

Agata Górny

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**THE ROLE OF  
SOCIAL,  
ECONOMIC  
and POLITICAL networks**

**in settlement migration to Poland:  
the case of Ukrainian migrants**

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PhD thesis  
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
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## **ABSTRACT**

The economic and political transition in Central and Eastern Europe at the beginning of the 1980s gave rise to relatively new migratory trends in the region. In particular, it resulted in higher migration to Poland – a traditionally migrant-exporting country. Migrants from the former USSR and in particular from Ukraine constitute the main group of migrants coming to Poland in the 1990s. The dominant pattern of their mobility is short-term movements involving income-generating activities – trans-border trade and seasonal work in Poland. Nevertheless, in the course of this migration process, other types of movements and also settlement migration to Poland have been of growing importance.

The subject of this thesis is Ukrainian migration to Poland which involves migratory patterns typical for foreigners coming from the former USSR. In this thesis, Ukrainian migration is considered as a case study the analysis of which allows for an explanation of the main mechanisms of dominant migratory trends to Poland. In particular, this thesis examines the development of Ukrainian settlement migration to Poland in relation to the overall migratory movements between the two countries.

The analysis included in this dissertation demonstrates that temporary movements and settlement migration from Ukraine to Poland are interrelated and that migrant networks play an important role in relating various types of movements. The prime characteristics of temporary movements to Poland are reflected in the population of settlement migrants resident there. At the same time, the examination of actual and potential settlement trajectories of temporary Ukrainian migrants implies that among them there exists a potential for settlement in Poland. It should be noted, however, that settlement of illegal migrants – the main group of Ukrainians coming to Poland – involves a considerable change in their initial goals of migration.

In general, according to the analysis derived in this thesis, there are grounds for continued settlement migration from Ukraine to Poland in the future.

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## CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

### 1.1. Rationale

In the past, settlement migration was the main type of international mobility of people. At present, it constitutes a particular type among a variety of migratory movements<sup>1</sup>. In the era of globalisation and easy transportation people can shape their time-space strategies in different ways than used to be the case in the past. They can divide their migratory activities into many short trips instead of taking one long trip which exposes them to the long lasting separation from their families left in the home country. On the other hand, the increasing mobility of people all over the world contributes to the creation of culturally diverse societies. Settlement migrants form minority communities which became a structural element of the host societies and their labour markets. 'According to recent estimates, the world's 184 independent states contain over 600 living language groups, and 5,000 ethnic group. In very few countries can the citizens be said to share the same language, or belong to the same ethnonational group.'<sup>2</sup>

For receiving societies, temporary movements and settlement migration constitute two distinct phenomena. Temporary migrants enter the destination labour market and society only temporarily and they occupy specific positions usually designated only to migrants. So called 'migrant jobs' comprise jobs which are not attractive for nationals due to their instability and low prestige attributed to them. Thus, temporary migrants are usually at the bottom of social strata of the receiving society with very limited opportunities for social mobility. In fact, the demand for temporary migrant labour force is a common characteristic of the labour markets of the highly developed countries<sup>3</sup>. In contrast, settlement migrants enter the structures of the receiving society permanently having virtually the same rights as the nationals. Therefore, the development of settlement migration to a given country may involve important changes in the labour market and social structures of the receiving society. In particular, it may lead to tensions caused by competition between immigrants and nationals on the labour market. Nevertheless, temporary movements and settlement migration are usually interrelated as there are common structural factors underlying both types of movements (i.e. good economic opportunities in the destination country).

Moreover, settlement migration may follow various temporary movements from one area to another when migrants develop strong ties with the host society or have the opportunity to bring there their families.

Poland became a destination country for labour migrants only one decade ago as a consequence of economic and political transition in Central and Eastern Europe which gave rise to virtually new migratory trends in the region in the late 1980s. Most of the migrants coming to Poland originate from the former USSR and especially from Ukraine. At the outset, these movements comprised mainly short-term shuttle trips devoted to income-generating activities. Later on, along with the development of the migratory process other types of movements also occurred such as settlement migration. It appears that the influx of settlement migrants to Poland is at its initial stage especially given that there is usually a time lag between temporary movements and that which follows, settlement migration. However, the development of settlement migration to Poland should not be neglected. Poland as a 'new' immigration country, which is expected to join the European Union soon, is likely to experience a much bigger influx of settlement migrants in the future. The creation of 'new' immigrant communities produces challenges for Polish immigration policy and involves the cultural diversification of Polish society which currently is very homogenous with Polish nationals accounting for 98% of the total population. The above factors are of special importance in the light of the fact that Poland, on joining the European Union, will join the European 'migration space' as well.

## **1.2. Main objectives of the study**

The subject of the dissertation is migration from Ukraine to Poland which started as a consequence of the political and economic transition in Central and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s. Ukrainian citizens are an important part of citizens of the former Soviet Union - the main group of migrants coming to Poland in the 1990s. At the same time, patterns of Ukrainian migration are typical for ex-USSR migrants. Thus, the Ukrainian migration is a case study which is described so as to present the mechanisms for the main trends of immigration to Poland.

The dissertation examines the dynamics and development of settlement migration to Poland in relation to various temporary movements to Poland under way in the 1990s. It seeks to explain how temporary movements – the dominant type of

migration to Poland – influence the volume and development of settlement migration to Poland. Attention is paid chiefly to the role of migrant networks in this process. This is due to the fact that migrant networks, in general, work as a facilitator of migration from one area to another<sup>4</sup>. Their reproduction may lead to a situation where migration becomes a self-perpetuating phenomenon involving large parts of the sending society.<sup>5</sup>

The other important purpose of the dissertation is to provide an overview of the volume, chief characteristics and geographical distribution of settlement migrants in Poland with special attention paid to the Ukrainian migrants. Moreover, the description of the population of settlement migrants in Poland seeks to relate their characteristics to the characteristics of the other types of migrants coming to Poland. The latter is another way of examining the interrelation between settlement migration to Poland and other types of movements. It should be noted that the description included in this dissertation is the first attempt towards covering the whole population of settlement migrants resident in Poland at the end of the 1990s.

### **1.3. Outline of the thesis**

The dissertation comprises ten chapters. The first is devoted to introductory remarks whereas the final one includes conclusions deriving from the empirical data as well as an evaluation of the theoretical approach used in the dissertation. This chapter also proposes some research problems arising from the overall analysis, which should be investigated in the future.

Chapter 2 is an overview of the dominant theories of migration as well as a presentation of the theoretical approach taken in the dissertation and the definitions used. Theories of migration are presented in relation to the level of social life (micro-, meso- or macro-) to which they pay primary attention. Such a division allows one to distinguish and evaluate the meso-approaches dealing with migrant networks which are the main focus of this dissertation.

The theoretical approach proposed in Chapter 2 constitutes the basis for the assumptions of the overall analysis developed in the dissertation. These assumptions with theses of the study and the research method are presented in Chapter 3. The description of the research method provides information about data and types of analysis used. Theses of the study refer to both Ukrainian temporary movements and settlement migration to Poland. Nevertheless, they mainly address the issue of the

interrelation between various movements to Poland and settlement migration in the context of structural factors of migration from Ukraine to Poland. This context is examined in Chapter 4, which interrogates not only the macroeconomic determinants of migration, but also historical, political and economic linkages between the two countries. In this way it identifies both the main push as well as pull factors of migration from Ukraine to Poland. Chapter 4 analyses also those particular factors which may stimulate Ukrainian settlement migration to Poland. Beside this, it provides an overview of the main migratory trends from Ukraine to Poland excluding only settlement migration, which is the subject of next chapters.

In other words, Chapter 4 provides the background for the analysis of the Ukrainian settlement migration to Poland, which is developed in the dissertation. The subsequent chapters examine the data collected during the research carried out for the purpose of this study. Among them, Chapters 5, 6 and 7 interrogate statistics of the three different stocks of settlement migrants in relation to the concept of the three gates to the host society (compare Chapter 3.1.2). Each of these stocks has some peculiarities which are analysed separately. Nevertheless, these three chapters provide information about the volume and characteristics of the population of settlement migrants in Poland. They also examine the participation of the Ukrainian migrants in the overall settlement migration to Poland.

The first stock of settlement migrants in Poland analysed is that of aliens. This is the subject of Chapter 5, which is devoted to the population of mixed marriages contracted in Poland in 1989-1997. Foreigners married to Polish citizens are considered as those aliens who are the most likely to settle in Poland permanently. The chapter aims also at explaining the process of mates' selection in the Polish-Ukrainian marriages contracted in Poland in relation to the fact that in these marriages there are evident some specific traits of partners, which influence this process. In particular, marriage to a Polish citizen involves the possibility of settling permanently in Poland which can be perceived as a trait of potential Polish partners. This part of the analysis aims to investigate the propensity of Ukrainians married to Polish people for settlement in Poland.

It should be noted that Chapter 5 is devoted to a particular type of settlement migration to Poland, whereas Chapter 6 examines the largest part of the population of settlement migrants in Poland – namely denizens. In most European immigration

countries, denizens constitute the major group of foreign residents.<sup>6</sup> Thus, the analysis of this group provides information about main patterns of settlement migration to Poland. Moreover, Chapter 6 addresses the issue of the willingness of denizens to become Polish citizens. Such an inclination reflects the propensity of foreigners from various countries to settle permanently in Poland. This is due to the fact that obtaining citizenship of the destination country involves the bestowal of full social and political rights in this country. Thus, it is usually associated with a migrant's strong attachment to this country implying permanent settlement there.

Therefore, newly admitted Polish citizens are foreigners who have a particularly high inclination towards staying in Poland permanently. Moreover, they are usually considered as the best integrated into the host society, as they have passed through the third and final gate to the host society.<sup>7</sup> The group of such migrants is the subject of Chapter 7. This chapter examines that group of foreigners for whom Polish citizenship has a relatively high value, as they intend to settle permanently in Poland. In this way, Chapter 7 presents characteristics of settlement migrants who are expected to have the highest propensity towards permanent stay in Poland.

In general, Chapters 5,6 and 7, apart from giving an overview of settlement migration to Poland, analyse the propensity of migrants from various countries towards settlement in Poland. Certainly, they pay particular attention to Ukrainian migrants. The subsequent chapters develop further the issue of the inclination of Ukrainian migrants to settle in Poland. They also examine the probability that Ukrainian temporary migrants of various types become settlement migrants. Such an analysis involves an investigation of the migratory trajectories of actual and potential Ukrainian settlement migrants. Thus, Chapter 8 interrogates qualitative data on actual Ukrainian settlement migrants – those married to Polish citizens. This is intended to examine the settlement process for this particular group and the formation of Polish-Ukrainian marriages in relation to various Ukrainian temporary movements to Poland. On the other hand, Chapter 9 is devoted to the main group of Ukrainian temporary migrants – undocumented migrants – considered as potential settlement migrants to Poland. Referring to qualitative data, Chapter 9 proposes a typology of potential migratory trajectories of migrants of this kind, with special attention paid to the probability that they will become settlement migrants in Poland. In this way it presents the mechanisms which may lead to the settlement of undocumented Ukrainian migrants in Poland.

## CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL ISSUES

### 2.1. Introduction

International migration constitutes a sub-component of population processes. It is, however, a more complex phenomenon than other demographic ones e.g. fertility or mortality. The broad collection of international determinants of migration makes its analysis extremely difficult. International mobility is, therefore, investigated by sociologists, economists, geographers, demographers, historians and linguists. Multidisciplinary approaches allow one to take into account the complexity of the various determinants of migration<sup>8</sup>. On the other hand, the fact that migration is a phenomenon studied by different disciplines has led to the formation of many migration theories which are difficult to integrate into one comprehensive international mobility theory. The need for a formulation of one coherent theoretical approach to migration has been raised recently by many researchers and is growing in importance<sup>9</sup>.

As with other social phenomena, migration is determined by sociological, psychological, economic and political factors on micro-, meso- and macro-levels. Theories, which attempt to cover all of these levels, constitute a minority among migration theories. Most often they describe international migration only in relation to selected levels of social life<sup>10</sup>.

The crucial problem which theorists of migration face, is the integration of all levels of migration analysis into one coherent theory. It seems that the concept of social network can work very efficiently in solving this problem<sup>11</sup>. Through interpersonal networks, small-scale interaction may become translated into large-scale patterns and these, in turn, feed back into small groups<sup>12</sup>. Thus, social network theory serves as a bridge between both the micro and macro factors underlying migration patterns. According to Faist, 'Social relations, viz. ties in collectives and networks, constitute distinct sets of intermediate structures on the meso-level. It is via these relations that actors relate their resources to opportunity structures.'<sup>13</sup>. He posits that social and symbolic ties are relational structures within which individuals make their decisions, also decisions about migration. Thus, social network theory constitutes a crucial meso link which relates micro- and macro-levels of social life.



In this chapter, I wish to present various approaches to those theories of migration in relation to which level of social life they pay primary attention to<sup>14</sup>: micro, meso or macro. At the end of the overview, I describe those approaches in which an effort is made to integrate various levels of the analysis of migration. I adapt the Faist's approach whereby the social network constitutes a meso-level in migration analysis. Moreover, I devote special attention to the role of the concept of social network in each of the approaches presented, as it is the primary focus of this dissertation. My overview is not exhaustive, as migration literature comprises many diverse theoretical approaches to explain international migratory movements. It may be argued that the most comprehensive overview of migration theories has recently been made by Massey<sup>15</sup>. He addressed the issue that various migration theories only partly explain the phenomenon of migration, but they are not contradictory, and thus, can be used simultaneously. In his overview, he does not literally refer to the differentiation between micro-, meso- and macro-levels. Nevertheless, the four elements, which, according to him, should be taken into examination while aiming at creating satisfactory theoretical account, are related to the problem of the multilevel nature of the phenomenon of migration. These four elements are as follows: (1) the structural forces that promote emigration from developing countries (macro-level), (2) the structural factors that attract immigrants into developed nations (macro-level), (3) motivations, goals and aspirations of the people who respond to these structural forces by becoming international migrants (micro-level), (4) the social and economic structures that arise to connect areas of out- and in-migration (meso-level).

For my overview, I chose the most influential and recent theories of migration as well as those which are of use in explaining problems presented in this dissertation. In general, the overview includes four groups of theories:

- Micro approaches, which focus on determinants of individual migration decisions
- Meso approaches, which refer to the role of social networks in the migration process
- Macro approaches, which pay attention to factors from state, international and global level while explaining the migration process
- Approaches which attempt to integrate three levels of analysis: micro, meso and macro

## 2.2. Micro approaches

### 2.2.1. Neoclassical economics: micro theory

The micro theory of neoclassical economics corresponds to the macro theory, which is also presented in this dissertation later on.<sup>16</sup> According to this approach, potential migrants estimate the costs and benefits of moving and not moving and they migrate when benefits from migration are higher than its costs. While migrating they chose locations where their expected net returns from migration are the greatest over some horizon.<sup>17</sup> Moreover, migrants tend to move to the place where their work productivity<sup>18</sup> is higher than in their home area.

A net return is calculated on the basis of earnings corresponding to individuals' skills in the destination country and costs of migration<sup>19</sup>. The latter consists of costs of travelling and maintenance while moving and looking for a work. They comprise also the effort of learning a new language and a culture, the difficulty experienced in adapting to a new labour market, and the psychological costs of cutting old ties and forging new ones.<sup>20</sup> The migration decision-making process is described analytically by an equation presented below.<sup>21</sup> A person takes up migration when a net return derived from the equation is positive.

$$ER(0) = \int [P_1(t) P_2(t) Y_d(t) - P_3(t) Y_o(t)] e^{-rt} dt - C(0)$$

where:

- $ER(0)$  the expected net return to migration calculated just before departure at time 0
- $P_1(t)$  the probability of avoiding deportation from the area of destination
  - $P_1(t) = 1$  legal migration
  - $P_1(t) < 1$  illegal migration
- $P_2(t)$  the probability of employment at the destination country
- $Y_d(t)$  earnings if employed at the destination
- $P_3(t)$  the probability of employment in the community of origin
- $Y_o(t)$  earnings if employed in the community of origin
- $r$  the discount factor
- $t$  time
- $C(0)$  the sum total of the costs of movement (including psychological costs)

In the light of neoclassical economics, migration occurs when differences in wage rates and unemployment levels between countries exist, as individuals act rationally in order to maximise their expected incomes, and stops when these

differences disappear. Thus, this approach considers migration as the aggregated outcome of individual decisions (micro-level) in response to structural differences between countries of the origin and destination (macro-level).

It should be noted that costs of migration include not only material expenditures but also the psychological costs. This way, the existence of migrant networks is incorporated in the cost-benefit analysis of a migrant as a factor lowering costs of migration. However, the migrant network of a potential migrant is not a subject of analysis in neoclassical economics. It is perceived as a static phenomenon, which influences only the migration decision-making process as an important source of information about the destination country for prospective migrants. Therefore, it is considered only as an additional resource which potential migrants take into consideration in their cost-benefit analyses. The other roles of migrant social networks in the migration process are not included in this approach.

### **2.2.2. *New economics of migration***

The new economics of migration has risen to challenge many of the assumptions and conclusions of neoclassical theory.<sup>22</sup> In contrast to neoclassical economics, it posits that migratory decisions are made collectively rather than individually: within groups of related people – typically within a family or a household. It implies a particular approach to studies of migration, as households and families operate in different ways than individuals. Unlike individuals, they are in a position to control the risk to their economic well-being by diversifying the allocation of their resources, such as family labour. This is executed by means of migration. Some members of families work in local economies, whereas others are designated by families to work abroad, assuming that wage and unemployment rates are negatively correlated with the local ones. This strategy enables households to rely on remittances provided by migrants, which constitute part of the overall incomes of households. This is of particular importance when part of households' incomes generated in the home country decrease due to economic slowdown in the country of migrants' origin.

An important element of the theory refers to the existence of private insurance markets, which play an important role in households' risk management in the developed countries. By contrast, in the less developed countries, such institutions are imperfect, absent or inaccessible for poor families. In such a situation migration is a powerful strategy for risk minimisation. Moreover, in poor countries, access to credit markets

also is usually limited. Therefore, migration can also play an important role in the investment strategy of a household as a source of additional capital which can be invested in the area of origin.

According to the new economics of migration, even though migration is related to inequalities in wage and unemployment levels between various countries, it does not need to stop when these differentials disappear. This is due to the fact that migration is taken up, not only in order to satisfy the cost-benefit analysis of individuals, but also to diversify the resources of households as well as to gain additional capital for investments in the home countries<sup>23</sup>. The new economics of migration pays attention to some important elements of the migration process which are not included in the other approaches to migration theory. Among other things, it includes the problem that individuals make their decisions in the context of their social ties – members of their households in particular. Thus, this framework includes some elements of meso-determinants of migration.

### ***2.2.3. Value-expectancy model of migration decision-making behaviour***

DeJong and Fawcet proposed the application of the psychological value-expectancy model of migration behaviour (hereafter the V-E model).<sup>24</sup> This is derived from detailed analysis of approaches aiming at explaining a decision process within the migration literature: namely theoretical writings and empirical studies. Although the V-E model is mainly devoted to factors influencing individual migratory decisions it links determinants of migration to various levels of social life. Within this model, migration is behaviour viewed as ‘based on an underlying general desire of individuals and families to improve or maintain their quality of life.’<sup>25</sup> Its basic components are goals (values, objectives) and expectancies (subjective probabilities). They are assumed to have a multiplicative, rather than additive relation which may be presented as follows:<sup>26</sup>


$$MI = \sum V_i E_i$$

In the formulation, V is the value of the outcome. Within the model a variety of possible values was reduced to seven categories: wealth, status, comfort, stimulation, autonomy, affiliation and morality. They may be measured not only by means of simple ratings of importance, but also, for example, by their centrality in a personal value system. E in the equation refers to the expectancy that the migration will lead to the desired outcome. The strength of intentions for migration – MI - is a function of the sum

of the value-expectancy products (multiplication of an expectancy  $i$  that migration will result in obtaining desired value (goal)  $v$ ). According to the assumptions of the V-E model, particular motivational factors, which have an indirect impact on migration behaviour through their effect on the value-expectancy components of the decision to move, can be distinguished. Moreover, both negative and positive motivational factors should be considered, not in simplistic push and pull terms, but as a constellation of factors that are weighted for each location of a potential move.

The V-E model is intended to explain, how the family-based micro-level decision making process and macro level causes and constraints of migration are linked. The diagram presented below outlines the elements of the V-E model and relations between them.

Figure 2.1 The value expectancy model of migration decision-making process



Source: G.F. De Jong, J.T. Fawcett, 'Motivations for Migration: an Assessment and a Value-Expectancy Research Model' in G.F. De Jong, R.W. Gardner (eds), *Migration Decision Making. Multidisciplinary Approaches to Microlevel Studies in Developed Countries* New York, Oxford, Toronto, Sydney, Paris, Frankfurt, Pergamon Press, 1981, pp. 13-58, (p. 54)

Various motivational factors are divided into four groups: individual and household demographic characteristics, social and structural norms, personal traits and opportunity structure differentials between areas. These groups of factors differ in their importance for migration decision-making process. Individual and household demographic characteristics as well as social and structural norms influence, in particular, the values of migration. On the other hand, opportunity structure differentials have a profound impact on individual expectancies. It is worth noticing that they comprise not only economic opportunities, but also marriage opportunities, education, entertainment and amenity differentials. In this scheme, information is not perceived as a determinant of major importance for the decision-making process. It is considered only as a factor moderating the effect of opportunity structures.

To sum up, according to the V-E model, migration behaviour is a result of '(1) the strength of the value-expectancy-derived intentions to move, (2) the indirect influences of background individual and area factors, and (3) the modifying effects of constraints and facilitators that become salient during the process of migration decision making'<sup>27</sup>.

The fact that the V-E model links vague elements of a personal perception with structural factors of migration by means of the concepts of values and expectancies constitutes its big advantage. On the other hand, even though it introduces an element of individual perception, it is deeply anchored in rational choice theory. Therefore, a crucial element of the individual decision-making process – the fact that individuals make their decisions within the context of their social ties - is virtually omitted in this model.<sup>28</sup> In fact, the phenomenon of migrant networks and their role in migratory decisions is not included in the model at all. Moreover, this approach does not cover the problem that the rationality of potential migrants is bounded by their 'awareness spaces' inherent in their social spaces<sup>29</sup>, thus, they consider only a limited group of choices in their decision-making. Because of that, the V-E model has also another shortcoming. It does not explain the problem that individuals take into consideration only particular countries of their potential destination, because they are not able to consider all possible destinations in their cost-benefits calculations<sup>30</sup>. It should also be noted that the minor role ascribed to information in the scheme is questionable. Moreover, the V-E model does not include the issue of the type of source of information (relatives, friends, media

etc.), which seems to be an important element shaping expectancies about obtaining desired goals in the destination country.

#### 2.2.4. *Perception theory*

Perception theory grew out of demography.<sup>31</sup> It describes a process of individual decision-making, in which psychological variables play an important role. Thus, it refers to 'demographic decisions' connected with fertility, mortality and migration phenomena. Therefore, migration is analysed as a demographic characteristic of a population.

Demographic transition as a consequence of technological diffusion through a society constitutes a basic element of perception theory. The social context and diffusion of innovation are perceived as important determinants of individual decisions. On the other hand, Beshers<sup>32</sup> states that personal perception is also crucial for this decision-making process and should be included in any model describing migratory processes.

Perception theory describes the decision-making process as a dynamic one. It refers to sequential decision-making. The unit of analysis constitutes an individual of a given characteristic who responds to social change. Social change as depicted by modernisation is acknowledged by individuals by means of information being spread in their social environment. Here, channels of information and its ability to diffuse play an important role. Individuals are perceived as 'information processors'<sup>33</sup> who constantly receive new information from the 'environment', and can re-evaluate their choices with the help of this information. They are able to re-estimate the probabilities and utilities of various alternatives at successive points of time.

This approach provides an interesting presentation of the decision-making process, which ascribes great importance to information provided to potential migrants. This element of perception theory should be included in the analysis of migrant social networks, as these networks are important channels of information and facilitate its diffusion in society. On the other hand, it should, however, be noted that the factors which influence decisions of potential migrants – in particular the nature of information – are described only broadly and do not form analytical categories within this approach.

Perception theory attempts to capture the vague phenomenon of individual perception, which appears to be its advantage. Individual perception is very important in

the migration process, but is very weakly conceptualised in the theory of migration. On the other hand, the mode of aggregation of individual behaviour, proposed within this scheme, is questionable, for example, in the light of sociological theory. This is due to the fact that an individual is perceived as responding to social variables rather than as a member of social reality.

### 2.3. Meso approaches

#### 2.3.1. Network theory

The concept of social network is essential in sociological theory. However, a coherent theory of networks, in fact, does not exist. The most advanced approaches were created on the basis of sociometry,<sup>34</sup> but a few important proposals were also developed by other representatives of sociology. Networks between members of society are perceived to play an important role in the creation and existence of social structures which are defined as ‘rules and resources which both enable and constrain the actions of human agents as they are drawn upon in their everyday lives.’<sup>35</sup>

As far as migration studies are concerned, scholars have examined the role of migrant networks from many different perspectives, using diverse approaches for both international and internal migration.<sup>36</sup> The network approach has been used to describe different aspects and stages of the migration process. Nevertheless, all of these concepts are based on common elements and assumptions. The most essential of these is the concept of social capital, which is strongly related to social network theory itself. Social capital refers to the potential value that inheres in social relationships between people.<sup>37</sup> One of its definitions is: ‘Social capital is the sum of the resources actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition.’<sup>38</sup> Like other forms of capital, social capital is productive, making possible the achievements of certain ends that in its absence would not be possible. Its values are embedded in relations between persons<sup>39</sup>. All social relations and social structures facilitate some forms of social capital. People establish relations (parts of networks) purposefully and continue them when they continue to provide benefits. The access to goods, which are in the possession of members of a social network or the community, is determined by



various mechanisms through which social structures affect social and economic actions.<sup>40</sup>

Social capital is created on the basis of social networks, which may have different forms, like kin and friendship networks or networks of persons weakly related to each other. It can be the combination of them as well. The structure of networks is dynamic and it is constantly developing and changing.

Migrant networks develop from social networks, as individuals and groups exploit social relationships of kinship, friendship, community, or employment experience in order to support migration.<sup>41</sup> Migrant networks connect migrants, former migrants, and non-migrants in the origin and the destination areas and enable people to gain access to foreign employment and information about the destination area. The literature identifies a substantial set of networks functions including:<sup>42</sup>

- determining, to a degree, who migrates from communities and households
- influencing the selection of destinations and origin sites
- shaping the size and momentum of migration
- serving as a channel of information, other resources, and normative structures

If network connections exist, the number of people migrating from a given area of origin increases, since these networks facilitate migration. As more people join the group of migrants, such networks expand. It is stated that when the number of migrants reaches a critical threshold, the cost of movement and its associated risk are considerably reduced. This leads to an increase in the probability of migration and additional movements, which further expand networks. Thus, thanks to migrant networks, migration may become a self-perpetuating process. Broader segments of the sending society become engaged in migration. On the other hand, migration is still likely to be selective as the network is not homogenous, and lacunas in it are likely to occur.

In general, migrant networks are dynamic structures determined by many factors, but mostly by the number of people engaged in migration. The existence of migrant networks lowers costs of migration and in this way enables higher benefits from migration. Thus, there is a direct relationship between international movements and the formation of migrant network. The evidence that networks shape the composition of

migration is strong. However, a few studies have focused on the role of migrant networks in initiating international movements to the given destination from an area where such movements had not been observed before. Therefore, migrant networks appear to be important determinants of the maintenance of origin and destination channelling, but they are not major factors in the initial creation of particular flows.<sup>43</sup> It should be noted that the patchy framework of the migrant network approach does not offer, of itself, the analytical tools to bridge micro- and macro-levels in the migration process. Thus, elements of network analysis need to be put into a broader theoretical framework so as to explain interdependencies between micro and macro-determinants of migration.

### **2.3.2. Structuration theory of migration**

The structuration theory of migration<sup>44</sup> proposes a structural complement to migrant networks – migrant institutions. According to this approach, interpersonal ties are not the only means by which international migration is perpetuated.<sup>45</sup> A migrant institution is defined as: ‘A complex articulation of individuals, associations, and organisations which extends the social action of and interaction between these agents and agencies in time and space.’<sup>46</sup> It enforces the expansion of social relations across time and space to bring together the potential migrant and foreign employer. Migrant institutions comprise individuals, international and national institutions, among which the employers and complex networks of recruitment agencies are very important. The main interest of the theory is in the manner in which knowledgeable actors - potential migrants – employ their understanding of the rules of interaction and exploit their access to allocative and authoritative resources within the migrant institution in order to obtain access to migratory opportunities. In the light of this theory, international migration is perceived as: ‘A process whereby individuals transcend the limits to presence-availability and negotiate their way across boundaries between locales in order to establish presence and control over resources in a distance place.’<sup>47</sup>

According to this theory, social practices of migration and the articulation of strategic goals of individuals and institutions structure the international migration process, by specific modalities of interaction. The access to international migration is, therefore, conditioned by the operation of specific rules and by the mobilisation of resources. People from the same community, for example, follow similar patterns of migration.

Usually, routinisation of migration occurs over time. Within structuration theory it is called the institutionalisation of migration, which is perceived to be a relatively permanent feature of social life. Migration is a structured phenomenon which, as with other institutionalised social phenomena, is characterised by specific norms of behaviour and rules, in which actors engage. These norms and rules are created and shaped by means of actions and interactions among individuals and institutional agents.

Migrant networks are usually described as a collection of interrelated relationships between individuals, which have their own dynamics and are spontaneous to some extent. According to structuration theory, migrant networks in the form of migrant institutions are perceived of as structured phenomena. They include individuals from both origin and destination countries. It should be noted that the structuration approach pays attention to the determinants of a network's creation located at state and international levels. Although it mainly analyses the network between individuals and institutions, it posits that the nature, volume and structure of networks are bounded by the factors from macro-level. Hence, this approach refers not only to meso- but also to macro-level of migration analysis.

## **2.4. Macro approaches**

### **2.4.1. Neoclassical economics: macro theory**

Neoclassical economics is one of the oldest and best-known of migration theories. It consists of macro and micro approaches. It was developed, originally, to explain labour migration in the process of economic development.<sup>48</sup> According to this theory and its extensions, international migration, like its internal counterpart, is caused by differences in the supply of and demand for labour in various geographical localities. It posits that countries with large endowments of labour relative to capital tend to have low equilibrium market wages, whereas countries with limited labour endowments relative to capital have high equilibrium market wages. The differences between wage levels in the two countries stimulate movements of workers from the low-wage country to the high-wage country. These movements cause a decrease in labour supply and an increase in level of wages in the capital-poor country, whereas, in the labour-poor country, the supply of labour rises and the level of wages falls. This leads to a new equilibrium, where wage differences reflect only the costs of migration and, eventually, to the decline of international migration.

The flow of workers is accompanied by the inverse flow of investment capital. It is stimulated by the fact that its relative scarcity in the poor countries yields a rate of return which is high when compared with international standards, thereby attracting investment. Highly skilled workers move in the same direction as capital. This is due to the fact that the capital-poor countries are usually also the poor-countries which are short of a human capital. Therefore, workers with suitable skills, such as managers, technicians, etc., can reap high returns from their skills while migrating to such countries.<sup>49</sup>

According to macro neoclassical economy, labour markets are the primary mechanisms inducing the international mobility of labour whereas the impact of the other markets is neglected. The migration of workers is caused by differences in wage rates and it ends when they are eliminated. It should be noted, however, that this is based on the assumption that there is homogeneity of skills between the areas of origin and destination, and that full employment is maintained in both areas during the migration process, which usually does not apply to the real situation.

In general, neoclassical economy provides a very simple framework for explaining the international mobility of people. On the other hand, as a macro-theory, it does not refer to virtually any factors from the micro- and meso-level, which constitute important forces driving international migration. This approach also does not take into account some important macro-factors such as the international and political environment, as well as the effects of state-level economic and political decisions, which usually influence decisions regarding migration.

#### **2.4.2. Global market theory**

The framework for the global market theory is that of the contemporary world economy and the elemental division of the world labour market into three highly interdependent but geographically distinct zones: cores, semi-peripheries, and peripheries.<sup>50</sup> It originates with the work of Wallerstein<sup>51</sup> and its main idea is that the international division of labour unifies a hierarchical system of world production.

This approach pays attention to the consequences of penetration, which the highly developed countries achieved in the peripheral countries, driven by a desire for higher profits which could be gained from land, raw, materials, labour and new consumer markets. It results in disruptions and dislocations in non-capitalist countries,

but also in new opportunities for their citizens. They gain access to the labour markets of highly developed countries, as employers in these countries look for a cheap labour force. These two forces stimulate international migration, which is accompanied by reverse flows of goods and capital

In the past, economic penetration of the above kind was assisted by colonial regimes which administered poor regions for the benefit of economic interest in colonising societies. Now, the role of other forces – such as international corporations - in economic penetration is of growing importance. Such companies establish their branches in underdeveloped countries and provide a demand for a local labour force which stimulates the flow of employees between countries<sup>52</sup>. Nevertheless, international migration is still very likely to occur also between past colonial powers and their former colonies, because of the cultural and administrative similarities. This is due to the fact that the post-colonial linkages have often led to the creation of specific international markets and cultural systems which are free from external competition<sup>53</sup>.

According to the global market theory, international migration results from the structure of the global market economy, but also from the dynamics of markets. At the same time, international - historical, economic, and political – linkages stimulate it to a great extent. In fact, micro- and meso-determinants are virtually omitted in this approach. Individuals are perceived mainly as actors responding to these structural factors. Due to this fact the global market theory allows only for explaining the dominant migratory flows, whereas it offers very limited tools for understanding migration as a social phenomenon.

#### **2.4.3. Dual labour market theory**

Dual labour market theory belongs to those theories, which explain migration as an effect of differences between levels of development in various countries. According to this framework, migration is stimulated by inequalities in economic development, which determine differences in labour market structures between various countries. International migration results from a permanent demand for foreign workers that is inherent in the economic structures of the developed countries.<sup>54</sup> Therefore, migration is mainly driven by pull factors in the receiving countries (a chronic and unavoidable need for foreign workers), whereas push factors in the sending areas (low wages or high unemployment) are of less importance.

In the highly developed countries, labour markets have dual structures implying the co-existence of a capital-intensive primary sector and a labour-intensive secondary sector<sup>55</sup>. The natives are eager to work only in the primary sector, whereas migrants accept jobs in the secondary sector. The dual labour market theory describes various factors which influence an unwillingness on the part of the native workers to work in a secondary sector. Firstly, workers in the capital-intensive primary sector get stable, skilled jobs, whereas in labour-intensive secondary sector, workers hold unstable, unskilled jobs and they may be laid off. Moreover, in the highly developed countries, wages not only reflect conditions of supply and demand but they also confer status and prestige. Consequently wages do not respond freely to changes in the supply of workers, as established occupational hierarchy is to be preserved. Thus wages must be increased proportionally through the job hierarchy in order to keep them in line with social expectations. Because of this the cost of rising wages in order to attract native workers to a secondary sector would be very high and would lead to structural inflation<sup>56</sup>. Therefore, employers are forced to look for cheaper solutions such as employing migrant workers who accept lower wages. Finally, the bottom-level jobs provide few avenues for upward mobility which also restrains the native workers from taking them up.

The concept of the dual labour market implies a structural demand for foreign unskilled workers in the highly developed countries. This is due to the fact that employers in these countries need workers who see low-level jobs only in terms of the incomes they can provide and who disregard status implications or the lack of upward mobility prospects. Workers from the countries characterised by low wage rates satisfy this demand. They are not members of the receiving society so they pay less attention than native workers to the status of given jobs.

The dual labour market theory focuses mainly on the structural factors of migration in the destination countries – the demand for immigrant labour force. In this way, micro- and meso-determinants of migratory decisions and behaviour are of little importance within such a framework. The main driving force of migration are macro-differences in the level of economic development between countries.

## 2.5. Multi-level approaches

### 2.5.1. *Cumulative causation theory*

The cumulative causation approach can be perceived of as an attempt toward integrating various levels of analysis evident in migration studies. It is based on the concept of ‘circular and cumulative causation’ proposed by Myrdal.<sup>57</sup> He proposes that migration induces changes in social and economic structures that make additional migration likely. In other words, it is stated that individual decisions are strongly influenced by structural factors, but, on the other hand, they transform and shape the social and economic structures. At the same time, the cumulative causation theory pays primary attention to the phenomenon of migrant networks. This is due to the fact that social networks strongly influence the form of social structure.

The cumulative causation approach distinguishes six socio-economic factors that are potentially affected by migration in a cumulative fashion, and which further influence migration patterns.<sup>58</sup> These are: the distribution of income, the distribution of land, the organisation of agriculture, the culture of migration, the regional distribution of human capital, and the social meaning of work. All of them stimulate migration to expand among members of a given community. They occur mostly in the area of origin but the last one – the social meaning of work – takes place in the area of destination. Immigration changes the social definition of work in the receiving countries. The particular occupations, into which immigrants are recruited in significant numbers, become culturally labelled as ‘migrant jobs’<sup>59</sup>. They are stigmatising and viewed as inappropriate for native workers. The demand for migrant workers appears among employers from these sectors. In fact, in various countries of destination, different jobs are labelled as migrant ones.

The other socio-economic factors listed within the cumulative causation theory are observed in the areas of origin. They influence migration as they change the social structure of the sending society. The distribution of land and the organisation of agriculture affect migration, as they both cause the displacement of local workers from their traditional tasks and therefore create more unemployed people, who are prone to migrate. The distribution of income and the culture of migration are connected with changes in individuals’ and households’ perceptions of their income levels. After the first members of a community have begun to migrate and the income of their households rises, the sense of relative deprivation of the other households increases,

which motivates their members to take up migration.<sup>60</sup> Furthermore, as migration becomes more prevalent within the community, it changes the values and cultural perceptions of its members. Migration becomes part of the community values, whereas experiences in an advanced industrial economy change the tastes and motivations of migrants. These cultural and economic factors stimulate 'old migrants' to move again whereas new potential migrants are motivated by them to migrate. The last factor proposed by the cumulative causation theory is the distribution of human capital. Migration, selective in its nature, tends to attract relatively well-educated, skilled and productive workers to the receiving country. Over time, the accumulation of human capital reinforces economic growth in the destination area while its simultaneous depletion in the sending ones exacerbates their stagnation. It is therefore, another factor enhancing the conditions for migration.

Thus, migrants' choices are determined by their personal characteristics, preferences and constraints imposed by the immediate socio-economic environment. At the same time, individual decisions made at one point in time have a profound impact on the context of the decisions made later on. They feed back on structures within the society (i.e. networks) and alter them in a manner that encourages further migration. Within this approach, social networks, therefore, are an element of social structure which influences migration and, in reverse, is influenced by it. As a result of this interdependence, social structure changes and becomes a stimulator to further migration. The big advantage of the cumulative causation theory is that it addresses the issue of not only inter-level dependencies (i.e. individual, household, community, and national levels) but also inter-temporal dependencies as well.


### ***2.5.2. Migration systems approach***

The systems approach has some elements in common with the global market theory. It concentrates, however, on the international scale – connections between two countries – rather than on the global one<sup>61</sup>. According to this theory, migration creates a 'unified space' encompassing both the place of origin and that of the destination, and is but one of the processes linking these areas. The linkages between these two areas are dynamic, but strongly determined by historical factors. They modify the conditions in both areas, giving rise to feedback mechanisms, and are likely to transform the initial process over time. The systems approach pays attention to the role of a state in determining international migration flows. Its policy could stimulate migration and



restrain it as well. According to this theory, it is crucial to identify mechanisms through which the macro-level forces that influence migration are translated into determinants of international mobility at the level of the actual, individual decision-makers (micro-level).

Figure 2.2 The system framework of international migration



Source: Kritz, M.M., H. Zlotnik, 'Global Interactions: Migration Systems, Processes, and Policies' in M.M. Kritz, L.L. Lim, H. Zlotnik (eds), *International Migration Systems*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992, pp. 1-16 (p.3)

The migration system – central to the migration systems approach - is a group of countries that satisfies the following conditions<sup>62</sup>:

- they have a similar position relative to migration, that is, they can be identified as either attraction poles for migrants or as a sources of migrants

- if the countries concerned are mainly the countries of destination, the migration flows converging to them should show considerable overlap in terms of the countries of origin involved
- the countries classified as a system should have the same level of development, a high degree of cultural affinity and similar institutional structures
- they should be linked by economic and political ties and the policies which are applied or have been applied in these countries in order to control migration are expected to be coherent to some degree

The main assumption of the migration systems approach is that migration occurs only when multilevel networks between the countries of the system exist. Linkages on the macro-level are given priority, but representatives of this approach also pay considerable attention to social networks created between institutions and individuals in the countries which are involved in the system.

This theory aims at covering micro- meso- and macro-factors of migration. The meso-level, referring to social networks, serves as a bridge between the two other levels of social life. The 'network of legal and extra-legal institutions can be conceptualised as extending from the macro to the micro level, while migrant networks operate in the reverse direction, i.e. they link individual migrants to formal organisations, extra-legals, and/or governmental institutions that can assist with migration.'<sup>63</sup> It should, however, be noted that even though the migration systems theory proposes an interesting and promising approach to migration studies, it offers limited analytical tools for analysis. In particular, the bridging function of social networks is not well described.

### ***2.5.3. The concept of a transnational social space***

The concept of a transnational social space has developed as a response to new types of mobility of people, which occurred as a consequence of advancement in communication and transportation technologies. It explains a particular type of migration 'in which the actual living spheres and projects of the "transmigrants", i.e. their "social spaces", span a number of different residences or "geographic spaces"<sup>64</sup>. This approach adapts the concept of a social space 'comprising of everyday life and concentrated social "interlacing coherence networks"<sup>65</sup>, and the social institutions that structure human life'<sup>66</sup>. Therefore, a social space can extend over a given geographical area. In particular, it may form a transnational social space defined as social space,

which consists of ‘combination(s) of sustained social and symbolic ties, their contents, positions in networks and organizations, and networks of organizations that can be found in multiple states’<sup>67</sup>. A transnational social space may develop between communities, villages and areas located in different countries, as well as between two states. Its development is determined by the structure (social networks) and the content (social capital) of social and symbolic ties inherent in a given space, which have to extend beyond one locality. Therefore, the concept of the transnational social space pays particular attention to the meso-level of migration analysis, which ‘offers mechanisms for disaggregating macro- into micro and aggregating micro- into macro-level analysis’<sup>68</sup>.

The meso-level is conceptualised as an intermediate middle level. It comprises social and symbolic ties between people. Social ties are a continuing series of interpersonal transactions to which participants attach shared interests, obligations, expectations and norms, whereas symbolic ties are perceived bonds, both face-to-face and indirect, to which participants attach shared meanings, memories, future expectations, and representations.<sup>69</sup> Social capital is perceived as the content of social and symbolic ties, which determines access to various resources inherent in a social space. They comprise, among other things, resources of others, information as well as control and authority. In general, social capital is a resource for individuals and collectives (also for a community) and facilitates social co-operation, because it is related to social structures.

Faist<sup>70</sup> distinguishes three mechanisms of social capital, which lower transaction costs (the most important function of social capital) and facilitate co-operation, and also other functions of social capital. Mechanisms of social capital include:

- obligations as pattern of social exchange – imply mutual obligations and expectations of the actors, associated with specific social ties and based on exchange and services rendered in the past
- reciprocity as a social norm – implies ‘actions that are contingent on rewarding reactions from others and that ceases when these expected reactions are not forthcoming’<sup>71</sup>

- solidarity – implies solidarity with others in a group, who have similar social and symbolic ties; the most important basis of solidarity is constituted by collective representations: shared ideas, beliefs, evaluations and symbols

Apart from lowering transaction costs, social capital also has four other important functions:

- a selective function – social capital is a local asset, which is difficult to transfer abroad, thus, social and symbolic ties maintained in the home country may restrain migration of an individual
- a diffusive function – when transferred abroad, social capital may constitute an important force stimulating emigration to a given area, as it enables access to resources located there
- a bridging function – when migrants maintain social and symbolic ties with their home social spaces, social capital serves as a bridge between the sending and the receiving areas
- an adaptive function – social capital enables access to resources in the destination area, thus, it influences a mode of migrants' insertion into the receiving country.

The dominant mechanisms of social capital as well as its functions are determined by the stage of the migration process observed between two areas. The stage of the migration in turn influences the development of the transnational social space between these areas.

Faist<sup>72</sup> proposes the three main stages of the migration process which should be taken into consideration:

- start and acceleration – pioneer migration results in the formation of migrant and migration networks (threshold effect)
- climax – chain migration develops by implying cumulative mobility causation (self-feeding effect)
- deceleration – migration becomes a way of life in the sending area (a culture of migration), but, at the same time, the exhaustion of mass migration takes place.

The above three stages of the migration process do not fully determine the type of a transnational social space between the sending and the receiving areas.

Nevertheless, the stage in the migration process influences the type of adequate transnational social space. In general, there are three types of transnational social spaces:

- transnational kinship groups – these usually refer to first-generation migrants; a typical mechanism of social capital within such social spaces is reciprocity
- transnational circuits – they also usually refer to first-generation migrants, but they may arise beyond the first generation when children of return migrants keep ties with the area of origin; transnational circuits ‘are characterized by a constant circulation of goods, people, and information transversing the borders of sending and receiving states’<sup>73</sup>; typical mechanisms of social capital with such social spaces are exchange and instrumental reciprocity
- transnational communities – they do not refer to first-generation migrants, as they may develop only when solidarity within these social spaces reaches beyond narrow kinship systems, which usually takes a long time; a crucial mechanism of social capital within a transnational community is diffuse solidarity, but exchange and reciprocity are also observed within them.

The concept of a transnational social space offers a comprehensive analytical description of the meso-level of the migratory analysis and relates it to other levels of social life (micro- and macro-). It is a considerable advantage of this concept, as theoretical approaches to migrant networks constitute a patchy framework and do not offer powerful tools for the analysis of this phenomenon. On the other hand, it does not devote a lot of space to the micro- and macro-level of migration’s analysis. The main assumption about the micro-level of the migration process is that individuals make their decisions in the context of their social and symbolic ties. Their positions in the web of ties as well as the density, structure and content of their personal ties determine individuals’ decision-making process. However, the process itself is not described within this framework. It only gives examples of types of decisions which people may take up under the influence of their social ties. At the same time, macro-factors in the migration process are presented in a virtually descriptive way as opportunity structures in the destination and the home countries and refer mainly to political factors (entry/exit regulations).

The concept of a transnational social space has been proposed only recently. Therefore, currently it is still being developed. It covers the important social phenomena of transnationalism, multiculturalism and globalisation which have been growing in importance in contemporary social reality. It also pays great attention to an important feature of the migration process – its dynamics. It should, however, be noted that even though it attempts to bridge micro- and macro-factors of migration, it is mainly devoted to the meso-level of social life. At the same time, it aims at explaining migration from the macro-level perspective, as the subject of its examination is the overall migratory movements between two given areas. It mainly describes the dynamics of this migration, but also sketches some macro-determinants of this process. This macro-perspective of the migration process results in the fact that the approach offers a limited range of tools for explaining individual migration decisions.

## 2.6. The approach taken

### 2.6.1. *Theoretical premises and definitions used*

In my dissertation, I propose the one-trip model (see description below) which allows for explaining the relationship between various types of movements and settlement migration to a given country. I consider potential migrants as individuals who make their migratory decisions within the context of their ties<sup>74</sup>. Therefore, I apply approaches devoted to the role of social networks in the migration process, but especially the concept of a transnational social space. It is very appropriate in explaining the contemporary mobility of people comprising a variety of movements and it pays strong attention to social networks. Thus, I use definitions of social and symbolic ties, but also of social networks and social capital, perceived as structure and content of social and symbolic ties, which are derived from this approach. Moreover, in line with the concept of transnational social space, I also refer to reciprocity, exchange and solidarity as mechanisms of social capital.<sup>75</sup>

Thus, major components of the meso-level of social life and a transnational social space are defined as follows:

**Social ties** – ‘a continuing series of interpersonal transactions to which participants attach interests, obligations, expectations, and norms’<sup>76</sup>.

**Symbolic ties** – ‘bonds, both face-to-face and indirect, to which participants attach shared meanings, memories, future expectations, and representations’<sup>77</sup>.

**Social network** – the structure of ties, which can be ascribed to an individual or a group as well.

**Migrant network** – the structure of ties between migrants and non-migrants in the destination and the home countries within a transnational social space.

**Migrant's network** – the structure of ties between a migrant and other migrants and non-migrants in the home and the destination countries

**Social capital** – ‘those resources that help people or groups to achieve their goals in ties and the assets inherent in patterned social and symbolic ties that allow actors to co-operate in networks and organizations serving as a mechanism to integrate groups and symbolic communities’<sup>78</sup>

**Migrant social capital** - those resources that help people or groups to migrate and to integrate in the host society and the assets inherent in patterned social and symbolic ties that allow actors to co-operate in networks and organisations serving as a mechanism to integrate groups and symbolic communities into transnational social spaces.

**Migrant's social capital** - those resources that help a person to migrate and to integrate in the host society and assets inherent in his/her patterned social and symbolic ties

**Transnational social space** – combinations of sustained social and symbolic ties, their contents, positions in networks and organizations, and networks of organizations that can be found in at least two geographically and internationally distinct localities<sup>79</sup>

According to the above definitions, social networks and social capital facilitating migration constitute specific attributes of both individuals and their social spaces (in particular transnational social spaces). Thanks to such an approach, the micro-level can be related to the meso-level – individuals are linked to the structure of social ties within their social spaces via their personal social networks. It should be remembered that transnational social spaces may evolve between villages, communities, regions as well as states. Therefore, not only one but also several various transnational social spaces may evolve between the two countries.

While describing the decisions of individual migrants, I use the revised version of the value-expectancy model of migration decision-making behaviour (hereafter – the revised V-E model), which attempts to cover not only micro- and macro-determinants of individual migratory decisions, but also meso-factors. The revised V-E model aims at covering an issue that social ties of individuals and social spaces to which they belong create boundaries of their rationality. Moreover, it seems to capture an issue that a potential migrant is more likely to consider particular countries of destination over others.

Because of the fact that my dissertation analyses mainly the dynamics and maintenance of the migration process I focus on meso-factors of the migration process, which are crucial for these issues. Thus, I do not devote a lot of space to structural factors in the destination and the home countries, which determine migration between given areas. I present them only as a background for the phenomenon being studied using some elements of migration systems approach, but also neoclassical economy (macro approach) and dual labour market theory. Therefore, according to migration systems approach, I refer to historical, economic and political ties between the destination and the home countries. At the same time, it should be noted that such ties between the two countries also influence the maintenance of the migration process (the stronger they are the more migration is likely to proceed). Neoclassical economy and dual labour market theory serve only as a framework for presenting opportunity structure differentials between the destination and the home countries<sup>80</sup>.

A description of particular migratory processes requires not only a consistent theoretical framework, but also precise definitions of types of mobility movements taken into consideration in the analysis. This is due to the fact that definitions of migration used in various theoretical frameworks of migration research differ. Moreover, there is no consistency in definitions applied in the statistics of migration in various countries.<sup>81</sup> For the purpose of the study presented in my dissertation, I use two groups of definitions. The first one comprises definitions of mobility of people in relation to the duration of their trips, but also to their frequency. The second one consists of definitions which refer to the goals of trips.

The duration of a trip is captured in the following definitions:

**Migratory trip** – a trip which is shorter than three months and is not tourism



**Short-term migration** – migration which lasts at least three months but not longer than one year, unless it is tourism

**Long-term migration** – migration which lasts longer than one year, unless it is tourism

**Shuttle migration** – a great variety of movements, usually short-term, repetitive, or cyclical in nature, which all have the lack of any declared intention of permanent or long-lasting change in residence in common<sup>82</sup>

I distinguish migratory trips from the other types of migration, because such short-term movements have not been, traditionally, classified as migration. However, in the era of globalisation, which involves effective and cheap transportation, very short-term movements are growing in importance. The purposes of such trips are frequently the same as goals of typical labour migration. Therefore, students of migration face the need for including also such short-term movements in their analyses. The above factors enabling very short-term movements underlay also shuttle migration. In the past, this type of migration was observed mainly in the internal mobility of people, which comprised relatively short-distance movements<sup>83</sup>.

At the same time, in the era of globalisation, when transportation is more effective and migratory trips became shorter and more frequent, the time-dimension of migratory movements has less explanatory power than in the past. It is, among other things, related to the fact that people are able to take several short-term trips instead of one long-term trip. Because of that, the other classification of mobility of people is growing in importance – a classification on the basis of various goals of trips.<sup>84</sup>

In my dissertation, I use the following definitions of migration capturing dominant types of movements observed in the migration space, which is the subject of my study:

**Pseudo-tourism** – trips which are taken up in order to sell or buy goods in the destination country

**Seasonal workers' movements** – trips which are to take up seasonal, low-paid job for unskilled workers in the destination country

**Business people's trips** – trips taken by people who manage a business in the destination country, but who do not live there permanently

**Contractual labour migration** – trips which are to take up a job on the basis of a contract for a limited time in the destination country

**Students' movements** – trips which are taken up in order to study in the destination country

**Settlement migration** – migration which involves permanent legal stay in the destination country

**Marriage migration** – a sub-category of settlement migration which depicts the trips taken up in order to marry a citizen of the destination country

**Overstay** – migration which involves a permanent illegal stay in the destination country or permanent legal stay and illegal work (when, for example, a migrant lives permanently in the destination country and leaves it every several months so as to be entitled to a tourist visa)

The above types of trips are not fully disjunctive. It is probable that purposes of a given trip and activities taken during its duration comprise several categories e.g. trade and seasonal work. Nevertheless, particular goals of trips taken up by migrants influence patterns of their migration and adaptation in the destination country. Therefore, such a partially disjunctive classification is necessary for the purpose of this analysis.

## **2.6.2. *The one-trip model***

### **2.6.2.1. General description**

As was mentioned above, my analysis is based on the one-trip model (see Figure 2.3) which is put into the framework of appropriate theories of migration (see notes above). Its construction is simple, but it covers all kinds of mobility. Therefore, it enables the understanding of the relation between various types of movements and settlement migration to a given country, which is important from the point of view of the topic of this dissertation.

According to this model there are three stages of each trip:


- Decision
- Process
- Finalisation/End

The first stage i.e. 'Decision' refers to the decision about taking up a given trip. The 'Process' stage depicts the duration of a trip. It covers the time, which migrants spend in the country of destination during given trips. In the case of settlement migration it concerns migrants' lives from the moment they arrive at the destination country (assuming that they do not leave this country during that time). Therefore, this stage refers to the process of development of migrants' attachments to the host society (Piore, 1980) and their adaptation. The third stage i.e. 'Finalisation/End' should be understood as a return to the country of origin – 'Finalisation' – or migrants' death in the country of origin - 'End'.

As is shown in the model (see Figure 2.3), determinants and consequences of different stages of a trip, in very general terms, are interrelated. The consequences of one stage may become the determinants of the following stage likewise the effects of one trip may lead to a next trip or restrain it. A subsequent trip can be made either to the same destination country or to another one. In general, factors from different levels of social life determine three broad categories of the consequences of each stage of a trip. Determinants of the 'Decision' stage influence the type of migration (duration, main activities in the destination country etc.), whereas those of the 'Process' stage determine the mode of adaptation of a migrant. Finally, factors leading to the 'Finalisation/End' stage shape an attitude of a migrant to further migration.

Determinants and consequences of each stage are located at various levels of social life: micro-, meso- and macro-level. Certainly, various levels of social life are strongly interrelated. However, some basic distinctions can be made. Micro-level factors refer to the individual resources of potential migrants. They comprise their economic, cultural, social and symbolic capitals<sup>85</sup>, socio-demographic characteristics and personal traits. The latter are, for example, risk taking ability, efficacy, adaptability to change. Socio-demographic characteristics of individuals, which influence their migratory behaviour include: life-cycle variables, family characteristics, employment etc.<sup>86</sup> The broad category of socio-demographic characteristics is strongly related to the structure and volume of capital of a person. The latter determines social positions which individuals occupy 'vis-a-vis' one another<sup>87</sup>. According to Bourdieu<sup>88</sup>, 'These positions are objectively defined, in their existence and in the determinations they

Figure 2.3 The One-Trip Model



impose upon their occupants, agents or institutions, by their present and potential situation (*situs*) in the structure of the distribution of species of power (or capital) whose possession commands access to the specific profits that are at stake in the field, as well as by their objective relation to other positions (domination, subordination, homology etc.).’ It should be noted that the hierarchy of different capitals (economic, social, cultural and symbolic) varies across the various fields. Evidently, for potential and actual migrants the knowledge of the language of the destination country is a central type of cultural capital. On the one hand, it makes the reproduction of the other capitals of a person, especially of social capital, in the destination country particularly effective. On the other hand, those migrants who do not speak the language of the destination country usually occupy lower positions in migrant networks in the destination country than migrants who are able to communicate with nationals. The latter group may exercise a power over relations between the other migrants (who do not speak the language) and nationals. This is due to the fact that those who speak the language are usually translators and intermediaries in migrant-nationals contacts. Therefore, not only the volume of capital, but also its structure is crucial for determining the social position of its holder. Social positions of individuals condition their access to various resources inherent in structures within their social spaces. The concept of a social position seems to be very important for relating micro- and meso-level of the analysis. This is due to the fact that the social position of an individual is defined as relational to other social actors and implies his/her ‘control over social relations in which one is enmeshed’<sup>89</sup>. It can, therefore, be argued that social positions determine positions which given individuals hold in various sets of their social networks. At the same time, the positions of individuals in the web of social ties determines the role of meso-level factors in their migratory behaviour<sup>90</sup>.

The meso-level refers to the structure and the content of social ties observed in a given (transnational) social space<sup>91</sup>. This group of factors is crucial for bridging micro- and macro-level determinants of the migration process. Individuals take up their decisions and actions in the context of their social ties: ‘Social relations, viz. ties in collectives and networks, constitute distinct sets of intermediate structures on the meso level. It is via these relations that actors relate their resources to opportunity structures’<sup>92</sup>. To put it another way, social capital (the content of social ties) constitutes a specific type of individual capital which enables a person to get access to the

resources of other people which are inherent in the structures of a given social space<sup>93</sup>. In particular, it enables agents to get access to resources which are beyond their reach while using only their economic, cultural or symbolic capitals. On the other hand, social capital inherent in the meso-level of social life is a collective good and 'relates to an aspect of social structure that facilitates co-operation'<sup>94</sup>. Its dominant mechanisms within a social space (reciprocity, exchange and solidarity) determine its functions and type of resources to which individuals may have access via their social ties.

Opportunity structures in the destination and the home countries constitute the macro-level. I use the concept of structure proposed by Giddens<sup>95</sup> so as to conceptualise this level of analysis<sup>96</sup>. It is a powerful concept because it captures the duality of political, social, economic and cultural structures: namely rules and resources inherent in them. Thanks to this an aspect of the resources to which individuals may have access because of their social positions (allocation and authorisation resources) or their social ties (their structure and the content) can be easily included in the analysis. According to Giddens structure is 'Rules and resources, recursively implicated in the reproduction of social systems. Structure exists only as memory traces, the organic basis of human knowledgability, and as instantiated in action'<sup>97</sup>. It should be noted that social structure is dynamic, not static: 'According to the notion of the duality of structure, rules and resources are drawn upon by actors in the production of interaction, but are thereby also reconstituted through such interaction'<sup>98</sup>. Intermediate structures of the meso level are not included in the concept of structuration. However, it seems that the meso-link is likely to influence the process of transformation of rules and resources inherent in structures to a great extent. This is due to the fact that the main function of social capital (the content of social ties) is to reduce transaction costs and, thus, to facilitate co-operation. At the same time, co-operation implies the facilitation of particular social actions (e.g. migration). Therefore, it can be argued that social capital influences the trajectories of reproduction of structures to a great extent. On the other hand, transformations of rules and resources within structures determine patterns of social action of individuals as well as their co-operation in social networks. Political, economic and cultural structures in the destination and the home countries determine opportunity structure differentials between these countries such as economic, marriage, status advancement opportunities, which are crucial for the migration process<sup>99</sup>. Moreover, as posited in migration systems approach, linkages between the destination

and the home countries constitute another important macro-force driving migration from one area to the other<sup>100</sup>.

Finally, it should be noted that social capital may be considered not only on micro- (structure and content of social ties of an individual) and meso-level (structure and content of social ties in a social space), but on the macro one as well.<sup>101</sup> Social capital, defined ‘as set of informal values and norms shared among members of a group that permits co-operation among them’<sup>102</sup>, may be an attribute of various units of a society (family, social groups) and of a nation as a whole as well. It differs from the other capitals in that it is transmitted and reproduced by means of cultural mechanisms: religion, tradition, and history and underpinned by the level of trust widespread in a given society.<sup>103</sup>

The above collection of determinants influences the whole migratory process of an individual, but their role and importance differ over stages of a trip. Therefore, it is necessary to sketch basic mechanisms observed at each stage of an individual’s trip.

#### 2.6.2.2. ‘Decision’ stage

The ‘Decision’ stage is a crucial one as its consequences involve the type of migration, which determines the further stages of a trip to a considerable extent. It seems that the revised V-E model, which I describe below, constitutes a powerful tool for analysing this stage of a trip (see Figure 2.4). It proposes a slightly different scheme of interdependencies between various groups of factors influencing individual migratory decisions and ascribes different importance to some of them, when compared with the original V-E model. It also includes a few groups of factors which are not taken into consideration in the original V-E model. Moreover, I implement an additional element to the model: factors, which influence the probability that an individual will take into consideration migration to the particular country in his/her decision-making process. Therefore, I argue that the act of taking up migration to a given country (space) as well as its type (time) is influenced by a combination of probability that a person will consider the particular time-space strategy in his/her decision-making process and a strength of his/her intentions for migration.

Migration can be considered as a type of time-space strategy applied by a given individual<sup>104</sup>. Therefore, decision about migration should not be perceived only as a simple choice between move and stay. A potential migrant has to choose also between


various countries of destination (space) and various types of migration: shuttle, migratory trip, short-term migration, settlement migration etc. (time). Decision process involves evaluation of each option taken by an individual under examination.

The variety of choice makes it impossible for potential migrants to consider all possible scenarios. I argue that the probability that they take into consideration the given time-space strategies instead of the other factors depends on some structural factors of migration and the type of transnational social spaces they are involved in. If they are not involved in transnational social spaces and migrant networks do not exist in any of their social spaces then this factor does not play any role in determining the collection of potential time-space strategies of given persons. On the other hand, when individuals are involved in transnational social spaces they are likely to take into account time-space strategies (the destination country and duration of a trip) which are implied by their relatives or friends. Moreover, the stage of the migration process observed in their social spaces also matters. Phases of 'Climax' and 'Deceleration' imply a high probability that they will consider the time-space strategies, which are dominant within their social spaces, whereas for an initial stage of the migration process – 'Start and acceleration' – this probability is lower. Historical, economic and political ties between individuals' home countries and particular potential destination countries constitute structural factors which seem to increase the likelihood that these people will examine migration to these particular countries. This is because such linkages facilitate migration movements between the given areas.<sup>105</sup> Finally, people are more likely to take into account migration to near destinations rather than to distant ones. Thus, distances between the home country and various potential destinations constitute another factor which increases the probability of some time-space strategies over others. Furthermore, migration to close destinations is more likely to involve short-term trips than migration to distant ones. Therefore, the proximity of a given country influences also the type of potential movements to this country (time-dimension).

It should be noted that not all of the above factors are necessary conditions for increasing the likelihood of the fact that people include a given time-space strategy in their evaluation process. These factors work as substitutes to some extent. However, they are usually interrelated, thus, they are also complementary in some way.



Figure 2.4 The revised V-E model



Therefore, it can be assumed that potential migrants evaluate only particular time-space strategies. Following the original V-E model, there are two groups of micro-factors which influence their final migratory decisions. One consists of the personal traits of individuals – moderate predictors of both values and expectancies, whereas the second one comprises their socio-demographic characteristics which are ‘important predictors of values and expectancies’<sup>106</sup>. However, in the revised V-E model, I include a category ‘social position’ instead of socio-demographic characteristics of individuals. Social positions of individuals are determined by the capitals of potential migrants, but also by their socio-demographic characteristics. This category refers, therefore, to the individual resources of potential migrants and their capacity to achieve their will (command over persons and objects).

The revised V-E model does not include societal and cultural norms in the way in which it is done in the original one. This is due to the fact that such a group of factors refers to very broad phenomena and does not directly cover social networks and social capital, which influence access of a potential migrant to various resources inherent in structures. Instead, I introduce two other groups of factors. The first one depicts structures (political, economic, cultural etc.) in the social spaces of individuals, whereas the second one refers to the structure and the content of social and symbolic ties within their social spaces. It should be noted that the second group includes also the structure and the content of personal social ties of given potential migrants via which they are related to broader structures of social ties. I consider the two above categories of factors as influencing both values and expectancies of potential migrants to a great extent. In particular, social spaces of individuals may form transnational social spaces and include migrant networks<sup>107</sup>, which play a crucial role in shaping values and expectancies related to migration decisions of individuals. Bearing in mind that individuals make their decision in the context of their ties, it can be argued that potential migrants formulate their goals of migration on the basis of experiences and advice of the other migrants - their relatives or friends. At the same time, migrant networks and migrant social capital influence expectancy about achieving given goals by means of migration, as potential migrants have access to resources facilitating migration via their personal networks of this type (information about the destination country, help during their migration etc.). Thus, an expected outcome is more certain, when compared with

migration of pioneer migrants<sup>108</sup>. Migrant networks and migration as a process (social actions within a social space) influence the

structures of social space – rules and resources. For example, the structure describing a private sector in a given sending area may change as a consequence of high-volume short-term emigration. Namely, incomes from migration (increase in particular type of resources determined by emigration) may become the main source of funds for the development of own business (change of a rule determining the mode of establishing an own business). Such changes influence the values of individuals – goals of migration (migration in order to obtain financial resources of establishment of a private business). On the other hand, expectancies of potential migrants are likely to be higher, when institutionalisation of migratory movements takes place.<sup>109</sup> Then, some migratory activities develop into structured schemes supported by resources inherent in them (for example illegal border crossing) and the outcome of a migration becomes more certain.

Macro-factors of the migration decision making process, which I include in the revised V-E model, depict opportunity structure differentials between the destination and the home countries. Following the premises of the original V-E, model I assume that this group of factors plays a major role in the formation of individuals' expectancies about attaining goals in the area of origin or in alternative areas of destination.<sup>110</sup> However, I argue that another group of macro-factors, which especially influences the expectancies of potential migrants, should be added – opportunities for exit/entry in the destination and the home countries (migration policy). Particular political factors may facilitate migration movements and restrain them as well.<sup>111</sup> Moreover, this group of factors refers to an important dimension of migratory movements: legality versus illegality. For example, the fact that the policy of the destination country is promotional for the reunion of families augments an expectancy among relatives of migrants that they may attain the goal of joining their relatives in the destination country. On the contrary, a restrictive policy in the destination country restrains immigration as a whole or stimulates illegal migration. It creates, for example, very low expectancies that a migrant will find a stable and well-paid job in the destination country, which requires an adequate work permit. Moreover, illegal migration usually involves high uncertainty.<sup>112</sup> On the other hand, the limited right to free movement in the home country involves relatively low expectancies of people

about attaining their goals by taking up migration. It is because the likelihood that they manage to leave their country is relatively low.

The revised V-E model ascribes also much higher importance to information in migration decision-making process than is proposed in the original V-E model. This is due to the fact that the quality and quantity of information about the destination country, which potential migrants have, is crucial for their expectancies about migration. For example, a person who knows, only from media, that there is a demand for construction workers in a given destination country is unlikely to have high expectancies about obtaining a desirable income in the destination. On the contrary, a person who knows about maintenance costs and people to whom turn to find a job in the destination country (assuming that conditions in the destination country are satisfactory for him/her) is likely to have those expectancies higher. The information about the destination country being in the possession of potential migrants is not an independent factor of migration in the revised V-E model. It is influenced by the other factors from the model. For example, migrant networks are an important source of information for 'new migrants'. Moreover, social positions of potential migrants and especially their cultural capitals influence, in general, their access to information.

Finally, it should be noted that the constellation of a group of factors which influence the migration decision-making process is dynamic. Information, which influences expectancies about migration, is constantly renewed. At the same time, the decision-making process is usually extended in time. Therefore, individuals, while deciding about their migrations, face different constellations of groups of factors included in the revised V-E model at various moments of their decision-making process.<sup>113</sup>

#### 2.6.2.3. 'Process' stage

The 'Process' stage of a trip refers to the adaptation of a migrant in the destination society and is strongly related to the type of trip as determined by the 'Decision' stage. Adaptation may take forms of melting into the core, pluralisation and transnationalisation. It depends on 'the opportunities available in the immigration country and their [migrants'] own resources'<sup>114</sup>. Opportunity structures in the destination country comprise rules and resources inherent in various structures in the destination country. 'Own resources' of a migrant consist of his/her economic, cultural, social and symbolic capital, but also his/her socio-demographic characteristics and

personal traits. At the same time, migrants' social networks and their social capital relate their own resources and opportunity structures in the destination country.

Modes of adaptation of migrants are determined by the stage of development of migration processes between the given destination and home countries. According to Faist<sup>115</sup>, at the last third stage (deceleration), a culture of migration develops which involves migration as a way of life of inhabitants of the sending area. At the initial stage of the migration process (start and acceleration), the volume of migrants is relatively small in the destination country. Then, their adaptation may take the form of either melting into the core or pluralisation and transnationalisation. The latter results in transnational kinship systems formation in which a dominant type of mechanism of social capital is reciprocity. In general, the first stage of the migration process influences patterns of adaptation of migrants at later stages to a great extent.

For the second stage (climax), processes of melting in to the core, ethnic pluralism and transnationalisation may proceed. Groups of migrants who do not maintain social ties with other migrants in both the destination and the home countries and non-migrants in the home country are likely to melt into the host society within one to three generations. This process can be restrained when some structural factors such as severe discrimination against a given migrant group occur in the host society. Then, migrants may form ethnic groups or transnational circuits. Formation of an ethnic minority (pluralisation) may take place when migrants maintain strong social and symbolic ties with other migrants in the destination country. For transnational circuits to develop migrants need to maintain social ties with their social spaces in the home country. It involves 'constant and regular circulation of goods, people, and information crossing the borders within migration systems over a considerable period of time'<sup>116</sup>. In transnational circuits, exchange as a mechanism of social capital accompanies reciprocity.

At the third stage (deceleration), melting into the core and pluralisation are expected to continue, whereas transnational circuits may transform into transnational communities. 'For transnational communities to emerge, solidarity [the third mechanism of social capital] has to reach beyond narrow kinship systems.'<sup>117</sup> The important feature of transnational communities is that they are very unlikely to change their adaptive trajectories (transnationalisation) for melting into the core or pluralisation when compared with transnational circuits.

In analytical terms, three realms of the adaptation process can be distinguished – economic, political and cultural.<sup>118</sup> The three above types of adaptation of migrants are reflected in these three spheres of social life (see Figure 2.5). Some authors also propose a fourth dimension – social adaptation.<sup>119</sup> The latter refers, in fact, to the development of social ties (their structure and content) and attachments developed by a migrant in the destination country. It is, therefore, related to the three other spheres of adaptation to a great extent, as social capital inherent in social ties facilitates access to various resources in economic, political and cultural structures in the destination country.

Figure 2.5 Three concepts for the analysis of migrant adaptation in immigration countries

|                                                   |                                                                                                         |                                                                                                                       |                                                                                                     |
|---------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Approach: realms of adaptation                    | Assimilation                                                                                            | Ethnic pluralism                                                                                                      | Border-crossing expansion of social space                                                           |
| Main prediction                                   | melting into the core                                                                                   | pluralization                                                                                                         | transnationalization                                                                                |
| Economic: social status and occupational mobility | socio-economic parity with autochthonous population, in the case of failure: socio-economic marginality | niches and enclaves; middleman minorities: groups specialization in trade and concentration in the petite bourgeoisie | transnational entrepreneurship in kinship- and community-based groups and in transnational circuits |
| Political: state-citizen ties                     | national citizenship; unitary national political culture                                                | multicultural citizenship; recognition of cultural differences                                                        | dual citizenship; elements from various states can be complementary                                 |
| Cultural: language and collective identity        | acculturation: melting into values and behaviour of the nation-state's core                             | cultural retention: practices and identities transplanted into a new context                                          | syncretism: diffusion and emergence of new types-mixed identities                                   |

Source: Faist *The Volume and Dynamics of International Migration and Transnational Social Spaces*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2000, p. 253

It seems that the personal social networks of migrants as well as the web of ties within their (transnational) social space are crucial for their adaptation patterns. At the same time, on the one hand, the personal traits of migrants influence their openness for new contacts and ability to establish them. On the other hand, capital and socio-demographic characteristics of migrants determine the type of people with whom they prefer to develop contacts in the destination country. For example, people with higher education are likely to look for contacts with highly educated people, young people make relationships with other young people, unmarried persons may become involved in intimate relationships, whereas married persons are much less likely to do it.

In general, it is difficult to talk about successful versus unsuccessful adaptation of a migrant, as various people have various values and expectations in the destination

country. Moreover, there is no agreement on any comprehensive collection of indicators of finalisation of this process among theorists of migrants' adaptation. However, it should be noted that the social ties of migrants develop and are reshaped during the 'Process' stage of their trips. This has two results. Firstly, the context of decisions of migrants changes. In particular, migrants' social networks in the destination country may become very dense and strong – densier and stonger than their social networks in the home country. Then, migrants make their decisions under a strong influence of their social ties in the host society. Secondly, the access which migrants have to various resources inherent in various social structures (related to economic, political and cultural realms of adaptation) of the host society changes during the course of the 'Process' stage. Usually, the more ties migrants develop the more resources they have access to. However, the quality and a quantity of these resources (e.g. access to various well paid jobs versus access to a few low-paid jobs) depends on their positions in the web of ties as well as on the positions of persons with whom they establish their relationships.<sup>120</sup>

Finally, two other important consequences of the 'Process' stage should be presented. In the course of the 'Process' stage of a trip, migrants acquire new skills which are useful in the destination country. Language skills constitute the most prominent example. Moreover, migrants collect much broader information about opportunity structures in the destination country, when compared with their knowledge before migration, especially before the first trip. Therefore, the structure and volume of capital change as a consequence of the 'Process' stage of a trip.

#### 2.6.2.4. 'Finalisation' stage

As a consequence of the 'Decision' and the 'Process' stages of a trip, the actual moment of the 'Finalisation' of a trip may vary from that planned. Migrants can either prolong their stay in the destination country or make it shorter. It depends on opportunities in the destination country which may arise or disappear in the course of their trips. For example, they may stay longer in the destination country when they have found new promising jobs or they may leave the destination country earlier, when they have lost their jobs and are not able to find new ones.

Nevertheless, for the analysis of migratory movements, the consequences of the 'Finalisation' stage of a trip seem to be the most important and interesting, since they influence the further time-space strategies of a migrant (move/stay, goals (values) of a

potential trip and expectancies that these goals will be achieved by means of a migration. These consequences should be perceived as the cumulated outcome of all of the three stages of a trip. So as to make my description simpler, I assume that macro-factors (structures in social space, opportunity structure differentials in the destination and the home countries as well as political opportunities for entry and exit) are constant (compare the revised V-E model). On the other hand, the quality and quantity of information which migrants have about the above opportunity structures is expected to be higher than before their first/previous trips. It may work as an incentive for migrants to take up next migrations or may restrain them from taking them up as well. In general, people who have past-migration experiences are more likely to take up other trips,<sup>121</sup> thus, they are also more likely to consider migration as their time-space strategy (the probability of taking a given time-space strategy into consideration). Moreover, according to the original V-E model, having a migration experience is perceived as a socio-demographic characteristic of potential migrants which influences both their values and expectancies about migration.<sup>122</sup> I would argue that such a conceptualisation of this migrants' characteristic is rather unclear. Instead, changes of their individual resources (volume and structure of capital) caused by previous migrations should be taken into consideration. They comprise, for example, acquisition of skills, which are useful in the destination country or marriage to a citizen of the host society (change in marital status). These two examples refer to changes which make the probability of a subsequent migration higher. Conversely, the acquisition of skills which are valuable in the home country or loss of member of a family (change in a structure of a household) as a consequence of a given trip may restrain a person from taking up further trips.

The structure and content of social ties of a migrant seem to be factors which change a lot as a consequence of trips taken. Their density and strength in the destination country, usually, increase. In extreme cases, people in the destination country may become the main reference group for experienced migrants. Not only does it make their propensity to migrate to the given country higher, but it may also change their values (goals) of migration. The most prominent example of such a situation constitutes a migrant who married a citizen of the destination country. Then, the subsequent trips of a person are taken in order to join his/her spouse, whereas the reasons for previous trips were usually different (work, studies, tourism etc.). Also, the content of social ties of migrants is likely to change after given trips. On the one hand,



migrants may get access to better opportunities for accomplishment of their goals (higher expectancies that a migration will lead to a desired outcome), when compared with the situation before these trips, hence be more likely to take up subsequent trips. On the other hand, the fact that they have access to resources to which they did not have before their first/previous trips may result in changes in their values (goals) of subsequent trips. For example, persons who took up their first trips as students may become labour migrants, when they are able to find proper jobs in the destination country.

To sum up, the consequences of first/previous trips influence many elements of migration decision-making process presented in the revised V-E model. In general, persons with past-migration experience have a higher propensity to migrate again, but in particular situations it may be the other way round. Moreover, the consequences of previous trips may change a migrants' values (goals) of subsequent trips and their expectancies that these goals will be achieved, when compared with the first/previous trips. Finally, I argue that the decision about the first trip should be distinguished from decisions about subsequent trips. This is due to the fact that the latter is influenced by the consequences of previous trips, which is not the case with the first trip. The first trip involves the beginning of the development of migrants' social networks and provides migrants with information about opportunity structures in the destination country. Before their first trips, they have relatively little information, which in turn is shaped by a type of sources (relatives, friends, media etc.) from which it was obtained.

