

---

PRISM: Political & Rights Issues & Social Movements

---

1-1-1948

## The devil and Jimmy Byrnes

Frederick Lewis Schuman

Find similar works at: <https://stars.library.ucf.edu/prism>  
University of Central Florida Libraries <http://library.ucf.edu>


This Book is brought to you for free and open access by STARS. It has been accepted for inclusion in PRISM: Political & Rights Issues & Social Movements by an authorized administrator of STARS. For more information, please contact [STARS@ucf.edu](mailto:STARS@ucf.edu).

---

### Recommended Citation

Schuman, Frederick Lewis, "The devil and Jimmy Byrnes" (1948). *PRISM: Political & Rights Issues & Social Movements*. 355.

<https://stars.library.ucf.edu/prism/355>



# **THE DEVIL AND JIMMY BYRNES**

**BY  
FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN**

**A SOBERING ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN POLICIES TOWARD THE USSR BASED ON REVELATIONS—AND OMISSIONS—BY THE FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE IN HIS BOOK "SPEAKING FRANKLY"**

**"ALL CIVILIZATION AS WE KNOW IT WILL CRUMBLE INTO RADIOACTIVE DUST AND RUBBLE IF MR. BYRNES HAS HIS WAY."**

**PUBLISHED BY SOVIET RUSSIA TODAY**

**5c**

*Frederick L. Schuman, distinguished professor of political economy and government, has been on the faculty of leading American universities. He is the author of many outstanding books on European and world affairs, of which the latest is Soviet Politics at Home and Abroad. The material in this pamphlet was first published in Soviet Russia Today.*

A PUBLICATION OF  
**SOVIET RUSSIA TODAY**  
New York, 1948

Printed in the U.S.A.

# THE DEVIL AND JIMMY BYRNES

by Frederick L. Schuman

**O**N October 15, 1947, Harper and Brothers published James F. Byrnes' *Speaking Frankly*, a book which has aroused widespread comment at home and abroad. The scope of the comment is amply justified. This is the most important and revealing book on U.S. foreign policy to appear since the war. It is a record of experience and a confession of faith by the chief architect of that policy. It is also the most baffling, incredible and terrifying document to come from the pen of a responsible American official in many years.

## Man and Nemesis

Let no one suppose that this is merely another outbreak of symptoms in the current epidemic of anti-Soviet hysteria and D.T.'s. Mr. Byrnes is a man of reason who all his life has sought peace through compromise. He is mild, modest, almost mouse-like—albeit not without Irish pride and temper, as shown by his demand for Henry Wallace's dismissal from the Cabinet after his public criticism of Mr. Byrnes' policies. This shrewd South Carolinian was, successively, altar-boy (before he turned Episcopalian), local politician, Congressman, lawyer, Senator, Supreme Court Justice, Director of Economic Stabilization, Director of War Mobilization, and Secretary of State (July, 1945-January, 1947). Few men have served their country more ably or been more honored by it. Here is no Bullitt, Earle, Luce or Burnham. Mr. Byrnes, I am wholly convinced, is a citizen of good will, a genuine Christian in the best sense, a splendid American, a Roosevelt "New Dealer" (though he may not now like the term), and a mover and thinker who is devoutly concerned, to a degree rare among public servants, with the welfare of his countrymen and of all the world's people.

It is precisely these attributes which give to his work and words an appalling quality of nightmarish insanity which, if uncured, can leave no hope whatever for the survival of civilized mankind. The reader who knows no more of the diplomatic record than what is told in the book or is vaguely remembered from headlines will scarcely detect the element of madness here. Yet here it is—poisonous, pathological and pathetic—to such a degree as to justify completely the gloomiest prognoses of a Spengler or a Toynbee regarding democratic statesmanship in decadent civilizations. By some subtle magic, Jimmy Byrnes—who, unlike Faust, has no comprehension of what he has done—has sold his mind and soul to the dark god variously known as Beelzebub, Satan or Mephistopheles.

