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THE DIPLOMACY OF DISARMAMENT

The imperatives of survival in an atomic age have lent a desperate urgency to the search for security. But by their very nature they have largely emptied that search of content and meaning. Fear has driven men to negotiate and fear has averted agreement. There can, it is said, be no trust without disarmament and no disarmament without trust.

Meanwhile, the power of annihilation grows to a point where mere accident could unleash devastation, and nations less practiced in the arts of self-restraint may come to hold that power in the not too distant future.

The unavailing struggle of the past decade and a half to establish "a system for the regulation of armaments," as provided for in the United Nations Charter, has been the subject of searching inquiry and heated controversy. Each observer makes his own interpretation of the facts and clings tenaciously to his own prognosis. The author of the present article also has a point of view, and it is one with which there will doubtless be some disagreement. Nevertheless, it it hoped that this schematic effort to analyze the disarmament negotiations since 1945 will help to sharpen the issues and will provide insights into the Sisyphean task of preventing man from destroying himself.

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ANNE WINSLOW
Editor-in-Chief

January 1960

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The Setting

THE FIRST SUCCESSFUL explosion of an atomic bomb, on 16 July 1945 in New Mexico, inaugurated a new era in the history of arms development. It also marked a new era in the problem of armament control. Only twenty days previously, the delegates of fifty nations had signed the Charter of a new world organization whose principal political organ was made responsible, *inter alia,* "for formulating . . . plans . . . for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments."[1] Of course, the atomic bomb was at that time a closely guarded military secret. Whether public awareness of the existence of this new weapon would have resulted in a more positive commitment to disarmament is only a matter of speculation.

Almost fifteen years have passed. Instead of moving toward disarmament or even controlled regulation of arms, the major powers have been involved in the greatest arms race known to man. The factors that have frustrated the expectations of 1945 are by now well known. They are, principally, a serious deterioration in relations among the major powers, whose consensus is necessary to create an arms agreement, and the development of an arms technology, the control of which would involve considerable infringement of national sovereignty. And yet, almost surprisingly in view of this situation, the past decade and a half has witnessed almost ceaseless negotiations about arms agreements, and both the United States and the Soviet Union are agreed that "the question of general disarmament is the most important one facing the world today."[2]

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[1] Charter of the United Nations, Art. 26.

[2] Communiqué issued by President Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev, 27 Sept. 1959. Reproduced in U.S. Department of State *Bulletin*, Vol. XLI, No. 1059 (12 Oct. 1959), p. 499.

In order to understand more fully the disarmament problem as of 1960 a brief review is necessary. This study will focus upon three aspects of the problem: first, the changing aspects of the disarmament negotiations since 1945; second, the principal obstacles to a Soviet-Western power agreement; and third, some of the political uses to which disarmament negotiations have been put.

Two of the principal difficulties in predicting success or failure in disarmament negotiations are the changing political alignments in international politics and the new developments in weapons technology. Both relate to the questions of who is to be disarmed and what instruments of war are to be denied to nations.

In the months immediately following the end of World War II, disarmament was thought of principally in connection with the defeated powers and, indeed, was actually enforced for a time vis-à-vis Germany and Japan. Article 26 of the United Nations Charter, however, anticipated the creation of an international system regulating armaments. Clearly such a system would have to be multilateral. By vesting primary responsibility for disarmament in the Security Council, the Charter provided, furthermore, for a multilateral *formulation* of this system.

Little more than a year after defeat of the Axis, the Paris Peace Conference highlighted the beginning of an entirely new political alignment. By early 1947 the division between the Axis powers and the Allied coalition had been replaced by that between the Western democracies and the Soviet Union. This disruption of Allied unity was to have profound consequences for the multilateral disarmament arrangements implied in the Charter. One of the fundamental assumptions behind all the provisions relating to the Security Council had been that the Big Five (China, France, the USSR, the United Kingdom, and the United States) would have to work together toward a world-wide system. But what the Soviet Union and Western powers have been seeking, with few exceptions in the past fourteen years, is disarmament of each other—a far different matter.

Initially forced to negotiate within the framework of the Security Council and related bodies, the major powers soon found themselves in a strait jacket. The formal rules of a United Nations organ, the maintenance of a public official record, and the inclusion of "extraneous" nations in the negotiating group have, from the point of view of both sides, been obstacles to attaining a disarmament agreement. As a result, multilateral negotiations for an agreement to apply to many nations have gradually been displaced in favor of negotiations between East and West aimed at disarming only a few nations, at least initially. Taking into consideration the intensity of debate and the accomplishments of negotiating bodies, one can note that the trend has been for the more fruitful groups to be smaller and to center around the Big Four—France, the USSR, the United Kingdom, and the United States—often outside the United Nations.

As regards the scope of these negotiations, changes in weapons technology have exercised a determining influence. Disarmament has traditionally referred to the abolition of armies, navies, and fortifications or to a reduction in the number of men under arms, tanks, guns, ships, aircraft, and other equipment. The birth of atomic weapons immediately involved the United Nations in negotiating toward a much wider goal: international control over the complete production of a potentially major industry. But that effect was only temporary. As existing stocks grew and the destructive power of nuclear weapons increased (to theoretically unlimited proportions), the difficulty of negotiating an agreement also increased. The development of intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) during the latter part of the 1950s compounded the difficulty of reaching agreement on reduction or regulation of armaments and of devising a "foolproof' control system.

Consequently, disarmament efforts have been concerned with more limited goals. In lieu of an agreement on comprehensive arms reduction or regulation, the major powers have sought agreement on partial disarmament measures requiring less drastic control systems. Since the 1955 summit

meeting in Geneva, discussions have been more and more concerned with questions relating to prevention of surprise attack and to "confidence-building" first steps. Even narrower in scope has been the one question on which there is currently more than a slight hope of agreement—cessation of nuclear testing.

The Changing Framework of Negotiations

THE BREAKDOWN of attempts to negotiate a general post-war disarmament agreement was the direct result of the cold war. Agreement on regulating arms had been envisaged as a complement to the establishment of an international security system. In describing the anticipated operation of the Security Council, Secretary of State Cordell Hull had stressed that it was based upon the assumption that "each of [the major powers] will maintain adequate forces and will be willing to use such forces as circumstances require to prevent or suppress all cases of aggression."[3] Under Article 43 of the Charter all Members of the Organization were to undertake to make available to the Security Council, in accordance with agreements to be concluded, the armed forces necessary to maintain international peace. Plans for the application of armed force were to be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee (Article 46). This was the same committee that, under Article 26, was to assist the Security Council in formulating plans for arms regulation. Relying upon the assistance of the same group to create both an international army and a system of arms regulation may seem unusual, but it was a natural consequence of what the major powers considered to be a necessary interconnection.

The Military Staff Committee never was able to fulfill its mandate under Article 26. It immediately became deadlocked on the problem of creating an armed force for use by the Security Council. On 30 April 1947 the Committee re-

[3] Memorandum for the President, 29 Dec. 1943. Quoted in Inis L. Claude, Jr., *Swords Into Plowshares*, 2nd ed. (New York, Random House, 1959), p. 83.

ported to the Security Council its recommendations for the organization of a collective force. Of the forty-one articles in its report not more than twenty-five had secured unanimous agreement; and the sixteen articles on which there was no harmony contained the most important elements of an international force.[4] With the failure of the Military Staff Committee, any immediate prospects for a system of arms regulation within a United Nations security framework died.

Initial Multilateralism

The first serious post-war disarmament negotiations took place within the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, which had been created on 24 January 1946 under the first resolution of the first General Assembly. Its membership was the same as that of the Security Council (with the addition of Canada whenever that country was not a member of the Council).[5] For twenty-one months it served as the principal arena for disarmament negotiations, since at that time the United States held that some sort of control over atomic energy would be necessary before success in the general area of the regulation of armaments would be possible. On 17 May 1948 the Commission adopted its third and final report, the first sentence of which noted succinctly: "The Atomic Energy Commission reports that it has reached an impasse."[6]

Previously, on 13 February 1947, the Security Council had established the Commission for Conventional Armaments, with the same membership as the Council. This Commission was unable to record any more success than its atomic counterpart, and from mid-1948 until the spring of 1954 there were for all practical purposes no serious negotiations.

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[4] See Report of the Military Staff Committee, in United Nations Security Council, *Official Records* (SCOR): 2nd Year, 1947, Spec. Suppl. No. 1.

[5] Canada was included because, along with the United States and United Kingdom, it possessed the knowledge essential to the use of atomic energy. Canadian scientists had participated in the wartime research and development of the atomic bomb and Canadian uranium was an important source for the fuel that went into the bomb.

[6] Third Report to the Security Council, 17 May 1948, in United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, *Official Records* (UNAEC, OR): 3rd Year, Spec. Suppl., p. 1.

On 29 July 1949 the Atomic Energy Commission acknowledged that for it to hold further discussions would serve "no practicable or useful purpose" and called upon the Sponsoring Powers (the Big Five and Canada) to get together privately.[7] Although six-power discussions in late 1949 and debate in the General Assembly offered no grounds to expect more success from private than from public discussions, the fourth General Assembly called upon the six to continue their consultations. The year 1950, however, proved to be one of silence. After the USSR walked out of the Security Council and the two disarmament Commissions in January, and the Korean war began, disarmament talks broke down completely.

Consolidation of United Nations Efforts

In an effort to restructure the negotiations, the General Assembly on 11 January 1952 created a single Disarmament Commission to replace and encompass the work of the Commissions on both atomic energy and conventional armaments.[8] But any expectation that an amalgamated commission would facilitate agreement on an over-all disarmament plan was disproved by the first two years' work of the Commission. An interim first report of the Commission on 28 May 1952 merely noted that "the discussions . . . are continuing." A second report approved in October 1952 summarized the futile debates.[9] The seventh General Assembly that year prodded the Commission to further efforts, but to no avail. Between the seventh and eighth sessions of the Assembly the Commission held only one meeting.

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[7] See UNAEC, OR: 4th Year, No. 8, 24th Mtg., 29 July 1949, p. 38, for the United States draft resolution, passed by 9 votes to 2.

[8] In belated recognition of the connection between atomic and conventional armaments, President Truman had revised United States policy two years previously by suggesting that the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments coordinate their work in one commission.

[9] See United Nations Disarmament Commission, *Official Records:* 1st Report, Supplement for April, May, and June 1952, Doc. DC/11, para. 12, and 2nd Report, Spec. Suppl. No. 1, respectively.

By 1953 the USSR had substantially reduced the gap in atomic power between it and the United States and had developed a sizable stockpile of atomic weapons. In August of that year it exploded a hydrogen device—only some nine months after the first such explosion by the United States. Differentiation between the great and lesser powers had already been carried a step further by the United Kingdom's demonstration in October of the previous year that it possessed an atomic weapon. Aware of the increased importance of agreement between the leaders of the two sides before any disarmament could be achieved, the eighth General Assembly asked the Disarmament Commission to "study the desirability of establishing a sub-committee consisting of representatives of the Powers principally involved, which should seek in private an acceptable solution."[10] This approach was supported by the Big Four foreign ministers at their conference in Berlin in the spring of 1954.

Growing Exclusiveness

With the establishment of the Disarmament Commission's five-power Sub-Committee—Canada, France, the USSR, the United Kingdom, and the United States—on 19 April 1954, negotiations entered a new phase. For the next four years, meetings were conducted in private. The Sub-Committee held five major series of discussions: 13 May-22 June 1954; 25 February-18 May 1955; 29 August-7 October 1955; 19 March-4 May 1956; and 18 March-6 September 1957. During this period every phase of disarmament was considered at one time or another. At various times the group was reported nearing an agreement but, while positions changed on both sides and a healthy "clarification of views" took place, the net result remained a stalemate. The fifth and last report of the Sub-Committee was submitted on 6 September 1957 "as

[10] General Assembly Res. 715 (VIII), 28 Nov. 1953. Although the Soviet representative abstained, this was the first time since 1946 that the USSR had not voted against an Assembly resolution on disarmament.

a further progress report."[11] Since then, however, neither the Sub-Committee nor, except for one purely formal meeting, its parent body has met. These Sub-Committee meetings were, in fact, the last negotiations held under the direct auspices of the United Nations.

Direct Great-Power Confrontations

Since 1957 there has been further bipolarization of Soviet-Western efforts. Two factors contributed to this. One was Soviet dissatisfaction with the numerical dominance of Western powers at negotiating sessions—hence the Soviet demand for "parity" between the two sides. The other was United States unwillingness to increase the number of negotiators on the ground that too many nations make a group unwieldy and result only in propagandistic speeches. An attempt to compromise these views at the twelfth General Assembly satisfied no one. The membership of the Disarmament Commission was enlarged from twelve, of which ten were bound to the United States by military treaties, to twenty-five, of which sixteen were United States allies. This change was considered inadequate by the USSR, which boycotted the Commission and thus made any meeting pointless. In 1958 the General Assembly acceded to Soviet demands and enlarged the Disarmament Commission to include all Members of the United Nations, but no more use has been made of it than of the twenty-five member group.

