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S O C I A L S C I E N C E L E C T U R E S

N U M B E R 1

**THE
SOVIET UNION
AS A
WORLD POWER**

BY SCOTT NEARING



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SOCIAL SCIENCE LECTURES

1

THE SOVIET UNION

AS A

WORLD POWER

By Scott Nearing

1945 • ISLAND WORKSHOP PRESS

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THE SOVIET UNION
AS A
WORLD POWER

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | |
|---|------------|
| I. The Russian Revolution and the Soviet Union . . . | 5 |
| II. The Soviet Union Becomes a World Power . . . | 20 |
| III. The Soviet Union in Europe | 36 |
| IV. The Soviet Union in Asia | 50 |
| V. The U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. | 65 |
| VI. Peace or War for the U.S.S.R. | 83 |
| <i>Postscript: The Game of Power Politics</i> | <i>99</i> |
| Bibliography | 104 |

FOREWORD

I have frequently been urged to publish the lectures which I have for some years given annually in various cities. The suggestion came both from those who had been unable to attend the lectures and, more especially, from those who wished to review them at their leisure.

The difficulty has heretofore been the problem of distribution. A possible solution has presented itself through the facilities of The Island Press, a cooperative publishing house, and the *World Events* Committee, which has developed extensive connections throughout the United States and Canada.

I have accordingly decided to try the experiment of publishing one of the two series of lectures which I gave during the 1944-1945 lecture season, but brought up to date. If the experiment is successful, I plan to make it an annual practice, under the series title *Social Science Lectures*.

The publishing of the present volume is a cooperative non-profit undertaking. I have prepared and contributed the manuscript without remuneration; the costs of printing and binding have been covered by loans without interest from readers of *World Events*; the Island Press, which is attending to the manufacture and distribution, is a genuine non-profit cooperative, and the members of the *World Events* Committee, who worked out the financial details and will assist in the distribution, are giving their services without compensation.

Any surplus of receipts over expenses will be employed to extend the distribution of this and similar publications. The cooperation of all who are interested will be welcome.

SCOTT NEARING

Jamaica, Vermont
July 1, 1945.

PREFACE

There is peculiar timeliness in a discussion of the role of the Soviet Union in world affairs—(1) because the part played, and to be played, by the Soviet Union is so substantial, (2) because it is so little understood and (3) because it is so frequently misrepresented. I have studied closely the Russian Revolution and the Soviet Union, have made six trips to Soviet Russia and have had opportunities to discuss Soviet policy with many well informed persons. While I have no idea that I can set the reading public right on the much discussed issue of Soviet foreign policy, I hope that I can make some contribution toward brushing away the cobwebs of traditionalism and providing a reasonable viewpoint from which to consider the position of the Soviet Union in the world of today and tomorrow.

Anyone attempting to write or speak on a general subject such as the relations between the Soviet Union and other nations is confronted by three serious difficulties: (1) the bigness and complexity of the matter, (2) its unfamiliarity to an outsider (foreigner) and (3) the great body of prejudices, preconceptions and half-truths that all of us carry about. These difficulties are present in the consideration of many controversial questions, but in the case of the Soviet Union, with its land mass flung across two continents, its conglomeration of cultures, races, peoples and nationalities and its bold attempt to replace an old social system by a new one, the difficulties are magnified and multiplied.

Writers and speakers on the Soviet Union fall into two main classes, those who deal with some technical subject, such as the construction of hydro-electric plants or the handling of tuberculosis, and those who discuss the economic and social structure and policies. The first group has an easy time of it, since it is necessary merely to survey and report; the second group is hampered by personal bias and harassed by special interests.

If there is a wholly unprejudiced report on the Soviet Union, I have never seen it. Some writers, like the Webbs, make an effort at neutrality. I make no such pretense. I am not neutral on the Soviet Union. I have been a partisan of the Russian Revo-

lution since its inception and I am still a partisan of it. Anything I say or write on the subject will necessarily be colored by that partisanship.

Why am I partisan? I am not Russian, nor were any of my ancestors, so far as I know. I am not and never have been in the pay of the Soviet government and, with the exception of two years, 1927-29, I have not been and am not a member of the Communist Party. But I am a student of sociology and I am profoundly convinced that a time has come in the development of social theory and practice when mankind can undertake what Lester F. Ward called "the conscious improvement of society by society".

I have lived my life in an outmoded social order that is tearing itself to pieces in a manner which has proved highly expensive in terms of material wealth, health, life, hopes, aspirations and ideals. As a teacher of social science, I came in contact with the youthful victims of this social death agony and was casting about for some proposal or proposals that would provide a way out for the lost generation.

This search led me through the literature of social reform and social revolution. At the outset I was inclined to believe that the established order could be reformed—that is, preserved in principle and changed only in detail. The economic breakdowns that preceded World War I and then the war itself convinced me that the present social order is unsound in principle and must therefore be radically altered—that is to say, uprooted and replaced.

I was not and am not committed to any particular technique of social revolution. I disagree with Bolshevik theory and practice in a number of important particulars. But, while we in the west swallowed the bitter pill of economic paralysis and war, the Bolsheviks worked out an alternative theory and, at the risk of their lives, tried to put it into practice. Here was a group of people with a passionate belief in an ideal, a willingness to make immense sacrifices in its behalf and wide backing among a sturdy, uncorrupted people.

Had the Zapata brothers in Mexico or Sun Yat-sen and his Chinese followers or Gandhi and his Indian multitudes stepped out with equal boldness, I would have been equally partisan in

their behalf. I felt and feel confident that capitalist imperialism has outlived its usefulness. I am convinced that any effort to keep the old carcass alive by the injection of artificial stimulants will result in disillusionment and much unnecessary suffering. I welcome any and every attempt to find a workable substitute.

Soviet Russia to date embodies the most ambitious attempt to find a way out of the world-wide social crisis precipitated by the decay of capitalist imperialism and accentuated by the rush of technological changes and the rapid spread of social science. In the same sense that the years from 1780 to 1840 are known as the era of the French Revolution, the years from 1900 to 1950 will be known in history as the era of the Russian Revolution.

Bolshevism has already profoundly altered the social pattern of this half-century. Its influence will extend far into the future. Anyone who pretends to be well informed on the major social movements of our time must devote serious study to the rise and development of the Soviet Union. Anyone who is concerned for the future of mankind must do his thinking, plan his social strategy and formulate his program of social action only after a careful survey of Soviet experience.

In the field of world politics Soviet influence has been felt ever since the revolution of 1917. During the past five years the Soviet Union has played a leading political role in both Europe and Asia. There is every reason to believe that this role will be enlarged and will extend to the Americas and perhaps to Africa. Under these circumstances the subject of the role of the Soviet Union in world affairs becomes a matter of prime importance for every thinking person.

I. THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION AND THE SOVIET UNION

Events have moved so fast and so far during the last few decades that it is comparatively difficult for a person living in the current year to look back over the period that preceded the Russian Revolution. Three things can be said about this pre-revolutionary Victorian Age. First, the British merchant fleet, the British navy, the British pound sterling and the British agencies of propaganda spread their influence even more widely than did the world-girdling British Empire. It was a British Age and had been British since the downfall of Napoleon.

Second, the age was characterized by a sense of stability and permanence that expressed itself in peace, prosperity and a widespread belief in the inevitability of progress. A century elapsed between the end of the Napoleonic Wars and the beginning of World War I. During that century people learned to believe that men were too civilized to fight another great war and that the rapidly spreading supply of gadgets that came with mass production was ushering in an age of plenty as well as of peace.

Third, the years preceding the Russian Revolution witnessed the rise of the labor movement. Trade unions, cooperative societies, political labor parties, fraternal and benefit organizations, sport associations, literary clubs, large numbers of daily, weekly and monthly publications, and libraries of books and pamphlets saw the light of day during the century that ended with World War I. One of the most remarkable features of the labor movement was that it came from the masses, who selected their leaders, formulated their policies, initiated, established, financed and defended their enterprises by great personal sacrifices and often in the face of bitter ruling-class opposition.

While the Victorian Age beguiled the heedless and the ill-informed with its superficial appearance of security and stability, underneath the surface of the western world there was a ferment that always attends the efforts of a social class, heretofore exploited

or frustrated, to secure the reins of power. The Victorian Age seemed stable. Actually, it was evolving the agencies of its own destruction.

Profound economic changes underlay the life of the Victorian world. The most spectacular of these changes had to do with communications and transportation: telegraph, telephone, radio, printing press, camera, locomotive, steamship, automobile, airplane.

The most fundamental of the changes was the phenomenal stepping-up of profit accumulation in the industrial centres, where labor power was concentrated, propagated, psychologized and systematically exploited. Beyond these transformations lay the developing use of electric energy, the employment of petroleum as a lubricant and as a fuel, the widespread and cheap production of machine tools, the growth of synthetics and other factors that increased human control over nature and facilitated the conversion of raw materials into finished goods. With this power age went the mass production of consumer goods, bringing both quantity and variety of utensils, gadgets and trinkets into the homes of the masses. Mass production was achieved as the result of a newly established science of industrial management and organization that introduced local planning, budgeting, cost-accounting and bookkeeping as permanent factors in the business world.

Fundamental changes in the means of production are of necessity accompanied by equally widespread changes in political organization and social relationships. The transformation of 19th century economy as a result of power techniques moved populations from old lands into new areas, converted country folk into city dwellers, replaced the farm by the factory and office, and thus laid the foundation for the mass living, mass work, mass education, mass recreation, mass thinking and mass emotional reactions that are met with in the modern urban community.

The political scene shifted no less rapidly than the economic. Lenin characterized the epoch from 1870 to 1914 as "the struggle to redivide the planet". It was during these years that the great powers of Europe, followed by the United States and later by Japan, extended their colonial conquests across Africa and through large parts of Asia. At the same time, they were building bigger navies and perfecting their armies. A dozen local wars, mostly

in Europe, were followed by a period of general war that lasted from 1911 to 1922.

War was accompanied by revolution. Colonial revolts broke out in Cuba, the Philippines, and South Africa. The Russian Revolution of 1905 was followed by the Mexican Revolution of 1910 and the Chinese Revolution of 1911. The Russian Revolution of 1917 spread through Central Europe, North Africa and the Near East, and fanned the flames of the quiescent Chinese Revolution.

Revolution was answered by counter-revolution. From 1918 when Russian landlords, business men, bureaucrats, militarists and monarchists organized their drive to destroy the Soviet power, the counter-revolutionary forces of Europe dominated the political scene for decades. British, German and American troops invaded the Soviet Union while the ruling classes in whose interests they were operating, financed the anti-Soviet Russians. From the Fascist march on Rome in 1922 to the Nazi seizure of power in 1933, popular and republican governments were swept out of existence in one European country after another, and in their place appeared dictatorships, directing managed economies and building up military machines.

The new World War was rehearsed in Spain from 1936 to 1939. It spread through Europe after 1939 and became a general war in 1941.

Peace, progress, prosperity and permanence were taken for granted during the Victorian Age. This seemingly stable social order was disrupted by a spectacular series of economic changes, political and military conflicts between the major powers, revolutions and counter-revolutions that wrecked Europe and the world during the closing years of the 19th and the opening years of the present century. This is the background of the Soviet Union. These are the death agonies of an old social system and the birth pangs of a new one. It was under these world-shaking conditions that the Russian Revolution took place.

Two facts should never be forgotten about the Russian Revolution. The first is that it was the crest of a revolutionary wave that moved across the Americas, Asia, Africa and Europe during the first quarter of the 20th century. The second fact is that the pro-

fessional revolutionaries of Russia were for the most part either in exile or in prison when the revolution occurred.

There is always a tendency to personalize historical events and to localize or nationalize them among particular groups of people. Thus the names of Lenin and Trotsky are connected with the Russian Revolution and the Russian Revolution itself is singled out as though it were the only event of its kind during this particular period.

Such interpretations are grotesque distortions of the historic picture. Lenin and Trotsky were both out of Russia when the Revolution broke. The Russian Revolution of 1917 occurred seven years after the Mexican Revolution and six years after the revolution in China. It is true that Lenin and Trotsky were both outstanding revolutionary leaders. It is also true that the Russian Revolution marked the crest of the revolutionary wave. Headlines therefore centre on these personalities and on this event, although the personalities and the event were "one out of many".

There is another matter that should never be forgotten in a discussion of the Russian Revolution. The overturn did not come because revolutionaries wanted it or worked for it. Undoubtedly their plans and efforts had some effect in shaping its course and even in giving it birth. But the major factor behind the Russian Revolution was the inability of the Tzarist regime to function under the conditions of modern total war.

Tzarist Russia was an anachronism in 1917. Despite abundant mineral resources, the country was still overwhelmingly agricultural. Its relations with Britain, for example, were substantially those of colony and mother country. Russia shipped raw materials to Britain and in exchange the British sold the Russians manufactured goods and invested capital in Russian enterprises. British and other foreign capitalists even provided technicians to direct their exploitive activities in Russia because the Russian educational system was so inadequate that it failed to supply the necessary number of trained specialists. In political theory, Tzarist Russia was a great power. In economic fact, its development lagged more than a hundred years behind that of Britain and at least seventy-five years behind Germany.

Russia's cultural lag expressed itself equally in the social realm.

Not only was the peasantry illiterate but in an age of printing press, camera, and other ready means of communication, government policy limited education, restricted freedom of the press, and thus denied the masses any possibility of breaking through the ignorance and superstition that enveloped them.

Britain, Germany, France and other European powers had passed out of the era of landlord domination into that of business domination during the 18th and 19th centuries. Serfdom was not officially abolished in Russia until 1861, and when the Revolution of 1917 occurred public policy in Russia was still decided in the main by a bureaucracy that drew its support from the landholders, the army, the church and the state apparatus. It is not correct to describe the Russia of 1910 as feudal, because large manufacturing plants were operating in Petrograd, Kharkov and other cities, extensive railroad and telegraph systems were functioning, and Russian merchants were actively engaged in world commerce. But the business interests were definitely subordinate to those of the ruling bureaucracy, and through the entire period that followed the efforts of Peter the Great to westernize Russia the business interests fought an uphill fight for a share in the determination of public policy.

When World War I began, Russia was backward economically, the masses of its people were backward culturally, it had a small and inadequately trained middle class, and its ruling class was divided. Such a social set-up might carry on economically and politically in peace time or during a brief, small-scale war. It was in no position to handle total war in competition with highly industrialized, coordinated, modernized Germany.

Two years of war brought Russia to the verge of economic collapse. Incidentally, of course, the Russian armies had suffered severe reverses. But the major difficulties were food and munitions for the fighting fronts, transport facilities, raw materials for industry, fuel and food for the cities. The Russian breakdown in 1916 was a breakdown in supply that affected every branch of Russian life. The army suffered most, the peasantry least.

Tzarism's political apparatus crumpled in 1917 after the economic and social apparatus had begun to go to pieces. When Liberals took over in March, the Socialists in midsummer, and the Bolsheviks in November, they assumed control of a bankrupt community.

An outdated social system had failed to stand the strain of total war. Tzarism had gone to pieces under the pressure of the struggle to redivide the wealth and power of the imperialist world. The Liberals, Socialists, and Bolsheviks were trustees in bankruptcy whose duty it was to assemble what assets they could lay their hands on and reestablish some kind of normal social relationships.

Both the Liberals and the Socialists, for example, tried to continue in the war. Liberals, Socialists and Bolsheviks all attempted to revive production, restore transport, stabilize fuel and food supplies and liberate war-weary, hungry, disease-ridden masses who were desperately seeking peace, bread and a measure of freedom. It is customary in the United States and elsewhere to think of the Russian Revolution as a violent and successful attempt to overthrow Tzarism. Tzarism overthrew itself with the assistance of its Central European neighbors. The revolution was an attempt to modernize an antiquated social machine and set it to running along reasonably efficient lines.

Behind the revolution lay a century of social theory, of wide-ranging discussion and of ardent propaganda. The social theory found its origins in England and France. Locke, Hume, Rousseau, Godwin, Fourier, Comte, and many other thinkers in the two countries were responsible for the 19th century outpouring of revolutionary theory and attempts at the organization of cooperative communes. Germany made its contribution through the monumental work of Hegel and Marx. Russia produced Bakunin, Kropotkin and Tolstoy. These theoreticians differed sharply, one from the other, and when it came to connecting theory and practice, their planned patterns of a new society were miles apart. But it was upon their thinking and writing that the ideology of the labor movement depended. The leaders of the Russian Revolution had read and discussed these theories in great detail. They were the heirs of a distinguished group of social planners. They enjoyed another great advantage. The revolution and the civil war which followed it liquidated the superstructure of Tzarist society very thoroughly. The old had gone. The new had a free field.

Residues of the old social order remained, of course. These existed more generally in the villages than anywhere else. The peasants retained their agricultural and craft techniques, their

folkways, their social attitudes, their respect and contempt for authority. Although the superstructure of both the Tzarist church and state had disappeared, the peasants still respected the symbols of both institutions. Thus, the chairman of a peasant committee, sent from his village to Moscow, reported the marvels he had witnessed and ended, "Last of all I saw Tzar Lenin himself. God bless him!"

Other elements of the old order still persisted. Middle class and upper class individuals were passively or actively anti-bolshevik. Much of the church apparatus was intact and anti-revolutionary. Large numbers of Russians had gone abroad at the time of the Revolution, hoping for foreign aid in the re-establishment of their privileges. These and other factors laid the foundations for a potent counter-revolution.

Counter-revolutionary efforts against the Bolshevik regime took several forms. First there was the civil war, accompanied by military invasion from Japan, Britain, the United States, Germany and Poland. Czech troops participated in the counter-revolutionary struggle. Then came the era of encirclement by armed state capitalism. Japan on the east and Germany and Italy on the west built up powerful military machines, and in the Anti-Comintern Pact made what amounted to a joint plan for destroying the Bolshevik regime. Between 1932 and 1941 Great Britain and the United States joined the anti-Comintern bloc in their war on the republics. The immediate occasion for this counter-revolutionary move was the world-wide economic breakdown that began in 1929 and the Spanish Revolution of 1931. Within six years all of the European republics except Switzerland had been either destroyed or neutralized. Then came Munich (1938) with its program for the liquidation of the Soviet Union.

Bolshevism survived all of these attacks. The Soviet regime in Russia, like the Soviet regime in China, persisted. Unlike the Soviet Regime in China, however, the Bolsheviks succeeded in maintaining their control of the entire social apparatus. From this vantage point they were able to carry on planned socialist construction.

From the day the Bolsheviks took power down to the present moment there have never been two periods when the Soviet Union

was exactly the same. All social life changes; and social life in the Soviet Union has changed with unusual rapidity through the entire course of its existence. It is therefore impossible to give a description of the Soviet Union at any particular stage in its evolution without knowing that before the description had been completed the thing described will have been modified in some degree. Perhaps the most satisfactory way to characterize the Soviet Union is to set down some of the immediate achievements of the revolution, some of the early efforts at social construction and then to list some of the factors that distinguish present-day Soviet society from the social systems existing in other parts of the world.

Peace, abundance and freedom were the slogans under which the Bolsheviks took power. As followers of Marxian theory, their first task was to end exploitation in the Soviet Union and to assist in terminating exploitation in other parts of the world. John Reed, in his *Ten Days that Shook the World*, gives a well-documented picture of this stage in Soviet history. Land, productive tools, buildings and utilities were declared social property. Some of them were held by the cooperatives, some by municipalities and other local government agencies and some by the central government. The means of exploitation—the ownership of jobs, were thus transferred from private to public control. A line of distinction was drawn between those forms of property which the individual used to satisfy his own needs, and those forms through which the owner could compel others to do his bidding. Hand tools and implements, small dwellings and personal belongings remained private property. All other property became public.

Bolshevik control of Russian life had been secured under the slogan "All power to the Soviets". The Soviets were bodies of delegates elected by farmers, workers and soldiers. In the early stages, farmers elected representatives from their villages, workers from their factories and soldiers from their military formations. As the soviet system developed, each village, town and city had its village, town and city council or soviet. There were regional soviets, corresponding to state legislatures in the United States. Republics such as the Ukraine and White Russia had their all-republic soviets. Over all was the All-Union Soviet, a central parliament composed of representatives from the entire Soviet Union.

Tzarist Russia had restricted or suppressed mass organization. With the revolution such organizations blossomed in wide variety. The country went organization-crazy.

Since the Bolsheviks held their authority as a result of mass support, they began the organization of a society in terms of these mass interests. The peasants secured the use of the land. The workers took control of productive enterprises. Public authorities began the organization of schools, health services, recreation facilities. The Soviet Union was to be a country of, by and for the masses.

Although Soviet leaders had promised peace to their followers, immediately after the Revolution they found themselves in a civil war against a score of counter-revolutionary armies, with invading forces moving in from east and west. One of the first tasks of the new government was therefore the establishment of the Red Army. Throughout the entire course of Soviet history the Red Army has received a large share of the national income, has been accorded a high place among Soviet institutions and has played an important role in shaping Soviet policy. The threat of war and the Axis invasion in 1941 made the Red Army the focal Soviet organization.

Soviet leaders realized the necessity of unifying the population over whom they exercised authority. In order to achieve this result they proposed to abolish all forms of discrimination against races and nationalities; to organize a federation of socialist soviet republics, each of which should enjoy a large measure of autonomy; to place men and women on the same political, social and economic basis; to make rural economy as efficient as urban economy and thus to end the distinction between the backward country and the advanced city; to raise the cultural level of the more backward areas of the Soviet Union as rapidly as possible to the level of the more advanced areas. All of these provisions were aimed at one general object: the ending of inequality and the establishment of equal opportunity for the rising generation of Soviet citizens.

