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Thomas Knight Finletter


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THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO



ROUND TABLE

THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE BOMB

A Radio Discussion by THOMAS FINLETTER
EDWARD SHILS *and* HAROLD UREY

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Around the Round Table . . .



THOMAS K. FINLETTER, lawyer and author, formerly served as special assistant to the Secretary of State and as a consultant to the American delegation at San Francisco. He studied at the University of Pennsylvania, where he was granted both his A.B. and his LL.B. degrees. He was admitted to the New York bar in 1920 and practiced law in New York City. From 1926 until 1941, when he joined the State Department, he was a partner of Coudert Brothers. He served as a lecturer at the University of Pennsylvania Law School from 1931 to 1941. He is the author of *Principles of Corporation Reorganization* (1937); *Cases on Corporation Reorganization* (1938); *The Law of Bankruptcy Reorganization* (1938); and *Can Representative Government Do the Job?* (1945).



EDWARD A. SHILS, assistant professor of sociology at the University of Chicago, has recently returned to the University after doing special work for the government on Germany. He went to Washington in 1941, where he was associated with both the Department of Justice and the Federal Communications Commission in studying Germany. During 1943 and 1944, Mr. Shils was in London with the OSS working on the problems of internal politics in Germany and studying German public opinion. The following year he was attached to SHAEF as an adviser on German problems. Mr. Shils received his A.B. degree at the University of Pennsylvania in 1931 and has done graduate work at the University of Chicago. He has been a member of the department of sociology at the University of Chicago since 1938.



HAROLD C. UREY, distinguished service professor of chemistry at the University of Chicago, has specialized in the study of atoms and molecules and has made many outstanding contributions to the knowledge of this particular field. He is the discoverer of the hydrogen atom of atomic weight two and is the holder of many awards and medals for his services, such as the Nobel Prize in Chemistry (1934), the Willard Gibbs Medal from the Chicago Section of the American Chemical Society (1934), the Davy Medal of the Royal Society of London (1940), and the Franklin Medal from the Franklin Institute (1943). He is a member of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, the American Chemistry Society, the National Academy of Sciences, the Royal Swedish Academy of Science, Académie Royale des Sciences, des Lettres et des Beaux Arts de Belgique, and many other associations both here and abroad. He has contributed widely to scientific journals and is the author (with A. E. Ruark) of *Atoms, Molecules and Quanta* (1930). He contributed to the *Treatise on Physical Chemistry* (edited by H. S. Taylor) and was the editor of the *Journal of Chemical Physics* from 1933 to 1940.

The United Nations and the Bomb

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MR. SHILS: The United States through the Baruch proposals has presented a plan for the international control of the atom bomb to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. What does this plan involve? What is the effect of the Russian proposal which was made last Wednesday?

You have been working on atomic-energy policy now for a long time, Urey; what is the problem which we face?

MR. UREY: There are three alternatives in the solution of the problems raised by the atomic bomb. The first is to do nothing. I think that this is most likely the program which we are to follow. The second one is to attack immediately while other people do not have atomic bombs. And the third is to secure international control of atomic weapons which is adequate to prevent their use in war.

MR. SHILS: Where do the Baruch proposals fit into this scheme?¹

¹ Mr. Bernard M. Baruch, United States representative to the Atomic Energy Commission of the United Nations, submitted the United States plan for authority on the control of the atomic bomb in an address to the Atomic Energy Commission June 14, 1946. Excerpts from Mr. Baruch's address are quoted below (see pp. 10-13 for the text of his proposals):

"It is to express this will and make it effective that we have been assembled. We must provide the mechanism to assure that atomic energy is used for peaceful purposes and preclude its use in war. To that end we must provide immediate, swift and sure punishment of those who violate the agreements that are reached by the nations. Penalization is essential if peace is to be more than a feverish interlude between wars. And, too, the United Nations can prescribe individual responsibility and punishment on the principles applied at Nuernberg by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, France and the United States—a formula certain to benefit the world's future. . . .

"The basis of a sound foreign policy, in this new age, for all the nations here

MR. FINLETTER: Obviously, the Baruch proposals fit into the third category, because they are decidedly doing something—and they are doing something extremely important. The Baruch

gathered, is that, anything that happens, no matter where or how, which menaces the peace of the world, or the economic stability, concerns each and all of us.

"That roughly, may be said to be the central theme of the United Nations. It is with that thought we begin consideration of the most important subject that can engage mankind—life itself. . . .

"The United States proposes the creation of an International Atomic Development Authority, to which should be entrusted all phases of the development and use of atomic energy, starting with the raw material and including:

"1. Managerial control or ownership of all atomic energy activities potentially dangerous to world security.

"2. Power to control, inspect and license all other atomic activities.

"3. The duty of fostering the beneficial uses of atomic energy.

"4. Research and development responsibilities of an affirmative character intended to put the authority in the forefront of atomic knowledge and thus to enable it to comprehend, and therefore to detect, misuse of atomic energy. To be effective, the authority must itself be the world's leader in the field of atomic knowledge and development and thus supplement its legal authority with the great power inherent in possession of leadership in knowledge. . . .

"Now, if ever, is the time to act for the common good. Public opinion supports a world movement toward security. If I read the signs aright, the peoples want a program not composed merely of pious thoughts but of enforceable sanctions—an international law with teeth in it.

"When an adequate system for control of atomic energy, including the renunciation of the bomb as a weapon, has been agreed upon and put into effective operation and condign punishments set up for violations of the rules of control which are to be stigmatized as international crimes, we propose that:

"1. Manufacture of atomic bombs shall stop.

"2. Existing bombs shall be disposed of pursuant to the terms of the treaty, and

"3. The authority shall be in possession of full information as to the know-how for the production of atomic energy.

"Let me repeat, so as to avoid misunderstanding: My country is ready to make its full contribution toward the end we seek, subject, of course, to our constitutional processes and to an adequate system of control becoming fully effective, as we finally work it out.

"Now, as to violations: In the agreement, penalties of as serious a nature as

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proposals provide not only for the control of atomic energy but also for the control and elimination of war throughout the world.

