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**MARXISM
AND
PSYCHOANALYSIS**

PAUL A. BARAN



**ARON KRICH
N. S. LEHRMAN
PETER B. NEUBAUER
NORMAN REIDER**

MARXISM AND PSYCHOANALYSIS

PAUL A. BARAN

MONTHLY REVIEW PAMPHLET SERIES—NO. 14

MARXISM AND PSYCHOANALYSIS by Paul A. Baran, reviewed from
Monthly Review, October 1969

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Comments:

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Reply: PAUL A. BARAN

Appendix:

The Soviet View of Psychoanalysis
By DR. D. FEDOTOV
Comment: DR. NORMAN REIDER

MARXISM AND PSYCHOANALYSIS

BY PAUL A. BARAN

My topic tonight is one which by profession I am hardly qualified to discuss. I am an economist, and my concern with psychoanalysis is only marginal. If nevertheless I am going to speak about "Marxism and Psychoanalysis," it is because as a social scientist and as a Marxist I have to consider the social process as a whole; I have to study the phenomena which play a major role in the social life of our time. And it is a fact which we should face squarely: psychoanalysis today exercises an influence which is probably more pervasive than that of any other doctrine or school of thought which contributes to the formation of our "collective mind." It would be instructive to poll this large audience and to find out how many came here tonight because Marxism appears in the announcement and how many because of their interest in psychoanalysis.

Ever since Marxism stepped upon the intellectual stage as a powerful effort to understand historical development, its most important bourgeois adversary has been what I may call "psychologism." Although appearing in different forms, assuming different guises, and presented in different terms, psychologism has always rested on two main pillars: first, the reduction of the social process to the behavior of the individual; and second, the treatment of the individual as governed by psychic forces deriving their strength from instincts which are considered to be deeply imbedded in "human nature," with "human nature" in turn constituting an essentially stable, biotically determined structure.

Gradually, in the light of far-reaching changes in the real world and of accumulating historical and anthropological knowledge, these concepts became increasingly untenable, and traditional psychologism was forced into the background. What took its place is a new version

This is the reworked transcript of the author's lecture delivered at the Tenth Anniversary meeting of MONTHLY REVIEW in New York on May 19, 1959. Paul Baran is Professor of Economics at Stanford University and the author of MR Press book *The Political Economy of Growth*.

of psychologism: an amalgam of Freudian psychoanalysis and some quasi-Marxian, sociological notions—a doctrine which I propose to call “socio-psychologism.” This new arrival on the ideological scene distinguishes itself from its defunct predecessor by recognizing freely that the individual is not entirely a man for himself but is influenced by society, is somehow affected by the social setting within which he grows up. What is crucial, however, is that society in socio-psychologism is viewed as “environment”: family, occupational stratum, interracial relations, residential community, and the like.

We must realize the implications of both positions. In the first, if it is “human nature” that determines the historical process, and if this “human nature” is unalterable, then all attempts to achieve a radical transformation of the human character and of the foundations of the social order are necessarily doomed to failure. In that case we might as well give up all hope for a society without exploitation of men by men, without injustice, without war, because all these things—exploitation, injustice, war—are the ineluctable result of the everlasting properties of the human animal. Encapsulated in his perennial “nature,” man is eternally condemned to live down his original sin; he can never aspire to a free development in a society governed by humanism and reason. It hardly needs adding that what follows from these premises is a conservative or indeed a reactionary attitude towards all the burning issues of our time, an attitude close to the heart of the most “old-fashioned” elements of the ruling class.

Different conclusions emerge from socio-psychologism. For the proposition that human development is determined by the social “milieu” and depends on the nature of inter-personal relations—on conditions obtaining within the family and so forth—leads obviously to the conclusion that significant changes (improvements) in human existence can be brought about by suitable “adjustments” in the prevailing environment. More togetherness and love, more schools and hospitals, and more co-ops and family counseling services then become the appropriate response to the human predicament in our society.

As in the case of all ideologies, neither psychologism nor socio-psychologism is a mere hallucination wholly unrelated to the real world. Each reflects, albeit in a distorted, ideological manner, an aspect of the actual, existential condition of men in capitalist society. By enunciating a manifest lie—the sovereign power of the individual in our society—psychologism points unmistakably to the loneliness, un-

relatedness, and impotence of men under capitalism, and thus comes nearer truth than the shallow liberal claptrap treating "us" as controlling and shaping our lives, or pontificating about national or even international "communities" determining their own destinies. Similarly, in raising the principle *homo homini lupus* to the status of an eternal verity, in considering man to be by nature a selfish, aggressive monad fighting ruthlessly for a place in the market, psychologism captures more of the capitalist reality than those doctrines which would have us believe that the character of the capitalist man can be changed by sanctimonious incantations concerning love, productivity, and the brotherhood of men. For, with exploitation, injustice, and war having molded for centuries the character of men, treating the existing human species as a formidable rock not easily displaced or transformed is undoubtedly more appropriate than the view of the superficial meliorist who would reshape human attitudes by intensified preaching, by larger federal grants-in-aid to education, by strengthening the Pure Food and Drug Administration, or by electing a Democratic President.

Socio-psychologism, too, mirrors important aspects of our society. By uncovering the horrors of our culture—the dismal state of our educational system, the misery of our cities, the abominable "climate" in which Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Mexicans, and unemployed whites live in this country—socio-psychologism is nearer the realities of capitalism than the enthusiastic celebrators of free and unhampered private enterprise. At the same time, by attributing this social condition to "our" lack of enlightenment, to "our" incapacity for purposeful action, to the power of "conventional wisdom," and to similar psychic "facts," it expresses the refusal to see the fundamental causes of the existing malaise, a refusal that constitutes the characteristic and indeed decisive element of the ruling ideology. Moreover, the insistence of socio-psychologism on the curability of all of these ills by means of various and sundry "adjustments" is part and parcel of the spirit of manipulation in which the Big Business executive "fixes" the problems confronting his corporation by such methods as establishing recreation facilities for his workers, or appropriating more money for market research or advertising, or by initiating some fancy product variation. Thus socio-psychologism becomes one of the most important components—if not *the* most important component—of the ideology of monopoly capitalism which seeks to find ways of eliminating the most crying irrationali-

ties, the most conspicuous injustices of the capitalist system in order to preserve and to strengthen its basic institutions.

But to realize and to unveil the ideological nature of both psychologism and socio-psychologism is only one part of what needs to be done. Even this job can be adequately performed only if the differences between the two doctrines are clearly understood, and if this ideological development is carefully analyzed as a reflection (and an aspect) of the transformation of the underlying economic, social, and political reality itself. Yet, as in the case of most problems posed by the emergence and evolution of monopoly capitalism, Marxism has been seriously remiss in coping with this matter. Failing to distinguish between old-fashioned psychologism and its modern, more sophisticated offshoot, Marxists, both in the West and in the USSR, have been seeking to refute the latter by employing arguments applicable only to the former. This has been particularly tempting since marshalling the arguments called for little effort: all of them are readily available in the works of Marx and Engels, as well as in the writings of later Marxists.

Even more serious is that another, equally important part of the Marxist commitment has been left unattended to. This is the separation of the wheat from the chaff, the distillation of whatever genuine scientific insights may be submerged in the ideological flood of socio-psychologism. For to the development of Marxism nothing is more essential than the systematic identification and absorption of such scientific advances as are attained by bourgeois scholarship—accompanied by relentless unmasking and debunking of its manifold ideological ingredients.

Thus in dealing with psychoanalysis—a doctrine which is the mainstay of socio-psychologism and which differs significantly from earlier theories underlying psychologism—Marxists have taken the position that all of it is nothing but ideology void of scientific content. This attitude has been based to a large extent on the notion that Freud's abiding concern with the irrational underpinnings of the conduct of men is tantamount to glorification of irrationality, to its elevation to the status of the ultimate, inexplicable, irreducible determinant of human activity. If such had been Freud's view, there would be little indeed to distinguish him from all and sundry philosophers of romanticism and existentialism. Yet although Freud undoubtedly had strong tendencies in that direction—particularly apparent in some of

his later writings—the bulk of his work is inspired by a different intention. Having recognized what is undisputable—that irrationality governs a large part of human behavior—Freud directed most of his life's effort to an attempt at a *rational* understanding of irrational motivations. Far from considering irrationality to be an elemental phenomenon inaccessible to scientific analysis, Freud sought to develop a comprehensive theory providing a *rational* explanation of irrational drives.

To be sure, this ambitious goal remained beyond Freud's reach. Nevertheless, he took the matter further than anyone before him, and—I might add—anyone after him, even if he did fail to arrive at a satisfactory concept of human conduct. And just as Marxism has been the heir and the guardian of what is most valuable and progressive in bourgeois culture, so it is incumbent upon Marxism today to take up Freud's work where Freud left it, and to turn his insights to good use in the elaboration of a rational theory of human activity.

I submit that only Marxism is able to fulfill this task. For the Marxian theory of social dynamics sheds penetrating light on the factors principally determining human behavior. What is needed is to revive some of the central—albeit neglected—strands in Marxian thought, and to focus them on the problem at hand. While this claim of mine cannot be fully substantiated in a short lecture, I would like to attempt a “telegram-style” outline of the relevant considerations.

It is fundamental to the Marxian approach to the study of man that there is no such thing as an eternal, invariant “human nature.” With due regard for what can be considered biotic constants, the character of man is the product of the social order in which he is born, in which he grows up, and the air of which he inhales throughout his life; it is its result and indeed one of its most significant aspects. Yet it is of the utmost importance to understand that what is meant by “social order” in Marxian theory is at most only a distant cousin of the notion of “society” as employed in socio-psychologism. The latter, it will be recalled, refers to “environment,” to “inter-personal relations,” and to similar aspects of what constitutes the *surface* of social existence. The former, on the other hand, encompasses the attained stage of the development of productive forces, the mode and relations of production, the form of social domination prevailing at any given time, all together constituting the *basic* structure of the existing social organization. Changes of the social order (in the Marxian understanding of that

term), radical and shattering as they always are, have taken centuries to mature and have occurred only a few times in the course of history. Correspondingly, changes in the nature of man have also proceeded at a glacial pace; while assuming tremendous proportions if looked at in full historical perspective, they have been all but imperceptible in the lifespan of entire generations. Still it is a fallacy to mistake the slowness of change in the character of man for its absence. This error leads to psychologism and to the belief in the everlasting sameness of the human species. And it is no less fallacious to deduce from the existence of change its rapidity. This error in turn leads to socio-psychologism and to the illusion that human beings can be "remodeled" by persuasion or by some repair jobs within the existing social order, that they can be manipulated into something different from what that social order has made them.

Thus a proper analysis of human motivations and conduct must refer to a timespan shorter than that of psychologism but longer than that of socio-psychologism. It has to avoid the a-historical frozenness of the former while escaping at the same time the newspaper-headline orientation of the latter. And it must consider human development in its true context: the economic and social order determining the content and molding the profile of the relevant historical epoch. Accordingly the exploration of the human character can neither rely on empty abstractions such as "man in general" nor gain much insight from an ever-so-careful examination of spurious concretes such as the "other-directed personality," the "trade-union man," the "chamber of commerce man," or the "man in the gray flannel suit." At the present time and in this country, the object of the investigation is the human being born with certain inherited characteristics and reared as a member of a class in capitalist society or—more specifically—in capitalist society's most advanced stage, the reign of monopoly capital.

This suggests that—leaving biology aside—the first step of such an investigation has to be directed toward the understanding of the basic factors determining human existence under the prevailing social order. Outstanding among these factors is the vast expansion of society's productive resources. Based on a spectacular intensification of the subjugation of nature (including human nature) by society, this growth of productivity has promoted (and has been promoted by) a tremendous increase of rationality in the productive process as well as in the mental habits of men. Yet it is inherent in the capitalist order,

and indeed its most striking characteristic, that this advance in rationality has proceeded in a complex and contradictory fashion. It has been primarily an advance of *partial* rationality and has remained essentially confined to segments of the social fabric, to its particular units and aspects. Thus the efficiency of industrial and agricultural enterprises, the rationality of their administration, of their cost and price and profit calculations, as well as of their efforts to manipulate the market, have reached unprecedented dimensions. But this increase in *partial* rationality has not been accompanied by a corresponding growth of *total* rationality, of rationality in the overall organization and functioning of society. In fact, the total rationality of the social order has declined; the disparity between partial and total rationality has been growing increasingly pronounced. This can be fully realized if one thinks of the contrast between the automated, electronically controlled factory and the economy as a whole with its millions of unemployed and other millions of uselessly employed people; if one considers the efficiency with which redundant chrome and fins are being affixed to unfunctional automobiles; or if one contemplates the palatial office towers, planned and equipped according to the last word of science, in which highly skilled employees devise the most effective methods for the promotion of a new soap, standing next to squalid slums in which families of five vegetate in one dilapidated filthy room. But the abyss dividing the parts from the whole is most horrifying if one places next to each other the breathtaking productive power harnessed in the energy of the atom, and the death, the misery, the human degradation, that mark the existence of the great majority of mankind subsisting in the underdeveloped countries.

The basic reason for this glaring cleavage between partial and total rationality, between the rising "know how," and the declining "know what," is the alienation of man from his means of production, an alienation that has become increasingly marked throughout the history of capitalism and is strongly accentuated in its current monopolistic phase. Indeed the concentration of the means of production in the hands of a small group of oligarchs—responsible to no one but themselves and to their everlasting commitment to keep increasing their profits—who smoothly and rationally preside over their corporate empires, has completed the fixation of the productive apparatus as a power outside and above the individual, a power dominating his existence but entirely inaccessible to his control. And at no time in

history has this power over the vast and growing productive forces been to such an extent power over life and death of millions of men, women, and children everywhere.