### Split Personality

In its general tone, however, the book sounds deceptively sane. Byrnes' contacts with Soviet leaders began at the Yalta Conference of February, 1945, to which Roosevelt insisted he come. They continued through the Potsdam Conference, the deadlocked September meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, the successful session of the Three Foreign Ministers in Moscow in December, the U.N. Assembly in London in January, 1946, the Paris meetings of Foreign Ministers in spring and summer, the Paris Peace Conference of July-October, 1946, and the New York Council session of December where five peace treaties were finally approved. He warmly endorses Stalin's view that "it is our duty to see that our relations in peace-time are as strong as they have been in war." (p. 44) Stalin he describes as "a very likeable person" (p. 45) and Molotov as able, shrewd, gracious, persistent and exasperating.

Byrnes recounts instance after instance of Soviet concessions and compromises. He is flatly opposed to American intervention in China. "The best course is to withdraw," to retain our "reservoir of goodwill" and remain "on the side of progress in Asia." (p. 229) While he never admits that he himself was ever wrong, he grants that "many issues admit of honest differences of opinion. We cannot and must not claim infallibility for our policy decisions." (p. 312)

The problem of explaining Mr. Byrnes arises from numerous other passages where endorsement is given to almost all the clichés about the Soviet Union which are the stock-in-trade of

the Russophobes and Red-baiters of government, business, press and radio with purposes of their own to serve. Mr. Byrnes' purposes, one would like to believe, are of a different order. But his sales technique is suspiciously similar. In mealy-mouthed self-righteousness, he paints a portrait of American diplomacy dedicated consistently to peace, democracy, freedom and rectitude and constantly obstructed in its quest for virtue by Soviet wickedness. Russian "expansionism" is alarming and clearly sinful, in contrast to American expansionism which is at once noble and non-existent. Russian expansionism, it seems, is old. Karl Marx is quoted against it. Bolshevik expansionism is more dangerous than Tsarist expansionism because it has an "aggressive ideology." "Greece is apparently their first objective." Italy may be next. "I do not doubt that their ultimate goal is to dominate, in one way or another, all of Europe." (p. 295) Therefore "firmness" is needed, the Truman Doctrine is "correct," although somewhat "nervous" (p. 302), the so-called Marshall Plan is excellent, Hungary must be rescued, etc. Here again, between the lines of Mr. Byrnes' unemotional prose, the Red Monster is reaching out menacingly to gobble up all of God's children, and all good men and true must rally to halt its fiendish onrush and save Christianity, Capitalism and Civilization from annihilation.

The present writer has repeatedly written and said that these views are not only utterly nonsensical but that their propagation is dangerous to the point of criminality. I propose to continue speaking and writing to the same effect so long as freedom of speech survives. The question as to why Americans believe these falsehoods is easily answered: they have been assured of their truth by most of their newspapers and periodicals, by almost all commentators still broadcasting, by many of their clergymen, and by virtually all of their public leaders, including Mr. Byrnes. The question as to why (or whether) Mr. Byrnes believes them to be true is more complex. But it merits exploration. Fortunately, such exploration is possible because Mr. Byrnes has a conscience and a feeling for accuracy and honesty. He does not confine himself, as do most others of this school, to mere affirmation and defamation. His "evidence" is nowhere plainly stated in one place, but is scattered through the book. It deserves evaluation.

## Double Standard

Mr. Byrnes is rightly troubled by "violations of pledges." The Yalta accords, for example, were "useful" because they are "the basis on which we have shown the world that Russian actions in Eastern Europe have been in violation of Russia's pledged word." (p. 34) The Potsdam agreements "did make the conference a success but the violation of these agreements has turned success into failure." (p. 87) As for the Moscow accords of December, 1945, had they been "as favorable to the Soviet Union as some critics have charged, the Soviets would not have violated them. And the fact that ever since we have been protesting against these violations indicates that they were in the best interests of the liberated States." (p. 239) Leaving aside this curious *non-sequitur* (one of many in the book), what is the basis of the contention, now accepted as a truism by the government and many of the people of the USA, that the USSR has violated its pledges?

