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A UNIVERSAL UNITED NATIONS

FIFTEENTH REPORT

COMMISSION TO STUDY THE ORGANIZATION OF PEACE

ARTHUR N. HOLCOMBE, *Chairman*

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July 1962

**COMMISSION TO STUDY
THE ORGANIZATION OF PEACE**

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**Research Affiliate of the
American Association for the United Nations**

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FOREWORD

We Americans like to think of ourselves as a peace-loving people. We believe that our record in world politics supports this view of ourselves. We cite our persistent efforts to make a success of the United Nations as evidence of our naturally pacific disposition.

Unfortunately a love of peace does not automatically ensure the success of peace-making and peace-keeping institutions. It is always necessary for those who form the institutions to choose proper means to the desired end. One of the basic problems in making a success of the United Nations is that of its membership. Should every independent state be admitted to the Organization? Specifically, should states which have not always seemed to be peace-loving, or have not been independent long enough to show their true character, be admitted to membership?

These questions are urgent. The failure of the victorious powers in World War II to agree upon peace treaties with their principal opponents has left the peace itself incomplete and precarious. Should Germany, or the two Germanies, be admitted to the United Nations? And what government, or governments, should represent China, or the two Chinas, in the Organization? And what also of the numerous new and untried states which are springing from obsolete colonial empires now in full course of liquidation? These questions need to be answered before other basic problems, notably that of the role which the United Nations should play in contemporary world politics, can be satisfactorily solved. And these other problems are also urgent.

Recent critics of the United Nations, including some leading supporters of the proposition that the world needs a general international organization for peace-making and peace-keeping purposes, question its suitability in its present form for all the work that is required of it. One asserts that the world needs also an independent concert of free nations to undertake pressing tasks which he believes to be beyond the capacity of the United Nations. Another suggests that too much reliance on the United Nations invites disappointment and that great powers, seeking adequate protection for their national interests in this frightening age, should make greater use of other international agencies and

of the processes of conventional diplomacy. Still others contend that judgment cannot properly be passed on the performance of an intended general international organization which falls as far short of universality as does the United Nations, in its present form. These supporters of the proposition that the world needs an efficient international peace-making and peace-keeping organization insist that the present crisis calls first for a vigorous effort to strengthen the United Nations by making it as soon as possible a truly universal organization.

The worldwide discussion of the two hundred million dollar bond issue, authorized at the Sixteenth Session of the General Assembly, has caused thoughtful people everywhere to take a hard look at the United Nations Organization and make a fresh appraisal of its practical utility under the rapidly changing conditions of world politics. The task of appraisal is complicated by the unexpected way in which the Organization has developed. Instead of a consensus of the major powers, which through their permanent membership in the Security Council were to supply leadership in world politics, there is the Cold War. Instead of a return to normality after World War II there is the liquidation of colonial empires. Instead of a comforting system of collective security there is the arms race and the darkening shadow of a third world war.

On the other hand, the United Nations Organization has been unexpectedly serviceable in developing and using new processes of peaceful change in this rapidly changing world. This unexpected serviceability has been particularly important in connection with threats to the peace growing out of the liquidation of colonial empires, a major political phenomenon in the post-war period. If the possibility of peaceful change be a necessary prerequisite for peace itself, as may well be believed under the exigent circumstances of this troubled age, every effort should be made to improve the capability of the United Nations to serve in this way. We showed in our Fourteenth Report, dealing with the role of the Secretariat in world politics, how important it is to maintain this capability of the Secretariat, and especially of the Secretary-General, for mediation and conciliation in international disputes. We now think, as this Fifteenth Report shows, that a truly universal United Nations would be capable of serving even more effectively as an agency for international mediation and conciliation.

The inclusion of effective spokesmen for all the world's peoples in the general international organization will not only expand the existing facilities for multilateral diplomacy within the framework

of the United Nations. It will also maximize the possibility of peaceful changes in the world. The Organization cannot be made universal without at the same time disposing of some of the gravest threats to the world's peace. The failure of the major powers to finish the task of peace-making imposed upon them by their success in World War II has permitted these threats to hang over mankind too long. It is time to find out by trying what can be done through the United Nations to fill this noxious void.

The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace sees no reason for losing faith in the purposes and principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations or for relaxing efforts to make the Organization a more effective servant of these purposes in accordance with these principles. There is much that can be done without waiting for a Charter Review Conference, as we have shown in previous reports, to strengthen the United Nations and improve the organization of peace in this difficult age. The time has now come when the most urgent task for those who believe in the purposes and principles set forth in the Charter is to complete the unfinished work of the World War II peace-makers by making the United Nations a universal organization. How can the United Nations be expected to accomplish its mission in this troubled world when a quarter of the world's people are excluded from it or not effectively represented in it? If the peace is to be kept, it must first be made.

Some readers of the following study in the organization of peace may deplore the lack of specific proposals for the solution of some of the outstanding peace-making problems. We do not suggest, for instance, any particular solution of the German problem nor even terms for solving the apparently lesser problem of Berlin. It should be said here that the prescription of conditions upon which peace might be made in any particular area is not our present purpose. We are concerned in this Report with the development of a peace-making and peace-keeping process which we believe will produce results that should be acceptable to all who wish to promote the establishment of a reign of law in international affairs.

The proper development of this process calls for a universal United Nations. The steps which should be taken toward this end now are the topics of this Report. Finishing the transformation of the United Nations from a military alliance of the victors in the Second World War into a general and complete international organization is a necessary means for the further strengthening of the organization of the world's peace.

This Report has been prepared in accordance with our usual practice. Our Executive Committee determined its scope and

method and timing. A special Drafting Committee prepared a first draft of the text, which was carefully reviewed by the Executive Committee and further revised. Other members of the Commission have contributed helpful advice and drafting assistance. The Report's recommendations are approved by those Commission members whose names are attached at the end. Reservations by some members are duly noted. We are greatly indebted to the Fontenay Corporation of New York for financial assistance in the preparation of this Report, for which we express our thanks.

ARTHUR N. HOLCOMBE, *Chairman*
Commission to Study the Organization of Peace

June 1962

A UNIVERSAL UNITED NATIONS

I. *Need for a Universal United Nations*

The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace has always believed that the United Nations should be an organization with a universal membership. In our Fourth Report, published in 1943, we expressed the opinion that "the erection of a universal structure of law and order" had become a matter of practical politics. Our program for immediate action began with the proposition that "the United Nations and their associates should proceed now to establish the general international organization. It should provide for eventual participation by all nations capable of fulfilling their responsibilities." (See our Fourth Report, "Fundamentals," p.25.) Capacity to fulfill the responsibilities of membership was the only qualification specified in our original plan for admission to the permanent United Nations Organization.

The justification of this program was a matter to which the members of our Commission had given much thought. The real difficulty in erecting a universal structure of law and order, we then believed, "does not lie in any fundamental disagreement among thoughtful people as to what such an organization should be like. It lies in the doubt as to whether the nations of the world today are ready and willing to accept the responsibility of membership in an international system which secures peace by denying the eldest attribute of sovereignty, the right to go to war." We knew that it was idle to erect a system unless it would work, and that political organizations do not work, or at least work badly, unless they are supported by mutual confidence and good will. We recognized that the then Axis Powers were not qualified for an immediate part in a general international organization to secure the peace.

We were clear in our own minds, however, that a permanent United Nations Organization must eventually be a universal organization. "Any plan for world organization is destined to betray the very purpose for which it is made," we declared, "unless it is so drawn that those nations which are held back from participation in it at first shall, nevertheless, immediately become subject to its jurisdiction and may look forward ultimately to winning a place alongside the others." We did not specify the form of a test by which the qualifications of candidates for membership should be measured, but we definitely rejected the view that a state with a bad record for past aggression would on that account alone be permanently disqualified for admission to the Organization's governing bodies.

The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace has never changed its position respecting the desirable character of the United Nations. In our Tenth Report, "Strengthening the United Nations," published in 1957, we declared that "the Commission adheres to the fundamental proposition that the United Nations should be a universal organization. To this end," we added, "we believe that all states able to discharge the obligations of membership should be admitted, if they apply." Willingness to apply for membership seemed to us acceptable evidence of intent to abide by the obligations of membership. Ability to discharge those obligations would be the qualification concerning which the Organization would have to exercise a discretionary authority at the time of admission.

In our Eleventh Report, "Organizing Peace in the Nuclear Age," published in 1959, we dealt with the problem of membership at greater length. "We believe," we then wrote, "that every independent state should be a member of the United Nations and that every government actually in power within such a state should be permitted and encouraged to take part in the work of the Organization, thereby clearly acknowledging the obligation to respect the provisions of the Charter. The Charter contains the most advanced statement of the principles of civilized international relations to which states have thus far bound themselves by agreement. Universal acceptance of the obligations incorporated in the Charter is the necessary foundation for progress toward world order. Thus membership in the United Nations should not be considered simply as a privilege, but as a solemn responsibility."

That the erection of a universal structure of law and order had become a matter of practical politics was the view also of the four founding powers of the permanent United Nations Organization. In the Moscow Declaration of October 30, 1943, the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the Republic of China joined in declaring "that they recognize the necessity of establishing at the earliest practical date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security." Thus the rule was adopted that membership should be restricted to peace-loving states. By peace-loving was meant, as the event showed, the states which fought in World War II against the Axis Powers.

With the growth of the Organization in its early years the meaning of peace-loving expanded. States which had persisted in guarding their neutrality during the War were admitted to membership

without any particular inquiry into the nature of their love for peace, and eventually former Axis Powers also were admitted, Italy and Austria in 1955 and Japan a year later. Both of the first two Secretaries-General, Trygve Lie and Dag Hammarskjold, were earnest advocates of a broad interpretation of the provisions of the Charter concerning the qualifications for admission. Lie, in his ill-starred Twenty-Year Program for Peace, promulgated on the eve of the fighting in Korea, dealt with the membership problem in the fifth of his proposed Ten Points. Here he bluntly called for proceeding toward universal membership without mentioning any need for investigating the love-life of non-member nations. Hammarskjold sponsored no similar Program, but welcomed more than forty new members into the Organization with few questions asked concerning either their intentions or their capabilities. International lawyers might argue about the interpretation of the qualifications for membership, but international politicians showed little interest in their arguments. (See Quincy Wright, memorandum on Legal Obstacles to Universal Membership. Appendix A.)

The need for universality, though not clearly seen in 1945 at San Francisco, was evident even then to many of the delegates. (See Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, Ninth Report, published by the Commission, 1955, p. 20.) As early as 1950 John Foster Dulles, who had taken an active part with the United States delegation at San Francisco, confessed that "a growing weakness of the United Nations is its lack of universality." He added: "I have now come to believe that the United Nations will best serve the cause of peace, if its Assembly is representative of what the world actually is, and not merely representative of the parts which we like." (See his *Peace and War*, N. Y. 1950, pp. 188, 190.) This belief follows logically from the four main purposes of the United Nations, set forth in Article I of the Charter. It applies to the newest Member States, springing from the liquidation of colonial empires, as well as to those previously admitted to the Organization.

The first of these purposes is to maintain international peace and security. To that end the Organization was authorized to take various collective measures involving the use of force to ensure compliance with the obligations of membership. The Charter further provided that even non-members shall act in accordance with its principles as far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security. This provision, however, is not altogether satisfactory, because it seeks to compel independent states to observe rules of conduct to which they are not legally bound and the United Nations itself should always set a good

example of scrupulous respect for law. This difficulty can be corrected by the admission of such states to membership in the Organization, even weak and politically inexperienced states in tropical Africa.

The Organization was also authorized in furtherance of the first of its purposes to bring about by peaceful means adjustments of international disputes or settlements of situations which might lead to breaches of the peace. Here again the good offices of the United Nations should be more acceptable and effective, when the Organization is dealing with Member States, because non-members are under no lawful obligation to utilize its procedures of peaceful settlement. The Organization's effectiveness should be enhanced by admitting independent states to membership, by no means excluding newly liberated states in tropical Africa. In fact the experience of the first sixteen years under the Charter shows that the mediatory powers of the United Nations are more promising of satisfactory results than the coercive. As John Foster Dulles once wisely observed: "The possibility of peaceful change is the fundamental pre-requisite for peace."

The second of the Organization's purposes is to develop friendly relations among nations. Friendly relations, based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, as the Charter requires, cannot be assured, if some nations are excluded from the opportunity to communicate their views, and to acquire understanding of the views of others, in the general forum of the United Nations. Nations no more than individuals can be "civilized" by ostracism. The "practice of tolerance" and the will to live "as good neighbors," called for by the Charter, are hardly to be expected of states excluded from the "club" and branded as inferior. Nor are these desirable attitudes to be expected of Member States in their relations to non-members so excluded and branded.

The third purpose is to achieve international cooperation in certain specified and important fields of action. Such cooperation cannot proceed satisfactorily if some states whose collaboration is desired are excluded from discussions proposing cooperative action or from participation in the resulting operations. It is true that the autonomous position of the Specialized Agencies makes it possible for states to limit their cooperation to areas in which they may claim an interest, but the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly coordinate the activities of the Specialized Agencies. Therefore, whatever their particular areas of interdependence, all states, including the newest, weakest, and most inexperienced, should participate in the United Nations itself.

