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Philosophy as Laughter

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Philosophy as Laughter
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Summary

Contextualising my current philosophical preoccupations within the framework of my understanding of my task as a philosopher, I engage with the proposition that philosophers have a double task: firstly learning (and teaching) how to think, and relatedly, unexpectedly, learning/teaching how to laugh.

Accepting that Philosophy has, first and foremost, styled itself as the discipline of thinking, the first half of the lecture offers a critical overview of Philosophy's task of thinking. It is not controversial to describe Philosophy as deeper level critical thinking, or to say that Philosophy involves critical thinking about a certain kind of subject matter related to the meaning of life or the human condition. Philosophy traditionally asks what it means to be human, and considers: the nature of things; the meaning of freedom, love, compassion, identity; how best to live well; what counts as knowledge, truth, good, evil; how to understand divinity, treat others, create a just society; and so on. It is when philosophers look at their own activity or, that is, think about thinking, that the characterisation of the philosopher's task becomes more contentious. The traditional explanation of what thinking means is challenged by a more contemporary explanation that takes account of complexity. The heart of the difference between these explanations lies in their different conceptions of "the truth". On a traditional account, a truth is understood to be as a piece of knowledge about the human condition that one may have in hand forever. On a contemporary account, the truth is described as the insight that every aspect of the human condition reveals a precarious condition of radical uncertainty. Wary of the unspeakable atrocities perpetrated by zealots who believe they have knowledge, in the discussion to follow, I embrace contemporary complexity thinking and the notion of "radical uncertainty".

In the second half of the lecture, I turn to the question of characterising Philosophy as more than an intellectual discipline of thinking. I consider Philosophy as a practice, or as a way of life. I engage specifically with a text by Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* [1892] to put forward a way of practicing philosophy as the task of learning how to laugh well. Learning how to laugh well turns out to be an extremely complex ethical task. It involves a strategy of lifelong learning and teaching in which there is a shift from immature to mature versions of at least four

kinds of laughter. Nietzsche offers gripping metaphors for three of these; namely, the laughters of the camel, lion and child. I draw the fourth metaphor from Nietzsche's contrast between two kinds of "fire-dog". The final "outcome" of the extremely difficult and laborious ethical task of learning to laugh (or, that is, the ethical task of self-overcoming or self-mastery) is the fittingly paradoxical insistence that it is ultimately necessary to renounce this outcome, since it represents a misconception of the ethical task as one of making linear progress from worse to better, ugly to beautiful, evil to good, and so on. Instead, immersion in a life of learning to laugh is its own reward, along with all of its pain, hardship, suffering and ugliness, as well as, importantly, the radical uncertainty of a better outcome. Nietzsche teaches us that the most important philosophical and ethical task is to make your tangible reality count so much that you can embrace its eternal recurrence.

1. Introductory Remarks

It might seem ironic to tie Philosophy as a discipline to laughter. After all, in accordance with philosophy's self-proclaimed seriousness, philosophers traditionally portray laughter as a weakness of passion that healthy thought can overcome. In the *Leviathan* (date), for example, Thomas Hobbes' dismisses laughter as merely an ugly upsurge of self-congratulation, when you see yourself made glorious by the comparative infirmity of others. He thinks laughter should be despicable to any great philosophical mind. Defying, this attitude, Nietzsche (1966: §294) insists that laughter instead should be understood as the very way of being philosophical, and he is willing to "risk an order of rank among philosophers depending on the rank of their laughter – all the way up to those capable of *golden* laughter." Following Nietzsche, particularly in a reading of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* [1892] (2010), I hope to convince readers that understanding laughter as the very way of being philosophical is a viable and non-trivial ethical task.

In order to tie philosophy to laughter convincingly, it is necessary to frame my particular understanding of my task as a philosopher. Philosophy has an extremely long and venerated "history of effects" (Gadamer 1998: 300), and there are probably as many conceptions of the philosophical task as there are philosophers and teachers of philosophy. As I see it philosophers have a double task: firstly learning (and teaching) how to think, and relatedly, unexpectedly, learning/teaching how to laugh.

2. "What is Philosophy?"

