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ACTIVE FPGA SECURITY THROUGH DECOY CIRCUITS

THESIS

Bradley D. Christiansen, Major, USAF

AFIT/GE/ENG/06-15

**DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
AIR UNIVERSITY**

AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio

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ACTIVE FPGA SECURITY THROUGH DECOY CIRCUITS

THESIS

Presented to the Faculty

Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering

Graduate School of Engineering and Management

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Air University

Air Education and Training Command

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Master of Science in Electrical Engineering

Bradley D. Christiansen, Bachelor of Science

Major, USAF

March 2006


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
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
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Abstract

Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) based on Static Random Access Memory (SRAM) are vulnerable to tampering attacks such as readback and cloning attacks. Such attacks enable the reverse engineering of the design programmed into an FPGA. To counter such attacks, measures that protect the design with low performance penalties should be employed.

This research proposes a method which employs the addition of active decoy circuits to protect SRAM FPGAs from reverse engineering. The effects of the protection method on security, execution time, power consumption, and FPGA resource usage are quantified. The method significantly increases the security of the design with only minor increases in execution time, power consumption, and resource usage. For the circuits used to characterize the method, security increased to more than one million times the original values, while execution time increased to at most 1.2 times, dynamic power consumption increased to at most two times, and look-up table usage increased to at most seven times the original values. These are reasonable penalties given the size and security of the modified circuits. The proposed design protection method also extends to FPGAs based on other technologies and to Application-Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs).

In addition to the design methodology proposed, a new classification of tampering attacks and countermeasures is presented.

Acknowledgments

Whoa! What a ride! At times, the terrain was very rugged. However, “My God hath been my support; he hath led me through mine afflictions in the wilderness; and he hath preserved me” (2 Nephi 4:20).

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Bradley D. Christiansen

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1. Introduction

1.1 Motivation

As an F-117A Nighthawk stealth fighter made its way to its target on 27 March 1999 [FAS00], enemy forces pieced together its flight path, from takeoff to the target area. Using knowledge from previous Nighthawk strikes, possible returns from low-frequency radars, and the hint from a dropped bomb, the enemy was able to down the aircraft with a surface-to-air missile (cf., Figure 1). Fortunately, the pilot safely ejected and was rescued before being captured. The decision had to be made whether to destroy the remains of the plane to protect its stealth technology [Lam02] and the specialized circuits used in the flight control system.



Figure 1. Downed F-117A. Note the HO designation for Holloman AFB, NM, home of the F-117As. [FAS00]

Almost two years later, as a U.S. Navy EP-3E Aires II surveillance aircraft was conducting a routine mission in international airspace, a Chinese fighter bumped the EP-3E's wing, necessitating an emergency landing in Chinese territory (cf., Figure 2) [New01]. Although the crew was trained to destroy sensitive equipment in the event of capture [DoD01], the equipment may not have been sufficiently destroyed before landing to preclude Chinese exploitation. Among the systems that might have been exploited by the Chinese was the Link-11 secure communications system [Smi01]. It is also possible that classified circuits were also compromised.



Figure 2. Captured EP-3E. Note the chipped propeller blade at (2) and the missing radome at (3). [Tri01]

The above examples illustrate the need to protect critical technologies in military systems. The United States Air Force goes to great lengths to maintain technological superiority, avoid technological surprise, and achieve a return on investment from advanced technology development. Protecting integrated circuit designs found in weapons systems helps to achieve those goals [AFR05]. Such protection enables a weapon system to have a long life without compromising its capabilities. Additionally, a protected design can prevent an adversary from increasing his knowledge base and advancing his technology [HuS99].

Field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) are increasingly taking the place of application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs) due to their flexibility, increasing densities [Act02], and lower non-recurring engineering costs. Reprogrammable FPGAs are attractive for applications with requirements that change over time, where changes need to be implemented quickly, or for quickly fielding a new product. As more commercial systems are designed with FPGAs rather than ASICs, an increasing number of military systems will also contain FPGAs.

FPGAs have some intrinsic vulnerabilities, including the possibility of extracting the circuit design through reverse engineering [AFR05]. In the corporate arena, protecting a design on an FPGA from reverse engineering helps maintain a competitive edge, market share, and revenues. Securing a design in a military application maintains its technological advantage, prevents the exploitation of a design by an adversary, and consequently can save lives.

1.2 Problem Statement

The challenge, then, is to devise methods of protecting designs on FPGAs that completely eliminate reverse engineering vulnerabilities or, at a minimum, introduce delays that make reverse engineering impractical. A worthwhile new design protection method balances increased security against increased implementation costs, decreased system performance, and increased operations and maintenance costs [AFR05].

1.3 Research Scope

The purpose of this research is to devise a method to secure integrated circuit designs implemented in FPGAs and then evaluate its effectiveness. A novel process is

proposed to protect designs specified using truth or state tables, with Boolean equations or that are already implemented in VHDL (Very high-speed integrated circuit Hardware Description Language). The proposed design methodology will produce secure application-specific integrated circuits, as well as secure FPGA designs. This procedure is demonstrated using several common circuits. The power consumption, execution times, and resource usage of the original and modified circuits are measured and compared.

1.4 Research Contributions

This research proposes a new attack classification scheme that combines of cost and time. A countermeasure classification system easily correlated to the attack classification is also developed.

In addition, the research contributes an innovative technique that provides significant protection to FPGA and ASIC designs against reverse engineering. The performance penalty to apply this technique to FPGA designs are only minor increases in execution time and power consumption. Increased resource requirements can be accommodated with the generally available excess FPGA resources.

The design methodology is demonstrated using circuits described in various ways from Boolean equations to VHDL. Additionally, the flexibility of the algorithm to modify only a portion of a circuit is illustrated.

1.5 Thesis Preview

Chapter 2 provides background information on FPGAs and reverse engineering, gives definitions, lists and classifies attacks and countermeasures, and presents relevant

existing research. Chapter 3 describes the testing methodology and provides an overview of the proposed circuit modification process. Chapter 4 gives the details of the proposed design methodology by illustrating it with several examples. Chapter 5 presents the test results and analyses. Chapter 6 presents a summary, explains the significance of the research, and makes recommendations for further study.

2. Background

2.1 Chapter Overview


The purpose of this chapter is to provide sufficient background for the reader to understand the context of the research. After covering FPGA architectures, the terms *tampering* and *reverse engineering* are defined, followed by a brief tutorial about reverse engineering. Finally, FPGA design threats and possible countermeasures to these threats are presented, as well as a threat and countermeasure classification scheme.

2.2 FPGA Defined

A field-programmable gate array (FPGA) is a computer chip that a user can program in the field to accomplish a particular function. For example, a user could program an FPGA to be a general purpose microprocessor or to encrypt or decrypt data. FPGAs are generally divided into cells called configurable logic blocks (CLBs), which may contain the following:

- look-up tables (LUTs) to accomplish logic functions, such as
$$Y = (B \text{ AND } D) \text{ XOR } C,$$
- arithmetic logic gates to implement other logic functions or to combine outputs from LUTs,
- multiplexers to select particular outputs, and
- storage elements (memory) such as D flip-flops.

Figure 3 shows a portion of a CLB. CLBs are interconnected with wires that can be



programmed to provide specific paths between CLBs or to input or output pins as shown in Figure 4 [BrR96, Xil05].

Programmable elements are controlled by switches that determine the function of that building block. The switches are generally either antifuses or SRAM (static random access memory) elements. An antifuse is a ‘sandwich’ configuration consisting of an insulator between two conductors. The insulator electrically isolates the conductors when the antifuse is not programmed. When the antifuse is programmed by applying a voltage, the insulator provides a low-resistance path between the conductors. Figure 5 shows an unprogrammed antifuse (a) and a programmed antifuse (b). The boxed area of (b) shows where the connection between the two conductors has been made. Antifuse FPGAs are




Figure 4. Generalized FPGA interconnect. Adapted from [BrR96].




Figure 5. Cross sections of unprogrammed and programmed antifuses. [Act06]

one-time-programmable, while SRAM FPGAs are reprogrammable. The appropriate value to either activate or deactivate a particular path or function is stored in an SRAM element. Figure 6 shows SRAM switches configured to connect two logic blocks through two interconnections and a multiplexer. An SRAM element loses its programming (theoretically) when power is disconnected. To program an FPGA, a configuration file (also called a bit stream) is usually created in a software application. This configuration




Figure 6. FPGA with SRAM switches. [BrR96]

file is downloaded directly to the FPGA or to a memory device (flash memory or a PROM – programmable read-only memory). The memory stores the configuration file and programs an SRAM-based FPGA at start-up since the SRAM switches lose their state after a loss of power. The bits in the configuration file dictate the switch settings [BrR96, WGP04].

2.3 Definition of Terms

It is important to understand the definitions of the following terms as they are used in this research.

Tampering is defined as activities that secretly, dishonestly, or interfere or intrude without consent [Pri05]. Such activities, accomplished through direct physical or remote electronic access, include destruction, modification, observation, and theft of integrated circuits [IEEE93]. The theft could be of the entire chip for use in another system or of

the design for duplication and distribution. The entire circuit, or just a portion thereof, could be destroyed, modified, or observed. The observation of a circuit, possibly in conjunction with modifications, could reveal private information or proprietary algorithms, technologies, or processes.

As the following examples show, tampering has varying levels of difficulty and complexity.

- If physical access is achieved, an entire chip could be stolen, or, with more effort, the circuit design itself could be stolen.
- Modifying an ASIC directly may be more difficult than remotely modifying a reprogrammable FPGA.
- The entire chip could be destroyed or, with more sophisticated tools, a specific area of the chip could be targeted for destruction.
- The leads of a chip could be probed or, at an increased level of complexity, the signals within a circuit could be observed.

Reverse Engineering, a subset of tampering, is defined as methods, processes, and analyses used to recreate a design from a final product [Ang06] or other process outputs [Geo05], to create a “representation at a higher level of abstraction” [J-STD95], or to determine the technology that is used [Geo05].

In general, reverse engineering requires more effort and resources than tampering alone. For example, deciphering a secret key in a cryptographic system is tampering, but discovering how the algorithm is implemented would be reverse engineering. Likewise, obtaining an unencrypted FPGA configuration file and using it to program other FPGAs

would be tampering, while deciphering the configuration file would be reverse engineering. Tampering to observe an integrated circuit is a prerequisite for analyses that would use the observations to recreate the design.

Being a subset of tampering, reverse engineering also occurs at varying levels. At one level, a cryptographic implementation may be discovered. At another level, the fabrication processes and technology used in that implementation might be determined.

Thus, a secure FPGA design would prevent interference with its operation, intrusion into its functionality, its replication, and the determination of its fundamental technology.

Anti-Tampering and *Anti-Reverse Engineering* are actions taken to hinder or prevent tampering and reverse engineering.

2.4 Reverse Engineering Tutorial

Since the goal of the proposed design methodology is to produce an FPGA design resistant to reverse engineering, it is appropriate to review the stages of a reverse engineering process. The following list of stages, which apply specifically to ASICs, is excerpted from [CEL99]. Following this list of stages, the application of these stages to FPGAs is discussed.

According to [CEL99], the following stages of the reverse engineering process were identified at the Argonne National Laboratory's 1998 Reverse Engineering Workshop.

1. Sample preparation: An ASIC must be cross-sectioned or chemically etched to reveal its internal construction. Since this step is destructive,

great care must be taken to avoid damaging the components of interest.

Several samples may be required, as well as several iterations of slicing or etching subsequent layers and the next stage [AnK96].

2. Image acquisition: Once the internal construction is revealed, it must be imaged, section by section. The images of the sections are pieced together for a complete image. A scanning electron microscope may be required, depending on the size of the transistors.
3. Geometric description: Geometric data is extracted from the image file and converted to a geometric data stream. Information about the technology employed to realize the circuit is necessary for the conversion of the image to geometric data.
4. Transistor netlist: From the geometric data, transistors are identified through design-rule checkers.
5. Gate-level netlist: Specific gates are identified from collections of transistors. For example, AND or NOR gates may be identified. Since gates generally have the same geometry, pattern-matching enables the process to be automated.
6. Module-level description: With the gates identified, modules such as multiplexers and full adders can be abstracted.
7. Register-transfer and behavioral descriptions: Further abstraction generates a register-transfer-level representation and eventually a

behavioral description. (In 1999, the technology to produce these interpretations was not available.)

Reverse engineering an FPGA design uses stages similar to those listed above. If the FPGA is antifuse-based, it has to be cross-sectioned and imaged. For an SRAM-based FPGA, sample preparation and image acquisition determine the contents of the SRAM elements that act as switches. (The process of discovering the state of an SRAM is discussed further in Section 2.5.) The processes of generating a geometric description and a transistor netlist are equivalent to correlating each switch with an FPGA interconnect intersection or CLB element. With that correlation information, gates and modules can be composed.

An FPGA can also be reverse engineered from its unencrypted configuration file. In such a case, obtaining the FPGA bit stream is equivalent to the sample preparation stage for an ASIC. A correlation similar to the one above is done between the bits of the file and entities on the FPGA, and the process continues with the reconstruction of gates and modules.

2.5 Attacks

Partly due to its flexibility and its programming method, an FPGA is vulnerable to reverse engineering (i.e., the determination of the implemented circuit design). Various methods can derive the functionality of a programmed FPGA. These methods include [WGP04]:

- a. **Black Box Attacks:** All possible inputs are applied and the outputs are observed as illustrated in Figure 7.




Figure 7. Black Box attack.

b. Readback Attacks: The FPGA's configuration data is read directly from the FPGA.

c. Cloning Attacks: An attacker eavesdrops on the transmission of the configuration file from memory to the FPGA and uses the stolen file to program a clone FPGA as shown in Figure 8.




Figure 8. Cloning attack.

d. Reverse-Engineering an unencrypted configuration: This is done after attack (b) or (c) above.

e. Side-Channel Attacks: These attacks include power consumption analysis, timing analysis, electromagnetic (EM) radiation analysis, and injecting faults to reveal functionality. Figure 9 shows the power consumption plot of a Data Encryption Standard implementation, which clearly shows 16 rounds of the algorithm.




Figure 9. Power consumption plot of DES implementation. [RRC04]

f. Physical Attacks: Since SRAM cells are not entirely erased when power is disconnected, physical attacks via accessing them include mechanical probing, accessing the test scan path, removing layers of a chip, and using electron microscopes. However, physical attacks against antifuse FPGAs do not seem practical since much of the chip must be destroyed by cross-sectioning or by removing multiple layers to reveal a single antifuse connection.

The methods for determining the value that is or was in an SRAM element deserve additional discussion. Non-destructive methods include:

- I_{DDQ} (quiescent power-supply current) testing measures the supply current to a device after applying a series of test vectors. An abnormal measurement would indicate that the device has been stressed and that its operating characteristics have changed [Gut01].
- Measuring the substrate and gate currents observes the amount of stress a device has experienced [Gut01].

- Using the circuitry intended for device testing, such as JTAG boundary scan [Gut01].
- Voltage contrast imaging detects logic levels and voltages through the examination of the differences in the brightness of the voltage intensity image [SoA93].

One invasive technique uses a focused ion beam (FIB) workstation to drill minute access holes for probing deeply buried entities. The FIB workstation can also inject metal probe points for easier device examination [Gut01]. Although the literature does not describe the use of these methods of attack against SRAM FPGAs, it is conceivable that they could be used to determine the programming of such a device [WGP04].

The attacks that could also be used against ASICs include black box, side-channel, and physical attacks [RRC04]. For example, with the destruction of only six chips, an Intel 80386 was reverse engineered in two weeks using the specific physical attack described in the Reverse Engineering Tutorial section above [AnK96]. Figure 10 illustrates the third stage in the reverse engineering process, where an integrated circuit image is converted to a geometric data format such as Graphic Design Station II (GDSII).




Figure 10. Reverse engineering an ASIC. [ACA02]

2.6 Protections/Countermeasures

There are various approaches to protect a design on an FPGA or to mitigate the effects of its theft and reproduction. Policy and law protections such as patents and copyrights allow private companies to sue an alleged thief for damages. To aid in proving ownership in the event a design is stolen, the original producer might embed a watermark in the design [JYP03]. Export control laws attempt to maintain a nation's technological advantage. Security classifications and laws that prescribe punishments for espionage and treason also attempt to protect a nation's technological capital. If classified knowledge is compromised, a non-disclosure agreement (NDA), which is generally executed to obtain a security clearance, may have been breached. NDAs are also signed before a manufacturer grants access to its FPGA bit stream design [WGP04] or to the mapping between switches and function elements.

If these policy protections are subverted, months or years could elapse before a theft is discovered, by which time significant damage may have already been done. Such was the case with atomic bomb secrets stolen from Los Alamos and given to the Soviet Union [FBI06]. In the corporate arena, by the time such a theft is discovered, a company's market share may have already been lost to a company in a foreign nation that not only refuses to enforce patents but also encourages such piracy. Likewise, a disgruntled former employee of Company X could begin employment with Company Y and describe how a watermark might be removed from a design stolen from Company X.

With these subversions, stronger protections are warranted for high-value assets. Encryption has long been utilized to protect messages. However, even encryption

algorithms will eventually be cracked as was the case of the Data Encryption Standard [EFF98]. As described in FIPS 140-2, there are also physical protections such as containers, tamper-evident coatings, and circuitry that detects and responds to unauthorized access [NIS02]. One example of a FIPS 140-2 Security Level 4 device is the IBM 4758 PCI Cryptographic Coprocessor [IBM06]. The circuitry of this device is surrounded by a mesh that detects physical penetrations and abnormal environmental conditions in parameters such as temperature and radiation. The response to such an attack is the erasure of critical secret data.

There are countermeasures stronger than policy that can protect the design of a circuit programmed into an FPGA. These include [WGP04]:

- a. The complexity of state-of-the-art FPGAs, which mitigates a black box attack.
- b. A security bit can prevent a readback attack. However, it is possible that fault injection may defeat this countermeasure. Applying unusual voltages or voltage transients could reset the security bit [AnK96]. If fault injection is a possibility, the FPGA should be placed in a secure environment.
- c. Encrypting, as in Figure 11, and/or storing the configuration file in memory resident on the FPGA, as in Figure 12, can prevent cloning attacks. Encryption also prevents reverse engineering a file. (The devices described in [Xil05], however, can decrypt an encrypted configuration file.)




Figure 11. Use of an encrypted configuration file. Adapted from [Kea01].




Figure 12. On-FPGA PROM.

d. Techniques to prevent side-channel attacks include inserting random values to mask secret information, smoothing power traces, and changing logic at the transistor level.

e. To prevent physical attacks on SRAM FPGAs, memory retention should be reduced as much as possible through methods such as periodically inverting the bits, applying an opposite current, inserting dummy cycles, or rearranging the data using dynamically reconfigurable FPGAs as in Figure 13.




Figure 13. Rearranging design modules.

Table 1 summarizes the attacks and countermeasures discussed above. Though the attacks and countermeasures listed are not necessarily specific to FPGA designs, some of the methods have been used against or on underlying FPGA technologies, such as SRAM. Attacks and countermeasures with respect to embedded systems have also been examined [RRC04].

2.7 Classification of Attacks and Countermeasures

2.7.1 Introduction

An attacker who tampers with an integrated circuit can harm both the developer and the user of the circuit. If the effects of tampering are widespread, the developer is damaged by a reputation for circuit malfunctions. Furthermore, revenue could be lost if the design is copied and distributed, since the developer does not recoup the research and development costs. Likewise, the user may be denied service due to destructive tampering of a circuit or lose information that was supposedly secure due to observation of a circuit. In security and defense applications, lives could be lost due to tampering or reverse engineering. A tampering attack could result in a malfunction that causes a

Table 1. Attacks and countermeasures. [WGP04]

Attack	Used against FPGAs?	Countermeasure	Available in commercial FPGAs?
Black Box	Yes	Inherent FPGA size and design complexity	Yes
Readback (Security bit possibly overcome with fault injection)	Yes (Not specifically)	Employ a security bit (Secure environment) See 1 and 2 below	Yes (User-specific) See 1 and 2 below
Cloning	Yes	1. Encrypt the configuration file 2. Store the configuration file in FPGA	1. Yes 2. Varies
Reverse-Engineer the configuration file	Yes		
Physical	Little specifically published	Reduce the memory-retention effects	Not specifically
Side-Channel	Yes	A. Insert random values B. Smooth the power traces C. Change the logic	Not specifically

vehicle to crash or the loss of the designed technological advantage of a weapon or countermeasure.