MR. SHILS: Let us examine the three proposals which, as Urey

the nations may wish and as immediate and certain in their execution as possible, should be fixed for:

"1. Illegal possession or use of an atomic bomb;

"2. Illegal possession, or separation, of atomic material suitable for use in an atomic bomb;

"3. Seizure of any plant or other property belonging to or licensed by the authority;

"4. Willful interference with the activities of the authority;

"5. Creation or operation of dangerous projects in a manner contrary to, or in the absence of a license granted by the international control body.

"It would be a deception, to which I am unwilling to lend myself, were I not to say to you and to our peoples, that the matter of punishment lies at the very heart of our present security system. It might as well be admitted, here and now, that the subject goes straight to the veto power contained in the Charter of the United Nations so far as it relates to the field of atomic energy. The Charter permits penalization only by concurrence of each of the five great powers—Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, China, France and the United States.

"I want to make very plain that I am concerned here with the veto power only as it affects this particular problem. There must be no veto to protect those who violate their solemn agreements not to develop or use atomic energy for destructive purposes.

"The bomb does not wait upon debate. To delay may be to die. The time between violation and preventive action or punishment would be all too short for extended discussion as to the course to be followed. . . .

"But before a country is ready to relinquish any winning weapons it must have more than words to reassure it. It must have a guaranty of safety, not only against the offenders in the atomic area, but against the illegal users of other weapons—bacteriological, biological, gas—perhaps—why not?—against war itself.

"In the elimination of war lies our solution, for only then will nations cease to compete with one another in the production and use of dread 'secret' weapons which are evaluated solely by their capacity to kill. This devilish program takes us back not merely to the Dark Ages, but from cosmos to chaos. If we succeed in finding a suitable way to control atomic weapons, it is reasonable to hope that we may also preclude the use of other weapons adaptable to mass destruction. When a man learns to say 'A' he can, if he chooses, learn the rest of the alphabet, too.

"Let this be anchored in our minds:

"Peace is never long preserved by weight of metal or by an armament race. Peace can be made tranquil and secure only by understanding and agreement fortified by sanctions. We must embrace international cooperation or international disintegration. . . ." (*New York Herald Tribune*, June 15, 1946).

suggested, face the American people. What about the first proposal?

MR. UREY: The result of the first proposal is that in a number of years we will have an atomic-bomb war. Atomic bombs will be used; other weapons of war, such as biological warfare and many other things, will also be used. The end result will be enormous destruction beyond anything which we can imagine at the present time.

MR. SHILS: But do you think that other nations will have the bomb?

MR. UREY: Of course other nations will get the bomb in time. I suppose that in five, ten years—or maybe somewhat longer—there will be a great many atomic-energy plants scattered all around the world. They either may be for peaceful purposes or they may exist for the purpose of making war. But that will surely come and it will come regardless of “secrets.”

The matter of what atomic bombs will do has been discussed a great deal, but it is not possible, by the use of English words, to exaggerate the difficulties which have been brought into this world by the atomic bomb.

MR. FINLETTER: I grant that, Urey. But, by your emphasis on the destructive power of atomic weapons, I take it that you are not minimizing the destructive power of other weapons—those which are already invented and those about which we are now beginning to talk.

For example, I saw in the paper the other day of various people appearing before one of the House committees and talking about the most fantastic kind of biological weapons.

MR. UREY: Such weapons are difficult to evaluate with the certainty with which we can evaluate the atomic bomb: This is true simply because the atomic bomb has actually been used in war and the others have not. The potentialities of scientific in-

ventions for making war, however, are very great indeed; and we probably did not get the worst weapon when we got the atomic bomb.

MR. FINLETTER: But we have had some slight indication of some of these things, like the V-bomb weapons, for example, which would probably have destroyed London if they had kept on going.

MR. UREY: Surely!

MR. FINLETTER: And I believe that General Marshall's report refers to a fifty-ton bomb already blueprinted by our ordnance, whereas the biggest bomb we used in this war was around two tons. That gives some indication of what is going to happen.

MR. UREY: Ten tons, I think, was used.

MR. FINLETTER: Ten tons was used by the British, but ours was two, was it not?

MR. UREY: Something of that sort.

MR. SHILS: I would like to ask what you think would happen to our society, Urey, if we do nothing to control the use of these terrific weapons about which Finletter has been telling us.

MR. UREY: If we live under the threat of total war of any kind, atomic bombs or otherwise, we are going to have to become a policed state in which we will lose all our liberties which we value so highly. Someone will have to tell us where we are going to live; whether we are going to scatter our cities or not; and so on.

MR. FINLETTER: You mean to say that in your opinion, Urey, we will have a full authoritarian state, which will be bossed by a few people from the top and in which all our civil liberties will go. Is that correct?

MR. UREY: I cannot imagine anything else.

MR. SHILS: Why will that be necessary?

MR. UREY: It will be necessary because with the threat of atomic bombs we have a new kind of warfare—one that will begin very suddenly and end in a very short time. Hence, it is necessary to keep on the alert at every minute, day and night, year in and year out. Otherwise, by means of the rockets carrying atomic bombs or by high-flying airplanes with atomic bombs or perhaps by planting them in our cities—one way or another—bombs will come on a moment's notice without any declaration of war.

MR. SHILS: Then you think that we would have to be in a state of perpetual national emergency—a perpetual atomic alert.

MR. FINLETTER: We are talking about the negative side of things; I think that we also ought to concentrate on the loss of the affirmative things. For example, I believe that something like 98 per cent of our taxes and of our national expenses in the last years (not just during the war but before) have gone to the cost of war—past, present, or future. Just think what we could have done with that money in terms of constructive effort.

MR. UREY: Maybe this is also on the negative side, but it is illustrative of what you say. This war probably cost the people of the world between one and two trillion dollars. Our share was something like a third of a trillion dollars.

MR. FINLETTER: But we cannot measure this sort of thing in dollars. We have to measure it in terms of destruction of everything which the people of the United States think of as decent. It is going to be destroyed even before the atomic war, because we are going to have to have that kind of state in order to survive. Then, when we get into the war, it is going, finally, to be destroyed.

MR. UREY: I would like to come back to one point. If we do

nothing about control of atomic weapons, this is the sort of thing which will happen. I want to emphasize that. Do not think that by avoiding the difficulties of a supergovernment control of atomic bombs we have an easy way out. An easy way does not exist.

