

# **Military Agency, Politics and the State: The Case of Pakistan**

Inauguraldissertation

zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades Dr. rer. pol.

im Fach Politikwissenschaft

vorgelegt von:

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Eingereicht an der

Fakultät für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften

der Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg

im Sommer Semester 2010

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“...Whatever community, caste or creed you belong to you are now the [civil] *servants* of Pakistan. *Servants* can only do their duties and discharge their responsibilities by serving. Those days have gone when the country was ruled by the [civil] bureaucracy. It is people’s Government, responsible to the people...do your duty as *servants*; you are not concerned with this political or that political party; that is not your business...you are not *rulers*. You do not belong to the ruling class; you belong to the *servants*.” [italics mine]

M.A. Jinnah’s address to the  
*Gazetted officers*,  
25 March 1948

“...I would like to take the opportunity of refreshing your memory by reading the prescribed *oath* to you. “ I solemnly affirm, in the presence of Almighty God, that I owe allegiance to the *Constitution* and Dominion of Pakistan (*mark the words Constitution and the Government of the Dominion of Pakistan*) and that I will as in duty bound honestly and faithfully serve in the Dominion of Pakistan [Armed] Forces and go within the terms of my enrolment wherever I may be ordered by air, land or sea and that I will observe and obey all command of any officer set over me.....”...if you have time enough you should study the Government of India Act, as adapted for use in Pakistan, which is our present Constitution, *that the executive authority flows from the head of the Government of Pakistan*, who is the Governor-General and, therefore, any command or orders that may come to you cannot come without the sanction of the Executive Head. This is the legal position.” [italics mine]

M.A. Jinnah’s address to the  
*Officers of the Staff College*,  
Quetta, 14 June 1948

## Acknowledgements

When I was a kid, growing up in Punjabi culture where family values are highly esteemed, my mother disclosed to me once that I have three fathers. I was simply non-pulsed. Having seen my anxiety turning into suspicion, she, with a meaningful smile on her face, categorized and termed the three-father syndrome as follows: 1) your biological father, 2) your (would-be) father-in-law and 3) your teacher(s). To my surprise and amusement, the existence of the phenomenon and practice of *Doktorvater* in Germany made me realize, on the one hand, the reverence for a teacher and hence knowledge and, on the other, the beauty that such a title carries even in a non-South Asian cultural setting.

Thus, in view of the above, it shall be morally akin to disrespect, if not disobedience, not to pay my heartiest regards to my *Doktorvater*, Prof Subrata Kumar Mitra, who formally introduced me to the domain of professional political science. Moreover, his logical emphasis on the importance of the Rational Choice theory further strengthened my (rational) conviction in the latter's explanatory utility. In addition, his timely guidance as regards the choice and application of research methods further helped me a great deal in terms of ensconcing empirical data with theory/model. Importantly, to me Prof Mitra is more than a *Doktorvater*. In a purely South Asian cultural/intellectual jargon, he is my *Guru*- the one who made me learn from him, both expressly and tacitly, the comparative difference between politics and political science, political science and the politics of political science, reason and ignorance, rationality and irrationality, the sacred and secular and respect for (other) people and perspectives and bigotry, conceit and the negativity of ego. Not only this, the *Guru* made me learn how to figure out possible similarity between two objects, at the minimum, and two cases/cultures, at the maximum.

Nonetheless, since knowledge-seeking is a continuous process than a product, it shall be extremely inappropriate to exclude Prof Aurel Croissant from the list of my teachers. I am deeply indebted to Prof Croissant for formally introducing me to an altogether different world of civil-military relations. Also, the value of organization and participation that I learnt from his colloquiums, which he allowed me to attend, shall serve as a practical guide. In addition, I am thankful to him for becoming my second marker. Here, I would also like to pay my deepest regards to Prof Dietmar Rothermund who took time to not only read parts of my thesis but also blessed me with his valuable comments and practical guidelines- and that too over a cup of coffee. Also, I appreciate the way he posted me his letters of recommendation. To conclude the list of teachers, I would like to pay homage to Dr Ayesha Siddiqa who remained, as always, a source of intellectual inspiration and struggle against authoritarianism, both military and civilian.

Besides teachers, the list of colleagues and friends who helped me, one way or the other, is very long. At its top sits (Dr) Jivanta Schöttli who, like a good South Asian, took the pain to read a significant part of my thesis. Moreover, her timely comments and questions helped me further improve upon the text. As regards comments and general observations, I also thank David Kuehn, Mada Sukmajati, (Dr) Siegfried O. Wolf, Imran Iqbal (Leeds University), Adeel Faheem (LUMS) and Farhan Sarwar (Lund University). Since moral encouragement is much-needed during especially the write-up phase, I was lucky to have too many around me. Hence, I would like to thank- besides my parents, sister and brother, and a coterie of cousins- (Dr) Clemens Spiess, Dr Wiqar Ali Shah, Dr Inayatullah Baloch, Dr Thierry DiCostanzo (Université de Strasbourg), Dr Kristina Jönsson (Lund University), Anna Løsnæs (Oslo), Azhar Shah, Anja Kluge, Altaf Qadar, Abrar Bhatti, Ch Yunus, Lionel Koenig, Florian

Britsch, Ivo Bielitz, Dr Khokhar, Markus Pauli, (Dr) Markus Franke, (Dr) Malte Pehl, (Dr) Thomas Bauer, Sergio Mukherjee, Soumen Mukherjee, Bashir Ahmed, Lu Yang, (Dr) Ali Qasmi, (Dr) Tahir Noor, Nasrullah Mirza, Dr Yousaf Khushk, Kashif, Khurram, Gulfam, Nafees, Rana Arshad, Ahmed, Amarah, Katharina, Kiran, Kathi, Nadia, Farida, Syed Arshad, Malik Majeed, Dr Khalid Sanjarani, Yasir Bhatti, Sayyar Khan, Sarmad, Nisar, Faran, Uzair, and Farah.

Besides, I would like to thank all the interviewees for their time and valuable input. In this respect, the help from Adil Ali, Asim Ali, Yahya and Ch Yousaf is much appreciated. Moreover, a special thank goes to Dr Farooq Ahmad Kiani who, despite being busy with his post-doctoral assignments, took time to help me manage statistical data. Without his help, the process would have taken much time. Hamza and Dr Sajjad deserve many thanks for their assistance with graphics and design.

In addition, I would like to thank the library staff- of South Asia Institute as well as the Heidelberg University- who took extra-care to provide me with much-needed books and archival material. Also, the help that I got from the staff of Studentenwerk is much appreciated. Furthermore, it shall be inappropriate here not to mention Barbara Neef who helped me with the faculty related concerns. Finally, my special thank to Ursula Schmitt-Köhler for helping me with Prof Mitra's letters of recommendation for the DAAD. I would like to express my gratitude to DAAD for their financial support without which it would have been almost impossible to accomplish my doctoral studies the way it is done.

Ejaz Hussain

Heidelberg, August 2010

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## List of Abbreviations

AB	Askari Bank
ADC	Aide-de-Camp
AEB	Askari Education Board
AN	Analytic Narrative
ANP	Awami National Party
AL	Awami League
AT	Agency Theory
APS	Airport Services
AWT	Army Welfare Trust
AZO	Al-Murtaza Organization
BB	Benazir Bhutto
BD	Basic Democracies
BF	Bahria Foundation
BMR	Balancing, Modernization and Replacement
BNA	Balochistan National Alliance
BNM -H	Balochistan National Movement- Hayee
BNP	Balochistan National Party
BoG	Board of Governors
BPC	Basic Principles Committee
CA	Constituent Assembly
CDA	Capital Development Authority
CE	Chief Executive
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
CEPA	Consolidated Electronic Power Asia
CJ	Chief Justice
CJCS	Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff
CMLA	Chief Martial Law Administrator
CMR	Civil-Military Relations
CNG	Compressed Natural Gas
COAS	Chief of Army Staff
COP	Combined Opposition Parties

COS	Chief of Staff
CPI	Consumer Price Index
CSP	Civil Service of Pakistan
DCC	Defense Committee of the Cabinet
DCO	District Coordinating Officer
DMG	District Management Group
DP	Defense Policy
DV	Dependent Variable
EBDO	Elected Bodies Disqualification Order
EC	Election Commission(er)
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
G-G	Governor-General
GHQ	General Headquarters
GNP	Gross National Product
GoP	Government of Pakistan
HDI	Human Development Index
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Country
HPG	Haq Parast Group (MQM)
HRI	House Rent Index
ICI	International Chemical Industries
ICS	Indian Civil Service
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IFI	International Financial Institution
IJI	Islami Jamhoori Itthead
IJM	Islami Jamhoori Mahaz
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPS	Indian Police Service
ISI	Inter-Services Intelligence
IV	Independent Variable
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Area
FC	Federal Court
FCA	Foreign Currency Account
FCCL	Fauji Cement Company Limited
FF	Fauji Foundation

FFBL	Fauji Fertilizer Bin Qasim
FFC	Fauji Fertilizer Company
FOTCO	Fauji Oil Terminal (& Distribution) Company
FP	Foreign Policy
FSF	Federal Security Force
FWO	Frontier Works Organization
FY	Fiscal Year
IPO	Initial Public Offering
JCO	Junior Commissioned Officer
JI	Jamat-i-Islami
JUI (F)	Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Fazalur Rehman)
JUP (-N)	Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (-Noorani)
JWP	Jamhoori Watan Party
KKH	Karakoram Highway
LFO	Legal Framework Order
LGP	Local Government Plan
LoC	Line of Control
MD	Managing Director
MGCL	Mari Gas Company Limited
MI	Military Intelligence
MILBUS	Military Businesses
MNA	Member National Assembly
MoD	Ministry of Defense
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MMA	Muttahida Majlis-e Amal
MPA	Member Provincial Assembly
MQM	Muttahida (previously Mohajir) Qaumi Movement
MQM-H	Mohajir Qaumi Movement- Hakiki
MRD	Movement for Restoration of Democracy
MTPD	Metric Ton Per Day
NA	National Assembly
NA	National Alliance
NAB	National Accountability Bureau
NAC	National Highway Council

NAP	National Awami Party
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
NDA	National Democratic Alliance
NDC	National Defense College
NHA	National Highway Authority
NLC	National Logistics Cell
NPL	Non-Performing Loan
NPP-K	National People's Party- Khar
NRB	National Reconstruction Bureau
NRO	National Reconciliation Order
NSC	National Security Council
NWFP	North Western Frontier Province
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OGL	Open General License
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PAF	Pakistan Air Force
PAI	Pakistan Awami Ittehad
PAAS	Pakistan Audits and Accounts Service
PAT	Pakistan Awami Tehrik
PAT	Profit After Tax
PB	Provincial (Assembly) Balochistan
PCCB	Pakistan Cricket Control Board
PCO	Provisional Constitutional Order
PDA	People Democrat Alliance
PEMRA	Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority
PF	Provincial (Assembly) Frontier (NWFP)
PFS	Pakistan Foreign Service
PIA	Pakistan International Airlines
PICIC	Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation
PIDC	Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation
PIF	Pakistan Islamic Front
PILDAT	Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency
PKMAP	Pakhtoon Khwa Milli Awami Party
PKQP	Pakhtoon Khwa Qaumi Party

PMAS	Pakistan Military Accounts Service
PM	Prime Minister
PMLCS	Pakistan Military Lands and Cantonment Service
PML-F	Pakistan Muslim League- Functional
PML-J	Pakistan Muslim League- Junejo
PML-N	Pakistan Muslim League- Nawaz
PML-Q	Pakistan Muslim League- Quaid-i-Azam
PML-Z	Pakistan Muslim League- Zia
PN	Pakistan Navy
PNA	Pakistan National Alliance
PNP	Pakistan National Party
POW	Prisoners Of War
PP	Provincial (Assembly) Punjab
PPO	Political Parties Order
PPP-S	Pakistan People's Party- Sherpao
PPP-SB	Pakistan People's Party- Shaheed Bhutto
PRAS	Pakistan Railways Accounts Service
PR	Pakistan Railways
PRODA	Public Representative And Officers Disqualification Act
PS	Provincial (Assembly) Sindh
PTI	Pakistan Tehrik Inqilab
PTV	Pakistan Television
QML	Qayyum Muslim League
RCO	Revival of Constitutional Order
SAPS	Shaheen Airport Services
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Programs
SAARC	South Asian Alliance for Regional Co-operation
SC	Supreme Court
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SF	Shaheen Foundation
SPI	Sensitive Price Indicator
TFP	Total Factor Productivity
TNSM	Tehrik-e Nifaz-e Shariat-e Muhammadi
UDF	United Democratic Front



UF	United Front
UN	United Nations
UNA	United National Alliance
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
US(A)	United States (of America)
WAPDA	Water and Power Development Authority
WB	World Bank
WPI	Wholesale Price Index
YOY	Year Over Year

## Introduction

Historically and even in recent times it is society which, as a result of the ‘social contract’, gave birth not only to the state but also its institutions. Along with parliament, judiciary, police, and civil bureaucracy, the military is one of the most fundamental state institutions. The state, on explicit behalf of the society, delegated(s) its prerogatives or rather powers to the military to protect the former against any kind of external as well as internal threat or use of force. The very practice of delegating from the (society)-state to military enabled the former to assume the principal and the latter, to take the position of agent logically, democratically and even morally. Arguably then, this state-military equation must not be reversed into becoming military-state combination until the former wills to do so consensually or on the basis of a majority principle.

Ironically however, the military has attempted to intervene<sup>1</sup> in politics throughout the nineteenth and twentieth century. It often staged military coup d’état. Therefore, most of Latin American, Asian and African states witnessed direct or indirect military interventions. Obviously, the military intervened in these countries for a number of reasons or ‘motives’ i.e. national interests, sectional interests, corporate interests etc. (see Finer 1962:32-57). Nevertheless, over a period of time a majority of Latin America and Asian states, one way or other, preferred to practice the basic norms of democratic processes. The nature of civil-military relations and the ‘transition’ to democracy in these countries nevertheless remains a constant topic of interest for experts of this field (Linz 1990; Welsh 1994; Huntington 1991 and 1995; Diamond 1992; O’ Donnell 1973, 1978; Collier 1979; Croissant 2004).

In the specific context of South Asia, the military preferred to intervene in Pakistan and Bangladesh’s politics directly i.e. in the form of coups. In Nepal and Sri Lanka, the military remains an important actor with certain institutional interests. Nevertheless, it abstained from taking over the reins of power overtly (Chadda 2000:221-235). Interestingly and paradoxically, the case of India within the South Asian context is quite unique in terms of its adherence to the norm and practice of democratic processes and parliamentary institutions.

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<sup>1</sup> The terms ‘military intervention’ is frequently used in the literature on civil-military relations. See for instance, Finer. 1962. *The Man on Horse Back*; Huntington. 1968. *Political Order in Changing Societies*; Nordlinger. 1977. *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments*; Decalo. 1976. *Coup and Army Rule in Africa: Studies in Military Style*; Henry Bienen (ed.). 1968. *The Military Intervenes: Case Studies in Political Development*; and Gavin Kennedy. 1976. *The Military in the Third World*.

Furthermore, the consolidation of democracy in India and its opposite in Pakistan despite being part of British India- the two states inherited more or less similar state intuitions from the state of British India such as a civil bureaucracy, military, constituent assembly (parliament), and constitutional-legal norms and practices etc. – presents a contrasting situation to figure out the causes for its success in the former case and its failure in the case of the latter. Therefore, in the light of the foregoing it becomes imperative to generally understand and explain the dynamics of politics and state in Pakistan and specifically the role, if any, of the military in the country’s politics.

### **Objectives of the Research**

Military intervention in Pakistan has not been systematically and rigorously the focus of a great number of studies, to that we shall return in Chapter 2. A few studies- see Kukreja (1991:37-66; 2003:1-8), Siddiqa (2007:2-23) and Aziz (2008:23-37) - have attempted to theoretically explain military intervention in Pakistan’s politics. These studies have marked the explanatory importance of models i.e. Kukreja and typologies of civil-military relations i.e. Siddiqa, in South Asia especially Pakistan. Nevertheless, as we shall explain later, even these accounts suffer from many lapses. For example, they have not considered the importance of ‘context and rationality’ in their model and typology building (Mitra 2006; see also 1999). Moreover, they have tended to de-emphasize the issues related to comparability of two or more different cases.

Therefore, the primary objective of this research is to build a model of civil-military relations applicable to the case of Pakistan. This model would help us explain the cause(s), and mode of military intervention as well as the nature of military rule. Moreover, the model would incorporate the necessary assumptions of agency theory and rational choice-neo institutionalism thus marking a departure from structural, path-dependent, irrational/conspiratorial and often *a*contextual descriptions- this shall be explained in detail in Chapter 2.

### **Historical Overview**

South Asia as a geographical entity has always been a historical reality. Indeed, the tradition of the state in South Asia dates back to 2500 BC- a period when the local ruled the land according to their own indigenous rules of the game. Over centuries, the region of South Asia

witnessed the intrusion of Persians, Greeks, Arabs, Afghans, Kushnas, Huns, Parthians, Turks and European especially the British. The external actors' interventions in the local, however, could not innovate a separate state system; rather they, due to the particular nature of the state and its rules, preferred to assimilate with the local. Thus, the indigenous statecraft remained intact. Nevertheless, the exogenous actors introduced various institutions which were previously non-existent (Kulke and Rothermund 1986:89; Rothermund 2006:53; Habib 2001: 9-12; 2002: 50-56; see also Hegewald and Mitra 2008).

As a point of departure, the Moghul state started to decline due to a multiplicity of variables. The forces of colonialism started replacing the Moghul state structure gradually. On the other hand, in the wake of the Moghul decline, the Punjab was conquered and governed by Maharaja Ranjit Singh. He raised his own army mainly comprising Punjabi Sikhs. However, the East India Company regime was able to annex the Punjab in 1849. Therefore, the next decade saw de-militarization of the defeated Ranjit's army. The 1857 mutiny, however, forced the British to re-evaluate the strategic importance of the Punjab as well as the Punjabis who had earlier supported the 'military-fiscal state' of the company rule. Thus, in 1880s soon after the Second Afghan War, the colonial masters began to think in terms of the so called 'great game' - the Russian threat. In this context, the 'martial races' concept was developed by the British authorities to 'divide and rule' not only the armed forces but also India. Subsequently, the punjabicization of the colonial military initiated the recruitment of Punjabi Sikhs, Punjabi Muslims and Pathans of north India- the so called military districts- into the restructured Bengal Army (Yong 2005:19-51).

This process of punjabicization, on the one hand, produced a 'culture of militarism' in the colonial Punjab. On the other hand, it also gave birth to the concept and practice of "canal colonies" in terms of a process of "land allocation" by the colonial masters to win the "loyalty" of the soldiering classes during the 1890s. In 1900 the Land Alienation Act was passed by the state to stop land slipping out of landed-feudals'<sup>2</sup> hands. Coincidentally, this landed-feudal class consisted of ex-soldiers, pensioners and relatives of in-service army

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<sup>2</sup> The phenomenon and practice of 'feudalism' is historically (and ontologically) a European export to the society (and state) of South Asia with the colonization of the region by especially the British. To locate this locally would be historically fallacious as is often upheld by many. Besides, the present study does not subscribe, as shall be explained later, to a feudalistic view of Pakistan state and politics.

personnel. Moreover, from 1914-1919, the Punjab provided a majority of recruits to safeguard the colonial interests in Asia, Africa and Europe (Yong 2005: 90-108).

Nevertheless, the noticeable fact is that all these developments happened under the civilian supervision of the British authority structure comprising a Governor General (G-G), the viceroy and the civil bureaucracy. This power system was answerable, via the Secretary of State to the British parliament in London. The civil bureaucracy was an integral part of this authority structure. Also, the state acted as an interventionist force to pursue its capitalist interests. In this respect, it was the bureaucracy which enjoyed an 'arbitrary' position in terms of bureaucratic paternalism. The landed-feudal's role was effectively reduced by the state-led economic mechanism affected and regulated, in turn, by the market. In addition, the state penetrated and influenced civil society through the civil bureaucracy (Rothermund 1983: xvi-xxi; Waseem 1994:27-28).

Nonetheless, the war years (1914-1918) brought a close collaboration between the civil and military authorities, giving birth to the concept of "militarized bureaucracy". The post-war chaotic economic situation along with the political uprising i.e. the Khilafat movement etc, threatened the socio-economic balance in the rural-military districts. As a result, the civil-military cooperation in terms of the Punjab Soldiers' Boards was further consolidated (Yong 2005: 141-182). However, the nationalist movement gained momentum during the inter-war period. At the same time, the Raj was political too. In revising the 1909 Morley-Mitno reforms, it rewarded the Indians with limited representation by introducing Montagu-Chelmsford reforms in 1919. However, in post-reforms India, both the Congress and the League failed to make political inroads into the Punjab which provided sixty percent of the Indian army by 1927. Instead, the Punjab based Unionist Party, an alliance of Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs landed-feudals, held on to power till the last days of the Raj. The Unionist party clearly represented the so called 'praetorian oligarchy' especially in the 'military districts' of northern Punjab (Yong 2005: 241-280). Importantly then, the consequent Partition in August 1947 of the British Indian state into independent countries of India and Pakistan brought new variables, politico-economic, strategic, ideological etc., into the limelight.

After Partition in August 1947, Pakistan opted for a strong centre to counter regionalism (Jalal 1995:85). Islam was cited as well to bind the Bengalis together (Alavi 1988). The

bureaucracy was assigned the task of state and nation building. Mohammad Ali Jinnah became the Governor General and Liaquat Ali Khan acted as Prime Minister. The pre-Partition Constituent Assembly was to make the constitution (Alavi 1990). The Secretary General of Pakistan, Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, was a bureaucrat who invented a ‘planning committee’ which was supposed to build the nation-state. During the process of nation-state construction, the secretary general bypassed the prime minister and his cabinet, thus paving the way for bureaucratic authoritarianism.<sup>3</sup> The military, a well disciplined and coherent organization, was still commanded by colonial officers i.e. Masservey, Gracey.

Jinnah being sick was dependent on his secretary general whereby the Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan did not normally attend the cabinet meetings due to weak eye sight. Thus, the secretary general as a head of the bureaucracy managed the military affairs as well (see Alavi 1990). As India went for princely states integration into the Indian Union, so did Pakistan. In a geo-strategically critical princely state of Jammu & Kashmir, it was the tribesmen from the Frontier province of Pakistan who invaded the valley supposedly to liberate the oppressed Kashmiris from the Dogra rule, in October 1947. Later, there was a well planned military operation by the Pakistan army to supposedly liberate Kashmir from the India occupation. The subsequent events led to Indo-Pak war (Ali 2002:235; Chadda 2000: 196). The religious parties especially Jamat-i-Islami (JI) supported the military action against ‘socialist India’ (Cohen 1984:37).

From 1951-58 the bureaucrats and the military ruled the roost in a joint venture. The ‘alliance’ politics further added to the military’s power (Chadda 2000:29). By 1954 the military had assumed a powerful position within the military-bureaucracy equation to the extent that the military was invited by the Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad, a bureaucrat, to intervene in country’s politics (Sayeed 1967:76-86). On the other hand, the religious elements raised the issue of ‘Ahmadiyya’ which led to massive riots especially in Lahore in 1953 (Chaudhri 1973:181-216). Resultantly, the country observed its first martial law in three major cities. Later on, the country was able to have its first constitution in 1956. However, it was abrogated by martial law two years later.

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<sup>3</sup> The present research does not conceptually/theoretically agree to a majority of existing interpretations of politics, especially the nature, pattern and dynamics of civil-military relations in Pakistan. Instead, the study shall explain such and many other similar episodes and events with the help of its model.

The 'Ayub Khan era' only brought Yahya Khan in power in March 1969 (Ziring 1970:109-113). He along with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto is held responsible for the break-up of Pakistan in December 1971. Bhutto though attempted to curtail the power of both military and the civil bureaucracy yet he resorted to the military to crush the nationalist Baloch (Chadda 2000:31-32). Moreover, he appeased the religious forces, which were deeply influenced and indoctrinated by the events in the Middle East (Roy 2004:73; Kepel 2002:63-73). In addition, it is widely believed that Pakistan's nuclear program was initiated by Bhutto to reduce military's influence in politics (Cohen 2004:140). Nevertheless, Bhutto's regime ended with another overt military intervention by another army chief in July 1977.

The Afghan Jihad served Zia till his death in August 1988. The religious parties gained much politically and economically during this period. Politically, Zia's real target was the Pakistan People's Party of late Bhutto (Chadda 2000:36). In short, the Eighth Amendment to 1973 Constitution, militarization, state-led Islamization and drug trafficking are among Zia's legacy. Last but not least, the 'decade of democracy'- the 1990s- witnessed dismissal of five ministries. Overall, the nuclear tests in May 1998, the Lahore Declaration and Kargil War (1999) are a few major events of this decade. As regards the transition to democracy, in October 1999, General Pervez Musharraf's 'armored democracy' replaced Sharif's 'Muslim democracy'(Shah 2003; Nasr 2005). Besides, the religious political parties along with Pakistan Muslim League- Quaid-e-Azam (PML-Q) reaped political benefits under the tutelage of General Pervez Musharraf.

To summarize, the historical overview presents an amalgam of different schools of thought on the nature and 'structure' of the British state, its civil-military bureaucracy, the Partition and the 'post-colonial' state of Pakistan. Importantly, this section attempted to highlight the nature, patterns and dynamics of civil-military relations in Pakistan as presented by the existing accounts- see Table 1 on the next page. However, the present study tends to theoretically and empirically differ from such structuralist-essentialist accounts as shall be presented and analyzed in Chapter 2.

**Table 1 Chronology of Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan**


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15 Aug 1947- 11 Sep 1948	Jinnah ruled as the country's first Governor-General
15 Aug 1947- 16 Oct 1951	Liaquat Ali Khan served as the first Prime Minister
14 Sep 1948- 17 Oct 1951	Khawaja Nazimuddin served as Governor-General
19 Oct 1951- 6 Oct 1955	Ghulam Mohammad, a bureaucrat, assumed Pakistan's Governor-Generalship (resigned in 1955)
19 Oct 1951- 17 April 1953	Nazimuddin served as country's Prime Minister
17 April 1953- 11 Aug 1955	Mohammad Ali Bogra got appointed as PM
6 Oct 1955- 23 March 1956	Maj-Gen Iskander Mirza ruled as Governor-General
23 Mar 1956- 27 Oct 1958	Iskander Mirza ruled as Pakistan's first President
11 Aug 1955- 12 Sep 1956	Chaudhri Mohammad Ali served as Prime Minister
12 Sep 1956- 11 Oct 1957	H.S. Suharwardy got appointed as PM
18 Oct 1957- 11 Dec 1957	I.I. Chundriger was appointed as Prime Minister
16 Dec 1957- 7 Oct 1958	Malik Feroz Khan Noon served as Prime Minister
7 Oct 1958- 8 June 1962	General Ayub Khan ruled as Pakistan's first Chief-Martial Law Administrator (CMLA)
27 Oct 1958*- 25 March 1969	General Ayub Khan ruled as President
25 Mar 1969- 20 Dec 1971	Gen Yahya Khan ruled as CMLA, and President**
20 Dec 1971- 21 Apr 1972	Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto ruled as (the only) civilian CMLA. Bhutto became President on 20 Dec. 1971 and remained in that office under an Interim Constitution.
14 Aug 1973- 5 July 1977	Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto remained Pakistan's Prime Minister under the framework of the 1973 Constitution. The country returned to a parliamentary system.
14 August 1973- 16 Sep 1978	Fazal Illahi Chaudhry served as President
5 July 1977- 30 December 1985	General Zia-ul-Haq ruled as CMLA
16 Sep 1978- 17 Aug 1988	General Zia ruled as President of the country
23 Mar 1985- 29 May 1988	Mohammad Khan Junejo (PML) served in the office of Prime Minister. The PM was dismissed by President-General Zia-ul-Haq under 58(2)(b). The National Assembly along with Provincial Assemblies were dissolved by the President. No caretaker Prime Minister was appointed.
17 Aug 1988- 19 July 1993	Ghulam Ishaq Khan, a bureaucrat, served as President (both Acting and Regular)
2 Dec 1988- 6 Aug 1990	Benazir Bhutto served as Prime Minister. President Ishaq enacted 58(2)(b) to dismiss the Bhutto Government. The National Assembly and Provincial Assemblies were dissolved by the President.
6 Aug 1990- 6 Nov 1990	Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, an anti-PPP politician, was appointed as Caretaker Prime Minister by the President
Nov 1990- 18 Apr 1993	Nawaz Sharif served as Prime Minister. On 18 April he was dismissed and the National and Provincial Assemblies were dissolved by President Ishaq under 58(2)(b).
18 Apr 1993- 26 May 1993	A caretaking Cabinet was headed by Prime Minister Balkh Sher Mazari. However, Pakistan's Supreme Court judged the Presidential Order (of dismissal) unconstitutional and restored the Sharif Government on 26 May 1993. Nevertheless, the Prime Minister and the



18 July 1993- 19 Oct 1993	President resigned on 18 July 1993. New elections were called by (the Acting) President.*** Moinuddin Qureshi, a banker, was appointed Caretaking Prime Minister. He tried to reform the economy.
19 Oct 1993- 5 Nov 1996	Benazir Bhutto remained as Prime Minister. The Bhutto Government was dismissed by President Farooq Leghari (13 Nov 1993- 2 Dec 1997) through 58(2)(b). The President dissolved the National Assembly. Later, the Provincial Assemblies were dissolved also.
5 Nov 1996- 17 Feb 1997	Malik Mairaj Khalid served as Caretaker Prime Minister
17 Feb 1997- 12 Oct 1999	Nawaz Sharif acted as Prime Minister. Sharif restored the parliamentary form of government through the Thirteen Amendment (1997). Muhammad Rafiq Tarar, a retired judge, served as President (1Jan 1998- 20 June 2001).
12 Oct 1999- 21 Nov 2002	General Pervez Musharraf ruled as the Chief Executive of Pakistan. From 20 June 2001 to 18 August General Musharraf remained President of the country.
21 Nov 2002- 26 June 2004	Zafrullah Khan Jamali, a politician from Balochistan, served as Prime Minister.
30 Jun 2004- 20 Aug 2004	Chaudhri Shujaat Hussain, head of PML-Q, served as Prime Minister, though for a brief period of time.
20 Aug 2004- 15 Nov 2007	Shaikat Aziz, a banker, served as Prime Minister

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Source: Data gathered from the existing accounts on Pakistan's civil-military relations.

\* General Ayub Khan was appointed Prime Minister by President Iskander Mirza. However, the General and CMLA ousted the latter the same day, and became President.

\*\* General Yahya Khan assumed Presidentship on 31 March 1969. The former handed over power(s) to Zulfikar Bhutto on 20 December 1971.

\*\*\* Wasim Sajjad, Chairman of the Senate, served as Acting President from 19 July to 13 November 1993.

Also, he served in this capacity from 2 December to 1 January 1998.

## The Case of Pakistan

The phenomenon and practice of military intervention in Pakistan has, over the decades, drawn considerable scholarly attention (Alavi 1988, 1990; Jalal 1988; Rizvi 2000; Waseem 1994; Shafqat 1997; Cheema 2002; Siddiqa 2007; Kukreja 1991; Cohen 1984; Moore 1969; LaPorte 1969). Each of these scholars, undoubtedly, made an effort to understand and explain the problem from his/her respective theoretical perspective. However, none has, as shall be demonstrated in Chapter 2, managed to rigorously address why the military intervenes in Pakistan's politics in the first place. Moreover, the matrixes and models, which some of these accounts rely on, are limited in nature and scope.

In addition, the case of Pakistan with respect to military intervention and its possible causes(s) has been overlooked by this literature with a possible exception of Kukreja.

However, the nature, character and scope of her ‘composite model’ urges one to raise questions about its applicability to the Pakistan’s case since the latter is contextually different from India and Bangladesh.

Therefore, the present study has endeavored to build its own model of civil-military relations grounded in the assumptions of agency theory and rational choice-neo institutionalism. In this respect, it assumes that the actors i.e. military, civil bureaucracy, politicians and judiciary, are inherently capable of making things happen (agency). Moreover, it is assumed that the actors are inherently rational with a clear conception of costs and benefits, and that they given the choice(s) tend to maximize their interests i.e. politico-economic (rational choice).

In addition, the thesis assumes actors to be institutions with their own institutional values and interests, and with the ability of playing a bridge role between the society and state in terms of articulating the former’s interests and initiation of policies. Nevertheless, the contextuality of Pakistan’s case is kept central to the model since Kukreja’s model and Siddiqua’s matrix have over-looked it. Besides, it is argued that the primary function of theoretical model, which the thesis attempts to design, is to enable us explain military intervention in Pakistan’s politics- itself a good case of developing state/ transitional society. Moreover, the comparative potential of the present case, at least at the level of analysis, may also be relevant to other developing states.

### **What is new?**

As is explained in the preceding section there is a dearth of a proper theory- guided research of civil-military relations of Pakistan as well as the phenomenon and practice of military intervention in politics. This study attempts to fill this gap. In this respect, it builds its own model of Pakistan’s CMR which attempts to theorize the empirical data comprehensively- sans compromising agency and rationality of the actors and the contextuality of the case. Moreover, within the case of Pakistan, the present research, unprecedentedly, assumes the five events of military coups d’état as contextually different cases whereby each case is methodologically accorded an analytical narrative treatment. In this respect, the study assumes coup as a dependent variable which is to be causally explained by the model with the help of two independent/explanatory variables, namely, agency A- shirk or work- and agency

B- (preferring) own versus larger interest(s).<sup>4</sup> This, in itself, it is argued, contributes to the existing body of knowledge.

Furthermore, the present research tends to ontologically distance itself from the existing literature on Pakistan's CMR, its general politics, the state of democracy etc. Because the overwhelming thrust of the existing work is on the 'structure' one way or the other, whereby the reality is over-essentialized, the actors' agency is depreciated; context compromised; and importantly de-rationalized (this shall be explained in detail in Chapter 3).

Last but not least, in stark contrast to exiting accounts, which rely heavily and often without reason, on sociological, historical and economic perspectives, the present research primarily centers upon the political; it logically believes in the precedence and centrality of politics over other variables. However, this is not meant to demote or devalue the significance of other perspectives. Where possible and plausible, the study takes the non-political into account, though not at the cost of the former.

### **Data and its sources**

This research has primarily employed qualitative data, obtained from both primary as well as secondary sources (see bibliography). Nevertheless, it has a quantitative dimension also in terms of the qualitative-interpretative analysis of the various governmental sources e.g. *Economic Survey of Pakistan*, and semi/non-governmental reports and documents which contain quantitative data. Secondary sources used during the course of this research, consist of a large number of books, journal articles (including those of various think-tanks such as Islamabad Policy Research Institute etc.), newspaper articles and internet sources. Primary quantitative data was selected from various reports and documents of the Ministry of Finance, the Election Commission of Pakistan, National Accountability Bureau of Pakistan, Ministry of Population and Welfare, Federal Bureau of Statistics. As regards data from non-governmental organizations, the reports of Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (PILDAT) are treated as primary source.

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<sup>4</sup> According to this research, only Mazhar Aziz (2008: 59-68) took different variables, though least explicitly, to explain the military coups in Pakistan. The present study strongly disagrees with his selection of the cases and the manner i.e. sans any model, they are made sense of. See Chapter 3 in this respect. Besides, with respect to the assumption of agencies A and B, see the footnotes of page 13 and 14.

## Methodology

The qualitative interpretative methodology of explanation is deemed useful to identify variables that signify relationships between explanatory variables, and to investigate causal patterns which are difficult to be found through quantitative analysis. Also, the identification of causal mechanisms does not preclude the investigation of causal effects, at least where the data and the existing theoretical framework allow. The main challenge to the present research problem is the large numbers of possible causal forces, or statistically, independent variables. These are identified in Chapter 2. The rigorous- in other words logical and empirical- reliance of this study on non-structure, non-identity and non-conspiracy aspects of civil-military relations has significantly helped to determine the numbers of the independent variables. However, in this respect it is argued that the estimation of the explanatory value of one particular variable among others is, by default, an intricate subject methodologically. Importantly, socially complex realities- in our case the interaction between the civilian and military or among various civilian actors- further intrigues a researcher in terms of how to limit and specify the variables- both dependent and independent (Feaver 1999). Moreover, from a foundationalist ontological perspective, complex social realities continue taking place despite and irrespective of a researcher's specific model or theory to understand and/or explain them. Nevertheless, logically and realistically, the presence of a model and/or a theory equips instrumentally not only a researcher but also the beneficiaries of his/her research to understand, if not explain, the reality scientifically with the added advantage of generalizability.

Case studies, in this respect, are usually considered a way out of such perplexing situations and questions. The origin of the case study method is generally associated with the principles of 'agreement' and 'difference' as expounded by J.S. Mill (Anckar 2008; Clark *et al* 2009:28-31; Ragin 1987:39). These methods, however, may not be taken for granted as they are certainly liable to intrinsic liabilities which Mill himself had indicated. Moreover, of the two the method of agreement is, arguably, the more problematic in terms of its assuming a similarity of outcome of multiple independent variables on a certain dependent variable, thus adjudicating the cause to the former. However, in some socio-cultural contexts, mono-causality could be considered as a satisfactory explanation and that too in recognition of the fact that it is seldom a single variable causes an effect. Also, when it comes to multiple/conjectural causality, the method of agreement seems incapable of handling it.

On the other hand, the method of difference focuses on different outcomes of the dependent variable in multiple cases and tends to find corresponding variance in an independent variable. If the two cases, as per the logic, have different outcomes in terms of the dependent variable, but demonstrate identical values for a specific independent variable, then the independent variable in question cannot be a sufficient cause of the outcome. However, this method requires non-concrete assumptions to provide non-spurious inferences as Mill himself has indicated. In addition, Andrew Bennet has noted that the causal relations under investigation, under the method of difference, ‘must be deterministic regularities, involving conditions that are either necessary or sufficient for a specified outcome.’ (Bennett 1999). In the case of civil-military relations and particularly the occurrence of a military coup d’état such conditions are not necessarily present which raises the issue of multiple/conjectural causality. Coups rarely rest upon the singularity of a variable. Often the coup makers point to a multiplicity of factors, as certainly has been the case in Pakistan.

Interestingly, the current body of literature on Pakistan’s civil-military relations is silent with respect to nominating specific cause(s) of any coup. Importantly, the majority of studies have tended to view the 1969 coup as a ‘continuation’ of military rule initiated by General Ayub Khan (Siddiqa 2007; Aziz 2008). Moreover, the staging of 2007 coup by General Pervez Musharraf is viewed from similar lenses- see the Table below regarding the events of coup in Pakistan.

**Table 2 Coup Occurrences in Pakistan**

<b>Coup</b>	<b>Date and Year</b>	<b>Coup Maker(s)</b>	<b>Dismissal<sup>5</sup></b>
1	7 October 1958	President Iskander Mirza and General Ayub Khan	PM Feroz Khan Noon
2	23 March 1969	General Yahya Khan	-
3	5 July 1977	General Zia-ul-Haq	PM Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
4	12 October 1999	General Pervez Musharraf	PM Nawaz Sharif
5	3 November 2007	General Pervez Musharraf	-

Source: Data gathered from the existing literature on Pakistan’s civil-military relations.

<sup>5</sup> The March 1969 coup was technically against the military’s own civilianized regime led by General Ayub Khan. The November coup was staged at a time when the civilianized regime led by PM Shaukat Aziz had almost completed its tenure. However, neither the Prime Minister nor the assemblies was dismissed.

This fact, it is argued, further complicates our case as one of the primary objectives of the present research is to possibly determine the common cause(s) to all cases of coup d'état which are spatially, temporally or better contextually different from each other. This difference of contextuality further raises not only questions about variability and causality but importantly of comparability: which are the independent variables which may have caused, for example, the 1958 coup and how may this case be compared with 1969 or 1977 coup cases over a specific period of time and that too with a considerable difference of context and actors? As a possible solution to this problem, the individual case study (i.e. 1958 coup) involving process-tracing, facilitates a detailed explanation of the causal mechanisms at play in each case. In this respect, Mill's method of agreement is generally assumed to make a variable-driven study; also, his method of difference identifies an independent variable thought to have caused the dependent variable (Anckar 2008).

As the foregoing suggests Mill's methods are instrumental to assume explanatory and dependent variables, it seems not inappropriate then to make a methodological point of departure based on Mills's analogy. Therefore, the thesis, in order to casually explain the phenomenon of military intervention in Pakistan's politics, selects five units of observation of military coups d'état- 1958, 1969, 1977, 1999 and 2007 (Pennings, Keman and Kleinnijenhuis 2006:9). Moreover, in order to qualitatively explain each case, the study identifies its dependent and independent variables as below:

**Dependent Variable:**

- Military coup d'état

**Independent Variables:<sup>6</sup>**

- Working or shirking (agency A)
- Own versus larger interests (agency B)<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Independent variables are deduced from two different theories of agency, and have been applied in two different forms in the study. For a deeper insight into the concepts of 'working/shirking' (agency A) and 'own versus larger interests' (agency B), and the manner they are incorporated into the model, see page 61. Besides, since the present study ontologically distances itself from normative and structural perspectives- as shall be explained in Chapters 2 and 3 in details- therefore factors such as religion, identity, ideology, (military) class, external threat etc., are excluded as independent variables. In addition, the study would attempt to establish that even on empirical grounds it is instructive not to take such variables into account to explain the occurrence of coup(s) - and for that matter military intervention- in Pakistan. See Chapter 3, in this respect.

Nevertheless, keeping in mind not only the historical nature of the selected cases e.g. 1958 or 1969 coup,- which also serves as dependent variable- and concerns of contextuality, the present study tends to abstain from applying Mill's methods in terms of a 'most similar systems design' and 'most different systems design'. Instead, the method of *analytic narrative* (AN) is accorded a preference due to reasons, beside historicity and contextuality, which are described in the following.

An explicit discussion of AN's advantages and disadvantages starts with *Analytic Narratives* (1998) edited by Robert Bates, Avner Grief, Margaret Levi, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal and Barry Weingast. It contains five chapters in which each contributor proposes an analytic narrative of some puzzling historical phenomenon- i.e. the stability of peace between clans of 12th century Genoa, the institutional foundation of US federalism, the rise and fall of the International Coffee organization, etc.-, and an introduction in which the authors together explore broad methodological rules for building an analytic narrative (Alexandrova 2009).

The analytic narratives' proposal involves choosing a puzzle, then building a model- to explicate the logic of the explanation and to elucidate the key decision points and possibilities- and finally evaluating the model through comparative studies and testable generalization that the model generates (Levi 2004:105). The method of analytic narrative favors parsimonious models. All narratives got to have an anchor(s) that are explicit in order to make it easier for critique and challenges to be made than in more configurative accounts. In comparative terms, this is a different strategy than the establishment of a general model from which is derived testable hypotheses, explored with appropriate cases (Croissant 2004). Another point of difference between AN and other methods relates to the former's reliance on the assumptions of rational choice and the logic of game theory that generate hypotheses, but the models are refined in interplay with the detailed elements of the narrative.

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<sup>7</sup> Own versus larger interests are assumed as an agency due to the following: a) an actor(s) is capable of preferring own to a larger interest or vice versa, thus denoting its agency; b) having worked or shirked (which is an interest in itself) an actor(s) tends to maximize its (politico-economic) interests. Especially having shirked in terms of staging a coup, the military, while marking its agency (B), maximizes its political and economic interests. This process of interest maximization even *empirically* points to the fact that the military- among other actors- is inherently capable of preferring its own to larger interest. See Chapters 4, 5 and 7 for conceptual as well as empirical details.

Besides, it is not inappropriate to mention here that A and B shall not represent Principal and Agents in the thesis. Rather, they differentiate between two agencies: working or shirking (agency A) and preferring own to larger interests (agency B).

Moreover, whereas the claim to generalizability of findings is clearer when hypotheses are deduced from general theory, the explanations of specific instances may be less compelling and realistic. This is a common critique of the rational choice application in comparative political science and one that the analytic narrative approach attempts to address (Levi 2004:213-214). In addition, both rational choice and analytic narrative approaches has been criticized for conducting ‘curve-fitting’ exercises whereby the model is modified to “fit the facts”. Nevertheless, the exponents of AN have, in its defense, highlighted its significance in terms of its emphasis on iterative process- which resembles process tracing mentioned earlier in this section- and novel facts that the old model did not recognize or capture. This, in turn, help refine the model (Alexandrova 2009; Bates 2000). Importantly, this method differs from other meta-narrative and qualitative analyses such as modernization theorists etc., when it comes to locating and exploring mechanisms that shape the strategic interaction between and/or among actors, their preferences and subsequent actions (Alexandrova 2009; Bates *et al* 1998:12).

As the foregoing has marked the analytical capabilities of the AN, both as a method and approach, this study therefore chooses to utilize it. In this respect, with the help of primary i.e. interviews, coup text(s), reports etc., and secondary sources i.e. books, journal articles etc., the aim is to understand and explain the central actors’ interests, preferences, their evaluation of alternatives, the information they possessed, the expectations they formed, the strategies adopted. The pieces are put together, using the technique of process tracing in order to construct an analytic narrative that accounts for the particular outcome of interest: shirking or working (agency A), and preferring own interest to larger i.e. national, interest (agency B). Extracting the processes that produce the outcomes of interest, it is posited, will capture the essence of the narrative (Mitra 2006:9-12).

In addition, as is mentioned above the interviews are used as primary source of information in order to qualitatively explain the variables in a given unit of observation, it seems appropriate then to describe the method for their conduct, transcription and interpretation. To begin with, 35 semi-structured interviews with the elite i.e. military personnel, civil bureaucrats, politicians, and other stakeholders i.e., industrialists, lawyers etc., were conducted. The method adopted for interviews was that of the ‘snowball system’ (Goldstein 2002; Rivera *et al* 2002) given a relatively small sample-size, political complexities (the lawyers’ movement was going on when I started approaching the interviewees during February-April 2008),



status and time constraints on the key respondents<sup>8</sup>. In this respect, it seems necessary to mention that all contacts with interviewees were established personally. They were called before hand to check their availability. On the appointed day, before the start of the interview the respondent was briefed about the general assumptions and aim of the study. Furthermore, care was taken to conduct interviews in a suitable environment. A majority of interviewees were found to be self-confident and expressive. At times and where relevant, awareness was shown about their past writings, actions or decisions in order to communicate a level of professionalism.

The interviews were partly standardized and mostly open-ended. The advantages of an open approach, it is argued, outweighed the disadvantages due to the fact that the Pakistani elite tends to fluctuate, stretch, and exaggerate during conversation (Aberbach *et al* 1975; Schuman and Presser 1981:79-110). Moreover, an ideal and rigid questionnaire was deemed to be helpful in trying to understand the level and degree of the elite and stakeholders' opinion/explanation of civil-military relations especially regarding cause(s) of the coups. All interviews but one, were conducted in person with the help of a guideline; the guideline fixed the subject matter and proposed specific questions for each. Each interview lasted between 45 minutes to 2 hours. 30 out of the 35 were mostly conducted in English; the remaining 5 were conducted in Urdu in which the author of this study is fluent. One interview was completely tape-recorded with the permission of the respondent; two were partially tape-recorded since the recorder broke down due to technical faults. Nevertheless, handwritten notes in each case were carefully taken and were elaborated upon from memory right after the interviews. In addition, all of the interviews were properly transcribed.

The interview results were analyzed at an aggregate level, in the form of a number of clusters which were related to the issue areas formulated in the questionnaire (see Appendix A). However, since during the course of the interviews, certain topics gained preference over others, and because the clusters are related to the analysis rather than the questions, they were

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<sup>8</sup> A few key respondents especially from the military excused to be interviewed on the appointed day. In the author's perception the reason for not giving an interview had little to do with the sample of questions used to conduct an interview (see Appendix A). Rather, the major factor indicating such an attitude is perceived to be political in nature. Since the lawyers' movement was going at its peak- and the former had openly criticized the military's political and economic role in Pakistan- the respective respondents felt uncomfortable to sharing their views on military's political economy. For instance, in two cases, an arrangement was made with retired generals, one of them a former chief of Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), through a journalist friend of the author. On the appointed day however, the respondents politely apologized lest their views should be leaked to the electronic media which the author's friend belonged to.

to be the same. The clusters are: 1) political system of Pakistan; 2) dynamics of civil-military relations; 3) role of religion in politics; 4) contemporary politics and the state. Furthermore, three types of codes as distinguished by Aberbach and Rockman (2002) were used for the purpose of this study. In this respect, *Manifest coding items* involve direct responses to particular questions such as: is there any difference between civilian and military domestic or security/foreign policy? Similarly, *Latent coding items* deal with the characteristics of replies which were not explicitly called for by the questions themselves; an example of this is the insights about the justification of use of force to topple a civilian government. “Global coding items” are responses in which the coder makes judgments from the interview(s) transcripts about the general traits and styles. Examples are: inferences with respect to the political framework of the interviewee, or about preferences concerning a given issue. Quite naturally, a move from “manifest” to “latent” involves a reduction in certainty. On the other hand, an interpretative approach becomes essential for an understanding of mindsets. Therefore in this case, latent and global coding items were used. Finally, given the type of coding, it makes little sense to present the findings in terms of quantitative precision. Rather, they are ordered plausibly by tendency.