Class-divided society, argued the Bolshevik leaders, is torn by schisms and conflicts. In the Soviet Union we shall set up a monolithic, class-free community in which the interests of all and the interests of each are synonymous. Civil strife will cease, the Soviet government will be the spokesman for the common and unified

aim of the community, which is the elevation of public well-being.

Monolithic society, freed from tensions by the abolition of class divisions, would not be torn by rival interests speaking through competing social groups and political parties. In the new society one political party would exist, the party of the workers. Into this party would be drawn a membership composed of the militant vanguard of farmers, industrial workers, technical workers, professional workers. Entrance into the party would be preceded by a long and arduous probation. Those who succeeded in gaining admission would work selflessly for the well-being of the whole Soviet people. Those members who failed to live up to their party obligations would be ruthlessly purged from the party ranks.

A time would come when the work of socialist construction would be completed and the new society had been organized. Then, in the words of Frederick Engels, the strong socialist state would "wither away". Such a development, however, lay in the future. It was an ideal toward which Soviet society might look forward. For the present the state was a powerful instrument, vigilantly safeguarding the interests of Soviet citizens.

Such were the general objectives of Soviet policy. They will be found in the writings and speeches of Lenin and his co-workers. They took form in the discussions and resolutions of the Russian Communist Party. Attempts were made to give them institutional reality in the developing life of the new society.

Counter-revolutionary forces and the inertia inherent in every social group rendered the fulfillment of such objectives difficult or impossible. In the economic field, for example, one of the first moves of the Soviet Government was to socialize the means of production and to establish a wide range of economic social services grouped under the general title of war communism. Within three years, however, the Soviet Union officially inaugurated a New Economic Policy which involved the granting of concessions to foreign investors and the restoration of private merchandising and some jobbing and manufacturing. Lenin recognized the move as a retreat from war communism but described it as a step backward in preparation for two steps forward. Similar changes were made in other fields. The high-water mark of the revolution was reached in the months and years immediately following November 1917. Thereafter adjustments and compromises were made with

the counter-revolutionary forces both inside and outside the Soviet Union. A temporary advance was registered in the collectivization of farmland that accompanied the first Five Year Plan (1928). For the most part, however, the years from 1921 to 1941 witnessed the adaptation of Soviet institutions to the psychology of a population trained under Tzarism and to a world scene in which the Soviet Union and its institutions were anathema to virtually every ruling class group.

So much for the internal life of the Soviet Union. Equally important in the eyes of Soviet leaders and of great numbers of Soviet workers was the relation between the Soviet Union and the outside world. The Russian Revolution was but one expression of a general revolutionary wave. If the Russian workers could overthrow their exploiters and set up a socialist republic, why could not the workers in Germany, France, Great Britain, the United States, Mexico, China and Japan do the same thing? The achievement of this world revolution would be followed by the establishment of a world federation of peoples' republics. Empires would be a thing of the past. Wars would cease. The peoples of the world, united in one great commonwealth, would live in peace and friendship. The age-old conflict of man against man would be forgotten in the period of universal brotherhood.

The world revolution did not materialize, however. By 1922, when the Fascists seized power in Italy, it was evident that world counter-revolution was far more likely than world revolution. Hence the gradual adaptation of Soviet diplomacy and Soviet foreign policy to a world directed by the principles of power politics and dominated by half-a-dozen well-armed empires.

More than a quarter of a century has passed since the Soviet Union adopted its ambitious program for a socialized Russia and a socialized, federated world. What remains of these plans? In the world at large, outside of Soviet China, little or nothing, except insofar as the existing anti-Soviet social order has taken over segments of Soviet thinking and organization. Social planning is now generally accepted as a function of government. Managed economies are taken for granted. The world at large, however, is still either non-socialist or anti-socialist.

Inside the Soviet Union, while the mortality of early Soviet in-

stitutions has been comparatively high, and while modifications in Soviet thinking have been numerous and profound, Soviet society has retained a phenomenally large proportion of the innovations which it inaugurated immediately after the revolution. Social ownership of the means of production has been retained and enlarged as the basis of Soviet economy. Social planning has been carried to a high state of proficiency. Racial minorities have been federated, their position has been respected, and despite their long tradition of friction and conflict under Tzarism, they have worked together with remarkable effectiveness. The one-party state has continued. Control within the party has been more highly centralized. The local autonomy of members of the Soviet Federation has been decreased. Opposition was liquidated in the drastic purges of 1936-38. Nevertheless, the test imposed by the Nazi invasion of 1941 showed the Russian people solidly behind their leadership.

Soviet foreign policy, as we shall see in the course of these discussions, no longer anticipates world revolution as an immediate probability. On the contrary, Soviet diplomats recognize their position as a socialist minority in an imperialist world.

When Eric Johnston, President of the United States Chamber of Commerce, returned from an extensive inspection trip of Russia in the summer of 1944, he wrote a series of signed newspaper articles summing up his observations. "The Soviet's life is based upon the State's ownership of all the means of production. . . . There is absolutely no evidence that the Soviet Union intends to abandon, even in the smallest degree, this principle of the State's ownership of all the means of production. In fact, the people's devotion to this system has been strengthened by the successes of war. . . . The older, top-ranking Communist leaders installed this system of collectivism twenty-seven year ago. They believed it saved Russia from German enslavement. These older leaders are not going to change the system. The directors of factories and farms are men in their thirties. They know no other system for comparison. . . . Today, not even telescopic or X-ray vision could see any private enterprise clothing in the Russian Bear's wardrobe." (*N. Y. Times*, July 30, 1944.)

Granted the correctness of Mr. Johnston's contention, and in the article he goes on to argue that the Russian rank and file support

their leaders in this position, it is evident that the revolution has brought benefits that make it appear superior to Tzarism. What are some of those benefits?

1. A people, living in the dark, has been enlightened. An illiterate famine-ridden exploited community, saturated with superstition, has been replaced by a literate, scientifically-minded generation, convinced that it can play a major role in shaping its own destiny and in modifying the destiny of the entire human race.

2. A technically backward community has been converted, within one generation, into one of the most technically advanced areas in the world. This transformation has been effected as a result of social plans which the masses helped to make and to carry out. The collectivization and mechanization of agriculture is one of the most important aspects of this technological revolution.

3. A widely-flung nation, consisting largely of farmers scattered in some three hundred thousand villages and enjoying few social services beyond those grudgingly rendered by a poorly served ecclesiastical apparatus, has come into possession of an elaborate social security and social service organization including public health, public education, public recreation, multiple social insurance, electrification, postal service, roads.

4. Industrialization, technical improvements, the broadening of scientific activity, the encouragement of the arts and the growth of the social services have created an unprecedented demand for trained personnel. Consequently, within a decade after the revolution the Soviet Union was turning out tens of thousands of trained men and women who were learning and following a wide variety of technical and professional careers. In the language of the capitalist world, the revolution greatly expanded the Russian middle class. In Soviet language, the revolution created a mass technological intelligentsia.

5. Socialistic construction offered energetic, ambitious boys and girls of the new generation an opportunity to make a career for themselves in the professions of their choice. Youth responded, as young people anywhere respond under similar circumstances, crowding into the schools, activating organizations, pouring time, energy and enthusiasm into the multiple channels opened to them by the revolution. Eric Johnston noted that the managers of Soviet

enterprises are generally in their thirties. They are men and women born around 1910, trained during or since the revolution, who today compose the immense staff of technical experts that directs the Soviet social apparatus.

6. Soviet youth has not worked for Russia alone. It has been trained to believe that socialist construction gains in the Soviet Union are gains for mankind. Events have demonstrated the correctness of this view. Successes achieved in many branches of Soviet endeavor have made the Soviet Union a pioneer and leader in world cultural advance. The Soviet Union is pioneering on the social frontier and its achievements have already modified human society. Individually and collectively the Soviet people have a record of which they may be justly proud and look forward into a future which they are actively helping to shape.

7. Tzarism confined opportunity to a relatively small group at the apex of the social pyramid. In accordance with feudal tradition, the top leaders were generally born to authority, whether they were capable of exercising it or not. The revolution opened the gates of opportunity to the masses, and through them flooded a great wave of popular enthusiasm to know, to plan, to build and create.

There was a type pattern of social organization existing throughout the western world in the 19th century. We have been calling it the Victorian pattern. It included such traditional institutions as private property, class division, capitalist exploitation, parliamentary government, imperialism and military conflict. During the past fifty years the Victorian pattern has been pulverized as the result of economic breakdown, war, colonial revolt and social revolution. Discovery and invention have played a basic part in expediting this process. Out of the disorder and chaos attendant upon the destruction of the old social order, a new social form is emerging. The Russian Revolution was the dramatic highlight in this social change and the Soviet Union has become the pioneer of the new social order.

Through the 18th century, when feudal society was being replaced by a business-dominated world, the English colonies in North America, the business elements in France and the ruling classes of Britain and Holland built up the system of free enter-

prise in economics and of representative parliamentary government in politics which became the type pattern of the more progressive parts of the 19th century world. There seems every reason to believe that the institutional changes that followed the Russian Revolution may be playing a similar part in establishing the social type pattern of the 20th century.

The Soviet Union is a large, complex and rapidly changing community, about which it is difficult to generalize with any degree of accuracy. I have tried to describe some of the changes that have taken place since Tzarism was replaced by Sovietism and to indicate the effects that these changes have had upon the life of the Russian people. This analysis is of necessity superficial, inadequate and sadly lacking in the kind of detail necessary to any complete picture. But it helps to clothe the term "Soviet Union" with a reality that lies beyond the realm of prejudice and that is making it possible for the peoples of Russia to play a major role in world affairs.

II. THE SOVIET UNION BECOMES A WORLD POWER

Tzarist Russia was a world power. There could be no two opinions on that subject. The country had a large area and a considerable population. Foreign governments sent ambassadors to the Court of St. Petersburg. Russian diplomats were sought out and consulted. The Russian Foreign Office was one of the busiest in Europe. Textbooks listed Russia among the seven or eight leading powers.

With the fall of the Tzar went the prestige that had attached to the Russian Court and had attended the representatives of the Russian state. The Tzar was dead, the Court was dissolved. Those who had spoken for Russia in the name of His Imperial Majesty were scattered far and wide. The guiding spirits in the Bolshevik state had been gathered from the prison camps of Siberia, the jails of Russia, and from humble living quarters in foreign cities. They spoke in the name of wage-earners, farmers, soldiers and professional workers. Could a state led by such a motley collection of nobodies become a great world power?

Before a specific answer can be given to that question it will be necessary to come to some understanding as to the meaning of political power. We speak of The Powers, with a capital P, and refer to a particular nation or empire as a Great Power or a World Power. What do these terms imply?

Until comparatively recent years it was customary to describe power rather than to define it. There was no question in anyone's mind but that Great Britain, France, Germany and Russia were all great powers before 1917. Why were they great powers? Psychologists, analysing power in human relationships, describe it as the possibility of imposing the will of one person upon another person. Sociologists define power as the possibility of compelling others to subordinate their interests to the interests of those in authority. The man in the street would say that power implies the possibility of pushing somebody else around. Translate these ideas into the realm of international politics and power signifies the capacity of

the power-holder to impose its will upon those nations, peoples or individuals over whom it desires to exercise authority.

Political scientists are pretty well agreed as to the practical meaning of power. Frederick L. Schuman, for example, begins his *International Politics*: "Force, fraud and favors are the weapons of power which rulers have used from the beginning of recorded time to induce obedience from the ruled." (2nd Ed., p. 1.) N. J. Spykman explains international power relations by pointing out that international society, as at present constituted, is "without a central authority to preserve law and order, and without an official agency to protect its members in the enjoyment of their rights." (*America's Strategy in World Politics*, p. 7.)* Consequently, "the basic objective of the foreign policy of all states is the preservation of territorial integrity and political independence." (*Ibid.*, p. 17.) Under such circumstances, "The struggle for power is identical with the struggle for survival, and the improvement of the relative power position becomes the primary objective of the internal and the external policy of states. . . . Power means survival, the ability to impose one's will on others, the capacity to dictate to those who are without power. . . . The search for power is not made for the achievement of moral values. Moral values are used to facilitate the attainment of power." (*Ibid.*, p. 18.) What is the ultimate test of power? Professor Spykman answers: "Power is, in the last instance, the ability to wage successful war." (*Ibid.*, p. 41.)

Such definitions make world politics and power politics synonymous terms. In the absence of world government, sovereign states in the pursuit of their special interests take whatever steps are necessary to ensure their survival and to extend their control over additional territory and larger numbers of people. "Politics has ever been a game wherein the contestants have vied with one another for the tools of authority." (Schuman, as above, p. 1.) What are the tools of authority? What are the elements of world power?

For the purpose of our discussion we shall list six factors and describe them as the essential ingredients of political power: (1) geographical advantage; (2) productivity; (3) man power; (4) leadership, management and direction; (5) a military apparatus,

* Quotations by permission of Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc., publishers.

and (6) the unity, solidarity and morale of the community. Any nation or people in possession of these six power ingredients is a world power, irrespective of historic background or contemporary world opinion.

If historic background or contemporary world opinion were the determining factor in world power, Tzarist Russia still would be classed as a world power. If world-wide disapproval, opposition, hatred and ostracism were determining factors in preventing a nation or people from becoming a world power, the Soviet Union could never have hoped for inclusion among the leading nations. In short, world power is a question not of prejudice or opinion but of fact. In examining the position of the Soviet Union as a world power, neither opinion nor prejudice play any significant role. Either the Soviet Union possesses the essential ingredients of power and must therefore be included in any consideration of world powers, or else, lacking these ingredients it must be content to rank among the minor factors in international affairs.

Geographically the Soviet Union occupies an unusually advantageous position. Its territory stretches from the Atlantic to the Pacific, occupying contiguous portions of northern Europe and northern Asia. During the last five centuries all of the great world powers have been located in the North Temperate Zone. There is some difference of opinion as to the reason, but one geographical factor is obvious, the bulk of the world land masses lies in the North Temperate Zone, and the bulk of the world's population lives there. Any nation occupying eight million square miles of contiguous territory in the North Temperate Zone would be in a strategically desirable power position.

Before the development of electricity as a source of light and industrial energy, Russia lay rather far to the north. Winters were severe; days were shorter, and the possibilities of production and transport were sharply limited by the seasons. One of the first measures taken by the Bolshevik Government called for the establishment of an electric grid covering the entire Soviet Union. Even during the war years, construction on this grid has continued.

Soviet territory lies so far to the north that the problem of ice-free ports is a matter of major importance. Russian foreign policy long has been colored by the necessity for warm-water outlets.

The problem remains, but with the growth of railroading, road-trucking and aviation it has become less essential than it was in the days when most transportation and travel were water-borne.

European national territories were carved out for the most part in an era of sailing ships and horse-drawn land traffic. These factors explain at least in part the relatively equal areas of the principal west European nations. The continental dimensions of the Soviet Union rendered efficient administration difficult or impossible before the introduction of rail, auto and air transport, telephone, telegraph and radio. Since these technical advances were made, continental areas like those included in the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. can be administered more easily from one central point than could the much smaller nations of West Europe be administered in the middle of the last century.

Fertility is no less important than the location and extent of a geographic area. The term includes soil productivity, timber growth and the presence of metals and fuels. In all of these respects the Soviet Union is unusually fortunate. Some of the most productive land in the world is included within its borders. In climatic range the country extends from the Arctic to the sub-tropics. The Soviet Union contains the largest timber reserves of any country in the world. The quantity and variety of its metals and fuels have not yet been determined, but the geological surveys undertaken and the mining enterprises launched during the last two decades make it certain that, with the possible exception of the United States, no nation has within its home territory a greater quantity or variety of the metals or fuels essential to modern industry.

One considerable school of thought has, in recent years, laid great stress upon the role of geography as an ingredient of power. The argument may have been somewhat overdrawn by the geopolitical school, but there can be no difference of opinion about the assertion that geographical factors are of great consequence as power determinants. In terms of geography the Soviet Union occupies a position that has no parallel outside of North America. If China or western Europe were unified, politically and socially, they would have to be included in this listing of advantageous geographic positions. As matters stand today, however U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. hold the two choicest geographic bases for political power.

The second ingredient of political power is productivity. Fertile soil and mineral deposits are ineffective in power terms unless they can be converted into producer and consumer goods. It is a truism that North America, under the Red Men, was less productive than under the White Men. The difference was not in fertility but in utilization.

Under the Tzars, Russian fertility was only partially utilized. Much of its mineral wealth was not even suspected. Quantities of timber and farm products were exchanged in the raw for manufactured imports. The Soviet regime has multiplied Russian productivity by greatly extending the utilization of its natural resources, improving its agricultural technique and building an extensive industrial plant.

Soviet economy has passed through four notable stages. The first, extending from 1917 to 1922, included the period of the revolution and the civil wars which followed it. Soviet productivity in 1922 was probably about one-fifth that of 1913. In certain fields, such as railroading and mining, production was virtually at a standstill. The second stage was one of recovery, lasting over five years. In 1927 the level of productivity in the Soviet Union was roughly that of Tzarist Russia in 1913. The third period of Soviet economy covered a decade, from the inauguration of the First Five Year Plan in 1928 to the Munich Conference ten years later. The fourth period was a period of war economy that began in 1939, when Soviet leadership definitely was preparing for participation in World War II.

Soviet authorities have compiled figures of national income which express this development in the following form:

RUSSIAN NATIONAL INCOME
IN 1926-7 PRICES
(in billions of rubles)

| | |
|-----------|-------|
| 1913..... | 21.0 |
| 1925..... | 16.8 |
| 1929..... | 28.9 |
| 1938..... | 105.0 |

The second year of the Five Year Plan found Soviet income

well above that of Tzarist pre-war Russia. During the next ten years the national income increased more than three-fold.

Soviet income increased rapidly after 1928 because that year witnessed the beginning of planned production. Various tentative plans had been tried out during the previous decade. Most of them were limited to particular economic fields, such as electrification, and all of them were tentative gropings after a technique that would permit the coordination of an entire national economy. The First Five Year Plan paralleled the collectivization of agriculture. After its inauguration the whole of Soviet economy moved ahead under the direction of local, regional and central planning authorities. The League of Nations *Statistical Year Book* publishes a table of index numbers covering general industrial production, and arranged by countries. The figures are based upon 1929 as 100 and cover exactly a decade. They were so significant that I should like to refer to them in some detail.

INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION INDEX

| | Germany | Great Britain | U.S.A. | Soviet Union |
|-----------|---------|---------------|--------|--------------|
| 1929..... | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| 1932..... | 53 | 84 | 54 | 183 |
| 1935..... | 94 | 106 | 76 | 293 |
| 1938..... | 126 | 116 | 72 | 470 |

Comparable figures are given for four countries in order to emphasize the contrast between Soviet economic trends and the trends in countries that were still relying upon unplanned economy. Perhaps it is merely a coincidence, but the Soviet Five Year Plan was launched in the height of bourgeois prosperity in the 1920s. Years before, Lenin had raised the question: who will outdistance whom? Bourgeois economy had sought stabilization in terms of its pre-war status. Soviet economy represented the achievements of socialist construction based upon an over-all social plan. Industrial production in Germany, Great Britain and the United States passed from a high point in 1929 to a low one in 1932. Thereafter, it advanced in Germany and Great Britain with the maturing armaments race. Arms production did not make its influence felt in United States economy until 1939.

Two facts regarding Soviet economy are particularly noteworthy in the above table. First, Soviet productivity increased every year from 1929 to 1938. In other words, Soviet production, unlike that of every other industrialized area was not affected by the worldwide depression. The second noteworthy fact is the rapidity with which Soviet economy developed. The *League Year Book* breaks down the production figures for the leading nations into consumer goods, producer goods and machinery. From 1929 to 1936 consumer goods production in the Soviet Union rose 186%; producer goods, 386%; machine production, 826%. Unfortunately for this comparison, Soviet figures for 1937 and 1938 were not available when the League publication went to print.

The First Five Year Plan was launched with the avowed intention of converting the Soviet Union from a country depending upon imports of manufactured goods to a country manufacturing for its domestic market. In order to achieve this result it was necessary to construct machines, open mines, build factories, expand road and railroad facilities. The success of this program between 1928 and 1936 is indicated by the figures just cited.

When the Soviet government was established, Russia was a predominantly agricultural country. Although some industries had been developed, Tzarist Russia did not rank as a producer of manufactured goods. Under the drive of socialist construction the Soviet Union became one of the three or four most important manufacturing centres in the world. Pig iron is the principal metal of modern industry. World production stood at 99 million tons in 1929; at 49 million tons in 1933; and at 104 million tons in 1937. Soviet production of pig iron for the same three years was 4 million tons; 7 million tons, and 17 million tons. Coal is the principal fuel of modern industry. World production was 1,333 million tons in 1929; 1,008 million tons in 1933, and 1,307 million tons in 1937. Soviet production of coal for the same three years was 42 million tons; 76 million tons; 123 million tons. While world iron and coal production dipped through the depression and reached pre-depression levels by 1937, Soviet iron and coal production multiplied three times. The Soviet Union was moving with giant strides in its efforts to overtake and surpass industrial production in the capitalist world.

Iron and coal were major factors in 19th century industry, and they are major factors today. The use of electricity, on the other hand, is a relatively modern industrial development. It is noteworthy that in 1938, the last year before the outbreak of World War II, the production of electric energy in millions of kilowatt hours was: U.S.A. 116,890; Germany 55,238; U.S.S.R. 38,000. The fourth country in terms of electric production was Great Britain, with 30,700. In 1929, Canada, Japan, France, and Italy all exceeded the Soviet Union in the production of electricity. Soviet production was more than six times as great in 1938 as it was in 1929, making the Soviet Union the third largest producer in the world.

When the Soviet leaders took over the broken remnants of Tzarist society they faced two major tasks. One was to get Russia back to the productive levels of 1913. The other was to industrialize the Soviet Union. The former task was completed by 1927. Ten years later the Soviet Union occupied a position among the three or four most important industrial producing nations of the world.

