police are able to be selective about what activities they present to what actors (Manning 1997, p. 43).

Impression management are the techniques used by performers and teams of performers to ensure to the best of their ability that their image is not damaged or performance disrupted. These techniques or 'artful strategies' (Scott 2015, p. 88) inform actors how to make their role believable. We are all aware of experiences where our own performances or co-

performances with friends of colleagues have been impacted by unmeant gestures or faux pas where the scene risks being damaged.

When considering the police-media relations, Mawby (2014) found that during the Leveson inquiry ‘police attempted to manage impressions about *how they manage impressions*’ (Mawby 2014:p. 240, emphasis original) while being investigated. It is argued that through putting forth constructed personas that would likely influence people’s perceptions of officers (ibid, p. 248) and crafting the institutional image of policing (as a whole), the organisation was able to navigate and impact how ‘outsiders’ interpreted the policing role within the investigation. Impression management also proved to be of significance to PCSOs who sought to continually display their usefulness to warranted police colleagues. This required PCSOs to display (or perform) their competence to counteract the initial scepticism of their wider policing colleagues (O’Neill 2017, p. 27).

Goffman asserts that in society we tend to distinguish between the ‘real’ and the ‘contrived’ self but really, both of these are dependent upon performance in any given social situation. Thus, the self is not a private entity but instead is a public reality created through social interaction. What is essential within these performances is a ritual cooperation in upholding this shared reality with people accommodating the social construction of self (Collins 1996, p. 48-49). As such, we can see the importance of ‘the other’ within a social exchange. Goffman (1967) suggests that when one enters into a social interaction, the person is entering into a situation where they are also responsible for the other’s face, ensuring an *expressive order* is sustained – where order is regulated by a sustained flow of events (1967, p. 19). It is the first self that is the performed self that we as the audience take to be the true self. Therefore, the self is socially determined as it is ‘imputed back to the actor from the outside, and is not innate’ (O’Neill 2002, p. 48). Linked to this, Manning has long argued that this grounding in how ‘the other’ perceives police encounters is what defines the work of constables (Manning 1979, p. 51).

For Manning (1997), policing is a ‘persuasive drama’, where actors present their performance in particular ways to evoke imagery of their activities to gain public support for their perception of their professional role as crime fighters (ibid, p. 36). It is argued that with the police being an organisation, actors are immediately united in a common purpose, which limits actors in the range of impressions they can adopt. Organisational communication is

performative with the careful selection (and suppression) of symbols that convey specific messages to specific audiences (Manning 2003, p. 17). For example, the performance of police funerals within America symbolically remind the wider public of the dangers faced by police officers within their jobs and the ‘thin blue line’ who are up against ‘them’ (Manning 1997, pp. 19-25).

This first section introduces us to the actor and the guiding principles of a performance. We learn that actors adopt a ‘front’ and invest in the reality of their performance through their appearance, manner and expressive equipment. Furthermore, the staging of their performance is significant – what they present to their audience in the front-stage is carefully selected to convey a specific message. While on stage, an actor needs to ensure they are careful in their performance and presents the right type of ‘impression’ to their audience. Only within the back-stage regions can the actor relax and let their perfected face slip.

Relating in Public: Interacting with the ‘Other’ and Team-Work.

How people interact (or relate) with one another in public enables a deeper investigation into the self, as we are able to consider how people perform and manage their self-identity through others (Scott 2015, p. 25). Interaction is fundamentally an exchange between two (or more) people who are informed of the ritualised nature of contact. Each refers to the others conduct and in return receives respect, aiding them to uphold their own demeanour (see Collins 1996, p. 49). As such, interaction can be understood as a cycle, a continual flow of events, where ‘one’s own face and the face of others are constructs of the same order’ (Goffman 1967, p. 6).

Interactions can be understood as ritualised due to their reliance upon a common order, one where each performs in a civil and polite way to ensure a continued sense of interactional trust. We can understand our mutual acceptance of a common order two ways – in a manipulative sense or a moral one. For the former, you can interpret behaviours through a game-like calculation within competitive interactions; alternatively, the perspective that we adhere boundaries of interaction for a wider respect for a socially established sense of order. It is argued that interaction that is game-like ensures interest is maintained by actors as, if interaction was too predictable all the time, it would be boring (Branaman 1997, p. lxiv). It is when order is broken that we see interaction begin to struggle, as people begin to feel a sense of vulnerability. For PLTs, this consideration of interactional order is particularly interesting,

as the officers are operationally charged with establishing dialogue with people who are often socially uninvested, thus the foundation of the interaction are weak.

Interactional order relies on social rules of underlying codes being upheld by actors, these codes can be interpreted as constraints that govern our behaviours (Manning 1992, p. 73). These rules form structural codes and allow us to make sense of the large array of interactions we partake in daily (ibid, p. 78). These underlying codes can be understood as ‘traffic codes’ (Goffman 1971, p. 7). Much like traffic lights signifies to drivers to start, slow and stop, Goffman’s traffic codes relate to a social understanding of how to behave and relate to others in public. The codes enable us to have certain levels of trust about an interaction before an encounter has even taken place, which is core to interpersonal relations and grounds our social life. Naturally, the extent to which different people feel differing levels of trust with those they are interacting with varies greatly throughout social conduct (Manning 2003, p. 15).

For Goffman (1967), it is through the micro-processes of interaction that enables us to understand ‘order’. Through observing how people express themselves (behaviours, gestures, verbal speech, demeanour), we are able to understand underlying social structures (Scott 2015, p. 25). Goffman sees interaction as ritualised, through ‘face-work’ we partake in subtle actions that ensure the interaction to be as successful as possible. He breaks this down to ‘line’ and ‘face’ and, through face-work, we counteract ‘incidents’ that threaten ours or another’s face. A person’s *line*, ‘the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself (sic) by the *line* others assume he has taken during particular contact’ (Goffman 1967, p. 5) is directly related to their *face*. Our *face* changes dependent on the particular type of interaction we are in, therefore people have a ‘vast number of others’ (ibid, p. 6); consequently, *face* is not ‘lodged’ but is in fact ‘located in a flow of events’. The significance of ‘face’ and how it relates to others is expertly considered in ‘the crowd scene’ of policing (Muir 1979, pp. 101-125).

Naturally when considering how we relate to other’s, the concept of ‘team’ becomes apparent. For Goffman, a team is established through both mutual dependence and sense of familiarity. Within this process, teamwork can be understood to be a micro-political process, requiring loyalty from cast members but also shrewdness (Scott 2015, p. 112). By entering into a social encounter aligned with others, you do of course become more vulnerable as you

now rely upon another not to ‘give up the game’ of the performance but instead keep the secrets of the projected reality being displayed. O’Neill (2002) was particularly influenced by Goffman’s concept of ‘teams’ as, within football, teams are everywhere and yet the interaction of these teams is less frequently considered (ibid, p. 59).

Interactional conduct has been explored within wider policing literature. Peterson (2008) explored the ritual performance of respect and authority during police encounters with young men. She observed how officers from local teams in Stockholm avoided unnecessarily engaging young people in confrontation, thus avoiding the contest of face (ibid, p. 97). Conversely, she also observed officers from the ‘street peace group’ whose operational agenda specifically sought confrontation with young men who posed the most prolific risk to the community (through their criminal actions) in order to demonstrate police dominance on the streets. Peterson identified that within their distinctive roles, the two groups of officers had different ‘police professional codes’; she divided these ‘codes’ into the *coercive code* and the *reciprocal code* (ibid, p. 101; also see Muir 1979). Officers from the street peace group (operating with the coercive code) sought to suppress certain behaviours, they were more confrontational and aimed to control street conduct. As such, how they interacted with the youth face-to-face was different from their local officer colleagues. For instance, the street peace group would often be the unit who would initiate the contact with the young men; this could be both casual encounters and also more repressive interactions. The officers were specifically contesting face and seeking to define and set the tone of interactions (Peterson 2008, p. 103).

Contrasting to this, the local officers took a different approach to interaction. Their encounters were often focused on small talk and they approached the young men with respect. Furthermore, their ‘front’ was different from their street peace colleagues, with relaxed bodily positions. It is not denied that, despite the mutual respect present, underlying power games were still present – for example, the role of humour during encounters often relied upon banter of past events, which symbolically reminded the young men how much the officers knew about them (ibid, p. 112).

For Fassin (2013), the notion of losing face within street-based interaction is also important. However, he focuses instead on the blasé reaction of citizens to police harassment during body searches. He comments that the youth within the banlieues are well aware that legal

authority rests with the officers and have become accustomed to the frequent infiltration of their personal space by the officers. As such, the youth remain passive as they understand the escalated interaction that would proceed any protest of their humiliating treatment. For these young people, it appears as though the only way to not to lose face (any further) is to remain expressionless, not to enter into any transaction with the police *at all* and simply wait for the bad moment to pass (ibid, p. 87). Fassin notes that, within police-public interaction, the notion of ‘game’ is undeniable, with the police seeking to adopt the ‘tough guy’ role and the youth the ‘smart guy’ one – creating an endless cycle of altercation and chase. However, he is critical of only seeing police interaction in this light, arguing that this theatre/actor interpretation distances the reality of violence within social relationships and normalises it into the everyday the very real lived experiences of people (ibid, p. 112).

Manning (1997) too explores police-citizen interaction with reference to control. For Manning, control is necessary for police officers as they are required to convert unusual encounters for the public (such as violence or trauma) to appear as though they are everyday and routine. It is argued that to control encounters, the police officer uses familiar objects symbolically (such as the police vehicle) and learns to use weapons (such as a batons). Here we can see how Manning is exploring the police-citizen interaction with non-verbal communication, identifying how police officers can communicate their control without conversing (ibid, p. 205). A clear example of this from my own research would be the domination of a street by large numbers of public order police officers in an attempt to clear space. Although within this example instructions are verbalised (‘Get back!’), it would be inaccurate to say verbal interaction has occurred as the police do not facilitate space for the audience to verbally respond (it is an order, not a negotiation).

Within this second section we explored the development of Goffman’s social theory from solely focusing on the production of self to considering how that self functions in social life. As such, the significant role of ‘the other’ becomes evident and how social actors relate to one another when interacting. The social codes or traffic codes people follow within daily interactions ensure that people feel that encounters are predictable enough (not necessarily entirely predictable) to not feel vulnerable or unprotected by another actor. This sense of vulnerability comes from a fear of having one’s face contested and losing face in front of other social actors, especially one’s team.

Teamwork:

Dramaturgical ‘success’ relies upon effective interaction with others – thus, working in a team of actors. Interaction is inherently performative and a central component to this performance is team-work, defined as, ‘any set of individuals who co-operate in staging a single routine’ (Goffman 1959, p. 85). Teamwork is inherently political, demanding both solidarity yet shrewdness from all team-players (Scott 2015). For Goffman a team can be established through two basic components: mutual dependence and a sense of familiarity (see *ibid*, pp. 88).

Goffman (1959, p. 108) notes the significance of secrecy amongst teammates, predominately in a ploy to protect teammates, conceal certain behaviours and to control definitions of situations. It is in these types of behaviours, where an individual seeks to protect another within their group that they are framed as a ‘team’ not simply a ‘group’. As such a team is, ‘a set of individuals whose intimate cooperation is required if a given projected definition of a situation is to be maintained’ (Goffman 1959, p. 108). Working as a team demonstrates an ability to increase control over the audience during an interaction (*ibid*, pp. 98).

This need for control derives from the fact that actors are increasingly reliant upon colleagues to present the same successful and cooperative performance, where the performance being presented is sustained. Central to the maintenance of the performance is communication – namely, the over-communication with some people (the team) and under-communication with others (the audience) (*ibid*, pp. 141). Tools used to increase interactional control and allegiance is impression management, the art of which has three elements: *dramaturgical loyalty*, *dramaturgical discipline* and *dramaturgical circumspection*.

For teammates to have a successful performance, it is essential for them to display that there are certain moral obligations (their ‘*line*’) that are ultimately agreed upon. It is understood amongst teams that they do not betray the secrets of the performance and that only ‘in-group’ members can be trusted. Noteworthy for policing, Goffman states that one way an organisation can protect itself against disloyalty is to create strong in-group alignments, enhancing solidarity amongst the performers, something that has been long recorded within policing literature (Banton 1964; Skolnick 1975; Van Maanen 1973; Chan 1996; Manning 2003; Reiner 2010; Fassin 2011).

Discipline in one's performance refers to the expert management of one's personal front. It is essential that an actor maintains the *line* of their team, 'someone who remembers his (sic) part and does not commit unmeant gestures or faux pas in performing it' (Goffman 1959, p. 210). Simply, a disciplined performer is one with self-control, recognising the contextual complexity, isolating issues and dealing with them appropriately.

Lastly, *dramaturgical circumspection* refers to the 'care' and 'prudence' (Goffman 1959, p. 212) in the staging of the show, ensuring that there is adequate preparation and contingencies in place for performative disruptions. Central here is trust, the recruitment of team-mates that one can rely upon, by having trust in one's teammates one is mitigating performative risk; alternatively, actors could also target a specific (and perhaps more forgiving and trusting) audience.

Loyalty to a team, where one is aware that another could 'give away the show', leads to a *bond of reciprocal dependency* amongst team mates. This understanding that one's performance is dependent on another means that actor's use many strategies to present a *disciplined* performance. This mutual knowledge of the strategies used creates a *bond of reciprocal familiarity*, meaning the collusion of the team is known amongst the trusted members making them 'too wise' to be taken in by their own show (see Scott 2015, p. 113). This is not to suggest teams are always harmonious, these bonds may extend to only some of the team, meaning others are excluded and socially isolated (see for instance Goffman 1967, p. 116).

The consideration of teams is clearly relevant within policing literature; however, we sometimes observe 'the police' presented as a homogenous group (see for instance, Stott and Reicher 1998). Yet O'Neill (2004, p. 97), in her study on Scottish football, identified that police forces are made up of multiple small, permanent and contextual teams. She notes that due to internal communication break-down and politics, 'the police' can not be unified, in Goffman's terms, as 'a team'. Furthermore, the study identifies how PC-public interaction (despite strict instructions from senior ranking officers) varied greatly based upon the situational context and the officer. As such, senior officers and rank-and-file officers do not operate as a unified 'team' working towards the same performance. O'Neill goes on to further solidify her argument that 'the police' are not a unified team by identifying how rank-and-file officers often 'performed' their professional assurance and familiarity of football

hooligans to their senior officers, when in reality many were inexperienced and unsure of what a ‘troublemaker’ looked like. Thus, ‘the police’ become a team of actors and an audience, demonstrating how in many contexts they cannot be unified as a team.

Within her more recent work, O’Neill (2019, p. 107-113) again shows how the differing performing teams of PCSOs and PCs demonstrate how the policing family cannot be homogenised. O’Neill presents within her study how PCSOs did not feel readily confident in their skills until they had the opportunity to shadow someone from their own team. Additionally, the process of ‘spoiling’ a performance further differentiated the two distinct teams, with PCSOs teaching and educating fellow teammates away from outsiders, whilst PCs would regularly ridicule or publicly chastising PCSOs, ensuring they were not identified as the same performance team.

For Manning (2003, p. 184) policing is both an individual and team performance with a fundamental irony of presenting itself as a militaristic command-and-control organisation, yet throughout carried out by isolated individuals making subjective decisions. Unlike O’Neill (2004), Manning (2003) sees ‘the police’ as a performative team of ‘us’ (the police team) and ‘them’ (outsiders); yet, recognises that this make-up is problematic as performances can be disrupted and fail. This failure is both due to external interactions (failure to coordinate interactions between the police and public) but also internal interactions (performative betrayals or failure between the police). Like Goffman, Manning (1978, p. 241) explicitly aligns the use of lying, both internally amongst colleagues and externally with the public, as a means of order maintenance (or performance success).

Spoiling Careers: Deviance, Stigma and Moral Trajectories

For Goffman, the self is continually emerging, dependent on the roles we experience throughout life; those roles are especially dependent upon our status position. This emerging self is understood by some as a ‘career’, experiences that ‘unfold successively and cumulatively’ to mould the self (Scott 2015, p. 139). Exploring how the self is spoiled within this career saw Goffman depart from his usual focus upon the ‘normal’ or ‘ordinary’ to how people experienced the self and social interaction when they were deprived of systemically defined ‘status’. This can be understood as Goffman’s exploration of the ‘confined’ self (Branaman 1997, p. liii). Importantly, there is a moral element when considering the spoiling

of an identity – as a normative judgement has to be formed on another and that judgement may be internalised by that individual, altering their performative self.

Goffman (1963) refers to people who are ‘blemished’ or ‘polluted’ (ibid, p. 11) which ultimately leads to a ‘spoiled’ self (ibid, p. 11). Stigma is classified into two groups – the ‘actual’ identity, those that can be factually attributed to a person; and the ‘virtual’ identity, the image one hopes to project to the ‘other’ in any given situation. Stigma is most popularly understood as a *physical* aspect of someone that is easily identifiable as ‘different’ – such as a physical disability or a speech impediment. However, two other categories are identified by Goffman: ‘blemishes of character’, by which he means individual aspects to a character that are socially determined as negative – for example, being weak or dishonest; and *tribal stigmas*, which are aspects that are essentially uncontrollable – race, gender, national or religious identity. Goffman identifies that there is largely only one group of people who escape tribal stigma: young, white, married, urban, northern (American context) men (ibid, p. 128).

The stigmatisation of a person is linked to a ‘moral order’, as only through the reaction from one upon another can stigmatisation happen. A person, a group or a society need to pass negative judgement – a feeling of disgust, disapproval, anger or distain (for example) – upon another in order to question the extent to which they are ‘normal’, ‘equal’ or ‘accepted’. Goffman explores these notions of judgement through looking at those who have been committed to a mental asylum (Goffman 1961). Through this confinement we can see how an individual has been defined by a system or institution as ‘abnormal’ and lacking (perceived) advantageous characteristics that others take for granted. As such, the confined person experiences society imposing a specific definition upon them – one that labels them as ‘deviating’ from the ‘norm’. These perceptions of deviancy are, of course, morally subjective, with definitions established by social groups in positions of power who benefit from institutional and systemic privilege and subsequently define others as different, labelling them as outsiders (Becker 1963).

Within the social sciences literature we see interest in understanding ‘stigma’ in relation to Goffman’s social theory. From a policing perspective, this has most recently been exploring how stigma is embedded into the policing environment with relation to police officers’ mental (ill) health and the impact this has upon the individual officer and the management of

addressing health issues (Bullock & Garland 2018, p. 174). It was identified that police officers suffering from mental ill health experienced status loss, through the questioning of whether they still had the ability to do their job, resulting in exposure to different forms of discrimination.

Further, stigma has also been explored within policing literature in relation to strategies applied within the policing of sex work. This research explored stigmatisation from the perspective of 'the policed', interviewing women identifying as cisgender and transgender who were street-based sex workers (Krüsi et al. 2016). It was identified that policing perceptions of sex workers had evolved from 'deviants' to 'victims' within a high-risk occupation. This resulted in a change of interaction between the police and the women, focusing communications more upon understanding who the violent customers were and reminding the women to look after themselves. Despite these experiences of improved interaction with the police, the women identified that the police continued to categorise their work as 'risky' and therefore would normalise their experiences of violence – stigmatising and victim blaming the women for remaining within this profession (ibid, pp. 1142-1143).

Wong, Holroyd & Bingham (2010) also explore the experiences of sex workers and their resulting stigmatisation. Here, sex workers in Hong Kong identified how people (the public and clients) did not treat them as human – a central feature of Goffman's social theory (Branaman 1997, p. lvii). The women also experienced physical and verbal abuse from the police. These experiences of abuse lead to an internalisation of the stigma, with some feeling degrees of shame about their profession (Wong, Holroyd & Bingham 2010, p. 57).

O'Neill (2005) considers how the internalisation of stigma is not always how Goffman identified it within his social theory. Within her work on football fans, O'Neill explores the significance of space for the detectives and hooligans they are seeking to interact with. She comments that during match days, the detectives have less control and are more reactive to the movements of the hooligans they are seeking to watch. Due to this lack of control and more level footing between the two groups, attempts to embarrass the hooligans through their stigmatised identity fails, as the actors are aware of how they are identified by the wider public and 'relish' in it (see ibid, p. 127). Loyd & Bonds (2018) also explore stigma within the context of policing black people in Milwaukee, America. The authors consider how certain areas or 'territories' have been stigmatized leading to a process of racialised

capitalism (wealth segregation, racial segregation, deindustrialisation), which shapes and divides the area.

It is not only within policing literature that Goffman's theory of stigma has been applied to contemporary issues. Within wider sociological literature (to name only a few), stigma has been explored in relation to homelessness (Smith 2011); state-ordered removal of children from their mothers (Morriss 2018); and the politics of urban regeneration (Paton 2018).

This third section explores the final part to my interpretative framework – the confined self (Branaman 1997). Here, we see Goffman's social theory develop to considerations of the self and social conduct that are not straightforward or within 'ordinary' settings. Looking at the confined self, we have explored the role of stigma and how this impacts social interaction and wider social conduct with those that have been stigmatised. It is clear that 'normal' performative functions, such as establishing one's front or managing one's impression, is not exercised freely by those who are confined or stigmatised, but instead they have particular definitions imposed upon them by the 'normals'. This also introduced us to the significant role of status within social conduct and privileges afforded to those deemed higher on social hierarchies.

Conclusion

Within this shorter chapter, we have explored the main thematic areas used within the analytical process of this thesis have been explored. Borrowing from Scott's (2015) insight into the works of Goffman: managing of faces; relating in public; and how the self can experience 'spoiling'. Each part shows a development in Goffman's social theory, enabling us to consider his work in unity as opposed to isolation. Managing faces introduced us to the performance setting – life as a theatrical stage complete with actors. Important here was the consideration of what roles actors take on and how they seek to manage how others perceive that role (through the presentation of self). Additionally, the staging areas of front and back-stage introduced us to the careful crafting of performances. Relating to others in public shows us the development from thinking solely of the self within a performance to how that self interacts with other actors. Here we considered interactional codes or 'traffic codes' and how actors use those to navigate predictability during interaction. Further, we considered the motivations behind interactional codes: manipulative or moral. Lastly, we considered the significance of when an actor experiences a 'spoiled' identity and how they manage this

imposed identity within social life. Significantly, we explored the role of 'stigma' and what this means for interaction.

As we have seen throughout this chapter, the application of Goffman's social theory is sprinkled across sociological, criminological and criminal justice literature. It demonstrates that I am not the first to apply this framework to my interpretation of policing, but does illustrate how useful it is for providing order within challenging and interaction rituals. Policing as a macro structure is a complex theatrical stage with a multitude of social encounters within it. Although, as Manning (1997) identified, police officers have less roles available to them as they are assigned the 'police' identity from initial contact, this does not mean that micro-interactions do not experience the same rituals experienced elsewhere. A policing actor with 25 years' operational experience, with 12 of them being spent exclusively within public order policing, will interact differently to a criminal investigations officer with 6 years' service, none of which is with crowds. Goffman's insights into social conduct illuminates these nuisances within police interaction, deepening our understanding of social conduct in this context.

One of the main contributing factors for utilising Goffman's social theory within my own analysis is that he 'normalises' aspects of social life that we perhaps had previously not considered. He offers routine and order within our everyday social encounters with others. When originally stepping into the field to observe public order policing, everything appeared, to an unaccustomed eye, as 'disorderly', chaotic and confused. However, it very quickly became evident that these interacting actors all had their 'roles' and their 'performative routine' that they were trying to convince 'the other' to accept as reality. Further, behind closed doors I observed officers discussing 'staging' aspects to their 'show' – how best to arrange their own 'props' but also (and perhaps more surprisingly) how they could arrange their 'show' to best enhance 'the others' performance'. Goffman's social theory illuminates the fascinating (and complex) interactional process of police and citizens; it enhances our feeling of order and routine where perhaps previously we had only seen chaos and it brings to life the theatrical performance of public order policing.

Chapter IV: Methodology

Introduction:

This chapter reflects upon the research methodology used for my doctoral research. As was explored within chapter one, the formal conversation around the significance of dialogue within public order policing has started to change (Adapting to Protest 2009; Keeping The Peace 2010). However, the informal acceptance and value of increased communication as a legitimate ‘tactic’ within public order policing remains understudied.

As stated previously, this thesis is primarily concerned with understanding how social order is impacted by dialogue and how PLTs communicative behaviours are structured; as such, my doctoral research has lent itself soundly to an ethnographic investigation. Through the use of ethnographic methods, I was better placed to uncover, to explore and to document the informal values of police officers. Thereby, providing deeper insight into police action as opposed to solely police talk of action. This chapter will begin by succinctly exploring ethnography within the wider social anthropological, sociological and policing literature. Following this, an in-depth investigation will take place into the ethnographic approach used within this research.

Ethnography:

Ethnography is a social science method that looks to understand and expose the lived experience of the everyday. It sits somewhere between art and science – both a method of gathering data (fieldwork) and an approach to writing (Campbell and Lassiter 2015). In its purest sense, it is most concerned with exposing hidden worlds, not due to secrecy (although this could sometimes be the case) but more due to people taking that specific knowledge (of their culture, organisation and so on) for granted, considering it mundane or unimportant to wider social structures. It requires researchers to get away from the library and controlled research environments and to conducting first-hand observations and get ‘the seat of [their] pants dirty in real research’ (Robert Park 1920: see Duneier et al. 2014, p. 1).

Ethnography moves away from controlled front-stage activities, where participants normally present a guise to an outsider, to learning and understanding the murky back-stage of a culture, organisation or group. Unlike other forms of research, ethnography is less troubled with seeking causes, explanation, ‘correct’ answers or definitive ‘truths’, but rather ‘telling it

like it is' (McNeill 1990). Ethnographic research allows researchers to fully engage in the socially constructed norms of any given group. As ethnographers, we recognise that knowledge is subjective to how it is known and by whom; therefore, we do not seek out laws of human behaviour, which are too scientifically bounded. Instead we acknowledge, 'human behaviour is continually constructed, and reconstructed, on the basis of people's interpretations of the situations they are in' (Hammersley & Atkinson 2004, p. 8). This is not to suggest, however, that ethnographic findings do not contribute to theory or use theory to meaningfully explain behaviours, but it is suggested that 'theory is our tool to master; it should not master us' (Madden 2010, p. 18).

Importantly, and linked to the above, ethnographic research allows the field to determine what should be studied, and not the researcher, a method that 'allow[s] us to discover phenomena whose existence we were unaware of at the beginning of the research' (Baker 1961, p. 18). Ethnography, then, is 'a culture-studying culture... seek[ing] to build a systematic understanding of all human cultures from the perspective of those who have learned them. Ethnography is based on the assumption that... knowledge of all cultures is valuable' (Spradley 1980, p. 13).

Limitations of Ethnography

Ethnography is not without its critics, as Van Maanen (2011, p. 3) articulates, 'culture is not itself visible, but is made visible only through representation' and it is through the process of visibility that causes issues for some academics. Bachman and Schutt (2011, p. 289) point to the fact that many take issues in the ability of social scientists to interpret the culture they are observing without distorting it with 'their own subjective biases'. Although not denying the criticism, Van Maanen (2011) articulates this point with a most positive spin, stating that ethnographic research works between two fields: that of the ethnographer (and the readers) and that of the world of cultural members. Whilst in between these two worlds, the ethnographer attempts to decode one culture while recoding it for the other, a very interpretive process (see *ibid*: 4; also see Barthes 1972). This entire process involves: power dynamics (the age, gender, ethnicity could have an impact on the level of access granted); politics (what is the end result of the research, who are the funders, what is the motivation behind allowing access?) and the influence of the ethnographer themselves on the field. As Van Maanen (2011) points out, these are all imposed criticism, but through the knowledge of

these different impacts, arguably the researcher is able to consciously consider them at all stages.

An obvious perceived weakness of ethnography is the deep but narrow field of study. Herbert (2006, p. 11) comments on how he was confined to a single case study for his research on community policing, which frustrated him due to the lessening capacity for generalisability. Yet, generalisability of ethnography is so challenging to achieve given the general ‘messy’ nature of the social worlds explored (O’Reilly 2009, p. 82). Given the impact the researcher will have upon the field of study, the extent to which one deems research ‘generalisable’ is likely impacted by the participant stance they took within the field. Gold (1958) talks of a complete participant where the researcher conceals their identity and intentions from the group they are studying; a participant-as-observer, who is actively involved in the group but the participants know the researcher is not ‘one of them’; or, an observer-as-participant where the researcher briefly visits and has very limited participation with the study group. Van Maanen (1978) too also explores different participations roles which are displayed in figure two below.




Figure Two: Pure Types of Participant-Observer Roles (Van Maanen 1978, p. 344)

For Van Maanen’s (1978) model as with Gold (1958), we see where a participant observer may be placed on this road map to identify their positioning as a researcher. Van Maanen (1978, p. 344) identifies the researcher as having two dimensions to their role: deciding to what extent they wish to participate in the day-to-day life of the group being studied – active or passive; secondly, the researcher needs to decide whether to reveal their identity – covert or overt.

Positioning a researcher also identifies the ever-present risk of ‘going native’ – another widely acknowledged risk of ethnographic research. Going native is a term used to refer to someone who has become too close to the field in which they are studying, thus losing objectivity (O’Reilly 2009, p. 89). This lack of objectivity impacts the detachment from the field and one’s ability critique.

These criticisms are not new to sociological literature both historically and within contemporary literature. We observe studies such as James Patrick’s (1973) study into a Glasgow Gang, or Bill Murray’s (1984) ‘The Old Firm’ as being challenged for being too close to report subjectively. Patrick (1973, p. 9) reports his delay in publishing aspects of his research due to his desire to protect members of the gang. Sudhir Venkatesh’s (2012) study, also looking at gangs, was accused of ‘sensationalizing his experiences’ (see Kaminer 2012). Most notably, Alice Goffman’s ground-breaking study ‘On the Run’, studying marginalised African-American young men some of which had gang affiliation, was for a short period of time overshadowed by the level of controversy it sparked, mainly amongst legal scholars and journalists (see Van Maanen 2017: 396).

From a different sociological focus, McLean (2007) explored the blurred boundaries of conducting ethnographic research on dementia care-home, at the same time her mother was diagnosed with dementia (but treated at a different care home). She explored how emotions can modify the research experience, impacting motivations, insights and interpretations. Ultimately articulating ‘personal experiences and emotions are inevitably part of all ethnographic practice’ (ibid. pp. 263).

Liebing (2007, p. 141) also commented on the role of emotions within ethnographic research and comments that with some, the research can become ‘the exploration of intimate experiences in autobiographies’ which risk becoming repetitive and ‘talk-show’ like in their structure. The process of ‘going native’ sees researchers fall too deep into the field they are studying, losing critical rational, adopt occupational thinking as their own and as such fail to observe the mundane and taken for granted behaviours of the group.

The risk of ‘going-native’ drives to the very heart of ethnographic research: the process of being with people. The ‘method’ (in its most clinical sense) or the ‘way of being’ (is the approach something you step in and out of, or does it professionally encompass an

academic?) utterly revolves around working with people, building rapport with people and respecting the world in which they inhabit. As such one cannot rush things or be too pushy (O'Reilly, p. 175) and the relationships one builds impose significant responsibilities upon the researcher (Madden 2010, p. 16). Madden (2010, p. 33) argues that an ethnographer has likely not done their job properly if after the fieldwork ends they are able to easily sever ties with those they had just spent 12-months or more living and working alongside.

The risk of 'going-native' is complex and messy, but I see it as falling comfortably in line with one's ethics, which due to the all-encompassing nature of ethnography, apply all the time and everywhere, being 'an ethical commitment from the very outset' (ibid, pp. 34). The term 'going-native' is unhelpful, as it is likely all ethnographers have been a version of 'native' at some stage of research. Instead, it is more accurate to consider the scale at which one is native, with the pendulum swinging side to side. An important element to ensuring this pendulum has a 'balanced swing' is ensuring one leaves the field to accurately investigate their fieldnotes and write up their thesis, avoiding the phenomenon of ABD (All But the Dissertation), something that many ethnographers have fallen foul of (see Johnson 1975).

Policing Ethnography:

The use of ethnography to research the police has been extensively documented (Van Maanen 1978; Holdaway 1983; Punch 1993; Manning 1997; Reiner 2000; Van Maanen 2011; Fassin 2017). As identified above, ethnographic approaches are particularly interested in understanding the cultures of a group or organisation. As such, as a means of understanding cultural assumptions for the perceptions and use of dialogue, an ethnographic approach was most appropriate. By opting to observe policing culture in action (as opposed to solely talk of action), it enables us to gain some insight into the world behind the formally fixed organisational 'front'. Furthermore, ethnography allows insights into the micro behaviours of an organisation, aspects that have profound significance in understanding wider actions. Micro-actions would not be able to be captured during interviews or quantitative research.

Historically, policing has seen much ethnographic research conducted in an 'outside/insider' role (Brown 1996) or by 'fans' (Van Maanen 1978). Clear examples of these are academic researchers who have taken extra measures in formal training in order to be able to work more closely with the police. Albritton's (1991) three-year sabbatical from his university post

to become a fully trained officer, Van Maanen's (1978) 13-week full training with a police department and Rubinstein's graduation from a police department (although not a sworn officer) are all within this category. There have also been ethnographic pieces that have used covert measures to research the police – a 'spy' category (Van Maanen 1978) – such as the research conducted by Holdaway (1980) while he was employed as a police sergeant.

More recently, ethnography of the police is suggested as having experienced a 'reinvention' (Fassin 2017, p. 2) after a period of decline in the 20th century (McLaughlin 2007). This revival comes during the same period where we have seen an expansion of collaborative research between police forces and universities across the UK and North America (Goode and Lumsden 2016). This partnership has facilitated initial access issues that have previously been cited as problematic in research. However, this co-production of knowledge is suggested to have altered the perspective of research – research for police as opposed to research of the police (Manning 2005). Although, we are seeing some growing focus upon 'critical ethnography' of the police, critical scholars who seek 'views from below' and to 'be on side' of the powerless (Jackson 2019, p. 4).

Ethnography enables researchers to penetrate the secretive and closed world of policing (Van Maanen 1978; Skolnick 1961). The unique type of occupation and day-to-day occurrences that officers operate in tends to create a way of looking at the world those 'outside' the organisation might not fully understand (Skolnick 2011, p. 39). As such, it is to be expected that officers protect their professional identity until they come to know and trust the 'outsider'. Police officers operate in terms of risk and this is no different to an unknown observer trying to break into their world.¹⁷ Ethnography (or a skilled ethnographer) allows a researcher – within limits – the required time it takes to negotiate their way behind the shroud of secrecy, building not only the required legitimacy for themselves but also for their research.

Ethnography of the police requires the researcher to actually be there, meaning they are witnessing first-hand the naturally occurring events officers are involved in and speak about. This means the ethnographer is able to interpret not only the police perception of action, but

¹⁷In the early days of my fieldwork, an officer once commented that I was using the bathroom as a space for privacy to complete my 'notes on them'.

also how those actions are later articulated in comparison to our own personal experience of the events.¹⁸ If we only rely on ‘insider’ narrative, then we are only being exposed to a partial world of policing, where the researcher is likely to only see ‘mystified’ or even ‘falsified’ accounts (Manning 1974). This means being present in the ‘everyday’, the mundane even when the officer isn’t public facing – to learn, understand and empathise with the everyday norms and values of that group is the very essence of observational research (Becker 1970).

This point is of paramount importance to understanding why ethnography is central to researching the police. Ethnographers are not interested in statistics or numbers, but instead are interested in ‘being there’ (Jerolmack & Khan 2018, p. xi). We want to interact with a social world that is (for the most part) foreign to our own: to learn its customs, its languages and ultimately understand why actions take place in the way they do. With our participants, we are present at scenes and have to navigate our way through the unknown until it becomes familiar – it brings an intimacy to the world that is not felt in quantitative methods.

Ethnography is a unique approach to understanding people and brings with it three areas of consideration: method, experience and writing (Fassin 2017, p. 4). Each phase of research interacts and redefines each other, it enables research focus to be uncovered and led by the field of study.

All ethnographers are in pursuit of culture, seeking to understand and later articulate their field of study. Within my own research I actively chose to involve myself within the field notes. I did this as I believe with my presence I was, in some way, impacting the field around me. As explored below in critical reflections, what we choose to study as ethnographers does not appear from nowhere, but is tightly aligned with our own biography. This choice to involve a more personal element within the research demonstrates a desire to ‘demand personalised authority’ in the work I was observing (Van Maanen 2011, p. 74). It is from this personalised understanding of the world one is studying that I believe demonstrates the profound power of ethnography – the method and experience of which we will move to now.

Negotiating Access

¹⁸ I think this is particularly significant in relation to emotions and how one feels (scared, anxious, in danger) during different fieldwork experiences.

An ethnographer's first assignment in the field is to search out knowledgeable individuals and make friends (Van Maanen 2011, p. 7); we can understand this as the process of negotiating access with our participants. Cassell (1988) soundly breaks down this process into two categories that mirror my own experiences: 'getting in' and 'getting on'. The former explores the more formal process of getting into the police force wishing to be studied. The latter explores the experiences of building informal networks with officers to facilitate deep study of the everyday. As we will see throughout this chapter, ethnography is a complex interaction process, which heavily relies upon a transactional process ('trading').

Getting In:

In my case, gaining formal access was facilitated by a formal partnership agreement between the University of Leeds and the MPS. Following this contractual agreement, both the University of Leeds and a representative from the MPS were involved in appointing a researcher to conduct the research for the partnership. Following my successful appointment, I then had to complete more formal processes with the MPS representative. I agreed to be vetted by the organisation to the same level as a police constable and therefore handed over many personal details to the MPS. Following this, I had an internal 'staff' account made which allowed me to sign on to the MPS intranet and meant that I had a formal profile on the MPS staff system. Importantly, I was able to be located using the MPS internal 'Aware' system – where officers could look me up by name on the system and gain access to my MPS email address, Leeds University email address and my personal mobile (information I voluntarily added onto the system). In addition to this, I was given a formal access pass, which allowed me entry to formally defined police 'space', such as different police stations, behind police cordons, Scotland Yard, Lambeth HQ and so on.