Nevertheless, the past two years have seen an intensification of disarmament diplomacy among the great powers, in the context of direct East-West confrontations. In the spring of 1958 President Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev engaged in an exchange of correspondence that resulted in agreements to hold two conferences of experts on two different aspects of disarmament: surprise attack and cessation of nuclear weapons tests. In compliance with Premier Khrush-

[11] The five reports are contained in, respectively, United Nations Docs. DC/53, 22 June 1954; DC/71, 7 Oct. 1955; DC/83, 4 May 1956; DC/112, 1 Aug. 1957; and DC/113, 11 Sept. 1957.

chev's insistence on the principle of "equal representation of countries which are members of the Atlantic Pact and . . . the Warsaw Treaty" the membership of the surprise attack conference was limited to five nations from each of the respective groups.[12] It met in Geneva in late 1958 but after thirty sessions of fruitless sparring abandoned its efforts.

Considerably more successful was the "Conference of Experts to Study the Possibility of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on Suspension of Nuclear Tests." It met from 1 July through 21 August 1958. Participating in the conference were experts from four Western countries (Canada, France, United Kingdom, United States) and four Eastern (Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, USSR). It was a strictly scientific and technical assemblage. It had no mandate to negotiate an actual cessation but was merely to report on the feasibility and requirements of a control system. Perhaps because its task was so limited, this technical conference was an unqualified success—a rare phenomenon in post-World War II history.

Spurred on by this achievement, the three nuclear powers agreed in late summer 1958 to hold a second conference on cessation of nuclear tests, this one given the more political task of developing a detailed agreement between the USSR, the United Kingdom, and the United States to end nuclear weapons tests and to create a control system to supervise the ban. This conference has been meeting intermittently since 31 October 1958.

Second only to the Berlin question, disarmament was among the principal subjects of discussion among the foreign ministers and at the Eisenhower-Khrushchev talks in 1959. One result has been the formation of a new ten-member dis-

[12] Soviet note of 15 Sept. 1958. Reproduced in U.S. Department of State *Bulletin*, Vol. XXXIX, No. 1009 (27 Oct. 1958), p. 649. The ten nations were the same as those making up the new disarmament committee formed in 1959 except that Bulgaria replaces Albania in the latter body. At the surprise attack conference and the conference of experts on nuclear tests the West had a single delegation that included nationals of the various countries. The East, in contrast, sent separate national delegations. This difference may have importance with regard to future discussions on parity of membership.

armament committee, again outside the framework of the United Nations; it was scheduled to begin consideration of the over-all problem of disarmament early in 1960. Comprising the new group are Canada, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, and the USSR. With the inclusion of the Eastern European states, the Soviet Union has at last achieved the parity in a general arms negotiating group it has sought for years. In effect, it is the East and West as blocs that are now bargaining.

It should be noted, however, that any decisions reached will be reported to the United Nations through its eighty-two member Disarmament Commission. The fourteenth General Assembly has accepted this arrangement, for, although today bipolarization of disarmament negotiations has been carried further than ever before, disarmament remains one of the principal concerns of the United Nations. The ten-nation committee's reports to the Disarmament Commission will be debated by the General Assembly. In addition, the Secretariat will service the committee and the Secretary-General will be represented at its meetings. Beyond this, it is not yet certain what role the United Nations will play as the new group goes into action.

The Changing Scope of Negotiations

NOTHING HIGHLIGHTS the problem of disarmament in the cold war more than the changing scope and subject matter of the negotiations. Largely, of course, these changes mirror changes in technological development. But the influence of changing technology is subtle and pervasive, and not confined to merely determining what new weapons—be they space satellites or missiles—could be outlawed. Changing weapons systems bring changes in military strategy and tactics, and these "secondary changes" have a further impact on the goals of disarmament efforts.

The post-war period has witnessed a staggering improvement in offensive weapons without a corresponding improvement in defensive armaments. Initially, this resulted in a wide extension of the goals established for disarmament negotiations. As, however, the unchecked offensive power of the major states increased, there was a corresponding decrease in the goals of disarmament. Generally the pattern has been as follows: during the middle and late 1940s the ultimate objective was virtually the elimination of war itself —the widest possible goal—through international control of atomic energy. When attainment of this end became progressively less likely, it was replaced by the more modest one of reducing international tension and establishing "confidence-building" first steps. Different means have variously been sought, such as the disclosure and verification of armaments information, renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons, and measures to guard against a surprise attack. Since 1957 the most viable goal in sight has been the limited one of elimination of further radioactive contamination in the

atmosphere. This is one of the principal reasons for all the recent concern with cessation of nuclear tests.

Focus Upon the Atom

The devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki brought home to peoples throughout the world the incalculable destruction and carnage that would result from any future war involving the use of atomic bombs. Coupled with the memories of all the horrors and sacrifices of the just-concluded World War, it produced a strong reaction against war itself. Even before the first General Assembly had time to consider the general principles of post-war disarmament, it was called upon to take immediate action on the problem of atomic weapons. The newly-created United Nations Atomic Energy Commission was urged to devise "with the utmost despatch" a plan for eliminating atomic weapons from national armaments.[13]

For almost a decade control of nuclear weapons remained the chief concern of disarmament negotiations. The Western solution, embodied in the proposals submitted by Bernard M. Baruch on behalf of the United States government, was for an International Atomic Development Authority to have a monopoly on the world's production of atomic energy. The Authority was to have exclusive control of all atomic activities from the mining of raw material to the production and use of fissionable fuel. In addition to owning and managing all uranium and thorium mines, refineries, chemical separation plants, and reactors, it was to have exclusive authority to engage in atomic research. This plan was offered as more than just a means to eliminate the use of one terrible weapon. It was, if accepted, to be the basis for extensive international cooperation for peace. In introducing the plan Bernard Baruch said:

> In the elimination of war lies our solution, for only then will nations cease to compete with one another in the production and use of dread "secret" weapons which are evaluated solely by their

[13] General Assembly Res. 1 (I), 24 Jan. 1946.

capacity to kill. . . . If we succeed in finding a suitable way to control atomic weapons, it is reasonable to hope that we may also preclude the use of other weapons adaptable to mass destruction. When a man learns to say "A" he can, if he chooses, learn the rest of the alphabet, too.[14]

From the Soviet point of view the whole plan was "thoroughly vicious and unacceptable"; instead, the USSR pressed for a simple treaty outlawing all atomic weapons—but with minimal control measures. When, in the winter of 1947, the Baruch Plan was first considered before the Security Council, Andrei Gromyko definitively rejected it, saying: "Only people who have lost the sense of reality can seriously believe in the possibility of creating such arrangements."[15] Debate on the Baruch Plan continued for several years thereafter, but it boiled down to little more than a war of words. Technological factors, which raised the problem in the first place, eventually made the plan outmoded: once a secret stockpile has been accumulated, there is no known method by which it can be controlled unless a nation voluntarily relinquishes its supply. By the early 1950s not only had the United States accumulated such a stockpile but so had the USSR.[16] Officially neither the Western powers nor the United Nations disavowed the Baruch Plan. However, the failure of the United Nations in 1953 to re-indorse the plan and the failure of the United States to mention it in its 1954 proposals constituted tacit recognition that its was outdated.

The full implication of the failure to establish international control over atomic energy was that henceforth no disarmament treaty could guarantee a disarmed world. It meant and continues to mean that international peace and

[14] Statement of 14 June 1946 to United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. Reproduced in *Disarmament and Security: A Collection of Documents, 1919–1955*, Subcommittee on Disarmament, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. (Washington, 1956), p. 193. This collection reproduces many key documents, including some originally published in the official records of United Nations bodies. Hearafter cited as *US Documents*.

[15] SCOR: 2nd Year, No. 22, 115th Mtg., 5 Mar. 1947, p. 449.

[16] Shortly after exploding its own hydrogen bomb in 1953, the Soviet government gave notice of its intention to keep on producing atomic weapons until the United States agreed to ban them. See *Pravda*, 29 Oct. 1953.

security must ultimately be based upon conditions other than complete disarmament. Even if a comprehensive agreement on armaments were negotiated, and even if it included a prohibition of the production and use of nuclear weapons, there is no guarantee that one or more of the major powers might not have a reserve of nuclear bombs ready—just in case.

Early Attempts at 'Confidence-Building'

The effect of this situation was to turn disarmament negotiations in the direction of establishing sufficient confidence between the two sides so that a limited agreement might be negotiated. An effort in this direction had been started in the Commission for Conventional Armaments, but the deteriorating state of East-West relations during its lifetime (1947-52) had frustrated agreement on even so much as a work plan. In 1948 the Commission could only note that a system regulating and reducing armaments could not be put into effect in the absence of "an atmosphere of international confidence and security."

> Measures for the regulation and reduction of armaments which would follow the establishment of the necessary degree of confidence might in turn be expected to increase confidence and so justify further measures of regulation and reduction.[17]

Prior to the Korean war two substantive plans were offered to stimulate this international confidence. One was a plan proposed by the Soviet spokesman at the General Assembly in 1948. Andrei Vyshinsky called upon the permanent members of the Security Council to reduce by one-third all current land, naval, and air forces. The other was a plan advanced by France in the Commission for Conventional Armaments in 1949 for the collection, verification, and publication of information on existing armaments and armed forces. Vyshinsky's plan was rejected because it included no

[17] Resolution of the Working Committee, 26 July 1948, United Nations Doc. S/C.3/27, p. 7. Quoted in Andrew Martin, *Collective Security: A Progress Report* (Paris, UNESCO, 1952), p. 83.

means of verification (and was also tied to a prohibition of all atomic weapons), and the French plan was rejected by the USSR on the grounds that it provided for no disarmament and would be used merely for gathering secret intelligence information. When the new Disarmament Commission began work in the spring of 1952, it continued along essentially the same lines as the Commission for Conventional Armaments, except that atomic as well as conventional weapons were included in a United States plan for progressive and continuing disclosure and verification of armed forces and armaments.

Negotiations in the Disarmament Commission during the Korean war were particularly sterile, for understandable reasons. Name-calling and mutual recriminations left no room for serious debate. During the spring and summer of 1952, two proposals were offered by the West which, though barely considered by the USSR at the time, marked a movement in a new direction. The first of these, offered on 28 May 1952, was a tripartite proposal for fixing numerical limitations on all armed forces. Its objective was "to reduce the possibility and fear of aggression and to avoid a disequilibrium of power dangerous to international peace and security." No attempt was made to achieve a comprehensive agreement. It suggested among other features a ceiling of 1,000,000-1,500,000 men each for China, the USSR, and the United States, and of 700,000-800,000 each for France and the United Kingdom.[18] The second proposal, offered on 24 June, was a French one interlinking various measures of disclosure and verification with various measures of disarmament in three stages. Novel in these approaches was the Western emphasis on a numerical limitation to armed manpower and on conventional disarmament by stages, with a corresponding control by stages. But any diplomacy had of necessity an air of unreality while aggression was being fought in the battlefield and arms themselves were being utilized in Korea to foster an East-West disequilibrium.

[18] Tripartite Proposals, with supplement of 12 Aug. 1952, reproduced in *US Documents*, pp. 287–291.

The years covering the work of the Disarmament Sub-Committee (1954-57) are not easily described because of their complexity and the proliferation of different proposals emanating from the private sessions. In all, the Sub-Committee submitted five reports containing a total of seventy-one documentary annexes.

Proposals for 'Phased' Disarmament

During 1954 and early 1955 a spate of proposals and counter-proposals was exchanged between the two sides. They came in many forms: working papers, memoranda, declarations, resolutions. None was in any sense a detailed disarmament plan; they were mainly skeletons of possible plans to be filled in by future Disarmament Commission sessions or, in some cases, by contemplated world disarmament conferences. The most important of these outlines were those submitted by the French and British jointly in June 1954 (which the Soviet government later accepted as a "basis for negotiations"), by the Western powers in March 1955, and by the USSR in May 1955. In substance, agreement between the Soviet Union and the Western powers remained as elusive as ever. But in scope their proposals all had elements in common. They all provided for a comprehensive and "phased" disarmament program. Both sides agreed that there should be a reduction in conventional armaments and forces as well as an eventual abolition of atomic weapons, and that this reduction should take place in stages. This approach was endorsed by the General Assembly on 4 November 1954 with the concurring vote of the USSR. Not since 1946 had there been a unanimous decision by the great powers on a disarmament resolution.

Behind this apparent unanimity, however, there remained the fundamental distrust and suspicion that one side would benefit at the other's expense during the application of the different stages. One particularly important indication of the superficiality of discussions during this period was the fact that the United States, in a proposal of May 1954 for an

international control organ to supervise conventional and atomic disarmament, implicitly abandoned the Baruch Plan but offered nothing in substance to replace it. The United States did call for the establishment of a United Nations Disarmament and Atomic Development Authority. The authority, under the United States plan,

> would be empowered to function in accordance with whatever plan may be agreed upon for the control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure effective prohibition of nuclear weapons and use of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes only.[19]

How atomic energy was to be controlled so that a prohibition could be enforced was not specified.