The third factor which we listed as among the six essential ingredients of political power, was man power. No state apparatus can function unless it has an adequate supply of men and women trained and willing to carry on the necessary social activities. The great powers of Europe, outside Russia, have populations running from 42 million in France, 43 million in Italy, 47 million in Great Britain to 65 million in Germany. The population of Japan is 72 million; of the United States 130 million. The population of the Soviet Union is 170 million. All of these figures are for 1937 and 1938. Among the great powers of the world the Soviet Union ranks first in the numbers of its home population. Quantity without quality is meaningless, however, and in terms of political power, quality means capacity to produce, organize, administer, defend. Tzarist Russia had a large population, but the bulk of them were farmers who depended upon human energy and a little animal power. Four-fifths of these farmers could neither read nor write.

One of the first tasks confronted by Soviet leaders was that of developing a trained personnel. Something has already been said in our discussion of the Russian Revolution concerning the revolution in Russian education that accompanied the shift in political

power. Under the Tzars, about seven million children were in school. Twenty years later, the total was about 33 million. If time permitted, a great deal might be said about the course of study under the two regimes. Tzarist schools were mainly church controlled. They deliberately avoided technical education. Soviet schools were organized to turn out a group of boys and girls capable of carrying on the necessary work of a modern industrial community.

The Soviet Union did not limit its educational endeavors to youngsters. It carried through a remarkably successful campaign to teach the whole adult population reading and writing. Twenty years after the revolution, when some 30 million children were enrolled in classes, the number of adults similarly enrolled was placed at 50 millions. Unfortunately, there is no time to pursue this subject further. It may be summed up in a sentence: the Soviet Union undertook the task of educating and retraining an entire population. Its success is measured at least in part by the remarkable strides made in the various departments of Soviet life.

Fourth among the essential ingredients of political power we listed leadership, management, and direction. Tzarism broke down because its leadership was unable to direct public affairs under the stress of total war. Soviet leadership faced the tasks of the revolution, of the liquidation of the old regime, of the rehabilitation of a disorganized society, and of the planning and construction of a socialist community. In all of these directions it successfully met the three tests of leadership: (1) it was able to survive; (2) it was able to command community support; (3) it was able to meet a changing social scene and to adapt itself to new social situations as they arose.

There are periods in history when leadership survival depends upon ability to defend and preserve the status quo, but a high tempo of social change requires of leadership adaptability rather than capacity to conserve. From 1917 to 1927 Soviet leadership faced revolutionary change. During the next decade its primary task was that of adjusting itself to survival in an imperialist world. Soviet leadership during the first period was in the main revolutionary; during the second period it fell back upon compromise and formulas of political expediency. The leadership mortality involved in this changing outlook was relatively high but the

Soviet people proved themselves equal to the task of providing a leader group for each of these sharply divergent tasks.

Munich presented Soviet leadership with a third problem: preparation for total war. Again there were replacements. Again Soviet leadership proved itself capable of waging total war and of surviving.

Survival in total war, which is the final test of political power, depends upon the effectiveness of the war-making apparatus. It is obviously impossible to give facts and figures concerning Soviet military preparations. This much is known, however. Between 1941 and 1945 the armed forces of the Soviet Union met and mastered a military organization that by common consent was one of the best organized and equipped. Furthermore, behind Nazi militarism in 1941 was the productive capacity not only of a highly industrialized Germany, but in addition, of Austrian, Czech, Belgian, French, Polish, Dutch and other industrialized European territories. Ten years earlier it would probably have been impossible for the Soviet Union to meet such an onslaught. The crucial years following the inauguration of the First Five Year Plan provided the country with the machine equipment needed to supply its armed forces and to maintain the working capacity of its civilian population.

Finally, among the essential ingredients of political power, is the unity, solidarity and stamina of a nation or people. Russia had never been a highly coordinated empire. On the contrary, regional and racial tensions and conflicts were accentuated and utilized by the Tzarist bureaucracy in accordance with the widely adopted formula: divide and rule. The years immediately after the Russian Revolution witnessed an ambitious effort to weld together into a working organization the heterogenous economic, racial, nationalistic, linguistic and religious elements that had lived in uneasy propinquity under Tzarism. The problem of making this adjustment was referred to in terms of racial and national minorities. Something has already been said about the success attending two decades of Soviet minorities policy. It was common talk in the imperial capitals that an invasion of Russia would split the country wide open, with Ukrainians, White Russians and other suppressed nationalities taking the opportunity to strike back at their Great

Russian oppressors. The German General Staff undoubtedly based its strategy upon such a pre-supposition. No such divisions occurred. Instead, the Soviet people displayed so phenomenal a sense of solidarity that, under the pressure of military defeat and even of military occupation, there were few defections. The invaders were able to secure as collaborationists no Russian leaders of consequence. The Moscow regime commanded the almost unanimous support of the Soviet population.

Such a test of national solidarity comes rarely—perhaps once in a generation. The Soviet Union met the test and survived it more successfully perhaps than any other invaded nation of Europe.

We have examined the six essential ingredients of political power,—geographical advantage, productivity, man power, leadership and direction, military effectiveness, and group solidarity,—as they are represented in the life of the Soviet Union. If these are the essentials of world power, then certainly the Soviet Union is a world power, because in these essential respects the Soviet Union stands well at the forefront among modern nations. In theory at least, and in the terms ordinarily employed by the student of politics, the Soviet Union occupies a prominent position in the top power group.

So much for our theoretical analysis. Now let us turn our attention to matters of power politics. Power politicians do not bargain and threaten in terms of theory. They recognize and respect strength as readily as they take advantage of weakness.

Revolution weakens the power position of any community in which it occurs. For one thing, revolution involves a change in leadership. Again, it means institutional transformations. Any such rapid alternations in the social set-up lead not only to confusion but invite disruption of which the counter-revolutionary forces are the first to take advantage. The Russian Revolution proved no exception to this rule of history. Changes of leadership, institutional shifts, and counter-revolutionary drives were so effective in weakening the Soviet State that the Germans had no difficulty in imposing a victor's peace at Brest-Litovsk and the Poles and Roumanians, with the backing of the western empires, were able to deprive the Soviet Union of vital territory. Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, all parts of the Tzarist empire, became independent nations

and, with Poland and Czechoslovakia, constituted the *cordon sanitaire* that separated western Europe from the "Bolshevik Menace". Thus, in the first four years of its existence, the Soviet State not only suffered military defeat, but was forced to surrender territory that had been a part of the Tzarist empire.

With the exception of protests from labor bodies like the British Trade Union Congress these attacks against the Soviet Union were carried on with impunity. Soviet Russia was an outcast nation. It was 1924 before Great Britain recognized the Soviet regime. France, Italy and Japan followed suit. Sixteen years passed before the United States recognized the U.S.S.R. As lately as the Munich encirclement of 1938 it was taken for granted that a coalition of the great powers could liquidate the Soviet Union as they had disposed of the Spanish and Czech Republics during the two preceding years. Count Ciano records in his diary a remark of the German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop on June 16, 1941: "If we attack them, the Russia of Stalin will be erased within eight weeks." (*N. Y. Times* 6/18/45)

From 1922 to 1941 the Soviet Union tested out its economic and social attitudes, relationships and institutions. Rapid and drastic modifications were made in many directions. Particularly after the launching of the First Five Year Plan, Soviet leadership, sure of its course, began large-scale industrialization as a preliminary to making the country relatively independent of the capitalist world. Speaking in Moscow before a meeting to celebrate the October Revolution, V. M. Molotov said: "The capitalist world has recently been obliged to yield a little and retreat, while the Soviet Union . . . has grown in dimensions and increased its population . . . We must not forget, of course, that nine-tenths of the human race are still living within the framework of capitalist society, under the rule of capitalism.

"The Soviet Union comprises less than one-tenth of the population of the globe . . . Comparison between the paths of development of the capitalist countries and of the Soviet Union speak against the capitalist world and not for it." (Text of TASS dispatch *N. Y. Times* 12/7/39)

It was at this time that Molotov and other Soviet spokesmen began to refer to the Soviet Union as "a great world power". The

reference was not taken seriously, however, in the imperialist capitals. So relatively unimportant did the Soviet Union seem as a factor in world politics that when Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt held their Atlantic Conference in August 1941 the Soviet Union was ignored. The Anglo-American leaders decided, in effect, that they would organize and police the post-war world, and in proof of their intentions they signed and published the Atlantic Charter, setting forth in idealistic language an Anglo-American formula for Anglo-American world domination. Not only was the Soviet Union ignored, but Anglo-Saxon publicists accepted the Atlantic Charter as the consummation of a long postponed unification of world-supreme forces. In the past, Britannia alone had ruled the waves. Combined with American productive capacity it seemed obvious that British sea-supremacy would be able to direct world affairs.

After the publication of the Atlantic Charter, people talked constantly about Anglo-American world policing. When I asked them: "Do you propose also to police the Soviet Union?" the almost invariable answer was: "Of course. Why not?"

The Soviet Union had been invaded on June 22, 1941 by German armed forces. In August therefore when the Atlantic Conference was held, the Soviet Union was at war as a partner of the British Empire. Had the Soviet Union been taken seriously it would certainly have been invited to participate in the Conference discussions. Although the United States did not enter World War II until four months after the Atlantic Conference, it was the United States and not the Soviet Union that joined with the British to make up the Big Two that drew up the Atlantic Charter. Soviet forces were engaging the great bulk of the Axis war machine. Negotiations were already under way that resulted in the Anglo-Soviet Twenty Year Treaty of May 1942. The Soviet Union was not included because both London and Washington were convinced that it could be ignored safely. Only the strong were invited to conferences of big powers.

During the next two years the Soviet Union suffered a series of military reverses, lost large areas of its most productive territory, and came within a hair's breadth of losing both Leningrad and Moscow. The tide turned at Stalingrad. The Red Army had

been reorganized and reequipped. The Nazis had extended their lines and had struck their blow. Now it was the turn of the Red Army.

A little more than two years after the Atlantic Conference Marshal Jan Smuts made a speech before the United Kingdom Branch of the Empire Parliamentary Association in the Houses of Parliament, London, Nov. 25, 1943. (South African Government Information Office text.) The speech was historic. General Smuts was the first responsible statesman outside the Soviet Union to say what Soviet leaders had been repeating since 1938: the Soviet Union is a great world power.

General Smuts offered this analysis of the world situation: "We have moved into a strange world, a world such as has not been seen for hundreds of years, perhaps not for a thousand years. Europe is completely changing. The old Europe which we have known . . . has gone. The map is being rolled up and a new map is unrolling before us." General Smuts followed this statement with a brief comment on the disappearance of "three of the five great powers" of Europe: France, Italy and Germany. "We are, therefore, left with Great Britain and with Russia. Russia is the new colossus in Europe, the new colossus that bestrides this continent. When we consider all that has happened to Russia within the last twenty-five years, and we see Russia's inexplicable and phenomenal rise, we can only call it one of the great phenomena in history. It is the sort of thing to which there is no parallel in history, but it has come about . . . Russia is the new colossus on the European continent. What the after-effects of that will be, nobody can say. We can but recognize that this is a new fact to reckon with, and we must reckon with it coldly and objectively. With the others down and out, and herself the mistress of the continent, her power will not only be great on that account, but it will be still greater because the Japanese Empire will also have gone the way of all flesh. Therefore any check or balance that might have arisen in the East will have disappeared. You will have Russia in a position which no country has ever occupied in the history of Europe."

General Smuts then turned his attention to Great Britain and the British Empire. "The purely European position of Great Britain will be one of enormous prestige and respect, and will carry

enormous weight, but she will be poor." After mentioning "the United States, the other great world power", General Smuts concluded "In that trinity you will have two powers of immense power and resources—Russia and America—and you will have this island, the heart of the Empire and of the Commonwealth, weak in her European resources in comparison with the vast resources of the other two."

While Marshal Smuts was speaking in London, Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin were meeting at Teheran. The brief communication, dated Dec. 1, 1943, apprising the world of the conclusions reached at this meeting was signed not by two but three names. The Big Three had superseded the Big Two of Atlantic Conference days. Little more than two years earlier, Roosevelt and Churchill had felt confident that they could decide world issues without the presence of a third party. Now the Soviet colossus, bestriding the European continent, was included as a matter of necessity.

This decision was not reached because of personal bias. Churchill's writings and speeches for a quarter of a century had marked him as an inveterate enemy of Sovietism. Roosevelt's record in the Spanish Civil War left no possible doubt as to his attitude. The Anglo-American partnership was enlarged because the demonstrated capacity of the Soviet Union to look out for its own interests and to play a prominent role in deciding the affairs of its neighbors allowed no margin of choice.

Churchill and Roosevelt both said many flattering things about the achievements of the Red Army in 1942 and 1943. It remained, however, for Churchill to hit the nail on the head in his report to Commons on August 2, 1944. "The Russian Army has done the main work in tearing the guts out of the Germany Army". That was the decisive factor. After the summer of 1941 more German divisions were occupied on the Russian front than on all other fields of operation combined. It was there that German resources and manpower were most rapidly exhausted. It was there that German military might was most effectively liquidated.

Facts are stubborn things. Nowhere are they more self-evident than on the field of battle, which synthesizes and synchronizes all of the ingredients of political power. If the capacity to wage successful war is the ultimate test of power, the Soviet Union had met

and passed the test by the autumn of 1943. Henceforward, it must be included as a major factor in world affairs. It became a matter of course for a *New York Times* correspondent (1/9/45) to begin a story dealing with the Eastern Mediterranean: "With Russia's emergence as the greatest power on the European continent, many dissident factions in other of the Middle-East countries are looking for the first time to Moscow for encouragement in some of their hopes."

The *New York Times* did not print this sentence because of any pro-Soviet leanings. For a generation the paper, both in its editorial and news columns had been an outstanding enemy of the Soviet Union. It printed the sentence in the opening days of 1945 because by that time no responsible European correspondent could ignore the immense influence that the Soviet Union was exercising over the lesser nations in its vicinity.

After a decade of obscurity and impotence growing out of defeat in World War I and the revolution with its accompanying civil wars, the Bolshevik regime in 1928 launched an over-all plan for the building of socialism in one country. Due partly to its geographic position and partly to its effective development of social and political organization, the Soviet Union has been able in the past three or four years to meet and pass all of the essential power tests. Today it is taken for granted, even among the bitterest reactionaries and the most hard-bitten defenders of capitalist imperialism, that the Soviet Union is a world power.

More than three-score nations make up what political scientists call the Western State System. Any thorough consideration of the part played by the Soviet Union in world affairs would have to include some comment on Soviet relations with at least the most influential of the world powers. Time forbids any such detailed analysis. So we shall group our subject-matter under three main headings asking: (1) what are Soviet relations with Europe; (2) with Asia, and (3) with the United States. Those considerations will lead us to our final topic: the probabilities of peace or war for the Soviet Union.

III. THE SOVIET UNION IN EUROPE

Geographically, the Soviet Union in 1938 occupied about one-half of Europe. Soviet population was about one-third of the European total. Politically, as Marshal Smuts so very well said, the Soviet Union has a position in Europe which no nation has held in modern times. So much for the general picture. In considering some of the detail, suppose we begin by noting the phenomenally rapid shifts in political partnerships made by the Soviet Union during the two decades that preceded 1941.

These two decades began with a series of European revolutions that accompanied and followed World War I and reached their high point in Russia. The Europe of 1921 was composed of three strong victor nations—Britain, France and Italy; of one defeated outcast nation—Germany, and of one nation—Russia, emerging from revolution and civil war. In addition to these major European powers there were a dozen minor powers in Scandinavia, the Low Countries, the Iberian Peninsula and South Europe, all of which had been in existence prior to 1914, and half-a-dozen synthetic minor powers made up at Versailles out of territory formerly held by Tzarist Russia, Germany and the dismembered Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Europe of 1921 was as unstable as a large aggregation of wealth, population and power could well be. The stablest part of the continent was in the west. Middle and eastern Europe had suffered from political and social major surgery and it seemed very doubtful whether the end of the process was yet in sight.

Russia and Germany were the two outcasts in the European family of nations. Russia was outcast because its government was headed by avowed revolutionists. Germany was outcast because it had suffered military defeat, and by official admission had assumed sole guilt for beginning World War I. Representatives of these two nations met at Rapallo in 1922 and made a treaty which constituted for both Russia and Germany a major diplomatic victory. For Russia it meant diplomatic recognition by a first-class European power. Germany, though officially guilty of the war, had been diplomatically recognized by Russia.

The Treaty of Rapallo thus strengthened the position of the two weakest major states of Europe. It did something else. In 1922 Russia was a source of raw materials much needed in Germany. Germany possessed a well-equipped industrial plant capable of supplying the Soviet Union with the machine tools required for socialist construction. Russia was able to offer Germany an opportunity to train military cadres on Russian soil. Germany, in exchange, provided the Soviet Union with technical aid in establishing its arms industry.

There has been much speculation as to the exact nature of the Russian-German relationships established at Rapallo, and of the effect which they had on the development of the two countries during the next fourteen years. It is a fair guess that the diplomatic and economic arrangements made at Rapallo were as significant as any entered into by the Soviet Union between 1922 and 1936.

The decade following Rapallo was not a fruitful one in terms of Soviet-European relations. Other nations were grudging and slow in establishing trade and diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Even after the Soviet Union entered the League of Nations, in 1934, European governments generally looked askance at Moscow as the possible or probable source of international revolutionary agitation that might constitute a serious threat to the established system of capitalist imperialism.

During 1934 and 1935 Soviet diplomats negotiated treaties with France and Czechoslovakia. The French treaty was a mutual assistance pact. The Czech treaty provided that the Soviet Union would come to the aid of Czechoslovakia if the French did so. Both treaties were in theory the beginning of a multilateral mutual assistance agreement that might be signed by any European nation desiring to do so. The move was a part of the new Soviet diplomacy of collective security. It was the answer of the Soviet Foreign Office to the growing danger of military encirclement involved in the Japanese occupation of Manchuria and in the rise of a fascist-oriented Middle Europe. The Soviet-French-Czech pacts had another significant aspect. With the Spanish Republic, organized in 1932, Russia, France and Czechoslovakia stretched across the European continent from north-east to south-west. Until the end of the German Republic they constituted a continuous belt of pop-

ular or revolutionary governments, splitting the monarchies of north-west Europe away from the monarchies of south-east Europe.

Two events of 1936 had a profound effect upon Soviet relations with western Europe. The first was the speech made by Chancellor Hitler at the Nazi Party Congress in Nuremburg. In the course of this address Hitler said that if Germany had the wheat-fields of the Ukraine and the minerals of the Urals, the German people could enjoy great enhancement of their prosperity. The second was the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War with its line-up of the Soviet Union on the side of the Spanish Republic and of Italy, Germany, Britain and France on the side of the rebel generals.

1938 brought the virtual defeat of the Spanish Republic with its consequent discomfiture for the Soviet Union, and the Munich Conference engineered by Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain. At this conference Chamberlain representing Britain, Daladier representing France, Mussolini speaking for Italy, and Hitler for Germany, reached certain agreements with regard to the Czech Republic and the Soviet Republic. These agreements are not yet a matter of public record. The fate of Czechoslovakia is history. The Munich commitments, insofar as they referred to the Soviet Union, are still a matter of conjecture. Circumstantial evidence however, points strongly to the conclusion that the participants in the Munich Conference agreed upon the liquidation of the Soviet Republic. Ostensibly, Chamberlain was seeking peace. Actually, he succeeded in establishing an alliance of the four major powers of western Europe. Two of these powers were members of the Axis combination. The Axis group had already signed and published the Anti-Comintern Pact (November 1936) and were thus publicly lined up in opposition to the Soviet Union. Hitler had openly expressed the desire of the Nazis for the Soviet food and metals (November 1936). All four of the Munich powers had worked closely together for two years in the effort to destroy the Spanish Republic (1936-38). By implication, Japan, though not represented at Munich, was a part of the combination made there. Japan had signed the Anti-Comintern Pact, was in close touch with Germany and Italy, and since 1931 had been threatening and attacking the Soviet Union through Manchuria and Mongolia. Munich, in effect, was a five power encirclement of the Soviet

Union, directed by the British Prime Minister and designed to liquidate the last of those European republics that had come into being during the revolutionary decade that followed 1917. Except for the United States, every major world power was thus definitely aligned against Soviet Russia.

Munich meant something else beside a four or five power alliance, encircling the Soviet Union. It meant the complete collapse of the collective security diplomacy which Litvinov had been championing in Geneva. The Soviet Foreign Office had asked for a multilateral treaty of mutual assistance that would bind together the principal powers of Europe in a policy of collective security based on the enforcement of the League of Nations Covenant. The answer of western Europe to this Soviet overture was the pact of Munich.

Soviet diplomacy thus found itself defeated. The Soviet Union was isolated and encircled. Could it break this iron ring of hostile imperial enemies? Or must it accept the gauge of unequal battle and fight a war against the vast power of this world-wide political combination? The first and obvious step was an attempt to break the iron ring. With this object in mind, Soviet representatives immediately began negotiations with Britain, France and Germany. The negotiations with Britain and France dragged on through the spring and early summer of 1939. It seemed evident that the Anglo-French spokesmen were stalling for time. The negotiations were ended when the Soviet Union signed its ten-year non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany, August 24, 1939.

Molotov, speaking before the All Union Soviet Sept. 1, 1939, described the episode thus: "The decision to conclude a non-aggression pact between the U.S.S.R. and Germany was adopted after military negotiations with France and Great Britain had reached an impasse . . . As the negotiations had shown that the conclusion of a pact of mutual assistance could not be expected, we could not but explore other possibilities of enduring peace and eliminating the danger of war between Germany and U.S.S.R." (Tass text. *Daily Worker* 9/2/39)

The Soviet-Nazi Pact was unexpected only to those who had not followed the course of Soviet diplomacy after Munich. Rumors of such a development were published as early as March 1939. To the

uninitiated, however, the pact was a thunderclap out of a clear sky.