Image Two: Research Pass



The significance of having access to such formal processes meant that I had considerable formal internal legitimacy. Aspects such as officers being able to find me on 'Aware' meant that, although they knew I was not an internal member of staff, I was a more trusted 'outsider'. Although formal access was agreed contractually, the extent to which this was facilitated and speed at which it was completed was largely down to the proactive nature of the internal member of staff assigned as my internal supervisor – at the time an inspector – who was a staff officer for a chief superintendent, who was very supportive of my research. This officer was heavily involved in Evidence-Based Policing and passionately believes in the value of policing research. Further to this, his character played a substantial role in getting these formal processes completed. He is a 'go-getter' person who will see jobs through to their end, he was very well networked and knew who to contact in order to get my vetting done on a relatively quick timescale; and, importantly, he understood the internal mechanisms of his organisation and how much these formal processes would aid me in being able to become more independent within the organisation. Although he moved away (professionally) from public order policing very early on in my fieldwork, he continued to be an invaluable gatekeeper throughout the research.

Getting On:

Following the successful completion of all formal documentation, I was then able to begin my fieldwork and the process of meeting and networking with officers who would subsequently inform my research. Reflecting upon my fieldwork experience, I would break the process of 'getting on' down still further – to 'getting on' with the senior leadership team (SLT) and 'getting on' with rank and file – two distinct groups I had to separately gain and continually negotiate informal access to.

Gaining access to senior leadership was my first port of call within the fieldwork. From a research perspective, I was very aware of the need for 'top-cover'¹⁹ for any difficulties that might arise during fieldwork. In addition to this, the SLT were the immediate group of police officers for me to negotiate access with as I was spending a large amount of my time at the

¹⁹Cultural reference to ensuring one is protected by a senior ranking officer. By ensuring I had strong support for my research among SLT, I was able to legitimately give a name when other ranking officers asked who was 'allowing me access', or when they wanted an SLT to speak to before facilitating me, ensuring they were 'squaring it with the boss' first.

public order policing HQ. Throughout the fieldwork there were a handful of senior leaders who 'backed' my research, openly supporting me to study public order policing. However, there were two specific chief superintendents whose personal support not only opened doors for my fieldwork but also brought legitimacy to the research due to the respect lower-ranking officers held for them.

A strong level of trust was established between myself and a small group of higher-ranking officers due to a very unique and political episode that was experienced in the early stages of the research. There was a challenging beginning to my PhD concerning another academic and, due to the collaborative nature of the research, this also connected the MPS with the issues. I made the professional decision that I was unable to work with this academic and progressed with a formal separation of the PhD. The process of professional separation was an extremely challenging one for me – both personally and professionally. Due to the fact I was conducting fieldwork at the time and regularly interacting with my MPS internal supervisors (as I was in limbo for academic support), the officers observed me during a time of extreme professional strain. It was later communicated to me that my show of strength in continuing with the PhD in the face of a very challenging professional backdrop was respected among those involved and demonstrated my tenacity for getting a job done – a behaviour culturally respected by officers. Through conversations with a small group of officers, I believe that my decision to challenge problematic aspects of my own professional culture (while also working within another organisation to academically analyse their culture) was positively interpreted and respected.

The role context plays when gaining trust in an organisation should not be downplayed. This was a very unique experience, one I did not anticipate experiencing nor for it to have the impact upon access that it did. Although we cannot explore this episode as a formal process for gaining trust within the field, I think what can be formalised is to ensure that a researcher is 'authentic' when conducting their research. I believe the officers observed me in a challenging position and took confidence from my ability to continue working and do what I believed to be 'right'. Consistently throughout my fieldwork (not related to this incident), officers would pass comment on the significance of outsiders being perceived as authentic in order to gain trust within the organisation. I believe this is an example of me being interpreted by officers as 'authentic' and positively impacted the level of trust these SLT placed upon me to ethically and accurately complete my research.

Although this brought me ‘top-cover’ for the research, I still had to build a good reputation among the rank-and-file officers – those who would form the main bulk of my research. The professional connection between myself and the academic referred to above did hinder some access to rank-and-file officers as I often had to negotiate against their professional reputation. I had many officers explicitly refuse to speak to me through perceived ‘risk’ that I was ‘reporting back’ to this untrusted outsider and I had others state they understood that I was working independently, but felt uncomfortable with my associations. This meant that I was establishing myself within an organisation from a tricky position – not only was I trying to build my own independent reputation as someone who is trustworthy, but I was also working against an associated reputation. The professional separation positively impacted my access, as I was able to truthfully tell officers that I was no longer working alongside the academic and officers were more comfortable speaking with me. Academics working within policing can have many different reputations for many different reasons, what is certainly interesting here is how much those reputations can impact access.

Another central and broadly applicable aspect to getting on with rank-and-file officers was the amount of time I committed to fieldwork. I spent in total approximately 13 months researching the unit. During this time, I spent a minimum of three office-based days at HQ/other police stations and two ground-based days. While conducting office-based research, I would be there anywhere between two to eight hours (dependent on what happened). While doing ground-based research, I would normally be with the officers a minimum of eight hours, with the longest observation being around 13 hours. Naturally, these different research ‘sites’ were not always distinctly separate; while doing office-based research this would sometimes graduate into ground-based and vice versa.

The time committed to the research did not go unnoticed by the officers, latterly in the research I would regularly receive good-natured jokes about how much time I was spending observing. Officers were particularly entertained by the fact I was not doing it for money – ‘*she’s not even earning today!!*’ [Field note 1] being a regular comment officers would joke about with colleagues. Police officers within my fieldwork were – as a stereotype – very hard-working people and I believe the level of commitment I showed to my work impressed them enough that they understood I was not interested in a quick or superficial understanding of their professional world. I would suggest the commitment of my time was one of the top

aspects to my methodology that earned me strong rapport with the officers I interacted with. Many commented that they respected, *'when people actually come out to understand what we do,'* [Field note 2] as opposed to just commenting from the side-lines.

When spending a lot of time within the field, a natural element is that you form a large number of networks of potential participants. I ensured that I introduced myself to everyone I came into contact with and gave them a very short sound bite of why I was there. Sometimes officers preferred to introduce me themselves and give their own definition of my research – I did not challenge this as I perceived this as their world and wanted to empower the officers to be actively involved in understanding and articulating the research.²⁰ After a number of months, I started to get more and more recognition – *'oh you're the student they speak about!'* [Field note 3]

Another element to fieldwork that enabled me to build rapport with officers was my acceptance that I would sometimes be 'used'. This did not concern me, as I accepted the transactional element to interaction, but I believe it continued to develop my reputation as 'being alright' despite being an outsider. Notable amongst the examples of being 'used' was individual PLOs enjoying being 'partnered' with me as it enabled them to have some time 'off' their usual duties. Officers would joke with me, *'I love being with you, they'll [meaning SLT] be looking on CCTV and see that I've been engaging with the crowd all day, but really, I'm just talking to you'* [Field note 4]. Although the research was focused on seeing how police interaction occurred, it was also vital to understand how police officers speak about and articulate their experiences of these encounters. As such, these times where they were pretending to engage with someone from the crowd for CCTV purposes, were equally as important to me, allowing me to have extended conversations with different officers.

Just as I interpret actions and words of police officers within this thesis using Goffman, it is also completely plausible to interpret my own actions within a dramaturgical framework. I would never enter into an interaction with officers without quickly trying to demonstrate the micro-politics of those 'on-stage'. I recognised that the conduct used to build rapport with rank-and-file officers was not the same as when those officers were in front of their senior

²⁰ Not that I ever experienced this, but if an officer completely misrepresented my research, I would have corrected them.

command. Recognising, internalising and respecting the local authority of interacting groups is essential when trying to get on with officers.

As alluded to above, I strategically chose to identify myself as ‘a student’ instead of titles such as ‘a researcher’ or ‘an academic’. This was a decision I made quite early into my studies, after spending time with officers and noticing their physical tension increase when I introduced myself as ‘a research’. As Loftus (2009, p. 203) found, many officers were concerned I was reporting to their bosses, recording conversations or generally ‘spying’. During a very early fieldwork visit to Glennock, after I was late to the onsite bar, one officer joked loudly to his colleagues, ‘*she was probably late as she was getting all her notes down to ‘out’ us on her blog*’ [Field note 5]. I found comments like this particularly interesting, as they usually occurred following fieldwork experiences where nothing ‘of note’ (in the sense that the officer was alluding to) had happened and I could not help but surmise that some officers liked to speak of their actions in a way that suggested their professional world was far more interesting than it was.

Power dynamics always exist within research, but when researching police who hold so much state-endorsed power, the dynamics can be more blurred. I wanted the officer’s I worked with to feel empowered, as I felt this would be the most productive means to ‘get them talking’. As my fieldwork spent a high proportion of time with rank-and-file officer’s, I felt that if they spent the whole of my fieldwork feeling I was ‘above’ them, they would do as I observed them doing with their bosses on countless occasions – namely, telling them what they wanted to hear. I did not once get the sense that through being identified as ‘a student’ any officer felt I was ‘below’ them. Instead, I felt that ‘the student’ title afforded me the position of ‘being there to learn’ as opposed to ‘being there to teach or observe’ (which, for me, is the impression the title of research or academic creates).

This ‘student’ title relaxed officers which likely led to me feeling more confident in their presence. This confidence from both fronts ricocheted, as both parties (myself and officers) felt comfortable in more ‘open talk’, where I was able to demonstrate and articulate to officers what they had taught me throughout fieldwork. I remember a noticeable difference in a small number of officers (who I observed regularly) after spending an extended fieldwork experience with them in Specialist Operations Room (SOR). During this protest there was perhaps more civil disobedience than was usual during my fieldwork and officers (PCs up to

Chief Superintendent) were having a discussion amongst themselves about where the protesters were likely to target next. There were a few informal ‘wagers’, but none had mentioned Topshop, which I found surprising. Having observed both ground-based public-order events and more strategic planning, I felt I had learnt some policing knowledge on how senior leaders would work their way through problems. I decided to take a leap and voice my opinion, saying that I was quite confident the crowd in question would go to Topshop. When one of the Superintendents asked me why I stated that the crowd were around my age or maybe a little younger and Phillip Green had recently been the focus of negative press for how little Topshop paid their cleaning staff. One of the PCs I knew very well, gave me a bit of banter (not unkind) and stated he did not think this was likely, but I noticed the Chief Superintendent did not laugh at me – my response was simply to shrug. It turned out I was right and the group went to Topshop and all the officers congratulated me on getting it right. The PC mentioned above laughed at how ‘the student’ got it right and loudly expressed how impressed he was.

In research terms these types of experiences are hard to ‘stratify’ as they are so context dependent – I was lucky to be in SOR that day, with a very welcoming group of officers and to get the wager correct. These experiences can be trivial, often mundane and (for the officers) probably uneventful experiences with ‘an outsider’, but for me these chances to ‘trade’ were gold dust. Through engaging more actively with those I wanted to gain deeper access to (trading clinical distance from the field),²¹ my suggestion for the wager, that turned out to be right, gained me increased trust and respect from those I was there to observe. Interestingly, at a later point in my fieldwork, I wanted to gain access to hostage negotiation training, to understand how dialogue worked in this area of policing. The experienced required senior sign-off, with an informal call to the same Chief Superintendent mentioned above with the training team questioning why I was seeking to observe this area. The Chief Superintendent replied to me – across an open office – *‘I told the officer ringing what you are studying and how you’re completely trusted by us’* [Fieldnote 6]. As such, through these ‘trading’ opportunities and experiences within ethnography, the fieldworker increases their access to the group being studied.

The different ‘sites’ of fieldwork:

²¹ See later section: Fieldwork positioning and ‘Going Native’

Conducting fieldwork within such a large metropolitan police force requires careful construction of the most relevant and data appropriate fields of study. Unlike research into, for example, patrol work, where I could have joined one specific team within a number of different boroughs and conducted a series of observations, public order policing draws police officers MPS-wide from a variety of different specialties (response policing, community policing, custody suites) who then conduct public order duties *in addition* to their normal policing role. As such, the police officers I was observing (outside of the Gateway Team) partook in this public order role on a part-time basis. This provided an added complexity to the observations, as it meant that this skill was an additional one which was applied for a multitude of reasons (break from normal duties, requirement for evidence for promotion, additional money).

As such, to try to ensure I did not gain a ‘data-overload’, I decided to structure my fieldwork around two overarching areas: office-based and ground-based. Office-based research was exclusively concerned with public order policing; ground-based research was predominately concerned with public order policing. However, I did also conduct a number of different observations with other policing roles (PLOs role during their ‘normal’ duties) as a means of gaining insight into how their wider policing experiences informed their public order conduct.

Figure 1: Office Layout




Figure 1 represents the office setting where I spent a proportion of my observational time during fieldwork. The diagram above is not a perfect representation of the office, but is included to give the reader an indication of the different relevant areas that I interacted with over the course of the fieldwork – my seating area is represented by the red dot. Given that

my research was concerned with the work of the PLTs, one could soundly question why I did not situate myself within the Gateway Team. There were a number of well-considered reasons for not positioning myself with the Gateway Team:

1. Given that I would spend my time with PLTs during my ground-based observations (Area B – considered below) which includes the Gateway Team, I was very concerned of ‘over-researching’ the very small number of officers within this team. I was acutely aware that it was their senior officers who had agreed to partake in this research partnership and therefore to spend a considerable amount of time with such a small group of people when you are not a team-member but an outsider observing, seemed ethically unsound. I was able to easily walk to the Gateway area and chat with the team, something I did regularly.
2. The objective of the office-based fieldwork was less focused on understanding the Gateway Team and instead interested in how public order operations were framed as a whole. It would have been very easy had I spent all my time with the PLTs to interpret the observational data as the PLTs being the centre to an operation – which would have been profoundly incorrect. By situating myself with the command team and their staff officers, I was able to learn that the PLTs were a small cog in the overarching operation – something that proved analytically very important. For example, there were a number of times when I was invited to briefings/planning meetings where I observed that the PLTs were not present (as the planning team had forgotten to invite them to the meeting). This type of data collection enabled crucial insight into ensuring the PLTs’ role was not overplayed within my fieldwork.
3. Policing is a hierarchical organisation and culturally deeply respects the rank structure (even if the officers do not always respect those who hold rank!). I was acutely aware of how unique my access was to this organisation and very aware that I needed to continually renegotiate this access with senior command as the officers retired or went to new postings. By placing myself with the staff officers I was a ‘constant’ feature to the senior command (who I am confident would have forgotten me if I had not been present). As such, when new senior command came to the office and replaced leaving staff, I was introduced to them alongside the staff officers as, ‘*Ashley the student researcher doing some work with us around public-order*’ [Field note 7]. I am sure behind closed doors the new officer would be briefed more informally about my role,

but it meant that I was (at least formally) accepted as part of the office make-up from the outset. I found that building these networks with senior officers was vital for gaining access to different areas of the police during the course of my research; continuing my 'top-cover' for the research; increasing organisational ease about my presence; and developing my policing insight.

Using these three rationales for where I placed myself within the office evidences that I did not want to 'tunnel' my developing knowledge of public order to only understanding the PLTs and their role. The aim of the office-based research was ultimately to gain a more informed and holistic insight into the cultures of public order policing. This allowed me to build informed knowledge on how dialogue and communication was valued within public order policing, not solely within the newer tactic of PLTs.

The office-based research was initially something that I was not sure was needed within the research – I was interested in seeing how officers valued dialogue during police-citizen interaction and was unsure what I would gain from sitting in an office. If I am honest, I also was not sure how much I personally valued it as 'real' policing research. This point is, I think, very methodologically interesting, aligning with Reiner's (2010) consideration of police officers thinking that action is 'real police work'. I had also presupposed that 'real police research' had to be action-focused. However, this ill-informed perspective quickly changed. The office-based research widened my understanding of public order policing, the breadth and depths of operations and also the extent of them – a surprise I shared with Waddington (1994). I attended a large number of planning meetings (on average around two per week), briefings, debriefs and informal meetings. In addition to this, I was able to integrate into the office environment and listen and partake in informal chatter. I found this latter point to be very important – I was able to have very open conversations with both senior command and planners about reasons behind the decisions being taken within an operation. I perceived myself to be in a 'safe-space' where I knew the officers and they knew me – I was therefore able to ask all and any 'stupid' questions that came to mind.

This investment in both office-based and ground-based research of course brought its own challenges – during the week, I would conduct fieldwork in (predominately) Area A and then, at the weekend, in Area B. I would never take field notes while situated within the office setting as I believed this would isolate me if observed (an outsider taking notes about officers


while sitting alongside them), which meant that I would often use my train journey home and evenings to jot my notes down. My fieldwork was all consuming, something that is methodologically important. I was largely only able to commit myself to this level due to the fact I was young, single, with no children and no responsibilities. Although the level of time-commitment was significant, it provided me with an informed insight into both ‘areas’ that were essential for understanding public order policing.

Area B: Ground-Based Research

Ground-based research refers to any fieldwork that took place outside the office. This could refer to attendance at a protest, the Notting Hill Carnival, an observation of the sight where an event would take place, being out-and-about with officers (for instance, a coffee) and so on. The ground-based research for Carnival took place all over the Carnival footprint. This included more ‘back-stage’ ground-based work, such as briefings in classrooms hired out by the MPS for the event. Protest ground-based work occurred very regularly within central London – however, there were also occasions where it took place in East London and the City of London.

For protests, ground-based fieldwork was selected by those events where the PLTs would be in attendance. Every week the Gateway Team would update their board of the events they were involved in. This was particularly helpful for structuring my research as I was able to check this board regularly to gain insight into the ‘type’ of upcoming events, police involvement and its location.

Image 3: Upcoming Events



Ground-based fieldwork would normally begin with some form of briefing; this might occur at a central location, such as Lambeth HQ, or a location nearer to the event, such as local police stations. Following this, the officers would then complete certain required administrative work (checking their emails, collecting cars, contacting colleagues, collecting lunches if they are provided for the event) before heading to the required area. The act of getting such large numbers of officers to the right place, with the right people, at the right time proved to be a complex operation in itself.

Following this, the PLTs would normally have a quick walk around of the event to familiarise themselves with the area, the people within it and the construction. After this, if time permitted, they would often take ten minutes for a quick coffee break. Although experiencing little command-and-control oversight during deployment, the majority of PLOs observed during the research were incredibly hard-working and proactive. As such, they rarely would take breaks during the operation (outside of visiting the toilet if possible) as they believed their job was to be constantly active within the crowds. This meant that when any opportunity presented itself for a ten-minute sit down (which was not often), the officers took it.

I would then observe a number of different PLTs during the course of the day. Within a protest setting, this might be a static event or a march, within a Carnival setting, this was always a (very slow) moving procession of float performers. Events were often lengthy, lasting a minimum of eight hours and more often than not many hours more than this. I was sometimes encouraged by the officers to use my 'privilege' as non-police personnel and to go home (especially during particularly tiring events). This was not something I ever did, I remained with the officers that had been deployed until they were dismissed at the end of their shift. On more than one occasion, I missed my last train home, resulting in either having to get a taxi home or (on particularly financially tight months) sheepishly calling my father for a lift. Although this might be criticised as impractical for a fieldworker, my intention was to understand precisely the experiences of an officer – if I had been working that event as an employed officer, there would have been no option for me to leave early. Although not done for this purpose, towards the end of my fieldwork, a number of different officers commented to me that many had observed I never left an operation early and stated that they respected the commitment and hard work I dedicated to understanding their role. I believe these types of subtle behaviours continually enhanced my access to officers.

Perhaps surprisingly, I found it far easier to take field notes during ground-based observations. I would use the 'note' section of my iPhone to jot down street names, timings and the main points to prompt my memory when writing fuller notes later that evening. I was never questioned for this, but could have easily stated I was texting someone if I was. In addition to this, I regularly took photos while conducting fieldwork. I had opened up a research-related Instagram²² account and had gained some interest from students and police officers about my work. These photos also acted as both memory prompts for notes but also visual representation of the events I was attending. Furthermore, I gained further interest in how pictures could completely misrepresent events I had attended. I would regularly look to see how an event I had attended was latterly reported within the news, to see how it represented my own experiences. A common occurrence was provocative photos being used to emphasis the 'disorder' or 'violence' that had occurred, which more often than not was either exaggerated or false.

As stated previously, I also conducted some cursory observations with PLOs while in their 'normal duties' – this was neighbourhood policing, response policing and the TSG. In addition to this, I spent some time with level-two officers. Many PLOs had previously been or still were level-two trained. During the course of my fieldwork, I only interacted with a handful of officers who had exclusively only experienced public order policing through their PLT role. Although these observations were only cursory, they were conducted with the intention of further informing my understanding of the officers within their public order role.

Field notes:

Field notes formed the main form of data during the research. These were constructed in different ways. Initial field notes were often recorded on spare bits of paper, notepads, the 'notes' section on my phone, or voice recordings of events which I took while pretending to be on the phone during ground-based events. Never quite reaching the experience of Ditton (date) who jotted notes on toilet paper, I would use anything to record notes on, I would even scribble notes to myself on my arm which could then be covered up by my clothing. These were then supported by 'fuller' field notes that I took in more depth when away from the field of study. In addition to this, I kept a 'reflective' diary during the whole research period. The PhD process carries with it some very intense emotions – ones that often do not make sense

²² A social media platform people use to share photos.

when one is ‘fixed’ in the moment. Furthermore, there were occurrences within the PhD process that I felt I could not or did not want to speak to other people about; I found downloading thoughts and feelings to a private text very therapeutic. I had not initially anticipated on using anything within the diary – not considering it ‘data’ – however, latterly decided against this as I felt including the emotions of both the PhD process and specifically the fieldwork (where appropriate) could be very powerful to articulating an experience or idea.

I stated above that I would never take full field notes within the presence of a police officer. The reasons for this were not malicious (for example, the police action I was observing could rarely be deemed to be ‘illegitimate’), I was not trying to hide my research status (in fact, I actively utilised my student status), but I was trying to create an atmosphere in which I was ‘present’. One of the most powerful aspects to ethnography is the inclusion of human interaction and relationships; you bond with others and share experiences in order to develop knowledge of that field. As such, I deemed it socially redundant to always be jotting down notes or using my phone.

One area of research where it was entirely natural to take notes in was office-based formal meetings, such as planning meetings or briefings. It was expected that officers would be taking their own notes to disseminate to their officers and this created the environment where I too could legitimately take my own notes. However, I kept these notes factual about the occurrences within that specific meeting. If I wanted to take notes about a specific person and what they had said, I would do this in a coded way which I would later be able to decipher – for example, I would regularly give officers a fieldwork nickname.

There were specific periods of research where I had to take some time out of the field in order to ensure I had adequate notes to reflect the operation. Following Carnival 2016, Carnival 2017 and the Balfour 100 events²³, I took approximately two weeks away from the field in order to write up my fuller notes. This was due to necessity. Carnival is an extremely tiring event, and the run up to the event itself is full with briefings and planning meetings. Following this, the event itself required observations from approximately 0700-0200 the next

²³ A week’s worth of events/protests focused on the 100-year anniversary of the signing of the Balfour declaration.

morning. Upon returning home after fieldwork, I would jot down some very cursory thoughts²⁴ before retiring to bed to be up again for 0530. Further to this, Balfour 100 saw the planning, briefing and execution of a very high number of protests, celebrations and supporting events over the space of a week.

Within my field notes (and field diary) I wrote down everything I could: smells, sounds, emotions, behaviours, attitudes, dialogue, random thoughts. I included myself within these notes: how I felt, what I was seeing, feeling, hearing in addition to that of the officers I was attached to. I do not deem my field notes to be ‘clinical’, laboratory styled notes – I deem them to be a very human story of very human events.

There were times where officers would say things to me ‘off-the-record’ – I strictly adhered to this request. I would never write down, record in any way, or disclose those conversations. However, from a research point of view, I could not pretend that they had not occurred. Furthermore, when they occurred the officer was normally disclosing them as a means of further elaborating a point of experience that they could not fully articulate without providing ‘off-the-record’ details. These occurrences, although not featured within my written field notes, have helped build and shape my understanding of policing in an equal capacity (sometimes more so) to the recorded data.

Sampling:

The sampling of officers within my fieldwork occurred in a stricter capacity at the very beginning of my fieldwork. Although not a ‘pilot study’, I used time at the beginning of my fieldwork with the intention of solely building networks. As such, I was keen to get out with and introduce myself to as many different public order-related officers as possible. This would mean that I would attach myself with different PLTs at the beginning of each operation, remaining with them for the entirety of the day, allowing me to gain different perspectives from officers. This attachment brought comfort to both myself and to the organisation. I would still deem myself inexperienced in fieldwork and my face was largely unknown. During this period, officers were often concerned for my safety and I was

²⁴I called these ‘brain-dumps’ as I literally unloaded all my thoughts onto paper with little structure.

considered an extra ‘risk’ to them in case I got caught in any form of disorder.²⁵ This led to the PLTs being constantly concerned for my whereabouts and welfare.

Following the initial stage of research, more and more officers became aware of ‘the student’ who was doing fieldwork. This was not limited to PLTs, I became familiar with a number of different level-two TSGs and intelligence gatherers. Through being known more within the field, I would sometimes experience officers actively seeking me out to speak with me about the research and their experience. In addition to this, the PLTs would no longer strictly regulate or control my movements. I had spent enough time with them to know that I would not actively seek out trouble and was deemed ‘sensible’. Among very trusted officers during briefings I would experience, ‘*Ashley’s with us today, you know who she is and that she can be trusted, she’ll be floating around, assist her as needed.*’ [Field note 8].

This next phase of research therefore impacted the sampling of officers. I was no longer picking PLTs at random but instead was interacting with those who were regularly deployed at events.²⁶ Instead, I was now observing more regularly officers who were positively and proactively invested in the PLT role. Despite this, I do not think this bias should be overstated. Yes, towards the latter part of my research, specific PLTs featured more regularly; however, this was not due to the research seeking them out, but instead due to their regularity of deployment. As such, I was experiencing the sample of officers who were most regularly interacting with the public.

²⁵Despite not personally feeling in danger, a PLO I was assigned to once had me physically lifted out of a disorderly crowd of men by a TSG officer. Missiles were being thrown by some involved in the disorder, alongside punches (and spit). The PLO I had been assigned to that day had never worked with me before and I believe felt concerned about how much he personally was willing to expose me to. The officer shouted at the men involved that I needed to be removed. This then created a distraction, where the fighting men stopped and created a space for me to move towards the police barrier. I was then lifted behind a barrier by a (very large) officer, who asked me exasperated, ‘*what the fuck are you doing in there?!*’ At the time, I was distinctly unimpressed by what I deemed to be a sexist decision to have me removed (I still genuinely do not believe the PLO would have got me removed if I was a man). However, I noted that the PLO used this moment of calm to begin dialogue with the fighting group of men and he was able to negotiate order long enough to get these groups distracted and moved on. I quickly re-entered the protest ‘side’ and re-joined the PLO. The experience of being ‘used’ within the field was not uncommon and not something I perceived negatively – everything in life is an exchange!

²⁶At the time of my fieldwork, there were around 80 PLOs, this grew to 100 before the end of the fieldwork. Despite this number, ‘regular faces’ were more commonly seen at protests. This was a smaller number of officers – around 23 – who were really invested in the role and would often work every deployment that I was observing.

Interviews:

Formal semi-structured interviews were used as a means of supporting my field note data. In total, I conducted 20 interviews with a range of ranks and roles within public order policing. I conducted these interviews specifically as supportive data to my field notes, as I wanted to ensure the experiences and perspectives I was capturing in the field were similar to those that were articulated by officers during interview. Furthermore, interviews were a sound additional data form to gain further insight into the perspectives of senior command – a perspective I did not observe regularly during my ground-based fieldwork.

The interviewing of officers allowed for a formalisation of data that had also been gathered during fieldwork. For example, I spoke to all the key officers within the Gateway Team about their experiences within the role. This allowed for information that had previously been gathered in field notes (such as why they decided to become PLTs and their experiences within it) to be told in their own way. I perceived this to be important within the fieldwork, as it essential to be able to get the perspectives of officers communicated in a way that is most true to their experiences. Furthermore, it provided a structured formality to ending the fieldwork. I was able to communicate with key players within the fieldwork that my research time was coming to an end and empower them to voice anything further that they perhaps had not previously.

Lastly, I conducted these interviews as a ‘close’ to my research as I had gained a high level of trust among different PLTs and senior command. As a result, I believed that this would result in candid discussions about different public order policing areas. This was particularly evident within one of the interviews which was conducted with a very trusted participant – it lasted almost two hours and was largely unstructured, instead taking the form of a very lively debate.

Analysis

The analysis of ethnographic data does not take place at a specific or distinct time during the research process, instead it is a fluid and continuous task. Becker (1970) notes how many important parts of analysis can be made while the researcher is still in the field. An important analytical factor that took place early during my fieldwork was the identification of a more appropriate interpretative framework. Having started with a tightly defined studentship, I was

experiencing issues within the field where I felt like the data needing to be collected was too restricted to a specific framework. Goffman's dramaturgical work was far more suited to the data being collected and, as such, I re-framed my work using this theoretical framing to aid future data analysis.

The first and biggest challenge I experienced with data analysis, even during the early stages of fieldwork, was the large quantity of data being collected. As such, it was important to continually revisit my field notes to dispose of unnecessary data (Wolcott 1990). This early process of breaking down my field notes took the form of 'open-coding' – this process was two-fold for me. Firstly, I would use the raw data I had collected (my field notes) and read them repetitively, as a means of trying to become increasingly familiar with the world I was immersed in. Alongside this, I would continually make mind-maps and notes of my ideas and thoughts (these were separate to specifically observed activities). Although it may sound primitive in the age of technology, during the process of analysis I would never be without a notepad, pen and at least two highlighters. These 'open coding' processes allowed me the space away from my field notes (but reflecting on them in memory) to create labels and categories relative to the regular experiences within the field. These could then be cross-referenced when revisiting my field notes. This type of open coding allows for the researcher to be open to surprises and have the ability to make new and fresh ideas, instead of being restricted by what they perceived to be most important in the field (O'Reilly 2009, p. 37). The raw categories created during this early process can be understood as 'first order themes' which are then developed and built upon during the next process of analysis.

Moving from open coding, I then would establish substantive themes that were regularly occurring within my notes. These substantive themes were often (although not always) influenced by my interpretive framework, for example, 'performative'; 'face-saving' or 'signalling'. However, the content of these substantive themes could also take a different form, such as 'story-telling'; 'gossip' or 'gendered talk'. Within these substantive themes, I would then create sub-themes that were related, but different. This process can be understood as more 'focused coding'.

It would be incorrect to suggest that this coding process was slick, structured or straightforward. Open coding and focused coding occurred alongside one another continuously throughout the fieldwork. As all ethnographers do, I would revisit older field

notes after some time having since created newer ones and, as such, newer patterns were identifiable. The coding process of data was for me a continuous flow – I would question the extent to which fieldwork data is ever ‘fully’ analysed. It has been noted the overwhelming process of analysing fieldwork data. Emerson et al. (1995) suggest open coding, then focused coding, then returning to open coding then focused coding. It is suggested that this ensures a balance of inductive and deductive theorising (O’Reilly 2003, p. 37).

This circular motion of data analysis was particularly necessary, as I conducted all my interviews at the end of my fieldwork period. The interview data accumulated was handled in the exact same way as the field notes, with categories and subcategories being established, then colour coded within the text. From here I was then able to cross-reference the interviews (police talk) with the field note data (police talk and action) to establish the most representative themes of the fields being studied.

Within the process of collecting data and analysing data, there is a subjectivity that should be discussed. Who I am as a person impacts what I see, how I write it down and latterly how I interpret that data. Although some deem the subjective nature of qualitative research as problematic, there is little data collection and analysis about humans and by humans that is likely to be as objective as the researcher might claim. Field notes are personal, short-hand, incomplete reconstructions of events (Van Maanen 1988), therefore afford the ethnographer much discretion. As such, even within the patterning of the data and subsequent categorisation, there is a subjective nature to the work. Within this process, the researcher should be aware of their position as a researcher, and keep this reflexivity during the multiple times of revisiting and becoming intimately familiar with their own data.

Presentation of the Self:

How I looked during fieldwork was not something I had given thought to prior to entering the field. I had of course considered clothing – thinking my way through what would be deemed ‘appropriate’ between the two different ‘sights’ (explored below). However, my visual appearance became a significant feature of my field notes, especially during the early stages of gaining trust and acceptance within the working environment. Given that my research was policing focused, but even more specifically was public order policing focused, I was acutely

aware that I was entering into a very male-dominated environment.²⁷ However, given this is the demographics of many professional worlds, I was not particularly ‘put out’ by the knowledge I would be ‘different’. ‘Difference’ to the field one is studying can be advantageous, as Ulf Hannerz (1969) commented about being a white Swedish man seeking to study an African-American environment.²⁸

However, an unanticipated gendered fieldwork experience was the attitudes of many female officers towards me personally (not as a researcher or ‘outsider’). Others have highlighted similar problematic experiences with female officers – De Camargo (2016, p. 80) comments on how female officers would seek to ‘re-dress’ her, highlighting that her clothing was ‘inappropriate’ and O’Neill (2002, p. 390) highlighted how female officers responded to her personally as a woman (speaking about ‘lad culture’) or would barely interact with her at all, resentful of the attention being placed on her by male officers.

Both of these experiences were commonplace during my fieldwork and I spoke to a few trusted gatekeepers about ways to try to lessen this negative experience in the field.

Male officer: Do you want my honest opinion on why you can’t get female officers to speak with you?

Me: Yes!

Male officer: Ashley, you’re an attractive young female coming into a male-dominated environment and you’re getting so much attention from the male officers – this will piss women off!!

Me: Are you joking?

Male officer: No. I’m not trying to make things awkward, but if you’re looking for genuine advice and a genuine opinion, I would make a few steps to change how they see you...

Me: Like?

Male officer: You always wear your hair down, you’ve got long blonde hair and I’ve noticed that when you speak with officers you play with it...

Me: (perhaps defensively) So?

Male officer: Police women have to tie theirs back, while you don’t. Also, when you play with it, the male officers will think you’re flirting with them...

Me: That’s not true..?

²⁷ In fact, during my first few years of my PhD, I became so tired of constantly being surrounded by men (both at academic conferences and fieldwork) that I joined the University Women’s Club, which is a private members club in London for women only. I noted in my diary a strong emotion of how I ‘was sick of constantly being around testosterone-filled men competing for dominance and control over space’. I felt very isolated and lonely always only seeing male faces.

²⁸ However, we can of course differentiate the difference between a white, European male seeking access to a black community and my own experiences.

Male officer: I promise you – men are shallow Ashley, male cops are even more so. They will instantly think ‘oh she’s playing with her hair, she’s flirting with me, maybe she’s keen’ ... You also laugh at their shit jokes, which doesn’t help.


Field note 9, Office-Based, 2015

For this officer, the issue lay in the fact I was so evidently an outsider, free to dress how I wished and wear my hair down. It is interesting how mundane, everyday behaviours are interpreted by onlookers. I have long hair and I do indeed often play with it, however, the reasoning behind not wearing my hair up was far more practical – fieldwork lasted for many hours and I would regularly suffer from intense headaches if my hair was pulled back for this length of time. Notably, no one was interested in why I wore my hair down, just the fact that I did.

Although the field notes above mirror the advice many officers gave me about my appearance in the field, I changed very little about myself during my fieldwork. I recognised the professional desire to change things about myself (dress myself up or dress myself down) that might be able to gain me more access to different groups. However, outside of more regularly wearing my hair up (especially when out on ground-based research), I remained very true to my own character. I am naturally a very happy, positive, chatty person and did not want to alter this while working – something I felt required an unnecessary amount of effort and distracted away from the effort that should be focused on observing police work. From growing up within a policing environment, I personally felt what would gain me best access to a policing world was authenticity to myself and, over time, I noticed that more and more females began to speak to me, many of whom would latterly seek me out to speak with me about my work.

Despite this eventual and positive change, the perception from female officers that they had the ‘right’ to dictate my clothing or to request I ‘redress’ or dress in a particular way continued consistently throughout the PhD period.

Image Four: Email Correspondence



Although a positive reading of this email could be someone who is trying to be kind and ensure comfort, it is more realistic to note the patronising tone of the interaction. For example, I regularly emailed and spoke with male officers and never once experienced them trying to dictate what I wore (outside of negotiations around wearing a stab-proof vest), experiences of this kind exclusively came from female officers (and were regular). After a few early field experiences, I spoke to a small number of male PhD students and asked if they had ever experienced something similar, all stated they had not. De Camargo (2016) experienced similar encounters with female officers, identifying how she felt as though she was dressed appropriately but was dictated to by other female officers on how she needed to change her clothing.

A more positive experience of female officers – although not a common occurrence – was in relation to sexualised comments from male officers. What is significant about the very limited explicitly sexually motivated interactions I did experience within the policing environment was that female officers immediately blocked the interaction and used their insider power in an attempt to positively impact the environment. As such, when I was just an unknown ‘outside’ entity, female officers could be rude and aggressive or simply dismissive. However, within the examples below, when these female officers observed me experiencing sexualised behaviour, they immediately aligned themselves with me and sought to ‘protect’ me and block it.

Example One:

I am out with a unit I have not been with before. They seem friendly, but a bit awkward; this is a common experience when with a new unit. While sitting in the carrier, much banter is present. One of the male officers (around a similar age to me) is on Tinder and his colleagues are teasing him about not being able to find a date.²⁹ He looks embarrassed but shakes it off. The inspector begins to mock the

²⁹Tinder is an app for online dating.

