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**THE
SPLIT**

in the

- **CAPITALIST WORLD**
- **SOCIALIST WORLD**

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THE SPLIT

in the

- CAPITALIST WORLD
- SOCIALIST WORLD

by

PAUL M. SWEEZY

and

LEO HUBERMAN



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THE SPLIT IN THE CAPITALIST WORLD

The rejection of Britain's bid to enter the European Common Market marks the biggest setback for United States global policy since the victory of the Chinese Revolution in 1949. It seems likely that a radically new period of postwar history is opening.

To understand why this is so, it is necessary to have in mind a conception of the general aims of American policy, of what has been called Washington's "Grand Design" for the world of the second half of the 20th century. This design has of course never been laid down in a precise blueprint, but its main outlines are well known and have been described in general terms in innumerable public pronouncements. For example, in his 1961 trade expansion message to Congress, President Kennedy said:

The combined output and purchasing power of the United States and Western Europe—nearly a trillion dollars a year—is more than twice as great as that of the entire Sino-Soviet world. Though we have only half the population, and far less than half the territory, we can pool our resourcefulness in an open trade partnership strong enough to outstrip any challenge, and strong enough to undertake all the many enterprises around the world which the maintenance and progress of freedom require. If we can take this step, Marxist predictions of "capitalist" empires warring over markets and stifling competition would be shattered for all time—Communist hopes for a trade war between these two economic giants would be frustrated—and Communist efforts to split the West would be doomed to failure.

One need only know that in official Washington language "partnership" means American control, to see in this statement a bold claim to United States hegemony over the "free world." This is the keystone of the "Grand Design," and the way it is to be implemented can be deduced from the specific decisions and policies of the present administration and those which preceded it in office during the past two decades. To put the matter in the simplest possible terms, American hegemony is to be achieved

and perpetuated in two ways: first, through an American empire organized and directed from Washington; and, second, through two subordinate empires headed respectively by the Common Market expanded to include Britain, and Japan. Each of the two subordinate empires is to be organized and directed from its own metropolis, with Washington retaining an ultimate veto power over policies and decisions which are deemed inimical to the interests of the "free world" as a whole, that is to say, inimical to the interests of the American ruling class as interpreted in Washington. All three metropolises—the American, the European, and the Japanese—have a free rein to exploit their own empires through long-term investments, provision of banking and other services, controlling import and export trade, and so on. The U.S. participates in the exploitation of the subordinate empires primarily through investment in the metropolises—the form of U. S. foreign investment which has tended to be quantitatively predominant in the last few years.

The techniques in use for achieving these results are varied and numerous. First, there is the crucially important ideological justification for the acceptance by all concerned of U. S. hegemony. This of course is the Communist menace, compounded of the threat of Soviet (and/or Chinese) aggression and the threat of internal subversion. All countries in the "free world" are supposed to be in mortal danger from one or both of these threats; they all therefore need U. S. military protection and none can afford to go it alone for fear of being picked off one at a time. Granted these premises, the legitimacy of U. S. hegemony, indeed the urgent necessity for it, follows automatically. In the light of this, it is not surprising that the propagation of anti-Communism becomes the central task of all intellectual and educational effort by the American ruling class. To the extent that the anti-Communist message gets through to the masses in the dependent countries, their very dependency acquires a popular base.

Economically, U. S. hegemony is buttressed by a wide variety of techniques depending on the particular situation and requirements of the different dependencies. Private investment, government loans, monopolization of vital imports or exports,

control over important technologies—these are examples of the kinds of leverage exercised by the U. S. on the dependent economies. In this connection, however, an important fact must be noted: because of vigorous economic development in Europe and Japan during the past decade or so, U. S. economic leverage on the subordinate empires is much less than it used to be. As far as Western Europe is concerned, indeed, it can now be said that full economic independence has been achieved.

Politically, the methods employed by the United States range from a complicated network of pacts and alliances to the classical techniques of divide-and-rule practiced by all the great empire builders of the past. Dependencies are graded in a hierarchical scale of status and privilege; rivalry for favor is encouraged and the contestants are suitably rewarded or punished; excessive power concentrations are either prevented from forming or are watered down if they occur. It is in this connection that the matter of British entry into the Common Market acquires its transcendent importance for American policy. The United States encouraged the formation of the Common Market by the original Six (France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg) and then saw it grow rapidly in coherence and strength. The threatened emergence of a powerful rival was an obvious danger that had to be countered. The tactic chosen by the U. S. was to push Britain, the most privileged ally, into the Market, thereby ensuring that U. S. interests would at all times be respected. After British entry, the cohesiveness of the grouping would be further weakened by the adherence of some or all of Britain's partners in the European Free Trade Association (Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland). French President de Gaulle, in his famous news conference of January 14th, foresaw the results with great clarity: a community increasing in this way, he said,

would be faced with the problems of its economic relations with all sorts of other nations and, first of all, with the United States. It is to be foreseen that the cohesion of its members, who would be very numerous and very different would not stand up for long and that in the last resort it would appear as a colossal Atlantic Community dependent upon a control by the United States and

which would have soon absorbed the community of Europe. (*New York Times*, Western Edition, January 15, 1963.)

The military means of ensuring American hegemony again vary according to the specific situation of the various dependencies. Financial aid for purchase of American weapons plus military training missions may be sufficient to guarantee the loyalty to Washington of dominant military establishments in some of the weaker dependencies. One-sided treaties providing for U. S. military bases create quasi-occupation regimes. Integrated commands, such as those which characterize the NATO military setup, have the effect of bringing part of the allies' forces under direct American control. Finally, and most important vis-à-vis the leaders of the subordinate empires, the United States aims to maintain an absolute and pre-emptive military preponderance by preventing any of its allies from achieving an effective nuclear capability.

Such, in briefest outline, is the Grand Design for a "free world" run from Washington. If it could be realized—if all the parts could be put together and made to function smoothly—the United States could then proceed to attempt a settlement with the socialist world, either through a continuation and intensification of the Cold War or, much less likely, through some sort of an agreement to live and let live.

Now it is clear that the rejection of Britain's bid to join the Common Market, together with the closely related refusal of France to accept the U. S. plan for a so-called multilateral nuclear force (in reality a device for perpetuating America's atomic monopoly in the "free world"), have dealt a shattering blow to all Washington's calculations. The concentration of power represented by the Common Market is not to be watered down by the admission of the most favored ally of the United States. It can hardly be over-emphasized that this has far more than merely negative significance. The Common Market grouping will naturally go on building up its power, and the United States will either go on trying to bring it under control or set about breaking it up. Whichever aim the U. S. pursues, the two power centers are now certain to develop as antagonists in a continuing and intensifying struggle. In the world of power politics, there is simply no middle road between subordination

and struggle for supremacy. The rejection of Britain's entry was at the same time the Market's rejection of subordination; from now on there can only be struggle.

The French decision to go ahead with the development of an independent nuclear capability was a logical corollary and necessary complement of the rejection of Britain's entry. Nor does this decision have only military significance. In the world as it is constituted today, technological independence necessarily implies military independence. If France were to renounce the development of nuclear weapons, she would at the same time be putting shackles on her own scientific-technological development. She would, in other words, be accepting technological as well as military subordination to the United States. (France is the country principally involved at the moment, but it goes without saying that the other members of the Six, especially West Germany, will soon be fully immersed in the military-technological race—according to some accounts, the French atomic effort is already in reality a Franco-German effort.)

One part of the American Grand Design, perhaps the most important part, thus lies in ruins. The nucleus of what was to have been the subordinate European empire has opted out and now has no choice but to try to build an independent empire. The "free world," far from being united under U. S. leadership, is divided against itself and threatened with internecine strife.