Moreover, the need for universal cooperation is particularly evident in the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The essence of these rights and freedoms is the recognition that all members of the human race are entitled to enjoy them without distinction on account of race, sex, language, or religion. The more respect for essential rights is lacking in a state, the more important it is that the state should be subject to the obligations of the Charter and the scrutiny of the Organization.

The need for universal cooperation is likewise evident in the fields of nuclear testing, arms control, and disarmament. Such cooperation can best be promoted by membership in the United Nations, which commits its members to discussion of the principles of disarmament in the General Assembly (Article 11), and to the formulation of specific plans for disarmament in the Security Council (Article 26). The newly liberated colonial dependencies may not be the states whose excessive armaments are most in need of limitation, but they are among the states which are most eager for effective limitations on the armaments of others.

Furthermore, there is need for universal cooperation in the development and codification of international law. A world rule of law implies the collaboration of all states in both the formulation and maintenance of legal rules, principles, and standards. While non-member states have been invited to conferences for the codification of international law, as for example the Conference on the Regime of the Seas in 1958, the initiation of projects in this field takes place in the International Law Commission and the General Assembly. Active interest in this work is desirable on the part of nations with experience under all kinds of legal systems. Acceptance of the results of international conferences is bound to be uncertain among states which, because of non-membership in the United Nations, have not taken an active part in the proceedings.

The fourth and last of the main purposes of the United Nations is to be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of common ends. For obvious reasons hostile or merely indifferent relations between members and non-members, far from being harmonized by discussions among the former in the United Nations, are likely to be aggravated by the exclusion of the latter. The admission of the newly liberated states is most desirable from this point of view. They have been so fortunate in many cases as to obtain their freedom without serious fighting and are specially interested in developing the opportunities for further peaceful changes in their relationships with one another and with the outer world. If the purposes of the United Nations are accepted as valid,

the admission to membership of all independent states, capable of fulfilling their responsibilities under the Charter, is logically necessary and proper.

At the beginning of 1962 there were 104 Member States in the United Nations—more than twice the original membership at the beginning of 1946—and the attainment of universality was in sight. Additional members may be expected from three sources. The most productive source is the crop of new states to be raised from the dependent territories of obsolete colonial empires in process of liquidation. A second source of additional members is the group of divided states resulting from the failure of the principal victor nations to settle by suitable treaties of peace sundry troublesome problems growing out of the defeat of the German and Japanese forces in the second World War. Finally, there is one member of the former League of Nations, Switzerland, which has refused up to now to accept membership in the United Nations. Altogether there may be more than half a hundred additional states which will have to be brought into the United Nations family in some manner—not necessarily in all cases as full-fledged Member States—if the United Nations is to become a genuinely universal organization.

II. *Switzerland*

The problem of Switzerland is the least urgent but most tractable. This well-governed and prosperous state was an active and useful member of the League of Nations. It contributed competent and dedicated personnel to the League Secretariat and administrative agencies, as well as able and forward-looking representatives to its political leadership. But Swiss participation in the League did not prevent the catastrophe of World War II and Swiss statesmanship preserved with great difficulty throughout the War a precarious neutrality. The Swiss had little difficulty persuading themselves after the War that they could continue to maintain their precious neutrality more surely outside than within the United Nations.

Swiss neutrality offers certain advantages to the major powers both in war and in peace. The protection of neutral territory may be a valuable convenience for various belligerent activities in time of war, and in time of peace the good offices of neutral diplomats are always available at the call of more powerful nations involved in threatening situations and embarrassed by the lack or the inadequacy of direct diplomatic contacts. But Swiss statesmen could render even greater services as officers of the United Nations.

Moreover Swiss contributions to its revenues would be very helpful in this trying period of financial stringency. The admission of Switzerland would be most welcome to the responsible members of the United Nations, if the Swiss could be persuaded to apply for membership.

1. *The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace recommends that greater efforts be made to convince the Swiss that the interests of a genuine neutrality can be better served within than without the United Nations.* Switzerland has always been a supporter of the World Court at The Hague. It has joined most of the UN Specialized Agencies, several of which maintain their headquarters on Swiss soil. The former League of Nations headquarters in Geneva has been turned over to the United Nations for use as its principal branch office in Europe. In short, Switzerland is already so deeply involved in the activities of the United Nations family that membership in the parent Organization itself is a logical, and should be an early, culmination of this relationship.

III. *Germany*

The problem of the divided states is both more urgent and more difficult. In the case of Germany the problem has been allowed to drift too long. When the War ended, the victorious Powers were laboring under the spell of the earlier German successes, and schemes for the permanent division of the Third Reich gained favorable attention in various quarters. Fears of a revival of German military power outweighed hopes for a German contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security. But now in parts of the West hopes for a German contribution to international security outweigh fears of a revival of German military power. Western Germany has already been reintegrated, and only Russian opposition prevents the completion of the process.

The potent fact is that the Germans stand at the cross-roads between the way of the Past and the way of the Future. The way of the Past was called Nationalism, and it once formed the broad high road between obsolescent monarchies, which were clearly destined to pass away, and more vigorous democratic states, which promised to usher in what we used to call modern times. But Nationalism has done its work in this part of the world, and in the extreme form which it took under Hitler's misguided leadership demonstrated its unfitness for an essential task of the present time, the building of larger political entities capable of managing the bigger problems of this nuclear and electronic age. It is time for the Germans to choose between renewing the dreams of the

republicans of 1848, and the fresh visions of their modern successors, who will settle for nothing short of European, or at least West European, Union. Would the contemporary Germans really be content with the completion of the task, which Bismarck only partially performed and Hitler botched, or would they prefer to be leading members of a wider political community, based on the further development of the European Coal and Steel, the European Atomic Energy, and the European Economic ("Common Market") communities?

No one can confidently predict the future of the German people. History offers to the political prognosticator uncertain guidance based on imperfect analogies. In the case of the Germans there is the analogy of their close relatives and neighbors, the Netherlanders, long better known as the Dutch and the Flemish. Once united as members of the Holy Roman Empire, they were eventually separated by the Protestant Reformation, the rise of the Dutch Republic, and the Westphalian Treaties at the close of the Thirty Years War, and the Flemish became associated with the French-speaking Walloons. Reunited at the close of the Napoleonic Wars by the Congress of Vienna, they could not long endure a close association and again broke in two parts, the modern Netherlands and another part for which a name had to be filched from classical antiquity. Now Belgium and the Netherlands are growing closer together again in the new Common Market and allied communities, to which the West Germans have also adhered. They all seem to be following a natural principle of political order. Outsiders with their own special interests should interfere as little as possible. Let the peoples of modern Germany be free to make their own decisions in matters that primarily concern themselves.

American policy in recent years has favored the closer organization of Western Europe. The Marshall Plan produced the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, replaced in September 1961 by the new Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. NATO produced the drive for a European Defense Community, frustrated by French resistance. But the Coal and Steel Community, the Atomic Energy Community, and the Economic Community (the "Common Market") are flourishing. The West Germans, who belong to all these communities, may look forward to a brilliant future as a leader in a gradual evolution toward an integrated political community, which would make Western Europe a new superpower of major importance in this rapidly changing world.

Americans cannot afford to take an inflexible attitude toward

the problem of Germany. We are pledged under the United Nations Charter to seek peaceful solutions to our international problems; we cannot have recourse to war as an instrument of American policy for Germany; we cannot permit the Germans to try to settle their problem by force. The possibility of peaceful change is the primary prerequisite for a satisfactory solution of the German problem. The American task is to help create the conditions under which it may be possible for the Germans to settle their mutual political relations peacefully and primarily in their own interest without undue concern for the fears or hopes of more heavily armed Powers with their own security primarily in mind.

This task can best be accomplished through the United Nations. American influence there should be thrown in favor of bringing Germany, or the two Germanies, into the United Nations. The Security Council should have an opportunity to recommend, and the General Assembly to decide, its or their admission. Which it should be, one or two Germanies, is a determination that can best be reached through the processes of parliamentary diplomacy. The genuine devotion of many Members of the United Nations to its purposes and their firm belief in its principles create an atmosphere favorable to a political rather than a military solution of the problem. All the major powers will have an equal opportunity to get the German problem settled consistently with their interest in the maintenance of peace and security. The sooner Germany, or the two Germanies, are brought into the United Nations, and become subject to the obligations of membership, the less the danger that this highly flammable situation will burst into hot war. The universal interest in keeping the peace must be made to prevail over the special interests of the various states concerned with the German problem.

The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace is aware that a strong case can be made for either of the suggested solutions of the German problem. A unified Germany would have to be a politically non-aligned Germany, if the consent of all the major powers were to be secured for that solution. What this might mean may be conjectured from the record of Switzerland in the League of Nations and from that of Austria in the United Nations. The Austrians in recent years, like the Swiss formerly, have shown that representatives of a non-aligned Member State can render useful service in a general international organization. A non-aligned Germany, it might be argued, should become an even more valuable member of the United Nations than Austria or Switzerland.

Significant proposals for the reunification and non-alignment of

Germany have generally been accompanied by proposals for the similar treatment of other Central European States, already members of the United Nations. The plan suggested by the Polish Foreign Minister, Rapacki, in 1957, and the similar plans put forward by the British Labour Party Leader, Hugh Gaitskell, and the American diplomat and historian, George F. Kennan, all provided for the non-alignment of other Member States on the broad border between the Soviet Union and Western Europe. These plans also contemplated readjustment of the relations between the non-aligned Member States and the military alliances to which they respectively belonged. Such readjustments could not be made without disturbing, or threatening to disturb, the relations between the alliances themselves. Eminent statesmen of the Major Powers seemed unable to make up their minds whether the hoped-for strengthening of the United Nations and enhanced security of Europe would be more or less than a fair equivalent for the expected weakening of NATO and the Warsaw Pact Alliance.

The alternative solution of the German problem would involve less disturbance of the arrangements of Major Power statesmen, but greater injury to the feelings of patriotic Germans. The possibly indefinite prolongation of the separation of East and West Germany would seem to be a high price to pay for the privilege of freely negotiating a reunion of the two parts of the country, when the use of force would be excluded and no easily workable process of peaceful change would be available. Moreover, eminent Major Power statesmen have been unable to decide whether putting an end to the risk of hot war breaking out by mischance in Berlin offered acceptable compensation for abandoning hope of making the whole of Germany communist or non-communist, as the case might be. Nevertheless, admission of the two Germanies to the United Nations would facilitate the process of settlement by parliamentary diplomacy, while securing to both parts of the German people all the solid advantages flowing from membership in the world organization. It would also enable harassed Major Power statesmen to share the responsibility for finding a solution of the German problem with the representatives of Member States better situated for the exacting business of international mediation and conciliation.

2. *The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace recommends that the German problem be referred to the United Nations.* Our Commission recognizes that German unification is not likely to be realized in the near future. But it is convinced that the time has come for the United Nations to take a hand in the search for a solution. Whether there shall be for the near future

two Germanies or one is a question which has waited too long for an answer. The Security Council should inquire into the advisability and possibility of admitting a reunited Germany, or the two Germanies, to membership and should recommend appropriate action to the General Assembly.

IV. *China*

The problem of China also has been allowed to drift too long. Like the German problem that of China involves the division of a once powerful country, inhabited by a proud people, eager to regain for themselves a suitable position in the world. But there are important differences between the problems of the two peoples. China, unlike Germany, is already a member of the United Nations, and possesses one of the permanent seats in the Security Council. The question is, which of two Chinese Governments is entitled to sit in the Security Council and in the General Assembly, and enjoy the rights and privileges of a Major Power.

The problem of China, again unlike that of Germany, grew out of victory, not defeat, in the second World War. The Province of Taiwan, or Formosa, taken from China by Japan in 1895, had been promised to China by her allies as one of the fruits of victory, and was in fact duly yielded by the Japanese after their defeat, although Japan retained formal title until renounced, without specifying to whom, by the peace treaty which went into force in 1951. But which Government is entitled to recognition as the government of China, the Nationalist Government which, losing effective control of the mainland to the Communists in the civil war, took refuge on the island, or the Communist Government, which has actually ruled the mainland since 1949? After 1950 possession of Taiwan by the Nationalist Government was guaranteed by the Government of the United States, which was unwilling that the island should become a military base of the Communist Government after the latter's intervention in the international police operation in Korea. But is Taiwan an integral part of China, or is it an autonomous territory, pending a final settlement of all the international disputes in the general area of East Asia?

There is another important difference between the circumstances of the two problems. In Germany a settlement acceptable to the United States could easily be reached by a popular plebiscite. A majority of the Germans would favor a unified republic under a non-communist government. But in China the Nationalist Government has clearly lost the mandate of Heaven, as the tradi-

tional Chinese expression runs. In Germany the interests of the United States call for recognizing the right of a majority to determine the political complexion of the whole country, but in China American interests seem to call for protecting the right of the people in Taiwan to determine the political complexion of their particular part of the country. Under these circumstances the Government of the United States finds itself in a real dilemma. Consistency would require the adoption of the same policy in the West and in the East. Inconsistency would be more agreeable to American interests, but would make fewer friends among the nations and diminish American influence in world politics. The German problem could at least be kept out of the United Nations. The Chinese problem came up at each session of the General Assembly, where consideration of the Communist Government's claim to the seat occupied by the Nationalists was regularly in order, and with increasing difficulty the American Government managed to keep it off the agenda. But this was merely an evasion, not a settlement, of the problem.