"But what is philosophy?" From the day I declared my love for philosophy the demand has not ceased for a clear answer to this question. Over many years, I have diligently striven to supply one. Now, after twenty-seven years of study, I think I am uncertain enough about the answer to start feeling wise. The allusion is to Socrates' famous "doctrine of ignorance", from Plato's *Apology* [399 BCE] (1892a: 12). In dialogue with different experts, from politicians to poets and craftsmen, Socrates repeatedly came to the same conclusion: Regarding what he saw as the pretence of wisdom concerning the otherworldly, he asks:

Is not this ignorance of a disgraceful sort, the ignorance which is the conceit that a man knows what he does not know? And in this respect only I believe myself to differ from men in general, and may perhaps claim to be wiser than

they are:--that whereas I know but little of the world below, I do not suppose that I know (Plato 1892a: 12).

Plato has Socrates argue here that he is the wiser person, since his interlocutors suppose they know something about the otherworldly, when they actually cannot, whereas Socrates is able to accept his own radical uncertainty. It is easy to trot this quotation out in a Philosophy 101 course, but it is exceptionally difficult to embrace its truth and live with it. But exactly because of the unspeakable atrocities perpetrated by zealots who believe they are uniquely in the know, if there is anything I want to walk away with after twenty-seven years, it is the skill, honesty and courage to embrace “radical uncertainty”.

“Radical uncertainty” does not imply that there is no true answer (in this case about philosophy’s unique subject matter and what philosophers are supposed to do). Instead, it implies that the true answer is “uncertainty”. Keeping this in mind, I will venture a four-fold answer to the question, “What is philosophy?”: 1) Philosophy is thinking; 2) Philosophy is thinking about “the meaning of life”; 3) Philosophy is thinking about thinking; 4) Philosophy is a way of life.

2.1 *Philosophy is thinking*

First, philosophy involves deeper level, critical thinking. It involves disclosure, or *aletheia* to use Heidegger’s (1962: 105-106) poetic metaphor, meaning the act of drawing things back out of the river of forgetting. We think because we desire to uncover “the underlying truth” about the human condition.

2.2 *Philosophy is thinking about “the meaning of life”*

To be human is to open questioning eyes to the world, wonder about our place in and beyond it, and, perhaps since the first cave paintings, leave records of our speculations (Lewis-Williams 2002). “Philosophy” names the deep thinking that seeks the truth about perennial questions concerning “the meaning of life”: the nature of things; the meaning of freedom, love, compassion, identity; how best to live well; what counts as knowledge, truth, good, evil; how to understand divinity, treat others, create a just society; and so on.

2.3 *Philosophy is thinking about thinking*

“Philosophy” (from the Greek words *philos*—love, and *sophia*—wisdom) emerged as a named discipline of thinking 2,500 years ago and explicitly becomes “thinking about thinking”. And this is tied to Philosophy’s elevation of Reason, in competition with the powerful authority over the meaning of life vested in the poets, politicians and craftsmen (the religious, mythological, social and practical storytellers). In this “game of thrones” Socrates was swatted out of existence like an annoying gadfly. But Plato gained enough power to set up the first Academy, and there are all kinds of ironies in the fact that so many subsequent famous philosophers, from Descartes to Nietzsche, philosophised “on the run” from academia.

When philosophy is understood as “thinking about thinking” things become complex. Remaining with academic philosophy, Plato, in the *Phaedrus* [370 BCE] (1892b) articulated a formal theory of thinking, which has held sway with so few modifications for so long, that it is really hard to think of it as somebody’s fabrication. The brief outline to follow of what, right from Plato, we describe as “what we do when we think”, will probably sound like common sense. This outline is drawn from what Deleuze (1994: 129-167) has named “the dogmatic image of thought”.

When we think: (1) we seek truth, and we understand truth to be (2) knowledge. Knowledge, we say, is possible when our different faculties (perception, memory, imagination, understanding, reason etc.) (3) operate in harmony and we have the “good sense” to use/trust the right set of faculties for the right kind of object. When you say “seeing is believing”, for example, you implicitly put your trust in perception over memory or imagination. This makes (4) repeatable recognition of objects possible, and we understand misrecognition to be a form of error: a misapplication of our faculties, which can be corrected (if they are not damaged). So, we say that thinking can’t really intrinsically go wrong – it is (5) external mechanisms that cause errors, such as brain dysfunction or emotional distraction. We believe that we are thinking properly when we make propositions that (6) make sense. They make sense if they can be assessed as true or false, and we find it more acceptable to make “honest errors” than to produce nonsense or construct false problems. (7) A genuine problem, we say, is one that can potentially be solved and will disappear once the solution has been found. (8) We believe we have learned, then, when we pass from “not knowing” to an outcome called “knowledge”.