Impact of Technological Change

As the first post-war decade came to an end, technological developments in the arms race compelled a major reconsideration of the whole problem of disarmament. Previously the main concern of all negotiations had been international control of atomic weapons. The radical Baruch Plan had originally been advocated on the ground that only it, or something comparable to it, could guarantee the absolute security from atomic war that was universally desired. Toward the latter part of the decade, Western spokesmen began referring to the imminence of a "point of no return"—the moment when no system of control can ensure security against violators because the amount of atomic material in existence defies accounting for and involves a "margin of error" too great to accept. Strangely, there was almost no discussion of this problem in the USSR's public statements or in its press. By the early 1950s that point of no return had been reached.

An additional factor reducing the likelihood of international control of atomic energy was the progressive integration of atomic and conventional weapons in the armed forces of the United States beginning in late 1951, after a series of

[19] Reproduced in *ibid.*, p. 329.

atomic tests in Nevada proved for the first time that tactical atomic weapons could be used effectively in combat. In January 1952 President Truman's announcement of a five- to six-billion dollar expansion of atomic energy facilities—the largest expansion since the formation of the United States Atomic Energy Commission—indicated that the bottlenecks that had stood in the way of a vast program had been surmounted. The United States' growing reliance on atomic weapons was not limited to its own continental defense, but was, logically, extended to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, then looked upon as the West's principal bulwark against Soviet expansion. General Eisenhower, then Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, intimated in his first annual report (2 April 1952) that NATO forces were being equipped with tactical atomic weapons:

> The military forces we are building must be continually modified to keep pace with new weapons. . . . We are at the very point, for example, of seeing a whole sequence of fundamental changes made in response to the development of new types of arms. The tendency in recent decades to produce weapons of greater range, penetrating power and destructiveness is accelerating.[20]

As the revolution in the destructiveness of weapons was spinning itself out, a new revolution in the delivery of weapons was beginning. During the 1950s, developments in guided and ballistic missiles reached the point where they could be considered operational. When combined with atomic weapons, they added a new dimension to the potency of offensive weapons because there was no known method of stopping or intercepting them.

New 'Package' Proposals

These scientific and miltary developments were reflected in 1955 in a change in the scope of disarmament discussions. Insofar as atomic weapons themselves were not likely to be

[20] *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1952*, ed. Clarence W. Baier and Richard P. Stebbins (New York, Harper for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1953), p. 163.

controlled, efforts were directed toward getting agreement on more limited guarantees. This constituted a significant contraction of the immediate aims of disarmament. To guide the administration in its formulation of a new approach President Eisenhower on 19 March 1955 appointed Harold E. Stassen as Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament. Mr. Stassen was given cabinet status, an unprecedented position in United States history for an official concerned with such a limited aspect of foreign policy.

Two major sets of proposals made in the spring and summer of 1955 heralded the change in disarmament policy. The first was the important Soviet package proposal of 10 May 1955. Some of its provisions were concessions, such as force reductions at levels the West proposed on 29 March 1955 (1,000,000-1,500,000 for China, the USSR, and the United States, and 650,000 for France and the United Kingdom). It also accepted an Anglo-French proposal that use of nuclear weapons be prohibited at the time that 75 per cent of the reductions in conventional forces was reached, and that all nuclear weapons be eliminated when 100 per cent of the conventional reductions had been carried out. In addition, it contained a new provision for cessation of nuclear weapons tests, as one of the first steps.

For the first time the USSR publicly acknowledged that no known system of detection could ferret out a secret cache of hydrogen or atomic weapons. "In such a situation," reported the Soviet negotiators, "security . . . cannot be guaranteed, since the possibility would be open to a potential aggressor to accumulate stocks of atomic and hydrogen weapons for a surprise atomic attack on peace-loving States." They repeated the theme that agreement was made difficult in the atmosphere of "international tension and mistrust in relations between States."

> Barriers of every sort are being erected even in regard to the interchange of industrial, agricultural, scientific, cultural and other delegations. Such a situation makes difficult the attainment of agreement regarding the admission by States to their enterprises,

particularly those engaged in military production, of foreign control officials who might carry out the inspection of such enterprises. . . . *Until* an atmosphere of trust has been created in relations between States, any agreement on the institution of international control can only serve to lull the vigilance of the peoples.

The Soviet solution to this problem was the creation of an International Control Organ which, in addition to supervising the disarmament measures, would also prevent surprise attack. The control organ would

establish on the territory of all the States concerned, on a basis of reciprocity, control posts at large ports, at railway junctions, on main motor highways and in aerodromes. The task of these posts shall be to see to it that there is no dangerous concentration of military land forces or of air or naval forces.[21]

The second set of proposals—later known as the "open skies" proposal—was made by President Eisenhower in his opening statement at the Geneva heads-of-government meeting in the summer of 1955:

Surprise attack has a capacity for destruction far beyond anything which man has yet known. . . . Perhaps, therefore, we should consider whether the problem of limitation of armament may not best be approached by seeking—as a first step—dependable ways to supervise and inspect military establishments, so that there can be no frightful surprises, whether by sudden attack or by secret violation of agreed restrictions. In this field nothing is more important than that we explore together the challenging and central problem of effective mutual inspection. Such a system is the foundation for real disarmament.[22]

Later in the conference he proposed a mutual exchange of blueprints of military establishments as well as provision for aerial reconnaissance of each nation by the other. He asked that these steps be taken "immediately."[23]

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[21] Soviet 10 May 1955 proposals (United Nations Doc. DC/SC.1/26/Rev. 2). See *US Documents*, pp. 388-391.

[22] The White House Disarmament Staff, *Reference Documents on Disarmament Matters*, Background Series D-1 through D-42 (Washington, n.d.), D-6, p. 65. This collection hereafter referred to as *Reference Documents*.

[23] *Ibid.*, D-9, p. 83.

There appeared to be at the Geneva summit meeting general agreement on the need to reduce international tension. The United States position was emphatic that inspection was the way to accomplish this. The Soviet Union, in spite of the importance given to inspection in its 10 May proposals, emphasized rather that an all-European system of collective security would reduce tension. Pending an agreement on arms reduction and prohibition of atomic weapons and the withdrawal of foreign troops from Europe, Premier Bulganin called for a moratorium on further increases in the armed forces of either the NATO or the Warsaw Pact powers. Unquestionably this Soviet emphasis was prompted by the entry of the Federal Republic of Germany into the Atlantic Alliance only a little over two months before. Prime Minister Eden offered a plan that would, in a limited pilot area, combine the United States emphasis on inspection and the Soviet concern with troop withdrawal. He suggested that

> we should consider whether we cannot set up a simple, joint inspection of the forces now confronting one another in Europe. It should not be impossible to decide that over a specified area to be agreed between us, extending perhaps a fixed depth on either side of the line which now divides East and West Europe, there should be supervision by inspecting teams appointed by the military commands on both sides.[24]

No specific agreements materialized from the Geneva meeting.

After the summit conference of 1955, the disarmament discussions took a new turn. The Western powers emphasized that comprehensive disarmament was unattainable since there was no way of controlling the elimination of stockpiles of atomic weapons. Said Mr. Stassen at the third session of the Sub-Committee: "The advances in modern armaments, including nuclear weapons, have been so significant that much of the earlier discussions of the inspection and control problems may well be outmoded."[25] On 6 Sep-

[24] Speech of 21 July 1955. Reproduced in *ibid.*, D-13, p. 103.
[25] Reproduced in *ibid.*, D-15, p. 109.

tember 1955, therefore, the United States placed a reservation on all of its pre-Geneva disarmament proposals. While not explicitly disavowing its pre-Geneva positions, the United States representative made it clear that his government was not reaffirming them either. The USSR, for its part, continued to press for the Bulganin plan, which was a restatement of its 10 May 1955 proposals.

When the issue came before the tenth General Assembly there was general recognition of the need for some sort of confidence-building measures. The Assembly called upon the Disarmament Sub-Committee to give priority to reaching agreement on "tangible" measures of disarmament, such as the United States plan for exchanging military blueprints and for mutual aerial inspection and the Soviet plan for establishing control posts at strategic centers. The USSR opposed the resolution on the ground that it called for control measures without any disarmament measures.

The fourth and fifth sessions of the Disarmament Sub-Committee, covering the years 1956-1957, were the most intensive and serious periods of general disarmament negotiations since the war. Certainly they witnessed a wide variety of proposals offered by all five powers, and at times a definite narrowing of points at issue could be observed on isolated questions. But this period was also one of confusion and aimlessness on the part of the negotiators. Weapons testing was proceeding at a furious rate, and almost every day seemed to foreshadow new developments in arms technology. The principal difficulty centered around agreement on control measures to supervise any disarmament program and on what subjects were the best for a start on disarmament.

In terms of the scope of discussions, the last two years of work in the Sub-Committee were characterized by wide-ranging proposals. Each of the five powers offered outline proposals covering first-step measures in the four chief areas of disarmament: reduction of conventional arms and forces, prohibition of nuclear weapons, measures to guard against

surprise attack, and establishment of a control and inspection system to guarantee observance of any agreement. All the major Western proposals interrelated these four problems, making agreement on one contingent upon agreement on one or more of the others. The USSR alternated between general proposals and more limited ones dealing with specific problems independently (*e.g.*, regional disarmament, cessation of tests, budgetary reductions).

The intensity of debate and variety of proposals, however, in no measure compensated for their failure to solve the technological and political problems that had frustrated agreement in the past. No one was able to offer a satisfactory technical solution—much less a political one—to the problem of guaranteeing a ban on the production of nuclear weapons or guaranteeing the reduction of stocks. There remained the tactical and strategic problem of Western reliance upon a world-wide system of military bases as opposed to Soviet reliance upon massed armies prepared to fight in territories contiguous to the USSR: at what level were manpower and conventional arms to be stabilized so as to permit a remaining over-all balance of strength? And finally, there was the political problem of continued mutual hostility and suspicion, which denied the conditions necessary to establish a control and inspection system. On one isolated issue, a cessation of nuclear tests, some headway was made. This will be considered separately below.

Proposals for a three-stage disarmament plan were offered by France and the United Kingdom on 19 March 1956 and for the first steps of a comprehensive plan by the United States on 3 April. A two-stage plan for conventional armaments and for partial measures was offered by the USSR on 27 March. Western objections that the Soviet control features were inadequate were countered with Soviet complaints that the West wanted control (for the purposes of furthering intelligence information) without genuine disarmament. A French formula, "neither control without disarmament, nor disarmament without control but, progressively, all the disarmament that can at present be con-

trolled"[26] met the problem in principle but could not be worked out in practice. The Soviet solution to this vicious circle was a beginning agreement on "partial solutions." Among the items mentioned by Premier Bulganin as "ripe" for first-step disarmament were agreement on a limit to conventional manpower and discontinuance of nuclear tests.[27]

The Western powers generally insisted upon the interrelation of all phases of disarmament, though a United States draft working paper offered in London on 3 April 1956 did suggest two new steps that the five powers might take "promptly." They were (1) exchange of a limited technical mission to analyze problems of control and inspection of conventional armaments, and (2) creation of a small demonstration test of control and inspection including ground and aerial survey in a limited, non-sensitive area in the United States and in the USSR. Furthermore, on 3 May 1956 the United States warned that

> comprehensive disarmament and drastic reductions can only be carried out safely as parallel progress is made in the solution of important political issues in the world, as otherwise the dangers of war would be increased.[28]

Consideration of disarmament at the General Assembly was essentially a holding action. Not wanting to disturb in any way the possibility of an agreement in the Sub-Committee, the eleventh Assembly did not endorse the proposals of either side. It recommended rather that prompt attention be given to all the various proposals submitted. Such a recommendation could be accepted unanimously.

Hopes were high when the Sub-Committee reconvened in 1957 for what was to be its longest and most intensive session. Initially, debate centered around a series of proposals offered by the USSR on 18 March and by the United States

[26] Yves Collart, *Disarmament: A Study Guide and Bibliography on the Efforts of the United Nations* (The Hague, M. Nijhoff, 1958), p. 55.

[27] See Premier Bulganin's letters of 11 Sept. and 17 Oct. 1956 to President Eisenhower, *Reference Documents*, D-36, p. 216, and D-37, p. 223.

[28] *Ibid.*, D-31, p. 185, and D-29, p. 180.

the next day. Neither contained any features essentially new except that the United States formally reiterated a proposal for research on the peaceful use of outer space that it had made before the eleventh Assembly. Two major new sets of proposals were offered during the year—one by the USSR on 30 April and the other by the four Western powers on 29 August. Each set contained new items in the way of compromise but both were tied to conditions in successive stages that were unacceptable to the other side.