The Kennedy Administration wisely abandoned this policy of evasion. Consideration of proposed solutions of the problem of China on their merits showed that there were more than two sides of the problem. First, the Communist Government in power on the mainland might be recognized as the legitimate representative of China in the United Nations. Secondly, the Nationalist Government in exile on Taiwan might continue to be regarded as the *de jure*, if not the *de facto*, government of the country, entitled to retain its place in the Security Council and General Assembly. Thirdly, the Taiwan regime might be accepted as an autonomous region within the Chinese Republic, or an independent state, with a vote in the General Assembly in addition to that of Mainland China.

The case for the first solution was presented by the British Government when in 1949 it recognized the Communist Government at Peking as the lawful government of the country. It was excessively unrealistic, the British contended, to continue to recognize the Nationalist regime as the Government of China, when it no longer possessed any authority on the mainland. Moreover, ignoring the legal existence of the Peking Government was too inconvenient, when for instance negotiations were necessary in order to secure the release of missionaries and others detained in Chinese Communist prisons. It became dangerous, the British argument continued, and might easily have led to war, when the United States intervened with its fleet for the purpose of protecting Taiwan against forcible subjection to the authority of Peking.

Finally, it was a formidable obstacle in the way of general agreement upon the limitation and reduction of armaments and other enlightened measures which were demanded by the true interests of the West.

The people living under the rule of the Peking Government, constituting between a quarter and a fifth of all mankind, are an indispensable part of the world community, for which the United Nations with its forward-looking Charter is at least a living symbol. The General Assembly cannot reflect the various wants of the world community or voice its aspirations without authentic spokesmen for all the Chinese people. Parliamentary diplomacy cannot be practiced there with the best prospects of full effectiveness without the presence of their representatives. Moreover such an entity as the Peoples Republic of China should be clearly subjected to the obligations stated in the Charter. This requires its representation in the United Nations.

The case for the second solution has been forcefully stated by a private propagandist association, styled the American Security Council, in a special issue of its "Washington Report," June 1961. This organization was strongly of the opinion that the record of the Peking Government in its relations with its neighbors as well as with the United Nations did not support the claim that it was the government of a "peace-loving" state. The objections to the admission of Communist China's representatives into the United Nations were summarized in the following four theses: (1) "The United States's strategic position in the Far East . . . would be irreparably damaged." (2) "The United States's moral position as leader of essential Free-World alliances would be destroyed." (3) The United States should not support the two-China concept. (4) The United Nations would be rendered "completely ineffective."

The case against the seating of representatives of Communist China in the United Nations was widely accepted in the United States, where the participation of Communist forces in the military operations in Korea had made an unpopular war much more difficult for the American people. Though fifteen other Member States furnished contingents which fought alongside the American forces, the main burden of the fighting in Korea fell upon South Korea and the United States. The idea of Communist Chinese participation in a general international organization, whose authority they had been resisting on the Korean battle-fields, was highly repugnant. There was even talk of American withdrawal from the United Nations, if representatives of the Peking Government were admitted to its deliberations. Such talk gave the case against the Peking

Government greater influence in the United Nations than it might otherwise have had.

The case for an autonomous Taiwan, which should have separate representation in the United Nations in addition to the representatives of the Peking Government, has received less consideration than the others. Though sometimes called the "two-Chinas" plan, this is an obvious misnomer. Both the Peking and the Taiwan Government regard Taiwan as a Chinese province and reject all suggestions that it become an independent state. The Government of the United States declared its intention to return the island to China in the Cairo Declaration of 1943, but the peace treaty with Japan did not explicitly accomplish this result. In recent years the American government has steadily insisted that the Government on Taiwan is in law, if not in fact, the Government of China.

But conditions on the island are very different from those on the mainland. Japanese capital and enterprise during the Japanese occupation caused more rapid development of island industry than that in mainland China. American capital and enterprise in recent years have continued the development of the island until Taiwan has reached a more advanced stage of economic development than any country in Asia except Japan. The people of Taiwan, though of Chinese extraction, may not want a close connection with those on the mainland. The relationship between the two, if both were members of the United Nations, would have a better chance of being determined, not by force, but by pacific settlement.

In the Sixteenth General Assembly the problem of China was discussed at length for the first time. On Dec. 15, 1961, the discussion ended in a vote on a resolution introduced by the Soviet Union, calling for the seating of representatives of the Peking Government in place of those from Taiwan. This resolution naturally caused the advocates of all other solutions of the Chinese problem to combine against the advocates of the first solution. It is not surprising that the Soviet Union's resolution was defeated. The actual vote was 37 in favor, 48 against, and 19 abstaininng.

This result was not much more encouraging for the supporters of the second solution under American leadership than for the supporters of the first under Russian leadership. Neither side polled a majority of the total membership of the United Nations. Sixteen of the non-aligned and uncommitted Member States and three of the United States' military allies, obviously preferring some other solution, held the balance of power between the Russian and American groups. Four of the United States' military allies, significantly headed by the United Kingdom, supported the Russian resolution. The Soviet bloc of course voted solidly for its own reso-

lution. Of the other votes for the resolution twenty came from members of the Belgrade Conference of Non-aligned States and three from the other uncommitted Member States. It was evident that some acceptable form of the so-called "two Chinas" solution would have to be found.

3. *The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace recommends the recognition of an autonomous Taiwan, entitled to its own representatives in the General Assembly, in addition to the representatives of the Peking Government regarded as the effective government of China.* There is an excellent opportunity here for an imaginative act of creative statesmanship. The two parts of the Chinese people, protesting that they are all one people, should be more capable of settling their differences by peaceful negotiation within the frame-work of the United Nations. Before the employment of more drastic measures that opportunity should be provided for them.

V. *Korea and Vietnam*

The other divided states, Korea and Vietnam, present two problems, resembling in some ways but not in all the problems of Germany and China. Each of these states possesses an ancient history and venerable cultural traditions. Both have been tributaries of the Chinese Empire. Confucian Temples in the capitals and monuments in the villages to the success of local scholars at the triennial civil service examinations attest the long domination of classical Chinese political ideas and the wide diffusion of classical Chinese political institutions. Korea was wrenched loose from the Chinese political system by the Japanese near the end of the nineteenth century; Vietnam, by the French only a few years earlier.

Both Korea and Vietnam mixed their classical Chinese politics with the Buddhist religion originally derived from India, forming a solid base for resistance to the dogmatic Marxism-Leninism derived from the Soviet Union. Yet in recent years conditions in both made for a hospitable reception to new ideas of political and economic freedom streaming in from the West. Modern nationalism and anti-colonialism combined to make two proud peoples intensely desirous of possessing the advantages of both Western scientific and technical progress and a government of their own conducted by their own leaders and primarily for their own benefit. Each country boasted a population of twice the size of most United Nations Member States. In each intelligent young men with

modern educations looked forward to a respectable position for their state and people in the contemporary family of nations.

Both countries were divided by accident rather than design. In Korea the Soviet Union accepted the surrender of the Japanese forces in the northern region and the United States accepted it in the south. Each of these two Powers naturally wished to guide the further development of the country, thus casually falling under their control, according to its own sense of what was necessary and proper. The Russians wished to establish a Communist regime; the Americans, an example of the free-enterprise system. The Americans urged that the Koreans, of whom the South Koreans under United States influence formed a large majority, should be permitted to determine their own national character by a United Nations plebiscite. Thus the problem of Korea resembled that of Germany. The Russians stubbornly resisted the incorporation of their part into the whole; the Americans stoutly contended for the integrity of Korea.

In Vietnam conditions led to the contrary result. The Japanese had ousted the French from the country during the war, and modern-minded Vietnamese resisted their return. The regime which the French sought to establish was least acceptable to Vietnamese with political and economic ideas made in Moscow and leadership of the nationalist and anti-colonialist cause fell into their hands. Their greatest strength lay in the northern part of the country, where support from beyond the border was most readily available. When the French decided to abandon their claim to the country, possession of the North was surrendered to the resistance forces under Ho Chi Minh, and a regime more agreeable to French influence was installed in the south.

The settlement reached at Geneva in 1954 provided for the division of French Indo-China into three parts. Two of the parts, Cambodia and Laos, were declared independent states and admitted to the United Nations the following year. Vietnam, however, was divided between two separate governments, one operating in the north and the other in the south, and could not be admitted immediately. The state was to be unified later after a plebiscite to ascertain the choice of the people between the two regimes. But the population of the North exceeded that of the South, and the government of the Southern regime opposed such a solution. The United States also, though inconsistent with its position on Korea and Germany, opposed reunification by plebiscite. Thus the problem of Vietnam resembled that of China. Should there not be, therefore, since the conditions are similar, some kind of "two Vietnams" solution?

4. *The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace recommends that the Korean and Vietnamese problems be referred to the United Nations.* Every effort should be made to arrange at the earliest practicable time a general settlement of the problems of Korea and Vietnam. Our Commission recognizes that Korean and Vietnamese unification is not likely to be realized in the near future, but it is convinced that the time has come for the United Nations to take a more active part in the search for a solution. The services of the Secretary-General and his principal aides, who constitute the world's most valuable agency for promoting peaceful change in international relationships, would be more available for encouraging and assisting negotiations to that end. If successful, such negotiations would be an important step toward universal membership. This would make a substantial contribution toward achieving the purposes of the Organization.

VI. *Liberated Colonies*

The problem of the new states to be created from the dependent territories of obsolete colonial empires in process of liquidation is an extension of the problem already presented by the recent admission to the United Nations of numerous former colonial dependencies with little or no previous experience of self-government as practiced either in the modern West or in the classical Far East. In some of these new states periods of tutelage under the mandates system of the League of Nations or the trusteeship system of the United Nations, or both, have supplied limited training in modern processes of government. In others, notably in the former British and French colonies, fruitful opportunities for political education abroad were extended to the more promising aspirants for leadership among the indigenous peoples. In still others, notably in the Belgian Congo, educational opportunities had been restricted to persons in clerical or industrial occupations with little regard for the needs of future political development. In the colonies of countries ruled by military dictatorships, notably Portugal and Spain, there was even less concern for the political education of the indigenous populations than for that of the subject peoples at home.

From such sources, beginning in 1945 with the Philippines and pausing at the end of 1961 with Tanganyika, more than forty newly independent states have been admitted to the United Nations. A majority of these new Member States have been carved out of former colonial areas in tropical Africa. Indeed nearly all the new Member States admitted to the United Nations in recent years are of tropical African origin. With the addition of these

former colonial dependencies the Member States in Africa and Asia compose a majority of the total membership of the United Nations. The political complexion of the United Nations has been radically changed.

The original leaders of the movement to establish a general international organization for the purpose of keeping the peace, and helping to create conditions around the world under which peace-keeping might be most likely to succeed, were states in the West where modern industry was highly developed and capital available for export was abundant. In the nature of things the most influential members of the League of Nations were highly industrialized. The leadership of the United Nations in its early years was similar. The experience of the period between the two world wars was needed to cause the United States to take its proper part in the establishment of the latter organization. But the responsible leadership of both organizations was vested in nations with advanced technology and highly developed productive capacity.

Now the underdeveloped nations possess a majority of the votes in the UN General Assembly. Leadership in that body must be responsive to the needs of emergent nations whose wants exceed their productive capacity to satisfy. The difficult task of creating conditions around the world under which peace-keeping may be most likely to succeed cannot be managed by the well-developed nations alone. They must take account of the wishes of peoples who could be ignored in the "good old days" before the liquidation of the West European empires had begun. This new nuclear and electronic age is indeed an age that is radically different from what we used to call modern times.

It is not surprising that some Americans, including even a few who cherished high hopes for the United Nations in its early years, should have become distrustful of the Organization in its present form. They question the qualifications of newly independent states with so little modern education and industrial capacity for an equal position in the management of a general international organization with an important role in world politics. May not these new Member States act irresponsibly in the exercise of their unfamiliar powers? Will they not fall under the influence of the Soviet Union and turn the United Nations against its original leaders? Has not the United States already lost control of the Organization and does it not jeopardize its own security by relying overmuch on this unproven international machinery for producing a rule of law under the Charter?

Such fears are magnified by the prospect of the further growth of the Organization through the admission to membership of

additional new states from the continued liquidation of obsolete colonial empires. The expected additional states will on the whole compare unfavorably with those already admitted. The inhabitants of the Portuguese and Spanish possessions in tropical Africa are even less prepared for independence than those of the Belgian Congo. The remaining British, Dutch, and French dependencies are mostly smaller than those already liberated; they are more widely scattered; many of them are insular possessions with inadequate resources for maintaining the character of a sovereign state in the modern world. Are they all presently to have an equal voice in the UN General Assembly?