But the most insidious, and at the same time the most portentous, aspect of this overwhelming power of the objectified productive relations over the life of the individual is their capacity to determine decisively his psychic structure. For the conflict between total and partial rationality not only sets the tone of the entire capitalist culture; it also sinks deeply into the mentality of the human being brought up in and molded by the all-pervasive institutions, values, and habits of thought which make up that culture. The exigencies of the productive process call for the development of an increasingly well trained, literate, and intelligent manpower. Earning a livelihood at the conveyer belt, in the office, or in the sales force of the modern corporation depends on the possession of rational attitudes and aptitudes greatly superior to what was required at an earlier, less advanced stage of capitalist development. Much of the work that used to be guided by authority, tradition, and intuition is now based on scientifically established procedures and accurate measurements. Yet, as stressed above, this highly rationalized effort is directed towards largely irrational ends; the individual worker is not only unconcerned with the outcome of the productive process in which he plays an infinitesimal part but this outcome has no meaning and no purpose; it cannot inform his activity with the knowledge of aim or with the pride of accomplishment.

This incessantly reproduced clash between what might be called "micro-sense" and "macro-madness" is, however, only one part of the story. The other, even more important, aspect is the profound impact of the lack of total rationality upon the dynamics and nature of partial rationality itself. I must therefore amend what I said above about the achievements in regard to partial rationality. For reason is indivisible, and the irrationality of the whole cannot coexist harmoniously with the rationality of the parts. The one continually threatens the other, and their antagonism expresses one of the profound contradictions of the capitalist system. Whereas the irrationality of the whole must be constantly maintained if exploitation, waste, and privilege, if—in one word—capitalism is to survive, the rationality of society's individual parts is enforced by the drive for profits and the competitive necessities of capitalist enterprise. Thus this partial rationality continually edges forward—albeit jerkily and unevenly—but

the advance takes place at the cost of its being warped, perverted, and corrupted by the irrationality of the surrounding social order. As a result, such progress as has been attained is far from uniform. Some of it constitutes genuine steps forward in the rational comprehension of the world and in the development of the forces of production. This applies to much of what has been accomplished in such areas as mathematics and natural sciences, as well as in certain branches of historical research. Elsewhere, however, what parades as an increase in rationality is frequently nothing but the amplification and propagation of business "know how," of the rationality of the capitalist market. There the intellectual effort which takes market relations for granted is exclusively directed towards manipulation in the interest of corporate enterprise. What it promotes is "practical intelligence," the capacity to make the best of a given market constellation, to maximize one's advantages in the struggle of all against all. Thus, important parts of physics and chemistry have been pressed into the service of war and destruction; much mathematical and statistical ingenuity has been turned into an auxiliary of monopolistic market control and profit maximization; psychology has become a prostitute of "motivation research" and personnel management; biology is made into a handmaiden of pharmaceutical rackets; and art, language, color, and sound have been degraded into instrumentalities of advertising.

Under such circumstances human rationality inevitably becomes crippled, and its advance is pushed into a direction that bears no relation to the prerequisites for, and the needs of, human health, happiness, and development. If the compulsion to take *anything* for granted is a fetter on the expansion and perfection of men's capacity to reason and to understand, the oppressive and stifling function of that fetter grows in proportion to the irrationality of what men are brought up not to question but to accept as a datum. True, taking capitalism for granted when it was an essentially progressive social order interfered relatively little with (or even promoted) the development of partial rationality. By the same token, however, the necessity not to scrutinize but to treat as part of the natural order of things the regime of monopoly capital, along with all the waste and all the destruction that go with it, constitutes a straitjacket within which reason cannot but suffocate. Thus the clash between partial and total rationality becomes complicated and aggravated by the no less violent conflict between

reason and the debasement of reason which dominates the sphere of partial rationality itself.

This condition has manifold psychological ramifications to only two of which I can now attempt to draw your attention. First, such rationality as prevails solidifies itself into a system of rules, procedures, and habits of thought that not only does not further the satisfaction of human needs but becomes a formidable obstacle to human development and, indeed, survival. As bourgeois rationality turns increasingly into the rationality of domination, exploitation, and war, the ordinary man revolts against this obstruction to his aspirations for peace, happiness, and freedom. Yet, afflicted with "common sense" that is studiously nurtured by all the agencies of bourgeois culture and the principal injunction of which is to take capitalist rationality for granted, he can hardly avoid identifying the rationality of buying, selling, and profit-making with reason itself. His revolt against capitalist rationality, against the rationality of markets and profits, thus becomes a revolt against reason itself, turns into anti-intellectualism, and promotes aggressiveness toward those who manage to capitalize on the rules of the capitalist game to their advantage and advancement. It renders him an easy prey of irrationality.

Irrationality and aggressiveness in our time are, therefore, not emanations of some unalterable human instincts. Nor do they express simply the supposedly "natural" rejection of *reason*. Irrationality and aggressiveness in our time reflect primarily the refusal to accept as sacrosanct the rationality of capitalism. They testify to the protest against the mutilation and degradation of reason for the sake of capitalist domination. This outcry against bourgeois rationality, as well as its identification with reason as such, is magnificently depicted in Dostoevsky's *Underground Man* who "vomits up reason" and who scornfully rejects the commandment to accept the proposition that two times two equals four. While this strikingly exemplifies the posture of irrationalism, an important aspect of the *Underground Man's* attitude should not be lost sight of. It is that the *Underground Man*, irrational and "crazy" as he is, is actually profoundly *right* in "vomiting up reason," in refusing to bow to the logic of two times two equals four. For this logic is the logic of the capitalist market, of the exploitation of man by man, of privileges, insecurity, and war. To be sure, his contempt for *this* rationality, his uprising against the "common sense" of human misery, is an irrational reaction to a pernicious social order.

But it is the only reaction available to the isolated and helpless individual who, incapable of comprehending the forces by which he is being crushed, is unable to struggle effectively against them. This reaction is neurosis.

Secondly, as I mentioned in passing earlier, the development of the forces of production and the advance of rationality with which it has been associated were based on a tremendous intensification of human domination over nature. The result of this harnessing of natural resources to the needs of men has been a momentous rise in the output of goods, services, health, and literacy—combined with a spectacular lightening of the burden of human toil. Yet this advance was achieved not merely by the expansion of human control over the objects and energies of the outside world; it was based on a perhaps even more radical subjugation of the nature of man himself. This subjugation has two separate, if closely interconnected, aspects. In the pre-capitalist era, it involved the emergence and development of the domination and exploitation of man by man. Extracting from the underlying population varying quantities of economic surplus, the dominating and exploiting classes used this economic surplus to assure their privileged positions in society, at the same time directing larger or smaller shares of the surplus to investment in productive facilities or to the maintenance of military, religious, and cultural establishments. Applied to those days, however, the expression “surplus” is a euphemism. With productivity and output rising only very slowly, the condition had not yet been attained in which the consumption of the ruling class and its outlays on productive investment and on religious and military and other purposes could be based upon a genuine sufficiency of goods and services for the people. Sheer violence and elaborate systems of political enforcement always played a major role in the process of extraction of the requisite resources. Yet neither would have been able to fulfill this task had it not been for the development and propagation of religious, legal, moral—in one word: ideological—notions which sanctified the ruling classes’ claims to their appropriations and which were turned in the course of centuries into a comprehensive network of internalized thoughts, beliefs, fears, and hopes, compelling the people to recognize the rights and to heed the demands of their rulers.

A new chapter was opened by the advent of the capitalist order. Now the human being had to go through a further process of “adjust-

ment." To the qualities cultivated in the wood-hewers and water-carriers of old had to be added a new and all-important characteristic, that of rationality. For now it was no longer sufficient to be an obedient and selfless serf of a cruel and rapacious squire; what was required henceforth was a diligent, docile, efficient, and reliable worker in a rationalized, streamlined, profit-maximizing capitalist enterprise. This enforced what is probably one of the most far-reaching transformations of "human nature" experienced thus far. If in the course of preceding history man had been made submissive by exploitation and domination, the working principles of the capitalist order demanded that he should acquire the ability to calculate and the habit of acting with forethought and deliberation. What was left of his elemental emotionality, of his spontaneity, after having been disciplined for centuries by the whip of his titled overlords, came now under the much more systematic, much more comprehensive pressure of the callously and accurately calculating market.

As deliberateness in the business of earning a living—and in all other aspects of life as well—became the prerequisite for survival in capitalist society, spontaneity came to be disdained and feared not only as a source of disruption of the production routine but as a threat to the stability of the class-dominated and exploitative social order. From the very beginning of the capitalist era it was accordingly exposed to a withering fire of economic sanctions and social opprobrium, and the assault against it was mounted simultaneously by the entire apparatus of bourgeois ideology and culture, including such divergent components as Christian religion and the utilitarian philosophy. And in capitalism's current, monopolistic, phase this attack has multiplied in scope and intensity. Just as human relations in corporate empires came by necessity to be attuned to "making friends and influencing people," so has love been "streamlined" into a scientifically approved means of securing medically indicated sexual gratification, while beauty is identified with the precise measurements of Miss America, and nature, music, literature, and art are valued in exact proportion to their serving as purveyors of "relaxation." Not that the campaign against spontaneity was ever decided upon or directed by some executive committee of capitalist elders, although attributing to Marxism such a view of the matter has long been the stock in trade of professional Marx-refuters whose ignorance of Marxism is exceeded only by their incapacity to understand it. The implacable hostility toward

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spontaneity and the powerful tendency toward its suppression are rather the inherent characteristics of a mode of production based on commodity exchange and unfolding within a system of relations of production of domination and exploitation. Far from being a pre-meditated, well-planned stratagem of the ruling class, calculated to repress the drives and aspirations of the underlying population, both the ascent of deliberateness and the decay of spontaneity affected the members of the ruling class itself and turned them in the course of time into unhappy beneficiaries of an unhappy society.

The crux of the matter, it seems to me, is that market-oriented deliberateness and market-induced suppression of spontaneity, "adjusting" the privileged and the underprivileged alike to the requirements of the capitalist system, fatally damage what Freud, and before him Marx and Engels, identified as the sources of human happiness: freedom of individual development and the capacity to experience sensual gratifications. Putting a severe tabu on the individual's emotionality and channeling what is left of it into an aggressiveness which is disciplined and directed toward the attainment of success and the elimination of rivals in the competitive struggle, they produce "affect-crippledness"—to use an expression of Freud—and generate the phenomenon which was put into its proper theoretical context by Marx in his concept of the alienation of man from himself. This alienation of man from himself—the maiming of the individual, the subjugation of his nature to the needs of capitalist enterprise, the mortal wounding of his spontaneity, and the molding of his personality into a self-seeking, deliberate, calculating, and circumspect participant in (and object of) the capitalist process—represents the basic framework within which the psychic condition of men evolves in capitalist society.

It is only within this framework that I can see a promise of a genuine understanding of psychic disturbances in our time. As I mentioned earlier, achieving such an understanding was not given to psychoanalysis. To be sure, Freud's identification of sexual malfunctioning as the principal source of psychic disorder represented a major advance in psychological thought. But what Freud's theoretical structure fails to provide—all assurances and appearances to the contrary notwithstanding—is a satisfactory explanation of the sexual malfunctioning itself. Not that Freud was unaware of this weakness of his doctrine, but it was in attempting to fill this crucially important gap that his efforts were least successful. It was here that he sought to find

refuge either in psychologism or in socio-psychologism: either in a concept of a biotically unchanging human nature with equally unchanging intra-family relations as symbolized in the ancient Oedipus legend; or in surface observations referring to habits of child rearing and of sexual enlightenment. Neither of these approaches enabled him to solve the central issue confronting psychology at the present time: the specification of the part played by more or less invariant biological factors in the determination of the psychic structure of men, and the analysis of the profound impact upon the human psyche exercised by the alienation of man from himself in the society of monopoly capitalism.

Marxists, impressed by the momentous accomplishments of Pavlov and his school, have focused attention on the former aspect of the matter and have tended—paradoxically enough—to sidestep Marx's revolutionary contribution to psychology: the sociology of the psyche. Still, while there can be no dispute about the importance of physiological factors in governing human behavior, it is indispensable to recognize the vast extent to which the economic and social order of capitalism and the process of alienation which it generates mold the psychic and, indeed, the physical functioning of men in the capitalist era. For it is impossible to understand sexual malfunctioning apart from the capitalism-caused atrophy of spontaneity; it is impossible to understand the shrinking capacity to experience sensual gratifications of any kind apart from the capitalism-generated proliferation of deliberateness, selfishness, and aggressiveness. I would go further and say that it is impossible to comprehend human activity in our society except as an outcome of a dialectic interaction of biotic forces and the working principles of monopoly capitalism, with the latter dominating, subjugating, and directing the former. And it is crucially important to recognize the nature of this interaction of the determinants of human existence under capitalism, because it is the powerful dynamism of the social and economic order which points to the location of the strategic leverage which in fullness of time will shift the historical gears and orient the development of man towards a fuller realization of his physical, emotional, and rational capacities. This leverage is to be found neither in tranquilizing pills nor in "social adjustments," nor in the preaching of love, of productivity, and of "meeting of minds." This leverage must be found in the establishment of a more rational, more human society, and conversely in the abolition of a social order based

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upon the domination and exploitation of man by man. Not that socialism would change the situation "overnight." Expecting the liquidation of the centuries-old legacy of capitalism within a relatively short—if ever so eventful—period of transition reflects the attitude of socio-psychologism, which is as fallacious in this case as it is in others. Thus it is by no means an accident that those who hold the views of socio-psychologism are among the severest critics of the existing socialist societies: censuring sharply the Soviet Union or even China for not having yet abolished the alienation of man, and for not having yet created the socialist individual. It hardly needs stressing that demanding such impossible changes amounts to demanding no changes at all; that stipulating the immediate realization of what can develop only slowly on the basis of vast institutional transformations as a condition for the participation in the struggle for a better society is tantamount to deserting this struggle altogether.