#### 2.6.2.5. The one trip-model in extended form

The one-trip model in extended form may also describe the migration of a group of people belonging to the same social space in their home country. Factors stimulating migration of given people may be transmitted via social networks to people who do not take up migration at the moment. Moreover, experienced migrants tend to help non-migrants in taking up migration (i.e. meso-determinants of trips of 'new migrants'). Because of that, the trips of different people and their patterns are interrelated. The consequences of a trip by a given person influence not only his/her further migration, but also the migration of other people. Moreover, the cumulative effect of trips taken up by a considerable group of migrants is likely to feed back on the social structures of the community of origin in the way that it stimulates further movements from this community.<sup>123</sup> The structure and content of social ties within a transnational social

space determine the nature of this process. In general, the denser the social network is the more people start to migrate following the example of experienced migrants. On the other hand, the volume of migrants can grow effectively when the content of social ties 'extend[s] beyond specific reciprocity and focused solidarity to include exchange-based obligations, generalized reciprocity, and diffuse solidarity'<sup>124</sup>. Otherwise, a group of migrants is likely to be limited to members of kinship groups which contain pioneer migrants. It should also be noted that the macro-determinants of migration apply usually to the whole social space in the sending country. At the same time, particular structural factors support the development and maintenance of migration movements. According to the migration systems approach, they comprise existence of historical, political and economic ties between the destination and the home countries.

#### 2.6.2.6. Final remarks

The one-trip model seems to be very simple and universal. When circulation and short- or long-term migrations were taken up more than once, the model shows that different trips, their determinants and consequences, are interrelated. It also allows for the description of a form of a mobility which comprises circulation at the beginning and short-, long-term or settlement migration later on.

According to the one-trip model, people who take up their first trips are exposed to various factors related to these trips and their decisions about subsequent movements are influenced by consequences of these trips. Thus, persons experienced in international trips make their migratory decisions on a different basis than those who have never travelled abroad. The 'Process' stage seems to be of special importance in studying the probability that migrants who start their migrations from short-term trips will become settlement migrants in the future. During this stage migrants develop their social and symbolic ties, which influence their access to various resources inherent in social structures of the destination country. The stronger and more important these ties are for them, the more likely they are to settle in the destination country in the future<sup>125</sup>. In particular, when migrants meet persons in the destination country whom they plan to marry, they are very likely to become settlement migrants.<sup>126</sup>

In general, the one-trip model does not give a precise answer to why people migrate. On the other hand, it describes mechanisms of the migration process. It shows that each individual trip affects further mobility of migrants themselves as well as of other people involved in the same social spaces. Structure and content of ties (social

networks and social capital) within a social space determine the degree to which migration from a given area grows in volume. These meso-level determinants also influence the rapidity of development of transnational social space between the receiving and the sending area.

## CHAPTER 3: THESES FOR THE STUDY AND THE RESEARCH METHOD

### 3.1. Theses for the research

Movements from Ukraine to Poland became high in volume only one decade ago (in the late 1980s) as a consequence of economic and political transition in Central and Eastern Europe, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and deep crises in many republics of the former USSR also in Ukraine. In general, I argue that, during the last decade, various transnational social spaces between Poland and Ukraine (hereafter – Polish-Ukrainian social spaces) have been developing. Moreover, various types of movements proceeding within these spaces and settlement migration from Ukraine to Poland are interrelated<sup>127</sup> mostly because of the development of migrant networks. Therefore, settlement migration which constitutes a small part of movements from Ukraine to Poland at the present is also rising and its further increase can be expected. Below, I present more detailed theses which refer to characteristics of Polish-Ukrainian social spaces as well as social networks and social capital within them; the relation between various movements and settlement migration from Ukraine to Poland and also some characteristics of the latter.

Political and economic changes in Central and Eastern Europe resulted in the emergence of structural factors for migration from Ukraine (also from the other countries of the former USSR) to Poland. Among other things, it is macroeconomic factors which matter. Faster and more successful economic transition in Poland, when compared with the Ukrainian transition,<sup>128</sup> led to the creation of considerable discrepancies in GDP growths, wage levels, and overall living standards between the two countries making Poland an attractive country to which Ukrainian citizens could migrate. At the same time, Ukrainians were given the right to free movement which was limited during the Soviet period and it has been relatively easy for them to enter Poland. In addition to the above factors, the proximity of the Polish border has been enabling Ukrainians to take up short-term trips which are usually relatively cheap and involve easy transportation. It should also be noted that historical, economic and political ties, which have existed between Poland and Ukraine, seem to also represent important factors which stimulate migration from Ukraine to Poland.<sup>129</sup> To sum up, structural

factors in both Poland and Ukraine constituted a good basis for the initiation of migration from Ukraine to Poland in the late 1980s and for its development in the following years.

Beginning with the late 1980s, Ukrainians have been migrating to work and to trade in Poland. At the same time, from the moment when Ukrainian migration to Poland started to be high in volume, the Polish government has provided few, if any, official incentives for Ukrainians to come to Poland<sup>130</sup>. It seems that this migration has been based mostly on interpersonal contacts and informal agreements between Ukrainian migrants and their Polish co-operators (employers, clients, accommodation providers etc.). Moreover, it is estimated that Ukrainian undocumented migration outnumbers legal migration.<sup>131</sup> Ukrainian undocumented migration can flourish, as Ukrainian citizens enjoy the right to free entry to Poland for a period not longer than three months. In this type of migration, personal contacts constitute the basis for migratory success.<sup>132</sup> Because of the above factors, it can be argued that migrant networks play a crucial role in migration from Ukraine to Poland. Moreover, the development of various Polish-Ukrainian social spaces (between various areas in Poland and Ukraine) can be expected to be very dynamic, as these types of social spaces are based on social and symbolic ties between migrants and non-migrants in the destination and the home countries.<sup>133</sup> Thus, it is very likely that a considerable part of migration from Ukraine proceeds within these Polish-Ukrainian social spaces.

Although the development of Polish-Ukrainian social spaces appears to be dynamic, they probably have not developed into transnational communities. This is due to the fact that they are still at their formative phase, as migration from Ukraine to Poland started to grow in volume only a decade ago. At the same time, the formation of a transnational community requires a longer period. The time necessary for this process is not settled, but it is expected that 'for transnational communities to emerge, solidarity has to reach beyond narrow kinship systems'<sup>134</sup>. The latter, usually, does not apply to first generations of migrants<sup>135</sup>. Moreover, it is stated that transnational communities are involved in relationships with state and non-state entities in the countries of emigration and immigration. Certainly, this does not apply to most of the Polish-Ukrainian social spaces, since they comprise mostly undocumented migrants. On the other hand, it seems that most of these social spaces may satisfy the conditions for the formation of either transnational kinship groups or transnational circuits. These two types of transnational

social spaces can develop before the second generation of migrants matures. In transnational kinship systems, the main mechanism of social capital is reciprocity (e.g. in the form of remittances being sent to the home country), whereas in transnational circuits – exchange viz. instrumental reciprocity. The latter enables the constant circulation of goods, people and information over the borders of the sending and receiving countries.<sup>136</sup> Patterns of movements from Ukraine to Poland (high in volume, shuttle, based on informal relations etc.) seem to involve dominant mechanisms of social capital characteristic of transnational kinship groups and circuits. Therefore, I argue that these two types of transnational social spaces are observed in the Polish-Ukrainian case. It should, however, be noted that the Polish-Ukrainian social spaces are at the initial stage of their formation. Thus, their further development may proceed according to the rule of either transnationalisation or pluralisation and melting into core. Evidently, the same applies to potential transnational social spaces which have developed in the course of migration from the other republics of the former USSR.

There is also one specific Polish-Ukrainian space which appears to satisfy the requirements for the formation of a community. It is located mostly in Poland and includes a large group of ethnic Ukrainians with Polish citizenship (hereafter – ethnic Ukrainians) - about 150-300 thousand people.<sup>137</sup> This group can be termed a social community, since solidarity within it extends beyond narrow kinship systems. Although dispersed over the territory of Poland during displacement action (*Akcja Wisła*) in 1947, ethnic Ukrainians retained their identity as one ethnic group. Moreover, they formed institutions (political and cultural associations) which operate, today, in Poland as legal entities representing the group and negotiating its interests with both the Polish and the Ukrainian authorities.<sup>138</sup> On the other hand, the transnational character of this community can be questionable. Most of its members are Polish citizens of Ukrainian origin whose ties with their country folk in Ukraine were limited to only particular activities<sup>139</sup> till the beginning of the 1990s. It was only a short time ago that the group involved itself deeply in various activities in Ukraine. Nevertheless, it seems that the transnational ties of this community will be growing in importance which may enable the formation of a transnational community in the future.

It is evident that Ukrainian migrants are mainly involved in transnational kinship systems and transnational circuits, whereas ethnic Ukrainians living in Poland belong to the (transnational) community. The latter differs from other Polish-Ukrainian social

spaces in terms of the characteristics of the people involved, but also in terms of the main mechanisms of social capital formation. It seems that these are crucial differences, which may make it difficult to integrate various Polish-Ukrainian social spaces and the community consisting mostly of ethnic Ukrainians into one transnational community. On the other hand, it can be expected that an increase in movements from Ukraine to Poland has resulted in the revival of old family and social ties between ethnic Ukrainians in Poland and their countrymen in Ukraine. It appears that those Ukrainian contemporary migrants, who have ties with the 'old' Ukrainian community in Poland, are especially likely to join the community of ethnic Ukrainians in Poland in the future contributing in this way to its overall volume. It may also stimulate the integration of the two groups of Ukrainians in Poland into one transnational community.

The probability of the formation of a transnational community rises when the volume of settlement migrants in the destination country increases. The latter can be expected to occur in Poland. There are particular macroeconomic factors underlying international movements to the given country which are common for both labour and settlement migration. These are mainly better job and life prospects. For settlement migration, security and a satisfactory social policy in the destination country constitute additional important determinants.<sup>140</sup> In general, the Ukrainian welfare system is less effective than the Polish one<sup>141</sup>, whereas the level of personal security seems not to be a decisive factor for settlement migration from Ukraine to Poland, since neither of the countries has undergone any armed conflicts. Nevertheless, it can be expected that there are structural factors which stimulate not only various temporary movements but also settlement migration from Ukraine to Poland.

At the present time, settlement migration constitutes only a small part of Ukrainian migration to Poland.<sup>142</sup> It should, however, be noted that there is usually a time lag between labour migration and the settlement migration which follows.<sup>143</sup> This can be also the case with the migration from Ukraine to Poland, which started only recently. It appears that migrant social networks, which developed in various Polish-Ukrainian social spaces comprising mainly undocumented migrants, may also stimulate the settlement of Ukrainian migrants in Poland. This is because, various Ukrainian migrants who come to Poland on the basis of migrant networks can hold different orientations: temporary versus permanent ones.<sup>144</sup> To put it in another way, Ukrainians participating in various temporary movements to Poland may support their countrymen

in settlement migration to Poland. It should, however, be noted that the ability of a migrant to help settlement migrants in their migration requires access to specific resources: for example information about opportunities for acquiring a PRP in Poland, their own apartment, their own business etc. Thus, only a part of the population of migrants can be helpful in the settlement migration of their countrymen.

I argue that settlement migration is related to other movements from Ukraine to Poland and stimulated by them also in another way: Ukrainians participating in various movements to Poland are potential settlement migrants. As presented in the one-trip model, individuals make their decisions about subsequent migrations in relation to the consequences of their previous trips. It is clear from the migration literature that people who migrated at least once are more likely than others to take up trips in the future.<sup>145</sup> Because of the fact that each migratory decision of a given individual is taken in different contexts (different consequences of various trips), it is likely that various migrations of a given person differ from each other. Furthermore, it is also probable that a person who takes up short-term trips today will take up a settlement migration in the future. I argue that the probability that given Ukrainians taking up various trips to Poland, subsequently will settle there in the future, depends on the structure and the content of the social ties which they develop in the course of their movements to Poland. In particular, it is conditioned by the type of assets to which they have access thanks to their social capitals (also by their individual assets). This is due to the fact that only particular resources enable settlement in Poland. Evidently, the social capital inherent in the Polish-Ukrainian spaces usually supports migration of the main pattern observed in these social spaces – namely undocumented short-term labour migration. It may, therefore, be argued that those Ukrainian migrants who develop their social ties beyond their original transnational social spaces are more likely to settle in Poland than others. It may also be assumed that the desirability of settling in Poland occurs when migrants' access to various resources such as job, accommodation, information etc. provides them with better opportunities when settling in Poland rather than in Ukraine. It involves a change in the main goal of migration from income generating activities towards permanent settlement. Certainly, it is difficult to point out the threshold in this process as various people have different expectations and abilities to change their places of residence.



A particular type of social tie, which migrants may develop in Poland, is the relationship with a Polish citizen whom they wish to marry.<sup>146</sup> Such a marriage is very likely to end up with the settlement migration of a Ukrainian in Poland.<sup>147</sup> It is evident that the higher the volume of Ukrainian migrants in Poland the more of them develop attachments of the above kind in Poland and the more Polish-Ukrainian marriages are likely to be contracted.

Therefore, Ukrainian temporary movements to Poland are likely to stimulate settlement migration from Ukraine to Poland. At the same time, there are structural factors for this migration. However, for settlement migration to develop, the appropriate legal framework in the destination country is necessary. It needs to provide opportunities, which are within reach of migrants eager to settle there, both those newly arriving and those staying there, for the legalisation of their status in the destination country. Otherwise, migrants are more likely to choose other types of movements (shuttle, short-term etc.) or overstay instead of settlement migration.<sup>148</sup> At the same time, it should be noted that overstayers have to face very unstable conditions in their everyday professional, social and private life in the destination country,<sup>149</sup> as they are usually deprived of virtually all social and political rights in the destination country. Thus, only selected migrants are able to participate in this kind of migration.

In the immigration countries, settlement migration has been usually strongly related to the process of reunion of the families of labour migrants.<sup>150</sup> Families of labour migrants have been given the right to settle in the country to which their relatives (usually husbands) went as labour migrants earlier. This procedure applies mainly to families of legal labour migrants. Thanks to this, both labour migrants and their families are able to settle in the destination country. The other type of legal framework for settlement migration are the regularisation procedures, which enable overstayers who satisfy particular conditions to be granted a legal status in the destination country. Such actions were carried out in those immigration countries which experienced a considerable influx of undocumented migrants and high volumes of overstayers.<sup>151</sup> Measures are usually taken once in a while when the volume of overstayers reaches a high level.

In Poland, there exists the possibility for the procedure of family reunion. However, migrants, who want to bring their families to Poland, have to satisfy requirements for becoming settlement migrants themselves, which is usually difficult

for Ukrainian migrants in Poland<sup>152</sup>. Above all, they have to work and stay legally in Poland. Legal migration from Ukraine to Poland is relatively low in comparison with undocumented migration.<sup>153</sup> Thus, only a small part of all Ukrainian labour migrants can be allowed to bring their families there officially. At the same time, regularisation procedures have not yet been carried out in Poland and neither are they expected to be in the short run. Therefore, while taking into consideration the dominant types of movements from Ukraine to Poland, most Ukrainian migrants have very limited opportunities to become settlement migrants and to bring additional settlement migrants – namely their families – to Poland. On the contrary, it is relatively easy for them to overstay in Poland (see Appendix I). Thus, when they decide to settle in Poland, they are likely to become overstayers instead of settlement migrants.

At the same time, it seems that Polish-Ukrainian marriages constitute a crucial part of Ukrainian settlement migration in Poland. This is due to the fact that it is relatively easy for foreigners married to Polish citizens to legalise their status in Poland, whereas other opportunities for legal settlement of Ukrainian migrants in Poland are limited. Marriage migration is supported by international matchmaking organisations which usually develop when migration between the two given areas gets underway.<sup>154</sup> At the present time, in Central and Eastern Europe, many such institutions support marriages between women from the former USSR and men from Western countries (also from Poland).

Following the above argumentation, it may be expected that women constitute a considerable part of Ukrainian settlement migration to Poland. This is because, it has been widely observed that women prevail among migrants who married citizens of the country which is the destination for labour migrants from their home country.<sup>155</sup> According to analyses of the American marriage market, push factors of this type of female settlement migration can be explained by the general desirability ‘of women from low income countries to move to higher income countries’<sup>156</sup>. The benefits of such migration include: ‘greater economic and social opportunities in a country with less traditional gender roles’<sup>157</sup>. At the same time, men from developed countries (the US is the prominent example) look for foreign wives, because they are unsatisfied with women in their home countries who devote themselves to their professional careers rather than to their families.<sup>158</sup> In Poland, the demand for foreign wives can be expected to be lower than in the US, as feminist movements have not been developed yet to the

degree which is observed in the US. On the other hand, the general desirability on the part of women to marry foreigners from more developed and prosperous countries is very likely to be observed among Ukrainian women in Ukraine. The fact that Ukraine is undergoing economic crisis is likely to increase this desirability at the present. At the same time, Poland which is expected to join the European Union soon is often perceived by Ukrainian citizens as the gateway to the 'Western world'. Therefore, it is expected, in line with observations from the other immigration countries, that women outnumber men among Ukrainians married to Polish citizens in Poland, hence, they are likely to account for a higher share of the whole population of Ukrainian settlement migrants.

The above arguments should also be put in the context of contemporary migration from Ukraine to Poland. It has been observed that women are numerous among shuttle and short-term Ukrainian migrants in Poland.<sup>159</sup> Ukrainian women as well as women from the other countries of the former USSR have been particularly active on the labour market when compared with the women from other countries. At the same time, female workers dismissed from their jobs account for the majority of ex-USSR workers who lost their jobs as a result of economic crises in the republics of the former Soviet Union<sup>160</sup>. These conditions create a considerable potential for female labour migration from Ukraine. Some of the labour women-migrants are expected to develop access to specific resources which may enable their settlement in Poland and, in particular, by marriage with a Polish citizen. This seems to be another argument for the thesis that women are a crucial part of Ukrainian settlement migration in Poland.

As far as the other socio-demographic characteristics of Ukrainian settlement migrants are concerned, I argue that young and well-educated people are likely to prevail in this population. This is due to the fact that young people have, in general, a higher propensity to resettlement.<sup>161</sup> They are less likely than others to have already established households in their home country, which implies lack of strong family ties with the home country. These latter ties usually restrain resettlement. Those who have their own families (a spouse and children) are more likely to migrate for shorter periods so as to avoid longer separation from their families.<sup>162</sup> Certainly, the resettlement of whole households also takes place frequently. However, it is usually more complicated and involves higher costs than individual resettlement. Therefore, it may be argued that single persons who do not have strong obligations to support their Ukrainian households are more likely to settle in Poland than others. Moreover, it is easier for young people

than for older persons to adjust to the labour market and the society of the destination country. Young people can easily develop suitable skills which enable them to operate efficiently in the foreign environment. At the same time, for well-educated people possessing various skills, it is also usually relatively easy to adjust to conditions in the destination country. In particular, thanks to their skills, they usually have relatively good job opportunities in the destination country which enable them to achieve attractive incomes there.

To sum up, I argue in my dissertation that Ukrainian settlement migration is expected to rise in the future. This is especially probable if Ukrainian overstayers have greater opportunities for the legalisation of their stay in Poland (for example, families' reunification programmes or regularisation procedures) This is because, there are structural factors in both Poland and Ukraine which stimulate this migration. Moreover, the dynamic development of the Polish-Ukrainian social spaces, which proceeds alongside the development of various types of migratory movements and migrant networks related to them, creates a favourable basis for such migration.

## **3.2. Method of the study**

### **3.2.1. General overview**

The method of the study undertaken for this dissertation involves the triangulation of statistical and qualitative data on Ukrainian migrants in Poland as well as of empirical and historical materials for both countries (Poland and Ukraine). Data on Ukrainian migrants refer to the period 1989-1999 - from the moment, when migration from Ukraine to Poland became high in volume, until recently. However, there are some discrepancies between the periods covered by various pieces of data. This is due to the problems encountered with the availability of data on given groups of migrants for the whole period under consideration in this dissertation.

Statistical data interrogated in the course of the study refer not only to settlement migrants but also to other types of migrants coming to Poland. This is in order to present settlement migration to Poland in relation to other movements to Poland. In this way, the interrelation between settlement migration and other types of spatial mobility to Poland can be investigated.

The main source of statistical data on Ukrainian migrants in Poland is Polish statistics, as the dissertation focuses on the analysis of Ukrainians in Poland and it pays

only limited attention to the composition of the overall emigration from Ukraine. Data on various types of movements, other than settlement migration, from Ukraine to Poland are secondary data derived from reports published in Poland, in Ukraine and also in other countries. Statistical data on settlement migration to Poland are primary data. They were collected during the research 'The role of social, economic and political networks in settlement migration to Poland: the case of Ukrainian migrants' carried out for my dissertation in 1998-2000. These data cover various groups of settlement migrants resident in Poland and they are able to describe the overall population of settlement migrants in Poland. The fact that they cover all migrants resident in Poland is the reason why I chose statistical material instead of survey data for my study. This is due to the fact that an important aim of my research was to provide an estimate of stock of migrants resident in Poland. This was of great importance for the Polish case, as due to high fragmentation of data on migrants in Poland, the exact number of foreigners living in Poland has been unknown.

While interrogating the statistical data on settlement migrants, I devote some space to the presentation of the characteristics of settlement migrants resident in the Warsaw voivodeship<sup>163</sup>, which is the area covered by my qualitative research. This part of the investigation is aimed at explaining the mechanisms of settlement process in both a retrospective and prospective view, with special attention to the role of migrant networks in this process. For such an analysis, qualitative methods are the most effective. The qualitative research covers actual and potential Ukrainian settlement migrants. The analysis of the first group focused on past-migratory experiences of Ukrainian migrants and on factors which caused their settlement in Poland. For potential settlement migrants, the main purpose of the investigation was to identify factors which may lead to their settlement in Poland. The qualitative data were collected during the research 'The role of social, economic and political networks in settlement migration to Poland: the case of Ukrainian migrants' carried out for my dissertation in 1998-2000 and also during the pilot study 'Undocumented foreigners in Poland' carried out by the Centre of Migration Research, Institute for Social Studies, University of Warsaw in 1999. My task in this project was to design a research method and to supervise the collection of data and also to collect some data.

I chose the Warsaw voivodeship for my qualitative research, as it was expected to attract most of the settlement migrants coming to Poland. This is because this

voivodeship offers, in general, better life prospects than other areas in Poland. In particular, the labour market of Warsaw itself and the surrounding areas is very attractive for migrants.

It should be noted that in the course of the overall research project<sup>164</sup> also other qualitative data were collected. However, information obtained from them constitutes only the background, enriching the main analysis included in the dissertation. These data cover two groups of respondents. The first is that of representatives of organisations involved in the activities of the Ukrainian minority in Poland and the Polish minority in Ukraine. This group also includes people considered to be experts in Polish-Ukrainian relations. A total of eight interviews was conducted with such people (one in Ukraine and the rest of them in Poland). These were unstructured interviews related to particular issues with which those people deal in Poland or in Ukraine (for the description of this research group see Appendix V). The second group investigated during the research is sixteen Ukrainians studying in Poland (Warsaw). With them, semi-structured interviews were conducted (for the description of this research group see Appendix VI).

In general, the research carried out for the dissertation involves a case study method (migration from Ukraine). This approach is defined as an empirical inquiry that: 'Investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used.'<sup>165</sup>. The inclusion of the context as an integral part of the case study method constitutes its distinctive characteristic. This aspect of the method makes the analysis of statistical data difficult. On the other hand, it is argued that the quantitative component of the research should not be omitted in the case study method.<sup>166</sup> It should be noted that the case study method involves a particular type of analysis: orientated not only to outcomes but also to processes. It also requires that specific interpretations and conclusions should be linked to adequate data on which they are based. The analysis presented in my dissertation is made according to the above assumptions. In particular, while analysing qualitative data, I interrogated each case separately (for example, an interview) paying particular attention to the overall context in which it is anchored. The aggregation of the outcomes from the various cases was the very last stage of my analysis of the qualitative data.

### 3.2.2. *Statistical data*

#### 3.2.2.1. Introductory remarks

The statistical data collected during the study cover three groups of settlement migrants: foreigners married to Polish citizens, Permanent Residence Permit holders and foreigners granted Polish citizenship. These three groups correspond with three types of immigrants: aliens, denizens and citizens, respectively, which altogether cover the whole population of immigrants resident in a given destination country. Such a differentiation of an immigrant population is based on the concept of ‘three gates’ to the host society.<sup>167</sup> According to this, foreigners who intend to settle in the destination country have to go through three stages (‘gates’) of regulation of their status there. These stages are as follows:

- Regulation of a foreigner’s immigration – acquisition of a work permit and a residence permit for limited periods, which can be prolonged (aliens)
- Regulation of a foreigner’s residence in the destination country – acquisition of a permanent work permit and a permanent residence permit without time restrictions (denizens)
- Naturalisation – acquisition of citizenship of the destination country, which, usually, implies acquisition of political rights there (citizens).

It should be noted that foreigners who form the three different stocks of settlement migrants in Poland (aliens, denizens and citizens) started their migration to Poland in different periods. Nevertheless, they became members of given groups in 1989-1999. In general, foreigners married to Polish citizens (aliens) are representatives of the most recent settlement migration to Poland, whereas newly admitted Polish citizens participated in migration to Poland much earlier than members of the other groups.

#### 3.2.2.2. Aliens – foreigner married to Polish citizens

I use the term ‘aliens’ while referring to foreigners married to Polish citizens, as I present data on marriages contracted. Therefore, they cover the population of foreigners who are expected to be at the beginning of a process of the regulation of their status in Poland (there can be some exceptions to this rule). I consider only this category of aliens, as they are particularly likely, when compared to other groups of aliens (foreign students, visas holders, or Temporary Residence Permit holders – compare

Appendix I), to settle in Poland permanently. At the same time, the assumption of my research was that foreigners married to Polish citizens constitute a considerable share of settlement migration in Poland. It should, however, be noted that not every mixed marriage contracted in Poland stays there permanently, as some of mixed marriages contracted in Poland leave for a country of a foreigner partners just after wedding ceremony or some time later.

Data on foreigners married to Polish citizens were provided by the Polish Main Statistical Office. They refer to all mixed marriages contracted in Poland in 1989-1997 between Polish citizens and people who had resided in foreign countries before their marriages. Data on Polish-Ukrainian marriages cover a shorter period – 1992-1997, as Ukraine became an independent state only in 1991 and it is impossible to distinguish Ukrainians from other citizens of the Soviet Union before that time.

The shortcoming of those statistical data is that mixed marriages can be distinguished from other marriages contracted in Poland only by a foreign place of residence of one of the partners before the marriage. Data on citizenship and ethnicity of partners are not provided. Nevertheless, the qualitative research on Polish-Ukrainian marriages in Warsaw showed that, in mixed marriages identified this way, partners originating from abroad typically had also non-Polish citizenship (for the description of the qualitative part of the research see Chapter 3.2.3.2). It should be also noted that the statistics provided by the Polish Main Statistical Office are collected directly from Polish Registries and they are the only available source of data about foreigners married to Polish people in Poland.

Primary data on mixed marriages contracted in Poland were provided in the form of two databases which could not be merged. In both of them a unit of analysis was a marriage. The first database covered all mixed marriages contracted in Poland and contained basic information about those marriages, i.e. year of marriage, country of origin and gender of foreign partner and place of residence after wedding. Information about socio-demographic characteristics of partners was included in the other database where a variable depicting country of origin of a foreign partner had only two values: foreigner or Ukrainian. To put it in another way, the second database enabled the analysis of socio-demographic characteristics of only Polish-Ukrainian marriages or of the overall population of mixed marriages. Such a construction of the databases limited possibility of comparisons between socio-demographic characteristics of various groups



of foreigners and their partners. Needless to say, a single database containing all necessary information would be a much better source of data about mixed marriages in Poland. However, in the course of long-lasting negotiations with the Polish Main Statistical office, the two-database solution turned out to be the most satisfactory in terms of price, while also not breaking the rule of statistical secret in Poland

### 3.2.2.3. Denizens – foreigners holding Permanent Residence Permits

Immigrants holding a Permanent Residence Permit (hereafter – a PRP) in Poland are termed ‘denizens’, as they have the right to work<sup>168</sup> and stay in Poland without time restrictions. Information about this group are primary data provided by the Ministry of Interior and Administration in Poland in the form of the database. This database covers the whole population of foreigners who were granted a PRP in Poland before 1.01.00. However, before 1992, there was no computer system and data were recorded manually. A large share of the information about those people who received a PRP at that time is missing therefore (data on citizenship, age etc.) and it is unavailable at the moment. Moreover, for some of those people, it is not known whether they are still living in Poland or not. Therefore, I used also archival data of the Ministry of Interior and Administration in Poland on denizens resident in Poland in 1991. They contain limited information about denizens, namely data on foreigners’ citizenship, only. Unfortunately following computerisation of data collection the department responsible for collection of data was closed down and all archival information which it possessed was withdrawn. Selected copies of these data are available in the Centre of Migration Research Institute for Social Studies, University of Warsaw. Nevertheless, the comparison between archival data for 1991 and data included in the database of PRPs holders allowed for estimation of a stock and composition (according to foreigners’ citizenship) of denizens living in Poland at the present time.

It should be noted that the database of the Ministry of Interior and Administration in Poland is the only source of information about PRPs issued in Poland. This Ministry is responsible for issuing PRPs and for registration of PRPs granted. Unfortunately, statistics which it produces relate only to the number of documents issued and not directly to the number of people who obtained PRPs. Those two numbers are not the same, as one person may obtain a few duplicates of a PRP which are registered as new documents issued. In the database which I obtained for my study the unit of analysis also was a document and not a person. Therefore, in order to make

statistical analysis on this database, I changed its structure in such a way that a person became the unit of analysis<sup>169</sup>.

In general, the description of a population of denizens, presented in my dissertation, is the first attempt to estimate a volume of denizens resident in Poland on the basis of data of the Ministry of Interior and Administration in Poland. This is also the first in-depth analysis of these data.<sup>170</sup> The database provides information about geographical distribution of denizens in Poland and about their main socio-demographic characteristics. The big advantage of this database is that it includes not only information about documents which are used at the moment by foreigners, but also about documents which have been returned to the Ministry of Interior and Administration. The most frequent reasons for returning a PRP are: departure from Poland, acquisition of Polish citizenship, death of a PRP holder. Therefore, denizens who left Poland or acquired Polish citizenship can be identified. This is valuable, because it allows for making estimate of naturalisation rate among denizens in Poland, thus, for analysing their propensity to pass through the third and final gate to Polish society. It should be, however, noted that the volume of returned PRPs may be underestimated, as some foreigners do not obey a requirement of returning a PRP upon departure from Poland or acquisition of Polish citizenship.

For the study carried out for my dissertation, a population of denizens was of particular interest. Apart from this, the database of the Ministry of Interior and Administration in Poland contains also information about foreigners who obtained Temporary Residence Permits (hereafter – a TRP) granted by 1.01. 2000. They are aliens who may become denizens in the future. They are briefly described in the Chapter 4 (for a description of this category of aliens in Poland see Appendix I).

#### 3.2.2.4. Citizens – foreigners granted Polish citizenship

According to the above classification, foreigners who acquired Polish citizenship belong to a group of ‘citizens’. They have the same social and political rights as all the other Polish citizens. In fact, this group of immigrant citizens is usually excluded from statistics on immigration to a given country<sup>171</sup>. However, they certainly constitute a group of settlement migrants, which is expected to be best integrated to the host society, when compared with other groups of settlement migrants.<sup>172</sup>

Data on foreigners granted Polish citizenship are very fragmented. They are provided by the Department of Civil Affairs in the Ministry of Interior and Administration in Poland. Until 1998, these data were collected only in a paper form. Moreover, the Department collects data only on a part of the group - migrants who follow the 'conferment' procedure (for definitions of the procedures see Appendix I). Information about those foreigners who use other procedures is available only in the voivodeship Departments in the form of personal data files. For 1997 and the first part of 1998, the Department of Civil Affairs of the Ministry of Interior and Administration collected, from the voivodeship Departments some data on foreigners who had used the 'acknowledgement' and the 'marriage' procedures (for definitions of the procedures see Appendix I). The above data provide information only about the volume and nationality structure of migrants who acquired Polish citizenship.

As a consequence of this shortage of data, an exhaustive description (including socio-demographic characteristics of migrants) of the whole population of foreigners granted Polish citizenship in Poland is impossible at the moment. Therefore, most of the descriptions presented in my dissertation are based only on data collected during my research on the basis of personal data files of applicants for Polish citizenship, who submitted their applications to the Warsaw voivodeship Department in 1989-1998<sup>173</sup>. Information as to the status of the applications (a positive/negative decision, or an application 'in progress') submitted during that period refers to the moment when data were collected, namely to November 1999. Data on foreigners granted Polish citizenship in the Warsaw voivodeship includes the 'conferment', the 'acknowledgement' and the 'marriage' procedures<sup>174</sup>. Certainly, information collected this way refers only to a part of the whole population of the foreigners granted Polish citizenship. On the other hand, the Warsaw voivodeship processes the largest volume of applications for Polish citizenship in Poland. Moreover, the database of applicants (the unit of analysis) for Polish citizenship in Warsaw voivodeship created on the basis of individual biographies (described in the adequate applications) contains a variety of information. The unique data include, among other things: the duration of a stay in Poland, history of all marriages of a person, information whether a person has Polish origins etc. Furthermore, for each case a qualitative record was created in which its peculiarities are described.

### 3.2.3. *Qualitative data*

#### 3.2.3.1. Introductory remarks

Qualitative data cover two groups of Ukrainians: actual and potential settlement migrants in Warsaw. The actual settlement migrants are Ukrainians involved in marriages with Polish citizens, whereas potential ones are undocumented Ukrainian migrants. The Ukrainians married to Polish citizens are chosen to represent the actual settlement migrants, as they are expected to constitute a crucial part of Ukrainian settlement migration to Poland at the moment. This is due to the fact that marriage to a Polish citizen provides an opportunity for the legalisation of a foreigner's status in Poland, whereas other opportunities for potential settlement migrants at present are limited in Poland. On the other hand, it should be noted that settlement in Poland as a consequence of marriage to a Polish citizen is a particular type of settlement migration which should be analysed separately. The primary aim of the analysis of qualitative data on Polish-Ukrainian marriages was to identify how settlement in Poland following marriage with a Polish citizen is related to other movements between Ukraine and Poland and what is the role of migrant social networks in relating different types of spatial mobility.

The group chosen for the examination of potential settlement trajectories is that of undocumented Ukrainian migrants. This is due to the fact that they comprise the biggest group in the overall Ukrainian migration to Poland.<sup>175</sup> Moreover, the members of this group are deprived of virtually all social and political rights in Poland and their activities occur mainly in the Polish shadow economy. Due to the above factors undocumented Ukrainian migrants attract the attention of Polish authorities and policy makers. It is, therefore, very important to understand the mechanisms which may lead to the settlement (on a legal basis) of Ukrainian migrants of this type. This was the primary goal of this part of research. Certainly, there are also other groups of potential Ukrainian settlement migrants in Poland (Ukrainian students<sup>176</sup>, legal Ukrainian workers, people involved in Polish-Ukrainian import-export businesses, Ukrainian tourists etc.). However, this research is devoted to the biggest group of Ukrainian migrants who, at the same time, may create social problems both in Poland and Ukraine. It should be noted that an assumption underlying the qualitative research on potential Ukrainian settlement migrants was that those migrants who planned at the moment of the research to marry Polish citizens should be excluded from this part of the research.

This is due to the fact that a marriage to a citizen of the destination country is a particular migratory trajectory, which has been interrogated in retrospective view by qualitative research on Polish-Ukrainian marriages in Warsaw.

### 3.2.3.2. Actual settlement migrants – Ukrainians married to Polish citizens

Data on Polish-Ukrainian marriages in Warsaw comprise thirty-four in-depth interviews which were conducted in 1998-2000 (for the description of this research group see Appendix III). The investigated group was derived from the database containing addresses of 162 Polish-Ukrainian marriages contracted in Warsaw in 1989-1998<sup>177</sup>. This database was created on the basis of archives of Warsaw Registries and provides basic information about Polish-Ukrainian marriages and their addresses of residence. It covers five out of seven Warsaw districts, as two Warsaw Registries refused to provide information about Polish-Ukrainian marriages. There is also a danger that some Polish-Ukrainian marriages contracted in Warsaw might have been omitted during the creation of the database. This is due to the fact that Registries do not provide information about the volume of mixed marriages contracted there. Thus, information about such marriages was collected manually. The records of Registries were carefully studied so as to select Polish-Ukrainian marriages from among all marriages contracted in a given registry. Information about citizenship of foreigners was not provided in records of Registries and Polish-Ukrainian marriages chosen for the analysis, are those where one partner had lived in Ukraine before the marriage. Such an approach allowed for identification of Polish-Ukrainian marriages contracted before 1991 (before the creation of the independent Ukrainian state), as those who had lived on the present Ukrainian territory were classified as Ukrainians. Polish-Ukrainian marriages were visited randomly as they are distributed evenly in Warsaw. Fifty-two out of 162 addresses included in the database have never been visited. The research continued until forty-four interviews had been collected. The investigation then ended, as information collected by then was sufficient to answer main research questions and to create comprehensive typology of Polish-Ukrainian marriages in relation to their migratory experiences. Moreover, the initial objective of the overall research was to conduct thirty interviews. Such a number of interviews usually allows for reliable analysis<sup>178</sup>. Ten out of forty four cases were excluded from the analysis as they contained insufficient information. In my analysis, I occasionally refer to these cases (see the description of cases in Appendix IV).

The research technique was a semi-structured interview (for a scenario of an interview see Appendix VII) conducted with the help of scenario, recorded and transcribed verbatim. The average duration of an interview was one hour<sup>179</sup>. Interviews were conducted in respondents' homes in the Polish language. Interviewers were three researchers<sup>180</sup> who co-operated closely during the research project. The research method foresaw interviews with both a wife and a husband. This was due to the fact that, in my analysis, I concentrated on facts related to past-migratory experiences of Ukrainian partners and their integration to Polish society. The reconstruction of the facts is better when two partners participate in an interview. The interviews with both spouses allowed also for observing interactions between the partners. Moreover, the researchers were asked to describe the overall interview situation and behaviour of respondents. This brought additional information about Polish-Ukrainian couples and allowed for making some conclusions about a given couple. This was particularly helpful for identification of bogus marriages.

Nevertheless, an interview with both partners was sometimes impossible. This problem referred particularly to divorced couples where usually only one partner was available. On the other hand, marriages which ended up with a divorce were important for the research as, in this way, the full picture of the Polish-Ukrainian marriages contracted in Poland could have been obtained. In general, when both partners were not available, an interviewer tried to talk with the Ukrainian partner. An interview with the Polish partner alone was the last option. As a consequence, interviews of three types were collected: (1) with both partners (fifteen cases); (2) with a Ukrainian spouse (thirteen cases); (3) with a Polish spouse (two cases). While presenting outcomes of my analysis, I concentrated on facts, thus I did not distinguish interviews with one interviewee from those with couples. Had I concentrated on attitudes or feelings of my respondents, I would have to differentiate them since respondents behave differently in presence of their spouses than when being alone with the interviewer

The analysis of the in-depth interviews was a combination of content analysis and discourse analysis<sup>181</sup>. I started from a content analysis so as to identify dominant types of past-migratory experiences of Ukrainian partners, patterns of their integration to Polish society and facts related to the formation of Polish-Ukrainian couples. The next step was a discourse analysis devoted to the way in which Ukrainian respondents described their attitudes towards settlement in Poland at different stages of their

migration to Poland (if such took place) and towards a marriage with a Polish citizen. In this part of my analysis I also attempted to characterise relationships between the partners in these marriages which seemed to be bogus or at least tactic marriages. This part of the analysis may be biased as some of the interviews were conducted with two partners, whereas in other cases only one partner was present. However, I addressed this problem in the presentation of my conclusions.

### 3.2.3.3. Potential settlement migrants – undocumented Ukrainian migrants

Data on undocumented Ukrainian migrants were collected by means of various research techniques: in-depth interview, focus group and the participant observation. Different techniques were used for investigation of different types of undocumented migrants. In fact, one goal of this research was to test the usefulness of various research techniques for interrogation of undocumented migrants in Poland. In this part of the research, I compiled data from the study carried out for my dissertation and from the research 'Undocumented foreigners in Poland' carried out in 1999. Among other things, this study aimed to investigate two types of undocumented migrants in Poland (not only Ukrainians): traders and seasonal workers. For the purpose of my study, which was to interrogate potential migratory trajectories of undocumented Ukrainian migrants, the inclusion of three out of four types of cases studies corresponding with three different potential migratory trajectories was necessary. The four types of potential migratory trajectories, which I propose, are: (1) continuation of migration of the same type, (2) continuation of migration of a different type, (3) abandonment of migration and settlement in the destination country, i.e. Poland, (4) abandonment of migration and settlement in the home country, i.e. Ukraine (for detailed description of these potential migratory trajectories see Chapter 9). I did not include in my research the migratory trajectory leading to a permanent settlement in the home country (Ukraine), as migration of this pattern is beyond the scope of my dissertation. The research on Ukrainian traders and seasonal workers provided data on migrants who are likely to continue migration to Poland of either the same or different pattern. The additional case which I included in my research is a family of Ukrainian overstayers which represents the third type of potential migratory trajectory: abandonment of migration and settlement in Poland.

The Ukrainian migrants investigated during this part of qualitative research were involved in various transnational social spaces. Therefore, they differ in type of social

ties which they develop in Poland (strength, density and content of ties) and their propensity to settle in Poland permanently. This is due to the fact that the transnational social space in which migrants are involved influences their attitudes and behaviour and promotes particular patterns of migration. On the other hand, a long-term involvement in migration to Poland (at least five years) is what all Ukrainian migrants participating in the research have in common.

The first case study is a group of undocumented Ukrainian seasonal workers who come every year to a village close to Warsaw. Information about this group was collected during two-week participant observation carried out in August 1999. This observation was mostly limited to one particular farm, but it allowed also for collecting information about Ukrainian migrants coming to other nearby farms and to an 'immigrant hotel' located in the village. This hotel hosts about 250 Ukrainians during the summer time.<sup>182</sup>

A participant observation seems to be a very efficient tool for an investigation of seasonal workers when a large number operates in one place. A researcher can obtain not only information about individual cases but he/she is also able to observe the interactions within a migrant group. In the participant observation described here a Ukrainian researcher pretended to be a seasonal illegal worker. He worked and lived with other Ukrainian migrants. This method of carrying out the participant observation may be criticised as violating ethics of sociological inquiry. Nevertheless, in research on undocumented migrants it appears to be much more efficient than observation conducted in circumstances when migrants are aware that they are under investigation<sup>183</sup>.

My role in this observation was to supervise its progress. Thus, I held regular meetings with the researcher to discuss further steps of his investigation. The data presented in my dissertation derive from a diary of the researcher, my personal notes and observations made during the research and also from the report prepared by the researcher after the observation. My analysis of these data aimed at presenting factors influencing migratory decisions of Ukrainian seasonal workers and, in particular, changes in these factors which occurred in the course of migrants' repetitive trips to Poland. I paid a primary attention to the role of migrants social networks in the migration of this group and the reproduction of the migrant social capital within a Polish-Ukrainian social space involved. I also interrogated chief characteristics of this space.



The second case study is a group of Ukrainian traders operating in Warsaw. Data on these migrants were collected by means of a focus group. The research group consisted of four persons who operate on two different bazaars in Warsaw. The interview was conducted with the help of a scenario (for the scenario of the interview, see Appendix VIII). It lasted two hours, was recorded both on a tape and a video-type and transcribed verbatim. I prepared the scenario of the focus group and moderated the discussion.

The focus group as a research technique for the investigation of Ukrainian traders seems to be satisfactory. Its big advantage is that it helps to overcome a problem that illegal Ukrainian traders are reluctant to agree for an individual interview. While going to the focus group, they may be accompanied by their colleagues from the Polish bazaar. It should be noted, however, that data produced by a focus groups differ from those obtained by an in-depth interview. In particular, a group interview gives limited opportunities for the investigation of individual cases, but provides data on the nature of interactions within the research group. In the described investigation, this was not fully achieved as scenario of the focus group was too long and addressed too many issues. On the other hand, another experiment introduced in this focus group brought interesting and satisfactory results. The language of the interview was a mix of the Polish, Ukrainian and Russian languages. Ukrainian respondents spoke Ukrainian and Russian while moderator spoke Polish. Such a composition of language used in the conversation was to create a situation similar to this observed on Polish bazaars, where all three languages are used simultaneously. Thus, there were no great language problems in the course of the interview and Ukrainian respondents felt comfortable. Indeed, the conversation was very dynamic which is treated as an indicator of a successful focus group. Furthermore, in this way, the problem of translation from a respondent's language into a researcher's language, which students of foreigners usually face, has been partly avoided<sup>184</sup>. Parts of the conversation carried out in Ukrainian were translated into Polish in transcription.<sup>185</sup>

My analysis of data on Ukrainian traders was devoted to determinants of this type of migration to Poland. In particular, I attempted to trace changes in the external factors influencing trading activities of Ukrainian migrants in Poland. I also interrogated individual migratory trajectories of respondents. This type of analysis is not fully justified in the case of focus group technique. Nevertheless, data from this focus group

allowed for making limited analysis of this kind. In particular, I was able to identify the development of migrants' social networks and reproduction of these networks in the transnational social space of trans-border traders.

The third case study is a Ukrainian family – overstayers in Warsaw. The household consists of three persons – a married couple and one child. Data on this case were collected by means of a semi-structured interview (for scenario of the interview see Appendix IX), which I conducted personally with the head of the household in the respondent's home. The interview was held in Polish. It lasted one and half an hour, was recorded and transcribed verbatim.

The chief shortcoming of this part of the study is that I collected information about only one such a case. This was caused by the difficulty in identifying appropriate respondents and the time limits of my research. Certainly, more cases would considerably enrich the outcome of my study. Nevertheless, the examination of the single case allows for a detailed in-depth analysis.

My analysis of the case of the family of overstayers was devoted to factors influencing various sets of trips taken up by different members of the family. I paid particular attention to the migratory behaviour of the head of a household who initiated migration of his family to Poland. My focus was to determine how settlement in Poland, as a goal of migration, develops in the course of repetitive trips to Poland. In particular, I aimed at identifying factors which cause radical changes in migratory goals of undocumented Ukrainian migrants.

In general, qualitative data on undocumented Ukrainian migrants presented in my dissertation provided only limited information. They need to be enriched with additional data in order to provide a reliable empirical and theoretical account of potential migratory trajectories of undocumented Ukrainian migrants in Poland. Thus, the results of this part of the research should be treated as the first step towards investigation of this issue.

## CHAPTER 4: POLAND AND UKRAINE – INTERNATIONAL TIES AND MIGRATION

### 4.1. Introduction

The dissolution of the Soviet Union rapidly increased emigration from its territory to Western countries, and also to Poland. Emigration was spurred on among other things, by the liberalisation of migration policies and by the catastrophic conditions of the economy of post-USSR countries. Poland has constituted an important destination country for citizens of these countries not only because of its absorptive labour market for migrants, but also because of its geographical and cultural proximity. Economic and political ties between Poland and its eastern neighbours also played their roles. These ties were most significant in migration from Ukraine, as this republic is the closest to Poland both geographically and in terms of its culture.

As mentioned above, movements between Poland and Ukraine commenced only a decade ago, therefore it is too early to talk about a developed migration system.<sup>186</sup> This mobility, however, initiated the development of a complex migrant social network as well as of institutions which constitute a crucial element of a migration system<sup>187</sup>. 'At a minimum, a system would consist of two countries and the migrants 'linking' them, such an atomistic approach constrains the analysis of other linkages operating at the international level and having both direct and indirect effects on migration. Consequently, though the existence of a migrant flow would be a necessary condition for the existence of a system, it would not be a sufficient condition as well.'<sup>188</sup> On the other hand, international linkages constitute not only the basis for the creation of a migration system between the countries involved, but also important structural factors in the development of migration movements between the two countries.<sup>189</sup> Therefore, while describing macro-determinants of migration from Ukraine to Poland, I refer also to linkages between those two countries.

## 4.2. Structural factors of migration from Ukraine to Poland – macro-determinants and international ties

### 4.2.1. Macro-determinants

‘The emergence of Ukraine as a free and independent country is promising, as it could play a pivotal role in Europe, due to size, geographical position and economic potential. [...] However, since independence Ukraine’s economy has suffered a serious decline.’<sup>190</sup> At the same time, it can be argued that the Polish economy is more advanced than the Ukrainian economy in its transition towards market economy which started in the late 1980s.<sup>191</sup> The differences in advancement of transition in both countries created, on the one hand, push factors for out-migration of Ukrainian citizens and, on the other hand, pull factors for Ukrainian migration to Poland in the 1990s.

The above differences in the economic situation of Poland and Ukraine are reflected in key macroeconomic indicators, which are considerably worse for the Ukrainian economy. Since 1990, Ukrainian GDP has been falling constantly. In 1994, it decreased by as much as 23%<sup>192</sup>. According to the Polish Main Statistical Office, in 1998, Ukrainian GDP accounted for only 53% of its level from 1990 (in constant prices). Industrial production in Ukraine was also decreasing during 1991-1998<sup>193</sup> (in constant prices). However, in 1997-1998 its fall did not exceed 1% whereas it was only in 1999 that it rose by 4%<sup>194</sup>. Conversely, Polish GDP has been rising constantly since 1993 and, in 1998, was higher by 32% than its 1990 level<sup>195</sup>. The value of sold Polish production (in constant prices)<sup>196</sup> was also increasing by a few percent annually in 1993-1999<sup>197</sup>. In general, a comparison of the two macroeconomic indicators – GDP and industrial production – shows that the Polish economy was growing whereas the Ukrainian economy was declining in the 1990s. At the same time, the differences in the performance of the two economies contribute to the variation between the various factors in the two countries, which determine migration between the areas involved. In particular, they influence the wage and price levels as well as the differences between unemployment rates. Altogether these three indicators are the driving forces of the migration between the two areas.

Relative changes in nominal wages and consumer price index determine the satisfaction of the economic well-being of people. When the consumer price index increases faster than nominal wages, people experience relative deprivation, which is an important push factor in migration.<sup>198</sup> Such a situation took place in Ukraine in the

1990s. In 1991-1995, the Ukrainian consumer price index was rising by over 100% annually. Until 1999, its increase continued, but it was not so high (by 40% in 1996 – the peak year) as in previous years<sup>199</sup>. At the same time, real wages in the official sector of Ukrainian economy rose only in 1995 (by 28%), whereas in most of the other years of the last decade they kept falling<sup>200</sup>. It should be also noted that wages and salaries are not paid regularly in Ukraine. For example, from January to August 1995, total wages in arrears grew 7.7 times and amounted to 20% of the total payroll.<sup>201</sup> Delays in payment of salaries extend to as long as a few months and, when finally remunerated, Ukrainians frequently receive not cash but its equivalent in various consumer goods<sup>202</sup>. At the same time, the average Polish citizen was much less likely to encounter relative deprivation than the average Ukrainian in the 1990s. This is due to the fact that annual increases in the Polish consumer price index did not exceed increases in the index of average gross nominal wages and salaries during this period. Both indexes grew by at most 35% annually in 1993-1998<sup>203</sup>. Evidently, in the 1990s, according to macroeconomic indicators the economic well-being of Ukrainian citizens was constantly worsening, whereas, for inhabitants of Poland, economic conditions of life were relatively stable. The above conclusions are supported by the indicators of poverty calculated by European Bank for Reconstruction and Development for Poland and Ukraine.<sup>204</sup> According to these figures, the poverty headcount<sup>205</sup> was 20% for Poland and 63% for Ukraine in 1993-1995, whereas, for 1987-1988, it was 6% and 2%, respectively. In general, differences in the rapidity and nature of economic transition in Poland and Ukraine created considerable discrepancies in the economic and life prospects in Ukraine and Poland in the 1990s. This way they created both push and pull factors for migration from Ukraine to Poland.

The increase in the relative deprivation of Ukrainian citizens in the 1990s was also reflected in data on economic satisfaction in Ukraine<sup>206</sup>. These data show that almost three fourths of Ukrainian population felt worse off each year<sup>207</sup>, whereas the share of those who reported improvement in their material status is very small, and is becoming even smaller (7.1% in 1994 and 5.2% in 1998). These data refer to the perception of material status, and not to hard data. Golovakha<sup>208</sup> argued that they represent only the subjective feelings of Ukrainian respondents, whereas actual living standards<sup>209</sup> in Ukraine did not worsen, and even improved. On the other hand, the

feeling of relative deprivation – a powerful driving force for individual out-migration - is a subjective assessment.

The difference in unemployment rates is another important factor shaping migratory movements.<sup>210</sup> According to official Ukrainian data, the unemployment rate is very low, although it increased from 0.03% in 1992 to 4.2% in 1999<sup>211</sup>. It should, however, be noted that official figures do not correspond to the real situation, as ‘hidden’ unemployment has become widespread. ‘According to the Ukrainian Ministry of Labour, in 1994, almost one in three employees either worked part-time, or was in a long-term unpaid ‘administrative’ leave because production has been halted. In separate regions of Ukraine about half of the employed were on “administrative” leave.’<sup>212</sup> As a consequence, the number of people who are self-employed and engaged in both legal and illegal activities is growing. ‘According to some estimates, it involves eight million people, that is, more than one third of the labour force in Ukraine.’<sup>213</sup> In fact, according to official figures, the level of unemployment is much higher in Poland than in Ukraine. In 1998, the registered unemployment rate was 13% in Poland and it has increased by 5.5% when compared with 1993 (6.5%). Such a high rate of unemployment in Poland is related to the fact that many old and ineffective industrial and agricultural companies are being closed down. This is a result of the transition of the Polish economy towards a market economy. In Ukraine, the above process is also underway, but is less advanced.

It is clear that the comparison of the official data on the levels of unemployment in Poland and Ukraine is not a good predictor of movements from Ukraine to Poland. However, the official figures for Ukraine do not reflect the catastrophic nature of the situation. At the same time, Ukrainians coming to Poland are often employed in the shadow economy, thus, are beyond the official labour market. While doing typical simple migrant jobs, foreigners satisfy the demand for a cheap foreign labour force in Poland created by the Polish shadow economy. People working in this sector – either Polish nationals or foreigners – are not registered in the official statistics of the labour force in Poland. In fact, officially, such workers are often unemployed and work in the shadow economy constitutes for them the only additional source of income.

The above main macroeconomic factors create push and pull factors for the movements from Ukraine to Poland. Clearly, they may also stimulate settlement migration from Ukraine to Poland. This is due to the fact that there are better economic and life prospects in Poland than in Ukraine. At the same time, the low level of

satisfaction with welfare benefits (medical care as an indicator) and with the overall stability and security also can be an important push factor stimulating settlement emigration from a given country.<sup>214</sup> In fact, in Ukraine, the indicators of life satisfaction are dramatically low and were worsening in the 1990s.<sup>215</sup> In 1995, as many as two thirds of Ukrainians pointed to a lack of stability in their country and society; the percentage of such opinions rose to 71% in 1997. Moreover, about two thirds of respondents, in 1995-1998<sup>216</sup>, reported that basic medical care is insufficient in Ukraine. Finally, protection from crime appeared to be unsatisfactory for about 68% of respondents in 1995 and in 1997<sup>217</sup>. Therefore, apart from the overall macro-determinants of migration from Ukraine to Poland, there are also push factors which may stimulate settlement out-flow from Ukraine.

It should be noted that there are also other structural factors related to migratory movements themselves which influence the volume and patterns of migration from Ukraine to Poland. On the one hand, Polish authorities do not provide many, if any, incentives for Ukrainians to migrate to Poland. The policy applied in many countries of Western Europe,<sup>218</sup> which aimed at attracting low-paid unskilled foreign labour force, has not been applied in Poland. In Western countries, such a policy led to a sharp increase in immigration from less developed countries. On the other hand, Ukrainian citizens have the right to free entry to Polish territory for a period not longer than three months (see Appendix I). This, in fact, creates considerable possibilities for illegal migration, as the right to free entry applies only to tourists, who are not entitled to work in Poland. Nevertheless, this regulation makes migration from Ukraine to Poland relatively easy. At the same time, the proximity of the Polish border involves short and cheap trips which are simple to organise. Also, the fact that Polish and Ukrainian cultures and languages are similar makes migration from Ukraine to Poland less difficult. Thanks to this, Ukrainian migrants do not encounter language problems and are able to adjust relatively quickly to Polish society.

To sum up, there are several structural factors which stimulate migration from Ukraine to Poland. Moreover, the proximity of Polish and Ukrainian territories as well as similarity between the two cultures, makes migration from Ukraine to Poland relatively cheap and easy. Finally, it should be noted that there are also structural factors in Ukraine which may stimulate Ukrainian settlement out-migration.

#### 4.2.2. *Historical ties*

Historical ties between Poland and Ukraine result from a past which was filled with conflicts, wars and constantly rearranged agreements. Until the revolt under Bohdan Chmielnicki, which took place in 1648, neither Polish authorities nor Polish citizens perceived Ukrainians as a separate nation. At the same time the whole Ukraine was within Polish borders.<sup>219</sup> According to Babiński<sup>220</sup> Ukrainian national identity was finally formed in the second part of the XIX century. At that time, relationships between Poles and Ukrainians took the form of a partnership (before which time Poland did not treat Ukraine as a partner). This did not, however, lead to the creation of a sovereign Ukrainian state. Ukrainians fought for their independence with Russia, Poland, Romania, and the Czech Republic, up until the end of the Second World War<sup>221</sup>, when the whole territory of Ukraine was incorporated into the former Soviet Union. An independent Ukrainian state was established only after the collapse of the Soviet empire in 1991.

Ukrainian national identity also developed within Polish territory. After a series of wars, the military position of Poland in this part of Europe became weakened. Its territory shrunk and eventually Poland disappeared in the late XVIII century. Therefore only western Ukraine (that part which was on Polish territory after the First World War) was under the strong influence of Polish culture, whereas other parts of Ukraine were subjected to intensive Russification. Nevertheless, Polish and Ukrainian cultures have a lot in common, especially that the Polish and Ukrainian languages are very similar. The most important difference between these two cultures is religion: Poles mostly belong to the Catholic Church, whereas in Ukraine there are a few influential churches. The Greek Catholic and the Orthodox Church are the most popular. The Greek Catholic Church is especially influential in western Ukraine, whereas most inhabitants living in eastern Ukraine adhere to the Orthodox Church. These churches are also present in Poland, but attended mostly by representatives of national minorities (Belarusians, Russians and Ukrainians). Nevertheless, apart from religious differences, the strong historical and cultural ties between western Ukraine and Poland stimulate migration from this region of Ukraine to Poland<sup>222</sup>.

Starting from XVII century the Polish-Ukrainian border<sup>223</sup> has shifted many times. Those changes caused mobility movements between the two countries. Nowadays, a large group of people of Ukrainian nationality lives in Poland. The



estimated size of this group varies from 150 to 300 thousand people.<sup>224</sup> Its members were scattered all over Poland in the displacement action (*Akcja Wisła*) taken up by Polish authorities in 1947 in order to prevent the creation of a strong Ukrainian minority in Poland. Later on, mainly after 1989, many of the ethnic Ukrainians came back to their regions of birth – south-eastern Poland. However, there are regions where many Ukrainians were resettled in the 1940s and where they still form a strong Ukrainian minority – in particular in south-western Poland. At the same time, the number of people of Polish origins living in Ukraine was estimated at 219 thousand in 1989.<sup>225</sup> The existence of large national minorities of Polish people in Ukraine and Ukrainians in Poland involve social ties between members of these communities and their country folk in the countries of origin. These ties appear to be the basis for social capital formation which may stimulate migratory movements between the two countries.

In 1956, the Communist authorities allowed for the creation of socio-cultural associations of national minorities in Poland. The Socio-Cultural Ukrainian Association was the largest one among them. It operated in many regions in Poland, as ethnic Ukrainians were dispersed all over Polish territory. The organisation was controlled by the Polish authorities, thus, its members had very limited opportunities for independent initiatives. Contacts with Ukrainians living in Ukraine were limited to a few official channels. The main activity of the association was the organisation of cultural events promoting Ukrainian culture in Poland. Starting from 1989, the association changed considerably its modes of operation. From that moment it was named the Ukrainian Association in Poland. It became much more independent of the Polish authorities. The beginning of the 1990s brought with it the revival of the activities of most national minorities in Poland. This was also the case with the Ukrainian minority and the Ukrainian Association in Poland grew<sup>226</sup>. As of the mid 1990s, the association had 7,500 members.<sup>227</sup> Virtually all members of the association are Polish citizens of Ukrainian origin. According to the opinion of the president of the Ukrainian Association in Poland, the number of the Ukrainian citizens in Poland who co-operate with the association does not exceed twenty persons<sup>228</sup>. At the present time, the activities of the association also involve mainly the cultural sphere, but the association has also developed more contacts with other organisations in Ukraine and also with the Polish minority in Ukraine. In general, the co-operation between Polish organisations in Ukraine and Ukrainian ones in Poland as well as the involvement of various Polish and

Ukrainian bodies in these activities are important facilitators of movements between the two countries. It enables, for example, the exchange of students. In particular, many Ukrainian students of Polish origins are travelling to Poland, as they are entitled to scholarships from the Polish Ministry of Education.

In general, these strong and ancient historical ties between Poland and Ukraine, in particular with western Ukraine, stimulate migratory movements between the two countries. At the same time, the revival of the activities of national minorities in both countries, at the beginning of the 1990s, also renewed the social and organisational ties between the two countries. It should be noted, however, that Polish-Ukrainian conflicts from the past contribute to many tensions in the Polish-Ukrainian relations at the moment. These conflicts shape the attitude of Polish people towards Ukrainians, which tend to be rather negative. The latter is a factor which may restrain some Ukrainians from coming to Poland due to the fear of being exposed to xenophobic reactions from Polish people.

#### **4.2.3. Political ties**

After the Second World War, Poland had strong political ties with the USSR, thus also indirectly with Ukraine. Both countries were in the same military organisation (Warsaw Pact) as well as in the economic system (Council for Mutual Economic Aid – hereafter CMEA). However, it was the Soviet Union which was the dominant force in these agreements, not Ukraine. The latter was only one of many republics of the Soviet Empire.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Poland like other European countries, faced the need for a rearrangement of its foreign affairs. Ukraine became Poland's closest and the largest neighbour. These two countries whose co-operation had been very close since the Second World War, had to develop a new bilateral policy in a completely changed environment. Poland was the first country which acknowledged the independence of the newly established Ukrainian state in 1991. Since then, both countries have been aiming at developing satisfactory international co-operation. The Polish Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka in her lecture given at the Centre of Eastern Studies in Warsaw in 1993 stated that co-operation with Ukraine constituted one of the four main mechanisms of Polish international strategy. In the same lecture the Polish Prime Minister pointed to Polish-Ukrainian international affairs as a model of satisfactory co-operation.<sup>229</sup> The importance of developing a Polish-Ukrainian

partnership differed in the policies of various Polish governments. Nevertheless, according to Połohało<sup>230</sup>, since 1991 ‘We witness a dynamic creation of partnership of two European countries – Poland which is involved in almost every economic and political West-European structure, and Ukraine which aims to co-operate with West-European bodies as to finally become a member of these structures.’<sup>231</sup>.

In the international arena, Poland presents itself as the ally of Ukraine and supports it in various international debates. A prominent example of such a form of politics was the negotiations concerning the new gas pipeline from Russia to Western Europe. The pipeline may either go via Ukraine or bypass it. The first option involves considerable financial benefits for Ukraine, but Russia opted for the second solution. In this debate, the Polish government has strongly supported the option which is more profitable for Ukraine.

At the same time, Polish-Ukrainian migration policies are well advanced in comparison to those with the other republics of the former Soviet Union. Ukraine was the first country among the republics of the former Soviet Union with which Poland signed a bilateral agreement relating to the employment of labour (16.02.1994)<sup>232</sup> and a readmission agreement. This agreement was signed in 1993, and became effective in 1994<sup>233</sup>. Moreover, in 1997, Poland and Ukraine signed another agreement which allows citizens of both countries (tourists) to cross the Polish-Ukrainian border without visas. Due to the requirements for joining European Union, Poland will have to introduce visas for citizens of all non-candidate countries in the near future. However, Poland announced that visas for Ukrainian citizens would be introduced as late as possible. In this, Ukraine is to be the last country from among those for which Poland has to introduce visas.

In general, Polish-Ukrainian relations are in the process of development. Both parts aim at effective co-operation with their closest neighbour. At the same time, Polish-Ukrainian migration policy is well advanced and promotes migration from Ukraine to Poland. The latter facilitates migratory movements between the two countries.

#### **4.2.4. Economic ties**

After dissolution of the CMEA both the Polish and Ukrainian economy lost important export markets. Production and distribution systems created according to

guidelines from the centre in Moscow were no longer effective. Therefore, both countries had to undergo an in-depth economic transformation. It should, however, be noted that Ukraine was much more dependent on its economic ties and co-operation with the other republics of the former USSR than was Poland during the Soviet period. Thus, the transformation of the Ukrainian economy involves much deeper structural changes than does the transition of the Polish economy. In fact, the latter is already much more advanced. In particular, the privatisation process, a key element of the transition, has been very slow in Ukraine.<sup>234</sup>

Both economies are similar, but economic ties between them (usually as measured on a scale of investments made by citizens/firms in each others countries) are not very strong. According to the Statistical Yearbook of Ukraine for 1997, at the beginning of 1998 direct Polish investment (37.2 million USD) accounted for only 2% of total direct foreign investment in Ukraine. However, it has risen since 1995 by 184%. At the same time, direct Ukrainian investment in Poland was below 1% of total Ukrainian direct investment abroad at the beginning of 1998 (318.5 thousand USD). Such weak economic ties in terms of foreign investment stem mainly from the poor condition of the Ukrainian economy and from the lack of an effective institutional framework for investment in Ukraine. For example, a crucial barrier was constituted by the fact that there was no Polish-Ukrainian bank which could process Polish-Ukrainian investment before 1997.<sup>235</sup>

The volume of Polish-Ukrainian trade also has not been very high since 1991. Up until the mid 1990s, Polish export to Ukraine accounted for only 1% of the total Polish export. On the other hand, Poland was the second importer (after Germany) for Ukraine, but Polish imports accounted only for around 10% of the overall Ukrainian exports.<sup>236</sup>

Nevertheless, since 1991 Poland and Ukraine have signed various bilateral agreements which could stimulate economic co-operation, trade and investment. Both countries promote each other under the 'most favoured clause in the realms of duties, taxes and various fees.'<sup>237</sup> Moreover, Poland and Ukraine have developed interregional co-operation which is an important form of international economic co-operation<sup>238</sup>. It is clear that in the light of factors which might limit large scale Polish-Ukrainian economic co-operation, such interregional co-operation may play a significant role in Polish-Ukrainian relations. An agreement on just such co-operation was signed on

23.05.1993. Poland and Ukraine were also the first two countries of Central and Eastern Europe to join the Madrid Convention of the European Council for trans-border co-operation between communities and between local authorities.

In particular, interregional co-operation may stimulate investments and trans-border trade in border areas. It is thanks to such agreements, for example, that Polish investments predominate in one Ukrainian Special Economic Zone, 'Jawor'. This has been in operation for about one year, and ten Polish small businesses were established there in that period.<sup>239</sup> At the same time, trans-border trade has constituted an important element of the economic performance of the border regions of both Poland and Ukraine. According to estimates, in the 1990s, 95% of the border crossings in south-eastern Poland were related to trade activities<sup>240</sup>. This involved both official trade and activities undertaken in the shadow economy. In general, there were two phases in the development of trans-border trade in Poland in the 1990s. In 1991-1994, it was mainly the import of cheap goods from the former USSR to Poland. Since the mid 1990s, Ukrainians as well as citizens of the other republics of the former USSR have been importing goods from Poland to their home countries. The second phase continues, but there has been a slow down in trans-border trade activities due to the crisis in the Russian economy in 1998.<sup>241</sup>

The size of Polish-Ukrainian economic co-operation is typically underestimated because of the large shadow economy element in both countries – a typical feature of post-Soviet societies.<sup>242</sup> It is clear that there are many Polish-Ukrainian small firms which operate beyond the official market in both countries and thus are not captured in statistics. Such activities are usually based on person-to-person relations. Moreover, it has been estimated that the value of unofficial trans-border trade between Poland and Ukraine was considerably higher than the volume of official international trade<sup>243</sup>. The above phenomena, related to Polish-Ukrainian economic co-operation in the shadow economy, are directly related to migratory movements between Poland and Ukraine. Therefore, the economic activities of migrants contribute to the development of Polish-Ukrainian economic ties at the local level. At the same time, such local and trans-regional co-operation seems to be an important element in Polish-Ukrainian economic co-operation at the present time.

In general, economic ties between Poland and Ukraine measured by the official data are not very strong. However, this is due to the economic crisis which got

underway in Ukraine in the 1990s as well as to the lack of a proper legal framework for official Polish-Ukrainian economic co-operation. It appears that co-operation at the local and interregional level is of particular importance at the present stage of Polish-Ukrainian economic relations. It has grown chiefly in border regions and is strongly related to migratory movements between the two countries. It should, however, be noted that such co-operation usually involves small-scale investments which do not contribute considerably to the overall picture of international co-operation.

### **4.3. International migration in Ukraine**

#### **4.3.1. General overview**

‘Historically, migration has greatly influenced the size of Ukraine’s population, as well as its age and ethnic composition. For centuries, during which Ukraine did not exist as an independent state, the Ukrainian lands were outlying districts of great empires – districts whose manpower and natural resources were used in the interests of the metropolitan centres.’<sup>244</sup>

In the early XX century, overpopulation and lack of industrial development caused a massive emigration from western as well as eastern Ukraine. Western Ukrainians tended to migrate overseas (United States and Canada), whereas inhabitants of the eastern part moved to other parts of the Soviet Union<sup>245</sup>. The Ukrainian diaspora, formed overseas as a consequence of those movements, especially from the western Ukraine, comprises two million people in the USA, and one million in Canada.<sup>246</sup>

From the moment Ukraine was incorporated into the Soviet Union, the mobility of Ukrainians was restricted to movements within the Soviet Empire. Only a proportion of these movements was voluntary, mainly to seek work in remote territories of the country. Many Ukrainian migrants were resettled to regions where there were labour shortages, especially in agriculture and construction. In general, the volume of Ukrainian movements within the territory of the former Soviet Union was high. According to the 1989 Soviet ‘census’, the group of people of Ukrainian origin living outside the Republic of Ukraine amounted to 6.8 million (including 4.36 million in Russia, 896 thousand in Kazakhstan, and 600 thousand in Moldova).<sup>247</sup> On the other hand, there was a significant influx from the other republics of the Soviet Union to the Republic of Ukraine, which resulted in a decomposition of its ethnic structure. In 1989, Ukrainians accounted for only 55% of the whole population of Ukraine, whereas

Russians accounted for as much as 27%. Other ethnic groups present in Ukraine at that time were: Bulgarians (6%), Moldovans (6%), Jews (3%) and others (3%).<sup>248</sup> It could be argued that spatial mobility was promoted within the Soviet Union and this could contribute to the relatively high propensity of citizens of the former USSR to take up migratory activities today.

Mobility movements within the territory of the former Soviet Union continued also after its dissolution and the creation of an independent Ukrainian state in 1991. At first, it was mostly repatriation, which reached its peak in 1992 (504,577 people came to Ukraine). Afterwards immigration to Ukraine started to decline. Emigration from Ukraine decreased immediately after 1991, as movements typical for the Soviet period diminished, but deep economic crisis in Ukraine gave a kick start to another increase in emigration in 1993. In 1994, for the first time in the post-war period, Ukraine experienced net emigration to the countries of the former Soviet Union (-91,606 people).<sup>249</sup>

The establishment of an independent Ukraine also brought about changes in migration to the West. The main change was that from that moment virtually everybody was allowed to migrate (it was extremely difficult during the Soviet period). Until the end of 1991, about 200 thousand permits for settlement migration were issued.<sup>250</sup> The main destination country of the first waves of settlement emigration from the independent Ukraine was Israel (87,823 persons in 1990 - the peak year) whereas Germany took second position (21,444 in 1991 - the peak year). This migration was chiefly ethnic migration and repatriation. Many ethnic Jews and Germans were returning to their mother countries. Other destinations of settlement migrants have gained in importance since 1992 and economic reasons gradually have replaced ethnic issues. Table 4.1 presents a scale of settlement migration between Ukraine and countries other than those of the former Soviet Union. It does not cover temporary movements.

Table 4.1 Settlement migration between Ukraine and countries other than the former Soviet Union

| Year | Immigrants   | Emigrants <sup>a</sup> | Net          |
|------|--------------|------------------------|--------------|
| 1989 | Missing data | 5,096                  | Missing data |
| 1990 | Missing data | 95,371                 | Missing data |
| 1991 | 47,451       | 73,587                 | -26,136      |
| 1992 | 33,628       | 53,933                 | -20,305      |
| 1993 | 18,532       | 47,965                 | -29,433      |
| 1994 | 9,349        | 58,670                 | -49,321      |
| 1995 | 6,664        | 54,058                 | -47,394      |
| 1996 | 5,784        | 53,047                 | -47,263      |
| 1997 | 5,949        | 51,675                 | -45,726      |
| 1998 | 5,058        | 50,049                 | -44,991      |
| 1999 | 4,155        | 48,411                 | -44,256      |

Source: State Committee of Ukraine

Since the beginning of the 1990s Ukraine has experienced a considerable settlement net emigration alongside an increase in the number of Ukrainian citizens who intended to migrate. According to various pools, there is a high emigration potential in certain age and social categories, especially among students and young specialists with post-secondary education.<sup>251</sup> Table 4.2 describes the propensity of Ukrainian respondents to settlement migration (change of residence).<sup>252</sup> According to this, the share of Ukrainians who would like to migrate to the West has increased, whereas other directions (other places in Ukraine, Russia, other republics of the former Soviet Union) have become less popular<sup>253</sup>. A considerable increase in such a propensity took place in 1995, whereas in later years it was insignificant. The percentage of those who are eager to migrate to the West never fell to its 1994 level. In 1998, almost 10% of Ukrainian respondents were willing to migrate abroad (beyond the former Soviet Union), which means that about 5 million Ukrainians would like to move abroad, as settlement migrants.



Table 4.2 Destinations of potential Ukrainian migrants according to year of respondents' declarations (in percent)<sup>a</sup>

| Year | Ukrainians who would like to migrate <sup>b</sup> | Destination               |        |                                            |                                                |
|------|---------------------------------------------------|---------------------------|--------|--------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|
|      |                                                   | Other location in Ukraine | Russia | Other republics of the former Soviet Union | Foreign country beyond the Former Soviet Union |
| 1994 | 16.1                                              | 15.3                      | 12.7   | 1.1                                        | 4.6                                            |
| 1995 | 16.4                                              | 9.9                       | 11.5   | 1.4                                        | 10.8                                           |
| 1996 | 18.1                                              | 10.4                      | 13.3   | 1.2                                        | 9.1                                            |
| 1997 | 17.2                                              | 11.2                      | 9.3    | 1.2                                        | 9.9                                            |
| 1998 | 18.8                                              | 11.3                      | 9.7    | 1.4                                        | 9.7                                            |

<sup>a</sup> Those who did not define any destination and those who did not intend to migrate are excluded.

<sup>b</sup> This percentage is much lower than the sum of percentages in following columns in a given row, as some people who answered that they do not know if they would migrate or that they did not want to migrate, pointed destination areas to which they would like to move if they decided to migrate.

Source: N. Panina, E. Golovakha, *Tendencies in the Development of Ukrainian Society (1994-1998) Sociological Indicators*, Kiev, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, 1999, p. 137

The main reason for settlement emigration<sup>254</sup>, pointed to by Ukrainian respondents, was environmental conditions harmful for health (18.6% in 1994 and 15.6 in 1998). However, such a high ratio of people referring to environmental conditions should be associated with a specific factor – the catastrophe in the Chernobyl which caused widespread pollution in many areas of Ukraine. On the other hand, the desire for a new job was another important motive for moving. In 1994-1998 the share of people who identified that as a motive doubled (it was 7.1% in 1994 and 14.4% in 1998). Only this reason for settlement migration gained so much in importance<sup>255</sup>. Clearly, economic reasons became substantial motives for Ukrainians to take up settlement migration. This phenomenon should be linked with data indicating the low satisfaction of Ukrainian citizens with changes in the economic conditions of their lives. It seems that a considerable group of Ukrainians perceived migration as a mean for improving their economic well-being.

It should be noted, however, that, in order to improve economic well-being of a household, settlement migration is not necessary. Temporary migration can work very effectively in achieving this purpose. This is because it brings attractive incomes but does not involve the cost of resettlement. In fact, temporary migration became an important part of survival strategy of many Ukrainian households in the 1990s. According to opinion polls, 5% of the economically active population in Ukraine make

regular trips to earn a living abroad, whereas 20% of working-age people make such trips occasionally.<sup>256</sup>

Temporary migration from Ukraine towards the West has been bigger than the waves of settlement migration. The year 1989 brought an enormous growth in the number of temporary emigrants, and about 1.5 million people received permits for temporary migration (compared to only 360 thousand in 1988). This figure reached 2-2.3 million per annum in 1990-1992.<sup>257</sup> Unfortunately, data on subsequent years are not available, as since January 1993, when a Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers granted all citizens the right to free movement abroad, the Ukrainian state no longer issues permits for temporary trips abroad. Frontier guards estimated that since 1993 those movements have decreased. It was not, however, a considerable decrease.<sup>258</sup>

A large share of Ukrainian migrants went to neighbouring countries as petty-traders exploiting differences in prices and exchange rates. This business was very profitable in the early 1990s<sup>259</sup>. An increase in the number of temporary labour migrants has been observed since 1994.<sup>260</sup> They were not only seasonal workers, but also labour migrants, arranged either in terms of contracts or through educational training programmes including trips within the technical assistance programmes currently rendered by international organisations from West European countries and the USA. In general, the main destination countries for temporary migrants were Poland, other Central and Eastern Europe countries, China, and Turkey.<sup>261</sup>

A survey carried out at three Ukrainian border crossing points at borders with Poland, the Slovak Republic, Hungary and Romania<sup>262</sup> during autumn 1997 and spring 1998<sup>263</sup> brought some information about Ukrainian migrants<sup>264</sup>. Table 4.3 presents the distribution of migrants by the main goals of their trips.

