# The Soft Power of Populist Politics: A Case Study of the Economic Freedom Fighters in the South African Context

Marine Fölscher

Thesis presented in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts (Political Science) in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at Stellenbosch University.

Supervisor: Dr Nicola de Jager

March 2019

Declaration

By submitting this thesis electronically, I declare that the entirety of the work contained therein is my own, original work, that I am the sole author thereof (save to the extent explicitly otherwise stated), that reproduction and publication thereof by Stellenbosch University will not infringe any third party rights and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it for obtaining any qualification.

Date: March 2020

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Abstract

While in the past scholars of political science have generally thought democracy to die at the barrel of a gun – in coups and revolutions – the rise of populist politics has alerted the world to the possibility of democracy being strangled slowly in the name of 'the people'. Populists consider society to be separated into two homogenous but antagonistic groups – the 'pure people' and the 'corrupt elite'. While there has been much research into populism in the West, the particularities of the phenomenon within the African context are still emerging. The importance of a regional perspective becomes clear when one considers the deeply contextual nature of populist politics and the different iteration it therefore takes on the African continent: more economically focused than in the West, more prone to Marxist-socialist ideological underpinnings, reliant on a dual nexus of urban and ethnically-based rural support, and underpinning a rising wave of populism in post-liberation states aimed at former liberators.

This study examines the phenomenon within the context of the current South African political climate, which is dominated by three political parties: the incumbent African National Congress (ANC), the Democratic Alliance (DA) as the official opposition, and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), a growing populist party. The broader rationale of this research is to advance an understanding of how populist discourse works within the African political and socio-economic context by using a South African case study. More narrowly defined, the main research question guiding this analysis is: Could the EFF have led to a shift wherein the ANC and DA became more populist in their political rhetoric and discourse? The research thus focuses on the populist party's 'soft power' – its ability to make others choose to follow its example through influence, not threats. If the EFF could shift the political rhetoric and policymaking in South Africa despite their inability to amass sufficient electoral support to attain the highest office in the land, what could this mean for other governments facing populist resurgences in democratic states? Clearly, the phenomenon of populist parties' 'soft power' needs to be better understood and studied.

The discourse-centred approach of this study allows for populists to be identified by their political rhetoric, with speeches by political leaders forming the primary data used to analyse the level of populist discourse of a particular party. A holistic textual grading method, first pioneered by Hawkins (2009), which scores political speeches on a scale of 0 – not populist at all – to 2 – extremely populist – is used. In this study, the coding rubric compiled by Hawkins

(2009) is utilised to score 12 speeches. These include two each from the 2014 and 2019 electoral periods for each of the three biggest parties in South Africa. Through the combination of the above qualitative coding method and a desktop study, this study found that the EFF has not caused a marked increase in populist political rhetoric in the other two parties. However, the populist party does pose a danger to the as yet unconsolidated South African democracy owing to its illiberal and anti-pluralist tendencies, and because of the possibility that other parties may also choose to adopt some of the EFF's policies and behaviour (rather than rhetoric) in order to sway voters.

Opsomming

Terwyl navorsers op die gebied in die verlede gedink het dat demokrasie voor die loop van 'n geweer sou sterf - tydens staatsgrepe en rewolusies - het die opkoms van populistiese politiek die wêreld gewaarsku van die moontlikheid dat demokrasie stadig maar seker verwurg kan word in die naam van 'die mense'. Populiste beskou die samelewing as bestaande uit twee homogene, maar antagonistiese groepe - die 'suiwer mense' en die 'korrupte elite'. Alhoewel daar in die Weste baie navorsing omtrent die verskynsel is, is die besondere kenmerke van die verskynsel binne die Afrika-konteks steeds ontluikend. Die belangrikheid van 'n streeksperspektief word duidelik wanneer die kontekstuele aard van populistiese politiek in ag geneem word, sowel as die verskillende iterasies wat dit op die vasteland van Afrika neem: meer ekonomies gefokus as in Europa en Noord-Amerika, meer geneig tot Marxisties-sosialistiese ideologiese onderbou, afhanklik van 'n tweeledige samesmelting van stedelike en etnies-gebaseerde plattelandse steun, en gekenmerk deur 'n nuwe golf van populisme in onafhanklike state wat op voormalige bevryders gemik is.

Hierdie studie ondersoek die verskynsel binne die konteks van die huidige Suid-Afrikaanse politieke klimaat wat deur drie politieke partye oorheers word: die gevestigde African National Congress (ANC), die Demokratiese Alliansie (DA) as die amptelike opposisie, en 'n jong, maar groeiende populistiese party, die Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). Die breër rasionaal van hierdie navorsing is om 'n begrip te bevorder van hoe populistiese diskoers wbinne die politieke- en sosio-ekonomiese konteks in Afrika werk deur gebruik te maak van 'n Suid-Afrikaanse gevallestudie. Die navorsingsvraag wat hierdie ontleding lei, is nouer omskryf: Het die EFF die ANC en DA beïnvloed om meer populisties te raak in hul politieke retoriek en diskoers? Die navorsing fokus dus op die 'sagte mag' van die populistiese party - die vermoë om ander te laat kies om sy voorbeeld te volg deur sy invloed, nie deur dreigemente nie. As die EFF die politieke retoriek en beleidmakery in Suid-Afrika kan beïnvloed ondanks hul onvermoë om voldoende verkiesingssteun te bekom om die hoogste amp in die land te bereik, watter gevolge kan dit inhou vir ander regerings wat populistiese herlewings in demokratiese state in die gesig staar? Die verskynsel van populistiese partye se 'sagte mag' moet duidelik beter verstaan en bestudeer word.

'n Diskoergesentreerde benadering laat toe dat populiste deur hul politieke retoriek geïdentifiseer word. Toesprake van politieke leiers vorm die primêre data wat gebruik word

om die vlak van populistiese diskoers te ontleed. 'n Holistiese tekstuele beoordelingsmetode, baanbrekerswerk deur Hawkins (2009), wat politieke toesprake op 'n skaal van 0 – glad nie populisties nie – tot 2 – uiters populisties – beoordeel, word gebruik. In hierdie studie word die koderingsrubriek wat deur Hawkins (2009) saamgestel is, gebruik om 12 toesprake te beoordeel. Dit sluit twee uit die 2014 verkiesingstydperk en twee uit die 2019 verkiesingstydperk in vir elk van die drie grootste partye in Suid-Afrika. Deur die kombinasie van bogenoemde kwalitatiewe koderingsmetode en 'n ontleding van relevante literatuur het hierdie studie bevind dat die EFF nie 'n noemenswaardige toename in populistiese politieke retoriek by die ander twee partye veroorsaak het nie. Die populistiese party hou egter 'n gevaar in vir die nog nie-gekonsolideerde Suid-Afrikaanse demokrasie as gevolg van sy onliberale en anti-pluralistiese neigings, en as gevolg van die moontlikheid dat ander partye ook kan kies om 'n deel van die EFF se beleid en gedrag (eerder as retoriek) aan te neem om kiesers te laat swaai.

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I would like to extend a word of thanks to my editor, Professor Edwin Hees, for his patience with my revisions and questions at all hours of the day and for the extreme care with which he assisted me in fine-tuning this document. This study would have been immensely poorer were it not for your careful consideration of every "due to" and "because of".

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A final word of appreciation to all the friends, co-workers and fellow students who kept me encouraged and accountable throughout this year. I am sure that you have all heard enough about Julius Malema's syntax to last a lifetime, but I hope you will allow me one more quote: "Comrades, it is very difficult to be your own boss, because if you don't work there is no [thesis] and you can't march against the boss because you are the boss." Thank you for reminding me of this, and for marching against the boss when I could not.

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Abbreviations

Amcu	Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union
ANC DIP	African National Congress Department of Information and Publicity
ANC NEC	African National Congress National Executive Council
ANC	African National Congress
ANCYL	African National Congress Youth League
CIC	Commander-in-Chief
COPE	Congress of the People
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
DA	Democratic Alliance
EFF	Economic Freedom Fighters
FF+	Freedom Front Plus
IEC	Electoral Commission of South Africa
NPA	National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa
NSFAS	National Student Financial Aid Scheme
NUM	National Union of Mineworkers
PAC	Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania
SACP	South African Communist Party
Sanef	South African National Editors' Forum
UDM	United Democratic Movement
VAP	Voting Age Population
WRI	World Resources Institute

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Chapter I – Introduction

1.1 Background and rationale

On 12 January 2019 thousands of South Africans dressed in political regalia flocked to the Moses Mabhida stadium in Durban for the launch of the manifesto of one of the country's key political parties. The crowd sang and danced while they waited for the top brass to show, many holding posters with their party's slogans and dressed in its colours. They cheered when the party leaders arrived and launched into fiery speeches, with particular emphasis on issues that faced many of those in the crowd – job creation, the provision of free housing, and healthcare. One of the most celebrated points in the manifesto was welcomed with screams and chants from the crowd as the party leader confirmed that the document "outline[d] the elements of a plan to accelerate land reform, making use of a range of complementary measures, including, where appropriate, expropriation without compensation" (Daniel, 2019).

To South Africans, this may seem like a familiar montage. The country's radical left-wing party, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), has been espousing land expropriation as one of the main drawcards in its manifestos since its founding in 2013. In 2018, the land issue became one of the most talked about policy points in the country, briefly making the parliamentary television channel one of South Africa's most popular. To scholars of the growing tide of populism internationally, this type of rhetoric is nothing strange. However, one detail seemed out of place: the EFF was not, nor had it ever been, in power in South Africa. The party firing up the crowd in Durban that day was not the EFF. Instead, the African National Congress (ANC), South Africa's ruling party, was echoing rhetoric that sounded surprisingly like that of the EFF only one election cycle earlier.

The South African context presents only one example of the manifestation of populism that has been perturbing political scientists for decades, but which has intensified in recent years. This research thus aims to explore the definition, identification and soft power of populist political parties in the South African political context from 2014 to 2019.

1.1.1 Populism globally

The concept of populism has been a highly contested one. In political literature it is most often thought to represent a political movement of "the people" against "the corrupt elite" (Müller, 2016; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013). Scholars have attempted to define populism in a variety of ways, of which the 'political discourse' metric appears to be the most convincing

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within the field. This and other definitions will be discussed in the literature review section of this study.

Mudde (2004:543) states that populist discourse "considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups". Müller (2016) argues that the delineation of 'the people' is a moral process – while 'the people' are morally pure and fully unified, 'the elite' is in some way morally inferior and corrupt. However, most scholars agree that by its very nature, populism is anti-pluralist – resting as it does on the claim that populists and only populists represent 'the people' (Mudde, 2004). What distinguishes populists – self-proclaimed or otherwise identified – from other political organisations is their elicitation of the people as the 'true holders of sovereignty' as opposed to a supposed corrupt and antidemocratic elite (Moffitt and Tomey, 2014; Mudde, 2004; Müller, 2016). The claim is thus that 'only some of the people are really the people' and that only they themselves, as the populist political leaders, authentically identify with and represent this real and true people.

1.1.2 Populism in Africa

There is a general agreement among scholars of politics and International Relations on the resurgence of populism and populist discourse all over the world. Much of the discourse in contemporary African politics also fits into what Mbete (2015:55) calls "a global pattern of populism in electoral politics". The rhetoric of 'the people' against 'the corrupt elite' is evident in a diverse range of contexts; this is evident in the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands, 'Trumpism' in the United States and in leaders like former Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, as well as in parties such as South Africa's EFF, the Namibian EFF, or the Patriotic Front in Zambia. However, it seems hard to agree on what populism is or who is populist, yet without an accurate conceptualisation of populism and its different regional understandings, it is difficult to understand its implications for democracy.

While there is a great deal of scholarship in the United States, South America and Europe on the subject, less attention has been paid to contemporary African politics, where the phenomenon plays out in substantially different environments with less consolidated democracies and more socio-economic challenges. If we are to heed the general warning on applying Western concepts directly to the continent, it is important to study the concept of African populism and its possible effects on Africa's democracies, especially as the failure of the political mainstream to address the needs of the poor creates space for the emergence of a

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new generation of populist movements and leaders. In Africa, these movements are also distinguished by their tendency to be on the far left, rather than the far right, of the political spectrum, as opposed to the more right-leaning politics of most European populist leaders.

In November 2018 Jordan Kyle and Limor Gultchin (2018:6), two scholars from the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, released an international populist database named *Populists in Power: 1990–2018*. The report set out "to define populism from a global perspective and identify some of its key trends since 1990." The authors joined a growing field of research into global populism and its local iterations in an attempt to understand the rise of the phenomenon and the dangers it could pose. While *Populists in Power* represented the first time that such an effort had been made to determine the prevalence of populist governments, the authors provided two caveats to their research. Firstly, many African states had not been examined for the project, as these states were assumed "not to be democratic enough" to undergo democratic backsliding due to populism, and thus not worth being included in the study; secondly, only populist *governments* were included, on the assumption that populist parties could not influence the state to such an extent that they could pose a danger to democracy unless they occupied the 'chief executive' position in a given country (Kyle and Gultchin, 2018:6).

Among the potential dangers of populist resurgences in democratic countries is the possible erosion of formal democratic rules and liberal institutions. The effects of populist rule may include "the takeover and taming of courts and oversight institutions, and new laws that limit the freedom of the media and civil society. These legal and formal manoeuvres erode public criticism, transparency, and accountability" (Stanford Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, 2019). These issues, further discussed in sections 3.5 and 4.6, become particularly prominent in states where democracy has not yet become consolidated. In Africa many states have struggled to fully support the system of institutional checks and balances that are essential to an accountable and transparent democracy, such as independent courts and limitations on the powers of post-colonial leaders. A populist government intent on breaking down these institutions may be too much to bear for fledgling democratic states. Furthermore, the effects of populist political parties that do not take office could be equally damaging, but more difficult to pinpoint and combat.

Furthermore, soft power can be difficult to measure. There is therefore limited research into the influence of parties, other than the incumbent, on those that are in power and on the broader

political environment when their rhetoric is populist; there is even less such research on the African continent. This study will thus analyse the populist progression of the political discourse in a more established democracy in the region, while not yet consolidated – South Africa – in an attempt to contribute to the understanding of the possible ramifications of populist political parties on the African continent in a time that has been called the "playtime of the populist" (Forde, 2014:1).

1.1.3 Non-incumbent populists and soft power

If one accepts that populist politics pose a danger to democratic institutions due to the abovementioned erosion of democratic rules and institutions, the importance of being able to identify the soft power of rising or non-incumbent political parties becomes clear. If populist parties in non-executive positions have an undue influence on the political discourse in democratic states, which in turn influences the policies of the ruling parties, being able to identify the trend should assist those working to strengthen democratic institutions. If the EFF could influence the political rhetoric and policymaking in South Africa despite their inability to amass enough support to attain the highest office in the land, what does this mean for other governments facing populist resurgences in normally staunchly democratic states? Clearly, the phenomenon of populist parties' 'soft power' needs to be better understood and studied.

Joseph Nye describes power as "an ability to do things and control others, to get others to do what they otherwise would not" (1990:154). Simply put, it is "the ability to achieve one's purpose" (Nye, 1997:7). However, Nye distinguishes between what he calls "hard" and "soft" power: Hard power, which includes military and economic power, rests on the ability to provide threats or inducements to make others do what one wishes[1]. Soft power, on the other hand, is more subtle: it aims to make one's objectives and values attractive to others so that they choose to do what one wants (Nye, 2003:57). In essence, soft power changes preferences, while hard power changes circumstances (Vuving, 2009:6). These terms are usually used in the study of international relations and foreign policy, but they can be "equally instructive in the study of local politics" (De Jager, 2006:102).

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[1] This study acknowledges the EFF's hard power – for example, winning local government elections and thus wielding localised decision-making power – but has chosen to focus on the presence of soft power in the party's ability to shift national rhetoric.

1.2 Problem statement and research question

Governments are only considered populist when the party in power is considered as such. However, populist opposition parties may also have an influence in African democracies. On the African continent populism reflects a style of political rhetoric and policymaking that emerges from a state of real or perceived crisis, includes some distinction between the 'pure' and the 'impure' people, and usually has some component of ethnic emphasis. In the light of developing countries' socio-economic challenges, African populists often make outcome variables the centre of their campaigns, rather than specific ideological determinants – although ideology can inform their practices. This study thus posits that populist parties can influence the policies and political discourse in democracies where they are not in power. This hypothesis will be tested by an examination of the EFF and its influence on the ANC and the Democratic Alliance (DA) in South Africa.

1.2.1 The research question

The research question for this study thus becomes clear: Has the EFF influenced, and thus exercised soft power on, other South African political parties to be more populist in their political rhetoric and discourse?

As such, it is hypothesised that the EFF has made South African politics more populist.

1.2.2 Goals and objectives

This research project aims to broaden the knowledge available on the specific iteration of populism in new African democracies by examining a previously neglected area of study: the influence of populist parties that have not achieved 'the highest office in the land' in public politics in a given country. In order to do so, this research aims to accomplish the following objectives:

i.   Establish whether the EFF can be considered a populist party;

ii. Consider whether the EFF's proposed populist rhetoric has influenced, or exerted soft power on, other parties, specifically the ruling party (the ANC) and the official opposition (the DA), to adapt their own political rhetoric;

iii. Contemplate the influence of such populism on less entrenched or unconsolidated democracies.

1.3 Theoretical framework

This study will focus on the identification of populism as a particular form of political rhetoric or discourse. As such, when measuring populism, analysing the discourse of political actors to see whether the 'noble people' are praised and the 'corrupt elites' condemned in the name of the *volonté générale* is used as a measure of identifying populism. Ernesto Laclau is considered the father of this understanding of populism, having first examined the discursive nature of populist phenomena in the seminal *Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory: Capitalism-Fascism-Populism* (1977) and elaborated on the idea in *On Populist Reason* (Laclau, 2005a) and *Populism and the Mirror of Democracy* (Laclau, 2005b). He insisted that "a movement is not populist because in its politics or ideology it presents actual *contents* identifiable as populistic, but because it shows a particular logic of *articulation* of those contents – whatever those contents are" (Laclau, 2005b:33 (emphasis added)). The way in which populist rhetoric is presented thus serves as the identifier, as opposed to the contents of the rhetoric itself.

One of Laclau's (2005a, 2005b) most important contributions to the literature on this topic is his identification of the subjectivities of 'the people' and of the opposing power bloc of 'the elite' as 'empty signifiers', symbolic vessels filled with particular content depending upon the political context within which the would-be populist finds themselves[2]. Neither 'the people' nor 'the corrupt elite' are fixed in their identities, a flexibility of content which explains the diversity of the varying phenomena collected under the umbrella of populism. However, this still allows scholars to identify populist parties by their modes of mobilisation, which would be characterised by an anti-elitist discourse that aims to rectify the purported exclusion of marginalised constituencies (Canovan, 1999; Resnick, 2014).

1.4 Research design and methodology

The research design for this study features a qualitative strategy through a case study research design. A more holistic picture of the phenomenon in question can be developed by using

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[2] While it is not the focus of this study, Policy Studies as a field within Political Science could also be useful in the examination of a political actor's ability to influence another party – see, for example, Hall, P.A 1993. Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of Economic Policymaking in Britain. *Comparative Politics*, 25(3):275-296, Mettler, S. and Soss, J. 2004. The consequences of public policy for democratic citizenship: Bridging policy studies and mass politics. *Perspectives on politics*, 2(1):55-73, Mewhirter, J., Coleman, E.A. and Berardo, R. 2019. Participation and political influence in complex governance systems. *Policy Studies Journal*, 47(4):1002-1025, and Sabatier, P.A., 1991. Toward better theories of the policy process. *Political Science & Politics*, 24(2):147-156.

qualitative research because of its multifaceted nature. Three methodological elements contribute to the overall findings of this study: a literature review, a case study, and qualitative coding of texts.

A literature review focuses on the interpretations of secondary academic sources (Hofstee, 2006). This allows for the contextualisation of this study within the field of populism studies in general and African populism in particular in the light of the work that has already been done in the field. The case study method has as its strength its focus on detailed knowledge of a certain phenomenon and context (Yin, 2018:15), here the South African socio-political context within which any study of specific populist rhetoric must be situated. This allows for an intense study of the context within which the three biggest parties in South Africa might be motivated to employ populist rhetoric.

The "holistic grading" (Hawkins *et al*., 2019) method of textual analysis that is used to examine the populist shift in South African politics in this study is a new method, and as such presents some limitations. However, the method was specifically produced to measure populism and thus presents an opportunity to contribute to the body of knowledge in this neglected field. This research method will be further described in Chapter II.

As the aim of this case study is to analyse the shifts in political rhetoric in South African politics over two national elections, a study of key texts presents the most relevant way to measure a change in tone and subject matter over the time period. This study will implement a holistic grading method of textual analysis, as pioneered by Kirk Hawkins (2009) specifically for use in populism studies. Textual analysis of speeches is "one of the more reliable, valid and precise techniques used by political scientists to gauge levels of populism" (Lewis *et al*., 2019b). The analytical coding of speeches in this way allows for the allocation of a score to each text, which then allows for further inspection, interrogation and interpretation of the data (Richards, 2013:95-96). The relevant methodology will be further discussed in Chapter II.

1.5 Ethical considerations

Ethical considerations remain an important aspect of social science analyses, even in desktop studies. As this study is conducted at Stellenbosch University, it must comply with the institution's *Framework Policy for the Assurance and Promotion of Ethically Accountable Research at Stellenbosch University* (2009). This policy outlines the ways in which any research conducted at the University must adhere to "the values of equity, participation,

transparency, service, tolerance and mutual respect, dedication, scholarship, responsibility and academic freedom in all its activities" (Framework Policy, 2009:1). This study does not involve a human element, and all information sourced for this study is available in the public domain. The Stellenbosch University Research Ethics Committee: Social, Behavioural and Education Research (SBER) has exempted this study from the need for ethical clearance. As such, the researcher does not anticipate any ethical issues, but continues to strive to maintain the highest standards of honesty and integrity over the course of this study.

1.6 Study outline

Having outlined the background and rationale to this study, it is now necessary to present the structure of this study and the way in which the subsequent chapters buttress and answer the research question. Chapter II presents the research design and methodology employed for this study, with specific emphasis on the coding rubric and method of textual grading utilised to score the speeches analysed in this study. Chapter III highlights the body of work within which the study is located, identifying the aspects that make populism in Africa unique and pointing out the ways in which populist parties can be identified on the continent according to the work of other researchers on the topic. Chapter III thus provides an analytical view of the relevant literature concerned with identifying populist political parties within the African context, as well as an examination of the links between populism and democracy. It also accomplishes the third research objective by contemplating the influence populism may have on unconsolidated African democracies, thus providing further rationale for this study.

With the theoretical groundwork laid for a deeper analysis of populist politics, Chapter IV examines the South African political landscape over the past 25 years. It intends to contextualise the current discourse used by the country's main political parties over the previous two national election cycles, namely, 2014 and 2019. It also discusses the creation and function of the EFF in South Africa and examines its methodology and discourse to determine whether it can be considered a populist party, and is therefore suited to the study, thus accomplishing the first research objective.

Chapter V then focuses on analysing and comparing the three largest parties in South African politics in a case study format by using the aforementioned methodology. It attempts to answer the primary research question by analysing selected key texts from each of the three main parties in the run-up to the 2014 election cycle according to the rubric discussed in Chapter II.

It highlights the changes that have occurred in populist ratings for the ANC and the DA, thus showing whether there is a correlation between the rise of the EFF's populist rhetoric and the subsequent incorporation of such rhetoric into the political discourse of the other two main political parties, the DA and the ANC. This chapter attempts to accomplish the second research objective by answering the following question: Has there been an influence on other parties over the last six years?

Finally, Chapter VI restates the importance of the research and discusses the results of the study, as well as reflecting on the influence that this brand of African populism may have on less entrenched and unconsolidated democracies. It also attempts to make recommendations and identifies possible areas for future study, as well as discuss the limitations of this study.

Chapter II – Research design and methodology

2.1 Introduction

Chapter I outlined the importance of a sound research design and methodology when studying a phenomenon as complex and context bound as populism. It will be argued that the qualitative data handling offers an authentic and accurate way to answer the research question of this study: Has the EFF influenced South African political parties to be more populist in their political rhetoric and discourse? Qualitative research methodology provides the most efficient and inclusive method to describe, interpret, contextualise, and gain in-depth insight into specific concepts or phenomena. In this study, a case study research design allows for a focus on the phenomenon of populism as a form of political rhetoric in the South African context.

This chapter explains the desktop research used in the next two chapters, as well as the research methodology used to code each political speech as more or less populist in an attempt to find trends in the use of political rhetoric over time. Chapters III and IV situate this study within the appropriate academic and socio-political landscapes, respectively, while Chapter V analyses the selected speeches. This chapter will thus outline the research design of this research as a case study, after which it will discuss the use of both desktop research and an innovative holistic textual grading method of qualitative coding that can be used to measure the level of populist rhetoric in a given speech. It will also discuss the criteria for selecting speeches, and finally indicate the possible limitations of this study.

2.2 Research design

The research design features a qualitative strategy through a case study research design. The study aims to test the hypothesis that the soft power of the EFF has led to other South African political parties adopting more populist rhetoric in their political discourse. While these results do not aim to be generalisable to the African continent as a whole, the case may expose principles which can be extrapolated to similar cases through further research.

Robert Yin (2018:15) puts forth a twofold definition of the case study as research method, which encompasses both the *scope* and the *features* of a case study. He states that it is "an empirical method" that investigates "a contemporary phenomenon (the 'case') in depth and within its real-world context". This is especially useful in cases where the phenomenon being examined and the context within which it occurs cannot be easily distinguished (Yin, 2018:15), as is often the case when political phenomena are examined. Thus, a case study method is

useful in that it helps the researcher understand a contemporary real-world case, such as the one represented by the rise in populism in South Africa and the EFF's connection with the change, where it is of the utmost importance to situate the phenomenon within its context.

Yin's (2018:15) definition further discusses the blurring of the boundaries between phenomenon and context. As a result of the lack of clearly-distinguishable boundaries, other methodological characteristics become relevant as features of case study research: A case study can deal with the technically distinctive situation that has more variables than data points; it "benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide design, data collection, and analysis"; and it relies on multiple sources of data which converge on the topic at hand (Yin, 2018:15).

The case study method is also useful as detailed knowledge is required of changes in political discourse in order to validate the above hypothesis. As such, the political discourse of two major South African political parties – the African National Congress and the Democratic Alliance – from the 2014 election cycle to the 2019 election cycle will be examined in order to identify trends or changes. In order to do so, the content of relevant texts will be examined in order to provide insight into the extent of populist rhetoric in the speeches of party leaders. It is anticipated that both the DA and the ANC will have become more populist – and will thus receive a higher score – in 2019 than in 2014.

2.3 Research methodology

2.3.1 Desktop study

Concept and evidence are mutually interdependent, particularly in case study analysis (Neuman, 2011:502). Case studies in general, and those that use qualitative coding in particular, benefit from more than one form of research methodology (Neuman, 2011; Richards, 2013). This study thus utilises both desktop study and textual coding.

Chapters III and IV are informed by the desktop analysis. Secondary data were gathered, examined and analysed to situate this study within the existing academic debates in the field of populism and democracy studies. They were also used to examine the current political context within which the case study is taking place, as well as the main political actors in the form of the three most prominent political parties in South Africa. A major strength of using secondary data in this way is the speed with which the relevant information can be located and interrogated, allowing for the rapid analysis of current issues. However, it does have the

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disadvantage of not being as focused as the research question demands. For this reason, this study also utilises primary sources in the form of coded speeches. In order to bring data and theory together, this study depends upon both the analysis of the relevant literature and context and the scores obtained through the holistic grading method to obtain a more complete picture of any increases in the use of populist rhetoric in South African political discourse.

2.3.2 Holistic grading methodology

As the aim of this case study is to analyse the shifts in political rhetoric in South African politics over two election cycles, a study of key texts presents the most relevant way to measure a change in tone and subject matter over this period.

This study implements a holistic grading method of textual analysis, as pioneered in the Hawkins *et al*. (2019) study of global populism. Textual analysis of speeches is "one of the more reliable, valid and precise techniques used by political scientists to gauge levels of populism" according to Kirk Hawkins (2009), an associate professor who oversaw the study on global populism (Lewis *et al*., 2019). The analytical coding of speeches in this way allows for the allocation of a score to each text, which then allows for further inspection, interrogation and interpretation of the data (Richards, 2013:95-96). This innovative grading method presents one of the most expansive and specific attempts to develop methodology aimed at understanding populism and expands the reliability of studies focused on the soft power, or influence, of political discourse.

For the purposes of their study, Hawkins *et al*. (2019) defined populists as those who "tend to frame politics as a battle between the virtuous 'ordinary' masses and a nefarious or corrupt elite – and insist that the general will of the people must always triumph", a concept originally introduced by Cas Mudde (2004) and falling broadly within the 'discourse approach' to populism studies. The study ultimately relied on a definition of populist parties as those "[p]arties that endorse the set of ideas that society is ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite', and which argue that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale*, or general will, of the people" as first set out by Mudde (2004). This definition does, however, acknowledge the varying ideologies that may use populist rhetoric as a vehicle for the delivery of their message (Hawkins, 2019).

Qualitative coding organises raw data into conceptual categories. The scoring of populism on a scale entails a tag or label for assigning units of meaning to the descriptive data provided in the texts (Neuman, 2011:510). While codes are more usually "attached to 'chunks' of varying size – words, phrases, sentences or whole paragraphs" (Neuman, 2011:510-511), Hawkins's holistic grading method allows for coding which considers the entire text in a more all-inclusive way.

As such, coding by a holistic grading method becomes the apparent choice in this study. The method combines the efficiency of using key word indicators with the more well-rounded considerations of full paragraphs by considering a text in its entirety and comparing it with 'anchor' texts. Rather than judge a text on the frequency of certain words or sentences, which may indicate only ideological leanings, holistic grading requires researchers to consider a text in its entirety. This works to measure the tone, themes and ideas conveyed in the text and can be used to compare texts on the basis of these features as long as the same rubric and anchor texts are used to train all coders (Hawkins *et al.*, 2019).

This research method sees populism as a spectrum, not as one dimension of a simple binary; this in turn allows for closer examination of trends over time and small shifts in political discourse and style. In their study Hawkins *et al.* (2019) assigned the political leaders they examined a score on a scale from 0 to 2, where 0 indicated "not populist" and 2 indicated "clear populism".

The coding rubric used will be the one originally constructed by Hawkins (2009), utilised by Hawkins *et al.* (2019) and provided for use by other researchers by the latter study. Accordingly, texts will be awarded scores as follows:

> *2: A speech in this category is extremely populist and comes very close to the ideal populist discourse. Specifically, the speech expresses all or nearly all of the elements of ideal populist discourse, and has few elements that would be considered non-populist.*

> *1: A speech in this category includes strong, clearly populist elements but either does not use them consistently or tempers them by including non-populist elements. Thus, the discourse may have a romanticized notion of the people and the idea of a unified popular will (indeed, it must in order to be considered*

populist), but it avoids bellicose language or references to cosmic proportions or any particular enemy.

0: A speech in this category uses few if any populist elements. Note that even if a manifesto expresses a Manichaean worldview, it is not considered populist if it lacks some notion of a popular will.

The rubric contrasts possible populist rhetorical tactics and content with the pluralist perspective. For example, a discourse which frames everything in moral and dualistic terms – in other words, which espouses a Manichaean vision of the world, with the implication, or even the explicitly stated view, that there are no grey areas, would be termed populist. The pluralist antithesis would "not frame issues in moral terms or paint them in black-and-white" but would instead tend to focus on particular issues or policy ideas. The pluralist discourse would emphasise (or at least not eliminate) "the possibility of natural, justifiable differences of opinion" (Hawkins *et al*., 2009). As such, the rubric allows for a score to be allocated on the basic of these oppositional forms of rhetoric.

The following rubric from Hawkins (2009) will thus be used to determine the populist score of the relevant political speeches:

Populist	Pluralist
It conveys a Manichaean vision of the world, that is, one that is moral (every issue has a strong moral dimension) and dualistic (everything is in one category or the other, "right" or "wrong," "good" or "evil") The implication – or even the stated idea – is that there can be nothing in between, no fence-sitting, no shades of grey. This leads to the use of highly charged, even bellicose language.	The discourse does not frame issues in moral terms or paint them in black-and-white. Instead, there is a strong tendency to focus on **narrow, particular issues**. The discourse will emphasize or at least not eliminate the possibility of natural, justifiable differences of opinion.
The moral significance of the items mentioned in the speech is heightened by ascribing **cosmic proportions** to them, that is,	The discourse will probably not refer to any reified notion of history or use any cosmic proportions. References to the spatial and

by claiming that they affect people everywhere (possibly but not necessarily across the world) and across time. Especially in this last regard, frequent references may be made to a reified notion of "history." At the same time, the speaker will justify the moral significance of his or her ideas by tying them to **national and religious leaders** that are generally revered.	temporal consequences of issues will be limited to the material reality rather than any mystical connections.
Although Manichaean, the discourse is still democratic, in the sense that the good is embodied in the will of the majority, which is seen as a unified whole, perhaps but not necessarily expressed in references to the "voluntad del pueblo"; however, the speaker ascribes a kind of unchanging essentialism to that will, rather than letting it be whatever 50 percent of the people want at any particular moment. Thus, this good majority is romanticized, with some notion of the common man (urban or rural) seen as the embodiment of the national ideal.	Democracy is simply the calculation of votes. This should be respected and is seen as the foundation of legitimate government, but it is not meant to be an exercise in arriving at a preexisting, knowable "will." The majority shifts and changes across issues. The common man is not romanticized, and the notion of citizenship is broad and legalistic.
The evil is embodied in a minority whose specific identity will vary according to context. Domestically, in Latin America it is often an economic elite, perhaps the "oligarchy," but it may also be a racial elite; internationally, it may be the United States or the capitalist, industrialized nations or international financiers or simply an ideology such as neoliberalism and capitalism.	The discourse avoids a conspiratorial tone and does not single out any evil ruling minority. It avoids labeling opponents as evil and may not even mention them in an effort to maintain a positive tone and keep passions low.

Crucially, the evil minority is or was recently in charge and subverted the system to its own interests, against those of the good majority or the people. Thus, systemic change is/was required, often expressed in terms such as "revolution" or "liberation" of the people from their "immiseration" or bondage, even if technically it comes about through elections.	The discourse does not argue for systemic change but, as mentioned above, focuses on particular issues. In the words of Laclau, it is a politics of "differences" rather than "hegemony."
Because of the moral baseness of the threatening minority, non-democratic means may be openly justified or at least the minority's continued enjoyment of these will be seen as a generous concession by the people; the speech itself may exaggerate or abuse data to make this point, and the language will show a bellicosity towards the opposition that is incendiary and condescending, lacking the decorum that one shows a worthy opponent.	Formal rights and liberties are openly respected, and the opposition is treated with courtesy and as a legitimate political actor. The discourse will not encourage or justify illegal, violent actions. There will be great respect for institutions and the rule of law. If data is abused, it is either an innocent mistake or an embarrassing breach of democratic standards.

As such, populist elements are consistently framed in their opposition to the pluralist ideal. While the populist will mention the 'evil minority' that has subverted the system to suit their own interests, i.e. the 'corrupt elite', the pluralist discourse will omit mention of any specific evil minority. These two oppositional modes of discourse create a spectrum along which each text can be individually scored.

Hawkins *et al*. (2019) found that four key speeches per term were enough to measure how populist a political leader was during that term. An average rating on the 0-2 scale is given for every speech, after which the average for all four speeches is found. This rating is then assigned

to that particular leader to indicate how populist they were during that term. For this study, in the interest of time and the lack of large numbers of coders, a choice of four speeches per party was instead selected.

2.3.3 Criteria for the selection of speeches

As a parliamentary system (De Jager, 2015:54), South Africa's political system tends to give precedence to political parties, as opposed to presidential systems which favour individual leaders (Kyle and Gultchin, 2018:26). In order to adapt this research method to party politics in South Africa, party leaders' speeches are used as proxies for party rhetoric. Electoral issues in national elections tend to be more wide-ranging and less localised, and speeches from these elections better preserved, than with local elections. The units of analysis are thus the three parties which captured the largest share of the vote in both the 2014 and 2019 national elections – the ANC, the DA, and the EFF. Four key speeches from each party are thus examined. These speeches are selected on the basis of having had high impact, significant press coverage and major audiences.

In consideration of the time and researcher constraints mentioned above, this study examines two speeches from each of the two national election cycles for each party. In an effort to maintain reliability, all speeches are selected from the election campaigns of the respective parties. These speeches are expected to be the most reliable measure of populist discourse used by these political leaders, as they are delivered to their voters directly in an attempt to galvanise voters to show up for the relevant party on election day. While the exact dates of the speeches for each party differ somewhat, the goal and occasion of the six texts for each election cycle are the same, thus making them comparable within this coding system.

A manifesto speech and a final rally speech from each party was selected for each election cycle. A 'manifesto speech' is exactly that – a speech given by the most senior party member at the official launch of the manifesto for that election period. A 'final rally speech' is defined as a speech given during the party's final public convention in their campaign for office. Speeches given to large public audiences are preferable over ones given at a party convention, as they are aimed at those outside the party as well as party members, and therefore all 12 speeches chosen for this study are from large public rallies where audiences numbered in their thousands and where the general public was invited to attend, not just party members. The

speeches were only chosen from texts that are available to the public and sourced from legitimate sources, for example legitimate news sites and government or party websites.

While these speeches differ in their degrees of populism, they give a coherent idea of the average level to be assigned to the relevant party for that electoral campaign. Leaders of the respective parties whose speeches qualify as position-defining texts include the president (or 'party leader' in the case of the DA, or 'Commander-in-Chief', in the case of the EFF), the secretary-general, the chairperson, and official spokespeople. Given the nature of national election campaigns in South Africa, all 12 speeches selected for this study were given by the party leader at the time, as they were also the party's candidate for president, making the gravitas of the speakers comparable.

This study relies purely on textual data, available in the public domain on the relevant parties' web pages and through reliable online news sources. Hawkins *et al*. (2019) recommend a speech that is at least two to three pages long, or about 2,000 words, in order to have enough text to code. A longer or shorter speech may be used if it is the only one available in the category, or if it is clearly the most suitable, for instance, in the 'final rally speech' category. However, all the speeches graded in this study conform to these requirements and can thus be assumed to be reliable measures of the respective speakers' use of populist rhetoric.

Upon initiating this study, the researcher expected to find that only the EFF scores highly, or as 'clearly populist', in the 2014 election cycle, while the other two parties move further away from a 0 score on the scale in the ensuing years, indicating that they are becoming more populist as the EFF normalises populist political discourse in the South African political milieu.

2.4 Possible limitations

As with any such research, "[p]erfection is seldom, if ever, attainable" (Hofstee, 2010:117). The researcher anticipated that it would at times be difficult to obtain texts which are appropriate for each section. In such a case, the political party involved was contacted for their help. As a last resort, a speech was chosen for which the context resembles the ideal context as stated in the previous section as closely as possible and which is noted as such in the relevant chapter.

Hofstee (2010:123) also notes that the case study method carries certain risks inherent in its structure. These include a risk of subjectivity on the part of the researcher, the lack of generalisability of results, and the regression of the research topic due to a lack of focus on the

part of the researcher. To counteract this, he suggests combining it with other research methods (Hofstee, 2010:123); in this case, an in-depth analysis of the relevant literature. Mouton (2012: 150) further notes that the use of documentary sources and other existing data can help counteract this – in this study, the relevant political parties' manifestos and other secondary texts on their political positions help to confirm findings.

For human-coded data, it would be ideal to have more than one researcher coding every text to counter possible researcher bias; however, this option was not available for all texts in this study because of budget constraints. The Hawkins *et al*. (2019) study used two researchers to code every text where possible, but also used a statistic known as Krippendorff's alpha to measure agreement between the two coders. Krippendorff's alpha runs from 0.0 to 1.0, with 1.0 indicating perfect agreement. The Krippendorff's alpha score for their research was 0.82, which indicates a high level of agreement and led them to conclude that they could be confident of the accuracy of scores even for texts scored by only one researcher (Lewis *et al*., 2019).

The researcher also had the opportunity to receive training in coding with the holistic textual grading method and rubric from Dr Robert Nyenhuis, assistant professor in the Political Science department at California State University, Pomona. Dr Nyenhuis was a research assistant on the original study who received his training from Hawkins. This training programme was intended to ensure that coders maintain consistent results.