A few concluding remarks: what I have said so far is not meant to suggest that there may be no possibility of individuals who are ill finding a measure of relief through currently available means of psychiatric treatment. The frequently reiterated observation that the degree of success attained in psychotherapy is largely independent of the school of psychological thought to which the therapist adheres, but is rather determined by the skill and personality of the physician and the amount of attention given by him to the patient, suggests the absence of any well-founded theory underlying psychotherapeutic practice. Moreover, psychotherapy's relative success in dealing with isolated symptoms of nervous disorder and the generally admitted failure of its efforts at curing character neurosis would tend to confirm the earlier expressed view that the phenomena underlying character neurosis are inaccessible to treatment on the individual plane. Indeed, the insistence on the possibility of altering character structure on the individual plane, of "producing" a healthy, well-functioning, and happy individual in our society is in itself an ideology. It tears asunder individual and society, it ignores the alienation of man under capitalism, and it represents a capitulation to socio-psychologism. It obscures the painful but ineluctable truth that the limits to the cure of man's soul are set by the illness of the society in which he lives.

BEYOND PSYCHOLOGY

BY ARON KRICH

Paul A. Baran's paper "Marxism and Psychoanalysis" calls attention again to the danger of a jealously guarded and partisan monism. Faced with the formidable task of synthesizing two seminal conceptualizations of man in society, Professor Baran atomizes psychoanalysis by extrapolating a theory of personality out of a theory of history. The result, of course, is not synthesis but an ideological fantasy in which *depth* psychology (my italics) is held to concern itself with "what constitutes the *surface* of social existence" (Baran's italics), and in which abstractions like "the attained stage of the development of productive forces" are held to be of more concrete influence on the individual than mother love. Corollary contradictions arise in embracing those theories of psychoanalysis least reconcilable with Marxism while castigating its complementary aspects.

This last point best illustrates Baran's need to deny those developments in contemporary psychology and psychoanalysis which threaten his imposed "hegemony" of Marxism. Readers will recall that Baran, in renouncing "socio-psychologism" as amelioristic, suggests that "only Marxism is able to fulfill the task" of "taking up Freud's work where Freud left it." Baran then goes on to say that it is "fundamental to the Marxian approach to the study of man that there is no such thing as an eternal, invariant human nature." But Freud never abandoned his belief that the infant comes into the world with an archaic phylogenetic inheritance which is active in its mental life. These built-in memory traces, Freud held, gave impetus, for example, to fears of castration as punishment for incest wishes.

It follows that for Freud "the fate of the Oedipus Complex" is the crucial determinant of personality in any society, no matter how

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advanced or primitive. This has remained a basic, if sometimes hidden, postulate of the orthodox Freudian school. Its rejection accounts, along with other differences too technical to outline here, for the rise of the so-called culturalist school of psychoanalysis, which Baran refers to as "socio-psychologism" and which believes—along with Baran—that "man is the product of the social order in which he is born." Yet it is just at this point in his paper that Baran decries their interest in society as referring "to environment, to inter-personal relations, and to similar aspects of what constitutes the *surface* of social existence."

Baran achieves these stunning reversals by a device which is not immediately apparent in the text of a persuasive polemic. As I read it, I found myself puzzled at being in disagreement even while wanting to agree, until I realized that he was writing about a psychoanalysis stripped of function. The work of metapsychology is taken over by a "metamarxism." Nowhere in the paper is there a recognition of psychoanalysis as an instrument for the exploration of the inner processes of human personality. By the same token there is utter disregard, or ignorance, of its clinical observations.

How else could we explain Baran's dismissal of the need for love as "liberal claptrap." The most convincing kind of evidence (Spitz, Goldfarb, Roudenko, Bowlby and others) is now available that the absence of mothering care in the first year of life can lead to crippling disabilities of personality, ranging from psychopathic inability to give and receive love to mute autism. More recently these findings have been confirmed in the controlled laboratory setting by Harlow's now famous, ingenious substitution of wire and terry-cloth "mothers" for the real mothers of infant rhesus monkeys. Baran either is—or pretends to be—oblivious of that part of human motivation which is elaborated below the level of awareness in the constellation of nurture and nature.

By eliminating the psychic backdrop against which human events are enacted, Baran leaves himself without a set of variables intervening between the individual and his social order. Since, according to Baran, the important influences on human beings do not stem from "environment" (i.e., the encounters from birth through maturity with parents, peers, and other significant people who transmit and interpret the social order) but from the social order itself, (i.e., "the attained stage of the development of productive forces, the mode and relations of production, the form of social domination prevailing") the re-

action of the individual becomes undifferentiated. Neurosis, in Baran's sense of the word, identifies something endemic to the sick society and, in the analogue of physical disease, the individual unavoidably "catches" it as from a non-filterable virus.

Indeed, in his spoken remarks Baran declared: "Neurosis is society." Strangely enough this position, if modified to read, "Change society and man's difficulties in living will change," is central to much of contemporary psychoanalytic thought. Erich Fromm and Karen Horney, in particular, have alerted us to the possibilities of a double neurosis in which the pressures of cultural history herniate into the vicissitudes of personal history. The position that man is a product of his culture as much as his culture is a product of man is the basis for those occasional recommendations for new ways in child-rearing, education, and other human relations emanating from the movement of "socio-psychologism" which Baran considers so pusillanimous.

Obviously some of us are more immune than others from infection by our sick society. There is a growing body of studies on the epidemiology of mental illness which may ultimately reveal a nosological pattern of mental disorder by economic class, occupation, education, or other reality circumstances. However, all of us live under monopoly capitalism; but only about 15 percent of us break down under its pressure or are seized with its "macro-madness". The rest of us hang on to our culture's "micro-sense." We handle the stress of life in a variety of ways with varying degrees of success or failure. The methods we choose to use come up for examination in the psychoanalytic therapies. From these we learn that the adult who is having neurotic difficulties in living is usually suffering from an inability to let go of beliefs about himself and his world which were early imprinted and are no longer appropriate. Such an individual is not in the grip of "the form of social domination prevailing" but is, rather, in the toils of what Freud once called his "reminiscences" of what happened in his past.

To see the operational inutility of Baran's reductionism we need only look at actual clinical situations. "It is impossible," Baran writes, "to understand sexual malfunctioning apart from capitalism-caused atrophy of spontaneity." Parenthetically, one might ask Baran to document his assumption that sexual malfunctioning has increased in the advanced stage of monopoly capitalism over, let us say, late 19-century burgeoning industrialism. From the sparse evidence available it seems more likely that at least one half of the population

in the countries of greatest industrial development are enjoying greater sexual participation and response than ever before. But, again, Baran's reductionism leaves no leeway for the consideration of such variables as the accelerating emancipation of women.

Leaving this question aside, we could reply to Baran that it is *quite possible* to understand and treat sexual malfunctioning without reference to "capitalism-caused atrophy of spontaneity." Any clinician could supply numerous instances of the removal of debilitating symptoms and disturbances in the sex-life without such reference. At the risk of sounding *gauche* in this non-clinical publication, I must say that understanding a patient's masturbation fantasies may be more pertinent. In the area of sexual behavior, Marxism has rather remote heuristic value when compared to the methodology of psychoanalysis.

However, if Baran intends his sweeping statement to mean that behavioral science must be broad enough to include all the data which might help us to understand the individual, then he is doing contemporary psychoanalysis an injustice. On the whole, today's therapists are alert to the multiple vectors that locate the individual in his social field. As a corrective to Baran's caricature of psychology as the "prostitute of motivation research," I offer a randomly chosen sample of a psychoanalytic view of the "economic" factors in neurosis. From a recently published statement by a spokesman for the Karen Horney group we hear:

As originally pointed out, in spite of individual variations, the crucial conflicts around which neuroses develop are almost always the same. It is economically based in our culture on the principle of individual competition which generates hostilities and fears. Success means economic security and enhanced prestige; failure, less income and diminished self-esteem. With the resultant emotional isolation, the need for love becomes all the more intense and is overvalued in our culture. This—not genuine love, but an illusion of it—will solve all problems. Just as there are contradictory drives in neurosis, there are false values in our culture which intensify the neurotics' problems. We put value on competition and success with which antithetical values of brotherly love and humility collide. Simultaneously, desires for more are stimulated through our advertising, while circumstances constantly frustrate them. We are told we are free individuals, although realistically there are many factual limitations to getting what one wants even if one is energetic and efficient. (Kellman, *American Handbook of Psychiatry*, p. 1437.)

This point of view is not unique in psychoanalytic circles, even being held to some extent by Freudians who are theoretically bounded by the libido theory. It is axiomatic in the major schools of psychoanalytic thought that in every neurosis there is some element of "reaction to society." If the individual encountered no external obstacles to his wishes he would have no need for the special life arrangements we call neurosis. Indeed, the ego itself would have no cause to develop beyond the blissful hallucinations of infantile omnipotence. But societal existence makes demands for mastery as well as adjustment. How the individual handles these transactions with reality is the subject matter of psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis is a method of treatment of the abnormal personality out of which has grown a body of hypotheses concerning normal personality. Its theories are largely based on clinical empiricism. Some have been verified in the long pull of experience; some are still in the process of verification by observation and experiment; others have been, or will be, discarded as new insights make them obsolete. This readiness to correct itself keeps psychoanalysis from becoming a closed system. It protects psychoanalysis from declaring, as Baran does for Marxism, that *only* psychoanalysis can see the full spectrum of man's existence.

I have heard no less a pioneer psychoanalyst than Theodor Reik declare that by the year 2000 psychoanalysis as we know it today will cease to exist. For the goals of psychoanalysis are functional and relative, aimed mainly at liberating from confining symptoms the inherent potential of the individual to deal purposefully with his complex intimate and public environment. I see nothing here which is inimical to social change. On the contrary, by making it possible for the individual to discern and engage the genuine enemies of his well-being it adds a new dimension to his citizenship in the world.

It seems to me that Baran's failure to grasp the significance of early life experience for the emotional and mental "set" of the adult individual leads him into distortions not only of the psychoanalytic investigation of environment but also of a position implicit in Marxism itself. Marxism, by calling attention to the ways in which the cultural superstructure erected upon an economic base, proliferates social organizations and arts and sciences which attempt to singularize or pedestalize it, is an eminently environmental theory. In attacking the concept of "environment" in a polarity between psychologism and socio-psychologism, Baran leaves us in an epistemological dilemma. If changes in environment are futile, then human nature

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is immutable. If human nature is immutable then changes in environment are futile.

Professor Baran attempts to escape this dilemma by positing a "sociology of the psyche". This means, I suppose, that individual psychology is held indeterminate between epochal social changes like that of feudalism to capitalism and, again, in the projected leap from capitalism to socialism. What happens to human motivation in the interval is rejected as spuriously concrete and ahistorical "sociopsychologism". In this paradigm of wishful thinking, psychology is by-passed and with it the possibility for genuine understanding of how the nature of man changes while he changes his society.

THE CONFLICT WITHIN PSYCHOANALYSIS

BY N. S. LEHRMAN, M. D.

Professor Baran's distinguished paper on "Marxism and Psychoanalysis" in the October issue of MONTHLY REVIEW, is a welcome advance in Marxist thinking. It points out the fundamental difference in approach between Freud and Marx, rather than prating about non-existent differences between Freud and Pavlov. The basic truth which Baran points out most clearly once again is the fundamental fact that Marx's sociological explanations of psychology are far more accurate and far more useful than Freud's biopsychological explanations of sociology.

Having made this point, however, Baran does not slip and throw the Freudian baby out with the bathwater. He recognizes the importance, as many Marxists have not, of separating that which is true and useful in Freud's work from its mystical, unscientific core. To follow Baran still further, I think we must do with Freud what Marx did with the mystical Hegel: not discard him but, in a sense, stand him on his feet. I believe this task is in process of being accomplished.

The key to this problem, as I see it, is the scientific recognition and understanding of the importance of human feelings as *signals*. Pavlovians have recognized the importance of verbal signals, but have tended to minimize the significance of emotions. Freudians, correctly recognizing the importance of human feelings, have incorrectly seen them as determined ultimately by inner biological reality rather than by outer social reality. A correct synthesis of the two points of view is by no means impossible.

Three Specific Criticisms

There are three aspects of Baran's paper, however, to which I believe valid exception can be taken.

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CONFLICT WITHIN PSYCHOANALYSIS

(1) While I think he is correct in criticizing "socio-psychologism", it seems to me that he does not sufficiently recognize the correct direction this movement *has* taken, even though it has as yet not gone far enough. To present "socio-psychologism" solely as a "concession" is incorrectly to imply that there is a mastermind within the field of psychoanalysis from whom scientific advance is reluctantly extracted. I do not think there is any such mastermind, although perhaps some psychoanalyst members of the Guild of Catholic Psychiatrists might like to take on this function.

