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The Christian conscience and war: A statement

Church Peace Mission Commission on Christian Conscience and War

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the Christian Conscience
and War

a
statement
by
theologians
and
religious
leaders
with
an
introduction
by
John
Oliver
Nelson



A CHURCH PEACE MISSION PAMPHLET

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PART ONE — THE PROBLEM

I. Points on which pacifists and nonpacifists agree

On many important points pacifist and nonpacifist Christians agree. They agree that war is mockery of the love of God as revealed in Christ. It is the stark opposite of the way of reconciliation. The Universal Church "must pronounce a condemnation of war unqualified and unrestricted."* This condemnation of war by the Church must be made regardless of differences of opinion as to the proper course of action of a nation or a Christian citizen in given circumstances.

Pacifist and nonpacifist Christians agree also that although in one sense mass-weapon warfare raises the same ethical questions as does conventional-weapon warfare, nevertheless "the dimensions of the evil in any major conflict are now so heightened as to face us with something new. It is as though the One who said to us, 'They that take the sword shall perish with the sword' were pointing with inexorable logic to the Dead End towards which man's way of violence leads."**

INDISCRIMINATE VIOLENCE

In modern war, for example, the destructive process is no longer selective. The distinction between armed forces and the civilian population tends to vanish. The last war saw entire cities subjected to obliteration bombing! There is every reason to think that in any future war the destructive process will be even more general and awful. Whole populations thus become relatively innocent victims of an indiscriminate violence that uses fear and mass annihilation as a regular part of its operation.

* *The Message and Decisions of the Oxford (1937) World Conference.* (For brevity any future references will use the term "Oxford 1937.")

** *The Christian Conscience and Weapons of Mass Destruction.* Report (1950) of a Special Commission appointed by the Federal (now National) Council of the Churches of Christ in America. Bishop Angus Dun of the Washington Diocese of the Protestant Episcopal Church was Chairman of this Commission. Subsequent quotations in the present document unless otherwise designated are from this "Dun Commission" report.

"JUST WAR" CHALLENGED

It is increasingly doubtful whether modern large-scale war taking the form of a struggle for mere existence and absolutized victories, can continue to be regarded as an instrument of justice. Few serious Christians feel genuinely confident that the injustice war seeks to overcome is actually greater than the injustice and social disruption embodied in war itself and in its aftermath. Most Christians traditionally have held that law requires the sanction of coercive force, but, as the Amsterdam statement pointed out, "force is now used on a scale which tends to destroy the basis on which law exists." In these circumstances, "the tradition of a just war . . . is now challenged."

WAR MAY BE SUICIDAL

Along with its dubious value as an instrument of justice, war has largely lost even its function as an instrument of survival. The possibility that the destructiveness of modern war will so increase as to destroy both "victor" and "vanquished" beyond all hope of restoration patently exists.

NO MORAL BOUNDS

Pacifists and nonpacifists likewise agree that "what we now face in war and the threat of war and our involvement in it is an overwhelming break-through in the weak moral defenses to keep war in some bounds." In temporary periods and certain phases of war some restraint may still obtain, but usually only in peripheral and isolated matters where it does not endanger strategic victory. Each side, firmly convinced that the charge applies to the enemy, either cannot bear to face up to its own moral plight or simply asserts that it has no choice but to take such measures as may be needful for "the successful conduct of a war." But this simply amounts to making military expediency or necessity the supreme rule of conduct. No matter what the provocation, however great the extremity of peril to nation, church, or culture, the Christian Church dare not acquiesce completely in the supremacy of military considerations even in wartime.

PREVENTIVE WAR RULED OUT

Pacifists and nonpacifists agree, in the next place, that resort to so-called "preventive" war must be ruled out. Because the probable results of general war with atomic weapons are so terrible, as well as for other obvious reasons, no God-fearing people can take the responsibility for initiating a war that cannot be fought successfully without their use.

INEVITABILITY OF WAR RULED OUT

The idea that war is inevitable must be resolutely rejected. Even the nonpacifist cannot accept war save as a very last resort. Christians cannot assent to the proposition that war is preferable to the negotiation of differences, or be a party to an action that closes the door on just and sober means of discussion and reconciliation.

MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS NOT ENOUGH

There is agreement that no great struggle, and certainly not the present struggle against Communist expansion, should be conceived simply and exclusively in military terms. The economic, political and spiritual dimensions of the struggle must be acknowledged and met by creative programs of a non-military nature. It is generally agreed, moreover, that the scope and character of the military program may itself interfere with the more basic economic, political and spiritual strategy. Military preparation, though intended as a deterrent or defensive measure, may serve instead as an irritant and provocation. It may impose such intolerable economic burdens and social strains that the attempt to guard against Communist attack from without exposes free nations to civil strife or to the internal triumph of Communism. Military considerations may lead to support of such elements that exploited masses in the Orient will experience a revulsion against democracy and regard Communism as their one available and dependable ally.

WAR ALWAYS INVOLVES SIN

But a far more basic understanding concerning the Chris-

tian attitude toward war is now emerging. It is the recognition that war is always, as the Oxford Conference has said, a "demonstration of the power of sin in the world and a defiance of the righteousness of God as revealed in Jesus Christ and Him crucified." Even Christians who participate in war appraise the action as moral compromise which they believe is necessitated by tragic choice. Such a witness of sensitive and concerned Christian nonpacifists in their agony over the cost of war (not simply to themselves, but to God's world as a whole) is as removed in intent and ethical meaning from a war ethic of self-defense as is a Christian pacifist position.

All of the factors listed are essential to a Christian position. They distinguish the Christian level of concern from that of cultural jingoism and conventional patriotism. Alas, they are too rare in the Church. Great numbers of church members everywhere derive their standards from the secular culture in which they happen to be born, and bear deepest loyalty to the nation-state in which they live. To most nominal church members the idea that a Christian might have, or should have to take, another attitude toward war than that of any other citizen is entirely repugnant or simply does not occur.

Further evidence of this agreement between sensitive nonpacifism and sensitive pacifism appears in a growing awareness on the part of pacifists that theirs is not a perfectionist application of love. Pacifism is not immune from the danger of self-centeredness. It is not immune from ambiguous compromise. The Dun Commission, speaking in the main as a non-pacifist group, said:

"The clearest and least ambiguous alternative is that urged upon by our most uncompromising pacifist fellow-Christians . . . We believe that God calls some men to take the way of nonviolence as a special high vocation in order to give a clearer witness to the way of love than those can give who accept responsibility for the coercion in civil society. We rejoice that God has called some of our brethren in the universal Christian fellowship to bear this witness and are humbled by their faithfulness in bearing it."

While this quotation exhibits great charity toward Chris-

tian pacifists, it tends to obscure the difficulties in a pacifist decision. Even if pacifism is "the least ambiguous alternative" open to the contemporary Christian, it also confronts him with the need of making tragic choices. These ambiguities are apparent whenever pacifism seeks political expression. Certain strategies of nonviolence may cloak a contradiction of love as serious as strategies that involve resort to violence. All men stand in need of the redeeming love of God. The Lord of love, who is the Prince of Peace, no doubt judges most severely, whether in pacifist or nonpacifist, the unagonized choice, the complacent conscience, the sinner who justifies himself and condemns his brother, instead of invoking upon both the divine mercy which neither merits.

II. Points of Difference

There are, however, continuing disagreements among sensitive Christians regarding the problem of war. The crisis confronting both the nations and the Church is so deep and urgent that the utmost effort should be made to understand the origins, implications and possible resolution of these differences.

Most of the arguments for participation in war by Christians can be grouped under two heads. One set of considerations derives largely from the concepts of Order and Justice (presumed to imply coercive force as sanction). Stated in the barest outline, this type of argument alleges that the pacifist takes a position that is too simple for most Christians and one that seems irresponsible because it does not face "the hard realities of our situation." There can be no justice and responsible freedom without law and order, and law must be sustained by coercive power. The world of contemporary nations is one of self-regarding, mutually suspicious masses. The beginnings of order in the United Nations cannot be sustained except by undergirding them with effective power. This may require "police action" against "aggressors" — which means war. To state the situation in another way, if the United States and its allies are not willing to prepare for and risk the danger of global war, it is very likely that totali-

tarian tyranny will be extended over the world. The lesser evil is, therefore, to prepare for such a war against totalitarianism, including resort to atomic weapons.

The other type of argument derives from an interpretation of the Christian doctrine of love, or *agape*, namely, that love for the neighbor who is attacked requires the use of violence against his attacker. Greater love hath no man than to lay down his life for his friend in such a defensive conflict.

Let us attempt to assess the validity of these two types of nonpacifist approach to the problem of war, looking at them both from the theoretical or theological standpoint and in the light of what they mean in terms of the hard realities of the contemporary power-struggle.

JUSTICE, LAW, COERCIVE POWER, WAR

Most, though not all, pacifist Christians wish to function as "good" and responsible citizens and agree that this involves acceptance of responsibility for order and justice in civil society. They further agree to some exercise of coercive power by the community. But to jump from this to support of war is to fail to take account of a number of highly relevant factors.