However, besides the primary reliance on qualitative analysis, the study also uses quantitative material, to construct a narrative, which is handled in two different but practical ways. On the one hand, to possibly determine the cause of a given coup, the law and order variable is specifically accorded a statistical treatment. For this purpose, the relevant data was converted into a sheet in the Microsoft Excel and then was statistically analyzed in terms of murders and riots’ trend.

### **The Scheme of the Thesis**

In terms of chapterization, preceded by an introduction Chapter 1 deals with the theoretical aspects of the study, and discusses in detail, the core question, dependent and independent variables, and hypotheses of the study. The chapter further discusses not only the assumptions of agency, rational choice neo-institutionalism but also the level and degree of their operational capabilities. Moreover, the chapter builds the study’s agency model of Pakistan’s civil-military relations.

Chapter 2 attempts to critically analyze existing body of knowledge on the issue of civil-military relations, both theory and practice, and general politics and the state in Pakistan. In

this respect, the chapter divides the existing literature into six sections and categorize it as the legitimist point of view, conspiracy theorists, the generalist accounts, the instrumentalist work, the structuralist literature and the path-dependent perspective respectively. Having highlighted the inherent theoretical and empirical weaknesses in the existing accounts, the chapter re-emphasizes the need and scope for an actor-oriented rationalist interpretation of Pakistan's CMR.

Chapter 3 aims at highlighting the theoretical as well as empirical shortcomings in the existing works on the construction of Pakistan's state. The chapter, while applying the assumptions of its causal model, identifies the actors, specifies context and explains the actor's interests, their preferences in terms of working/shirking and the outcome in terms of their own/larger interests. The last part of the chapter connects the preceding section in terms of marking the agency and rationality of the civil bureaucracy whose preference of shirking prevailed in the post-October 1951 period. The chapter ends by mentioning the dissolution of Prime Minister Noon's ministry as a result of martial law declared, paradoxically, by the leader of the civil bureaucracy.

Chapter 4 seeks to explain the 1958 and 1969 coups in particular and the civil-military relations during this period in general. In this respect, the chapter relies on the method of an analytic narrative. The chapter ends with a conclusion which maintains that a coup was an outcome of military agency- to get things done. In other words, a coup is rational rather than structural. Moreover, it is always political in nature for the primary aim of staging a coup is to capture political power which then is used as an instrument for political and economic purposes. In addition, the chapter concludes that the rational judiciary and politicians looked to their own rather than larger interests.

Chapter 5 begins by explaining the change in principal with the help of the study's causal model. It argues that the politicians were able to assume principalship for the military could not bear the cost of confrontation with the political forces. The chapter further explains that Bhutto rationally opted to sideline the socialist-inspired section within his party. Moreover, the chapter emphasizes the agency and rationality of the military in its subsequent analysis. In addition, the chapter applies the model to explain the occurrences of the July coup. The chapter concludes that it is military agency which causes the coup. The latter is rational rather

than structural and/or conspiratorial in nature and political in character. The political power is instrumental to facilitate the military's economic interests.

Chapter 6 chapter analyzes the civilian circularity in the 1990s. The chapter explains, with the help of the model, that the military was able to maintain its overall principalship of Pakistan's state since its preference had prevailed, especially in the realm of foreign/defense policy. Moreover, it is maintained on empirical grounds that a section of politicians and the country's president rationally allied with the principal military. Though Nawaz Sharif was able to repeal 58(2)(b), his government could not establish civilian control over the military's economic activities as well as the foreign/defense policy. The chapter views the Kargil war as rational move by the principal military to politically weaken the prime minister. In the post-Kargil period, the latter was sacked in a military coup d'état.

Chapter 7 seeks to explain the fourth and fifth military coup d'état. In this regard, the chapter conducts an analytic narrative of each. The findings point to negative correspondence between each of the coup/martial law and the conceptual variables identified in each of the coup-text. The chapter then applies the study's causal model to explain the occurrence of each coup. The chapter maintains that though contextually the two coups are different, they are caused by the military agency. Moreover, the coups are rational in nature and political in character, for each was staged to politically sustain the military's principalship. The chapter concludes that Pakistan's military is able to maintain its overall principalship of the state, because it is able to maximize its economic interests and make and implement the foreign/defense policy as a dominant actor.

A detailed conclusion encompasses the whole debate in terms of pinpointing the answer to the study's core question and the central puzzle. It is maintained, with a degree of certainty, that the military intervenes in Pakistan's politics due to its inherent agency- its ability to make things happen- and rationality i.e. cost-benefits analysis. In addition to this, the overall theoretical, empirical and methodological contribution of the research also forms part of the conclusion.

## Chapter 1

### Conceptual Framework

This chapter begins by stating the main puzzle along with core and supporting research questions. In this regard, the main focus of the first two sections is to stress the need to address the problem of military intervention in politics. The following three sections cover the parameters of case-selection, explanatory and dependent variables of the study. In order to understand and explain the phenomenon of military intervention in Pakistan's politics, this thesis has selected five cases of coup d'état; these cases are methodologically regarded as analytic narratives of five coups. Moreover, to analytically analyze each case, coup is taken as dependent variable whereas "working" or "shirking" (agency A) and "own" versus "larger" interest (agency B) are assumed as independent variables of the thesis. Section four briefly highlights the importance of theoretical paradigms to build a conceptual framework for the study. The theoretical paradigms are schematically categorized, over a span of about dozen sub-sections of section four, into sociological, comparativist, structural and agency perspectives respectively.

The sociological perspectives take a critical view of Huntington and Janowitz's pioneer work on civil-military relations. These works have introduced the concepts of 'praetorianism' and 'professional soldier' in order to understand not only military's politics but also to achieve civilian control of the military. Since the thrust of these accounts in on the societal, it has been criticized for a lack of appreciation of the political/institutional. Moreover, it is also criticized on empirical grounds. The comparativist literature begins with a critical review of Finer's pioneering work on military intervention. It is followed by equally important works of Nordlinger and Amos Perlmutter. Since this literature is comparative in nature it is criticized for compromising contextuality. The next in the line is Michael Desch's structural theory of civilian control of the military in particular and civil-military relations in general. Despite the significance of this account, the section argues that structural theory is not applicable to the case of Pakistan on empirical grounds. Hence, the following section looks at the agency theory of civil-military relations as postulated by Peter Feaver. Since the agency theory distances itself from its predecessors on account of its rationalist framework, it is accorded due attention for the case of Pakistan requires, on empirical basis, an analysis which takes different actors, their choices, and outcomes into account.

Nevertheless, since the agency theory is primarily specific to the US case, its assumptions- those that are empirical in nature- are modified and applied to Pakistan ‘case in the fifth section. With the help of the agency theory’s assumptions, the next section aims at building an agency model of Pakistan’s civil-military relations. The proposed model takes the variables into its fold and tends to operationalize itself on the empirical data in order to explain the phenomenon under investigation. The final section of this chapter introduces the hypothesis of the thesis. They are grounded in the model for testability. A conclusion, at the end of the chapter, summarizes the entire arguments of the chapter.

### **1.1 Puzzle**

Military intervention in terms of a coup d’état in politics is an established historical fact. The reasons/factors/causes/ supposedly responsible for intervention has been discussed and ascribed to many reasons (see Huntington 1957; Finer 1962; Janowitz 1960; Nordlinger 1975; Stepan 1975). Little wonder then, the case of Pakistan has been accorded more or less the same treatment by many political scientists as well as non-political scientists- the detailed critical review of their work comes in the next chapter.

Nonetheless, the multiplicity of such variables is, from the perspective of comparative politics, contextual and hence hardly related to another case. Moreover, such accounts have, arguably, compounded the problem or better transformed the problem into a puzzle instead of pinpointing any variable(s) in terms of a solution. Thus, the puzzle the present study poses is: *is it structure or agency which brings the military in- through a coup d’état which is the dependent variable of the study- and out of politics?*<sup>9</sup>

### **1.2 The Core Question**

In order to possibly solve the puzzle the core question of the research is posed as under:

- *Why does the military intervene in Pakistan’s politics?*

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<sup>9</sup> Structure here is used in its broader concept that pertains to socio-economic, political, and religio-cultural conditions prevailing in a society (and state). Agency is used conventionally- the ability of the actors to make things happen (see Steans and Pettiford. 2005. *Introduction to International Relations: Perspectives and Themes*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edn. Harlow, England: Person Education Limited). Besides, our usage of agency should not be confused with ‘agency problem’ which is generally associated with the principal-agent relationship. For the latter, we maintain ‘delegation’ (problem). Moreover, though the CMR’s agency theory contains the element of rationality yet, for clarity and emphasis, the term is often separately applied in the study.

Here the ‘why question’ refers to both cause/reason -or broadly ‘interests’- and process which is based on strategic interaction, that signifies divergence of preferences- or broadly the delegation problem.

Hence, the core question is supported by the following questions:

- How does the military intervene in the country’s politics? (agency)
- Is it possible to single out any dominant cause for its intervention? (rationality)

### 1.3 Analytic Narratives and Variables Selection

Political realities are always complex. Doing research in political science almost always implies a reduction of the complexity of real life. The issue is, therefore, how to select the appropriate combination of units of observation- cases- and units of variation- variables- to validate model/theory without disregarding relevant contextual features. In this respect, the following seems suggestive:

Whatever way one argues, however, we feel that cases should always be defined as empirical entities in relation to the research question asked. We shall therefore define cases as those *units of observation* that are:

- Identically defined by time and place; and
- Logically connected to the research question under review.

(Pennings *et al* 2006: 4-9)

In other words, cases are the carrier of information which can be collected by means of translating concepts into empirical indicators. Similarly, variables represent conceptual information over time i.e. years, and the number of cases remain still the number of variables times the number of units of observation. In this respect, the general guiding principle is the posed problem/puzzle or rather the core research question. For example, if the research question is elaborated in terms of an ‘*international*’ comparison, then the number of cases is identical to the number of nations included. Similarly, when the research question is proposed to be ‘*cross-national*’, the units of observation defines the number of cases such as parties or governments, regardless the number of nations or systems. Finally, if the research question focuses on change over time i.e. *inter-temporal*, then the time units included indicate the number of cases (ibid 2006:9)

As the foregoing informs, cases can be selected on the basis of inter-nationality, cross-nationality and inter-temporality. Therefore, in order to possibly solve the puzzle and answer

the core question, five cases of military coups d'état are selected on the basis of intertemporality i.e. 1958, 1969, 1977, 1999 and 2007- see Table 2 also. However, as per this study's methodological position, the selected five coup cases are assumed as analytic narratives whereby each narrative is identified with a dependent variable which, in turn, is causally explained by two explanatory variables- these are explained in the subsequent sections. Moreover, the selection of the ANs in terms of specific events taken place at a specific point of time helps avoid the issues related to a narrative's point of departure and end. The following makes it more explicit:

First Coup: it was staged on 7 October 1958. The subsequent military rule continued one way or the other, till 24 March 1969. The analytic narrative of the coup would, with the help of the model, explain why the coup was staged. However, the AN takes the pre-coup years (1948-1958) into account since the coup maker(s) in the 'coup proclamation' has pointed to problems of law and order and economy as a justification to take otherwise that undesirable and unnecessary action<sup>10</sup>. In his address to the nation on 8 October 1958 President Iskander Mirza said:

I have been watching, with the deepest anxiety, the ruthless struggle for power, [and] *corruption* [by politicians]...no serious attempt has been made to tackle the *food crisis*...In East Pakistan...there is a well organized *smuggling* of food, *medicines* and *other necessities* of life...You do not raise the prestige of your country by beating the Speaker, [and] *killing* the Deputy Speaker...I am convinced...that elections will be neither free nor fair...we have undertaken to *safeguard the security* of Pakistan...The Constitution...is unworkable...it is my intention to...*devise a Constitution*...[which] it will be submitted to the *referendum* of the people. [italics mine]

(Mirza 2000:367-370)

Second Coup: it was attempted successfully on 25 March 1969. It placed the country under martial law. On 16 December 1971 the state of Pakistan broke up and General Yahya left the corridor of power by handing over the power to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who became the civilian Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA). Since the study is concerned with military

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<sup>10</sup> The 1958 coup is a puzzle in Pakistan's CMR since empirically it was announced by President Iskander Mirza. Interestingly however, in the coup proclamation/address to the nation he appointed General Ayub Khan as CMLA. Moreover, the general, the very next day, also addressed the nation and pointed to the same reasons/factors for the coup as stressed by Mirza. The study shall explain this puzzle in Chapter 4.



intervention and especially the phenomenon of coups, therefore the period under civilian CMLA is excluded from the coup narrative. However, the politics in new Pakistan's initial years would be specifically explained with the help of the model and narrative. This is the subject matter of chapter 4. Nevertheless, the preceding years (1958-1968) of this coup are included in the narrative since General Yahya Khan attempted to legitimize the action on the basis of problems of law and order too. In his address to the nation on 25 March 1969<sup>11</sup>, he said:

As we all know, his [Ayub Khan] effort did not meet with success. He, therefore, called upon me to carry out my prime duty of *protecting this country from utter destruction*...I have imposed Martial Law throughout Pakistan...*the situation has deteriorated to such an extent that normal law enforcing methods have become totally ineffective*...*Serious damage of life and property has occurred*...Production has gone down to a dangerously low level and the *economy generally has suffered an unprecedented set-back*...My sole aim in imposing Martial Law is to *protect life, liberty and property*. [italics mine]

(Rizvi 2000:302-303)

Third Coup: the military staged its third coup on 5 July 1977. The country was placed under martial law. The imposed martial law was only lifted in 1985 after having secured indemnity and presidential form of government in terms of Eighth Amendment to the 1973 Constitution. However, the subsequent civilianized military rule- as is shown in Table 2- ended with the death of General-President Zia-ul-Haq on 17 August 1988. Thus, a narrative of this coup shall be constructed for primarily the period specified. However, like his predecessors General Zia-ul-Haq, in his 5 July address to the nation, also highlighted the problems of law and order and economy. He said:

It must be quite clear to you now that when the *political leaders failed to steer the country out of [politico-economic] crisis*, it is an inexcusable sin for the Armed Forces to sit as silent spectators...The Army [military] had, therefore, to act as a result of which the Government of Mr. Bhutto has ceased to exist...My [the military's] *sole aim is to organize free and fair elections* which would be held in October this year...I

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<sup>11</sup> General Yahya Khan, in his coup proclamation/address to the nation, cited the state of democracy and security also as factors/reasons for the coup. He, as CMLA, vowed not only to democratize the country but also provide security to the people. Importantly, both President Mirza and (CMLA)-President Ayub also claimed, as is shown in the quote on the previous page, the same. The present research shall explain in Chapter 4 whether the stated objectives were achieved; if so, could the coups be empirically legitimized?

[the military] sincerely desire...*The life, honor and property of every citizen to be safe...the frontiers of Pakistan ( are) fully guarded...*[italics mine]

(Rizvi 2000:307-310)

Thus, the foregoing suggests that the Bhutto government failed not only to maintain law and order but also provide economic relief to the people. In order to empirically explore whether that was the case, it seems then realistic to assume the pre-coup period (December 1971- June 1977) as part of the analytic narrative.

Fourth Coup: the fourth military coup d'état was staged by General Pervez Musharraf on 12 October 1999. As is shown in Table 2 on page 11, the regime was able to civilianize it after a few years of overt military rule. The civilianized phase continued till 2 November 2007. In other words, the narrative would be constructed for the period between 12 October 1999 and 2 November 2007. The objective shall be to empirically explore and explain, in light of the model and narrative, the reasons/factors for the October coup as stated by General Pervez Musharraf in his address to the nation. On 17 October 1999<sup>12</sup>, he said:

*Today, we have reached a stage where our economy has crumbled...state institutions lie demolished...the few at the helm of affairs in the last government were intriguing to destroy the last institution of stability left in Pakistan by creating dissention in the ranks of the armed forces of Pakistan...I [the military] shall not allow the people to be taken back to the era of sham democracy, but to a true one...our armed forces are fully equipped and ready to defend our national sovereignty and territorial integrity...our aims and objectives shall be:...*

3. *Revive the economy* and restore investor confidence.
4. *Ensure law and order* and dispense speedy justice. (emphasis added)

(Dawn 2007: Oct.18)

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<sup>12</sup> General Pervez Musharraf had addressed the nation briefly on 13 October 1999. In this address/coup proclamation he explicitly pointed to the problems of law and order, economy and security, if not democracy. Since he, as vowed, was able to readdress the nation at length on 17 October, therefore, we preferred to rely on this address. Besides, a more detailed description of the text shall come later in Chapter 7.

What the quote suggests is that like his predecessors General Musharraf explicitly held the Sharif government for its failure to maintain law and order and bring economic prosperity. Therefore, in order to explain whether the Sharif government was responsible for creating conditions for the stage of the October coup, it is deemed necessary to include the Sharif years (1997- October 1999) as part of the analytic narrative.

Fifth Coup: it was (also) staged by General Pervez Musharraf in the capacity of army chief on 3 November 2007. The narrative period of this coup ended on 18 August 2008 when the General-President left the presidency. This coup, like the 1969 coup, is puzzling since the military under Musharraf was already in power, though civilianized. Interestingly, the coup maker institution's leader, General Musharraf, addressed the nation the same day and pointed to the problems of law and order and economy which the previous government failed to solve. In this regard, on 3 November 2007 he said<sup>13</sup>:

There is visible ascendancy in the *activities of extremists* and incidents of *terrorist attacks...posing a grave threat to the life and property* of the citizens...the *law and order* situation in the country as well as the *economy* have been adversely affected...the Constitution provides no solution for this situation...the situation has been reviewed in meetings with the prime minister, governors of all four provinces, and with Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, Chiefs of the Armed Forces, Vice-Chief of Army Staff and Corps Commanders of the Pakistan Army...I, General Pervez Musharraf, Chief of the Army Staff [the military], proclaim Emergency<sup>14</sup>[martial law] throughout Pakistan...[italics mine]

What can be deduced from the afore-mentioned is that the coup was staged by the military to improve country's law and order and economic situation. However, herein lays the puzzle, namely, why the coup was staged, because the military was already in power. Moreover, there are other questions such as whether the stated objectives were achieved or otherwise, which demand a thorough investigation and a theory-oriented explanation of the

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<sup>13</sup> General Pervez Musharraf addressed the nation at night after having issued the proclamation. The address-which lasted around 45 minutes - was primarily delivered in Urdu. The address highlighted the problems of law and order, security and economy at length. This section was delivered in English. The address' video is available at <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aGQjuHOLKWQ>. The study, for the sake of comprehension, has relied on both the texts which are cited in more detail in Chapter 7.

<sup>14</sup> In author's view the term 'emergency' was used by the Musharraf-led military to either confuse or mislead the masses, if not the intelligentsia. Moreover, on empirical grounds this is untenable since the *emergency* was declared by General Musharraf in the capacity of army chief- as the quote shows. In addition, the country's press rightly put it as 'martial law' (see <http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?date=11%2F4%2F2007>).

phenomenon. Therefore, this coup event is also regarded as a case of analytic narrative, which under the framework of the model is proposed to explain the occurrence of the coup.

To summarize, the study, in order to explain military intervention in the politics of Pakistan, has selected five cases of military coups d'état. Since the coups are empirical realities in terms of occurring at specific points of time, they are kept within the domain of comparative politics as regards the concept and criterion of inter-temporality. However, since the coups are historically-informed events, and that too with unique contexts, underlying puzzles and questions- as the brief description of five cases show-, the method of analytic narrative, as opposed to Mill's methods of agreement and difference, is accorded preference due to its potential to solve within-case puzzles, emergent questions etc. Nevertheless, the AN is applied within the overall and overwhelming framework of the model.

### 1.3.1 Dependent Variable

Peter Feaver has, in his *Civil-Military Relations* (1999), done a great service to not only political science but its subfield- CMR- by critically documenting and categorizing a wide range of 'normative', 'descriptive/empirical' and 'theoretical' literature on civil-military relations. Since the present study is theory-driven, it seems, therefore, relevant to seek insight and inference from Feaver's. To begin with, as regards the definition of a dependent and independent variable he wrote:

It is impossible to recommend a certain course of action without making an implicit predictive claim of cause and effect: A state should do *X* because then *Y* will happen, and otherwise *Z* will happen (where *Y* is "better" than *Z*). The theoretical approach distinguishes between the things to be explained/predicted, called dependent variables (DVs) - for example, coups or robustness of civilian control- and the things doing the explaining/ predicting, called independent or explanatory variables (IVs), such as the degree of military professionalism or the type of civilian governmental structure. The theoretical approach specifies ways in which changes in the IVs are reflected in changes in the DVs.

(Feaver 1999)

In the proceeding sections of the article, he has evaluated 'coups', 'military influence', 'civil-military friction', 'military compliance', 'delegation and monitoring' as the DVs. As is obvious from his analysis, each dependent variable has certain merits and disadvantages in

terms of measurability, contextuality and theoretical limitedness. For example, military influence, on the one hand, marks ‘continuous’ rather than ‘dichotomous’ in civil-military relations; however, on the other hand, it is hard to measure it.

Therefore, in light of the foregoing especially problems related to measurement of non-coups DVs and contextual differences between different (cross-national) cases, this study- as is briefly mentioned in methodology section- prefers military coup d’état as its dependent variable. After all, coups have been the traditional focus of civil-military relations since they symbolize the central problem of the military, namely, exploiting its coercive strength to dismiss and replace civilian rulers. Besides, the phenomenon of coups has constantly captured the imagination of political scientists who have glanced at two related but distinct questions. On the one hand, the emphasis has been made to the instance or frequency of coups- also attempted coups-; on the other hand, the probability, that a coup will be successful, is paid due attention<sup>15</sup>.

### 1.3.2 Independent Variables (IVs)

As mentioned in the preceding section, independent/explanatory variables are those which help explain the change/variance in the dependent variable.

Explanatory factors [variables] can be differentiated according to whether they are external or internal to the country. External factors that require a large army (such as the presence of a security threat), or pressure in the form of targeted aid and “advice” from particularly influential great powers, can influence the shape of a country’s civil-military relations. Internal factors include such determinants as the nature of dominant cleavages in society, whether the society faces an internal threat or civil war, the nature of the domestic political system, and the distribution of wealth.<sup>16</sup>

(ibid 1999)

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<sup>15</sup> Huntington (1957), Finer (1962), Bienen (1968), Nordlinger (1977), Horowitz (1980), Thompson (1975, 1976), Jackman (1978), Perlmutter (1977), O.Kane (1981), Zimmermann (1983), Johnson et al (1984), Bienen & Van de Walle (1990), Londregan & Poole (1990) and Frazer (1994) addressed the first question whereas Luttwak (1979 (1983), Bienen & Van de Walle (1990) and Frazer (1994) attempted the second question (for details, see Finer 1999).

<sup>16</sup> Generally, political scientists have tended to seek more explanatory leverage from internal factors (Aguero, Colton 1979, Colton & Gustafson 1990, Finer 1962, Horowitz 1980 and 1985, Janowitz 1960, Nordlinger 1977, Perlmutter 1977, Rouquie 1982, Stepan 1971 and 1988, Vagts 1937, Welch 1976). On the other hand, Huntington (1957), Lasswell (1941, 1950), and Bueno de Mesquita & Siverson (1995) have emphasized the significance of external systemic factors in shaping CMR. Recently but quite differently, the work of Michael Desch (1999) has integrated both internal and external variables.

What the quote informs is that both external and internal factors are assumed as independent variables by a variety of scholars. However, a deeper view of such factors makes it explicitly clear that these factors/variables are either structural or (socio-) cultural in nature and character. Moreover, another set of factors which may qualify as IVs are those related to ‘transitional’ phase from authoritarianism to democracy. In addition, ‘civil-military relations’ may also serve as an independent variable vis-à-vis a specific political phenomenon of interest (Finer 1999; Jenkins and Kposowa 1990; also O’Kane 1981).

In light of the foregoing, if one critically analyze the existing works on Pakistan’s civil-military relations- of Jalal (1990) and Aziz (2008) especially- one finds that the external factors i.e. military aid, security alliances, diplomatic, politico-moral support to the military especially from the US etc., are given a preference. To emphasize and make this point more clear, the factors assumed as explanatory variables by Aziz- his is a most recent work on Pakistan’s CMR- are critically examined as follows.

Mazhar Aziz’s (2008:59-60,63-67,70-76) work is generally least concerned about comparability and causality related issues. Nevertheless he has, implicitly and briefly, taken ‘political disorder’, ‘saving democracy’ and ‘problems of governance’ as independent variables to determine historically-institutionally whether 1958, 1977 and 1999 coups were caused by them respectively. The present study’s point of disagreement with that of Aziz starts with regards to his theoretical-methodological approaches, case and variables selection criterion and importantly the findings.

Moreover, as regards his variables-evaluation, it is argued that the ‘political disorder’ and ‘problems of governance’ variables are not two but one- either political disorder or problems of governance. Moreover, the ‘saving democracy’ connotation as applied by Aziz is also problematic on, at least, two grounds. One, the inference of saving democracy from ‘our ultimate aim is to restore democracy but of the type that people can understand and work’ is invalid empirically and textually: empirically, a day before General Ayub’s address, President Mirza had, though illogically and immorally, already declared the governmental activities (under his presidency) as ‘a dictatorship of the lowest order.’ If Mirza is correct, then, arguably, there was no democracy which Ayub were to ‘restore’; textually, if textual-*context* is a guide, then above-quoted statement is futuristic in terms of promising and alluding to a process of electioneering which the coup maker claimed to set forth.

Regardless, having criticized- see next Chapter in this respect- the causal insignificance of such variables empirically and logically, the present study, while grounded in comparative politics, dismisses the external (power influence) variable altogether. Moreover, during the course of our explanation of each coup narrative, a contextualized analysis of this factor shall be attempted. In addition, as shall be explained in detail in the literature review, the ‘professional soldier’, religious, ethnic, (military) class, cultural, higher defense expenditure , army chief (personality factor), ‘coup contagious’-where coup in one county is thought to have caused coup in another country (Li and Thompson 1975)- factors/variables etc., do not possess empirically and theoretically the causal capability to explain the occurrence of coups d’état- and hence military intervention- in Pakistan.

Therefore, as is mentioned in methodology section, the present study takes agencies A and B, working/shirking and own/larger interest respectively, as its independent variables to explain, within the framework of the proposed model- which comes in the end of this chapter-, the occurrence of coups d’états in Pakistan. However, before the study embarks such a course, it seems highly imperative to take a critical view of important works on civil-military relations theory in order to possibly find an answer to the posed puzzle and the core question; if not, then the critical review shall serve as a theoretical basis for developing a conceptual framework for the present research .

## **1.4 Theoretical Paradigms**

In the following sections, an attempt is made to conduct a critical review of the existing literature on civil-military relations theory. The aim is to possibly locate literature which could serve as either a theoretical basis or point of reference and departure. Also, the secondary aim shall be to formulate a model of Pakistan civil-military relations.

### **1.4.1 ‘Sociological’ Perspectives<sup>17</sup>**

Under this, a critical review of not only Huntington and Janowitz’s work but also that of their followers is presented due to the former’s pioneering position in CMR theory. Their works atop this section due to the fact that:

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<sup>17</sup> The term ‘sociological’ is borrowed from Feaver (1996), when it comes to critical categorization of Huntington’s and Janowitz’s work on civil-military relations.

In the [American] context, it has been sociologists and political scientists operating within the sociological school who, following the Janowitz tradition, are responsible for the bulk of scholarship on [American] civil-military relations.

(Feaver 1996)

In addition, the inherent objective here is to see if their work relates to the posed puzzle and helps to conceptualize a framework for the present study.

#### **1.4.1.1 Huntington- between ‘Professionalism’ and ‘Praetorianism’**

Theoretically, this type of puzzle has been central to the literature on civil-military relations. The phenomenon and practice of military intervention in politics and the nature and dynamics of civil-military relations drew the attention of many. Samuel Huntington (1957) was probably the first one in this regard who conducted a serious study on the subject. Building his theory upon the general concept of professionalism, Huntington demolishes convincingly many clichés from outmoded theories of civil-military relations. In the specific CMR context of the US, he has attempted to explain the nature and dynamics of civil-military relations as well as the nature and categories of civilian control, namely, ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’. In the words of Peter Feaver:

Huntington’s causal chain is as follows: autonomy leads to professionalization, which leads to political neutrality and voluntary subordination, which lead to secure civilian control.

(ibid 1996)

Nevertheless, his description and explanation of civilian behavior in the civil-military system is much less thorough and convincing. Also, though there is considerable discussion of the authority of the principal civilian offices yet the civilian element is summarily and unjustifiably dismissed in contemptuous pronouncements about liberal ideology. Moreover, related to insufficient analysis of civilian politics is an over-rigorous conceptual concentration upon solely military aspects of the military which reflects inadequate attention to more general political theory. In addition, there remain some questions in this account of his that demand further explanation.

For instance, is the call for broad-minded officers always a demand that they deny their professionalism? Can it be a plea that strategic decisions be uncontaminated by service



chauvinism? Is the formulation of qualitative requirements an esoteric business for officers alone, or should civilian scientists intervene? Is it inherent in the professional function that an officer be alert to technological developments? The reverse is at times suggested by deductive logic. Does the professional military ethic require a pluralistic strategy? Or, in a poor nation, may such a strategy be so costly as to endanger political stability and thus military security? More generally, is there a necessary identity between professionalism and security? Finally, if the system of separation of powers, despite its baneful influence on civilian control and professionalism, is justified on other and higher grounds, has liberal ideology no comparable compensating advantages? These questions somehow led Feaver to critically sum *The Soldier and the State* into ‘four’ hypotheses which, argues Feaver (1996), cannot stand the test of rigorous empirical analysis, and ‘draws erroneous inferences and makes predictions that have not proven accurate.’

In *Changing Patterns of Military Politics* (1962) Huntington has ostensibly re-emphasized the structure and responsibility of the armed forces. With respect to military coups or overt intervention the thrust of the argument is: if the division of function and military training is addressed towards external threats rather than internal, there is likelihood that the military would not intervene. This explicit emphasis on the external variables implicitly points to his earlier thesis of ‘professional’ armed forces. In addition, quite ironically, the frequency of military coups in developing countries are not viewed as pathological but an alternative to revolution and a form of gradual change.

Nonetheless, progression, if not an outright paradigm shift, with regards to his conception of society-state interaction and civil-military relations is acutely visible in *Political Order in the Changing Societies* (1968). The argument of this work hangs massively on a perceptive distinction between two closely related concepts of ‘political modernization’ and ‘political development’. The term ‘political modernization’ is used mainly with reference to the spread of political participation, and ‘political development’ is maintained to mean the establishment of institutions that regulate the rate of modernization in all spheres of life. Logically, Huntington demonstrates that the underdevelopment of a society’s political institutions will result in the waste of its modernizing potential. On the other hand, more regulation than the rate of modernization required is merely repressive and may be intolerable. Also, political stability is valued both as an end in itself and as a condition for the consolidation and

extension of public benefits. But the primary concern for political stability does not lead him to oppose all revolutionary changes including the return of the praetorian to politics.

As regards coups or return of the praetorian, Huntington (1968:80) has introduced the concept of 'praetorian polities'. Among the praetorian polities he identifies 'oligarchical praetorianism' where the influential social forces are 'the great landowners, the leading clergy, and the wielders of the sword' (Huntington 1968:199-201). The anti-colonial struggle by such polities proved an 'artificial phenomenon' due to their low levels of social mobilization argues Huntington. Resultantly, the slow development of political institutions along with rapid mobilization of new groups into politics caused by economic modernization gave birth to chaos, uprisings and political disorder. The emergent political vacuum is filled by the military. Thus, persuasive cases are made for the merits of both 'modernizing monarchs' and soldier-politicians the like of Ayub Khan. Interestingly, he further argues that 'the most important causes of military intervention in politics are not military but political and reflect not the social and organizational characteristics of the military establishment but the political and institutional structure of the society.'

The importance of Huntington's work granted, there are empirical, if not theoretical, anomalies in this account too. For example, he does not perceive the possibility of a growing revolutionary potential in any of the major industrial societies of today. Moreover, his categorization of political gap, which in his opinion is widening between the rich and poor countries, is as confusing as the economic gap. By the conventional standards of political science, this argument may carry conviction. However, his analogy between the measurable economic gap and his so-called political gap' seems dubious. Also, his developmental thesis, when applied on the Pakistan case in the 1960s, takes, on the one hand, surface-view of political realities, and over-negates, on the other hand, the presence of economic disparities among different sections of society within the country- this shall be explained later in the study.

Besides, when it comes to governance the complications inherent in the analysis simply creep up. To put this plainly, there is no way to hold that one society is better governed or more developed than another except as a matter of value or an act of faith (see Mitra and Singh 2009:233-238). Moreover, it is naive to question Huntington's belief that the industrial societies of the world are less chaotic than others. Are the industrial societies really less

chaotic than others by Huntington's own standard of measurement? Furthermore, he does not expect democracy to develop in a one-party state which attempts to centralize power. His realism also tends to exclude the vision of effective modernization under the auspices of political institutions that are designed for the dispersion of power. The primacy of order in his thought implies an exceptional solicitude for authority and the managerial approach to political development.

#### **1.4.1.2 Janowitz: Portraiting the 'Professional'**

Janowitz has attempted to draw a social and political portrait of the professional soldier with the help of a wealth of available documentary and historical material along with intensive interviews. The study focuses on the past and present American military elite and those officers who by virtue of their rank and reputations were destined to join the inner circles of military decision making. Having served in the military service and being a sociologist himself, Janowitz preferred to take a sociological view of the military institution. In the words of one of his critics:

Like Huntington, Janowitz focuses on the officer corps and the concept of professionalism. Janowitz rejects, however, the ideal-type division of labor that Huntington claims is essential to the professionalization of the military. Indeed, Janowitz documents in some detail the unavoidable politicization of the military given its global reach and the centrality of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry to both international and domestic politics.

(Feaver 1996)

Apparently it seems that he faced little difficulties related to clarity of vision and precision of arguments yet somehow he remained unable to institutionally look at the civil-military 'problematique'- the civilian control of the military.

In fact, [then,] the primary control mechanism for Janowitz is the same values-based one that Huntington relied on: professionalism, albeit differently constituted. Janowitz's 'pragmatic' professionalism is perhaps analytically richer than Huntington's 'radical' professionalism.

(ibid)

What the foregoing suggests is that, on the one hand, Janowitz's *Professional Soldier* (1960:3-17) could not rise above the 'professional' to provide an alternative explanation of

civil control and, on the other hand, it guides little towards seeking the explanation for military coup d'état even beyond the US context.

Similarly, Janowitz has more or less followed the same 'professional' path in *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations* (1964:50-64). The central question this work addresses is to explain how characteristics of military institutions and personnel affect their activities in the processes of modernization and democratization. Having collected data on fifty-one countries in Asia and Africa he classifies them into five groups according to the place of the military in politics: (a) authoritarian-personal regimes, (b) authoritarian-mass party regimes, (c) democratic-competitive regimes, (d) civil-military coalitions, (e) military oligarchies. In the first three types the military occupy, respectively, a symbolic, instrumental, or subordinate role. In the last two, they are involved in politics as coalition partners or as dominant components. Interestingly, to explain these five patterns of civil-military relations, he pays little attention to the history of military organization, the period since independence, and the level of economic development. Instead, he argues that in all the new and modernizing nations the military and the socio-political context in which they operate tend to have common characteristics, resulting in a high potential for military involvement in politics and making that involvement unstable.

Nonetheless, this volume's new version *Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations* (1964:5-20) did not add any new insights despite its attempts at re-packaging the 'professional' with an excessive number of cases, and that from different socio-cultural background. These works including *On Military Intervention* (1971) attempt to sociologically look at patterns of civil-military relations cross-nationally. Overall they, on the one hand, de-emphasize the importance of institutional explanation of civil-military relations, and, on the other hand, extremely compromise the imperative of contextuality. Also, within the gambit of empirical data, lesser attention is paid to Latin America as compared to East Asia.

To sum up, the sociological perspectives as operationalized by Huntington and Janowitz focus, one way or the other, more on societal variables than political-institutional ones owing to the fact that Janowitz was a sociologist, and Huntington, despite being a political scientist, tilted more towards political sociology. This is rightly observed in the following:

To political scientists, institutional civilian control is the heart of civil-military relations. To sociologists, civil-military relations is about the integration (or the absence of it) of civil and military institutions.

(ibid)

In addition, Michael Desch had also criticized Huntington's praetorian societies which imply that weak state institutions are less effective tools of civilian control. In this respect, Desch (1999:9) ably pointed out that Huntington's distinction leaves 'unanswered the question of what determines whether a state has strong civilian governmental institutions or not.'

#### **1.4.2 The Comparativist<sup>18</sup> Literature**

The term comparativist pertains to literature on CMR which attempts to cross-nationally/culturally analyzes the different patterns of civil-military relations. It also tries to explain the factors behind military coups d'état. The aim in this section is twofold: one, to find if this literature provides any theoretical clues to the puzzle; two, to see if its findings are in any sense relevant to the case of Pakistan. Besides, the review would remain confined to pioneer work of this category.

##### **1.4.2.1 The Men on Horseback**

In his classic on military intervention, *The Man on Horseback*, Samuel E. Finer (1988:34-78) has attempted to look at and analyze cross-nationally the phenomenon and practice of military intervention from a purely sociological-historical perspective. The distinctions and hypotheses forwarded in the account could be organized around the following themes: (a) the strengths of the military: organization and coherence, control of arms, emotional and symbolic status, and military virtues; (b) the motives for intervention: from identification with a national interest- conceived as standing above parties and particular governments or even constitutions- to identification with sectional interests -class, regional, or corporate, if not individual, self-interest; (c) the mood to intervene, created by feelings of self-importance or morbidly high self-esteem.

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<sup>18</sup> The terms 'comparativist' is borrowed from Feaver (1996). The other comparativist literature which is not mentioned in detail here includes: Colton, Timothy. 1979. *Commissars, Commanders and Civilian Authority: The Structure of Soviet Military Politics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press; Colton, Timothy. 1990. *Soldiers and the Soviet State: Civil-Military Relations from Brezhnev to Gorbachev*. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Rouquie, Alain. 1982. *The Military and the State in Latin America*, trans. Paul E. Sigmund. Berkeley: University of California Press; Stepan, Alfred. 1971. *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil*. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Welch, Claude (ed.) 1976. *Civilian Control of the Military*. New York: State University of New York Press; also Welch, Claude. 1987. *No Farewell to Arms? Military Disengagement from Politics in Africa and Latin America*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Finer notes that neither the capacity for intervention, nor the motivation to do so, nor the mood triggering off action would be sufficient without opportunity to intervene, created by increased civilian dependence on the military especially in crisis situations. It is this interplay of disposition and opportunity that constitutes the key to the success or failure of various types of military intervention- from influence and pressure to displacement and supplanting of civil authority. Moreover, like Huntington, Finer has conditioned disposition and opportunity to the levels of political culture i.e. mature, developed, low, and minimal. It is maintained that national political cultures could be ranked according to the following three criteria:

1. The extent of public support for the procedures used to transfer political power and for the corresponding belief that only those procedures are legitimate.
2. The degree of public awareness regarding the individuals and institutions holding sovereign authority, and the degree to which the population believes that no other person or group can legitimately hold that power.
3. The extents to which the populace is organized into groups such as political parties, labor unions, business associations, or churches that are capable of acting independently of the government.

In other words, the higher the political culture of a nation ranks on each of these three dimensions, the lower the likelihood of military intervention in politics. However, Finer (1981:242) is critical of Huntington's developmental thesis with respect to praetorianism. He argues that Huntington is primarily concerned with the relationship between the 'strength of political institutions and increasing mass participation in politics', not military intervention. Not only this, he has also come up with a critique on Janowitz's five types of civil-military relations. The latter is criticized for being passive with respect to criterion 'for assigning any one particular regime to any of these categories.'

Nonetheless, his own work falls short of being conceptually and even empirically comprehensive. For example, there is little reference made to the social, economic and institutional structures associated with the different types of political cultures, and to the ways in which these factors, in turn, affect the outcome of military intervention. Also, the study lacks a more exhaustive analysis of comparable situations- over a period of time- to locate deviant cases i.e. despite a low political culture intervention was weak or unsuccessful, or cases where despite a developed political culture such interventions take place. Besides,

perhaps more attention could have been paid to the interaction between military mentalities and ideologies and those of the civilians. Also, the study excessively compromises the importance of contextuality of a specific case especially during the course of comparative analysis.

#### **1.4.2.2 Soldiers in Politics**

Eric Nordlinger in his *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments* discusses various methods for civilian control of the military particularly in the Third World context. With respect to military coups, having carefully reviewed various hypotheses about the military decision to topple the government, he concludes that too often coups occur when corporate grievances of the military coincide with a deficit of legitimacy produced by poor government performance. Moreover, how coups occur is explained with (over)emphasis on the officers and their attitudes towards politics and politicians.

Also, the account discusses the attitudes, policy preferences and governing style of the soldiers when in power. In this respect, Nordlinger builds upon his earlier work on the comparative performance of military regimes (Nordlinger 1970). Importantly however, his findings about the military's economic performance put the latter on the negative side of the equilibrium vis-à-vis civilians. Despite the claims made for, and often by, the military as an agent of change, he finds that most military regimes tend to accept or protect the status quo, with military governments much more uniformly conservative than their civilian counterparts (Nordlinger 1977:176). Moreover, even the more radical military regimes normally turn out to be ineffective in promoting reform. Their conservativeness and concentration of power within them make their claims about national integration and development hollow, which often in the aftermath of military intervention results in lingering crises, concludes Nordlinger.

Nonetheless, despite the relative significance of the work, it is not proven to factual critique. To begin with, the overall reading of it gives the impression that it unavoidably tends to over-generalize in terms of focus on the 'typical' case and to underplay the range of variations, thus neglecting the explanation of such variations. Possibly, the major exception in this regard is a section on the Latin American military. This, in turn, endorses, though with qualifications, Nun's thesis on the ties of the military to the middle class, and Huntington's propositions that the military usually plays a progressive role in traditional societies; then it

switches to a moderating role; and finally becomes the guardian of the status quo as mass mobilization threatens middle class interests (Feaver 1996). Nevertheless, the logic of the argument is grossly simple. In addition, there is a lack of evidence of strong class identifications among the Latin American military.

Moreover, the difficulty in this case stems from the sometimes uncritical reliance on statistical studies especially cross-national co-relational analyses which are methodologically very suspect. Also, there is little discussion of foreign military assistance programs, foreign advisory roles, foreign military aid and training even though these relate to the increased professionalization of the military and thus to the growth of a sense of corporate identity which Nordlinger quite properly stresses as a key determinant of military behavior.

#### **1.4.2.3 Perlmutter- Praetorianism Revisited**

Amos Perlmutter (1974:4-20) also views the civil-military relations generally from primarily a praetorian perspective. In this respect, though in the context of Egypt's CMR, he has developed a concept of 'military praetorianism' whereby the military plays 'a highly significant role in key political structures and institutions'. Furthermore, he has identified two types of praetorian armies: the arbitrator army and the ruler army. The arbitrator army having established its writ prefers to return to barracks due to time-limit, acceptable social order, lack of independent political organization and fear of civilian retribution etc. The ruler type army has a propensity to stay in power. Moreover, she remains the dominant political power bent on maximizing her power and perks. His view does not regard military rule as a particularly efficient means of establishing broadly based political structures:

Military rule is politically restrictive and fails to integrate new men and economically and socially liberated groups and classes; [thus]...the level of political institutionalization is limited, rigid and non-adaptive;...economic changes do not affect social cohesion on the distribution of power; and above all praetorianism... after a certain period of time, develops an inner momentum of its own.

(Perlmutter 1974:125)

The major problem posed by praetorianism, then, is how to expedite the removal of the army from control over executive functions and its domination of mass political institutions, which stifles the expression of the political desires of the masses. A state de-praetorianizes to the



extent political legitimacy requires it; unfortunately the army acts as an obstacle to this process once it perceives its power and status interests threatened.

In *The Military and Politics in Modern Times* Perlmutter (77:85-98) distinguishes among three types of soldiers: professional, praetorian, and revolutionary. Each type is subdivided further. Professional soldiers are examined historically with Prussia, Germany, France, Japan, and the Soviet Union as cases. Each of these cases, according to the writer, demonstrates that instability 'invites' the military to intervene. Similarly, praetorian soldiers characterize most of the Third World- the cases selected from the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America point to it. The praetorian army, asserts Perlmutter, tends to 'replace weak and unstable political groups and regimes.' However here, his analysis is faulted due to the problem of determination of weakness and instability prior to army intervention. Anyhow, the third type of soldier, the professional revolutionary, is subdivided between revolutionaries and routinized revolutionaries with the People's Liberation Army of China and Zahal of Israel as respective cases. Moreover, he has relied upon his earlier 'arbitrator' and 'ruler' typologies primarily built upon the Egyptian and Syrian cases.

Nevertheless, despite the informative nature as well as comparative ambition of this account, it falls short of building up an alternative 'theory' of civil-military relations due to 1) lack of definitional/conceptual clarity, 2) little attention paid to causality, 3) logical inconsistency, and (4) verification-difficulties. In this regard, intriguing is his concept of 'corporatism' whose definitional status keeps changing almost every time the word is used. Moreover, this concept incorporates almost every possible definition, losing all coherence and meaning in the process. In addition, one finds that the three ideal types of military orientation- professional, praetorian and revolutionary- become almost indistinguishable. Also, the third crucial concept- army (military) intervention in politics- is never defined at all (Fever 1996).

Remaining again within the confines of Huntingtonian 'praetorianism' Perlmutter's *Modern Authoritarianism* has categorized praetorianism as one of the types of modern authoritarian system. In this regards, he describes five principal types of authoritarian regimes: 1) communist party states, 2) Hitler's Nazi system, 3) fascist regimes, 4) corporatist states, and 5) praetorian dictatorships. The thrust of the argument is that the modern authoritarianism is populated and dominated by 'oligarchic political elite'. The military as a 'parallel and

auxiliary' institution is used as instrument by the political elite in praetorian-authoritarianism (1981:1-13).

Despite the significance of Perlmutter's work, the limits of generalizability are too obvious. The primary focus of his analysis remained on the Middle East and its militaries, and the manner they attempted to intervene in politics. Also, the European states along with Middle Eastern and Latin American states are presented as cases where praetorian authoritarianism is projected as a vivid phenomenon. However, in doing so, Perlmutter (1981:28-62) seemingly tended to bypass the basic principles of comparative politics. How the Iraqi and Peruvian militaries and their interventions in politics could be compared? On what principles and levels the USSR and Cuban cases could be compared? Unfortunately, the comparative thrust of context-sensitivity is also paid no attention at all.

To summarize, the comparativist literature attempts to cross-nationally/culturally explain different patterns of civil-military relations. In this respect, its insights are quite useful, and the data is informative in nature. Moreover, it, at least, provides a theoretical foundation to build alternative model(s) of civil-military relationship especially in the context of developing states. Nonetheless, despite its merits, the limitations of this literature are all too oblivious. To begin with, the comparativist literature pays little attention to the contextuality of a given case. Also, the problem of comparability remains unsolved. In addition, it has an inherent tendency to over-generalize. Also, its models, in many cases, are not empirically and even theoretically, sound. Last but not least, despite its attempts at difference, it (un)intentionally follows the Huntingtonian tradition with a possible exception of Finer (Feaver 1996).

### **1.4.3 The Structuralist Thought**

The structuralist thought as per its foundational positioning attempts to understand and explain the problem of civilian 'control' of the military, in particular, and civil-military relations, in general, from the structural perspective. It emphasizes exclusively the specific structure of a state and society vis-à-vis its international state structure. In the section following a review of this literature is conducted with the aim to see whether this literature provides insights to the puzzle and the questions posed by the present study.

### 1.4.3.1 Desch- The Structural Theory of Civil-Military Relations

Michael C. Desch, an American political scientist, focuses on a crucial issue in civil-military relations, namely, civilian control of the military. He attempts to develop, and test a theory which explains why we get different levels of civilian control. In doing so, Desch revives an old, unresolved debate concerning the effect of the international system on civilians' ability to successfully control the military. However, in this respect, unlike many, he has coupled quite systemically external threats with internal ones. Therefore, he suggests that the degree to which civilians control the military is shaped essentially by two factors: external/international and internal/domestic threat environments- both real and perceived.

Furthermore, on the basis of a proposed 'structural' theory of civilian control, Desch deduces several hypotheses and predictions about the nature of civilian control in different threat settings. The thrust of his argument is: states in high external and low internal threat environments should have good civilian control; those with low external and high internal threat settings should have the least effective civilian control; and those with high/high and low/low will vary, but are likely to be poor and mixed, respectively - see his model on the next page.