Dr Nyenhuis visited the University of Stellenbosch in August 2019 presenting his own research at a conference and then departmental seminar. After face-to-face introductions and meetings, communications continued via email. Correspondence with Dr Nyenhuis allowed for cross-checking of scores awarded to speeches from the 2019 election cycle. Consistent scores across all three main parties for this study and the two coders in Dr Nyenhuis's study for the 2019 national elections indicate that validity may be assumed for the other six scores from the 2014 electoral cycle. While the Hawkins *et al.* (2019) study found that they could be confident of the score of texts coded by only one researcher, the researcher acknowledges the possibility of bias due to this circumstance. Cross-checking the scores where available, as well as the training received by the researcher, increase the reliability of the scores assigned during this study.

The subjectivity of the rubric may also present an obstacle to the study. However, as with all qualitative research (Neuman, 2011:214), this study is concerned with offering a fair, honest and balanced account of the context of populism in South Africa. The consistent use of a

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detailed rubric used across multiple studies in populism studies is important in order to lessen this risk.

The average score given to a political party is dependent upon the speeches selected. Analysing more speeches per party may have yielded a more reliable average score – however, previous research by Hawkins and his colleagues "suggests that scholars can calculate reliable scores…with a sample of just four speeches per term" (Lewis *et al*., 2019). While Hawkins *et al.* (2019) graded their speeches in the original language wherever possible, this study has largely graded speeches in English because of time and budget constraints, using reliable translations as far as possible, including sections where South African vernacular was used.

The researcher also acknowledges that the particularities of the South African context may make the final analysis very specific to the country itself, and therefore unable to be used to generalise to the rest of Africa, a recognised limitation of the case study research design. As such, this study aims only to reflect the possible influence of these political circumstances and to provide a point of departure for future studies on the topic in Africa.

2.5 Concluding remarks

Along with a literature review and case study research design, this study utilises a method of holistic textual grading which is an emerging and thus original method in political studies. Although it has the disadvantage of being less entrenched as an accepted method of study within political science, its strength lies in the fact that it was created specifically to measure populist politics within the theoretical framework of populism as discourse. Unlike other methods of measuring populist rhetoric, this approach does not treat populism as a binary category. Rather, it recognises that politicians can use varying degrees of populist rhetoric in their discourse, and that they can adapt these levels depending on audience, event and political climate. Accordingly, this methodology allows for the most well-rounded examination of the possible rise of populist political discourse in South Africa following the establishment of the decidedly populist EFF. Chapters III and IV provide the literature review and contextual chapters respectively, using desktop study, while Chapter V presents the coded data. Coded rubrics are also attached to this document as appendices to provide more insight into the coding process and the validity of conclusions made in Chapter V.

Chapter III – The many faces of populist politics

"The leader correctly discerns what we correctly think, and sometimes he might

just think the correct thing a little bit before we do" (Müller, 2016:17).

3.1 Introduction

While there is great deal of scholarship in the United States, South America and Europe on the subject of populism, less attention has been devoted to contemporary African politics, where the phenomenon plays out in a substantially different environment with many less-consolidated democracies and more socio-economic challenges. If we are to heed the general warning on applying Western concepts directly to Africa, it is important to study the concept of populism and its possible effects within the African context, especially as the failure of the political leadership to address the needs of the poor creates space for the emergence of a new generation of populist movements and leaders.

Given that sub-Saharan Africa is now the fastest-urbanising region in the world (CSIS, 2018; The World Bank, 2015), the relevance of its poor urban masses to the continent's political dynamics is growing. Africa's future will undoubtedly be shaped by urban politics. However, this vast demographic shift to cities has brought with it urban poverty, sprawling informal settlements, a host of service-delivery issues and growing unemployment, especially among the youth (Haddad, Ruel & Garrett, 1999; Mitlin, 2004; Satterthwaite, 2003). These circumstances contribute to a wave of disillusionment that is sweeping African democracies and creating unprecedented opportunities for opposition parties (Resnick, 2014:1). South Africa is no exception to this trend.

This literature review will thus assess the scholarship on populism, with a focus on the five different theoretical approaches that have mainly been used to examine the phenomenon and the possible causes of populist politics in democratic states. This chapter will further investigate the potential influence of populist politics on democracy in the African context and identify the main ideas, definitions, theories and conclusions on the topic. It will then consider the different definitions of democracy and the way that populism plays into, and against, these definitions. This will be done by analysing the work of other scholars in the field, identifying major seminal works, establishing similarities and differences between previous studies and identifying the main theoretical frameworks and research techniques used by other scholars, thus providing an intellectual context for further research on the topic. This will provide the for a more thorough

examination of the contextual factors that have enabled populist politics in South Africa in Chapter IV.

3.2 Populism, in theory

As has already been discussed, populism as a concept is both topical and contested. While many scholars agree that the most basic version of the definition includes a contestation between 'the people' and a so-called 'corrupt elite' (Müller, 2016; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013), different theoretical frameworks allow for different interpretations. As such, populism has what Taggart (2004:1) calls a "conceptual slipperiness", a definitional ambiguity due in part to the fact that populism manifests itself differently depending on contextual conditions (Priester, 2007, in Wirth *et al*., 2016:7).

Early research, mostly in the United States, depicted populism as a threat to democracy, with influential theorists like Shils (1954) and Lipset (1955) setting up the study of populism as one focused on the 'politics of irrationality'. Later literature on populism in developing countries became attached to modernisation theory (see Stewart, 1969), while in more developed Western countries it was studied as an ideology (Hadiz and Chryssogelos, 2017:403). These two approaches became the first of many approaches to understanding populism as a phenomenon, the most influential of which will be discussed below. It is imperative to scrutinize the lenses through which one may examine the concept of populism before examining the possible causes and effects of populist politics. As such, the next section of this literature review chapter briefly examines the main theoretical approaches that have been used in this field of study.

3.2.1 The 'Ideology' approach

Cas Mudde's (2004:543) seminal work introduced the idea of populism as an ideology, one "that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups," which he termed "the pure people" and "the corrupt elite". Mudde (2004:544) argued that as an ideology, populism's core assumption is that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* or 'general will' of the people. However, Mudde (2004) and Canovan (2002) both stressed that populism is a 'thin-centred' ideology – that is to say, an ideology that does not conform to the 'full' definition of an ideology, since the particular ideas it embodies are of limited complexity, scope and ambition.

Other scholars argue that the 'ideological' explanation does not hold up to close examination, as they believe it lacks one of the most important dimensions of ideology in political literature: coherence (Aslanidis, 2016:89). Instead, analysts highlight the ability of populism to change face according to context and *underlying* ideology, arguing that much of its strength and relevance comes from its chameleonic nature (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013; Taggart, 2004). Aslanidis (2016:89) argues that this is why populism is visible in such ideologically diverse forms of political leadership, such as in the rhetoric of Marine le Pen and Julius Malema, or Geert Wilders and Raila Odinga. Betz (2002:107) agrees, stating that "populist parties are generally held to lack grand visions or comprehensive ideological projects". They also lack historical continuity within (Bale *et al.*, 2011; Moffitt and Torney, 2014; Worsley, 1969, cited in Allcock, 1971:376), or ideological coherence with, this supposed ideology (Aslanidis, 2016:89). These scholars thus believe that the existing "knee-jerk association of populism with ideology" (Aslanidis, 2016:90) in literature on the subject should be contested.

Aslanidis (2016:94) also worries that depicting populism as an ideology inflates its scope and imbues it with normative connotations that can hinder objective study of an increasingly important subject. When populism is accused of undermining checks and balances by its very nature, the term is used derogatorily and "empirical measurement…largely escape[s] scholarly attention" (Aslanidis, 2016:95), especially when scholars are entrenched behind traditional ideological barriers (Aslanidis, 2016:101).

3.2.2 The 'Political Style' approach

Moffit and Tormey's (2014) approach does not require an understanding of populism as an ideology, but rather sees populism as a category of 'political style'. This perspective focuses on politics as performance and the ways in which it creates political relations. The mutually constitutive relationship between content and style is acknowledged by the 'political style' analysis of populism (Moffit and Tormey, 2014; Mbete, 2015). This approach also highlights the performative features of contemporary populist politics (Mbete, 2015), which seems to make it increasingly useful in the information age. *The Economist* (2019) has also weighed in on the debate, noting that a new breed of "cometicians" (a neologism constructed from the words 'politician' and 'comedian') is using comedy as "a weapon to destabilise the established political order", thus endorsing the notion of a charismatic leader as central to a populist approach.

Drawing on Max Weber's notion of charismatic authority, Resnick (2014) highlights the role of a charismatic authority at the centre of many populist parties. She argues that a party that is dependent on the personalistic linkages its leaders have with its constituency is "virtually reduced to its leader's agenda rather than representative of a particular ideology or broader mandate" (Resnick, 2014:39). However, charismatic leadership is seen as less important to other definitions of modern-day populism. Not only is the term 'charismatic' a contested one, but many scholars consider it a facilitative feature of populist politics rather than a denotational one (Hawkins, 2010; Mudde, 2004), thus making this framework unworkable across a wide variety of studies.

3.2.3 The 'Policy' approach

Acemoglu *et al.* (2013) agree that populism necessitates a charismatic mode of linkage between voters and politicians, and that the populist version of democratic discourse relies on the 'struggle' between 'the pure people' and 'the corrupt elite', and on the supposed existence of a popular will. However, they insist that a populist party or government must also attempt "the implementation of policies receiving support from a significant faction of the population, but ultimately hurting the economic interests of this majority" (Acemoglu *et al*., 2013:772). Populism, by their definition, as in Dornbusch and Edwards (1991), thus has a specific economic intent *and* outcome. They argue that policies such as redistributive programmes and other ways of 'levelling the playing field' are harmful to the targeted rich elite, but not without also negatively affecting the poor majority (Acemoglu *et al*., 2013:802).

However, the above argument assumes a leftist orientation of all populist movements. Most scholars (Hawkins, 2010; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013) now agree that the wide variety of contemporary populist movements shows this assumption to be false. Economic policy is considered a contingent, but not a necessary factor in the classification of populist leaders and parties. This approach is further rendered less useful by the fact that populist parties sit on both the left and the right of the ideological spectrum, thus making policy identifiers too varied to be useful.

3.2.4 The 'Political Strategy' approach

Populism can also be seen as a political strategy. Weyland (1996; 2001) has repeatedly emphasised this perspective in the literature. Weyland (2001:14) states that it encompasses all political strategies "through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power

based on direct, unmediated, non-institutionalised support from large numbers of mostly unorganised followers". Others agree. Betz (2002:198) claims that "populism is primarily a political strategy, whose political rhetoric is the evocation of latent grievances and the appeal to emotions provoked by them, rather than an ideology".

Aslanidis (2016:96), however, argues that strategy is inherent in political activity, that each and every political action is in some way strategic, and that this definition therefore lacks conceptual refinement. By the 'Political Strategy' approach, populism becomes once again simply a type of demagoguery, a tendency by politicians to overpromise and tell voters what they want to hear. By defining it as such, political scientists risk ignoring the aspects that make the phenomenon so attractive not only to those who style themselves as populist leaders, but also to the many millions of voters who are touched by the populist discourse.

3.2.5 The 'Discourse' approach

Those scholars who argue for populism as a behaviour that fulfils a specific political function, either as a matter of conviction or strategically, consider 'discourse' to be the better conceptual classification. When considered as a type of discourse, populism can be simplified to an "anti-elite discourse in the name of the sovereign people" (Aslanidis, 2016:96). When measuring populism, analysing the discourse of political actors to see whether the 'noble people' are praised and the 'corrupt elites' condemned in the name of the *volonté générale* is used as a measure of populism. Ernesto Laclau is considered the father of this approach to studying populism, having first examined the discursive nature of populist phenomena in the seminal *Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory: Capitalism-Fascism-Populism* (Laclau, 1977) and elaborated in *On Populist Reason* (2005a) and 'Populism: What's in a Name?' (2005b). He insisted that "a movement is not populist because in its politics or ideology it presents actual *contents* identifiable as populistic, but because it shows a particular logic of *articulation* of those contents – whatever those contents are" (Laclau, 2005b:33 (emphasis added)). The way in which populist rhetoric is presented thus serves as the identifier, as opposed to the contents of the rhetoric itself. Laclau discarded nonessential dimensions which had been held forth in earlier literature and focused on the discursive construction of populist appeals (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, 2014), but was vague on the subject of how these might be identified.

Stavrakakis and Katsambekis (2014) agree with Laclau's discursive approach to the subject, but find his Marxist overtones outdated, while Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2013:7) dismiss

his theory as "extremely abstract". Aslanidis (2016:97) notes that Laclau explicitly defined populism as a graded concept, "but never provides concrete means of operationalising indicators to reveal variation in some detail".

However, one of his most important contributions to the literature is his identification of the subjectivities of 'the people' and of the opposing power bloc as 'empty signifiers'; symbolic vessels filled with particular content depending upon the political context within which the would-be populists finds themselves (Laclau, 2005a, 2005b). Neither 'the people' nor 'the corrupt elite' are fixed in their identities, a flexibility of content which explains the diversity of the varying phenomena collected under the umbrella of populism. However, this still allows scholars to identify populist parties by their modes of mobilisation, which would be characterised by an anti-elitist discourse that aims to rectify the exclusion of marginalised constituencies (Canovan, 1999; Resnick, 2014).

Aslanidis (2016:98) underscores the benefits of a formal approach to populism and argues that the structural elements of populism are therefore better conceptualised as a 'discursive frame' to provide a methodological framework for empirical research. Differences in perceived patterns among populist instances would then be explained by the "circumstantial content" of the constructed subjectivities of Laclau's 'people' and 'elites' (Aslanidis, 2016:101). In the context of the rapidly-changing field of African politics, this explanation would certainly provide scope for the wide range of liberation- and post-liberation populist movements, where the signifier of the 'corrupt elite' ranges from the descendants of European colonisers to formerly radical freedom-fighter now turned governing parties. This allows for the discourse approach to be used more widely in regions that have not been the focus of an analysis of populism through many of the abovementioned approaches. This study also focuses on the discourse approach in its theoretical framing and methodology due to its unique ability to highlight soft power through rhetoric and discourse. An analysis of discourse and its influence is, thus, an analysis of soft power.

When using the 'discourse' approach, then, populism emerges from a state of real or perceived crisis that is politicised by populist leaders, includes some distinction between the 'pure' and the 'impure' people, and is defined by its opposition to that which represents the 'establishment', because it is not the will of the people that it claims to represent in its entirety.

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As such, the 'discourse' approach will be used by this study to examine the effects of the above phenomenon in the African context.

3.3 On possible causes of populism

3.3.1 Populism and perceived crisis

Moffitt and Tormey (2014) state that the driving force of populism frequently comes from a perceived crisis, often related to economic hardships or social developments. When these events or circumstances are presented convincingly enough as 'crisis situations', the emergency narrative created helps to simplify the terms and terrain of political debate, which is reflected in the populist discourse. Similar to a state of emergency declared by an illegitimate government, a crisis state as depicted by populist parties allows for more urgent and inflammatory attacks on the 'other' group on the basis of its crisis-led demarcation, as an 'us or them' narrative is created. The *real or perceived* crisis as presented by the populist discourse, does not need any corroboration by official government or media coverage, and is presented as the fault of the perceived 'other' as according to the populists themselves.

Inglehart and Norris (2016) elaborate on the nature of the possible perceived crises. According to their research, European populist parties tend to enjoy support generated by two apparent 'crisis' situations: perceived cultural value change, and perceived economic decline in some populations.

Inglehart and Norris (2016) find that cultural values, in combination with several social and demographic factors, provide the most consistent explanation for support for European and North American populist parties, where appeals to traditional values challenge the values of liberal democracy. While the economic factors discussed below do not provide a dependable measure of probable populist support, those who previously formed a cultural majority in Western European and Northern American societies – especially older white men – and are now seeing their privilege and status eroded are most likely to support 'counter-revolutionary' populist parties against a wave of more progressive political norms (Inglehart and Norris, 2016:5), providing a compelling argument for the prominence of a cultural backlash as a cause for the current populist uprising in these states.

European populist rhetoric also tends to have xenophobic nationalist or nativist leanings. Inglehart and Norris (2016:8) state that populism in the developed nations of North America and Europe favours mono-culturalism over multiculturalism, national self-interest over

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international cooperation and aid, and closed borders over the free flow of people; Donald Trump's 'America First' policies provide an obvious example.

The other possible crisis is the profound changes affecting the workforce and economy in post-industrial societies. Some scholars (Hacker, 2006; Piketty, 2014) argue that the trend towards greater wealth inequality in the West has created a class of 'left-behinds' for whom rising economic insecurity and social deprivation has fuelled popular resentment of the political elite. This 'left-behind' population – low-wage unskilled workers, residents of public housing, and poorer white populations in inner-city areas that they must now share with a wave of immigrants – is suspected to be more susceptible to anti-establishment and xenophobic scare-mongering focused on "blam[ing] 'Them' for stripping prosperity, job opportunities, and public services from 'Us'" (Inglehart and Norris, 2016:2).

Interestingly, Kyle and Gultchin (2018:16) note that in both the above examples, populists often lay the blame both at the feet of the political class who allegedly failed to protect the people – the political elite – and of the threat itself – immigrants, monopoly capitalist owners, or globalising international companies. The mandate of the populist leader in crisis thus becomes twofold – to root out the current, uncaring and corrupt leaders, and to act against those who threaten 'the people'. A state of perceived crisis also gives the pretext for 'stronger' leadership, unconstrained by the limitations constructed by institutions meant to limit the power of 'illegitimate' leaders. Populists present themselves as the answer to the crisis they have defined, and argue that strong, unconstrained leadership is needed to eradicate the problem (Kyle and Gultchin, 2018:16-17).

However, Inglehart and Norris (2016:4) have found that while European populist parties do receive significantly more support from those who report being economically insecure, other measures do not consistently confirm the theory that this support is based on resentment of economic inequality, while, for example, much of president Donald Trump's support in the United States comes from the middle class. In the West, it seems, cultural backlash may play a far larger role in drumming up populist support than emerging economic insecurities do. However, Inglehart and Norris's (2016) research on perceived cultural exclusion as a cause of populist phenomena only applies to advanced capitalist economies and may not fully explain the same phenomenon in Africa, where the economic explanation may have greater relevance.

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3.3.2 Poor governance

Studies by, among others, Dalton (1996) and Klingemann (1999) show that citizens in established democracies are increasingly dissatisfied with the function and performance of their political system. However, only in unconsolidated democracies does this dissatisfaction necessarily lead to a decline in the legitimacy of democracy as a regime type. Because democratic norms and values have yet to become fully entrenched in many African states (as discussed further under 'Populism and African Democracies'), it is more likely that "a decline in the perceived performance of the incumbent government will erode support for democracy as a regime type over time" (De Jager and Steenekamp, 2018:2).

Citizens of countries that have more recently transitioned to democracy are not ignorant of the standards of governance expected in democratic regimes. Failure to live up to these expectations can generate dissatisfaction with the political system, not just the political actors, in the form of support for anti-system political forces. Meeting minimum standards of liberties and freedoms may qualify a new regime as a democracy but have only a limited impact on public perception "in the absence of more substantive, tangible improvements that provide citizens better protection and representation" (Jou, 2016:605-606).

Jou (2016:597) argues that "one way to measure political extremism is legislative representation of anti-system parties, since this poses a challenge to a key democratic institution". Both radical rightists and leftists share means of political engagement that exceed widely perceived bounds of democratic participation, a resentment of mainstream or establishment politicians and a penchant for authoritarian measures (Jou, 2016), all of which are associated with dissatisfaction with democratic principles and procedures.

Support for more radical positions, and thus, anti-system stances, increases when support for democracy decreases (O'Brien, 2015). Unconsolidated democracies that suffer from poor governance are vulnerable to political actors who are indifferent to the intrinsic values of liberal democracy (De Jager and Steenekamp, 2018). While the threat of anti-system politics is not non-existent in advanced democracies, it has much greater disruptive potential in societies that have not yet consolidated democracy as the only option for a regime. The anti-system and anti-elite performative functions of populist politics perfectly channel support for such non-democratic and antagonistic forms of governance in many African democracies. The negative effects on to democracy in a populist age will be discussed in a later section.

3.4 Populism in the African context

Populism as a concept is thus defined not by the differences of the phenomenon itself between regions, but by the contextual differences which causes it to manifest differently and to have different effects. Africa presents a unique context within which populism must be examined because of the predominance of personalistic leaders, the lack of ideological distinction underlying many political parties and their policy statements, and the particular focus on economic issues that permeates populist campaigns in Africa. As sub-Saharan Africa prepares to enter its fourth decade of democracy, the continent's urbanising demographic has become an increasingly important feature in electoral politics. A disproportionately large number of these newly urbanised citizens are poor, jobless and dissatisfied, which creates opportunities for politicians to capitalise on their discontent. As such, more populist politicians and political parties are again making their appearance all over the continent.

Resnick (2014) highlights the fact that research into the subject of populism in an African context is still growing, despite the importance of contextual information when analysing the chameleonic phenomenon that is contemporary populism, as argued by Laclau (2005a; 2005b), Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2013) and Taggart (2004). Contemporary research has expanded but is still focused on "mature capitalist economies and liberal democracies" in Western Europe and the Americas. Despite the growth of research into populism in Latin America (Hadiz and Chryssogelos, 2017:399), Africa is still underrepresented in studies that focus on the regional context of populism, although there is growing body of research into populism as a modern African phenomenon (Kimenyi, 2006; Vincent, 2011; Hess and Aidoo, 2014; Resnick, 2014; Mbete, 2015; De Jager and Steenekamp, 2018; Melber, 2018) to which this study aims to contribute. The dominant approach of studying populism as an ideology has allowed little scope for a study of it in Africa, where populist parties often differ immensely in terms of rhetoric, but little in policy, from their incumbent opposition. Instead, populism in Africa has been approached as a mutation of older challenges to liberal democracies (Hadiz and Chryssogelos, 2017) such as the European far right (Minkenberg, 2000).

Where research has focused specifically on the African continent, analysts have long come to divergent conclusions on populism in Africa. In earlier literature grounded in modernisation theory, populism in developing countries and especially in Africa was often treated as "an anomaly caused by a less than complete process of economic and cultural modernisation" (Hadiz and Chryssogelos, 2017). More recently, some scholars have argued that it does not

necessarily constitute a threat to democracy and could even serve as a corrective to democratic systems where politicians are increasingly removed from their constituents (Taggart and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2016:346).

Many contemporary scholars acknowledge that populism is present wherever there is an emergence of new kinds of social marginalisation – whether economic, cultural or otherwise (Hadiz and Chryssogelos, 2017:400). However, Hadiz and Chryssogelos (2017:401) argue that the current understanding of populism in much of the literature as an ideological and partisan phenomenon designed for competitive party democracies is an immensely Eurocentric one. To construct an African approach to understanding populism, it is important to understand regional contexts. In Africa's fast-moving political context, European-based theoretical frameworks might be less relevant.

As established above, local context provides the basis upon which populist discourse is built. In Africa, rapid urbanisation and informalisation has a strong influence on economic and political context, and this in turn provides a base for populist politicians. For the first time in Africa's history, urbanites are becoming the majority (Kessides, 2006), but this happens in a context of limited economic growth and employment opportunities (Bryceson, 2006). Ultimately, this leads to the increasing urbanisation not only of Africa's people, but also of its poverty (Haddad *et al.*, 1999; Mitlin, 2004; Satterthwaite, 2003). At the same time, staggering levels of inequality continue to rise all over the continent (Milanovic, 2003).

As urban populations grow, Africa's labour force has become increasingly informalized as a result of the lack of conventional job opportunities in big cities. A report by the World Resources Institute (WRI) (2018:12) states that the informal sector now constitutes up to 76% of urban employment in Africa. As the trend towards urbanisation is far from over, the informal sector is expected to grow. One consequence of the growth of the informal sector is an erosion of traditionally strong unions, formerly seen as the most active representatives of the poor and working classes in Africa (Resnick, 2014:5), and a resultant dearth of organisations that can legitimately represent the urban poor and working class.

This situation is not only conducive to supporting populist strategies; it also creates the context for a uniquely African take on populists and populism. A real basis for grievances, augmented by the increased visibility of issues and alternatives to traditional politics in many African cities, and the lack of organisations representing the poor in those cities, creates a window for

politicians to forge ties with the urban poor (Resnick, 2014:5). These groups tend to develop a growing distrust of the formal institutions that organise economic, social and political power, as well as of other systems that appear to preserve prevailing class structures. Hadiz and Chryssogelos (2017:401) state that this is especially frustrating to those who 'bought into' modernisation and progress, and "developed self-identities tied closely to upward social mobility and material advancement", a narrative of social progress emphasised by many post-colonial governments.

3.4.1 Populism and ideology in Africa

The ideational approach to populism, as mentioned in section 3.2.1 above, focuses on the ideological and rhetorical content of populist politics in Africa. However, Resnick (2014:2-4) argues that here the literature again encounters the problem of a lack of ideological consistency, also pointed out by Hadiz and Chryssogelos (2017). In fact, she contends that the current political and socio-economic conditions in many African states are conducive to populist strategies partly *because* of the lack of clear ideological frameworks of many of its parties and much of its politics. She argues that, because democratic transition in Africa occurred before industrial transformation could create the mass economic cleavages of the kind found in African countries today, no tradition of ideological differences was entrenched in the political systems of the newly democratised states of sub-Saharan Africa.

However, Thomson (2016) disagrees, stating instead that differentiations on the theme of African nationalism and African socialism have been the dominant ideological frameworks of post-colonial African states. As a reaction to colonialism, African nationalism advocated for unity within African states. As their borders had been artificially imposed, post-colonial states relied on an ideology of national unity as opposed to earlier tribal or ethnic groupings. The death of the tribe was necessary so that the new nation could live (Mangcu, 2012; Thomson, 2016). Thomson (2016) argues that the widespread existence of one-party states on the African continent developed out of this framework, as the democratic ideal of pluralism was sacrificed to the higher goal of nation-building. Resnick's (2014:3) 'lack of clear ideology' might thus be better understood as a lack of ideological differentiation within party systems. She states that populist politics in Africa has a policy component "which is not programmatic in the traditional sense of alignment along a left-right ideological spectrum" but instead focuses on outcome variables such as housing and unemployment, making rhetoric, not ideology, the main

identifier of populist politics in a political system where a combination of African nationalism and African socialism forms the basis of most parties' positions.

A more thorough analysis of the ideological roots of the continent's nations would have acknowledge that the context of 20th-century politics left Africa particularly vulnerable to left-wing populism. The proxy battles of the Cold War which took place on the continent led to the influx of Soviet- and communist Chinese ideology alongside the weapons and training which the two superpowers supplied to liberation movements across the continent. Africa was steeped in Marxist-Leninist ideology before it even gained the independence it needed to implement democratic governance or any variations of it. Leftist orientations were made even more appealing as inequality continued to grow after independence in many states. Africans originally enamoured by the idea of self-determination were disappointed again and again by governments that failed to produce tangible benefits while politicians became ever more affluent. In the new context of ailing states or disappointing democratic progress and widespread poverty and unemployment, Marxist-Leninism became even more enticing.

Resnick (2014:4) also argues that such a situation leads to political parties centred on a specific leader and his or her values, rather than a specific variation of the aforementioned ideological framework. Voters with lower levels of education might thus resort to a personalistic 'information shortcut' when deciding for which party to vote, without being informed about ideological or policy considerations. Widespread poverty and government corruption contribute in yet another way towards making populist leaders more effective in Africa. The funding structures and the centralised systems of many new governments encouraged personalistic parties by making little money available to opposition parties, who had even less chance of raising enough for an effective campaign from their impoverished supporters. Populist parties in Africa, then, have a need for left-leaning, charismatic leadership that may not be as prominent for populist parties in other areas of the world, as charismatic leaders with their incendiary rhetoric guarantee media coverage at no cost to the party itself.

Resnick (2014:11) further argues that it is precisely because of the lack of funds for opposition parties that those opposition leaders who are successful are often funded privately. As such, those with access to political leadership positions are often not struggling economically like the 'oppressed' themselves, and thus use language and symbols that bring them closer to 'the people' by way of slogans aimed at addressing their grievances. She notes Michael Sata's

"Lower taxes, more jobs, more money in your pocket" as an example of one such slogan (2014:10), as well as Raila Odinga's "People's President" (2014:17). For opposition parties in particular, the "fusion of charismatic leadership with a message of social inclusion is especially useful for gaining a broader appeal", while more abstract policy considerations are harder to market in these contexts (Resnick, 2014:3).

3.4.2 African populism and ethnicity

While race and racial minorities dominate populist discourse in Europe and the Americas, in Africa populist discourse almost always (South Africa being the exception) disregards the subject of race. Instead, it is replaced with the equally inflammatory and controversial topic of ethnicity. The most successful populist leaders in sub-Saharan Africa have been those who have managed to mobilise ethno-linguistic support in the regions where their own ethnic group is dominant.

These 'peripheral' rural coalitions are achieved with appeals to identity cleavages. Ethno-linguistic groups in Africa are often geographically concentrated, making it both time- and cost-effective to address their specific concerns and to campaign in these areas (Kimenyi, 2006). A party leader who is a "co-ethnic" also has greater credibility in delivering his promises. In countries that are suffering the effects of economic slowdown and ethnic conflict, politicians can inspire immense loyalty when appeals are centred on a shared identity (Resnick, 2014:10-12). Zambia's Michael Sata, for instance, made such an appeal to his Bemba co-ethnics in outlying parts of the country, leading to great success in regional elections. It is, however, important to keep in mind that the rhetoric used was not an exclusive one of 'us and no one else', but rather a claim that their ethnic grouping had historically been excluded from positions of political and economic power. This differentiates African populism from similar appeals in Europe and the USA, where an exclusionist rhetoric is intensively employed in order to capitalise on feelings of cultural alienation within the nation-state. Put simply, one might state that populism in the West is a politics of xenophobic or cultural *exclusion*, while in Africa it advocates for radical economic *inclusion*.

Ethno-linguistic appeals are also simply better value for money in Africa. In a region where economic scarcity is at the heart of many contemporary issues, many opposition campaigns do not have access to any state or party resources for campaigning. What funds there are must be applied in the most effective way possible in order to stretch them, and Resnick (2014:6) argues

that ethnically focused campaigns thus have another benefit: small, geographically concentrated ethno-linguistic rural coalitions provide the greatest possible impact – while conserving campaign funds.

3.4.3 The economic have-nots

De la Torre (2014) notes that African populists employ conceptions of 'the people' that aim to empower excluded segments of the population. Western populists, he argues, use conceptions that exclude those considered to have alien cultural values, but populism in Africa is clearly linked more closely to economic debates than it is in the developed world.

Rapid urbanisation in African states has also led to increasingly ethnically diverse urban environments. Traditional cultural markers of ethnicity tend to fade in more cosmopolitan cities. Combined with a demographic bulge of young people born outside the traditions of their ethnicity, ethno-linguistic appeals become almost inconsequential when it comes to mobilising the urban poor (Resnick, 2014:21). These groups are united in their economic struggles, not along tribal lines.

Hess and Aidoo (2014) argue that the modern populist rhetoric in Africa has its roots in "resistance to…neoliberal orthodoxy", even as it assumes different forms in different states and regions. For many Africans, the influence of neoliberal economic convention, and globalisation in general, is associated with impoverishment, powerlessness, and a loss of African countries' agency over their own affairs (Negi, 2008:48). Leaders in many African countries have been forced to work closely with international partners to implement sweeping economic reforms in order to attract the foreign investment that neoliberal economic policies convince them they sorely needed. As a result of World Bank terms and conditions and at the insistence of other international financial institutions and Western partners, many African countries were forced to open their economies to international trade towards the end of the 1990s. This resulted in the privatisation of previously state-owned mining assets, sold off to international investors at "bargain prices" (Hess and Aidoo, 2014:135; Negi, 2008). Hess and Aidoo (2014) argue that the international community has received as much criticism for problems associated with neoliberal reforms as the governments that allowed these policies. In many states, the incumbent government is cast as a 'corrupt elitist' formation precisely because of its attempts to improve the economy through Western partnership and reforms.

Taylor (2007) and Hess and Aidoo (2014) further add that China took on the role of international benefactor when Western partners withdrew in the early 20th century, becoming a critical partner in Africa's economic development – but also, in some areas, as much a scapegoat as the West had been before them because of their increasing control of local economies. Elites are seen to be working together with Chinese companies in the neo-colonialization of African countries, and this contributes to angry anti-globalisation resistance that is easily exploited by populist leaders (Hess and Aidoo, 2014).

As elsewhere in the world, globalisation has been accompanied by the emergence of new kinds of social and economic marginalisation, but in Africa this is accompanied by disenchantment at the broken promises of liberal modernity and its proponents in the form of Western fiscal authorities and aid suppliers (Hadiz and Chryssogelos, 2017:400). These broken promises include stalled social mobility and deteriorating material circumstances, which attracts many Africans towards the seemingly utopian promises of populist opposition parties.

The international circumstance within which an oppositional populist operates can thus provide a source of rhetoric but will also influence the shape that different populist politics will take (Hadiz and Chryssogelos, 2017:405). However, Resnick (2014:3) argues that the pressure from international donors to commit to certain policy decisions also contributes to populist leanings within the incumbent party. When ideological choices are prevented by donor prescriptions, personalistic, populist discourse can present a way of maintaining support for the ruling party.

It is important to note Resnick's (2014:9) argument that general economic growth, such as under Zambia's Rupiah Banda or Kenya's Mwai Kibaki, has no influence here; what the urban poor 'feel' and see in the overcrowded city environment and in the ubiquitous urban slums has a much more intrinsic role in advancing disillusionment and thus support for populist politicians. Actions by the government to improve infrastructure also often go unnoticed by this demographic because of their precarious existence in overcrowded informal settlements on city borders. When Banda's government razed street vendor stalls in Lusaka's streets to alleviate traffic congestion, his populist opponent Michael Sata tapped into the street vendors' resentment, and so became even more admired among Zambia's urban poor and informal workers.

Contemporary African populism, then, is in large part a reaction to the social dislocations brought about by globalisation. Hadiz and Chryssogelos (2017) state that a shifting

international structural context conditions the shape and content of African populist rhetoric. However, they also argue that, while global constellations change, "the legacies of older populist phenomena can serve as reservoirs of inspiration for new images of 'the people'" (Hadiz and Chryssogelos, 2017:406). In a post-socialist Africa, populist responses to increased economic insecurity have only to look back a couple of decades for inspiration. Modern charismatic populist leaders can easily draw from the styles of presentation and rhetoric as well as the modes of mobilisation of long-ruling liberation leaders (Hadiz and Chryssogelos, 2017; Resnick, 2014). A history of 'big man' politics in Southern Africa in particular is inextricably linked with anti-colonial resistance (Melber, 2018:681) and has created prominent examples of charismatic leadership for new populist leaders.

Cheeseman and Larmer (2015) argue that variation in "the reach of the urban political economy and the extent to which ethnic identities have historically been politicized" shape the potential for populism and populist mobilization to overcome traditional ethnic divisions – and hence challenge prevailing patterns of "ethnic politics" – in African states. There is potential to build cross-ethnic movements based on a common sense of "solidarity and economic marginalisation" across the continent. Significantly, such potential is generally highest in the more urbanised states of Southern Africa, where the presence of trade unions and a history of radical urban politics make it easier to build a sense of solidarity among voters (Oxford Analytica, 2017:1).

3.4.4 The case for a new African populism

Resnick (2014:1) thus draws on earlier definitions of populism in general to define it as an African phenomenon, in particular as a "mode of mobilisation characterised by an anti-elitist policy discourse that aims to rectify the exclusion of economically marginalised constituents". She notes the importance, but not necessity, of a charismatic leader with an affinity with the 'under-class', especially as portrayed by his (usually) or her own rhetoric. In other words, a populist leader's self-portrayal as an outsider to the political establishment that they are protesting against must be believed by their constituency. As such, populist parties in Africa are even more plebiscitarian than those in more developed liberal democracies with more established traditions of individual freedoms.

Oxford Analytica (2017:1) notes that what distinguishes the new populist wave in Africa from previous iterations is that it seeks to overthrow existing inequalities, consciously targeting

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established 'nationalist' or 'liberation' forces that are seen to have grown complacent and corrupt in their new positions as the ruling elite. As such, the previous 'anti-elites' have become the corrupt 'other' in contemporary African populist discourse (Mbete, 2015). Unlike in other areas of the world, populist leaders in Africa are often insiders of the political party system that dons the mantle of a radical outsider (Resnick, 2014:24), claiming to be disgusted by the degradation of once-nationalistic governments. Zambia's Michael Sata and South Africa's Julius Malema are prominent examples.

In an analysis of African populist rhetoric, exclusion from the structures of power in politics and economics, real or imagined, provides the crisis situation that 'necessitates' a strong populist approach (Moffitt and Tormey, 2014; Resnick, 2014). The 'other' is then easily defined as the current political elite who seem to be reaping excessive benefits from the new political structure; the 'pure people' are those that are being excluded.

Another important factor in the identification of African populism is the chameleonic nature not only of populism itself, but of the parties that choose to adopt its discourse. Definitions of populism as an ideology prove to be weak when one considers that a majority of African political parties have altered their mode of mobilisation and the programmatic content of their policies depending on the time, context or constituency with which they are dealing (Resnick, 2014:1). However, the prominence of leftist or Marxist interpretations of African socialism cannot be ignored.

The segmentation of approaches between urban and rural canvassing was first illustrated in Mexico and Latin America (Gibson, 1997), but is clearly a characteristic of African populism as well. Dual peripheral and metropolitan coalitions enable African party leaders to employ populism "aimed at the policy priorities of the urban poor without losing rural voters" (Resnick, 2014:7). Interestingly, Madrid (2008) shows that, traditionally, the literature claims that populist appeals are made to 'undifferentiated masses', while ethnocentric political styles are typically more exclusive in nature. The double mode of mobilisation used by African populist leaders is thus unique to the global South.

De la Torre (2014) is correct in stating that populist rhetoric assembles all social, economic, cultural and ethnic differentiations and oppressions into two irreconcilable poles: the people and the elite. However, an in-depth look at African approaches to populism shows that membership of these groups is dependent on regional context: being a rich Bemba man in a

Bemba-dominated rural area would make you a part of Raila Odinga's 'people'; but so would being a poor non-Bemba in the city of Nairobi. The colonialist-imposed artificial borders of most African states combine and divide ethnic groupings almost at random, creating a brand of populism that differs substantially from the phenomenon in the West in its use and misuse of ethnic groupings.

Most importantly, while populism in other regions is often defined by its plebiscitarian relationships between leaders and followers, African populism "cannot be divorced from programmatic content" defined by the goal of social inclusion of especially economically marginalised groups (Resnick, 2014:25). African populists make economic outcome variables the centre of their campaigns, rather than specific ideological determinants. However, this comes at the expense of the pluralist values necessary for a consolidated democracy, as examined in the next section.

3.5 Populism and the consequences for democracy in Africa

3.5.1 Defining democracy and democratic consolidation in Africa

De Jager (2015:204) states that one of the most broadly accepted definitions of democracy, that by Joseph Schumpeter, is also one of the more minimal interpretations of the concept, with a focus on the existence of universal suffrage and the existence of political uncertainty as a consequence of multiple political parties and competitive elections. However, De Jager (2015:204) further notes that more broad definitions of the concept demand more in the way of certain democratic institutions, the existence of certain human rights, the separation of powers, a political culture which is in itself democratic and, crucially, often includes the existence of socio-economic equality as well as political equality. Intrinsic support for democracy thus "reflects a commitment to democracy (and therefore to its core principles) regardless of the economic problems or social upheaval that may occur", while instrumental support, by contrast, is conditional to these factors and may be withdrawn "if the government is seen as not delivering on socio-economic goods or rectifying material inequalities" (De Jager, 2015:205). This broader understanding and expectation of democracy makes it vulnerable to poor governance, threatening its stability and hampering prospects for consolidation.

Phillips *et al*. (2019) note that in South Africa, for instance, "failures to deliver basic services to tens of millions are also seen as a consequence of official corruption", thus confirming the

idea that those at the top are using the democratic system to keep those who are considered the economic underdogs in that position. This can lead to a lack of participation, but as previously noted, it may also drive disgruntled voters into the arms of those who make grand promises to end this sorry state of affairs – populist leaders.

Phillippe Schmitter (1994) states that 'unconsolidated' democracies are regimes that have at least some plausible claim to being relatively democratic. However, democracy is not embedded in these regimes as it is in consolidated democracies. According to Schmitter (1994:58), this is chiefly because there is no consensus among groups of political actors that democracy is "the only game in town". A democratic political culture cannot be said to exist where democracy is not seen as the only option for a healthy society. Jou (2016) argues that a democratic political culture is a key condition for democratic consolidation; nevertheless, in many new democracies democratic norms and values have yet to become fully entrenched.

