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Commencement of Russo-Japanese relations in Heisei Era (1989-2019) almost coincided with the end of World War II, the end of World War and emergence of Russian Federation as the succession state of the USSR. If one looks at the development of Russo-Japanese relations in this period, one would be surprised by Russia's drastic domestic changes, but the development of Russo-Japanese relations remained rather calm. Japan, in its turn, followed challenges of the emergence of Russian Federation and the end of World War agendas. This does not mean that Japanese perception was slow or stagnant, but the domestic transformation was too fast and went beyond the expectation of most Japanese, who were preoccupied with the territorial questions or the Peace Treaty.

This can be illustrated by the mutual visits of top leaders. In the cold war period, visits of top leaders between the two countries were rather exceptional. Official summits among the top leaders took place only twice: in 1956 and 1973. In October 1956, the Joint Declarations between the two countries were concluded by the Soviet Ministers Nikolai Bulganin and Japanese Premier Ichiro Hatoyama. Seventeen years later, in October 1973, Premier Kakuei Tanaka made an official visit to Moscow to see USSR General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev during the period of détente.

In its turn, the Soviet top leader visited Tokyo only once in the USSR period, April 1991, though it was the first time since the end of World War II. Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev came to Japan, six months prior to the demarcation of the end of Soviet stagnant policy and new principle of "Extended equilibrium relations, including the visa free visits among the islanders of the disputed Northern territories." This was a significant step in Russo-Japanese relations, especially interest among the Japanese business was already

political collapse of the Soviet Union.

Emergence of Russian Federation as the succession state meant, or should have meant, a previous USSR on ideology, economics, geopolitics and other parameters. Normal interact countries began to develop, though the confusion of transition to the market economy of I prevented an extended relationship.

Bilateral relations in the Russian Federations can be divided into two periods: the Yeltsin p Putin period. It may be true President Boris Yeltsin wanted a new approach to Japan distir the failure of August Coup of 1991, Yeltsin and his colleagues, Foreign Minister Andrei Koz Georgii Kunadze, a Japan expert, activated policy towards Japan under the new principle c return to the 1956 formula, by implication, a return of the 'two islands' was hinted at. But was suddenly cancelled in July 1992.

Japanese politics also changed, as the LDP government of Kiichi Miyazawa fell in August 1 the oppositionist coalition party. Its leader Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa agreed with Declaration of October 1993 in which it made it clear that the Peace Treaty would solve th islands of Kunashir, Etorofu, Shikotan and Habomai. Japanese took it as the four islands st Japanese sovereign, though Russians took otherwise. Thus Russian and Japanese interpre differed sharply.

Russian position's stance hardened by the mid-1990s, as the NATO enlargement towards impact on the new East-West dimension. Russian Foreign Minister was replaced from pro-Kozyrev by a more multi-oriented academician, Gorbachev's politburo member Ye. Primak and India as the priority.

This discrepancy developed in 1997-98 when Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto met wit Krasnoyarsk (November 1997), and then Kawana (April 1998). The Japanese side propos demarcation between Etorofu and Urup, based upon the assumption that four islands wer sovereignty. However, this proposal was eventually negated by Russians. Hashimoto resig successor Keizo Obuchi made his official visit to Moscow after a 25-year interval in Octobe economic liberalization policies had failed by then, and the Moscow Declaration only signifi the setting up of two commissions; economic joint activity and demarcation of the borderl Yeltsin's waning health condition made it difficult to continue to strengthen relations with . December 1999.

In May 2000, a new leader, Vladimir Putin, ex-KGB officer of GDR and jyudoist, was app began a new course including a pivot to Asia. He visited Pyoungyang in July 2001, prior to Okinawa. In his first visit to Tokyo, Putin declared in September 2000 that the 1956 Decla implication suggesting that the two smaller islands should be handed over to Japan as the concluded. This was in line with Putin's policy of anti-terrorism as priority, especially after Putin period, but Russo-Japanese relations were far from stable.

Japanese domestic upheavals sometimes hampered bilateral relations. Prime Minister Yo accommodate with Russians by the solution of 'Two plus alpha' formula hinted in the Irkut realism was not necessarily followed by his successor PM Shinichiro Koizumi and his foreig as domestic scandal followed involving the MP Muneo Suzuki who had been active in Hash solving territorial issue. Koizumi's new six point policy, focusing on economic cooperation, other sectors was originally welcomed by Russians, but Koizumi's inclination towards the l alienated Moscow from Tokyo. Putin also wanted his first pivot to Asia including the pipelir

Asian economic integration process; this included the APEC summit that was originally planned for 2012. Also, Russian economic revival driven by the high energy prices until 2008 was welcomed by Japanese business circles, but once again, the short cycle of Japanese political changes deepened the gap in bilateral relations.