Uncertainty concerning the lengths to which anti-colonialism will be carried by the African and Asian Member States in the United Nations increases the existing reluctance to make membership in the Organization universal. A delegate to the General Assembly from Sierra Leone may concede that one from St. Helena, if and when that isolated island is admitted to membership, should not have an equal voice with himself, but will the delegate from St. Helena prove equally reasonable? The percentage of the world's population still living in colonial dependencies is small—apparently less than two per cent of the total—but its destiny is obscure. It is difficult even to estimate the number of additional Member States that would be brought into the United Nations family by the complete triumph of modern anti-colonialism. It is clear, however, that in the remaining colonial empires there are many potential candidates for admission.

It is easy to exaggerate the difficulties for the United Nations that may arise from the complete liquidation of the obsolete colonial empires. The case of Western Samoa may have unexpected significance. This former German possession, which had been under the tutelage of New Zealand first through a League of Nations mandate and then as a United Nations trusteeship territory, gained its independence at the beginning of 1962. Instead of applying for immediate admission to the United Nations, however, it announced that it would be content for the near future with self-government without active participation in world politics. What this may mean as a precedent does not yet appear, but it is clear that there is wide room for experimentation in the development of new relationships between the United Nations and the liberated colonial dependencies.

It must be admitted that the liquidation of the colonial empires has created new problems for the United Nations. Many of the newly liberated states are comparatively small, as well as underdeveloped and lacking in political experience. Their boundaries

problems. There is much to be done, as the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace has shown in previous reports, to strengthen the United Nations and develop its capacity to achieve its objectives. One of these necessary tasks, we believe, is to bring into the Organization all independent states capable of fulfilling the obligations of membership. The purposes of the United Nations, we are convinced, cannot be fully accomplished until it becomes a universal organization.

5. *The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace recommends, therefore, that new independent states, resulting from the continued liquidation of colonial empires, be promptly admitted to the United Nations, if capable of fulfilling their responsibilities under the Charter.* The Commission sees no need for further tests of such capacity beyond what have been applied in connection with recent admissions. States whose governments doubt their readiness to meet the expenses of membership in the United Nations and of maintaining permanent delegations at the headquarters in New York may, like Western Samoa, prefer a less formal relationship to the Organization. In some cases an answer to this problem may be found in the formation of federations, as the British colonies in the West Indies have been trying to do. There is wide room for imaginative experimentation in this field of political engineering.

What is most urgently needed is a suitable successor to the Trusteeship Council and the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories. It should command the services of technical experts able to assist small states in the development of federations, where conditions are favorable, and in the maintenance of a viable independent existence, where federalization is impracticable. It is difficult to define the minimum size of a state to be admitted to the United Nations, but the line should be drawn to exclude very small states. Lichtenstein, Monaco, and San Marino show how even the smallest independent states can find for themselves a satisfactory place in the United Nations family through membership in Specialized Agencies without formally joining the Organization or sitting in the General Assembly. Newly liberated and politically inexperienced states, though more populous and productive than any of these three, may well need further assistance before assuming all the obligations of a regular member state. The Organization should be in a position to supply such assistance, particularly if the new small state falls also in the category of underdeveloped. The new council or committee would not only protect and assist these smaller states but also represent their interests before agencies of the United Nations.

6. *The Commission recommends further, therefore, that the United Nations encourage the formation of federations under the appropriate circumstances by newly liberated peoples desiring admission to membership.* The Organization has already shown itself hospitable to the formation of federations by Member States in the case of the United Arab Republic. This attitude should be maintained and technical aid and other assistance might well be extended to states bent on experimenting with projects of federalization. The formation of larger political units is a natural phenomenon in this nuclear and electronic age. There is abundant opportunity in the United Nations, as presently organized, for the further application of the principle of federalism.

7. *The Commission also recommends the development of more informal relationships between the Organization and autonomous areas or independent states of limited resources springing from the continued liquidation of colonial empires.* For many of the small dependencies the important end result should be self-government, and not necessarily active participation in world politics. The possibility of peaceful changes in international relationships is a greater attraction to these states than that of participation in organized arrangements for collective coercion of states contemptuous of their obligations under the Charter. The impressive achievements of the United Nations in recent years in promoting peaceful settlements in various threatening situations suggest the desirability of devising suitable relationships with independent states primarily interested in the development of this most promising function of parliamentary diplomacy and of the Secretary-General. The failure in the case of the Portuguese colonies in India, where international law seemed to favor one side and natural equity the other, emphasizes the importance of pushing this development as rapidly as possible. There is much that should and can be done to make the dissolution of the obsolete colonial empires a source of additional strength and not merely of additional problems for the United Nations.

VII. United States Policy

Despite the great strength of the general case for universal membership in the United Nations there is opposition to the admission of certain types of states. In recent years the critics of universality have directed their objections particularly against the admissibility of increasing numbers of small, weak, and politically inexperienced states springing from the liquidation of the colonial empires. They complain of the unwillingness of many of these states to share equitably the expenses and other obligations of the United Nations, while insisting on a full and equal voice in the

making of decisions, the burdens of which must be assumed by others. They think they see a growing "double standard" of international morality, reflected in a disposition to condone resort to military force in violation of the Charter by Member States with whose objectives they sympathize, while applying stricter tests to other Member States. They deplore an allegedly growing tendency to bloc voting which puts the interests of special groups of states ahead of the general interests of the world community. They denounce an allegedly expanding tendency to interfere in the internal affairs of other Member States. They conclude that the admission of these states tends to throw the balance of power in the United Nations too much in favor of the Soviet Union.

American critics stress particularly the effect of these new admissions on the leadership of the United States in world politics. They assert that the American Government has lost control of the world organization. They predict that control cannot be regained, if these politically inexperienced Member States continue to increase in number. They conclude that the United States should put its faith more largely in its military alliances. They urge the development of NATO or some better agent of the Western Powers into a more effective instrument of the "free world."

A partial answer to this point of view is to raise the question: What are the national interests of the United States in regard to the United Nations? Is it in the national interest to consider the United Nations (1) an instrument of United States policy, (2) an instrument for promoting the diffusion of free democratic institutions throughout the world, (3) a reflection of world opinion as it really is, or (4) an instrument for the realization of the purposes and principles expressed in the Charter?

To the first question the answer is unmistakable. In the early years of the Organization it was natural that the United States, with the prestige of victory in World War II and overwhelming power by reason of its monopoly of the atomic bomb, should have treated the United Nations as an instrument of its own national policies. It is clear, however, that under the changed conditions in this rapidly changing world, if this attitude continues, the United States cannot hold the leadership in the United Nations.

Secondly, it is equally clear that the ideal of free democracy, as understood in the United States, will not dominate among the membership of the United Nations in the presently foreseeable future. This ideal is very imperfectly manifested even among the present military allies of the United States, which include several non-democratic and some actively anti-democratic states. Among the non-aligned and uncommitted states only a few are in any

proper sense of the term free democracies. The Communist states look toward a "democratization" of their institutions along the lines indicated in the party program, adopted at the Twenty-Second Party Congress in October, 1961, but they believe that "the dictatorship of the proletariat" must continue, until the people are sufficiently educated in Marxism-Leninism to support voluntarily the Communist system. Under these circumstances the United States cannot maintain leadership in the United Nations merely by propagandist slogans or preachments of free democracy and the virtue of free elections.

There has been influential support for an affirmative answer to the third question. John Foster Dulles wrote, before he became Secretary of State, that he had "come to believe that the United Nations will best serve the cause of peace, if its Assembly is representative of what the world actually is, and not merely representative of the parts that we like. Therefore, we ought to be willing that all the nations should be members without attempting to appraise closely those which are 'good' and those which are 'bad.' Already that distinction is obliterated by the present membership of the United Nations. Some of the present member nations, and others that might become members, have governments that are not representative of the people. But if in fact they are 'governments,'—that is, if they 'govern,'—then they have a power which should be represented in any organization that purports to mirror world reality." (See Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, Ninth Report, p. 23.)

At that time Mr. Dulles thought that Mainland China should be represented and, though he modified this opinion after he became Secretary of State, he continued to favor "approximate universality" of the United Nations. His conception, however, seemed to consider the United Nations as a passive index of opinion rather than an active force in the world. The United States undoubtedly has a national interest in knowing what world opinion really is and in supporting institutions which will contribute to this knowledge. The dangers which arise from a lack of such knowledge were indicated by recent mistakes of policy in the Cuban and Laotian situations. These situations also indicate, however, that United Nations debate may not be adequate to reflect opinion even among the members, though doubtless it helps. In any case the United States has a broader interest in the United Nations than that it shall serve merely as a mirror of world opinion.

The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace believes that the United States has a major national interest in developing the United Nations as an active force to establish conditions in the

world under which peace, justice and respect for international obligations can be maintained. The experience of the last seventeen years, as well as earlier history, indicates that a free constitutional democracy, like the United States, is at a disadvantage in an anarchic world of states vulnerable to immediate attack and engaged in an arms race. Under such conditions democracies feel impelled to militarize and to some extent abandon free democracy in order to keep up in the competition, or fall behind and succumb either to superior force or to gradual attrition. The Commission believes that the conditions under which democracy can in the long run survive can be maintained only by realizing the purposes and principles set forth in the United Nations Charter.

A major national interest of the United States, therefore, is that the United Nations achieve its purposes and maintain its principles. This is also a major interest of a large majority of the members of the United Nations. The non-aligned and uncommitted states are not primarily interested in the rivalry between Communism and Western Democracy. They see merits and defects in each system. They are interested in the elimination of war and threats of war, in respect for their territorial integrity and national independence, in the self-determination of peoples seeking independence, in respect for human rights irrespective of race, color, language, or religion, and especially in economic and social progress for underdeveloped peoples.

Policies clearly and sincerely forwarding these purposes and principles will command a majority in the United Nations. By taking care that its policies are of that character the United States can maintain leadership in the United Nations now and even more when the United Nations becomes universal and more capable of maintaining its principles. Furthermore, leadership of this kind, supported by the uncommitted states, would not only strengthen the United Nations in world opinion, but would establish its impartiality in cold-war controversies and give it greater competence than it now possesses to mediate or conciliate major controversies. It is clearly in the national interest of the United States under present conditions that the United Nations should occupy the position of an impartial mediator. With a universal membership and an appropriate American policy this seems possible of achievement.

A further answer to the opponents of a universal United Nations is afforded by a look at the record of actual voting in the General Assembly. In the Sixteenth General Assembly, during which the number of Member States rose from 99 to 104, there were three outstanding roll calls, on which the attitudes of the United States and the Soviet Union were in direct conflict and the division

of opinion among the newer and less experienced members was clearly revealed. The first of these, which took place on December 15, 1961, recorded the votes cast on a Russian resolution to solve the China problem by seating representatives of the Peking Government in place of those from Taiwan. The second took place on December 20 on a resolution, urgently supported by the United States, proposing to meet the rapidly accumulating fiscal deficit caused by the operations in the Congo by a bond issue of \$200,000,000. The third, recorded on January 30, 1962, was occasioned by another resolution strongly supported by the Soviet Union, dealing in drastic fashion with the problem of Angola.

Since it is the record of the newly admitted, weak, and politically inexperienced Member States that is of primary interest in an analysis of the voting in the Sixteenth General Assembly, the analysis begins by putting these states in their proper places among the other members. For this purpose the whole group of underdeveloped states requires investigation. In the light of the latest statistics collected by the United Nations, especially those published by the Managing Director of the United Nations Special Fund, Paul G. Hoffman, the underdeveloped states may be conveniently described as those with a gross national product below three hundred dollars a year per capita. There were altogether seventy-one of these Member States at the beginning of 1962. Despite important practical differences between conditions in states with less than one hundred dollars gross national product per capita and in others with a per capita production three times as high, there can be no doubt that all are underdeveloped by comparison with the Member States in which modern industrial technology and capital accumulation are most advanced.

The more advanced states, technologically speaking, differ greatly among themselves. There are only sixteen Member States which, on account of the high development of their vital industries, especially the armaments industry, or the advanced state of development of their productive capacity generally, can be put in the highest class. Among them the United States and the Soviet Union are outstanding, though for different reasons. There are seventeen Member States in various intermediate stages of development between the most advanced and those definitely classed as underdeveloped. They range from Japan, with its advanced industry and its traditional agriculture, at one end to states like Cuba and Venezuela, where large outside capitalistic investments have stimulated a more rapid development of the national productive capacity than could be effectively controlled by the traditional economic and political institutions. (See Appendix B.)

In the Sixteenth General Assembly, for the first time, the underdeveloped nations, many of which had been admitted to membership in the last five years, possessed two-thirds of the total number of votes. They were in a position to control the action of the General Assembly, if disposed to act together. Neither the Communist bloc, nor the military alliances organized by the United States, could control the Assembly without the support of at least a majority of these underdeveloped and in many cases politically inexperienced Member States. Most of these states professed to be uncommitted in the struggle between the two super-powers or at least not to be formally aligned with either of them. It was evident that their voting behavior would not only be important for the present effectiveness of the United Nations but also significant for its future success with the further addition of small, weak, and politically inexperienced states growing out of the continued liquidation of obsolete colonial empires.