The Soviet-Nazi Pact marked the end of the Munich Alliance. The iron ring had been broken. Soviet diplomacy, for a price, had been able to disrupt the Munich combination and thus to guarantee itself against an invasion in which all of the major nations of Europe would have participated, directly or indirectly. The Nazis, on their side, had gained access to the wheat of the Ukraine and the metals of the Urals. This source of food and raw materials would partly counter-balance the American, African, Asiatic and Australasian sources upon which the Anglo-French Allies were drawing. In exchange for food and raw materials the Nazis agreed to furnish manufactured goods, including machinery.

The Soviet-Nazi pact also marked the end of the European armistice and the beginning of World War II. It was immediately followed by the German invasion of Poland, the occupation of that country by German and Soviet armies, the treaty of September 29, 1939, fixing the boundaries between Soviet and German areas in Poland, the withdrawal of German nationals from the Baltic states, and the ultimate incorporation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania into the Soviet Union. Finland, resisting Soviet overtures regarding transfers of property that would have given the Soviet Government control of the Mannerheim defence line, was invaded by the Soviet Union, and after a costly winter campaign was defeated in 1940.

The Soviet-Nazi economic agreement was signed Feb. 11, 1940. A year later the official Tass agency, on behalf of the Soviet Government, issued a statement (Jan. 10, 1941) describing the series of Soviet-Nazi agreements made up to that time. The series included the "enlarged economic agreement of January 10, 1941 under which the U.S.S.R. delivers to Germany industrial raw materials, oil products and food-stuffs, especially cereals; Germany delivers to the U.S.S.R. industrial equipment." (*N. Y. Times* 1/11/41 text) On June 22, 1941 Axis armies invaded the Soviet Union. Eleven months later, May 26, 1942, the Soviet Union signed its Twenty Year Treaty of Alliance with Great Britain. Thus, within three years, the Soviet Union had been a neutral in the struggle between Nazi Germany and the British Empire, an ally of Germany, and an ally of Great Britain.

The Soviet-Germany treaty of August 1939 had taken the form

of a ten year non-aggression pact. The Anglo-Soviet treaty was a twenty year offensive and defensive military and economic alliance. The parties to the treaty agreed to take joint action against aggression; to render each other mutual assistance during World War II; not to conclude a separate peace; to take joint action against future aggression; to render each other mutual assistance in any future war against the Axis powers. The parties "agree to work together in close and friendly collaboration after the re-establishment of peace for the organization of security and economic prosperity in Europe." The two parties further agreed to render one another all possible economic assistance after the war and "not to conclude any alliance and not to take part in any coalition directed against the other high contracting party." (Great Britain. Treaty Series. 1942. No. 2 Cmd. 6376).

The next three years were almost equally eventful. The treaty with Czechoslovakia was signed in December 1943; the treaty with France in December 1944. The agreement with the new Yugoslav Federation was likewise drawn up in December 1944 as was the agreement with the Polish Provisional Government. During 1945 the Soviet Union recognized the Warsaw Government, established a provisional Austrian government in Vienna and was maintaining friendly governments in Hungary and Roumania.

If Soviet diplomatic relations between 1921 and 1945 appeared like Joseph's coat of many colors, the evolution of Soviet policy in Europe was in reality both consistent and consecutive. Furthermore, it corresponded very closely with the changing power position occupied by the Soviet Union during this period.

Soviet objectives in Europe might be summarized under four headings: (1) peace and security, (2) assured in part by the establishment of strategic frontiers, (3) also certain natural advantages such as a warm water outlet and the control of oil reserves, and finally, (4) a coordinated Europe. Such objectives did not differ materially from those of Tzarist Russia. They corresponded in substance with the objectives of other major European powers. They could be realized in proportion as the Soviet power position improved vis-a-vis the power position of its neighbors.

The Soviet power position altered materially during the two

decades following 1921. The Brest-Litovsk Treaty and the Polish War cost the Soviet Union territory. It had no prestige to lose. League membership restored a measure of respectability and gave Soviet representatives an opportunity to make their pleas for disarmament and collective security from a rostrum in Geneva, Switzerland, but in the big power game of the 1930s the Soviet Union was clearly on the defensive. The occupation of Manchuria by Japan and of Ethiopia by Italy, the course of the Spanish War and the Munich Pact of 1938 could all be interpreted as triumphs for the enemies of Sovietism. The Anti-Comintern Axis Pact was a public declaration of intent to smash the Soviet Union. The Atlantic Charter was formulated without Soviet participation. It was not until the successful defense of Stalingrad that the Teheran Conference was held and the Big Two was expanded into the Big Three. It was only in 1944 that the Red Army succeeded in leaving Russian territory and in occupying portions of Norway, Finland, the Baltic states, Roumania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Hungary and Germany. When World War II began, thirteen small states, from Finland on the north to Greece on the south, separated the Soviet Union from Germany and Italy. By the summer of 1945 the Red armies had occupied Berlin and Vienna and everyone of these thirteen states, with the exception of Greece, had either been incorporated into the Soviet Union or had been brought within the Soviet sphere of influence.

Soviet spokesmen sometimes pretend that their foreign policy is unchangeable. The *Soviet Information Bulletin*, published by the Soviet Embassy in Washington, contained an article in the November 16, 1944 issue by Colonel A. Galin, listing the six basic principals of foreign policy which the Soviet Union has been consistently following since the Bolsheviks secured power:

1. Peaceful relations with all states irrespective of their political systems.
2. Economic and political cooperation with all states on the basis of sovereign equality and independence of the contracting parties and the co-existence of two systems.
3. Alliances with any state with the purpose of protecting both partners from acts of aggression.

4. Categorical renunciation of imperialistic expansion at the cost of other nations.
5. Non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states.
6. Strengthening of the coalition of freedom-loving nations in the fight against Fascist aggressors.

Soviet diplomats may have had some such list of principles in mind, but their actual policies were shaped by their power position. Immediately after the revolution they tried unsuccessfully to preserve their frontiers against aggression. During the next fifteen years their policy was clearly and emphatically defensive. Stalin told the 17th Party Congress: "Our foreign policy is clear. It is a policy of preserving peace and strengthening commercial relations with all countries. The U.S.S.R. does not think of threatening anybody—let alone of attacking anybody. We stand for peace and champion the cause of peace. But we are not afraid of threats and are prepared to answer the instigators of war blow for blow. Those who want peace and are striving after business intercourse with us will always receive our support. And those who try to attack our country will receive a stunning rebuff to teach them not to shove their hogs' snouts into our Soviet garden again." (*Inprecor* 2/13/34 p. 239) It was 1939 before Soviet spokesmen were demanding the restoration of Russia's 1913 frontiers, and Molotov, in his radio address of Sept. 17, 1939, was saying: "Nor can it be demanded of the Soviet Government that it remain indifferent to the fate of its blood-brothers, the Ukrainians and Byelo-Russians inhabiting Poland, who even formerly were without rights and who now have been abandoned entirely to their fate." (*Tass text. N. Y. Times* 9/18/39) In the same year Moscow insisted, by the use of military force, that the Finnish frontier be so readjusted that the guns on the Mannerheim line were no longer an immediate physical menace to Leningrad. On April 2, 1944 Foreign Commissar Molotov received the representatives of the foreign press in Moscow and made an official statement on behalf of the Soviet Government. The Red Army, he said, is about to enter Roumania, in pursuit of German forces. "The Soviet Government declares it does not pursue the aim of acquiring Roumanian territory or of altering the existing social structure of Roumania. The entry of Soviet troops into the boundaries of Roumania is dictated

exclusively by military necessities." (Official text *N. Y. Times* 4/3/44) Seven months later, *Pravda*, writing editorially on "The Red Army's Great Mission of Liberation" stated: "In this war we are seeking neither foreign territories, nor power nor prestige. Poland and the world know we are going westward for one purpose—to liberate peoples from their enslavers." (*N. Y. Times* 11/21/44)

It was a far cry from the days of Soviet weakness, when the Red Army was being driven back from Warsaw by the Allied-supported Polish troops, to the victorious sweep of the Red Armies across the Polish plains in their pursuit of retreating Nazi forces. In the days of the civil wars Soviet military forces were engaged in a desperate and unsuccessful effort to protect their frontiers. In 1944-45 the Red armies were occupying the whole of central Europe.

What is a foreign policy? It does not consist of either a declaration or of a set of principles. Rather, it is a series of workable alternatives. The Soviet Union is a state attempting to survive in a world of rival—and potential enemy—states. Soviet policy must therefore be determined by the actions of its potential enemies. If Berlin and London join hands in a Munich Pact, the Soviet Government must counter by some move that will successfully protect Soviet interests against this threatened combination. If London offers Moscow assistance immediately upon the announcement of the Nazi invasion, Moscow must respond with the Anglo-Russian Twenty Year Treaty as the most available method of meeting the Nazi menace. Moscow foreign policy, in other words, is made only partly in Moscow. Most Moscow decisions are conditioned by decisions previously made in London, Berlin and Tokyo. Furthermore, Moscow's policy must be sufficiently multiple so that it can be readily adjusted to London and Berlin decisions. After Munich, Moscow negotiated with both London and Berlin. Since Berlin offered the best terms, Moscow signed the Nazi-Soviet Pact.

Weak nations have their foreign policies made almost exclusively in foreign capitals. They are then classed as satellite states. Powerful nations make policy in proportion to their power. This fact appears in the decisions taken by the Big Three and accepted

by the other members of the United Nations. When the Soviet Union was weak it was compelled to adopt policies in terms of the relative strength of neighboring capitals. With the Teheran Conference in November 1943 the strength of the Soviet Union was officially recognized. From that time forward Moscow was able to make policy on a parity with London and Washington.

Moscow did make policy. For example, with regard to the government of Poland. London was supporting a Polish Government in exile. Moscow was supporting a Free Poland Committee. When the Red Army occupied Warsaw the Moscow-supported Polish Government moved there. Cable appeals from Washington and the personal visit of Prime Minister Churchill to Moscow were insufficient to alter the Russian determination with regard to the Warsaw regime. The struggle was continued during the pre-San Francisco conversations in Washington in mid-April 1945 and was carried into the San Francisco Conference. The Soviet Union was able to maintain its stand because its armies were in Poland and it had developed sufficient economic strength to give it a good bargaining position.

Policy in foreign affairs is thus an attribute of power. In our discussion of the Soviet Union as a world power, we pointed out that between 1941 and 1945 the Soviet military apparatus, backed by Soviet production and by the Russian population, had won for the Soviet Union a position among the Big Three powers. During these same years Soviet foreign policy underwent a change that corresponded with its altered power position. Moscow policy was no longer dependent in the main upon moves made in London, Berlin and Tokyo. Berlin and Tokyo were both out of the running. London and Washington were watching and wondering what Moscow would do next. In short, Moscow had secured the diplomatic initiative.

At the beginning of this discussion on the role of the Soviet Union in Europe we listed the series of alliances and re-alliances between Moscow and other European capitals. From 1934 to 1945 there was a considerable rise in the tempo of these changes. Thus far there is no indication of any diminution in this respect, altho it seems probable that the Anglo-Soviet treaty of 1942 is still the keystone of Soviet relations with western Europe. In view of our

analysis of the changing Soviet power position and of the nature of foreign policy, the past two decades of Soviet-European relations may be construed in the following manner. Immediately after the Russian revolution the Bolsheviks issued flaming proclamations, calling upon the workers of the world to arise and overthrow their oppressors. This revolutionary offensive was accompanied by a notably defensive diplomacy. The middle twenties found the Friends of the Soviet Union organized in various bourgeois capitals as a means of defending Moscow against a potential bourgeois assault. Soviet diplomacy was still on the defensive. During the Civil War in Spain, while the Soviet Union gave active support to the Republic, it did so in the name of completing a bourgeois revolution. The Latvian Treaty of October 5, 1939, Article V, guaranteed the contracting parties against any interference with their sovereign rights "in particular their state organization, economic and social systems and military measures". Here Bolshevism was on the defensive in revolutionary terms, but the Soviet Union was definitely on the diplomatic offensive. The Anglo-Soviet Alliance of 1942 found the Soviet Union again on the diplomatic defensive. Soviet representatives signed a mutual assistance agreement providing for mutual diplomatic support and all possible economic assistance after the war. It was not until the turn of the war at Stalingrad that the Soviet Union was again able to take the diplomatic initiative expressed in its treaty with Czechoslovakia (December, 1943), its open and vigorous support for Marshal Tito and the Yugoslav Federation (1944), the Soviet-French Treaty (1944), the recognition of the Lublin Government (1944), of the Warsaw Government (1945) and the distribution of land to Polish and other peasant inhabitants of the central European territories from which the Nazi armies had been expelled. The Soviet Union was reaching out, no longer in terms of world revolution, but in terms of enlarged frontiers, military occupation of neighboring non-Russian areas, and the establishment there, under Soviet auspices, of Moscow-sponsored friendly governments.

The situation of 1918-19 was thus completely reversed in 1944-45. At the earlier date an all-powerful France was sponsoring friendly governments in the newly-created states that made up the *cordon sanitaire* between bolshevik East Europe and capitalist

West Europe. The *cordon sanitaire* was established for the deliberate purpose of preventing the spread of bolshevism. The French sponsors of these synthetic governments were doing their bit in the defense of bourgeois society. At the later date an all-powerful Soviet Union was sponsoring friendly governments in the re-created states that made up the *cordon sanitaire* between bolshevik East Europe and the remnants of capitalist West Europe. This *cordon sanitaire* was established for the deliberate purpose of enlarging bolshevik influence. The bolshevik sponsors of these synthetic governments were doing their bit to extend sovietism into an ever-widening circle of mid-Europe territory.

During the troubled years that ushered in the present European crisis there seemed to be four broad possibilities for the continent:

1. Continued division into a score of sovereign states under the balance of power principle actively supported by Great Britain and generally accepted by the ruling classes of the European nations.
2. Coordination under German auspices, first, the imperial Germany of the Hohenzollerns; and second, under Nazi Germany.
3. Coordination under Soviet auspices: first, of the world revolution; and second, of the victorious Red Army, expelling Nazi military forces and replacing them by Soviet armies of occupation.
4. A united states or free federation of Europe, organized as a result of voluntary action among the member states in very much the same way that the English colonies in North America formed their federation in 1789.

Division, and a competitive struggle for power employing modern machine weapons, have proved so costly that their continuance would have involved the obliteration of European culture. The alternative was some form of unification. Since British policy precluded such unification, two possibilities remained, coordination under Germany or under Russian auspices. Twice the Germans bid for European leadership and twice they failed, because in both cases they were opposed not only by substantial European forces but by the joined strength of Great Britain, her dominions, the United States and its satellites, working under

the general direction of British policy. The first Russian bid for European domination along the lines of general revolution was met by the united opposition of bourgeois Europe, supported by the remainder of the bourgeois world. The second Russian bid for the control of Europe took an entirely different form. The Soviet Union, functioning as the defender of European culture against the menace of Nazi barbarism, was able to align not only the anti-Nazi forces of the European continent but the full strength of the Anglo-American combination. And since in this struggle Red Army men did the bulk of the fighting and dying in behalf of the anti-Nazi cause, they were able to secure agreements at Teheran, Yalta or elsewhere, under which the whole of Central Europe, including Eastern Germany with its capital, Berlin, fell within the Soviet sphere of influence.

The Soviet Union occupied the eastern half of Europe before 1939. The capitalist empires occupied the western half, including the whole Mediterranean Basin. In terms of natural resources, the position of the U.S.S.R. was probably superior. The production potential and the population potential, both in terms of volume and training, were strongly on the side of the capitalist empires. Had the capitalist empires been able to establish and maintain a united front as they attempted to do through the League Covenant, through the Non-Intervention Committee, and through Munich, their combined political strength would have been far greater than that of the Soviet Union. Again and again, however, the capitalists split amongst themselves. The final division, which came with the initiation of World War II, gave the Soviet Union an overwhelming advantage. Once the Soviet military forces had turned back the Nazi invasion it was only a question of time before a united Soviet Union would out-point divided western Europe.

This is the background against which Marshal Smuts, in November 1943, assigned to the Soviet Union its role as the colossus bestriding the European continent. This is the background against which the Soviet Union took and held the diplomatic initiative in support of the Moscow Polish Government as opposed to the London Polish Government. This is the background against which the Soviet Union has re-established the frontiers of Tzarist Russia and is successfully surrounding those frontiers with a broad belt

of Soviet-sponsored friendly governments. This is the background against which the Soviet Union, in 1944, stepped out of its own sphere of influence, extended its official recognition to General de Gaulle and unofficially demanded that action be taken to liquidate anti-Soviet governments in Spain or wherever else they might be functioning.

The Soviet military and diplomatic offensive has created consternation in many a bourgeois circle. There is every reason for this consternation. The Allied offensive after World War I, directed to the liquidation of bolshevism, inspired every Bolshevik and Bolshevik-sympathiser in the world with apprehension for the future of the working masses. The apprehension was justified. The Allied offensive in the form of military intervention in the Soviet Union failed. The second phase of the Allied offensive, in the form of Fascist governments throughout middle Europe was a serious menace to the newly formed republics, including the Soviet Republic. In its outcome, however, it brought disaster to the bourgeois world, and opened the gates wide to admit Soviet culture. The Soviet Union is an economic and political colossus bestriding the European continent. Its strength and its success lie in two chief directions. In the first place, in the failure of bourgeois society to provide peace and security for its own people. In the second place, in the success of the Soviet Union in offering the only workable alternative to bourgeois culture thus far inaugurated.

IV. THE SOVIET UNION IN ASIA

Geographically, there is no valid line that marks off Asia from Europe. The two continents are supposed to be divided by the Ural Mountains, a worn-down range, that has the general appearance of a rough plateau. It bears so little resemblance to a barrier that Asiatic nomads have been able to sweep across it repeatedly. Actually, Asia and Europe are one land mass in the same sense that eastern United States and Western United States are one land mass. The Soviet Union occupies the entire northern section of this land block.

Culturally, Asia differs from Europe. The Asiatic cultures are older, and until comparatively recent times were diffused into Europe. The last episode in the series took place at the time of the Crusades. During recent centuries, however, European culture, particularly that connected with technology, has been diffused throughout Asia. The process of this diffusion has involved the subjugation of Asia to European control. This process went on in Russia, as it did elsewhere, with the steady eastward movement of trade, colonization and the expansion of political authority.

Twentieth century Asia differs from twentieth century Europe in four essential respects: (1) the population of Asia is over twice that of Europe; (2) the people of Asia dwell for the most part in villages and are engaged chiefly in agriculture; (3) European technology is more highly developed; (4) European empires had succeeded by the end of the last century in reducing almost the whole of Asia to colonial status.

Soviet policy in Asia displays some of the general characteristics of Soviet policy in Europe, but since policy is a relationship between the policy-making centre and the territory in which policy is made, the differences in the objective situations of Europe and Asia have necessarily modified Soviet policy-making.

The Russian Revolution succeeded in replacing a decadent monarchy by a Soviet Republic. Events surrounding the Russian Revolution were also responsible for eliminating ruling dynasties in Germany, Austro-Hungary, Greece and Spain. This breakdown in the structure of European monarchies was paralleled by a break-

down in the structure of European capitalism. The breakdown had two aspects. One was domestic. It involved job-insecurity for workers and a falling rate of profit for business men. The other aspect was colonial. It involved the growth of independence movements, the organization of colonial revolts, systematic boycotts and sabotage directed against imperial overlords. The empire system, with its centre in Europe and its circumference in Asia, Africa and Latin America, was breaking up. The Bolsheviki inherited a disrupted empire. Their European capital was surrounded by decaying imperial structures.

Soviet policy in Europe was conditioned by the presence of four other great powers: Britain, France, Germany and Italy. There was only one great power in Asia: Japan. Europe was accustomed to a balance of power. Asia knew no balance except that of competing imperial interests.

There was a force in Asia, however, which did not exist in Europe. The people of Asia were emerging from their colonial vassalage. The Chinese Revolution of 1911 preceded the Russian Revolution by six years. Nationalist movements were already well developed in India and the Near East. Asia was in turmoil long before World War I. The cutting off of manufactured supplies from accustomed European sources during that war gave the impetus to Asiatic industrialization which pushed Japan quickly to the level of a first-class industrial area and added substantially to the industrial productive capacity of both India and China.

Significantly enough, the situation in considerable portions of Asia is quite similar to that existing in the Russia of 1900. Industrialization has made advances, but to a considerable degree it has employed foreign capital and has developed under foreign technical direction. The masses are village dwellers, gaining their living by agriculture. There are, however, large industrial and commercial centres in which there is a developed wage-working class, the more advanced sections of which are versed in the principles of the class struggle and the concepts of Marxian socialism. The middle class is small and relatively ineffective. The ruling class is divided between landowners, moneylenders, merchants, traders and manufacturers, whose interests are divergent and in many cases conflicting. For the most part there is no such national solidarity

as has been built up in the principal nations of western Europe. Japan must be excepted from this description, as must also the newly-industrialized areas of Siberia. For the most part, however, Asia is dominated by cultural cross-currents, by blurred political divisions, by foreign imperial economic and political controls, and by the will of a considerable section, particularly among the young, that is demanding technical improvements and national independence.

While the bulk of Russian population and technology are still centred in Europe, strategic considerations have led to a rapid development of various Asiatic territories. The policy of moving industry beyond the Urals was well-matured by 1930. World War II, which cost Russia important industrial areas adjacent to Poland and Czechoslovakia, forced the transfer of large industrial units into Siberia. The movement of production into Asia may therefore be described as one of the major aspects of present Soviet policy. This applies to the development of natural resources, the building of transportation facilities, the construction of industries and the transfer of populations. Politically the Soviet Union is enlarging its European sphere of control and of interest. The basic Soviet movement, however, is undoubtedly Asia-ward.