But this is still not all. Though it is perhaps not yet obvious, recent events cannot help having a serious undermining effect on the anti-Communist ideology which, as previously noted, provides the sole justification for America's claim to "free world" hegemony. Not that the Common Market is any less impeccably anti-Communist than the United States, of course. The point is that by taking the course they are now embarked upon, the Six are in effect laughing at the whole elaborate pretense that there is a danger of aggression from the Soviet Union. As Walter Lippmann put it even before the rejection of Britain's entry bid:

European and American feelings differ about how urgent, immediate, and earth-shaking is the Soviet challenge. Our European

allies are not getting ready to call up reserves, and they are much less hot and bothered about Mr. Khrushchev than we are. . . . Quite evidently, though as well aware as any man of the challenge from the Soviet Union, General de Gaulle does not consider it a risk to sidetrack Great Britain, to alienate the Commonwealth, and to cold shoulder the United States. (*New York Herald Tribune*, November 13, 1962.)

And the decision to develop an independent nuclear capability merely underlines the same point. France's deterrent power will not be a reality for several years at best. Can even a schoolboy believe that it has anything to do with fear of an attack on Western Europe by the USSR? De Gaulle is saying in no uncertain terms that the Soviet Union is no military threat to anyone. That particular bogey, which in the past has been such a reliable weapon in the American arsenal, seems about played out. The consequence should be a world-wide loosening of the bonds that tie the dependencies of the United States to the metropolis.

It may be said that our whole argument rests on a shaky foundation, that the sharp turn events have taken in the last few months is the work of two old men deluded by dreams of their countries' past greatness, and that when they have departed the scene, or perhaps even sooner, everything will revert to normal: Britain will be admitted to the Common Market and Europe will slip back into its appointed place in the American Grand Design. This is certainly the hope of the United States and, what is more important, there need be no doubt that Washington will move heaven and earth to see that the hope comes true.

This line of argument—or for that matter any other that rests on a personalist interpretation of the Common Market and its policies—we find completely unconvincing. It is no doubt true, as we are continuously being told, that de Gaulle is a power-hungry megalomaniac obsessed with the idea of the grandeur of France, that he is now the exclusive architect of French policy, that Adenauer's support has been of crucial importance, and that there is widespread opposition to the two old autocrats throughout the Common Market. What the argument neglects to say is that de Gaulle and Adenauer would not be able to hold the positions and exercise the power they do unless

they had the backing of the decisive sectors of the French and German ruling classes. If this is so, as we believe it is, the conclusion which follows is that their departure from the scene is most *unlikely* to lead to any basic changes in the nature or policies of the Common Market.

These policies are to gain political and military independence of the United States, build up the power of the group internally, and expand its possessions and spheres of influence abroad. It seems to us beyond any question that these are the policies which the Big Business rulers of France and Germany have historically pursued whenever they have been in a position to do so. That they did not for roughly a decade and a half after World War II was because they were not in a position to, not because they didn't want to. During that period they were dependent on U. S. economic aid, and they accepted political and military subordination as its price. By now, however, they have recovered their economic independence, and it is wholly natural that they should move to recover their political and military independence as well. Moreover, their economic strength, joined to that of their partners in the Six, is ample to sustain all-around independence and to enable them to contemplate with equanimity, nay with eagerness, a struggle for supremacy against the United States. The personal attitudes and wishes of de Gaulle and Adenauer thus correspond to the objective needs of the classes they represent. It is so with all "great" historical politicians and statesmen.

What, then, is the source of the opposition to de Gaulle and Adenauer inside the Common Market? This is an interesting subject which would repay careful study. We would suggest that there are three main sources.

First, and probably least important, there are segments of the ruling class, probably relatively small, which stand to lose from the exclusion of Britain or from other policies now being adopted (producers selling to the British market, importers of grain from the U. S. and Canada, etc.).

Second, there are all those who are directly or indirectly dependent on U. S. private investments in the Common Market countries. Though, as is well known, U. S. investment in the area has been rising steeply in recent years, the size and im-

portance of this group should not be over-estimated. According to latest available Commerce Department figures, the value of U. S. direct investments in France in 1961 was \$841 million, in Germany \$1,170 million, and in the Common Market as a whole \$3,041 million. These figures compare with \$3,523 million in Britain and \$11,804 million in Canada.* In other words, continental Europe is still not an area of extreme U. S. investment concentration. In relative terms, a well informed French writer has estimated that U. S. investments in France account for between 5 and 6 percent of the national total, and the proportion cannot be significantly different for West Germany or the Market as a whole.** Quite clearly, the apparently widespread notion that the U. S. monopolies through direct investments have grabbed control of the continental economies is a myth. (The very much higher concentration in Britain, incidentally, obviously helps to explain why Washington is so anxious to shoehorn Britain into the Market.)

The third, and we would judge by far the most important, source of opposition to the de Gaulle-Adenauer course comes from the vested political and bureaucratic interests that have grown up during the years of European subordination to the United States. Most of Western Europe's leading politicians and civil servants have climbed to their present positions during this period. Their most valued skill has been their ability to get along with and get results from the trans-Atlantic benefactor. Those infected with anti-Americanism (a varied group to be sure but certainly including everyone with a strong sense of personal and national dignity) have been shunted aside or denied promotion. As a result of this process of selection, the governing elite in Western Europe has acquired a thoroughly lackeyized mentality: they do not want independence from the United States, they fear it in much the same way that the ruling classes in Latin America fear it, and they will do their best to prevent its realization. It is, above all, *this* opposition that de Gaulle and Adenauer must overcome.

*Samuel Pizer and Frederick Cutler, "Expansion in U.S. Investments Abroad," *Survey of Current Business*, August 1962, p. 22.

**Jacques Malterre, "L'Europe Colonisée," *France Observateur*, February 7, 1963.

There are two main reasons for believing that they will succeed. In the first place, as already indicated, the great trusts and combines which are at least as dominant in the European economies as their counterparts are on this side of the Atlantic, have every interest in independence from the United States. In an historical sense, indeed, de Gaulle and Adenauer are merely their instruments in lifting the yoke of subservience to the United States which had to be endured during the period of postwar reconstruction. The conflict between the politicians and bureaucrats on the one hand and the monopoly capitalists on the other is neatly illustrated by a recent report from Rome by the columnist Joseph Alsop. Describing the Italian reaction to de Gaulle's "bold attempt to transform the European Common Market into an exclusive, protectionist Europe inspired by a new 'continental nationalism,'" Alsop writes that

the Italian government leaders, from President Segni and Prime Minister Fanfani down to the able permanent officials in the ministries, are completely united in their distaste for the Gaullist conception of Europe. In the business and industrial communities, however, support for de Gaulle is already discernible. And this pro-de Gaulle tendency may grow importantly, especially if it is aided by clumsy American diplomacy. (*Washington Post*, March 6, 1963.)

If this is the case in Italy, how much greater is de Gaulle's support likely to be in France and Germany which have even bigger and stronger monopolies as well as deep-rooted traditions of struggling for world leadership! We would say that this "pro-de Gaulle tendency" (really a pro-independent imperialist tendency) is certain to grow, while the opposite tendency, represented by Segni, Fanfani, et al, is equally certain to decline.