Hagopian (1993:468) agrees that many states in the developing world have "barely managed to limp along in an unconsolidated state" after the institution of democratically elected governments. Haynes (2003) similarly argues that the formal procedures of democracy do not define democratic consolidation if a state is deficient in respect of societal freedoms – for example, poor civil liberty regimes, limited societal toleration, and little citizen participation in politics. An unconsolidated democracy, then, is one where the basic demand of an officially democratic system of governance has been met, in that regular and relatively fair elections are held and transfers of power take place, but which lacks the 'soft' aspects of generally accepted democratic regimes – for instance, an entrenched democratic political culture and high rates of citizen participation in politics. Respect for the electoral laws of liberal democratic politics by the stakeholders of the election is also lacking in many African democracies. Adar *et al.* (2008) warn that in many of these countries, the ruling as well as the opposition parties fail to evince respect for electoral laws and procedures.

In Jan-Werner Müller's (2017) seminal text on the definitions and dangers of populism, titled *What is Populism?*, he argues that the most minimal definition of democracy is "a mechanism to ensure peaceful turnovers in power after a process of political will-formation" (2017:55). He states that it is no coincidence that newly democratised African states established constitutional courts to protect the basic political rights of their citizens, as the ultimate goal was to preserve pluralism "in politics and in society" (Müller, 2017:55). However, Müller (2017:58) also warns

against the dangers of an overly inclusive notion of democracy. He worries that such a concept would allow illiberal or even authoritarian leaders to claim that their policies still fell within the broad boundaries of 'democracy' and thus could not be criticised. Even more importantly, anyone who did criticise them could be labelled an enemy of the people *and* of democracy.

Some scholars argue that Africa also has some regionally specific legacies that contribute towards maintaining a more tenuous grip on liberal democracy. Adar *et al*. (2008:139) contend that decades of one-party rule has left many African countries with a set of deeply entrenched constraints on the workings of their democratic processes. In the 2004 elections in Algeria, Ghana, Cameroon, Malawi and Mozambique, independent observers found that there were "consistent, deeply entrenched, and institutionalised webs of constraints, which threatened the legitimacy and institutional potency of liberal multiparty democratic electoral processes found in the countries" (Adar *et al*., 2008:139).

As discussed above, poor governance in many African states also poses a threat to democratic consolidation. In democracies where democratic norms and values are not yet entrenched, it is more likely that a decline in the perceived performance of the incumbent government or political party will erode support for democracy itself as a regime over time (De Jager and Steenekamp, 2018). States with an ineffective government are also unlikely to have elites that contribute to building democracy by way of inculcating respect for democratic values (Vincent, 2011:1).

In short, African democracies are in a more fragile position than democracies in other regions of the world, and many scholars thus believe that the anti-pluralist nature of populism distorts the democratic process and holds the potential for causing more permanent harm. Tampering with the institutional machinery of democracy in the name of a supposedly homogenous 'real people' is thus a real danger to the establishment of consolidating democracies in Africa (Müller, 2017:57).

3.5.2 Populist dangers to democracy

To return to Mudde's *volonté générale*: populists claims to represent the general will of the people against the 'corrupt elite', but in their exclusion of anyone whom they do not regard as 'the people', their opposition to the elite also becomes an opposition to pluralism (Wodak, 2015:8). Populism can thus expand opportunities for democratic participation through its inclusionary dynamic at the same time as it restricts institutional spaces for effective

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democratic contestation through its majoritarian logic (Roberts, 2012:138). Populists value the direct expression of the popular wisdom of the 'people' – through referenda, opinion polls, plebiscites and other methods – over a process of representative democracy with built-in systems of checks and balances and the protection of minority rights (Inglehart and Norris, 2016:7). In the words of Carlos de la Torre (2014:1), "populism simultaneously attempts to fulfil democratic promises while working against the pluralisms and freedoms that make a democracy possible".

Mouzelis (1985:342) believes that an obvious danger of populist politics becomes clear when an organisational or institutional approach is taken, as this allows populism to be defined as an attempt to bypass the formal political institutions which the populist claims to have become distant from the concerns of ordinary people. Hadiz and Chryssogelos (2017) argue that this means that populist mobilisation always aims to permanently alter the political institutions of the state, which holds an obvious danger for liberal democracies in Africa. Acemoglu *et al.* (2013:802) further state that the weakness of democratic institutions has a direct correlation to populist strategies, as weak institutions allow the economic elite to have a disproportionate influence on politics, thereby showing that politicians can be corrupted. They thus believe that an 'honest' politician may adopt populist tactics to demonstrate to their constituents their independence from big business.

In other world regions, populism is often described by scholars such as Roberts (2007:4) as a symptom of a breakdown of a long-established party system. However, most African states, as shown in the previous section, are still in a period of nascent democratisation. As such, electoral volatility is high (Bogaards, 2000; Mozaffar and Scarritt, 2005), and populist leaders develop not as an alternative to normal political parties, but as a substitute for the lack of them (Resnick, 2014:24).

Adar *et al*. (2008) believe that the democratisation of political parties in Africa is a necessary precondition for democratic consolidation in Africa. In their opinion, "[it] is unrealistic to assume that democracy can take root in a country governed by undemocratic political parties" (Adar *et al*., 2008:142). They further state that political openness and democratic culture have to originate within both the ruling and opposition parties. When either party is preoccupied with a narrative of political exclusion, this cannot happen.

The ethno-linguistic appeals of African populist leaders may also present a challenge to African democracy in the future. An unanticipated consequence of campaigning on ethnic lines, even if it only makes up the peripheral part of a segmented campaign, may cause further ethnic conflict in a region that has already suffered far too much of it. Resnick (2014:17) argues that Odinga's strategy of playing on Kenya's history of tribal exclusion in order to attract more votes and his anti-Kikuyu rhetoric caused flare-ups of tribally motivated conflict in the country. In a similar fashion, Jacob Zuma's emphasis on his Zulu identity definitely won the incumbent ANC some votes from his co-ethnics, but also informed the underlying ethnic tension within the party after his election (Adar *et al.*, 2008; Resnick, 2014:22). Ethno-linguistic mobilisation thus poses a direct threat to democratic consolidation in multi-ethnic African states.

However, one must also keep in mind that it is common practice for incumbent parties in Africa to use state resources during their campaign in order to cement their position over their opposition (Adar *et al*., 2008:139). In this case a populist strategy and discourse may present a low-cost option for the opposition, as already mentioned in the discussion of ethnically focused tactics. Adar *et al*. (2008) argue that this means that populism may help diversify the political landscape of many one-party states in Africa, thereby contributing to a more pluralistic democratic practice. While this argument is contested (see Müller, 2017), it highlights the need for more scholarship focused on the African iteration of populist politics and the re-examination of the Eurocentric theories currently being used to study African populist phenomena. Populists in Europe, the USA and Australia tend to be more exclusionary in their understanding of 'the people', including only those who subscribe to more traditional and xenophobic values. However, these regions also have stronger, more consolidated institutions of governance that tend to prevent populists from coming into power (Rhoden, 2015; De la Torre, 2014). African states, on the other hand, do not have such safeguards.

Many populist leaders have yet to win power, but Oxford Analytica (2017:4) believes that they still have the capacity to influence government policies by building public support for economic programmes that would not be 'conventionally' acceptable. They may also weaken more conventional ruling parties by highlighting the government's failures. Some scholars predict that populist opposition parties, especially ones that are successful at amassing popular support, may encourage incumbent parties to adopt the same discourse (Oxford Analytica, 2017; Resnick, 2014). These leaders will be encouraged to become more vocal critics of the West's privileged role in the global political economy and hence of global inequality (Oxford

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Analytica, 2017:1). If African states become more populist, they will probably become more economically left-wing, as discussed above, and display a greater willingness to ignore the textbook advice of international financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, possibly undermining any success derived from previous economic reforms (Oxford Analytica, 2017:2).

3.5.3 Illiberal tendencies in populism

Wirth *et al*. (2016:15) note that "populists are anti-establishment, but they are not anti-system…[t]hey stand by the democratic system and in fact often present themselves as the 'true democrats' as they fight for democratic rights and sovereignty of 'the people'." However, populists pose a danger to democratising states because they reject three of the basic principles of liberal democracy, as pointed out succinctly by both Kriesi (2014) and Pappas (2014) and discussed below.

Firstly, populists strive for a version of democracy which conforms to the most basic tenets of that form of governance: for and by the people. However, populists regard this principle as absolute, and reject all checks and balances on the popular will. Key features of liberal democracies the world over, such as constitutional guarantees for minority rights and power-sharing safeguards, are lambasted as protective of the 'other', while the populist accepts no restrictions on the supremacy of the people. (Mény and Surel, 2002; Abts and Rummens, 2007, cited in Wirth *et al*., 2016:16). In Africa, these checks are often not as culturally entrenched, and democratic institutions are frequently undermined and underfunded by states intent on rent-seeking without consequences (Keefer and Knack, 2007:567). Furthermore, in ethnically diverse states that were previously ruled from afar by colonial powers, the constitutions set up after independence were meant to create not simply democratic but also deliberative government (Zakaria, 1997:41). Populist rule aims to put an end to any deliberation, as there is only one true 'voice of the people'.

Second, populist democracy is illiberal because of its disdain for representative democracy and the necessary creation of career politicians. Pappas (2014) notes that representatives can only be tolerated as long as they are seen to be serving 'the people', whereas active politicians who cannot be directly controlled by voters except during elections, cannot be trusted to act in the people's best interests. The mainstream media and other intermediaries who are not directly controlled by 'the people', and who may impede the unhindered and unfiltered propagation of

the will of the people, are similarly untrustworthy (Wirth *et al*., 2016). Media sources which are politically friendly, however, serve as welcome allies to populists the world over. Populists create doubt in the functioning of the democratic system, thereby slowing down or even reversing the process of democratic consolidation still underway in many African states where democracy has not yet become "the only game in town" (Schmitter, 1994:58).

Lastly, populist versions of democracy are illiberal because they oppose a pluralistic interpretation of 'the people'. In fact, 'the people' becomes an ever more regulated and exclusionary grouping as is politically expedient to a leader drawing on former feelings of exclusion. As such, the notion of 'the people' is of a mythical homogenous, unified actor – leaving no room for minorities (Wirth *et al*., 2016:16). Populists assume, and enforce, the existence of a single cleavage in society, namely that between 'the people' and those who represent the established interests (Mudde, 2007; Pappas, 2014). Wirth *et al.* (2016:16) note that, according to populists, "[t]he people speak with one voice and have one common will, and this common will also defines their identity". Africa is littered with examples of the democratic decline that ensues when some people are labelled 'the only people' and minorities are deemed lesser people through their construction as the 'corrupt elite', but Rwanda in the late 1980's and early 1990's is the most prominent (Newbury, 1995).

Liberal democracy implies both the existence of a diverse political community and the political equality of those within that community, and the refusal to accept this fact, or the blatant rejection of it, by populist leaders exposes their lack of commitment to democratic ideals. Zakaria (1997:35) notes that in Africa, elections have long since ceased to signal liberal constitutional values in a state: "Opposition movements, armed rebellions, and coups in Africa have often been directed against ethnically based regimes, many of which came to power through elections".

To counter ethnic tensions, new leaders may argue that they need more authority to "bring order to chaotic societies", break down feudalism and overturn vested interests; in other words, that liberal values would follow bread-and-butter issues on the agenda (Zakaria, 1997:32). Populist rhetoric strengthens this argument, using the three tactics outlined above to advocate for more power for populist leaders and a more centralised state, all in the name of 'the people' whom they claim to represent. These states, with their democratic sheen but lack of liberal pluralism, "become predatory, maintaining some order but also arresting opponents, muzzling

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dissent, nationalizing industries, and confiscating property" (Zakaria, 1997:32). Zakaria (1997:42-43) further argues that "[d]emocracy without constitutional liberalism is not simply inadequate, but dangerous, bringing with it the erosion of liberty, the abuse of power, ethnic divisions, and even war." It is clear that Africa can ill afford the rise of illiberal democratic states.

3.6 Concluding remarks

Clearly, all is not well for democracy. Some scholars would suggest that the danger to democracy comes from within the democratic world. For them, populism presents the ultimate danger to liberal democracy today, a "degraded form of democracy" (Müller, 2017:6) that promises to make good on the highest ideal of democracy – "power to the people" – while encouraging a rhetoric that is blatantly anti-pluralist and illiberal (Plattner, 2010).

However, excluding populists from political participation altogether in an effort to buttress democracy has the obvious effect of reinforcing the populist's message that they and their 'people' are being excluded. More importantly, it is not liberal, and it is certainly not democratic.

The third research objective is thus accomplished in this chapter: The literature shows that populist politics has the potential to be especially damaging in African countries where democratic norms have yet to become entrenched. It also highlights regional differences when examining populism in the African context, where scholars argue economic concerns, the history of leftist ideologies and a resulting dependence on the state, poor governance and the impact of globalisation play a far greater role in the global South than the cultural backlash fuelling populist rhetoric in the global North. In Africa, ethno-linguistic coalition-building and charismatic leadership serve as substitutes for a more developed and informed political system, and adds a layer of complexity to a phenomenon that some scholars believe may pose a danger to fledgling democratic systems.

On the other hand, populism may be the only recourse for politicians who do not have access to state power and resources in many new democracies, and may contribute to a new wave of democratisation in some African states that have been under the thumb of one-party rulers or quasi-dictatorships for decades by putting power back into the hands of the continent's people.

Scholars of African politics have come to accept that Eurocentric conceptualisations may not always apply on the continent, and that a special focus is needed on the local effects of global

trends. What is certain is that populism deserves study in Africa that acknowledges the challenges and contexts of the region, and that its effect on African democracies must be examined. Fuchs and Klingemann (2019:3) ask "Is democracy under threat?", adding that "In the past several years, this question has caused an intense and controversial debate." This study hopes to contribute to this debate by examining one small section of the populist wave crashing down on the continent: that of the EFF and its main political rivals, the DA and the ANC, in South Africa.

Chapter IV – Our beloved populists: The South African context

"Whatever one's views of the EFF and its leaders, they are remaking South Africa's politics" (Gumede, 2019).

4.1 Introduction

A study of the literature illustrates that while populism as a concept can be identified across the world, it is the local context that influences how it manifests in any given state. As such, populism in a South African context is reliant both on the wider realities of the phenomenon on the continent and the one-of-a-kind local contexts of South Africa. While populism demonstrates a unique challenge to democracies in the African context, South Africa presents its own unique political and social context within which the phenomenon again becomes more specified and specific. With the theoretical groundwork laid for a deeper analysis of populist politics on the African continent in the previous chapter, this chapter will examine the current South African socio-political landscape. It is intended to contextualise the current discourse used by the country's main political parties over the previous two election cycles. This section will also discuss the creation and function of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) in South Africa, and will examine its methodology and discourse to determine whether it can be considered a populist party, and is therefore suited to the study, thus accomplishing the first research objective.

This study focuses specifically on the period from the 2013 creation of the EFF until the 2019 election. As this period encompasses two election cycles, it is possible to chart the possible shifts in political rhetoric of the Democratic Alliance (DA), the official opposition party, and the African National Congress (ANC), the incumbent party. As such, it is useful to understand the socio-economic and political contexts within which these parties operate, their historical origins and their ideological leanings. Following on from Chapter III, this chapter will be organised similarly when analysing the ways in which the EFF conform to the findings on African politics. The possible sources of populist support in the country will first be assessed, after which the context of populism in South Africa will be examined. The formation, core values of and shifts within the three main political parties in the country will then be discussed. This examination also allows for the identification of the EFF as a truly populist party in the African context in general and the South African context in particular. Finally, this chapter will examine the dangers that a rise in populist rhetoric holds for the still-consolidating South

African democracy, indicating the need for research which tracks the populist fervour of each of the three biggest parties in South Africa.

4.2 On possible causes of populism in South Africa

4.2.1 Marikana, Nkandla and State Capture: Populism and perceived crisis

The importance of a crisis narrative in the motivation for populist rhetoric was explored in section 3.3.1 of the previous chapter. The South African context supplies plenty of crisis material as ammunition for a reactionary political movement, but the so-called 'State Capture' debacle that has dominated parliamentary discussion and the news media during the latter half of the Zuma presidency and beyond provides the most obvious example. Two of the most inflammatory words in South African political coverage in the third decade of democratic rule are thus points on a map: Nkandla, the name of former President Jacob Zuma's private home in the province of Kwa-Zulu Natal, and Marikana, a mining town in North West province now infamous for the protests that took place there and their fatal consequences. The third inflammatory term is 'State Capture', a type of systemic corruption in which private interests improperly influenced Jacob Zuma's government (Shai, 2017), perhaps the most serious political challenge to the ANC since the recall of former President Thabo Mbeki in September 2008 (Chikane, 2012).

In 2014 the Public Protector found that Zuma had to repay the state for some, though not all, of the 'security upgrades' made to his Nkandla home and originally bankrolled by the taxpayer. In a decision confirmed by the Constitutional Court in 2016, Zuma was found to have benefited unduly from the unnecessary renovations (Koenane, 2017). In the protracted legal battle that ensued, the public was ended up questioning the integrity of a government which could find money for a new swimming pool for the president, but little for infrastructure improvement in poor communities.

If Nkandlagate represents the ruling party's corruption and the decline of its credentials as a party that cares for the people of South Africa, Marikana represents the darker consequences of this disregard for its constituents. The Marikana massacre epitomises for many a state that put profit before its people. On 16 August 2012, 36 mineworkers were gunned down by police at Wonderkop near Marikana in the North West province following days of dispute between mineworkers, the local community, and Lonmin, the international mining company which owns the mines in the area (Naidoo, 2015). "The Marikana massacre injected a sense of

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urgency and convergence into what were [before then] often fragmented and episodic activities" (Nieftagodien, 2015:32). While many workers had long suspected that the ANC no longer stood for their rights, the Marikana shootings seemed to confirm their worst fears; the "ghosts of the past could not have taken more physical form" (Bundy, 2014:14).

The State Capture debacle, while still unfolding in all its reprehensible detail, represents perhaps the single biggest challenge to ANC hegemony in the post-apartheid era. While the term has been in use since 2000, in South Africa it refers to the later alleged improprieties of an overly close and potentially corrupt relationship between then-President Jacob Zuma, his family and leading members of his party with the wealthy Gupta family. Shai (2017:63) states that the control exerted by the millionaire family "engulfed the entire state machinery" as they sought to control the outcome of government deals and state business with the allegedly willing collaboration of Zuma. This was outlined in a report by the Public Protector, released in 2016, which urged official enquiry (Shai, 2017:63). The report led to the establishment of the Commission of Enquiry into Allegations of State Capture, known to the public as the Zondo Commission after its head, deputy Chief Justice Raymond Zondo. The Commission has revealed a vast amount of information regarding the systemic corruption of the state under Zuma and the Gupta family and is still ongoing at the time of writing of this study (Commission of Enquiry, 2019). What is certain, however, is that many members of the ANC were involved in a network which was beneficial to neither the party's image nor to the country itself.

Sarakinsky (2015:189) sums it up: "Corruption is a powerful signifier. It imbues moral failure and societal betrayal in those accused of its practice." Inherently, these incidents point to the ANC's corruption and state capture chiefly as a failure to represent the people. The mandate for a would-be populist leader becomes clear: he or she would be compelled to do two things: root out the current, uncaring and corrupt ANC that has failed to protect the people, and act against those who threaten the people themselves – the capitalist class. This state of perceived crisis does not necessarily need to be corroborated by official media coverage, but the widespread attention that state capture has received in both the independent media and in the courts does help to legitimise the issue (Kyle and Gultchin, 2018). While democratic values demand that the government be called out when it fails, populists can use this discourse to advocate for a change not just of the incumbent, but of the system itself.

This crisis situation creates the pretext for 'stronger' leadership which should not be constrained by the institutions meant to limit the power of other, less legitimate leaders. In South Africa, these checks and balances take the form of constitutionally mandated Chapter 9 institutions, including the Public Protector and the Auditor General as well as the independent court system. A perceived crisis allows for the simplification of the political narrative and the dismissal of these institutions by populist parties. An 'us' versus 'them' narrative is easily created, and more urgent attacks on the 'other' group justified, if there is an underlying emergency narrative. Because populists must present themselves as the answer to the putative crisis (Kyle and Gultchin, 2018), they would argue that strong, unconstrained leadership is needed to eradicate the corrupt leadership and the cruel capitalists whom these leaders are enabling in South Africa.

4.2.2 The ANC rule: Poor governance

As noted in section 3.3.2, dissatisfaction is common in established democracies, but often more deadly to democratic legitimacy in unconsolidated states. While South Africa has been a democracy for a relatively short period of time, it has made great strides in meeting the standards of liberties and freedoms typically associated with a democratic state. However, there has been an absence of more tangible improvements for many of its citizens. The dangers of this situation become apparent when one considers that South Africans tend to have a more instrumental understanding of democracy. Despite having only recently transitioned to democracy, citizens are not oblivious to the standards of governance expected from democratic regimes like theirs and are intent on pointing out these disparities.

A 2005 protest in the township of Intabazwe, on the outskirts Harrismith in the Free State province, was the first to be termed a 'service delivery protest' (Nieftagodien, 2015:30), which is defined as "demonstrations, often violent in nature, levelled at incompetent municipalities for their perceived lack of public provision" (Daniel, 2018). Service delivery protests have fast become a euphemism for "ticking time bombs and social unrest" (Forde, 2011:239). South African politics is often dominated by service delivery issues precisely because many citizens demand tangible improvements to their living conditions rather than rhetoric about the freedoms that they now have access to. The incumbent ANC has done much to combat the legacy of the apartheid state, but a series of corruption and mismanagement scandals combined with the sheer scale of the task has led to increased dissatisfaction among those who are still waiting for promised houses, running water or electricity 25 years later.

For many, non-conventional forms of political participation seem to provide the only way of making their voices heard. Jou (2016) points out the link between dissatisfaction with democratic principles and procedures, and the rising resentment for mainstream politics and shift towards extra-parliamentary political participation. In a country where voter participation is falling even as instances of protest are increasing, a shift of support towards more radical political actors is not surprising. It is thus clear that South Africa is vulnerable to political actors who are indifferent to the intrinsic values of democracy. The ground was ripe for a populist leader to channel these anti-system and anti-elite feelings into a new political movement influenced not only by populism as a concept, but also by the South African context.

4.3 Populism in the South African context

4.3.1 Populism and ideology in South Africa

It is impossible to discuss the current socio-political climate in South Africa without acknowledging how the painful history of the country has shaped the politics of today. African nationalism became a dominant political ideology in South Africa as a direct response to colonial and apartheid rule. African socialism is a result, in part, of the heavy involvement of communist governments in support of the liberation movements that would ultimately inherit the government.

Under colonisation, the church and school became the main vehicles through which European values were to be impressed upon the defeated, uncivilised Africans (Mangcu, 2015:57). While some took the church's teachings on the supremacy of white rule to heart, a more radical form of African nationalism soon developed among those who, influenced by Pan-Africanism and other liberation movements on the continent, rejected cultural assimilation and saw Africa as the 'black man's continent'. This strand of African nationalism became more popular among those involved with the struggle against the apartheid government (Gerhart, 1978). Today, decolonisation remains a prominent debate in South African politics and education, as seen in the 2015 #FeesMustFall protests which rocked university campuses nationwide.

Following the Russian Revolution and the success of other liberation movements which ascribed to the same ideologies, Marxism became an increasingly prominent tool for opposing apartheid rule despite the South African Communist Party (SACP) having been declared illegal in 1950 (Dubow, 2000). Marxism presented an alternative to the repressive politics of the South African state. Socialism and self-governance became intertwined in liberation theory, but it

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was after the banning of many of the liberation movements, including the ANC and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), became dependent on the Soviet Union both financially and ideologically (Dubow, 2000; Mangcu, 2015). South Africa's negotiated settlement necessitated some compromise on all fronts, and communist overtones were largely dropped by the ANC and other liberation stakeholders in the negotiation process. However, post-apartheid South Africa remains a mixed economy and all successful parties incorporate some aspect of socialism, or at least deference to the idea of a continued existence of some form of welfare state being necessary. The country thus has a history of leftist liberation movements, like other states on the continent, but it has also integrated this into policy promises, such as the extensive system of state grants.

4.3.2 Will the real Zulu candidate please stand up: South African populism and ethnicity

Another factor which may influence the prominence of populist politics is the domination of voting blocs in the country. Mattes and Piombo (2001:102) argue that "there is no denying the clear relationship between race, ethnicity, and voting patterns in South Africa's first two national elections." While ethnic delineations remain important in modern South African politics, they are often overshadowed by racial factors in ways that the politics of many other African states is not. The Inkatha Freedom Party, which has been said to mobilise largely on the grounds of Zulu nationalism (Anyangwe, 2012), remains the fourth largest political party in South Africa (IEC, 2019) and the most obvious example of ethnically based partisanship. The ANC under Zuma was touted by many as the real 'Zulu ascendency' (Anyangwe, 2012), with the implicit suggestion that the ANC was a Xhosa party under Mandela and Mbeki. Zuma's political strategy also appealed to "the primordial identities of a 'Zulu warrior culture'" (Melber, 2018:683), in part by making the struggle song 'Bring me my machine gun' his personal anthem. However, when the Congress of the People (COPE) laid claim to the Amatole region in the Eastern Cape in the run-up to the 2009 national elections, based solely on the ethnicity of the party's founder, a Xhosa man, the ANC was quick to publish their own ethnically-tinged reminder that the Eastern Cape was the heartland of the party (Anyangwe, 2012:53).

Despite protestations to the contrary, race still matters in South Africa's entrenched voting patterns and "remains by far the most salient line of political cleavage in the country" (Mattes and Piombo, 2001:102). While many scholars argue that the link between ethnic or racial identities and electoral behaviour is not strong enough to maintain this argument, opposition

politicians continue to mobilise on these platforms and thus continue to make these issues central in political debates (Habib and Naidu, 2006). The DA is "projected by the ruling party and generally perceived as representing and defending white interests" and thus struggles to capture African votes (Anyangwe, 2012:52). The ANC is still seen as having the majority of black votes. While "no political party would openly appeal to race or ethnicity", Anyangwe (2012:52-54) notes that a form of shorthand has developed: any mention of "empowerment" or "emancipation" is seen to target black voters, while an emphasis on "minority rights" or "equal opportunities" can be seen as pandering to white or coloured voters.

While significant sections of the population make rational choices in the voting booth based on democratic considerations (Habib and Naidu, 2006), race continues to play an important role in partisanship in South Africa, whether as a real or perceived issue. This thus creates a precedent for populist mobilisation on racial and ethnic fronts.

4.3.3 Of miners and maids: The economic have-nots

South Africa's massive levels of inequality are quantifiable in terms of the Gini coefficient, where it measures an awe-inducing 0.66, the highest in the world (Pillay, 2018:4). However, to truly understand the depths of the South African tragedy, one must also consider the broken promise of democracy. The ANC contested the 1994 elections with the promise, "A better life for all" (Bundy, 2014:138). However, many South Africans now feel that the past 25 years have been more akin to 'A better life for some'. In contrast to the expectations of many voters who queued up for the first time in 1994, "[p]atterns of accumulation and exploitation that [had] lasted for decades" (Bundy, 2014:14) have remained much the same, with the Gini coefficient actually rising by 0.02 since 1996 (The World Bank, 2019). While the richest group of South Africans has become more racially representative, and state social grants and services have alleviated poverty among low-income groups, the inequality gap has been maintained by joblessness, pay scales and asset ownership (Makgetla, 2018). The most significant change in post-apartheid South African society has been the de-racialisation of its upper classes. Bundy (2014:148) argues that "members of a racially mixed middle class have been major beneficiaries of the post-apartheid dispensation" but also notes that the existence of black 'tenderpreneurs' says nothing about the average change in quality of life for most citizens. In fact, while the average income of the top 6% of South African earners has risen in the 25 years since democracy, the average earnings of the bottom percentile have fallen in real terms (Makgetla, 2018).

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Cities tend to concentrate political problems (Bundy, 2014), but rural areas are often even more destitute, if in slightly more idyllic-looking settings, leading many to move to larger cities in search of a better life. South Africa is becoming increasingly urbanised, with young people moving to cities in the hopes of finding jobs. The promises of social mobility unfulfilled under a new government are made all the more obvious in the sometimes-claustrophobic environment of *kasi* or township life. As a result of the deliberate downgrading of education for Africans under the apartheid regime, "[b]lack schools became 'sites of struggle'…and the education of many pupils was seriously disrupted" (Welsh, 2015:43). Poor education has subsequently become one of the main scapegoats for the lack of social mobility in township areas. Ramphele (2008:171) argues that "[t]he markedly inferior education imposed on African children from the 1950s has had a devastating and lasting impact on the capacity of the majority of the population to free themselves from the shackles of the apartheid past." She argues that unequal and inadequate education continues to be a stumbling block to this day (Ramphele, 2008), like many other unaddressed legacies of the country's apartheid past.

Combined with the detrimental consequences of a more neoliberally orthodox economic plan as the new millennium progressed, the ANC government's lack of progress with regards to righting the economic and social wrongs of apartheid understandably elicits a strong response. Gillian Slovo (quoted in Forde, 2011:233), sums it up best: "This was the nature of South Africa's agreement: the transfer of power without a previous settling of historic rights and wrongs." For a majority of South Africans, the call that political freedom is useless without economic freedom is painfully true. A populist leader had no need to create a sense of justified public anger; he or she had only to tap into "the racial and social anger that continues to bubble beneath the surface of society" (Forde, 2011:42).

4.3.4 The South African branch of the new African populism

From the above it is clear that the South African context contains the core elements that go towards generating populist discourse in other African countries. The country's high levels of poverty and inequality and the existence of a politically-connected upper class open it up to a politics of 'the people', while the influence of Marxist ideology and elements of ethnically- or racially-based political mobilisation create opportunities for a plebiscitarian politics of the African variety identified in Chapter III. However, South Africa also displays a non-essential symptom of a pre-populist African state: the existing liberation party is seen as having 'sold out' the struggle for a place in the ruling elite.

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Those who were liberators in the struggle generation – the ANC and others – have become the corrupt 'other' in large portions of South African political discourse. The ANC's complacency about current levels of inequality is seen as the primary reason for "'the hope and promise of 1994 [having] no meaning" (Msomi, 2016:72). A perception that a new, radical 'outsider' to the political process is needed stems from this dissatisfaction with the progress made by the party originally understood to be the saviours of those suffering under colonial and apartheid oppression (Oxford Analytica, 2017). Democracy has not brought economic freedom to the vast majority of the population, and exclusion from the structures of economic power in the midst of a state that has made explicit its disregard for its citizens in its striving for personal profit have precipitated the crisis to which populists claim to have the only solution.

It is clear that the time was ripe for someone to take advantage of these grievances for their own political gain. However, despite the dire situation that many South Africans face, the context need not inevitably have led to the manifestation of populism. To understand why the EFF has made such inroads into South African politics, it is necessary to examine the current political playing field.

4.4 The contemporary political playing field

Since the 2014 election cycle, the South African political landscape has been dominated by three parties in particular – the ANC, the DA and the EFF. South Africa's political playing field has been further defined by five key trends: 1) the political stronghold of the ANC, a liberation movement turned governing party, which has nonetheless shown a decline in support in recent years with a corresponding increase in competitiveness in the political landscape; 2) the entrenchment of the DA as the official opposition, and as the governing party in one of the country's nine provinces; 3) the decline of smaller political parties, with the exception of radical parties of both the left and the right, which have shown dramatic increases in support in recent elections; 4) the rapid urbanisation of the electorate; and 5) increasing voter apathy, especially among younger voters, in the face of increasing levels of unemployment and pervasive inequality (De Jager, 2015).

The ANC has dominated South African politics since the first democratic elections in the country in 1994, but have recently been rocked by several high-profile corruption cases and the state capture saga under the Zuma administration, creating opportunities for the official opposition, the DA, and the much younger EFF to assert themselves. Before the rise of Julius

Malema's political force, one of the main trends in South African politics was the decline of smaller parties – although notable exceptions include the United Democratic Front (UDM) and the Freedom Front Plus (FF+) – and the entrenchment of the DA as the official opposition (De Jager, 2015). However, the EFF's rise on the back of a legitimacy crisis in the ANC-controlled government has been a conspicuous deviation from this trend.

The country's electoral system of proportional representation was specifically designed for the deeply divided post-minority rule South Africa in an attempt to ensure that minority rights remained paramount. However, the existence of closed party lists, a dependence on the party for positions and a corresponding lack of direct responsibility to constituencies has created a political climate where members of parliament are very unlikely to present opinions that do not toe the party line and thus risk losing access to their lucrative positions in the party (De Jager, 2015:146-147).

Figure 4.1 Election results of the 5 biggest parties in the South African national elections, 2009-2019. Results derived from IEC (n.d.).

Like other African countries, South Africa is rapidly urbanising, but a lack of voter registration among 'born frees' – those voters born after the first democratic elections – has limited the impact of its fairly young population on policymaking and the political process (Southall, 2014:5). However, despite the urbanisation trend, rural municipalities maintain higher percentages of registered voters than metropolitan municipalities. The rural/urban split is pronounced, and rural areas continue to matter hugely in South African electoral politics

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(Southall, 2014:7). This creates the perfect breeding ground for the uniquely African brand of populist politics which manages to capitalise on the grievances of both the disaffected young urban voters and the ethnic enclaves in the more rural parts of the country, as will be discussed under the EFF's campaign strategy. The political climate in the country is further defined by the entrenched inequality among its population, with 10% of the population accounting for roughly half its income and the overwhelming majority of its tax earnings (Goldhammer, 2014).

4.4.1 The ANC

The freedom-fighting ANC has been the ruling party for all 25 years of the existence of a democratic South Africa. Founded in 1912 as the first truly national movement for the advancement of native rights in South Africa, it originated as a movement for the middle class, Christian, law-abiding black men whom its founders represented. The South African Native National Congress, as it was known then, was intended to be a broad-church umbrella movement to unite Africans across ethnic lines, but from its inception it was dogged by tensions between the radical African nationalists and the more traditional liberal elements in its ranks. However, following the founding of the ANC Youth League (ANCYL) in 1944 by a group of younger, more radical members including, Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu, later in the organisation's lifetime, the main body was slowly influenced to adopt a more radical approach to the fight for freedom (Dubow, 2000).

Up until then, the ANC had been committed to change through petitions and discussions, but the 1949 Programme of Action committed the ANC to "a campaign of boycotts, strikes and civil disobedience" in a militant departure from previous tactics (Dubow, 2000). This led to the cementing of their status as the dominant force of opposition to the apartheid state.

When this inevitably led in 1990 to the banning of the ANC and its more radical African nationalist offshoot, the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), the ANC developed a much closer relationship with the SACP in exile (Dubow, 2000). The ANC received military help and training from the SACP, which had been banned for much longer and was thus more proficient at running a campaign of defiance from outside the borders of South Africa.

More recently, the ANC has drawn on its legacy as the liberation movement that helped facilitate the peaceful transfer to democracy, and its image as the 'party of Mandela', to put forth policies and political promises that fall on either side of their centre-left position on the

political spectrum. "as the oldest and most consistent African resistance movement, the party has succeeded in accumulating enormous reserves of symbolic capital" (Dubow, 2000), making it easier for the party to implement more radical policies should it so choose. Long-standing partnerships with the trade union federation Cosatu and the South African Communist Party (SACP) in the form of the Tri-partite Alliance ensured approving leftist responses to strategic challenges over the first two decades of their rule, but endemic corruption, factionalism within the party itself, and a poor service delivery record have all contributed to a decline in voter trust over the past three election cycles. While the ANC's representation grew fairly consistently over the first three democratic electoral cycles, it began to decline rapidly after 2009 (De Jager, 2015:159). In its time as a liberation movement, "the leadership-in-limbo" could stay out of day-to-day politics while maintaining their prestige on Robben Island, thus remaining a source of "unimpeachable moral authority" for the party. However, the state capture debacle has put into stark contrast the ANC's promises to its electorate with the actions of its recent leadership.

Jacob Zuma's appointment as the party's president in 2007, leading to his eventual ascension to president of the country, was built on a "left-populist coalition of disgruntled grassroots activists, trade unionists, unemployed youth, veteran guerrilla fighters" and other members of the "walking wounded" (Gumede, 2008). The group successfully blamed the ANC government's failure to share the country's prosperity with the poor masses on then-president Thabo Mbeki's neoliberal economic and social reforms, and Zuma was expected to initiate a move to the left for the beleaguered ruling party. Zuma's appointment of two members of the SACP to key economic portfolios seemed to confirm the hopes of the other two alliance members that his government would do so (Southall, 2014:11). However, the enduring legacy of the Zuma years have instead been marked by corruption, increased economic insecurity, and the decline of once healthy parastatal institutions such as the national power utility, Eskom. The party's flagship Black Economic Empowerment policy has been dubbed a partial failure, having only served to increase inequality (Joubert, 2018). The above factors have all contributed to leaving Zuma's former supporters demanding justice, which led to the ousting of the former president to be replaced by business tycoon Cyril Ramaphosa as State President in late 2017 (Roberts, 2018). However, Marikana had tainted even his name: Ramaphosa was known to have used his influential role in the ruling party to ensure the mobilisation of the

police against the workers and in the interests of mining capital (Pillay, 2015), thereby signalling the ANC's collusion with the capitalist classes.

Notwithstanding this, the election of Ramaphosa led to widespread investor euphoria, as he was understood to be more market-friendly than his predecessor (Roberts, 2018). Yet, almost two years later little has changed for the average South African as the presidency struggles to deal with the fallout from the Zuma years. President Ramaphosa is clearly trying to clean up the party's image, focusing attention on anti-corruption efforts and headline-making inquiries into the previous president's tenure as well as attempting to restore integrity to damaged state institutions (Conway-Smith, 2019). The party's claims to be sharpening its focus on anti-corruption efforts, however, seemed somewhat quixotic to those who had been watching corruption become endemic within the once noble freedom movement.

Butler (2014) argues that the ANC's manifestos have long had an "anti-populist flavour", but its 2014 election manifesto was essentially a backward-looking document, highlighting the party's achievements since 1994 and pronouncing South Africa a better place than before their rule. It also contained a confusing combination of radical and conservative proposals, although its focus on the gradual expansion of social welfare and health insurance and job creation were familiar tenets of ANC campaigns over the years. Because it is structured as an alliance, "supporters of the ANC spanned a greater range of social groups and ideological positions than any other competing party or organisation" (Dubow, 2000:109). However, the party currently seems torn between the values of those who funded and built it, and those who seek to use it as a platform for personal gain.

4.4.2 The DA

The DA is "the culmination of a long line of political parties splitting and coalescing", but its true roots lie in the formation of the liberal Progressive Party in 1959 under the leadership of Helen Suzman and its opposition to apartheid "from inside the system" (De Jager, 2015:155-156). The DA grew its votes in every election since 1994, when its predecessor, the Democratic Party, garnered only 1.7% of the votes, largely by consolidating its support among minorities (Msomi, 2016:109). The party consolidated its position as the 'official opposition' in the 2004 general election, earning 22.23% of the national vote (IEC, 2019).

Today, the party defines itself as "a party that believes in liberal values and principles" (Grootes, 2019). Nevertheless, as Pallo Jordan (quoted in Msomi, 2016:147), has noted:

"Running like a blue thread through the history of South African liberalism is a readiness to defer to White prejudices," and the party thus faces an uphill battle in South Africa, where a majority of voters are black. Having long struggled with this image as a 'party for whites', the DA has in recent elections been drawing black middle-class voters away from the ANC, but not yet in numbers anywhere near enough to challenge the ruling party's hegemony (Jolobe, 2014:57). Its emphasis on 'non-racialism', however, has found support among white and coloured voters who feel alienated by the ANC's Black Economic Empowerment- and other black-focused schemes. Nevertheless, the DA has "come to terms with the reality that its political fortunes live with the black majority" (Jolobe, 2014:71), and is shifting its attention to this demographic. The party has been most successful in winning support in large municipalities as a result of its comparably good service delivery record in the city of Cape Town and other Western Cape municipalities.

The DA thus positions itself as a "party of government" and champions its successes in the Western Cape, where it has been at the helm of government since 2009 (De Jager, 2015:155). Butler (2009) highlights the party's liberal ideology, including a limited state and a market economy. Then-party leader Mmusi Maimane has made no secret of the fact that the promotion of business confidence and investment is the main concern that a ruling party should be focused on in South Africa. In true liberal fashion, his party sees "reluctant fiscal restraint" as a major reason for the poor economic performance of the state over the past decade, and thus advocates for the reduction of the power and cost of the state (Joubert, 2018:89-90). The DA believes that overemphasis on regulation will stifle growth and thus, job creation.

