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1-1-1946

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Recommended Citation

Petran, Tabitha, "Open secret: Reports on the betrayal of Roosevelt's peace policy and American preparations for World War III" (1946). *PRISM: Political & Rights Issues & Social Movements*. 295. <https://stars.library.ucf.edu/prism/295>

Open Secret

***Reports on the Betrayal of
Roosevelt's Peace Policy
and American Preparations
for World War III***

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A Publication of
THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO WIN THE PEACE
1309 14th Street, N. W. Washington 9, D. C.

Price: 5 cents

National Committee to Win the Peace July, 1946

Drawings by Charles Rowe

Introduction

We in the United States are a democratic and a peaceful people. Certainly the last thing most of us want to do is to wage war. This undisputed fact gives truth to that favorite cliché of our editorial writers that the American people are lacking in any aggressive intent. Too often, however, the warmakers use just such truths to cloak their own activities until they have succeeded in stepping into positions of command and control.

The following pages document, from material published by reputable correspondents, the process by which relatively small but very powerful forces are taking command in our own country, and preparing the American people to accept another World War.

The Military Clique and the War Party

SECRETARY OF COMMERCE HENRY WALLACE, SPEAKING ON APRIL 12, 1946, at a PAC dinner to honor the late President Roosevelt, warned of the "desperate efforts of a small military clique" to bring about war with Russia.

On March 24th, John J. O'Neill, science editor of the New York *Herald Tribune*, wrote of "the actions . . . staged by the Washington military clique mostly through stooges in and out of Congress." He said: "Every possible step toward making atomic energy available for human welfare applications has been completely and ruthlessly suppressed by the military clique. *Every action that has been taken, including the control bills, is pointed in the direction of war making.*" (Italics ours).

O'Neill continues: "A farcical bit of diplomatic buffoonery is being staged to provide apparent justification for a military control coup—

a spy scare in Canada so ludicrous that it is a laugh to all but the most gullible, and an Iran situation that is being decked with all the melodramatic panoply available to the state departments. . . .

"To a scientist it is difficult to imagine anything more idiotic than diplomats threatening an atomic-energy war to monopolize the oil supply of one country when the proper development of atomic energy for welfare purposes will make oil for power uses as antediluvian as the catapult."

The Washington columnists, Joseph and Stuart Alsop, in the New York *Herald Tribune* of March 18th, under the headline: U. S. POSSESSION OF NEW WEAPONS SEEN UNDERLYING FOREIGN POLICY, wrote that the new line in American foreign policy, the so-called get-tough-with-Russia policy, is the direct result of the new weapons the U.S. has developed. They painted a terrifying picture of those weapons, and said American experts were inclined to suspect the Soviet High Command has not recognized the implications of the new weapons.

In a highly significant paragraph, the Alsops, who are known to have excellent sources among top American policy-makers, wrote: "Sooner or later, however, the existence of the new weapons will make it necessary to find out whether Russian policy can be radically changed."

In other words if scaring the Russians doesn't work, the "new" weapons must be used.

The Constitution

Another significant paragraph reports that some generals are worried by the fact that "the American Constitution virtually requires this country to accept a surprise attack before girding itself for war."

Since at the present time and in the foreseeable future no country in the world is in a position to launch a surprise attack on the U. S., the statement clearly suggests that some of the military are beginning to chafe at the bit—the bit being the American Constitution, which leaves the decision of war or peace up to elected civilian authorities and not to the military.

Johannes Steel, in a broadcast March 18, 1946, interpreted the

Alsops' dispatch to mean that "we must be in a position to use the atomic bomb as a surprise weapon without Constitutional restraints." He described the "war party" as including "various elements, secular and otherwise, in the Army, Navy, finance and international cartels," and said that it "wields tremendous pressures" and by a "terrific barrage of radio and newspaper propaganda" has "made an ally of six months ago almost appear an enemy."

These tremendous pressures, apparently tending toward an atom war on the Soviet Union or the threat of one, were sufficiently serious for Walter Lippmann, New York *Herald Tribune* columnist, to warn publicly that such an attack could not succeed.

Lippmann wrote just before his recent trip to Europe: "No atomic bombardment could destroy the Red Army; it could destroy only the industrial means of supplying it. The Russian defense to atomic attack is, therefore, self-evident; it is to over-run continental Europe with infantry, and defy us to drop atomic bombs on Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Switzerland, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden. The more we threaten to demolish Russian cities, the more obvious it is that the Russian defense would be to ensconce themselves in Europe and cities which we could not demolish without massacring hundreds of thousands of our own friends."

Drew Pearson, in his column in the New York *Daily Mirror*, March 29, 1946, indicated that the military were waiting for some pretext to use the atom bomb on the Soviet Union. He wrote:

"The Russian situation was so tense just before Stalin started pulling his troops out of Iran that U. S. military men seriously discussed bombing Russian oil fields—if the Red Army started an aggressive move on Turkey. President Truman opposes using the atom bomb, but military strategists figured long-range bombers, by knocking out Russian oil, would paralyze the Red Army—if it started to march against Turkey or the Dardanelles."

The implication of the foregoing statements seems to be that the military now considers that it has a weapon it can and should be able to use without consulting the American people. According to Blair Bolles in *PM*, February 23, 1946, Drew Pearson has acquired Admiral Leahy as a source: "Leahy also feeds the anti-Russian feeling that is sweeping the country by the discreet use of columnists. . . . Pearson

. . . is passing on the wild fears of Leahy to his millions of readers, who knowing Pearson as a liberal-minded friend of Russia in the past, naturally think Pearson has reason to change his mind, although he has simply changed his source. . . . What strikes Leahy as aggression appears to moderates as simple readjustment by Russia in view of the lessons she has learned by her experience in World War II." The Pearson report, if reflecting the temper of Admiral Leahy and the military, appears to be also in the nature of a trial balloon.