What does the Soviet Union want in Asia?

1. It desires to develop the considerable agricultural, mineral and power resources of Russia-in-Asia, as a basis for a production area far removed from invading armies and bombing planes.
2. Peace and security in Asia will facilitate this development, and they are therefore among the primary Asiatic, as they are among the primary European, aims of the Soviet Union. nationalist organizations, freed from imperial domination
3. The emergence of colonial movements into well-formulated and engaged in the establishment of independent Asiatic states. Thus far there is no indication that the Soviet Union will go any further in its attempts to influence the internal organization of these Asiatic states than it has gone with similar states in Europe. Undoubtedly, however, Soviet policy will aim to have such Asiatic states as border on the Soviet Union administered by friendly governments.

4. Exclusion from Asia of all non-Asiatic imperial controls.
5. Exclusion from Asia of any power combination or federation that might challenge the Asiatic supremacy of the Soviet Union.
6. A sufficient limitation upon the existing power of Japan to prevent that country from interfering with Soviet Asiatic policy, but in the absence of a strong Soviet China, a Japan powerful enough to act for the Soviet Union in the capacity of a Far Eastern policeman.
7. Free access, through adequate port facilities, to a free Mediterranean, a free Red Sea and Indian Ocean and a free Pacific Ocean.

Soviet relations with Asia have been at least as turbulent as with Europe, except that the Soviet Union has not thus far engaged in a major war with any Asiatic power. Asia was in turmoil long before the Bolshevik Revolution. Tzarist Russia had contributed its share toward this turmoil. Aggressive imperial adventures in Korea and Manchuria had brought on the Russian-Japanese War of 1904-5. Britain's far-flung interests in the Near East, India, Tibet and the Far East, led the British to use Japan, unofficially before 1902 and officially from 1902 to 1922, and again unofficially from 1922 to around 1937, as the British policeman in Asia. It was while performing this policing duty in 1904 that Japan attacked Port Arthur and administered a heavy naval and military defeat to the Tzar's armed forces. At the time, British policy was based on the assumption that from the Dardanelles to the Pacific the most formidable of Britain's rivals was Tzarist Russia.

Like every war, the Russian-Japanese War stirred up unrest that pointed actively toward revolution. The revolution came first in Russia, in 1905, and was followed by a series of nationalist movements throughout Asia that culminated in the Chinese Revolution of 1911. Bolshevik revolutionists, among whom Stalin was one of the leaders, linked up the colonial nationalist movements with bolshevism. European revolutionaries were seeking to overthrow capitalist imperialism in its European homeland. Colonial revolutionaries, through their struggle for independence, were administering a check to the movement for imperial expansion. What more natural, the Bolsheviks argued, than that the working

class revolutionists of Europe should join hands with their colonial fellow-revolutionists in a simultaneous attempt to crush imperialism at its centre and at its circumference? Even before they came to power in Russia, therefore, the Bolsheviks had formulated a theory that connected European with colonial revolution.

Another factor pushed strongly in the same direction. Tzarism had ruled over a nation composed of many divergent racial and national groups. By keeping these groups at sword's points and by using the man power of one to police the others, the Tzar's regime was able to rule over a divided community. Bolshevism embodied a program of national cultural self-determination under which each minority should enjoy the right to shape its own cultural life in so far as that did not interfere with its neighbors. The cultural self-determination of minorities was paralleled by a centralized system of social, economic and political planning and organization. Instead of living at sword's points, the national minorities were expected to cooperate in the interest of the whole composite community.

This formulation of the principle of self-determination in local affairs and of centralized control of general matters was translated into Asiatic politics first by the Bolshevik renunciation of special privileges held by the Tzarist regime in Turkey, Persia and China. Second, by active offers of help directed toward nationality groups struggling to throw off the shackles of imperial domination. Since the high point in Asiatic colonial revolt was China, the high point in Bolshevik assistance was reached in that country. Between 1919 and 1926 Sun Yat-Sen and his followers turned definitely to the Soviet Union for help in their independence struggle. After repeated attempts to obtain aid from the United States and from various European governments, Sun Yat-Sen became convinced that his best source of support was the Soviet Union. At the request of his government, and of the People's Party which he headed, the Soviet Union sent to China a corps of technical assistants that at one time numbered approximately three hundred. The titular head of this group was Michael Borodin. Under the split in the Chinese People's Party (1926-7), and the defection of Chiang Kai-shek, Commanding General of the People's Party armies, the Russian advisors and technical assistants played an important role in the

formulation of policy and in the direction of the Chinese revolutionary movement.

The split in the People's Party further divided an already segmented China into two contending groups: the Chiang Kai-shek regime, in close touch with Chinese business and banking interests and with various imperialist governments, of which the most helpful financially was the United States, and the Chinese Soviet Government, supported ideologically and to a minor extent materially by Moscow.

Between 1927 and 1936 one of the principal preoccupations of the Chiang Kai-shek regime was the organization of a series of expeditions financed and equipped in part by western imperialists and directed against the Chinese Soviet areas. Agnes Smedley, Edgar Snow and others have described these struggles in detail. During the same years the chief preoccupation of the Chinese Soviets was the organization of a workable planned economy and polity that was adapted to the peculiar needs of a semi-colonial country seeking independence. The decade ended with the Chinese Soviets still functioning and, in December 1936, entering into an agreement with the Chiang Kai-shek regime for joint action against the Japanese invaders.

The conflict between Chiang and the Chinese Soviets had afforded Japan an opportunity of which she had taken full advantage, first by occupying Manchuria, and thus cutting off the easiest avenue through which Soviet material assistance could reach China, and second, by seizing and occupying portions of North China, splitting China away from the Soviet Union and providing Japan with a corridor that led into the Lake Baikal region and laid the basis for a Japanese military assault aimed at cutting the Trans-Siberian railroad and adding a slice of eastern Siberia to the rapidly expanding Japanese Empire. These developments of Japanese major strategy took place between 1931 and 1936, and involved the general occupation of China by Japan beginning in 1937.

No figures are available showing the exact amount of material assistance sent by Russia into China during the twenty years that ended in 1937. In the first decade the material aid was probably considerable. In the second decade it diminished sharply. From the Japanese invasion of China in 1937 until the German invasion

of Russia in 1941 Soviet aid to China again increased. Military necessity forced Soviet supplies to follow old caravan routes converted into extemporized truck roads across the Gobi Desert. Until the early months of 1942 Soviet aid continued to reach China. Then the pressure of invasion necessity and the sharpening differences between Chiang and the Chinese Soviet leaders again led to the curtailment of Soviet assistance. When the Teheran Conference assembled in 1943 Soviet representatives refused to meet with those from China on the technical ground that while China was at war with Japan, the Soviet Union was not. Actually the reason for this refusal undoubtedly lay in the strained relations that had developed between Chiang's regime and the Chinese Soviets, involving open warfare and the systematic blockade of the Chinese Soviet areas by Chungking troops. The pattern was also followed at Dumbarton Oaks, where Soviet representatives refused to meet with those of Chiang's government.

Two nations have had a profound effect upon the development of Republican China. One is Japan, the other is Russia. Speaking generally, Japan has sought to dominate and ultimately to assimilate China as a part of its Far Eastern Empire. With minor exceptions Soviet Russia has extended consistent help to the movement for a Chinese Republic in the hope that a China directed by a Chinese Soviet Government would be able to win its independence from the western empires, industrialize China, raise the standard of well-being of the Chinese masses and by so doing blaze the trail toward a Soviet Asia.

Relations between the Soviet Union and Japan have passed through various stages from friendly trade to open conflict. Japanese troops participated in the invasion of Siberia in the summer of 1918. The end of the civil conflict in Russia was followed by the establishment of diplomatic relations with Japan and a decade of strained collaboration. Soviet leaders mistrusted the intentions of Japanese imperialists and Japanese leaders were greatly disturbed by the existence at Vladivostok of landing fields from which the large, numerous and vulnerable industrial centers of Japan could be disastrously bombed.

Japan's Manchurian adventure (1931) introduced an entirely new element into the picture. Japanese armed forces were detailed

along the Soviet-Manchurian frontier and as the Japanese military moved farther into North China, a longer and longer line of Soviet frontier was exposed to a possible attack.

Soviet military forces were distributed along the Soviet side of the frontier. Preparations were made to defend the Trans-Siberian railway which, for geographic reasons, ran very close to the Chinese territory now occupied by Japan. A new railroad line, well to the north of the Trans-Siberian, was projected and constructed and a new Soviet seaport was opened to the north of Vladivostok and well beyond the range of an immediate Japanese attack.

For ten years Japanese and Soviet forces faced each other along the frontier. Border clashes were reported at frequent intervals. At times these clashes rose to the level of major combats in which considerable numbers of troops, tanks, planes and artillery were employed. Protests were made by both sides and relations were strained to the breaking point. But there was no declared war.

On April 13, 1941, a Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact was signed in Moscow. Article I of the Pact declared that "both contracting parties undertake to maintain peaceful and friendly relations between them and mutually respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of the other contracting party." Article II provided that if one of the parties should become the object of hostilities "on the part of one or several third Powers, the other contracting party will observe neutrality throughout the duration of the conflict." Under Article III the treaty was to continue for five years and then was to be automatically renewed unless one of the parties denounced the pact at least one year before its expiration. There was an annex to the treaty under which "the two countries solemnly declare that the USSR pledge to respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of Manchukuo, and Japan pledges to restore the territorial integrity and inviolability of the Mongolian Peoples Republic."

There has been considerable speculation as to why the Soviet-Japanese Pact was signed in the Spring of 1941. The Japanese Government was preparing to enter the war and desired to free herself as much as possible from the necessity of garrisoning the Soviet-Manchurian frontier. At the same time, the Japanese Government was a party to the Anti-Comintern Pact and as such was

more or less committed to a hostile position against the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the Soviet Union had signed a somewhat similar agreement with Germany two years earlier and this Soviet-Nazi agreement had been reaffirmed and enlarged in January 1941. The Japanese therefore, in negotiating their pact with the Soviet Union, were merely following a precedent already laid down by their leading Axis partner.

The Soviet Union, by signing the pact with Japan, relieved itself, at least in theory, from the danger of a two-front war. There were many signs in the Spring of 1941 of an impending Nazi attack on the Soviet Union. Should that attack come, Soviet military forces would be hard-pressed if at the same time they were compelled to maintain and supply a large garrison separated from the western front by the entire breadth of European Russia and Siberia.

After the signing of the Soviet-Japanese Pact, reports of border conflicts ceased to appear and relations between the two countries seemed much less strained. Early in 1944 a supplementary treaty was negotiated between the Soviet Union and Japan that had particular reference to the Japanese concessions in northern Sakhalin. The agreement provided that Japan should give up these concessions, that the Soviet Union should pay a stated sum of money to Japan, and should in addition deliver a specified amount of the petroleum produced in the Sakhalin oil fields. At the same time, adjustments were made with regard to Japanese fishing rights in Soviet waters. The treaty was signed in Moscow March 30, 1944.

Soviet-Japanese political and economic relations were therefore readjusted in the Spring of 1944 and there seemed every likelihood that the Pact of April, 1941 would be automatically renewed at its expiration on April 13, 1946. Major political strategy, however, pressed strongly from several directions. There was a possibility that the Japanese High Command, checked in its attempt to enlarge its territorial controls in southern Asia, might strike north and attempt to take over the richly endowed territories of eastern Siberia, add them to the resources of Manchuria and North China and thus provide an extensive continental base for provisioning its war against the United Nations. The Soviet Union, on its side, was in a rather serious predicament. It was allied with Great Britain and was receiving extensive lend-lease supplies from the

United States that were being used in a joint war against Germany. Germany was the senior partner in the Axis Alliance of which Japan was now the only remaining important member. Quite logically, the Soviet Union was being urged, directly or indirectly, to make available Siberian bases from which the Anglo-Americans might carry on their war against Japan. The Soviet Union was receiving considerable quantities of lend-lease through its Pacific ports. This commerce was of course subject to interference by the Japanese sea and air forces. Furthermore, should Japan be defeated by Anglo-American forces without the assistance of the Soviet Union the settlement of many important Asiatic questions might be made by the British and Americans without consulting the Soviet Union.

These and other considerations led Premier Stalin in his speech of November 6, 1944 commemorating the Bolshevik Revolution, to make the following comment on Soviet-Japanese relations: "It cannot be considered accidental that such unpleasant facts occurred as the incident at Pearl Harbor, the loss of the Philippines, and other islands in the Pacific Ocean, the loss of Hong Kong and Singapore, when Japan as an aggressive nation proved more prepared for war than Great Britain and the United States, which pursued a policy of peace." This statement evidently meant that the Soviet Government was seriously considering a termination of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact. Five months later, the Soviet Foreign Office issued a statement giving Japan official notice of Soviet intention to terminate the pact at its expiration in April 1946.

One other item should be mentioned in the catalog of Soviet relations in Asia,—the oil reserves and oil concessions of Persia. The Soviet oil position was relatively strong before the beginning of World War II. Production figures for 1938 credited the Soviet Union with 77% of European oil production for that year. Roumania had 18%, and of the remaining 5%, Germany had 1.5 and Poland 1.3. As the war progressed, the oil reserves of Asia Minor took on new significance. Rumor had it that the oil deposits in Saudi Arabia were the most extensive untapped reserves in the world. To the north and east lay the oil fields of Mesopotamia and Persia. Still farther north were the principal oil fields of European

Russia. Secretary of the Interior Ickes, from his vantage point as United States petroleum administrator, launched an ambitious program involving the drilling of wells in Arabia and the transportation of the oil produced to Mediterranean ports through American-built pipe lines. The proposal aroused particular interest because the oil fields of the Eastern Mediterranean were at that time dominated by British capital and American oil concerns were trying to secure a foothold in the area.

The United States proposals led to counter-proposals from Great Britain and the dispatch of a mission, headed by Lord Beaverbrook, to discuss the entire problem with representatives of the Washington Government. The upshot of this discussion was the "Agreement on Petroleum between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland", signed August 8, 1944 by Acting Secretary of State Stettinius and Lord Beaverbrook. Textually the agreement provided that "preparatory to the convocation of a world petroleum conference for the negotiation of a multilateral agreement . . . the two governments agree that the development of petroleum resources for international trade should be expanded in an orderly manner on a worldwide basis." Whatever the intention of the signers, the Anglo-American Oil Agreement sounded like a proposal under which the two principal capitalist nations were to divide between themselves oil reserves that promised to be an extremely important source of post-war economic and military power.

During the critical period of World War II, when Axis forces were winning important victories and were evidently moving to occupy Suez and to make a junction with their Japanese partners somewhere in the Indian Ocean, Persia became an object of considerable strategic importance. This importance was enhanced by the fact that supplies for the Soviet Union were being shipped to the Persian Gulf and transported overland to the Soviet battle-fronts. To forestall Axis occupation of Persia, the country was occupied by the Red Army in the north, and by the British, later supplemented by American armed forces in the south. British oil interests in Persia were centred in the south and the British were in a position to bring considerable pressure to bear upon the Per-

sian Government. While the evidence is far from complete, there seems reason to believe that British and American interests were seeking additional concessions from the Persian Government, whereupon the Soviet Government proposed that parallel oil concessions be granted to the Soviet Union in the northern portion of Persia then occupied by the Red Army.

These proposals, which were made during 1944, accorded ill with the Declaration on Iran adopted by Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill at their Teheran meeting in November 1943. The Iran Declaration had provided that the three governments "will continue to make available to the Government of Iran such economic assistance as may be possible." The last paragraph of the Declaration stated that the three governments "are at one with the Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Iran."

The refusal of the Iran Government to grant the Soviet concessions or any other concessions during the continuance of the war led to a change of administrations, to denunciations in the Soviet press, and ultimately to a suspension, at least as far as public activity was concerned, of the whole program for dividing up Near East oil reserves. In theory at least the issue remains in abeyance, but during the controversy over these oil reserves Moscow had served notice upon London and Washington that it was prepared to assert its claim to a fair share of such important economic advantages as Near East oil.

Irrespective of theoretical considerations, it seems obvious that Soviet policy has been evolving in Asia as it has been evolving in Europe. Whatever the Soviet attitude toward Asiatic problems may have been during the critical 1930s, Soviet policy in Asia is now defensive in name only. With the progressive weakening of Japan under Anglo-American pressure, and the increasing probability of a severe military defeat, the Soviet Union remains as the only important resident power in Asia. British-American and other western imperialist groups may or may not retain or re-establish their colonial position in the East Indies, in the Pacific Islands or on the Asiatic mainland. The Soviet Union after the defeat of Japan will be the one Asiatic nation with an immediate post-war industrial and military potential. The end of the war in

Europe enabled Soviet diplomacy to take increasing advantage of this unique strategic position.

There are two avenues along which Soviet policy in Asia may move. The first is that already well established in Europe—a firmly held Soviet frontier bordered by a number of friendly governments, free to conduct their local affairs as they see fit, but strongly bound to Moscow in all matters involving foreign policy. Beginnings in this direction have already been made. The Outer Mongolian Peoples Republic has been functioning for more than twenty years in this capacity. Since some time in 1944 an obscure conflict has been progressing in Chinese Turkestan that may easily convert that territory into a Singkiang Peoples Republic resembling that of Outer Mongolia. The Chinese Soviet areas offer a third possibility in this same general direction. Whether Manchuria will be returned to China or be converted into a friendly border state dependent upon the Soviet Union for its major policies is a matter that will be decided as a result of the defeat of Japan.

In Asia as in Europe an important power centre is in process of liquidation. The liquidation of a power centre necessarily involves the redistribution of the power elements composing that centre. The Japanese ruling class hoped to create a Far East empire of continental dimensions. By 1942 they had established such an organization, at least in temporary form. The disintegration of the Far East Prosperity Sphere will be followed by one or more reintegrations of power. For example, the whole of China may be unified under a strong central government, including Manchuria and a semi-independent Korea. India and Burma may be federated under the British Empire or with independent status. Similarly, an Arab federation may unify important areas of Asia Minor. These are possibilities. The overwhelming probability is that the Soviet Union will follow the general policy in Asia that it has been following in Europe, discouraging federations of any considerable magnitude and encouraging the organization of minor states friendly to the Soviet Union. Insofar as independence for Asiatic colonial territories will eliminate foreign imperial controls from the area, the Soviet Union may be expected to continue its policy of encouraging colonial nationalist movements.

The second avenue for Soviet-Asiatic policy differs substantially

from that of maintaining numerous satellite states. It involves the establishment and support of a power or powers capable of maintaining economic and political stability under the general direction of Soviet policy. Japan performed this police function for Britain through several decades. If Japanese power is thoroughly liquidated it will be in no position to perform a similar function under the direction of the Soviet Union. If Soviet spokesmen decide on this aspect of power politics they will be compelled to build up in India, China or perhaps in both territories, political units strong enough to do continental policing, and also well enough supplied with the implements of power to check or prevent aggression by any of the western empires, and ultimately to terminate their imperial strangle-hold on Asiatic peoples.

One vitally important issue remains to be considered—that of the Pacific. The Pacific Ocean in the next few decades will undoubtedly become one of the most important if not the most important area of world trade, commerce, industrial development and social expansion. Should one nation succeed in dominating the Pacific it would enjoy the power advantages accompanying such a development. For a long time to come it seems unlikely that the Soviet Union will be in a position to throw into the Pacific area a volume of wealth or manpower sufficient to ensure Pacific domination. If that is the case and if Soviet diplomacy proposes to maintain a considerable degree of influence in the Pacific area, this must in all probability be done through the agency of an Asiatic police nation. To date, the only candidate for such a position is Japan. No other Asiatic nation has the industrial plant and the skilled manpower necessary to carry through such an ambitious program. If Japan is to act with the Soviet Union as a counterpoise to maintain the Pacific balance of power, Soviet policy must necessarily protect Japan against a too serious military or economic defeat.

Japanese empire builders attempted with only moderate success to build up an "Asia for the Asiatics" policy in which other Asiatic countries could participate with a considerable degree of autonomy. While the Japanese used the slogan, they insisted upon centralizing most of the power in Tokyo.

The Soviet Union is an Asiatic power, controlling a large geo-

graphic area and is in many respects the most important industrial area in Asia. There is every possibility that the Soviet leaders may take a leaf out of Japan's torn notebook, revive the "Asia for the Asiatics" slogan and launch a Pan-Asia movement that might closely resemble the Pan-American movement headed by the United States. In pursuit of such a policy the Soviet Union would not only have the advantage of American precedent, but through American insistence in San Francisco, the United Nations has been so organized as to permit this type of dominated, regional federation. All things considered, the Soviet Union may find that such a development will follow the line of least resistance, will liberate Asia from foreign imperial control and establish the Soviet Union in a role that, for the time being, is as dominant as the role played by the United States in the Pan-American Union.

Soviet policy makers will probably follow at least one of these suggested paths. They may follow all three, emphasizing one or the other as circumstances dictate. There is one thing very certain, however. Unless there is an internal breakdown in Soviet administration, and of this there is now not the slightest indication, the Soviet role in Asiatic affairs will be at least as important as that in European affairs. In all probability it will be more important, due to the absence in or near Asia of any power competent to challenge or checkmate the Soviet Union.

V. THE U. S. S. R. AND THE U. S. A.

Thus far in our consideration of the Soviet Union as a world power we have discussed the relations between Soviet Russia and a partially wrecked Europe, as well as relations between Soviet Russia and an Asia emerging from colonialism. We now turn to a very different theme—the Soviet Union and the United States.