Nevertheless, despite the ambition as well as relative significance of this model, it is indeterminate in two important threat configurations. In a first setting with both internal and external threats high, the model cannot predict whether there will be good civilian control, because the external threat has made the military outward. Or there shall be bad civilian control, because the threats have unified the military and the presence of an internal threat is sufficient in order to distract the military inward. In the second scenario, the model suffers from a similar fate of unpredictability as is argued by Feaver below:

When both threats are low, the model cannot say whether there will be good civilian control, because the military will be divided (and thus, presumably, easy to control), or bad civilian control, because without any threats the military's orientation will be uncertain (or because the divided institutions slip into contentious factionalism). Which outcome prevails depends, according to Desch, on ideational factors, such as organizational culture and clashing world-views, a story that transpires more or less off Desch's structural stage...one wonders whether the causal mechanisms are undertheorized.

(Feaver 2000)

Regardless, in order to test his model, Desch has selected twenty three different case studies which specifically focus on civil-military relations in eight post-World War II states- Argentina, Brazil, Chile, France, Germany, Japan, Soviet Union/Russia, and the United States. Obviously, an ambitious study like this, which attempts to cross-nationally explain complex phenomenon and practice- the civilian control of the military-, has its explanatory limitations which Desch admits, at times, quite openly. Furthermore, his reliance on secondary historical sources and the problem of determination of threat ‘perception’ - both international and domestic- are major instruments of critique of his otherwise ‘parsimonious’ theory (ibid 2000).

**Table 3 ‘Civilian Control of the Military as a Function of Location and Intensity of Threats’**

		External threats	
		High	Low
Internal threats High/Low	High	Poor (Q3)	Worst (Q4)
	Low	Good (Q1)	Mixed (Q2)

#### **1.4.3.2 Is Desch’s Model Applicable to the Case of Pakistan?**

Desch’s model, or rather theory, as is seen above, is innovative and has the potential of generalizability. In the following, an attempt is made to see if his theory is applicable to the case of Pakistan which has a long history- as shall be seen later in this study- of very complex civil-military relations where coups have been staged quite intermittingly. In order to see whether the Pakistan case fits into Desch’s model, it is suggestively imperative to summarize on the next page the assumptions of it. The model claims that the civilian ‘control’ over the military would be:

**Table 4 Summary of Desch's Model**

- good if the external/internal equation is high/low
- worst if the external/internal equation is low/high
- mixed if the external/internal equation is low/low
- poor if the external/internal equation is high/high

Having summarized and tabled the assumption of Desch's model, the thesis, with history in terms of primary and secondary sources as its guide, takes the case of Pakistan and attempt to apply the model to it with the help of Table 3. Pakistan, as the Table shows, never had: a) a high external and high internal threat; b) a low external and low internal threat; c) a high external and low internal threat<sup>19</sup>; d) a high internal and low external threat. Therefore, in light of the afore-mentioned it is argued that despite Desch's model comparative potential of generalizability, it cannot be applied- as Table 5 shows below- to the case of Pakistan on purely empirical grounds. Importantly enough, had it been applicable empirically, even then the problem of determination of threat perception in the context of Pakistan would have further complicated and restricted the scope of its application.

**Table 5 Application of Desch's Model to Pakistan's Case**

Civilian Control	Threat Equation	Threat Intensity Level	Pakistan Case
Good	External/Internal	High/Low	No
Worst	External/Internal	Low/High	No
Mixed	External/Internal	Low/Low	No
Poor	External/Internal	High/High	No

Source: Data gathered from Desch's work (1999).

#### 1.4.4 The Actor-oriented Work

The agency work, which though is not in abundance, assumes actors capable to affect, in principle, any change in the 'structure' or whatever of state and/or society or any state-society

<sup>19</sup> India- and for that matter Afghanistan- is structurally projected as a case of external threat to Pakistan, especially at Partition (see, for instance, Aziz 2008). However, the underlying methodological and theoretical basis of this threat construction is, arguably, problematic since the question of threat perceiver is left unanswered by such accounts. The preset study shall, therefore, attempt, from its conceptual-methodological perspective, the very question of external threat perception, construction and importantly rationalization.

institution(s). Also, it assumes actors to be rational- they have a clear conception of costs and benefits. Furthermore, the agency work, with a background in economics, assumes and treats actors as principal and agents. In the following, an attempt is made to explain how the agency theory is developed with respect to civilian control of the military, in particular, and civil-military relations and politics, in general. The specific aim is to see whether the assumptions of agency theory are applicable or useful to the case of Pakistan.

#### **1.4.4.1 Peter Feaver: The Agency Theory (AT) of Civil-Military Relations**

Peter D. Feaver, renowned American political scientist, set forth his arguments, more empirical in nature and less theoretical in content, in his article ‘The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control’(1996). This article, as is seen before, severely criticized the weakness in Huntington and Janowitz theories of CMR. Moreover, it quite convincingly categorized and placed almost all important work on different patterns of civil-military relations under the theoretical influence of the two. Empirically, Feaver’s arguments stood the test of the day; his ‘outlines’-or better assumptions- of a new theory of civil-military relations also gained ground argumentatively. Besides, in his next important articles ‘Crisis as Shirking’(1998) and ‘Civil-Military Relations’ (1999), he further explained the ‘problematique’- the perennial question of how the civilian control soldiers-, and identified a few useful variables related to the problem. Also, an attempt was made to explain, with the help of agency theory, the ‘souring of American civil-military relations’.

Nonetheless, his assumptions with respect to agency theory of civil-military relations got formalized and theorized properly in his famous *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations* (2003). In this account, Feaver developed his arguments, by contrast to Huntington’s and others, after the collapse of the Soviet Union. To begin with, the theoretical core of this volume lies in agency theory which was primarily developed by non-political scientists- economists. However, it is used by political scientists though infrequently and insufficiently.

In principle, the agency theory is normally presented as the ‘work’ or ‘shirk’ trade-off. Those responsible for supervision- the ‘principals’- wish to extract the maximum effort for the minimum cost. Those who carry out the tasks- the ‘agents’- hope to get away with the greatest reward for the least work. Nevertheless, translating this model from economic to

political realms leads to major problems. The issues are further compounded in applying them to the military. In this respect, Feaver (2003:36-65) suggests three reasons: first, military agents prefer to be told what policy to pursue. They wish to deal with threats from a position of advantage in terms of controlling the tempo and the scope of the conflict, thus resulting in a preference for offensive operations; second, military agents wish to have their accomplishments given appropriate recognition by others; third, they wish to carry out their tasks with minimal civilian interference and oversight.

By this basic logic, Feaver identifies six possible logical outcomes based on decisions by principals to monitor the military intrusively or otherwise; by agents to work or shirk, and then by principals to punish the military or not in case shirking occurs. Furthermore, the interaction among a limited set of variables, whose values are exogenous to the model, determines if one outcome or another is reached or not. Thus, the resultant model is able to provide powerful interpretive tool for explaining changing patterns of civilian control over the military from the Cold War to the present.

In addition, Feaver aptly demonstrates the concept of power in four ways. First, he dissects Huntington's theory of civil-military relations which prescribed that the United States needed to adopt objective civilian control based on a conservative ideological shift so as to prevail in the Cold War. From the agency theory perspective, Huntington expected a narrow gap between civilian and military policy preferences as civilians changed their preferences to match those of the military. Under such conditions, civilian control could operate with non-intrusive monitoring. Feaver documents and argues that this model outcome did not occur as Huntington predicted, and yet the US prevailed in the Cold War. Second, on the basis of a history of Cold War civil-military relations, Feaver empirically describes that the gap between civilian and military preferences remained wide throughout the Cold War, while the costs of monitoring declined and the probability of punishment for shirking was high. Under these conditions, as agency theory expects, civilian monitoring of the military was intrusive and military compliance with civilian preferences- working- was high. This explains why the U.S. prevailed in the Cold War.

Third, Feaver uses his model to explain the 'crises' in US civil-military relations in the post-Cold War era. The gap between civilian and military preferences, in this period, remained wide and the costs of monitoring were still low. But the probability of punishment for

military shirking declined also. The details that explain why expectations of punishment declined cannot be rehearsed; they include, but certainly go beyond, Clinton's weaknesses as commander-in-chief. However, the effect as expected by agency theory was to push the pattern of civilian control away from intrusive monitoring with working toward a pattern of intrusive monitoring with shirking, which marks a crisis in civil-military control. Fourth, Feaver describes how agency theory helps explain the decisions to use force in the post-Cold War era. In this regard, his contribution has shown that the decision to work or shirk is not an either-or proposition but rather a substantial variation in the degree and modes of shirking.

#### **1.4.4.2 Agency Theory's Assumptions and their Advantages**

Feaver's Agency Theory and the subsequent Agency Model of civil-military relations, as the study has seen, are framed in the USA's civil-military relations context. The present research, due to the comparative sensitivity of contextuality, resorted to Feaver's 'Informal Agency Theory' in order to build its conceptual framework on the assumptions of principal-agent framework, in particular, and the agency theory, in general. In the following, the assumptions of agency theory are explained in details and its theoretical advantages are weighed vis-à-vis sociological and structuralist perspectives.

Explanatorily, at the heart of the principal-agent framework is the assumption that both the principal and the agent are rational actors: they have the ability to calculate costs and benefits. In other words, the principal-agent duo is rational. In the Informal Agency Theory - onward agency theory- of civil-military relations, Feaver has maintained the same assumption. The agency theory, however, treats civil-military relationship primarily as a 'strategic interaction' whereby the actors, either the principal or the agent, makes things happen rather than the structural (or cultural) settings. The actors being rational have their interests i.e. political, economic or military etc., which they rank in terms of preferences- which itself is a process and indicator of a rational calculus. Though the actors define their interests in a specific cultural/ structural context and at times the context shapes and affect their interests, yet importantly it is the actors who, even being affected by the culture/ structure behave rationally. They have the ability to (re)rank their perceived interests accordingly. Put simply, the agency theory and the principal-agent framework, which the former is grounded in, are actor-oriented.



Similarly, in a civil-military relations setting, the agency theory assumes the civilians to be principal and the military as agent. The underlying assumption behind this is the long history of civil-military relations especially of Europe. Conventionally, the democratic theory (and the general practice in the West) delegated authority from the civilians (society-state) to the military- an institution of the state- to guard the civilians from the internal and external threats. The civilian principals were/are democratically authorized to make the military agents do its bidding. If the military obeys the orders of the civilians, then in the lexicon of agency theory the military is ‘working’. And if the military agents are strong enough to put aside the civilians’ orders, then the latter is ‘shirking’. In other words, working and shirking occur due to inherent differences in the roles played by civilians and the military. Nonetheless, according to the theory, both the civilians and the military have a convergence of preferences when it comes to the ‘security of the state’. But this argument is made in the context of the USA, and may not necessarily hold true in the case of Pakistan as shall be explained later in the thesis.

In addition, according to agency theory, the civilians have a set of preferences to ‘punish’ the military when the former are able to catch its shirking. Also, the theory provides the civilians with incentives and rewards to be rationally offered to the military agent to prevent shirking- the extreme of which is a military coup. The occurrence of a coup or a ‘crises’- as the terms is used in the USA civil-military setting- is not, according to AT, to be assigned to the structure as is normally done in the literature on civil-military relations and, for that matter, democratic transition. The crisis, coup or any rupture in civil-military relations signifies the strategic interaction between the civilian principals and the military agents. If the civilians are weak, coward and selfish, unintelligent, or ignorant, then the rational military with the advantage of coercive power would attempt to maximize its interests- primarily economic- even in an advanced democracy such as the USA. Therefore, the question of political culture, political system, the level of democratization, which are in their essence indicators of political development, is not *that central* to civil-military relations problemaqtive. The central focus of the agency theory is on the strategic interaction, preferences and the subsequent (in) action of the principal and the agent.

#### **1.4.4.3 Summary of Agency Theory’s Assumptions**

Having presented above an overview of Feaver’s agency theory of civil-military relations it would seem appropriate here to summarize the assumptions of agency theory. Moreover, this

and the subsequent section would attempt to make a comparative analysis of the core assumptions of agency theory and sociological, comparativist and structural perspectives in order to plausibly mark the (possible) theoretical/explanatory advantages of agency theory over its predecessors and/or counterparts.

To begin with, the agency theory of civil-military relations as postulated by Feaver (2003:103-111) assumes that:

- Civil-military relations are primarily a strategic interaction;
- Civilians are the principal and the military is the agent;
- Civilians and the military are rational actors- they have a clear conception of cost-benefit analysis. Also, they hold preferences which lead to actions;
- The problem of delegation occurs when there is divergence between preferences of the two;
- To make its preferences prevail- or to make the military work- the civilians devise and implement oversight mechanisms/regimes. In the absence of an oversight regime, the rational military tend to shirk: the minimum form of which is a ‘crisis’, and the maximum, a coup.
- The question of military intervention is beyond the confines of *a democracy*- whether functional, transitional or advanced.. As already mentioned, it is posited that the civilian control of the military is a game of strategic interaction. Even in the USA- an advanced democracy- there are many instances of potential ‘crises’ of civil-military relations;
- The ‘punishment’- be that physical or financial, as assumed in the theory- helps to explain why the agent military stops short of a coup (in the context of the US civil-military relations.);
- Civil-military relations could be understood and explained on a ‘daily-basis’.

#### **1.4.4.4 Advantages**

The agency theory has theoretical/explanatory advantages over any other theory of CMR. Why and/or how? Consider the following:

- It accords top priority, logically, to the ‘agency’ of actors; that they are capable of making things happen. The sociological and structuralist perspectives believe in the precedence of

‘structure’ thus underemphasizing the significance of agency. After all, it is the actors’ agency which makes or breaks ‘structure’ in the first place;

- It assumes that the actors- both principal and agent- are rational; they have a clear conception of costs and benefits. They tend to maximize their benefits and minimize the costs during their strategic interaction. The non-agency theories pay little attention to this fact, and instead give more weight to factors such as culture, norms, values etc;
  
- It attempts to understand and explain the puzzle central to civil-military relations, namely, the civilian control of the military. In this respect, it assumes actors’ interests as central to the puzzle. Their interests mould their set of preferences which in turn produces a set of actions. If the civilians are vigilant and are able to devise and implement oversight mechanism, they enhance control in their favor in terms of winning over the preferences of the agent military. If not, the military’s preferences prevail and it gets out of control. Thus, the agency theory is capable of answering the puzzle. On the other hand, the sociological and structuralist literature accords more importance to exogenous variables whose impact, under complex situations, is difficult, if not impossible, to identify and measure;
  
- Since it assumes civil-military relations as strategic interaction among the principal civilians and agent military and proposes oversight mechanisms to control the agent, it helps to explain the CMR on an almost ‘daily’ basis. In other words, it provides a researcher with both theoretical and empirical tools to measure the patterns of interaction between the principal and agent, and to explain and possibly predict the nature and direction of their relationship. Thus, it enables one to explain why- and why don’t- crises and coups occur. The non-agency theories though rely and revolve around a host of variables, they remain unable to rationally pinpoint cause(s) for a coup.

### **1.5 Is Feaver’s Theory Applicable to Pakistan’s Case?**

Peter Feaver’s theory is certainly an innovative and quite useful addition to the literature on civil-military relations. Its assumptions are logical and theoretically powerful. They are quite capable, as is explained above, to analyze the empirical data especially in the US’s civil-military relations context. Nevertheless, the theory has its operational constraints outside the specific US context for it assumes:

- There are only two actors- civilian and military;

- The civilian are constant principal and the military is constant agent;
- The United States political system is open, plural and democratic.

The above three empirical/ theoretical facts, however, may not be present in many developing states/transitional societies such as Pakistan. This implies that the assumptions of agency theory are useful and have explanatory power but they need to be contextualized or better modified. Importantly, Feaver (2003:292-302) himself has openly suggested to ‘modify’ his work in order to solve the often difficult but central problems of contextuality and comparability.

### **1.5.1 Contextualization of the AT’s Assumptions**

Having explained the basic assumptions of agency theory, it seems appropriate now to modify and contextualize them so as to apply them effectively to the case of Pakistan. To begin with, it seems appropriate to give a brief historical overview. The state of Pakistan came into being on 14 August 1947 out of a United India which was a colony of Great Britain. Thus, it would not be inappropriate to historically assume Pakistan to be a postcolonial state, which like India inherited a semblance of state institutions such as civil bureaucracy and military, and a measure of constitutionalism and electoral exercise- the India Act of 1935 and the 1946 election, along with the Constituent Assembly (CA), are cases in point respectively. Moreover, under the Partition Plan of 1947, the 1935 Act was to serve as a body of rules and regulations until the newly created states make their own constitutions. The inherited constituent assemblies were legally responsible to draft constitutions for the new republics of India and Pakistan.

With the hindsight of history it suffices to assume that this legal and constitutional arrangement as well as the assumptions of democratic theory made the people of Pakistan through their elected representatives constitutionally, legally and morally the principal in terms of agency theory. In other words, politicians such as Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the Governor-General, Liaqat Ali Khan, the first Prime Minister (PM), and Maulvi Tamizudin, the Speaker of the Constituent Assembly, were a few among the principal civilians<sup>20</sup> who were delegated authority by the British.

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<sup>20</sup> The term civilian(s) is primarily used for politicians in the study. However, it also means the general masses who elect(ed) the politicians in the first place. Nevertheless, the real determinant of the usage would be the context in which the term may be applied.

Thus, what the above-mentioned informs us is that the civil bureaucracy, judiciary and the military were legally, constitutionally and morally the agent (however, it is altogether a different story that the civil bureaucracy assumed the principal position (see Flow Matrix 2 on the next page) within a few years after independence; this actually is one of the puzzles of the present study as shall be explained in Chapter 3). For now, a matrix below is proposed which contextualizes the agency assumptions with respect to the principal-agent relationship in the specific context of *newly* independent Pakistan:

### Flow Matrix 1 Four Actors: Principal-Agent Relationship at Partition

<b>Politicians (Principal)</b>	<b>Civil Bureaucracy (Agent)</b>
<b>Military (Agent)</b>	<b>Judiciary (Agent)</b>

What can be deduced from the matrix is that at independence politicians were able to get the authority delegated, both conceptually<sup>21</sup> and practically, by the masses to run the affairs of the state of Pakistan. Therefore, from the perspective of AT, they assumed the principal position since independence. The remaining actors i.e. civil bureaucracy, military and judiciary, assumed an agent position legally, constitutionally and morally. The Jinnah-led principal, in order to make the agents especially the military and the civil bureaucracy work, attempted to re-structure not only the latter's institutional organization but also urged upon the agents to do the principal's bidding (see Chapter 3 for details).

However, quite to the principal's surprise, the agents especially the military preferred to shirk in terms of not carrying out the former's plan of action during the war against India over Kashmir in 1947-48. Importantly, in the post-Liaquat period, the agent civil bureaucracy was

<sup>21</sup> The term 'conceptually' points to the logical and historical significance of democratic theory which provided basis, originally to the European masses, for the attainment of fundamental human rights i.e. speech, organization, participation, election etc. Though the agency theory of civil-military relations has taken the democratic theory into consideration yet the present study, for reasons of emphasis and clarity, logically tends to base itself on the core assumption- namely, people/masses elect their representatives- of democratic theory with respect to the important question of who shall rule and how.

able to replace the politicians as the principal of Pakistan's state. Not only this, at later stages in the history of Pakistan, as has already been mentioned and as shall be explained briefly in the following section, the military also assumed the principal position and vice versa. The following matrix summarizes the context-specific flow of principal-agent relationship in Pakistan ('s history):

### Flow Matrix 2 Principal-Agent Relationship in Pakistan<sup>22</sup>

<b>Politicians</b> <b>(Principal-Agent-Principal-Agent)</b>	<b>Civil Bureaucracy</b> <b>(Agent-Principal-Agent)</b>
<b>Military</b> <b>(Agent-Principal-Agent-Principal)</b>	<b>Judiciary</b> <b>(Agent)</b>

#### 1.5.2 Actors and Agency: Rationalization of AT's Assumptions

As the need for contextualizing the agency assumptions was felt due to the agency theory's specific focus on the US case, it seems now appropriate to not only explicitly explain the theoretical relationship between agency and rationality- rational choice theory- but also the strategic interaction among and/or between actors, their interests, preferences and subsequent actions. In addition, the aim is to contextualize the case of Pakistan under the assumptions of agency-rationality.

To begin with, it is highly necessary to highlight the 'rationalist framework'- in other words rational choice theory, upon which agency theory is based. The rationalist method, in Feaver's words, is:

A fruitful point of departure, not out of an ideological commitment to rational choice theory...The use of the rationalist method cuts against a trend in the general political science literature to focus nonmaterial determinants of behavior, be they identity,

<sup>22</sup> Since the assumptions of these relationship shall be incorporated into the model ( see page 61), the terms can be abbreviated sequence-wise as follows: a) Politicians, P-A-P-A; b) Civil Bureaucracy, A-P-A; c) Military, A-P-A-P; d) Judiciary, A. These abbreviated terms are used in the model to denote context-specific flow in principal-agent relations in the case of Pakistan's civil-military relations.

norms, beliefs, or ideas...Paradoxically, this focus on the nonmaterial determinants of behavior is where civil-military relations theory has more or less remained for the past forty years...if anything, then, civil-military relations theory needs to make room for material factors. Agency theory does that.

(ibid: 12-14)


What the foregoing suggests, is that agency theory being grounded in rational choice, assumes actors to be inherently rational: that they have certain interests and to achieve and maximize them, they have certain preferences which, in turn, give birth to certain actions or policies. Thus, it is assumed that the actors in terms of principal and agent(s) interact strategically to maximize interests. The interests produce a set of preferences which, in turn, produces actions. In addition, agency theory treats, implicitly, the principal and agent, civilian and the military, as actors in terms of institutions. However, to emphasize the role and position of actors as institutions, which conceptually make a clear distinction between individual/personal actors and institutional actors, the assumption of neo-institutionalism are accordingly appreciated (Mitra 1999; also North 1990:3-26). Therefore, it is assumed that the actors in the Pakistan's CMR context are rational institutions with certain institutional values and interests (Mitra 2001; also 1999).

Besides, in the case of Pakistan, the strategic interaction among and/or between different actors occurs in a specific context of civil-military relations. The sets of interests i.e. primarily political and economic, preferences and policies (actions) are inherently present due to the rationality and agency of the actors. This implies that the interests, preferences and subsequent actions are not a product of context or culture, per se as is over-assumed by sociological and structural theories. The agency does not, however, attempt to reduce the importance of context. Rather, the significance of context lies in providing actors with a strategic space to interact with each/one another rationally.

Nevertheless, it is the actors who transform culture and context into 'sources of values, networks and organizational resources' (Mitra 2006:23; also 2008). Therefore, the task of the researcher is to locate the existence of actors within the context-oriented strategic space, and then, within the confines of that context, attempt to explain their interaction or otherwise based on interests be they political or economic etc.

In other words, the context and culture- and/or cultural context or contextual culture- is a product of agency and rationality for, arguably, it is the strategic interaction between/among rational actors which gave birth to cultural norms/values/beliefs etc., in the first place. Interestingly enough, the importance of interests and the way they generate ‘accommodation’ is accepted by the exponents of ‘cultural’ studies of politics too (Diamond 2009:155156). Last but not least, the flow matrix, on the next page, attempts to not only summarize the foregoing but also help understand the strategic interaction, actors, interests, preferences and actions in the case of Pakistan:

### Flow Matrix 3 Four Actors’ Strategic Interaction



#### 1.6 Designing the Model

As is explained, the Flow Matrix 3 indicates strategic interaction among/between four actors who are contextually assumed to be principal and agents in terms of agency theory- as the Flow Matrix 2 has already shown. Indubitably, the very fact of strategic interaction points to the contextuality of the present case which assumes that politicians on behalf of the state *delegated* authority, at Partition, to the agent military to protect the former against any internal/external threats. In this respect, it seems not inappropriate to quote the founding



father of the country- M.A. Jinnah. Addressing the officers of staff college Quetta on 14 June 1948, he said:

I would like to take the opportunity of refreshing your memory by reading the prescribed *oath* to you. “I solemnly affirm, in the presence of Almighty God, that I owe allegiance to the *Constitution* and Dominion of Pakistan (*mark the words Constitution and the Government of the Dominion of Pakistan*) and that I will as in duty bound honesty and faithfully serve in the Dominion of Pakistan [Armed] Forces and go within the terms of my enrolment wherever I may be ordered by air, land or sea and that I will observe and obey all command of any officer set over me.....”...if you have time enough you should study the Government of India Act, as adapted for use in Pakistan, which is our present Constitution, *that the executive authority flows from the head of the Government of Pakistan*, who is the Governor-General and, therefore, any command or orders that may come to you cannot come without the sanction of the Executive Head. This is the legal position. [emphasis added]

(Jinnah 1948)

As is obvious from the quote, this delegation was based on legal and constitutional, if not moral, principles. In addition, it is assumed that the case of Pakistan, unlike the US case, has four, instead of two, actors. Also, the present case assumes that out of the four actors there is contextually one permanent principal, and three agents. Moreover, the four actors are assumed to be rational and capable of affecting any change to minimize their costs and maximize their interests. However, as regards the interests, it is assumed that the actors primarily hold politico-economic interests i.e. electoral victories, budgetary allocations, non-budgetary economic enterprises, special funds etc.

Besides, the very fact of strategic interaction implies that the actors especially the politicians and the military have certain preferences which they rank accordingly; the problem of delegation occurs when the agent military has a divergence of preferences, which normally includes policy persuasions, ‘desire for respect’, relaxed/minimum monitoring/oversight (Feaver 2003:58-65). In Pakistan’s case, the military, however, has the tendency to influence policies in a way that helps boost its ‘economic’ interests, both budgetary and non-budgetary. Moreover, this study believes in the primacy of political interests which, in turn, facilitates economic interests of the actors especially the military with which the study is primarily concerned. However, non politico-economic interests such as the legal or religious are not

excluded as such. Their presence shall be noted if and when they have an impact on politics and the state.

In addition, according to the study's model, the politicians, on the other hand, make sure that their preferences prevail: if their preferences prevail it means the military agent is under control and 'working'; however, if the military preferences prevail, this means the military is 'shirking'- not working as the civilian politicians would have liked it to. Importantly however, the working or shirking never occurs in a vacuum. According to our agency model, politicians must devise some monitoring mechanism- an oversight regime- to make military do its bidding. They must be over-vigilant as regards information related to the tasks assigned to the agent military. In this respect, as elected representatives of the people the 'civilian have a right to do wrong' and importantly to 'judge' on behalf of the nation. In addition, with respect to an oversight regime, Feaver's appreciable contribution is that he has brought the 'punishment' back in the business - in the US case it starts from 'audits' and ends at court-martial and 'purges'(Feaver 2003:86,94). In the absence of (or in the presence of poorly devised and implemented) an oversight regime, the rational military, after having calculated the costs and benefits, shirks of which overt demonstration and maximum form is a military coup d'état.

Nevertheless, the example of Pakistan, unlike the US case, has its own peculiar context, four actors, their agency and rationality. Therefore, this study assumes that the civil bureaucracy too was able to directly intervene in politics and thus assumed the principal position. From the perspective of AT however, the agent civil bureaucracy, in principle, was delegated certain powers in the capacity of an agent as indeed the military or judiciary was delegated to 'work' in order to consolidate the state-nation. Again, to highlight the caseness as well as the civilian principalship of Pakistan, it is instructive to resort to the principled principal politicians who were able to legally-constitutionally delegate the authority to agents of which civil bureaucracy was one. In this regard, Jinnah, while addressing the gazetted officers on 25 March 1948, said:

Whatever community, caste or creed you belong to you are now the [civil] *servants* of Pakistan. *Servants* can only do their duties and discharge their responsibilities by serving. Those days have gone when the country was ruled by the [civil] bureaucracy. It is people's Government, responsible to the people ...do your duty as *servants*; you are not concerted with this political or that political party; that is not your

business...you are not *rulers*. You do not belong to the ruling class; you belong to the *servants*. [italics mine]

(Jinnah 1948)

However, quite contrary to Jinnah's advice, the civil bureaucracy rationally did shirk to replace the civilian politicians as the principal, as shall be explained in Chapter 3. This implies that in the model/thesis 'working-shirking' (agency A) terms are not confined to only civilian politicians and the military; rather they equally are applicable to other actors as well. Moreover, the model emphasizes rationality of the actors the military being one. In this respect, it assumes an actor's inherent capability to prefer own to larger interest (or vice versa) an act, and hence indicator, of agency- which is termed agency B in the model (-guided explanation).

In addition, the proposed model assumes that the *agent* military, after having chose to shirk in terms of a (successful) coup d'état, and preferred its own interest (i.e. coup) to a larger one, takes the principal position which is context- or better case- dependent. Thus, the very act of coup and preferring own to larger interest points to its agency and rationality. In other words, a coup is interest-oriented: it is staged to maximize (the military's) political and economic interests. Nevertheless, in this respect, the study's categorical assumption is that the military assumes principalship of Pakistan sans legality, constitutionality and morality (This shall be substantiated with the help of empirical evidence.) However, in the post-coup period, the agent judiciary, as shall be explained in this thesis, endorses a coup rationally.

Furthermore, what the model assumes is that as the *principal* military, it is capable, as a result of its agency B, namely, preferring own interest, of staging a coup which is assumed as an extreme form of punishment against the shirking agent(s).<sup>23</sup> As the model-guided analysis shall show, the principal military chooses to stage a coup only when its political (and indirectly economic) interests are assumed to be institutionally and/or constitutionally threatened by one of its agents. In other words, the agent(s) had opted to shirk by not performing the task (of working) as the principal military would have it performed. On the other hand, when the principal military does not resort to a coup, as the model implicitly

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<sup>23</sup> There is no need for the military to shirking, for it is already the principal actor. Instead, in such a specific context, it stages a coup, while points to its inherent agency B in terms of preferring own to larger interests. Therefore, the causal but context-specific model further highlights it.

assumes, the agents are assumed to be working i.e. the agents are obeying the military's orders. However, an agent's working should not be assumed a marker of its essentialized weaker position or any structural constraint per se. Rather, it points to its rationality: it does not attempt to shirk since the cost would be higher than the intended benefits and vice versa.

In addition, unlike Feaver as his case did not have any coup problem, the present research, as hinted above, assumed coup to be a form of punishment. The coup punishment is primarily accorded to the respective agent institutionally; for instance, the constitution is abrogated; the parliament and provincial assemblies are dissolved; the offices of Prime Minister and Chief Ministers cease to function/exist; the judiciary is enforced to take a 'fresh oath' in terms of PCO; LFO is issued; opposition political parties are banned<sup>24</sup>.

However, the coup punishment also has a physical dimension i.e. shirking politicians are either put behind bars, physically tortured, forced into exile and even killed. But, the element of punishment is lacking in the case of civilian politicians and civil bureaucracy when they happen to assume principalship. Instead, they rationally prefer let the military go scot free. In this respect, it is argued that the politicians in their capacity of either principal or agent do not accord any preference to establish an effective oversight regime. Though there are a few attempts at, arguably, creating an implicit oversight mechanism yet the attempts remain unable to operationalize such measures effectively.


Last but not least, this model-guided study brings rewards i.e. politico-economic benefits, along with punishment into the business. In this respect, it is assumed that the principal, be that politicians, civil bureaucracy or military, prefer to politico-economically reward that section of agents with whom their preferences converge. The rewards may take the form of facilitated political space i.e. no-espionage through intelligence agencies, party tickets to ex-military men/civil bureaucrats to promotion to senior posts- in the case of judges civil bureaucrats and top military officers- easy bank loans, official land allotments, relaxed or no financial accountability etc. However, quite contrary to non-military principal(s)' expectations, the model assumes that the rational military calculates such measures as weaknesses and prefers to shirk.

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<sup>24</sup> The normal practice of the military in the (immediate) post-coup period is to arbitrarily abrogate the respective constitution, and replace it with a Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO). This is followed by the norm of a 'fresh oath' administered to the judiciary especially the higher courts, under the PCO. In this respect, the judges, who refuse to take an oath, are arbitrarily either retired or expelled from the service. Also normally, the military promulgates a Legal Framework Order (LFO) in order to restructure the country's political system.

Finally, it is proposed that the model on the next page summarizes the foregoing, and explains the intricacies inherent to the specific civil-military relations of Pakistan. Arguably, the model has a predictive ambition too. It assumes that until the politicians are able to increase the politico-economic cost for the rational military, the latter shall continue to maintain its principal position and stage a coup if and when necessary.

## Agency Model of Pakistan's Civil-Military Relations



## 1.7 Hypotheses

Since the methodology used in this thesis- a combination of process tracing and analytic narratives- differs from a historical (grand) narrative in the sense that it carries out an analytical explanation grounded in theoretical variables, it, therefore, becomes imperative to test a specific theory-oriented ‘law’ that acts as a statement of regularity between a set of events. Hence, the thesis begins with six sets of hypotheses to be tested. In this respect, it is stated that the first hypothesis (H 1) is exclusively based on the general agency theory- agency A in the context of this study. Similarly, the theoretical base of H 4 is also agency literature; however, this hypothesis is operationally intermingled with agency B- rational choice. Moreover, hypotheses 2, 3 and 5 are purely derived from the theoretical literature of rational choice. In addition, the final hypotheses- H 6- is derived from the literature on Pakistan’s civil-military relations.

The six hypotheses correspond, one way or the other, to the main puzzle and core and supporting questions of the study:

- Is the coup- and hence military intervention- caused by structure or agency?
- Why does the military intervene in Pakistan’s politics?
- How does the military intervene in the country’s politics?
- Is it possible to single out any dominant cause for its intervention?

Having stated the theoretical as well as empirical basis of the hypotheses and appreciated their correspondence to the posed puzzle and the questions, it seems then appropriate to state the hypotheses themselves. The following section deals with it.

### 1.7.1 Primary Hypothesis

The primary hypothesis along with the core question of the study is posed as under:

**H 1.** *Military intervenes in politics because of its inherent agency, and not culture, identity, religion, conspiracy, ‘structure’ or internal/external threats. It is a rational institution which attempts coup(s) after having calculated the costs and benefits of the exercise. The coup-attempt marks (more) politico-economic benefits than cost. As shall be explained in the next chapter, the existing literature is replete with structural, conspiratorial and/or identitist descriptions which foresee the military not only staging a coup but also remaining in politics*

for a considerable period of time. These types of works have excluded the military agency and rationality altogether. Therefore, it is high time these essential features of the institution, which after all is made up of rational humans, were accorded due importance and acknowledged their potential to explain extreme actions like a military coup d'état.

### 1.7.2 Secondary Hypotheses

The secondary hypotheses of the present research are presented as follows:

**H 2.** *The military intervention- both direct and indirect- is primarily caused by its political interests.* Normally the literature on civil-military relations in Pakistan, and its politics has not touched this aspect of the problem (see Chapter 2). Though Siddiqi (2007:1-7) highlighted the importance of economic variables the analysis is short of a systematic determination of the dominant cause(s).

**H 3.** *Having intervened in politics the military utilizes its political space to maximize its economic interests.*<sup>25</sup> The conventional literature in Pakistan' civil military relations excludes this aspect of military's economic interests altogether. In this regard, though Jalal (1990) has pointed to the political economy of defense, this narrative, by no means, qualifies as an empirical account of the military's economic activities- as shall be explained in this study. Moreover, the level and degree of the data provided is limited. In addition, the analysis attempted is methodologically, if not theoretically, unconvincing since there are no explicit attempts at causation between 'political economy of defense' and military intervention. Besides, more recently, Siddiqi has boldly enumerated a variety of business enterprises led by the military especially its top brass. However, her work falls short of a systemic comparative correlation between *Milbus*- military businesses- and military intervention in politics.

**H 4.** *The military stages a coup d'état when its political space is perceived to be constrained by non-military actor(s) - politicians, civil bureaucracy and judiciary.* The existing literature, as we shall explain in chapter 2, is void of any rigorous analysis of this aspect of the problem. Normally structure or the weaknesses of political institutions is (over)emphasized to justify military intervention. In other words, a 'by default' syndrome is highly appreciated. Quite to

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<sup>25</sup> The study shall empirically explain that a (successful) coup is economically beneficial for the military. Rationally, it gives incentives to the various components (the Army, the Air Force, the Navy etc.) of the military institution (and even its subsidiaries such as the Fauji Foundation) to, overall, stand united vis-à-vis other actors such as politicians and/or civil bureaucracy.



the contrary, this hypothesis marks the importance of the ‘by design’ side of the political coin.

**H 5.** *The coup is staged by the military to politically enable itself to (re)negotiate the rules of the game with other stake holders i.e. politicians, bureaucrats, judges.* In Pakistan’s civil-military relations context, it is usually considered that the military stages a coup to remove undesirable elements from the political scene and that’s it. Arguably however, this sort of thinking is fundamentally flawed since it takes agency and rationality out of the picture. Empirically even, this type of assertions over-ignores the military’s politics in terms of consciously attempting a (re)negotiation of rules of the games which are perceived to be threatened, for instance, of change in terms of incorporation of pro- parliamentary/democracy provisions in constitution by actors in a specific context.

**H 6.** *Coup is a marker of the military’s political weakness rather than strength.*

Normally in the Pakistan’s context staging a coup is considered as military’s institutional and politico-economic strength (Aziz 2008; Siddiqua 2007). It is also postulated by such literature that she has ‘embedded influence’ in the politics, economy and society of Pakistan. However, one wonders, if it is so, then why it would take the pain to stage a coup?

To ‘test’ each of these statements, the study applies the model proposed above which claimed that agency A in terms of working/shirking and agency B in terms of own/larger interest explain the occurrence of a coup and (overt) military intervention in the domestic politics of Pakistan- coup here denotes policy measure adopted rationally by the military. Moreover, it is proposed that a coup is caused by military agency which rationally takes contextual constraints into account. In other words, this model-oriented explanation distances itself from cultural and/or structural studies of the phenomenon at hand.

Besides, the present study is aware of its limits as regards generalizability. Since it is engaged in *small-N* comparative analysis, the danger of a selection bias should be apparently high for, at least, a comparativist of political science. Nevertheless, in defense of analytic narratives of coups d’état it is argued that the case-selection should not reflect any selection bias since all cases- five in number- of coups are selected for a theoretical as well as empirical analysis. This in itself, as mentioned earlier, is a contribution of the present study since the existing accounts are devoid of it.

Moreover, the coup cases assumed methodologically as analytic narratives are selected for their empirical potential to help understand and explain the phenomenon of military intervention in Pakistan. In addition, the thesis assumes coup d'état as dependent variable due to its empirical utility in terms of displaying the effects on it of explanatory variables as suggested by the CMR literature. Besides, the study has a comparative ambition. However, being primarily a case study of military intervention in one developing state- and transitional society- its findings could not necessarily be applicable to a case of military intervention from the developed world or case(s) of sort from developing states/transitional societies.

Nonetheless, the findings of this research may serve a comparative purpose in three different ways: a) it informs and emphasizes military agency and its centrality as regards military intervention in domestic politics; b) it vociferously points to military's rationality in terms of political and economic interests- this aspect of military institution, according to this study, is highly important in order to understand and explain the occurrences of a coup d'état in particular and military intervention in general; c) hypotheses posed by this study could be tested cross-nationally/culturally since the proposition of mere hypothesis does not raise issues related to contextuality or case-sensitivity.<sup>26</sup>

## **1.8 Conclusion**

This chapter began with the introduction of the central puzzle posed by this study, namely, whether it is structure or agency which draws the military into and out of politics. This was followed by the core question which asked why the military intervenes in Pakistan's politics. To explain this intriguing question and solve the puzzle, the study aligns itself within the field of comparative political science and has selected five cases of military coup d'état. These cases, for methodological reasons, were assumed as essentially five analytic narratives of coups. Furthermore, coup d'état was assumed to be the dependent variable whereas shirking/working (agency A) and own/larger interests (agency B) were taken as explanatory variables to analytically explain each coup narrative.

Having defined the main puzzle, core question, variables and analytic narratives the chapter critically reviewed the major existing literature on civil-military relations theory in order to design a theoretical framework for the study. With this in mind, different theoretical

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<sup>26</sup> Przeworski. 2003. *Capitalism, Democracy and Science*. An Interview with Adam Przeworski. It is available from: [http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politics/faculty/przeworski/przeworski\\_munck.pdf](http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politics/faculty/przeworski/przeworski_munck.pdf).

paradigms were termed and categorized into sociological perspectives, comparativist literature, structural thought and actor-oriented work respectively. Each of these categories was analyzed critically. To begin with, the sociological perspectives as presented by Huntington (1957, 1962 and 1968) and Janowitz (1960) sought to look at the civil-military nexus from the societal, and not necessarily at the political/institutional dimension. Regarding the question of military intervention and civilian control of the former, these works heavily emphasized the importance of subjective/normative factors i.e. 'subjective civilian control'. However, Huntington though introduced and applied the concept of 'objective civilian control', it could not exclude the ideological factor to maintain a balanced relationship between the praetorian and the civil. Importantly, despite its pioneering position within the domain of CMR theory, these sociological perspectives were even criticized on empirical grounds; that they remained unable to predict the nature, patterns and importantly dynamics of civil-military relations especially in the USA.

The comparativist literature, on its part, tended to take a cross-national/cultural view of civil-military relations and especially military intervention. The exponents of this literature (Finer 1960; Nordlinger 1977; Perlmutter 1974, 1981) also relied more on the cultural rather than purely on institutional and political factors. Moreover, this literature, while aiming at a comparative analysis of different cross-national cases, seriously compromised contextuality. For example, it is very difficult to understand, from the perspective of comparative politics, how a contextually different case from Latin American can be compared with that of the Middle East.

The critical review of comparativist literature was followed by a similar review of structural theories of 'civilian control' over the military. The theorist, Michael Desch (1999), attempted to explain the intriguing question of civilian control over the military from primarily a structural- threat perspective, using cross-national cases for this purpose. Nevertheless, despite the significance of this structural thought, the chapter described, with the help of tables, that this theory could not be applied to the Pakistani case on empirical grounds, since Pakistan did not fit into Desch's model/theory.

Having made a critical review of the structural thought, the chapter then examined actor-oriented- or the agency theory of civil-military relations. The agency of CMR, as postulated by Peter Feaver (2003), is grounded in a rationalist framework. As a point of departure, it

starts with a critical analysis of pioneering works, especially of Huntington and Janowitz, on the subject of military intervention and/or civilian control of the former. Moreover, this theory explicitly gives due attention to actors, their interests, preferences/choices, and subsequent actions/outcomes. In other words, the agency theory while not demoting non-material factors relies on material factors in order to understand and explain the complexities inherent in civil-military relations. In addition, since the actor-oriented work appreciates the rationality and agency of actors, it helps to explain CMR almost on a daily basis. Therefore, due to its emphasis on actors, choices, rationality etc., Feaver's theory was deemed highly useful for the puzzle and core question of the present study.

However, since Feaver's work is primarily specific to the US case, it became apparent that its application to the case of Pakistan was limited due to critical empirical differences between them. Hence, the need for modifying its otherwise useful assumptions was seriously felt. Therefore, the chapter, in its later part, contextualized and rationalized the agency theory's assumptions vis-à-vis Pakistan. In this respect, the analysis identified four actors- politicians, civil bureaucracy, judiciary and the military-, specified their interests in political and economic terms and importantly, categorized the four actors into either principal and/or agents contextually, over a span of about six decades of Pakistan's civil-military relations.

Furthermore, with the help of the foregoing, an agency model of Pakistan's civil-military relations was designed. The model, grounded in the agency theory, incorporates the above-mentioned four actors, their (politico-economic) interests, preferences in terms for working/shirking (agency A) and own/larger interests (agency B) - the explanatory variables. The deductive model is both context-specific and causal in the sense of explaining coup-causation as it occurs in a certain context whereby the four actors strategically interact with each/one another for rational reasons.

More precisely, when the military is an agent, it stages a coup, while marking agency A in terms of shirking, to achieve political interests- i.e. political power- which, in turn, is used as an instrument to facilitate economic interests- hence agency B in terms of preferring own to larger interests. However, when the military is the principal, itself a result of its agency and rationality, it stages coups, again registering its agency, to protect its political and economic interests. Here, it rationally chooses to stage a coup in order to disallow a section of shirking agents, either politicians or judiciary, to sustain its shirking in terms of preferring a larger

interest which is, by its very nature and character, antithetical to that of the military. Finally, having designed the model, the chapter then attempted to ground the study's hypotheses in the causal model in order to test them. Six hypotheses were generated and each corresponds, one way or the other, to the main puzzle and to the core and, secondary questions of the study.

## Chapter 2

### Literature Review

The aim of this chapter is to critically review the major existing literature on Pakistan's civil-military relation in particular and politics and the state, in general. This will be done in six sections followed by a conclusion. The first section shall deal with that literature which believes that Pakistan inherited not only weak political institutions but also external security threat especially from a 'Hindu' India. The first war in and, over Kashmir, in 1947-48 added to Pakistan's insecurity. Therefore, it was quite natural that the military received the bulk of the country's budgets since 1947-48. Moreover, during the 1950s political institutions further deteriorated due to the incompetence of the politicians. India kept looming as a potential threat. Thus, in order to secure the country and provide it with a semblance of stability, the military intervened in Pakistan's politics overtly. Over the decades, the military remained in politics due to politicians' in-fighting and incompetence. This literature over-simplifies the phenomenon of military intervention in Pakistan's politics. Very importantly, this type of work puts the burden of responsibility on the politicians' shoulders and absolves the military entirely. In other words, it explicitly legitimizes not only military coup/intervention but also military rule. Therefore, this kind of work is referred to here as the 'legitivist' point of view.

The second section deals with so called 'conspiracy theory/theorists'. This category of works refer to those accounts on Pakistan's politics, democracy and civil-military relations which believe, sans evidence, that no meaningful change in Pakistan's politics/CMR can occur without the consent and involvement of external actors/factors especially the US, India and Israel. Furthermore, there is an internal dimension to the conspiracy perspective as well. According to this, a section of politicians conspired with the military to affect every change in Pakistan's political system that has occurred. This section is followed by those accounts on Pakistan's civil-military relations which have the tendency to describe and understand politics, military and the state in terms of a multiplicity of domestic, regional and international factors. Moreover, these accounts attempt to over-generalize their findings. In addition, they seriously compromise context. Hence, these accounts are termed and categorized as 'generalist accounts'. A fourth section briefly reviews that part of the literature which believes in the instrumentality of Pakistan as a state. The latter is, more precisely, viewed from the US's geostrategic interests in the South Asian region.

The 'structuralist literature' is critically reviewed in the fifth section of this chapter. This category of literature massively focuses on the structure of the colonial-state of British India whereby civil bureaucracy and the military are regarded as well organized, highly disciplined and comparatively modern entities. At Partition, the post-colonial state of Pakistan structurally inherited these as part of the colonial legacy. Thus, the civil-military bureaucracy continued to retain its old position, role and attitude. Also, in view of this literature Pakistan enjoys qualified stability since the rule of law flows in structural continuum. Nonetheless, the present study views and categorizes these works as essentialist in addition to being structuralist, for it depreciates and demotes both context and agency. Moreover, this type of literature ignores many a missing link which demands re-evaluation empirically.

The final section attempts to critically review the 'path dependency-historical institutionalist' account of military, politics and the state in Pakistan. This work tends to establish general patterns and institutional values- Muslim separatism, the Hindu threat, well-entrenched civil-military- bureaucracy etc.- from within the framework of the colonial-state. These historically- induced patterns and institutionalized values set forth a particular path in the post-Partition period. The external security threat (primarily from India) brought the military *in* politics for reasons of state survival. When brought in, it never left since it had, over time, institutionalized its control over civilians and importantly become a parallel state. This work too compromises agency and context. Finally, this section is followed by a conclusion which summarizes the critically reviewed literature- from the legitimist to path dependency perspectives.

## **2.1 The Legitimist Point of View**

The legitimist literature tends to legitimize military's intervention in politics one way or the other. General Fazle Muqeem Khan (1963:67-199) was one of the pioneers of this sort of writing. His work is primarily concern with the history of organization, recruitment and warfare of Pakistan army. Moreover, it looks at the army as a modern organization which has the potential and capability to modernize the country. Therefore, the military rule is justified and legitimized on such grounds. However, the writer has not taken into account the contemporaneous accounts of corruption of Ayub's family, let alone of entire regime. Also, the prevalent incidence of poverty, low governance and low expenditure on health and education are ignored. One wonders how the military rule could be legitimized in the presence of these evidences.

In the same vein, Ayub Khan (1967:49-66), the military ruler of Pakistan from 1958-69, has himself presented a legitimist account of political developments during this period. Nonetheless, having ignored the pinching questions about the abrogation of the 1956 constitution, the suppression of fundamental human rights etc., the writer believes that the ‘masses’ were guided towards democracy and development. Furthermore, it is writer’s conviction that the western type of democracy is alien to the people of Pakistan. Hence, the only panacea for their grievances is military rule. Thus, Ayub Khan has justified and legitimized his martial law and subsequent political developments. However, having gone through his account one is compelled to ask a simple question: why did he not mention his family’s corruption, the suppression of media and citizen’s basic rights, poor law and order, the resentment of the Eastern Wing, the sorry state of health and education and to cut the long story short, defeat in the 1965 war against India?