Table 4.3 Ukrainian migrants according to the purpose of their actual and prospective trips (in percent<sup>265</sup>)

| Goal of trip                                   | International migrants       |        |                              |        |                                           |        |
|------------------------------------------------|------------------------------|--------|------------------------------|--------|-------------------------------------------|--------|
|                                                | Western Ukraine <sup>a</sup> |        | Central Ukraine <sup>b</sup> |        | Eastern and Southern Ukraine <sup>c</sup> |        |
|                                                | Actual                       | Prosp. | Actual                       | Prosp. | Actual                                    | Prosp. |
| Shopping                                       | 41.3                         | 40.0   | 30.1                         | 22.9   | 20.6                                      | 21.4   |
| Visit family or friends visit                  | 21.6                         | 17.3   | 15.7                         | 15.4   | 17.2                                      | 14.9   |
| Trade                                          | 12.4                         | 12.6   | 17.7                         | 22.3   | 13.1                                      | 17.2   |
| Tourism                                        | 11.3                         | 7.8    | 18.2                         | 14.8   | 29.5                                      | 23.2   |
| To have a rest, or medical treatment           | 3.7                          | 6.1    | 2.6                          | 6.1    | 6.2                                       | 5.8    |
| Temporary work which is more profitable abroad | 3.5                          | 9.7    | 3.2                          | 7.8    | 3.6                                       | 6.2    |
| Other                                          | 6.2                          | 6.5    | 12.5                         | 10.7   | 9.8                                       | 11.3   |

<sup>a</sup> Oblasti: Cherniviecka, Ivano-Frankowska, Lvivska, Rivnienska, Termopiliska, Volinska, Zakarpatskaya

<sup>b</sup> Oblasti: Cherkaska, Kievska, Khmielnicka, Kirovogradska, Vinnicka, Žitomirska

<sup>c</sup> Oblasti: Crimea, Dnipropetrovska, Doniecka, Luganska, Kharkovska, Kherconska, Mikolayevska, Odeska, Poltawska, Sumskaya, Zaporozska

Source: International Organisation for Migration, *Struktura i napriyamki migratsiynykh potokiv naseleण्या Ukrainy (The Structure and Characteristics of Migratory Flows in Ukraine)* Kiev, 1998, p. 19

Migrants from different parts of Ukraine differ in their main purposes of travel. Evidently, people who go shopping prevail in migration from Ukraine. The share of those who go shopping and to visit family or friends – movements typical for border regions - is considerably higher for western Ukrainian migrants than for those from other parts of the country (the survey was conducted on the western Ukrainian border). On the other hand, tourism is most popular among migrants from the eastern Ukraine.

Those who migrate to make money abroad (trade, and temporary work) account for only around one fifth of respondents. It seems, however, that the shares of Ukrainian economic migrants might be underestimated in the outcomes of such research. This is due to the fact that shares of those who only intend to take up labour migration in the future are considerably higher than shares of actual labour migrants<sup>266</sup>. Evidently, there was a group of Ukrainian respondents who did not acknowledge that they were labour migrants. Ukrainian temporary migrants often work illegally in neighbouring countries, hence their reluctance to admit to migrant status. According to this survey, only 39% of those who had worked in the destination countries or were going for work at the moment of the survey had work permits<sup>267</sup>.

To sum up, the beginning of the 1990s brought about a considerable increase in migration from Ukraine. High-volume temporary movements involving income-generating activities were driven mainly by the catastrophic conditions of the Ukrainian economy. It is clear that settlement migration has been a minor part of the overall outflow from Ukraine and settlement emigrants were mainly repatriates of German and Jewish origin. Nevertheless, the potential for resettlement abroad seems to be relatively high among Ukrainian citizens. As for temporary movements, economic reasons constitute an important determinant of this propensity to settlement out-migration.

### 4.3.2. *Emigration to Poland*

#### 4.3.2.1. General trends and temporary migration

Poland is an important destination country for migrants from Ukraine, especially for temporary labour migrants. It is estimated that 70% of Ukrainian migrants of this kind made their trips there in the early 1990s.<sup>268</sup> This finding is supported by data collected during research carried out on migrant households in Ukraine in 1993-1996<sup>269</sup>. The method of the study was one based on the assumptions of ethnosurvey<sup>270</sup> as proposed by Douglas Massey.<sup>271</sup> In an ethnosurvey, the unit of study constitutes a community (referring to the concept of local community, not to a territorial unit), which can be a village, a group of villages, a district of a town or the whole town. Communities chosen for the research had to send a considerable number of migrants abroad. They are selected on the basis of official and survey data on migration available in a given country. Ukrainian researchers chose three communities suitable for the study: Kiev (the capital of Ukraine), Chernivtsi (a medium size town in west-central Ukraine), and Prylbychi (a small village situated in Lvivska *oblast* in western Ukraine). Surveys carried out in these communities were based on representative random samples of households<sup>272</sup>. Their outcomes are representative for given communities but not for Ukraine as a whole.

The research shows that a considerable share of Ukrainian migrants chose Poland for their destination country<sup>273</sup> (see Table 4.4). In every community, emigration to Poland accounts for more than half of the total. From among migrants from Prylbychi which is located close to the Polish-Ukrainian border as many as 83% went to Poland. Most of migrants who visited Poland started their migrant activities after 1986<sup>274</sup>, especially during 1987-1991. In 1992-1994 the number of 'new migrants' was smaller by comparison with the previous period.<sup>275</sup> Evidently, data from this research provide

evidence that Ukrainian migration to Poland was an effect of economic and political changes in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which commenced in the late 1980s.

Table 4.4 Ukrainian migrants from Kiev Chernivtsi and Prylbychi who took up at least one migration to Poland in 1975-1994

| Community  | The number of international migrants | The number of migrants to Poland | The share of migrants who went to Poland in the total number of migrants (%) |
|------------|--------------------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Kiev       | 256                                  | 130                              | 51                                                                           |
| Chernivtsi | 191                                  | 99                               | 52                                                                           |
| Pribyvtsi  | 82                                   | 68                               | 83                                                                           |

Source: Own calculation on the basis of data provided by Economic Commission for Europe, United Nations

The vast majority of Ukrainian migrants from the three communities under investigation went to Poland to trade (80%). Interestingly enough, the highest proportion of traders has been observed from among migrants from Kiev (87%) which is relatively distant from Poland. Usually, trade activities are popular among inhabitants of border regions. This is due to the fact that bazaars at which migrants can sell their goods are often located close to the border. Thus, migrants can take up very short and cheap trips which enable them to obtain a high rate of return from their trade activities. Contrary to the above observations, the inhabitants of Prylbychi, which is located close to the Polish-Ukrainian border, were the most likely to work in Poland: 34% of migrants from this community worked there<sup>276</sup>. This suggests that some organisations supporting people undertaking labour migration, which appeared in Ukraine in the 1990s also operated in Prylbychi. Such organisations provided migrants with jobs and accommodation (usually of poor quality) in Poland. Thanks to these organisations people usually found it easier to involve themselves in migration since the organisation of trips was less complicated. It should be noted that very few Ukrainians from the three communities investigated went to Poland to study or to do a job commensurate with their skills (four persons – one from Chernivtsi and three from Kiev). It seems that Ukrainian labour migration to Poland usually ended up with typically low paid ‘migrant jobs’. In general, data from the research show that patterns of migration taken up from the various regions of Ukraine to Poland can be quite diverse due to some peculiar factors associated with these movements.

#### 4.3.2.2. The inclination of Ukrainian migrants towards using migrants social networks

The research mentioned above, carried out in the three Ukrainian communities, also provides important information as to the propensity of Ukrainian migrants towards taking advantage of migrant networks. This propensity differs over the migrants' communities of origin. It was the highest among migrants from Chernivtsi (69% were supported by migrant networks), and the lowest among migrants from Prylbychi (24% were supported by migrant networks) (see Table 4.5). It should be noted that migrants who made their first international trips to Poland were less likely to be supported by migrant networks than those who started their migration with trips to other countries (see Table 4.5). This relatively small propensity for migrants travelling to Poland towards taking advantage of migrant networks is probably related to the fact that the majority of these trips were taken up in order to trade in Poland. At the same time, it has been observed that it is usually difficult for migrant-traders to point to a particular person or group of people who supported them in the migration<sup>277</sup> especially given that such trips were made usually in organised groups (so called 'excursions'). Nevertheless, the small role of migrant networks in migration from Prylbychi deserves particular attention. It would suggest that migrants from this village were going to Poland rather in organised groups than on the basis of migrant networks even though most of them were workers. It is likely that workers going to Poland this way would behave similarly to traders and would not report the support of migrant networks in their migrations. The other factor which may influence such behaviour by migrants from Prylbychi is the fact that the community is located close to the Polish-Ukrainian border. It has been observed that migrants from border regions tend not to perceive their trips to the neighbouring country as international migration<sup>278</sup>, as travel to the other country is short, cheap, and common. Because of that migrants are likely to underestimate the role of factors which supported them in this migration including also the role of migrant networks.

Table 4.5 Ukrainian migrants according to whether they took advantage of migrant social networks

| Community  | The whole population of migrants |                                                    |                                                             | Migrants who took up their first migration to Poland |                                                    |                                                             |
|------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------|
|            | Total number of migrants         | Migrants supported by social networks <sup>a</sup> | The percentage of migrants supported by social networks (%) | Total number of migrants                             | Migrants supported by social networks <sup>b</sup> | The percentage of migrants supported by social networks (%) |
| Chernivtsi | 191                              | 132                                                | 69                                                          | 57                                                   | 37                                                 | 65                                                          |
| Kiev       | 256                              | 135                                                | 53                                                          | 106                                                  | 38                                                 | 34                                                          |
| Prylbychi  | 82                               | 20                                                 | 24                                                          | 65                                                   | 10                                                 | 15                                                          |

<sup>a</sup>This is a group of migrants who got help from their relatives or friends while organising migration or being abroad. It refers to those who got such help in at least one migration.

<sup>b</sup>This is a group of migrants who got help from their relatives or friends while organising migration or being abroad. It refers to those who got such help in their first migration

Source: Own calculation on the basis of data provided by Economic Commission for Europe, United Nations

The data show that various factors may differentiate the role of migrant networks in migration from different locations. At the same time, the importance of migrant networks in different types of migration varies. Nevertheless, migrant social networks supported a relatively high share of migrants to Poland. Only among migrants from Prylbychi was the proportion of such persons less than one third. It should be noted, however, that the research refers to the period when migration from Ukraine to Poland had been underway for a relatively short time, thus, migrant networks were at a relatively early stage of development. Therefore, it is very likely that the proportion of Ukrainians supported by migrant networks in their migration to Poland may have increased in the late 1990s. Moreover, the later movements comprise more migrants going to Poland for work instead of trade. In this migration of workers, migrant networks seem to play a more important role than they do in trade.

#### 4.3.2.3. Settlement migration

According to Ukrainian statistics, Poland is not the main destination country for Ukrainian settlement migrants. In 1993-1998 the share of settlement migrants who went to Poland did not exceed 2% of the total number of settlement migrants from Ukraine (see Table 4.6).

Table 4.6 Settlement migration from Ukraine to Poland in 1993-1998 according to year of migration

| Year | Ukrainian settlement migration to Poland | Ukrainian settlement migration to countries outside the former ISSR | The percentage of settlement migrants to Poland in the total number of settlement migrants (%) |
|------|------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1993 | 379                                      | 47,965                                                              | 1                                                                                              |
| 1994 | Missing data                             | 58,670                                                              | Missing data                                                                                   |
| 1995 | 671                                      | 54,058                                                              | 1                                                                                              |
| 1996 | 814                                      | 53,047                                                              | 2                                                                                              |
| 1997 | 804                                      | 51,675                                                              | 2                                                                                              |
| 1998 | 704                                      | 49,710 <sup>a</sup>                                                 | 1                                                                                              |

<sup>a</sup> This number is smaller than the number of Ukrainian settlement emigrants included in Table 4.1, even though data included in both Tables were provided by the same institution. The reason for that may be that data included in Table 4.6 were issued earlier (autumn 1999) than data in Table 4.1 (summer 2000) and data on settlement emigrants from Ukraine were completed during that time.

Source: State Committee of Ukraine

It seems that an inclination towards settlement in Poland among Ukrainian migrants is low. Moreover, according to Ukrainian statistics, settlement migration from Ukraine to Poland is mainly related to family reunions. More than 70%<sup>279</sup> of Ukrainian settlement migrants went to Poland for family reasons, which, usually, means to join their relatives there (a spouse, parents, children etc.). However, it should be noted that data provided by the State Committee of Ukraine depict only a part of settlement migration to Poland, namely those people who were granted a PRP in Poland<sup>280</sup>. At the same time, there are Ukrainian settlement migrants who have not yet obtained a PRP in Poland (compare Appendix I). It should also be noted that there is a group of Ukrainian overstayers in Poland, which is not covered by either Polish or Ukrainian statistics on settlement migrants. Those people may have a high propensity to settle permanently in Poland, but difficulties related to the regularisation of their status there restrain them from becoming legal settlers in Poland.

#### 4.4. Immigration to Poland – general trends and temporary migration

Ukrainians – inhabitants of the biggest neighbouring country to Poland – constitute a considerable part of all types of migrants going to Poland: shuttle, labour and settlement ones. Most of them come to Poland as labour migrants. In recent years, the arrivals of Ukrainian citizens to Poland accounted for 6% of all border crossings (see Table 4.7). The number of arrivals is usually higher than the number of people



coming to Poland, as many foreigners cross the Polish border more than once a year. This refers especially to German and Czech migrants, but also to Ukrainians, who typically visit the border regions of Poland. Germans, whose arrivals account for 58% of all arrivals, tend to come to Poland for shopping, whereas citizens of the Czech Republic make their trips to Poland so as to sell particular goods, especially alcohol, which are much cheaper in the Czech Republic than in Poland. Such traders usually cross the Polish border more than once a day.

Table 4.7 Arrivals of foreigners to Poland in 1997-1999 (in million); largest nationality groups

| Country        | Total |     | 1997 |     | 1998 |     | 1999 |     |
|----------------|-------|-----|------|-----|------|-----|------|-----|
|                | N     | %   | N    | %   | N    | %   | N    | %   |
| Belarus        | 11    | 4   | 3.8  | 4   | 2.6  | 3   | 4.6  | 5   |
| Czech Republic | 47.1  | 18  | 16.8 | 19  | 16.8 | 19  | 13.5 | 15  |
| Germany        | 155   | 58  | 49.6 | 56  | 51.6 | 58  | 53.8 | 60  |
| Lithuania      | 4.8   | 2   | 1.7  | 2   | 1.7  | 2   | 1.4  | 2   |
| Russia         | 6.2   | 2   | 2.0  | 2   | 2.1  | 2   | 2.1  | 2   |
| Slovakia       | 12.9  | 5   | 4.2  | 5   | 4.5  | 5   | 4.2  | 5   |
| Ukraine        | 15.4  | 6   | 5.3  | 6   | 4.8  | 5   | 5.3  | 6   |
| Other          | 12.9  | 5   | 4.3  | 5   | 4.4  | 5   | 4.2  | 5   |
| Total          | 265.5 | 100 | 87.8 | 100 | 88.6 | 100 | 89.1 | 100 |

Source: Border Guard from M.Okólski, *SOPEMI Report for Poland*, OECD, 1999 and M.Okólski, *Recent Trends in International Migration. The 2000 SOPEMI Report*, OECD, 2000

Cross-border movements have also been observed among migrants from Ukraine, but it seems that the proportion of such mobility is lower in migration from this country than in the case of German and Czech migration in recent years. Cross-border movements from Ukraine to Poland were particularly high in volume in the early 1990s.

The most numerous group among Ukrainian migrants to Poland is that of short-term labour migrants who come to Poland for a period not longer than three months. They do not need visas to come to Poland. According to research carried out at two border crossing points on the Polish-Belarusian and Polish-Ukrainian border in the summer 1995<sup>281</sup>, Ukrainians accounted for 30% of citizens from the former USSR.<sup>282</sup> Such a proportion of Ukrainian migrants does not fully depict their share in the total population of migrants to Poland, but it shows that they constitute a considerable group

among them. Most of interviewed migrants came to Poland to trade (70%), while 15% of migrants intended to seek employment in Poland. The rest of them visited Poland to study (4%) and for sightseeing (11%). Data show that male and female labour migrants differ in their primary activity in Poland. Women are more prevalent among traders (63% of traders), whereas they are in a minority among job seekers (25% of job seekers).

It should, however, be noted that the survey refers to a period when trading in Poland was a very profitable activity for migrants from the former USSR. According to qualitative studies<sup>283</sup>, at the beginning of the 1990s, it was the primary activity of short-term migrants from the former USSR, as well as from Ukraine. It was very profitable to sell cheap Ukrainian goods in Poland. In the middle of the 1990s, the relativities of Polish and Ukrainian prices changed and trade became less profitable. Nowadays, Ukrainian migrants trading in Poland are involved in only a few types of activities. Only a small proportion of them bring goods for sale in Poland. Those who are engaged in trade on a small scale come to Poland and sell commodities bought in Polish wholesalers on Polish bazaars. They stay in Poland usually for three months. Others visit Poland in order to buy cheap goods and resell them to Ukrainian wholesalers. However, when trade became less profitable, a higher proportion of Ukrainians started to migrate to Poland to do seasonal work (mainly in construction, agriculture and services).

There is also a group of Ukrainian labour migrants who work legally in Poland. They predominate in the population of foreigners granted work permits individually in Poland in 1995-1999 (16% of the total) (see Table 4.8). Data show that the number of foreigners granted such work permits has been rising since 1995, along with the volume of Ukrainians granted such permits. In 1999, the number of Ukrainians granted individual work permits totalled 2,532 persons.

Table 4.8 Work permits granted individually in 1995-1999 according to country of origin and year (top nine countries)

| Country        | Total  |     | 1995   |     | 1996   |     | 1997   |     | 1998   |     | 1999   |     |
|----------------|--------|-----|--------|-----|--------|-----|--------|-----|--------|-----|--------|-----|
|                | N      | %   | N      | %   | N      | %   | N      | %   | N      | %   | N      | %   |
| Belarus        | 3,148  | 4   | 673    | 6   | 516    | 4   | 611    | 4   | 688    | 4   | 660    | 4   |
| China          | 3,481  | 5   | 689    | 7   | 630    | 5   | 741    | 5   | 736    | 4   | 685    | 4   |
| France         | 3,339  | 5   | 276    | 3   | 386    | 3   | 602    | 4   | 937    | 6   | 1,138  | 7   |
| Germany        | 4,870  | 7   | 589    | 6   | 803    | 7   | 1,025  | 7   | 1,189  | 7   | 1,264  | 7   |
| Russia         | 3,802  | 5   | 708    | 7   | 738    | 6   | 741    | 5   | 823    | 5   | 792    | 5   |
| Ukraine        | 11,125 | 16  | 1,815  | 17  | 2,234  | 19  | 2,233  | 15  | 2,311  | 14  | 2,532  | 15  |
| United Kingdom | 5,313  | 7   | 885    | 8   | 951    | 8   | 1,106  | 7   | 1,135  | 7   | 1,236  | 7   |
| United States  | 3,664  | 5   | 578    | 6   | 680    | 6   | 816    | 5   | 806    | 5   | 784    | 5   |
| Vietnam        | 7,587  | 11  | 1,079  | 10  | 1,221  | 10  | 2,041  | 13  | 1,779  | 11  | 1,467  | 9   |
| Other          | 25,378 | 35  | 3,149  | 30  | 3,756  | 32  | 5,391  | 35  | 6,524  | 39  | 6,558  | 38  |
| Total          | 71,707 | 100 | 10,441 | 100 | 11,915 | 100 | 15,307 | 100 | 16,928 | 100 | 17,116 | 100 |

Source: National Labour Office from M.Okólski, *SOPEMI Report for Poland*, OECD, 1997; M.Okólski, *SOPEMI Report for Poland*, OECD, 1998; M.Okólski, *SOPEMI Report for Poland*, OECD, 1999 and M.Okólski, *Recent Trends in International Migration. The 2000 SOPEMI Report*, OECD, 2000

Ukrainian legal labour migrants tend to take up jobs as unskilled (26%) and skilled (17%) workers (see Table 4.9). They differ in this from other migrants, especially from those originating in countries of Western Europe (France, Germany, United Kingdom), among whom only a small proportion takes up such jobs in Poland. In fact, more than one third of migrants from these countries work in Poland as managers, whereas in the case of Ukrainians this is only 3%. Similarly Vietnamese – a very numerous group among legal labour migrants – rarely engage in jobs as skilled and unskilled workers. Most of them (57%) are owners of their own businesses. Therefore, Ukrainian labour migrants usually take up jobs in low-paid segments of the labour market, which is not the case with other labour migrants, even from other republics of the former USSR.

Table 4.9 Work permits granted individually in 1995-1999 according to occupation (top countries)

| Country        | Manager |    | Owner  |    | Expert - consultant |    | Teacher |    | Skilled worker |    | Unskilled worker |    | Other  |    |
|----------------|---------|----|--------|----|---------------------|----|---------|----|----------------|----|------------------|----|--------|----|
|                | N       | %  | N      | %  | N                   | %  | N       | %  | N              | %  | N                | %  | N      | %  |
| Belarus        | 38      | 6  | 99     | 15 | 108                 | 16 | 100     | 15 | 119            | 18 | 13               | 2  | 183    | 28 |
| China          | 635     | 18 | 1,513  | 43 | 318                 | 9  | 28      | 1  | 688            | 20 | 31               | 1  | 268    | 8  |
| France         | 1,651   | 49 | 385    | 12 | 610                 | 18 | 217     | 6  | 43             | 1  | 5                | 0  | 428    | 13 |
| Germany        | 1,869   | 38 | 996    | 20 | 924                 | 19 | 546     | 11 | 105            | 2  | 1                | 0  | 429    | 9  |
| Russia         | 453     | 12 | 809    | 21 | 762                 | 20 | 515     | 14 | 292            | 8  | 99               | 3  | 872    | 23 |
| Ukraine        | 320     | 3  | 930    | 8  | 1,148               | 10 | 1,782   | 16 | 1,921          | 17 | 2,877            | 26 | 2,147  | 19 |
| United Kingdom | 1,516   | 29 | 432    | 8  | 362                 | 7  | 2,457   | 46 | 5              | 0  | 1                | 0  | 540    | 10 |
| United States  | 1,202   | 33 | 441    | 12 | 445                 | 12 | 1,974   | 29 | 6              | 0  | 5                | 0  | 491    | 13 |
| Vietnam        | 932     | 12 | 4,292  | 57 | 369                 | 5  | 15      | 0  | 1,601          | 21 | 17               | 0  | 361    | 5  |
| Other          | 7,750   | 31 | 5,573  | 22 | 4,398               | 17 | 1,398   | 6  | 1,822          | 7  | 289              | 1  | 4,148  | 16 |
| Total          | 16,471  | 23 | 15,663 | 22 | 9,723               | 14 | 8,475   | 12 | 7,315          | 10 | 3,674            | 5  | 10,386 | 14 |

Source: National Labour Office SOPEMI 1997-2000

It appears that work permits granted individually are usually issued for short periods. This is suggested by the comparison between the volume of migrants granted a Temporary Residence Permit (hereafter – a TRP) in Poland and the volume of foreigners granted work permits individually<sup>284</sup> in 1998-1999<sup>285</sup>. For example, if we compare the number of TRPs and work permits issued in 1999<sup>286</sup> (12,184 versus 17,116), it appears that the latter outnumber TRPs as much as 1.4 times. Therefore, a relatively high proportion of work permits granted individually can be expected to be short-term permits (for a period shorter than 12 months<sup>287</sup>).

Table 4.10 Foreigners granted TRP in Poland<sup>a</sup> according to the year of the first document and citizenship<sup>b</sup>

| The year of first document's acquisition | Total  | Europe |                | Former USSR |                | Ukraine |                |
|------------------------------------------|--------|--------|----------------|-------------|----------------|---------|----------------|
|                                          | N      | N      | % <sup>c</sup> | N           | % <sup>c</sup> | N       | % <sup>d</sup> |
| 1998                                     | 3,995  | 685    | 17             | 1,680       | 42             | 716     | 18             |
| 1999                                     | 12,184 | 3,468  | 28             | 4,042       | 33             | 1,789   | 15             |
| Total                                    | 16,179 | 4,153  | 26             | 5,722       | 35             | 2,505   | 16             |

<sup>a</sup> Table refers only to those who were over eighteen on 31.12.99 and who possessed their own TRP at that time.

<sup>b</sup> If a person was stateless, but information about his or her former citizenship was available, I take the latter.

<sup>c</sup> The percentage of migrants from a given area granted TRP in a given year of the total population of migrants granted TRP this year.

<sup>d</sup> The percentage of migrants from Ukraine granted TRP in a given year of the population of migrants granted TRP this year.

Source: Own elaboration on the basis of data provided by Ministry of Interior and Administration in Poland

Also, Ukrainians granted work permits individually outnumber those who obtained TRPs in 1999 in Poland (2,532 versus 1,789). It seems, therefore, that a relatively high proportion of Ukrainians working in Poland on the basis of work permits granted individually, is involved in short-term jobs. On the other hand, in the group of TRPs holders who are entitled to stay in Poland at least 12 months Ukrainians, constitute as many as 16%. This group includes: legal workers, students, businessmen, but also foreigners newly married to Polish citizens<sup>288</sup>.

To sum up, Ukrainians constitute an important part of the general migratory movements to Poland and of temporary ones in particular. According to estimates, they are especially active in illegal migration to Poland. At the same time, among the population of TRPs holders comprising legal migrants of various types, as much as one sixth of foreigners originates from Ukraine. It should be noted, however, that, while working illegally or legally in Poland, Ukrainians are usually unskilled workers.

#### 4.5. Conclusions

The economic and political transition in Central and Eastern Europe and the dissolution of the Soviet Union resulted in the formation of structural factors which led to high volume migration from Ukraine to Poland. Moreover, Poland and Ukraine – countries whose histories have been closely intertwined – now endeavour to establish

close co-operation based on the new political and economic environment which emerged after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Therefore, historical, political and economic linkages between the two countries may stimulate migration between them, especially from Ukraine to Poland. On the other hand, it should be noted that migration from Ukraine to Poland is strongly connected with the crisis which the Ukrainian economy is undergoing at the moment. It appears that economic reasons are the primary force driving out-migration from this country. Thus, movements from Ukraine to Poland may decrease when the disparities between levels of wages and standards of life in Poland and Ukraine disappear.

Data on migration from Ukraine to Poland show that Ukrainian migration is a considerable part of various kinds of movements to Poland, but Ukrainians are mainly involved in short-term trips. According to Ukrainian data<sup>289</sup>, Poland is not the main destination country for Ukrainian settlement migrants. On the other hand, it seems that there are structural factors in Poland and Ukraine which may stimulate this migration in the future. Migrant networks which support a relatively high share of Ukrainians coming to Poland may also support settlement migration from Ukraine to Poland. The volume and development of such settlement migration to Poland in the 1990s is described in the next three chapters.

## CHAPTER 5: ALIENS – FOREIGNERS INVOLVED IN MIXED MARRIAGES

### 5.1. Introduction

A mixed marriage constitutes a specific type of marital union as it is contracted between people of different religious, cultural or national backgrounds. The share of such marriages in the total number of marriages in a given society depends on that society's cultural diversity. It is higher in societies which have many religious and ethnic minorities and is relatively low in homogenous ones. At the same time, in the era of globalisation, multiculturalism and easy transportation, which involves an increase in the mobility of people, the phenomenon of mixed marriages is of growing importance.<sup>290</sup>

There are a few types of mixed marriages: interfaith, cross-cultural, interethnic and marriages contracted between people of different citizenship. They differ in their relation to the mobility of people. The last type of mixed marriage seems to be strongly determined by migration patterns, whereas interfaith, cross-cultural and interethnic marriages can be more easily contracted between people living in the same country. It should, however, be noted that various types of mixed marriages usually overlap, as people of different nationality tend to have a different the cultural background and can also be of different religion.

As far as a marriage between citizens of different countries is concerned, it frequently involves a change of the country of settlement of one partner. Traditionally, women are spouses who join their husbands in their country of settlement.<sup>291</sup> However, this depends on the economic and life prospects which the couples have in countries of origin of both husbands and wives. They usually settle in the country where they have relatively better life chances. Mixed marriages may also bring about changes in their place of settlement, during the course of their life, travelling between the countries of origin of both partners as well as to other countries. Such couples usually have a relatively high propensity to resettlement.<sup>292</sup> At the same time, their mobility is likely to grow in volume along with the transnationalisation of migratory movements.

In my dissertation, I focus on mixed marriages contracted between citizens of different countries notwithstanding their ethnicity<sup>293</sup>. For the sake of the analysis, I define a few different types of marriages:

- 'Foreign woman' marriage – a marriage contracted between a man who has Polish citizenship and a woman who has non-Polish citizenship
- 'Foreign man' marriage – a marriage contracted between a man who has Polish citizenship and a woman who has non-Polish citizenship
- 'Ukrainian woman' marriage – a marriage contracted between a man who has Polish citizenship and a woman who has Ukrainian citizenship
- 'Ukrainian man' marriage – a marriage contracted between a man who has Polish citizenship and a woman who has Ukrainian citizenship
- Polish marriage – a marriage contracted between two Polish citizens
- Ukrainian marriage – a marriage contracted between two Ukrainian citizens

## **5.2. Mixed marriages in the light of the economic approach to human behaviour**

According to Becker,<sup>294</sup> people marry to maximise their expected well-being. They decide to marry when it brings them higher utility than remaining single. Such a conceptualisation of the phenomenon of marriage constitutes an element of the economic approach to human behaviour proposed by this author. It is based on rational choice theory, which considers the family as an outcome of individual decisions, which are made on the basis of cost-benefit calculations.<sup>295</sup> It should be noted that the term 'expected well-being' refers not only to the economic satisfaction of a person, but also to other individual expectations related to a marriage and following on from the formation of a family. The broad collection of functions of family comprises cultural, social and psychological components.

Becker states that 'The output of a married household exceeds the sum of the outputs of single male and female households because men and women are biological complements in the production and rearing of children and perhaps of other households commodities, and because rates of return to specialized investment in household and market skills are greater in large households'<sup>296</sup>. Mates choose suitable partners in order to maximise their utilities and the outputs of prospective marriages. There are two types of traits of potential partners which are important in a selection process: market traits



(income, professional position, etc.), and non-market traits (age, education, health, intelligence, personality, religion etc.). High-quality mates tend to marry one another. Simple correlations between non-market traits such as: intelligence, education, age, race, religion, ethnic origin of spouses are positive and strong.<sup>297</sup> On the other hand, if there is a difference in wage rates of men and women, while the population is homogenous in terms of all other market and non-market traits, then low-wage mates tend to marry high-wage ones.<sup>298</sup> This is because the time of a low-wage partner is relatively cheap and he or she can easily devote it to household occupations (rearing children, cooking, cleaning etc.), whereas the time of a high-wage partner is utilised in market production (mainly for earning money). Moreover, young, attractive and intelligent people, especially women, are more likely to marry rich partners, as those women have valuable non-market traits, which combined with the high incomes of their spouses can work very effectively in marriage output (the utilities of both partners are relatively high in such a situation).

Becker also devotes some space to mixed marriages between people of different religion, ethnicity and nationality<sup>299</sup>. According to him, a mixed marriage is more likely to bring worse outputs<sup>300</sup> and to end up in divorce, compared to other marriages. Because of that, those who enter mixed marriages are likely to have lower expectations than others: 'Persons enter mixed marriages even though they anticipate a higher probability of divorce because they do not expect to do better by further search and waiting'<sup>301</sup>. Moreover, divorced persons are more likely to out-marry as they usually expect lower gains from a subsequent marriage after one unfortunate marriage<sup>302</sup>. On the other hand, mates entering mixed marriages can also have some specific expectations which make them prone to marry out of their religion and ethnicity.

Marriages are contracted between persons who are present in a given marriage market. In line with this assumption, a migrant enters the marriage market in the destination country upon his or her arrival to this country. It can be assumed, therefore, that a person of suitable age and marital status for marriage while moving between two areas migrates between two different marriage markets. Because of this, the phenomenon of mixed marriages between citizens of different countries is strongly related to migration trends. The marriage markets of those countries, which tend to receive more migrants, include more foreigners and people of various cultures and religious backgrounds than do the marriage markets in the countries to which the influx

of migrants is relatively small. Therefore, the volume of mixed marriages is likely to be higher in the first group of countries.

Some elements of both Becker's theory and rational choice theory can also be adapted to explain the settlement patterns of mixed marriages. According to these, people act so as to maximise their individual utility while entering marriages. After marriage, spouses also tend to maximise their utility which is strongly related to the outputs of their marriages. Because of this, a mixed marriage is likely to choose, for settlement, the country in which opportunities for high output of a marriage are greater. The latter is strongly related to the level of a household's income. However, other conditions, which are different in various countries such as, for example, immigration policy, social policy as well as educational opportunities for children or environmental issues (i.e. climate) also play their role.<sup>303</sup> As far as the income of a household is concerned, if other conditions are identical in all countries of potential settlement, a mixed couple is likely to settle in a country in which the household can generate a higher income. However, it also depends on the division of labour between the couple. In a household where only one partner is active in the labour market the couple tends to settle in a country where job prospects for this person are better. Traditionally, the husband is responsible for satisfying the family's economic needs. Therefore, mixed couples are likely to settle in the country where he can obtain higher income. This is one of the reasons why most mixed marriages live in the countries of husbands' origin. However, female participation in the labour market is rising and this rule needs no longer apply.<sup>304</sup> Dual-career households, where both husband and wife are active in the labour market, are very common at the present<sup>305</sup> The calculation of incomes, which such households can obtain in various areas of settlement involves the job and income opportunities for both partners. In mixed marriages, usually, one partner has to resign from better professional prospects, which he or she has in one country, in favour of better prospects of his or her partner in the other country.

### **5.3. Mixed marriages in Poland – general description**

The total number of mixed marriages contracted in Poland in 1989-1997 is 30,435, which comprises 1.5% of all marriages contracted in Poland during that period. Although the volume of mixed marriages contracted each year was relatively stable, the share of marriages of 'foreign woman' type increased (see Table 5.1). By 1997, the number of such marriages had doubled in comparison with 1989 whereas the number of

'foreign man' marriages fell. At the same time, the share of 'foreign woman' marriages in the total population of mixed marriages has been rising constantly since 1989 (see Figure 5.1).


Table 5.1 Mixed marriages contracted in Poland in 1989-1997

| Year of marriage | Mixed marriages |     | Marriages of 'foreign woman' type |     | Marriages of 'foreign man' type |     |
|------------------|-----------------|-----|-----------------------------------|-----|---------------------------------|-----|
|                  | N               | %   | N                                 | %   | N                               | %   |
| 1989             | 3250            | 11  | 630                               | 8   | 2620                            | 12  |
| 1990             | 4128            | 14  | 855                               | 11  | 3273                            | 14  |
| 1991             | 3791            | 13  | 736                               | 10  | 3055                            | 13  |
| 1992             | 3250            | 11  | 719                               | 9   | 2531                            | 11  |
| 1993             | 3015            | 10  | 723                               | 10  | 2292                            | 10  |
| 1994             | 3235            | 11  | 900                               | 12  | 2335                            | 10  |
| 1995             | 3240            | 11  | 920                               | 12  | 2320                            | 10  |
| 1996             | 3154            | 10  | 977                               | 13  | 2177                            | 10  |
| 1997             | 3372            | 11  | 1166                              | 15  | 2206                            | 10  |
| Total            | 30435           | 100 | 7626                              | 100 | 22809                           | 100 |

Source: Own calculation on the basis of data provided by the Polish Main Statistical Office

From the above it is clear that the changes in the composition of mixed marriages – the increase in the volume of foreign women marrying Polish men - reflect changes in general trends of migration to Poland. Namely, it reflects the fact that Poland has become the destination country for labour migrants since the beginning of the 1990s. It has been already observed that females from migrant-exporting countries have a relatively high tendency to marry citizens of the countries which are the destinations for labour migrants from women's home countries.<sup>306</sup> This is due to the fact that such marriages enable women to live in the country where they have better economic and life prospects. At the same time, in the destination countries, there are some particular factors which create a demand for foreign wives.<sup>307</sup> Such mixed marriages are widely supported by international matchmaking organisations.

Figure 5.1 Mixed marriages in Poland in 1989-1997 by sex and a year of marriage contract



Source: Own calculation on the basis of data provided by the Polish Main Statistical Office

Most of the foreigners married to Polish citizens originate from Europe (57% of all mixed marriages), whereas ex-USSR citizens are involved in one fifth of mixed marriages contracted in Poland in 1989-1997. It should be noted that the shares of 'foreign woman' marriages differ in terms of the country of origin of a foreign spouse (see Table 5.2). Among marriages with citizens of European countries, the marriages of this type constitute a small minority (12%). At the same time, as many as 67% of foreign men married to Polish women are Europeans. Most foreigners of European origin were Germans<sup>308</sup> (57% of marriages between Poles and citizens of European countries).

Table 5.2 Mixed marriages contracted in 1989-1997 in Poland according to area of origin of a foreign spouse

| Area of origin of foreign spouse | Mixed marriages |     | Marriages of 'foreign woman' type |     | Marriages of 'foreign man' type |     |
|----------------------------------|-----------------|-----|-----------------------------------|-----|---------------------------------|-----|
|                                  | N               | %   | N                                 | %   | N                               | %   |
| Europe                           | 17,334          | 57  | 2,080                             | 27  | 15,254                          | 67  |
| the former Soviet Union          | 6,211           | 20  | 4,296                             | 56  | 1,915                           | 8   |
| Asia                             | 2,106           | 7   | 333                               | 4   | 1,773                           | 8   |
| Africa                           | 860             | 3   | 26                                | 0   | 834                             | 4   |
| Northern and Central America     | 3,244           | 11  | 747                               | 10  | 2,497                           | 11  |
| Southern America                 | 175             | 1   | 31                                | 0   | 144                             | 1   |
| Australia and Oceania            | 404             | 1   | 88                                | 1   | 316                             | 1   |
| Missing data                     | 101             | 0   | 25                                | 0   | 76                              | 0   |
| Total                            | 30,435          | 100 | 7,626                             | 100 | 22,809                          | 100 |

Source: Own calculation on the basis of data provided by the Polish Main Statistical Office

The former USSR is the second area of origin, after Europe, in terms of the number of foreign spouses. However, it is the main sending area of foreign women married to Polish partners (56% of marriages of 'foreign woman' type). Among marriages of ex-USSR citizens, the marriages of 'foreign woman' type account for as much as 69%, whereas the share of such marriages in the whole population of mixed marriages in Poland does not exceed 25%.

Evidently, the phenomenon that women from the sending areas are likely to marry men from the receiving areas is reflected in the structure of the population of mixed marriages contracted in Poland. The predominance of ex-USSR citizens among women married to Polish men seems to be related to the fact that Poland is an important destination country for labour migrants from this area. Moreover, the number of the marriages between Polish citizens and women from the former Soviet Union has been rising steadily since 1989 (see Table 5.3). Thus, this phenomenon appears to be growing in importance. On the other hand, the large volume of marriages contracted between Polish women and men from European countries, in particular from Germany, appears to be conditioned by the emigration potential present in Poland. Here, Polish women marry foreign men from the typical destination countries for Polish emigrants.

Table 5.3 Marriages between Polish citizens and women from the former Soviet Union according to year of marriage contract

| Year of marriage contract | Marriages of 'foreign woman' type |                          |                                                 |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|
|                           | N                                 | Percent of the total (%) | Increase in comparison to the previous year (%) |
| 1989                      | 183                               | 4                        | Does not apply                                  |
| 1990                      | 253                               | 6                        | 38                                              |
| 1991                      | 320                               | 7                        | 26                                              |
| 1992                      | 369                               | 9                        | 2                                               |
| 1993                      | 427                               | 10                       | 16                                              |
| 1994                      | 578                               | 13                       | 35                                              |
| 1995                      | 645                               | 15                       | 12                                              |
| 1996                      | 706                               | 16                       | 9                                               |
| 1997                      | 815                               | 19                       | 15                                              |
| Total                     | 4,296                             | 100                      | 345                                             |

Source: Own calculation on the basis of data provided by the Polish Main Statistical Office

#### 5.4. Polish-Ukrainian marriages – general description

The total number of mixed marriages contracted in Poland in 1992-1997 is 19,266. Ukraine is the most important country of origin of the foreign spouses among ex-USSR countries – 45% of the foreign spouses from this area are Ukrainians. Only Germany sends more foreign spouses to Poland than Ukraine (5,203 compared to 2,203). However, the number of female Ukrainian spouses is three and a half times higher than the number of female German spouses. In this way, Ukraine is the main country of origin of foreign women married to Polish men.

Table 5.4 Mixed marriages between Polish citizens and foreigners from the area of the former Soviet Union according to country of foreigner's origin

| Country of origin of foreign spouse        | Mixed marriages |     | Mixed marriages of 'foreign woman' type |     | Mixed marriages of 'foreign man' type |     |
|--------------------------------------------|-----------------|-----|-----------------------------------------|-----|---------------------------------------|-----|
|                                            | N               | %   | N                                       | %   | N                                     | %   |
| Ukraine                                    | 2,203           | 45  | 1,703                                   | 48  | 500                                   | 37  |
| Russia                                     | 1,102           | 23  | 817                                     | 23  | 285                                   | 21  |
| Belarus                                    | 617             | 13  | 506                                     | 14  | 111                                   | 8   |
| Armenia                                    | 355             | 7   | 119                                     | 3   | 236                                   | 17  |
| Lithuania                                  | 262             | 5   | 196                                     | 6   | 66                                    | 5   |
| Other republics of the former Soviet Union | 356             | 7   | 199                                     | 6   | 157                                   | 12  |
| Total                                      | 4,895           | 100 | 3,540                                   | 100 | 1,355                                 | 100 |

Source: Own calculation on the basis of data provided by the Polish Main Statistical Office

Women are prevalent among foreigners from virtually all the republics of the former USSR who married Poles. Armenia is the only exception, but it accounts for only 7% of marriages of ex-USSR citizens. It differs from the other republics in that it is a very traditional country. The role of a woman in such a society is usually limited to domestic work, which involves the relatively low tendency for women to take up migration as well as to marry foreigners.<sup>309</sup>

The volume of the Polish-Ukrainian marriages has been rising since 1992 along with the share of Polish-Ukrainian marriages in the total population of mixed marriages in Poland (see Table 5.5). Between 1992 and 1997, their number increased threefold, mostly because of a rapid increase of 'Ukrainian woman' marriages which constitute 77% of Polish-Ukrainian marriages contracted in Poland in 1992-1997.

Table 5.5 Polish-Ukrainian marriages and the whole population of mixed marriages contracted in Poland in 1992-1997 – comparison

| Year of marriage contract | Polish-Ukrainian marriages |                | Polish-Ukrainian marriages of 'Ukrainian woman' type |                | Polish-Ukrainian marriages of 'Ukrainian man' type |                |
|---------------------------|----------------------------|----------------|------------------------------------------------------|----------------|----------------------------------------------------|----------------|
|                           | N                          | % <sup>a</sup> | N                                                    | % <sup>b</sup> | N                                                  | % <sup>c</sup> |
| 1992                      | 181                        | 6              | 134                                                  | 19             | 47                                                 | 2              |
| 1993                      | 255                        | 9              | 188                                                  | 26             | 67                                                 | 3              |
| 1994                      | 337                        | 10             | 254                                                  | 28             | 83                                                 | 4              |
| 1995                      | 420                        | 13             | 331                                                  | 36             | 89                                                 | 4              |
| 1996                      | 448                        | 14             | 340                                                  | 35             | 108                                                | 5              |
| 1997                      | 562                        | 17             | 456                                                  | 39             | 106                                                | 5              |
| Total                     | 2,203                      | 11             | 1,703                                                | 32             | 500                                                | 4              |

<sup>a</sup> Percentage of mixed marriages contracted in Poland in a given year

<sup>b</sup> Percentage of mixed marriages of 'foreign woman' type in Poland

<sup>c</sup> Percentage of mixed marriages of 'foreign man' type in Poland

Source: Own calculation on the basis of data provided by the Polish Main Statistical Office

In 1997, the share of Polish-Ukrainian marriages in all 'foreign woman' marriages was 39% whereas in 1992 it was only 19%. Such an increase has not been observed among the marriages of women from the other republics of the former Soviet Union (Ukraine excluded). The marriages of these women accounted for 33% in 1992 and for 31% in 1997 (in the peak year 1996 – 37%). Therefore, the increase in the volume of 'Ukrainian woman' marriages, though in line with a trend observed in the whole population of mixed marriages in Poland, was much higher than the average increase in the number of the other 'foreign woman' marriages. On the other hand, the 'Ukrainian man' marriages did not account for more than 5% of marriages of 'foreign man' type each year. This share was stable throughout the whole period analysed. Thus, the phenomenon of marriages contracted between Ukrainian women and Polish men particularly is growing in importance.

Therefore, the volume and the structure of the Polish-Ukrainian marriages contracted in Poland seems to be related to the migratory movements from Ukraine to Poland. The comparison of the populations of the Polish-Ukrainian marriages contracted in Poland and Ukraine constitutes additional evidence for the above thesis. In 1995-1999, there were only 507 Polish-Ukrainian marriages contracted in Ukraine and their volume has been decreasing since 1995. Moreover, they account for only 0.4% of the total population of mixed marriages in Ukraine (see Table 5.6). Thus, most of the



Polish-Ukrainian marriages appear to be contracted in Poland<sup>310</sup>. If we consider the period 1995-1997<sup>311</sup>, the proportion of the Polish-Ukrainian marriages contracted in Poland as compared to that contracted in Ukraine is 4.4. Moreover, this proportion is likely to rise over the next few years along with the growing volume of Polish-Ukrainian marriages contracted annually in Poland and the decreasing number of those contracted in Ukraine. Certainly, such a predominance of Polish-Ukrainian marriages in Poland over those in Ukraine is linked to the fact that the volume of Ukrainian migration to Poland is high, whereas only a small group of Polish people takes up trips to Ukraine. Therefore, Ukrainians are far more numerous on the Polish marriage market, when compared to Poles on the Ukrainian marriage market.

Table 5.6 Polish-Ukrainian marriages contracted in 1995-2000 in Ukraine according to year of marriage contract

| Year of marriage contract | Mixed marriages in Ukraine | Polish-Ukrainian marriages in Ukraine |                |
|---------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------------------|----------------|
|                           |                            | N                                     | % <sup>a</sup> |
| 1995                      | 41,343                     | 116                                   | 0.3            |
| 1996                      | 23,156                     | 106                                   | 0.5            |
| 1997                      | 21,007                     | 105                                   | 0.5            |
| 1998                      | 16,476                     | 100                                   | 0.6            |
| 1999                      | 14,966                     | 80                                    | 0.5            |
| Total                     | 116,948                    | 507                                   | 0.4            |

<sup>a</sup> Percentage of Polish-Ukrainian marriages in Ukraine in the total population of mixed marriages in Ukraine

Source: Own calculation on the basis of data provided by the Polish Main Statistical Office

### 5.5. Polish – Ukrainian marriages - geographical distribution<sup>312</sup>

The largest share of Polish-Ukrainian marriages was contracted in cities of less than 200 thousand inhabitants<sup>313</sup>. At the same time, for both 'Ukrainian woman' and 'Ukrainian man' marriages the share of those contracted in cities over 200 thousand inhabitants is almost the same (one third). Therefore, the statement that women have a particular propensity to migrate to big cities, which is often cited in literature,<sup>314</sup> can not easily be argued on the basis of data on Polish-Ukrainian marriages in Poland. On the contrary, Ukrainian women are more likely to marry Polish people from the Polish countryside (30%) than Ukrainian men (22%). This is a phenomenon discussed in the Polish media, namely that Polish farmers look for wives from countries of the former


Soviet Union, as they are not able to find Polish wives.<sup>315</sup> In turn this is due to the fact that Polish women would rather marry men from towns so as to leave the countryside which is synonymous with social advancement. Thus, Polish men often have to run their farms alone. For women from Ukraine, marriage to a Polish citizen can be perceived as social advancement, as life and economic prospects are better in Poland than in Ukraine. On the other hand, it is rather unlikely that Ukrainian women who marry Polish peasants originate from large Ukrainian towns.

Polish-Ukrainian marriages are dispersed across Poland (see Figure 5.2), but 35% of them were contracted in six voivodeships<sup>316</sup> in which large agglomerations and cities (cities over 200 thousand inhabitants) are situated. These were: Warsaw (11% of Polish-Ukrainian marriages), Katowice (8%), Wrocław (6%), Krakow (4%), Szczecin (3%) and Gdansk (3%) voivodeships (for the location of those voivodeships see Figure 10A.1 in the Appendix X). Thus, those who enter Polish-Ukrainian marriages are more likely to settle in large cities, when compared with the overall population of marriages contracted in Poland. For example, in 1992-1997, only 6% of the total of Polish marriages in Poland was contracted in the Warsaw voivodeship, which is twice as small as for the Polish-Ukrainian marriages<sup>317</sup>. Moreover, the vast majority of Polish-Ukrainian marriages in the Warsaw voivodeship was contracted in Warsaw itself (71%)<sup>318</sup>. Therefore, the phenomenon of Polish-Ukrainian marriages in the Warsaw voivodeship is related to migration to the big city – the capital of Poland. It attracts migrants, since it has the most active labour market in Poland and the lowest rate of unemployment. Economic conditions of life in Warsaw are also on the average better than in other regions of Poland. Probably, the situation that big cities attract the majority of migrants coming to a given voivodeship is similar in the other voivodeship with big agglomerations<sup>319</sup>. It should be noted that the ‘Ukrainian woman’ marriages were slightly more often contracted in the six above mentioned voivodeships (36% of ‘Ukrainian woman’ type and 32% of ‘Ukrainian man’ type) which to some extent reflects the propensity of women to migrate to big cities<sup>320</sup>.

On the other hand, one third of Polish-Ukrainian marriages were contracted in south-eastern Poland<sup>321</sup>, especially in Lublin (5% of Polish-Ukrainian marriages), Przemyśl (4%), and Zamość (3%) voivodeships<sup>322</sup>. Ukrainian women have a slightly higher tendency to marry Polish people from this region than Ukrainian men<sup>323</sup>. At the same time, in this region, Polish-Ukrainian marriages were relatively more likely to be

contracted in the countryside. In some voivodeships, the share of Polish-Ukrainian marriages contracted in the countryside constitutes the vast majority. In the Zamość voivodeship, it is, for example, 74%. The ‘Ukrainian woman’ marriages are particularly frequently contracted in the countryside for this region (43%)<sup>324</sup>. The fact that Ukrainian women often marry Polish citizens living in the countryside is related to the phenomenon described above, namely that Polish men are often forced to look for non-Polish spouses so as to have partners with whom to run their farms. In the border-regions, it is more popular, as the proximity of the border lowers the costs of searching for a foreign spouse as well as costs of travel between the two countries, especially when many Ukrainians come to border-areas as petty traders and seasonal workers.

Figure 5.2 Distribution of Polish-Ukrainian marriages in Poland



Source: Own elaboration on the basis of data provided by the Polish Main Statistical Office

The proximity of the Polish-Ukrainian border is certainly an important reason that a relatively large share of Polish-Ukrainian marriages were contracted in south-eastern Poland. The relative popularity of this region among Ukrainian spouses probably also stems from the fact that a considerable part of this region used to belong to Western Galicia, in which the ‘old’ Ukrainian minority has been very strong and numerous.<sup>325</sup> It is clear, therefore, that social and symbolic ties between ethnic Ukrainians living in Poland and their country folk in Ukraine contribute to the relatively

high volume of the Polish-Ukrainian marriages contracted in this region. It appears that the same factors strongly influence the geographical distribution of the Polish-German marriages contracted in Poland. Half of them were contracted in fourteen western voivodeships which have many economic, social, and cultural ties with Germany. It may, therefore, be argued that, apart from migratory trends, the proximity of borders and historical factors also play their role in shaping the geographical distribution of mixed marriages in Poland. Border communities in Poland were formed under the influence of the various shifts of the Polish border. Thus, they are inhabited by people of both Polish and foreign origin. Moreover, due to dynamic trans-border movements involving profitable trade activities, the mode of operation of these communities is of a transnational character. The latter can be another factor facilitating the formation of mixed marriages in these regions as such marriages can be perceived as specific – transnational marital unions.

## **5.6. Polish-Ukrainian marriages – patterns of mates’ selection**

### **5.6.1. Assumptions of the analysis**

The concept of mates’ selection, proposed by Becker<sup>326</sup>, seems to be a powerful tool for explaining specific elements of modes of the Polish-Ukrainian marriages’ formation. Therefore, I refer to his approach while presenting market and non-market traits of Polish people and Ukrainians entering the Polish-Ukrainian marriages in Poland. My analysis is based on the main socio-demographic characteristics of the partners involved in the Polish-Ukrainian marriages<sup>327</sup> as well as on the factors underlying migration from Ukraine to Poland.

It should be noted that, in Polish-Ukrainian marriages, there are some specific traits of mates that matter. Firstly, I make an assumption that an important market trait of Polish partners is the fact that they enable their Ukrainian partners to settle in Poland where they have better life and economic prospects than in Ukraine. It is easier for a foreigner married to a Polish citizen to legalise his or her status in Poland (to get a Permanent or a Temporary Residence Permit) than for other migrants. When granted Polish documents, a migrant does not have to work illegally or to look for an employer who would be eager to engage a foreigner, which involves very complicated procedures so as to do it legally. This is the reason why some migrants enter into bogus marriages with Polish citizens. The assumption that Poland is an attractive country for Ukrainians

to live is made on the basis of macroeconomic indicators, as well as on the basis of opinions of migrants themselves<sup>328</sup>. Moreover, it should be noted that it is usually difficult for immigrants to find a well-paid job in the destination country although some of them do. Partners who migrate to the country of their foreign spouses are, generally, expected to earn less than partners who did not resettle. Therefore, they tend to be low-wage partners in couples, especially in a short time perspective, as at the beginning of the legalisation of their status in Poland many of them do not have work permits.

### 5.6.2. *Age of spouses*

The age of spouses is an important indicator which influences the other characteristics of partners. The economic situation of older persons is usually more stable. They are also more likely to be better educated, especially by comparison with persons aged under twenty-five (the typical age of graduation). On the other hand, young partners are usually more attractive than old ones, especially young women who possess valuable non-market traits.

Spouses in the Polish-Ukrainian marriages in Poland are on average older than those who marry in their home countries<sup>329</sup> (Poland and Ukraine). The biggest difference occurs between Ukrainian brides entering marriages in Poland and Ukraine. Only a tiny share of those who married Polish men are under twenty (see Table 5.8) – 4%, by comparison with 38% in 1992 in Ukraine. It should be noted, however, that Ukrainians, and especially Ukrainian women, tend to get married at a younger age in Ukraine than do Poles in Poland<sup>330</sup>. This difference results not only from cultural factors but also from Ukrainian legislation: women over sixteen years and men over eighteen do not need the permission of their parents, whereas in Poland the limits are eighteen and twenty-one, respectively. It seems, therefore, that Ukrainian women tend to follow Polish rather than Ukrainian patterns, marrying Polish partners at the older age than that common in Ukraine. However, Ukrainian wives are on the average younger than their Polish husbands.

In general, people involved in marriages of ‘Ukrainian woman’ type are considerably older, both women and men, than those involved in the other type. The age distribution of Ukrainian husbands in Polish-Ukrainian marriages is similar to that of Ukrainian husbands in Ukraine. They are usually young - only 10% of them are over forty. Their Polish wives are on the average older, but it seems that most marriages of ‘Ukrainian man’ type are contracted between young people. The majority of partners

from these marriages are under thirty, which is usually perceived as the typical age for getting married.

Table 5.7 Age of spouses in Polish-Ukrainian marriages contracted in Poland in 1992-1997

| Age of spouses | Marriage of 'Ukrainian woman' type |     |                |     | Marriage of 'Ukrainian man' type |     |                   |     |
|----------------|------------------------------------|-----|----------------|-----|----------------------------------|-----|-------------------|-----|
|                | Ukrainian wife                     |     | Polish husband |     | Polish wife                      |     | Ukrainian husband |     |
|                | N                                  | %   | N              | %   | N                                | %   | N                 | %   |
| under 20       | 74                                 | 4   | 9              | 1   | 39                               | 8   | 4                 | 1   |
| 20-29          | 885                                | 52  | 535            | 31  | 260                              | 52  | 302               | 60  |
| 30-39          | 434                                | 25  | 574            | 34  | 110                              | 22  | 144               | 29  |
| 40-49          | 228                                | 13  | 337            | 20  | 67                               | 13  | 41                | 8   |
| over 49        | 82                                 | 5   | 248            | 15  | 24                               | 5   | 9                 | 2   |
| Total          | 1,703                              | 100 | 1,703          | 100 | 500                              | 100 | 500               | 100 |

Source: Own calculation on the basis of data provided by the Polish Main Statistical Office

The most common scenario is that it is a man who is older in a marriage (44% of Polish marriages). The age difference between spouses usually does not exceed ten years. It seems that spouses involved in marriages of 'Ukrainian woman' type adhere to the above rule. As many as 60% of Polish husbands are older than their Ukrainian wives<sup>331</sup> (see Table 5.8) and in 16% of these marriages the age difference is over eleven years<sup>332</sup>. This shows that Ukrainian wives tend to marry older partners from Poland. Polish wives of Ukrainians do not follow this pattern and only 37% marry older men. In those marriages where Polish women are younger than their Ukrainian partners, they are usually very young (20% of them were below the age of 19<sup>333</sup> and only 14% were over 29 years). On the contrary, a relative big share – almost one third - of Polish women marry younger Ukrainian partners. This is quite a lot, when compared with Polish marriages contracted during the period 1992-1997, where the respective ratio is only 7%<sup>334</sup>. Furthermore, in 7% of 'Ukrainian man' type marriages, women are at least 11 years older than men. Such age distribution suggests that Ukrainian women prefer to marry old Polish men, who are probably able to offer them financial security. It seems that it is not as important for Polish women who find young men from Ukraine more suitable.

Table 5.8 Age of spouses involved in Polish-Ukrainian marriages – comparison within couples

| Comparison of spouses' age <sup>a</sup> | Marriage of 'Ukrainian woman' type |     | Marriage of 'Ukrainian man' type |     |
|-----------------------------------------|------------------------------------|-----|----------------------------------|-----|
|                                         | N                                  | %   | N                                | %   |
| at the same age                         | 467                                | 27  | 166                              | 33  |
| husband older                           | 1,029                              | 60  | 187                              | 37  |
| wife older                              | 207                                | 12  | 147                              | 29  |
| Total                                   | 1,703                              | 100 | 500                              | 100 |

<sup>a</sup> The comparisons are made on the basis of five-year age ranges: under twenty, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, and over forty-nine.

Source: Own calculation on the basis of data provided by the Polish Main Statistical Office

In general, the marriages of 'Ukrainian woman' and 'Ukrainian man' types differ in age differences between spouses. In both types Ukrainians tend to be younger. It is not surprising that Ukrainian women are usually younger than their Polish husbands, as females tend to marry earlier than males,<sup>335</sup> and they usually prefer partners who can offer them financial security. Therefore, they frequently choose older partners. However, some young Ukrainians marry older Polish women, which is a little surprising. It should be noted that, for Polish women, high economic status is less likely to be related to their age than for Polish men. There is probably also another factor underlying this: Polish wives can offer their foreign husbands the possibility of living in Poland, which they apparently perceive as the country in which they have better economic prospects than in Ukraine. Polish women are, therefore, attractive to Ukrainian men, even though they are not too prosperous, whereas, because of their age, they tend to be not very attractive mates for Polish men.

To sum up, the distribution of age of spouses involved in Polish-Ukrainian marriages suggests that the young age of Ukrainians can be perceived as of a non-market trait which matched with the relatively high incomes of older Polish partners (in comparison with average Ukrainian incomes), tends to augment the output of Polish-Ukrainian marriages. It should be noted, however, that at the same time a considerable part of Polish-Ukrainian marriages (about one third) was contracted between people of the same age<sup>336</sup>.

### 5.6.3. Education of spouses

Mates usually marry partners who have a similar educational level<sup>337</sup>. Such mating reduces the risk of considerable differences between partners which may lead to divorce. On the other hand, high level of education is a non-market trait, as it is frequently related to the high social position of a given person. Education also determines the level of present or expected incomes of a given person.

Ukrainian men as well as women are better educated than Poles (see Table 5.9). Only about one fifth of them did not complete secondary school, whereas the respective ratio for Polish citizens is 60% for men and 38% for women. Polish husbands are, therefore, the worst educated among the four categories of partners. It should be noted that citizens of the former Soviet Union are, on the average, well educated. In particular, the proportion of people with a university degree is high. In 1992, 43% of Ukrainians over fifteen had at least complete secondary education, whereas for Poland this share was 31%<sup>338</sup>. Moreover, it can be argued that settlement migrants are likely to be better educated than the average citizens of their country of origin, as it is easier for well-educated people to adjust to the host society and to find a proper job there. Because of this, they have a higher propensity to take up the risk of resettlement.

Table 5.9 Education of spouses in Polish-Ukrainian marriages contracted in Poland in 1992-1997

| Education of spouses | Marriages of 'Ukrainian woman' type |     |                |     | Marriages of 'Ukrainian man' type |     |                   |     |
|----------------------|-------------------------------------|-----|----------------|-----|-----------------------------------|-----|-------------------|-----|
|                      | Ukrainian wife                      |     | Polish husband |     | Polish wife                       |     | Ukrainian husband |     |
|                      | N                                   | %   | N              | %   | N                                 | %   | N                 | %   |
| Primary              | 134                                 | 8   | 343            | 20  | 74                                | 15  | 25                | 5   |
| Vocational           | 242                                 | 14  | 678            | 40  | 119                               | 24  | 75                | 15  |
| Secondary            | 907                                 | 53  | 539            | 32  | 221                               | 44  | 235               | 47  |
| Higher               | 405                                 | 24  | 141            | 8   | 86                                | 17  | 163               | 33  |
| Missing data         | 15                                  | 1   | 3              | 0   | 0                                 | 0   | 2                 | 0   |
| Total                | 1,703                               | 100 | 1,703          | 100 | 500                               | 100 | 500               | 100 |

Source: Own calculation on the basis of data provided by the Polish Main Statistical Office

In the Polish-Ukrainian marriages, the average Ukrainian is better educated than the average Pole. At the same time, Ukrainians tend to be the better educated spouses in couples (see Table 5.10). In more than half of 'Ukrainian woman' marriages the woman is better educated than the man, and 44% of Ukrainian women with university degree



married Polish men whose education is below that of secondary school level. On the other hand, in those marriages where Polish husbands are older, they are also more likely to be better educated (11%)<sup>339</sup>. Like Ukrainian wives, Ukrainian husbands are also better educated than their Polish spouses. In general, in only 40% of Polish-Ukrainian marriages both spouses have the same level of education, which is quite small when compared with 51% of the whole population of marriages contracted in Poland in 1992-1997.

Table 5.10 Education of spouses in Polish-Ukrainian marriages – comparison within couples

| Comparison of spouses' education | Marriage of 'Ukrainian woman' type |     | Marriage of 'Ukrainian man' type |     |
|----------------------------------|------------------------------------|-----|----------------------------------|-----|
|                                  | N                                  | %   | N                                | %   |
| The same level of education      | 658                                | 39  | 205                              | 41  |
| Husband better educated          | 151                                | 9   | 220                              | 44  |
| Wife better educated             | 879                                | 52  | 73                               | 15  |
| Missing data                     | 15                                 | 1   | 2                                | 0   |
| Total                            | 1,703                              | 100 | 500                              | 100 |

Source: Own calculation on the basis of data provided by the Polish Main Statistical Office

Evidently, the higher levels of education of Ukrainian spouses is another non-market trait of Ukrainian partners which may affect the mating patterns of Polish-Ukrainian marriages, especially given that the share of Polish-Ukrainian marriages in which partners had the same education level is relatively low. It suggests that, in relative terms, the high education of Ukrainian partners combined with high incomes of Polish partners (and the possibility of living in Poland) result in marriage outputs which are satisfactory for both Polish and Ukrainian partners.

#### 5.6.4. Marital status of spouses

The marital status of a spouse depicts his or her marriage experience which is an important input a given person brings into a marriage. As it was noted before, divorced persons tend to expect to gain less from remarriage than they expected from prior marriages.<sup>340</sup> On the other hand, the decision about the re-marriage is also usually more careful and less emotional than about the first marriage. It seems that cost-benefit calculations can be more important in decisions about subsequent marriages. Thus, the latter can be perceived of as more contract-like<sup>341</sup> than first marriages. Moreover, each

marriage means an important change in one's life. Therefore, those who are divorced or widowed are bound to be more flexible than others or at least more familiar with changes in their lives.

The divorce rates in various countries and cultures differ and so do the frequency of situations when people enter their subsequent marriages. In some traditional societies, divorces are socially unacceptable, especially if the marriage is sanctioned by the church. In such societies, those who break their marriage vows must be either very determined or unconcerned about social norms and sanctions. It should be noted that in the republics of the former Soviet Union social pressure on marriage is very low. The divorce rates in these countries are high. For example, in 1996 there were 3.80 divorces per 1 thousand inhabitants in Ukraine, whereas in Poland this indicator was considerably lower – 1.02 per 1 thousand inhabitants. The high divorce rate in Ukraine seems to be related to many years of Soviet social policy, which eroded social norms and destroyed traditional Ukrainian social structures. Moreover, the economic crisis in Ukraine resulted in job losses and poverty. It is usually more difficult to maintain good relationships within a family when its members have to face severe problems in everyday life. Finally, it should be noted that Ukrainians get married at a very young age in Ukraine which may also influence the high divorce rate in that country<sup>342</sup>.

Among Ukrainian newlyweds in Ukraine, in 1992, divorcees accounted for as much as 20% of women and for 22% of men. In Poland, it is much less common to marry as a divorcee. In 1992-1997, only 7% of both men and women married their partners being divorced. The shares of both Polish and Ukrainian partners entering Polish-Ukrainian marriages as divorcees are higher not only than those observed in Poland but also than those in Ukraine in 1992 (see Table 5.13). It is rarer for Ukrainian than for Polish spouses that their Polish-Ukrainian marriages are their first ones. It seems that high rates of divorce – a phenomenon observed in Ukraine – influences the structure of marital status of Ukrainian partners entering Polish-Ukrainian marriages.

It appears that Becker's argument that divorcees are more likely to marry out of their religion, culture and nationality finds support in the data on Polish-Ukrainian marriages. On the other hand, there are other reasons which can explain the high proportion of divorcees among people who enter into Polish-Ukrainian marriages. Firstly, it has been proven that rich and educated people are more likely to divorce.<sup>343</sup> At the same time, it seems that well educated people are over-represented in the group

of Ukrainian partners. Secondly, migrants tend to be flexible and bold people who are able to adjust to the new conditions in the country of destination. They are likely, therefore, to be as risk taking and flexible in their marital life. The last note may also refer partly to Polish partners involved in Polish-Ukrainian marriages, as they have to be able to adapt to the situation where they have to live with a person of different nationality, culture and usually language.

The high rate of divorcees entering the Polish-Ukrainian marriages can be also viewed from another perspective. A large proportion of Polish-Ukrainian marriages are remarriages. Unsuccessful marriage often involves a willingness to look for a 'different relationship' which would not bring with it the problems encountered in the first marriage. The mixed marriage is an example of such a 'different relationship' as the partner of foreign origins has a different cultural and social background. Extending the above argumentation, the other factor influencing the high rate of remarriages among mixed marriages can be related to the inclination of people to start a 'new life' after a 'new marriage'. This purpose can be sometimes difficult to achieve in the home environment of a person. Therefore, searching for a spouse who does not belong to the same social circle of a person appears to represent a good means of achieving the above goal. The latter argumentation would explain the propensity of Ukrainians to remarry Polish citizens instead of people from their home country. On the other hand, taking the economic approach to human behaviour, partners who have attractive market and non-market traits remarry faster than others. At the same time, the traits of an average Polish person are usually valued more highly by Ukrainians than by Polish people. This is due to the fact that, for Ukrainians, marriage to a Polish person involves settlement in Poland, bringing with it economic and social advancement. Because of the above, Polish people for whom it is difficult to remarry within the Polish marriage market can be likely to look for a foreign partner who would be willing to settle in Poland instead of his/her country of origin.

Table 5.11 Marital status of spouses in Polish-Ukrainian marriages contracted in Poland in 1992-1997

| Marital status of spouses | Marriage of 'Ukrainian woman' type |     |                |     | Marriage of 'Ukrainian man' type |     |                   |     |
|---------------------------|------------------------------------|-----|----------------|-----|----------------------------------|-----|-------------------|-----|
|                           | Ukrainian wife                     |     | Polish husband |     | Polish wife                      |     | Ukrainian husband |     |
|                           | N                                  | %   | N              | %   | N                                | %   | N                 | %   |
| first marriage            | 856                                | 50  | 964            | 57  | 342                              | 68  | 320               | 64  |
| divorced                  | 773                                | 45  | 600            | 35  | 125                              | 25  | 176               | 35  |
| widowed                   | 74                                 | 4   | 139            | 8   | 33                               | 7   | 4                 | 1   |
| Total                     | 1,703                              | 100 | 1,703          | 100 | 500                              | 100 | 500               | 100 |

Source: Own calculation on the basis of data provided by the Polish Main Statistical Office

It is more seldom for partners involved in the 'Ukrainian woman' marriages than for spouses from the other type of marriages that their Polish-Ukrainian marriages are their first ones. It seems, therefore, that the marriages of Ukrainian women may be more contract-like than those of Ukrainian men. This is in line with the observation that women usually marry foreign men from countries which are wealthier than their home countries so as to grasp the opportunity for a better life.<sup>344</sup> In particular, the cost-benefit analysis seems to be important for the marriage decisions of women who look for foreign husbands by means of international matchmaking organisations.

In general, the share of divorcees is high among people entering Polish-Ukrainian marriages, which is in line with Becker's observation that divorcees are more likely to out-marry. However, the analysis of the marital status of Ukrainian spouses in relation to their marriage strategy is difficult because of the extremely high divorce rate in Ukraine. Moreover, the argument which Becker uses for explaining such a relatively high propensity for divorced persons to be involved in mixed marriages – namely the relatively low expectations of divorcees about their subsequent marriages – is difficult to argue in the case of the Polish-Ukrainian marriages. It seems that this explanation can be of use only in relation to Polish partners in these marriages. Marriage to a Ukrainian is risky for a Pole, because of differences in terms of culture and language between partners, which can lead to various tensions between partners and may result in divorce. Moreover, it is usually difficult for Ukrainians to find a good job in Poland, thus, their expected income is relatively low. On the contrary, Ukrainian divorcees marrying Polish citizens are rather unlikely to have low expectations about their marriages with Polish people. Researches on Ukrainian migrants in Poland show that they perceive

Poland as an attractive country to live in<sup>345</sup>. Therefore, they expect that marriage to a Polish citizen will allow them to achieve a higher standard of living than marriage to a Ukrainian citizen.

### 5.7. Conclusions

Data on mixed marriages contracted in Poland show that marriages between citizens of different countries are connected to migration trends observed in the given countries. In particular, the growing volume of Polish-Ukrainian marriages in Poland is related to migratory movements from Ukraine to Poland. Ukrainian migrants are numerous on the Polish marriage market. Moreover, those involved in Polish-Ukrainian marriages appear to prefer to settle in Poland instead of Ukraine, as this implies better economic and life prospects for their households. This is in line with the rational choice theory which posits that individuals act so as to maximise their utilities.

The marriages of 'foreign man' type were more prevalent in marriages between Polish citizens and foreigners from the typical destination countries for Polish emigrants. On the other hand, foreign women who married Polish men came mostly from those countries which have been sending migrants to Poland. This depicts the migration of women as seeking a better life abroad by marrying foreigners. Ukraine, which is an important country sending migrants to Poland, is at the same time the main area of origin of foreign women marrying Polish men. The number of 'Ukrainian woman' marriages has been increasing steadily since 1992.

Nowhere in Poland is the concentration of Polish-Ukrainian marriages very high. The Warsaw voivodeship is the main area where such marriages are observed, but they account for only 11% of all Polish-Ukrainian marriages. In general, a considerable share of these marriages was contracted in the voivodeships where large cities and agglomerations are situated, but also in the east-southern region of Poland. The latter is the border region inhabited by ethnic Ukrainians, which provides social and symbolic ties between people living on both sides of the Polish-Ukrainian border. It clearly influences, among other things, the relatively high volume of the Polish-Ukrainian marriages contracted there.

The Ukrainian spouses in the Polish-Ukrainian marriages are usually younger and better educated than their Polish partners. It seems that these non-market traits of Ukrainian partners combined with relatively high incomes of Polish partners in Poland

(by comparison with the average income in Ukraine) create a marriage outcome which is satisfactory for both Polish and Ukrainian spouses. At the same time, among Polish-Ukrainian marriages, there is a high share of remarriages. It is consistent with Becker's argument that divorcees are more likely to be involved in mixed marriages, which bring lower outputs than do other marriages, as they have lower expectations as to their subsequent marriages. It should be noted, however, that it is difficult to argue that Ukrainians have lower expectations about marriage with a Polish citizen in comparison to marriage with a Ukrainian citizen. Instead, they usually expect that marriage with a Polish citizen and settlement in Poland gives them an opportunity for a more prosperous and secure life than they would have had in Ukraine. Therefore, Becker's explanation of high divorce rates among out-marrying people can not be easily applied to the Polish-Ukrainian case. This problem should be explained rather by the very high divorce rate observed in Ukraine and other factors related to migration between Poland and Ukraine.

In general, patterns of mates' selection in Polish-Ukrainian marriages suggest that there is a potential for settlement migration among Ukrainians citizens. Thus, the fact that Polish partners enable Ukrainians to settle in Poland constitutes an important non-market trait of the Polish partners. Due to this non-market trait, Polish people appear to be more attractive partners for some Ukrainians than the other Ukrainians. It should be noted, however, that the mixed marriages contracted in Poland do not necessarily have to settle permanently in Poland. Thus, not every alien married to a Polish citizen enters the group of denizens in Poland. Denizens who constitute the main part of settlement migration not only in Poland but also in most European countries are described in the next chapter.<sup>346</sup>

## CHAPTER 6: DENIZENS

### 6.1. Introduction

Denizens in Poland are foreigners who possess PRPs, hence the right to work and stay permanently in Poland. Therefore, those who returned their PRPs drop out of this group (hereafter - ex-denizens). It should be noted, however, that ex-denizens have not necessarily left Poland. Some of them acquired Polish citizenship, thus, fell into the other group of settlement migrants – ‘citizens’. Thus, according to Hammar<sup>347</sup>, they passed the third and final gate to the destination country.

According to various estimations, more than half of the foreign resident population of Western Europe are denizens<sup>348</sup>. In general, they constitute a crucial part of settlement migration. In many countries they are granted full social rights, but are deprived of political rights. This is also the case in Poland. Nevertheless, part of the population of denizens does not intend to become citizens of the destination countries. Their inclination to naturalisation depends on various factors related to this process in a given country. In general, the population described in this chapter constitutes the main part of settlement migration to Poland.

### 6.2. Stock of denizens<sup>349</sup>

The number of foreigners who as of 31.12.99 held PRPs was 25,855 (see Table 6.1). According to data presented in Table 6.1, the volume of denizens resident in Poland in 1991<sup>350</sup> and 1999 do not differ considerably (23,612 versus 25,855 denizens). It should, however, be noted that the figure for 1999 is likely to be underestimated. Around three quarters of the group of foreigners holding PRPs on 31.12.99 comprises people who got their PRPs after 1991. Apparently, there were more denizens living in Poland in 1999, who were granted PRPs before 1992, but information as to whether they still held their PRPs in 1999 is unavailable. By 1999, those people could have returned their PRPs for various reasons such as, for example, departure from Poland or acquisition of Polish citizenship. The database contains 12,066 such foreigners (hereafter - potential denizens). The actual volume of denizens among members of this group can be estimated on the basis of a ratio of returned PRPs, which is 17%<sup>351</sup>. Certainly, the propensity to return a PRP is likely to vary among denizens, but the above

ratio can be treated as an indicator. Thus, the estimated number of denizens from 1991 who still held their PRPs in 1999 is around 18,890<sup>352</sup>. Among them, 5,083 were recorded in the database as holding PRPs in 1999. Therefore, the additional estimated volume of denizens resident in Poland in 1999 is about 13,800. This estimation is higher than the number of potential denizens included in the database (12,066). Therefore, it seems that actual number of denizens resident in Poland in 1999 is considerably higher than 25,855 people. Assuming that the total volume of denizens resident in Poland in 1999 was greater than the 35 thousand<sup>353</sup> migrants, the stock of denizens in 1999 was about 1.5 times higher than in 1991<sup>354</sup>. The distribution of citizenship in the group of potential denizens can be only estimated on the basis of archival data on foreigners who possessed PRP on 31.12.91<sup>355</sup> (see Table 6.2).

Table 6.1 Stocks of denizens in Poland in 1991 and 1999 according to citizenship - comparison

| Citizenship                 | Foreigners holding PRPs on 31.12.91 |     | Foreigners holding PRPs on 31.12.99 <sup>a</sup> |     |
|-----------------------------|-------------------------------------|-----|--------------------------------------------------|-----|
|                             | N                                   | %   | N                                                | %   |
| Europe                      | 5,496                               | 23  | 7,639                                            | 30  |
| Former Soviet Union         | 12,646                              | 54  | 11,659                                           | 45  |
| Asia                        | 391                                 | 2   | 2,095                                            | 8   |
| Middle-East                 | 1,068                               | 5   | 1,325                                            | 5   |
| Northern and Middle America | 1,307                               | 6   | 902                                              | 3   |
| Southern America            | 190                                 | 1   | 210                                              | 1   |
| Africa                      | 655                                 | 3   | 994                                              | 4   |
| Australia                   | 71                                  | 0   | 82                                               | 0   |
| Other                       | 71                                  | 0   | 53                                               | 0   |
| Stateless                   | 1,717                               | 7   | 636                                              | 2   |
| Missing data                | N.A.                                | 0   | 260                                              | 1   |
| Total                       | 23,612                              | 100 | 25,855                                           | 100 |

<sup>a</sup> If a person was stateless, but information about his or her former citizenship was available, I take the latter.