MR. FINLETTER: I take it that what we are talking about now is what happens in case we do not face up to this problem and use our brains to solve it.

MR. SHILS: What is likely to be the outcome of this national emergency—the permanent national emergency which is associated with an international armaments race in atomic bombs? Would you maintain peace that way?

MR. UREY: No, I do not think so. The time will come when some "Hitler" will arise in some country of the world and conclude wrongly (as Hitler concluded) that he can conquer the world and get for himself a great deal of power or a great advantage for his own country.

MR. FINLETTER: Is it not true that these new weapons—the atom bomb and all these other things—do lend themselves particularly to the advantage of the aggressor? In other words, the blitzkrieg seems more possible with these things; and, therefore, the aggressors are more apt to use them.

MR. SHILS: Is there not a danger, though, that we might even become aggressive ourselves in this terrible state of tension, not because we are deliberate or calculating about it, but because we will be so nervous, the tension will be so intolerable, that, in order to get the condition over with, some people will say, "Let's let the bombs fly"? And we will have a world war of atomic bombs.

MR. FINLETTER: It seems to me that, with the kind of government which we have now—that is to say, a government which

is run by the people—there is no possibility that the people would stand for our starting on an aggressive war and throwing bombs around. But I am willing to concede that if we have the kind of authoritarian government which Urey has been talking about, even the American people might do anything, including starting a “preventive” war. I will concede that.

MR. SHILS: We should also make the point that people, because of the fear of destruction by atomic bombs and other new types of weapons, might become so irrational from panic in this country that they, out of sheer desperation, will say, “Let us have a war and get it over with, even if we are destroyed.”

MR. FINLETTER: Certainly those first two alternatives of Urey’s do not seem very pleasant. No. 1 is going to mean the destruction of this country; and No. 2 might be the destruction of another country along with this one.

MR. SHILS: There was also a third alternative.

MR. FINLETTER: To oversimplify it, Shils, the third alternative is to adopt the Baruch proposals in their full implications. Let me say at the outset that the Baruch proposals are not specific on all points. There is a good deal of latitude there for interpretation; but, certainly, taking the spirit of those proposals, and the letter as well, it seems to me that they call for the elimination of war under the rule of law. This is also another way of saying that we need a form of limited world government.

MR. SHILS: Let us look into the Baruch proposals. We might distinguish between the technical aspects and the wider political implications. Urey, you have been associated with the discussion of the Baruch proposals. Tell us about them.

MR. UREY: First of all, let me say that I think that we have a little time yet to discuss what we will do on international control

of atomic bombs. We do not need to make a definite decision today.

MR. FINLETTER: How soon, though, Urey?

MR. UREY: In the course of the months to come.

MR. FINLETTER: Months?

MR. UREY: We have time to discuss this.

MR. FINLETTER: We have not very many years, though.

MR. UREY: No. We do not have many years; but we have a little time to discuss it.

MR. SHILS: Why do you think that we do not have so much time?

MR. UREY: Because other countries can get the secret of the atomic bomb by their own efforts in a relatively short time. Moreover, if they work on the problem of producing bombs for a short time, they will get a vested interest and will wish, then, to continue their work. War is a destructive business.

MR. FINLETTER: Let me understand that, Urey. When you say other nations do not have the bomb now but that they will get it some time or other, I gather that you think within a fairly short period of time they will get a vested interest in it. In other words, the American people have the opportunity to take the leadership before they get the vested interest, and it is much easier for the American people to get rid of the bomb throughout the world and get rid of war *now*. In other words, it is going to become increasingly harder to get rid of it.

MR. UREY: That is exactly what I mean.

MR. SHILS: Urey, could you tell us a bit about the technical aspects of the Baruch proposals?

MR. UREY: The Baruch proposals follow, on the technical

side, the Acheson-Lilienthal Report.² An atomic development authority is proposed which would operate under the United Nations. It would have under its direct ownership or immediate control the mines which produce uranium and thorium. It would have complete control of all dangerous activities, such as power plants containing fissionable material which might be used immediately for the production of bombs. It would then allow citizens and countries throughout the world to develop the non-dangerous activities like the beneficial uses of radioactive materials for medical purposes and things of that sort. This proposal devises some very good danger signals which would enable us to know rather quickly whether some other country intended to violate the agreement and thus make it possible for us to take any action which we saw fit. And it tries to have these danger signals such that we would have time to do something about the matter.

It, of course, emphasizes the positive benefits of atomic energy and gives the atomic-development authority something beneficial to do. It is very difficult to think of a mere police organization, with nothing but negative things to do, as having any very great effectiveness in the world.³

² The United States proposal for the international control of atomic energy was drawn up by the Committee on Atomic Energy and submitted to the Secretary of State on March 17, 1946. See Reuben G. Gustavson, Joyce Stearns, and Harold C. Urey, *The Implications of Atomic Energy*, a University of Chicago ROUND TABLE transcript, No. 424, broadcast May 5, 1946. This pamphlet contains a special supplement of excerpts from the Acheson-Lilienthal report.

³ The text of the Baruch proposals follows:

"I now submit the following measures as representing the fundamental features of a plan which would give effect to certain of the conclusions which I have epitomized.

"1. *General.*—The authority should set up a thorough plan for control of the field of atomic energy, through various forms of ownership, dominion, licences, operation, inspection, research and management by competent personnel. After this is provided for, there should be as little interference as may be with the economic plans and the present private, corporate and state relationships in the several countries involved.

"2. *Raw materials.*—The authority should have as one of its earliest purposes

MR. SHILS: Finletter, perhaps you might go into some of the political assumptions and implications of these technical proposals which Urey has just been telling us about.

to obtain and maintain complete and accurate information on world supplies of uranium and thorium and to bring them under its dominion. The precise pattern of control for various types of deposits of such materials will have to depend upon the geological, mining, refining and economic facts involved in different situations.

"The authority should conduct continuous surveys so that it will have the most complete knowledge of the world geology of uranium and thorium. Only after all current information on world sources of uranium and thorium is known to us all can equitable plans be made for their production, refining and distribution.

"3. *Primary production plants.*—The authority should exercise complete managerial control of the production of fissionable materials. This means that it should control and operate all plants producing fissionable materials in dangerous quantities and must own and control the product of these plants.