Because "mental health" has so far been presented only in terms of family and other soupy "togetherness" does not mean that the concept can go no further. True mental health can only be achieved under socialism, in which man's exploitation of man, and man's consequent inhumanity to man, have been ended.

(2) Baran's discussion of man's "alienation from himself" also has a rather vague and fuzzy flavor. I am not quite sure what he means—and this is unusual in so precise and meticulous a thinker as Baran. Perhaps he is referring to the ever-widening gap between the *actual* achievements of the individuals in our society and their ever-increasing potentials. If so, greater precision in his paper might have been in order.

(3) Baran seems to overstress the importance of spontaneity and emotionality in his basically correct criticism of the "men of measured merriment" of our times. This overstress can lead to a worship of impulse and feelings, at the expense of thought and consciousness. Freudians have attempted, in the most unscientific way possible, to separate thinking from feeling, and it is a little surprising to find Baran apparently tending to do the same. Thought and feeling are two aspects of the same process; Sir Charles Sherrington, the brilliant British Nobel laureate in neurophysiology, pointed out long ago that "every cognition has, potentially at least, an emotive value." This inextricability of thinking and feeling is most clearly described in V. J. McGill's fine little book, *Emotions and Reason*.

What Psychoanalysis Can Do

Unlike Baran, I write as a professional in the field of psychoanalysis. In my opinion, psychoanalysis is one of the most potent tools that have existed in the medico-ideological armamentarium. Provided that a person's basic economic needs are met—and they usually are in the people who can afford the treatment—psycho-

analysis can often truly throw open the door of happiness and usefulness to suffering people. It can do so by giving them a clearer understanding of themselves in relationship to the world about them—to their families and to their society—by helping them to understand and to change their own incorrect responses. It can do so by helping people to understand their own feelings, the signals to their consciousness arising from their present and past experience, and by aiding them to understand the extent to which these feeling-signals are accurate, and to what extent they are not.

I have seen desperate, panicked people returned to usefulness, health, and courage through psychoanalytic treatment. I have seen disintegrating families, filled with acrimony, restored to warmth, happiness, and effectiveness through psychoanalytic treatment. I have seen cowardly people become courageous, and terrified people become calm, again through psychoanalytic treatment. Properly applied, by a courageous psychoanalyst with an accurate perception of the world in which he lives, psychoanalysis can, even at this moment, after certain important technical changes, be a most mighty boon to many of the suffering Americans who can afford it.

The effectiveness of psychoanalysis is, however, limited by the society within which it exists. The extent to which any person can be helped cannot, in the long run, extend beyond limits set by the contradictions and opportunities of the society he lives in. But, on the basis of what I have seen, I firmly believe that psychoanalysis *can* help people to see reality more clearly, so that they can help to improve the world, and even to enjoy it in the process.

What Psychoanalysis Has Done

The potentialities of psychoanalysis for assisting human advancement are tremendous. So are the potentialities of nuclear energy. In both cases, I am referring to what *might* be done with the valuable ideas, techniques, and ideology, after elimination of the anti-human and unscientific elements.

But the overall result of psychoanalysis, like that of nuclear energy, has been basically anti-human so far, it seems to me. It has had a profoundly destructive effect on human thinking, despite the assistance it has undoubtedly rendered to many individuals. Psychoanalysis is potent. It is potent in helping people to feel and function better, but it is also potent in making people worse.

The harmful therapeutic effect which psychoanalysis often has is frequently hidden by analysts' tendencies to blame the patient if he is more disturbed after treatment than before. "He must have been schizophrenic," they say, making a mystical, Kantian *Ding an sich* of this vague "disease."

But if psychoanalysts take credit for helping some of their patients, and they rightfully do, they must also take blame for harming others. In my own practice, for example, I find that the most difficult patients to treat are those who have failed with other therapists. In these situations, it is harder to undo the harm which the previous treatment has caused than it is to treat people who have not had the dubious benefits of such unsuccessful treatment.

Many private psychiatric hospitals have large numbers of patients who became worse in office psychoanalytic, or psychoanalytically oriented, treatment. The state hospitals know full well the glib excuses for uselessness and irrational behavior presented on admission by "graduates" of some of the psychoanalytically-oriented hospitals. These people are worse after treatment than before, so we must conclude the treatment harmed them.

The Pernicious Social and Political Effects of Psychoanalysis

From the social and political point of view, the overall results of psychoanalysis have been far more pernicious, I believe, than even Baran realizes. As often practiced, psychoanalysis is the most potent method yet devised for paralyzing the radical intellectual, and the Jewish radical in particular. Tensions, particularly of a racist kind, fill the air of our country, and vague, covert threats impinge on people these days, particularly when they begin to become politically active. The result is fear and anxiety.

There remains little political organization to provide solidarity and emotional support for such individuals. Indeed, many Left organizations seem so frightened that they tend to extrude the member who becomes uneasy. When in trouble, people no longer go to the rabbis and ministers for help and courage. Failing to realize that they are responding to the stimuli of a pervasively contradictory and threatening society, they consider themselves "disturbed" and seek psychoanalytic, or psychotherapeutic, help.

The analyst, "high in a tower up a chamber to the east," doubts the existence of harassment in the present, suspects the patient's reaction is "paranoid" and assumes that the roots of the fears of the

present lie somewhere in the past. The patient accepts this concept and withdraws interest from the present in order to examine the past. Amorphously and sincerely, analyst and patient then go to work examining the latter's childhood.

The paralytic effectiveness of the treatment is maximized by the fact that both the patient and the analyst sincerely believe the treatment to be efficacious and scientific. This belief is enhanced by the fact that the treatment is sometimes accompanied by diminished discomfort, particularly if political activity, and consequent harassment, are discontinued.

And while the patient searches his past, the world goes on and opportunities are missed. I have often wondered what the role of the flourishing Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute was in 1932 and 1933, with particular reference to the paralysis of intellectuals of the Social Democratic Party.

The political effect of psychoanalysis has all too often been a substitution of procrastination for courage. "Contemporary moderns," psychoanalyst Allen Wheelis writes, "often put their backs to the couch, and in so doing may fail to put their shoulders to the wheel." This is the result, as Baran notes, of accepting a most changeable society as unchangeable, and leads to submission and conformity, rather than to change and creativity.

Search versus Dogma in Psychoanalysis

Within psychoanalysis, as in all other parts of ideology, a struggle is going on between scientific search and mystical dogma. Within the field itself, even today, increasing numbers of psychoanalysts are rejecting the biopsychological dogma of Freud. It does not work. Instead, they are searching out new and useful truths in the nature of the society.

While, as Baran points out, these psychologico-social trends still fall short of the truth, they do represent movement in a progressive direction within the field. They indicate a change toward increased recognition of the still basically unrecognized primacy of societal factors in molding our biological clay. It depends on Marxists, in the field and outside it, to point out that the essential "societal factor" which must be seen and changed is the existence of class contradictions within our society, contradictions which can be resolved *only*, so far as I am concerned, by a peaceful transfer of power from the

“elite” to the people, through extension of American political democracy into the economic field as well.

Search versus Dogma in Marxism

The struggle between search and dogma is not limited to psychoanalysis, however. It exists in the field of Marxism as well. Many previously accepted concepts may require correction and even—to use a dirty word—“revision.” Science, after all, revises its conceptualizations when formerly useful ideas become a drag; isn’t Marxism also a science?

One important area where Marxist thinking might warrant re-examination is its tendency to damn the entire bourgeoisie. Psychoanalysis, an important ideology of the bourgeoisie, reflects both its healthy and unhealthy trends. There is a tradition of political and scientific democracy deeply rooted in both the American bourgeoisie and American psychoanalysis. It was this democratic tradition *in the bourgeoisie itself* which drove back McCarthy, despite the signal absence of effective help from labor or the Left.

A fundamental conflict exists within the ideology of the American bourgeoisie. On the one hand, there is the tradition of freedom of peaceful dissent, which partly underlies America’s previously unmatched technological progress, and from which emerged John Dewey’s pragmatic philosophy. On the other hand, there is the fact of oligarchic economic control, with its ideological derivations of “elitism” and obscurantism. This conflict exists in the minds of every bourgeois, even those named Rockefeller and Stevenson.

Since there are such constructive, honest, democratic trends within bourgeois ideology, it appears that it might be worth while to work openly and honestly with the bourgeoisie. Such honest intellectual interaction is far more desirable than renouncing the constructive influence we can have on the bourgeoisie, and leaving the ideological field to Roman Catholic dogma and elite fascism.

Search versus Dogma in Religion

The struggle between scientific search and mysterious dogma exists in the much neglected and oft-maligned field of religion as well. The mainstreams of American Protestantism and Judaism today emphasize *search*—the search of each man for his own God, the attempt of each individual to realize his own potentialities. The

monolithic Roman Catholic Church, on the other hand, resembles much of the contemporary American psychoanalysis, insofar as both emphasize submission to dogma. The former kneels while the latter lies, each passively accepting what is presented as the doctrine of a great Jew.

Psychoanalysis, the ideology of the bourgeoisie, reflects both the scientific and dogmatic aspects of the class from which it comes. It, like the bourgeoisie, should be dealt with openly, peacefully, and scientifically, so as to retain that which is good and useful, without keeping the dead and dogmatic. Precision, rather than large emptiness, is the hallmark of science. Let us therefore be careful not to throw the baby out with the bath water—whether the baby be Freudian or bourgeois.

WE NEED NOT WAIT

BY PETER B. NEUBAUER, M.D.

Professor Baran has given his article a misleading title and it is therefore difficult to discuss it. A careful outline of the theoretical propositions of both Marxism and psychoanalysis must be the basis of any investigation. Only then will it be possible to come to specific conclusions and to answer the important questions: To what degree may a science present a true advance but still be misused by present conditions of the social order? To what degree is it itself a reflection of these social conditions?

Psychoanalysis would have to be discussed as a theory of the psychology and psychopathology of man, as a technique of treatment and as a tool for research. Similarly one would need an outline of the propositions of a Marxist psychology, or at least to apply consistently the principles of dialectical materialism to the clinical data in order to evolve such a psychology.

Baran is interested in the "social" aspects of Marxian psychology, and he refers to psychoanalysis only to the degree that it has reference to social conflicts. But psychic life can be understood only in its continuous interplay with biologic and social conditions. It is more than their simple reflection. It follows its own laws and its own mechanisms. The great achievement of psychoanalysis is based on Freud's freeing of psychology from the tradition of his time, which had reduced it to biological laws and to the function of the central nervous system. There is a similar danger today in the assumption that by knowing social laws and conflicts one thereby also understands psychic conflicts.

If Baran had been content to discuss the social frame of reference within which the individual functions, he would have given us an important outline. But he went far beyond this and thereby, as I shall try to show, ends up with an anti-psychologic position.

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He does not refer once to psychic processes, to the developmental organization, to the symbolic representation of the outside world, to the role of memory, of fantasy and thought processes, neither as a Marxian psychology would present them, nor as psychoanalysis does.

We can easily agree with him when he speaks about the dangers of viewing man too much from the individual point of view, which leads to the opposite mistake, namely, to the psychologizing of social events.

Baran has eloquently presented an outline of social conflicts in a capitalistic society. He stresses the increase of irrationality of our social order enforced by competition and the drive for profits. This in turn becomes an obstacle to human development, leading to an impairment of the spontaneity in man. Social conflicts have a direct and immediate bearing in certain areas of our interest: (1) for the understanding of whatever comprises mental health in the community; (2) for the purpose of prevention of emotional disorders; and (3) in order to assess the interplay between the social and neurotic conflict. This is to say, for an understanding of how individual psychological conflict can be reinforced or even exploited by social conditions. But this is insufficient to permit us to accept his definition of neurosis—that it is the irrational reaction to a pernicious social order—nor does it explain his finding that irrationality and aggressiveness in man are a refusal to accept capitalism.

When we explore the causes of, let us say, a phobia, our patients do not inform us that their central conflict stems from their relationship to social institutions or from their role in connection with the means of production. We have learned that each step in human development is influenced by the human example others give, by the quality of this relationship. From the study of children we have learned to raise these questions: *What* has happened to the child, *by whom*, *when* did it happen in his development, and what are the *specific characteristics* of this child? Unless we have the answers to these four factors in each individual life history, we are not able to understand a child's psychic life. It is true that the parents are exposed to social conditions, are influenced by them, and transmit them to the child. But again, the transmission is not a simple reflection. The parents, too, transform their social experience through their psychic organization, their degree of understanding or rationality, their degree of maturity. We are forced to explore each individual's own life history and we are happy to say that we have such an

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Individual Psychology today. While there is danger of over-emphasizing the individual, there is also the possibility of giving the individual unlimited attention.

We find that certain specific events and experiences within this relationship can lead to an arrest of further development, and that these patients then repeat over and over again their early pattern, which has become partially independent of changes in their environment. Our patients have lost the freedom to change with changing circumstances. Even if there should be a vast improvement in the social order, they would be bound to the old because psychic enslavement does not permit a free interaction between the individual and his environment.

These important processes take place within the family. The concept of a psychological environment is significantly not acceptable to Baran because it does not stand for society at large. But we need a concept which refers to that part of society to which an individual has a significant emotional relationship, namely, *his* environment. The role of the family as a bridge between the individual and social organization is psychologically of utmost importance. When damage has been done to a child *within* the family, so that neurotic conflict has emerged, the stepping out of the child into society will have only a secondary modifying influence on his further development. The extra-familial experience may ameliorate or reinforce the original problem, but we cannot regard it as the direct cause. The family has the capacity to protect the individual from the pathological influences of the social order, or the family may be the seat of such disturbances as to be responsible for much more serious pathology than is generally found in the community.