Source: Own calculation on the basis of data provided by the Ministry of Interior and Administration in Poland



Table 6.2 Stock of potential denizens in 1999 in Poland granted PRP before 1992 <sup>a</sup>

| Citizenship                 | N      | %   |
|-----------------------------|--------|-----|
| Europe                      | 2,406  | 20  |
| Former Soviet Union         | 7,321  | 61  |
| Asia                        | 164    | 1   |
| Middle-East                 | 535    | 4   |
| Northern and Middle America | 707    | 6   |
| Southern America            | 96     | 1   |
| Africa                      | 356    | 3   |
| Australia                   | 37     | 0   |
| Other                       | 47     | 0   |
| Stateless                   | 397    | 3   |
| Total                       | 12,066 | 100 |

<sup>a</sup> If a person was stateless, but information about his or her former citizenship was available, I take the latter.

Source: Own calculation on the basis of data provided by the Ministry of Interior and Administration in Poland

Migrants from the former USSR constitute almost half of the population of denizens in Poland (45% - see Table 6.1). Europeans are less numerous but they still account for almost one third of the total. The most numerous groups of European migrants are Germans (17% of Europeans) and Bulgarians (12%). The Bulgarian migration to Poland has particular origins which stem from the Soviet period. At that time, there was an intensive student exchange between Poland and Bulgaria. It seems that this resulted in the settlement migration of some Bulgarians in Poland.

The shares of denizens from the other areas do not exceed 5% of the total. It should be noted, however, that Asian settlement migration to Poland is particularly homogeneous. Vietnames account for as much as two thirds (62%) of Asian migrants. Their volume is as high as the volume of German denizens<sup>356</sup>. As with the Bulgarian migration, the Vietnamese migration started during the Soviet period when many students used to come to Poland from their country. Some of them never returned to Vietnam. They are known for establishing businesses in Poland – restaurants, shops etc. This group of migrants is relatively well organised and its members co-operate one with another. Moreover, these former students are followed by other migrants from Vietnam. Thus, the Vietnamese group in Poland has grown considerably in volume since the beginning of the 1990s.

Nevertheless, the main group of denizens in Poland is that of ex-USSR citizens. Among them, Ukrainians who account for as much as 38% of the group, predominate (see Table 6.1.A in Appendix II). At the same time, they constitute 17% of the total population of denizens in Poland. Russians form the other big group of ex-USSR migrants (30% of them), whereas denizens from the other republics of the former Soviet Union are far less numerous.

Evidently, denizens resident in Poland in 1999 came from the countries which were sending considerable numbers of various migrants to Poland in the 1990s. The predominance of migrants from the former USSR and a high volume of Vietnames among them are prominent examples. At the same time, some particular migratory flows, which proceeded during the Soviet period, are also reflected in the distribution of citizenship in the group of denizens. Therefore, data clearly show that settlement migration is related to the overall migratory trends to a great extent. Moreover, the stock of denizens has risen since 1991 alongside the increasing immigration to Poland. As far as Ukrainian migrants are concerned, they constitute the most numerous group among denizens, which appears to be related to the fact that they prevail also in the other types of migration to Poland.

### 6.3. Ex-denizens<sup>357</sup>

Denizens who became Polish citizens account for as much as 85% of ex-denizens in Poland. More than half of newly admitted Polish citizens originate from the former USSR (51%) and as many as 18% from Ukraine. In fact, only around one tenth of ex-denizens from the former USSR as well as from Ukraine did not acquire Polish citizenship (see Table 6.3). At the same time, only around 2% of have them left Poland. It seems that this group of denizens has a high propensity to stay in Poland permanently. This inclination seems to be smaller among European migrants. They became Polish citizens less often (59% of the European ex-denizens), whereas a considerable part of them have left Poland (10%). The latter group accounts for as much as 39% of the total of ex-denizens who left Poland.

Table 6.3 Foreigners who returned their PRPs<sup>a</sup> according to reason for returning and to country of birth<sup>b</sup>

| Reason of returning               | Total |     | Europe |     | Former USSR |     | Ukraine |     |
|-----------------------------------|-------|-----|--------|-----|-------------|-----|---------|-----|
|                                   | N     | %   | N      | %   | N           | %   | N       | %   |
| Departure from Poland             | 160   | 3   | 63     | 10  | 46          | 2   | 11      | 1   |
| Acquisition of Polish citizenship | 4,043 | 85  | 361    | 59  | 2,081       | 89  | 724     | 90  |
| Death                             | 520   | 11  | 184    | 30  | 183         | 8   | 61      | 8   |
| Other                             | 57    | 1   | 8      | 1   | 16          | 1   | 5       | 1   |
| Total                             | 4,780 | 100 | 616    | 100 | 2,326       | 100 | 801     | 100 |

<sup>a</sup> Table refers only to migrants who possessed their own PRPs. This is due to the fact that for the children ascribed to PRPs of their parents the only available information is the reason why their parents returned their PRPs.

<sup>b</sup> For those who were born in Poland I take their citizenship. It refers: 168 migrants from Europe, forty-five migrants from the former USSR, and eight migrants from Ukraine.

Source: Own calculation on the basis of data provided by the Ministry of Interior and Administration in Poland

Among ex-denizens from the former USSR granted Polish citizenship, Ukrainians account for more than one third of the total (see Table 6.2.A in Appendix II). In general, for ex-USSR migrants, the distribution of citizenship in the group of ex-denizens granted Polish citizenship is close to the one observed among denizens in Poland in 1999. It seems that all migrants from the former USSR have a similar inclination to acquire Polish citizenship. A particular example is the group of Kazakhstan migrants who are over-represented in the group of newly admitted Polish citizens. They account for as much as 11% of this group, whereas, among denizens, only 1% originates from Kazakhstan. This is due to the specificity of migration from this country to Poland. It is related to the repatriation of people of Polish origins from Kazakhstan. This group of people is growing in volume<sup>358</sup>. In general, it is easier for repatriates to acquire Polish citizenship. Moreover, new procedures which promote this group of people in the acquisition of Polish citizenship became effective in June 2000<sup>359</sup>. This in-flow is growing in volume, as new procedures, which make it easier for repatriates to acquire Polish citizenship, become effective. At the same time, it is relatively simple for repatriates to obtain Polish citizenship.

A considerable proportion of ex-denizens have become Polish citizens. A more interesting issue is what part of the population of denizens become citizens. To make such a calculation, I compare the volume of newly admitted Polish citizens with the stock of foreigners which is the sum of those who either retained or returned their

PRPs<sup>360</sup> by 31.12.99. This stock is therefore bigger than the figure presented in Chapter 6.2<sup>361</sup>. Moreover, I assume that those children who did not acquire their own documents and whose parents acquired Polish citizenship also became Polish citizens<sup>362</sup>.

Table 6.4 Comparison of stock of migrants and stock of foreigners granted Polish citizenship according to country of birth

| Country of birth | Sum of foreigners who either hold or returned their PRPs | Number of foreigners who acquired Polish citizenship | Ratio of foreigners who acquired Polish citizenship |
|------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|
| Europe           | 7,829                                                    | 383                                                  | 5                                                   |
| Former USSR      | 13,929                                                   | 2,370                                                | 17                                                  |
| Ukraine          | 5,369                                                    | 808                                                  | 15                                                  |
| Total            | 31,100                                                   | 4,472                                                | 14                                                  |

\* For those who were born in Poland I take their citizenship. It refers to: 1,804 migrants from Europe, 416 migrants from the former USSR, and 160 migrants from Ukraine.

Source: Own calculation on the basis of data provided by the Ministry of Interior and Administration in Poland

Estimates show that 14% of denizens acquired Polish citizenship. The propensity to become a Polish citizen differs by area of migrants' origin. It is much lower among Europeans (5%), when compared with ex-USSR denizens (17%) and the average for the whole group as well. Such discrepancies can be explained by the fact that: 'Certain citizenships are considered to be more precious, more advantageous'<sup>363</sup>. Polish citizenship may be perceived as more attractive for ex-USSR migrants than for Europeans. This is due to the fact that the economic situation in Poland is, on the average, better than in the countries of the former Soviet Union. This is not the case for most of the European countries. Thus, the propensity to become a Polish citizen is high among denizens from the former USSR as well as from Ukraine. It should be noted that this propensity could be even higher when ex-USSR migrants have the possibility to retain their original citizenship after being granted Polish citizenship. It has been observed that people are more prone to naturalise in the destination country when they do not have to relinquish their previous citizenship.<sup>364</sup>

To sum up, estimations presented in this chapter show that Ukrainians along with the trend observed among ex-USSR migrants have a high inclination to settle in Poland permanently as Polish citizens.

#### 6.4. Dynamics of change in the volume of denizens<sup>365</sup>

Changes in the volume of the population of denizens in Poland and their dynamics are difficult to estimate on the basis of data available in Poland. This is due to the changes in Polish law concerning foreigners, especially a 'new' 'Aliens Law' which became effective only at the end of 1997. The main difficulty is the fact that since December 1997 the procedure for granting PRPs to foreigners is more complicated and longer (compare Appendix I). Therefore, beginning with 1998, the number of PRPs granted diminished considerably when compared with previous years. Although this decrease stems chiefly from procedural changes in Polish immigration law. Thus, it is not a result of change in migratory trends in Poland and in the propensity of migrants to become denizens in Poland (see Table 6.5).

Table 6.5 Foreigners granted PRPs in Poland according to year of acquisition of the first document and by citizenship <sup>a</sup>

| The year of first document's acquisition | Total  | Europe |                | Former USSR |                | Ukraine |                |
|------------------------------------------|--------|--------|----------------|-------------|----------------|---------|----------------|
|                                          | N      | N      | % <sup>b</sup> | N           | % <sup>c</sup> | N       | % <sup>c</sup> |
| Before 1989                              | 14,256 | 1,315  | 9              | 1,555       | 11             | 160     | 10             |
| 1989                                     | 770    | 138    | 18             | 91          | 12             | 9       | 10             |
| 1990                                     | 1,249  | 236    | 19             | 173         | 14             | 30      | 17             |
| 1991                                     | 2,091  | 312    | 15             | 471         | 23             | 158     | 34             |
| 1992                                     | 3,492  | 891    | 26             | 1,483       | 42             | 366     | 25             |
| 1993                                     | 2,731  | 818    | 30             | 1,149       | 42             | 352     | 31             |
| 1994                                     | 2,654  | 768    | 29             | 1,200       | 45             | 451     | 38             |
| 1995                                     | 2,902  | 801    | 28             | 1,395       | 48             | 534     | 38             |
| 1996                                     | 2,800  | 765    | 27             | 1,331       | 48             | 532     | 40             |
| 1997                                     | 3,349  | 828    | 25             | 1,592       | 48             | 732     | 46             |
| 1998                                     | 1,945  | 436    | 22             | 1,063       | 55             | 490     | 46             |
| 1999                                     | 603    | 143    | 24             | 292         | 48             | 109     | 37             |
| Total                                    | 38,842 | 7,451  | 19             | 11,795      | 30             | 3,923   | 33             |

<sup>a</sup> If a person was stateless, but information about his or her former citizenship was available, I take the latter.

<sup>b</sup> The percentage of migrants from a given area granted PRPs in a given year in the total population of migrants granted PRPs that year.

<sup>c</sup> The percentage of migrants from Ukraine granted PRPs in a given year in the population of migrants from the former USSR granted PRPs that year.

Source: Own calculation on the basis of data provided by the Ministry of Interior and Administration in Poland

According to data presented in Table 6.5, 37% of denizens obtained PRPs before 1989 (14,256 foreigners). This share can be an underestimate because records for the years before 1992 are far from being complete. Also for the same reason the numbers of European migrants and ex-USSR migrants who came to Poland during that time may also be an underestimate<sup>366</sup>.

On the other hand, data for 1992-1997 are good. There is rich information about migrants who became denizens as there were no changes in Polish legislation concerning denizens during that period. In 1992, the number of denizens has increased considerably in comparison with the previous year. A large share of these migrants probably started to come to Poland just after the transition in 1989, and settled here for good in 1992. This refers at first to migrants from the former USSR, but also to others for whom Poland was worth coming to since it had become a democratic and capitalist country<sup>367</sup>. After the year 1992, the volume of newly admitted denizens in Poland fell below 3 thousand persons per year and remained at that level until 1997, when as many as 3,349 persons became denizens in Poland. Europeans accounted for around one quarter of foreigners being granted PRPs annually in 1992-1997, and only in 1993 was their share considerably higher – 30%. Ex-USSR migrants outnumbered Europeans during the whole period concerned. Moreover, their share in the population of annually newly admitted denizens had been rising steadily since 1992 (42%); and in 1997 they constituted almost half of the total (48%).

Ukrainian migrants formed a sizeable part of denizens from the former USSR granted PRPs in 1992-1997. In 1997, their number (732 persons) doubled in comparison with 1992 (366 persons). Moreover, in 1997, they accounted for almost half of ex-USSR migrants, whereas, in 1992, only one quarter of this group originated from Ukraine.

As was noted above, in 1998-1999, the volume of PRPs granted in Poland decreased considerably due to changes in Polish legislation. Nevertheless, the shares of migrants from the given areas in the total of denizens did not differ much from the ones observed in previous years. Migrants from the former USSR still accounted for almost half of the population. It should also be noted here that, in 1998-1999, as many as 16,179 foreigners acquired TRPs. This is the first step in becoming a denizen in Poland in the future. Part of this group are typical settlement migrants (e.g. foreigners married to Polish citizens), who would become denizens in Poland before 1998 immediately

(see Appendix I). Nevertheless, at the present time it is impossible to estimate the size of this group.


To sum up, in 1992-1997, about 3 thousand foreigners were being admitted to the group of denizens in Poland annually. As far as previous and subsequent years are concerned, data do not allow for reliable comparisons. Nevertheless, the group of ex-USSR migrants was growing in importance in the population of denizens in Poland during this period. Since 1995, migrants from this area have accounted for nearly half of the total. The volume of Ukrainian migrants was rising as well. Moreover, this increase was higher than the average for ex-USSR migrants and, in 1997, Ukrainians accounted for as much as 46% of denizens from the former Soviet Union granted PRPs in that year. It is clear therefore that overall migratory trends in Poland are reflected not only in the composition of the stock of migrants in Poland, but also in the dynamics of changes in its volume. Ex-USSR migrants, especially Ukrainians – the main groups of foreigners migrating to Poland in the 1990s – contributed to the high increase in the stock of denizens in Poland in the 1990s.

### **6.5. Destination regions in Poland<sup>368</sup>**

The description of regions where denizens live in Poland is based on data on places of the acquisition of the migrants' first PRPs<sup>369</sup>. Therefore it is devoted to regions where migrants settled in Poland for the first time.

Denizens are dispersed across Poland. In fifteen voivodeships<sup>370</sup>, the shares of foreigners living there do not exceed 10% of the total, and only in the mazowieckie voivodeship (for the location of voivodeships see Figure 10A.2 in Appendix X) is their concentration larger (see ).

Figure 6.1 Distribution of denizens in Poland




Source: Own elaboration on the basis of data provided by the Ministry of Interior and Administration in Poland

European denizens tend to settle near to large towns more frequently than do other foreigners (see Figure 6.2). This is probably related to the fact that foreigners from European countries come more frequently to Poland as employees, often as experts, in large international companies than do others. Such companies are often situated in large towns. On the other hand, European denizens are also concentrated in western Poland - dolnośląskie, śląskie, pomorskie and zachodniopomorskie voivodeships. The group, which settled in this area, comprises mostly Germans. They account for as much as 32% of European denizens living there. It seems that the proximity of the German border as well as a high concentration of the ethnic German minority in this region constitute important incentives for migrants from that country to settle there.



Figure 6.2 Distribution of European denizens in Poland




Source: Own elaboration on the basis of data provided by the Ministry of Interior and Administration in Poland

On the other hand, migrants from the former USSR come to those voivodeships with big cities less often than average denizens (see Figure 6.3). Nevertheless, 13% of this group settled in the mazowieckie voivodeship. In general, ex-USSR denizens seem to be more dispersed across Poland than Europeans. They also have a higher propensity to settle in eastern Poland than does the other group, which is closer to migrants' countries of origin.

The largest group of ex-USSR migrants – Ukrainians – settles in the mazowieckie voivodeship even more rarely - 9% of Ukrainian denizens (see Figure 6.4). On the contrary, they are particularly likely to stay in eastern Poland, especially in that part which is close to the Ukrainian border, but also in those voivodeships where the 'old' Ukrainian minority is present and dynamic (south-eastern and south-western Poland)<sup>371</sup>, as well as in western Poland. In these voivodeships Ukrainians account for around 50% and more of ex-USSR denizens. In some particular voivodeships their shares are even higher and in podkarpackie voivodeship almost three quarters of denizens from the former USSR originate from Ukraine. The phenomenon that Ukrainians tend to migrate to regions inhabited by ethnic Ukrainians has been already described in academic literature<sup>372</sup>. According to the author of this study, not only Ukrainian settlement migrants but also labour migrants tend to choose these regions of


Poland. It seems that networks which have tied Ukrainian families in Poland, with their relatives in the home country, play a strong role. Interestingly enough, representatives of the 'old' Ukrainian minority in Warsaw say that<sup>373</sup> members of this group usually do not support their relatives from Ukraine in migration to Poland. It is probably more common in those regions where the concentration of ethnic Ukrainians is very high and where they live in small towns and in the countryside.

Figure 6.3 Distribution of ex-USSR denizens in Poland



Source: Own elaboration on the basis of data provided by the Ministry of Interior and Administration in Poland

Figure 6.4 Distribution of Ukrainian denizens in Poland



Source: Own elaboration on the basis of data provided by the Ministry of Interior and Administration in Poland

Data on the places of PRPs' acquisition show that denizens prefer the mazowieckie voivodeship (the voivodeship where Warsaw – the capital of Poland, the biggest town – is situated), whereas the other voivodeships host similar shares of the population. Certain factors may prompt representatives of a given country to migrate to particular regions. It is the case for Ukrainian migrants, which tend to migrate not only to regions close to the Polish-Ukrainian border, but also to those where the 'old' Ukrainian minority is present. It seems that such particular factors play a role in migration from the neighbouring countries, but also from those from which migration is influenced by some political or historical factors. A similar phenomenon has been observed in the population of those mixed marriages contracted in Poland which are concentrated in the border regions and in those regions inhabited by national minorities.

### 6.6. Ukrainian denizens – regions of origin<sup>374</sup>

Ukrainian migrants often choose Poland for their destination country, but their inclination to come to Poland differs over regions of Ukraine. Migrants from distant eastern regions have to travel thousands of kilometres to reach Poland, whereas those who live close to the Polish-Ukrainian border need only a few hours of travel to be in Poland. Because of this, the cost of coming to Poland is much lower for inhabitants of

western Ukraine. Moreover, because of the historical ancestry and the geographical proximity, western Ukraine has many ties with Poland, whereas eastern Ukraine does not.

Indeed, according to data on places of birth<sup>375</sup>, the majority of Ukrainian denizens come to Poland from western Ukraine<sup>376</sup> (36%) (see Table 6.6). The smallest groups originate from the most distant (from Poland) parts of Ukraine – eastern and southern Ukraine (19% in total). Evidently, western Ukraine sends to Poland, the greatest volume, of not only short-term labour migrants<sup>377</sup>, who take advantage of the proximity of the border, but also settlement migrants. Migrants from western Ukraine prevail especially in the border Polish voivodeships (lubelskie and podkarpackie), where they constitute almost two thirds of Ukrainian denizens (59% in each of the above voivodeships)<sup>378</sup>. These voivodeships are popular among the western Ukrainians mostly because of their proximity to the Polish-Ukrainian border, but probably also because of cultural and social ties existing between inhabitants of western Ukraine and south-eastern Poland.

Table 6.6 Ukrainian denizens according to region of birth

| Region of Ukraine                              | N     | %   |
|------------------------------------------------|-------|-----|
| Western Ukraine                                | 1,605 | 36  |
| Central Ukraine                                | 713   | 16  |
| Eastern Ukraine                                | 526   | 12  |
| Southern Ukraine                               | 294   | 7   |
| Outside Ukraine                                | 749   | 17  |
| Missing data on region in Ukraine <sup>a</sup> | 587   | 13  |
| Total                                          | 4,474 | 100 |

<sup>a</sup> In the database there was an information about a village and a country of migrant's birth. When a migrant was born in Ukraine, I attributed to his village of birth an appropriate region of Ukraine. This was made on the basis of map of Ukraine which had a scale: 1:1500,000. Missing data refer to these villages which I was unable to locate on this map.

Source: Own calculation on the basis of data provided by the Ministry of Interior and Administration in Poland

The place of birth does not accurately reflect the country from which a given migrant arrived, as 17% of Ukrainian citizens were born out of Ukraine. The vast majority of them were born in the former USSR – 60%. They probably participated in dynamic migratory movements within the Soviet Union before 1989. A proportion of them may be Ukrainians by nationality (ethnic affiliation), who came back to their home

country after 1991 as repatriates. It is likely that this group has a higher propensity to mobility than average Ukrainians. Moreover, Poland was the country of birth for 20% of Ukrainian citizens born outside of their country of origin. Usually, they are the children of other Ukrainian migrants.

Table 6.7 Ukrainian denizens according to size of village and region of birth

| Region of Ukraine         | Size of a village |                              |    |                                    |     |                           |   |
|---------------------------|-------------------|------------------------------|----|------------------------------------|-----|---------------------------|---|
|                           | Total             | Over 50 thousand inhabitants |    | Of 50 thousand inhabitants or less |     | Missing data <sup>b</sup> |   |
|                           | N                 | N                            | %  | N                                  | %   | N                         | % |
| Western Ukraine           | 1,605             | 980                          | 61 | 615                                | 38  | 10                        | 1 |
| Central Ukraine           | 713               | 521                          | 73 | 189                                | 27  | 3                         | 0 |
| Eastern Ukraine           | 526               | 397                          | 75 | 126                                | 24  | 3                         | 1 |
| Southern Ukraine          | 294               | 223                          | 76 | 67                                 | 23  | 4                         | 1 |
| Missing data <sup>a</sup> | 587               | 0                            | 0  | 585                                | 100 | 2                         | 0 |
| Total                     | 3,725             | 2,121                        | 57 | 1,582                              | 42  | 22                        | 1 |

<sup>a</sup> In the database there was an information about a village and a country of migrant's birth. When a migrant was born in Ukraine, I attributed to his village of birth an appropriate region of Ukraine. This was made on the basis of map of Ukraine which had a scale: 1:1500,000. Missing data refer to these villages which I was unable to locate on this map.

<sup>b</sup> Missing data refer to situations where the name of village of birth was unknown and only information about the 'oblast' in which it was situated was available.

Source: Own calculation on the basis of data provided by the Ministry of Interior and Administration in Poland

More than half of Ukrainian denizens originate from cities of over 50 thousand inhabitants (57%)<sup>379</sup>. The number of people who came from smaller villages was lower by 25% (see Table 6.7). At the same time, the further from the Polish border the migrants were born, the more likely they were to be born in cities over 50 thousand inhabitants. The vast majority of denizens from both eastern and southern Ukraine (about 75%) originate from large cities. Clearly, this is related to the fact that the inhabitants of distant parts of Ukraine have to invest more in migration, when compared to western Ukrainians. It is also, usually, more difficult for them to obtain information about Poland as well as to obtain access to migrant networks supporting migration to Poland. Thus, migration from eastern and southern Ukraine is more selective than from the other parts of the country. At the same time, access to information is better in big cities than in small locations. Moreover, inhabitants of large cities are on the average better educated, and hence more flexible and open to new situations such as migration.

Finally, they are also likely to be more prosperous and they can more easily afford international travel.

In general, Ukrainian denizens in Poland originate usually from western Ukraine. Social and symbolic ties between the Polish and the Ukrainian people living on the two sides of the Polish-Ukrainian border appear to support migration from this part of Ukraine. Denizens from the distant regions of Ukraine are less numerous and they usually originate from big cities. It seems that they belong to a group of people who have relative good opportunities for migration as well as propensity to it.

## **6.7. Socio-demographic characteristics of denizens in Poland<sup>380</sup>**

### **6.7.1. *Introductory remarks***

Descriptions presented in the previous chapters show that the composition of the population of denizens in Poland is related to various migratory movements to Poland. Because of that, while describing socio-demographic characteristics of denizens, I compare European and ex-USSR migrants. They are two groups of immigrants in Poland which represent different patterns of migration. The former Soviet Union has been the main area sending labour migrants to Poland since the beginning of the 1990s, whereas factors driving migration from European countries to Poland are more complex<sup>381</sup> and more seldom related only to economic determinants.

### **6.7.2. *Gender of denizens***

Historically, the gender of migrants strongly influenced patterns of their migration. In the past, women migrated usually only to accompany their husbands in their migration, but as the role of women in the composition of household income grew in importance, they also began to take up labour migration.<sup>382</sup>

Women account for 47% of denizens in Poland (see Table 6.8). Their share differs considerably over the countries of migrants' origin. Female denizens constitute 44% of European migrants, whereas among migrants from the former Soviet Union as much as 68%.

Table 6.8 Migrants who got their PRPs after 1991 according to gender and citizenship<sup>a</sup>

| Gender | Total  |     | Europe |     | Former USSR |     | Ukraine |     |
|--------|--------|-----|--------|-----|-------------|-----|---------|-----|
|        | N      | %   | N      | %   | N           | %   | N       | %   |
| Male   | 9,339  | 53  | 3,301  | 66  | 2,561       | 32  | 1,070   | 32  |
| Female | 8,199  | 47  | 1,689  | 44  | 5,443       | 68  | 2,258   | 68  |
| Total  | 17,538 | 100 | 4,990  | 100 | 8,004       | 100 | 3,328   | 100 |

<sup>a</sup> If a person was stateless, but information about his or her former citizenship was available, I take the latter.

Source: Own calculation on the basis of data provided by the Ministry of Interior and Administration in Poland

It seems that the dominance of women in settlement migration is common for most republics of the former USSR (see Table 6.3.A in Appendix II). They prevail also among Ukrainian denizens (68% of Ukrainian denizens). Moreover, the share of women in the Ukrainian group rose steadily from 1992 (62%) to 1999 (70%). Men prevail only among denizens from republics like Armenia, which has a very strong traditional culture. In such societies the role of women is usually limited to looking after the households and bringing up children. It is likely to restrain female migration from these countries. Indeed, according to the literature<sup>383</sup>, female migration is high in volume in those societies that allow women to participate in professional and economic activities. This refers especially to labour migration, but also to the general inclination to be a 'mobile person'. According to the results of qualitative research made in one region of Poland where many migrants from Armenia are present<sup>384</sup> (they sell goods on Polish bazaars without a permission), Armenians often migrate to Poland with their families (wife, children etc.), even though they come as undocumented migrants. This is due to the fact that family ties are very important in Armenian culture. Single Armenian men can be found relatively easy in Poland, but it is very difficult to come across single Armenian women.

- In general, women are in the majority in the population of settlement migrants from the former USSR, which is the opposite of the situation observed among European migrants. It appears that ex-USSR women tend to participate in the traditional type of female migration – settlement migration to Poland. The latter, in Poland and Ukraine, is driven by structural factors, mainly macroeconomic determinants. It should be noted, however, that it is very unlikely that a high proportion of these women migrated to Poland under the auspices of family reunion. This is due to the fact that labour

migration from the former USSR to Poland started only one decade ago, whereas there is usually a time lag between labour migration and following this the settlement of the families of labour migrants. Moreover, the majority of ex-USSR migrants are illegal workers who are not entitled to bring their families to Poland. Lastly, work permits granted individually to ex-USSR migrants are usually for short periods of time<sup>385</sup>, thus, only a small proportion of legal workers in Poland are entitled to settle there with their families.

It is, therefore, very likely that the large group of ex-USSR women came to Poland individually. They may have participated in marriage migration, but also in labour migration at the outset. It should be noted that women also play an important role in illegal labour migration from ex-USSR countries as well as from Ukraine. There is no data on the volume of women and men coming to Poland for illegal work and trade, but qualitative research suggests<sup>386</sup> that many women do take it up. For example, there are many citizens of the former Soviet Union on Polish bazaars and they are mostly women. Moreover, many Poles have female servants from the former USSR. The latter is widely described in the Polish media.<sup>387</sup>

The fact that women from the former USSR are typically more independent than, for example, European women, can be another reason for a high volume of ex-USSR female migrants in Poland. Policies imposed in the USSR promoted the equality of men and women in many areas of social life, but especially in the labour market and in the participation in the creation of a household's income. The picture of a 'Soviet woman' driving a tractor is widely known all over the world. Such policies produced women who are more likely to migrate than other female representatives of most nations.<sup>388</sup>

### 6.7.3. *Age of denizens*

It may be expected that the age of potential migrants influences their propensity to resettlement. In general, it is easier for young people than for older migrants to adjust to the new conditions in their destination country. They are on average more flexible and they are able to pick up new skills faster than the other migrants. It may be expected, therefore, that young people have a relatively high inclination to resettlement when compared with the other older potential migrants.



In fact, denizens from the former Soviet Union as well as from Ukraine<sup>389</sup> are relatively young. The great majority are under forty (see Table 6.9). On the other hand, 50% of European migrants are over forty. This dissimilarity is probably related to the difference between major factors underlying migration from these two areas.

Most ex-USSR migrants who took up migration after 1989 are economic migrants. This seems to be related to the relatively young age of members of this group of denizens. Young people are more willing to risk moving to a new environment to have better prospects for the future. Moreover, there were many mixed marriages contracted between citizens of the former USSR and Polish people in the 1990s in Poland and nearly half of them were Polish-Ukrainian marriages. At the same time, marriages are usually contracted between young people.

Table 6.9 Denizens who got their PRPs after 1991 according to age and citizenship<sup>a</sup>

| Age     | Total  |     | Europe |     | Former USSR |     | Ukraine |     |
|---------|--------|-----|--------|-----|-------------|-----|---------|-----|
|         | N      | %   | N      | %   | N           | %   | N       | %   |
| 18-19   | 671    | 4   | 206    | 4   | 348         | 4   | 144     | 4   |
| 20-29   | 5,317  | 30  | 970    | 19  | 3,064       | 38  | 1,304   | 39  |
| 30-39   | 5,500  | 31  | 1,351  | 27  | 2,313       | 29  | 995     | 30  |
| 40-49   | 3,051  | 17  | 1,093  | 22  | 1,237       | 16  | 522     | 16  |
| Over 49 | 2,999  | 17  | 1,370  | 28  | 1,042       | 13  | 363     | 11  |
| Total   | 17,538 | 100 | 4,990  | 100 | 8,004       | 100 | 3,328   | 100 |

<sup>a</sup> If a person was stateless, but information about his or her former citizenship was available, I take the latter.

Source: Own calculation on the basis of data provided by the Ministry of Interior and Administration in Poland

The determinants of European migration to Poland are more complex which appears to be reflected in the age distribution of this group of denizens. On the basis of information collected on migration from Europe<sup>390</sup>, denizens from this area are often prompted to migrate to Poland by their professional situation or political factors. Some of them are experts employed in international companies, who settled in Poland. Others work as English teachers and are satisfied with their work and economic situation in Poland. These people often were not able to find a suitable job for themselves in their home countries. There are also some political migrants, especially from the former Yugoslavia, among European denizens. Finally, there is a group of people of Polish origins who have become citizens of other countries. They left Poland after the Second

World War or during the Soviet time and they had to relinquish their Polish citizenship. Some of them have come back to Poland after the revolution in 1989<sup>391</sup>. To sum up, European migrants are frequently experienced in professional or political life, which may be the explanation of their relatively old age.

My analysis of the age of migrants is based on the assumption that the age distribution of migrants is related to the factors underlying migration from a given region. Although it does not explain it fully, it gives some important clues about this phenomenon. It seems that denizens who are likely to seek better conditions of life in the host country are on the average younger than the other migrants. This applies to migrants from the former USSR, as well as from Ukraine.

#### 6.7.4. *Education of denizens*

Education seems to be an important socio-demographic characteristic which influences propensity to migration. It may be argued that well educated people are more willing to accept the risk related to resettlement. It is also easier for them to find a job in the destination country, as well as to adjust and integrate to the foreign society.

In general, denizens in Poland are very well educated – 41% have higher education (see Table 6.10). At the same time, a considerable proportion of migrants has vocational education, which is very useful type of education especially for labour migrants who typically take up jobs in construction or agriculture. In this migration such professions as master-builder, bricklayer, house-painter, plumber, gardener etc. constitute a useful capital which makes it easier for migrants to find a job, albeit illegal, in the host country.

Differences in education of migrants from Europe and the former USSR are not crucial. Interestingly enough, a relatively large group of Europeans has only primary education (10%), when compared with the other groups of denizens and the average for the whole population. In fact, almost one third of this group are Germans. Probably, this is due to the fact that factors underlying German migration to Poland are highly specific. Germans come to Poland as businessmen, spouses of Polish people, but seldom as unskilled legal or illegal workers. They usually settle in regions where the German minority is numerous, sometimes they even come back to those places in Poland from which they originated. It should also be noted that they are unlikely to come to Poland to strive for better economic life prospects. Because of the above factors, they do not

necessarily have to have out-standing skills so as to adjust to Polish society efficiently. Moreover, the risk related to their migration to Poland is relatively low as they have the possibility to settle in a virtually German environment.

Table 6.10 Denizens who got their PRPs after 1991 according to education and citizenship<sup>a</sup>

| Education    | Total  |     | Europe |     | Former USSR |     | Ukraine |     |
|--------------|--------|-----|--------|-----|-------------|-----|---------|-----|
|              | N      | %   | N      | %   | N           | %   | N       | %   |
| Primary      | 1,269  | 7   | 500    | 10  | 502         | 6   | 164     | 5   |
| Vocational   | 5,877  | 34  | 1,953  | 39  | 2,989       | 37  | 1,336   | 40  |
| Secondary    | 2,782  | 16  | 796    | 16  | 1,224       | 15  | 509     | 15  |
| Higher       | 7,138  | 41  | 1,626  | 33  | 3,134       | 39  | 1,289   | 39  |
| Missing data | 472    | 3   | 115    | 2   | 155         | 2   | 30      | 1   |
| Total        | 17,538 | 100 | 4,990  | 100 | 8,004       | 100 | 3,328   | 100 |

<sup>a</sup> If a person was stateless, but information about his or her former citizenship was available, I take the latter.

Source: Own calculation on the basis of data provided by the Ministry of Interior and Administration in Poland

At the same time, the group of highly educated Europeans is relatively low, which is surprising if we have in mind that European migrants are supposed to possess skills which allow them to find a good job in Poland. It should be noted, however, that the high skills of European migrants, especially those from Western Europe, are not necessarily related to their education<sup>392</sup>. At the beginning of the 1990s those who came from the 'Western World' and who spoke English fluently were perceived in Poland as highly-qualified experts. They brought to Poland valuable know-how as to how to operate in a market economy, and that knowledge was precious. Citizens of the former Soviet Union come to Poland as experts less frequently than Europeans. However, ex-USSR citizens are, in general, very well educated. This may partly explain why settlement migrants in Poland, who originate from this region are so well educated.

There are no considerable discrepancies in the education level between Ukrainian migrants and other migrants. It should be noted, however, that the group of Ukrainians with vocational education is relatively large. This appears to be related to the fact that Ukrainian migrants frequently work in Poland as unskilled workers both legal and illegal. Probably some of them became denizens in Poland.

To sum up, denizens in Poland are very well educated. Evidently, differences in dominant patterns of migration from various areas do not strongly influence the level of education of settlement migrants in Poland. Only small discrepancies between different groups of migrants can be found. It should be noted that, according to literature, also illegal unskilled migrant workers are likely to be relatively well educated.<sup>393</sup> The jobs, which they do in the destination countries, do not reflect the skills which they acquired in their home countries.

### 6.7.5. Marital status of denizens

The marital status of denizens depicts their family situation. Those who are married, divorced or widowed came to Poland with their spouses or married Polish citizens. In fact, it seems that the vast majority of denizens have their families in Poland (the proportion of married persons is 67%)<sup>394</sup>. On the contrary, single migrants, who never married, account for only one tenth of the total (see Table 6.11).

Table 6.11 Denizens who got their PRPs after 1991 according to marital status and citizenship<sup>a</sup>

| Marital status | Total  |     | Europe |     | Former USSR |     | Ukraine |     |
|----------------|--------|-----|--------|-----|-------------|-----|---------|-----|
|                | N      | %   | N      | %   | N           | %   | N       | %   |
| Single         | 1,648  | 10  | 464    | 9   | 741         | 9   | 316     | 9   |
| Married        | 11,691 | 67  | 3,073  | 62  | 5,557       | 69  | 2,436   | 73  |
| Divorced       | 811    | 5   | 245    | 5   | 429         | 5   | 185     | 6   |
| Widowed        | 573    | 3   | 174    | 3   | 321         | 4   | 109     | 3   |
| Missing data   | 2815   | 16  | 1,034  | 21  | 956         | 12  | 282     | 8   |
| Total          | 17,538 | 100 | 4,990  | 100 | 8,004       | 100 | 3,328   | 100 |

<sup>a</sup> If a person was stateless, but information about his or her former citizenship was available, I take the latter.

Source: Own calculation on the basis of data provided by the Ministry of Interior and Administration in Poland

The share of married persons among migrants from the former USSR does not differ much from the rest of population of denizens, but, in the group of Ukrainian migrants, such a ratio is considerably higher than the average (73%). Thus, a large proportion of migrants from that country brought their families with them to Poland or established their own families there. At the same time, women account for as much as 70% of married denizens among ex-USSR migrants as well as Ukrainians. At the other end of the scale, only 30% of European married migrants are women<sup>395</sup>.

Most denizens live with their families in Poland. Clearly, ex-USSR women as well as Ukrainian ones are particularly likely to establish their households in Poland. This is reflected also in data on those mixed marriages in Poland in which citizens of these countries are involved. Interestingly enough, for European denizens, the opposite is the case. It seems that the propensity of women to settle their households in the destination countries is related to opportunity structure differentials related to economic life prospects in the destination country. For ex-USSR citizens, economic differences between Poland and their home countries usually imply a more prosperous life in Poland when compared to their countries of origin.

### **6.8. Conclusions**

Migratory trends to Poland are reflected in the volume and composition of the population of denizens in Poland, which is the main part of settlement migration to Poland. Thus, Ukrainians prevailing in many types of migration to Poland form also the most numerous group of denizens in Poland. They dominate among foreigners from the former USSR (38%) and account for 17% of the whole population of denizens. Moreover, their share in the population of ex-USSR denizens has been growing since 1992.

Ukrainians tend to settle in regions which are close to the Polish-Ukrainian border, but also in the voivodeships inhabited by the 'old' Ukrainian minority. Similar patterns of settlement in Poland have been observed among the Polish-Ukrainian marriages contracted in Poland. It appears that the settlement migration from Ukraine to Poland is supported by social networks between people who live in the border regions of Poland and Ukraine. Also old family and friendship ties between the ethnic Ukrainians in Poland and their country folk in Ukraine (also between the ethnic Poles in Ukraine and their country folk in Poland) seem to be of prime importance in this process. The fact that a considerable share of Ukrainian denizens originates from western Ukraine, which has many historical and cultural ties with Poland, seems to support the above thesis. At the same time, migrants from the distant regions of Ukraine originate mainly from big cities (over, 50 thousand inhabitants). It seems that the better access to information (media, institutions) in big towns makes their inhabitants less dependent on migrant networks, when compared to people living in smaller locations.

Young married women prevail among Ukrainian denizens. They are likely to establish their households in Poland. Probably a considerable proportion of them married Polish citizens. It seems that female migrants are particularly likely to respond to opportunity structure differentials related to settlement migration. As with other denizens in Poland, Ukrainian migrants are very well educated, which probably allows them to adjust to Polish society efficiently.

It should also be noted that Ukrainian migrants appear to have a high inclination towards permanent settlement in Poland and also towards becoming Polish citizens. An estimated 15% of Ukrainian denizens acquired Polish citizenship, which is a relatively high proportion when compared with other denizens. The acquisition of Polish citizenship is the last stage on the way to membership of Polish society (at least in the political realm of integration of migrants). Only a part of denizens passes through this stage. It is argued that naturalised foreigners have the highest propensity to stay permanently in the destination country due to their attachments to the host society which they developed during their stay there.<sup>396</sup> This propensity is also strongly related to the relative life prospects which foreigners originating from various countries have in the destination country. Usually the better these are, when compared with the other countries and the country of foreigners' origin in particular, the more denizens tend to appreciate citizenship of the destination country, hence they are also more likely to become naturalised. The next chapter describes the population of foreigners who acquired Polish citizenship. Therefore, it is devoted to the group of settlement migrants in Poland who are the most determined to stay for the rest of their lives in Poland. Data on denizens suggests that such a determination is relatively high among Ukrainian denizens. The next chapter allows for investigating this issue more deeply.

## CHAPTER 7: CITIZENS - FOREIGNERS GRANTED POLISH CITIZENSHIP

### 7.1. Acquisition of citizenship of the destination country – introductory remarks

Foreigners who acquire citizenship of the destination country pass the third and the final gate to this country.<sup>397</sup> Acquisition of citizenship designates full membership of a given state. Thus, it implies not only rights but also duties in the destination country and is often defined as a relation between individuals and states.<sup>398</sup> It should be noted, however, that the propensity to naturalisation can not be easily perceived as an indicator of a will to integration in the host society. Such a propensity depends on various factors. Holding citizenship of certain countries is perceived as more precious than citizenship of the other states.<sup>399</sup> Moreover, the acquisition of citizenship of the destination country may deprive foreigners of rights in their home countries, in particular, they may have to relinquish their original citizenship. The latter, considerably decreases the inclination to acquire citizenship of the destination country.<sup>400</sup> At the same time, in certain destination countries, denizens have virtually all social rights available. In such a situation they tend to be indifferent as far as the acquisition of citizenship of the destination country is concerned.<sup>401</sup> There are also the two other important issues which should be addressed. In order to be granted citizenship foreigners have to satisfy particular requirements, thus, not everybody, notwithstanding the will to integrate into the host society, is eligible for citizenship. Furthermore, it has been observed that foreigners who intend to stay permanently in the destination country are more interested in becoming citizens of this country.<sup>402</sup> At the same time, along with the transnationalisation of mobility of people, migration is not any longer ‘a one-way street which leads towards definite settlement and abandoning social and political ties to societies of origin’<sup>403</sup>. This implies ‘the emergence of membership that is multiple in the sense of spanning local, regional, and global identities, and which accommodates intersecting complexes of rights, duties and loyalties’<sup>404</sup>.

In general, immigrants in various countries have different propensities towards naturalisation. This is due to the fact that decisions concerning the acquisition of citizenship may be influenced by many factors. At the same time, the tendency to

naturalisation is not a simple indicator of the will of foreigners to integrate in the host society even though it designates full membership of a given state.

In Poland, as in most countries, denizens are eligible for virtually the same social rights<sup>405</sup> as Polish citizens. On the other hand, they are deprived of political rights. Therefore, the propensity to acquire Polish citizenship depicts mainly the willingness of migrants to become full members of Polish society and to have the right to political participation in Poland. This chapter analyses the three main procedures of acquiring Polish citizenship: 'conferment', 'acknowledgement' and 'marriage' procedures (for description of these procedures see Appendix I).

## **7.2. Foreigners granted Polish citizenship – general overview**

The available statistics for foreigners granted Polish citizenship in Poland in the 1990s are fragmented, but they allow for the presentation of some basic characteristics of the population<sup>406</sup>. The total number of foreigners granted Polish citizenship according to the 'conferment' procedure in 1992-1997 is 5,377 (see Table 7.1.) The largest share of positive decisions was made in 1992 (28%), whereas in the other years their numbers vary and do not form any regular trend. Most foreigners granted Polish citizenship according to the 'conferment' procedure in 1992-1997 originated from Europe (48%), with the predominance of Germans (43% of European migrants). Shares of foreigners from the former USSR (16%), Middle-East (13%) and Northern and Central America (15%)<sup>407</sup> were almost equal.



Table 7.1 Positive decisions made in Poland and the Warsaw voivodeship according to the 'conferment' procedure in 1992-1997

| Year  | Poland         | Warsaw voivodeship |                                            |
|-------|----------------|--------------------|--------------------------------------------|
|       | N <sup>a</sup> | N <sup>b</sup>     | Percentage of decisions made in Poland (%) |
| 1992  | 1,522          | 98                 | 6                                          |
| 1993  | 834            | 37                 | 4                                          |
| 1994  | 751            | 55                 | 7                                          |
| 1995  | 1,036          | 82                 | 8                                          |
| 1996  | 679            | 68                 | 10                                         |
| 1997  | 555            | 63                 | 11                                         |
| Total | 5,377          | 403                | 7                                          |

<sup>a</sup> On the basis of data provided by Ministry of Interior and Administration in Poland

<sup>b</sup> On the basis of data provided by Warsaw voivodeship Department

Source: Own calculation on the basis of data provided by the Ministry of Interior and Administration in Poland

Data on people granted Polish citizenship according to the 'acknowledgement' procedure refer to a very short period, but they show that the numbers of foreigners using this procedure are probably higher than those of foreigners following the 'conferment' procedure (see Table 7.2). This applies especially to citizens of the former USSR, who account for as much as 91% of foreigners from this group, whereas Europeans constitute only 6% of the whole. Such a predominance of migrants from the former USSR is related to the fact that the 'acknowledgement' procedure is relatively easy, but it requires a relinquishment of the former citizenship of an applicant. At the same time, according to international agreements, ex-USSR citizens have to relinquish their previous citizenship before obtaining Polish citizenship (see Appendix I).

Table 7.2 Positive decisions made in Poland and in the Warsaw voivodeship according to the 'acknowledgement' procedure in 1997 and the first part of 1998

| Year               | Poland | Warsaw voivodeship |                                            |
|--------------------|--------|--------------------|--------------------------------------------|
|                    | N      | N                  | Percentage of decisions made in Poland (%) |
| 1997               | 725    | 73                 | 10                                         |
| First part of 1998 | 401    | 32                 | 8                                          |
| Total              | 1,126  | 105                | 9                                          |

Source: Own calculation on the basis of data provided by the Ministry of Interior and Administration in Poland

The 'marriage' procedure was used by only a few migrants applying for Polish citizenship. In 1997, for example, only 4% of foreigners who obtained Polish citizenship were subject to this procedure. It should be noted, however, that, until the end of 1998, this procedure applied only to female migrants married to Polish citizens. The largest country-group of foreign women to be granted Polish citizenship this in way originated from Vietnam (40%). However, female ex-USSR migrants were also numerous in this group and altogether account for 41% of the total.

Table 7.3 Positive decisions made in Poland and the Warsaw voivodeship according to the 'marriage' procedure in 1997 and during first part of 1998

| Year               | Poland | Warsaw voivodeship |                                            |
|--------------------|--------|--------------------|--------------------------------------------|
|                    | N      | N                  | Percentage of decisions made in Poland (%) |
| 1997               | 52     | 13                 | 25                                         |
| First part of 1998 | 43     | 5                  | 12                                         |
| Total              | 95     | 18                 | 19                                         |

Source: Own calculation on the basis of data provided by the Ministry of Interior and Administration in Poland

Shares of Ukrainian migrants who were granted Polish citizenship by various procedures are different. They constitute a surprisingly small proportion of foreigners who got it according to the 'conferment' procedure (0.3%). Only fifteen Ukrainians were recorded in statistics<sup>408</sup>. It should be noted, however, that this number does not reflect the presence of Ukrainians in this group of foreigners<sup>409</sup>. Many Ukrainian migrants were probably included in the large general group of citizens of the former USSR (716 persons – 13% of the population of foreigners granted Polish citizenship according to the 'conferment' procedure in 1992-1997 in Poland). Ukrainians are more numerous in the groups of foreigners granted Polish citizenship according to the other procedures mentioned above. They account for 11% of those who obtained it by way of the 'acknowledgement' procedure (12% of migrants from the former USSR) and for 5% of those who followed the 'marriage' procedure (13% of migrants from the former USSR).

The number of positive decisions made in the Warsaw voivodeship according to the 'conferment' and the 'acknowledgement' procedures account for about 10% of all such decisions in Poland. For the 'marriage' procedure, this ratio was more than twice as high. Moreover, the proportion of positive decisions made in the Warsaw

voivodeship according to the 'conferment' procedure has been rising regularly since 1992, independently of the number of positive decisions made in Poland. It appears that this voivodeship processed the most positively considered applications each year<sup>410</sup>. Therefore, the description of the population of foreigners who were applying for Polish citizenship in Warsaw voivodeship in 1989-1998, included in the following chapters, can provide important information about a considerable part of the whole population of newly admitted Polish citizens.

### 7.3. Population of applicants in Warsaw voivodeship<sup>411</sup>

In 1989-1998, the Warsaw voivodeship (for the location of the Warsaw voivodeship see Figure 10A.1 in Appendix 10) processed 1,541 applications for Polish citizenship. The actual number of applicants was smaller – 1,483 (see Table 7.4). This is due to the fact that some people applied more than once.

Table 7.4 Applicants by number of applications they submitted to the Warsaw voivodeship according to type of procedure

| Type of procedure           | Once  | Two times | Three times | Number of people in total |
|-----------------------------|-------|-----------|-------------|---------------------------|
| 'Conferment' procedure      | 698   | 50        | 4           | 752                       |
| 'Acknowledgement' procedure | 656   | 0         | 0           | 656                       |
| 'Marriage' procedure        | 75    | 0         | 0           | 75                        |
| Total                       | 1,429 | 50        | 4           | 1,483                     |

Source: Own calculation on the basis of data provided by the Ministry of Interior and Administration in Poland

The largest group of applicants followed the 'conferment' procedure – 51%. Foreigners who were classified by the 'acknowledgement' procedure account for 44% of all applicants, whereas the 'marriage' procedure was used by only 5% of them. The share of foreigners using the 'marriage' procedure is surprisingly small, since this procedure is simple and easy. This is mainly due to the fact that this procedure was of no use to citizens who were obliged to relinquish their former citizenship, especially so in the case of the citizens of the former Soviet Union. The 'marriage' procedure requires that a foreigner would apply for Polish citizenship within three months from the moment of marriage with a Polish citizen. This three-month period is usually too short for the renunciation of citizenship procedure because of the slow operation of the authorities in the countries of migrants' origin. Another reason is that few people are

aware of it. The decision to acquire Polish citizenship is usually made after living in Poland for some time, usually much longer than three months. It is then far too late to use this simple procedure.

It can be observed that it is only the 'conferment' procedure where foreigners apply more than once. This is because of the character of the two other procedures. In the 'marriage' procedure, applicants have only one chance to apply. A requirement that application shall be submitted not later than three months after the wedding is very strict. Therefore, if an application is rejected, the applicant can apply later by another procedure<sup>412</sup>. The 'acknowledgement' procedure is used in simple cases. People are supposed to fulfil certain requirements. There is no place for discretionary decisions. People who applied for Polish citizenship can be considered as 'suitable' cases to apply according to this procedure. If they are, they are typically given Polish citizenship unless any complications occur<sup>413</sup>.

#### **7.4. Previous citizenship - applicants<sup>414</sup> in Warsaw voivodeship**

The distribution of applicants by their previous citizenship differs over the procedure. It is related to the fact that, because of international agreements, some foreigners have to relinquish their former citizenship to be granted Polish citizenship (see Appendix I). Apart from ex-USSR migrants, foreigners tend to use the 'conferment' procedure which allows them to hold their home citizenship. Among Europeans, there are only a few persons (three) who followed the 'acknowledgement' procedure<sup>415</sup>, whereas foreigners from the other countries never use it.

In general, citizens of the former USSR prevail in the population of foreigners applying for Polish citizenship (see Table 7.5). They account for as much as 58% of the total and they definitely dominate among foreigners who submitted their applications in the 'acknowledgement' procedure – 94% of the whole group. Most of them originate from Russia (41%) and Ukraine (25%) (see Table 7.6). The percentages of citizens from the other republics of the former USSR do not exceed 10%. At the same time, Ukrainian citizens account for 14% of the total population of applicants.

Table 7.5 Previous citizenship of applicants according to type of procedure

| Citizenship                  | Total |     | 'Conferment' |     | 'Acknowledgement' |     | 'Marriage' |     |
|------------------------------|-------|-----|--------------|-----|-------------------|-----|------------|-----|
|                              | N     | %   | N            | %   | N                 | %   | N          | %   |
| Europe                       | 226   | 15  | 215          | 29  | 3                 | 1   | 8          | 11  |
| Former USSR                  | 853   | 58  | 187          | 25  | 619               | 94  | 47         | 63  |
| Asia                         | 65    | 4   | 57           | 8   | 0                 | 0   | 8          | 11  |
| Middle East                  | 182   | 12  | 179          | 24  | 0                 | 0   | 3          | 4   |
| Northern America             | 37    | 2   | 33           | 4   | 0                 | 0   | 4          | 5   |
| Southern and Central America | 15    | 1   | 12           | 2   | 0                 | 0   | 3          | 4   |
| Africa                       | 51    | 3   | 49           | 7   | 0                 | 0   | 2          | 3   |
| Other                        | 1     | 0   | 1            | 0   | 0                 | 0   | 0          | 0   |
| Missing data                 | 53    | 4   | 19           | 3   | 34                | 5   | 0          | 0   |
| Total                        | 1,483 | 100 | 752          | 100 | 656               | 100 | 75         | 100 |

Source: Own calculation on the basis of data provided by the Ministry of Interior and Administration in Poland

Table 7.6 Applicants from the former USSR according to type of procedure

| Citizenship     | Total |     | 'Conferment' |     | 'Acknowledgement' |     | 'Marriage' |     |
|-----------------|-------|-----|--------------|-----|-------------------|-----|------------|-----|
|                 | N     | %   | N            | %   | N                 | %   | N          | %   |
| Armenia         | 14    | 2   | 3            | 2   | 8                 | 1   | 3          | 6   |
| Belarus         | 80    | 9   | 9            | 5   | 66                | 11  | 5          | 11  |
| Kazakhstan      | 18    | 2   | 6            | 3   | 9                 | 2   | 3          | 6   |
| Lithuania       | 73    | 9   | 23           | 12  | 41                | 7   | 9          | 19  |
| Russia          | 351   | 41  | 63           | 34  | 276               | 45  | 12         | 26  |
| Ukraine         | 208   | 24  | 49           | 26  | 152               | 25  | 7          | 15  |
| Other republics | 76    | 9   | 25           | 13  | 46                | 8   | 5          | 11  |
| Former USSR     | 33    | 4   | 9            | 5   | 21                | 3   | 3          | 6   |
| Total           | 853   | 100 | 187          | 100 | 619               | 100 | 47         | 100 |

Source: Own calculation on the basis of data provided by the Ministry of Interior and Administration in Poland

The two other large groups of foreigners in the population of applicants are Europeans (15% of the total) and citizens of the Middle East (12% of total). Among European migrants, the most numerous proportion is that of Bulgarians – 50% of this group.

In general, the distribution of citizenship in the group of applicants for Polish citizenship reflects the main migratory movements to Poland. It should be noted,

however, that this refers to not only contemporary migration, but also to migration which proceeded under the umbrella of the Soviet bloc. In the latter case the participants were mostly citizens of the USSR and inhabitants of Central and Eastern Europe.

### 7.5. Dates of first arrivals - applicants in Warsaw voivodeship

To be eligible for Polish citizenship, a foreigner should have lived in Poland for at least five years. Therefore, only a relatively small share of the group of applicants who were granted Polish citizenship during 1989-1998 came to Poland in the 1990s for the first time (13%) (see Table 7.7). The proportion of newcomers is probably higher in a group of foreigners applying by the 'marriage' procedure, as this procedure was designed for women who had been married to Polish citizens for no more than three months<sup>416</sup>.

Table 7.7 Date of first applicants' arrivals to Poland according to citizenship

| Date of first arrival                         | Total |     | Europe |     | Former USSR |     | Ukraine |     |
|-----------------------------------------------|-------|-----|--------|-----|-------------|-----|---------|-----|
|                                               | N     | %   | N      | %   | N           | %   | N       | %   |
| Before the end of the Second World War        | 25    | 2   | 0      | 0   | 20          | 2   | 12      | 6   |
| 1946-1949                                     | 23    | 2   | 5      | 2   | 15          | 2   | 8       | 4   |
| 1950-1959                                     | 104   | 7   | 8      | 4   | 81          | 9   | 17      | 8   |
| 1960-1969                                     | 175   | 12  | 30     | 13  | 103         | 12  | 28      | 13  |
| 1970-1979                                     | 332   | 22  | 71     | 31  | 175         | 21  | 28      | 13  |
| 1980-1989                                     | 424   | 29  | 44     | 19  | 245         | 29  | 69      | 33  |
| 1990-1997                                     | 191   | 13  | 20     | 9   | 134         | 16  | 36      | 17  |
| Born in Poland                                | 49    | 3   | 9      | 4   | 25          | 3   | 0       | 0   |
| Lives outside Poland                          | 6     | 0   | 1      | 0   | 0           | 0   | 0       | 0   |
| Lives in Poland only from time to time        | 2     | 0   | 0      | 0   | 0           | 0   | 0       | 0   |
| Born in Poland but left it later <sup>a</sup> | 74    | 5   | 26     | 12  | 12          | 1   | 1       | 0   |
| Missing data                                  | 78    | 5   | 12     | 5   | 43          | 5   | 9       | 4   |
| Total                                         | 1,483 | 100 | 226    | 100 | 853         | 100 | 208     | 100 |

<sup>a</sup> This category refers to people who were born in Poland but left during the Soviet period, as a result of which they lost their Polish citizenship

Source: Own calculation on the basis of data provided by the Ministry of Interior and Administration in Poland

The majority of applicants for Polish citizenship came to Poland in the 1970s and the 1980s (51%) mostly from the countries of the Soviet bloc. For example, as many as 96% of Bulgarians arrived in Poland for the first time before the 1990s. Foreigners from the Middle East also appear to have participated in movements during the existence of the Soviet bloc. Those, who started their migration to Poland in the 1990s, account for only 10% of this group. Nevertheless migrants originating from this area are known in Poland as dynamic businessmen. Therefore, their inflow from the Middle East to Poland did not stop even though the Soviet bloc disintegrated.

Among ex-USSR migrants, there is a relatively large group of people who came to Poland for the first time no later than the 1980s - 45% of applicants from the former Soviet Union. The proportion of Ukrainian migrants who came to Poland in the above period is even higher – 50%. It appears that even though migration from the USSR was strongly supported by official institutions during the Soviet time, it did not lose its importance later on in the 1990s.

Polish people who had lived in Poland and left it during the Soviet period constitute another very interesting group among the applicants for Polish citizenship. Most of them came back to Poland in the 1980s and the 1990s (62% of this group), especially after 1988 (41%) when Poland became a democratic country. The example of this group suggests that economic and political transition in Poland was the factor which may have encouraged some foreigners to apply for Polish citizenship.

To sum up, most applicants for Polish citizenship were involved in movements proceeding under the umbrella of the Soviet bloc. Interestingly enough, a relatively high proportion of ex-USSR migrants and also Ukrainians came to Poland no later than the 1980s, thus, they are representatives of a quite recent migration to Poland. It should be noted also that the political and economic transition in Central and Eastern Europe at the beginning of the 1990s increased the propensity of foreigners to apply for Polish citizenship. It is, therefore, very likely that, in the future, the volume of applicants for Polish citizenship will grow alongside the number of migrants coming to Poland. The latter may apply especially to Ukrainian migrants who have been coming to Poland in large numbers in the 1990s.

## 7.6. Reasons for coming to Poland - applicants in Warsaw voivodeship

Most applicants for Polish citizenship came to Poland for reasons typical for settlement migrants: to visit their actual or prospective spouses<sup>417</sup> (hereafter - to one's spouse), and to their families – 62% (see Table 7.8). Those who came to work constitute a small minority – 3%. It should be noted, however, that the population of applicants consists mostly of migrants who arrived in Poland before 1989 when the overall volume of labour migration to Poland was not very high. Therefore, the share of former labour migrants in the population of the future applicants for Polish citizenship may be higher. On the other hand, a considerable proportion of migrants came to Poland for the first time to study (12%).

Reasons for coming to Poland differ by the countries of migrants' origin. European migrants were less likely to have visited Poland for reasons typical for settlement migrants than did the other migrants (58% of them came to their spouses or to families). Conversely, a considerable share of them came to Poland to study (12%). This refers especially to Bulgarian migrants who account for 77% of all European 'students'. According to their biographies included in the personal data files, they participated in student exchanges between Poland and Bulgaria in the 1960s and the 1970s which led also to many Polish-Bulgarian marriages. Because of this, Bulgarians are also numerous among those who came to their spouses (62% of European migrants of this kind). It should be noted that the group of Bulgarian migrants contains also Polish nationals who became Bulgarian (after marriages with Bulgarian citizens). In the European population of migrants, there is also a relatively high percentage of Polish people who came back to Poland after a long emigration (32% of them came from Europe). Most of them migrated from Western Europe (62% of those who migrated from Europe)<sup>418</sup>.



Table 7.8 Reason for coming to Poland for the first time according to citizenship

| Reason for coming to Poland | Total |     | Europe |     | Former USSR |     | Ukraine |     |
|-----------------------------|-------|-----|--------|-----|-------------|-----|---------|-----|
|                             | N     | %   | N      | %   | N           | %   | N       | %   |
| To spouse                   | 706   | 48  | 100    | 44  | 522         | 61  | 141     | 68  |
| To parents                  | 148   | 10  | 31     | 14  | 103         | 12  | 24      | 12  |
| To other family             | 54    | 4   | 1      | 0   | 50          | 6   | 13      | 6   |
| To friends                  | 10    | 1   | 0      | 0   | 9           | 1   | 4       | 2   |
| Repatriate                  | 28    | 2   | 0      | 0   | 25          | 3   | 6       | 3   |
| Come back                   | 66    | 4   | 21     | 9   | 8           | 1   | 0       | 0   |
| To work                     | 43    | 3   | 12     | 1   | 18          | 2   | 5       | 2   |
| For studying                | 185   | 12  | 26     | 12  | 17          | 2   | 3       | 1   |
| Tourism                     | 25    | 2   | 1      | 0   | 7           | 1   | 0       | 0   |
| Refuge                      | 17    | 1   | 6      | 3   | 2           | 0   | 0       | 0   |
| Born in Poland              | 49    | 3   | 9      | 4   | 25          | 3   | 0       | 0   |
| Other                       | 13    | 1   | 0      | 0   | 4           | 0   | 2       | 1   |
| Missing data                | 139   | 9   | 19     | 8   | 63          | 7   | 10      | 5   |
| Total                       | 1,483 | 100 | 226    | 100 | 853         | 100 | 208     | 100 |

Source: Own calculation on the basis of data provided by the Ministry of Interior and Administration in Poland

The vast majority of migrants from the former USSR visited Poland for reasons typical for settlement migrants (79%) arriving for the first time. The proportion of such people among Ukrainians was even higher – 86%. In particular, ex-USSR migrants as well as Ukrainians were coming to Poland to their spouses (61% of ex-USSR migrants and 68% of Ukrainians). Even though foreigners from the former USSR often worked or studied in Poland during the Soviet period, such migrants account for only 4% of the group ('workers' – 2% and 'students' – 2%). Moreover, most of them visited Poland, for the first time, in the 1980s and the 1990s (66% of 'workers' and 65% of 'students'). It seems that the Soviet Union citizens who participated in mobility within the Soviet bloc ('workers' and 'students') did not tend to settle in Poland permanently.

Apparently, 'students' originating from the Middle East were settling in Poland more willingly than ex-USSR citizens. As many as 37% of the total of 'students' originates from this area. Such migrants account for 38% of the Middle East citizens. At the same time, arrival in Poland to study was also relatively common among Asians and Africans who later on settled permanently in Poland<sup>419</sup>. This type of migration was supported by official bilateral agreements between Poland and these countries. On the

other hand, migrants from the Middle East were coming to Poland also relatively frequently to work (6%), which was very seldom the case among Asians and Africans (only one person from each area). As with the movements of students, labour migration of the Middle East citizens was also influenced by structural factors – co-operation between Poland and some countries of the Middle East on the exchange of experts.

It should be noted that a relatively high proportion of applicants for Polish citizenship came to Poland under the auspices of social networks i.e. to their family or friends (14%)<sup>420</sup>. For the former USSR as well as Ukraine, the ratio of such people was a little bit higher (18%). It is difficult to judge how many of these networks were typical migrant networks, as applicants tended to stress their attachment to Poland in their life stories. This is due to the fact that Polish origins are a strong advantage for an applicant, and make the probability that he/she would be granted Polish citizenship that much higher. Thus, foreigners presented their ties with Polish people, especially with their families, as relationships which stemmed from their Polish origins. In fact, many of those statements were of doubtful veracity. According to biographies included in the personal data files, family networks were mostly related to families divided by the Polish-USSR border after the Second World War. Some of them were, however, migrant networks. Parents who migrated as labour migrants brought their children to Poland, or children migrated first and brought their parents. Friendships with Polish people, which helped migrants from the former USSR to come to Poland, were usually related to the migratory activities of foreigners. Their Polish friends supported them in labour migration<sup>421</sup>. The latter applies also to Ukrainian migrants.

In general, many foreigners applying for Polish citizenship came to Poland for reasons typical for settlement migrants – to join their families or to establish new ones in Poland. This seems to be related to the fact that people who set up their households in the destination country develop the strongest attachments to this country via their family ties. Therefore, they are particularly likely to become naturalised. On the other hand, the population of applicants comprises also a high proportion of people whose migration to Poland was strongly influenced by the structural factors driving the various types of movements to Poland. Before the political and economic transition in Central and Eastern Europe, these factors were shaped mainly by policies implemented in the countries of the Soviet bloc. Labour migration, at that time, was supported mainly by official organisations and was of less importance than in the 1990s. From the beginning

of the 1990s, labour migration to Poland mainly from the countries of the former USSR grew in importance. At the same time, the majority of the ex-USSR and Ukrainian former 'workers' and 'students', who applied for Polish citizenship, came to Poland after 1979. Thus, it seems likely that the proportion of Ukrainian former labour migrants in the population of applicants will grow in the future.

## 7.7. Socio-demographic characteristics of applicants in Warsaw voivodeship

### 7.7.1. Gender of applicants

Women predominate in the population of applicants for Polish citizenship (62%) (see Table 7.9). It should be noted that they differ from men in their main reasons for coming to Poland for the first time. As many as 79% of female migrants came to Poland to their spouses or families (parents or children)<sup>422</sup>. Conversely, men frequently migrated to Poland to work or to study (32%)<sup>423</sup>. Therefore, factors which drove the settlement migration of males were relatively diversified, whereas the determinants of female settlement migration were mostly typical for resettlement.

Table 7.9 Applicants according to gender and citizenship

| Gender | Total |     | Europe |     | Former USSR |     | Ukraine |     |
|--------|-------|-----|--------|-----|-------------|-----|---------|-----|
|        | N     | %   | N      | %   | N           | %   | N       | %   |
| Male   | 568   | 38  | 103    | 46  | 170         | 20  | 40      | 19  |
| Female | 915   | 62  | 123    | 54  | 683         | 80  | 168     | 81  |
| Total  | 1,483 | 100 | 226    | 100 | 853         | 100 | 208     | 100 |

Source: Own calculation on the basis of data provided by the Ministry of Interior and Administration in Poland

Gender distribution differs according to migrants' countries of origin. It is fairly balanced among Europeans. Moreover, in this group, the reasons for coming to Poland are quite similar for both gender groups. Shares of male and female migrants who came to Poland to their families<sup>424</sup>, to work<sup>425</sup> and to study<sup>426</sup> do not differ very much<sup>427</sup>.

Among ex-USSR citizens, females – typical settlement migrants<sup>428</sup> – definitely predominate. They account for as much as 80% of the group. At the same time, most of them (87%) came to Poland to their families, in particular, to their spouses (72%), namely as settlement migrants joining their families in the destination country. Among ex-USSR men, the above reasons for migration to Poland were of less importance<sup>429</sup>. On the other hand, women from the former USSR more seldom arrived as 'workers' or

'students' (3%) than men (10%). It should be noted that the predominance of female migrants is also a feature of the Ukrainian group (81% of women). Moreover, regularities related to gender distribution and to reasons for coming to Poland, observed among migrants from the former USSR, apply to Ukrainian migrants as well. In general, male and female migrants from the former USSR differ in their reasons for coming to Poland. Such a considerable dissimilarity has not been observed among European migrants.

It appears, therefore, that the predomination of women in settlement migration from the former USSR and also from Ukraine to Poland is a characteristic feature of not only the contemporary migration from this region, but also of movements which were underway in the Soviet period. At the same time, female applicants from this area have been coming to Poland as typical settlement migrants joining their families or spouses over there. In the past, this female settlement migration was facilitated by the intensive movements of students and workers under way in the Soviet bloc. According to information included in the personal data files of the applicants, women from the former USSR coming to Poland to their prospective partners were often joining Polish men whom they met in their countries of origin. These men went there as students or workers. Nevertheless, at the present, when migration from the former USSR is not facilitated by political circumstances but driven mainly by macroeconomic factors, the female settlement migration from this region and from Ukraine in particular has not diminished and is even growing in volume.

### ***7.7.2. Marital status of applicants and marriages with Polish citizens***

Most applicants are married – 73% (see Table 7.10) - and the other 14% have experienced marriages (divorced and widowed people)<sup>430</sup>. Thus, the vast majority of applicants for Polish citizenship appear to have settled in Poland with their families. Moreover, many foreigners have entered into marriages with Polish partners (80%) (see Table 7.11). There are also some people who were married to Polish persons more than once. In fact, only 6% of applicants who have experienced marriages have never been married to Polish citizens. In general, foreign women more frequently marry Polish citizens (81%) than foreign men (78%).

Table 7.10 Applicants according to marital status and citizenship

| Marital status     | Total |     | Europe |     | Former USSR |     | Ukraine |     |
|--------------------|-------|-----|--------|-----|-------------|-----|---------|-----|
|                    | N     | %   | N      | %   | N           | %   | N       | %   |
| Single             | 94    | 6   | 25     | 11  | 56          | 7   | 9       | 4   |
| Married            | 1,090 | 73  | 164    | 73  | 610         | 72  | 153     | 74  |
| Divorced           | 154   | 10  | 21     | 9   | 108         | 13  | 28      | 13  |
| Widowed            | 54    | 4   | 4      | 2   | 42          | 5   | 13      | 6   |
| Other <sup>a</sup> | 7     | 0   | 0      | 0   | 4           | 0   | 0       | 0   |
| Missing data       | 84    | 6   | 12     | 5   | 33          | 5   | 5       | 2   |
| Total              | 1,483 | 100 | 226    | 100 | 853         | 100 | 208     | 100 |

<sup>a</sup> This category refers, for example, to people who are in a concubinage

Source: Own calculation on the basis of data provided by the Ministry of Interior and Administration in Poland

Among ex-USSR citizens, the share of those who had been married to Polish citizens is extremely high (84% of foreigners from this area has ever been married to Polish citizens). Females from this region are particularly likely to marry Polish citizens – 86% of them have done so<sup>431</sup>. This holds also for Ukrainian women. In fact, both Ukrainian female and male migrants have a slightly higher propensity to marry Polish citizens than the average for the population of ex-USSR citizens<sup>432</sup>. On the other hand, European settlement migrants seem to be a little less likely to marry Polish citizens - only three quarters of them did so. Moreover, in contrast to ex-USSR migrants, European men have a higher propensity towards it than women from Europe (85% versus 63%)<sup>433</sup>.

Table 7.11 Applicants according to number of marriages with Polish citizens and citizenship

| Number of marriages with Polish citizen | Total |     | Europe |     | Former USSR |     | Ukraine |     |
|-----------------------------------------|-------|-----|--------|-----|-------------|-----|---------|-----|
|                                         | N     | %   | N      | %   | N           | %   | N       | %   |
| No such marriages                       | 89    | 6   | 15     | 7   | 38          | 4   | 12      | 6   |
| One marriage                            | 1,116 | 75  | 159    | 70  | 665         | 78  | 166     | 80  |
| Two marriages                           | 78    | 5   | 12     | 5   | 50          | 6   | 13      | 6   |
| Three marriages                         | 5     | 0   | 0      | 0   | 3           | 0   | 0       | 0   |
| Never married                           | 94    | 6   | 25     | 11  | 56          | 7   | 9       | 4   |
| Missing data                            | 101   | 7   | 15     | 7   | 41          | 5   | 8       | 4   |
| Total                                   | 1,483 | 100 | 226    | 100 | 853         | 100 | 208     | 100 |

Source: Own calculation on the basis of data provided by the Ministry of Interior and Administration in Poland

In general, settlement migration of applicants for Polish citizenship is strongly related to the phenomenon of mixed marriages contracted between foreigners and Polish people. This applies particularly to Ukrainian settlement migrants. It can be seen that it is likely that migrants of this type are over-represented in the population of those who are eager to become Polish citizens. This is due to the fact that the integration of foreigners involved in mixed marriages with citizens of the destination country usually proceeds faster than the integration of other groups of settlement migrants.<sup>434</sup> Moreover, such a marriage involves a strong attachment to the destination country in terms of family ties. The above factors usually make the propensity of a foreigner to acquire citizenship of the destination country relatively high.

### 7.7.3. Age of applicants

The population of applicants who followed the 'conferment' and the 'acknowledgement' procedures is relatively old<sup>435</sup>. People over the age of forty-nine at the moment when they submitted their applications account for as much as 29%<sup>436</sup> of the total. The above age distribution is related to the fact that a large group of the applicants following the two procedures are foreigners who had been living in Poland for a long time but who applied for Polish citizenship only in the 1990s. This is due to the fact that before the political and economic transition foreigners were more reluctant in applying for Polish citizenship than now. The latter applies, in particular, to those who left Poland as Polish citizens during the Soviet period and came back as foreigners after 1989.

Foreign women who applied according to the 'marriage' procedure were much younger than the average for the rest of the population. In this group, only 4% of women were over the age of forty-nine and as many as two thirds of female applicants were under thirty years. This is due to the formal requirements for this procedure. It is available only to those newly married to Polish citizens and not longer than for three months (compare Appendix I). At the same time, it is generally younger people who get married.

#### 7.7.4. Education and professional status of applicants

Applicants for Polish citizenship are very well educated. More than half of them have higher education (53%) (see Table 7.12) and another 30% completed secondary school. Differences between the levels of education of foreigners originating from various countries are small. Europeans are, on the average, slightly better educated than migrants from the former USSR and Ukraine. Ukrainians differ from Europeans especially in the high proportion of people with only primary education (13% of Ukrainians). It seems that differences in factors stimulating settlement migration from various countries to Poland do not have an important influence on the level of migrants' education. Evidently, people involved in settlement migration to Poland, who are eager to become Polish citizens, are very well educated.

Table 7.12 Applicants according to level of education and citizenship

| Education    | Total |     | Europe |     | Former USSR |     | Ukraine |     |
|--------------|-------|-----|--------|-----|-------------|-----|---------|-----|
|              | N     | %   | N      | %   | N           | %   | N       | %   |
| Primary      | 102   | 7   | 14     | 6   | 78          | 9   | 26      | 13  |
| Vocational   | 46    | 3   | 10     | 4   | 28          | 3   | 7       | 3   |
| Secondary    | 443   | 30  | 67     | 30  | 263         | 31  | 55      | 26  |
| Higher       | 783   | 53  | 120    | 53  | 432         | 51  | 110     | 53  |
| Missing data | 109   | 7   | 15     | 7   | 52          | 6   | 10      | 5   |
| Total        | 1,483 | 100 | 226    | 100 | 853         | 100 | 208     | 100 |

Source: Own calculation on the basis of data provided by the Ministry of Interior and Administration in Poland

Applicants for Polish citizenship also have relatively high professional status in Poland and only a small proportion of them is unemployed<sup>437</sup>. About one quarter of applicants work as specialists (24%), and another 14% are businessmen. It seems that migrants from the Middle East achieved the highest professional status in Poland, as

26% of them work as specialists and 40% are businessmen. The respective shares for migrants from the other countries are lower<sup>438</sup>. In particular, there are far fewer businessmen in the other groups. For example, only 10% of Ukrainians are businessmen, but 27% of them work as specialists.

In general, well educated foreigners of a good professional status are highly represented in the group of applicants for Polish citizenship. Thus, it seems that such people are likely to effectively integrate into Polish society, hence their inclination to acquire Polish citizenship. On the other hand, well educated people have usually relatively high political and social consciousness. The latter may increase their propensity to become Polish citizens, as it brings with it the opportunity for political participation in Poland.

## 7.8. Conclusions

The fragmented data on foreigners granted Polish citizenship do not allow for a detailed analysis of the volume and characteristics of their whole population in Poland. However, data collected in Warsaw voivodeship Department, to which a high proportion of foreigners applied for Polish citizenship in 1989-1998, provide rich information about this part of settlement migration to Poland.

The largest group among applicants for Polish citizenship originates from the former USSR. At the same time, Ukrainians account for 14% of the total population of applicants, which is the percentage similar to the shares of Ukrainians in the other stocks of the settlement migrants in Poland: aliens and denizens. It appears, therefore, that Ukrainians are not under-represented in the population of 'citizens'. Thus, they have a relatively high propensity towards naturalisation.

Most of the applicants for Polish citizenship arrived in Poland for the first time before 1990. The population of 'citizens', therefore, consists mostly of people who migrated to Poland during the Soviet period. These foreigners had been living in Poland for a long time, but they decided to become Polish citizens only after economic and political transition in the late 1980s. As a consequence of this transition Polish citizenship became more valuable to foreigners. It should be noted, however, that as many as half of Ukrainian migrants came to Poland for the first time no later than the 1980s. Thus, recent migrants are more numerous among Ukrainians, when compared



with the rest of the applicants. This may be related to the high influx of various types of Ukrainian migrants to Poland in the 1990s.

Many newly admitted Polish citizens came to Poland under the auspices of social networks, mainly family networks. Typical migrant networks were used by only a small part of migrants. It should be noted, however, that the development of migrant networks in Poland started only at the beginning of the 1990s alongside the rapid increase in the volume of labour migrants coming to Poland, mainly from the former USSR. It seems that migrant networks were scarce at the time when the majority of those who applied for Polish citizenship in the Warsaw voivodeship in 1989-1998 first came to Poland. Also, ex-USSR and Ukrainian 'citizens', among whom the proportion of recent migrants is relatively high, migrated with the help of migrant networks slightly more often than did the others.

On the other hand, the vast majority of Ukrainians, in line with patterns observed in the total population of newly admitted citizens, came to Poland as typical settlement migrants – to their families or prospective partners. This seems to be related to the fact that migrants who set up their families in the destination country develop very strong attachments to the host society, hence their propensity towards naturalisation. At the same time, the integration of foreigners married to the citizens of the destination country usually proceeds faster and involves particularly strong attachments to the host society via family ties. This is reflected in the population of applicants, where foreigners married to Polish citizens constitute the vast majority. It should be noted that the percentage of Ukrainians involved in such mixed marriages is particularly high.