The "Crisis"

The Pearson report quoted above refers to the "tenseness" of the situation and uses the term "Iranian crisis."

William L. Shirer in the New York *Herald Tribune*, April 14, 1946, summarized some of the evidence that this "crisis" was an Anglo-American fabrication and pointed to the real meaning of the Iranian affair. He said:

"About a month ago there appeared in the press two dispatches whose significance in shedding light on the struggle between the Anglo-American powers and Russia in the Security Council can only now be appreciated. One was from Washington; the other curiously enough, came from Berlin.

"From Washington on March 15th the brothers Alsop, two of our keenest Washington correspondents, reported that 'among American policy makers there is only one reason why ultimate war is not expected.' The reason was, they said, that to stop the Russians we would precipitate 'the most violent kind of crisis.'

". . . the Alsops received confirmation six days later, on March 21st, from an unusual source. Tacked on to the end of a long dispatch from Berlin by C. L. Sulzberger of The New York *Times* about a reduction in the size of the Red Army of occupation in Germany were two interesting paragraphs about a totally different subject. They were especially interesting if one kept in mind that Correspondent Sulzberger undoubtedly enjoyed the confidence of American diplomats in the German capital.

"'Certain diplomats,' he cabled on March 21st, 'believe that this crisis (the flare-up over Iran) may have been deliberately seized upon

by the United States government to crystallize public opinion and strengthen the American hand in dickering about to be resumed at the meeting of the United Nations organization.

“‘According to these observers,’ Mr. Sulzberger went on, ‘the momentum of pro-Soviet feeling worked up during the war to support the Grand Alliance had continued too heavily after the armistice. This made it difficult for the Administration to carry out the stiffer diplomatic policy required now. For this reason, these observers believe, a campaign was worked up to attain a better psychological balance of public opinion to permit the Government to adopt a harder line.’”



Shirer continued: “So a campaign was worked up then to make the American people less pro-Russian? A violent kind of crisis was deliberately planned to stop the Soviets? . . .

“There seems to be no doubt that when James F. Byrnes, Secretary of State, was last in Moscow he made every effort to be accommodating to the Soviets. A man to whom compromise comes naturally, both because of his nature and his long experience in Congress, he believed compromise with a new Russia, which was flexing its great muscles after the victory, was both possible and desirable. And he made some compromises in Moscow.

“Whether they were good or bad only time will show. But the fact is that when he returned to Washington he suddenly found himself in a most uncomfortable situation. From the White House down, the new line was: get tough with the Russians and stop them. He was severely taken to task from all sides for having ‘given in’ to the Soviets in Moscow. I do not think it is inaccurate to say that he was

given to know that unless he immediately adopted a 'firm line' he would be replaced by some one who would. . . .

" . . . It soon became obvious that some sort of crisis was in the making. The announcement on the night of March 12th by the State Department that Soviet troops in Iran were moving west toward Turkey and Iraq still remains something of a mystery to this day. Could the oldest Washington correspondent remember when the State Department had ever before called them in at 8:00 P. M. to give them news of the movement of foreign troops in a far away land? Had it done so when Hitler's troops marched into the Rhineland? Into Austria? Into Czechoslovakia?

"And whatever happened to those 'heavy' Soviet columns emblazoned in scare headlines across the front pages of our newspapers? The State Department never said . . . no more word was ever forthcoming from the department about the progress of the Red Troops. Did they turn back? Did they get lost in the snowdrifts? We were never told. But the frightening headlines had achieved a purpose."

The Ultimatum to Byrnes

On December 30, 1945, the Alsop brothers could write in an analysis of the Truman administration that "matters of foreign policy to be sure are left wholly to Mr. Byrnes," but this was not long to be the case.

Subsequent events support Shirer's thesis that upon Byrnes' return from Moscow, where he had secured agreement with the Russians on several vital points, he received an ultimatum from Admiral Leahy and the President that he pursue the get-tough-with-Russia policy or get out.

Early in March the Washington columnist, Constantine Brown, the newspaperman closest to Admiral Leahy, reported that Byrnes might resign to be replaced by General Marshall. The press was full of attacks on Byrnes. He was painted as following a line of "Munich appeasement" towards the USSR, and it was predicted he would be replaced by a "tougher" man.

The Alsop brothers reported that these attacks upon Byrnes emanated from Leahy's office. They wrote that whereas Stettinius had been

amenable to Leahy's influence, Byrnes had not been. Leahy, on March 16th, broke his habit of not talking to the press to deny this report to Bert Andrews of the New York *Herald Tribune*. The President also denied the rift. Following these denials, however, there came a drastic about-face in Byrnes' policy, indicating that Byrnes must have decided to give in to the ultimatum to "get tough." Instead of postponing the Iranian question (which only Hearst could describe as endangering world peace) for a mere two weeks, he fanned the flames of an international crisis.

His "tough" stand, which widened the rift between the U. S. and the USSR, caused Arthur Krock to write in the New York *Times* on April 7th, that Byrnes had achieved "a new stature in Washington. . . . He has shown he can be firm." On April 6th the Alsops reported that Byrnes had won "a new type of support—Vandenberg's."

On April 14th, *AP* correspondent John M. Hightower reported from Washington that "*officials describe Secretary of State Byrnes as willing to risk the worst split yet in Anglo-American-Russian unity—even to foredoom the Paris meeting to failure—rather than go anything like all the way to meet Russian demands.*" (Italics ours).