The pattern of voting behavior in the most advanced group of states is impressively irregular. In the first test roll-call, the United Kingdom and the Scandinavian states rejected the leadership of the United States and voted with the Soviet Union for seating the Peking representatives in place of the Taiwan representatives of China. In the second test roll-call France and Belgium joined with the Soviet Union in resisting the two hundred million dollar bond issue. In the third test roll-call alone did all the non-communist states in advanced stages of industrial development vote in the same way as the United States. It is evident that those industrially advanced states, which hold privileged positions of potential leadership by virtue of their permanent seats in the Security Council, are disinclined to respect any leadership but their own.

In the intermediate class of states the pattern becomes less confused. The leadership of the Soviet Union was followed without deviation by all the Communist states. The leadership of the United States was followed by the non-Communist states with considerably more regularity than in the first class. Half of all the states in this class supported the position of the United States on the first test vote, two-thirds supported it on the second, and a majority on the third. The general picture was clearly more favorable to American than to Russian leadership.

In the third class of underdeveloped states a different pattern of voting emerges. The solidarity of the Communist bloc is fully maintained, affording an example of rigid political discipline ill-designed to attract newly liberated colonial dependencies jealous of their new found freedom and reluctant to risk it by too close association with any leading power. There is no similar solidarity

in any of the groups of underdeveloped states more or less closely associated with one or another of the Western leaders. The outstanding feature of the pattern is the strong tendency of the newer underdeveloped Member States to keep out of the conflicts between the nuclear giants. The tropical African states are the most prone to avoid involvement in these conflicts by recording themselves on the roll-calls as present, but not voting, or by staying away from a roll-call altogether.

These voting patterns confirm the results of a similar analysis of leading roll-calls in the Fifteenth General Assembly. (See Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, Fourteenth Report, published by the Commission, 1962, pp. 9-12.) The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace found at that time that the record "should be encouraging to perceptive Americans." "The position of the Soviet bloc," it reported, "was considerably weaker than that of the American-formed group of states." Moreover, "the so-called Neutralists and other non-aligned and uncommitted nations were conspicuous for their lack of solidarity. . . ." The Commission concluded that "the fears of those who question the qualifications of newly liberated and politically inexperienced peoples for active participation in United Nations politics do not seem warranted by the recent experience of the Organization."

These conclusions are strengthened by the voting on the test roll-calls in the Sixteenth General Assembly. The delegations from south of the Sahara continue to support the authority of the Secretary-General, when challenged by a major power with special interests in view, and to avoid embroilment in the conflicts between the super-powers growing out of the manoeuvres of rival aspirants for leadership. The unanimous election of U Thant to fill the remainder of Dag Hammarskjöld's term of office was an impressive triumph for the forces within the United Nations which are striving to build the kind of world order described in Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter. The unanimous choice of this firm and politic diplomat from southeast Asia for this major world office should greatly encourage all peace-loving peoples who believe in the kind of peace-keeping represented by the developing operations of the UN Organization. The restrained reliance on military force and growing emphasis on the pacific settlement of international disputes through the mediatory and conciliatory offices of the Organization describe the most probable course of its further development under the impact of the changing conditions in world politics.

The final answer to the opponents of a universal United Nations will be a well-planned program for the further development of the

underdeveloped nations in all parts of the world. The great success of the Marshall Plan naturally promoted interest in other plans for improving economic conditions in depressed areas in other parts of the world, by financing projects for increasing national productivity. As Western Europe returned to normality after World War II leaders of the "free world" began to explore the possibilities of strengthening the resistance to Soviet Communism by economic aid to the underdeveloped countries. Under the Truman Administration the point-four program of technical assistance made a promising beginning with the cooperation of the UN Specialized Agencies. Under the Eisenhower Administration the new policy was carried further with the establishment of the UN Special Fund. But both the superpowers, sustained by great expectations of favorable effects on the national fortunes in the Cold War, preferred to put their trust chiefly in unilateral arrangements for economic aid. Participation in operations under the United Nations received secondary support from the Government of the United States and less than that from the Government of the Soviet Union.

There were, of course, important differences between the conditions with which the Marshall Plan was designed to deal and those in the Asian and African countries for which the unilateral American and Russian programs of economic aid and technical assistance were designed. The basic problem was not that of restoring a shattered economy in a nation temporarily exhausted by ruinous war; but one of developing fresh productive capability in nations with governments lacking experience, and in many cases also interest, in the marvels of modern science and technology. It was a problem involving not only the supply of indispensable technical aid and economic assistance but also the design of safeguards to prevent dependence on foreign aid from turning into a new form of colonialism incompatible with a genuine independence. These differences were most significant in the case of the newly liberated colonial dependencies, especially those in tropical Africa. Would it be possible for both the super-powers and the new states to get what they wanted under these conditions?

The problem of rapid development in the underdeveloped states was more complex in other ways than in the more advanced states for which the Marshall Plan was devised. It was not simply a matter of extending credit on an unprecedented scale to governments capable of executing their own plans for relief, recovery, and rehabilitation, if supplied with the necessary means. Fresh capital on credit alone would not be enough. Satisfactory economic development would require also measures for the stabilization of prices in the world market for nations engaged mainly in the pro-

duction of foodstuffs and raw materials. It would require technical assistance not only in mastering the new techniques of modern industry but also in improving ancient forms of agriculture. There would be great need of progressive developments in the general field of public education. There would be even the stubborn question of balancing the expected reduction in death-rates with new forms of control over traditionally high birth-rates.

Moreover, experience soon showed that economic aid and technical assistance, even when most effective in attaining immediate objectives, may not guarantee satisfactory relations between the sponsors of aid programs and their beneficiaries. For instance, the stabilization of sugar prices and the guarantee of a rich foreign market by the Government of the United States brought Cuba to a more advanced stage of economic development than most of the tropical Latin American states enjoyed, but it did not produce a Cuban Government capable of managing the economy satisfactorily. Some new political invention is required, which will enable the United Nations to furnish acceptable guidance to newly independent nations whose economic development threatens to outrun the development of their political capacity. This is a problem for solution by the United Nations, not by superpowers with unilateral projects prompted by a primary concern for their own special interests.

The experience of the United Nations Operation in the Congo is an impressive harbinger of a new era in the development of the United Nations. The Organization has again demonstrated its ability to recruit an efficient peace force at short notice. Together with the Specialized Agencies, it has demonstrated also the ability to command diversified and extensive human resources for technical assistance. Though the coordination of these resources has left something to be desired, the performance is apparently proving equal to the most urgent need. The struggle to meet the challenge of the emergency has strengthened more than it has strained the Organization.

The greatest difficulty has been presented by the problem of financing this abnormally expensive operation. The total cost of the Congo activities is but a minute fraction of the direct cost of the arms race during the same period, yet ordinary revenues of the Organization have been permitted to fall far short of covering the charges. There has been a strange reluctance to employ deficit financing for this operation. American experience in the early years of the Federal Union showed that the bold creation of public debts for important public purposes could bring powerful support to a struggling new organization. There should be a ready market

among the more advanced industrialized Member States for necessary loans for expensive peace-keeping activities in an emergency.

There is also need for expanded use of the public credit in the further economic development of underdeveloped Member States. The experienced management of the Special Fund under the leadership of its Managing Director, Paul G. Hoffman, has already made good use of sound techniques for preparing such programs. What is most needed at this stage in the evolution of the United Nations is to put greater efforts into the development of this part of the Organization's work. The colonial system should be supplanted by something better than the Trusteeship System, which seems to be fulfilling its mission more rapidly than could have been anticipated seventeen years ago. Settled arrangements should be made for planning and financing extensive improvements in the underdeveloped Member States which will make membership in the United Nations a manifest advance over the status of dependencies under the old colonial system.

8. *The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace recommends, therefore, that the public credit be employed on a large scale to enable the United Nations Organization and Specialized Agencies to execute carefully prepared programs of internal improvements in underdeveloped Member States.*

There should be a fairer balance between the highly industrialized Member States and the underdeveloped Member States than now exists in the raising and appropriation of money by the General Assembly under the Charter. (See discussion in our Thirteenth Report, pp. 41 and 42). But satisfactory fiscal practices are already established for such agencies as the International Bank and the International Development Association. The capital funds at the disposal of these Agencies, especially the latter, should be greatly enlarged and their operations rapidly expanded in states which indicate willingness to cooperate and provide an appropriate fiscal, governmental and social climate.

9. *The Commission recommends also that improved arrangements be designed for coordinating the programs of technical assistance administered by the United Nations Secretariat and the Specialized Agencies.* The wide latitude allowed to the Specialized Agencies in the management of their activities was useful during the experimental stage of their operations. Imaginative thinking needed encouragement, while these Agencies were demonstrating their practical usefulness. Now the need is for the greatest possible operating efficiency, while their potential services are seriously limited by insufficient financial resources. Admission of numerous newly liberated colonial dependencies into the

United Nations involves the Organization in new responsibilities and requires that it must be better organized in order to meet them effectively.

10. *Finally, the Commission recommends that United States policy in the United Nations be based on the support of the Member States most strongly committed to the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations, set forth in Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter.* The Government of the United States, as a leading aspirant to United Nations leadership, should rely more than heretofore on the spontaneous collaboration of the Member States which believe most strongly in the Organization's capacity to achieve its objectives. There is little likelihood that either military allies, or Member States which are democracies in the Western sense of the term and hence more likely than others to be sympathetic political associates, will form a majority of the membership of the United Nations in the foreseeable future. A large majority of the Member States, however, including most of the Western-type democracies and many others, are strongly committed to United Nations purposes and principles. They form a group, leadership of which by the United States should be a point of departure for the further development of American policy in world politics.

VIII. *A New View of an Old American Goal*

Despite the great strength of the general case for a universal United Nations there is continued opposition in various quarters to the further strengthening and development of the Organization. The clue to this opposition was clearly exposed by President Kennedy in his Address to the Congress on the State of the Union, January 11, 1962. "But arms alone are not enough to keep the peace," he declared; "it must be kept by men." Then he stated his main point with impressive clarity and force. "Our instrument and our hope is the United Nations, and I see little merit in the impatience of those who would abandon this imperfect world instrument because they dislike our imperfect world. For the troubles of a world organization merely reflect the troubles of the world itself."

Outstanding among those who dislike our imperfect world are the Marxist-Leninists. Their attitude toward the organization of peace found most recent and authentic expression in the official program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, adopted at the Twenty-Second Party Congress, October, 1961, in Moscow. This program forms a lengthy and exhaustive document, which has a great deal to say about the "world Socialist system" and the strong desire of the Communist Party leaders to pursue a policy

of "peaceful coexistence" to the end that this world system may be rapidly developed and strengthened. But the program is strangely vague concerning the details of its structure and processes. "The world Socialist system is a new type of economic and political relationship between countries," the program asserts,—a "socio-economic and political community of purpose." But how will this "community" be organized? The program does not plainly say.

In fact the Soviet design of a world state leaves a great deal to the imagination. Karl Marx's original idea seemed to be that a dictatorship of the international proletariat would eventually put an end to the need for organized political institutions and the state would "wither away". Under Lenin's more aggressive and vigorous leadership of the international Communist movement the end of the need for political institutions faded from view and the idea that the state would wither away itself withered away. In its place there has developed the idea of the Soviet world state, "the most extravagantly coercive, caste-ridden world state ever conceived in the minds of men," as Elliott R. Goodman describes it in his illuminating book on the subject. Thus what we Americans like to call the Free World is confronted by a Soviet Russian plan for a universal political order, or world state, deriving its claim to validity from the patronage of a triumphant, as they think, international Communist Party.

In the eyes of its votaries this Communist world state is no idle dream of impractical visionaries. It is, they believe, the natural and inevitable result of the operation of the basic economic forces in the contemporary world. The destiny of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as the Russian Communists see it, is to become the vital center of an expanding system of Communist states until the Communist world order embraces all mankind. Khrushchev professes to have convinced himself that this Communist world system can be realized without resort to international war as the instrument of Communist foreign policy. This is the essence of his recent devotion to the cause of "peaceful coexistence". (See Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, Twelfth Report, June 1960)

The Chinese Communists also presumably see something like the Russian vision of a new world order. The idea of a world state is certainly no radical novelty to the heirs of the Confucian political tradition. From the classical Chinese point of view the massive and durable Celestial Empire was a universal political order, in which there was room for any number of imperial provinces and tributary kingdoms, but no comprehension of the sovereign equality of states as exhibited in the political system of the modern

West. The Chinese Communist leaders, however, boasting the superior purity of their brand of Marxism-Leninism, may question the feasibility of achieving world-wide supremacy for their ideal world order without resort to sanguinary wars against the "Free World." It is "peaceful coexistence" prior to the achievement of the Communist world order, rather than the ultimate world order itself, that seems to them the visionary dream.