While general in scope, both new sets of proposals were offered with the idea of implementing partial measures at first and then going on at a later date to complete, comprehensive disarmament. Again the theme of "decreasing existing tension" and restoring "a minimum of international confidence" was heard. The differences proved insurmountable, however, and in the fall the Disarmament Commission could only report a deadlock. At that time the principal areas of agreement and disagreement could be summed up as follows:

In conventional armaments there was agreement on a first-stage 2,500,000-manpower level for the USSR and the United States and 650,000 for France and the United Kingdom;[29] but Western insistence on progress in the settlement of political issues as a condition for further reduction was unacceptable to the USSR. There was agreement on the principle of exchange of information as a means of control, but disagreement on how it was to be carried out. In principle both sides favored a suspension of nuclear tests with controls; there was no agreement on the nature and timing of such controls, however, and the USSR particularly objected to United States insistence on agreement to cease the production of fissionable fuel before a test ban became permanent. Both sides accepted the principle of ground and

[29] The Soviet manpower figures included China. The 1952 proposals of the Western powers had also included it but in 1957 that country was omitted, presumably because of United States domestic political considerations. However, it can be assumed that any effective manpower agreement would have to include the People's Republic of China.

air inspection to guard against surprise attack; they differed on the area to be inspected.

Isolating the Issues

Once the comprehensive disarmament talks collapsed, discussions narrowed considerably in scope. For over two years the Disarmament Commission did not meet and there was no concerted discussion of comprehensive disarmament apart from speeches in the General Assembly. Instead, two isolated issues were the subject of several conferences. They involved measures to prevent surprise attack and cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons.

The question of surprise attack was revived in the spring of 1958 as an aftermath to a Soviet charge before the Security Council that United States Strategic Air Command flights over the Arctic region threatened the security of the USSR. During the debate United States Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge introduced a proposal recommending the establishment of a zone of inspection over the Arctic to guard against surprise attacks. At about the same time, President Eisenhower, who had long been concerned with the problem of "open skies," asked Premier Krushchev to permit a meeting of experts to study the "practical problems involved" in such an agreement. The Soviet government rejected the United States proposal in the Security Council but did agree (in July) to a meeting of experts.

The "Conference of Experts for the Study of Possible Measures Which Might Be Helpful in Preventing Surprise Attack" met in November and December 1958. The Western powers held its mandate to be strictly technical. The Soviet representative, however, treated it as primarily a political, negotiating body. At no time during the conference was there a meeting of minds on its basic purpose, and the conference eventually adjourned *sine die*.

By far the greatest consideration since 1957 has been given to the problem of a nuclear test ban. Nuclear testing first became an international issue in 1954, following the thermo-

nuclear explosions conducted by the United States in its Pacific Proving Grounds in March 1954. India raised the question in the United Nations, expressing great concern over the "after-effects" of nuclear explosions. The Indian government asked that the Disarmament Sub-Committee give special consideration to a "standstill agreement" among the testing powers even before a control system was devised; and it called for full publicity of "the extent of destructive power and known effects of these weapons, and also adequate indication of the extent of unknown but probable effects."[30] Asians in general became increasingly vehement critics of nuclear weapons testing. Particular concern was expressed in Japan, whose nationals had been not only the first wartime victims of an atomic attack but also the first serious casualties of the testing program.[31] The Asian-African conference held in Bandung in April 1955 appealed in its final communiqué to the "powers concerned" to reach an agreement on suspension of tests pending an agreement prohibiting the manufacture of nuclear weapons.[32]

During the next three years world-wide pressure for such action mounted. This was to be reflected in the intense—and sometimes heated—debates at the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth General Assemblies. The focus of the argument was the possible deleterious effect upon present and future generations of radioactive contamination of the atmosphere. At the tenth Assembly, Indonesia and Syria proposed that all nuclear weapons tests be suspended until more was known about their radiation effects. Instead of taking so direct a stand, the Assembly created a fifteen-member permanent Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation to assemble, compare, review, and disseminate

[30] Speech of 2 Oct. 1954 to Indian House of the People. See extracts reproduced in *US Documents*, pp. 249 ff.

[31] See "The Voyage of the Lucky Dragon," *Harper's Magazine*, Dec. 1957-Feb. 1958, a three-part series by Ralph E. Lapp, for the unhappy tale of a 23-man Japanese fishing crew which strayed into the danger area during a United States atomic bomb test in the Pacific.

[32] Communiqué reproduced in *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, ed. Paul E. Zinner (New York, Harper for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1956), p. 339.

information on observed levels of radioactivity in the environment and the effects of such radiation upon man and his environment.

Toward a Nuclear Test Ban

Among the nuclear powers themselves the initiative in seeking a test-ban agreement came from the USSR. Discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests was included in its 10 May 1955 proposals before the Disarmament Sub-Committee as one of the first measures in a disarmament program. Later, on 27 March 1956, the USSR called for a test cessation "forthwith," independently of the attainment of agreement on other problems of disarmament. Premier Bulganin, in his extensive correspondence with President Eisenhower during 1956, continued to press for an independent agreement. On 11 September 1956 he wrote:

> I should also like to direct your attention, Mr. President, to so important and pressing a problem—one which is a part of the atomic problem—as that of discontinuing tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons. It is a known fact that the discontinuation of such tests does not in itself require any international control agreements, for the present state of science and engineering makes it possible to detect any explosion of an atomic or hydrogen bomb, wherever it may be set off. In our opinion this situation makes it possible to separate the problem of ending tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons from the general problem of disarmament and to solve it independently even now, without tying an agreement on this subject to agreements on other disarmament problems.[33]

Premier Bulganin's assertion that controls to detect a test violation were unnecessary was flatly denied by the West. Anglo-French counterproposals on 19 March 1956 called for a test cessation, under controls, only as part of the third stage of a comprehensive disarmament agreement. A second Western qualification was added by Ambassador Lodge before the General Assembly in January 1957: before

[33] *Reference Documents*, D-36, p. 220.

nuclear test explosions could cease, there would have to be an agreement on a cut-off, under an agreed control system, in production of fissionable fuels for nuclear purposes. He defended this requirement on the grounds that

> even if all test explosions were stopped, the stockpiling of atomic and hydrogen weapons would continue. If the tests were discontinued, all efforts to reduce radio-active fallout in those weapons would also be discontinued, and those being stockpiled would contain far larger amounts of radio-activity than they would have otherwise. Finally, additional nations, even without nuclear tests, would be manufacturing their own nuclear weapons using techniques already known.[34]

The Western insistence on the need to continue testing until a cut-off agreement and a control plan were negotiated encountered strong criticism not only from Eastern European delegates at the eleventh Assembly but from many of the leading neutralist nations as well. V. K. Krishna Menon, speaking for India, maintained that even the smallest increment of external radiation in the atmosphere was harmful because it increased the mutation of genes in human reproductive organs. The United States found itself in an ever more uncomfortable position on this issue. Ambassador Lodge remarked somewhat apologetically: "We know that nuclear testing has given concern to many sincere people throughout the world. We believe these fears are ill founded, but we respect their motivations."[35]

Neither the United States position nor that of those who wanted an immediate test ban was fully supported by the evidence published by the Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation in mid-1958. It tended to back up the Western argument on the relative harmlessness of testing by revealing the comparatively small addition to radioactive materials attributable to nuclear tests—particularly in comparison to the large amount created by the

[34] United Nations General Assembly, *Official Records* (GAOR): 12th Sess., 1st Cmtte., 866th Mtg., 10 Oct. 1957, para. 12.
[35] United Nations Doc. DC/PV.63, 30 Sept. 1957, para. 25.

peaceful use of X-rays. On the other hand, the report stressed the danger of genetic harm in *any* increment of radioactivity.[36]

One major obstacle was eliminated when, on 14 June 1957, the USSR offered for the first time to permit control posts on its territory to supervise a test cessation. Following the Soviet announcement of a provisional unilateral cessation in March 1958, the United States found itself under considerable pressure to negotiate a test ban without awaiting agreement on a cut-off in fissionable fuel production. President Eisenhower then proposed to Premier Khrushchev the convocation of a group of Eastern and Western experts to study the specific control measures. Premier Khrushchev agreed, and the ensuing conference concluded that it was "technically feasible to establish . . . a workable and effective control system to detect violations of an agreement on the worldwide suspension of nuclear weapons tests."[37] The final report described the scientific and technical requirements for such a system. The problems and prospects of the second, more political, conference will be evaluated in a later chapter.

The year 1959 thus found active disarmament negotiations being carried out in only one limited phase of the whole problem. Some consideration to the over-all problem was given by the Geneva foreign ministers' meeting in the early summer, at least enough to result in an agreement to rejuvenate disarmament discussions in the ten-nation committee described above.[38] President Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev, too, in their Camp David talks in September 1959 considered disarmament, though the details of their conversations have not yet been revealed.

That there is a universal popular desire for some break in the intensity of the current arms race is beyond question. The numerous debates related to disarmament in the four-

[36] See GAOR: 13th Sess., 1958, Suppl. No. 17.
[37] United Nations Doc. A/3897, 28 Aug. 1958, p. 20.
[38] See pp. 244-245.

teenth General Assembly and the several important proposals put forward in this world-wide setting are sufficient witness to this fact. But even intense popular desire does not guarantee serious consideration of a viable agreement. The old problems—political and technological—remain. They will be considered in the following chapters, before an assessment of the current disarmament picture is attempted.

The Problem of Control

IN SUBSTANCE the contemporary problem of disarmament is a problem of control to ensure that agreement will not covertly be violated. The United States insists that it will accept no disarmament agreement that is not a controlled one. Behind this demand lies the fear that an uncontrolled disarmament agreement will lull the democratic nations of the Western coalition into a false sense of security; that the USSR will maintain a strong military posture while the West reduces its strength; and that the USSR, in the absence of a military deterrent, will ultimately expand its influence by aggressive means. Furthermore, there is the belief that an uncontrolled agreement may promote suspicions of violations which in turn could lead to recriminations and an increase instead of a decrease in international tensions.

Control, in short, is to be a substitute for the mutual trust that is lacking among the signatories. This leads to the fundamental dilemma of modern disarmament: control is demanded as a substitute for mutual trust; yet a high degree of mutual confidence is necessary before a control plan can be put into effect. Modern history provides very little guidance for solving this dilemma. While disarmament negotiations have a lengthy history, the number of consummated agreements is very small. And in no case has a freely negotiated disarmament agreement included a control system to guarantee its observance.

This analysis suggests that control is principally a political problem. It is not enough that the major powers be agreed on the short-run political *status quo* to achieve a disarmament agreement; there must be a more basic longer-run understanding on each side that the international order as it

exists is going to endure. Peaceful coexistence must mean more than a propagandistic slogan: it must involve an acknowledgment of the legitimate right of all nations and social systems to exist. Otherwise the establishment of an adequate control system is extremely doubtful, if not impossible.

The major problem centers around the attitudes and outlook of the Soviet Union. In the last analysis any control agreement must be fully reciprocal. The USSR must accept the same limitations on its national sovereignty that the Western powers are willing to accept. It must look upon a controlled disarmament plan as offering more over-all security than is offered by its own military establishment. Furthermore, its scientists and technicians must agree with those of the West on the specific requisites of the control system. As we shall see, neither Soviet ideology nor the statements and behavior of Soviet negotiators indicate that it does look upon control in this light.

In view of the preoccupation that both sides, the West in particular, have had with the concept of control, it is perhaps surprising to note how limited the negotiations on an actual control plan have been. The negotiations over the past fourteen years have really been preliminary skirmishes. Most of the speeches, debates, and proposals have concerned general aims, bases for future discussions, and the like.

In only three instances at most can it be said that the major powers got down to serious discussion of a control plan. The first took place during 1946 in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, where the details of a plan to control the world's production of atomic energy were wrestled with. Twelve years later representatives from the East and West met in Geneva to consider the technical means of preventing surprise attack. (In view of the basic lack of agreement on the conference's terms of reference, one might omit even this as an instance of serious discussion. Finally, there are the two Geneva conferences to devise a control system for prohibiting nuclear tests. A brief review of the Soviet reaction to specific control plans illustrates the nature and extent of Soviet opposition to any control.

In the Baruch Plan, the USSR was confronted with the most far-reaching type of control plan possible. Its purpose was to guarantee that atomic energy would be used for peaceful purposes only. The means proposed was internationalization of all facilities producing fissionable fuel, including plants and reactors supplying energy for peaceful purposes as well as for atomic bombs, because "there is an intimate relation between the activities required for peaceful purposes and those leading to the production of atomic weapons."[39] In addition to ownership of all fissionable materials and production facilities, Mr. Baruch's Atomic Development Authority would have had complete inspection, accounting, and licensing powers.[40]

In principle the USSR also called for international control of atomic energy. But the Baruch Plan was totally unacceptable. The USSR insisted upon national ownership and management of atomic energy facilities, accepting, at the most, international inspection of these facilities. In 1946 internationalization of all atomic energy production would have involved a greater sacrifice for the United States, which then possessed such facilities, than for the USSR, which did not. Why was the latter so adamantly opposed? Principally, it would appear, because it feared that the plan would tend to preserve the United States monopoly of atomic weapons. Moreover, the USSR did not trust the operations of an international control authority that would regulate an atomic industry once one had been established in the Soviet Union. The Russians could not conceive of an international board in which they were a minority without a right of veto that could distribute the benefits of atomic technology as fairly to the USSR as it would to the non-Communist nations of

[39] Report to the Security Council, 1946, in UNAEC, OR: [1st Year], Spec. Suppl., Part II, p. 11.