In its 2014 campaign the party hailed the progress of previous ANC presidents but posited that the current president, Jacob Zuma, was reversing the progress that had been made since 1994 (Jolobe, 2014). It further emphasised its plan to incentivise job creation and make South Africa more attractive for foreign and local business, partly by breaking up the state monopolies supported by the ANC at the time. The DA manifesto also promised that the party would invest in public infrastructure and work to drive down high prices for consumers (Jolobe, 2014).

After the 2014 national elections, the party underwent a leadership change in order to appeal more directly to the new target of their campaigning – middle-class black voters. Helen Zille, a former anti-apartheid journalist and activist and the party leader at the time, had become "a massive liability with a penchant for racially inflammatory tweets" (Pillay, 2019). Maimane

was then styled as an Obama-style hero of the predicted 'rebirth' of the country and the party (Msomi, 2016). However, the party continues to struggle against hitting an 'electoral ceiling' of minority voters.

The 2019 manifesto, meanwhile, categorically rejects expropriation without compensation, placing property rights at the centre of a theoretical bid to make South Africa more attractive to investors in the hopes of boosting the country's struggling economy (Grootes, 2019). It did, however, offer some policies aimed at attracting votes from an aspirational black middle class, including waiving house duties for first-time homeowners and making learning to drive part of the matric certification (Grootes, 2019).

4.4.3 The EFF

On 13 October 2013 Julius Malema, the *enfant terrible* of South African politics captivated media attention in the country with the launch of the Economic Freedom Fighters (Southall, 2014), a self-declared Marxist-Leninist party that defined itself partly by its very opposition to the dominant ANC (Goldhammer, 2014). The new party had been formed earlier that year in Soweto, the symbolic heartland of black political mobilisation in South Africa, but the launch was held in Marikana, an even more symbolic venue: in 2012, the South African police gunned down 34 platinum miners on the site.

The new party quickly began to dominate news headlines in ways that few other political debuts had (Mbete, 2015). Malema's abrasive behaviour and love of grand political statements captured the attention of the news cycle, but the party's message of wealth redistribution had immediate mass appeal in a society as deeply unequal as South Africa's, where 47 percent of the population lives below the poverty line (Goldhammer, 2014). The EFF's trademark red overalls are meant to express solidarity with the domestic workers and manual labourers who would make up large portions of the poor and working class and of the party's electoral support, while the red colour denotes not only a connection to communist parties past, but also the blood of labourers, including that shed at Marikana (Goldhammer, 2014). Coupled with their familiar red berets and revolutionary-sounding titles for leadership ranks, the EFF quickly started to dominate political coverage in the run-up to the 2014 national elections. Whether in positive or negative terms, the new party was the talk of the South African media.

While initial media reports suggested that the party was little more than a vehicle for Malema's personal political aspirations (Robinson, 2014:75), its success in the 2014 national elections

made it clear that the EFF was here to stay. The party's clever media strategy, fluid branch structure and effective central organisation helped it overcome the pitfalls of electoral infancy and a "powerful ANC counter-offensive on the campaign trail" to appeal to "constituencies which the ANC had long taken for granted" (Robinson, 2014:73). The EFF's electoral message that corruption was spreading unchecked within the ANC and that ruling party was now beyond internal reform was reinforced by their candidate list – all nine EFF premier candidates were former ANC members who had publicly abandoned the party in favour of Malema's purportedly ideologically purer workers' party (Robinson, 2014:76-77).

Policy-wise, the EFF manifesto for 2014 had its roots in the ANCYL policies formulated when Malema was president of that body, but the EFF also appropriated "a smattering of ideology and rhetoric" such as Pan-Africanism, Fanonism and Marxism "that allowed it to embrace like-minded parties, such as the PAC and AZAPO" (Robinson, 2014:77). By being absorbed into the EFF, smaller parties with similar ideological leanings were ensured a measure of political and ideological survival.

The party's manifesto outlined the seven cardinal pillars for future government, including the expropriation of land without compensation and the nationalisation of banks and mines without compensation. The manifesto – and the party leaders – made a range of grandiose promises to the electorate, most of which were dismissed by business leaders and other political parties, but their simple message was remarkably effective (Robinson, 2014:77-78), winning them the third largest vote nationally in 2014 (Robinson, 2014:82). Their electoral support had extended beyond the marginalised youths who were assumed to be the party's prime constituency, with 48% of their votes coming from large metropolitan areas (Robinson, 2014:84). Southall (2014:7) contends that the 2014 election was the first such event where class played as much a role in voting behaviour as race; the newly formed 'workers' party' provided the perfect vehicle for a rising wave of working-class antagonism to the political status quo.

Their 2019 manifesto was even more clearly defined in its handling of topics such as land and inequality. All land should be transferred to state ownership by way of expropriation without compensation; mines, banks, and other strategic sectors of the economy should be nationalised and foreign ownership of these sectors should be limited; the state should prioritise small-scale farmers, stamp out corruption, and abolish all tender processes in favour of building capacity for infrastructure-building itself. The EFF's economic policy favours a developmental state

with heavily centralised power, with the state directing much of the mandate of private corporations (Joubert, 2018).

The EFF is not the first party to lay claim to those disaffected voters who have begun to see the ANC as the new ruling class of oppressors. There have been other parties that espoused a workers-first brand of Africanist political thought which was aimed precisely at this group, but the EFF is the first to do so with marked electoral success. Gumede argues that "[t]he EFF's success eclipsed older populist liberation movements on the left such as the Pan Africanist Congress," as well as other, earlier Black Consciousness-focused parties, which made them a more viable threat to the established political order (Gumede, 2019). Other scholars have argued that the poor performance of parties such as COPE and Agang SA may indicate the rise in the susceptibility of disgruntled, unemployed and impoverished voters to radicalism and new brands of populism (De Jager, 2015:161). Although the ANC also pays lip service to an Africanist focus and a purportedly socialist stance on treating the inequality that has become chronic in post-apartheid South Africa, for many voters the EFF presents the first truly radical party that also has some hope of political success.

The EFF has thus transformed the South African political scene by making clear to the black electorate that there are (ANC-based) traditions from within the liberation mould but outside the ANC that are also legitimate (Mbete, 2015; Gumede, 2019; Robinson, 2014). The ANC thus loses its privileged position as the only party that can claim to represent a post-struggle black electorate on the basis solely of its revolutionary credentials.

Malema has been called a "champagne socialist" (Goldhammer, 2014), but these assessments miss the political point – his is a carefully curated image that attracts attention and evokes the ire of those whom he has already designated as traitors to the new struggle, who then further entrench his point with attacks that he easily denounces by designating them racist or sexist. Malema is presented as the unapologetic Commander-in-Chief (CIC) with an army of red-suited, beret-wearing foot soldiers (Southall, 2014), but nonetheless as a political underdog. In court battles around his tax issues and funding of party registrations, the EFF claimed that Malema was the victim of targeted campaigns orchestrated by government elites who wanted to silence him and his party because he threatened their privileged position (Robinson, 2014:73), indicating the important role that rhetoric about the CIC would play in his career.

On 21 August 2014, only months after 25 of its number were elected to the National Assembly, the EFF regained the media spotlight for its actions in Parliament, where the party's vocal protests at President Zuma's alleged misuse of state funds to upgrade his personal residence included chants of "Pay back the money". Joubert (2018:14) states that the party "managed to place Parliament at the centre of South African political discourse and elevated the parliamentary TV channel to one of the most popular in the country – outperforming in popularity the soap operas with which it came to share many characteristics." Malema himself has stated that, as an opposition party, going to parliament was "a ceremonial thing" (Robinson, 2014:86), in that it was the act of showing up, of taking up space and of vocally opposing that was important, rather than adhering to the process of parliamentary rule. As such, the EFF provides a prominent example of a populist party within the African context.

4.5 Portrait of a populist party

The EFF has "fired South Africa's cultural imagination, attracted unprecedented levels of curiosity and raised high levels of expectation, while being subjected to enormous scrutiny" (Mbembe, 2014), becoming perhaps the most controversial political movement of the post-1994 democratic spectrum. De Jager (2015:161) argues that the party's use of militancy and radicalism to attract the poorest South Africans while leaders wear hundred-thousand-rand watches "is nothing short of the use of populism to prey on the disaffected".

What is certain is that the EFF complies with every aspect of the definition set out earlier in this study for populism. Populism emerges from a state of real or perceived *crisis* that is then politicised by populist leaders; it includes some *distinction* between the 'pure' and the 'impure' people; it is defined by its *opposition to the 'establishment'*; and it does these things because it claims to represent *the will of the people in its entirety*. The EFF has made the crisis of leadership in South Africa – that is to say, the assertion that the incumbent government has become too corrupted to care about the people who voted them in and the "White monopoly Capital" that they purportedly support – a central tenet of every election that they have contested. They have made a Manichaean distinction between the 'pure people' and the 'corrupt elite'. The party also shows a strong opposition to the political 'establishment' in the form of the ANC. Instead, the EFF claims to represent the will of the people in its entirety in their struggle against domination by those who remain in power despite purportedly not having 'the people's' best interests at heart.

However, these circumstances constitute only the basic outline of the discourse. The details which colour in the picture are based upon the specifics of the African context, as set out in section 3.4 of the previous chapter. The EFF's populist discourse is firmly situated in a political landscape dominated by *socio-economic inequality*. Like other radical parties on the African continent, the EFF is based in a tradition of *Marxist-Leninist ideology* and fuses the use of *charismatic leadership* which proclaims itself 'of the people' with an intoxicating *message of social inclusion*.

The EFF's support, like that of other populist parties in Africa, come from the *dual bases* of a rural ethnic base and the urban poor. Like other populist parties on the continent, there is a distinct focus on the *broken promises* of both the old regime and their neoliberal economic policies. This section will delve more deeply into the contextual identifiers which mark the EFF as a populist party in the African tradition.

South Africa fares much better than many other African countries on traditional measures of living standards, such as GDP per capita, literacy rates, and average lifespan. However, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, the country's extremely high level of inequality has left many South Africans facing circumstances much the same as those their parents dealt with a generation earlier, with the only difference being the absence of pass books, which have been replaced by voter IDs. As such, the country has much in common with other African countries where populism has taken root. In the context of the highest levels of inequality in the world, it becomes clear why the EFF's focus on a Marxist-Leninist ideology of wealth redistribution, the expropriation of land and free education sounds so enticing. Like other populist parties in Africa, the EFF has chosen to be guided both by the political history of the country and by the socio-economic challenges that their voters face every day. While the ANC does not shy away from making references to their history as the party of liberation to bolster their campaigns, the EFF's purported Marxist-Leninist ideological grounding ties in much more closely with the history of the freedom fighters in Africa.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, in the context of disappointing democratic progress and widespread poverty and unemployment, Marxist-Leninism becomes an enticing promise to those who are failing to benefit from the current regime. South Africa's ANC government has been widely criticised for failing to translate economic growth to economic equality. In the face of vast socio-economic hierarchies, the promise of better living conditions in exchange for

more state control seems an obvious one to appeal to large portions of the population. The EFF's red regalia is meant to signal their commitment to revolutionary rhetoric, even if few analysts believe that the millionaire party executives and donors truly think that their economic policy promises will come to fruition.

The party states that it has "drawn inspiration from the broad Marxist-Leninist tradition school of thought" [sic] (EFF Online, 2019b). There have been some accusations of ideological ambiguity despite the party's clear leftist orientation. The EFF describes itself as both "a vigorous vanguard organization leading the revolutionary masses in the fight against the class enemy for total liberation" and a party "driven by sound democratic socialist values" (EFF FAQ, 2019). Interviews with party members frequently reveal the lack of party consensus around how some of their loftier policy goals must be reached. However, the EFF remains, in theory, a far-left organisation, attracting voters on the premise of a Marxist-Leninist redistribution of the means of production among those who are currently losing out in a capitalist society. This places the party firmly in line with other radical populist movements across the continent.

This ideological grounding also gives Malema's party the opportunity to cast him as the people's hero, a 'son of the soil'. As a populist leader, Malema incarnates the 'will of the people' and thus must be believably portrayed as one of them, albeit their brightest star. His background as the son of a domestic worker and his identification as the victim of the ANC- and elite-led plotting help establish this persona. The party executive is made up of those who do not need the radical economic changes they espouse. The most obvious example of a populist movement trying to associate itself with a culture of ordinariness is the uniforms that the party wears – the sea of red overalls in every sitting of Parliament prove that the ideological leanings of the party are closely tied to their target audience in the workers' class. That many of the party leaders are millionaires does nothing to taint this image because, as elsewhere in Africa, working-class language and symbolism are used to perform their membership of 'the people' they claim to represent.

While charismatic leaders are not a prerequisite for a populist movement, they do help the movement to gain momentum – and the EFF has no shortage of party members who can formulate attention-grabbing quotes and point fingers at the 'corrupt elites'. Duncan (2015) argues that, because of Malema's history with the organisation, the EFF had access to a large

pool of experienced and well-known political leaders in the ANC Youth League who could be called upon to quickly fill the executive of the new party. The likes of Floyd Shivambu and Dali Mpofu had cut their teeth on the campaign trail for the ANC but were able to make much more personalistic appeals to voters under the mentorship of the undeniably charismatic Malema as Commander-in-Chief.

The freedom fighting history of the ANC has afforded the party the opportunity to raise many of its former leadership to near god-like status. Anti-apartheid campaigns both locally and abroad were built on the shoulders of these men and the name recognition they assured for the movement. However, Duncan (2015) also argues that this history had led to a penchant for 'big man' leadership in South Africa. The EFF has embraced this marketing gap most effectively since the rise and fall of Jacob Zuma as the ANC's first populist experiment. Malema and Shivambu are particularly adept at serving as the party's chief political provocateurs, regularly making statements inflammatory enough to dominate the news cycle in South Africa. This gives the party both the opportunity for more publicity as they are asked to apologise or further explain, and the name recognition that is so important in electoral politics. It has also made Malema's name the chief policy export of the party, making him the most effective 'information shortcut' through which voters can identify the party's stance.

As in other parts of the continent, voters also identify with Malema based on his ethnic background. Populism in Africa relies partly on support coming from the double nexus of frustrated urban poor and rural ethnic backing. True to form, while the majority of the party's support comes from the working-class poor in urban areas targeted specifically by the EFF's strong socio-economic message, Malema's populist movement enjoys particular success in its Commander-in-Chief's home province of Limpopo (Southall, 2014; De Jager, 2015), where the highest concentrations of Bapedi, the ethnic group from which he stems, live. The Commander-in-Chief does not shy away from delivering speeches in both English and his native Pedi. By virtue of Malema's birth-right, then, the EFF enjoys support in poor urban areas and Pedi-dominated rural areas. Journalists have also noted that his oratorical tours de force seem to be less effective in, for example, the province of Kwa-Zulu-Natal, seemingly because he does not speak Zulu (Schneider, 2014).

Within this African context, then, the EFF conforms to all the requirements for a populist party. The final step is to examine the characteristics of the core tenet of populist discourse – the

Manichaean distinction that is made between the 'pure people' represented by the party and the 'corrupt establishment elites' against which it is opposed. The people that the EFF claims to represent are made up of the poor, unemployed and working-class South Africans who have not benefited from the country's democratisation in 1994 in any sense but in name. The 'elite' in the South African context is made up of both those who are purported to have maintained economic power after the fall of the apartheid state, who Malema terms beneficiaries of 'white monopoly capital', and of the newly corrupted ANC government who are said to use their position for their own benefit rather than that of the people whom they claim to serve.

As a populist party, the EFF has created a politicised crisis – their stated reason of existence – from the broken promises of the current regime. Marikana proved to be the catalyst for a backlash directed at the ruling party. This extrajudicial massacre became the 'perceived crisis' through which Malema justified his scathing attack of the ANC. However, his party argues that Marikana was but a symptom of the incumbent's degeneration into the party of elites who feed off the poor and the disaffected and thus fail to address the systemic issues which continue to plague poor South African decades after the end of minority rule. The EFF argues that the ANC is "rotten to its core" (Joubert, 2018:50), and the widespread reportage of the State Capture debacle served to legitimise the EFF's claim that the latter no ANC represented the people they had once led to freedom.

The ANC leadership are simply "front office managers for white interests at the expense of the black majority" (EFF FAQ, 2019), according to the EFF. Malema's position at the EFF's sixth birthday celebration left little to the imagination about who he thought was responsible for the deplorable living environment of many of his supporters: "We thought 1994 was a turning point but only to realise we are much deeper trouble because ANC is collaborating with the enemy of black people" [sic] (quoted in Krige, 2019). The ANC is positioned as the political collaborator, while the economic elite is the enemy behind the scenes.

Who exactly represents the economic elites is not important, as in populist rhetoric "their entire identity simply emerges in dissociation from the people, from being the people's eternal "nemesis" (Wirth *et al*., 2016:12). By blaming the current inequality and lack of economic growth on "white monopoly capital, the professional classes and the intelligentsia, banks, the media and all other scapegoats and culprits one can find" (Fakir, 2019), the EFF easily defines the 'corrupt elites' in economic terms. The practice of virtuous politics is thus only represented

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by the 'oppressed workers' whom the party represents. As embodiments of the 'true people', the EFF claims to have the full support of those they consider to be a part of that group.

It follows that anyone who stands against the party in any way must thus also be against the free rein of the people's will. Any media sources which disagree with them are termed 'anti-revolutionary' or said to be corrupted, although positive press is welcomed. Malema has likened journalists to apartheid spies and went so far as to tweet one journalist's personal telephone number, which EFF followers used to make rape and murder threats against the unfortunate journalist (Conway-Smith, 2019). The South African National Editors' Forum (Sanef) brought a court case against Malema and the EFF, citing persistent threats and intimidation, in 2019. While the case was lost, the above tweet is but one example of the EFF's belligerence towards negative journalistic endeavours (Chabalala, 2019).

Like other populists the world over (Kyle and Gultchin, 2018), the EFF decries political correctness and eschews expert knowledge, choosing to idealise the wisdom of ordinary citizens. The party's 2019 manifesto is, by its own admission, based largely on "numerous submissions the EFF received" through "public consultations," both in person and on social media, and on the experiences of party members in the previous term (EFF 2019 Election Manifesto, 2019). The expert opinion of economists, journalists and political analysts is brushed aside where it does not underwrite the EFF's existing policies. The party's promises are often politically correct, but its actions continually undermine its words. For example, while Malema frequently mentions violence against women as a main concern (EFF 2019 Election Manifesto, 2019; Krige, 2019), he has also been known to make sexist comments about female journalists, as previously mentioned.

The EFF has all the hallmarks of a populist party in the African context. It has used a Marxist-Leninist ideological leaning and charismatic leadership to connect to those suffering under South Africa's current socio-economic circumstances. The broken promises of the ANC regime have provided a springboard for South Africa's own populist party. The EFF promise that, under their leadership, "democracy will serve the people instead of serving politicians and public representatives at the expense of the people" (EFF FAQ, 2019). As such, the EFF is both the symptom of real distress on the part of struggling South Africans and the expression of hope (Mbembe, 2014). Kyle and Gultchin (2018) note that "populism often arises from serious and legitimate concerns about the quality of institutions and political representation" as well as

profound economic failures. In South Africa the ANC's failure to address its own members' looting of state coffers and the plight of those whom the party led to freedom in 1994 has come to represent both the systemic and economic failures of democracy.

4.6 Possible consequences for democracy in South Africa

Few scholars would argue that there has not been a public loss of faith in what democracy can actually deliver 25 years after the regime was first welcomed with euphoric celebration in 1994. South Africans view democracy overwhelmingly in procedural terms, although a significant portion of the population also sees it in terms of the principles of equality, justice and material benefits. As discussed in section 3.5.1 of the previous chapter, there are two prevailing understandings of democracy: as having intrinsic value – in other words, valued by citizens as an end in itself – and as having instrumental value – valued as a means to a different end, usually an improvement in living standards (Bratton and Mattes, 2000:1). However, many South Africans put socio-economic outcomes ahead of the procedural, civil liberties that define the concept in academia. De Jager (2015:205) states that these citizens link notions of democracy "with the improvement of their material welfare".

A 2011 Afrobarometer study found that 63% of South Africans in the sample group would be willing to give up regular elections in favour of a government that could provide security and deliver housing and employment, even if it were non-elected (De Jager, 2015:206). The ANC's failure to deliver basic services to tens of millions of South Africans is seen as a consequence of official corruption. Phillips *et al*. (2019) point out that enquiries into state capture, as well as the work done by the Public Protector and independent media sources to expose corruption within the ruling party, may be strengthening the populist argument that the political elites have become corrupt, evil and incapable of further representing the people. That these claims by the EFF turned out to be true may also help to legitimate other claims made by populist leaders, such as the corruption and co-option of independent media sources. A survey conducted by the YouGov-Cambridge Globalism Project in partnership with the British news site *The Guardian* found that 84% of their South African respondents agreed with the idea their government is run by a few self-interested powers (Phillips *et al.*, 2019). In light of the State Capture report and the continuing investigation by the Zondo Commission, this should not be surprising. The state being run by a few elites in a self-serving manner is no longer a conspiracy theory – it has been proven true by some of the most trusted institutions the young democracy has.

The EFF's disdain for the ANC's performance at the helm of the state, and the former's insistence on holding the latter accountable, are not inherently dangerous to democratic processes – in fact, public accountability is an important aspect of liberal democracies the world over. However, the claim that the ANC is illegitimate precisely because it is the political elite is dangerously illiberal. This argument is especially dangerous in a country which has a history of majority exclusion by an elite minority.

The EFF's logic of the righteousness of the people presents a Manichaean worldview, where those who do not agree with them, and those who would try to limit their powers through democratic checks and balances, are cast as the 'corrupt elite' by default, the premise being that "[a]nyone threatening the idea of an unrestricted sovereignty of the people should be bereft of power" (Wirth *et al*., 2016). This logic holds that they as the EFF should not be the 'victim' of democratic checks and balances, since they alone represent the true voice of the people and the voice of the people should always reign supreme.

Populists are not inherently anti-democratic – in fact, they often present themselves as the only true democrats in their fight for the sovereign rule of 'the people' (Wirth *et al*., 2016). However, their version of democracy, as shown in the previous chapter, excludes the pluralist values that define modern liberal democracies, reducing the concept to a shadow of the inclusive system of democratic rights that it is supposed to represent. Constitutional elements which would protect these rights, such as an independent judiciary and free press, are opposed because they constrain the people's sovereignty. Several scholars have noted that the EFF presents a challenge to the values of pluralist democracy (De Jager, 2015; Satgar, 2017), with some outrightly calling the party "deeply undemocratic" because of its "disdain for hard-won democratic values, constitutional principles and practices" that make the party "nothing less than an antidemocratic pariah" (Satgar, 2017).

Power-sharing safeguards and constitutional guarantees for minority rights are key features of liberal democracy, but the populist counter-vision does not (in theory) accept any restrictions on the political and ideological supremacy of the people (Mény & Surel, 2002; Abts & Rummens, 2007). Former Public Protector Thuli Madonsela is almost universally revered in South Africa for her role in bringing to light the corruption around former President Zuma's Nkandla residence, which sparked the EFF's 'pay back the money' campaign. However, when Madonsela released a report implicating Malema in an "unlawful and invalid" multi-million-

rand contract with the Limpopo government in 2009, Malema was quick to pronounce the public protector "a tool used by Afrikaner minorities to undermine the leadership of African masses" (Moloto, 2013). This attempt to discredit one of the core pillars of accountability in the South African government highlights the dangers of populist politics for the still-consolidating democracy.

The EFF's disdain for the independent judiciary of the country has also been well documented. The party's six years of operations have been marked both by high-profile court battles and by the EFF high command's controversial responses. Julius Malema's comments after rulings against the EFF include statements such as "The judges can save the democracy of South Africa by not being biased" and "A biased judiciary will force us into the bush, and we don't want to go into the bush" (Mitchley, 2019).

Where the court has ruled in favour of the EFF, or in favour of issues that align with the party's agenda, the executive members of the party have made their support for South Africa's independent court system very clear. However, Malema's responses to unfavourable judgements were not criticism of the case itself or the outcome, but of the judicial system or of the judges themselves. A few days after two judgments were handed down by women judges in matters where the EFF was the unsuccessful party, Malema relied on personal attacks on the judges, remarking that South Africa needed "women judges who are not scared of male politicians" (Mitchley, 2019) rather than commenting on the case itself. The General Council of the Bar (GBC) publicly objected to Malema for "referring to [judges] as being incompetent, lacking in appropriate confidence, independence, and being politically motivated" (Mitchley, 2019).

Most worryingly, Malema has claimed that "there is no neutrality" in the South African legal system and that the EFF would therefore have no choice but to "take up arms" (Mitchley, 2019), thereby endorsing violence as a response when the law does not go the way his party wanted it to. Any political party in a still-consolidating democracy endorsing violent extra-judicial action is a clear cause for alarm, especially when that party is growing its share of parliamentary seats in every election. Malema's outbursts against the judiciary are particularly concerning considering that he is one of the six members of Parliament on the Judicial Service Commission, which is responsible for appointing judges (Corder, 2019a).

South African law is prepared for the attacks. In a 2001 case, the Constitutional Court found that a balance must be achieved between "'the commitment to open and accountable government' and speech which was 'likely to damage the administration of justice'" (Corder, 2019a). Those who recklessly criticise judges can be prosecuted for it. However, it remains to be seen whether that will help restore the public trust in the independent judiciary, which has been eroded by claims of bias by some of the most influential voices in South African politics. Justice Nugent issued a dire warning to that effect in a judgement on press freedom: "If the rule of law is itself eroded through compromising the integrity of the judicial process then all constitutional rights and freedoms … are also compromised" (quoted in Corder, 2019b).

Malema's involvement in the siphoning off of public funds from the Limpopo Province highlights another of the dangers the EFF poses to South African democracy. Despite not being at the head of the country's government, and despite the party's stated goal of rooting out corruption in the governing party, the EFF has been implicated in a vast number of corruption scandals in its short existence. In 2012 the Public Protector traced R2.1-million in dividends and loans that flowed to Malema from On-Point Engineering, a company in which he owns a 50 percent stake, in fraudulent tenders from Limpopo roads and transport department. Malema was consequently charged with 16 counts of money laundering a year before founding his 'corruption-busting' party (Van Wyk, 2019).

However, the more recent VBS Mutual Bank scandal eclipses even that incident. The *Daily Maverick*'s investigative journalism unit, *Scorpio*, found that the EFF received over R1.8-million in illicit VBS funds flowing through two front companies. "No VBS-money has flowed into our coffers", Malema pledged on 18 April 2019 (Van Wyk, 2019). The *Daily Maverick* reported that this was a "crude lie": "In fact, VBS money funded the EFF's fourth birthday bash, paid for printing of T-shirts, transport and what was described as 'Jhb Office Rental'" (Van Wyk, 2019). The bank was looted for everything it was worth, declaring insolvency as a direct result of being robbed by owners, managers and the politically connected. In direct contravention of the EFF's stated goals, the bank it helped to bring down was used mostly by the poor and vulnerable, by way of stokvels and burial societies, and later by municipalities. While the EFF were the financial winners of the great bank heist, the losers were taxpayers, the poor and the economically defenceless (Van Wyk, 2019). These two incidents highlight the EFF's core hypocrisy. While it claims to represent the most vulnerable citizens of South Africa

as a democratic force, the party poses a danger to the very institutions and values which make democracy possible.

A populist vision of democracy further poses a threat to liberal democratic values because it opposes a pluralistic understanding of the people (Mudde, 2004; Pappas, 2014). In contrast, its notion of the demos "is that of a homogeneous, unified actor, leaving no room for minorities" (Wirth *et al*., 2014). In a state as diverse as South Africa, an understanding of the 'true people' as a single, unified group poses obvious dangers to the concept of representative democracy.

De Jager (2015:148) notes that political parties are necessary, but not sufficient, for a democracy to function optimally, noting that political parties can also "become tools of tyranny and repression". As such, the continued existence of a competitive electoral environment may not be an adequate measure of the health of the state of democracy in South Africa, especially if one or more of those parties represent non-democratic values. Mounting voter apathy is quickly becoming one of the most significant challenges to the continued consolidation of South African democracy (De Jager, 2015:159). At their best, political parties can serve to combat this trend by inspiring voters to 'take matters into their own hands' by choosing representatives who care about the issues that concern them. At their worst, however, political parties can also contribute to further decline of the democratic process by encouraging extra-parliamentary measures such as illegal protest or inciting violence (De Jager, 2015:151). The EFF's history of justifying violence from its party members and supporters calls into question their support for parliamentary solutions to issues.

The EFF's embrace of violence is also evident in many other populist movements. The party argues that its use of violence is legitimate, since it is aimed at those who would attempt to counteract them, and thus against the will of the people. In parliament EFF members of parliament "routinely ignore" the speaker's rulings and seem to relish getting thrown out by parliamentary security. As the self-proclaimed "Commander-in-Chief" of the party, Malema heads an army of angry young "fighters" who have smashed outlets of the telecommunications company Vodacom and trashed H&M stores over an allegedly racist shirt design (Conway-Smith, 2019). Malema has told supporters that "parliament is full of thugs and criminals, go and shoot them randomly" (quoted in Van Wyk, 2019), actively encouraging violence as an alternative to parliamentary politics.

Gumede (2019) notes that "[b]efore the rise of the EFF, left-wing populists in the ANC tripartite alliance were curtailed by communists and socialists in the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu), social democratic components at the centre, and conservative African traditionalists on the right flank of the ANC." Now, however, the continuing electoral success of the EFF may indeed lead to a rise in populist resurgence in the ANC and DA in an attempt to gain political relevance and social support at the polls.

4.7 Concluding remarks

It is clear that the socio-economic and political context of South Africa has left the ground fertile for a rise in radical politics. This chapter discussed the local contexts which provide the background for the rise of the EFF and identified the factors which mark the EFF as a populist party in the African tradition, as well as the possible dangers of such an increase in illiberal politics for the fledgling democracy. Neither the EFF's rise nor its populist politics can be seen as apart from the current socio-economic context of South Africa. Mbembe (2014) argues simply that the EFF's rise is a "dramatic manifestation of the structural incompleteness of South Africa's democracy". Populism rarely rises within fully healthy political systems, but it is almost certain to further disrupt democratic consolidation once it has taken root. It thus becomes imperative to identify creeping populist rhetoric in South Africa's current political climate.

Chapter V – Contemporary shifts (or not) in populist rhetoric

"It is a story about power changing hands and changing colour but failing, finally, to change the lives of those in whose name that power is held." (Davies, 2015)

5.1 Introduction

Having confirmed both the populist trademarks of Julius Malema and the EFF, and the possible danger that this brand of political discourse poses to the as-yet unconsolidated democracy of South Africa, this study now turns to an analysis and comparison of the rhetoric used by the three main political parties in the country. Using holistic textual grading as the method of analysis, this chapter will investigate the changes in political rhetoric that have occurred in the other two major parties, the ANC and the DA. By comparing the score that these two parties receive for speeches in their 2014 and 2019 general election campaigns, this chapter expects to find a correlation between the rise of the EFF's populist rhetoric and policy proposals and the subsequent incorporation of such rhetoric into the political discourse of the other two main political parties, the ANC and the DA.

As discussed in Chapters I and II, holistic textual grading combines the efficiency associated with methods using key word indicators with a more holistic consideration of full paragraphs and wider context in a text. This method considers a text in its entirety by comparing it with 'anchor' texts along a predetermined rubric as supplied in Chapter II. This allows the researcher to measure the themes and ideas in a text and its tone and to compare it to others, rather than measure the frequency of certain words or phrases which may only indicate ideological leanings. This methodology will be adopted in this study to ascertain whether the EFF's populist rhetoric has influenced other parties, specifically the ANC and the DA, to adapt their own political rhetoric, thereby accomplishing the second research objective.

Four texts have been selected for each political party based on the criteria outlined in section 2.3.3. – thus 12 texts in total will be analysed. The EFF is expected to score as highly populist in both 2014 and 2019. For the 2014 electoral cycle, a speech by Julius Malema at the occasion of the party's election manifesto launch for the 2014 elections on 22 February 2014 is analysed. Malema's speech from the EFF's first *Tshela Thupa* (which loosely translates to 'give a hiding' in Sesotho) rally in 2014 has not been preserved for posterity by the media, and repeated attempts to obtain a copy from the party's head offices were unsuccessful. Accordingly, the

second speech by Malema analysed for the 2014 election period is the launch of the party's manifesto in October 2013. It replaces the unavailable final rally speech because it was made within 6 months of, and within the same electoral cycle as, the intended speech. For the 2019 election cycle, two speeches were also examined: Malema's speech at the manifesto launch on 2 February, and his speech at the party's *Tshela Thupa* rally on 5 May.

The DA and the ANC are both expected to score lower on the scale for 2014, when the EFF's populist rhetoric had not yet become as pervasive, nor proven as effective, as it was in 2019. Jacob Zuma's speech at the ANC's manifesto launch on 11 January 2014 and at the party's closing rally on 4 May of that year will be taken as the units of analysis for his term. This study will evaluate the populist elements in President Cyril Ramaphosa's speech on the occasion of the ANC's manifesto launch for the 2019 election on 12 February, as well as his speech at the ANC's final rally, known as the *Siyanqoba* rally, on 5 May of the same year. While Zuma was expected to score as more populist than Zille in the same election period, the expectation is that Ramaphosa will score equally or higher because of a desire to compete with the EFF.

For the DA the speeches by the then-party leader Helen Zille at the party's 2014 manifesto launch on 23 February and at the campaign's closing 'Vote for Jobs' rally on 3 May 2014 are expected to rank close to 0 on the scale. For the 2019 election cycle, Mmusi Maimane's speech at the DA manifesto launch on 23 January and at the DA's final *Phetogo* rally on 4 May of that year will be examined. A discussion of observable shifts along the populist-pluralist spectrum for the two election cycles will then follow.

The first section of this chapter will analyse the selected EFF, ANC and DA speeches from the 2014 electoral campaign period and the scores for those texts, with brief notes on party positions at the time. The second section will do the same for the 2019 electoral campaign period, while the final section will discuss the results of the scoring and analyse any observable shifts over the period from 2013 to 2019. The coded rubrics for all 12 speeches are available as addendums to this document, organised by party.

5.2 "The vote will change nothing, and everything"[3]: The 2014 election cycle

5.2.1 The EFF at war

On 22 February 2014 the Mehlareng Stadium in Thembisa fills up early with berets, red shirts and the occasional red jumpsuit. The main attraction arrives hours later, to great applause from the crowd. The EFF high command is decked out in the same crimson regalia as they stride towards the stage, with the new party's Commander-in-Chief, Julius Malema, leading the way. Political leaders use their outward appearance, of which the most conspicuous aspect is clothing, to elevate themselves above the masses or, in Malema's case, to walk among them. Physical appearance as political messaging is as old as politics itself, and Julius Malema's Guevarian politics is well complemented by his beret and red jumpsuit with the black spear and fist of the EFF logo prominently displayed on his left breast.

Malema's speech complements his attire in both its military undertones and in its ability to tap into the collective spirit in the stadium (Addendum 1A). This speech is extremely populist. It articulates nearly all the elements of the "ideal populist discourse" as posited in the assessment rubric outlined in chapter II and contains few elements that would be considered pluralist. In his manifesto launch speech Malema posits a clearly contrasted political field – the self-serving, corrupt government and their capitalist influences, and the 'people's movement' of the EFF. While he frames it within democratic discourse, Malema emphasizes the betrayal of the cause by the incumbent ANC and presents the EFF as the only party that can fight for the full freedom of the people of South Africa.

Interestingly, Malema constructs the former liberators of the country as an evil minority elite. The ANC government, which is revered for the critical role it played in the negotiated settlement that led to South Africa's first democratic elections, is named as the people's enemy. Malema states that "those who were trusted with the responsibility to give us a better life, they have sold out." As a result, the crowd in front of him "must stop relying on the elite" and instead "must be [their] own liberators." In Malema's South Africa the evil elite has exploited the people for long enough, and the EFF is the only party which can change the system.

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[3] Saunderson-Meyer, 2014.

How exactly the crowd should do this is made clear in his speech: they should trust in, and vote for, a true movement of the people, not a pretender. According to Malema, the EFF is the only movement created at the people's request, and as such is the obvious choice to pick up the mantle of progress. Malema goes to great pains to showcase the EFF as a true movement of the people: He emphasises that the South Africans living in "squatter camps" and townships are the true inspiration for the party; the EFF is posited as the party "on the ground" and Malema states the party's intention to limit its MPs to using public services by, for example, allowing them to utilise only public hospitals, or for their children to attend only government schools; and along with the party's dress code of workers' overalls, Malema's frequent use of the terms "we", "us" and "our people" in his speech demonstrates his supposed identity as one of the people. Malema situates the EFF as an "*organization of the poor*" and working-class South Africans and includes himself in that group with the use of "we" throughout his speech.

Where a pluralist politician might reject the existence of a supposed pre-existing, knowable 'will' of the people, Malema makes it clear that he and his party represent this will in its entirety. The speech nods in the direction of a pluralistic construction of the citizenry of South Africa, for instance when he discusses equal pay and working conditions: "Whether you are white or black, you must all be paid the same salary. Whether you are Pedi or Xhosa or Zulu, you shall all be treated the same." But his unchanging, romanticised ideal of 'the people' clearly define his speech as populist.

Malema is fully aware that his target audience is concentrated in large groups of "unemployed, skilled youth, wasting away" in townships across the country. Sosibo (2014) warns that it would be a mistake to underestimate the EFF's support: "Potential energy and sometimes directionless brilliance abound in those who have chosen to suit up in berets and matching blouses. There are some whose first political participation will occur when they vote for the EFF. There are others for whom activism and volunteerism are a way out of oppressive boredom."

The EFF's claim that it is the true inheritor of the struggle is an attractive one to a generation that has grown up in the shadow of the promise of 1994. Through the use of populist discourse and frequent references to struggle heroes who have become almost mythical to a new generation of South Africans, Malema posits himself and his party as the counter-heroes to the ANC's fraudulent political heroics. It is intriguing, but not surprising, that this tactic of the EFF

relies so heavily on the charismatic leadership of Malema and his fellow EFF command members. While this speech contains various references to a 'movement of the people' rather than a movement spearheaded by Malema *et al*., there is no doubt that the CIC's charismatic leadership does much to draw voters to the party (Reiersgord, 2018). Nieftagodien (2015:26) has noted that the "'great man' politics" around Malema "revealed the continuities with the politics of the ANCYL, rather than the insurgent politics of the poor," and this speech sees Malema actively trying to combat that perception. However, while his reliance on the politics of personality are not a prerequisite for populist discourse, it is in line with the general trend among populist leaders in less educated and less technologically connected Africa, as discussed in section 3.4.1.

It is clear from the above that Malema's speech at the party's manifesto launch is a populist speech, with very few nods towards a pluralistic democratic system. This speech scores a 1.7 on the scale, making it a clearly populist text.[4]

At the EFF's official party manifesto launch on 13 October 2013, Malema took to the stage for the first time to make a speech in his official capacity as the young party's Commander-in-Chief (Addendum 1B). It was a speech meant to position the EFF on the national political stage, and Malema used the opportunity to wear "the red heart of the EFF" on his sleeve. Malema launched his new party by positioning it as representing the continuation of a struggle that the ANC has abandoned. He states that his new party knows 'the people' and knows their struggle, and he clearly positions them as the only legitimate voice of the 'masses' of South Africans who are downtrodden and forgotten by the current administration. There is a clear narrative that the EFF is the people's voice, and anyone who disagrees is not one of 'the people'. This makes the speech deeply populist in nature.

According to Malema, white South Africans who still hold onto economic power from the apartheid era are a clear enemy of the people, as is an ANC which is no longer serving its voters. Interestingly, Malema makes it clear that the position of white people can be saved if they agree to share their resources. However, the ANC is posited as corrupt and irredeemable. It is also ridiculed as not a serious political party, especially its leader, and as a result is also

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[4] See Addendum 1A for the rubric and the full breakdown of the scoring.

mocked as an unfit competitor for the ideologically vastly superior EFF. At one point, Malema even apologises to the crowd for bringing them "a mediocre non-thinker and non-reader", referring to his time as the head of the ANCYL and as a staunch Zuma supporter. Zuma is likened to an embarrassing old man at a family function and treated with no political courtesy. In Malema's world, he is no longer a legitimate political actor.

Malema constructs a revolutionary narrative in the speech, drawing on freedom fighting metaphors and including his listeners in his narrative of revolution. In his eyes, the EFF is simply spearheading a revolution which will be happening anyway. It is a continuation of the original fight for freedom, and the EFF is thus tied in with a storied version of history. All EFF 'fighters' are likened to freedom fighters, and Malema lists examples of those who went before them to further tie the EFF in with this version of history. Malema makes it clear that systemic change is required by the revolution of the people to cast off their bondage under 'white supremacy and the ANC', even if technically this comes about through elections, a distinctly populist tactic.

