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## Reconciling multiple counterfactuals when evaluating biodiversity conservation impact in social-ecological systems

Journal:	<i>Conservation Biology</i>
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Keywords:	Baseline, Conservation impact, Impact evaluation, Reference frame, Sum of perceived differences
Abstract:	<p>When evaluating the impact of a biodiversity conservation intervention, a 'counterfactual' is needed, as true experimental controls are typically unavailable. Counterfactuals are possible alternative system trajectories in the absence of an intervention and comparing observed outcomes against the chosen counterfactual allows the impact (change attributable to the intervention) to be determined. Since counterfactuals are hypothetical scenarios, and by definition never occur, they must be estimated. Sometimes there may be many plausible counterfactuals, given that they can include multiple drivers of biodiversity change, and be defined on a range of spatial or temporal scales. Here we posit that, by definition, conservation interventions always take place in social-ecological systems (SES; ecological systems integrated with human actors). Evaluating the impact of an intervention within an SES therefore means taking into account the counterfactuals assumed by different human actors. Use of different counterfactuals by different actors will give rise to perceived differences in the impacts of interventions, which may lead to disagreement about its success or the effectiveness of the underlying approach. Despite that there are biophysical biodiversity trends, it is often true that no single counterfactual is definitively the 'right one' for conservation assessment, so multiple evaluations of intervention efficacy could be considered justifiable. Therefore, we propose the need to calculate a quantity termed the sum of perceived differences, which captures the range of impact estimates associated with different actors within a given SES. The sum of perceived differences gives some indication how closely actors within an SES agree on the impacts of an intervention. We illustrate the concept of perceived differences using a set of global, national and regional case studies. We discuss options for minimising the sum, drawing upon literatures from conservation science, psychology, behavioural economics, management and finance.</p>



# 1 Reconciling multiple counterfactuals when 2 evaluating biodiversity conservation impact in 3 social-ecological systems

## 4 5 **Abstract**

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24 concept of perceived differences using a set of global, national and regional case studies. We discuss  
25 options for minimising the sum, drawing upon literatures from conservation science, psychology,  
26 behavioural economics, management and finance.

## 27 **Introduction**

28 The effectiveness of attempts to conserve the biodiversity of ecosystems – and associated  
29 contributions towards human wellbeing – has become an increasingly pressing topic over recent  
30 decades. A ‘counterfactual’ is necessary when quantitatively evaluating the ecological impact of a  
31 biodiversity conservation intervention (Ferraro & Hanauer, 2014). Counterfactuals are a type of  
32 ‘reference scenario’, capturing an alternative possible trajectory of a dynamic system in the absence  
33 of a given intervention. The ‘impact’ of the intervention is the change attributable to the intervention,  
34 measured as the difference between the actual observed trajectory (the ‘outcome’) and the predicted  
35 counterfactual (Ferraro & Pattanayak, 2006). Numerous counterfactuals can be reasonably specified  
36 for most systems relevant to conservation, as it is possible to select from a range of drivers of system  
37 change for potential inclusion within the counterfactual (Maron et al., 2018), notwithstanding that  
38 counterfactuals can also be specified over various spatiotemporal scales (Bull et al., 2014). Crucially  
39 counterfactuals are, by definition, a scenario that does not occur, so they can never be directly  
40 observed and monitored – and there is often no single ‘correct’ counterfactual, but rather various  
41 counterfactuals of differing plausibility. This is even true to an extent for ‘control’ sites used in quasi-  
42 experimental methods, as subjective decisions have to be made when choosing such sites to reduce  
43 the impacts of confounding factors (e.g. Wiik et al., 2019). Thus, though such control sites may give a  
44 good approximation to what would have happened at the ‘treatment’ sites without the intervention,  
45 they are still open to some interpretation.

46  
47 Typically, conservationists are interested in a counterfactual representing the alternative ecological  
48 trajectory of a system, which is often influenced by multiple anthropogenic activities beyond the  
49 intervention in question (Ferraro & Pattanayak, 2006; Maron et al., 2018). But – while the literature on  
50 impact evaluation is accumulating rapidly, along with tools for implementation – impact evaluation is  
51 still rarely carried out in practice (Wiik et al., 2019). Moreover, conservation interventions do not take  
52 place in purely ecological systems – they take place in social-ecological systems (SES; Berkes &  
53 Folke, 1998), i.e. ecological systems integrated with social systems consisting of human actors. Thus,  
54 it is critical to go beyond purely *ecological* counterfactuals when evaluating the impact of a  
55 conservation intervention, and consider interlinked social systems (Alagona et al., 2012; Maron et al.,  
56 2018). This adds considerable challenges, as different actors may subjectively assume different