The role of coercion and violent power in establishing and maintaining civil society is commonly exaggerated. Many a citizen naively assumes that the community is held together by the policeman's club and the sheriff's gun. Instead, it is from the community that law enforcement officials mainly derive both their authority and their power. Many communities exist with a minimum of police force, and the latter is patently impotent when, for example, it seeks to enforce laws that do not have community support.

Justice, according to a widely accepted notion, is the result of social strife in which claims of power are contradicted by opposing claims of power, which on occasion achieve a balance. Though this view should not be overlooked, it is nevertheless by itself an oversimplified version of how human society came into being and persists. It loses sight of men's need of each other, of the significance of the fact that God

has set men in families, of the protracted infancy of the human being as a factor in the development of society, and of the place of mutual aid and the need for fellowship in human life. Justice is not simply the slag that boils off the cauldron of the power struggle. It is a creative and hard-won achievement of men who seek to organize their common life for meaning and stability. Unless justice is conceived in such terms, the idea of organized civil society in effect is abandoned in favor of a theological version of the survival of the fittest as the essence of human existence. On the other hand, justice conceived in these creative and dynamically human terms is not a contradiction of love but complementary to it and a means of its more adequate expression.

It is unsound, moreover, to draw a simple line from the use of sanctions to undergird justice in civil society to resort to war, especially in its modern forms. This is deceptively logical reasoning from abstraction to abstraction. The immediate issue facing mankind is whether war can in fact serve as an instrument of justice. In an era of hydrogen-bomb warfare, it may be impossible for military power to establish even an approximation to justice or even to leave the way open for a promising attempt to restore a semblance of orderly society. Under these circumstances, no abstract or generalized appeal to justice can of itself sustain a nonpacifist position.

Furthermore, many leading political philosophers, including the founding fathers of the American republic, have held that the parallel between coercion of individuals in civil society and the coercion of states in political unions is a misleading and highly dangerous one. The attempt to coerce states by bringing "police action" against them actually is always war, involving violence against the admittedly innocent as well as against the allegedly guilty. It will be so regarded by the people of the state against which the "police action" is taken, and consequently such coercion cannot be and in practice has not been, the basis for functioning democratic unions of states.

If, therefore, United Nations activity in Korea is to bear

even a resemblance to "police action" rather than simply unmitigated warfare, factors of restraint and control over the military process must be brought into play. Such controls will not be developed on the basis of military policy, but only by critical judgment over it. Furthermore, the method of "police action" here represented should, in the process of time, be eliminated in favor of police action by a sovereign body over individuals. We suggest that this problem should have more careful attention than it has had from church bodies and Christians, as they seek to determine the attitude they should take toward present efforts through the United Nations to establish world order.

THE LESSER EVIL?

A second problem in this general field that requires fresh study is that which emerges when Christians move from general reflections about order, justice and coercion to a realistic study of the contemporary situation. Nonpacifist Christians hold that we in the western world find ourselves faced with the lawlessness of the present world of states and with the "brutal and irresponsible violence" of Russia and the other Communist-bloc countries. In these circumstances, for the United States not to maintain its military establishments, including its stockpile of atomic weapons, would leave the non-Communist world open to devastating attack and would probably result in the extension of totalitarian tyranny over the entire world. The exponents of this policy readily agree that it involves taking the risk of global war, but they hold that there is at least a chance that it may serve as a deterrent and even preventive of global war. If, nevertheless, war should come, as they admit it may, then it may still prove the one way to save something from the onslaught of a demonic totalitarianism. The advocates of this policy admit that it is by no means free from evil, but maintain that it is the lesser of two evils that confront us.

The concept of the "lesser evil" is closely related to the doctrine of "tragic necessity" which has received much emphasis in recent Christian thinking, especially in discussion

about the problem of war. This doctrine in an extreme form presents man as enmeshed in forces beyond his control. Penitence tends to be thought of, not in its original sense of "turning around," but as the continuing attitude of one who, though sorry for his sins, expects to continue in them under the sheer necessity of his own nature and by social compulsions.

The doctrine of the lesser evil says, in effect, that though all human choice is bad, it is morally necessary to choose the lesser of two evils. This distortion and oversimplification of the true picture of successive human situations with their plural potentialities for good, evil, and mixed courses, has the practical effect of discouraging any search for creative alternatives to the current national policy. Efforts to find such alternatives are labeled "romanticism" and "sentimentalism" and even "irresponsibility."

Although the ethic of the lesser evil theoretically bears upon any human situation — in the home, in business, in politics — its principal use in our time has been in connection with the problem of war. The actual, though unintended, result of justifying war by the doctrine of the lesser evil is to sanctify a secular political analysis with a twisted version of the basic Christian insight about the universality of sin. To a considerable extent the concept of the lesser evil has become a sort of private property of anti-pacifist polemic. The weakness of this is obvious: a valid insight regarding the ambiguity of all human choices should not dictate any particular choice in advance of a thorough weighing of the ethical issues involved. Granted that the success of the polemic here being examined was in a considerable measure due to pacifist claims of having avoided the ambiguities of ethical choice, still the use of a basic Christian principle as a private tool of anti-pacifist polemic is a perversion of its real meaning.

Christians on both sides of the battle line use the ethic of the lesser evil to justify war on the part of their respective nation-states. During World War II a Selective Service Board official asked a conscientious objector appearing be-

fore the tribunal where he would be if he were at that time in Hitler Germany instead of the United States. The C.O. replied: "Probably in a concentration camp, but may I ask you whether if you were also in Hitler Germany now, you would be filling your present role?" This consideration further emphasizes the need of extreme caution in using the doctrine of the lesser evil in a generalized form.

Resort to the doctrine of the lesser evil, moreover, though it is not so intended, has the practical effect of largely ruling out serious inquiry into the possible relevance of actual political experiments in nonviolence. It makes impossible any serious belief that in a time when demonic forces are operating in history God has in Christ given his Church a distinctive way and a more than human power for overcoming such forces. In a tragic political crisis, it leaves the Christian with exactly the same choice of evils as the non-Christian. The distinctive Gospel note of redemption from sin by the available grace of God, the assurance that "if any man is in Christ he is a new creature" and like the Apostle "can do all things in Christ who strengtheneth me," seems lacking in this approach. All this, however, raises the central and deepest problem with which we have to deal, and we shall return to it in another section.

TYRANNY VS. WAR

The evils between which, in the supposed absence of any realistic alternative, the Christian today must choose are said to be war and tyranny. The prevailing tendency to resort to the formula of the lesser evil obscures the fact that war and tyranny are not always two mutually exclusive possibilities, but run together as apparently inseparable aspects of a disintegration that threatens civilization. The hysteria, fear, and preoccupation with military strategy that mark a war psychology are incompatible with the long-range maintenance of a democratic way of life. The ethical compromises demanded by wartime military strategy can finally be sanctioned only by the eclipsing of freely expressed moral indignation. Should the expression of moral indignation

against atrocious conduct in a desperate war become sufficiently strong to limit military strategy or to suggest its abandonment, it would unquestionably be put down by totalitarian means even in the United States. The choice of tyranny makes for war, and the choice of war to end tyranny makes for greater tyranny — and the next war. Sensitive nonpacifists are aware of this, and thus see through the shallow enthusiasm (essential to war propaganda) that the next victory will be a magical new beginning of a warless world.

A broader and fundamental consideration relating to the availability of war as an instrument of justice must be introduced. Nonpacifist theologians and exponents of Christian ethics tend to assume that war is an imperfect but essentially neutral instrument that can be used for given political ends that are invested with ethical value. They picture the nation as taking the tool of war off the shelf on occasion for political ends. All moral meaning attaches to the objective of the nation, rather than to its means — war. The issue between war or non-participation in war is relativized while the degrees of difference in the political objectives of one warring nation as against another are in effect absolutized.

Social studies do not sustain this optimistic view of war as something that is rationally and wilfully controllable, morally and ethically neutral, culturally and sociologically set apart.

Social psychology, for example, furnishes no support for the idea that only the wars of our enemies result from "the lusts that war in your members." It does not substantiate the concept of the static neutrality of war. It sees war as both deep and broad in human life. War is not a neutral or aseptic tool but a symptom of sickness, a climax of a series of acts in which individuals and groups externalize their problems in the enemy, the outer expression of inner conflict in a society.

The social pathologists see war as the final stage in a process of world disorganization of which various forms of totalitarianism and revolution are preliminary stages. War

oscillates from *effect* of disorganization to *cause*, then back to *effect* again, and so on. War carries disorganization to the entire population and all phases of culture. We witness the personal demoralization of the soldier and the civilian, vast economic and political dislocations, the dysgenic effect of war and the break-up of social institutions. Even on the assumption that the "tool" of war, though used in the past for such evil ends as plunder, tribute, imperialism, and military glory, is now in the service of relatively good ends like the suppression of tyranny, it is still a tool which the social pathologist regards as covered with the germs of an advanced case of communicable disease.