Women prevail in the population of the applicants and they definitely predominate among ex-USSR and Ukrainian migrants. The latter is a pattern also observed in the two other stocks of settlement migrants: aliens and denizens. The vast majority of them are typical settlement migrants. Moreover, as foreigners belonging to the other stocks of settlement migrants in Poland, 'citizens' are very well educated. This is what migrants originating from various countries have in common. It may be argued that highly educated people may integrate very efficiently into the host society which appears to result in their high proportion in the group of newly admitted Polish citizens. This line of argumentation is based on the assumption that this group of settlement migrants is expected to be best integrated into the host society.

Data on various stocks of settlement migrants in Poland suggest that the Ukrainian settlement migration is strongly related to the phenomenon of Polish-Ukrainian marriages. On the other hand, the formation of such marriages is likely to be influenced by various temporary movements from Ukraine to Poland. This way, temporary movements may contribute to the overall population of Ukrainian settlement migrants in Poland. This problem is examined in the next chapter which describes the interrelation between various movements from Ukraine to Poland and the formation of the Polish-Ukrainian marriages on the basis of qualitative data.

## CHAPTER 8: POLISH-UKRAINIAN MARRIAGES - DATA FROM QUALITATIVE RESEARCH

### 8.1. Formation of Polish-Ukrainian marriages - typology

A mixed marriage contracted between people of different citizenship usually involves migration of one or both partners. Firstly, the prospective spouses have to be present in the same marriage market.<sup>439</sup> Thus, at least one of them has to take a trip so as to enter the marriage market of a foreign partner. Secondly, a mixed marriage may settle either in the country of origin of a husband or a wife, but also in a third country, which results in settlement migration of one or both partners. It should be noted, however, that due to the fact that mixed marriages constitute particular transnational marital unions they may be attached not only to one, but to two or even more countries of residence.<sup>440</sup>

This chapter is devoted to the Polish-Ukrainian marriages resident in Warsaw. Thus, it describes the group of marriages which led to the settlement migration of the Ukrainian partners in Poland. These Polish-Ukrainian marriages differ, however, in the way that the prospective partners travelled between various marriage markets, in particular between the Polish and the Ukrainian ones, before their marriages. These movements involve four possible scenarios which constitute the types of formation of Polish-Ukrainian marriages in relation to the mobility of the prospective partners (see Figure 8.1). It should be noted that this typology does not refer to the overall migratory experience of a person. It addresses the question of mobility versus immobility as far as presence in a given marriage market is concerned. Thus, for the sake of the proposed typology, the persons who met the foreign partners in the marriage markets of their home countries are considered to be the immobile ones.

Figure 8.1 Typology of formation of Polish-Ukrainian marriages in relation to mobility of prospective partners

|                 |          | Ukrainian partners           |                           |
|-----------------|----------|------------------------------|---------------------------|
|                 |          | Mobile                       | Immobile                  |
| Polish partners | Mobile   | 'Bi-migrant' marriage        | 'Polish migrant' marriage |
|                 | Immobile | 'Ukrainian migrant' marriage | 'Arranged' marriage       |

Source: Own proposal

'Ukrainian migrant' and 'Polish migrant' marriages are directly related to migration between Poland and Ukraine. This is due to the fact that they are preceded by the migration of only one of the partners. Thus, mobile partners have to take up trips either to Poland (Ukrainians) or Ukraine (Poles) so as to meet their prospective immobile partners on their marriage markets. 'Bi-migrant' marriages refer to the situation when both partners took up migration and met each other in a third foreign country – neither Poland nor Ukraine. Therefore, marriages of this type are not conditioned by migration between Poland and Ukraine. This also applies partly to 'arranged' marriages as they are not related directly to the mobility of the prospective partners<sup>441</sup>. It may be assumed that the largest proportion of such marriages constitute the marriages contracted by means of international match making organisations. Thanks to such organisations potential partners enter foreign marriages markets without the need to take up migration to a foreign country (Poland or Ukraine). Marriages may be also arranged by families or even friends of prospective spouses. However, this is rather seldom in the case of Polish-Ukrainian marriages, as the arrangement of a marriage without the contribution of the future partners is a habit in neither Polish nor Ukrainian cultures. Such situations are observed, for example, in Muslim culture<sup>442</sup>.

In this chapter, I shall concentrate primarily on Polish-Ukrainian marriages which are related to migration between Poland and Ukraine, in particular, to migration from Ukraine to Poland – 'Ukrainian migrant' marriages. This is in order to demonstrate the interrelation between various Ukrainian migratory movements to Poland and Ukrainian settlement migration related to Polish-Ukrainian marriages. It should be noted, however, that 'arranged' marriages contracted with the help of international matchmaking organisations are also related to structural factors of migration between given areas. In particular, these refer to the phenomenon that women

from less developed countries (sending migrants), while looking for a foreign husband, are likely to search for men originating from countries which offer better economic and life prospects than those of their home countries (receiving countries).<sup>443</sup> Thus, the pattern of the formation of mixed marriages by means of international matchmaking organisations reflects migratory trends.

The focus of this chapter is the interrelation between movements from Ukraine to Poland and the formation of Polish-Ukrainian marriages. Thus, while presenting the two types of marriages related to migratory movements between Poland and Ukraine: 'Ukrainian migrant' and 'Polish migrant' marriages, I refer to the participation of Ukrainian spouses in migration to Poland. Therefore, I divide 'Ukrainian migrant' marriages into two sub-groups: 'migrants' and 'travellers'. The first group includes those Ukrainian partners who were taking up labour migration to Poland before they met their Polish partners on the Polish marriage market. 'Travellers' are Ukrainians who differ in their reasons for visiting Poland before meeting up with their Polish partners. However, what they have in common is that none of them were labour migrants to Poland. This division is very important as factors underlying labour migration differ to a considerable extent from the factors underlying the other types of movements. In particular, opportunity structure differentials play much more important role in labour migration than in other types of movements. Moreover, trips to Poland taken up by 'travellers' do not involve typical migration decision making processes and are usually not related to the migrant capital of these persons. As far as 'Polish migrant' marriages are concerned, I title Ukrainian spouses as 'stayers'. This is due to the fact that they met their Polish partners on the Ukrainian marriage market which did not require of them any type of movement.

## **8.2. 'Migrants' – from labour migration toward settlement in Poland**

### **8.2.1. *Introductory remarks***

The marriages of 'migrants' constitute almost half of the investigated population (fifteen of thirty four cases). This group includes three Ukrainian men and twelve Ukrainian women. On the one hand, 'migrants' differ in the patterns of their migration to Poland, whereas, on the other hand, their migratory trajectories have a lot in common. Their trips to Poland can be divided into two sets of trips. The first refers to their labour migration, usually comprising many short-term trips taken up either to work

or to trade in Poland. The second stage is settlement in Poland due to marriage to a Polish citizen. Therefore, when presenting the migratory trajectories of this group I distinguish the 'Decision' and the 'Process' stages of their first sets of trips, whereas analysis of the settlement process is included in the description of the 'Finalisation' stage. This is because the determinants of this process are a cumulative outcome of the previous trips of 'migrants'.

### 8.2.2. 'Decision' stage of the first set of trips

The group of 'migrants' comprises various types of labour migrants. The smallest group is made up of traders or people related to a trade (four cases), whereas the largest consists of migrants who worked in Poland as skilled workers (six cases). Members of this group had skills which were in demand in Poland (cultural capital). They worked as: English teachers (two cases), a ballet dancer, a masseuse, a bioenergotherapist, and an employee of a Polish company which used to have its branch in Ukraine (the woman moved to Poland when this branch was closed down). Most of them worked legally in Poland<sup>444</sup>. Unskilled workers represent the third category of Ukrainian migrants (five cases). They took up typical low-paid migrant jobs in agriculture and construction, and two of them were dressmakers. Both unskilled workers and traders followed the typical pattern of Ukrainian undocumented migration to Poland: repetitive, short-term trips. Skilled workers also travelled between Poland and Ukraine, but usually more seldomly depending on the type of job they had.

Opportunity structure differentials were of major importance for the migration of 'migrants'. Their migration was strongly conditioned by economic crises in Ukraine and the related unemployment. High income, that is, when compared with the average in Ukraine, derived from migration to Poland, allowed 'migrants' to cope with their hard economic situation in Ukraine. Some changes in these structural factors of migration are reflected in the group of 'migrants'. All of the skilled workers and traders came to Poland for the first time before 1993, whereas all unskilled workers arrived after 1993. This difference stems from the fact that, at the beginning of the 1990s, trans-border trade was very profitable (opportunity structure differentials).<sup>445</sup> Also, at that time, the influx of foreigners to Poland had only just started and it was relatively easy to acquire an adequate work permit. It became more difficult when labour migration to Poland grew in volume, involving stricter regulations being applied to immigrants (opportunity for exit/entry). Thus, most of the 'migrants' who started their migration in the middle of

the 1990s were illegal unskilled workers. It should be noted also that for unskilled workers and traders, good opportunities for exit/entry related to migration from Ukraine to Poland constituted an important factor facilitating their migration, as they could easily travel back and forth between Poland and Ukraine (see Appendix I).

Migrant networks were of special importance for unskilled workers. When migrating for the first time to Poland, they were supported chiefly by their Ukrainian friends, experienced in migration to Poland, who knew how to find a job in Poland. Sometimes, migration was organised by companies which arranged transportation, accommodation and a job<sup>446</sup>. Nevertheless, such trips were also taken in the company of more experienced Ukrainian friends. Evidently, unskilled workers took advantage of various Polish-Ukrainian social spaces which developed in the course of shuttle movements between Poland and Ukraine.

Traders came to Poland mainly with other traders. Three out of four were involved in the 'pseudo-tourism' related to petty trade which was very popular at that time (the early 1990s)<sup>447</sup>. The exception was a woman who had a Polish family which provided her with accommodation but also with information and with goods to sell in Poland. Like unskilled migrants, the traders started their migration with the help of resources inherent in the Polish-Ukrainian social spaces (of trans-border traders). Nevertheless, for them, it was more difficult to point out a particular person who drew them into migration. They often said that they went to Poland with a group of friends or with an 'excursion'. It has been observed that it is less important for traders than for the other migrants to have migrant networks, especially if they had the possibility to use 'Tourist Offices' which were available for Ukrainian migrants travelling to Poland.<sup>448</sup>

Migrant social capital supporting the migration of skilled workers was not related to typical migrant networks. In fact, this group was diversified in terms of the social capital of its members, as it was mainly linked to the professions of 'migrants'. Two of them (9MW and 28MW), worked, for example, in Tourist Offices which organised trips to and from Poland so they had many contacts with Polish people. These relationships were a source of information that there was a demand for English teachers in Poland. Thus, the two 'migrants' went to teach there. A different example is another skilled worker (32MW) who was employed in a Ukrainian branch of a Polish company. Her Polish employers invited her to Poland when the Ukrainian branch was closed down. The masseuse was also invited to Poland by Polish people for whom she worked

in Ukraine. She met her Polish clients in a Ukrainian sanatorium where she worked as a masseuse<sup>449</sup>.

All 'migrants' were unmarried when they started their migration to Poland. Some of them were divorcees and four had children from previous marriages. Therefore, only a small group of 'migrants' took up migration to Poland mainly in order to support their households<sup>450</sup>. Most of them only in part financially supported their Ukrainian families, devoting a major part of their incomes in Poland for their own expenses (goal of migration). Their expectancies that trips to Poland would bring about desired outcomes usually increased in the course of their trips when 'migrants' developed their migrant networks in Poland as well as skills useful to their migrations (cultural capital).

To sum up, the dominant goal of the first sets of trips to Poland taken up by 'migrants' was to acquire an attractive income in Poland. For skilled workers, it was usually their main income whereas for the other 'migrants', migration to Poland was a source of temporary or additional income. Migration for this group was mainly driven by attractive opportunity structure differentials between Poland and Ukraine. At the same time, virtually all 'migrants' had migrant social capital which supported them in taking up a decision about starting migration to Poland. It seems that typical migrant networks were of special importance for unskilled workers, but traders also migrated within Polish-Ukrainian social spaces. It should also be noted that the particular cultural capitals of skilled workers enabled them to acquire legal work in Poland<sup>451</sup>.

### 8.2.3. *'Process' stage of the first set of trips*

During the 'Process' stage of the first sets of trips, 'migrants' were developing their social capital in Poland, which influenced the patterns of their adaptation in Poland. It should be noted, however, that the group of skilled workers was less dependent on migrant networks during this stage of their migration to Poland than were other groups. In fact, the economic and legal realms of their adaptation in Poland proceeded without the crucial recourse to their social capital. They did not have to rely on personal contacts to find a job, as they were able to do this officially<sup>452</sup>. Moreover, most of them had legal status in Poland at the outset. Cultural adaptation of skilled workers was also relatively swift due to the many contacts with Polish people, when compared with the other 'migrants'.



The adaptation of unskilled workers and traders was strongly influenced by the social networks which they were developing in Poland. Unskilled workers relied on them while looking for illegal jobs in Poland (i.e. the economic realm of adaptation). Interestingly enough, most of them established various relationships with Polish people who were helping them in the search for jobs<sup>453</sup>. Two of them started as seasonal workers in agriculture (11MW and 15MW). Then, Polish farmers who found their work performance satisfactory recommended them to other Polish potential employers (also for work in the construction industry). In this way the two 'migrants' did not have problems in finding a job in Poland. The dressmakers (two cases) followed a similar scenario. At the beginning they relied on jobs which were available within their Polish-Ukrainian social spaces (typical illegal jobs for Ukrainian migrants). Later on both of them established relationships with Polish people from whom they were renting rooms in Poland. These people then helped them in finding their next jobs. As a consequence, the two women found jobs in sewing-rooms which were employing mainly legal Polish workers. Each of these 'migrants' was the only foreign illegal worker in these companies. Nevertheless, their salaries were the same as those of Polish workers, hence much higher than the income which both the women had been obtaining when they had worked within their original Polish-Ukrainian social spaces. While relying on the Polish people in looking for a job, 'migrants' obtained access to posts which are usually beyond the reach of undocumented migrants (social capital). This is due to the fact that their Polish friends acted as their references making them trustworthy in the eyes of the prospective Polish employers. These modes of operation of 'migrants' are prominent examples of a situation when foreigners obtain access to new resources (from beyond their original Polish-Ukrainian social spaces) in the destination country thanks to the social capital which they had developed in the course of their trips to Poland.

The legal adaptation of unskilled workers had not developed until they married Polish people. Some of them stayed in Poland illegally and all were illegal workers. Their social networks with Polish people did not help them to overcome illegality in Poland. On the other hand, it seems that their cultural adaptation was relatively fast thanks to their contacts with Polish people<sup>454</sup>.

As a rule, traders maintained and developed social ties with other traders and Polish people co-operating with trans-border traders. Thus, they tended to limit their social contacts to their original Polish-Ukrainian social spaces. It should be noted,

however, that two out of the four traders established very close relationships with Polish people running small companies providing various services for trans-border traders<sup>455</sup>. These relationships were of special importance for the economic dimension of their adaptation in Poland. Thanks to these, 'migrants' had access to resources which enabled them to maximise their incomes from migration to Poland: namely very cheap accommodation and transportation, useful information and help in difficult situations in Poland. On the other hand, the cultural adaptation of these two women was very slow. Even a few years after their first migration, they did not speak Polish<sup>456</sup>. This was due to the fact that both of these women were operating mainly in Russian speaking environments (their Polish friends were also fluent in Russian as they needed to communicate with traders from the former USSR). The situation of the two other female traders was different as they both had their families in Poland<sup>457</sup>. Nevertheless, their families supported them in their migration which stimulated economic adaptation of the women. Like unskilled workers, these traders also were not able to adapt in Poland in terms of acquiring legal status there. Their social networks as well as the resources to which they had access were sufficient to achieve this.

In general, the structure and content of the social capital of 'migrants' developed considerably in the course of their trips to Poland. It was of special importance for the economic adaptation of unskilled workers and traders, but did not influence considerably the legal realm of their adaptation in Poland. On the other hand, skilled workers adapted relatively efficiently also without the help of migrant social capital both economically and legally. It should be noted that 'migrants' appear to have been relatively open for contacts with Polish people, since they usually did not limit their social ties to their original Polish-Ukrainian social spaces.<sup>458</sup> In fact, some of them did not contact with Ukrainian migrants at all. Certainly, it facilitated their cultural adaptation in Poland.

#### **8.2.4. 'Finalisation' stage of the first set of trips - marriage with a Polish citizen**

In the course of trips to Poland, 'migrants' developed cultural and social capitals, whereas their economic capital increased thanks to migration to Poland. At the same time, opportunity structure differentials and opportunities for exit/entry related to migration to Poland, did not change considerably. Migration to Poland continued to be an attractive source of income. Thus, 'migrants' were succeeding in achieving their goals. Moreover, their expectancies that migration to Poland would bring a desirable

outcome (attractive income) were usually higher than at the initial stage of their migrations to Poland. Most of them intended to continue their movements following a similar pattern of migration. However, the constellation of factors influencing their migratory decisions changed considerably when they met Polish citizens whom they intended to marry in the future.

Some 'migrants'<sup>459</sup> met their prospective Polish spouses at their places of work<sup>460</sup>, whereas other couples were introduced to each other at informal meetings with their friends<sup>461</sup>. The Polish wife of the bioenergotherapist (20MW) had been one of his patients, whereas one of the Ukrainian English teachers (28MW) married his Polish student. The remaining 'migrants' made their relationships with the Polish partners in situations which may happen to any couple: during a walk, at a discotheque, at a shop, but also at the bazaar at which the Ukrainian 'migrant' was selling some goods (31MW). In fact, only one marriage was arranged by Polish friends of the female 'migrant' (masseuse - 16MW). This was due to the fact that the woman had aimed at settling in Poland and she intended to achieve this by marrying a Polish man. As she said: 'I would have to be invited for a permanent stay by a family, which could provide support for me and my family [...] There was only marriage. [marriage to Polish citizen]'(16MW)<sup>462</sup>.

In general, meeting with a prospective Polish spouse resulted in a considerable change of goals of migrations of 'migrants'. For most of them, from that moment, settlement in Poland became a major purpose. It should be noted, however, that some of the 'migrants' aimed at settling in Poland before they met a suitable Polish partner (as in the case of the masseuse). Nevertheless, none of them had planned settlement in Poland at the initial stage of their trips to Poland. Evidently, this willingness developed in the course of their migrations. Therefore, settlement in Poland as a goal of migration may occur as a consequence of the past-migratory experience of a person or of a meeting with a Polish partner. Moreover, for some 'migrants' marriage to a Polish citizen was a tool for the accomplishment of this goal. This is due to the fact that it is a very efficient way to get a PRP in Poland (see Appendix I). In fact, migrants could be easily suspected of marrying a Polish citizen in order only to be entitled to a legal stay in Poland.

In order to trace the transformation of goals of the group of 'migrants' towards settlement in Poland and to distinguish those who used marriage with a Polish citizen as a tool for achieving this goal I chose a few indicators. First, I took into consideration the

period which a ‘migrant’ planned to spend in Poland at the outset. I did not refer literally to the plans of ‘migrants’, as it is known that migrants usually tend to perceive themselves as short-term migrants rather than long-term ones.<sup>463</sup> It is very rare that the actual duration of migration is equal to the planned one, unless there is a fixed-time work contract. For example, two ‘migrants’ from my sample, who came to Poland as skilled workers, said that they came to Poland for three years. Secondly, I looked at the main value (goal) of migration, in particular, at main recipients of income from migration. The latter was to see whether migrants spend their incomes on consumption or in the development of their capitals (cultural, economic, and social<sup>464</sup>) in Poland instead of spending most of their money in Ukraine (for themselves or supporting their Ukrainian families). It has been observed that migrants whose strategies are extremely short-term oriented spend very little money in the country of destination.<sup>465</sup> Then, I considered the status of the family of a ‘migrant’ in Ukraine (socio-demographic characteristics). Those who did not have their households in Ukraine for which they earned money via migration (children, their spouses) were usually more likely to settle in the destination country. Finally, I considered the attitude of ‘migrants’ to the idea of living in Poland at the moment of their departure from Ukraine. The problem with this indicator is that the attitude of a migrant towards staying in Poland usually changes during the ‘Process’ stage of migration. I was able to derive these changes only indirectly from the story told in an interview.

Using the indicators presented above, I distinguished three groups of migrants. Two groups refer to the extreme cases: (1) short-term oriented ‘migrants’ (four cases), (2) long-term oriented ‘migrants’ (four cases), whereas the third group comprises cases which I considered as intermediate between the other two. Short-term oriented ‘migrants’ did not have as their goal to settle in Poland until they met their prospective Polish partners. In fact, only marriage to a Polish citizen transformed them into settlement migrants in Poland. At the opposite end, long-term oriented ‘migrants’ aimed at settling in Poland permanently. This goal occurred in the course of their trips to Poland. It should be noted that examples of Polish-Ukrainian marriages contracted mainly in order to acquire legal status in Poland could be found only in the group of long-term oriented ‘migrants’. For the rest of the ‘migrants’ (the intermediary group), settlement in Poland became an additional goal of their migrations in the course of their trips to Poland. However, this goal was always accompanied by another one – namely

attractive income in Poland. In fact, the attitude of this group of 'migrants' towards settlement in Poland can be described by the quotation from one interview: 'It would be nice [to settle permanently in Poland on a legal basis]'(14MW). It was obvious for most members of this group that they would have better economic and life prospects in Poland compared to Ukraine. At the same time, they did not have strong ties with Ukraine which would restrain them from settling in Poland. They also knew that marriage to a Polish citizen is an efficient way to stay in Poland permanently, but analysis of their stories suggests that they did not dare to arrange such marriages for themselves.

Below, I describe short- and long-term oriented 'migrants' so as to show the two opposite scenarios of the settlement process of Ukrainian labour migrants married to Polish citizens. The first one refers to migrants who settled in Poland even though it was not the goal of their migration, whereas the other applies to the group of migrants who were strongly determined to stay permanently in Poland.

All short-term oriented 'migrants'<sup>466</sup> are women among whom there are three unskilled workers (two dressmakers and one woman who was doing various seasonal jobs in Poland) and one trader. What the marriages of these four women have in common is a very short period of engagement<sup>467</sup>. The prospective partners met unintentionally and these meetings were followed by intense relationships involving powerful mutual fascination. The couples travelled together to Ukraine. The quick decision about marriage was often caused by their wish to avoid the separation related to travels of the Ukrainian to her home country. At the same time, the two couples had children already and the other one had tried to have them.

The migratory trajectories of the two dressmakers (35 MW, 38MW) have much in common. Both of them devoted major parts of their incomes in Poland to their life in Ukraine or to the support of their Ukrainian families (goal). One of them, when asked for her experiences in Poland, said, for example: 'Work was very hard, but what made me work was the thought that I would be able to buy a nice dress and shoes when I got back to Ukraine, and that I would not have to feel inferior in comparison to my friends' (35MW). This statement shows that this young woman lives her life in Ukraine among her Ukrainian family (parents and siblings) and friends. Moreover, the two women were very attached to their families. This factor seems to have had a strong influence on the fact that these two 'migrants' did not consider leaving Ukraine permanently (i.e.

settlement in Poland) at any stage of their labour migrations. In fact, both of them stated that they settled in Poland only because they met proper men to marry there.

The other short-term oriented 'migrant' (31MW) had a very precise goal for her migration to Poland. She was working in Poland to earn money for surgery which was necessary for her after the car accident which she had with her husband. Even though she did not have strong family ties with Ukraine, as her husband was killed in that car accident, she did not plan a settlement in Poland at all. This was due to the fact that she was at that stage of life at which it is difficult to make long-term plans. The fourth woman from the group of the short-term oriented 'migrants' (24MW) also did not plan to settle in Poland. This was due to the fact that she perceived migration to Poland only as a source of additional income. She was coming to Poland during her holiday so as to sell goods on Polish bazaars. At the same time, she had a relatively good permanent job in Ukraine.

The four extreme cases from the other end of my scale, which I call long-term oriented 'migrants', seem to have been determined to stay in Poland and to have married a Polish partner in order to achieve this goal. At the time of the research, there were two divorcees in this group, and one widow. There is no other divorced couple in the investigated group. The average age difference between partners from these Polish-Ukrainian couples is extremely high – twenty-five years<sup>468</sup>. In each of them the man was older. In the three marriages in which Ukrainian women were involved, husbands were at least nineteen years older (nineteen, twenty and fifty-five)<sup>469</sup>. All the couples were childless (unless they had children from previous marriages).

Nevertheless, only one of those cases - the masseuse (16MW) - was an obvious example of marriage being used as a tool to obtain a PRP in Poland. This particular female 'migrant' came to Poland for the first time in 1992. The initial goal of her trips to Poland was to earn extra money, as she was a single mother of a teenage daughter. She was also taking care of her elderly mother in Ukraine. During her subsequent trips to Poland, her circle of clients broadened and her earnings in Poland became a major part of the income of her Ukrainian household (change in the goal of migration). She also came to think that her daughter would have much better economic and educational prospects in Poland than in Ukraine (i.e. value of her goal – settlement migration). Moreover, her Polish clients advised her to stay in Poland (the role of social networks in decision process). Finally, she realised that she had Polish origins which her family had

to conceal during the Soviet period<sup>470</sup>. The latter was her cultural capital of which she was not aware at the beginning of her migration to Poland. This 'migrant' is a typical example of a person whose goals of migration were short-term oriented (additional income) at the outset, but transformed in the course of her trips to Poland. As a consequence, settlement in Poland became her major goal. Expectancy that she would be able to achieve this goal was supported by the fact that her Polish friends (social capital) acted so as to help her to achieve this goal. Moreover, they advised her of the best way to achieve her goal – by marriage to a Polish man. Thus, she started to aim at settling in Poland and the marriage with the Polish man was a tool for achieving this goal. She married a man who was fifty five years older<sup>471</sup>. The deal was that he would help her to get a PRP in Poland. She would take care of him till his death, and then she would inherit his small apartment. After three years of marriage the old man died. Thanks to this marriage the Ukrainian woman achieved all her stated goals. She obtained a PRP and brought both her daughter and mother to Poland. It should be noted that this particular bogus marriage was possible to arrange, as there was a social acceptance for it in the Polish environment of the 'migrant'. The positive attitude of the Polish relatives of the old Polish husband was of particular importance. They were not able to do their duties themselves, thus, they resigned claims to their part of the inheritance in favour of the person who was eager to take care of the old man. Here, both social and moral norms acted in the same mutually reinforcing direction.

The Polish-Ukrainian marriages of the other long-term oriented 'migrants' are not as obvious examples of bogus marriages<sup>472</sup>. In the two cases of divorced marriages, the Ukrainian partners left their Polish spouses. The Ukrainian woman (18MW) left her Polish husband after four years of marriage. She came to Poland invited by this man to work in his small company, which organised accommodation and transportation for traders from Ukraine (goal). It seems that the woman did not plan to stay permanently in Poland at the beginning of her migration. The main goal of her migration was a temporary, attractive income in Poland. However, later on, she started to perceive her migration to Poland as a means towards upward social mobility. This was due to the fact that, notwithstanding her relatively good economic situation in Poland, she experienced social and economic advancement when she was visiting Ukraine. It is clear that this factor influenced her decision about settlement in Poland (higher status attainment as a new goal of migration) and prompted her to marry her Polish boss after

two years in Poland. From that moment, she also started to learn the Polish language very willingly<sup>473</sup>. According to her Polish ex-husband, the Ukrainian 'migrant' left him when she found another Polish man who promised her that she would acquire Polish citizenship very quickly (additional goal of migration). If this is true the woman seems to have been determined to stay in Poland.

Another Polish spouse (woman) left by Ukrainian bioenergotherapist (20MW) also suspected that marriage to her was a means for her ex-husband to be granted a PRP. It appears likely, as her Ukrainian husband left her after half a year of marriage whereas they had cohabited for three years before that. Today he lives with another Ukrainian woman in Poland. The interviewed woman stressed that from the moment she had started to cohabit with her ex-husband he had pushed her into marriage. Clearly, the main goal of migration for this man had been economic, but it is likely that it was also accompanied by the propensity to settle in Poland permanently. Certainly, income in Poland was the main source of earnings for this man virtually from the beginning of his trips to Poland. Moreover, from the moment he came to Poland he had invested into his prospective business (bioenergotherapy) which developed quickly. Probably one of the reasons for such an approach was that he had been divorced in Ukraine and that practically all of his property had been left to his ex-wife. As a consequence of the divorce, he also did not have strong family links with Ukraine which would have restrained him from settlement migration in Poland.

There is also one more marriage of a Ukrainian woman and a Polish man (22MW) which seems to be a part of a pre-set strategy of settlement in Poland<sup>474</sup>. The Ukrainian woman started her migration to Poland as a petty trader so as to obtain additional income for her life in Ukraine (goal). Later on, the goal of her migration changed, mainly due to her family situation, as she was divorced in Ukraine. From that moment on, she aimed at settling in Poland because she wanted to start a new life abroad together with her son<sup>475</sup>. She chose Poland as she used to go there as a petty trader (past-migratory experience), but also because her sister lived there with her Polish husband (social networks). It seems that her marriage with the Polish man was a means to become a settlement migrant in Poland. In fact, the prospective spouses knew each other only three months before the wedding and the Ukrainian woman did not want to describe the way they met each other: 'Just by accident, as people often met' (22MW). Moreover, the way she was talking about her Polish husband suggested that



they were not close to each other. She described him as if he was a stranger to her. These are some examples of her statements: 'Later on he.. my husband was very mad' (22MW) or 'This man... my husband' (22MW). In this particular case, the marriage of the Polish man and following it settlement migration of the woman may be perceived as the way of dealing with her uncertain situation in Ukraine. This uncertainty was caused, on the one hand, by the unstable economic situation in Ukraine and, on the other hand, by the fact that she was left alone to maintain her son. At the same time, the settlement migration to Poland involved better economic opportunities and support from her sister living there.

#### **8.2.5. Final remarks**

At the moment, economic and life prospects are better in Poland than in Ukraine. It appears that most of the Ukrainian labour migrants are aware of this. Nevertheless, settlement in Poland as the goal of migration does not necessarily have to figure among the initial goals of labour migrants to Poland. Usually, this goal arises in the course of subsequent trips and accompanies the original ones which comprise the acquisition of attractive incomes in Poland constituting a minor (additional) or a major part of Ukrainian migrants' households. Moreover, this analysis demonstrates that past-migratory experience does not have to lead to the development of this goal. Migrants who have very precise and short-term goals, where their earnings in Poland are devoted to particular spending, aim are relatively unlikely to consider settlement in Poland. Their strong social ties with Ukraine also appear to restrain migrants from changing their orientations from short-term to long-term ones. On the other hand, labour migrants who did not feel attached to Ukraine in term of social ties are relatively likely to aim at settling in Poland. The development of their economic, cultural and social capitals seems to support them in these efforts. Nevertheless, the situations when settlement in Poland becomes a major goal of migration seem to be of a particular sort. They take place when migrants have very weak incentives to stay in Ukraine related either to their family or economic status. It also appears that the fact that migrants develop their economic, cultural and social capital in such a way that they are able to obtain a relatively attractive and permanent income in Poland is a strong determinant of a high propensity towards settlement migration<sup>476</sup>.

The view that marriage to a Polish citizen is an efficient way to become a settlement migrant in Poland is widespread among Ukrainian labour migrants. It should

be noted, however, that careful analysis clearly shows that only long-term oriented migrants, whose main aim is to settle in Poland, may use marriage to a Polish citizen as a means to become a settlement migrant. On the basis of the qualitative material collected, it is difficult to estimate the size of the group of such long-term oriented migrants among Ukrainian labour migrants in Poland. However, my respondents frequently stated that they heard or knew cases of bogus marriages. Moreover, it should be noted that it is relatively difficult to convince people, who are or were involved in bogus or arranged marriages, to be interviewed. Among the ten stories, which were collected during this research, there were two obvious examples of bogus marriages (4CM, 9CM) and three more cases which appeared to be at least fake marriages (1CM, 3CM, 8CM) (see Appendix IV)<sup>477</sup>.

In general, bogus marriages are observed in virtually all countries which experience a high influx of migrants. This is because marriage with a citizen makes the legalisation of a foreigner's status in the destination much easier. However, the scope of the phenomenon of bogus mixed marriages is complicated to study, as it is difficult to draw a clear line between bogus marriages and real ones. People are reluctant to acknowledge that they are or were involved in such marriages, as this is illegal. At the same time, it is difficult to prove it, as it requires a research of the intimate spheres of personal life. Therefore, bogus marriages are usually studied with the use of qualitative methods.<sup>478</sup> This type of research does not give, however, the information about the scope of the phenomenon.

It should be noted also that bogus marriages attract considerable attention from the authorities and policy makers in the countries which experience a high influx of migrants. This is due to the fact that immigration policy should aim at preventing the illegal modes of acquisition of legal status in the given country, which is the case with foreigners in bogus marriages entered into with the citizens of the destination country. On the other hand, immigration policy should also preserve the right of families to live together in the destination country which is an important aspect of human rights domain.

### 8.3. 'Travellers' – cultural capital and settlement migration to Poland

#### 8.3.1. *Travels to Poland*

The group of 'travellers' includes ten cases, among which there are two Ukrainian men and eight women. It is diverse in terms of the reasons for which Ukrainians came to Poland for the first time. Nevertheless, all of them visited Poland for the first time neither as labour migrants nor so as to visit their prospective Polish partners. This group can be divided into two main sub-groups: those who came to Poland to study (four cases) and those who came to Poland either to visit family or friends (six cases) (for details see Appendix III). It should be noted that a particular feature of this group is its relatively high share of people with Polish origins (six out of ten). Among students, only one Ukrainian was not of Polish origin. This is partly due to the promotional policy of the Polish Ministry of Education for foreigners of Polish origins. They are entitled not only to free education in Poland, but also to a scholarship from the Polish Ministry of Education. Most of them originate from the former USSR – about 70%<sup>479</sup>. At the same time, among the population of Ukrainian students in Poland, people of Polish origins account for as much as about two thirds of the total<sup>480</sup>. Thus, 'travellers' – students - from the investigated group came to Poland mainly thanks to the structural factors which enabled them to study in Poland. Their decisions about studying in Poland were made under the influence exerted by their families or friends who had started their studies in Poland earlier. Here, the role of particular, but not migrant, social networks can be traced. Evidently, the Polish environment of the prospective students played an important role in their decisions concerning studies in Poland.

The journeys of the remaining 'travellers' – non-students - did not involve a complicated decision process. This is because they usually came to Poland only to visit their families or friends for the first time. Their trips were short and devoted mostly to social activities in Poland. People inviting 'travellers' were not the former contemporary migrants from Ukraine to Poland. The social networks, which drove the trips of this group of 'travellers', were in most cases related to certain historical factors. As a consequence of the shifts in the Polish-Ukrainian border, many Polish and Ukrainian families as well as groups of friends were split up. Some of them did not break their ties and, after the dissolution of the former USSR, their contacts became more intense.

It is very interesting how the above historical factors can influence current movements between Poland and Ukraine. In my sample, there is, for example, one very typical case of movement conditioned by historical factors<sup>481</sup>. A woman who belonged to the Polish minority in Ukraine had family in Poland which she had been visiting regularly since 1987 (i.e. from first time that it was possible). Such movements take place under the auspices of social networks which bind Polish families in Ukraine with certain circles and institutions in Poland, for example, churches.

Another story (15MW) demonstrates how complicated the influence of historical factors on migration may be. This particular Ukrainian man would probably never have come to Poland if it had not been for certain historical conditions that occurred. In one Polish family, there was a woman who used to live very close to the Ukrainian border. She had many friends who moved to Ukraine after the Second World War and whom she visited with her family during holidays<sup>482</sup>. While travelling near the Black Sea her Polish family established a close relationship with one Ukrainian family and invited them to Poland a few times. The Ukrainian man concerned was a member of this Ukrainian family.

Students and non-students from the group of 'travellers' differ considerably in the duration of their stay in Poland before marriage to a Polish citizen as well as in the way they spent this time. Non-students came to Poland as guests of people living in Poland. They did not have to work and they did not have to be bothered with accommodation. Their Polish friends were taking care of them. Usually, they spent time with their hosts or their close friends. Therefore their contacts in Poland were limited mainly to Polish citizens (also of Ukrainian origin)<sup>483</sup>. Students in Poland spent much more time before their marriages with Polish citizens than the other 'travellers' – usually a couple of years of their studies. During that time, they maintained contacts mainly with other students studying and going out together. It should be noted that foreign students in Poland tend to stick together. This is because virtually all of them live in student halls. Students from the former USSR are particularly eager to form social groups as they can communicate in Russian, which is very handy for them, especially at the beginning of their studies in Poland when they lack fluency in the Polish language. Nevertheless, foreign students do not limit their contacts to foreign students and they also have Polish friends. Usually, the longer they study in Poland the more Polish friends they make<sup>484</sup>.

Adaptation to Polish society is not an issue among the group of non-students, as they usually spent at most one month in Poland during their trips. On the other hand, it should be noted that students were relatively well adapted to Polish society before their marriages to Polish people, especially, in the cultural realm. All of them were fluent in Polish and knew a lot about Polish culture thanks to their active social student life in Poland.

To sum up, trips of ‘travellers’ to Poland were strongly related to their cultural and social capitals. Their Polish origins and social networks with people living in Poland were the main determinants of their visits. At the same time, the groups of students and non-students differed considerably in their experiences in Poland, in particular, in the advancement of their cultural adaptation to Polish society.

### **8.3.2. *Marriages with Polish citizens***

Most of the prospective Polish partners belonged to the social circles of ‘travellers’ in Poland. Students married other students, whereas non-students, friends of their Polish hosts. Certainly, examples of couples, which met by accident, can be also found in the group of ‘travellers’.

Most non-students stated that they did not expect that they would ever settle in Poland. They ‘fell in love’ with their Polish partner within one month of their arrival in Poland. Virtually all of them had had permanent jobs and relatively good economic status in Ukraine (social and economic ties with Ukraine). One woman had also had a fiancé in Ukraine (21MW). Thus, settlement in Poland was not their goal as they had lived their lives in Ukraine only occasionally visiting Poland. Clearly, the meeting with their Polish partner was the dominant, if not the only, reason for settlement in Poland. On the other hand, one Ukrainian woman<sup>485</sup> (21MW), while describing the process of her decision to leave Ukraine permanently, mentioned the fact that the economic situation in Ukraine worsened at that time. This factor seems to have influenced her decision to some extent.

There is one important exception in the group of non-students which should be mentioned: a woman who was a member of the Polish minority in Lviv<sup>486</sup> in Ukraine (36MW). She had been to Poland many times since 1987 visiting her friends and family. At the same time, many of her friends from Lviv, who had Polish origins, settled in Poland. Most of them studied in Poland at the outset and married Polish people later

on<sup>487</sup>. Therefore, it is probable that this woman considered settlement in Poland as well. It appears that, for her, settlement in Poland and marriage to a Polish citizen was tantamount to following a strategy widespread in her social environment in Ukraine – amongst the Polish minority. The latter was not the case with the other non-students.

As far as students are concerned, the longer they lived in Poland the more they liked the idea of staying there permanently. In this, they may be compared to ‘migrants’ who also changed their attitudes towards settlement in Poland in the course of their trips. It should be noted that the initial attitudes of students towards living in Poland were strongly influenced by negative opinions which their Polish families and friends had about the attitudes of Poles in Poland towards foreigners originating from the former USSR. In fact, many students were prepared to encounter hostile and even xenophobic behaviour in Poland. However, during the course of their studies in Poland they developed cultural and social capitals in Poland which facilitated their adaptation there. They were educated in Poland and spoke the Polish language fluently (cultural capital). They also had many Polish friends (social capital). Thus, settlement in Poland might easily have become their goal. It seems that a scenario in which Ukrainian students settle in Poland after the completion of their Polish studies is not rare. According to the opinion of one Ukrainian student (26MW), half of her friends from Ukraine stayed in Poland permanently. The opinion of her Polish husband was also interesting, as he stated that Ukrainian women tended to stay in Poland by means of marriages with Polish men.

The example of the group of ‘travellers’ shows that a proportion of the Polish-Ukrainian marriages contracted in Poland is related to the activities of the Polish and Ukrainian minorities as well as to the policies applied to them in both countries. These are important determinants of movements between Poland and Ukraine in which the members of these minorities participate. Moreover, this mobility is also stimulated by social ties between families and friends living on both sides of the Polish-Ukrainian border. It also seems that representatives of the Polish minority in Ukraine have a high propensity towards settlement in Poland. Young Ukrainians of Polish origins are very likely to stay in Poland permanently after the completion of their studies and marriage to a Polish citizen.

#### 8.4. 'Stayers' – unintended settlement migration to Poland

'Stayers' are involved in six of the investigated Polish-Ukrainian marriages. They are all women. Virtually none of the Ukrainian spouses from these marriages took up a trip to Poland before meeting a prospective Polish partner<sup>488</sup>. Polish men from these marriages were usually involved in export-import businesses related to travel between Poland and Ukraine<sup>489</sup>. Usually, the Polish businessmen had been involved in Polish-Ukrainian activities for a few years. Their trips to Ukraine were short-term and repetitive. Only one Polish man was an unsuccessful young businessman who tried to export cosmetics from Poland to Ukraine with an aim to set up his own shop in a big city in Ukraine. However, this investment was poorly planned and he gave it up very quickly (he made just one deal) after a couple of months. In general, these movements of Polish people were conditioned by opportunity structural differentials (mainly price differentials between Poland and Ukraine) which were making Polish-Ukrainian businesses profitable.

All of the couples met in Ukraine during the business trips of Polish men. These meetings were usually accidental and took place: at parties (discotheques, business parties, and friends meeting), at the bus stop and in the Ukrainian train. Ukrainian women involved in these marriages typically did not possess any particular capital (economic, cultural or social) related to Poland or Polish people. In fact, they did not even plan to visit Poland before meeting their Polish partners. Each of them, regardless of her age, planned her future in Ukraine. They had permanent jobs and relatively good economic status there. In fact, Ukrainian women from this group tended to perceive their potential future in Ukraine (if they did not marry Polish men) as manageable. Such statements were met relatively seldomly among the Ukrainian partners from the other marriage types, who usually complained heavily about the economic crisis in Ukraine and difficulties related to it.

Therefore, 'stayers' settled in Poland mainly because they met their Polish partners in Ukraine. The latter determined their decisions about settlement migration (goal). Certainly, there were also other factors influencing their migratory decisions. However, a prospective marriage with a Polish citizen definitely constituted the major determinant of their decisions. On the other hand, this part of the Polish-Ukrainian marriages is related to the movements of Polish people to Ukraine, who were short-term

oriented migrants. Here, the structural factors of these migrations should also be stressed.

## **8.5. Polish-Ukrainian marriages not related to migration between Poland and Ukraine**

### **8.5.1. *Bi-migrant marriages***

The Ukrainians involved in the two 'bi-migrant' marriages are one man and one woman. Both couples met neither in Poland nor in Ukraine. One of them met in the United Kingdom, when both the prospective partners travelled there for seasonal work. Therefore, it is the marriage of two 'migrants' who took their trips to Western Europe. The Polish man and the Ukrainian woman involved in the other 'bi-migrant' marriage were not 'migrants' but 'travellers' – tourists. They met during their holiday in the Slovak mountains.

Ukrainians involved in both the marriages did not plan to settle in Poland before they met their Polish partners. In fact, the Ukrainian man involved in labour migration to the United Kingdom had planned to migrate in the future to the United States or Canada. Thus, he possessed a propensity to leave Ukraine permanently. At the present moment, he does not plan to migrate further from Poland. He considers that he would not be able to gain a job as a skilled worker in highly developed countries (Western Europe, United States or Canada), whereas, in Poland, he is able to take advantage of his university degree. The Ukrainian woman from the other 'bi-migrant' marriage did not plan to leave Ukraine. She had a stable job and relatively good financial situation there.

The small size of the group of 'bi-migrant' marriages in the investigated population does not allow for far reaching conclusions. Nevertheless, the two cases show an important diversification which should be taken into consideration when referring to 'bi-migrant' marriages. Such marriages can be contracted either between people who have a high propensity to migration (marriages of the two 'migrants) or between those who do not consider migration at all<sup>490</sup>(marriages of the two 'travellers')<sup>491</sup>. Nevertheless, willingness and ability of prospective partners to travel is the crucial determinant of the formation of 'bi-migrant' marriages. It should also be noted that what the two 'bi-migrant' marriages have in common is the fact that partners involved in these marriages entered the foreign marriage markets only temporarily.



Because of this none of these couples settled in the place they met each other. It can be expected that in a situation when one of the prospective partners stayed in a foreign country for a long time the couple would be more likely to settle in this country instead of Poland or Ukraine.

### 8.5.2. *'Arranged' marriages*

There is only one case of an 'arranged' marriage in the investigated group. It should be noted, however, that my interviewees often referred to marriages contracted with the help of international matchmaking organisations. These were the stories of their Ukrainian friends who settled this way not only in Poland, but also in Western countries. It is difficult to judge if the 'arranged' Polish-Ukrainian marriages are underrepresented in the investigated group. Nevertheless, the knowledge about this phenomenon seems to be widespread. Matchmaking organisations and newspapers are turning international. Such services are also provided on the internet. Thus, any type of mixed marriage can be arranged upon request. In Polish editions of matchmaking newspapers, there are a lot of announcements placed by German men looking for Polish wives. At the same time, as migration from the former USSR has increased, new types of such announcements appear in the newspapers. Women from that area now look for husbands from Poland and Western countries.

The story I collected during my study refers to the Ukrainian woman who had been divorced for a long time in Ukraine. As a single mother, she faced a very difficult financial situation when the Ukrainian economy went into crisis in the 1990s. Among other things, her poor economic situation was the reason why she wanted to start a new life with another man (low economic capital). She met a Polish man in a Ukrainian sanatorium who invited her to make a trip to Poland. There, she came across a matchmaking newspaper and, as she said: 'That man [she travelled with] was not good for marriage so I decided to place my advertisement in this newspaper.' (7MW). It is difficult to judge how important it was that she had met Polish man who showed her Poland. The fact is that she put an advertisement in a Polish matchmaking newspaper shortly after her trip to Poland.

The goal of this Ukrainian woman was settlement in Poland. Her other goal was a new marriage, but marriage particularly to a Polish man was also a tool for her migratory goal. Thus, factors influencing her decision to settle in Poland do not form the typical constellation of determinants of migratory decisions. Certainly, opportunity

structure differentials played an important role in her choice of her future husband's country of origin. At the same time, the lack of economic capital was a factor which influenced both her goals: a new marriage and resettlement. On the other hand, her cultural and social capitals were not of major importance for her decision. This is because they were not necessary to enable her to migrate to Poland as she used a matchmaking newspaper which may be perceived as an institutionalised form of help in settlement migration. In fact, international matchmaking organisations and newspapers can play a similar role to that of migrant social capital. They provide people who want to leave their home countries with information about potential foreign partners. Thanks to such institutions, prospective settlement migrants are less dependent on migrant networks as a source of information about the destination country.

The above mentioned factors influenced decisions about the migration of the Ukrainian woman. It should be noted that she considered settlement migration from the outset. Evidently, mixed marriages arranged with the help of matchmaking organisations are related to the propensity of one of the prospective spouses to settle in the other country. At the same time, this propensity does not have to be linked to any past-migratory experience.

## **8.6. Polish-Ukrainian marriages and reproduction of migrant social capital**

### **8.6.1. General overview**

The previous chapters show that the formation of Polish-Ukrainian marriages resident in Poland is linked to various movements proceeding between Poland and Ukraine. On the other hand, Ukrainians who settled in Poland because of their marriages with Polish citizens can be a source of migrant social capital for other potential migrants from Ukraine.

Virtually all Polish-Ukrainian marriages hosted their families from Ukraine in their Polish houses. However, most of these visits were limited to social activities in Poland: meeting with members of a family, holiday etc. Nevertheless, a large share of my respondents also constitute migrant social capital for other migrants from Ukraine, both labour and settlement (twenty of thirty four cases). The Polish-Ukrainian marriages provided labour migrants mainly with accommodation, but they also supported them in the development of their own migrant social capital in Poland. They usually found the first job for their guests, usually in the construction industry. It was the starting point for

their Ukrainian guests, who were typically able to later find another job themselves<sup>492</sup>. Settlement migrants received a much wider scope of assistance from the Polish-Ukrainian marriages. They were provided with housing and maintenance at least during the first days of their stay in Poland. My respondents also assisted them in legalising their status in Poland. Usually, a new settlement migrant was the relative of a Ukrainian married to a Polish citizen.

### 8.6.2. 'Migrants'

Among the 'migrants', only six persons did not declare that they helped any migrant from their country of origin. However, none of them admitted to being strictly against this<sup>493</sup>. It seems that skilled workers were more likely to support their country folk in migration to Poland than were the other 'migrants'. Their financial status was usually better than that of the rest of the group. Virtually all of them had jobs related to their professions whereas it was very rare among traders and unskilled workers. Skilled workers could, simply, more readily afford to help new migrants.

The Polish-Ukrainian marriages of 'migrants' tended to support only their relatives<sup>494</sup>. Some of them declared that they did not want to help anybody outside of their families, because it is risky, as newcomers usually work in the shadow economy. Here is an extreme statement of a Polish husband, related to this topic. 'I said to my wife, at the very beginning that I can help her family, but only her family. I do not want to help any friends. Simply I can not do that. Because it would result in phone calls every five minutes. In fact that turned out to be the case. They asked me to find a job for them [in Poland]. But I said that I would not, because I do not want to get into trouble [...]. Besides, I said to my wife that it can happen that someone would be caught working illegally, and he could say that she helped him to find this job. Then we will be in trouble.' (31MW).

The above example of the Polish partner not wanting to help Ukrainians coming to Poland was not exceptional. Some of them stopped their Ukrainian partners from supporting their friends from Ukraine, when it became too burdensome. One Polish wife said for example: 'There was a time when people from Ukraine were coming to us at chiefly in order to trade. I did not like it and I put an end to it very quickly, because they treated our house like a hotel. [...] I did not like it especially when Jarek [their first child] was born.' (28MW). Finally, this woman accepted the visits of Ukrainian labour migrants but only of those who belonged to their very close family in Ukraine.

Also, some of my Ukrainian respondents from the ‘migrant’ group admitted that they were reluctant to support Ukrainian newcomers. However, they usually stated this in a less straightforward manner than their Polish spouses. Sometimes I was able to tell this only by the context of a story told by a couple. There was only one example where the negative attitude of a Ukrainian spouse towards giving help to her country folk was presented straightforwardly, but it was an opinion expressed by her Polish husband<sup>495</sup>. According to him, his Ukrainian ex-wife did not want to help her Ukrainian friends, as she did not want to share her financial and social success in Poland with them. On the other hand, she invited her Ukrainian brother and he worked with her in Poland. Unfortunately, it is difficult to judge how much of the above opinion of the Polish husband is true – his Ukrainian ex-wife might well deny it.

Most of the ‘migrants’ served as migrant social capital for labour migrants (eight cases). Only two of them (16MW, 20MW) brought settlement migrants to Poland – and then only their very close relatives<sup>496</sup>. These ‘migrants’ were representatives of a group of long-term oriented Ukrainian spouses – a widow and a divorced man. Once they legalised their status in Poland and their situation there became relatively stable, they invited their adult children to stay with them. This was after their marriages with the Poles were over. One of them (the widow) also brought her mother, whereas the other (the divorced man) invited a Ukrainian woman with whom he started to live<sup>497</sup>. It seems clear that ‘migrants’ who were long-term oriented were more likely to serve as migrant social capital for subsequent settlement migrants than were the others. It is also very likely that bringing members of their Ukrainian families to Poland was one of the aims of their migrations to Poland which accompanied their main goal – settlement in Poland.

### 8.6.3. *‘Travellers’*

‘Travellers’ helped their Ukrainian relatives and friends in migration to Poland less enthusiastically than ‘migrants’. Only half of them did so. It should be noted that ‘travellers’ supported mainly friends in their labour migration. This seems to be related to the fact that ‘travellers’ did not migrate to Poland as labour migrants in the past. Thus, their Ukrainian families did not have a tradition of earning money abroad and were not as mobile as families of ‘migrants’. It appears that friends of ‘travellers, were more eager to work in Poland than their families.

'Travellers' did not bring their families to Poland for settlement in the way that the 'migrants' did. The Ukrainians whom they encouraged to come to Poland were migrants of a special kind – repatriates<sup>498</sup>. One of my respondents (21MW) persuaded her friend to come to Poland as a repatriate, while a sister of another of my respondents (36MW) is waiting for a repatriation visa and will follow her sister to Poland.

#### 8.6.4. *'Stayers'*

'Stayers' like 'travellers' were unlikely to bring their families to Poland<sup>499</sup>. They provided settlement migrants with a peculiar type of support. Two mixed couples acted as matchmakers for Ukrainian women, trying to find Polish husbands for them. In one case (27MW) they were successful whereas in the other (5MW) they were still working on it. In both situations my respondents were looking for Polish husbands within the circles of their friends. They did not use any matchmaking organisations or newspapers.

Only two couples helped labour migrants. In both cases the Polish partners were very active in the Polish-Ukrainian business. They had many friends in Ukraine who sometimes came to Poland for business purposes and stayed with them for a few days. It should be noted that nowadays these Polish-Ukrainian marriages rarely host such people, as the Polish-Ukrainian businesses in which they had been involved are not as profitable as they were.

#### 8.6.5. *'Bi-migrant' and 'arranged' marriages*

Migrant social capital related to movements between Poland and Ukraine played an important role neither in 'bi-migrant' marriages nor in the 'arranged' marriage. This is explained by the fact that these Polish-Ukrainian marriages were not related to migratory movements between Poland and Ukraine. In fact, migrant social capital might have played some role in 'bi-migrant' marriage of the two 'migrants' who met in the United Kingdom (17MW). It is probable that both the spouses went to the United Kingdom with the help of migrant social capital<sup>500</sup>. Nevertheless, none of 'bi-migrant' marriages supported their country folk in migration to Poland. In contrast, the Ukrainian woman involved in the 'arranged' marriage was an important migrant social capital for other settlement Ukrainian migrants. Firstly, she found a Polish husband for her Ukrainian daughter using the same Polish matchmaking newspaper as she had used while looking for a husband for herself. Thus, her daughter settled in Poland with her Polish husband three years after my Ukrainian respondent. The daughter was not the

only Ukrainian settlement migrant whom the lady helped. She also placed advertisements for four of her friends from Ukraine in the same newspaper. Therefore, the 'arranged' marriage investigated during the research may lead to another five Polish-Ukrainian marriages, hence five more Ukrainian settlement migrations to Poland. This particular example shows the way in which migrant social capital may effectively stimulate migration.

#### **8.6.6. Final remarks**

In general, Ukrainian migrants involved in Polish-Ukrainian marriages constitute migrant social capital for newcomers from Ukraine. The fact that they settled in Poland permanently spurred on the development of migrant networks and thus the reproduction of migrant social capital. It resulted in new Ukrainian migrants making trips to Poland.

Evidently, the types of movements stimulated by Polish-Ukrainian marriages differ according to type of Polish-Ukrainian marriage. Those Ukrainians who are experienced in labour migration to Poland seem to be the best migrant social capital for other labour migrants<sup>501</sup>. Interestingly enough, 'migrants' helped their families whereas others supported their friends. The reason for this may be that families of 'migrants' had relied on remittances, which they had been receiving from them during their migration to Poland. Once 'migrants' settled in Poland, they often had to cut a part or all of the support they had been giving to their families. Therefore, families in Ukraine sent another family member for migration to Poland. Such behaviour would fit the new economy of migration.<sup>502</sup> Families of 'travellers' did not have a tradition of living on remittances from migration to Poland. It appears that the propensity of members of these families to migrate to Poland did not increase even after their relatives ('travellers') became useful migrant social capital in Poland.

Polish-Ukrainian marriages were also a source of migrant social capital for settlement migrants from Ukraine. Normally, each type of couple 'specialised' in supporting a particular type of settlement migrant. The 'migrants' brought their close relatives and assisted them in obtaining legal status in Poland as well as in their adaptation. The fact that 'travellers' attracted repatriates from Ukraine is possibly related to the way they came to Poland themselves. Their migration was linked to the cultural and social capitals related to Poland: Polish origins, old social ties with families and friends in Poland, which had been limited since the Second World War. 'Stayers' and the lady from the 'arranged' marriage were trying to help their friends in settlement

migration to Poland by looking for Polish spouses for them. The only difference between them was the method of looking for a prospective partner. 'Stayers' were running searches among their friends, whereas the lady from the 'arranged' marriage was using the matchmaking newspaper.

To sum up, Ukrainians involved in Polish-Ukrainian marriages attract new migrants. Thus, the Polish-Ukrainian marriages may initiate or stimulate chain migration to Poland, as they constitute migrant social capital for new migrants. Interestingly enough, each type of Ukrainian partner ('migrant' 'traveller' 'stayer' etc.) is likely to support migration and marriages of a particular type.

### 8.7. Conclusions

Qualitative data on the Polish-Ukrainian marriages resident in Warsaw do not allow for reliable estimation, but they suggest that most such marriages are related to movements between Poland and Ukraine. Only three (two 'bi-migrant' and one 'arranged') out of thirty-four marriages were not linked to such movements. At the same time, these 'arranged' marriages, supported mainly by international matchmaking organisations, are also to a great extent driven by the structural factors of migration.

'Ukrainian migrant' marriages prevail in the investigated group. They are a result of various movements from Ukraine to Poland, and in particular, of Ukrainian labour migration. Settlement in Poland, as a goal of migration, occurs usually in the course of trips of a given person. This transformation of migratory goals is strongly related to the development of individual economic, social and cultural capitals in Poland. It is rather seldom that Ukrainian labour migrants aim at settling in Poland from the outset. For most of them, meeting with a prospective Polish partner is the main factor determining their decisions to settle in Poland permanently (goal). On the other hand, for particular, long-term oriented 'migrants', marriage to a Polish citizen is the means to achieve this goal. The latter often involves Polish-Ukrainian bogus marriages which seem to be underrepresented in the investigated group.

Opportunity structure differentials were important determinants of trips for both Ukrainians to Poland and Polish people to Ukraine. Most of their trips were taken up with the help of migrant social capital. For 'travellers', specific social and cultural capitals, anchored in historical, cultural and ethnic ties between Poland and Ukraine, were of special importance. At the same time, Ukrainians involved in Polish-Ukrainian

marriages supported subsequently both labour and settlement Ukrainian migrants to Poland. Therefore, the Polish-Ukrainian marriages resident in Poland contribute to the further reproduction of migrant social capital. In this way, they stimulate migration from Ukraine to Poland and the development of the Polish-Ukrainian social spaces.

It should be noted that for labour migrants, marriage to a Polish citizen and subsequent settlement migration to Poland is a particular migratory trajectory. This is because it is the result of a migrant's relationship with a prospective Polish partner. Such a relationship considerably transforms the constellation of determinants of the further movements of a Ukrainian. In particular, it implies the emergence of a new goal of migration – settlement in Poland. This goal seems to be much less likely to be present among goals of the other temporary Ukrainian migrants comint to Poland especially of undocumented ones. The next chapter examines potential trajectories of such undocumented Ukrainian migrants, with special emphasis on the probability that they become settlement migrants in Poland. At the same time, the analysis included in that chapter excludes Ukrainian migrants who intend to marry Polish citizens.



## **CHAPTER 9: CHANGING PATTERNS OF MIGRATION OF UNDOCUMENTED UKRAINIAN WORKERS – THREE CASE STUDIES**

### **9.1. Potential migratory trajectories of undocumented migrants - typology**

Undocumented migrants constitute an important part of Ukrainian migration. Most of them do not intend to settle permanently in Poland. They operate on the edges of Polish and Ukrainian societies and many of them travel constantly between Poland and Ukraine over many years. They work illegally in Poland taking advantage of the large Polish shadow economy. Trade or seasonal work in Poland constitutes the source of their main or additional income for their Ukrainian households. This large group of Ukrainian migrants comprises people who are deprived of social rights in Poland. The above phenomena create the ground for the development of criminality and social problems in Poland.<sup>503</sup>

This chapter aims at analysing the patterns of undocumented Ukrainian migration to Poland with the emphasis on factors which may lead to the fact that given migrants leave the group of undocumented migrants and, in particular, settle in Poland. The typical scheme of undocumented Ukrainian migration to Poland is frequent, short-term trips (no longer than three months) on the basis of a tourist visa in order to do illegal seasonal work or trade illegally in Poland. Therefore, most undocumented Ukrainian migrants take up more than one trip to Poland. According to the one-trip model, each trip influences subsequent ones, thus, the patterns of further migrations by a person. Therefore, the potential prospective migratory trajectories of undocumented Ukrainian migrants should be analysed in relation to their past-migratory experience.

In general, a very broad typology of potential migratory trajectories of experienced undocumented migrants may be proposed. They may continue migration to Poland or stop it. Each of these options involves two different scenarios which depend on the past-migratory experiences of persons and, in particular, on access to resources supporting migration which the migrants developed in the course of their trips to Poland. It should be noted that resources inherent in typical Polish-Ukrainian social space comprising mostly undocumented migrants are usually of use in undocumented migration of a particular type (for example trade in Poland). Thus, one possible option

is that experienced migrants continue migration of the same type taking advantage of resources inherent only in their original Polish-Ukrainian social spaces. Certainly, migrants behaving in this way may be more or less successful and may differ to some extent in terms of patterns of their migrations. Another scenario for the continuation of migration is that migrants change the patterns of their migration due to the fact that they derive access to resources from beyond their original Polish-Ukrainian social spaces. In particular, this scenario may lead to legal migration. As far as ceasing migration is concerned, migrants may settle permanently either in their home countries or in the destination countries. The latter group become settlement migrants (see Figure 9.1).

Figure 9.1 Potential migratory trajectories of undocumented Ukrainian migrants

| Access to resources supporting migration and their use                                           | Attitude/decision about further trips    |                                       |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
|                                                                                                  | Continue                                 | Stop                                  |
| Only resources inherent in the original Polish-Ukrainian social space<br>(‘Passive migrants’)    | Migration of the same or similar pattern | Staying in the home country           |
| Resources also from beyond the original Polish-Ukrainian social space<br>(‘Innovative migrants’) | Migration of a different pattern         | Settlement in the destination country |

Source: Own proposal

The above typology shows that settlement in the destination country is only one out of four options which undocumented migrants may follow. Moreover, it requires the acquisition of access to resources which may support this kind of migration and which are usually not inherent in the original Polish-Ukrainian social space of a undocumented Ukrainian migrant in Poland.

Migrants who limit their activities to taking advantage of migrant networks and resources inherent in their original Polish-Ukrainian social spaces, and which usually reproduce migration of the same or similar type, can be labelled as passive migrants. They do not make an effort to establish new social ties and to obtain access to resources which would support migration of a different pattern. Therefore, they are more likely to specialise in their original type of undocumented migration than to change the pattern of their mobility. At the same time, when stopping their migration they may be expected to settle permanently in their home country rather than in the destination one, as they do not have access to the resources which would enable them to become settlement

migrants<sup>504</sup>. Conversely, innovative migrants are likely to change their patterns of migration. This is possible as they have the ability to develop their social ties beyond their original Polish-Ukrainian social spaces, to look for opportunities for different types of migrant activities, develop skills which are of value in migration of another pattern and to learn from their migratory experiences. Thus, innovative migrants have particular social skills which result in their capital being of use in migration. Innovative migrants also appear to be more likely to settle in the destination country as a consequence of their migratory activities than does the other group<sup>505</sup>. This in turn is due to the fact that they actively develop their capitals in the destination country. Thus, they are more likely to get access to resources which enable settlement migration than the passive migrants. It may be expected that the inclination towards settlement occurs when the volume and structure of migrants' capitals (cultural, social and economic) are transformed in such a way that these capitals may be used more efficiently when migrants settle in the destination country instead of continuing migration according to the original pattern. Certainly, different migratory trajectories may become transformed over time as long as a migrant does not definitely stop such migration.

In this chapter, I describe three case studies which are examples of three out of four types of potential migratory trajectories of undocumented Ukrainian migrants which are described above. I do not present an example of the type of migration which ceased when a migrant settles permanently in Ukraine. This is because this group of migrants has left the population of undocumented Ukrainian migrants in Poland. Thus, their behaviour is beyond the scope of this chapter.

## **9.2. Passive migrants – continuation of migration of the same type**

### **9.2.1. *Introductory remarks***

Data for the case study of passive migrants who continue migration of the same type are derived from participant observation conducted among Ukrainian seasonal workers in a village, where farmers employ many Ukrainian migrants. This form of observation was devoted mainly to the operation of the whole group of migrants in the village, thus, the investigation of individual time-space strategies was not its main goal. Therefore, most of this chapter is devoted to mechanisms observed within the Polish-Ukrainian social space which has developed between the Polish village and some Ukrainian villages. Only at the end of this chapter, do I present values (goals) and

expectancies related to various trips of selected Ukrainian migrants coming to the one farm which was under particular investigation during the research. It should be noted, however, that individual migratory behaviours are determined to a great extent by mechanisms observed in the given social spaces.

## **9.2.2. *The transnational social space – main characteristics***

### **9.2.2.1. General description**

In 1999, in the village (hereafter – V), which comprises twenty farms, Ukrainian migrants were employed permanently in about one third of them, whereas other farms engaged Ukrainian migrants occasionally.<sup>506</sup> The Ukrainian labour force is available in the V because one farmer, who runs a vegetables' processing company (hereafter – VPC) there, employs a large number of migrants and he built up a 'migrant hotel' which may accommodate up to 250 Ukrainian workers.<sup>507</sup> Not all of the Ukrainians who live in the 'migrant hotel' are employed in the VPC at a given moment. The Ukrainians, who are not employed there, work occasionally on nearby farms. Other farmers employ them, usually for a few days when they have some extra work to do on their farms. Every day, these Ukrainian migrants who do not have work in the VPC at a given moment, wait at the front entrance to the 'migrant hotel' and farmers who need additional labour force can come there and employ as many people as they need. Besides, some farms in V employ Ukrainian migrants permanently, whom they had recruited mainly from the 'migrant hotel'. Usually, Ukrainian migrants who started to work for a particular farmer keep coming to this farmer over the next few years instead of going to the 'migrant hotel'. This is because work in a given farm is more stable and the accommodation provided is of a higher standard than in the 'migrant hotel'. Therefore, the 'migrant hotel' is the key institution which stimulates Ukrainian migration to V and facilitates the development of the Polish-Ukrainian social space. For particular migrants, it constitutes the basis for the initiation of their migration. Later on, they may start to migrate independently of the 'migrant hotel' following a different pattern of migration (for example migrants who started to go to particular farmers).

Most Ukrainian seasonal workers come to V during the farming season from the beginning of May until the end of October. However, virtually all of them leave Poland at least once during this period so as not to exceed the three-month period in Poland to which they are entitled on the basis of a tourist visa. There are some examples of people who live in Poland illegally, but they are in the minority in V. On the other hand, many

Ukrainian migrants, do in fact, stay in Poland illegally, because the owner of the 'migrant hotel' registers only a proportion of the migrants staying there. He does this because, according to official regulations, this building is too small to accommodate the high number of people that it actually does. Ukrainian workers in both the 'migrant hotel' and on the other farms are provided with free accommodation and catering. Usually, they work from twelve to fourteen hours per day (depending on the availability of work) doing simple jobs as low-skilled workers on farms. They are paid around 0.6USD per hour for their work.

#### 9.2.2.2. Start and acceleration

At present, it is difficult to identify pioneer migrants who started migration to V. Ukrainian migrants stated that the most experienced migrants came to the 'migrant hotel' in 1996. At the same time, Ukrainians who keep coming to the farm, which was investigated more deeply during the research (hereafter – F) took up their first trips to Poland in 1995. Thus, it can be assumed that migration flows from Ukraine to V started in the middle of the 1990s.

Obviously as mentioned above, there are structural factors which drive these migratory flows. The economic crisis in Ukraine implies high unemployment and low salaries there. At the same time, the average wage in the Polish farm sector is much higher than average Ukrainian salaries, which makes for attractive opportunity structures for Ukrainians in Poland. Moreover, it is profitable for Polish farmers to employ Ukrainian workers. They acknowledged that they were able to develop their farms thanks to the Ukrainian labour force, which is cheaper and more efficient than the available Polish labour.<sup>508</sup> Furthermore, Polish farmers are not really afraid of the consequences of employing illegal workers. According to opinions collected during the research, the Polish police do not aim at restraining the employment of illegal Ukrainian workers in V. They take occasional measures in the 'migrant hotel', but such inspections are not, in fact, effective. For example, during such a raid carried out in 1999, police caught two out of around 250 Ukrainian migrants residing in the hotel at the time. The remainder of the migrants managed to hide themselves in farm-buildings and in the nearby forest. Sometimes, the police inspect various farms which employ Ukrainian migrants, but then they only check as to whether Ukrainians have temporary registration, which they usually possess. The police do not investigate whether they work or not on these farms. The role of the police's consent to the undocumented

Ukrainian migration to V should not be underestimated. It can not be said that the police co-operate with the farmers, but they support activities which are beneficial for them, and as such facilitate undocumented migration to V.

The above structural factors stimulate the migration of Ukrainian seasonal workers to V. Moreover, developed migrant networks constitute an additional force driving this migration. Virtually all migrants resident in the 'migrant hotel' and on nearby farms are from one Ukrainian village in central Ukraine (hereafter – CU). Others originate from small villages in western Ukraine located close to the Polish-Ukrainian border.

It can be argued that a Polish-Ukrainian social space between V and some Ukrainian villages (especially CU) has been formed. Ukrainian migrants maintain strong social ties with their country folk in Ukraine and develop new social ties in Poland. It seems that both transnational kinship systems and transnational circuits exist in this particular Polish-Ukrainian social space. Transnational kinship systems comprise mostly migrants from a few villages from western Ukraine which are not as numerous as migrants from CU. The western Ukrainian migrants arrive usually with their relatives and close friends and they support mainly further migration of their relatives. On the other hand, migration from CU appears to take the form of transnational circuits. According to the opinions of migrants, virtually all the inhabitants of this village migrate to V. 'There is nobody to have a beer with in CU. The whole of CU is here [in V].'<sup>509</sup> Such an opinion is probably an exaggeration, but it reflects the volume of migration from CU to Poland. Moreover, the constant circulation of people and goods between CU and V is stimulated by the development of small private companies which provide migrants with transportation between CU and V as well as with some Ukrainian goods in Poland. The latter, in fact, involves the smuggling of cigarettes and alcohol. These small companies are individuals who work as drivers of their own cars. They are able to take four persons in one run<sup>510</sup>. They earn money from transportation (about 120-160 USD per one trip back and forth) as well as from smuggling. These small transport companies help to solve a very difficult problem which Ukrainian migrants face when they want to repatriate money earned in Poland to Ukraine. When using public transportation (buses, trains) they are exposed to the threat of organised crime. Racketeers who often include other migrants and Poles operate on Polish railway and bus stations.

The way in which migrants from CU operate in V is of a highly co-operative nature. The reproduction of social capital seems to be very efficient in this Polish-Ukrainian social space. It may be expected that these phenomena observed in Poland, feed back into the social relations in CU, increasing the strength and density of the social networks there. Evidently, migration of the pattern observed between CU and V can be a source of social mobilisation in the area of migrants' origin. However, this issue needs some further examination.

It should be noted that transnational kinship systems and transnational circuits comprising migrants from different Ukrainian villages seem to be integrated into one Polish-Ukrainian social space in V. Ukrainians staying in the 'migrant hotel' and those from nearby farms know each other and maintain some social ties. They often spend their spare time together, visiting each other or at parties organised in the 'migrant hotel'. Some of the Ukrainian migrants came to the 'migrant hotel' with the support of Ukrainians working on other farms and the other way round<sup>511</sup>.

In transnational kinship systems, instrumental reciprocity seems to be the main mechanism of social capital. In F, which was investigated, two families of migrants (husbands and wives), who have been working there for two years (before they worked on the other farm), were very cool towards 'new workers'. This is because the more migrants that work in F the less money the 'old workers' could earn, since there is only a limited amount of work available on F. At the same time, the families of migrants support their relatives and friends in their migration to Poland. On the other hand, exchange as a mechanism of social capital can be observed in the transnational circuits which developed between V and CU. Migrants from CU support not only their close friends and relatives, but also other migrants in exchange for some services they render to them, bringing, for example, cheap cigarettes from Ukraine. Moreover, the type of accommodation in the 'migrant hotel' also involves exchange mechanisms. This is because migrants usually live in overcrowded rooms, so a comfortable place can be exchanged for other goods or services.

#### 9.2.2.3. Adaptation within a transnational social space

Most Ukrainian migrants in V limit their social ties to other Ukrainian migrants and their employers in Poland. Thanks to these ties they have access to resources inherent in their Polish-Ukrainian social space. In fact, resources related to job opportunities are of major importance for migrants as, for most of them, the main goal

of their trips to Poland is to earn additional money for their Ukrainian households (as mentioned above they send this money with the help of private transportation companies to Ukraine). The more social ties migrants have in V the better job opportunities they have in Poland (economic realm of adaptation). The most valuable social capital, which migrants may develop in V is strong ties with the owner of the 'migrant hotel'. Then, migrants can expect that they will be employed in VPC permanently, which is a very well paid job. On the other hand, it should be noted that social ties which Ukrainian migrants develop in V give them access only to the low-paid jobs as unskilled work. This is because jobs, which require some skills, are usually given to Polish people not to Ukrainians in V.

The political (legal) realm of adaptation is common for virtually all Ukrainian migrants in V. The whole Ukrainian group works illegally in Poland and, therefore, does not have the right to insurance and medical treatment. At the same time, the conditions of work are very difficult and dangerous, especially in the VPC<sup>512</sup>. On the other hand, the social ties which Ukrainian migrants develop with Polish employers differentiate their ability to stay legally in Poland. This is due to the fact that Polish farmers, who employ Ukrainian workers permanently, tend to register them, whereas many of the Ukrainians staying in the 'migrant hotel' do not have registration, which is tantamount to an illegal stay in Poland.

The nature of social ties which Ukrainian migrants develop in Poland also influences the cultural realm of their adaptation. Most of them do not speak the Polish language, even though some of them have spent almost two years in total in Poland. It should be noted that there is no TV set in the 'migrant hotel'. Also, migrants do not read any Polish newspapers and books. During the majority of their spare time, they socialise with other migrants in their living quarters. Some of them may go to a nearby bar, but usually only those who stay in Poland legally, whereas the others are afraid of contact with any people from beyond the 'migrant hotel'. The importance of social ties for cultural adaptation can be shown by the example of a Ukrainian trainee, who lives in F. This young Ukrainian man stays in Poland legally and works there legally. Thus, he is not afraid of contacts with Polish people. Moreover, he watches Polish TV. After six months of his stay in Poland, he understood 90% of the Polish language and was able to speak it fluently.<sup>513</sup> Certainly, it is not only the lack of social ties, but also the fact that



Ukrainian workers work 12-14 hour days, which restrains their cultural adaptation in Poland.

In general, only a few Ukrainian migrants coming to V developed social ties with Polish people. However, in the 'migrant hotel' there are a few Ukrainian women who are involved in relationships with Polish men. The social ties which they have developed with Polish men give them access to some resources which are not available in their Polish-Ukrainian social space. For example, they received mobile phones from their boyfriends. Moreover, their cultural adaptation was faster than that of the others. They learned the Polish language very quickly. It should be noted, however, that no example of a Polish-Ukrainian marriage has been observed from the moment when migration to V started. The Polish-Ukrainian couples tend to be informal relationships.

### ***9.2.3. Individual time-space strategies – selected examples***

Participant observation provided some data on the individual time-space strategies of migrants employed in F. Certainly, this information does not represent migratory values (goals) and expectancies related to trips taken up by all Ukrainian migrants to V. It does, however, show some patterns of migration observed in V. F employs four Ukrainian migrants permanently (for the past two years), and one Ukrainian trainee (for six months). One more Ukrainian migrant was employed shortly before the participant observation started. Furthermore, the observant – a Ukrainian student – also worked there for a period of two weeks. The migration of the Ukrainian trainee is not a typical example of migration observed in V, thus, it is not analysed here.

The four migrants who worked in F permanently, initiated their trips to Poland in 1995. This group comprises two couples from a small village in western Ukraine. They usually spend seven months in Poland (from mid-April to mid-November) travelling every three months to Ukraine. The patterns of migration of the two couples are very similar. Both of them have their children in Ukraine. When they are in Poland, the grandparents take care of these children. The goals of the trips for the four Ukrainian migrants to Poland are to earn money in order to build their new houses in Ukraine. Thus, their income in Poland is devoted to extra spending in Ukraine. Therefore, the main factor, which influenced their goals of migration, was a shortage of economic capital which is related also to their socio-demographic characteristics – young marriages, which needed to establish their households in Ukraine. Unfortunately, the social ties which they had before their first trips to Poland are not known, thus, it is

impossible to judge the role of these ties in migration of these couples. Nevertheless, some structural factors were of great importance for expectancies which they maintained about migration to Poland (also for their goals but to a lesser extent). Firstly, opportunity structure differentials between Poland and Ukraine allowed them to achieve their goals – building new houses – by means of migration to Poland. The fact that the average income in the agricultural sector in Poland was much higher than in Ukraine and that there was a demand for unskilled Ukrainian workers in this Polish sector ensured that their expectancy that they would achieve these goals within a few years, was valid. At the same time, the political opportunities for exit/entry allowed them to take up migration, which did not involve breaking ties with their Ukrainian households, and which seems to be important for them as they have small children there.

In the course of their migrations to Poland, both Ukrainian couples developed relationships with the Polish farmer, who is eager to employ them every year. Thanks to this, their expectancies related to subsequent trips were higher than at the time of their first trips. In fact, the other factors relating to their migratory decisions remained unchanged. They hardly augmented their cultural capital, as they did not need to develop any additional skills to work in Poland. They did not even need to speak the Polish language (and they still do not).

