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# DETERMINANTS OF SALES TAX COMPLIANCE AMONG JORDANIAN SMEs: THE MODERATING EFFECT OF PUBLIC GOVERNANCE

# AHMAD FARHAN AWAD ALSHIRA'H



# DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITI UTARA MALAYSIA 2018

### DETERMINANTS OF SALES TAX COMPLIANCE AMONG JORDANIAN SMEs: THE MODERATING EFFECT OF PUBLIC GOVERNANCE



Thesis Submitted to Tunku Puteri Intan Safinaz School of Accountancy (TISSA-UUM), Universiti Utara Malaysia, in Fulfilment of the Requirement for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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#### ABSTRACT

Tax compliance leads to reducing the fiscal deficit and public debt, thereby it provides funding to satisfy the economic and social development. Despite the extensive government's efforts, the compliance of sales tax (typically known as value added tax globally) among the Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) in Jordan is relatively low, thus, it negatively impacts the government revenues. Previous studies regarding the determinants of sales tax compliance among SMEs are limited and somewhat inconsistent. Therefore, the present study aimed at extending Fischer's model that is built on the integration of both economic and socio-psychological theories in the context of sales tax compliance as well as examining the moderating role of the public governance and patriotism as a new construct to have better understanding on the determinants of sales tax compliance. This study hypothesised eight factors affecting sales tax compliance, as well as eight hypotheses on the moderating effects of public governance on such relationships. Using the quantitative approach, this study employed a self-administered questionnaire survey of 660 owner-managers of SMEs listed in the Jordan Chamber of Industry of which 212 responses were usable for analysis purpose. The Partial Least Squares (PLS) results revealed positive influence of tax audit, tax penalty, tax moral, tax fairness and patriotism on sales tax compliance and a negative effect of tax complexity on sales tax compliance respectively. Meanwhile, peer influence and tax rate do not demonstrate any significant influence on sales tax compliance. The findings also ascertained the considerable moderating effect of the public governance on the associations between tax audit, tax penalty, and peer influence on sales tax compliance. Besides extending the body of knowledge by providing a comprehensive model to explain how several interrelated factors influence sales tax compliance, the results offer insights on the determinants of sales tax compliance among SMEs.

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Keywords: sales tax compliance, value added tax, SMEs, public governance, patriotism.

#### ABSTRAK

Pematuhan cukai dapat mengurangkan defisit fiskal dan hutang negara. Justeru, kerajaan hendaklah menyediakan dana secukupnya bagi memenuhi pembangunan ekonomi dan sosial. Walaupun kerajaan telah melaksanakan pelbagai usaha dan pematuhan cukai jualan (lazimnya dikenali sebagai cukai nilai tambah di peringkat global) dalam kalangan Perusahaan Kecil dan Sederhana (PKS) di Jordan, namun ia masih berada pada tahap yang rendah, dan keadaan ini memberi kesan negatif kepada hasil kerajaan. Kajian terdahulu tentang penentu pematuhan cukai jualan dalam kalangan PKS adalah terhad dan tidak konsisten. Oleh itu, tujuan kajian ini dilaksanakan adalah untuk memperluaskan model Fischer yang dibina dengan mengintegrasikan kedua-dua teori ekonomi dan sosio-psikologi dalam konteks pematuhan cukai jualan. Kajian ini juga menguji peranan tadbir urus awam sebagai penyederhana dan patriotisme sebagai pemboleh ubah baharu untuk menjelaskan dan memahami pematuhan cukai jualan. Kajian ini menguji lapan hipotesis yang mempengaruhi pematuhan cukai jualan, dan juga lapan hipotesis bagi menguji kesan penyederhana tadbir urus awam terhadap hubungan tersebut. Kajian ini menggunakan kaedah soal selidik ke atas 660 pemilik pengurus PKS yang tersenarai dalam Dewan Perniagaan Jordan dengan mengaplikasi pendekatan kuantitatif. Sebanyak 212 maklum balas dapat digunakan untuk tujuan analisis kajian. Hasil ujian dengan menggunakan kaedah Partial Least Squares (PLS) menunjukkan bahawa pengaruh positif audit cukai, penalti cukai, moral cukai, keadilan cukai dan patriotisme terhadap pematuhan cukai jualan, dan hubungan negatif antara kerumitan cukai dan pematuhan cukai jualan. Manakala faktor rakan sebaya dan kadar cukai tidak menunjukkan sebarang hubungan yang signifikan terhadap pematuhan cukai jualan. Penemuan ini juga menunjukkan kesan penyederhana tadbir urus awam terhadap perkaitan antara audit cukai, penalti cukai, dan pengaruh rakan sebaya terhadap pematuhan cukai jualan. Selain daripada memperluaskan bidang pengetahuan dengan menyediakan model komprehensif bagi menjelaskan bagaimana beberapa faktor saling berkaitan yang mempengaruhi pematuhan cukai jualan, hasil kajian juga memberikan gambaran tentang penentu- penentu pematuhan cukai jualan dalam kalangan PKS.

# Kata kunci: pematuhan cukai jualan, cukai nilai tambah, PKS, tadbir urus awam, patriotisme.

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# LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

| ACIAmman Chamber of IndustryCACronbach's AlphaCRComposite ReliabilityDOSDepartment of StatisticsEUEuropean UnionGDPGross Domestic ProductGSTGeneral Sales TaxGSTGoods and Services TaxISTDIncome and Sales Tax DepartmentIBPInternational Business PublicationsJIEWJordan Independent Economic WatchJESCJordan Chamber of IndustryJICJordan Chamber of IndustryJICJordan Investment CommissionMOFMinistry of FinanceMITMinistry of Industry and TradeMYRMalaysia RinggitsOECDOrganization for Economic Cooperation and DevelopmentUSDUnited States Agency for International DevelopmentUSDUnited States DollarsSMEsSmall and Medium EnterprisesSSTSpecial Sales TaxSPSSStatistical Package for Social SciencesVATValue Added TaxVIFVariance Inflation FactorPLS-SEMPartial Least Squares Structural Equation ModelingYEAYoung Entrepreneur AssociationZCIZarka Chamber of Industry | ABJ     | Association of Banks in Jordan                        |
|--|---------|---|
| CRComposite ReliabilityDOSDepartment of StatisticsEUEuropean UnionGDPGross Domestic ProductGSTGeneral Sales TaxGSTGoods and Services TaxISTDIncome and Sales Tax DepartmentIBPInternational Business PublicationsJIEWJordan Independent Economic WatchJESCJordan Economic and Social CouncilJCIJordan Chamber of IndustryJICJordan Investment CommissionMOFMinistry of FinanceMITMinistry of Industry and TradeMYRMalaysia RinggitsOECDOrganization for Economic Cooperation and DevelopmentUSDUnited States Agency for International DevelopmentUSDUnited States DollarsSMEsSmall and Medium EnterprisesSSTSpecial Sales TaxSPSSStatistical Package for Social SciencesVATValue Added TaxVIFVariance Inflation FactorPLS-SEMPartial Least Squares Structural Equation ModelingYEAYoung Entrepreneur Association   | ACI     | Amman Chamber of Industry                             |
| DOSDepartment of StatisticsEUEuropean UnionGDPGross Domestic ProductGSTGeneral Sales TaxGSTGoods and Services TaxISTDIncome and Sales Tax DepartmentIBPInternational Business PublicationsJIEWJordan Independent Economic WatchJESCJordan Economic and Social CouncilJCIJordan Chamber of IndustryJICJordan Investment CommissionMOFMinistry of FinanceMITMinistry of Industry and TradeMYRMalaysia RinggitsOECDOrganization for Economic Cooperation and DevelopmentUSDUnited States Agency for International DevelopmentUSDUnited States DollarsSMEsSmall and Medium EnterprisesSSTSpecial Sales TaxSPSSStatistical Package for Social SciencesVATValue Added TaxVIFVariance Inflation FactorPLS-SEMPartial Least Squares Structural Equation ModelingYEAYoung Entrepreneur Association  | CA      | Cronbach's Alpha                                      |
| EUEuropean UnionGDPGross Domestic ProductGSTGeneral Sales TaxGSTGoods and Services TaxISTDIncome and Sales Tax DepartmentIBPInternational Business PublicationsJIEWJordan Independent Economic WatchJESCJordan Economic and Social CouncilJCIJordan Chamber of IndustryJICJordan Investment CommissionMOFMinistry of FinanceMITMinistry of Industry and TradeMYRMalaysia RinggitsOECDOrganization for Economic Cooperation and DevelopmentUSAIDUnited States Agency for International DevelopmentUSDUnited States TaxSMEsSmall and Medium EnterprisesSSTSpecial Sales TaxSPSSStatistical Package for Social SciencesVATValue Added TaxVIFVariance Inflation FactorPLS-SEMPartial Least Squares Structural Equation ModelingYEAYoung Entrepreneur Association   | CR      | Composite Reliability                                 |
| GDPGross Domestic ProductGSTGeneral Sales TaxGSTGoods and Services TaxISTDIncome and Sales Tax DepartmentIBPInternational Business PublicationsJIEWJordan Independent Economic WatchJESCJordan Economic and Social CouncilJCIJordan Chamber of IndustryJICJordan Investment CommissionMOFMinistry of FinanceMITMinistry of Industry and TradeMYRMalaysia RinggitsOECDOrganization for Economic Cooperation and DevelopmentUSAIDUnited States Agency for International DevelopmentUSDUnited States DollarsSMEsSmall and Medium EnterprisesSSTSpecial Sales TaxSPSSStatistical Package for Social SciencesVATValue Added TaxVIFVariance Inflation FactorPLS-SEMPartial Least Squares Structural Equation ModelingYEAYoung Entrepreneur Association   | DOS     | Department of Statistics                              |
| GSTGeneral Sales TaxGSTGoods and Services TaxISTDIncome and Sales Tax DepartmentIBPInternational Business PublicationsJIEWJordan Independent Economic WatchJESCJordan Economic and Social CouncilJCIJordan Chamber of IndustryJICJordan Investment CommissionMOFMinistry of FinanceMITMinistry of Industry and TradeMYRMalaysia RinggitsOECDOrganization for Economic Cooperation and DevelopmentUSDUnited States Agency for International DevelopmentUSDUnited States DollarsSMEsSmall and Medium EnterprisesSSTSpecial Sales TaxSPSSStatistical Package for Social SciencesVATValue Added TaxVIFVariance Inflation FactorPLS-SEMPartial Least Squares Structural Equation ModelingYEAYoung Entrepreneur Association  | EU      | European Union  |
| GSTGoods and Services TaxISTDIncome and Sales Tax DepartmentIBPInternational Business PublicationsJIEWJordan Independent Economic WatchJESCJordan Economic and Social CouncilJCIJordan Chamber of IndustryJICJordan Investment CommissionMOFMinistry of FinanceMITMinistry of Industry and TradeMYRMalaysia RinggitsOECDOrganization for Economic Cooperation and DevelopmentUSDUnited States Agency for International DevelopmentUSDUnited States DollarsSMEsSmall and Medium EnterprisesSSTSpecial Sales TaxSPSSStatistical Package for Social SciencesVATValue Added TaxVIFVariance Inflation FactorPLS-SEMPartial Least Squares Structural Equation ModelingYEAYoung Entrepreneur Association  | GDP     | Gross Domestic Product                                |
| ISTDIncome and Sales Tax DepartmentIBPInternational Business PublicationsJIEWJordan Independent Economic WatchJESCJordan Economic and Social CouncilJCIJordan Chamber of IndustryJICJordan Investment CommissionMOFMinistry of FinanceMITMinistry of Industry and TradeMYRMalaysia RinggitsOECDOrganization for Economic Cooperation and DevelopmentUSDUnited States Agency for International DevelopmentUSDUnited States DollarsSMEsSmall and Medium EnterprisesSSTSpecial Sales TaxSPSSStatistical Package for Social SciencesVATValue Added TaxVIFVariance Inflation FactorPLS-SEMPartial Least Squares Structural Equation ModelingYEAYoung Entrepreneur Association   | GST     | General Sales Tax                                     |
| IBPInternational Business PublicationsJIEWJordan Independent Economic WatchJESCJordan Economic and Social CouncilJCIJordan Chamber of IndustryJICJordan Investment CommissionMOFMinistry of FinanceMITMinistry of Industry and TradeMYRMalaysia RinggitsOECDOrganization for Economic Cooperation and DevelopmentUSAIDUnited States Agency for International DevelopmentUSDUnited States DollarsSMEsSmall and Medium EnterprisesSSTSpecial Sales TaxSPSSStatistical Package for Social SciencesVATValue Added TaxVIFVariance Inflation FactorPLS-SEMPartial Least Squares Structural Equation ModelingYEAYoung Entrepreneur Association  | GST     | Goods and Services Tax                                |
| JIEWJordan Independent Economic WatchJESCJordan Economic and Social CouncilJCIJordan Chamber of IndustryJICJordan Investment CommissionMOFMinistry of FinanceMITMinistry of Industry and TradeMYRMalaysia RinggitsOECDOrganization for Economic Cooperation and DevelopmentUSAIDUnited States Agency for International DevelopmentUSDUnited States DollarsSMEsSmall and Medium EnterprisesSSTSpecial Sales TaxSPSSStatistical Package for Social SciencesVATValue Added TaxVIFVariance Inflation FactorPLS-SEMPartial Least Squares Structural Equation ModelingYEAYoung Entrepreneur Association  | ISTD    | Income and Sales Tax Department                       |
| JESCJordan Economic and Social CouncilJCIJordan Chamber of IndustryJICJordan Investment CommissionMOFMinistry of FinanceMITMinistry of Industry and TradeMYRMalaysia RinggitsOECDOrganization for Economic Cooperation and DevelopmentUSAIDUnited States Agency for International DevelopmentUSDUnited States DollarsSMEsSmall and Medium EnterprisesSSTSpecial Sales TaxSPSSStatistical Package for Social SciencesVATValue Added TaxVIFVariance Inflation FactorPLS-SEMPartial Least Squares Structural Equation ModelingYEAYoung Entrepreneur Association   | IBP     | International Business Publications                   |
| JCIJordan Chamber of IndustryJICJordan Investment CommissionMOFMinistry of FinanceMITMinistry of Industry and TradeMYRMalaysia RinggitsOECDOrganization for Economic Cooperation and DevelopmentUSAIDUnited States Agency for International DevelopmentUSDUnited States DollarsSMEsSmall and Medium EnterprisesSSTSpecial Sales TaxSPSSStatistical Package for Social SciencesVATValue Added TaxVIFVariance Inflation FactorPLS-SEMPartial Least Squares Structural Equation ModelingYEAYoung Entrepreneur Association   | JIEW    | Jordan Independent Economic Watch                     |
| JICJordan Investment CommissionMOFMinistry of FinanceMITMinistry of Industry and TradeMYRMalaysia RinggitsOECDOrganization for Economic Cooperation and DevelopmentUSAIDUnited States Agency for International DevelopmentUSDUnited States DollarsSMEsSmall and Medium EnterprisesSSTSpecial Sales TaxSPSSStatistical Package for Social SciencesVATValue Added TaxVIFVariance Inflation FactorPLS-SEMPartial Least Squares Structural Equation ModelingYEAYoung Entrepreneur Association  | JESC    | Jordan Economic and Social Council                    |
| MOFMinistry of FinanceMITMinistry of Industry and TradeMYRMalaysia RinggitsOECDOrganization for Economic Cooperation and DevelopmentUSAIDUnited States Agency for International DevelopmentUSDUnited States DollarsSMEsSmall and Medium EnterprisesSSTSpecial Sales TaxSPSSStatistical Package for Social SciencesVATValue Added TaxVIFVariance Inflation FactorPLS-SEMPartial Least Squares Structural Equation ModelingYEAYoung Entrepreneur Association   | JCI     | Jordan Chamber of Industry                            |
| MITMinistry of Industry and TradeMYRMalaysia RinggitsOECDOrganization for Economic Cooperation and DevelopmentUSAIDUnited States Agency for International DevelopmentUSDUnited States DollarsSMEsSmall and Medium EnterprisesSSTSpecial Sales TaxSPSSStatistical Package for Social SciencesVATValue Added TaxVIFVariance Inflation FactorPLS-SEMPartial Least Squares Structural Equation ModelingYEAYoung Entrepreneur Association   | JIC     | Jordan Investment Commission                          |
| MYRMalaysia RinggitsOECDOrganization for Economic Cooperation and DevelopmentUSAIDUnited States Agency for International DevelopmentUSDUnited States DollarsSMEsSmall and Medium EnterprisesSSTSpecial Sales TaxSPSSStatistical Package for Social SciencesVATValue Added TaxVIFVariance Inflation FactorPLS-SEMPartial Least Squares Structural Equation ModelingYEAYoung Entrepreneur Association  | MOF     | Ministry of Finance                                   |
| OECDOrganization for Economic Cooperation and DevelopmentUSAIDUnited States Agency for International DevelopmentUSDUnited States DollarsSMEsSmall and Medium EnterprisesSSTSpecial Sales TaxSPSSStatistical Package for Social SciencesVATValue Added TaxVIFVariance Inflation FactorPLS-SEMPartial Least Squares Structural Equation ModelingYEAYoung Entrepreneur Association  | MIT     | Ministry of Industry and Trade                        |
| USAIDUnited States Agency for International DevelopmentUSDUnited States DollarsSMEsSmall and Medium EnterprisesSSTSpecial Sales TaxSPSSStatistical Package for Social SciencesVATValue Added TaxVIFVariance Inflation FactorPLS-SEMPartial Least Squares Structural Equation ModelingYEAYoung Entrepreneur Association   | MYR     | Malaysia Ringgits                                     |
| USDUnited States DollarsSMEsSmall and Medium EnterprisesSSTSpecial Sales TaxSPSSStatistical Package for Social SciencesVATValue Added TaxVIFVariance Inflation FactorPLS-SEMPartial Least Squares Structural Equation ModelingYEAYoung Entrepreneur Association  | OECD    | Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development |
| SMEsSmall and Medium EnterprisesSSTSpecial Sales TaxSPSSStatistical Package for Social SciencesVATValue Added TaxVIFVariance Inflation FactorPLS-SEMPartial Least Squares Structural Equation ModelingYEAYoung Entrepreneur Association  | USAID   | United States Agency for International Development    |
| SSTSpecial Sales TaxSPSSStatistical Package for Social SciencesVATValue Added TaxVIFVariance Inflation FactorPLS-SEMPartial Least Squares Structural Equation ModelingYEAYoung Entrepreneur Association  | USD     | United States Dollars                                 |
| SPSSStatistical Package for Social SciencesVATValue Added TaxVIFVariance Inflation FactorPLS-SEMPartial Least Squares Structural Equation ModelingYEAYoung Entrepreneur Association  | SMEs    | Small and Medium Enterprises                          |
| VATValue Added TaxVIFVariance Inflation FactorPLS-SEMPartial Least Squares Structural Equation ModelingYEAYoung Entrepreneur Association   | SST     | Special Sales Tax                                     |
| VIFVariance Inflation FactorPLS-SEMPartial Least Squares Structural Equation ModelingYEAYoung Entrepreneur Association   | SPSS    |   |
| VIFVariance Inflation FactorPLS-SEMPartial Least Squares Structural Equation ModelingYEAYoung Entrepreneur Association   | VAT     | Value Added Tax                                       |
| YEA Young Entrepreneur Association   | VIF     | Variance Inflation Factor                             |
|  | PLS-SEM | Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling    |
| ZCI Zarka Chamber of Industry  | YEA     | Young Entrepreneur Association                        |
|  | ZCI     | Zarka Chamber of Industry                             |



