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Transcendence and Immanence: Deciphering Their Relation through the Transcendentals in Aquinas and Kant

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Abstract: This article examines the relationship between the conspicuous and complicated terms of transcendence and immanence, which may equally be defined as essentially connected or diametrically opposed. Recent developments in two largely unrelated sets of scholarship—the re-evaluation of secularization, and the relationship between medieval and modern philosophy—provide a helpful means to arrive at a clearer understanding of this challenging problem. Charles Taylor and Jan Aertesn act as foci for these developments, particularly through their respective concerns with epistemic framing in relation to transcendence and immanence, and the role of transcendentals in medieval philosophy. This examination brings these two concepts together, examining the idea of transcendentals offered by both Aquinas, a thinker of the transcendent frame, and Kant, a thinker of the immanent frame. From this juxtaposition, we can offer two contrasting understandings of the relationship between transcendence and immanence from within both the transcendent and immanent frames. Finally, two brief literary examples demonstrate how these two ways of reading transcendence and immanence may be employed in the contextual understanding of religious writing. To understand the unity and division between transcendence and immanence is to better comprehend two primary terms in the study of religion and to appreciate a fundamental development in the history of religion in the West.

Keywords: Aquinas, Charles Taylor, immanence, Kant, post-secular, transcendence

Two words central and indispensable, yet contested and confused, within the study of religion are "transcendence" and "immanence." The *Oxford English Dictionary* describes "transcendence" in relation to the deity: "The attribute of being above and independent of the universe; distinguished from immanence," appending "see immanent" to its description.[1] When we turn to "immanent," we find two relevant definitions. The first, relating to both theology and philosophy, defines the term as "existing or operating within … pervading and sustaining the universe," providing God as a specific example. The second relates

specifically to Kantian philosophy and defines the immanent as that which is "limited to or valid for the realm of experience or empirical knowledge." The dictionary's definition adds that this is "contrasted to the transcendent."[2] Here, we find two diametrically opposed definitions of immanence, at least in terms of how they relate to transcendence. The one maintains a fundamental relationship between the two, with a transcendent God also immanent in all creation, while the other distinguishes the two as opposites, with any direct access to the transcendent cut off. To understand these opposing definitions is to grasp the profound differences in the fundamental theological underpinning of the nature of meaning found in texts from the medieval and modern periods, and to appreciate a fundamental development in the history of Western Christianity. It is only when these contextual differences in definition are taken into account that these essential yet problematic terms can be employed with a degree of clarity.

The relationship between transcendence and immanence is considered here by bringing together two sets of recent scholarship, both of which shed light on this problem but approach it from different temporal vantage points. The first, the recent consideration of secularization, looks from our present position backwards. It reveals a complicated process of religious evolution as opposed to a story of simple institutional decline. The second is the endeavour to understand the philosophical dimension of medieval scholasticism, often problematically reconstructed through categories or concepts anachronistic to its theological concerns. This examination is not directly concerned with either the definition of secularization or medieval philosophy but rather with what both of these can tell us about the relationship of transcendence and immanence.

Much has been contributed to both of these groups of scholarship, but here we will focus upon two particular contributions. For the former, we take what has now become the modern *locus classicus* of secularization studies, Charles Taylor's *A Secular Age*.[3] For the latter, we take the recent study of Jan Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought: From Philip the Chancellor (ca. 1225) to Francisco Suárez*, one of the most substantial contributions to the study of medieval philosophy this century.[4] First, in the context of their respective fields, this examination outlines Taylor's idea of a shift in epistemic frames from transcendent to immanent and Aertsen's account of medieval philosophy as a transcendental way of thought. We then take these two terms and, turning *ad fontes*, examine the contrasting definitions of transcendentals offered by both Aquinas, a thinker of the transcendent frame, and Kant, a thinker of the immanent frame. From this juxtaposition, it is possible to offer two contrasting understandings of the relationship between transcendence and immanence from within both the transcendent and immanent frames. Finally, two brief literary examples demonstrate how we may employ these opposed understandings of the relationship between transcendence and immanence as a means for understanding religious writing within its given context.