[40] For details of how the plan of control would have been applied at each stage of production, see Second Report to the Security Council, 11 Sept. 1947, in *ibid.*, 2nd Year, Spec. Suppl., Part II.

the West. Andrei Gromyko minced no words in getting to the heart of the Soviet objection:

> It is easy to understand that the granting of such rights to control organs would mean a complete arbitrariness of these organs and, first of all, of those who would be in a position to command a majority in these organs. . . . The Soviet Union is aware that there will be a majority in the control organ which may take one-sided decisions, a majority on whose benevolent attitude toward the Soviet Union the Soviet people cannot count. Therefore, the Soviet Union, and probably not only the Soviet Union, cannot allow that the fate of its national economy be handed over to this organ.[41]

Preventing Surprise Attack

Control of a different sort was discussed in 1958, when the two sides met to study measures concerning protection against surprise attack. Western experts presented detailed scientific and technical information describing possible means of surveillance and observation to prevent a potential surprise attack by missiles, aircraft, naval craft, and ground forces. Among the techniques that the Western powers saw as possible were aerial photography, radar, electronic reconnaissance, infra-red techniques, the use of ground forces, and acoustic, magnetic, and pressure techniques for underwater detection. In describing a "possible system" of detection against surprise attack by aircraft, the West suggested the necessity of a rather extensive penetration into the domestic activities of the controlled states. For example, at almost all major airfields used by long-range aircraft there would have to be ground observers who might even have to observe the take-off and landing of all such aircraft, so that the exact number of planes airborne at any time as well as the length of time each individual craft had been in the air could be known.[42]

These technical questions were never considered seriously by the USSR. V. V. Kuznetsov charged on the last day of the conference that

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[41] SCOR: 2nd Year, No. 22, 115th Mtg., 5 Mar. 1947, p. 453.
[42] United Nations Doc. A/4078-S/4145, 5 Jan. 1959, Annexes 6 and 7.

during the course of our labours here the Western representatives obstinately attempted to drag the Conference into a consideration of nothing but control questions, a control whose obvious purpose was to get as much military information as possible about the newest weapons such as, for example, long distance rockets.[43]

Nevertheless, the Soviet representatives did offer a series of proposals that contained control features. Some of these features paralleled the Western suggestions, although taken as a whole they clearly reveal the suspicion and distrust the USSR has always manifested regarding comprehensive control arrangements. It did agree to the establishment of ground control posts at railroad junctions, major ports, and on main roads. It also called for the establishment of aerial photography zones in Europe, Asia, and the United States. But even these features were linked to political conditions that the West could not accept, such as a one-third reduction of troops in Europe and a prohibition of nuclear weapons and missiles on German territory.

In describing the scope of control against surprise attack the Soviet government noted that "the main principle" underlying any ground control operations or aerial photography should be "respect for the full sovereign rights of countries on whose territories ground control posts and aerial photography will be established."[44] Its plan for ground inspection fully conformed to this principle. For example, the number of control officers at each post could not exceed four, of whom half had to be nationals of the country being observed. A maximum of six posts were to be established in the USSR, which meant that *at the most* twelve non-Soviet control officers would be responsible for checking on the movements of all land forces in the territory of the USSR. In addition, the post commander would be a citizen of the state being controlled, as would all auxiliary personnel. The conference adjourned, however, without giving serious consideration to specific proposals.

[43] *Ibid.*, Annex 15, p. 9
[44] *Ibid.*, Annex 12, p. 2; also Annex 8.

On the question of establishing a control system to oversee a nuclear test ban, at least the first hurdle has been surmounted. Except for the question of underground explosions, there is general agreement on the technical requisites for controlling a test ban. But developments at the second Geneva conference indicate that Soviet opposition to a genuine control system has not yet been overcome.

At the first technical conference, a network of approximately 180 fixed control posts was recommended. Ten of them would be on ships, and from 160 to 170 would be land-based throughout the world as follows: North America, 24; Europe, 6; Asia, 37; Australia, 7; South America, 16; Africa, 16; Antarctica, 4; and 60 on various islands. These control stations would be so equipped that they could detect a nuclear explosion anywhere in the world. An estimated thirty specialists, in addition to an auxiliary servicing staff, would be required for each post. Furthermore, the control system would include air sampling by aircraft carrying out regular flights along north-south routes over the oceans.

Underground explosions of low kiloton-yield posed a special problem because their signals, as recorded on seismic instruments, closely resemble the signals caused by earthquakes. Thus provision was made for dispatching on-site inspection teams to those areas where seismic signals could not clearly distinguish an earthquake from a possible nuclear test. An international control organ would supervise and coordinate this whole system.

But several problems remain to be solved. For example, what exactly is to be the composition and authority of the central control board? By what vote are the various kinds of decisions to be taken? Who shall man the control posts? What criteria are to determine how many on-site inspections are to be made? What specific data shall be taken into account in developing these criteria? These are among the principal questions now under consideration in Geneva.

There is agreement that the international control commission should have seven members. The USSR, the United Kingdom, and the United States, as permanent members, would elect four other nations to serve on a rotating basis. But agreement is lacking on who the four non-permanent members should be as well as on the voting procedure of the commission as a whole. Until late last year the USSR insisted that the permanent members have a veto on such vital questions as policing (including the decision to dispatch on-site inspection teams) and on fiscal and budgetary matters. The application of a veto by the permanent members on the control commission would, in Western eyes, cripple the whole system of control: automatic and prompt inspection of any explosion suspected of being nuclear is considered to be a vital element of the whole plan; an inadequate system of financing the control commission's operations could also stifle the commission's work. The USSR's general defense of the veto power is that the Western powers will have an "automatic majority" on questions involving the Soviet national interest. France's forthcoming entry into the nuclear club is likely to exacerbate this fear.

Two Soviet compromises have been offered as a way out of the impasse. Premier Khrushchev last spring publicly approved Prime Minister Macmillan's suggestion for advance agreement on a specified number of annual veto-free on-site inspections. Currently under consideration is the exact number of such inspections. A more sweeping proposal to eliminate the veto entirely was made last December. The USSR agreed to permit all substantive decisions to be made by a two-thirds vote of the commission if, *inter alia,* the four non-permanent members were to include two representatives from Warsaw Pact nations, one from the NATO countries, and one neutral, thus giving the USSR and its allies their long sought-after "parity" of representation. As of now the Western powers are adhering to their position that the non-permanent members of the control commission should include representatives from one Western nation, one Soviet ally, and two neutral nations, thus establishing

an over-all representation of three for the West and two for the East, plus the two neutrals.

Closely related is the problem of how to select the teams for on-site inspection and what authority they are to have. The Western powers want trained, permanent mobile inspection teams ready to investigate at a moment's notice. The USSR has insisted that the teams could act only in consultation with the government on whose territory the investigation takes place. They would presumably be composed of nationals from the nation under inspection accompanied by "foreign specialists" from the other side. As the USSR sees it, without such limitations the inspection teams would have license to roam indiscriminately for espionage purposes.

Also under contention is the composition of the personnel of the permanent control posts. As noted, the general Soviet position has been that this personnel should be primarily indigenous, with the inclusion of a specified number of "foreigners." The USSR has agreed to as many as ten foreigners out of the suggested total of thirty per post. In the Western view, Russians inspecting the Soviet Union, Americans the United States, Frenchmen France, and so forth, is tantamount to self-inspection and violates the basic purpose of a control system. The United States and the United Kingdom have been working on a compromise whereby Soviet nationals would comprise that third of the total complement which is devoted to servicing and, in addition, approximately a third of the technical positions, in posts within Soviet borders. But they insist that in these posts all supervisory positions be occupied by Westerners and that the remaining technical positions be filled by British, United States, and "third party" nationals. Naturally, a reciprocal arrangement would be made for the control posts in the United States and United Kingdom.

Last December the Soviet representative at Geneva agreed to accept the Western compromise plan for staffing of the control posts if in turn the West would accede to the Soviet demand for parity on the seven-nation control commission.

A recurring theme runs through all Soviet positions: Soviet distrust of majority voting in any control group. In the three instances where a control system has been considered in some detail, Soviet representatives have insisted either upon parity of representation between East and West or on the right of veto in the contemplated international control organ. In the last analysis they have refused to be bound on any question involving a vital national interest. Both the development of a domestic atomic energy industry and the maintenance of a military establishment immune from foreign scrutiny fall in the category of vital national interests.

Under present circumstances, any international control group reflecting the realities of political power would inevitably include a majority of non-Communist nations. Decisions involving actual and potential interests vital to the USSR would have to be made continuously by a control board the majority of whose members would represent social and economic systems the USSR considers inherently hostile. Any conflicts would ultimately have to be resolved by representatives of governments, and it is assumed that on all major decisions the capitalist nations would vote as a bloc.

In Soviet eyes, the basic economic and political conflict today is between the Soviet and the capitalist systems, which are felt to be irreconcilably opposed. In the USSR's view, there is no *permanent* middle ground between the two, nor is it possible for "neutral" representatives to arbitrate political and economic conflicts between them. Thus, for the Soviet Union, representation on a control board along the lines proposed by the West would be inherently inequitable because the capitalist nations and their allies would have several times as many votes as the Communist nations.

Repeatedly, Soviet representatives have brought up charges of possible bad faith on the part of a control agency. Typical was the question asked by Andrei Vyshinsky before a General Assembly meeting:

If it was acknowledged, as the supporters of the United States plan did acknowledge, that evidence of bad faith might possibly be given by the governments, why not acknowledge that such bad faith might equally well be shown by the staff of the control agency in its administration?[45]

Questions of good and bad faith are, to the USSR, related to political judgment, not to moral character or personality. The Soviet leadership has evinced extreme doubt that representatives of communism and capitalism can be neutral on important political questions. *Pravda,* for example, gave as one of the reasons for Soviet rejection of the United Nations plan for international control of atomic energy the argument that it would be impossible to find "independent people" to run the control agency.[46] This disbelief in the possibility of impartiality of states or statesmen when questions of differing economic and social systems are involved has been a constant feature of Soviet foreign policy.

[45] GAOR: 4th Sess., 253rd Plenary Mtg., 23 Nov. 1949, para. 22.
[46] *Pravda,* 5 Oct. 1948.

The 'Gamesmanship' of Negotiations

IT IS EASIER to account for the inability of the major powers to reach a disarmament agreement than for the tenacity with which negotiations have been carried on over the past fourteen years. United States insistence upon a system of control and Soviet resistance to it loom as the principal reasons why all disarmament efforts to date have proven abortive. Arms, after all, remain one of the principal means by which national security is maintained. A government can afford to let down its defenses in the face of a threatening power only at its own peril. Disarmament efforts must of necessity evoke the most conservative responses from those responsible for a nation's safety.

This analysis operates on the assumption that arms races are more a product than a cause of international tension. Admittedly there is a circular effect: Nation A in fear of nation B increases its armaments. Nation B, in consequence, intensifies its military build-up lest it fall behind nation A. This adds to nation A's insecurity and a counter-build-up takes place. And so build-up is added to build-up.

Perhaps the strongest argument for a disarmament agreement is the need to break this vicious circle. Why not, it is argued, let disarmament be the beginning of a reduction in international tension? This argument would be more easily sustained if it were possible to measure exactly the military capabilities and intentions of all nations so that some form of parity or equity of military force could be established. But one nation's security may, unfortunately, be another's insecurity. The history of both inter-war and post-war disarmament efforts proves the near impossibility of this task. There are too many immeasurable factors. What

criteria of national size are to be used to gauge the proper strength of an army: land mass, population, industrial capacity, gross national product, overseas possessions? What weight is to be given national animosities and traditional historical fears? In the words of behaviorists, how precisely can "threat perception" be measured?

Another set of problems plagues the proponents of disarmament-to-reduce-tension. How can different military instruments be compared? What, for example, is the manpower equivalent of a missile armed with a nuclear warhead? Are domestic police or trained reservists to be considered part of a nation's army? These and similar questions have been studied earnestly by many authorities without satisfactory answers. It follows that the only possible way to produce a genuine, entirely satisfactory disarmament agreement is to eliminate or mitigate the political conflicts giving rise to the tension. It is more than likely that this would lead to unilateral disarmament without any agreement. The prognosis for a comprehensive disarmament agreement while the cold war lasts is not very good.

What, then, accounts for the persistence of these negotiations? Are policy makers so blinded by their own words that they have failed to see the real difficulties and operate under some form of self-delusion? Or, worse yet, have the leaders of the major powers been engaged in a coldly cynical game of deluding domestic and international public opinion? Neither hypothesis accords with the facts.

No simple hypothesis can explain something so complex as these negotiations carried on over a period of fourteen years by several nations governed by many different administrations and leaders. The complexity of the subject is underscored by the facts of the rapidly changing technology of weapons, the shifts in intensity of the cold war, the growing importance of independent Asian and African countries, the changing political complexion of the United Nations, and the different expectations and aspirations of elite groups and leaders throughout the world. Nevertheless, in spite of these changes, certain generalizations about disarmament do

emerge. It is possible to observe in all the ebb and flow of negotiations, throughout the periods of total deadlock and near agreement, a pattern that at least partially accounts for much of the content of the proposals.