These two countries are the colossi of Marshal Smuts' Empire Parliamentary Association speech: "Russia is the new colossus in Europe . . . Then, outside Europe, you have the United States, the other great world power. You will therefore have these three great Powers: Russia, the colossus of Europe; Great Britain, with her feet in all continents, but crippled materially here in Europe, and the United States of America with enormous assets, with wealth and resources and potentialities of power beyond measure."

Marshal Smuts is not alone in rating the Soviet Union and the United States as the top-ranking powers of the world. Sumner Welles holds the same point of view: "In the first post-war years the two greatest powers, both from a material as well as from a military standpoint, will be the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Frank recognition of this fact must underlie any consideration of the policy which this government should pursue toward the Soviet Union." (*Time for Decision*, p. 306)*. A McGraw-Hill editorial on Russia, Threat or Promise, which occupied a full page in the *Washington Post* of October 18th, 1944, assumed that "when this war is ended, two nations—the United States and Russia—will possess the bulk of the world's military and industrial might." In *The Super Powers*, W. T. R. Fox argues that: "It will be a commonplace after the war to speak of the United States and the Soviet Union as the 'Big Two' whose falling out will be the curtain-raiser for the Third World War." (p. 101.)

In our discussion of the Soviet Union as a world power we reached the conclusion that in terms of the recognized power essentials the Soviet Union must be rated among the foremost nations of the world. It now appears that we must go a step far-

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ther and assert that the Soviet Union must be rated as one of the two foremost nations.

After the defeat of Germany the Soviet Union stood head and shoulders above the remaining nations of continental Europe. Before Pearl Harbor it was the only Asiatic nation other than Japan which might be rated as a major factor in world affairs. With the defeat of Japan the Soviet Union will be the only modern power in Asia. Both in Europe and Asia, therefore, the Soviet Union stands out as a giant among pygmies. By comparison with the United States, however, the Soviet Union faces another giant.

There is no easy way to compare the power potential of the Soviet Union and the United States. Both are continental in area, the Soviet Union occupying nearly three times as much contiguous territory as the United States. Both have abundant resources, those of the Soviet Union largely untouched; those of the United States depleted to some degree. Both countries have an ample agricultural base, with fertile land and climatic variations adapted to the production of a variety of food and agricultural industrial raw materials. Speaking from the standpoint of geography therefore, the Soviet Union and the United States are two North Temperate Zone powers amply equipped with natural advantages. In terms of productivity the United States enjoys a considerable advantage particularly in its capacity to turn out production goods and heavy consumer goods on a mass scale. The consumer goods markets of the United States have been glutted with commodities for two generations, and the average American household is therefore far better equipped with a consumer goods surplus than households in the Soviet Union. United States man power is better trained technically than in the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the total of Soviet man power exceeds that of the United States by about 50 percent, and the net annual population gain in the Soviet Union is considerably above that in the United States. In terms of leadership and management the Soviet Union ranks lower than the United States as far as experience and technical competence are concerned. At the same time, the average age of Soviet leadership is less than that in the United States. The military apparatus of the United States is well manned and particularly well supplied with mechanical equipment. The United States navy and

air force are larger than those of the Soviet Union. The Soviet army, however, is probably larger than that of the United States and has proved itself phenomenally efficient in its conflict with the Axis. Finally, in our listing of power ingredients comes the question of unity, solidarity and public morale. There is ample evidence that despite staggering material and human losses, far exceeding those of the United States, the Soviet population has displayed steadiness and willingness to stand up under conditions of extreme hardship. It is possible that the United States population, faced with a similar situation, would have displayed equal solidarity and tenacity of purpose.

One other factor should be mentioned in a comparison between the power position of the Soviet Union and the United States. The Soviet Union represents a new social system, or perhaps more correctly, a revolutionary adaptation of the existing social order to conditions in the mid-twentieth century. The United States, on the other hand, is dominated by a social order that had its rise in Europe, that was transferred as a mature culture to North America, and that is now displaying in North America the same characteristics of culture decay that exist in the European countries still supporting a free enterprise economy. If this is a correct sociological description, the United States labors under the disadvantage of domination by a decaying social order, while the Soviet Union enjoys the advantage of a new and far more vigorous social apparatus.

There is no attempt here to line the two countries up side by side and to assert that one is stronger than the other. Rather, the power potentials of the two are listed, and the conclusion to be drawn is that these two countries are both immensely strong in the essentials of power. In some respects the Soviet Union is ahead; in other respects the United States leads.

Quite irrespective of the relative strength of the Soviet Union and the United States, it seems obvious from what we have been saying thus far that the post-war world will have two dominant power poles. One will be located in Eurasia, the other in North America. The Soviet Union and the United States will be the two main centres of political and social gravity. These major bodies will draw minor bodies to them with the same gravitational force

that is exerted in the physical sphere by large bodies over small bodies. Small nations will be drawn toward these power centres with the same irresistible force that the powerful have always been able to maintain over the weak. The small nations of Europe and Asia are already feeling the pull of the Soviet centre of gravity. The nations of the Americas were long ago drawn within the United States sphere of political influence.

There may possibly be a third post-war power centre. Attempts will be made to establish one in western Europe with the British Isles as the nucleus. Plans are already far-advanced to set up a power centre in China. The leaders of Argentina and other Latin American countries hope to organize a power centre in South America. These are possibilities. The actuality of the immediate post-war world will be two centres of power, one focussed in Moscow, the other in Washington. Small nations, weak nations and colonial peoples seeking liberation must perforce choose between these two major power possibilities. In most instances the choice has already been made. There will be defections and realignment, but in general it can be predicted that the gravity pull of these two poles will vary inversely as the square of the distance between them and the small powers. Those in close proximity to the Soviet Union will of necessity be drawn Sovietward. Those in close proximity to the United States will with equal necessity be drawn United Statesward.

We have no immediate experience in dealing with a two pole world. Through the greater part of the 19th century Britain was THE World Power. Then, as the struggle to redivide the world matured, several competing powers replaced the One. During the half century preceding World War I nearly a dozen powers had world leadership pretensions. Between World Wars I and II the number was cut to six or eight. With the defeat of the Axis forces, the devastation of Germany and Japan, and the humbling of France and Italy, another drastic cut in the number of world powers has been made.

It will be necessary for us to readjust both thought and action to the conditions surrounding a two pole world. At the moment we are asking ourselves what the relations between these two poles will probably be. We shall begin by discussing some of

the contact points between the Soviet Union and the United States. We shall then continue by asking whether these contact points are likely to develop friction and to become conflict points.

Historically, the relations between Russia and the United States have been almost uniformly peaceful. Twice Tzarist Russia actively assisted the United States. The second time, during the American Civil War, the intervention was of the greatest importance to the Washington Government. Neither country has ever gone to war against the other. With the exception of United States invasion of Soviet territory during the counter-revolution, relations between the two countries have been unmarred by military conflict.

The record is especially remarkable because throughout the entire history of the United States the Russian government has been almost completely antithetical to the American government. When the English colonies were federated in a democratic republic, Russia had one of the most absolute monarchies then in existence. This Russian monarchy continued in power until 1917 when it was replaced by a revolutionary government, the declared object of which was the liquidation of bourgeois democracy and the substitution of a world-wide federation of workers republics. How did it come about that two governments so apparently opposite succeeded in maintaining peaceful relations for a century and a half?

Professor P. A. Sorokin has attempted to answer this question in *Russia and the U.S.A.* Professor Sorokin marvels at "the miracle of a lasting, unbroken peace . . . between these two countries, extending throughout the entire history of the United States." (p. 15) "When both countries have happened to be involved in the same war, they have invariably been ranged on the same side, fighting a common enemy, whether in the case of the Boxer uprising, the war of 1914-18, or the present war." (*Ibid.*, p. 17) Sorokin attempts to explain this seeming miracle in terms of what he describes as similar socio-cultural traits.

The Sorokin explanation acquires peculiar significance because of the unusual background of the author. Professor Sorokin was a prominent sociologist in pre-revolutionary Russia. As an official in the Kerensky regime he came into conflict with the Bolsheviks, left Russia and resumed his academic career in the United States, where he has taught and written for two decades. He is now head

of the Department of Sociology in Harvard. He has thus had the unique experience of building an academic career in both Russia and the United States. Out of this experience he writes his comparison of the two countries.

Professor Sorokin contends that the differences between Russia and the United States are superficial, while the similarities are fundamental. The village background, he argues, is much the same in both countries. The organization of the family, the status of women, the forms of local, municipal and provincial self-government, the legal and the judicial systems of the two are strikingly similar in many respects. Both countries are inhabited by pioneer types. Both occupy vast, sparsely populated continental areas. Both have been expanding consistently through several generations. The Russian people and the American people are both interested in science and passionately devoted to technology. The American people have been free to express their scientific and technical interests since their separation from the British Motherland. The Russians were liberated scientifically and technologically by the Revolution of 1917. Both in terms of institutions and of world outlook these two peoples are following closely parallel courses. Geographically they are barely in contact. In terms of political ideologies they are at variance. But the major socio-cultural forces point toward collaboration rather than toward conflict.

Peaceful relations between Russia and the United States are a matter of history. The explanation of these peaceful relations lies in the realm of social theory. Certainly Professor Sorokin has offered an analysis which has the appearance of authenticity.

Expansion in the broad social sense of extending influence over outlying territory is possible in terms of trade, conquest and ideas. The American Revolution of 1776 gave the United States an opportunity to expand ideologically. The Russian Revolution of 1917 gave the Soviet Union a similar opportunity. During the 19th century United States technology gained world-wide influence. Since the middle 1920s Soviet techniques of social reorganization have influenced the thinking and have helped to shape the social policy of nations and peoples on every continent. It is quite conceivable that at some point in the not distant future another centre of cultural expansion may develop. The Axis powers tried to estab-

lish such a centre and failed in their attempt. In the absence of some such development the United States and the Soviet Union will remain the two present-day centres of cultural, social and political expansion. They will touch in Europe. They will make direct contact in the Pacific. The two countries represent contrasting and rival social systems. Can they live together in peace or must contact mature into conflict?

Immediately after the Russian Revolution Lenin raised the question of socialism overtaking and outdistancing the capitalist world. From the Bolshevik point of view the science and technology developed under capitalism were indispensable tools for socialist construction. Capitalism had evolved these tools. Socialists must learn to make them and to use them, must improve them and must ultimately supersede them. The Bolsheviks thus proposed to take over the results of capitalist achievement and make them a part of the techniques of socialist construction. Such an attitude involved neither animosity nor antagonism. In fact, the Bolsheviks felt a very great admiration for the technical devices of capitalism and desired to make them their own.

The attitude in the capitalist world was of necessity profoundly different. The Bolsheviks sought to supersede capitalism. The capitalists desired to conserve and defend their institutions and ideas against a revolutionary ideology and a political revolutionary force that threatened their prerogatives and privileges. Spokesmen for private property and big business felt that they had nothing to learn from the builders of socialism, whereas if the socialists succeeded the capitalists had everything to lose. Consequently when in March 1921 an appeal was made to the United States Department of State to re-establish business relations with the Soviet Union, Secretary of State Charles E. Hughes on March 25, 1921 replied through the American Consul at Reval that the American government viewed "with deep sympathy and grave concern the plight of the Russian people", and desired to aid in every possible way in establishing commercial relations with them. Secretary Hughes, however, agreed with Mr. Hoover, then Secretary of Commerce, that under the existing economic system Russia could make no return to production and therefore had no commercial future. "It is only in the productivity of Russia that there is any hope for

the Russian people," Secretary Hughes wrote. "It is idle to expect resumption of trade until the economic bases of production are securely established." These bases must include "the safety of life, the recognition of firm guarantees of private property, the sanctity of contracts and the rights of free labor". Until Russia was prepared to make such readjustments in its internal economic life, the Secretary of State saw no possibility or resuming trade relations.

President Coolidge took the same position two years later. (Message to Congress Dec. 6, 1923.) He held that the United States could not enter into relations with another country which refused to recognize "the sanctity of international obligations" or "the cherished rights of humanity." President Coolidge expressed a desire "to make very large concessions for the purpose of rescuing the people of Russia." "Whenever there appears any disposition to compensate our citizens who were despoiled, and to recognize that debt contracted with our government, not by the Tzar but by the newly formed republic of Russia; whenever the active spirit of enmity to our institutions is abated; whenever there appear works meet for repentance; our country ought to be the first to go to the economic and moral rescue of Russia." It was from such lofty eminences of economic and moral superiority that United States officials looked down upon the spokesmen of the infant Soviet Republic.

Ten years later, after the United States had tasted the bitterness of economic defeat, President Roosevelt did condescend to recognize the Soviet Union. Recognition was extended, however, only after Foreign Commissar Litvinov had agreed in his letter of Nov. 16, 1933, "to refrain, and to restrain all persons in government service and all organizations of the government or under its direct or indirect control . . . from any act overt or covert liable in any way whatsoever to injure the tranquility, prosperity, order, or security of the whole or any part of the United States, its territories or possessions, and, in particular, from any act tending to incite or encourage armed intervention, or any agitation or propaganda having as an aim the violation of the territorial integrity of the United States, its territories or possessions, or the bringing about by force of a change in the political or social order of the whole or any part of the United States, its territories or possessions."

Thus the United States government maintained its position of moral superiority and extended recognition to the Soviet Union sixteen years after the beginning of the revolution.

During the interval, and in fact until 1941 or 1942, attitudes in the two countries were maintained at very much the same divergent levels. The Soviet Union continued to admire American technological achievements. Throughout these years no anti-American sentiment was discernible among the Russian people. On the contrary, even Russian school children were well-informed about detailed matters affecting American life, while Russian adults were omnivorously curious regarding United States institutions and practices. "Had the visitor to Russia seen Boulder Dam? How did it compare with Dneiperstroy? Had he visited the Ford factory in Detroit? Was Bolshevik tempo up to American industrial tempo? Did the leadership of the American Federation of Labor represent the viewpoint of American workers?" There were endless variations on such questions, which were never asked with either envy or animosity but out of a desire to learn as a means of improving Soviet techniques.

American attitudes during the same period were dominated by fear and hatred of Bolshevism and all its works. The most fantastic and ridiculous stories were printed in United States newspapers and circulated over the radio and by word of mouth. Any distortion that reflected discredit on the Soviet Union was taken up and endlessly repeated. Facts to the credit of the new regime were ignored or suppressed. At one stage in this campaign of mendacity the *New Republic* made a detailed study of *New York Times* reporting on the Soviet Union, which showed that the *Times* had been taking a consistent anti-Soviet attitude. The *Times* pretended to do a job in objective reporting. The Hearst and Scripps-Howard papers made no such pretence. They were openly and bitterly anti-Soviet. The most ambitious anti-Soviet educational campaign in the United States was carried on by the Roman Catholic Church. Through all of the publicity agencies at its disposal the Catholic Hierarchy preached and taught anti-Sovietism. Various business organizations, the American Legion, the American Federation of Labor, and other influential associations carried on the anti-Soviet campaign. Attempts were made by

various minority groups to counter anti-Soviet propaganda. For every pro-Soviet word that was uttered or printed, however, there were a hundred or a thousand on the other side. Consequently, an entire generation of American people gained its outlook on world affairs through a haze of anti-Soviet propaganda. That generation is now coming to manhood and womanhood. It constitutes a hard kernel of anti-Sovietism which must play an important role in determining Soviet-American relations through the coming years.

Suppose we now attempt to translate the history of Russian-American friendliness and the sharply divergent Soviet attitude toward the United States, and the United States attitude toward the Soviet Union into political terms. By so doing we shall establish a background against which Soviet-American relations have been developing during the past few years, and against which they must continue to develop during the years which lie immediately ahead. Such an analysis must begin with a brief statement of the general foreign policy of the two countries in relation to each other.

Soviet-United States relations grow out of different attitudes in the two countries. They also grow out of different power positions. U.S.A. business interests girdle the globe. Wherever profit-possibilities present themselves United States business men have interests based upon trade, commerce, communications, raw materials and investments.

Soviet policy makers are not in business. Soviet interests therefore are restricted primarily to territory that surrounds the Soviet Union or to issues that involve Soviet security. The United States has vital interests in the Philippines, China, Malaya, Iran, Arabia, Italy and Germany, as well as in the Americas. The Soviet Union, on the other hand has few interests in Latin America. Thus while American interests extend into territory that borders the Soviet Union, Soviet interests do not extend, to anything like the same degree, into territory that borders the United States.

These differences of interests are brought out very clearly in the two recent controversies over Argentina and Poland. The United States has a sphere of influence that includes the Western Hemisphere. Quite as a matter of course United States officials extend or withhold credit and lend-lease, recognize or refuse to recognize Latin American governments that win the approval of Washington

or labor under its disapproval. This policy reached a point of high intensity in the case of the Farrell regime in Argentina. The regime was denounced by Secretary of State Hull and President Roosevelt. Restrictions were placed on commerce; credits were frozen. Attempts were made to line up other Latin American countries and Great Britain for a general boycott of the Farrell regime. The Soviet Union took no public part in the controversy. The Americas were a region in which United States interests were paramount and whatever Soviet sympathies may have been, Soviet officials stuck to their knitting.

How different the situation in Poland! Poland bears the same geographic relation to the Soviet Union that Cuba or Mexico bears to the United States. Twice in a generation Russia has been invaded through Poland. The pre-war Polish regime was anti-Soviet. The Soviet Union, as a matter of major policy, proposed that the post-war government of Poland should be friendly to the Soviet Union.

Throughout the war the British Government, headed by an anti-Soviet Tory, Winston Churchill, had maintained in London a Polish Government-in-Exile that in its general attitude and in its personnel was quite definitely pro-British and anti-Soviet. During the same period the Soviet Government had backed a Polish Government-in-Exile in Moscow. With Europe divided into two major spheres of influence—British in the west and south; Soviet in the east, Poland became buffer territory and an object of special interest to both London and Moscow.

What did Washington do under these circumstances? Washington intervened aggressively and insistently, although no United States sphere of influence was involved. When Moscow recognized the Lublin Polish Government in 1944 London and Washington both reaffirmed their recognition of the London Polish Government-in-Exile.

Soviet interests and Soviet policy both call for non-intervention in a controversy between Washington and Buenos Aires. Latin America is a United States sphere of influence. United States interests and United States policy both call for intervention in a controversy between London and Moscow over Poland. United States interests are planet-wide.

Since these decisions deal with the Soviet role in world affairs,

we shall first state the issues of major politics that exist between the Soviet Union and the United States from the Soviet point of view:

1. The Soviet Union has special interests in the territory that borders directly upon the U.S.S.R.
2. These special interests are in the first place defensive. Moscow desires to protect its territory against military aggression. It also desires to protect its social order against the disorders and disturbances that accompany civil war in neighboring countries.
3. Soviet special interests are likewise economic. The Soviet Union wishes access to raw materials such as oil, to harbors and other channels of transportation and communication. The Soviet Union desires to extend the practice of economic planning far enough to link up Soviet economy with the economy of surrounding countries.
4. Soviet special interests are also cultural. The Soviet Union would prefer to be surrounded by "progressive" communities: that is, communities that are developing Soviet or socialist institutions.

In addition to these Soviet special interests in contiguous territory which affect the United States only indirectly as they affect the social system of which the United States is a part, there are several aspects of Soviet foreign policy that affect the United States directly, as a major world power.

5. The Soviet Union cannot remain indifferent to the presence of a non-European world power on the European mainland. This statement applies to military occupation primarily, although it would necessarily refer to the establishment of basic economic interests which might lead to political and therefore ultimately to military involvement. At this juncture in world affairs only one non-European power could qualify as a possible agency for the establishment of controls in Europe. During World War I United States military forces were present for a short period but were promptly withdrawn at the termination of the war. They were in Europe long enough, however, to take part in the military occupation of portions of

Soviet Russia. During World War II United States military forces have been in Europe and Africa since 1941. According to present plans they will remain as occupying forces in Germany and perhaps elsewhere for an indefinite period.

6. The Soviet Union cannot remain indifferent to a non-Asiatic world power on the Asiatic mainland. Up to the time of the Russian Revolution every world power except the United States held colonial territories on the mainland of Asia. The United States occupied the Philippines. Germany was eliminated as a colonial power in Asia as a result of World War I. The outcome of World War II is not yet definite but it seems quite possible that as a result of the Cairo Declaration of Dec. 1, 1943 Japan will be eliminated from the Asiatic mainland. Even though French control of Indo China is re-established, only one major non-Asiatic power, Great Britain, will occupy a strong position in Asia, unless the United States succeeds through its influence with the Chungking Government in securing a continental foothold.
7. Nor can the Soviet Union remain indifferent to the establishment of any rival world power centre in Asia, no matter how that centre may be constituted. The Axis combination in Europe was such a centre. The Japanese Co-Prosperity Sphere was such a potential centre.
8. The Soviet Union cannot remain indifferent to a monopoly established by any one power over the Atlantic, the Pacific, or over any essential channel of communication such as the Dardanelles, Suez or the Straits of Malacca. Such monopolies in the past have enabled their holders to practice a strategy of economic strangulation that might be disadvantageous or disastrous to any rival power.

Most of these eight generalizations regarding Soviet policy are obvious enough. All of them are based on the evidence already presented in our discussions of Soviet relations with Europe and Asia. They constitute a summary of the policies which the Soviet Union seems to be pursuing or seems likely to pursue in the immediate future, in its dealing with the United States or with any other world power.

What can be said in parallel fashion regarding the foreign policy of the United States?