On the other hand, both couples do not plan to cease their trips to Poland, even though they are about to finish the construction of their new houses. It is expected that their houses will be ready within one year. In the future, they would prefer to go to the United States rather than Poland, but they need the necessary visas to do this, which is relatively difficult (importance of opportunities for exit/entry). It seems that due to their migratory experiences, the initial goals of their migration have changed. The goals of their future trips will be not only to earn money for a particular purpose, but also to obtain additional income for their households in Ukraine. This change in the goals of their migration is probably conditioned by the development of valuable social ties in Poland with the Polish farmer which makes their expectancies about desired incomes in Poland very high. Moreover, it seems that the structures of incomes of their households have changed as a consequence of their trips to Poland. At present, the income derived from migration to Poland appears to constitute an important part of the total. At the same time, structural factors (the demand for unskilled workers in the Polish agricultural sector, the economic crisis in Ukraine, income differentials between Poland

and Ukraine, and political opportunities for exit/entry) which conditioned their migration to Poland have not changed since the time that they took up their first trips to Poland. Thus, these four Ukrainian migrants intend to continue migration of the same type.

The other migrant employed in F started his trips to Poland only recently (in 1999). He took up his migration, since his income as a driver in Ukraine had decreased considerably since 1996. Moreover, he had considerable outgoings on his adult children. At the outset, he took up migration to the Czech Republic. His goal was to acquire a legal job there, which was supposed to be arranged by a Ukrainian company. However, this company cheated him and not only did he not get any job, but he also lost the money he had invested in this migration. Thus, he took up migration to Poland in order to earn money to pay off this debt, which he had to render in the short run (goal). He took up migration to Poland, because he was able to go there without a visa. This was of special importance for him, since he had to arrange this trip very quickly (opportunity for exit/entry). He embarked on his first trip to V, because he originated from CU, where information about the 'migrant hotel' in V is widespread. Therefore, it seems that in the case of migration for this Ukrainian man the role of social ties within his social space was crucial. It especially influenced his expectancy that he would achieve the desired income thanks to migration to V. At present, the Ukrainian man does not plan to change the pattern of his trips to Poland. He intends to continue his migration to V at least until he earns enough money to pay off his debt. However, it is probable that he will not stop his migration even then, as he has rather unattractive job prospects in Ukraine.

#### **9.2.4. *Potential migratory trajectories – final remarks***

The migration of Ukrainian seasonal workers to V is determined by structural factors as well as by the existence of the Polish-Ukrainian social space and social capital inherent in it. Each year, more and more Ukrainian workers come to V<sup>514</sup>. The patterns of their migration to V are virtually the same. All of them stay in Poland for about six months (going back to Ukraine every three months) so as to work in the farms located in V. According to this research, hardly any migrant develops social ties beyond the Polish-Ukrainian social space. Most of them limit their contacts to other migrants and to their Polish employers. This seems to be related to two facts. Firstly, migrants do not need to develop any additional social ties so as to achieve the prime goals of their trips

(additional incomes). The Polish-Ukrainian social space provides them with virtually all their necessary resources, even including transportation between their home village and V. Secondly, the type of activities they take up in Poland – exhausting work which lasts the whole day – limits the spare time which they could devote to the development of new contacts in Poland. The fact that Ukrainian migrants limit their social ties to the Polish-Ukrainian social space makes the probability that many of them will change patterns of their migration in the future highly unlikely. This is because the pattern of their operation in Poland does not involve obtaining access to resources which would be of value in other types of migration.

### **9.3. Innovative migrants – continuation of migration of a different type**

#### **9.3.1. *Introductory remarks***

The example of innovative migrants who obtained access to resources from beyond their original Polish-Ukrainian social spaces in the course of their trips to Poland and, as a consequence, changed the patterns of their migration, is based on the focus group carried out with Ukrainian traders in Poland. In fact, this example refers not to actual but prospective changes in patterns of Ukrainian respondents' migration. The focus group was devoted to the overall migratory experiences of Ukrainian respondents in Poland. Therefore, the material from this group interview does not allow one to distinguish determinants and consequences of each separate trip of Ukrainian migrants. On the other hand, their trips do not differ one from another in their goals (values) and the patterns of their migrations have not changed considerably from the moment when they took up their first trips to Poland. Thus, it can be assumed that the consequences of any of their previous trips did not cause crucial changes in the determinants of their migrations. On the basis of this assumption, while presenting the 'Decision' stage, I refer to the first trip taken by a given person, whereas the description of the 'Process' stage covers the whole set of trips taken by a given person up until the date of the research. Certainly, even though the values (goals) of every trip taken by Ukrainian migrants are virtually the same, the expectancy related to subsequent trips is likely to be higher than the expectancy related to the first trips. This issue is covered in the description of the 'Process' stage of trips of Ukrainian migrants. The 'Finalisation' stage concerns plans and prospective changes in the migratory patterns of my Ukrainian respondents.

The research group comprised four Ukrainian migrants: two women (hereafter - TW1 and TW2) and two men (hereafter – TM1 and TM2). The men operate in the largest Warsaw bazaar, whereas the women on one of many smaller bazaars in Warsaw. Women commenced their migration to Poland at the beginning of the 1990s (TW1 in 1991 and TW2 in 1993), whereas the men, in the second part of the 1990s (TM1 in 1995 and TM2 in 1997). Therefore, Ukrainian respondents are representatives of different waves of Ukrainian movements to Poland and the various factors determining their migration decision-making process differ to considerable extent. It should also be noted that respondents possess some different socio-demographic characteristics, which influence the patterns of their migrations. The women were married and had children in Ukraine when they took up their first trips to Poland, whereas the men were single. Moreover, the women originated from central Ukraine (western part) and the men from western Ukraine.

### 9.3.2. *'Decision' stage*

Interestingly enough, all the Ukrainian traders tended to perceive the sets of their trips to Poland as single migrations<sup>515</sup>. Some of them did not even mention that they travelled back and forth between Poland and Ukraine every three months: 'Excuse me, I also travel every three months' (TM2).

All of them, when they started their migration to Poland, had problems with their jobs in Ukraine. They were unemployed, their employer did not remunerate them or they were sent into early retirement, which involved a very low level of income (economic and cultural capitals). These problems were caused mainly by the economic crisis in Ukraine (structural factors). On the other hand, the four Ukrainian migrants took up migration to Poland instead of migration to other countries because of some particular factors. None of the Ukrainian traders spoke any Western language at the moment they were making their migratory decisions (cultural capital). Thus, the fact that they would be able to communicate with Polish people without the need for learning any foreign language (Polish is very similar to the Ukrainian language) was an important reason why they decided to migrate particularly to Poland (cultural capital). 'Language, language [as a reason for coming to Poland]. I could go, for example, to Germany, but then I would have to learn German, whereas Polish and Ukrainian languages are 60% the same.' (TW1) The Ukrainian respondents mentioned also cultural similarity between Poland and Ukraine as the reason for coming to Poland.

Evidently, historical ties between Poland and Ukraine, which involve similarity of cultures and languages, worked as an incentive for Ukrainian traders to consider migration to Poland as part of their time-space strategy.

Migrant networks were of special importance for the migration decision-making of men who migrated in the second part of the 1990s. They had knowledge of economic opportunities in Poland from other Ukrainians who had migrated there earlier. 'When I heard that there are good opportunities in Poland, when people came [from Poland] and gave me concrete information, I decided to come.' (TM2) They also obtained some help in Poland from more experienced migrants from their home-town. On the other hand, the women, who took up their first trips to Poland earlier than the men, did not stress the importance of migrant networks in their migration decision-making process. They only admitted that they had received good information about economic opportunity structures in Poland (the level of various price differentials on goods).

All the Ukrainian migrants preferred to trade rather than undertake seasonal work in Poland (goal), because it allowed them to be independent of Polish employers 'When I pick apples, I do not know in advance whether he (the employer) will pay me or not.' (TW1) Moreover, according to the Ukrainian traders, their income from trade is determined by their own propensity to work harder or not as well as by their own initiative, whereas they can have only a light impact on their income from seasonal work. 'And it is not important whether you work better or worse. Any way you will receive the remuneration which was settled before, nothing more and nothing less, whereas here [in trading] you work as much as you like.' (TW2) 'I rely on my own brain. My income depends on the way I can operate here [in Poland].' (TW1)

All the Ukrainian migrants interviewed were traders in Poland, but their goals of migration varied because of differences in their socio-demographic characteristics. The women – married and with children – were taking on trips to Poland in order to derive additional income for their Ukrainian households. The money, which they earned in Poland, was spent on everyday life in Ukraine (bills, food, clothes etc.). It was not devoted to any extra spending in Ukraine. Conversely, the migration of Ukrainian men, who had been single before their first trips to Poland, did not aim at supporting their Ukrainian households, but at obtaining an attractive income for themselves. Moreover, TM2 took up his first trip to Poland with his girlfriend whom he later married. They were both earning money in Poland for their current needs. It should be noted that the

migration of a couple involves a particular constellation of determinants of migratory decisions. Apart from the factors mentioned above, the fact that these two young people were living at some distance from each other in Ukraine (3 hundred kilometres) was a strong incentive to take up migration to Poland together. In Ukraine, they did not have their own apartment and due to the problems of employment they had very limited opportunities to buy or rent one. In Poland, where they were both working, they could afford to rent a room, which was a satisfactory solution for them both (particular opportunity structure differentials).

In general, the goals of trips taken up by Ukrainian traders to Poland are determined to a great extent by structural factors in Ukraine (economic crisis) and opportunity structures differentials between Poland and Ukraine (price of goods differentials). On the other hand, the socio-demographic characteristics of migrants differentiate the way in which Ukrainian traders spend their incomes generated by their migration to Poland (also goal).

Migrant networks were important to Ukrainian traders especially as a source of information, which influenced both the goals and expectancies as to prospective trips. However, it should be noted that social networks seem to have had a particularly great impact upon the migration decision-making of the young Ukrainian men who started their migration later than the Ukrainian women. Evidently, this is due to the fact that migrant networks were well developed within the social spaces of men at the time when they took up their first trips. Probably this was not the case with the social spaces of the Ukrainian women who started their trips to Poland at the beginning of the 1990s. On the other hand, at the beginning of the 1990s, the opportunity structure differentials between Poland and Ukraine were very attractive, when compared with the late 1990s. At that time, taking up trading trips to Poland was very profitable because of the enormous differences between prices of goods in Poland and Ukraine, which diminished as time passed. Thus, it seems that very attractive opportunity structure differentials between Poland and Ukraine were the major factor which influenced expectancies related to the first trips of the Ukrainian women.

### 9.3.3. *'Process' stage*

During their trips to Poland, Ukrainian traders were developing social ties mainly with the other Ukrainian and Polish people involved in trade in Poland. It should be noted that the four Ukrainians stressed that they did not maintain contacts with the

Vietnamese and Armenians operating in Polish bazaars, mostly because these migrants tended to form closed groups. Moreover, they usually stayed in Poland for a long time, whereas the Ukrainians come only for at most three months on the one trading run (different patterns of migration). Thanks to their social ties with other traders, Ukrainians were able to find cheap accommodation, which usually involved sharing an apartment or a room with other migrants or with Polish people. It appears that it is easy to acquire information about accommodation from the other traders. Moreover, accommodation is constantly being offered to migrants in Warsaw bazaars. On the basis of their social ties, Ukrainian traders also rent stalls on the bazaars. Such transactions can not be official, because only foreigners who have work permits can do that officially. Therefore, the Polish owners of stalls usually sub-let them to foreign traders.

In general, the social ties, which Ukrainian traders developed in Poland gave them access to resources which enabled them to operate in Poland effectively as traders and to adjust to changes in Polish and Ukrainian markets for various goods (economic realm of adaptation). In fact, the patterns of migration of Ukrainian women were transformed as a consequence of these changes. When differences between the prices of Polish and Ukrainian goods diminished, Ukrainian women started to spend more time in Poland during the course of their trips. At present, they have to sell more, when compared to amounts they were selling at the beginning of the 1990s, so as to obtain the equivalent income from migration to Poland. Thus, the change in the opportunity structures differentials resulted in certain important changes in the migratory behaviour of these women. Nevertheless, they continued to migrate within the same transnational<sup>516</sup> social space of trans-border traders. It is very likely that the overall modes of operation in this social space changed, reshaping the space itself as well.

In addition to relationships with the other traders in Poland, the two Ukrainian men also established social ties beyond the transnational social space of trans-border traders. They met people who engaged them in network marketing<sup>517</sup>. In this company, they developed more social ties, which were not related to trade in the bazaars in Warsaw. Because of this, their incomes in Poland grew (economic capital). They did not give up their trade activities, but they devoted less time to them than before. Evidently, these social ties established beyond their original transnational social space were crucial for the adaptation of the Ukrainian men in Poland (importance of social capital).



It also seems that the fact that the Ukrainian men had more contacts with Polish people influences their adaptation within a cultural sphere. They speak good Polish, whereas the Ukrainian women who started their migration a few years earlier are not able to speak Polish (they only understand it quite well). This difference in cultural adaptation may also be related to some other factors such as the ability to learn foreign languages, age (the women are older) or to the fact that the men originate from a village located close to the Polish-Ukrainian border. Nevertheless, social ties with Polish people certainly played their role (social capital).

The structure and the content of social ties developed by Ukrainian traders in Poland seem to have affected the economic and cultural realms of their adaptation in Poland. However, they all followed the same pattern in the legal realm of their adaptation – they all stayed in Poland on the basis of tourist visas<sup>518</sup>. Interestingly enough, all of the Ukrainian respondents agreed spontaneously<sup>519</sup> that marriage to a Polish citizen is virtually the only way to obtain legal status in Poland.

#### **9.3.4. 'Finalisation' stage – prospective migratory trajectories**

The fact that the Ukrainian men developed social ties beyond the transnational social space of that of traders operating on the Warsaw bazaars resulted in a considerable change in the constellation of factors influencing their further migration decision-making processes. Therefore, the four Ukrainian traders, who participated in the research, should be divided into two groups (the women and the men), when analysing future trajectories of their migrations.

In fact, the determinants of further trips by the Ukrainian women do not differ much from those which influenced their initial trips. Economic opportunity structures in Ukraine have not improved since the beginning of the 1990s, and they may even have worsened. In spite of the fact that the female Ukrainian traders developed their skills as trans-border traders, their family situation did not change to a considerable extent. The values of their trips are also constant – additional income for their Ukrainian households. Moreover, the migrant networks which they developed in Poland are particularly useful in the type of migration in which they have participated since the beginning of the 1990s. Also, political opportunities for exit/entry have remained virtually unchanged during the whole period of their migrations to Poland. The only changes which seem to influence patterns of migration to Poland are changes in markets in Poland and Ukraine (opportunity structure differentials). To a great extent, they

influence income from their migration to Poland. However, it appears that skills (cultural capital) as well as social ties (social capital) which Ukrainian women developed in the course of their migration to Poland enable them to adjust to such changes. Thus, both Ukrainian women, in the future, plan to continue the same type of migration to Poland. Only a slow-down in trade on the Polish bazaars due to the development of supermarkets in Poland would restrain them. This is a problem which worries them at the present. It should be noted here that the prospective enlargement of the European Union, which will involve a more restrictive immigration policy in Poland, could be another factor which would make the continuation of shuttle trade migration difficult (political opportunities for exit/entry). However, none of the Ukrainian traders mentioned this problem.

The plans of the Ukrainian men are different from the plans of the Ukrainian women. They intend to give up their trading activities in Poland. This is because they have developed social ties which give them access to better economic opportunities in Poland, than the trading business offers. Because of this, the values (goals) of their migration have changed to some extent. They still comprise the main incentives to earn good money. However, in fact, they would prefer to stay (not permanently) in Poland and work there instead of going back and forth to Ukraine every three months. Moreover, their expectancies that migration to Poland may bring a valuable income have risen, as they expect much higher income from network marketing than from trading on the Warsaw bazaars. It should be noted also that both the Ukrainian men do not expect that they will settle either in Poland or in Ukraine in the short run. Instead, they plan to go to another country (for example to Germany) with the help of their company, where they also want to work in network marketing.

It is clear that the social ties developed by Ukrainian traders in the course of their trips to Poland seem to have a profound impact on their plans concerning the patterns of their further migration. The development of the skills of trans-border traders, good access to information and the social ties within the transnational social space related to trans-border trade, seem to stimulate further migration of the same type. Nevertheless, social ties developed beyond the given transnational social space make migration of a different pattern more likely. Interestingly enough, changes in the other factors, which are expected to influence the migration decision-making process, appear to be less important. It should be noted, however, that these might be neglected in this

analysis because the research material from the focus group does not allow us to make a detailed analysis of the factors influencing each separate trip.

The Ukrainian women can be labelled as passive migrants, whereas the Ukrainian men – innovative. It should be noted, however, that the women did not follow literally the same pattern of migration during all their trips to Poland, as they had to respond to changes in price differentials between Polish and Ukrainian goods. If they did not adjust to these changes they would have had to stop their migration to Poland as their incomes from such migration would have become too low. Nevertheless, the women specialised in a particular type of migration – trans-border trade taking advantage of the resources inherent in their transnational social space. Conversely, the Ukrainian men were more innovative in their migration to Poland. They were open to contacts with people who did not belong to their original transnational social space and to becoming involved in new migratory activities. It enabled them to find more attractive opportunities for migration to Poland (and also to the other countries) instead of trans-border trade.

It should also be noted that innovative versus passive participation observed in the group of the four Ukrainian trans-border traders is not related only to their ability to find attractive migratory activities in Poland. The fact that the women already had their husbands and children resident in Ukraine seems to be of great importance to patterns of their migration. Because of this, they did not take into consideration settlement or a longer stay in Poland. It appears that the strength of the social ties with the Ukrainian community and, in particular, family obligations have an important impact on the propensity of migrants to change the patterns of their migration. Those who have weak ties with their Ukrainian households (especially single persons) have more freedom in choosing alternative types of migration and in extreme situations to settle in the destination country.

#### **9.4. Innovative migrants – finalisation of migration in the destination country**

##### **9.4.1. *Introductory remarks***

The Ukrainian overstayer constitutes an example of an innovative migrant who aims at settling in Poland as a consequence of his previous trips to Poland. At the time of this research, he did not have any legal status in Poland, but he was taking action in order to achieve this. Information about this case is derived from an in-depth interview

with this Ukrainian man, which covers the overall migratory experience of the man and his family. His trips to Poland can be divided into two sets of trips which differ in terms of the patterns of his migration and adaptation to Polish society. At the same time, the factors influencing all the trips considered as one set of his trips are very similar. Therefore, I do not present determinants of each of his trips separately, but the factors influencing a particular set of trips. This appears to be justified as the consequence of each of his trips had a cumulative effect, which led to changes in his migratory patterns (consequences of the 'Finalisation' stage).

#### 9.4.2. 'Decision' stage of the first set of trips

My Ukrainian respondent was a man (hereafter – IM) who is an overstayer in Poland. He started his migration to Poland in the late 1980s. At that time, Ukraine was not a sovereign state, but some economic and political changes had already started as a consequence of *perestroika*. IM, who has higher education, quitted his profession (engineer) and involved himself in trade activities in Ukraine (at that time it was the USSR). It seems that he belonged to a group of men of initiative, who took advantage of the liberalisation of policy in the USSR so as to engage in private business, which was more profitable than working in state-owned enterprises and institutions (relatively high cultural capital). On the one hand, he was newly married and he did not have his own apartment, hence his determination to earn good money (lack of economic capital and particular socio-demographic characteristics). On the other hand, he stated that he had had the aspiration to achieve a standard of living which would be above the average living standard, typical for countries of the Soviet bloc: 'After we married, I decided that we should earn more instead of waiting for these odds and ends.' (IM). It seems this goal had a great value to him, but, at that time, he did not as yet consider migration.

The idea of migration occurred, when IM visited his brother who had prolonged his stay in Germany after military service. During this trip, IM spent some time in Germany and he passed through Poland on his way back to Ukraine. As a consequence of this trip he realised that he would have better economic and life opportunities in Poland than in Ukraine (expectancy). 'I just saw that I could earn good money [in Poland]. It was enough for me to come here and think about opportunities for staying here a little bit longer.' (IM) It appears that IM did not have migrant networks, but information about economic opportunity differentials between Poland and Ukraine was a strong enough incentive to encourage him to take up migration to Poland. IM also had

some information about what types of goods were worth bringing to Poland for sale. He had obtained this information from other Ukrainians who were experienced in migration to Poland. It seems, however, that they were people he met only occasionally, and not his close circle of friends: 'I met someone and spoke to him once, I do not remember exactly.' (IM)

For him, Poland was an attractive country to migrate to, not only because of the good economic opportunities, but also because of its proximity. He did not want to go very far away from Ukraine as he was taking care of his elderly mother. Moreover, it was relatively easy to enter Poland, compared to Germany, which IM had visited before. At that time, Ukrainians needed only a passport and, so called, *voucher* to enter Poland. The latter was very easy to obtain at every Polish-Ukrainian crossing-point, whereas the acquisition of a passport was more complicated. However, IM already had one, as he had acquired it before his visit to Germany (opportunities for exit/entry).

Evidently, IM decided to migrate to Poland, because high income (goal) was of great importance for him (value). It was, among other things, due to the fact that his newly established family needed money for an apartment and other household appliances (shortages in economic capital and socio-demographic characteristics). At the same time, IM was a man of initiative, who had the aspiration to achieve a high standard of life (cultural capital). The above mentioned personal traits also influenced his values for migration. On the other hand, it seems that IM's social ties did not have a great impact on his values for migration, because not that many people in Ukraine were experienced in migration to Poland at that time. It should be noted, however, that IM did know such people. Moreover, the fact that IM's brother had migrated to Germany and settled there permanently (he has never come back to Ukraine) may have had an impact on his migratory decision, especially that IM perceived his brother's economic position as better than his own.

The expectancy that migration to Poland would bring about a desirable outcome (high income) was influenced mainly by personal observation, which IM gathered when passing through Poland. Moreover, he had some information about trading opportunities from other people experienced in migration to Poland. Therefore, his expectancy was based only on limited information about opportunity structures in Poland. At the same time, IM presented his expectancy about obtaining high incomes in Poland as a very high. This is probably because at the time when he took up his first migration to Poland,

price differentials between Poland and Ukraine were very great and income from migration to Poland very high, when compared with the average Ukrainian income (attractive opportunity structure differentials). ‘I noticed, for example, that just the price of an ice-cream was the equivalent of the monthly salary which my mother earned in a library.’ (IM)

#### **9.4.3. ‘Process’ stage of the first set of trips**

IM took up his first migration to Poland virtually without any access to the resources essential to migration. He had only some sparse information about the opportunity structures in Poland and access to Ukrainian goods the sale of which could bring an attractive income. He did not speak the Polish language and did not know people who would provide him with help in Poland (for example in finding accommodation). Nevertheless, his resources and the opportunity structures differentials between Poland and Ukraine (differences in prices of goods) determined the type of his migration to Poland – shuttle, short-term trips in order to sell in Poland goods bought in Ukraine.

During his first set of trips to Poland, IM maintained strong ties with his family in Ukraine. This was relatively easy for him because his trips to Poland were frequent, but short. At the same time, he started to develop his social ties in Poland. They took the form mainly of relationships with the other traders from the former USSR (not only Ukrainians) and Polish people who were also involved in Polish-Ukrainian trade. Such relationships enabled him to attain knowledge about effective modes of operation in this type of migration and access to additional resources useful for it (cheap accommodation, well-located bazaars, good places in the bazaar etc.), which was important for the economic realm of his adaptation.

Nevertheless, IM said that this initial period of his migration was very hard for him. This was due to the fact that he was not able to speak the Polish language (low cultural capital) and had not enough information about various conditions in Poland. He stressed that he had succeeded in getting through this period thanks to his relationship with a Polish man who was involved in the Polish-Ukrainian trade business<sup>520</sup>. Clearly, this Polish man had many social ties within the social space of traders from the former USSR. He was very experienced in trade activities and provided IM with rich information. He also spoke Russian fluently, which was of great importance for IM, who did not know Polish at that moment. Moreover, this Polish man also supported IM

financially at the beginning. ‘He helped me to manage, to manage during this time. Up to the moment when I had earned a little money and had got to know how to obtain accommodation and also had learned how to survive [in Poland] and all those related things.’ (IM)

This particular relationship was of great importance for the adaptation of IM in Poland. The Polish man, who helped IM, seems to have had a central position in the migrant network within a (transnational) social space of traders from the former USSR in Poland, as he had many ties and good access to various resources. This example clearly demonstrates the importance of the content of social ties (access to information and resources) of a given migrant for his/her adaptive trajectories. Evidently, not only the number and density of social ties of a migrant influence adaptation, but also positions which given members of his/her migrant network occupy in the web of ties within a given social space.

There is also another reason why the relationship with that particular Polish man was so crucial for IM. According to IM, at the time when he started his migration to Poland, information about opportunity structures in Poland was scarce: ‘No such information was available. At the present, you have a lot [of information], everybody knows everything which is necessary and knows how to do that [to migrate].’ (IM) Therefore, that particular Polish man can be named as a social capital entrepreneur. Such individuals are very important at the first stage of the migration process between two areas – start and acceleration phase.<sup>521</sup> Thanks to their social skills (cultural capital) and central positions in the structure of a migrant network, they effectively stimulate the reproduction of social capital within a given transnational social space.

To sum up, the ‘Process’ stage of the first set of IM’s trips to Poland involved the development of social ties which determined his adaptation in Poland. These ties were anchored in the transnational social space comprising traders from the former USSR in Poland. Therefore, his adaptation in Poland mainly involved adjustment to this social space and growing access to its particular resources.

#### **9.4.4. ‘Decision’ stage of the subsequent set of trips**

After about half a year – ‘It was half a year maybe more.’ (IM) – IM decided that his wife and daughter should also take up migration to Poland. His values (goals) of migration had not changed considerably from the moment he had started his migration

to Poland and his main goal was still to earn good money. However, the other goal of migration – life in a country where one has better conditions of life – now also grew in importance. ‘I started to speak Polish a little bit and, certainly, I saw that one can have better life here and better salaries as well.’ (IM) Therefore, he convinced his wife to come to Poland with their daughter. They rented an apartment in Poland and she also involved herself in trade activities. It should be noted that, for trans-border traders, bringing their families to Poland was not very common at that time. They usually left their families in their home countries when travelling to Poland.

It seems that IM changed the patterns of his migration as a consequence of previous trips, when factors influencing his migration decision-making process also changed. He developed the skills of the trans-border trader and his fluency in the Polish language (cultural capital). Moreover, he developed social capital in Poland and also in Ukraine, which provided him with good access to the resources inherent in the transnational social space of trans-border traders – information and material resources. It should be noted that the skills and social ties, which he developed in Poland, enabled him to earn good money not only as a trans-border trader, but also as a trader in Poland (selling Polish goods on the Polish bazaars). This is because the social spaces of trans-border traders and Polish traders overlapped. People involved in each of them were meeting each other in the Polish bazaars, which involved the development of social ties between the two groups. Thanks to the above circumstances, IM’s expectancy that he would obtain not only his main goal of migration (high income), but also the other goal – stay in Poland with his wife and child – grew.

It is clear that the additional goal of migration to Poland, which occurred in the course of the first set of IM’s trips to Poland – bringing his family to Poland – was also conditioned by the level of his economic capital to a great extent. His family did not have their own apartment in Ukraine. At the same time, his wife’s income in Ukraine was very low when compared with her potential income as a trader in Poland (opportunity structures differentials). Thus, her migration to Poland paid the whole household. Thanks to this the family could have a higher income and proper accommodation in Poland, as IM knew how to find cheap accommodation in Poland (goal). Clearly the ownership of an apartment in the home country constitutes an important element in the economic capital of potential migrants. It seems that the lack of such an apartment may make emigration easier especially for young couples, as they



are at the initial stage of the development of the overall capital of their newly established family. They may be stimulated to develop other types of capitals (cultural and social) which would facilitate their migration to the country where they have better economic opportunities as either temporary or permanent migrants.

It should be noted that IM did not consider the permanent settlement of his family in Poland at that time. Indeed, he did not plan to acquire the status of settlement migrant in Poland. He also did not intend to stop going back and forth to Ukraine and he expected his wife to operate in the same way (goal). This was because such a way of life was typical for trans-border traders operating in their transnational social space. Moreover, he had knowledge of opportunity structures related to this type of activity, which implied a high expectancy that he and his wife would achieve a desirable income in Poland.

In general, certain factors influencing the migration decision-making process of IM changed after his first set of trips to Poland. This involved additional goals for his subsequent trips. Moreover, his expectancy about achieving these goals rose, thus, he also encouraged his wife to become involved in migration to Poland. Thanks to her migration to Poland the expectancy related to these trips to Poland rose still further, as while working and living together in Poland they were able to maximise the incomes and utility of their household (proper accommodation for a reasonable price and higher incomes).

#### **9.4.5. 'Process' stage of the subsequent set of trips**

IM has been involved in shuttle migration for about ten years and his wife for about nine years. During that time, their household was based in Poland and their daughter attended Polish primary school. During all that time, both of them have been working as traders. However, as the conditions of trading (price differentials between Poland and Ukraine, various regulations etc.) changed, they were also taking up various other types of a trade. 'This depends, so that when I had a normal income here then I worked here. When they [prices of goods in Poland] all went down, I took merchandise from here and went to Ukraine to sell it to the wholesale or to sell it myself.' (IM)

It is clear that during the subsequent set of trips, IM has continued to adapt to the transnational social space of trans-border migrants while maintaining strong social ties with relatives and friends in Ukraine. This is possible as he often travels to Ukraine. At

the same time, IM tended to stress that he operates alone and does not tend to develop many social ties with the other migrants from the former USSR. This is because, according to him, migrants from the former USSR and also from Ukraine do not tend to support each other. He pointed to Armenian and Vietnamese migrants as examples of those who support each other, by comparison to migrants from the former USSR. In the course of the interview, it appeared that he maintains social ties mainly with those Ukrainian migrants who started their migration to Poland at the same time as he did. At present, these people reside either in Poland or in Ukraine. Thus, some of them have ceased their migratory activities, whereas others have changed their patterns of migration. A few members of the latter group are still involved in petty-trading, as is IM. Some of them have established their own businesses in Poland which are based on this Polish-Ukrainian trade. Thus, IM is definitely involved in the transnational social space built on the basis of social ties between actual and former Ukrainian migrants both in Poland and Ukraine. However, newly arrived migrants constitute only a small part of this social space.

The social capital, which IM developed in Poland, has influenced the economic realm of his adaptation process. He acquired skills and social ties which allowed him to take advantage of the constantly changing price differentials between Poland and Ukraine. On the other hand, he is still involved in bazaar trade as his individual and social capitals do not include those resources which would enable him to establish his own Polish-Ukrainian business in Poland. It should be noted that IM stressed that he would involve himself in such a potential business only if it were more profitable than the bazaar trade.

The political (legal) realm of IM's adaptation also seems to be related to the type of transnational social space in which he is involved. In fact, not that many trans-border traders from Ukraine, with whom he is acquainted, have decided to settle in Poland. Thus, the dominant pattern of adaptation within the political sphere observed in IM's transnational social space is a short stay in Poland on the basis of a *voucher* (in the past) or a tourist visa (at present) and continued illegal trading in Poland. This activity involves the avoidance of contacts with any official bodies in Poland. 'When someone works in this way then he does not have the normal conditions of life and work, because he does not have a work permit and permission to trade, I would say so, then he, certainly does not tend to show himself in public.' (IM)

However, it should be noted that the daughter stimulates IM's adaptation within the cultural sphere of Polish society. This is largely because she has mainly Polish friends and she wants to participate in the same social and cultural events as the other Polish children do. She often asks her parents to go with her to the cinema, the theatre and to museums in Poland. Moreover, she received Holy Communion in a Polish church, which required that her parents attended some masses with her in the Polish Catholic Church. It seems very probable that IM's cultural adaptation would be much less advanced if he had not a daughter who had been growing up in the Polish environment.

During the 'Process' stage of the subsequent set of trips, IM's adaptation continued according to the rule of transnationalisation.<sup>522</sup> He maintained strong ties with both his Polish and Ukrainian social spaces. As a consequence of his adaptation he obtained access to useful economic resources in Poland. At the same time, the political realm of his adaptation was virtually static for many years of his migration to Poland. This is largely because members of IM's social space mainly operated illegally in Poland and tried to avoid any contacts with official bodies in Poland. On the one hand, IM appears to have followed their example. On the other hand, his social ties in Poland have not enabled him to obtain access to the resources necessary to legalise his status in Poland, namely to information as to the processes and possibilities of legalisation. As far as the cultural realm of IM's adaptation in Poland is concerned, he has good access to Polish culture because of his daughter – the significant other – which stimulates this element of his adaptation.

#### ***9.4.6. 'Finalisation' stage – prospective migratory trajectory***

At the moment, IM and his family are overstayers. Their type of migration is determined by the 'Decision' and the 'Process' stages of the first set of trips taken up by IM and of the subsequent set of trips in which the whole family participated. During this time, IM and his wife were adapting according to the rule of transnationalisation, namely developing and maintaining ties with both Poland and Ukraine, within the transnational social space comprising mostly people involved in Polish-Ukrainian trade. On the other hand, their daughter, who has been growing up in an almost totally Polish environment has very weak social and symbolic ties with Ukrainian people. In general, the family has been developing their capitals (cultural, social and economic) in Poland. It should be noted that this process involves different mechanisms than those involved

in the development of individual capital. It should also be noted that the volume and the structure of capital of a family are not the simple sum of the individual capitals of its members. In this particular family, the reproduction of various capitals seems to proceed relatively efficiently. Both partners work and contribute to the augmentation of the overall economic capital. Each of them also develops social ties in Poland (social capital) whereas the daughter, by growing up in the Polish environment, stimulates the reproduction of cultural capital within the family. Nevertheless, the problem of the creation and reproduction of family capital needs a more detailed investigation which is not possible within the scope of this chapter. Later on, I shall refer only to those particular aspects of this phenomenon which influence the migratory trajectory of the family.

During the ten years of the family's overstay in Poland, many factors influencing its decisions about further migration to Poland have changed. The transnational social space in which IM and his wife have been involved was transformed in response to changes in the market for Polish and Ukrainian goods. Differences between the prices of Polish and Ukrainian goods have diminished (opportunity structures differentials). Thus, some Ukrainian trans-border traders have given up migration to Poland, whereas others have developed different profit-yielding activities (change in the structure of social ties in the social space). The latter group is an example of innovative migrants who, instead of ceasing migration, have developed more profitable migratory patterns. As a consequence of these transformations, IM also intends to change his main activities in Poland from petty-trade to the establishment of his own Polish-Ukrainian business in Poland. He expects this business to be more profitable than his trading activities. He also learned how to achieve this goal from his Ukrainian friends (social capital). He has also formed a valuable relationship with a Ukrainian man in Ukraine, who produces goods which IM wants to import into Poland (social capital which can be efficiently transformed into economic capital). While planning this business, IM has to establish new social ties which extend beyond the environment of trans-border traders. On the other hand, IM also relies on the advice of his Ukrainian friends who have succeeded in setting up their Polish-Ukrainian businesses in Poland, i.e. innovative migrants (the structure and the content of social ties).

In establishing his own Polish-Ukrainian business in Poland, IM will follow the example of some his Ukrainian friends in Poland, who are currently businessmen in

Poland (social capital). His intention is to establish his own business in Poland. This is conditioned by changes in the opportunity structures in Poland and the fact that he has obtained access to resources which will enable him to achieve good profits from such business activities (social ties with a businessmen in Ukraine). On the other hand, another important determinant of his plans is his desire to acquire legal status in Poland<sup>523</sup>. Among other things, this is due to the fact that he perceives Poland as the country in which he and his family will have better economic prospects than in Ukraine. Nevertheless, there are also two other important determinants which have acted as facilitators in developing IM's inclination towards legal settlement in Poland. Firstly, he wants his daughter, who is almost totally assimilated into Polish society, to be able to live in Poland on a legal basis. 'She does not speak Russian very well, she does not know fairy tales [Ukrainian] which children hear yet. She knows everything about Poland.' (IM) In fact, the girl is living illegally in Poland at the present moment. She attends Polish private school and, thus, she is not able to leave Poland every three months. Secondly, IM is afraid that when Poland joins the European Union, he will not be able to travel between Poland and Ukraine as easily as at the present moment without a permission for settlement in Poland (change in political opportunities for exit/entry).

Thus, values (goals) of IM's migration to Poland have changed in the course of his trips. Currently, settlement migration (i.e. on a legal basis) has become his main goal, although the other goal – satisfactory incomes – is still a high priority. It should be noted that settlement migration as a goal occurred as a consequence of the fact that IM wanted his daughter to be able to stay legally in Poland, since she is being assimilated into Polish society and has better prospects there than in Ukraine. This aim further can be achieved only when he himself acquires legal status in Poland. Obviously this is an important reason why IM is looking for resources which will enable him to establish a legal business in Poland. Otherwise he probably would not pay so much attention to the legality of his economic activities in Poland. The other factors influencing his decision concerning the establishment of a legal business and settlement in Poland stem mainly from his willingness to involve himself in an economic activity which will bring better profits than the bazaar trade in Poland<sup>524</sup>.

At the same time, his expectancy that this goal will be successful has grown. This is because some of his friends (social ties) have managed to settle in Poland as businessmen, involved in Polish-Ukrainian trade. Moreover, he established a business

relationship in Ukraine which may result in profitable Polish-Ukrainian business (content of social capital). It should be noted, however, that even though IM wants to become a settlement migrant in Poland he is still likely to operate in a transnational social space, since he expects to achieve his goal by involving himself in the import of goods from Ukraine to Poland. Such business activity usually involves operating in the transnational environment.

## 9.5. Conclusions

It goes without saying that the case studies presented in this chapter are not representative of the whole population of undocumented Ukrainian migrants in Poland. However, they are examples of migrants who follow three out of the four types of potential migratory trajectories. The case study of migration which was finalised by permanent stay in Ukraine is not presented here as it does not fit in to the subject of this chapter. Nevertheless, so as to provide an exhaustive description of prospective trajectories of undocumented Ukrainian migrants in Poland a case study of this type should be also analysed. Suffice to say an analysis of the three case studies presented brought out some interesting conclusions and questions for further research.

In general, the three case studies show that each trip made by migrants may change the constellation of factors influencing their decisions as to subsequent trips. Moreover, the greater and more critical these changes are, the more likely migrants are to change their migratory trajectories. At the same time, the transformation of these factors has a profound impact on the values (goals) of subsequent migrations. In particular, they may result in the creation of new goals, among which legal labour migration or settlement in Poland may become an important purpose for a migrant. Usually, the expectancies that subsequent migrations will lead to desirable outcomes (old or new ones) develop as migrants become more and more experienced in migration. This is due to the fact that they typically develop their economic, cultural and social capitals in the course of their trips.

Migrants have an impact on the development of their capitals. In particular, they may develop their social ties either within or beyond their original transnational social spaces. The establishment of new social ties beyond migrants' original transnational social spaces increases the likelihood that migrants will have access to resources enabling migration of a different type. It has been shown that innovative migrants are

more likely to transform the constellation of this group of factors than are passive migrants.

On the other hand, the above analysis implies that a differentiation between innovative and passive participation is not sufficient to explain the probability of changes in migratory trajectories of undocumented Ukrainian migrants. This, in turn, is because there are also structural factors which constrain the behaviour of migrants. Moreover, these factors may change over the course of the migrants' trips, independently of their individual actions. Such external factors are opportunity structures differentials as well as opportunities for exit/entry. Migrants have to adjust to them while continuing or ceasing their migration. The transnational social spaces to which migrants belong also constitute a specific type of external factors for these decisions. Such social spaces are dynamic and their character depends on the major patterns of migration observed within them. They are usually transformed in response to changes in the structural factors of migration. They are also developed and reshaped by migrants themselves. The comparison of the three case studies shows that in a self-contained transnational social space, which provides migrants with virtually all the resources necessary for their migration, the probability that migrants change their patterns of migration is relatively low.

Due to the differences between external factors and factors which depend on individual migratory behaviours, one important aspect of transformation in migratory trajectories should be addressed. Migrants may change the patterns of their migration as a consequence of adjustment to structural factors (e.g. changes in price differentials between Polish and Ukrainian goods). However, this still implies their continued operation in their original transnational social space. Furthermore, such migrants may still hold the same values (goals) and similar expectancies about their trips as at the outset. Thus, such changes do not lead to a significant transformation of the patterns of migration of these people. They continue to rely on the resources inherent in their original transnational social spaces, which in turn usually promote undocumented migration of a particular type.

Prospective settlement migration of undocumented Ukrainian migrants is only one out of the four options which they have. Moreover, it seems relatively unlikely to be chosen, as most of the undocumented Ukrainian migrants perceive settlement in Poland as either unnecessary or very difficult to achieve. The latter, among other things,

restrain them from attempting to settle in Poland. In general, the settlement of undocumented migrants requires a considerable change in their values (goals) as to migration to Poland. Their main goal is usually additional income for their Ukrainian households. In particular, migration to Poland may constitute the main source of such incomes. Moreover, the case study of the family of overstayers demonstrates that the willingness to live in Poland may also be a too weak incentive for becoming a legal settler in Poland. This is explained by the fact that Ukrainians can easily stay in Poland without the necessary documents. In fact, in the case study described in this chapter factors which determined decisions about settlement in Poland were of a very particular nature: i.e. the danger that the overstay might not be continued after Poland joins the European Union and the fact that the child of the migrant is assimilated into Polish society and it would be difficult for her to go back to Ukraine when the time comes. The two above reasons made him search actively for opportunities to bring about the legalisation of his and his family status in Poland.

Furthermore, for undocumented Ukrainian migrants to settle legally in Poland, the development of social ties beyond their original transnational social spaces appears to be of particular importance in this process, which is in itself sometimes very difficult (compare for example the case of the transnational social space in V). It should also be noted that the tendency to settle in Poland is strongly determined by the domestic situation of migrants and the strength of their social ties with their Ukrainian community. Evidently, undocumented migrants who have their households in Ukraine and those who maintain intensive contacts with their community of origin are less likely to settle in Poland than are others.

To sum up, the interrogation of these three cases studies, representing different types of potential migratory trajectories of undocumented Ukrainian migrants in Poland, elicited interesting information about modes of operation of this group. Moreover, it suggests that migrants who obtained access to resources from beyond their original transnational social spaces are more likely to settle in Poland than are others. Nevertheless, it indicates that the settlement of undocumented Ukrainian migrants in Poland is relatively unlikely unless some particular circumstances occur. To identify these factors, some important research questions need to be answered in the future so as to enrich the typology proposed at the beginning of this chapter with further additional dimensions. Firstly, the differentiation between various transnational social spaces in



relation to the way in which they enable migrants to develop their social ties and resources beyond these spaces is recommended. Secondly, the potential transformation of values (goals) of migrations of various undocumented migrants should be traced so as to identify the probability that propensity to settlement in Poland (not overstay) would eventually occur as well as the factors which stimulate this process. The analysis presented in this chapter suggests that settlement in Poland as a purpose may appear when migrants aim at achieving some particular goal(s) which can be accomplished only when they settle in Poland permanently on a legal basis. Thirdly, a more in-depth analysis is required of the impact of social ties, which migrants maintain with their communities of origin, on their attitudes towards settlement in Poland. The last would allow for understanding why some migrants prefer to expose their families to long separation instead of considering bringing their relatives to Poland whereas others take that risk.

## **CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSIONS**

The empirical and historical data presented in this dissertation brings together rich information about the dynamics of migratory movements to Poland in the 1990s. It also demonstrates that the volume of settlement migration to Poland is growing. As of the end of 1999, around forty thousand foreigners were living permanently in Poland. Ukrainian migration constitutes an important part of contemporary movements to Poland. Among migrants from the former USSR, which is the main area of origin of foreigners coming to Poland since the late 1980s, Ukrainian citizens are the most numerous. They also form the biggest groups of virtually all types of contemporary migrants coming to Poland. Moreover, according to estimates, Ukrainians dominate in the undocumented migration to Poland.<sup>525</sup> At the same time, Ukrainian data show that Poland has been an important destination country for Ukrainians taking up international trips in the 1990s.

The discrepancies in the rapidity of the political and economic transitions in Poland and Ukraine created structural, mainly macroeconomic, factors for initiation and development of migratory movements from Ukraine to Poland. The fact that both of these countries aim at co-operating closely in political and economic spheres is another important factor stimulating the development of this migration process. At the same time, common Polish-Ukrainian historical ancestry provides social and symbolic ties between the western part of Ukraine and south-eastern Poland. The existence of these ties and the geographical proximity of the two countries determine the particularly high mobility of inhabitants of their border regions. It appears that even though various Polish-Ukrainian conflicts from the past are present in the political and social discourses of the two countries, they do not restrain movements between the two countries.

Apart from the structural factors of migration from Ukraine to Poland, the dynamic reproduction of migrant networks appears to be another crucial determinant of development for this migratory process. Research carried out in the three Ukrainian communities sending considerable numbers of migrants abroad demonstrates that almost half of Ukrainian migrants who took up their trips to Poland in the mid 1990s were supported by migrant networks. It may be expected that the share of Ukrainians migrating with the help of migrant networks in the late 1990s is even higher, as the

development of migrant networks usually proceeds in the course of high-volume movements between two areas. At the same time, in undocumented migration, a migrant network constitutes a crucial basis for migratory success.<sup>526</sup> This is due to the fact that undocumented migrants have to rely on informal channels of information and their personal contacts while organising their trips (looking for a job, accommodation etc.). According to qualitative data on undocumented Ukrainian migrants, migrant social capital is an important determinant of migratory decisions taken up by migrants of this type as well as of their adaptation in Poland. Bearing in mind that undocumented migration constitutes a considerable part of the movement from Ukraine to Poland,<sup>527</sup> the role of migrant networks in the overall flow from this country to Poland appears to be of special importance. It implies also the effective reproduction of migrant social capital related to this migration process.

At the same time, the dynamic reproduction of migrant networks creates the basis for the development of Polish-Ukrainian social spaces. It appears that these social spaces, at the moment, are at the initial stages of their formation. Nevertheless, undocumented Ukrainian migrants taking up many short-term trips to Poland are usually involved in various Polish-Ukrainian spaces. These social spaces comprise not only Ukrainian (foreign) trans-border traders or seasonal workers, but also Polish people – co-operators and employers of Ukrainian migrants. In some of them, notwithstanding the relatively short time of their existence, the modes of operation and co-operation are highly institutionalised.<sup>528</sup> Usually, a given Polish-Ukrainian social space promotes migration of a particular pattern. As a consequence of certain changes in the structural factors of migration from Ukraine to Poland, the existing Polish-Ukrainian social spaces are transformed in terms of the dominant modes of operation of people involved in them (Polish and Ukrainian people). Nevertheless, due to the fact that most of the Polish-Ukrainian social spaces emerged as a consequence of undocumented shuttle migration from Ukraine to Poland, they contribute mainly to the development of undocumented Ukrainian migration to Poland.

Given the initial phase of formation of Polish-Ukrainian social spaces, it follows that contemporary Ukrainian migrants, in particular undocumented migrants, are involved in either transnational kinship systems or transnational circuits. These two types of transnational social spaces may develop into transnational communities at later stages of the migration process.<sup>529</sup> On the other hand, ethnic Ukrainians living in Poland

form an ethnic community whose transnational ties have extended since the beginning of the 1990s. At the moment, its transnational character is questionable but in the future it may evolve into a transnational community. Nevertheless, this community differs considerably from the other Polish-Ukrainian social spaces in terms of the characteristics of the people involved and the modes of its operation. Ethnic Ukrainians are Polish citizens who usually had been living in Poland for all of their lives. At the same time, hardly any Ukrainian citizens are involved in the activities of the Ukrainian Association in Poland. By contrast, the other Polish-Ukrainian social spaces comprise mainly contemporary short-term Ukrainian migrants who have usually only a temporary orientation as far as their stay in Poland is concerned. The above dissimilarities make it difficult to integrate the community of ethnic Ukrainians and the other Polish-Ukrainian social spaces. However, some individual Ukrainian contemporary migrants, in particular of the settlement kind, appear to integrate with the 'old' Ukrainian community in Poland. This applies mainly to those Ukrainians who have social ties and especially family ties with representatives of the latter. In fact, Ukrainian migrants have a relatively high propensity to travel to regions of Poland which are inhabited by ethnic Ukrainians. This applies to various types of Ukrainian migrants: short-term as well as the settlement type.<sup>530</sup> It seems that the social ties between members of the Ukrainian minority in Poland and their countrymen in Ukraine stimulate contemporary migration from Ukraine to Poland. This migration contributes to the overall population of Ukrainians living in Poland. At present, Ukrainians are the second national minority in Poland in terms of size of the group. The fact that some Ukrainian migrants are related to ethnic Ukrainians via social ties may enable the creation of an even larger and more integrated Ukrainian community in Poland in the future. This would contribute to the cultural diversification of Polish society.

At the moment, temporary Ukrainian migrants coming to Poland considerably outnumber settlement ones. However, there are structural factors for not only labour migration from Ukraine to Poland but also for settlement. Relatively better economic prospects in Poland in comparison with Ukraine constitute a determinant, which is common for both types of Ukrainian migration to Poland. The economic discrepancies between the two countries create the basis for settlement migration from Ukraine to Poland, as a considerable improvement of the economic situation in Ukraine is not foreseen in the short term.<sup>531</sup> Moreover, the overall 'political uncertainty and lack of

general security'<sup>532</sup> in Ukraine constitute other important push factors for Ukrainian settlement out-migration.

In Poland, Ukrainian settlement migrants, even though outnumbered by temporary ones, account for over 10% of various stocks of settlement migrants. Ukrainians constitute 11% of aliens (foreigners married to Polish citizens), 17% of denizens and 14% of 'citizens'. Furthermore, shares of Ukrainians in each of these stocks have been rising since the beginning of the 1990s alongside the overall volume of Ukrainian settlement migrants. Typically, Ukrainian citizens are the dominant group among ex-USSR settlement migrants. They predominate particularly in the population of recent settlement migrants. The Ukrainian group of aliens (foreigners married to Polish citizens) constitutes nearly half of the population of ex-USSR aliens, whereas only one quarter of ex-USSR 'citizens' originates from Ukraine. Thus, it is clear that Ukrainian settlement migration is growing in volume and importance.

The continuing increase in Ukrainian settlement migration to Poland appears to be related to the other movements from Ukraine to Poland. In general, the overall migratory trends are reflected in the three main stocks of settlement migrants in Poland. Clearly, foreign settlers in Poland are representatives of various waves of migration to Poland. At the same time, Ukrainians, who predominate in temporary movements to Poland in the 1990s, comprise a considerable part of settlement migrants.

On the one hand, the interrelation between the Ukrainian temporary movements and the settlement migration from Ukraine to Poland is a result of the fact that there are some structural factors (mainly macroeconomic factors) which are common to both types of migration. On the other hand, the Ukrainian temporary movements appear to contribute to the increase in the volume of settlement migration from Ukraine to Poland. In particular, migrant networks which have been developing in the course of temporary movements from Ukraine to Poland also seem to stimulate settlement migration. As much as one fifth of Ukrainian newly admitted Polish citizens migrated to Poland supported by family or friends. Also, many Ukrainians married to Polish citizens migrated to Poland under the auspices of migrant networks. It should be noted, however, that it is rather unlikely that Ukrainian temporary migrants provide direct support for the settlement of their countrymen in Poland. This is due to the fact that the ability to provide such help involves access to particular resources in Poland<sup>533</sup>, which are usually beyond the reach of Ukrainian temporary migrants and of undocumented

ones, in particular. Nevertheless, short-term Ukrainian migrants may support other temporary migrants who are oriented towards permanent settlement in Poland in the future. Such an orientation may accompany the migratory trips of a person from the outset or may evolve in the course of his/her trips to Poland. I argue, therefore, that, for prospective Ukrainian settlement migrants, migrant social capital related to temporary movements may constitute the basis for development of their own capitals in such a way that they are able to settle in Poland.

Some of the Ukrainian temporary migrants become settlement migrants themselves as a consequence of changes in their goals of migration (settlement instead of short-term movements involving income-generating activities). Decisions about subsequent trips are influenced by the past-migratory experience of a person. In general, those people experienced in migration usually have a higher propensity to migrate in the future than others. It should be noted, however, that settlement in Poland as a consequence of the short-term movements of a given person is only one out of the four potential migratory trajectories. Moreover, it involves the situation when migrants obtain access to resources which enable them to settle in Poland. Such resources are usually not inherent in the Polish-Ukrainian social spaces in which most of the temporary Ukrainian migrants coming to Poland are involved. Thus, so as to be able to settle in Poland, migrants have to extend their activities beyond their original Polish-Ukrainian social spaces and develop adequate cultural, economic and social capitals. The latter type of capital seems to be of particular importance as it stimulates the reproduction of other types of capital of a migrant. In fact, only selected migrants, who can be named as innovative migrants, have the ability to develop their capitals in such a way that they are able to become settlement migrants. Moreover, the orientation towards settlement in Poland also involves a considerable change of migratory goals. Research on undocumented Ukrainian migrants demonstrates that even the propensity to stay permanently in Poland may not be an incentive which is strong enough to encourage a migrant to look for opportunities for legal settlement in Poland. This is due to the fact that Ukrainians may relatively easily become overstayers in Poland. In fact, only the emergence of particular goals which can be fulfilled only when a migrant settles in Poland on a legal basis appears to lead to the settlement of undocumented Ukrainian migrants in Poland. It may be expected that, for other types of Ukrainian migrants coming to Poland, settlement instead of overstay in Poland is more likely. This is due to

the fact that illegal overstay in the destination country involves dealing with high levels of uncertainty in everyday life and with activities in the underground economy. Apparently, it is easier for ex-undocumented temporary migrants experienced in this type of operation than for the other migrants. Nevertheless, bearing in mind the high volume of undocumented Ukrainian migrants coming to Poland, they may also contribute considerably to the overall number of Ukrainian settlement migrants in Poland.

Marriage to a Polish citizen is a particular migratory trajectory which involves the development of specific social ties in the course of migration of a person – an intimate relationship with a prospective Polish partner. However, social ties of this type make the settlement of a Ukrainian partner in Poland particularly likely. This is due to the fact that Poland is a country which provides for better job and life prospects than Ukraine. Thus, Polish-Ukrainian couples are likely to settle in Poland instead of Ukraine.<sup>534</sup> Moreover, marriage to a Polish citizen involves good opportunities for becoming a denizen in Poland. This is because it is easier for foreigners married to Polish people to legalise their status in Poland than for other migrants.

Clearly, marriage migration – a particular type of settlement migration – is related to overall migratory movements to Poland. The latter are reflected in the population of mixed marriages contracted there in the 1990s. In particular, various temporary movements from Ukraine to Poland contribute to the volume of mixed marriages contracted in Poland. According to the results of qualitative research, for a considerable proportion of Polish-Ukrainian married couples resident in Warsaw, marriage was preceded by the mobility of one of the partners. Frequently, the Ukrainians married to Polish people used to be labour migrants in Poland. Such an interrelation between temporary movements and mixed marriages contracted results from the fact that, in coming to Poland, foreigners enter into its marriage market. Thus, the high presence of Ukrainian migrants on the Polish marriage market implies the increased probability of the formation of the Polish-Ukrainian marriages. At the same time, the role of the growing population of Polish-Ukrainian marriages in Poland in the further development of Ukrainian settlement migration to Poland should not be neglected. Again, this is due to the fact that Ukrainians married to Polish people usually possess resources which enable them to support other settlement migrants from their country (for example their own apartment). Their propensity towards this behaviour

differs, depending on their past-migratory experience and their financial situation in Poland. Most of them appear to serve as social capital for Ukrainian labour migrants – their relatives or friends. Nevertheless, some of them also provide assistance for prospective Ukrainian settlement migrants. Thus, the Ukrainians married to Polish citizens stimulate the further reproduction of migrant social capital and in this way also further migratory movements from Ukraine to Poland. Apparently, the processes accompanying the formation of Polish-Ukrainian marriages and their operation in Poland constitute a prominent example of the profound impact which migrant social capital related to temporary movements may have on settlement migration.

At the same time, foreigners married to Polish citizens constitute a crucial part of the overall settlement migration to Poland. For example, foreigners married to Polish citizens outnumber those granted a PRP in Poland in the following year<sup>535</sup>. This is because a proportion of the mixed marriages, in particular Polish-German marriages, settle in the country of the foreign partner instead of Poland. At the opposite end, Ukrainians married to Polish citizens constitute around two thirds of Ukrainians granted a PRP in the following year. Therefore, most of the Polish-Ukrainian marriages appear to settle in Poland. It should also be noted that the vast majority of denizens are married people, and that only a tiny proportion of applicants for Polish citizenship in the Warsaw voivodeship had never been married to a Polish citizen. It is clear that marriage migration is of great importance in settlement migration to Poland. It should be noted that such migration implies particular modes of adaptation and operation of migrants. Foreigners married to citizens of the destination country usually adapt relatively quickly.<sup>536</sup> Moreover, such migrants develop particularly strong attachments to the destination country in terms of their family ties. Thus, migration of this pattern is rather unlikely to involve the formation of a distinct immigrant community in the destination country. On the other hand, mixed marriages form a particular type of transnational family which tends to maintain strong ties with the countries of origin of both the partners. At the present time, when communication and transportation technologies are being developed, the transnational character of operation of such families may come into prominence.<sup>537</sup> In particular, transnational modes of operation of the Polish-Ukrainian marriages may involve the formation of various Polish-Ukrainian kinship systems which could promote further migration of Ukrainians to Poland. The beginning of this process has been observed in the population of the Polish-Ukrainian marriages



resident in Warsaw which supported their relatives and friends in their migration to Poland.

Most of the Ukrainians married to Polish citizens are women, who are typically most numerous among migrants married to the citizens of the country, which is the destination for labour migrants from their home countries.<sup>538</sup> Such a relatively high propensity for women to out-marry stems not only from their 'search for a better life' in the destination country (one which will provide them with better economic prospects). It is also related to the fact that it is usually more difficult for female labour migrants to enter the official labour market of the destination country. Thus, they are more likely to operate as undocumented migrants than are male migrants. Because of this, women are also more likely to respond to those opportunities provided by marriage businesses which flourish in typical immigration countries.<sup>539</sup> By marrying citizens of the destination country they are able to legalise their immigrant status there and work legally. Moreover, for women, marriage is traditionally perceived as an important avenue for upward social mobility.<sup>540</sup> Nowadays, when female participation in the labour market is growing in importance, alternative opportunities for their social and economic advancement are coming into prominence. Nevertheless, the continuing role of marriage in the upward social mobility of partners should not be neglected, especially those patterns of mate selection observed on marriage markets which involve the search for high-value partners.<sup>541</sup> Evidently, marriage to a citizen of a country which is more developed than the country of the women's origin, can be perceived as a means for upward social mobility of females. It may be compared to the widely observed phenomenon that women from the countryside have a particularly high inclination, when compared to men, to migrate to towns. There, they tend to marry urban residents which is directly related to the social and economic advancement of female migrants.<sup>542</sup> On the other hand, the high representation of women among foreigners married to citizens of the destination country is related to the fact that wives usually follow their husbands. This frequently involves settlement in the country of origin of the husband. The growing number of dual-career households contributes to the transformation of such modes of operation of mixed couples. Nevertheless, according to research on the mobility of female citizens of the European Union, women are still likely to follow their husbands notwithstanding their own professional status.<sup>543</sup>

The fact that marriage migration is a considerable proportion of Ukrainian settlement migration to Poland appears to influence the socio-demographic characteristics of the latter. Women predominate not only among the Ukrainians married to Polish citizens (aliens), but also among denizens and 'citizens' from this country. It is clear that the prevalence of women in Ukrainian settlement migration is related to the fact that the present situation of women in the republics of the former Soviet Union creates a considerable potential for out-migration among ex-USSR females. In these countries, the proportion of female workers who lost their jobs as a consequence of severe economic crises experienced by the whole region is particularly high.<sup>544</sup> At the same time, ex-USSR women are very active in the labour market. This is caused by the fact that during the Soviet times, they were expected to contribute to the income of their households on an equal basis to men. The latter involves the relative independence of women and has a profound impact on their propensity to take up migration. It has been observed that in societies where the role of a woman is limited to the care of children and domestic work the potential for female migration is relatively low.<sup>545</sup> This observation is also backed up by evidence on differences between migratory patterns from the various republics of the former USSR. For most of them (especially for the European ones), the common pattern is that women prevail in settlement migration to Poland. Conversely, in migration from such a traditional country as Armenia it is not women but men who constitute the majority among migrants coming to Poland. It appears that all the above factors influence the dominant presence of women in the overall Ukrainian migration to Poland as well in Ukrainian settlement migration.

Interestingly enough, the Ukrainian settlement migrants belonging to the three different stocks of settlement migrants (aliens, denizens, citizens) possess also another common characteristic – namely they are usually very well educated. In fact, a high level of education has been observed in the overall population of the settlement migrants in Poland. For highly educated people, it is relatively easy to develop skills which can be of high value in the destination country. Moreover, they learn faster, an ability which develops in the course of education. Thus, a high level of education is likely to be common for the settlement migrants coming not only to Poland but also to the other destination countries.

As far as the age of the settlement migrants in Poland is concerned, the average for migrants belonging to the three different stocks of settlement migrants differs. The foreigners married to Polish citizens are, on the average, the youngest, whereas the population of newly admitted citizens is relatively older. Nevertheless, the average Ukrainian is usually relatively young. In the population of denizens where the age distribution is the most diversified, ex-USSR denizens and also Ukrainians are, for example, considerably younger than European citizens. It appears that this is related to the fact that many Ukrainians are likely to be economic migrants looking for better economic prospects for themselves and their families in Poland. At the same time, resettlement at a young age is frequently related to the establishment of a new household for a person.<sup>546</sup> Thus, it is very likely that many young Ukrainian settlement migrants set up their households in Poland and start their family lives there. The latter finding is supported by evidence from data on the marital and family status of Ukrainians belonging to the three different stocks of settlement migrants in Poland. Most of them were married in Poland. In general, it seems that it is easier for young people to take on the risk of resettlement and to adjust to a foreign environment than for older people. Young people are at the beginning of their professional careers. Thus, they are in a position to develop their capitals in such a way that they are able to achieve professional success in the destination country. Nevertheless, the age of settlement migrants seems to be related to factors driving their migration to a given destination country. For example, foreigners initially migrating as experts to the destination country (as many Europeans to Poland) may be expected to be on average older than economic settlement migrants.

To sum up, according to the results of research presented in this dissertation, there are grounds to believe that Ukrainian settlement migration to Poland will grow in volume in the future. This is due, in particular, to the fact that there exist structural factors for such migration. Moreover, temporary movements from Ukraine to Poland – high in volume in the 1990s – stimulate settlement migration in many ways, in particular, via migrant networks reproduced in the course of these movements. At the same time, there is a potential for settlement in Poland among Ukrainian citizens. On the one hand, the proportion of Ukrainians considering resettlement from Ukraine is relatively high. On the other hand, Ukrainians resident in Poland as aliens or denizens have a high propensity to stay in Poland permanently, especially when compared with

European migrants. Ukrainians involved in mixed marriages are more likely to become denizens than are other foreigners married to Polish people. Moreover, as many as 15% of Ukrainian denizens became Polish citizens in the 1990s, whereas for European migrants the respective ratio was only 5%. The acquisition of citizenship of the destination country is perceived as the last gate for entry to the receiving society.<sup>547</sup> It usually involves a strong attachment to the destination country and strong determination to stay there permanently. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the relatively high potential for the development of settlement migration from Ukraine to Poland, Ukrainians have limited opportunities to settle permanently in Poland on a legal basis. This is due to the lack of a promotional legal framework for this type of migration in Polish immigration law. Thus, Ukrainian migrants who enjoy the right to free entry to Poland are likely to choose to overstay rather than to settle on the legal basis in Poland. It should be noted that the latter could change in the near future due to recent changes in the Polish 'Aliens Law'. In 2001, new regulations promoting the reunion of migrant families were introduced, which involves better opportunities for the legal settlement of foreigners in Poland.

It should be noted that the structural factors for Ukrainian migration to Poland are presented in this dissertation mainly as a background for the overall analysis. The latter does not include the issue of the potential for considerable changes in this group of factors. In fact, such changes were not noted during the period under examination. However, migration from Ukraine to Poland is strongly conditioned by such economic factors, especially by the fact that Ukraine has been undergoing a severe economic crisis. Therefore, it is very difficult to foresee the influence which economic improvement in Ukraine may have on the migratory outflow from this country. On the other hand, it has been observed that when migrant networks related to movements between the two locations are well developed, migration is likely to proceed, notwithstanding changes in the initial structural factors of this migration. This is due to the fact that in such a situation migration becomes a self-perpetuating process which involves institutionalised modes of operation in the sending and receiving communities. This may be the case with migration from Ukraine to Poland in the future.

The important circumstance involving considerable changes in structural factors of migration from Ukraine to Poland in the near future relates to the prospective membership of Poland in the European Union foreseen to take place in next few years.

This will involve stricter controls on the eastern border of Poland and the cancellation of the visa-free regime between Poland and Ukraine. The latter may have a considerable impact on Ukrainian migration to Poland which proceeds mainly under the auspices of the current visa-free regime. It may be expected that the volume of Ukrainian migration will diminish as a consequence of these changes. Nevertheless, it is rather unlikely to fully restrict these movements. This is because the Polish-Ukrainian social spaces already in operation may be transformed in such a way that Ukrainian migrants will develop alternative modes of migration to Poland within the changed framework of opportunities for exit/entry. In extreme situations this may involve illegal border crossing supported by migrant institutions and migrant social capital. Such a situation has already been observed in the case of migration from Mexico to United States. In spite of growing restrictions in American immigration policy regarding these movements, Mexican migration did not stop. It only led to the growth in the proportion of undocumented migrants in the population of Mexicans coming to United States.

Moreover, the role of the Polish-Ukrainian economic co-operation should not be neglected. Notwithstanding the prospective Polish membership in the European Union, Polish authorities pay considerable attention to the maintenance and development of effective Polish-Ukrainian economic co-operation. Therefore, it may be expected that alongside the stricter border controls on the eastern Polish border other possibilities for running Polish-Ukrainian businesses will be introduced. The latter could involve opportunities for migration between the two countries within a changed legal framework.

Empirical data on Ukrainian migration to Poland clearly demonstrate that there is an interrelation between the overall migratory trends and settlement migration. The theoretical framework used in the dissertation – a combination of the revised VE expectancy model, the one-trip model and the concept of transnational social space – permits the tracing of the way in which various types of migrants' trips may be interrelated. The collection of factors of migratory decisions, which is proposed in the revised V-E model, seems to include the main determinants of individual migratory decisions. The analysis of migratory trajectories according to the one-trip model demonstrates how a constellation of these factors may change as a consequence of past-migratory experiences of individuals. These changes lead to the transformation of the values (goals) of migration and the expectancies that these values can be achieved by

means of migration. As a consequence, a particular migratory goal may occur – settlement in the destination country. The one-trip model in the extended form, addresses the issue of the interrelation between trips – their determinants and consequences – of individuals involved in the same transnational social space. It seeks to explain the reproduction of migrant social capital and the development of a migratory process in a given transnational social space as well as the institutionalisation of activities of migrants. At the same time, the concept of transnational social space seems to be a powerful tool for interrogating contemporary Ukrainian migration to Poland which is of highly transnational nature. Clearly, the Polish-Ukrainian social spaces in which many Ukrainians coming to Poland are involved provide them with resources promoting a certain type of migration – that which is dominant in a given transnational social space. Therefore, on the one hand, these social spaces stimulate Ukrainian migratory movements to Poland, but on the other hand they limit potential changes in migratory trajectories of Ukrainians coming to Poland.

It should also be noted that, according to the theoretical approach developed in this dissertation, settlement in the destination country as a consequence of previous temporary movements should be perceived as a gradual process rather than as a single decision. Temporary migrants seldom migrate with the initial intention to settle permanently in the destination country. The propensity to settlement grows gradually alongside the development of various individual capitals of migrants in the course of their trips to the destination country. In fact, the only situation when settlement as a migratory goal occurs suddenly and therefore unexpectedly is when migrants meet their prospective partners in the destination country. Nevertheless, the relationship with a future spouse should also be perceived as the development of the individual capital of a migrant in the destination country. Namely, it involves the development of a particular type of social capital which brings with it beneficial opportunities for settlement in the destination country.

The theoretical framework and data used in this dissertation permit the explanation of pertinent mechanisms of Ukrainian settlement migration to Poland. However, there are still important issues which should be investigated more deeply in the future. For this purpose, further theoretical and empirical work is necessary.

Firstly, the role of a transnational social space in shaping individual migratory trajectories should be analysed more deeply. In general, transnational social spaces

usually reproduce a particular pattern of migration. Qualitative research on undocumented Ukrainian migrants in Poland suggests that migrants need to act in an innovative manner so as to develop their individual patterns of migration which differ from the dominant modes of operation in a given transnational social space. Thus, the role of a transnational social space in shaping the migratory trajectories of people involved within it, should not be neglected. Therefore, a typology of transnational social spaces is necessary so as to examine their role in enabling migrants to change their original migratory patterns. It is evident that the transformation from temporary movements towards settlement in the destination country involves a crucial change in the migratory goals of a person. It may be expected that only particular transnational social spaces can enable such a change.

Secondly, the examination of undocumented Ukrainian migration raised an interesting question concerning the role of transnational social space in stimulating social mobilisation in the community of migrants' origin. The development of migrant networks and modes of co-operation in the destination country appear to feed back on the social relations in the sending community. This process has been already partly investigated by the theory of cumulative causation. According to this approach, high-volume migration from a given community involves structural changes in this community leading also to the institutionalisation of the migratory process. Nevertheless, the question of social mobilisation and the transformation of social relations in the home community of migrants has not been properly investigated. This issue seems to be important as it appears that social capital developed in the course of migratory movements can be transferred to the sending community. This way not only remittances brought by migrants but also their social capitals may contribute to the overall profits from migration.

Thirdly, factors which restrain and facilitate the integration of various transnational social spaces should be identified. A particularly interesting question posed is to what degree different social spaces such as the (transnational) community of ethnic Ukrainians in Poland and the social spaces comprising contemporary Ukrainian migrants may be integrated in the future. It may be expected that the role of various institutions is of crucial importance for this process. For example, it is generally accepted that Polish catholic churches operating in the countries to which many Polish people migrate constitute the main institutions which integrate the various groups of

Polish people living in a given destination country. Representatives of old waves of migration and recent migrants all go together to Polish masses each Sunday. At the same time, Polish churches are places where newcomers may find information about jobs and accommodation provided by other Polish people in the destination country. In this way the existence of Polish churches stimulates co-operation between 'old' and 'new' Polish migrants. It seems that the role of the church is not so important in the migration from Ukraine to Poland. Among other things, this is because Ukrainian society is differentiated in terms of religious affiliation. Moreover, many years of Soviet policies in the republics of the former USSR led to the diminution of the role of the church in the social life of these countries. In general, according to empirical data, there may exist grounds for the integration of the community of ethnic Ukrainians in Poland and various Polish-Ukrainian social spaces. However, such a process seems to be possible only in the long run. When it does get underway, it could lead to the enlargement of the Ukrainian community in Poland and contribute to the cultural diversification of Polish society.

Finally, the complexity of the notion of settlement in a given country should be scrutinised more carefully. The reason for this is that in the era of fast and affordable transportation, even over long distances, and with highly developed communication technology, the meaning of the word 'resettlement' appears to have been transformed. Traditionally, settlement in a given country usually involved permanent stay there during most of a migrant's life, if not during the whole of his/her life. Nowadays, people may easily change their places of residence, at the same time, not breaking their ties with their countries of origin. In particular, the settlement process does not necessarily involve the abandonment of the original transnational social space of a migrant. It is not unusual, especially among citizens of highly developed countries, that a family owns apartments in two or more countries. It should be noted, however, that citizens of various countries have different opportunities for travelling between countries and for changing their places of residence. For example, citizens of the European Union may work and stay in any country of the Union without need to become permanent settlers in this country. To put it in another way, their willingness to stay in a given country of the Union does not necessarily involve a decision about permanent settlement in that country. Citizens of other countries usually do not enjoy such freedom of movement. The above dissimilarities between opportunities of citizens



## *CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSIONS*

of various countries for international travel and resettlement carry in them important differences in the meaning that the term resettlement has for various groups of migrants. This should be taken into consideration when analysing settlement migration. In general, settlement migration may involve various patterns of spatial mobility and this issue definitely deserves further research.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> See: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *Transition Report 1999. Ten Years of Transition*, London, 1999; European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *Transition Report Update*, London, 2001.

<sup>2</sup> W. Kymlicka, *Multicultural citizenship: a liberal theory of minority rights*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995, p. 1.

<sup>3</sup> Compare: M.J. Piore, *Birds of Passage. Migrant Labour and Industrial Societies* (hereafter *Birds of Passage*), Cambridge, London, New York, New Rochelle, Melbourne, Sydney, Cambridge University Press, 1980.

<sup>4</sup> For example: D.T. Gurak, Fe. Cases, 'Migration Networks and the Shaping of Migration Systems' in M.M. Kritz, L.L. Lim, H. Zlotnik, (eds.) *International Migration Systems*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992, pp. 150-76.

<sup>5</sup> D.S. Massey, 'Social Structure, Households Strategies, and the Cumulative Causation of Migration', *Population Index* 56, 1990, pp. 3-26.

<sup>6</sup> Hammar, *Democracy and the Nation State*.

<sup>7</sup> Compare: Hammar, *Democracy and the Nation State*.

<sup>8</sup> H. Zlotnik, 'The Theories of International Migration', paper presented at the conference 'Challenges for European Populations', Bari, Italy, 25-27 June 1998.

<sup>9</sup> Compare for example: A. Portes, 'Immigration Theory for a New Century: Some Problems and Opportunities', *International Migration Review* 102, 1997, pp. 799-825; J. Salt, 'Reconceptualising Migration and Migration Space', paper presented at the conference 'Central and Eastern Europe – New Migration Space', Pultusk, Poland, 11-13 December 1997; M.M. Kritz, H. Zlotnik, 'Global Interactions: Migration Systems, Processes, and Policies' in M.M. Kritz, L.L. Lim, H. Zlotnik (eds.), *International Migration Systems*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992, pp. 1-16.

<sup>10</sup> For example: K. Iglicka-Okólska, Analiza zachowań migracyjnych na podstawie wyników badania etnosondażowego migracji zagranicznych w wybranych regionach Polski w latach 1975-1994 (*The Analysis of Migratory Behaviour in Selected Regions of Poland in 1975-1994. The Outcomes of the Ethnosurvey Research*) Warsaw, Szkoła Główna Handlowa, 1998; M.M. Kritz, H. Zlotnik, 'Global Interactions: Migration Systems, Processes, and Policies' in M.M. Kritz, L.L. Lim, H. Zlotnik (eds.), *International Migration Systems*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992, pp. 1-16.

<sup>11</sup> T. Faist, *The Volume and Dynamics of International Migration and Transnational Social Spaces* (hereafter *The Volume and Dynamics*), Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2000; L. Pries, 'New Migration in Transnational Spaces' in L. Pries, (ed.) *Migration and Transnational Social Spaces*, Aldershot, Brookfield, Singapore, Sydney, Ashgate, 1999, pp. 1-35.

<sup>12</sup> Compare: M.S. Granovetter, 'The Strength of Weal Ties', *American Journal of Sociology*, 78, 1973, 6, pp. 1360-1380; D.T. Gurak, Fe. Cases, 'Migration Networks and the Shaping of Migration Systems' in M.M. Kritz, L.L. Lim, H. Zlotnik (eds.), *International Migration Systems*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992, pp. 150-76.

<sup>13</sup> Faist *The Volume and Dynamics*, p. 100.

<sup>14</sup> Usually, approaches devoted to one level of social life include some elements referring to the other levels.

<sup>15</sup> D.S. Massey, 'Why Does Immigration Occur? A Theoretical Synthesis' in Ch.Hirschman, J.DeWind, P.Kainitz *The Handbook of International Migration*, New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 1999, pp. 34-52.

<sup>16</sup> Compare: L.A. Sjasas, 'The costs and returns of human migration', *Journal of Development and Economics*, 14, 1962, pp. 251-59; M.P. Todaro, 'A Model of Labor Migration and Urban Unemployment in Less-Developed Countries', *The American Economy Review*, 59, 1969, pp. 138-48; M.P. Todaro, L. Maruszko, 'Illegal Migration and U.S. Immigration Reform: a Conceptual Framework', *Population and Development Review* 13, 1987, pp. 101-35.

<sup>17</sup> G. Borjas, *Friends or Strangers: the Impact of Immigrants in the U.S. Economy* New York, Oxford, University Press, 1990.