Role of Admiral Leahy

Those who heard Winston Churchill call for an alliance of Christian peoples at Fulton, Missouri, might have recalled that on June 5, 1945, at Mount Vernon, Iowa, Admiral Leahy spoke in similar vein declaring that permanent peace could be achieved only if "civilized Christian peoples should at the end of this war enter into a solemn agreement to join forces at once in war against any nation that may in the future violate the sovereignty or the territory of any nation."

The influence Admiral Leahy exercises on American policy is known to most informed newspapermen but not to the American public. Here is the testimony of some reputable correspondents:

Marquis Childs, in the New York *Post*, March 8, 1946: "Of all the men in Truman's oddly assorted inner circle, no one has more influence, and at the same time is less known to the public than Admiral Leahy. . . . The President has come to lean heavily on this counselor. There is no doubt that he has recently played an important part in

persuading the President of the need to take a firm stand towards the Soviet.”

Leland Stowe, in the *New York Post*, March 23, 1946: “There are impressive indications that Mr. Truman pays particular attention on questions of international politics to the advice of Admiral Leahy. . . .”

Stowe described Leahy as “mysterious, the least known of Washington officials.” He added: “It can be a dangerous precedent for a career military man to act behind the scenes as a key adviser to the President on foreign policy. Certainly it is not in the American tradition.”



William Player and Charles Van Devander in the *New York Post*, March 12, 1946, said: “Now that Truman has succeeded to the Presidency and a host of international politics new to him, Leahy has branched out to become an adviser on world politics as well as on military and naval matters. His chief complaint against Byrnes is understood to be that the latter has not been ‘firm’ enough in dealing with Soviet Russia.”

Leahy, President Roosevelt’s Ambassador to Vichy, was a firm partisan of Marshal Petain, and is a declared enemy of all the progressive movements of Europe which he labelled “bolshevism” pure and simple. Roosevelt’s early attitudes in French policy, his underestimation of the French underground and the De Gaulle movement, can be traced in large part to Leahy.

Leahy’s influence on Truman is infinitely greater than on Roosevelt. Truman—who has frequently confessed his lack of knowledge of world affairs and whose general orientation is revealed in his state-

ment on the occasion of the Nazi attack on the USSR in 1941 that we should help the Soviets if the Nazis were winning and the Nazis if the Soviets were winning, in the pious hope that they would destroy each other,—is letting Leahy make policy.

On March 11, 1946, *ONA* correspondent Malcolm Hobbs reported from Washington: "Ascendancy of the military to a position where it virtually controls American foreign policy is becoming an established fact. It is conceded here that international matters are getting direct treatment from the White House. Increasingly, international decisions are being made in which the State Department is 'consulted' after the fact. . . . Truman has become, in fact, his own Secretary of State, perhaps to an even greater degree than was Roosevelt. This means that Leahy, a military man, is exercising greater control over foreign policy than is the civilian Byrnes."

On March 29th, Bert Andrews reported in the *New York Herald Tribune* that the policy Byrnes was pursuing about Iran had been determined in consultation with the military.

National Intelligence Authority

It is not only directly through Admiral Leahy that the military are assuming "virtual control" over American foreign policy.

The Alsop brothers reported in the *New York Herald Tribune*, March 1, 1946: "Policy is based on fact, and the man who selects and prepares the facts for the highest authority cannot avoid making policy. In the light of these ancient axioms, it is singularly interesting that Rear Admiral Souers, Director of the new Central Intelligence Agency, now has the task of preparing the President's daily summary of the world situation. Souers, who is an old Truman friend, a fellow Missourian, and the President's personal choice for the directorship of the Central Intelligence Agency, must now be regarded as possessing a major potential influence on American foreign policy.

"The daily summary which is the only paper on the subject of the world situation that Truman reads every day (italics ours), is drafted by Souers' staff of nine young officers, recruited equally from the ground, air and naval forces and six men seconded from the State Department. Souers takes the summary to the White House every

afternoon after luncheon and generally presents it personally to the President. . . .”

The Alsops comment that the “significance of this novel plan adopted by the President should not be minimized. One obvious meaning in view of the composition of Souers’ staff is that the opinion of the service departments on the world situation will be more regularly, if indirectly, transmitted to the President. The importance of the larger voice given the War and Navy Departments was recognized by the State Department which originally had only three men attached to Souers’ staff and insisted that its representation be increased to six. Even so the representatives of the service departments remain in the majority.”



The Alsops, noting Truman’s “increased interest” in foreign affairs, said that the creation of Souers’ staff indicated that the President will intervene to a greater extent in foreign policy and reported his intervention to oppose the State Department’s proposed recognition of Bulgaria and Rumania.

On June 7th, President Truman appointed Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, nephew of Senator Arthur Vandenberg, to succeed Rear Admiral Souers who resigned to return to his banking and insurance enterprises in St. Louis. Lt. Gen. Vandenberg was formerly Assistant Chief of Staff in the War Department and head of Army Intelligence.

Infiltration of Military into Diplomatic Corps

Several of the most important posts in the diplomatic service today are held by military men, all of them good friends of Admiral Leahy.

As presidential envoy to China, General Marshall holds the key position in an area of the world where Soviet and American interests meet each other face to face.

Gen. Walter Bedell Smith—by special legislation—is permitted to retain his military status while acting as U. S. Ambassador to Moscow. In Frankfort, on his way to Moscow, Gen. Smith was quoted as saying there “was a great feeling of doubt” among the American people as to “what the Russians want and what the Russian motives are.”

Vice Admiral Alan G. Kirk is the recently appointed Ambassador to Belgium and Minister to Luxembourg.

A Major General has been introduced into the State Department with the appointment of Major General John H. Hildring as Assistant Secretary of State.