1. The simplest generalization regarding United States foreign policy is purely negative: the United States has no consistent policy. There are three reasons for this. First, those who make United States policy are not of one mind. Since the policy makers do not agree, a unified, consistent policy is out of the question. Second, the United States has moved so rapidly from a position of isolationism into that of a first-class world power, that its policy makers have had neither time nor opportunity to formulate a policy consistent with the greatly expanded economic and political interests of the country. Third, United States policy has shifted irresponsibly from isolation to intervention and back again ever since the period immediately preceding the Spanish-American War of 1898.
2. The United States, like every other major capitalist country, has followed a policy of dollar diplomacy. Business men have been encouraged by the Department of Commerce and other government agencies to set up profit-seeking enterprises beyond United States frontiers. Behind these enterprises the government has put its diplomatic and consular services and various government departments, including the army and navy.
3. Early in the 19th century the United States declared a policy known as the Monroe Doctrine, under which the United States refuses to permit any non-American power to establish political or military control in the Western Hemisphere. The Doctrine has been variously interpreted, but its basic conception is America for United States Americans.
4. United States policy in Europe, with minor exceptions, has recently been governed by a willingness to accept and follow the lead of London. Frequently the United States has been consulted by London on issues involving American interests. Even where such consultation has not taken place Washington has tended to follow London.
5. In Asia, United States policy has been symbolized by the Open Door: profit-seeking for all comers on the same non-monopoly basis. Such a policy was inevitable in a market so

thoroughly dominated by non-United States interests as was Asia at the beginning of the present century.

6. The Pacific Ocean is a special interest area for the United States. There is as yet no agreement as to how that special interest shall be interpreted. The United States borders the Pacific. The construction of the Panama Canal by the United States marked an important step in Pacific development. As wartorn Europe falls in relative planetary importance, Asia rises relatively. The decline of Europe shrinks the significance of the Atlantic in world affairs. The rise of Asia correspondingly enhances the Pacific. The United States lies between the two oceans. There is a strong probability that Pacific control will be as significant a determiner of world power in the next hundred years as was the control of the Atlantic in the last hundred. It is half a century since the United States secured the Philippines, Hawaii, Guam and other Pacific stepping stones. The Japanese challenge to United States Pacific control has been met with a fierce determination to devastate and de-industrialize Japan.

Recent attempts have been made by Secretary of State Hull and other official spokesmen to formulate United States foreign policy in terms of democratic ideals, good neighborliness and moral correctness. Such statements have a certain propaganda value both at home and abroad. They bear no relation to the facts of United States foreign policy. If the above analyses of Soviet and United States foreign interests and attitudes is correct, it must be abundantly evident that the general interests of the two countries are antithetical and that their specific interests are in conflict at a number of important points.

Private individuals have sought to supplement or formulate American foreign policy in terms of the world power struggle. Clarence Streit, for example, in his *Union Now: A Proposal for a Federal Union of the Leading Democracies* (N. Y. Harper 1939) advocated a grouping of the world's "democracies" around a British-American nucleus. The same theme was developed by W. T. R. Fox in *The Super Powers*. Fox points out that "both Britain and Britain's empire are essential to American security because they provide the indispensable bases from which threats

to the United States from Old World aggressors can be stopped within the Old World", (p.58) He notes that for half a century "British interests in the Western Atlantic, the Caribbean, and the New World generally have not been supported by units of the British Navy for forty years. The basic pattern thus emerges of an informal global collaboration in which the Western Atlantic, the New World, and the Pacific Ocean area are primary United States responsibilities, with Western Europe, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and the Indian Ocean left in the first instance to British protection." (*Ibid*, p. 59). He says that "a specific proposal has been made for enlarging the symbol, 'United States', so that it refers for security purposes at least, to the United States plus Great Britain. Can it be further enlarged to include the Soviet Union? (*Ibid*, p. 69)*. Walter Lippman (*U. S. War Aims*) divides the western world into the Atlantic sea powers comprising "the Atlantic Community", and "the land power of Russia". The Atlantic Community includes besides those countries bordering on the Atlantic, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, the Union of South Africa, Italy and Greece. In short, the British and American Empire plus their satellites. This Atlantic Community "is the historic centre of the international exchange economy." (p. 86) Russia, although bordering on the Atlantic, "exists in and depends upon a region of strategic security separate from the Atlantic powers." All three of these authors make Anglo-American collaboration the key to future world order.

Several limitations upon the Atlantic Community idea should be noted. The first is the improbability of continued Anglo-American unity. The second is the drastic weakening of West Europe. The third is the progressive disintegration of free enterprise economy. The fourth, the rise of the Pacific as the strategic centre of planetary life. It is impossible to develop any one of these four themes here. None can be ignored in an evaluation of the Atlantic Community concept as the basis for American foreign policy.

United States insistence at the San Francisco Conference upon the recognition of regionalism as embodied in the Act of Chapultepec supplemented the division of Europe into regions of influence agreed upon at Teheran. The post-war world will evi-

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dently be regional in character without any strong central world government. The two major poles in this regionally organized world will be the United States and the Soviet Union. If British policy follows the premise formulated in the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of 1942, the British may well be drawn toward the Soviet centre of world power. This will create a situation in which the United States with its satellites and supporters will face the Soviet Union with its satellites and supporters.

The Soviet Union and the United States are not involved in any conflicts in the Western Hemisphere. The nearest approach to such a situation was the United States support against Soviet opposition, for the admission of the Argentine to the San Francisco Conference. In the Eastern Hemisphere, however, conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union has developed over Iran, Poland, Austria, Trieste, Roumania and China. All these territories are contiguous to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is not "interfering" in the Americas. The United States is "interfering" in Eurasia.

An indication of the tensions growing out of the juxtaposition between the Soviet and United States poles of world influence is found in the growing chorus of anti-Soviet propaganda. William C. Bullitt, former United States Ambassador to Moscow, led off with an article in *Life*, Sept. 4, 1944, in which he virtually said that the United States must prepare for war against the Soviet Union. Responsible United States spokesmen, including men well placed in the Army and particularly in the Navy, for years had been taking this position in private. Mr. Bullitt's utterance was the first public semi-official statement of the attitude. The anti-Soviet line has been followed by radio broadcasts, speeches and other public pronouncements in which members of Congress, prominent newspaper editors and other spokesmen for United States business interests have attacked Soviet institutions, denounced Soviet policy in Poland, Austria, Roumania and elsewhere, and have begun to rally United States public opinion for "the inevitable conflict."

Soviet-American conflict is still in its early stages. It exists only by implication in Lippman's Atlantic Community. Thus far it has not been formulated publicly in the Soviet Union. Prominent

United States officials, from the President down, continue to insist upon the desirability of United States-Soviet friendship and collaboration. There is no escape, however, from two major facts: first, the world will emerge from World War II with no central governmental authority; second, it will be a two pole world with Moscow at one pole and Washington at the other.

“What then are the prospects for a war between the Soviet Eastern power-nucleus and the Anglo-American western aggregation? If either were to allow the other to consolidate the rimland of the Eurasian land-mass under its control, it would also have permitted its own power position vis-a-vis to the other to be irretrievably damaged. Although a third world war is thus not likely to *start* as a Soviet-Anglo-American war, an attempt by either at sole hegemony in non-Russian Europe or Asia would almost certainly finish as a Soviet-Anglo-American war. This is almost the sole condition under which the two powers would become polar opposites in a world war.” (Fox, W. T. R. *The Super Powers*, p. 103.)* Fox’s statement seems accurate if it is subject to one amendment. It now seems possible or even probable that his first sentence should read “a war between the Anglo-Soviet Eastern power-nucleus and the American western aggregation”.

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VI. PEACE OR WAR FOR THE U.S.S.R.

International political power, in the final analysis, is tested by the capacity to wage successful war. In a very real sense, however, the success of national policy is in direct proportion to the avoidance of war, particularly of total war, which is so costly to the victor as well as to the vanquished. Thus far in our consideration of the Soviet role in world affairs we have discussed the power position of the Soviet Union and analysed the policies which it is pursuing in Europe, in Asia and in its relations with the United States. Will these policies lead to peace or will they involve war? This is one of the fateful political questions of our time.

Any observer of political events since 1917 must be convinced that the Soviet Union wants peace. From those early days immediately after the revolution when the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic was broadcasting to the world: "Close up your ranks, proletarians of all countries, under the flag of peace and the social revolution", down to the efforts made by the Soviet Union to avoid involvement in World War II, Soviet spokesmen have been among the world's most vocal advocates of a peaceful solution for international tensions and conflicts.

The Bolsheviks gained power over the Kerensky regime for several reasons. One of the principal reasons was the determination of the Kerensky regime to continue Russia in the war on the side of the Allied nations. Bolshevik propaganda demanded the cessation of hostilities, the election of delegates by soldiers, farmers and workers, all power to the Soviets so constituted, the convocation of a constituent assembly, the drafting of a constitution and the establishment of a world-wide federation of peoples' republics. Henri Barbusse edited a book, *The Soviet Union and Peace*, in which many documents dealing with this phase of Soviet policy are brought together.

Since the world revolution did not take place immediately after World War I, and since no hope for peace lay in this direction, the next formal move of the Soviet Union was an attempt to enforce those provisions in the League of Nations Covenant which

called for disarmament. It was 1927 before the Disarmament Commission in Geneva was seriously discussing the calling of a general disarmament conference. Soviet delegations attended this and subsequent meetings of the Disarmament Commission, presenting to each session some variant of a disarmament program. One Soviet proposal was that "the Conference decides to base its proceedings upon the principle of universal, complete disarmament". The Soviet delegation then offered a detailed list of the steps necessary to achieve this objective: the destruction of fortifications, the liquidation of armies and navies, the disbandment of war and navy departments, the cessation of arms manufacture, the abolition of military and naval academies, and a number of other measures designed to reduce or eliminate war-making possibilities. On another occasion Soviet delegates proposed that forty percent of the world's armaments be eliminated the first year, thirty percent the second year, and the remaining thirty percent the third year, thus substituting gradual disarmament for immediate disarmament. Again, in the interest of the smaller nations, Soviet spokesmen advocated disarmament for the great powers first, and for the lesser powers only subsequently.

It goes without saying that these specific disarmament proposals received little support in groups composed of admirals, generals and diplomats, all of whom make their living and build their reputations as a result of military preparation and the waging of war. Furthermore, the armament business was one of the most prosperous and profitable branches of profit-economy, hence the sessions of the Disarmament Commission were carefully shepherded by well-financed lobbyists of the big armament manufacturers who saw to it that any projected arms reduction program was effectively pigeon-holed. The Soviet delegations to the Disarmament Commission did not achieve their objective of disarmament. On the contrary they saw the inauguration of the arms building race that preceded World War II. But they did establish for themselves and for the Soviet Union an enviable record as advocates of a concrete disarmament program.

Long before the Disarmament Conference faded out of the international picture in 1934 Soviet spokesmen had decided upon two courses of action. First, they would accept membership in the

League of Nations, and second, from that vantage point they would advocate a system of collective security based upon the League Covenant and implemented by a series of treaties, under League auspices, designed to inaugurate an effective scheme for checking aggression and thus reducing the probability of war. On September 18, 1934, Litvinov speaking as head of the Russian delegation at Geneva said: "To many members of the League ten or fifteen years ago war seemed to be a remote, theoretical danger and there seemed to be no hurry as to its prevention. Now war must appear to all as the threatening danger of tomorrow. The organization of peace, for which thus far very little has been done, must be set against the extremely active organization of war. Everybody knows now that the exponents of the idea of war, open promulgators of a refashioning of the map of Europe and Asia by the sword, are not to be intimidated by paper obstacles. Peace and security cannot be organized on the shifting sands of verbal promises and declarations." (*League of Nations Official Journal*, Sept. 18, 1934.)

Another year and Litvinov, again speaking in the League Assembly, was urging the immediacy of the war danger and the necessity of concrete proposals to avert it. He suggested a Permanent Peace Conference as a substitute for the defunct Disarmament Conference; he suggested immediate, complete disarmament as a more practicable step than partial disarmament; he suggested League action "with a view to the complete outlawing of war"; he suggested the possibility of a "European Union" as one means of adjusting the rising tensions between European nations. Soviet spokesmen made further attempts to have the League define aggression. In 1934-35 they negotiated treaties with Czechoslovakia and France which were designed to become a multilateral pact to guarantee the collective security of Europe.

This is a considerable catalogue of Soviet peace advances. I present it for the purpose of emphasizing the active and persistent part taken by Soviet delegations in every conference or assembly where they had an opportunity to advance their point of view. Sumner Welles sums up the Soviet role during this period: "When the Soviet Union entered the League, even the most obstinate were soon forced to admit that it was the only major power which seemed to take the League seriously. The Soviet

Government seemed to believe that the Covenant of the League meant what it said. It seemed to feel that the Covenant was not to be regarded merely as a screen for the achievement of each country's individual and selfish purposes. The Foreign Commissar, Maxim Litvinov . . . must be recognized as the only outstanding European statesman who was consistently right during the years between the wars. It was Litvinov's constant appeal that 'peace is indivisible'; that the purposes of the Covenant of the League of Nations could be achieved if the European powers complied with its provisions . . . So long as he represented his government in the League he strove with all his great ability to make the League work." (*The Time for Decision* p.31)*

Questions have been raised regarding the sincerity of Soviet spokesmen in calling for disarmament and collective security. Did the Soviet Union really want peace, or did it aim at a curtailment of arms making until it was in a position to out-arm the other nations? There are several reasons for believing that the Soviet Union had a vested interest in peace and was opposed to any resumption of war activity. In the first place the Soviet Union was led by men and women who had been schooled in the socialist tradition of anti-militarism. One of the basic Marxian arguments was that profit-making, empire-building, armament and war were all parts of a unified pattern which was to be replaced by international socialism. During the years before 1914 the socialist parties of Europe were among the most vociferous opponents of competitive militarism. Second, the Soviet leaders represented a new and as yet unstable community just emerging from revolution and civil war. The stability of this community depended in large measure upon a period of peace and relative order that would permit concentration on the work of socialist construction. In the third place, the energies of the Soviet Union were devoted, not to profiteering at home and abroad but to the task of raising the standard of community well-being. All three reasons gave the Soviet Union a vested interest in peace and a motive for desiring to avert another war.

Soviet spokesmen asked for peace repeatedly and insistently. They got war.

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If there was a popular movement anywhere in the world during the first quarter of the present century, it was the movement that led to the overthrow of the Tzar's regime and the establishment of the Soviet Republic. The movement was not only popular in the Soviet Union but it commanded worldwide popular support. Here was a reorganized community engaged in a social experiment of vast proportions, seeking peace, bread and freedom. How did the balance of the world react to this effort of the Russian people to liberate themselves from an old tyranny, to free themselves from war and to launch an effort looking toward worldwide cooperation?

1. The United States poured out scorn, derision, mendacity.
2. Japan occupied Manchuria and inaugurated a decade of border wars.
3. Great Britain organized the Munich encirclement.
4. Germany and Italy invaded the Soviet Union.

Through two decades the Soviet Union attempted by various means to establish or to assist in establishing world conditions that would ensure peace and collective security. The effort failed. Late in the 1930s, as the collapse of their peace policy became more and more evident, Soviet officials turned their attention seriously to war preparations. They had hoped to live in a peace world. They found themselves in a war world and acted accordingly. Today the Soviet Union is a world power, playing power politics, not because Soviet spokesmen or the Russian people wished to occupy any such role, but because they felt that their survival depended upon it.

In a very real sense, Soviet world policy today is *Our Baby*. We have made it what it is. It is opposed to socialist theory and is inimical to Soviet interests as these were conceived for fifteen years after the Revolution. Soviet world policy is a departure from world socialism and a reluctant adaptation necessitated by a ring of armed imperial enemies.

Having adopted the war-making techniques of the empires, the Soviet Union, after the Axis invasion, gave such a good military account of itself that it rose in a few months to a position as one of the two or three major powers of the planet. Since 1943 Soviet spokesmen have been consulted on all major United Nations policy, and since 1944 the Soviet Union has held the diplomatic and military initiative in Europe.

Now that the European war has been won by the United Nations and that the Big Three have succeeded in imposing their program of world domination upon the San Francisco Conference, world peace and security will depend upon the effectiveness with which the Big Three work together. This proposition has been laid down and widely accepted since the Teheran Conference in 1943. The prospect of military victory carried with it the equally definite prospect of world domination by those nations which controlled the world's wealth, manpower and armaments. So long as these power-holders cooperate, world peace can be enforced and world security guaranteed. Soviet policy has thus entered a new phase. First it stressed world revolution, then disarmament, then collective security and now Big Three unity. Implicit in the Big Three unity policy, however, is another element—military might. This aspect of Soviet policy has been reiterated ever since the surrender of Berlin in May 1945: the Red Army is strong and will remain strong; the Red Navy will be strengthened.

Will Big Three unity provide peace and security for the Soviet Union and the planet? The answer, of course, depends upon the nature of that unity. How thoroughly are the Big Three united? And how long will their union last?

Officially, the Big Three are united and have been ever since their Teheran Declaration of 1943: "From these friendly conferences we look with confidence to the day when all the peoples of the world may live free lives untouched by tyranny and according to their varying desires and their own consciences. We came here with hope and determination. We leave here friends in fact, in spirit, and in purpose." The declaration was signed by Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill. Eleven months later Prime Minister Churchill was making his Oct. 27, 1944 report to Commons on his Quebec conference with President Roosevelt and his Moscow conference with Marshall Stalin. The enemy, he said, has two hopes: first that a long war will wear down the Allies. "The second and more important hope is that division will arise between the three great powers." The Prime Minister assumed the continuance of Anglo-American cooperation. As for Russia: "Our relations with the Soviet Union were never more close, intimate and cordial than they are at the present time." (*N. Y. Times*, Oct. 28, 1944.)

Another four months, and President Roosevelt reported to Congress on the Yalta conference of the Big Three: "On every point unanimous agreement was reached . . . Never before have the major Allies been more closely united—not only in their war aims but also in their peace aims. And they are determined to continue to be united." (*N. Y. Times*, March 2, 1945.) Do these sentiments represent wishful thinking; are they propaganda slogans for public consumption, or are they descriptive of political reality?

Officially the Big Three are united. Actually, however, there are increasing tensions among them. What are the reasons for this tension? With the European phase of World War II ended and the end of the Pacific War in sight, will the tensions increase or decrease?

There has been a substantial change in the character of international tensions during recent years. From 1815 to 1905 international tensions arose mainly between competing capitalist and imperialist groups. Incidentally, there were conflicts between imperial and colonial peoples, and within the homelands of some of the empires, notably those in Central Europe, minor conflicts occurred between the organized wage-workers and their capitalist exploiters. Since 1905 the organized working class has pushed steadily toward the forefront as a factor in international politics. The defeat suffered by Russia at the hands of Japan in the war of 1904-5 helped to precipitate the Russian Revolution of 1905. In essence, this revolution was an attempt on the part of the Russian business classes to win concessions from the ruling semi-feudal bureaucracy. During its course, however, the Russian workers in Petrograd and elsewhere organized soviets and made a definite bid for power. At the same time in other European countries, in North America and in Australasia, working class parties were winning elections, sending representatives to legislative bodies and participating in the formation of ministries. With the Russian Revolution of 1917 these new class forces took power in a major country, set up and maintained a political regime. Since 1917, therefore, every international situation has been complicated by the actual or possible presence of working class forces. The old tensions between competing imperialists have been supplemented by new tensions between exploiters and exploited.

Tensions between the Big Three contain both elements. On the one hand, the Big Three are the big Have nations. Britain controls the world's largest empire. The Soviet Union has the largest contiguous territory of any nation in the world. The United States possesses the world's largest single unit of wealth and its most prolific productive apparatus. These three nations at the end of World War II will command the three most powerful armies, navies and air forces. In terms of old line power politics the Big Three will be the three big centres of production, income and political might.

At the same time Britain is ruled by an oligarchy composed of hereditary monarchist and aristocratic elements, coordinated with a modern business class. The United States is ruled by a business oligarchy. In both of these countries private property in the means of production is the foundation of the economic pattern and the exploitation of wage labor and the production of commodities for profit are the techniques pursued by the ruling oligarchies for their personal enrichment. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, is ruled by a bureaucracy composed originally of revolutionary leaders and recently augmented by additions from the ranks of technically trained economic, military and social directors and managers. Private property in the means of production has been abolished, and with it has gone the form of exploitation characteristic of Anglo-American economy. On the surface the members of the Big Three are armed sovereign states. In terms of class relationships they represent two definitely antithetical social systems.

Big Three collaboration has passed through several well-marked stages. Until 1942 the Soviet Union was hardly considered a nation of first-class importance by the Anglo-American leaders. Furthermore, the Soviet Union had signed a collaboration pact with Nazi Germany in 1939, and in the same year had launched a war against Finland which had resulted in its expulsion from the League of Nations and in a widespread anti-Soviet campaign in both Great Britain and the United States. The successful defense of Stalingrad, Leningrad and Moscow marked a turn in the Soviet fortunes of war and led to the Teheran Conference of 1943 at which Soviet representatives were for the first time accepted on a parity with those from Great Britain and the United States. The war was still

in full swing, however, and for another year the Big Three worked together with little superficial disharmony, although some sharp words were occasionally said about the failure of the western powers to develop a second front. The summer of 1944, with its successful cross-channel invasion and the rapid advance of the Red Armies through southern and central Europe, saw a sharp shift in attitudes. Members of the Big Three were no longer working in harmony.

The first official recognition of disharmony was voiced by Prime Minister Churchill, in his report to the House of Commons on Oct. 27, 1944. The Prime Minister had discussed world affairs with President Roosevelt in Quebec and with Marshal Stalin in Moscow. "You would not expect three great powers so differently circumstanced as Britain, the United States and Soviet Russia not to have many differences in views about the treatment of the various numerous countries into which their victorious armies have carried them. The marvel is that all hitherto has been kept so solid, sure and sound between us all." Mr. Churchill stated the case exactly. While the Big Three were engaged in a desperate indeterminate conflict they were able to maintain a large degree of unity. With victory in sight the question of who shall have what, and how, took precedence over the problem of survival.

