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## Toward a world without war, a summary of United States disarmament efforts, past and present

United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

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# TOWARD A WORLD WITHOUT WAR

A Summary of United States Disarmament  
Efforts—Past and Present







# **TOWARD A WORLD WITHOUT WAR**

**A Summary of United States Disarmament  
Efforts—Past and Present**

**United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency**



TOWARD A WORLD  
WITHOUT WAR

A Summary of United States Disarmament  
Efforts—Past and Present

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**W**ORLD ORDER will be secured only when the whole world has laid down these weapons which seem to offer us present security but threaten the future survival of the human race. That armistice day seems very far away. The vast resources of this planet are being devoted more and more to the means of destroying, instead of enriching, human life.

But the world was not meant to be a prison in which man awaits his execution. Nor has mankind survived the tests and trials of thousands of years to surrender everything—including its existence—now. This Nation has the will and the faith to make a supreme effort to break the logjam on disarmament and nuclear tests, and we will persist until we prevail, until the rule of law has replaced the ever dangerous use of force.

PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY  
State of the Union Message  
*January 11, 1962*

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# *Toward a World Without War*

There is a thread which runs with tragic regularity throughout the recorded history of man; it is the thread of war and bloodshed between peoples and nations. Can it be stopped? No one knows. Yet, if ever there was an opportune time and a burning need, this is the moment.

Never before has man come closer to harnessing nature's immense resources for the well-being of the great masses of the earth's population; and never before has he been so ingenious in devising techniques for their total annihilation. It is in his power to take one road or the other toward the world of health and plenty which the advances in modern science and technology increasingly make possible, or toward the radioactive wasteland which is equally within the capacity of modern technology.

Ours is a time of great revolutionary changes—political, social, economic—utterly unimaginable a century ago. The present U.S. effort to reach agreement on disarmament springs from the conviction that 20th-century man can bring about still another great revolution in the history of man—universal disarmament. This revolution, if it comes, will not merely fulfill the ancestral dream of freeing man from the destruction of war, but by liberating enormous resources and energies it will profoundly affect all the other revolutionary trends of our times and advance the day when man becomes truly the master of his destiny.

The current search for disarmament is spurred by this vision. At the same time, there are practical factors that make disarmament a realistic possibility. One is the existence of a vital organization for international cooperation—the United Nations. Another is our greater knowledge and understanding of the problem because of intensive and pathbreaking studies made in recent years. But perhaps the most important incentive for a disarmament agreement is the increased awareness by all nations of the great perils inherent in the present world situation.



What are these perils?

First of all, there is the danger of nuclear war—a specter which hangs over all humanity. Its awesome reality lends an unprecedented urgency to the present quest. “The weapons of war must be abolished before they abolish us,” said President Kennedy last year in his address to the U.N. General Assembly. “The mere existence of modern weapons—ten million times more powerful than anything the world has ever seen, and only minutes away from any target on earth—is a source of horror and discord and distrust.” In these circumstances, he went on to say, the reduction and destruction of arms “is no longer a dream; it is a practical matter of life or death.”

Another peril in the present state of affairs is the terrible cost, in human terms, of the arms race. The U.S. gross national product in 1961—that is the value of all the goods and services produced in the country—was over \$521 billion. The United States spends roughly 10 percent of this amount on national defense. The burden is even heavier for other countries where the gross national product is smaller and the standard of living lower.

At the same time the complex weapons which make up the modern arsenal of nations require ever larger resources. The cost of producing a submarine in World War II, for example, was about \$8 million. This type of vessel is now so completely outmoded that it cannot even be compared to a modern nuclear-powered, missile-equipped submarine such as the Polaris type. The Polaris-type U.S. submarine, without its missiles, costs about \$110 million.

Naturally, as long as there is no general agreement on disarmament among nations each country will go on spending whatever it deems necessary to protect its national security and deter a would-be aggressor. Since the cost of modern weapons keeps mounting, this spending requires a constantly greater sacrifice of national resources and living standards.

Nevertheless, objectively considered, the policy of deterrence has helped to preserve peace during a time of great international tension. President Kennedy, like his predecessors, has made it clear that the United States maintains its military strength precisely for the purpose of minimizing the chance that it will ever have to be used. Other countries have made similar declarations. The reluctance of any nation to risk a major nuclear conflict has played an important role in averting war during the years since the end of World War II.

At the same time it is clear that nuclear deterrence—the universal fear of nuclear war—is only a temporary “second-best” to disarma-





*The Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament opens at Geneva on March 14, 1962.*

ment. It carries no guarantee against the outbreak of war. All it does is buy time—precious time in which to find an agreement on disarmament.


The unstable character of deterrence, therefore, represents the third major peril in continuing the present arms race. Thus far two nations—the United States and the U.S.S.R.—have acquired the de-



structive power to lay waste to much of the world. As more nations acquire this power, as the arsenals continue to grow and expand—and they must unless the arms race is stopped—the risks of war continue to multiply.

But the world is not helpless in the face of these dangers. The postwar period has seen an unprecedented expansion of constructive international activities and a growing recognition that nations have responsibilities toward the international community. Aided also by numerous studies of the disarmament problem and by new scientific discoveries and techniques, the nations of the world are now better equipped to solve the disarmament problem than ever before.