PC, relaying a story that I immediately gather is extremely personal and not for an ‘outsiders’ ears. The PC become visibly embarrassed and his colleagues do not laugh, but shift uncomfortably in their seat. I perceive them to be awkward about this sharing of information with someone they don’t know. I state to the inspector (not amused), ‘to be honest, I doubt [name] wants me to know that’ and I turn my head away to look out the window. Later in the evening, the inspector continues to behave immaturely, very cringeworthy. He tells me how he is single and then later starts commenting about how impressive his new car is, asking if I like the make of it. I raise my eyebrows at him and respond, ‘not really, kind of looks like the type of car a drug dealer would drive’. He goes quiet. Later during the evening, a female officer I know comes over to me – ‘some of the officers have been saying [the inspector] has been inappropriate with you?’ I respond, ‘nothing dramatic, he’s just flirting. Its cringe given his age, but it’s nothing I can’t handle, don’t worry about it.’ She responds simply, ‘noted’.

[The next night]

I’m out with the same unit, however I’ve been assigned to another carrier. The sergeant gets in the carrier, I’m sitting at the back – ‘happy to have you on board with us tonight Ashley, I heard [the inspector] was a nightmare last night. Don’t worry, none of us are like that here, it’ll be a good night.’ It turns out the female officer from the previous night (also a sergeant) spoke to the sergeant on this carrier and they decided to move me away from the inspector.

Field note 10, Ground-Based, 2016

Example Two:

I’m sitting at the back of the carrier, it’s only a few of us. It’s relaxed and chatty. I’ve been out with this unit a few times before. The inspector turns to me, ‘do you fancy a finger, Ashley?’ he asks with a smirk on his face. I look up, understanding there’s a joke and see him extending his hand holding a Kit Kat. The banter he’s trying to give me is explicit. I’m trying to think of a quick-witted reply when I hear vomiting noises from the female PC in front, ‘excuse me guv, just being sick over here. Trying lines like that with someone like Ashley – you’re old enough to be her fucking dad. Christ! How utterly embarrassing!!!’ She continues to make very audible vomiting noises and I burst out laughing. The inspector looks sheepish but laughs it off while turning back away from me to face the front. I purposefully continue to laugh.

Field note 11, Ground-Based, 2017

These fieldwork experiences were not typical – they are interesting by the fact they were atypical of the treatment I experienced by male officers during the course of my research. Furthermore, I find the attempt at flirtation or sexualised comments far less significant and would likely have brushed them off (due to their atypical nature) if it was not for the more significant and interesting behaviours of the female officers. Despite my experience with female officers often being negative, these examples demonstrate two female officers utilising their relative power (as insiders and/or positions of rank) to re-shape my experience

of the field. I have no doubt that they were of course seeking to protect their professional environment, however, I also believe they were seeking to ‘protect’ a woman who they may have perceived as less likely than themselves to defend herself (again, due to my ‘outsider’ status).

When beginning fieldwork, I anticipated having to navigate gendered experiences. I do not assign this as specifically relating to policing – over the course of my PhD, I have encountered far more sexist behaviour within academia than I have in a policing environment. However, I expected to experience encounters I will classify as ‘the usual’ experiences of interacting with a new professional environment while female. When I reflect upon my field notes and field diary, what strikes me most was actually the *lack* of noteworthy experiences where I felt I was being treated inappropriately or unprofessionally by men due to my gender.

We can perhaps theorise this difference between the academic and policing field through my power position. Within a policing environment, as a PhD student, I was often afforded the quality of being ‘very intelligent’ or ‘more intelligent’ than the officers. As such, the officers (mostly male) were attributing power to my position as a researcher. Contrary to this, one’s power position as a PhD student is limited – within the academic hierarchy, you are the lowest of that hierarchy. Thus, would I have experienced more sexist interactions had I been a new PC (the equivalent power position as a PhD student) working *within* policing as opposed to *with* it?

Critical reflexivity – location the self in research:

It is important to frame why particular people study particular institutions. We should all understand and acknowledge the scholarly as well as the personal reasons behind our study (Van Maanen 1978, pp. 312-314). Researchers come with histories (Madden 2010, p. 22), meaning research is a two-way process and the self is as important to understanding the fieldwork as the field itself. Reflexivity demands us to consider how social aspects about ourselves (identity, social position) are bound to the type of interactions we have with the field (Stuart 2018, p. 212). There are lots of aspects that ethnographers can reflect upon, but I believe there are two central aspects about my identity to consider here: my professional interest in joining the police and my policing family.

Despite considering a policing career, I knew I wanted to complete doctoral studies first. The reasons for this were simple – I wanted academic freedom to observe, report, criticise and publish independent of a policing organisation. I think some, specifically, more critical scholars, would view my professional motivations to join the police to be problematic. Although I can empathise with this positioning, I actually think it perpetuates a culture (within academia) that ‘learning’ and ‘knowledge building’ is distinctly ‘academic’ and does not hold a place within policing. At the early stages of my fieldwork, I experienced this defensiveness among officers too, with jokes (rarely with a harsh or aggressive undertone) focused on: how *I* must think I know policing better than police officers (notice the positioning being upon me as the researcher thinking this); how I was the brains and they were the brawn; whether I was going to tell them how to do their job and so on. During more informal coffees or after-work drinks, when discussing aspects of policing, I would sometimes get comments such as, ‘well, I can’t articulate myself like you can’.

Academically reflecting upon these interactions, I was noticing (and continued to notice throughout my fieldwork) a distinct insecurity from many officers around their perceived lack of intellectual abilities (in terms of formal qualifications). From my experiences, I think there is a distinct ‘us vs. them’ attitude from both academics and police officers about the relevant ‘other’. With the growing significance of Evidence-Based Policing within police organisations, ‘academic knowledge’ is becoming increasingly accepted, however, informally within academic cultures there appears to be less of an acceptance that a policing career can follow academic study.

Another factor that I believe impacted the type of interactions I had with police officers was due to the fact I come from a policing family. I have many cousins within Police Scotland and my father was in the MPS from 1988-1997, until he was medically retired following a near fatal stabbing as a response officer. Following this, my father became the creative director of the Strategic Command Course for senior officers based at Bramshill Police Training College.³⁰ As such, I have always described myself as ‘acutely comfortable’ around police officers and I think this comfort empowered me to communicate, understand, challenge and, importantly, empathise with officers in a way that helped gain trust and

³⁰Which has since closed.

respect in the field. The ability to empathise with those we study is a central quality to ethnographic research (Liebling 2001).

The fact that my father was a police officer who had been medically retired was something that (in a very dark way) brought me capital among some officers. When attending fieldwork with new units, I noticed that sergeants or inspectors would introduce me often followed by something like, '*your dad was job³¹ wasn't he, Ashley?*' [Field note 12] or '*I heard your dad was job and was injured?*' [Field note 13] Being aware of policing culture, I did not find this entirely unusual; police officers are, of course, interested in 'action-orientated' police work and being medically retired from a stabbing communicates that the individual has experienced the worst parts of the 'action' of police work first hand. Yet, I actually believe that many of these ranking officers were introducing me in this way to subtly communicate to others that, '*she's alright*' [Field note 14]. Within more personal conversations with police officers after many months in the field many admitted that they had asked specific officers about me, asking them if they could trust me. When I asked what was said in response, it was always '*oh s/he said you're alright*' [Field note 15]. Looking back on diary entries in my reflective notebook, it became increasingly clear that 'she's alright' was a regularly used term to describe an outsider who had gained some level of internal acceptance.

I do not believe these experiences or positionings 'tarnish' me as a researcher (from an academic point of view), I was still a critical outsider who was not entirely trusted by the organisation. However, I do believe these experiences impacted the way in which I interacted with police officers. It is a very strange reality to grow up knowing someone has attempted to murder your father while he was conducting his professional duties. As such, when a police officer told me they were 'terrified' during a policing operations, I could reflect upon my personal emotions of knowing at some point my father had been in that same position. Having lived all my life with someone who has PTSD, I am acutely aware of its impact on the lives of those who have it and also those who live around it. Thus, when speaking with officers (specifically about their experiences of the London riots), although still taking place within a research capacity (they occurred during fieldwork), they were entirely human

³¹'Job' is an informal and regularly used term to refer to the police: 'S/he's job' would mean 's/he is a police officer'.

conversations where I could empathise on a more personal level with the tremor in an officer's voice as he admitted, *'I thought I was going to die'* [Field note 16].

Through building connections, based upon personal positions, with those inside the organisation one is studying, some have commented on subsequent problems. It has been suggested that inexperienced researchers can fall foul to the 'seductive' world of their police participants (see, for instance, Heidensohn 1992). Other has confronted the issue of the level of which one can disclose everything they observed. Patrick (1973) neglected to publish for years following the close of his fieldwork in an attempt to protect the gang members he had been researching. Coffield, Borrill & Marshall (1986; see McNeill 1990, p. 81) took this further by omitting large quantities of their data due to concern for their participants; 'the ethics of our relationship demanded that anonymity... even at the cost of some of the best illustrative material'.

For my own research – as I'm sure all researchers do – I used my own personal moral compass to navigate my way through more challenging ethnographic encounters. For instance, if I felt an interaction between myself and an officer was moving more into the 'grey' areas of research, I would ask the officer if what they were discussing could form part of my research. Alternatively, some officers would turn to me and state, *'Ashley, this is off the record'* [Field note 17]. In addition to this, if I ever felt uncomfortable about an experience in the field (which happened only a small number of times), I would speak to my internal supervisor who I had formed a close friendship with – never disclosing the officers involved, location or any identifying factors. Instead, I used this conversation to navigate the extent to which what had been experienced was representative of the field.

Your personal positioning within the field should always be considered. Along with Madden (2010, p. 140), I fundamentally believe, 'we can get a more objective account out of our field notes if we acknowledge and manage the fact that there are subjective elements in them'. Ethnographic work is undoubtedly subjective but, by always maintaining a critical self-reflection – notably within my diary – I was consistently reflecting upon my own position and the impact it had in fieldwork.

Fieldwork positioning and 'Going Native':

The process of ‘going-native’ was discussed at the beginning of this chapter, where I challenged this term stating that ‘being-native’ on a pendulum shift is a more realistic and accurate for fieldwork; the binary approach of ‘going or not going’ native is limited. There were times within my fieldwork where I perceived the process of embodying the policing role as important. As will be explored in detail within Chapter Five, I took part in the public-order training of Level-Two officers during a residential stay at Glennock Police Training School. I decided to do this for two central reasons. Firstly, I wanted to understand, within the parameters of research, what it felt like to be under this type of physical pressure. I felt that such a unique opportunity gave me access to facilitated a deeper level of understanding of the public-order experience - this is explored in Chapter Five. Secondly, as is common with many ethnographers, I understood that I had to continually renegotiate access with the field in which I was studying. This renegotiation required constant creativity and having a ‘shared’ experience with officers facilitated many openings when I was challenged *‘but have you actually ever tried it?’* (Field note 18) The role of story-telling has previously been identified as a powerful socialisation tool within policing (Shearing & Ericson 1991) and such a unique academic experience as taking part in public-order policing gave me a distinctive ‘story’ to tell.

The requirement to re-negotiate access with officers was particularly acute within Glennock, as it was isolated away from my usual field of work. Furthermore, here I experienced the most overt displays of masculinity comparative to anywhere else in my fieldwork and I was acutely aware of my ‘female’ status as a researcher and outsider.

“I’ll be down in five minutes for a beer, I just need to go bash one out.”

Fieldnotes 19, Glennock Observations, December 2017

The above fieldnote was overheard whilst sat in my room at Glennock, it was shouted across the courtyard, which all the bedrooms back on to. The significance of the fieldnote lies not in the statement of masturbation, but in the fact the officer felt it appropriate to shout this loudly across the courtyard in explanation of why he would be late to the bar. It captivates a prevalent culture of masculinity that was acutely felt across the training school.

It's argued that 'real police-work' centres on a "cult of masculinity" (Waddington 1999: 298), with the occupation being highly gendered and where 'masculine' attitudes such as a willingness and ability for more robust types of police-work hold higher 'capital'. It was during a fieldwork experience that displayed this focus on 'real police-work' where I actively choose to blur the boundaries of my research status by 'being-native'; a conscious choice as opposed to an unconscious development of 'going-native'.

"You're going to get involved though, aren't you?" Asks instructor D. I have mostly avoided this instructor as I did not get any good vibes from him. Unlike many of the other instructors who physically exerted masculinity with many hours spent in the gym gaining large physic, this particular instructor was smaller, 'scrawnier' and yet had persistently tried to have laddish 'banter' with colleagues. I reply to him, "I'm not sure, I haven't really worked out a plan."
"Well I'll get X [female instructor] to get you some kit, you need to try it, no one likes a fucking coward, do they?" I decide not to reply, but I know in my head I will do the training.

Field note 20, Glennock, Tuesday, December 2017

I was well aware during this experience that I was being 'tested' and – through the nature of my character – I knew I would rise to the challenge. I was aware that I would likely make a fool of myself within the training, but I felt this was a relatively fair trade off as this group of officers had (for the most part) welcomed me full-time into their working environment. For a week, I would ask them endless questions and (through my very presence) likely make them more conscious of everything they said and did that week.

In the strictest sense, by partaking in the training I was there to observe I was blurring the lines of 'going-native'; yet, for me, the ability to earn increased access and potentially respect for at least attempting to complete the training, was worth it. Additionally, due to the fact I was there for a week and had visited previously also, I had observed the training before. Having worked extensively with police officers, I am well aware of their orientation towards respecting more 'action-based' work and this was the closest I would ever come to 'action'. I believe my decision to blur these lines of 'being-native' were entirely justified when I got invited to a social event to celebrate a member of the team retiring. Here I was able to speak to the team more openly and they disclosed that they had been 'warned' about me as I 'had

friends in high places’ as I was ‘friends with the bosses’ – a similar experience to Loftus (2009: 203).

If we take Maanen’s (1978) model Pure Types of Participant-Observer Roles (Figure 2) to help position my fieldwork I would situate myself comfortably within the ‘Fan’ role. However, within that role I was constantly moving along the covert/overt and active/passive axes. This more accurately identifies the pendulum moving back and forth in the scaling of the term ‘native’ depending on the type of fieldwork being done.




Figure Three: Pure Types of Participant-Observer Roles, Edited 1

Figure Three shows the ability of a fieldworker to move their positioning during the course of their fieldwork, transitioning their levels of ‘native’ status on the graph. Figure Four below shows a visual depiction of where I would plot myself during the period in which I took part in training at Glennock.




Figure Four Pure Types of Participant-Observer Roles, Edited 2

Figure Four demonstrates how during the Glennock training I was clearly in the most ‘active’ period of my fieldwork, I was no longer observing the training I would later analyse, I was taking part in it. However, notably during the whole of my fieldwork it was the period where I felt the most ‘overt’ as a researcher, as I was well aware that many people were watching to see how I reacted to *faux* risk during the role-plays and during the final stage of the training named ‘fire-bomb alley’. Many extra officers came to observe this session – something that is discussed more in Chapter Five.

I am challenging here the assertion that ‘going-native’ is a complex enough statement for ethnography. At no stage of my research did I perceive myself to be ‘native’ in the way we read about it within literature – often a term used in a derogatory way. Yet, there were stages within my research where my positioning on the axis were more active/passive and overt/covert. For example, whilst observing protest I was at my most passive but potentially at my most covert as I was often assumed to be a police officer, with many officers referring to me as ‘Ma’am’. It is these nuances that are important to unpick for us to fully appreciate both the power and complexity of ethnography.

Conclusion:

This chapter has considered the methodological approach to my study into public order policing. I briefly demonstrated how ethnography is understood and positioned methodologically, and how it has previously been used within policing research. I then moved on to more extensively cover my own process of conducting fieldwork within the MPS. This approach enabled me to make a range of different observations and open-ended discussions with numerous police officers from a variety of ranks. Significant within the considerations was the formal and informal process of gaining access to the police officers who would inform my research. As ethnographers have always noted, this process is lengthy and very context specific – something that was no different to my own fieldwork experience. I identified how although structured as a formal collaboration (therefore I was afforded formal access relatively quickly), I was still required to work extensively in gaining informal acceptance with both rank-and-file officers and senior management. In addition to this, the chapter outlined the process of data collection (field notes) and data analysis, something that is less scientifically ‘fixed’ than other qualitative forms of research. As part of this analytical

process, a critical reflection on one's positioning within the field and why certain people study certain phenomena was explored.

Part II: Research Findings

Chapter V: Training and Socialisation

Introduction:

This findings chapter – the first of three – will ‘set the scene’ of the public order policing performance (Goffman 1959). It will focus on both the formal training of public order officers at Glennock police training school, as well as the informal socialisation of officers while deployed at different operations. Here, we will learn about how the policing performance is ‘fine-tuned’ and ‘tweaked’ in order to better control and manage the wider public’s impressions of the police.

PLOs are trained very differently to tactics such as Level-Two (L2) or Level-One (L1); yet many PLOs are also L2 or L1 trained. Further, the PLT tactic remains a minority of officers within the public order policing family. Therefore, the extent to which PLOs understand and perceive public order policing is still impacted by the traditional approach to policing the events is significant. Simply because an organisation introduces a new tactical option does not mean cultural perceptions immediately change. As such, this chapter sets the scene of public order policing holistically, considering the training of the more robust tactic of L2 training in addition to the training of PLOs.

During the time of my fieldwork, the training of PLTs was exclusively classroom based, only post fieldwork did I hear about the PLT trainers adding additional training which involved being out on the ground of Glennock police training school. During conversations with the trainers, they suggested this addition allows the L2 and L1 officers to get used to seeing PLTs, but also provides a more practical element to the PLT training.

It is essential to consider how the PLTs ‘fit’ within the wider public order performance. At the time of my fieldwork, there were 119 PLOs within the MPS – this is compared to 3,759 L2 trained officers and 517 L1 trained officers,³² without even exploring other tactics such as mounted branch, dogs and others besides. Thus, when PLTs are deployed, they form a very small part of an operation, yet the capital they carry with senior command is notable and the tactic is discussed widely within central command.

³² These numbers were provided by central command in December 2018.

The findings from this chapter are based on five different visits to Glennock Police Training School from 2015 until 2017 to observe L2, L1 and PLT formal training. In addition to this, it draws upon data from a full week's residential stay where L2 training was both observed and participated in. As such, the data takes the form of field notes, diary entries and interviews with trainers. The chapter is largely split into two thematic areas: formal training and informal learning of public order officers. The former exclusively considers training that occurred at Glennock, while the latter incorporates both interactions at Glennock in addition to the socialisation of officers while on the job.

Ultimately, the findings of this chapter identify that the staging of the production in the back-stage (both L2 and PLT) do not reflect the actual requirements of front-stage performance. It is entirely possible that the 'worst-case' disorder an L2 officer experiences is the faux violence that occurs during their training. Conversely, PLT training is classroom based, yet the reality of their deployment is far more action-orientated. Furthermore, the chapter identifies the significant role that uniform plays, with it symbolising the performative nature of the officer's public order role, not necessarily the reality of it.

General Training Background

Formal training is a central component to all professional environments, ensuring workers acquire the capability to perform their job (Nikolou-Walker & Meaklin 2007). Sociologically, we can understand formal training as a bureaucratic record that a workforce is adequately trained (Maanen & Pentlan 1993). Within the police, as with many organisations, this training is often mandatory.

Within the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) there are three levels of training for officers. Level-three represents the basic standard of training all officers must reach in order to become a police officer. Level-three trained officers can be deployed at public order policing operations, but only in the capacity of community engagement, foot patrols, visible patrols, among other equivalent examples. L2-trained officers represent the first level of specialist training for public order policing and are the initial response to any public disorder. Following L2 training, an officer can become L1 trained, which is the specialist unit called the Territorial Support Group (TSG); a full-time specialist 'public order' role, often branded in news media as 'the riot police'. L1 is the highest public order policing capability in the MPS and country, requiring refresher training every six weeks. Policing large-scale events

such as protests is only one aspect of their role. TSG offer a diverse range of capabilities within the MPS such as patrols known as the Commissioner's Reserve; rapid entry to properties where warrants are being served and there is intelligence of violent individuals inside; or borough reserves. Although L1-trained officers used to be commonplace nationally, many forces outside of the MPS have lost this capability due to government-imposed austerity measures.

All levels of training can be deployed at different events, however, only L2 and L1 officers can claim to hold a public order policing specialism; despite being present at large-scale events, an L3 officer would not be deployed to disorder. In the early establishment of the PLTs (prior to my fieldwork), it was a requirement that a PLO would be trained to a minimal standard of L2; however, during my fieldwork this had changed and all interested candidates could register an interest in the role. This being said, during the course of my research, the majority of officers engaged with were at least L2 trained.

My time in the field illuminated that public order policing used to carry with it a high level of significance to wider policing cultures. According to officers, it was previously a role that was highly competitive to get into, requiring a manager's recommendation and was only accessible for officers no longer within their probationary period (the first two years of service). Some officers described how the role gave access to more professionally desired and respected roles. Longer in-service officers also described the competitive and difficult nature of trying to get onto the public order training course.

This was different to the contemporary attitude towards public order policing. During my fieldwork officers would state, *'there's nothing Gucci³³ about public order anymore, you want a course, you just request it and you're on it, they're so desperate for bodies'* [Field note 1]. This 'desperation for bodies' was not without evidence; during my early fieldwork, I attended meetings with a number of different senior leaders with the sole purpose of brainstorming different ideas that might make the L2 role a more desirable skill to attract officers, due to the severe shortage in numbers. A key finding of Part One of the Windsor Review (Windsor 2012, p. 30) under 'Expertise and Professional Accreditation Allowance',

³³ A word used mostly by PCs to describe a specific job or role within policing that equated to the mythical image of 'real policing', something that was well respected and challenging.

was that public order police officers should benefit from a £1,200 per annum pay bonus for their specialist skill; in Part Two of the Review, this was lowered to £600 per annum for those who are most regularly deployed to critical public order events (ibid, p. 531).

Interestingly, pay benefits did not feature prominently within these meetings, instead ideas such as providing officers with iPads were considered. Officers receive a £50 per annum payment from the MPS for being public order trained, the reason behind this payment is because they are required to spend one night away from home at Glennock. This small payment featured as a regular negative topic of conversation among officers, especially those who decided to allow their training certificate to expire. Despite ongoing challenges of the organisation to attract officers, L2 training remains mandatory.

For L2 public order and PLT training, officers are required to complete and pass a two-day training course at Glennock Police Training School once a year. Although both courses are formally pass/fail, informally, weaker candidates or those who do not display commitment to the role are encouraged to voluntarily leave the course before its culmination.

Glennock is a purpose-built facility to provide officers with role-play scenarios they might face during different deployments; the facility is residential to enable training over a number of days. It has classrooms where teaching and lectures can take place; indoor sports halls; a mock town with tube stations, shops, green space and other relevant spaces; and rest areas. PLTs, L2 and L1 officers were not trained together, their training often took place on different days to ensure enough instructors were available for teaching. However, if additional tactics, such as mounted branch, are on-sight during training periods, the instructors will try to add them into the 'role-play' aspect of training, so the officers become aware of their likely presence during deployments.

Image 5: Level-Two Training – PSU clearing away from path (‘disorderly’ crowd in the distance)



Image 6: Level-Two Training – Mounted branch breaking through PSU



Image 7: Level-Two Training – PSU follow behind mounted branch



Initially, PLT training did not take place at Glennock but instead at other more central locations. It was argued that as it was classroom-based learning, there was no need for it to be based in Glennock. However, this changed just prior to the start of my fieldwork due to the perceived isolation of PLTs in comparison to their public order policing colleagues. It was suggested during my fieldwork that the tactic was not being appropriately integrated due to its separation and latterly was moved to Glennock. Since the culmination of my fieldwork, the PLT training has been further integrated by adding PLOs into L2-based training scenarios, adding a practical role-play section to the formal PLT training.

Level-Two Training and the Absence of Dialogue:

Level two training begins with a lecture from instructors about the functions of public order policing. Following this initial lecture, which lasts around 30 minutes, all other training is physical. Best practice dictates that, upon arrival at Glennock, officers receive the lecture to set them up for the two days ahead; yet most trainers admitted that the structure of the two-day training is rarely perfect and sometimes the lecture can be missed or given last.

Following this, the officers have a kit check, involving one of the instructors running through all the individual pieces of kit required for the training. Formally, if any officer has forgotten any part of their kit, they are sent home immediately; according to instructors, this is due to health and safety issues, where officers have previously been allowed to continue with their training without a particular piece of kit and have then subsequently sued the organisation after experiencing an injury during training. However, in practice, instructors observed are more flexible than policy dictates they should be, *'officer, you can't take part in this training without that piece of kit, if you do not have it, I will have to send you home, you have 10 minutes, get creative...'* [Field note 2] Here we can see a sound example of an officer's personal front and costume being 'scrutinized for flaws' (Goffman 1959, p. 114). Following the kit check, the officers are required to complete and pass a bleep test to level 6:3, which is only marginally higher than the base level required to become a police officer (5:4).

After successful completion of the bleep test, officers are ordered to put on all their non-flameproof kit and they spend the rest of this allocated time running through a number of different role-plays. This could involve a standard protest where a number of protesters become violent; officers are encouraged to 'engage' with the protester to try to de-escalate

any rising risk. They then run through more ‘disorderly’ role-plays, where officers learn tactical responses using both the long shields and short shields.

Culminating the training course, during the second half of the second day is the full role-play; this often coincides with a senior leader being assessed on their Cadre course, assessing their strategic response to any disorder on the ground. Part of this extended role play involves the worst examples of public disorder, where officers are fire bombed while trying to regain control of the space around them. This fire bomb aspect of the course is mandatory, in order to build officer’s confidence in their protective kit and to ensure that if they ever experience this in real life, it does not take them entirely by surprise. The majority of people spoken to over the course of the training anticipated this aspect of the course with excitement, but some did speak of their nerves and concerns of what it would be like.

As identified in Chapter Two, dialogue is now tactically viewed as a core model for public order policing in England and Wales (Keeping the Peace 2010). Furthermore, the presence of the *words* ‘engagement’, ‘communication’ and ‘dialogue’ was notable in all areas of fieldwork. However, the presence of formal training around their meaning, value and place within public order policing was distinctly absent from both the L2 and PLT training observed. When discussing this absence with a range of different officers, the most common response experience was, *‘you’re a copper, you should already know how to speak to people, it’s a basic part of the job’* [Field note 3]. In spite of this perspective, observations of L2 officers outside of the training environment demonstrate that they less frequently engaged in effective communication with members of the public. A commonly given reason from officers was a concern that they would be recorded saying ‘the wrong thing’ and the belief that it was not part of their public order role, especially since the introduction of the PLTs. For many officers, the core ideology of the L2 role is the traditional ‘robustness’ and the reactivity to rising disorder. Here an officer soundly articulates a view regularly voiced by L2 officers:

‘... in public order [policing], we are trained to follow orders. So, we go down to Glennock and we do our two days... and the whole time we’re shouted at and we’re told: you do this, you do that, you’ve done it wrong, do it like this. We’re told and taught and trained [that] you will listen to your sergeant and your sergeant will tell you what to do and your sergeant will get his (sic) orders from Silver. So, it’s just what we’re taught, what we’re trained for. That’s the long-standing tradition

of public order policing. I don't think we're really encouraged to make decisions, we're not really encouraged to use our initiative...'

Interview, PC, Level-Two Trained

During my fieldwork, or while speaking with officers at Glennock, the perception that they are not encouraged to communicate with the public as part of their role was discussed regularly. Many also listed concerns of not understanding or even knowing what operations were about, why they were there, or what Silver's overarching objectives were, which resulted in no confidence in speaking to the public. For many of the officers spoken with during my fieldwork, there was no sense of empowerment to police and their training reinforced this.

Although not specifically addressing public order policing, Grint (2015) talks of policing as a 'mechanical hierarchy', which is fitting for what was observed among traditional public order – following orders given by those in positions of formal leadership. The traditional 'disciplined body' (Waddington 1991, p. 136) identified by the PC in the interview above are viewed operationally as 'units' or 'squads' working as one instead of individualised officers. Waddington (1991) argues that this command-and-control structure is the most appropriate style to police large-scale events as the officers' experience 'unprecedented levels of supervision' (ibid, p. 140), ensuring their actions are coordinated, proportionate and allow for intensifying emotions over the fear of losing control to be managed.

It was quickly identifiable during my fieldwork that the organisational perception of a paramilitary structure within public order is the most appropriate policing approach. This is reflected in the training L2 officers receive, with very limited emphasis placed upon dialogue as a tactic. Officers (both trainers and trainees) defended this absence by suggesting that officers should already know how to communicate with the public as part of their continuous learning within their daily policing roles. Additionally, officers would state that the organisation was under time pressures to deliver formal training and therefore not able to train the officers in every area of development. As such, the organisation focused on the areas professionally required of officers that they could not regularly gain access to 'on-the-job' – which for L2s are the robust aspects of policing (for example, shield tactics) and for PLTs is the legal framework refreshers.

The logic of this can be understood; a preconception of policing is that officers are regularly effectively interacting with the public,³⁴ yet this means that there is no area of public order training (for both L2s and PLTs) where the officers' communication skills are being developed, enhanced, challenged or improved.³⁵ But due to the sheer quantity of L2 officers, they are the main 'face' of public order policing, the police officers the public are predominately going to be faced with. PLTs are not assigned to liaise with people aimlessly – they engage in targeted dialogue with targeted group leaders, challenging and vocal protesters, and colleagues. Hence, there is still a vast number of the public who will interact with L2 officers and therefore the scope of communication-based requirements of L2 officers is important.

The L2 training places emphasis on the physical aspects of public order policing, seeking to familiarise the officers with what it is like to experience a 'high-risk' operation (involving missiles being thrown). With the focus being on these more robust skills, there is little room for the trainees to learn what the role of communication is within the L2 role.

I could see the instructors on top of the building dressed up and carrying fire bombs. Due to the positioning of officers, I ended up at the front far right end of the cordon and therefore it was my responsibility to step forward and look down the street to my left and shout 'clear', but I could see it wasn't clear, so we remained standing there. My right arm was throbbing with the weight of the shield, I could barely hear a thing due to the NATO helmet and balaclava blocking my ears, the only way to communicate with people near me was to shout. The gloves I had been given, despite being an extra small, kept slipping off, making the shield even more uncomfortable. I realised in that moment just how unfit I was! We had not run a huge distance but my heartbeat was in my throat and the groin protector was causing me extreme pain. I felt pretty miserable. I could feel the officer next to me panicking, she was moving far too much and keeps looking behind her – the Sergeant was shouting at her to stay in position. Her lack of confidence increased my nerves. She stepped forward, I shouted at her to stay in position because I knew that if she kept moving forward the instructors would throw petrol bombs in front of her. This is a punishment for stepping out of line and exposing yourself and your team to potential risk by 'breaking' the line of officers. She either didn't hear me or didn't listen and the predicted fire bombs came flying – one hit the ground immediately in front of her, one hit the ground in between us and one hit right in

³⁴ The extent to which this is accurate is, I think, debatable. Furthermore, simply having access to an area does not necessarily correlate with continual professional development in said area.

³⁵ This was notably entirely different to hostage negotiation training. A communication-based tactic observed as part of the fieldwork that provided a two-week residential course with both ideological lectures for officers and role-play based training.

front of me. This was my first time of experiencing the sensation of being engulfed in a huge burst of flames. My heart rate immediately increased, but I tried to think back to [instructor's] directions, 'don't panic, stamp your feet and pat yourself off, the uniform protects you, so you don't need to panic'. I lean forward and pull the officer back into position and shout at her to stay there, 'they'll keep throwing them if you don't remain in place'. She couldn't get the fire out on herself and the officer the other side of her assists. The commotion is over and I look forward, remaining in place. I could feel my heartbeat in my ears and all my previous bodily pains for the day's training were exacerbated, especially my arm from the shield. My visor of the NATO had completely steamed up, impairing my vision. I saw other officers trying to wipe theirs free of condensation. My instinct wanted to lift the visor to get some fresh air into the NATO as I was feeling so claustrophobic in all the kit. Despite it being October, I was utterly boiling. However, I knew I wasn't allowed to lift it as it would incur another round of punishment petrol bombs. My heavy breathing achieved nothing but making the visor worse! I could feel my nerves while I stood there waiting for our instructions, but also a more surprising sensation of adrenaline and excitement. I felt annoyed at the officer for stepping forward and wished I hadn't been standing next to her. In the few moments we had to stand and catch our breath I thought about what an unusual experience this is for a researcher and reflected on how – if this was real life – at what point would I actually be able to begin verbal communication with a member of the public (outside of shouting instructions)?

Diary Entry 1, Reflections of Level-Two Training Experience, October 2017

The physical exertion that is demanded upon officers during this training was also evident by how tired they appeared during short rest periods. There was very little chatter observed among colleagues, which was different to the PLT training.

Looking around to see how the officers are reacting to this training experience, I can see that everyone has found it as tough as me. Next to no one is talking. Everyone has taken off some aspects of their uniform and are excessively sweaty. Others have collapsed against the wall, with their head leant back against the cold wall with their eyes closed. Some are fixing bits of their uniform that clearly hadn't performed to the desired standard. There isn't any opportunity to speak to the officers at this point and I also don't want to deprive them of this short rest period.

Field note 4, Level-Two Training, October 2017

Experiencing the physical side to level-two training is important, as the diary entry and field notes exemplify. It familiarises an actor with a range of emotions, thoughts and realities of being involved in public order policing. It informed me of a diverse range of emotions during the training: fear, nerves, excitement, frustration and high adrenaline. It provided me with an indication of what it is like to feel 'at-risk' and the reliance one feels upon the ability of their teammates. Speaking to officers over lunch at Gravesend or during fieldwork out on the ground, many confirmed my own emotions as what they had also experienced. A minority of

PLTs articulated the level of sheer panic and fear they had felt during training, and identified this as the main deciding factor that L2 *'was not for them'* [Field note 5]. Only after the introduction of PLTs did these officers show interest in public order policing again. This identifies the hugely problematic nature of targeting training entirely on the robust skills required of the role, as it means the organisation is losing diversity of talent, namely those who perhaps would struggle with the robust requirements, but would excel elsewhere.

In addition to the emotional responses, the experience educated me of the reality of practical issues that were continuous prompts of frustration and exasperation for L2 officers. For example, I was able to experience the capability of the uniform (protective from fire) but also the weaknesses of it (poor visibility from the NATO helmet, uncomfortable nature of the groin protector). Furthermore, it plants a seed into the actor's mind of what might happen in examples of worst-case public order disturbances and how to react. 'What if...' scenarios were a commonplace feature throughout the fieldwork and are nothing new to public order policing (Waddington 1994, p. 136).

Observations over the week's residential stay pointed towards the experience of faux disorder as the 'real' training. Despite observing some training and attempts by instructors to encourage 'engagement', the attempts came across as half-hearted and more of a 'buzzword' exercise (perhaps for the researcher's benefit) as opposed to an acknowledgement of the role communication has within L2 training.

While observing some of the L2 trainees, one trainer comments, 'look at them with the protesters, no engagement at all...' There's a mutter of agreement, but none of the trainers takes it upon themselves to direct the trainees in better engagement.

Field note 6 Level-Two Training, Residential stay, October 2017

Myself and [instructor] are dressed up and 'role-playing' as members of the public. [Instructor] is pretending to be an old lady and I am the carer. The point is to try to get ourselves through the cordon of officers. [Instructor] begins to try to negotiate her way through, pointing out that she is only an old lady and that she lives up the road and needs to get back to her house. The first group allow us through with little issue; the second group stop us and seek permission from their sergeant; the third group refuse all entry and push [instructor] to the floor after she tries to force her way through. Following the third group, [instructor] is bemused at her treatment, 'he needs speaking with' she states to another trainer.

Field note 7 Level-Two Training, Residential stay, October 2017

Contrary to this, the role-play where full disorder is occurring and requires a display of physicality, strength and fire bombs came across as the real thing, the real reason officers came to Glennock and the real police work (Van Maanen 1978; Reiner 2010) officers wanted be involved in. All trainees and trainers understood this culmination of training as the ‘proper performance’ and instructors got dressed up in different costumes and were assessing and watching for officers to demonstrate they could cope with this fast-paced environment. During the chatter of rest periods, this part of the training came across as the real reason many officers came to the training and wanted to be L2 trained, a distinctly unique policing experience. As one officer phrased it, *‘what other job requires you to attend training where you’re paid to run around in full kit and get petrol bombed?’* (Field note 8)

It is this experience that creates a shared identity of what performing the level-two ‘role’ entails and what it ‘means’ to be level-two trained. Throughout my fieldwork, following this experience, public order officers gave me a certain level of ‘respect’ when they discovered I had experienced training, including being fire bombed. Informally, officers spoke of the ‘baptism of fire’, emphasising the need to be petrol bombed to fully understand what is required of the role. During my own experience, this perception of it being the ‘real’ part of training was heightened when a large percentage of senior officers attending Glennock that day came to observe my baptism, *‘not to put the pressure on, but look how many people have come to watch?’* [Field note 9] Whether they had come to observe the ‘outsider’ being put to the test (this is only suggested because they disappeared following my ‘baptism’) or whether this was simply a coincidence is not known. However, the point remains the same, this particular part of the training was perceived as the main ‘spectacle’ to observe, while all other training had not been observed.

Image 8: My ‘Baptism of Fire’

Arguably, the training reinforces the ‘us versus them’ attitude that has been identified in many different areas of police work (Van Maanen 1978; Manning 1994). The training environment depicts all the worst public order eventualities that a police officer could experience, with no educational environment identifying the unlikelihood of it actually happening. Level-two trained officers are essentially trained to expect the worst from public order deployments, with little training focus given to a graduated response to crowd behaviour, despite the operational responsibility placed upon level-two officers to offer a graduated response in real time. Thus, the training encourages officers to embrace a militarised sentimentality to police work, isolating them from those they police (Herbert 1997). By contrast, during live operations, senior commanders would habitually seek to *avoid* all forms of confrontation where possible, due to the ‘on-the-job’ and ‘in-the-job’ trouble this created (Waddington 1994), but this operational reality never appeared to be communicated during training to L2 rank-and-file officers.