#### **CHAPTER ONE**

#### **INTRODUCTION**

#### 1.1 Background of Study

The economic growth and development of any country typically depends on how much revenue has been collected. Taxes remain as one of the major components in managing the national revenue in both developed and developing countries (Gangl, Torgler, Kirchler & Hofmann, 2014), which are afflicted by an extensive tax non-compliance (Schneider, Buehn & Montenegro, 2010). Countries aim at spending more money on developing the health services, public infrastructure, and education. Therefore, they need to increase their tax revenue as a proportion of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) if they want to develop and grow (Bird, Martinez-Vazquez & Torgler, 2008). Therefore, governments should have sufficient revenue (Frey & Torgler, 2007).

Tax revenue collection has become a significant issue, particularly after the world economic crisis of 2008, the upward trend of fiscal deficits and net public debt have raised the need for consideration of tax revenue, so countries have turned toward universal collaboration to combat tax non-compliance (Slemrod, 2016; Sawyer, 2014). Therefore, tax non-compliance is a serious and growing problem in all economies (Alm, Bloomquist & McKee, 2017; Alm, Clark & Leibel, 2016; Gangl, Hofmann & Kirchler, 2015), particularly in developing world (Rosid, Evans & Tran-Nam, 2017; Palil, 2016; Bird, 2015; Gangl, Kirchler, Lorenz & Torgler, 2015), and more especially in Jordan (Alasfour, 2017).

# The contents of the thesis is for internal user only

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
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**Appendix A** The Questionnaire in English



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Dear Manager,

I am Ph.D. student at the University Utara Malaysia, currently preparing my doctoral project on

### SALES TAX COMPLIANCE AMONG JORDANIAN SMEs

In Jordan, the economy is largely dependent on tax revenue, which is a crucial item in the Jordanian public budget; the main source of tax revenue is sales tax. In line with that, the government, through various initiatives, is strongly motivated to increase in tax revenue through encouraging tax compliance behaviour. Thus, it is important to recognize factors affecting sales tax compliance, particularly in the context of SMEs that have strategic significance in the national economy.

The main aim of this study is to discover determinants of sales tax compliance among Jordanian SMEs. We really appreciate your cooperation in making this research a success. The surveys take **10 minutes**. Please spare some of your valuable time to complete it. Please be assured that your responses will be analysed for academic purpose. Hence, respondent's identity will never be known throughout any part of the research process. If you have any questions about the questionnaire, or would you like to see the final results, feel free to contact the researcher.

Thank you for participating in this study. Your cooperation is highly appreciated

Researcher,Supervisors: Assoc. Prof. Hijattulah Abdul-JabbarAhmad Farhan AwadDr. Rose Shamsiah Bt SamsudinAlshraah.Ahmad@yahoo.comDr. Rose Shamsiah Bt Samsudin

Section 1 Tax Rate: Please state the extent to which you agree with each of the following statements by circling the appropriate number/answer.

|   | Tax Rate  | Strongly<br>Disagree | Disagree | Neutral | Agree | Strongly<br>Agree |
|---|---|----------------------|----------|---------|-------|-------------------|
| 1 | A fair sales tax rate should be the same for every type of business size. | 1                    | 2        | 3       | 4     | 5                 |
| 2 | A fair sales tax rate should be the same for every type of goods.         | 1                    | 2        | 3       | 4     | 5                 |
| 3 | A fair sales tax rate should be the same for every type of sector.        | 1                    | 2        | 3       | 4     | 5                 |

**Section 2 Tax Audit**: Please state the extent to which you agree with each of the following statements by circling the appropriate number/answer.

|   | Tax Audit   | Strongly<br>Disagree | Disagree | Neutral | Agree | Strongly<br>Agree |
|---|---|----------------------|----------|---------|-------|-------------------|
| 1 | Businesses pay the correct amount of sales tax<br>when there are greater enforcement and<br>monitoring. | 1                    | 2        | 3       | 4     | 5                 |
| 2 | The likelihood of audits encourages me to comply with the sales tax law.                                | 1                    | 2        | 3       | 4     | 5                 |
| 3 | Businesses registered for sales tax are often subject to tax authority audits and inspections.          | 1                    | 2        | 3       | 4     | 5                 |

**Section 3 Tax Penalty**: Please state the extent to which you agree with each of the following statements by circling the appropriate number/answer.

|   | Tax Penalty  | Strongly<br>Disagree | Disagree | Neutral | Agree | Strongly Agree |
|---|--|----------------------|----------|---------|-------|----------------|
| 1 | Businesses that are discovered for tax<br>non-compliance will be forced to pay the<br>sales tax they owe with interest.  | 1                    | 2        | 3       | 4     | 5              |
| 2 | Businesses that are discovered for tax<br>non-compliance will be forced to pay<br>large penalty and pay the sales tax they<br>owe with interest.               | 1                    | 2        | 3       | 4     | 5              |
| 3 | Businesses that are discovered for sales<br>tax non-compliance will be taken to court<br>and pay the sales tax they owe with<br>interest.                      | 1                    | 2        | 3       | 4     | 5              |
| 4 | Businesses that are discovered for sales<br>tax non-compliance will be taken to court,<br>pay a substantial penalty and pay the tax<br>they owe with interest. | 1                    | 2        | 3       | 4     | 5              |

**Section 4 Tax Complexity**: Please state the extent to which you agree with each of the following statements by circling the appropriate number/answer.

|   | Tax Complexity   | Strongly<br>Disagree | Disagree | Neutral | Agree | Strongly<br>Agree |
|---|--|----------------------|----------|---------|-------|-------------------|
| 1 | There are ambiguities in the sales tax law which<br>may lead to more than one defensible position. | 1                    | 2        | 3       | 4     | 5                 |
| 2 | Too many computations must be made.  | 1                    | 2        | 3       | 4     | 5                 |
| 3 | There have been frequent changes in the sales tax law.   | 1                    | 2        | 3       | 4     | 5                 |
| 4 | There are excessive details in the sales tax law, such as rules and exemption to the rules.        | 1                    | 2        | 3       | 4     | 5                 |
| 5 | Detailed special records must be kept by the taxpayer to comply with sales tax law.                | 1                    | 2        | 3       | 4     | 5                 |
| 6 | The format and instructions of the sales tax forms are confusing.                                  | 1                    | 2        | 3       | 4     | 5                 |

**Section 5 Tax Fairness**: Please state the extent to which you agree with each of the following statements by circling the appropriate number/answer.

|   | Tax Fairness  | Strongly<br>Disagree | Disagree         | Neutral | Agree | Strongly<br>Agree |
|---|---|----------------------|------------------|---------|-------|-------------------|
| 1 | Sales tax applies to most goods and services, so people who consume more pay more sales tax.  | 1                    | 2                | 3       | 4     | 5                 |
| 2 | The sales tax registration threshold is fair to your business.  | 1                    | 2                | 3       | 4     | 5                 |
| 3 | Being sales tax registered does provide other benefits such as better recordkeeping.  | Mala<br>1            | <b>ysta</b><br>2 | 3       | 4     | 5                 |
| 4 | Although an administration cost falls on the sales tax registered business it is not significant.   | 1                    | 2                | 3       | 4     | 5                 |
| 5 | The tax penalties imposed are applied consistently by the tax authority.  | 1                    | 2                | 3       | 4     | 5                 |
| 6 | Being sales tax registered doesn't affect the<br>competitiveness of my business, having to add<br>sales tax rate to my prices doesn't affect my<br>business sales volume. | 1                    | 2                | 3       | 4     | 5                 |

**Section 6 Peer Influence**: Please state the extent to which you agree with each of the following statements by circling the appropriate number/answer.

|   | Peer Influence   | Strongly<br>Disagree | Disagree | Neutral | Agree | Strongly<br>Agree |
|---|--|----------------------|----------|---------|-------|-------------------|
| 1 | Most people who are important to me think<br>that I should report all my sales tax return.     | 1                    | 2        | 3       | 4     | 5                 |
| 2 | Most people who are important to me think it<br>is unacceptable to overstate tax deductions on | 1                    | 2        | 3       | 4     | 5                 |

|   | their sales return.   |   |   |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | Most people who are important to me think<br>that the tax they pay is fair given the services<br>they get from the government.  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 4 | Most people who are important to me prefer<br>to pay less tax even if it means receiving a<br>more restricted range service.    | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 5 | Most people who are important to me think<br>that sales tax non-compliance is a trivial<br>offense.                             | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 6 | Most people who are important to me think<br>the government should actively discourage<br>participation in the informal sector. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

**Section 7 Patriotism**: Please state the extent to which you agree with each of the following statements by circling the appropriate number/answer.

|   | Patriotism   | Strongly<br>Disagree | Disagree | Neutral | Agree | Strongly<br>Agree |
|---|--|----------------------|----------|---------|-------|-------------------|
| 1 | Businesses are more patriotic when they buy goods made in Jordan than goods made in other countries.   |                      | 2        | 3       | 4     | 5                 |
| 2 | A business that pays more in sales taxes is more<br>patriotic than a business that pays less in taxes. | 1                    | 2        | 3       | 4     | 5                 |
| 3 | A person who cheats on his/her sales taxes is not patriotic.   | 1<br>Mala            | 2        | 3       | 4     | 5                 |
| 4 | A business that hides its sales revenue in a foreign country to avoid sales taxes is not patriotic.    | 1                    | 2        | 3       | 4     | 5                 |
| 5 | Businesses that cheat on sales taxes are not patriotic.  | 1                    | 2        | 3       | 4     | 5                 |
| 6 | I would be willing to increase sales tax rate if it would help my country.                             | 1                    | 2        | 3       | 4     | 5                 |

**Section 8 Tax Moral**: Please state the extent to which you agree with each of the following statements by circling the appropriate number/answer.

|   | Tax Moral  | Strong<br>Disagree | Disagree | Neutral | Agree | Strongly<br>Agree |
|---|--|--------------------|----------|---------|-------|-------------------|
| 1 | The current sales tax burdens can never be justified by sales tax non-compliance.                              | 1                  | 2        | 3       | 4     | 5                 |
| 2 | The easy availability of opportunities to evade<br>sales taxes can never justify sales tax non-<br>compliance. | 1                  | 2        | 3       | 4     | 5                 |

| 3  | If in doubt about whether or not to report a certain sales turnover, I would report it.                         | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
|----|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4  | The government's getting enough sales taxes<br>can never justify some people's evasion of sales<br>taxes.       | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 5  | Sales taxes are so heavy that sales tax non-<br>compliance is not an economic necessity for<br>many to survive. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 6  | If I receive JD 2000 in cash for sales and services rendered, I would report it.                                | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 7  | Cheating on sales taxes can never be justified by the unfairness of the sales tax system.                       | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 8  | Sales taxes are not taken away from customers.  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 9  | Evasion of sales taxes by everybody can never justify one doing it.   | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 10 | There is something bad about under-reporting taxable sales on one's sales tax return.                           | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

Section 9 Sales Tax Compliance: Please state the extent to which you agree with each of the following statements by circling appropriate number/answer.