Epistemic Framing from the Study of Secularization

The first set of scholarship this examination engages asks the question: "What is secularization?" The "secularization thesis" developed by and from the work of the founding thinkers of modern social theory, such as Max Weber, Karl Marx, and Émile Durkheim, postulated an inverse relationship between modernization and religion. The thesis mapped the decline of institutional religion onto the primary developments of modernity, such as Renaissance humanism and the Reformation, establishing a connection between modernization and religious decline. However, toward the close of the last century, there increasingly emerged a widespread interdisciplinary consensus that the thesis was fundamentally flawed.[5] Practical objections, such as the growth of religion in the Global South, its persistence in the United States, and the increasing recognition of new categories of non-institutional religion (or spirituality), challenged the universality of the thesis.[6] Equally, theoretical objections emerged, including the postmodern opposition to totalizing modernist narratives and the possibility of multiple simultaneous narratives.[7] In addition, some arguments have called into question the ontological assumptions that have barred the theological and the metaphysical from legitimate participation in scholarly discourse, thereby challenging the assumptions that have defined secular philosophy.[8] From both these practical and theoretical objections emerged a much more complicated typology of modern religion and the secular, wherein the relationship between the secular and the eternal, the profane and the sacred, and the temporal and the spiritual is not simply a narrative of divergence but a complex story of shifting alignments.[9]

Against the backdrop of this wholesale re-evaluation of the idea of secularization, Taylor's *A Secular Age* made an important contribution by providing an epistemic framework for considering the process of secularization through his introduction of the concept of the "immanent frame." In the immanent frame, Taylor explains, answers to fundamental questions concerning meaning, value, and the truth may be found wholly within the natural order, whereas in the transcendent frame, these have their ultimate source in the supernatural order.[10] According to *A Secular Age*, to understand this shift makes it possible to answer a central question concerning the development of religion: "How did we move from a condition where, in Christendom, people lived naïvely within a theistic construal, to one in which … unbelief has become for many the major default option?"[11]

This shift in epistemic frameworks is equally characterized by a shift in the nature of the self, from what Taylor calls a porous to a buffered self.[12] The porous self occupied the theurgic cosmos of the medieval period, wherein all finite reality was shaped by the transcendent forces in which it participated. Whether understood as God, angels, or demons, individuals could interact and influence these forces through sacraments, magic, or prayer. Over a long

period, Taylor's *A Secular Age* outlines how this transcendent world view changed through the exercise of discipline and reform, which tamed uncontrolled and supernatural forces. Coalescing in the Reformation, and affected through a growing middle class, this process of discipline sought to control disruptive beliefs and practices to ensure a well-ordered and industrious society. The model for the buffered self's relationship to God was the inner justification through faith, made apparent through the fruits of grace.[13] In this manner, through a wide-ranging narrative, Taylor describes a shift from a theocentric outlook, wherein a porous self participates in a hierarchical, vertically orientated cosmos, where meaning ultimately resides in the supernatural, to an anthropocentric outlook, wherein a buffered self was part of a disciplined society, horizontally orientated, and possessed of a telos of autarky.[14]

According to Taylor, the present-day secular age is not characterized by a conscious choice made by individuals between different ways of conceptualizing the world. Rather, it is the result of a fundamental change in "the whole context of understanding in which our moral, spiritual or religious experience and search takes place."[15] As we will come to see, this shift leaves us with two differing understandings of the relationship between transcendence and immanence based upon the epistemic frame in which they are encountered.