The military historian and the students of the war system as a culture bring us to the same conclusion. They suggest that theologians who make power central in their political analysis have made far too little of the power that the war system represents: a cluster of power jealous of its own prerogatives in relation to all other human orders. In undertaking to make use of war and the military the Christian community is trying to use an essentially supranational "caste" with centuries of overlaid creed and practice that have defied all attempts of economic and political forces to conquer it. It is a caste that has survived every kind of culture and defied the predictive powers of science. When nonpacifist Christians propose to pick this tool off the shelf of culture, they are embracing one of the most sovereignly successful cultures of history: continuous, resilient, and explosive. In wartime it is this military caste that largely formulates policy and determines the nature of the use of power. In practice if not in theory, total loyalty is required of the Christian soldier and this is made virtually synonymous with unquestioning obedience to military orders. In such a situation, rather than using war as a tool, the individual finds himself the tool in the hands of the war system.

Finally, sociology rules out the concept of war as a tool with which to protect the culture, since today war is not occasional, accidental, or peripheral. War is the culture of our age and the culture is war. It is an amiable optimism

that sees in war not the maniac who will destroy democracy but the slave who will obediently serve it.

In view of such considerations, nonpacifism should no longer claim automatic and exclusive title to such terms as "responsible," "politically concerned" and "realistic." Certainly the idea that pacifism provides a workable way of resisting violence and of insuring reconciliation has often been bound to pacifism as an ideological stand, and has thus been doctrinaire and abstract. But nonpacifism may similarly be doctrinaire and abstract, automatically assuming the validity of a political analysis that springs from the ideological stand of nonpacifism. To argue, via the doctrine of the lesser evil, that resort to war alone can save civilization from tyranny, obviously is to preclude the possibility that civilization can rid itself of tyranny by other means. This can be said without assuming that refusal to participate in war will of itself prevent tyranny or a tragic social struggle. We must guard against two illusions: that war solves the problem of tyranny, and that refusal to participate in war leaves us without any means to combat tyranny.

CHURCH AND CULTURE

Those who accept resort to atomic war generally do so within the political and cultural framework of the nation in which they happen to live. They regard their citizenship in the nation and participation in its culture as a "destiny," from the responsibilities and limitations of which men cannot escape. There is a strong disposition also for the leaders of the Church to identify themselves with "the responsible political leaders" of the country, who in a considerable number of instances are also prominent churchmen. A pacifist or other program which these men could not embrace while continuing to "hold positions of effective political leadership" is likely to be dismissed as unworthy of serious consideration.

The Dun Commission Report, whose authors for the most part proceed from the basis just stated, presents a hypothetical picture of the power struggle. On the one side it

portrays a peace-loving and democratic United States and the powers associated with it. On the other it poses an aggressor who is the embodiment of a debasing and enslaving totalitarianism, which it is determined to impose upon the rest of the world, and who might launch an unprovoked atomic attack upon the free and peace-loving sector of the world. We have no intention of minimizing the threat of war or of tyranny from the Moscow center of power. We see that tyranny spread before our eyes; we know that it is rapidly stocking its own arsenal of atomic and other weapons.

At the same time we see that the sway of this tyranny grows faster and wider precisely in those areas most disrupted by the last war, whose purpose was to check tyranny and remove the threat of war. Furthermore, even though the United States power is motivated by democratic considerations and in this regard is morally preferable to Russian power, it does not follow that United States policy is immune from criticism nor unadulterated with less worthy motives.

It was the United States that by a unilateral decision first used atomic weapons and thus ushered in the era of atomic war. To its credit, the report on *Atomic Warfare and the Christian Faith* presented in 1945 by the Calhoun Commission called the nation to repentance for these acts. But in 1950 the Dun Commission fails to remind the Church of this need for repentance and leaves out any explicit recognition of the possible provocative effect of these actions, and their contribution to the creation of the atmosphere of suspicion, fear and hysteria that grips the world today. Under the circumstances, we should be prepared to reckon sympathetically and understandingly with the fact that there are multitudes both in Communist-bloc countries and elsewhere not prepared to attach much credence to American protestations that we shall never be first to use atomic weapons again. They tend to regard us as either naive or exceedingly devious when we profess to feel injured because our assurances are not taken at face value.

The policy of the United States is derived from more than moral considerations having to do with such ends as "democracy" and "peace." Basic, also, are considerations of power: an expansionist drive, the maintenance of a highly privileged economic and political position, and sheer survival in a struggle with other nations, especially those of the Communist bloc. Consequently, those who support American military policy share the burden of proof for showing that the role of the United States in the world today does not actually retard the elimination of feudalism, the raising of the standard of living (next to impossible along with large-scale rearmament), and the building of new social and political structures.

It is not difficult to understand the view held by many non-Communists in other countries that it is precisely the United States that today stands in the way of a deep-going and widespread democratization of the life of mankind. Multitudes, especially in the so-called backward countries, for discernible reasons look to Communism for liberation. The immense stock of good will that the United States and Western democracy so recently had in the Orient is now low. It follows that the military measures being taken to establish a "defense" position in the Orient are more likely to hinder than help the solution of the problem, especially when military expenditures outstrip those for economic assistance by a ratio of many billions to a few millions.

A small segment of the Christian movement pays some attention to this phase of the world picture, as when the Dun Commission observes that "if the moral and political struggle with Communism is lost, no military strength will avail." But the Church in general gives far too little thought to the question as to how these two kinds of struggle — moral, political and economic on the one hand, and military on the other — can be combined effectively, and how the present situation, where "constructive" programs command sums that are infinitesimal in comparison with military expenditures, can be changed.

Furthermore, we must face the changes in the power

relationships within American society that are needed and how these changes may be accomplished. The problem of whether a nation can make adequate progressive social changes while its resources and energies are largely concentrated on military activities — a problem that keeps Western European countries constantly tottering on the edge of crisis — receives far too little consideration.

So much has already been yielded to military expediency that the political and military leaders of the nation are undoubtedly confident of the outcome if a "supreme crisis" requires that the Church yield still more. It is well enough to say that "the Church cannot acquiesce in the supremacy of military considerations even in war time, nor in the view that modern war may properly, even in case of extreme peril to nation, church, or culture, become total war."* Christians have to say this and should act upon it. But Christians also have already gone so far as to call "rigorous blockades of foodstuffs essential to civilian life and obliteration bombing of civilian areas, however repugnant to *humane* feelings . . . justifiable on *Christian* grounds."** They have, moreover, specifically allowed for atomic bombing in a future war. Having yielded so far in "peace time," it is utterly unrealistic to suppose that when the national existence actually is at stake in war they will suddenly produce the power, or even the will, to call a halt. Instead, they will draw on the old arguments that we are all deeply involved in guilt, that we cannot "contract out" of society, or divest ourselves of "responsibility" in the immediate situation. Military and political leaders know all this and act upon the assumption that the churches give them a blank check.

To cite one more illustration, since we are here dealing with a truly crucial point: All sensitive Christians recoil both from the idea of having the United States use atomic weapons first in another war and from the idea of preventive war. But the Dun Report goes no further than to

* *The Relation of the Church to War in the Light of the Christian Faith.* (Calhoun Commission, 1944.)

** *Op. cit.* (Majority view of Calhoun Commission, 1944.)

suggest that "the nation which uses atomic weapons first . . . bears a special burden of responsibility for the almost inevitable development of extensive mass destruction." This is meant to have some deterrent effect, presumably, on policy makers. But a president or chief of staff believing it likely that in a day or an hour the enemy will launch a devastating atomic attack which might be prevented or blunted if "our side" struck first, will regard such a statement as a green light for taking the initiative. He will undertake whatever "special burden of responsibility" this involves rather than the "special burden of responsibility" that giving the enemy an important advantage would entail. If Christian leaders mean that in such an event they will repudiate the leader making such a decision and refuse to support the war thus initiated, then once again they need to make this explicit in advance, and to prepare for this dramatic action. It is likely that in such a crisis the contention that the enemy really "began" the war will be advanced. But this is no solution. It simply brings up another certainty, namely that policy makers on each side will manage to resolve in their own favor this question of what beginning a war means in a situation where two blocs have been feverishly arming for years. That an institution, like a church, that has gone along with the process of rivalry in armaments, is going to have the will or power to reverse its previous course is well-nigh incredible.

The idea of preventive war presents, on a large scale, essentially the same problem. This idea of a "preventive war," we are told, "we must put behind us as a Satanic temptation." It is easy to use this strong language at a time when it means, in practical terms, simply that we are against going to war now when the decisive policy makers are also against it. If it means that there is a species of war that Christian leaders would unequivocally refuse to support, whatever the consequences, then once again it is necessary carefully to define this species and to prepare themselves and the churches for this difficult action.