Military Super-Cabinet

The military gained a most strategic foothold when President Truman announced the appointment of a council of “elder statesmen” made up of five generals and five admirals, including Leahy. This “council” received scant attention in the nation’s press, although its appointment is an unprecedented move in a democracy in peacetime. Such military *camarillas* have been common in the governments of kings and emperors, but are completely contrary to American tradition and practice. One wonders what Clemenceau, who thought war too important a matter to be left to the generals, would think of the increasing power the American generals are winning in the peace. In the *ONA* dispatch quoted above, it is interesting that Hobbs predicted that such a council would be set up and said it “would be charged with significant duties in the foreign policy field.”

“Department of National Defense”

Early in June 1946, President Truman put forward a plan to combine the Army, Navy and Air Forces into one Department with one Secretary of National Defense and three subordinate secretaries for the Army, Navy and Air. Radio commentator Frank Kingdon commented on this proposal June 17th: “The plan proposed by Pres-

ident Truman does safeguard the important first thing—the President remains the Commander-in-Chief and the budget is under the control of Congress. So far so good. The fact remains, however, that the proposed Department of National Defense would be the most powerful single department we have ever had in our government. It would overshadow every other department. In case of war, it would take over the entire country. In addition to these characteristics, it is the department which would be in possession of the atomic bomb. The outcome of the creation of such a department will be that it will be the core of the government and all other departments will be subordinate to it. We shall be in fact a military government.”

Since Roosevelt

AS LONG AS PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT HELD THE REINS OF COMMAND, BIG Three unity was assured.

He was dead two weeks when the first session of the United Nations opened at San Francisco, April 25, 1945. There the first split among the Big Three became visible when the U. S. and Great Britain insisted—over the opposition of the Soviet Union—on welcoming Fascist Argentina into the peace organization of the victorious powers.

As hostilities drew to a close in Europe, the rift between Russia and the west widened when, under British pressure, we broke a pledge made at Yalta with respect to the occupation of Germany. As Ralph Ingersoll reports in TOP SECRET: “We had agreed at Yalta to turn over the Russian sphere in Germany as soon as hostilities were over. Instead, on Churchill’s personal persuasion, we rattled a saber at the Russians across the Elbe for months before we went back to our territory with all the grace of a grudging giver.” The breach grew wider as the U. S. embarked on a policy of a double standard in world affairs, whereby what the Russians did in Europe was our business, while what we did in Asia was none of theirs.

The conference of Big Four foreign ministers in London, which followed after the San Francisco meeting, produced an absolute deadlock.

On Thanksgiving Day, 1945, Secretary of State Byrnes decided, on

his own initiative, to break the deadlock. He suggested a conference of Big Three foreign ministers in Moscow, only a few days after President Truman had declared that there would be no more such gatherings.

The Russians accepted his proposal at once. Great Britain was reluctant, but could not very well publicly oppose an attempt to reconstitute Big Three unity. Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin accepted too.



The Moscow Conference was a success, since Byrnes at that time followed a clearly-conceived give-and-take policy, making concessions to the Russians in the Balkans where American interests are not at stake and winning concessions from the Russians in China where American interests are considered strong. In both areas—the Balkans as well as China—the former *status quo* of the British Empire, it is true, suffered.

British "Vacationer"

The Moscow Conference opened on December 16, 1945. Three days later, when London must have been informed what strategy Mr. Byrnes was following in Moscow, the first British counter-move was announced in the form of the most innocent news.

On December 19th, from London, the *New York Times* reported on its front page that Winston Churchill would soon arrive in the U. S. to spend a "vacation" in Florida.

Churchill's "vacation," as events ultimately proved, was timed to try to thwart an American-Russian understanding and to attempt to steer American policy to an alignment with Britain against Russia.

Meanwhile, in the U. S. itself groups were flexing their muscles because of the atom bomb. The stockpiles of the bomb were growing. The American President was loudly proclaiming America's determination to increase still further its already supreme military power, and scarcely bothered to veil his hostility to the Soviet Union. Successfully maneuvering for greater control on the domestic scene was American big business which is strongly opposed to the Soviet Union on a class basis. A continual anti-Soviet hysteria was being fomented by big business' control of the press and radio, and by other groups such as the National Catholic Welfare Conference, exiled Poles and Yugoslavs, a faction in the Federation of Churches, the Vandenberg Republicans, former isolationists, and the British government itself.

Meanwhile Byrnes had returned from Moscow to be vociferously attacked from all sides.

Winston Churchill arrived in the United States on January 14, 1946.



Churchill conferred with President Truman; Byrnes and Baruch went down to Florida to see the British "vacationer." Eventually Truman travelled with Churchill for almost twenty-four hours to sit on the platform at Westminster College, at Fulton, Missouri, to hear the British crusader suggest an Anglo-American "fraternal association," or, as one publication phrased it, "an Anglo-American alliance against Russia."

Despite subsequent denials there is persistent belief that Churchill's speech was discussed in detail with Truman and Leahy, Byrnes and Baruch. In the light of this belief, Truman's presence on the platform

at Fulton meant just what it seemed to mean—approval of the Churchill proposal.

Marquis Childs in the *New York Post*, March 8th, wrote: "The President went over the text of Winston Churchill's Fulton, Missouri, speech before it was delivered. The two men discussed in considerable detail the history-making address."

Malcolm Hobbs wrote in an *ONA* dispatch from Washington: "The most successful expression yet of the military viewpoint in our relations with other countries came with the Churchill speech in Missouri. Truman's introduction of Churchill is being widely accepted as endorsement. Circles close to Admiral Leahy have been openly gleeful about this development."

It is evident that Churchill's war-like speech and President Truman's widely credited endorsement of it had as their purpose to test public opinion if not to arouse it.