The second main reason for believing in the success of the de Gaulle-Adenauer line is that it is likely to have genuine popular support. Nationalism is a two-edged weapon which operates differently in different situations. If the Common Market appeared in the eyes of Europeans as a device for perpetuating the dominance of the United States over its allies, nationalism would work against it. If, on the other hand, the Common Market appears as a device for throwing off American dominance and enhancing the relative standing of the European

member countries, then nationalism works for it. Since the de Gaulle-Adenauer policies obviously give the Market the latter character, it is safe to say that they can rely on nationalist support. It needs only to be added that Western Europe is the birthplace of modern nationalism and that there is no habit of mind that is more deeply ingrained in the European peoples. Observant reporters have noted that the events of recent months have already produced a marked change in attitude among Europeans. Writes Ray Vicker in the *Wall Street Journal* from Brussels:

In the red plush interior of the Ondres Restaurant near the Theatre Royal de la Monnaie, a helpful waiter recommends the lobster entente cordiale to a hungry diner. Says he (in that lordly manner of European waiters): "It is much better than lobster à l'Americaine."

That waiter's tone is being adopted by many another European today when referring to American ideas—especially in the field of diplomatic policy. As a result, President Kennedy's "grand design" for an Atlantic partnership of Western nations faces rough sledding. Moreover, even if a grand design materializes, there are increasing signs that it will not have a made-in-America stamp on it, nor will the end product be entirely to American liking. (*Wall Street Journal*, January 23, 1963.)

If we are right that the de Gaulle-Adenauer policies serve the interests of the monopolists and express the nationalistic sentiments of the masses, there can hardly be any doubt that they will prevail over the pro-Americanism of the hack politicians and the bureaucrats. These gentlemen are either going to have to accept the new dispensation (which many of them will manage without too much difficulty) or else be replaced by others (of whom there are plenty waiting to step forward).

Let us attempt now to survey some of the possible implications of the split in the capitalist world which is now opening up and in our judgment is certain to grow wider and deeper as time goes on. This is of course an enormous subject which could hardly be treated satisfactorily in a volume, let alone a brief essay. The following remarks should therefore be taken in the spirit in which they are offered, as suggestions for further thought and study.

Taking the United States first, we may quote again from

the article by Ray Vicker in the *Wall Street Journal* of January 23rd:

For the U. S. that trend [toward an independent Europe] has some uncomfortable implications. Among them: Possible loss of a substantial part of its agricultural exports to Europe, tough bargaining before any trade concessions are won under the administration's Trade Expansion Act, a fierce fight in those negotiations over just about every exception to tariff cutting that may be advanced by U. S. negotiators to protect specific American industries, possible reorganization of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and continuation of national nuclear forces in the Western alliance.

This by no means exhausts the list, of course. What is likely to be of particular importance is an intensified struggle for dependencies and spheres of influence in the underdeveloped areas of the world. During the past two decades, the United States has used its paramount position in the "free world" to steal one area after another from the older colonial empires and to add the stolen territories to its own string of dependencies. In this manner, South Korea, Taiwan, and Okinawa have been transferred from the Japanese empire to the American, South Vietnam has been transferred from the French empire, Pakistan and Iran from the British, and so on. Similarly, British and German investment and influence, once so prominent in South America, have been liquidated in some countries and sharply curtailed in others. With the re-establishment of a strong and independent imperialist power in Europe, however, this process of one-way transfers is likely to be halted and even reversed. The Congo perhaps offers us a preview of what is in store in other countries and continents. It probably requires no elaborate argument to prove that the Tshombe-Adoula struggle was at bottom a struggle of the Belgians to hold on to the extremely lucrative Katanga mining complex against the bold bid of the United States to use the UN to bring the whole Congo into the American sphere of influence. The fall of Tshombe seemed to signalize a resounding victory for the United States. And yet one of Adoula's first acts after this military denouement was to accept an invitation to visit Brussels. The resulting talks are said to have ended in "complete success. . . . A joint com-

muniqué was issued after the last meeting between the Congolese Ministers and a Belgian delegation headed by Premier Theo Lefevre and Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak. It said the talks had been conducted 'in a particularly cordial atmosphere' and had revealed 'a complete similarity of views between both governments.'" (*New York Times*, Western Edition, March 1, 1963.) Belgium, it seems, is now seeking to buy Adoula out from under the Americans' noses, and with the wealth of Katanga still firmly in its grasp the chances of success would appear to be very favorable. Adoula evidently has every interest in playing the two off against each other with a view to finally selling out to the highest bidder. (The Congolese people of course have nothing but misery to gain from all this haggling over the right to exploit them, but their welfare is the last thing that any of the principals involved are concerned with.)

Be that as it may, a world-wide struggle for empire is clearly in the offing, and the United States, having had everything its way for two decades, is pretty sure to suffer some defeats and losses. At the same time, the price of local ruling groups will go up: competition among buyers, they say, always has the effect of ensuring a fairer price to sellers. All of which, it may be surmised, will not do much to solve the U. S. balance-of-payments problem or to stimulate a lagging domestic economy sorely in need of expanded overseas "living space."

What about Britain? To begin with, one must understand that the door to the Common Market is by no means permanently closed to the British. As de Gaulle made quite clear at his January 14th press conference, they can enter any time they are ready to give up their special relation with the United States. In other words, they can enter if and when the effect of their entrance would be to strengthen the Common Market rather than transform it. The basic condition for such an entry is clear: cut all bilateral military ties to the U. S. and pool nuclear capabilities and research with those of the continental partners. The British would also have to bring as large a part of their remaining empire as possible into the Market on an associate membership basis like that now held by most of France's ex-colonies in Africa. But there is no point in speculating further about this at the present time since it is perfectly clear

that the one thing the British are not prepared to do is give up their position as most favored ally of the United States.

From this premise certain consequences flow. As the struggle between the U. S. and the Common Market intensifies, Britain will inevitably be squeezed from both sides. Both will try to take away her markets and colonies (or neo-colonies), and as her situation deteriorates, she will be thrown into ever closer dependence on the United States. At some stage along this gloomy route British Big Business might decide that it would be better after all to throw in their country's lot with the Market. It is hard to see what other alternatives are now open to Britain. The idea of turning the Commonwealth into an independent (and liberal) third force in the "free world" is totally impractical, the more so since large parts of the Commonwealth are already under American domination (for example, Canada and Pakistan) and even larger parts appear to be in the process of falling under American domination (for example, India and Nigeria). The Commonwealth is much more likely to provide battlegrounds between the American and European empires than to form the basis of a British-led third force. If the Labor Party were a real socialist party, it might be able to lead Britain into the socialist camp where the country would enjoy independence of both capitalist empires and could in addition find all the markets needed for rapid economic growth. But the Labor Party is not now a real socialist party and the day when it may become one is still apparently a long way off.

As for the underdeveloped countries in the "free world," one must make a distinction. We have already suggested in connection with the Congo that the ruling groups can play the imperialist powers off against each other and thereby extract better terms for themselves. As far as the masses are concerned, however, it makes hardly any difference whether they are exploited by Americans or Europeans, and it matters just as little whether the local agents of the imperialists are paid better or worse. If the masses are able to win genuine concessions, as sometimes they are, the reason is their own strength and militancy, not the competition of the imperialists for their favor. Imperialist rivalry is after all nothing new, and so far as we know there is not a single case in which it can be shown to have

benefited the people in the exploited lands. Rather the contrary: they are usually made to pay, in one way or another, the costs of deciding who is to have the privilege of battenning off their misery.

This does not mean that it is a matter of indifference to the peoples of the underdeveloped countries whether the imperialists are united or divided. Their real hope, their *only* real hope, is to escape altogether from the clutches of imperialism and to join the socialist world. Hence anything that weakens imperialism as a whole is good for them: their escape becomes that much easier. And anything that strengthens the socialist world is also good for them: more assistance can be given them both along the escape route and after they have reached their destination. It will probably be generally agreed that an imperialist system divided against itself is weaker than one united under a single leader and that on this count therefore, recent developments are altogether favorable to the real interests of the underdeveloped countries. That the split in the imperialist camp will actually strengthen world socialism, however, is less obvious. Still, we believe that it is both true and important.