This research is not suggesting that the L2 training being offered at Glennock is entirely without merit. From an operational perspective, police officers identify themselves as the ‘last line of defence’ when things go wrong with regards to social order and to a certain extent they are correct. If we (the public) call the police, we expect them (the police) to know what to do. As such, everything experienced at Glennock is knowledge and should not be displaced as unimportant, however, the issue lies with the fact this particular knowledge is

framed within the training as the only relevant knowledge worth the time to be formally taught. Ultimately, negotiation-based skills (such as effective communication and dialogue) are the responsibility of the individual officer to learn ‘on-the-job’ or from their own efforts. These skills are not perceived as warranted enough to feature within formal organisational training.

Although we can understand the training facility as a bounded region where police remove their performance from the watchful eye of the public and move to the back-region, the region is not quite as bounded as may be interpreted from Goffman’s dramaturgical perspective (Goffman 1959, p. 114). Within this bounded region there is some level of protection offered to the officers from traditional or untrusted ‘outsiders’, but this does not definitively mean that their performance has halted. What was presented within Glennock was simply a different police performance, one where officers were instructed to polish their performance based upon a partial definition of their role.

The reality is that public order police officers could go an entire career without confronting the types of mass disorder that were evident within the Poll Tax Riots of 1990, the student demonstrations of 2010, or the London Riots of 2011. Yet it is precisely this type of disorder many officers remain L2 trained for:

Me: If it’s so bad [being an L2], why not just hand in your ticket?

Officer: ... because if something like that [London Riots] happens again, I want to ensure I’m ready to do my bit for London, that’s the type of policing we join the job for...

Field note 10, Ground-Based, 2016

This officer echoes the most common response I received during my fieldwork when asking why they bothered to remain L2 trained when their treatment was (often) so poor from the organisation.³⁶ Thus, what we are presented with in L2 training at Glennock is ‘painstakingly

³⁶ A common-place conversation with officers was on how poorly L2s were treated by the organisation. As a L2 officer you receive very little financial benefit for the extra skill required for this area – in fact, the £50 annual payment is paid for the overnight stay away from home (whilst training at Glennock) as opposed to being related to the officer being more skilled than their L3 counterparts. In addition to this, due to the staff shortages, officers

fabricated' and the 'illusions' of what officers wish their experiences of public order policing were more regularly 'openly constructed' (see Goffman 1959, p. 114). When asking officers if they thought the training at Glennock mirrored their public order experiences, they would openly laugh at the question and exclaim, '*not at all*' [Field note 11]. This humour regularly displayed evidences an actor 'deluding their audience for what they consider to be their own good' meaning the officers are not 'taken-in' by their own performance (see Goffman 1959, p. 28-29). Instead, officers are acutely aware that the performance they are giving at Glennock is a fabrication of reality in order to pass a test – the test being an accurate and effective performance as defined by police trainers (in this context, the audience). Here, officers are actively partaking in 'make-work' (Goffman 1959, p. 112), skilling themselves with the performative ability to *give the impression* that they are physically ready for robust contact if the necessity presents itself (and therefore so is the organisation).

If one is to interpret the British policing model through one of Peel's principle as '*policing by consent*' the perception of the L2 tactical training as isolated to that of PLT tactical training is problematic (the extent to which policing by consent is true within public-order policing can of course be contested). The isolation of training not only risks the tactic of PLTs and its significance being lost within L2 officers' professional knowledge, this failure to present the

experienced cancelled rest-days and annual leave at very short notice. One officer told me how he had booked annual leave for his partner's birthday but received an aid warning (notification that you are required for duty on a set date) a few days prior. When he phoned the staffing department they informed him that if he found a replacement they would honour his annual leave, which he did. A few hours later (that same day), he received another 'aid warning' for the same event; after contracting the staffing department again to explain their mistake they said they couldn't help him and he would have to work and he missed his partner's birthday. Officer's also discussed how they no longer received any food at events unless they were very large-scale central events. Instead, officers were expected to pay for their lunch themselves (which became a problem for cash-strapped officers) and subsequently claim it back. Many commented how they would lose their receipts over the course of the day, were not given sufficient time to put claims in and ultimately could not be bothered to process the claims. Another common-place experience was being left for many hours, during very hot deployments, in full-kit with no water. Many complained that the organisation saw their duty to provide water to the public way before any consideration of a duty to provide water to their staff. When communicating this last grievance to a senior police leader, they commented of their frustration of stories like this as it demonstrated no initiative of a 'Bronze' to go and buy water for their staff using their police-issued credit card. When speaking with officers it seemed that not everyone was issued a police-issued credit-card. Ultimately, from my research, it appears that organisational welfare towards staff within this area of policing is chaotic and disorganised.

training as interrelated also risks invalidating the use of dialogue as holding a legitimate place within public-order policing. When operationally deployed, the two tactics (alongside others) co-exist together within public-order policing stage and therefore would benefit from being taught as such. This need for training to be conceptualised as interrelated is not new (or specific to public order) and came as a principle recommendation from Glenn et al.'s (2003) work on Community police (see Fielding 2018, p. 13).

The training of L2 officers provides a potential script that can be used when deployed, policing scripts are built up over time and provide craft knowledge of how to act with routine behaviour during a deployment (Fielding 2018, p. 196). However, the L2 training only offers one script: robust response to maintaining the peace and robust response to spontaneous unrest. For many years, officers have formally and informally built up knowledge of 'how best' to respond within a public-order setting. The introduction of the PLTs challenges this taken-for-granted perception; yet, the formal L2 training remains the older, one-dimensional and perhaps outdated 'script'. Focus is on control and how to physically exert that as opposed to inter-personal skills, an issue not new within police training (Graham & Karn 2013, p. 3).

This is not to be taken as a suggestion that confrontation does not occur within public-order settings, it is acknowledged that confrontation alters training 'scripts' (ibid, pp. 197). Further to this, formal training does not necessarily reflect what officer's experience in real-time (McNamara 1967). Yet, unlike areas such as 'street policing' where authors have previously noted young-in-service recruits are encouraged to forget everything they learned in training school (Fielding 2018) and within my own research officers' acknowledgment that the reality of public-order policing was far different, deriding of L2 training was rare. Even when officer's spoke negatively of the L2 training it was always underwritten with a cautious 'what if' the robustness was ever needed (Waddington 1994), or even with a hint of affection for the 'fun' had at Glennock.

PLT Training and the Absence of Dialogue:

This assumption that officers should already be skilled communicators was also taken for granted during the PLT formal training. The two days focused excessively on the law: the human rights legislation and its significance to protest; other popular legislation that PLOs would need to know due to its regular use; and different scenario-based learning to test the

legal knowledge of officers. This was prefaced with, *'you need to know this stuff, your protesters will know it, sometimes better than you, so you need to know it'* [Field note 12].

The training course also sought to educate the officers of different tactics used by protesters, such as lock-ons, and why protesters might be motivated to use such tactics. In addition, the course covered the National Decision-Making Model (College of Policing) and how essential this is to use in order to protect the officer from any decision taken that could result in a legal dispute. At no stage did the officer engage in role-play with challenging scenarios to equip them with an increased experience of crowd mediation.

When discussing the course with various PLOs, all spoke about how much they enjoyed it and how much they had learnt, some citing it as the best training course they had been on.

When asked whether they had learnt any new communication skills they could use within the role, one officer said, *'but that's not what training is for, you'll learn that on the job, won't you? If anything, I wish they'd covered the legislation a bit more'* [Field note 13]. To this comment, all the surrounding officers agreed and went on to discuss legislative issues at length. The significance placed upon more informal 'on the job' training in policing has long been recognised (Banton 1964; Van Maanen 1978; Ker Muir 1977; Manning 2003).

Considerations with respect to the socialisation of officers are in the second half of this chapter.

Contrary to the training of L2 officers, which was full of 'action', PLT training was relaxed and classroom based – my field notes identified multiple times just how bored I was. It involved legal knowledge and scenario-based learning, but was entirely detached from L2 colleagues. Yet operationally, the work of PLTs is far more action-orientated, while their L2 colleagues regularly spend entire deployments on carriers. Speaking with newer PLOs, they would unanimously state, *'no one warns you how tough this role is'* [Field note 14] with comments such as 'challenging', 'mentally and physically draining' and 'really rewarding' regularly being cited. I would take this further and suggest the public order policing experience is largely contradictory of reality; where the organisation paints a picture of 'robustness' and 'hard' policing (L2), the deployment reality is disproportionately the complete opposite (no conflict); yet where the organisation paints a picture of less conflict and focus upon the significance of the law (PLT), the deployment reality is far more 'action-orientated' with disproportionately complex and challenging interactions (for similar see, Innes 2005).

Thus, both sets of formal training identify and engage with only a partial reality of what an officer is likely to experience. For the PLTs, formal training is enhanced by informal socialisation, where an officer quickly experiences the reality of their work. Contrary to this, a level-two officer could be deployed multiple times before experiencing any form of confrontation, let alone disorder.

What training the organisation invests time in is symbolic to the actors within it about what the MPS perceive as important and appropriate. During fieldwork, I felt that I was observing a transitional stage within public order training. The formal conversation had changed – it is now recognised that dialogue and communication play a role in public order policing; yet the organisation still needs to catch up with this conversation, cementing more effectively in training the skills required to execute dialogue and communication. As with the absence of dialogue within formal training, the organisation communicated the officers' perceived roles through their uniform, the analysis of which we will now turn to.

Role Front – Appearance & Uniform:

Policing is fundamentally a job of social encounters; state actors interacting with the wider public, negotiating a myriad of 'faces' (Goffman 1967). These social encounters are fine-tuned and manicured to ensure the best impression is presented of the self (or organisation). The 'front' of an actor refers to performative aspects of an individual which functions 'in a general and fixed fashion to define the situation for those who observe the performance' (Goffman 1959, p. 32). Building on this there is one's 'personal front', items of expressive equipment which identify the performer such as clothing, sex, age and other characteristics (Goffman 1959, p. 34). When deployed 'front-stage' at a public order event, these social encounters are continuous, with little rest for officers, unless they are able to retreat to the protected police space of the carrier. A central element to these social encounters and to the police officers managing perceptions was the uniform they wore.

There is no power without clothes. It is the power that governs the human race. Strip its chiefs to the skin, and no State could be governed; naked officials could exercise no authority; they would look (and be) like everybody else – commonplace, inconsequential. A policeman (sic) in plain clothes is one man; in his uniform he is ten. Clothes and title are the most potent thing, the most formidable influence, in the earth. They move the human race to willing and spontaneous respect for the judge, the general, the admiral, the bishop, the

ambassador, the frivolous earl, the idiot duke, the sultan, the king, the emperor.
No great title is efficient without the clothes to support it.

(Twain 1905, p, 776)

The quotation above denotes the symbolic importance of police uniform (also see Innes 2004) that was evident in a large proportion of the encounters police officers had with the public. A large percentage of interactions with the public encompassed questions about uniform – ‘*are you expecting trouble today?*’ [Field note 15] a regular question to L2 officers; ‘*why are you blue and not yellow like the others?*’ [Field note 16] a regular question to PLOs. The authority police officers carry with them is communicated through the unique items they obtain when graduating to become a warranted officer. Their stab-proof vest communicates the dangerous situations they sometimes are put in. Their notepad and pens communicate the significance of evidence in their role. Their baton and CS spray communicate the legitimised state violence they are allowed to use against another. Their warrant card communicates how they can deprive another of their liberty. All these items symbolically communicate to those outside the organisation and within that police officers are different, they hold legitimised and legalised authority to impose upon others (Bittner 1990). The uniform is part of this, representing a sacred territory – both the sanctity of personal protective equipment (PPE) but also the stability of state power (Holdaway 1983).

Public order policing is no different from this, the props an officer (the actor) uses are acutely stage-managed to express a particular message to the public (the audience) (Goffman 1959). The significance of non-verbal communications is essential in the wider consideration of dialogue. The wearing of specific uniform, the choice to use (or not use) PPE all communicate a specific message to the audience. However, how it is interpreted is subjective (Manning 1997); one may view the L2 public order uniform as a symbol of state oppression, while another may feel confidence that their police force is well equipped to protect them from unknown dangers – their symbolic meaning is therefore double edged (see Barker 2014, p. 3053). Thus, we can understand that even with a well thought out, pre-planned operational message from senior command, ‘the police’ are simultaneously expressing several messages (see Turner 1966). This then becomes increasingly more complex as spontaneous action occurs.

An image of something is an effective way to communicate a message to others (Manning 2003) and how the police look and the impact that has upon the public is widely

acknowledged within senior public order command. From a dramaturgical perspective, the vast considerations over uniform and the messages they convey demonstrates SLT seeking to manage performance disruptions (Goffman 1959, p. 203). The extent to which it was acknowledged, understood and accepted among those on the ground is varied. Senior command would sometimes spend much time in planning meetings debating the different ‘messages’ being transmitted to different groups through police appearance, action or inaction. Even when it was not a topic for extended debate, it was always – at the very least – spoken about and addressed. Furthermore, it appeared that some protest groups – those who were most regularly attending – were equally sensitive to the differences in uniform – ‘*Officer! Officer! What does the ‘U’ mean?_*’ [Field note 17]. Here, the protesters are communicating to the police officers that they understand there has been an escalation in tactics with the deployment of the TSG – who are identifiable through the ‘U’ on their epaulettes.

For PLTs, the physical uniform was less of a focus for officers – while deployed, all social capital was given to their *ability* to mediate with the public, therefore their uniform can largely be perceived as their communicative abilities. Conversely, learning how to put on, wear and operate within the uniform was central to public order learning for L2 officers. Given the discomfort of the uniform, it was also important to learn how to alter the uniform in order to fit the individual officer’s purpose. If they sought increased protection, they would wear every piece of uniform, if officers perceived it to be an ‘easy day’ (meaning they did not expect much or any confrontation), they could afford to not wear some of the (most uncomfortable) protective uniform. Prior to training (for L2 officers) and on completion of training (for PLOs), officers were provided with the required uniform for their speciality. For PLOs, this comprised a single tabard that is baby-blue; for level-two officers, this was an entire ‘kit bag’ with all operationally required uniform.

See below for further detail on the different kits

Image 9: Full body view of Level-Two public order policing uniform

Underneath the top part of the uniform is a 100% cotton long sleeved top. The reason for this is to ensure there is nothing flammable underneath the uniform and against the skin. Prior to my visit to Glennock I only spoke to male officers, who were unable to inform me of any issues around bras. After consulting a female officer, they informed me that a sports bra would suffice (despite it not being cotton). The outer part of the kit (seen in picture) is flame-proof and should repel any fire thrown at an officer.



In addition to the cotton top and leggings are protective pads, explored in diagram two.

Underneath the bottom part of the uniform is a 100% cotton long leggings and underwear. As with the top part, the cotton protects the skin. Again, the outer part of the uniform (see in picture) is flame repellent. Both parts of the uniform are held together with a leather belt, securing it in place.

In my hand are flame proof gloves.

Steel capped public order boots – these are special issue, different from the boots of 'beat duty' uniform. Only available in UK size 3 and upwards.

These small addition to the boots are detachable and are flame-proof. They are to ensure that the top part of the officers' feet is protected. The slide onto the laces and are secured by Velcro.

Image 10: Upper-body Level-Two public order policing protective equipment




Image 11: Lower-body Level-Two public order policing protective equipment



Groin Protector. Larger photo located to the right.

Thigh Protector.

Lower leg and knee protectors. Larger picture located to the right.



Image 12: PLT Uniform – Front-View

Standard beat duty hat. Male officers can choose which hat to wear, many do not like the traditional police helmet as they said they found it uncomfortable. Others liked it due to its tradition – those wearing this helmet were regularly stopped by people requesting photos. Female officers wear the traditional bowler hat.

Standard issue police trousers. Officers have no protective pads beneath their uniform.

Unlike their level-two colleagues' officers are not issued with steel-capped boots as part of the PLT role. Instead they are supposed to wear their normal beat-duty boots they are issued with when they join as a police officer.



Stab proof vest.

Special issue police liaison officer tabard, the blue is distinctive against the yellow of level-two public order officers. The blue colour attracts a lot of public attention, inquiring how they are 'different'.

Liaison officers carry minimal equipment on their belt. They are strongly advised to not get involved in any form of robust policing, but instead of rely on their level-two and level-one colleagues.

Image 13: PLT Uniform – Back-View



The images above identify the starkly different messages being communicated to the public from the police. The L2 uniform physically alters the police officer's appearance and, when in full riot uniform, dehumanises, disidentifies and homogenises the police. Contrary to this, the only difference between a PLO and beat-duty uniform is the blue tabard. Standards of uniform are continuously observed to be of importance to officers. They referenced uniform as a demonstration of 'professionalism', as a way of ensuring safety standards and some even discussed 'pride' in their uniform.

During the training of L2 officers, the uniform and protective kit featured regularly. As L2 is a graduated-standard³⁷ of police work, there was a level of inquisitive excitement and perception of internal significance around the uniform. Newer public order officers were observed examining the kit: the protective pads looked comical; the gloves were moaned about for smaller females; and it altered the body, making officers move differently. In short, it made officers resemble a superhero 'Robocop' character.

Training level-two officers involved timed tests to see whether they were able to 'kit-up' (a term used to refer to officers putting all required uniform on) speedily. Examples were made of officers if they had put on their uniform incorrectly, particularly if that officer was of rank. Due to the protective nature of the uniform, it became a focal point for officers: how it fitted, how it protected, its comfort, its versatility. Given the fact that L2 training centred on disorderly conduct, it is somewhat unsurprising that officers wanted to ensure they are protected.

Image 9 and 10 visually depicts the robustness of the L2 uniform. Within image 9, we can observe how the robust uniform distorts a person's physical appearance: I am approximately 5 foot 3 inches tall and around nine stone in weight, however, when wearing this uniform, the protective pads and layered clothing physically broadened me and the boots pushed me upwards an inch or so. When in full L2 uniform, all humanistic elements to the officer is lost – the sole remaining piece of skin on show (an officer's face) is subsequently covered by a balaclava and NATO helmet (image 10). Furthermore, when dressed in full kit, the ability to effectively communicate is lost due to the restrictive nature of the NATO.

³⁷ Meaning you have to complete mandatory training before being qualified.

Uniform, Communication and Identity

Learning about the uniform, practising wearing it and practising policing tactics wearing it identifies Glennock as a formal back-stage arena for level-two officers to tweak, amend and fine tune their public order performance (Goffman 1959). Through the uniform, the officers – and those in senior command – are able to ascertain different methods of impression management.

Policing can often be viewed as binaries: good versus evil; order versus disorder; right versus wrong. The composition of level-two and PLO uniforms presents another binary of policing: hard versus soft. As can be seen from the images above, the level-two uniform prepares the officer for the worst possible situation, it communicates to the officer that risk and dangers of professional attacks are always present. The occupational hazard of officers being at risk of encountering more danger than others is undeniable – but this perception that public order policing is continuously linked with imminent danger is evidentially unsound, with threat and risk experiencing a ‘conceptual vagueness’ within public order policing (Leach 2017, p. 70). Public order policing operations observed during fieldwork were disproportionately peaceful. Thus, the training is preparing the officer for something that may only occur once (if ever) during an officer’s career. When discussing this an officer commented:

Response policing is spontaneous and you can’t be in riot gear the whole time, so basically we patrol in what’s practical, [distinguishing this from public-order policing, where officers] prepare for the worse and hope it doesn’t happen, because you’re dealing with a protest group who are potentially 20-100 or so and if they decide that they’re going to cause trouble, you don’t have time to go back and get kitted up... it’s what’s practical at the time.

Interview, PS, Level-Two Trained and PLO, February 2018

Actors coordinate roles to achieve interactional order (Scott 2015) and the uniform that officers are issued helps to frame the actor’s perception of that ‘order’. The type of uniform an officer is deployed in communicates to that officer the ‘type’ or ‘style’ of police work that would be accepted as legitimate to the organisation, further identifying the level of discretion available while maintaining order (McCabe and Wallington 1988). For PLOs, the uniform communicates their de-escalated approach – taking out all the ideology of the role, PLOs cannot afford to get involved in physically robust disputes as they will not be fully protected. This forces an officer to recognise the fact they are physically equal to their counterparts, meaning that their policing style relies on them being able to talk their way out of any rising confrontation, or if necessary remove themselves from that area – referred to by PLTs as

‘tactically relocating’. Contrasting to this, the level-two uniform communicates their physical prowess. If they are not kept ‘back-stage’ on the carriers, they are most likely to be located on cordon or creating a human line to direct traffic. Unlike what they experience in training, their most frequent on-the-job learning is their operational goal of *symbolically* communicating their ability to be robust, if required. They are a constant non-verbal reminder of the legitimate state coercion that can be used if the organisation deems it necessary – they are, essentially, a symbolic threat. As such, PLTs represent the ‘trade and truth’ of police work in a public order context, while level-twos communicate the ‘threat’ (Ker Muir 1977, p. 48).

Shifting the Policing Performance:

For Goffman (1959, p. 32) a performance is ‘all the activity marked by his (*sic*) continuous presence before a particular set of observers’. The uniform shows us one element of how a policing actor crafts their role, the informal socialisation of officers also provides insight into the mechanism of role design, an important consideration of Goffman’s (see Scott 2015, p. 83). PLTs recognised that they were required to police differently within this new public-order role and much of this performance knowledge was gained through shadowing other valued policing actors. As such, PLTs recognised that the process ‘role selection’ was different to prior public-order experience and they had to adopt their performance to best fit the demands of this new policing routine. Of course, these performative routines are counter to what the audience expect and therefore are open to increased criticism when performative flaws are seen (Goffman 1959, p. 59) meaning that officers were keen to be socialised within the new role with the key elements of role success being transferred from colleagues.

The socialisation of officers and the significance it carries has long been recognised within policing scholarship (Skolnick 1966; Ericson 1982; Van Mannen and Manning 1978; Manning 2003; Charman 2017). The socialisation process identifies the continued development of policing knowledge (della Porta 1998) about how, when, why and who to police. The socialisation of PLTs into their role (or any officer into their role) fits most appropriately with ‘recipe knowledge’ (Chan 1997), different learning acquired over time that enables officers increased ease in achieving the desired outcomes. This could be holding back to avoid any unnecessarily ‘trouble’ (Chatterton 1979) or the following codes of practice to protect one another from things that can go wrong within the role (Reiner 1992). The

socialisation of officers equates to police as a ‘craft’ with significance placed upon on-the-job learning (Van Maanen 1978; Rowe et al. 2016).

Within the fieldwork, far more capital and emphasis were placed upon how a PLO learned and performed their role away from the training setting. The Gateway Team would regularly seek to pair officers together that appeared to have similar working ‘styles’ in order to try to appease this continued development.³⁸ Where PLOs working style ‘rubbed’ negatively, the Gateway Team recognised the impact this could have upon the wider working order of a day and sought to avoid these pairings. Officers would gain cultural capital within the specialism as particularly skilful and would, as a result, become an informal ‘trainer’. Equally, some officers gained reputations as lazy or lacking creative ability and, as such, were avoided by both the Gateway Team and PLO colleagues.

The role of a PLO is often described by officers as ‘not for everyone’, with many suggesting you have to be a particular ‘type’ of officer to excel in the role and achieve its objectives. Like community policing objectives, PLTs are opening the policing ‘doors’ to liaise with anyone and therefore they risk being the face of policing and challenge against their policing tactics (for similar see, Herbert 2006; Mulcahy & Orde 2015). During one visit to Glennock, an instructor with many years’ service spoke about the pros and the cons of the role within policing, stating, *‘I could never do their job [due to the ‘grief’ the officers experience], but I’ll admit I have a respect for what they do [how hard they work]’* [Field note 18]. The PLT role is dedicated to co-producing community solutions to any current or forming issues within a crowd setting with the community. As such, it is more tactically aligned with roles such as PCSOs or neighbourhood policing – a ‘softer’ tactical option (see, for instance, Innes 2005) for policing public order compared to L2, L1 or other public order policing options. Despite this, those in leadership positions – for example, the Gateway Team or PLT trainers – always identified the significance of how hard the reality of the role was and, as such, the necessity to have hard-working and resilient officers.

However, despite this desired ‘ideal’ type of PLO recruit, the Gateway Team and PLT instructors were not always in a position to separate those who ‘performed’ well in training

³⁸This is the full-time dedicated team. During fieldwork, the Gateway Team was made up of approximately five officers, this number was growing as I finished data collection.

but were not applying for the role due to the dedication to this ‘type’ of policing. During the course of my research, the PLT role was relatively new and was largely well respected by senior management due to its perceived commitment to ‘policing by consent’. Many officers were sceptical and referred to it as ‘flavour of the month’ – cynically arguing that it is a popular tactic now because it fits an agenda, but is not embedded into public order policing. As such, through the grapevine many reasons were cited for becoming a PLO – officers acknowledged how it was valued among senior leaders and therefore would likely aid promotion; it was acknowledged as a ‘stepping stone’ to other qualifications perceived to be superior, such as hostage negotiation; and some did it only because their sergeant wanted them to.

Yet what was identified by many in the Gateway Team or informal leadership positions as essential to any strong PLO was the mind-set they adopted while in the role. It was exclusively identified how different this policing approach was to the traditional hierarchical structure of public order policing and that there was a dramatic ‘shift’ in thinking which had to occur for people occupying the role of PLO. From a dramaturgical perspective, the Gateway Team openly looked for officers who could ‘shift’ their policing performance away from the long-term acceptance of over-reliance on robust tactics and skills.

‘It’s getting your head around that mind-set. It’s something I’ve had to do but I don’t think people realise quite how difficult it is when you come into PLT because we have got this strange tarnished view of protest that it’s a bad thing and it’s not a bad thing, it’s just another thing that happens in London!’

Interview, PS Gateway Team, PLO, 2017

As this interview data identified, the shift in mind-set was a real hurdle to many officers: no longer viewing large crowds as inherently risky (but still with potential risk within it); seeing crowd members as people to communicate *with* (not *to*) in order to reach a mediated response; or even learning to challenge colleagues. As such, the public order ‘ritual’ had to be fundamentally altered. Police work as a form of ritual has been explored previously (Manning 1997), but it is within the changing of the ritual where the importance lies within PLT socialisation. Experienced PLOs – those who were actively involved with the role – recognised the tactics less cemented place in the wider public order policing family and yet passionately believed in the significance of its place. As such, PLOs appeared to be relatively protective of the role – not wanting any police action to damage their ‘blue-brand’ – their

group identity of being ‘good’ police officers distinct from their level-two colleagues. Thus, away from the classroom, the informal socialisation of a PLO was observed to be essential in ensuring those actively involved encompassed the PLTs’ alternative public order mind-set and did not damage the perception of the tactic. As identified in the interview data above, to cement the ritual among newer PLOs was to ensure that their mind-set (how they perceived crowds and how they policed those crowds) was of central importance.

When asking PLOs what it took to be ‘good’ within their role, officers almost exclusively responded ‘resilient’ and ‘hard-working’. PLOs would often go on to offer a variety of different required skills, such as being confident and having an ability to talk to anyone. Yet it was resilience and hard-work which were always cited. Under their umbrella of a ‘softer tactic’, the PLT redefined their understanding of ‘hard policing’ and ‘real police work’ by ensuring they were always seen as proactive.

Throughout the fieldwork, PLOs spoke of how ‘new’ they still were as a tactic and, as such, how much pressure they felt to continuously prove the significance of their role to colleagues and senior officers. PLOs who displayed any sign of being lazy or someone who would give up with a group too easily were not considered ‘strong’ PLOs. Many commented how infuriating it was to observe their PLO colleagues detached from crowds – ‘policing from the sidelines’ – and not working hard to negotiate with groups – often described as ‘not getting stuck in’.

Due to this understanding that their role was not as cemented in the public order policing landscape compared to more traditional tactics, the Gateway Team appeared protective over which officers would go to internal planning meetings, which officers got introduced to key members of the public in groups and so on. Newer PLOs would be given less prominent roles within the operation until they had proved themselves and their ability to other members of the team.

The Gateway Team inferred the proactiveness of an officer by how often they volunteered for ‘aid’ as a PLO. The Gateway Team require a PLO to work five events per year to retain their PLO status. Despite there being over 80 qualified PLOs in the MPS, a considerably smaller number of officers (around 23) were regularly seen to be working large-scale events, far more than their required five events.

Volunteering for increased 'aid' exposed PLOs to increased experience on the ground. This process of socialisation effectively became on-the-ground training. Experience ensures that PLOs are increasing their knowledge base for alternative ways of interacting with crowds. The information they gather over increased deployment informs their judgement on a variety of contexts, meaning they accumulate knowledge of how best and most effectively to respond to different situations – becoming a chess master instead of a novice (see Fielding 2018, p. 195).

Storytelling:

The role of storytelling is not new in policing scholarship, although it remains an understudied area (Van Hulst 2013). Some have gone as far as identifying policing as a 'storytelling organisation' (Smith et al. 2014), where storytelling can be viewed as a conversational ritual. From the perspective of this ethnographic work, police stories play a central role in ritualistic learning. They are told, consumed and dramatized in a myriad of settings and with a myriad of forms. Some represent new learning – stories that allow colleagues to discuss how an unusual and difficult job was handled; some represent comical value – stories that provide entertaining narrative about policing experiences; some represent darker narratives – stories that contain warnings to other officers; and some represent myths and legends – stories that have circulated a police force for generations, with the reality highly questionable. These represent only a few examples of police stories, yet they all contain one commonality – they facilitate learning, functioning as a searchlight instead of a spotlight, identifying police practice as fluid (Shearing & Ericson 1991, p. 489).

For PLOs, storytelling appeared to be as significant in their socialisation as any other area of police work. Yet what proved to be most noteworthy within these stories was the form that they took. PLOs disproportionately told stories that focused on their own or others' ability in de-escalating situations using their communicative skills. This contrasted with observations of storytelling of traditional public order policing tactics (L1 and L2) that often (although not exclusively) focused on masculine stories of 'roll-arounds' (physical confrontation which required an officer to physically dominate the other, often physically rolling around on the ground); shield-related (stories requiring the use of an officers' shield either as protection

from missiles or as a tool to incapacitate the forming threat); or, a ‘stick’ fight (confrontations requiring the use of a baton).

The PLO stories did feature within formal training, as a means of communicating to the police students the ‘type’ of police work that was expected within this area of public order. Use of storytelling in formal training appeared to take the form of *‘how would you feel about this?’* *‘Would you mind doing similar practice to produce these results?’* [Field note 19] From informal discussions with instructors outside of the classroom, it was perceived that these stories allow the police student to understand whether they would be capable of such practice and allow them to unenroll from the course if necessary – this was not uncommon.

Linking to the exploration of uniform earlier in this chapter, if we perceive uniform as a means of identity, protection and the main prop for an actor’s performance, the PLT uniform can most accurately be seen as their negotiating skills – as almost every PLO spoken with suggested, *‘the best piece of kit I can ever use as a copper is my mouth’* [Field note 20]. Officers’ perceived their ability to ‘speak to anyone’ as central to their ability to do their job effectively (for similar, see Charman 2017). Yet the PLT tactic itself was still relatively new, meaning that officers were perhaps less experienced in negotiating in public order specific contexts. As such, the police stories enabled officers to define, learn and understand what ‘good-practice’ looked like within this area of police work.

Furthermore, the stories identify how, as a newer tactic, the PLO culture is still be built and established; the precedence given to stories of de-escalation abilities highlights how the culture is guiding the officer into operationally understanding what ‘good practice’ looks like within this role (see Ericson et al. 1987; Chan 1997). The stark difference in ‘storytelling’ practice highlights that the form in which police stories take is contextual (Van Hulst 2013) and thus identifies cultural practice as fluid, not monolithic.

Within the PLO socialisation, the stories that were respected and held cultural capital were ones that showed the officer being able to negotiate, not to force their way to a resolution – as it was widely accepted among PLOs that if force was required, the tactical role of PLT had ultimately failed. This is similar to perceptions of ‘street craft’ (see Kerr Muir 1977). The core focus of PLT ideology is a preventative approach to policing, seeking to co-produce ‘order’ through a communicative approach. This can be seen as the ‘craft’ of a PLT and the

stories that were celebrated as skilful matched this. Contrasting within the more traditional public order setting, it is the harder policing tactics that are accepted and expected of officers and the storytelling matched this.

This preference for alternative police stories is significant for training and socialisation, as it relates to the wider identity of what it means to be a 'good' PLO. Generating this performance of a good PLO is influenced by what the officers observe being congratulated and boasted about as 'good policing', facilitating increased knowledge of what they should be replicating on the ground, "transferring competency knowledge can inspire refinement and development, by making neglected features explicit and through learners volunteering points from their own experience" (Fielding 2018, p. 197). Professional competence in empathising with another's point of view, a key element to police-work, is conditioned by an officer's wider brief, their perception of a situation, their expected role and the values they attach to it and – importantly – the reference group of their performance (such as peers and supervisors) (see *ibid*). As such, positive reinforcement for de-escalated approaches to policing becomes the 'Gucci' (see footnote on page 135) policing for those within the 'in-group' to emulate.

Conclusion:

To conclude, Glennock demonstrates another policing 'stage', where actors are competing to define public order policing. Like other policing stages, it contains fundamental contradictions between the perceptions and reality of police work.

Formal policy and practice dictate that dialogue and communication and liaison/mediation practices are essential to public order policing. Yet the skills required to achieve a communicatively accomplished public order workforce are absent from both the level-two training and PLT training. For the PLTs, this is buffered by on-the-job learning, immediately exposing officers to challenging and complex encounters with learning from more experienced PLOs expected. Contrastingly, on-the-job learning does not teach level-two officers anything about communication. In addition to the training preparing the officers for the worst-case scenario, their on-the-job training reinforces their role as a symbolic threat, while senior command insists all officers 'should be' communicating effectively.

The uniform also reflects the paradoxical nature of the public order environment. The protective uniform provided to level-two officers provides an image of 'hard' policing. Yet it is rarely needed – to the extent that officers often do not wear it all to allow for more comfort and ease of movement. The PLTs are only issued with a tabard, minimalistic uniform, with only the ordinary protective equipment of any deployed officer. Despite this, they are in the centre of crowds – where the perceived imminent danger exists – but rarely require any protection.

Through the informal learning of officers, we see another fundamental contradiction occur. Level-two officers are perceived as the 'hard' line of policing, with the PLT viewed as a 'soft' option. Yet the traditionally 'macho' practice– being in the 'centre' of any perceived threat, getting face-to-face with escalating tensions – is fulfilled by PLTs. Through formal training and informal learning, a core ideological difference exists between the two tactics – with PLTs understanding dialogue as an exchange, with interaction as reciprocal. Comparatively, level-two officers appear to understand dialogue as a direction or order which needs to be followed by the public.

The PLTs represent an ideological shift in public order policing where the organisation has always focused on responding to escalating disorder. Comparatively, PLTs are a preventative tactic, evidencing a fundamental shift in the tactical approach to policing large-scale events. Not only can we observe a shift in the operational approach to policing such events, but my research demonstrates how the PLT role requires a mindset shift from officers. As such, we observe a different focus on 'police craft' within the informal socialisation of officers, celebrating and commending de-escalated approaches to police-citizen interaction.

Chapter VI: Protest

Introduction:

The previous findings chapter of this thesis considered the training of public order police officers; this chapter is the first of two chapters exploring in ‘real time’ police-citizen interaction. Protest forms a large part of the public order units’ weekly events list. These can last for longer periods of time – such as Balfour 100; they can be large in scale with thousands of attendees – such as protests for/against Brexit; or, they can be only a small number of people. No matter the topic or size, what united all forms of protest throughout the fieldwork period was the level of passion and emotion displayed. The political context of these events can be very poorly circulated within mainstream media, such as African Lives Matter (not to be confused with Black Lives Matter) who protest against slavery; or they can attract much media attention, such as the English Defence League (EDL). The fieldwork introduced me to a whole new world of injustices and the people who are protesting for change.

In among these protesters are the officers, charged with facilitating the rights of individuals to express themselves peacefully. The number of officers deployed to an event varies dependent on the level of perceived ‘risk’ that it carries. This risk can be understood in terms of dangers to the public, but also perceptions of the dangers towards police legitimacy if they were to lose control over an event. As Waddington (1994) has pointed out previously, public order events are never just engineered through one tactic, or one team, but through a myriad of different policing units, working over a range of geographies.

The chapter that follows will explore two central features of the fieldwork: back-stage planning meetings of events and front-stage police interaction during protests. The opening section will explore the performative nature of police planning, considering it from the perspective of what symbolic meaning is behind the meetings, as opposed to simply a superficial reflection of the meeting’s content. As the PLTs only form one small aspect of a public order operation, the field notes and data that feature in the first section are considering public order policing as a whole policing field. Present at these meetings were Criminal Investigation Department (CID), firearms units and partner agencies, among many others. Thus, the performative nature of planning meetings features interactions with many different

‘types’ of police officers. The second half of this chapter focuses specifically upon ground-based interaction experienced by PLTs, exploring both the significance of ‘space’ within these interactions, in addition to police ‘lying’.

Back-Stage Interaction: Planning Meetings

Planning meetings form a key part of the back-stage processes of a public order policing operation. The front-stage policing of protest – the performances we more regularly observe (either via media or attendance) – is not one-dimensional, it is part of a long-term finely tuned event with much back-stage activity. The event itself (front-stage) and the planning of an event (back-stage) come together to form a performance in its entirety – you cannot consider one without the other. Planning meetings formed a key part of the back-stage policing processes and my fieldwork. For this thesis, they provide another element to the policing performance, albeit within a more protected frame (Goffman 1972) and highlight a different form of dialogue and communication to that which takes place on the front-stage.