The trial balloon to test public opinion collapsed on this first flight. Clement Attlee, British Prime Minister, finally disavowed Churchill's speech—just as Truman did. But it was only after public opinion had reacted violently against the speech that both of them declared they had had nothing to do with the talk of a "private citizen."

Anglo-American "Fraternal Association"

Byrnes, as developments following his return from Moscow indicate, had understood he had to join the Fulton camp or quit. He stayed. It was Byrnes who followed up the failure of the Churchill speech with the Iranian "crisis." The "Iranian crisis" was designed to accomplish what Churchill had failed to do—to re-orient the American people against the Soviet Union so that Churchill's Anglo-American "fraternal association" could be realized.

As early as March 5th, the Alsop brothers revealed just how this first lesson of "political education" was to be managed when they reported that American policy makers had accepted the eventuality of a break with the Soviet Union and were determined that, when the break came, "The major issue will be the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the United Nations."

So the Iranian crisis was staged. Events were to prove that the

Soviet Union had been seeking, and finally attained, a friendly agreement with Iran—an agreement which with or without the presence of Soviet troops was far more advantageous for Iran than any that “small nation” had ever made with other foreign powers, including Britain and the U. S. This is made indisputably clear by I. F. Stone in *PM*. The break with the Soviet Union did not materialize. But to a large measure the “crisis” served the purpose for which it had been apparently designed. A dispatch from London by C. L. Sulzberger in the *New York Times*, April 17, 1946, said of the coming Paris conference:

“There is a good deal of preliminary bluff evident on both sides. But what is more important in the pre-conference line-up is the vastly altered status of public opinion in the Western democracies which is bound to strengthen the hand of the Byrnes-Bevin team. . . . There are many diplomats who believe this change was deliberately engineered by some effective maneuvering by the Administration in Washington. *The momentum of the pro-Soviet feeling, carefully engendered and built up during the war—which carried on through Potsdam and Moscow Conferences—has been halted and replaced.*” (Italics ours).

So Secretary Byrnes went to the first Paris Conference, apparently not with any intention or purpose of coming to an agreement with the Soviet Union but, as reported by Malcolm Hobbs to the *Overseas News Agency*, April 23rd, resolved that “all Soviet demands must be opposed adamantly.”

“Mr. Byrnes has been frank to say,” Hobbs reported, “that he believes world peace to be in great peril and that differences between the eastern and western powers are so fundamental that the Paris meeting is doomed to failure. . . . Mr. Byrnes coupled these remarks with strongly worded pleas for the continuation of the draft and the preservation of a large well-equipped American army. He believes that American foreign policy cannot function without the military power to back it up. His attitude must be said to be typical of . . . the growing frame of mind that holds that another war is inevitable. That view is particularly noticeable in the White House and the War Department.”

Thus doomed in advance, the first Paris Conference of Big Four Foreign Ministers resulted in a deadlock. The American press heaped

the blame on the Soviet Union, and any reporter or observer who found the facts otherwise, had difficulty in being heard.

On the eve of the second Paris Conference, Howard K. Smith, News Director of the Columbia Broadcasting System in Europe and its correspondent in London, reported to his home office on June 16th that the British Broadcasting Corporation had refused to allow him to broadcast a commentary in which he took the position that Russia alone was not responsible for the failure of the Foreign Ministers to write a European peace treaty.

Bert Andrews, Washington correspondent of the *New York Herald Tribune*, wrote in that paper, June 2nd, that President Truman, Secretary Byrnes and Senator Vandenberg having agreed on a "firm" policy towards Russia "wish others saw eye to eye with them. They wish in particular that Senator Claude Pepper, Democrat of Florida, and Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace would go along with the policy. Go along or keep quiet."

Regimentation of Public Opinion

William L. Shirer commented on this report in the *Herald Tribune* a week later. He said, June 9th: "For if Mr. Andrews' report is correct—and he is one of the most responsible reporters in the nation's capital—what the President and the Secretary of State and the Republican Senator from Michigan are proposing is a regimentation of public opinion on foreign policy such as has never been asked for by the heads of government in our history or in that of modern England, even in war time. It is even worse than that, for the Andrews' dispatch makes clear that our makers of foreign policy would like the dissenters in the Senate—especially Senator Pepper—to give up their constitutional rights to air their criticism of government policy on the floor of the Upper House."

Apparently designed to further this effort at "a regimentation of public opinion on foreign policy" was the act of G-2 of the War Department in mid-June, stopping the sending to newsmen of copies of daily radio broadcasts picked up by government monitors. Radio commentator Sidney Walton who reported this, pointed out that it deprived "the American press and radio of a valuable source of information from abroad."

Some few reports which were not cast into the Truman-Byrnes-Vandenberg-John Foster Dulles mould, reached here from abroad.

U. S. and Britain Responsible

David Schonebrun, reporting from Paris for the *Overseas News Agency*, May 13th, said: "French observers hold that Britain and the United States are responsible for the deadlock in the deliberations of the Council of Foreign Ministers, and not Russia . . . the French believe that Russia showed at the outset of the meeting a willingness to cooperate whereas the Anglo-American powers refused to engage in compromises. . . . It appears that the British and Americans have never had any intention of reaching major decisions at this meeting, some observers say. The French observer is experienced and responsible and could more readily be accused, on his record, of anti-Russian than of pro-Russian sentiments. However, he believes that the conference record should be kept straight, as regards who did what and why."

Howard K. Smith in a broadcast from London, June 16th, for the Columbia Broadcasting System, said this: "To a reporter on the spot in Europe the impression is inevitable that there are powerful circles who are not interested in agreement with Russia. They have not even allowed circumstances just to drift—they are engaged in an active, feverish campaign to prevent agreement and they are winning.