Its essence is simply that when Washington's interpretation of an agreement differs from Moscow's interpretation, the former is obviously right and the latter obviously wrong. If America and Britain define "democracy," "free elections" or "Fascists" in one way and the Soviet Union defines them in another, the same rule holds. In sober fact when an agreement calls for "joint assistance" and refers to "joint responsibilities" to be discharged "when in the opinion of the three governments, conditions make such action necessary," all logic and law prescribe that the action in question is to be taken when the three governments are agreed and that none can properly be taken when they are not agreed. Not so, however, with Mr. Byrnes and the State Department. Under the Truman dispensation such pledges mean that when there is no agreement Moscow must do what Washington and London demand—and if it refuses, it is guilty of a breach of faith.

Is it conceivable that the USA or Britain has ever violated pledges? Hardly. Frankness obliges Mr. Byrnes to note that the U.S. agreed to the admission of Argentina to the U.N. at San Francisco in violation (said Stalin) of Roosevelt's statement at Yalta. He quotes Stalin on the Polish question as saying: "Even though the Russians are simple people, the West often makes the mistake of regarding them as fools." (p. 62) At San Francisco, moreover, Stettinius asserted that the USSR was "eligible" to

receive a territory as a U.N. Trusteeship. But when Molotov later suggested that the USSR might receive a territory as a U.N. Trusteeship, this, Mr. Byrnes implies, was clear evidence of perfidy and sinful ambition. On September 15, 1944, Roosevelt and Churchill at Quebec "approved the Morgenthau plan" for Germany (p. 184); but the subsequent repudiation not only of its details but of its purposes in Washington and London, is somehow not a repudiation of the pledged word. Mr. Byrnes solemnly agreed in Moscow, December 28, 1945, to "non-interference in the internal affairs of China" and to "withdrawal of Soviet and American forces from China at the earliest practical moment." There has been no Soviet intervention in China. Soviet troops have long since been withdrawn. The U.S. has intervened to the tune of billions of dollars. American troops are still there. By a logic never explained, this also adds up, *mirabile dictu*, not to an American but to a Soviet breach of faith!

## Mendacity by Deletion

This persistent use of two scales in which to weigh American and Soviet policies is matched by a number of amazing omissions in Mr. Byrnes' record—none of them, I believe, a product of deliberate deception, but all of them a result of that familiar process whereby the mind, when worried by fears of guilt, suppresses into the unconscious all memory of the sources of anxiety. There is, for example, no mention of Henry Wallace's arguments against Byrnes' policies and no effort to answer them. The present tragic impasse in American-Soviet relations had its chief original source in Byrnes' statement of August 18, 1945, seconded by Bevin's speech of August 20, wherein Washington and London, in the name of "democracy," opened the diplomatic and propaganda campaign, which has continued ever since, to oust Soviet influence from Eastern Europe and the Balkans. A highlight of this campaign, and a direct precursor of the Truman Doctrine, was Churchill's "iron curtain" speech in Fulton, Mo., March 5, 1946. Not even a one-page outline of post-war diplomacy would be worth the paper it is written on without mention of these statements of purpose. But, incredibly in a book of 300 pages, Mr. Byrnes does not mention any of them even once, much less discuss their import or impact. Neither does he indicate how and why the French and Chinese Foreign Ministers in London (September, 1945) consistently voted against



Molotov and with Bevin and Byrnes. He presents (p. 107) American recognition of the Provisional Governments of Austria (October 20, 1945) and Hungary (November 2) as gestures of friendship toward Moscow, with no mention of the fact that Vienna, early in October, had yielded to Anglo-American pressure in rejecting a Soviet proposal for a joint oil company and that the anti-Soviet Small Landowners' Party won the Budapest municipal elections of October 7.