While Malema ostensibly believes in democratic institutions, and his party and speech are aimed at gaining votes, he does not make specific mention of voting as a democratic process or show specific regard for the rule of law. In fact, where the law is unjust in his eyes, such as with the e-toll system in Gauteng, he encourages disobedience.

As such, this speech earns a 1.8 on the scale[5], as it contains nearly all the elements of the ideal populist discourse and few issues that can truly be regarded as pluralist. Even though it is supposedly open to the inclusion of those who accept his agenda, Malema's construction of the people is decidedly race- and class-based. The 'enemy of the people' is clearly set out in the text as the ruling ANC and their supporters and partners in corporate South Africa. This brings the average for the EFF for the 2014 election cycle to 1.75, a decidedly populist score.

5.2.2 The ANC in trouble

When Jacob Zuma stepped out in front of the crowd of 60 000 at the start of his 2014 bid for the presidency, the stakes seemed higher than ever before. Just a couple of months earlier Zuma had been booed multiple times by sections of the crowd at Nelson Mandela's memorial service

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[5] See Addendum 1B for the rubric and the full breakdown of the scoring.

(Mataboge, 2013). While the ANC still managed to fill the 60 000-seater Mbombela stadium in Nelspruit for the January 8 manifesto launch (Letsoalo, 2014), it was clear that the party was in crisis. The previous four election cycles had cemented the ANC's party dominance, but the party was also experiencing a continuing decline in its support base. The previous election had made this painfully obvious: while the ANC's seats in the National Elections had increased with every election since 1994, in 2009 the party found, to its surprise, that its representation was declining (De Jager, 2015:159). It seemed that for many South Africans, voting for the ANC no longer looked like the path to a better life, even if none of the opposition parties offered a credible alternative. The percentage of the voting-age population (VAP) who voted had been falling rapidly since a historic high of 86 in 1994, albeit with a brief resurgence in 2009 with Zuma's first appearance on the ballot (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2009:25). In 2014 the ANC's proportion of the VAP would reach a new low of only 36.4% (De Jager, 2015:158). However, it must be pointed out that the same crowd who had so enthusiastically booed Zuma had spent much of the morning "singing ANC struggle songs in honour of Madiba" (Mataboge, 2013). While support for Zuma had clearly declined, the party of Mandela would remain the primary choice for most South African voters.

While Zuma himself is often seen as the ANC's attempt at populist leadership, both his speeches for the party's 2014 campaign remain decidedly pluralist. His speech at the ANC's January 8 rally, which actually took place on January 11 and doubled as the election manifesto launch rally for the 2014 national elections, reads more as a policy overview of the ANC's past and future plans for South Africa than any kind of populist urging to abandon the system or rise up against a common enemy (Addendum 2A). Opposition parties are not even mentioned, and the only real reference to an 'enemy' is in the mention of "certain destructive and opportunistic elements". Zuma does not focus on the low-hanging fruit of the poor foreigner as enemy, and in general avoids a conspiratorial tone and does not single out any evil ruling minority. While the ANC is praised throughout the speech, Zuma uncharacteristically keeps passions subdued.

Zuma focuses repeatedly on the ANC's role in establishing the trappings of a democratic society. He praises the independent judiciary and the Constitution and there is a clear condemnation of political violence, which are all characteristics of a traditional liberal, pluralist democracy. He states that in some areas the "ANC will intervene", which may come across as a populist threat of unchecked government power. However, he quickly clarifies that these

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issues will be resolved through government programmes and policy changes in the vein of the way that a pluralist democracy would address them. While he does call on the financial sector, for example, to be more "inclusive and accessible", Zuma does not suggest that this must happen through radical systemic change, even if he does allege that the ANC itself is radical in other areas. He is also at pains to point out that the changes the party has made to its land restitution policy is based on specific areas of the Constitution, not on 'the will of the people'. Instead, he focuses on the power of a democratic vote. There is no argument for systemic political change – in Zuma's eyes, this is because the ANC is doing a good job as ruling party.

Zuma does sell his party through its connection to Nelson Mandela and the struggle for freedom in South Africa, and lists struggle heroes in the hopes that this will further associate the party with the country's almost mythologized past. However, he also points out the various policy areas where the party has made a difference in recent years and does not insinuate that its freedom-fighting past makes the party or its members invulnerable to critique.

While he often speaks of "our" people of South Africa, Zuma's construction of 'the people' is as broad as his construction of the 'enemy' is vague. He boasts that the ANC is the body that can "unite the broadest cross-section of society". Zuma emphasizes the ANC's non-racialism and the idea of a South Africa of "one people…united in diversity". As such, his speech comes across as very non-populist despite his calls for an ANC-owned 'people'; this earns his speech a 0.2[6] on the scale. While the speech is clearly written in advance by party members, as evidenced by its being released as the ANC National Executive Committee's (NEC) official January 8 Statement a couple of days later, it still represents the pluralist nature of the party's rhetoric at the time.

What is interesting about Zuma's constant comparison between the two decades of ANC rule and the apartheid regime that preceded it is that he posits the latter as both "unjust and farcical" and a valid point of comparison for the achievements of the ANC government. Zuma here produces a false comparison between the democratic regime post-1994 and the illegitimate pre-1994 one in the hopes of attracting votes, but it also allows him to continue to uphold the pre-1994 government as the people's enemy. This creates a fallacy of logos, as the previous regime

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[6] See Addendum 2A for the rubric and the full breakdown of the scoring.

cannot be both completely rejected as being unhuman as well as a valid measure of how well the ANC regime is doing.

Zuma's final rally speech focuses on the numerical and statistical results of the ANC's 20 years in office (Addendum 2B). He lists economic transformation as a key priority area and gives multiple examples of the ANC's successes in that area over his previous term. He avoids moral terms and framing policies as stark black-or-white issues, and instead takes a more pluralist approach by focusing on narrow, particular issues. Among other things, he highlights the ANC's successes at allocating more funding to the National Student Financial Aid Scheme (NSFAS), the National School Nutrition Programme, and even mentions specific towns where new hospitals are planned.

The true enemies of the smooth running of the South African state are said to be individuals who commit corruption or other crimes in their own capacity, not as part of any conspiring minority. While Zuma mentions that companies involved in "bid rigging, price fixing and corruption in past and current infrastructure build programmes" will be punished, he does not make them out to be a powerful force of subversion. The system, he implies, does not need systemic change.

While Zuma taps into the ANC history as a liberation movement often in this speech, insinuating that the country's and the party's histories are inextricably linked, he does not contrast the inherent morality of the struggle with the party's political opponents. The ANC's history is used to legitimize the party and brand it as the original, true mover of the liberation of South Africa. However, no specific enemy is named against which the party must mobilise in the current political climate, thereby keeping the speech firmly within the confines of pluralism.

Zuma's construction of the South African 'people' is similarly pluralist. He mentions the democratic rights and liberties of citizens, and states that South Africans "fly one national flag and embrace our cultural diversity". While he states that the ANC has made conditions better for many people, he does not construct an exclusionary view of who these people are. Instead, he focuses on a notion of citizenship that is broad enough to be considered pluralist. All in all, the speech reads more like a report card of his party's time in power than a populist ploy. Due to its general pluralist nature, and evident absence of populist discourse, the speech scores a

0.1[7] on the scale. This brings the party's average score for the 2014 election cycle to a 0.15, denoting Zuma's campaign as very pluralist, contrary to expectations.

5.2.3 The DA embraces its new role

The DA had in 2009 entrenched its role as the official opposition party by attracting voters away from smaller, issue-based parties with a concerted campaign of united opposition to the ANC (De Jager, 2015:160). In 2014 it would build on this progress, attracting 22.23% of the vote, or 3% of the VAP more than had voted for all other opposition parties (De Jager, 2015:162). However, to do so it had to muster support for an opposition party that still had much ground to gain in order to implement the changes that it promised. The party chose to do this by rallying South Africans behind the governance failures of the ANC, defining its campaign in part by its very opposition to the ruling party.

Helen Zille's speech at the DA's 2014 manifesto launch was clearly written with this tactic firmly in mind (Addendum 3A). Zille spends most of the speech promoting the DA's tangible successes at governance in the city of Cape Town and the Western Cape and advertising the improvements the party will make when it comes into power nationally. The overwhelming content of the speech is thus her party's policy proposals. She justifies the need for these policies by pointing out the ANC government's recent failures under Jacob Zuma, but she also admits that the incumbents faced extremely difficult circumstances when they were first elected. Zille seems to be stating that she used to respect the party – and she clearly respected its leaders, including Nelson Mandela – in its early years, but that it was no longer the same party which had fought so valiantly for a better South Africa under apartheid. In 2014, she argues, "'[a] better life for all' has become 'a better life for some'".

Zille thus makes a moral argument: the ANC has failed its moral duty to those who fought shoulder to shoulder with the party during the struggle for freedom. The ANC is clearly described being led by an immoral, corrupt elite. However, there is no mention from Zille of the need for any extra-parliamentary measures to combat this state of affairs. Politicians in general are clearly not the issue, as Zille praises rising stars within the DA. While Zuma is called out by name for using his office for personal gain on the back of the Public Protector's

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[7] See Addendum 2B for the rubric and the full breakdown of the scoring.

report that this was indeed the case, Zille highlights the need for competent political leadership and policymaking, thus keeping her speech within the confines of pluralism. The democratic system seems to be working, in Zille's eyes, if only voters would make the right choice, and there is no mention of the system itself being corrupted.

Zille mentions that the ANC has failed its constituency and uses strong emotive language to point this out in places, but she tempers some of these statements by pointing out the policies that can be implemented to remedy the situation. All in all, the speech reads like much more of a policy brief, even if it is clearly addressed to a 'corrupt elite' made all the more visible in the widespread media coverage of state capture under the incumbent. Zille argues that South Africans can work together for better circumstances, but there is little evidence of a strong popular will, even if she does mention a somewhat romanticized notion of the South African people. To Zille, the popular will is driven by practical needs – people want houses, jobs and an education – rather than by opinion or ideology. This brings the score for the speech to a 0.0[8] because of it espouses strong pluralist values as the best form of opposition to the corrupted ANC.

In the second speech by Helen Zille on the 2014 DA campaign trail analysed for this study, made at the DA's 'Vote for Jobs' rally in early May, Zille incorporates some elements of populism (Addendum 3B). However, the speech remains a definitively pluralist text. Throughout the campaign, the DA embraced its new role as the official opposition to the ANC on the national stage, and this speech is in keeping with its policy of defining itself in response to the very failures of the party that it opposes.

In the speech, Zille clearly posits the ANC as both a party of corrupt minority elites and the source of the troubles that South African citizens are facing at the time of the speech. The ANC elite is made out to be arrogant and secure in its position despite the lack of support for those who had supported them. Zille notes that under the ANC government, "the powerful few get richer and richer". In contrast to this supposedly arrogant and detached perspective of the ANC, Zille uses Xhosa and South African slang in her speech in an attempt to associate herself and her party with South Africa's majority black working class. However, she does not make any

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[8] See Addendum 3A for the rubric and the full breakdown of the scoring.

direct claims to be a part of the mythical 'people' and does not construct an exclusive 'people' which may be said to form the base of her party. There are some emotive phrases used to describe the ANC's neglect, but the general tenor of the speech is logical.

Zille emphasises that democratic processes are the only way in which South Africa's ship may be righted. The ANC is very clearly blamed for the current state of affairs, which is said to be very negative: "When a government becomes corrupt, when it does not do its job properly, the economy declines, unemployment grows, poverty deepens and the powerful few get richer and richer." However, as in the previous speech, the DA is said to offer more honest and competent officials and leaders, and she did not advocate a complete overhaul of the system. DA politicians "serve the people, not the other way around," and therefore South Africans should vote for the DA, not revolt against the system. The ballot is emphasised as the weapon of choice, and Zille highlights the importance of electoral competition, saying to the South African people that "You hire us with your vote, and you fire us with your vote."

While the speech does include populist elements – the conspiring minority elite, the fact that capital is being concentrated in the hands of the few, the idea of a popular will for a better South Africa – Zille uses them to advocate for her policy proposals and for more efficient government in general. It must also be noted that, considering the evidence of state capture that was emerging at the time, these were not unfounded claims. Change is emphasized in the form of voting for a DA government, but not through any extra-democratic measures as Zille does not resort to a crisis narrative or delegitimization of the democratic system. This speech thus remains pluralist with a score of 0.0[9]. This brings the DA's score for the 2014 election cycle to an average of 0.0, making it a decidedly pluralist campaign.

5.3 "They will continue to be short-changed"[10]: The 2019 election cycle

5.3.1 The EFF's tour of champions

In 2019, Julius Malema started his election tour as the triumphant champion. The party was clear in its message that expecting private interests to rebuild the economy had been a "total failure and disaster" (EFF Statement, 2019b:2). Feeling vindicated by the party's success in the 2016 local elections, the EFF was further buoyed by Ipsos predictions that they would earn

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[9] See Addendum 3B for the rubric and the full breakdown of the scoring.
[10] Bundy, 2014:157

up to 11% of the vote in 2019 (Haffajee, 2019). Malema's speech at the party's manifesto launch was that of a returning conqueror – he knew what his people wanted, and he would promise to give it to them – but it was also the speech of a man who knew that much of his success depended on him convincing the audience that his party remained a scrappy underdog.

The EFF was assured that the issues that had first brought it to prominence would be equally important in their second bid for the presidency. However, it also had to convince its voters that it was being kept from power by evil minority interests afraid of its full power. In Malema's view, "White Monopoly Capital remain[ed] the primary enemy in the war for economic freedom and in the struggle to change the lives of [their] people" (EFF Statement, 2019a:3), and as such it became the joint focus of his attack, along with the old enemy, his former party, the ANC.

Malema's speech at the EFF election manifesto launch at Giant Stadium in Soshanguve township north of Pretoria on 2 February 2019 can be scored as a highly populist text (Addendum 1C). Malema's main thesis for this speech is clear: In South Africa under the ANC, the rich are becoming richer and the poor are becoming poorer, and these two groups are still largely divided along racial lines despite a small growing black middle class – a factually valid critique of the country's lack of transformation in the post-apartheid era. Malema makes it clear that he is making this speech to 'his people' in Soshanguve, because they represent the millions of other South Africans who live under the same circumstances and who make up the people the EFF stands for. However, his construction of 'the people' in this speech is clearly predicated on both racial and class lines. Malema thus constructs the EFF as representing the will of the majority, which is here seen as a unified whole of poor, black South Africans.

According to Malema, black South Africans have been robbed of their dignity by the as a result of the latter's failure to improve the circumstances faced by the former in the 25 years since the dismantling of apartheid. He uses the metaphor of hunger to frame this situation as a crisis to which a robust response cannot be postponed. This leads him to argue that stronger actions are necessary. Malema thus creates a crisis narrative which allows for statements such as compulsory education "by force" or making those who are found to be corrupt face a "firing squad". This also helps him to justify his constant calls to change the system by changing the rules of engagement in South African politics, namely the Constitution.

Malema pays lip service to the Constitution and other elements that make up the checks and balances of a healthy liberal democracy but does so with certain caveats. The independent media are important, but only if they tell the truth and refrain from 'lying' about the EFF. Institutions that correct corruption should be supported, as long as they themselves are not corrupted. The judiciary should be supported, but this can only happen if the Constitution is changed. Malema cautions against tribalism, but does so as an extension of his plea to stand together as black South Africans against the corrupt ANC and the white business interests that they are enabling. He advocates for an independent National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) head in the same breath as he attempts to brand the current NPA head as corrupt and in cahoots with the ANC for making statements unfavourable to the EFF.

It is also striking that Malema uses an incredible amount of 'liberation' rhetoric. The EFF are "fearless fighters" whom he urges to "Go to war!" even as he calls for a peaceful election period, making his call for an election free of bloodshed ring a little hollow. While his own party is filled with capable "ground forces", opposition cabinet members are "useless". He highlights the ANC's incompetence by arguing that they have failed to do even "simple thing[s]" that the people demanded, showing that he does not see them as competent competition. He also openly calls them criminals and promises their arrest when the EFF takes over government.

While his understanding of 'the people' is very intersectional within the broader category of black African that makes up 'the people' – including members of the LGBTQI, women, children, the disabled and foreigners – he returns again and again to the black African demarcation when he speaks about those that his party serves. He is also very clear on who the enemy is that 'the people' must oppose: the ANC government which has become corrupt and has done nothing to improve their economic situation in 25 years, and the 'white monopoly capitalists' who corrupt the government and continue to exploit black people. These decidedly populist statements, tempered with little in the way of pluralist thinking except a stated regard for the democratic voting system and the protection of human rights, mark this speech as highly populist, with a score of 1.8[11].

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[11] See Addendum 1C for the rubric and the full breakdown of the scoring.

On May 5 in Orlando stadium in Soweto Malema declared "Let the red flag fly high" in the final EFF push for votes ahead of the elections. His followers seemed to have received the message ahead of time, as the stadium was filled to capacity with red flags, t-shirts and posters. Malema's speech welcomed them to the rally with the customary "Long live EFF, long live!", a call enthusiastically answered across the stadium (Addendum 1D).

Malema constructs a distinctly moral argument in this speech – he accuses the incumbent ANC of having forgotten those South Africans who are struggling and rely on the government for help. He thus posits the EFF as the best option for those people, who are still struggling 25 years after apartheid, since the DA is "racist", and the ANC elite are both "criminals" and "too old" to be in government. The ANC's rule is referred to as "nonsense". Malema's language shows a bellicosity towards the opposition that is incendiary and condescending, lacking the decorum that one shows a worthy opponent. Malema clearly sees no need to respect them as valid political opponents, which is indicative of a more populist stance towards democratic processes.

Malema also uses the speech to state explicitly that the EFF is aimed at representing the working class. He mentions repeatedly that theirs is a party of the "poor masses" and thus constructs his 'people' along very explicit racial and class lines. He also insinuates that the EFF's purpose is that of redeeming the "hopeless masses" of South Africa – the party thus embodies the will of the majority. While he attempts to reassure white voters somewhat by claiming that "the EFF is not fighting for blacks to oppress white", he makes it clear that a lack of redistributive action from white South Africans will lead to an upset of the system.

The most populist aspect of this speech is the constant justification of extra-parliamentary responses to the current government's failures. While Malema both denies and denounces any EFF involvement in the threats made towards a journalist critical of the EFF, he is also quick to encourage his followers in the police force to "go to parliament…and shoot them randomly". While he might argue that these are simply rhetorical devices, it is not reflective of a pluralist stance which encourages voting as the answer to these issues. Overall, non-democratic means are, if not openly justified, at least hinted at openly. The speech also exaggerates data to make this point by claiming that Ramaphosa is directly to blame for Marikana.

Overall, the speech is highly populist because its use of a specified 'people' and its attack on the due process of democracy and on other political parties, earning a score of 1.9[12]. The combination of a very populist 1.8 and an even more populist 1.9 give the EFF an average of 1.85 for the 2019 electoral cycle. This marks them decisively as the most populist party on the ballot examined in this study, and perhaps overall in that year.

5.3.2 The ANC attempts to reassure

In the ANC camp President Cyril Ramaphosa was on a mission to reassure in 2019 – to reassure white voters that their interests would be looked after, to reassure black voters that the ANC was still their party; to reassure local businesses that South Africa was worth staying in and to reassure foreign investors that the country was worth investing in. Melber (2018:684) puts it best: Ramaphosa's ascendance was intended to "[allow] political credibility to be regained among ordinary voters." The ANC's 2019 manifesto contained a stark admission by the president: "We accept that mistakes have been made and, in some critical areas, progress has stalled." (ANC 2019 Election Manifesto, 2019:1) This was the tone that the new president approached his campaign speeches as well: harking back to the 'gilded' history of the party, while admitting in small part the devastation that state capture had wrought upon both the economy and the party's legitimacy.

Ramaphosa's election manifesto launch speech in Durban was meant to kick-start a campaign aimed at reversing the decline in support the party had experienced under Jacob Zuma (Addendum 2C). The event coincided with the party's 107th birthday celebrations, and the president wasted no time in praising the party's achievements over the previous 24 years of governance, highlighting the ANC's successes in social justice through which "millions of South Africans have benefited". While he uses the Isitlwalandwe/Seaparankoe awards, certain events from SA history, as well as the names of nationally venerated ANC cadres who were freedom fighters, to highlight the ANC's history as a party of 'the people's heroes', Ramaphosa generally steers away from mythologizing the ANC's role in the liberation of South African citizens. Yet Ramaphosa's evocative welcoming and opening statements made it clear that the

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[12] See Addendum 1D for the rubric and the full breakdown of the scoring.

ANC still believed itself to be the party of liberation and freedom, and that he believed that the party had the track record to prove it.

Ramaphosa makes it clear that, despite its flaws, the "ANC remains the most effective vehicle to unite the broadest cross-section of society". However, in saying this, he remains firmly within traditional, pluralist discourse by focusing on a "non-racial South Africa" and constructing a broad view of who is a citizen of the ANC's South Africa. He makes a concerted effort to link the party to the same broad-based attractions that had assured its dominance in the struggle and avoids romanticizing the notion of the common man in South Africa. His broad construction of 'the people' is summarised in his call to all South Africans: "Let us grow as individuals, respectful of the rights of others, conscious of their needs and concerns, and determined to lend a hand to improve their lives."

The speech contains an insinuation that the ANC is inextricably linked with the will of the people for a better life and with the benefits that democracy have brought so far. However, Ramaphosa does not allude to an unchanging essentialism to this will – listeners are to understand that this will is dependent on what voters want from the party they vote for. As such, Ramaphosa does not at all insinuate that the ANC is the only party that knows what voters want or that it is the only morally good party on the ballot.

There is no mention of a clear enemy here, as in the case with more populist speeches – while Ramaphosa lists several specific issues that plague the country's civil service, he does not create any one group of 'enemies of the people'. Instead, he mentions incidents or areas for improvement where transgressions should not be tolerated. He states that "As a society, we must show no tolerance for these acts", implying that his government will respond to violations within its own 'society' as well. He confirms this by stating that his government will "ensure that those who are responsible for stealing both public funds and private investments face the full might of the law." Ramaphosa thus avoids a conspiratorial tone and does not single out any evil, conspiring minority. Instead, he states that these acts are committed by individuals who will be apprehended and removed from the system.

Ramaphosa also pays more than lip service to pluralist democratic institutions, noting that great strides have been made in the young country through the actions of these structures. He positions South Africa as a nation "founded on a democratic and progressive Constitution that guarantees equal rights to all people". Formal rights and liberties, as well as the democratic

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institutions that help ensure their survival, are openly respected in his speech. Ramaphosa goes so far as to list some of the pillars of a strong pluralist democracy: "strong and durable democratic institutions, an independent judiciary, a free media and an active civil society." He calls for the restoration of democratic institutions that have deteriorated under his predecessor's rule. Crucially, he credits the "Constitution, legislation and policies" for some of the greatest strides made in the process of consolidating South Africa's young democracy, not the popular will. As such, this speech falls firmly within the pluralist dimension, attaining a 0.2[13] score on the scale.

In his final speech as party leader before the 2019 elections that would once again make him the president-elect, Ramaphosa constructs a more Manichaean worldview (Addendum 2D). He contrasts hope in the ANC with despair, and growth under his party with inevitable decline under any other. However, Ramaphosa's speech at the ANC's *Siyanqoba* ('to conquer') rally is partly an admission that the party has been found wanting. Ramaphosa lists specific areas where the governing party has failed its constituency, and while he does shift the blame somewhat from the party itself to the individuals who have purportedly committed the crimes, he admits that the ANC itself has some work to do. The party's continued hegemony is not used as a reason to avoid accountability. Combined with the clear absence of reference to any conspiring evil minority, this makes for a very pluralist text.

Ramaphosa notes the importance of collaboration with different stakeholders in order to address the country's economic woes. He does not describe a specific enemy or evil minority, but instead speaks of a unified South African voice. However, this voice stems from a broad construction of the South African people whom the ANC claims to represent. He affirms this several times in the text, noting that his party is working for "all the people of this great land", and that it must strive to build a South Africa which "belongs to all South Africans, and in which all South Africans belong", and even listing the diverse groups who make up his party's support: "artisans, shop assistants, teachers, nurses, students, artists and pensioners…business people, professionals, farmers, religious leaders and traditional leaders". Overall, the notion of citizenship is broad and legalistic, and therefore pluralist.

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[13] See Addendum 2C for the rubric and the full breakdown of the scoring.

In this text the ANC is presented as the only option for South Africans who want to see a positive change, a statement with populist undertones. The party's liberation history is hinted at to prove this, and Ramaphosa emphasizes the contact the party has had with ordinary South Africans and that the party has 'heard them' – the implication being that the ANC now speaks for them as well. Ramaphosa further insinuates that the ANC thus represents the people of South Africa as well as anyone can. However, his inclusive positioning of 'the people' of South Africa tempers the populist effect of this construction. He also emphasizes the importance of certain democratic institutions meant to place checks and balances on the power of the government, and regards the findings of the Zondo inquiry, which is aimed at holding to account his party's wrongdoers, among others, as positive. He does not claim that the ANC's majority should exempt the party from being held in check or accountable, and instead emphasizes that it is time for accountability for public servants.

The discourse avoids a conspiratorial tone, openly respects democratic institutions, and preaches a politics of differences, even if he does at the same time encourage unity. In this sense, the speech remains unquestionably pluralist despite its allusions to a mythical ANC of yesteryear. It thus receives a score of 0.0^{14}, bringing the ANC's average for the 2019 election campaign to 0.1 – decidedly pluralist.

5.3.3 The DA and the glass ceiling

Mmusi Maimane's first official speech as presidential candidate for the 2019 elections was as "well-choreographed and punctual" as the event itself (Du Plessis, 2019). The party of 'clean governance' ran a slick event, but their main priority was clear: the official opposition was out to prove that they were a party that could win as much as they were one that could govern. The DA had faced some political headwinds (many of its own making) since its rather successful run in the 2016 local elections. The party's image had taken some hits, and its own polls showed that it was at risk of losing voters to the reinvigorated ANC under Cyril Ramaphosa and to the Freedom Front Plus. Party leaders were also worried about the 'electoral ceiling' it was facing in terms of its lack of success in capturing black voters. Maimane's own leadership was in part a response to this crisis, as the party sought to make its upper echelons more representative in

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[14] See Addendum 2D for the rubric and the full breakdown of the scoring.

a bid to prove that it was not the 'party for whites' its competition made it out to be. However, Maimane had his work cut out for him when he mounted the stage in January.

In his speech Maimane undeniably creates the idea that his dream for South Africa is a work in progress, stating that "we should all pull up our socks" to build the country he foresees (Addendum 3C). He argues that the ANC has corrupted the system, but this is presented as a moral degradation of a former liberation party rather than the decline of democracy of South Africa's democratic system in general. Accusatory or inflammatory language is directed at the ANC itself instead of the system; the ANC is said to be completely full of liars, thieves, and the corrupt, and so none of them should be spared judgement. Maimane argues that the ANC "will not change" and that corruption has permeated every aspect of the party, "from crooked ward councillors all the way to the office of the President." The DA leader states that "there comes a time when we must liberate ourselves from the liberators". He uses 'freedom fighting' rhetoric to encourage voters to turn their backs on the ANC, which he argues has subverted the system to suit its own interests, a populist argument. However, Maimane makes it clear that this judgement should take the form of a democratic vote.

The text displays a clear respect for the rule of law and the democratic process. Maimane presents his party as an alternative to the ANC's corrupt practices, but also highlights the ANC's betrayal of both the letter and the spirit of the Constitution. He promotes the protection of democratic institutions and praises the Constitution and South Africa's commitment to the rule of law. He also calls for the creation of more independent bodies to monitor corruption amongst public officials. In this speech there is no notion that 'the people's choice' of party should be above the law, above reproach, or above the checks and balances of a pluralist democracy. He also promotes the idea that the system can be trusted to accomplish the DA's goals. Maimane believes that the best way to get rid of 'the thieves' is to vote, to use one's democratic rights.

It is also clear that Maimane's criticisms of the ANC are more focused on their performance in governance. Where changes must be made, Maimane advances the notion that the system has not been used to its full potential and that implementation has not happened to the extent that it should have rather than claiming the system has not been effective. Maimane mentions specific policies which the DA will implement in order to right this wrong, from austerity measures in government to a National Service Year for unemployed young people.

Maimane's view of 'the people' is ultimately what marks this speech as fully pluralist. It is inclusive of all South Africans who want a better future for their children – there is no mention of a racial of class divide, only that everyone has been suffering under the ANC. Maimane states that the task for the DA "now is to build a South Africa where no one is left out." There is no conception of ANC supporters as an enemy – but rather that they have hoodwinked by a party which formerly stood for the goals they once espoused, but which has become quietly corrupted and now no longer represents them. Maimane aims to show empathy with this process of disillusionment by reflecting it in the telling of his own story as a former ANC supporter who turned to the DA for real change. This inclusive construction of the people and deep respect for the rule of law are the main features of the text that mark it a fully pluralist speech with a score of 0.0[15].

The DA's final rally for the 2019 election period was held at the Dobsonville Stadium in Soweto, hometown of the new party leader who was to give the keynote speech at the event. Called *Phetogo*, or Change, the rally was meant to assure voters that the DA could build a strong enough 'blue tide' to wash away the incumbent ANC and quell rapidly rising competition like the EFF.

Maimane's speech thus seems like a response to the ANC government and the incumbent party's electoral campaign around Ramaphosa rather than a DA-specific one (Addendum 3D). It includes much more scathing personal attacks than, for example, Maimane's manifesto launch speech. Ramaphosa is named as a perpetuator of Zuma's crimes, and the ANC leadership presented as criminals, not statesmen who should be respected. According to Maimane, Ramaphosa's name "is recorded in these votes as one of those who betrayed us." Ramaphosa is presented not as the saviour the ANC makes him out to be, but rather another chip off the same block, with explicit mentions of allegations of corruption against the president and his role in the Marikana massacre. Thus, Maimane argues that the entire party and their government must be removed, because none of them can be trusted. The speech seems both incendiary and condescending towards the ruling party, culminating with an encouragement from Maimane to put the ANC leadership "in prison, not parliament".

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[15] See Addendum 3C for the rubric and the full breakdown of the scoring.

A dichotomy of choices is clearly represented – either vote for the ANC, like before, and go 'over the edge', or vote for the DA and make a positive change. The DA is presented as the only way to save South Africa from the excesses and greed of the ANC in a clear use of a crisis narrative by Maimane. He argues that the DA can represent the people more accurately.

However, Maimane's inclusive framing of 'the people', and his stated respect for the rule of law and democracy as a legitimate system are distinctly anti-populist. For the DA leader, there is no specific group of South Africans who make up 'the people': "We are young and old, black and white. We are Christian, Muslim, Jewish and nonbelievers. We are men and women, gay and straight. We're in cities, we're in villages and we're on farms." He also encourages voters to choose the DA by discouraging traditional measures of in-grouping: "Your vote cannot simply be an expression of who you are: your race, your language, your culture or your religion." To Maimane, democracy is clearly the calculation of votes – the procedural act of democracy – rather than the creation of one unified whole, a distinctly pluralist sentiment.

While Maimane highlights the corruption of the ANC, the system itself is not said to have failed, only the party. The system needs to be saved and reformed, but not demolished and rebuilt. However, Maimane makes it clear that the crisis situation the country is in warrants a Manichaean perspective on politics, and stronger condemnation of the ruling party. The discourse thus includes mention of an evil ruling minority, the ANC and their business cronies, and a crisis situation of cosmic proportions for South Africans and thus it romanticizes the South African public to some extent. Nevertheless, this is tempered by a respect for democracy as the best option of governance. Minority rights and the protection of the constitution are also highlighted, and Maimane constructs a broad understanding of the people, thus keeping his speech more aligned with pluralist discourse despite some populist elements. This earns his election manifesto launch speech a 0.4^{16} score, making the DA's average for the 2019 elections 0.2 – still largely pluralist.

5.4 Contemporary shifts (or not) over the two election cycles

It is clear from Figure 5.1 that there have been no major shifts in the level of populist rhetoric employed by the ANC and the DA. However, the qualitative coding system used in this study

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[16] See Addendum 3D for the rubric and the full breakdown of the scoring.

allows for an analysis of the texts within the parameters of their populist scores to inspect, interrogate and interpret (Richards, 2013:95) within the context of the South African socio-economic and political climate. As such, the context of each of the parties' positions may help to explain their placement on the populist spectrum. What is clear from the above analysis is that populist rhetoric seems to be more attractive to opposition parties. It also seems that one party's success in employing populist discourse in their electoral campaigns has not encouraged the other two parties to venture further from more pluralist discourse.


Figure 5.1. Average populist rhetoric scores by party over the two most recent national elections

Julius Malema's EFF entered the political arena in South Africa in the immediate aftermath of the gunshots at Marikana. The young party immediately became known for its use of populist discourse, which it adopted to much greater effect than older populist liberation movements in South Africa, such as the Pan Africanist Congress, which had combined Africanist policies with leftist populism (Gumede, 2019). In a very real sense, the rise of the EFF seemed to signify the shift of the political landscape in South Africa away from the hegemony of the ANC. From the above data, it is clear that the EFF qualifies as the most populist of the three parties examined in this study by a large margin. Like other African populists, Malema constructed his 'people' along racial lines and the urban poor became his target audience (Resnick, 2014).

Malema faced a revived ANC with the removal of Jacob Zuma as state president and the instatement of the less politically tainted Cyril Ramaphosa. This may explain the intensified and consistent use of populist rhetoric throughout his campaign. Though the EFF's favoured

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political target had been removed, Malema continued to construct the ANC regime as the evil minority elite that was keeping poor black South Africans from economic and socio-political emancipation. While his assertion that inequality in the country was deepening was correct, as discussed in section 4.3.3, Malema constructs the suffering 'people' strictly along racial lines and cites collusion between the ruling ANC and the country's white capitalists as the main reason for this dire state of affairs. Malema's clear populist rhetoric and scathing attacks on his political rivals confirm his populist credentials and aim to do as much damage as possible to the ANC, his greatest competition for the position of chief executive. However, the rise of the 'red army' was as much a response to the ANC's legitimacy crisis as the cause of it.

After Marikana, there was a distinct challenge to the ANC hegemony on the left from various sources. Ongoing local-level protests, called 'service delivery protests' in the media, were the first indication that the ANC was no longer beyond criticism from the core constituency of its voters, nor did it have the monopoly on expressing the concerns of the people of South Africa. This "rebellion of the poor" is seen to be challenging the ANC on a local level, if not on the higher political levels. The wave of strikes on the platinum belt between 2012 and 2014 was seen to expose the shared interests of ANC leaders, particularly then business tycoon and now President Ramaphosa, with mining capital. This helped to discredit the ANC's narrative of continuing the liberation journey of its past heroes through governance and situated it on the side of the capital interests it had promised to fight. Furthermore, the demise of established trade unions such as the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) which had been aligned with the ruling party created a power vacuum as members became disillusioned with what they saw as union leaders' cooperation with the government at the expense of workers. These workers then left unions like NUM to seek representation elsewhere (Pillay, 2015:3). This vacuum was easily filled by new unions such as the Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (Amcu) which were able to act as free agents because of their lack of prior links to any political parties. As such, they were free to create congregations of people dissatisfied with ANC rule who were easy targets for the EFF's attempts to connect with other 'revolutionary organisations'.

Concerned that the EFF was outflanking it on the left and attracting younger voters, a 2017 ANC conference passed a resolution on land reform without compensation, thereby theoretically making it easier for land ownership to be moved from white farmers to poor black South Africans (Conway-Smith, 2019; Joubert, 2018). This signified a shift to the left for the

ANC and opened the door to collaboration with the EFF on the issue, despite the ANC voting against the EFF in a parliamentary debate on the topic earlier in the year. In 2018, with land expropriation among the key topics of the upcoming election, the party's manifesto also promised that all undergraduate students would be fully funded by NSFAS by 2024, that the state would work against the dominance of large companies in townships and villages, and would "incentivise" citizens from other African countries to "stay in the borders of their own country" (ANC 2019 Election Manifesto, 2019:8). All these policy proposals were clearly aimed at winning over working-class and poor voters which the party assumed had been attracted by the EFF's poor-friendly policy proposals and agenda. In short, the ANC was adapting its policies to suit a more populist political rhetoric. Thus, while not evident in rhetoric, it does appear that the EFF has shifted policy priorities for the ruling party.

While Jacob Zuma's other engagements with the public have often been markedly populist in rhetoric (Vincent, 2011; Melber, 2018), both speeches examined in this study could easily be classified as pluralist. This aligns with theories that populist discourse is a tool employed when deemed necessary rather than being a trademark of a particular politician. As the ANC needed to boost its prestige and reconfirm its gravitas in the South African political sphere, a much more pluralist speech was written for Zuma on both occasions. This may also have represented an attempt by the ruling party to reaffirm its credibility amongst the business classes of South Africa after the exposure of various ANC- and Zuma-related corruption scandals had lowered investor confidence and effectively dried up international investment.

Cyril Ramaphosa's pluralist turn on the podium may be read as a continuation of this approach. A businessman and former head negotiator for the ANC before 1994, the politician was seen as possessing a certain gravitas which would help instil confidence in both the economy and the party. It would also make sense for popular[17] incumbents to be less likely to use populist rhetoric to convince the electorate to give them another chance in office.

One could also hypothesise that the allure of populist rhetoric declines for the ruling party that is charged with facilitating alliances between business and state interests, and that Zuma's fall suggests that populism has its limits (Melber, 2018:684). Divisive rhetoric becomes less helpful

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[17] The latest SA Citizen Survey report found that Ramaphosa's favourability rating has hovered steadily around 60% for 2019 (Haffajee, 2019).

when the party needs the cooperation of even those they might term the economic elite. Ramaphosa's aim, then, is to shore up as much partisan support as possible without alienating potential supporters, which he accomplishes by emphasising the party's non-racial roots even when lauding racial diversity. The ANC also faces an image problem when considering populist rhetoric: after 25 years in power, the position of the 'political elite' cannot be shrugged off by the ANC. This makes it hard for ANC leaders to easily identify a blameable 'minority elite' which does not include themselves, and thus makes populist rhetoric less attractive.

The official opposition presents an equally interesting case. Msomi (2016:16) points out that the DA itself says its core supporters are turned off the party by Malema-like antics. Rooted as it is in a long line of liberal parties with a core group of liberal white voters that it has retained throughout its transitions, the DA can ill afford to shift too far towards a more populist form of discourse. On the other hand, the party is facing an erosion of more conservative white voters to the rightist FF+. As mentioned in section 4.3.2, the DA is also struggling to make inroads among middle class black voters as successfully as it would like to, even with a newly diversified upper leadership. Bumping their heads against an electoral ceiling may also encourage the party to adopt a more populist stance against the 'conspiring elite minority' represented by the incumbent government. It is clear that Maimane makes selective use of populist rhetoric in his political discourse. However, he constructs an evil minority of economic insiders who have corrupted the system, with the key charge being not their economic success but the unlawful actions which gained them that success.

Both Helen Zille and Mmusi Maimane stress non-racial unity even when defining the ANC as a privileged minority. Neither of them advocates for any form of systemic change, preferring to emphasise the importance of the ballot box in any quest to hold the incumbent accountable. Maimane also takes pains to point out that electoral competition would remain important even if the DA were to take over the national executive. Finally, both Zille's and Maimane's continued praise and respect for democratic institutions help mitigate any populist construction of their competition, while Zille's stated respect for the ANC in its pre-Zuma years is a further pluralist characteristic.

While both Zille's and Maimane's campaigns as DA leaders and candidates for president were pluralist in nature, it is interesting that Maimane achieved the higher average score. This could be read as an identity issue. Maimane, with his township upbringing and fluid command of

seven South African languages, may find it easy to identify with the DA's main target for its election rallies: working-class black people who disproportionately come from informal settlements or the outskirts of towns and cities. Zille, on the other hand, with her German-Jewish heritage and private school education, presents a somewhat more unlikely champion of the people.

Malema, in contrast, plainly constructs himself as the champion of those whom he considers to be 'the people'. Like other African populists – most prominently, Zambia's Michael Sata and Kenya's Raila Odinga – Malema makes clever use of the destitute socio-political context that his voters face every day to mobilise the urban poor which make up the majority of the EFF's supporter base. He turns complex economic and political questions into easily understandable, simple images: pit toilets amidst gleaming skyscrapers, domestic workers being beaten, or disabled elders left to fend for themselves by an uncaring state. His rhetoric is extremely populist and often comes very close to the 'ideal populist discourse' as set out in the coding rubric. A new generation of voters who are too young to remember the struggle, for whom "appeals to remain loyal to the liberators [have] lost their relevance" (Melber, 2018:684), is more easily swayed by these descriptions of everyday struggles.

