

Chapter 2

2.1 *The Migration of Elites in a Borderless World: Citizenship as an Incentive for Professionals and Managers?*

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The 21st century has been proclaimed as the „Age of Mobility“ (Papademetriou 2007) as well as an „Age of Migration“ (Castles/Miller 2009). People from all over the world and with the most different social backgrounds, are said to be increasingly moving and migrating around the globe. As for the developed countries, the populations concern and fear is growing, with the perception of aliens pouring into their homelands. Politicians, scientists, journalists and others are responding in their very own way to this situation. In politics, the legal concept of citizenship has recently become one of the key issues for debates revolving around immigration policies. But citizenship is not merely a concept; it is also an emotional issue, since the changing legal status serves as a bureaucratic bottleneck for many other social policy issues that are formative aspects of any modern nation-state, especially the citizen's right to vote. In recent times, science and politics have united in their efforts to understand the effects and consequences of the citizenship status in a more profound manner. Thus, this legal concept promises to become one of the most forceful mediums for the patronization of a political integration of migrants, as well as their subsequent social integration.

In marked contrast, throughout the 1990s Globalization has been said to bring about a change in the concept of citizenship that used to bear on close connections to the nation-state. Soysal (1994) even predicted that the emergence of post-national citizenship will replace the traditional nation-based citizenship. Jacobson (1997) also predicted the diminishing importance of citizenship, related to nationality.

Are these predictions already coming true? Is our world actually composed of „transnational citizens“? This article tackles the issue by providing empirical evidence concerning the migration pattern of professionals and managers.

From a sociological perspective, citizenship is a mechanism of inclusion used by nation states. The nation state occupies a territory and assembles a majority of its carefully selected members on that territory.¹ Citizenship is a multidimensional concept that comprises membership in a specific nation-state and the formal rights and obligations that this membership entails. But citizenship can also be understood as a status and as an identity. According to Kymlicka and Norman (1995: 284), citizenship describes both a legal status and a desirable involvement in one's community. The principle premise of citizenship is that nation-states can set and

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control the parameters of membership (Gilbertson 2006). The words ‚citizenship‘ and ‚nationality‘ are often used interchangeably (i.e., dual nationality, dual citizenship). However, nationality is often used to signify membership in a community on the basis of common cultural characteristics whereas citizenship refers to membership conferred by a state. Citizens of a nation-state may include those who see themselves as part of a single nation based on a common culture or ethnicity, but more often include some groups who are seen as outside of national culture and incapable of inclusion (Gilbertson 2006).

In our research, we focus on the formal concept of citizenship as a mechanism of inclusion used by nation states. We address the question ‚who’s included and who’s not?‘ “ We are therefore not focusing on national identity as an important factor in nation states’ decisions about citizenship (Choe 2006: 85). We are more interested in how citizenship has been used as an incentive to attract (talented) personnel all around the world. First we discuss whether the „brain-drain/brain-gain“ pattern of migration between developed countries that are members in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) fits with the perception of an ongoing „war of talents“. Second, we ask whether a transnational management is actually emerging and if this process is facilitated by the open-door-policies of OECD countries. Third, we suggest an explanation for the labour migration pattern that we have found and end with some conclusions.

2.1.1 Boundaryless Careers for High Skilled People? The Brain Drain - Brain Gain-Pattern

From the perspective of highly qualified employees, globalization is not merely a threat, but a chance to move across borders. Compared to the restrictions that low qualified employees are facing, national migration policies opened up the doors for experts, professionals and managers (see Dreher 2003: 18; Chalamwong 2005: 488). A fierce competition for desired jobs with high income and reputation is said to take place, as well as a „war of talents“ between nations and between companies to hire the „best brains“. Professionals and managers are said to be the pace-makers for borderless careers, in a world where money, goods and people are chasing each other around the globe (cf. Appadurai 1998: 15). Thus, globalization seems to foster the mobility of a new „jet set“ of professionals and the establishment of a „world class“ of management. Many others are reaching out to achieve a similar way of life. Crossing borders, staying abroad and demonstrating one’s flexibility become necessary as well as desirable prerequisites for meteoric careers. An unwritten law argues that the greater the mobility, the more rapid young talent will rise above the competition. To this end, a lot of countries have paved the way for a greater influx of highly qualified personnel, in part by providing citizenship as an incentive.