Similarly, instead of writing a critique on Ayub’s regime, his policies are theorized by Samuel Huntington in his famous *Political Order in the Changing Societies*. Huntington’s (1968:250-255) ‘developmental thesis’ posits that the military rule leads to socio-economic development in changing societies. In so doing, he assumes Ayub Khan as ‘Solon’- or in simple terms, a modernizer. Thus, in the name of modernization, military rule is legitimized in Pakistan by Huntington. However, very much like Fazle Maqeeem, Huntington has also ignored the above-mentioned areas which bemoaned military-led-modernization thesis in Pakistan. In addition, these writers remained unable to see lack of development in East Pakistan and only focused, and that too through GDP indicators, on West Pakistan. Importantly, this was done despite the fact that the GDP indicated least expenditure for health and education and a massive amount for defense- this shall be explained in detail later in the thesis.

Raymond Moore (1979:229) has, while towing the legitimist line, come up with more or less the same themes. Moore’s point of reference was the military rule led by General Zia-ul-Haq, who put the 1973 constitution in abeyance through a military coup d’état in July 1977. Moore also thinks that socio-economic development, if not democracy, can be ensured by a military rule. However, his account did not take into account Ayub-led military rule which failed to bring- as shall be explained in Chapter 4- any meaningful change in the political system of Pakistan. Moreover, Moore has also remained oblivious to the post-coup suppression of



human rights, suspension of the constitution, the dictation to the judiciary, massive poverty, poor state of health and education etc., in Pakistan.

Military rule is analyzed in terms of “legitimation of regimes” till 1971 in *Pakistan: The Roots of Dictatorship* (1983:41-78). The army served as arbitrator in the view of this study. The military had no interest to intervene in politics. Rather, it is the failure of administration on the part of civil bureaucracy which brought Ayub Khan in power. Like all legitimist accounts, this study is also extremely neglectful of the suppressiveness of Ayub and Yahya regimes, let alone Zia. Interestingly, it did not answer why the military tends to prolong its rule by hooks and crooks once it had served as an arbitrator.

G. W. Choudhury (1988:6-23, 27-50) has also played with the same cards in terms of assuming military as a modernizer. He traces the genesis of military intervention from the pre-partition days. The military’s intervention under Ayub Khan is legitimized due to the ‘inherited’ weak and ineffective political leadership as well as weak political parties. Then, there was a ‘Hindu India’ against whom the country could only be defended by the armed forces. Thus, the eulogization of Ayub’ rule is understandable. However, the writer, who otherwise wrote some balanced accounts on constitutional development in Pakistan, has failed to grasp the importance of democratic process, and the damage done to it by successive military interventions. Moreover, Choudhury has also legitimized the military rule led by General Zia- ul- Haq since , in author’ view, Pakistan progressed under his ‘martial law’ in all respects. In addition, Zia is considered the right person to make the country ‘transit’ from authoritarianism to democracy. One wonders what made Choudhury turn a blind eye to the grim realities that the people of Pakistan faced i.e. (forced) Islamization, suppression of basic human rights, Afghan Jihad, lawlessness, a huge incidence of poverty etc. The present study, hence, would take a critical view of these developments in Chapter 6.

Similarly, Shahid Javed Burki has written extensively on Pakistan’s politics. While writing from an economic-growth perspective, Burki (1980:39) believes that the country achieved more economic growth under military rule. In this respect, the economic growth achieved by the middle class under Ayub is vehemently cited. However, at the same time the reality of the trickle downs of this growth to the poor is ignored. Moreover, the repressiveness and authoritarianism of Ayub’s military rule find little place in the account. In addition, Burki has (1980:91-105) made a reference to the military sociology which is far from touching the

central questions of military intervention in Pakistan's politics. Furthermore, the account (1980) is silent on Balochistan operation, the formation and diffusion of Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) and the nature and scale of rigging in the 1977 elections.

In addition, in his later account, Burki has (1991:1-16) legitimized 1977 coup. In the writer's view, Zia was, unlike Ayub and Yahya, reluctant to take over. In fact, he was forced by Bhutto and his (bad) polices to intervene. Should mismanagement of policies by an elected Prime Minister invite a military coup d'état? The account provides no answer. Moreover, if the Bhutto's harmful policies were a danger for the security and development of the country, what did Zia regime do on these fronts? Burki did take the pain to address these questions. Interestingly, the writer has ignored the military intervention and its causes, and has instead highlighted the methods used for intervention. In addition, the account details social background of the army generals in order to explaining Pakistan's politics and the role of military in it. However, the causality of this variable is not established at all.

The legitimist narrative is further corroborated by the 'memoirs' of Lt. Gen. (rtd) Gul Hassan Khan (1993:133-134), who became Pakistan army chief just after the birth of Bangladesh in December 1971. Gul also believes that since the creation of the country politicians and civil bureaucrats ran the affairs of the country blatantly. Ayub Khan had no dubious designs to take over. He even had cordial relations with President Iskander Mirza. Ayub Khan staged a coup because he was suspicious of some 'ambitious' generals who could have staged a coup against him. Had it happened Pakistan would have been in serious security dilemma vis-à-vis hostile India. Therefore, it was Mirza who declared martial law and Ayub was to administer it. Thus, the burden of 1958 coup and the subsequent martial law is put on incompetent politicians and power-hungry bureaucrats. Interestingly however, Gul has not convincingly answered why then Mirza was sent into a forced exile after almost three weeks of the coup.

Moreover, the causes of politicization of generals are not provided with any empirical evidence. Retrospectively, however, the ex-army chief thinks that Ayub Khan was not sincere in his efforts to democratize the country. He gave Pakistan a 'constitution and a half-baked democracy' (1993:137). But again the writer has provided legitimacy to Ayub in the Ayub-Yahya encounter. For instance, Gul thinks that it were 'ministers' (read politicians) who impressed upon Ayub to impose martial law in March 1969. However, the latter, in the best interest of the country, did not do so. Instead it was Yahya Khan who imposed martial law

(1993:247-248). Ironically, the writer believes that Ayub Khan and his family did not do any corruption. Not only this, he is also silent on his acceptance of ambassadorship of Austria offered by Bhutto who earlier had literally put the Lt. Gen. in 'protective custody' and forced him to resign from army chiefship. Nonetheless, despite this benevolence by Bhutto, the writer believes that it was Bhutto, and not Zia, who pushed the country into another martial law. In believing so, he has shed little light over the causes and consequences of the 1977 coup.

Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema (2002:135-158) has also legitimized the military intervention in politics on the grounds of national security and incompetence of civilian politicians. In essence, it is a strong argument that Pakistan faced (even) militarily a powerful enemy- India; that there was strong threat to the very existence of the state of Pakistan since the first war over Kashmir in October 1947. Nonetheless, this type of arguments, though grounded in factuality of pre- and post-Partition cross-border bloodshed, presents one side of the coin. Suppose, one assumes that there was a strong Indian military threat to Pakistan, the question is who/which was supposed to perceive that threat? Was there any unanimity on the reception and construction of the threat perception? Were the politicians and the masses from East Bengal, North West Frontier Province (NWFP), Sindh and Balochistan taken into confidence in the process, if any, of threat construction?

Moreover, the military could only stage its first coup in 1958- a period when the Pakistani military has sufficiently nationalized. It was also a beneficiary of a huge amount paid in military aid by the USA. Pakistan had also signed defense pacts i.e. SEATO, CENTO, with the USA. Very importantly, this was a time when India was internationally considered by the capitalist block a pro-Moscow country. One wonders why the military then staged a coup in October 1958- from Cheema's logic of national security- when Pakistan, an ally of the US, faced no security threat from India. Interestingly, this reasoning also fails to answer why the two countries did not fight any war between 1947/48-1958.

In addition, the argument that incompetent politicians bring the military in politics is weak. In this respect, the question arises: if this was the case, why the military then, during the preceding decade, did not urge/force the civil bureaucracy and the politicians to sincerely make a constitution and put the country on the path of, at least, electoral democracy? In light of the above, it is argued that such types of explanations willfully or wishfully expect

democracy and development from an organization which is different in its training and orientation to such concepts. Moreover, this line of reasoning over-emphasizes the concept of 'threat perception'. Therefore, there is a need to explain and place the threat perception thesis along with military intervention in a proper context.

The last prominent exponent of legitimism is General (retd) Pervez Musharraf. Following the logic of his military and non-military predecessors, Musharraf, in *In the Line of Fire*, has put the blame of ruining the country on the civilian leadership. He (2006:93) argues that the Pakistan's political leadership 'played a total lack of statesmanship'. The politicians failed to serve a country which was created to 'escape Hindu economic and political domination and social discrimination' (2006:136). They remained feudals and ruled the country on caste, tribe and clan basis (2006:154-155). The writer (2006:156-157) further argues that Mirza and Ayub dissolved a parliament which was 'unelected' and 'lacking legitimacy'. Therefore they abrogated the constitution. However, over power-sharing Ayub prevailed and Mirza was sent home. Musharraf, however, admits that the Constitution (1962) Ayub 'introduced' was authoritarian and 'antidemocratic'. On his October 1999 coup, Musharraf (2006:93-109, 136-138) blames the then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif who withdrew from Kargil. Moreover, Sharif replaced the writer with a pliant army chief to win the next elections.

If one critically analyzes this account, one notices that Musharraf, like Ayub and Gul Hassan, has presented a half-picture of Pakistan's politics and civil-military relations. Interestingly, the account suffers from many an empirical mistake. For example, he thinks that the Constituent Assembly was 'unelected'. However, the historical fact is that it was elected though by a limited franchise in 1946. Secondly, the question of a government 'lacking legitimacy,' is not legally to be decided by a president or an army chief but the judiciary. In this regard, Tamizuddin case is a case in point, which the writer has somehow ignored. Thirdly, suppose Sharif asked the military to withdraw from Kargil war zone, can the former be constitutionally, legally and morally blamed for it? Fourthly, if an elected prime minister decides, for whatever reasons, to replace the serving army chief, does the replaced army chief has any legal-constitutional right to dismiss an elected prime minister and then send him into exile? Fifthly, suppose Sharif was authoritarian, on what basis the army chief put the constitution in abeyance, packed the assemblies, and issues a Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO)? Finally, the writer has put all the blame of the 1971 debacle on Bhutto and Mujib-ur-Rahman. Ironically however, Yahya Khan (military) is absolved of any

responsibility. In addition, the writer is highly subjective when it comes to Kargil war which the Pakistan's army started after a few months of the signing of peace-oriented Lahore Declaration between Pakistan and India.

## **2.2 Conspiracy Theorists**

The term conspiracy theory/theorist(s) refers to those accounts on Pakistan's politics, democracy and/or CMR etc., which tend to make a reader believe, without any *evidence* though, that any domestic change in Pakistan's politics/CMR is caused mostly by external actors/factors i.e. the US, India, Israel. In addition, the conspiracy theory has internal dimension too, whereby a section of politicians conspire with the military to affect any change in the country's political system.

To begin with, Tariq Ali, self-proclaimed has written extensively on the different phases of Pakistan's politics from a conspiracy perspective. His (1970:87,168-169,215; see also 1983:99,134) central argument is that the Pakistan's military involves in politics on the behalf of the USA. In the Cold War context, Pakistan allied with the capitalist block against the communist USSR. The military was encouraged by Washington in 1958, 1969 and 1977 to stage a coup because a strong general as head of the military and the state would better serve the Washington's geostrategic interests. Also, his conspiracy theory has an 'internal dimension'. In this respect, he argues, contrary to established facts, that Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman and Maulana Bhashani, the popular leaders from East Pakistan, were informed by the army of the 1969 takeover. Moreover, Bhutto started denouncing the Awami League's (AL) 'six points' only after having been informed and encouraged by the General Headquarters (GHQ). In addition, Ali asserts that in 1972 Bhutto became president and Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) only with the support of the military.

From the surface, Ali's arguments seem catchy. However, they stand on weaker empirical ground. Moreover, he has failed to grasp the intricacies of contextuality of the Pakistani politics in general and civil-military relations in particular. For example, on the 1958 military coup, he has not provided any solid reason for the intervention other than 1959 elections-which are, at best, means but not ends of staging a coup. In addition, on Bhutto-army relationship he has assumed Bhutto to be a weak partner and military, a master. In so assuming, however, the writer has ignored, on the one hand the 'demoralization' and 'unpopularity' of the military's officer cadre, and on the other hand, the electoral standing, if

not popularity, of Bhutto in post-1971 period. Besides, the writer has not highlighted the fact that a demoralized organization with stakes in Pakistan's politics needed a 'strategic understanding' with Bhutto more than the latter desired with the former. Put simply, Ali's accounts are essentialized, subjective and conspiratorial in nature.

Another addition to conspiracy theory has been made by Aqil Shah (2006:51-58) who traces the US influence in Pakistan's politics from an entirely different angle. Shah has attempted to understand the functioning of International Financial Institutions (IFIs) - i.e. the World Bank (WB), International Monetary Fund (IMF) etc. - and their role in 'aiding authoritarianism' to Pakistan.<sup>27</sup> Put in simple terms the thrust of his argument is that the military had allied with the IFIs. Hence, the civilian governments were dismissed on account of mismanagement of the economy despite the fact that the former had little resources at their disposal. However, Shah, in this respect, has not probed the presence of corrupt practices among politicians and/or bureaucrats. Moreover, he argues: the more aid Pakistan got from the US, the more influence of the American economic advisors- the US-led IFIs aided Pakistan due to the former's geostrategic interests. In other words, the writer's reasoning takes conspiratorial tone: that the US influences Pakistan through the IFIs, and that Pakistan has no independent sovereign status. Nonetheless, in assuming so, Shah has ignored the open-ended fact that the IFIs are a global phenomenon. There are many countries in the world that have signed mutual agreements for economic collaboration with the World Bank or IMF. Does the economic assistance-based on mutual agreement from the IFIs imply a 'given' influence of the US in Pakistan? Suppose one assumes so, then why this influence failed to force Generals Zia or Musharraf not to take over in 1977 and 1999, for instance? Moreover, having put all the burden of responsibility on exogenous factors, the account has demoted the importance of domestic variables, actors, their rationality and context.

### **2.3 The Generalist Accounts**

The generalist accounts have a tendency to assume a multiplicity of domestic i.e. political, economic, cultural etc., regional i.e. economic, security etc., and international i.e. economic, geostrategic etc., factors to have affected the nature and dynamics of civil-military relations in Pakistan. Moreover, these accounts generally take a historically linear view of socio-economic and political developments. In addition, these works seem to carry an implicit

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<sup>27</sup> For more on this type of claims see Nayar (1991:78-84).

conspiratorial tone towards politics in Pakistan. To begin with, Ayesha Jalal is atop this list. She (1990:117-135) believes that the British had a strong say among the Pakistan's military. They placed their trusted officers at the top. Even Ayub Khan was promoted as C-in-C on the advice of General Gracey. Moreover, the territorial status quo over Kashmir was suggested to Pakistan by London and Washington. About the October 1958 coup, Jalal is categorical that the USA State Department was not only aware of the coup but also supportive to the military-civil bureaucracy. The then US ambassador to Pakistan, James M. Langley, served as a medium. In this respect, she writes:

Suggestions by some American diplomats in Pakistan that Washington try and steer Mirza away from his authoritarian tendencies were countered by the argument that this would defeat US purposes by reviving the old slogan: the 'real Prime Minister [of Pakistan] is named Hildreth. In any event, the state department and the joint chiefs had not been seeing eye to eye on who was their 'best man'- Mirza or Ayub...The American foreign and defense establishments, however, were agreed on one thing. They would back the military and bureaucratic combination most capable of restoring a semblance of stability in a country in which they had so much for so little...

(Jalal 1990:268-269)

On the question of the causes and mode of October 1958 coup the writer (1990: 270, 301) argues that it was the 'evolving dialectic between state authority and the political process' which, in the crucial pre-coup months, played an important part in urging the military to takeover to 'dispelling if not altogether resolving' the 'crisis of the state'. In other words, the military intervened in politics with the explicit aim of 'countering threats to its alliance with the civil bureaucracy and certain dominant social and economic classes.'

Despite the significance of her work in terms of information especially about the initial 'political economy of defense' as well as coherent style, there are certain areas which require a critical examination. To begin with, Jalal's narrative is based on 'dialectical' linearity of events whereby the politics of Pakistan is understood and described from within the framework of state authority (structure) and political processes- the two implicit explanatory variables- which are impacted by international (state structure and political) processes- the implicit intervening variables. From the surface, the triad of state authority-political processes-international factors looks catchy in terms of detailing the importance and impact of a respective factor(s). Nevertheless, from the perspective of comparative politics, the

narrative is rendered analytical ambiguity if not self-contradiction since it is not clear, spatio-temporally, which factor/variable caused what, how and why. For example, as the quote and the follow-up paragraph above show the 1958 coup is, on the one hand, expressly ascribed to international factor, and on the other, the ‘evolving dialectic’ between state authority and political process takes the toll. Interestingly, if the military staged the 1958 coup to counter threats to its alliance with the bureaucracy and dominant classes- as Jalal believes- the question that this statement poses is: who did the military was afraid of? If it were civil bureaucracy and the ‘dominant classes’, then the military was already in ‘alliance’ with these powerful section of population. From this logic there should be no threat to the alliance. Or suppose the military took the alliance partners on in around October 1958, then, from this angle, there should be no alliance at all. In addition, this work is limited in nature and scope as it hardly coves the post-1958 period.

Nonetheless, Jalal (1995:16-38) has further elaborated her previous work, though with no significant analytical modifications. This account is comparative in ambition in the sense that it attempts to explain ‘democracy and authoritarianism’ in three South Asian states- India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. From the very outset, this work suffers from a lack of theoretical framework and a rigorous comparative method- the writer though seems aware of it (Jalal 1995:1-3). Moreover, the triad of state structure (here used as state formation grounded in ‘colonial legacy’), political processes and the international factor(s) is kept central to the narrative along with the ‘twin dialectics of centralism and regionalism as well as nationalism and religious communalism in the pre- and post-independence eras (1995:2, 54-55).

However, again one faces the difficulty of distinguishing between not only dependent and independent variable(s) bust also the causal linkages between two or more variables. Importantly, this account, while aiming at a historical-comparative analysis of the three cases, has accorded much attention to Partition and its ‘strategic and economic consequences’. Though the author has emphasized the post-Partition political process, the impact of pre- and post-Partition ‘structural and ideational postures’ have added historical linearity to the narrative (Jalal 1995:3, 120-121). In addition, this work is also limited in scope as it hardly covers post-1993 period. By and large, Jalal’s accounts are very informative and ambitious. However, when analyzed critically they are a unique mixture of structural and conspiratorial overtones.



Similarly, Veena Kukreja also does not lag behind her Pakistani counterpart. She too argues that Pakistan had developed a threat perception from India. An oligarchic rule of civil bureaucracy and military prevailed in the country due to weak political institutions and ineffective political leadership (1991:37-66; 2003:1-8). The military since 1947 emerged as a 'final arbitrator' in the Pakistani state and society. The civil politicians including Nawaz Sharif weakened the political institutions. In this respect, with a conspiratorial tone she writes:

As soon as Sharif learned about Musharraf's intention, he sent his brother Shahbaz Sharif and then Chief of the ISI, Lieutenant General Ziauddin to the US to persuade Washington to counter possible moves by Musharraf. The US warned the Pakistani military establishment against a military coup, which was given calculated publicity. Despite the cautionary warnings from the US, Musharraf remained committed to his plan but postponed its implementation. Given his apprehensions about Musharraf, Sharif assumed that inner difference in the upper echelons of the army high command coupled with US opposition to any coup will neutralize Musharraf.

(2003:262; see also 2005:66)

In addition, Kukreja has come up with a 'Composite Model' of civil-military relations in South Asia, namely, Pakistan, Bangladesh and India. The model consists of an amalgam of Huntington and Janowitz's work on the subject of military intervention. Under this model, the writer has proposed the following four independent 'summary variables' to explain civil-military relations in South Asia. In addition, each summary variable is extended to some other factor or variables:

- a) The level of the institutionalization of civilian political procedures: (i) the level of the institutionalization of the political system and the roles of the political leadership and political parties in institution-building; (ii) the functioning of democratic institutions; (iii) the legitimacy crisis.
- b) The level of military institutionalization: (i) its traditional orientation, (ii) its organization and size, (iii) representativeness, (iv) social origins and ethos (v) military expenditure (vi) aid to civil authority.
- c) 1. The domestic socio-economic and international environments: (i) the level of socio-economic development in Pakistan, (ii) the weak social base, (iii) the social cleavages and ethnic problems, (iv) Islamic ideology. 2. International Environment: (i) Pakistan's security environment, (ii) Impact of Foreign aid and Cross-National Coups.

- d) The nature of boundaries between the military establishment and its socio-political environment.

(1991:37-57)

Kukreja's model is rich in terms of information it contained. Also, it is ambitious as regards generalizations. However, there are certain issues related to contextuality, nature and character of comparison and the limits of generalizability which demand a thorough examination of the model. To begin with, it seems that there is no effort made to compare the four variables with each other in order to determine cause(s) of military intervention in one and/or all cases studied. Furthermore, the thrust of the analysis is to put the three cases in the two-pronged model which comprehensively relies on imported input- all sub-variables support the summary variables which in turn conform to the 'praetorian polity' and 'low political culture'. However, what determines the weakness or otherwise of political institutions in a praetorian polity or low political culture, the writer is silent. In addition, the concepts of praetorian and low political cultures (societies) were- as is explained in previous chapter- primarily based on a cross-national analysis of military intervention. Kukreja, on her part, does not mention if large-*N* study and its conceptual frameworks could be applied to any of the three South Asian countries.

Besides, Kukreja's analysis, implicitly and explicitly, excludes the military from the responsibility of the derailment of democratic process in, for example, Pakistan. To justify her reasoning, she has resorted to Janowitz's 'reactive militarism' (1991:59-64). One again wonders how an imported concept could be matched to the empirical realities of Pakistan. Interestingly, her efforts to empirically analyze each of the sub-variables lead one nowhere, empirically. For example, in order to support the 'Islamic ideology' variable she argues:

In Islam, there has never been a distinct separation between the civil and military authorities, whereas the concept of civil-military relations in the western countries has essentially evolved out of secularism and the separation of the civilian functionaries from the military functionaries of government, with the former acting as controllers and the latter as the subordinate professionals. Since in Islam there is no background of secularism and no distinction between the military and civilian components, an overwhelming majority of Muslim states, consequently, are military-ruled or military-dominated.

(Kukreja 1991:52)

The foregoing, in principle, is writer's own analysis. However, operationally her argument is based on the works of Saleem M.M. Qureshi, Leonard Binder and A. Ahmed – all there, according to this study, are not professionally trained in theology- more precisely the religious text- and its relationship with military organization in an Islamic state (the study would explain this phenomenon in detail in Chapter 3, because Kukreja had obscured the difference between the state and its military.) Also, she, while playing with the conspiracy theory, argues that the impact of the US aid and the 'cross-national coups'- coup contagious- in Iraq, Egypt, Burma and Indonesia had 'some bearing on the condition in Pakistan (1991:55). However, the mechanism through which such a 'bearing' is effected is not informed about.

#### **2.4 The Instrumentalist Work**

The Instrumentalist literature looks at the Pakistan's military from the prism of Washington's geostrategic interests especially in South Asia. In the context of Pakistan, Stephen Cohen in his *The Pakistan Army* (1984:7-49), has contributed to this type of reasoning. The writer has, for the most part, taken a sociological view of Pakistan army especially its regimental and organizational aspects. The work though is very informative in nature, it lacks a theoretically enriched and methodologically sound analysis of Pakistan's politics and/or its civil-military relations. Moreover, the account is limited in scope. Besides, Cohen has patiently contributed another account, *The Idea of Pakistan* (2004:87-130), which takes a historical view of the 'idea' of Pakistan. However, the book provides no idea as to why the military takes over the rein of political power every now and then. In a nutshell, this account gives the impression of being a new version of his previous work on Pakistan.

#### **2.5 The Structuralist Literature<sup>28</sup>**

The military's power is studied as a structural problem by Hamza Alavi (1988, 1990). He starts his arguments from the pre-Partition period in which 'Muslim ethnicity' and 'Salariat Nationalism' formed the two pillars of Pakistan or rather salariat movement. The salariat wanted to secure their economics interests vis-à-vis the majority Hindus of British India. Thus, Pakistan was a result of their efforts for economic security. In independent state of Pakistan, civil-bureaucracy and the military became upper echelons of the salariat class.

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<sup>28</sup> For a purely (cross-) 'cultural' study of CMR, see Rebecca L. Schiff (2009:43-47). In Schiff's view Pakistan lacks 'concordance' among its political elite, citizenry and the military on account of her 'culture' (ibid:79-89). However, this account, very much like the literature critiqued in this Chapter, demotes actors' agency, rationality and context.

Furthermore, the civil bureaucracy-military oligarchy was numerically dominated by the Punjabis. The use of religion for political purposes is, in Alavi's views, a post-independence phenomenon- it was cited and used to contain ethnic movements. In addition, the state, in his Marxian perspective, is an 'overdeveloped' structure having strong capitalist links with the 'metropolitan bourgeoisie'. Within the framework of 'overdeveloped state' of Pakistan the 'landed-feudal' class along with the 'indigenous bourgeoisie' strives to collaborate with the civil, if not military, bureaucracy to further its interests politically, socially and economically.

The thrust of Alavian thought, however, is that the bureaucracy is central to the state structure in Pakistan whereby the state functions 'autonomous' of the dominant 'classes'. In their bid for political power the three 'classes'- namely, landed-feudal, indigenous bourgeoisie, metropolitan bourgeoisie being engulfed in some political crisis resort to the bureaucracy and the 'charismatic' military for arbitration. Interestingly, Alavi argues that military enjoyed 'charisma' at least in West Pakistan, which differentiated it from civil bureaucracy and the corrupt politicians. Therefore, he has termed the 1958 coup 'a bureaucratic coup', because it was Mirza who viewed the 1959 elections as a problem, not General Ayub Khan. Moreover, in the 1950s and 1960s the military remained a 'junior partner'. In this regard, only Zia regime entitles to be a true 'military regime' in Pakistan. Besides, Alavi also gives a conspiratorial tone to his analysis. In this respect, he argues that Bhutto's assumption of office in 1972 was clarified by Richard Nixon- the then US president.

Despite the significance of Alavi's work, the present study believes that the room for improvement is always there. To begin with, the author is not clear about the concept of 'overdeveloped' state. How and why is it assumed so? Is the state 'overdeveloped' vis-à-vis civil society? If yes, then the dominant landed-feudal and indigenous bourgeoisie classes are part of the society, and they are *developed* at least functionally in enhancing their politico-economic interests. Another way to understand Alavi's thesis is by looking at the state's institutions. If one looks at the state's elective institutions such as parliament, then one finds that they have not been able to establish themselves even after 62 years in Pakistan. Hence, in light of the above, it seems that the state's developed institutions- namely civil and military bureaucracy- have been, from Alavi's Marxian 'peripheral capitalism' paradigm, equated with an 'overdeveloped state'. Moreover, though his concept of salariat is innovative, the writer has remained unable to not clarify how the various elements of the 'salariat oligarchy' interact with each other, and especially with the non-salariat actors. The internal rifts i.e.

differences over politico-economic interests etc., between civil bureaucracy and the military or between the civil-military bureaucracy and landed-feudal class are also ignored.

Besides, Alavi has taken an essentialist view of the oligarchy which is ontologically assumed as a 'given': it remains there through all seasons. However, empirical evidences are just the opposite- this shall be explained in Chapter 3. In addition, the military's charisma thesis is also problematic. In West Pakistan especially in the Punjab it may be argued that the military enjoyed a sort of charisma pre-1958 period, for it was engaged in relief activities i.e. aid to civilian authorities during floods etc. Nonetheless, one cannot conclude, from this, the same about Sindh, Balochistan and East Bengal if not NWFP. These provinces had comparatively lower representation not only in the military but also civil bureaucracy. In short, despite contributing a Marxist reading on Pakistan's politics and the state, Alavi's accounts are over-essentialist, over-generalizing and often empirically least sustainable- there is a noticeable tendency not to cite references to many a claim (see Alavi 1988).

The next structuralist account is narrated by Mohammad Waseem. His works (1994:42-59, 85-101; also 1987:13-18) have very convincingly established the transformative links of the colonial civil bureaucracy with that of Pakistan. The civil bureaucracy was well trained and disciplined in the art of administration and politics under the British. Pakistan inherited a healthy share of this 'colonial legacy' which underscored the existence of political and social forces due to the structural nature of the colonial state.

In analyzing the structure and stature of the civil bureaucracy in the colonial state, Waseem, however, has paid little attention to the non-civil bureaucracy - the military- which was part and parcel of the colonial state. Moreover, the writer has not emphasized the changes (and their causes) in the organizational structure of the civil bureaucracy in the postcolonial state of Pakistan. In addition, the author structurally believes in the continuum of 'rule of law' from pre-Partition till the present. However, in this regard, he has ignored the contextual difference between the colonial and post-colonial states as well as the identifier of the rule of law. This essentialization of structural view of rule of law raises the following question: should the Provisional Constitutional Orders issued by army chiefs be assumed as the 'qualified stability' and identifier of the 'rule of law' in Pakistan?

In addition, Waseem's work is not primarily concerned with the nature, patterns and dynamics of civil-military relations in Pakistan. Its main objective was to establish a hypothesis that the civil-bureaucracy was a part of the colonial authority structure (Waseem 1994:1). Peripherally though, the military intervention in politics is understood from Huntington's concept of praetorianism. In other words, the writer tends to believe that weak political institutions made military to takeover. Again, the questions regarding the determinants of weak state institutions and the objectives behind the coups are unanswered.

Another structuralist account is presented by Husain Haqqani. He (2005:10-26), like Alavi, has analyzed the pre-Partition decade to formulate his core assumptions. His narrative revolves around the Muslim League's 'Islamic project' grounded in Pakistan's movement which is assumed- unlike Alavi's salariat movement- a 'religious movement' whereby Muhammad Ali Jinnah was unclear about the nature of the future state of Pakistan. Hence, after Partition, Pakistan was turned into an ideological state based on religion by religious leaders, politicians and theologians. Moreover, the 'Kashmir dispute as well as the ideological project fueled rivalry with India, which in turn increased the new country's need for a strong military' argues Haqqani. In this respect, 'the religious sections' of the British intelligence service inherited by Pakistan were used accordingly. Herein lies, according to him, the genesis of mullah-military alliance which impacted Pakistan's politics in the future.

About the 1958 coup the writer (2005:38-81) brings in the civil bureaucracy-military's apprehension about the 1959 elections. In addition, Ayub Khan is termed as a non-secularist who 'simply wanted to do what he perceived was good for the state and declare it as Islamic'. Therefore, Pakistan was able to maintain its 'Islamic identity' intact during the 1965 war. Not only this, the military operation in East Pakistan (1971) was characterized as a war for country's Islamic identity argues Haqqani. On the post-1971 politics his (2005:86-116) belief is that the military needed Bhutto for its institutional safety and prestige and to divert domestic criticism to the former. Writing further on the military-mullah nexus, the writer informs that the nexus remained intact even when military remained in barracks. After all, it was this nexus which brought the downfall of Bhutto in 1977. Also, there is a conspiratorial tinge in his analysis of politics in the 1990s. For example, he (2005:201-259) describes that the USA sided with the military against Benazir Bhutto's first government; and the military under Musharraf was reluctant to intervene- it staged the October 1999 coup reactively.

Haqqani's account is very interesting from the outset. The worth of his work lies in the empirical data he has presented about the role of intelligence agencies in factionalizing political parties in general and opposition in particular. However, his account is extremely essentialist. It assumes the role of religion in the making of Pakistan 'essential' and a 'given'. Thus, the state of Pakistan is essentialized as 'Islamic' since pre-partition days. It is, from Haqqani's logic, the duty, be that religious or otherwise, of the mullah-military combine, civil bureaucracy and politicians to protect the 'Islamic' identity of the state. Nonetheless, in response to this logic, it is argued that Haqqani has failed to realize the instrumentality of religion as enacted by Jinnah, the Muslim League, the mullah and the military etc. For example, if the county was achieved in the name of Islam, then why did all the above-mentioned actors remain passive, divided and disinterested in turning Pakistan into a *Sharia*-based state? Empirically, the efforts in this regard till today fall under the 'instrumentality' of religion- the present study would explain this dichotomy in Chapter 3.

Moreover, in his essentialist jargon, Haqqani has looked at only one side of the coin. He is apparently logical that the military needed Bhutto to divert the criticism off to him. But the empirical ignorance of this line of reasoning is exposed by the very fact that Bhutto packed his military bosses within a few months of his assumption of the offices of President and Chief Marital Law Administrator. Moreover, he brought major changes not only in the command and control system of the military but also the organizational structure of the civil bureaucracy. In addition, he established a parallel police force- Federal Security Force (FSF) - for his own political objectives. Similarly, Haqqani's conspiratorial assertion about the role of Washington and the reluctance of the military to stage a coup are, at best, reflector of wishful or willful thinking which lack empirical and logical foundations. Besides, his work is least concerned with the nature, patterns and dynamics of civil-military relations in Pakistan. By and large, the account tends to exclude, if not absolve, politicians from the problemaqtue of Pakistan's CMR.

Finally, Ayesha Siddiq's *Military Inc.* (2007) is one of the very important structural accounts of Pakistan's politics and the military. The aim of this study (2007:1) was to explore the internal economy of the military 'as a driver of armed forces political ambitions' in a 'militaristic-totalitarian' political system where the 'head of the state is an army general'. The fundamental question it addresses is whether having engaged in internal economy the

military's top leadership is interested to withdraw from politics. To answer it, three hypotheses are proposed as under:

[1] *Milbus* [military businesses] is military capital that perpetuates the military's political predatory style...Consequently, profit is directly proportional to power. Financial autonomy gives the armed forces a sense of power and confidence of being independent of 'incompetent' civilians...[2] The military economic predatoriness increases in totalitarian systems. Motivated by personal gains, the officer cadre...seek political and economic relationships which will enable them to increase their economic returns...[3] The military' economic predatoriness, especially inside its national boundaries, is both a cause and effect of a feudal authoritarian, and non-democratic political system.

(Siddiq 2007:2-3)

Having posed the fundamentals of her research, Siddiq (2007:33-72) identifies six types of civil-military relations in the international state system. To discuss civil-military relations from 1947 to 1977 in Pakistan, she borrows Huntington's praetorianism. According to her analysis, the military since the first war, in and over Kashmir, started asserting its military-corporate position in the security state of Pakistan. The civil bureaucracy and other elites used the military to enhance their interests. But in 1958, with the first martial law, the equation got changed in favor of the military. Interestingly, however, to discuss politics under Ayub Khan, Perlmutter's concept of 'arbitrator military' is taken out of her proposed typology and applied to discuss politics and the *Milbus* in the 1960s. In this regards, she argues that the Ayub regime created its cronies based on 'patron-client relationship' from the civil bureaucracy and politicians to plunder the national resources predatorily. Furthermore, during this period the military had obtained 'political and financial autonomy' that gave it confidence to keep its hold over Pakistan's state. In addition, Siddiq sees Yahya's coup as a continuation of Ayub's regime. However, the post-1971 period witnessed a strong Bhutto vis-à-vis the military whereby the *Milbus* stumbled from 1972-1977. Nonetheless, Bhutto, who was a landed- feudal himself, also engaged in predatoriness along with other elites- the military being one. His downfall, however, was caused by his dependency on the military organization.

Besides, Siddiq's *Milbus* thesis argues that from 1977 to 2005 - or better 1977 onward- the military has 'morphed into a dominant class' exerting influence socially, economically and



politically (2007:19-23). Moreover, to theorize her 'class' thesis, the author has resorted to Alavi's 'three classes'- metropolitan bourgeoisie, indigenous bourgeoisie, landed-feudal- and added 'military class' to Alavi's Marxist typology of classes. Having ensconced itself within the existing class structure of Pakistan the military enters into politics as an equal partner of other members of the elite/oligarchy/establishment. Not only this, its 'arbitrator' status is transformed into 'parent-guardian' one. Thus, the organization is able to produce its 'military politicians', civilian 'politicians or entrepreneurs' who were 'propelled into prominence by the military'. On their part, the civilian elites, due to their 'mutual interests' and 'mutual dependency', never challenged the military predatory and 'feudal-authoritarian' style and attitude. Thus, in Siddiq's (2007:24) analysis the military is the most powerful institution in Pakistan. It could only be forced to return to barracks by sustained mass-based political movement and massive international pressure especially by the USA.

Doubtlessly, Siddiq's work is monumental in terms of its original contribution towards documenting military businesses. Moreover, the attempt at establishing a structural linkage between Milbus and (feudal) authoritarianism as well as between existing classes and military (class) is impressive. Nevertheless, despite this significance the account carries many a theoretical and empirical contradiction. For example, one wonders on what grounds the writer has assumed the military both a 'class' and 'praetorian-feudal' construct. Historically, the class is the production of Industrialized European societies. How could it be mixed with a Third World conception of a pre-industrial and pre-capitalist institutional 'feudal'? Moreover, the concept of 'feudalism' is a European export to South Asia. Does one find 'feudalism' or private property in pre-colonial India? The writer is silent on it. In addition, the author has equated the officer cadre's economic ventures with a military class. In this regards, she argues:

The senior generals (both serving and retired) are the primary beneficiaries of the internal economy. The whole economic process of benefits is structured in such a manner that those at the top received the bulk.

(Siddiq 2007:13)

In light of the quote, one is urged to ask: do the middle rankers, JCOs and NCOs also form a part of the ‘military class’<sup>29</sup>? Do all the serving and retired military personnel are unanimous over the distribution of socio-political and economic benefits? The writer has not highlighted these queries. Perhaps a better way to deal with this subject was to term officer cadre a class if class conception was deemed central to the analysis. Or this could have been put in Alavi’s indigenous bourgeoisie. After all, the military’s enterprises do make business with the metropolitan bourgeoisie. Moreover, if the military class is structurally considered a crucial construct, then the writer has somehow ignored the ‘military class’ in colonial Punjab (Yong 2005:90-108,241-280). From a structuralist perspective, Siddiqa could have established a linkage between the pre-colonial and post-colonial military class and its economic ventures along with the dominant classes. Interestingly, despite emphasis and reliance on structure, her narrative is post-independence.

Moreover, the author’s handling of the core question is problematic. She argues that the military, as an organization and a class- economically, politically and socially- is the most powerful force in the country. Having engaged in internal economy the officer cadre could only decide to return to barracks if there is an indigenous political movement and internal pressure. This claim, instead of answering the core question, raises certain questions: a) how and when do/shall the indigenous movement start since the writer has given no timeframe? b) Who does/shall start and lead this indigenous movement? c) How does/shall one know if and when the exogenous pressures come to the support of an indigenous movement? d) Why does the military stage a coup when it has become the most powerful institution with the discretion and privilege to produce its own (military) politicians?

In addition, the present study argues that Siddiqa’s hypotheses 1 and 3 (2007: 1-2, 14-15, 21) do not hold empirically. Also, hypothesis 3 is problematic conceptually. To begin with, in the description of her first hypothesis she proposed that ‘profit is directly proportional to power’. If this is so, then how can one explain Zia’s coup in July 1977? Because, if the above logic is correct, the military’s *Milbus* and ‘class’ status only thrived and strengthened after Zia assumed power. In other words, this means a profit-deficit and (*Milbuswise*) weak military staged a coup in 1977. Interestingly, however, the empirical evidence provided by Siddiqa goes against her hypothesis. Similarly, her third hypothesis could not be justified on

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<sup>29</sup> The acronyms JCOs and NCOs stand for Junior-Commissioned Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers respectively. These acronyms along with others could be seen under Abbreviations.

ontological and empirical grounds as well. Ontologically, the writer has taken the feudal as a given and being, and not *becoming*.<sup>30</sup> Empirically, the socio-economic, if not political, transformations taking place within the Pakistani society have not been taken into account with respect to understanding and constructing not only the basis but also the body of a feudal. In other words, one wonders who could be a feudal in Pakistan? What is the empirical, if not theoretical, basis to measure this phenomenon? The account is silent on it.

As regards her second hypotheses, it is argued that instances of non-military predatoriness could also be found in democratic countries. Arunacahl in India is a case in point (Barbara-Harris 2007). In other words, exploitation of economic resources is not necessarily confined to the military or its cronies in a non-democratic country. It is rather contextual than cross-national. Moreover, the conceptual basis of this hypothesis, namely, ‘predatoriness’, is borrowed from Charles Tilly.<sup>31</sup> Hence, during the course of this conceptual importation the context of Pakistan’s case is grossly compromised. One wonders how a Sixteenth/Seventeenth century Europe could be compared with Twenty/Twenty-first century Pakistan if not South Asia?

Last but not least, equally problematic and questionable is Siddiq’s use of civil-military relations typology<sup>32</sup> which is based on Western experiences of state-society interaction (Mitra 1997:1-6). One wonders why the ‘context’ and ‘embedded values’ of the Pakistani society are accorded no attention at all (Mitra 2006:29-52). Moreover, her analysis revolves around ‘patron-client’ model where the military is essentialized as patron (2007:51-54). However, the account is replete with instances where the military looks like a client especially after 1971 debacle. Interestingly, the work (2007:15) takes conspiratorial tone when it comes to the US becoming a patron of Pakistani military. Finally, her account (2007:16) shifts the focus away from civil-military relations to have and have-nots.

Maya Chadda in *Building Democracy in South Asia* (2000) has also taken a structural view of ‘democracy’. Chadda (2000:13-97, 226-232) has attempted a comparative analysis of India,

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<sup>30</sup> Her ontological positioning could explicitly be traced in her entire work including newspaper and magazine articles (see, for instance, ‘New Land Barons’ *Newsline* (July 2006). In addition, this observation is based on my personal observation of her outlook toward reality conception along with detailed discussions on the subject of CMR and military intervention in politics.

<sup>31</sup> Charles Tilly has, in his later works, given due importance to the principles of comparative politics, thus emphasizing the importance of context (see Tilly 2004:5-6).

<sup>32</sup> The writer has no model of her own. This CMR typology is based on the works/models of Amos Perlmutter and Samuel Huntington respectively (see Chapter 1 in this respect).

Nepal and Pakistan's political system and the way democracy and its opposite has impacted each of the case respectively. Though the study is very informative and ambitious, the lack of comparative model and method, however, reduces its significance. Moreover, the contextual-normative sensitivity of the three states is not taken into account. Even, on empirical grounds it is extremely difficult to justify her arguments. For example, she has narrated politics in Pakistan from an elitist mindset which is essentially marked as a supreme force capable of using even 'coercive' measures to democratize, integrate and 'consolidate' the state in Pakistan. One wonders did the elite- civil-military bureaucracy, politicians etc. - consolidate the country in 1971? Besides, her 'elite bargaining' approach is defective in the context of Pakistan as it creates the myth of an elitist leadership riding over a monolithic nationalism. It also reduces or better ignores the role of public masses in shaping the political developments in the country. Implicitly, the account seems to suggest that the military may use illegitimate and illegal means of violence in the name of national consolidation.

## **2. 6 The Path-Dependent Perspective**

The Pakistan's military intervention in politics has been studied from a path dependency-historical institutionalist perspective by Mazhar Aziz in *Military Control in Pakistan* (2008). Aziz builds his argument from the pre-Partition Hindu-Muslim relationship which, in his view, was defined as Hindu-Muslim conflict by the Muslim League (2008:4, 12-13). The Muslim League was the platform where the Muslim minority interests were provided a political cover. In other words, the writer has disregarded Alavi's work on the salariat which explained the Muslim League's politics in Muslim-minority provinces- UP, CP etc.- from economic rather than religious perspective. However, in assuming so, Aziz has not provided any empirical evidence to refute Alavi's salariat theory. Moreover, he did not include in his analysis the Muslim-majority provinces where the League made pacts and electoral arrangements with the local elite in the 1940s.

Moreover, the writer has remained unable to notice that it was by early 1940s that the Muslim League resorted to religion for political purposes. Additionally, it raises another question: was the League's politics and policy based on religion when it was founded in 1906 or during the 1920s and 1930s? It seems, in view of the present study, that Aziz has failed to distinguish between a process of securing Muslims' (elite) interests within the framework of British India- whereby the League had to face the Congress as a political rival- and the instrumentality of religion for political purposes. After all, had a religiously induced Muslim

separatism been a unifying factor since the formation of the Muslim League- as Aziz has argued (2008:14) - there would then have been no political arrangements/alliances between Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims in the form of Unionist party to which little reference is made. Interestingly, the conception of Muslim separatism, as applied by Aziz's account, is essentialist in nature for it over-ignores the intra-Muslims religious, if not politico-economic, differences. The manner the writer has de-emphasized and demoted the presence of sectarian element in aftermath of partition is beyond comprehension- the Munir Report is a case in point.

Aziz's analysis of the post-colonial state and society of Pakistan is also guided by the path dependency and historical institutionalism. In this respect, he transformed his thesis of pre-Partition Hindu-Muslim religious conflict into India-Pakistan religious conflict. Pakistan perceived from the very beginning a threat from India. Subsequently, this threat perception led to 'state survival' policy. The military, which was already 'fairly entrenched and organized in 1947', was brought in politics (2008:4). In this regards, he argues:

Although it is debatable what special competencies the military might have brought in for administering the state at that point in time, one can validly infer that the military would have taken the first steps in accumulating experiences and skills to manage civilian affairs. It is likely that these steps laid the foundation of institutionalization of the military-bureaucratic nexus within the state.

(2008:36)

The concepts of threat perception and state survival, as the above-mentioned highlights, are very catchy from the outset for India and Pakistan had fought a war over Kashmir in 1947-48. Nonetheless, they point to a very important aspect of the phenomenon, namely, which institution perceived the external threat and how. Also, which institution was responsible for the 'survival' of the state at inception and on what basis- since the military was only 'brought in'?

As regards the phenomenon of military intervention in politics, Aziz has considered only three coups in Pakistan- that of 1958, 1977 and 1999. The 1969 coup d'état is assumed, like Siddiq, as a continuation of Ayub-led military rule (2008:45). To explain the occurrence of a coup, the author has looked at consequences, and not the actual cause(s) of a coup. In this regard, only two variables- law and order, and political instability- are taken to understand

the consequences in post-coup period. Also, to support his argument, the writer has taken National Defense College (NDC) as a case study to view the perception of the military about itself. His findings are that the military intervened (staged a coup) due to its ‘institutional interests’.

Nevertheless, as regards Aziz’s efforts to explain coup occurrences and/or military intervention, it seems many important dimensions of the phenomenon are missed. To begin with, the ‘brought in’ syndrome is stressed though from the prism of *consequences*. However, it is not specified which actor(s) and/or institution brought the military in. If it was threat perception, then there is not mention of its perceiver- this also implies that Aziz’s ‘institutional interests’ thesis did not apply to the 1958 coup. Interestingly, however, the reason/factor pointed out for coups (intervention) is none else but the military’s institutional interests. But, the scope, degree, limits and meaning of this usage is left unexplained.

Besides, the defective aspect of path dependent and historical institutionalist approach is that it ignores the importance of causes. Secondly, it ignores the contextual differences and actor’s preferences between two events, phenomena or periods. In this respect, one may ask: did the 1977 coup have the same context (in this case of consequences) as the 1999 one had? Thirdly, this approach does not study civil-military relations on daily basis. In other words, this path-dependent and consequences-orientated approach has no theoretical capability to comprehensively answer the reasons for a fresh coup by looking merely at the consequences for the latter (if defined as variables) take time to get cognized and documented.

Last but not least, historical institutionalism-path dependency is also essentialist and structural in nature and character since it tends to assume path as a given. For example, about the 1977 coup the writer argues that it occurred due to institutionalized military rule historically. This very conception of ‘institutionalized’, in view of the present study, implies that the military *had to* intervene. In other words, the agency, rationality and political interaction of other actors are underestimated. Even empirically the 1977 coup cannot be assumed being ‘institutionalized’ for it begs a question: when and how the military rule was institutionalized in the pre-coup period? The present study shall explain it in Chapter 5. Finally, Aziz’s concepts of ‘military control’ (of civilians if not the state) as well as ‘parallel state’ are not theorized/problematised properly. For example, it is hard to find the indicators of military control and a method by which they could be measured. Similarly, the concept of

a parallel (military) state is, in view of the preset research, a new version of Alavi's overdeveloped state- the study shall take these relevant issues up in Chapter 3.

## **2.7 Conclusion**

This chapter sought to critically review the existing literature on Pakistan's civil-military relations in particular and politics and the state in general. In this respect, the literature was divided into six sections and categorized as the legitimist point of view, conspiracy theorists, the generalist accounts, the instrumentalist work, the structuralist literature and the path-dependent perspective respectively.

The first section of the chapter looked at the legitimist point of view. The legitimists (Khan 1960; Huntington 1968; Rizvi 2000; Cheema 2002) believe that Pakistan's political institutions remained unable to grow democratically. The politicians, by and large, were incompetent too. Instead, it views the military as a modernizing force. Therefore, it was quite natural on the part of the military to takeover in such an institutional vacuum. Moreover, since India had viewed Pakistan as its chronic enemy and had fought a war with Pakistan in Kashmir in 1947-1948, it was imperative, on the part of the military, to administer political obligations for the security of the state and the society. Hence, the military's intervention in politics is not viewed as a problem at all by these accounts. Rather, coups d'état and military rule is legitimized on account of the country's weak political institutions, politicians' incompetence and external security threat. Nonetheless, this point of view suffers from theoretical as well as empirical weaknesses. For example, despite its uni-focal over-emphasis on the inherent weaknesses of political institutions, there is no mention whatsoever of the factors which might have left political intuitions weaker. Furthermore, despite its rhetorical stress on the external security threat, the legitimists have failed to name which institution of the state was supposed to perceive the threat and on what grounds. In addition, the military-as-modernizer thesis is empirically invalid as shall be explained in this study.