A Focus on Transcendentals from the Study of Medieval Philosophy

The second set of scholarship this examination draws from asks the question: "What is medieval philosophy?" This question brings up further correlate problems, such as the relationship between philosophy and theology and the role of medieval scholasticism in the development of modern philosophy.[16] According to the contribution of Jan Aertsen, these secondary questions have problematically shaped the reception of scholasticism. He cites four examples in particular: first, the self-enclosed Christian metaphysics of Étienne Gilson, which centred upon God's revelation of divine Being to Moses, but problematically did so apart from Greek metaphysics;[17] second, the Anglo-analytical approach to medieval philosophy, which emphasized the importance of the period's logical and semantic insights but significantly downplayed its metaphysical and theological concerns;[18] third, the contribution of the influential Alain de Libera, who used the development of the private intellectual pursuit of knowledge to define medieval philosophy as the emergence of an ethical and humanistic way of thought, yet did so by relying upon a selective appropriation of materials rather than by providing an overall picture;[19] and finally, a range of recent scholars who have aimed to connect developments in later medieval philosophy to Kant's transcendental idealism but who problematically assume a proto-Kantianism that they are seeking to find.[20] In this manner, particularly in relation to the latter three examples of scholarship, Aerten's approach bears

some structural similarity to the rereading of the secularization thesis: just as that thesis sought to show the inevitable decline of religion based on modern institutional diminution, each of these approaches attempted to show the inevitable trajectory of trends within medieval philosophy toward a given selected modern concern, whether linguistic, humanistic, or idealist.

Aertsen instead develops a method that, he claims, constructs the period not from the perspective (and concerns) of contemporary modern readers but from within medieval philosophy itself. When this is done, what we find, according to Aertsen's *Medieval Philosophy*, is that from the thirteenth century right through to Suárez, the enterprise of medieval scholastic thought is fundamentally concerned with the question of transcendentals. Aertsen does not offer a definition of the transcendentals, an ever-evolving and debated concept, but he does offer a description of them, beginning with an account of their plurality, which almost always consists of being (*ens*), one (*unum*), true (*verum*), and good (*bonum*), with *ens* as primary. Overall, there are two ways the transcendentals are understood. The first is as what transcends and goes beyond every being. This definition concerns God, who transcends all being. The second is as what is common of predication, as in that which is predicated of all beings. This definition concerns things and what is common to their being.[21] The tension between these two possibilities is what plays out in the history of medieval philosophy. It is tempting to call the former the realist position and the latter nominalist, but as Aertsen's 750-plus-page study illustrates, to simplify the argument to such specificities is not possible.

As a result of this complexity, Aertsen develops his own set of thematic considerations that are based around a historically systematic consideration of the transcendentals: first is the relationship between *ens* as primary, and the posterior nature of the other transcendentals; second, how the transcendentals constitute the proper subject of metaphysics as First Philosophy; third, what the relationship is between the ontological and the theological nature of the transcendentals as divine names; fourth is whether the transcendentals are to be understood analogically or univocally; and finally is the consideration of the epistemology of the transcendentals as the first things knowable by the intellect.[22] Taken together, the question of the transcendentals is not one of many philosophical issues for medieval philosophy but, according to Aertsen, its fundamental object of concern.

In highlighting the importance of the transcendentals as the definitive issue for medieval philosophy, Aertsen is also making a further claim concerning the interpretation of medieval philosophy vis-à-vis modern philosophy. The term "transcendental" is most often encountered by the student of philosophy in relation to Kant's transcendental idealism. Kant's appropriation of the term has led to what Aertsen sees as a problematic reconstruction of the medieval consideration of the transcendentals, reading back into medieval philosophy the sources of Kant's transcendental idealism.[23] Throughout *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought*, Aertsen demonstrates this tendency to be

fundamentally problematic, hindering our understanding of medieval philosophy and undermining a construction of the period within its own context. To understand medieval philosophy through Aertsen's thesis, as fundamentally transcendental thought, is to understand it through the period's own intrinsic central concern, distinguishing the medieval mode of transcendental thought fundamentally from the Kantian mode.

Transcendentals in Aquinas and Kant

With the work of both Taylor and Aertsen set out, it is now possible to bring their two contributions together and address the central question of the relation of transcendence and immanence by comparing Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) and Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). From Taylor, we take the notion of epistemic frames, comparing Aquinas, as a thinker of the transcendent frame, to Kant, as a thinker of the immanent frame; from Aertsen, we take the transcendentals as our criterion for comparison.