Perhaps the most glaring omission of all in these pages is the ghastly cost of the war to the Soviet Union. Nowhere is this crucial determinant of Soviet policy more than hinted at. Mr. Byrnes speaks for a nation which grew wealthy on the war to one which was fearfully devastated and impoverished and gave thirty lives for every American life sacrificed to defeat the foe. Yet Mr. Byrnes can say that Soviet proposals for reparations from current German production are "inexcusable" and that "we (*sic*) should realize that, modern war being what it is, it is short-sighted and futile for any country to seek approximate compensation for losses it has sustained." (p. 86) He is also silent on the refusal of his government to grant any post-war loans or credits to the USSR while pouring out billions for Britain, France, Italy, Germany and Japan. With commendable candor but unbelievable pettiness, he does note, however (pp. 143-4), that when he saw Czechoslovak delegates at Paris applaud Vyshinsky's criticism of American "dollar diplomacy," he "immediately cabled instructions to the State Department to stop the extension of credits to Czechoslovakia." He also told Jan Masaryk how "shocked" he was by the fact that Prague had proposed to transfer a portion of the credit to Romania at a profit. Yet on the next page he admits, as a "slight mitigation" of Czechoslovak sin, that a U.S. Treasury Department official in Prague had been asked about the Romanian transaction and had made no objection. The credit was never renewed. . . .

## Mendacity by Distortion

Misrepresentation is as effective as omission in gilding the lily of delusion. On page 38 Byrnes attributes to Roosevelt at Yalta a statement that Sumner Welles made a "mistake" in telling the Latin American Republics merely to break relations with Germany rather than declare war. "Never," wrote Mr. Welles in reply, October 21, "during the years I served under the Presi-

dent did the Department of State ever 'tell' any other American Republic what action it should take. Never did President Roosevelt suggest such a step. It was only after Mr. Byrnes was appointed Secretary of State that 'telling' our American neighbors became a feature of our policy." Mr. Byrnes also tells of his "shock" (p. 255) at Stalin's speech of February 9, 1946, "in which he announced the new Five-Year Plan with its emphasis on rearmament instead of the production of consumer goods." Anyone who cares to reread the speech will recognize that any such description of it is a falsehood. Again: "As I said in Charleston on November 16, 1945, the suggestion that we might use the atomic bomb 'as a diplomatic or military threat against any nation is not only untrue in fact but is a wholly unwarranted reflection upon the American government and people.'" (p. 275) Comment is needless.

Yet again: the USSR concluded its neutrality and non-aggression pact of 1939 with Hitler (who flagrantly violated it 22 months later) with no conviction that it would escape ultimate attack by the Nazi Reich. "Thus, it seems clear that the Soviet Government concluded the pact while fully intending to violate it." (p. 286) Evidence: none, since there is none. Arguments: if I conclude a contract with my neighbor who, I fear, may break it, this proves that I intend to break it! Finally, Mr. Byrnes makes much (pp. 288 f.) of the contention, allegedly derived from the Nuremberg documents, that Hitler decided to attack the USSR after Molotov had proposed in Berlin, November 12-13, 1940, a new regime for the Straits and a Soviet-Bulgarian mutual aid pact. "This was the decisive moment." In fact the Nuremberg documents show beyond question that the Nazi decision to invade the USSR was reached in August, 1940. Jodl and his staff officers were well advanced in planning the invasion when Molotov came to Berlin. These documents are public knowledge. Mr. Byrnes is a former Secretary of State. Therefore . . . ?

## Program

On the broader theme Mr. Byrnes is concerned with arguing three general propositions: (1) the deterioration of American-Soviet relations began *before* Roosevelt died and is therefore not attributable to President Truman or Mr. Byrnes; (2) there was not (or maybe there was—Mr. Byrnes is here confused) an

accord between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union on "spheres of influence" in Eastern Europe; (3) Germany must be restored as a bulwark against the Red Menace.

The first of these propositions is demonstrably false, on Mr. Byrnes' own evidence. The second lies at the very heart of the problem of American-Soviet relations since V-J day. The third is the Truman-Byrnes-Marshall prescription for World War III.