In the past it has always been possible for each govern-

ment to satisfy its own citizens that a given war was essentially defensive on its part, or on some other ground just and unavoidable. Even when there has been some doubt on this score, its people, including church people, nevertheless went along. It is, therefore, utterly unrealistic to suppose that these people, and the churches, will adopt another pattern of behavior in a crisis when the very existence of the nation and the culture will seem to be at stake, when fear will be more intense and censorship more rigid than ever, when conscription and general regimentation will prevail, and when churches are identified with the nation and the culture. If we are to hope that in such an hour the churches may draw a line, then that eventuality must be prepared for now. As much care must go into preparation for this strategy of resistance and nonconformity as goes into military preparations. Instead of having increasing secrecy thrown about military preparations and basic policy decisions, it would be necessary to make information about such matters available to the people so as to enable them to make democratic decisions. If steps are not immediately taken to bring about this condition, surely support ought to be withdrawn from unlimited military preparations.

In the light of these considerations, the question whether the likely *outcome* of war between the dominant power-blocs is such as to justify resort to atomic war, also needs a much more thorough study than it has yet received. There is now universally admitted doubt as to whether any "victory" is possible in such a war and whether enough reserves of physical resources, let alone decency, justice, and mercy would be left with which to build a decent world. The question we are raising, then, is this: Suppose all efforts to "deter aggression" and to put off or prevent war — for example, by building up Western military power to offset Soviet bloc power — have been exhausted. Admittedly such a moment may come. All of us know that it is "only an outside chance" that war may in the end be averted by the balancing of power against power. But if war is not averted the choice is then (assuming that nonviolent re-

sistance or some such alternative is ruled out as impractical) the final awful choice between global atomic war or at least temporary "submission" to Communist rule.

The chance that *both* global war and totalitarianism may be avoided by the build-up of Western military power as a deterrent on Soviet "aggression" is admittedly very slight. It would come about only if more restraint over power than comes from mere pragmatic and secular use of power is actually marshalled. A purely secular arms race is almost bound to be self-destructive. Rivalry in armament between big powers does not ordinarily end in stalemate and peace. Has it indeed ever done so? The counter-armament which from one viewpoint "deters," from another viewpoint appears obviously to demand countering in kind. It increases suspicion, fear and a sense of self-righteousness, since each side is convinced that it is engaged in self-defense. Apart from very temporary periods of slight relaxation, therefore, tension mounts. Anything is a "lesser evil" than submission while a chance remains that resort to war might bring victory.

Furthermore, those on each side who have developed the habits of power and have vested interests in power, as have the rulers of Russia, for example, are as afraid of having "peace" break out as of having general war break out. Indeed, in a certain sense they fear the former more than the latter. For, in the first place, the men of power on each side cherish the hope that they may win and thus retain power, possibly even gain more. In a peaceful, unarmed world, on the other hand, their kind of power would no longer exist. In totalitarian countries heads would almost certainly roll in the transition to "peace." In the second place, the men of power know how to handle the instrument of war; they have no knowledge or training in a substitute strategy for war. Once again, then, the chance that in the present global struggle, stalemate and then peace may be achieved by building armament against armament, is very slim.

Two observations seem appropriate and in fact inevitable

at this point. First, the churches and Christian leaders who go along with a policy of arming are apparently concerned to exercise almost no judgment over the arming. This lets purely military planners call the tune. Second, they evidence no awareness of the possible need to extricate themselves from a war which may be a greater evil than temporary "capitulation" to tyranny. They will certainly not be able to extricate themselves unless, as we have previously observed, serious preparations for such a revolutionary shift in program are undertaken now. Otherwise, those who embrace the policy of arming as a deterrent are in fact embracing an uncritical arms race.

To put our criticisms of prevalent contemporary thought on the responsible use of power in religious terms, the fact that the United States is a great Power, equipped with a colossal, technologically monstrous military establishment, is accepted by contemporary exponents of the nonpacifist position as something given. It is tacitly assumed that God has brought the United States to its present place and endowed it with its present power. Some countenance is, perhaps, by implication or omission, given to the idea all too generally held that the possession of wealth and power is the reward for national virtue. The spokesmen of the Christian Church in the West then take their place by the side of the economic, political and military leaders who man — or perhaps seem to man — the controls in this society and determine how and when this power is to be used. From that vantage point, the question is put as to what constitutes "responsible" behavior in this context and "responsible" use of available power. But this approach omits serious reckoning with such basic questions as whether power has not been acquired in an irresponsible manner, whether it may not in some respects be "demonic" in character, and whether the instrumentalities employed by the power-state are not diabolical in character and suicidal in effect, inherently unfitted to serve the ends either of justice or of love. In so far as this is the case, the divine judgment, not blessing, rests upon the nation. Except it

repent, it will perish. It is the peculiar responsibility of the Church constantly to raise such prior questions rather than encouraging an uncritical acceptance of the power situation of the moment as the context within which alone "responsible" action can take place.

Two brief observations may here be made regarding the effect of these conditions on the role and life of the churches themselves. While there may be profound and meaningful significance to the spiritual dimensions of the ecumenical church, and a high intentioned unity among all Christians, the fact remains that the ecumenical church is very largely a victim of the political divisions of our time. It has been next to powerless to effect any political counterpart to its professed spiritual unity. The churches do not serve as a bridge between sundered peoples. They are only in a very restricted sense reconciling forces. They do not bring an independent judgment to bear on the conflict, nor do they make an impact on the culture of respective sections of the world, which might result in the transformation of that culture. The churches do none of these things because they are themselves parts of the sundered cultures, their spokesmen, justifiers and prisoners. Even the emphasis on what on either side is called "ecumenicity" may well, under these circumstances, mean primarily a yielding to the demand of the state for closer solidarity in the secular struggle for survival rather than a response to an inward and genuinely Christian impulse toward unity in Christ.

Even the elementary task of preaching the Gospel freely to every creature the churches do not and cannot now adequately fulfill, as recent developments in a number of mission fields testify. The fact that in a country like the United States we seldom even entertain seriously the idea of winning Communists to Christ is another illustration of the impasse we have reached. Whether in West or East, the "universal" gospel of Christ is preached, save for a very few exceptions, only by those who are firmly attached to the national state and to the prevailing cultural pattern of the region. A Christian mission that would carry the Word,

as the early Christians did, to every class and region, not being deterred from going where they would not be wanted and would be persecuted, is hardly seriously thought of today. And this is not merely because states enforce repressive measures, though in various forms and degrees they do and this is a troublesome factor. On the part of large sections in the churches there is no vital desire to preach the Gospel to the "foreigner" or the "enemy." More sensitive and less parochial Christians, though they may not be fully aware of the situation, yet sense that they are essentially representatives of American Christianity or British Christianity, or Russian, as the case may be, bearing the mark of their nation and culture, rather than apostles who bear no mark but that of the Cross of Christ and who speak from within a universal fellowship in which there is truly neither white nor black, neither American nor Russian. Christians should proclaim peace to all, both them that are near and them that are afar.

PART TWO — OUR RESOURCES

Love — as constraint, guide and grace

Thus we have come to the central issue as to whether in the Christian gospel and especially in the concept of the divine Love (*Agape*) as revealed in Christ we have indeed a distinctively Christian norm, a light which may illumine our darkness and dispel our confusion and a source of power which may enable us to overcome our weakness and fear.

LOVE IS ULTIMATE

All Christians agree that this love of Christ "constrains" us. It is from His love poured out for us that we derive our life as individuals and as a Church. The framework in which the Christian and the Church operate ought to be the service of Christ rather than any human institution or

pattern of culture. Not that we can simply stand apart from the latter, but neither ought we to be subjected or enslaved by them. *We serve Christ in our day and generation and in our station in life with all its limitation and frustration, but it is Christ and not our age or our "station in life" that we serve.* The ultimate norms of conduct are given to men and to human institutions by God's revelation in Christ. Christians do not have to achieve recognition and success in terms of a given nation or culture. They have a meaningful basis of action even in situations meaningless in terms of their pragmatic possibility, a constraint to action stronger than the promise of success. They have also, therefore, hope without having to base hope on the possibility of quick, neat answers to every contemporary problem. They have moral earnestness without the need to believe in a utopian dream of moral perfection.

Another way to state this aspect of Christian experience is to say that the standing-ground of the Christian is first of all within the Church, which is a universal society based on love and charged with the ministry of reconciliation. Within this society — "in Christ Jesus" — there can be neither Jew nor Gentile; barbarian, Scythian; bondman, freeman; male or female, since "Christ is all and in all." As a member of this society, the Christian sees other men not as black or white, nor primarily as Americans, Russians, Chinese, Germans, but as made in the image of the same God as himself: subjects of redemption in Christ to whom it is urgent that His gospel should be preached, as neighbors whom he is to love as he loves himself and even as Christ has loved him.

LOVE IS A GUIDE TO ACTION

The love of God made known in Christ provides not merely the framework or orientation for the Christian life, but also a guide to the nature of Christian action in concrete situations. Practical decisions have to be made in the light of the fullest possible service to the Gospel norm. This norm is *agape-love*. Seen in its divine expression, it

is the love of God poured out for men in the life and death of Christ. Humanly defined, it is love for the neighbor, unselfish, outpouring love. Its principle is not that we love those who are worthy of love, which in practice always comes down to loving those who love us. The principle of Christian love is that it is by first being loved that men may be redeemed and become worthy of love, "even as Christ also died for us while we were yet sinners." We love "because God first loved us."