Aquinas is a well-placed medieval figure to contrast with the modern figure of Kant for the consideration of the transcendentals. The transcendentals are central to Aquinas's thought and can be found throughout his works, though he did not produce a treatise specifically concerned with them. According to Aertsen, they receive their fullest general elaboration in *De veritate*, under the considerations of the true and the good.[24] In the first of these, dealing with the question of "what is truth?" Aquinas offers what Aertsen calls the most systematic derivation of the transcendentals in the thirteenth century.[25] This account went on to become an authoritative model in the history of the doctrine of the transcendentals.[26] Aquinas elaborates on the plurality of the transcendentals but also argues for the conceptual priority of being, since it is included in everything the mind apprehends. Articulating this position, Aquinas writes, "all the other conceptions of the intellect are necessarily received by addition to being. But nothing can be added to being as though it were something not included in being—in the way that a difference is added to a genus or an accident to a subject—for every nature is essentially a being."[27] Here, Aquinas is articulating that what is added to being lies outside the concept itself. Hence, posterior transcendentals express modes of being not contained within being itself. However, posterior transcendentals are not added to being in the conventional sense of an addition from outside, as that which is extrinsic to the essence of being is nothing.

For the purposes of this inquiry, what is most important in Aquinas's consideration of the transcendentals is the connection between the ontological nature of the transcendentals as common to all things and the theological nature of the transcendentals as divine names. The transcendentals are ontologically anterior to all other divine names because of the logical order of human understanding: "these names 'being [*ens*] and good [*bonum*], one [*unum*], true [*verum*]' precede the other divine names simply according to the reason

of understanding, which is evident from their commonness."[28] Aquinas reasons that the less determinate names are, and the more universally they can be applied, the more properly they can be said to be names of God.[29]

The question that occupied Aquinas, and so many other scholastic minds, was how these transcendentals related to God, who like the transcendentals was equally common to all things yet transcended them. Aquinas found his answer in analogical predication. The transcendentals could not be predicated of God univocally (that is, having only one possible meaning) because of the priority of God and the posterior nature of creatures. Nor could they be equivocally predicated (that is, having multiple possible meanings) because of the relationship between creation and God. Instead, the transcendentals are predicated analogically, and we come to what Aquinas calls an imperfect knowledge of God through all things in creation, which are God's effects.[30]

For Aquinas, the transcendentals describe a relationship wherein all immanent reality is saturated with transcendence based upon the causal relationship between God the transcendent creator and immanent creation.[31] Aquinas maintains that "deus est omnia ut causa omnium" ("God is everything as the cause of everything").[32] Consequently, God cannot be understood as something transcendent over and against immanent creation. Rather, as the cause of everything, God is radically transcendent, distinguished from everything as the First Being (*primum ens*) and not dependent upon any prior cause for existence as "Being itself" (*ipsum esse per se subsistens*).[33] At the same time, also as the cause of everything, God is also immanent, since all creatures participate in God, who determines their natures.[34] It is through this immanence that we come to know transcendence: "because we come to a knowledge of God from other things, the reality in the names said of God and other things belong by priority in God according to His mode of being, but the meaning of the name belongs to God by posteriority. And so He is said to be named from His effects."[35] Through the universal presence of the transcendentals in immanent creation, we come to imperfectly know the transcendent God.

Kant defines the transcendentals in intentional opposition to medieval philosophy.[36] Referring to the "transcendental philosophy of the ancients" in the "Transcendental Analytic" of the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, he singles out for criticism the position "so famous among the scholastics: *quodlibet ens unum, verum, bonum* [every being is one true, and good]."[37] Kant accepts these transcendentals as "logical requirements and criteria for the cognition of all things in general."[38] However, he argues that the medieval understanding of them was mistaken, as they constitute "nothing but logical requirements and criteria of all knowledge of things in general, and lay out for such knowledge the categories of quantity, namely, *unity*, *plurality*, and *totality*."[39] The error of medieval philosophy, according to Kant, was to have "converted [the transcendentals] from criteria of thought to be properties of things in themselves without care."[40] Kant's philosophical position goes on to develop his transcendental idealism, wherein the transcendentals reside within the mind of the knower alone: "I call

all knowledge transcendental which is occupied not so much with objects, but rather with our mode of cognition of objects, so far as this is meant to be possible *a priori*."[41] It was this relocation of the transcendentals, from the mind of God as divine ideas to the mind of humans as the categories of understanding, that constitutes the essence of Kant's Copernican Revolution, which separated the transcendentals from the transcendent.