It was with a profound conviction of the urgency and practicality of a disarmament agreement that the United States on April 18, 1962, submitted for consideration by the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva an "Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World." This document is both far-reaching and realistic. To understand its scope and appreciate its realism, a brief review of earlier postwar efforts on disarmament is necessary.



*Combat aircraft which was resmelted to salvage aluminum and steel for peacetime use after World War II.*





*Bernard Baruch presents to the United Nations the U.S. proposal for nuclear disarmament in 1946.*

## Earlier Disarmament Efforts

With the end of World War II, a number of countries took concrete action to reduce their armaments. The most drastic arms reduction was that of the United States, which destroyed thousands of aircraft and sent scores of warships and immense quantities of tanks and other equipment to the scrapyards. In addition, the United States reduced its Armed Forces from over 12 million to less than 2 million in the short span of 3 years. This was typical of the voluntary disarmament by a few, done without an international treaty guaranteeing that all countries were doing the same. The world later found that this type of disarmament made no contribution to lasting peace. A careful, detailed, practical plan was needed—especially to solve the problem of control of the atomic bomb.

During early 1946, the United States was developing such a concrete plan for nuclear disarmament. Often referred to as the “Ba-



ruch plan," it was submitted to the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission in June 1946. It proposed the establishment of an International Atomic Development Authority. The functions of the Authority would have included:

- Control or ownership of all atomic energy activities potentially dangerous to world security.
- Control, inspection, and licensing of all other atomic activities.
- Fostering of the beneficial uses of atomic energy.
- Research and development designed to put the International Authority in the forefront of atomic knowledge.
- Power to control nuclear raw materials and nuclear production plants.

At this time, in 1946, the United States alone possessed atomic weapons. If the Baruch plan had been accepted, all these weapons would have been destroyed, further manufacture of atomic weapons would have stopped, and nuclear material adaptable for peaceful uses transferred to the International Authority. The nuclear threat would have been removed at the very outset, and mankind would have entered the nuclear age in a joint and peaceful effort.

On December 30, 1946, the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission approved the Baruch plan by a vote of 10 to 0, with the U.S.S.R. and Poland abstaining; on September 11, 1947, the Commission reaffirmed its approval by a 10 to 1 vote, with the U.S.S.R. voting against and Poland abstaining; on November 4, 1948, the U.N. General Assembly endorsed it by a vote of 40 to 6. On each occasion the Soviet Government rejected the plan on the grounds that it would foster espionage and constitute interference in internal affairs.

Rebuffed by Soviet opposition to the Baruch plan, the United States, sometimes in association with other countries, presented a number of other proposals for disarmament or related actions. Among these were plans for reducing armed forces to 2.5 million men each for the United States and the U.S.S.R., transferring nuclear armaments to internationally supervised storage depots, stopping nuclear weapons tests under international control, stopping production of fissionable materials usable for weapons purposes, transferring fissionable materials stockpiles from military to nonmilitary purposes, and establishing aerial and ground observation procedures in the United States, the U.S.S.R., and elsewhere to guard against surprise attack.

Soviet rejection of these measures was usually based on the claim that the inspection and control proposals accompanying these plans





*President Kennedy signs the bill establishing the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. William C. Foster (far right) is the Director of the new agency.*

were a pretense for espionage, and that disarmament should commence regardless of the efficacy of the verification mechanism. The United States pointed out that its inspection and control proposals would apply to all nations equally, and that in its view Soviet proposals lacked the necessary safeguards to insure that disarmament agreements were actually carried out.

One important achievement in the long years of discussion was the Atoms-for-Peace plan presented in 1953 by President Eisenhower. This led after years of negotiations to the establishment, in 1957, of an International Atomic Energy Agency.

## **The Search for a New Approach**

All through the decade of the 1950's the deadlock on the crucial questions of nuclear disarmament and reliable verification continued. However, nuclear weapons testing was halted in 1958, when the United States, U.S.S.R., and Great Britain each unilaterally accepted a voluntary moratorium on tests. Negotiations for a treaty banning tests permanently, under international inspection, also showed promise. But in August 1961 the U.S.S.R. announced it would resume



testing, and meaningful progress on a test ban agreement suffered a severe setback.

The failure to stop nuclear weapons tests lent even greater urgency to new efforts to reach agreement on the broader question of disarmament. Indeed only a month after the Soviet announcement, President Kennedy in September 1961 presented to the U.N. General Assembly the broad outlines of a new comprehensive U.S. disarmament plan. This plan is based not only on the best parts of earlier proposals and studies but also on a fresh reappraisal of the whole problem made after President Kennedy took office in January 1961.

The systematic review of the disarmament question was given added impetus by the establishment in 1961 of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. This Agency combines activities previously carried on in several different departments and has specific responsibility for developing new approaches to disarmament and related problems. As the first governmental body anywhere to concentrate exclusively on such questions, the Disarmament Agency has brought together a highly qualified staff of experts in science, international relations, economics, and weapons systems. The work of these men and women also benefits from the many private studies and investigations which have been undertaken at U.S. universities and research institutes during the past decade. Never before have so much effort and so many resources been devoted to finding ways of stopping the arms race and building a secure peace.