Thus, recent years have witnessed growing competition for highly skilled migrants as many OECD countries have opened their doors to workers in the sector of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) as well as other highly

skilled professionals (see Chalamwong 2005: 489). The globalization constellation did change for high qualified people. Citizenship was used more extensively to attract high skills. But according to Chalamwong most OECD and developed Asian countries have not introduced special measures to recruit highly skilled foreign workers. They continue to rely on their existing work-permit systems. The schemes that have been introduced invariably aim at ICT and health staff (especially care givers or nurses) and intra-company transfers for skilled workers (see *Ibid* 515).

German students are a role model in this sense; never before in history have so many of them studied in foreign countries. Compared with other European countries, German students rank at the top in terms of mobility. As a sending country Germany ranks fifth following China (1), India, the Republic of Korea and Japan (BMBF, 2005: 9 f.). A year or an even longer period spent abroad appears to be a reliable jump-start to a career, not least due to language proficiency acquired along the way. Not surprisingly the number of expatriates is on the rise as well. Corporations send their employees to their foreign subsidiaries with similar intentions, thus creating a new form of migration that obviously obeys different rules as compared with traditional emigration patterns (cf. Kolb et al. 2004). These different rules, rules of intensified and globalized competition, imply international and transnational career paths. Therefore, in addition to the emphasis on the role of TNCs in the world economy, the rise of „global elites“ has become one of the central assumptions of mainstream globalization theories. Along with the internationalization of production chains, a transnational management seems to be emerging, forming a new world class of business elites (see Hartmann and Kopp 2001). As described by Ulrich Beck (1997: 17), these people are able to produce their goods where costs are minimal, settle and work where life is most comfortable, and pay taxes where rates are lowest. But as elites they are also responsible for many of the decisions that shape the world's economy.

The sociology of migration has widely ignored these new movement patterns of highly qualified labour. Controversies associated with the international migration of labour are often subjected to a debate of problems of integration in recipient countries. Discussion of these problems is usually restricted to the analysis of ethnic minorities, or focuses on low skilled workers migrating between specific world regions (cf. Pries 1998: 71; Pries 2003; 2005a; 2005b; Kolb 2006). In the case of managers and highly skilled labour, it is assumed that a new international labour market is developing (cf. Pries 1998; Castles/Miller 1993; Rodriguez-Pose 2003). But although a new form of migration among companies has been observed, it has not been systematically taken into account. Even in the literature of business economics, where transnational strategies for transnational management are an important subject, the careers of executives have not been carefully analyzed.

To examine how the migration pattern of high skilled labour is related to the citizenship issue, we are first going to discuss whether there is a brain drain – brain gain pattern emerging between developed countries. According to Chalamwong, the concept of brain drain first emerged in the 1960s when it was used to describe the migration of British intellectuals and scientists to the United States.

Mostly, the debate concerning brain drain has taken the perspective of the human capital approach. Chalamwong writes: „Governments invest in this human capital through training and education and expect a return on their investment when the individual becomes economically active, starts paying taxes, etc. “ (Chalamwong 2005: 502 f.). From this perspective, the migration of highly skilled human resources represents a „loss“ to the sending country, which does not reap the returns on its investment in these people. The International Labour Organization (ILO) „indicates that there is considerable evidence that the average level of human capital in a society has positive effects on productivity and growth. Conversely, low levels of education resulting from high levels of skilled emigration can slow the growth rate of the economy and adversely affect those who remain“ (Chalamwong 2005: 503).

Although this point of view is corroborated by statistics on the mobility of students and university graduates (cf. BMBF 2005; Han 2005: 38 ff.), images of war-like competition and exodus are exaggerated. Statistics of the European Union show that only 4% (1.2 million people) of all the highly skilled people in its member states are foreigners (cf. Jahr et al. 2002: 321). Jahr, Schomburg und Teichler (2002) draw the conclusion that the mobility of young European graduates is moderate rather than alarming, according to a survey of 36,000 graduates, comparing eleven European countries and Japan. Of those people that graduated in their country of citizenship, four years later only 3% had decided to work abroad (cf. Jahr et al. 2002: 329). For example, although German students are relatively mobile during their studies, it is a remarkable fact that their eagerness to take a job abroad is below average compared to students from other countries.