"You get this impression here in London in the House of Commons where the Tories, the men who own 75 percent of Britain's substance and wield its mighty influence, are openly jubilant at every indication of great power dissension which Foreign Minister Bevin reveals. You get this impression from the American slick paper magazines and the scare press which has repeatedly tried to bury agreement before it is dead.

"After a year of frenzied campaign these influential circles in both countries are succeeding in their aim. By continual pounding they have built up a set of completely false notions in the public mind—all notions tending to make the public think that agreement is impossible.

"For example, if a Gallup Poll were taken on the question: What

nation has been the sole obstacle to a unified administration of Germany, it is beyond doubt that 90 percent of the public would answer Russia. If you like to play quiz games with your friends, try that on one of them.

"The true answer is France. In fact, Russia and America have been the most urgent backers of unification in Germany. . . .



"Our anti-agreement press has built up the impression that Russia is being 'unreasonable' and 'stubborn' on European settlement. In actuality, Russia has been a comparatively good boy in this respect. Our relations are based on two fundamental pacts. One is our most solemn agreement not to sign a separate peace with the enemy. The Russians have never threatened to break it. From our side there have been repeated threats to break this agreement. Mr. Bevin made the latest threat to do so at the Labor Party Conference here in England this week.

"The other basic treaty is the Potsdam accord, signed by all three of us. There is no doubt that Russia has made an earnest effort to live up to it and has succeeded. America broke the agreement outright, last week, by refusing to continue dismantling Nazi factories to be delivered as reparations. The promise to de-Nazify our various zones in Germany is an essential part of the Potsdam agreement. Russia has done a pretty thorough job. Meanwhile, particularly the British zone of Germany continues to be shot through with Nazis in high administrative positions and the British do not deny it."

Smith pointed out that the Russians had dropped their demand (which Smith termed "absurd"), for a part control of a former Ital-

ian colony on the Mediterranean where "Britain is jealous of other powers gaining footholds inside her 'iron curtain.'"

"Still," Smith added, "the news magazines have not brought out the parallel absurdity of our claim to share control of the Danube River in Russia's sphere of interest. The Russians want the Danube controlled by a commission of the countries who live on and by the Danube. America is 8,000 miles from the Danube, Britain is 2,000 miles from it. If we insist on our claim for control we must be fair and logical and offer the Russians control of the St. Lawrence and the Amazon. . . .

Compromise is Possible

"In fact, there is no single point of difference which is not capable of compromise if fairness of approach, breadth of vision and patience and goodwill prevail. . . .

"The background facts of the state of international affairs today are not complicated. They are only made to seem so. The facts are these:—There is still no effective international body of law protecting countries from aggression. We have only begun to try and build an international law against aggression in UNO.

"Until it becomes completely effective the great nations will continue to demand security on their borders. They will continue to stake off areas where no other great power may have a foothold and where no hostile government could be set up.

"We proclaimed such a zone in the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 and it was a wise act. Britain has done it through the centuries in building up what she calls an Empire. Russia is now rather belatedly demanding a similar consideration for her security in eastern Europe.

"Russia can make out a rather good case for her sphere in eastern Europe. America has never been invaded from North or South America. Russia has twice in thirty years suffered unprovoked invasions from eastern Europe. In those two unprovoked invasions Russia has lost 15 times as many of her sons killed as America and Britain together have lost in two world wars. Russia has suffered a thousand times as much damage as we have to her material pieces of livelihood, her factories, her agriculture. It would be foolhardy of Russia not

to demand security in eastern Europe after brutal lessons like that.

"It is in fact in our interest that Russia get security. World peace would be impossible if she does not. The scare press tells us that Russia wants this extension of her influence not for self-protection but for aggression. *No material evidence to that contention has ever been produced.* (Italics ours.)

"In fact, America has proved herself considerably more aggressive than Russia since the war. As a result of the war Russia has extended her influence to 12 new nations. As a result of the war, America has extended ours and our troops to 56 new nations, and islands, entities of strategy for defense or offense. Russia's farthest new bases are within 600 miles of her frontiers. America's are five, six and seven thousand miles from our borders. . . ."

Smith warned that if the Foreign Ministers' meeting in Paris fails, "future history will stamp them next to the giants of Yalta as the pygmies of Paris."


Atom Bomb Diplomacy

SENATOR CLAUDE PEPPER IN A MAJOR FOREIGN POLICY SPEECH IN THE Senate, March 20, 1946, called on the U. S. to "destroy every atomic bomb we have and smash every facility we possess which is capable of producing only destructive forms of atomic energy. Of course, we should have stopped the whole atomic bomb production on V-J Day. Our failure to do so has not only precipitated suspicion and ill will, and many of the acts of provocation now being committed in the world, but a desperate atomic bomb race among the major powers is already on the way."

Raymond Swing, whose Friday night talks on atomic energy over a nationwide network have won him the status of an authority, declared in a broadcast, January 18, 1946: "We are already the strongest military nation. We do not need the atom bomb to pull our weight in the world. But we continue to manufacture it. And we manufacture it under a secrecy which must be called sinister because of the stress put on secrecy in this country and the effect it has on our international relations."

The struggle for control of atomic energy and for the decisive voice in determining the uses to which it will be put reflects the basic struggle in the U. S. today between the warmakers and the peace-makers.

The original bid by the military for outright and complete control of atomic energy put forward in the May-Johnson bill was defeated. But the legislation for domestic control by civilian authorities proposed many months ago by the McMahon Committee has yet to be passed, and is still being tampered with in an effort to increase military representation on the proposed control commission. The bill itself calls for the continued production of atomic weapons "in such amounts as the President may annually determine."