Countermeasures are employed to thwart such tampering attacks. These methods vary in cost and effectiveness. Thus, an understandable classification is needed to apply appropriate protection mechanisms against perceived threats. However, there are no universally accepted classifications of threats and protection levels for integrated circuits. In fact, there is no IEEE standard that addresses either of these classifications. This section presents a classification of tampering threats and a corresponding classification of protection levels.

In [ADD91], Abraham et al. propose a classification of attackers based on the attacker's knowledge and available resources. They also present a security level scheme that appears to be loosely correlated with the attacker classification. Anderson and Kuhn apply the attacker classification to specific attack examples in [AnK96] and [AnK97]. Actel Corporation in [Act02] also references [ADD91] to compare the security offered by their FPGAs to that offered by other manufacturers' devices.

The following subsection explains the IBM classifications and describes the usage of these classifications in other applications. Threats against ASICs and FPGAs are also presented and classified. Examples of countermeasures are given, along with a security level classification correlated to the threat classification. Alternate classifications based on the time required to crack a design are also given.

2.7.2 Previous Works

To define the potential physical threats against the Transaction Security System, attackers are categorized as [ADD91]:

Class I (clever outsiders)—They are often very intelligent but may have insufficient knowledge of the system. They may have access to only moderately sophisticated equipment. They often try to take advantage of an existing weakness in the system, rather than try to create one.

Class II (knowledgeable insiders)—They have substantial specialized technical education and experience. They have varying degrees of understanding of parts of the system but potential access to most of it. They often have access to highly sophisticated tools and instruments for analysis.

Class III (funded organizations)—They are able to assemble teams of specialists with related and complementary skills backed by great funding resources. They are capable of in-depth analysis of the system, designing sophisticated attacks, and using the most sophisticated analysis tools. They may use Class II adversaries as part of the attack team.

Security levels which correlate to the resources (time, money, knowledge) required to conduct an attack on a system are also defined. Table 2 summarizes their security levels.

Table 2. IBM security level scheme. Adapted from [ADD91].

Security Level	Definition			
	<i>Knowledge/Skills</i>	<i>Tools/Equipment</i>	<i>Tool or Total Cost</i>	<i>Notes</i>
ZERO	——	——	——	No special security features
LOW	——	Common lab or shop tools	——	Some security features
MODL	Some specialized knowledge	More expensive	\$500 - \$5,000 (tools)	——
MOD	Some special skills and knowledge	Special tools and equipment	\$5,000 - \$50,000 (tools)	Attack time-consuming, but successful
MODH	Special skills and knowledge; adversarial team effort	Available, but expensive to buy and operate	\$50,000 - \$200,000 or more	Attack could be unsuccessful
HIGH	Team of specialists	Highly specialized, which may have to be built	\$1,000,000 or more	Known attacks unsuccessful; attack success in question

Even though both an attacker classification and a protection level scheme are defined, the correlation between the two is not clear. It appears that the LOW security level corresponds to a Class I attacker, the MOD security level could correspond to a Class II attacker, and the HIGH security level corresponds to a Class III attacker. In addition, the security levels MODL and MODH do not clearly fall between the outsiders of Class I and the insiders of Class II and between the insiders of Class II and the funded organizations of Class III, respectively. Thus, how is an outsider classified who is more than clever but less than a funded organization?

The IBM attacker categorization has been used to classify several example attacks [Ank96]. The IBM scheme defines Class I as the application of low and high voltages, and power and clock transients, which can be applied non-invasively. For example, directing UV light at the security lock cell of an EPROM, or removing a smartcard chip with a knife, nitric fuming acid, and acetone are Class I attacks. A Class II attack removes each chip layer, imaging it using the Schottky effect and an electron beam, and reconstructing the collection of images with image processing software. Another Class II attack uses a focused ion beam (FIB) workstation to actively attack a chip. Although the use of the FIB workstation is considered Class II, a Class I attacker could rent time on such machines. A Class III attacker is one whose resources are such that “chip contents cannot be kept from” the attacker [AnK96].

Class distinctions do not hold when an attacker can access equipment available predominantly to an attacker of a higher class. For example, a Class I attacker can rent time on a FIB workstation, a tool predominantly available to a Class II attacker. Furthermore, the insider threat is not considered, and Class II is also applied to academics who apparently have no privileged information.

Actel Corporation references [ADD91] in [Act02], but it is not entirely clear whether the reference is to IBM’s attacker classification or security level scheme. Actel definitions of security levels are close, though not exact, restatements of IBM’s security level definitions. However, Actel uses numbers and + or - for the security levels rather than names as IBM did. In addition, the words “Class” and “Level” are interchanged. With this modification of IBM’s attacker classification and/or security level scheme,

Actel claims that conventional SRAM FPGAs are Class or Level 1, SRAM FPGAs with DES encryption are Level 2, and Actel products are Level 2+. A Level 3 example is not given, and the insider threat is not addressed.

[ETS05] applies the IBM classification to attackers of bus encryption hardware. The classification is presented in the context of smartcard memories but was used only sparingly [NPS03]. Others assert the IBM classification should not be used to describe the tamper-proof level of wireless sensor networks, but rather, the level should be defined in terms of network availability [PaS05].

Attacks have also been categorized using privacy, integrity, or availability attacks [RRC04]. Another classification divides attacks among physical, side-channel, and software attacks. Countermeasures are presented and correlated with the second attack classification, but they are not classified with a security level [RRC04].

These previous classifications have obstacles to their understandability and use. Classifying the insider threat, as well as the outsider with moderate resources but no private information, has been a challenge. Also problematic has been the distinction between classes when a member of one class has access to tools of another class. If both attack/attacker classification and countermeasure security level classification are given, the correlation between them is generally absent. The attacker classification is often used to determine a security level. Whatever the obstacles, there are not universally accepted classifications of threats and countermeasure security levels and a correlation between the two.

2.7.3 Classification of Threats

To overcome the shortfalls of the previous classifications, the following matrix categorization is proposed. This categorization uses the attacks, not attackers, based on the resources and time required to successfully accomplish the attack. In this way, the dissolution of classes does not occur when a member of one class uses tools of another. The proposed classification also accounts for the insider threat and the outsider with moderate resources but no inside knowledge. Finally, a correlation can easily be made to protection levels, as discussed in the next subsection.

It is appropriate to classify the attacks and not the attackers. For example, a bullet-proof vest should work whether a gun is fired by a child or a senior citizen. An automatic teller machine should thwart an attack whether perpetrated by a drug addict or by the mafia.

Attacks are classified according to both cost and time, and the classification is depicted graphically in Figure 14. In some respects, cost and time can be considered independent. However, since the application of additional resources (personnel, equipment, etc.) at an additional cost may reduce the time required for a successful attack, this relationship is indicated by the blue arrow in Figure 14 that shows that as the cost increases, time may decrease. Insider knowledge is removed as a class, but this variable is depicted by the three orange arrows in Figure 14, indicating that such information may reduce the cost, time, or both. Insider knowledge may include information about designs and/or processes. The potential for damage from an insider information-enabled attack is increased due to the access available [Ver01]. According




Figure 14. Matrix classification.

to the 2005 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey, incidents from the inside occur about as often as incidents from the outside [GLL05].

A qualitative explanation of the cost levels follows.

- **Low-cost attack:** A successful attack requires limited resources (equipment, knowledge, and personnel). The attack could be executed within an academic laboratory containing only ordinary equipment or possibly at home. Examples of low-cost attacks include black box, fault-injection [AnK96], protocol failure [AnK97], and smartcard physical attacks [AnK96]. Assuming the appropriate access is obtained, perhaps by the end user, reading back and cloning an unencrypted bitstream could also cost very little.
- **Medium-cost attack:** Moderate resources are required for a successful attack. Specialized academic and corporate laboratories probably contain the required equipment. More people can be applied to the attack, since

the benefits are expected to be greater. Power and timing analyses, determining SRAM contents, and ASIC reverse engineering are examples of medium-cost attacks.

- High-cost attack: These attacks entail vast resources, such as are available to governments and organized crime. Many people, perhaps in multiple locations engage in the attack, since success has implications for years to come. Funds could also be spent to acquire insider knowledge. Examples of these attacks include reverse engineering a bitstream and physically attacking an antifuse FPGA [WGP04].

The time categories are described next.

- 0-5 years: Little time is required or invested for an attack to ensure an appropriate return on the investment. This timeframe provides the highest profit margin if an attack is successful. Reading back and cloning an unencrypted bitstream, given the requisite opportunity, requires little time. For example, an Intel 80386 was reverse engineered in two weeks.
- 5-50 years. Despite the length of time required for success, an attack may proceed based on the expected payoff. Reverse engineering a bitstream could take longer than 5 years. Given a large enough design on an FPGA, more than five years could be expended to determine the values remaining in the SRAM elements that were programmed.

- 50+ years. Weapons systems generally have life spans of less than 50 years, so providing protection against a 50-year-long attack provides a comfortable measure of security. A black box attack could last longer than 50 years, if the circuit has a great amount of inputs, has bi-directional inputs and outputs, and is constructed with state machines [WGP04]. Fifty years or more could be required to locate 2-5% of millions of antifuses [Act06].

2.7.4 Classification of Countermeasure Security Levels

From the above categorization of threats, a classification of security levels can be easily made. The security level of an anti-tampering action corresponds to the classification of the attack. For example, a countermeasure that ensures an attack requires more than fifty years for success is a 50-plus-year security measure, and a countermeasure is High-cost if it entails great expense for a successful attack. In this way, the security level of an action correlates to the resources and time required for a successful attack. This meets the goal of Anderson and Kuhn: “the level of tamper resistance offered by any particular product can be measured by the time and cost penalty that the protective mechanisms impose on the attacker” [AnK97].

An example of a Low-cost countermeasure is the use of complex FPGAs and designs to prevent black box attacks. Another example of a Low-cost countermeasure is setting the security bit to prevent readback. If the security bit can be compromised with fault injection and a secure location houses the design, Medium cost or higher could be imposed depending on the location.

Storing the FPGA configuration file in an on-FPGA PROM is another example of a Medium-cost security measure, since attacks similar to SRAM physical attacks would be required to extract the file from the PROM.

One High-cost security measure is bitstream encryption to prevent cloning and reverse engineering. Rearranging design modules to frustrate SRAM physical attacks is another potentially High-cost measure, since more resources would have to be applied to discover the scarce traces of memory contents.

In addition to the higher cost of attacking an SRAM FPGA that uses dynamic reconfiguration, the length of time required could be greater than five years. Another countermeasure that could impose an attack length of greater than five years is configuration file encryption.

Employing on-FPGA PROM for configuration file storage may provide less than a five-year delay. A security bit to prevent readback may also provide protection for less than five years. However, a secure location for placing an FPGA could be designed to repel unauthorized entry for at least five years, if not fifty.

Although the use of complex designs and FPGAs is low-cost, it requires a significant amount of time to perform a black box attack against such a design or FPGA. Due to this time constraint, an attacker would probably consider an attack with a lower time requirement.

Security measures designed to require extensive resources and a considerable amount of time to break include the protection of nuclear weapons [AnK96]. It would be a great benefit to humanity for those security measures to be updated when necessary and

to succeed even when faced with an attack from within. This highlights the need for a classification system to ensure designs are adequately secured against perceived threats.

The leak of insider information of appropriate quality and quantity will decrease the security level of a design. A design considered to be of High cost and require ten years to crack could be reduced to medium cost or require only four years to crack, or both, with the proper knowledge. Steps to mitigate the effects of unauthorized disclosure of proprietary information include the compartmentalization of knowledge among developers and restricting of access to the development of products. Expending additional resources for an attack may also reduce the time required for success.

The proposed classification provides a mapping of attacks and countermeasures so that appropriate measures can be employed to counter perceived threats. Efforts to refine the time and cost estimates of particular attacks are still needed. As Anderson and Kuhn state, “Estimating these penalties is clearly an important problem, but is one to which security researchers, evaluators and engineers have paid less attention than perhaps it deserves” [AnK97].

2.8 Related Circuit Protection Research

Current research in circuit protection deals mostly with methods other than modifying the circuit itself, such as encryption and physical access prevention. A review of the literature has not revealed any work in decoy circuits for protection. As far as can be ascertained, this research is the first of its kind dealing with the use of decoy circuits to protect digital circuit designs.

2.9 Summary

This chapter contains background information concerning FPGAs, attacks against these devices, and countermeasures that can protect these devices from the attacks. The architecture and programming of FPGAs are described. Definitions of tampering and reverse engineering are presented. Reverse engineering is further explained with a tutorial. Attack examples and countermeasures are listed and illustrated. Finally, a framework for classifying the attacks and countermeasures is offered.

3. Methodology

3.1 Chapter Overview

This chapter presents the methodology for implementing and testing the proposed anti-reverse engineering scheme. The results of the tests performed characterize the effects of the design modification procedure in terms of security, FPGA resources consumed, execution time, and power usage. An overview of the actual design modification process is given. The details of the process are described in Chapter 4.

3.2 Problem Definition

3.2.1 Goals and Hypotheses

This research proposes a new scheme of anti-tampering through decoy circuits, and determines the effect of a proposed design modification methodology on the security, execution time, power consumption, and chip area utilization of a given circuit. Multiple circuits are produced using this methodology. The security, execution time, chip area utilization, and power consumption of the resultant circuits are measured and compared with the original circuits' values of these parameters.

The security of the circuits is defined as the time required to conduct a brute force, black box attack on the FPGAs. This time is calculated by dividing the number of required cycles by a frequency and the appropriate scaling factor to express a value in years. To calculate the number of cycles required for an original circuit, all possible input combinations are considered. Thus, if m is the number of original inputs and S is the number of sequential elements in the circuit, the number of required cycles for the original circuit is 2^{m+S} ($S=0$ for a combinational circuit). The number of cycles required

to conduct a black box attack on a modified design is the sum of half the number of possible input combinations to a Combination Lock (explained later) and the product of half the number of input combinations to the modified circuit and the possible output combinations in length equal to the total number of outputs. That is, the cycles required to conduct a black box attack on a modified design (A_{mod}) is

$$A_{\text{mod}} = \frac{1}{2}l + \frac{1}{2}(2^{m+s+p})(\text{output combinations of length } n + q) \quad (1)$$

where l is the number of Combination Lock input combinations, p is the number of additional inputs, n is the number of original outputs, and q is the number of additional outputs. The number of cycles required for a modified combinational circuit is expected to be at least 4 times the cycles required for an original circuit (of 3 total inputs and 2 total outputs), in addition to 1.68×10^7 cycles for the smallest combination lock circuit considered. With increases in the numbers of inputs, outputs, and copies added to a circuit, the security is expected to increase exponentially. An increase in the number of possible combination lock input combinations, due to increases in the numbers of inputs and states, is also expected to exponentially increase the security of a modified circuit.

A slight increase is expected in the execution time of the resulting FPGA designs. However, this increase is not expected to be worse than approximately ten gate delays – one or two LUTs. This translates to a minor clock frequency decrease, or only one clock cycle penalty at the original circuit's frequency. This increase is mainly due to a multiplexer introduced into the modified circuit. The execution time is expected to increase by nearly a constant amount over an original circuit's execution time, even with increases in the numbers of added inputs, outputs, and circuit copies.

Both the area and power consumption are expected to increase less than approximately 400% when adding one extra input and one copy. Adding an input would suggest a doubling of the area of the original circuit. Making a copy of the circuit with an extra input would suggest a further doubling, for a total of a 400% increase in area, and thus power consumption. However, logic functions are implemented in FPGA look-up tables (LUTs), and one LUT in the original design may have the capacity to accept the extra input without consuming another resource. As inputs, outputs, and copies are added to a circuit, the area and power are expected to increase linearly.

3.2.2 Approach

Various steps are taken in the methodology to ensure a secure FPGA design. These reduce an FPGA design's susceptibility to reverse engineering. However, the increased operation costs are reasonable for the security achieved as a result of the methodology.

The design flow is illustrated conceptually in Figure 15. An original circuit is copied multiple times and scrambled. (Although the word 'copy' is used, the scrambled circuits are not exact duplicates of each other.) Scrambling adds extraneous inputs and outputs. The scrambled circuit produces correct outputs based on predetermined extraneous inputs. For example, if two extraneous inputs are added, then Scrambled Copy 1 may only produce the correct value for output 2 when the extraneous input is 10₂, and Scrambled Copy 2 may only produce the correct value for output 2 when the extraneous input is 00₂, etc. The extraneous output values are chosen to confuse and produce multiple patterns so the original output pattern is hidden among many possible




Figure 15. Methodology design flow.

patterns. The scramblings are such that all original outputs are produced for a given extraneous input combination (for example, 00_2 or 10_2), although each correct output may be produced by a different copy. To select the correct output, additional Selection Inputs and a multiplexer (MUX) are added. The Selection Inputs determine the copy from which to choose a particular output. The Selection Inputs are synchronized at runtime with the extraneous inputs. For example, when the extra input is 10_2 , the Selection Inputs cause the MUX to select output 2 from Scrambled Copy 1 and output 1 from Scrambled Copy 2. A Combination Lock state machine (inspired by [MIT01]) is added to increase the effort needed in a black box attack. The correct sequence of inputs to the Combination Lock causes the assertion of a signal that enables the MUX. Finally, the

Scrambled Copies are intertwined to produce confusion, subject to the constraint that the intertwining does not exceed the expected increase in execution time stated above.

Intertwining is achieved by placing elements of one circuit among elements of others and by crossing paths. Explicit intertwining is not investigated in this study. Implicit intertwining may occur as the design software allocates FPGA resources. For example, the design application may assign portions of different circuits to the same CLB.

The proposed methodology is for designs that can be described using truth tables or Boolean equations, designs with gate-level representations, designs already written in VHDL, or designs which require only a portion of the design to be modified.

The various steps of the design flow aid in countering the attacks listed in Chapter 2. Table 3 lists the design steps and the attacks they counter. Although the readback and cloning attacks are not directly countered with the design methodology, understanding a reverse-engineered configuration file obtained with those two attacks is thwarted. Gaining knowledge of the scramblings, the input synchronization, and the correct Combination Lock key is a significant challenge.

Even though significant security for a design is attained with the methodology, the research hypothesis is the performance impacts are reasonable. To determine this, the security, execution time, power consumption, and chip area utilization values of several original circuits are gathered and processed according to the methodology. The parameter values of the resulting circuits are collected and compared with the original circuits' values.

Table 3. Design steps and attacks they counter.

Design Step	Attacks				Notes
	Black Box	Reverse-engineering configuration file	Physical	Side-channel	
Copying			X	X	Power and EM analyses and probing more tedious.
Scrambling	X	X	X	X	More inputs and outputs increase reverse-engineering time and number of combinations to try. Power and EM analyses and probing more difficult.
Selection	X	X			Sequencing increases complexity of analysis.
Combination Lock	X		X		Prevents operation. Time-consuming to physically disable.
Intertwining			X	X	Power and EM analyses and probing more difficult.

3.3 System Boundaries

Figure 16 depicts the system under test, which consists of the methodology and an FPGA. The component under test (shaded in Figure 16) is the methodology – the Christiansen-Kim Security Algorithm for FPGAs (ChKSAF, pronounced “check safe”). The input to the system is a circuit, and the output is a circuit modified according to the algorithm.