For Kant, the transcendent is set over and against immanence. He considers the transcendent as that which "flies beyond" the borders of possible experience, and the immanent as that which is "entirely within the limits of possible experience."[42] The a priori transcendentals structure our experience; however, unlike in Aquinas's position, they do not reveal the transcendent cause behind creation but instead the structure of one's own mind. Kant's critical philosophy does not deny the existence of God, but it does deny the possibility of the knowledge of God. This is behind Kant's famous pronouncement in the second preface to the first *Kritik*, which claimed that it was necessary to limit reason in order to make room for faith.[43] Metaphysical speculation without empirical verification leads to the paralogisms and antinomies of pure reason.[44] It is this restriction on the employment of speculative reason that lies behind the demolition of the rational arguments for the existence of God that Kant carried out in the transcendental dialectic.[45]

Reading Transcendence and Immanence

Two brief examples, taken not from philosophy but literature, demonstrate how these opposed understandings of the relationship between transcendence and immanence may be employed. For a representative of the transcendent frame, wherein immanence is saturated with transcendence, we may take the lai "*Yönec"* by the twelfth-century poet Marie de France. In this tale of magic and *mal-mariée*, an old lord imprisons his beautiful, young wife in a tower, fearful that she may someday be unfaithful. One day, reflecting on the stories of noble knights and beautiful ladies, she cries out: "Deus, ki du tut ad poësté, / Il en face ma volenté!" (God, for whom all is possible / Grant me my wish!)[46] At this moment, a hawk flies through her window and transforms into a knight. To prove himself worthy, and allay her doubts, the knight assumes the form of the lady and takes the Eucharist from her chaplain. In the world of Marie, the immanent is saturated with transcendence, here in the form of love, both universal and particular. In relation to humankind, the goodness of being works through an economy of love and salvation. It is God's love that brings creation into being and that constitutes the motivation for Christ's sacrifice. Equally, it is this same transcendent power of divine presence that allows the knight to become the hawk, and the host to become the body of Christ. In the transcendent frame Marie occupied, everything was more than it seemed through the

participation of the divine transcendent forces that moved, shaped, and made immanent creation what it was.

We find the reverse of this in another poetic example from William Wordsworth, in which he expresses his concerns with the immanent frame. In his sonnet "*The World Is Too Much with Us*," published in 1807, the Lakeland poet longs for an age when, looking upon nature, one could encounter a greater meaning beyond or within it:

> This Sea that bares her bosom to the moon,
>
> The winds that will be howling at all hours,
>
> And are up-gathered now like sleeping flowers,
>
> For this, for everything, we are out of tune;
>
> It moves us not.[47]

According to Wordsworth, the immanent frame is out of tune with an early age that would have been able to encounter meaning beyond immanence. As the poem progresses, Wordsworth dreams of being a pagan, who might "Have sight of Proteus rising from the sea; / Or hear old Triton blow his wreathèd horn."[48] Yet, despite this sense that beyond immanence there is something greater, he cannot find transcendence in immanence—only a reflection of his a priori desire for something beyond.

Neither Marie nor Wordsworth sat down with the *Summa Theologiæ* or the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* in hand, with the aim of developing a poetic reflection of the philosophy of their age; indeed, Marie slightly predates Aquinas. Yet Marie and Aquinas, and Kant and Wordsworth, respectively, share in these works two different understandings of the relationship between transcendence and immanence. In the world of Marie de France, God could be found in all things, manifest through an economy of salvation and love; while in Wordsworth's, the transcendent was entirely separated from immanence, banished, as reflected in the Romantic's disenchanted melancholy.