57 counterfactuals are most relevant when judging impact (e.g. whether to use a counterfactual at the  
58 spatial scale of the project or the landscape; Bull et al., 2014), due to factors such as unconscious  
59 biases (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), temporal starting point (Pauly, 1995), or assumptions made  
60 about processes driving change. This is important as the choice of counterfactual not only alters  
61 perceptions about intervention success, but also potentially the actions of stakeholders (Bull et al.,  
62 2014). Therefore, it is insufficient to consider counterfactuals on a purely ecological basis when  
63 judging conservation impact; also deserving attention are the ecological counterfactuals associated  
64 with differing interpretations from relevant stakeholders within the SES. We term this set of possible  
65 social-ecological counterfactuals – i.e. ecological counterfactuals derived from varying stakeholder  
66 perceptions – a *family* of counterfactuals.

67

68 Here, our objective is to further formalise the use of counterfactuals for evaluating biodiversity  
69 outcomes within an SES. Biodiversity is not the only property of an SES which might require  
70 conservation interventions, but it is our focus. We develop an exploratory conceptual framework,  
71 illustrated (although not formally tested) with case studies. In particular, we focus on differences of  
72 interpretation during quantitative evaluation of the ecological impact of conservation interventions.  
73 Approaches for qualitative evaluation exist (Sutherland et al., 2018); however, as the latter do not  
74 require quantitative impact estimates, we do not explore them further here. We do, though, explore  
75 how an actor's precise choice of counterfactual arises from their personal 'reference frame'. We go on  
76 to explore what approaches exist for minimising divergence in personal reference frames and thus the  
77 choice of counterfactual, to avoid conflicting perceptions of conservation impact in SES. Ultimately,  
78 we aim to enable better impact evaluation by considering not only biophysical outcomes against  
79 counterfactuals, but also how multiple stakeholders view the plausibility of different counterfactuals.

80

### 81 **Towards families of counterfactuals**

82 We start with a conservation intervention in a hypothetical ecosystem. We do consider 'conservation  
83 interventions' to be targeted at biodiversity, but framed more broadly around 'people and nature'  
84 (emphasizing "the importance of cultural structures and institutions for developing sustainable and  
85 resilient interactions between human societies and the natural environment"; Mace, 2014). By  
86 definition, an intervention being implemented means that: (a) at least one human actor has the

87 potential to influence that biodiversity; (b) at least one human actor must be affected by that influence  
88 on biodiversity; and, (c) at least one human actor must be responsible for the intervention. In the  
89 simplest case, (a), (b) and (c) describe the same actor; for instance, if the SES is a farm, the single  
90 actor might be a farmer creating habitat for declining bird species. Note the logic that, for any system  
91 within which a conservation intervention is taking place, there must be at least one relevant human  
92 actor – that is, every system involving a conservation intervention must be an SES.

93

94 We focus on social perceptions of the ecological impact of an intervention, a necessary precursor to  
95 evaluating its social *impacts*; but though social impacts require similar treatment (e.g. Davidson,  
96 2013), they are beyond scope here. So, to evaluate the impact of the intervention we then specify a  
97 counterfactual (“a causal effect of a program is only defined with respect to a well-defined alternative”;  
98 Ferraro & Hanauer, 2014). The actor anticipates an alternative biodiversity trend that would have  
99 taken place without the intervention. But biodiversity measurement is open to interpretation (Purvis &  
100 Hector, 2000), and sub-components of biodiversity are often ascribed wildly different weightings  
101 dependent upon the actor (Baylis et al., 2016; Bull & Maron, 2016; Pearson, 2016). Compounding this  
102 is the difficulty in determining which components of biodiversity are relevant when going beyond static  
103 considerations – which depends upon the chosen spatiotemporal scale (Bull et al., 2014). Finally, the  
104 ‘shape’ of the counterfactual trend will be heavily influenced by actor’s expectations (Ferraro &  
105 Hanauer, 2014). Yet in the simplest case of our hypothetical SES, the single actor is free to select  
106 whatever counterfactual they choose – and the perceived impact of the intervention is the difference  
107 between the observed biophysical outcome and that counterfactual (Ferraro & Hanauer, 2014).

108 Continuing our farmer example, the farmer might compare outcomes to the counterfactual scenario in  
109 which they had not created new habitat (acknowledging multiple plausible futures).