The detailed planning of an operation is a formal requirement, involving consideration of various aspects such as intelligence, legal advice and clarity of the rationale of the policing purpose at any event (Beggs et al. 2012): 3-4). Legal authors such as these have sought to articulate the different legal elements underpinning the planning of public order policing operations, which are essential for our knowledge. The legal requirement for detailed documentation of an event evidences a different form of accountability than what we observe in the front-stage. As we will see, the back-stage planning meetings provide a region with increased staging control (comparative to the front-stage) where policing actors can ensure appropriate documentation evidence for an event. Through this lens, it is far more effective to consider the performative nature behind planning meetings.

Furthermore, within back-stage planning meetings we see a far smaller group of ‘key’ actors, invited by those in command to contribute their area of knowledge. Within this region, police to a large extent can control who is in attendance, what can be said, the manner in which it can be stated, and the method and content of what is ultimately recorded. This significantly differentiates it from the front stage, where the audience has far more opportunities to express and articulate their opinions. Restricted access to these backstage meetings therefore makes it

essential for a more complex overall understanding of the role of policing within both the rule of law and the imposition of order.

For Goffman, the back-stage region is an area where an actor relaxes out of character and their performance is 'knowingly contradicted' (Goffman 1959: 114). From this point it is reasonable to take issue with my definition of this region as back-stage; yet, within context of this thesis where I am contrasting police-controlled regions with regions that are open to influence and interference from protesters, revellers or other event related personnel who have not been deemed 'trusted' enough to be invited into police space, it is the most appropriate to definition.

Due to the size of London and the number of public order events that occur (daily), policing operations are divided up between boroughs³⁹ and the central planning team dependent on scale, officer requirements, geography or level of controversy. For example, a small-scale protest (say, 20 people) in an east London park, protesting an international injustice that had not attracted much media attention in the UK, would be left to the responsibility of that specific borough – they would likely not police it at all and only respond to any disturbance if it was to be reported, or alternatively assign one PLT from their own borough if they felt it necessary. ⁴⁰ But an EDL small-scale protest in east London outside a mosque would most likely fall to the responsibility of the central planning team. Furthermore, there are events that are unlikely to pose much more risk that would need to be centrally planned due to their size and the disruption the event causes London as a whole – an entertaining example here could be Santacon, an annual pub crawl where people dress as Santa.

³⁹ At the time of my fieldwork, this was accurate. Following the end of my fieldwork, the MPS went through a structural change in an attempt to deal with the increasing work and falling police officer numbers as a result of the austerity measures imposed by government. As such, the MPS is now formally divided into Basic Command Units (BCUs), which are geographical areas which have adjoined neighbouring boroughs (and therefore resources) into one. Informally, officers still speak of 'boroughs' they belong to and police within, not BCUs.

⁴⁰ Borough's prefer to keep their own officers policing within the borough as opposed to bringing in outside officers from neighbouring boroughs due to the cost this incurs on loaning out the officers from their daytime role. For example, if an officer in Southwark borough is requested for PLO 'aid' in Lambeth (the next borough over), Lambeth is required to pay for that officer in order to cover the missed duties in Southwark. As such, loaning officers can become very expensive and is not desirable for those in charge of budgets.

During my fieldwork, I only attended planning meetings for large-scale events or those that were attracting larger policing resources due to their perceived controversial nature or risk. This was due to the fact that I was based at Lambeth HQ and these meetings were easily accessible for me. An ethnographic understanding of formal planning meetings is significant to the development of a wider understanding of police interaction on the ground as, when an officer speaks to a protester, this interaction is not totally unstructured or random, it is part of an operation that senior leaders and those operating within a planning role have attempted to meticulously design and control. Formal planning meetings – and the documentation attached to these meetings – bring to light another element to policing performative routine. Records of meetings are always kept, with everyone in attendance physically writing down their name, number and reason for attendance. As such, even this small act gives us immediate insight into the wider significance of formal planning meetings, as ‘people assembl[ing] and us[ing] records with some goal in mind’ (Cochran, Gordon and Krause 1980, p. 6).

The level of the intensity in the planning that occurred was often dependent on expectations about the event itself, for example: how much media attention it might gain; who and how many people might be in attendance; political motivation; level of risk and so forth. The largest series of protests and events that occurred during my fieldwork was Balfour 100, a series of events celebrating and protesting the 100-year anniversary of the Balfour declaration. Planning meetings took place continuously, with many different sub-planning events due to the number of events happening over the week and the number of VIPs and VIP events arranged. However, there were also planning meetings that resulted in a very large policing response, yet experienced in a very low-level of attendance, such as Million Mask March 2017.

Staging the meeting

Meetings would normally begin with everyone congregating outside the meeting room. People would spend this time catching up with one another and speaking about the upcoming meeting. They would ask each other for relevant favours and speak over what they were expecting from the upcoming meetings. Often these police officers had not seen each other in some time (if it was early on in the meeting stage) and would immediately start discussing job-related topics, gossip and rumours. These pre-meets were very informal, people would be looking around to see who they knew and often taking interest in those they did not know. However, as will become more evident later, these informal pre-meets can be understood as

more informative in terms of ‘planning content’ compared to formally defined ‘planning meetings’.

When people enter into the meeting room, everyone appeared to know their relevant spaces to take. Meeting rooms would most often be large rectangular rooms with a number of desks and chairs, but rarely enough for the amount of people in attendance. The Silver Commander would always take the space nearest the phone, as a number of people would often phone in to the meeting – but Silver was ordinarily one of the last to enter the room. Next to Silver would normally be their planners (often PCs or Sergeants), Chief of Staff and Bronzes. After these seats were full, others would file around the room, with those of lower ranks or those who had less to say trying to secure a seat at the back of the room furthest away from Silver.

I attended my first planning meeting today, I had a ridiculous feeling of nerves that they might be expecting me to say something intelligent. I felt super awkward as I entered into the room, such stupid emotions such as not knowing the ‘informal rules’ such as where to sit. Yet I found much comfort when I looked around the room and saw there were many other sheepish faces in the room. I even saw two PCs jokingly fighting with each other to get the space furthest away from Silver.

Diary Entry 1, 2016

The arrangement of seating often led to some awkward embarrassments when people were sat in the ‘wrong’ places, though this was very rarely said out loud,⁴¹ but instead by people recognising their mistake after noticing their most immediate colleagues were not sat near them, or when they noticed the paperwork and day book of a senior officer had been left on the desk ‘reserving’ the officer’s space.

Meetings would always proceed in the same way, with brief introductions around the room so that everyone knew who else was present in the room. Alongside this was an attendance register on which everyone was expected to fill out their name, department and contact

⁴¹ Only once or twice did I hear more senior ranking officers asking an officer to move and, when this happened, it was normally by a senior officer who was less popular, relying on their rank to show dominance instead of holding informal respect from the rank-and-file officers.

number. Once the introductions had finished within the room, Silver would then move to the phone to inquire who was on the line. This would normally result in more comedy as those on the line sought to have their names checked as present, leading them all to speak at the same time. This occurrence often broke the formality of the meetings for a few minutes, as everyone in the room would laugh as people's names slowly got ticked off the attendance sheet.

Meetings would then begin to discuss the relevant event, normally moving round the room based on the order of the previous meeting's minutes or based on who Silver wished to hear plans from. The fieldwork showed that these meetings were some of the only times that all leading staff involved in the event would meet together in the same room to discuss relevant information. It was therefore anticipated that these meetings would be long-winded, technical, challenging and complex. However, very soon it became clear that it was essential to understand these meetings as a form of bureaucratic performative action rather than to understand them with reference to the specific public order operation they were meant to be planning.

Those in attendance were not always warranted officers, but also police staff and external partners. For instance, traditional outsiders (those who are not police officers, but instead 'partners') or insider-outsiders (those police officers not based in public order planning full-time – for example, a tactical firearms officer or CID intelligence officers). Or, more uncommonly Doctoral students. Although initially I would have classed myself as a traditional outsider, as the months of fieldwork progressed I would transition my status to an 'outsider-insider'. There were even times where officers would note my absence from meetings, subsequently seeking me out to ask why I had not attended and if I needed any information about what had been discussed.

The various actors within the room highlight that not everyone within the meeting is a trusted colleague one can speak openly in front of, as they are often unknown or not a member of one's immediate team (considered below in 'outsiders'). However, the area in which these meetings take place are controlled, concealed and restricted for partners who are invited to the meeting only. These partners hold a role of significance within the wider operation: council representatives, stakeholders, other policing departments. Unless an actor has permission to be in the meeting by a senior leader, they will not access the region.

Control over space ensures ‘vital secrets’ (Goffman 1959, p. 116) of the show are protected from outsiders deemed not trusted enough to be invited to the meeting. Documentation available to those within formal planning meetings will contain information that will be ‘kept hidden’ wherever possible to facilitate the impression that the police are ‘in control’ of the event (such as: level of resourcing available at the event, level of abstractions from other boroughs, level of risk and so forth). Although much of this information could likely be requested via a Freedom of Information Request, the bureaucratic process of achieving that is extremely lengthy.

Chain of Command

The arrangement of formal planning meetings is always the same; these are scheduled a number of weeks or months in advance, depending on how much notice the planning team had. As I only observed the planning of large-scale protests, these were always buffered with enough notice given by the relevant protest group. Those in attendance listed on the event would receive all relevant information about the upcoming event and meetings via email. This responsibility falls to the main full-time planners, normally one or two police officers – predominately PCs but also sometimes sergeants.

These PCs would then be responsible for making sure everything was in place for the upcoming meetings. They would chase different officers for their relevant plans (for example, each Bronze will have their own tactical plan that they feed into Silver, working to Gold’s strategic intentions). These plans would then all be collated to allow Silver to review and ensure they correlate with her/his intentions and Gold’s strategic intentions. Throughout the fieldwork, the latter always seemed to be of a similar focus, considering the police’s core responsibilities:

- The protection of life and property;
- The prevention and detection of crime; and
- The maintenance of the Queen’s peace.

Bronze's plans would consider a range of factors, ranging from potential terrorist threats, to the type of dress code they thought officers should wear.⁴²

The formal leader of planning meetings was Silver or, if they were unable to attend (this was rare), their Chief of Staff. All attention was paid to Silver and relevant polite language used (Ma'am, Sir, Guv, Boss). All questions and potential solutions were initially directed towards them – thus, all relevant performative respect was given to the hierarchical leader of the operation. However, control and knowledge, in reality, was disproportionately possessed by PCs – those who hold complex and in-depth knowledge of their own particular specialities.

One of the officers asks a question around planning, a few other begin to throw ideas together, Silver recognises that all are a possibility, but doesn't come to a definitive solution – 'Where's X [nickname for a public order planner]?' Everyone looks around, but the officer isn't present. 'Why's X not here? I'll need to speak with him, he'll know what to do. Leave it with me and I'll let you know when I do.'

Field note 1, Protest Planning Meeting, 2017

Within the above field note, the officer in question is a long-in-service PC, specialising in tactical command and often sits within the Silver suite to offer advice and guidance to Silver during events. He is well respected throughout the ranks and possesses a high level of professional 'capital' within the public order policing world. The field note exemplifies the complexity of authority and power within policing. The Silver in question was also operationally very well respected among colleagues and there appeared to be no judgement from colleagues and no embarrassment at seeking further clarity from a lower ranking officer. This type of leadership was most common throughout office-based fieldwork, however, there were some senior officers – often those who were less well respected among the rank-and-file – who exerted their authority through rank instead of ability.

The Performative Nature of Meetings

⁴² Please see Appendix One for the draft format of a typical plan.

Early on during fieldwork, I anticipated planning meetings would be long-winded, heavy in detail, difficult to follow and significant in the process of the public order operation. After a short number of months of fieldwork, I soon realised that these meetings took place predominately for legal reasons; to ensure that the officers had – on paper – met the requirements of an operation, to plan effectively and efficiently. In their work on the rhetoric of records, Van Maanen & Pentland (1994) state that official records that different organisational bodies produce are done so with a specific audience in mind – the documents are created to present a particular image to a particular audience. Thus, although they carry much significance internally, they always have a particular reader in mind (ibid, pp. 53-54). As such, we need to consider records and documentation within the context that they are produced.

Different documentation accompanying the meeting setting included: meeting minutes; sign-in sheet; intelligence documents; event plans; legal frameworks and so forth. Applying Van Maanen & Pentland's (1994) work to the planning meeting setting, we can question the significance of different factors: why are these meetings being held? To whom is the rhetoric within these meetings directed? Who reads and reviews the documentation produced following these meetings – if anyone? When we explore the planning meetings from this perspective, a new appreciation can be gathered for the performative nature of them within the overall policing operation.

Each meeting had a very similar performative routine. Silver would progress around the table to speak to each individual about the progress of their plans, with most saying they had '*nothing further to add*' from the notes provided pre-meeting or, if they had a question, it was normally of basic structure, which someone in the room would be able to answer there and then or notify the questioner that they would speak to them about it after the meeting.

In reality, planning appeared to take place through two formations. Firstly, 'off the shelf' (Waddington 1994) plans from previous large-scale events were utilised. These were in-depth documents that detailed previous operationally successful plans from colleagues who had been in command in previous years. Senior officers were able to take learning and advice from these documents. It is my understanding that these official documents were not regularly altered as they were believed to work.

It's clear Sx. is nervous about this upcoming event, they've gone above and beyond in meticulously documenting their pre-event planning inclusive of additional training of tactics for officers. It's their first event as Sx., from informal chatter among officers I gather that Sx. feels like everyone is watching (which I guess they are!). During an early planning meeting, Sx. commented *'there's not really any need to alter X's [previous Sx.] plan, it worked last year, so I'm sure it'll work this year.'*

Field note 2, Protest Planning Meeting, 2017

Secondly, I quickly gathered that the 'real' planning (the planning I had anticipated observing prior to fieldwork) was being conducted elsewhere, a staging area I would classify as 'back-back stage', an area of operational action that no 'outsider' is likely to gain access to (unless perhaps conducting covert research). As such, instead of a binary 'front-stage' 'back-stage' region, I am re-classifying Goffman's (1959) 'back-stage' region like the layers of an onions, with each layer being peeled back representing a 'deeper' level of 'back-stage', one in which entry to becomes increasingly controlled.

For Goffman, any situation organised through social moves constitutes a frame of a social reality which are split with frame-breaks (see Collins 1996, p. 54). The planning meetings I observed evidence a frame-break from the main front-stage performance that would be viewed by a large and semi-unpredictable audience (attendees, passers-by, media and so forth). Although there is still evidence of performance within these meetings, all actors are aware that they are not being observed by their main (and often critical) audience and use this frame-break as a means of evidencing their contribution to the front-stage performance. This front-stage performance is vulnerable to extreme embarrassment and therefore this evidence to 'ass-cover' (Van Maanen 1978) is vital. As such, if we again think of the onion, we can understand this back-back stage region as one of the early layers being peeled back. However, it is still most accurate to consider this region as 'back-stage' as it is providing the actors with a 'safer' space to navigate and negotiate the social moves that will occur front-stage during the event.

'Outsiders'

Within my classification of the 'back-stage' region there are still outside actors to the public-order policing team present (for example council representatives, other policing departments). However, the meeting is a 'team of actors' as, through uniting to coordinate the public-order event in a pre-arranged (via planning meetings) structure, these back-stage actors are

‘cooperating [as a team] together to present their activity in a particular light’ (Goffman 1959: 106). For all parties involved, they have a vested interest in the operation being concluding as straight-forward and peaceful as possible, as they are all (formally) registered stakeholders of the event and can therefore latterly be held to account for their own role and responsibilities if anything in the performance was to ‘go wrong’. Yet, this is notwithstanding the variation to which outsiders are trusted (some outsiders, who have worked on many previous events with the police, carry more trust than others).

As such, I began to interpret these back-stage meetings as a tick-sheet formality for the wider front-stage policing operation.

We have just left another planning meeting, lots of key players in the room and yet more evidence that this is just performance. An hour-long meeting with many words spoken but very little said. I decide to hang around busying myself in a corner of the room (ironically manipulatively creating a ‘performance’ of doing other work) and observe all the officers lingering talking among one another. Sx. has already left. I hear a firearms officer say to his colleague, ‘yeah that’s exactly how I want our plan to look – good idea’, it’s the most dynamic I’ve seen any of the officer’s with regards to planning. ‘Look, I’ll call you in the week and we can get our heads together and get it down on paper.’ Looking at all the other officers in conversation with each other – this is real communication, this is how I expected the planning meetings to look. Is this where the planning happens?

Field note 3, Post-Meeting, 2016

Although I was never able to gain ‘real’ access to these informal planning meetings, but field note data enables confidence that they do occur on a regular basis. This is a practice that I understand to take place across policing – not solely public order – officers commented to me that within specialist units or response teams, you would often have formal briefings about what was to be done within a shift, which would then be informally deconstructed and altered within carriers, cars, break areas, or locker rooms. As such, I surmise that informal planning of operations were taking place during after-work drinks, coffee shops, over the phone, passing conversations among colleagues and so on. The ‘formal’ planning meetings were instead a ‘formality’ of ‘arse-covering’ to ensure that, if the organisation was ever investigated, key players were able to ‘evidence’ that legally required planning meetings had taken place.

Furthermore, it is this variation in trust referenced above, that impacts policing actors’ comfort to talk openly. There was often a ‘competitive’ atmosphere within planning meetings

– especially those protests that were deemed as carrying increased risk. This resulted in actors having stilted, guarded and formal dialogue that hindered free-flowing communication.

Within his work on organisation cultures, Schein (2010) identifies three generic sub-cultures within an organisation: the operator, the design and the executive. In relation to policing, the operators represent the rank-and-file within policing, those working on the front-line who believe that people are the centre of the organisation. Operators understand that human interaction, trust and teamwork are key to effective operations and, most notably, they accept from the outset the likelihood that they will need to deviate from formal procedures in order to get the job done (see *ibid*, pp. 58-59). Designers believe in the significance of processes and that their work should be orientated towards useful products and outcomes (see *ibid*, pp. 60-62). Lastly, executives who, in policing terms, represent senior officers. Senior officers are known to be more risk focused, in a ‘macro’ sense (such as cost efficiency, legal frameworks), their concerns appear to centre on management and the wider organisational machine being correctly oiled to function properly. Schein (2010) notes that this sub-culture can often become increasingly impersonal due to their detachment from the front line (see *ibid*, pp. 63-67). Schein points out that, due to differing sub-cultures, communication between them can be impacted, as each is focused on different areas of the organisation and perceives the other’s focus as less important.

The clash in relevant sub-cultures was most apparent between CID officers responsible for communicating the intelligence for an operation and uniformed officers within the room. Intel documents were collated and presented by a detective inspector. Unlike others in the room, the intel officers often spent quite a significant amount of time talking, sometimes reading word-for-word from the document. Most notable throughout the fieldwork was the attempts of the intel officers to communicate their work with an atmosphere of mystique, something that their colleagues rarely seemed to rise to.

The intel document was particularly long today, probably reflective of the number of events going on at the moment. A quick look around the table suggests that not everyone is listening to X [intel officer]. Silver comments on the amount of detail and asks if she can have a copy. Another inspector chimes in, ‘yeah can we have a copy too?’ Other officers also ask if they can have a copy. The intel officer becomes very awkward, ‘I’d prefer not for this document to be unnecessarily photocopied’. The inspector asking for a copy slightly sneers, ‘there’s lot of detail, I need to go through and take out what will be meaningful to my officers

on the carrier'... The inspector is holding out his hand [the photocopy room is next door]. The intel officer still won't hand over the document, becoming quite indignant in body language, 'with due respect, this type of document can't just be handed out, lost on carriers, there's lots of information on it. PCs will just discard this document anywhere.' The original inspector stares at the intel officer for a number of seconds, 'I think we'll be fine looking after it'... The intel officer won't hand it over. Silver steps in, 'I think it would be best to make limited copies of this document, so if one can be made and given to each Bx. so they can tell their officers, that would be helpful.' The intel officer won't hand over the document, but instead heads to the photocopying room. The remaining officers turn to each other and start muttering and laughing. The intel officer returns five minutes later and hands out a very small number of copies and then leaves.

Field note 4, Protest Planning Meeting, 2017

This consistent performance by intel officers of showing their work as important and mysterious came into significant conflict with the PLOs, who regularly presented different and more mellowed perspectives to their CID colleagues.

Intel officer reports on the expected numbers that will be in attendance, bringing up the history of the event and the disorder it has caused elsewhere in the world and also in London a number of years ago. Silver later comes to the PLO 'what's your feeling?' The PLO responds, 'it will be a non-event, the numbers will be incredibly low, there's very little interest in this event now.'

Field note 5, Protest Planning Meeting, 2016

Intel officer says that there is intel that protesters are going to turn up with Nerf guns and are planning on altering the pellets so they'd be hard and have the ability to injure officers. If true, this is obviously some cause for concern upon officer safety. [The meeting continues.] Later Silver turns to X [PLO], 'what's your take on this?' X shrugs, 'the intel officers are obviously working to a different source, I don't know where that's come from, but I'm hearing nothing of the sort. These groups push the boundaries, but I can't see that happening.' Intel officer looks furious.

Field note 6, Protest Planning Meeting, 2017

The PLOs were always diplomatic in their responses, qualifying their own information through differing sources and speaking to different people. However, it did not change the reality that the PLOs were consistently undermining the information being passed through the CID intel officers, demystifying their performance and de-escalating perceptions of risk associated with the event. Notably, there is no evidence from my fieldwork of the higher-risk warnings from intel officers being correct.

However, to an extent each department clouded themselves with an air of mystique, sharing formal documents with relevant parties but no one else. All documents attached to the meeting were considered confidential and it is from this building of a perception of significance surrounding the planning meetings that seeks to remind others of the importance of the relevant departments work, but ‘the records they create are as much proactive as reactive in the sense of anticipating the uses to which their paper may be put’ (Van Maanen & Pentland 1994, p. 71). Each sub-culture carries departmental risk if their area of the operation was ever called into question at a subsequent time. Thus, each has to construct documentation that ensures their ass is covered (Van Maanen 1978) and as such adopts the language that best frames the information for a particular incident (Van Maanen & Pentland 1994, p.79). Consequently, what we see featured within documentation represents the goals and intentions of the record keeper (Cochran, Gordon & Krause 1980, p. 8), not necessarily ‘factual data’ as some might suggest. For example, if disorder was to occur at a public order event and the intel was called into question, they would be able to legally respond that they had ‘warned’ relevant superiors of the expected risk.

This interpretation points to the importance of outsiders’ perception of police meetings and accompanying documents should they come to be inspected, with a background understanding of why they are being produced in the first place, not necessarily for the content within them. As such, we can understand the actions of collating vast ‘ass-covering’ data sets to evidence internal action as an audit ritual, where we gain a better understanding of micro-behaviours behind macro-level orders (Pentland 1993, p. 605).

This control over documentation ensures those taking the minutes of the meeting hold ‘the power of the pen’, formally recording information amongst meeting actors that is agreed to potentially, if ever released, be dissected by a number of outside agencies (media, HMIC, Mayor of London and so forth) in the ‘front-stage’ region. This ‘fine-tuning’ of the documentation of this performance facilitates appropriate impression management (see Van Maanen & Pentland 1994).

It is perhaps unsurprising that an organisation like the MPS (or other policing bodies) seek to keep stringent documents of their actions and decision making. However, for the purposes of this thesis, what is interesting is the fact that formal planning meetings and collation of

documents exist not for the functioning of that individual public order policing event, but instead as a performance to outsiders (if they are ever investigated) to ‘evidence’ the necessary procedures took place. Planning of events take place – there is no challenge here – but the planning of events do not take place within formal planning meetings. They exist to properly record an event and to provide evidence that the planning existed – something that is deemed ‘essential’ for public order events (Beggs et al. 2012, p. 5).

Yet the very requirement of policing organisations to formalise evidence that planning meetings have taken place does not change informal practice of planning taking place elsewhere. As ‘when records are used for making evaluative judgements affecting the fact of those who generate records, they provide focused opportunity to cheat’ (Cochran, Gordon and Krause 1980, p. 9). Here I am suggesting that policing organisations are ‘cheating’ the system through performative action of ensuring formal documentation of a paper-trail of planning meetings, despite planning of events taking place outside of these meetings. However, we can understand the essential and very political nature of the requirements of these documentations as, although we are considering the ‘back-stage’ within this thesis, the MPS has to be fully prepared for this performance to move to the ‘front-stage’ if any formal investigation was to subsequently take place.

What is clear is that formal planning meetings lacked any real relevance to what I saw later on during the actual protest. The importance of formal planning meetings lies not within the content of the meeting, but in the performative nature of that meeting and the reasons of why it exists in the first place – as strategic action, put in place for legal reasons to ensure an audit trail to ‘ass-cover’ any potential future investigation. Just as the formal briefing of officers at the start of a shift holds little relevance for what takes place that day, so to with the formal planning meetings.

Despite the performative nature of the meetings and the fact that traditional outsiders (in the form of stakeholders and partners) are within this back-stage region, the space still evidenced a safer area to ‘polish’ the upcoming front-stage performance. During the meeting, if there were conflicts within approaches (for example, if one route was more advantageous to one group than another or, if two groups interpreted risk factors differently), these could be raised (and formally recorded) and at the very least notified to Silver and others in attendance.

Again, with the controlled actors in attendance, this back-stage region allows a private space (away from the front-stage audience of the event) to rehearse roles and responsibilities.

As such, these meeting areas can only be defined as ‘back-stage’ region. However, as I allude to earlier, I detach from Goffman’s strict ‘front-stage’ ‘back-stage’ binary concept and instead perceive the policing environment to experience a multi-layered back-stage region – much like an onion, with every layer past the skin being another protected back-stage layer. By no means does my analysis above suggest that the planning meetings are the only back-stage region to an operation, but they are protected from outsiders enough to conflict with being defined as ‘front-stage’.

Framing the Front-Stage: Space, Control and Interaction at Protest

We now move to the front-stage region, the area in which we enact a performance for the audience. It is here where the relevant actors seek to guard the secrets of the show and ultimately maintain moral and instrumental decorum in front of the audience (Goffman 1959, p. 110). We are all social actors and, consciously or subconsciously, cooperate to uphold a recognised and accepted interaction order (Scott 2015, p. 27). How we behave in public is a construct of society we have built up over many years. It is how we can so quickly identify ‘cultural differences’ when we are away on holiday and find that some of our European neighbours do not obsess over queuing as much as the British. Interaction order within a protest policing setting is incredibly interesting to reflect upon, due to how often rudeness and incivility would occur, challenging the social ‘norm’ for order. A central element in interaction is space (Goffman 1959, p. 109), the significance of which featured heavily in my fieldwork.

It is essential for a police officer to ensure a level of control is maintained over the group they are policing – controlling people is perhaps the principal concern of a police officer (Rubinstein 1973, p. 255). The police are always expected to be effective agents of territoriality, people look to those in law enforcement to have control over social action by controlling space (Herbert 1997, p. 10; also see Sack 1986). As such, protest places those in policing in a precarious position as they are – in the front-stage – appearing to relinquish control of space and, if ‘order’ was ‘lost’, it would be expected of those in command to regain it swiftly. It is due to this reason that many senior commanders (and rank-and-file

officers) practice the habit of questioning ‘what if’ to establish whether they have relevant plans in place to combat any unexpected ‘trouble’ (for similar, see Waddington 1994).

Within a protest context, we can think of the creation of boundaries as assisting in maintaining internal perceptions of ‘control’ – this is not to suggest that police are actually in control (I would suggest with events like Notting Hill Carnival, the police are fundamentally not in control) but that through boundaries the police are able to ‘stage’ a perception of ‘control’ in their performance of order maintenance. The staging of protest and the impact this has upon the interaction order is key to my research findings. Police are aware their ‘control’ in public order policing events is contested. As such, we can observe how protest is staged to create spatial boundaries that are within increased police ‘control’ (compared to wider areas not under focus) which facilitate uncontrolled behaviours that challenge the normative order.

The creation of boundaries (real and symbolic) within a front-stage setting relates to how people occupy ‘space’. All protesters appeared to perceive themselves as ‘the most’ important feature of any protest or counter demonstration; members of the public appeared to deem their right of way ‘the most’ important; and police officers deemed not ‘losing’ perceptions of control to be paramount. Dotted around this messy scene were PLTs – some proactively and patiently speaking with protesters about the importance of balance:

‘... if you’re allowed to be here, then we can’t stop them being there! You’re both equally allowed to express your views.’ One officer tells an ardent left-wing protester, who responds: ‘they aren’t fucking equal to me, they and their views don’t deserve to be here.’

Field note 7, Observation with ‘left’ protest PLTs, 2017

During this rivalry for control, the scenes appeared chaotic, disordered and messy. Yet this is simply just the nature of protest policing. Enacting boundaries is key to the creation of public order – boundaries signify specific geographical locations that legitimise behaviours that may otherwise be deemed as illegitimate. *‘Why can’t we get through? Oh, typical, fucking protesters!!’* [Field note 8] This is a common frustration expressed by London locals when they spot their most direct pathway is blocked. Acceptance (even reluctant acceptance) was regularly observed when people realised the reasoning behind their disruption – protest was to be expected in London and where hordes of people mulling around might initially seem


worrisome (passers-by would sometimes enquire if something was ‘wrong’) the explanation of ‘protest’ suddenly rationalised the chaotic behaviour in the geographical location.⁴³

This conflict for ‘space’ can, of course, be viewed on a macro scale. During some observations, I could see Silver’s stress levels as they speak of the sheer numbers of events taking place across London: multiple football matches of varying risk; multiple protests; small-scale park ‘festivals’; the continued high numbers of tourists that travel to London daily; and the ever-present fear of a terrorist incident. With this complexity, information pertaining to ‘intentions’ and ‘routes’ became a central focus for the PLT to gain for Silver. This knowledge facilitates increased ‘control’ over the developing scene throughout the day. Although protest scenes can appear chaotic, it is important to look for the creation of normality within them. Route plans (for march protests) or street arrangements (for static protests) demonstrate micro ‘staging’ areas within wider social orders.

Below there are two images to visually depict ‘regular’ staging of protest during fieldwork.


⁴³ Interestingly, we saw patience from the wider public depleting with the 2019 Extinction Rebellion (XR) protests. Widely circulated YouTube videos showed non-protesters assaulting protesters for standing on top of a tube (and therefore causing transport disruptions). The XR protests unfortunately did not feature during my fieldwork, but evidence a common theme present of ‘legitimacy of protest/protester’.

Figure 5: Static Protest



This depicts an example of a ‘static’ protest that occurred outside Canada Goose. I have underlined in black different sights that – from an operational point of view – could be deemed ‘at-risk’. Both Apple and Longchamp appeared to have their own security team. The static protest itself took place on Little Argyll Street. The first red solid line on this street shows the Level-Two cordon in place, the second red dotted line shows the reality of where the protesters spilled out to. Every so often the red solid line became fixed and protesters would have to move back and then eventually they’d spill out to the dotted line again – a cycle of movement. The blue line represents a physical queuing barrier that was erected for ‘genuine’ customers to enter the shop by. However, as the blue dotted line shows, they did not have to exit the shop this way and as such as they exited they experienced some quite extreme levels of verbal abuse from the red dotted line (the over-spill). It was this abuse that normally motivated the officers to push the protesters back to the red dotted line. The cycle continued. The black arrows are there to signify that during all of this Regent Street (one of London’s busiest streets) continued to experience high levels of both vehicle traffic and footfall traffic.

Figure 6: Protest March



Below we can see some examples of the ‘staging’ of protests. Each protest – along with all attended during fieldwork – depict an occupation of space, a challenge to normative order and a policing response seeking to reproduce an ‘accepted order’.

Image 14: Israel/Palestinian protest



Image 15: Student Protest



Image 16: Canada Goose, Argyll Street View



Image 17: Canada Goose, Regent Street View



Protesting demonstrates a right to be seen (Routledge 2017). Staging that right, we can understand protesters wanting to be positioned in an area that gives maximum coverage to their grievance. With the Canada Goose example given, Little Argyll Street – as the name might suggest – was a small side street that kept the protesters ‘out of the way’, causing less obstruction to the wider social orders of Regent Street. During periods of the protest, the protesters were predominately behind a police level-two cordon (red solid line), although they were still audibly visible, passers-by could easily avoid and ignore them if they wanted to. It was clear quite early on within the protest that this did not suit some of the more passionate activists, who repositioned themselves past the police cordon during times of more ‘relaxed’ policing (red dotted line).

During these periods where protesters occupied space beyond the police-defined ‘acceptable space’, much of the interaction with the PLTs was educational. Although there were periods of extreme verbal abuse, much of the time it was a loud ‘show’ or ‘performance’ of protesting a grievance, such as chants like, ‘fur is murder’. This appeared to frustrate some passers-by, who shouted at the protesters, *‘angry about animal rights are you love? Nice fur around your hood!’* [Field notes 9] The first time this was shouted at a protester it immediately created an opening for one of the PLOs who had been struggling to connect with some of the protesters. The PLO asked, *‘actually, a colleague and I were wondering about that, is that faux fur?’* The protesters answers, *‘yeah it is, fur is fashionable we get that, but you don’t actually need real fur to follow fashion.’* [Field note 10] The PLO, seizing the opportunity, begins to talk about how she had been reading an article in Vogue about all the different animal-friendly products you can now buy and how fashionable they are. Many of the protesters sought to join in this conversation, appearing very keen to ‘educate’ the PLO. Despite still occupying the same ‘space’ as previously and clearly still causing disruption to shoppers, the out spill of protesters appeared less chaotic – the officer appeared to have a ‘grip’ over the space there were occupying.

For the PLTs, it is their role to best facilitate the legitimate aims of a protest. Within this protest, during times of general chanting or provocative ‘confrontations’ with those who challenged their views, the PLTs largely accepted pockets of chaotic contact, perceiving this to be legitimate and expected within the wider premise of protest – this was routine within protest. However, it was when people were exiting Canada Goose where the PLT (and wider police resources) sought to take back control of the space surrounding the store, pushing the

majority of protesters back behind the cordon. The verbal abuse shouted at the consumers was some of the most severe observed during my fieldwork and it was personally targeted upon small numbers of consumers exiting the shop. The protesters would force pictures of suffering animals in the faces of people, shout ‘murdering scum’ and ‘shame on you’. Many of the shoppers appeared intimidated, cowering away from the protesters, others became confrontational about the treatment they were receiving. The first time this occurred, the scene escalated quickly and it appeared that the police had not quite prepared for the extremity of reaction of the animal protesters to the exiting consumers. As such, the space in between those exiting the shop attempting to make their way back onto Regent Street and the protesters was basically non-existent.

Although the bravado nature of the protesters was to some extent routine, the space in which it was being acted out was not in the pre-defined protest area (solid red line). As such, following the confrontation of shoppers and protesters, the routine protest behaviour was no longer deemed legitimate in the loosened spatial boundary (red dotted line). To rectify this issue, the officers quickly reinforced the cordon (solid red line), which the PLTs supported by encouraging protesters to move behind the police line. Only a very small number of protesters refused (including the one with the fur hood who had engaged with the PLO earlier). She made the point of identifying the point of the protest was to demonstrate to the shoppers and harshly cursed her protesting colleagues as they followed the police orders by moving behind the cordon – calling them ‘*fucking pathetic*’ [Field note 11]. However, within this space she was now largely an isolated figure and, although still shouting abuse at different shoppers, the level at which police felt they were able to control the scene appeared to relax them, accepting that this particular protester was one they could not silence (and therefore, would not try).

When we think of ‘space’ and ‘control’, the police (as in micro street-based actors) are in a very challenging, fluid and in some cases ironic position. During encounters like Canada Goose we see multiple interactions:

- Police officer (regardless of role) < --- > protester;
- Police officer < --- > security team;
- Police officer < --- > police officer;

- Security team < ---> customer;
- Protester < --- > customer;
- Police office < --- > customer;
- Police officer < --- > member of the public;
- Protester < --- > member of the public and so on.

During all of these interactions, actors (in all their variations above, inclusive of police officers) are seeking control and wanted the authority of police only when the authority was not directed onto 'their' space. For example, security teams wanted control over their own mandate, until they realised they required assistance from police. Protesters sought assistance of police to remove counter-protesters or 'out-group' members from their 'space', but would less frequently acknowledge dialogue with officers about their own encroachment of someone else's space. Police officers would sometimes (quite openly) mock their PLO colleagues if they were not deemed to be policing in the 'right' way. Thus, although we can identify much unity within and among groups, it is important to recognise the regularity in which 'othering' takes place. Through all this 'othering', it becomes challenging for the police to be able to negotiate order and, as such, the spatial boundaries provide structure around what is and is not acceptable.

Spatially bounding protest enables the legitimisation of behaviours that do not fit the usual normative order. By spatially bounding behaviour, police officers are able to identify what behaviours are legitimate, where and for whom. From a critical perspective, this may sound as though it is an extension of the 'strong arm of the law' enforcing order. Yet the reality is that while managing protesters, the police have to also manage the 'everyday publics' who were more often than not are unsympathetic towards (the very regular) protest.

Understanding specific behaviours within specific boundaries acts as a blue print for what social conduct is acceptable and accepted within different areas. Officers can operate based on the different 'frames' present within the performance – accepting that within each frame different types of rules, roles and rituals will be accepted (Goffman 1986).

Actions such as letting off smoke bombs, consumption of drugs, offensive or problematic language are all bounded within the context of protest. During one observation, I observed a far right-wing (static) protester become irate at the passing left-wing opposition (this was

very common from both sides). Aware that the opposition protest was en route, a level-two PSU had arranged itself as a physical barrier around the geographical area reserved for the right-wing protest. Leaning between myself and a level-two police officer, who was black, he shouted at them, *'you're all a bunch of nigger lovers, you're all a bunch of nigger lovers.'* [Field note 12] Shocked, I looked to see how the black officer next to me was going to react, but he simply ignored the racist chants of the individual, however, I must note that I did observe the strain in his jaw as his teeth were grinding.⁴⁴ During this time, the racist protester never once left the 'boundary' of his protest nor tried to forcibly push his way through to the perceived opposition. Did the officers on that cordon perhaps identify his behaviour as expected from that group, which legitimised it within the geographical boundaries that it featured? Did the officers present perhaps feel that, by acting on what they had heard, they would in fact escalate and heighten tensions that are already present during protest – a key feature in what police officers should avoid during contact with the public (Bayley & Bittner 1984, p. 50).