In the second section, the chapter took a critical view of the so called conspiracy theory/theorist(s). The term referred to such accounts (Ali 1970, 1983) on Pakistan's politics, democracy and/or civil-military relations etc., that had a tendency to posit, without any *evidence*, that no domestic change in Pakistan's politics/CMR can occur without support from the outside- by external actors/factors especially the US. Also, the conspiracy theory had an internal dimension whereby a section of politicians conspires with the military to

affect any change in Pakistan's political system. However, besides making a case of Pakistan's politics/CMR without evidence, the conspiracy theory lacks internal consistency. For instance, following the breakup of Pakistan, Bhutto was assumed to be a weak partner and the military to be a strong master. However, this conception and construction of the Bhutto-military relationship ignores, on the one hand, the demoralization and unpopularity of the military's officer cadre, and on the other hand, the electoral standing, if not popularity, of Bhutto in the post-1971 period. In addition, the conspiracy theory is highly essentialist in nature in that it demotes the value of context and the significance of agency and rationality.

The generalist accounts were analyzed in the third section. These accounts (Jalal 1990, 1995; Kukreja 1991, 2003) have a tendency to describe and understand Pakistan's civil-military relations from a rather general perspective in terms of first selecting multiple domestic, regional and international variables and then understanding the phenomenon of military intervention by operationalizing them. Moreover, these accounts were found to have a comparative ambition whereby Pakistan, Bangladesh and India were studied, with the help of a 'composite' model- which contained a variety of variables-, comparatively. The military intervened in Pakistan's politics on account of the stated variables. However, there is no mention of a *single*- or two- particular variable which might have caused a coup/intervention, for example, in 1958 or 1977.

In other words, a generality of a variety of variables is prescribed in order to understand the phenomenon. However, as mentioned above, these accounts, despite their informative nature, severely suffer from a lack of theoretical as well as empirical rigor. The proposed model, which, for the most part, is grounded in imported concepts such as 'praetorian polity' and/or 'reactive militarism', suffers from explanatory capability to explain which factor causes military coup and how. Importantly, though the generalist accounts posit that a combination of various variables compelled the military to takeover, they are silent as to why the military takes the pain to intervene in the first place. Besides, these accounts give an explicit impression of carrying structuralist as well as conspiratorial overtones.

Having conducted a critical review of the generalist accounts, the chapter then attempted a similar review of the instrumentalist work in the fourth section. This work (Cohen 2004) looked at the Pakistan's military from the lenses of Washington's geostrategic interests in the South Asia region especially during the Cold War period. Despite its pioneering position



within the domain of CMR-literature on Pakistan, the account focused primarily on the sociological aspects of military organization. In other words, the question of military intervention falls outside the purview of the instrumentalist work.

The structuralist literature came up for a critical review in section five of the chapter. The exponents of this literature (Alavi 1988, 1990; Waseem 1994; Siddiq 2007) exclusively focus on the socio-economic and political structure of the colonial state and the society. Since structural accounts are conceptually grounded in Marxian conception of reality, they overwhelmingly attempt to locate and understand the existence, collaborative instinct and potential and socio-economic and political significance of classes within and around the British India state. Accordingly, three classes, namely, indigenous bourgeois, landed-feudal and metro-politan bourgeois, were identified, which viewed and treated the state as instrumental to maximize their returns. In addition, since the colonial state is viewed as an interventionist force in terms of its modernizing capability, the indigenous bourgeois and the land-feudal entered into a structural relationship with the civil-military bureaucracy, the functional face of the state, in order to access and link itself with the metropolitan bourgeois.

Moreover, the structuralists argued that a section of the indigenous bourgeois- the salariat- resorted to protest and participatory politics in order to secure and maximize their socio-economic interests vis-à-vis Hindus and the British. The movement for Pakistan was, in substance and form, a salariat movement according to this literature. Hence, when British India was divided, the post-colonial state of Pakistan inherited the colonial state in terms of a civil-military bureaucracy and importantly the classes from the colonial to the post-colonial state and the society. In other words, there is qualified difference between the two states since the classes and the civil-military bureaucracy remained intact. Furthermore, the structuralist position does not view military intervention and constitutional/legal issues related to 'rule of law' as valid problems since, structurally, Pakistan observed 'qualified stability' and a continuation of the rule of law on account of its being an 'overdeveloped state'. In addition, most recently, one exponent of structural school of thought on Pakistan's politics/CMR argues that the military had, socio-economically, morphed into a military class due to its engagement in military businesses (Milbus). Therefore, the focus of studies on Pakistan's military ought not to be on how the military intervened in politics, economy and the society but rather how it should vacate the corridors of power.

Nonetheless, despite its informative character regarding the nature and functions of different classes in the colonial and post-colonial state, the structuralist literature, by and large, suffers from conceptual as well as empirical weaknesses. Conceptually, it has remained unable to distinguish between the nature, character and functions of the state and the classes (society). Moreover, the literature is devoid of any criterion to conceive and construct a class. In other words, it has ignored the inter/intra class dissimilarities and differences. Hence, context and individual rationality and agency are seriously compromised. Also, the structuralists' concept of the 'overdeveloped state' is both conceptually and empirically invalid: conceptually, the state is, in a Marxian context, equated with the civil-military bureaucracy, thus ignoring, on the one hand, an institutional distinction between the civil bureaucracy and the military, and on the other, between the state and society. Empirically, the literature excluded the political institutions functional within British India- for instance, political parties, legislative councils etc. One wonders on what criterion a civil-military bureaucracy-based state is termed 'overdeveloped' and that too in the presence of the state's political apparatuses.

As regards the post-colonial state of Pakistan, the structuralists' reasoning of structural transformation of the colonial-state into the post-colonial is additionally conceptually/logically flawed since it ignores the significance of context, agency and rationality. Importantly, this line of reasoning tends to give the impression that politicians and political institutions are inherently weak and incompetent to run the affairs of the state. In this sense, there is no fundamental difference between a structural and legitimist point of view. Equally illogical, empirically unfounded and thus misleading is the structuralists' concept of 'qualified stability' and 'continuum' of the rule of law, because these concepts seriously undermine the contested legality, constitutionality and morality of bureaucratic authoritarianism (of the 1950s) and military interventions.

Last but not least, the conception of a military class is also problematic. Firstly, it lacks an explicit criterion to judge- or statistically measure- which section of the military organization falls within the military class. Secondly, if income and engagement in the Milbus is the basis, then, from this logic, the population below the 'officer cadre does not form part of the military class since it is the officer cadre which accrues most of the politico-economic benefits. Thirdly, since the concept of military class is an addition to Alavi's class thesis, one wonders what makes the military a different class from the indigenous bourgeois or the

landed, feudal classes. Besides, the structural literature, by and large, shifts the focus away from civil-military relations to the haves and have-nots.

In the final section, the chapter critically analyzed the path dependency-historical institutionalist perspective on Pakistan's civil-military relations. The major themes covered by this work includes the colonial legacy in terms of Muslim separatism, the military institution, (pre-post Partition) threat perception and importantly, institutionalization of these values and patterns (path) in the state of Pakistan. Having institutionalized the external threat-primarily from India- this account posited that the military was 'brought' in to politics by the state's psychological insecurity. Thus, when brought in, the military never left. Instead, it established 'control' over the civilians and emerged as a 'parallel state'.

Despite its significance in terms of applying the assumptions of path dependency and historical institutionalism, the account suffers from conceptual and empirical shortcomings. To begin with, like the structuralists, it assumes the structure of the colonial state and takes its inheritance by Pakistan's state, as a given. Importantly, it fails to describe how and, by whom, the threat perception was perceived. In addition, like the legitimists, this work tends to implicitly legitimize the military's intervention in politics on account of, firstly, an institutionalized external threat perception and, secondly, path dependency. In addition, the proponent of this work has ignored the *causes* of military coups. In other words, context, agency and rationality are under-appreciated. Ironically, the work, while attempting to explain the military's control over its civilians, lacks any definition and indicators of the concept. Finally, equally problematic is the concept of a parallel state due to its lack of conceptual and empirical rigor.

## Chapter 3

### Politics and the State- From Construction to Military Intervention

The primary aim of this chapter is to highlight the theoretical as well as empirical shortcomings in the existing literature on the construction of Pakistan's state. In this regards, the thrust of critical analysis of the first three sections centers on the works of legitimists and structuralists. Quite contrary to the latter's belief, the present study, with the help of its deductive model, posits that the political leadership, the principal at Partition- until October 1951-, rationally designed the state's physical and institutional apparatuses especially the civil bureaucracy and military. The latter were delegated certain powers, as is normal with modern states, to assist the civil section of the state in matters related to domestic and foreign policies. Moreover, it was the politicians, as principal actor, who perceived the external (i.e. Indian) threat rationally, not structurally, and responded to it accordingly. However, despite the political leadership's constitutional supremacy, the military was able to shirk during the first war in and over Kashmir in 1947-48. No coup d'état occurred at this point of time since the institutional and, importantly, the political costs of the action would have been greater than perceived benefits.

The chapter, while applying the assumptions of its causal model, identifies the actors, both principal and agents, specifies context and explains the actor's interests, their preferences/choices in terms of working/shirking and the outcome in terms of their own/larger interests. The study argues that the principal politicians in the post-war period, by and large, accorded more preference to their own rather than larger/national interests. In this respect, to appease the socio-economically disrupted section of the populace and address issues related to law and order and external security, the principal rationally relied on its agents especially the civil bureaucracy. Moreover, to deal with the authoritarian clergy, which attempted to influence politics and the state socio-politically, the principal was able to negotiate the Objectives Resolution<sup>33</sup> with the former. However, according to the present study, the Resolution was more politically motivated than purely religiously inspired. Importantly, this section highlights the principal actor's failure to devise any oversight regime/mechanism for the agents, especially the military. This failure, however, can be explained by the fact that the principal needed the military for political reasons.

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<sup>33</sup> The Objectives Resolution was adopted on 12 March 1949 by the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. The resolution, proposed by Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, proclaimed that the future constitution of Pakistan would not entirely be modeled on a European pattern, but rather on the ideology and democratic faith of Islam.

The last part of the chapter connects the preceding section in terms of marking the agency and rationality of the civil bureaucracy whose preference of shirking prevailed in the post-October 1951 period. The former principal, the politicians, could not resist its agent since the former also accorded more importance to its own rather than party and/or national interests. Hence, the period from October 1951 to October 1958, is, by and large, replete with examples of politicians working. However, a section of politicians, out of their own interests, was able to shirk in terms of depriving the principal of its discretionary powers to dismiss governments. This smart political move, nonetheless, was thwarted by the agent judiciary. The latter also acted rationally in terms of maximizing its returns. Moreover, during this period the military, according to the model's explanation, worked as an agent. Nevertheless, due to the principal's own interests, there developed a collaborative relationship between the two. This also helps explain why the bureaucracy could not devise any oversight regime etc.

The chapter ends by mentioning the dissolution of Prime Minister Noon's ministry as a result of martial law declared, paradoxically, by the leader of the civil bureaucracy- Iskander Mirza (this is taken up in the next Chapter). A conclusion, at the end of this chapter, summarizes the analysis so far.

### **3.1 The Structured 'Structure' of the ((Post) Colonial) State**

There is, undoubtedly, abundance of work, as is already mentioned in the introduction to the present study, on the colonial state of British India and the 'newly' established states of India and Pakistan. However, with respect to civil-military relations in Muslim-majority provinces and later in Pakistan if one critically reviews the major exiting literature on the (post colonial) state, it falls, for the most part, either under the structuralist or legitimist literature as explained in details in Chapter 2. The thrust of the structuralists' argument stands on the 'structure'- politico-institutional in particular and socio-economic in general- of the state and society. In this respect, Hamza Alavi argues that since the state was 'overdeveloped' from the colonial days, it structurally kept intact in the post-colonial phase/period too. Moreover, the civil-military bureaucracy assumed influential position in the overdeveloped state to maximize their returns along with the 'landed-feudal' and 'indigenous bourgeoisie' classes which had structural links with the 'metropolitan bourgeoisie (Alavi 1988; also 1990). Similarly, following the Alavian structuralist tradition, another exponent of structuralism argues:

Although the political community at large occasionally seemed to dominate the political scene through the election campaigns, religious movements, ethnic violence or legislative activity, it is essentially to the *structural* dynamics of the state that we *must* ascribe the primary responsibility for shaping the political events throughout the post-independence period. [italics mine]

(Waseem 1994:1)

In addition, the structuralists argue that since the political leadership such as M.A. Jinnah and Liaqut Ali Khan and the political organization, the Muslim League, were housed in the Muslim-minority provinces of United India, their migratory nature and character structurally made them less effective in terms of being an incharge of the subsequent political developments in especially Muslim-majority provinces. Also, the Muslim refugees from India extremely affected not only the physical demographics of the country but also the institutional balance structurally for the former had assumed important positions in civil-military bureaucracy (Waseem 1994:102-110).

In almost the same vein, the legitimists go one step further in legitimizing the influential positions held by civil bureaucracy and the military on the basis of 'weak' political institutions and security threats from India- the Hindu enemy. In this respect, the 1947-48 war between India and Pakistan is seen from Hindu-Muslim (pre-partition structural) rivalry perspective. Furthermore, the conspiracy theorists, path dependency work and instrumental accounts are no different from structuralist and legitimist perspectives since all of these, one way or the other, tend to de-emphasize the rationality and agency of actors involved in negotiating not only the transfer of the authority but also locating and establishing it within the state of Pakistan.

### **3.1.1 Non-Overdeveloped State**

From a purely structuralist and/or path dependency-historical institutionalist perspective, Pakistan may be termed a post-colonial state. However, in theoretical disagreement with the existing body of knowledge, it is argued that Pakistan like India rationally preferred to carry on with institutions such as a civil bureaucracy and the military which were established by the British for purely administrative purposes. The inheritance of the colonial legacy by Pakistan's state does not necessarily imply a structural continuity of the pre-colonial bureaucratic state as is most often made it to be (Waseem 1994:130-131). For if one assumes

so, the very meaning of Independence (movement) and subsequent Partition lose its significance. After all, the Jinnah-led Muslim League had a rational agenda of Muslim interests to negotiate with the Congress and London (Jalal 1999: 174-207).

Moreover, the Pakistan state preferred to carry on with the tradition of electoral-constitutional politics. The 1935 India Act and the 1937 and 1946 elections are cases in point. Also, in terms of leadership and political organization, the coming of Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan from Muslim-minority to Muslim-majority areas was a rational decision, not a structural constraint per se. So was the case with the Muslim League as a political party and Muslim refugees- or rather the cross-migration which occurred as a result of costs-benefits calculus. After all, a good number of Hindus and Muslims preferred to stay on in Pakistan and India respectively on the basis of rational choice. Suppose they did never have any option other than to stay on their respective land, then the question arises: why did not they commit (collective) suicide in the absence of any choice? The empirical fact of preferring life to death is sufficient to take the air out of Aziz's argument of a structured monolithic Hindu-Muslim pre-Partition conflict and the subsequent Partition on purely 'religious' basis (Aziz 2008:14-15).

Additionally, again in empirical disagreement with the structural-legitimist-path dependency etc., literature, it is posited that the 'inheritance' of the legal, institutional and political apparatuses could never imply that Pakistan was/is bound to tread the same 'path' set by pre-Partition political developments. For if one assumes so, the rationality and agency of the actors as well as the contextuality of Pakistan's case gets seriously compromised. Paradoxically enough, the structuralist thought is self-contradictory. It, on the one hand, believes in the demarcation between pre-colonial and colonial periods and, on the other hand, disbelieves in any such demarcation between pre-Partition and post-Partition periods. Regarding this, Waseem argues:

Many still conceive the British administration as mere continuation of the pre-existing economic and political traditions of the country... This approach while discussing the formal continuity of various roles and titles from pre-colonial to colonial periods, tends to ignore the qualitative difference between their respective systems of administrative functions. A closer look at the two systems will reveal a fundamental shift in the *location of sovereignty* and patters of regulation of the economy, which

together shaped the contours of what we know the modern state system of Pakistan.  
[italics mine]

(1994:13)

Furthermore, Waseem's explorative hypothesis of 'colonial authority patterns' exclusively investigates the structural linkages between the civil bureaucracy and other societal elements. However, it never explored the structural linkages, if any, between civil bureaucracy and the military under the British. Importantly, the posed hypothesis does not answer why the (bureaucratic) authority 'structure' was established in the first place. Was it a structural product or a rational decision by London whose role as '*mai-baap*' (parents) of the subordinate civil bureaucracy is ironically ignored whereby the *mai-baap* position of civil bureaucracy vis-à-vis Indians is strangely accepted? (see Waseem 1994:15-15,53).

Besides, the overdeveloped thesis as postulated by Alavi and adhered to by his followers, is, by any standard, a Marxian construct which views the state from class(es) perspective, and implicitly, questions the very being of the state. Moreover, within the specific context of South Asia especially with regard to Pakistan's state at Partition, Alavi has equated the civil-military bureaucracy with the state itself (see Chapter 2 for details). Supposedly, if the civil-military bureaucracy was well organized and trained in the art of administration and violence *under* the British, how could it be justified that it has a control *over* the Pakistanis- both people and their chosen representatives? The present study therefore assumes, from the perspective of agency theory-neo institutionalism, that it was not the overdeveloped state which structurally made certain classes to assume power(s). Rather, it was a non-overdeveloped state- a normal modern-style state with certain state institutions such as civil bureaucracy, military, judiciary, parliament (CA), the office of Prime Minister etc.

### **3.1.2 Legitimacy Thesis Exposed**

As regards the weak political institutions and their vulnerability to invite military intervention in politics, it is posited that this thesis too revolves around structure of the state and leaves many questions unanswered. For example, suppose weak political institutions- the weak Muslim League, the weak Constituent Assembly, the weak judiciary- made extra-parliamentary forces to take over at or after the Partition, even this supposition leaves the question of cause(s) of weakness of the political institutions unexplained. Empirically even, the legitimacy granted by the existing body of literature to the political role and rule of civil



bureaucracy and the military is unfounded since the people and politicians of East Bengal preferred to question the domination of the state by the minority-population from the very beginning. In addition, the structural argument, on the one hand, ignores the contextual differences between pre- and post-Partition periods and, on the other hand, undermines the agency and rationality of the actors. Therefore, it is argued that the legitimacy thesis as propagated by legitimists is logically, legally, empirically and morally flawed and thus misleading.

Besides, another structural construct over-emphasized by the existing body of literature is the security threat posed by Hindu India which was/is bent upon destroying the very state of Pakistan. Thus, according to legitimist, conspiracy theory, path dependency, instrumentalist and structuralist works the bureaucratic-military oligarchy assumed powerful position to confront the Indian threat as was/is rightly perceived by them (see Chapter 2). Again, the mentioned literature extremely suffers from self-contradiction. On the one hand, it presents and poses India as a *legitimate* enemy but, on the other, it remains unable to mention, locate and explain the mechanism as well as the legality, constitutionality and morality of Indian threat perception by the bureaucratic-military combine especially at Partition. Moreover, if the war in Kashmir is cited as a point of reference and departure, then this case empirically is irrelevant as it were the tribals from Pakistan who, in the first place, crossed into the valley and waged a war against India (Jalal 1990:56-60). However, suppose it was civil bureaucracy and the military top brass which perceived the Indian threat in 1947-48, then again facts inform differently. The Pakistan army was under the politicians constitutionally and morally. How then a subordinate institution could perceive threat in 1947-48 and make judgement on the behalf of the entire nation is beyond one's comprehension. Furthermore, the initial refusal of British army chief, Masservey, to open fire in Kashmir should not be lost sight of in this regard.

To summarize, the existing body of literature especially the structural, legitimist and path dependency accounts projects an overdeveloped state, weak political institutions, baseless political leadership and Indian threat to legitimize, structurally or otherwise, the political role and rule of bureaucratic-military oligarchy in the political system of Pakistan. However, having pointed out conceptual and empirical weaknesses of these works, it is posited that Pakistan is a normal state whose political leadership rationally chose a specific course of actions regarding the nature of the state.

### 3.2 Actors, Interests and Preferences: The Institutional Construction of the State

In theoretical-empirical disagreement with the existing literature on Pakistan's politics in general and civil-military relations in particular, the present study, as mentioned in Chapter 1, tends to explain Pakistan's CMR and the state in light of the proposed agency model. To begin with, under the Independence Act, the state of Pakistan got located temporally and spatially in August 1947 in (West) Punjab, East Bengal, NWFP, British Balochistan; the princely states of Bahawalpur, Swat, and Balochistan were to decide their fate in terms of integration with either India or Pakistan as per the terms of Partition Plan. Population wise, the areas under Pakistan counted around 73 million heads. Moreover, India and Pakistan also witnessed cross-migration of more than 14 million people (Yong and Kudaisya 2000:81-82; Hay 2006:67; also Maini *et al* 2009: x). The reality of cross-migration should make those realize who only preferred to look at the one side of the coin- the Muslim carnage at the hand of the Hindu enemy- at the expense of the other: the Hindu-Sikh carnage at the hand of the Muslims. If this historical fact is objectified and properly contextualized, then it leaves little room for arguing for a structural/embedded threat perception of a Hindu enemy.

As regards the question of state sovereignty, under the Independence Act Pakistani political leadership, being principal legally, constitutionally, politically/democratically and morally, chose to rationally carry on with 1935 India Act (as amended in 1947), Constituent Assembly (elected in 1947; which was to served as parliament), office of Governor-General (with absolute powers), office of Prime Minister (PM), non-elective civil bureaucracy and non-elective military (with its British officership)- the latter two being the agents. The third agent, the judiciary, was established in terms of Federal Court of Pakistan by the state's elective authorities in 1948 under the Federal Court of Pakistan Order, 1948<sup>34</sup>. These facts explicitly pointed to the location and institutional construction of the state by the rational political leadership.

Moreover, as regards assumption of offices of Governor-General and Prime Minister, M.A. Jinnah, being the leading politician, had certain choices contextually. Either he could assume the office of PM (as Nehru did in India) or become the Governor-General of the newly established state of Pakistan. If neither of the two, Jinnah could have assumed the presidentship of the Muslim League and/or the Constituent Assembly; or he could prefer

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<sup>34</sup> [www.supremecourt.gov.pk](http://www.supremecourt.gov.pk)

none of the officers and instead decide to leave the business of the state to his associates especially Liaqat Ali Khan. Nevertheless, Jinnah, with a keen interest to construct and consolidate the state of Pakistan, preferred politics than privacy. Therefore, preferring a larger interest, he chose to not only assume the office of Governor-General but also president of the Muslim League and the Constituent Assembly at Partition. Logically, if he had no larger interest in mind then it is empirically impossible to ascribe his multiple roles to any other variable. This fact should also take care of Alavi's (1988) exaggeration of Jinnah's 'ailment' and thus his instrumentality vis-à-vis the civil bureaucracy. The ailment thesis, at best, alludes to his physical state of health. His mental health, however, needs to be dissociated from the physical on account of available empirical evidences in terms of his orders, visits and speeches delivered especially to civil servants and military officers. Importantly, had Jinnah been really ill and weak then history must have recorded a coup against his ostensibly powerful position by, at least, the non-elective institutions.

In addition, with regards to political organization and activity in the immediate post-Partition period, the Muslim League preferred to base itself in the newly state of Pakistan since the former was previously housed in Muslim-minority provinces. To establish itself organizationally and expand itself electorally, the party made certain compromises with political actors at provincial and local levels. Especially in East Bengal, where the local political parties and actors had a different conception of the state, the League prioritized rational political alliances with the localized politicians who, in turn, were cognizant of majority Bengalis. The latter, by then, had a firm belief in their agency and rationality as regards the democratic-moral right for government formation at the centre.

### **3.2.1 Actors, Interests, Preferences: The Physical Construction of the State**

As regards the process of constructing the state physically, Karachi was accorded preference over Lahore or Rawalpindi to be the capital due to its commercial strength and transport facilities, which linked it to the capitalist centers internationally. Moreover, the state's institutional apparatuses, in physical sense, were housed in least developed socio-economic environment. However, having institutionally established the state system, the politicians turned to the physical construction and subsequent consolidation of the state.

In this respect, as a result of hectic negotiations with London and the Congress, the political leadership was able to accrue material benefits in terms of its share of the British India's

assets. In addition, the civil service- All India Services comprised of the Indian Civil Service (ICS) and the Indian Police Service (IPS)- was divided.

During the first quarter of 1947 the cadres of the Indian Civil Service and Indian Political Service had a strength of 1,157 officers (excluding those assigned to Burma). Of these 101, or 9 per cent, were Muslims. Ninety-five of these *opted* for Pakistan. They were joined by one Christian officer, fifty British officers, and eleven Muslim army officers. Of these 157 officers, only 36 were actually available for administrative work, the remainder being posted to judicial or diplomatic assignments. Of these 136, fewer than twenty had more than fifteen years' experience, and half had less than a decade of service. Qualitatively, only eight of these officers held positions in the secretariat of the Indian government and only three attained the rank of joint secretary to the central government. About ten other officers in services other than the ICS and IPS can be added, thus making a total of 146 officers of administrative experience available for creating the new state of Pakistan. [italics mine]

(Braibanti 1966:116)

The foregoing, contrary to structuralists' essentialized 'steel frame' thesis, empirically marks not only rationality of the officers but also the degree of their agency. Moreover, as regards the principal's agency and calculus, it chose to modify the British 'system of the cadre organization' in 1947 since Muslims traditionally were under-represented in the service cadres. Therefore, Pakistan could not inherit enough trained personnel to fill requisite posts in the civil bureaucracy (Kennedy 1987:29-31). This fact should make the structuralists realize that the principal politicians rationally maintained the cadre system, not structurally. In addition, though the formal encadrement of the CSP (Civil Service of Pakistan) took place in 1950 yet at Partition

the External Affairs, Commonwealth Relations, and Political Departments of the Government of India, were merged to form the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations. Later, in 1948, the units of the Political and External Departments which had formed an adjunct to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were separated to form the Ministry of States and Frontier Regions...The Pakistan Foreign Service was formed in 1948 to man diplomatic, counselor, and commercial posts abroad within the overall control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relation.

(Kennedy 1987: 36)

Furthermore, the civil authorities modified the British 'Land Branch and the Cantonment Executive Service'- the latter service was recruited by the Public Service Commission- into Pakistan Military Lands and Cantonment Service (PMLCS) in 1947. Overall, Pakistan's political leadership established thirteen Central Superior Services. The former chose to retain the British old cadre system to manage the governmental affairs effectively. The latter, on its part, saw in it an opportunity to excel materially in terms of pay and promotion opportunity provided by the dearth of senior officers as well as the Bengalis who, despite being in majority, were under-represented in the civil bureaucracy of Pakistan (ibid: 182).

Similarly, the British military was also divided on the basis of 3 June 1947. Field Marshal Auchinleck carried out the orders to reconstitute the armed forces. In this regard, the Field Marshal handed down principles with respect to the reconstitution of the armed forces on 2 July 1947. Also, the Armed Forces Committee, headed by the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C), was established to supervise the process. Thus, the future of the troops was decided by 15 August 1947 without much hurdle. However, the units under the Punjab Boundary Force and the troops overseas were to be divided at later stage. On the same day, the Joint Defence Council was created which consisted of:

- The Governor-General of India as an independent Chairman
- The Defense Ministers of India and Pakistan
- The C-in-C of the undivided India

The C-in-C, or the Supreme Commander, as he was informally called to distinguish him from the C-in-Cs of India and Pakistan, had no 'operational' control over the armed forces of the two states. Importantly, the Joint Defence Council and the office of the Supreme Commander were to close down on 1 April 1948. To fill the posts, Field Marshal Auchinleck was appointed as the Supreme Commander, and General Masservey was appointed the Pakistan Army's C-in-C by the principal politicians (Rizvi 2000:38-41). As regards the military manpower, immediately after the Partition the army consisted of six cavalry regiments, eight artillery regiments, and eight infantry regiments. In others words, the country's share of the British Indian army came to about 36 per cent or about 140,000 personnel out of a total of some 410,000 personnel in 1947. With regards to military's division, Pakistan, at the end of

the day, had to settle for 30% of the Indian army, 40% of the navy and 20% of the air force. Moreover, the moveable stores and relevant equipment were to be divided between the two countries in proportion to their respective military strength (Cloughley 2006:22; Jalal 1990:42).

In addition, the issue of the division and administration of surplus stores was, on the choice of Pakistan's politicians, referred to an arbitral tribunal, for the issue of the stores was considered essential for Pakistan's armed forces build up as the sixteen ordnance factories were located in India. As regards the Pakistanization of the military the pace was slow due to dearth of Muslim officers in the British military. For instance, during the World War II, there were only four Muslims lieutenant-colonels of which one was appointed temporary colonel, and one acting brigadier. The latter was, within a few days, promoted to the rank of major-general. Moreover, out of all the Muslim officers, whose percentage accounted for around 23.7, four decided to stay in India. The non-Muslims officers who opted for Pakistan decided for India just after the Partition. Besides, the Government of Pakistan (GoP) appointed a nationalization Committee, in February 1948, to examine the problem of nationalization and reorganization and other allied matters, and to make recommendations for the complete nationalization by the end of December 1950. Importantly, a considerable number of British officers were retained in the three services (Rizvi 2000:46-47; also Cohen 1984:41-45).

### **3.3 Civilian Principal- The Perceiver of Threat**

The legitimist, conspiracy theorist, and structuralist literature point to the Indian threat perception, one way or the other. Nevertheless, these works have not, theoretically and empirically, explained which institution perceived the threat and how. The following is an attempt to explain actor(s), their preferences and actions and the context in which they rationally constructed strategies domestically and importantly, externally.

To begin with, quite logically, the political leadership, the principal of newly created state of Pakistan, preferred to establish state institutions, as is already explained, in order to not only construct but also consolidate and run the affairs of the state. Had they abstained from this crucial obligation the very meaning and purpose of Partition and subsequent independence would have been lost. Nevertheless, when the politicians were busy according preference to the division of assets with the state of India after the Partition, the fact of cross-migration brought with it massive massacre of civilian population on both side of the boarder. Though

the Punjab Boundary Force was established on 1 August 1947 by the Central Government to maintain peace in the Punjab, it was abolished within a month's time by the Joint Defence Council. Therefore, in the absence of any peace keeping mechanism, the Pakistani (and even Indian) government, by design, assigned the evacuation of the refugees to the military. The agent military performed the task well. Moreover, the latter was called upon by the principal to help the refugees and flood affectees in the autumn of 1947. Coincidentally, this was also the time when Delhi dispatched troops to a predominantly Muslim state of Kashmir after having secured Maharaja's 'formal letter' for military assistance (Hussain 1998:10).

Since the political situation was turbulent in the valley from the pre-accession days; the Muslim dissidents had refused to abide by Maharaja Hari Singh's Dogra raj. The stories of the persecution of Kashmiri Muslims along with settled Afridi tribesmen and Punjabis factored into the preference-ranking of tribesmen from the North West Frontier Province. These tribals primarily intervened into the Srinagar valley to maximize their economic returns in the post-British withdrawal period. Importantly, they were logistically encouraged by the Frontier government. Also, the involvement to the level of commanding the Azad Forces by a serving army officer, Colonel Mohammad Akbar (pseudonym General Tariq) factually refutes Pakistan's denials of non-fighting (Jalal 1990:57-59; also Weeks 1964:228-229).

Initially, the politicians, especially Jinnah and Liaqut, opted not to engage in Kashmir due to severe shortage of arms and ammunitions. Moreover, the army high command also preferred not to engage with India militarily due to its assumption that the Azad Forces were doing well. Moreover, the engagement of the force overseas and in Punjab Boundary Commission factored in the top brass's calculus not to engage militarily at this stage. However, in early October 1947 the political leadership led by Jinnah ordered invasion in the wake of Indian troops airlift due to political interests (Schofield 2000). Had they not taken any action there was a high political cost to pay by these politicians who were still to politically reach the provinces and the localities where the Muslim League organizationally stood on weak footing.

However, despite the Azad Forces' being assisted by five percent of Pakistani regular army, its British C-in-C, General Douglas Gracey, refused to obey the civilian orders without permission to attack from the overall C-in-C, Field Marshal Auchinleck, who was based in

Delhi. Importantly, with regards to civil-military relations since independence, this was the second time the military advised against military operation against India, and, formally, it was the first instance when its high command was able to shirk- it refused to carry the principal's orders. However, in April 1948, the Pakistan Army C-in-C's preference converged with that of the civilian principal. Little wonder then, the action was taken in terms of troops intervention in Kashmir in order to stop India seizing it all. The following table summarizes civil-military divergence/convergence of preferences and subsequent action during this Kashmir (and 1965/1971) war against India:

**Table 6 Decision for Conventional and Tribal Attacks by Pakistan 1947-1971**

	<b>Regime</b>	<b>Civilian Choice</b>	<b>Military Choice</b>	<b>Outcome</b>
Srinagar Valley- Early Oct 1947	Civilian	Yes	No	Attack
Jammu- Late Oct 1947	Civilian	Yes	No	No Attack
Kashmir- April 1948	Civilian	Yes	Yes	Attack
War Scare- Jun-Aug 1951	Civilian	Yes	No	No Attack
Rann of Kutch- Mar-Apr 1965	Military	NA	Yes	Attack
Kashmir- Aug-Sep 1965	Military	NA	Yes	Attack
East Pakistan- Dec 1971	Military	NA	Yes	Attack

Source: Schofield, Julian.2000. 'Militarized Decision-Making for War in Pakistan:1947-1971', *Armed Forces & Society*, 27(1):131-148.

What the foregoing empirically informs is that it was the principal who judged the situation/conflict and decided accordingly. In other words, it is the political leadership which perceived the Indian threat in the wake of India's military action in Kashmir, and for that matter, in Junagadh (1947) and Hyderabad (1948). In this respect, Prime Minister Liaqut Ali Khan wrote a letter dated December 30, 1947 to India's Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and categorically pointed to India's non-acceptance of Pakistan, non-compliance to divide the



assets and forcible occupation of formally princely states including Kashmir. Again, in 1948 while addressing a military parade in Dacca, the Prime Minister prioritized state's defense over any other governmental activities (Rizvi 2000:52-56). The above very explicitly points to principal actor's agency and rational calculus in terms of preferring larger to own interests. However, it does not imply that the politicians did not have their own political interests attached to the outcome of the war in Kashmir.

What it, nonetheless, denotes is that the top political leadership was able to maintain a sublime strategic balance between larger i.e. national and own i.e. personal/party interests. In this regard, the plausible variables which would have factored into Liaqut Ali's set of interests and subsequent threat related judgment were his and his party's weak organizational base and lingering problems of governance, for the issues of law and order, inter-provincial disparity, language, constitution, general elections, weak economic base were taken up by the opposition political parties for mobilizational politics. Hence within this specific context, the perception of threat from India was a strategic move by the politicians to ward off criticism of poor governmental performance. Moreover, contextually the civilian leadership strategically engaged the agent military and the civil bureaucracy in order to possibly solve a few of above-mentioned issues. In addition, had there been a given/structural Indian threat, then subsequent history would have recorded Indian military attacking Pakistan proper (excluding princely states including Kashmir) in, for instance, 1947, 1948, 1951 or 1958 (Hussain 2010).

In addition, in this respect the oft-cited anti-Pakistan statements by Indian leaders such as Krishna Menon may serve to be perceived as an indication of military attack on Pakistan. However, these threat-slogans, if contextualized, were primarily directed to the domestic Hindu-fundamentalist constituency. Empirically enough, one should never lose sight of Gandhi's assassination. Furthermore, once a state is perceived as an enemy then the perceived state, as a rational actor, reacts to safeguard its interests atop its physical survival. If this logic is applied to India-Pakistan case in 1947-1948, it is (the politicians of) Pakistan who perceived India- which was numerically/territorially/militarily stronger than its counterpart- as a threat; whence perceived as a threat, India reactively perceived Pakistan as an enemy *par excellence*.

### **3.4 Politics- Principal and the Agents**

As is explained the previous section, Pakistani politicians were opting to militarily engage not only with India in Kashmir but also the dissidents within the state of Pakistan. Of the latter, the Khan of Kalat preferred independence to integration with Pakistan in the post-Partition period. However, his belated and divergent preference was acted down through a military operation in Balochistan in March 1948 (Ali 1983:123). Coincidentally, during this period (February 1948) the country's first budget was prepared and presented in the assembly. As mentioned above, due to their perception of Indian threat in particular and a realization to ensure state's physical survival, the principal opted to allocate as much as 70% of the budget for defense- precisely, the central government spent Rs. 461.5 million during 1948-49 in actual terms (GoP 1959). Paradoxically, though the political leadership was able to prioritize not only state's defense but also massive allocation for defense, it remained unable to devise any mechanism to oversight the monetized military.

Moreover, despite its focus on building state's non-elective institution(s), the central government, however, failed to assuage provincial grievances which further got aggravated. Moreover, the country's first industrial policy, made in April 1948, further disfavored the provinces. The financial constraints coupled with issues related to constitutionalism, electoralism, and ideologism (role of religion in the state) factored into the choice-set of provincial opposition politicians who questioned securitization of the state by the principal politicians at the centre. The latter, on its part, having calculated the contours of mobilizational politics decided to tactically engage not only the Muslim League's own dissidents but also opposing section of the political force. In this respect, both Jinnah and Liaqut opted to reorganize their party, revise its constitution, and visited different places to deliver appealing speeches.

Meanwhile the war in Kashmir was still on; due to her geostrategic interests the US had, in March 1948, imposed arms embargo on both India and Pakistan. Importantly, this was a time when the rational and agent military, while preferring its own to larger interests, shirked in terms of establishing direct connections with Washington to procure weapons. In this regard, the military, as a rational actor, saw more benefits than costs since the very absence of any oversight regime/mechanism indicated civilian's lack of appreciation of the former's agency and rationality (Hill 1980:25). However, at this point of time, the military abstained from staging a coup for its political as well as institutional cost would have been higher for an institution in the process of increasing its coercive capacity.

Importantly, it was not the military alone that shirked; individuals from the foreign and defense ministries, who shared commonality of interests with the former, also shirked due to their own interests. Nonetheless, as results of military's collaborative efforts with the US, the latter, though without lifting the arms embargo, provided Pakistan US\$10 million as credit. Although this amount was primarily released for refugees rehabilitation, it was spent on weapons procurement the bulk of which was 'discarded' and 'defective' (Jalal 1990:76-77). The principal, arguably, refrained from bringing the individuals from the agent military under book or better control due to its political interests such as using the agent for maintaining law and order, integrating the princely states and fighting the war.

Politically, the situation was less comfortable for the politicians in power. The political tussle in Punjab between Iftikhar Hussain Mamdot, the Muslim League's chief minister, and Mumtaz Daultana, the finance minister, added into Jinnah and Liaquat's set of preferences whereby the two, especially Jinnah, chose to favor Daultana. In post-Jinnah period- he died in September 1948- the new Governor-General, Khawaja Nazimuddin, got the Punjab's legislature dissolved and ordered the Governor to takeover the administration under section 92a of the (amended) 1935 India Act (Aziz 1976:4-5). The Punjabi politicians took it seriously and decided to take the prime minister along with province's British governor on. East Bengal was also not lagging behind in this respect. The principal's anti-majority policies- i.e. Urdu as national language, low share of Bengalis in military and civil bureaucracy, revenue extraction for the centre (especially for defense), low industrialization, poor agriculture sector development etc.- could not converge with the interests of the majority Bengalis who opted for agitational politics to obtain their democratic rights. However, rational Nazimuddin, a Bengali himself, remained unable to stabilize his province politico-economically if not socio-culturally.

Also in Sindh the power struggle among local politicians such as Ayub Khuro, Pir Ilahi Baksh, Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah and Yusuf Haroon marked their agency and rationality in terms of preferring their own politico-economic interests to provincial issues related to economy and governance. In NWFP and Balochistan the central political leadership dealt with anti-League and anti-Pakistan elements strictly and, at times, militarily. In sum, the principal politicians especially the centre's leadership gave more weightage to its political interests in terms of centralization of power than the larger interests in terms of giving proper autonomy to the provinces. Nevertheless, the former had to pay the price by facing the

agitational politics led by non-PML politicians and political parties. To curb this and any other form of opposition and dissention, the principal in 1949 introduced a legal measure in terms of Public Representatives Disqualification Order (PRODA). The PRODA policy accorded much power to the agent civil bureaucracy which now had an opportunity to closely observe the strengths and weaknesses of the principal.

### **3.4.1 Religion, Politics and the State**

Ideologically and constitutionally the state of Pakistan during 1947-49 progressed little despite vociferous activism by opposition political parties and social forces. Of the latter, a section of clergy due to its religio-social and politico-economic interests opted to defy the government. In this respect, a paradoxical example is of Jamat-i-Islami (JI). In the pre-Partition period the Jamat led by Mawdudi had opposed the very creation of Pakistan state. However, it started to agitational politics, in the post-Partition period, in order to Islamize the state. Therefore, in order to appease such religious actors and maximize its political interests- i.e. non-passage of a constitution which would have shifted the balance of power in Bengalis' favor- the Constituent Assembly, on the behalf of the principal politicians, opted to pass, on 12 March 1949, an Objectives Resolution than a constitution. On this Objectives Resolution, the subsequent establishment of a Board of Ta'limat-e-Islamiyyah, its recommendations to the Basic Principles Committee (BPC), the concept/establishment/creation of 'Islamic state' and Islamic ideology/identity, there is, doubtlessly, abundance of work available (Binder 1961:116-154; also Malik 1996:33-46). Since the existing literature has fallen short of defining an Islamic state comprehensively, this section attempts to explain this phenomenon with the help of primary sources.

To begin with, in the context of Pakistan's state, the work and efforts of Mawdudi and his JI assumed a pioneering position. Mawdudi influenced intellectually and politically a significant section of Muslim population in Pakistan and abroad, particularly the Middle East. His was a well-defined ideology/theory, namely: to establish political order in terms of state power(s) in a specific geographic area and then expand the order to the rest of the world, both Islamic and non-Islamic. Despite its coherence and appeal, Mawdudi's ideology, if not practice, was prone to severe but logical criticism. For example, his associate in the Jamat-i-Islami, Amin Ahsan Islahi, opted to argumentatively differ with him over the interpretation of religious texts i.e. the Qur'an, hadith etc (Islahi 2000:19-32; also 2003). Moreover, the latter resigned

from the JI due to his ideological differences with the Amir (leader) of the Jamat (Islahi 2004:87-116).

In recent times, a former member of JI and pupil of Mawdudi and Islahi,- though intellectually more closed to the latter- Javed Ahmed Ghamidi has not only carried over Islahi's tradition of constructive criticism but also put forth his arguments as regards the concept and practice of Islamic state. While commenting on the Objectives Resolution and the concept of Islamic state<sup>35</sup> he said:

**Box 3.1 The Concept of an Islamic State**

I think the passage of Objectives Resolution was a useless activity. It or any other such measure could never have Islamized the Pakistan state. Indeed, the method was [is] wrong. Instead of passing Islamic resolutions and rallying for such causes, our religious leaders should have focused on the education of our masses... As a result of education they would become good Muslims; and then they would elect good Muslims for their parliament...[Because] the establishment of any political order [*Nazm-e-Ijtimai*] has to be based on the opinion of a [given] Muslim society. Indeed, it is the decision of God as enshrined in the Qur'an...Once in parliament, the elected can, on the behalf of the Muslim society, make laws which are not repugnant to the [last] book of God [the Qur'an]...The parliament can also legislate on matters which the Qur'an has not provided any legal basis...This is, in my opinion, what the Qur'an informs us about Islam's political system.

Interview with Javed Ahmed Ghamidi, Religious Scholar and Founder of Al-Mawrid- an Islamic research Institute. Lahore: 22 March 2008

Moreover, regarding the Objectives Resolution the opinion of the following legal expert happened not to be categorically different from that of Ghamidi. He commented:

<sup>35</sup> The concept of an Islamic state was found to be categorically different for religious scholars (and leaders) other than Ghamidi. All of them vociferously differed to Ghamidi's interpretation of religious texts. However, interestingly, none of them (belonging to different sects such as Deobandi, Brelvi and Shia) agreed to one another regarding the definition and dimensions of an Islamic state. According to the author, the religious views as expressed by these scholars other than Ghamidi are, more or less, the same as are founded in the existing literature on this subject. In the author's opinion, Ghamidi's arguments are stronger than that of his counterparts. Hence, his views are presented in the study. Further information about Ghamidi and his works is available from: [http://www.al-mawrid.org./pages/research\\_detail.php?research\\_id=5](http://www.al-mawrid.org./pages/research_detail.php?research_id=5).

**Box 3.2 Islamic or Muslim State?**

I think it's [Pakistan] a modern democratic state...The mere fact, which it mentions, that sovereignty belong to Allah [God] and that it should be exercised by the chosen representatives...means that we [it] wanted to have a parliamentary democratic system in Pakistan...Therefore we are a Muslim state, and not an Islamic state as many of our political actors have tried to define it.

Interview with Hamid Khan, Former President Supreme Court Bar Association, Member Pakistan Bar Council, Senior President Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf [PTI]. Lahore: 20 March 2008

Thus, in light of the foregoing, it is argued that religion is *primarily* about the establishment of a Muslim society, not (an Islamic) state. Moreover, whence the society gets established and, if and when it collectively decides to establish a *Nazmi Ijtimai* (roughly political order), it has to religiously resort to the stated Qur'anic principle.

Nonetheless, Pakistan continued to move on in an ideological stalemate. However, as regards her foreign relations, Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan in the capacity of principal decided to establish strong ties with the US from the very beginning. They based their preferences on geostrategic calculation in the context of the Cold War. Moreover, they also took into account not only the political sensibilities of the masses, especially the clergy which was fundamentally anti-communism, but also those of agents military and civil bureaucracy which happened to incline towards the West generally and the US particularly, for the military top brass was categorical as regards weapons procurement from Washington (Cheema 2002:58-60; Venkataramani 1984:64-94). Besides, the country started to establish cordial relations with the Muslim states of the Middle East. Moreover, to appease the masses and the belligerent clergy the prime minister supported the Arabs over the Palestine issue which led to severe tension not only within the principal-agent equation but also between Pakistan and the UK-USA combine. However, the start of relations with China was friendly. Karachi lost no time to recognize the Chinese state/government in 1949.

Domestically, however, Prime Minister Liaquat-led government faced severe criticism due to its non-performance with respect to governance, economy, and constitution-making. The poorer sections, therefore, looked to non-Muslim League parties which, in turn, had a political interest to destabilize the government. The socio-economic and political situation

was much worse in East Bengal where the PML government lost the provincial election held in 1950. The politickeering was less comfortable in rest of the provinces too. Even within the party, the PM was politically constraint primarily at the hands of Punjab-based politicians who attempted to politically exploit the least popular position of the PM. Nevertheless, Liaquat was successful at political maneuvering to obscure the party-government distinction by assuming the office of party's president. Despite this, the issues related to low governance, economy, education, health, constitution, language, provincial autonomy, national election and foreign policy etc., were still to get solved if the PML government were to continue.

In this respect, the principal led by Liaquat had a limited set of choices. If the election were held, there was a strong likelihood of a government being formed by East Bengal based politicians and political parties; if constitution was democratically made, East Bengal were to be given its due share; if relations were to be normalized with East Bengal and non-Punjabi politicians and parties, in some kind of a compromise below general elections, agents military and civil bureaucracy were to get politically benefited along with a coterie of personalistic Leaguers. Anyhow, the rational PML government opted for the third choice though in the absence of any reached compromise.

However, there was more cost to pay than the intended benefits. The opposition politicians especially in East Bengal gave the government a tough time in the wake of communal disturbances in 1950. Also they objected to the Interim Report of the BPC. The postponement of discussion over Kashmir in the United Nations Security Council went unaccepted by a majority of Pakistanis and the military too. The military actions in Korea further intrigued the PML government which after much ado decided to ally with the US-led coalition. The blow to civil-military relations, however, came in the form of a failed *putsch*- commonly called the Rawalpindi Conspiracy (March 1951)<sup>36</sup>. The conspiracy was planned and carried out by Major General Akbar Khan, the newly appointed chief of staff. The conspirators aimed at replacing the (central) government with a military regime. However, the shirking was timely detected and the conspirators got held up.

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<sup>36</sup> On Rawalpindi Conspiracy, see Akbar Khan's *Raiders in Kashmir* (1975) and Hasan Zaheer's *The Times and Trial of The Rawalpindi Conspiracy 1951* (1998).