Traditional Philosophy still works according to these eight postulates, but what drew my attention as a doctoral student was the Socratic aspect of philosophy; the radical uncertainty that was (ironically) both immortalised and suppressed in Plato’s writings and mostly suppressed in all the later “footnotes to Plato” (Whitehead 1978: 39). An alternative way of thinking about thinking, inspired by the “radical uncertainty” attributed to Socrates, only really gained currency recently (for Philosophy, “recently” means 100 years ago). In my studies, I followed a path from Kant’s famous “transcendental turn”, through Husserl’s phenomenology to contemporary post-structural thinkers, mainly Derrida, Lacan, and lately Deleuze, who were all strongly influenced by Nietzsche, Freud and Heidegger. In my Doctoral dissertation I addressed the face-off between deconstruction and psychoanalysis, because I had found that both Derrida and Lacan, despite their discursive differences and proclaimed antagonisms, used the same, subversive, alternative way of thinking about thinking. They were both, at bottom, thinking according to the same logic of complexity. And it was this logic that interested me, as a very useful way of approaching the human condition (Hurst 2008).

The bottom line of complexity thinking is that our means of access to perceptual, social and intellectual phenomena leaves us humans radically uncertain about almost every aspect of our being in the world. If uncertainty is the truth about the human condition, every postulate of “the dogmatic image of thought” is overturned (this “overturning” is the first and primary figure of laughter).

I agree with Deleuze (1994: 129-167) that thinking does not take the form of a comfortable cognitive harmony. Instead, thinking is forced, mostly by a nasty shock where your faculties are involuntarily awakened by a threatening strangeness, and they can’t work together to “get your mind around” a thing. This means we genuinely think, only when we have difficulty in recognising. Thinking is not “problem-solving” but active problematization of what we thought was self-evident. It is a disruptive, polemical insistence on perplexity. Learning is not about knowing, it is about developing a capacity to respond sensitively to signs and creatively to perplexities. Also, the traditionally subversive figures – madness, absurdity, illusion, nonsense – are not always threats to thinking, but may turn out to be life-affirmative and desirable conditions that open up spaces for critical and creative thinking. The biggest threat to thinking is the stupidity of “good sense”, where you render the ineffable in terms of the conceivable (through proper propositions, arguments and problems) and take this narrowed down fabrication for truth. But why do we believe so firmly that things should be sense? Why is finding life’s meaning regularly posed as the ultimate goal?

Once it is granted that the true answer is “uncertainty” it becomes noticeable everywhere. And isn’t another figure of laughter, self-contradiction, already inscribed in Plato’s text about thinking, the *Phaedrus* [370 BCE] (1892b), where a divine “madness” indicates access to deeper insights that reason cannot reach. Who is Socrates after all? Like Jesus, Siddhartha and Confucius, Socrates was indeed a historical figure – but Socrates never wrote anything down, and the most sustained account of who Socrates was, and of what Socrates said, comes from his role as the protagonist in Plato’s dialogues. Who is making Socrates say what? And, since these are dialogues between characters, can we ever be certain that Plato says anything at all in his own name?

Before I tie philosophy more closely to laughter, it is important to add one more response to the “What is philosophy?” question.

2.4 Philosophy is “a way of life”

Following Pierre Hadot (1995: 267) philosophy may be seen “as a way of life”. Ancient philosophical schools shared a conviction that the philosopher’s task involved “speaking and thinking well” together with “acting in a correct and just way”. Today, in the disciplinary context of universities, it is considered enough to construct, study and critique diverse theories of self, world and society in a “technical jargon reserved for specialists.” On the one hand, I would be distressed if universities finally bolt their doors to “the life of the mind” or the purely intellectual life that gives rise to great philosophies. I do worry, on the other hand, that we academics are too comfortably placed as marginal figures whose ethical responsibility conveniently stops with criticism. Perhaps this keeps us too safe from personal obligations towards self-transformation, lifestyle change, or community building. It is disheartening to read inspirational books about “welcoming the other” and “hospitality” authored by philosophy professors at such war with one another that they and respective students and acolytes will not greet one another in the hallowed corridors of the academy. That said, living up to any philosophy is exceptionally difficult, and I am (of course) not sure what it would mean to orientate life practices and attitudes towards an existential expression of complexity. But I think that the deeply serious and subversive figure of laughter is a good candidate.