This is not to claim that we incarnate this love perfectly, nor to minimize the difficulties of applying it, especially in political life and international relations. Nevertheless, the incarnation of the divine love in the lives of men and in the history of mankind remains the norm for the Christian and for the Church. We ought to be able to appeal to the norm even in justification of actions that seem to contradict it. Even when in the ambiguities of historical decisions we choose what we regard as lesser evils, we should weigh the alternatives against the norm of love and not some other standard. Only such a procedure can protect us against moral relativism and antinomianism. Non-pacifism makes its strongest case when it appeals to the norm of love for the neighbor as ground for the use of violence against his attacker. It is to the norm of love that men pay tribute — often unconsciously — when they justify the soldier on the ground that he lays down his life for his fellows.

To recognize this is not to dispose of the problem of modern war. Modern nations are seldom if ever motivated by protective love when they go to war. Even if many individuals in a nation honestly feel that they are trying to extend the protection of love to innocent victims, this motive plays almost no part in the making of policy decisions at critical moments.

The use of violence in the service of protective love raises fundamental religious questions. For the Christian conscience the primary question is not whether this individual or that is to die a violent death, or even whether such a fate is to overtake many thousands in one nation or

another. For the Christian conscience the basic issue is not what it means to die but what it means to inflict death on another. The problem is not an impersonal or arithmetical one but in an entirely different dimension, viz., the ethical. The protective function of love in Christian thought extends to all men, and includes the attacker, the enemy. Even in a clear case of one who makes an unprovoked attack on an innocent victim, a Christian cannot, in the face of the clear teaching of the New Testament and the example of his Lord, *uncritically* accept a violent defense that wreaks injury upon the attacker.

Moral judgment has to be pronounced against the attacker, but whether this justifies his annihilation, as punishment or on other grounds, is a different matter. A Christian cannot assume automatically that he meets the requirements of protective love by striking out at an attacker, even though by so doing he indubitably saves the intended victim from injury. It is possible that even so he may have sinned against love and done grave spiritual injury to both attacker and victim. This will certainly be the case if love for the former, who may well have needed it most, played no part in the action taken.

If this is true in such relatively simple situations, what shall we say of situations that pit against each other thousands of youth who do not know each other and who are probably conscripted for warfare, or of dropping atomic bombs on an enemy city? Does any real concern for those other neighbors on the far side of the frontier even exist, not to speak of finding effective expression? If arming Christian youth in order to protect those who are on "our side" exposes other neighbors, equally children of God, to the risk of devastation — and this is the case in war — we can hardly avoid the question whether protective love is really in evidence here.

LOVE IS GRACE

The divine love manifested in Christ is more than the "constraint," i.e., the impelling motive and basic orienta-

tion, for Christian life and the guide for Christian action in concrete situations. It is above all the grace of God upon which, whether we be pacifists or nonpacifists, we depend for forgiveness and redemption. We have the zest and courage to act in the face of our own uncleanness and weakness and amidst the complexities and frightful hazards of such an age as ours, because we know that we are accepted of God in disregard of any merits of our own and that what is not possible for man is possible with God. When we have acted, we are again conscious of the impurity of our motives, the inadequacy of our commitment and faith, and the insufficiency of our wisdom and strength. Furthermore, the situation we face, after all our efforts, will appear confused and magic. Thus it is again because we know that we are justified by faith, and not by any works of our own, and that we are forgiven by love and renewed by the operation of the Holy Spirit, that we experience God's peace within and go forth to act in obedience to his commandment of love.

All Christians feel themselves under a deep sense of obligation to obey the commandment of love and to seek to make the motive of love operative in the solution of political and social crises. The pacifist Christian finds it necessary to renounce violence even though this appears to involve disregard of generally accepted considerations of prudence and of immediate consequences. *He rejects the idea that we must in effect play God to human events in the sense that we must involve ourselves in the ethical contradictions of war in order to save proximate historical situations.* Granted, he says, that sometimes we need "to save a situation" and that this will involve compromise, the price of resort to full-scale use of weapons of mass destruction and total war is too great a moral price to pay for an historical existence, especially when the expectation that such resort to violence will save the historical existence rests on the slenderest and most precarious foundation.

Love can sometimes prove more practical and expedient than the calculations of expediency. Faithfulness to prin-

ciple in the abstract may be more "realistic" than calculation in the concrete. The principle of love may be to the culture as a parent is to the child, a wisdom not immediately understood but finally valid. Even if it be granted that we have no explicit guidance in theory or Scripture as to where love can be more expedient than calculation, the possibility cannot be rejected by labeling those who refrain from the use of violence in a given situation as "irresponsible."

This does not mean, however, that the pacifist Christian is in an unambiguous position. He has not extricated himself from the historical situation, from the society to which he belongs, or from his station in life. He is, therefore, not free from responsibility for the results of his action. In rejecting reliance on the calculation on which a secular ethic depends and starting instead with obedience to the commandment of love, he has not freed himself from the necessity to use calculation, in a religious ethic, as the means to discover the best way of implementing the demands of faith. In this connection he, too, is liable to error and will be influenced by preconceptions and prejudices of which he may be unaware. He will fall far short of incarnating the love to which he professes allegiance and serving as a channel for the power and grace of God by which alone, he contends, men and history can be redeemed. He, too, must in the end as in the beginning throw himself upon the mercy of God and find consolation and peace in the conviction that the issues of history are in God's hands and not in his.

MEANING OF HISTORY

In seeking to grasp the meaning of history and the consequent function of the Christian and the Church in relation to the historical process, Christians are subject to diverse temptations and errors.

Some deny the power of God to impart meaning to the historical process itself and to transform the kingdoms of *this* world into the kingdoms of His Christ. Only in an

equivocal sense and in a remote degree do they see the Spirit of God working through Christ, the Church and the Christian, actually changing and sanctifying the course of human events and the history of mankind. They tend to see no real relation between the eternal and the historical, the spiritual and the political. The meaning of history in any important sense is not to be sought or achieved, they say, *in* history but only *beyond* history.

The practical outcome of this approach, as we suggested in an earlier section, is that the Church and Christians generally, who obviously cannot extricate themselves from history and society, become bulwarks and agents of the status quo. They impart a certain sanctity to what nations and cultures are actually doing. The consequence is that in an age of crisis and disintegration such as this, secular, militarized, totalitarian regimes prevail or tend to prevail. Churches have then the choice of accepting the domination of even such a regime and becoming its instrument for keeping the masses in control, or of finally severing their ties with the nation and the culture. Since by then they will have been reduced to a tiny remnant of those who patiently submit to ostracism and persecution, the churches will, in the ordinary sense of the term, exercise no effect upon the immediate historical situation.

Other Christians, though probably fewer than was once the case, think that the will of God can be fully realized in history, or *must* be realized within its bounds in so far as it is realized at all. This also is a distortion of the Christian gospel. And the paradoxical outcome in this case is that in catastrophic epochs it is such "idealists" and optimists who are utterly bereft of hope. Having experienced defeat, they conclude that God is dead and Christ is not risen. They despair of the Church at the very moment when the opportunity to build a new culture may by God's grace be opening before it. They despair of the seed at the moment when, having died, it is about to bear much fruit.

The conclusion to which the Christian is carried is clear.

As an individual he is called to obedience to his Lord, i.e., to the commandment of love, but this obedience he can in some degree render only because he has first experienced this love as unmerited grace which elicits the response of gratitude. Seeking to obey God, he must again throw himself upon the boundless mercy of God revealed in Christ. Looked at in a broader perspective, Christians and the Church must seek to do the will of God and to mediate the love of Christ in every situation and in all times. This is their task in history and it is this that gives meaning to history. But it is God's will, not the Church's will or the Church's idea of God's will, which is to be done, and the power to do it is likewise God's. The Church and the Christian cannot see history as God sees it. They cannot dictate how God will redeem history and give it meaning. As they must walk in the way of obedience, so they must walk in faith and not by sight. No political or cultural achievement of men should lure them into the belief that history no longer needs redemption. No historic catastrophe should cause them to despair as those who have no hope and who believe that history cannot be redeemed. "It is not for you to know times or seasons, which the Father hath set within his own authority but ye shall receive power . . . and ye shall be my witnesses . . . unto the uttermost part of the earth."

PART THREE — CONCLUSIONS

It is incumbent upon us to try to draw conclusions from this study. We seek to do this as Christians who are conscious of their membership in an Ecumenical Church and who are deeply concerned about its mission in this time of tribulation.

THE NEED FOR A UNITED VOICE

We suggest that a greater and more determined effort should be made to reach the point where the Church can deliver a more united witness on the issue of contemporary

war. It is highly dangerous in such a time as this for the churches and their members to resign themselves to a multiplicity of Christian attitudes toward war combined with mutual toleration of diverse viewpoints. Lack of a common witness, even when prompted by the desire to maintain a Christian fellowship despite differences in ethical judgment, weakens the ecumenical impact of the Church.