Nevertheless, this shirking marked, on the one hand, the underlying political interests of the agent military vis-à-vis the politicians, and, on the other hand, highlighted the inter-institutional interests and preference-divergence; the chief of general staff led officers carried a different policy preference towards C-in-C<sup>37</sup> and his associates not only over Kashmir (the former preferred a decisive military solution) but country's general politics and economy. Moreover, it pointed to the politicization of the officer cadre who attempted to judge the political issues of the country. Importantly, it signified the civilian control of the military; as an institution the latter remained unable to successfully topple the civil principal. Besides, the act of shirking marked the rationality and agency of the military as a rational institution. The C-in-C-led section rationally decided not to side with the disobedient section for reasons: first, the C-in-C section, being more powerful in terms of hierarchical command and control, preferred to exploit the coup-staging section's apprehension. When the coup stagers got arrested, the remaining power and influence further went into Ayub Khan's hands; second, had the military unanimously acted, the military and political cost would have been higher- i.e. less attention to military modernization, lesser opportunity to militarily capture Kashmir, severe political opposition etc.

The politics in the post-shirking period centered primarily around the perplexing civil-military relations. The politicians became more cautious of the agent military. In this regard, during the India-Pakistan border tensions in the summer of 1951, and on the question of Pakistan's strategic alliance with Washington vis-à-vis the Middle East, the PM made calculated decisions. He tried to reconcile not only with India but also kept the initiation of alliance-politics in his hands.

Nonetheless, as regards his domestic policies they bore less fruit. The masses were least satisfied with governance and socio-economic policies. The state-related issues also kept lingering. Even his Leaguers chose to maintain a tough line. Before the PM took further

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<sup>37</sup> General Ayub Khan was appointed C-in-C by Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan-led principal politicians. It is maintained that his appointment was a rational decision of the PM who saw more political benefits than cost in the appointment of a general who was in PM's calculus least politicized, if not political, due to his originally junior-position within the army (military) ranks (General Iftikhar, who died in plane crash in late 1949, was to be appointed C-in-C by the rule/norm of seniority), his non-involvement in the refugees-settlement process, his being a non-Punjabi (a Hindku-speaking indeed), his belonging to non-influential political family and non-involvement in the 1947-48 Kashmir War (see Khan 1967:6).



measures to possibly find a political solution to, at least, a few of these issues he fell to a pistol shot on 16 October 1951 in Rawalpindi.<sup>38</sup>

### **3.5 Agency and Rationality- The Case of Civil Bureaucracy**

In the post-assassination period, the central cabinet by virtue of PM's death stood dissolved. Under the constitution the Governor-General, Khawaja Nazimuddin, was obligated to form a new cabinet. However, the norms of democracy and the spirit of the constitution were set aside by the agency of the hitherto agent civil bureaucracy who, having calculated the factionalized and personalistic politicians and their parties, chose to shirk extremely. Moreover, this undemocratic, if not immoral, assumption of state's powers by the civil bureaucracy points to its inherent capability to get things done. Also, it highlighted that the civil bureaucracy preferred its own interests to larger one- that of the state and the nation.

Little wonder then, the civil bureaucracy grabbed the seat of power(s) by replacing politician Governor-General with a bureaucrat one- Ghulam Mohammad- and thus improved its institutional position from an agent to the principal, for its preference had prevailed. Ironically, the deposed Governor-General, a Bengali, was appointed prime minister of the country. In other words, the G-G opted to work than shirk. This also points to the deposed G-G's rationality in terms of prioritizing own to larger interest. Importantly, the deceased PM's associates also chose to join the new government which highlights their capability to working than shirking for own their benefits.

As principal of its agents- military, judiciary and the politicians, the civil bureaucracy opted for a non-popular/electoral mode of politics which resulted in further factionalization and personalization of political behavior on the part of politicians who had a penchant for own than party or national interests. Therefore, a section of politicians rationally allied with the principal in the power-game. So did the agent military. The latter was able to negotiate a strategic space with the civil bureaucracy. The C-in-C Ayub Khan was thus able to pursue military modernization in terms of weapons procurements from the US. The military was also

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<sup>38</sup> Officially, there is little known about PM Liaqut Ali Khan's murder except the murderer's murder- by the security police, minutes after PM's death. Publicly, there is a lack of any authentic accounts on Liaqut Ali Khan's assassination. Nevertheless, most recently in a private TV channel documentary named *Band File* (Sealed File) on the very assassination of the PM, his family (members) implicitly fingered at his rival politicians from the Punjab.

able to assert its input on the security/defense matters. On its part, the principal endorsed such measures as a way-out to not only appease the agent military but also use it to maintain law and order if need be.

Politically, the so called Nazimuddin government faced issues related to economy, constitution and especially law and order. Ideologically, the state of Pakistan was still obscure. Though it rationally retained the secular laws of the British Indian state, it is maintained that the Pakistan's state was more secular than sacred in character. The secularity of the state was, however, constantly questioned by the authoritarian religious interpretation(s) by politically active clergy. Since the latter lacked political and participatory role in the government and a section of it had earlier opposed the state itself, it chose to influence and approach the state politico-socially. Therefore, the authoritarian clergy selected Ahmaddiya sect for this purpose as the latter's members had a considerable representation in the military and civil bureaucracy. The first foreign minister- Zafrullah Khan- is a case in point (Hasan 2008).

The charge sheet against the Ahmaddiya sect was its violation of the finality of Prophet Muhammad. However, historically/empirically and logically if this was the case, then what of (Twelvers) Shias who believe in the office of *Ima'mat* (divine appointment of the leader).<sup>39</sup> Moreover, the majority of Brelvis and Deobandi (especially their scholars) also believe in the duality (human and non-human (*Nur*) of the Prophet's person.<sup>40</sup> In addition, the majority of Sufis (mystics) have an established belief in direct linkage/merge with God.

Thus, in light of the foregoing it is suffice to posit that despite the Ahmadiyya's claim to Mirza's prophethood the selection by Brelvi-Deoband-JI clergy of this case/sect was a result of a rational decision, namely, to highlight and undermined the former's representation in the government. In this respect, the clergy's plan was simple: since the Ahmedis are anti-Muhammad, therefore, they are anti-Pakistan and anti-Islam; to purify Pakistan and Islam it is obligatory upon every Muslim-Pakistani to get them declared non-Muslims officially. In pursuance of this political objective, the clergy resorted to agitational politics during 1952-53. Due to failure of law and order apparatuses, the agitations led to communal riots in the major cities of the country. The Nazimuddin government, instead of principal civil bureaucracy,

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<sup>39</sup> This is based on the views expressed by one Shia intellectual with the author.

<sup>40</sup> Deobandi interviewees unanimously believed so.

bore the brunt of socio-economically affected populace. Ultimately, on the behalf of the principal, martial law was declared in Lahore, Hyderabad and Karachi to establish the writ of the state.

Though relative law and order was maintained by the military, the latter was thought to be part of the problem by Nazimuddin since the defense sector took much out of the preceding budgets, which, in turn, left less resources to assuage socio-economically affected people. After all, the Prime Minister was a politician with a constituency, however weak, to be answerable to. Hence, as a result of Nazimuddin government's calculation, the 1953-54 budget, for the first time since 1947, reduced the defense share by one-third. Expectedly, the military top brass disliked it. Moreover, the incumbent Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad in strategic interaction with the agent military also got displeased, for his relations with the PM were already non-cordial. The PM, a former G-G, in order to politically assert the politicians' position in country's political system opted to curtail the powers of the G-G in the Constituent Assembly. However, the personalistic politicians accorded more weightage to their own than larger interests of the state and society. Resultantly, Nazimuddin had to pay the price himself; he was unsummarily dismissed by Ghulam Mohammad in April 1953. He was replaced, on the whims of the principal, with Mohammad Ali Bogra, another Bengali and Pakistan's (former) ambassador to the US (Sayeed 1954). Bogra's appointment marked the agency and rationality of both the agent politicians and the principal bureaucracy. The former wanted to maximize his own politico-economic interests; the latter chose to appease not only the majority-Bengalis but also benefit from Bogra's US experiences with respect to foreign/defense policy.

Bogra, without any political base, relied on Muslim League which was in shambles especially in East Bengal where provincial elections were scheduled to be held in early 1954. In order to rationally deal with the socio-economic issues and to gain political space vis-à-vis other personalistic Leaguers and non-League politicians, the PM worked out a constitutional 'formula' which to a good extent had appeased the East Bengal politicians. Nevertheless, whereas Bogra politically benefited in the Bengal, the cost was higher in non-Bengal Pakistan. Indeed, the principal along with agent military had a different take on the constitutional formula which had proposed Bangla as national language- which from the perspective of democratic theory was justifiable (McGrath 2000:113-114).

However, on the foreign/defense policy front, Bogra government was least confronted. In fact, it was the principal bureaucracy and the agent military which negotiated the costs and benefits of strategic alliance with Washington in September 1953. Resultantly, Pakistan opted to sign a military agreement with Turkey, a US ally, against communist USSR in February 1954. Two months later, Karachi also signed its first Mutual Assistance Agreement with Washington. The signing of the above agreements marked the agency and rationality of both civil bureaucracy and the military. The former did not want the latter to take political initiations in its hands. The latter did not shirk in terms of a coup at this stage for the political cost would have been higher than the intended benefits.

The political cost, however, was paid by PM Bogra whose party lost provincial election in East Bengal to United Front (UF) - the former hardly won 10 seats as compared to UF's 223 in an assembly of 309. In the post-electoral period, the Front became demanding. It demanded the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly which had, in its opinion, become non-representative of Bengali interests. However, instead of meeting these democratic demands, the principal chose to take tough measures against the dissident section of politicians. Thus, Nazimuddin, Fazlur Rahman and Fazlul Huq were politically victimized; the latter was dubbed pro-India on accounts of a speech. The charge, however, was less than plausible (ibid 2000:119-120).

The civil bureaucracy's anti-UF agenda further aggravated the socio-economic and importantly political situation in East Bengal- Karnafuli riots and subsequent deaths in March 1954 is a case in point (see Table 7 on page 141). Bogra government also struggled in this respect as the ultimate powers and apparatus to maintain law and order rested with the civil bureaucracy. Moreover, on 20 September 1954 in his absence, a section of the coalition led by the United Front was able to ratify the constitutional/Bogra formula and repeal the PRODA. This non-consensual action put Bogra government on back burner politically. To cap it, the very next day, in an explicit act of shirking vis-à-vis the principal bureaucracy and even the PM, the Constituent Assembly amended sections 9 and 10 of the Constitution (1935 India Act, as amended). The amendment deprived the Governor-General to dismiss the cabinet (ibid 2000:123, 134-154).

Indubitably, the two acts marked the agency and rationality of the politicians who had calculated more political benefits than cost. They deemed this legislative performance as a

boaster to their political moral. Moreover, they might not have expected any extra-constitutional act on the part of the principal led by Ghulam Mohammad. However, if they had assumed so, then it pointed to their short memory since the civil bureaucracy had earlier assumed power at will in October 1951, and had dismissed Nazimuddin government in April 1953. Nonetheless, having viewed this politico-legal action, which entailed heavy politico-economic cost for the civil bureaucracy, as an act of severe shirking, the principal in strategic understanding with the agent military chose to punish the shirking politicians.

### **3.5.1 Principal Bureaucracy, Agent Judiciary and Politics**

As mentioned before, a section of politicians had attempted to shirk which had caused deep concerns in the corridors of power. The principal bureaucracy took it as an onslaught on its politic-economic interests. Therefore, she decided to teach the shirkers a blue lesson. Resultantly, the Constituent Assembly was dismissed on 24 October 1954 (Wheeler 1955). The dissolution created a legal-normative crisis in the country which was left with neither a constitution nor an assembly to make one. The incumbent civil bureaucracy and its leader Ghulam Mohammad had seen more benefits in this extraordinary act of highhandedness. Nevertheless, the politicians led by Maulvi Tamizuddin- the deposed Speaker of the Assembly- decided to challenge the G-G's action in Sindh High Court which gave its verdict in favor of the Assembly in term of invalidating the dissolution by the Governor-General. Hence, on latter's behalf an appeal was filed in the country's Federal Court (FC) - apex body of the agent judiciary which due to its weak institutional position preferred working in the preceding years.<sup>41</sup>

However, this time around CJ Munir and his institution was faced with a really tough challenge. In this respect, it only had two choices; either to uphold the lower court's verdict or invalidate it. It rationally decided to pick the second choice by denying jurisdiction to the Sindh Court to issue the writs in this case. The decision also invalidated a large number of laws passed by the assembly in the past five years. Therefore, the Governor-General chose to give his assent to these acts with retrospective effect under the Emergency Powers Ordinance No. 9. Importantly, however, this Emergency Ordinance's validity had been already declared *ultra vires* in a parallel case- Usif Patel vs. the Crown. Hence, on 10 May 1955, the G-G

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<sup>41</sup> The Federal Court, headed by Chief Justice Muhammad Munir, only had 'Munir Report'- a judicial commission was formed under FC's Chief Justice Munir to report on the anti-Ahmediyya disturbances- to her credit (see Chaudhri 1973:181-215).

rushed to summon a Constituent Convention. As a result of it, he assumed the necessary powers ‘to make laws or invalidate present or past laws, pending an answer to his special reference to the Federal Court’. The agent court, while marking its rationality, acknowledged the necessity of dissolution of assembly and Governor-General’s need to validate the laws in retrospect (Waseem 1994:128).

As the above informs the Federal Court necessitated the bureaucracy’ principalship on a unique basis. Was the court correct in its judgement? Was it a protector of the state? What did make the FC to judge so?

**Box 3.3 The Doctrine of Necessity?**

The doctrine of necessity was a novel device in the legal realm of the country. It was in fact unprecedented. [Chief] Justice Munir based it wrongly on the Kelsen work[s] on law which had no relevance whatsoever in this case...Actually the court did not want to confront the Governor-General...He [the latter] had [ a] support of the Army [military].

Interview with Anwar Kamal, President, Lahore High Court Bar Association and Advocate Supreme Court of Pakistan. Lahore: 17 March 2008.

In light of the foregoing, it is argued that the agent judiciary having based its decision on the contentious and controversial ‘doctrine of necessity’ acted rationally to maximize its political and economic interests. The Chief Justice would have rationally anticipated the wrath of the principal had the verdict been given differently. Indeed, the doctrine was the brainchild of the CJ himself who misread theoretically-empirically Hans Kelsen thesis on Law. In this, Munir failed to distinguish between legality and legitimacy for, Kelsen had focused on efficacy as a condition of validity, and not a reason for it. Thus, the CJ’s ‘revolutionary legality’ was quite novel which legitimized the Governor-General’s arbitrary act (Newberg 1995:74). Also the arguments put forth by some political analysts- as is explained in Chapter 2- to implicitly legitimize the necessity-doctrine by pointing out the non-representative character of the Constituent Assembly are factually weak and thus untenable. How could the G-G dissolve the assembly on the basis of slow-legislation and non-representativeness? Suppose this was the case, why did not then the G-G (re) act in 1952 or 1953 to dissolve not only the assembly but also hold fresh general elections? After all, the opposition politicians especially from East Bengal were demanding it vociferously.

Nonetheless, in the post-verdict period, PM Bogra preferred working. After all, it was the assembly, which he had little political base, and the opposition politicians who paid the price. Bogra's rational decision was welcomed by the civil bureaucrats who now sat in the cabinet under the banner of Muslim League. Importantly, General Ayub Khan, the C-in-C, had also accepted the defence portfolio in order to maximize his institution's politico-economic interests i.e. to assert military's input about foreign/defence policy and finances effectively. Quite contrary to Bogra's position, the real challenge for the principal lay in the fresh election to the Constituent Assembly by the provincial assemblies. For this purpose, the Governor-General increased its total seats to eighty.

Moreover, the former used carrot and stick policy to get pro-principal politicians elected- the dismissal of Punjab's Leaguer Chief Minister, Firoz Khan Noon, is a case in point. The politician and their parties also bargained to win over as like-minded members as possible. Especially in East Bengal it was mere rationality and agency which prevailed. For instance, the United Front, which hitherto posed a united political opposition to the principal and its allied section of politician, was politically no longer united. Indeed, Suhrawarday's Awami League (AL) had been expelled from the coalition in April 1955. Little wonder then, owing to their non-commonality of political interests the UF-minus-AL decided to support the principal politico-electurally (Jalal 1990:209-210).

Subsequently, the election process got completed in June 1955. The electoral results were mixed; none of the parties, the disorganized Muslim League included, was able to form government on its own. Therefore, after hectic political give and take between the principal and agent politicians, it was the principal-led Muslim League and the United Front which agreed to form a coalition government in the centre under the premiership of Chaudhri Mohammad Ali, the ex-Secretary General. Iskander Mirza, the former defence secretary, chose to become the acting Governor-General. Fazlul Haq, the leader of UF, opted to assume Governorship of his province- East Bengal.

Despite the lingering issues of socio-economic under-performance, role of religion in the state, constitution etc., the Chaudhri government paid more time and attention to the principal's old project of centralization of state power in terms of proposed One Unit; the proposal aimed at merging of Punjab, Sindh, NWFP, Balochistan, Balochistan State Unions, Bahawalpur, Khairpur into One Unit as par with East Bengal. The underlying assumption

was to decrease the administrative, electoral and political weight of the majority Bengalis. Nevertheless, the principal's preference prevailed despite United Front twelve votes going against the bill which legally established 'West Pakistan' on 14 October 1955 (Sayeed 1980:44).

Moreover, the incumbent civil bureaucracy was also able to draft, present and negotiate a constitutional bill in the assembly. Mirza, the G-G, after having secured his nomination as the provisional president, signed the bill on 2 March 1956. Thus, on 23 March 1956 Pakistan was able to formally have its first constitution made by indirectly elected Constituent Assembly. However, the constitution, since it was the brainchild of the bureaucracy, gave authoritarian powers to the president who was to be elected indirectly. Moreover, the assemblies and cabinets were to stand on his discretion. Thus, instead of being a device to consolidate the state, it was a rational mechanism to authoritatively control the shirking elements which had been agitating for proper provincial autonomy. Besides, despite naming Pakistan as 'Islamic Republic' the principal tactfully put the Objectives Resolution outside the main body of the constitution- it served as a preamble only. In other words, Islam was not officially declared as state religion (see Choudhury 1956).

On the foreign/defence policy front, the civil section of the government led by Chaudhri had practically no choice but to toe the principal and the agent military's line. Therefore, Pakistan continued to remain an ally of the US for the politics of alliance was instrumental to accrue economic and military benefits from Washington. Nonetheless, the opposition politicians especially Awami League and the socio-economically affected masses held the PM responsible for all the ills. Even his League-associates chose to defect/shirk in order to gain more political benefits. Though Chaudhri tried his best to survive politically, the shirking from the ML, which resulted into establishing the Republican Party in collaboration with the principal bureaucracy, further reduced his choices. Moreover, the AL-UF political rivalry brought Miza into action who imposed presidential rule in the Eastern part of the country. In this regards, the provincial food distribution machinery was handed over to the agent army-undoubtedly, much to the chagrin of the Awami League (Jalal 1990:261). However, after a few months when the presidential rule was lifted, the PM, in his last bid to survive his government, replaced UF's Sarkar Ministry with AL's Ataur Rahman. However, Chaudhri's preference diverged with that of his principal which had a different game plan. Hence, having



calculated the cost of confrontation with the principal, the PM, despite majority in the National Assembly (NA), opted to resign on 8 September 1956.

In the post-Chaudhri period, the moderate Awami Leaguer politicians opted to form a coalition government with bureaucracy-backed Republicans. The issues which the new government faced at the centre were old in nature but quite different in context: poor socio-economic situation, law and order problems, role of religion, public opposition to pro-West foreign/defence policy, the Kashmir issue<sup>42</sup>, undoing of One Unit, nature of electoral system (joint or separate) and demand for general elections.

However, being in a coalition, Suhrawarday had little choice to revise country's FP/DP. On the domestic front, though he did try to solve the issues, the opposition looked more demanding. The blow came when, out of his own party, Maulana Bhashani created another party, namely, National Awami Party (NAP). Moreover, in the absence of any effective economic policy, the socio-economic situation worsened especially in the Eastern Wing, where the principal deployed army to check food prices and smuggling of gold etc. In addition, on 17 September 1957 the undoing of One Unit by the West Pakistan Assembly, as act of shirking by the agent Republicans to maximize their political benefits vis-à-vis the principal and its coalition partner, provided the Bengali opposition politicians an opportunity to demand the same along with equivalent representation in civil bureaucracy and the military. With respect to these demands, the PM contextually had two choices; either to try to fulfil the opposition demands- and that would be at the cost of principal's opposition- or resign since he had already failed to get a vote of confidence. Since the cost of confrontation with the principal would have been much higher, the agent PM tendered his resignation on 10 October 1957.

After Suhrawarday's resignation, the Republicans calculated the risk of going against the line of the principal. Ultimately, they decided to form a coalition government with the Muslim League led by Chundrigar. The tasks his government hurriedly accomplished were the reversing of \$10 million of ICA aid, dumping the proposal for the establishment of National Shipping Corporation and approving the anti-smuggling ordinance- the latter delegated enough powers to the army to carry out the project (ibid 1990:263). However, the work he

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<sup>42</sup> On 17 November 1956, the Kashmir Assembly had declared it an integral part of the Indian union.

failed to complete, due to poor negotiations with the Republicans, was the modification of electoral amendment act in the National Assembly. Subsequently, the PM resigned after nearly two months of premiership, for he remained unable to gain confidence-vote in a second bid too.

Post-Chundigar politics of the principal revolved around the Republicans led by Noon. The latter, on 16 December 1957, was able to form a coalition government with Awami League, National Awami Party, Krishak Sramik Party, National Congress and the Scheduled Caste Federation. In a multi-party coalition, Noon had a few options of his own to go by. The coalition partners- a majority of which belonged to East Pakistan- as well as the general opposition were demanding more provincial autonomy, socio-economic relief, end to army operation in the Eastern Wing, religious identity of the state, change in pro-West foreign/defence policy, a debate on Kashmir issue and importantly the holding of general elections.

However, before the PM could take any measures, that given his limited choices, the political music-chair in the provincial politics of East Pakistan led to virtual chaos. Indeed, the Deputy Speaker, Shahid Ali, lost his life on the assembly floor on 20 September 1958. The situation, somehow, did get out of control. The public pressure mounted on the PM. Hence, quite rationally, instead of deploying the army, his ministry chose to relax the army anti-smuggling operation- though quite to the latter's dislike- and banned paramilitary organizations in the country. Moreover, in order to sustain his government, he expanded the cabinet to let AL maximize its political returns. However, the AL ministers resigned in displeasure over the nature of portfolios.

Moreover, to add to Noon's misfortunes, the Khan of Kalat, on 6 October 1958, opted to obstruct the building of military bases in Balochistan. In the wake of all these developments, the principal led by Mirza was all concerned. It lost no time to engage strategically with the agent military to deal with the situation. Therefore, army operation was carried out instantly to scotch the revolt in Balochistan. However, to Noon's surprise, the next operation was carried out against none else but his government. On 7 October, 1958, the principle had declared martial law in Pakistan- this shall be the subject matter of the next chapter. Resultantly, the assemblies and cabinets stood dissolved; the 1956 constitution abrogated; the political activity banned (see Wilcox 1958).

### 3.6 Conclusion

Since the existing structuralist and legitimist accounts had over-emphasized the structural transformation of the colonial state's institution into that of independent Pakistan, it was deemed necessary to critically analyze the impact, if any, of structure on the construction of the state. In this regard, the study, with the help of its deductive model, categorized actors into four groups, namely, politicians, civil bureaucracy, judiciary and the military. Furthermore, with the support of empirical data, politicians were assumed to have been the principal actor at Partition- till October 1951- constitutionally, legally, electorally and morally. The other three actors were delegated powers, as is the practice of modern states, in the capacity of agents. Also, these four actors were assumed capable of getting things done (agency A) and rationalizing their preferences in terms of their own rather than the larger interests (agency B).

Quite contrary to the structuralists thesis of an 'overdeveloped state' (Alavi 1988), it was posited that the political leadership of Pakistan, instead of compelled by the structural constraints, had certain interests and strategies as regards the construction of the state in terms of institutions such civil bureaucracy and the military. Hence, though the former rationally retained the nomenclature of the so called pre-colonial civil-military bureaucracy, the latter was thoroughly overhauled in terms of a reorganization of personnel, ranks etc. Importantly, where needed new offices/departments were established by the principal. Thus, it was maintained that the overdeveloped state was, from a Marxist perspective, equated with the civil-military bureaucracy despite the fact that the latter remained an agent of the British. Undoubtedly, Pakistani politicians, though in a different context and for different purposes, also treated the civil bureaucracy and the military not so differently- the latter remained an agent.

In addition, the chapter exposed crucial weakness in the legitimacy thesis, which believes that the military intervened in politics due to external (i.e. the Indian) threat perception, on logical and empirical grounds. In this respect, it was maintained that the legitimists fail to explain which institution(s) perceived the threat, for without a perceiver a threat cannot be constructed and hence military intervention cannot be justified. This study attempted its own analysis of the crucial early years of Pakistan's history and, with the help of the model, explained that it was the principal politicians who perceived the external threat and then rationally constructed strategies to deal with the situation. In this regard, the first India-

Pakistan war (1947-48) in and over Kashmir is cited as a case in point whereby the principal, having judged the matter, ordered the agent military to engage India militarily. The latter, instead, preferred to shirk twice, revealing its agency and rationality.

Paradoxically, however, the principal abstained from punishing the agent meaningfully for example by devising an oversight regime/mechanism. However, in the post-war period, the principal did appoint, from its perspective, an apolitical Commander-in-Chief in order to prevent future shirking. Besides, having realized the consequences of agitational politics of the authoritarian clergy, the principal politicians chose to appease not only the clergy but also the general masses. In this regard, the Objectives Resolution (1949) was passed in the constituent assembly. However, contrary to the existing literature on the impact of the Resolution on Pakistan's state, it was posited here that the aims of this Objectives Resolution were political rather than purely religious, instrumental as it was for the political leadership in resolving future difference with the religious authorities.

Moreover, the chapter, with the help of its casual model, explained the change that took place in the principal in October 1951. It was posited, in this regard, that in the post-Liaquat period the agent civil bureaucracy's preference for shirking prevailed in terms of assuming the office of the Governor-General arbitrarily- against the spirit of the constitution. The explanation emphasized the importance of the bureaucracy's inherent agency to affect this change to maximize its political and economic benefits. Also, the working agency and rationality of politicians- both Muslim Leaguers and the general opposition- were pointed out, for they accorded more preference to their own rather than larger, party and/or national, interests. In the changed political context of Pakistan's state, the judiciary and military worked as agents.

In its last part the chapter emphasized the strategic interaction between the principal, politicians and the military whereby each actor engaged the other for rational reasons. For example, in 1954 a section of politicians opted to repeal those sections of the constitution which empowered the Governor-General to dismiss governments at his discretion. However, before this smart politico-legal move could take root, the agent judiciary chose to undo it, for the cost of confronting the principal would have been greater. Hence, the judiciary looked to benefits i.e. non-transfer, pay and pension, prolongation of tenure etc. Moreover, the military chose to work with the principal bureaucracy in order to accrue politico-economic benefits, especially military aid and hardware from the US. The former, on its part, strategically

interacted with the latter to not only appease it but importantly use it in extreme situations i.e. the maintenance of law and order.

Overall, the chapter maintained that politicians, due to their preference for own interests, failed to devise any oversight regime/mechanism and/or to put up a politically united resistance to the principal bureaucracy. Thus, the latter, in October 1958, due to a commonality of interests and convergence of priorities with the agent military, opted to dismiss PM Noon's ministry. Importantly, the country was put under martial law. The October coup d'état, the consequent martial law, its constitutional, legal and moral basis, its reasons and consequences for the state are the subject matter of the next chapter.

## Chapter 4

### **Military Agency: CMR under Generals Ayub and Yahya**

This chapter seeks to explain the 1958 and 1969 coups in particular and the civil-military relations during this period in general. In order to achieve this objective, the chapter relies on the method of an analytic narrative as has been explained under the methodology section. Each of the analytic narratives is a combination of agency A (working/shirking) and agency B (own/larger interests). The respective narrative begins, in principle, from the time a coup occurs. However, the preceding periods are also taken into account given that the coup/martial law proclamation refers to the past in terms of a deteriorating law and order and economic situation of the country.

The point of departure and reference, as a result, is the respective coup-text which the military cites to justify its intervention in politics. In order to understand and explain the cited reasons/factors/causes for a coup, a system of coding- based on the work of Robert Axelrod- is applied to identify conceptual variables in the text and subsequently to highlight their correspondence with the coup. The primary aim of this part of the narrative-oriented- but model inspired- analysis shall be to answer the core question, core puzzle and the hypotheses of the study.

Having conducted an analysis to explain the above-mentioned correspondence between conceptual variables, the study reverts to its model to apply its explanatory variables, namely, working/shirking and own/larger interests (agencies A and B) formally in order to explain the occurrence of a coup, seek answers to the core question, supporting questions and the core puzzle and test the hypotheses. A secondary aim of this chapter shall be to explain the role of religion in Pakistan's politics and the state. In this respect, the study uses primary sources to make the point.

The chapter ends with a conclusion which maintains that a coup was an outcome of military agency- to get things done. In simple terms a coup is rational rather than structural as the structuralist and path-depend accounts make it out to be. Moreover, a *putsch* is always political in nature for the primary aim of staging a coup is to capture political power which then is used as an instrument for political and economic purposes. In addition, the conclusion also

points out that the rational judiciary and politicians looked to their own rather than larger interests.

#### 4.1 Actors and Agency: Explaining the First Coup

President Iskander Mirza, as is mentioned in the previous chapter, declared martial law in Pakistan on 7 October 1958. Before one attempts to solve the president's puzzle- the declaration and imposition of martial law in the capacity of president and the subsequent appointment of General Ayub Khan as Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) - , it seems imperative to present here the factors/reasons on the basis of which Mirza took this action.

##### Box 4.1 Excerpts from President Mirza's Proclamation, 7 October 1958<sup>43</sup>

For the last two years, I have been watching, with the deepest anxiety, *the ruthless struggle for power*, [and] *corruption* [by politicians]...Despite my repeated endeavors, no serious attempt has been made to tackle the *food crisis*...In East Pakistan...there is a well organized *smuggling of food, medicines and other necessities of life*...*You do not raise the prestige of your country by beating the Speaker, [and] killing the Deputy Speaker*...I am unable any longer to believe that *elections will improve the present chaotic internal situation*...[they] *will be neither free nor fair*...we have undertaken to *safeguard the security of Pakistan*...The Constitution...is unworkable...it is my intention to...*devise a Constitution*...[which] will be submitted to the *referendum* of the people...I have, therefore, decided that

- a) The Constitution of the 23<sup>rd</sup> March, 1956, will be abrogated.
- b) The Central and Provincial Governments will be dismissed with immediate effect.
- c) The National Parliament and Provincial Assemblies will be dissolved.
- d) All political parties will be abolished.
- e) Until alternative arrangements are made, *Pakistan will come under Martial Law*. I hereby appoint General Ayub Khan, Commander-in-Chief, Pakistan Army, as the Chief Martial Law Administrator and place all the Armed Forces of Pakistan under his command. [italics mine]

(Khan 1967:Appendix II)

As the above shows President Mirza's proclamation refers to certain factors/reasons/causes of the coup. In order to assess the causal assertions inherent in the above text and analyze

<sup>43</sup> General Ayub Khan also issued a 'Proclamation of Martial Law' the same day. In his proclamation the general stressed in unequivocal terms the 'Martial Law Regulations and Orders'. Besides, according to the author of the preset study, the excerpts do not exclude any reasons/factors deemed responsible for the coup and subsequent martial law.

critically the coup-narrative, a simply system of ‘coding’, as postulated in Axelrod’s *Structure of Decision* (1976:291-332), is applied. In this regard, the first step is to identify *conceptual variables* that the author- President Mirza- emphasizes<sup>44</sup>. In this case these are the following:

A = *the ruthless struggle for power; beating the speaker; killing the deputy speaker; the present chaotic internal situation (law and order variable)*<sup>45</sup>

B = *corruption [by the politicians]; food crisis; smuggling of food, medicines and other necessities of life (economic variable)*

C = *devise a constitution; referendum (democratization variable)*

D = *to safeguard the security of Pakistan (securitization variable)*

E = *Pakistan will come under Martial Law (policy variable)*

As mentioned earlier, the primary objective of the present study is to explain military’s intervention in Pakistan’s politics- for this purpose, it assumes coup d’état as its dependent variable. Since the above-mentioned conceptual variables do not, empirically, match with the independent variables of the study, namely, working/shirking (agency A) and own/larger interests (agency B), it thus becomes imperative to, in light of the above , describe the direct correspondence between the coup and these variables . This is done as follows:

1. The problems of law and order require military intervention for its solution. Thus, the coup is staged; and the martial law is imposed subsequently (positive relationship):

A  $\xrightarrow{+}$  E

2. The deteriorating economic situation can only be improved by bringing the country under a military rule. Hence, the coup is staged (positive relationship): B  $\xrightarrow{+}$  E

3. Since the elections will be neither fair nor free, the country shall be given a constitution by the military government. It would be put before the people for their approval in a (free and fair) referendum. Thus, Pakistan can be democratized under the supervision of a martial law authority (positive relationship): C  $\xrightarrow{+}$  E

<sup>44</sup> On 8 October 1958- a day after the coup- General Ayub Khan, too, addressed the nation. Surprisingly, the general also referred to the same reasons/factors/causes.

<sup>45</sup> The conceptual/theoretical basis for the application of law and order and other variables- economic, democratization and securitization- shall come in subsequent analysis.



4. Since the corruption and incompetent politicians have brought the country to the brink of disaster, Pakistan's security can only be ensured by the military (positive relationship): D  $\xrightarrow{+}$  E

The following observations can be drawn in light of the above:

- The October coup-action and the subsequent martial law is justified by President Mirza (and General Ayub for that matter) on accounts of problems of law and order and economy, democratization and securitization;
- Law and order and economic problems are cited as primary reasons/causes due to their extremely negative impact both on the people and the state;
- Democratization and securitization are cited, undoubtedly, as reasons/causes of the coup. However, they seem complementary in nature;
- The coup/martial law is presented as a panacea to the stated ills Pakistan suffered from;
- The military aims to perform the stated tasks.

Having described the stated reasons/causes of the coup, their (textual) correspondence with the dependent variable and importantly drawn observations about this action, it seems appropriate here to explain the president's puzzle before one conducts an analytical narrative of the coup. To begin with, issuance of coup/martial law proclamation and declaration/imposition of martial law by President Mirza marks the convergence of preferences between Mirza-led bureaucracy and Ayub-led military. Moreover, Mirza established a martial law administration headed by him in the capacity of its president; the administration was, over all, a mixture of military men and bureaucrats.

Surprisingly however, on 26 October 1958, Mirza appointed General Ayub Khan as Prime Minister of Pakistan- the latter took oath the next day along with his cabinet which comprised politicians too. Quite dramatically however, in the evening of 27 October, Prime Minister Ayub Khan opted to pack the president off along with the Office of Prime Minister. Furthermore, his cabinet refreshed its oath with a slight change of transforming itself into the cabinet of President Ayub Khan.

However, the question that arises in light of the above is that why Mirza chose to take such a measure which ultimately caused his downfall along with the civil bureaucracy- the principal.

As is already critically explained under the literature review, President Mirza, being head of the civil bureaucracy, preferred a total collapse of the existing political system due to his electoral-political calculation, for there was a strong likelihood of his being ousted at the hand of agent politicians especially from East Pakistan. Logically then, being already in a cordial strategic engagement with the agent military, Mirza would have taken the military high command into confidence to declare martial law in his name. On its part, the military, being a rational actor, would not have any problem with this kind of arrangement as, at the end of the day, the entire coup-burden falls on the president's shoulders. Thus, one sees a unique staging of a coup and subsequent martial law imposition by a bureaucrat-turned politician.

Moreover, from 7 to 27 October, Mirza delegated almost all powers of administration to Ayub-led Advisory Council. Also, important members of the civil bureaucracy had started working under the military command. Plausibly, these facts would have boosted latter's confidence to stand the test of the day- at least administratively. To cap it, Mirza's decision to appoint a General-C-in-C-CMLA as prime minister would have further added insult to injury.

Therefore, having calculated Mirza and his institution's political strength and weaknesses along with that of politicians General Ayub Khan formally opted to take over the reins of Pakistan as leader of a new principal actor- the military. However, the removal of Mirza added to Ayub's concerns when it came to legitimacy and legality, if not morality, of the coup since it was neither sanctioned by the abrogated constitution nor the people of Pakistan. Hence, the matter was put before the agent judiciary still headed by Justice Munir. A quote from an interview, given on the following page, brings into light the pertinent questions related to the legality, if not political legitimacy and morality, of the coup and consequent martial law. In addition, an analysis of this puzzle shall be made with the help of this primacy source.

#### **Box 4.2 A Critique of the Doctrine of Necessity**

The martial law- or [technically] the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order- was challenged in the Supreme Court. It was headed by Justice Munir...The question before the Supreme Court was if the Lahore High Court's writ had abated under the Order [Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, Clause (7), Article 1]...In his judgment Justice Munir maintained that a successful revolution or coup is a internationally recognized legal method to change a constitution...Therefore, the martial law had created a new law-creating organ...I think Justice Munir made an arbitrary judgment...he relied on Kelsen [indeed his *General Theory of Law and State*] to make a case...He, in fact, decided hurriedly to legitimize the martial law... I think there was no need on the part of the Supreme Court to decide its cases while entering into question of the validity of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order...Even before the imposition of martial law, there were appeals pending before the [Supreme] Court...these appeals were heard a few days after the martial law...it shows that the Court dragged the validity of the Order into a controversy...It did not wait until someone could directly challenge the very validity of the martial law [Laws (Continuance in Force) Order].

Interview with Hamid Khan, Former President Supreme Court Bar Association, Member Pakistan Bar Council, Senior President Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf [PTI]. Lahore: 20 March 2008.

What the above informs is that the judiciary dealt with the politico-legal situation rationally. She was well aware of her weak institutional position vis-à-vis the new principal which had, unlike the former one, coercive power(s) at its disposal (Rotermund 1997:7-16). Therefore, instead of challenging the martial law regime in the national interest, the judiciary preferred to validate it in order to maximize her politico-economic interests i.e. stay in office with regime's blessings, remuneration etc. Had Justice Munir-led Supreme Court not controversially validated undemocratic, illegal, unconstitutional and immoral coup action a legal precedent would have been set which, at least, might have been referred to in the future legal cases. In this respect, the maximum cost the Justice and his team would have to pay was to lose the pay and pensions. But as is maintained previously in the study, the actors in Pakistan's civil-military relations had developed a penchant for their own politic-economic than larger interest.

Nonetheless as the above shows the military was successful at obtaining the judicial legitimacy. However, according to present study's theoretical position, it never implies that the reasons/causes cited for the October coup also got legitimized by the verdict of an agent

judiciary. Therefore, it becomes imperative to conduct a theory/model-guided analytic narrative of this coup.

## **4.2 An Analytic Narrative of the Coup**

As the preceding section shows, having assumed the principal position the military put its coup-case before the agent judiciary which provided the former with judicial legitimacy ultimately. However, in order to understand and explain the cited reasons/causes of the coup, and for that matter the core question, puzzle and hypothesis respectively, one is urged to conduct a critical analysis of this puzzling phenomenon since the legitimacy granted by an agent actor cannot be taken for granted academically. In order to achieve this objective, the first step in this direction is to explore, in light of our deductive model, whether positive correspondence exists between the four conceptual variables, drawn from the coup-text earlier in this chapter, and the coup d'état- dependent variable of the study. In addition, the secondary aim of this exercise shall be to determine the status of the study's hypotheses. Hence, the following four sections would deal with each variable respectively. This would be followed by a summary of the results.

### **4.2.1 Law and Order Variable**

Law and order is generally considered a state's primary responsibility. Its maintenance is often equated with good governance. However, governance itself is a fluid, encompassing and contested concept (Huntington 1968; Pierre and Peters 2000:1; Adsera *et al* 2000:5; Campbell *et al* 1991; Hollingsworth *et al* 1994; Williamson 1996; Rhodes 1997; Pierre 1998; Kohli 1990). Nevertheless, while disagreeing in principle with the existing approaches to governance, Mitra (2006) has theoretically and empirically attempted to define, measure and explain governance from a rational choice-neo institutionalist perspective. He argues

As a conceptual variable, governance has the paradoxical attribute of being visible by its absence rather than its presence...It is therefore important, particularly for the purposes of prediction, to develop conceptual and operational measures of governance from the point of view of social forces whose perceptions necessarily differs from that of the state. Seen through the eyes of the modern state, political order and challenges to legitimacy can be measured in terms of murders, riots and other forms of challenge to the authority of the state.

(Mitra 2006:20)

Moreover, in providing the quantitative, among others, basis for his subsequent theory of governance, Mitra (2006:39-47) maintains that governance is low when there is large numbers of murders and riots per million population. What the foregoing informs is that almost all major indicators related to the break down or otherwise of a governmental apparatus are comprehensively covered by it. Therefore, in order to explain whether the coup(s) were caused by disorderly rule, the present study relies on Mitra's. However, since the nature of the question at hand is quite different from that of Mitra- it is not about measuring governance (cross-regionally)-, the study, therefore, sticks to the quantitative part of the former, namely, the higher the number of murders and riots per million population, the lower the governance. In this respect, however, the study tends to undertake a statistical analysis of murders and riots, the latter where applicable<sup>46</sup>, in order to analyze the law and order situation at a specific point of time i.e. occurrence of a coup.

In addition, it is posited that the term 'law and order' is retained for two reasons: first, it is used by coup-makers implicitly and explicitly; secondly, it is maintained for the sake of clarity and simplicity. In other words, there should be no conceptual and definitional difference between governance and law and order variable. Moreover, as regards the data for analytic narratives of the five coups, the study relies on the official source (MoF) in order to maintain objective standards; the official data is representative of the entire country for it is based on the reported crimes committed in the administrative boundary of a police station (*thana*), located at the bottom of the district administration.

As regards the data on Pakistan's population, the study has relied on the same official source due to reasons: a) the population data on pre-1971 Pakistan is wrongly presented by both Population Census Organization- a department of Statistics Division (GoP)- and Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat. Erroneously, the former assumes (West) Pakistan as Pakistan and the latter believes (East) Pakistan as Pakistan. Interestingly, the Yearbooks from 1971 onwards present (West) Pakistan's population data as Pakistan's for the pre-1971 years<sup>47</sup>; b) since the data on murders and riots is taken from the yearbook(s), it seems more logical to take population data from the

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<sup>46</sup> The riots category, as shall be shown in this research, disappears from the official data sources after a few years of General Zia-led military takeover.

<sup>47</sup> To see the details of the misleading and erroneous data as presented by Population Census Organization (Pakistan) and the Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (the United Nations) visit the following: [http://www.statpak.gov.pk/depts/pco/statistics/pop\\_by\\_province/pop\\_by\\_province.html](http://www.statpak.gov.pk/depts/pco/statistics/pop_by_province/pop_by_province.html) and <http://esa.un.org/unpp> respectively. In the latter case, the country name has to be selected manually.

same sources as it is inclusive of increase in population contextually. Having explained the theoretical underpinnings of the present variable, it now seem appropriate to explain whether the law and order situation had worsened in 1958 to such an extent that it became inevitable to stage the coup to prevent the state from collapsing.

To begin with, as is obvious from Iskander Mirza's proclamation, one of the reasons/causes of the October coup was the deteriorating situation of law and order in the entire country especially East Pakistan. However, Mirza- and Ayub Khan for that matter- remained unable to define the parameters of law and order. Nor did they give any number of committed murders and riots in their respective addresses to the nation. Nonetheless, as per the study's governance framework, it is posited that murder and riots, see Table 7 below, are taking place since 1948 in Pakistan. In other words, the presence of murderers and riots is not a 1957 or 1958 phenomenon at all.


**Table 7 Murder & Riots per Million Population**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Murders per million pop.</b>	<b>Riots per million pop.</b>	<b>Pop. (million)</b>
1948	60	69	71.500
1949	49	66	73.500
1950	44	78	75.000
1951	37	58	76.808
1952	42	60	78.428
1953	44	63	80.082
1954	42	67	81.772
1955	40	58	83.498
1956	39	65	85.261
1957	42	74	87.061
1958	40	66	88.900
1959	35	59	90.777
1960	39	61	92.696
1961	43	69	93.831
1962	42	56	96.639
1963	42	61	98.674
1964	39	68	100.753
1965	42	64	102.876
1966	44	68	105.044
1967	43	70	107.258

Source: Pakistan Statistical Yearbook, 1959, 1968

Moreover, as per the model it was the civil bureaucracy who was in charge of the country in terms of principal since October 1951. Therefore, the reported crimes of murders and riots from October 1951 to October 1958 were logically and empirically committed under the very principalship of the civil bureaucracy. If there were any problems of law and order, it was the legal-administrative, if not moral, responsibility of the principal, whose leader was Mirza himself since 1955, to either prevent its occurrence or accept its responsibility. Neither of the two, however, happened as coup was the preferred choice of action. Regardless, if one looks at the trend of murders and riots- see Figure 1 below- committed from 1948 to 1958, it indicates relative decrease in both the categories.

**Figure 1 Trend: Murder and Riots per Million Population**



The Figure shows the principal's stress on problems of law and order as justification of the coup and consequent martial law is empirically/statistically unfounded. Nevertheless, before

Mirza could consolidate his institution's principalship over Pakistan, he was disgracefully sacked by agent military's leader, General Ayub Khan, within less than a month's time. Interestingly however, having assumed power Ayub Khan, in his first address to the nation, also tried to justify the takeover and military's direct intervention in politics on the basis of problems of law and order. Moreover, having assumed the reins of power, he vowed before the nation to maintain law and order which was deemed essential for the country's development especially economic. However, if one put his-led military rule under statistical scrutiny, as the Figure has done below, one notices that there was a rapid increase in both cases of murders and riots as the overall trend in both cases is going upward steadily.

Thus, in light of the study's statistical analysis, what, therefore, can be posited is that despite the oft-made claims by the principal military the problems of law and order remained not only there but also got deteriorated significantly. Moreover, the military despite its claims of modern weaponry and well-trained manpower remained unable to prevent the incidences of murders and riots. The presence of latter, according to this research, points to military domination of the political system as well as the political process. In addition, the general public, as a last resort, resorted to agitational politics to politically pressurize the regime. As a result, General-President Ayub Khan opted to give in, though rationally, in March 1969.

#### **4.2.2 Economic Variable**

Economic variables are simply a broader family of variables through which one measures economic trends or an economic phenomenon like economic (under-)development, (un)employment, markets for goods etc. However, these concepts are contested regarding their definition and/or measurement (see for example, Mankiw 2004:4-15, 64; Begg *et al* 2008:14-15, 377-394; Krugman and Wells 2009:2-6, 569-587). Especially, there are different historical debates/theories on defining development (see Huntington 1968). The bottom line, however, is that economic development is more than economic growth. Since the economic growth in developing countries is not equally shared, due to income/assets inequality and lack of equal opportunities, by majority of the people, other indicators of human well-being like education, health, freedom, water and sanitation are needed to be examined. The Human Development Index (HDI), which is developed by the development economists, incorporates three important dimensions of human well-being such as: a) life expectancy at birth, general health; b) literacy rate; c) GDP per capita- total income divided by total population (Haq 1995).



Finally, the evaluation of economic development includes economic growth as one of other determinants of development. However, high economic growth does not mean better economic development. Therefore, under the present variable the task would be twofold: one, to explain on the basis of empirical data whether in the pre-coup period the economic situation in terms of key (macro) economic indicators along with social sector development i.e. poverty incidence etc., was deteriorating; and two, to explain whether the economic problems, the military had cited at the time of the coup were resolved under the military rule. Finally, to avoid any sort of confusion related to the use of concepts such as economic development and/or economic growth, the study has, for the sake of clarity, accorded preference to merely macro/social economic indicators and hence has applied the term economic variable for reasons of neutrality and clarity.

Having outlined the conceptual basis for this variable it is deemed necessary to trace and explain the positive correspondence between worsening economic situation and consequent staging of the coup, for the economic factor was also cited as a justification. However, the author(s) did not define and conceptualize it properly. Hence, the subject demands a methodologically sound and theoretically enriched analysis. Therefore, one is urged to ask the following questions: first, whether the economic situation was worsening under the Mirza-led civil bureaucracy during 1952-58<sup>48</sup>; second, whether the economic problems were solved by the new principal- the military.

To begin with, having assumed the principalship the civil bureaucracy in strategic interaction with agent military and working politicians prioritized import-substitution. Resultantly, laboriously earned capital was invested on the importation of machinery for the capital-intensive industrialization since the country lacked the capital goods sector. Moreover, the agriculture sector- which was major contributor to GDP since 1947- was neglected in terms of resource allocation. Importantly, the securitization drive factored into the set of available choices. No wonder then, in order to appease the military and the opposition, defense expenditure was allowed to squeeze the allocations for the social sector- see Table 8 on the following page.

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<sup>48</sup> The study counts the period 1952-58 roughly since economic data, for this period, is not available on monthly or quarterly basis. In this regard, however, care is taken to maintain numerical balance by keeping the entire 1958- coup occurred on 7 October 1958- under the civil bureaucracy as 1951 is excluded from the latter's principalship- which it assumed on 26 October 1951.