110

111 Consider a more complex hypothetical scenario with *two* actors: one carrying out activities that reduce  
112 biodiversity, and the other implementing conservation interventions. Assuming it is relevant for both  
113 actors to monitor impact, each specifies a counterfactual and measures the outcome. There is a  
114 wealth of reasons why their choice of counterfactual might differ – but even if their choice is the same  
115 in theory, expectation or uncertainty might mean that the precise trajectory of their chosen  
116 counterfactual diverges. The perceived impact for Actor 1 is the difference between the observed

117 biophysical outcome and Actor 1's chosen counterfactual, and for Actor 2 it is the difference between  
118 the same biophysical outcome and Actor 2's chosen counterfactual. If the counterfactuals are  
119 different, there is consequently a difference between perceived impact for Actor 1 and Actor 2, which  
120 – whatever the actual trajectory – equals the difference in their chosen counterfactuals (assuming  
121 they use the same measure of outcome; Fig. 1, Appendix 1). For a real example see Maron et al.  
122 (2015), who find Australian policymakers (Actor 1) using different counterfactual rates to those  
123 calculated by researchers (Actor 2) for 'biodiversity offset' conservation interventions (Fig. 1, and  
124 below); or analogously, multiple reference levels in climate change mitigation (Griscom et al., 2009).

125

126 Finally, consider the general case of three or more actors within the hypothetical SES, who all  
127 evaluate the impact of an intervention, but at least some specify different counterfactuals. This  
128 resultant set of counterfactuals is the aforementioned *family of counterfactuals*. For the SES as a  
129 whole, consider the total difference in perceived impact across the family of counterfactuals for the full  
130 diversity of stakeholders: the larger it is, the greater the difference in perceived impact for multiple  
131 actors, which may imply that some actors are not satisfied with the intervention. We propose  
132 calculating a *sum of perceived differences* for the family of counterfactuals, which is the sum of the  
133 magnitude of the difference between the counterfactuals assumed by every actor and every other  
134 actor within the system (see Appendix 1 for our mathematical formulation, and justification). Note: the  
135 sum could conceivably weight the counterfactuals assumed by various individuals differently, e.g. to  
136 account for different uncertainties, or for uneven power dynamics – we return to this later in the  
137 article. Since no counterfactual is definitively 'correct', but rather is chosen on the basis of actors'  
138 value judgments, the sum of perceived differences is necessary to capture the impact of a  
139 conservation intervention in an SES. Importantly, the sum incorporates the counterfactuals actually  
140 used by actors without differentiating between those counterfactuals that are more or less plausible;  
141 but applying this framework *does* make the counterfactuals used more transparent, facilitating  
142 discussion around plausibility.

143

144 Actual biodiversity trends are, in principle, objective and biophysical. Yet, because the result of  
145 conservation interventions will be scrutinised by multiple different actors who each have their own  
146 personal counterfactual, which will often diverge, even robustly monitored interventions could lead to



147 wide-ranging and at times conflicting interpretations of efficacy (Pearson, 2016). Equally, since robust  
148 evaluation of interventions must inextricably be linked to the initial design of the interventions  
149 themselves (Bull et al., 2014), the challenge of divergence in counterfactuals is important when  
150 setting conservation objectives. Concerning the sustainability of interventions, it would be preferable  
151 to minimise the sum of perceived differences for an SES – implying that most actors use  
152 approximately the same counterfactual. Is it possible to reduce the sum of perceived differences? To  
153 answer, we first consider the ‘reference frame’ within which the counterfactual is specified.

154

### 155 **Counterfactuals and reference frames**

156 Again, counterfactuals are a type of *reference scenario* (Maron et al., 2018). Reference scenarios are  
157 specified within a *reference frame* (or ‘frame of reference’), and any number of reference scenarios  
158 can be specified within one reference frame (Bull et al., 2014). In Appendix 2 we formally describe a  
159 reference frame, and in Appendix 3 discuss usage of the term in different scientific disciplines. To a  
160 greater or lesser extent across different disciplines, a reference frame is typically composed of: (i) the  
161 relevant ‘parameter space’ capturing all possible variables of interest, particularly the subset of  
162 interest to the relevant ‘observer’; and, (ii) the observer themselves, including the social values  
163 through which that observer views the chosen parameters. Unlike other disciplines in the natural  
164 sciences, which do so *alongside* rather than as *part* of the reference frame, we also include: (iii) the  
165 specific *coordinate system* used to make measurements within the parameter space, chosen by the  
166 observer, which determines the spatiotemporal scale of the reference frame (see Fig. A2.1). A  
167 coordinate system is a set of numbers used to specify quantitative information (e.g. an object’s  
168 location in space; Appendix 3). In contrast to measurement of physical change in disciplines where  
169 standardised units exist, a coordinate system requires specification when assessing quantitative  
170 change in biodiversity as it is an imprecise term, and so there are many different ways in which  
171 ‘biodiversity’ could be measured (Purvis & Hector, 2000).