By that time, east-west relations deteriorated as Putin warned in Munich 2007. The Global Financial Crisis and Lehman shock of 2008 made the situation worse. After the departure of the Koizumi government, Yukio Hatoyama was elected as the PM; He was the grandson of PM Nobusuke Kishi, who had been LDP secretary-general. Ichiro Hatoyama made the Joint Declaration of 1956 with Soviet PM N. Bulganin, but his handling of domestic scandals prevented further involvement with Moscow. His successor LDP government was more inclined towards Asia. His tenure was only one year and he was replaced by Tarō Aso, and Shigeru Yoshida, and had willingness to engage Russia, but his government was too short-lived to achieve any achievements.

Following the failure of the LDP in the election of August 2009, the coalition government led by Yukio Hatoyama and the DPJ came into office. His grandfather was Ichiro Hatoyama, who made the 1956 Joint Declaration. His tenure was too brief to achieve any progress towards Russia. His successor PM Naoto Kan continued to deteriorating relations as was illustrated by President Dmitri Medvedev's visit of Kunashir island in 2009 and earthquake and following nuclear disaster in Fukushima on March 2011 made impact on FUKUSHIMA. Putin made a declaration that Russia was prepared to deliver the LNG resources. PM Yoshihiko Noda of the DPJ inaugurated his cabinet in September 2011 and appointed Kishida Fumio as Foreign Minister. Before Putin's return to the presidency in May 2012, he even suggested solving the Senkaku islands by 'hikiwake' when he was asked by a Japanese journalist. Foreign Minister Genba Fumiko Kishida tried to reassure the strategic relationship of bilateral relations. Prime Minister Noda visited the United States in September 2012 that signified Putin's pivot to Russia.

With the December 2012 election, the LDP government led by Shinzo Abe came back and resumed. Putin made open his priority in May 2012 on his presidential agendas. He also announced 'Pivot to Asia' by promoting Yamal-Nenets LNG project in the arctic region. In its turn, Abe moved towards Russia, when he officially visited in May 2013 to widen economic cooperation, and visited Sochi in February 2014. However, the Ukraine crisis took place at that time; Russia was suspended from the G8 and severe sanctions began to be imposed to Russia. Japan was in an awkward position between EU countries that were tough on sanctions, while Japan pursued the chance to resolve the Ukraine crisis intensified, the Japanese position towards Russia became unique among the G7 countries, the last runner among the G7 countries to impose sanctions against Russia, being partly rivalled by China.

Prime Minister Abe took a chance, by visiting Sochi in June 2016, and proposed his eight-point plan for economic cooperation. Putin came to Nagato, Abe's hometown, and Tokyo in December 2016 by the Japanese government promised to carry out the joint economic program at the disputed islands. Still, Ukraine re-intensifying tensions, though Republican Donald Trump won the November 2016 presidential election, the political gap between Moscow and Washington made it difficult to break the ice of bilateral relations. Japan made a historical compromise of the 1956 formula at the negotiations of the Peace Treaty with Russia.

This turn of PM Abe should have paved the way to break through the impasse and several Japanese political commentator Dmitri Trenin welcomed that Japan downgraded her claim to come back to the original idea of 1956 formula, but on the whole Russians were not prepared to embrace Aso's idea because the East-West tensions went worse, while Russian-Chinese relations came near to be quas-

negotiation of the bilateral relations by 2019 produced real progress, but tangible results : US-Russia makes a peace treaty difficult, partly because the Peace treaty for Japan is the the WW2 with the allies, the US and USSR among others.

The still-changing Asian landscape and Russian political agenda, especially in Reiwa give relations a unique position. First, Abe-Putin relationship has made remarkable record of 2: including tete-a tete personal meetings each time. In 2020 two important summits are sti Moscow and in the beginning of September in Vladivostok, symbolizing institutionalization Second, president Putin declared the amendment of constitutional change, thus paving th his power. Some member on the commission on the Russian constitution asked the ban of territory, but Kremlin finally defined Japanese- Russian negotiation is exception, by saying the national border is not yet finished. Foreign Minister Lavrov also told last August that th 1956 Joint declaration is obligatory for Russia. Third, coronavirus crisis that began to spre the mankind and its impact on global politics is enormous. Thus, both Russia and Japan a following the change of international parameters. Russian are now facing historically low-p that may also fundamentally change Russian international strategy for obvious reason. In nearby energy resources, because the Middle East crisis is likely to follow and must divers

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