Figure 16. System and component under test.

The study is limited to SRAM FPGAs, but the methodology easily extends to antifuse FPGAs, and should extend to ASICs as well. Since the goal of this research is to produce a viable design methodology that yields a significant increase in security without major adverse consequences to speed, power, and area usage, small and simple circuits are processed with the algorithm to keep the problem manageable. Although the proposed design modification algorithm can be automated, which study is not herein, the modifications are produced by hand.

3.4 System Services

The general service provided by the system is a secure FPGA design that functions as the original circuit does. The system either fails or succeeds at producing a design that functions correctly. If the modified circuit does not perform correctly, it is not worth placing in a system since it won't produce the correct output. Only successfully functioning designs are considered in this study.

With a successfully functioning design, the system may succeed or fail at providing acceptable security, execution time, chip area utilization, and power consumption. Table 4 lists the combinations of these outcomes with the metrics listed in order of importance from left to right. The color code indicates the number of successes in the outcome combinations – blue for four success, green for three successes, yellow for two successes, orange for one success, and red for no successes. When there is a failure in any of the four measurements, the designer must decide whether there is sufficient excess from the successful metrics that can be traded to the initially unsuccessful metrics to meet their goals. Alternatively, the designer could implement system changes that

Table 4. Failure mode combinations.

Security	Execution time	Power	Area	Outcome
Success	Success	Success	Success	Ideal
Success	Success	Success	Failure	Trade space or system changes?
Success	Success	Failure	Success	Trade space or system changes?
Success	Failure	Success	Success	Trade space or system changes?
Failure	Success	Success	Success	Trade space or system changes?
Success	Success	Failure	Failure	Trade space or system changes?
Success	Failure	Success	Failure	Trade space or system changes?
Success	Failure	Failure	Success	Trade space or system changes?
Failure	Success	Success	Failure	Trade space or system changes?
Failure	Success	Failure	Success	Trade space or system changes?
Failure	Failure	Success	Success	Trade space or system changes?
Success	Failure	Failure	Failure	Trade space or system changes?
Failure	Success	Failure	Failure	Trade space or system changes?
Failure	Failure	Success	Failure	Trade space or system changes?
Failure	Failure	Failure	Success	Trade space or system changes?
Failure	Failure	Failure	Failure	Failure

accept the particular goal failure, such as allowing a longer delay from the circuit.

Without acceptable security in a modified circuit, the system must reprocess the original circuit with different parameters to achieve the desired security. When the security goal is not met, but there exists sufficient excess from other goals' successes, the algorithm may be modified to achieve security success along with the other successes. When the security goal has been met and other goals have not been met, trading excess security (if available) for the other parameters may be possible. A failure to meet the execution time goal may render the modified circuit useless, even though acceptable security is provided. A failure to meet the power consumption goals may require additional system power supplies and cooling, or less scrambling, which could in turn affect the security. Failing to meet the area constraint may indicate the need for a larger FPGA or the need to partition the circuit between FPGAs (which the ChKSAF algorithm does not address).

The area and power measurements are closely correlated, so a success/failure in one is likely a success/failure in the other.

3.5 Workload

The primary workload submitted to the system is two small, simple circuits described by their truth and state tables – one combinational and one sequential. This primary workload characterizes the effects of additional copies, inputs, and outputs on a design. Though small and simple, these circuits are likely components of any system design. Thus, they will demonstrate the soundness of the methodology.

Two additional workloads are submitted to the system. One is a small and simple circuit already written in VHDL to demonstrate the algorithm's use on an existing VHDL design. The other implements the function $result = a \times b + c$ to illustrate the methodology's partial scrambling.

3.6 Performance Metrics

The performance of the system is evaluated by calculating the security, and simulating the execution time, chip area utilization, and power consumption of the original and modified circuits. The security is the time required to conduct a brute force, black box attack on the FPGAs. The numbers of original inputs and outputs, the numbers of extraneous inputs and outputs added, the number of states in the Combination Lock, and the number of inputs to the Combination Lock are variables in this calculation. Execution time is collected to show the methodology does not produce a significant increase (more than the delay through two LUTs) in execution time compared to the original circuits. Chip area is measured to estimate whether a design fits on a given

FPGA and is reported in the units provided by the FPGA software that converts a circuit schematic and/or VHDL code to an FPGA programming file. Power consumption is measured so a designer can decide if its level is acceptable or not.

3.7 Parameters

3.7.1 System

The following are the parameters identified for the system:

- a. The number of copies of the original circuit.
- b. The number of additional inputs to add to the circuit copies (for added confusion).
- c. The number of additional outputs to add to the circuit copies (for added confusion).
- d. The number of states in the Combination Lock state machine.
- e. The number of additional inputs for a Combination Lock key.
- f. The FPGA design software.

Power consumption and area are significantly affected by the number of copies made. Security is expected to be exponentially sensitive to the numbers of additional inputs and outputs added and the number of states in the Combination Lock. The FPGA design software may affect the execution time, power, and area metrics, although those affects are not known.

3.7.2 Workload

The following are the parameters identified for the workload:

- a. The number of gates.

- b. The number of flip-flops.
- c. The number of feedback loops.
- d. The number of circuit inputs.
- e. The number of circuit outputs.
- f. The length of the critical path.
- g. The area used.
- h. The power consumed.

Even though workload parameters f, g, and h are mainly determined by parameters a through e, they are listed above for completeness. The numbers of inputs and outputs significantly affect the security of a circuit. Power consumption and area utilization are significantly affected by the numbers of gates and flip-flops. The numbers of gates and flip-flops also considerably affect execution time. Scrambling, and thus security, is sensitive to workload parameters a, b, and c.

3.8 Factors

The factors, selected from the lists of parameters, that will be varied in the primary workload are:

- a. The number of copies made of the original circuit, with two levels – 2 copies and 4 copies.
- b. The number of inputs added to the circuit copies (for added confusion), with two levels – 1 extra input and 2 extra inputs.
- c. The number of outputs added to the circuit copies (for added confusion), with two levels – 1 extra output and 2 extra outputs.

- d. The workload parameters, with two levels set by the selection of one combinational circuit and one sequential circuit.
- e. The number of states in the Combination Lock, with two levels – 8 states and 16 states.
- f. The number additional inputs for a Combination Lock key, with two levels – 3 inputs and 4 inputs.

Factors a, b, c, e, and f affect the amount of security provided by the design methodology, the area used, and power consumed. Higher numbers are expected to provide more security. The number of copies significantly affects the area utilized and power consumed, both of which are anticipated to be greater with a larger number of copies. Two and four copies are chosen to determine whether two copies provide sufficient protection within given power and/or area constraints. The higher numbers of factors c, e, and f are expected to produce a slight increase in the area used and power consumed (compared to an original circuit with large numbers of inputs and outputs). The number of additional inputs to add to circuit copies may impact execution time, but the effect is expected to be minimal for both levels. Determining the Combination Lock key is expected to be more difficult with more states and inputs. The workload parameters determine the complexity of implementing the algorithm. Again, only two small and simple circuits are supplied as the main workload to characterize the effects of the factors, with additional workloads to demonstrate the methodology's application to an existing VHDL design and to only a portion of a circuit.

3.9 Evaluation Technique

The security provided by the system is analytically calculated. The result of the calculation is compared with the security measure of the original circuit (2^{m+S} divided by the frequency and number of seconds in 365 days). Analytical analysis is used to determine the time for an adversary to crack an FPGA design since there are insufficient time and resources to characterize all possible ways an adversary might crack the design. Employing and expanding (1), the calculation to determine the security (in years) of a modified circuit is

$$T(i,k,m,n,p,q,s,S) = \frac{\frac{1}{2}(2^i)^s + 2^{m+S+p-1}(k^{n+q})}{500 \text{ MHz} / 31,536,000 \text{ sec/yr}} \quad (2)$$

where i is the number of inputs to the Combination Lock, s is the number of states in the Combination Lock, m is the number of original inputs, S is the number of sequential elements in the circuit, p is the number of additional inputs, k is the number of copies, n is the number of original outputs, and q is the number of additional outputs. A frequency of 500 MHz is chosen since this frequency is typically available in commercial devices. The expression to the left of the plus sign in the numerator accounts for determining the key to the Combination Lock. The division by two is for an average. To the right of the plus sign is the time to produce all output combinations.

Execution time is simulated in Altera's Quartus II Version 5.1 Build 176 10/26/2005 SJ Web Edition. Simulation is chosen due to the relative ease of collecting the execution times for over two dozen circuits.

As with execution time, the utilized area and power consumption of a design are reported in the vendor FPGA design software. Simulation is chosen for collecting area and power consumption values for the same reasons as stated above.

3.10 Experimental Design

Three full factorial experiments are used – one to determine the effects of different numbers of states and inputs in the Combination Locks alone and the two others to determine the effects on the two primary workload circuits. For the Combination Lock experiment, four circuits are evaluated for security, area, power, and execution time. Sixteen modified primary workload circuits, along with the originals, are evaluated to determine the effects of extra inputs, outputs, and copies.

Three, rather than one, full factorial experiments are run for several reasons. First, a full factorial experiment of all factors would be too large, requiring 64 modified circuits. Partitioning the factors separately determined the effects on the Combination Locks and the modified designs. Second, different Combination Locks can be used with the same circuit, depending on the security requirement. As illustrated in (2), security increases due to the Combination Lock and the scrambled circuit. Finally, the combinational and sequential primary workload circuits are not compared against each other due to the different number of outputs and the inherent area difference due to registers in the sequential circuits.

For this study, the measurements from a Combination Lock and a modified design module are assumed to be additive. The FPGA design software provides a method to partition modules so they are optimized and placed separately. Testing this assumption is

accomplished by combining three modified circuits with a Combination Lock, but without using the partition capability.

From the measurements, the effects of the factors and their interactions can be determined. It is interesting to compare the security gained from the two levels of copies in relation to the costs (increased execution time, power consumption, area) of each level. The assumption of exponential growth in security is verified by plotting (2) for different variable values. The assumptions of a nearly constant increase in execution time, and linear increases in area and power are verified by comparing the measurements of the original circuits with the measurements of the modified circuits.

3.11 Analyze and Interpret Results

Exponential and linear regressions are used to extrapolate results to other circuits and other levels of the chosen factors. The execution times indicate whether the modified design satisfies the timing constraints of the original design. The area and power measurements specify if the modified design can fit on a given FPGA and meet the power requirements. Most importantly, the security values determine whether the design methodology is worthwhile.

3.12 Summary

This chapter describes a systematic approach for the study of a design methodology. As a first step, the goals of the research are identified and drive the determination of the rest of the approach. The strategy to complete the study is described. The system, including the system under test and the component under test, is identified and its services are listed with their respective outcomes. Execution time,

security, power consumption, and area utilization are chosen as the performance metrics.

From the parameters listed, factors are chosen with associated levels. The evaluation technique is mostly simulation but security is calculated analytically. A full factorial design is used and the factor effects are analyzed.

4. Design Algorithm

4.1 Chapter Overview

This chapter contains the details of the design modification algorithm. Methods of modification for designs described by truth or state tables and by Boolean Equations, in a gate-level representation, and in existing VHDL code are provided. The method for scrambling only a portion of a design is also described.

Altera's Quartus II Version 5.1 Build 176 10/26/2005 SJ Web Edition is used to create and simulate the designs described below. All designs target the Altera Stratix II EP2S15F672C5 FPGA for compilation.

4.2 Combination Lock

Combination Locks are sequence-recognizer state machines that require a designer-specified input key to transition to the next state. If the proper key for a state is not input, the state machine returns to the beginning state. For example, a required sequence might be 5, 1, 8, 6, for a four-state Combination Lock. Thus, 5 is the required input to transition from state one to state two, 1 is the required input to transition from state two to state three, etc. A Combination Lock can be constructed with any number of inputs and states. This study considers Combination Locks with three or four inputs and eight or sixteen states. Once the final state is reached and the appropriate key is entered for this state, the state machine asserts the 'success' pin, which is connected to the multiplexer enable pin. The key sequence acts as a password to enable the rest of the circuit. The state machine remains in the final state and continues to assert 'success' unless reset is asserted, which sends the state machine to the initial state.

The following is the VHDL code for a Combination Lock with eight states and three inputs.

```
-- original state machine code from Doug Hodson's
-- L:\eng students\Seetharaman\CSCE687\RapidCode.zip\scomp.vhd
-- [Hod05]
library ieee;
use ieee.std_logic_1164.all;

entity s8i3 is
port( clock    : in std_logic;
      reset    : in std_logic;
      input1   : in std_logic;
      input2   : in std_logic;
      input3   : in std_logic;
      success   : buffer std_logic
    );
end s8i3;

architecture rtl OF s8i3 IS
type state_type is ( one, two, three, four, five, six, seven,
eight
                    );
signal state: state_type;

begin

process ( clock, reset )
begin
if reset = '1' then
    success <= '0';
    state <= one;
elsif clock'event AND clock = '1' then

case state is
when one =>
    success <= '0';
    if (input1 = '0') AND (input2 = '0') AND (input3 =
'1') then -- "001" is the key to transition to state two
        state <= two;
    else
        state <= one;
    end if;

    when two =>
        success <= '0';
        if (input1 = '0') AND (input2 = '1') AND (input3 =
'0') then -- "010" is the key to transition to state three
            state <= three;
        else
            state <= one;
        end if;
```

```

when three =>
    success <= '0';
    if (input1 = '0') AND (input2 = '1') AND (input3 =
'0') then
        state <= four;
    else
        state <= one;
    end if;

when four =>
    success <= '0';
    if (input1 = '0') AND (input2 = '1') AND (input3 =
'1') then
        state <= five;
    else
        state <= one;
    end if;

when five =>
    success <= '0';
    if (input1 = '0') AND (input2 = '1') AND (input3 =
'1') then
        state <= six;
    else
        state <= one;
    end if;

when six =>
    success <= '0';
    if (input1 = '0') AND (input2 = '1') AND (input3 =
'1') then
        state <= seven;
    else
        state <= one;
    end if;

when seven =>
    success <= '0';
    if (input1 = '1') AND (input2 = '0') AND (input3 =
'0') then
        state <= eight;
    else
        state <= one;
    end if;

when eight =>
    if success = '0' then
        if (input1 = '1') AND (input2 = '1') AND
(input3 = '0') then
            success <= '1';
            state <= eight;
        else
            state <= one;
        end if;
    end if;

```

```

        end if;
    else
        success <= '1';
        state <= eight;
    end if;

    when others =>
        success <= '0';
        state <= one;
    end case;

end if;

end process;

end rtl; -- end Combination Lock

```

The resulting state machine as depicted by Quartus II is in Figure 17. State one is at the top and state eight is at the bottom. As long as the correct key for each state is entered, the state machine progresses from top to bottom. If an invalid key is entered, the state machine returns to state one. A reset at anytime sends the machine to state one.

4.3 Decoy Circuit Generation from Truth and State Tables

The following subsections describe how the methodology applies to a full adder (a combinational circuit) and a three-bit counter (a sequential circuit) that are described by their truth and state tables. Once the truth or state table is obtained, the methodology

- adds extra inputs, outputs, and copies;
- decides what extraneous input combinations produce correct output;
- decides the placement of the correct outputs in the expanded table;
- fills the remainder of the table;
- minimizes the resulting functions; and
- transfers the minimized functions to VHDL.




Figure 17. Eight-state Combination Lock.

The following scramblings are performed by hand. Suggestions for implementing the process in a script are given.

4.3.1 Combinational Circuit

The truth table for a full adder is given in Table 5. Three bits – A, B, and the carry-in (Cin) – are added, resulting in Sum and carry-out (Cout) bits. Figure 18 shows a schematic of a full adder constructed with AND and OR gates. The schematic could be drawn with fewer gates by using XOR gates. However, AND and OR gates are used to maintain consistency with the circuit modifications that follow.

Table 5. Full adder truth table.

A	B	Cin	Cout	Sum
0	0	0	0	0
0	0	1	0	1
0	1	0	0	1
0	1	1	1	0
1	0	0	0	1
1	0	1	1	0
1	1	0	1	0
1	1	1	1	1

Based on security requirements, (2) determines the numbers of inputs, outputs, and copies to add. Suppose it is decided to add one copy, one input, and two outputs. Table 6 shows the results of that decision. The output tables of both copies are shown. Out13 represents output 3 from copy 1.

For simplicity, the input A is assigned to In2, B to In3, and Cin to In4. Thus, the extra input Xi1 is assigned to In1. These assignments could be made randomly, but that would likely only confuse the designer and not an adversary. On his first attempt, an adversary will most likely not build the exact table created by the designer. An adversary




Figure 18. Full adder schematic.

Table 6. Expanded full adder truth table.

In1	In2	In3	In4	Out11	Out12	Out13	Out14	Out21	Out22	Out23	Out24
0	0	0	0								
0	0	0	1								
0	0	1	0								
0	0	1	1								
0	1	0	0								
0	1	0	1								
0	1	1	0								
0	1	1	1								
1	0	0	0								
1	0	0	1								
1	0	1	0								
1	0	1	1								
1	1	0	0								
1	1	0	1								
1	1	1	0								
1	1	1	1								

may construct an initial truth table and manipulate it until a pattern results such that the pattern only depends on the extra inputs, i.e., the extra inputs are in the leftmost columns of the table.

Again for simplicity, the output Cout1 is assigned to Out11, Sum1 to Out12, Cout2 to Out21, and Sum2 to Out22. Similar to the input assignment, these outputs could be assigned randomly, but their order in an adversary's table is not significant – columns can be easily swapped.

Now it is randomly decided when each output – Cout1, Sum1, Cout2, Sum2 – is correct. When $X_{i1}=0$, it is decided that Sum1 is correct from Copy1 and Cout2 is correct from Copy 2. When $X_{i1}=1$, it is decided that Cout1 is correct from Copy 1 and Sum2 is correct from Copy 2. Correct output is now available whether X_{i1} is 0 or 1. Deciding which extraneous input combinations produce correct output is not necessary with only one extra input – correct output is produced for both values of the extra input.

Next, the empty spaces in the top half of the expanded table are filled with ones and zeros. This could be accomplished randomly. Alternatively, specific decoy circuit output values could be entered. Table 7 shows the input and output assignments, the correct outputs Sum1 and Cout2 (shaded), and the top half cells filled. Cout2 represents Cout from Copy 2. The Sum2 and Cout1 spaces are filled using the following procedure.

Table 8 depicts the last table manipulation and the final expanded truth table. The top, left portion (shaded) of the output table is copied to the bottom, right portion (shaded) along the solid line, and the top, right portion (not shaded) is copied to the bottom left portion (not shaded) along the dashed line. Sum is correct from Sum2 (bolded) and Cout is correct from Cout1 (underlined) when $X_{i1}=1$. This duplication of the portions of the output table enables many possible output combinations and provides multiple decoy patterns.

Table 7. Expanded full adder truth table with complete top half.

Xi1	A	B	Cin	Cout1	Sum1	Out13	Out14	Cout2	Sum2	Out23	Out24
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1
0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0
0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0
0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1
0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0
0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0
1	0	0	0								
1	0	0	1								
1	0	1	0								
1	0	1	1								
1	1	0	0								
1	1	0	1								
1	1	1	0								
1	1	1	1								

Table 8. Final expanded full adder truth table.