Public Opinion and Disarmament Diplomacy

Foremost among the factors that explain the persistence of the negotiations is public opinion. From the moment of Hiroshima, the horror of a future war involving use of the atomic weapons was made clear, and the demand that atomic weapons never again be used has persisted among peoples throughout the world. Part of this demand has, of course, been an outcry against war itself. A weariness with war and armed conflict was a natural and inevitable reaction to the titanic struggle between the Allies and the Axis. In August 1945, following Japan's surrender, demobilization and disarmament, along with restoration of peacetime economies, were principal national objectives. The reaction against atomic weapons found expression in the speeches made before the first General Assembly and in the unanimous vote creating the Atomic Energy Commission. Later that year the Assembly, again unanimously, produced a set of principles governing the general regulation and reduction of armaments.[47] So impressed were many with this achievement that the Assembly session was referred to at the time as the "disarmament Assembly." Since then disarmament has been continuously on the Assembly's agenda.

The feeling of urgency about reducing and regulating armaments, particularly nuclear weapons, gradually subsided as the hostilities of the cold war deepened, only to be re-aroused by the successful testings of the hydrogen bomb by the United States and the USSR in 1952 and 1953, respectively. To the awesome power of the A-bomb was added the theoretically unlimited destructiveness of the H-bomb. Prime Minister Nehru pointedly warned the major powers that

[47] General Assembly Res. 41 (I), 14 Dec. 1946.

the world did not look with indifference upon the nuclear arms race:

> These are horrible prospects and affect us nations and peoples everywhere, whether we are involved in wars or power blocs or not. . . . There can be little doubt about the deep and widespread concern in the world, particularly among peoples, about these weapons and their dreadful consequences.[48]

Fuel was added to the fire of public indignation by the problem of atomic radiation. India first raised the question in April 1954 before the Disarmament Commission. A month later the Trusteeship Council received a petition from the "Marshallese Congress Hold-Over Committee" expressing alarm at the increasing danger from United States tests in the Trust Territory of the Marshall Islands. Since then the question of the potentially harmful effects of the tests upon all peoples has been a regular—and at times extremely emotional—issue before the General Assembly. The most recent Assembly expressed "the profound concern evinced by the peoples of all countries regarding the testing of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons" and requested states to refrain from testing.[49]

General Assembly resolutions are not, of course, legally binding. Their political and moral influence can nevertheless be great. Every government vigorously seeks to obtain United Nations approval of any of its policies that may be under consideration. A motion of censure, condemnation, or even disapproval against a nation's policy is, if nothing else, a serious propaganda defeat. For the United States and the USSR this is all the more true because each is engaged in a global campaign to win allegiance and support. As a reflector of world opinion the United Nations is imperfect; it represents governments, not peoples. But its actions come nearer to representing world consensus than any other instrument that exists.

Because of the appeal that disarmament has for world public opinion, negotiations have inevitably become in-

[48] Extracts of speech, *op. cit., US Documents,* pp. 247–249.
[48] General Assembly Res. 1402B (XIV), 21 Nov. 1959. See pp. 297-298.

volved in the propaganda warfare between the USSR and the Western powers. The purposes of propaganda have virtually dominated all negotiations to date, with the possible exception of those involving cessation of nuclear tests. This is not to deny the sincerity of some efforts to reach agreement. But sincerity of purpose is no solvent for the hard realities that have stood in the way of an agreement. As these realities have become apparent, each side has used the negotiations to discredit the other and put upon it the onus for failure to reach an agreement. Each side has sought to portray its own proposals as fully reasonable and those of the other as unworkable or unfair.

The New Diplomacy

In effect, disarmament negotiations themselves have become a weapon in the cold war. Speeches made in commission, committee, and plenary Assembly have more often been designed to influence different segments of opinion than to reach an accommodation with the other nations represented at the conference table. Both East and West have become masters at the art of appealing directly to peoples over the heads of their governments.

Soviet policy in negotiating international control of atomic energy exemplified this new kind of diplomacy. The Soviet alternatives to the Baruch Plan, typified by the Stockholm "peace pledge" to "ban the bomb," were too extreme to be considered seriously even by the Soviet Union. Their purpose was to identify Soviet policy with the same ultimate goal—elimination of the atomic bomb—without making the real sacrifice necessary to achieve that goal. Soviet resolutions and speeches were designed to create attitudes, to convey and reiterate the theme that the Soviet Union stood for the absolute prohibition of atomic weapons and that the United States refusal to renounce the bomb proved the aggressive nature of its foreign policy.

One of the important features of the way Soviet disarmament policy in the United Nations was carried out was the

general uniformity of presentation before all the various organs where the subject was debated. In general, there was no significant differentiation in the content and tone of Soviet speeches in United Nations bodies according to the particular functions of the General Assembly and its committees, the Security Council, the Atomic Energy Commission, or the Disarmament Commission. The usual procedure was for the Soviet representatives to present, with few exceptions, the same kind of long, tendentious, and hostile speeches before every body, large and small.

Beginning with the proposals for international control of atomic energy, both sides have developed and refined the technique of utilizing the discussions for propaganda purposes. This might be described as the "gamesmanship" of disarmament negotiations. A cardinal feature of this "game" has been to reject the proposals of the other side without appearing to sabotage the discussions.

Examples of Gamesmanship

Every plan offered by either side has contained a set of proposals calculated to have wide popular appeal. Every such set has included at least one feature that the other side could not possibly accept, thus forcing a rejection. Then the proposing side has been able to claim that the rejector is opposed to the idea of disarmament *in toto*. The objectionable feature may be thought of as the "joker" in every series of proposals.

This tactic accounts for the paradox that, over the past fourteen years, the two sides have appeared to be narrowing their differences on some issues even though fundamental differences have prevented them from consummating an agreement. The proposals were never meant to be considered in isolation. If the negotiators could afford to come closer at times, it was only because a joker that had outlived its usefulness had been discarded; meanwhile, a new one was being introduced that would again make over-all agreement impossible. Some of the jokers, of course, may have been intended

as bargaining points. Others may have been reflections of incompletely resolved conflicts within the bureaucracies of the proposing governments. The fact remains, however, that they served to prevent agreement. This pattern is clearly more evident in the case of the Soviet proposals than in those of Britain, France, or the United States because Soviet opposition to most aspects of general disarmament (with controls) is greater than that of the West.

A detailed review of all the proposals in order to observe this pattern is impossible in a summary analysis such as this. Three examples will suffice: (1) international control of atomic energy, (2) the problem of limiting armed manpower and (3) the question of a nuclear test cessation.

For reasons outlined earlier, the Baruch proposals for international control of atomic energy were anathema to the USSR. They nevertheless confronted Soviet foreign policy with a very serious challenge in terms of world opinion. In one fell swoop the United States proposed striking at the root of national sovereignty and forever eliminating the menace of atomic warfare, if not all global conflict.

Seemingly, there were only three alternatives open to the Soviet government: to accept the Western plan, reject it, or propose a more viable alternative. But since none of these choices fully suited Soviet needs, another way was found that had a political logic of its own. The Soviet government demanded an immediate and unconditional prohibition of the production and use of atomic weapons. In effect it asked the United States to abandon the bomb without assurance that the USSR itself would not secretly build one. (Nor, for that matter, would the Soviet Union have been assured of United States good faith.) Prohibition of atomic weapons without a workable control system to ensure Soviet compliance would never have been accepted by the United States, as the Kremlin was well aware. This *sine qua non* of all Soviet proposals on the subject was the propagandistic joker.

It is unnecessary, for our purposes, to challenge the sincerity of the Baruch Plan. If adopted, it would have served the United States national interest well. It would have for-

ever precluded the USSR from carrying out the research necessary to produce the bomb; and the United States would always have been able to preserve the knowledge of the technical requirements for production—just in case. It may be questioned, however, whether the United States Congress would in fact have gone along with the plan had the Russians accepted it.

As it was, the Baruch Plan, too, contained a joker: United States insistence that the permanent members of the Security Council abandon the veto where questions of sanctions against the violators of the control agreement were raised. This demand may have been not so much a joker as a bargaining point to be dropped if the USSR accepted all other features of the plan, but the United States never did offer to abandon it. Soviet resistance to any tampering with the veto was well known. Elimination of the veto was neither an original feature of the Acheson-Lilienthal Plan (the precursor of the Baruch Plan) nor a vital element of the control system. If the USSR had accepted this plan (and while it is now clear that the idea of international ownership of all atomic facilities was totally repugnant to the Russians, that could not be assumed in the mid-forties), there would have been no need for eliminating the veto to punish a violator. The Western powers, under Article 51 of the Charter regarding the "inherent right of individual or collective self-defense," could have taken the necessary action on their own, although the veto might, of course, have made it impossible to obtain the moral support of a Security Council resolution.

On the question of determining an agreed maximum for the armed forces of the major powers, the Soviet proposals were more subtle but equally impossible of acceptance by the West. Manpower limits have not been the subject of active debate since the Disarmament Sub-Committee sessions of 1957, but future consideration of a comprehensive plan will inevitably re-activate this question. Any reduction of armed forces must be carried out in such a way that no country's over-all military strength is reduced proportionately more than any other nation's. The problem is knotty

because of the difficulty of establishing a military equivalent of a given quantity of men and other fighting units, such as ships, aircraft, tanks, and cannon. Determined efforts in the inter-war period to establish such an equivalent failed.

In the post-World War II period this problem has been complicated by two basic factors. First, the USSR has maintained a considerably larger army than has the United States. To compensate for this the United States has concentrated on the development and stockpiling of atomic and nuclear weapons. "Massive retaliation" and "nuclear deterrence" refer to policies felt to be necessary to cope with an enemy capable of putting more manpower in the field. Second, Soviet land forces have the advantage of being concentrated in Europe and Asia relatively close to the areas most likely to become the battlefields in a future conflict. United States manpower is dispersed in bases throughout the world. This dispersal forces the United States to maintain a minimum of between 2,000,000 and 2,500,000 military men in order to keep all its bases in Europe, Southeast Asia, Japan, the Middle East, and Africa, in addition to its hemispheric defenses, adequately staffed.

Andrei Vyshinsky dramatically raised the question of limiting manpower in a speech before the third General Assembly, calling for an over-all one-third reduction of troops by the major powers. The USSR's numerical superiority in armed manpower was so great that a proportional cut would have left the Western powers in a position of permanent inferiority. A proportional reduction of forces was thus totally unacceptable to them. Yet for years the Soviet government insisted upon a one-third proportional reduction of troops as the basis for any limitation of manpower.

In its proposals of 10 May 1955, the USSR finally abandoned its insistence upon a flat percentage reduction and agreed to a maximum figure as desired by the three Western powers. It proposed a reduction of Chinese, Soviet, and United States forces to 1,000,000-1,500,000 men, with 650,000 each for France and the United Kingdom. This proposal had the appearance of a concession insofar as these were

virtually the exact figures proposed by the West in 1952 and by France and the United Kingdom again in 1955. But this concession was made conditional upon agreement that "States possessing military, naval and air bases in the territories of other States shall undertake to liquidate such bases."[50] In non-diplomatic language, the Soviet Union was demanding dissolution of NATO and SEATO, a condition unacceptable to the West without a prior settlement of the outstanding political conflicts between the two sides. Since then, withdrawal of United States forces from Europe has substantially replaced the one-third cut as the unacceptable demand in Soviet manpower proposals.

A renewed effort to solve the manpower problem was made in 1956. At this time Soviet representatives were stressing the 1,000,000-1,500,000 figure as the most suitable for a manpower reduction by the major powers. That figure, though previously acceptable, was now categorically rejected by the United States. Harold Stassen explained to the Sub-Committee:

> When . . . the Soviet Union speaks in its proposals of force levels that had been suggested [by the West] under one set of conditions, which it says specifically it does not accept, it has not moved to meet the United States in any real sense.[51]

The United States now set a maximum of 2,500,000 for its own and the Soviet armies, with further reduction conditional upon settlement of outstanding political issues. The USSR held to the old figures and countered on 27 March with a proposal that agreed to consider the problem of reducing conventional armaments and forces without linking the agreement to any form of nuclear disarmament. This in itself marked a reversal of its decade-old policy of combining conventional and nuclear disarmament. Several months later Andrei Gromyko announced Soviet willingness to accept the higher United States figure as part of a larger agreement unconditionally banning the use of nuclear wea-

[50] Reproduced in *US Documents*, p. 387.
[51] United Nations Doc. DC/83, 4 May 1956, Annex 12, p. 32.

pons, destruction of nuclear stockpiles, and a test cessation. No mention was made of a control system and no agreement resulted.

Again in London a year later, an even more intense series of negotiations on manpower limitation took place. Particular emphasis was given to the problem of staged disarmament. In most cases the unacceptable conditions were in the second or third stages of the proposed agreement. For example, the USSR claimed a serious effort to compromise when on 30 April 1957 it agreed to accept the United States figure of 2,500,000 men without a prior agreement to cease the manufacture of atomic weapons. But as a new condition it demanded agreement on a second-stage level of 1,500,000 men for the three large land powers. It in effect deferred the breakup of NATO and SEATO to a later stage.