**Table 8 Defense Expenditure: 1949-1958**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Defense Expenditure (Rs. million)</b>	<b>Percentage of the total Government Expenditure</b>
1947-48*	236.0	65.16
1948-49	461.5	71.32
1949-50	625.4	73.06
1950-51	649.9	51.32
1951-52	792.4	54.96
1952-53	725.7	56.68
1953-54	633.2	58.7
1954-55	640.5	57.5
1955-56	917.7	64.0
1956-57	800.9	60.1
1957-58	854.2	56.1
1958-59**	996.6	50.9

\* 15<sup>th</sup> August 1947 to 31 March 1948

\*\* 1 April 1958 to 30 June 1959

Source: Rizvi.2000.

As the Table shows, the civil bureaucracy opted to privilege the agent military due to rational reasons: namely, the latter was seen instrumental for law and order purposes; the military was appeased so as to make it work; and to give a political signal to other agents especially politicians that there is a collaborative interaction between the principal and the military. This also points out that both the principal and the agent(s) gave preference to their own than larger interest.

In addition, as a result of state's interventionist approach in terms of import-substitution, poor resource allocations to agriculture and social sectors etc., a certain resourceful section- for example, the migrant traders, large land-owners- of the population was able to extensively benefit by the economic policies.<sup>49</sup> Moreover, since the civil bureaucracy was the principal, its members especially at the top echelon also maximize economically. The sufferers, however, were the illiterate, non-sanitized and malnourished who lived both in the urban and rural sectors of both wings of the country. Importantly, the inter-wing socio-economic, if not politico-administrative, disparity further increased- see Table 9 on the following page.

<sup>49</sup> In order to see the extent of business-minded persons' collaboration with a military regime in Pakistan, see Hasan, Naveed. 1997. *Managing Practices and Business Development in Pakistan, 1947-1988*. Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company.

**Table 9 Index of Disparity in per Capita Income**  
**(West minus East, divided by West)**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Index of Disparity</b>
1949-50	17.9
1954-55	19.5
1959-60	24.5
1964-65	31.1
1969-70	37.9

Source: Ahmed, Viqar and Rashid Amajd. 1984. *The Management of Pakistan's Economy: 1947-1982*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.

What the Table informs is that the index of disparity remained low during the politicians' period- 1949-50. But, it witnessed a gradual increase during the principalship of the civil bureaucracy. Importantly, the Table marks the principal actor's rationality in terms of allocating more resources to the Western part at the expense of East Pakistan, for lesser resource-allocation to the Bengalis gave the principal politico-economic leverage vis-a-vis the former. However, this economic disparity, from the very beginning, entailed negative consequences for the state of Pakistan which shall be explained later in the chapter.

Nonetheless, Pakistan's aggregate economic performance remained sluggish during this period as Table 10 shows on the next page. This sluggish performance of the economy was, as mentioned above, caused none else but the principal civil bureaucracy itself due to its performance for certain economic measures which, indubitably, brought economic returns to not only the principal but also the working agents who rationally allied with its policies- the making and functioning of Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC) is a case in point (Hasan 1997:73-82).

Thus, in light of these quantitative evidences, it is posited that despite the overall sluggish economic performance the occurrence of coup cannot be ascribed to this variable since the coup and the subsequent martial law was carried out by the bureaucracy itself, though in strategic understanding with the military. Moreover, instead of conspiring coup with the agent military, Mirza, if not his institution, should have the moral courage to, on the one hand, accept the responsibility for the presence of growing inter-regional as well as poor-rich disparity and, on the other, leave the corridors of power. Interestingly however, President Mirza, as leader of the civil bureaucracy, hanged on to power until he was disgracefully

removed from the scene by General Ayub Khan. Also, the military under Ayub forced the civil bureaucracy to an agent position.

**Table 10 Annual Growth Rate, 1950-58, at 1959/60 Factor Cost (% per annum)**

Year*	Agriculture	Manufacturing		Wholesale and retail trade	Banking and insurance	Public administration and defense	Services	GDP
		Large scale	Small scale					
1950/1	2.6	23.5	2.3	6.1	9.1	2.5	4	3.9
1951/2	-9.1	18.7	2.4	0.5	10.0	4.0	4	-1.8
1952/3	0.2	23.6	2.2	0.6	7.6	-4.4	4	1.7
1953/4	13.6	28.7	2.3	6.3	8.5	-2.4	4	9.4
1954/5	-0.8	24.1	2.3	5.5	2.6	4.6	4	2.7
1955/6	2.1	17.5	2.3	2.3	21.5	1.6	4	3.4
1956/7	2.3	8.1	2.3	3.2	22.9	-2.6	4	3.0
1957/8	1.9	4.9	2.2	3.4	-1.7	-2.2	4	2.6
1950-54(ave.)	1.8	23.6	2.3	3.4	8.8	-0.1	4	3.3
1954-58(ave.)	1.4	13.6	2.3	3.6	11.3	0.4	4	2.9

\* The annual growth rate for 1950/1 means the rate for the period 1949/50 to 1950/1.

Source: Zaidi, S. Akbar. 2005. *Issues in Pakistan's Economy*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edn. Karachi: Oxford University Press.

Having assumed direct political power the military became the principal, as explained above, since its preference had prevailed. The replacement of civil bureaucracy as principal was an arbitrary act of power. However, the military was able to seek judicial legitimacy from the agent judiciary. Importantly, in the post-Mirza period, Ayub-led military also vowed, in line with General Ayub's October 8 address to the nation, to improve country's economic situation in the capacity of a self-appointed modernizing principal.

In this respect, the regime opted to disband many of the controls which were imposed post-Korean War. For example, the 1959 trade policy shifted the policy focus away from direct controls towards indirect controls on domestic goods' prices and imports. The Export Bonus Scheme stirred the process of liberalization viewed essential by the military for opening up the market, at least, for specific commodities (Hasan 1998:160-166). Also, the introduction of Open General License (OGL) and 'Free List' - importation of certain goods sans any license provided an opportunity to new traders to maximize their returns. The primary reason behind such a generous trade policy, however, was the extensive inflow of foreign aid whose volume increased from 2.5 per cent of GNP in the mid-1950s to 7 per cent of GNP in the mid-1960s.

Overall, the GNP grew annually at around 5.5% through both the second (1960-65) and third (1965-70) plans period (Zaidi 2005:98-100). Moreover, the large-scale manufacturing along with other sectors register growth especially during the first half of the decade. However, the outbreak of the 1965 war impeded the economic activities especially in the large-scale manufacturing sector. The Green Revolution, however, came as a rescue to the regime's development plans in the post-war period. As a result, the agriculture sector, which was neglected in the pre-coup period, was able to achieve considerable growth rate. The overall performance of the economy under the military rule can be viewed in the Table below:

**Table 11 Annual Growth Rate, 1958-70, at 1959/60 Factor Cost (%per annum)**

Year*	Agriculture	Manufacturing		Wholesale and retail trade	Banking and insurance	Public administration and defense	Services	GDP
		Large scale	Small scale					
1958/9	4.0	5.6	2.3	2.5	12.9	9.8	4.0	5.5
1959/60	0.3	2.7	2.3	5.9	22.1	-2.7	3.8	0.9
1960/1	-0.2	20.3	2.9	6.9	10.0	1.3	4.7	4.9
1961/2	6.2	19.9	2.9	7.8	8.5	3.9	4.0	6.0
1962/3	5.2	15.7	2.9	9.8	11.5	2.8	4.2	7.2
1963/4	2.5	15.5	2.9	10.1	8.9	9.7	4.0	6.5
1964/5	5.2	13.0	2.9	7.9	37.9	17.8	7.0	9.4
1965/6	0.5	10.8	2.9	8.7	10.9	56.5	1.1	7.6
1966/7	5.5	6.7	2.9	5.3	12.7	-14.4	4.3	3.1
1967/8	11.7	7.6	2.9	3.7	11.8	-2.5	4.0	6.8
1968/9	4.5	10.6	2.9	7.1	8.5	5.0	3.9	6.5
1969/70	9.5	13.9	3.0	10.9	19.4	3.6	6.8	9.8
1958-64(ave.)	3.0	13.3	2.7	7.2	12.3	4.1	4.1	5.2
1965-70(ave.)	6.2	10.4	2.9	7.2	16.9	11.0	4.5	7.2

\* The annual growth rate for 1958/9 means the rate for the period 1957/8 to 1958/9.

Source: Zaidi. 2005. *Issues in Pakistan's Economy*.

Nevertheless, the economic indicators in the table above present half the picture. They ignore the distributional aspect of economic growth in agriculture, industry and services vis-à-vis East Pakistan and resource-less section of the population generally.

Indeed, the model of economic development adopted in the sixties consciously promoted inequalities as a necessary precondition for successful economic growth. The doctrine of functional inequality was based on the premise that the initial stages of capitalist development required a high degree of inequality. This was due to the necessity of channeling resources to those classes which have a high savings rate. These high savings would be converted into investment, which would raise the rate of

economic growth. This model implied a diversion of resources towards industrialist in an effort to raise their incomes and, consequently, their savings. The model, associated with the works of G. Papanek and Mahbub-ul-Haq, was explicit in its distributional implications. The second five-year plan [indeed] warned that “it will be necessary to tolerate some initial *growth in income inequalities* to reach high levels of savings and investment”.

(Noman 1990:40)

As the Table and the quote show, in the absence of any mechanism for redistributive justice, the adopted policy framework helped divert resources to industrial capital in West Pakistan. Noticeably, this empirical development was viewed by majoritarian and rational Bengalis as further encroachment on their economic rights. In addition, the poor-rich disparity also grew in Pakistan, by and large. It was made public by economists such as Mahbub-ul-Haq that twenty two families owned between them 66% of industry, 97% of insurance and 80% of banking. Moreover, 65% of total loans disbursed, between 1958-1970, by the PICIC went to 37 monopoly houses of which the largest thirteen accounted for about 70 per cent of these loans (Noman 1990: 41; Zaidi 2005:102; also Hasan 1997:295-296).

Importantly, Ayub’s own son, Gohar Ayub, after having resigned from the army got engaged in business enterprises under the auspices of his father and parent institution- the military (Khan 2007:51). Interestingly however, he was criticized by the opposition politicians for gaining special privileges in terms of import licenses etc (Gauhar 1993:492). Besides, the resource allocation to the social sector especially education under the military rule was the worst in Asia. This neglect of social sector, during this period, contributed an annual population growth rate of 2.8% from 2.3%. Moreover, the industrial wage of workers fell despite a constant rise in per capita national income- see Table 12 below.

**Table 12 Index of Real Wages of Industrial Workers: 1967-68  
(Base Year 1954=100)**

West Pakistan		
	All industries	88.8
	Cotton textiles	76.9
East Pakistan		
	All industries	101.1
	Jute textiles	94.6

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Source: Noman, 1990.

The Table shows, on the one hand, the decrease in industrial wages cross-regionally and on the one other, it highlights the principal's priority in terms of ignoring the larger section of Pakistan's population. Importantly, the decrease in the wages is an indicator of the poor's worsening economic condition which, as is explained under law and order (large number of riots), made the front of agitational politics against Ayub-led military rule.

Last but not least, the projected high growth rate during the period under study was significantly based on foreign aid as hinted earlier. Little wonder then, in the 1960s in contrast to the earlier decade, the composition of external capital flow was overwhelmingly 96% compared to 62% in the 1950s in the form of grants and only 4% in the form of loan as compared to 48% in 1950s. This availability of easy finance led to extravagance even in development expenditure and actual costs often overran the estimated costs of projects by more than hundred percent. While aid undoubtedly contributed to a high rate of growth in the 1960s, it also imposed considerable burden on the country in terms of non-repayment as a larger proportion of foreign assistance became to be financed by loans rather than grants (Hasan 1998:156-166).

Another great disadvantage of the foreign assistance during the 1960s was that a high proportion of it was in terms of tied loans and involved the use of local financing for which the country lacked fiscal resources. By the end of 1967, Pakistan had contracted an external debt of \$3.7 billion. Moreover, a basic weakness of Pakistan's use of foreign aid during the 1960s was that much of the aid was spent on mega infrastructure projects, such as the shifting of capital to Islamabad and large irrigation projects which largely benefited the affluence in the country while little was done to show any compassion for the poor and those who did not benefit from the high growth in the 1960s. These feelings of disenchantment were capitalized by the military's opponents and helped to fuel riots in 1968 (see Papanek 1967:225; Amjad 1982: 12).

In addition, even the flow of the aid from the United States and the Western countries got suddenly stopped in 1965 as a result of war with India. To some extent, this was compensated

by aid from China especially for defense and establishment of heavy industries. However, the United States expressed its disapproval of Pakistan's leaning towards China and the Soviet Union, her enemy by then, by not pledging the aid which had been endorsed by the Consortium and, importantly, by canceling Ayub Khan's visit to Washington. Resultantly, Islamabad was left out in the cold during the war against India. Moreover, the myth that foreign aid was not politically motivated was exploded by the fiasco of the 1965 Consortium. Although in post-war period Washington chose to normalize its ties with Pakistan and agreed to support General Ayub Khan, the damage in prestige had been done and both his political power and economic strategy began to be questioned widely in the country. The resultant price hike (15% in 1966/67 from 10% in 1965-66), sugar crisis in 1967/68 along with growing inequality was perceived negatively by the masses especially in the Eastern wing (Noman 1990:40; Zaidi 2005:102-103). Indubitably, this became one of the reasons for anti-military rule riots as is mentioned above.

Therefore, as a result of agitational politics, General Ayub Khan, the leader of the principal military, preferred life over death and resigned in the best interests of his person and institution. Thus, in light of the ongoing quantitative explanation it is maintained that the military rule was able to project economic growth at the macroeconomic level. However, these growth indicators were heavily dependent on foreign aid. Moreover, the military regime remained unable to (re)distribute the benefits of even this aid-dependent growth. In other words, the rich, including the principal and its allied agents, grew richer and the poor grew poorer. Besides, the military regime's doctrine of functional inequality further increased inter-wing disparity which further widened the gulf between East and West Pakistan. Resultantly, the resource-less masses given the opportunity allied with the shirking politicians to register their anger and dissatisfaction in terms of agitational politics. Thus, by and large, the military remained unable to resolve country's economic problems. Hence, in light of the empirical evidences, it is maintained that the positive correspondence between the coup and economic variable is unfounded.

#### **4.2.3 Democratization Variable**

There is an abundance of literature on the concept of democratization (Diamond 2008:1-38, also 1992; Doorenspleet and Mudde 2008; Koelble and Lipuma 2008; O'Donnell 2007; Olson 2007; Fukuyama 2006; Ziblatt 2006; Croissant 2004; Morlino 2004; Xing 2001). However, the present research assumes it to be as a process embodying regular, free and fair



i.e. non-rigging by politicians and their parties, non-involvement of intelligent agencies to possibly factionalize, non-interference by the military with the Election Commission(er), and party-based elections i.e. at least major political parties of the day are not banned to participate in the electoral exercise by the respective military regime. Under this variable, the aim is to explain whether the country democratized in terms of achieving, at least, a semblance of electoral democracy under different military rules/regimes or not.

Having stated the conceptual parameters of democratization, the analytic narrative turns to the October coup in order to empirically, while remaining within the model's framework- explain the stated positive correspondence between coup and democratization. To begin with, the martial law proclamation, as already mentioned, had banned not only political parties but also political activity (Gauhar 1993:51-52). Furthermore, a new law was enforced by the military regime called Elective Bodies (Disqualification) Order, 1959 (EBDO). Under this law, the agents- in fact, a section of politicians and civil bureaucrats- had to be subjected to enquiry by tribunals either appointed by President Ayub Khan or governors- military appointees. The EBDO defined misconduct of a politician with the help of indicators such as any subversive activity, propagating any doctrine or committing an act which contributed to political instability, nepotism, favoritism, bribery, corruption, willful maladministration, diversion of public money and any other abuse of position or power (see Sayeed 1963-1964).

Moreover, the legal reach of EBDO was extensive with respect to 'elective bodies' as the latter included any assembly, board, committee etc. A tribunal for enquiry as mentioned in the law had to be composed of three members with the presiding officer being an incumbent or retired judge of the Supreme Court, the Federal Court or High Court; also a district and session judge, qualified to be appointed a High Court judge, could head a tribunal. This fact point to the principal's preference to reward those from the judiciary who preferred to work. In addition, as a punishment measure meant for those who may prefer to shirk, the EBDO could disqualify a person to become a member of any elective body until 31 December 1966. Furthermore, to be made to a politician, an officer could voluntarily retire from public life until 31 December 1966. As regards the operationalization of the law, many a politician of national standing- Ayub Khuhro, Suhrawarday, Qayyum Khan- came under its arbitrary and inhuman treatment. The disqualification of a section of politicians, it is posited, marked Ayub-led military's rationality. It, on the one hand, opted to harass yet non-EBDOed

politicians and, on the other hand, having disqualified a good number of them attempted to tilt the political leverage in its hands (ibid 1963-1964).

Besides, in line with her political interactive strategy, the military introduced another law, Basic Democracies Order, 1959, to democratize Pakistan in a manner 'people can understand and work' (Khan 1967) The system of Basic Democracies (BD) was initially a five-tier arrangement. They were: (a) union councils (rural areas), town and union committees (urban areas); (b) *thana* (sub-district) councils (East Pakistan), *tehsil* (sub-division) councils (West Pakistan); (c) district councils; (d) divisional councils; (e) provincial development advisory council. Organizationally, at the base of the system was the union council which consisted of one chairman and usually about 15 members- both elected (two-thirds) and nominated (one-third). Practically, the nomination was abolished by an amendment in 1962 (Friedman 1960 and 1961).

Importantly, under the 1959 Order, of the five councils, only the union and district councils had been given specific functions. The divisional and *thana* council were to perform mostly coordinative functions. The union council was supposed to perform a variety of functions such as agriculture, small industry, community development and increased food production in the union. Also, it was to maintain law and order through the rural police and adjudicate minor civil and criminal cases through its conciliation courts. Moreover, they were given the responsibility of planning and implementing rural public works programs for construction of roads, bridges and culverts, irrigation channels and embankments. The union council was empowered to levy taxes, impose rates, tolls and fees also. Nevertheless, the most important feature of the basic democracy system was that it formed the national electoral college consisting of 80,000 members from East and West Pakistan for the elections of President, members of national assembly and of the provincial assemblies.

What the afore-mentioned suggests is that the military chalked this brilliant plan of BD to explicitly democratize the country. However, this was not necessarily the case for the BD system was planned to possibly achieve certain objectives: a) to politicize the local populace with military virtues; b) to rationally interact with the local politicians directly giving them a choices either to ally or fear the EBDO; c) to depoliticize the provincial politics; d) to financially reward the working section of civil bureaucracy- after all they were to implement

if not make policies at the unit level; e) and importantly to politico-electorally legitimize the regime.

Little wonder then, on 14 February 1960, a referendum, where President- C-in-C- and army chief was the sole candidate was held. The basic but rational 75,283 democrats- with 95.6% turn out- elected Ayub Khan as president for next five years. Also, the elected president, through this Electoral College, was mandated to bless Pakistan with a constitution (Khan 2002:221). However, politicians and their political parties- disqualified or banned- did not accept this arbitrary and controlled referendum. They resorted to agitational politics to urge Ayub to hold free and fair elections if not to leave for good. Since, the regime after having consolidated itself administratively and relatively politically with the support of working bureaucrats and democrats chose to use coercive measures to control the shirking section. Consequently, massive arrests were carried out; and punishment was accorded.

Nonetheless, to further democratize the democrats- both basic and advanced- the president decided to set the rules of the game in terms of a new constitution. For this purpose, under the chairmanship of former CJ of Supreme Court, Justice Shahabuddin, a Constitution Commission was set up on 17 February 1960. The commission submitted its report on 29 April 1961; the politicians and political parties generally welcomed its recommendations except the adoption of separate electorate. However, Ayub unwelcomed it; he put the report before his cabinet to civilize it to the principal's standards. Not surprisingly then, the constitution, the country was given in 1962, was totally opposite to the Commission's report as well as politicians' expectation. In fact, it formally introduced a presidential form of government whereby the president was repository of all powers. Besides, the Objectives Resolution still remained in the preamble- much to the chagrin of the clergy. Moreover, unicameral legislature was introduced along with a centralized federal system. Importantly, it introduced indirect election by the basic democrats for the president, the national and provincial assemblies (ibid 2002:249-251, 254-282).

As the above shows, the Ayub-led military rationally determined the rules of the game. The underlying objective behind the politics of constitution was to retain the political leverage in its own hands. Therefore, all difficulties related to the election of national assembly and ministers' appointments were solved by the president under the Removal of Difficulties (Appointment of Ministers) Order, 1962. Moreover, all actions taken and proceedings carried

out by any martial law authority were given full protection under the Martial Law (Pending Proceedings and Protection) Order 1962. Importantly, indemnity was provided to all actions and proceedings in connection with the administration of martial law under Martial Law Orders (Repeal) Order 1962. In addition, the principal, by such measures, wanted to appease and reward the shirking and working politicians respectively (ibid:284).

However, despite attempts at civilianization by revoking either the Presidential Proclamation or issuing Presidential Orders, the opposition politicians especially from East Pakistan preferred not to compromise their agency and rationality. They saw more politico-economic cost in the acceptance of the principal's principles- rules of the game. As a result, they opted for agitational politics to demand their basic rights of speech, organization etc. The Ayub-led regime, however, having calculated the situation chose to undo the ban on political parties. Thus, the Political Parties Act of July 1962 provided a political opportunity not only to opposition politicians but also allied ones to strategically interact with each other to maximize their returns.

In fact, the military under Ayub did the same. She was able to ally a section of personalistic politicians from the Muslim League who had named their faction Muslim League Convention- the non-allied section called its faction Muslim League Council. In December 1963, the Convention League chose unanimously President-Army Chief- C-in-C Ayub Khan its President. Moreover, the country's President assumed party's presidency in order to not only deal with opposition politicians more effectively but also fight the next presidential election politically least controversially since under the 1962 Constitution the President's term was to expire on 14 February 1965. Therefore, the presidential election was scheduled to be held on 2 January 1965 followed by election for new assemblies- both national and provincial.

No wonder then, Ayub Khan decided to contest it: thus, he was the candidate from the ML-Convention. The opposition political parties, on their part, were able to unite under an umbrella organization named Combined Opposition Parties (COP). However, they struggled to nominate their presidential candidate. After many negotiations, the COP was, somehow, able to convince Miss Fatima Jinnah- M.A. Jinnah's sister- to fight against General Ayub Khan electorally. However, before the presidential election could take place, the constitution required the election for a new electoral college – which would then elect the new president.

Hence, the election for a new college was scheduled for November 1964. During the run-up to the election, the COP, despite its internal differences, decided to give government a tough time. It demanded the withdrawal of Press and Public Ordinance, the Loudspeaker Ordinance and the Public Safety Act. Also, it complained to Election Commission about Gerrymandering and faulty voters' list. However, the agent EC, on its part, saw everything green. Resultantly, on the election day, out of Electoral College's 80,000 members, 3,282 (around 4.5%) were selected by the government's political agents from the tribal areas; 32,000 (around 40%) happened to be sitting Democrats. Both these categories, as mentioned earlier, were administratively and judicially facilitated by principal-led agents- civil bureaucracy and judiciary. If rationality is a guide, they were then supposed to vote for Ayub Khan on January 2 (see Mujahid 1965).

The COP, on its part, was campaigning rationally too. Though it knew its disadvantages vis-à-vis the principal and its agent section of politicians, it campaigned massively and enthusiastically in order to possibly urge the masses to stir, in turn, their respective Democrats to vote for Miss Fatima. In this respect, the COP left no stone unturned to criticize Ayub's failed domestic and foreign/defense policies. Indeed, they highlighted the malpractices in terms of corruption, misuse of authority etc., by his close associates including his sons. The Ayub side, at its end, never hesitated to label the COP, especially its Eastern component, traitors and unpatriotic.

Nevertheless, election took place as scheduled. Ayub Khan was able to poll 49,951 Democrats and Miss Fatima was honored by 28,691 Democrats. K.M. Kamal and Mian Bashir Ahmad, the minnows, were able to only poll 183 and 65 votes respectively. From East-West Pakistan perspective, Ayub got 28,939 against Jinnah's 10,257 in the West; in the East, the former obtained 21,012 against latter's 18,434 votes. In addition, the Electoral College elected members to the national and provincial Assemblies also. The majority of the elected, however, was in political alliance with Ayub. Expectedly, the opposition refused to accept the results and accorded a preference for agitational politics. Consequently, many innocent lost their lives (Khan 2002:303-315; also Gauhar 1993:61-67).

To summarize, after the October coup shirking politicians were arbitrarily banned and disqualified from politics respectively. General Ayub, as a sole candidate, was able to get himself elected as president through a controversial referendum by the Basic Democracies

system- a brainchild of Ayub's regime to legitimize his regime. The Democrats opted to work rationally to accrue politico-economic benefits. Moreover, the constitution the principal military gave to Pakistan was primarily a rationally devised mechanism to set the rules of the game on the principal's terms. Therefore, the indirect presidential and assemblies' elections- which were comprehensively rigged- was a further attempt to legitimize the otherwise illegitimate, illegal and immoral regime. The working politicians, while preferring own to national interests helped the former to achieve this all. Thus, in light of the foregoing explanation it is maintained that the attempts at democratization were actually attempts at de-democratization. Hence, the positive co-relation between this variable and the coup could only be defended at the expense of empirical evidences as presented in this section.

#### **4.2.4 Securitization Variable**

This variable ostensibly pertains to the country's internal/external security. The study, however, tends to rely on the concept of securitization over security due to the latter's encompassing and confusing nature i.e. military, socio-cultural, political, human and comprehensive security. On the other hand,

The concept of securitization introduced by the Copenhagen School in the early 1990s is of particular relevance in understanding the security scenario in South Asia, as well as the role of mass media. Securitization involves the interpretation of security as a social construct and as an effect of mobilization. It is the process of raising security issues above politics so that they are made unquestionable...An important aspect as enunciated by the Copenhagen School is to create an awareness of the arbitrary nature of 'threats', to stimulate the thought that the foundation of any national security policy is not given by 'nature' but chosen by politicians and decision-makers who have an interest in defining it in just that way. Dominant sections of society identify and create the enemies of the state through the process of discourse by labeling them as enemies, or as threats to national security, etc...

(Teresa 2009:20-21)

As the above shows the very concept of security (threat) is primarily 'constructed' by policy makers. In the context of Pakistan, securitization is assumed to be a process by which the

military attempts to not only perceive<sup>50</sup> but also construct an enemy. Moreover, as regards its operationalization, it is aimed at militarily securing/defending the state against internal i.e. insurgencies, civil wars, large-scale terrorism etc., and external i.e. wars, cross-border infiltration etc., threats. In other words, securitization, in view of the present research, is two-dimensional: subjectively, it is purely a domain of the military especially its defense establishment; objectively, it is operationalized to militarily secure the state against internal as well as external (objectified) threats.

Having described the conceptual parameters of securitization the study now attempts a critical analysis of positive correspondence between this variable and the coup. As is explained in the previous chapter, after the creation of Pakistan's state, it was the politicians who assumed the official responsibility to perceive any security related threat from anywhere. However, in the post-Liaquat period the civil bureaucracy having become the principal position did the same in a strategic interaction with the military. In October 1958, after disposing Mirza, the military under Ayub assumed the principal's seat and thus became a direct maker and implementer for that matter of country's domestic and foreign policies. Moreover, the study also explained that the bone of contention between India and Pakistan was the issue of Kashmir over which the two states fought a war in 1947-48.

Nonetheless, under direct military rule, Pakistan did not face any grave security threat from anywhere. Indeed, in 1958-59, Ayub Khan gave vent to entering into a security pact with neighboring India. However, the move was restrained due to country's alliances with the US- the SEATO and CENTO are cases in point. Nevertheless, under the Ayub-led military Pakistan signed Indus Waters Treaty with India in September 1960.<sup>51</sup> In addition, though Afghanistan, in the mid 1950s, attempted to disclaim the Durand Line, the two countries stopped short of any military escalation in terms of a war. Domestically, the Baloch tried to challenge the writ of the state. However, they were militarily dealt with in March 1959. Thus, as the foregoing suggests, at the time of October coup the country did never face any internal and external threat as such and therefore the invocation of securitization variable is

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<sup>50</sup> The perception and construction of 'threat' by the military as the principal is post-October 1958 phenomenon- see Chapter 3 in this respect.

<sup>51</sup> India's Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru visited Karachi for this purpose. This fact clearly points to the military's rationality regarding the 'political' and 'economic' nature of Kashmir and Indus 'waters' respectively (see Khan 1967:107).

empirically unfounded. However, in order to see whether the state of Pakistan got securitized under the military rule, the following is an exercise in this respect.

To begin with, minor incidents, after the cease-fire in Kashmir in 1949, on the Indo-Pakistan border and the cease-fire line in Kashmir were observed. However, 'the tension between the two countries did not burst into a large scale war until April 1965.' (Rizvi 2000:139). The trouble started in January-March in Rann of Kutch- a desolate wasteland in the southeast extremity of Pakistan (approx. 22,000 square kms in area) separating the Sindh (Pakistan) from Gujarat (India)- when the Indian troops moved in the area due to its undemarcated nature. On 4 April, a Pakistani outpost at Ding was captured by the Indian Army. Subsequently, Pakistan moved her forces in the area lying between Chadd Bet and Beir Bet which led to a full-scale war in the two states in the Rann of Kutch. However, before the conflict escalated to other parts of the two countries, the two, in June, were able to reach, though with British mediation, a cease-fire agreement which provided for the restoration of 1 January 1965 position and submission of the issue to either talks or a three-member arbitrational tribunal (Cheema 2002:67-68).

Ironically enough, after military de-escalation, cease-fire agreement and submission of the Kutch affair to arbitration, the Pakistani side opted, in August, for military operations- Gibraltar and Grand Slam- in Kashmir with an explicit objective to take Kashmir with the help of the Kashmiris from India. However, the Kashmiris' non-military attitude might have come as a surprise, if not a blow, to Pakistani planners. On the one hand, the Indian Army retaliated in time and occupied the critical passes in Kargil and, on the other, she was able to occupy two strategically important points in the Pakistani part of Kashmir- Tithwal and Haji Pir. Despite all this, on 1 September, the Pakistani military decided to cross the cease-fire line and attempted to move in Chamb-Akhnur sector. However, due to change of command at the critical juncture, poor organization, lack of coordination and poor planning, it remained unable to achieve the desired objective in Kashmir. Meanwhile, the Indian military probably surprised its counterpart by preferring to cross the international boarder in the Punjab sector on 6 September to engage Pakistan outside-of-Kashmir. Thus, since 1947/48 it was the first occasion when the war spread not only along the cease-fire line but also India-(West)



Pakistan-proper border. Quite strangely, however, the two sides restraint somehow to engage militarily in East Pakistan (Khan<sup>52</sup> 1993:234).

The war lasted for 17 days. During the war, the Pakistan side remained unable to get expected military support from its allies especially Washington. On the other hand, India received positive diplomatic support especially from Moscow. Nevertheless, the two states ranked the international and local input into their respective preference-order and agreed to accept, on 23 September 1965, a Security Council Resolution calling for a cease-fire. Moreover, Moscow's diplomacy was able to urge the two sides to formalize their respective cost and benefits in Tashkent. As a result, after week-long negotiations, whereby Kosygin was a participant also, General Ayub and Prime Minister Shastri signed a declaration not to have recourse to force, and settle their disputes through peaceful means. Also, they agreed to withdraw their troops to 5 August position- the pre-hostilities point (Rizvi 1993:18-22).

Subsequently, the diplomatic missions between the two countries started to function normally. However, besides post-war roadmap to normalization what this full-scale war informs is that Pakistani military remained unable to achieve its Kashmir objective. In fact, it had to face the Indian onslaught on Pakistan proper. Importantly, the principal military failed to securitize East Pakistan where the Bengalis were left to God if not the Indians. Indeed, the opposition politicians in West and especially in East Pakistan took Ayub regime on for its failure on the securitization project. Thus, in light of the foregoing it is suffice to posit that the principal, despite its claims and military operations, remained unable to securitize the state in terms of integrating Kashmir and importantly securing the Eastern Wing militarily. Hence, this variable also does not qualify as a reason and/ or cause of the coup.

To summarize, in the preceding sections the study conducted an analytic narrative of the coup with the help of four conceptual variables drawn from the coup/martial law proclamation as issued by President Mirza in strategic understating with the agent military. Under the law and order variable it was maintained, on empirical grounds, that civil bureaucracy failed, on the one hand, to ensure high governance in the pre-coup period, and on the other, to accept the administrative-moral responsibility for this failure. Ironically however, Iskander Mirza, the

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<sup>52</sup> Lieutenant-General Gul Hassan held several important appointments in the Pakistan Army: he was Director Military Operations during the 1965 war and Chief of General Staff during the 1971 war. In December 1971, he assumed command of the Army, and was its last Commander-in-Chief. He died in 1999.

leader of the principal bureaucracy, declared martial law in Pakistan on October 7, 1958 and appointed General Ayub Khan as Chief Martial Law Administrator. However, within a few weeks after the coup, the military sacked Mirza and assumed the principal position. Having assumed direct power, the military attempted to, in line with General Ayub's 8 October address, maintain law and order. However, with the help of Mitra's definition of governance-murder and riots per million population- the study quantitatively showed that the military remained unable to achieve this objective. Instead, Ayub-led military's policies were perceived negatively by the resource-less who took to streets especially during 1968 and early 1969.

Under the economic variable it was posited, on the basis of quantitative data, that despite military's efforts to boost economic growth, as indeed it claimed, the country's economic situation did not change meaningfully for the beneficiaries of the regime's policies were not the poorer section of the society but rather a few families including those of Ayub's and working politicians. Moreover, the macroeconomic indicators which the principal military boasted of were primarily a result of foreign aid. Importantly, the regime's economic policies further increased the rich-poor and East-West socio-economic inequality, with the result that the disaffected left no opportunity to register its dissatisfaction in terms of agitational politics.

Similarly, though the military claimed to democratize the nation by introducing it to a referendum, a constitution, a system of basic democracies, indirect elections to national/provincial assemblies, these measures pointed, as the study explained, to the opposite: de-democratization. Because each of these measures was politically motivated whereby the objective was to, on the one hand, electorally legitimize the regime, and on the other, to depoliticize the shirking politicians especially provincially. Importantly, the concentration of political power in the principal's hands further sowed seeds of alienation and deprivation among the majority Bengalis- this shall be explained in detail later in the chapter. Moreover, the principal also remained unable to securitize the state despite claims and military operations such as Gibraltar. The latter culminated into a full-scale war with India in Kashmir in 1965. Though with foreign mediation the two states were able to show restraint, Ayub-led military could not take Kashmir from India. Besides, another negative aspect of the war was that it exposed military's lack of vision and policy to defend East Pakistan.

Last but not least, the analysis also shows that the study's hypotheses could not be refuted for the positive correspondence between coup and the mentioned variables could not be established empirically. Hence, the study moves from here to its casual model in order to explain the occurrence of the October coup. The following sections shall deal with it.

### **4.3 Military Agency: Causing the Coup**

As the preceding sections show none of the reasons/factors Mirza and then Ayub-led military cited was present empirically. Therefore, the study attempts to locate and explain the reason/cause behind the military's overt intervention in politics. To begin with, the critically reviewed literature such as structuralist accounts and the afore-mentioned conceptual variables remain unable to explain military intervention in Pakistan's politics. Hence, in light of our model it is posited that the agent but rational military was able to stage the coup on account of its inherent agency- its ability to affect change or get things done by and for itself. In other words, as a rational actor with the inherent ability to make things happen, the military chose to shirk in order to transform its institutional position from an agent to principal (agency A). In this respect, the cost-benefits analysis especially in the pre-coup period and the strategy vis-à-vis concerned rational actors to attempt a successful coup marks military's agency and rationality, empirically.

Moreover, emphasizing and highlighting the military's rational action to stage the coup it is maintained that the primary reason/objective behind the act of extreme shirking- or agency A- is its preference to maximize its own interests- hence agency B. The nature and kind of interests, as stated in the model, is primarily political and economic respectively. The coup itself points to the first set of interests for it is through successful coup that political power is captured to be able to negotiate rules of the game in the capacity of principal, as was explained under the democratization variable, and then facilitate economic interests- this shall be subject of the subsequent section since it is one of hypotheses of the research.

Importantly, the military's political interests are not caused, as is explained in Chapter 2, by any exogenous factor i.e. socio-economic conditions or structure etc. Rather, they are inherent in soldiers who as rational human being constitute and represent the military as an institution. Viewed from this angle, the latter's political interests are at par with those of civil bureaucrats, judges and politicians. After all, who is not a maximizer given opportunity, capacity and importantly interest(s)?

Moreover, in light of the foregoing it is posited that the act of coup and consequent martial law is not an indicator of military's *given* political control, influence or strength and/or structure as is commonly understood. Had this been the case she would not have taken the pain to leave barracks, stage a coup, make administrative plans, issue orders and regulations, arrest the shirking actors, make announcements about good governance and better economy, make political alliances with the politicians, contest elections, wage war and ultimately face the music. Therefore, as per hypothesis it is maintained that the coup marks military's political weakness vis-à-vis other actors rather than her strength. As the present case shows, being politically weak and constrained vis-à-vis politicians and civil bureaucracy, it having calculated cost and benefits opted to collaborate and share the burden of coup-making with the civil bureaucracy and then replace the latter.

Moreover, as mentioned above having directly assumed political power, the military prioritized to negotiate rules of the game with the agents on its term- the martial law rules and regulations and the 1962 constitution are a few examples. However, the direct assumption of political power indicated military's comparative politico-institutional strength vis-à-vis other actors involved in the game. But, it remained politically *a* dominant actor among others *contextually*, and not structurally, ethnically, Islamically etc. Importantly, as per hypothesis, the military having directly intervened in politics tends to operationalize its political power to maximize its economic interests. The following section shall attempt to explain it.

#### **4.3.1 Maximizing Economic Interests**

As explained in the previous section that the coup was political in nature. It was staged to primarily achieve political power. The latter was then used as an instrument to maximize economic interests.<sup>53</sup> In this section, an attempt is made to provide a quantitative-qualitative picture of the military's economic activities.<sup>54</sup> The primary aim of this section is to test H2: military's political power facilitates its economic interests.

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<sup>53</sup> The term economic interests should not be confused with the military's budgetary benefits such as defense allocation, for the latter had neither empirical relevance with the military's principalship- see Table 8- nor is it amongst the aims of the present study. Rather, the term pertains to the military's economic activities in the (free) market as an independent actor- indeed at par with other actors such as industrialists etc. Importantly, as critically analyzed in Chapter 2, the military's economic activities are an indicator of its agency and rationality- the study's explanatory variables- rather than a product of (feudal) culture, structure and/or military 'control'.

<sup>54</sup> This also includes individual efforts (by some General etc.,) to make money. This and similar sections in Chapters 5 and 7 shall highlight any individual/private gain empirically.

To begin with, the military after having directly assumed the reign of political power started allocating state land especially agricultural to itself. For this purpose, the Colonization of Land Act 1912 was amended arbitrarily. This Act was used as a legal instrument to grant land to military men at highly subsidized rates- varying from Rs.20-60 per acre. Table 13 below describes it in unequivocal terms:

**Table 13 Land Allotment to Military Personnel: 1965-2003**

<b>District</b>	<b>Province</b>	<b>Acreage</b>
DI Khan	NWFP	185,000
Muzaffargarh	Punjab	173,000.7
DG Khan	Punjab	153,000.5
Rajanpur	Punjab	133,000.3
Vehari	Punjab	170,987
Pakpattan	Punjab	193,676
Multan	Punjab	123,793
Khanewal	Punjab	143,283
Sahiwal	Punjab	173,407
Lahore	Punjab	273,413
Kasur	Punjab	387,283
Sheikhupura	Punjab	193,863
<b>Total</b>		<b>2,303,706.5</b>

Source: Siddiq. 2007. *Military Inc.*

Moreover, this land allocation/acquisition method was highly arbitrary. For example, Ayub Khan, as leader of the principal military, arbitrarily gave (see Table 14 on the next page) this ‘colonized land’ to military personnel, which was brought under cultivation by construction of new water sources i.e. barrages, dam. Precisely, under the policy, ten per cent of the land reclaimed through construction of three dams- Guddu, Kotri and Ghulam Mohammad in the Southern Sindh (1955-62) - was granted to military personnel. As a result, about nine million acres of land was reclaimed of which one million acres were granted to military men. However, the senior generals were able to accrue more benefits- General Ayub Khan (247 acres), General Muhammad Musa (250 acres) and General Umrao Khan (246 acres)- from the scheme. Importantly, the defense establishment had the capability to bring any state land under its control ostensibly for ‘public purpose’ by enacting the Land Acquisition Act 1894.

The military used its political principalship to fix the meaning of public purpose in terms of redistribution of the land for its officers' personal benefits.

**Table 14 Land Entitlement for Military Personnel**

<b>Rank</b>	<b>Acreage</b>
Maj.Gen. and above	240 acres
Brigadiers and Colonels	150 acres
Lt.-Colonels	124 acres
Lieutenants to Majors	100 acres
JCOs	64 acres
NCOs and other Ranks	32 acres

Source: Rizvi. 2000.

Moreover, the maximizing military had an interest and ability to transfer urban land for its personnel. This phenomenon is historically post-Partition when the officers started obtaining land on 'lease' in the cantonments. Primarily, it was the immigrant military officers who were granted the evacuee property in the cantonment areas. In the subsequent period, a considerable number of non-immigrant officers were also able to obtain this land on account of their seniority or prominence- General Azam Khan, among others, is a case in point. The grant of this land to military officers on a 99-year transferable lease was extendable especially in cases where the officers happen to own the property. In addition, there was no bar regarding re-sale of the lease or any tax imposed on profit gained through its sale.

Moreover, in the 1960s the army demanded 12,000 acres of agricultural land transferred to those military personnel affected by the construction of Islamabad- the capital. Furthermore, in 1962-63 the military's construction arm - the Frontier Works Organization (FWO) - built a 'temporary camp' on privately owned land; the owners were given the impression that it would be vacated when the task of road construction was finished. However, the camp was arbitrarily made permanent without giving any compensation to its owners. In a similar case in Chamman district, Balochistan, 200 acres of privately owned land was occupied by the army which established itself in the district in 1963-64.

Besides, as mentioned in Chapter 3, the Fauji Foundation (FF), which was established in 1954 ostensibly providing for its personnel's welfare, was further consolidated and expanded in terms of infrastructure and resource allocation by the Ayub-led military. The FF invested

in a variety of industrial unit such as tobacco, sugar and textile production in both wings of the country. For example, in West Pakistan the Foundation made investments in the acquisition/establishment of the Khyber Tobacco Company (Mardan), a cereal manufacturing factory at Dhamial (Rawalpindi), a sugar mill at Tando Mohammad Khan (Sindh), and a textile factory at Jehlum. In the Eastern Wing, the Foundation was able to acquire/establish East Pakistan Lamps and East Pakistan Electrical Industries (Dhaka), a rice mill at Rangpur, a flour mill at Chittagong and a jute mill nearby Dhaka. Furthermore, the FF had financial stakes in Fauji Ceramics and West Pakistan Lamps Ltd also- however they were liquidated later on (Siddiqi 2007:131).

What the afore-mentioned informs is that the focus of FF's infrastructural development remained in the West. Moreover, since the investment came primarily from West Pakistan-based military and the returns also went to the principal, the resentment of majority Bengalis was quite natural. This fact is also reflective of regime's overall economic policies which increased inter-wing disparity as is already explained. However, the military projected the FF's enterprise as a source of national development. Nonetheless, in light of the cited empirical evidences it is maintained that the practices of (state) land acquisition and expansion of FF's businesses certainly mark military's rationality in terms preferring own to larger interest.

Besides, to maximize profit at the organizational level of involvement, the Frontier Works Organization was established in 1966. Its primary task was to construct the 805 km Karakoram Highway (KKH). For this purpose, the army's corps of engineering was used. Though initially the organization was kept under the ministry of communication, it was brought under the direct administrative control of the ministry of defense (MoD) later on. Interestingly however, in the post-construction of KKH period, the FWO got never disbanded. Rather, it was viewed as a reserve force to be utilized in any unforeseen situation i.e. conflict, emergency. However, with the passage of time, the Organization got engaged in commercial activities.<sup>55</sup>

Last but not least, the military's political rule was instrumental to provide economic opportunities for its individuals, both serving and retired, too. In this respect, Rizvi observed

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<sup>55</sup> <http://fwo.com.pk/>

During this period [1962-69], the senior military positions became a ladder for lucrative jobs in the public and private sectors. A good number of retired Lieutenant-General, Major-General and Brigadiers, and their equivalent ranks in the other services, were provided with top positions in government and semi-governmental corporations, autonomous bodies and boards, where they could draw handsome salaries and other facilities...Some of the senior military officers resigned their posts to take up some of these positions. A large number of military officers were absorbed in various factories and mills run by the armed forces. In 1960, the central and provincial governments fixed a quota in various services for the retired military personnel and agreed to make some concessions in education, age and other qualifications for them. Some of the senior officers were appointed ambassadors in foreign countries...The recruitment to the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) was made open to the officers of the military in 1960 [also].

(2000:128-130)

In addition, as mentioned earlier in the chapter, President-General Ayub Khan was criticized by the opposition politicians for privileging his own son, Gohar Ayub. The latter, as mentioned earlier, accorded more preference to business than army service.

To summarize, the October coup was a result of military's inherent agency. Being a rational actor, it saw more benefits than cost to perform this action. The latter was, however, political in nature as the primary aim of the exercise was to capture political power. Having obtained the political power, the military was able to replace civil bureaucracy as principal for its preference had already prevailed. In the capacity of Pakistan's principal, it started negotiating rules of the game with the concerned agent actors. Of the latter, a section from the judiciary and politicians rationally chose to ally with the regime in order to accrue more politico-economic benefits. Importantly, the military herself used politics as an instrument to maximize economic returns. However, the military's political rule and its involvement in economic activities was a major source of alienation and deprivation among the resource-less section of population. Especially, the regime's political and economic policies further increased political and socio-economic inequality among the Bengalis. Consequently, the latter along with the affected sections from the West opted to challenge the military rule in terms of agitational politics. The following sections of the chapter shall explain it in detail.



#### **4.4 Actors and Agency: Explaining the Second Coup**

As is explained in the preceding sections, the military's political and economic policies had increased not only political and socio-economic inequality but also caused deep resentment among the affected section of the population i.e. poor workers, students etc. The latter ultimately chose to capitalize any opportunity to register its anger and grief. In this respect, the shirking politicians from both wings of the country- Bhutto and Mujib are cases in point- afforded them with political platforms to start agitational politics. Consequently, the agitational politics of the late 1960s gradually transformed into a movement against military rule. Riots became an order of the day- see Table 9 in this respect.

Thus, in such a deteriorating politico-economic and law and order situation the military-technically under General Yahya's command- negotiated an intra-military solution of the problem. It had a few choices at its disposal: a) to urge Ayub Khan to resign as president and pave the way for general elections; b) to let the civilian dispensation continue without Ayub; c) to declare martial law. All the three choices entailed more cost than benefits. Of the three, the last choice was fraught with obvious danger- martial law meant giving fodder to the opposition. The first choice was also dangerous: elections entailed the opposition especially the Awami League, in power. The second choice was seemingly less dangerous than the first and third. However, the absence of Ayub would have further strengthened the already demanding opposition.

Nevertheless, General Ayub Khan, being a rational military-man, enacted the last choice in the larger interests of his institution. Therefore, on 25 March 1969, while addressing the nation he said:

The situation in the country is fast deteriorating. The administrative institutions are being paralyzed...The mobs are resorting to Gheraos [closed-ins] at will, and get their demand accepted under duress...The economy of the country has been crippled; factories are closing down and production is dwindling every day...It is impossible for me to preside over the destruction of our country...Every problem of the country is being decided in the streets. Except for the Armed Forces there is no constitutional and effective way to meet the situation. The whole nation demands that General Yahya Khan, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, should fulfill his constitutional responsibilities. The Pakistan Navy and the Air Force are with him...The security of the country demands that no impediment be placed in the way

of the Defense Forces and they should be enabled to carry out freely their legal duties. In view of this, I have decided to relinquish today the office of the President.

(Rizvi 2000:Appendix E)

From the quote the conclusion is self-evident. The general, quite strangely, cited the same reasons/problems to hand over authority to another general which he referred to justify his martial law a decade ago. However, as per his address, the authority was handed over to army chief/C-in-C rather than the speaker of the National Assembly as stipulated in the rules of the games. Having taken the formal charge as leader of the principal, General Yahya Khan did not waste time to coup away the civilian face of the regime.

Interestingly enough, the act of coup did not mark the military's comparative strength, 'control' and/or 'embedded influence', as is argued by Siddiqa (2007) and Aziz (2008) respectively. Had this been the case, the military would not have to intervene and wrap up its laboriously constructed political dispensation. Or had it really been in control of politicians it would have instantly replaced unpopular president by some working politician.