|   | Sales Tax Compliance  | Strong<br>Disagree | Disagree | Neutral | Agree | Strongly<br>Agree |
|---|---|--------------------|----------|---------|-------|-------------------|
| 1 | Most business owner-managers always correctly record the details of a sale on the sale tax invoice.   | 1                  | 2        | 3       | 4     | 5                 |
| 2 | Most business owner-managers generally<br>believe that it is unacceptable to alter a sales<br>tax invoice to allow a customer to claim more<br>sales tax.               | 1                  | 2        | 3       | 4     | 5                 |
| 3 | There are no circumstances when it might be<br>acceptable to alter the details on a tax invoice<br>to allow another business owner-managers to<br>claim more sales tax. | 1                  | 2        | 3       | 4     | 5                 |
| 4 | If the customer's requests a tax invoice to be<br>altered so they can claim more sales tax,<br>business owner-managers will not do it for<br>them.                      | 1                  | 2        | 3       | 4     | 5                 |
| 5 | If business owner-managers altered a tax<br>invoice to allow a customer to claim more<br>sales tax, they would not feel good about it.                                  | 1                  | 2        | 3       | 4     | 5                 |
| 6 | There are no circumstances when business<br>owner-managers find it justifiable to ask<br>another sales tax registered business to alter a                               | 1                  | 2        | 3       | 4     | 5                 |

| tax.       7     Most business owner-managers believe that it |   |
|---|---|
| 7 Most business owner-managers believe that it                |   |
| 5   | _ |
| is unacceptable to alter a tax invoice to include             | 5 |
| private expenses as business expenses for sales 1 2 3 4       | 5 |
| tax purposes.   |   |
| 8 I think it is unacceptable to alter a tax invoice           |   |
| so that private expenses appear to be business-               | 5 |
| related in order for me to make a sales tax 1 2 3 4           | 5 |
| claim.  |   |
| 9 Some businesses owner-managers believe that                 |   |
| its unacceptable to create fake invoices or alter 1 2 3 4     | 5 |
| invoices in order to claim sales tax refunds 1 2 3 4          | 5 |
| they are not entitled to.                                     |   |
| 10 I do not find faking invoice or altering an 1 2 3 4        | 5 |
| invoice justifying a sales tax refund.                        | 5 |
| 11     If I created or in any way altered a tax invoice       |   |
| to get a claim for sales tax I was not entitled to, 1 2 3 4   | 5 |
| I would not feel good about it.                               |   |

**Section 10 Public Governance**: Please state the extent to which you agree with each of the following statements by circling appropriate number/answer.

|   | Public Governance   | Strong<br>Disagree | Disagree         | Neutral | Agree | Strongly<br>Agree |
|---|---|--------------------|------------------|---------|-------|-------------------|
| 1 | I trust the Jordanian parliament in making good laws for Jordan.                          | ara 1Ma            | la <u>\</u> 2sia | 3       | 4     | 5                 |
| 2 | I believe that there are a free and fair elections in Jordan.                             | 1                  | 2                | 3       | 4     | 5                 |
| 3 | I believe that there is no wastefulness in government expenditures in Jordan.             | 1                  | 2                | 3       | 4     | 5                 |
| 4 | I have access to the published accounts and<br>annual report of the government in Jordan. | 1                  | 2                | 3       | 4     | 5                 |
| 5 | I am satisfied with quality of the general infrastructure in Jordan.                      | 1                  | 2                | 3       | 4     | 5                 |
| 6 | I feel that Jordanian public servants are not vulnerable to political interference.       | 1                  | 2                | 3       | 4     | 5                 |
| 7 | I am satisfied with the manner in which the government is handling the health service.    | 1                  | 2                | 3       | 4     | 5                 |

| 8  | I am satisfied with the manner in which the government is handling the education system.   | 1      | 2      | 3 | 4 | 5 |
|----|--|--------|--------|---|---|---|
| 9  | I trust the financial honesty of Jordanian politicians.  | 1      | 2      | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 10 | I believe that the diversion of public funds<br>due to corruption is not common in Jordan.                                       | 1      | 2      | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 11 | I think that individual and firms,<br>frequently, make extra payments in<br>connection to tax payment, loan<br>application, etc. | 1      | 2      | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 12 | I believe that political situation is stable in Jordan.  | 1      | 2      | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 13 | I believe that political protests are not a threat to Jordanian stability.   | 1      | 2      | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 14 | I believe that there is no tribal conflict threat to stability in Jordan.  | 1      | 2      | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 15 |  | 1      | 2      | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 16 | I believe that justice is fairly administered in Jordan.   | 1      | 2      | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 17 | I believe that Jordanian police has effective<br>power in combating crime.   | 1      | 2      | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| L  | Universiti Uta   | ara Ma | laysia | 1 | 1 | L |

| Discount on $(a)$ in the highly that relates to your            |
|---|
| Please place an $()$ in the block that relates to you.          |
| The period your business has been in operation is:              |
| Less than 5 years   |
|   |
| More than 10 years  |
| Your current position in the business is:                       |
| Chief executive officer   |
| Managing director   |
| Owner- manager  |
| Other, please state   |
|   |
| The sales turnover of your business in financial year 2016 was: |
| Less than JD 100,000  |
| JD 1, 00,000– JD 5,000,000                                      |
| More than JD5, 000,000  |
|   |
| Your educational qualifications are:                            |
| Up to Secondary level   |
| Diploma   |
| Degree  |
| Postgraduate  |
| The number of staff employed by your business is:               |
| 1-9Malaysia   |
| 10-49   |
| 50-249  |
| JU-247  |
| The main manufacturing activity of your business is:            |
| Therapeutics  |
| Plastic, Rubber and Products                                    |
| Chemicals   |
| Engineering Industries  |
| Furniture, kitchens and doors                                   |
| Construction  |
| Printing, paper and stationeries                                |
| Food & Supply   |
| Garments  |
| Mining  |
| A registration in sales tax                                     |
| Registered Unregistered   |
|   |

#### Appendix B

The Questionnaire in Arabic



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### ل غيكم ورحمه الله وركته

عنيزي لمفير فسض ..

ن اطلب ال المتنور اف ي اللي، Tunku Puteri Intan Safinaz الله م حلف ف ي جامع ه Utara Malaysia ، ق وم طي اب اعداد اط و ح ال المتنور امت حت يو وان

### <u>ض ب</u>ه ل بع عالتف ی ل ش ادی ع **ل بن غ**ار ه ول چوس ط ه ۱ روی ق

في للوقاع, تعد للض عيه للمورد للملي للتغيري ي ادا في للموازن و للعام ارزي و خص ه ضعيه للجيعا ، ومشي مع ليكف ان للكوم ه و من ل مطيف للمهادرا ولل عليا تتشجع و حاول يقوقي زياده عليه المتزام للض عيبي للمخاط في يموم ه للموارد للمليه، وللتلاي ف من للم مم ان ق ق ق وندرس للعوامل للتي ترف في المتزام في فعض عيه للميعا خص في للم اي عليم من ان من ق ق ق عن عرب اقتص اد ارون يوب ليك تلكون مذه استبيل عار من للعوامل وللم حوال خاص في في مي الموارد الموار عن الموار عن الموار للمي عن المي الموار الم المن عيبي للمع عن عن الموار و للملي من المي الم مم ان الم عن الم عرب العوامل التي ترف في المي وب ليك تلكون منه المي عال خص في الم اي علي الموار ال خاص بك ن حو المي و عن عرب المع عن المور ال خاص بي من منه الدول من مو در الموار و الم الموار ال خاص بك ن عو المي في ف عن عن المور من عن المي عن المي عن من منه الدول مو در الموار عن التص و المور ال خاص بك ن عو المي من عن مي المور من عن المي عال من المور المون المور الموار من الموار عن التص و المور ال خاص بك ن عو المور المور المور المور المور المور المور المور عن عن عن عن مو المور المور المور المور المور المور المور المور المور المور المور المور المور المور المور المور المور معن المور الموور المور المور المور المور المور المور المور المو

ى شى بى مى مەنتى مەنتى مەنتى مەنتى مەنتى مەنتى مەنتى مەنتى مەنتى مەنتى مەنتى مەنتى مەنتى مەنتى مەنتى مەنتى مەنتى

لمسم للهاحث: احمف حان عوض للش ع علي ميك:<u>Alshraah.Ahmad@yahoo.com</u> ملف: 0787230096/0779064943 ش اف : أ.د. حج ه الله عبد للهجار د. روز شمري مين شش مس للهين **ع**ر موفكق **غ**ر موفكق موفكق معدلض رب الميعات محلي بشدة موفكق بشدة يجب أن يكون معدل ض وية البيعات موفس ولكل 1 5 4 3 2 1 نوع من أنواع للإركات. يجب أن يكون معدل ضرب ة البيعات مو فس ملكل 2 5 4 1 3 2 نوع من أواع للمضطع ول فتجات. يجب أن يكون معدل صري ، ألهي عات موفس ملكل 3 5 4 3 2 1 نوع من لڨطاعات ا قتصابية لامظف،

1- معدل وي ق لو عات : موني ، من ي البجي عا الف وض في معظم الدل ع وال خدما ال من ع م الي ا.

2- لتقوق لضري : ويف حص للوطنة ال الله والتقاري الض ي توق الض ، واخس اب ع و الن ع الف ي الف ي الف ي الم على الم على الم على الم على الم ع الم ع الم ع الم ع الم ع الم على الم ع م الم على الم ع الم على الم ع الم ع الم ع الم ع الم ع الم ع الم ع الم ع الم ع الم ع الم ع الم ع الم ع الم ع الم ع الم ع الم ع الم على الم على الم ع الم ع الم ع الم ع الم ع الم ع الم ع الم ع الم ع الم ع الم ع الم ع الم ع الم على الم على الم على الم على الم لم م الم ع الم ع الم ع الم ع الم ع الم ع الم ع الم ع الم ع الم ع الم ع الم ع الم على الم على الم على الم ع الم م الم ع الم ع الم م الم م الم م الم م الم م الم ع الم م الم ع الم م الم م الم م الم ع الم م م مالم محلم الم م م الم م الم

| موفكق<br>بشدة | موفلق | محليد | غير<br>موفلق | غير<br>موفلق<br>بشدة | لتقيق لضريب  |
|---------------|-------|-------|--------------|----------------------|--|
| 5             | 4     | 3     | 2            | 1                    | 1 الشرك التعطيمة مدين عضري، قال المجيات عن دم الجكون<br>فاك فريد من ل رقيب والتحقيي ش.                   |
| 5             | 4     | 3     | 2            | 1                    | 2 التوقيق في ضرب البجيع التي فلحي الضرط ب<br>لحى المتنال قرار ون ضرب البجيع الت.                         |
| 5             | 4     | 3     | 2            | 1                    | 3 الشرك ات المسطىة في ضربية البجي عات تخسع<br>العلمي ات تشيق وشتي ش صارم من قمال السرال طات<br>الضريجية. |

# **3-لاع بي ات لض ريبي ہ :** هي مجموع ہ من لاجزاءا ولاغ اما لاف وض طى لائل *الحين الذين عليت ز*مون في مي ف عض مي ہ النہي عا

| موفكق<br>بشدة | موفلق | محليد | غير<br>موف | غير<br>موفلق<br>بشدة | ل ع وسات الضريبي ه  |   |
|---------------|-------|-------|------------|----------------------|---|---|
| 5             | 4     | 3     | 2          | 1                    | الشركات للتبييتم التشفل داجل دا غير لمهتز معبضع<br>ضري،ة البچيعات سوف تفع فيم م الضري، مع<br>اللهاندة.  | 1 |
| 5             | 4     | 3     | 2          | 1                    | الشرك ات التيجي تم الخنشف هابل ما غير المتاز معبف ع<br>ضري ة البجي حات سوف منف عوم ما الضري مع الله يدة<br>وتت حرض لرق و ات صارم من قبال اله إل طات<br>الضري ة.   | 2 |
| 5             | 4     | 3     | 2          | 1                    | لِشْرِكَات لِيَّتِيِيتم لَتَتْشَفَلَ البل العَ غَيْرِ لَمِّهَازَ مَعْدَعَ<br>ضَرْفٍ ةَ لَبَعِيحَات سَيْتَتَحَرِ ضَالَ مِرَلَى القَرْلَ وَيُوَى وَ وَتَغْتَعَ<br>وَيَهِ مُ لِصَرْفٍ اللهِ مَعَ قُلْطَادَة. | 3 |
| 5             | 4     | 3     | 2          | 1                    | لشركات للتيبيتم التنشف هابل ما غير المتزم مبفع<br>ضرية البي عات ستتعرض الىمرال القراري م و<br>لعي اتصارمه وتفعتي مه الضري ه مع العائدة  | 4 |

|               |       |       |               |                      |   | - |
|---------------|-------|-------|---------------|----------------------|---|---|
| موفكق<br>بشدة | موفلق | محليد | غير<br>موفي ق | غير<br>موفلق<br>بشدة | ت چ دق و ن ضرب ه ل چ عات  |   |
| 5             | 4     | 3     | 2             | 1                    | ڧاك غموضف يقرلون ض ي ة المېيعات ممايودي<br>البي سو ف همه.                         | 1 |
| 5             | 4     | 3     | 2             | 1                    | ف اك لتحديد من العليميات الحريلي ه ال يحقده التي ي جب<br>اجرئ ه اعن دف ع الضري ه. | 2 |
| 5             | 4     | 3     | 2             | 1                    | ف اك لعديد من التحد ت ال م خي ةف ي قرانون<br>ضري، ة المبيع ات                     | 3 |
| 5             | 4     | 3     | 2             | 1                    | فاك ليحديد من الشمريل الفهر طفيق أون ضري ة<br>المي عات.                           | 4 |
| 5             | 4     | 3     | 2             | 1                    | يجب أن يعطىظ فلعو الضرط بسس ت خصة<br>فمصرابة.                                     | 5 |
| 5             | 4     | 3     | 2             | 1                    | الثرك وللتراييب النماذج ضري، البيعات تتعبر<br>مركة.                               | 6 |

5 العدل، الفريجي، و مي ا نصاف وعدم الترجيزف بالتحامل مع اللهين لف عض بيه، المجيع المحمد المعني المحمد المعنية المحمد المعنية المحمد المعنية المحمد المحم المحمد المحم محمد المحمد المحمد المحمد المحمد المحمد المحمد المحمد المحمد المحمد المحم محمد المحمد محمد المحمد حمد المحمد لمحمد المحمد

| موفكق<br>بشدة | موفكق | محليد | غير<br>موفياق | غير<br>موفلق<br>بشدة | لاعدل ه لض ريبي ه   |   |
|---------------|-------|-------|---------------|----------------------|---|---|
| 5             | 4     | 3     | 2             | 1<br>nive            | تطبقض ي قاليجيعات في معظم للول وللخدمات،<br>لذف إن ا شخاص ل في زيون لكون ل في د من للول ع<br>ول خدمانتس يضعون ض ي ة بجيعات أكبر .                       | 1 |
| 5             | 4     | 3     | 2             | 1                    | حد للتس جي ل لض ي البي عات ي عبر عادل ل ش اطك<br>الص اعي .  | 2 |
| 5             | 4     | 3     | 2             | 1                    | للتس مجاف ي ض ربي ال المجيع استغر العديد من الله وعاند<br>مثم في خالس ت ال م حليبي ه.   | 3 |
| 5             | 4     | 3     | 2             | 1                    | تىغبىر ل <u>ات</u> خلەف اي، لاتىيىتى غى لاشركات<br>لەرن ع، ئامى لى تاخىرىي، لامچى ات غېر مەمە.  | 4 |
| 5             | 4     | 3     | 2             | 1                    | ل ق ب ات الض بي الفروض ق ط ق ب عل اه .  | 5 |
| 5             | 4     | 3     | 2             | 1                    | للتس چ ل ف ي ض بي ة المبيعات ي ش الحى ل ق درة<br>التفلسية ال شرائتي ، حيث ان لمن ف ا من بي ة المبيعات<br>ك بي اده الحي الس عر أي شر الحيى حجم المبيعات. | 6 |