For one thing, the rift between the imperialist giants should serve materially to lessen the purely military pressure on the socialist countries. In more concrete terms, to the extent that West Germany gets caught up in a struggle against the United States for markets and spheres of influence, her attitude toward her neighbors to the East is bound to be affected. Germany has twice suffered military disaster as a result of fighting two-front wars. Left to itself, the German ruling class might make the same mistake again, but there is less likelihood that the integrated ruling class of a Western European empire will do so. Its orientation will be more toward the Iberian peninsula in Europe and toward Africa and Latin America overseas. Under these circumstances, the working out of some sort of *modus vivendi* in Central Europe would become a realistic possibility. With the threat of German aggression thus reduced, the socialist countries of Eastern Europe could divert resources from military to civilian uses and in this way step up their rate of growth.

Analagous considerations apply in the field of economic relations between capitalist Europe and socialist Europe. It is

well known that Western European capitalists (including Germans) have few if any scruples about trading with the East and that it has been American influence that has prevented them from doing so on a much larger scale. With the restraining grip of the Americans broken, this trade should flourish, to the great benefit of both sides. For the Western Europeans, this may well become a crucially important matter in the next few years. Their present boom, like all capitalist booms, rests on overproduction of capital goods. When creeping stagnation sets in, as it did in the United States already during the 50's,* the pressure of the big monopolies to open up new markets will steadily mount. In part, this will take the form of intensified struggle against the Americans. But it will also take the form of increased trading with the East, probably on more and more advantageous terms for the latter. That this will facilitate the rapid development of the socialist societies, not only in Europe but on all other continents as well, goes without saying.

For the socialist world, then, the implications of the imperialist split are all favorable. And this means that for the peoples of the underdeveloped countries the implications are also favorable. But no one should misinterpret this statement. It does not mean that the peoples of the underdeveloped countries can expect any immediate or direct benefits from the quarrels of their imperialist masters. In the short run, indeed, they may suffer, as the Congolese have suffered during the last three years. What it does mean is that the conditions for overthrowing imperialist rule altogether are improving and will continue to improve. We are clearly reaching a stage of world history when, for the poor and exploited who make up the vast majority of mankind, no other goal makes sense and therefore no other goal is worth striving for.

(March 17, 1963)

*Much of the European Left has succumbed to the view that "neo-capitalism" is no longer subject to such ills. The Right has retained a better sense of proportion, as shown by the example of the arch-conservative Swedish economist Per Jacobsson, managing director of the International Monetary Fund: "Western Europe," he told a convention of the American Bankers Association, "is going to encounter more problems like those of the United States than it has in recent years." (*New York Times*, Western Edition, February 26, 1963.)

THE SPLIT IN THE SOCIALIST WORLD

The Review of the Month in the December, 1961, issue of MR was on the subject of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Since then a lot has happened, and a large amount of new or previously relatively inaccessible material has been published.* In the light of these developments, we have to say quite frankly that our earlier analysis of the dispute does not stand up. It contains serious inaccuracies, the emphases are misplaced, and it now seems to us that the conclusions are untenable. But much more serious, the whole argument rested on a misconception of what the dispute is all about.

What the Dispute Is About

It is not about whether war is inevitable or how to minimize the danger of war or what the relations among Communist Parties should be—though these and many other questions are involved. At bottom it is about the nature of the historical period through which the world is passing and what can and should be done to advance the cause of world socialism.

The Russians and those who agree with them (including the leadership of most of the non-Asian Communist Parties) think that the over-riding issue of our time is war or peace, and that by comparison everything else is of secondary importance. If thermonuclear war comes, they argue, civilization itself will be destroyed or at any rate set back hundreds if not thousands of years, and the bright future which now seems to beckon the socialist countries will be ruined. On the other hand if war can

* The following sources are particularly valuable: (1) Donald S. Zagoria, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961*, Princeton, 1962. This book quotes from or summarizes the most important documents on both sides from the 20th Congress through the 22nd Congress of the CPUSSR. (2) Edgar Snow, *The Other Side of the River: Red China Today*, New York, 1962. This 810-page work, perhaps the best general account of revolutionary China to date, throws valuable light on the motivations and ideas of the Chinese leaders. (3) The following statements published by the Chinese CP: "The Differences between Comrade Togliatti and Us," *Renmin Ribao*, December 31, 1962; "Whence the Differences: A Reply to Thorez and Other Comrades," *Renmin Ribao*, February 27, 1963; and "More on the Differences between Comrade Togliatti and Us: Some Important Problems of Leninism in the Contemporary World," *Hongqi*, March 4, 1963. The last named is in fact a book of 199 pages which contains a detailed and authoritative statement of Chinese views. All of these, as well as other statements on the dispute, have been published

be avoided, the superiority of socialism over capitalism will be clearly demonstrated within a decade or two and the whole world will be irresistibly attracted into the socialist camp.

The political line which follows from this analysis puts primary emphasis on three objectives: peaceful coexistence of countries with different social systems, disarmament, and peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism. These are treated—for example, in the new program of the CPUSSR adopted at the 22nd Congress in October, 1961—not merely as desirable but as actually attainable goals. This is a crucially important distinction which must be continuously kept in mind. The dispute in the socialist camp concerns not the desirability of these goals but their attainability, and attainability depends on reality not on wishes.

War and Imperialism

The Chinese, for their part, are emphatic in their espousal of a policy of peaceful coexistence. "The Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese government," we read in the first reply to Togliatti, "have always stood for peaceful coexistence between countries with different social systems." (*Differences*, p. 22.) And again: "A socialist country has no antagonistic social contradictions . . . and it is absolutely unnecessary and impermissible for a socialist country to embark on wars of expansion. No world war can ever be started by a socialist country." (*More on the Differences*, p. 66.) But they are no less emphatic in their insistence that imperialism does not stand for peaceful coexistence, that imperialism is full of antagonistic social contradictions, that it is in the nature of imperialism to embark on wars of expansion, and that imperialism can start a world war. These are, indeed, among the most basic tenets of Leninism, and they have been fully confirmed by history. Imperialist

separately by the Foreign Languages Press, Peking. In what follows, references are to these separate editions, identified by short titles. On the Soviet side, many articles and speeches could be cited. Perhaps the best single source is Khrushchev's speech to the Supreme Soviet on December 12, 1962, entitled "The Present International Situation and the Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union," published as a separate pamphlet by Cross-currents Press, New York.

conflict has already been responsible for starting two world wars, and "the history of the 17 postwar years shows that local wars of one kind or another have never ceased." (*Differences*, p. 25.) In the three years 1960-1962 alone, the Chinese enumerate some 20 local wars or acts of imperialist aggression. (*More on the Differences*, pp. 60-63.) The conclusion follows with iron logic that "only after the imperialist system has been overthrown and only after all systems of oppression of man by man and of exploitation of man by man have been abolished, and not before, will it be possible to eliminate all wars and to reach 'a world without war.'" (*Differences*, p. 25.) To believe otherwise is not Leninism but bourgeois pacifism.