Xi1	A	B	Cin	Cout1	Sum1	Out13	Out14	Cout2	Sum2	Out23	Out24
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1
0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0
0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0
0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1
0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0
0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	0
1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0
1	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0
1	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0
1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1
1	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1

The completed truth table values are now copied to a text file and arranged in the “.pla” format. The following is an example of this format for Cout1. The # sign indicates a comment, which describes the significance of the line.

```

.i 4          # Four inputs
.o 1          # One output
.ilb xil a b cin  # Names of the four inputs - left column is
xil, right column is cin
.ob cout1     # Name of the one output
.p 16         # Sixteen products or entries in the table
0000 0        # Truth table
0001 0
0010 1
0011 1
0100 0
0101 1
0110 0
0111 1
1000 0
1001 0
1010 0
1011 1
1100 0
1101 1
1110 1
1111 1
.e           # End .pla for Cout1

```

The manipulation of the truth tables takes place in Microsoft Excel. However, the original truth table could be entered directly into a .pla file and a script could be written to perform the truth table manipulations above and the manipulations that follow.

Once the truth table for an individual output (for example, Cout1) is in a .pla file, the sum-of-product minimizer RONDO v.1.1 [Mis01] reduces the number of products in the table. The command *rondo filename* is executed from a Windows command prompt. The default quality of the minimization is “implicit reduction + heuristic CC (reasonable trade-off)”.

The result of *rondo fa-212-cout1.pla* is

```

# RONDO v.1.1 output for command line: "-q2 -v0 fa-212-11.pla"
# Minimization performed Fri Feb 03 18:02:18 2006
# Quality: "implicit reduction + heuristic CC (reasonable trade-
off)"
# Initial statistics: Cubes = 16  Literals = 64
# Final   statistics: Cubes = 4  Literals = 10
# Input file reading and variable reordering time = 0.00 sec
# SOP minimization time = 0.00 sec

```

```

.i 4
.o 1
.p 4
-1-1 1      # (A AND Cin) # Xi1 and B not used
--11 1      # (B AND Cin)
111- 1      # (Xi1 AND A AND B)
001- 1      # (NOT Xi1 AND NOT A AND B)
.e          # End minimized .pla for Cout1

```

This represents the function $Cout1 = (A \text{ AND } Cin) \text{ OR } (B \text{ AND } Cin) \text{ OR } (Xi1 \text{ AND } A \text{ AND } B) \text{ OR } (NOT \text{ } Xi1 \text{ AND } NOT \text{ } A \text{ AND } B)$. The input columns correspond to the columns of the original .pla file. A zero in an input cell represents the inverse (NOT) of that input. An input is not used in a product if a dash is in that input's position.

After each output from the final expanded truth table is minimized, the resulting functions are input into a VHDL file. Along with the inputs to and outputs of the minimized functions, the multiplexer select and enable inputs are declared. The 'enable' input is the 'success' output of a Combination Lock. The multiplexer is also constructed in the file containing the minimized functions. An example of a completed VHDL file follows. Double dashes precede comments.

```

-- Brad Christiansen
-- 21 Nov 05.  modified 30 Jan 06

library ieee;
use ieee.std_logic_1164.all;

entity fa212 is
    port (
        i3, i4, i5 :    in std_logic;
        i1, i2      :    in std_logic;
        enable : in std_logic; -- enable for muxes
        sel1, sel2  :    in std_logic;
        sel3, sel4  :    in std_logic;
        o1, o2      :    out std_logic;
        o3, o4      :    out std_logic
    );
end fa212;

architecture behavior of fa212 is
    signal out11, out12, out13, out14, out21, out22, out23, out24 :
std_logic;

```

```

begin
    out11 <= (i1 AND i3 AND i5)
             OR (i1 AND i2 AND i3 AND i4)
             OR (NOT i1 AND NOT i2 AND i3 AND NOT i5)
             OR (NOT i2 AND i3 AND i4 AND i5)
             OR (i1 AND NOT i2 AND NOT i3 AND i4 AND NOT i5)
             OR (NOT i1 AND NOT i3 AND NOT i4 AND i5)
             OR (NOT i1 AND i2 AND NOT i3 AND i4 AND NOT i5)
             OR (i1 AND i2 AND i4 AND i5);

    out21 <= (NOT i1 AND i3 AND i5)
             OR (i1 AND NOT i2 AND i3 AND NOT i5)
             OR (i1 AND NOT i2 AND i3 AND i4)
             OR (NOT i1 AND i2 AND i3 AND i4)
             OR (i1 AND NOT i3 AND NOT i4 AND i5)
             OR (i1 AND i2 AND NOT i3 AND i4 AND NOT i5)
             OR (NOT i1 AND NOT i2 AND NOT i3 AND i4 AND NOT i5)
             OR (NOT i1 AND i2 AND i4 AND i5);

    out12 <= (NOT i1 AND i2 AND i3 AND i4 AND i5)
             OR (NOT i1 AND i2 AND NOT i3 AND i4 AND NOT i5)
             OR (i1 AND NOT i2 AND i4 AND i5)
             OR (i1 AND NOT i2 AND NOT i3 AND i4)
             OR (NOT i2 AND NOT i3 AND i4 AND i5)
             OR (i1 AND i2 AND NOT i3 AND NOT i4)
             OR (NOT i1 AND i2 AND i3 AND NOT i4 AND NOT i5)
             OR (i2 AND NOT i3 AND NOT i4 AND i5)
             OR (NOT i1 AND NOT i2 AND NOT i3 AND NOT i4 AND NOT
i5)

             OR (i1 AND NOT i2 AND NOT i3 AND i5);

    out22 <= (i1 AND i2 AND i3 AND i4 AND i5)
             OR (i1 AND i2 AND NOT i3 AND i4 AND NOT i5)
             OR (NOT i1 AND NOT i2 AND NOT i3 AND i4)
             OR (NOT i2 AND NOT i3 AND i4 AND i5)
             OR (NOT i1 AND NOT i2 AND i4 AND i5)
             OR (i1 AND i2 AND i3 AND NOT i4 AND NOT i5)
             OR (NOT i1 AND i2 AND NOT i3 AND NOT i4)
             OR (i2 AND NOT i3 AND NOT i4 AND i5)
             OR (i1 AND NOT i2 AND NOT i3 AND NOT i4 AND NOT i5)
             OR (NOT i1 AND NOT i2 AND NOT i3 AND i5);

    out13 <= (NOT i1 AND NOT i2 AND i3)
             OR (NOT i2 AND i3 AND i4)
             OR (i1 AND NOT i3 AND NOT i4)
             OR (i1 AND NOT i3 AND i5)
             OR (i2 AND NOT i3 AND NOT i4)
             OR (i1 AND NOT i4 AND i5)
             OR (NOT i1 AND i2 AND i4 AND i5);

    out23 <= (i1 AND NOT i2 AND i3)
             OR (NOT i2 AND i3 AND i4)
             OR (NOT i1 AND NOT i3 AND NOT i4)
             OR (NOT i1 AND NOT i3 AND i5)

```

```

        OR (i2 AND NOT i3 AND NOT i4)
        OR (i1 AND i2 AND i4 AND i5)
        OR (NOT i1 AND NOT i4 AND i5);

out14 <= (i1 AND NOT i2 AND i3 AND i4)
        OR (i1 AND i3 AND NOT i4 AND i5)
        OR (i2 AND i3 AND NOT i5)
        OR (NOT i1 AND NOT i3 AND NOT i4 AND i5)
        OR (i2 AND NOT i3 AND i4)
        OR (i1 AND i2 AND NOT i5)
        OR (NOT i1 AND i4 AND NOT i5)
        OR (NOT i2 AND NOT i4 AND i5);

out24 <= (NOT i1 AND NOT i2 AND i3 AND i4)
        OR (NOT i1 AND i3 AND NOT i4 AND i5)
        OR (i2 AND i3 AND NOT i5)
        OR (i1 AND NOT i3 AND NOT i4 AND i5)
        OR (i2 AND NOT i3 AND i4)
        OR (i1 AND i4 AND NOT i5)
        OR (NOT i1 AND i2 AND NOT i5)
        OR (NOT i2 AND NOT i4 AND i5);

process(enable, sel4, sel3, sel2, sel1) -- the multiplexer
begin
    if enable = '1' then

        if sel4 = '0' then
            o4 <= out14;
        else
            o4 <= out24;
        end if;

        if sel3 = '0' then
            o3 <= out13;
        else
            o3 <= out23;
        end if;

        if sel2 = '0' then
            o2 <= out12;
        else
            o2 <= out22;
        end if;

        if sel1 = '0' then
            o1 <= out11;
        else
            o1 <= out21;
        end if;

    else -- without the 'else' clause, a latch is made
        o4 <= '0';
        o3 <= '0';
        o2 <= '0';
    end if;
end process;

```

```

        o1 <= '0';

    end if;
end process;

end behavior; -- End modified full adder

```

For a sense of the changes that have occurred to the simple circuit of Figure 18, the modified circuit is shown in Figure 19. Again, Figure 19 is not meant to be understood (besides the size of the components in the figure, the algorithm is meant to distort understanding).




Figure 19. Modified full adder schematic.

Explicitly intertwining the circuits is not necessary when modifying a circuit described by its truth or state table. The intertwining in this case occurs as consequence of the process, specifically the addition of extra outputs and the design software's assignment of multiple outputs to a single LUT. In the case of this small circuit, the

output pair Out11 and Out21 is assigned to one FPGA LUT. The others pairs (Out12 and Out22, Out13 and Out23, Out14 and Out24) are also assigned to their own LUTs.

4.3.2 Sequential Circuit

A sequential circuit described by a state table is transformed in a similar manner to the combinational circuit. The main differences pertain to the inclusion of registers for feedback.

For this study, a three-bit up counter is modified with the algorithm. The original state table for this circuit is in Table 9. The outputs X, Y, and Z become the inputs A, B, and C on the next clock cycle. The circuit advances from 0 to decimal 7, returns to 0, and repeats. A schematic of the counter is in Figure 20. The rectangles are the registers (D flip-flops). In Figure 20, out1 is A, out2 is B, and out3 is C.

Table 9. Three-bit up counter state table.

A	B	C	X	Y	Z
0	0	0	0	0	1
0	0	1	0	1	0
0	1	0	0	1	1
0	1	1	1	0	0
1	0	0	1	0	1
1	0	1	1	1	0
1	1	0	1	1	1
1	1	1	0	0	0




Figure 20. Three-bit up counter schematic.

To illustrate the effects of two extra inputs and four copies on correct output placement and selection and on circuit size, the modification of the three-bit counter with two extra inputs, one extra output, and four copies follows. Table 10, with copies 1 and 2, and Table 11, with copies 3 and 4, show the results of

- adding the extra inputs, outputs, and copies;
- deciding what extraneous input combinations produce correct output;

Table 10. Copies 1 and 2 of modified counter.

Xi1	Xi2	A	B	C	Out11	X1	Out13	Z1	Out21	X2	Out23	Z2
0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1
0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	0
0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0
0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	1
0	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	0
0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	1
0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1
0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0
0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
0	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1
0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0
0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1
0	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1
1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	1
1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0
1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0
1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	0
1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0
1	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0
1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1
1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1
1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0
1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1

Table 11. Copies 3 and 4 of modified counter.

Xi1	Xi2	A	B	C	Out31	Out32	Y3	Out34	Out41	Out42	Y4	Out4
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0
0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0
0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1
0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1
0	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1
0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1
0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	1
0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1
0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0
0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	1
0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1
0	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0
0	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	0
1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	1
1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0
1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0
1	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0
1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0
1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1
1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1
1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1
1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1
1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0

- deciding the placement of the correct outputs in the expanded table; and
- filling the remainder of the table.

Notice that the input combinations $Xi1Xi2=01$ and $Xi1Xi2=11$ produce the correct output (shaded). The combinations $Xi1Xi2=00$ and $Xi1Xi2=10$ are an alternate choice. Also note that X is correct from copy 1 when $Xi1Xi2=01$ and from copy 2 when $Xi1Xi2=11$, Y is correct from copy 4 when $Xi1Xi2=01$ and from copy 3 when

$X_1X_2=11$, and Z is correct from copy 2 when $X_1X_2=01$ and from copy 1 when $X_1X_2=11$.

Each output column is transferred to a .pla file, minimized, and entered into a VHDL file. For the outputs that are feedback, they are typed as 'BUFFER' rather than 'OUT' objects as is the case of the combinational circuit. The multiplexer is coded so it is constructed before the registers. The registers are built with the code

```
PROCESS(clock)
BEGIN
    if rising_edge(clock) then
        o1 <= out1;
        o2 <= out2;
        o3 <= out3;
        o4 <= out4;
    END if;
END PROCESS;
```

The signals 'out1' through 'out4' are the outputs of the multiplexer to the registers and correspond to the selection from Out11, Out21, Out31, and Out41 through Out14, Out24, Out34, and Out44, respectively. The signals 'o1' through 'o4' are the outputs to the pins and the feedback inputs to the circuit.

Page 3 of 4 of the resulting modifications is shown in the schematic of Figure 21. Pages 1 and 2 are similar. Page 4 contains the registers and output pins. As with Figure 19, this figure is included to convey a sense of the changes effected, not to produce an understanding of the changes.

4.4 Decoy Circuit Generation from Boolean Equations

Modifying a circuit described by its Boolean equations is very similar to modifying a truth or state table. Suppose the original circuit has the outputs X and Y that are functions of the inputs A , B , and C . Let $X=f(A, B, C)$ and $Y=j(A, B, C)$. Suppose




Figure 21. Page 3 of 4 of the modified counter schematic.

two extra inputs, one extra output, and four copies are to be added to the original circuit.

Let D and E be the extra inputs. Let the outputs from Copy 1 be Out11, Out 12, and

Out13, and the outputs from Copy 2 be Out21, Out22, and Out23, etc. Let Out41 and

Out31 be X when DE=00₂ and 10₂, respectively. Let Out13 and Out23 be Y when DE=00₂ and 10₂, respectively. Then,

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Out41} = X' = & (\text{NOT } D \text{ AND NOT } E \text{ AND } f(A, B, C)) \text{ OR} \\ & (\text{NOT } D \text{ AND } E \text{ AND } g(A, B, C)) \text{ OR } (D \text{ AND } h(A, B, C, E)) \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

where g and h are arbitrary functions. Similarly,

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Out31} = X'' = & (D \text{ AND NOT } E \text{ AND } f(A, B, C)) \text{ OR} \\ & (D \text{ AND } E \text{ AND } g(A, B, C)) \text{ OR } (\text{NOT } D \text{ AND } h(A, B, C, E)). \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

Also,

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Out13} = Y' = & (\text{NOT } D \text{ AND NOT } E \text{ AND } j(A, B, C)) \text{ OR} \\ & (\text{NOT } D \text{ AND } E \text{ AND } k(A, B, C)) \text{ OR } (D \text{ AND } l(A, B, C, E)) \end{aligned} \quad (5)$$

where k and l are arbitrary functions. Similarly,

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Out23} = Y'' = & (D \text{ AND NOT } E \text{ AND } j(A, B, C)) \text{ OR} \\ & (D \text{ AND } E \text{ AND } k(A, B, C)) \text{ OR } (\text{NOT } D \text{ AND } l(A, B, C, E)). \end{aligned} \quad (6)$$

The resulting condensed truth table is in Table 12.

Table 12. Resulting truth table from Boolean equation modification.

DE	ABC	Out			Out			Out			Out		
		11	12	13	21	22	23	31	32	33	41	42	43
00				j							f		
01		b		k	c		l	h			g		
10				l	b		j	f			h		
11		c					k	g					

Pairs of remaining outputs are created with arbitrary functions of the example form

$$\text{Out11} = (\text{NOT } D \text{ AND } b(A, B, C, E)) \text{ OR } (D \text{ AND } c(A, B, C, E)) \quad (7)$$

and

$$\text{Out21} = (\text{D AND } b(\text{A, B, C, E})) \text{ OR } (\text{NOT D AND } c(\text{A, B, C, E})) \quad (8)$$

where b and c are arbitrary functions. Thus, where b is ANDed with NOT D in Out11, b is ANDed with D in Out21. See Table 12 for the placement of b and c in the resulting truth table.

To select the correct outputs, the signals to the multiplexer select Copies 4 and 1 for X and Y, respectively, when $\text{DE} = 00_2$, and Copies 3 and 2 for X and Y, respectively, when $\text{DE} = 10_2$.

4.5 Decoy Circuit Generation from Gate-level Representation

A gate-level representation can be treated as a black box to which decoy and selection circuitry can be added. Functions such as g , k , and b in the previous section are implemented as the decoy circuits. The selection circuitry consists of AND, OR, and NOT gates, like the operators added above to transform X into X' and X''. Multiplexers are also part of the selection circuitry and select the copy from which a correct output is produced.

Suppose Figure 22 contains the original circuit to protect. (Not all necessary signals are shown.) X and Y are combinational functions of inputs A and B and output Y which is also labeled C at the input to the combinational block.

Suppose one copy, one extra input (D), and one extra output (Z) are added for protection. Let X be correct from Copy 1 when $\text{D} = 0$ and from Copy 2 when $\text{D} = 1$. Let Y be correct from Copy 1 when $\text{D} = 1$ and from Copy 2 when $\text{D} = 0$. Z is produced by choosing one of two outputs from the added decoy circuitry block.




Figure 22. Original gate-level representation.

The results of these decisions are in Figure 23. All signals are not included, most notably the register clock and multiplexer select signals. Copy 1, the top Copy, is between the inverter and the feedback line from Y, the output of the register. Copy 2 is below the feedback line. Note that the combinational blocks of Copy 2 are redundant and are included only to illustrate the logical flow and fewer lines have to be followed to understand the routing. The outputs from the combinational blocks of Copy 1 can be routed to the AND gates of Copy 2, just as D and NOT D are. This illustrates how area (and power) can be reduced for an algorithmic modification. Note that for each output, there are four AND gates, two OR gates, and a multiplexer added. The delay for each output in an FPGA might be increased by a LUT to implement the AND and OR gates and multiplexer. In an ASIC, the delay for each output increases by one AND gate, one OR gate, and a multiplexer. Another item to notice is the additional hardware separates the combinational logic and register. Placing additional hardware, for example, the multiplexer, on the output side of the register requires additional registers, since the inputs to the multiplexer would have to be registered. A final note is that the outputs X




Figure 23. Modified gate-level representation.

and Z can also be registered and fed back to the extra combinational block for additional confusion.

The resulting abbreviated state table is in Table 13. The names of the outputs (origX, extraY, extraZ1, etc.) correspond to the names of the outputs from the combinational blocks in Figure 23.

Table 13. Resulting state table from gate-level modification.

D	ABC	Out			Out		
		11	12	13	21	22	23
0		<i>origX</i>	<i>extraY</i>	<i>extraZ1</i>	<i>extraX</i>	<i>origY</i>	<i>extraZ2</i>
1		<i>extraX</i>	<i>origY</i>	<i>extraZ2</i>	<i>origX</i>	<i>extraY</i>	<i>extraZ1</i>

In this case of circuit modification, explicit intertwining would be useful to intermingle portions of the two combinational blocks. The design software may accomplish a degree of intertwining, but will likely not be to a sufficient level.

4.6 Decoy Circuit Generation from Existing VHDL

VHDL code that implements a four-bit priority encoder is modified using the algorithmic principles already demonstrated. The encoder functions as follows. If the most significant input bit is 1, the output is 11_2 . If the most significant input bit is 0 and the second-most significant input bit is 1, the output is 10_2 . If the two most significant inputs are 0 and the third-most significant bit is 1, the output is 01_2 . The other two input combinations result in an output of 00_2 . Table 14 summarizes the relationships described. An X in this table represents a “don’t care”, meaning the output does not depend on, or doesn’t care about, that particular input value.

Table 14. Priority encoder truth table.