The capacity to love, to understand, and to reach maturity varies from individual to individual in each society. We have to emphasize these differences, for they alone permit us to understand why some of our patients suffer from phobias and others from depression, why some from an inhibition of sexual function, others from a perversion, why some are addicted to alcohol and others to success or to failure in the same society. This is the main interest of psychopathology. Statements by Baran that our capitalist society is responsible for sexual inhibition present a generalization beyond reason. Have these disturbances not occurred in other societies and isn't it true that we find not only inhibition but also the opposite—selfish indulgence with insufficient controls?

If we are not interested in studying the individual life history, the phases of psychological development which are particularly vulnerable to certain influences, the talents of each individual, his capacity to submit to present conditions or to transcend them, then we do not have a psychology. It is for this reason that Baran has not discussed any of the contributions which psychoanalysis has made to an understanding of these essential variables, and we therefore have no basis for discussing the correctness of this part of psychoanalytic theory. Without such an individual psychology, Baran arrives at the conclusion that "the insistence on the possibility of altering character structure on the individual plane is in itself an ideology," and that "the limits to the cure of man's soul are set by the illness of the society in which he lives." Such a formulation does not take into account the contradictions in each social and individual organization, the endless attempt of man to master nature, to change himself, and to substitute rationality for irrationality. As Freud has stated it, where there is *id* there shall be *ego*.

It is possible to learn about those psychological processes which arrest development and set off a neurotic repetition of conflict. It is possible to develop techniques to free the individual from such inner enslavement. It is possible to use professional skill and the continuous effort of one individual to help another individual free himself from internal and external restrictions.

It is true, however, that there are psychiatric disorders which are often less responsive to our intervention. If Baran had been satisfied, as he said he would be, to outline a sociology of the psyche, he would have made it easier for us to study his findings with the care which they deserve, but he drew conclusions which attempt to explain psychopathology while neglecting psychological processes and neglecting the individual, and therefore he has fallen prey to some errors he criticizes in others. Even when man shall have mastered society in such a way that its resources will be sufficient "to give to *each* according to *his* needs," we will still have need of a science of the individual and his inner life. In the meantime we can do better than just wait.

TWO RECENT MARXIST VIEWS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS

BY NORMAN REIDER, M.D.

Soviet Survey, a London quarterly devoted to providing facts and analyses of the Soviet Union, presents in its issue for July-September, 1959, an account of a special conference called on the initiative of the Presidium of the Academy of Medical Sciences of the USSR for the purpose of discussing the problems of ideological struggle with modern Freudianism. The account was written by P. P. Bondarenko and M. Kh. Rabinovich and originally appeared in *Voprosy Filosofii*, February, 1959. According to the editors of *Soviet Survey*, this document is of particular interest because it represents a new line in Soviet psychology and not just the view of an individual writer. This new line, they say, is much better informed and much more sophisticated than the official line of ten or even five years ago, and the conference in question dealt with problems which previously would have been ignored as wholly irrelevant.

The implication in the title of the conference that there is something modern about Freudianism is a promising beginning, but unfortunately the promise is not fulfilled. An introductory speech by Professor S. A. Sarkisov holds that bourgeois countries have accepted Freud's theory that the basic forces determining human behavior are unconscious biological instincts originating in the sexual experiences of infancy. This unfortunate kind of inaccuracy characterizes a great deal of the document, which deals heavily in criticism of Freudians who use psychoanalytic methods "to mislead and pacify the workers." Many of the speeches that follow are clearly not scientific discussions but polemics against the imputed political implication of Freudianism.

This pattern is sustained by F. V. Bassin, who attacks the sociological applications of psychoanalytic theory. What is significant in this paper is the repeated statement that attempts to reconcile Freud-

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ian and Pavlovian theories must be fought. However, a cogent remark is made in the statement that Freud's error lay not in the fact that he gave much attention to the problem of conflict, but in his erroneous formulation of the problem. Freud is obviously not forgiven for having deserted the field of neuropathology, since "he renounced the study of neurosis as a consequence of disturbance of the normal interrelation of nervous processes and adopted a path of subjective idealism." There is a still further yielding in this critique of Freud in the acknowledgment that an impulse behind a particular action can influence behavior despite its being unconscious. Even though Bassin states that this hypothesis is given a mystical interpretation by Freud and that Pavlov's explanations are more scientific, it is nevertheless a distinct change for the official attitude to concede even this much in regard to the forces of the unconscious. On the whole, however, it is clear that for the most part the Soviets still consider psychology scientific only when it is neurophysiology.

This concession Bassin negates in the rest of his paper. He poses to Freudians the following question: "How can the Oedipus complex occur in children fed artificially and not from the mother's breast?" "What happened to the Oedipus complex in the matriarchal period, when children did not know their own fathers?" "What happens when children are brought up from infancy in orphanages?" He states further, "These simple questions proved fatal to the Freudians and to this day they are powerless to answer them, since the facts refute their attempt to reply from Freudian positions." The truth is that these excellent questions have been considered and investigated by many psychoanalysts. For example, Anna Freud's and Dorothy Burlingham's *Infants Without Families* published in 1944, presents some fascinating data on one of the questions. Such investigations have not proved fatal to psychoanalysis but on the contrary have fostered the growth of its theory and practice.

A paper by Dr. N. G. Gartshtein is primarily noteworthy for attacking two articles that had been printed previously in the MONTHLY REVIEW by Dr. Lawrence Kubie (March 1958) and by myself (December 1957), the latter a reply to Dr. D. Fedotov's "The Soviet View of Psychoanalysis" which appeared in MR, December 1957. There is nothing new in this paper. I am quoted as saying that Freud and his followers discovered an objective method for the investigation of the brain, a remark which is held by Gartshtein to be completely unfounded. I agree. Moreover, I never made

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any such statement, which an examination of the original article (p. 61) will show. Translations from one language to another are occasionally inaccurate. But this sort of knocking down of straw men is symptomatic of an over-defensiveness which would not need to be resorted to if the Soviet official position were sound scientifically.

In my opinion the most significant part of this symposium is contributed by Dr. P. K. Anokhin, who draws attention to the need of a more profound and more concrete approach to Freudism without over-simplification of Freudian views. The two most substantial remarks by Anokhin are: (1) "It was necessary to put forward opposing scientific-materialistic data to explain those complex intimate questions which Freudism has monopolized, trying to give them its own interpretation. It must be remembered that Freudism has not remained constant; it has changed, and its arguments have changed also. It cannot be said that Freudism ignores social phenomena; it distorts their nature and gives an incorrect explanation of people's behavior." (2) "It was necessary to squeeze Freudism out of those scientific fields which it was trying to exploit for reactionary ends, and to give a scientific-materialistic explanation of psychological phenomena." The rest of the symposium is largely repetitious by way of criticism of Freudian theory—particularly with relation to dreams and psychosomatic medicine—and its application to sociology.

All this is old stuff except for the bit of yielding as to (1) the importance of the unconscious in human motivation, (2) the admission that Freudian theory has been over-simplified, and (3) the suggestion that its subject matter and content must be taken over by the Pavlovians. This acknowledgement of the importance of the content of psychological data, which has hitherto been ignored as a kind of epiphenomenon, is in a sense new; but in the main, the anti-Freudian arguments are old, largely polemic, and are based upon incomplete appreciation of Freud's libido theory. For the most part these critics continue the argument as if Freud had written nothing since 1914 except the death instinct theory. The great advances that have been made in ego psychology are ignored. Thus the promise of a "new look" is disappointing.

A second contribution appeared in the October 1959 issue of MONTHLY REVIEW by Dr. Paul A. Baran on "Marxism and Psychoanalysis." This is a much more urbane, sophisticated, and knowledgeable approach to the subject than that of the Soviet scientists. It is

refreshing to find that an economist like Baran has a better insight into psychological processes than the Russian writers, who are so steeped in the neurophysiological approach inherent in Pavlov. Baran perceives something new on the horizon, a sort of amalgam of psychoanalysis with some quasi-Marxian sociological notions. This doctrine, which he calls "socio-psychologism," holds that man is influenced by society, while equating "society" to the environment.

Let us follow Baran in what he considers the implications of socio-psychologism. First, he disposes of the theory that since human nature determines the historical process and since human nature is unalterable, all attempts to transform society are doomed. In contrast, socio-psychologism holds that human development is determined by the social milieu, or the nature of interpersonal relationships, from which it follows that improvements can be made by suitable "adjustments" in the prevailing environment. Socio-psychologism, according to Baran, uncovers horrors in our culture and therefore is nearer to the realities of capitalism, but it proceeds to blame our difficulties on our own inefficiencies and refuses to see the fundamental causes of our problems in the very nature of capitalism itself. Baran holds that Marxists are in error in combating such new versions of the psychological approach by means of their old arguments, and that it is a mistake not to extract what is good from socio-psychologism, "whatever genuine insights may be submerged" in this new approach.

Baran's arguments are incisive, at times witty, at times sarcastic, and at times erroneous. But as I indicated above, it is decidedly refreshing to find a Marxist who does not hold that all of Freud is bunk. Baran acknowledges that Freud directed his studies to a rational understanding of the irrational motivations in man. Where Freud goes wrong in his view, is not in his aim but in holding that human nature is invariable. Baran believes that changes have taken place in "human nature," for example, an increase in rationality with changes in the methods of production. This has caused a change in the mental habits of man. Baran's meaning is not entirely clear here, but I take it that he means that magical thinking plays a smaller role in the mental processes of man than previously.

Baran's thesis holds that the alienation of man from his means of production leads to the madness of our economic system, which in turn leads to the alienation of man from himself. Under such circumstances, human rationality becomes crippled and bears no relation-

ship to the prerequisites for and the needs of human health, happiness, and development. Another way of stating his thesis leads to the conclusion that the conflict between "partial rationality" and "total rationality" leads to man's psychological aberrations.

Baran concludes that irrationality in our times is not a development from unalterable human instincts, but rather that advances in capitalism have led to a radical subjugation of the nature of man himself. Whereas previously violence was used by the ruling class to keep the workers down, now the capitalist enforces a subtler "adjustment." Now the worker has become a more diligent, docile, efficient, and reliable worker, but a high price has been paid in the loss of spontaneity. Again Baran's superior approach leads him to say, in contrast to the Russians quoted above, that he does not think this is a plot on the part of capitalists to turn workers into "diligent, docile, efficient, and reliable workers," but that this trend derives from an inherent characteristic of a mode of production which is based upon commodity exchange.

Baran's thoughts lead him to make an almost heretical remark that Marx, Engels, and Freud all strove towards the same goal: to increase human happiness via freedom of individual development and the capacity to experience sensual gratifications. However, he holds that under capitalism aggression is so disciplined and channeled toward the attainment of success that it leads to what Freud called the "alienation of man from himself." Therefore, according to Baran, the only change that is possible in man must come as a result of a change in the framework of his socio-economic condition.

Baran's ideas, which I have of course abbreviated, are superior to the neurophysiological approach of the Russians in holding that at least there are innate biologically determined drives that do play a role in psychic development. However, he stumbles on the old anti-Freudian dogma that human nature is unalterable and that all attempts to transform human character are therefore doomed. If the innate biologically-determined, instinctual drives have shown a certain fixity, it does not follow that their derivatives cannot change. As a matter of fact, it is the effort to understand the very effects of all sorts of forces on the innate structure which constitutes one of the major objectives of psychoanalytic study. Moreover, Baran's argument falls back on an old saw, namely, that treatment of emotional disturbances invariably tends to take the fight out of an individual and make him adjust to his environment.

Baran's psychological contribution lies in his belief that human nature has changed, as evidenced by an increase in man's rationality as methods of production have progressed, and that this progress has produced changes in the mental habits of man. This interesting thesis is a simplified attempt to account for whatever changes have taken place in the course of man's historical development. To attempt to cover this subject would necessitate an extremely long exposition, and I shall therefore restrict myself to only one point. Baran seems to ignore that there is onto-genetic development of the psyche, which is of necessity a very slow process. From a condition in which magical thinking holds sway there gradually develops a variety of educative processes which lead to rational thinking. Moreover, there are forms of magical infantile thinking that remain throughout each individual's life. If this kind of magical thinking is what Baran means by "human nature," then I hold that it is likely to remain unchanged so long as man exists on this planet. If the Marxist ideal is the production of infants who are born with a perceptual, discriminative, and executive psychical apparatus that can at birth distinguish between Mozart and boogie-woogie and have a knowledge of the calculus and the Bill of Rights, I hold that this is a form of sheer irresponsible idealism which is being foisted on the masses as one of the new tranquilizers. Further, by putting emphasis upon rationality versus irrationality, Baran misses the point of the difference between emotional life and intellectual life. The relationship between the two is a most interesting area of study, but the equation of rationality and healthy emotional life, implying as it does that the healthy human being must be an intellectual, is taking for granted much more than there is any warrant for in Baran's argument.