3. Philosophy as Laughter in Nietzsche’s *Zarathustra*

Nietzsche’s *Zarathustra* is a great text for elaborating on laughter as a candidate for orientating an existential expression of complexity. By portraying the ethical development of the character, Zarathustra, Nietzsche indeed envisages how to practice philosophy as a way of life and this is a matter of learning how to laugh well.

In what follows I aim to map out Zarathustra’s “learning curve”. I should mention that this “map” will not be found in a standard account of Nietzsche’s text. One may legitimately call it a violent imposition, or, in a more generous mode, an act of co-creation. I have formed it in the struggle to produce a creative “reading” that still pays due respect to the text.

I see Zarathustra’s pathway as an upward spiral, in which he engages repeatedly, but at increasingly higher levels (in each turn of the spiral), with the three significant shades of laughter suggested by Walter Kaufman (a prominent Nietzsche scholar and translator). By virtue of each respectively, one is able finally to “slay the spirit of gravity,” “teach knowledge to smile”, and “pronounce laughter holy”. These forms of laughter may also be understood respectively as laughter that: “makes light of”; “laughs off” in emancipatory dismissal; and

“finds joy”. Finally, each is represented respectively by Nietzsche’s metaphors of the camel, lion and child. I believe another shade of laughter must be added, by virtue of which you are able to slay the spirit of revenge. I think Nietzsche’s second fire-dog is an appropriate symbol for this, and the related shade of laughter is laughter that “laughs at” any form of power struggle.

The upward spiral is nevertheless driven by what Nietzsche calls “the will-to-power”. Roughly, desire for power has turned inwards and takes the elevated form of self-overcoming. This conjoins two more laughs: a) backward-looking, self-destructive mockery of our own naïvetés, stupidities and vanities etc; b) a forward looking, surprised delight at new insights. Our negative, mocking resentment about our own deficiencies (rather than blank ignorance of, or indifference to, them), already inscribes a belief in our perfectibility (you can only resent a deficiency if it can be changed) and a longing for healing that stems from love, understood as the passion to lure the human monster towards self-overcoming, in the joyous affirmation of our potential to be so much more.

Beginning with the backstory of Nietzsche’s narrative, for the first 30 years of his life, Zarathustra was presumably consumed with the ugly, petty laughs that emerge from base forms of resentment and will-to-power and keep an in-group bound together by a notion of equality tied to mere sameness. Basically, lust for power-over another stems from a fear of not being equal enough - vengeance, retribution and punishment all aim to restore sameness, and balance power. We take revenge on difference – if they outshine us too far we pull them down by mockery; if they are beneath us, we punish their weakness through dehumanising ridicule. Security stems from being part of the in-group where people are trained to share the habitual, superficial, drunken joys of self-forgetting and petty sniggering of easy comfort.

Zarathustra’s journey starts when he awakens to self-disgust - a higher form of resentment, represented in the vengeful self-mockery of the great despisers. [These are our contemporary stand-up comedians and satirists]. In self-mockery I upbraid myself – and humanity by implication – for petty weaknesses. This form of laughter, as mentioned, has the energy to drive the will to power in its guise as self-mastery. But left to its own devices, self-mockery becomes self-destructive (the unhappy clown is a stereotype) and, as initially such a buffoon, Zarathustra eventually must “take his ashes to the mountains”. Realising that “Not by wrath, but by laughter, do we slay” (Nietzsche 2010: 37) he begins teaching himself to laugh well.

Still part of the backstory, Zarathustra spends ten years in isolation mastering camel, lion and child laughter. But he also discovers that individual self-overcoming is incomplete. Addressing the sun he asks: “What would your happiness be, had you not those for whom you shine?” (Nietzsche 2010: 37). The sub-text here is Plato’s insistence philosophy’s most prominent task is to teach. Zarathustra therefore comes down from the mountain, and starts the long confrontation, detailed in the book, with the power dynamics of the teacher/learner relationship.