6- تشور اقران: و دي وج د منظ الدي وتوقعت د منتشي ا شخاص الد دي في في عن عي داليجي عاري المنظيم من المنظيم الم المنظيم المنظيم المنظيم المنظيم المنظيم المنظيم المنظيم المنظيم المنظيم المنظيم المنظيم المنظيم المنظيم المنظيم ا المنظيم المنظيم المنظيم المنظيم المنظيم المنظيم المنظيم المنظيم المنظيم المنظيم المنظيم المنظيم المنظيم المنظيم المنظيم المنظيم المن المنظيم المن منظيم المنظيم المن المنظيم المن المنظيم المنظيم المنظيم المنظيم المنظيم المنظيم المنظيم المن المنظيم المنظيم المنظيم المنظيم المنظيم المنظيم المن المنظيم المنظيم المن المن المنظيم المنظيم المنظيم المنظيم المنظيم المنظيم المنظيم المنظيم المنظيم المنظيم المنظيم المنظيم المنظ الم منظيم المنظيم المن المنظيم المنظيم المن المنظيم ال

| موفكق<br>بشدة | موفكق | محليد | غير<br>موفي | غير<br>موفلق<br>بشدة | شنگیر اقران   |   |
|---------------|-------|-------|-------------|----------------------|---|---|
| 5             | 4     | 3     | 2           | 1                    | ا ش خاص ال م دين ب النبي ، ق لي بينتخ دون ال ه يين خي<br>الجي أن الجي نب س راحة عن ك امل بي راد ال بي عات . | 1 |
| 5             | 4     | 3     | 2           | 1                    | ا شخاص لام <i>هي</i> ن بـالنيب،ة لي <del>ي</del> يتحقدون اله من   | 2 |

|   |   |   |   |   | ل قبول المهالئ ةفي الخصومات الض يعيية في ع<br>علراد بي عله مم   |   |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | اً شُخاصٌ لكم مون النهي قل ي يتق دون أن الضري عنه التي التي الم مون النهي عنه التي التي التي التي التي التي الت<br>التي ي يف عون ما عالى قن ظر الل خدمات العق دم مل مم. | 3 |
| 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | ا شخاص لام مينبليني، ذلي في مركون أن يُفع<br>ضرب، مي عات قال حتى لو ادى لاى تولي لاخدمات<br>الهق م .  | 4 |
| 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | ا شخاص لام <i>مي</i> ن بـالن <b>س</b> ة ل <i>ي ي</i> يعبرون ان عدم<br>الخير المبف عض مي ه المبيعات جريم متفله ه.  | 5 |
| 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | ا شخاص لام مين بالني ، ق لي ييتقدون له ي جب<br>لي لى لكوم مان تقوم ب اعمال تشجع فلعي<br>الض رئاب في لاع ملف ي الق طاع غير رسمي.   | 6 |

## **7-لوطني ة** : و دي حب للوطن وا ل ه

| موفكق<br>بشدة | موفكق | محليد | غير<br>موفي | غور<br>موفلق<br>بشدة | لو طفي ة  |   |
|---------------|-------|-------|-------------|----------------------|---|---|
| 5             | 4     | 3     | 2           | 1                    | الشركات ا انشر وطيية تقوم بشراء للمولي ع ل محرن ع<br>م لچيا انشر من للمرل ع ل ميت ورده.   | 1 |
| 5             | 4     | 3     | 2           | 1                    | الشركات للتبي تفع اللثير من ضرئ ب البچيعات<br>تنعبر لثمر وطيء من الشركات للتبي تفع قال.   | 2 |
| 5             | 4     | 3     | 2           | 1                    | ا شخاص لافين ي مون من ف عضري ل لهي عات<br>ي عبرون في وطييين.                              | 3 |
| 5             | 4     | 3     | 2           | 1<br>nive            | الشركات للتميت تحيى بېيى فل مەلىي دول اچنې متى چىا<br>لف عض ي، الىچى استىتىبىر غېر وطيي ة | 4 |
| 5             | 4     | 3     | 2           | 1                    | الشركات التيمينة مرب من فع ضرطء المجيعات<br>تنقبر في وطي.                                 | 5 |
| 5             | 4     | 3     | 2           | 1                    | ارغيفي زيادەنىپ،من يە لىچىعات اذاكان تىك<br>سوف يىساعف يېتىمى، قوطۇرربلدى.                | 6 |

8-1 خ ق لضريوي ٥: ٥٠ الدول علاناي لف عض يه الهي ١ النائه عن المتزام اخ ق يلف علف عن النائب المتزام المتراب النائ النائب النائب النائب النا

| موفلق<br>بشدة | موفكق | محليد | غير<br>موفلق | غور<br>موقلق<br>بشدة | ا ق لض ريبي ه  |
|---------------|-------|-------|--------------|----------------------|--|
| 5             | 4     | 3     | 2            | 1                    | 1 نظر المهالغ ضرب ة المبجيعات للطبية، ي لمحن اللمرء<br>أنطِقى يسلكوم في المتم مويين من فسع ما.   |
| 5             | 4     | 3     | 2            | 1                    | 2 نظرا ليس ولى ة تغور الكرص المكته مرب من ضري ة<br>المجيعات بي الكن لل مرء أن يلقى يبد الكوم الحى للمة مري ن<br>من فع ما.  |
| 5             | 4     | 3     | 2            | 1                    | 3 إذا راودك شك حول قوامكبا غ او عدم عن بيجيعات معنى ة ف ان ي معنى ان عنها عنها |
| 5             | 4     | 3     | 2            | 1                    | 4 وحما أن ل كومة تحصل في ضري، د دي عات<br>الفلية، عيدر لله درب من ف عض ي ة ل جي عات.   |

|   |   |   |   |     | بالرغم من ان ضربي الهي عات فولي الله أن الله مرب                              | 5  |
|---|---|---|---|-----|---|----|
| 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1   | من فدع، المحصر في من من من في المانتي المنتخفير من<br>الشركات الميقا ف ليسوق. |    |
|   |   |   |   |     | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·   |    |
| 5 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 1   | إذار الشي المجيع الم المن المن المن المجيع المت المجيع المستم                 | 6  |
| J | 4 | 5 | 2 | 1   | <u>ي</u> ع ها قردماً،سوف <b>ل</b> لينغ عن ها.                                 |    |
| - | 4 | 2 | ſ | 1   | لله مرب من ف ع ض ربي ، ل ل جي ع ات لي س ل ه م اي ر ر ه                        | 7  |
| 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1   | يضوء عدم عدل مقولون ضري ة الهيعات أ   |    |
| - | 4 | 2 | 2 | 4   | ضريب،ة النهيعات مي من اشرياء للټمي تؤخذ                                       | 8  |
| 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | L L | ع في الله الله الله الله الله الله الله الل                                   |    |
| - | 4 | 2 | • |     | بما ان غليبية للشركاتىت،مرب من ف ع ص به                                       | 9  |
| 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1   | البجيعات ف مذا عيرر القي المبلك مرب   |    |
| - | 4 | ч | 2 | 1   | تعَبَرَ فاك شهاظًى، اختَقِي، بشأن عدم بغ عن                                   | 10 |
| 5 | 4 | 5 | Z | 1   | البيع عات الالمض عظ من حيرة.  |    |

**9-الټزانې يض بيه قامپوعات:** و هو اسټعداد لواق درة وال غې ل دى فلحي الض طاب في ا مټال الق والي ن ض بي الهي عا

| موفلق<br>بشدة | موفكق | محليد | غير<br>موفلق | غير<br>موفك<br>بشدة | ا لټزانې ضریب ة له عات   |   |
|---------------|-------|-------|--------------|---------------------|--|---|
| 5             | 4     | 3     | 2            | 1                   | بشرك لص مح ح في مد ورة الهجي عات.  | 1 |
| 5             | 4     | 3     | 2            | 1                   | مدراء للشرك التي يتعقدون بشرك عام ل ، من غير<br>ال ته ول اجراءت عيل وتغيير في ي ي ال ال فسلورة<br>ال جي حال من اجل للسماح لل فرط ين فع عض و ال ال              | 2 |
| 5             | 4     | 3     | 2            | nive<br>1           | 3 شخريا اعتقد ان لييس فاك ظروف يكون قيهو<br>ييما أجراءت في لي فسمول ضرية للميعات لفع<br>ضري، قال.  | 3 |
| 5             | 4     | 3     | 2            | 1                   | 4 إذا طَّىب الن عان اجراءت عَن عَن عَن مَع مَع مَن مَن عَن مَن مَن عَن مَن مَن مَن مَن مَن مَن مَن مَن مَن م   | 4 |
| 5             | 4     | 3     | 2            | 1                   | يتى يَتِي كُن لكن عَنْ مَن فَع صَرَفٍ، وَلَى، سَتَّسَعَر<br>بعدم لكرضا.  | 5 |
| 5             | 4     | 3     | 2            | 1                   | ) أي ف ف حات اجد عند داأن من له رر اجرا جعض<br>الله في ر في ق ف احتيال ف وي الهي عات عندما ش عر ان<br>ف عي ض وي الهي عات خرين ق دت عجوف ي قيم م<br>اله والي ر. | 6 |
| 5             | 4     | 3     | 2            | 1                   | معظم مدراء للشرك التبيتة ون أنه من غير لاقب ول<br>أريت متغير ف ملتورة للمبيعات لتشمل لا صروف ات<br>لاخصة، والفيقات لامته لتى مبال مبيعات لف عض ي ة<br>ق.ل.     | 7 |
| 5             | 4     | 3     | 2            | 1                   | ع أنتخاد أن من غير القبول أري تم تغير فعلورة<br>الهي عالت شمل فيقات خص تفب دو متافق مبل عمل من<br>أجل ف عض رط ب قل.  | 8 |

| 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 9 مدراء الشرك اتفي بعض الحيان على جاون<br>لتزويرف ويلير، أوت في رفيو ثير، من أجل ال مطل، ة<br>بلت رداد ض ربي، تابي عات خوع.  |
|---|---|---|---|---|--|
| 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 10 يوجد فاك مل عفي بعض الحي ان عند لل جوء<br>لتزويرف ولير، أوت غير يشطري لف ولير، من أجل<br>ل مطل، قبلت رداد ض ي ة ل مي عات. |
| 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 11 سوف شعربعدم للرضا ذاقمت بأي شكل من<br>شكال لك عب بفسلورة للمجيعات للمطلب هفي<br>المتر داد ضري متم فع دا.                  |

10- **لَحِ كَمِ دَلَعَامِهُ :** مي لَلْحَلْمِي الْمَتَىتِ فَي هَ الَحَيَّارِقَادَةَ لَلِسَلُطُ وَم فَلِقَ مَ وَلَقَدَر فَي هَ ادَارِهُ موارد لَدول بَشْكُلُفَ عَال قَيْنِي دَسْمَ بِلَسَا سَلِمَيمَ فَ عَن اجَ ام لَلَمُواطَنَ وَلَقَرْلُونَ وَسَطَّيم لَقُسَاعَلُ اقتصادي والحَجَماعِيفِي ا

| موفلق<br>بشدة | موفلق | محليد | غير<br>موف | غير<br>موفك<br>بشدة  | ل چ ک م دال عام د  |   |
|---------------|-------|-------|------------|----------------------|--|---|
| 5             | 4     | 3     | 2          | 1                    | ىلەق فىي قىدرە ملى لانواب اردني لىى سن<br>لقەرلېيىن ل جيدە.        | 1 |
|               | 6     | TARA  |            |                      |  | - |
| 5             | 4     | 3     | 2          | 1                    | فا <sup>ل</sup> ک لټخبات حرة و <i>ن ي</i> هشي اردن.                | 2 |
| 5             | 4     | 3     | 2          | 1                    | يوجد فياك مدرفي ا فياق للمحكو مي.                                  | 3 |
| 5             | 4     | 3     | 2          | 1                    | يس م حليف ي للوص و للل مطاومات والتقارير لل لخوي ة.                | 4 |
| 5             | 4     | 3     | 2 U        | ln i <sub>l</sub> ve | شعر برضا عن جوده ليوية لقضية لنعامةفي                              | 5 |
|               |       | oubr  |            |                      | ۱ ردن.   |   |
| 5             | 4     | 3     | 2          | 1                    | ل <i>شعرب</i> رضا عن جوده للخدمات ل <i>لص چي</i> ة للعام <i>في</i> | 6 |
|               | •     | )     | _          | _                    | ا رد <u>ن.</u>   |   |
| 5             | 4     | 3     | 2          | 1                    | للموظيين لمغلبه لت،مامتهم غير معرضوين للهتد ت                      | 7 |
|               | ·     | Ū     | _          | _                    | السري لمري أ   |   |
| 5             | 4     | 3     | 2          | 1                    | شعرب رضا عن جوده لاخدمات للتلجي ميءة لاعام ق                       | 8 |
| 5             | 7     | 5     | 2          | -                    | ا ردن.   |   |
| 5             | 4     | 3     | 2          | 1                    | أن الحمى دفقة من ثفيفاية لاوضع لالمايي للسم والميين                | 9 |
| 5             | -     | 5     | 2          | -                    | ا رېپين.   |   |
|               | _     | _     | _          |                      | عدم اسټخدام انټل موال لاعامة بېښب <b>لا</b> ېس اد<br>م             | 1 |
| 5             | 4     | 3     | 2          | 1                    | امر غيرشرط څي اردن.  | 0 |
| 5             | 4     | 3     | 2          | 1                    | افراد والڨركات تفع الكثير من ا موالفيما                            | 1 |

|   |   |            |   |   | يټ پې قب المضر بي المق روض.                      | 1      |
|---|---|------------|---|---|--|--------|
| 5 | 4 | 3          | 2 | 1 | للوضع للرياسي مرتقرف ي اردن.                     | 1<br>2 |
| 5 | 4 | 3          | 2 | 1 | ا تحجاج لليري <i>بلي ي</i> مدد ا ستقرار في اردن. | 1<br>3 |
| 5 | 4 | 3          | 2 | 1 | يوجدص اعقليي مدد استق رارفي اردن.                | 1<br>4 |
| 5 | 4 | 3          | 2 | 1 | لقضاء ا ريني مريوقل ع تدخل لالحكوم.              | 1<br>5 |
| 5 | 4 | 3          | 2 | 1 | للقضاء ا ريښ يداربعدلاه ولځعائفي ا ردن .         | 1<br>6 |
| 5 | 4 | 3<br>UTARA | 2 | 1 | الأسرطة الروي فسطل فسي المخلوحة الجريمة.         | 1<br>7 |