### **The Firmness of F.D.R.**

After Yalta President Roosevelt was disturbed, says Byrnes, by Soviet policy in Rumania and Poland and by Stalin's belief that Anglo-American parleys for the surrender of Kesselring's army in Italy involved terms permitting the transfer of German divisions to the Eastern Front and suggesting a "soft peace" for the Reich. Roosevelt expressed resentment at the "vile misrepresentations" of Stalin's informers. Stalin made a conciliatory reply. The incident was closed on April 11, 1945. F.D.R. invariably resolved such frictions satisfactorily because, unlike his successor, he wanted a settlement for peace and not occasions for conflict. On April 12, notes Mr. Byrnes, the President, an hour before he died, sent a message to Churchill, urging that the "Soviet problem" be minimized as much as possible "because these problems, in one form or another, seem to arise every day and most of them straighten out. . . . We must be firm, however, and our course thus far is correct." (p. 59)

Mr. Byrnes disproves his own point because he does not understand the course. Franklin D. Roosevelt's course was to treat the Soviet Union as an equal, to minimize frictions, and to adjust differences by discussion and compromise—all of which was diametrically opposite to the course of President Truman, who conferred with Leahy, Marshall, Patterson and Forrestal before meeting Molotov on his way to San Francisco. "It was not," says Byrnes cryptically (p. 61), "a very harmonious meeting and ended rather abruptly." To the work, thus meanly begun, of wrecking the wartime coalition, Byrnes added his labors in August of the year of victory, and intermittently thereafter.

### **Broken Bargain**

On the moot question of whether or not Washington, London and Moscow reached agreement, before or after Yalta, on "spheres of influence," Mr. Byrnes, all unwittingly, has performed

a real service (for those with eyes to see) in settling the issue. There was in fact an agreement that Eastern Europe and the Balkans north of Greece should be regarded as a Soviet security zone, while Western Europe, Italy and the Mediterranean, including Greece, were recognized by Moscow as part of the Anglo-American security zone. It is precisely the violation and repudiation of this understanding by Byrnes and Bevin which has driven the Big Three off the road of unity and toward the valley of disaster. In his rambling and confused recital of controversies over Poland, Bulgaria and Romania, Mr. Byrnes obscures realities. Yet, by happy accident, he has since let the cat out of the bag. On page 53 he wrote that Churchill and Eden in Moscow in October, 1944, reached an "informal understanding that, if the British found it necessary to take military action in Greece, the Soviets would not interfere. In return, the British would recognize the right of the Soviets to take the lead in maintaining order in Romania." When an anonymous "British Foreign Office spokesman" on October 16, 1947, declared that this statement was "incorrect," Mr. Byrnes was moved by a desire for self-justification to make a further revelation which demolishes the whole basis of his policy:

Evidently (he asserted, *New York Times*, October 18, 1947) the Foreign Office spokesman is not informed. My statement was based on a message from Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt, dated March 8, 1945, in the first paragraph of which, after deploring Soviet actions in Romania, Mr. Churchill said: "We have been hampered in our protests against these developments by the fact that, in order to have the freedom to save Greece, Eden and I at Moscow in October recognized that Russia should have a largely preponderant voice in Romania and Bulgaria while we took the lead in Greece. Stalin adhered very strictly to this understanding during the thirty days' fighting against the Communists and Elás in the city of Athens, in spite of the fact that all this was most disagreeable to him and those around him."

The question is thus answered. At no time did Moscow protest against or challenge the British action in Greece in 1944-45, shameful as that action was, as long as the Kremlin believed that London and Washington were reconciled to preponderant Soviet influence in the Balkans north of Greece. Yalta and Potsdam seemed to Moscow, and quite plausibly, to confirm this under-

standing. Byrnes and Bevin repudiated it in August, 1945. Washington and London have been seeking ever since (and thus far quite in vain) to challenge and destroy Soviet influence in the area they originally acknowledged to be part of the Soviet security zone. Moscow has retaliated and will continue to do so, since it regards the unity of Slavic Europe under Muscovite leadership as an indispensable condition of Soviet safety which in no way threatens British or American interests—as Roosevelt and, originally, Churchill conceded without question. The subsequent Byrnes-Bevin-Truman-Marshall program for ousting the USSR from Eastern Europe and the Balkans and reconstituting these communities as an anti-Soviet bulwark is a direct and open attack upon all the objectives for which the Soviet Union fought and won its war against the Axis.