"There are great difficulties, but I earnestly hope that they may be overcome," said the Prime Minister in the same speech. "The most urgent and burning question was, of course, that of Poland, and here again I speak words of hope reinforced by confidence. To abandon hope in this matter would indeed be to surrender to despair." Mr. Churchill added, "I wish I could tell the House that we had reached a solution of these problems. It is certainly not for the want of trying."

Twice during the speech Prime Minister Churchill reverted to his major theme. On one occasion he said "The future of the whole world and the general future of Europe, perhaps for several generations, depends upon the cordial, trustful and comprehending associations of the British Empire, the United States and Soviet Russia, and no pains must be spared and no patience grudged which is necessary to bring this supreme hope to fruition." At another point, after a careful statement of the dangers that would

result from disunity among the Big Three: "The future of the world depends upon united action in the next few years of our three countries. Other countries will be associated, but the future depends upon the union of the three most powerful Allies. If that fails, all fails. If that succeeds a broad future for all nations may be assured."

Mr. Churchill stated the case very strongly when he said that if the Big Three unity fails "all fails". Certainly his recent experiences at Quebec, and particularly at Moscow, had led him to take a very serious view of the possibilities and dangers of Big Three disagreement.

Ten days after Churchill's address to the House of Commons, Premier Stalin gave his report at the anniversary of the November Revolution. His premises were very much the same as those of Mr. Churchill. "There is a talk of differences between the three powers on certain security problems. Differences do exist, of course. . . . The surprising thing is not that differences exist, but that there are so few of them." His outlook for the future was cautiously worded. "The alliance between U.S.S.R., Great Britain and U.S.A. is founded not on casual and short-lived considerations but on vital and lasting interests. There can be no doubt that having stood the strain of over three years of war and being sealed with the blood of nations risen in defense of their liberty and honor, the fighting alliance of the democratic powers will all the more certainly stand the strain of the concluding phase of the war." (U.S.S.R. *Information Bulletin*, Nov. 14, 1944, p. 4-5.) It is significant that Stalin saw Big Three unity continuing through the concluding phase of the war. He does not mention post-war possibilities.

The actual course of events during the first months of 1945 more than justified the Stalin outlook. The war in Europe was not yet over, though it had reached its final stage. The Red Armies had been remarkably successful in occupying not only Balkan and Polish but also German territory. The Anglo-American forces had been unexpectedly delayed in their penetration of Germany. While there was no actual race to reach Berlin, the spheres of control in Germany which had already been laid out were taken over by the four invading powers. At the same time

the future of other parts of Europe and Asia Minor was being determined. Here was the supreme test of Big Three unity. They had been able to work together during the war. Could they continue their cooperation when it came to dividing the booty?

Again and again history has repeated the same story. Military alliances among victor nations have dissolved, and frequently have ended in conflict, because the allies could not agree upon a division of the spoils of war. The Big Three are re-enacting the oft-repeated historical drama.

Big Three, or Big Five unity has cracked in various directions. Good intentions and fair words cannot cover up the rifts which first pressed themselves on public attention during the summer of 1944. There was a formal conflict at Dumbarton Oaks, centering about council voting procedure. No agreement was reached and the Dumbarton Oaks proposals were published with this note appearing in parentheses under Section C of Chapter VI: "The question of voting procedure in the Security Council is still under consideration". This document (Department of State Publication 2192) was dated Oct. 7, 1944. Five months later, at the Yalta Big Three Conference, a voting formula was verbally agreed upon, only to be sharply fought out at the San Francisco Conference sessions.

A second formal issue arose at Dumbarton Oaks. The Soviet delegates refused to meet with delegates from Chungking. Consequently two conferences were held, the main conference between Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union, and a subsequent conference between Britain, the United States and China.

Preparations for the Civil Aviation Conference in Chicago, Nov. 1, 1944, included the Soviet Union as a matter of course. A Soviet delegation was sent to the Conference, but at the last moment it withdrew and returned to Russia. The official Soviet Tass Agency, in a broadcast on Oct. 29 (*N. Y. Times*, Oct. 30, 1944) explained the withdrawal: "In view of the fact, which has recently become known, that countries like Switzerland, Portugal and Spain have also been invited to the Chicago Conference, countries that for many years have conducted a pro-fascist policy hostile to the Soviet Union, the representatives of the Soviet Union will not take part in this conference." Again the rift was over a matter of

procedure. But the Soviet Union, one of the three most important air powers, took no part in the Civil Aviation Conference.

A far more substantial conflict developed during 1944 over Persian oil. The matter was sufficiently dealt with in our discussion of Soviet policy in Asia. Here it is only necessary to note that the issue still remains unsettled.

One of the sharpest cleavages between members of the Big Three arose over Poland. That issue was discussed in our consideration of Soviet policy in Europe. Through the latter part of 1944 and the early months of 1945 it remained, as Prime Minister Churchill described it: "the most urgent and burning question" dividing the Big Three.

Not the least urgent among the Big Three controversies was the problem of enlarging the triumvirate so that it might include an Asiatic and a west European continental power. China was picked for Asia because there was no alternative. But which China? For years Chungking China, supported by the United States, had been making war on Soviet China, backed by the U.S.S.R.

France, as a member of the United Nations oligarchy, presented an even more knotty problem than did China. In November 1943 Marshal Smuts dismissed France in his speech before the Empire Parliamentary Association in London: "France has gone, and if ever she returns it will be a hard and long upward pull for her to emerge again." Difficulties arose between Great Britain and the United States over the leadership of a reconstituted France. Britain favored de Gaulle; the United States backed Darlan. De Gaulle's visits to London and Washington failed to gain concessions from either country. After the June 1944 invasion of France, de Gaulle was perforce recognized as head of the French Provisional Government. In December 1944 de Gaulle scored an important victory in the form of the French-Russian Treaty. But when plans were being made for the Yalta Conference, the Big Three decided not to include de Gaulle, whereupon the French Government refused to participate as one of the sponsors of the San Francisco Conference. Paris, dissatisfied with the allocation of German territory for French occupation seized Italian territory along the French-Italian frontier and came close to an open break with Great Britain in the Syrian crisis of May-June 1945.

There are two other areas of Big Three disunity. The first has to do with the administration of Germany, and the second with the Pacific War. Theoretically, German administration is in the hands of an Allied Control Commission. Practically, each of the four occupying powers is going its own way in its own occupation zone. As for the Pacific War, after years of conflict the United States and Great Britain are fighting against Japan, with whom the Soviet Union is still allied.

These specific areas of Big Three disagreement arise not only out of divergent interests but more particularly out of the acceptance of the principles of national sovereignty. During the entire history of the United Nations, organized in 1942, the principle of national sovereignty has been upheld and defended by representatives of all major powers. In the past two years the principle has been expanded into regionalism or spheres of influence, each under the direction of a major power. It seems probable that the regional principle was accepted at Teheran and implemented either there or at Yalta by an agreement under which the Americas became the United States sphere, East Europe became the Soviet sphere, leaving West Europe and the Mediterranean to Great Britain. Active measures were taken by the Soviet Union in the summer of 1944 to occupy its area with military forces. In December 1944 British action in Greece earmarked that country as a part of the British sphere. The United States proceeded, unchallenged, with its private war on the Argentine and immediately before the San Francisco Conference, called together a Pan-American group in Mexico City, secured the adoption of a regional agreement and carried this agreement to the San Francisco Conference as an essential element in United Nations organization.

Before the term "regionalism" is accepted, it is important to inquire regions of what? These territories were always regions of the earth's land mass. Beyond that, they have no significance except in so far as they can be dominated by armed, master states. If a world government had been established, they might well be described as regions under the world authority. But since there is no world government, and since each region is sovereign, and subject to the will of a master nation, the newly constituted re-

gion appears as a slightly modified form of the old sphere of influence, consisting of territory not politically integrated with but subject to the dictates of a master state.

Within their respective regions the Big Three are practicing unilateral action in very much the same way that a sovereign state acts within its own frontiers. The Soviet handling of Roumania, the British handling of Italy and Greece in the autumn of 1944, and British action in Syria in 1945, like United States action in the Argentine, were accepted just as any domestic action is accepted by the government of a neighbor state. There was obvious disagreement between the United States and Russia over Roumania, and between the United States and Britain over Italy. Protests are frequently made, however, when a domestic action of a government infringes the interests of a neighboring government.

Big Three practices accept unilateral action as normal, within designated spheres of influence or regions. United action is by special agreement only. The difficulty over the enlargement of the Polish Government after Yalta, and the setting up of the Austrian Government by the Soviet Union without consultation, arose because the three powers had agreed on a particular formula for these cases.

National sovereignty and regionalism, or master national spheres of influence, have both been institutionalized at San Francisco. In the Security Council each one of the master nations holds a veto power which is a guarantee against interference within its own area of influence. Each of the master nations also retains its arms and its facilities for arms manufacture. The United Nations as constituted will be ruled over by a small oligarchy of the rich and strong. If this oligarchy is taken to include the Big Five it will comprise ten percent of the total membership in the United Nations. In reality, of course, the oligarchy numbers three and thus comprises something more than six percent of the total membership. No provision is made and no means are available to protect the interests of small weak nations against aggressions by the oligarchy unless all of the oligarchs agree on the desirability of such action.

If the master nations disagree, there will be war. Secretary of State Stettinius recognized this fact quite frankly in his radio

broadcast of May 28, 1945: "What happens if one of the five permanent members embarks upon a course of aggression and refuses to recognize the machinery of the world organization? How can the aggressor be restrained if his own contrary vote prevents the Council from invoking force against him? In such an event, the answer is simple. Another world war has come, vote or no vote, and the world organization has failed."

This entire analysis permits of but one conclusion. The Soviet Union has become part of the Western State System in which war has been and still is the accepted means of deciding major issues. None of the international conferences recently held has in any way modified the basic principles of national sovereignty nor set up any institutional means of restraining a master nation from going to war when it considers that its interests demand military action. Under these circumstances:

1. Peace will continue as long as the master nation oligarchy is in agreement.
2. The master nations have been disunited, and on specific issues in open conflict since the summer of 1944..
3. The poles of antagonism are well defined. The post-war world will be a two pole world divided along lines of national and class interests.
4. It is not yet clear how the lesser powers, and especially Great Britain, will group themselves, but it seems increasingly probable that the Soviet Union will control the major portion of Europe's resources and productive tools as well as important areas in non-Russian Asia. There is also a possibility if not a probability that the British, in line with the policy embodied in the Anglo-Soviet Pact of 1942, may cast in their lot with the Soviet Union on many issues of planet-wide policy.
5. After the war in the Pacific is ended there will be little demobilization and no disarmament, except of the defeated powers. On the contrary, military preparations will be stepped up, conscription and military training will both be extended, and every effort will be made to prepare for the next war.

The U.S.S.R. must fight again, not of her choosing but of the necessity which is inherent in the Western State System. Had a world government been set up at San Francisco or if there were

any immediate prospect of establishing a world government, the perspective would be otherwise. With the old established principles of national sovereignty still in full force and unrestrained by any world state apparatus, it seems obvious that procedures under the Western State System will continue in the future along substantially the same lines that they have followed in the past.

One final point should be noted: time works for the Soviet Union. A new social order, moving with the social trends and self-sufficient to a degree impossible under a profit-price economy, should gain in strength with each passing year. Each year that war is postponed is one more year in the task of socialist construction. Thus the Soviet Union continues to have a vested interest in peace.

Only the Soviet Union can afford peace, however. The other master nations, dependent upon profit-price economies, cannot tolerate it. They can hope to provide full employment only on the basis of military preparedness and war. Without full employment there is no remote possibility of preserving the status quo in free enterprise society. Without war, the new social order, represented by the Soviet Union, will inexorably outdistance free enterprise economy. Thus the system of free enterprise has a vested interest in war just as surely as the Soviet Union has a vested interest in peace.

The next war within the Western State System will not be initiated by the Soviet Union. If it becomes a general war with the same totalitarian character as World Wars I and II, it will destroy free enterprise economy in the Americas as surely as World War II crumpled up the same economy in Europe. If the Soviet Union can survive the next war it will serve as the prototype of the new social order that will replace the Western State System and will thus serve as the transfer agent to carry the mechanical and social techniques across the chasm that separates the old world order from the new.

POSTSCRIPT: THE GAME OF POWER POLITICS

The topic for this series of discussions is the Soviet role in world affairs. Emphasis has been placed on "Soviet" rather than "world affairs" because that was the corner of the field that we set out to examine. Nevertheless "world affairs" is a far broader and more inclusive theme than "Soviet". There were world affairs or international relations before the Soviet Union came into existence. Relations between the nations are older than written history. They provide much of the subject matter of history as it is usually presented. So having devoted an entire lecture series to the Soviet aspect of this problem, I want to treat international relations or power politics in this brief postscript. Throughout this series of talks I have taken the pattern of international life as the background against which to consider Soviet foreign policy. I have neither questioned the pattern nor attempted to evaluate it. Now the time has come to describe it briefly and say a few words about its social and ethical import.

In our last discussion of Peace or War for the Soviet Union I attempted to show that Soviet spokesmen first opposed the international pattern in principle, then tried to modify some of its more objectionable features and only as a last resort adjusted their policy to its total-war standards. One of the earliest acts of the Bolshevik Government was to propose a worldwide revolution that would overthrow capitalist states and empires, and substitute for them a world government organized by representatives of the world's peoples. Such a move, if successful, would have replaced competing nationalisms and imperialisms by a coordinated and perhaps by a cooperative world community.

Bolshevik efforts in this direction failed. Consequently we find ourselves today living under a system of world politics that is practically the same in principle as it was when men plodded along mud roads behind horses and oxen, moved across water in sailing ships, and spoke to each other only by word of mouth or by letter and printing press.

Shelves of books have been written about world politics. R. P.

Dutt's World Politics (N. Y.: International, 1936) is a good treatment of the subject from the left. N. J. Spykman's *America's Strategy in World Politics* (N. Y.: Harcourt, 1942) presents the theme in geo-political terms. F. L. Schuman's *International Politics* (N. Y., McGraw Hill, 1933) is a standard college textbook. These and scores of other recent studies explain the workings of world politics or power politics. One of these days I shall prepare a series of lectures on this theme. Right now I should like to present a thumb-nail sketch of the subject.

1. World politics or power politics is intercourse—peaceful or warlike—between governments of sovereign states.
2. In the absence of a world government, with sovereign power, the planet is essentially law-less. Each nation makes its own laws, and formulates its own policies often with little or no regard for the well-being of its neighbors who are engaged in like nationalist practices. Under such a set-up, friction and conflict are inevitable, and the ultimate decisions are made by a resort to war.
3. Business for profit and the will to power both drive national policy makers into a competitive struggle for economic, political and social advantage or privilege.
4. Urged on by this drive, individuals already rich strive to augment their wealth, and powerful nations seek additional power.
5. Recent centuries of world power struggle have involved:
 - a. World supremacy for a series of nations: Spain, Holland, France, Britain,
 - b. Gained through the defeat and often through the destruction of their rivals,
 - c. And through the extension, by armed force, of imperial control over dependent and colonial peoples.
 - d. Some colonial people like the English colonies of North America and the Spanish and Portuguese colonies of Latin America have thrown off the yoke of empire and become sovereign states, competing in their turn for wealth and power.
 - e. The power struggle has been waged with all of the weapons in the hands of the power seekers. War has been

going on in some part of the empire-dominated world about nine years out of every ten.

6. The international power struggle is carried on ruthlessly. It is impossible to understand the game of power politics unless you remember that it has no rules, no ethics and no morals. It is a life and death grapple in which no holds are barred.
7. The power politics game goes on incessantly between foreign ministers and other government agents who sneak, spy, double-cross, cheat, lie, bribe, steal, burn and kill to advance the interests of "our country" and to out-manuever the "enemy" (all other countries).
8. At irregular intervals, when small scale spying, cheating, double-crossing, lying, debauchery, theft, incendiarism and murder will no longer secure the desired results, the total resources of the fatherland are mobilized against the enemy. Economy, science, the radio, the press, the screen, the school, the church and every other available agency are pressed into service for a campaign of organized destruction, rapine and mass murder called total war.
9. Since the final test of success in the power-politics game is military victory, no pains are spared to destroy, burn and kill to the utmost. Recently developed mechanical and automatic weapons enable the users to wipe out towns and cities in a few hours and to devastate entire countries in a few months.
10. Military victory carries with it the right to appropriate the movable property of the vanquished; to take title to the natural resources within enemy territory; to humiliate, enslave, execute. Glory to the victor! Woe to the vanquished!
11. This is the power politics game—the sport of kings and the king of sports. Not only does it make or ruin individuals, but it creates and annihilates nations and entire cultures.
12. Our best people dedicate their talents and their lives to the game of power politics. Those who lead their fellows to victory are acclaimed and honored. Those who lead their fellows to defeat are usually cursed and forgotten. Power-hungry, cynical, greedy, ignorant, cruel manipulators, in the name of defense, patriotism, national honor, survival, sacrifice the happiness and well-being of multitudes on the altar of greed and violence.

Through the ages thinkers and teachers have tried to formulate rules of conduct under which human life would be dignified and exalted. They have spoken of understanding, sympathy, compassion, brotherhood; of devotion to truth, beauty and goodness; of generosity, sharing, cooperation. Judged by any such standards, power politics is a dirty game, unworthy the time and energy of any man or woman of good-will.

Civilized communities have deified the state and have accepted the power-politics game as a necessary accompaniment of state sovereignty. The absence of rules, ethics and morals in the game has been excused on the grounds that (1) "It is our country, right or wrong", (2) "Everybody is doing it", and (3) "We are in it now and we must go through with it". Spokesmen for this pattern of western life conveniently forget that "they who take the sword, perish by the sword"—victor and vanquished alike. Yet this must be true, because war is waged between groups of human beings in terms of fear, hate, deliberate devastation and premeditated, planned killing.

No community can hope to endure which does not establish and maintain social standards that conserve and build. The power politics game is organized and played in terms of destruction.

No community can hope to endure which does not develop techniques of cooperation and mutual aid. Power politics practices cutthroat competition.

No community can hope to endure which does not work out ethical and moral codes under which human decencies are preserved, human worthiness is enhanced and men learn the hard lesson of live and help live. Power politics is based on the assumption that every person across the frontier is a potential enemy, to be suspected, feared and hated in peacetime and in wartime, to be murdered at the command of the state.

Power politics contravenes every concept of popular sovereignty, every principle of fair dealing, every code of "do unto others", every teaching of brotherhood. Either we follow the precepts laid down by the leading ethical teachers or else we take part in the power politics game. There is no middle way.

Soviet leaders entered the power politics game not because they liked it but because they felt that there was no alternative. They

have been calling for another game, with decent rules and new players. How can any man or woman of good will fail to sympathize with Soviet spokesmen in their heroic efforts for world peace and security and to afford them every assistance in their struggle to replace power politics by a planned, ordered, governed world community?

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INDEX

- Anglo-American Petroleum Agreement, 60
Anglo-Soviet Treaty, 40
Anti-Bolshevism in U.S.A., 73
Atlantic Community, 80
Big Three, 34; and France, 94; and Poland, 94; at San Francisco, 88; collaboration, 90; tensions, 89; unity, 88
Big Two, 65
Bolshevik seizure of power, 12
Bolshevism, objectives, 13
Border wars in Soviet Asia, 57
Bourgeois revolution in Russia, 8
Chinese Revolution and Bolshevism, 54
Civil war in China, 55
Coal production in Russia, 26
Collective security, 37, 85; defeated, 39
Colonial nationalism and Bolshevism, 53
Colonial revolt in Asia, 51
Counter revolution in Russia, 11
Culture lag in Russia, 8
Declaration on Iran, 61
Disarmament Conference, 84
Education in Russia, 27
Electric energy in Russia, 27
Europe, possibilities for, 47
Europe, Soviet domination of, 48
Foreign policy, nature of, 44
Geography, as a power element, 22
Imperialism, extension of, 6
Industrial production in Russia, 25
Iron production in Russia, 26
Japan and the Chinese Revolution, 56
Leadership in Russia, 28
Military strength of Russia, 29
Monolithic society, 14
Munich Pact, 38
National income of Russia, 24
New power centres, 68
New social systems in Russia, 67
Oil concessions in Persia, 59
Pacific Ocean, domination of, 63
Peace and the master nations, 97
Permanent peace conference, 85
Persian oil controversy, 94
Policy-making in Russia, 74
Political power, meaning, 20
Power ingredients, 21
Power politics, 21, 99
Power shifts in Asia, 62
Production, changes in, 6
Profit accumulation, 6
Racial minorities and Bolshevism, 54
Rapallo Treaty, 37
Regionalism, 95
Revolution, 7; and political power, 30
Revolutionary gains in Russia, 17
Revolutionary theory, 10
Russian Revolution, nature of, 8
Smut's analysis of Russian power, 33
Socialism and Capitalism, 71
Socialism in Russia, 15
Social solidarity in Russia, 29
Soviet diplomatic offensive, 46
Soviet expansion, 70
Soviet foreign policy, 42
Soviet influence in China, 54
Soviet-Japanese Pact, 57
Soviet-Nazi Pact, 39

Soviet objectives, in Asia, 52; in Europe, 41
Soviet peace proposals, 85
Soviet policy, objectives, 13
Soviet policy in Poland, 45
Soviet production, 25
Soviet-U.S. tensions, 81
Soviet world policy, 87
Soviet Union, a world power, 34; and disarmament, 83; and Europe, 36; historical background, 7; in Asia, 50
Spanish Civil War, 38

Tzarism, collapse of, 9

U.S.A. and U.S.S.R., 65; compared, 66; policy compared; 76
U.S.A., intervenes in Europe, 75; recognizes Russia, 72


Victorian Age, 5

Western state system, 99

World politics, 21, 99

World revolution, 15

World War II, beginnings, 7, 40



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