During the summer of 1957 the United States counterproposed with conditions of its own. It suggested 2,500,000 men as a first-stage reduction, to be followed in later stages by reductions to 2,100,000 and 1,700,000 men if and when there was progress toward the solution of political issues. With the Soviet rejection of this condition, negotiation for a reduction in manpower reached a dead end.

The history of negotiations for a separate agreement banning nuclear tests shows considerably more balance between Soviet and United States use of gamesmanship. The initiative for a test ban agreement originated with the USSR in its 10 May 1955 plan. It called for a discontinuance of tests "as one of the first measures." On 30 April 1957 the USSR again singled out the problem of nuclear tests and asked that it be solved "without delay." Neither proposal mentioned the establishment of a control system to supervise a test cessation, although any Western consideration of a test cessation was contingent upon agreement on control.

A major change in the Soviet stand was made on 14 June 1957, when it reversed all previous policy and agreed to accept the supervision of an international commission, with control posts actually to be stationed on Soviet territory. This change immediately put the United States on the defen-

sive and permitted the USSR to seize the propaganda initiative. Probably no single issue has served the USSR better than that of test cessation in repairing the propaganda defeat it suffered in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. The Achilles heel of Soviet propaganda has always been its resistance to control. In pushing the idea of a test cessation, with controls, the USSR has been able to capitalize on the anxiety felt throughout the world, particularly in Asia, over increased radiation in the atmosphere.

Stopping nuclear tests in the absence of a broader disarmament agreement was not originally looked upon with favor by the United States. Its initial argument had been that continued testing was needed in order to develop a "clean" nuclear bomb and to perfect anti-missile missiles. The United States now accepted the new Soviet proposal "in principle" and in turn attached several conditions. The Western powers on 2 July and the United States again on 21 August 1957 demanded, as part of an agreement, cessation of the *production* of fissionable material for weapons purposes and establishment of a control system to guarantee such cessation. President Eisenhower had previously proposed a ban on the production of fissionable fuels, but at the time it had not been a condition for a test cessation.[52] This condition was the joker in the United States response. In view of the known Russian objection to controls over Soviet production of atomic energy, such a condition would not easily be met. Moreover, the difficulty of establishing controls on a cut-off in fissionable fuel production would have seriously delayed agreement on a test cessation.

Pressure was intensified against the United States when, on 31 March 1958, the USSR announced a unilateral cessation of its own testing program. (Not coincidentally, this announcement followed the end of a Soviet test series and immediately preceded the United States Nevada test series.) In the spring of 1958 President Eisenhower proposed to

[52] Letter to Marshal Bulganin, 1 Mar. 1956. Reproduced in *Reference Documents*, D-26, pp. 166-168.

Premier Khrushchev that technical talks limited to the detection of nuclear blasts be held. Without explicitly abandoning its demand regarding production of fissionable fuel (this condition was officially abandoned early in 1959), the United States letter thus opened the way for the political talks on testing now being held in Geneva. The West's sole condition for conclusion of an agreement is now the establishment of an effective control system. As already noted, the current obstacles to agreement center around the specifics of such a system.

These three illustrations by no means exhaust the examples of the gamesmanship of disarmament negotiations. In its full operation the art of disarmament negotiations is a most subtle and complex process. It is a task not taken lightly. The stakes are too high. Even where the prospect of agreement is highly remote, the issues are most seriously considered and the debate is carried on with the greatest intensity. Disarmament negotiation is just one tool—but a very important one—in the foreign policy arsenals of East and West in their struggle to build a world in their own image.

1960—A Watershed?

To JUDGE by the recent outpouring of new proposals and major speeches, the year 1960 may be a watershed of sorts. A new round of disarmament negotiations was made possible by the East-West agreement last summer to establish the ten-nation disarmament committee, which has scheduled the first of what promises to be many meetings for mid-March 1960. Some of the ideas and proposals the new committee will consider are already known; others are still being developed in national policy groups. But once again the discussion may be veering toward comprehensive, rather than partial, disarmament.

Of the proposals already announced, those made by Premier Khrushchev on 18 September 1959, in a speech before the General Assembly,[53] have received the greatest publicity. Actually, they encompass three different, though not mutually exclusive, plans. The first is "that, over a period of four years, all States should carry out complete disarmament and should divest themselves of the means of waging war." Land armies, navies, air forces, atomic weapons, and missiles, along with overseas bases, general staffs, war ministries, and even military schools would cease to exist. To ensure compliance, there should be an international control body "in which all States would participate."

A subsequent elaboration of this plan, submitted by the Soviet government, called for achievement of "general and complete" disarmament in three stages: reduction of armed forces and conventional arms in the first stage; complete dis-

[53] For text, see GAOR: 14th Sess., 799th Plenary Mtg., 18 Sept. 1959.

bandment of armed forces and military bases in the second; and completion of the remaining, and most significant, steps, including destruction of nuclear weapons, in the third.[54]

In case the West rejected this far-reaching proposal, Premier Khrushchev proposed an alternative plan for partial disarmament. In addition to calling for agreement on a cessation of nuclear testing, the partial plan has five elements: (1) creation of a zone of control and inspection with a reduction of foreign troops in Western Europe; (2) creation of an atom-free zone in Central Europe; (3) withdrawal of all foreign troops from Europe and liquidation of military bases on foreign territories; (4) conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO and Warsaw Pact states; and (5) an agreement on the prevention of surprise attack. The gap between total and partial disarmament is here rather wide. With the exception of the third point, this alternative plan would not actually involve a reduction of either side's forces. Nor, with the exception of the fifth point, would it involve an extensive system of controls.

As a third suggestion Premier Khrushchev, almost offhandedly, re-introduced the Soviet 10 May 1955 proposals as constituting "a good basis for agreement" on partial disarmament measures.[55]

British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd also made a major speech before the United Nations, which unfortunately tended to get lost in the welter of publicity attending the Soviet Premier's speech the following day. Mr. Lloyd's proposal, while not so explicit in its call for complete disarmament as that suggested by Premier Khrushchev, does provide for comprehensive disarmament. It would be implemented in three stages, the first being essentially a stage of negotiating means and ends, the second a partial implementation, the third complete implementation. With one important excep-

[54] United Nations Doc. A/4219, 19 Sept. 1959.

[55] On 14 Jan. 1960 Premier Khrushchev announced to the Supreme Soviet that the USSR would unilaterally reduce its standing army from 3,623,000 to 2,423,000 by 1961. This reduction will bring Soviet armed forces to approximately the same level as that of the United States at present. See *The New York Times*, 15 Jan. 1960.

tion, none of Mr. Lloyd's proposals is new. Taken as a whole they would cover every phase of the armament race.[56] At least two elements of his plan require extensive controls: a cut-off in the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, and inspection against surprise attack, both of which are recommended to begin in the second stage.

The creation of a peace force is the new feature of the Lloyd plan. Though not entirely novel, it does constitute a departure from recent efforts at disarmament. It marks a revival of the plan envisaged by the authors of the United Nations Charter linking disarmament with collective security.

Another potentially important proposal—but for partial disarmament—was made by Jules Moch, of France, at the Assembly. Mr. Moch compared the current state of missile development to that of atomic development in 1946 and urged that a high priority be given to measures prohibiting the development, manufacture, and possession of all vehicles capable of delivering nuclear weapons before a "point of no return" is reached with respect to these, too. The vehicles would include satellites, rockets, supersonic or long-range aircraft, ocean-going submarines, aircraft carriers, and launching pads.[57]

The United States has not announced any major proposals, but it is clearly using this period for a major reappraisal. President Eisenhower may have indicated the direction of this re-evaluation when he wrote to Senator Hubert Humphrey on 17 November 1959 that the risks of not reaching agreement may be greater than the risks of imperfect disarmament controls:

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[56] They provide for (1) cessation of nuclear testing, (2) a cut-off in the production of fissionable fuel for military purposes, (3) armed manpower limitations, (4) handing over designated armaments to the custody of an international control organization, (5) reduction of conventional armaments, (6) transfer of military stocks of fissionable fuel to non-weapons use. (7) inspection against surprise attack. (8) use of outer space for peaceful purposes. (9) a ban on the manufacture and use of all weapons of mass destruction, and (10) international control of military budgets. GAOR: 14th Sess., 798th Plenary Mtg., 17 Sept. 1959, paras. 47-60.

[57] See GAOR: 14th Sess., 1st Cmtte., 1030th Mtg., 24 Oct. 1959.

The best and most carefully elaborated disarmament agreements are likely to carry with them some risks, at least theoretically, of evasion. But one must ponder, in reaching decisions on the very complex and difficult subject of arms control, the enormous risks entailed if reasonable steps are not taken to curb the international competition in armaments and to move effectively in the direction of disarmament.[58]

That some re-thinking has already been done is clear from the important change in the United States position concerning prevention of surprise attack. Ambassador Lodge told the First Committee of the fourteenth Assembly that his government would, in contrast to its previous stand, be willing to talk of political matters "concurrently" with technical ones at the forthcoming meetings of the ten-nation committee.[59] Furthermore, the United States has modified its stand on the Soviet demand for parity in negotiating groups; in addition to accepting strict parity on the ten-nation committee, the United States accepted a larger Soviet representation on the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space than it had previously been willing to.

In July 1959 Charles A. Coolidge was appointed by President Eisenhower to make a study on behalf of the Departments of State and Defense on "comprehensive and partial measures of arms control and reduction which, if internationally agreed, would contribute to the achievement of United States national security objectives."[60] The report of the Coolidge committee is expected in early 1960 and will provide one of the major bases for United States policy proposals in this field at the projected summit meeting in Paris in May as well as in the new disarmament committee.

Despite the evidence of new thinking, however, it cannot be said that any of the fundamental problems previously posed has really been resolved. The "spirit of Camp David" has not erased the elemental suspicions each side has of the other, nor is agreement on meaningful international inspec-

[58] Reproduced in *The New York Times*, 27 Nov. 1959.
[59] GAOR: 14th Sess., 1st Cmtte., 1027th Mtg., 14 Oct. 1959, para. 8.
[60] *The New York Times*, 30 July 1959.

tion and control yet a realistic prospect. The Khrushchev proposals speak of "controls" to be established "in conformity with the stages in which disarmament was carried out." Nevertheless, in the same speech Premier Khrushchev made it clear that what the USSR "still advocate[s]" is "strict control over the fulfilment of a disarmament agreement, after such an agreement has been reached." In the present atmosphere of distrust between states, said the USSR in its elaborating statement,

> any deliberate attempt to advance inflated control requirements and especially to put . . . control before disarmament as a prerequisite for any disarmament measures, is tantamount to blocking all approaches to the solution of the problem.

Implied in this argument is the Soviet fear that a strict system of international inspection and control would give the West considerably more benefits in terms of penetrating Soviet secrecy than it would the Soviet Union in obtaining Western secrets. And in view of the relative openness of Western compared to Soviet society, this fear is justified.

One can go still further. Philip Noel-Baker, winner of the 1959 Nobel Peace Prize, argues that Soviet unwillingness to accept controls is related to the scope of the proposed disarmament agreement—that is, that the economic and political advantages that might accrue from any agreement thus far proposed by the West have not justified the sacrifices the USSR is asked to make.[61] As indicated in an earlier chapter of this study, it is evident that to the USSR controls of the sort the West demands threaten to subvert the Soviet system; thus the price of controls may seem inordinately high and the question is whether any disarmament agreement is possible that will appear to the USSR to be worth this cost.

Is, however, the absolute "fool-proof" system of control heretofore demanded by the West essential? In fact, is it technically feasible? In an analysis done for Columbia Uni-

[61] See his *The Arms Race: A Programme for World Disarmament* (London, Stevens, 1958).

versity based on scientific and technical studies, Professor Seymour Melman concludes:

> It is possible to design and operate systems of control which would give substantial assurance that evasions of various types of agreements on disarmament could not be carried out successfully. It is not possible, however, to design and operate a system by which perfect compliance with international disarmament agreements could be guaranteed. Let us be clear at the outset that perfection cannot be guaranteed here, nor in any natural or social phenomenon. Indeed, foolproof and flawless reliability in inspection for disarmament is not only unattainable; it is not necessary for workability.[62]

Western policy-makers are seriously considering what would be the ingredients of a disarmament agreement that would offer reasonably effective inspection and control and would reduce to tolerable limits the consequences of covert violation. A certain level of armaments, either national or under some kind of international police force, would presumably have to be allowed to counter the irreducible possibility of concealed violation in a world in which it is no longer possible to account for all the nuclear material that has been produced.