We have no illusions about the difficulties involved in seeking such a common mind. We do not equate uniformity with unity and we are aware of the dangers of artificial or authoritarian unities. Yet the call of the Apostle comes to us as it did to the Early Church, in the midst of its weaknesses and divisions: "I beseech you through the name of our Lord Jesus Christ that ye all speak the same thing and . . . that ye be perfected together in the same mind and in the same judgment."

If we accept the necessity of seeking a common witness with regard to war and related issues, then this agreement must be implemented in the program of the Church and the churches. Toward this end —

a. Meetings should be held in which nonpacifist and pacifist theologians, ministers, youth, etc., discuss these problems. It seems likely that theological seminaries may be able to render a special service in this field.

b. The National Council of Churches might sponsor another Commission in the series that has already included the Calhoun Commission (with two reports) and the Dun Commission. Perhaps it is too soon to undertake this. On the other hand, there was a widespread feeling even among those who on the whole accepted its approach, that time had been lacking satisfactorily to carry out the heavy assignment that was given the Dun Commission. If care were taken to make a new Commission thoroughly representative and it addressed itself specifically to the attempt to achieve an "ecumenical" utterance, the attempt might bear fruit.

c. Prayer, study and discussion of the problem should take place on all levels — in Christian prayer and cell

groups, in the local church and its various organizations, in ministerial associations, in denominational and interdenominational Christian youth organizations, in state, regional and national ecclesiastical assemblies.

d. So far as possible in the time available, the Study department and various commissions of the World Council of Churches should, in preparing for the Evanston Assembly, take full cognizance of the necessity of wrestling with the problem of achieving a more united voice on the issue of the Christian conscience and war in our day.

A BREAK WITH WAR?

We suggest that in the present historical context it is incumbent on nonpacifist Christians to consider whether the hour has not struck for the Church to issue a condemnation of war as an instrument of policy, to declare that it cannot serve as an instrument of justice, much less of love, and to teach that participation in war under modern conditions requires compromises that the Christian conscience cannot tolerate.

This is not a proposal that the Church should now embrace pacifism as a political ideology nor that Christians should universally adopt a theology or ethical philosophy that may have been associated with Christian pacifism. Nor is it a suggestion for legalistic excommunication of individuals who desire to be in the Christian fellowship though not prepared fully to appropriate as their own such a corporate witness. (Pacifists should be the last to suggest that there is no place for the dissenter with a sensitive conscience in the fellowship of the Church.)

It is to suggest, however, that fidelity to the assumption on which both pacifist and nonpacifist Christians agree now requires the Church to break with modern absolutized war. It is to suggest that it is no longer possible for the Church to be the Church and to carry out her own distinctive and divine mission unless she adopts this corporate witness. To state the matter in another way: there is wellnigh universal agreement that vocational pacifism and vocational pa-

cifists have a place in the Church. Our question is whether the time has not arrived when the Church and its members generally should follow this vocation, in order that the Church should be to culture what the pacifist is to the Church.

Even sensitive nonpacifists have indicated the need for restraint over the power struggle, and asserted that every effort should be made to "keep the cold war cold" in order that we can "buy time" to negotiate political issues between present blocs of power and to develop machinery for maintaining peace. They have further suggested that the Church cannot acquiesce in a war conducted by the norm of sheer military expediency, and that all doctrines of preventive and inevitable war must resolutely be rejected.

If we agree as Christians on these points, then we have ample room for decided and concerted witness. Such a witness must be more than verbalization by theologians in little understood and hardly publicized documents. It must be a radical witness that reaches the general run of church members, and marshals their concern and effort against all the secular forces driving us toward the use of war as a solution to our current problems.

Our nation is not tempted to destroy its power. Even political isolationism now advocates strong armament, and in its new versions generally argues for the single-handed use of great American power without regard for the will of the community of nations as expressed in the United Nations. Little responsibility devolves even on sensitive nonpacifists to urge military preparation. But tremendous responsibility falls on all Christians to qualify such preparation. The exercise of this responsibility needs a clear voice. This clear voice must be more than a traditional word of caution: it must be a radical qualification of the whole military enterprise and system, which as we have suggested, is the very expression of our contemporary secular culture.

If the Church and Christian leaders are to exercise actual restraint they must — we suggest — put governments clearly on notice now that the Church will not support or condone

preventive war or first resort to atomic or bacteriological war, and that in the ultimate situation she will not tolerate the use of mass destruction in a suicidal situation. The danger that such a declaration would tie the hands of statesmen and military leaders at the present time is not so great as the danger that its lack leaves such planners to project policy in the almost certain knowledge that the voice of the Church will never effectively qualify their policies when they become "necessary" to the State.

It seems clear that if a large segment of the Christian Church must at some future time expect to find itself unable to support the policies of the nation, especially at a moment of extreme crisis when its very existence may be, and certainly will appear to be, at stake, more is needed than a simple declaration, no matter how clear, that the Church will not support preventive war, etc. These are matters that require definition and elaboration. Even though not all contingencies can be foreseen and a good deal will have to be left for decision "at the last moment," it will be necessary for the Church to spell out in some detail what is meant by "preventive war" and other terms, what tests would be applied by churches or individual Christians in deciding whether the line had been reached which they must in obedience to God, "the sole lord of conscience," refuse to cross. Perhaps a commission of theologians, political scientists and others should begin work on this problem at an early date.

Besides this spelling out of the Church's program and the conditions for its support or tolerance there must be a careful study of what the Church and Christian people need to know in order to judge intelligently whether these conditions are being observed. It is extremely doubtful whether even Christian leaders have access to sufficient information about what goes on in the State Department or the Pentagon to meet this requirement. Here is an intricate and highly critical problem to which Christian leaders and social scientists should address themselves.

Lastly, the membership of the Church, and especially

its youth, need to be trained in the Christian teaching with regard to war. Christian youth must be taught as an integral part of the religious education program in local churches the distinction between what is Christian and what may be expedient, permissible, or defensible on political and cultural grounds. And they should be prepared now for the possibility that one day, even on a nonpacifist basis, they would have to refuse military service, with all that this implies.

Save in rare instances, this is simply not being done today. That there are few conscientious objectors may, in this context, be a matter of small import. But there are other more serious facts. The conscientious objector position is still infrequently presented in the training of youth. In most churches it is not understood and is frequently regarded with contempt. Few young church members, as the draft claims them for the armed forces, are aware of any tension between what is Christian and what may be allowed or defended on other grounds. To most of them it never occurs that "the dimensions of the evil" in war are now so great that the hour may soon come when they and the whole Church will have to choose between war and Christ. All these imply a serious gap in the current program of Christian education. Nonpacifist teachers and leaders have fully as much responsibility as pacifists for filling this gap. Until it is filled, it cannot be asserted realistically that the Church is seeking to exercise restraint on power or the military instruments that power employs. It cannot be honestly asserted that there are circumstances under which the churches will break decisively with the war policies of a state. A break for which no preparations are made will not occur.

Perhaps it is still possible to hold that we have not reached "the ultimate ethical situation" in which war can no longer be condoned on Christian grounds. But it is no longer possible to say that contemplation of that situation and actual preparation for dealing with it, can be postponed. It is conceivable that if the churches were to

train their youths in this way governments might regard such training as not good for morale *now*. They might hold that men under such tension are not fitted to be soldiers. In any event, the Church faces the necessity of re-examining its life at this point. We cannot escape the anguish of these decisions, or the risk of divisions in the Church and rejection by the world that they may entail.

A brief word may be added as to the probable effect of such a renunciation of war, whether it took place now or later. Even in what may be called a practical, political sense, it is not certain that such a decisive break with war on the part of the Christian Church would be foolish or futile. It *might* be the most practical step the Church could take. Perhaps the way to peace and to freedom from tyranny in our time does lie in this direction. We are often warned against taking the position that war is inevitable. There are those who sincerely hold that war can actually be avoided on the basis of present American foreign policy or some modification thereof. We submit that we cannot either assume that war or the triumph of tyranny would become inevitable should a widespread renunciation of war take place. Let us admit that in either case our judgments on such matters are liable to error and must be somewhat tentative.

We do not here enter into a detailed discussion of alternative economic and political programs, important as these are. We are concerned primarily with the problem of the Church — the theological or religious problem — rather than programs for public action. Our main thesis is that we have to find a new focus or standing-ground before we can think fruitfully about political programs, or act effectively. The thinking of a Church that had broken with war would be vastly different from its thinking today, and who of us can now say what insights might be given by the Spirit to the corporate prayer and thinking of a Church standing on that new vantage ground? Or who shall say what in that case might take place in the realm of political life?