Input	Output
000X	00
001X	01
01XX	10
1XXX	11

The original VHDL code for the encoder follows.

```
-- From Dr. Yong C. Kim [Kim05]
library IEEE;
use IEEE.std_logic_1164.all;

entity pri_encoder is
port( a : in  std_logic_vector(3 downto 0);
      c : out std_logic_vector(1 downto 0));
end pri_encoder;

architecture algorithmic of pri_encoder is
begin
process(a)
begin
    if(a(3) = '1') then
        c <= B"11";
    elsif (a(2) = '1') then
        c <= B"10";
    elsif (a(1) = '1') then
        c <= B"01";
    elsif (a(0) = '1') then
        c <= B"00";
    else
        c <= B"00";
    end if;
end process;
end algorithmic; -- End original encoder
```

A schematic of the priority encoder, as produced by the design software, is in

Figure 24.

To scramble the encoder, one input, two outputs, and one additional copy are added. The input vector a is declared with five elements, from $a(4)$ as the most significant bit (msb) to $a(0)$ as the least significant bit (lsb). $a(2)$ is the extra input. The




Figure 24. Four-bit priority encoder schematic.

overall circuit output vector is labeled *out1* and has four elements, from *out1*(3) to *out1*(0). Since there are two copies, two vectors internal to the circuit and corresponding to *out1* are declared as VHDL ‘signals’. Their labels are *c1* and *c2*, for Copy 1 and Copy 2.

2. The elements of these vectors are the inputs to the multiplexers, whose outputs are the elements of *out1*. *out1*(2) serves as the most significant output bit, *out1*(0) will be the other output bit, and *out1*(1) and *out1*(3) will be the extra outputs. When *a*(2)=0, *c1*(0) and *c2*(2) are correct. Similarly, when *a*(2)=1, *c1*(2) and *c2*(0) are assigned to be correct. For the remaining signals, functions of *a*(4), *a*(3), *a*(1), and *a*(0) are created. *a*(2) cannot be an operand of the decoy functions since it turns on one copy or the other. When *a*(2)=0, *c1*(1) is the sum of a full adder (included as a deception), *c2*(3) is the carry out of a full adder, *c1*(2) and *c1*(3) are arbitrary combinational functions, and *c2*(1..0) is the difference of *a*(1..0) and *a*(4..3). When *a*(2)=1, the *c1*’s and *c2*’s are exchanged in the previous sentence. The resulting VHDL code follows.

```
library IEEE;
use IEEE.std_logic_1164.all;
use ieee.std_logic_arith.all;
use ieee.std_logic_unsigned.all;

entity pri_encoder is
port (
```

```

        a : in  std_logic_vector(4 downto 0);      -- change from 4
to 5 inputs
        enable : in std_logic;
        out1 : out std_logic_vector(3 downto 0); -- change from 2
to 4 outputs
        sel0, sel1 :      in std_logic;
        sel2, sel3 :      in std_logic
    );
    end pri_encoder;

    architecture algorithmic of pri_encoder is
        signal c1 : std_logic_vector(3 downto 0); -- c1 for copy 1;
change from 2 to 4 outputs
        signal c2 : std_logic_vector(3 downto 0); -- add second copy; c2
for copy 2; change from 2 to 4 outputs
    begin

        process(a)
        begin
            -- copy 1
            -- let a(2) be extra input
            -- let c(2) be msb, c(0) be lsb, c(3) extra output, c(1)
extra output
            -- let c1(0) be correct when a(2) = 0
            -- let c2(2) be correct when a(2) = 0
            if (a(2) = '0') then
                if (a(4) = '1') then
                    c2(2) <= '1';
                    c1(0) <= '1';
                elsif (a(3) = '1') then
                    c2(2) <= '1';
                    c1(0) <= '0';
                elsif (a(1) = '1') then
                    c2(2) <= '0';
                    c1(0) <= '1';
                elsif (a(0) = '1') then
                    c2(2) <= '0';
                    c1(0) <= '0';
                else
                    c2(2) <= '0';
                    c1(0) <= '0';
                end if;
                c1(1) <= (a(3) XOR a(1)) XOR a(0); -- function of a(4),
a(3), a(1), a(0) -- not of a(2); sum of FA
                c1(2) <= (a(4) OR (a(3) NAND a(1))) NOR NOT a(0); --
function of a(4), a(3), a(1), a(0) -- not of a(2)
                c1(3) <= (a(4) AND a(3)) NOR (a(1) XOR a(0)); -- function
of a(4), a(3), a(1), a(0) -- not of a(2)

                c2(3) <= ( ( a(3) XOR a(1) ) AND a(0) ) OR ( a(3) AND a(1)
); -- function of a(4), a(3), a(1), a(0) -- not of a(2); cout of FA
                c2(1 downto 0) <= a(1 downto 0) - a(4 downto 3); --
function of a(4), a(3), a(1), a(0) -- not of a(2)

```

```

-- copy 2
-- let c1(2) be correct when a(2) = 1
-- let c2(0) be correct when a(2) = 1
elsif (a(2) = '1') then
    if (a(4) = '1') then
        c1(2) <= '1';
        c2(0) <= '1';
    elsif (a(3) = '1') then
        c1(2) <= '1';
        c2(0) <= '0';
    elsif (a(1) = '1') then
        c1(2) <= '0';
        c2(0) <= '1';
    elsif (a(0) = '1') then
        c1(2) <= '0';
        c2(0) <= '0';
    else
        c1(2) <= '0';
        c2(0) <= '0';
    end if;
    c2(1) <= (a(3) XOR a(1)) XOR a(0); -- function of
a(4), a(3), a(1), a(0) -- not of a(2); sum of FA
    c2(2) <= (a(4) OR (a(3) NAND a(1))) NOR NOT a(0); --
function of a(4), a(3), a(1), a(0) -- not of a(2)
    c2(3) <= (a(4) AND a(3)) NOR (a(1) XOR a(0)); --
function of a(4), a(3), a(1), a(0) -- not of a(2)

    c1(3) <= ((a(3) XOR a(1)) AND a(0)) OR (a(3) AND
a(1)); -- function of a(4), a(3), a(1), a(0) -- not of a(2); cout of FA
    c1(1 downto 0) <= a(1 downto 0) - a(4 downto 3); --
function of a(4), a(3), a(1), a(0) -- not of a(2)
    end if;
end process;

process(enable, sel3, sel2, sel1, sel0)
begin
    if enable = '1' then

        if sel3 = '0' then
            out1(3) <= c1(3);
        else
            out1(3) <= c2(3);
        end if;

        if sel2 = '0' then
            out1(2) <= c1(2);
        else
            out1(2) <= c2(2);
        end if;

        if sel1 = '0' then
            out1(1) <= c1(1);
        else
            out1(1) <= c2(1);

```

```

        end if;

        if sel0 = '0' then
            out1(0) <= c1(0);
        else
            out1(0) <= c2(0);
        end if;

    else
        out1 <= "0000";

    end if;
end process;

end algorithmic; -- End modified encoder

```

Figure 25, showing the schematic of the modified encoder, is included for comparison to Figure 24.

4.7 Decoy Circuit Generation through Partial Scrambling

To demonstrate partial scrambling of only a portion of a circuit, the product in the function $result = a \times b + c$ is secured according to the methodology already demonstrated. Partial scrambling is useful in circumstances when only a portion of a circuit requires protection and protecting the entire circuit only serves to add unnecessary overhead.

The VHDL code for the above function follows. The operands a , b , and c are two-bit vectors, and $result$ is a four-bit vector. The product of a and b is also a four-bit vector.

```

-- Brad Christiansen
-- 8 Feb 06
-- Partial scrambling

library ieee;
use ieee.std_logic_1164.all;
use ieee.std_logic_arith.all;
use ieee.std_logic_unsigned.all;

entity partial is

```




Figure 25. Modified four-bit priority encoder schematic.

```

port (
    a, b, c      :    in std_logic_vector(1 downto 0);
    result       :    out std_logic_vector(3 downto 0)
);
end partial;

architecture behavior of partial is
begin
    result <= a * b + c;
end behavior; -- End VHDL for result=a*b+c

```

Figure 26 contains the circuit schematic produced by Quartus II. The scrambled circuit takes the place of the multiplier in Figure 26. To scramble the product of a and b , two copies are made with one extra input bit (xi) and one extra output bit (v). Note that xi requires an input pin, but v is internal to the scrambled circuit and does not require an output pin. When the extra input is 0, the four bits of the correct product come from Copy 1 (msb), Copy2, Copy 2, and Copy 1 (lsb). Copy 1 produces $v1$ and Copy 2 produces $v2$. When the extra input is 1, the correct product bits come from the alternate copies: Copy 2 (msb), Copy 1, Copy 1, Copy 2 (lsb). In this case, Copy 1 produces $v2$ and Copy 2 produces $v1$. The correct output is labeled w (msb), x , y , and z (lsb). Table 15 contains a condensed truth table of these relationships.




Figure 26. Schematic of $result=a*b+c$.

Table 15. Resulting truth table for partial scrambling.

xi	ab	Out					Out				
		11	12	13	14	15	21	22	23	24	25
0		w	$extraX$	$v1$	$extraY$	z	$extraW$	x	$v2$	y	$extraZ$
1		$extraW$	x	$v2$	y	$extraZ$	w	$extraX$	$v1$	$extraY$	

To select the correct output of the scrambled circuit that is input to the adder, five outputs are chosen: w , x , y , z , and either $v1$ or $v2$. This selection requires five select input bits – one select bit for each output since there is a choice between two outputs, one from each of the two copies. To choose the four of the five that are passed to the adder, a type of combinational multiplexer is implemented. This combinational multiplexer provides for any of the five (${}_4C_5$) combinations of four outputs to be selected. Since there are five combinations, three select input bits are required for this combinational multiplexer, in addition to the five select input bits already mentioned. All eight possible combinations of the three select inputs could be used as inputs to the combinational multiplexer. This would allow the same output combination to be selected by different combinations of select inputs or for output permutations to be selected. However, using all eight possible combinations adds additional hardware. The combinations of select inputs and associated output combinations of the combinational multiplexer are shown in Table 16.

Table 16. Combinational multiplexer input and output combinations.

Select inputs	Output combinations			
000	$w (out1)$	$x (out2)$	$v (out3)$	$y (out4)$
001	$w (out1)$	$x (out2)$	$v (out3)$	$z (out5)$
010	$w (out1)$	$x (out2)$	$y (out4)$	$z (out5)$
011	$w (out1)$	$v (out3)$	$y (out4)$	$z (out5)$
100	$x (out2)$	$v (out3)$	$y (out4)$	$z (out5)$
Others	0	0	0	0

An alternative to the five two-input multiplexers and the five-input/four-output combinational multiplexer is a ten-input/four-output combinational multiplexer. The ten inputs would be either the $x_i=0$ row or the $x_i=1$ row in Table 15. The difficulty when performing the scrambling by hand is the number of four-bit combinations possible from the ten inputs – 80. The number of required select input bits is reduced to seven, rather than a total of eight. With either alternative, all possible output combinations should be selectable, so that all outputs appear valid to an adversary.

There are two reasons for selecting four of the five outputs, and not passing the fifth. The first is to make the extra output (v in the case above) believable. If the extra output is not an input to another portion of the overall circuit, then that output can be identified as invalid. Second, rather than passing the extra output out of the scrambled portion for another sub-circuit to handle, the extra output is handled within the scrambled portion by not selecting it at the combinational multiplexer.

The decisions above result in the following VHDL code.

```
-- Brad Christiansen
-- 8 Feb 06
-- Partial scrambling

library ieee;
use ieee.std_logic_1164.all;
use ieee.std_logic_arith.all;
use ieee.std_logic_unsigned.all;

entity partial is
  port (
    a, b, c      : in std_logic_vector(1 downto 0); --
operands
    xi          : in std_logic; -- extra input
    enable      : in std_logic; -- MUX enable
    sel1, sel2, sel3, sel4, sel5 : in std_logic; -- MUX
selects
    downselect  : in std_logic_vector(2 downto 0); -- to
downselect from 5 outputs to 4
```

```

        result      :      out std_logic_vector(3 downto 0) --
=a*b+c
    );
end partial;

architecture behavior of partial is
    signal a_temp, b_temp : std_logic_vector(2 downto 0); -- to
extend a and b so they can be added
    signal v1, v2, w, x, y, z, extraW, extraX, extraY, extraZ :
std_logic; -- for valid and invalid outputs
    signal temp_sub : std_logic_vector(1 downto 0); -- for
difference of a and b
    signal temp_add : std_logic_vector(2 downto 0); -- for
addition of a and b
    signal temp_mult : std_logic_vector(3 downto 0); -- for
multiplication of a and b
    signal out11, out12, out13, out14, out15 : std_logic; --
outputs from Copy 1
    signal out21, out22, out23, out24, out25 : std_logic; --
outputs from Copy 2
    signal out1, out2, out3, out4, out5 : std_logic; -- output
1 from Copy 1 or 2, etc.
    signal final_out : std_logic_vector(3 downto 0); -- final
output of partial scrambling

begin
    temp_mult <= a*b;
    w <= temp_mult(3);
    x <= temp_mult(2);
    y <= temp_mult(1);
    z <= temp_mult(0);

    temp_sub <= a-b;
    extraW <= temp_sub(1);
    extraX <= temp_sub(0);

    a_temp <= '0' & a; -- concatenate '0' as msb
    b_temp <= '0' & b;
    temp_add <= a_temp + b_temp;
    extraY <= temp_add(1);
    extraZ <= temp_add(0);

    v1 <= (a(1) AND a(0)) OR (b(1) XOR b(0)); -- one of
two extra output choices
    v2 <= (a(1) NAND a(0)) NOR (b(1) XNOR b(0)); -- the
other extra output choice

    process(xi)
    begin
        if xi = '0' then
            out11 <= w;
            out12 <= extraX;
            out13 <= v1;
            out14 <= extraY;

```

```

        out15 <= z;
        out21 <= extraW;
        out22 <= x;
        out23 <= v2;
        out24 <= y;
        out25 <= extraZ;
    else
        out11 <= extraW;
        out12 <= x;
        out13 <= v2;
        out14 <= y;
        out15 <= extraZ;
        out21 <= w;
        out22 <= extraX;
        out23 <= v1;
        out24 <= extraY;
        out25 <= z;
    end if;
end process;

process(enable, sel1, sel2, sel3, sel4, sel5)
begin
    if enable = '1' then

        if sel1 = '0' then
            out1 <= out11;
        else
            out1 <= out21;
        end if;

        if sel2 = '0' then
            out2 <= out12;
        else
            out2 <= out22;
        end if;

        if sel3 = '0' then
            out3 <= out13;
        else
            out3 <= out23;
        end if;

        if sel4 = '0' then
            out4 <= out14;
        else
            out4 <= out24;
        end if;

        if sel5 = '0' then
            out5 <= out15;
        else
            out5 <= out25;
        end if;
    end if;
end process;

```

```

        else
            out1 <= '0';
            out2 <= '0';
            out3 <= '0';
            out4 <= '0';
            out5 <= '0';

        end if;
    end process;

    process(downselect) -- selecting 4 outputs from 5 (5
choose 4 = 5 combinations)
    begin
        if downselect = B"000" then
            final_out <= out1 & out2 & out3 & out4;
        elsif downselect = B"001" then
            final_out <= out1 & out2 & out3 & out5;
        elsif downselect = B"010" then
            final_out <= out1 & out2 & out4 & out5;
        elsif downselect = B"011" then
            final_out <= out1 & out3 & out4 & out5;
        elsif downselect = B"100" then
            final_out <= out2 & out3 & out4 & out5;
        else -- don't repeat combinations or worry
about permutations; adds hardware
            final_out <= B"0000";
        end if;
    end process;

    result <= final_out + c;
end behavior; -- End partial scrambling

```

Quartus II produces the schematic (page 1 of 2) shown in Figure 27 from the VHDL code above. Page 2 of the schematic is in Figure 28. The circuit in Figure 27 and the multiplexer in Figure 28 replace the multiplier in Figure 26.

4.8 Summary

This chapter explains and illustrates the scrambling methodology in detail. The Combination Locks are described and an example is given. The steps to scramble a circuit are listed and demonstrated. These steps include

- adding extra inputs, outputs, and copies;
- deciding what extraneous input combinations produce correct output;




Figure 27. Page 1 of partial scrambling schematic.




Figure 28. Page 2 of partial scrambling schematic.

- deciding which outputs are correct, which are extraneous, and when;
- creating extraneous decoy functions; and
- producing the design in VHDL or a schematic.

Demonstration includes scrambling combinational and sequential circuits from truth and state tables, designs expressed by Boolean equations, and gate-level representations of designs. In addition, transforming existing VHDL code and modifying only a portion of a circuit are illustrated.

5. Results and Analysis

5.1 Chapter Overview

This chapter presents the performance metrics, whether calculated or collected from the circuit simulations. Each of the following sections reports one performance metric. The subsections report the metric for a particular set of circuits. The metrics are primarily analyzed to quantify the effects on performance. The subsections also include metrics for the VHDL and partial scrambling demonstrations, so that the metrics from the original and modified circuits may be compared.

5.2 Security

The security metric is of primary interest since the goal of this research is to produce a method to protect FPGA designs from reverse engineering.

From (2), the security contributed by a Combination Lock is $(2^i)^s / 2$, where i is the number of inputs to the Lock and s is the number of states in the Lock. The security contribution from a scrambled circuit is $2^{m+S+p-1}(k^{n+q})$, where S is the number of sequential elements, m is the number of original inputs, p is the number of additional inputs, k is the number of copies, n is the number of original outputs, and q is the number of additional outputs.

Given the design methodology explanation in Chapter 4, the operands of the addition in (2) are explained in light of the methodology. The 2^i in the $(2^i)^s / 2$ term for the Combination Lock contribution accounts for the total number of bit combinations of i inputs. Since each of s states receives 2^i possible bit combinations, 2^i is raised to the

power of s . For example, with $i=2$, there are $2^2=4$ possible bit combinations – $00_2, 01_2, 10_2, 11_2$. With $s=3$, the first state could receive any of the 4 bit combinations, the second state could receive any of the 4 bit combinations, and the third state could receive any of the four bit combinations, so $4 \times 4 \times 4 = 4^3 = (2^2)^3 = 64$. This quantity is divided by two for the average number of random trials required to successfully find the correct sequence of inputs.

For the scrambled circuit contribution ($2^{m+S+p-1}(k^{n+q})$), only half of the input combinations are required to completely specify the truth or state table, since the top portions of the output table are copied to the bottom portions (cf., Subsection 4.3.1.). Thus, two is raised to the power of $m+S+p-1$. For each input combination, each of k copies produces $n+q$ outputs from which to select the final output of the circuit. Since each final output can come from any of the k copies, the total possible combinations of outputs are k^{n+q} . For example, with $m+p=4$ ($S=0$), only $2^{4-1}=8$ input combinations are required to fill the output columns of the truth table. With $k=3$ and $n+q=4$, one circuit output can come from three possible copies, another output can come from three possible copies, etc., so $3 \times 3 \times 3 \times 3 = 3^4 = 81$. Thus, there are $8 \times 81 = 648$ possible output combinations.

Figures 29, 30, and 31 plot (2), as well as exponential trendlines, for varying values of p , k , and q . The other variables are held constant at $i=3$, $s=8$, $m=n=30$, and $S=0$. A conservative yet moderately sized example is desired for the plots, so 30 is chosen for m and n , and zero is chosen for S since an Intel 80386 has 42 inputs, 72 outputs, and eight 32-bit general purpose registers (among others). The security metric for an




Figure 29. Security vs. varying extra inputs.




Figure 30. Security vs. varying copies.




Figure 31. Security vs. varying extra outputs.

Intel386™ DX microprocessor is $2^{42+256}/500 \text{ MHz}/31,536,000 \text{ sec/yr} = 3.23\text{E}+73$ years (500 MHz is used so that this metric is consistent with the metrics that follow).

The range of Figures 29 and 30 begins at 146 years. With only five extra inputs, the plot of Figure 29 ends at 2,340 years. The plot of Figure 30 ends at $9.03\text{E}+16$ years for six copies. The plot in Figure 31 begins at $4.21\text{E}+07$ years, and with only five extra outputs, ends at $3.41\text{E}+09$ years.