This does not mean the Chinese think that a third world war is inevitable, still less that the world is going to be blown up in a thermonuclear holocaust. On these questions, as distinct from banning war altogether, they are even quite optimistic. Their reasoning, reduced to its essentials, is that just as the first two world wars resulted in vast losses of territory and population to imperialism, so a third world war would finish the job, wiping imperialism off the face of the earth. If the forces opposed to imperialism and war can be effectively mobilized and the imperialists can be convinced that to start another world war would be suicide, they can be deterred from doing it. With respect to atomic warfare, the Chinese hold that since "the secret of nuclear weapons has long since ceased to be a monopoly," it follows that "those who possess nuclear weapons and guided missiles cannot prevent other countries from possessing the same. In their vain hope of obliterating their opponents with nuclear weapons, the imperialists are, in fact, subjecting themselves to the danger of being obliterated." Therefore, "we have always maintained that it is possible to conclude an agreement for a total ban on nuclear weapons." (*More on the Differences*, p. 73.) And they call attention to the fact that "there are precedents for the outlawing of highly destructive weapons. One such precedent is the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, concluded by various nations in 1925 at Geneva." (*Differences*, pp. 13-14.) But of course the possibility of avoiding a third world war or of out-

lawing nuclear weapons is an entirely different matter from banning war altogether. That will be possible only after imperialism has been completely eliminated.

To be sure, if the nature of imperialism had changed or if it were in the process of changing, this conclusion would no longer hold. But the Chinese contend that the changes which have taken place in imperialism, and in particular the decline of the old colonial empires, have in no way changed the nature of the beast. The United States has stepped into the shoes of the formerly dominant imperialist powers and "is carrying out a policy of expansion in all parts of the world ever since World War II." (*More on the Differences*, p. 27.) But this in no way affects the contradictions of the system. On the contrary:

The U.S. imperialist policy of world hegemony inevitably intensifies the fight between the imperialist powers and between the new and old colonialists over colonies and spheres of influence; it also intensifies the struggles between U.S. imperialism with its policy of control and the other imperialist powers which are resisting this control. These struggles affect the vital interests of imperialism, and the imperialist contestants give each other no quarter, for each side is striving to strangle the other.

The policy of the U.S. imperialists and their partners towards the oppressed nations and people of Asia, Africa, and Latin America who are struggling for their own liberation is an extremely reactionary policy of suppression and deception. . . .

The population of these areas in Asia, Africa, and Latin America constitutes more than two thirds of the total population of the capitalist world. The ever-mounting tide of revolution in these areas and the fight over them between the imperialist powers and between the new and old colonialists clearly show that these areas are the focus of all the contradictions of the capitalist world; it may also be said that they are the focus of world contradictions. These areas are the weakest link in the imperialist chain and the storm center of world revolution.* (*Ibid.*, pp. 31-32.)

* It is important to understand that in saying that "these areas are the focus of world contradictions," the Chinese definitely mean to include the contradictions between the capitalist and socialist systems. "In terms of the actual interests of the imperialist powers," they say in another passage, "these contradictions [in Asia, Africa, and Latin America] are more pressing, more direct, more immediate than their contradictions with the socialist countries." *Ibid.*, p. 50.

The Chances of Disarmament

In these circumstances, the Chinese evidently think that the prospects of any genuine disarmament are vanishingly small, so small indeed that they hardly bother to discuss the problem at all. In *More on the Differences between Comrade Togliatti and Us*, which is unquestionably their major theoretical pronouncement, disarmament is brought up at only one place in the chapter on "War and Peace" and is quickly disposed of:

That old-line opportunist Kautsky held that "war is a product of the arms drive," and that "if there is a will to reach agreement on disarmament," it "will eliminate one of the most serious causes of war." Lenin sharply criticized these anti-Marxist views of Kautsky and other old-line opportunists who examined the causes of war without reference to the social system and the system of exploitation.

In "The War Program of the Proletarian Revolution," Lenin pointed out that "only *after* the proletariat has disarmed the bourgeoisie will it be able, without betraying its world-historical mission, to throw all armaments on the scrap heap; and the proletariat will undoubtedly do this, but *only when this condition has been fulfilled, certainly not before.*" Such is the law of social development, and it cannot be otherwise.

Being incapable of explaining the question of war and peace from the historical and class angle, the modern revisionists always talk about peace and about war in general terms without making any distinction between just and unjust wars. Some people are trying to persuade others that the people's liberation would be "incomparably easier" after general and complete disarmament, when the oppressors would have no weapons in their hands. In our opinion this is nonsensical and totally unrealistic and is putting the cart before the horse.* (*Ibid.*, pp. 67-68. Emphasis in original.)

This low estimate of the chances of disarmament does not mean that the Chinese oppose the socialist countries' taking the

* The reference may be to Soviet First Deputy Premier Mikoyan who was reported in the *New York Times* of March 15, 1962, as saying in a speech in Armenia that he "rejected the thesis that Mr. Khrushchev's disarmament proposals would hamper the national liberation movements. The Deputy Premier . . . said that disarmament would strip the 'imperialists' of the means of 'resisting the revolutionary actions of the proletariat and the peasantry.'" This very consequence of disarmament serves to explain why, in the Chinese view, Mr. Khrushchev's proposals are "totally unrealistic."

initiative in proposing disarmament: not to do so would be to abandon an effective propaganda weapon. But the Chinese evidently believe that to rely on disarmament as a means of promoting or insuring peace makes no sense. The threat of war comes not from armaments as such but from imperialism and can be countered only by fighting imperialism. Hence where the Soviet Union's political line centers on the struggle for peace and disarmament, that of the Chinese centers on the struggle against imperialism.

How to Fight Imperialism

How should the struggle against imperialism be carried on? The Chinese answer that it must be conducted on all levels and by all available methods. But since, as we have seen, they regard the underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America as "the weakest link in the imperialist chain," they naturally conclude that the key to a successful fight against imperialism is to be found in the revolutionary struggles of the peoples of those areas. Since this is the real heart of the Chinese position and the central issue in their dispute with the Soviet Union, a full statement of their views seems called for:

A fundamental task is thus set before the international Communist movement in the contemporary world, namely, to support the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed nations and people of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, because these struggles are decisive for the cause of the international proletariat as a whole. In a sense, the revolutionary cause of the international proletariat as a whole hinges on the outcome of the people's struggles in these regions, which are inhabited by the overwhelming majority of the world's population, as well as on the acquisition of support from these revolutionary struggles.

The revolutionary struggles in Asia, Africa, and Latin America cannot be suppressed. They are bound to burst forth. Unless the proletarian parties in these regions lead these struggles, they will become divorced from the people and fail to win their confidence. The proletariat has very many allies in the anti-imperialist struggle in these regions. Therefore . . . the proletariat and its vanguard . . . must march in the van . . . and be skillful in organizing their allies in a broad anti-imperialist and anti-feudal united front, exposing every deception practiced by the imperialists, the reactionaries, and the modern revisionists, and leading the struggle in the correct

direction. Unless all these things are done, victory in the revolutionary struggle will be impossible, and even if victory is won, its consolidation will be impossible and the fruits of victory may fall into the hands of the reactionaries, with the country and the nation once again coming under imperialist enslavement. Experience, past and present, abounds in instances of how the people have been betrayed in the revolutionary struggle, the defeat of the Chinese Revolution in 1927 being a significant example.

The proletariat of the capitalist countries in Europe and America, too, must stand in the forefront of those supporting the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed nations and people of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In fact, such support simultaneously helps the cause of the emancipation of the proletariat in Europe and America. . . . Therefore the proletarian parties of the metropolitan imperialist countries are duty bound to heed the voice of the revolutionary people in these regions, study their experience, respect their revolutionary feelings, and support their revolutionary struggles. . . . It should be understood that according to the teachings of Marxism-Leninism, without a correct stand, line, and policy on the national liberation movement and the people's revolutionary movement in the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, it will be impossible for the workers' parties in the metropolitan imperialist countries to have a correct stand, line, and policy on the struggle waged by the working class and the broad masses of the people in their own countries.