A similar gendered example happened during fieldwork, when a mixed-gender group of PLTs were assigned to police a Hasidic Jewish protest (exclusively male). During this protest, the female officers were invisible to the protesters and struggled extensively to engage with them. Despite some frustrations (one PLO removed herself from the protest back to the carrier out of frustration), many of the female officers shrugged the discrimination off, accepting it as 'cultural' and 'just part of this protest'. Contrastingly, the male PLOs experienced very high levels of engagement and the protest (operationally) was one of the most straightforward protests observed. Further to this, ethnic minority PLOs would sometimes pass comment on particular content of protests, identifying themselves as a 'racial insider' of particular groups. For example, one PLO commented *'given the subject of this*

⁴⁴ I am offering no values-based opinion on whether the police officers within the vicinity of this racist chant acted right/wrong. Subsequent discussions with officers about the experience suggested that there was no 'uniformed' or 'best-practice' response – some suggested they would have 'had a word' with the racist protester, others suggested they would have 'nicked him' for a public order offence. The point of the field-based example is to demonstrate the shift in how people frame legitimate behaviour in different geographical boundaries, such as protest.

protest, don't be awkward about me being Asian. I am Asian, use me as needed.' [Field note 13] Therefore, within these bounded spaces, the PLOs recognise potentially uncontrollable aspects to the self that impacts interaction. Observed within my fieldwork, I saw little evidence of police officers taking this personally or overtly allowing it to impact interaction, instead it was accepted as the nature of protest within these spatial boundaries.⁴⁵

Image 18: Hasidic Jewish Protest



For interactional purposes, rudeness serves as evidence to wider publics of ‘the exceptional’ (Scott 2015, p. 46) and, as evidenced above, varying levels of rudeness towards others (including policing actors) was prolific at protest. However, through the reframing of acceptable behaviours, this rudeness experienced at protest was considered as what is needed to be accepted within a protest setting. Officers would comment on behaviours (not just related to rudeness), identifying that if this happened in any other environment, it would not be tolerated by police. Thus, although we can understand police to still have ‘ultimate

⁴⁵ This does not negate the organisational responsibility SLT have for officers experiencing this.

control' over environments, we can also see an acceptance that within a public order context, that control is challenged so reframing what is acceptable allows policing actors to identify perceptions of control within wider challenges to normative order.

The spatial bounding still occurs when protests are marches instead of static, the only difference occurring here is that the boundaries move along with the people (see Figure 5). Most protests attended during my fieldwork had a pre-planned route and often (especially particularly large ones) would be followed by a police vehicle, which would act as the boundary for the end of the protest. This would allow for re-opening of roads and so on. However, it is accepted internally that not everyone will stick to this route. Some groups, such as Black Bloc, would often seek to disrupt the protest by splitting away from the main groups, drawing with them specific policing units (deployed for this reason). Despite little being achieved by pursuing these groups – they were often much younger and fitter than the officers and would be quickly lost. We can surmise that they offered Silver more insight into which space was at risk of attracting protesters.

This need to grasp an understanding of intentions around their movements often led PLTs to try to establish very early on the intentions of different people at the protest, specifically where the groups were heading that day and how they planned on getting there. This knowledge quickly equips Silver with an understanding if things are going off course. Even if groups were not favourable at sharing information with the PLTs, they were well positioned to have their ear to the group to gain some insight into what was happening.

While positioning oneself with a critical eye looking in, we can appreciate how the occupational desire to have increased control over space brings with it problematic sentiments of state control over protest. However, from a street-level operative perspective, you can interpret the boundaries as positions where people are legitimately allowed (within reason) and at times even facilitated to break normative order. It creates spatial boundaries where forms of disorderly conduct, civil disobedience and, at times, law breaking is excused (or ignored) in the name of protest. The boundaries allow for spaces where people accept a certain type of behaviour if they are in among it, but still have access to move away from these areas. They differentiate spatial boundaries, creating safe spaces for different accepted behaviours.

During my fieldwork, I never observed an arrest occur within these spatial boundaries (this is not to suggest they never happened, simply that it was not captured within my data). However, on the occasions where I observed policing tactics charged with pursuing break-away groups, I did observe arrests. This challenges Waddington's (1994, p. 38) assertion that within protests, arrests are avoided at all costs and suggests that perhaps arrests are avoided at all costs *within the spatial boundaries* where the accepted interactional order is altered to facilitate protest behaviours (in their multiple variations). Outside of this boundary, police actors once again take up their role of enforcing the legal/moral mandate of wider normative order (Bittner 1984; Fassin 2011) and the protesters behaviours are less protected due to the unbounded nature of their actions.

This develops our understanding of the dramaturgical bounded regions, as we can see that contradictory behaviour is occurring within front-stage regions, something which, within his own work, Goffman limits to the back-stage (Goffman 1959, p.120). For police interaction, informal rules are learnt about the 'decorum' and 'fronts' that are acceptable within the bounded region of a protest. Aggressive or technical public order offences (such as aggressive behaviour, swearing, or behaviour causing offence) would likely, in a different environment, be dealt with swiftly. Yet within protest, the social tolerance for behaviour which might otherwise be deemed inappropriate increases. Within Notting Hill Carnival, we can also apply this concept to the relaxed nature in which drug consumption or underage drinking is considered by the police.

Calculated Communication: Miscommunication, Deception and Lying

We have seen how framing the show is central to wider protest order maintenance, with controlling the staging and space impacting interaction at protest. We now move to another aspect to the front-stage performance, considering calculated communication. Deception within talk is not unusual, a low-level deception which is common in our society is *faux* civility we see in polite communication between strangers, often when in public (Goffman 1963). This type of calculated communication is aligned with societal focus on maintaining each other's face (Goffman 1959) and upholding the interaction order (Goffman 1983). Within a policing context, we see a more complex navigation with calculated communication, but all of which remains focused on upholding an order.

The PLT tactic is an additional tactic in the public order policing toolkit. Fieldwork experiences evidenced that at its core the tactics seek to: improve relations with communities the police interact with; increase dialogue and facilitative approaches to policing; and police better than previously where the organisation were arguably not ‘good enough’ (see Bowling 2007). Yet the PLTs are still a policing tactic, the officers – although unquestionably dedicated to this communicative approach – are still warranted police officers. Thus, the tactic is coercive by nature of the organisational actors who are executing it and to suggest otherwise would be nonsense. But social interaction – where one is trying to gain ‘something’ from another – is always coercive, manipulative and, at times, exploitative, so this should not surprise us.

Lying is indicative to society; we lie every day and hear lies everywhere. There are of course different ‘types’ of lies or lying to different degrees of seriousness. Some might ‘fluff’ a story, exaggerating the facts to make it more interesting or exciting (a regular occurrence of police stories); some might mislead an individual for reasons of protection; some people might lie for personal gain; or perhaps lie for malicious intention. Within social interaction, we can expect the deviancy of lying to occur regularly for a variety of reasons. Some might perceive the significance of a lie only truly being felt if the recipient of the lie discovers the untruth and feels embarrassment at being misled within an interaction (Goffman 1967). Interestingly, it has been questioned that, as lying is so prolific throughout societies, we need to better understand the reasons behind ever telling the truth (Barnes 1994, p. 7).

Police lying has previously been broken into two categories: external lies (told to manipulate the public) and internal lies (told to colleagues for self-protection, to construct a case or protect an informant) (Manning 1974, p. 286). Misrepresentation of facts has previously been identified as a policing tactic during police-citizen interaction as it facilitates different requirements of an officer, such as getting people to talk more openly to reveal information (Skolnick 1966, p. 79). However, more explicit lying can be understood within tactics such as undercover policing, which continued to plague the reputation of PLTs during fieldwork as they are the colleagues of undercover officers. As Buckner (1976, p. 413) notes, the public often react more to police deceit due to their powerful position as government actors who are supposedly ‘above reproach’. Yet this is only true if the citizen being lied to becomes wise to the lie – here, we can think of ‘white-lies’ that officers might tell to members of the public that cause little harm, such as trying to make someone feel safer (Manning 1974, p. 295).

Lying has even been suggested as virtually a requirement of policing in order for the police officers to conduct their duties (Van Maanen 1978; Buckner 1976).

For some within the protest community, the PLT tactic is a lie. Groups such as the Network for Police Monitoring (NETPOL) believe that the PLT tactic is solely established for gaining intelligence on protesters. The initial introduction of the PLTs struggled against an identity crisis, being associated with intelligence gatherers and/or Field Intelligence Team (FIT) officers. This mistrust preceding fieldwork and during fieldwork was often communicated in relation to unethical practice among an undercover policing unit (see, for instance, Collins 2012). However, as the tactic became more self-confident in its mandate, the value and role of PLTs (especially PLT trainers or those in positions of authority) stopped hiding from the fact that they were police officers and information that was said in their presence would be used to form a wider picture of the event. They maintained they were fundamentally not 'intelligence-gatherers' but that they could not ignore information provided to them.

During fieldwork, more ardent protesters would assume that the PLTs wanted personal information such as names but a common opinion among regularly active PLOs is, *'tell me your name is Mickey Mouse, I don't care, I just want to get through today!'* [Field note 14] PLOs did not appear to have some deep-rooted agenda of collecting information on particular protesters, nor did they have any interest in assisting police officers whose operational mandate was to do so. During fieldwork, an intelligence gatherer contacted a senior PLO requesting information on a particular individual who the team had formed a good workable rapport with. The PLO in question refused to give any information to the other police officer, which escalated the interaction and the requesting officer attempted to 'pull rank' (meaning she was of a higher rank) on the PLO and demanded under order for the information to be given. The PLO again refused and, with some strong words, informed the officer he did not care what rank she held, he was not providing the information she requested. PLOs are fiercely protective over their relationships with different protest groups and no 'outsider', including wider PLOs, have access to these relationships. During 13 months' fieldwork and a positive working relationship with all the senior PLOs, I was unable to gain access to any of these meetings.

This proactive culture within the PLT unit, in attempting to positively bridge the problematic relationship between protesters and 'the police' as a homogenous organisation, is strong.

PLTs often saw themselves as something quite ‘unique’ and ‘different’ to the wider public order policing world; this will become clearer in Chapter Eight where I discuss something termed ‘the blue brand’. Yet within micro-level interactions – both external to the organisation (PLT-protest) and internal (police officer-police officer) – different falsehoods were present. I term these falsehoods in three different categories, which we can think of as a ‘scale of falsehoods’: miscommunication, deception and lying. Below we can explore four examples which are indicative of the different categories present throughout my fieldwork.

1. **[External miscommunication]** We are all standing around in a ‘calmer’ ten minutes into the protest. One PLO has been working relentlessly with a small group of protesters, her hard work and determination is clear. The protesters are perceived as ‘good as gold’ and she’s communicated her desire to assist in making their day successful. One of her PLO colleagues tells her that Sx. has decided to change their plan and not go ahead with a particular decision at the agreed time. She exclaims, *‘What do you mean?! I’ve just told them that we’re doing that at 10:00!’* Her colleague responds, *‘Yeah I know, I’m not sure what he knows, but he’s decided not to do that plan.’* She responds infuriated, *‘Excellent! And they just decided to not tell us so we can inform the group? I’ve already told them we’re doing this. I’m going to look like a total dick now. I’ll need to go and speak with them.’* She moves off quickly to find the protesters she has been working with.
2. **[Internal police deception]** We are leaving the morning briefing, I’m watching the officers move into their respective groups. I hear a uniformed officer comment to a few of his team, *‘Silver wants us to be strict in getting the traffic moving, they don’t want people sat down in the street and want us to be forceful if they do. That’ll obviously never work. So, what we’re going to do is when we see them sat down in the street, we’ll go and surround them, cross our arms, look stern, do all the usual... allow them to get their photo op and then we’ll get them to move on. They’ll be less grief if we just give them what they want.’*
3. **[External police deception]** We’re moving fast along Pall Mall and the PLO I’m with mutters to me that there has been a suspected terror attack in another part of London. *‘We need to keep it from this lot for as long as possible. We need to block that information.’* The group we are with have far-right affiliations and there has been much anti-immigration and racist chatter throughout the observations of this group.

When we arrive at Westminster Bridge, one of the protesters turns to the officer and says, *'Apparently there's been a terrorist attack somewhere in London, have you heard that?'* One officer denies he has heard that and another keeps quiet. About ten minutes later, the same person asks again but the officer replies, *'I think we should just focus on what we're doing here now. The protest is almost over and it's been a success.'* Again, the officers avoid answering the relevant question. Upon a third attempt, the officer says they have just received information about a suspected occurrence but there is no evidence that it is one. By this point many of the protesters have dispersed and no one seems particularly interested in it.

4. **[External police lying]** A protest of one political affiliation has been given a particular form up point, which has been negotiated with the PLTs. The morning of the protest, a very opposing political group have decided to form up directly opposite this group. This has angered the original group as they comment that it'll distract from their media opportunities. One PLO says to the organiser, *'it's a complete disgrace that this has been allowed to happen, I'll be sure to report back to the bosses how angry we all are of this failing of the organisation.'* As we walk away, I look to him confused he has taken such a hard-line response, he shrugs at the lie he just told *'we knew it was going to happen like this, I think someone actually signed off and agreed it, but I couldn't exactly tell them that, could I?'*

The evidence from fieldwork highlighted that police officers did not lie for a malicious reason/gain. Instead they told 'falsehoods' of varying intensity due to the belief that it would make their operational responsibilities more straightforward, it would cause them less 'grief' or they perceived the lie to be necessary for wider order maintenance. Deception is a pragmatic tool used within social interaction. Goffman (1963) highlights how 'tactful' non-observance can facilitate the routine flow of social encounters. In some areas of social life, lying is expected, normalised and perhaps even encouraged – for example, with the lies of Santa Claus and the Tooth Fairy (Barnes 1994). Interestingly, in the example of miscommunication, the PLTs were aware of the precarious nature of the relationships they were building with protesters and how even 'honest mistakes', such as internal police miscommunication, could have a negative impact their working relationship. We can understand this as 'deceptive interaction' where it is the interpretation of the audience to the action that is important, even if the intention was not to deceive (Scott 2015, p. 207).

With regards to policing, lying naturally becomes more problematic due to their power status. However, if we break police lying down using the two functions of police work, we can understand the act as being related to order maintenance and law enforcement (Banton 1964; Bittner 1967). Understanding lying in these two categories is vastly different: lying for purposes of order maintenance we can academically rationalise and theorise; but lying within a legal capacity holds risks of perjury and therefore becomes an offence (Manning 1978, p. 241).

From a social interactionist perspective, deception/lying can have a wider social good, even if it is morally problematic (Scott 2015, p. 206). As such, we can perhaps consider lying through a lens of pragmatism as opposed to ethics (Scheibe 1979), which for police lying within my fieldwork is far more analytically relevant. We can understand lying, deception or the concealing of certain information as an extension of police desire for control. Within example three given above, the PLOs were genuinely very concerned of how the far-right wing protesters would react to rumours of terrorism – for the officers, they understood that facts would not matter, it is the power of the rumour that could cause the police order maintenance issues. This group had experienced particularly high numbers of attendance and the officers were concerned of wider risks of disorder if these people ascended upon the area of London rumoured to have experienced a terror attack.

Image 19: Football Lads Alliance Protest



What was clear from my fieldwork was that lying or deception was not some pre-planned action agreed upon between policing actors, which I suggest can be understood as ‘organisational lying’ on a macro-scale. Instead, within my fieldwork it is more accurate to conceptualise the ‘lying’ observed as ‘entrepreneurial deception’, where officers were creatively problem solving so as to gain an immediate micro-order (both with their own policing colleagues and members of the public).

Conclusion:

This chapter has considered aspects of both the back-stage and front-stage performance of protest policing. Firstly, the significance of planning meetings within the wider public order policing operation was explored. Here I identified how the central role of these meetings is to ‘ass cover’ the organisation in case any subsequent investigation was to occur. This is not to suggest that ‘planning’ does not take place, but that the finer detail of it takes place in a more informal capacity among trusted colleagues and therefore was not captured within my fieldwork. Fieldwork highlighted that we need to reconfigure how we conceptualise planning meetings – not as a tool for effective public order planning, but instead as a performance for a legal requirement with specific details presented with an intended future front-stage audience in mind.

The second half of the chapter moved on to consider the traditional front-stage setting of protest. Here, I considered two dominant features present in the data analysis: the significance of ‘space’ and the role of police ‘lying’. Within both of these concepts we can see how the police utilise different performative tools to try to increase their control over the event. I suggest that this desire for control does not come from a malicious, state-agent perception of authority, but instead due to a desire to best achieve immediate wider order maintenance. We can perhaps understand these behaviours as noble cause corruption, where some outside actors could perceive, for example, police lying as unethical, but instead data analysis evidences how this practice is widely used within social interaction and should be understood through a pragmatic lens as opposed to an ethnocentric one.

What both the back-stage framing of meetings and the front-stage organisation of protests evidence is that interaction, in its varying forms, is performative. It is constructed and

executed with specific audiences in mind and often articulates more about the performers than those at the other end of the interaction. Yet protest policing was not the only public order event featured within the fieldwork. We will now move on to consider the performative nature of police interaction at London's Notting Hill Carnival.

Chapter VII: Notting Hill Carnival

Introduction:

Notting Hill Carnival (herein referred to as Carnival) is a three-day street festival in London celebrating Caribbean cultures. It is held over the August bank holiday, with informal and formal evening celebrations on the Saturday, followed by J'ouvert⁴⁶ around the Ladbroke Grove area from around 0600-0900 on the Sunday morning. Following this, the main attractions of the Carnival celebration take place on Sunday and Monday, with millions of attendees, floats and performers, sound systems and street stalls. Although formally understood as a carnival, the event can also symbolically be understood as a masquerade of street power (Cohen 1993; Alleyne 1997), where black people visibly appear to contest the normative understanding of public space.

The fieldwork observed Notting Hill as it oozed the hearty smells of Caribbean cuisines, with amazing displays of electric colours and earth-shuddering music. The atmosphere was euphoric, with people released from their daily tensions through laughter and revelry. But the fieldwork also observed another face of Carnival. It observed young black men standing on the edges of the crowds, stern faced, many purposefully shirtless exposing their large muscular physics, or in a uniformity of dark clothing, eyes focused on the slow-moving crowds, watching and observing. Then, their sudden burst of movement as they rushed into the crowds, surging forward, pushing revellers out the way. The fieldwork observed frightened masses running away from the shouts of 'ACID!' as liquid was thrown into the air, splashing many within the facility. It observed the atmospheric change at around 1900 hours when emotion shifted, aggressive exchanges increased and tensions escalated.

The Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) plans hundreds of public order policing operations each year; they are likely the most experienced police service in the country in this regard, but no other operation is parallel to the associated sensitivities that surround Carnival. The 'front-stage' – in Goffman's terms – of the operation is acutely observed by councils, politicians, community leaders, human rights activist, members of the public, the media and many more besides. The MPS is aware of this reality and, through dedicated planning, seeks to fine tune the impression of the policing it portrays to the multitude of competing agendas

⁴⁶ Meaning dawn or daybreak, often celebrated at Caribbean festivals, and marking the official beginning of Carnival.

of those who observe and engage with the event. There is intense pressure on the MPS to get it right with regards to the complexities of managing interactions with the public.

Within this chapter, the pre-staging of the event will be explored briefly. This is to consider strategic dialogue, where the organisation (as a macro entity) seeks to direct the policing narrative of the event. Following this, the main part of the chapter will explore dialogue as it was experienced in real face-to-face encounters by PLTs.

The Notting Hill Carnival

Carnival is intrinsically interwoven with the local politics, geography and history of Notting Hill, London. Recognised as a carnival, it can also be related to the political order and understood as a protest or a form of resistance (Alleyne 1998), a 'struggle for power' (Cohen 1993). Originally polyethnic, Carnival was first held in 1966 with only a few thousand attendees, around half of whom were West Indian (ibid). During the 1970s, the event became exclusively a celebration of West Indian culture and was attended by hundreds of thousands of people (ibid).

Carnival is held in Notting Hill, an area in the now affluent borough of Kensington and Chelsea in west London. Despite campaigns by residents to get the event moved elsewhere, many revellers are passionate to keep Carnival in the area from which it originated. Carnival derives from an era of poor race relations in Britain and widespread poverty, with the roots of the event focused on celebrating and promoting Caribbean cultures and teaching younger generations about their heritage (Cohen 1993). The contemporary event has diversified in content and attendees, it attracts many international visitors and, during my fieldwork, some cursory evidence of gentrification was observed – with, for example, the availability of champagne stalls. Yet from the perspective of my fieldwork, one can still very clearly observe much celebration of Caribbean cultures.

Due to the sheer scale of Carnival, the event draws much formal and political attention, and came under strategic review in 2004 and again in 2016. Both reviews were interested in overarching themes of: public safety and security; responsibility and accountability; ownership; crime; and how to improve the event (see Greater London Authority 2004; Police and Crime Committee 2017). The number of stakeholders involved in Carnival continues to grow and we can understand the event as increasingly political.

Approximately two million people attend Carnival every year, policed by just shy of 13,000 officers, approximately 40 per cent of all officers within the MPS.⁴⁷ This type of police deployment is unrivalled for an annual pre-planned public order policing operation. For the most part, all leave is denied for officers over this bank holiday weekend and many officers spoken with during my fieldwork have policed the event every year of their career. Thus, this is a densely populated urban location within which both the police and attendees compete for front-stage control.

During my fieldwork many officers – from Silver (see Appendix 2) to PCs – spoke of their professional experiences of the violence that occurs during the Carnival weekend, with many speaking about the issues of gang-affiliated violence. Float revellers who were spoken to during the course of my fieldwork also communicated their frustration at this violence, especially with regards to static sound systems present at Carnival as, from their perspective, the violence is tarnishing the wider event as a whole. Police have attempted to respond proactively by introducing ‘pre-Carnival raids’ that seek to limit the numbers of affiliated gang members attending – by arresting them for other offences in advance – and therefore reducing the likelihood for police confrontation at the event. These raids focus on a myriad of criminal activity associated with the gang members, with county lines – the exploitation of vulnerable children to travel across the country to sell drugs on behalf of gangs – being a prominent feature of the raids during the fieldwork period. Following the raids, arrested gang members are given bail conditions that restrict their attendance at Carnival. It was argued by many different frontline and senior officers that these bail restrictions assist in preventing extreme levels of violence at the event. In doing so, it is believed by many officers that this preventative policing strategy facilitates the aims of Carnival as a cultural celebration.

Central to the ideology of police power is the domination of public space (Herbert 1997). Carnival epitomises this loss of police control, reversing the commonly accepted normative order. For three days, Notting Hill is occupied, dominated and controlled by West Indian culture, communities of people who for generations have perceived their treatment by some

⁴⁷In 2015: 12,583; 2016: 12,025; and 2017: 12,573. Information received through personal correspondence. The total for each year is the total deployed over the bank holiday, this total number would never be deployed at the one time.

in law enforcement as illegitimate and unjust. There was much happiness observed during the Carnival fieldwork, but the police-reveller historic turbulence was continually palpable and it was clear that in among the vibrant colours, the exotic foods and penetrating music, Carnival operates within a framework of a highly contentious racial history between the predominately white police officers and the black communities. This tension was ever present, bubbling underneath the surface of all the Carnival merriment.

PLTs and Carnival

Deployment of the PLTs within Carnival demonstrates one of its newest policing additions, with their first deployment being in 2016. They are attached to Carnival floats – which are a central feature of the event – and provide a direct communication link between the floats and Silver. During the fieldwork it was highlighted by leading PLOs that formal practice dictates the PLT should only contact Silver (see Appendix Three) in exceptional circumstances and that the PLT should mostly only liaise with Bronze 8 (see Appendix Three) or, alternatively, through the PLT coordinator (see Appendix Three) – a unique welfare role used during larger operations to ensure knowledge of the whereabouts of each PLT and to facilitate rest periods. However, radio communication is exceptionally broken at Carnival due to poor reception coverage. Although communication with and via Bronze 8 was observed, the fieldwork also commonly observed the PLT reporting directly to Silver bypassing all other command – this informal practice is represented in the red dotted line in Appendix Three. This informal practice was more heavily present during 2016, likely due to a close professional relationship between Silver and the PLT assigned to the Evergreen float, demonstrating the extent to which informal practice can impact communication channels with the PLT and command.

Within this chapter, reference to three floats will be made: Evergreen float, Pure Sugar float and Music Massive float (all pseudonyms) and the term ‘float organiser’ or ‘float reveller’ will be used to refer to the people attached to each float. The floats at Carnival visually look like a typical parade float – with large amounts of colour, activity and noise. They are effectively large trucks that have been stripped of their outer shell to allow an open space resembling a staging area. At the front is the cabin where the professional driver stays throughout the day, driving the vehicle through the route. The main part of the truck is open, secured round the sides with barriers. The truck can be accessed by official float members, this gives revellers access to a higher ground where many sights of Carnival can be seen. Carnival floats are not limited to one vehicle, and some can have a number of main floats

with smaller supporting vehicles also attached. The main truck normally consists of some form of sound system or band alongside supplies for the day. Following behind the truck are the dancers, performers and other associated members of the float – these revellers are separated from others by some form of physical barrier. Membership of the float is strictly controlled via identifiable features (for example, wrist bands or T-shirts) and stewards will remove any extraneous personnel.

In 2016 and 2017, there were 40 PLTs deployed (80 PLOs), assigned to the top 20 main floats featured in Carnival. These top floats were identified through various methods: some attracted large quantities of people; some were well known and popular among the Carnival community; and some had previously experienced a historically poor communication with the police. The remaining PLTs were used as support throughout the Carnival footprint, assisting their PLT colleagues where necessary. The field observations consciously observed a number of different ‘types’ of floats. For example, Evergreen had a long-standing problematic relationship with the police. Evergreen-police communication had predominately been none existent, but where communication was present, it had previously been negative and volatile. In 2016, Evergreen was considered by Silver as the most significant float to get communications right with during Carnival and two of the most highly respected PLOs were assigned to them, both with long-standing positive working relationships with Silver. Pure Sugar float from 2017 had a positive reputation with the command team at Carnival and the PLT did not anticipate experiencing any issues with the float. This float only paraded on Sunday, the family day, so the PLT were reassigned to another float on the Monday. Music Massive float had experienced some challenging communication with the police, but again were not widely associated by the command or the PLT as a float likely to experience any large issues.

Policing Carnival is an enormous operation – the largest annual pre-planned event for the MPS. As such, it is geographically separated into five different geographical sectors. However, PLTs are not sector assigned, they are float assigned. This means that they move through the Carnival footprint and work exclusively with the float they have been assigned to. Prior to the use of PLTs, ‘Band Serials’ had been used – these were level-three trained officers who were sector assigned. As such, when they reached the geographical boundary of their assigned sector, they passed responsibility of communication with the floats to a new set of officers. Many PLOs and senior command stated their belief that this subtle change from

being sector assigned to float assigned, alongside the introduction of skilled liaison officers, makes a significant difference towards rapport building and effective communication flow.

Image 20: View from an upper deck of a float




Image 21: Float examples and early morning crowds at Carnival



Image 22: Float construction and PLT



Image 23: Float procession with stewarding



Image 24: Float procession, static, awaiting movement of crowds



Part I: Impression Management

Pre-planning Notting Hill Carnival & Strategic Dialogue

Carnival can best be understood as the most sensitive (in terms of professional reputation) pre-planned public order policing operation the MPS experiences annually. Given the continued challenging relationship that exists between policing bodies and ethnic minority communities, the police service invests considerable efforts into ensuring the event is framed in a way that best supports the likelihood of a performative success. The pre-planning of Carnival seeks to achieve ‘dramaturgical circumspection’ (Goffman 1959, p. 212), and ‘dramaturgical discipline’ (ibid, p. 210)

Strategic External Dialogue – Pre-Carnival Raids

Dramaturgical circumspection (ibid, p. 212) ensures that policing actors invest forethought in staging the performance of Carnival. From here, the planning team are able to prepare in advance contingencies and avenues for performative exploitation (see ibid). Through exercising circumspection, policing actors are able to frame and tailor the rhetoric around Carnival, seeking to shape wider audiences’ (the public’s) understanding of Carnival (see ibid, p. 213).

One way policing actors seek to fine tune their Carnival performance is through ‘pre-Carnival raids’ – as they are known in the wider press. Through these raids, the police seek to target known offenders (it was suggested during fieldwork that many are associated with gangs). The raids allow the officers to arrest said individuals and, as part of their bail conditions,⁴⁸ order that they are not allowed to attend Carnival or the surrounding areas over the August bank holiday weekend. These raids attract much media attention and public debate annually. In 2017, Silver commented that the raids succeeded in ‘dismantling one of the top gangs’ (Interview, Silver, 2017) and the MPS sought to advertise this perceived success.

⁴⁸ Although not discussed as part of this thesis, the problematic nature of these raids must be acknowledged.

Image 25: MPS Tweet on Carnival Raids, 2017



In 2017, public interest in these raids appeared to increase following a tweet by famous grime artist Stormzy: *'How many drugs did you lot seize in the run up to Glastonbury or we only doing tweets like this for black events?'* (The Guardian 2017). Uncommonly, the Gold Commander of Carnival 2017 responded with a formal statement addressing Stormzy's tweet:

What do the public expect of us? Last year we had 70 to 80 stabbings, four of them people who nearly lost their lives in attempted murders. My officers saved the lives of those people but I cannot remember a single murder at Glastonbury. We are going to be uncompromising in ensuring the safety and security of the public and if that means putting a significant effort into dealing with criminality before carnival I am unapologetic about that and will continue to do it. I will arrest anyone, anywhere, if we have intelligence they are involved in crime and they intend to travel to the carnival to cause trouble.

(Evening Standard 2017)

Within this formal statement, the MPS is presenting the image of Carnival as violent. Given the policing role within Carnival, it is perhaps unsurprising that the 'face' of Carnival most regularly experienced by officers relates to violence. Scenes of violence are not uncommon, during fieldwork I was made aware of and observed the aftermath of sexual assaults/harassment (both on Carnival attendees and police officers); physical fighting; homophobic abuse; substance overdose; threatened corrosive substance attack; threatened

physical attack on isolated officers; and the aftermath of panic as small groups of young men purposefully stormed dense crowds. Furthermore, within a research interview with Silver, the research was exposed to a very severe attack upon a young boy and the emotions this creates for officers,

We're standing in SOR⁴⁹ watching the CCTV cameras and I've got my closest staff in there with me. We chucked everyone else out and we shut the door and I felt absolutely sick because I realised there was **nothing** [huge emphasis placed on this word] I could do. People would either die or not and there was nothing else I could do. I have never in my entire life felt like that. I wanted to take my epaulettes off and go home. Physically frightened. But you don't. You grip it and you move on. I will never forget that space of an hour and a half just thinking how can this be allowed to happen? And everyone at the end of Carnival every year goes, 'yeah check us out we delivered Carnival'... No, no we can't carry on. So that for me was the tipping point.

Silver, Carnival, Interview 2017

Here, Silver is referring to a young boy who was targeted and attacked at Carnival 2015; he was stabbed in the anus and, through continued attacking motions with a knife,⁵⁰ it was believed the attacker would disembowel the victim. During this time the Carnival crowds were so dense that, despite Silver's continued attempts and her being privy to the event on CCTV, she was unable to immediately get any of her units to the victim's aid and there was a delay in them arriving.

The continued experience of violence evidences a specific type of 'front' (Goffman 1959, p. 32) being created for officers, one where the 'manner' (ibid, p. 35) of the officer warns the audience of the specific type of interaction to be expected from the performer – a slightly defensive and apprehensive one – with the expectation that violence could occur anywhere. This is further evidenced through the experience of a number of different PLOs passing

⁴⁹ Specialist Operations Room (SOR) – this is an area of HQ where many different roles are fulfilled. It is a large room, surrounded by CCTV, where anything from emergency firearms plans can be established, police staff can dispatch officers to relevant areas of London and public order operations from a senior level are executed. The Silver and Gold suites are situated here, allowing the two most senior public order commands to have their own space and staff around them for the entirety of an event. Informal debriefs were often held here during my fieldwork.

⁵⁰ This was reported within the press as a 'zombie knife', however, Silver made no reference to the specific knife used.

comment on how being attached to the floats, thus, experiencing a new area of Carnival, enabled a different policing experience – ‘*I’ve never seen this side to Carnival before, it’s amazing!*’ [Field note 1].

As such, the raids, which are a big media attraction, and the images of raids – these news items are regularly supported by photos or videos – enhance the legitimacy of the actions taken by the police. Furthermore, through engaging with this rhetoric via their Twitter page, the MPS are able to self-narrate the reality of the raids – what Larkins (2013) would refer to as a ‘hyperreality’ (see *ibid*, p. 26). This is by no means to suggest that the image put forward by the MPS is not truth but instead highlights that this perception of Carnival is the police version of a truth – a carefully constructed message to tell a particular tale.⁵¹

Silver was upfront about the different messages communication teams attempt to put forth within policing:

Silver: ... the gang running and the drug running and the guns into Carnival, all stems back to the activities in the different areas across London. Carnival gangs are not Notting Hill Carnival gangs, they are not local residents, they do not live there, they travel into Carnival to settle their scores, that’s the narrative we didn’t do... that was a narrative that [Gold Commander] then tried to lay out a bit more.

Me: *Was that a mistake in the original message?*

Silver: Yes, we didn’t message that well... [Marion] our spokesperson, but [Marion] delivers a certain type of message, so what we realised now is, [Connor] who’s Crime, he’ll do the crime messaging and we will lead that in. [Marion] will do that engagement soft stuff and then you’ve got it covered. So, we definitely didn’t get our comms right. We kind of did the standard comms that we’ve always done... But we changed the strategy so why don’t we change the comms? No idea.

Silver Carnival, Interview, 2017

Within this interview data, Silver is referring to two different senior leaders within the MPS. The first is ‘Marion’, this is the officer who presents ‘the friendly face of Carnival’ – she was regularly active on Twitter pages, presenting a community-based message about the enjoyment of Carnival. Contrasting to this, Silver refers to ‘Connor’, this was the officer who

⁵¹ It is important to note that ‘hyperreality’ messages of Carnival as filled with revelry and enjoyment are also present within the media. Carnival is also advertised positively as a family day out, a party, a street festival, a top attraction in London. These messages are equally as problematic; however, we are only considering the policing message here.

was the face of ‘crime’ aspects of Carnival. Silver articulates here that part of the reason the legitimacy of the raids was lost on the wider public was due to the fact the organisation did not communicate the message appropriately. As opposed to isolating specific ‘types’ of messages to specific ‘types’ of officers/roles, the organisation used a community-focused officer to deliver a crime-focused message.

This miscommunication demonstrates an organisation trying to communicate a complex message while expecting the audience (the public) to hold expert knowledge of the context – in this instance, the connection between county lines and gang links to Carnival. For Goffman (1959), we can see an embarrassing faux pas or blunder, the creation of an incident where a performance is halted due to a disruption to the reality promoted by actors (see Scott 2015, p. 88).

The results of the raids are largely unimportant for our analysis here, as it is the attempts of the organisation to stage and frame specific performances that are of interest. For Goffman (1959), the circumspect performer tries to select an audience who will prove the least troublesome in consuming the performance being put forth by the actor (ibid, p. 213). Policing representatives do not have this privilege of selecting an audience, however, they can use their institution power to frame specific messages to specific audiences in order to try to assist in communicating their truth within Carnival.

Strategic Internal Dialogue – Pre-Carnival Briefings

Another aspect of impression management central to performative success is dramaturgical discipline (Goffman 1959, p. 210). A disciplined performer is someone who remembers the part which they are playing, they do not give away the secrets of a performance and have the ability to cover up faux pas that are committed by their fellow actors (see ibid). Within the context of this research, pre-planning stages showed that *evidence* of organisational attempts to *create* disciplined performers was more significant than the reality of ensuring the performers were disciplined. We can best understand this through formal briefings⁵² of officers – these are large-scale events, sometimes with more than 100 officers in attendance. All officers who are actively involved in Carnival (no matter their role) will receive a formal briefing. During the fieldwork, for the level-two officers they largely took the same form –

⁵² Formal briefings are, of course, partly carried out for legal reasons.

with the same presentation used, but with some content adapted depending upon the Sector Bronze who was leading it. For the PLTs (who were briefed with level-three officers), the presentation was different (to the level-twos) and was specifically focused on the community-based work their role required of them.

Despite the formality of briefings and the considerable effort they take to coordinate such a large number of officers into one room, the messages that came out of briefings seemed confused and not uniform. Briefings aim to formally notify the officers involved in any operation with the relevant information they need to aid in their ability to effectively police the event. This could include (but is not limited to) relevant powers being used within the Carnival footprint; different information about the attending performers (for example, floats or sound systems); information about tube stations; information about toilets; timings for the day; rest areas; and messages from Silver and Gold (related to their operational vision of the event). There is a formal presentation from the strategic leadership team, that is officially meant to be shown to all rank-and-file officers and is accessible through the intranet system:

The officer in charge has the projector up in front and is running through the formal briefing given to officers, there are a large number of pages in this briefing, I would guess he has skipped through about 15 different slides, 'I'll take you to the important slide' he comments and stops on the slide with information about where the nearest toilets are and when tubes will be open and closed. 'We have a large number of briefings to get through, so this is all the information we have time for.' Officers are dismissed.