172

173 A counterfactual (or indeed any change) cannot be comprehensively specified in the absence of a  
174 reference frame: the observer, the parameters they are interested in, and the scale and coordinate  
175 system they are using must all be defined first (Fig. A2.1) even if in practice these are typically implicit  
176 or assumed (Bull et al., 2014). The reason for discussing reference frames here is that it is differences

177 in the actors' underlying reference frames that give rise to the family of counterfactuals. To expand,  
178 reference frames used for evaluating conservation interventions vary depending upon the actor  
179 carrying out the evaluation – because different actors have different personal values built into their  
180 reference frame when constructing a counterfactual (e.g. Bull & Maron, 2016) which additionally may  
181 change over time, or because actors make different assumptions about the appropriate parameter  
182 space and scale for evaluation (e.g. Pauly, 1995). Minimising the sum of perceived differences in an  
183 SES therefore requires influencing underlying reference frames.

184

185 Reference frames can be *divergent* (e.g. actors using different scales) and even *conflicting* (e.g.  
186 observers making directly contradictory assumptions about value ascribed to biodiversity  
187 components) (Hahn et al., 2014). The idea of conflicting reference frames is not new – Schön & Rein  
188 (1994) discuss divergent and conflicting reference frames in policy design respectively as  
189 'disagreements' (resolvable by examining facts) versus 'controversies' (which tend to be intractable).  
190 In conservation, it is well established that focusing upon different parameters or coordinate systems  
191 can cause conflicting assessments on efficacy (e.g. Naidoo et al., 2008).

192

### 193 **Illustration**

194 We now illustrate the preceding concepts using examples across different spatial scales. Multi-scalar  
195 illustration is important as counterfactual evaluation is relevant and necessary for conservation  
196 interventions on any spatial scale (Ferraro & Pattanayak, 2006). Note that in testing our proposals  
197 more thoroughly – and certainly in implementing them – the counterfactuals used would be based on  
198 extensive empirical data collected from different actors.

199

#### 200 *International: influence of Aichi Target 11*

201 We start at the largest scale, treating the global biosphere as our SES. Aichi Target 11 is associated  
202 with the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) (<https://www.cbd.int/sp/targets/>): these targets, set  
203 in 2010, were intended to be met by 2020, and there are numerous interested stakeholders seeking to  
204 understand the impact of setting them (see Butchart et al., 2010). Aichi Target 11 states that, "By  
205 2020, at least 17 per cent of terrestrial and inland water, and 10 per cent of coastal and marine areas,  
206 especially areas of particular importance for biodiversity and ecosystem services, are conserved

207 through effectively and equitably managed, ecologically representative and well connected systems of  
208 protected areas and other effective area-based conservation measures, and integrated into the wider  
209 landscapes and seascapes". Here, for conceptual clarity, we focus on a subset of protected areas  
210 (marine areas), tracked via the World Database on Protected Areas (WDPA).

211  
212 Observations seemingly indicate progress towards Target 11, evidenced by the ongoing trend in  
213 marine protected area (MPA) coverage (Fig. 2). But the process of setting the Aichi Targets can be  
214 viewed as an attempt to stimulate specific actions across the 196 countries Party to the CBD; as  
215 such, it is reasonable to ask whether there has been any associated change in conservation trends  
216 since 2010. So, imagine one actor characterises the immediately pre-2010 trend in MPA coverage as  
217 linear, with the post-2010 projection of that linear trend taken as their counterfactual. Comparing the  
218 latter against the observed trend for MPA coverage post-2010, this first actor treats the difference  
219 between the two as resulting from action stimulated by setting Target 11 (Fig. 2). Though not a  
220 particularly sound statistical analysis, it represents a plausible interpretation of the data.

221  
222 A second actor might instead argue that a non-linear trend-line fits the 18-year dataset better,  
223 suggesting the MPA network is on a longer-term exponential growth trajectory. This would imply that  
224 the counterfactual scenario in the absence of the CBD Strategic Plan was also the observed outcome,  
225 insinuating (correctly or otherwise) that setting Target 11 had no influence on net MPA outcomes. The  
226 perceived difference between actors one and two, regarding the degree to which Target 11 has  
227 stimulated additional growth in MPA coverage, is clear – despite their using the same biophysical  
228 outcome, metric and dataset (Fig. 2).