Part 1 of the text covers Zarathustra’s attempts to teach others about laughter through telling; that is, through sermons, parables, and metaphors. These encounters teach him that people are not equally open to his words, and he needs to engage with a few willing companions rather than the masses. Having spent time with a select group, he realises he has now attracted believers rather than genuine companions in learning. He has to overcome this asymmetrical power-relation: undo his own attachment to it, release the believers, and attract/give birth to genuine companions, who themselves can learn/teach at a higher level. Part 2 roughly covers a time of teaching/learning through shared experiences, periodic isolations, returns and

wanderings, culminating in the Happy Isles (Nietzsche's version of the Epicurean Garden). But Zarathustra is not done yet with the will to power, and in what he calls his stillest hour has to begin confronting the challenge posed by the thought of "eternal return". Part 3 covers Zarathustra's period of isolation and convalescence, marked by the command "physician heal yourself" (Nietzsche 2010: 65).

Before I turn to Part 4, where Zarathustra re-connects with flawed humanity, in a process of making peace with the eternal return, it is necessary to give this movement of self-overcoming some substance by showing the following: 1) How camel laughter develops towards slaying the spirit of gravity; 2) How lion laughter develops towards teaching knowledge to smile; 3) How child laughter develops towards making laughter holy; and 4) How a shift from the first to the second fire-dog overcomes the spirit of revenge. This shows in detail what it means to learn to laugh well.

3.1 How camel laughter develops towards slaying the spirit of gravity

Camel laughter is a strengthening laughter through which you develop the courage to "make light of" the heavy: both burdens of constraint and emotional heaviness. Its development in *Zarathustra*, from Part 1 through to Part 3 involves, first, the task of making light of discomforts, sufferings, and unhappinesses by embracing them. This is a matter of strengthening yourself to carry the burdens. Then Zarathustra in effect advises one to choose carefully what burdens to bear. The injunction is to stop loading yourself with externally imposed burdens. Then you are advised to detach from your resignation to the unhappiness of life and your gratefulness for minor consolations, even if it causes despair because you now don't know how to live. It becomes time to face your fear of the abyss which replaces the solid ground to which gravity attaches you. Nietzsche's metaphor for this is to "bite off the head of the snake" to wrestle with and tear out the down-dragging heaviness of: despair, depression, horror, hatred, loathing, and pity. The laughter of release from the need to suffer, readies you for the self-shattering flash of lightening and the laugh of exaltation when you see that lightening does not harm you. Then the task is to make lightening work for you – blind others with your wisdom. But then, it is essential to learn to make light of the naïve, arrogant, hubristic way you have laughed at the spirit of gravity. How do you laugh at this? Nietzsche proposes that you face with courage the emerging thought of the eternal return. In this affirmation, you become a light-hearted "blesser and a Yes-sayer" surrounded by an "abyss of light!"

The other three shades of laughter follow a similar kind of trajectory. Lion laughter by which you teach knowledge to smile begins with "laughing off" as unimportant, petty, irrelevant, trivial the self-satisfied injunctions that come from those "wise, knowing and learned ones" supposedly "in the know", but who hold unthinkingly, habitually to rigid binary values in all domains (virtue/vices, purpose/chance, order/disorder). It reaches its zenith in the laugh that erupts when your mind/your thinking is freed for your "final lion-wantonness and playfulness".

Child laughter begins with the recognition that God is dead and the acknowledgement of the need to prepare yourself - as a precursor to the new game of life. The first task is to seek innocence through forgetting the God phantom and its gloomy fire and brimstone rhetoric, and purifying yourself of the toxic old religious ways of the "good and the just". Once this is achieved, you are ready to become pregnant with your new self and with the others you will deliver as companion creators; and the pregnancy involves: the joyful laughter of a sacred "yes" to life: Yes to traces of the overman in yourself; Yes to your body – become a dancer; Yes to the earth rather than the otherworldly illusion; Yes to traces of the overman in others; Yes to

the responsibility for creating the new beginning, with the available earthly principles (riddles, chance)