| لقسم فثلتي : للعوامل ال في موغرفلي ة  |
|---|
| يرجى وضع )√(غلى ا جبة لونلابة أفناه.<br>عددسن وات عمر وشنك:<br>قال من كسن وا<br>1-01سن وا<br>لكث من 10سن وا<br>روزيس نغيبي ني لكلي لكف ي لثر كه:<br>مي عام<br>اخ ى, لل جاء ك ها     |
| ي راد لي عات ليرين و يل علم الله ين علي ة ليرين ه<br>ل م لي ه 2016:<br>ق ل من 100,000 فين ار  |
| لمون تالغ في ق:<br>للميت وى للثلاث ي<br>بلكال وي وس<br>در لس الغي المي المحالي المحالي المحالي المحالي المحالي المحالي المحالي<br>عدد لمو ظين لع الجي نفي تش اطك لتج اري :<br>19-10 |
| الش اط لتصرف عي لوعيس ي:<br>للصرن اع الى عي وللى وازم للطبي   |
| ليس جي لف مي من جل<br>ليس جي لف يض ريب ة ل جي عات<br>من جل<br>ق ك رال <b>ج</b> ن نت عاق كم  |

|   | Author(s); year         | Country   | Key Findings on Income Tax Compliance   |
|---|-------------------------|-----------|---|
| 1 | Joulfaian (2000)        | USA       | <ul> <li>Non-compliant firms are more likely to be managed by executives who have failed to comply with personal income tax than are compliant firms.</li> <li>High audit rates, lower tax rates, larger corporate size have a negative relation with tax non-compliance</li> <li>High income level has a positive effect on tax non-compliance.</li> <li>Foreign ownership has an insignificant impact on tax non-compliance.</li> </ul> |
| 2 | Hanlon et al.<br>(2005) | USA       | <ul> <li>The non-compliance in large companies is higher than in small and medium enterprises, while the tax non-compliance of medium enterprises is lower.</li> <li>Tax rate and governance quality does not have an impact on the compliance behaviour of a firm's taxpayers.</li> <li>Corporates in the private sector are linked with higher non-compliance.</li> </ul>   |
| 3 | Birskyte (2014)         | USA       | Higher confidence in government improves tax compliance.  |
| 4 | Chan and Mo<br>(2000)   | China     | <ul> <li>Corporates are less compliant before a tax holiday.</li> <li>Most corporates are more compliant in a tax-exemption period.</li> <li>Domestic market-oriented corporates, service-oriented corporates, and joi ventures are less compliant than export-oriented corporates, whol foreign-owned corporates and manufacturing-oriented corporates, respectively</li> </ul>  |
| 5 | Evans et al.<br>(2005)  | Australia | <ul> <li>Poor SME record keeping practices leads to a decrease in tax compliance.</li> <li>Tax compliance costs have a positive relation with poor record keeping.</li> </ul>   |
| 6 | Langham et al. (2012)   | Australia | Taxpayers do not have enough control over their behavior to guarantee the   |

**Appendix C** Summary of Income Tax Compliance Studies among SMEs Worldwide, 2000-2017

| 7  | Hasseldine et al.       | UK                                | <ul> <li>successful fulfilment of all tax tasks.</li> <li>A high level of intention does not always mean compliance, and tax complexity has a negative correlation with the willingness to be tax compliant.</li> <li>Communications are particularly efficient for self-preparers when reporting turnover.</li> </ul>  |
|----|-------------------------|-----------------------------------|---|
| 7  | (2007)                  | UK                                | • In general, tax penalties letters are more efficient than normative citizenship letters for reported turnover.  |
| 8  | Nur-Tegin<br>(2008)     | 27<br>transition<br>economie<br>s | <ul> <li>Anti-corruption, tax audit, tax reforms, and tax fairness have a positive relation with tax compliance.</li> <li>A tax rate increase does not seem to cause companies to under-report their tax.</li> <li>Owned enterprises in the private sector are more likely to evade than owned enterprises in the public sector.</li> </ul>   |
| 9  | Abdul-Jabbar<br>(2009)  | Malaysia                          | <ul> <li>An increase in tax complexity and a decrease in tax audit are positively associated with an increase in tax non-compliance.</li> <li>Business size, tax level, tax fairness, IRB relationship and tax compliance costs do not affect the tax compliance behavior.</li> <li>The impact of sector, business age, tax rate and incentives on the income tax compliance behavior of company SMEs is inconclusive.</li> </ul> |
| 10 | Hai & See<br>(2011)     | Malaysia                          | • Attitudinal variables (expected tax cost, tax fairness), subjective norms variables (unapproved account preparer and unapproved tax preparer and) and demographic variables (age and gender) have a positive correlation with the tax non-compliance intention of sole proprietors.   |
| 11 | Sapiei et al.<br>(2014) | Malaysia                          | <ul> <li>Tax compliance cost has an insignificant relation with tax compliance. Large and medium-sized are more non-compliant than small-sized.</li> <li>PLCs in the manufacturing sector are more compliant than those in the services</li> </ul>  |

|    |              |           | sector.  |
|----|--------------|-----------|--|
|    |              |           | • Tax complexity and tax psychological costs have a positive relation with tax no compliance.  |
|    |              |           | • PLCs with a lower tax liability tend to be more non-compliant. Older corporation are more compliant than their younger counterparts.                       |
|    |              |           | • Tax audit and tax penalty lead to reduced tax non-compliance.  |
|    |              |           | • An increase in tax rate and tax penalty has a positive relationship with tax no compliance.  |
| 12 | Yusof et al. | Malaysia  | • Financial and foreign ownership liquidity has no impact on tax non-compliance  |
|    | (2014)       |           | • Large corporates are more compliant than small corporates.   |
|    |              |           | • There is a positive correlation between industry type and SMCs tax no compliance.  |
|    | E            | 2         | • Corporates throughout the world share in tax non-compliance.   |
| 10 | T 11 (2010)  | 80        | • The corruption of government and tax rate are the main reasons for tax no compliance   |
| 13 | Tedds (2010) | Courtiers | • Political instability, get on financing, tax fairness and organized crime were fou to have no impact on tax non-compliance.                                |
|    | CLARU BUDI   | BAST      | • There is a significant relationship among tax non-compliance and the le organization of the business, age, size, ownership, audit controls and competition |
|    |              | New       | • Unfair procedures have a negative correlation with the willingness of taxpayers  |
| 14 | Yong (2012)  | Zealand   | interact with the tax authority.   |
|    |              | Zealand   | • Tax audit operations are ineffective in detecting tax cheating by the busine owner   |
| 15 | Brainyyah    | T. 1      | Tax fairness positively affect taxa compliance   |
| 15 | (2013)       | Indonesia | • Tax knowledge insignificantly impacts tax compliance,  |
|    |              |           | • Tax complexity has a negative linkage with tax compliance.   |

| 16 | Inasius (2015)                 | Indonesia    | <ul> <li>Income tax rate has a negative relation with tax compliance</li> <li>Tax audit, tax knowledge and referral group have a positive relationship with tax compliance.</li> </ul>  |
|----|--------------------------------|--------------|---|
| 17 | Akinboade<br>(2014)            | Cameroo<br>n | <ul> <li>Time-consuming operations, high registration cost, and complex tax system promote the tax non-compliance of SMEs owners.</li> <li>Perception of the tax system as being fair, clear, easy to understand promotes the tax compliance of SME owners.</li> </ul>  |
| 18 | Mahangila<br>(2014)            | Tanzania     | <ul> <li>Corporate income tax penalties levied on managers (responsible persons) are more effective than corporate income tax penalties charged on corporates.</li> <li>The retributive justice of corporate income tax penalties has a positive correlation with tax compliance.</li> <li>High tax compliance costs have a negative relation with tax compliance.</li> </ul> |
| 19 | Antwi et al.<br>(2015)         | Ghana        | <ul> <li>Women are more non-compliant with tax laws.</li> <li>High education positively affects the non-compliance rate.</li> <li>Older people are more compliant compared to their younger counterparts.</li> <li>Marital status has a correlation with entrepreneurs' non-compliance behavior.</li> </ul>   |
| 20 | Ayuba et al.<br>(2015)         | Nigeria      | • There is interacting effect of perceived service orientation on the relation among work family conflict and tax compliance behavior, while no interacting effect was found between fuel subsidy removal and tax compliance  |
| 21 | Oladipupo and<br>Obazee (2016) | Nigeria      | • Tax knowledge and tax sanctions have a positive correlation with tax compliance.  |
| 22 | Musimenta et al.<br>(2017)     | Uganda       | <ul> <li>Tax fairness and isomorphic forces were significant relationships between with tax compliance.</li> <li>Strategic responses were insignificant relation with tax compliance.</li> </ul>  |

Source: Abdul-Jabbar (2009) extended by the author (2017)

|   | Summary of                    | Income Tax Com | <b>Appendix D</b><br>pliance Studies in Middle East and Arab Countries, 1977-2016.  |
|---|-------------------------------|----------------|---|
|   | Author(s); year               | Country        | Key Findings on Income Tax Compliance   |
| 1 | Mahmmud (1977)                | Egypt          | • Weak tax law, tax unfairness, and poor awareness taxpayer has a positive relationship with tax evasion.   |
| 2 | Al-Bahwashi<br>(1986)         | Egypt          | • Tax rate, tax audit, middle and low income has a positive relationship with tax evasion.  |
| 3 | Al-Said (2001)                | Egypt          | • Unfair tax exemption leads to increased tax evasion; tax rate is positively linked with tax evasion   |
| 4 | Nomani (2011)                 | Egypt          | • Lack of transparency of public expenditure increases income tax evasion.  |
| 5 | Said (2011)                   | Egypt          | • Loopholes in tax law and decrease in trust between taxpayers and government lead to tax evasion.  |
| 6 | Alkatib (2000)                | Syria          | <ul> <li>Taxpayers do not have morals or a willingness to pay their tax in Syria.</li> <li>There is no trust between taxpayers and government.</li> <li>Goods and service provided by the government are disproportionate to the size of tax payment, and government does not do anything for taxpayers.</li> <li>Tax rate is high and tax system is unfair.</li> </ul> |
| 7 | Akroush and<br>Zouhiri (2005) | Syria          | • Low wages and salary of tax department employees, increase in tax rate and unemployment were positively correlated with tax evasion.  |
| 8 | Mrouh (2011)                  | Syria          | <ul> <li>Tax rate increase is positively linked with an increase in tax evasion and governmental revenues in Syria.</li> <li>Tax penalty has a positive relation with reduced tax evasion in Syria.</li> </ul>  |

| 9  | Al-Adi and<br>Abdullah (2013)   | Syria     | • There is a positive relation between the fairness of the tax system and reduced tax evasion.  |
|----|---------------------------------|-----------|---|
| 10 | Al-Adi (2015)                   | Syria     | • Tax complexity and tax unfairness have a positive correlation with tax evasion.   |
| 11 | Mansour (2004)                  | Palestine | <ul> <li>The inefficiency of the tax penalty in Palestine.</li> <li>The political and economic instability in Palestine.</li> <li>Low cooperation between tax authority and taxpayers.</li> </ul>   |
| 12 | Al-Omour (2007)                 | Palestine | <ul> <li>The absence of security and political stability in the Gaza strip plays a major role in spreading the phenomenon of income tax invasion.</li> <li>The lack of credibility in the general expenditure.</li> <li>Clear lack of tax awareness can be noticed from the taxable to the role of income tax in supporting the treasury of the country.</li> </ul> |
| 13 | Dergham and Al-<br>Omour (2009) | Palestine | • Absences of security and political stability, full sovereignty of the Palestinian Authority over the Palestinian territories and the lack of transparency of public expenditure have a positive relationship with tax evasion.  |
| 14 | Ateeq (2013)                    | Palestine | • Tax authority suffers from serious structural and functional deficiencies that lead to ignorance of taxpayer concerning the significance and objectives of tax and increased tax evasion.   |
| 15 | Saruc (2001)                    | Turkey    | <ul> <li>Increase in tax audit and tax penalty have a positive relation with tax evasion.</li> <li>Ethics have a negative relation with tax evasion.</li> <li>Young taxpayers are more likely to evade.</li> </ul>  |

|    |   |            | • High level income has a positive relation with tax evasion.  |
|----|---|------------|--|
| 16 | McGee et al.<br>(2011)                  | Turkey     | <ul> <li>Males are more strongly opposed to tax non-compliance than females in Turkey.</li> <li>The youngest group is least opposed to tax non-compliance in Turkey.</li> <li>Tax non-compliance could be considered ethical in some respects and unethical in other cases in Turkey.</li> </ul> |
| 17 | Çevik and<br>Yeniçeri (2013)            | Turkey     | <ul> <li>Social norms are positively related to tax compliance.</li> <li>Efficiency of tax administration has a significant positive moderating impact on the connection among social norms and tax compliance.</li> </ul>   |
| 18 | Aljaaidi et al.<br>(2011)               | Yemen      | <ul> <li>Old people, female, single people, level of income and employees who work for the government have a negative relation with tax evasion in Yemen.</li> <li>Highly educated people in Yemen perceived tax evasion as a more</li> </ul>  |
|    |   |            | • Finging educated people in Tennen perceived tax evasion as a more serious crime than those with medium and low education.  |
| 19 | Megble (2012)                           | Yemen nive | • Tax unfairness, inadequate tax authority, ineffective tax penalty, prevalence of corruption among tax officers, unawareness of taxpayers and no trust among taxpayers and tax authority have a positive relationship with tax evasion.   |
| 20 | Al-Ttaffi and<br>Abdul-Jabbar<br>(2016) | Yemen      | • Tax service quality had a positive relation with income tax compliance of SMEs owners.   |
| 21 | Juhi (2011)                             | Iraq       | • There is positive relationship between tax compliance and tax fairness, and exchange with government and tax structure.  |

| 22 | Samarrai and<br>Obeidi (2012) | Iraq         | Tax unfairness and poor awareness of taxpayers have a positive relationship with tax evasion.  |
|----|-------------------------------|--------------|--|
| 23 | Baqer (2015)                  | Iraq         | Tax complexity, tax unfairness and inadequate tax authority lead to increased tax evasion.   |
| 24 | Kazem (2016)                  | •<br>Iraq    | Taxpayers do not trust the tax office; the services and infrastructure are not good enough for the taxpayers.  |
| 25 | Kabashi (2007)                | •<br>Sudan   | The instability of tax legislation, the absence of well-trained<br>employees, and the increase in tax rates have a positive relationship<br>with tax evasion.  |
| 26 | Abdul-Majid<br>(2011)         | •<br>Sudan   | No tax penalty to prevent taxpayers from tax evasion, together with<br>the absence of tax equity among taxpayers, and the weakness of tax<br>awareness among taxpayers.  |
| 27 | Ali (2013)                    | Sudan nive   | Majority businesses do not keep regular and sound accounting<br>records and ledgers.<br>accounting systems applied on the economic units were weak,<br>incomplete, or even not available in some units, all of which<br>contributed to tax evasion |
| 28 | Zaied (2009)                  | •<br>Algeria | There is positive relation among increase in tax penalty, tax rate,<br>education and confidence in the government with an increase in tax<br>evasion in Algeria.   |
| 29 | Murad (2010)                  | Algeria      | Uunfair tax system, unpredictability of tax law, inadequate tax<br>authority, tax rate is high are all positively associated with tax  |