The national liberation movement and the people's revolutionary movement in Asia, Africa, and Latin America give great support to the socialist countries; they constitute an extremely important force safeguarding the socialist countries from imperialist invasion. Beyond any doubt, the socialist countries should give warm sympathy and active support to these movements and they absolutely must not adopt a perfunctory or a selfishly national attitude, or an attitude of great-power chauvinism, much less hamper, obstruct, mislead, or sabotage these movements. Those countries in which socialism has been victorious must make it their sacred internationalist duty to support the national liberation struggles and the people's revolutionary struggles in other countries. Some people take the view that such support is but a one-sided "burden" on the socialist countries. This view is very wrong and runs counter to Marxism-Leninism. It must be understood that such support is a two-way, mutual affair; the socialist countries support the people's revolutionary struggles in other countries, and these struggles in turn serve to support and defend the socialist countries. (*More on the Differences*, pp. 45-47.)

Revolutionary movements in the underdeveloped countries thus constitute the crucial factor in the all-important struggle

against imperialism. Proletarian parties must correctly lead these movements so as to prevent the kind of disastrous setback the Chinese Revolution suffered in 1927. The Left in the capitalist countries must understand and support these movements. And finally the socialist countries must provide them with all possible backing, not only as a matter of international solidarity but because this is the best way of weakening their own mortal enemy. As to the outlook, the Chinese are full of revolutionary optimism. "The present situation," they say, "is an excellent one for the people of the world. It is most favorable for the oppressed nations and people in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, for the proletariat and working people of the capitalist countries, for the socialist countries, and for the cause of world peace; it is unfavorable only for the imperialists and the reactionaries in all countries and for the forces of aggression and war." (*More on the Differences*, pp. 48-49.) The Chinese Communists carried out a successful fight of their own against imperialism and reactionaries despite seemingly insuperable odds; they believe that conditions are now much more favorable and that similar victories can be won by the other oppressed and exploited peoples of the world.

Peaceful Competition and Peaceful Transition

Nothing in all this should be taken to imply that the Chinese deny or minimize the importance of socialist successes in the economic competition with capitalism as a factor in promoting the world revolution. They stress that "the superiority of the socialist system as demonstrated in the socialist countries is a source of great inspiration to the oppressed people and nations," and quote Lenin approvingly as saying that "it is by our economic policy that we are exerting our main influence on the international revolution." They then go on to say, however:

But Lenin never said that the building of a Soviet state could take the place of the struggles of all countries to liberate themselves. Historical events during the 40 years and more of the Soviet Union's existence also show that a revolution or a transformation of the social system in any country is a matter for the people of that country, and that the policy of peaceful coexistence and peaceful competition followed by socialist countries cannot

possibly result in a change of the social system in any other country. What grounds have Togliatti and other comrades for believing that the pursuit of the policy of peaceful coexistence and peaceful competition by the socialist countries can change the face of the social system in every other country and establish an "economic and social order" capable of satisfying all the aspirations of men? (*More on the Differences*, p. 17.)

The Chinese position, in other words, is that peaceful competition may spur revolutions in the nonsocialist countries but can never be a substitute for them.

What about the possibilities of peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism? The Chinese subscribed to the Moscow Declaration (1957) and the Moscow Statement (1960) of the world's Communist Parties, both of which documents assert the possibility of such a peaceful transition; but it is apparent that they do not have very high hopes in this regard and that they consider exclusive reliance on peaceful methods of struggle to be dangerous in the extreme. "It would naturally be in the interests of the proletariat and the entire people if peaceful transition could be realized," they say. But "possibility and reality, the wish and its fulfillment, are two different things." Moreover, up to now, "history has not witnessed a single example of peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism." Still more important:

Even when it is possible to secure state power through peaceful means, one must be prepared to deal immediately with armed intervention by foreign imperialists and with counter-revolutionary armed rebellions supported by the imperialists. Communists should concentrate their attention on the accumulation of revolutionary strength through painstaking efforts and must be ready to fight back against armed attacks by the bourgeoisie whenever necessary. They should not lay one-sided stress on peaceful transition and concentrate their attention on this possibility; otherwise they are bound to benumb the revolutionary will of the proletariat, disarm themselves ideologically, be utterly passive and unprepared politically and organizationally, and end up by burying the cause of the proletarian revolution. (*Differences*, pp. 35-36.)

In the final analysis, then, the question of peaceful transition is seen to involve the struggle against imperialism. This is the starting point and the ending point of every meaningful discussion of socialist policy in the world of today. But can a

militant struggle against imperialism, such as the Chinese advocate and support, be carried out without provoking a third world war with all its catastrophic consequences?

Nuclear Weapons and Paper Tigers

The Chinese answer to this question is not spelled out in any detail. They simply say, in effect, that the struggle against imperialism helps to defend peace, not to provoke war. Presumably some such reasoning as the following underlies this belief. Nuclear weapons are totally irrelevant to the combatting of guerrilla war and other forms of popular struggle, and these are bound to be the main forms of conflict between imperialism and the revolutionary forces in the underdeveloped countries. And the Dulles doctrine of "massive retaliation" against the socialist countries because of their moral and/or material support of the revolutionaries is a recipe for suicide. Even Dulles himself was unable to persuade the U.S. government to apply the doctrine at the time of Dienbienphu, and with the power of the socialist countries to retaliate against any attack on them growing all the time, the doctrine is still less likely to be applied in the future. In the meantime, the revolutionary struggle weakens imperialism by liberating one country after another, a process which intensifies all the contradictions of the system and will eventually set the stage for its overthrow in the metropolitan centers themselves.

This reasoning might seem to imply that the socialist countries can afford to go to any lengths to support revolutionary struggles in Asia, Africa, and Latin America; and the Chinese are in fact accused by their opponents of taking this position. In order to evaluate this accusation, one must understand and take account of two well publicized Chinese doctrines—"despise the enemy strategically, take him seriously tactically" and "imperialism and all reactionaries are paper tigers."

The "paper tiger" doctrine is really nothing but a metaphorical way of stating one of the most elementary and least controversial propositions of orthodox Marxism, that the decline of capitalism and its replacement by socialism on a world scale

are both inevitable. In an historical sense, therefore, the defenders of the capitalist system are powerless, they are paper tigers. And this is the enemy which should be despised strategically, the term "strategically" in this context meaning both "in the long run" and "as a whole." Taken together, the "despise the enemy strategically" and "paper tiger" doctrines are thus simply the Chinese way of saying what Marxists have been saying to the downtrodden and exploited for a long time: do not be overawed and cowed by the apparent might of your oppressors; their fate has already been sealed by history; join the battle now and hasten their downfall and your own liberation.

Man-eating Tigers

All of this, however, has nothing to do with the actual conduct of the battle, the "tactical" aspect in the Chinese terminology. Here there are no paper tigers to be despised. Everything in the world, according to Mao Tse-tung, has a dual nature. "Imperialism and all reactionaries, looked at in essence, from a long-term point of view, from a strategic point of view, must be seen for what they are—paper tigers." But this is only one side of their nature. "On the other hand, they are also living tigers, iron tigers, real tigers which can eat people." (*More on the Differences*, p. 141, quoting Mao.) And these real man-eating tigers are the ones that have to be fought against in everyday battle. Hence the principle: Take the enemy seriously tactically.