229

230 *Regional: Australian state biodiversity offset policy*

231 A more pertinent application is in exploring the actions taken towards meeting global conservation  
232 policy targets at regional scales; not least because it is on such scales that conservation interventions  
233 typically act, and which ecosystem responses can be monitored over reasonable timescales. So, we  
234 turn to the aforementioned example of Australian state-level 'biodiversity offset' policies. These  
235 policies require that biodiversity losses via clearance of certain native habitats, as a result of  
236 economic development activities, are fully compensated through biodiversity gains on sites with

237 comparable habitat elsewhere. These gains can take the form of ‘averted losses’ (i.e. protection of a  
238 habitat that prevents otherwise near-certain degradation), and as such the counterfactual scenario  
239 used to evaluate impacts is critical (Maron et al., 2015).

240

241 For six offset policies across five Australian states, Maron et al. compared the counterfactual rate of  
242 habitat loss assumed by the regulator (the ‘crediting baseline’ in Fig. 1) against a counterfactual  
243 calculated by researchers based on the proxy of ‘recent observed deforestation’. These can be  
244 considered the counterfactuals assumed by Actors A1 and A2 respectively, and clearly the difference  
245 is substantial for most states. Using our mathematical formulation (Appendix 1), we can calculate the  
246 sum of perceived differences between the two actors for each state separately (Table 1). In doing so,  
247 we show that even the normalised sum varies by 1–2 orders of magnitude between states, and South  
248 Australia is a potential outlier (although this may be an artefact of offset data availability for the state;  
249 Maron et al., 2015). In isolation, these figures do not substantially advance our understanding of the  
250 SES, but if compared to similar statistics calculated for a wide range of regional policy interventions  
251 elsewhere (an empirical application of our framework), they could indicate the relative degree of  
252 disagreement over policy outcomes.

253

#### 254 *Local: species protection in Uzbekistan*

255 The previous examples consider two actors, but the framework can be extended to any number, and  
256 for different biodiversity components. Consider protection efforts on a subnational scale for an IUCN  
257 Red List species, the Critically Endangered saiga antelope *Saiga tatarica*. In remote northwest  
258 Uzbekistan, the ‘Ustyurt’ saiga population has declined in recent years, and consequently attracted  
259 intensive conservation efforts; but the region is also experiencing increasing economic development  
260 activity (Bull et al., 2013). New development projects typically seek to mitigate any impacts that might  
261 exacerbate extinction risk for saigas, and so a counterfactual scenario is needed for evaluating the  
262 success of mitigation measures relative to the observed trend in saiga population numbers.

263

264 We compare five possible counterfactual population trends for Uzbek saigas over 15 years against  
265 the observed population trend. Three counterfactuals relate to known population trends for distinct  
266 saiga populations of historically comparable sizes (Association for the Conservation of Biodiversity of

267 Kazakhstan, unpublished data), and two are hypothetical but realistic counterfactuals (extirpation, and  
268 population expansion without die-offs) (Fig. 3). From initially close alignment, the counterfactuals  
269 (which we ascribe to five different actors, A1 – A5) diverge substantially over time. This can be  
270 tracked using the annual normalised sum of perceived differences across the family of counterfactuals  
271 (Fig. 3); showing the dramatic variation possible in terms of interpreting the impact of protection  
272 efforts.

273

274 If divergent families of counterfactuals in SES do undermine interventions, it is a problem which needs  
275 resolution. One solution would be to make the divergence explicit, requiring actors to 'agree to  
276 disagree' (Biggs et al., 2017). But next, alternatively, we consider opportunities to minimize the  
277 summed difference across a family of counterfactuals via resolving conflicting frames.

278

### 279 **Minimising perceived differences**

280 A starting point is to *understand* the relevant actors' reference frames. Extensive literature exists on  
281 stakeholder analysis in relationship to natural resource management (Reed et al., 2009; Cummings et  
282 al., 2018). Determining reference frames through stakeholder analysis would involve uncovering the  
283 perceptions of different actors, associated social discourses, and relationships between actors (Reed  
284 et al., 2009; Baynham-Heard et al., 2018). One aspect that needs consideration when implementing  
285 our approach is the *power* dynamics between actors (i.e. differentiation between actors' ability or  
286 capacity to influence outcomes). This involves assessing who is represented and who is left out of the  
287 decision-making, and whether the reference frames of some actors be given greater weighting (e.g.  
288 Smith et al., 2010). This is not the same as *weighting* for power dynamics when performing our  
289 proposed calculations: that is something we avoid, since our framework relates specifically to  
290 differences in counterfactuals *chosen* by various actors, rather than actors' ability to *act* upon those  
291 differences. Power dynamics are certainly important to our approach if they result in certain  
292 stakeholders being completely excluded from consideration, such that their perspective is not  
293 incorporated into the sum of perceived differences; a risk that requires careful treatment. Conversely,  
294 consideration of the specific nuance of power dynamics – albeit likely an important next step for  
295 research on this topic – is more crucial to discussions around steps taken to *resol*ve such differences.