|     |                       |               | evasion.   |
|-----|-----------------------|---------------|--|
|     | M = 1 (2015)          |               | <ul> <li>A positive relationship among tax rate, corruption, Islamic religio<br/>and tax penalty with tax evasion.</li> </ul>          |
| 30  | Mohamed (2015)        | Libya         | • There is a negative relationship between education level and ta evasion.   |
| 31  | Alshaibani (2014)     | Morocco       | • Lack of taxpayer's awareness, tax unfairness, tax complexity an loophole in tax laws are main reasons for high level of tax evasion. |
|     |                       |               |  |
| Soi | urce: Compiled by the | author (2016) |  |
|     | UTAR                  |               |  |
|     | SUUTARA               |               |  |
|     | E UTARA               |               |  |
|     |                       |               |  |
|     |                       |               |  |
|     |                       |               |  |
|     |                       |               | JUM<br>versiti Utara Malaysia  |

|   | Summary of Income Tax Compliance Studies in Jordan, 1994-2016. |   |   |  |  |
|---|--|---|---|--|--|
|   | Author(s); year  | Sample  | Key Findings on Income Tax Compliance   |  |  |
| 1 | Awamleh (1994)   | 174 employees in<br>income tax<br>department                            | <ul> <li>Taxpayers are not satisfied with the income tax department</li> <li>There are several economic, political, social and managerial obstacles that limit the performance of the income tax department</li> </ul>  |  |  |
| 2 | Al-Khdour<br>(1999)  | Data analysis of<br>income tax revenue<br>over the period<br>1976-1997. | • Increase in the tax rate is the main reason for income tax evasion.   |  |  |
| 3 | Zaiton (2003)  | 188externalauditors and 127 taxauditors.                                | <ul><li>Level of confidence between taxpayers and tax authority is low.</li><li>Information about taxpayers is low.</li></ul>   |  |  |
| 4 | Al-Maharma<br>(2003)   | 200 personal income taxpayers in private sector.                        | <ul> <li>Taxpayer's weak awareness of the importance of tax payment.</li> <li>There is no trust between citizens and the government.</li> <li>The tax auditors in the tax authority are inexperienced and efficiency in reduce tax income evasion.</li> </ul> |  |  |
| 5 | Bataineh (2003)  | 76doctors,43lawyers,55pharmacistsand29engineers(incometaxpayers).       | <ul> <li>Decrease in tax rate leads to a decrease in tax income evasion.</li> <li>Experience of employees has a negative relation with tax income evasion.</li> </ul>   |  |  |
| 6 | Al-oran and Al-<br>Khdour (2004)                               | Data analysis of<br>income tax revenue<br>over the period<br>1976-1997  | • Tax rate and economic condition have a positive correlation with tax evasion.   |  |  |
| 7 | Muharm (2004)  | 25 Tax auditors   | • There is a relation between the income tax (unclear law, high tax ratio,  |  |  |

**Appendix E** mmary of Income Tax Compliance Studies in Jordan, 1994-20

|    |                            |   | unfair law and lack of penalty for evasion) and increase in tax income evasion.  |
|----|----------------------------|---|--|
| 8  | Haddad (2006)              | 111 External<br>auditors and 78 Tax<br>auditors                         | Tax audit is effective in reducing tax income evasion.<br>There are loopholes in the income tax law that facilitate tax evasion  |
| 9  | Abusnina<br>(2008)         | 91 External auditors  | Bad economic situation has a positive correlation with tax evasion.<br>Tax penalties are of no use in limiting tax evasion.  |
| 10 | Khasawneh et al<br>.(2008) | 275 personal income taxpayers   | Tax system is fair.<br>Income tax law is fair.<br>Tax rate structure is fair.  |
| 11 | Slehat (2009)              | 212 income<br>taxpayers for private<br>and public sectors               | <ul> <li>Positive significant relationship among increase in penalty rate, tax rate, tax audit, tax fairness, religion, and ethics with increase in tax evasion.</li> <li>Education and level of income is significantly negatively related to tax evasion.</li> <li>No significant correlation between marital status, age, gender, and source of income with tax evasion.</li> </ul> |
| 12 | Al-Zou'bi<br>(2010)        | 614 of income tax • assessors   | Psychological, ethical and social factors have statistically significant effect on the level of the income tax compliance.   |
| 13 | Alkhdour (2011)            | Data analysis of<br>income tax revenue<br>over the period<br>1977-2010. | Unemployment rate has a negative effect on tax evasion.<br>Depreciation of the Jordanian dinar in 1988 had a positive effect on tax<br>evasion in Jordan.  |
| 14 | Olaimat (2012)             | 90 income tax<br>auditors •   | <ul><li>Personal, administrative, legislative, economic and social factors play a major role in tax evasion.</li><li>Manipulating revenue and expenses without keeping accounting records is considered to be one of the most important forms of tax evasion.</li></ul>  |

| 15 | Al-Zoubi et al.<br>(2013)       | 120 income tax auditors                   | • | Tax penalties insufficient to reduce tax evasion.<br>Employees in tax authority do not have experience for treatment of tax evasion.   |
|----|---------------------------------|---|---|--|
| 16 | Qblan (2014)                    | 100 income tax<br>auditors                | • | Accounting policies impact on the temporary income tax Act No. (28) of 2009 to limit tax evasion.<br>Procedures applied by the tax department have no impact on limiting tax evasion.  |
| 17 | Al-Falahat and<br>Zaidan (2014) | 12 external auditors and 18 tax auditors. | • | There is an increase in the amount of evasion in Jordan.<br>Tax evasion is intentional acts of and planned in Jordan, with taxpayers<br>paying huge amounts of money to tax advisors to help hide their money<br>from taxes. |
| 18 | Al-Sheikh et al.<br>(2016)      | 173 external auditors                     | ٠ | Tax penalty, tax rate and company size have a significant effect on income tax evasion   |

|   | Author(s);<br>year                  | Countries  | Key Findings on Sales Tax Compliance  |  |
|---|-------------------------------------|--|---|--|
| 1 | Murray<br>(1995)                    | <ul> <li>Greater non-compliance opportunities contribute to an increase in sales tax non-compliance.</li> <li>Policy of tax audit has no obvious effect on combatting sales tax non-compliance.</li> </ul> |   |  |
| 2 | Agha and<br>Haughton<br>(1996)      | 17 OECD countries  | • Longer experience of administering VAL leads to an increase in VAL  |  |
| 3 | Adams and<br>Webley<br>(2001)       | UK   | <ul> <li>Inequitable tax system and a decrease of tax morals are positively related with VAT non-compliance.</li> <li>Major opportunities for non-compliance mask a tendency to cheat if the penalties are not so extensive</li> </ul>  |  |
| 4 | Webley et<br>al. (2004)             | UK   | • Tax department is powerful, tax non-compliance behaviour is unacceptable,<br>business owners admitted to sometimes engaging in non-compliance, a large<br>majority of business owners perceived that the VAT law is unjust for small<br>business, social norms are affected by VAT compliance behaviour and mental<br>accounting has an insignificant relation with VAT compliance. |  |
| 5 | Engel et al.<br>(2001)              | Chile  | <ul> <li>An increase in enforcement spending leads to an increases in VAT compliance.</li> <li>Tax rate is positively correlated with VAT compliance.</li> </ul>  |  |
| 6 | Bergman<br>and<br>Nevarez<br>(2006) | Chile and<br>Argentina   | • Tax audits have a negative effect on prompting VAT non-compliance behaviour among evaders, but have a more positive impact on those inclined to comply.   |  |
| 7 | Matthews                            | 14   | • VAT system efficiency is reduced with an increase in VAT rate.  |  |

**Appendix F** Summary of Sales Tax Compliance Studies Worldwide, 1995-2015.

|    | (2003)                  | countries in the EU | • VAT non-compliance is positively linked to the tax rate.  |
|----|-------------------------|---------------------|---|
| 8  | Salleh<br>(2009)        | Malaysia            | • Negative relationship among fair perception of tax system, complexity, tax knowledge and perception of tax law, and enforcement and registration as local sales tax licensee.   |
| 9  | Symons et<br>al. (2010) | 145<br>countries    | <ul> <li>VAT is the prevalent form of consumption tax system applied in the world,</li> <li>The time necessary to comply with VAT differs considerable around the world and among neighbouring countries.</li> <li>VAT compliance in developed countries takes less time than in developing countries.</li> <li>VAT Compliance takes a longer time when extra documentation has been submitted with the VAT return.</li> <li>Administrative procedures vary from country to country and have a significan effect on how long it takes to be VAT compliant.</li> </ul> |
| 10 | Johnson et al. (2010)   | Canada              | • Increasing the tax audit does not necessarily lead to a reduction in tax non compliance   |
| 11 | Naibei<br>(2011)        | Kenya               | <ul> <li>Positive correlation between the use of ETRs and VAT compliance.</li> <li>VAT compliance is lower among firms that have middle turnover sales, while large companies are highly VAT compliant. Equally, VAT compliance is good among the companies with the lowest sales turnover</li> <li>Tax audit has a positive relationship with VAT compliance.</li> </ul>   |
| 12 | Wawire (2011)           | Kenya               | • Certain factors demographic, institutional and structural features of the economy have a positive effect on VAT revenue.  |
| 13 | Naibei et<br>al. (2012) | Kenya               | <ul> <li>VAT non-compliance is high in middle-income enterprises.</li> <li>There is a positive link between VAT compliance and tax audit.</li> <li>A regular and effective use of tax registers is positively correlated with VAT</li> </ul>  |

|    |  |                | compliance.   |
|----|--|----------------|---|
| 14 | Biabani<br>and<br>Amezani<br>(2011)    | Iran           | <ul> <li>Tax compliance cost and tax culture have a positive relationship with VAT compliance.</li> <li>Tax complexity has an insignificant association with VAT compliance.</li> </ul>   |
| 15 | Giesecke<br>and Tran<br>(2012)         | Vietnam        | • A VAT compliance rate of around 13%, raising VAT rates and removing or reducing exemptions can be an efficient means of raising VAT revenue.  |
| 16 | Oladipupo<br>and<br>Izedonmi<br>(2013) | Nigeria        | <ul> <li>Most respondents do not have knowledge of VAT law in Nigeria, irrespective of their literacy level.</li> <li>Poor knowledge of tax laws is responsible for the high level of taxpayer's non-compliance.</li> </ul>   |
| 17 | Eragbhe<br>and Omoye<br>(2014)         | Nigeria        | <ul> <li>Business age, employee size, turnover, industry class and distance to tax office have a negative relationship with VAT tax compliance costs.</li> <li>There is a positive correlation between export status and outsourcing and VAT tax compliance costs.</li> </ul>         |
| 18 | Faridy et<br>al. (2014)                | Bangladesh     | <ul> <li>SMEs contribution in VAT revenue is underrepresented in Bangladesh.</li> <li>Complexity in VAT law and compliance costs positively affects VAT non-compliance in SMEs.</li> <li>Tax audits and tax penalties were found have little impact on VAT non-compliance.</li> </ul> |
| 19 | Woodward<br>and Tan<br>(2015)          | New<br>Zealand | • Tax penalty, tax audit, tax fairness and tax morals have a positive relation with GST compliance.   |

Source: Compiled by the author (2016)

|         | Six Stages of Moral Reasoning  |
|---------|--|
|         | Moral reasoning  |
| Stage 1 | <b>Pre-conventional level (Individual Perspective)</b><br>The punishment and obedience orientation, you do what<br>you are required firstly to avert penalty.  |
| Stage 2 | Pragmatic selfhood and Simple reciprocity. Solely consideration the cost and/or self-interest.   |
| Stage 3 | <b>Conventional level (Member of Society Perspective)</b><br>Interpersonal Concordance. Be considerate the good conduct and get along with different people. Attention and collaboration with persons and help them in your surrounding environment. |
| Stage 4 | The law and order. There is tendency toward respect and<br>obey authority, conservation of the social order by<br>people who live in society.  |
|         | <b>Post-conventional, Autonomous, or Principled Level</b><br>Social- contract, legalistic orientation. There is an   |
| Stage 5 | evident knowledge that right action tends to be defined<br>in terms of general personal standards and right, which<br>agreed upon by the all society as determined by fairness<br>and equality.  |
| Stage 6 | Universal ethical, principal. The decisions of persons<br>accord with ethical principles which derived from<br>principle of fairness, equality of human rights and<br>respect for the dignity of human beings as individual<br>persons.              |
|         | Stage 1<br>Stage 2<br>Stage 3<br>Stage 4<br>Stage 5  |

| Appendix G                    |  |
|-------------------------------|--|
| Six Stages of Moral Reasoning |  |

Source: Kohlberg and Hersh (1977).