Allied to the question of control is that of the veto. The position of the USSR on the veto in the Security Council is only too well known and, in any event, there is serious question whether the Western permanent members, either, would give up the veto on proposals for coercive action. Yet Mr. Lloyd's scheme for an international army would almost necessarily involve some ability to take veto-free action. *Pravda,* in commenting upon the Lloyd plan, has already warned against the creation of an international police force "armed to the teeth" which would be used for "sup-

[62] *Inspection for Disarmament,* ed. with an introduction by Seymour Melman (New York, Columbia Univ. Press, 1958), p. 3. See also companion study by Louis Henkin, *Arms Control and Inspection in American Law* (New York, Columbia Univ. Press, 1958), for a discussion of the legal aspects of a control plan. Professor Henkin concludes that an arms agreement might be negotiated that would be fully compatible with the United States Constitution.

pressing peoples determined to change the social system in their countries."[63]

The problem of reaching a disarmament agreement is further complicated by new technological developments in the arms race—particularly the apparent Soviet superiority in the long-range missile field. Some United States officials have admitted that there will be a "missile gap" at least between 1961 and 1963. The United States is under pressure to develop an adequate counterforce and would thus be unlikely to favor a control plan, such as that suggested by Mr. Moch, that might deprive it of the opportunity to perfect its missiles and anti-missile missiles, even were the USSR to limit itself in a like fashion.

In these circumstances, the United States will be more dependent than ever over the next two or three years on its Strategic Air Command bombers and intermediate-range missiles to maintain its deterrent striking power. This may necessitate continuing dependence on overseas bases, although some observers have seen in the development of such weapons as the 1,200-1,500 mile-range Polaris missile, which can be fired from a submerged atomic submarine, the possibility of a greater and more flexible military deterrent than fixed bases; at least one such submarine is scheduled to carry operational missiles by the end of 1960. When more of the United States ICBMs, having a 5,000-mile range, have been produced, it will be possible to utilize bases in continental United States for a retaliatory nuclear attack. In the interim, the United States seems to be counting on its presumed superiority in diversification of weapons and on the strength of its international alliances.

To a certain extent, these considerations will affect the Western view of the possibility of controlled "limited disengagement" in Europe, as called for in the Khrushchev proposals, or a variant thereof such as has been advocated by Prime Minister Macmillan. From the Soviet point of view, this would be more acceptable because Soviet territory would

[63] Article by Yu. Zhukov, *Pravda*, 2 Oct. 1959.

not actually be involved, although the effect of Soviet military withdrawal from countries in Eastern Europe might be a cause for concern. Militarily, too, the proposal has an element of feasibility in that it would not entail a significant diminution of the forces on either side; it amounts more to a redeployment than to a reduction of forces. Although there is evidence that President Eisenhower as well as Prime Minister Macmillan may be thinking along the lines of some "thinning out" in Central Europe, such proposals will almost surely require some consideration of the status of Germany, with all the pitfalls that this involves.

Pressures on the Great Powers

Despite these rather negative remarks, there are strong pressures upon the major countries both from within and from other countries—especially the smaller nations—to make some headway on disarmament. The most effective of these pressures has been, as noted, for cessation of nuclear testing. No fewer than four out of six of the fourteenth Assembly resolutions on disarmament related to testing of nuclear weapons, and all passed overwhelmingly. One urged intensification of the work of the Geneva Conference to devise a test control system and another asked for a moratorium by all states on all further tests (passed by votes of 78-0, with 2 abstentions, and 60-1, with 20 abstentions, respectively). The other two reflected concern lest the "nuclear club" grow and, in all likelihood, become less responsible. France, which has already announced that it will imminently test an atomic device in its Sahara territory, was particularly requested to refrain from going through with its plans. In view of the strength of the Western alliance, the vote of 51-16 (with 15 abstentions) against France was surprising. In another significant resolution, the Assembly approved an Irish proposal the intent of which was to oppose further dissemination of nuclear weapons to those nations not now possessing them. Although this was watered down to a simple suggestion that the ten-nation disarmament committee consider the matter,

the concern evidenced for the "nth country" problem was real and universal. Not one dissenting vote was cast.[64]

There are other pressures on the three nuclear powers that relate to this "nth nation" problem. Politically the influence that these powers now exercise inside their alliance systems would be diluted as their allies came to produce atomic weapons. Smaller nations able to produce such weapons would be capable of exercising a kind of "atomic blackmail" to which even the largest nations would not be immune. A year ago this problem was referred to as the "fourth country" problem; today it is the "nth country." It is too late to prevent France's entry into the nuclear club. But other countries are now, or soon will be, in a position to embark on programs of their own. One report lists twelve countries as being "technically able" to do so "in the near future"—Belgium, Canada, China, Czechoslovakia, France, East Germany, West Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Sweden and Switzerland.[65] Sooner or later this list will surely be expanded. It is evident that with greater dispersal of atomic know-how will come greater risk of accidental or irresponsible use of atomic weapons.

This problem is particularly acute with regard to that emerging giant, the People's Republic of China. There is considerable belief in the West that the USSR is no more eager to see the People's Republic develop atomic weapons than is the West. Thus it may be that an agreement on cessation of testing would provide the USSR with an excuse to deny information to its ally. An agreement would not,

[64] See, respectively, General Assembly Resolutions 1402A and 1402B (XIV), 21 Nov. 1959, 1379 (XIV), 20 Nov. 1959, and 1380 (XIV), 20 Nov. 1959. The other two resolutions continued the 82-member Disarmament Commission, with an oblique indication of approval of the 10-nation committee (the debate made it clear that the members consider the Assembly as retaining ultimate authority for approving any agreements reached), and urged achievement of a constructive solution to the problem of general and complete disarmament: Resolutions 1403 (XIV), 21 Nov. 1959, and 1378 (XIV), 20 Nov. 1959, respectively.

[65] For summary of report done for American Academy of Arts and Sciences, see Howard Simons, "World Wide Capabilities for Production of Nuclear Weapons," *Survival* (Institute for Strategic Studies), Vol. 1, No. 4 (Sept.-Oct. 1959), p. 127.

however, solve the problem of what could be done if China developed atomic weapons on its own, and under the circumstances no agreement that did not include it would be effective. What is done with respect to France will provide an important precedent, since that country, too, has indicated it would be cool toward an agreement reached without its participation.

The most hopeful prospect in the near future has been for an agreement on a controlled test cessation, although it is clear that basic questions are still outstanding even here. Last November, the Soviet representative agreed, after many months of refusal, to consider new scientific data—principally the information gathered by the United States after its 1958 "Hardtack" test series, which indicated that the report of the first Geneva conference on a control system had underestimated the difficulty of detecting underground shots. Subsequent studies in the United States have shown the theoretical possibility of carrying out tests in large underground excavations that would be indistinguishable seismographically from earthquakes. Soviet technical experts meeting in Geneva have virtually rejected these latest studies, which seem to point to a need for a more extensive control system than originally envisaged. As of January 1960 no solution to this problem was in sight, and agreement on an annual number of veto-free inspections had been held up by the inability to agree on the technical implications of the new data. All this raises again the fundamental question, discussed earlier, of whether and to what extent the USSR can accept inspection and control on its territory and whether the West can accept the minimum controls that seem to be the maximum the USSR might allow.[66]

As the military implications of a test ban become clear, the United States, too, seems to show signs of diminishing enthusiasm for agreement. Some military opinion in the United States holds that the further development of tactical

[66] President Eisenhower suggested in April 1959 that immediate agreement be reached to ban tests in the atmosphere or under water, which would not require an elaborate control system. This proposal has so far been rejected.

weapons, the miniaturization of missile warheads (necessary in view of United States failure to develop as powerful propellent fuel for missiles as the USSR), and an understanding of the technical-military effects of detonations in space all depend on renewed testing. In an effort to offset Soviet missile superiority, work is going forward on perfection of anti-missile missiles with atomic warheads, and this work, too, might be retarded by a permanent test cessation.

On the other hand, test cessation, strictly speaking, involves no real *dis*armament or fundamental change in the war potential of either side, and agreement on this limited question should therefore be more easily reached. Test cessation would primarily limit the further development and perfection of weapons already possessed in great abundance in the United States and the USSR. In some aspects of nuclear arms production a point of saturation has undoubtedly been reached.

The question of whether or not there will be agreement on a permanent, controlled test ban will ultimately depend —as do other larger disarmament questions—on the balance of needs. Is the Soviet Union's suspicion of controls greater than its need to reduce the drain on its economic potential that is represented by excessive defense expenditure? Is the West's fear of remaining behind in the missile race greater than its need to appease domestic and international pressure to stop testing? Is it possible to arrive at an agreement that will be of equal advantage to each side? Would a start on any aspect of disarmament, such as a test ban, be sufficient to reverse the trend of the arms race or to lessen the risk of accidental war? In the absence of agreement, each side has left itself room to maneuver. The United States, on 1 January, announced itself "free" to resume testing, though not without prior announcement. France continues to move forward on its projected testing. And the USSR has indicated that its unilateral cessation would not apply if any Western power, presumably including France, conducted a test.

Should a control agreement ending nuclear tests be signed, it would constitute the first real breakthrough in the four-

teen-year disarmament impasse. It might well establish a climate for further agreements, such as a thinning out of forces in Central Europe. Just as a cumulative increase in arms adds to tensions, a gradual, balanced limitation of military capacity should further mitigate distrust and help prepare the way for a long-term *détente*.

Recent Changes

Within the past few months, at least one area has been taken out of the arms race. On 1 December 1959, twelve nations having claims or an interest in Antarctica agreed to demilitarize that icy continent. The treaty prohibits "any measures of a military nature, such as the establishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of military maneuvers, as well as the testing of any type of weapons" in the Antarctic.[67] A system of inspection is provided for that permits each government to designate inspectors and requires all governments to accord the inspectors "complete freedom of access at any time to any or all areas of Antarctica." Each nation must provide the others with a timetable of planned movements of expeditions and ships and with lists of military personnel, equipment, and bases in operation. Agreement on this quite comprehensive treaty was facilitated by Antarctica's relative unimportance as a base for military operations.

Outer space, only now being opened up to exploration, poses considerably greater problems because it is the region through which missiles sail. Furthermore, even instruments of peaceful purpose (*e.g.*, weather-prediction satellites) could be used for military intelligence. Over the past year the Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) of the International Council of Scientific Unions (a non-governmental body) has been seeking Soviet cooperation in developing coordinated research programs. Although Soviet scientists joined COSPAR, they threatened not to cooperate because they felt they were under-represented. In January agreement

[67] Text of treaty in *The New York Times*, 2 Dec. 1959.

was announced that East and West would have parity in COSPAR's seven-man inner cabinet (the president is to be a neutral). The voting procedure, in effect, gives either side a veto on all important decisions taken by COSPAR. Another compromise has ended the Soviet boycott of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, which the USSR felt was dominated by Western powers. Under a new membership formula agreed to in December, the original membership of eighteen, twelve of whom were allied to the West in one way or another, was expanded to twenty-four, with twelve from the West, seven from the East, and five neutrals.

These recent changes in the composition of the outer-space committees, along with the unanimous-voting procedure in the Geneva conference and parity of membership in the new ten-nation disarmament committee, mark the increasing success of Soviet efforts to achieve equality with the West in transactions related to disarmament. To the extent that the changes encourage or permit Soviet participation in negotiations, they constitute an advance. However, this is not to say that a successful conclusion to the negotiations is thereby ensured or even made more probable.

A new role for the United Nations is foreshadowed by recent developments. Unlike the previous period of active negotiations, the forthcoming talks will not be held under its direct auspices. For the time being, at least, the United Nations is less likely to be the source of a disarmament plan than to be the ratifier of a possible agreement, to encourage, prod, or modify, but not to create. In the long run, this may prove to be a more realistic role for the Organization.

This trend was highlighted by the fourteenth Assembly's activity on the subject of disarmament. The Assembly, in spite of its inability to serve as the broker for a disarmament transaction, has become a powerful stimulant to action, be it propaganda or a serious probing for agreement. The tone of these debates indicates great-power awareness that the current arms race concerns many more than those immediately involved. It indicates an acceptance by the great powers

of their responsibility to take steps to curb the race or, failing that, to account to the United Nations for their inability to do so. No one has seriously challenged the assertion of the Secretary-General last summer that disarmament "is one of those questions of which the General Assembly should always be seized."[68]

Given the instability and risks of reliance on mutual nuclear deterrence, the question remains whether the external pressures of world opinion and the internal pressures of an increasingly burdensome arms race are sufficient to cause real progress on general arms limitation and control, or whether the ferment of 1960 will simply turn out to have provided new forums for East-West disagreement.

[68] Press conference of 23 July 1959, Note No. 2015 (United Nations, N. Y.).

50 YEARS

In the Service of Peace With Justice

Fifty years have passed since the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace was established by Andrew Carnegie to "hasten the abolition of international war." To observe this important anniversary, the Endowment is undertaking an extensive year-long program, "Perspectives on Peace," to stimulate constructive thinking on the problems involved in working for an enduring peace founded on freedom and justice. Eminent statesmen and responsible citizens here and abroad have been invited to draw on their special experience for insights that may be applied today and tomorrow. Ideas will be sought as to specific measures that might be adopted by the United States and other governments. But the primary concern will be a re-evaluation of the nature, causes, and conditions of world peace in the nuclear age.

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