296 Though we begin to explore the latter in this article, the issue of power dynamics deserves further  
297 attention in its own right.

298

299 Different authors have explored options for using understanding of actors' perspectives to design  
300 effective conservation (Battista et al., 2018; Cummings et al., 2018; Cinner, 2018); here we do so  
301 based upon our formalised structure for reference frames (Appendix 2). So – having isolated different  
302 actors' reference frames, we can structure possible approaches to conflict resolution in terms of the  
303 three key components (Fig. A2.1; Table 2), each of which we discuss below.

304

### 305 Conflict in the physical component

306 The physical component of the reference frame (i.e. measurable biophysical quantities, whether biotic  
307 or abiotic; Appendix 2) is inevitably associated with development of conservation objectives.

308 Consequently, resolution of conflict in the physical component of the reference frame relates strongly  
309 to conservation objectives and targets.

310

311 Structured decision-making (SDM; an approach designed to “systematically incorporate participant  
312 values, objectives and knowledge in decision-making”; Addison et al., 2013) can help develop  
313 objectives for natural resource use, given competing actor values (e.g. Robinson et al., 2016).

314 Further, despite involving explicit expression of conflicting reference frames, SDM can strengthen  
315 consensus amongst groups during decision-making (Priem et al., 1995) such as design and  
316 evaluation of interventions. Indeed, experts typically perform better at making decisions based on  
317 well-structured discussions with peers rather than alone (Burgman et al., 2011). Incorporating  
318 monitoring and evaluation into SDM is well established (Lyons et al., 2008). Considering these  
319 factors, SDM provides a practical platform for using group consensus to reduce conflicts between  
320 stakeholders with different reference frames.

321

322 When there are intractable differences between stakeholders, consensus may be impossible.

323 International policy decisions can be seen as negotiated decisions constructed through multi-actor  
324 interactions (Daniels et al., 2012). In such cases, e.g. the development of quantifiable environmental  
325 targets, Maxwell et al. (2015) propose allowing room for manoeuvre, promoting ambiguity in targets

326 with the goal of building trust, cooperation and consensus. This is akin to allowing ambiguity in  
327 specification of the parameter space for the physical component of conflicting frames, to promote  
328 convergence in social components of those reference frames. An obvious disadvantage is that  
329 ambiguity in the definition of any component of the reference frame makes rigorous evaluation  
330 impossible – so the approach sacrifices short-term measurability to enable long-term resolution.

331

### 332 Conflict in the social component

333 More diverse groups often frame likely outcomes more accurately (Sutherland & Burgman, 2015). But  
334 this is not only relevant to experts and decision-makers: Addison et al. (2013) suggest using  
335 participatory SDM to increase broader social acceptance of conservation objectives. That is, through  
336 participatory exercises featuring diverse non-experts, interventions can be designed that integrate  
337 multiple social reference frames. Such reference frames typically involve several layers of complexity:  
338 deeply held values, important interests, local knowledge, and socially embedded conflicts among  
339 them (Daniels et al., 2012). Similarly, participatory modelling is designed to integrate a diversity of  
340 perspectives (i.e. social reference frames) through e.g. using role playing games (Jones et al., 2007)  
341 – again, for both specialist and non-specialist participants. In seeking consensus across  
342 heterogeneous groups of actors, there are many formal processes available e.g. stakeholder  
343 engagement, scenario planning (Cummings et al., 2018), and workshops designed to facilitate  
344 alignment between individual social values (Kenter et al., 2015).

345

346 Beyond participatory mechanisms, extensive literature concerns the degree to which personal  
347 reference frames can be modified, including for conservation (Iftekahr & Pannell, 2015). Consider  
348 ‘anchoring’ – when estimating numerical outcomes, individuals generally make minor adjustments to  
349 some initial value to yield their answer. The initial (anchoring) value is linked to the individual’s  
350 personal cognitive frame, and influenced by the formulation of the question itself (Tversky &  
351 Kahneman, 1974). Consequently, the extensive theoretical basis underlying the construction of  
352 personal reference frames could be leveraged to support resolution of conflicting reference frames –  
353 for instance, by purposefully creating common, appropriate anchoring points for evaluating  
354 conservation interventions by a range of actors (e.g. the quantitative extent of remaining habitat  
355 evaluated as ‘acceptable’; see Cinner, 2018).