The R^2 values greater than 0.95 shown on each plot indicate a good fit to the plotted data for the exponential trend lines. These signify that security increases exponentially with the numbers of extra inputs, copies, and extra outputs.

With the plots of Figures 29, 30, and 31, it is easy to see how the application of the design methodology can transform a 0-5-year, Low-cost design into a design with a 5-50-year, Medium-cost, or greater, security level.

5.2.1 Combination Lock

The security contributions of the Combination Locks are listed with each Lock's factors in Table 17. Beneath "Config" are the configurations of the Combination Locks; the configurations are denoted with "CL" followed by the number of states and then by the number of inputs. "States" and "Inputs" in Table 17 are, respectively, the number of states in and the number of inputs to the Combination Lock state machine. "Cycles" is determined with the Combination Lock portion of $(2)^i$, $(2^i)^s / 2$.

Table 17. Combination Locks' security contributions.

Config	States	Inputs	Cycles	Security Contribution (years)
CL8-3	8	3	8.39×10^6	5.32E-10
CL8-4	8	4	2.15×10^9	1.36E-07
CL16-3	16	3	1.41×10^{14}	8.93E-03
CL16-4	16	4	9.22×10^{18}	5.85E+02

Table 18 analyzes the effects of the numbers of states and inputs and their interaction on the security contribution of the Combination Locks. The mean performance is in the "I (mean)" column and "Total/4" row (highlighted). The effects of the numbers of states and inputs and their interaction are listed in their respective columns in the "Total/4" row (highlighted). These values indicate nearly equal effects on the security metric of a Combination Lock. The reason that these values are effectively equal is that their determination is dominated by the value in the "yi" column and "4" row. The importance of the number of states is indicated by SSA/SST, the effect of the

i (config)	Effect				yi (cycles)	(yi-ybar)^2
	l (mean)	A (states) 8=-1, 16=1	B (inputs) 3=-1, 4=1	AB (interaction)		
CL8-3	1	-1	-1	1	8.389E+06	5.317E+36
CL8-4	1	-1	1	-1	2.147E+09	5.317E+36
CL16-3	1	1	-1	-1	1.407E+14	5.316E+36
CL16-4	1	1	1	1	9.223E+18	4.785E+37
Total	9.2235E+18	9.2235E+18	9.2232E+18	9.2232E+18	9.2235E+18	=sum
Total/4	2.3059E+18	2.3059E+18	2.3058E+18	2.3058E+18	2.3059E+18	=ybar
	SST=	SSA=	SSB=	SSAB=		
	6.380E+37	2.127E+37	2.127E+37	2.127E+37		
		SSA/SST=	SSB/SST=	SSAB/SST=		
		33.3347%	33.3327%	33.3327%		

5.2.2 Combinational Circuit

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Table 19. Combinational circuits' security metrics.

C0	Original	$m=3$	$n=2$			5.0736E-16	
Circuit	Copies (k)	Inputs (p)	Outputs (q)	CL states (s)	CL inputs (i)	Security (years)	Normalized to original
C211cl	2	1	1	8	3	5.3200E-10	1.04858E+06
C212cl	2	1	2	8	3	5.3201E-10	1.04859E+06
C221cl	2	2	1	8	3	5.3201E-10	1.04859E+06
C222cl	2	2	2	8	3	5.3202E-10	1.04860E+06
C411cl	4	1	1	8	3	5.3203E-10	1.04864E+06
C412cl	4	1	2	8	3	5.3213E-10	1.04883E+06
C421cl	4	2	1	8	3	5.3206E-10	1.04870E+06
C422cl	4	2	2	8	3	5.3226E-10	1.04908E+06

Table 20 analyzes the effects of varying the numbers of copies, extra inputs, and extra outputs. The “i (config)” column shows the circuit configurations that produced the values in the “yi” column. The “cl” suffix in Table 19 is absent in Table 20 since the security contributions of scrambled circuits without Combination Locks are analyzed. The bottom row of values indicates that the number of copies (SSA/SST) in a scrambled circuit affects the circuit’s security contribution more than any other primary factor or interaction. The second greatest influence on a scrambled circuit’s security contribution is the number of extra outputs (SSC/SST). The last significant effect on a circuit’s security contribution is the interaction of the number of copies and the number of extra outputs (SSAC/SST), which is not surprising given the first two significant effects.

5.2.3 Sequential Circuit

The security metrics of the scrambled sequential circuits and an eight-state, three-input Combination Lock are listed with each circuit’s factors in Table 21. The original three-bit up counter’s security metric ($2^{m+S}/500 \text{ MHz}/31,536,000 \text{ sec/yr}$) is included in the first row of the table for comparison to the modified circuits’ security metrics. The “Circuit” column lists the configurations of the circuits, which are denoted with an “S”

Table 20. Analysis of combinational circuits' security contributions.

Effect										
i (config)	I (mean)	A (copies) -1=2, 1=4	B (inputs) -1=1, 1=2	C (outputs) -1=1, 1=2	AB (interaction)	AC (interaction)	BC (interaction)	ABC (interaction)	yi (cycles)	yi-ybar)^2
C211	1	-1	-1	-1	1	1	1	-1	64	937024
C212	1	-1	-1	1	1	-1	-1	1	128	817216
C221	1	-1	1	-1	-1	1	-1	1	128	817216
C222	1	-1	1	1	-1	-1	1	-1	256	602176
C411	1	1	-1	-1	-1	-1	1	1	512	270400
C412	1	1	-1	1	-1	1	-1	-1	2048	1032256
C421	1	1	1	-1	1	-1	-1	-1	1024	64
C422	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	4096	9388096
Total	8256	7104	2752	4800	2368	4416	1600	1472	8256	=sum
Total/8	1032	888	344	600	296	552	200	184	1032	=ybar
SST=SSA=SSB=SSC=SSAB=SSAC=SSBC=SSABC=										
13884448	6308352	946688	2880000	700928	2437632	320000	270848			
SSA/SST=SSB/SST=SSC/SST=SSAB/SST=SSAC/SST=SSBC/SST=SSABC/SST=										
45.500%	6.828%	20.773%	5.056%	17.582%	2.308%	1.954%				

Table 21. Sequential circuits' security metrics.

S0	Original	$m=0$	$n=3$	3			5.0736E-16	
Circuit	Copies (k)	Inputs (p)	Outputs (q)	S	CL states (s)	CL inputs (l)	Security (years)	Normalized to original
S211cl	2	1	1	4	8	3	5.3202E-10	1.04860E+06
S212cl	2	1	2	5	8	3	5.3206E-10	1.04870E+06
S221cl	2	2	1	4	8	3	5.3203E-10	1.04864E+06
S222cl	2	2	2	5	8	3	5.3213E-10	1.04883E+06
S411cl	4	1	1	4	8	3	5.3226E-10	1.04908E+06
S412cl	4	1	2	5	8	3	5.3408E-10	1.05267E+06
S421cl	4	2	1	4	8	3	5.3252E-10	1.04960E+06
S422cl	4	2	2	5	8	3	5.3616E-10	1.05676E+06

for sequential, followed by a single digit for each of the number of copies, extra inputs, and extra outputs, and “cl” to indicate the use of a Combination Lock. For example, S421cl is the sequential circuit with four copies, two extra inputs, one extra output, and a Combination Lock. The S values of the modified circuits depend on q through the relationship $S_{mod}=S_{orig}+q$. As with the scrambled combinational circuits, the scrambled sequential circuits with the smallest Combination Lock have six orders of magnitude improvement.

The analysis of the effects of varying the numbers of copies, extra inputs, and extra outputs in the scrambled sequential circuits is in Table 22. The “i (config)” column shows the circuit configurations that produced the values in the “yi” column. The “cl” suffix in Table 21 is absent in Table 22 since the security contributions of scrambled circuits without Combination Locks are analyzed. As with the scrambled combinational circuits, the greatest effects on the security contributions are, in descending order, the number of copies (SSA/SST), the number of extra outputs (SSC/SST), and the interaction of these two factors (SSAC/SST). The percentages in Table 22 are slightly different than those in Table 20 due to the value of S_{mod} depending on q .

Table 22. Analysis of sequential circuits' security contributions.

i (config)	Effect										
	I (mean)	A (copies) -1=2, 1=4	B (inputs) -1=1, 1=2	C (outputs) -1=1, 1=2	AB (interaction)	AC (interaction)	BC (interaction)	ABC (interaction)	yi (cycles)	yi-ybar)^2	
S211	1	-1	-1	-1	1	1	1	-1	256	1.973E+08	
S212	1	-1	-1	1	1	-1	-1	1	1024	1.764E+08	
S221	1	-1	1	-1	-1	1	-1	1	512	1.902E+08	
S222	1	-1	1	1	-1	-1	1	-1	2048	1.502E+08	
S411	1	1	-1	-1	-1	-1	1	1	4096	1.042E+08	
S412	1	1	-1	1	-1	1	-1	-1	32768	3.409E+08	
S421	1	1	1	-1	1	-1	-1	-1	8192	3.736E+07	
S422	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	65536	2.625E+09	
Total	114432	106752	38144	88320	35584	83712	29440	27904	114432	=sum	
Total/8	14304	13344	4768	11040	4448	10464	3680	3488	14304	=ybar	
SST= 3.821E+09											
SSA=		SSB=		SSC=		SSAB=		SSAC=		SSBC=	
1.424E+09		1.819E+08		9.751E+08		1.583E+08		8.760E+08		1.083E+08	
SSB/SST=		SSC/SST=		SSAB/SST=		SSAC/SST=		SSBC/SST=		SSABC/SST=	
37.278%		4.759%		25.516%		4.142%		22.923%		2.835%	
2547%		547%		835%		2835%		547%		835%	

It is interesting to note the differences in SSC/SST, the effect of the number of outputs, between Tables 20 and 22. Table 20's SSC/SST value is 20.773%, while the SSC/SST in Table 22 is 25.516%. The $2^{m+S+p-1}$ factor in (2) accounts for this difference, since the value of S_{mod} depends on the number of extra outputs. Table 22's value of SSAC/SST exhibits a similar increase of approximately five percentage points over Table 20's SSAC/SST value. The sequential SSA/SST decreases with increases in SSC/SST and SSAC/SST.

5.2.4 VHDL and Partial Scrambling

Table 23 presents the original and modified encoders' security metrics. The Combination Lock is the small, eight-state, three-input circuit.

Table 23. Original and scrambled existing VHDL circuits' security.

Original	$m=4$	$n=2$	16	1.0147E-15	
Copies	Inputs (extra)	Outputs (extra)	Cycles	Security Contribution (years)	Security w/CL (years)
2	1	2	256	1.6235E-14	5.3202E-10

Scrambling alone produces a ten-fold increase in security. Adding the Combination Lock provides an additional increase of four orders of magnitude.

The security metrics of the original and partially scrambled circuits are listed in Table 24. The multiplier is isolated from the rest of the circuit, since the multiplier is the portion of the circuit modified. To calculate the security of the entire modified circuit, (2) is customized so that the number of scrambled multiplier cycles is multiplied by the number of possible combinations from the two-bit input c , in this case, $2^2=4$ possible combinations.

Table 24. Security metrics of original and partially scrambled circuits.

Original	6	4	64	4.0589E-15	
Multiplier	$m=4$	$n=4$			
Copies	Inputs (extra)	Outputs (extra)	Cycles	Security Contribution (years)	Security w/CL (years)
2	1	1	512		
Input c	2		4		
Total			2048	1.2988E-13	5.3213E-10

Scrambling the multiplier alone increases the security by a factor of 32. Adding the eight-state, three-input Combination Lock increases the security by another factor of 4,000.

5.3 Execution Time

Execution time metrics are collected from a Quartus II compilation report, specifically the design's ".tan.rpt" file. The compilations are not optimized for speed. For combinational circuits, pin-to-pin delay (t_{pd}) is collected. The maximum clock frequency (f_{max}) is collected for sequential circuits.

5.3.1 Combination Lock

The maximum clock frequency of each Combination Lock is listed in Table 25.

Table 25. Combination Locks' maximum clock frequencies.

Config	States	Inputs	f_{max} (MHz)
CL8-3	8	3	379.36
CL8-4	8	4	354.36
CL16-3	16	3	385.8
CL16-4	16	4	271.08

Table 26 shows the results of the analysis of the maximum frequencies of the Combination Locks. Table 55 in the Appendix is the entire analysis table. From Table 26, one can see that the number of inputs has the greatest effect on f_{max} (SSB/SST).

Table 26. Results of Combination Locks' maximum frequency analysis table.

SSA/SST=	SSB/SST=	SSAB/SST=
17.6378%	58.3159%	24.0463%

The reason that this effect is the greatest on f_{\max} may be that, with more inputs, more logic is required to test whether the input is correct and the state machine can advance to the next state. More logic translates to a longer delay, and thus a slower clock frequency. Interestingly, the effect of the interaction between the number of states and the number of inputs (SSAB/SST) is greater than the effect of the number of states alone (SSA/SST). This may be due to the significant effect that the number of inputs alone has on f_{\max} .

5.3.2 Combinational Circuit

The combinational circuits' pin-to-pin delays are listed in Table 27. Although the execution times are generally increasing with increasing numbers of copies, inputs, and outputs, the hypothesis that the increase in execution time is nearly constant cannot be rejected. In the eight cases of modified combinational circuits, each circuit has at most one additional level of LUT in the critical path. If a circuit much larger than the full adder is modified according to the algorithm, it is expected that the additional delay incurred would be through one or two LUTs and would be on the order of the additional delays listed in Table 27. This additional delay would be insignificant in relation to the delay of the original large circuit. This one- or two-LUT increase in delay for an FPGA might translate to an additional delay of ten or so gates. This delay for a large ASIC would be minor compared to the execution time of the original circuit.

Table 27. Combinational circuits' execution times.

C0	Original	$m=3$	$n=2$	10.118	
Circuit	Copies	Inputs (extra)	Outputs (extra)	tpd (ns)	Normalized to original
C211	2	1	1	9.857	0.9742
C212	2	1	2	10.607	1.0483
C221	2	2	1	10.851	1.0724
C222	2	2	2	10.884	1.0757
C411	4	1	1	10.752	1.0627
C412	4	1	2	11.737	1.1600
C421	4	2	1	12.129	1.1988
C422	4	2	2	11.338	1.1206

The reason for circuit C211 having a lower execution time than the original relates to the FPGA resources used, their location, and the routing between them. This is the same reason circuit C422 is slightly faster than circuit C421 and circuit C411 is slightly faster than circuits C221 and C222.

The results of the analysis table for the combinational circuits' execution times are in Table 28. The entire analysis is in Table 59 in the Appendix. (A, B, and C correspond to copies, inputs, and outputs, respectively, as in Tables 20 and 22.) The number of copies (SSA/SST) has the greatest effect on the execution time of the combinational circuits. This effect follows since the number of copies determines the number of levels of multiplexers required, and additional logic is implemented to compare the multiplexer select signals. Why the second most significant effect is the interaction of the number inputs and the number of outputs, rather than the number of inputs alone, is not understood. Perhaps, the increase in inputs and outputs contributes to routing congestion. The number of inputs is the third most significant effect for good reason. An increase in the number of inputs impacts the amount of logic in the modified

Table 28. Results of combinational circuits' execution time analysis table.

SSA/SST	SSB/SST	SSC/SST	SSAB/SST	SSAC/SST	SSBC/SST	SSABC/SST
50.597%	18.131%	3.422%	0.308%	1.244%	22.279%	4.020%

circuit, and additional logic results in longer paths and delays and increases in execution time.

5.3.3 Sequential Circuit

For the original and modified counters, f_{\max} is 400 MHz, the maximum frequency of the targeted FPGA. Although this frequency is less than the one used in (2), there are devices in the targeted FPGA's family capable of 500 MHz. The lower frequency of the targeted FPGA does not invalidate the results in the Security section. The modified circuits' maximum clock frequencies are the same as the original circuit's frequency because the example circuits are likely too small to impact the clock frequency. The execution times of the combinational and sequential circuits are not compared since their metrics are different.

5.3.4 VHDL and Partial Scrambling

The execution times of the original and modified VHDL design are listed in Table 29. The increase in the modified circuit is due to an additional LUT on the critical path.

Table 29. Existing VHDL designs' execution times.

VHDL Original	$m=4$	$n=2$	9.701	
Copies	Inputs (extra)	Outputs (extra)	tpd (ns)	Normalized to original
2	1	2	10.592	1.092

The execution times of the partially scrambled circuit and its original are shown in Table 30. The increase in the modified circuit is due to the FPGA resources used, their location, and the routing between them, since both circuits have four LUTs between the input and output on the critical path.

Table 30. Partially scrambled and original circuits' execution times.

Partial Original	6	4	11.062	
Copies	Inputs (extra)	Outputs (extra)	tpd (ns)	Normalized to original
2	1	2	13.623	1.232

5.4 Power Consumption

Power consumption is measured in Quartus II. Simulation files cycle twice through all possible original input combinations. For example, there are eight possible input combinations to the original full adder. Two cycles are used since a modified circuit has two paths to correct output, one in the upper half of the truth table and the other in the lower half of the truth table. For example, with two extra inputs, correct output is obtained when the extra input is 01_2 or 11_2 . The simulations are also used to ensure the modified circuits function correctly. When simulating the original design, two cycles are used to maintain consistency across tests. The time between rising (or falling) edges is 40 ns, or 25 MHz. Thus, the full adder circuits are simulated for 320 ns (since output transitions occur on both rising and falling input edges) and the counter circuits are simulated for 640 ns (since output transitions only occur on rising clock edges).

Signal activity in the simulation is captured and analyzed by the Quartus II PowerPlay Power Analyzer Tool. Toggle rates are set at 20% as shown in Figure 32.




Figure 32. Quartus II PowerPlay Power Analyzer Tool.

5.4.1 Combination Lock

Combination Locks are simulated for one successful key sequence. In the case of the eight-state Locks, the simulation time is 320 ns. The sixteen-state Locks are simulated for 640 ns.

The power consumption of the Combination Locks is listed in Table 31.

Table 31. Combination Locks' power consumption.

Config	States	Inputs	Static (mW)	Dynamic (mW)
CL8-3	8	3	322.94	1.97
CL8-4	8	4	322.97	2.1
CL16-3	16	3	322.94	1.74
CL16-4	16	4	322.98	1.77

The results of the analysis table for static power are in Table 32. Table 56 in the Appendix contains the entire analysis. Clearly the number of inputs (B) is the major factor in determining static power consumption.

Table 32. Results of Combination Locks' static power analysis table.

SSA/SST	SSB/SST	SSAB/SST
1.9608%	96.0784%	1.9608%

The dynamic power analysis results are listed in Table 33. Table 57 in the Appendix is the entire analysis table. Dynamic power consumption is greatly affected by the number of states (A), and hence, the amount of logic, in the Combination Lock. The logic is where most switching activity is expected to occur. The number of inputs (B) has only a minor effect on the dynamic power consumption.

Table 33. Results of Combination Locks' dynamic power analysis table.

SSA/SST	SSB/SST	SSAB/SST
89.8053%	7.3310%	2.8637%

The effect of the number of states on dynamic power is interesting in light of the dynamic power metrics in Table 31. The eight-state Combination Locks consume more power dynamically than the sixteen-state Locks, even though sixteen states require more logic. The reason for this apparent contradiction is the key sequence for the sixteen-state Locks has more stability than the eight-state Locks. The eight-state key sequence is 1, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 4, 6, and makes four of seven possible transitions – from 1 to 2 to 3 to 4 to 6 – in 320 ns. The sixteen-state key sequence is 2, 4, 4, 6, 6, 6, 8, 8, 8, 8, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 12, and makes only five of fifteen possible transitions – from 2 to 4 to 6 to 8 to 10 to 12 – in 640 ns. Thus, the eight-state Locks are switching a greater percentage of time than the

sixteen-state Locks, which explains the eight-state Locks' greater dynamic power consumption. With greater variation in both sequences, the sixteen-state Locks, with greater numbers of LUTs, are expected to have greater dynamic power consumption than the eight-state Locks.