American scholars have been interested in disarmament for more than half a century, but their intensive efforts started toward the end of World War II with a serious exploration of ways to control the atomic bomb. A distinguished group of scholars, scientists, and Government officials headed by David Lilienthal, the former head of the Tennessee Valley public power and reclamation project, labored for months to master the complex technical problems of the bomb and set the studious pattern for all later efforts. This group's report was the basis of the Baruch plan for international ownership of all atomic facilities.

During the 1940's and 1950's articles and books on disarmament multiplied in the United States. Institutes were established, and groups of scholars from different fields conducted broad investigations of the problem. In 1960 appeared a special 1,000-page issue of *Daedalus*, the journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, devoted entirely to articles on arms control and disarmament. The foreword was written by Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner, a leading physicist



with a long-standing interest in disarmament and now Special Assistant to President Kennedy for Science and Technology. A listing of the 23 contributors to the volume reveals the broad variety of authorship: three physicists, two chemists, two economists, two legal scholars, one legislator, two political scientists, one military scientist, one psychologist, two journalists, two international relations experts, two mathematicians, and one diplomat.

One of the legal scholars was Professor Louis Sohn of the Harvard Law School, who originated the idea of "zonal inspection," which has been suggested in the U.S. disarmament plan as a possible method of verification.

### Arms Control Concept

This intensive scholarly activity developed the "arms control" concept, which has become an important element in American thinking. The idea started with the realization that everyone's agreed goal—abolishing war—cannot be reached solely through arms reduction plans, especially since such plans seem to take so long to be agreed upon and adopted. As complex modern weapons pile up, American intellectuals argued, risks of war through accident or miscalculation increase. Arms reduction—classic "disarmament"—is simply not enough. It is equally important that the major powers *do something now* to cut the risk of war, while at the same time working for agreement on arms reduction plans.

So the concept of "arms control"—controlling, in the sense of calming, the military situation—was evolved. Arms control means measures, other than arms reduction itself, which lessen the risk of war.

"Arms control" is a twin to "arms reduction"—*not* a substitute for it. Arms control measures are *not* intended to replace arms reductions but to accompany them.

But discussions of disarmament in the United States have not been confined to the scholars. Public discussions, which are occurring with increasing frequency, have involved representatives from labor, business, the professions, and Government, as well as the universities. A number of private organizations have been formed, with varying programs, devoted to the problems of peace and disarmament.

At the United Nations, too, an atmosphere of urgency developed, and, with the active encouragement of the 15th U.N. General Assembly, U.S. and Soviet representatives in private meetings from March to



September 1961 explored the basis for a new and earnest effort toward disarmament.

Out of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. discussions came the present 18-nation Geneva conference on disarmament—the most important international meeting on this question in many years. Eight new nations, representing different areas of the world, were added to the five Western and five Communist nations which had taken part in the previous negotiations. The new participants are: for Asia—India and Burma; for the Middle East—United Arab Republic; for Africa—Nigeria and Ethiopia; for Latin America—Mexico and Brazil; for Europe—Sweden.

Developments in the past year indicate that the long postwar years of negotiations and study have not been entirely fruitless. Despite much disappointment and frustration the countries concerned now have a better understanding of the problems that have hindered agreement on disarmament. There has emerged the realization that disarmament is a practical and attainable goal, not a Utopian dream; that it can begin even in the absence of mutual trust and confidence if verification procedures are adequate; and that it represents a highly complex technical, political, economic, and psychological process, which needs careful and continuous planning to succeed.

Three recent developments reflect this realistic and hopeful approach to the problem: (1) the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations of September 20, 1961; (2) the U.N. study "Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament" of April 1962; and (3) the U.S. "Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World,"—the most detailed and comprehensive proposal so far presented.

## **U.S.-Soviet Agreement on Disarmament Principles**

The U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Statement of Principles records agreement on a number of key issues. It states, among other things, that measures for general and complete disarmament—the goal of both nations—must include:

(1) ". . . establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes . . . [and] to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace."

(2) ". . . agreed manpower for a United Nations peace



force . . . [to] deter or suppress any threat or use of arms in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations.”

(3) “. . . disarmament . . . in an agreed sequence, by stages . . . [and] balanced so that at no stage . . . could any State . . . gain military advantage.”

(4) “. . . strict and effective international control . . . [to] provide firm assurance that all parties are honouring their obligations . . . the nature and extent of such control depending on the requirements for verification . . . in each stage.”

(5) “. . . an International Disarmament Organization . . . assured [of] unrestricted access without veto to all places as necessary for the purpose of effective verification.”

The U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Statement of Agreed Principles was unanimously adopted as a United Nations resolution on December 20, 1961. Thus these became United Nations principles, furnishing a world charter for all disarmament negotiations, including the 18-nation conference at Geneva, which opened in March 1962.