All studies that have investigated a possible brain drain from Germany and selected other OECD countries to the USA concluded that it has not been of considerable magnitude. Only a few Germans have permanently settled in the US, and the size of this population has remained consistently low (approximately 0.8% of the total German population) (cf. Table 1). Thus, the form of temporary residence has prevailed as the dominant path of migration (cf. Diehl/Dixon 2005: 714 ff.). In the case of the Republic of Korea, there has actually been a substantial decline in the number of US residents. The only exception to this trend is the People’s Republic of China, from which emigration to the US has remained high.

The share of people with a university degree and in professional or managerial positions has not changed considerably over time. Thus a brain drain is not evident, neither in terms of population structure nor with regard to the international variance in this realm. The large-scale import of labour into Japan and Korea has been mostly restricted to low skilled workers, with only low numbers of highly qualified personnel from OECD countries (cf. Chalamwong 2005).

Table 1: Growth of the foreign-born US-population by country of birth 1995-2006

	1995	2006	Decrease/
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			Increase
Japan	358,000	235,000	-123,000
Korea	710,000	304,000	-306,000
China	690,000	1,386,000	+696,000
Germany	586,000	594,000	+8,000
England	608,000	528,000	-80,000
Italy	446,000	409,000	-37,000

Source: Migration Policy Institute, Data Hub (2007).

According to this line of research, brain drain and brain gain have a negligible role in the contemporary world economy. The easing of restrictions in Japan's migration policy has caused the foreign population to grow from 85,500 in 1992 to 154,700 in 2000 – across all qualification levels. Notwithstanding that a similar trend is visible in the Republic of Korea, but both countries still host a low proportion of foreigners: 1% and 0.3% respectively of their entire population. Most of those migrants originate from non-OECD countries such as the Philippines and China (cf. OECD Migration Report 2004). In 2006, Japan hosted 271,807 highly skilled foreigners (134,132 from OECD countries) compared to 647,407 migrants having a low or intermediate skill level. In Korea in 2006, there were 18,406 highly skilled foreigners from OECD countries and 20,982 from non-OECD countries compared to 86,676 migrants with a low or intermediate skill level.

Table 2: Foreign population in the Republic of Korea by level of qualification and position

2008	Total	High Qualified	Workers	Art & Sports
Foreign born	531,133	29,844	496,672	4,617

Highly Qualified Personnel	Total	Legal	Illegal (16-60세)	Illegal (Total)
Total	29,844	28,630	1,158	1,214
Teacher, Professor (E-1)	1,564	1,516	36	48
Language Teaching (E-2)	17,970	17,408	548	562
Research (E-3)	2,231	2,139	85	92
Teaching of Technology (E-4)	163	151	12	12
Professionals (E-5)	451	425	17	26
Special Tasks (E-7)	7,465	6,991	460	474

In the USA, the numbers are greater but the proportion is similar. There are 13 million migrants with a low or intermediate skill level and more than 2.2 million highly skilled foreigners from non-OECD countries. Germany has roughly the same ratio of high-skilled to low-skilled workers (1:8).

Table 3: Foreign population in Japan, Republic of Korea, USA and Germany by level of qualification (2006)

	Qualification Level and Origin					
	High		Medium		Low	
	OECD	Non-OECD	OECD	Non-OECD	OECD	Non-OECD
Japan	134,132	137,675	196,569	211,291	114,217	125,330
Korea	18,406	20,982	6,866	48,887	1,445	29,478
USA	1,287,614	2,235,188	2,381,200	2,659,979	5,084,499	2,934,046
Germany ² (2001)	1,132,000		3,590,000		4,906,000	

Source: OECD-Data (2006).

We are able to conclude that, if measured in quantitative terms, there is an increased mobility of the workforce but there has not been any considerable brain drain that would deplete needed resources of OECD countries. Although there are serious methodological difficulties in obtaining the necessary data, the evidence is straightforward; taking up residency abroad is mainly temporary and marginal in nature. The argument that mobility may cause „brain circulation“, or „brain exchange“ rather than „brain drain“ will more likely hold for mobility of skilled workers among developed countries and not among developing countries (see also Chalamwong 2005: 505). Martin (2002) points out that a new era of „brain circulation“ may have begun between Asian countries and the United States.

The above analysis discussed high-skilled workers as a single group. Next we address whether our conclusions extend to top-management personnel.