Marie's poetry operates within the transcendent frame, in a world where immanence is saturated by transcendence, as it was for Aquinas. Wordsworth operated within the presently strengthening immanent frame that concerned him and his fellow Romantics. According to the logic of that intellectual framework, humans were bound within immanence, with any desire for the transcendent rendered increasingly the object of nostalgia. The insights afforded by recent scholarship in the two areas represented here by Taylor and Aertsen set out an intellectual framework that allows us to contemplate and contextualize the profound differences in theological mentality underpinning both philosophical and literary texts from the medieval and modern periods. What is more, our own period's historicization and critical awareness of secularism brings to us the interesting possibility of a further post-secular framework, where the transcendent longing of Wordsworth can perhaps overcome modern disenchantment.[49]

Notes

1 Oxford *English Dictionary Online, s.v.* "transcendence," accessed June 1, 2018, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/204607?redirectedFrom=transcendence.

2 *Oxford English Dictionary Online*, s.v. "immanent," accessed June 1, 2018, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/91798?redirectedFrom=immanent.

3 Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007).

4 Jan Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought: From Philip the Chancellor (ca. 1225) to Francisco Súarez* (Leiden: Brill, 2002).

5 This consensus is represented by the uncommon convergence of three differing figures: Peter L. Berger, *The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999); Jürgen Habermas, "Die Dialektik der Säkularisierung," *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik* 53 (2008): 33–46; and John Milbank, *Beyond Secular Order: The Representation of Being and the Representation of the People* (Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2014).

6 Philip Jenkins, *The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); Roger Finke and Rodney Stark, *The Churching of America, 1776–1990: Winners and Losers in Our Religious* Economy (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1992); William Sims Bainbridge and Rodney Stark, *The Future of Religion: Secularization, Revival and Cult Formation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996); Wade C. Roof, *A Generation of Seekers: The Spiritual Journeys of the Baby Boom Generation* (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1993); Christopher Partridge, *The Re-Enchantment of the West: Vol. I, Alternative Spiritualities, Sacralization, Popular Culture and Occulture* (London: T&T Clark, 2004); Edward I. Bailey, *Implicit Religion in Contemporary Society* (Leuven, Belgium: Peeters, 2006); Boaz Huss, "Spirituality: The Emergence of a New Cultural Category and Its Challenge to the Religious and the Secular," *Journal of Contemporary Religion* 29 (2012): 47–60.

7 Jean-François Lyotard, *La condition postmoderne: Rapport sur le savoir* (Paris: De Minuit, 1979); Fredric Jameson, *Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1991); David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989); John Milbank, "Problematizing the Secular: The Post-Postmodern Agenda," in *Shadow of Spirit: Postmodernism and Religion*, ed. Philippa Berry and Andrew Wernick (London: Routledge, 1992), 30–44.

8 René Girard, *La violence et le sacré* (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1972); *Des choses cachées depuis la fondation du monde* (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1978); Alasdair MacIntyre, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* (London: Duckworth, 1988); Paul Ricœur, *De l'interprétation: Essai sur Freud* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1965); John Milbank, *Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990).

9 José Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).

10 Taylor, *Secular Age*, 542.

11 Taylor, *Secular Age*, 14.

12 Taylor, *Secular Age*, 37–42, 262–264, 300–307.

13 Taylor, *Secular Age*, 105–106.

14 Taylor, *Secular Age*, 138, 152.

15 Taylor, *Secular Age*, 3.

16 Jan Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals: The Case of Thomas Aquinas* (Leiden: Brill, 1996); Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought*.

17 Étienne Gilson, *L'esprit de la philosophie médiévale (Gifford Lectures, Université d'Aberdeen)* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1932).

18 Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg, eds. *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy: From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism, 1100–1600* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

19 Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals*, 38.

20 Jean-François Courtine, *Suarez et le système de la métaphysique* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1990); Gerhard Krieger, "Menschliche Vernunft als Terminus der Reflexion: Zu einer Übereinstimmung zwischen mittelalterlicher Philosophie und Kant," *Kant-Studien* 96 (2005): 182–207; Ludger Honnefelder, *Scientia transcendens: Die formale Bestimmung der Seiendheit und Realität in der Metaphysik des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit (Duns Scotus, Suárez, Wolff, Kant, Peirce)* (Hamburg: Meiner, 1990).