The significance of these principles cannot be overestimated, for if properly applied, they contain all the elements for an effective disarmament agreement and the building of a stable peace. They recognize that war and the threat of war can be eliminated only if there are effective alternatives for settling disputes among nations; that disarmament cannot be achieved overnight but must progress through stages, creating, as it progresses, an atmosphere of mutual confidence; and lastly that effective international inspection is a legitimate and essential element of any disarmament program.

## **Economic Consequences of Disarmament Appraised**

The U.N. study “Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament” represents a milestone of a different sort in the quest for a disarmament agreement. For the first time in the many years of discussion of the problem, an international group of experts has objectively and scientifically evaluated the prospects and consequences of a disarmament agreement in economic and social terms. The group, appointed by the U.N. Secretary-General, included experts from the U.S.S.R., United States, United Kingdom, Poland, Czechoslovakia, France, Sudan, India, Pakistan, and Venezuela. These distinguished scholars examined all the available evidence on the problem, including detailed studies by a number of governments undertaken in re-



sponse to the Secretary-General's inquiry, and studies by specialized agencies of the United Nations.

The group unanimously agreed that, contrary to some popular misconceptions, disarmament would *not* bring about an economic depression or large-scale unemployment, if governments took proper preventive measures. "All the problems and difficulties of transition connected with disarmament could be met by appropriate national and international measures," the report states. "There should thus be no doubt that the diversion to peaceful purposes of the resources now in military use could be accomplished to the benefit of all countries. . . . No country need fear a lack of useful employment opportunities for the resources that would become available to it through disarmament."

The experts examined in detail how the vast resources freed by disarmament might best be utilized. "There are so many competing claims," they concluded, "that the real problem is to establish a scale of priorities." The experts' report went on to list these possibilities: increased personal consumption; conversion of plants producing military equipment to production of durable consumer goods; expansion of productive capacities needed for greater consumption; more investment in social improvements such as schools, housing, and hospitals; scientific research in hitherto neglected fields; international ventures for peaceful exploitation of nuclear energy; space research; exploration of the Arctic and Antarctic; climate control; and others.

The U.S. contribution to the U.N. study went into considerable detail concerning the impact disarmament would have on the American economy. It found that the U.S. economy would benefit greatly from disarmament and that any temporary dislocations could be satisfactorily overcome by cooperative efforts of Government, business, and labor. It foresaw opportunities for a substantial increase in the American people's standard of living and ability to aid other nations as a result of the diversion of defense expenditures to consumer needs and socially beneficial projects.

## The Concept of the U.S. Plan

But before the economic and social benefits of disarmament can be enjoyed, agreement on a disarmament plan is necessary. The United States believes it has a proposal that can be put into effect quickly, that meets the objections made to earlier plans and satisfies the security needs of all participating nations.



The new U.S. "Outline of a Treaty for General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World" is wholly in accord with the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Statement of Principles. First outlined by President Kennedy in his address to the U.N. General Assembly in September 1961, it was fully developed by the U.S. Arms Control and

*Disarmament would free vast resources for peaceful uses such as the building of new schools.*






Disarmament Agency and then submitted for consideration by the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva on April 18, 1962.

The new U.S. plan represents a "total approach" to solving the problem of war on our planet. It starts from the premise that the main objective is not the destruction of arms—important as this is—but the elimination of war and the building of a secure and lasting peace. Hence arms reduction—disarmament in the classic sense—is not treated in isolation but is made part and parcel of two other equally important elements of the peacebuilding process: (1) measures to enable the United Nations to become an effective agency for keeping the peace in a disarmed world and (2) steps to reduce the risks of war through accident or miscalculation.

Many earlier disarmament efforts had foundered because they approached arms reduction as a goal in itself, without sufficient regard for the political conditions which cause international tensions. One of the few "successful" disarmament efforts of the past, the Washington Naval Conference of 1922, for example, resulted in an agreement by France, Great Britain, Japan, Italy, and the United States to reduce their respective fleets of battleships to a fixed level. Yet this agreement, while temporarily halting a naval race in battleships, had no

*The Washington Naval Conference of 1922 succeeded in temporarily halting a naval race in battleships.*





lasting benefit for international peace, because it was unrelated to effective peacekeeping and peacebuilding measures.


In the light of such experiences and of postwar international developments, the United States proposes a realistic, not a Utopian, plan. It does not assume that disputes and distrust among nations will vanish with a stroke of a pen on a disarmament treaty; nor does it pretend that disarmament can be achieved overnight or apart from effective international measures to safeguard the security of nations. Yet, if accepted, this plan could transform our world within a short span of years into a secure and peaceful planet.

Despite the complexity of the problem, the technique of the U. S. plan is basically simple. It is to stop the present arms race and start the world immediately on the path toward a secure world without arms. As Ambassador Arthur Dean, the U.S. delegate, put it when he presented the plan to the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference, the idea is "that the nations of the world should seize a moment in time to stop the arms race, to freeze the military situation as it then appears, and to shrink it to zero . . . like a balloon—instead of permitting more and more air to be blown into the balloon until it bursts, the air is let out of the balloon, and the balloon shrinks in simple proportion until the air is all gone."