2.1.2 Internationalization of Management: „Brain Circulation“

There are two forms of internationalization that we will subject to critical scrutiny in this section. At issue is the question of whether domestic leaders pursue their careers abroad and if they are able to reach the top-positions. But it is also contestable if staying abroad as a student or in a leadership position is of any relevance to empirical career paths (cf. Mense-Petermann/Wagner 2006; Klemm/Popp 2006).

According to the data of Germany's „microcensus“ there is a considerable increase in the number of foreign entrepreneurs, managers and head's of department. But their overall share amounted only to 6% in 2004 and 7.3% in 2006 respectively. That is not as much as mainstream globalization theories would have led to expect, since the statistics include a multitude of foreign SMEs and executives that had a temporary assignment in a foreign country's SME. And even in the top ranks of German companies the picture does not change, according to the

data from Michael Hartmann's studies. He reports (Hartmann 2007a: 59) similarly low percentages of foreign personnel in top-management positions. In-between 1995 and 2005, the absolute number of foreign top-managers in Germany's top 100 companies has risen from 2 to 9, but many of those come from neighbouring Austria or Switzerland. There are neither British nor US-American citizens at the top of a German company. And the 10% of foreign citizens among the 416 board members in 2005 had usually remained in the corporation after a takeover (cf. Hartmann 2007a: 59 f.).

If one is to assume a global market for top-managers the German segment is typical in an international comparison. The share of foreign top-managers in France's 100 biggest enterprises has remained steadily at 2% between 1995 and 2005. In case of the USA, according to Hartmann, only 5% of CEOs have been raised abroad (cf. Hartmann 2007b). The SpencerStuart CEO-report counts 16 foreign CEOs in USA's 100 biggest enterprises in 2008. Surveying East Asian countries produces similar results, in some cases even with lower shares of foreign personnel than in German companies. The results seem pretty homogenous, the only exception in the sample being the case of Great Britain with a remarkable rate of foreign top-managers that amounts to 20%. However, this portion consists mostly of people from Commonwealth-countries.

Table 4: Foreign Top-Managers among the board of directors of top 100 companies in China, Japan and Korea (Chaebol)

Top Industrial Enterprises	CEO China N=100, 2005	CEO Japan N=100, 2006	CEO Korea³ N=100, 2008
Foreigner	0	4	4
Has Studied Abroad	7.1%	21.8%	30%
Has Worked Abroad \geq 1Y	9.1%	40%	43.3%

Source: Own Research.⁴

On the Chinese mainland the top 100 industrial enterprises are state-owned in great measure. Roughly 76% of these enterprises have a CEO who is at the same time board member of an important subcommittee of the communist party. That is one of the reasons why foreign personnel cannot be selected for these positions. In Korean chaebol, the influence of family clans prevails and secures their dominion in the companies' boards, by building informal networks between formally autonomous enterprises. Measures of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the wake of the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s have not changed this fact at all. And also in Japan the modernization of industrial consortiums has not led to the allocation of international personnel to domestic top-positions.

With regard to the middle management, our case studies of German industrial companies show the same pattern as reported above. So-called „Inpatriates“, the residing foreigners, are largely occupied as professionals, not as executives. In our case studies we found a quota effectively ranging from 4% to 6% of inpatriates in

middle and upper management positions. Yet again to a great extent these people come from EU countries, especially from Austria and Switzerland. Thus, considering middle management positions there are no signs of an international market for executives of any significant proportion or of any relevance for career paths. Preliminary data gathered from case studies in the U.S. chemical industry show a quota of foreign citizenship in senior management positions of approximately 8%. 2 out of 25 senior managers in the sample had actually moved to the U.S. According to our case studies of the big business conglomerates in Korea, they have established think tanks that include international talents that have staff functions, but those recruited from abroad remain outside of the line organization (cf. Pohlmann 2002). The same applies to Japanese consortiums.

These findings lead to the conclusion that that national career patterns prevail with regard to top positions in management. There is little reason to believe in the significance of brain drain or brain gain. Our data is consistent with the idea that internationalization of management is a matter of brain circulation: that is temporary residency abroad. In terms of international student exchanges between universities and the number of expatriates sent abroad there is a substantial rise in numbers as well as in importance for national career paths (cf. Diehl/Dixon 2005: 715 f). This holds also true for the cases of Japan and Korea. Studying or working abroad is a means of internationalizing one's career profile.

Hence, the chances of staying abroad are limited. A longer duration bears risks regarding the loss of important domestic opportunities, especially the problem of missing opportunities for advancement in the national domain. Thus, in our view the main mechanism of internationalization is a temporary assignment.