356

357 The power of setting expectations for assessment is also relevant in terms of qualitative presentation  
358 of interventions; policies are likely deemed more acceptable when presented without loaded terms.

359 Again, the presentation of interventions can thus be used proactively to help set personal reference  
360 frames amongst actors and reduce potential conflicts; albeit with associated ethical considerations  
361 (e.g. Rothschild, 2000). Alternatively, personal reference frames might be open to modification  
362 through management of appropriate incentives. Whilst, prosaically, these could be the provision of  
363 financial incentives, they could also be 'intrinsic' incentives related to personal desires or values.

364 Some stakeholders might be better motivated by e.g. attachment to the land than by financial  
365 incentives (Reddy et al., 2017).

366

367 Of course, substantial components of personal reference frames are deeply held and cannot be  
368 modified. Individuals distinguish between 'sacred' and 'secular' values (Tetlock et al., 2000). This  
369 forms part of an actor's personal reference frame, and they may consider it unacceptable for a  
370 conservation intervention to exchange one type of value for the other (Daw et al., 2015). In that case,  
371 the solutions would be to explicitly identify sacred values held by different actors and ensure that they  
372 are not jeopardised by interventions. Such an approach – requiring an iterative process through which  
373 trust and cooperation is built between key parties on a seemingly intractable issue – involves  
374 negotiating shared belief structures (Cummings et al., 2018), e.g. squaring different 'mental models'  
375 held by stakeholders (Biggs et al., 2017). Alternatively, the intervention could be redesigned around  
376 secular values, for which examples in the literature go back decades (Cummings et al., 2018).

377

### 378 Conflict in coordinate systems

379 One solution to conflict caused by using different coordinate systems is accepting the need to track  
380 multiple indicators (e.g. Butchart et al., 2010). Approaches that combine multiple indicators are used  
381 widely elsewhere (e.g. finance; Engle & Gallo, 2006). Where this is not satisfactory – say, due to the  
382 increased resource requirements – an alternative is again participatory approaches, facilitating  
383 consensus between actors on coordinate systems rather than parameter spaces.

384



385 Conflict arising from differences in the spatial or temporal scale for evaluation might arise because  
386 scales are implicitly assumed by different actors (Bull et al., 2014). An explicit statement of the scale,  
387 as part of counterfactual construction, is therefore one straightforward approach towards avoiding  
388 conflict. A more nuanced approach would be to consider the appropriate counterfactual scenario for  
389 different spatial scales at a given moment: Maron et al. (2018) recommend that the scope of the  
390 reference frame be explicitly expanded to approach the largest possible 'overarching' frame. Doing so  
391 is comparable with other calls in the literature to evaluate conservation interventions using very long-  
392 term timescales (e.g. Willis & Birks, 2006). Finally, Pearson (2016) suggests actors construct their  
393 personal reference frames for conservation based partly upon the spatial scale in question: setting the  
394 scale could itself be a means for influencing personal reference frames.

395

### 396 **Conclusions**

397 All biodiversity conservation interventions take place within a social-ecological system (SES), and if a  
398 SES contains more than one actor, this may give rise to a family of counterfactuals. The use of a  
399 family of different counterfactuals by different actors will cause perceived differences in the impacts of  
400 (change attributable to) an intervention, even when all actors agree on outcomes. This may lead to  
401 disagreement between actors on the efficacy of interventions, undermining efforts to conserve  
402 biodiversity. But, since no counterfactual can be considered definitive, multiple different impact  
403 evaluations can be performed or proposed by different actors, more than one of which might be  
404 considered valid. Therefore, we have developed the basis for evaluating a *sum of perceived*  
405 *differences* between actors (defined mathematically in Appendix 1), and explored approaches for  
406 minimizing perceived differences. An important next step would be to test the conceptual framework  
407 we have developed here against extensive empirical data: not only in terms of the value of our  
408 proposed sum in different SES and associated implications, but also in terms of finding the limits to  
409 which counterfactuals might be considered 'valid'. Our work provides an exploratory theoretical basis  
410 for better quantifying, understanding and ultimately managing multiple diverse perspectives on nature  
411 conservation in SES.