5.4.2 Combinational Circuit

The power consumption of the full adder circuits is listed in Table 34.

Table 34. Combinational circuits' power consumption.

C0	Original	$m=3$	$n=2$	322.9		3.76	
Circuit	Copies	Inputs (extra)	Outputs (extra)	Static (mW)	Normalized to original static	Dynamic (mW)	Normalized to original dynamic
C211	2	1	1	323.13	1.0007	5.62	1.4947
C212	2	1	2	323.22	1.0010	6.81	1.8112
C221	2	2	1	323.19	1.0009	5.03	1.3378
C222	2	2	2	323.29	1.0012	6.51	1.7314
C411	4	1	1	323.27	1.0011	5.6	1.4894
C412	4	1	2	323.38	1.0015	7.21	1.9176
C421	4	2	1	323.3	1.0012	6.35	1.6888
C422	4	2	2	323.4	1.0015	7.33	1.9495

After arranging the circuits in the order C211, C221, C212, C222, C411, C421, C412, C422, the plot in Figure 33 is generated. This ordering is due to the significance of the factors shown below in Table 35. The number of inputs has the least significant effect so it is varied first. For example, circuit C211 has one extra input and circuit C221 has two extra inputs. Then, the number of outputs is varied, so the order goes from circuit C221 with one extra output to circuit C212 with two extra outputs. Finally, the number of copies is varied, so circuit C411 with four copies follows circuit C222 with two copies. The R^2 value indicates a good linear fit to the data. The static power increases nearly linearly as inputs are added, then outputs, and finally copies. The primary factor impacting static power is copies (compare circuits C211 and C411). This




Figure 33. Combinational circuits' static power consumption.

is due to the impact the number of copies has on resource allocation. Adding an output has the second most significant effect (compare circuits C211 and C212). Finally, the third most significant factor is adding inputs (compare circuits C211 and C221). Adding an output increases the static power more than adding an input, as evidenced by the ordering of the circuits – from two copies, one extra input, one extra output (circuit C211), to two copies, two extra inputs, one extra output (circuit C221), to two copies, one extra input, two extra outputs (circuit C212).

The dynamic power measurements do not lend themselves to a coherent ordering to produce a linear plot. The ordering C221, C411, C211, C421, C222, C412, C212, C422, produces a linear plot with $R^2=0.917$. However, this ordering does not have a basis like the static power ordering.

As shown in Table 35, the order of significant factors affecting static power is the number of copies (A), the number of extra outputs (C), and the number of extra inputs (B). (Table 60 in the Appendix contains the entire analysis.) The number of copies is significant since an increase in the number of copies increases the number of required multiplexer select signals. It is interesting that the number of inputs does not affect the static power measurements as it did with the Combination Lock.

Table 35. Results of combinational circuits' static power analysis table.

SSA/SST	SSB/SST	SSC/SST	SSAB/SST	SSAC/SST	SSBC/SST	SSABC/SST
57.532%	6.894%	34.043%	1.362%	0.085%	0.000%	0.085%

Table 36 lists the effects on the example circuits' dynamic power consumption. (The entire analysis is in Table 61 in the Appendix.) The number of outputs (C) is the most significant factor, followed by the number of copies (A), and the interaction (AB) of the numbers of copies and inputs. The reason why the number of outputs has such an effect could be that most of the circuit switching activity occurs in the selection of copy outputs. It is odd that the numbers of copies and inputs do not play a greater role, since they determine the amount logic in the modified circuit.

Table 36. Results of combinational circuits' dynamic power analysis table.

SSA/SST	SSB/SST	SSC/SST	SSAB/SST	SSAC/SST	SSBC/SST	SSABC/SST
16.675%	0.001%	72.648%	8.134%	0.017%	0.304%	2.222%

5.4.3 Sequential Circuit

The power measurements of the up counters are listed in Table 37. As with the combinational circuits, the same ordering (S211, S221, S212, S222, S411, S421, S412, S422) of the sequential circuits for the same reasons generates a linear plot. The

Table 37. Sequential circuits' power consumption.

S0	Original	$m=0$	$n=3$	322.9		3.43	
Circuit	Copies	Inputs (extra)	Outputs (extra)	Static (mW)	Normalized to original static	Dynamic (mW)	Normalized to original dynamic
S211	2	1	1	323.11	1.0007	3.96	1.1545
S212	2	1	2	323.19	1.0009	4.6	1.3411
S221	2	2	1	323.17	1.0008	4.34	1.2653
S222	2	2	2	323.25	1.0011	5.55	1.6181
S411	4	1	1	323.29	1.0012	4.43	1.2915
S412	4	1	2	323.43	1.0016	5.13	1.4956
S421	4	2	1	323.35	1.0014	4.5	1.3120
S422	4	2	2	323.43	1.0016	5.46	1.5918

significant factors and their order are the same for both the combinational and the sequential examples, namely copies, outputs, and inputs as shown in Table 38. (The entire analysis is in Table 64 in the Appendix.) The proportions of effects are different in the two classes of circuits. The number of copies has the most significant effect on static power since the number of copies has a significant effect on the amount of resources a circuit requires.

Table 38. Results of sequential circuits' static power analysis table.

SSA/SST	SSB/SST	SSC/SST	SSAB/SST	SSAC/SST	SSBC/SST	SSABC/SST
76.088%	4.052%	18.059%	0.450%	0.450%	0.450%	0.450%

The results of the sequential circuits' dynamic power analysis table are in Table 39. Table 65 in the Appendix contains the entire analysis. The three factors having the greatest effect are, in descending order, the number of outputs, the number of inputs, and the number of copies.

Table 39. Results of sequential circuits' dynamic power analysis table.

SSA/SST	SSB/SST	SSC/SST	SSAB/SST	SSAC/SST	SSBC/SST	SSABC/SST
6.310%	16.495%	67.902%	4.767%	0.199%	3.797%	0.530%

5.4.4 VHDL and Partial Scrambling

The existing VHDL and partially scrambled circuits are simulated for 640 ns each. Table 40 shows the power measurements for the original and modified VHDL circuits. The power measurements of the original and partially scrambled circuits are in Table 41. The modified VHDL circuit's more than 300% increase in dynamic power over the original circuit's metric is due to its considerable increase in FPGA resources.

Table 40. VHDL circuits' power consumption.

VHDL Original	$m=4$	$n=2$	322.94		1.56	
Copies	Inputs (extra)	Outputs (extra)	Static (mW)	Normalized to original static	Dynamic (mW)	Normalized to original dynamic
2	1	2	323.27	1.001	4.88	3.128

Table 41. Partially scrambled circuits' power consumption.

Partial Original	6	4	323.08		4.27	
Copies	Inputs (extra)	Outputs (extra)	Static (mW)	Normalized to original static	Dynamic (mW)	Normalized to original dynamic
2	1	2	323.49	1.001	4.74	1.11

5.4.5 Observations

There is a strong correlation between the number of pins used for a circuit and the static power consumed by that circuit. Figure 34 illustrates this correlation. This plot considers all circuits tested and duplicate measurements are deleted. The reason for this correlation is due to the number of copies. The number of copies impacts the number of required multiplexer select signals.

Sorting the circuits according to pin count, as was done to produce Figure 34, results in combinational/sequential pairs of the same copy/extra input/extra output configuration. These groupings lend credence to the hypothesis that the number of copies




Figure 34. Correlation between pin count and static power.

significantly impacts that number of pins required, which impacts the amount of static power dissipated.

Sorting the tested circuits in order of dynamic power consumption leads to groupings of sequential circuits and groupings of combinational circuits. These groupings seem to indicate that dynamic power dissipation is circuit-dependent.

5.5 Resource Usage

Resource usage metrics are collected from a Quartus II compilation report, the design's ".map.rpt" file. The compilations are not optimized for resource usage. For all circuits, the numbers of LUTs and pins are collected. For sequential circuits, the number of registers is also collected.

5.5.1 Combination Lock

The resource usage of each Combination Lock is listed in Table 42. The number of pins is solely dependent on the number of inputs. Similarly, the number of registers depends only the number of states.

Table 42. Combination Locks' resource usage.

Config	States	Inputs	LUTs	Registers	Pins
CL8-3	8	3	13	9	6
CL8-4	8	4	16	9	7
CL16-3	16	3	25	17	6
CL16-4	16	4	28	17	7

The results of the analysis of the effects of the Combination Locks' states and inputs on LUT usage are in Table 43. Table 58 in the Appendix contains the entire analysis. As expected, the number of states is the greatest contributor to the number of LUTs required – more states require more logic.

Table 43. Results of Combination Locks' LUT analysis table.

SSA/SST	SSB/SST	SSAB/SST
94.1176%	5.8824%	0.0000%

5.5.2 Combinational Circuit

The resources used by each test combinational circuit are listed in Table 44. As expected, circuits with more copies, inputs, and outputs generally require more LUTs and pins. Also as expected, the required area for a circuit with one extra input and two copies is less than a 400 percent increase over the original circuit.

For a given number of copies, the increase in LUTs appears to be exponential. See Figures 35 and 36. Figure 35 shows the increase in LUTs when considering only

Table 44. Combinational circuits' resource usage.

C0	Original	$m=3$	$n=2$	2		5	
Circuit	Copies	Inputs (extra)	Outputs (extra)	LUTs	Normalized to original LUTs	Pins	Normalized to original pins
C211	2	1	1	3	1.5	11	2.2
C212	2	1	2	4	2.0	13	2.6
C221	2	2	1	6	3.0	12	2.4
C222	2	2	2	9	4.5	14	2.8
C411	4	1	1	6	3.0	14	2.8
C412	4	1	2	8	4.0	17	3.4
C421	4	2	1	10	5.0	15	3.0
C422	4	2	2	14	7.0	18	3.6




Figure 35. Combinational circuits' LUT increase for circuits 1-4.

circuits C211 through C222. Figure 36 considers circuits C411 through C422. Lines can also be fit to the same data. However, the resulting R^2 values are slightly lower than those shown in Figures 35 and 36, but still greater than 0.95.




Figure 36. Combinational circuits' LUT increase for circuits 5-8.

The metrics for the circuits with two copies appear exponential as they increase from 3 to 4 to 6 to 9. On the other hand, the data for the circuits with four copies appears linear, except for the last value, as it increases from 6 to 8 to 10 to 14. More data is required to conclusively decide whether the increase is exponential or linear.

If the circuits are ordered as in the Subsection 5.4.2, namely C221, C411, C211, C421, C222, C412, C212, C422, a line fits well to the pin data in Table 44 (cf., Figure 37). The order is coherent since adding an input increases the pin count by one, but adding an output increases the pin count by at least two – one for the output pin and one for the multiplexer select signal.

The results of the analysis of the combinational circuits' resource requirements are in Table 45. Table 62 in the Appendix is the entire analysis. The number of inputs




Figure 37. Combinational circuits' pin increase.

Table 45. Results of combinational circuits' LUT analysis table.

SSA/SST	SSB/SST	SSC/SST	SSAB/SST	SSAC/SST	SSBC/SST	SSABC/SST
36.364%	46.023%	14.205%	0.568%	0.568%	2.273%	0.000%

(B) has the greatest impact on LUT usage, followed by the number of copies (A), and the number of outputs (C). It is expected that the number of inputs has the greatest impact – adding one extra input to a truth table doubles the size of the table. It is also logical that number of inputs has a greater effect than the number of copies. Twice as many copies should double the area. However, as demonstrated in Section 4.5, doubling does not occur if internal circuit signals are routed appropriately.

Table 46 contains the results of the combinational circuits' pin analysis. The entire analysis is in Table 63 in the Appendix. The number of copies (A) has the greatest effect on the number pins used, as stated in Subsection 5.4.5, due to the number of multiplexer select signals required. The second greatest influence on the number of pins used is the number of outputs (C), since increasing the number of outputs affects the number of multiplexer select signals needed.

Table 46. Results of combinational circuits' pin analysis table.

SSA/SST	SSB/SST	SSC/SST	SSAB/SST	SSAC/SST	SSBC/SST	SSABC/SST
62.025%	5.063%	31.646%	0.000%	1.266%	0.000%	0.000%

5.5.3 Sequential Circuit

The resource metrics for the sequential circuits are listed in Table 47. As expected, the circuits with greater numbers of copies, extra inputs, and extra outputs generally require more resources. Also as expected, the required area for a circuit with one extra input and two copies is less than a 400 percent increase over the original circuit.

Table 47. Sequential circuits' resource usage.

S0	Original	$m=0$	$n=3$	3		4	
Circuit	Copies	Inputs (extra)	Outputs (extra)	LUTs	Normalized to original LUTs	Pins	Normalized to original pins
S211	2	1	1	4	1.333	11	2.75
S212	2	1	2	5	1.667	13	3.25
S221	2	2	1	9	3.000	12	3.00
S222	2	2	2	10	3.333	14	3.50
S411	4	1	1	7	2.333	15	3.75
S412	4	1	2	9	3.000	18	4.50
S421	4	2	1	12	4.000	16	4.00
S422	4	2	2	16	5.333	19	4.75

As with the combinational circuits, exponential curves fit better than lines to the sequential LUT data. The R^2 values for the lines are slightly lower than for the

exponential curves. More data is required to decide whether the increases in LUTs for the sequential circuits are linear or exponential. A line fits well to the pin data in Table 47, with an R^2 value greater than that of Figure 37.

In addition to the metrics in Table 47, the number of registers in a circuit is also of interest. The number of registers in the counter circuits depends only on the total number of outputs. Hence, a modified circuit with one extra output has four registers and a modified circuit with two extra outputs has five registers.

Table 48 lists the results of the LUT analysis table for the example sequential circuits. The entire analysis table is Table 66 in the Appendix. Although in different proportions than the combinational circuits' analysis results, the major contributors to counter LUT usage are, in descending order, the number of inputs (B), the number of copies (A), and the number of outputs (C). The reasons for these effects are the same as those stated in the previous subsection.

Table 48. Results of sequential circuits' LUT analysis table.

SSA/SST	SSB/SST	SSC/SST	SSAB/SST	SSAC/SST	SSBC/SST	SSABC/SST
30.769%	58.173%	7.692%	0.481%	1.923%	0.481%	0.481%

The results of the sequential circuits' pin analysis table are in Table 49. Table 67 in the Appendix is the entire analysis. Similar to the combinational circuits, the two most significant factors in determining counter pin usage are the number of copies (A) and the number of outputs (C). The reasons for these effects are the same as those stated in the previous subsection.

Table 49. Results of sequential circuits' pin analysis table.

SSA/SST	SSB/SST	SSC/SST	SSAB/SST	SSAC/SST	SSBC/SST	SSABC/SST
72.973%	3.604%	22.523%	0.000%	0.901%	0.000%	0.000%

5.5.4 VHDL and Partial Scrambling

The resource usage metrics for the original and modified VHDL designs are listed in Table 50. The increase in LUTs is 400%, which is reasonable for an extra input, two copies, and two extra outputs. The pin count increases by 233%.

Table 50. VHDL circuits' resource usage.

VHDL Original	<i>m=4</i>	<i>n=2</i>	2		6	
Copies	Inputs (extra)	Outputs (extra)	LUTs	Normalized to original LUTs	Pins	Normalized to original pins
2	1	2	8	4.0	14	2.333

Table 51 lists the resource usage metrics for the original and partially scrambled circuits. The increase in LUTs is only 200%, even with the combinational multiplexer. The pin count only doubled.

Table 51. Partially scrambled circuits' resource usage.

Partial Original	6	4	8		10	
Copies	Inputs (extra)	Outputs (extra)	LUTs	Normalized to original LUTs	Pins	Normalized to original pins
2	1	2	16	2.0	20	2.0

5.6 Combining a Combination Lock with Modified Circuits

To understand the effects of combining a Combination Lock with a modified circuit, the sixteen-state, four-input Combination Lock (CL16-4) is added to three different modified circuits. The circuit results in Table 52 are the full adder with two copies, two extra inputs, and two extra outputs (C222). The counter results with four

copies, two extra inputs, and two extra outputs (S422) are shown in Table 53. Table 54 is for the third circuit with the VHDL design modified to two copies, one extra input, and two extra outputs.

Table 52. Combination Lock and modified full adder.

Circuit	Timing	Simulation time	Static Power (mW)	Dynamic Power (mW)	LUTs	Registers	Pins
Modified full adder (C222)	10.884 ns	320 ns	323.29	6.51	9	0	14
Combination Lock (CL16-4)	271.08 MHz	640 ns	322.98	1.77	28	17	7
Combined	367.24 MHz	960 ns	323.31	4.14	36	17	15

Table 53. Combination Lock and modified counter.

Circuit	Timing	Simulation time	Static Power (mW)	Dynamic Power (mW)	LUTs	Registers	Pins
Modified counter (S422)	400 MHz	640	323.43	5.46	16	5	19
Combination Lock (CL16-4)	271.08 MHz	640	322.98	1.77	28	17	7
Combined	326.05 MHz	1280	323.29	3.98	43	22	19

Table 54. Combination Lock and modified VHDL circuit.

Circuit	Timing	Simulation time	Static Power (mW)	Dynamic Power (mW)	LUTs	Registers	Pins
Modified VHDL	10.592 ns	640	323.27	4.88	8	0	14
Combination Lock (CL16-4)	271.08 MHz	640	322.98	1.77	28	17	7
Combined	298.33	1280	323.29	3.98	36	17	15

The clock frequency increases for the Combination Lock when combined with the other circuits due to different routing and resource sharing. The clock frequency

decreases for the counter, but this can be remedied by partitioning the two modules and providing separate clocks to the two modules.

In Tables 52 and 53, the LUT usage is one less than adding the LUT usages of two components, due to resource sharing. In Table 54, the LUT usage is the sum of the two LUT usages. The registers counts are also added together. The pin counts are not summed, since some multiplexer select signals are also inputs to the Combination Lock.

The static power measurements of the components and the combination are within 0.5 mW of each other. The combination of the modules has lower dynamic power consumption, but that may be due to the simulation file characteristics.

Overall, the combinations of the components meet the expectations for resource usage and power dissipation. The timing issues can be addressed with partitioning.

5.7 Summary

This chapter gives the results of the tests and explanations of these results. Significant increases in security can be achieved by applying the proposed circuit design methodology to digital circuit designs, especially since security increases exponentially with additional copies, inputs, and outputs. Although the execution times for the combinational circuits are increasing, the additional level of delay is at most one LUT. The modified sequential circuits maintain the clock frequency of the original sequential circuit. More execution time data from larger circuits are needed to better characterize the effects of the algorithm. Static power consumption appears to be linear with increases in the size of the modified circuits, and is linearly correlated to design pin count. Dynamic power dissipation depends on the specific circuit and simulation file.

More data are required to determine whether LUT usage increases linearly or exponentially as circuit sizes increase. Pin count increases linearly and is most affected by the number of copies.

The examples of this chapter and their test results illustrate the relatively low cost of operating a design secured by the design modification algorithm. This low cost is a great value given the substantial increase in security obtained.

The examples also illustrate the flexibility of the design methodology to be applied in various ways to circuits described in various ways – complete or partial circuit modification; and by truth or state tables, or already written in VHDL.

6. Conclusions and Recommendations

6.1 Chapter Overview

This chapter contains the conclusions of the research and their significance. Recommendations for future research are also listed. Finally, a summary concludes the chapter.

6.2 Conclusions of Research

This research found that there is not a standard classification for tampering attacks and countermeasures. Previous classifications have weaknesses or have been misinterpreted and misapplied. In addition, there is no clear correlation of countermeasures to attacks.