The political success of the EFF may also have had other unintended consequences. Gumede (2019) has argued that the rise of black left-wing populism has led to a reciprocal rise in white right-wing populism, which he regards as the chief reason for the increase in electoral support for the right-wing FF+ in the 2019 national elections.

From the above, it is clear that populist rhetoric is employed mostly by opposition parties in the current South African political climate. As the DA and EFF face an incumbent with a vast majority support in the country, they may turn to populism as a cheaper and more effective way to gain support in a race that may seem lost from the get-go. It is also evident that, like elsewhere in the world, the economic and socio-political context of the country plays an indispensable role in the creation and maintenance of populist discourse.

While no distinct shift in populist rhetoric over the two election cycles can be seen in official speeches, one might point to the shifts in policy and behaviour that the ANC and DA have undergone in the face of the EFF's populist onslaught. Some critics point to the DA's release of blue berets, or the ANC's renewed policy proposals for expropriation without compensation, as examples of these shifts towards emulating the EFF's tactics. It does seem that the EFF's

electoral success has ushered in a recognition of black leftist populist politics as a viable strand of politics in South Africa with strong popular appeal (Gumede, 2019). As outlined in Chapter III, African populism since the end of formal colonisation has been the playground of leftists and Marxist-socialist parties. On a continent where successive regimes of colonisation, apartheid and neo-colonisation have deprived large parts of the population of opportunities, support for the inclusivity promised by populist politicians should not come as a surprise. Gumede (2019) sums it up well: "Ordinary impoverished, illiterate and jobless black South Africans can hardly be expected to see the difference between leftist populism; and more ideologically left positions". This may push other parties to embrace populist-sounding policies and actions, if not the rhetoric itself.

Gumede (2019) argues that the EFF threat caused Ramaphosa to support policies pushed by the more populist wing of the ANC, led by Zuma supporters, ahead of the 2019 elections. If this is true, further electoral success for the younger party may lead to its policies, rather than its rhetoric, becoming its main influence in South African politics. Many 'born-frees', knowing only a post-1994 South Africa, have grown up in an ANC-controlled state but have seen only the ineffectiveness of local governance by the once-lauded party. These young people have instead turned to the EFF, meaning that Malema's party has the most growth potential in the current political context (Gumede, 2019), with 49% of EFF supporters under the age of 25 (Harris, 2014). The ANC's battle to attract new voters as the struggle generation ages may leave it inclined to look towards policies that are attracting young people to its rival.

The DA, on the other hand, cannot afford to lose its core supporters by endorsing more leftist policies and may thus turn to more surface-level behavioural shifts. The party's release of blue berets ahead of the 2014 national elections (*The Citizen*, 2014) may provide one example; another might have been the party's conscious efforts to build up a cult of personality around the most recent party leader, Mmusi Maimane, ahead of the 2019 cycle (Msomi, 2016). What is clear is that populist discourse will remain an important factor in South African politics for the foreseeable future.

The research also makes clear the possible shortcomings of a discourse-only approach when analysing shifts in populist politics. While the EFF's success may not have encouraged the DA or the ANC to change their political rhetoric, the success of the populist party at the polls seems to have made the other two parties more likely to adapt their policy offerings and even media

presence to that of the EFF. Perhaps a more thorough approach would analyse other forms of public relations, such as party-sponsored supporter's wear, as well as shifts in policy.

What both the voters' and the other two parties' response to the EFF makes clear is that populist frustrations should be taken seriously. Ebrahim Rasool, a senior ANC elections strategist, puts it most succinctly: "We are not dealing with just outraged, disillusioned young people – they have adopted the weapon of populism to bring onboard young people who are genuinely outraged" (quoted in Phillips *et al*., 2019:42).

While this analysis is by no means exhaustive, it does present a way of engaging with the growth in populist rhetoric in South Africa and may offer a glimpse into the motivations of those politicians who do employ this discourse with various levels of success. To quote Hawkins (2009:1062):

> After all, this is still an attempt to quantify what some may see as unquantifiable, and it glosses over important qualitative distinctions that we can only see by closely analyzing particular speeches. My point in this analysis is not to discredit qualitative techniques but to complement them with quantitative ones that can enhance our understanding while still respecting culturalist insights.

As such, this analysis is an attempt to gauge the rise in populist rhetoric in South Africa within the country's unique historical, cultural and socio-economic context. The above examination, in combination with the information in the previous chapters, makes it clear that the rise of the EFF is not necessarily associated with a rise in populist rhetoric among other political parties in South Africa. It also makes clear the importance of the country's context in determining which party will successfully implement populist discourse and among which groups of voters this will be most effective; in other words, who will make up 'the people'.

5.5 Concluding remarks

This chapter explored the topic of populism in Africa through an examination of the speeches of the three largest political parties in South Africa over the two most recent national elections in order to address this study's main research question: Has the EFF influenced South African political parties to be more populist in their political rhetoric and discourse? In attempting to answer this question, this chapter utilised the qualitative coding methodology of holistic textual grading discussed in Chapter II to assess these three parties over their 2014 and 2019 national

election campaigns. The first two sections show that the EFF scored consistently as 'populist', while the ANC was surprisingly pluralist and that the DA utilised selective populist rhetoric while remaining largely pluralist.

The final section of this chapter provided some commentary on the observable shifts, or rather lack thereof, in the use of populist rhetoric in South Africa. While the study found that Malema's effective use of populist rhetoric designated the EFF as an almost 'ideally populist' party, this mode of address seems to have had little effect on the level of populist rhetoric employed by the official opposition and the governing party. This section also elaborated on the possible reasons for this lack of effect, namely, the ANC's position as incumbent and its attempts to reconfirm its gravitas, and the DA's history as a liberal party and large support base of white liberal voters. However, this section also posited that the EFF's electoral success may be contributing towards policy and behavioural shifts from the other two parties, highlighting a possible limitation of the discourse approach as an analytical tool.

Chapter VI – Conclusion

> "Given that the causes of all these processes are structural, rather than incidental, they will stay with us for a long time." (Mudde, 2018)

6.1 Introduction

Chapter I of this study discussed the research problem within the context of a global surge in populism and populism studies, and the need for more regionally specific research on the topic. The dearth of research on the phenomenon in the African context was highlighted in particular. Moreover, it examined the danger that the 'soft power' of populist politics might hold for unconsolidated democracies, on the continent and beyond. The first chapter also demonstrated that the general goal of this research is to advance an understanding of how populist discourse works within the African political and socio-economic context. More narrowly defined, the main research question guiding this analysis was whether the EFF as a non-incumbent has influenced, and thus exercised soft power on, two other South African political parties to be more populist in their political rhetoric and discourse.

This final chapter will first discuss and summarise each of the study's constituent parts. The next section will restate the importance of the research and will discuss the results of the study, as well as reflect on the influence that this brand of populist politics may have on less entrenched and unconsolidated democracies. It will then identify possible areas for future study and, finally, discuss the limitations encountered during the study which have bearing on its methodology and findings.

6.2 Study overview

Having outlined the background to and rationale for this study in chapter I, Chapter II presented the research design and methodology employed for this study, with specific emphasis on the coding rubric and holistic textual grading used to assign scores to the 12 speeches analysed in this study. This is a key contribution of this study to the body of knowledge on populism in South Africa in particular, but in Africa in general. The research methodology combined a desktop study with a qualitative coding method to construct a more effective case study on the effects of populist rhetoric. This chapter also emphasised the applicability of this methodology, noting that it was developed specifically for this area of research, even if its relative novelty does impose a limitation. As research on this topic becomes more established, more texts will be available for comparison, helping to validate scores.

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Chapter III then examined the global body of work on populism within which this study is located and identified the most appropriate theoretical framework for a study on the phenomenon as the discourse or rhetorical approach: Laclau's (2005a, 2005b) focus on populism as articulation rather than content, and on the nature of the 'people' and 'elites' as empty signifiers, is further expanded upon by examining Canovan (1999) and Aslanidis (2017). Both emphasise the contextual factors which influence the phenomenon, as these signifiers are flexible categories which can be circumscribed to fit any context – the elite might be an economic elite, for instance, a racial elite, or neoliberalism itself. The next section identified the possible causes for populism as analysed in the relevant literature, namely perceived crisis and poor governance. The following section recognised the contextual factors which distinguish populism in African countries from iterations of the phenomenon elsewhere, and investigated the ways in which populist parties on the continent can be identified on the basis of work by other researchers on the topic. These features included a reliance on the Marxist-socialist liberation backgrounds of many African states, a focus on a dual nexus of ethnic and urban support, a reliance on large groups of economic have-nots within post-colonial states for support, and a possible affinity for second-wave populism, which constructs former liberation parties as the newly hateful elite.

Finally, Chapter III delves into the danger populism poses to democracy in Africa, pointing out the more instrumental understanding of democracy in many African states and the danger that the illiberal nature of populist rhetoric poses to the continent's as-yet unconsolidated democracies. Chapter III thus provided an analytical review of the relevant literature concerned with identifying populist political parties within the African context, as well as an examination of the links between populism and democracy and their possible consequences.

With the theoretical groundwork having been lain for a deeper analysis of populist politics, and having established that populism is deeply rooted in its contextual environment, Chapter IV provided context for the analysis. This chapter examined the South African political landscape over the past 25 years within the parameters of populism as set out in Chapter III. The first section examined the South African contextual factors which proved possible causes of populism: the ruling ANC's well-publicised corruption and poor governance record. The ambient conditions for the African iteration of the populist phenomenon were also found to be present in South Africa, including a history of Marxist ideologies among the country's liberation movements and ethnic as well as racial political tensions, a particularly economically

unequal society, and a former liberation party embroiled in various accusations of complacency.

The next section contextualised the discourse adopted by the country's main political parties over the previous two election cycles, namely, 2014 and 2019. It then discussed the EFF as a populist party by methodically highlighting each feature which identify the young party as such, mirroring the identification of these components in Chapter III and accomplishing the first research objective. It is clear that the EFF complies with every aspect of the definition for populism in the African context set out in Chapter III. It has emerged from *a state of perceived crisis* leadership in South Africa, which it uses to enforce a *strictly Manichaean distinction* between the 'corrupted leadership elite' and the 'oppressed working-class people'. The EFF shows a strong *opposition to the political establishment* in the form of the ANC and instead *claims to represent the will of the people in its entirety*, however restrictive their interpretation of 'the people' might be.

The EFF's populist discourse is further shown to comply with the specificities of populism within the African context. It is firmly situated within a political landscape dominated by *socio-economic inequality*; it is based on a tradition of *Marxist-Leninist ideology*; and it proclaims a message of *social inclusion* through the clever use of *charismatic leadership*. With the source of the populist danger thusly identified, the final section considered the consequences that anti-pluralist politics could have for South Africa's fledgling democracy. In a state that has not yet managed to fully entrench its relatively new democracy, the EFF's attempts to discredit some of the core pillars of political accountability is concerning, to say the least. The party's disdain for the independent judiciary and media and claim that there is no true neutrality in these institutions does irreparable damage to democracy-building. In a state as diverse as South Africa, the EFF's understanding of 'the true people' as a single, unified group poses obvious dangers to the concept of representative democracy upon which the state is built. The party also advocates the use of violence against those that oppose 'the people', even while being involved in corruption scandals which would place them firmly in the position of the 'corrupt elite' that they claim to oppose. As such, the EFF were found to pose a clear danger to democratic consolidation in South Africa.

Finally, Chapter V addressed the overall research objective through gathering and analysing primary data. This chapter focused on analysing and comparing the three largest parties in

South African politics in a case study format by using the qualitative coding methodology described above. It answered the research question by analysing two speeches from each of the three main parties in the run-up to the 2014 national election cycle, and two each from the 2019 election cycle. It then discussed the observable shifts in populist rhetoric over that period. This chapter address the second research objective by answering the question: Has the EFF influenced the rhetoric of other parties over the last six years? Thus, Chapter V actively examined whether the rhetoric used in the speeches of the ANC and the DA changed around election periods between 2014 and 2019.

6.3 A note on problems encountered

While the research of Hawkins *et al.* (2019) shows that any speech over 2,000 words – thus any the English sections of the speeches analysed for this study – should prove conclusive to the scoring of the speech in its entirety, future researchers may choose to make use of translations of the short sections presented in other South African languages. While every effort was made to obtain translations, this was not always possible, especially where colloquial language is used, a trademark of Malema's populist discourse. However, the length and content of the sections that could be coded by an English-speaking researcher were sufficient to draw the conclusions presented above.

A more prominent issue was the lack of recordkeeping of important speeches in South African political coverage. As a result of the suspension of the ANC's website for non-payment to its service provider in 2018, transcripts of Zuma's 2014 manifesto speech were not publicly available and had to be obtained through correspondence with the ANC Department of Information and Publicity (DIP). Transcripts of Malema's speeches were more difficult to track down. While the two speeches from 2019 analysed in this study were provided by Dr Nyenhuis, having already been transcribed by him for earlier research, the researcher had to transcribe the EFF election manifesto launch speech from 2014 from a video uploaded to the party's website by its supporters. As discussed in Chapter V, the party's final rally speech was unavailable even in this format, and as such had to be substituted with a transcription of a similar speech delivered at the EFF launch in 2013.

Finally, a warning to future researchers implementing the holistic textual grading method used in this study: at first the researcher struggled to use the rubric to look for a 'balance' between the populist and pluralist elements to score the speech on, rather than giving each text a holistic

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score as should have been done; this neglected the importance of the creation by the populist of a theoretical 'popular will' when constructing populist discourse. This is an important point, as a speech that does not contain such a construction of 'the people' cannot be said to be populist. This issue was revealed by comparing my scores for 2019 with those assigned by other coders. A further danger is the attribution of some aspects of a kind of charismatic leadership common in South Africa to populist discourse rather than recognising it simply as a political strategy. These issues were all resolved through correspondence with researchers trained to instruct others in this methodology, and this additional check is recommended for future researchers, as they highlighted the need for more than one coder to verify the results.

6.4 On the research question

On the basis of the findings of the primary research in chapter V, it becomes possible for this study to return to the research question as stated in Chapter I: Has the EFF influenced, and thus exercised soft power upon, other South African political parties to be more populist in their political rhetoric and discourse? This analysis replies in the negative, noting that while South Africa does evince the contextual factors that are conducive to the manifestation of populist politics, only the EFF has consistently taken advantage of this condition. The EFF earned '2' scores on all four speeches examined in this study, designating it firmly as a populist party for its evocation of a 'people' based on both race and class distinctions and complete lack of professional respect for the identified 'enemy' – the apparently corrupted and complacent ANC and their white capitalist collaborators. The EFF, through Julius Malema, scores 1.7 and 1.8 in 2014, and 1.8 and 1.9 in 2019. These speeches are extremely populist and come very close to the ideal populist discourse and have few elements that would be considered non-populist.

The ANC and the DA, while utilising selective instances of populist rhetoric in their political discourse, continually temper these populist statements with more pluralist statements, earning consistently low scores across the two election periods examined for their inclusive constructions of the 'people'. In 2014, then-party leader Jacob Zuma's speeches for the ANC scored 0.2 and 0.1, while current president Cyril Ramaphosa scored 0.0 and 0.2 in 2019. Thus, the ANC actually scores less populist in 2019, rather than more so. Helen Zille achieves two 0.0 scores for the DA in 2014, while Mmusi Maimane scores 0.0 and 0.4 in 2019. While the DA's level of populist rhetoric rises somewhat, the difference is negligible, and it stays within the realms of a '0' score – in other words, a speech with few populist elements.

As such, the hypothesis that these two parties would become more populist in their political rhetoric due to the EFF's soft power is shown to be incorrect. Even so, on the question of what broad trends and developments exist in the political arena in South Africa, if any, as a result of the EFF's populist success, this study presents the shifts in both policy and behaviour of its two main opponents over the two national election periods. While the ANC has not consistently adopted more populist rhetoric despite its failure to hold onto younger voters as the struggle slowly fades into history, it has incorporated policy issues brought forward by the EFF into its own policy stance. The DA, on the other hand, has adopted some of the younger party's regalia and image choices. To a lesser extent, the DA has also adopted the EFF's focus on personality politics through its depiction of Maimane and other young DA leaders as 'saviours' of the struggling state.

While the EFF's populist rhetoric has not influenced the DA and the ANC to consistently adopt a more populist rhetoric, such rhetoric still poses a challenge to the country as a young democracy. The state has institutionalised its precepts of constitutionalism since 1994 but has not necessarily entrenched these values deeply in its political culture yet. Moreover, in South Africa it is clear that populism has seized on real rather than imagined tensions, leaving the EFF with the potential to disrupt the budding democracy with its anti-pluralist rhetoric.

6.5 Research contributions, at home and abroad

This study has added to the research in the field of populism by confirming the usefulness of the 'discourse approach' as a theoretical framework within which to examine populism with a focus on its contextual elements, and buttressing and expanding upon this approach first introduced and later elaborated upon by Ernesto Laclau (1977, 2005a, 2005b). The subjectivity with which each of the three parties constructed their own version of the 'pure people' and the 'corrupt elite' further confirms the enduring value of Laclau's (2005b) identification of these opposing blocs as 'empty signifiers'. However, it has also highlighted the limitations of the 'discourse approach'. While there were no changes in rhetoric, evidence of policy and behavioural change shows that studies may gain from including other indicators when examining populist discourse.

This research has also contributed to the body of research on populism within the African context by consolidating the work of other researchers on the topic, including Resnick (2014), Kimenyi (2006), De la Torre (2014), Mbete (2015) and Melber (2018), in order to identify the

factors which make populism in Africa unique. This study thus further expands the research on populism as a democratic problem in its own right on the continent, the need for which has been highlighted by Hadiz and Chryssogelos (2017) and Minkenberg (2000).

By identifying the EFF as a populist party with two different research methods – both desktop study and qualitative coding – this study accomplishes three things. Firstly, it adds to the reliability of the growing and therefore important holistic textual grading method developed by Hawkins *et al*. (2009). Secondly, it provides evidence for researchers, journalists and other civil society actors and policymakers to treat the EFF as a populist, and thus illiberal, political party, allowing for more direct approaches to counteract the party's anti-pluralist rhetoric and buttress democratic values and institutions. Thirdly, the improved reliability of these findings supports the discursive theory of analysing populist politics as an effective approach with which to analyse the phenomenon across different regional contexts.

While the findings of this study apply only to South African politics, the political similarities with other African states allows for reflection on the implications of this study for other African democracies. The two more pluralist parties have remained so because of the more broad-church ambitions of their campaigns and, at least for the DA, the liberal roots of the party.

However, on a continent where campaign funds are often jealously guarded by incumbent parties and sates are often dominated by one-party systems, more opposition parties may turn to populist discourse in an attempt to build mass support quickly and cheaply. It is no surprise to scholars of populism that the EFF has risen so quickly in the national elections in its short lifespan, as its larger-than-life politics makes for easy informational shortcuts for less educated voters that may be just as easily – and freely – spread by outraged media outlets.

Thus, while the absence of significant change in the DA's and the ANC's rhetoric is a positive sign for other still-consolidating democracies on the continent with multi-party systems, the rise of the EFF and its clearly anti-pluralist nature poses a distinct threat that reverberates all over the continent: Populist parties pose a threat to liberal democratic values and institutions in still-consolidating democracies; however, populist leaders are exploiting real suffering. While more research on possible parallels with other newly democratic African states is needed, this study hopes to contribute to an understanding of both the legitimate causes and the very real dangers of populist politics on the continent, thereby accomplishing the third research objective. While populism is often seen to be a politics of *exclusion* in the global North, this

study found that the phenomenon manifests as a politics of social *inclusion* in Africa. It also found that regional contexts remain paramount when analysing populism, reaffirming the importance of African political scholarship.

Lastly, through work with Professor Robert Nyenhuis from California State University, Pomona, who has also lectured at Stellenbosch University on the subject of populism in South Africa, this study has contributed to a growing body of Africanist populism data. The speeches coded for this research will be added by Dr Nyenhuis to a proposed inventory of scored speeches for South Africa available to other researchers, allowing for the development of a database and helping to improve intercoder reliability over time. This may also serve as the basis for future research on the topic of populism in Africa, thereby contributing to the field at large.

6.6 Avenues for future research

In academic work one good answer generally leads to several new good questions. The preceding chapters not only answer the thesis question, but also allow for the identification of a host of avenues for future research. While the findings in chapter V show that neither the official opposition nor the governing party has increased its level of populist discourse significantly, the trend may differ for other opposition parties in South Africa not examined in this study. A clear avenue for future research is presented in the rise of the Freedom Front Plus (FF+) and their reported use of right-wing populist discourse to counter the left-wing variety of the EFF.

The EFF's use of Facebook, WhatsApp and other social media to spread their manifestos, statements and invitations to rallies presents a unique opportunity to examine the influence of new technologies on populist political strategy. The rapidly increasing rate at which the use of these technologies is spreading across the continent may point to new, more inclusive ways to spread political knowledge to previously under-served areas, as cleverly demonstrated by the EFF in South Africa.

Finally, the results of the qualitative coding of the 12 speeches highlight the significance of rhetoric aimed at South Africa's poor governance record under the ANC. Further research on the effectiveness of local governance and the correlation with support for specifically populist political movements in South Africa may prove illuminating within the larger field of research on the links between governance and radicalisation.

6.7 Concluding remarks

This chapter has discussed the parts of this study, all constructed to provide an answer to the question stated in section 1.2.1: Has the EFF influenced, and thus exercised soft power on, other South African political parties to be more populist in their political rhetoric and discourse? This study highlighted the importance of taking regional contexts into account when analysing populism and has identified the contextual characteristics which set populism in Africa apart from iterations of it in other areas of the world. In doing so, it contemplated the effects that populist political leaders might have on unconsolidated democracies in Africa and found them to be dangerous to the formation and consolidation of liberal democracies.

To accomplish the research question, the EFF was identified as a populist party before the question of its soft power on two other political parties was addressed. The work within this study, through desktop study and qualitative coding, shows that the EFF has not exercised soft power on the ANC and the DA to make their rhetoric more populist, even though the other two parties do make selective use of populist discourse. However, the study further shows that there have been changes in the policy proposals and behaviours of the ANC and the DA that may be a response to the EFF's populist success. The EFF's illiberal approach to democracy also poses a danger to the process of democratic consolidation in South Africa, as it attacks independent institutions that aim to function as checks and balances on political power, espouses violence and creates distrust in the functioning of democracy in general.

"If we put our trust in the common sense of common men and 'with malice toward none and charity for all' go forward on the great adventure of making political, economic and social democracy a practical reality, we shall not fail" Henry Wallace (1944:7) famously declared about the prospects for democracy at the end of World War II. Perhaps that statement could be tempered for South Africa today. If we put our trust in both the voice of the common people and the institutions established for democratic checks and balances, such as an independent judiciary, independent media, the Public Protector and other agencies of the state and of civil society supposed to act in the public interest and not that of political parties or populist demagogues, we may yet avoid being overshadowed by undemocratic populism.

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Appendix 1 – Coded speeches for the EFF

Appendix 1A

Name of politician: Julius Malema
Title of Speech: Unknown: 'Julius Malema addresses the nation at the EFF's manifesto launch'
Date of Speech: 22 February 2014
Category: Manifesto launch
Grader: Marine Fölscher
Date of grading: 4 September 2019

Final Grade: (1.7)

2   A speech in this category is extremely populist and comes very close to the ideal populist discourse. Specifically, the speech expresses all or nearly all of the elements of ideal populist discourse, and has few elements that would be considered non-populist.

Populist	**Pluralist**
It conveys a Manichaean vision of the world, that is, one that is moral (every issue has a strong moral dimension) and dualistic (everything is in one category or the other, "right" or "wrong," "good" or "evil") The implication—or even the stated idea—is that there can be nothing in between, no fence-sitting, no shades of grey. This leads to the use of highly charged, even bellicose language.	The discourse does not frame issues in moral terms or paint them in black-and-white. Instead, there is a strong tendency to focus on **narrow, particular issues**. The discourse will emphasize or at least not eliminate the possibility of natural, justifiable differences of opinion.
Malema uses emotive language to make his point: People are living in "squalor" and "*hopelessness*" and being paid "*slave wages*"; he feels "*the pain of our people*"; the mines are "*stealing*" from them rather than profiting off them.	
The EFF is clearly contrasted with the actions of the current government.	
"*We must restore the dignity of our people*"	
"*it is important to take a different direction*"	
"*We are going to be attacked from all corners. We are going to be intimidated from all corners.*"	

The moral significance of the items mentioned in the speech is heightened by ascribing **cosmic proportions** to them, that is, by claiming that they affect people everywhere (possibly but not necessarily across the world) and across time. Especially in this last regard, frequent references may be made to a reified notion of "history." At the same time, the speaker will justify the moral significance of his or her ideas by tying them to **national and religious leaders** that are generally revered. "*enough is enough*" "*the time for change, it's now*" Marikana etc. used not as historical fact but as a symbol for the corruption of the government. There is a "*crisis of poverty*" Malema positions the EFF as the inheritors of the original struggle, links to ANC struggle heroes The creation myth is also interesting – the EFF created because they were 'asked to' by the people.	The discourse will probably not refer to any reified notion of history or use any cosmic proportions. References to the spatial and temporal consequences of issues will be limited to the material reality rather than any mystical connections. Malema does make specific policy promises, but they are meant as contrast to the failures of the current government.
Although Manichaean, the discourse is still democratic, in the sense that the good is embodied in the will of the majority, which is seen as a unified whole, perhaps but not necessarily expressed in references to the "voluntad del pueblo"; however, the speaker ascribes a kind of unchanging essentialism to that will, rather than letting it be whatever 50 percent of the people want at any particular moment. Thus, this good majority is romanticized, with some notion of the common man (urban or rural) seen as the embodiment of the national ideal. People living in squatter camps seen as "*inspiration*"	Democracy is simply the calculation of votes. This should be respected and is seen as the foundation of legitimate government, but it is not meant to be an exercise in arriving at a preexisting, knowable "will." The majority shifts and changes across issues. The common man is not romanticized, and the notion of citizenship is broad and legalistic. Citizenship constructed along class, racial lines. Nods to intersectionality of some issues within those parameters – e.g. black women.

The EFF are "*on the ground*" with the people. They must use public services like the average working class South African. "*our people*", "*we*" used frequently to identify with the voice of the people. EFF is an "*organization of the poor*" and working class. Malema makes an effort to detach the EFF from the excesses of other politicians.	"*Change your vote*" to make a change to your living environment. Democracy theoretically still trusted as a system. Nods to democratic pluralism and equality: "*Whether you are white or black, you must all be payed the same salary. Whether you are Pedi or Xhosa or Zulu, you shall all be treated the same.*"
The evil is embodied in a minority whose specific identity will vary according to context. Domestically, in Latin America it is often an economic elite, perhaps the "oligarchy," but it may also be a racial elite; internationally, it may be the United States or the capitalist, industrialized nations or international financiers or simply an ideology such as neoliberalism and capitalism. Malema states that the "*elite*" have sold out the movement and betrayed the people. "*they must stop relying on the elite*" "*those who were trusted with the responsibility to give us a better life, they have sold out. Therefore, you must be your own liberators.*" Its not explicitly stated, but the implication is that the government has sold out to capitalism and that capitalists are part of the enemy. Surplus goes to corrupt elite rather than building SA. Politicians are preoccupied with "corruption and self-enrichment". "*the struggle for socialism has been rescued*"	The discourse avoids a conspiratorial tone and does not single out any evil ruling minority. It avoids labeling opponents as evil and may not even mention them in an effort to maintain a positive tone and keep passions low. Evil minority clearly identified and criticized, although there is a focus on the fact that they have so far been chosen by the people.
Crucially, the evil minority is or was recently in charge and subverted the system to its own interests, against those of the good majority or the people. Thus, systemic change is/was required, often expressed in terms such as "revolution" or "liberation" of	The discourse does not argue for systemic change but, as mentioned above, focuses on particular issues. In the words of Laclau, it is a politics of "differences" rather than "hegemony."

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the people from their "immiseration" or bondage, even if technically it comes about through elections.	No mention of overhauling the democratic system itself – each person who supports the cause must vote, and that will lead to victory for the EFF.
The EFF must "*liberate*" the people; they need "*true freedom*" which the current government will not or cannot give them.	Malema does concede that the 'battle' for 1994 was won – political freedom did stem from the ANC's and others' struggle, and insinuates that democracy was worth the fight. However, this will remain meaningless to most if economic freedom is not also reached, and the EFF, not the ANC, is the vehicle for this.
"*We need a true freedom*" as opposed to half freedom under ANC	
They must "*do away with colonial patterns of property ownership in South Africa into democratic patterns of ownership of property*"	
Malema speaks of his policy changes as directives by his government rather than cooperation with civil society and private sector: "*we shall force business*", "*mines should prepare themselves*"	
Because of the moral baseness of the threatening minority, non-democratic means may be openly justified or at least the minority's continued enjoyment of these will be seen as a generous concession by the people; the speech itself may exaggerate or abuse data to make this point, and the language will show a bellicosity towards the opposition that is incendiary and condescending, lacking the decorum that one shows a worthy opponent.	Formal rights and liberties are openly respected, and the opposition is treated with courtesy and as a legitimate political actor. The discourse will not encourage or justify illegal, violent actions. There will be great respect for institutions and the rule of law. If data is abused, it is either an innocent mistake or an embarrassing breach of democratic standards.
Malema states that the government sends the SANDF to fight "*illegal wars*".	"*All of us must subject ourselves to the rule of law. All of us must respect our judiciary. All of us must respect our constitution*"
Current ministers in power (all opposition since EFF has not contested an election) are portrayed as 'fat cats': they are treated like "*royalty*" but Malema insinuates that they are not that smart, and they have security payed for by the state despite being "*nobodies*".	Despite militant rhetoric, "*peaceful election campaign*" aimed for.
	"*special courts*" to be established to deal with corruption; claims that the EFF will also bow to these courts.
"*this nonsensical government.*"	"*Institutions such as Public Protector and Auditor General will be protected*"
The current government – the EFF's main competition – is portrayed as inefficient,	

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corrupt, in cahoots with more antagonistic capitalist powers.	

Overall Comments:

Julius Malema posits a clearly contrasted political field – the self-serving, corrupt government and their capitalist influences, and the 'people's movement' of the EFF. While he frames it within democratic discourse, Malema emphasizes the betrayal of the cause by the incumbent and presents the EFF as the only party that can fight for full freedom for the people of South Africa. The evil elite has exploited the people for long enough, and now the EFF is there to change the system.

There is no explicit call for action outside the democratic framework. Malema urges supporters to change their vote so that EFF policies can be implemented, but also lists the protection of certain democratic checks and balances as important issues. Nevertheless, he does present the system as weighted in favour of the same forces that were in charge before the fall of apartheid and pledges to change this. There is no sense of a pluralist stance with regards to policy changes or issues facing the country – as the embodiment of the people's will, the EFF knows what is good for the country and must be able to force these changes on anyone else.

Malema further emphasizes the idea of the EFF as the 'popular will' by assuring the crowd that the movement was created at the people's behest and they were the chief informants on policy and the manifesto. He also states that his own involvement is not critical to the movement, as the movement is driven by the people.

Appendix 1B

Name of politician: Julius Malema
Title of Speech: Today is he birth of a giant
Date of Speech: 13 October 2013
Category: Party launch
Grader: Marine Fölscher
Date of grading: 2 September 2019

Final Grade: (1.8)

2   A speech in this category is extremely populist and comes very close to the ideal populist discourse. Specifically, the speech expresses all or nearly all of the elements of ideal populist discourse, and has few elements that would be considered non-populist.

Populist	Pluralist
It conveys a Manichaean vision of the world, that is, one that is moral (every issue has a strong moral dimension) and dualistic (everything is in one category or the other, "right" or "wrong," "good" or "evil") The implication—or even the stated idea—is that there can be nothing in between, no fence-sitting, no shades of grey. This leads to the use of highly charged, even bellicose language. Malema conveys a saviour rhetoric – the EFF has been created as the only party that will truly fight for the people. Describes the plight of the people in stark terms – "beaten", "raped", "terrible conditions", "dying underground", "unidentifiable graves", "thirsty for our blood", "used to kill innocent people".	The discourse does not frame issues in moral terms or paint them in black-and-white. Instead, there is a strong tendency to focus on **narrow, particular issues**. The discourse will emphasize or at least not eliminate the possibility of natural, justifiable differences of opinion. Specific issues mentioned that the EFF will improve, but all in terms of change from the current, oppressive system. Those who differ from the EFF are incorrect, traitors or 'coconuts'.
The moral significance of the items mentioned in the speech is heightened by ascribing **cosmic proportions** to them, that is, by claiming that they affect people everywhere (possibly but not necessarily across the world) and across time. Especially in this last regard, frequent references may be made to a reified notion of "history." At the same time, the speaker will justify the moral significance of his or	The discourse will probably not refer to any reified notion of history or use any cosmic proportions. References to the spatial and temporal consequences of issues will be limited to the material reality rather than any mystical connections.

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her ideas by tying them to **national and religious leaders** that are generally revered.

The EFF is the natural continuation of the struggle. Malema notes the ANC started it, but they must now continue.

Struggle heroes listed as examples: "Steve Biko, Solomon Mahlangu, [inaudible], Hector Peterson, Mbuyisa Makhubo, Tsietsi Mashinini, Onkgopotse Tiro, Andrew Zondo, and the ever-roaring young lion of Limpopo, Peter Mokaba."

"You will never kill all of us."

SA as a history of oppression that should influence policy now: "They have paid for it already because you killed people when you took that land."

EFF linked implicitly to other pan-Africanist revolutionaries: "the African revolution and the African leadership"

Although Manichaean, the discourse is still democratic, in the sense that the good is embodied in the will of the majority, which is seen as a unified whole, perhaps but not necessarily expressed in references to the "voluntad del pueblo"; however, the speaker ascribes a kind of unchanging essentialism to that will, rather than letting it be whatever 50 percent of the people want at any particular moment. Thus, this good majority is romanticized, with some notion of the common man (urban or rural) seen as the embodiment of the national ideal. Malema ingratiates the EFF with the downtrodden of the country. "We know your situation" "the organisation of the neglected and oppressed masses of our people" "We know that pain, and that pain will be taken care of"	Democracy is simply the calculation of votes. This should be respected and is seen as the foundation of legitimate government, but it is not meant to be an exercise in arriving at a preexisting, knowable "will." The majority shifts and changes across issues. The common man is not romanticized, and the notion of citizenship is broad and legalistic. All South Africans can be part of the people – "White South Africans, South Africa belongs to you too," – but under certain conditions – "you've got stolen property in your hands, and if you've got stolen property in your hands it means you are thieves who have stolen." Those who do not agree to share to share will be in trouble. "we know there is an EFF in all South Africans" so long as they conform to the EFF's agenda.

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"We know those problems."	"The petrol attendants, the security guards, the shopkeepers, the sex workers, you all occupy a special place in the red heart of the EFF."
All black people are a part of the EFF, even if they don't want to admit it. "Black journalist, be the real EFF, don't pretend to a white person, don't pretend to a white editor."	
"We are inviting you for simple reasons, because we know that there is an EFF in you, like we know there is an EFF in all South Africans."	Some mentions of minority groups who are particularly vulnerable in South Africa being supported, e.g. HIV positive persons and illegal immigrants.
Any black person who claims that they disagree with the EFF/does not support them, is lying to others and themselves: "Let the real black man come out. Let the real African come out. Stop being a coconut, become a real African."	Prisoners to be integrated back into society.
The evil is embodied in a minority whose specific identity will vary according to context. Domestically, in Latin America it is often an economic elite, perhaps the "oligarchy," but it may also be a racial elite; internationally, it may be the United States or the capitalist, industrialized nations or international financiers or simply an ideology such as neoliberalism and capitalism.	The discourse avoids a conspiratorial tone and does not single out any evil ruling minority. It avoids labeling opponents as evil and may not even mention them in an effort to maintain a positive tone and keep passions low.
Evil minority is both the ANC government which has failed the people – "they have delivered you to death" – and the white minority who still hold onto economic power – "white bosses and madams".	Specific mention of how the elite is conspiring to keep black people in their place: "Those who must qualify the black engineers, including [also] the black chartered accountants, are restricting the numbers of blacks in those fields."
"as long as Alexander continues to swim in a pool of poverty, you have everything to be scared of"	
White powers of apartheid still in power implicitly and economically: "we remain a conquered nation"; "our minds are in their hands"	
ANC corrupted and no longer the liberation movement it once was: "most of you councillors and ministers, you are in bed with	

these construction companies which are given tenders to"	
The ANC does not respect itself or its people: "the current government thinks about you when they think about drugs and alcohol. They have nothing positive to do to you."	
Crucially, the evil minority is or was recently in charge and subverted the system to its own interests, against those of the good majority or the people. Thus, systemic change is/was required, often expressed in terms such as "revolution" or "liberation" of the people from their "immiseration" or bondage, even if technically it comes about through elections. Both evil minorities mentioned are still in charge. "the revolution is going to start today, don't stand opposed to the revolution" "in defense of the masses of our people" Military rhetoric used throughout – "fighters" "Let us fight against the plague" "When we come into government, your days will be numbered." Malema promotes the notion that the EFF is there to lead a revolution which is imminent anyway. It is not the party that is causing it, they are simply the first leadership group that is not scared to fight the prevailing interests. If the EFF is not supported, the people will rise up anyway: "one day they are going to engage in an unled revolution" "People financing their own revolution form their own pocket."	The discourse does not argue for systemic change but, as mentioned above, focuses on particular issues. In the words of Laclau, it is a politics of "differences" rather than "hegemony."

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"When you took the land you committed black genocide."	
Because of the moral baseness of the threatening minority, non-democratic means may be openly justified or at least the minority's continued enjoyment of these will be seen as a generous concession by the people; the speech itself may exaggerate or abuse data to make this point, and the language will show a bellicosity towards the opposition that is incendiary and condescending, lacking the decorum that one shows a worthy opponent. Jacob Zuma ridiculed as the president. Malema makes him out to be an embarrassment. Malema apologizes for supporting him earlier: "an old man who dances like a teenager. Every time he dances, older people look down with shame," "I apologise for giving you a mediocre non-thinker and non-reader" White people told to share the land and resources, 'or else' EFF as an excuse not to follow certain laws which are not fair.	Formal rights and liberties are openly respected, and the opposition is treated with courtesy and as a legitimate political actor. The discourse will not encourage or justify illegal, violent actions. There will be great respect for institutions and the rule of law. If data is abused, it is either an innocent mistake or an embarrassing breach of democratic standards.

Overall Comments (just a few sentences):

Malema launches his new party by positioning them as the continuation of a struggle that the ANC has abandoned. He states that his new party knows the people and knows their struggle, and he clearly positions them as the only legitimate voice of the 'masses' of South Africans who are downtrodden and forgotten by the current administration. There is a clear narrative that the EFF is the people's voice, and anyone who disagrees is not 'the people'.

White people who still hold onto economic power from the apartheid era are positioned as a clear enemy, as is the ANC which is no longer serving its voters. Interestingly, white people can be saved – if they agree to share their resources – but the ANC is posited as corrupt and unsavable. It is also ridiculed as a serious oppositions party, especially its leader.

Malema constructs a revolutionary narrative. In his eyes, the EFF is simply spearheading a revolution which will be happening anyway. It is a continuation of the original fight for freedom, and the EFF is thus tied in with a reified version of history. All EFF 'fighters' are likened to freedom fighters.

While Malema ostensibly believes in the democratic institutions, and his party and speech is aimed at acquiring votes, he does not make specific mention of voting as a democratic process or show specific regard for the rule of law. In fact, where the law is unjust in his eyes, he encourages disobedience.

Name of politician: Julius Malema
Title of Speech: Elections manifesto launch
Date of Speech: 2 February 2019
Category: Manifesto launch
Grader: Marine Fölscher
Date of grading: 5 October 2019

Final Grade: (1.8)

2   A speech in this category is extremely populist and comes very close to the ideal populist discourse. Specifically, the speech expresses all or nearly all of the elements of ideal populist discourse, and has few elements that would be considered non-populist.