| Good GovernanceBad Governance1The authority described as institutional<br>and it is appropriated to officials.The authority is personal rather than<br>institutional and it is appropriated to<br>individuals.2Political leaders and others who share<br>power are held accountable for their<br>actions and the decisions they make.Political leadership employ<br>monopolistic power and are not<br>accountable for both their actions and<br>decisions.3Leaders wield their power by the<br>provision of collective benefits that<br>agmer societal support.Leaders use their power by providing<br>collective benefits that<br>agmer societal support.4in with transparency following public<br>discussion and review.Standards of decision-making are<br>clear, with transparent procedures.5Standards of decision-making are<br>clear, with transparent procedures.Standards of decision-making are<br>ambiguous and procedures are carried<br>out in secret.6Political parties are formed around<br>stated programs affecting significant<br>numerous, transparent donations.Political campaigns are supported by<br>major, secret donations.7Political campaigns are supported str<br>that is free, fair, open and competitive<br>rocesses based on merit and<br>expertise.Political campaigns are financed by<br>major, secret donations.9The civil engineering projects are<br>appropriated to meet the interests of<br>significant portions of societal<br>citizenry.The civil engineering projects are only<br>appropriated to meet the interests of<br>significant portions of societal<br>citizenry.The civil engineering projects are only<br>appropriated to meet the interest of<br>significant portions of societal<br>citizenry. <td< th=""><th></th><th colspan="8">Differences between Good and Bad Governance</th></td<> |    | Differences between Good and Bad Governance   |   |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|--|----|---|---|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| 1The authority described as institutional<br>and it is appropriated to officials.1and it is appropriated to officials.2Political leaders and others who share<br>actions and the decisions they make.2Political leaders and others who share<br>actions and the decisions they make.2Leaders wield their power by the<br>provision of collective benefits that<br>agarner societal support.3Leaders wield their power by the<br>provision of collective benefits that<br>agarner societal support.4in with transparency following public<br>discussion and review.5Standards of decision-making are<br>clear, with transparent procedures.6Political parties are formed around<br>stated programs affecting significant<br>numbers of beneficiaries characterized<br>by either universal or generic<br>categories.7Political campaigns are supported by<br>numerous, transparent donations.8Elections are held in an atmosphere<br>that is free, fair, open and competitive<br>processes based on merit and<br>expertise.9Singlifcant<br>oppriated to meet the interests of<br>significant portions of societal<br>citizenry.10The crivil engincering projects are<br>appropriated to meet the interests of<br>significant portions of societal<br>citizenry.11An authorized administrators<br>insissal of administrators is based<br>on cause and aligned with codified<br>rules and procedures.12Administrators are not allowed to<br>Administrators server. </th <th></th> <th>Good Governance</th> <th>Bad Governance</th>  |    | Good Governance   | Bad Governance  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Pointcal leaders and others who share<br>actions and the decisions they make.monopolistic power and are not<br>accountable for both their actions and<br>decisions.2power are held accountable for heir<br>actions and the decisions they make.monopolistic power and are not<br>accountable for both their actions and<br>decisions.3Leaders wield their power by the<br>provision of collective benefits that<br>garner societal support.Leaders use their power by providing<br>collective benefits that only garners<br>specific societal segments.4in with transparency following public<br>discussion and review.The government takes policy decisions<br>in secret without the involvement of<br>the public.5Standards of decision-making<br>are<br>clear, with transparent procedures.Standards of decision-making are<br>ambiguous and procedures are carried<br>out in secret.6Political parties are formed around<br>stated programs affecting significant<br>numerous, transparent donations.Political campaigns are financed by<br>major, secret donations.8Elections are held in an atmosphere<br>that is free, fair, open and competitive<br>processes based on merit and<br>expertise.Political campaigns are only<br>appropriated to meet the interests of<br>significant portions of societal<br>citizenry.The recruitment and promotion of<br>administrators involves a competitive<br>processes based on merit and<br>expertise.The recruitment and promotion of<br>administrators involves a competitive<br>processes based on merit and<br>euledefined channels of reporting.The recruitment and promotion of<br>administrators is based on<br>on cause and aligned with codified<br>rules and procedures.Dismissal of administrators is based<br>on ause and aligned with codi  | 1  |   | institutional and it is appropriated to                                 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3provision of collective benefits that<br>gamer societal support.collective benefits that only gamers<br>specific societal segments.4The government takes policy decisions<br>in with transparency following public<br>discussion and review.The government takes policy decisions<br>in secret without the involvement of<br>the public.5Standards of decision-making are<br>clear, with transparent procedures.Standards of decision-making are<br>ambiguous and procedures are carried<br>out in secret.6Numbers of beneficiaries characterized<br>by either universal or generic<br>categories.Political parties are formed around<br>personalities and the<br>distribution of<br>individual benefits.7Political campaigns are supported by<br>numerous, transparent donations.Political campaigns are financed by<br>major, secret donations.8Elections are held in an atmosphere<br>that is free, fair, open and competitive.Political campaigns are financed by<br>intimidation, buying of votes, rigging<br>and fraud.9Significant portions of societal<br>citizenry.The recruitment and promotion of<br>administrators involves a competitive<br>processes based on merit and<br>expertise.The recruitment and promotion of<br>administrators involves a competitive<br>personal relationships with political<br>leaders and power brokers.11An authorized administrative<br>hierarchy exists with clear labour,<br>division, certain output standard, and<br>well-defined channels of reporting.Atministrators involves a competitive<br>administrators are not allowed to12On cause and aligned with codified<br>rules and procedures.Dismissal of administrators is based on<br>amisusal of administrators are not allowed to  | 2  | power are held accountable for their  | monopolistic power and are not accountable for both their actions and   |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 4in with transparency following public<br>discussion and review.in secret without the involvement of<br>the public.5Standards of decision-making<br>clear, with transparent procedures.Standards of decision-making are<br>ambiguous and procedures are carried<br>out in secret.6Political parties are formed around<br>stated programs affecting significant<br>numbers of beneficiaries characterized<br>by either universal or generic<br>categories.Political campaigns are supported by<br>numerous, transparent donations,<br>that is free, fair, open and competitive.Political campaigns are financed by<br>major, secret donations,8Elections are held in an atmosphere<br>that is free, fair, open and competitive.Political campaigns are only<br>and fraud.9The civil engineering projects are<br>appropriated to meet the interests of<br>significant portions of societal<br>citizenry.The civil engineering projects are<br>of significant portions of societal<br>citizenry.The recruitment and promotion of<br>administrators involves a competitive<br>processes based on merit and<br>expertise.The recruitment and promotion of<br>administrators involves a competitive<br>processes based on merit and<br>expertise.An authorized administrative<br>hierarchy exists with clear labour,<br>division, certain output standard, and<br>well-defined channels of reporting.An unspoken hierarchy exists with<br>litte to no specialization of output and<br>ambiguous reporting channels.12Dismissal of administrators is based<br>on cause and aligned with codified<br>rules and procedures.Dismissal of administrators is based on<br>ambiguous reasons that are<br>inconsistent with rules and procedures.13Administrators are not allowed toAdministrators m  | 3  | provision of collective benefits that garner societal support.  | collective benefits that only garners specific societal segments.       |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| <ul> <li>Standards of decision-making are clear, with transparent procedures.</li> <li>Political parties are formed around stated programs affecting significant numbers of beneficiaries characterized by either universal or generic categories.</li> <li>Political campaigns are supported by numerous, transparent donations.</li> <li>Elections are held in an atmosphere that is free, fair, open and competitive.</li> <li>The civil engineering projects are appropriated to meet the interests of significant portions of societal citizenry.</li> <li>The recruitment and promotion of administrators involves a competitive processes based on merit and expertise.</li> <li>An authorized administrative hierarchy exists with clear labour, division, certain output standard, and well-defined channels of reporting.</li> <li>Dismissal of administrators is based no cause and aligned with codified rules and procedures.</li> <li>Administrators are not allowed to Administrators may supplement their</li> </ul>   | 4  | in with transparency following public   | in secret without the involvement of the public.                        |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 6stated programs affecting significant<br>numbers of beneficiaries characterized<br>by either universal or generic<br>categories.Political campaigns are supported by<br>numerous, transparent donations.Political campaigns are financed by<br>major, secret donations.7Political campaigns are supported by<br>numerous, transparent donations.Political campaigns are financed by<br>major, secret donations.8Elections are held in an atmospher<br>that is free, fair, open and competitive.Elections are characterized by<br>intimidation, buying of votes, rigging<br>and fraud.9The civil engineering projects are<br>appropriated to meet the interests of<br>significant portions of societal<br>citizenry.The civil engineering projects are only<br>appropriated to meet the interests of<br>small portions of the societal citizenry.10The recruitment and promotion of<br>administrators involves a competitive<br>processes based on merit and<br>expertise.The recruitment and promotion of<br>administrators entails reward for<br>personal relationships with political<br>leaders and power brokers.11hierarchy exists with clear labour,<br>division, certain output standard, and<br>well-defined channels of reporting.An unspoken hierarchy exists with<br>little to no specialization of output and<br>ambiguous reporting channels.12Dismissal of administrators is based<br>on cause and aligned with codified<br>rules and procedures.Dismissal of administrators are not allowed to<br>Administrators may supplement their  | 5  | clear, with transparent procedures.   | ambiguous and procedures are carried                                    |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1numerous, transparent donations.major, secret donations.8Elections are held in an atmosphere<br>that is free, fair, open and competitive.Elections are characterized by<br>intimidation, buying of votes, rigging<br>and fraud.9The civil engineering projects are<br>appropriated to meet the interests of<br>significant portions of societal<br>citizenry.The civil engineering projects are only<br>appropriated to meet the interests of<br>significant portions of societal<br>citizenry.The civil engineering projects are only<br>appropriated to meet the interests of<br>small portions of the societal citizenry.10The recruitment and promotion of<br>administrators involves a competitive<br>processes based on merit and<br>expertise.The recruitment and promotion of<br>administrators entails reward for<br>personal relationships with political<br>leaders and power brokers.11An authorized administrative<br>division, certain output standard, and<br>well-defined channels of reporting.An unspoken hierarchy exists with<br>little to no specialization of output and<br>ambiguous reporting channels.12Dismissal of administrators is based<br>on cause and aligned with codified<br>rules and procedures.Dismissal of administrators is based on<br>ambiguous reasons that are<br>inconsistent with rules and procedures.13Administrators are not allowed toAdministrators may supplement their  | 6  | stated programs affecting significant<br>numbers of beneficiaries characterized<br>by either universal or generic | personalities and the distribution of                                   |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| <ul> <li>8 Elections are held in an atmosphere that is free, fair, open and competitive.</li> <li>9 The civil engineering projects are appropriated to meet the interests of significant portions of societal citizenry.</li> <li>10 The recruitment and promotion of administrators involves a competitive processes based on merit and expertise.</li> <li>11 An authorized administrative hierarchy exists with clear labour, division, certain output standard, and well-defined channels of reporting.</li> <li>12 Dismissal of administrators is based on cause and aligned with codified rules and procedures.</li> <li>13 Administrators are not allowed to</li> </ul>   | 7  |   |   |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| <ul> <li>appropriated to meet the interests of significant portions of societal citizenry.</li> <li>The recruitment and promotion of administrators involves a competitive processes based on merit and expertise.</li> <li>An authorized administrative hierarchy exists with clear labour, division, certain output standard, and well-defined channels of reporting.</li> <li>Dismissal of administrators is based on cause and aligned with codified rules and procedures.</li> <li>Administrators are not allowed to</li> </ul>   | 8  | -   | intimidation, buying of votes, rigging                                  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 10administrators involves a competitive<br>processes based on merit and<br>expertise.administrators entails reward for<br>personal relationships with political<br>leaders and power brokers.11An authorized administrative<br>hierarchy exists with clear labour,<br>division, certain output standard, and<br>well-defined channels of reporting.An unspoken hierarchy exists with<br>little to no specialization of output and<br>  | 9  | appropriated to meet the interests of significant portions of societal  | appropriated to meet the interests of                                   |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 11hierarchy exists with clear labour,<br>division, certain output standard, and<br>well-defined channels of reporting.An unspoken hierarchy exists with<br>little to no specialization of output and<br>ambiguous reporting channels.12Dismissal of administrators is based<br>on cause and aligned with codified<br>rules and procedures.Dismissal of administrators is based<br>inconsistent with rules and procedures.13  | 10 | administrators involves a competitive processes based on merit and  | administrators entails reward for personal relationships with political |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 12on cause and aligned with codified<br>rules and procedures.ambiguous<br>inconsistent with rules and procedures.13Administrators<br>are<br>not<br>allowed<br>toAdministrators<br>may supplement<br>their  | 11 | hierarchy exists with clear labour, division, certain output standard, and  | little to no specialization of output and                               |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 12 | on cause and aligned with codified rules and procedures.  | ambiguous reasons that are inconsistent with rules and procedures.      |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 259  | 13 | supplement their salary with extra  | salary through bribes and kickbacks.                                    |  |  |  |  |  |  |

**Appendix H** Differences between Good and Bad Governance

|     | income or through bribery or other   |  |
|-----|--|--|
|     | fraudulent means.  |  |
| 14  | The actions of administrators are<br>predictable and are according to the<br>objective methods, and standard | The actions of administrators are not<br>predictable and are according to<br>subjective reasoning and sub-standard |
|     | procedures.  | procedures.  |
| 15  | Rules are implemented in neutral and justified means to all citizens.  | Rules are implemented favouring other people that are closely related to government.                               |
| 16  | Legal contracts that are binding are<br>used in government procurement and<br>sales.                         | Contracts that are conducted through<br>verbal agreements are used in<br>government procurement and sales.         |
| 17  | There are strict internal controls, with<br>clear records that are audited in a<br>regular manner.           | Lack of internal controls exists and documentation is lackadaisical with some matters omitted from records.        |
| 18  | Citizens are allowed to appeal through<br>proper channels to seek redress from<br>poor service received.     | Citizens have little to no recourse when<br>they receive poor service or when they<br>want to raise complaints.    |
| Sou | arce: Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2005)   |  |

Source: Brinkernoff and Goldsmith (2005)