Meanwhile the Army continues to produce atom bombs, and the American people do not know how many bombs are being made, or where they are or for what purposes they are being manufactured. Yet the American Constitution provides that the people, through their elected representatives, control the size, purposes and uses of the armed forces. The atom bombs are as much a branch of the armed forces as the Army, the Navy, the air force.

The first proposals for international control of atomic energy were advanced in the Acheson-Lilienthal report. The introduction to this report insisted on the continued manufacture of the bomb, while the body of the report was silent on this question. The report, said Raymond Swing in a broadcast, April 5th, "is not enough to outweigh our exclusive possession of the atomic bomb and the manifest inten-

tion of using it in event of war if this international control is not achieved."

Our Own Brutality

"We appear," Swing continued, "to the outside world as a nation committed to the most brutal means of waging war at the same time that we are trying to build up a world organization to curb our own brutality and that of any other country. . . . There is no justification for our continued manufacture of the atomic bombs."

I. F. Stone, writing in *The Nation*, April 13, 1946, underlines one great weakness of the Acheson-Lilienthal report: "We are asking other nations to hand over control of their uranium deposits well in advance of our handing over the secret of the atomic bomb to the new international authority."

Another highly significant aspect of the Acheson report was brought out by the Alsop brothers in their *Herald Tribune* column, March 31st.

They wrote: "The purpose of the report was to make it as painless as possible for the Soviet rulers to accomplish the immense change from a nationalist to a 'one world' policy, with the sacrifices of sovereignty, lifting the iron curtain and other tremendous new steps which that would entail. American public opinion was a consideration almost as important as the desirability of securing Soviet acceptances. For the possibility—indeed the probability—that the Soviets would not accept had always to be borne in mind. Those who had prepared the Acheson Committee report believed that offering the Soviets the most generous arrangements consistent with national safety was the best way to unite American opinion in the terrible situation that would be created by Soviet rejection.

"Unity in this country will not be achieved if the arrangements proposed to the Soviets are shaped by the thought that it might be better after all if we kept the atom bomb to ourselves."

On May 23rd, the Alsop brothers predicted accurately: "In a week or ten days Bernard M. Baruch, American representative of the Atomic Energy Commission of the United Nations, will be ready to recommend a policy to President Truman. And it is far from im-

possible that his recommendation will include suspension of the Big Five veto on United Nations action in cases of violation of atomic-control agreements."

The Alsops went on to say that Baruch felt that the safeguards proposed in the Acheson report were not sufficient. They wrote: "If Baruch is correctly represented, he is inclined to believe that this method is incomplete and to desire a system by which penalties of a severe kind would be automatically imposed on any violator of the rules. The line of his thought is simple. The United Nations military force, which the Chiefs of Staff are now planning, would be constituted an enforcement agency for the atomic-energy convention. It would be armed with a suitable number of atomic bombs. At the same time, the veto would be suspended in all cases of violation of the atomic control. The Security Council would thus be empowered to order the United Nations military force into immediate action. And the penalty of violation would be both as severe and as automatic as possible."

And the Alsops went on: "The revolutionary implications of such a proposal must be obvious to everyone. It would, in effect, make the United Nations into something very like a world government overnight. At the same time, if put forward as United States policy, it would create enormous problems of the utmost complexity. The first and most serious would be the embittered opposition of the Soviet Union to any tampering with the United Nations veto. In all probability the Soviet consent to such an arrangement could only be obtained by the threat of force—which is a situation that cannot be lightly risked."

The Baruch Report

Baruch made his report public on June 14th. It was widely hailed.

Realistic commentators, however, considered the report to be part of the U. S. plan to impose the peace upon the rest of the world—as the Alsops had suggested it would be some months before when they wrote: "The final test between the two policies [Soviet and American] is likely to come, and ought to come, when the effort is made to solve the basic problem of control of the new weapons. . . ."

Johannes Steel commented that "no proposal could be more ill-timed" than that to abolish the veto. He said: "It is an unrealistic proposal and almost suggests that no agreement is desired, for it is quite clear that for the time being we have a very simple choice—the United Nations with the veto, or no United Nations. It is quite apparent from the Baruch approach that political considerations dominate it. . . . The problem has not been approached by him for the sake of solving the question of distributing atomic energy as such. It has been approached from the point of view of depriving other nations of the energy or of atomic bombs. In other words, the Baruch approach continues to consider the matter as an argument of American foreign policy rather than as a question of how to find a way to let the world participate in the wonderful possibilities of atomic energy."

Raymond Swing in a first comment on the Baruch report on June 14th, said: "The long transition period, however, is the potential weakness of the American plan. For we are asking other countries to submit to international control and operation of their sources of uranium while we alone go on having the bomb, making the bomb, and so retaining our lead in the atomic armament race that already has begun. I assume we do this because the negotiations may not succeed. But other countries also have their security to consider if the negotiations fail, and their uranium deposits are part of their security. So we should be ready to bargain on this aspect of the plan. Mr. Baruch stressed that there must be faith if the problem is to be solved. We can afford to have the faith to suspend our advantage in the atomic race if thereby we achieve agreement. For it is agreement we want most of all."

Lippmann on the Veto

Walter Lippmann, in his column in the New York *Herald Tribune*, June 20, 1946, titled *MR. BARUCH AND THE VETO* wrote in part: ". . . His treatment of the problem of the veto showed little evidence that he had investigated it thoroughly or had chosen his words carefully.

"For while his words imply that the United States is opposed to

the principle of the veto, the American proposal, which he himself outlined, is founded upon the American veto. [Italics Mr. Lippmann's.] Mr. Baruch's task is to negotiate a treaty with the other governments. This treaty is to contain international agreements to do certain things and not to do certain other things. This treaty cannot come into being until it has been ratified by many governments, not the least among them the government of the United States.