## Deutschland Über Alles

Since it is now clear that this challenge has failed, that the Truman Doctrine is bankrupt, and that no effective counterweights to Soviet power can be established in Poland, Czechoslovakia or the Balkans, the little men in Washington have turned eagerly to an obvious alternative: the restoration of Germany (and prospectively Japan and China) as an anti-Soviet bastion. This is the meaning of the Marshall Plan. In supporting it, Mr. Byrnes arrives at his formula for World War III. He notes (pp. 26, 29, 86) that the USSR is committed to a German settlement whereby it will share in international control of the Ruhr and will be granted, as Roosevelt agreed at Yalta (at least as a basis for discussion), the equivalent of 10 billion dollars in reparations from Germany, out of a proposed total of 20 billions. This, says Mr. Byrnes, is intolerable. The USSR should abandon both demands, agree to the reunification of the Reich, and accept instead a 25-year or a 40-year treaty with the USA, pledging continued German disarmament and mutual aid against future German aggression. If Moscow doubts the efficacy of this arrangement and insists on its original proposals, it is guilty of delay, obstructionism, expansionism and wicked designs to promote chaos.

“My patience was exhausted,” writes the Secretary of State (p. 175) when Molotov insisted on 10 billions in reparations. At Stuttgart (September 6, 1946) Byrnes appealed to German nationalism by arguing for German unity and challenging the

new Polish-German frontier. Bevin and Churchill sent congratulations. Byrnes (pp. 192-3) held a secret parley in Paris with Churchill and Smuts to celebrate the new line on Germany. "The Stuttgart speech," notes Mr. Byrnes correctly (p. 194), "continues to represent American policy toward Germany."

Since Moscow will not agree and insists, sinfully, on Four-Power control of the Ruhr and 10 billions in reparation, what is to be done? Mr. Byrnes has a clear answer. "Wisdom and justice will prevent the United States from ever acceding to the Soviet demands either on the Ruhr or on reparations." Internationalization and socialization in the Reich are both unthinkable. America must therefore act—(read this carefully; it is not a misprint!)—to see that "*the control of German industries should be turned back to the owners*" (p. 195, my italics)—i.e., the private monopolists and carteleers who put Hitler in power and furnished the arsenal of the German war machine in World Wars I and II and, prospectively, III, despite Mr. Byrnes' enthusiasm for "disarmament." America should demand a peace conference on Germany early in 1948. If the USSR refuses to participate or to accept the Anglo-American terms, a separate German peace must be made with a German Government in the combined Western zones, providing for the evacuation of all German territory by foreign troops. If Moscow refuses to agree, then America must ask the U.N. Security Council to eject Soviet troops from Eastern Germany, since their continued presence "would constitute a threat to the peace of the world."

## War For Peace

America has "obligations" and "pledges" (apparently to Germany) that must be fulfilled. "We must be clear . . . that we are willing to adopt these measures of last resort if, for the peace of the world, we are forced to do so. . . . I hope, believe, and I pray that the leaders of the Soviet Union will never force us to this course of last resort. But they must learn what Hitler learned—that the world is not going to permit one nation to veto peace on earth (p. 203). . . . We must use our best efforts to develop better (atomic) bombs and more of them (p. 275). . . . Today there is no military strength in Europe to restrain the Russians. Only the power of the United Nations can do it. The United Nations must make known its determination to act to protect the threatened State. And the United States must make

known its determination to use all of its power to support the action of the United Nations." (p. 297)

For all Americans still in their right minds, no comment is called for on these propositions. They are, as the London *Times* put it on October 16, "little better than a simple recipe for war." Mr. Byrnes, observed the London *News Chronicle*, "has talked deplorable and dangerous nonsense." Wrote the London *Daily Mirror*: "Mr. Byrnes . . . is so frank as openly to advocate war with Russia. Is this wickedness, idiocy or a mixture of both?" Mr. Byrnes on October 22 expressed pained surprise at the notion that he had proposed using force to drive the Russians out of Germany, for he did not use the word "force" (only "measures of last resort"! ) and his reference to atomic bombs "appeared in another chapter of the book." Dmitri Manuilsky on October 18 said Byrnes is "asking for war against the Soviet Union." *Pravda* on the next day called his book "a direct appeal for war with the Soviet Union." Vyshinsky on October 22 concurred in the view that Byrnes' proposals were "a recipe for war" against the USSR.