Resolute support of all efforts of the peoples of so-called backward countries to secure their independence and improved social and economic conditions; refusal to support reactionary and totalitarian regimes and encouragement of resistance to them; the practice of undiluted democracy and racial equality at home; the complete abandonment of the doctrine and practice of "white supremacy" abroad; readiness to devote the nation's resources under United Nations auspices to raising the world standard of living on some such scale as we now devote to a military establishment; ministering to elementary human needs without discrimination on political, racial or religious grounds — these would presumably be elements in a strategy of peace. A foreign policy under which the people of this country sought, in so far as it was in their resources and power, to see to it that henceforth not a child anywhere in the world went hungry or naked or shelterless or untended in illness or without generous opportunity for education, could make us, in the words of Emerson's famous Essay on War, a nation "which has a friend in the bottom of the heart of every man." It might well provide more genuine security than the mightiest atomic arsenal in the world.

Another specific possibility to which far too little thought has been given, from either the political or the religious angle, is that of resort to nonviolent means of defense against aggression and resistance to tyranny, if need for it were to arise in spite of the adoption of a sound political program for combatting Communism, such as we have just sketched. Granted that such nonviolence is not an expression of unadulterated love or *agape* and that its exercise might not be free from ambiguities, this can hardly be a pretext for dismissing serious consideration of nonviolent political strategies.

In an age when the weapons of violence are such as to be less and less subject to rational or ethical control and their use probably suicidal, the almost complete lack of serious study of nonviolence as an alternative is almost incredible. A decade and a half ago Jacques Maritain said

to his fellow-Catholics that "the example of Gandhi should put us to shame. Not that it ought to be taken in an uncritical spirit or without reserve, but it is heart-breaking to hear Catholics talk . . . with levity and contempt" of Gandhi, his strategy and his methods. "There are other means of warfare than secular means. If a spiritual means could furnish arms of sufficient strength, the debate would shift its axis and the possibility of fresh solutions would appear."*

Here is another problem that might well merit the early attention of Christian theologians, social scientists and men of affairs. A strategy of nonviolence for dealing with the titanic issues of our times may more adequately embody the demands of Christian ethics than does the uncritical acceptance of the strategy of purely political warfare.

The effort needs to be made, by God's grace and under the inspiration and guidance of the Holy Spirit, to make Christian love operative in the temporal order, in political and social life and through its structures. Basically we are not cooperators or collaborators with the temporal order, but cooperators with God. "To absent oneself from history is to seek death. Eternity does not vacate time; but possesses it from on high. Our duty is to act on history to the limit of our power, God being first served."**

In the nature of the case we are not guaranteed success in the worldly sense. But neither — let it be emphasized again in an age when the masses no longer look to Christianity as a harbinger of hope — are we doomed in advance to failure. The Christian is not required to choose from among defeat if he remains loyal to Christian ethics, betrayal of his deepest convictions if he seeks to be effective in the life of his people and his time, and perpetual inaction. To assume that the energies of the Spirit are without influence or potency in the temporal order is Manichean and not Christian thinking.

Our basic contention is precisely that *both nonpacifists*

* Jacques Maritain. *Freedom in the Modern World*, New York, 1936. Essay on "The Purification of Means."

** *Op. cit.* The following paragraph is in part a further paraphrase of Maritain in the essay on "The Purification of Means."

and pacifists, the leaders and teachers of the Church as a whole, the ecumenical Church, need to tackle anew and together this task of making the wisdom and the energies of the Spirit potent in the temporal order.

Whatever may be the elements entering into a strategy to avert catastrophe and to make a democratic and creative world order possible, it is clear that this country and the Western world generally will have neither the clarity of vision nor the will and the moral energy needed to devise and execute such a program unless they achieve a thoroughgoing psychological reorientation, and tap new sources of spiritual power. Only on this basis can they develop a dynamism to meet that which is incarnated in the Communist movement.

There is no agency in sight except the Church to serve as the channel of new vision and power from above. But the Church itself will have to experience a new birth, a Pentecost, if it is to serve this purpose and to be the Body in which Christ comes to heal and redeem our age, "to shine upon them that sit in darkness and the shadow of death, to guide our feet into the way of peace." We have, then, to fix our attention in closing upon the Church, to realize more clearly and deeply its essential nature and mission, and to contemplate our place within it.

THE NEED FOR TRUE ECUMENICITY

The main burden of a large section of this statement is that with few exceptions the members of the Church in the present crisis are bound primarily to the nation to which they happen to belong and the culture in which they have been reared. The Church simply is not their basic standing-ground. It is imperative that we should recover the sense of the universal character of the Church, that we should take our standing-ground within this universal fellowship, and that we should understand and consecrate ourselves to the discharge of its distinctive ministry of reconciliation. In an age such as ours, all hope is gone if there is no Church above the

conflicts that are ravaging mankind, and which in the name of Christ asserts moral authority over men and nations.

If we make central this conception of the Church as a universal fellowship and the voice of the Holy Spirit, rather than of the nation or secular culture, and if we truly see ourselves and seek to live first of all as members of this universal, reconciling society, then certain things will follow.

If we are truly members of the Church and take our standing-ground there rather than in the culture of the age, we shall live in a state of tension at a time when so many things that men feel called upon to do are admittedly difficult to defend on Christian grounds. We must seek less and less to escape the anguish of that tension. We must guard resolutely against the temptation to "resolve" it by lowering or softening the definition of "Christianity" or by giving up the effort to be Christian. We must be prepared as individuals and as churches to be driven by the anguish of this tension "wherever the Spirit listeth."

If we accept the approach thus suggested, we shall be much more alert to use the standard of ecumenicity in our thinking as individuals and as churches about the problems of the temporal order in general and international problems in particular. This will affect the pronouncements and activities of church bodies as well as the course pursued by Christian leaders and people.

If pronouncements about the international situation are to be made — and churches do in effect make them even when they refrain from doing so in a formal sense — then there must be an effort to envisage needs of the Russian or Chinese people as sharply and intensely as the need of Americans or of our allies of the moment. If the "national interest" of the United States may in some sense enter legitimately into the calculations of churchmen, no less must the "national interest" of Russia. The effort to see and feel as other people see and feel is a Christian responsibility.

One may commonly hear it said that once war has broken out nobody can extricate himself from it, from which the conclusion is drawn that he should in some way participate

in it by contributing to "the national safety and interest." But very few Christians in any country take the stand that it is inconceivable that an American Christian should war upon a German or Russian or Chinese Christian — or vice-versa. In other words, on the existential level, all take the stand that the body of the *nation* cannot be rent assunder, but the body of *Christ* can! The nation, not the Church, is the "destiny" that men cannot escape. Our speech and our actions betray us.

The intervention of the ecumenical Church in the conflicts between nations should always be as a reconciler. This is not to argue for a sentimentally soft analysis of the policies of the Soviet Union, for example. But an analysis based on "tough" American nationalism or on the philosophy that the only "real" politics is a politics of power is also sentimentalism. A Church conscious of its responsibility as reconciler will not countenance an approach to international problems stemming from the desire of a people to justify themselves and from their refusal to recognize themselves as sinners before God and other peoples.

To emphasize the reconciling role of the ecumenical Church is not synonymous with a demand for negotiation or mediation in specific situations, though there may well be occasions when such proposals are legitimate. Though it is better for nations to keep on talking to each other than to start wholesale shooting, we must at the same time "remember Munich." So-called negotiation at its worst may be a screen for war preparation. It may mean cynical bargaining for spheres of influence at the expense of small nations. At the best negotiation and mediation are not the same as reconciliation, which goes much deeper and seeks to dig up the roots of conflict. It is to this lofty task that an ecumenical Church should address itself in its dealing with world conflicts. In so doing it must free itself from provincial viewpoints and from too great a concern about its popularity, reputation for respectability and institutional safety.

The Church discharges its ministry of reconciliation pri-

marily through its evangelistic work rather than through the expression of its concerns about the improvement or revolutionizing of the temporal order. Its great and continuous task is by word and by its "daily life" to preach to men the free grace of God, the inexhaustible love of God in Christ, and to bring them into the Church so that although, as the Apostle wrote, they live "in Rome," it is as "beloved of God, called to be saints" that they live there.

We have already alluded to the severe crisis that has overtaken the missionary enterprise in a number of countries and, unless a new strategy is found, will overtake it wherever Communism triumphs or makes substantial advances. We have pointed out that the Church does not *in practice* think of itself now as a trans-national agency called to preach the Gospel to all men and to every nation. The various churches stop at their respective national boundaries or in any event at an Iron, Bamboo, or other "Curtain." Their emissaries travel, if they travel at all, with passports, which mean that their respective national governments consider them to be "politically reliable." In an age tending toward totalitarianism this means that the governments regard their mission as in "the national interest." The passports are, of course, withdrawn when governments develop doubts on this point.

It is not only that missionaries and evangelists of the Cross are virtually stopped at the geographical boundaries between nations. They are also virtually stopped dead at the Iron Curtain, which in these days separates the two significant groupings within the various countries and parts of the globe: the masses of the underprivileged and disaffected, increasingly under Communist leadership, on the one hand, and other elements, largely middle-class, on the other. There is little serious thought in our American or other Western churches of preaching the Gospel to and winning converts among Communists, who presumably need the Gospel the most.