Populist	Pluralist
It conveys a Manichaean vision of the world, that is, one that is moral (every issue has a strong moral dimension) and dualistic (everything is in one category or the other, "right" or "wrong," "good" or "evil") The implication—or even the stated idea—is that there can be nothing in between, no fence-sitting, no shades of grey. This leads to the use of highly charged, even bellicose language.	The discourse does not frame issues in moral terms or paint them in black-and-white. Instead, there is a strong tendency to focus on **narrow, particular issues**. The discourse will emphasize or at least not eliminate the possibility of natural, justifiable differences of opinion.
Malema contrasts the promises of the ANC and the middle-class existence of many with the lives of poor South Africans: "*capital city*" with "*pit toilets*". The EFF will "restore your dignity."	
"*the poor are becoming more poorer and the rich are becoming richer*"	
Wording constantly refers to the moral failings of the current system: "*exploitative*", "*dumping*", "corrupt", "*rape*", "*killed*", "*stole*", "*suffering*".	
The current situation is enough to allow a 'the means justify the ends' type of response: e.g. with education "*by force*" – "*my government, I thought they were abusing me, now I realize they are helping me,*"	

The moral significance of the items mentioned in the speech is heightened by ascribing **cosmic proportions** to them, that is, by claiming that they affect people everywhere (possibly but not necessarily across the world) and across time. Especially in this last regard, frequent references may be made to a reified notion of "history." At the same time, the speaker will justify the moral significance of his or her ideas by tying them to **national and religious leaders** that are generally revered. The crisis narrative is evident throughout the speech. "*We cannot postpone the land question, we cannot postpone the jobs question, it must happen now*." "*we are hungry now, we want to eat now*" – hunger typically not something you can defer. "*For 25 years, they failed*" Thus, measures such as a "*firing squad*" which would currently be illegal, are encouraged. "*Our struggle is to liberate all of Africa.*"	The discourse will probably not refer to any reified notion of history or use any cosmic proportions. References to the spatial and temporal consequences of issues will be limited to the material reality rather than any mystical connections. Specific policy points from the manifesto are highlighted.
Although Manichaean, the discourse is still democratic, in the sense that the good is embodied in the will of the majority, which is seen as a unified whole, perhaps but not necessarily expressed in references to the "voluntad del pueblo"; however, the speaker ascribes a kind of unchanging essentialism to that will, rather than letting it be whatever 50 percent of the people want at any particular moment. Thus, this good majority is romanticized, with some notion of the common man (urban or rural) seen as the embodiment of the national ideal. Malema is presenting a "*manifesto of the people*", thus he insinuates that all information given by him is actually the will of the people by default.	Democracy is simply the calculation of votes. This should be respected and is seen as the foundation of legitimate government, but it is not meant to be an exercise in arriving at a preexisting, knowable "will." The majority shifts and changes across issues. The common man is not romanticized, and the notion of citizenship is broad and legalistic. Vey intersectional consideration of the people – highlights LGBTQI, women and children, immigrants, the disabled. "*democracy is not elections but human rights*" "*Let us stop xenophobia, let us stop self-hate.*"

"*our people*" dominates the speech. These people are constructed along the lines of "black people of South Africa". Malema states that the situation in Soshanguve is the same as "all over South Africa". South African education must "*make you patriotic [and]…African*". Must make you one of the people. All black Africans "*were divided by the Boers who imposed borders*" "*There is EFF in every blood of every African child.*"	
The evil is embodied in a minority whose specific identity will vary according to context. Domestically, in Latin America it is often an economic elite, perhaps the "oligarchy," but it may also be a racial elite; internationally, it may be the United States or the capitalist, industrialized nations or international financiers or simply an ideology such as neoliberalism and capitalism. "*the economy is in the hands of white minority*" "*people who raped our people, the people who raped our land, the people who raped our cattles*" "*The reality is that the whites are becoming richer and the blacks are becoming poorer.*" Malema insinuates that, because IDs are held as collateral for loans, poorer South Africans who are indebted and who would vote EFF, are not able to vote. The media is portrayed as not bad in itself, but filled with liars who are in the pockets of the ANC.	The discourse avoids a conspiratorial tone and does not single out any evil ruling minority. It avoids labeling opponents as evil and may not even mention them in an effort to maintain a positive tone and keep passions low. Malema is very clear that the EFF is anti-tribalism. However, this is because "*We are all one, we are all black South Africans.*" Discourages violence during elections. "*I do not want to see a drop of blood or any violence.*" "*Let us say no to violence.*"

"We are not fighting with the media, we want the media that is self-regulating, we want the *media that is not biased, we want the media that is not embedded, we do not want a media that is politicized"* *"you will not lie to them about us"* *"Stop being a Ramaphosa defense force."*	
Crucially, the evil minority is or was recently in charge and subverted the system to its own interests, against those of the good majority or the people. Thus, systemic change is/was required, often expressed in terms such as "revolution" or "liberation" of the people from their "immiseration" or bondage, even if technically it comes about through elections. Private industry consultants are 'causing' government corruption. Malema insinuates that the South African banks are set up against the poor. *"The money was stolen from the people by politicians."* Various mentions of the system being changed by way of amending the Constitution. *"Our struggle is to liberate all of Africa."* Lots of 'liberation' language: *"fearless fighter"*; *"Go to war! We are ready for war.";* *"Let us go and fight."*	The discourse does not argue for systemic change but, as mentioned above, focuses on particular issues. In the words of Laclau, it is a politics of "differences" rather than "hegemony." "Only a cross will make an EFF government."
Because of the moral baseness of the threatening minority, non-democratic means may be openly justified or at least the minority's continued enjoyment of these will be seen as a generous concession by the people; the speech itself may exaggerate or abuse data to make this point, and the language will show a bellicosity towards the opposition that is incendiary and	Formal rights and liberties are openly respected, and the opposition is treated with courtesy and as a legitimate political actor. The discourse will not encourage or justify illegal, violent actions. There will be great respect for institutions and the rule of law. If data is abused, it is either an innocent mistake or an embarrassing breach of democratic standards.

condescending, lacking the decorum that one shows a worthy opponent.	Constitution held up as the law, but when it is mentioned it is to say that it will be amended.
"*the cabinet is useless*"	Institutions which are meant to fight corruption must be fixed.
Institutions that fight corruption might themselves be somewhat corrupted – the insinuation is, that is why more of the 'enemy' have not been arrested.	LGBTQI must be protected by law and anyone who goes against these laws must "*be punished by law*."
"*A simple thing of cleaning water. They have failed,*" – The current government is so useless that it cannot even do the simple things demanded of it.	Criminals must be arrested "*whether they are EFF criminals or not,*"
"*When we come into government we are going to arrest the minister who stole the money of those people. We are going to arrest all those who stole the money of the people*" – no mention of an enquiry, due process – where the EFF decides someone is guilty, he or she is.	Judiciary and parliament must be empowered, but the way to do this is by changing the rules of engagement, e.g. the Constitution.
Voting age must be changed – also constitutional.	
Trust in the NPA deliberately eroded.	
Criminals must "*face a firing squad*" which is not allowed by the constitution.	

Overall Comments:

Malema's main thesis for this speech is clear: In South Africa under the ANC, the rich are becoming richer and the poor are becoming poorer, and these two groups are still divided along racial lines. Malema makes it clear that he is making this speech to 'his people' in Soshanguve, because they represent the millions of other South Africans who live under the same circumstances and who make up the people the EFF stands for. His construction of 'the people' in this speech is predicated on both racial and class lines. Because of the squalor faced by these people, and the fact that the ANC government has done nothing about it and thus robbed them of their dignity, according to Malema, stronger actions are advocated for. Malema thus creates a crisis narrative which allows for statements such as schooling "by force" or making those

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who are found to be corrupt face a "firing squad". This also helps him to justify his constant calls to change the system by changing the rules of engagement in South African politics: the Constitution.

Malema pays lip service to the Constitution and other elements that make up the checks and balances of a healthy liberal democracy but does so with certain caveats. The independent media is important, but only if they tell the truth and refrain from 'lying' about the EFF. Institutions that correct corruption should be supported, as long as they themselves are not corrupted. The judiciary should be supported, but this can only happen if the Constitution is changed. Malema cautions against tribalism, but does so as an extension of his plea to stand together as black South Africans against the corrupt ANC and the white business interests that they are enabling. He advocates for an independent NPA head in the same breath as he attempts to brand the current such position as corrupt and in cahoots with the ANC.

While his understanding of 'the people' is very intersectional within his stated outline of black African – including members of the LGBTQI, women, children, the disabled and foreigners – he returns again and again to the black African demarcation when he speaks about those that his party serves. He is also very clear on who the enemy is that this group must oppose: The ANC government which has become corrupt and has done nothing to improve their economic situation in 25, and the 'white monopoly capitalists' which corrupts the government and continues to exploit black people.

Appendix 1D

Name of politician: Julius Malema
Title of Speech: Tshela Thupa 2019
Date of Speech: 5 May 2019
Category: Final rally
Grader: Marine Fölscher
Date of grading: 5 October 2019

Final Grade: (1.9)

2   A speech in this category is extremely populist and comes very close to the ideal populist discourse. Specifically, the speech expresses all or nearly all of the elements of ideal populist discourse, and has few elements that would be considered non-populist.

Populist	Pluralist
It conveys a Manichaean vision of the world, that is, one that is moral (every issue has a strong moral dimension) and dualistic (everything is in one category or the other, "right" or "wrong," "good" or "evil") The implication—or even the stated idea—is that there can be nothing in between, no fence-sitting, no shades of grey. This leads to the use of highly charged, even bellicose language. Malema makes a distinctly moral argument – the ANC has forgotten about the poor and vulnerable. The EFF has arrived in their place to fight for those who cannot fight for themselves. If you do not vote [for the EFF], *"[y]ou are committing a suicide"* – something that is distinctly wrong.	The discourse does not frame issues in moral terms or paint them in black-and-white. Instead, there is a strong tendency to focus on **narrow, particular issues**. The discourse will emphasize or at least not eliminate the possibility of natural, justifiable differences of opinion.
The moral significance of the items mentioned in the speech is heightened by ascribing **cosmic proportions** to them, that is, by claiming that they affect people everywhere (possibly but not necessarily across the world) and across time. Especially in this last regard, frequent references may be made to a reified notion of "history." At the same time, the speaker will justify the moral significance of his or	The discourse will probably not refer to any reified notion of history or use any cosmic proportions. References to the spatial and temporal consequences of issues will be limited to the material reality rather than any mystical connections.

her ideas by tying them to **national and religious leaders** that are generally revered. "*they know Mandela has handed over the baton to the younger generation and that generation is in the EFF.*" The EFF posited as the continuation of the struggle.	
Although Manichaean, the discourse is still democratic, in the sense that the good is embodied in the will of the majority, which is seen as a unified whole, perhaps but not necessarily expressed in references to the "voluntad del pueblo"; however, the speaker ascribes a kind of unchanging essentialism to that will, rather than letting it be whatever 50 percent of the people want at any particular moment. Thus, this good majority is romanticized, with some notion of the common man (urban or rural) seen as the embodiment of the national ideal. Malema insinuates that the EFF controls the majority of the real people. "*You have shaken the ANC, they are very scared of you,*" The people is made up of the working-class and poor. Malema makes this clear by dismissing the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Johannesburg: "*we are not looking for you Habib [the VC], we are looking for the cleaners, we are looking for the domestic workers, we are looking for what you used to call garden boys and girls, we are looking for them, they are our people.*" "*let us vote for the hope of the hopeless masses of our people.*" "*the children of the poor*" "*Those are the forgotten people of South Africa.*"	Democracy is simply the calculation of votes. This should be respected and is seen as the foundation of legitimate government, but it is not meant to be an exercise in arriving at a preexisting, knowable "will." The majority shifts and changes across issues. The common man is not romanticized, and the notion of citizenship is broad and legalistic. Malema highlights the rights of women and disabled people as citizens. "*we do not say we are driving white people into the sea*" but that seems like quite a low bar. "*EFF is not fighting for blacks to oppress whites.*" Malema claims that he is fighting for the equality of all South Africans. The party taken power "*will be through the EFF performance in the election*"

The EFF is "*made by the squatter camps [and the]…townships*," the "*security guards*," "*farmworkers*" and "*cleaners*". It is a party of "*those who are not paid.*" "*EFF is for the African masses*"	
The evil is embodied in a minority whose specific identity will vary according to context. Domestically, in Latin America it is often an economic elite, perhaps the "oligarchy," but it may also be a racial elite; internationally, it may be the United States or the capitalist, industrialized nations or international financiers or simply an ideology such as neoliberalism and capitalism. "*Why do they hate black people so much?*" Malema contrasts "*white*" areas with "*black*" areas. Black areas "*still worse than Sandton…worse than everywhere else where you find a white person.*" "*ANC has forgotten about the children of the poor in Alexandra*" Specific members of the ANC mentioned as "*criminals*": Zuma must go "*straight to jail!*", "*Ramaphosa is responsible for Marikana.*", "*Ace Magashule, the real criminal*".	The discourse avoids a conspiratorial tone and does not single out any evil ruling minority. It avoids labeling opponents as evil and may not even mention them in an effort to maintain a positive tone and keep passions low. Malema is specific in his singling out of evil minorities. He openly dismisses the official opposition as "*the racist DA*" and calls the ANC "*criminals*".
Crucially, the evil minority is or was recently in charge and subverted the system to its own interests, against those of the good majority or the people. Thus, systemic change is/was required, often expressed in terms such as "revolution" or "liberation" of the people from their "immiseration" or bondage, even if technically it comes about through elections. The usual liberation dictionary – "*Forward to victory, forward!*"; "*ground forces*", a "*force to be reckoned with*"	The discourse does not argue for systemic change but, as mentioned above, focuses on particular issues. In the words of Laclau, it is a politics of "differences" rather than "hegemony." Thanks "leaders of political parties" for their condolences.

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"*You have been watching them eating. Now it is your time to eat, you are going to eat.*" Malema calls the ANC criminals.	
Because of the moral baseness of the threatening minority, non-democratic means may be openly justified or at least the minority's continued enjoyment of these will be seen as a generous concession by the people; the speech itself may exaggerate or abuse data to make this point, and the language will show a bellicosity towards the opposition that is incendiary and condescending, lacking the decorum that one shows a worthy opponent. Malema insinuates that the ANC leaders are too old to be in touch with what a 'new generation of fighters' want. "*The ANC, they are all old age, they must go to the old age home or they must go to prison. They are too old.*" Malema says of the ANC rule: "*we must bring that nonsense to an end on the 8th of May.*" The ANC I referred to as "*the criminals in office*" that are "*not delivering to us*" Violence opened used as rhetorical device: "*If you want to shoot people, go to the government house and shoot Ace Magashule, the real criminal. You want to shoot? Go to parliament, that parliament is full of thugs and criminals. Go and shoot them randomly, do not select.*" "*Go and arrest that bastard, straight to jail!*" Journalists who criticize the EFF are called moles and agents of the ANC.	Formal rights and liberties are openly respected, and the opposition is treated with courtesy and as a legitimate political actor. The discourse will not encourage or justify illegal, violent actions. There will be great respect for institutions and the rule of law. If data is abused, it is either an innocent mistake or an embarrassing breach of democratic standards.

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Ramaphosa is accused of being the cause of Marikana, even after being declared innocent by the official enquiry.	

Overall Comments:

Malema constructs a distinctly moral argument in this speech – he accuses the incumbent ANC of having forgotten those South Africans who are struggling and rely on the government. He thus posits the EFF as the best option for those people who are still struggling 25 years after apartheid, since the DA is "racist" and the ANC are both "criminals" and "too old" to be in government. The ANC's rule is referred to as "nonsense". Malema clearly sees no need to respect them as a valid political opponent, which is indicative of a more populist stance towards democratic processes.

Malema also uses the speech to state explicitly that the EFF is at aimed at the middle class. He mentions repeatedly that theirs is a party of the "poor masses" and thus constructs his 'people' along very explicit racial and class lines. He also insinuates that the EFF's purpose is that of the "hopeless masses" of South Africa – the party thus embodies a majority will.

The most populist aspect of this speech is the constant justification of extra-parliamentary responses to the current government's failures. While he both denies and denounces any EFF involvement in the threats that a journalist critical of the EFF received, he is also quick to encourage his followers in the police force to "go to parliament…and shoot them randomly". While he might argue that these are simply rhetorical devices, it is not reflective of a pluralist stance which encourages voting as the answer to these issues.

Appendix 2 – Coded speeches for the ANC

Appendix 2A

Name of politician: Jacob Zuma
Title of Speech: January 8th statement
Date of Speech: 11 January 2014
Category: Manifesto launch
Grader: Marine Fölscher
Date of grading: 20 September 2019

Final Grade: (0.2)

0   A speech in this category uses few if any populist elements. Note that even if a speech expresses a Manichaean worldview, it is not considered populist if it lacks some notion of a popular will.

Populist	Pluralist
It conveys a Manichaean vision of the world, that is, one that is moral (every issue has a strong moral dimension) and dualistic (everything is in one category or the other, "right" or "wrong," "good" or "evil") The implication—or even the stated idea—is that there can be nothing in between, no fence-sitting, no shades of grey. This leads to the use of highly charged, even bellicose language. No explicit Manichaean division. There is no mention at all of an explicit enemy, even if corruption is a "*scourge*". Only the mention that the ANC is still the only party which can accomplish what is necessary.	The discourse does not frame issues in moral terms or paint them in black-and-white. Instead, there is a strong tendency to focus on **narrow, particular issues**. The discourse will emphasize or at least not eliminate the possibility of natural, justifiable differences of opinion. Specific issues are highlighted as the main problems in South Africa. There is also a lot of information of the ANC's policies so far in their rule. The speech reads more like a policy overview of the ANC's time in power than a real attack on any electoral enemies. Opposition parties are not even mentioned or alluded to. Zuma focuses on ANC targets for HIV prevention, upskilling, lowering joblessness, building schools, hospitals and other infrastructure, etc.
The moral significance of the items mentioned in the speech is heightened by ascribing **cosmic proportions** to them, that is, by claiming that they affect people everywhere (possibly but not necessarily across the world) and across time. Especially in this last regard, frequent	The discourse will probably not refer to any reified notion of history or use any cosmic proportions. References to the spatial and temporal consequences of issues will be limited to the material reality rather than any mystical connections.

references may be made to a reified notion of "history." At the same time, the speaker will justify the moral significance of his or her ideas by tying them to **national and religious leaders** that are generally revered. Nelson Mandela is presented as a near-mythical figure "*produced by…the African National Congress.*" Mandela was "*one of the greatest sons of our Movement*", a "*giant of our struggle*". Zuma delves into the history of the country to justify the ANC's position. The struggle was a "*sacrifice and dedication*" of the party and South Africans. The mention of ANC struggle heroes in the form of 'obituaries' to link the party further to the people's movement. The ANC's history (and its history with 'the people') is definitely presented as the defining characteristic of the party and the reason that voters should continue to choose them.	What is interesting is that the ANC's struggle leadership is considered true history to some extent by the majority of historians. The history mentioned by Zuma is thus not mythologized as such, but is presented with a goal in mind with regards to the party's image. The ANC is the better option because they have more "experience, capacity and political determination".
Although Manichaean, the discourse is still democratic, in the sense that the good is embodied in the will of the majority, which is seen as a unified whole, perhaps but not necessarily expressed in references to the "voluntad del pueblo"; however, the speaker ascribes a kind of unchanging essentialism to that will, rather than letting it be whatever 50 percent of the people want at any particular moment. Thus, this good majority is romanticized, with some notion of the common man (urban or rural) seen as the embodiment of the national ideal. Zuma does boast about the ANC's achievements as 'proof' of unity in South Africa. There is a sense that all people are "our" people – an attempt to make the majority of	Democracy is simply the calculation of votes. This should be respected and is seen as the foundation of legitimate government, but it is not meant to be an exercise in arriving at a preexisting, knowable "will." The majority shifts and changes across issues. The common man is not romanticized, and the notion of citizenship is broad and legalistic. Zuma speaks of voting as a democratic right, etc., not something that is done to keep the 'enemy' out. Zuma emphasizes the ANC's non-racialism and the idea of a South Africa of "*one people*" "*united in diversity*". ANC unites "*the broadest cross-section of society*".

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South Africans ANC people. E.g. NDP supported by "overwhelming majority" *"working with the masses of our people"*	*"a united, nonracial, non-sexist, democratic and prosperous South Africa as enshrined in the Freedom Charter"* *"building a South Africa that belongs to all who live in it."* He urges South Africans to "actively combat the dangers of tribalism and ethnicity". He also emphasizes the role of non-racialism in both the ANC's constitution and the country's. *"call on all our people"* *"The Truth and Reconciliation Commission helped heal the wounds of the past. We sing one national anthem, fly one national flag and embrace our cultural diversity."* Zuma points out the majority black poverty, but does not make it a requirement to be part of *"the people"*.
The evil is embodied in a minority whose specific identity will vary according to context. Domestically, in Latin America it is often an economic elite, perhaps the "oligarchy," but it may also be a racial elite; internationally, it may be the United States or the capitalist, industrialized nations or international financiers or simply an ideology such as neoliberalism and capitalism. Zuma reiterates the ANC's commitments against corrupt members. "*certain destructive and opportunistic elements*"	The discourse avoids a conspiratorial tone and does not single out any evil ruling minority. It avoids labeling opponents as evil and may not even mention them in an effort to maintain a positive tone and keep passions low. Zuma seems to make it clear that building a social compact is a priority for his party. Opposition parties not mentioned. Zuma emphasizes the ANC's "*Africanist*" policies – there is no mention of immigrants or border security as an issue. "*we shall maintain a culture of dialogue and commitments as part of building a social compact to move South Africa forward*"
Crucially, the evil minority is or was recently in charge and subverted the system to its own interests, against those of the good majority or the people. Thus, systemic change is/was required, often expressed in	The discourse does not argue for systemic change but, as mentioned above, focuses on particular issues. In the words of Laclau, it is a politics of "differences" rather than "hegemony."

terms such as "revolution" or "liberation" of the people from their "immiseration" or bondage, even if technically it comes about through elections. Zuma alleges the "*ANC will intervene*" in issues, but the changes are presented mostly as policy issues. ANC's second phase of leadership will bring about "*economic emancipation*". ANC volunteers as the "*the army of the people's movement*". The ANC is working against the past – the "*economic and social legacy of apartheid*". However, this must be done by through "*unity is the rock upon which our Movement was founded and highlighted that a 'united and revolutionary ANC and Alliance' must be rooted amongst the people for us to achieve our goals*"	Zuma makes promises of the policies the ANC will be implementing to solve the problems that he has identified. There are calls on i.e. the financial sector to be more "*inclusive and accessible*", but Zuma does not suggest that this must happen through radical systemic change, even if he does allege that the ANC itself is radical.
Because of the moral baseness of the threatening minority, non-democratic means may be openly justified or at least the minority's continued enjoyment of these will be seen as a generous concession by the people; the speech itself may exaggerate or abuse data to make this point, and the language will show a bellicosity towards the opposition that is incendiary and condescending, lacking the decorum that one shows a worthy opponent. No mention of a political opponent, even if Zuma states that the ANC is the only option.	Formal rights and liberties are openly respected, and the opposition is treated with courtesy and as a legitimate political actor. The discourse will not encourage or justify illegal, violent actions. There will be great respect for institutions and the rule of law. If data is abused, it is either an innocent mistake or an embarrassing breach of democratic standards. Zuma praises specificities of democratization in South Africa, including: - An independent judiciary - The values of the Constitution - Overcoming the systemic divisions of Apartheid - Decrease of political violence - "*fairness and equality for all before the law*" Zuma points out that the changes that the ANC has made to its land expropriation policy is based on a specific section of the constitution: "in line with section 25 of the Constitution."

Overall Comments:

This speech reads more as a policy overview of the ANC's past and future plans for South Africa than any kind of populist urging to abandon the system or rise up against a common enemy. Opposition parties are not even mentioned, and the only real reference to an 'enemy' is in the mention of "certain destructive and opportunistic elements". Zuma does not focus on the low-hanging fruit of the poor foreigner as enemy.

Zuma focuses repeatedly on the ANC's role in establishing the trappings of a democratic society. He praises the independent judiciary and the constitution and condemns political violence, all characteristics of a traditional liberal, pluralist democracy. While he does call on i.e. the financial sector to be more "*inclusive and accessible*", Zuma does not suggest that this must happen through radical systemic change, even if he does allege that the ANC itself is radical in other areas. He is also at pains to point out that the changes the party has made to its land restitution policy is based on specific areas of the constitution, not on 'the will of the people'. Instead, he focuses on the power of a democratic vote. There is no argument for systemic political change – in Zuma's eyes, this is because the ANC is doing a good job as ruling party.

Zuma does sell his party through its connection to Nelson Mandela and the struggle for freedom in South Africa, and lists struggle heroes in the hopes that this will further associate the party with the country's almost mythologized past. However, he also points out the various policy areas where the party has made a difference in recent years, and does not insinuate that its freedom-fighting past makes the party or its members invulnerable to critique.

While he often speaks of "our" people of South Africa, Zuma's construction of 'the people' is as broad as his construction of the 'enemy' is vague. He boasts that the ANC is the body that can "unite the broadest cross-section of society". Zuma emphasizes the ANC's non-racialism and the idea of a South Africa of "one people…united in diversity". As such, his speech comes across as very non-populist.

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Appendix 2B

Name of politician: Jacob Zuma
Title of Speech: The ANC lives, the ANC leads!
Date of Speech: 4 May 2014
Category: Final rally
Grader: Marine Fölscher
Date of grading: 6 September 2019

Final Grade: (0.1)

0   A speech in this category uses few if any populist elements. Note that even if a speech expresses a Manichaean worldview, it is not considered populist if it lacks some notion of a popular will.

Populist	Pluralist
It conveys a Manichaean vision of the world, that is, one that is moral (every issue has a strong moral dimension) and dualistic (everything is in one category or the other, "right" or "wrong," "good" or "evil") The implication—or even the stated idea—is that there can be nothing in between, no fence-sitting, no shades of grey. This leads to the use of highly charged, even bellicose language.	The discourse does not frame issues in moral terms or paint them in black-and-white. Instead, there is a strong tendency to focus on **narrow, particular issues**. The discourse will emphasize or at least not eliminate the possibility of natural, justifiable differences of opinion.
Zuma mostly focuses on good that has been done by the ANC, but does not contrast it with anyone else.	The speech is very much a brief on ANC issues that have worked.
There is almost no bellicose language or highly charged argument.	Zuma mentions the specific policy steps the ANC hopes to take in the next term, e.g. "*Lokhu sizokwenza ngokwakha izingqalazizinda, siheheosozimboni baphesheya nabakhona la ekhaya ukuzebatshale izimali, kanye nokuthuthukisa osomabhizinisiabancane.*" [We will do this by building infrastructure, attracting foreign and local businesses to invest, as well as developing small business.]
	Various successful or ongoing programmes are mentioned, as well as their specific successes: - NSFAS budget tripled - National School Nutrition Programme worked with 3000 businesses - 3 new universities built - New hospitals ins specific towns mentioned

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	- amended Employment Equity Act - new Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment Act.
The moral significance of the items mentioned in the speech is heightened by ascribing **cosmic proportions** to them, that is, by claiming that they affect people everywhere (possibly but not necessarily across the world) and across time. Especially in this last regard, frequent references may be made to a reified notion of "history." At the same time, the speaker will justify the moral significance of his or her ideas by tying them to **national and religious leaders** that are generally revered. The ANC's and the country's histories are inextricably linked, according to Zuma. South Africa "*born out of the ashes*" Zuma does mythologize the ANC. Mentions of support for other liberation causes are meant to link to the ANC's own liberation history. Iconic struggle leaders are associated with the party. The ANC is made out to be the only and obvious choice: "*Let us vote for this movement of Nelson 7andela, Oliver Tambo, Walter Sisulu, Chris Hani, Solomon Mahlangu, Harry Gwala, Mitta Siperepere, Dorothy Nyembe, Ruth First, Billy Nair, Braam Fischer, Reg September and a host of other illustrious leaders.*"	The discourse will probably not refer to any reified notion of history or use any cosmic proportions. References to the spatial and temporal consequences of issues will be limited to the material reality rather than any mystical connections. Although "kodwa lokhuesesikwenzile, kuyabonakala, sekuzishintshile izimpilozabantu" [what we have done, it seems, has changed people's lives], Zuma admits that there is still much to do. Specifics mentions of numerical evidence of what the ANC has done.
Although Manichaean, the discourse is still democratic, in the sense that the good is embodied in the will of the majority, which is seen as a unified whole, perhaps but not necessarily expressed in references to the "voluntad del pueblo"; however, the speaker ascribes a kind of unchanging essentialism to that will, rather than letting it be whatever 50 percent of the people want at any particular moment. Thus, this good majority is romanticized, with some	Democracy is simply the calculation of votes. This should be respected and is seen as the foundation of legitimate government, but it is not meant to be an exercise in arriving at a preexisting, knowable "will." The majority shifts and changes across issues. The common man is not romanticized, and the notion of citizenship is broad and legalistic.

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notion of the common man (urban or rural) seen as the embodiment of the national ideal. *"The people have told us that South Africa is a much better place to live in now than it was before 1994, thanks to the programmes and policies of the ANC."*	*"new society based on the foundations of human rights, equality, justice, unity and reconciliation."* *"We have worked together to build a South Africa that truly belongs to all who live in it, regardless of colour, race, class or creed."* Zuma's conception of the South African citizen is fairly wide: the people *"fly one national flag and embrace our cultural diversity."*
The evil is embodied in a minority whose specific identity will vary according to context. Domestically, in Latin America it is often an economic elite, perhaps the "oligarchy," but it may also be a racial elite; internationally, it may be the United States or the capitalist, industrialized nations or international financiers or simply an ideology such as neoliberalism and capitalism. No mention of a united or other enemy, even if individuals are insinuated to be guilty of corruption. No one true enemy.	The discourse avoids a conspiratorial tone and does not single out any evil ruling minority. It avoids labeling opponents as evil and may not even mention them in an effort to maintain a positive tone and keep passions low. No evil minority identified. Opposition parties are not mentioned by name or ideology.
Crucially, the evil minority is or was recently in charge and subverted the system to its own interests, against those of the good majority or the people. Thus, systemic change is/was required, often expressed in terms such as "revolution" or "liberation" of the people from their "immiseration" or bondage, even if technically it comes about through elections. *"will restrict public servants from doing business with government, and will hold public officials liable for losses incurred as a result of corrupt actions."* *"will pursue action against companies involved in bid rigging, price fixing and corruption in past and current infrastructure build programmes."*	The discourse does not argue for systemic change but, as mentioned above, focuses on particular issues. In the words of Laclau, it is a politics of "differences" rather than "hegemony." Zuma admits that there are issues where the ANC has not done what it should have: They were told *"where we need to improve"* Policies and laws suggested more than systemic restructuring. Regional integration highlighted.

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Because of the moral baseness of the threatening minority, non-democratic means may be openly justified or at least the minority's continued enjoyment of these will be seen as a generous concession by the people; the speech itself may exaggerate or abuse data to make this point, and the language will show a bellicosity towards the opposition that is incendiary and condescending, lacking the decorum that one shows a worthy opponent. Issues with other parties only implied: "*We urge all others who are still in other parties, to make the journey home. They will be warmly received.*" "*The ANC is the home of all progressive South Africans.*"	Formal rights and liberties are openly respected, and the opposition is treated with courtesy and as a legitimate political actor. The discourse will not encourage or justify illegal, violent actions. There will be great respect for institutions and the rule of law. If data is abused, it is either an innocent mistake or an embarrassing breach of democratic standards. There is no implication that formal democratic processes are anything to worry about. People urged to vote, but no other actions. "*hard won right to choose a government of their choice*"

Overall Comments:

In this speech, Zuma focuses on the numerical and statistical results of the ANC's 20 years in office. He lists economic transformation as a key priority area, and gives multiple examples of the ANC's successes in that area over his previous term. While Zuma taps into the ANC history as a liberation movement often in this speech, he does not contrast the inherent morality of the struggle with the party's current political opponents. The ANC's history is used to legitimize the party and brand them as the original, true holder of the liberation of South Africa. However, no specific enemy is given against which the party must mobilise in the current political climate.

Zuma mentions democratic rights and liberties in his constructions of the South African 'people'. He mentions that the ANC has made conditions better for many people, but he does not construct an exclusionary view of who these people are. Instead, he focuses on a notion of citizenship that is broad enough to be considered pluralist. All in all, the speech reads more like a report card of his party's time in power than a populist ploy.

Appendix 2C

Name of politician: Cyril Ramaphosa
Title of Speech: Let's Grow South Africa Together!
Date of Speech: 12 January 2019
Category: Manifesto launch
Grader: Marine Fölscher
Date of grading: 4 September 2019

Final Grade: (0.2)

0   A speech in this category uses few if any populist elements. Note that even if a speech expresses a Manichaean worldview, it is not considered populist if it lacks some notion of a popular will.

Populist	Pluralist
It conveys a Manichaean vision of the world, that is, one that is moral (every issue has a strong moral dimension) and dualistic (everything is in one category or the other, "right" or "wrong," "good" or "evil") The implication—or even the stated idea—is that there can be nothing in between, no fence-sitting, no shades of grey. This leads to the use of highly charged, even bellicose language. "*ANC remains the most effective vehicle to unite the broadest cross-section of society,*" and is set up as the best hope, even if it is flawed. No clear enemy or 'dark side': only inefficiency, individual corruption, unethical civil servants etc. The issue is individual or isolated.	The discourse does not frame issues in moral terms or paint them in black-and-white. Instead, there is a strong tendency to focus on **narrow, particular issues**. The discourse will emphasize or at least not eliminate the possibility of natural, justifiable differences of opinion. Focus on a "non-racial South Africa" Specific ways in which the ANC will work for a more inclusive economy: - Work for local enterprises - Expand funding and capital for new businesses - Skills development for 4th industrial revolution - A "*social plan*" for retraining workers - National Health Insurance - Rail infrastructure - Public employment programmes - National Plan on Gender Based Violence - National Drug Master Plan Ramaphosa emphasizes certain areas where the ANC has not done enough as issues
The moral significance of the items mentioned in the speech is heightened by ascribing **cosmic proportions** to them, that	The discourse will probably not refer to any reified notion of history or use any cosmic proportions. References to the spatial and

is, by claiming that they affect people everywhere (possibly but not necessarily across the world) and across time. Especially in this last regard, frequent references may be made to a reified notion of "history." At the same time, the speaker will justify the moral significance of his or her ideas by tying them to **national and religious leaders** that are generally revered.

National icons mentioned – Battle of Isandlwana, freedom fighters, many ANC-linked freedom fighters mentioned by name. South African history a "*heroic struggle*"

"*Many generations of young people fought hard*" for free education and the ANC is thus continuing their legacy by attempting to implement the policy.

There is a definite sense that the ANC is building on its history of working for South Africans.

temporal consequences of issues will be limited to the material reality rather than any mystical connections.

"*strengthening unity and working together*" within ANC

More recent ANC history admitted as not flawless: "*Even as we applaud the great progress that has been made, we must acknowledge that mistakes have been made and that in some areas transformation has stalled.*

We must acknowledge that state capture and corruption have weakened several of our public institutions, undermined effective governance and contributed to the poor performance of our economy.

We must also acknowledge that factionalism and patronage has diminished the ability of the ANC to lead the process of transformation and fulfil its mandate to the people.

As the ANC, we admit our shortcomings, we accept the criticism of the people and we are hard at work to correct our mistakes."

Although Manichaean, the discourse is still democratic, in the sense that the good is embodied in the will of the majority, which is seen as a unified whole, perhaps but not necessarily expressed in references to the "voluntad del pueblo"; however, the speaker ascribes a kind of unchanging essentialism to that will, rather than letting it be whatever 50 percent of the people want at any particular moment. Thus, this good majority is romanticized, with some notion of the common man (urban or rural) seen as the embodiment of the national ideal.

South African citizens' struggle for freedom identified with the ANC.

The insinuation that the ANC inextricably linked with the will of the people for a

Democracy is simply the calculation of votes. This should be respected and is seen as the foundation of legitimate government, but it is not meant to be an exercise in arriving at a preexisting, knowable "will." The majority shifts and changes across issues. The common man is not romanticized, and the notion of citizenship is broad and legalistic.

Ramaphosa maintains a very broad view of the common man in the entire speech.

"*Let us grow as individuals, respectful of the rights of others, conscious of their needs and concerns, and determined to lend a hand to improve their lives.*"

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better life and with the benefits that democracy have brought so far. The 25 years of democracy have also shown "*the South African people to be resourceful, resilient and determined.*" But not that there is some concept of a unified popular will emphasised throughout that time.	The ANC must actively "*build non-racialism*" and "*wage war on all forms of ethnic and racial chauvinism*" "*diverse non-racial nature of our society*" "*all citizens*" – an attempt at returning to the ANC's broad-based history
The evil is embodied in a minority whose specific identity will vary according to context. Domestically, in Latin America it is often an economic elite, perhaps the "oligarchy," but it may also be a racial elite; internationally, it may be the United States or the capitalist, industrialized nations or international financiers or simply an ideology such as neoliberalism and capitalism. The evil minority are insinuated to be isolated individuals against which the state will act. "*ensure that those who are responsible for stealing both public funds and private investments face the full might of the law.*" "*As a society, we must show no tolerance for these acts*" with regards to political killings, but also other crimes mentioned e.g. gender based violence, corruption, etc. Border policing presented as a safety issue: "*Effective border management is an important aspect of ensuring that the country and its people are safe.*"	The discourse avoids a conspiratorial tone and does not single out any evil ruling minority. It avoids labeling opponents as evil and may not even mention them in an effort to maintain a positive tone and keep passions low. South Africa as a nation "*founded on a democratic and progressive Constitution that guarantees equal rights to all people.*" "*a nation united in its diversity, working together to overcome injustices of the past*" Work towards a "*more humane global order*" – Ramaphosa does not aim at the low-hanging fruit of immigrants to justify inhumane actions. Links importance of good relations with other states. Building South Africa as a "*responsibility we all share*"
Crucially, the evil minority is or was recently in charge and subverted the system to its own interests, against those of the good majority or the people. Thus, systemic change is/was required, often expressed in terms such as "revolution" or "liberation" of the people from their "immiseration" or bondage, even if technically it comes about through elections.	The discourse does not argue for systemic change but, as mentioned above, focuses on particular issues. In the words of Laclau, it is a politics of "differences" rather than "hegemony." Ramaphosa notes the ANC's broad-church approach. He notes that they will work with "*all social partners*" and emphasizes that his party will attempt to make the ANC-

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Definite sense that South Africa had to be liberated from apartheid and colonial suppression. This was done through the work of the ANC and other freedom fighters. However, there is very little mention of the formerly 'in-charge' parties. Specific evils mentioned not necessarily committed by those in power. The insinuation is that the system itself works, sometimes some people fail the system.	governed South Africa more friendly to collaborators in the private sector. "*an inclusive economy*" "*It is not surprising that citizens protest*"
Because of the moral baseness of the threatening minority, non-democratic means may be openly justified or at least the minority's continued enjoyment of these will be seen as a generous concession by the people; the speech itself may exaggerate or abuse data to make this point, and the language will show a bellicosity towards the opposition that is incendiary and condescending, lacking the decorum that one shows a worthy opponent. "*This will change*" through systemic steps within the confines of the constitution and democratic process.	Formal rights and liberties are openly respected, and the opposition is treated with courtesy and as a legitimate political actor. The discourse will not encourage or justify illegal, violent actions. There will be great respect for institutions and the rule of law. If data is abused, it is either an innocent mistake or an embarrassing breach of democratic standards. Notes the importance of the core pillars of pluralist liberal democracy: "*strong and durable democratic institutions, an independent judiciary, a free media and an active civil society*." Ramaphosa often brings up the importance of democratic institutions and their protection. "*provide an opportunity to restore our democratic institutions*" Strides made are as a result of the "*Constitution, legislation and policies*" not the popular will.

Overall Comments:

Ramaphosa here uses an evocative welcoming linking the ANC to the current freedoms in the country. While he uses the Isitlwalandwe/Seaparankoe awards, certain events from SA history,

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as well as the names of nationally venerated ANC cadres who were freedom fighters, Ramaphosa generally steers away from mythologizing the ANC's role in the freedom of South African citizens. He also very clearly notes the areas where the ANC is at fault, but emphasizes that it remains the most effective vehicle for citizens' issues. However, he does not at all insinuate that it is the only moral good on the ballot.

There is no mention of a clear enemy here – while Ramaphosa lists several specific issues, he does not create any one group of 'enemies of the people'. Instead, he mentions incidents or areas for improvement. Ramaphosa also pays more than lip service to pluralist democratic institutions, noting that great stride have been made in the country through the use of these structures.

Appendix 2D

Name of politician: Cyril Ramaphosa
Title of Speech: Siyanqoba rally speech
Date of Speech: 5 May 2019
Category: Final rally
Grader: Marine Fölscher
Date of grading: 4 September 2019

Final Grade: (0.0)

0   A speech in this category uses few if any populist elements. Note that even if a speech expresses a Manichaean worldview, it is not considered populist if it lacks some notion of a popular will.