| $ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$  |    |                    |                | ice missing v |        |            |             |
|---|----|--------------------|----------------|---------------|--------|------------|-------------|
| Result Variable         Missing Values         First         Last         Cases         Function           1         TR2_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(TR2           2         TR3_1         2         1         215         215         SMEAN(TR2           3         TA2_1         2         1         215         215         SMEAN(TA2           4         TA3_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(TP2           5         TP1_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(TP1           6         TP2_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(TP2           7         TP3_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(TP2           8         TP4_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(TP2           10         TC4_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(TP2           11         TC6         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(TP1           13         TF3_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(TP1   |    |                    |                |               |        |            |             |
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| $ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$  |    | Result Variable    | Missing Values | First         | Last   | Cases      | Function    |
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| $\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$   | 2  |                    | 2              | 1             | 215    | 215        | SMEAN(TR3)  |
| $ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$  |    |                    |                | 1             |        |            | · /         |
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| $ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$  |    |                    | -              | -             |        |            |             |
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| $\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$   |    |                    | -              | -             |        |            |             |
| $\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$   |    |                    | -              | -             |        |            |             |
| $\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$   |    |                    | 1              | -             |        |            | . ,         |
| $\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$   |    |                    | 1              | 1             |        |            | SMEAN(TF4)  |
| $\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$   | 15 | PI1_1              | 1              | 1             | 215    | 215        | SMEAN(PI1)  |
| $\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$   | 16 | PI2_1              | 1              | 1             | 215    | 215        | SMEAN(PI2)  |
| $\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$   | 17 | PI6_1              | 1              | 1             | 215    | 215        | SMEAN(PI6)  |
| $\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$   | 18 | PA1 1              | 2              | 1             | 215    | 215        | SMEAN(PA1)  |
| $\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$   | 19 | PA6_1              | 2              | 1             | 215    | 215        | SMEAN(PA6)  |
| $\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$   | 20 |                    | 1              | 1             | 215    | 215        | SMEAN(TM3)  |
| $\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$   |    |                    |                | 1             |        |            |             |
| 23       TM10_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(TMI SMEAN(STC 2))         25       STCM3_1       1       1       215       215       215       215       217         26       STCM7_1       1       1       215       215       215       3)         26       STCM7_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(STC 7)         27       STCM8_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(STC 7)         28       STCM10_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(STC 7)         29       STCM11_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(STC 10)         30       PG4_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(STC 10)         30       PG4_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(STC 10)         30       PG4_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(STC 10)         31       PG5_1       1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG4         31       PG5_1       1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG6         32       PG6_1   |    |                    |                |               |        |            |             |
| 24         STCM2_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(STC<br>2)           25         STCM3_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(STC<br>3)           26         STCM7_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(STC<br>3)           27         STCM8_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(STC<br>7)           27         STCM8_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(STC<br>7)           28         STCM10_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(STC<br>7)           29         STCM11_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(STC<br>10)           29         STCM11_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(STC<br>10)           29         STCM11_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(STC<br>10)           30         PG4_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(STC<br>10)           31         PG5_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(PG6<br>32           32         PG6_1         1         1         215         215 |    |                    |                |               |        |            |             |
| SICM2_1         1         1         215         215         2)           25         STCM3_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(STC<br>3)           26         STCM7_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(STC<br>7)           27         STCM8_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(STC<br>7)           28         STCM10_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(STC<br>8)           29         STCM11_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(STC<br>8)           29         STCM11_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(STC<br>10)           29         STCM11_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(STC<br>10)           30         PG4_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(STC<br>11)           30         PG4_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(STC<br>11)           31         PG5_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(PG4           31         PG5_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(PG6               |    |                    |                |               |        |            |             |
| 25       STCM3_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(STC<br>3)         26       STCM7_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(STC<br>7)         27       STCM8_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(STC<br>7)         28       STCM10_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(STC<br>8)         29       STCM11_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(STC<br>10)         30       PG4_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(STC<br>10)         31       PG5_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG4         31       PG5_1       1       1       215       SMEAN(PG4         32       PG6_1       1       1       215       SMEAN(PG4         33       PG7_1       1       1       215       SMEAN(PG4         34  |    | STCM2_1            | //•/ 1         | 1             | 215    | 215        |             |
| 26       STCM7_1       1       1       215       215       3)         27       STCM8_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(STC<br>7)         28       STCM10_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(STC<br>8)         29       STCM11_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(STC<br>10)         30       PG4_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(STC<br>10)         31       PG5_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG4         31       PG5_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG4         33       PG7_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG6         33       PG7_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG6         35       PG9_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG6  | 25 | 12                 | 🔊 Unive        | rsiti Uta     | ara Ma | avsia      |             |
| 26         STCM7_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(STC<br>7)           27         STCM8_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(STC<br>8)           28         STCM10_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(STC<br>8)           29         STCM11_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(STC<br>10)           30         PG4_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(STC<br>10)           30         PG4_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(STC<br>10)           30         PG4_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(PG4<br>31)           31         PG5_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(PG4<br>33           32         PG6_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(PG6<br>33           33         PG7_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(PG6<br>35           34         PG8_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(PG6<br>36           36         PG10_1         1         1         215         215            |    | STCM3_1            | / 1            | 1             | 215    | 215        |             |
| 27       STCM8_1       1       1       215       215       7)         28       STCM10_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(STC)         29       STCM11_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(STC)         30       PG4_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(STC)         31       PG5_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG4)         32       PG6_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG4)         33       PG7_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG4)         34       PG8_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG4)         35       PG9_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG4)         37       PG11_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG1)         38       PG12_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG1)         39       PG13_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG1)  | 26 |                    |                |               |        |            |             |
| 27       STCM8_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(STC<br>8)         28       STCM10_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(STC<br>10)         29       STCM11_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(GTC<br>10)         30       PG4_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG4<br>31)         30       PG4_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG4<br>31)         32       PG6_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG4<br>33)         33       PG7_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG4<br>35         34       PG8_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG4<br>36         36       PG10_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG4<br>37         37       PG11_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG1<br>38         39       PG13_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG1<br>37  | 20 | STCM7_1            | 1              | 1             | 215    | 215        |             |
| SICM8_1         I         I         215         215         8)           28         STCM10_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(STC)           29         STCM11_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(STC)           30         PG4_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(PG4)           31         PG5_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(PG4)           32         PG6_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(PG6)           33         PG7_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(PG6)           34         PG8_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(PG6)           35         PG9_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(PG6)           36         PG10_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(PG1)           37         PG11_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(PG1)           38         PG12_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(PG1)   | 27 |                    |                |               |        |            |             |
| 28         STCM10_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(STC<br>10)           29         STCM11_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(STC<br>10)           30         PG4_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(PG4<br>11)           30         PG4_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(PG4<br>11)           31         PG5_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(PG4<br>32           32         PG6_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(PG6<br>33           33         PG7_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(PG6<br>34           34         PG8_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(PG6<br>36           35         PG9_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(PG6<br>36           36         PG10_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(PG1<br>37           38         PG12_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(PG1<br>39           39         PG13_1         1         1         215         215              | 27 | STCM8_1            | 1              | 1             | 215    | 215        |             |
| 29       STCM10_1       1       1       215       215       10)         30       PG4_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(STC<br>11)         30       PG4_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG4         31       PG5_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG4         32       PG6_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG5         33       PG7_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG6         33       PG7_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG6         34       PG8_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG6         35       PG9_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG6         36       PG10_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG1         37       PG11_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG1         38       PG12_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG1         39       PG13_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG1 <td>20</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td>  | 20 |                    |                |               |        |            |             |
| 29       STCM11_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(STC<br>11)         30       PG4_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG4         31       PG5_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG4         32       PG6_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG5         33       PG7_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG6         34       PG8_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG7         34       PG8_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG8         35       PG9_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG8         36       PG10_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG1         37       PG11_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG1         38       PG12_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG1         39       PG13_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG1   | 20 | STCM10 1           | 1              | 1             | 215    | 215        | · ·         |
| 30       PG4_1       1       1       215       215       11)         30       PG4_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG4         31       PG5_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG4         32       PG6_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG6         33       PG7_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG6         34       PG8_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG6         35       PG9_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG6         36       PG10_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG1         37       PG11_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG1         38       PG12_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG1         39       PG13_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG1  | 20 | _                  |                |               |        |            |             |
| 30       PG4_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG4         31       PG5_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG4         32       PG6_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG6         33       PG7_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG6         34       PG8_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG6         35       PG9_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG6         36       PG10_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG6         37       PG11_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG1         38       PG12_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG1         39       PG13_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG1   | 29 | STCM11 1           | 1              | 1             | 215    | 215        |             |
| 31       PG5_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG5)         32       PG6_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG5)         33       PG7_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG5)         34       PG8_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG7)         34       PG9_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG7)         35       PG9_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG7)         36       PG10_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG1)         37       PG11_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG1)         38       PG12_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG1)         39       PG13_1       1       1       215       215       SMEAN(PG1)   | 20 | —                  | 1              | 1             | 215    | 015        |             |
| 32         PG6_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(PG6           33         PG7_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(PG6           34         PG8_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(PG6           35         PG9_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(PG6           36         PG10_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(PG1           37         PG11_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(PG1           38         PG12_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(PG1           39         PG13_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(PG1   |    |                    |                |               |        |            |             |
| 33         PG7_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(PG7           34         PG8_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(PG7           35         PG9_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(PG7           36         PG10_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(PG1           37         PG11_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(PG1           38         PG12_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(PG1           39         PG13_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(PG1  |    |                    |                |               |        |            | · /         |
| 34         PG8_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(PG8           35         PG9_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(PG8           36         PG10_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(PG9           37         PG11_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(PG1           38         PG12_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(PG1           39         PG13_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(PG1   |    |                    |                |               |        |            | · /         |
| 35         PG9_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(PG9           36         PG10_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(PG1           37         PG11_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(PG1           38         PG12_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(PG1           39         PG13_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(PG1  |    |                    |                |               |        |            |             |
| 36         PG10_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(PG1)           37         PG11_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(PG1)           38         PG12_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(PG1)           39         PG13_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(PG1)   |    |                    |                |               |        |            | SMEAN(PG8)  |
| 37         PG11_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(PG1           38         PG12_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(PG1           39         PG13_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(PG1   |    |                    | 1              | 1             |        |            | SMEAN(PG9)  |
| 38         PG12_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(PG1)           39         PG13_1         1         1         215         215         SMEAN(PG1)   |    |                    |                |               |        |            | SMEAN(PG10) |
| 39 PG13_1 1 1 215 215 SMEAN(PG1)  |    |                    |                |               |        |            | SMEAN(PG11) |
| _   |    |                    |                |               |        |            | SMEAN(PG12) |
|   |    | PG13_1             | 1              | 1             | 215    | 215        | SMEAN(PG13) |
|   | 40 | PG14_1             |                | 1             | 215    | 215        | SMEAN(PG14) |
|   | 41 | PG17 <sup>-1</sup> | 2              | 1             |        |            | SMEAN(PG17) |

Appendix I Replace Missing Values

|    | Ouilier (Manalanobis) Test |    |                |    |          |     |          |     |          |     |         |     |         |  |
|----|----------------------------|----|----------------|----|----------|-----|----------|-----|----------|-----|---------|-----|---------|--|
| Ν  | MAH_1                      | Ν  | MAH_1          | Ν  | MAH_1    | Ν   | MAH_1    | Ν   | MAH_1    | Ν   | MAH_1   | Ν   | MAH_1   |  |
| 1  | 14.2144                    | 32 | 10.2694        | 63 | 11.09380 | 94  | 4.61877  | 125 | 4.85174  | 156 | 2.89117 | 187 | 8.88795 |  |
| 2  | 6.26190                    | 33 | 8.23793        | 64 | 1.91262  | 95  | 8.03074  | 126 | 4.23757  | 157 | 5.10521 | 188 | 5.49259 |  |
| 3  | 8.16354                    | 34 | 22.9253        | 65 | 1.84849  | 96  | 5.22122  | 127 | 21.56757 | 158 | 2.86581 | 189 | 11.4594 |  |
| 4  | 6.75596                    | 35 | 2.31765        | 66 | 2.21640  | 97  | 25.48230 | 128 | 2.11183  | 159 | 7.58305 | 190 | 14.6134 |  |
| 5  | 12.24567                   | 36 | 3.62414        | 67 | 4.68760  | 98  | 7.39668  | 129 | 13.94372 | 160 | 6.47614 | 191 | 3.66447 |  |
| 6  | <u>35.92847</u>            | 37 | 5.54598        | 68 | 10.11882 | 99  | 6.95316  | 130 | 12.77719 | 161 | 2.15096 | 192 | 12.1853 |  |
| 7  | 23.07301                   | 38 | 11.9872        | 69 | 16.71552 | 100 | 25.41389 | 131 | 5.71675  | 162 | 5.86828 | 193 | 15.6744 |  |
| 8  | 16.30238                   | 39 | 6.69661        | 70 | 12.79158 | 101 | 25.56895 | 132 | 2.19790  | 163 | 22.6482 | 194 | 5.67031 |  |
| 9  | 1.40622                    | 40 | 3.86928        | 71 | 2.00742  | 102 | 5.14763  | 133 | 9.83727  | 164 | 22.4893 | 195 | 7.62361 |  |
| 10 | 4.67838                    | 41 | 6.76030        | 72 | 20.59362 | 103 | 12.64717 | 134 | 4.06000  | 165 | 5.28479 | 196 | 5.65430 |  |
| 11 | 9.20894                    | 42 | 7.81389        | 73 | 5.63703  | 104 | 2.02525  | 135 | 3.30721  | 166 | 7.78778 | 197 | 16.0193 |  |
| 12 | 3.53780                    | 43 | 6.85907        | 74 | 3.61797  | 105 | 22.82336 | 136 | 9.06083  | 167 | 9.99408 | 198 | 10.0734 |  |
| 13 | 5.14355                    | 44 | 1.42445        | 75 | 3.46359  | 106 | 4.25783  | 137 | 16.80133 | 168 | 5.87463 | 199 | 4.06279 |  |
| 14 | 7.41396                    | 45 | 8.05026        | 76 | 8.74203  | 107 | 9.17749  | 138 | 4.53580  | 169 | 22.6231 | 200 | 10.4264 |  |
| 15 | 7.77388                    | 46 | 4.69952        | 77 | 9.97602  | 108 | 5.03144  | 139 | 6.48454  | 170 | 3.22959 | 201 | 6.19835 |  |
| 16 | 3.25098                    | 47 | 2.87226        | 78 | 4.53635  | 109 | 8.74937  | 140 | 2.48653  | 171 | 5.18154 | 202 | 8.01505 |  |
| 17 | 9.93723                    | 48 | 9.50806        | 79 | 8.19269  | 110 | 25.05757 | 141 | 11.58608 | 172 | 13.0002 | 203 | 6.48544 |  |
| 18 | 7.97338                    | 49 | 8.58457        | 80 | 14.72646 | 111 | 10.29621 | 142 | 6.57579  | 173 | 19.6831 | 204 | 4.12886 |  |
| 19 | 6.64280                    | 50 | <u>37.4919</u> | 81 | 8.93961  | 112 | 7.43176  | 143 | 3.53180  | 174 | 19.0344 | 205 | 6.09288 |  |
| 20 | 4.44404                    | 51 | 4.99912        | 82 | 12.65679 | 113 | 1.47120  | 144 | 14.17117 | 175 | 8.72859 | 206 | 8.51249 |  |
| 21 | 9.21090                    | 52 | 4.31945        | 83 | 6.21292  | 114 | 17.27244 | 145 | 5.60578  | 176 | 12.4154 | 207 | 5.22141 |  |
| 22 | 4.29593                    | 53 | 16.0336        | 84 | 3.42837  | 115 | 12.88509 | 146 | 5.80313  | 177 | 7.68510 | 208 | 6.28365 |  |
| 23 | 4.17313                    | 54 | 13.3863        | 85 | 3.92268  | 116 | 5.44005  | 147 | 6.56774  | 178 | 7.25467 | 209 | 4.07305 |  |
| 24 | 5.43014                    | 55 | 5.97646        | 86 | 6.55766  | 117 | 3.89835  | 148 | 4.91880  | 179 | 7.41963 | 210 | 7.11848 |  |
| 25 | 11.71722                   | 56 | 6.85444        | 87 | 10.73934 | 118 | 3.43865  | 149 | 4.58269  | 180 | 6.18166 | 211 | 12.3582 |  |
| 26 | 8.98632                    | 57 | 3.30462        | 88 | 7.56612  | 119 | 4.16521  | 150 | 1.46917  | 181 | 22.7493 | 212 | 6.39234 |  |
| 27 | 16.60784                   | 58 | 4.08209        | 89 | 15.62738 | 120 | 42.76886 | 151 | 3.40796  | 182 | 6.03821 | 213 | 3.62756 |  |
| 28 | 4.52794                    | 59 | 5.09644        | 90 | 26.03387 | 121 | 19.04093 | 152 | 5.37839  | 183 | 13.6573 | 214 | 7.51405 |  |
| 29 | 7.83279                    | 60 | 13.6636        | 91 | 6.62944  | 122 | 21.39484 | 153 | 3.23971  | 184 | 10.4499 | 215 | 4.61398 |  |
| 30 | 4.24209                    | 61 | 10.6820        | 92 | 6.62172  | 123 | 2.23341  | 154 | 8.20607  | 185 | 6.65733 |     |         |  |
| 31 | 2.98152                    | 62 | 13.9372        | 93 | 9.55129  | 124 | 5.53885  | 155 | 2.49320  | 186 | 12.8520 |     |         |  |

**Appendix J** Outlier (Mahalanobis) Test

#### **Appendix K** Normality Test

| Normality Test         |      |      |        |      |      |      |        |        |        |       |  |  |  |
|------------------------|------|------|--------|------|------|------|--------|--------|--------|-------|--|--|--|
|                        | TR   | TA   | TP     | TC   | TF   | PI   | PA     | TM     | STCM   | PG    |  |  |  |
| Valid                  | 212  | 212  | 212    | 212  | 212  | 212  | 212    | 212    | 212    | 212   |  |  |  |
| Missing                | 0    | 0    | 0      | 0    | 0    | 0    | 0      | 0      | 0      | 0     |  |  |  |
| Skewness               | 564  | 925  | -1.024 | 746  | 555  | 733  | -1.765 | -1.311 | -1.127 | .213  |  |  |  |
| Std. Error of Skewness | .167 | .167 | .167   | .167 | .167 | .167 | .167   | .167   | .167   | .167  |  |  |  |
| Kurtosis               | 600  | .005 | .627   | .748 | 299  | .448 | 3.811  | 2.195  | 1.519  | 1.510 |  |  |  |
| Std. Error of Kurtosis | .333 | .333 | .333   | .333 | .333 | .333 | .333   | .333   | .333   | .333  |  |  |  |

| Wieun Tesi     |       |       |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
|----------------|-------|-------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
|                | TR    | TA    | TP   | TC   | TF   | PI   | PA   | TM   | STCM | PG   |
| Valid          | 212   | 212   | 212  | 212  | 212  | 212  | 212  | 212  | 212  | 212  |
| Missing        | 0     | 0     | 0    | 0    | 0    | 0    | 0    | 0    | 0    | 0    |
| Mean           | 3.36  | 3.58  | 3.66 | 3.46 | 3.39 | 3.47 | 3.92 | 3.56 | 3.55 | 3.04 |
| Std. Deviation | 1.002 | 1.061 | .885 | .786 | .907 | .764 | .753 | .686 | .695 | .588 |
| Minimum        | 1     | 1     | 1    | 1    | 1    | 1    | 1    | 1    | 1    | 1    |
| Maximum        | 5     | 5     | 5    | 5    | 5    | 5    | 5    | 5    | 5    | 5    |

**Appendix L** *Mean Test* 