## Elements of the New U.S. Disarmament Plan

The U.S. proposal divides the process of disarmament into three stages—the first two to be carried out in estimated 3-year periods and the last stage as promptly as possible thereafter. In order to make speedy progress possible, Stage I can begin immediately after the treaty is ratified by the U.S.S.R., the United States, and such other countries as may be agreed on. Stage II would go into effect after the measures in Stage I have been implemented and verified, when preparations for Stage II are complete, and "all militarily significant states" have joined the treaty. Stage III would commence at the completion of Stage II and after all states possessing armed forces and armaments have become parties to the treaty. This staged process is intended to protect the security interests of all participants by assuring them that they will not be disarming in good faith while others lag behind or remain outside the agreement.





*Ambassador Arthur H. Dean, U.S. delegate to the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament, who has also represented the United States during disarmament debates at the United Nations.*

The U.S. plan is based on the following elements:

**1. Arms Reduction.** The dismantling of the military establishments of nations begins immediately in Stage I and continues until



completed in Stage III. The process of dismantling is designed to reduce as speedily as practicable the capacity of nations for waging war with nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction or with major conventional weapons. The steps for reducing the military potential extend equally to all participating nations and are so organized that they do not change the relative military strength of the participants during the disarmament process. Thus nations can proceed to disarm without fear that their relative position vis-a-vis other nations may be altered to their disadvantage. The U.S. plan provides for slashing the nuclear warmaking capacity of nations by 65 percent during the first two stages—estimated 6 years—of the treaty, and eliminating it entirely in the final stage.

**2. Verification.** Effective verification by an international agency to make sure that nations are carrying out their obligations is essential. In the present world atmosphere of mutual distrust and suspicion it represents the only sound guarantee nations can accept for disarming. Without such effective safeguards no nation can be certain that its national security is not being jeopardized by some unscrupulous country bent on war or conquest. Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko stated at Geneva on March 19, 1962:

“The Soviet Union wishes to have the necessary guarantees that the disarmament obligations that have been agreed upon will be strictly carried out and that there are no loopholes which will permit the clandestine production of aggressive armaments once the process of general and complete disarmament has begun.

“Our country does not intend to take anyone at his word, least of all States which have established closed military alignments, are pursuing a policy of building up armaments and have placed their military bases as close as possible to the Soviet Union. Nor do we expect others to take us at our word.”

The U.S. proposals for verification by an International Disarmament Organization (IDO) are consistent with Mr. Gromyko's analysis of the problem. They call for strict but not excessive verification—the precise amount depending on the specific disarmament measure being considered. The simpler and more limited any specific step, the simpler and more limited the verification procedure suggested.

Complex disarmament steps, however, might require more comprehensive verification procedures. Thus, a ban on production of fissionable materials which could be used to produce nuclear weapons might require disclosure of the location of all production facilities,



inspection by IDO, and some check that production is not continuing clandestinely in secret facilities. Reduction of existing stockpiles of such materials, on the other hand, is a far simpler measure to verify. It would require IDO simply to supervise the destruction or transfer to peaceful purposes of a specific quantity of fissionable material.

In a further attempt to comply with the notion that the amount of inspection should be commensurate with the amount of disarmament undertaken, the U.S. plan suggests a system of progressive zonal inspection. Under this system countries would divide themselves into zones and list the military facilities or activities contained therein which are subject to verification, but not initially their precise location. Actual disclosure of location and inspection would proceed step-by-step, by opening one zone after another as disarmament progresses. By the end of Stage III, verification would extend to the entire territory of countries.

Under the U.S. plan, an International Disarmament Organization would be established within the framework of the United Nations. Its staff would be international, and its verification procedures would apply equally to all parties to the treaty. Thus it would be almost impossible for any country to gain an advantage over another by controlling or otherwise distorting the work of IDO.

**3. Reducing Risk of War.** Control over existing armaments and armed forces can be as important initially in preserving the peace as the destruction of weapons or liquidation of forces. It constitutes a step toward the reduction and eventual elimination of the military establishments.

Under the U.S. plan practical measures are proposed to prevent surprise attack, or war through accident, failure of communications, or miscalculation. When weapons of terrible destructiveness can be triggered on short notice, nations need the protection these measures offer, even while they progress toward complete disarmament.

Such measures, which reflect the importance of the "arms control" concept as it has developed in the United States, can be put into effect immediately and independent of actual disarmament measures. They would include, for example, banning nuclear weapons tests, stopping production of fissionable material suitable for nuclear weapons, and organizing U.N. Peace Observation teams to check on possible conflict. Their goal would be to initiate a halt in the arms race and reduce the dangers of accidental war. Indeed, by increasing mutual trust and security, such arms control measures would help to speed



agreement on arms reductions and make countries more willing to continue the process of disarming once it has begun.

**4. Keeping the Peace.** International arrangements for keeping the peace and for settling disputes among nations must keep pace with measures for slashing arms and armies and reducing the risks of war. The U.S. plan provides for the international community to develop new and effective instruments for dealing with disputes among nations. In particular, the plan proposes to expand and strengthen international peacekeeping arrangements through such new instruments as a U.N. Peace Force, a U.N. Peace Observation Corps, and a Code of International Conduct.