It is not possible for the churches or Christians on either side of the Iron Curtain to escape the grave implica-

tions of these facts — the contraction of Christian evangelism into something that is no longer universal either in a geographical or in a social and cultural sense — by pointing to the fact that governments impose restrictions and in many cases resort to persecution. It is likely that governments will resort increasingly to restrictions and persecution. If it becomes or remains the practice of the Church tacitly to accept such restrictions and to submit to political control of Christian witness, then the Church is doomed.

This does not imply that missionaries from the United States or other western lands working in the Orient have lacked courage or the readiness to sacrifice, which would be contrary to fact. These qualities are, in any event, not the exclusive prerogative of Christians or missionaries. The trouble is that, judged by its deeds, the missionary enterprise is forced largely to mirror the political divisions of our age.

The fact that some tenuous relation is maintained by the World Council with some churches in the Soviet bloc and that occasionally a leading Christian, who cannot readily be charged with a pro-Soviet orientation, makes a journey to the other side of the Iron Curtain, does not alter the picture essentially. Meritorious as such efforts may be, they do not penetrate below the surface. The stark fact is that as the months pass, the cleavage deepens.

We venture the suggestion that these "Iron Curtains" of which we are speaking are the counterpart of "the middle wall of partition" between Jew and Gentile in the First Century, that it is the task of the Church today to break down these barriers, and that it can do so only on the same terms as those on which the Early Church functioned.

The Early Church broke out of the restrictions of Judaism. It could not have carried out the commission to carry the Gospel to all nations if it had failed to do so. The fact that the Christians of the First Century did not participate in the effort of the Jewish nation to throw off the Roman yoke by violence — by reason of which they were naturally regarded as renegades — did not, however, mean that

they enrolled in Caesar's armies. Having broken with a culture that gave lip service to God but no longer did the works of God and sought to make the Eternal a God of one nation only, the early Christians did not on that account adopt the pagan culture of the Mediterranean world. They felt called to obey God rather than men and consequently, though industrious, sober, charitable and law-abiding citizens of the communities in which they lived, they refused to be subjects, tools, or soldiers either in the army of national "liberation" or in the armies of Caesar imposing the "peace" of Rome upon the world. As a result, they were regarded from both sides as "fools," "atheists," people "turning the world upside down." To their contemporaries it appeared that the only sensible thing to do was to exterminate such bad men, and they were frequently persecuted.

On their part the early Christians accepted without astonishment or complaint the rejection that met them from both sides. This was partly because in their view the Temple and the Pantheon, the Israelitish state and "Babylon the Great," and the contemporary cultures, the "wisdom" of the Jews and Greeks alike, were doomed. These already belonged essentially to the past. Why, then, should the disciples of Christ be concerned to cling to decadent institutions and patterns or grieve because they were rejected by them? "Let the dead bury their dead."

Furthermore, these institutions undergoing the process of decay had no attraction for the early Christians because there was something else to and by which they were drawn. The Church was the source and the center of their life. In its fellowship, in which there was "neither Jew nor Greek" and in which "the middle wall of partition" had been broken down, they found true and satisfying community. No "earthly" community could have a superior attraction for those who "continued steadfastly in the apostles' teaching and fellowship, in the breaking of bread and of prayers," having all things common, and to whom day by day God added those who were saved.

Strange as it may seem at first sight, it was these Christians

who "held the world together," this world which they rejected and which rejected them. These Christians were able to proclaim to Jews and Greeks and all others in their own tongues "the mighty works of God." On a closer look this is, of course, not strange. In an age when the world was rent with cleavages and when the existing communities of politics, culture and faith were no longer adequate to human needs, it was inevitably those who had been fused into a new, dynamic, universal community in which the cleavage had been overcome, who were able to speak to each in his own tongue. The new community became the magnet that drew simple men and women, slaves and some of Caesar's own household, and ere long men of the stature of Origen, Clement, Athanasius and Augustine.

We realize that such parallels are not exact. History does not reproduce an identical human situation after the lapse of centuries. The Church of today and tomorrow will have to work out its own adjustment under the guidance of the Holy Spirit to the infinitely complex situation presented in the atomic age.

Nevertheless, we believe that in certain respects the contemporary Church may have to follow in the footsteps of the Church of the early centuries, if it is to save and be saved. The contemporary churches and Christians are tied closely to Western or Communist cultures respectively, and to the nations in which they are located. The Christian Church today has to break through this limitation, as the Apostolic Church had to break through the shell of Judaism. It must do so for two reasons.

In the first place, recurrent economic crises, two World Wars in a generation, and the present state of "permanent war" clearly show that these institutions are in process of disintegration, or must at any rate undergo radical modification. The Church cannot save the Western nations and Western cultures in their present forms. If it identifies its own fate with theirs, the Church as an institution will perish.

Secondly, the Western world is now a world that names

the name of Christ but no longer does his work. The Church should not strive to save this world as it now is. If it does it will lose its soul.

Again, as in the early centuries, the Church is confronted with an alternative system, culture and empire — the Soviet or Communist. There are those who see in them the force that will liberate mankind and organize human life on the basis of reason or "science." But the Christian sees here another regime that denies the living God and relies on human "virtue" to build a world society under the aegis of an imperial, totalitarian world-state. Those who use Gospel norms have to reject this regime and the entire man-centered, secular, pseudo-scientific, mechanistic, authoritarian concept upon which it is built.

A Church that is subject to the spirit of Christ, and Christians who desire to be Christians, cannot make their first aim to salvage either the American or the Russian power-state. Similarly, Christians cannot devote themselves primarily to the maintenance either of the secular culture of the West or of the Communist culture that is its child in so many respects.

The Church must again be a truly universal fellowship, to which Christians give first loyalty, and in which they find such deep satisfactions that its drawing power will be far greater than that of an "earthly" nation or institution. The Church and Christians must stand over against the world, not conformed to it, but as salt that has not lost its savor, leaven that has not lost its fermenting and germinating power. Otherwise, they too will be trodden under foot in the tribulations that in the years ahead will overcome the nations that do not repent and turn to God.

A Church and Christians who followed this course, rejecting the "wisdom" and "power" of the contemporary world and choosing the "foolishness" of the Gospel, would naturally be rejected by many and probably would suffer persecution. The rich, respectable, and outwardly flourishing churches of a country like ours are perhaps in special danger of shrinking from such a destiny, of forgetting that Jesus

also "suffered without the gate," as did the Early Church, and that it behooves us to "go forth unto him without the gate bearing his reproach; since we have not here an abiding city, but we seek after the city which is to come." Paradoxically, yet also inevitably, the Church that took this course would draw men unto itself.

However small such a Church as we are picturing might be, and seemingly irrelevant on the political level, it would constitute a true community. Men accordingly would be able again to believe that community is possible. Multitudes sick unto death of strife, would recognize this church as the seed of the society to be, as the abode of peace, the "new Jerusalem." By the martyrdom they joyfully endured, the members of this church would prove to their fellows that it was possible for men even in this age to live responsibly as unto God and not unto men. This fellowship of believers would generate a dynamism before which even that of international Communism would pale.

The cleavages of our age having been overcome within the fellowship, evangelists would not be stopped by any Iron Curtain. They would, on the one hand, have no fear of men. On the other hand, they would not be paralyzed from the sense of having no message for the poor, the outcast, the believers in Communism, Fascism, or other current false faiths. Thousands of them would face the world not with the Gospel in one hand and an atomic weapon in the other — but as did the early Christians, unarmed, defenseless, eager to feed the poor and heal the sick, passionately preaching the gospel of love, glorifying in the proclamation of one who had proved His divine sonship and His lordship over men by dying on a cross, ever ready, if necessary, to "resist unto blood, striving against sin," especially in high places, to be sacrificed on love's altar since "the disciple is not above his Lord."

We do not claim to have answered the questions that such a church would face as it sought to work out the implications of such an approach as this in the realms of politics, economics, culture, or with respect to its own organiza-

tion and leadership. We recognize that the Church and the Christian, though not *of* the world, are still called to function in it. The Christian cannot transport himself bodily from the culture into the Church as if his problem were one of topography. We realize the danger of a too simplistic attempt to apply Gospel insights and standards to the political order and that there is a continual tension between *agape* and all political attempts to implement it. We stand at the beginning, not the end, of such a Church's adventure in this infinitely complex world, at this infinitely critical moment in human history, i.e., in God's dealings with man and man's response to God. So far, then, from suggesting that we have the answer as to how the intervention of God in the temporal order may take place, we emphasize again that our plea is precisely that the answer to that question will be given to a Church more united and repentant, less preoccupied with merely saving the present situation, much readier for revolutionary adventure in faith than the Church now is. The prayers and labors of both nonpacifists and pacifists are required in order that the Church fulfill its mission of bringing all the orders of life into conformity with Christ.

We subscribe to the declaration of Amsterdam that faith in a God whose purposes cannot be frustrated is "the meaning of history, which forbids despair or surrender to the fascinating belief in power as a solvent of human trouble . . . We are laborers together unto God who in Christ has given us the way of overcoming demonic forces in history."

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