2.1.3 Domestic Careers Instead of International Markets

The picture that mainstream globalization theories suggest is an exaggeration of actual results with respect to the internationalization of management. Although management experiences in a foreign country gain in relevancy, a majority of careers are pursued exclusively in the national domain. An international executives' market among OECD countries has yet to be established. The reason for this is that in all three world regions under scrutiny there is a strong preference for domestic careers.

Whereas in Germany their relevance is lowest, accounting for roughly half of all CEO positions in 2005 (cf. Hartmann 2007a), data from Spencer Stuart show that newly appointed CEOs in the top 500 U.S. companies were „insiders“ in more than 80% of all cases in 2008. Such domestic careers are absolutely predominant in East Asia, accounting for roughly 74% to 82% of all career paths.

Table 5: *Domestic Careers of CEOs in Top 100 Industrial Enterprises in China, Japan and Korea*

Industrial Enterprises	CEO China N=100, 2005	CEO Japan N=100, 2006	CEO Korea⁵ N=100, 2008
Domestic Careers	81.8%	79.2%	74%
Job Tenure	18.7 years	27 years	24.7 years
Age	55.3 years	62.7 years	59.7 years

Source: Own Research.⁶

Especially in Japan and South Korea averages of age as well as job tenure of CEOs exceeds even high expectations. Reforms and restructuring were not able to change such a clear preference for insiders. The recruitment of outsiders to an extent as in Germany is exceptional in international comparison. But if conglomerates recruit outsiders their selection favours the candidates of dominant coalitions and networks, according to our research. Thus, neither external nor the internal labour markets of organizations can account for these decisions.

The hypothesis that a new transnational management has emerged cannot be sustained by our empirical findings. Citizenship neither works as an incentive for the high skilled workers of OECD countries nor for the economic elites of developed countries, yet. The „war of talents“, fought with „open door“ migration policies on international markets is an exaggerated as well as misleading depiction, if not a myth, of mainstream globalization theories.

2.1.4 Conclusions

Does globalization lead to global markets for managers and international careers? The hypothesis of the globalization literature that a transnational management is emerging out of a global „war of talents“ was examined in this article, by using data on the migration of managers from the U.S., East Asia and Germany. The data show that no significant brain drain between these countries is taking place; „brain circulation“ of insiders with short-term stays abroad is the dominant career pattern. The less likely the exchange of an installed CEO, the more career systems are used for status achievement by Clans and the stronger the influence of informal cultural rules, the higher is the rate of insiders. Thus, between the U.S., Germany and East Asia no significant global markets for managers have been evolving, yet.

The open-door policies of the nation-states do not change that picture. Citizenship does not work as an incentive. It cannot attract talented people all around the world, because they still have to face substantial disadvantages by continuing their careers abroad. The underlying career systems inside their specific firm and the role of internal labor markets for high skilled personnel did not change in line with

the expectations of the globalization literature. To deal with globality inside and outside of those groups of globally operating firms makes it even more necessary to rely on trust, loyalty and informal cultural rules inside the firm's networks. Thus, Globalization is rather fostering the importance of insider career systems for the firms recruiting practices, instead of opening it up for outsiders.

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Endnotes

¹ Attribution and acquisition of citizenship are structured on two principles: *jus soli* (the conferral of citizenship to persons born in the state's territory, or soil) and *jus sanguinis* (the conferral of citizenship to persons with a citizen parent or parents, or blood). Most nation-states base their citizenship laws on a combination of *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis* (see Gilbertson 2006).

² Since there was no data available for Germany in 2006, the reported numbers originate in *SourceOECD International Migration Statistics* (2001).

³ If one looks at the Chaebol instead of solely focusing on industrial enterprises, then there are six CEOs with a foreign citizenship.

⁴ The research received the support of Isabel Burkert in the case of Japan (cf. Burkert 2007), in the case of China support came from Yuan Yuan Liu and in the case of the Republic of Korea it was Jong-Hee Lee, who aided in acquiring the data.

⁵ The data refer to the total of top 100 consortiums in the Republic of Korea.

⁶ The research received the support of Isabel Burkert in the case of Japan (cf. Burkert 2007), in the case of China support came from YuanYuan Liu and in the case of the Republic of Korea it was Jong- Hee Lee, who aided in acquiring the data.