Such peacekeeping arrangements would advance simultaneously and proportionately with the dismantling of national military establishments. As the warmaking power of nations declined, the peace-making power of the international community grows.

**5. Studies for the Future.** The present U.S. plan is the product of hundreds of scholars, scientists, and military experts who have studied the problem for years. It is more concrete than any disarmament plan ever presented before. Yet it is only a beginning in the systematic search for the means necessary to create a society without war. The international community will have to come to grips with such problems as disposing safely of the vast quantities of nuclear weapons to be destroyed, converting nuclear material stockpiles to peaceful uses, liquidating stockpiles and halting production of chemical and biological weapons, devising measures to guard against surprise attack or accidental war, and improving the machinery for peaceful settlement of disputes.

Studying these questions and coming up with appropriate solutions is a vital element in the disarmament process. The U.S. plan identifies some of the most important problems and proposes the machinery so that man's intelligence can be applied to their solution.

## Highlights of the U.S. Disarmament Plan


The breadth and depth of the U.S. proposal can be gaged by examining more closely some of the specific measures suggested.

### STAGE I (Estimated time: 3 years)

#### 1. REDUCING ARMAMENTS

All types of so-called nuclear delivery vehicles, such as missiles and airplanes and other equipment which can deliver nuclear weapons,






*The B-52—a U.S. long-range bomber.*

*The long-range bomber is one type of weapon that the U.S. disarmament plan proposed to eliminate by phased reductions, starting with a 30 percent reduction in Stage I.*

*The Bison—a Soviet long-range bomber.*





as well as major conventional armaments in agreed categories, would be slashed by 30 percent. The reductions in this stage would be 10 percent annually over an estimated 3-year period.

The purpose is to begin shrinking the overall warmaking capacity of nations in the most destructive weapons, without altering the relative military strength of the participants. Countries would have the assurance, essential in this early stage of disarmament, that their military position vis-a-vis others remains unimpaired. At the same time the process of defusing the world's most destructive powder kegs would have begun, and all nations would be safer for it.

For example: Stage I reduction of the U.S. and Soviet long- and medium-range nuclear striking force would mean the destruction or the conversion to peaceful uses, under international supervision, of 30 percent of each type of missile or aircraft in this category. As Ambassador Dean explained it at Geneva:

"The United States would . . . have to apply this cut to its B-52 aircraft, to its Titan missiles, to its Atlas missiles, to its submarine-launched Polaris missiles, and to its Hound Dog missiles, and to any other type of delivery vehicle which, by the time the treaty is negotiated, came into the category description. . . .

"The Soviet Union . . . would have to apply the 30 percent cut to its heavy four-turboprop bomber designed by Tupolev and known in the West as the Bear; to its heavy four-jet bomber designed by Miasishchev and called in the West the Bison; to its intercontinental missiles fired to the Kamchatka peninsula and into the Pacific; to its missiles on submarines; and to its air-to-surface missiles displayed last year with the Bear bomber.

"In the case of the United States Titan and Atlas missiles, as in the case of the Soviet missiles in this category, related fixed launching pads would be cut, along with the missiles. The same would be true with respect to fixed launching pads related to missiles which would be cut in other categories."

Similar procedures would apply to other agreed categories of weapons, and at each successive stage of disarmament. Any arms production permitted during Stage I would have to be offset by comparable destruction of weapons in the respective categories so that the 30 percent net reduction in each category is maintained.



## 2. REDUCING MILITARY FORCES

The armies of the United States, U.S.S.R., and of other specified military powers would be reduced to 2.1 million men each. Other countries would reduce their armies to 100,000 men or to one percent of their population, whichever is higher, provided this does not result in an increase in the size of the particular country's armed forces. Thus, for example, a country of 50 million would be allowed a maximum armed force of 500,000 men, provided its force was at least that large at the time it became a party to the treaty.

Countries would also consult regarding civilian employment by military establishments to insure that military forces are not being surreptitiously maintained in the guise of civilian employees.

## 3. LIMITING NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Production of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons would be halted immediately and the United States and U.S.S.R. would begin to transfer weapons-grade Uranium-235, the essential ingredient of nuclear arms, from military to peaceful purposes under international supervision. The United States has suggested that for a start the two principal producers of U-235, the United States and the U.S.S.R., each transfer 50,000 kilograms of this material. This would immediately reduce the atomic materials used in weapons by 100,000 kilograms, the equivalent of tens of thousands of megatons of explosive power. Additional transfers would follow in Stages II and III.

The danger that countries without nuclear arms may develop nuclear arsenals in the future would be reduced by an agreement not to transfer nuclear weapons or weapons production know-how to such countries; at the same time signatories to the treaty who do not possess nuclear weapons would agree not to acquire or manufacture them.

Agreement on halting all nuclear weapons tests under effective international control, if not achieved earlier, would become part of the Stage I measures with respect to nuclear weapons.

## 4. CONTROLLING ACTIVITIES IN OUTER SPACE

Agreement not to place weapons of mass destruction into orbit, required in Stage I, would eliminate the danger to mankind which might arise if nations were to send artificial satellites equipped with nuclear warheads into orbit around the earth. At the same time countries would support increased international cooperation in peaceful outer space activities and would notify IDO and other countries



of upcoming space launchings. IDO would have the right to inspect space vehicles and missiles before launch and would also monitor arrangements for limiting the production, stockpiling, and testing of the rocket boosters needed to place space vehicles into outer space.