What this means in more concrete terms of course depends on particular circumstances. But it is certainly no recipe for irresponsible adventurism, and the record shows that the Chinese have been as cautious as any other major power in their conduct of foreign relations. While claiming their undoubted legal right to liberate Taiwan, they have taken no military steps to do so and have even refrained from occupying the offshore islands despite their use as sabotage and espionage bases; they have tolerated the colonies of Hong Kong and Macao on Chinese soil, waiting to solve these problems "until the time is ripe"; repeated charges in the U.S. press of Chinese military inter-

vention in Laos and Vietnam seem to be without foundation;* and farther away from home, in Algeria and Cuba for example, the Chinese have given their full moral support to revolutionary forces and have provided as much economic aid as they could manage but have been careful to avoid actions which could be considered provocative. At the same time, where they have felt that China itself was directly menaced or attacked, as in North Korea in 1950 and on the Indian border from 1959 on, the Chinese have not hesitated to strike back hard in self-defense.

But what about the Chinese attitude in the Cuban crisis of last October? Was that not provocative? If China instead of the Soviet Union had been pitted against the United States, is there not a good chance that the world would already have gone up in thermonuclear flames? The Chinese answer to these questions is an emphatic negative. In the first place, they were strongly opposed to the introduction of missiles into Cuba; in their view, it was an adventurist act which simply played into the hands of the United States imperialists. The real deterrents to a U.S. attack on Cuba must be the will of the Cuban people to fight to the death, the condemnation of world opinion, the wrath of Latin America; and with respect to these deterrents the missiles could not but do more harm than good. In the second place, the Chinese were definitely not opposed to removing the missiles. What they *were* against was removing the missiles without consulting the Cubans, and agreeing to unilateral inspection by the UN—in short, they were against making a deal with imperialism at the expense of another nation's sovereignty. There is nothing in all this to indicate an adventurist or warlike policy on the part of the Chinese. On the contrary, it is clear

* This particular accusation has been made so often and so emphatically that it may be as well to quote a person who should know the facts if anyone should and who certainly has no motive to cover up for the Chinese. In a press conference in Saigon recently, General Paul D. Harkins, head of the U. S. military forces in South Vietnam, briefed reporters on the situation in South Vietnam. According to the account in the *Washington Post* (March 6): "Harkins said the guerrillas obviously are not being reinforced or supplied systematically from North Vietnam, China, or any place else. He said they apparently depend for weapons primarily on whatever they can capture. Many of their weapons, he said, are homemade."

that if Mao had been in Khrushchev's place there would have been no missile crisis to begin with, and the Cuban crisis, if it had occurred, would have taken a quite different form.

Reform vs. Revolution

There is one other issue which has figured prominently in the polemics between the Chinese and their opponents, the question of "structural reform" versus proletarian revolution for the countries of advanced capitalism. For anyone who has read the literature of previous "great debates" between reformists and revolutionaries, especially Lenin's famous tracts of 1917 and 1918, *State and Revolution* and *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky*, this new exchange has a very familiar sound. Just as Lenin in his day saw it as his first duty to revive and restate the true doctrines of Marx on the then burning issues of state and revolution, so now the Chinese see it as their responsibility to recall to the "modern revisionists" what Lenin himself said and stood for and to demonstrate that their "new" ideas are really not new at all and are as much at odds with the ideas of Marx and Lenin as were Kautsky's a half century ago. This is not the place for a discussion of the theory of "structural reform" now being propounded by Togliatti (as well as by various other, Communist and non-Communist, theorists in Western Europe). For present purposes, it is enough to point out that the Chinese position on the questions at issue is strictly orthodox Marxism-Leninism.

The Mantle of Lenin

One can, indeed, go further and say that on the whole range of subjects under dispute between the two sides, the Chinese arguments are purely Leninist in spirit even if not always in form (tigers, real or paper, are after all not a Russian specialty). The Russians and their followers, by comparison, are undoubtedly the modern revisionists the Chinese describe them as. And this accounts for one of the most striking aspects of the whole controversy.

For reasons which we can only touch on here, Khrushchev and his associates have a great need to wear the ideological mantle of Lenin. By brusquely dethroning Stalin, they breached

the continuity of Soviet development and in a sense called into question the legitimacy of their own leadership. They therefore need to reach back, as it were, and attempt to establish a more basic continuity by showing that they are the real heirs of Lenin while Stalin was a sort of impostor. The Khrushchevian style is thus to pay homage to Lenin whenever a suitable opportunity presents itself, while relegating Stalin to a limbo of silence even in respect to matters where he was a faithful disciple of Lenin or where the weight of his authority might be most useful to Khrushchev.

Now along come the Chinese with their overwhelming proof that Khrushchev's ideas and the political line he bases on them are not Leninist at all and in fact have more in common with the ideas and line of the people on whom Lenin focused his attacks just before and after the Soviet state was born. If Khrushchev and his associates could answer the Chinese and make out a plausible case that they and not the Chinese are the true interpreters of Lenin, that would be one thing. But this would obviously be a hopeless undertaking: any rational debate with the Chinese could only do more harm than good. The result is a good deal of misrepresentation and distortion of the Chinese position. The Chinese are accused of wanting to advance the cause of socialism through world war, of advocating and practicing adventurist foreign policies, of stirring up premature revolts, of ignorance of conditions outside their own country, and so on and so forth. All of these charges are false, as anyone who knows the history of the recent past and takes the trouble to read the relevant Chinese literature can easily verify. In order to keep their own people from learning the truth of the matter, the Soviet leadership is therefore forced to suppress the replies of the Chinese to the accusations made against them. The contrast between the Chinese policy of publishing both sides of the debate and the Russian policy of publishing only one side tells a great deal about the debate itself.* "Since you are quite

* One of the saddest features of the situation is the extent to which able leaders like Khrushchev and Togliatti, not to mention lesser figures, have thrown dialectical and historical materialism to the winds and have put in its place the most commonplace kind of pragmatism. But this is too large a subject to discuss within the framework of the present paper.

definite that our articles are wrong," say the Chinese to their opponents, "why don't you publish all these erroneous articles and then refute them point by point, so as to inculcate hatred among your people against the 'heresies' you call dogmatism, sectarianism, and anti-Marxism-Leninism? Why do you lack the courage to do this? Why such a stringent embargo? You fear the truth." (*More on the Differences*, p. 194.) It is, alas, hard to think of another reason.

Relations among Communist Parties

The controversy of course involves the question of relations among Communist parties. Even in the days of the Third International when no member party would have dreamed of openly challenging Soviet leadership, the Chinese were quietly going their own way; and after the Second World War they directly defied Stalin's advice to enter a coalition dominated by Chiang Kai-shek. As Stalin himself later admitted, they were right and he was wrong. As a result of these experiences, the Chinese are used to being in a minority and have never been under the spell of the doctrine of Soviet infallibility, facts which help to explain their present stand. All Communist parties, in the Chinese view, are equal and none can presume to dictate to others. This does not exclude a party's voluntarily following the "baton" if it wants to (the "baton" is their euphemism for the Soviet line), but none is obliged to. The only line binding on all parties is that laid down in documents such as the Moscow Declaration and the Moscow Statement to which all have put their signatures. (Since each party interprets these documents as it wishes, it is clear that in practice the commitment to abide by them means little.) The Russians, on the other hand, while they have given up any claim to exclusive leadership, argue that all parties ought to accept the views of the majority. This the Chinese deny, supporting their position with one of the classical doctrines of bourgeois democracy. What matters, they say, is not a majority but the truth; a minority which takes a principled stand for the truth will in due course become a majority. For their part, they have not the slightest doubt that they represent the truth and that time is on their side. As for the modern revisionists who are betraying Marxism-Leninism, "Let them go on creating trouble

if they must. The masses, and history, will pass judgment on them." (*More on the Differences*, p. 193.)