"4. *Atomic explosives.*—The authority should be given sole and exclusive right to conduct research in the field of atomic explosives. Research activities in the field of atomic explosives are essential in order that the authority may keep in the forefront of knowledge in the field of atomic energy and fulfill the objective of preventing illicit manufacture of bombs. Only by maintaining its position as the best informed agency will the authority be able to determine the line between intrinsically dangerous and non-dangerous activities.

"5. *Strategic distribution of activities and materials.*—The activities entrusted exclusively to the authority because they are intrinsically dangerous to security should be distributed throughout the world. Similarly, stockpiles of raw materials and fissionable materials should not be centralized.

"6. *Non-dangerous activities.*—A function of the authority should be promotion of the peace-time benefits of atomic energy. Atomic research (except in explosives), the use of research reactors, the production of radioactive tracers by means of non-dangerous reactors, the use of such tracers, and to some extent the production of power should be open to nations and their citizens under reasonable licensing arrangements from the authority. Denatured materials, whose use we know also requires suitable safeguards, should be furnished for such purposes by the authority under lease or other arrangement. Denaturing seems to have been over-estimated by the public as a safety measure.

"7. *Definition of dangerous and non-dangerous activities.*—Although a reasonable dividing line can be drawn between dangerous and non-dangerous activities, it is not hard and fast. Provision should, therefore, be made to assure constant re-examination of the questions, and to permit revision of the dividing line as changing conditions and new discoveries may require.

"8. *Operations of dangerous activities.*—Any plant dealing with uranium or thorium after it once reaches the potential of dangerous use must be not only subject to the most rigorous and competent inspection by the authority, but its

MR. FINLETTER: Before I do that, may I ask Urey a question or so? You point out, Urey, that the Baruch proposals in their first segment of action do the positive thing about atomic energy

actual operation shall be under the management, supervision and control of the authority.

"9. *Inspection.*—By assigning intrinsically dangerous activities exclusively to the authority, the difficulties of inspection are reduced. If the authority is the only agency which may lawfully conduct dangerous activities, then visible operation by others than the authority will constitute an unambiguous danger signal. Inspection will also occur in connection with the licensing functions of the authority.

"10. *Freedom of access.*—Adequate ingress and egress for all qualified representatives of the authority must be assured. Many of the inspection activities of the authority should grow out of, and be incidental to, its other functions. Important measures of inspection will be associated with the tight control of raw materials, for this is a keystone of the plan. The continuing activities of prospecting, survey and research in relation to raw materials will be designed not only to serve the affirmative development functions of the authority, but also to assure that no surreptitious operations are conducted in the raw materials field by nations or their citizens.

"11. *Personnel.*—The personnel of the authority should be recruited on a basis of proven competence but also so far as possible on an international basis.

"12. *Progress by stages.*—A primary step in the creation of the system of control is the setting forth, in comprehensive terms, of the functions, responsibilities, powers and limitation of the authority. Once a charter for the authority has been adopted, the authority and the system of control for which it will be responsible will require time to become fully organized and effective. The plan of control will, therefore, have to come into effect in successive stages. These should be specifically fixed in the charter or means should be otherwise set forth in the charter for transitions from one stage to another, as contemplated in the resolution of the United Nations Assembly which created this commission.

"13. *Disclosures.*—In the deliberations of the United Nations Commission on Atomic Energy, the United States is prepared to make available the information essential to a reasonable understanding of the proposals which it advocates. Further disclosures must be dependent, in the interests of all, upon the effective ratification of the treaty. When the authority is actually created, the United States will join the other nations in making available the further information essential to that organization for the performance of its functions. As the successive stages of international control are reached, the United States will be prepared to yield, to the extent required by each stage, national control of activities in this field to the authority.

"14. *International control.*—There will be questions about the extent of control to be allowed to national bodies, when the authority is established. Purely national authorities for control and development of atomic energy should, to the extent necessary for the effective operation of the authority, be subordinate to it. This is neither an indorsement nor a disapproval of the creation of

in the sense that they make it available to mankind. But, having passed that one over, they then provide for the world disarmament of atomic weapons. That is right, is it not?

MR. UREY: That is a conclusion which we can very easily draw.

MR. FINLETTER: Do you think that you can eliminate just the atomic bomb without eliminating other weapons as well?

MR. UREY: No, I do not. I have always hoped that we would be able to start with the atomic bomb and go on from that point to the elimination of planes and ships and everything which has anything to do with war.

MR. FINLETTER: But let me insist on that question a little bit more. I mean, is it possible really to provide an effective system for eliminating atomic weapons unless we eliminate other weapons simultaneously as well?

MR. UREY: You push me hard, and I think that I have to agree with your proposition that what we are looking for is what Mr. Baruch mentioned in his speech—namely, the elimination of war. That is really the solution to the problem.

MR. FINLETTER: All right. At the cost of some repetition, I want to emphasize the implications of what you have said. You pointed out that we cannot get rid of the atom bomb alone; that

national authorities. The commission should evolve a clear demarcation of the scope of duties and responsibilities of such national authorities.

"And now I end. I have submitted an outline for present discussion. Our consideration will be broadened by the criticism of the United States proposals and by the plans of the other nations, which, it is to be hoped, will be submitted at their early convenience. I and my associates of the United States delegation will make available to each member of this body books and pamphlets, including the Acheson-Lilienthal report, recently made by the United States Department of State, and the McMahon Committee Monograph No. 1 entitled 'Essential Information on Atomic Energy' relating to the McMahon bill recently passed by the United States Senate, which may prove of value in assessing the situation" (*New York Herald Tribune*, June 15, 1946).

we have to get rid of other weapons; and that, in getting rid of other weapons, we get rid of war. That is exactly what Mr. Baruch said. If I may just read you a couple of sentences from his report, it will make this very important point clear: "Before a country is ready to relinquish any winning weapons, it must have more than words to reassure it. It must have a guarantee of safety, not only against offenders in the atomic area, but against the illegal users of other weapons—bacteriological, biological, gas—perhaps—why not?—against war itself. In the elimination of war lies our solution."⁴

MR. SHILS: How is it going to do this? What does this have to do with the veto power which has been discussed recently?