## **5. REDUCING RISK OF WAR**

The danger of surprise attack or accidental war would be reduced through a series of measures, including prior notification of military movements or maneuvers, establishment of observation posts to report on military movements, exchange of military missions, and establishment of rapid and reliable communications among governments and the United Nations.

An International Commission on Reduction of the Risk of War would be established under IDO to work out further measures in this area.

## **6. STRENGTHENING PEACEKEEPING ARRANGEMENTS**

Countries would renounce the threat or use of force in international relations, including nuclear, conventional, chemical, or biological warfare as well as all forms of indirect aggression or internal subversion. A subsidiary body of IDO would seek to develop a Code of International Conduct related to disarmament. Countries would agree to utilize and further strengthen existing U.N. peacekeeping machinery, and to this end plans would be drawn up for a U.N. Peace Force capable of insuring international security, to be established in Stage II. A permanent U.N. Peace Observation Corps would be established to investigate on a moment's notice any breach of peace or situations which might lead to such a breach.

### **STAGE II (Estimated time: 3 years)**

#### **1. REDUCING ARMAMENTS**

Countries which had participated from the beginning would slash their remaining armaments in categories specified in Stage I in half, bringing them down to 35 percent of pretreaty levels. New parties to the treaty would reduce armament in these categories by 65 percent to match the reductions made by the original participants in Stages I and II.

Additional categories of arms not included in Stage I would be included and reduced by 50 percent during Stage II. This cut would apply to smaller types of military aircraft, missiles, ships, and other



specified military equipment, as well as to auxiliary-type planes or ships, thus further reducing the overall war potential of nations.

Moreover, on the basis of studies previously undertaken, countries would proceed to reduce and eventually eliminate chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction. All production and testing of such weapons would cease, plants would be converted to peaceful uses, and countries would slash their stockpiles of such weapons by 50 percent.

There are reasons—political, economic, and technical—for proceeding in this graduated fashion. The kind of process the United States proposes is unprecedented in history. It would transform political relations among nations, shift the employment of vast economic and scientific resources within countries, and virtually liquidate one of the oldest institutions of society—the military establishment. For such a monumental task to be completed, there must be the proper psychological and political climate; new machinery for reducing and verifying the reduction of arms and arms production must be established and perfected; and measures must be taken, as indicated earlier, to allow for retraining manpower and redirecting resources previously employed by the military establishment. The three-stage approach, allowing an estimated 6 years for the first two stages, would actually guarantee a very fast, but realistically feasible, pace of disarmament, considering the great complexity of the process.

## **2. REDUCING MILITARY FORCES**

Stage I force levels for the United States and U.S.S.R. would be reduced to 1.05 million men. Other countries' armies would also be reduced from Stage I levels, and in no case could they exceed the agreed level of 1.05 million men each for the United States and U.S.S.R.

## **3. LIMITING NUCLEAR WEAPONS**

Countries would reduce their remaining nuclear weapons by agreed percentages to minimum levels. These reductions would be based on studies to determine the best means for reducing and eventually eliminating nuclear weapons stockpiles. Such studies are essential if the elimination of nuclear weapons is to proceed safely and effectively.

During the last 6 months of Stage II, all nuclear weapons in the possession of nations would be registered with IDO, to insure complete elimination from national stockpiles in Stage III.



#### **4. DISMANTLING MILITARY BASES AND FACILITIES**

Countries would dismantle or convert to peaceful uses agreed military bases and facilities. The liquidation would proceed in an agreed sequence and would be verified by IDO. Under this provision the United States and U.S.S.R., for example, would liquidate bases outside as well as within their territories, since both contribute to the warmaking capacity of the two countries.

#### **5. STRENGTHENING PEACEKEEPING ARRANGEMENTS**

In preparation for Stage III, international peacekeeping activities would be greatly expanded. Countries would agree on additional steps to assure peaceful settlement of disputes and codification of rules of international conduct related to disarmament. These steps would be based in part on prior studies. Participants would also accept compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice to settle international legal disputes.

The U.N. Peace Observation Corps established earlier would be further expanded, and a U.N. Peace Force, equipped to deal with breaches of the peace, would be established. Countries which had not yet done so would enact national laws in support of the treaty.

The adoption of all these measures would profoundly alter the present complexion of international relations. National military strength would recede into the background as a factor in settling disputes among nations, making way for a growing body of international law and other peaceful machinery. The world would be ready for the process of complete disarmament indicated in Stage III.

### **STAGE III (Estimated time: to be agreed)**

#### **1. ELIMINATING ARMAMENTS, ARMED FORCES, AND MILITARY BASES OR FACILITIES**

Countries would dispose of all remaining armaments, military forces, and bases or facilities, except for those needed to maintain internal order and the personal security of citizens. Arms production would cease except for limited amounts needed to maintain the permissible national forces or to supply the U.N. Peace Force. All nuclear weapons still retained in national arsenals at the conclusion of Stage II would be eliminated, and nuclear weapons production facilities and materials would be converted to peaceful purposes.