In our present social structure there is much to foster irrational drives toward success and a sadistic type of competitive life. It draws out much of what is aggressive in ourselves and distorts love relationships, affection, mutual respect, and cooperation. But to suggest that a socialist transformation of the socio-economic structure will *per se* make for major changes in human nature and in the human psyche, though a consummation apparently to be wished, is, to use Baran's own phrase, "claptrap." Nor can Baran take refuge in the argument, which he implies, that whatever defects exist in present-day socialist societies are vestiges of the capitalist order. A wiser interpretation is one suggested by Engels, that under socialism man would cease

suffering like an animal and begin to suffer like a human being. But Baran's fostering of the thesis that economic changes in themselves will resolve human problems is a form of sheer irresponsibility.

If Baran really believes that his thesis is scientific and not merely an article of faith, then he should be able to demonstrate how a psychological system based on Marxism could step by step indicate how economic changes would influence cultural patterns, which in turn would influence the family structure, which in turn would influence interpersonal relationships, which in turn would influence psychodynamic mechanisms and psychic development. Any systematic attempt to explain what Baran holds as his thesis need not follow exactly the above formula, to be sure, but at least it should avoid the mythological monstrosity that methods of production have a direct effect upon the human psyche. Even the followers of Pavlov would not hold that changes in the methods of production cause directly observable changes in patterns of cerebral-neuronal activity. This even they would recognize as pseudo-Marxism.

Dialectical materialism in psychology should be able to propose (1) a systematic theory of the development of the psyche, which would serve as a basis for some sort of study of biologically determined drives and their vicissitudes under different conditions; (2) a theory of symptom-formation; and (3) a theory of treatment. At present the official Soviet position has, at best, no theory of psychic development (a remarkable thing in view of the emphasis of Marxists on the historical approach); a neurophysiological theory of symptom-formation which is detached from emotional problems as such and considers the content of symptoms as meaningless waste products; and a chaotic theory of treatment made up of a conglomerate of biochemical, neurophysiological, and social elements, all essentially doctrine-oriented rather than individual-oriented.

Two encouraging signs in regard to the problem of Marxism and Freudism do exist. One I pointed out in my earlier article in MR (December, 1957) in which I stated that there were many things incomplete and possibly inaccurate in psychoanalytic theory and practice, but they were none of the items that are stressed in the Soviet critiques. Psychoanalytic theory and practice are constantly being revised in the light of new findings in experimental and clinical fields, and the best place to find these changes is in the psychoanalytic journals themselves. They illustrate that psychoanalysts are self-

critical. The second sign is one that I picked up from listening to American psychiatrists who have spent time recently in visits to psychiatric facilities in the USSR. In spite of official attitudes, when these psychiatrists have discussed clinical material (and not theory) with Soviet colleagues they found in the more advanced clinical centers little reliance upon official theory, but a reliance upon an understanding of psychodynamics and a growing clinical experience which is essentially sound from the American observers' point of view. This is not the first time that theory and practice have not gone hand in hand, and is illustrative of something that has been frequently pointed out: that sooner or later if one attempts to treat individuals he must perforce come in contact with and treat patients via a dynamic psychotherapy; he must perforce come to the utilization of Freudian concepts whether he acknowledges them or not.

REPLY

BY PAUL A. BARAN

Although differing among themselves in emphasis and detail, the preceding observations on my lecture "Marxism and Psychoanalysis" center on three broad issues. First, the scope of the human predicament in our society; second, the causes of the prevailing condition; and third, the extent to which currently practiced psychotherapy may be able to cure individuals seeking its help. While it would far transcend my competence to attempt to "cover" even approximately such formidable ground, I will try a necessarily brief summary of my principal reflections on the views advanced by my critics.

The first issue is raised most explicitly by Dr. Krich. "All of us," he writes, "live under monopoly capitalism, but only 15 percent of us break down under its pressure or are seized with its 'macro-madness.' The rest of us hang on to our culture's 'micro-sense.'" This statement reveals, I submit, that its author missed not only the point of my lecture but, what is much more serious, he has missed the intent and content of the theoretical work of both Marx and Freud. For neither Marx's sociology nor Freud's psychology is concerned solely or even primarily with social and psychic *pathology*, with pronounced, diagnostically identifiable social or psychic *illness* calling for specific, pragmatic therapy. At least in this regard Marx and Freud were treading on the same ground. Both were seeking to comprehend the visible pathological excrescences of social existence in their relation to the "statistical norm," to discern in the condensed, one might say exaggerated, manifestation of suffering the less intense but universal malaise hidden beneath the relatively calm surface of everyman's everyday life. Treating these excrescences as "deplorable exceptions" that have to be explained, and if possible cured, may well be a legitimate preoccupation of what Krich commends as "clinical empiricism," but it is certainly not conducive to insight into the fundamental problem involved. Indeed, far from referring exclusively to the "15 percent of us [who] break

down," the problem is precisely the nature of the culture to which the 85 percent "hang on"—the culture that produces the more or less violent breakdown of the "only" 15 percent, and the more or less supportable *misère psychologique* (Freud) of the 85 percent.

This is not the place to attempt a description of this culture or to detail its repressive, irrational, neurosis-breeding characteristics. Some of the relevant considerations were indicated briefly in my lecture and there is abundant material on this subject in the sociological and psychological literature. Whether we examine the general cultural standards of our society or the prevailing state of education, whether we consider race relations or juvenile delinquency, whether we think about the increasingly pronounced breakdown of the family or the incidence of alcoholism and suicide—there can be no doubt about the illness of our society, about the glaring incompatibility of its institutions with the health, happiness, and development of man. To be quite clear about it: the question relates *not* to the *subjective* reaction to the prevailing condition on the part of those whom it affects. Even if all 100 percent of society, not only Krich's 85 percent, were content to "hang on" to the existing state of affairs, the finding of the *objective* inadequacy of the existing social order would remain valid. What is more, such a state of mass intoxication and "tranquilization" would in itself represent the most conspicuous and indeed most dangerous aspect of the entire pathological syndrome. It can be, and usually is, objected that under such circumstances there would be no criteria left for judging an existing state of society. Freud was fully aware of this difficulty even if only implicitly indicating a solution: "In the neurosis of an individual we can use as a starting point the contrast presented to us between the patient and his environment which we assume to be 'normal.' No such background as this would be available for any *society similarly affected*; it would have to be supplied in some other way." (Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, London, 1955, p. 142. Italics added.) This "other way" is *social thought*—the age-old philosophical, scientific, artistic, and practical effort to develop standards for man's "right way of life," to clarify the concept of what constitutes a "good society." What Dr. Krich haughtily dismisses because of "operational inutility" is actually not just my modest bit of theorizing but all of the truth-searching tradition of mankind, whether it has found expression in the Bible or in the Koran, in the meditations of the Greek philosophers or in

the creations of the Renaissance artists, in the writings of Shakespeare and Tolstoy, or in the far-flung studies of Marx and Freud. All of these endeavors were "operationally useless"—except that it is thanks to just this unremitting, all-embracing quest for the clarification and creation of the prerequisites of the "good life" that we are able today to specify with much more precision than in earlier times what the conditions are that need to be fulfilled for the somatic and psychic welfare and growth of man. The denial of the possibility to identify, let alone establish, such conditions reflects either the ideological blinkers of empiricist agnosticism that (by no means fortuitously) obscure intellectual vision in our society, or, (worse still), the vested interests of those whose primary concern is to discredit theoretically and obstruct practically all radical departure from the *status quo*.

It is with reference to these indispensable conditions for human welfare that we have to examine the problem explicitly or implicitly raised by all my critics: whether there has been and is a continual improvement of human life within the framework of the capitalist order. The answer is far from simple. There has been in this country as well as in other advanced capitalist countries a tremendous development of productive resources. It has resulted in a considerable rise of the standard of living and in an equally pronounced reduction of the burden of human toil. The process of rationalization and enlightenment to which this growth of productivity is intimately related has also led to a certain liberalization of mores and to a certain relaxation of tabus, weakening the reign of superstition and obscurantism. Yet it would be inadmissibly rash to jump from these undeniable facts to the conclusion that these processes have improved the psychic welfare of people. Comparisons over time are notoriously difficult, particularly if what is to be compared are psychic states of different people at different times, but a strong case can be made for the proposition that the material advances attained under capitalism have been bought at a very high price in terms of repression and alienation. In the words of one expert, speaking for many, "There is no indication that the mental health of the nation has improved. Delinquency is steadily rising; juvenile drug addicts probably run into tens of thousands (a phenomenon unknown in any other part of the Western world); we constantly hear of infantile schizophrenics, and the number of neurotics is certainly not less than it was under the sternest Victorian upbringing." (Dr. Melitta

Schmideberg, director of clinical service, Association for the Psychiatric Treatment of Offenders, in *Phi Delta Kappan*, December, 1959.) The rise of juvenile delinquency—probably one of the most eloquent indices of the deterioration of the psychic state of young people and of the conditions obtaining in their families—cannot be disputed:

The records of juvenile courts, compiled by the Children's Bureau of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, show that the number of children brought before the courts increased from 300,000 in 1948 to 435,000 in 1953. Only 10 per cent of this increase could be explained by the growth of the juvenile population. The court figures show the trend, but they do not show the full extent of juvenile delinquency. The Senate Committee on Juvenile Delinquency estimates that there are at least three juvenile offenders brought to the attention of the police for every child actually brought to court. So, at the current rate, the number of youngsters who get into trouble with the police each year is about one million and a quarter. If the rate continues to rise, as it has since 1948, the number will reach 1,700,000 in 1960. (Irving Adler, *What We Want Of Our Schools*, New York, 1957, pp. 109-110.)

Is there any justification for the view, apparently held by Drs. Neubauer and Krich, that it is an important "offset" to this profound illness of society that in our time there has been an increase in sexual activity, that now "we find not only inhibition but also the opposite—selfish indulgence with insufficient controls"? (Neubauer) It is surely a remarkable kind of "depth psychology" which judges the intensity of repression endured and the extent of genuine gratification experienced by people on the basis of the "turnover in the sex market" as measured by the number of sexual transactions registered by Kinsey and kindred researchers. One might have hoped that, if nothing else, this fallacy of psychological reasoning would be put to rest by the work of Freud. Indeed, it would seem to me that the very opposite of what is maintained by Drs. Neubauer and Krich comes nearer the truth. As the objective possibilities for human liberation from want and toil and exploitation expand, as the gap between the freedom that *could* be realized on the basis of the attained development of productive resources and the misery enforced by the capitalist order widens, the repressive function of capitalist institutions and culture becomes more rather

than less pronounced, the mechanisms enforcing "adjustment," conformity, and passive "hanging on" become more elaborate and more pervasive. And the more the realization of society's objective potentialities comes to depend on people's capacity to seize the historic opportunity, the stronger becomes the dependence of the system on obscuring and confusing the issues, on the denial of the very existence of those potentialities, and on the cultivation of a sense of contentment with such pseudo-happiness, pseudo-love, and pseudo-productivity as may be attainable within the capitalist order. The resulting state of deception, delusion, and paralysis thus turns, in the current phase of capitalist development, into the principal obstacle to human advancement.

This brings me to the second question raised by my critics, namely, the *causes* of the existing situation. Here Dr. Reider is flogging a dead or a wrong horse when inveighing against the "sheer irresponsibility" or "mythological monstrosity" of a view that "economic changes *in themselves* will resolve human problems," or that "methods of production have a *direct* effect upon the human psyche." The key words in those sentences are clearly the ones that I have underscored: "in themselves" and "direct." But who ever claimed that economic changes *in themselves* have a *direct* effect upon the human psyche? Certainly not Marx who repeatedly returned to the intricate relation between the socio-economic base and the so-called "superstructure," and whose concept of alienation encompasses the very heart of the psychological problem. Nor can it be fairly said about the lecture to which my critics have addressed themselves that it postulates a "direct" relation between the economic and the psychic spheres. There I was concerned precisely with the *mediations* between those two realms, with what might be called the "transmission belts" which connect the relations of production prevailing in a given epoch to the psychic structure of the individuals living in that epoch. In fact, the lecture represents nothing if not an attempt to draw attention to some of these "transmission belts" which are usually ignored or sidestepped in psychological thought. And since the role played by intrafamily relations is surely not one of modern psychology's neglected stepchildren, I did not feel an urgent need to emphasize a factor the importance of which is generally recognized even if not always put in the proper theoretical context.

If it is an impermissible oversimplification and vulgarization of Marxian thought to disregard the "transmission belts," and to consider the psychic processes as a simple, direct reflection of socio-economic relations, it is even more erroneous and more dangerous to treat these "transmission belts" not for what they are but as ultimate, irreducible sources of human conduct. This position is the essence of what I called psychologism and leads inevitably to postulating an autonomous psyche producing and reproducing itself in the lofty realm of the spirit far removed from the concrete, material bases of human existence. And the "mythological monstrosity" of such a concept of the human soul is not banished in the least by a "generous" acknowledgement that there may be after all some "interdependence" between the psychic sphere and that of the forces and relations of production. For the mere recognition of the existence of interdependence means very little both theoretically and practically unless it is accompanied by the identification of the active, leading component in the interrelation. There is not much to be gained from what may look at first like the profound wisdom of the proposition that everything depends on everything else. The crux of the matter is to discover what accounts *primarily* for the dynamics of the entire structure, what constitutes the Archimedian point from which it may be possible to move, to change the whole system. The neglect of this consideration leads both to theoretical sterility and to practical impotence. Thus Erich Fromm's insistence "that progress can only occur when changes are made simultaneously in the economic, socio-political and cultural spheres; that any progress restricted to *one* sphere is destructive to progress in *all* spheres" (*The Sane Society*, pp. viii-ix, italics in the original), while appearing to be most radical, would justify the renunciation from all meaningful *action*. Since social energies are limited, since different changes require different time spans, since finally some changes are more important than others—if for no other reason than because once undertaken they cause or facilitate other, derivative changes—the categoric imperative that either all changes should take place at the same time or none be undertaken at all amounts practically to a counsel of passivity, to support for the *status quo*.