"If we do not ratify the treaty, we shall not cease to manufacture atomic bombs, we shall not place our atomic plants in the hands of any international authority, we shall not disclose any of our secret knowledge.

"The treaty must, in other words, satisfy us or we shall veto it. There can be no international control of atomic energy without our consent. The power to prevent something from happening by withholding consent is the veto. In the case of atomic energy the American veto is unique and absolute. . . .

". . . If the United States refuses to ratify, international control will have been vetoed absolutely. For the United States has at present a monopoly of the bombs, stockpiles, and plants which the international control would have to control.

"Now Mr. Baruch, as our representative, not only has no slightest intention of surrendering this American veto; on the contrary he intends to use it for all it is worth to induce the other governments to agree to a treaty which we judge to be good enough not to veto. We intend to use our veto as a diplomatic instrument to obtain what we believe will be a constructive and beneficent treaty. That being our intention, and an altogether honorable intention, what is the good of concealing and confusing it by talking as if the veto—the principle of unanimous consent among sovereign states—were a peculiar device which, but for the Russians, we should gladly abolish? . . .

". . . What it (abolishing the veto) would do would be to give the right to a majority of other nations, not necessarily including the United States, to vote the United States into a war in the hypothetical future.

"I cannot see what Mr. Baruch thinks he can gain by binding the United States now to fight, not necessarily with its own consent, in

the future. What is more, I do not think that he and the Senate today can under our Constitution legally commit a future Congress to war, or that the legal commitment, if made today, would have any binding effect in the future. . . .”

“Atomic Alliance”

Donald Bell, writing for the *Overseas News Agency*, June 17, 1946, said in essence that the Baruch report seemed to amount to an effort to force an “Atomic Alliance” and to brand any dissenting power as “a violator” according to the terms of our proposal. And he made this significant comment:

“Diplomats and historians know that a crucial moment in power relations is reached when one state offers an alliance to another. If this bid is rejected, war may be imminent. Hitler tried in vain to secure an alliance with Britain. When he was turned down, he knew that ultimately he would have to fight Britain. He tried the same procedure with the Soviet Union when Molotov visited Berlin in the autumn of 1940. When Molotov rejected his offer, both Germany and Russia knew they would soon be at war. . . .

“The Baruch Plan may be compared to an offer of alliance to all the nations of the world. Any power rejecting this offer becomes potentially an enemy. This is the concealed threat in the situation we have now reached.”

That in the minds of some high American policy makers it is a deliberate threat of possibly aggressive war was indicated by the Alsop brothers on January 10, 1946, when they wrote: “The chief planners of all three arms insist that the United States must acquire a worldwide system of naval, military and air bases . . . The projected American base system conspicuously places within our range both European Russia and the new industrial area beyond the Urals . . . The Soviets have been supposed to be primarily ground-force minded, but they can be counted on to grasp the meaning to them, in terms of potential bombardment which the United States base program so obviously has . . .” And on January 24, the Alsops wrote, “With the production in quantity of the new B-36 aircraft, the program [for American overseas bases] would also bring within range of effective attack all vital areas of the Soviet Union.”

A Word to the Reader from Col. Evans Carlson and Paul Robeson

ALL THAT THESE PAGES HAVE TO SAY ABOUT THE FOREIGN POLICY OF our government today may be summed up in the words of Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Roosevelt's Secretary of the Treasury and one of the late President's closest friends, who said in a recent broadcast:

"Why does our nation find itself in a state of crisis today, both on the domestic and foreign fronts? It is because Mr. Truman has renounced the Roosevelt philosophy and the Roosevelt policy. His substitute is the compulsion of the atomic bomb on the foreign and the compulsion of the equally dangerous weapon—involuntary servitude—on the labor front."



The alternative to the Truman-Byrnes-Vandenberg-Dulles foreign policy and its domestic corollary was put before the American people in November, 1944, and they gave it their overwhelming approval. That alternative is the Roosevelt policy for a lasting peace based on the continuation of the unity of the Big Three which assured victory in the war.

Roosevelt and Stalin, the architects of Big Three unity, firmly believed that the western capitalist world and non-capitalist Russia could find a way to live together in one world "for many generations to come." Official American foreign policy today is a negation of that belief—it is the policy proposed by Winston Churchill at Fulton, Missouri, and decisively repudiated by the American people.

Neither the electoral approval of Roosevelt's policy nor the popular repudiation of Churchill's have thus far been made to stick.

President Truman has a mandate from the American people to carry forward the policy of his great predecessor. Under our democratic system it is both the right and duty of the people to enforce that mandate. Its enforcement has become a life and death issue for every American. We have reached that critical stage in international relations here where even a seemingly small step that takes us farther from the path charted by Franklin Roosevelt may plunge us into the catastrophe of a third World War and spell the end of our democracy and our hopes for peace.

The National Committee to Win the Peace calls the American people to give daily, organized and effective expression to their determination that the policy of Roosevelt shall again be the official policy of our government.

We ask you to join the Win the Peace Committee in your community, or help to establish one there if none already exists.

We ask you to join with us in combatting each and every departure from the policies of Franklin Roosevelt, and to support every move designed to restore unity of the Big Three.

Write to us today, on the form provided below, so that you may receive our publications and participate in our campaigns to win the peace.

COL. EVANS F. CARLSON
PAUL ROBESON
*Co-Chairmen,
National Committee to Win the Peace*

NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO WIN THE PEACE

1309 14th Street, N.W.

Washington 9, D. C.

I want to help win the peace by returning our government to the Roosevelt policy of Big Three unity. Please send me all your publications and enlist my support in your campaigns to stop World War III.

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