## 2. REPORTING RESEARCH OF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE

While the nations proceed in the total dismantling of their military establishments, the international community would have to take on added responsibilities to see that new scientific discoveries do not reverse the process of universal disarmament so carefully achieved. To accomplish this, treaty members would report to IDO any basic scientific discovery or technological invention of potential military significance; IDO, in turn, would examine such discoveries or inventions and recommend appropriate measures for their control.

## 3. STRENGTHENING PEACEKEEPING ARRANGEMENTS

Countries would support and provide agreed manpower for the U.N. Peace Force, which would be progressively strengthened to a point where no state could challenge it. Arrangements for peaceful settlement of disputes, reducing risks of war, and codification of rules of international conduct related to disarmament, begun in Stages I and II, would be continued. Additional measures would be adopted as necessary to make possible peaceful change in a disarmed world.

### Verifying Disarmament Progress

The United States proposes the establishment of an International Disarmament Organization (IDO) within the framework of the United Nations to verify that agreed disarmament measures are in fact being carried out. The proposed functions and procedures of this all-important body have been developed in accordance with the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Statement of Principles, especially the principle that disarmament should proceed "from beginning to end" under "strict and effective international control . . . [to] provide firm assurance that all parties are honouring their obligations . . ., the nature and extent of such control depending on the requirements for verification . . . in each stage."

The extent of verification is directly related to the amount and type of disarmament measure undertaken and the degree of risk involved in possible violations. Questions naturally arise about the way this principle would apply in practice—how much authority it would give the international body and whether it would lead to unnecessary "snooping" into the affairs of individual nations. These questions can best be answered by specific illustrations.

Stage I, of the U.S. plan, for example, provides, among other things, for transferring specified stockpiles of Uranium-235—the es-



sential component of nuclear weapons—to purposes other than weapons. In this instance all IDO would do would be to verify that the particular quantities were in fact transferred; it would not be authorized to look at a country's remaining stockpiles of Uranium-235, since these have no relation to the particular disarmament measure being undertaken.

On the other hand, in order to verify that a country has indeed reduced certain major armaments by 30 percent, as provided in Stage I, IDO would have to verify not only the reduction itself but also the level of armament being retained. If only the reduction were supervised, there would be no assurance to other participating countries that it really represents a 30 percent cut and that new production will not replace those weapons which have been destroyed.

For example, if a country allowed IDO to supervise only the destruction of 1,000 bombers, claiming that this represented 30 percent of its bomber force, what real assurance would other countries have that the 1,000 bombers destroyed really represented 30 percent of the total force? How would they know that these were not simply 1,000 obsolete models which had been replaced by better models from new production? Obviously such assurance can only be obtained through IDO verification of the destruction of the bombers, combined with inspection of the remaining bomber force.

In an effort to limit verification to the minimum consistent with the security of the disarming nations, the United States suggests a system of progressive zonal inspection. The system would apply to those disarmament measures, such as arms or armed forces reduction, which can be verified by applying advanced statistical sampling and auditing techniques; others, however, such as stopping production of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons, could not be verified in this manner and would require separate procedures.

Under a system of progressive zonal inspection, each country would divide its territory into an agreed number of zones and declare to IDO the types but not the geographical location of armaments, forces, or facilities in each zone which would be subject to verification.

When the first 10 percent reduction of armaments takes effect, for example, as provided for in the first year of Stage I, a zone or zones would be selected in each country. The exact geographical location of armaments, forces, and facilities would then be revealed in the zone or zones selected, and inspection would proceed. With the next 10 percent reduction, additional zones would be opened, and so on, until at the end of the disarmament process the entire territory of



a country would be open to verification. Countries would have no advance notice which of their zones would be selected for verification, and there would be safeguards against illegal transfers between zones. Thus there would be reasonable assurance against clandestine activities, and yet the extent of verification would closely correspond to the extent of disarmament undertaken.

The zonal inspection system, of course, would apply to all parties to the treaty, so that at any particular time the same proportion of the territory of the United States, the U.S.S.R., and of other countries would be open to international verification.

## Conclusion

The U.S. plan described in this pamphlet represents a realistic attempt to bring about general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world.

It provides for the simultaneous development of peacekeeping machinery and the destruction or conversion of the warmaking capacity of nations to peaceful purposes. It outlines reasonable procedures for verification, which would apply equally to all participating countries and would be in proportion to the amount of disarmament undertaken. Lastly, it provides for an immediate halt to the arms race, a freeze in the warmaking capacities of nations, and effective procedures for dismantling these capacities until they no longer exist.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt wrote 17 years ago, just before his death:

“Today, as we move forward against the terrible scourge of war—as we go forward toward the greatest contribution that any generation of human beings can make in this world—the contribution of lasting peace—I ask you to keep up your faith. . . . The only limit to our realization of tomorrow will be our doubts of today. . . .”

These words still apply. The United States believes the time is ripe for reaching agreement on disarmament. It will continue to work for such agreement in the conviction that man's creative genius is capable of realizing man's dream of a world without war.