It should be needless to say that the recognition of the necessity to assign different weights to different elements in a relation, that the emphasis on the inequality of the strength and influence of different forces making up the historical process is not the same

as the assignment of an *exclusive*, "direct," causative function to any one particular factor (or combination of factors). What it does mean is that changes in certain areas are more important, more consequential than changes in other areas, that action exercised in one segment of the whole has a greater impact on the whole than action exercised in other segments. Accordingly the Marxist view that the relations of production and the socio-economic structure resting upon them play a crucially important part in shaping *all* aspects of human existence not only does not exclude but indeed demands the concrete specification of intermediate links, of all the complex interrelations which weld the disparate facets of the social process into an organic whole.

But, to repeat, the recognition of the existence of this complex interrelation should not be permitted to become the night in which all cats are gray. It is *not* the psychic make-up of the worker that has caused the emergence of the giant corporation or of the automated factory. It is the objective economic process that brought into being these institutions of monopoly capitalism, and these institutions of monopoly capitalism have exercised a profound impact on the psychic structures of the individuals caught in their nets. And this does not imply that employment in an automated factory "by itself" changes "directly" the psyche of the worker, nor does it mean that in some way even the changes that do take place in the psyche of the worker have no "feedback" effect on the working principles of the corporation or the factory. What it does call for—and imperatively—is dealing with first things first, distinguishing between roots and branches, the attribution of the movement of the carriage to the horse rather than to the cart.

In the light of these considerations one can only rub one's eyes in astonishment at Dr. Neubauer's argument: "When we explore the causes of, let us say, a phobia, our patients do not inform us that their central conflict stems from their relationship to social institutions or from their role in connection with the means of production." This is indeed "clinical empiricism" gone wild! What would be the need for any *analysis* if all we had to do to establish the causes of any human and social phenomenon were to register whatever information may be supplied by the individuals affected? I wonder how many somatic patients inform their physicians that the Koch bacillus is the cause of the tuberculosis of their lungs, or how many mental patients inform their therapists that their infantile

fantasies or the methods of child rearing to which they were exposed have something to do with their character formation? And for that matter, how many businessmen report that their profits or losses are due to certain developments in the realm of aggregate saving and investment? As Marx once remarked, "all science would be superfluous if the appearance of things coincided directly with their essence."

When it comes to the third issue raised in the preceding articles—the therapeutic value of psychoanalysis—the discussion becomes difficult indeed. Having no professional qualifications in this area, I must confine myself to a few theoretical observations. As stated in the concluding paragraph of my lecture, I do *not* deny the "possibility of individuals who are ill finding a measure of relief through currently available means of psychiatric treatment." In other words, I am perfectly willing to grant that psychiatry (of whatever doctrinal orientation) may be capable of enhancing the patient's ability to cope with the surrounding reality and/or to carry his travails with a lessened sense of unhappiness. Yet, as Freud recognized, "neurosis and psychosis are both of them an expression of the rebellion of the *id* against the outer world, of its 'pain,' unwillingness to adapt itself to necessity . . . or, if one prefers, of its incapacity to do so." ("The Loss of Reality in Neurosis and Psychosis," *Collected Papers*, Vol. II, p. 279.) This raises a problem of the utmost importance. The "outer world" against which the "id" rebels is both a physical and a social world; on the one hand, the hardships, privations, and toil imposed by scarcity and the effort required by man's struggle with nature; on the other hand, the repression, compulsion, and suffering which a social order based upon the exploitation of man by man inflicts upon the individual. To be sure, both of these "outer worlds" are aspects of the same reality; it is indispensable, however, to see them in their unity and dialectical interaction as well as in their specificity and differentiation. For to the extent to which the individual rebels against the constraints of the physical world and the oppressiveness of the social order founded upon and resulting from it, his rebellion is a rebellion against what Freud refers to as "necessity." Insofar, however, as the oppressiveness of the social order is no longer a reflection and inevitable outgrowth of physical scarcity but a means for the perpetuation of the existing relations of production in the interests of a privileged, exploitative minority, to this extent the individual's rebellion ceases to be a rebellion against

“necessity.” If he is caught—as he usually is—in the comprehensive network of bourgeois ideology, the main tenet of which is the treatment of *social* relations as if they were physical, natural relations, his rebellion becomes misguided, shifts from the actual source of his suffering to an imaginary source and develops into a destructive and self-destructive drive. Only if he is capable of piercing the fog of bourgeois mentality and of recognizing that it is the social order in which he lives that blocks the attainment of genuine plenty and the growth, development, and freedom of man, can the individual turn his rebellion against the *real* obstacles to his happiness and thus direct his protest against a meaningful target. To avoid a possible misunderstanding: I do not mean to suggest that the social order and its injunctions do not confront the individual as a necessity. The necessity involved is, however, a dialectical necessity: ineluctable and inexorable at one stage of historic development, it is brittle and overthrowable at another—given sufficient determination, courage, and insight on the part of people.

If psychoanalysis would undertake to advance the individual's understanding of the precise nature of the “outer world” which imposes upon him his privations and his suffering and thus reorient his protest from fetishes to the actual causes of his distress, it would perform a progressive task. Yet such has not by any means been the function of psychoanalysis, as pointed out by Dr. Lehrman. Freud himself, as well as most of his followers, subsumed *both* aspects of the “outer world”—the physical *and* the social—under the concept of “necessity,” with this necessity seen as stemming from essentially unalterable biologically determined libidinous drives. Even some sociologically-minded writers such as C. Wright Mills and Herbert Marcuse, tend unwittingly to obscure the matter by attributing the “necessity” of the “outer world” in the present historical epoch to “civilization” or to “modern industrial society” rather than to the specific, concrete socio-economic relations of monopoly capitalism. Quite naturally, if the “outer world” is considered to be an immovable wall, or, as in socio-psychologism, a somewhat elastic but essentially unchangeable enclosure—the only way of dealing with the problem of the individual is to reduce as much as possible his unwillingness or incapacity to adapt himself to this situation, to curtail and destroy his *individuality*. What Dr. Reider derisively refers to as an “old saw”—that “treatment of emotional disturbances invariably tends to take the fight out of an individual and make him

adjust to his environment"—is thus not a fortuitous outcome of therapy caused by the way it is "often practiced" (Dr. Lehrman); it is related to the very nature of the cure that it sets out to provide. And this is not contradicted by such successes as it may be able to attain. For these successes consist at best in "transfers" of individuals from Dr. Krich's 15 percent group to Dr. Krich's 85 percent group. It is very far from my wish to minimize the vital importance of such a "transfer" to the suffering individual. No price in resignation, in "life adjustment," in tranquilization may be too high for him to pay for some ability to get along, to "hang on," to experience some modicum of gratification. It should be clear, however, that this outcome is a cure only in the limited sense of "killing the pain."

A genuine solution of the human predicament in the present stage of our development is not achievable except through a far-reaching transformation in the basic existential conditions of society. The process of production which under capitalism dominates man must be brought under his conscious control and turned from a governor into a tool of his life. This is an indispensable prerequisite for true human freedom and therefore also *the fundamental requirement for the growth and development of the individual*. Dr. Neubauer is grievously mistaken in saying that "when man shall have mastered society . . . we will *still* have need for a science of the individual and his inner life." (Italics added.) It is exactly the other way round! Only when the socio-economic apparatus of repression, domination, and exploitation is destroyed and replaced by an "association in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all" (Marx and Engels)—only then will there be a real "science of the individual and his inner life," for only then will there be a possibility for the existence and flowering of the individual himself. Only when the "furies of private property" are tamed and eventually banished, only when the repressive, destructive, and dehumanizing relations and ideology of capitalism are rendered fossils of a dark past—only then will people be able to face directly and to deal rationally with the challenges, the perplexities, and the immense potentialities encompassed by the human soul.

APPENDIX

THE SOVIET VIEW OF PSYCHOANALYSIS

BY D. FEDOTOV, M. D.

In the Soviet Union we greatly honor everything of genuine worth in our own national as well as in world science. We cherish the germs of human reason that have come down to us from past millennia, such as the writings of Hippocrates and the *Canon* of medical science by Abou-Ali-Ibn-Sina (Avicenna); we revere the heroic labors of Edward Jenner and the immortal work of Elie Mechnikov; we admire the scientific realism of Claude Bernard and the immense intellectual sweep of Ivan Sechenov. Contrary to the calumnies of our ill-wishers, in no other land is there such profound respect for Charles Darwin and Paul Ehrlich, for Luther Burbank and Louis Pasteur as in ours. We appreciate the scientific contribution of Edward Fleming and the strict objectivity of the outstanding researches of Walter Cannon. And when we speak of the great Ivan Pavlov, the creator of the materialist conception of the higher nervous activity, we at the same time bear in mind that this conception could not have been formulated without the previous labors of Sechenov as well as the great legacy of Darwin's creative genius.

We value highly the works of the advanced scholars of today. But while paying due respect to everything which is truly scientific and serves man's progress, we cannot indifferently let pass theories that are anti-scientific and that drag human reason backward. One such theory, widely held in several countries, is that of psychoanalysis, the creation of the Austrian neuro-pathologist Sigmund Freud.

I have received a kind invitation from the editors of this journal to express myself on the subject indicated in the title. I am glad to do so.

First, it should be pointed out that while in the 1920s, and earlier, a number of physicians in the Soviet Union did evince some interest in psychoanalysis, at the present time Soviet physicians, psychologists,

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and physiologists read psychoanalytic works only for the purpose of keeping in touch with the scientific interests of our colleagues abroad.

To meet this purpose of the Soviet scholars, our libraries subscribe to books and journals on psychoanalysis, along with other publications issued abroad. Also, a number of psychoanalytic works, particularly the major works of Freud, are available in Russian translation and are thus accessible to our readers.

But neither the theoretical works of the psychoanalysts nor their practical activities satisfy Soviet scholars and physicians. Indeed, both are rejected as lacking in scientific substance.

The reasons why this attitude toward psychoanalysis has become established in the Soviet Union cannot be grasped without taking into account the tremendous significance that Pavlov's teachings and the materialistic view in general have assumed in Soviet science.

Freud and his followers have been unable to find a method for the objective exploration of the physiology of the brain. At the same time, Pavlov's teaching has provided science with a tremendously significant method for such exploration. At the present time, both here and abroad, including the United States, a great deal is being done toward the mastery and development of Pavlov's teachings, and methods are being worked out for the objective exploration of the brain's functioning. The methods of conditioned reflexes and electro-encephalography, particularly, are assuming ever greater importance. In this way, the progress of true science is providing students with a means for the objective investigation of psychic processes.

Yet the psychoanalysts persist in ignoring the achievements of science and continue to treat psychic processes as something utterly independent of the physiological processes in the brain, the basis of psychic activity. In his *Lectures on Psychoanalysis*, Freud wrote that in its investigations psychoanalysis must cast aside all anatomical, chemical, and physiological theories as irrelevant and must operate only with psychological concepts that are specifically psychoanalytic. This position of Freud's continues to characterize, in essence, psychoanalytic work to the present time.

Our materialistic view renders such a dichotomy between the psyche and its material base quite unacceptable. In this ignoring by psychoanalysis of the scientific discoveries in the physiology of the brain we discern a reactionary tendency to drag science backward.

This position of psychoanalysis, the position of separating the psyche from the brain, has, quite naturally, a negative effect in practice. We will permit ourselves only one example.

The psychoanalysts have often turned their attention to ulcerous affections. A number of American authors, starting from psychoanalytic positions, have attempted to solve the problem by considering exclusively psychic factors. Thus, one of the leaders of American psychoanalysis, F. Alexander, asserted in an article which appeared a few years ago that at the basis of the etiology of ulcerous ailments lies a particularly intense and, by its very nature ungratified, "oral-aggressive" urge to satiation, an urge that has been driven into the unconscious. Hence the pathogenesis of ulcers is reduced to a fantastic psychological mechanism. Let us see how the same ailment is viewed by the proponents of Pavlovian views.

Academician K. M. Bykov (Leningrad) and his collaborator I. T. Kurstin, after thorough research, established that the etiology of ulcers is compounded of many factors: type of higher nervous activity, presence of characteristic "ulcerous diathesis," regimen of eating, living conditions, disturbance in the functioning of the vegetative nervous system, and various changes in the biochemistry of the organism. Such a broad understanding of the etiology of ulcers naturally determines the system of treatment. We are convinced that the one-sided view of the psychoanalysts in this matter reflects negatively on their handling of patients, and prevents the timely application of necessary and truly useful methods of treatment.

Similar differences in the understanding and treatment of sicknesses may be cited without end.

We are definitely at variance with the psychoanalytic trends in the understanding of the nature of the psyche. We start from the premise that the psyche is a reflection in the brain of objectively existent reality. Human consciousness reflects human existence and this insures the oneness of man and his environment. This is not the view held by Freud or by any of the later psychoanalytic schools. In psychoanalytic theory, the role of the external world in forming the psyche is extremely limited. The psychoanalytic schools cling to the notion that the unconscious is a separate subdivision of the psyche, essentially independent of the external world, the environment, and one that exerts a decisive influence on man's consciousness. Man is thus fenced off from the world, from the reality of which he is a part and outside of which, indeed without his oneness with which,

he is inconceivable. Thus psychoanalysis ignores the role of the external environment in man's psyche, it denies man's social essence. This psychoanalytic conception, too, affects quite negatively psychoanalytic practice. Here, too, we shall give one example.