MR. FINLETTER: It is going to do it by two political principles. It is going, first of all, to give the United Nations the political power to act.

Let us take a concrete case. Let us suppose that, for example, in some city of Russia or of the United States (and I think that those are the countries which we are going to talk about over the next fifteen years or so; others will come up later; but let us take our present troubles), let us suppose that it is alleged that someone is violating the law—let us say, illegally manufacturing atomic weapons or infantile-paralysis weapons or whatever they may be. Now the question of enforcement comes up. Let us suppose that it is in the Security Council of UN where the decision has to be made. Russia or the United States could veto any action whatsoever by the United Nations, and the United Nations would then not have the political capacity to act. Therefore, Pillar No. 1 of the Baruch principles is that we must get rid of the veto. Without the elimination of the veto, all this is nonsense and will not work.

MR. UREY: There is another thing in regard to putting in an

⁴ See note 1, pp. 1-3.

effective control. We must get rid of the large armaments of the world. Taking a specific example, let us think of what would happen if the United States or Russia, at St. Louis or Moscow or other places, should violate the agreement in regard to atomic energy. How would the United Nations do anything to prevent that illegal action? Let us suppose that the country where the violation took place interposed an army in the way of the United Nations.

MR. FINLETTER: In other words, let us assume that we did not have the veto. Therefore, in that particular case, let us suppose that neither Russia nor the United States, whichever were the offender, had the power to veto action. Then action is ordered. But the point which you are making is, what kind of action? In other words, it is a war, is it not?

MR. UREY: It is a war; certainly.

MR. FINLETTER: The United Nations forces would have to battle their way through the United States Army, Navy, and Air Force or the Red Army, as the case might be, in order to get at the individual.

MR. SHILS: In other words, if we are to get rid of the veto under present conditions of national control of armies, in so eliminating the veto, in order to avoid war, we would create war for ourselves. That is something else which is involved.

MR. FINLETTER: If we learn anything, it is simply that we cannot eliminate war by making war. That is the crux of Mr. Baruch's proposal for jurisdiction over the individual. He refers, in this connection, to the Nuremberg trials.

MR. SHILS: I wonder whether you could elaborate a bit more fully your interpretation of the Baruch proposals about disarmament.

MR. FINLETTER: In broad lines, Mr. Baruch says what we said

just a minute ago. We cannot stop war by making war. It just is not practical. It simply will not work.

Therefore, he suggests that we adopt the principle of the Nuremberg trials. What is that principle? It is that punishment must be against the individual malefactor himself. In other words, in this hypothetical case which we are talking about, the United Nations would have to have the power and the right to go down to arrest the individual, either in Moscow or in St. Louis.

MR. SHILS: How are you going to get the individual malefactor, though, if each national state has a large army?

MR. FINLETTER: That is precisely the point which Urey made a moment ago. If it had to go through a large national army to get at the individual, the United Nations would not ever be able to go through without a war. The result would not be jurisdiction over the individual; it would be enforcement by sanctions.

MR. UREY: I might remark there about the use of atomic bombs to police the world, which many people speak about. Atomic bombs, I think, are no good for such police purposes. Of course, one might say that, since the United Nations has a large stock pile of atomic bombs, it could jump right over the United States Army or the Russian Army and attack their cities. But that would necessarily be an action which would unite those countries solidly against the United Nations and destroy the whole policing function.

MR. SHILS: In other words, you think that atomic bombs are not very useful for the United Nations police force?

MR. UREY: Not at all. I would not try to police Chicago by means of a lot of sixteen-inch guns placed around the city so that if anything went wrong in the city, if some gangster murdered someone, we would start to attack the city with large weapons.

A large weapon is not suitable for police purposes. We want small weapons which distinguish between those individuals of the world who violate the law and those individuals who do not.

MR. FINLETTER: It is worth while to hammer at this point, because I regard it as the most important part of the Baruch proposals. The veto is equally important, but the veto has been picked up by the press and largely publicized, and everybody understands it quite clearly. But the newspaper comment on this disarmament question has been entirely inadequate.

MR. SHILS: The discussion about the veto leads us to a discussion of the Russian proposal. The newspapers have declared that the Russian proposal is diametrically opposed to the Baruch proposals. What are the similarities and the differences between the Russian and the Baruch proposals? At least, what is their compatibility?⁵

⁵ Mr. Gromyko, speaking on June 19, 1946, before the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, said, in part:

"There are thus two possible ways in which atomic discoveries can be used. One way is the use of these discoveries for the purposes of producing means of mass destruction. The other way is the use of this discovery for the welfare of humanity.

"The paradox of the situation lies in the fact that it is the first way that has been studied most and most applied in practice. The second way has been studied and practically applied less. However, this circumstance does not diminish the importance of the tasks which lie ahead of the Atomic Commission, but, on the contrary, emphasizes still further in a high degree the meaning of these tasks from the point of view of the reinforcement of peace between the peoples. There can be no active and effective system of peace if the discovery relating to the ways of using atomic energy is not placed in the service of humanity and is not applied to peaceful purposes only. The use of such a discovery only for the purposes of raising the welfare of the peoples and of widening their scientific and cultural horizons will help to strengthen confidence between the countries and friendly relations between them.

"On the other hand, if we continue to use these discoveries for the production of weapons of mass destruction, we may intensify mistrust between States and keep the peoples of the world in continual anxiety and mistrust. Such a position would work against the aspirations of the peace-loving peoples who are thirsting for the establishment of a solid peace and who are making every effort to insure that their aspirations shall be transformed into reality.

"As one of the first measures to be carried out, in order to carry out the de-

MR. UREY: The Russians wish to keep the veto power, while Mr. Baruch wishes agreement that there shall be no veto used in the limited region of atomic energy. I hope that it is possible

cision of the General Assembly of the 24th of January, the Soviet delegation proposes a study of the question of the conclusion of international agreements forbidding the production and use of weapons based upon the use of atomic energy for the purposes of mass destruction. The purpose of such an agreement should be to forbid the production and use of atomic weapons, the destruction of existing stocks of atomic weapons and the punishment of all activities undertaken with a view to the violation of such agreements.