Populist	Pluralist

It conveys a Manichaean vision of the world, that is, one that is moral (every issue has a strong moral dimension) and dualistic (everything is in one category or the other, "right" or "wrong," "good" or "evil") The implication—or even the stated idea—is that there can be nothing in between, no fence-sitting, no shades of grey. This leads to the use of highly charged, even bellicose language.
 	
The speech displays a very dichotomous worldview with regards to the elections: The ANC is "*hope*" versus "*despair*", "*growth*" versus "*decline*".
 	
"*Ours is a message of national unity, hope and renewal – not hatred, drama and empty rhetoric.*"
 	
ANC is posited as the only possible solution.
 	
"*There is no alternative.*"
 	
"*for the only party that can unite South Africans in realising our common aspirations for a better life*"
 	
However, Ramaphosa acknowledges that the ANC is imperfect and that it does not do everything in a true and effective manner,
	The discourse does not frame issues in moral terms or paint them in black-and-white. Instead, there is a strong tendency to focus on **narrow, particular issues**. The discourse will emphasize or at least not eliminate the possibility of natural, justifiable differences of opinion.
	
	Specific failures of the NAC rule mentioned:
	  - Service delivery failed
	  - Corruption among those in power
	  - Infrastructure not maintained
	
	Mention of specific policies meant to combat some of the issues mentioned:
	  - Tsepo 1 Million
	  - NARYSEC
	  - Youth Unemployment Service
	
	The economic policies that Ramaphosa lists as the answer to South Africa's issues are framed as cooperative, e.g. the ANC will "*work with labour and business and communities*" and

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as well as the importance of collaboration, lessening the impact of his somewhat Manichean statements.	
The moral significance of the items mentioned in the speech is heightened by ascribing **cosmic proportions** to them, that is, by claiming that they affect people everywhere (possibly but not necessarily across the world) and across time. Especially in this last regard, frequent references may be made to a reified notion of "history." At the same time, the speaker will justify the moral significance of his or her ideas by tying them to **national and religious leaders** that are generally revered. The ANC referred to in terms of a "*movement*", meant to link it to liberation history while other parties are 'politicians at heart'. Names of revere national freedom fighting heroes brought up as the 'core' of the party: "*restore the ANC to an organisation worthy of leaders like Chief Albert Luthuli, Moses Kotane, Lilian Ngoyi, Oliver Tambo, Nelson Mandela, Dulcie September, Elijah Barayi, Albertina Sisulu, Chris Hani and Joe Slovo*" This is "*a decisive moment in our history*"	The discourse will probably not refer to any reified notion of history or use any cosmic proportions. References to the spatial and temporal consequences of issues will be limited to the material reality rather than any mystical connections. The ANC is "*working hard to restore the integrity of [their] movement*". The understanding that the ANC is still the only choice, but it needs to return to what it stood for before. This is also an admission from Ramaphosa that the corruption in the ranks has affected the party itself and citizens' view of it; it is not only confined to a few rank and file members.
Although Manichaean, the discourse is still democratic, in the sense that the good is embodied in the will of the majority, which is seen as a unified whole, perhaps but not necessarily expressed in references to the "voluntad del pueblo"; however, the speaker ascribes a kind of unchanging essentialism to that will, rather than letting it be whatever 50 percent of the people want at any particular moment. Thus, this good majority is romanticized, with some notion of the common man (urban or rural) seen as the embodiment of the national ideal.	Democracy is simply the calculation of votes. This should be respected and is seen as the foundation of legitimate government, but it is not meant to be an exercise in arriving at a preexisting, knowable "will." The majority shifts and changes across issues. The common man is not romanticized, and the notion of citizenship is broad and legalistic. Ramaphosa's notion of citizenship is very broad: "*all the people of this great land.*" He makes a call to "*every South African*" to vote in the elections at first.

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Mentions of the people of South Africa as ANC supporters: "*As the people of South Africa, let us declare with one clear and loud voice that we choose to go forward.*" Lots of 'we' and 'us' rhetoric around the people. There is an insinuation that all South African have the same needs in "*we have heard them speak with one voice*" but this is tempered by a much broader understanding of who these people are. "*The people of South Africa expect and demand nothing less.*" Ramaphosa highlights the ANC's involvement with the ordinary people of South Africa. While he states that some of them are embattled and disillusioned, he makes it clear that the ANC is the vehicle for their voices.	The ANC must strive to build a country "*which belongs to all South Africans, and in which all South Africans belong*" Broad construction of those his party stands for and thus should listen to: "*artisans, shop assistants, teachers, nurses, students, artists and pensioners…business people, professionals, farmers, religious leaders and traditional leaders*" "*work together, side-by-side with all South Africans, to build a country in which all may thrive and in which all may prosper.* *If we are united, there is nothing we cannot achieve.*"
The evil is embodied in a minority whose specific identity will vary according to context. Domestically, in Latin America it is often an economic elite, perhaps the "oligarchy," but it may also be a racial elite; internationally, it may be the United States or the capitalist, industrialized nations or international financiers or simply an ideology such as neoliberalism and capitalism. Issues are individualized. The ANC as a ruling party is not to blame entirely, but there is no mention of i.e. a conspiracy against the party. While there seems to be a coherent 'people', there is no unified evil minority.	The discourse avoids a conspiratorial tone and does not single out any evil ruling minority. It avoids labeling opponents as evil and may not even mention them in an effort to maintain a positive tone and keep passions low. There is no understanding of the 'enemy' as a coherent group or minority elite; rather some people who use the system to their advantage.
Crucially, the evil minority is or was recently in charge and subverted the system to its own interests, against those of the good majority or the people. Thus, systemic change is/was required, often expressed in terms such as "revolution" or "liberation" of the people from their "immiseration" or	The discourse does not argue for systemic change but, as mentioned above, focuses on particular issues. In the words of Laclau, it is a politics of "differences" rather than "hegemony."

bondage, even if technically it comes about through elections. Ramaphosa's "*freedom*" rhetoric more refers to the role of the ANC. But freedom from the evils of corruption: "*Let us declare, here and now, that we will never surrender our freedom to corruption and state capture.* *We will not submit and we will not retreat.*"	"*We acknowledge the mistakes we have made.* *We recognise how patronage and corruption have eroded the people's trust and confidence, and how they have undermined our ability to serve the interests of all South Africans.*" Ramaphosa emphasises cooperation necessary to solve some of the policy and practical issues he brought up in the speech; "*social compact between government, labour, business, civil society and communities*" necessary.
Because of the moral baseness of the threatening minority, non-democratic means may be openly justified or at least the minority's continued enjoyment of these will be seen as a generous concession by the people; the speech itself may exaggerate or abuse data to make this point, and the language will show a bellicosity towards the opposition that is incendiary and condescending, lacking the decorum that one shows a worthy opponent. Those who committed corruption should know that "*[t]he era of impunity is over*". No mention of opposition parties as enemy, but slightly condescending in their omission: The ANC is presented as the only legitimate option.	Formal rights and liberties are openly respected, and the opposition is treated with courtesy and as a legitimate political actor. The discourse will not encourage or justify illegal, violent actions. There will be great respect for institutions and the rule of law. If data is abused, it is either an innocent mistake or an embarrassing breach of democratic standards. "*We are restoring the rule of law.*" Ramaphosa reacts harshly to abuses of state power in the ANC's own ranks. The value of institutional checks and balances in a democracy implied: "*We have done much to restore the credibility and effectiveness of the NPA, SARS, SAPS and the State Security Agency*" The Zondo Commission is praised for its role in investigating state capture, but Ramaphosa notes that much must still be done and that those who have benefited unduly will stand against democratic processes.

Overall Comments:

Ramaphosa's speech at the ANC's *Siyanqoba* ('to conquer') rally is not a victory speech, but rather an admission that the party has been found wanting. Ramaphosa lists specific areas where the governing party has failed its constituents, and while he does shift the blame somewhat from the party itself to the individuals who have purportedly committed the crimes, he admits that the ANC itself has some work to do. The party's continued hegemony is not used as a reason to avoid accountability.

Ramaphosa notes the importance of collaboration with different stakeholders in order to rectify the country's economic woes. While he does speak of a unified South African voice, he does not outline a specific enemy or evil minority. The ANC is, however, presented as the only option for South Africans who want to see a positive change. The party's liberation history is hinted at to prove this, and Ramaphosa emphasizes the contact the party has had with ordinary South Africans and that the party has 'heard them' – the implication being that the ANC now speaks for them as well. However, his inclusive positioning of 'the people' of South Africa lessen the populist effect of this construction.

He emphasizes the importance of certain democratic institutions meant to place checks and balances on the power of the government, and sees the results of the Zondo inquiry as positive. He does not claim that the ANC's majority vote should exempt the party from being held in check or accountable, and instead emphasizes that it is time for accountability for public servants.

Appendix 3 – Coded speeches for the DA

Appendix 3A

Name of politician: Helen Zille
Title of Speech: Together for Change, Together for Jobs!
Date of Speech: 23 February 2014
Category: Manifesto launch
Grader: Marine Fölscher
Date of grading: 24 August 2019

Final Grade: (0.0)

0   A speech in this category uses few if any populist elements. Note that even if a speech expresses a Manichaean worldview, it is not considered populist if it lacks some notion of a popular will.

Populist	Pluralist
It conveys a Manichaean vision of the world, that is, one that is moral (every issue has a strong moral dimension) and dualistic (everything is in one category or the other, "right" or "wrong," "good" or "evil") The implication—or even the stated idea—is that there can be nothing in between, no fence-sitting, no shades of grey. This leads to the use of highly charged, even bellicose language. The ANC is said to have become corrupted since (or leading to) Zuma's ascension to power. *"It was hijacked by leaders who care more about themselves than the people they are meant to serve."* *"'A better life for all' has become 'a better life for some'."*	The discourse does not frame issues in moral terms or paint them in black-and-white. Instead, there is a strong tendency to focus on **narrow, particular issues**. The discourse will emphasize or at least not eliminate the possibility of natural, justifiable differences of opinion. *"There is no perfect government anywhere in the world."* The new ANC government faced "*an enormous challenge*" Very specific claims are made with regards to which policies will be implemented by the DA. Most of the speech delves into the DA practical plans: - Narcotics Bureau reinstatement - NSFAS improvement - An internship program - Job Zones - Youth Wage Subsidy - A broadening of the EPWP Not as many specific details on the programs, but she does mention how they aim to help.
The moral significance of the items mentioned in the speech is heightened by	The discourse will probably not refer to any reified notion of history or use any cosmic

ascribing **cosmic proportions** to them, that is, by claiming that they affect people everywhere (possibly but not necessarily across the world) and across time. Especially in this last regard, frequent references may be made to a reified notion of "history." At the same time, the speaker will justify the moral significance of his or her ideas by tying them to **national and religious leaders** that are generally revered. Mention of Nelson Mandela, the Struggle, the 'South African dream' following 1994. All South Africans are hoping for a better future. "*The ANC of today is not Nelson Mandela's ANC.*" The scale of the ANC's corruption and inefficiency is said to be large: "*Think of the millions of hard working people who have seen their money wasted*" Insinuation that the ANC has failed their moral duty towards those who fought for freedom.	proportions. References to the spatial and temporal consequences of issues will be limited to the material reality rather than any mystical connections.
Although Manichaean, the discourse is still democratic, in the sense that the good is embodied in the will of the majority, which is seen as a unified whole, perhaps but not necessarily expressed in references to the "voluntad del pueblo"; however, the speaker ascribes a kind of unchanging essentialism to that will, rather than letting it be whatever 50 percent of the people want at any particular moment. Thus, this good majority is romanticized, with some notion of the common man (urban or rural) seen as the embodiment of the national ideal. No mention of an essentialism of will. South Africans as a specific type of hardworking people: "*invincible spirit of the South African people*"	Democracy is simply the calculation of votes. This should be respected and is seen as the foundation of legitimate government, but it is not meant to be an exercise in arriving at a preexisting, knowable "will." The majority shifts and changes across issues. The common man is not romanticized, and the notion of citizenship is broad and legalistic. Very inclusive greeting. "*We will not become a one-party state.*" "*building one nation with one future*" but specific mentions

<table>
<tr>
<td>The evil is embodied in a minority whose specific identity will vary according to context. Domestically, in Latin America it is often an economic elite, perhaps the "oligarchy," but it may also be a racial elite; internationally, it may be the United States or the capitalist, industrialized nations or international financiers or simply an ideology such as neoliberalism and capitalism.

Definite portrayal of the ANC as the corrupt elite, but not to politics/political elite in general.

Jacob Zuma called out several times for his failures as president. Nkandla mentioned. Contrasted with normal citizens: "*R200-million of public money for one private house, while many people don't have a house at all!*"

Political movement for the people "*hijacked by leaders who care more about themselves than the people they are meant to serve*"

Capitalists not directly mentioned or called out, but Zille states that the DA supports broad-based BEE that creates "*jobs for more people, not just a few billionaires*". However, "*BEE must open opportunities for everyone who suffered past discrimination, not just those with political connections.*"</td>
<td>The discourse avoids a conspiratorial tone and does not single out any evil ruling minority. It avoids labeling opponents as evil and may not even mention them in an effort to maintain a positive tone and keep passions low.

Apart from ANC, other issues addressed in more measured way: Police brutality is an issue that must be addressed, but Zille also states that there are "*very many brave and hard-working policemen and women out there.*"

Zille praises rising leaders in the DA – the issue is the ANC, not political leaders in general. She makes no effort to make them appear closer to 'the people'.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Crucially, the evil minority is or was recently in charge and subverted the system to its own interests, against those of the good majority or the people. Thus, systemic change is/was required, often expressed in terms such as "revolution" or "liberation" of the people from their "immiseration" or bondage, even if technically it comes about through elections.

The ANC is using citizens' money for their own gain. However, no mention of the system itself being corrupted.</td>
<td>The discourse does not argue for systemic change but, as mentioned above, focuses on particular issues. In the words of Laclau, it is a politics of "differences" rather than "hegemony."

Zille does argue that they must bring change but backs this claim up by describing the policy changes that the DA will implement.

Not all political elites are bad, as "*leaders*" are necessary.</td>
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Attack on Jacob Zuma as political leader who has subverted the system; the insinuation with the corruption charges that were dropped is that the ANC no longer holds guilty leaders within their own party accountable. "*We will stop politicians and their families doing business with government. Tender processes will be opened up to public scrutiny.*" ANC's corruption at the helm as the cause of a lack of further progress: "*Job creation is only possible if we cut corruption*"; "*Korrupsie maak arm mense armer.*" [Corruption makes the poor poorer]	Particular issues that need to be improved mentioned often – joblessness, housing issues, crime, corruption in the public sector, red tape for new businesses.
Because of the moral baseness of the threatening minority, non-democratic means may be openly justified or at least the minority's continued enjoyment of these will be seen as a generous concession by the people; the speech itself may exaggerate or abuse data to make this point, and the language will show a bellicosity towards the opposition that is incendiary and condescending, lacking the decorum that one shows a worthy opponent. No mention of non-democratic means being used on anyone's part. "*Don't believe the lies of our opponents.*"	Formal rights and liberties are openly respected, and the opposition is treated with courtesy and as a legitimate political actor. The discourse will not encourage or justify illegal, violent actions. There will be great respect for institutions and the rule of law. If data is abused, it is either an innocent mistake or an embarrassing breach of democratic standards. Early ANC praised for their efforts to tackle the legacy of apartheid. Democratic institutions such as Auditor-General, certain policies, mentioned with respect.

Overall Comments:

Zille spends most of the speech promoting the DA's tangible successes at governance. The overwhelming content of the speech is her party's policy proposals. She justifies the need for these policies by pointing out the ANC government's recent failures under Jacob Zuma, but she also points out that the party faced extremely difficult circumstances when they were first elected. She seems to be stating that she used to respect the party – and she clearly respected its leaders, including Nelson Mandela – in its early years, but that it was no longer the same party.

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Zille mentions that the ANC has failed its constituents and uses strong emotive language to point this out in places, but she tempers some of these statements by pointing out the policies that can be followed to remedy the situation. All in all, the speech reads as much more of a policy brief, even if it is clearly in response to a 'corrupt elite'. Zille argues that South Africans can work together for better circumstances, but there is little evidence of a strong popular will, even if she does mention a somewhat romanticized notion of the South African people. To Zille, the popular will is one of practicality – people want houses, jobs and an education – rather than one of opinion or ideology.

Appendix 3B

Name of politician: Helen Zille
Title of Speech: Vote for Jobs
Date of Speech: 3 May 2014
Category: Closing rally speech
Grader: Marine Fölscher
Date of grading: 25 August 2019

Final Grade: (0.0)

0   A speech in this category uses few if any populist elements. Note that even if a speech expresses a Manichaean worldview, it is not considered populist if it lacks some notion of a popular will.

Populist	Pluralist
It conveys a Manichaean vision of the world, that is, one that is moral (every issue has a strong moral dimension) and dualistic (everything is in one category or the other, "right" or "wrong," "good" or "evil") The implication—or even the stated idea—is that there can be nothing in between, no fence-sitting, no shades of grey. This leads to the use of highly charged, even bellicose language. "*Blue People*" The ANC is depicted as newly corrupted: "*The ANC has become arrogant*" while the DA is the 'clean' choice – the "only party" that can clean up SA. Emotive descriptions of the ANC's neglect of the country's poor: "*a hostel sinking in sewage and waste*";	The discourse does not frame issues in moral terms or paint them in black-and-white. Instead, there is a strong tendency to focus on **narrow, particular issues**. The discourse will emphasize or at least not eliminate the possibility of natural, justifiable differences of opinion. Specific policies mentioned. Zille lists where and how the DA will improve: - NSFAS - Open tender processes - Textbook delivery - A township internship programme - Invest 10% of GDP in infrastructure etc.
The moral significance of the items mentioned in the speech is heightened by ascribing **cosmic proportions** to them, that is, by claiming that they affect people everywhere (possibly but not necessarily across the world) and across time. Especially in this last regard, frequent references may be made to a reified notion of "history." At the same time, the speaker will justify the moral significance of his or	The discourse will probably not refer to any reified notion of history or use any cosmic proportions. References to the spatial and temporal consequences of issues will be limited to the material reality rather than any mystical connections. Zille's speech does not have the 'crisis situation' narrative that the DA adopted in the 2019 campaign.

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her ideas by tying them to **national and religious leaders** that are generally revered. Mentions of Nelson Mandela, the Struggle, South Africa's liberation history as the set-up. Zille makes it clear that change is needed and that South African's are 'fed up'.	"*Democrats, friends and voters*"
Although Manichaean, the discourse is still democratic, in the sense that the good is embodied in the will of the majority, which is seen as a unified whole, perhaps but not necessarily expressed in references to the "voluntad del pueblo"; however, the speaker ascribes a kind of unchanging essentialism to that will, rather than letting it be whatever 50 percent of the people want at any particular moment. Thus, this good majority is romanticized, with some notion of the common man (urban or rural) seen as the embodiment of the national ideal. "*We are building a new, blue majority to govern South Africa*" Zille gives the sense that all South Africans are striving towards the same goal of a better life.	Democracy is simply the calculation of votes. This should be respected and is seen as the foundation of legitimate government, but it is not meant to be an exercise in arriving at a preexisting, knowable "will." The majority shifts and changes across issues. The common man is not romanticized, and the notion of citizenship is broad and legalistic. "*You hire us with your vote and you fire us with your vote.*" Zille praises universal suffrage as an achievement of the post-apartheid government. Democratic processes praised; the importance of the constitution with regard to voting and accountability. "*Die DA is die enigste party op die stembrief*" [The DA is the only party on the ballot] which can facilitate change – but emphasis on the ballot as the weapon of choice. Democratic processes are trusted.
The evil is embodied in a minority whose specific identity will vary according to context. Domestically, in Latin America it is often an economic elite, perhaps the "oligarchy," but it may also be a racial elite; internationally, it may be the United States or the capitalist, industrialized nations or international financiers or simply an ideology such as neoliberalism and capitalism.	The discourse avoids a conspiratorial tone and does not single out any evil ruling minority. It avoids labeling opponents as evil and may not even mention them in an effort to maintain a positive tone and keep passions low. "*fellow South Africans*" "*Together, we can build an economy that gives everyone an opportunity to live a life they value.*"

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The ANC is clearly posited as the corrupt minority elite which is uncaring about the people while enriching itself. "*It has become corrupt and only cares about the few at the top.*" "*the powerful few get richer and richer*" "*The DA difference is that politicians serve the people, not the other way around.*" "*Under a DA government, no politicians or their families will be able to do business with government*" Zille uses less inflammatory language, but makes a clear call for a change in leadership and a less corrupt system that is more accountable to the people of South Africa.	General tone and the language used in the speech is argumentative but not emotional.
Crucially, the evil minority is or was recently in charge and subverted the system to its own interests, against those of the good majority or the people. Thus, systemic change is/was required, often expressed in terms such as "revolution" or "liberation" of the people from their "immiseration" or bondage, even if technically it comes about through elections. Zille argues that the ANC is clearly corrupted as a governing party. "*Its leaders believe they will rule forever, so they have forgotten about the voters who put them in power.*" The government is blamed for the struggles of the South African people due to its corruption and inefficiency. "*When a government becomes corrupt, when it does not do its job properly, the economy declines, unemployment grows, poverty deepens and the powerful few get richer and richer.*"	The discourse does not argue for systemic change but, as mentioned above, focuses on particular issues. In the words of Laclau, it is a politics of "differences" rather than "hegemony." South Africa's past is a "*sad story*", but it is made clear that things are better than under apartheid. Change of leadership is needed, but not the system itself. Zille mentions specific policy ideas to address issues.

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| Because of the moral baseness of the threatening minority, non-democratic means may be openly justified or at least the minority's continued enjoyment of these will be seen as a generous concession by the people; the speech itself may exaggerate or abuse data to make this point, and the language will show a bellicosity towards the opposition that is incendiary and condescending, lacking the decorum that one shows a worthy opponent.

The ANC is condescended to as a steward of public trust.

"they believe that the voters will carry on voting for them, whatever they do"

However, no mention of non-democratic means of a change of regime – it must happen through the ballot. | Formal rights and liberties are openly respected, and the opposition is treated with courtesy and as a legitimate political actor. The discourse will not encourage or justify illegal, violent actions. There will be great respect for institutions and the rule of law. If data is abused, it is either an innocent mistake or an embarrassing breach of democratic standards.

Zille praises the constitution and the steps taken by the post-1994 government to raise the rights and dignity of South Africans.

The opposition is respected as an early governing party and under Mandela and Mbeki.

"We did not agree with everything the government died, yet there was progress."

The ANC must be ousted, but *"the only way you can do that is with your vote."* The democratic process is trusted. |

Overall Comments:

Zille clearly posits the ANC as both a corrupt minority elite and the source of the troubles that South African citizens are facing at the time of the speech. The ANC is made out to be arrogant and secure in their position despite the lack of support for those who supported them. Zille emphasizes that voting and democratic processes are the only way to oust the ANC.

Zille uses Xhosa and South African slang in her speech in an attempt to assimilate herself and her party with South Africa's majority black working class. However, she does not make any direct claims to be a part of the mythical people. There are some emotive phrases used to describe the ANC's neglect, but the general tone of the speech is fairly logical.

While the speech does include populist elements – the conspiring minority elite, the fact that capital is being concentrated in the hands of the few, the idea of a popular will for a better South Africa – Zille uses them to outline the need for her policy proposals and for more efficient government in general. Change is emphasized in the form of voting for a DA

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government, but not through any extra-democratic measures due to the lack of a crisis narrative or delegitimization of the democratic system.

Appendix 3C

Name of politician: Mmusi Maimane
Title of Speech: Our Manifesto is an Agenda for Change
Date of Speech: 23 February 2019
Category: Manifesto launch
Grader: Marine Fölscher
Date of grading: 17 August 2019

Final Grade: (0.0)

0   A speech in this category uses few if any populist elements. Note that even if a speech expresses a Manichaean worldview, it is not considered populist if it lacks some notion of a popular will.

Populist	Pluralist
It conveys a Manichaean vision of the world, that is, one that is moral (every issue has a strong moral dimension) and dualistic (everything is in one category or the other, "right" or "wrong," "good" or "evil") The implication—or even the stated idea—is that there can be nothing in between, no fence-sitting, no shades of grey. This leads to the use of highly charged, even bellicose language. Maimane uses inflammatory or emotive language – crooked, betrayed, lie, steal, looting, 'turning their guns on the people' Moral degradation of ANC government – from "*liberators*" to "*looters*" ANC *"threatens your safety and the future of your children"* Anyone who is such a threat cannot be trusted and must be dealt with immediately.	The discourse does not frame issues in moral terms or paint them in black-and-white. Instead, there is a strong tendency to focus on **narrow, particular issues**. The discourse will emphasize or at least not eliminate the possibility of natural, justifiable differences of opinion.' While moral degradation of the ruling party is highlighted, specific policy areas highlighted where DA will improve - National Service year - Provincial controls - Governance issues, clean municipal audits - More provincial control - Halve cabinet, austerity in government
The moral significance of the items mentioned in the speech is heightened by ascribing **cosmic proportions** to them, that is, by claiming that they affect people everywhere (possibly but not necessarily across the world) and across time. Especially in this last regard, frequent references may be made to a reified notion of "history." At the same time, the speaker will justify the moral significance of his or	The discourse will probably not refer to any reified notion of history or use any cosmic proportions. References to the spatial and temporal consequences of issues will be limited to the material reality rather than any mystical connections. *"Our task now is to build a South Africa where no one is left out."*

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her ideas by tying them to **national and religious leaders** that are generally revered. SA history has been betrayed – Mandela's legacy not protected Crisis situation: SA is "*heading towards the edge of a cliff*." There is clearly a lot at stake for SA right now – Maimane makes it clear that now is the time to reassess loyalties and to make a decision for a future. The consequences have already been dire, but this is the only way to make them better.	
Although Manichaean, the discourse is still democratic, in the sense that the good is embodied in the will of the majority, which is seen as a unified whole, perhaps but not necessarily expressed in references to the "voluntad del pueblo"; however, the speaker ascribes a kind of unchanging essentialism to that will, rather than letting it be whatever 50 percent of the people want at any particular moment. Thus, this good majority is romanticized, with some notion of the common man (urban or rural) seen as the embodiment of the national ideal. South Africans as 'common heroes', romanticized notion of people who must unite again as they have done before. Much has been sacrificed to bring us to this position. South Africans' part in their history should afford them their goals. The ANC no longer represents those goals. "*we are once again a nation of insiders and the outsiders – those with jobs and opportunities, and those without.*" Emotive appeal to the suffering under apartheid – the ANC's inefficiency at ensuring economic progress has meant that many still suffer in the same way. Illegal immigrants highlighted as issue with the demos?	Democracy is simply the calculation of votes. This should be respected and is seen as the foundation of legitimate government, but it is not meant to be an exercise in arriving at a preexisting, knowable "will." The majority shifts and changes across issues. The common man is not romanticized, and the notion of citizenship is broad and legalistic. Maimane clearly displays respect for the system of democracy itself. Extra-judicial and extra-parliamentary action is discouraged. The system has been corrupted, but it is sound in essence. Repeated mention of the rights and expectations of ordinary South Africans. Notion of citizenship as any hardworking South African – no clear class, race distinctions.

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The evil is embodied in a minority whose specific identity will vary according to context. Domestically, in Latin America it is often an economic elite, perhaps the "oligarchy," but it may also be a racial elite; internationally, it may be the United States or the capitalist, industrialized nations or international financiers or simply an ideology such as neoliberalism and capitalism. ANC government very clearly the evil minority – contrasting champagne with clean water, RDP houses with Nkandla, etc. Political elite the issue, rather than economic elite.	The discourse avoids a conspiratorial tone and does not single out any evil ruling minority. It avoids labeling opponents as evil and may not even mention them in an effort to maintain a positive tone and keep passions low. Maimane starts by listing many different people who are included. All South Africans who are not the ANC government can be part of the change – specifically no mention of businesses needing to change etc. despite wanting to give share to miners etc. Labour, business and government to "*build a better partnership*".
Crucially, the evil minority is or was recently in charge and subverted the system to its own interests, against those of the good majority or the people. Thus, systemic change is/was required, often expressed in terms such as "revolution" or "liberation" of the people from their "immiseration" or bondage, even if technically it comes about through elections. ANC subverted the system, betrayed those who voted for them. Systemic change of government morals and processes needed. The ANC "*will not change*"; also corrupted every aspect of the system – "*from crooked ward councillors* [sic] *all the way to the office of the President.*" The ANC has clearly subverted the system to its own interests, but Maimane refers more to the corruption of leadership than of the system of leadership or the system of choosing leadership. "*then comes a time when we must liberate ourselves from the liberators*" Liberation will happen through elections, but Maimane here uses a 'freedom fighting' rhetoric against the original liberation movement. The ANC's corruption has kept	The discourse does not argue for systemic change but, as mentioned above, focuses on particular issues. In the words of Laclau, it is a politics of "differences" rather than "hegemony." "*I know we can grow our economy and create jobs.*" The sense is very much that all issues must happen through constitution, and that they will be inclusive of all South Africans. No one group of 'civilians' is said to be separate from. Where changes must be made, the notion that the system has not been used to its full potential/implementation has not happened rather than the system not being effective – e.g. Section 25 on land redistribution. Specific policy areas are mentioned where changes are planned. Hospitals, schools, matric qualification. Concrete plans on specific issues.

South Africans hostage – they are not free to make their own choices due to their lack of economic freedom.	
Because of the moral baseness of the threatening minority, non-democratic means may be openly justified or at least the minority's continued enjoyment of these will be seen as a generous concession by the people; the speech itself may exaggerate or abuse data to make this point, and the language will show a bellicosity towards the opposition that is incendiary and condescending, lacking the decorum that one shows a worthy opponent.	Formal rights and liberties are openly respected, and the opposition is treated with courtesy and as a legitimate political actor. The discourse will not encourage or justify illegal, violent actions. There will be great respect for institutions and the rule of law. If data is abused, it is either an innocent mistake or an embarrassing breach of democratic standards.
	Maimane praises the constitution, rule of law. Independent bodies must be created to supervise corruption watch. A feeling of 'we will not stoop to their level'. South Africans praised for choosing peace in 1994, with the implication that choosing to vote DA is the same kind of choice now – non-violent opposition.
	Land issue must be settled *"through our legal system, and not by politicians."* The ANC's and others' wanting to change the constitution seen as proof that they do not respect the rule of law.
	"Use your vote to fire the government that has been stealing from you."
	The system can thus be trusted to accomplish these goals. The best way to get rid of 'the thieves' is to vote, to use your democratic rights.
	"you can have your own opinions, but you can't have your own facts"
	Very much the idea that the system has allowed for these things, that the democratic system must be protected at all costs. The system will also allow for resolving the current issues through democratic elections etc.

Overall Comments:

Maimane very much creates the idea that his dream of SA is a work in progress – "we should all pull up our socks". The ANC has corrupted the system, but it is presented as a moral degradation of a former liberation party rather than the decline of democracy in general. Accusatory or inflammatory language is directed at the ANC itself instead of the system; the ANC is said to be completely full of liars, thieves, and the corrupt, and so none of them should be spared judgement. However, Maimane makes it clear that this judgement should come in the form of a democratic vote. Maimane displays a clear respect for the rule of law. He presents his party as an alternative to the ANC's corruption, but also its stated betrayal of both the word and the deed of the constitution. It is also clear that Maimane's criticisms of the ANC are more focused on their performance in governance.

Maimane's view of the people is inclusive of all South Africans who want a better future for their children – there is no mention of a racial of class divide, only that everyone has been suffering under the ANC. There is also no idea of the ANC supporter as an enemy – rather, he has been hoodwinked by a party which formerly stood for the goals he has, but which has become quietly corrupted and now no longer represents him. Maimane aims to show empathy with this process of disillusionment by telling his own story as such.

Appendix 3D

Name of politician: Mmusi Maimane
Title of Speech: Let us vote for our hopes, not our fears.
Date of Speech: 4 May 2019
Category: Final rally
Grader: Marine Fölscher
Date of grading: 20 August 2019

Final Grade: (0.4)

1   A speech in this category includes strong, clearly populist elements but either does not use them consistently or tempers them by including non-populist elements. Thus, the discourse may have a romanticized notion of the people and the idea of a unified popular will (indeed, it must in order to be considered populist), but it avoids bellicose language or references to cosmic proportions or any particular enemy.

Populist	Pluralist
It conveys a Manichaean vision of the world, that is, one that is moral (every issue has a strong moral dimension) and dualistic (everything is in one category or the other, "right" or "wrong," "good" or "evil") The implication—or even the stated idea—is that there can be nothing in between, no fence-sitting, no shades of grey. This leads to the use of highly charged, even bellicose language.	The discourse does not frame issues in moral terms or paint them in black-and-white. Instead, there is a strong tendency to focus on **narrow, particular issues**. The discourse will emphasize or at least not eliminate the possibility of natural, justifiable differences of opinion.
Maimane uses emotive language: "*stolen", "waste and excess", "greed", "brutally killed*"	Certain policy promises of a DA government are made. However, they are all sketched as directly oppositional to the ANC which is doing little/actively working against the people.
Maimane makes it clear that the crisis situation that the country is currently in warrants a Manichean perspective – either you are for the corrupt ANC government, or you are against them and for the DA which is bravely standing against them.	It is understandable that some would vote for the ANC, given their history, but the actions of the ruling party are not justifiable.
The ANC is held as directly responsible for the Life Esidimeni and Marikana deaths: "*shot down and killed by the hand of their government*"	
The ANC was meant to "*deliver and protect our freedom*" but did not do so; they failed as the moral representative of the people.	

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SA has "*insiders and outsiders*"	
The moral significance of the items mentioned in the speech is heightened by ascribing **cosmic proportions** to them, that is, by claiming that they affect people everywhere (possibly but not necessarily across the world) and across time. Especially in this last regard, frequent references may be made to a reified notion of "history." At the same time, the speaker will justify the moral significance of his or her ideas by tying them to **national and religious leaders** that are generally revered. Voters are urged to act bravely, 'like' Helen Suzman, Caster Semenya or Rosa Parks. Maimane makes it clear that SA is at a final crossroads: *"we are on borrowed time in this country"; "there is so much at stake".* *"It's now or never."* The dichotomous choice is set against a backdrop of crisis – if ever there was a time to leave the ANC, fight for the common people etc. it is now. *"our only hope – lies with the DA."* The peaceful transition from apartheid and the dream of a united SA as a mythical destiny: *"One can't help but wonder how the generation that sacrificed so much for our freedom throughout the struggle would feel about how* *things turned out today." "We have a date with destiny"*	The discourse will probably not refer to any reified notion of history or use any cosmic proportions. References to the spatial and temporal consequences of issues will be limited to the material reality rather than any mystical connections. *"It has to be an expression of what you want for your country, for your future and for your children."*
Although Manichaean, the discourse is still democratic, in the sense that the good is embodied in the will of the majority, which is seen as a unified whole, perhaps but not necessarily expressed in references to the "voluntad del pueblo"; however, the speaker ascribes a kind of unchanging essentialism to that will, rather than letting it be whatever 50 percent of the people want at any particular moment. Thus, this good majority	Democracy is simply the calculation of votes. This should be respected and is seen as the foundation of legitimate government, but it is not meant to be an exercise in arriving at a preexisting, knowable "will." The majority shifts and changes across issues. The common man is not romanticized, and the notion of citizenship is broad and legalistic.

is romanticized, with some notion of the common man (urban or rural) seen as the embodiment of the national ideal. *"We have to choose change, or we will lose everything we once thought possible for our country."* An 'ideal' SA is put forth – Maimane makes it clear that this cannot be accomplished under the ANC. South Africans are idealized as hardworking but suffering under their corrupt government.	Maimane advocates for the system to be cleaned up. South Africans should unite across racial and class borders. The concept of the SA citizen is wide – even those who voted ANC previously can be empathized with and welcomed back into the fold. *"We are young and old, black and white.* *We are Christian, Muslim, Jewish and* *nonbelievers.* *We are men and women, gay and straight.* *We're in cities, we're in villages and we're* *on farms."* *"Your vote cannot simply be an expression of who you are: your race, your language, your culture or your religion."* Distinctly pluralist understanding of the people: *"Ours must be a country where the rights of minorities are defended by the majority"* Maimane emphasizes the rights of citizens which he claims the ANC has neglected: *"We will defend every right contained in it, for every single South African"*
The evil is embodied in a minority whose specific identity will vary according to context. Domestically, in Latin America it is often an economic elite, perhaps the "oligarchy," but it may also be a racial elite; internationally, it may be the United States or the capitalist, industrialized nations or international financiers or simply an ideology such as neoliberalism and capitalism. The ANC is clearly indicated as the evil ruling minority. Two ANC presidents are named, and Cyril Ramaphosa, the current president, is called out for his actions under Jacob Zuma. If the DA is in power, the ANC's "*days of living like kings at the expense of the people will be over.*"	The discourse avoids a conspiratorial tone and does not single out any evil ruling minority. It avoids labeling opponents as evil and may not even mention them in an effort to maintain a positive tone and keep passions low. Very inclusive language and style of delivery, but the ANC is still clearly outlined as the evil ruling minority.

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The ANC is very clearly outlined as the evil ruler: *"Your vote has to say: "I will not be abused by anyone, even if it is a party I love. I will not allow them to take away the future of my children. I will be brave and I will choose change."*	
Crucially, the evil minority is or was recently in charge and subverted the system to its own interests, against those of the good majority or the people. Thus, systemic change is/was required, often expressed in terms such as "revolution" or "liberation" of the people from their "immiseration" or bondage, even if technically it comes about through elections. Scathing attack of Cyril Ramaphosa and the ANC: "Cyril Ramaphosa was there, as Deputy President, when the state was looted." "His name is recorded in these votes as one of those who betrayed us." Ramaphosa presented as not the savior the ANC makes him out to be, but rather another chip off the same block – allegations of corruption, his role in the Marikana massacre highlighted. Thus, the entire party and their government must be removed, because none of them can be trusted. ANC has become corrupted: "They were once our liberators, but today we need to be liberated from them." ANC today "stand directly in the way of freedom for millions of South Africans."	The discourse does not argue for systemic change but, as mentioned above, focuses on particular issues. In the words of Laclau, it is a politics of "differences" rather than "hegemony." "Because our project is no longer freedom fighting, but freedom protecting and enhancing." The protection of minority rights highlighted as important. The DA argues against the incumbent, but not the system. Maimane pledges to improve the ANC's 'failed' system with regards to practicalities: jobs, policing, public transport.
Because of the moral baseness of the threatening minority, non-democratic means may be openly justified or at least the minority's continued enjoyment of these will be seen as a generous concession by the people; the speech itself may exaggerate or abuse data to make this point, and the	Formal rights and liberties are openly respected, and the opposition is treated with courtesy and as a legitimate political actor. The discourse will not encourage or justify illegal, violent actions. There will be great respect for institutions and the rule of law. If data is abused, it is either an innocent

language will show a bellicosity towards the opposition that is incendiary and condescending, lacking the decorum that one shows a worthy opponent. Let's "put them in prison, not parliament"	mistake or an embarrassing breach of democratic standards. Voting is emphasized as the means by which the ANC must be removed. It is also highlighted as the means by which a future DA government might be held accountable: "When we reach the end of this period, judge us. See if we did the things we said we'd do." Maimane mentions the sanctity of the constitution and the rule of law more than once. The current government is said to have breached good democratic standards.

Overall Comments:

This speech seems like a response to the ANC government and electoral campaign around Ramaphosa rather than a DA-specific one. It includes much more scathing personal attacks than, for example, Maimane's manifesto launch speech. Ramaphosa is named as a perpetuator of Zuma's crimes, and the ANC leadership presented as criminals, not statesmen who should be respected.

A dichotomy of choices is clearly represented – either vote for the ANC, like before, and go 'over the edge', or vote for the DA and make a positive change. The DA is presented as the only way to save South Africa from the excesses and greed of the ANC. The DA is able to represent the people more accurately. However, Maimane's inclusive framing of 'the people', and his stated respect for the rule of law and democracy as a legitimate system, are distinctly anti-populist.

While Maimane highlights the corruption of the ANC, the system itself is not said to have failed, only the party. It needs to be saved and reformed, but not demolished and re-formed.

The discourse thus includes a mention of an evil ruling minority and a crisis situation of cosmic proportions for South Africans, and romanticizes the South African public, but this is tempered by a respect for democracy as the best option of governance. Minority rights and the protection of the constitution are also highlighted.