Due to this finding, a classification of threats and countermeasures and their correlation is proposed. The classification addresses some of the weaknesses of previous classifications. Significant aspects of the classification are the categorization of attacks, rather than attackers, and the use of both cost and time for the taxonomy. With the proposed classification, attacks and countermeasures are correlated. However, there are still no quantified costs and times for attacks nor similar measures for countermeasures.

This research developed a circuit design modification methodology that provides significant security gains over an original circuit without considerable performance costs. Thus, the reverse engineering vulnerability of an FPGA design can be significantly reduced without corresponding penalties to its operation. This research also provides a proof of concept for the algorithm by modifying and testing several circuits, to include the modification of only a portion of a circuit. The modified sequential circuits maintain

the original circuit's clock frequency. The execution time of the modified combinational circuits increases by the delay of one level of LUTs at most over the original execution time. Static power consumption, the main component of power consumption in the tests conducted, increases linearly with the number of circuit copies or pins. Pin count increases linearly with increases in modified circuit size. LUT usage may increase linearly or exponentially – more data are required to determine the growth rate. The tests show that the increase in the number of LUTs is at or below what might be expected for added copies, inputs, and outputs.

6.3 Significance of Research

The proposed classification provides a method to apply appropriate countermeasures to perceived threats. With properly classified threats, suitable measures can be applied to counter those threats.

The circuit design modification methodology protects critical technologies and information. This in turn maintains the nation's technological advantage and provides many years of weapons systems use.

6.4 Recommendations for Action

It is recommended that the Air Force Research Laboratory's (AFRL) Anti-Tamper – Software Protection Initiative (AT-SPI) Technology Office evaluate the merit of the proposed methodology. The portions of the methodology found to have merit should be implemented by the Department of Defense.

6.5 Recommendations for Future Research

Based on the knowledge and experience gained from this study, there are several areas that can be explored further.

The lack of quantified costs and durations of attacks and countermeasures indicates a need to collect such metrics. These metrics can refine the proposed classification and the application of appropriate countermeasures to threats.

Scripts or a program could be written to automate the processing of circuits according to the proposed design modification algorithm.

The use of bidirectional pins is not addressed in this study. Incorporating bidirectional pins into the algorithm would be useful.

The application of the methodology to ASICs would uncover any ASIC-specific implementation problems.

Applying the algorithm to larger circuits and testing their security by attacking the modified circuits are additional avenues to pursue. A specific large-circuit issue is the scrambling of multiple modules of VHDL. Each module could be scrambled and interfaced with other individually scrambled modules. An alternative is to treat the collection of modules as a single black box.

The explicit intertwining of valid circuits with decoy circuits was not specifically addressed in this study. Studying this technique further could aid in other aspects of anti-reverse engineering.

Finally, additional research could extend the design algorithm to pipelined circuits. Specifically, scrambling and interfacing each stage or deciding what portions of

the circuit must be modified are of interest. The application of the procedure to larger circuits and explicit intertwining may be useful in pipelined designs.

6.6 Summary

This chapter presents the conclusions of this research and its significance, focusing on the classification of threats and countermeasures and the design modification algorithm. It is recommended that AFRL's AT-SPI Technology Office evaluate the algorithm. Further study, including the refinement of cost and time values of attacks and countermeasures and the application of the design methodology to ASICs and multicycle designs, is also proposed.

The proposed design modification method is found to be economical in terms of the security gained and performance costs incurred.

Appendix: Data Analysis Tables

Table 55. Analysis of Combination Locks' maximum frequencies.

i (config)	Effect				yi (fmax)	(yi-ybar)^2
	I (mean)	A (states) 8=-1, 16=1	B (inputs) 3=-1, 4=1	AB (interaction)		
CL8-3	1	-1	-1	1	379.36	1005.5241
CL8-4	1	-1	1	-1	354.36	45.0241
CL16-3	1	1	-1	-1	385.8	1455.4225
CL16-4	1	1	1	1	271.08	5862.9649
Total	1390.60	-76.84	-139.72	-89.72	1390.60	=sum
Total/4	347.65	-19.21	-34.93	-22.43	347.65	=ybar
	SST=	SSA=	SSB=	SSAB=		
	8368.936	1476.096	4880.420	2012.420		
		SSA/SST=	SSB/SST=	SSAB/SST=		
		17.6378%	58.3159%	24.0463%		

Table 56. Analysis of Combination Locks' static power consumptions.

i (config)	Effect				yi (mW)	(yi-ybar)^2
	I (mean)	A (states) 8=-1, 16=1	B (inputs) 3=-1, 4=1	AB (interaction)		
CL8-3	1	-1	-1	1	322.94	0.0003063
CL8-4	1	-1	1	-1	322.97	0.0001562
CL16-3	1	1	-1	-1	322.94	0.0003063
CL16-4	1	1	1	1	322.98	0.0005062
Total	1291.83	0.01	0.07	0.01	1291.83	=sum
Total/4	322.9575	0.0025	0.0175	0.0025	322.9575	=ybar
SST=		SSA=	SSB=	SSAB=		
0.001275		0.000025	0.001225	0.000025		
SSA/SST=		SSB/SST=	SSAB/SST=			
1.9608%		96.0784%	1.9608%			

Table 57. Analysis of Combination Locks' dynamic power consumptions.

i (config)	Effect				yi (mW)	(yi-ybar)^2
	I (mean)	A (states) 8=-1, 16=1	B (inputs) 3=-1, 4=1	AB (interaction)		
CL8-3	1	-1	-1	1	1.97	0.005625
CL8-4	1	-1	1	-1	2.1	0.042025
CL16-3	1	1	-1	-1	1.74	0.024025
CL16-4	1	1	1	1	1.77	0.015625
Total	7.58	-0.56	0.16	-0.10	7.58	=sum
Total/4	1.895	-0.140	0.040	-0.025	1.895	=ybar
	SST= 0.0873	SSA= 0.0784	SSB= 0.0064	SSAB= 0.0025		
		SSA/SST= 89.8053%	SSB/SST= 7.3310%	SSAB/SST= 2.8637%		

Table 58. Analysis of Combination Locks’ LUT usages.

i (config)	Effect				yi (LUTs)	(yi-ybar)^2
	I (mean)	A (states) 8=-1, 16=1	B (inputs) 3=-1, 4=1	AB (interaction)		
CL8-3	1	-1	-1	1	13	56.25
CL8-4	1	-1	1	-1	16	20.25
CL16-3	1	1	-1	-1	25	20.25
CL16-4	1	1	1	1	28	56.25
Total	82.0	24.0	6.0	0.0	82.0	=sum
Total/4	20.5	6.0	1.5	0.0	20.5	=ybar
	SST= 153.0	SSA= 144.0	SSB= 9.0	SSAB= 0.0		
		SSA/SST= 94.1176%	SSB/SST= 5.8824%	SSAB/SST= 0.0000%		

Table 59. Analysis of combinational circuits' execution times.

i (config)	I (mean)	Effect								yi (ns)	yi-ybar)^2
		A (copies) -1=2, 1=4	B (inputs) -1=1, 1=2	C (outputs) -1=1, 1=2	AB (interaction)	AC (interaction)	BC (interaction)	ABC (interaction)			
C211	1	-1	-1	-1	1	1	1	-1	9.857	1.351	
C212	1	-1	-1	1	1	-1	-1	1	10.607	0.170	
C221	1	-1	1	-1	-1	1	-1	1	10.851	0.028	
C222	1	-1	1	1	-1	-1	1	-1	10.884	0.018	
C411	1	1	-1	-1	-1	-1	1	1	10.752	0.071	
C412	1	1	-1	1	-1	1	-1	-1	11.737	0.515	
C421	1	1	1	-1	1	-1	-1	-1	12.129	1.231	
C422	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	11.338	0.102	
Total	88.1550	3.7570	2.2490	0.9770	-0.2930	-0.5890	-2.4930	-1.0590	88.1550	=sum	
Total/8	11.0194	0.4696	0.2811	0.1221	-0.0366	-0.0736	-0.3116	-0.1324	11.0194	=ybar	
SST=		SSA=	SSB=	SSC=	SSAB=	SSAC=	SSBC=	SSABC=			
3.4871		1.7643811	0.6322501	0.1193161	0.010731125	0.043365125	0.776881125	0.140185125			
SSA/SST=		SSB/SST=	SSC/SST=	SSAB/SST=	SSAC/SST=	SSBC/SST=	SSABC/SST=				
50.597%		18.131%	3.422%	0.308%	1.244%	22.279%	4.020%				

Table 60. Analysis of combinational circuits' static power consumptions.

i (config)	Effect									
	I (mean)	A (copies) -1=2, 1=4	B (inputs) -1=1, 1=2	C (outputs) -1=1, 1=2	AB (interaction)	AC (interaction)	BC (interaction)	ABC (interaction)	y _i (mW)	y _i (y _i -y _{bar}) ²
C211	1	-1	-1	-1	1	1	1	-1	323.13	0.0203
C212	1	-1	-1	1	1	-1	-1	1	323.22	0.0028
C221	1	-1	1	-1	-1	1	-1	1	323.19	0.0068
C222	1	-1	1	1	-1	-1	1	-1	323.29	0.0003
C411	1	1	-1	-1	-1	-1	1	1	323.27	0.0000
C412	1	1	-1	1	-1	1	-1	-1	323.38	0.0116
C421	1	1	1	-1	1	-1	-1	-1	323.3	0.0008
C422	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	323.4	0.0163
Total	2586.1800	0.5200	0.1800	0.4000	-0.0800	0.0200	0.0000	-0.0200	2586.1800	=sum
Total/8	323.2725	0.0650	0.0225	0.0500	-0.0100	0.0025	0.0000	-0.0025	323.2725	=y _{bar}
SSA= SSA= SSB= SSC= SSAB= SSAC= SSBC= SSABC=										
0.05875 0.03380 0.00405 0.02000 0.00080 0.00005 0.00000 0.00005										
SSA/SST= SSB/SST= SSC/SST= SSAB/SST= SSAC/SST= SSBC/SST= SSABC/SST=										
57.532% 6.894% 34.043% 1.362% 0.085% 0.000% 0.085%										

Table 61. Analysis of combinational circuits' dynamic power consumptions.

Effect										
i (config)	I (mean)	A (copies) -1=2, 1=4	B (inputs) -1=1, 1=2	C (outputs) -1=1, 1=2	AB (interaction)	AC (interaction)	BC (interaction)	ABC (interaction)	yi (mW)	yi (yi-ybar)^2
C211	1	-1	-1	-1	1	1	1	-1	5.62	0.4727
C212	1	-1	-1	1	1	-1	-1	1	6.81	0.2525
C221	1	-1	1	-1	-1	1	-1	1	5.03	1.6320
C222	1	-1	1	1	-1	-1	1	-1	6.51	0.0410
C411	1	1	-1	-1	-1	-1	1	1	5.6	0.5006
C412	1	1	-1	1	-1	1	-1	-1	7.21	0.8145
C421	1	1	1	-1	1	-1	-1	-1	6.35	0.0018
C422	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	7.33	1.0455
Total	50.460	2.520	-0.020	5.260	1.760	-0.080	-0.340	-0.920	50.460	=sum
Total/8	6.3075	0.3150	-0.0025	0.6575	0.2200	-0.0100	-0.0425	-0.1150	6.3075	=ybar
SST=		SSA=	SSB=	SSC=	SSAB=	SSAC=	SSBC=	SSABC=		
4.7606		0.7938	5E-05	3.45845	0.3872	0.0008	0.01445	0.1058		
SSA/SST=					SSB/SST=	SSC/SST=	SSAB/SST=	SSAC/SST=	SSBC/SST=	SSABC/SST=
16.675%					0.001%	72.648%	8.134%	0.017%	0.304%	2.222%

Table 62. Analysis of combinational circuits' LUT usages.

i (config)	Effect									
	I (mean)	A (copies) -1=2, 1=4	B (inputs) -1=1, 1=2	C (outputs) -1=1, 1=2	AB (interaction)	AC (interaction)	BC (interaction)	ABC (interaction)	y _i (LUTs)	y _i -y _{bar} ²
C211	1	-1	-1	-1	1	1	1	-1	3	20.25
C212	1	-1	-1	1	1	-1	-1	1	4	12.25
C221	1	-1	1	-1	-1	1	-1	1	6	2.25
C222	1	-1	1	1	-1	-1	1	-1	9	2.25
C411	1	1	-1	-1	-1	-1	1	1	6	2.25
C412	1	1	-1	1	-1	1	-1	-1	8	0.25
C421	1	1	1	-1	1	-1	-1	-1	10	6.25
C422	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	14	42.25
Total	60.0	16.0	18.0	10.0	2.0	2.0	4.0	0.0	60.0	=sum
Total/8	7.5	2	2.25	1.25	0.25	0.25	0.5	0	7.5	=ybar
SST= 88.0										
SSA= 32.0		SSB= 40.5		SSC= 12.5		SSAB= 0.5		SSAC= 0.5		SSABC= 0.0
SSA/SST= 36.364%		SSB/SST= 46.023%		SSC/SST= 14.205%		SSAB/SST= 0.568%		SSAC/SST= 0.568%		SSABC/SST= 0.000%
								SSBC/SST= 2.273%		

Table 63. Analysis of combinational circuits' pin usages.

i (config)	Effect								
	I (mean)	A (copies) -1=2, 1=4	B (inputs) -1=1, 1=2	C (outputs) -1=1, 1=2	AB (interaction)	AC (interaction)	BC (interaction)	ABC (interaction)	yi (pins)
C211	1	-1	-1	-1	1	1	1	-1	11
C212	1	-1	-1	1	1	-1	-1	1	13
C221	1	-1	1	-1	-1	1	-1	1	12
C222	1	-1	1	1	-1	-1	1	-1	14
C411	1	1	-1	-1	-1	-1	1	1	14
C412	1	1	-1	1	-1	1	-1	-1	17
C421	1	1	1	-1	1	-1	-1	-1	15
C422	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	18
Total	114.0	14.0	4.0	10.0	0.0	2.0	0.0	0.0	114.0
Total/8	14.25	1.75	0.50	1.25	0.00	0.25	0.00	0.00	14.25
SST=		SSA=	SSB=	SSC=	SSAB=	SSAC=	SSBC=	SSABC=	
39.5		24.5	2.0	12.5	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.0	

Table 64. Analysis of sequential circuits' static power consumptions.

i (config)	Effect								
	I (mean)	A (copies) -1=2, 1=4	B (inputs) -1=1, 1=2	C (outputs) -1=1, 1=2	AB (interaction)	AC (interaction)	BC (interaction)	ABC (interaction)	yi (mW)
S211	1	-1	-1	-1	1	1	1	-1	323.11
S212	1	-1	-1	1	1	-1	-1	1	323.19
S221	1	-1	1	-1	-1	1	-1	1	323.17
S222	1	-1	1	1	-1	-1	1	-1	323.25
S411	1	1	-1	-1	-1	-1	1	1	323.29
S412	1	1	-1	1	-1	1	-1	-1	323.43
S421	1	1	1	-1	1	-1	-1	-1	323.35
S422	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	323.43
Total	2586.22	0.78	0.18	0.38	-0.06	0.06	-0.06	-0.06	2586.22
Total/8	323.2775	0.0975	0.0225	0.0475	-0.0075	0.0075	-0.0075	-0.0075	323.2775
</									

Table 65. Analysis of sequential circuits' dynamic power consumptions.

Effect										
i (config)	I (mean)	A (copies) -1=2, 1=4	B (inputs) -1=1, 1=2	C (outputs) -1=1, 1=2	AB (interaction)	AC (interaction)	BC (interaction)	ABC (interaction)	yi (mW)	yi (yi-ybar)^2
S211	1	-1	-1	-1	1	1	1	-1	3.96	0.6182
S212	1	-1	-1	1	1	-1	-1	1	4.6	0.0214
S221	1	-1	1	-1	-1	1	-1	1	4.34	0.1650
S222	1	-1	1	1	-1	-1	1	-1	5.55	0.6460
S411	1	1	-1	-1	-1	-1	1	1	4.43	0.1000
S412	1	1	-1	1	-1	1	-1	-1	5.13	0.1473
S421	1	1	1	-1	1	-1	-1	-1	4.5	0.0606
S422	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	5.46	0.5094
Total	37.97	1.07	1.73	3.51	-0.93	-0.19	0.83	-0.31	37.97	=sum
Total/8	4.74625	0.13375	0.21625	0.43875	-0.11625	-0.02375	0.10375	-0.03875	4.74625	=ybar
SST=		SSA=	SSB=	SSC=	SSAB=	SSAC=	SSBC=	SSABC=		
2.26799		0.14311	0.37411	1.54001	0.10811	0.00451	0.08611	0.01201		
SSA/SST=		SSB/SST=	SSC/SST=	SSAB/SST=	SSAC/SST=	SSBC/SST=	SSABC/SST=			
6.310%		16.495%	67.902%	4.767%	0.199%	3.797%	0.530%			

Table 66. Analysis of sequential circuits' LUT usages.

Effect										
i	I	A (copies)	B (inputs)	C (outputs)	AB	AC	BC	ABC	yi	
(config)	(mean)	-1=2, 1=4	-1=1, 1=2	-1=1, 1=2	(interaction)	(interaction)	(interaction)	(interaction)	(LUTs)	(yi-ybar)^2
S211	1	-1	-1	-1	1	1	1	-1	4	25.0
S212	1	-1	-1	1	1	-1	-1	1	5	16.0
S221	1	-1	1	-1	-1	1	-1	1	9	0.0
S222	1	-1	1	1	-1	-1	1	-1	10	1.0
S411	1	1	-1	-1	-1	-1	1	1	7	4.0
S412	1	1	-1	1	-1	1	-1	-1	9	0.0
S421	1	1	1	-1	1	-1	-1	-1	12	9.0
S422	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	16	49.0
Total	72.0	16.0	22.0	8.0	2.0	4.0	2.0	2.0	72.0	=sum
Total/8	9.00	2.00	2.75	1.00	0.25	0.50	0.25	0.25	9.00	=ybar
SST=		SSA=	SSB=	SSC=	SSAB=	SSAC=	SSBC=	SSABC=		
104.0		32.0	60.5	8.0	0.5	2.0	0.5	0.5		
SSA/SST=		SSB/SST=	SSC/SST=	SSAB/SST=	SSAC/SST=	SSBC/SST=	SSABC/SST=			
30.769%		58.173%	7.692%	0.481%	1.923%	0.481%	0.481%			

Table 67. Analysis of sequential circuits' pin usages.

Effect								
i (config)	I (mean)	A (copies) -1=2, 1=4	B (inputs) -1=1, 1=2	C (outputs) -1=1, 1=2	AB (interaction)	AC (interaction)	BC (interaction)	ABC (interaction)
S211	1	-1	-1	-1	1	1	1	-1
S212	1	-1	-1	1	1	-1	-1	1
S221	1	-1	1	-1	-1	1	-1	1
S222	1	-1	1	1	-1	-1	1	-1
S411	1	1	-1	-1	-1	-1	1	1
S412	1	1	-1	1	-1	1	-1	-1
S421	1	1	1	-1	1	-1	-1	-1
S422	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Total	118.0	18.0	4.0	10.0	0.0	2.0	0.0	0.0
Total/8	14.75	2.25	0.50	1.25	0.00	0.25	0.00	0.00
SST=	55.5	SSA=	SSB=	SSC=	SSAB=	SSAC=	SSBC=	SSABC=
		40.5	2.0	12.5	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.0
		SSA/SST=	SSB/SST=	SSC/SST=	SSAB/SST=	SSAC/SST=	SSBC/SST=	SSABC/SST=
		72.973%	3.604%	22.523%	0.000%	0.901%	0.000%	0.000%
		=sum	=ybar					
		118.0	14.75					

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Vita

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