"The elaboration and conclusion of such agreements would be, in the opinion of the Soviet delegation, only one of the primordial measures which must be taken to prevent the use of atomic energy to harm humanity. It should be followed by other measures designed to introduce means of assuring a strict supervision of the observance of undertakings entered into, the conclusion in connection with the above-mentioned agreements, the setting up of a system of supervision and control to see that the conventions and agreements are observed, and measures concerning sanctions against unlawful use of atomic energy.

"The public opinion of the whole of the civilized world has already condemned the use in war of suffocating, poisonous and other similar gases, and the use of liquids and substances of the same character, as also bacteriological weapons, and have concluded agreements forbidding the use of such weapons. For this purpose the necessity of concluding agreement forbidding the production and use of atomic weapons is even more obvious.

"Such a convention would correspond in a high degree also to the aspirations of the peoples of the whole world. The conclusion and elaboration of such an agreement and such a system of measures to insure the strict observance of the clauses of the agreements, the establishment of a system of control to see that the obligations contained in the agreements were observed and the establishment of sanctions against those who violate the agreements, all this, in the opinion of the Soviet delegation, would constitute an important step in advance on the way of carrying out the tasks laid upon the Atomic Energy Commission. . . .

"One of the fundamental elements of the existing situation is characterized by the absence of any kind of limit to the production and application of atomic weapons. These elements are important considerations, and only strengthen the suspicion existing between countries and worsen relations between them, calling for the political instability. It is clear that a continuation of this situation is likely to bring only negative results for the peace of the world.

"Besides this, the continuation of the existing situation would mean that the most recent scientific attainments in this field could not constitute a basis for joint scientific efforts among the countries, directed toward the discovery and the perfection of methods of using atomic energy for peaceful purposes. From this there follows only one correct conclusion, namely, that it is indispensable that there should be an exchange of scientific information between countries and that it is indispensable that there should be joint scientific efforts directed toward a broadening of the possibilities of the use of atomic energy only in the interests

to convince the Russians in regard to this point. (As I said a moment ago, I do not believe that we should think that the argument is over with the discussions this week. We certainly have

of the raising of the material welfare of the people and in the development of science and culture. The success of the work of this Commission will be determined in a large measure by the extent to which it solves this important task.

"The proposals are as follows. The first one concerns the conclusion of an international agreement for the outlawing of the production and application of a weapon based upon the use of atomic energy for the purposes of mass destruction. The second concerns an organization of the work of the commission for the control of atomic energy. I will read the text of the first proposal.

"Deeply aware of the extreme importance of the great scientific discoveries connected with the splitting of the atom and with a view to the use of atomic energy for the purposes of raising the welfare and standard of life of the peoples of the world, and also for the development of culture and science for the good of humanity;

"Unanimously desiring universal cooperation as wide as possible for the use of all people of scientific discoveries in the field of atomic energy, for the improvement of the conditions of the life of the peoples of the whole world, the raising of their standard of welfare and further progress of human culture;

"Taking account clearly of the fact that the great scientific discoveries in the field of atomic energy contain a great danger first and foremost for the peaceful towns and civilian populations in case such a discovery were used as a means of applying an atomic weapon for the purposes of mass destruction;

"Taking note also of the great importance of the fact that, through international agreements, the use in time of war of suffocating, poisonous and other similar gases and also similar liquids, substances and processes, and also bacteriological methods have already been outlawed by common accord between the civilized peoples; and

"Considering that the international outlawry of the use of the atomic weapon for mass destruction would correspond in still greater measure to the aspirations and the conscience of the peoples of the whole world;

"Animated by an intense desire to remove the threat of the use of these scientific discoveries for the harm of humanity and against the interests of humanity;

"The high contracting parties decided to conclude an agreement to forbid the production and use of a weapon based upon the use of atomic energy, and for this purpose, appointed as their plenipotentiaries—(and here the list of plenipotentiaries will follow, whose credentials are found to be in due form) agree as follows:

ARTICLE I

"The high contracting parties solemnly declare that they will forbid the production and use of a weapon based upon the use of atomic energy, and with this in view, take upon themselves the following obligations:

"a) Not to use, in any circumstances, an atomic weapon;

"b) To forbid the production and keeping of a weapon based upon the use of atomic energy;

some time in order to try to come to some agreement.) Beyond that, the Russian proposals leave a very great breadth for discussion in regard to the details of atomic control. It is possible

"c) To destroy within a period of three months from the entry into force of this agreement all stocks of atomic energy weapons, whether in a finished or semi-finished condition.

ARTICLE 2

"The high contracting parties declare that any violation of Article 1 of this agreement shall constitute a serious crime against humanity.

ARTICLE 3

"The high contracting parties, within six months of the entry into force of the present agreement, shall pass legislation providing severe punishment for the violation of the terms of this agreement.

ARTICLE 4

"The present agreement shall be of indefinite duration.

ARTICLE 5

"The present agreement is open for signature to all States, whether or not they are members of the United Nations.

ARTICLE 6

"The present agreement shall come into force after approval by the Security Council, and after ratification by half the signature States, including all States members of the United Nations, as under Article 23 of the Charter. The ratifications shall be placed for safe keeping in the hands of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

ARTICLE 7

"After the entry into force of the present agreement, it shall be an obligation upon all States, whether members or not of the United Nations. . . .

"I would like now to read the text of the second proposal. It concerns the organization of the work of the Commission for the control of atomic energy.

"Basing ourselves upon the decision of the General Assembly of the 24th of January, 1946, concerning the setting up of a commission for the study of problems connected with the discovery of atomic energy and other related questions, and in particular upon Article 5 of this decision, stating the terms of reference of the Commission, the Soviet delegation considers it necessary to make the following proposals concerning the plan of the organization of the work of the Commission for the initial period of its activity:

"*Part 1.*—The setting up of committees of the Commission, pursuing the aims indicated in the decision of the General Assembly to 'proceed with the utmost dispatch and inquire into all phases of the problem and make such recommendations from time to time with respect to that as it finds possible.'

"In connection with this item, it seems quite necessary to establish two committees which, as auxiliary organs of the Commission, would be responsible for a general study of the problem of atomic energy and the elaboration of recom-

that the Russian proposals can be brought into agreement with the Baruch proposals on many details.