- <sup>18</sup> Work productivity is defined an average output (of work) in one unit of time
- <sup>19</sup> The prospective earnings in the destination country are multiplied by the probability of obtaining a job there. This calculation represents 'expected destination earnings'. Afterwards, the costs of migration and 'expected destination earnings are subtracted from the expected earnings in the country of origin (also multiplied by the probability of employment).
- <sup>20</sup> D.S. Massey, J. Arango, A. Hugo, A. Kouaouci, A. Pellegrino, J.E. Taylor, 'Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal', *Population and Development Review*, 19, 1993, 3, pp. 431-66.
- <sup>21</sup> G. Borjas, *Friends or Strangers: the Impact of Immigrants in the U.S. Economy* New York, Oxford, University Press, 1990.
- <sup>22</sup> O. Stark, D.E. Bloom, 'The New Economics of Labour Migration', *American Economic Review*, 75, 1985, pp. 1-14.
- <sup>23</sup> According to new economics of migration, migration also may have a positive impact on local development when a significant part of migrant remittances is invested in the community of migrants' origin.
- <sup>24</sup> G.F. De Jong, J.T. Fawcett, 'Motivations for Migration: an Assessment and a Value-Expectancy Research Model' (hereafter 'Value-Expectancy Research Model') in G.F. De Jong, R.W. Gardner (eds.), *Migration Decision Making. Multidisciplinary Approaches to Microlevel Studies in Developed Countries* New York, Oxford, Toronto, Sydney, Paris, Frankfurt, Pergamon Press, 1981, pp. 13-58.
- <sup>25</sup> De Jong, Fawcett 'Value Expectancy Research Model', p. 49.
- <sup>26</sup> *ibid.* p. 47.
- <sup>27</sup> *ibid.* p. 56.
- <sup>28</sup> Compare also: Faist *The Volume and Dynamics*; J. Wolpert, 'Behavioural Aspects of the Decision to Migrate' *Papers and Proceedings of the Regional Science Association*, 15, pp. 159-69.
- <sup>29</sup> Term 'awareness space' refers to 'those places to which the potential migrant has knowledge about through direct contact, through friends and relatives, the mass media, or links through intermediary agencies such as employment services. In most cases the awareness space includes only a small subset of the total sum of opportunities which are available', Faist *The Volume and Dynamics*, p. 43.
- <sup>30</sup> It is assumed in the V-E model, that individuals make their cost-benefit calculations in relation to various localities separately so as to choose the most satisfactory option – move or stay – and, while deciding to migrate, the most satisfactory country of the destination.
- <sup>31</sup> J.M. Beshers, *Population Processes in Social Systems* New York, The Free Press, 1967.
- <sup>32</sup> J.M. Beshers, *Population Processes in Social Systems* New York, The Free Press, 1967.
- <sup>33</sup> *ibid.* p. 79.
- <sup>34</sup> M.S. Granovetter, 'The Strength of Weal Ties', *American Journal of Sociology*, 78, 1973, 6, pp. 1360-80; C.H. White, S.A. Boorman, R.L. Breiger, 'Social Structure from Multiple Networks. I. Blockmodels of Roles and Positions', *American Journal of Sociology*, 81, 1976, 4, pp. 730-80.
- <sup>35</sup> J. Goss, B. Lindquist, 'Conceptualizing International Labor Migration: a Structuration Perspective' (hereafter 'Structuration Perspective'), *International Migration Review*, 29, 1995, 2, pp. 317-53 (p.331).
- <sup>36</sup> For example: D.T. Gurak, Fe. Cases, 'Migration Networks and the Shaping of Migration Systems' in M.M. Kritz, L.L. Lim, H. Zlotnik (eds.), *International Migration Systems*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992, pp. 150-76; K. Espinosa, D.S. Massey, 'Undocumented Migration the Quantity and Quality of Social Capital' in L. Pries, (ed.) *Migration and Transnational Social Spaces*, Aldershot, Brookfield, Singapore, Sydney, Ashgate, 1999, pp. 106-37; Ch. Tilly, C.H. Brown, 'On Uprooting, Kinship, and the Auspices of Migration', *International Migration Review*, 8, 1967, 2, pp. 139-64; J.T. Fawcett, 'Networks, Linkages, and Migration Systems', *International Migration Review*, 23, 1989, 3, pp. 671-80.
- <sup>37</sup> J.S. Coleman, 'Social Capital in a the Creation of Human Capital', *American Journal of Sociology*, 94, 1988, pp. S95-S120.
- <sup>38</sup> P. Bourdieu, L.J.D. Wacquant, *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, Cambridge, Oxford, Polity Press, 1992, p. 119.
- <sup>39</sup> If person A is in the relationship with person B, who possesses a given good, this good will become available to person A. This relates, of course, to goods which may be shared, especially to immaterial ones, like information, support etc.
- <sup>40</sup> A. Portes, J. Sensenbrenner, 'Embeddedness and Immigration: Notes on the Social Determinants of Economic Action', *American Journal of Sociology*, 98, 1993, 6, pp. 1320-51.

- <sup>41</sup> Goss, Lindquist 'Structuration Perspective'.
- <sup>42</sup> D.T. Gurak, Fe. Cases, 'Migration Networks and the Shaping of Migration Systems' in M.M. Kritz, L.L. Lim, H. Zlotnik (eds.), *International Migration Systems*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992, pp. 150-76 (p. 153).
- <sup>43</sup> Compare: H. Zlotnik, 'The Theories of International Migration', paper presented at the conference 'Challenges for European Populations', Bari, Italy, 25-27 June 1998.
- <sup>44</sup> This approach is based on the concept of social structure proposed by Giddens. It pays great attention to the 'duality of structure' conceived as a dialectical process by which the 'structural properties of the social system are both the medium and outcome of the practices they recursively organise' A. Giddens, *The constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration* Cambridge, Polity Press, 1984, p. 25.
- <sup>45</sup> D.S. Massey, 'Why Does Immigration Occur? A Theoretical Synthesis' in Ch.Hirschman, J.DeWind, P.Kainitz *The Handbook of International Migration*, New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 1999, pp. 34-52.
- <sup>46</sup> Goss, Lindquist 'Structuration Perspective', p. 319.
- <sup>47</sup> *ibid.* p. 335.
- <sup>48</sup> M.P. Todaro, 'A Model of Labor Migration and Urban Unemployment in Less-Developed Countries', *The American Economic Review*, 59, 1969, pp. 138-48.
- <sup>49</sup> D.S. Massey, J. Arango, A. Hugo, A. Kouaouci, A. Pellegrino, J.E. Taylor, 'Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal', *Population and Development Review*, 19, 1993, 3, pp. 431-66; H. Zlotnik, 'The Theories of International Migration', paper presented at the conference 'Challenges for European Populations', Bari, Italy, 25-27 June 1998.
- <sup>50</sup> E.M. Petras, 'The Global Labor Market in the Modern World-Economy' in M.M. Kritz, C.B. Keely, S.M. Tomasi (eds.), *Global Trends in Migration. Theory and Research on International Population Movements* Staten Island NY, The Center for Migration Studies, 1981, pp. 44-63; R. Skeldon, *Migration and development: a global perspective* Harlow, Longman, 1997.
- <sup>51</sup> I. Wallerstein, *The Modern World System, Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century* New York, Academic Press, 1974.
- <sup>52</sup> The international trips of employees of big international companies do not imply a change of their place of work, as international movements proceed within the company.
- <sup>53</sup> On these markets international companies also operate.
- <sup>54</sup> Piore *Birds of Passage*.
- <sup>55</sup> Capital, as a productive asset, can be made idle when demand for produced goods decreases, but can not be laid off, whereas labour can be released in such a situation. As owners of capital have to bear the costs of its unemployment, they, whenever possible, seek out the stable proportion of demand and reserve it for the employment of equipment, whereas the variable portion of demand is met by adding labour. Thus capital-intensive methods are used to meet basic demand, and labour-intensive ones are reserved for the seasonal, fluctuating component.
- <sup>56</sup> An increase in wages in the sectors placed at the bottom of the hierarchy would create pressure to increase wages at higher levels of the job hierarchy but would not attract additional workers to the secondary sector of the labour market. Otherwise the socially defined relationship between status and remuneration would be changed.
- <sup>57</sup> G. Myrdal, *Rich Lands and poor* New York, Harper and Row, 1957.
- <sup>58</sup> D.S. Massey, J. Arango, A. Hugo, A. Kouaouci, A. Pellegrino, J.E. Taylor, 'Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal', *Population and Development Review*, 19, 1993, 3, pp. 431-66.
- <sup>59</sup> W.R. Bohning, *The migration of Workers in the United Kingdom and the European Community* London, Oxford University Press, 1972; Piore *Birds of Passage*.
- <sup>60</sup> O. Stark, (ed.), *Research in Human Capital and Development. Migration, Human capital and Development* Greenwich, Conn. JAI Press, 1986; O. Stark, D.E. Bloom, 'The New Economics of Labour Migration', *American Economic Review*, 75, 1985, pp. 1-14.
- <sup>61</sup> The first attempt to explain migration in terms of the systems approach was made by Mobogunje (1970). He argues that rural-urban migration should be studied from a systems perspective in order to capture the spatial impacts and the role of migration in transforming the economic and social structure of both the rural areas where migrants originate and the urban centres that receive them. His approach is perceived to be applicable to international migration studies and its formalisation, as a framework for

analysis, is still in the formative form. Compare: H. Zlotnik, 'The Theories of International Migration', paper presented at the conference 'Challenges for European Populations', Bari, Italy, 25-27 June 1998.

<sup>62</sup> M.M. Kritz, H. Zlotnik, 'Global Interactions: Migration Systems, Processes, and Policies' in M.M. Kritz, L.L. Lim, H. Zlotnik (eds.), *International Migration Systems*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992, pp. 1-16 (pp. 2-3).

<sup>63</sup> M.M. Kritz, H. Zlotnik, 'Global Interactions: Migration Systems, Processes, and Policies' in M.M. Kritz, L.L. Lim, H. Zlotnik (eds.), *International Migration Systems*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992, pp. 1-16 (p.7).

<sup>64</sup> L. Pries, 'New Migration in Transnational Spaces' in L. Pries (ed.), *Migration and Transnational Social Spaces*, Aldershot, Brookfield, Singapore, Sydney, Ashgate, 1999, pp. 1-35 (p.3).

<sup>65</sup> N. Elias, *Was ist Soziologie*, Weinheim, Munich, Juventa Verlag, 1986 from L. Pries, 'New Migration in Transnational Spaces' in L. Pries (ed.), *Migration and Transnational Social Spaces*, Aldershot, Brookfield, Singapore, Sydney, Ashgate, 1999, pp. 1-35.

<sup>66</sup> L. Pries, 'New Migration in Transnational Spaces' in L. Pries (ed.), *Migration and Transnational Social Spaces*, Aldershot, Brookfield, Singapore, Sydney, Ashgate, 1999, pp. 1-35 (p.3).

<sup>67</sup> Faist *The Volume and Dynamics*, p 199.

<sup>68</sup> *ibid.* p. 291.

<sup>69</sup> *ibid.* pp. 101-02.

<sup>70</sup> *ibid.* pp. 104-11.

<sup>71</sup> P.M. Blau, *On the Nature of Organisations*, New York, Wiley, 1974, p.6 from Faist *The Volume and Dynamics*, p. 105.

<sup>72</sup> Faist *The Volume and Dynamics*, p. 146.

<sup>73</sup> Rouse, R. 'Mexican Migration and the Social Space of Post-modernism', *Diaspora*, 1, 1991, 1, pp. 8-23 from Faist *The Volume and Dynamics*, p. 206.

<sup>74</sup> Compare: Faist *The Volume and Dynamics*.

<sup>75</sup> Compare also: A. Portes, J. Sensenbrenner, 'Embeddedness and Immigration: Notes on the Social Determinants of Economic Action', *American Journal of Sociology*, 98, 1993, 6, pp. 1320-51.

<sup>76</sup> *ibid.* p. 101.

<sup>77</sup> *ibid.* p. 102.

<sup>78</sup> Faist *The Volume and Dynamics*, p. 102; compare also: P. Bourdieu, 'The Forms of Capital' in J.G. Richardson, (ed.) *Handbook of Theory and Research for Sociology of Education*, New York, Westport CT, Greenwood Press, 1986; J.S. Coleman, *Foundations of Social Theory*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1994; R. Putnam, R. Leonard, R.Y. Nanetti, *Making Democracy Work. Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*, Princetown NJ, Chichester, Princetown University Press, 1993.

<sup>79</sup> Faist *The Volume and Dynamics*, pp. 197-99.

<sup>80</sup> Compare also: De Jong, Fawcett 'Value Expectancy Research Model'.

<sup>81</sup> Compare: R.E. Bilborrow, G. Hugo, A.S. Oberai, H. Zlotnik, *International Migration Statistics*, Geneva, Labour Office, 1997.

<sup>82</sup> Compare: W. Zelinski, 'The Hypothesis of the Mobility Transition', *The Geographical Review* 61, 1971, 2, pp. 217-49.

<sup>83</sup> Compare: W. Zelinski, 'The Hypothesis of the Mobility Transition', *The Geographical Review* 61, 1971, 2, pp. 217-49.

<sup>84</sup> Compare: R.E. Bilborrow, G. Hugo, A.S. Oberai, H. Zlotnik, *International Migration Statistics*, Geneva, Labour Office, 1997.

<sup>85</sup> P. Bourdieu, 'The Forms of Capital' in J.G. Richardson, (ed.) *Handbook of Theory and Research for Sociology of Education*, New York, Westport CT, Greenwood Press, 1986.

<sup>86</sup> De Jong, Fawcett 'Value Expectancy Research Model'.

<sup>87</sup> A. Giddens, *Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure and Contradiction in Social Analysis* London, Macmillan, 1979, p. 117.

<sup>88</sup> P. Bourdieu, L.J.D. Wacquant, *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, Cambridge, Oxford, Polity Press, 1992, p. 97.

- <sup>89</sup> W.H. Sewell, 'A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation', *American Journal of Sociology*, 98, 1992, 1, pp. 1-27 (p.20).
- <sup>90</sup> Faist *The Volume and Dynamics*.
- <sup>91</sup> Structure and content of social ties within a given household also refers to meso-level.
- <sup>92</sup> *ibid.* p.100.
- <sup>93</sup> Compare: P. Bourdieu, 'The Forms of Capital' in J.G. Richardson, (ed.) *Handbook of Theory and Research for Sociology of Education*, New York, Westport CT, Greenwood Press, 1986.
- <sup>94</sup> Faist *The Volume and Dynamics*, p.103.
- <sup>95</sup> A. Giddens, *Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure and Contradiction in Social Analysis* London, Macmillan, 1979.
- <sup>96</sup> This concept of structure is not contradictory to the Bourdieu's concepts of capital, social space and field. According to Bourdieu 'The structure of the field [...] is defined by the structure of the distribution of the specific forms of capital that are active in it means that when my knowledge of forms of capital is sound I can differentiate everything that there is to differentiate.'; P. Bourdieu, L.J.D. Wacquant, *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, Cambridge, Oxford, Polity Press, 1992, p. 108.
- <sup>97</sup> A. Giddens, *The constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration* Cambridge, Polity Press, 1984, p. 377 from W.H. Sewell, 'A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation', *American Journal of Sociology*, 98, 1992, 1, pp. 1-27.
- <sup>98</sup> A. Giddens, *Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure and Contradiction in Social Analysis* London, Macmillan, 1979, p. 71.
- <sup>99</sup> Compare: De Jong, Fawcett 'Value Expectancy Research Model'.
- <sup>100</sup> M.M. Kritz, H. Zlotnik, 'Global Interactions: Migration Systems, Processes, and Policies' in M.M. Kritz, L.L. Lim, H. Zlotnik (eds.), *International Migration Systems*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992, pp. 1-16.
- <sup>101</sup> G. Kolankiewicz, *Towards a Sociology of the Transition* Leicestershire, School of Slavonic and East European Studies University College London, 2000.
- <sup>102</sup> F. Fukuyama, *The Great Disruption; Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order* Profile Books, 1999, p.16 from G. Kolankiewicz, *Towards a Sociology of the Transition* Leicestershire, School of Slavonic and East European Studies University College London, 2000, p. 45.
- <sup>103</sup> F. Fukuyama, Trust. *The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity*, London, Penguin, 1995.
- <sup>104</sup> G. Malmberg, 'Time and Space in International Migration' in T. Hammar, G. Brochman, K. Tamas, T. Faist *International Migration, Immobility and Development* Oxford, New York, Berg, 1997, pp. 21-48.
- <sup>105</sup> M.M. Kritz, H. Zlotnik, 'Global Interactions: Migration Systems, Processes, and Policies' in M.M. Kritz, L.L. Lim, H. Zlotnik (eds.), *International Migration Systems*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992, pp. 1-16.
- <sup>106</sup> De Jong, Fawcett 'Value Expectancy Research Model', p. 53.
- <sup>107</sup> The fact that a given social space forms a transnational space is not the necessary condition for existence of migrant networks within it.
- <sup>108</sup> Pioneer migrants are people who take up trips to the destination country which is unexplored by other migrants. They usually do that without any help of migrant networks and with little information about this destination country.
- <sup>109</sup> Compare: Goss, Lindquist 'Structuration Perspective'.
- <sup>110</sup> De Jong, Fawcett 'Value Expectancy Research Model'.
- <sup>111</sup> A.R. Zolberg, 'International Migration in Political Perspective' in M.M. Kritz, C.B. Keely, S.M. Tomasi (eds.), *Global Trends in Migration. Theory and Research on International Population Movements*, Staten Island NY, The Centre for Migration Studies, 1981, pp. 3-27.
- <sup>112</sup> L.R. Chavez, *Shadowed Lives. Undocumented Immigrants in American Society*, Orlando FL, Hoarcourt Brace Jovanovich College Publishers, 1992.
- <sup>113</sup> Compare also: J.M. Beshers, *Population Processes in Social Systems* New York, The Free Press, 1967.
- <sup>114</sup> Faist *The Volume and Dynamics*, p. 258.
- <sup>115</sup> Faist *The Volume and Dynamics*.
- <sup>116</sup> *ibid.* p. 260.

<sup>117</sup> *ibid.* p. 207.

<sup>118</sup> Compare: D. Joly, 'Between Exile and Ethnicity', paper presented at the conference 'International Migration Towards the New Millennium. Global and Regional Perspectives', Warwick, United Kingdom, 16-18 September 1999; Faist *The Volume and Dynamics*.

<sup>119</sup> A.H. Richmond, 'Sociology of Migration in Industrial and Post-Industrial Societies' in J.A. Jackson (ed.), *Migration*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1969, pp. 238-81.

<sup>120</sup> Compare: W.H. Sewell, 'A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation', *American Journal of Sociology*, 98, 1992, 1, pp. 1-27.

<sup>121</sup> M. Cadwallader, *Migration and Residential Mobility. Macro and Micro Approaches*, Madison WI, London, The University of Wisconsin Press, 1992.

<sup>122</sup> Compare: De Jong, Fawcett 'Value Expectancy Research Model'.

<sup>123</sup> Compare: D.S. Massey 'Why Does Immigration Occur? A Theoretical Synthesis' in Ch.Hirschman, J.DeWind, P.Kainitz *The Handbook of International Migration*, New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 1999, pp. 34-52.

<sup>124</sup> Faist *The Volume and Dynamics*, p. 150.

<sup>125</sup> M. Cadwallader, *Migration and Residential Mobility. Macro and Micro Approaches*, Madison WI, London, The University of Wisconsin Press, 1992; Piore *Birds of Passage*.

<sup>126</sup> L. Ackers, *Shifting spaces. Women, Citizenship and Migration within the European Union*, Bristol, The Policy Press, 2000.

<sup>127</sup> As presented in the one-trip model in Chapter 2.

<sup>128</sup> Compare: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *Transition Report Update*, London, 2001.

<sup>129</sup> M.M. Kritz, H. Zlotnik, 'Global Interactions: Migration Systems, Processes, and Policies' in M.M. Kritz, L.L. Lim, H. Zlotnik, (eds.), *International Migration Systems*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992, pp. 1-16.

<sup>130</sup> As it was, for example, in migration from Turkey to Germany, which developed in the late 1950s, as a result of policy of German authorities. Because of the shortages of unskilled low-paid workers on the German labour market, foreigners, especially Turks, were encouraged to come to Germany to do low-paid simple jobs. They were granted work permits for a limited period of time. See for example: U.Herbert, *A History of Foreign Labor in Germany, 1880-1980*, An Arbor MI, The University of Michigan Press, 1990.

<sup>131</sup> M. Okólski, 'Najnowszy ruch wędrowny z Ukrainy do Polski. Charakterystyka strumieni, cech migrantów i ich okoliczności pobytu w Polsce' (hereafter 'Najnowszy ruch wędrowny'), *Migration series*, 14, 1997, Warsaw, ISS UW.

<sup>132</sup> L.R. Chavez, *Shadowed Lives. Undocumented Immigrants in American Society*, Orlando FL, Hoarcourt Brace Jovanovich College Publishers, 1992.

<sup>133</sup> See: Faist, *The Volume and Dynamics*.

<sup>134</sup> *ibid.* p. 207.

<sup>135</sup> Faist, *The Volume and Dynamics*.

<sup>136</sup> Faist, *The Volume and Dynamics*.

<sup>137</sup> For a description of the 'old' Ukrainian minority in Poland see: G. Babiński, Pogranicze polsko-ukraińskie (*The Polish-Ukrainian borderland*), Kraków, Zakład Wydawniczy 'Nomos', 1997; and R. Żerelik, 'Mniejszość ukraińska w Polsce po II wojnie światowej' ('The Ukrainian Minority in Poland after the Second World War') in Z. Kurcz, (ed.) *Mniejszości narodowe w Polsce (National Minorities in Poland)*, Wrocław, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 1997, pp. 51-62.

<sup>138</sup> R. Żerelik, 'Mniejszość ukraińska w Polsce po II wojnie' in Z. Kurcz (ed.), *Mniejszości narodowe w Polsce* Wrocław, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 1997, pp. 51-62.

<sup>139</sup> The Ukrainian minority in Poland had no political power in either Poland or Ukraine. Opportunities for travel between Ukraine and Poland were usually limited to particular official trips – youth exchange, official meetings etc.

<sup>140</sup> L. Ackers, *Shifting spaces. Women, Citizenship and Migration within the European Union*, Bristol, The Policy Press, 2000.

<sup>141</sup> T. Frejka, M. Okólski, K. Sword, (eds.) *In-depth Studies on Migration in Central and Eastern Europe: the case of Ukraine* (hereafter *Studies on Migration: the case of Ukraine*) New York, United Nations, 1999.

<sup>142</sup> Frejka, Okólski, Sword, *Studies on Migration: the case of Ukraine*.

<sup>143</sup> Compare: S. Castles, 'The Guests who Stayed – The Debate on "Foreign Policy" in the German Federal Republic', *International Migration Review*, 19, 1985, 3, pp. 517-34; and Hammar, *Democracy and the Nation State*.

<sup>144</sup> Piore, *Birds of Passage*.

<sup>145</sup> M. Cadwallader, *Migration and Residential Mobility. Macro and Micro Approaches*, Madison WI, London, The University of Wisconsin Press, 1992.

<sup>146</sup> Piore, *Birds of Passage*.

<sup>147</sup> Compare: A. Górný, E. Kępińska, 'Life between Two Countries – the Case of Polish-Ukrainian Marriages', *International Journal of Sociology* forthcoming.

<sup>148</sup> Compare: L.R. Chavez, *Shadowed Lives. Undocumented Immigrants in American Society*, Orlando FL, Hoarcourt Brace Jovanovich College Publishers, 1992; P.R. Pessar, 'Dominican International Migration: The Role of Households and Social Networks' in R.W. Palmer, (ed.) *In Search of a Better Life. Perspectives on Migration from the Caribbean*, New York, Westport CT, London, Praeger, 1990, pp. 91-114.

<sup>149</sup> L.R. Chavez, *Shadowed Lives. Undocumented Immigrants in American Society*, Orlando FL, Hoarcourt Brace Jovanovich College Publishers, 1992.

<sup>150</sup> Compare: F.J. Davis, B.S. Heyl, 'Turkish Women and Guestworker Migration to West Germany' in R.J. Simon, C.B. Brettell, (eds.) *International Migration. The Female Experience*, Totowa NJ, Rowman & Allanheld Publishers, 1986, pp. 178-96; Hammar, *Democracy and the Nation State*.

<sup>151</sup> They were carried out, for example, in Italy. Compare for example: S. Palida, G. Pettli, P. Ruspini, 'Easy Scapegoats: Sans-Papiers Immigrants in Europe', unpublished report, University of Trieste; Cariplo Foundation – I.S.MU, Milan, 2000.

<sup>152</sup> Migrants have to have a permanent legal source of income and apartment where they are able to accommodate their family. The fact that they possess their own apartment is a great advantage.

<sup>153</sup> Okólski, 'Najnowszy ruch wędrowniczy'.

<sup>154</sup> L. Simons, 'Mail Order Brides: The Legal Framework and Possibilities for Change' (hereafter 'Mail Order Brides') in G.A. Kelson, D.L. DeLaet, (eds.) *Gender and Immigration*, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, London, Macmillan Press LTD, 1999, pp. 127-43.

<sup>155</sup> D.L. DeLaet, 'Introduction: The Invisibility of Women in Scholarship on International Migration' (hereafter 'The Invisibility of Women') in G.A. Kelson, D.L. DeLaet, (eds.) *Gender and Immigration*, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, London, Macmillan Press LTD, 1999, pp. 1-17.

<sup>156</sup> Simons, 'Mail Order Brides', p. 131.

<sup>157</sup> *ibid.* p. 131.

<sup>158</sup> Simons, 'Mail Order Brides'.

<sup>159</sup> K. Igllicka, 'The Economics of Petty Trade on the Eastern Polish Border' in K. Igllicka, K. Sword, (eds.) *The Challenge of East-West Migration for Poland*, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, London, Macmillan Press LTD, 1999, pp. 120-44.

<sup>160</sup> Compare: N. Rimashevskaja, 'Perestroika and the Status of Women in the Soviet Union' in S. Rai, H. Pilkington, A. Phizacklea *Women in the Face of Change. The Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and China*, London, New York, Routledge, 1992, pp. 11-19.

<sup>161</sup> P. Boyle, K. Halfacree, *Migration and Gender in Developed World*, London, New York, Routledge, 1999.

<sup>162</sup> P. Boyle, K. Halfacree, *Migration and Gender in Developed World*, London, New York, Routledge, 1999.

<sup>163</sup> The administrative reform carried out in Poland in 1997, which changed borders of voivodeships in Poland, makes this part of the description problematic. In Chapters 5 and 7 I refer to the Warsaw voivodeship, whereas in Chapter 6 to the mazowieckie voivodeship.

<sup>164</sup> The project 'The role of social, economic and political networks in settlement migration to Poland: the case of Ukrainian migrants' was carried out for my PhD dissertation in 1998-2000.



<sup>165</sup> R.K. Yin, 'The Case Study Method as a Tool for Doing Evaluation' *Current Sociology*, 40, 1992, 1, pp. 121-37 (p.123).

<sup>166</sup> Compare: R.K. Yin, 'The Case Study Method as a Tool for Doing Evaluation' *Current Sociology*, 40, 1992, 1, pp. 121-37.

<sup>167</sup> T. Hammar, *Democracy and the Nation State* (hereafter *Democracy and the Nation State*), Aldershot, Brookfield IL, Hong Kong, Singapore, Sydney, Avebury, 1990.

<sup>168</sup> In fact, some professions are unavailable to denizens in Poland. Civil servants and lawyers, but also for example doctors can acquire an adequate work permit only for a limited period of time.

<sup>169</sup> This was possible as each person included in the database has its unique number.

<sup>170</sup> The Ministry produces only information about volumes and nationality structures of foreigners granted Permanent or Temporary Residence Permits each given period (for example, year) in various voivodeships in Poland.

<sup>171</sup> R.E. Bilborrow, G. Hugo, A.S. Oberai, H. Zlotnik, *International Migration Statistics*, Geneva, Labour Office, 1997.

<sup>172</sup> Hammar, *Democracy and the Nation State*.

<sup>173</sup> In the Warsaw voivodeship, applications are registered according to the dates of their submission.

<sup>174</sup> Data on the 'marriage' procedure describe only past situation, as since the beginning of 1999 the 'marriage' procedure has changed (see Appendix I).

<sup>175</sup> M. Okólski, 'Najnowszy ruch wędrowniczy z Ukrainy do Polski. Charakterystyka strumieni, cech migrantów i ich okoliczności pobytu w Polsce' ('Recent Migration from Ukraine to Poland. Characteristics of Inflows, Migrants and their Residence in Poland') *Migration series*, 14, Warsaw, ISS UW, 1997.

<sup>176</sup> It should be noted that foreign students constitute an important group of potential settlement migrants. This is due to the fact that they usually stay a considerable period of time in the destination country. Moreover, during studies young people develop their professional and personal contacts which are likely to influence their further decisions about the place of their settlement. In particular, young foreign students may meet their prospective partners in the destination country which may easily lead to the settlement in this country.

<sup>177</sup> One marriage, from the group, was found thanks to personal contacts of researchers. It was not included in the database as it was contracted in Ukraine (in 1990).

<sup>178</sup> Compare for example: H.R. Bernard *Research Methods in Anthropology. Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*, London, New Delhi, Sage Publications, 1994

<sup>179</sup> They lasted from forty-five minutes to two hours.

<sup>180</sup> Researchers were me and my two colleagues from the Centre of Migration Research, Institute for Social Studies, University of Warsaw.

<sup>181</sup> Compare for example: M.S. Feldman, 'Strategies for interpreting qualitative data', *Qualitative Research Methods Series*, Thousands Oaks, London, New Delhi, Sage Publications, 1995

<sup>182</sup> Compare also: R. Antoniewski, A. Górny, 'Obserwacja uczestnicząca' in R. Antoniewski, A. Górny, I. Koryś, A. Kosmala, 'Z zastosowań technik jakościowych w badaniach nad migracjami: doświadczenia OBM', *Migration series*, 38, Warsaw, ISS UW, 2001, pp. 46-52.

<sup>183</sup> For more detailed justification of the method used in the described participant observation see: R. Antoniewski, A. Górny, 'Obserwacja uczestnicząca' ('Participant observation') in R. Antoniewski, A. Górny, I. Koryś, A. Kosmala, 'Z zastosowań technik jakościowych w badaniach nad migracjami: doświadczenia OBM' ('On Application of Qualitative Methods in Migration Studies: The CMR Experience'), *Migration series*, 38, Warsaw, ISS UW, 2001, pp. 46-52.

<sup>184</sup> The choice of language of an interview with a foreigner is an important issue in studies of migration. When an interviewee and a researcher are not fluent in the same language, there are two options. One is that an interview is conducted in either a respondent's or a researcher's language. Then, one party has problems in expressing himself/herself, which influences a dynamics of the conversation and hinders mutual understanding. The second option is the use of an interpreter, but then some mistranslation may occur especially when an interview is devoted to complicated issues such as: feelings, attitudes etc. See also for example: Edwards.R. 'A critical examination of the use of interpreters in the qualitative research process', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 24, 1998, 1, pp. 197-208

<sup>185</sup> Compare also A. Kosmala, 'Wywiad zogniskowany' ('Focus group') in R. Antoniewski, A. Górny, I. Koryś, A. Kosmala, 'Z zastosowań technik jakościowych w badaniach nad migracjami: doświadczenia OBM' *Migration series*, 38, Warsaw, ISS UW, 2001, pp. 35-45.

<sup>186</sup> H. Zlotnik, 'Empirical Identification of International Migration Systems' in M.M. Kritz, L.L. Lim, H. Zlotnik (eds.), *International Migration Systems*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992, pp. 19-40.

<sup>187</sup> H. Zlotnik, for example, was trying to identify migration systems only on the basis of information about spatial movements between given countries and she did not refer to any other characteristic of migration system. Compare: H. Zlotnik, 'Empirical Identification of International Migration Systems' in M.M. Kritz, L.L. Lim, H. Zlotnik (eds.), *International Migration Systems*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992, pp. 19-40.

<sup>188</sup> *ibid.* p. 19.

<sup>189</sup> Faist, *The Volume and Dynamics*.

<sup>190</sup> Frejka, Okólski, Sword, *Studies on Migration: the Case of Ukraine*, p.12.

<sup>191</sup> Compare: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *Transition Report Update*, London, 2001.

<sup>192</sup> Data provided by the National Bank of Ukraine.

<sup>193</sup> Industrial production fell by: 6% in 1992, 8% in 1993, 27% in 1994, 12% in 1995, 5% in 1996, 0.3% in 1997 and 1% in 1998.

<sup>194</sup> Data provided by the National Bank of Ukraine.

<sup>195</sup> Data provided by the Polish Main Statistical Office.

<sup>196</sup> The two indicators presented, i.e. industrial production in Ukraine and the value of sold Polish production, are not fully comparable. However, data on the overall Polish industrial production (not only sold) are not provided by. Nevertheless, presented indicators reflect trends in the industrial production in Ukraine and Poland, which show decrease and increase, respectively.

<sup>197</sup> The exact increases in sold Polish production (in constant prices) were as follows: 6% in 1993, 12% in 1994, 10% in 1995, 8% in 1996, 12% in 1997, 4% in 1998 and 4% in 1999.

<sup>198</sup> Compare: O. Stark, J.E. Taylor, 'Relative Deprivation and International Migration', *Demography* 26, 1989, pp. 1-14.

<sup>199</sup> Data provided by the National Bank of Ukraine.

<sup>200</sup> In 1999, real wages in the official sector of Ukrainian economy rose by 3% when compared with 1998 (the National Bank of Ukraine).

<sup>201</sup> Frejka, Okólski, Sword, *Studies on Migration: the Case of Ukraine*.

<sup>202</sup> It is, usually, one type of a good, e.g. twenty kilos of sugar. It should be also noted that the value of these goods is often calculated above market prices. Therefore, according to market prices (on bazaars) these goods have lower value than an adequate income. This is the information from an in-depth interview (27MW, compare Appendix III).

<sup>203</sup> Consumer price index rose annually by: 35% in 1993, 32% in 1994, 28% in 1995, 20% in 1996, 15% in 1997 and 12% in 1998, whereas average gross nominal wages and salaries by: 34%, 34%, 31%, 26%, 22% and 16%, respectively (the Polish Main Statistical Office).

<sup>204</sup> European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *Transition Report 1999. Ten Years of Transition*, London, 1999.

<sup>205</sup> The poverty headcount is defined as the number of people falling below the poverty line divided by the total population. International poverty line is four USD per day per person measured at purchasing power parity. Compare: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *Transition Report 1999. Ten Years of Transition*, London, 1999.

<sup>206</sup> These outcomes are based on surveys conducted on representative samples of Ukrainians each year from 1994 onwards within the project 'Ukrainian Society to the Gateway to the 21<sup>st</sup> Century' carried out by Ukrainian National Academy of Science. Compare: N. Panina, E. Golovakha, *Tendencies in the Development of Ukrainian Society (1994-1998) Sociological Indicators*, Kiev, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, 1999.

<sup>207</sup> It was exactly 72.8% in 1994 and 74.1% in 1998.

<sup>208</sup> E. Golovakha, 'Living Standards and Economic Attitudes of the Population', *International Journal of Sociology*, 29, 1999, 3, pp. 31-48.

- <sup>209</sup> This was estimated based on equipment and material belongings of Ukrainian respondents (actual and anticipated).
- <sup>210</sup> Compare for example: M.P. Todaro, 'A Model of Labor Migration and Urban Unemployment in Less-Developed Countries', *The American Economy Review*, 59, 1969, pp. 138-48.
- <sup>211</sup> Data provided by National Bank of Ukraine.
- <sup>212</sup> Frejka, Okólski, Sword, *Studies on Migration: the Case of Ukraine*, p.13.
- <sup>213</sup> *ibid.* p.14.
- <sup>214</sup> Compare: A. Evans, 'Nationality Law and European Integration' *European Law Review*, 16, 1991, 3, pp. 190-215.
- <sup>215</sup> N. Panina, E. Golovakha, *Tendencies in the Development of Ukrainian Society (1994-1998) Sociological Indicators*, Kiev, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, 1999.
- <sup>216</sup> It was exactly: 69.2% in 1995, 58.4 in 1996, 69.7% in 1997 and 62.8% in 1998.
- <sup>217</sup> The exact percentages were: 68.5% in 1995 and 68.4% in 1997.
- <sup>218</sup> Compare: S. Castles, 'The Guests who Stayed – The Debate on "Foreign Policy" in the German Federal Republic', *International Migration Review*, 19, 1985, 3, pp. 517-34.
- <sup>219</sup> G. Babiński, *Pogranicze polsko-ukraińskie*, Kraków, Zakład Wydawniczy 'Nomos', 1997.
- <sup>220</sup> G. Babiński, *Pogranicze polsko-ukraińskie*, Kraków, Zakład Wydawniczy 'Nomos', 1997.
- <sup>221</sup> Those wars brought the creation of only a small Ukrainian state, which was a satellite of Russia.
- <sup>222</sup> Information about the Greek Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church is based not only on the literature, but also on data collected during interviews with the priests from both churches in Warsaw (EW5, EW8; see Appendix V).
- <sup>223</sup> In fact, before 1648, there was no Ukrainian border, but there were people who, because of their identities, were ancestors of present Ukrainians.
- <sup>224</sup> R. Żerelik, 'Mniejszość ukraińska w Polsce po II wojnie światowej' in Z. Kurcz (ed.), *Mniejszości narodowe w Polsce*, Wrocław, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 1997, pp. 51-62; O. Subtelny, *Ukraine: a history* Toronto, Buffalo, London, University of Toronto Press, 1994.
- <sup>225</sup> This information is based on a national census carried out in Ukraine in 1989. It should, however, be noted that authors I quote say that this number is underestimated. See: P. Eberhardt, *Przemiany ludnościowe na Ukrainie XX wieku (Demographic Changes in Ukraine in XX Century)*, Warsaw, Biblioteka 'Obozu', 1994; T.A. Olszański, *Historia Ukrainy XX w (History of Ukraine - XX Century)* Warsaw, Oficyna Wydawnicza VOLUMEN, 1993.
- <sup>226</sup> The overall information about the Ukrainian Association in Poland is from an interview with the president of this Association (EW1; see Appendix V).
- <sup>227</sup> W. Gill, N. Gill, *Stosunki Polski z Ukrainą w latach 1989-1993 (Polish-Ukrainian Relations in 1989-1993)* Toruń, Drukarnia Marszałek, 1994.
- <sup>228</sup> Information acquired from the president of the Ukrainian Association in Poland (EW1, see Appendix V).
- <sup>229</sup> W. Gill, N. Gill, *Stosunki Polski z Ukrainą w latach 1989-1993*, Toruń, Drukarnia Marszałek, 1994.
- <sup>230</sup> W. Połahało, 'Strategiczne partnerstwo Ukrainy i Polski' ('Strategic Partnership of Poland and Ukraine') in J. Kozakiewicz (ed.), *Stosunki Polsko-Ukraińskie (The Polish-Ukrainian Relations)*, Kraków, Fundacja 'Międzynarodowe Centrum Rozwoju Demokracji', 1998, pp. 81-94.
- <sup>231</sup> *ibid.* p. 85.
- <sup>232</sup> By October 1999, Poland had signed such agreements also with Russia (15.03.94), Lithuania (26.09.94) and Belarus (27.09.95).
- <sup>233</sup> Until 30.04.2000 such agreements had been signed only with Lithuania and Moldova.
- <sup>234</sup> W. Gill, N. Gill, *Stosunki Polski z Ukrainą w latach 1989-1993*, Toruń, Drukarnia Marszałek, 1994.
- <sup>235</sup> W. Gill, N. Gill, *Stosunki Polski z Ukrainą w latach 1989-1993*, Toruń, Drukarnia Marszałek, 1994; A. Mync R. Szul, *Rola granicy i współpracy transgranicznej w rozwoju regionalnym i lokalnym, (The Role of Border and of Trans-border Co-operation in Regional and Local Development)*, Warsaw, Wydawnictwo Instytut Rozwoju Regionalnego i Lokalnego Uniwersytet Warszawski, 1999.
- <sup>236</sup> W. Gill, N. Gill, *Stosunki Polski z Ukrainą w latach 1989-1993*, Toruń, Drukarnia Marszałek, 1994.
- <sup>237</sup> W. Gill, N. Gill, *Stosunki Polski z Ukrainą w latach 1989-1993*, Toruń, Drukarnia Marszałek, 1994.

<sup>238</sup> In general, international economic co-operation may proceed on the basis of: (1) international agreements; (2) economic co-operation between various regions in Poland and Ukraine; (3) co-operation within various branches of industry located in Poland and Ukraine. For a description of Polish-Ukrainian interregional co-operation see: A. Skrzydło, 'Euroregiony w polsko-ukraińskiej współpracy transgranicznej' (Euroregions in the Polish-Ukrainian Trans-border Co-operation') in M. Całka (ed.), Polska i Ukraina w latach dziewięćdziesiątych (*Poland and Ukraine in 1990s*), Warsaw, Centrum Stosunków Międzynarodowych Instytutu Spraw Publicznych, 1997, pp. 43-56.

<sup>239</sup> J. Matusz, 'Najtrudniej pokonać biurokrację' ('The Most Difficult is to Fight of the Biurocracy') *Rzeczpospolita*, 9 October 2000, p. B4.

<sup>240</sup> A. Mync R. Szul, Rola granicy i współpracy transgranicznej w rozwoju regionalnym i lokalnym, Warsaw, Wydawnictwo Instytut Rozwoju Regionalnego i Lokalnego Uniwersytet Warszawski, 1999.

<sup>241</sup> A. Mync R. Szul, Rola granicy i współpracy transgranicznej w rozwoju regionalnym i lokalnym, Warsaw, Wydawnictwo Instytut Rozwoju Regionalnego i Lokalnego Uniwersytet Warszawski, 1999.

<sup>242</sup> See: M. Całka, 'Państwo szarej strefy – refleksje politologów ukraińskich' ('The State of the Underground Economy – Comments of Ukrainian Political Scientists') in M. Całka (ed.), Polska i Ukraina w latach dziewięćdziesiątych (*Poland and Ukraine in 1990s*), Warsaw, Centrum Stosunków Międzynarodowych Instytutu Spraw Publicznych, 1997, pp. 95-105.

<sup>243</sup> Compare: A. Mync R. Szul, Rola granicy i współpracy transgranicznej w rozwoju regionalnym i lokalnym, Warsaw, Wydawnictwo Instytut Rozwoju Regionalnego i Lokalnego Uniwersytet Warszawski, 1999.

<sup>244</sup> Frejka, Okólski, Sword, *Studies on Migration: the Case of Ukraine*, p.1.

<sup>245</sup> Southern Ukraine, Bessarabian lands, the North Caucasus, Lower Volga, the Urals and Northern Kazakhstan.

<sup>246</sup> O. Subtelny, *Ukraine: a history* Toronto, Buffalo, London, University of Toronto Press, 1994.

<sup>247</sup> Frejka, Okólski, Sword, *Studies on Migration: the Case of Ukraine*.

<sup>248</sup> P. Eberhardt, Przemiany ludnościowe na Ukrainie XX wieku, Warsaw, Biblioteka 'Obozu', 1994.

<sup>249</sup> Frejka, Okólski, Sword, *Studies on Migration: the Case of Ukraine*.

<sup>250</sup> Okólski, 'Najnowszy ruch wędrownkowy'.

<sup>251</sup> A. Shlepakov, O. Malinowska, O. Pinchuk, Emigratsiya neselelnya Ukrainy: sotsial'no-ekonomichni aspekty ta mozhyvi naslidki, (*The Emigration of Ukraine's Population: Socio-Economic Aspects and Possible Consequences*), Kiev, National Institute for Strategic Studies, 1993 from Frejka, Okólski, Sword *Studies on Migration: the Case of Ukraine*.

<sup>252</sup> Data presented in the Table are the results of surveys conducted on representative samples of Ukrainians each year from 1994 onwards within the project 'Ukrainian Society to the Gateway to the 21<sup>st</sup> Century' carried out by Ukrainian National Academy of Science. Compare: N. Panina, E. Golovakha, *Tendencies in the Development of Ukrainian Society (1994-1998) Sociological Indicators*, Kiev, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, 1999.

<sup>253</sup> Shares of Ukrainians who would like to migrate to the Republics of the former Soviet Union were as follows: to Russia – 12.7% in 1994 and 9.7% in 1998, to another location in Ukraine – 15.3% in 1994 and 11.3% in 1998, and to other republics of the former Soviet Union – 1.1% in 1994 and 1.4 in 1998.

<sup>254</sup> It refers to migration of any kind, also to internal migration. Authors of the report did not differentiate over a type of migration.

<sup>255</sup> Other reasons for settlement emigration were reported by not more than 6% of respondents (around 60% declared that they did not plan to move from the place where they currently lived). These reasons were as follows: in connection with training or education, desire to move closer to my friends, desire to return to my homeland, desire to change climate, fear of ethnic conflicts, simply want to change place of residence, because of language problems.

<sup>256</sup> Frejka, Okólski, Sword, *Studies on Migration: the Case of Ukraine*.

<sup>257</sup> Okólski, 'Najnowszy ruch wędrownkowy'.

<sup>258</sup> A. Shlepakov, O. Malinowska, O. Pinchuk, Emigratsiya neselelnya Ukrainy: sotsial'no-ekonomichni aspekty ta mozhyvi naslidki, Kiev, National Institute for Strategic Studies, 1993 from Frejka, Okólski, Sword *Studies on Migration: the Case of Ukraine*.

<sup>259</sup> According to one of my respondents who dealt with Ukrainian petty-traders providing them with accommodation and transportation, such activities were profitable until 1993. In relation to this issue he

stated: 'It [petty-trade] started to break down at the beginning... in fact the beginning of 1993. [...] Almost all money ... about 90% of money earned has to be invested again' (16MW).

<sup>260</sup> Frejka, Okólski, Sword, *Studies on Migration: the Case of Ukraine*.

<sup>261</sup> Okólski, 'Najnowszy ruch wędrowniczy'.

<sup>262</sup> One crossing point was in the place where Ukraine has a border with two countries: Slovakia and Romania. This is the reason why the number of crossing points is lower than the number of countries of migrants' origins.

<sup>263</sup> It was a survey sponsored by the International Organisation for Migration.

<sup>264</sup> It was random sample which covered 1015 cases in autumn 1997 and 986 in spring 1998. Unfortunately the report on this research does not inform about numbers of respondents interviewed at each border.

<sup>265</sup> Numbers of cases published in the report referred to the size of investigated population. Outcomes were presented only as percentages.

<sup>266</sup> Especially that, with one exception (migration to take a rest or a medical treatment), shares of people reporting given purposes of their future migrations are lower than respective shares related to actual migration (for example, less people intended to go abroad as tourists in the future than actually did at the moment of the survey).

<sup>267</sup> In the report, the 61% of illegal workers were divided into two sub-categories: illegal workers (38%) and half-legal workers (23%). The latter category covered those who did not know that they had to have work permits.

<sup>268</sup> Frejka, Okólski, Sword, *Studies on Migration: the Case of Ukraine*.

<sup>269</sup> The research was launched by the Population Unit of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe and its aim was to provide a better understanding of migration developments in Central and Eastern Europe during the period 1975-1994. The study was carried out simultaneously in Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine in 1993-1996.

<sup>270</sup> 'An ethnosurvey involves simultaneous application of ethnographic and survey methods within a single study of multiple sites. The guiding philosophy is that qualitative and quantitative procedures complement one another and that properly used one's weakness become the other's strength yielding a body of data with greater reliability and more internal validity than is possible to achieve using other method alone.' D.D. Massey, 'The Ethnosurvey in Theory and Practice', *International Migration Review*, 21, 1987, 4, pp.1498-1522 (p. 1504).

<sup>271</sup> D.D. Massey, 'The Ethnosurvey in Theory and Practice', *International Migration Review*, 21, 1987, 4, pp.1498-1522.

<sup>272</sup> Method of the study was the triangulation of quantitative and qualitative methods. Not only surveys were carried out in communities, but also in-depth interviews with selected migrants. However, in this text I refer only to outcomes of surveys.

<sup>273</sup> The term 'Ukrainian migrants' used in the description of outcomes from this research refers only to those who took up their migration to countries outside the former USSR.

<sup>274</sup> The year 1987 is crucial for migration movements from the former USSR, as in this year the proclamation of the right to free movement was made as a part of reforms carried out during a *perestroika* period. However, the number of migrants started to increase dynamically in following years.

<sup>275</sup> The proportions of these who visited Poland and started their migrant activities after 1986 were as follows: 89% in Chernivtsi, 85% in Kiev, and 97% in Prylbychi. Compare also: Okólski, 'Najnowszy ruch wędrowniczy'.

<sup>276</sup> In the other communities, shares of workers were considerably lower than in Prylbychi: 6% of migrants from Chernivtsi and 5% from Kiev.

<sup>277</sup> Compare: A. Górny, D. Stola, 'Migracyjny kapitał społeczny: akumulacja i wykorzystanie' ('Migrant Social Capital – Use and Accumulation') in E.Jaźwińska, M. Okólski Ludzie na huśtawce. Migracje między peryferiami Polski i Zachodu (*People on the Swing. Migration from Peripheries of Poland to the West*) Warsaw, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, pp. 164-187.

<sup>278</sup> For example, in the case of a village located close to the Polish-Belarusian border some migrant-respondents who used to be involved in trans-border trade reported such trips as migration in research which was carried out shortly after these trips took place, but they did not report them as international movement in panel research carried out three years later.

- <sup>279</sup> The shares of such people were 68%, 74%, 77%, and 80% in 1995, 1996, 1997 and 1998, respectively.
- <sup>280</sup> Such people are reported in Ukrainian statistics as having left Ukraine permanently.
- <sup>281</sup> The survey was based on a random sample of 792 citizens of the former USSR.
- <sup>282</sup> K. Iglicka, 'The Economics of Petty Trade on the Eastern Polish Border' in K. Iglicka, K. Sword (eds.), *The Challenge of East-West Migration for Poland*, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, London, Macmillan Press LTD, 1999, pp. 120-44.
- <sup>283</sup> Opinions of migrants were collected during the following research projects carried out by the Centre of Migration Research, Institute for Social Studies: 'Immigrants: socio-demographic characteristics, causes of inflow, integration in Polish society' (1995-1997), 'Undocumented foreigners in Poland' (1999), but also during the research 'The role of social, economic and political networks in settlement migration to Poland: the case of Ukrainian migrants' (1998-2000) carried out for the purpose of this dissertation.
- <sup>284</sup> A TRP is granted only to foreigners who are entitled to stay in Poland during a period longer than 12 months. Therefore, only those who got work permits for a period long enough can be granted TRPs.
- <sup>285</sup> A TRP was introduced at the beginning of 1998 (compare Appendix I).
- <sup>286</sup> The comparison between number of work permits and TRPs granted in 1998 would be questionable, as this year was the first one when TRPs were granted. Therefore, their number may be underestimated. Firstly, because it was a new procedure and some migrants did not know it. Secondly, it takes time from the moment when application is submitted until the acquisition of a TRP. Another reason why the number of TRPs issued in 1998 is much smaller than in the next year is that the first applications were submitted at the beginning of the year and proceeded for some time. Thus, in the first part of the year, very few TRPs were issued.
- <sup>287</sup> In fact, there can be also another reason for this difference between volumes of work permits and TRPs issued. A proportion of work permits issued are not collected, which means that some foreigners granted work permits do not take up migration to Poland and, thus, do not apply for TRPs in Poland even though entitled to.
- <sup>288</sup> This group comprises, in fact, also settlement migrants, who are at the beginning of legalisation of their permanent stay in Poland (compare Appendix I).
- <sup>289</sup> For Polish data see Chapters 5,6, and 7.
- <sup>290</sup> M. Morokvasic, "'In and out" of the Labour Market: Immigrant and Minority Women in Europe', *New Community*, 19, 1993, 3, pp. 459-83.
- <sup>291</sup> DeLaet, 'The Invisibility of Women'.
- <sup>292</sup> Compare: L. Ackers, *Shifting spaces. Women, Citizenship and Migration within the European Union*, Bristol, The Policy Press, 2000.
- <sup>293</sup> Compare also Chapter 8.
- <sup>294</sup> G. Becker, *A Treatise on the Family*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, Harvard University Press, 1991.
- <sup>295</sup> A. Giza-Poleszczuk, 'Rodzina i system społeczny' (*Family and the Social System*) in M. Marody, E. Gucwa-Leśny (eds.), *Podstawy życia społecznego w Polsce (The Foundations of Social Life in Poland)* Warsaw, ISS UW, 1996, pp. 174-97.
- <sup>296</sup> G. Becker, *A Treatise on the Family*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, Harvard University Press, 1991, p. 83.
- <sup>297</sup> See: S.G. Vandenberg, 'Assortative mating, or Who Marries Whom', *Behaviour Genetics*, 2, 1972, 2-3, pp. 127-57; R.F. Winnch, *Mate selection*, New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1958 from G. Becker, *A Treatise on the Family*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, Harvard University Press, 1991.
- <sup>298</sup> G. Becker, *A Treatise on the Family*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, Harvard University Press, 1991, p. 115.
- <sup>299</sup> In fact, Becker defines mixed marriages very broadly as those contracted between people of different religion, ethnicity, nationality, but also of different age and education. However, the analysis presented in his book is related mainly to marriages mixed in terms of religious and ethnicity, Therefore, I use the outcomes of his analyses in explaining the phenomenon of mixed marriages contracted between citizens of different countries in Poland.
- <sup>300</sup> Earnings and fertility are lower in these marriages; *ibid.* p. 337.
- <sup>301</sup> *ibid.* p. 337.

<sup>302</sup> Becker argues, however, this it is not a rule.

<sup>303</sup> L. Ackers, *Shifting spaces. Women, Citizenship and Migration within the European Union*, Bristol, The Policy Press, 2000.

<sup>304</sup> Compare for example: Shu-Ju Ada Cheng, 'Labor Migration and International Sexual Division of Labor: a Feminist Perspective' in G.A. Kelson, D.L. DeLaet (eds.), *Gender and Immigration*, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, London, , Macmillan Press LTD, 1999, pp. 38-55; M. Morokvasic, "'In and out'" of the Labour Market: Immigrant and Minority Women in Europe', *New Community*, 19, 1993, 3, pp. 459-83.

<sup>305</sup> Dual-career households are, for example, very common in countries of the former Soviet bloc, in which women were expected to work at roughly the same rate as men.

<sup>306</sup> DeLaet, 'The Invisibility of Women'; Simons, 'Mail Order Brides'.

<sup>307</sup> For example, in the United States, some American men were eager to out-marry as they looked for wives who would not devote themselves only to their professional careers. Foreign women, who had relatively low professional opportunities in United States, were more likely to work at home and to take care of their American households than American wives. For more details about mixed marriages contracted in the United States see: Simons, 'Mail Order Brides'. See also Chapter 3.

<sup>308</sup> This refers to Western and Eastern Germany as far as the period before German unification is concerned.

<sup>309</sup> S. Chant, 'Conclusion: towards a Framework for the Analysis of Gender-Selective Migration' in S. Chant (ed.), *Gender and Migration in Developing Countries*, London, Bellhaven Press, 1992, pp. 196-206.

<sup>310</sup> Certainly, there is also a group of Polish-Ukrainian marriages contracted neither in Poland nor in Ukraine. However, it can be argued that they are likely to constitute only a thin share of the overall population of Polish-Ukrainian marriages. This is due to the fact that mixed marriages tend to settle in the country of origin of either husband or wife.

<sup>311</sup> This is the period for which data on Polish-Ukrainian marriages contracted in both Poland and Ukraine are available.

<sup>312</sup> Geographical distribution of the Polish-Ukrainian marriages refers to a place where a marriage was contracted in Poland.

<sup>313</sup> Among other things, it is related to the fact that most Polish cities are of less than 200 thousand inhabitants. In 1998, there were only twenty cities over 200 thousand inhabitants in Poland.

<sup>314</sup> Compare: DeLaet, 'The Invisibility of Women'.

<sup>315</sup> For example: A. Fostakowska, 'Mieszkam na wsi – poznaj panią' ('I live in the Countryside – Willing to Meet a Lady'), *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 21 December 1999, pp. 16-17.

<sup>316</sup> I refer to the administrative division of territory of Poland into forty-nine voivodeships which was used before the administrative reform in 1998.

<sup>317</sup> It should be noted that the share of the overall mixed marriages contracted in the Warsaw voivodeship is equal to the share of the Polish-Ukrainian marriages contracted there - 11%.

<sup>318</sup> The share of the Polish-Ukrainian marriages contracted in the countryside in the Warsaw voivodeship was only 8%, whereas for the whole population of the Polish-Ukrainian marriages the ratio was as many as 28%.

<sup>319</sup> As far as the other Polish voivodeships are concerned, data on the size of towns/villages where Polish-Ukrainian marriages were contracted are not provided.

<sup>320</sup> DeLaet, 'The Invisibility of Women'.

<sup>321</sup> This refers to voivodeships of: Bielska Podlaska, Chełm, Kielce, Kraków, Krosno, Lublin, Nowy Sącz, Przemyśl, Rzeszów, Tarnobrzeg, Tarnów, Zamość.

<sup>322</sup> For the whole population of mixed marriages in Poland, the share of those contracted in the south-eastern region was only 14%.

<sup>323</sup> In this region, there were 30% of the 'Ukrainian woman' marriages and 26% of 'Ukrainian man' marriages.

<sup>324</sup> The respective proportion for the 'Ukrainian man' marriages is only 32%.

<sup>325</sup> After the First World War Ukrainian organisations established in Galicia made an attempt to set up an independent Ukrainian state on the territory of Galicia. It was, however, unsuccessful. See also: T.A. Olszański, *Historia Ukrainy XX w*, Warsaw, Oficyna Wydawnicza VOLUMEN, 1993.

<sup>326</sup> G. Becker, *A Treatise on the Family*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, Harvard University Press, 1991.

<sup>327</sup> I also refer to data on the overall populations of marriages contracted in Poland and Ukraine. These data are from Demographic Yearbooks: Ukrainian (1992, 1996) and Polish (1992-1997).

<sup>328</sup> Opinions of migrants were collected during following research projects carried out by the Centre of Migration Research, Institute for Social Studies: 'Immigrants: socio-demographic characteristics, causes of inflow, integration in Polish society' (1995-1997), 'Undocumented foreigners in Poland' (1999), 'The role of social, economic and political networks in settlement migration to Poland: the case of Ukrainian migrants' (1998-2000).

<sup>329</sup> For Ukrainian marriages, data on age distribution refer to 1992, whereas for Polish marriages to 1992-1997.

<sup>330</sup> The share of Ukrainian men who married below twenty years of age in 1992 in Ukraine was 8%. The shares of Polish men and women who married below twenty years of age in 1992-1997 in Poland were: 4% and 22%.

<sup>331</sup> All comparisons between age of spouses included in this chapter refer not to an exact age, but to five-year age ranges, which are as follows: under twenty, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, and over forty-nine. This is because data on the exact age of spouses are not available. Therefore, when I, for example, write that partners were of the same age it means that they were in fact in the same five-year age range.

<sup>332</sup> The age difference is not defined literally (see footnote No. 331), but estimated. For example, a woman is at the age 25-29 and a man is at the age 30-34 hence the smallest possible age difference between them is one year whereas the biggest nine years; a woman is at the age 25-29 and a man is at the age 35-39 thus the smallest possible age difference between them is six years and the biggest fourteen years etc.

<sup>333</sup> In the population of 'Ukrainian man' marriages, only one Polish woman at the age under 19 married a younger Ukrainian man.

<sup>334</sup> Data on age difference between partners involved in the Ukrainian marriages are not provided.

<sup>335</sup> According to Becker: 'The reason for the typical early marriages of women is that their biology, experiences, and other investments in human capital have been more specialised than those of men to the reproduction of children and other commodities requiring marriage of its equivalent' G. Becker, *A Treatise on the Family*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, Harvard University Press, 1991, p. 119.

<sup>336</sup> Among the Polish marriages in Poland, the share of marriages in which partners were at the same age was higher than among the Polish-Ukrainian ones – 49%.

<sup>337</sup> G. Becker, *A Treatise on the Family*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, Harvard University Press, 1991.

<sup>338</sup> At the same time, the percentage of those who had only primary education was considerably higher in Ukraine than in Poland (32% in Ukraine and 16% in Poland).

<sup>339</sup> If we consider only these 'Ukrainian woman' marriages where the Polish husband is either of the same age or younger than his Ukrainian partner, the share of these marriages where the Polish husband is worse educated falls to 6%.

<sup>340</sup> G. Becker, *A Treatise on the Family*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, Harvard University Press, 1991.

<sup>341</sup> I use this term to describe a marriage which resembles a contract in which costs and benefits of each spouse involved can be easily identified.

<sup>342</sup> For example, in 1992 in Ukraine, 39% of Ukrainian women and 30% of Ukrainian men, who entered new marriages as divorcees, were under thirty.

<sup>343</sup> N. Etcoff, *Przetwarzają najpiękniejsi. Wszystko co nauka mówi o ludzkim pięknie (Survival of the Prettiest. the Science of Beauty)*, Warsaw, Wydawnictwo CiS, Wydawnictwo W.A.B., 2000.

<sup>344</sup> DeLaet, 'The Invisibility of Women'; Simons 'Mail Order Brides'.

<sup>345</sup> Such a perception of Poland among Ukrainian migrants is derived from research carried out by the Centre of Migration Research, Institute for Social Studies in 1995-2000 (see footnote No. 328).



<sup>346</sup> Compare: Hammar, *Democracy and the Nation State*.

<sup>347</sup> Hammar, *Democracy and the Nation State*.

<sup>348</sup> These calculations exclude the United Kingdom. See: Hammar, *Democracy and the Nation State*.

<sup>349</sup> Data presented in this chapter include both adults and children. Such an approach is consistent with a definition of the migrant stock. I take into consideration those foreigners who did not return their PRPs to Polish officials until 31.12.99. The database contains also migrants about whom information whether they returned their PRPs or not is unavailable. They are part of a group granted PRPs before 1992. I refer to this group only to make my estimation of the stock of migrants in Poland more precise.

<sup>350</sup> Data for this year are archival data of the Ministry of Interior and Administration in Poland.

<sup>351</sup> This is the number of the returned PRPs divided by the number of foreigners who either held or returned their PRPs.

<sup>352</sup> This is 80% out of 23,612. I took 20% as the ratio of returns, which is higher than the one observed in the group of recent denizens. This is due to the fact that in the group of foreigners who got PRPs before 1992 the share of old people is likely to be higher than in the other group, hence the rate of death (return of a PRP) as well.

<sup>353</sup> This is when we consider the sum of 25,855 actual denizens and estimated volume of 13,800 potential denizens resident in 1999 in Poland.

<sup>354</sup> The estimations referring to the group of potential denizens are rough therefore I do not refer to this group in the rest of this chapter.

<sup>355</sup> These data were collected by Ministry of Interior in the past. According to them the stock of PRP holders in 31.12.91 was 23,612 persons (more than according to the data available at the moment). I deducted from this number those persons who were granted PRP before 1992 and about whom I have the information about whether they returned their PRPs or not. The result was: 16,587 persons. On the basis of this group of people I estimate citizenship of those 12,066 about whom the information whether they returned their documents was missing.

<sup>356</sup> There were 1,324 German and 1,304 Vietnamese denizens.

<sup>357</sup> Data presented in this chapter include only denizens who returned their PRPs. All analyses presented in this chapter refer not to citizenship of migrants but to their country of birth. For those who were born in Poland I take into consideration their citizenship. I do that so as to obtain as rich information as possible about migrants' countries of origin. For returnees, there is a considerable share of missing data, as the large proportion of them were recorded as stateless.

<sup>358</sup> It should be noted, however, that an increase in the volume of people coming as repatriates to Poland is rather small. This is due to the fact that repatriation requires funds which are very limited at the moment as it involves expenses for *gminy* and the Polish government. Compare: P. Legutko, 'Wracajcie... na własną odpowiedzialność. Dlaczego nie będzie masowej repatriacji Polaków z Kazachstanu' ('Come Back.... on Your Own Risk. Why there will not be a Massive Repatriation of Poles from Kazakhstan'), *Rzeczpospolita*, 16 January 2001, p. A8.

<sup>359</sup> E. Olczyk, K. Groblewski, 'Ułatwienia dla wysiedlonych, kłopoty dla dwupaństwowców' ('Privileges for Displaced and Problems for Dual Citizens'), *Rzeczpospolita*, 30 June 2000, p. A2. It should, however, be noted that this promotion applies only to repatriates from Eurasian part of the former USSR: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and from the Asian part of the former USSR.

<sup>360</sup> The analysis covers only those about whom information whether they returned their PRPs is provided. Thus, it does not refer to 12,066 migrants who are only potential denizens.

<sup>361</sup> The distribution of citizenship in this group is also different from the one in the stock of migrants presented in Chapter 6.2. This is due to the fact that countries of origin of foreigners are defined as their countries of birth, not as their citizenship (unlike in Chapter 6.2).

<sup>362</sup> This is due to the fact that the only available information about child migrants is why their parents returned their PRPs. It should be noted that my assumption is consistent with Polish legislation, as children have to either acquire new (their own) PRPs or become Polish citizens following the example of their parents.

<sup>363</sup> Hammar, *Democracy and the Nation State*, p. 101.

<sup>364</sup> Hammar, *Democracy and the Nation State*.

<sup>365</sup> The foreigners, who I put into my analysis in this chapter either held PRPs or had returned them by 31.12.99. So as to present numbers of foreigners who chose to be a denizen in Poland themselves, I take into consideration only adult migrants (over seventeen in 31.12.99) and those who are not children of other migrants in Poland.

<sup>366</sup> A considerable part of data on citizenship of migrants from this group is unavailable.

<sup>367</sup> Data on countries of origin of migrants who got PRPs in 1992 can not be compared with 1991, because data from 1991 are incomplete (see comments in footnote No. 366).

<sup>368</sup> Data presented in this chapter refer only to denizens resident in Poland on 31.12.99 not to ex-denizens.

<sup>369</sup> I can not make an analysis on the last places of a PRP acquisition because 45% of migrants got their last documents from the Ministry of Interior and Administration. In such a situation their place of residence would be unknown.

<sup>370</sup> Describing migrants' distribution in Polish voivodeships is problematic, as there was an administrative reform in 1998 which changed the territories and number of voivodeships. Until 1998, there were forty-nine voivodeships, which were turned into sixteen bigger voivodeships after 1998. In order to compare data on migrants such before and after 1998, I group the 'old' forty-nine voivodeships in a way that they reflect the present administrative map of Poland. I ascribed 'old' voivodeships to new ones as follows: (1) dolnośląskie, jeleniogórskie, legnickie, wałbrzyskie, wrocławskie, (2) kujawsko-pomorskie: bydgoskie, toruńskie, włocławskie, (3) lubelskie: bielskopodlaskie, chełmskie, lubelskie, zamojskie, (4) lubuskie: gorzowskie, zielonogórskie, (5) łódzkie: łódzkie, piotrkowskie, sieradzkie, (6) małopolskie: krakowskie, nowosądeckie, tarnowskie, (7) mazowieckie: ciechanowskie, ostrołęckie, płockie, radomskie, siedleckie, skierniewickie, warszawskie, (8) opolskie: opolskie, (9) podkarpackie: krośnieńskie, przemyskie, rzeszowskie, tarnobrzeskie, (10) podlaskie: białostockie, łomżyńskie, suwalskie, (11) pomorskie: gdańskie, słupskie, (12) śląskie: bielskie, częstochowskie, katowickie, (13) świętokrzyskie: kieleckie, (14) warmińsko-mazurskie: elbląskie, olsztyńskie, (15) wielkopolskie: leszczyńskie, kaliskie, konińskie, pilskie, poznańskie, (16) zachodniopomorskie: koszalińskie, szczecińskie.

<sup>371</sup> The 'old' Ukrainian minority is located also in north-western Poland, but it is less dynamic and numerous there. In general, this minority is present in: (1) north-western and northern Poland, namely in pomorskie, warmińsko-mazurskie and zachodniopomorskie voivodeships, (2) south-western Poland, namely in dolnośląskie, opolskie and śląskie voivodeships, (3) south-eastern Poland, namely in lubelskie, małopolskie, podkarpackie, and a part of świętokrzyskie voivodeship. Compare: R. Żerelik, *'Mniejszość ukraińska w Polsce po II wojnie światowej'* in Z. Kurcz (ed.), *Mniejszości narodowe w Polsce*, Wrocław, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 1997, pp. 51-62.

<sup>372</sup> For example, M. Jerczyński, 'Patterns of Spatial Mobility of Citizens of the Former Soviet Union' in K. Iglicka, K. Sword (eds.), *The Challenge of East-West Migration for Poland*, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, London, Macmillan Press LTD, 1999, pp. 105-19.

<sup>373</sup> For a description of the research group see Appendix V.

<sup>374</sup> Descriptions presented in this chapter are based on data on Ukrainian denizens who had not returned their PRPs by 31.12.99.

<sup>375</sup> In this chapter I refer to a migrant's place of birth as the information about place of stay before migration to Poland is unavailable.

<sup>376</sup> There is no one classification of Ukrainian regions. I take up the classification of Ukrainian regions from the Ukrainian publication on migration (IOM, 1998). There, Ukrainian oblasti are grouped as presented below. Western Ukraine comprises oblasti: Volinska, Rivienska, Lvivska, Termopilka, Cherniviecka, Ivano-Frankowska and Zakarpatskaya. Central Ukraine comprises oblasti: Khmielnicka, Vinnicka, Żitomirska, Kievska, Cherkaska and Kirovogradska. The authors of this publication consider the other oblasti as the rest of Ukraine. I split them into two regions of southern and eastern Ukraine, as they differ in history and culture to a great extent. Eastern Ukraine includes oblasti: Sumskaya, Poltawska, Kharkovska, Dnipropietrowska, Zaporozska, Doniecka, Luganska. Southern Ukraine includes oblasti: Kherconska, Mikolayevska, Odeska and Crimea.

<sup>377</sup> This note refers especially to very short-term Ukrainian labour migrants who came to Poland in large numbers in the 1990s.

<sup>378</sup> These calculations refer only to 3,599 Ukrainians (80% of the total). The rest of the Ukrainians either acquired PRPs from the Ministry of Interior (589 persons) or there is no information about the place where they acquired their PRPs (289 persons).

<sup>379</sup> There are 104 such cities in Ukraine.

<sup>380</sup> Descriptions presented in this chapter are based only on data on adult migrants (those who were over seventeen on 31.12.99) who were not born of other migrants. Moreover, due to a large amount of missing data on the group of foreigners granted PRPs before 1992, I refer only to those who got their PRPs after the year 1991.

<sup>381</sup> Certainly, there are similar groups of migrants among ex-USSR citizens and Europeans as well, e.g. people who came to Poland during the Soviet period or labour migrants.

<sup>382</sup> See: S. Chant, 'Conclusion: towards a Framework for the Analysis of Gender-Selective Migration' in S. Chant (ed.), *Gender and Migration in Developing Countries*, London, Bellhaven Press, 1992, pp. 196-206; E. Kofman, 'Female "Birds of Passage" a Decade Later: Gender and Immigration in the European Union', *International Migration Review*, 22, 1999, 2, pp. 269-99.

<sup>383</sup> Cheng, Shu-Ju Ada, 'Labor Migration and International Sexual Division of Labor: a Feminist Perspective' in G.A. Kelson, D.L. DeLaet (eds.), *Gender and Immigration*, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, London, , Macmillan Press LTD, 1999, pp. 38-55.

<sup>384</sup> The research: 'Immigrants: socio-demographic characteristics, causes of inflow, integration in Polish society' carried out by the Centre of Migration Research, Institute for Social Studies in 1995-1997.

<sup>385</sup> Compare the analysis presented in Chapter 4.

<sup>386</sup> This is an outcome of the research projects carried out by the Centre of Migration Research, Institute for Social Studies: 'Immigrants: socio-demographic characteristics, causes of inflow, integration in Polish society' (1995-1997); 'Undocumented foreigners in Poland' (1999) and 'The role of social, economic and political networks in settlement migration to Poland: the case of Ukrainian migrants' (1998-2000).

<sup>387</sup> For example: K. Sadłowska, 'Ekonomiska z Syberii sprząta mieszkania' ('An Economist from Siberia Cleans Apartments') *Rzeczpospolita*, 25 July 2000, p. A3; J. Podgórska, 'Przystanek, raj i pułapka. Czy już masz gosposie ze Wschodu?' ('A Stop, a Paradise and a Trap. Do you already have a Servant from the East?') *Polityka*, 3 June 2000, pp. 32-34.

<sup>388</sup> Compare: Shu-Ju Ada Cheng, 'Labor Migration and International Sexual Division of Labor: a Feminist Perspective' in G.A. Kelson, D.L. DeLaet (eds.), *Gender and Immigration*, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, London, , Macmillan Press LTD, 1999, pp. 38-55.

<sup>389</sup> Ukrainian migrants are on the average a little bit younger than other ex-USSR denizens.

<sup>390</sup> The research: 'Immigrants: socio-demographic characteristics, causes of inflow, integration in Polish society' carried out by the Centre of Migration Research, Institute for Social Studies in 1995-1997.

<sup>391</sup> It is difficult to distinguish them in Polish statistics, as they possess citizenship of various countries (French citizenship and English citizenship are the most common).

<sup>392</sup> The outcomes of the research: 'Mobility between East and West of highly skilled professionals' carried out by the Centre of Migration Research, Institute for Social Studies in 1995-1996 as part of the project 'The mobility of experts East-West-East'.

<sup>393</sup> For example: R.J. Simon, M.C. DeLey, 'Undocumented Mexican Women: their Work and Personal Experiences' in J.T. Fawcett, S. Khoo, P.C. Smith (eds.), *Women in the Cities of Asia. Migration and Urban Adaptation*, Boulder CO, Westview Press, 1984, pp. 36-59.

<sup>394</sup> Unfortunately the share of missing data on marital status of PRP holders is relatively high – 16%.

<sup>395</sup> Among single, never married, persons shares of women are similar for Europeans (46%), ex-USSR denizens (47%) and Ukrainians (47%).

<sup>396</sup> Compare: Hammar, *Democracy and the Nation State*.

<sup>397</sup> Hammar, *Democracy and the Nation State*.

<sup>398</sup> R. Baubock, *Transnational Citizenship*, Brookfield, Hants, Edward Elgar, 1994.

<sup>399</sup> Compare: Hammar, *Democracy and the Nation State*.

<sup>400</sup> Compare: R. Baubock, *Transnational Citizenship*, Brookfield, Hants, Edward Elgar, 1994.

<sup>401</sup> Hammar, *Democracy and the Nation State*.

<sup>402</sup> Hammar, *Democracy and the Nation State*.

<sup>403</sup> R. Baubock, *Transnational Citizenship*, Brookfield, Hants, Edward Elgar, 1994, p.104.

<sup>404</sup> Y.N. Soysal, *Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe*, Chicago IL, London, the University of Chicago, 1994, p. 166.

<sup>405</sup> In fact some particular jobs are not available for non-Polish citizens in Poland (see footnote No. 168).

<sup>406</sup> Statistics on foreigners granted Polish citizenship according to the 'conferment' procedure refer to the period 1992-1997. Data on the 'acknowledgement' and the 'marriage' procedures are even scarcer, and concern only the year 1997 and the first part of 1998. Moreover, statistics of applicants who were refused Polish citizenship are not available.

<sup>407</sup> As much as 97% of migrants from this group originated from the United States and Canada.

<sup>408</sup> According to statistics these fifteen persons were granted Polish citizenship in 1997.

<sup>409</sup> According to in-depth analysis of characteristics of foreigners granted Polish citizenship in Warsaw voivodeship, only in this area is the number of Ukrainians granted Polish citizenship according to the 'conferment' procedure in 1989-1998 much higher – forty-nine people.

<sup>410</sup> This is evident in data on foreigners granted Polish citizenship by the 'acknowledgement' and the 'marriage' procedure in 1997 and the first part of 1998. For the 'conferment' procedure, it is only a supposition which was drawn from the high share of foreigners granted Polish citizenship in Warsaw voivodeship in 1992-1998. Unfortunately, data on numbers of people granted Polish citizenship according to the 'conferment' procedure in the other voivodeships was not available at the moment of the research.

<sup>411</sup> Data presented in the following chapters refer to those who applied for Polish citizenship themselves. There is also a group of children who were included in the applications of their parents. There are 90 such children. Most of them were children of migrants originating from the former USSR (sixty children – 66%). I exclude these children from my analyses as there is very little information about their characteristics. Moreover, the procedure concerning children may vary dependently on their age, status etc. Exclusion of these children makes my analyses more clear.

<sup>412</sup> No such case has been found in the database.

<sup>413</sup> A total of sixty-one people applied simultaneously for 'conferment' and 'acknowledgement' and were classified as 'suitable' cases for the 'acknowledgement' procedure. I exclude them from this category in my analyses so as to make the description of data clear and consistent. They are all in the 'acknowledgement' procedure category.

<sup>414</sup> Analyses in this and the subsequent chapters refer to all those who have submitted applications. I decided to do that as the share of those who got negative decisions is very small (only 4%) and they are very likely to be granted Polish citizenship in the future. The description included in this and subsequent chapters refers therefore to people who decided to become Polish citizens.

<sup>415</sup> These European migrants originated from Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. In the case of citizens of these countries the Polish authorities frequently required a relinquishment of their former citizenship. A few representatives of these countries applying in the 'conferment' procedure were asked to do that.

<sup>416</sup> Unfortunately, it is impossible to check this, due to a large proportion of missing data on first arrivals in this group (81%).

<sup>417</sup> Some foreigners came to their future partners whom they had met earlier in another country.

<sup>418</sup> They migrated also from the United States (20% of the group), Canada (12%) and Israel (12%). Among migrants from the other parts of the world they constitute small minorities.

<sup>419</sup> 'Students' constitute: 51% of Asian migrants (twenty-nine persons of which twenty-six were Vietnamese) and 55% of African migrants (twenty-seven persons).

<sup>420</sup> I exclude from this category those who came to their spouses, as an intimate relationship with a prospective partner is a particular type of social tie.

<sup>421</sup> Unfortunately, it was very seldom stated in the personal data files how migrants met their Polish friends.

<sup>422</sup> The respective ratio for men is only 40%.

<sup>423</sup> The respective ratio for women is only 5%.

<sup>424</sup> 59% of European men and 60% of European women.

<sup>425</sup> 9% of European men and 3% of European women.

<sup>426</sup> 11% of European men and 13% of European women.

<sup>427</sup> It should be noted that, according to information derived from the personal data files, the relative high proportion of men who visited their spouses in Poland is related to the migration between Poland and Bulgaria, as 62% of such men originated from Bulgaria. In this case this is migration which was caused, in fact, by the mobility of Polish and Bulgarian students. Moreover, some part of male migrants considered as Bulgarian were Polish citizens who became Bulgarians because of marriages with Bulgarian women.

<sup>428</sup> DeLaet, 'The Invisibility of Women'.

<sup>429</sup> Just 66% of ex-USSR men came to their families and only 35% visited their spouses in Poland for the first time.

<sup>430</sup> Among single migrants, 31% are foreigners who were under nineteen at the moment when they submitted their application. Therefore they can be considered to be too young to be married.

<sup>431</sup> Among male migrants those who have ever married a Polish partner account only for 63%.

<sup>432</sup> For Ukrainians, 88% of women and 75% of men married Polish citizens versus 86% and 63% for ex-USSR citizens, respectively.

<sup>433</sup> The relatively high proportion of European men who have ever married Polish women is related to migration between Poland and Bulgaria. Bulgarian men who have ever been married to Polish women account for 66% of European men ever married to Polish women.

<sup>434</sup> C. Kahn, 'Four Women: Immigrants in Cross-Cultural Marriages' in P.H. Elovitz, C. Kahn (eds.), *Immigrant Experiences. Personal Narrative and Psychological Analysis*, Cranbury, London, Mississauga, Associated University Press, 1997, pp. 199-220.

<sup>435</sup> These statistics refer only to foreigners who applied for Polish citizenship in the 'conferment' and the 'acknowledgement' procedure.

<sup>436</sup> People who were under thirty at the moment when they submitted their applications account for only 14% of the population.

<sup>437</sup> In fact, 12% of the applicants were unemployed, but only a small part of them were not working because of problems in finding a job. The latter information is derived from personal data files. Many migrants, especially women, did not work when their husbands were able to provide for them and their household a suitable standard of living. Some women were also in full time child-care.