21 Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought*, 17–21.

22 Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought*, 4–11.

23 For example, Gottfried Martin, *Wilhelm von Ockham; Untersuchungen zur Ontologie der Ordnungen* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1949); Kurt Flasch, "Kennt die mittelalterliche Philosophie die konstitutive Funktion des menschlichen Denkens? Eine Untersuchung zu Dietrich von Freiberg," *Kant-Studien* 63 (1972): 182–206; Kurt Flasch, *Die Metaphysik des Einen bei Nikolaus von Kues: Problemgeschichtliche Stellung und systematische Bedeutung* (Leiden: Brill, 1973); Ruedi Imbach, "Gravis iactura verae doctrinae. Prolegomena zu einer Interpretation der Schrift *De ente et essentia* Dietrichs von Freiburg O. P.," *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie Und Theologie* 26 (1979): 369–425; Courtine, *Suarez et le système de la métaphysique*; Honnefelder, *Scientia transcendens*; Krieger, "Menschliche Vernunft als Terminus der Reflexion."

24 Aquinas, *De veritate*, q.1, q.21.

25 Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought*, 211.

26 Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought*, 211.

27 Aquinas, *De veritate*, q.1 a.1 co.

28 Aquinas, *In I Sententiarum*, Id.8 q.1 a.3.

29 Aquinas, *Summa Theologiæ*, Ia.q.13 a.11.

30 Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles*, I.c.32–34.

31 Rudti te Velde, "God and the Language of Participation," in *Divine Transcendence and Immanence in the Work of Thomas Aquinas: A Collection of Studies Presented at the Third Conference of the Thomas Instituut te Utrecht, December 15–17, 2005*, ed. Harm Goris, Herwi Rikhof, and Henk Schoot (Leuven: Peeters, 2009), 19–36.

32 Aquinas, *Summa Theologiæ*, Ia.q.4 a.2; Pseudo-Dionysius, *The Divine Names*, 816A–825C.

33 Aquinas, *Summa Theologiæ*, Ia.q.4 a.2.

34 Rudi te Velde, *Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas* (Leiden: Brill, 1995); John F. Wippel, "Aquinas and Participation," in *Studies in Medieval Philosophy* (Washington, DC: Catholic University Press of America, 1987), 17:117–158.

35 Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles*, I.c.32.

36 For an extended consideration of transcendence and immanence in Kant's period, see Alexander J.B. Hampton, *Romanticism and the Re-Invention of Modern Religion: The Reconciliation of German Idealism and Platonic Realism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).

37 Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (Frankfurt: Shurkamp, 1974), B113.

38 Kant, *Kritik*, B114.

39 Kant, *Kritik*, B114 (original emphasis).

40 Kant, *Kritik*, B114.

41 Kant, *Kritik*, A12/B25.

42 Kant, *Kritik*, A296/B352.

43 Kant, *Kritik*, Bxxx. Kant's position is not that one cannot think of God, but that there are too many possible ways to think of God since we lack experience of the supersensible divine.

This lack of experience leaves us unable to arrive at the cognition that would allow us either to affirm or deny the proposition. Lawrence Pasternack and Philip Rossi, "Kant's Philosophy of Religion," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2014), accessed September 25, 2018, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/kant-religion/.

44 Kant, *Kritik*, A348–443/B406–471.
45 Kant, *Kritik*, A603–642/B631–670.
46 Marie de France, "Yönec," in *Marie de France, Poetry*, trans. Dorothy Gilbert (New York: Norton, 2015), 94–95, at lines 103–104.
47 William Wordsworth, "The World Is Too Much with Us," in *Wordsworth's Poetry and Prose*, ed. Nicholas Halmi (New York: Norton, 2014), 403, at lines 5–9.
48 Wordsworth, "The World Is Too Much," lines 13–14.
49 For a post-secular approach to literature, see Alexander J.B. Hampton, "A Post-Secular Nature and the New Nature Writing," *Christianity and Literature*, 67, no. 3 (2018): 454–471.