It is not surprising that the Russian and Chinese Communists should have difficulty in understanding one another. Karl Marx himself, whatever may be the merits of his "dialectical materialism", regarded as a key to the interpretation of history, was grossly misled concerning the history of China. In his early life he acted for a time as a European correspondent for the New York Tribune. An article of his, written in the 1850s amidst the great Taiping rebellion, which then threatened to overthrow the Manchu Dynasty and restore the Empire on a more modern basis, forecast the development of revolution in China in harmony with the predicted course of the revolutionary movement in the West. (See N. Y. Daily Tribune, June 14, 1853, p. 4) But the Taiping leaders, though scoring sensational victories over the imperial forces, proved incapable of using to any good purpose the power which they wrenched from the feeble grasp of the Manchu rulers. The Taiping, or "Great Peace", rebellion was eventually put down by the Chinese themselves with an assist from the British and French. The time came when Stalin was able to dabble actively in Chinese revolutionary politics, but neither in his dealings with the Chinese Nationalists under Sun Yat-sen nor in those with the Communists under Mao Tse-tung did he show an intelligent grasp of the Chinese situation. His eventual alliance with the latter was more a marriage of convenience than an association based on a genuine sense of community of purpose and principle.

Moreover, there is nothing in either dialectical materialism or the Confucian tradition to determine whether the capital of the new Marxist-Leninist world order should be in Moscow or in Peking. There is also nothing in either of these systems of political philosophy to determine which group of Communist politicians, the Russian or the Chinese, possesses the better claim to the leadership of the international Communist Party. A third of mankind may share the Marxist-Leninist vision of a Communist system of world order, but happily for the other two-thirds the former do not share a common plan for realizing their vision.

The response of the Free World to the challenge of the Communist vision is the organization of peace under the Charter of the United Nations. The Russian and Chinese ideas of a universal

political order, whatever the difficulties may be in the way of their practical realization, constitute a powerful weapon in the present contest for the mastery of men's minds. Only a better idea of the form which a universal reign of law might take would be a more powerful weapon. The essence of such an idea is embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. The question remains: How serviceable can the United Nations be, regarded as an instrument of the purposes and principles of those who wish to create the kind of world order described in Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter?

The practical importance of this question in the development of American foreign policy has led to numerous appraisals of the past success and future promise of the United Nations. Some of these appraisals possess exceptional interest because of the importance of the persons who have made them. For instance, President Eisenhower's Commission on National Goals devoted the second part of its Report, published in 1960, to what it called "Goals Abroad." Goal number 15 related to the United Nations. "A key goal in the pursuit of a vigorous and effective United States foreign policy," the Report declared, "is the preservation and strengthening of the United Nations. Over the next decade," the Report continued, "it will be under tremendous strain. However, it remains the chief instrument available for building a genuine community of nations."

Does this mean that building a genuine community of nations is also a key goal of American foreign policy? The Report does not clearly say. The Commission on National Goals did make some significant observations concerning the United Nations. "It must be recognized," the Report conceded, "that the United Nations provides a forum for Soviet propaganda and tactics of dissension, and an opportunity for Soviet vetoes to block or delay world advances. Nevertheless, we should give the world community, as represented by the United Nations, our steadfast support." But, in giving such support, what kind of organization for the world community is our national goal? What do we really wish to make out of the United Nations? The Commission did not say.

The Rockefeller Panel Reports, published in 1961 under the general title, "Prospect for America", proceed in a similar vein. Report Number I, entitled "The Mid-Century Challenge to American Foreign Policy," prepared by Panel I under the chairmanship of Dean Rusk, now Secretary of State, is somewhat more specific. "The United Nations," this Report declares, "is proof of our conviction, that problems which are of world-wide impact must be dealt with through institutions global in their scope." The authors of this Report presumably believed that the world community

should possess an organization universal in membership and operation. But what needs to be done to enable the existing United Nations Organization to fulfill its necessary and proper mission? Rockefeller Panel Report Number I does not clearly answer this question.

This Rockefeller Panel Report discusses the problem in an interesting and imaginative way, though the end of the discussion is still inconclusive. "The United Nations," it declares, "stands, finally, as a symbol of the world order that will one day be built. The United States has need of symbols as well as power in its foreign policy." This is forthright as far as it goes, but it does not go far enough. Cannot more be said now concerning the nature of the world order that the Free World will one day build and of the preparatory work that may be done in the immediate future?

A more recent appraisal of the United Nations, which gains significance from the position of its author as well as from the cogency of its argument, is that by the chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, J. William Fulbright, published in the October, 1961, issue of "Foreign Affairs" under the title, "For a Concert of Free Nations". Senator Fulbright was an early leader in the movement to put a stronger general international organization in place of the defunct League of Nations and has been a sturdy supporter of the United Nations through all its trials and tribulations in the years since its foundation. Observing the weakness of the United Nations, regarded as a peace-keeping institution, in consequence of the failure of the super-powers to collaborate in the Security Council in accordance with the hopes of the founders, the Senator concludes that common fears of a nuclear holocaust are not enough to ensure the success of a genuine system of collective security on a world-wide scale. There must be, he believes, a more rational sense of community based on voluntary and unconstrained acceptance of common purposes and common principles. There must be, as he puts it, "a community rooted not only in common peril but also in common values and aspirations."

Senator Fulbright's analysis of the problem of establishing a viable world order probes deeply into the nature of world politics. "There is no necessary correlation," he declares, "between human need and human capacity." Successful political institutions require, he believes, "the positive force of a sense of community." He is sanguine enough to observe that "a genuine community is painfully emerging in the Western world." He would make this emerging community "a realistic concert of free nations." He does not profess to know in precisely what form this "concert of free

nations" should be organized. He does concede that the objective of building a cohesive community of free nations "should be pursued as far as possible within the United Nations."

The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace agrees with Senator Fulbright in emphasizing the importance of a sense of community of purpose and of principle among those who would build a durable and effective system of peace-making and peace-keeping. It agrees also with his conclusion that the effort to implement such a sense of community should be pursued as far as possible within the United Nations. It is convinced further that the most promising concert of free nations consists of those United Nations Member States which are strongly committed to the purposes and principles set forth in Articles 1 and 2 of the United Nations Charter. But the Commission sees no advantage at this time in trying to organize this particular community of free nations outside the United Nations Organization. On the contrary, we believe, the greatest influence of this "concert" can be expected to develop under wise leadership within the General Assembly and the Councils of that Organization.

The achievements of the United Nations Organization in its first seventeen years have been radically different from the expectations or hopes of the founders. Outstanding has been the development of a new and better system of tutelage for the states which have sprung from the liquidation of obsolete colonial empires. Colonialism proved to be a permanently unacceptable method of applying the technical skills and free capital of the more advanced societies to the development of those less advanced in the use of modern science and technology. Trusteeship under the United Nations was a useful temporary aid in the adjustment of older societies to modern conditions. Membership in the United Nations, however, on terms of political equality with the original members clears the way for the most effective utilization of modern ideas and techniques.

Membership in the United Nations for these new states promises enjoyment of the basic human rights and fundamental freedoms which the Charter seeks to extend to all peoples everywhere regardless of race, color, previous condition, or present lack of military power. It does not guarantee immediate full enjoyment of these rights and freedoms. But it does create better opportunities for their enjoyment with less risk of international conflict than during the period when the Western nations themselves were struggling to obtain these same rights and freedoms. This achievement means a better hope for all of maintaining a world environment in which free societies can prosper. It holds the promise of a

firmer foundation for the further development of the United Nations Organization itself.

Another important achievement of the United Nations Organization has been the improvement of the facilities for the peaceful settlement of international disputes. If the possibility of peaceful change be, as John Foster Dulles intimated, the fundamental prerequisite for peace, then the developing practice of parliamentary diplomacy offers the promise of a brighter future for the relations between the powers. The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace believes that the United Nations is already much more than a symbol. The Commission believes that it is indeed a veritable power in world politics, and that there is useful work to be done now in further developing the Organization to the end that those international statesmen who speak in its name may exert an even greater influence over the course of events. We Americans have been strangely reluctant to profess our intention of establishing a more rational and more peaceful world order as the logical as well as desirable culmination of the American way of life, but the record of peaceful changes already promoted by various proceedings at the United Nations forbids ignoring the latent possibilities in this field of world politics.

It is significant that most of the occasions on which the United Nations has employed military forces or observers in its peace-making or peace-keeping activities have arisen in connection with the problems of newly liberated colonial dependencies. Korea, Palestine, the Congo: all were situations in which the peace of the world was threatened by the unwillingness or inability of newly established authorities to keep their own peace. It is not necessary to apportion the blame for these situations among the various powers claiming an interest in them. It is enough that the situations grew out of operations concerned with the liquidation of colonial empires. The greatest service of the United Nations Organization in the prevention of war up to now has been to prevent war between major powers by stopping conflicts between lesser peoples, with little or no experience as independent states, before they could spread beyond their own borders.

If building a genuine community of nations is a key goal of American foreign policy, the transformation of the United Nations into a strong and universal organization, which can hold its place at the vital center of the modern world, is an urgent task of statesmanship, especially American statesmanship. For peace, as President Kennedy said in his masterly address to the United Nations General Assembly, September 25, 1961, "is not solely a matter of military or technical problems—it is primarily a matter of politics

and people.” He continued to point out the right conclusions from contemporary developments in the evolution of the United Nations in his State of the Union Address to the Congress on January 11, 1962. “We may not always agree with every detailed action taken by every officer of the United Nations,” he declared, “or with every voting majority. But as an institution it should have in the future, as it has had in the past since its inception, no stronger or more faithful member than the United States of America.”

11. *The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, therefore, recommends finally that the Free World support the further development of the United Nations Organization in pursuit of a goal in sharp contrast to the Communist vision of a system of world order.* We believe with President Kennedy that “in the development of this Organization rests the only true alternative to war; and war appeals no longer as a rational alternative.” The general direction which the further development of the United Nations Organization should take was carefully considered by the Commission in its Fourteenth Report, published in January of this year. We think that the Organization should be “a dynamic instrument of Governments,” implementing the purposes and principles set forth in the Charter. It should be made capable of serving efficiently the kind of world described in Articles 1 and 2.

12. *The Commission in its earlier reports has offered many specific suggestions for the strengthening and further development of the United Nations Organization.* (See especially our Reports numbered 10, 11, and 13.) It renews these recommendations here, We are convinced that a natural principle of the political order calls for the establishment of a world-wide reign of law based on the purposes and principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and realizable only through universal membership in the United Nations.

The new view of this old American goal has been well expressed in a recent address by Secretary of State Dean Rusk. Speaking on November 28, 1961 before the Academy of Political Science in New York City, he said: “Our foreign policy is directed toward building the kind of world community called for in the United Nations Charter—a community of independent nations, each free to work out its own institutions as it sees fit, but cooperating effectively in matters of common interest.” He added: “We think of ‘community’ as the context within which men can join together to build a more adequate home for the race within the physical environment, and the context within which man must find an answer to his propensity for self-extermination . . . The President has reminded us that ‘there cannot be an American solution to

every world problem.' The world community, which is a scarlet thread of American policy, is a necessary goal for all nations who wish to be both secure and free, whether allied or neutral, whether Western or non-Western, and whatever their stage of economic development. The building of that community is the main objective of man."

This, Secretary Rusk declared, "is no trivial goal." The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace agrees. And we suggest that making the United Nations as nearly as practicable a universal organization is an important next step in the direction in which all for whom Secretary Rusk spoke wish to go.

The following members of the Commission have signed this Report. Signature means approval of the general principles outlined in the Report, but not necessarily of all the details. Specific reservations in a few cases are noted below.

James T. Shotwell, *Honorary Chairman*
Arthur N. Holcombe, *Chairman*

G. Hinman Barrett	Charles G. Fenwick
Cyril J. Bath	Edgar J. Fisher
Clarence A. Berdahl	Denna F. Fleming
Donald C. Blaisdell	Margaret Forsyth
Roy Blough	Gerald Freund
John R. Boettiger	Benjamin Gerig
Charles G. Bolté	Leland M. Goodrich
Frank G. Boudreau	Frank P. Graham
David F. Cavers	Ernst B. Haas ³
Waldo Chamberlin	J. Eugene Harley ⁴
Daniel S. Cheever	Donald S. Harrington
Ben M. Cherrington	H. Field Haviland, Jr.
John L. Childs	Walter D. Head
Benjamin V. Cohen	John H. Herz
J. B. Condliffe ¹	Willard N. Hogan
Edward A. Conway, S.J. ²	H. Stuart Hughes
Norman Cousins	Erling M. Hunt
Royden Dangerfield	Samuel Guy Inman
Oscar A. de Lima	Anne Hartwell Johnstone ⁵
Albert I. Edelman	Hans Kohn
Clark M. Eichelberger	Joseph P. Lash
Rupert Emerson	Walter H. C. Laves

Gerard J. Mangone
Boyd A. Martin
Charles E. Martiñ
Herbert L. May
Marion H. McVitty
Hugh Moore
Laura Puffer Morgan
Ine Nijuis
Robert E. Osgood
Ernest Minor Patterson
Josephine W. Pomerance
James P. Pope
Charles C. Price
Leland Rex Robinson⁶
J. William Robinson

Eleanor Roosevelt
Paul E. Smith
Louis B. Sohn
Eugene Staley
C. M. Stanley
John G. Stoessinger
Arthur Sweetser
Obert C. Tanner
Amos E. Taylor
Amry Vandembosch
James P. Warburg
Francis O. Wilcox⁷
Richard R. Wood
Quincy Wright

1. I could not support Recommendation 8 in its present form, which is vague and liable to be misread. I could support a rewording along the following lines:

The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace recommends, therefore, that the activities of the United Nations Organization and its specialized agencies be extended vigorously in the preparation of programs of internal improvements in underdeveloped Member States and that the fullest use be made of the credit of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in the money markets of the world.