Field note 2 Ground-Based, Level-Two briefings, 2015

A PC turns to her colleague, 'I missed all of that it was so fast, what did he say?' The officer being asked shrugs and the officer asking closes her pocket book and writes nothing further.

Field note 3, Ground-Based, Level-Two briefings, 2015

I have just attended two briefings after each other located at the same venue. One sector Bx. has told their officers that there is absolutely no dancing allowed by officers, strict instructions from Silver. They have also told their officers that beat duty hats must be worn. The briefing following this has said some dancing is allowed as it ensures attendees won't be offended. Caps must be worn.

Field note 4 Ground-Based Level-Two briefings, 2017

Barely anyone in attendance, Bx. comments that most people are on holiday and will need to be briefed another time. Man sitting behind me looks exhausted, I learn he's just come off nights – I'm questioning how much he'll take from this briefing. Bx. says before he went on holiday he was really confident in his plan, but came back from holiday to learn his plan had gone out the window due to

changes in the operation. He also comments that the IT was down the other day ‘so this is my presentation’ – holds up notes on a piece of paper. Bx. states ‘absolutely no dancing’ is allowed – officers are there to police the event and they can’t remain vigilant if they’re dancing, loud tuts throughout the room. Bx. comments that ‘a clear part of the [PLT] role is to get them [the floats] on [the route], get them around as quick as possible, then get them off’. As with other briefings, significant warnings around safety.

Field note 5 Ground-Based, PLT briefing, 2017

Despite their formality, all briefings appeared to be – in content – disorganised and not uniform. The four field notes above evidence the conflict between the organisation attempting to evidence that they have formally briefed their officers and the reality that most presentations were skipped to specific slides, with officers being unable to gain all the information they needed in quick time and confused messaging (in these instances, about dancing or uniform). Officers were rarely observed taking notes and were regularly overheard questioning content with each other. The only uniform message to come out of all briefings was the potential dangers of the event and how all officers should ensure their own and colleagues’ safety.

The image presented by the organisation is one of a disciplined body of officers who are well informed of the event they must police. Formally, the organisation can evidence that they have coordinated large-scale briefings where all relevant information was communicated to the officers. Yet the reality of briefings appeared to be widely unhelpful to officers’ role performance. We can understand this as the conflict of performances, where the MPS (as a ‘macro’ entity) are using briefings as a performative strategy to try to manage their corporate face, trying to evidence how they are providing their officers with all the required tools for their role. Yet in a ‘micro’ policing setting, these briefings appeared to be redundant in assisting officers’ with polishing their performance.

As such, organisationally the MPS is relying upon their officers being ‘regular performers’ (Goffman 1961, p. 88), meaning that their expertise comes from their everyday experiences of policing events. Thus, the function (ibid) of briefings analytically needs to be understood as a strategic requirement as opposed to an informative meeting. It is perhaps within the informal briefings that this research experienced cursory evidence of where the more authentic exchanging of information to create a disciplined performer can be seen. Informal briefings could best be understood as small-scale informal conversations among officers where they would discuss – in a more relaxed way – the upcoming event. These meetings

were significantly harder to methodologically capture as they were often quiet, spontaneous and private discussions between officers.

Part II – The Event

Part II will consider the Carnival event itself, with focused analysis of fieldwork experiences while out on-the-ground with officers during the 2015, 2016 and 2017 Carnivals.

PLO Interaction: Operating within the context of a Professionally Spoiled Identity

I'm walking out of the school used by one of the sectors for Carnival, it's been a long day and I'm heading home. I notice a black man standing with arms around his young son – around five. There's a police car parked with two officers sitting in the front resting, an ambulance is parked in front of it, the medical staff are also resting. I begin to walk towards them, wondering why the man is just staring at them. 'Now, look there son... That's an ambulance, we trust them. But that there is a police car, we don't trust them, we never trust them.'

Field note 6, Ground-Based, Monday Late Evening, Carnival 2015

Goffman (1963) opened his chapter on *Stigma and Social Identity* quoting the Greek understanding of the term – where bodily signs are designed to expose something bad of the stigmatised group, to show to wider society their moral status and how they are ‘ritually polluted’ (ibid, p. 11). Field note six captures a tension that was consistently present during three consecutive years of fieldwork at Carnival. This apparent perception of anger, hostility and broken trust – exemplified in field note one – pointed towards the police as an institution being ‘ritually polluted’ with the officers being *professionally* stigmatised. This professionally spoiled identity of the police (as a homogenous group) weakened the foundations of interactions for PLOs (as individual officers). Consistently present during the fieldwork was a tense undercurrent that interactions could be misinterpreted and escalated, with PLOs appearing to be continually mindful of their spoiled police identity while attempting to negotiate their own more individualised identity.

For Goffman, self-identity is split between the actual (the true characteristics one possesses) and the virtual (the image one *hopes* to present) (Scott 2015) – it is when these two identities do not align and characteristics are ‘deeply discrediting’ (Goffman 1963, p. 13) that stigmatisation forms. Goffman differentiates between ‘the normals’ and stigmatized groups – this is not to suggest that ‘the normals’ are by any means ‘normal’, but that they perceive themselves as such in comparison to the stigmatised (Scott 2015). Thus, stigma forms as a

result of ‘blemishes of character’ (Goffman 1963) – characteristics that spoil one’s identity in the eyes of those with whom they interact. Stigma is explored in reference to the discrepancy between the ‘virtual’ social identity (what we expect someone should be like) and their ‘actual’ social identity. Goffman (1963) was particularly interested in ‘mixed contact’ between ‘the stigmatised’ and ‘the normals’ – identifying between *discrediting* stigmas (visibly identifiable differences such as disability), *discreditable* differences (behaviours that are perceived as deviating from the norm and might be judged as such, for example, a criminal record) and *courtesy* stigmas (stigma by association – a ‘wise’ person who, for example, might work alongside a stigmatised person).

Developing upon Goffman’s theory of stigma, Ashford and Kreiner (1999) explored different types of occupations that are widely considered to be ‘dirty’ – work that is physically, socially and/or morally tainted. Adjoining both these concepts, we can theorise how the police identity has been ‘spoiled’ in the eyes of some. Aspects of police work can be perceived as ‘dirty’, an occupation meshed in society’s ills that are hidden from most people. This is perhaps the core of police work, with officers living ‘in a state of perpetual trouble, labour and disquiet so that other folks may enjoy their rest’ (MP Croker; cited in Hurd 2007, p. 105). The fieldwork directly observed, as well as heard, accounts of officers engaging in challenging encounters: young men being strip searched due to suspicion of ‘plugging’;⁵³ persistent stop and searches of young black men for ‘fitting the description’ (often provided by a member of the public); an angry woman irate at being arrested, defecating on the floor of the cell and proceeding to use her hands to ‘paint’ the walls with her excrement; urine and spit being used as ‘weapons’ by members of the public; terrified children watching officers resolve domestic disputes; or aid to cover crime scenes of a murder.

The concept of police work being ‘dirty’ has been applied previously looking at the physically repulsive aspects of the job (see, for example, Gassaway 2007; De Camargo 2017), the morally challenging aspects (see, for example, Dick 2005) and the socially problematic aspects (Drew and Hulvey 2007). From the perspective of Carnival, we can understand the officers’ professionally spoiled identity forming as a result of the ‘dirty’ work the organisation is perceived to engage in on a routine basis – the over-policing of ethnic

⁵³ The act of inserting drugs into a condom and inserting the condom up their rectum – a widely used method by drug dealers to conceal their supply.

minority communities. Carnival is an event (symbolically) owned, executed and dominated by black people and at the very heart of Carnival is the celebration of Caribbean cultures. This fact is not lost on the normative order of police-public interactions. As we have learned, the historic police-reveller relations at Carnival are extremely contentious and I recorded in field notes that the strained contemporary relations were palpable, at times unnerving – and it is upon this foundation that police-public interactions are formed. Just prior to Carnival 2017, London witnessed the Grenfell disaster and the death of Rashan Charles – a young ethnic minority male, while in police custody.⁵⁴ Both of these events sent an added undercurrent of tension among officers and many officers voiced their concerns of what implications this would have upon rapport with revellers.

As such, through fieldwork it became abundantly clear that this event was handled with extreme sensitivity due to the perceived problematic relationship the police (as an institution) have with ethnic minority communities. Further fieldwork observations showed that many within the Carnival communities believed any form of formal police attention – attention that was not ‘positive’ (such as dancing with revellers) – at Carnival was *solely* motivated by this institutionally racist reputation. Indeed, I observed during fieldwork white people and BAME people being stopped for identical reasons – with the former going unnoticed by wider crowds, but the latter escalating tensions rapidly. Thus, police work appeared to be perceived as morally and socially ‘dirty’, officers’ reputations ‘tainted’ and police officers’ professional identity ‘spoiled’ (Goffman 1963).

However, those officers spoken with had an alternative view of their role and did not perceive their actions as racist, but as operating within a systemically discriminatory society – one that disproportionately fails young black men (socially, educationally, financially). They often articulated feelings that, despite many other contributing factors leading to the police having increased interaction with black communities, they singularly were being identified and stigmatised as the *only* institutionally racist actor. It appeared as though they were working

⁵⁴ Grenfell tower was a block of social housing located within Notting Hill. The horrific Grenfell fire saw the death of many who became trapped in the burning building. Debates since the disaster identified the perceptions of some that ethnic minorities (especially working-class minorities) are not protected by state bodies (such as councils) in the same way that affluent whites are. As a well-known representative of the state, the police became increasingly nervous about how these perceptions would impact them. During Carnival 2017, there was a Carnival-wide silence for the victims of Grenfell.

within the confines of a professional reputation that did not match their self-image, something that has previously been identified as significant to social identity (Hughes 1951).

This professionally spoiled identity in turn created a complex communicative foundation for the PLTs deployed at Carnival. Communication is of course an essential component to social order (Mead 2013 [1934]), patterning behaviour to give us interactional confidence with those we communicate with (see Goffman 1967). In a policing context, interactions can often be tense, contentious and untrustworthy; and, often begin from the point of embarrassment, awkwardness, incivility or aggression. This was especially true when observing many fleeting interactions between police officers and revellers throughout Carnival – especially with young black males. As such, the PLTs are entering into an interactional order that is largely untested, unpredictable and tense.

The field notes that follow exemplify these interactionally weak foundations. They show the complexity and depth that surrounds police interactions, in addition to the ingrained impact the ‘spoiled identity’ has upon forming rapport with different revellers. Additionally, it identifies the challenge for PLTs to build rapport with float revellers while working against other colleagues charged with conflicting duties.

Two non-liaison officers come over to Evergreen [float] and begin to tell them how they need to move, Thomas [PLO] immediately looks over from where we are standing and quickly moves to intervene.

Float Organiser to Thomas: [shouting] ‘WHAT DID WE TELL YOU? EVERY YEAR THIS HAPPENS.’

Thomas turns to one of the leading organisers, ‘What’s happening?’

Float Organiser: ‘THEY’RE TELLING US TO MOVE, THEY’RE SAYING WE HAVE TO START OFF THE ROUTE TO BE ABLE TO COME ONTO THE ROUTE. I TOLD YOU. EVERY YEAR THIS HAPPENS, EVERY YEAR.’

The tension is rising and I step back as more people gather round. Some of the younger men jump down from the truck and pull out their phones – one older man pulls out an older style camcorder. They all start filming.

Revellers: POLICE HARASSMENT... POLICE HARASSMENT’

They start to shout into the camera as they film themselves and the police in the background. The men hold the cameras right into the police officers’ faces, [apart from the float organiser, the group is exclusively male].

One of the officers starts speaking.

Officer 1: ‘We’ve had orders to get you off the route, you’re not meant to be here... where is your starting point?’

Float Organiser: 'THIS IS OUR STARTING POINT, THIS IS WHERE WE'RE BASED. THIS IS OUR STARTING POINT.'

[Exchange continues and gets increasingly heated]

Thomas [turning to float organiser]: 'Look, I need you to help me out, I need to speak to them [meaning the two other officers].'

Float Organiser: 'THEY DO THIS EVERY YEAR, EVERY YEAR, IT'S A JOKE... I TOLD YOU DIDN'T I?'

Thomas: 'Yeah you did.'

Float Organiser: 'SO WHY ARE THEY DOING THIS? THIS IS NOT RIGHT, THIS IS HARASSMENT.'

Thomas: 'I see where you're coming from, I get it, but I need to sort this. I need you to help me, look at this [motions around to the escalating situation], we can't have this, I need to sort this.'

They look at each other, Thomas is looking at her attentively – there's a pause, it looks as though the float organiser is thinking her way through the issues. The pause feels significant.

Float Organiser: 'Right.'

She turns to all the men surrounding her and shouts.

Float Organiser: 'GET BACK TO WHAT YOU'RE DOING...'

She takes a few of the younger ones and physically turns them round and pushes them away, some are left, but there seems to be less of a spark in the air. A few don't move – including Mr Evergreen [prestigious member of the float] – they remain in the perimeter to watch Thomas.

Thomas turns to the Officer 1.

Thomas: 'Look mate, they're not moving, this is the [location] this is their base, this is where they start.'

Officer 1: 'No. I've been told by my inspector that they need to move.'

Thomas: 'What is it about this that you're not getting? This is where they start. They're not like the other floats who travel in, they're based here. You've been briefed wrong.'

The exchange continues going back and forth for a few minutes. Despite Thomas being an exceptionally calm officer, with many years policing experience, I can feel his patience seeping away.

Thomas stops and takes a breath and then, with a very patronizing tone, speaks.

Thomas: 'I am telling you, they are not moving. This is where they are based. They are not moving. So, you go and deliver the message to your inspector [Thomas adds a mocking emphasis here] that if he has an issue with that, he is to come here and speak to me directly and we can both phone Silver together and explain why Evergreen has been moved away from their base, because 'your inspector' [mocking emphasis again] has said so... My name is Thomas, tell him to come and speak with me directly.'

I look to Officer 1 and his body language appears to show defeat, he walks off without further comment.

Field note 7 evidences a snapshot into different field experiences of negotiated micro-orders. Unlike previous years where Evergreen had their starting point challenged by an institution that had ‘macro-power’ and felt powerless to this perceived harassment, Evergreen now had access to agents of that power-holding organisation. As part of the PLT role, Thomas and the float organiser had been in contact with one another prior to Carnival, building some initial rapport and building knowledge of ‘the other’ outside of their assigned identity of ‘the police’ and ‘float organiser’. Scott (2015) identifies how social institutions are recognised for their patterned behaviour – in this instance, the perception that the police continuously (and unreasonably) harass Evergreen. As such, we can interpret the PLT being tested by their assigned float – would they be able to solve a long-standing issue for the float organiser? Whose side was the PLT really on? By positioning himself as an advocate for Evergreen, alongside micro significant behaviours such as asking the float organiser (not his institutional colleague) for an account of what was happening, Thomas appeared to be breaking the patterned behaviour experienced by Evergreen.

When referring to micro-level structures, Goffman (1968) identifies ‘institutional arrangements’, arguing that power is experienced through daily face-to-face encounters (also see Scott 2015). We can easily recognise the power policing institutions hold and how this frames interactions. However, this interpretation only gives us a macro understanding of police-public interaction and removes all agency from citizens. Within this micro setting, the float organiser held significant power over how that interaction could play out. Evident within the field notes and representative of many interactions at Carnival was the rapid escalation in tensions that occurred instantaneously. The collaborative nature of the PLT tactic with the communities they police is evident in the exchange of power observed. Despite the organiser’s own visible frustrations and anger at the non-PLT officers, she stepped back and empowered Thomas to negotiate and mediate the float’s desired outcome.

This analysis identifies the significance of the exchange of power, the micro-politics that takes place within the wider social order of interactions. While not ignoring the contextual restraints of the interaction (two groups often polarised as having problematic relations), the micro-order is shaped by the power of key individuals – in this instance, the organiser trusting the PLT. This identifies how micro-orders can be shaped and influenced by behaviours and interactions within an immediate context. It also identifies how we can

expand our understanding of interactional power when considering police and non-police citizens and the impact this has upon interactional orders. The interaction between Thomas and the level-two officer (field note 7) identifies a corporate clash of negotiation styles (Fine 1984). Where previously ‘the police’ definition had been imposed upon Evergreen (*‘you will start where we want you to start’*), the float now had internal representation, therefore ‘the police’ definition no longer exists as a homogenous entity. Instead, Evergreen’s cultural power is clearly present within the interactional order. This means Thomas (and other PLOs) are able to manipulate the system to impact their surroundings to mediate the best results within that moment.

This results in interactional order as an exchange (*how can we resolve this?*) instead of a direction or order (*do this because I’ve told you*). Both groups (PLT and float) are dependent on the other in the maintenance or micro-orders. It is within these interactions that we can observe the PLT challenging their professionally spoiled identity. This is not to suggest that perceptions of ‘the police’ had begun to change, but that perceptions of these particular officers within this context were positively impacting the organiser’s opinion of what could be achieved.

It is from this disruption to ‘usual’ policing practice that we can understand the PLTs as trying to re-identify themselves to the community. Police work is perceived as ‘dirty’ and the PLTs wider policing identity is ‘spoiled’, but the PLTs put themselves forward as something ‘different’ to their colleagues: something less ‘dirty’, less ‘spoiled’. It was highly frowned upon for PLTs to get involved in any form of ‘robust’ policing, such as physical confrontations or arrests. As one PLO succinctly articulated, the difference between PLTs and their ‘yellow’ public-order policing colleagues: *“I talk, he hits.”* [Field note 8]

The PLTs would regularly speak of their ‘blue-’ – their identity as PLOs that made them different from their ‘yellow’ public order policing colleagues. The blue brand was highly respected among the PLOs, who saw themselves as policing differently, fully committed to assisting the event achieve their goals. Many PLOs featured in the fieldwork had transitioned over from level-two officers to becoming PLOs, would partake in level-two aid with less frequency and many had let their training certification to be a level-two officer expire. This transition from being a ‘yellow’ public order officer to a PLT with commitment to the ‘blue brand’ of increased dialogue and engagement can be understood as a cleansing ritual, trying

to re-establish themselves among the policed as a less tarnished branch of the extended policing family. The PLOs are symbolically communicating that they recognise the ‘dirty’ and tarnished past of the organisation and have adopted their own policing approach by presenting a cleansed and purified tactic – one that is more closely aligned with their perceived self-identity as someone who is ‘fair’. Furthermore, many would comment that while ‘PLTing’ (as it was called), they felt more at the centre of an event, that they were professionally achieving more by helping the event with their desired goals and that they had a better understanding of the events.

This desire to separate their PLO identity was rarely articulated as a negative opinion of their level-two colleagues, but instead focused on the nature of the work that their colleagues were operationally charged to do. This is significant, as part of what actually enables the PLOs to identify differently to their level-two colleagues is the fact they have the operational freedom to engage in meaningful interactions with members of the public – in this instance, float revellers. Engagements like those evidenced in field note seven are not fleeting police-reveller interactions, they are grounded in a commitment to relationship building. How active the PLO was in the engagement and how meaningful that engagement was were both essential for being able to impact their professionally spoiled identity. For our purposes, *actively* engaging means dialogue where officers are either drawn into an interaction by a member of the public or colleague seeking assistance and are confirmed by those involved as a participant within that interaction (such as field note 7). *Meaningful* means the extent to which the officer is able to spend time working against their professionally spoiled identity to reaffirm a sense of self within the interaction. These types of interactions are in contrast to a superficial fleeting interaction where an officer does not have the time or space to negotiate or counteract the professional stigma being assigned to them.

Within the context of Carnival, superficial interactions can best be understood as those where the PLT is not with their assigned float – thus, not with people they have been building collaborative relationships with. These interactions are notable by the fact they are unable to impact or depart away from the professional stigma the PLO have been assigned – the common identity of ‘the police’ as opposed to a more individualised identity of ‘PLO’. The following two field note extracts exemplify the type of interaction where no active or meaningful engagement is established. Both depict scenes where the PLT were separated

from their floats (for various reasons) and therefore were not with the float revellers who they had built relationships with – they were simply ‘the police’.

It’s around 1500, Gordan and I are standing watching some traffic go past, the street is still packed but is actually quieter to the one we’ve just left. Gordan is looking around for Percy who is helping someone with directions. I see four young black men standing outside Starbucks, they’re looking at Gordan smirking, openly laughing and joking around together while always looking over at him. I look at Gordan, I can tell he’s spotted them but he doesn’t react. Nothing feels confrontational about the behaviour, more mocking. They’re all leaning against the wall, one with his leg up, all very relaxed. Gordan and I walk past. One shouts, ‘arhhhh rare, rare’, they all laugh. Gordan smiles at them, ‘hello lads’ – we continue to walk. Another of the boy’s shouts, ‘oiiii gang, gang!!!’ Gordan doesn’t react, still with his back to them. Another black man (separate to the younger men) is watching us, he’s smiling – amused by the interaction, his eyes darting between Gordan and the boy with a huge grin on his face. At this point, we’re walking away from the young men, so our backs are to them. Gordan continues to look round for Percy. He spots him back in the direction we just came from, he turns and starts to walk back in the direction we just came from. The young men all instantly move off around the corner. The separate man who had been watching the interaction says to Gordan, “oi fam, allow it, just allow it”. Gordan looks at the man, ‘mate, I don’t care about them, I’m just looking for my colleague!’ Gordan and I walk back the way we’ve come heading back towards Percy. I look to Gordan for explanation – ‘oh, they’ll just be thinking it’s rare to see a black officer.’

Field note 9, Ground-Based, Monday afternoon, Carnival 2017

Gordan and Percy have separated from their float who are working their way through the judging zone. Gordan has heard across the radio a description of a person reported to the police by a member of the public to be carrying a firearm. They begin to follow the individual who has approximately five friends with him, he looks the youngest. [Field note continues and the individual is detained by level-two officers for a search.] Gordan is trying to calm the young man’s friends who are irate at him being detained, ‘this is ridiculous, he’s my little brother, you actually think he has a firearm?’ Percy is standing back, not getting involved. Gordan begins to try to explain, ‘lads, lads, listen’. They don’t appear to be interested in listening, they’re moving around trying to get a better view of the young man getting searched. A community worker – present to observe the legality of searches at Carnival [common at Carnival] – is raising his voice and appears to be trying to gain the attention of the young men away from Gordan. Gordan appears mostly invisible to them all. ‘Here is where you make your complaint, you need to give these details’ states the community worker to the young men. Gordan turns to the community worker, asking for a space to explain what’s happening. The back and forth between all groups involved is chaotic, no one is hearing or listening to the other, there is so much noise. [Field note continues.] Eventually the young man who was detained is sent on his way after a negative search, he exits the search area and re-joins his friends, ‘mate they thought you had a gun’ they all laugh and walk off. No notice is given to Gordan.

Field note 10, Ground-Based, Sunday afternoon, Carnival 2017

In field note 9, Gordan had no meaningful engagement with these young men. The PLT were having trouble locating their assigned float in the heavy traffic after taking a short break in one of the rest areas. Having got caught up with a member of the public asking for direction, Gordan and Percy had got separated and Gordan was keen to relocate his partner. The interaction was light hearted and mocking, but despite this, the young boys reacted negatively to their perception that Gordan was moving back towards them, perhaps through fear of what their comments might lead to. This perception that Gordan was reacting to the young men was reconfirmed by the separate man watching the interaction – he too saw the redirection of Gordan as evidence he wanted to speak to the young men.

For field note 10, again there was no active or meaningful engagement – no member of that interaction was interested in listening to Gordan. Further, the members of the public involved in that interaction saw no reason to engage with Gordan – unlike float revellers, these wider revellers were unlikely to engage with Gordan again and this isolated interaction meant they had little to gain by investing in an interaction.

These field note extracts depict another ‘type’ of interaction experienced by the PLT – but a type only observed when away from the float revellers, representing the importance of the setting in which the PLO is trying to mediate their way through an interaction. When assigned to a float, both parties have the time and space to build relations, test one another and gain interactional predictability. When observing PLT interaction with the floats this appeared to bring increased trust between the PLT and the float and each were able to effectively legitimise or explain any misinterpreted behaviour to ‘the other’ – in short, they were able to build an active and meaningful interactional order. Through this stronger interactional basis, the PLO identity appeared to be less ‘spoiled’ and relations, although at the beginning felt tense, were eased. Contrary to this, when separated from their float, engagement with members of the public – interactions that could be perceived to have wider negative connotations – appeared to have minimal impact on the perceptions of ‘the police’ by members of the public – thus, the PLO identity still appeared to be ‘spoiled’ and negatively tarnished as ‘the police’.

Co-Production of Order Through Teamwork

For Goffman (1959), interaction is inherently performative and a central component to this performance is teamwork, defined as ‘any set of individuals who co-operate in staging a

single routine' (ibid, p. 85). The main actors within this chapter are the PLT and the float organiser(s) – although there are a number of key influential members within the float, each year observed one specific named individual as the 'organiser'. Thus, this 'team' is an intimate and fluid one, with a very small number of key actors.

A central purpose of the PLT role is to work with people to mediate and negotiate co-produced solutions between the group and the police. As such, the collaborative nature of the role demands teamwork in order to best mediate a mutually defined 'order' within the context they are working. Teamwork is inherently political, demanding both solidarity yet shrewdness from all team players (Scott 2015). Thus, in a Carnival context, where relations between the PLT and float personnel were at times unpredictable, it might appear inappropriate to define these distinct (and often polarised) individuals as a team. However, the construct of 'team' for this analysis pushes beyond the singular definition of actor/audience (Goffman 1959, p. 97) and instead suggests that actors manipulate interactional order, fluidly (overtly and covertly) transitioning between small teams (plural) in order to achieve 'order' within any specific context.

Among the PLTs and the float organiser, teamwork was clearly split between a 'traditional team' and an 'untraditional team' – with central actors fluctuating between the two, continuously negotiating an 'order'. A traditional team can predictably be defined as teamwork with those who can clearly be identified as colleagues: PLT-other police personnel and float organiser-other float personnel. An untraditional team is one where actors from one group manipulate their environment to aid 'the other' to achieve a mediated solution to any problem – these actions could be achieved overtly or subtly.

What united the PLT and float organiser(s) as a team was their agreed upon shared aim of (safely) gaining entry to the route; (safely) making it around the route to the judging zone; and (safely) making it back to base. Above all differences, these aims appeared to unite the PLT and float organisers during fieldwork, all appeared to be working towards this single routine (Goffman 1959, p. 85). If this is achieved, both experience a 'successful' Carnival: for the float organiser, they have guided their fellow revellers in parading around the route and performing to onlookers and then be formally judged; for the PLT, they will have achieved their assigned objective from Silver.

What further solidifies the PLT and float organiser as a team is their interactional commitment that is demanded of actors who are staged together over a prolonged period of time. Prior to the PLTs, there was no policing approach that was so profoundly dedicated to any one area of Carnival. The PLTs and float revellers are staged in the heart of Carnival *together* for the entirety of the weekend, meaning each is consistently in the front-stage of the performance and accountable to the other actors on stage, creating ‘reciprocal dependence’ (ibid, p. 88) – inclusive of the actors in their untraditional team. Goffman proposed the notion of ‘public order’ within interaction, ‘the order that governs the conduct of persons when they are in each other’s immediate presence’ (Kendon 1988, p. 15). This relates to micro-behaviours we employ to try to avoid socially awkward encounters. When these encounters are prolonged instead of fleeting (for example, a partner compared to a stranger on the street), we rely even more upon conventional rules of public order, as we acutely understand our own interactional order relies upon that person or persons. Interactional public order can be thought of like an exchange or investment – where one engages in common courtesies with others and exerts a moral demand for reciprocal courtesies (Goffman 1959).

The PLT and float organiser represent two sets of actors with directive dominance (Scott 2015) over their ‘traditional team’, both oversee the actions of their traditional team and brief those that need performative direction. But what unites the PLT and float organiser as an ‘untraditional team’ is their unique position within the overall performance, with insight into the others knowledge, exposing a perception that they alone know what is really going on in their immediate environment, leading to a bond of reciprocal familiarity (Goffman 1959, p. 88).

We’re stuck again in the Carnival traffic, we’ve been standing unmoving for some time. Evergreen float organiser is storming over to Thomas and Emily, she looks fierce and I wonder what the issue is. She begins shouting at Thomas but the music is so loud I can’t hear what she’s saying, so I move closer.

Evergreen Organiser: ‘LOOK I’M BEING WATCHED RIGHT NOW. YOU SEE THAT LADY OVER THERE, SHE’S ANNOYED AT HOW LONG THIS IS TAKING, BUT I KNOW THERE’S A HOLD UP. SHE WON’T LISTEN TO ME. SO I TOLD HER I’D COME AND SHOUT AT YOU. [She begins shaking her finger in Thomas’ face]. SO, THIS IS ME HAVING A GO AT YOU FOR SOMETHING I KNOW IS NOT YOUR FAULT. JUST PRETEND YOU’RE LISTENING AND THAT YOU’LL DO SOMETHING. OKAY?’

Thomas looks stern and nods his head.

Thomas: ‘Yes, I totally understand what you’re saying. Message received.’
Evergreen float organiser turns and storms off back to the woman who was complaining to her, who is stood staring at Thomas.

Field note 11, Ground-Based, Sunday Afternoon, 2016

The speed in which floats are able to move around the Carnival route causes continued frustration for everyone involved. Carnival is the second largest Carnival in the world outside of Rio and this is evident by the density of the crowds. A significant amount of time at Carnival was spent standing around waiting for the next movement of the vehicles. During the fieldwork, this slow-moving traffic was a source of operational frustration for the police and performative frustration to the float revellers who wanted to parade their costumes and routines without stopping and starting. But within this micro setting, neither the float organiser nor the PLT had any control over the traffic.

Field note 11 depicts the Evergreen float organiser transitioning herself between traditional and untraditional teams to achieve the required performative reality for each. Field note 11 epitomises an actor's manipulation of an interaction. The Evergreen float organiser was forming alliances and switching her loyalty to her non-traditional team – albeit more subtly than Thomas had previously done [Field note 2]. These types of deceptive scenes allow for the idealised performance to continue – where the PLT and float organiser remain 'outsiders' to one another. For Goffman (1959) it would mean that an actor's 'front' (see *ibid*, pp. 32-40) remains predictable and expected for the audience. Police officers would regularly speak of the need to 'lose the battle to win the war', field note 11 depicts a non-policing example of this analogy, with the Evergreen float organiser navigating her traditional team's micro-politics. Here she is both symbolically communicating her group membership of Evergreen float by appearing to chastise Thomas, while also articulating her alignment with her non-traditional team – the PLT – by openly telling them how she is deceiving her Evergreen colleague. As Manning (1992) soundly articulates, this shows 'the distinction between something being the case and someone wanting something to be the case, revealing the difference between expression and action' (*ibid*, p. 41).

The co-production of order through teamwork was also observed with regards to navigating the floats on and off the Carnival route in a way that satisfied float-revellers.

It's around 1100 and the floats are finally about to set off onto the route, there are about four floats – one of which is Music Massive Float – visible in the immediate vicinity and by this time the quantity of people in the area has dramatically increased. Far busier than yesterday and the heat is pounding. There is absolute carnage as the floats set off. There is a correct order for the procession of the floats (so that the judging zone receive the floats in the right

order) and no one is in the right order and all of the floats are coming to the PLT and the level-three (L3) officers in the area complaining about what's happening. The PLTs and L3 officers navigate all the floats into the correct order. This is a huge job as the floats are effectively huge lorries with a parade of people attached. There is extra space on either side of the main stretch of road for parking, floats have occupied this space on both sides while waiting for the main event to start. As they move off the traffic is dense, only one float can fit on the main stretch of road at one time because of the quantity of people attached. After approximately 20 minutes, the PLTs and L3s have managed to navigate the correct order, it seems the job is done and the PLTs pull back. After approximately five minutes, nothing has moved and Gordan goes to find out what the hold up is. It turns out one of the floats ahead has lost connection and their music can't play – music is a huge part of Carnival, so this is a big problem for the revellers. The PLTs and L3s then work to navigate this float off the route to allow another separate float to go ahead, so that the float with no connection can use their sound system. This is just carnage, there are so many people. Lots of people start to come up to Gordan and Percy, complaining that they should be on the route and it's not fair that the floats are being re-ordered. They both explain there's been a connection issue and the reasons behind the re-order, the complainers seem content with this answer and head back to their own floats. The procession is now in its new order, but it's still not moving. Gordan again goes to find out the issues up ahead, he comes back and explains the float that had originally lost power has regained it and the revellers are stating they want to return to the original order. I catch the eye of one of the L3 officers who's been part of the reorganisation – he's clearly exasperated, but bursts out laughing and holds his head in his hands. The PLTs and L3s move off to assist in the reorganisation again. Eventually, after 40-60 minutes, the floats appear organised and happy, and begin to very slowly move past.

Field note 12, Ground-Based, Monday Morning, Carnival 2017

Evergreen have asked to come off early because it's getting too late and the children are getting tired. This presents a tremendous challenge for the PLT, it seems to be impossible to achieve. The streets are extremely congested with both human and vehicle traffic. Both Thomas and Emily try independently to contact Sx. about the potential of taking the float off the route early, but the radio reception isn't strong enough. Instead Thomas tries his job issues Carnival phone, but there's also no reception. There continues to be broken communication for some time while Thomas tries to reach Sx. There is no movement on the floats and everyone is getting tired. An opportunity presents itself down a right turn, which will lead Evergreen back to their base. But the road is overwhelmed with people and street vendors, the process of getting the floats down this road would involve moving everyone, while ensuring no potential for crushing. It is unclear whether the PLT have been given the okay, but Thomas and Emily seize the opportunity with the right turn. They begin to navigate the vehicle, it takes several attempts to get the accurate turn to allow the float to access the street. People are being forced out the way, some are annoyed but most appear to see why they're doing it. Thomas gives other officers directions to help and the float organiser and prominent leaders from the day are all helping to navigate this process... [field notes continue] After some time, we arrive back at the Evergreen base. The process was exhausting. PLTs take it in their stride as

many come over to thank them. I see Mr Evergreen [prominent figure for the float in his 70s] sitting on a wall, I notice he is crying and don't know what to do. I walk over and ask if he is okay, 'we've never made it back to base before, we've never had the police help us like this.' I look round not knowing how to react to this emotion, he says again, 'we've just never had this, we've never got back to base before'.

Field note 13, Ground-Based, Sunday Evening, Carnival 2016

For revellers in field note 12, it was deemed essential that each float should be in the correct pre-defined order. Revellers wanted to ensure they were with 'their' people – their community and all its associated cultural displays. Float revellers would have displays, costumes and routines all pre-prepared to parade to other revellers and the judging panel. As such, if they were not in the correct order or with their own float community, the entire performance would be disrupted. The PLTs and a small number of level-three trained officers worked tirelessly to achieve this with the revellers, despite a number of difficult re-shuffles and the associated frustrations. The process took an extended amount of time and is likely to have caused operational disruption to senior command, who value getting the floats onto the route as quickly as possible. However, this small number of officers delayed the formal proceedings of Carnival, utilising the capital their authority affords them, and directed traffic according to the different float representative instructions. Thus maintaining the view that '*Carnival is theirs*' [Field note 14] and therefore where possible what is achieved should be to the benefit of the revellers.

The impact of what might at first appear as insignificant police action while working with their assigned float can most explicitly be seen in field note 13 where genuine emotions were displayed by Evergreen at what the police had helped them achieve. It demonstrated the positive community impact a small number of officers can have when their operational power is used to positively impact and negotiate results with the community of revellers. Due to their direct exposure to the needs of revellers and their experience in managing a performance between themselves and float organisers, their understanding of the needs of the floats were more appropriately informed. Thus, common problems experienced by the floats (such as getting on, around and off the route) were able to be explored and solved with 'insider' knowledge and 'outsider' resources and power. It is this unification that enables the co-production of order, closely aligning the ideology of PLTs with community policing and thus ensuring that any escalating problems within a community (in this instance, a float) is met

with an informed understanding by both police and community representatives of how to overcome it (Herbert 2006).

We understand Carnival as a spectacle, a unique setting in which human beings let go (Cohen 1993) and policing demands are negotiated. However, within this teamwork setting, what was often demanded of PLTs was dispute settlement (for example, speed of traffic, ordering of floats). There were no observations over the two years (of PLT deployment) of a PLT using their warranted power to implement the law – although there were countless observations of PLTs discretion over illegal activity. Thus, the collaborative nature of dispute resolution with PLTs mirrors the everyday order maintenance role within patrol policing (Banton 1959; Ericson 1982; Ker Muir 1979). This chapter demonstrates what a very small number of ‘skilled mediators’ (Barker 2014) can achieve if they are not micro-managed by senior command and instead operationally empowered. Thus, the practice of PLTs appears nothing new to police officers – it is simply new within public order policing. The PLTs are distinctly different from their level-two and level-one colleagues with the fact they only approach senior command when *they* deem it necessary. Due to the fact PLTs are deployed in twos into the heart of the event, it is not physically possible for senior command to continuously keep a watchful eye over the rank-and-file.

Police constables and sergeants – the rank of officer who most regularly interact with the public face-to-face and are confronted with the challenge of order maintenance – are the most ‘seasoned’ officers to be engaging in mediation. Yet in a traditional paramilitary command-and-control structure, they are the very officers who are most tightly controlled. This of course has been suggested to be the most appropriate way to police large-scale events, ensuring ‘control’ over officers (Waddington 1994). But this research argues a contrary position, demonstrating the significance of PLTs being empowered by senior command to be collaborators, mediators and micro-politic decision makers, using their discretion where possible. While recognising the utility of a command-and-control structure during times of disorder (recognising the difficulty in defining disorder), public order policing should utilise this tactic solely then during times of *disorder*. The paramilitary command of level-two capabilities is reactionary – responding to escalating signs of disorder. Contrary to this, PLTs proactively engage and mediate, using creative skills rather than ‘hard’ powers of coercion with an ‘unthreatening but authoritative manner’ (Barker 2014, p. 860). Their role requires

officers to problematise the traditional view of ‘team’ and, through collaboration, sensitively act while recognising and communicating the competing demands of all involved groups.