In the USSR we are all against war, against aggressions and aggressors. We strive to foster in our children a love for peace and a feeling of friendship for all peoples and races of all lands. Psychoanalysis bases itself on the false proposition that man is by nature aggressive. Freud, in a letter to the famous Einstein, wrote that war was "a perfectly natural thing; unquestionably, it has a sound psychological basis and, in fact, it can scarcely be avoided." (*Letters*, Vol. V.) Psychiatrists in America holding to psychoanalytic positions (at least some of them) advise the providing of children with "atomic toys," with comics wallowing in atrocious crimes. This on the assumption that they would provide an outlet for children's aggressive tendencies. Such views cannot but further the spread of the "war psychosis," contribute to juvenile delinquency, and injure the health of the young.

Psychoanalytic theory denies the historical development of man and his psyche. The determining force in shaping man's conduct is, the psychoanalysts believe, instinct, particularly sex.

But the whole of natural science, the entire development of science, indicates that the psyche is the product of historical development, the result of man's being primarily a creature of social forces. The unbiased study of facts indicates rather convincingly that it is not the sexual instinct that provides virtually all the stimuli for human behavior, but, to the contrary, that the human personality as a whole, shaped by history in a social setting, determines the forms of instinctual manifestations.

Freud and his followers do not hesitate to propound a psychoanalytic theory of society and morals. They explain such phenomena as national oppression, the behavior of criminals, the social activities of people as manifestations of the same blind elemental forces, innate instincts, and drives.

Characteristic in this connection, for example, is the way in which Freud attempts to explain the inferior status of women which, as we know, exists in capitalist countries. Now this "inferiority" is wholly conditioned by the social structure of those countries. But unwilling to see this, Freud argued that because of the anatomic differences between the sexes the women themselves see themselves

as having been subjected to castration and think it wrong to regard "both sexes as equal in social position and worth." (*Letters*, Vol. V, pp. 196-197.)

It certainly is unthinkable that a scientifically unacceptable theory can offer an acceptable methodology even in one area, the area of treating nervous and psychic disorders.

Because of their disregard of the patho-physiological bases of neuro-psychic disorders, the circle of which is excessively and impermissibly enlarged by the proponents of psychoanalysis, the psychoanalysts underestimate the importance of modern methods of medicinal treatment.

Psychoanalytic therapy fixes its attention on the sexual aspect in the life of the patients. This unavoidably leaves a heavy imprint on the patients, gives them a wrong orientation, and results in moral trauma.

The psychoanalytic method of treatment, furthermore, fixes the patient's attention on the distant past, on early childhood, even on the prenatal period. This too pulls the patients away from the present, from the real conflicts in their immediate existence, and from their real and immediate perspectives. Surely it can scarcely be thought that the neuroses developed by an unemployed worker who has been deprived of a livelihood for himself and his family, by a mother who has lost a child, and by a do-nothing whose neurosis arose out of idleness and boredom, out of satiation and lack of any interests, all spring essentially from the same causes that had had their origin in the remote past. We hold that, while due consideration must be given to early, real, proved, and not imagined psychological traumata, the doctor's main attention in the treatment of neurotics must be centered on their present life, on the perspectives of the immediate future; that in the process of psychotherapy the physician must keep closer to what presently disturbs the patient.

Psychoanalysts cite positive results allegedly obtained through psychoanalytic treatment. The apparent cures of which they boast are, however, in fact but temporary improvements. Such improvements have also been obtained by witch doctors with patients who had blind faith in them. These seeming cures have been known since ancient times, the results of most varied "healing" methods. These are all based on the power of suggestion, the physiological nature of which has been established by Pavlov and his followers. In this connection, we can refer to the many observations appearing in the

literature abroad indicating how unstable are the results obtained by the methods of psychoanalytic treatment.

The source of neuroses is traceable to the social relations among people. Neuroses, as Pavlov thought, are affections conditioned by the imposition of excessive demands on the nervous system, in particular, the mental and physical strain resulting from painful experiences (psychic traumas).

This makes possible the development of sound methods for the prevention of neurotic and other psychic disorders. A knowledge of the physiological mechanisms of neuroses makes possible rational medical and psychotherapeutic action.

It is quite different with psychoanalytic theory which reduces the problem of therapy to the digging up and baring of "complexes" of "suppressed desires" in the realm of the unconscious.

As we see it, Freudism finds itself in crying contradiction to the optimistic tendencies of modern progressive science. Instead of exact knowledge based on experiment and verified in life, it proffers arbitrarily concocted hypothetical schemes. Instead of paying proper regard to the potency of human reason, Freudism asserts that man and his knowledge are under the sway of elemental inborn forces. Instead of viewing man as the product of socio-historical development, an integral part of his social milieu, Freudism, in substance, affirms the unrelatedness of man's conduct to the multiplicity of external conditions.

Is it not clear that human progress cannot be achieved by irrational and teleological investigations?

Only true science, based on principles of materialistic cognition, will secure the further development of human knowledge and help achieve significant successes in revealing ever more of nature's secrets.

We see Freudism as a form of reaction to the magnificent successes of materialistic scientific knowledge in the fields of physiology and medicine. In this it is not alone. Among the reactionary forces arrayed against genuine science belongs everything that bases itself not on principles of exact scientific method, but on speculative constructions masked as science.

In a fit of candor, Freud himself admitted in a letter to Einstein that his activity was an adventure in science. This, it seems to me, is the most significant of all of Freud's utterances. Freudism was and is an admitted instance of adventure in science. This is the reason why in our country it enjoys neither popularity nor respect.

A PSYCHOANALYST REPLIES

BY NORMAN REIDER, M. D.

It was kind of the editors to ask me to write a reply to Dr. Fedotov's comments about psychoanalysis. It is with mixed feelings that I have agreed to do so, because it is a sort of useless gesture to reply in any polemic way to old arguments which are largely derivative of an official governmental stand of long duration in the Soviet Union, which are not the result of an investigatory open-minded attitude towards the nature of psychoanalysis, and which arguments have been answered over and over again in the scientific literature. Nevertheless, the hopelessness of convincing Dr. Fedotov to his satisfaction is somewhat mitigated by the anticipation of a receptiveness on the part of readers to the possibility that Dr. Fedotov's arguments are not the last word in the matter.

I cannot resist the temptation to pick point by point most of the arguments of minor nature throughout Dr. Fedotov's discourse and to attempt to answer them briefly, after which I proceed to what I consider the more valid scientific grounds for the difference of opinion.

By way of initial summary, it can be said that Dr. Fedotov simply does not understand psychoanalysis or he would not write the way he does. For example, he states that Freud and his followers have been unable to find a method for the objective exploration of the physiology of the brain. It seems that to Dr. Fedotov psychology can only be neurophysiological psychology. Freud made it clear that he left the problems of the biology of man to the biologist, and of the physiology to the physiologist. It is also amply clear to Freud and his followers that there is no dichotomy between psyche and soma as Dr. Fedotov would have one believe. Freud was primarily concerned with the psychic representation of biological phenomena and not their physiology or chemistry, a fact that has never been grasped by many of his critics. Freud did not consider anatomical, chemical, and physiological theories as irrelevant. He considered them quite important in their own field and he even went so far as to express

the expectation that some day chemical means would be the method of treating all psychiatric conditions.

An example that Dr. Fedotov gives as the horrendous result of the alleged separating off of psyche from soma in psychoanalytic considerations is a brief quotation from Dr. Franz Alexander about the etiology of ulcers. This criticism of one aspect of research in the psychic aspects of the etiology of ulcers, having mainly to do with libidinal derivatives, is incorrectly represented as being the psychoanalyst's consideration of the total etiology. Psychoanalysts from Freud on have acknowledged that the constitutional diathesis and numerous external factors play very significant roles in all psychosomatic conditions such as ulcers, and they make no bones about it. That they happen to be interested to a great measure in the distribution and fate of certain kinds of libidinal energy in psychosomatic conditions is as much justified as when a biochemist is concerned in highly specialized studies in the cellular metabolism of the tubercle bacillus. One might criticize such work in the problem of tuberculosis in regard to many aspects, but one has no right to say that such work is valueless because it does not point out sufficiently the social factors in the etiology of tuberculosis. This is in effect what Dr. Fedotov does.

Nowhere does Dr. Fedotov show his lack of knowledge of Freud's concepts more than in his statement that the import of the external world in psychoanalytic theory is extremely limited; the psychoanalytic concept of the unconscious as having an influence on man's conscious life by no means carries the implication that man is thus fenced off from the world, "from the reality of which he is a part." This is a naive conclusion that is not an inherent part of psychoanalytic theory in the slightest. Nor are Freud's early pessimistic views on the inevitability of war necessarily derivative from his own theories. Apparently Dr. Fedotov is not acquainted with Freud's later opinions on war which were considerably more optimistic. But, alas, it seems that Freud's earlier sociological speculations have had more verification than his later ones.

Surely to attribute to Freud or to his followers any view that they "advise the providing of children with 'atomic toys,' with comics wallowing in atrocious crimes," sounds as if Dr. Fedotov has fallen prey to a mite of propaganda. I know of no psychiatrists, whether of psychoanalytic persuasion or not, who "advise" such practices; I think that at worst a psychiatrist might on one occasion

or another resignedly condone them, realizing his relative ineffectiveness in changing the world.

Equally striking in Dr. Fedotov's evidence of misunderstanding of psychoanalysis is the statement that "psychoanalytic theory denies the historical development of man and his psyche." It is the essential core of psychoanalytic theory that it is a genetic psychology, a psychology that places central importance upon the historical development of the psyche. Moreover, it is more explicit in its attempts to show how instinctual forces, which are biologically determined, are constantly undergoing changes under the influence of external factors, a dialectical concept which has more universal applicability than anything that has derived out of Pavlovian neurophysiology or any other system of psychology, at least to date. It is also true that psychoanalytic theory has entered into considerations of sociology, criminology, art, literature and other fields of human endeavor, again via a universality due to the nature of the theory, a claim which cannot be made by Bechterev's or Pavlov's reflexology.

There is a curious contradiction in Dr. Fedotov's arguments. He attacks psychoanalysis as being ahistoric and then he attacks its treatment method as laying emphasis upon individual history. The same sort of curious contradiction exists in his remark that the source of neuroses is traceable to the social relations among people, a hypothesis which, after agreement as to definition of terms, would be quite acceptable to psychoanalysts as a partial explanation of the phenomenon of neurosis. But Dr. Fedotov continues that, "Neuroses, as Pavlov thought, are affections conditioned by the imposition of excessive demands on the nervous system." Now just what this has to do with social relations among people is not clear, nor is it then clear why such great emphasis is placed upon the medical treatment of neuroses which are caused by social relations. Should they not, therefore, be treated by social means exclusively? Yes and no, I suppose.

This sort of polemic discussion could be continued, but I shall leave these pleasantries to get to the basic issue. For some reason or other there has been a failure of Soviet psychologists to recognize the real essence of Freudian psychology. Their main attack stems largely from the fact that they appreciate some of Freud's concepts as being "idealistic" rather than materialistic. This is quite strange, especially since equally vehement attacks upon psychoanalysis have been made by "reactionaries," who agree with the official definition

of Freudianism in the 1955 Soviet edition of the Short Philosophic Dictionary as a science “developing the basest and most repellant instinctual tendencies”—only they call it materialistic and not idealistic! The point is that the theologian’s arguments that Freudianism has biologic roots are much closer to the roots than the Soviet view. Yet both fear it (or at least do not like it) and it is interesting to examine why. My own hunch is that all totalitarian systems have to oppose psychoanalytic theory since one of its sociological implications is that of putting the welfare of the individual above the welfare of the state. This by no means settles the question, I fully realize.

What is likewise important is that there exists a considerable literature, reference to which can most easily be found in Jones’s third volume of his biography of Freud, just recently published, of extensive discourses on psychoanalysis as dialectical materialism in psychology; this point of view has become quite unfashionable in recent years, perhaps regrettably so—and, then again, perhaps not—but at any rate these arguments are quite cogent and most interesting. Perhaps the Soviet psychologists have no access to the psychoanalytic literature of the 20s and 30s, and that is why such references are absent in the critique. Who knows?

To return: Freud discovered a method, analogous to those methods by which man’s urine, sputum, feces, heart sounds, brain waves, and gastric contents can be subjected to analysis and investigation; Freud found a way by which man’s dreams, thoughts, wishes, actions, imaginations, aspirations, reveries, and impulses can be studied. He modeled his own theoretical considerations on those of the physical sciences and achieved a consistent theory of the structure of the psychic apparatus, one of the greatest achievements of the intellect, even though he himself humbly called it an “adventure in science,” a subtlety which escapes Dr. Fedotov. Psychoanalysis, as a result of his efforts, is not only a theory but it has now become a body of knowledge and carries along with it a practice based upon the theory. The everchanging and inquiring attitude of the relationship of the theory to the practice, not nearly as doctrinaire as many of its opponents would like to believe, is a remarkable advance in scientific psychology, one which many so-called dialectical materialists would envy if they dared to understand it and give it a try.

Psychoanalysis has its defects in its theory and certainly in its practice, but none of these are those that Dr. Fedotov mentions.



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