J. B. Condliffe

2. With reservations on Recommendation No. 3.

E. A. Conway, S.J.

3. Does not agree with Recommendations Nos. 2, 4 and 11.

Ernst B. Haas

4. In view of recent developments in Southeast Asia, the India-Chinese Territorial dispute, and ideological differences regarding the inevitability of war, Communist China must have more time to display its attachment to the principles of peace and to those of the United Nations Charter as conditions for admission to the United Nations.

J. Eugene Harley

5. With reservations only as to the timing and the intent of applicants for membership among the "divided" nations.

Anne Hartwell Johnstone

6. Immediate efforts are imperative toward some political *modus vivendi* with the Peiping regime and the establishment of orderly contacts within or through the United Nations and its associated bodies.

However, the two China concept approved in principle in this Fifteenth Report spotlights several acute problems in whose resolution some progress should be made before admission of the Mainland government becomes feasible or desirable.

Among these are the open belligerence of Peiping and the occasional bellicose utterances from high quarters in Taipei, perhaps accentuated by the obvious entanglement of military strategy and humanitarian considerations in our aid; the provincial, rather than national, status imposed upon the people of Taiwan by the present set-up of the Nationalist Government, and by the uncompromising attitude of Peiping; and the structure of the Security Council after the proposed admission of the "Peoples Republic": i.e. whether the peoples of China should then be represented by permanent membership in the Council, and if so, by which "China."

In all this the wishes of the people of Formosa should be consulted, their protection and development underscored, and continued priority given to the build-up of political and economic standards offering potent competition in an environment of peaceful coexistence.

At no point should any question be raised as to continued direct representation of Taiwan in the United Nations—a condition which the "Peoples Republic" is not now prepared to accept. This responsible participation of the Nationalist Government, however, calls for far greater dedication to the acceptance, care and resettlement of refugees from Mainland China than has to this time characterized the Taiwan regime.

Leland Rex Robinson

7. With reservations on Recommendation No. 3.

Francis O. Wilcox

APPENDIX A

Legal Obstacles to Universal Membership

QUINCY WRIGHT

“Membership in the United Nations,” according to Article 4 of the Charter, “is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.”

Thus, there are five qualifications: (1) that the applicant for membership must be a state; (2) that it must be peace-loving; (3) that it must accept the obligations contained in the Charter; (4) that it must be able to carry out these obligations; and (5) that it must be willing to carry them out. These are the only provisions in the Charter concerning eligibility for membership.

The authority to interpret these qualifications is specified only with regard to the last two; they are to be interpreted by “the judgment of the organization.” It is not stated by what organ the United Nations will express judgment, but since the Charter says that “the admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations will be affected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council,” it would appear that this judgment is to be expressed by these organs. Furthermore, it would seem that the interpretation of the first three qualifications was intended to be made by judgment of the same organs.

The International Court of Justice gave an Advisory Opinion in 1950 at the request of the General Assembly, to the effect that members of the United Nations ought not to guide their judgment when voting in these organs by qualifications other than those explicitly mentioned in the Charter—particularly that they ought not to utilize their votes as an element in a bargain. The Opinion was asked because the Soviet Union had stated explicitly that it would not vote for the admission of Italy unless other states voted for certain Soviet satellites. Since, as pointed out by some members of the Court, a state is under no obligation to express the motives for its vote and there is no procedure for overriding its vote, the qualifications can actually be no more than subjective or moral limitations under member’s political discretion when voting in the General Assembly or the Security Council. It is clear that a state excluded by a vote so taken cannot appeal to the Inter-

national Court of Justice and gain admission to the United Nations on the ground that its admission had been prevented by an improperly motivated vote. Nor is there any procedure for declaring that votes which have admitted a new member are void on the ground that the state in question actually lacks the Charter qualifications. Indeed, it is clear that subsequent to this Advisory Opinion of the Court, many states have become members of the United Nations on the basis of votes motivated by political bargaining between the two sides in the Cold War. We must conclude that when votes for a new member ignore the qualifications of the Charter or are motivated by consideration not authorized in the Charter, this does not reduce their effectiveness. The Charter qualifications are merely appeals to the conscience or common sense of the voting members.

In its Advisory Opinion the Court also dealt with procedural matters, holding that a favorable "decision" of the General Assembly was not sufficient to confer membership unless there was also favorable "recommendation" by the Security Council. This issue had been controversial because an opinion of a committee at the San Francisco Conference had taken the contrary view, that while a recommendation of the Security Council must be given, the General Assembly could admit a state even if the recommendation were adverse (9th Report pp. 21-22). This Opinion of the Court was important because it had been assumed that a "recommendation" of the Security Council on this matter would not be procedural but would constitute a substantive "decision," subject under Article 27 of the Charter to veto by the permanent members. Thus, although not explicitly so provided in the Charter, the admission of new members has been subject to great-power veto.

Leaving aside the lack of sanctions to enforce the Charter qualifications for membership, what do they mean?

1. *What is a state?* International law recognizes the need for both condition of fact—the independent government of a population inhabiting a defined territory; and a condition of law—general recognition of this fact of prolonged conscious acquiescence in it by most existing states. The relative weights given to these two aspects of statehood divide the advocates of the "declaratory" and the "constitutive" theories of recognition. Both hold that some recognition is necessary for an entity to be a state. A small community on a Pacific Island or a native chieftainship in Central New Guinea, isolated from any contact with the states of the world, would not under either theory be a state in the sense of existing international law.

The advocates of the declaratory theory, however, hold that

when a state exists in fact with some external contacts, it is a state in the sense of international law and recognition is merely declaratory of that situation.

The advocates of the constitutive theory, on the other hand, hold that, whatever the facts, recognition is essential, and is therefore "constitutive" of statehood in the legal sense. Some, who take this view, hold that recognition is a political act to be exercised at discretion, that states may use recognition or non-recognition as instruments of policy, and that they may, therefore, refuse to recognize a state or a government formed by revolution, even when firmly established, and may continue to recognize the previous *de jure* government which may continue a ghostly existence in exile. Some, on the other hand, though accepting the constitutive character of recognition, hold that it is a juristic act and that states should, in general, recognize a *de facto* state or government, or even, as maintained by the late Judge Lauterpacht, that they are under a legal obligation to do so.

The United States rather consistently recognized *de facto* governments after President Washington recognized the revolutionary government of France in 1793, although that government had recently sent King Louis XVI, the ally of the United States, to the guillotine and was considered by many conservatives in the United States as dangerously radical. This policy was, however, changed when President Wilson refused to recognize the *de facto* Mexican government of Victoriano Huerta who had achieved his position by causing the assassination of his predecessor, President Madero. *De factoism* was in fact a major element of United States policy set forth in the Monroe Doctrine, which warned the European powers not to attempt to reestablish in Latin America the authority of the *de jure* sovereign, the King of Spain.

Since 1913 the United States has pursued varying policies, often refusing to recognize *de facto* governments over long periods because it did not like their ideology or their practices (as in the cases of Soviet Russia and Communist China) or because it hoped to reunite divided states such as Germany, Korea and Vietnam. Such refusals to recognize, from considerations of national policy, are to be distinguished from the non-recognition of new states arising from territorial transfers effected by the use of armed force in violation of international obligations. This principle was asserted by Secretary Stimson after Japan's conquest of Manchuria in 1931, and was supported by both the League of Nations and the United Nations. It was followed in regard to Mussolini's conquest of Ethiopia and Hitler's conquest in Europe. Such departures from *de factoism*, whether on grounds of policy or principle,

should be distinguished from non-recognitions arising from genuine doubt as to whether a state or government is actually established with sufficient material power, stable boundaries and moral support or acquiescence of its population to make it a state in fact. Doubtless there is always justification in delaying recognition of a revolutionary government until sufficient time has passed to make its continuance highly probable; but when that probability exists, it would appear that recognition makes for stability and accord with international law provided that change has not resulted from external aggression. Even in the latter case, it would seem that the United Nations might eventually recommend recognition of the change if it deemed it on the whole beneficial. As Judge Lauterpacht suggested, there must be a method for balancing the principle *jus ex injuria non oritur* with the principle *ex facto jus oritur*.

Non-recognition of a well-established state or government usually amounts to a denial of the right of the people concerned to choose their own government and to a condemnation of a state's attitude in international relations without a hearing. Non-recognition in such circumstances, therefore, seems contrary to the basic democratic principle that government should exist by the consent of the governed and to the basic principle of justice that no one shall be condemned without a hearing.

The United Nations should observe the same principles, particularly because—as Secretary-General Trygve Lie pointed out in the spring of 1950 when urging the representation of Mainland China—a member of the United Nations cannot meet its responsibilities under the Charter unless the government which represents it actually controls the territory of the state. Furthermore the United Nations cannot adequately perform its functions unless all existing states are members.

2. *What is the meaning of "peace-loving"?* The Charter makes it clear that this phrase referred to states which had been at war against the Axis powers. Article 3 says, "The original members of the United Nations shall be the states which, having participated in the United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco, or having previously signed the Declaration by United Nations of 1 January 1942, sign the present Charter and ratify it in accordance with Article 110." The Declaration of January 1, 1942 was signed by the states at war with one or more of the Axis powers. Under the Yalta agreement only states which had signed this declaration were invited to the San Francisco Conference. Article 4 of the Charter implies that these original members were "peace-loving states" by saying that "other peace-loving states" are eligible to membership.

To have recently been at war is an unusual conception of the term "peace-loving" but in view of the charges and countercharges of aggression made during the Cold War, it is difficult to reach agreement as to a definition. Each side, in charging the other with warlike propensities, has declared its own allegiance to the cause of peace. Nearly all states have participated in war in the past, more or less recently, more or less frequently. All regard their rivals of the moment as being belligerent and all regard themselves as champions of peace. Since the first purpose of the United Nations is to maintain international peace and security, it should perhaps be sufficient to ascribe a peace-loving character to any state which applies for membership in the United Nations and thus formally endorses this purpose.

3. *How can it be determined that a state accepts the obligations of the Charter?* This phrase would in international law be assumed to refer to formal acceptance by the usual procedures of signature and ratification by the state's duly constituted authorities. It is difficult to think of any other applicable conception. States have not, it is true, always observed treaties which they have accepted by such formal process. There is even evidence that on occasion states have formally accepted instruments when their governments had no real intention of observing them. International law recognizes that formal acceptance resulting from duress or fraud against the negotiator is not a real acceptance and renders the instrument voidable. The Stimson Doctrine goes further, asserting that duress against the state itself, as when it has been defeated in war, invalidates its formal acceptance of a treaty. It is unlikely, however, that either a government or a state will be coerced by force or deception to apply for membership in the United Nations and formally to accept the Charter. We must, therefore, assume that a state which has ratified the Charter by its constitutional procedure has "accepted" it in the sense of the Charter.

4. *When is a state able to carry out the obligations of the Charter?* Fulfillment of United Nations obligations involves three kinds of acts:

First: Action in the state's territory or in its ships, aircraft or space satellites necessary to carry out obligations such as those to promote respect for human rights and the self-determination of peoples, and to promote social and economic progress in accord with United Nations principles and special treaties to which it is a party. Also in this category are obligations to see that ships, aircraft and space satellites for which it is responsible observe international law. This may require positive action in enforcing law

within the State's territory and regulating its public services, or it may require abstention from such action as to infringe the human rights of its nationals and of aliens resident in its territory. Such capability is implied by the factual aspects of the definition of a state. An entity, as noted, is not a state unless a population inhabiting a defined territory is in fact controlled by an independent government. There has, of course, been great variation in the efficiency of government and all governments have at times been the victims of insurrection or rebellion temporarily preventing the exercise of authority in a part, or even the whole, of the state's territory. It would appear, however, that if an entity is judged to be a state and is represented by its *de facto* government, it can be assumed that the government is able to fulfill its obligations in its territory, its ships, aircraft, and space satellites. This, of course, would not be true of members which are represented by governments which do not in fact control the state's territory.

Second, there are the negative obligations in international relations such as to refrain from threat or use of force (Art. 2, par. 4) except in individual or collective self-defense against armed attack (Art. 51); from intervention in the domestic jurisdiction of other states or from violation of their territorial integrity or political independence (Art. 2, pars. 1, 4, 7); from assistance to a state found by the United Nations to be an aggressor (Art. 2, par. 5); or from attempting to influence the international character of the Secretary-General or the staff (Art. 100). Observance of such duties of abstention depends upon good faith (Art. 2, par. 2) in the highest decision-making authority and proper instruction of lesser officials. All states have the ability to fulfill obligations of this type if they have the will.

The *third* type of action required is that necessary to fulfill positive obligations for settling disputes peacefully, for supporting the United Nations as an organization, and for assisting it in collective security and other operations in foreign territory in fulfillment of its purposes and responsibilities. These obligations are of three types, financial, civil and military. The Charter authorizes the General Assembly to approve the budget and to apportion it among the members (Art. 17) and payment of the amount apportioned is an obligation sanctioned by suspension of voting privileges (Art. 19). This applies only to the regular budget. Extraordinary expenses as for refugees, economic assistance, and policing activities, not made part of the regular budget (as were the Congo operations), are sustained by voluntary contributions.