The laughter of the second “fire-dog” by virtue of which you slay the spirit of revenge, begins by embracing the mockery of the self-despisers instead of taking revenge on the different (via envy of the above, ridicule of the below). But, Nietzsche warns, handle the violence of mockery with care, or it will cripple you. This is not to overcome violence as such, but embrace the necessary violence of self-shattering that unbalances and destroys a deadening equilibrium in order to open the old to the new. Nietzsche imagines the second fire-dog, as one whose violent disruptive laughter, like a volcano, unleashes a flow of gold. To reach this kind of laughter you need to learn to combine mockery with inspiring love for the overman. In this love, you desire to share and to draw others upward with you. In the various teacher/learner relationships (audience, companions, believers, followers, children) you learn to accept that not all humans are equal. Finally Nietzsche asks you to learn to love humankind not only for its promise/beauty but equally for its folly/ugliness since self-overcoming only moves when you inflict a special kind of violence on human uglinesses – and that means that these uglinesses have to be there – because the new only arises out of their breaking down.

Finally, the apex of the upward spiral you are exhorted to face the thought of “eternal return”. Imagine, Nietzsche (2001: Section 341, 194) proposes, that “life, as you now live it, and have lived it, you must live it once more, and also innumerable times; and there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought and every sigh, and everything unspeakably small and great in your life” must repeat exactly as it is over and over again. In other words, if this were a game of “snakes and ladders”, Nietzsche’s snake (not for nothing the sign of ultimate wisdom), would be on the final rather than the penultimate block. To win this game is to lose it in the endless circulation of the eternal recurrence.

Nietzsche knows that the culmination of Zarathustra’s learning curve in the thought of the eternal recurrence undoes the “will-to-power” as the elevated combination of self-mockery and delight that leads to self-overcoming. Eternal return makes a mockery of Zarathustra’s teaching of self-overcoming as an “outcome”. But why would he ask us to follow Zarathustra in minute detail along the spiral pathway by means of which he learns and teaches you to strive for self-overcoming? I think the answer can be offered in Lacan’s (1992: 311) aphorism, “assume your desire”. It is only after you have taken up your desire with dedication, invested whole-heartedly in it, pursued it and pushed it to its limit that you genuinely learn how it fails. Only then are you qualified to let it go. Zarathustra’s teaching of the overman as an outcome should be ridiculed in face of the eternal return. Nietzsche reminds us that life’s value does not lie in the linear progression to an illusory future ideal outcome: from ugliness to beauty, misery to happiness, deficit to perfection, ignorance to knowledge, etc. Instead, it lies in “learning to laugh” in learning to love life without trying to fix it, and for this learning, you need to be immersed in a complex, contaminated, tangible reality, here and now on earth, which includes the paradoxes of ugliness within its beauty, misery within its happiness, evil within its good, and so on. Importantly, the perspective from which Zarathustra finally comes to ridicule his own teaching – having undertaken his journey – is entirely different from the perspective from which the mean-spirited are doomed to ridicule it – not having undertaken any such journey. Those who have not pursued the quest for self-overcoming to its limits can only fearfully mock Zarathustra in a way that puts everyone in danger. When they think of Zarathustra as a buffoon their laughter might be dismissively benign, when they perceive him as a devil, their laughter is lethal – the line between the two is extremely fine. By contrast, in pursuing, but losing your desire for self-overcoming, you learn a life-preserving skill along the way. You learn how to

laugh well. This entails, to reiterate, laughing the camel laugh that refuses to give in to tiredness, dejection, cowardice and depression; laughing the lion laugh that refuses to give your brain over to orders from above, or to normalising reason; laughing like a child who will not defer joy to the future that will never come, and refusing to waste your golden fire-dog energy on senseless power struggles. All of this, it seems to me, are ethical tasks of primary importance.

To conclude, allow me to bring the discussion back briefly to the notion of “radical uncertainty”. The injunction to affirm the eternal recurrence of your exact life over and over does not save you from the radical uncertainty of your here and now lifetime as you live it through. In fact, Nietzsche’s primary worry was our blindness to the here and now when we try to escape the terrifying uncertainties of the human condition by fixing our gaze on some otherworldly fantasy along the well-trodden lines of a paradise lost, hell on earth and the heavenly future that will make it all better again. In fixing your gaze on any otherworldly fantasy of a better future, you end up sleep walking through this life. The injunction to laugh is also a call to love life – to want to be “alive to” experiences in all the lucid vivacity of their pain and joy. In this realisation, Nietzsche’s “golden laughter” erupts as you slide down the snake, shouting “YES! All of it. All again”!

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