412

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
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
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**Figure 1:** hypothetical plot of different counterfactuals ( $B_{c(A1)}$ ,  $B_{c(A2)}$ ) used by two actors (**Actor 1**, **Actor 2**) in an SES, compared to a baseline ( $B_{base}$ ) at time = 0 and the observed biodiversity outcomes through time ( $B_{obs}$ ). **Actor 1's** perceived impact is based on comparing  $B_{obs}$  against  $B_{c(A1)}$ , while Actor 2 compares  $B_{obs}$  against  $B_{c(A2)}$ . The difference in perceived impact is shown. Inset: real life example, of two actors judging different counterfactual deforestation rates in Australian states (from Maron et al., 2015), abbreviations for each state given in Table 1.




**Figure 2:** plot of global marine protected area coverage (%) against time (years). Blue = pre-2010 trend (counterfactual for A1); orange = post-2010 trend; black = exponential trend-line fit to entire time series (counterfactual for A2); grey = Aichi Target 11 (10%). A perceived difference in the impact of setting Aichi Target 11 arises between two actors who use different counterfactuals (the blue and black lines on the graph). Data from the WDPA (UNEP-WCMC).



**Figure 3:** evaluating the outcomes of species protection in northwest Uzbekistan, 2006 – 2018.

Primary y axis: dashed grey lines = five possible counterfactual trends assumed by different actors 'A1' – 'A5' for the regional saiga antelope *Saiga tatarica* population; solid line = observed population trend 'Ob' (ACBK, unpublished data). All six lines labelled, for clarity, at years 2013 and 2017.

Secondary y axis: block dots = annual normalised sum of perceived differences.





**Table 1:** table of the perceived difference in outcomes between the regulator and researchers (A1 and A2, respectively) in the case of six different Australian state biodiversity offset policies, using the formulation of the ‘sum of perceived differences’ ( $\sum \Delta_i$ ) in Appendix 1. Normalised sum of perceived differences also given. Data from Maron et al. (2015).

	<b>A1: assumed counterfactual</b> (% habitat loss per annum)	<b>A2: assumed counterfactual</b> (proxy, % deforestation per annum)	<b>Perceived difference</b> ( $\sum \Delta_i$ )	<b>Normalised sum of</b> <b>perceived differences</b>
<b>New South Wales</b> <b>(NSW) ‘BioBanking’</b>	0.55	0.21 (min 0.14, max 0.32)	0.34	1.6
<b>New South Wales</b> <b>(NSW) ‘Major Projects’</b>	0.35 (min 0.07, max 0.65)	0.22 (min 0.00, max 0.42)	0.13	0.6
<b>Queensland (Qld)</b>	1.00	0.60 (min 0.32, max 1.96)	0.4	0.7
<b>South Australia (SA)</b>	1.48 (min 0.47, max 2.49)	0.09 (min 0.07, max 0.14)	1.39	15.4
<b>Western Australia</b> <b>(WA)</b>	1.50 (min 1.00, max 1.50)	0.19 (min 0.09, max 0.34)	1.31	6.9
<b>Victoria (Vic)</b>	3.12 (min 2.01, max 4.20)	0.45 (min 0.12, max 0.80)	2.67	5.9

**Table 2:** some possible causes of divergence between different reference frames, for actors observing conservation interventions

Component of frame (F)	Possible areas of divergence	Examples of divergence potentially leading to conflict	Relevant references
Physical parameter space ( $E^n$ )	Number and type of parameters	Which parameters to incorporate (e.g. objectives and targets of interventions)	Burgman et al., 2011; Maxwell et al., 2015
		Decision whether to include certain physical parameters (e.g. temperature), or otherwise	Poiani et al, 2011
		Treating the intervention as dynamic (that is, incorporating 'time' as a parameter) or otherwise	Corlett, 2016
Observer's personal reference frame ( $F_{ob}$ )	Personal values	Degree to which relationship exists between biodiversity and personal well-being	Woodhouse et al., 2015
		Assumption that high biodiversity is 'better' than low biodiversity (e.g. species numbers)	Bull & Maron, 2016
		Different intrinsic incentives to engage in conservation interventions	Reddy et al., 2017
	Social values	Preference for focus on conservation of certain components of biodiversity over others	Marris, 2013
	Cultural values	Attribution of sacred values vs. secular values to components of biodiversity	Daw et al., 2015; Biggs et al., 2017
Coordinate system (C)	Choice of indicators	Measurement of outcomes in relation to biological diversity, or to functionality (and consequent ecosystem service provision)	Naidoo et al., 2008
	Choice of scale	Evaluating interventions on the spatial scale of individual projects vs. a landscape scale	Bull et al., 2014; Maron et al., 2018
		Choice of temporal scale over which interventions are to be evaluated for efficacy	Bull et al., 2014
		Decision to include historical context, or otherwise	Willis & Birks, 2006;