The Causes of Revisionism

On the main issue in the controversy—whether the struggle for peace or the struggle against imperialism should take priority—we are convinced that the Chinese do indeed have the truth on their side. Real peace will never be achieved, much less guaranteed, as long as imperialism exists. And we are also convinced that the Chinese are right that imperialism can and will suffer decisive defeats at the hands of the revolutionary peoples of the underdeveloped countries. We are by no means so sure as the Chinese seem to be, however, that the fact of their being right on these crucial questions means that sooner or later the whole international socialist movement will come around to their position. It is impossible to form a worthwhile opinion about this without an understanding of the causes of modern revisionism, and here unfortunately the Chinese have little to offer.

Revisionism, according to the Chinese, is "bourgeois ideology which has infiltrated into the ranks of the workers." (*More on the Differences*, p. 4.) And the vehicle for this infiltration is the aristocracy of labor: "Revisionism represents the interests of the labor aristocracy, and hence also the interests of the reactionary bourgeoisie." But all forms of revisionism "run counter to the interests of the proletariat, of the masses of the people, and of all oppressed people and nations." Therefore:

One after the other, all the revisionists and opportunists who challenged revolutionary Marxism-Leninism have collapsed in the face of the truth and have been spurned by the people. . . . Those who are launching the new attacks on revolutionary Marxism-Leninism today are just as overbearing and arrogant; yet, if they continue to turn a deaf ear to all advice and persist in their wrong course, it can be said for certain that their end will be no better than that of the old revisionists and opportunists. (*Ibid.*, pp. 192-193.)

This theory of revisionism is, like Chinese Communist thought in general, pure Leninism. But unlike most of Lenin's ideas, it has failed to stand the test of time. Lenin tried to use

the theory to explain Social Democratic attitudes and policies in his day: he regarded Social Democracy as the creation of a small labor aristocracy which managed to attract a mass following through deceit and demagogy. This became the basis of the policies of Communist Parties in all the countries where Social Democracy was strong. But these policies never worked, for the simple reason that the Social Democrats and not the Communists expressed what the workers themselves felt to be their real interests. The workers, in other words, were not revolutionaries at heart, and no amount of exhortation by the Communists could turn them into revolutionaries. Gradually, the Communist parties, though continuing to use revolutionary phraseology, adjusted themselves to this fact, becoming in practice reformist parties much like the Social Democrats. What is happening now, with Togliatti and the Italian CP in the lead, is simply that the Communist parties of the advanced capitalist countries are taking the last step along this road by openly embracing a reformist ideology.

But this is not the only respect in which the Chinese theory of revisionism falls down. After all, the fountainhead of "modern revisionism" is not Togliatti, nor is it Tito, even if the Chinese often accord the latter pride of place; it is Khrushchev and his fellow-leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Does it make sense to speak of bourgeois influence penetrating the ranks of the Soviet workers through a labor aristocracy? Should we not rather conclude that if this theory is wrong as applied to the advanced capitalist countries, it is simply irrelevant as applied to the Soviet Union? Perhaps the Chinese have answers to these questions; and if so, we would be interested to know what they are. In the meantime, we can ask what other possible causes there may be for revisionism in the Soviet Union.

The most plausible answer seems to be that the Soviet people are no more revolutionary than the workers of the advanced capitalist countries, though for different reasons. It is not that they have shared as junior partners in the exploitation of a dependent empire, but rather that they have already made their revolution, have successfully defended it in violent struggles, and have laid the foundations of a rapid advance to higher standards of living. What they want now is a long period of

peace and quiet in which to get on with the business in hand. They want peaceful coexistence and disarmament, and they are more than willing to believe that their own successes in building socialism will persuade the whole world to follow in their footsteps. The pressure on leaders to tell the Soviet people that these are attainable goals and to orient the country's policies accordingly would seem to be a sufficient explanation of what has been happening. Marxism-Leninism is in its essence, as the Chinese correctly insist, a revolutionary doctrine addressed to the oppressed and exploited of the world. How can it be expected to appeal to people who are not oppressed or exploited and who have no need of a revolution?

As for the Communist parties in the advanced capitalist countries, they represent or seek to represent working classes which, objectively speaking, do share as junior partners in the exploitation of dependent empires. These parties either have to adopt policies which are acceptable to their own workers or else go into the political wilderness, perhaps for a long time to come. It can be argued, and we think correctly, that it is better to take the latter course, to begin now to prepare for the day when imperialism in decline once again creates the conditions for vigorous revolutionary movements in even the richest capitalist countries. But no one should be surprised if established political parties and leaders seek to maintain their positions even at the expense of their time-honored principles. Under the circumstances, the apparent paradox of Communists who are also revisionists and reformists is seen to be really no paradox at all.

Some Conclusions

If this analysis is on the right track, it suggests the following general conclusions:

First, Marxism-Leninism is as much as ever, perhaps even more than ever, the appropriate ideology for the oppressed and exploited majority of mankind. The Chinese as its most faithful and powerful champions seem certain to become the spiritual leaders of all genuine revolutionary movements in the world. In this sense, a new International is in the making, and it gives every sign of being the biggest and most revolutionary of all the internationals to date. (The strong leaning of Latin American

revolutionaries to the Chinese side, for example, can be clearly read in Eduardo Galeano's article on page 21 of the May 1963 issue of MONTHLY REVIEW.)

Second, the International that groups together the Soviet Union, the socialist countries of Eastern Europe, and the Communist parties in the advanced capitalist countries seems unlikely either to disintegrate or change its nature in the visible future. Thus what has for more than forty years been an ideologically and politically united world Communist movement seems on the way to a deep and lasting split.

What is the relation between the two Communist Internationals likely to be? It is much too early to expect to be able to give anything like a definitive answer to this crucially important question, but at any rate some of the relevant considerations can be indicated.

There are many good reasons why the two Internationals should agree to disagree on ideological questions while at the same time maintaining correct relations and cooperating economically and militarily. Neither group harbors expansionist designs in the manner of imperialism, and both are menaced by imperialism. In addition, all members of both groups can gain through the planned development of the international division of labor on an ever wider scale. Objective conditions, therefore, would seem to favor the working out of a *modus vivendi* on mutually advantageous terms.

On the other hand, it must be recognized that such an outcome is by no means assured. The Great Debate has not taken place entirely in the realm of polite (or not-so-polite) discourse. The abrupt withdrawal of Soviet technicians from China in 1960 was deeply resented by the Chinese; so also is the failure of the Russians to support the Chinese in their border conflict with India. Many revolutionaries around the world are developing a deep feeling of distrust toward Khrushchev and his associates, suspecting them of hankering for deals with the imperialists and blaming them, at least in part, for disastrous defeats such as that suffered last winter in Iraq. (On this, see the article by Tabitha Petran in the May 1963 issue of MR.) The Russians, on their side, unquestionably resent what they consider to be a grab by the Chinese for leadership of the

world movement, and they will not meekly give up just because the Chinese have the better arguments. Other wounds and potential sources of conflict could be cited, but even this list is enough to show that there is no lack of fuel to feed the fires of ill-will and even hatred. It will take extraordinarily wise and cool leadership on both sides to prevent what is still only a dispute from degenerating into a mutually damaging and potentially disastrous fight. Whether such leadership exists or will be forthcoming, time alone will tell.

Meanwhile, those of us who are not already irrevocably committed to one side or the other and who have the interests of international socialism at heart can perhaps make a contribution, however small, by maintaining friendly relations with all groups concerned and urging upon them the desirability, nay the necessity, of maintaining a united front against imperialism, the real enemy of mankind.

(April 12, 1963)

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