## Final Judgment

These British and Soviet evaluations of Byrnes' book, and of the current American policy which Mr. Byrnes first formulated, are entirely correct. Never under any threat will the Soviet leaders and people abandon Eastern Germany and Slavic Europe to Anglo-American control and to inevitable future use as new bases of attack against the Soviet Union. The children of Mother Russia have thrice in a single generation heroically faced death against the assaults of the Kaiser's Reich, the Allied and American interventionists, and the Fascist Powers. To the last man, woman, and child, they will all face death again before they yield to such demands as Byrnes proposes. Since Mr. Byrnes, who is not stupid, must be presumed to know this, no other conclusion can be drawn but that he sincerely believes that the values he lives by and the interests he serves can best be promoted by an anti-Soviet war. Such a war, he must suppose, would be brief, cheap and merciful, with atomic bombs dispelling the Red Menace for all time. Such a war, of course, must be "defensive." Hence the formula of U.S. support of U.N. action to rescue Prussia from the Russians. Perhaps Mr. Byrnes should be reminded that every act of aggression by the late Nazi leaders

was also "defensive" in exactly this sense. At Nuremberg, wrote Henry L. Stimson (*Foreign Affairs*, January, 1947), was "affirmed the simple principle of peace—that the man who makes or plans aggressive war is a criminal. . . ."

Is Jimmy Byrnes—able, affable, well-meaning and earnest—no better than the mass murderers who died on the gallows? No American today could accept any such monstrous view. But acts of men are judged less by their motives than by their fruits. If Mr. Byrnes' advice is taken, the most hideous of Nazi atrocities will pale before the infernal spectacle of scores of millions of human beings perishing in agony by fire and poison. No courts will remain, however, to try the culprits, since courts are products of civilization. All civilization as we know it will crumble into radio-active dust and rubble if Mr. Byrnes has his way. The war he dreams of cannot be won by either side. Russians don't surrender. Russians also have atomic physicists and big industry. This war means the end of our culture. It was Mr. Byrnes himself who once said: "There must be one world for all of us, or there will be no world for any of us."

Mr. Byrnes is not a vicious man. Neither were Keitel, Frick, Papan, Jodl or Neurath. Mr. Byrnes wants peace. Mr. Byrnes wants Soviet surrender without war. The special skill of Mr. Byrnes' private devil (who knows full well what the road to damnation is paved with, and who also administers to the needs of many other public figures) is that he leaves his victim a perfectly moral and patriotic Christian, who is merely mistaken in his political and military judgments. The offense is so small as to seem inconsequential. But its consequences in the atomic age may well be the murder of most of the human race. . . .

Is America still capable of a return to sanity? The answer, perhaps mercifully, is still unclear. Only this is clear: if the American people lack the wit and will to recapture the vision of Franklin D. Roosevelt and Wendell Willkie, and to give new life to such hopes as are voiced by Henry A. Wallace, Glen Taylor, Claude Pepper and Wayne Morse, they will have made a covenant with hell and a pact with death. The measure of their ignorance, incapacity and devilry is the fact that saintly Jimmy Byrnes is now the best advocate of Satan. The measure of their wisdom, resolve and righteousness remains to be taken. Who then shall be his brother's keeper?



*Soviet Russia Today* is the only American monthly magazine exclusively devoted to news and comment on the Soviet Union. Containing articles by outstanding authorities in their fields, attractively illustrated, *Soviet Russia Today* is *must* reading for the well informed. Subscription \$1.50 a year, \$2.50 for two years (Canada and abroad, \$2.00 a year; \$3.00 for two years). Write to: *Soviet Russia Today*, 114 E. 32nd Street, New York 16, N. Y.