MR. FINLETTER: It can be said, can it not, that on the two

mendations which the Commission might make for the carrying out of the decision of the General Assembly and other organs of the United Nations.

"It is proposed that there should be set up two committees, the first a committee for the exchange of scientific information. This committee would be set up for the purpose of studying point (a) of Article 5 of the decision of the General Assembly of the 24th of January, 1946. Among the tasks of this committee would be that of elaborating recommendations concerning practical measures for the organization of the exchange of information (1) concerning the contents of scientific discoveries connected with the splitting of the atom and other discoveries connected with the obtaining and use of atomic energy, and (2) concerning the technology and the organization of technological processes for obtaining and using atomic energy; (3) concerning the organization and method of industrial production of atomic energy and the use of such energy; (4) concerning forms, sources and the location of raw materials necessary for obtaining atomic energy.

"I come now to the second proposed committee whose task would be to prevent the use of atomic energy for the harm of humanity. This committee should be set up in order to attain the aims set forth in points (b), (c) and (d) of Article 5 of the decision of the General Assembly. The task of this committee would be to prepare recommendations on the following subjects:

"1. The preparation of a draft international agreement for the outlawing of weapons based upon the use of atomic energy and forbidding the production and use of such weapons and all similar forms of weapons destined for mass destruction.

"2. The elaboration and creation of methods to forbid the production of weapons based upon the use of atomic energy and to prevent the use of atomic weapons and all other similar weapons of mass destruction.

"3. Measures, systems and organization of control in the use of atomic energy to insure the observance of the conditions above-mentioned in the international agreement for the outlawing of atomic weapons.

"4. The elaboration of a system of sanctions for application against the unlawful use of atomic energy.

"Part 2.—The composition of the committees. Each committee would be composed of one representative of each state represented in the commission. Each representative may have advisers.

"Part 3.—Rules of procedure of the committees. The rules of procedure of committees shall be drawn up by the commission.

"Like the proposal for the conclusion of the agreement, these proposals which concern the organization of the work of the commission are a practical means of advancing at the present time. The convention would be a concrete and important step forward in the direction of setting up an effective system of control of atomic energy. This measure would have an immense moral and political sig-

fundamental propositions—namely, disarmament and the veto—the Russian proposals go right along with Mr. Baruch's proposal in so far as disarmament is concerned?

MR. UREY: Yes. It is quite obvious, it seems to me, that the Russians do not want war.

MR. FINLETTER: And it is also quite true, is it not, that Mr. Gromyko's proposal very clearly referred to all weapons of major mass destruction? In other words, it went far beyond the atomic bomb.

There is no doubt about it that at this moment, however, the two proposals are in disagreement over the veto. But do you not think that we might say that that veto attitude of the Russians can be regarded possibly as the first reaction or as a trading position?

nificance, and might strengthen the political stability in the world and the friendly relations between the peoples.

"The creation of the two committees that I have proposed with the tasks as I define them, would mean the adoption of a concrete plan of work of the commission in the initial stages of its activities and would at the same time mean the adoption of the necessary organizational forms for the carrying out of its work which would enable it to proceed quickly in the proposals of the broad exchange of scientific information and on questions related to the prevention of the use of atomic energy for the harm of humanity.

"The activity of the commission for the control of atomic energy can lead to the desired result only if it is in full conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, which are at the basis of the activity of the Security Council because the commission is an organ of this organization, working under the direction of the Security Council.

"Efforts made to undermine the activity of the Security Council, including efforts directed to undermine the unanimity of the members of the Security Council, upon questions of substance are incompatible with the interests of the United Nations created by the international organization for the preservation of peace and security. Such attempts should be resisted. I considered it necessary to make this statement in order that from the very beginning of the work of our commission I might make clear the position of the Soviet Government as regards the question of the character and basis of the work of the commission upon the question of the preparation of its recommendations as regards measures of control of atomic energy placed before the Security Council . . ." (*New York Times*, June 20, 1946).

MR. UREY: I should think so. At least, as I want to emphasize again, we should not believe that there is not yet time for argument, discussion, and mutual education among the Russians and the rest of the foreign representatives and ourselves.

MR. SHILS: But, Finletter, would you think that there is any significance in the fact that the Russians do not discuss inspection and operation in the way in which the Baruch proposals do?

MR. FINLETTER: No, I do not think that that is important. The whole question is whether or not the United States first will make up its mind that the Baruch proposals are the proposals of the United States government.

MR. SHILS: In other words, you think that one of the reasons why the Russians are holding out and why other nations might be suspicious of the United States is that they perhaps fear that the very generous proposals of Mr. Baruch and of the State Department do not represent American opinion and that the Senate would not support them. Is that right?

MR. FINLETTER: In the first place, Shils, if I may disagree with your word "generous," I do not think that there is anything generous about using one's intelligence in order to try to save one's self. This is enlightened self-interest in Mr. Baruch's proposals. Also, I do not think that nations are suspicious of the United States. So if you will amend your question, Shils, to say that other nations may have a reservation about accepting our proposals until they know that they are the official proposals of the United States government, my answer is "Yes," for the perfectly obvious reason that these Baruch proposals are only the proposals of the executive branch of the United States government—that is, of the President and the State Department. Congress, and particularly the Senate, because this will probably be a treaty in the form in which it is finally submitted, has to be heard from.

MR. UREY: And the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States are likely to do ultimately what the people back home in the small villages and the towns and the cities of the United States wish them to do. Finally, the whole question comes back to each one of us in our own communities and what we think about it. Do we agree that the Baruch proposal is a correct one? Personally, I think that it is a very fair proposal to all concerned. I am heartily back of it.

MR. FINLETTER: I agree completely with that. It is of the very highest importance that the people of the United States get back of the Baruch proposals.

May I add just one word? It must be understood that when I say "Baruch proposals" I mean the proposals in their present form. They can be watered down in such a way as to be nothing more than another promise to outlaw the bomb. Then they won't amount to anything. As they are now, they provide for the rule of law and for limited world government.

MR. SHILS: Prior to the actual writing of a treaty and presentation to the Senate, how could our government give some assurance to the other nations of the world that they mean this thing seriously?

MR. UREY: Why not pass a resolution in Congress supporting the essentials of the Baruch speech? If such a joint resolution by both Houses of Congress could be passed, it would help very decidedly.