<sup>438</sup> Among European migrants, proportions of specialists and businessmen are 19% and 12%, whereas, for ex-USSR migrants these shares are 25% and 7%, respectively.

<sup>439</sup> G. Becker, *A Treatise on the Family*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, Harvard University Press, 1991.

<sup>440</sup> Compare also Chapter 5.

<sup>441</sup> In fact, the notion of an 'arranged marriage' is very broad, as the degree of arrangement may vary considerably. There are marriages fully arranged by families of prospective partners (more seldom by friends), when future partners hardly meet each other before a wedding. On the other side of the scale, there are marriages in which the arrangement process is difficult to trace. Such situations take place when family or friends of prospective partners aim at mating two persons. They do it, however, in a discrete way by organising various situations which are conducive to formation of a given couple. In my typology the term 'arranged marriage' has a particular notion. It applies to the situations when formation of a couple is not preceded by an unintentional meeting of prospective spouses. Such meeting can be arranged by means of matchmaking organisations, but also by family or friends of partners.

<sup>442</sup> It should be, however, noted that in cultures like a Muslim culture mixed marriages are usually not socially accepted, thus, they are very unlikely to be arranged this way.

<sup>443</sup> Simons, 'Mail Order Brides'.

<sup>444</sup> Only one Ukrainian women from this group worked illegally (16MW). She was a masseuse and she did not need to legalise here activity to find Polish clients.

<sup>445</sup> See: Frejka, Okólski, Sword, *Studies on Migration: the Case of Ukraine*; K. Sword, 'Cross-Border 'Suitcase Trade' and the Role of Foreigners in Polish Informal Markets' in K. Iglicka, K. Sword (eds.), *The Challenge of East-West Migration for Poland*, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, London, Macmillan Press LTD, 1999, pp. 145-67.

<sup>446</sup> One woman, who came with her friends, was brought to Poland by a company which arranged transportation, accommodation and job. The Ukrainian migrants had to pay to this company 20% of the money they earned in Poland. Another woman came to Poland as a student of agricultural college to work at a Polish farm. She picked strawberries. It was organised on the basis of social networks of a Polish farmer and Ukrainians from the school.

<sup>447</sup> Traders comprise: a guide of 'trade-excursions' to Poland, a typical participant of such 'trade-excursions' but also an employee of a small (three persons) company which attended to Ukrainian traders in Poland. It provided them with accommodation and transportation in Warsaw.

<sup>448</sup> Compare: Górny, A., D. Stola, 'Migracyjny kapitał społeczny: akumulacja i wykorzystanie' in E. Jazwińska, M. Okólski Ludzie na huśtawce. Migracje między peryferiami Polski i Zachodu Warsaw, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, pp. 164-187.

<sup>449</sup> The example of the ballet dancer (34MW) is slightly different: she was invited to Poland by Poles whom she met in Ukraine during their vacation at the Black Sea. This Polish family helped her to find a job as a dancer in Poland. Although it seems that this particular Ukrainian woman went to Poland by accident, it should be noted that many of her colleagues from her theatre had migrated from Ukraine not only to Poland but also to Western Europe. In one case among skilled workers the role of migrant social capital in migration to Poland is not clear, thus, this case is not presented in this part of the analysis (20MW).

<sup>450</sup> In fact, only three out of four divorced persons with children had to maintain their children.

<sup>451</sup> However, it should be noted that their ability to get work permits in Poland was also related to the relatively liberal immigration law at the beginning of the 1990s in Poland.

<sup>452</sup> Only in the two cases of skilled workers – the masseuse and the bioenergotherapist (16MW and 20MW) – were their social networks (in particular, contacts with their Polish clients) very important.

<sup>453</sup> Only one woman did not have such relationships with Poles and she was working with the other Ukrainian migrants until her marriage with a Polish citizen.

<sup>454</sup> This is difficult to judge as at the moment of the research most of the Ukrainian respondents spoke the Polish language fluently; mostly because of their marriages with Polish people.

<sup>455</sup> In fact, these men became their Polish husbands later on.

<sup>456</sup> In fact, one of these women did not speak Polish even at the moment of the research – after four years of marriage to a Polish man.

<sup>457</sup> One of them had distant Polish relatives, not migrants (24MW), whereas the other had sister who married Polish man and settled in Poland (22MW).

<sup>458</sup> Compare the case studies of Ukrainian undocumented migrants presented in Chapter 9.

<sup>459</sup> Four 'migrants'.

<sup>460</sup> The two traders married Polish men with whom they co-operated.

<sup>461</sup> Three cases of Polish-Ukrainian marriages of 'migrants'.

<sup>462</sup> She was not able to prove her Polish origins so procedures for repatriates did not apply to her.

<sup>463</sup> Compare: P.R. Pessar, 'Dominican International Migration: The Role of Households and Social Networks' in R.W. Palmer (ed.), *In Search of a Better Life. Perspectives on Migration from the Caribbean*, New York, Westport CT, London, Praeger, 1990, pp. 91-114; M.J. Piore, *Birds of Passage. Migrant Labour and Industrial Societies*, Cambridge, London, New York, New Rochelle, Melbourne, Sydney, Cambridge University Press, 1980.

<sup>464</sup> An example of development of social capital may be that a migrant socialises with the other migrants or Polish people, which involves spending.

<sup>465</sup> For example: W. Kozek, 'Doświadczenie a stereotypy etniczne. Niemcy w opinii Polaków pracujących na obszarze państw niemieckich w latach osiemdziesiątych' ('Experience and Ethnic Stereotypes. Germans in the Perception of Polish People Working in East and West Germany in 1980s') in A. Jasińska-Kania (ed.), Bliscy i Dalecy (Close and Distant), Warsaw, Uniwersytet Warszawski, Instytut Socjologii, 1992, pp. 25-62.

<sup>466</sup> These are the following cases 24MW, 31MW, 35MW, 38MW.

<sup>467</sup> The dressmakers married their men of choice about five months after their first dates. The widow (31MW) was not so fast. She married the Polish man after one year but she started to cohabit with him two weeks after they met each other. Only the trader (24MW) was engaged longer. She married her Polish partner one year after the moment they were introduced to each other.

<sup>468</sup> The average age difference of the rest of couples in the sample (four extreme cases of long-oriented 'migrants' excluded) was three years and a half.

<sup>469</sup> In the couple where the husband was Ukrainian, the age difference is only six years.

<sup>470</sup> She was trying to convince the interviewer that her Polish origins were the main reason for coming permanently to Poland. However, her statements related to her and her daughter's future proved that this was not the only reason.

<sup>471</sup> She was born in 1958 whereas he was born in 1903.

<sup>472</sup> Unfortunately, in two divorce cases interviews were conducted only with Polish partners. There is, then, a risk that information about these couples is influenced by the feeling of disappointment, as in both the cases the Ukrainian partner left the Polish spouse.

<sup>473</sup> She started to learn the Polish language some time after her arrival in Poland.

<sup>474</sup> The interviewee did not say this but the whole interview suggested it.

<sup>475</sup> She was a widow.

<sup>476</sup> This is shown by the examples of the masseuse and bioenergotherapist who developed their businesses well enough to achieve permanent and attractive profits in Poland.

<sup>477</sup> Information included in stories is too scarce to base an analysis on them. The problem of bogus marriages is however very important and interesting. Therefore I present them in Appendix IV.

<sup>478</sup> For example: R. Staring, "Scenes from a Fake Marriage": Notes on the Flip-side of Embeddedness' in K. Koser, H. Lutz (eds.), *The New Migration in Europe*, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, London, Macmillan Press, LTD, 1998, pp. 224-41.

<sup>479</sup> Data of the Polish Main Statistical Office for 1995/1996-1998/1999.

<sup>480</sup> Data of the Polish Main Statistical Office for 1995/1996-1998/1999.

<sup>481</sup> There is also one more woman in this group who has Polish family in Poland. She did not however come to Poland to this family but to her friend from Ukraine.

<sup>482</sup> In fact, many Poles used to spend their holiday on the Black Sea during the Soviet period. Nevertheless, social networks with Ukrainian people living there was an additional incentive for them to spend their holiday there.

<sup>483</sup> Only one woman dealt mainly with representatives of the 'old' Ukrainian minority in Poland.

<sup>484</sup> The comments about the way in which Ukrainian students operate in Poland are based not only on four interviews with the Polish-Ukrainian marriages of the former Ukrainian students in Poland ('travellers'). This information is derived also from fifteen interviews with Ukrainian students in Warsaw collected in 1998-2000 during the project 'The role of social, political and economic networks in settlement migration to Poland: the case of Ukrainian migrants' (see Appendix VI).

<sup>485</sup> The one who had the fiancé in Ukraine.

<sup>486</sup> Big city in Ukraine which used to be on Polish territory before the Second World War.

<sup>487</sup> This opinion is based not only on the story of this Ukrainian woman but also on conversation with members of the Polish Association in Lviv which was carried out in August 1999 as a part of the research 'The role of social, economic and political networks in settlement migration to Poland: the case of Ukrainian migrants' (see Appendix V).

<sup>488</sup> Only one woman was in Poland before. However, she went there only as a tourist for a short excursion.

<sup>489</sup> Only one man went to Ukraine to meet Ukrainian members of his religious organisation, but this story is rather extraordinary and should be analysed separately. The couple met three or four times during the stay of the Polish man in Ukraine (he was there about one week). Then, after a few phone conversations, the couple decided to marry each other. According to their statements, their decision was based on the feeling, which both of them had, that the God wanted them to marry. They stressed that it was not love. This particular case is very difficult to understand for people who do not belong to this specific religious organisation: Seventh Day Adventist.

<sup>490</sup> According to traditional definition of migration tourism is not considered as migration. Compare: R.E. Bilborrow, G. Hugo, A.S. Oberai, H. Zlotnik, *International Migration Statistics*, Geneva, Labour Office, 1997.

<sup>491</sup> Certainly, the combination of one 'migrant' and one 'traveller' is also possible.

<sup>492</sup> Migrants supported by the Polish-Ukrainian marriages usually started with working for their friends or relatives in Poland, but often sought also job offers in newspapers. In such situations one person from the Polish-Ukrainian couple made the first contact by phone with a prospective employer. This way there were no problems with communication and the employer was less afraid of employing a foreigner from the former USSR.

<sup>493</sup> These six 'migrants' were: two traders, three unskilled workers and one skilled worker. One unskilled worker from this group was eager to help her family and friends from Ukraine to find a job in Poland, but she did not know how to do so.

<sup>494</sup> In the group of 'migrants' there were only two exceptions from this rule.

<sup>495</sup> Unfortunately it is difficult to judge the value of this statement as the man left by the woman is bound to be somewhat biased.

<sup>496</sup> One of them served as social capital both for labour and settlement migrants.

<sup>497</sup> This man invited also his brother as he wanted to set up a business in Poland with him. This was before he married the Polish woman.

<sup>498</sup> These were people who could prove their Polish origins.

<sup>499</sup> Only one respondent brought her elderly mother to Poland so as to be able to take care of her. Thus, this settlement migration was not related to the propensity of the old Ukrainian woman to settle in Poland.

<sup>500</sup> Unfortunately, data about migrations to the other countries (not Poland) taken up by respondents include only limited characteristics of these trips.

<sup>501</sup> Eight out of ten 'migrants' supporting migration of their country folk to Poland helped labour migrants. Among others only 'travellers' supported labour migration (three out of five supported migrants from Ukraine).

<sup>502</sup> O. Stark, D.E. Bloom, 'The New Economic of Labour Migration', *American Economic Review*, 75, 1985, pp. 1-14.

<sup>503</sup> Compare: Z.L. 'Cudzoziemiec chce zostać' ('A Foreigner Wants to Stay'), *Rzeczpospolita*, 30 November 1999, p. A4.

<sup>504</sup> Certainly, individual case of passive migrants settling in the destination country can be found. The prominent example of such a situation is marriage with a citizen of the destination country. On the other hand, such migrants also have to be able to establish relationships with prospective Polish partners. To do so they usually have to extend their personal contacts beyond the migrant group.

<sup>505</sup> It should be noted that settlement of ex-undocumented Ukrainian migrant in Poland because of a marriage with a Polish citizens constitutes a specific type of settlement migration and should not be considered within the framework presented in this chapter (for description of this issue see Chapter 3.2.3). This is because this type of settlement is not related only to activities of a Ukrainian migrant in Poland.

<sup>506</sup> R. Antoniewski, 'Pracownicy ukraińscy w jednym z 'zagłębi owocowo-warzywnych' na Mazowszu. Raport z obserwacji uczestniczącej' (*Ukrainian Workers in one of the Horticultural Centres on Mazowsze. A Report Based on Participant Observation*) (hereafter 'Pracownicy ukraińscy') unpublished research report, Warsaw, ISS UW, 1999.

<sup>507</sup> Antoniewski, 'Pracownicy ukraińscy'.

<sup>508</sup> Antoniewski, 'Pracownicy ukraińscy'.

<sup>509</sup> *ibid.* p. 9.

<sup>510</sup> It appears that it is a good business, as some of them could afford buying new cars for money earned this way.

<sup>511</sup> Some of Ukrainian migrants prefer to work for VCF instead of working on a particular farm, since the remuneration paid in VCF is higher than an average remuneration in nearby farms (0.63 USD versus about 0.58 USD per hour).

<sup>512</sup> It should be noted, however, that, according to statements of Ukrainian migrants, most Polish employers, and the owner of VPC in particular, take these workers, who suffered from their work in bad conditions, to a doctor and pay for these visits. It may be perceived as his investment in capital (cheap and efficient Ukrainian labour force) which brings him good income. Evidently, the knowledge that he would take care of ill migrants encourages migrants to work for him.

<sup>513</sup> Antoniewski, 'Pracownicy ukraińscy'.

<sup>514</sup> According to migrants, the 'migrant hotel' was most crowded in 1999, which was the year when the participant observation was conducted.

<sup>515</sup> This is also the reason why the mode of description of the 'Decision' and the 'Process' stages taken up in this chapter seems to be justified.

<sup>516</sup> I use the term 'transnational' instead of 'Polish-Ukrainian' when referring to social spaces of trans-border traders. This is due to the fact that these spaces usually comprise not only Polish and Ukrainian people, but also foreigners from the other republics of the former USSR.

<sup>517</sup> Network marketing is a trading business which is based on a network of salesmen who distribute products directly to clients.



- <sup>518</sup> Network marketing company does not require a work permit from foreigners whom it employs in Poland. In fact it was not clear how the Ukrainian men were employed in such a company.
- <sup>519</sup> The respondents were not asked whether they perceived a marriage with a Polish citizen as an easy way to get Polish documents. They mentioned this possibility spontaneously.
- <sup>520</sup> IM met this man in the apartment in which he was renting a room at that moment. The man brought some Ukrainian traders to this apartment.
- <sup>521</sup> Compare: Faist, *The Volume and Dynamics*.
- <sup>522</sup> Compare: Faist, *The Volume and Dynamics*.
- <sup>523</sup> Businessmen are entitled to a TRP in Poland, which can enable them to acquire a PRP in the future.
- <sup>524</sup> In fact, he stated that he would consider moving to Germany where his brother lives if not his daughter.
- <sup>525</sup> Okólski, 'Najnowszy ruch wędrowski'.
- <sup>526</sup> Compare L.R. Chavez, *Shadowed Lives. Undocumented Immigrants in American Society*, Orlando FL, Hoarcourt Brace Jovanovich College Publishers, 1992.
- <sup>527</sup> Compare: Okólski, 'Najnowszy ruch wędrowski'.
- <sup>528</sup> J. Goss, B. Lindquist, 'Conceptualizing International Labor Migration: a Structuration Perspective', *International Migration Review*, 29, 1995, 2, pp. 317-53.
- <sup>529</sup> Compare: Faist, *The Volume and Dynamics*.
- <sup>530</sup> Compare also: M. Jerczyński, 'Patterns of Spatial Mobility of Citizens of the Former Soviet Union' in K. Iglicka, K. Sword (eds.), *The Challenge of East-West Migration for Poland*, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, London, Macmillan Press LTD, 1999, pp. 105-19.
- <sup>531</sup> Compare: B.R. Roberts, R. Frank, F. Lozano-Ascencino, 'Transnational Migrant Communities and Mexican Migration to the US', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 22, 1999, 2, pp. 238-66.
- <sup>532</sup> S. Hasson, 'From International Immigration to Internal Migration: the Settlement Process of Immigrants from the Former Soviet Union in Israel' in N.Carmon *Immigration and Integration in Post-Industrial Societies*, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, London, Macmillan Press LTD, 1996, pp. 167-84 (p.170).
- <sup>533</sup> For example, a migrant who invites the other migrant for a permanent stay in Poland has to have his/her own apartment, which is rather seldom among temporary Ukrainian migrants.
- <sup>534</sup> Compare: A. Górny, E. Kepińska, 'Life between Two Countries – the Case of Polish-Ukrainian Marriages', *International Journal of Sociology*, forthcoming.
- <sup>535</sup> So as to estimate the contribution of foreigners married to Polish citizens to the overall population of settlement migrants in Poland, I make an assumption that migrants newly married to Polish citizens in 1989-1997 were granted PRPs within one year of their wedding. Such an assumption is made on the basis of interviews with the Polish-Ukrainian marriages resident in Warsaw. Thus, the number of foreigners who entered mixed marriages in the given year can be compared to the number of foreigners granted a PRP in the following year (see Table 5.1 and Table 6.5).
- <sup>536</sup> C. Kahn, 'Four Women: Immigrants in Cross-Cultural Marriages' in P.H. Elovitz, C. Kahn (eds.), *Immigrant Experiences. Personal Narrative and Psychological Analysis*, Cranbury, London, Mississauga, Associated University Press, 1997, pp. 199-220.
- <sup>537</sup> Compare: L. Ackers, *Shifting spaces. Women, Citizenship and Migration within the European Union*, Bristol, The Policy Press, 2000.
- <sup>538</sup> Simons, 'Mail Order Brides'.
- <sup>539</sup> M. Morokvasic, "'In and out" of the Labour Market: Immigrant and Minority Women in Europe', *New Community*, 19, 1993, 3, pp. 459-83.
- <sup>540</sup> Compare: N.D. Glenn, A.A. Ross, J.C.Taylor, 'Patterns of Interregional Mobility of Females through Marriage'. *American Sociological Review*, 39, 1974, pp.683-699 and N.D. Glenn, P.A.Taylor, 'The Utility of Education and Attractiveness for Females' Status Attainment through Marriage', *American Sociological Review*, 41, 1976, pp. 484-98.
- <sup>541</sup> G. Becker, *A Treatise on the Family*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, Harvard University Press, 1991.

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<sup>542</sup> V.N. Thandai, M.P. Todaro, 'Female Migration: a Conceptual Framework' in J.T. Fawcett, S. Khoo, P.C. Smith (eds.), *Women in the Cities of Asia. Migration and Urban Adaptation*, Boulder CO, Westview Press, 1984, pp. 36-59.

<sup>543</sup> Compare: L. Ackers, *Shifting spaces. Women, Citizenship and Migration within the European Union*, Bristol, The Policy Press, 2000.

<sup>544</sup> Compare: N. Rimashevskaja, 'Perestroika and the Status of Women in the Soviet Union' in S. Rai, H. Pilkington, A. Phizacklea *Women in the Face of Change. The Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and China*, London, New York, Routledge, 1992, pp. 11-19.

<sup>545</sup> Shu-Ju Ada Cheng, 'Labor Migration and International Sexual Division of Labor: a Feminist Perspective' in G.A. Kelson, D.L. DeLaet (eds.), *Gender and Immigration*, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, London, , Macmillan Press LTD, 1999, pp. 38-55.

<sup>546</sup> P. Boyle, K. Halfacree, V. Robinson, *Exploring Contemporary Migration*, New York, Longman, 1998

<sup>547</sup> Hammar, *Democracy and the Nation State*.

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# **APPENDIX I**

## **The Polish Immigration Law**

### **Selected Issues Concerning Settlement Migrants**

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### **1.1. General remarks**

Poland became an immigration country only recently and the Polish law on foreigners is still being formulated. It has been improving and adjusting to the constantly emerging problems and situations. Before 1989, the law was quite liberal, especially for foreigners from countries of the Soviet bloc. At that time, it was relatively easy for them to obtain a work permit, as well as a Permanent Residence Permit in Poland. After 1989, Polish legislation on foreigners became stricter as a response to the rapid increase in the volume of foreigners coming to Poland mainly from the former USSR. A 'new', considerably altered 'Aliens Law', was introduced at the beginning of 1998. The latter radically transformed the procedures of legalisation of migrants' status in Poland. Moreover, Poland as a country which is soon expected to join the European Union has to adjust its immigration law to the EU standards. Thus, further amendments in this law were introduced in 2000-2001 and some others are expected in the near future.

The appendix presents selected elements of the Polish immigration law with an emphasis on issues related to the legal integration of settlement migrants in Poland. One of its sections is devoted to particular regulations concerning Ukrainian migrants in Poland. Due to the fact that data presented in the dissertation refer to the period before 2000, this appendix is devoted mainly to the procedures in effect in Poland during this period. The changes introduced to the Polish immigration law in 2000-2001 are presented only in the last section. These changes influence the potential patterns for the legal integration of migrants in Poland. Thus, they will have an impact on the most recent and the future settlement migration to Poland.


### **1.2. The legal integration of migrants in Poland – potential trajectories**

The integration of migrants in a destination country is a very complicated process involving economic, social, cultural, but also the legal aspects of their adaptation (Richmond, 1969). Legal integration refers to the process of legalisation of a migrant's status in the destination country. Its complexity and duration, as well as the framework of its phases directly depends on the immigration policy of a given destination country.

In Poland, the population of settlement migrants is diversified in terms of the stage of legal integration at which they find themselves. Namely it is diversified in terms of the legal status of foreigners concerned. Migrants usually have to take a few steps in the legalisation of their status. There are a few possible scenarios for this process, which are presented in Figure 1.1. Certainly, the whole legislation route proposed in the Figure is valid for only a part of the immigrant population in Poland. A large group of foreigners came to Poland with a visa or a work permit. Thus, they did not start their stay in Poland as illegal migrants. Moreover, prior to 1998, there was no requirement for acquiring a TRP in Poland, as the latter was introduced by the 'Aliens Law' put into force at the beginning of 1998. Before the introduction of the TRP, short-term migrants stayed in Poland on the basis of visas, whereas settlement migrants were being granted a PRP relatively shortly after they had settled in Poland. Nevertheless, the chart demonstrates that the acquisition of Polish citizenship is the only way to skip some of the steps in the legalisation route. Otherwise, a migrant has to pass every stage in the order as determined by the Polish legislation. It should be noted, however, that the acquisition of Polish citizenship is possible only in certain situations.



Figure 1A.1 Scheme of legal integration



Source: Own proposal

### **1.3. The legal integration – description of selected groups of migrants in Poland**

#### **1.3.1. *Illegal migrants***

The population of illegal migrants in Poland is very large. According to estimations, they outnumber legal foreign residents in Poland (around 50 thousand settlement migrants). Moreover, research carried out on this group over the last few years suggests that the dynamics of influx of illegal migrants to Poland is much higher than the dynamics of official inflow. The group of illegal migrants comprises mostly foreigners from the former USSR, but also from Asia and especially from Vietnam. There is also a group of transit migrants who pass through Poland on their way to Western countries. They also usually stay illegally in Poland.

A certain proportion of the illegal migrants in Poland are overstayers. Such migrants reside in Poland without proper permission. If they have any, they usually only hold temporary registration. Nevertheless, their households are based in Poland. For migrants who enjoy the right of free entry to Poland for a limited period as tourists, it is particularly easy to become overstayers. They only need to travel between Poland and their home countries frequently enough so as to be entitled to their stay in Poland. Thus, such migrants stay legally in Poland whilst working there, illegally. Some proportion of the overstayers will become settlement migrants in Poland in the future. It should be noted, however, that most of them perceive the procedure concerning legalisation of their status in Poland as very complicated and difficult to fulfil, if not, in fact, beyond their reach.

#### **1.3.2. *Visas holders***

There are two types of visas in Poland: with and without a work permit. They are designed for people who come to Poland for a limited period - usually less than a year. The visas are usually granted for a few months (six months at most). It is relatively difficult to acquire a work permit (visa) in Poland, as only a prospective employer of a foreigner can apply for one. Thus, a migrant has to find an employer who would agree to hire him/her first. The latter is not easy, as the engagement of a foreigner involves extra costs and the employer has to prove that he/she is not able to find a suitable Polish worker for a given post. The above difficulties do not apply to employees of large international companies who are usually sent to Poland by their employers. Moreover, such high-skilled foreign workers may have either Polish or

foreign contracts. The acquisition of a visa without a work permit is less complicated. A foreigner has to have a person who would provide him/her with accommodation in Poland.

These visas were widely used in Poland in the past (before the 1998). At present, those who work in Poland can acquire a TRP, if their contracts in Poland are for a long enough period. A TRP is more convenient than a visa, as a TRP is usually granted for the overall duration of a foreigner's planned stay in Poland.

### **1.3.3. TRP holders**

A TRP is designed for those who have a reason for staying in Poland for at least twelve months. It is issued for a period not longer than two years and it can be prolonged. In total, a foreigner can stay in Poland on the basis of a TRP at most for ten years. The acquisition of a TRP does not imply the right to work in Poland. For example, students are entitled to one, as they have to be in Poland for at least one academic year, but their TRPs are not accompanied by work permits. The employees of Polish companies who have long-term contracts can be granted a TRP with a work permit. Foreign businessmen who want to establish their own businesses in Poland are also entitled to a TRP, but they have to document that they possess an initial capital of 4 thousand PLN (about 1 thousand USD). Foreigners married to Polish citizens are the fourth group of migrants who qualify for being granted a TRP in Poland. It should be noted that, even when granted a TRP, settlement migrants of this type do not necessarily have the right to work in Poland unless they are employees of Polish companies or businessmen. In fact, settlement migrants, such as spouses of Polish citizens, are usually granted a TRP without a work permit.

### **1.3.4. PRP holders**

A PRP may be issued when a foreigner has stayed in Poland on the basis of a TRP for at least three years, but successful applicants have to satisfy other requirements also. They have to prove strong and long-term attachments to Poland in terms of family or economic ties. Moreover, a PRP may be granted only to those foreigners who are able to maintain themselves in Poland and who have a place there (apartment, house etc) in which they can live permanently. When issued, a PRP gives migrants practically all rights which are needed for daily life in Poland. The exception are political rights, in particular the right to vote in Poland. There are also some professions which are not

available for non-Polish citizens at all or are subject to some restrictions (for example, such professions as: soldiers, lawyers). Moreover, it can be more difficult for a non-Polish citizen to buy Polish land unless a migrant lives permanently at a Polish address.

From 1998 onward the procedure concerning the acquisition of a PRP is more complicated than it used to be before the introduction of the changed 'Aliens Law'. For example, before 1998, a PRP was granted practically automatically to foreigners who married Polish citizens. Nowadays, such migrants can also receive a PRP only after possessing a TRP during three years. This means that after 1997 for foreigners married to Polish citizens the period of stay in Poland which would entitle them to a PRP, became three years longer.

### ***1.3.5. Acquisition of Polish citizenship***

There are three types of the procedures for the acquisition of Polish citizenship: (1) automatic acquisition, (2) acquisition applied for, not subject to discretionary power, and (3) acquisition applied for, subject to discretionary power. The automatic acquisition of Polish citizenship applies to children of migrants rather than to migrants themselves. A child of a Polish citizen and a foreigner, born in Poland, acquires Polish citizenship automatically if the parents have not declared within three months from its birth that they want it to be a citizen of the country of the foreign parent.

The other two non-automatic procedures of acquisition of Polish citizenship are appropriate for settlement migrants. There are four such procedures. Three of them may be classified as acquisition applied for, not subject to discretionary power, whereas the remaining one is the subject to discretionary power.

#### **Acknowledgement as Polish citizen** (hereafter 'acknowledgement' procedure)

People who do not have any citizenship and who have been living in Poland on the basis of a PRP for at least five years can be granted Polish citizenship.

#### **Marriage to a Polish citizen** (hereafter 'marriage' procedure)

Before 1998, this procedure applied only to women. A woman who had married a Polish man was entitled to apply for Polish citizenship within three months from the date of wedding. After 1997, the 'marriage' procedure was changed. At the present, both female and male foreigners married to Polish citizens can apply for Polish citizenship using this procedure. They become entitled to it after they have been married

to Polish citizens for at least three years and have held a PRP for at least six months. It is virtually an automatic procedure unless it happens to be a bogus marriage.

### Repatriation

People who classify as repatriates from another country (in practice this applies almost exclusively to citizens of the former USSR) and who came to Poland on the basis of a repatriation visa in Poland issued in their countries of origin, can apply for Polish citizenship. In this case, Polish citizenship is granted automatically and is not subject to discretionary power.

### Conferment of Polish citizenship (hereafter 'conferment' procedure)

This procedure is the only one which can be considered as acquisition of Polish citizenship applied for, which is a subject to discretionary power. It applies to situations when the President of Poland grants Polish citizenship to a person who has been living in Poland on the basis of a PRP for at least five years. In particular cases, Polish citizenship may be granted also to foreigners who have lived in Poland for a shorter period. For example, Polish citizenship can be granted to migrants who render some services to Poland or who may be considered as valuable assets, as well as those who can prove their very strong ties with Poland. It should be noted that the president could require the renunciation of an applicant's previous citizenship.

In general, only a section of newly admitted Polish citizens can retain their previous citizenship. The 'marriage' and the 'conferment' procedures allow for that. In the latter, however, applicants are sometimes asked to relinquish their former citizenship. Moreover, according to international regulations, citizens of the republics of the former USSR, which succeeded to the agreement on avoidance of dual citizenship signed in 1966 between Poland and the USSR are obliged to renounce their citizenship of origin (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan have not succeeded to this agreement. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia have not declared their position in this agreement.). This applies also to foreigners from the Czech Republic and Slovakia as a similar agreement was also signed between Poland and Czechoslovakia.

Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan have not succeeded to this agreement. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia have not declared their position in this agreement.

#### ***1.3.6. Polish law on Ukrainian migrants***

Ukrainian migrants enjoy the right to free entry to Poland as tourists for a period not longer than three months. In fact, many Ukrainian migrants take advantage of this law so as to trade or take up seasonal work in Poland. To stay legally in Poland, they only have to have temporary registration in Poland (usually for two months). Due to such a visa-free regime it is very easy for Ukrainian migrants to become overstayers in Poland. They usually travel back and forth between Poland and Ukraine, as when they leave the Polish territory they are entitled to another three-month stay while coming back to Poland. To legalise their status permanently, Ukrainian migrants have to follow the usual path and go through all its stages. They need visas to stay in Poland for longer than three months and they are obliged to possess work permits to work there legally. It should be noted that the acquisition of Polish citizenship is usually a difficult decision for Ukrainian migrants since they have to relinquish their Ukrainian citizenship to be granted Polish citizenship. It restrains some settlement migrants from applying for citizenship.

#### **1.4. Changes in the Polish immigration law introduced in 2000-2001**

Changes in the Polish immigration law in 2000-2001 will have an impact on the modes of migration and legal integration of the most recent migrants and foreigners and those who will be coming to Poland in the future. As a consequence of the development of Polish immigration law and its adjustment to the European Union's standards, two main legal acts concerning immigration, namely the 'Aliens Law' (changed in 21.04.2001) and 'Citizenship Law' (changed in 14.04.2000) were reconsidered and a new act – the 'Repatriation Law' – was introduced (put into force in 5.12.2000).

It appears that the changes introduced to the 'Aliens Law' will be the most important and influential in shaping further migratory trends and modes of operation of migrants coming to Poland. Here, I present only those amendments which appear to be the most pertinent for the prospective settlement migration to Poland. Firstly, regulations concerning the acquisition of a TRP and a PRP in Poland were changed. On the one hand, requirements concerning acquisition of a TRP became more liberal, as to

be entitled to one a foreigner has to have reasons for staying in Poland for only six months instead of twelve months, as used to be the case in the past. On the other hand, the period of a stay in Poland required for the acquisition of a PRP has been prolonged from three to five years. It should be, however, noted that, before, stay only on the basis of a TRP was counted to the three-year period required for a PRP, whereas at the moment also stay on the basis of various visas can be included in the calculation of time spent in Poland by migrants.

The group of foreigners entitled to a TRP at present is broader than in the past. Additional categories of migrants included in this group are: foreign artists, trainees and participants of various courses related to the European Union's programs, foreigners who can not be expelled from Poland as well as relatives of immigrant workers in Poland. It should be noted, however, that additional requirements were introduced for students and foreigners married to Polish citizens applying for a TRP in Poland. A TRP may be issued to foreign students only when they can prove that they are able to maintain themselves during their studies in Poland. As far as foreigners married to Polish citizens are concerned, a new crucial element was added to the collection of requirements related to the acquisition of a TRP in Poland. Beginning with 2001, marriages between foreigners and Polish citizens will be the subject of control so as to identify bogus marriages. Foreigners involved in the latter are not entitled to a TRP. Beforehand, the issue of bogus marriages was hardly noted in regulations concerning foreigners in Poland.

The category of foreigners entitled to a PRP in Poland did not grow considerably as a consequence of reconsideration of the 'Aliens Law' in 2001. Additional categories of migrants, however, also include: minors, born in Poland of foreigners among whom at least one has a PRP in Poland and foreigners who have stayed in Poland at least ten years on the basis of various visas or a TRP. In the latter case the other requirements (ties with Poland and adequate source of income) are not of main importance. The other important change in requirements concerning the acquisition of a PRP implies worse opportunities for students for staying permanently in Poland. This is because a stay on the basis of a 'student' TRP in Poland is not counted towards the five-year period required for a PRP.

Another new element in the 'Aliens Law' involves a crucial change in the overall Polish immigration policy. Beginning with 2001, family reunion is considered as

a particular type of migration which deserves separate promotional regulations. Relatives of migrants are entitled to a TRP in Poland when those inviting them stay in Poland on the basis of a PRP or at least for three years on the basis of a TRP. In the past, there were very limited opportunities for family reunion in Poland. Thus, this new regulation may have a profound impact on the future settlement migration to Poland, since migration under auspices of family reunion is usually a crucial part of the overall settlement migration to a given destination country.

There were few important amendments made in the 'Citizenship Law' in 2000. The main change was that the repatriation clause was virtually removed from this act. At the same time, a separate 'Repatriation Law' was introduced in 2000. The latter determines the detailed rules of repatriation procedure. According to this, repatriates have the right to the automatic acquisition of Polish citizenship on entering Poland. Thus, the procedure concerning repatriates' acquisition of Polish citizenship remained unchanged after the amendments made in 2000. It should be noted, however, that the 'Repatriation Law' limits the group of countries from which repatriates can originate. According to this law only foreigners from the Asian republics of the former USSR are entitled to a repatriation visa to Poland. This applies to the following countries Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Asian part of the Russian Federation.



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# **APPENDIX II**

## **Tables for Chapter VI**

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Table 2A.1 Stock of denizens from the former Soviet Union on 31.12.99 in Poland according to citizenship

| Citizenship                                             | N      | %   |
|---------------------------------------------------------|--------|-----|
| Armenia                                                 | 485    | 4   |
| Belarus                                                 | 1,513  | 13  |
| Kazakhstan                                              | 343    | 3   |
| Lithuania                                               | 509    | 4   |
| Russia                                                  | 3,502  | 30  |
| Ukraine                                                 | 4,474  | 38  |
| Other republics of the former Soviet Union <sup>c</sup> | 833    | 7   |
| Total                                                   | 11,659 | 100 |

<sup>a</sup> If a person was stateless, but information about his or her former citizenship was available, I include the latter.

<sup>b</sup> For 452 foreigners from the former Soviet Union, the republics of origin were not known. These people are considered as citizens of 'Other republics of the former Soviet Union'.

Source: Own calculation on the basis of data provided by the Ministry of Interior and Administration in Poland

Table 2A.2 Foreigners from the former Soviet Union who returned their PRPs because they acquired Polish citizenship (according to country of birth) <sup>a</sup>

| Country of birth   | N     | %   |
|--------------------|-------|-----|
| Armenia            | 26    | 1   |
| Belarus            | 288   | 14  |
| Kazakhstan         | 226   | 11  |
| Lithuania          | 149   | 7   |
| Russia             | 503   | 24  |
| Ukraine            | 724   | 35  |
| Others             | 165   | 8   |
| Total <sup>b</sup> | 2,081 | 100 |

<sup>a</sup> For those who were born in Poland I include their citizenship. This refers to: six migrants from Belarus, one migrant from Kazakhstan, seven migrants from Russia, four migrants from Ukraine, and thirteen migrants from other republics of the former USSR.

Source: Own calculation on the basis of data provided by the Ministry of Interior and Administration in Poland

Table 2A.3 Denizens from the former Soviet Union issued PRPs after 1991 according to gender and citizenship<sup>a</sup>

| Citizenship                                | Total        | Male         |           | Female       |           |
|--------------------------------------------|--------------|--------------|-----------|--------------|-----------|
|                                            | N            | N            | %         | N            | %         |
| Armenia                                    | 357          | 212          | 59        | 145          | 41        |
| Belarus                                    | 1,091        | 273          | 25        | 818          | 75        |
| Kazakhstan                                 | 265          | 121          | 46        | 144          | 54        |
| Lithuania                                  | 391          | 99           | 25        | 292          | 75        |
| Russia                                     | 2,016        | 546          | 27        | 1,470        | 73        |
| Ukraine                                    | 3,328        | 1,070        | 32        | 2,258        | 68        |
| Former Soviet Union <sup>b</sup>           | 267          | 110          | 41        | 157          | 59        |
| Other republics of the former Soviet Union | 289          | 130          | 45        | 159          | 55        |
| <b>Total</b>                               | <b>8,004</b> | <b>2,561</b> | <b>32</b> | <b>5,443</b> | <b>68</b> |

<sup>a</sup> If a person was stateless, but information about his or her former citizenship was available, I include the latter.

<sup>b</sup> This group consists of foreigners who were classified in the database as citizens of the former USSR

Source: Own calculation on the basis of data provided by the Ministry of Interior and Administration in Poland

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# **APPENDIX III**

## **The Polish-Ukrainian Marriages in Warsaw**

### **Description of the Research Group**

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**SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF POLISH-UKRAINIAN COUPLES**

| Symbol          | Date of U first arrival to Poland | Goal of U first arrival | Date of wedding | Duration of relationship before marriage | Cohabitation before marriage | Sex of U | Marital status of P <sup>b</sup> | Marital status of U <sup>b</sup> | Common children | Date of man's birth | Date of woman's birth | Education of P | Education of U |
|-----------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------|------------------------------------------|------------------------------|----------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------|---------------------|-----------------------|----------------|----------------|
| <b>Migrants</b> |                                   |                         |                 |                                          |                              |          |                                  |                                  |                 |                     |                       |                |                |
| 6MW             | 1991                              | trade                   | 1995            | 3 years                                  | yes                          | woman    | divorced                         | divorced                         | 0               | 1950                | 1949                  | N.A.           | N.A.           |
| 9MW             | 1988                              | trade                   | 1995            | 5 years                                  | no                           | woman    | single                           | single                           | 1               | 1956                | 1962                  | university     | university     |
| 11MW            | 1995                              | seasonal work           | 1998            | 1 year                                   | no                           | woman    | single                           | single                           | 1               | 1975                | 1977                  | vocational     | secondary      |
| 14MW            | 1991                              | seasonal work           | 1995            | 1 year                                   | no                           | man      | single                           | single                           | 1               | 1973                | 1971                  | vocational     | vocational     |
| 16MW            | 1992                              | job <sup>a</sup>        | 1995            | a few weeks                              | no                           | woman    | widower                          | divorced                         | 0               | 1903                | 1958                  | N.A.           | university     |
| 18MW            | 1991                              | 'excursion'             | 1993            | 2 years (almost)                         | yes                          | woman    | divorced                         | single                           | 0               | 1951                | 1971                  | N.A.           | secondary      |
| 20MW            | 1990                              | job                     | 1997            | 3 years                                  | yes                          | man      | divorced                         | divorced                         | 0               | 1949                | 1954                  | secondary      | university     |
| 22MW            | 1993                              | trade                   | 1996            | 3 months                                 | no                           | woman    | divorced                         | widow                            | 0               | 1948                | 1967                  | vocational     | university     |
| 24MW            | 1993                              | trade                   | 1995            | 1 year                                   | no                           | woman    | single                           | single                           | N.A.            | 1964                | 1963                  | vocational     | university     |
| 28MW            | 1990                              | job                     | 1991            | 9 months                                 | yes                          | man      | single                           | single                           | 2               | 1966                | 1964                  | university     | university     |
| 31MW            | 1996                              | seasonal work           | 1998            | 1 year                                   | yes                          | woman    | widower                          | widow                            | 1               | 1966                | 1970                  | secondary      | university     |
| 32MW            | 1989                              | job                     | 1995            | 6 years                                  | yes                          | woman    | single                           | single                           | 0               | 1963                | 1959                  | university     | university     |
| 34MW            | 1991                              | job                     | 1993            | 2 years                                  | yes                          | woman    | single                           | single                           | 1               | 1959                | 1968                  | secondary      | secondary      |
| 35MW            | 1994                              | seasonal work           | 1996            | 4 months                                 | no                           | woman    | single                           | single                           | 1               | 1970                | 1975                  | vocational     | secondary      |
| 38MW            | 1994                              | seasonal work           | 1996            | 5 months                                 | no                           | woman    | single                           | single                           | 0               | 1968                | 1966                  | vocational     | vocational     |

U - Ukrainian partner

P - Polish partner

<sup>a</sup> job which requires adequate skills

<sup>b</sup> refers to marital status before marriage with a foreigner

**SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF POLISH-UKRAINIAN COUPLES - CONTINUATION**

| Symbol                                                              | Type of 'migrant' | Occupation of 'migrant' in Poland                           | Migratory orientation |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|
| <b>Migrants continuation - characteristics of Ukrainian spouses</b> |                   |                                                             |                       |
| 6MW                                                                 | trader            | trader                                                      | other                 |
| 9MW                                                                 | skilled worker    | English teacher                                             | other                 |
| 11MW                                                                | unskilled worker  | worker in agriculture                                       | other                 |
| 14MW                                                                | unskilled worker  | worker in agriculture and construction                      | other                 |
| 16MW                                                                | skilled worker    | masseuse                                                    | long-term             |
| 18MW                                                                | trader            | worker in company providing traders with various facilities | long-term             |
| 20MW                                                                | skilled worker    | bioenergotherapist                                          | long-term             |
| 22MW                                                                | trader            | trader                                                      | long-term             |
| 24MW                                                                | trader            | trader                                                      | short-term            |
| 28MW                                                                | skilled worker    | English teacher                                             | other                 |
| 31MW                                                                | unskilled worker  | seasonal worker - various jobs                              | short-term            |
| 32MW                                                                | skilled worker    | worker in a Polish company                                  | other                 |
| 34MW                                                                | skilled worker    | ballet dancer                                               | other                 |
| 35MW                                                                | unskilled worker  | dressmaker                                                  | short-term            |
| 38MW                                                                | unskilled worker  | dressmaker                                                  | short-term            |

U - Ukrainian partner

P - Polish partner

<sup>a</sup> job which requires adequate skills

<sup>b</sup> refers to marital status before marriage with a foreigner

**SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF POLISH-UKRAINIAN COUPLES - CONTINUATION**

| Symbol            | Date of U first arrival to Poland | Goal of U first arrival | Date of wedding | Duration of relationship before marriage | Cohabitation before marriage | Sex of U | Marital status of P <sup>b</sup> | Marital status of U <sup>b</sup> | Common children | Date of man's birth | Date of woman's birth | Education of P | Education of U |
|-------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------|------------------------------------------|------------------------------|----------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------|---------------------|-----------------------|----------------|----------------|
| <b>Travellers</b> |                                   |                         |                 |                                          |                              |          |                                  |                                  |                 |                     |                       |                |                |
| 3MW               | 1990                              | to visit friends        | 1990            | 1 year                                   | no                           | woman    | single                           | N.A.                             | 0               | 1958                | 1965                  | university     | university     |
| 4MW               | 1990                              | to study                | 1997            | 3 months                                 | no                           | woman    | single                           | single                           | 1               | N.A.                | 1972                  | N.A.           | university     |
| 8MW               | 1989                              | tourism                 | 1992            | 7 months                                 | yes                          | man      | single                           | single                           | 1               | 1967                | 1969                  | vocational     | university     |
| 10MW              | 1992                              | to study                | 1996            | 4 months                                 | no                           | woman    | single                           | single                           | 1               | 1970                | 1974                  | university     | secondary      |
| 15MW              | N.A.                              | tourism                 | 1992            | 1 year                                   | no                           | man      | single                           | single                           | 1               | 1965                | 1967                  | university     | university     |
| 19MW              | 1991                              | to study                | 1997            | 2 years                                  | yes                          | woman    | single                           | single                           | 0               | 1962                | 1972                  | secondary      | university     |
| 21MW              | 1995                              | to visit family         | 1997            | 3 years                                  | yes                          | woman    | single                           | single                           | pregnancy       | 1976                | 1969                  | vocational     | university     |
| 26MW              | 1994                              | to study                | 1996            | 1 year                                   | no                           | woman    | single                           | single                           | 1               | 1973                | 1972                  | secondary      | university     |
| 29MW              | 1994                              | to visit friends        | 1996            | 2 years                                  | yes                          | woman    | single                           | single                           | 0               | 1955                | 1972                  | secondary      | secondary      |
| 36MW              | 1987                              | to visit family         | 1997            | 8 months                                 | no                           | woman    | single                           | single                           | 1               | 1969                | 1967                  | vocational     | secondary      |

U - Ukrainian partner

P - Polish partner

<sup>a</sup> job which requires adequate skills

<sup>b</sup> refers to marital status before marriage with a foreigner

**SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF POLISH-UKRAINIAN COUPLES - CONTINUATION**

| Symbol                      | Date of U first arrival to Poland | Goal of U first arrival | Date of wedding | Duration of relationship before marriage | Cohabitation before marriage | Sex of U | Marital status of P <sup>b</sup> | Marital status of U <sup>b</sup> | Common children | Date of man's birth | Date of woman's birth | Education of P | Education of U |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------|------------------------------------------|------------------------------|----------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------|---------------------|-----------------------|----------------|----------------|
| <b>Stayers</b>              |                                   |                         |                 |                                          |                              |          |                                  |                                  |                 |                     |                       |                |                |
| 5MW                         | 1997                              | to prosp .husb.         | 1998            | 1 year                                   | no                           | woman    | single                           | single                           | pregnancy       | 1967                | 1976                  | secondary      | secondary      |
| 25MW                        | 1992                              | to prosp .husb.         | 1995            | 3 years                                  | yes                          | woman    | divorced                         | single                           | 1               | 1964                | 1970                  | secondary      | secondary      |
| 27MW                        | 1997                              | with husband            | 1997            | 3 months                                 | no                           | woman    | single                           | single                           | 0               | 1965                | 1976                  | secondary      | secondary      |
| 30MW                        | 1994                              | to prosp .husb.         | 1996            | 2 years                                  | yes                          | woman    | single                           | single                           | 1               | 1964                | 1970                  | N.A.           | university     |
| 33MW                        | 1991                              | with husband            | 1995            | 5 years                                  | yes                          | woman    | divorced                         | single                           | 1               | 1961                | 1970                  | secondary      | university     |
| 37MW                        | 1993                              | to prosp .husb.         | 1995            | 2.5 years                                | yes                          | woman    | single                           | divorced                         | 1               | 1959                | 1966                  | secondary      | university     |
| <b>Bi-migrant marriages</b> |                                   |                         |                 |                                          |                              |          |                                  |                                  |                 |                     |                       |                |                |
| 12MW                        | 1989                              | to prosp .husb.         | 1990            | 1 year                                   | no                           | woman    | divorced                         | divorced                         | 0               | 1954                | 1961                  | university     | university     |
| 17MW                        | 1995                              | to prosp. wife          | 1996            | 1 year                                   | no                           | man      | single                           | single                           | 0               | 1969                | 1971                  | university     | university     |
| <b>Arranged marriage</b>    |                                   |                         |                 |                                          |                              |          |                                  |                                  |                 |                     |                       |                |                |
| 7MW                         | 1991                              | tourism                 | 1994            | 5 months                                 | no                           | woman    | divorced                         | divorced                         | 0               | 1929                | 1946                  | university     | university     |

U - Ukrainian partner

P - Polish partner

<sup>a</sup> job which requires adequate skills

<sup>b</sup> refers to marital status before marriage with a foreigner



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# **APPENDIX IV**

## **The Polish-Ukrainian Marriages in Warsaw**

### **The Case Studies Excluded from the Analysis**

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## LIST OF CASES

| Symbol | Date of an interview | Characteristic of respondents and interviews                                                                                                |
|--------|----------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1 CM   | 8.10.98              | Both partners who planned to get married three weeks after the interview                                                                    |
| 2 CM   | 16.09.98             | A Polish wife – short conversation at a place of the woman's work. The interview was not recorded, as the respondent did not agree to that. |
| 3 CM   | 8.01.00              | A new partner of a Polish woman who used to be involved in a Polish-Ukrainian marriage                                                      |
| 4 CM   | 9.01.00              | A Polish ex-husband – the short conversation, the interviewer was not let in.                                                               |
| 5 CM   | 15.01.00             | Polish relatives – short recorded conversation                                                                                              |
| 6 CM   | 30.01.00             | Both partners – the interview was not recorded because of technical problems                                                                |
| 7 CM   | 27.02.00             | A Polish ex-husband – long recorded interview, which brought very poor information                                                          |
| 8 CM   | 19.03.00             | A Polish wife – a short conversation                                                                                                        |
| 9 CM   | 19.03.00             | A Polish ex-husband – a short conversation, interviewer was not let in.                                                                     |
| 10 CM  | 19.03.00             | A mother of a Polish husband – a short conversation. The couple was abroad at the time of the research                                      |

## DESCRIPTION OF THE CASES

## 1CM

It is not known if marriage was contracted (it was scheduled three weeks after the interview). The man was Polish born in 1952 and the woman was Ukrainian born in 1968. She originated from a small town close to Lviv. The woman was pregnant at the time of the research.

This was the second interview in the research and it lacks some important information, therefore, I did not include it in my analyses. However, there is something special in this story. I phoned this couple more than half a year after the interview (in June 1999). The man's daughter from the previous marriage picked up the phone. I asked for her mother (by which I meant the man's Ukrainian wife), but she said that her mother was at work and would be back in the afternoon. When I saw the confusion I asked for the Ukrainian woman. The girl said that she was not in Poland, that she had

gone to Ukraine and she did not know when she might come to Poland. It is not obvious what really happened, but many things must have changed from the date of the interview.

### **2CM**

A marriage was contracted in 1998 in Warsaw between a Ukrainian man born in 1955 and a Polish woman. The Polish wife's date of birth is not known. She said only that she was much older than her Ukrainian husband. There was no divorce and the couple still lives together. They met via a match-making organisation. The Ukrainian was determined to stay in Poland, according to his wife.

Information about this couple is very poor. The interview was conducted in the place where the Polish woman worked. She was answering questions very unwillingly and she did not agree to a recording.

### **3CM**

The marriage was contracted in 1992 in Warsaw between a Polish woman born in 1955 and a Ukrainian man born in 1961. The man was from Lviv. There was no divorce, but according to the new Polish partner of that woman, the marriage lasted only one year. The woman and her new Polish partner still had contact with the Ukrainian at the moment of the research (he was in Ukraine at the time). This is not necessarily a bogus marriage, but there are some factors which give rise to suspicions. The place where the Polish woman lived is very close to the Bazar Różyckiego, which is a big bazaar in Warsaw, in which Ukrainians can be easily met. The woman works on this bazaar. Probably the Polish-Ukrainian couple met there. Another thing is that the ex-partners still had contact, with each other. It is likely that the woman helped her Ukrainian friend to legalise his status in Poland.

The interview was very short. It lasted about five minutes. The man (the Polish woman's new partner) gave the interviewer a phone number to arrange a proper interview, but the Polish woman did not agree to the meeting.

### **4CM**

The marriage was contracted in 1998 between a Polish man born in 1950 and a Ukrainian woman born in 1967. The Ukrainian was from Crimea. They married one and a half months after they got to know each other. They divorced in 1999, hence the

marriage lasted one year. It was the husband who initiated the divorcing procedure. The man admitted very readily that this marriage was a contract, but it was not clear what were the rules of this contract. According to his opinion, his ex-wife married him because of his apartment, which became a hotel for other Ukrainian migrants. She herself did not live in this apartment, but was shuttling between Poland and Ukraine. She did not acquire any Polish documents and was staying only on short-term visas in Poland. The Polish man decided to divorce, as according to his opinion, the Ukrainian woman did not fulfil the requirements of their contract. It seems he expected that she would behave as his wife, at least by helping him to run the household. It should be noted that the mother of this Ukrainian woman was also married to a Polish man and she lives in Poland at the present time.

This interview lasted about fifteen minutes. The interviewer was not let into the apartment of the respondent. The conversation took place in the hall of a block of flats.

#### **5CM**

The marriage was contracted in 1994 in Warsaw between a Ukrainian man born in 1971 and a Polish woman born in 1973. They have been divorced since 1997. The man came to Poland for seasonal work in 1993 to his family in Poland. Here, he got to know his future wife. They had known each other for one year before the marriage. After the wedding they went to Ukraine. They had one child. However, they were not a happy couple and his wife left him and came back to Poland after two years. This was the only couple in my sample which went to Ukraine after the wedding.

The interview was conducted in the apartment of the Polish family of the Ukrainian. The respondent was the wife of a brother of the Ukrainian's grandmother. The conversation was recorded.

#### **6CM**

The marriage was contracted in 1998 in Warsaw between a Polish man born in 1950 and a Ukrainian woman born in 1945. They had known each other one year before the marriage, but they started to cohabit soon after they met. There was no divorce and the couple still lives together. The woman came to Poland for the first time in 1994 to do seasonal work on a farm. She had been working there for one year. Then, she had come back to Ukraine and took up her next migration to Poland in 1997 also to do

seasonal work on a farm. During this migration, she met her prospective Polish husband who came to the farm, where she was working, to do some construction jobs.

It was a regular interview with both partners. Unfortunately, it was not recorded because of technical problems.

**7CM**

The marriage was contracted in 1995 between a Polish man born in 1947 and a Ukrainian woman born in 1973. The divorce is in progress. The woman was the second Ukrainian wife of the man. She was a stripper in Kiev. He brought her to Poland and helped her to find a job in Warsaw as a stripper. According to the opinion of the respondent, she became a prostitute in Poland. After some time, she left him and started a relationship with a citizen of the United States.

This interview, although very long (one and a half hour), brought very poor information. The respondent – Polish husband - was very talkative but he did not stick to the topic. He preferred to complain about various things or to talk about women and sex.

**8CM**

The marriage was contracted in 1990 in Warsaw between a Polish woman born in 1943 and a Ukrainian man born in 1947. The man originated from Odessa. There was no divorce, but the couple split after three months from the wedding. They had known each other one year before the marriage. They met at a party. The man was prosperous and was taking the woman for attractive international excursions. It was clear to the Polish respondent that the Ukrainian man married her not only because she was an attractive woman, but also because he wanted to obtain Polish documents. It was a kind of contract but they tried to live together. However, the woman left the Ukrainian man, as she did not like the way he had treated her, requiring from her to devote herself to housework.

This interview was conducted in the apartment of the Polish woman and lasted only twenty minutes. She did not agree to the recording of the interview.

**9CM**

The marriage was contracted in 1997 between a Polish man born in 1965 and a Ukrainian woman born in 1971. It was not a conversation. The young man opened the

door, but told by an interviewer about a purpose of the research he said: 'We divorced long time ago. I just helped this young girl. It was a long time ago. I am sorry but I have to take care of a child.' It is clear that the marriage lasted for a very short time.

#### **10CM**

The marriage was contracted in 1997 between a Polish man born in 1973 and a Ukrainian woman born in 1973. There was no divorce and the couple live together. However, they had been away in Ukraine for over a year at the moment of the research. The Ukrainian woman came to Poland to work illegally. She met her prospective Polish husband in 1997. They had known each other three months before the marriage. They had a child at the time of the research.

Information about this couple is scarce as the interview was very short – about ten minutes - and was conducted only with the mother of the Polish husband in the frontyard.

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# **APPENDIX V**

## **The Representatives of the 'Old' Ukrainian Minority in Poland and Experts**

### **Description of the Research Group**

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**INTERVIEWS WITH EXPERTS**

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| <b>No.</b> | <b>DATE</b> | <b>SYMBOL</b> | <b>AFFILIATION AND ACTIVITIES OF<br/>RESPONDENTS</b>                                                        |
|------------|-------------|---------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1          | 16.06.98    | EW1           | The president of the Ukrainian Association in Poland                                                        |
| 2          | 2.07.98     | EW2           | An academician from the insitute in dealing with ethnic relations in East-Southern Poland                   |
| 3          | 3.07.98     | EW3           | An academician from the insitute dealing with ethnic relations in East-Southern Poland                      |
| 4          | 4.07.98     | EW4           | A journalist specialising in the Polish-Ukrainian ethnic and political relations                            |
| 5          | 28.07.98    | EW5           | A priest from the Greek Catholic Church in Warsaw                                                           |
| 6          | 28.07.98    | EW6           | A lady working in the Polish organisation supporting people of Polish origins resident in foreign countries |
| 7          | 28.08.99    | EW7           | The president of the Polish Association in Ukraine                                                          |
| 8          | 20.02.00    | EW8           | A priest from the Orthodox Church in Warsaw                                                                 |



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# **APPENDIX VI**

## **The Ukrainian Students in Warsaw**

### **Description of the Research Group**

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**INTERVIEWS WITH UKRAINIAN STUDENTS**


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| <b>No.</b> | <b>DATE</b> | <b>SYMBOL</b> | <b>TYPE OF A STUDENT'S INITIAL CAPITAL</b> |
|------------|-------------|---------------|--------------------------------------------|
| 1          | 12.07.98    | 1SW           | Polish ethnicity                           |
| 2          | 28.05.99    | 2SW           | High cultural capital                      |
| 3          | 30.05.99    | 3SW           | High cultural capital                      |
| 4          | 1.06.99     | 4SW           | High cultural capital                      |
| 5          | 1.06.99     | 5SW           | High cultural capital                      |
| 6          | 16.06.99    | 6SW           | High cultural capital                      |
| 7          | 22.06.99    | 7SW/1         | Polish ethnicity                           |
| 8          | 22.06.99    | 7SW/2         | Polish ethnicity                           |
| 9          | 19.07.99    | 8SW           | Parents work in Poland                     |
| 10         | 20.07.99    | 9SW           | Polish ethnicity                           |
| 11         | 17.11.99    | 11SW          | High cultural capital                      |
| 12         | 7.12.99     | 12SW          | Polish ethnicity/Human                     |
| 13         | 14.12.99    | 13SW          | Polish ethnicity                           |
| 14         | 16.12.99    | 15SW          | Polish ethnicity                           |
| 15         | 12.01.00    | 16SW          | High cultural capital                      |
| 16         | 23.03.00    | 18SW          | Parents work in Poland                     |

**SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF UKRAINIAN STUDENTS BY THEIR INITIAL CAPITAL**

| Symbol                        | Date of birth | Age at the momen of arrival to Poland | Gender | When studies began | Type of studies <sup>a</sup> | Duration of stay in Poland | Marital satus | Work in Poland | Knowledge of Polish | Knowledge of English |
|-------------------------------|---------------|---------------------------------------|--------|--------------------|------------------------------|----------------------------|---------------|----------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| <b>Polish origins</b>         |               |                                       |        |                    |                              |                            |               |                |                     |                      |
| 1SW                           | 1975          | 16                                    | man    | 1991               | MA/5                         | 7 years                    | single        | yes            | vary good           | learns               |
| 7SW/1                         | 1975          | 18                                    | woman  | 1993               | MA/5                         | 6 years                    | single        | a little       | very good           | NA                   |
| 7SW/2                         | 1975          | 18                                    | woman  | 1993               | MA/5                         | 6 years                    | single        | yes            | very good           | NA                   |
| 9SW                           | 1978          | 17                                    | man    | 1995               | MA/5                         | 4 years                    | single        | yes            | good                | knows                |
| 13SW                          | 1974          | 17                                    | woman  | 1991               | MA/5                         | 8 years                    | single        | yes            | very good           | NA                   |
| 15SW                          | 1979          | 17                                    | woman  | 1996               | MA/5                         | 3 years                    | single        | a little       | good                | NA                   |
| <b>High cultural capital</b>  |               |                                       |        |                    |                              |                            |               |                |                     |                      |
| 2SW                           | 1975          | 23                                    | man    | 1998               | PhD                          | 7 months                   | single        | yes            | poor                | learns               |
| 3SW                           | 1967          | 28                                    | woman  | 1995               | MA/1                         | 4 years                    | single        | a little       | very good           | yes                  |
| 4SW                           | 1976          | 22                                    | woman  | 1998               | PhD                          | 7 months                   | single        | no             | poor                | yes                  |
| 5SW                           | 1974          | 24                                    | woman  | 1998               | MA/1                         | 8 months                   | married       | a little       | poor                | yes                  |
| 6SW                           | 1968          | 27                                    | man    | 1995               | PhD                          | 4 years                    | single        | yes            | very poor           | yes                  |
| 11SW                          | 1976          | 22                                    | woman  | 1998               | MA/1                         | 1 year                     | married       | no             | very poor           | yes                  |
| 12SW                          | 1972          | 27                                    | woman  | 1999               | scholarship                  | 3 monts                    | married       | no             | very poor           | no                   |
| 16SW                          | 1974          | 25                                    | man    | 1999               | MA/1                         | 4 months                   | single        | no             | good                | yes                  |
| <b>Parents work in Poland</b> |               |                                       |        |                    |                              |                            |               |                |                     |                      |
| 8SW                           | 1974          | 11                                    | woman  | 1991               | MA/5                         | 15 years                   | single        | yes            | very good           | yes                  |
| 18SW                          | 1972          | 13                                    | man    | 1989               | MA/5                         | 15 years                   | single        | yes            | very good           | NA                   |

<sup>a</sup> There are two types of MA studies

MA/5 is a five-year program typical for the Polish educational system

MA/1 is a one-year program typical for Western Europe educational system

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# **APPENDIX VII**

## **The Polish-Ukrainian Marriages in Warsaw**

### **Scenario of the Interview**

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**I. ETHNIC ORIGINS AND A HISTORY OF THE FAMILY OF THE MIGRANT**

1. From which part of Ukraine does the migrant originate (*trace from grandparents; detailed names of villages*)?
2. Ethnicity of the migrant.
3. Does the migrant have Polish origins? What is his/her ethnic identity?
4. What was the language spoken in the family of the migrant?
5. What was the tradition in which the migrant was brought up (*emphasis on ethnicity and religion*)?
6. Does the migrant belong to any church? If yes, which church?

**II. HISTORY OF THE MARRIAGE**

7. When and how did the prospective partners get to know each other?
8. Which was the more active partner in the relationship?
9. What attracted each of them to the prospective partner?
10. For how long had the partners known each other before their wedding?
11. For how long have the couple been married?
12. Was the marriage contracted in a church (*a Catholic Church or an Orthodox Church*)?
13. Where was the marriage contracted – in Poland or in Ukraine (*why in this country*)?
14. In how many marriages was each partner involved before his/her Polish-Ukrainian marriage?
15. Description of previous marriages and relationships of each partner (*with this question very carefully*).
16. How much time did the partners spend together before their wedding (*how often were they meeting each other; in what circumstances were these meetings taking place; how long did these meetings last*)?
17. What was the longest period which the partners spent together at one time before the wedding?

**III. THE LEGALISATION OF A MIGRANT'S STATUS IN POLAND**

18. Just after the wedding, did the couple have any plans relating to the legalisation of the migrant's status in Poland?
19. Did the couple have any advisers while processing the legalisation of the migrant's status in Poland?
20. What were the requirements which the couple had to fulfil so as to contract the marriage in Poland?
21. What is the legal status of the migrant in Poland at the present (*description of the legalisation route and difficulties related to it; for how long has the migrant had Permanent Residence Permit and which voivodeship issued it*)?
22. Has the migrant applied for Polish citizenship or does he/she intend to acquire it in the future (*why*)?

#### IV. PROFESSIONAL AND FINANCIAL STATUS OF THE MIGRANT IN POLAND

23. What job did the migrant have before starting his/her migration to Poland (*if any*) and before a wedding?
24. What job does the migrant have in Poland at the present (*description of changes of jobs*)?
25. Was it difficult for the migrant to find a job in Poland? If yes, what kind of difficulties did he/she encounter?
26. What would be the job and financial prospects of the migrant in Ukraine if he/she did not marry a Polish citizen?

#### V. ADAPTATION OF THE MIGRANT

27. Knowledge of the Polish language; difficulties related to this issue.
28. What are/were attitudes of Polish people to the migrant (*what opinions about Ukrainians did he/she hear in Poland*)?
29. What were the attitudes of families of both partners to their marriage to the migrant?
30. What astonished the migrant after his/her arrival to Poland?
31. What were unpleasant situations which both partners encountered because of their marriage (*related to the marriage with the migrant*)?
32. Contacts with official institutions in Poland.
33. Cultural activities in Poland (*cinema, theatre*).
34. Does the migrant belong to any ethnic associations in Poland?
35. Social life in Poland (*with whom the couple socialises; are its friends mainly Polish people or migrants; what these foreign friends do in Poland*)?
36. Does the migrant have his/her family in Poland (*what family, maybe he/she brought his/her family to Poland*)?

#### VI. MIGRATORY HISTORY AND LEGAL STATUS OF THE MIGRANT IN POLAND

##### **INDIVIDUAL**

37. When the migrant came to Poland for the first time? For how long was that?
38. Description of the migrant's first stay in Poland (*with whom did he/she come; to whom did he/she go*).
39. What did the migrant know about Poland and Polish people before his/her first arrival to Poland (*the destination place in Poland; prices, accommodation, necessary documents, how to find a job etc.*)?
40. Had the migrant had any contacts with other Polish people before he/she took up his/her first migration to Poland (*those living either in Poland or Ukraine*)?
41. Had the migrant had any contacts with other people migrating to Poland before he/she took up his/her first migration to Poland?
42. Why did the migrant decide to go to Poland (*did someone advise it to him/her; did he/she get any help*)?

43. Were the subsequent trips to Poland of the migrant similar to the first one? If not, what were the main differences (*duration, activities in Poland, organisation of a trip, peoples with whom he/she co-operated*)?
44. Were the experiences from the previous trips of the migrant to Poland useful in his/her subsequent trips (*were the subsequent trips easier than the initial ones*)?
45. Why did the migrant choose a given particular pattern of migration (*duration, activities, the destination place; e.g. why for a week instead of a month*)?
46. How many times did the migrant visit Poland before his/her wedding (*what were purposes of these trips, how long did they last; how long was the longest one, how much time did he/she spend in Poland in total*)?
47. How long was the migrant's the longest stay in Poland?
48. When did the migrant come to Poland for the permanent stay?
49. Description of the overall migratory experience of the migrant.
  - When and to which country did the migrant go for the first time (purpose of this trip)?
  - How many times did the migrant visit Poland?
  - Apart from Poland, did the migrant visit the other countries (what countries; for how long, how many times, purposes of these trips)?
50. How often does the migrant visit his/her family in Ukraine? Does the migrant go only to visit his/her family or also for some other reasons?

### **COMMUNITY OF ORIGIN**

51. Was international migration a widespread phenomenon in the migrant's community of origin?
52. If yes, when did such international trips start?
53. In the migrant's opinion, what were the main reasons for these international trips?
54. What was the main pattern of these international trips (*tourism, trade, seasonal job etc.*)?
55. How was that changing over time?

### **VII. PLANS FOR THE FUTURE**

56. Had the migrant thought about settling in Poland before he/she married a Polish citizen? If yes, how did he/she intend to do that?
57. What is the migrant's perception of his/her present status in Poland in comparison with one which he/she had in Ukraine? How does the migrant evaluate his/her:
  - Material situation (*what he/she can afford and what he/she can not*)
  - Housing situation (*size and standard of an apartment; house equipment*)
  - Place of living (*town: big, small, nice etc.*)
  - Professional status
 when compared with his/her prospects in Ukraine.
58. Does the couple consider a change of its place of residence in the future (*migration to the other country, return to Ukraine; if yes, to which region*)?
59. How the couple plans to bring up their children (*citizenship, tradition, religion etc.*)?

60. Does the couple see some strong and weak points related to the fact that Poland is expected to join the European Union soon (*if interviewees do not say anything, try to draw their attention to the fact that border control is expected to be more strict and relate it to contacts with their family in Ukraine*)?

### VIII. OTHER MIXED MARRIAGES

61. Does the couple think that there are many marriages similar to their one?
62. Does the couple know other Polish-Ukrainian marriages in Poland (*if yes, what are their stories*)?
- When and how the prospective partners got to know each other?
  - For how long had the partners known each other before their wedding?
  - For how long has the couple been married?
  - Was the marriage contracted in a church (*a Catholic Church or an Orthodox Church*)?
  - Where was the marriage contracted – in Poland or in Ukraine (*why in this country*)?
  - In how many marriages was each partner involved before his/her Polish-Ukrainian marriage?
  - Where does the couple plan to live in the future: Poland, Ukraine or the other country?
63. Did the couple hear about bogus marriages contracted between Polish people and Ukrainians?

### IX. PERSONAL DATA (*if not collected earlier*)

64. Date of the wedding
65. Age of both partners
66. Education of both partners
67. Professional status of both partners
68. Social background of both partners
69. For how long has the migrant had a Permanent Residence Permit in Poland?



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# **APPENDIX VIII**

## **The Case Study of Illegal Ukrainian Traders**

### **Scenario of the Focus Group**

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## I. INTRODUCTORY QUESTIONS

1. Which part of Ukraine are you from?
2. When did you come to Poland for the first time?
3. For how long have you stayed in Poland (*do you travel between Poland and Ukraine*)?
4. What job do you have in Poland?
5. What job did/do you have in Ukraine?

## II. THE ROLE OF A FAMILY AND FRIENDS IN MIGRATORY DECISIONS

6. What were the main reasons for your migration from Ukraine?
7. Are you alone in Poland? If not, with whom are you staying in Poland?
8. What is your family situation in Ukraine?
9. Who made up the decision about your migration to Poland?
10. What was the role of your family in taking up the decision about your migration to Poland?

## III. ACCOMMODATION IN POLAND

11. Is it difficult to find accommodation in Warsaw?
12. How did you rent a room/apartment in Warsaw (*how did you find it: with a help of Polish, Ukrainian people or other migrants; how much do you pay for a rent*)?
13. Do you have registration in Poland (*did you have to pay for it; what kind of registration is it; is it difficult to acquire a registry in Poland*)?
14. With whom do you live (*foreigners, Polish people etc.*)?
15. Had you known your home mates before you moved to your Polish apartment (*if yes, when and how did you meet them; what is the relationship you have with them – family and social ties*)?

## IV. WORK

16. What jobs did you have in Poland up till now (*were there different activities*)?
17. How did you find your job in Poland (*what did you choose this type of job*)?
18. With whom do you work (*with Polish people, Ukrainians or other migrants, with how many people*)?

## V. BAZAAR ACTIVITIES

19. When do you usually trade (*time of a year, duration of an average stay in Poland*)?
20. Is it difficult to find a place to trade on a bazaar?
21. Do you have your own stall on the bazaar (*if yes, how did you rent/buy it*)?
22. What do you sell on the bazaar (*what determine your choice of goods, do you specialise in some particular goods or adjust rather to changing demand*)?

## VI. BUDGET OF MIGRANTS

23. Do you see a difference between your past and present income in Poland?
24. What is the percent of your Polish income which you save?

25. How do you spend your savings from migration to Poland (*do you keep money in Poland or send them to Ukraine*)?
26. How do you keep your savings in Poland (*bank, home, friends etc.*)?

### VII. DOCUMENTS

27. What documents do you need to work and stay in Poland (*do you know the Polish regulations concerning this issue*)?
28. Is it difficult to acquire the necessary documents in Poland?
29. Do you have those documents?
30. Did you have to bribe in order to acquire some necessary documents in Poland (*how often does it happen*)?

### VIII. EXPERIENCES AND PROBLEMS IN POLAND

31. Did you have any problems with the police or civil servants in Poland (*also with controllers in public transport; how often do such situations happen; do you have to bribe in such situations*)?
32. Did you have any other problems in Poland (*e.g. aggressive attitudes, violence*)?
33. Did you have any problems with Ukrainians or other foreigners in Poland (*in work, extortion, etc.*)?
34. What was the most unpleasant situation that happened to you in Poland?
35. What was the most pleasant situation that happened to you in Poland?

### IX. FRIENDS AND SPARE TIME ACTIVITIES

36. Do you have mainly Polish or foreign (Ukrainian) friends?
37. How do you spend your spare time in Poland?
38. What do you usually do after your work in Poland?
39. Do you read Polish newspapers or books?
40. Do you watch Polish TV?

### X. PLANS FOR THE FUTURE

41. How do you foresee your further stay in Poland, in terms of:
- Work
  - Documents
  - Settlement
  - Family
  - Further migration

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# **APPENDIX IX**

## **The Case Study of the Ukrainian Family of Overstayers**

### **Scenario of the Interview**

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## I. ETHNIC ORIGINS AND A HISTORY OF THE FAMILY

70. From which part of Ukraine do the migrant and his wife originate (*trace from grandparents; detailed names of villages*)?
71. Ethnicity of the migrant and his wife.
72. Does the migrant or his wife have Polish origins? What is his and his wife ethnic identity?
73. What was the language spoken in the family of the migrant and his wife?
74. What was the tradition in which the migrant and his wife were brought up (*emphasis on ethnicity and religion*)?
75. Does the migrant or his wife belong to any church? If yes, what church it is?

## II. THE LEGALISATION OF THE FAMILY'S STATUS IN POLAND

76. At the time of travelling to Poland for the first time, did the migrant have any plans related to the legalisation of his status in Poland?
77. Does his family presently have any plans related to the legalisation of its status in Poland?
78. Did the migrant have any advisers while processing the legalisation of his and his family status in Poland?
79. What is the legal status of the migrant, his wife and their daughter in Poland at the present (*description of a legalisation route and difficulties related to it*)?

## III. PROFESSIONAL AND FINANCIAL STATUS OF THE FAMILY IN POLAND

80. What job did the migrant and his wife have before starting their migration to Poland (*if any*)?
81. What job does the migrant and his wife have in Poland at the present (*description of changes of jobs*)?
82. Was it difficult for the migrant and his wife to find a job in Poland? If yes, what kind of difficulties they encountered?
83. What would have been the job and financial prospects of the migrant and his family in Ukraine if they had not come to Poland?

## IV. ADAPTATION IN POLAND

84. Knowledge of the Polish language; difficulties related to this issue.
85. What are/were attitudes of Polish people to the migrant and members of his family (*what opinions about Ukrainians did he hear in Poland*)?
86. What surprised the migrant after his arrival in Poland?
87. What were the unpleasant situations which the migrant or members of his family encountered in Poland?
88. Contacts with official institutions in Poland.
89. Cultural activities in Poland (*cinema, theatre*).
90. Does the migrant or his wife belong to any ethnic associations in Poland?
91. Social life in Poland (*with whom the family socialises; are its friends mainly Polish people or migrants; what these foreign friends do in Poland*)?

## V. MIGRATORY TRAJECTORY

### **INDIVIDUAL**

92. When did the migrant come to Poland for the first time? For how long was that?
93. Description of the migrant's first stay in Poland (*with whom did he come; to whom did he go*).
94. What did the migrant know about Poland and Polish people before his first arrival in Poland (*the destination place in Poland; prices, accommodation, necessary documents, how to find a job etc.*)?
95. Did the migrant have any contacts with other Polish people before he took up his first migration to Poland (*those living either in Poland or Ukraine*)?
96. Did the migrant have any contacts with other people migrating to Poland before he took up his first migration to Poland?
97. Why did the migrant decide to go to Poland (*did someone advise it to him; did he get any help*)?
98. Were the subsequent trips to Poland of the migrant similar to the first one? If not, what were the main differences (*duration, activities in Poland, organisation of a trip, peoples with whom he co-operated*)?
99. Were the experiences from the previous trips of the migrant to Poland useful in his subsequent trips (*were the subsequent trips easier than the initial ones*)?
100. Why did the migrant choose a given particular pattern of migration (*duration, activities, the destination place; e.g. why for a week instead of a month*)?
101. How long was the migrant's the longest stay in Poland?
102. Description of the overall migratory experience of a migrant.
  - When and to which country did the migrant go for the first time (purpose of this trip)?
  - How many times did the migrant visit Poland?
  - Apart from Poland, did the migrant visit the other countries (what countries; for how long, how many times, purposes of these trips)?
103. How often does the migrant visit his family in Ukraine? Does the migrant travel only to visit family or also for other reasons?

### **COMMUNITY OF ORIGIN**

104. Was international migration a widespread phenomenon in the migrant's community of origin?
105. If yes, when did such international trips start?
106. In the migrant's opinion, what were the main reasons for these international trips?
107. What was the main pattern of these international trips (*tourism, trade, seasonal job etc.*)?
108. How was that changing over time?

## VI. PLANS FOR THE FUTURE

109. Had the migrant thought about a settlement in Poland before he started his migration to Poland?
110. What is the migrant's perception of his present status in Poland in comparison with the one he had in Ukraine? How does the migrant evaluate his:
- Material situation (*what he/she can afford and what he/she can not*)
  - Housing situation (*size and standard of an apartment; house equipment*)
  - Place of living (*town: big, small, nice etc.*)
  - Professional status

when compared with his prospects in Ukraine.

111. Does the family consider changing its place of residence in the future (*migration to the other country, return to Ukraine; if yes, to which region*)?
112. Does the migrant see some strong and weak points related to the fact that Poland is expected to join the European Union soon (*if interviewees do not say anything, try to draw their attention to the fact that border control is expected to be more strict and relate it to contacts with their family in Ukraine*)?

## VII. PERSONAL DATA (*if not collected earlier*)

113. Age of each member of the family
114. Education of each member of the family
115. Professional status of the couple
116. Social background of the couple

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# **APPENDIX X**


**The Administrative  
Division of Poland**

**Past and Present**

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Figure 10A.1 The administrative division of Poland before the reform in 1997 (forty-nine voivodeships)



Source: Own elaboration

Figure 10A.2 The administrative division of Poland after the reform in 1997 (sixteen voivodeships)



Source: Own elaboration