Conclusion

Part I and Part II of this chapter present two different sides to Carnival. We can see the pre-event staging of the event where the organisation (as a macro entity) seeks to fine tune the performance of the MPS as a whole. This was explored through two areas significant within the operation: pre-Carnival raids and briefings. Through the pre-event staging of Carnival (Part I) and the reality of police work for PLTs (Part II), we can see how the pre-event staging of the event is more focused on organisational reputation and trying to ensure the policing ‘message’ of Carnival is widely known. Here the individual encounters of officers are less important and dialogue is strategic – the organisation trying to achieve a specific rhetoric via pre-event raids, or trying to appear as though the organisation are sound in informing their officers of all relevant information through briefings. It is not until Part II where human face-to-face encounters were observed.

Goffman’s work on stigma (1963) assisted in the unpicking of the challenging interactional framework that PLTs operate within. We explored how PLTs operate within a stigmatised context – where their professional identity appears spoiled. From this point, PLTs have to differentiate themselves from their public order colleagues – reaffirming an individualised identity separate from the police. Through the PLT, meaningful engagement is able to be established with the Carnival floats – something that, according to both float revellers and police officers, had been lost for a number of years. Through continued communication with the same PLT over the Carnival weekend (and following years), both the PLT and the float are able to establish face-to-face interaction. This in turn reinforces the collaborative nature of the policing approach, where power is positioned as a mediated exchange. Thus, although recognising how the historically contentious relationships exists between the two (often polarised) groups, when operationally empowered to actively engage in meaningful exchanges, PLTs are able to challenge this tainted identity and build firmer communicative foundations with revellers.

In addition to this, this chapter explored how, through building a collaborative relationship, the PLT and float organiser were brought together as an ‘untraditional’ team in order to seek a mediated definition of ‘success’ to Carnival. Using Goffman’s (1959) definition, we are

able to define them as a team through their shared aim of successfully getting onto, around and off the Carnival route. Due to the fact the PLT and float organiser(s) spent the entirety of Carnival together, each became more aligned with the other. These were not fleeting interactions where actors could take risks and misbehave with the other. They were long-term relationships where, at different points of the weekend, each relied upon the other for help or support. This 'reciprocal dependence' further solidified these two (often polarised) groups as an untraditional team. Furthermore, developing Goffman's definition of teams, we explored how teams (plural) are essential to wider perceptions of order, with actor's shifting team alliances in order to achieve the best results within their immediate environment.

PLTs are internally legitimised and trusted to report directly with senior command, updating information on Carnival behaviour in order to provide an accurate depiction of order and risk. At the same time, the PLTs were also earning external capital with key float leaders and therefore communicating to float organisers updated information on police tactics and requirements. This relationship means that both the PLT and the float organiser become an insider/outsider team and co-producers of the immediate order that has been jointly negotiated. They then become empowered by the other to appropriately translate the information into culturally acceptable language. Furthermore, much of the stage management of co-production comes from supervision over one's own traditional teammates. This supervision encourages group self-governance, ensuring each is watching the behaviour of their traditional team, blocking any unnecessary interaction and filtering any necessary interaction.

Part Three: Research Conclusions

Chapter VIII: Conclusions & Implications

The PLTs as a tactical option is still in its early stages of being cemented within the wider public order policing family and remain a minority of resourcing deployed at public order events. The concept of a dedicated ‘talking’ tactic within public order remains counterculture and PLTs consistently fight against the image of being a ‘soft tactic’. As we can see from the literature in North America, Europe and the UK, there is a tendency to police large-scale events through robust force, with a preconception that ‘trouble’ is likely to occur due to the vast numbers of people in attendance. This focus upon reactively responding to issues that occur remains the biggest ideological shift between many overt public order policing tactics and the alternative PLT approach which centres on a more proactive approach (before, during and after an event) in ensuring a de-escalated policing approach.

Despite this PLT policing approach being newer within public order policing, we can see from the literature of street policing that the craft of PLT work – namely effective dialogue, negotiation and mediation – is not new. This research demonstrates that the PLT tactic encapsulates the formalisation of police craft but within a public order context. It would be easy within an evaluative process to attribute positive recognition to policing/academic environments for the introduction of this new tactic, but this would negate the reality that for front-line officers – for skilled mediators – what the PLTs employ is not new police work, it is simply the formal deployment of established policing skills, now strategically encouraged, within a new public order context.

Among other things, previous research into public order policing has considered: the crowd as the focus, configuring the most appropriate model to respond to any escalating disorder; the legitimacy of tactical responses; the accuracy of policing ‘knowledge’ of different crowds; or perceptions of policing responses from the policed. However, my research advances this scholarly field by documenting a fundamental shift in focus. This thesis specifically focused upon the micro-behaviours that PLTs engage in, ethnographically exploring how officers conduct themselves in the mundane everyday of a public order deployment. Within this, this thesis primarily concerns itself with exploring how interaction is performed, how dialogue impacts social order and what communicative behaviours officers engage in when attempting to establish some form of contested order.

Objectives of Study:

Central to this thesis are three core objectives: the role of dialogue; formal training and informal practice; and the extent to which dialogic interaction is performative. Here we will briefly re-consider these.

1. *The role of dialogue for officers at public order events* features throughout this thesis and is central to our understanding of PLTs.

Within Chapter Five, I gave attention to the training of both level-two officers and PLTs, demonstrating that features of dialogue or dialogue training are significantly absent. For level-twos, the training became disproportionately focused on action-orientated elements and the culturally symbolic significance of the uniform. This meant that officers were being trained for, and thus focusing upon, escalated scenes of disorderly conduct within training. PLTs too were experiencing no formal training on dialogue, but instead were focusing upon legislative aspects of the role. Where we can see significance to the training of dialogue within the PLT role is within the informal training of officers. Specifically, I argue that through storytelling we can see what skills are valued by particular types of officers. Among level-two officers, stories are concerned about physical confrontation; conversely, PLT stories celebrate an officer's ability to talk their way to a solution.

Chapter Six again demonstrated the role of dialogue for officers and for this specific aim we will reconsider the second half of this chapter. Here I explored the significance of dialogue in relation to space – in considering how social rules within a protest setting are largely spatially bounded, with specific behaviours being accepted in only some areas. We can understand the role of dialogue in relation to control here, where officers seek differing levels of control dependent on the bounded space. I identify that civil disobedience and even illegal activity is ignored and tolerated within certain areas of a crowd event, but not others. As a result of this, PLTs concentrate their efforts on negotiating within the boundaries and leave their more robust colleagues to address any activity outside this area. Additionally, I consider how dialogue takes different forms within protest, including deception and lying. I argue that these forms of dialogue are not used for malicious intent, but instead are commonplace tools within the interaction process, where one is trying to gain something from another.

Chapter Seven demonstrated how, due to a professionally spoiled identity, the dialogue PLTs experience at Carnival is built from a more challenging and interactionally weak foundation. The impact of the 'dirty work' police (as a homogenous entity) are seen to engage in (the over-policing of ethnic minority communities) directly impacts the interaction experienced by PLTs, who seek to create a new and different identity through active and meaningful dialogue. Within this chapter, I also identify how, through teamwork with both traditional and untraditional teams, PLTs are able to build firmer interactional foundations, which help co-produce social order.

My research shows that core to our understanding of dialogue is that this skill is not new for officers, instead the PLTs represent a formalisation of a skill-base already possessed by many police officers. Officers recognise the importance of being able to interact with the public, however, it is largely felt that prior to the PLTs, the specific skill of increased dialogue was not operationally encouraged or utilised within a public order context. We continue to observe a cultural perception that the level-two tactic does not need to engage in effective dialogue with the public and culturally perceive robust policing as 'real' police work. Conversely, PLTs perceive dialogue as core to their professional identity, highlighting a cultural shift in operational practice within public order policing. It is these latter PLT skills that are recognised and utilised by many senior policing leaders in command of the policing event who appreciate the leverage they bring in achieving overall policing aims.

2. *Formal training and informal practice* are considered extensively within Chapter Five, however, aspects of operational identity are also explored within Chapter Seven.

In Chapter Five, I demonstrated that the staging of the public order policing production in the back-stage arena does not reflect the actual requirements of the front-stage performance. Through formal training it became clear that attempts to engage officers in effective dialogue could best be understood as a prescribed requirement that formally emphasises that dialogue should remain part of their role. However, outside of 'buzzword' exercises, formal level-two training reverts to the culturally tried, tested and informally approved training that focuses upon the more robust elements of the role. Through role-play exercises, it is clear that at the heart of level-two training is the nerve to withstand 'firebomb alley', the real reason many officers travel to Glennock for training. Yet, despite this training, it is entirely possible that the worst type of disorder a level-two officer ever experiences is the faux disorder at

Glennock. However, this research evidences a reality that while deployed, many level-two officers are required to remain on static cordons, remain within their carriers, or conduct reassurance patrols (which have their origins in beat duty policing, not public order policing).

Aligned with this, the formal training given to PLTs does not reflect their front-stage performance. The training was classroom based and focused upon legislative aspects of the role. There is no physical aspect to their training and the experience was drastically different to the level-two training. However, while deployed, the PLT role is very action-orientated. PLTs often remain in the heart of crowds for extended periods of time and are at the core of any rising tensions.

Informal practice of the PLTs identifies shadow-learning as key to developing as a strong PLO. Many PLOs identified how formal training taught them about the law, which they thought was effective. For them, it is in the informal learning where they learn the operational role of being a PLO – the significance placed upon learning on-the-job is commonplace within policing scholarship.

Dialogue is clearly central to the identity of PLTs, who categorise their own professional identity through their ‘blue brand’. This identity makes them different to their ‘yellow’ branded public order colleagues. It demonstrated their professional commitment to increased dialogue and engagement. As such, I identified in Chapter Seven how this branding of the PLT identity can best be understood as a cleansing ritual, where PLTs are attempting to re-establish their own perception of self within the police as a less tarnished or spoiled branch of the extended policing family. I argued that here the PLTs are symbolically identifying that they recognise the ‘spoiled’ identity of their public order colleagues and the tarnished past (for instance, undercover policing), but are identifying themselves as a purified tactic – one that is more closely aligned with their perceived self-identity as someone who is fair.

3. *The extent to which dialogic interaction is performative* is featured throughout this thesis. However, the considerations of how training is performative have been considered above, therefore here we will briefly review Chapters Six and Seven.

Within Chapter Six, I identified how strategic planning meetings are performative. These meetings are highly staged, with rooms and people arranging themselves in relation to importance. This staging is mostly informally known by officers, however, occasionally it is not and faux pas take place that create awkward and embarrassing moments. Planning meetings are a legal requirement; therefore, we can acknowledge the reasons behind why they take place. However, through this legal necessity for them to take place, the whole concept becomes an ‘ass-covering’ exercise, meaning that much dialogue that occurs within them is formal and robotic. I highlight how it appears that real planning takes place within the pre-meets or interactions with colleagues that happen away from this formal setting.

Within ground-based deployment, there are many aspects to dialogue that are performative. Officers will often deceive members of the public when trying to ensure ‘wins’ for their operational requirements. I argue within the chapter, however, that these should not be understood from a malicious perspective, but more from interactional order. During interaction, each is trying to gain something from another and aspects such as elaborating on the truth or telling lies are commonplace, therefore it would be nonsensical to not acknowledge their existence within police-citizen interaction. This is not to suggest that the police are the only group engaging in these dialogic tools, as ‘the other’ will be lying and misleading also, as is commonplace in interaction.

Within Chapter Seven, we again see dialogic interaction in three forms. First, an interactive version with the public via media and social media platforms, where the MPS seek to control the narrative around Carnival, evidencing elements such as county line drug activity to legitimise pre-dawn raids and the exclusion of certain people and groups at Carnival. Second, the back-stage planning meetings seek (but fail) to display a uniform message about the policing of Carnival. We can understand this as an attempt to ‘impression manage’ a very visible policing operation. Again, through briefings, the organisation is able to evidence that the ‘right’ or ‘appropriate’ message has been given to their operational staff if ever the policing of Carnival was called into question. However, despite these formal briefings, officers were often confused by the message being delivered. Finally, ground-based dialogue is explored, through a perspective of a stigmatised identity, where PLTs are required to work harder in order to build firm foundations for interaction. PLOs are often tested by the floats they are working with, to see what side they are working on. Additionally, policing colleagues automatically seek alliance with their traditional teammates. This results in PLTs

having to perform their allegiance to each group as and when is required. The chapter also explores how revellers are often required to perform specific roles to ensure buy-in from their traditional teammates.

Conceptual Shift

Ideologically the PLTs have their roots within ESIM (Reicher 1984, 1996; Stott and Reicher 1998; Stott and Drury 2000). ESIM represents a conceptual shift away from a focus upon crowd actions being viewed as homogenous action, where many within crowds become mindless and therefore act in a mindless manner (Le Bon 1895). Instead ESIM suggests that crowd events are intergroup encounters, meaning there are a variety of perceptions as to the identity of a given crowd, depending on the in-group (the crowds) or the out-group (within this theory, this predominately relates to the police), and whether or not behaviours are deemed to be legitimate or illegitimate.

Within this varied perception of identity comes the risk of those in positions of power, like the police, misidentifying the in-group's understanding of their own social identity. Through this misunderstanding, police action also risks being deemed as indiscriminate, resulting in people viewing the organisation as illegitimate and thus prompting them to realign their identity with those groups who they previously did not share identity with. This in turn risks creating a violent cycle of escalation.

The conceptual shift ESIM has afforded wider scholarly understandings of public order policing is clear. Yet within my own research it was evident that applying an ESIM framework would not facilitate further conceptual insight in order to gain more intimate knowledge of micro-interactions occurring in the everyday deployment of officers. Dialogue is at the core of PLTs and therefore situated within the conceptual shift in understanding of crowds. Through applying a dramaturgical framework and understanding crowd interaction at an even more micro-level demonstrates the novel contribution my conceptual framework has enabled. My thesis applied the dramaturgical framework in three conceptual areas: managing faces – roles, performance and self-presentation; relating in public – interacting with the other; and spoiling careers: deviance, stigma and moral trajectories. Each will be respectively considered below.

Through an application of dramaturgy, this thesis facilitated a new insight into the performative dimensions of public order policing. It demonstrates that from back-stage training, back-stage dialogue with colleagues, front-stage dialogue with colleagues and front-stage dialogue with citizens, every interaction experiences a performative element. PLTs are well aware of the guiding principles of policing performance and quickly become attuned to the more individualised PLT performance, requiring an alternative dialogic ‘front’. Interestingly, due to the nature of PLT training being entirely focused upon legislation, the back-stage region does not provide PLOs with a bounded area where they are able to practice the relevant faces that are required for the role. Alternatively, this type of learning happens in the front-stage, which exposes the organisation to more problematic considerations around impression management.

This is not to suggest that the informal learning PLTs took part in was ineffective. Like other applications of dramaturgy, the officers quickly learnt ‘artful strategies’ (Scott 2015, p. 88) to equip them with dealing with an array of complex interactions. However, this thesis identifies that the bounded regions of front-stage and back-stage are not as clear cut for policing as presented within Goffman’s work. Similarly, the perceptions of actor/audience are also not as clear cut. Within briefings and planning meetings, we learn that there is much ‘performative dialogue’ that takes place, where – from a micro-perspective – any actor who is not within one’s immediate team and confidence is not a trusted ally and therefore all interaction becomes performative and guarded. These meetings represent performances where specific messages are presented to specific audiences (Manning 2003, p. 17).

This thesis has also contributed to theoretical considerations of how we relate to ‘the other’ in public. As identified, interaction is a dialogic exchange between multiple people who are informed of the ritualised nature of that contact. As such, interaction becomes a cycle of exchange where we seek to maintain others in order to maintain social cohesion.

Investigations into the police-citizen interactional order is so interesting because often the foundations are weak, aggressive, embarrassing and so on.

Yet despite this interactionally weak foundation, this thesis identifies that there are still dialogic constructs governing this interactional process. As we have seen in Chapter Six, PLTs continue to use tools such as misleading or even lying in attempts to try to neutralise exchanges as much as possible. Questioning whether police lie almost seems obsolete – lying

is indicative to our society – it is the type of lies that are being told that are interesting. This thesis evidences that PLTs tell both internal and external lies (by either misrepresenting the facts, concealing information or explicitly lying) in order to keep the wheel of interactional order turning. Using these manipulative tools are commonplace to how we relate to one another and evidence PLTs using everyday interactional tools in order to best de-escalate or neutralise any rising conflict. Exploring conflict resolution using such mundane social processes is new within public order literature and demonstrates a new application of dramaturgy.

Similarly, within Chapter Seven we see a new understanding of how PLTs and revellers relate to one another in relation to teamwork. I advance our conceptual understanding of team by categorising people into ‘traditional’ and ‘untraditional’ teams. The former is predictably those that each most regularly work with (such as colleagues), the latter is a new grouping of teammates. Here I evidence how ‘untraditional’ teams will manipulate their traditional colleagues by misleading or deceiving them in order to facilitate the needs of ‘the other’, with both focusing on a larger end-goal (in this instance, successfully and safely making it around the Carnival route).

Chapter Seven identifies the experiences of spoiling careers for police officers. Goffman identifies how people are ‘spoiled’ and ‘blemished’ in everyday society, but where this thesis advances our understanding of this concept is through the application of a *professionally* spoiled career. Consistently evident throughout my fieldwork in both a protest and Carnival setting (however, only explored within this thesis through Carnival) is how police (as a homogenous entity) and PLTs (as a more individualised entity) experience stigmatisation as a result of their profession. Aligned to this are considerations of how policing engages in ‘dirty’ work – from a Carnival perspective, the over-policing of ethnic minority communities. Through this, officers’ identity is stigmatised and as such PLT interaction begins from a very weak foundation. PLTs seek to distance themselves from this negative identity and created a ‘blue brand’ in an attempt to ritually cleanse themselves of the negative stereotypes assigned to their profession.

Policy

Policing is an occupation where warranted individuals have the legal authority to deprive another of their liberty. This is an immense power and one that cannot be overlooked. Yet within public order policing I would argue that academics and policy makers give disproportionate attention to the legitimacy and execution of the law compared to other areas of policing scholarship. In August 2019, Jennifer Brown wrote a Briefing Note for the House of Commons about the policing of protest, the most recent crowd policing policy insight available. The entire document concerned itself with legislation, considering whether reform is needed. It is clear that it is not only within protest policing where Government officials deem legislation to be the core necessary focus of policing (see O'Neill 2002, p. 350).

Yet what was unmistakably evident throughout my fieldwork was how little the law featured within negotiations with protesters or similar crowd events. On a micro-level, the law was only ever used as a tool to try to 'one-up' a police officer, an attempt by some of the most zealous crowd members to perform to onlookers that they understood the law better than law-enforcement. The most significant core to PLT-citizen dialogue is a requirement for problem-solving ability in ordinary citizenry disputes, a factor to police work that should not surprise us (Bittner 1990). Nevertheless, it is these cultural understandings of micro-interactions that are often omitted from policy records, with an apparent sole focus on the macro-level features involved in the policing of public order.

Furthermore, the Briefing Note makes no mention of PLTs, a notable and concerning non-inclusion. PLOs represent the best public order policing example: they need to recognise the natural leaders within the crowd, abstain from violence and have a relatively permanent relationship with those within the crowd (see Ker Muir 1977, Chapter 7). However, these micro-level behaviours that proactively work to quell disputes before they arise make them an easy tactic to overlook. Although legal authority over a citizen remains for a PLT, their ability to (re)-establish social control within a crowd setting fundamentally relies upon the relationships they are building and the cooperation they can encourage.

Most significant among all other policy-related suggestions from this thesis relates to training. PLTs and public order more generally would benefit from an updated and more informed approach to training officers. When conducting some cursory observations of hostage negotiation training, it was clear the level of investment the organisation can give to training and development, if they deem the skill or tactic as worthwhile. Hostage negotiation

students attend a two-week residential course where they learn both the ideology behind many of the tactics used and then do extensive role-play learning. During this course there is a real understanding from students that they are not guaranteed to pass the course and their passion and drive to succeed is evident. It is this type of training atmosphere that all public order tactics should strive to align with.

Formal policing at strategic level emphasises the need for dialogue in public order policing, yet the reality is that cultural capital and credibility is informally given to the hands-on more traditional forms of managing the public through the use of shields and strong tactics. Further, within PLT training, the officers are offered a more legislative aspect to development, yet their reality is that they are very hands-on and proactive in managing within large crowds. There is a training disconnect between what is required of officers when street assigned and what they are being taught. With regards to level-two training, it is clear that officers are training for the public order they want to police – as this aligns with their image of ‘real’ police work – as opposed to training for the reality of their role. Within PLT training, it would appear they are providing formal training in the area they perceive the officers to require further development in (the law) and leaving other skills to be developed informally. My research shows that there is a gap between the strategic intent which emphasises professionalisation within public order policing (increased dialogue) and the reality of training continuing to be bogged down in what officers perceive it means to be a ‘real’ police officer. This is obviously problematic if officers emphasis the latter while deployed on the street.

In addition to this, it is essential that policing organisations do not try to impose the hierarchical model they are so culturally aligned to with the PLT model. During the latter writing stages of my thesis, I remained in contact with many of the officers who assisted me and I could see some evidence that the organisation was trying to loosely impose a hierarchical structure upon the PLTs for the largest and most complex events. The PLTs succeed because they are different within public order settings and do not ascribe to the command-and-control structure of public order policing. From the experiences of my research, I am strongly of the opinion that command-and-control should only be utilised within times of disorder and only in addition to the PLTs who should continue to seek to re-establish dialogue where it had been lost.

Finally, I would suggest that the model of PLT needs to creatively and liberally continue to evolve – just as protest does. Following the culmination of my fieldwork, the MPS experienced the Extinction Rebellion (XR) protests, which the organisation sought to arrest their way through. XR demonstrate a real challenge to policing organisations as they are committed to non-violence, polite and engaging dialogue. Yet from cursory observations and conversations with PLTs, the groups often fundamentally have no interest in partaking in many of the suggestions from PLTs. XR are an absolutely fascinating group to study because they are so different to what has been experienced in protest policing previously and they potentially evidence a limitation of PLT capability.

Future Research

A principle objective of future research might be to engage in further research into dialogic tactics and how they engage with crowd interaction with groups such as XR. Given the current political focus of climate change and the continuous disruption being caused in cities by XR, we need to understand how to most effectively engage with such groups.

Additionally, this thesis focused entirely upon the policing perspective for three overarching reasons: the structure of the studentship, my own personal academic interests aligning specifically with policing, and the impossible nature of data gathering to such depth while focusing on two (often polarised) groups. As such, future research would benefit from an in-depth ethnographic study of PLT-citizen interaction from the perspective of the policed. Although there are some scholarly contributions from a critical perspective (for example, see Jackson 2019), the field would benefit from an increasing variation of perspectives.

Final Note

The PLTs evidence that skilled mediators (Barker 2014) exist throughout the MPS; the tactic did not create these officers, but it did empower and facilitate it within the new context of public order policing. Using a dialogic approach, PLTs get to the heart of crowds and seek to co-produce different definitions of social order. The thesis demonstrates what a small number of skilled mediators can disproportionately achieve if they are not micromanaged by senior command and are instead operationally empowered to problem solve. PLTs are not without fault or problem and, for some protesters/crowd members, they represent increased surveillance. Yet the evidence from this thesis shows that PLTs represent the first genuine ‘negotiated management’ tactical approach within public order. The PLTs can be understood

as the community policing branch of public order policing and evidence the power of ‘street-corner politicians’ operating within this context.

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Appendix One: Mock Tactical Plan

Tactical Plan Development Form

Event:	
Date:	
Officer Completing:	
Role/ Function:	
Call Sign:	
Reporting To:	
Role Function:	
Call Sign:	

Information:
Intelligence
Counter Terrorism
Strategic Intensions
Command Structure
Roles & Responsibilities of the police (MPS)
London Underground and Network Rail
Roles and Responsibilities of Partner agencies

+ Threat Assessment

	Likelihood: High/Low	Impact: High/Low	Controls
Social: e.g. likely impact of the event or police response on the community			
Technical: e.g. communication links like CCTV			
Economic: e.g. cost of policing, funding or stewards			
Environment: e.g. weather, proximity to water			
Political: e.g. external pressures, vulnerability of Gov't, confidence in police, international reputation.			
Legal: e.g. legality of organisers plan, responsibilities of partners, human rights compliant?			
Ethnical: e.g. is it a core policing function? Is there a public perception that police are responsible for the event or public safety?			

Powers and Policy

Powers and Policy
Human Rights
Public Order Legislation
Use of force legislation
Theft Offence legislation
Stop and Search Legislation
Legislation relating to Children and Young people
Anti-Social behaviour

Tactical Options


Night Duty
Early Turn
Different geographical areas within the officer's responsibility
Reserves

Command Protocols
Policing Style
Dress
Professional Standards


Planned Consistencies:

Event	Planned Contingency
For e.g. Crowd Congestion	
For e.g. Disorder	
For e.g. Firearm seen/discharged	
For e.g. Critical Incident	

Appendix Two: Traditional public order policing hierarchical structure



Appendix Three: PLT hierarchical structure for PLT



Appendix Four: Fieldnotes

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	Field note 1	<i>She's not even earning today</i>	103
	Field note 2	<i>When people actually come out to understand what we do</i>	104
	Field note 3	<i>Oh, you're the student they speak about</i>	104
	Field note 4	<i>I love being with you, they'll [meaning SLT] be looking on CCTV and see that I've been engaging with the crowd all day, but really, I'm just talking to you.</i>	104
	Field note 5	<i>She was probably late as she was getting all her notes down to 'out' us on her blog</i>	105
	Field note 6	<i>I told the officer ringing what you are studying and how you're completed trusted by us.</i>	106
	Field note 7	<i>Ashley the student researcher doing some work with us around public-order.</i>	108
	Field note 8	<i>Ashley's with us today, you know who she is and that she can be trusted, she'll be floating around, assist her as needed.</i>	115
	Field note 9	Extended Field note, Office-Based, 2015	119-120
	Field note 10	Extended Field note, Ground-Based, 2016	122
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	Field note 12	<i>Your dad was job wasn't he, Ashley?</i>	125
	Field note 13	<i>I heard your dad was job and was injured?</i>	125
	Field note 14	<i>She's alright.</i>	125
	Field note 15	<i>Oh s/he said you're alright.</i>	125
	Field note 16	<i>I thought I was going to die.</i>	126
	Field note 17	<i>Ashley this is off the record.</i>	126
Chapter V - Training and Socialisation			
	Field note 1	<i>There's nothing Gucci about public order anymore, you want a course, you just request it and you're on it, they're so desperate for bodies.</i>	135
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	Field note 5	<i>Was not for them.</i>	143
	Field note 6	Extended Field note, Level-Two Training, Residential Stay, October 2017	143
	Field note 7	Extended Field note, Level-Two Training, Residential Stay, October 2017	143
	Field note 8	<i>What other job requires you to attend training where you're paid to run around in full-kit and get petrol-bombed?</i>	144
	Field note 9	<i>Not to put the pressure on, but look how many people have come to watch?</i>	144
	Field note 10	Extended Field note, Ground-Based, 2016	146
	Field note 11	<i>Not at all.</i>	147
	Field note 12	<i>You need to know this stuff, your protesters will know it, sometimes better than you, so you need to know it.</i>	149
	Field note 13	<i>But that's not what training is for, you'll learn that on the job, won't you? If anything, I wish they'd covered the legislation a bit more.</i>	149
	Field note 14	<i>No one warns you how tough this role is.</i>	149
	Field note 15	<i>Are you expecting trouble today?</i>	151
	Field note 16	<i>Why are you blue and not yellow like the others?</i>	151
	Field note 17	<i>Officer! Officer! What does the 'U' mean?</i>	152
	Interview	PS, Level-Two Trained and PLO, February 2018	159
	Field note 18	Glennock Visit, 2015	161
	Interview	PS Gateway Team, PLO, 2017	162
	Field note 19	<i>How would you feel about this?" "Would you mind doing similar practice to produce these results?" PLT Training</i>	165
	Field note 20	<i>The best piece of kit I can ever use as a copper is my mouth.</i>	165
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	Field note 5	Extended Field note, Protest Planning Meeting, 2016	180

	Field note 6	Extended Field note, Protest Planning Meeting, 2017	180
	Field note 7	Extended Field note, Observation with 'left' protest PLTs, 2017	184
	Field note 8	<i>Why can't we get through? Oh, typical, fucking protesters!!</i>	184
	Field note 9	<i>Angry about animal rights are you love? Nice fur around your hood!</i>	190
	Field note 10	<i>Actually, a colleague and I were wondering about that, is that faux fur?" The protesters answers, "yeah it is, fur is fashionable we get that, but you don't actually need real fur to follow fashion."</i>	190
	Field note 11	<i>Fucking pathetic.</i>	192
	Field note 12	<i>You're all a bunch of nigger lovers, you're all a bunch of nigger lovers.</i>	194
	Field note 13	<i>Given the subject of this protest, don't be awkward about me being Asian. I am Asian, use me as needed.</i>	195
	Field note 14	<i>Tell me your name is Mickey Mouse, I don't care, I just want to get through today!</i>	199
Chapter VII – Notting Hill Carnival			
	Interview	Silver, 2017	215
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	Interview	Silver, 2017	216
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	Field note 9	Extended Field note, Ground-Based, Monday afternoon, Carnival 2017	228
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	Field note 12	Extended Field note, Ground-Based, Monday Morning, Carnival 2017	233
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	Field note 14	<i>Carnival is theirs.</i>	234

Appendix Five: Data Collection

Data Collection:

As outlined in Chapter Four, my data collection was divided into ‘ground-based’ and ‘office-based’ fieldwork. Although, it is acknowledged that the lines between these two were sometimes blurred. Ground-based research was any fieldwork that took place outside the office: protests, Carnival, time spent ‘out-and-about’ with officers. Office-based fieldwork took the form of any observation that took place within an ‘office’ setting, typically this occurred during the week at the public-order headquarters in London. As the table below identifies fieldwork occurred during different periods of my studies, the table below provides further detail (such as event, date, time spent observing), however the bullets points here briefly outline these periods.

- 2015 building my initial relationships with officers.
- From approximately September/October 2015 until April/May 2016 I spent dedicated time in the field.
- From approximately April/May 2016 until January 2017 I mostly removed myself from the field, only attending selected events and where possible accompanying planning/briefings. However, I rarely spent extended time in the office.
- From approximately February 2017 until December 2017 I spent dedicated time in the fieldwork.

My fieldwork completely ended in December 2017, however I did attend one event in 2018 and one in 2019 due to the interest I had in them. As the nature of data collection through ethnographic methods is not easily quantifiable, the table below indicates approximate hours. Furthermore, there are possibly events that are not listed due to a likely fluctuation in the rigour of my fieldnotes, for example not specifying which event I was at.

Events:

	Event	Further Info	Date	Approximate time in field
1.	Occupy	• Event Only	February, 2015	8 hours
2.	People’s Austerity March	• Event Only	June, 2015	10 hours
3.	10 th Anniversary of 7/7	• Planning Meeting • Event	July, 2015	Planning - 6 hours Event - 8 hours
4.	Notting Hill Carnival	• Planning Meetings • Briefings • Event	August, 2015	Planning - 10 hours Briefings - 5 hours Event – 13 hours
5.	Million Mask March	• Briefing • Event	November, 2015	Briefing – 1 hour Event – 8 hours
6.	Anti-Islamic Far Right Protest	• Event Only	(Month not recorded), 2015	8 hours
7.	Student Demo	• Event Only	November, 2015	10 hours

8.	Taxi Demonstration (against Uber)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Event Only 	February, 2016	8 hours
9.	People's Assembly March Against Austerity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Briefing • Event 	April, 2016	Briefing – 1 hour Event – 8 hours
10.	May Day	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Planning • Event 	May, 2016	Planning – 2 hours Event – 8 hours
11.	National Union Teachers Protest	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Event Only 	July, 2016	8 hours
12.	Black Lives Matter	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Event Only 	July, 2016	6 hours
13.	Anti-Brexit Protest	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Event Only 	July, 2016	8 hours
14.	Notting Hill Carnival	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Planning • Sector Walkarounds • Briefings • Event 	August, 2016	Planning – 10 hours Sector Walkarounds – 4 hours Briefings – 8 hours Event – 26 hours
15.	Glennock Public-Order Training Observations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Attendance at training school to observe public-order training 	October, 2016	9 hours
16.	Student Demo	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Planning • Briefings • Event 	November, 2016	Planning – 4 hours Briefing – 1 hour Event – 8 hours
17.	Million Mask March	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Planning • Briefings • Event 	November, 2016	Planning – 4 hours Briefing – 1 hour Event – 8 hours
18.	TSG Commissioners Reserve	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Briefing and shift x2 	February, 2017	20 hours
19.	Kurdish March & Rally	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Briefing • Event 	March, 2017	Briefing – 1 hour Event – 6 hours
20.	NHS/Anti-Austerity Protest	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Briefing • Event 	March, 2017	Briefing – 1 hour Event – 8 hours
21.	TSG Commissioners Reserve	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Briefing and shift 	March, 2017	10 hours
22.	Cannabis Day	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Event only 	April, 2017	8 hours
23.	Football Lads Alliance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Briefing • Event 	June, 2017	Briefing – 1 hour Event – 9 hours
24.	EDL	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Briefing • Event 	June, 2017	Briefing – 1 hour Event – 8 hours
25.	Hostage Negotiation Day-Court Observation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Training observations 	Summer, 2017 (month not recorded)	9 hours
26.	Notting Hill Carnival	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Planning • Sector Walkarounds 	August, 2017	Planning – 10 hours Sector Walkarounds – 4 hours Briefings – 8 hours

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Briefings • Event 		Event – 26 hours
27.	PLT Course	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Full course observation (classroom based) 	September, 2017	2 days
28.	Halloween Ride-Out	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Event only 	October, 2017	8 hours
29.	Bexley Ride-Out	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Planning • Briefing • Sight visits • Event 	Winter, 2017 (month not recorded)	Planning – 4 hours Briefing – 1 hour Sight visit – 7 hours Event – 9 hours
30.	No Surrender to Islamic Terrorists	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Briefing • Event 	October, 2017	Briefing – 1 hour Event – 8 hours
31.	Football Lads Alliance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Briefing • Event 	October, 2017	Briefing – 1 hour Event – 8 hours
32.	Glennock Visit	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Level-Two training observations 	October, 2017	1 day
33.	Balfour 100 – week of protest	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Planning Meetings • Resourcing Meetings • Briefings • Events • De-brief 	First week of November 2017	7x days Planning – 10 hours Resourcing meetings – 4 hours Briefings – 6 hours Events – 5 hours De-briefs – 2 hours
34.	National Campaign Against Fees and Cuts Protest	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Planning • Briefing • Event 	November, 2017	Planning – 4 hours Briefing – 1 hour Protest – 8 hours
35.	Glennock	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tactical Rehearsal 	November, 2017	1 day
36.	Million Mask March	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Planning Meetings • Resourcing Meetings • Briefings • Events • De-brief 	November, 2017	Planning – 4 hours Resourcing Meetings – 2 hours Briefing – 3 hours Event – 6 hours De-brief – 2 hours
37.	Jewish Protest	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Briefing • Event 	November, 2017	Briefing – 1 hour Event – 8 hours
38.	Palestine Solidarity Campaign	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Planning • Briefing • Event 	November, 2017	Planning – 2 hours Briefing – 1 hour Event – 8 hours
39.	Britain First	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Event 	November, 2017	8 hours
40.	Taxi Demonstration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Briefing • Event 	November, 2017	Briefing – 1 hour Event – 8 hours

41.	Canada Goose	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Planning • Briefing • Event 	December, 2017	Panning – 2 hours Briefing – 1 hour Event - 10
42.	Vegan Protest	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Planning • Briefing • Event 	December, 2017	Panning – 2 hours Briefing – 1 hour Event - 10
43.	NYE Event	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Planning Meetings • Briefings • Event 	December, 2017	Planning – 4 hours Briefing – 1 hour Event – 9 hours
44.	Stand up Against Racism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Briefing • Event 	December, 2017	Briefing – 1 hour Event – 7 hours
45.	Free Tommy Demonstration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Event Only 	June, 2018	Event – 5 hours
46.	Extinction Rebellion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Event Only 	October, 2019	Event – 6 hours

Interviews:

Interview Number:	Rank/Role:	Gender:
Interview 1:	Assistant Commissioner (Former) – Responsible for introducing PLTs (strategic)	Female
Interview 2:	Chief Superintendent – Responsible for introducing PLTs (operational)	Male
Interview 3:	Commander – Gold/Silver	Male
Interview 4:	Commander – Gold/Silver	Female
Interview 5:	Chief Superintendent - Bronze/Silver	Female
Interview 6:	Chief Inspector - Bronze	Male
Interview 7:	Chief Inspector – Bronze	Male
Interview 8:	PS – PLT Gateway	Male
Interview 9:	PC – PLT Gateway	Female
Interview 10:	PC – PLT Gateway	Female
Interview 11:	PC – Trainer	Male
Interview 12:	PC – PLO & L2	Male
Interview 13:	PC - PLO	Female
Interview 14:	PC – PLO	Male
Interview 15:	PC – PLO & TSG	Male
Interview 16:	PC – PLO & L2	Female
Interview 17:	PC – PLO & L2	Male
Interview 18:	PC – PLO	Female
Interview 19:	PC – PLO & L2	Female
Interview 20:	PC – PLO	Male
Interview 21:	PS – PLO & L2	Male
Interview 22:	PS – PLO & L2	Male
Interview 23:	PC – L2	Male
Interview 24:	PC – Planner	Female

Interview 25:	Notting Hill Carnival Community Member – contributes to planning board	Male
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