While it is conceivable that the General Assembly might so approve and apportion a budget as to impose financial obligations

upon certain members beyond their capacity to pay, no such danger has appeared on the horizon. The regular budget of the United Nations has been less than one-tenth of one per cent of the total governmental expenditures of the members and the apportionment has been carefully geared to the capacity of the members. They vary from one-third paid by the United States to a fraction of one per cent paid by the smaller states. While there have been delinquencies in payment, these have been due to delay in legislative appropriations, to temporary financial difficulties, which the General Assembly considers before imposing sanctions (Art. 19) or to political opposition to the purpose of the appropriation as by the Soviet Union and France in refusing to pay their apportionments for the United Nations Force in the Congo in 1961.

The members are expected to send representatives to the meetings of United Nations organs and this is made an explicit obligation of members of the Security Council. To facilitate prompt meetings "each member of the Security Council shall for this purpose be represented at all times at the seat of the Organization." (Art. 28). On several occasions members have failed to observe this obligation by absenting themselves for longer or shorter periods from Security Council meetings. Members are expected to permit the Secretary-General to recruit his staff from among their nationals but the only obligation of members in respect to the Secretary-General and staff is the negative one already referred to (Art. 100). While members are obliged to settle disputes by peaceful means (Art. 2, par. 3) and to utilize United Nations procedures to this end, none of these procedures, except for states which have accepted the optional clause of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, goes beyond recommendation, carrying out of which is voluntary. The obligation, therefore, is to bargain in good faith coupled with the negative obligation to refrain from nonpeaceful means of settlement. Participation by members in civil and military operations of the United Nations in foreign territory is voluntary.

Each member, while under a general obligation to assist the United Nations in collective security operations (Art. 2, par. 5) and to carry out decisions of the Security Council (Arts. 25, 48, 49) is free to specify the forces it will contribute to such enterprises by prior agreement as provided in Articles 43 and 45 of the Charter or by *ad hoc* contributions of forces as by certain states in the Palestine, Korean, Suez and Congo operations. No state can be required to contribute beyond its own estimate of its ability.

It therefore appears that insofar as the members of the United

Nations are states represented by their governments, they can be assumed to be able to carry out United Nations obligations. There are, doubtless, present members which do not entirely conform to these conditions, as, for example, the Ukraine and Byelorussia which, as members of the Soviet Union, lack independent authority over their territories; or China which is represented by a government that controls little, if indeed any, Chinese territory.

5. *When is a state willing to carry out its obligations?* This qualification adds little, if anything, to the requirements that an applicant must accept the obligations of the Charter. No test of willingness to fulfill obligations beyond formal affirmation of such willingness by ratifying the Charter is available. An inquiry into the motivation of the various persons taking part in the treaty-making process would not be feasible.

It would thus appear that any state which, by applying for membership, indicates its readiness to ratify the Charter, can be deemed peace-loving and able and willing to carry out Charter obligations. The only issue on which judgments may properly differ is whether the applicant is really a state. To determine this it is relevant to consider such questions as the habitual authority of the government over its population, the degree of popular support for or acquiescence in this government, the definition of the boundaries of its territory, the efficiency of its legal and administrative system in maintaining order, prevailing conceptions of justice, the stability and adequacy of its economy to sustain its population, and the extent and peaceful character of its foreign relations.

Thus I come to the considered conclusion that there are no legal obstacles to admitting all genuine states to the United Nations.

APPENDIX B

The following table shows the distribution of votes in the Sixteenth General Assembly of the United Nations on some leading roll-calls in which the United States and the Soviet Union voted on opposite sides. It is designed to illustrate some political traits of the underdeveloped Member States. The Member States in the first class are those of advanced industrialization and/or high production per capita. The second class contains Member States occupying an intermediate position in the scale of economic development. The underdeveloped Member States are distributed among the principal geographic regions and are listed according to the rate of contributions to the revenues of the UN Organization. In general the Member States classified as underdeveloped report an annual production of less than \$3.00 per capita. Many of them produce less than \$1.00 per capita per annum. The classification is based on findings of the United Nations Special Fund and of the Committee on Contributions.

The roll-calls took place on December 15, 1961, December 20, 1961, and January 30, 1962, respectively. The first was on a Resolution to seat representatives of Communist China in the United Nations, which was strongly supported by the Soviet Union; the second, on a Resolution to authorize the United Nations to borrow two hundred million dollars, strongly supported by the United States; the third, on a Resolution relating to the problem of Angola, strongly supported by the Soviet Union. The first and third of these Resolutions were defeated; the second was adopted.

NAME OF STATE	RATE OF ASSESSMENT	POPULATION (MILLIONS)	DATE OF ADMISSION	RESOLUTIONS		
				1	2	3
I. INDUSTRIALIZED "HIGH-PRODUCTION" MEMBER STATES (16)						
1. United States	32.02	179.0	1945	N	Y	N
2. Soviet Union	14.97	210.0	1945	Y	N	Y
3. Ukraine	1.98	41.9	1945	Y	N	Y
4. Byelorussia	.52	8.1	1945	Y	N	Y
5. United Kingdom	7.58	52.1	1945	Y	Y	N
6. France	5.94	45.0	1945	N	N	N
7. Canada	3.12	17.4	1945	N	Y	N
8. Australia	1.66	10.0	1945	N	Y	N
9. Sweden	1.30	7.4	1946	Y	Y	N
10. Belgium	1.20	9.1	1945	N	N	N
11. Czechoslovakia	1.17	13.5	1945	Y	N	Y
12. Netherlands	1.01	11.3	1945	A	Y	N
13. Denmark	.58	4.5	1945	Y	Y	N
14. Norway	.45	3.5	1945	Y	Y	N
15. New Zealand	.41	2.3	1945	N	Y	N
16. Luxembourg	.05	0.32	1945	N	Y	N
Totals	73.96			8/7/1	10/6/0	4/12/0

NAME OF STATE	RATE OF ASSESSMENT	POPULATION (MILLIONS)	DATE OF ADMISSION	RESOLUTIONS		
				1	2	3
II. INTERMEDIATE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (17)						
1. Japan	2.27	92.7	1956	N	Y	N
2. Italy	2.24	49.0	1955	N	Y	N
3. Poland	1.28	29.2	1945	Y	N	Y
4. Argentina	1.01	20.6	1945	N	Y	N
5. Spain	.86	29.9	1955	N	A	N
6. Hungary	.56	9.9	1955	Y	N	Y
7. South Africa	.53	14.4	1945	N	A	N
8. Venezuela	.52	6.5	1945	N	Y	N
9. Austria	.45	7.0	1955	A	Y	N
10. Finland	.37	4.4	1955	Y	Y	N
11. Chile	.26	7.5	1945	N	Y	N
12. Cuba	.22	6.6	1945	Y	N	Y
13. Israel	.15	2.0	1949	A	Y	A
14. Ireland	.14	2.8	1955	N	Y	N
15. Uruguay	.11	2.7	1945	N	A	N
16. Lebanon	.05	1.5	1945	A	Y	A
17. Iceland	.04	0.17	1946	A	Y	A
Totals	11.06			4/9/4	11/3/3	3/11/3

III. UNDERDEVELOPED MEMBER STATES (71)

A. EASTERN AND SOUTHERN ASIA (13)

1. China	4.57		1945	N	A	N
Taiwan		10.2				
Mainland		669.				
2. India	2.03	402.	1945	Y	A	Y
3. Indonesia	.45	90.3	1950	Y	Y	Y
4. Pakistan	.42	86.8	1947	Y	Y	A
5. Philippines	.40	24.7	1945	N	A	N
6. Thailand	.16	21.8	1946	N	Y	N
7. Malaya	.13	6.7	1957	N	Y	A
8. Ceylon	.09	9.6	1955	Y	Y	A
9. Burma	.07	20.4	1948	Y	Y	A
10. Cambodia	.04	4.8	1955	Y	A	A
11. Laos	.04	1.7	1955	N	Y	A
12. Nepal	.04	9.0	1955	Y	Y	A
13. Mongolia ¹		1.06	1961	Y	N	Y
Totals	8.44			8/5/0	8/1/4	3/3/7

B. LATIN AMERICA (15)

1. Brazil	1.03	64.2	1945	N	A	N
2. Mexico	.74	33.3	1945	N	A	N
3. Colombia	.26	13.8	1945	N	Y	N
4. Peru	.10	10.5	1945	N	Y	N
5. Ecuador	.06	4.1	1945	N	A	N
6. Dominican Republic	.05	2.9	1945	N	A	N
7. Guatemala	.05	3.6	1945	N	Y	N
8. Bolivia	.04	3.4	1945	N	Y	A
9. Costa Rica	.04	1.1	1945	N	A	N
10. El Salvador	.04	2.5	1945	N	A	N
11. Haiti	.04	3.4	1945	N	A	N
12. Honduras	.04	1.9	1945	N	A	N
13. Nicaragua	.04	1.4	1945	N	Y	N
14. Panama	.04	1.0	1945	N	Y	N
15. Paraguay	.04	1.7	1945	N	Y	N
Totals	2.61			0/15/0	7/0/8	0/14/1

¹ Scale of assessment for Member States admitted by Sixteenth General Assembly not yet determined.

NAME OF STATE	RATE OF ASSESSMENT	POPULATION (MILLIONS)	DATE OF ADMISSION	RESOLUTIONS		
				1	2	3
C. SOUTHWESTERN ASIA AND NORTHERN AFRICA (12)						
1. Turkey	.40	27.8	1945	N	Y	N
2. United Arab ² Republic	.30	25.4	1945	Y	A	Y
3. Iran	.20	20.1	1945	N	Y	N
4. Morocco	.14	10.5	1956	Y	Y	Y
5. Iraq	.09	6.9	1945	Y	A	Y
6. Syria		4.5	1945	Y	A	A
7. Saudi Arabia	.07	6.0	1945	A	A	A
8. Afghanistan	.05	13.0	1946	Y	A	A
9. Tunisia	.05	3.9	1956	A	Y	A
10. Jordan	.04	1.6	1955	N	A	A
11. Libya	.04	1.1	1955	N	A	A
12. Yemen	.04	4.5	1947	Y	A	A
Totals	1.42			6/4/2	4/0/8	3/2/7
D. EUROPE (7)						
1. Yugoslavia	.38	18.4	1945	Y	Y	Y
2. Romania	.32	18.2	1955	Y	N	Y
3. Greece	.23	8.2	1945	N	A	N
4. Bulgaria	.20	7.8	1955	Y	N	Y
5. Portugal	.16	9.0	1955	A	A	A
6. Albania	.04	1.5	1955	Y	N	Y
7. Cyprus	.04	0.56	1960	A	Y	A
Totals	1.37			4/1/2	2/3/2	4/1/2
E. TROPICAL AFRICA (24)						
1. Nigeria	.21	33.7	1960	A	Y	A
2. Ghana	.09	6.7	1957	Y	Y	Y
3. Congo (Leopold- ville)	.07	13.8	1960	A	A	A
4. Sudan	.07	11.4	1956	Y	A	Y
5. Ethiopia	.05	21.8	1945	Y	Y	Y
6. Senegal	.05	2.3	1960	N	Y	Y
7. Cameroun	.04	3.2	1960	N	Y	Y
8. Central African Rep.	.04	1.2	1960	A	A	A
9. Chad	.04	2.6	1960	A	Y	A
10. Congo (Brazza- ville)	.04	0.8	1960	A	A	A
11. Dahomey	.04	1.7	1960	A	A	A
12. Gabon	.04	0.4	1960	N	A	A
13. Guinea	.04	2.7	1958	Y	Y	Y
14. Ivory Coast	.04	3.1	1960	A	Y	A
15. Liberia	.04	1.2	1945	N	Y	A
16. Madagascar	.04	5.2	1960	N	Y	A
17. Mali	.04	4.3	1960	Y	Y	Y
18. Niger	.04	2.5	1960	A	Y	A
19. Somalia	.04	2.0	1960	Y	Y	Y
20. Togo	.04	1.1	1960	A	A	A
21. Upper Volta	.04	3.5	1960	A	Y	A
22. Mauritania ¹		0.73	1961	N	Y	A
23. Sierra Leone ¹		2.4	1961	Y	Y	A
24. Tanganyika ¹		9.08	1961	N	A	Y
Totals	1.14			7/7/10	16/0/8	9/0/15

Y — Yes

N — No

A — absent or abstain

¹ Scale of assessment for Member States admitted by Sixteenth General Assembly not yet determined.

² Allocation between Syria and United Arab Republic to be determined.

**Previous Reports of the Commission to Study the
Organization of Peace***

Seventh Report—Collective Security under the United Nations, July 1951.

Eighth Report—Regional Arrangements for Security and the United Nations and Papers Presented to the Commission, June 1953.

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Tenth Report—Strengthening the United Nations, Harper & Brothers, October 1957.

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* The early Reports are no longer available.

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