MR. FINLETTER: As a matter of fact, we have a precedent for that. It was in connection with the Dumbarton Oaks proposals that Senator, then Congressman, Fulbright, put forth the Fulbright Resolution, which approved, in advance, the principles which eventually were put in the United Nations Charter.

MR. SHILS: We have come to the point now where we ought to try to draw to a head some of the points which we have raised

in our discussion. The fundamental point to be made is that there is only one path for this country to follow if it wants to avoid destruction in a large scale war—namely, the establishment of a minimum world government.

The Baruch proposal represents a chance to cross the Rubicon from unrestricted national sovereignty and military policy to the necessary minimum of world government. Other nations are more likely to accept the Baruch proposals if they are sure that America means them seriously—that is, if they are sure that the American people and the American Congress (and the Senate in particular), and not just the State Department and the President, mean them seriously.

If the American people want other countries to believe that they mean these things seriously, they ought to get their Senate to adopt a resolution which will affirm the general principles in broad outline of the Baruch proposals. This must be done speedily because, if much time is spent in discussion, if years pass, other nations, impatient and increasing in distrustfulness, will go on doing research in nuclear physics, building up atomic weapons, and developing their own atomic energy installation. Then, if we were to get the Baruch proposals accepted, it would be too late, because it would be too difficult to establish a system of control, once all the other nations have both vested interests and have also had the opportunity of hiding bombs and secreting away fissionable material.

The proposals which Mr. Baruch has presented and which have been discussed here seem to be rather drastic. And the American people have, on the whole, tended to withdraw or to be

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fearful of giving their support to drastic proposals, not because individuals were afraid of drastic proposals, but because they were fearful that no one else would support them. But the American people, in supporting the United Nations, have shown that they are capable of supporting large-scale imaginative proposals for world peace. What they have to do is to have the courage to support the Baruch proposals and to get the Senate of the United States to express itself in the same direction.





What Do You Think?

1. What is the relation between the control of atomic energy and individual freedom? Do you agree that a state of continual preparation for atomic war in this country would mean the end of our freedom and liberty? What would be the conditions of life in the United States under a perpetual atomic emergency? Would it be possible to continue a rational discussion of policy? What are the inherent dangers to the American people?
2. Can the United States depend on staying out in front in an atomic bomb armament race? Will a policy of "do nothing" on atomic energy inevitably lead to such an armament race? Can anyone win such a race? Discuss.
3. Is it practical simply to outlaw weapons of mass destruction? How far will this go in bringing peace? Discuss. Do you agree with Mr. Baruch that the real problem is the elimination of war and that this entails the elimination of all weapons?
4. How do the Baruch plans propose to place guilt upon individuals rather than upon peoples? Upon what principle is it based? Do you agree with its validity? Do you favor the elimination of the veto power in regard to violations involving atomic weapons? What would be the importance of such a step for limited world government?
5. Compare the Baruch proposals with the Soviet plan, as introduced by Mr. Gromyko. In what respects do they seem to be in agreement? In disagreement? Do you consider the points of variance fundamental? Would you agree with Finletter that these may simply be for the purpose of general political bargaining and negotiating? Do you think that final agreement can be worked out? How much time is there for argument, discussion, and negotiation? Is it important that such discussion take place *now* before other nations get the bomb?
6. Are the people in your community behind the Baruch proposals? Do they favor international control of atomic energy? How do they think that this should be accomplished? What is their position on domestic atomic-energy legislation? Do they support civilian or military control? Why?



More on This Topic

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Buffalo, N.Y.	WBEN	930	New York, N.Y.	WEAF	660
Charlotte, N.C.	WSOC	1240	Norfolk, Va.	WTAR	790
Chattanooga, Tenn.	WAPO	1150	Providence, R.I.	WJAR	920
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Chicago, Ill.	WMAQ	670	Natchez, Miss.	WMIS	1240
Duluth, Minn. and Superior, Wis.	WEBC	1320	Pittsburg, Kan.	KOAM	810
Elkhart, Ind.	WTRO	1340	Shreveport, La.	KTBS	1480
Evansville, Ind.	WGBF	1280	Springfield, Mo.	KGBX	1260
Fargo, N.D.	WDAY	970	Terre Haute, Ind.	WBOW	1230
Greenwood, Miss.	WGRM	1240	Tulsa, Okla.	KVOO	1170
Hibbing, Minn.	WMFG	1240	Virginia, Minn.	WHLB	1400
Mobile, Ala.	WALA	1410	Wichita, Kan.	KANS	1240
Monroe, La.	KNOE	1450			

11:30 A.M. MOUNTAIN DAYLIGHT TIME

Albuquerque, N.M.	KOB	770	Helena, Mont.	KPFA	1240
Boise, Idaho	KIDO	1380	Phoenix, Ariz.	KTAR	620
Bozeman, Mont.	KRBM	1450	Prescott, Ariz.	KYCA	1490
Butte, Mont.	KGIR	1370	Salt Lake City, Utah	KDYL	1320
Denver, Colo.	KOA	850	Tucson, Ariz.	KVOA	1290

10:30 A.M. PACIFIC DAYLIGHT TIME

Fresno, Calif.	KMJ	580	Sacramento, Calif.	KCRA	1340
Medford, Ore.	KMED	1440	Seattle, Wash.	KOMO	1000
Portland, Ore.	KGW	620	Spokane, Wash.	KHQ	590
Reno, Nev.	KOH	630			

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Detroit, Mich. (Sunday, 10:00 P.M., EDT)	WWJ	950	San Diego, Calif. (Sunday, 9:00 A.M., PDT)	KFSD	600
Erie, Pa. (Wednesday, 8:00—8:30 P.M., EDT)	WERC	1230	San Francisco, Calif. (Sunday, 9:00 A.M., PDT)	KPO	680
Kansas City, Mo. (Tuesday, 10:30 P.M., CDT)	WDAF	610	St. Cloud, Minn. (Saturday, 4:00 P.M., CDT)	KFAM	1450
Los Angeles, Calif. (Sunday, 9:00 A.M., PDT)	KFI	640	Twin Falls, Idaho (Friday, 10:30 P.M., MDT)	KTFI	1270
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