Therefore, it is posited that the accounts, which believe in military control and/or embedded influence, remain empirically and theoretically unable to appreciate the realistic and logical importance of context, rationality and agency of the actors strategically engaged with each other and among themselves in the complex game of civil-military relations of Pakistan. The following sections tend to conduct an analytic narrative of the March coup in order to explain its causes and implications for politics and the state in Pakistan.

#### **4.5 An Analytic Narrative of the Coup**

The primary aim of this and subsequent sections is to explain why the coup was caused in the first place. What purpose did it serve? How did the military view the event itself? Moreover, the secondary aim shall be to test posed hypotheses in light of the analytic narrative. Before the analysis proceeds any further, it seems not inappropriate first to mention the coup/martial law text which was read to the nation to justify the action. In this regard, see Box 4.3 on the next page:

**Box 4.3 Excerpts from General Yahya's Proclamation, 26 March 1969**

As we all know, his [Ayub Khan] effort did not meet with success. He, therefore, called upon me to carry out my prime duty of *protecting this country from utter destruction*...I have imposed *Martial Law* throughout Pakistan...the *situation has deteriorated to such an extent that normal law enforcing methods have become totally ineffective*... *Serious damage of life and property has occurred*...*Production has gone down to a dangerously low level and the economy generally has suffered an unprecedented set-back*...The armed forces could not remain idle spectators ...My sole aim in imposing *Martial Law* is to *protect life, liberty and property* ...I wish to make it absolutely clear to you that I have no ambition other than *the creation of conditions constructive to the establishment of a constitutional Government*...They [Armed Forces] have never regarded any sacrifice as too great *to ensure and enhance the security and the glory of Pakistan*...[italics mine]

(Rizvi 2000:Appendix F)

The conceptual variables identified in the above quote are the following:

A = *protecting this country from utter destruction; situation has deteriorated to such an extent that normal law enforcing methods have become totally ineffective; Serious damage of life and property has occurred* (law and order variable)

B = *Production has gone down to a dangerously low; economy generally has suffered an unprecedented set-back* (economic variable)

C = *the creation of conditions constructive to the establishment of a constitutional Government* (democratization variable)

D = *protect life, liberty and property; to ensure and enhance the security and the glory of Pakistan* ((securitization variable)

E = *martial law [coup]* (policy variable)

Based on the text above, the main causal relations observed are:

1. The law and order situation has deteriorated to such an extent that the military has to intervene. Thus, the coup was staged and martial law declared: A  $\xrightarrow{+}$  E (positive relationship)
2. The country's economic situation has worsened extremely. Thus, the military intervened to uplift Pakistan economically: B  $\xrightarrow{+}$  E (positive relationship)
3. The martial law government would create conditions i.e. elections, so that Pakistan could gradually become a constitutional state: C  $\xrightarrow{+}$  E

(positive relationship)

4. Since the law and order machinery has become dysfunctional, it is the military which would protect and secure the people of Pakistan:  $D \xrightarrow{+} E$

(positive relationship)

The following observations can be drawn in light of the above:

- The March coup and consequent martial law is justified by General Yahya Khan-led military on accounts of problems related to law and order, economy as well as the need for democratization and securitization;
- Law and order and economic problems are cited as the major reasons/causes due to their highly negative effects both on society and the state;
- Democratization and securitization are cited as complementary reasons/causes of the coup;
- The coup/martial law is seen and projected by the military as a panacea to the stated problems Pakistan suffered from;
- The military has the will and capacity to carry out these projects.

What the foregoing suggests is that the Yahya-led military provided the nation with certain reasons to stage the coup and impose martial law. From the military's point of view these reasons were self-evident. Interestingly, in this case the judiciary gave its judgment after the martial law had been lifted- Chapter 5 would explain it in detail. Thus, it becomes necessary to explain the positive relationship between the stated conceptual variables for no claim, logically and morally, be accepted without evidence and arguments in its support. Since the military did not define, let alone quantify, problems of law and order and economy etc., the following sections tend to take each conceptual variable in order to , on the one hand, see whether the military's claims are empirically justified, and on the other, test the study's hypotheses.

#### **4.5.1 Law and Order Variable**

As General Yahya's proclamation serves as point of reference and departure, it becomes obvious that having assumed power the military under him attempted to legitimize the coup and consequent martial law on the basis of poor law and order. This attempt at self-legitimation, as explained under the same variable earlier in the Chapter, is self-contradictory

since the military, under General Ayub Khan, had already failed to fulfill the acclaimed responsibility.

Regardless, having taken the principal military's claim as granted the present research attempts to put it on the touchstone of empirical evidence- see Table 15 below, in conjunction with Figure 2 on the next page. In order to statistically explain law and order the study has, in the absence of data on murders and riots in East Pakistan during 1969-1971- possibly due to war- relied on West Pakistan only, to conduct a comparative analysis of problems of law and order during Ayub and Yahya- led military rule respectively.

**Table 15 Murder and Riots per Million Population**


<b>Year</b>	<b>Murders per million pop.</b>	<b>Riots per million pop.</b>	<b>Pop. (million)</b>
1959	55	25	41.423
1960	62	26	42.398
1961	70	39	42.978
1962	66	14	44.419
1963	65	17	45.466
1964	63	23	46.537
1965	69	21	47.633
1966	70	20	48.755
1967	69	19	49.903
1968	65	23	51.079
1969	72	27	52.282
1970	75	33	53.513
1971	87	35	54.653

Source: Pakistan Statistical Yearbook, 1969, 1974

Nonetheless, having conducted a statistical analysis of total murders and riots per population in West Pakistan, the resultant trend of both murders and riots under the military rule during 1969-1971 is on the rise. It means that the military under Yahya, despite its claims, badly failed to prevent the occurrence of murders and riots. Indeed, the incidents of riots highlight the political non-popularity of the regime as is qualitatively held in this study. Importantly, both the regimes comparatively registered upward trend in murders. In this respect, though the Ayub-led regime seemed to have witnessed a comparatively slight downward trend in murders by 1968, this fact is insignificant on two counts: first, if there is a slight downward trend in West Pakistan's murders case, then there is statistically sharp upward trend in the

same category in East Pakistan; second, even in West Pakistan, from the year 1967 onward, there is sharp upward increase in the riots as the Figure illustrates below.

**Figure 2 Trend: Murder and Riots per Million Population**



Nevertheless, since the primary aim of this statistical analysis is to explain the occurrence of coup under General Yahya Khan with the help of law and order variable, it is self-evident from the Figure 2 that both categories of murders and riots registered an upward trend under his-led military rule. Thus, it is maintained that the March coup cannot be ascribed to the problems of law and order empirically.

#### 4.5.2 Economic Variable

As is explained under this variable earlier in the chapter, Pakistan's economic performance was divisive in terms of giving birth to regional and poor-rich disparity. Since General Yahya was part of the last regime- indeed army chief- then the attempt at self-legitimation with reference to deteriorating economic situation is baseless logically and evidentially. How could one talk of (re)constructing the house which was demolished by one's very hands and this despite the vows about a durable construction?

Regardless, the study tends to examine the country's economic performance under the Yahya-led military rule in order to see whether there exists a positive correspondence between coup and worsening economic situation. However before a quantitative-qualitative analysis is conducted

a word about the data is of particular interest. The Ayub government [regime] fell...and Bhutto took over from General Yahya Khan in December 1971. However, some studies, when examining the performance of the Bhutto period, lump the post-Ayub three years with the Bhutto period, distorting the facts. One example is Nawab Haider Naqvi and Khwaja Sarmad's study, which in its evaluation of Pakistan's economy in the 1970s, considers 1969/70 to 1976/7 as one homogenous period and produces average growth rates for the whole of it. The Bhutto period was a distinct period, so clubbing it with the Yahya period does not reveal the true nature of the Bhutto regime [government]. The Pakistan Economic Survey of 1984/5 makes the same mistake and provides average growth rates for the period 1970-7, calling it the 'Non Plan' period.

(Zaidi 2005:104)

What can, in light of the quote, be deduced is that there is a contextual difference between the Bhutto government and Yahya regime and for a correct comprehension of the latter's claim to economic development, one needs to rely on the data of these years only. However, since the data normally is presented in conjunction with Ayub or Bhutto years, the study, therefore, takes an East-West Pakistan perspective to explain this variable. As the Table 11 (see page 148) shows the year 1969-70 registered 37.9 as compared to 31.1 in 1964/5 as index of disparity in per capita income respectively. Moreover, the during the same period, the per capita GDP in East and West Pakistan marked a further increase in regional disparity- see the Table below.

**Table 16 Per Capita GDP in East and West Pakistan at 1959/60 Constant Prices**

Year	Per capita GDP East	Per capita GDP West	West-East Disparity ratio	Index of disparity
1959/60	269	355	1.32	100
1964/65	293	426	1.45	141
1969/70	314	504	1.61	191

Source: Zaidi. 2005.

In addition, according to official sources, overall in Pakistan the 'proportion of poor' in terms of headcount also increased to 46.53 in 1969-70 from 44.50 in 1966-67 respectively (Zaidi 2005:435). Besides, the country's trade deficit continued to stay in minus at Rs. 1, 604 million in 1970-71; it was minus Rs. 1,676 million in 1965-66 and minus Rs. 1, 6333 million in 1960-61 respectively. Interestingly, as per our earlier analysis, the trade deficit remained negative under the civil bureaucracy too. However, under the first government- of principal politicians- it was recorded positive at Rs. 125 million in 1947-48 and Rs. 176 million in 1950-51 respectively (Saeed 2005:107; see also Zaidi 2005:163).

Importantly, during the Yahya-led military rule the exports' share of the Eastern wing remained significant. For instance, in 1969/70

just raw jute and jut-related manufactured products originating from East Pakistan were providing more than 47 per cent of Pakistan's total exports. In 1969/70, East Pakistan was a large market from West Pakistan, absorbing 50 per cent of the West's exports, while the East wing provided 18 per cent of (West) Pakistan's total inputs for that year.

(Zaidi 2005:162)

What the quote informs is that East Pakistan served as the backbone of country's economy. However, the West-based military principal, while according preference to its own political- and economic as shall be explain later in the chapter- interests, tended to ignore the socio-economic, if not political, development of that part of Pakistan. Little wonder then, the majority Bengalis, as mentioned earlier, opted to agitational politics for their due politico-economic, if not socio-cultural, rights. When denied by the principal military, the natural but rational result was their alienation and consequent separation from the state of Pakistan. In sum, in light of the foregoing the positive relationship between this variable and coup/martial law is unfounded empirically.

#### **4.5.3 Democratization Variable**

As is obvious from the proclamation, General Yahya Khan declared martial law in Pakistan the day General Ayub resigned. Therefore, the 1962 Constitution was abrogated; the national and provincial assemblies stood dissolved; the members of President's Council of Ministers



and the two Provincial Governors ceased to hold offices. Moreover, the General assumed the office of CMLA and appointed deputy army chief, air force chief and naval chief as Deputy CMLAs. In addition, he issued twenty-five martial law regulations on the same day. As regards the project of democratization the first step the CMLA took was the assumption of the office of President of Pakistan.

**Box 4.4 The PCO was Arbitrary**

The martial law proclamation was arbitrary...The PCO [Provisional Constitutional Order issued on April 4] promulgated by the Chief Martial Law Administrator [CMLA] was also arbitrary...I mean it had no legal or constitutional basis. It gave full powers to the CMLA who was also the army chief and Chief Martial Law Administer...No court was allowed to question anything done by the martial law authorities.

A 32 year old Advocate of the High Court informed the author in March 2008 in Lahore.

What the above informs is that when there is martial law, there is no law. Hence, with all powers in the principal's hand, its leader General Yahya arbitrarily assumed the office of president with effect from 25 March 1969 through a notification dated 31 March 1969 gazetted on 4 April 1969. Not only this, in order to democratize the country, he, on 28 November 1969, outlined the rules of the game: that elections would be held on 5 October 1970; parliamentary system would be preferred; the elected National Assembly would be tasked to frame a new constitution; maximum autonomy would be granted; One Unit is undone; and from 1 January 1970 the political activity could be resumed (Khan 2002:371-383).

Additionally, though all the pronounced points- which were converted into orders very soon- were important for one section of the opposition or other, the undoing of One Unit was indeed an act of arbitration. The principal did not bother to realize the fact that its doing had a history of debate, contestation and legislation in which politicians from two parts actively took part. Moreover, it was incorporated in the two late constitutions, however defective they were. To undo One Unit at this critical juncture without any reference to the people, if not politicians, was not without dangers, which related to state's physical integrity.

Importantly however, Yahya's announcements and regulations were political in nature. The principal having witnessed and calculated the popular demand for elections opted for it in the hope of not only defusing, at least in the short term, the anti-regime agitational politics and thus maintain relative law and order but also expecting a hung parliament given the intra-opposition political differences.

Nonetheless, working on the project of democratization a regulation was enacted, in December 1969, by the CMLA which strictly prohibited any opinion or action in a manner prejudicial to Pakistan's ideology, integrity or security. Moreover, on 28 March 1970, General-President, on behalf of his institution, formally made the rules of the game public by promulgating the Legal Framework Order (LFO), 1970. The LFO was a political device, at best, to manage the country's constitutional-political matters on the principal's terms. Moreover, the LFO was used as an instrument to further divert public and politicians' attention to electioneering. In addition, it set rules and regulations for the upcoming elections in terms of elections schedule, assemblies' seats, nature of religion etc. Commenting on the role of religion in Pakistan's politics at this critical juncture a politician-religious scholar opined:

**Box 4.5 Use of Religion for Political Purposes**

The state during Ayub period was not Islamic... General Yahya Khan issued the LFO to hold elections and gave country a [military's] constitution...In the LFO it was said that only a Muslim could become a President, and Pakistan is a Islamic state...But without proper legislation in parliament, these points were of no value...I think religion' name was probably used to keep the country united...As in East Pakistan the situation was getting worse...

Interview with Senator Sajid Mir, President Markazi Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadith, Pakistan. Lahore: 20 March 2008.

Nevertheless, the political forces responded to these arbitrary measures rationally. They preferred participatory politics over agitational for the ballot was seen more powerful than bullet received in the street. Hence, elections campaigns were launched by a variety of politicians and their parties which were more than twenty in number to contest for 313-seat parliament. Bhutto-led PPP, however, did not opt to nominate any candidate from East Pakistan. On the contrary, Mujib-led Awami League did nominate seven candidates from

West Pakistan. Both the politicians criticized Ayub and Yahya-led military rule for a multiplicity of reasons i.e. pro-West foreign/defense policy, non-resolution of Kashmir, poor economy and poor governance etc. Indeed, Mujib was more critical of West Pakistan and its military which deprived the majority Bengalis of their basic human rights. When the elections were held in December 1970- delayed due to floods in eastern part- the results were as given in Table 17 below:

**Table 17 1970 Elections: National Assembly Results**

	East Pakistan	Punjab	Sindh	NWFP	Balochistan	Total
Awami League	151	-	-	-	-	151
Pakistan People's Party	-	62	18	1	-	81
Council Muslim League	-	7	-	-	-	7
Ahle Sunnat	-	4	3	-	-	7
Jamat-i-Islami	-	1	2	1	-	4
Qayyum Muslim League	-	1	1	7	-	9
Convention Muslim League Pakistan	-	2	-	-	-	2
Democratic Party	1	-	-	-	-	1
National Awami Party	-	-	-	3	3	6
Jamiat Ulema-e- Pakistan	-	-	-	6	1	7
Independents	1	5	3	7	-	16
	153	80	27	25	4	291

Source: Election Commission of Pakistan.

As the Table shows, the Awami League, due to its popularity and massive campaign, was able to clean sweep in the East. Importantly, though there were incidents of 'moderate' pre-poll rigging, almost all the parties viewed the election free and fair (PILDAT 2008). However, the process of post-poll rigging, and that too at the highest level, began with the interference of the principal in the process of government making. In this respect, Yahya met with Mujib in January 1971 to persuade him to soften his position on the Six Points. The latter instead preferred non-compromise over the Points which, in fact, was the basis of his party's victory. Moreover, Mujib asked Yahya to call the National Assembly session where he would show his strength to assume the office of prime minister. Since the AL had formed

the electoral majority it should have been, from the perspective of democratic theory, allowed to form government at the centre. Nevertheless, the principal having been unsuccessful with AL turned to PPP of Bhutto in order to urge the latter to politically negotiate with AL. Rational Bhutto, on his part, had a different priority from both Mujib and the military. He had a political interest to prolong the situation to a point where the principal military strategically opts to engage him to possibly form government in the West. In this regard, Bhutto's position on the Six Points is a case in point. Logically, had this not been the case, then Bhutto's January meeting with Mujib would have focused on the contours of coalition formation and not Six Points on which AL remained adamant.

The principal military, on its part, chose to be flexible; it called for the Assembly's meeting on March 3. Meanwhile, the Awami League politicians- indeed party's parliamentary committee- had adopted a draft constitution which incorporated the Six Points. However, Bhutto prioritized non-compliance and called upon General Yahya to postpone the scheduled session of the parliament. Moreover, the former warned the participants of dire consequences. Yahya's preference converged with Bhutto due to the principal's policy of non-transfer of power(s) to majority Bengalis. Quite simply, had the military decided and allowed Mujib-led AL to form government there was strong likelihood of the former being taken on by the shirking section of politicians. Therefore, the principal formally postpone the NA session on 1 March 1971- indeed, no session was allowed by the Bhutto-military rational alliance (see Choudhury 1973).

Thus, in light of the foregoing, it is maintained that the arbitrary assumption of presidentship, the passage of LFO, post-poll explicit rigging are clear indicators of de-democratization- of negative correspondence between coup/martial law and democratization. These indicators certainly did not help to 'create conditions' to make Pakistan return to a constitutional rule. Rather, it further consolidated military authoritarian rule which is explained in the next section.

#### **4.5.4 Securitization Variable**

Empirically, when General Yahya imposed martial law the country did not face any internal or external military threat. Had this been the case, then the immediate measure the military would have taken was to mobilize the troops rather than passing orders and regulations. However, the indicators of internal security threat, from military's perspective, started

emerging when, due to principal's authoritarian political position, Awami League and its followers decided to apply militant means to be able to politically negotiate with the principal. In his respect, though upto 24 March, a series of meetings took place among Bhutto, a symbol of working politicians, Mujib, a sign of shirking politicians, and military- the principal-, the negotiations failed due to divergence of preferences between Bhutto-military and Mujib. The latter demanded either the acceptance or instant implementation of Six Points or independent Bangladesh- indeed 23 March was celebrated as Bangladesh day rather than Pakistan Day in the East (ibid 1973).

As is already explained statistically, the situation in the East was deteriorating due to failure of governmental machinery. The AL's non-compromise position further aggravated the situation. Hence, the military formally opted for military means, on 25 March 1971, in the hope of keeping the state united militarily. As a result, Mujib was arrested and the crackdown started against the AL fighters- generally called Mukti Bahini- under Lieutenant-General Niazi who had replaced cautious General Tikka Khan. With respect to the military operation, the generals had already seen the Indian hand in the East problem on account of Indian planes hijacked to Pakistan in March. As a result of this issue, Delhi had already stopped Pakistani planes, both civil and military, to use her air territory. In addition, an explicit Indian involvement was witnessed when a formal war started on 22 November in East Pakistan between India and Pakistan. India had ostensibly chosen to rescue Mukti Bahini which was struggling against the military operation for the last six months (ibid 1973).

Thus, as a result of India-Pakistan war, the latter, in the absence of any military support from her allies, had no option than to accept a de facto independent state of Bangladesh for which many had lost their lives; many got paralyzed for ever; and many got displaced for good. Formally, on 16 December 1971 the state of Pakistan physically broke up. The principal military's politico-military calculus proved erroneous. The process of securitization of the state, as vowed by Yahya Khan on 26 March 1969, abysmally died out in the country's disintegration. Hence, in light of the foregoing there is no ground whatsoever to attempt to legitimize the coup and the consequent martial law on the basis of this variable too.

To summarize, having identified conceptual variables in the coup/martial law text delivered to the nation on 26 March 1969 by General Yahya Khan, the study, under the framework of its model, took each of them to empirically explain its stated positive correspondence with

coup d'état. In this respect, the analectic narrative began with the problems of law and order which were invoked by the military to justify the martial law. However, based on Mitra's conception of governance, it was shown that the claim was self-contradictory empirically for the failure to maintain law and order was already the responsibility of the military since the first coup when General Ayub had vowed publically to accomplish this task. Regardless, the military under Yahya also remained unable to achieve this objective- the military operation in East Pakistan is a case in point. Similarly, on the economic front too the principal could not resolve country's worsening economic situation. Rather, rich-poor and importantly cross-regional disparity increased to an extent where the majority Bengalis openly started a movement to seek separation from the state of Pakistan.

Moreover, the stated necessary conditions to make the country return to a constitutional rule were never genuinely created. All measures in this regard pointed to the fact that the principal military was bent upon strengthening its rule through the promulgation of a Legal Framework Order and/or non-transfer of political power to the Awami League. Last but not least, the military operation in East Pakistan, the consequent war against India and the resultant breakup of Pakistan is sufficed to conclude that the principal also failed to securitize the state- which had now lost more than half its population and a considerable chunk of its territory.

Besides, the ongoing analytic narrative shows that the study's hypotheses cannot be refuted for there was a lack of positive correspondence between coup d'état and any of the conceptual variables. Nor is the core question or puzzle of the research solved. Therefore, in search of answers to these questions and the puzzle the study, in the following sections, returns to its causal model whereby the analysis is thoroughly model-guided- the explanatory variables tend to explain the occurrence of the coup- but the approach is akin to an analytic narrative.

#### **4.6 Military Agency: Causing the Coup**

As is informed by the preceding sections, the reasons the Yahya-led military gave to self-legitimize the coup are empirically unable to explain the phenomenon. Nor do the constraints of structure, as the structuralist accounts make one believe, explain it since the military was already in political power structurally. Hence, from this perspective, there should not be any coup at all. Similarly, path dependency approach also suffers from empirical, if not

theoretical, shortcomings. One wonders why the military had to take the pain to stage a coup when it was already on the 'path' of domination of politics if not the state. Moreover, the conspiracy theorists have nothing logical and/or empirical to support their conspiracies: there was no looming Indian threat; the US was already seen differently by the GHQ post-1965 war. Thus, in light of the above, following is an agency and rationalist explanation of the coup. The secondary aim of this analysis is to test the posed hypotheses.

To begin with, the March coup was staged by the military' agency: its inherent capability, as a rational actor, to affect change. In this case, the change in terms of coup was political in nature. The rational military having calculated the anti-Ayub movement wanted to achieve the following: a) it wanted to maintain its political principalship since it was essential to flourish economically as shall be explained in the adjacent section. Additionally, it had a plan to protect the institutional prestige and integrity in the wake of popular criticism against extremely unpopular Ayub-led military rule- Ayub got replaced for this very purpose; b) the coup-attempt was calculated to maintain a hold on the slipping political space vis-à-vis the shirking politicians. Had there been no coup, she had to compromise her political interests in terms of handing over authority to shirking politicians; c) the military wanted to do politics with her rules of the game- the LFO is a case in point. In this regard, having staged the coup, it was able to buy time to effectively deal with the opposition. Had it not been the case then the political implication of non-action would have harmed military's political, if not economic, interests to a great extent.

Thus, in light of the above it is maintained that the coup is the outcome of military agency in terms of , on the one hand, not sharing the political power with the shirking politicians, and on the other, strategically interacting with working section of the agents especially politicians (agency A). The staging of the coup, the consequent military rule and new rules of the game- which consequently led to country's breakup- point to the fact, in unequivocal terms, that the military, and working agents for that matter, gave more preference to their own than larger, national interests (agency B).

In addition, as hypothesized it is posited that the coup-event highlights the comparative political weakness rather than strength of the military institution vis-à-vis other actors especially the shirking politicians. Because had the military politically been powerful and/or influential as is described by the existing accounts, then it would have been able to negotiate

the rules of the game with the shirking actors in an interactive strategic environment short of a coup d'état.

So far, the trust of the analysis has been on the political dimension of principalship. In the following section, the study, as per its hypothesis, tends to explain whether the assumption of political power in the capacity of principal facilitated military's economic interests.

#### **4.6.1 Maximizing Economic Interests**

The Yahya years, as explained under the securitization variable, were very chaotic as regards the political situation in the country. Therefore, military's economic activities did not increase substantially in this period- late March 1969 to late December 1971. Nevertheless, the process of maximizing economically continued. For instance, the army was able to establish, on 27 October 1971, the Army Welfare Trust (AWT) - the second welfare foundation after the FF. The *raison d'état* behind its establishment was the inability of the Fauji Foundation to cater for needs of the army. However, this logic has its critics which points to the FF being dominated by the army already. The latter was responsible to inject investment to the AWT to run business enterprises the benefits of which were to be reaped by retired army personnel and their dependants.

In addition, the financial help could have been sought from the Trust by army's high command apparently for its other welfare related projects. Besides, in the absence of any data regarding the business functions of the Fauji Foundation, what can be assumed is- since the FF never got disbanded during this period- the Foundation continued with its economic ventures supposedly for the welfare purposes.

Moreover, since the country was placed under the martial law by the Yahya-led military the top brass naturally held important military and political positions. No wonder then, Lt. Gen. S.G.M. Peerzada, the Principal Staff officer to the President and CMLA, Lt. Gen. (later General) Abdul Hamid Khan, Chief of Staff Army, Air Marshal Nur Khan, C-in-C Air Force, and Vice Admiral S.M. Ahsan, C-in-C Navy, were the decision makers at the back of Yahya Khan. The latter two were later appointed Governors of West Pakistan and East Pakistan respectively in August 1969. Also, two more generals, Maj. Gen. Umer, Chairman of the NSC, and Maj. Gen. Akbar, Chief-ISI, were able to join this exclusive club which continued to 'enjoy privileged position' (Rizvi 2000:182-183). Thus, in the light of the above-



mentioned evidences it is suffice to posit that the military under Yahya used its principalship to maximize its economic returns.

#### **4.7 Conclusion**

The chapter began by explaining the first successful coup staged in Pakistan's political history. Since the coup and the subsequent martial law was formally declared, on 7 October 1958, by President Iskander Mirza- leader of the principal civil bureaucracy- this itself posed a puzzle which the study looked at theoretically and empirically. In this respect, it was posited that Mirza issued the coup/martial law proclamation in a strategic interaction with the agent military. The former's aim was to secure and prolong his-led bureaucracy's principalship vis-à-vis shirking politicians especially from East Bengal. However, the rational military, having calculated the costs and benefits, chose to sack Mirza within weeks after the formal declaration of martial law and thus, assumed the principal position. The civil bureaucracy, with no coercive means at its disposal, could not resist this change. Strangely, a section of it chose to ally with the military. So did a section of politicians.

As regards the reasons/causes for this coup Mirza, in his address to the nation on 8 October 1958, pointed to factors such as the deteriorating law and order situation, worsening economy, the need for a true democratic/constitutional rule and security of the state. Mirza's reasoning was supported by General and CMLA Ayub Khan the following day. Importantly, in the post-Mirza period the above-mentioned justification continued to hold. Interestingly, the analysis noted that the legitimist, path-dependent and structuralist accounts tend to legitimize the coup one way or the other. Therefore, the study took the coup as an analytic narrative of a combination of working/shirking (agency A) and own/larger interest (agency B).

To conduct the narrative, the chapter used the coup/martial law text as a point of departure and reference. With a system of coding, conceptual variables were identified; namely, law and order, economic factors, democratization, securitization, coup/martial law. The first four variables were theorized accordingly since the coup was already conceptualized in Chapter 1. Moreover, the analysis noticed a positive correspondence between each of the four variables and coup/martial law. However, since logically and empirically the cited/stated reasons/causes could not be justified, it was thought imperative to empirically and

theoretically analyze the positive correspondence between the occurrence of a coup and the other conceptual variables.

Hence, with the help of qualitative/quantitative data (primary sources included), it was maintained that the law and order situation was relatively better as compared to post-coup years. Had it deteriorated to the extent claimed, it was the Mirza-led principal which was responsible for this failure. Therefore, the study found no logical, empirical and moral reasons to put the county under martial law. Even the Ayub-led principal military could not maintain orderly rule for the statistical analysis pointed to a larger number of murder and riots in the final years of the Ayub-led military rule- indeed this was, from the military's perspective, one of the main reasons behind the second military coup. As regards the economic situation in the pre-coup period, it was posited that though key economic indicators pointed to a slowdown in economic growth, it was the principal bureaucracy which should have accepted responsibility rather than declare martial law. Nonetheless, the new principal did attempt to modernize Pakistan but the growth indicators it projected, were primarily based on foreign aid- which was also affected negatively by the 1965 war. Importantly, the military's economic policies helped increase the rich-poor gap and particularly, cross-regional inequality, with the result that the majority Bengalis in East Pakistan opted for agitational politics.

With respect to democratization, the chapter explained that measures such as a referendum and the Basic Democracies' system were meant primarily to depoliticize the political forces especially at the provincial level. Though, a section of politicians strategically allied with the principal in this project of democratization, there were also those who chose to shirk for their own rational reasons. Similarly, the stated purpose of securing Pakistan from threats remained a distant dream- given the ongoing military operations in Kashmir and consequent war with India, in 1965. Moreover, the West-concentrated defense measures during the war further alienated the majority Bengalis in East Pakistan, with the effect that they began to lose faith in the state- the Six-Points are a case in point.

Having explained the empirically negative correspondence between the conceptual variables and the coup/martial law, the analysis reverted to the causal model for an alternative explanation. Quite contrary to the existing body of knowledge- the legitimists, structuralists, conspiracy theorists, path-dependents etc. - the chapter posited that it was the military's

agency (the ability to make things happen) - which resulted in the coup. More specifically, being a rational actor the military made a calculation of costs and benefits of the action and chose to shirk and replace the civil bureaucracy as principal (agency A). In other words, the coup was rational rather than structural- or conspiratorial- in nature. Moreover, it was *political* in character for the primary aim was to capture political power in order to negotiate the rules of the game, on the military's own terms, with other actors concerned; a section of which, preferring its own to larger interests, strategically allied with the military. In addition, political power was used as an instrument by the principal military to maximize its own economic interests (agency B). In a nutshell, the 1958 coup was an outcome of agencies A and B.

Having explained the October coup, the analysis returned to the narrative of Ayub's military rule final year- a time where his regime faced agitational politics led by shirking politicians of both wings of the country. It was maintained that the primary reason behind public uprisings against military rule was the latter's lack of preference for re-negotiating the rules of the game with shirking politicians such as Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman. Instead, the principal chose to stage another coup on 25 March 1969. As its leader, General Yahya Khan, in his maiden address to the nation the following day, cited worsening law and order and the falling economy as primary reasons/causes for this action. The need to democratize and securitize the state were stated as complementary factors to self-legitimize the event. Quite interestingly, the study founded that the legitimist accounts also tended to legitimize it. The structuralists and path-dependent works, on the other hand, compromised the context and causes respectively. Moreover, the military remained unable to provide conceptual basis for its statements regarding law and order and/or worsening economy.

Therefore, the study preferred to conduct an analytic narrative of this second coup as well. In this respect, in the coup/martial law text conceptual variables, namely, law and order, economic, democratization, securitization and coup/martial law were identified. It was observed that there existed a positive relationship between coup/martial law and each of the rest. Hence, it was deemed necessary to empirically- while remaining within the framework of the model- explain not only the positive correspondence of these conceptual variables but also the status of cited claims by the military.

With respect to law and order, the following was maintained: a) the claim that the country was facing a serious law and order problem was illogical and immoral since the military, which had attempted to justify its 1958 intervention on this ground, had failed to accomplish this task under Ayub-led rule; b) the Yahya-led military rule also failed to maintain law and order despite resort to a military operation in East Pakistan. On the economic front, the regime's arbitrary economic approach helped increase poor-rich and cross-regional inequality. Similarly, though the martial law administration was able to promulgate its rule of the games- martial law regulations/orders are cases in point- and hold general elections, no meaningful change was let to happen by the principal who, while preferring its own interests, chose not to hand over political power to the representatives of majority Bengalis. The former was strategically supported by a section of West Pakistan-based politicians who also saw to their personal interests. The non-transfer of authority politically further alienated more than half of country's population. To cap it all, the project of securitization in terms of a military operation in East Pakistan to cover up failures related to law and order, economy and democracy, was a complete disaster: it paved the way for the state's physical disintegration in December 1971.

Having explained the negative correspondence between conceptual variables, the analysis then centered around the model in terms of applying its explanatory variables, namely, working/shirking and own/larger interests to explain dependent variable- coup d'état. In this respect, the analytic narrative continued as an approach. Thus, it was posited that the coup was a result of military's agency- being a rational actor it was able to affect change. Hence, in the specific context of late 1960s when the Ayub-led military rule was seriously challenged by the shirking politicians, the former, in order to preserve its principalship, chose to stage the coup. The coup was thus rational than structural/conspiratorial in nature. Moreover, it was political in character since the primary objective was to control the political situation from military's perspective. Moreover, it enabled the military to renegotiate the rules of the game with the agents especially politicians- the LFO is a case in point.

Most importantly, the military, having retained its principalship, used its political clout to further its economic interests. However, since the country's political situation was unstable- especially in East Pakistan and due primarily to the principal's political and economic policies, the extent of economic ventures remained limited. The chapter concluded that the Pakistani state disintegrated due to the principal military's preference for its own rather than

national interests. Though a section of agents strategically allied, for their own interests, with the military as regards the military operation in the East, the ultimate power, however, lay with the former. Had preference been accorded to the national/larger interest in time, there was a high probability of Pakistan staying united. The breakup of the state increased the costs for the military to continue its principalship. Thus, in the post-partition period the dynamics of civil-military relations were quite different. The next chapter shall attempt to explain this in detail.

## Chapter 5

### CMR in 'New' Pakistan

This chapter begins by explaining the change in principal with the help of the study's causal model. The thrust of argument, in this respect, is that the politicians were able to assume principalship for the military could not bear the cost of confrontation with the political forces. Hence, rationality prevailed and the military chose to go back to barracks. This fact also points to the politicians' agency. However, having assumed political power, the Bhutto-led principal accorded more preference to its own political and economic interests. Moreover, the opposition politicians also saw to their own interests. However, this politics of interests primarily remained rule-bound- the 1973 constitution is a case in point.

Nevertheless, Bhutto was able to introduce measures such as the establishment of Federal Security Force (FSF) to implicitly oversee the agent military. Moreover, the cadre system of the civil bureaucracy was fundamentally modified in order to reduce its shirking potential. However, Bhutto chose to appease the agent military in terms of defense allocations for political reasons for the former had a constituency which looked to India from a confrontational perspective. Moreover, in order to fulfill his electoral promises the Bhutto government opted to nationalize many an industry. Though this project of nationalization was socialist in character- and it benefited a section of the populace- it further widened the gulf between Bhutto's PPP and the affected section, especially industrialists.

The chapter further explains that in the middle of his government's tenure Bhutto, while preferring his own interests, opted to sideline the socialist-inspired section within his party. Instead, his reliance on the landed-interests grew since they had electoral prospects. Moreover, he rationally resorted to religion for political purposes. In addition, in 1976 a new phase of land reforms was initiated to supplement the earlier process which had hitherto remained unable to bring meaningful change in the land holdings. However, the opposition criticized these developments for being politically motivated. Bhutto was also seen as feudal and authoritarian by his opponents. Rational Bhutto, on his part, decided to hold general elections in order to appease the opposition and seek the electoral support of his favored section. Though elections were held accordingly and Bhutto's PPP won a majority of seats, the opposition accused the government of rigging. Subsequently, the opposition politicians- the PNA- opted to agitational politics.

At this critical juncture of civil-military relations in Pakistan, the chapter explains that Bhutto chose to declare martial law- under the constitution though- in major cities in order to assert the principal's control over the military vis-à-vis the defiant opposition whose members wrote letters to the military to intervene in politics. The chapter emphasizes the agency and rationality of the military in its subsequent analysis. The military, having calculated the cost and benefits of the coup-action ultimately staged it on 5 July 1977. The reasons cited for the coup and consequent martial law were related to problems of law and order and state of the economy, the need to truly democratize Pakistan and protect it from any kind of threats.

Since the existing accounts tend to legitimize the coup one way or the other, the chapter takes this coup as its centre of analysis. In this respect, it assumes the coup-text in terms of its stated reasons/causes as a point of departure and conducts an analytic narrative of the coup. Under the analytic narrative, conceptual variables, namely, law and order, economic, democratization, securitization and coup/martial law are identified in the text. The first four variables are shown to have positive correspondence with coup. In order to empirically determine the status of positive relationship between coup and each of the variables, the chapter carries out a comprehensive analytic narrative combining agencies A and B- working/shirking and own/larger interests respectively. The model-inspired empirical evidence however, points to a negative correspondence between coup and each of the conceptual variables.

Thus, the chapter then reverts to the model- especially its explanatory variables- to explain the occurrences of the July coup. The primary aim here is to test the study's hypotheses. Finally, the chapter concludes that it is military agency which causes the coup. The latter is rational rather than structural and/or conspiratorial in nature and political in character. The political power is instrumental to facilitate the military's economic interests.

### **5.1 Agency and Rationality- The Change in Principal**

In the post-partitioned state of Pakistan the contours of civil-military relations were contextually different from pre break-up period. The military top brass including General Yahya had admitted the defeat on 16 December 1971 (Khan 1993:259-345). The military defeat and the break-up of the country were received angrily by the people and politicians of new Pakistan- the old West Pakistan. The people, who had paid for the higher defense budget one way or the other, decided to question the armed forces' performance in the operation as

well as the war against India. Hence, on 18 December, agitational politics was again witnessed by the new state. The people and politicians demanded the removal of General Yahya along with those responsible for the defeat. Importantly, the mid-rank officers in Gujranwala cantonment, who blamed the military high command for the capture of their 90,000 fellows, also demanded instant change at the top (Nawaz 2008:314-325; Khan 2002:431).

Thus, in the wake of popular anger and violent demonstration and dissidence within its ranks, the institutionally demoralized and politically paralyzed military rationally chose to go back to barracks. Therefore, on 20 December with General-President-C-in-C Yahya Khan's resignation- a rational act to not only save his skin but also that of his institution- the principalship shifted to agent politicians since their preference had prevailed. Therefore, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, as leader of the new principal, assumed the country's arbitrary presidentship along with CMLA status- a unique one indeed- on the same day. However, new leader of the agent military came from the army- Lieutenant General Gul Hasan.

As regards Bhutto's assumption of important positions, it was a product of rational calculus of the former and the military. The former, on account of his electoral success and comparative popularity in new Pakistan, made rational decisions to strategically interact and ally with the military- whose agentship had just begun- to pursue his and his party's politico-economic interests as shall be explained later in the chapter. The latter, due to its politico-institutional limited set of choices, also rationally engaged with a politician who was electorally unmatched by any other in new Pakistan. Supposedly, had the military despite its constrained political space opted for another politician - or bureaucrat and/or judge for that matter- the socio-political reaction from PPP-led populace would have been drastic for military's long term interests if not that of the country. Therefore, the arguments (see Shafiqat1997:120-122) that Bhutto was a military's man; that he took the charge in national service; that he was psychologically power-oriented; that he was a power-hungry 'feudal' and representative of feudal class etc., are empirically unfounded. Had this been the case then Bhutto should not have left Ayub in political lurch and establish an anti-principal political party. Rather he should have join hands with Mujib to gain power to pursue personal and/or class interests. Quite to the contrary, Bhutto's political calculus in post-election period points to his agency and rationality which is explained in the following sections.



## **5.2 Politics of Interests: The Case of Bhutto**

Bhutto was a politician with an added advantage of a party which preferred the prevalent ideologies of socialism and nationalism to pursue political and economic goals. In addition, a reference to religion in term of Islamic socialism was also made to appeal and appease the authoritarian clergy who too had has its political parties. Besides, as Chief Martial Law Administrator, he issued orders and martial law regulations which covered a wide range of subjects. For instance, Mujib was released; top industrialists, who were his rivals, were put on exist control list; anti-Bhutto journalists were arrested; basic industries were nationalized- as shall be explained later- in light of Economic Reform Order 1972; Land Reforms Regulations was enacted in March 1972; colleges and schools got nationalized in April 1972 etc (Ahmed 1972 and 1973). The following sections tend to explain these policy measures in details.

### **5.2.1 Bhutto and the Opposition**

As explained earlier, in the post-partitioned state of Pakistan, Bhutto-led People's Party was able to assume the principal's seat. Yet the opposition politicians had a different set of preferences to achieve their respective interests. Therefore, the opposition especially the National Awami Party (NAP) gave warning to the civilian martial law regime to restore democracy or face the consequences. However, having read the situation, rational Bhutto was able to reach an accord with Wali Khan- leader of the NAP- and Mufti Mahmood- head of Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI)- with respect to lifting the martial law, forming of governments in NWFP and Balochistan on majority principle and issuance of an interim constitution.

As a result of preference-convergence between PPP and a section of the opposition, Bhutto issued National Assembly (Short Session) Order 1972 on 23 March 1972. Hence, under the order the NA session was called on 14 April 1972 where Bhutto was elected President of the Assembly unanimously. Importantly, unlike Bangladesh where fresh mandate was given to Awami League, in Pakistan's case the situation was quite the opposite. In the latter's case, Bhutto had given incentives to non-PPP politicians to support his party politically. The opposition politicians- especially from non-Punjab provinces-, due to their poor performance in the 1970 election, preferred to be part of the principal without a reference to their respective constituency. Nevertheless, the Interim Constitution- under which all the 'existing laws were continued in force with necessary adaptations' (Khan 2002: 453) - was accordingly adopted by the NA on 20 April; the following day martial law was lifted. Subsequently,

under the interim arrangements Bhutto got elected as President of Pakistan. However, the governorship of NWFP and Balochistan went to NAP/JUI as part of rational understanding.

Having politically controlled the situation, at least for the time being, Bhutto turned to foreign policy. The country that occupied his attention was none other than India- which kept 90,000 soldiers as POW. The agent military was desperate about this issue along with the captured territory. In order to get himself politically more popular, and on the other, appease the military, Bhutto was able to negotiate successfully with Indra Gandhi the two issues at Simla in July 1972.

Domestically, since the formation of the civilian government of NAP-JUI in NWFP and Balochistan, the common man was disenchanted with PPP and its coalition-partners' politics of confrontation, which was grounded in difference of preferences towards issues of economy and society. The PPP had an agenda of nationalization which faced resistance from tribalism of the two provinces. In order to politico-electorally reach in the two provinces in term of nationalization, Bhutto, in April 1972, chose to ally with Abdul Qayyum Khan- a veteran anti-NAP politician with a party of his own- the Qayyum Muslim League (QML). The latter was thus appointed minister of interior. The PPP's alliance with QML and its policies were equally confronted by the NAP-JUI coalition. Each side started a series of allegations: the Bhutto camp alleged the NAP-JUI to have involved in anti-state activities along with anti-Punjabi measures; the NAP-JUI side accused PPP-QML of unnecessary interference in provincial matters.

Consequently, the resultant mutual mistrust along with PPP's policy to create its own constituency in the two provinces would have made a presence in the choice-ranking of Bhutto who ultimately acted to dismiss Balochistan's Chief Minister and Governor on 14 February 1973. Reactively but rationally, the NAP-JUI government in the Frontier province, in order to pressurize Bhutto, resigned in protest. In the following months, the top politicians from Balochistan- Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, Atallah Mengal and Khair Bakhsh Marri- were arrested and put behind bars. Additionally, in Sindh, between early-mid 1972, the Bhutto government had to deal with Sindhi-Urdu controversy which was initiated by his cousin-Chief Minister, Mumtaz Bhutto. The government's political handling of the issue led to language riots- see Table 20 on page 212 in this respect. However, despite the agitational

politics led by opposition politicians, a good number of whom were arrested, the Sindhi was declared official language of the province.

### **5.2.1.1 Negotiating Rules of the Game**

As mentioned earlier, the interim constitution was an *ad hoc* arrangement in terms of informal rules of the game to prevent the state from further liquidation and run the governmental affairs. However, when the aggrieved opposition especially the NAP-JUI started leveling the public opinion against Bhuttoism, President Bhutto saw more benefits in the office of prime minister since his party already formed majority in the National Assembly. Moreover, he had a preference for a consensual document i.e. constitution. Had he opted to go on his own, the autonomist NAP-JUI would have challenged it on the ground that it is partially-representative since PPP had lost elections in NWFP and Balochistan.

In addition, the opposition politicians and their comparatively smaller and factionalized parties also favor the parliamentary system due to interests; a) they, at this point of time, did not opt to confront a powerful PPP; b) in a parliamentary system there is an opportunity to form coalition even against a major party i.e. PPP; c) had they opted for presidential system, then Bhutto's ongoing presidentship would not have been lost upon them. Thus, as a result of strategic interaction with the opposition, Bhutto, on 17 April 1972, appointed twenty-five members, six from the former constitution committee, to negotiate the formal rules of the game in terms of drafting the future constitution of Pakistan. After long rounds of political negotiations between government and deeply-divided opposition, the committee, in October, was able to reach an accord on the basics of the rules. Subsequently, a Constitutional Bill was moved in the National Assembly on 30 December to opposition's disappointment. The latter had found that the Bill violates the accord in many respects. Therefore, in order to further press the government for Islamic-democratic constitution, the opposition was able to form an alliance- the United Democratic Front (UDF) - which put its proposals before Bhutto who first put them aside, but later took them for consideration.

As a result, on 10 April 1973, the National Assembly passed the Constitution consensually. Indeed, there were not any dissenting votes by all the political parties on the floor; however, there were a few abstentions.

**Box 5.1 The 1973 Constitution deemed its Abrogation ‘High Treason’**

The 1973 Constitution was a big achievement of the politicians. They were finally able to make a consensus Constitution. It established a parliamentary form of government...Its main feature were...Council of Common Interests, National Finance Commission, Islamic provisions...The Islamic provisions, however, did not make the country Islamic since the Council of Islamic Ideology had only a recommendatory role...The smaller provinces though did not get what they wanted to, the important thing was that they got a document under which they can bargain for more...[Also] The Constitution had a provision [article 6] which deemed its abrogation high treason. It [article 6] was actually incorporated with the aim to stop military takeovers in the future.

Interview with Hashim Sabir Raja, Assistant Advocate General, Punjab. Lahore: 20 March 2008.

What the above informs is that the politicians, despite their political and ideological differences were able to negotiate formal rules of the game for rational reasons as mentioned earlier. Importantly, this marked their agency in terms of working together for a common cause. Moreover, with the passage of the constitution, Bhutto, with good bargaining skills, was able not only to get all laws i.e. proclamations, martial law regulations/orders, President’s orders, validated but also got indemnified the actors involved. In addition, Bhutto maneuvered the opposition in such a manner that the existing assembly was to continue till August 1977. Last but not least, before the Constitution could get enforced on 14 August 1973, elections to senate, offices of President and Prime Minister were completed accordingly. The latter were assumed by PPP candidates; Indeed, Bhutto himself sworn in as PM on 12 August 1973.

**5.2.1.2 Politics under the Rules**

Prime Minister Bhutto, with rules of the game formalized, started his politics afresh. The rule-oriented politics had two parallel but opposite aspects: first, it had a confrontational overtone- the third amendment is a case in point; secondly, it carried a cooperative tinge. As regards its operationalization, a few days after the commencement of the Constitution, top politician from Balochistan were arrested on charges of corruption, malpractices etc., and put behind bars as a consequence of confrontational politics. However, the cooperative part was enacted when the PM, in order to politically control the situation in the wake of anti-Ahmediyya movement- which got impetus again in May 1974-, got the latter declared non-

Muslims in strategic alliance with the opposition especially authoritarian clergy<sup>56</sup>. For this purpose, the constitution was amended. Was the state's interference in religious matters justified religiously?

**Box 5.2 The State should protect its Minorities**

I think it is not the responsibility of the state to declare someone Muslim or non-Muslim. It should rather provide equal opportunities especially of education to its citizen. However, the fact of the matter is the Ahmedis had taken initiative to religiously differentiate itself from rest of the Muslims. What the general Muslims did to them was reactive in nature. But it never means that their honor, person and property are harmed by any person, party or even the state.

Interview with Javed Ahmed Ghamidi, Religious Scholar and Founder of Al-Mawrid- an Islamic research Institute. Lahore: 22 March 2008.

What can be posited in light of the above is that the government- as part of the state- deemed it necessary to use religion for political purposes despite the fact that the Objective Resolution could only serve as preamble to the constitution. Moreover, the politicians accorded more preference to purely contentious religious issues rather than to provide basic amenities to the citizenry. Nonetheless, the Bhutto government continued with its policy of rule-oriented politicking.

On the foreign policy front, it took due advantage of country's cordial relations with the Arab countries which were to be invited to the Second Islamic Summit Conference to be held in Lahore (see Moskalenko 1974) . In the wake of the conference, there emerged an opportunity to constitutionally determine the status of East Pakistan as the matter was left open in the constitution. Therefore, as a result of Bhutto and Arab leaders' agency, Bangladesh was recognized by Pakistan as an independent and sovereign state in 1974 (Brown 1972:179-186). In addition, the recognition of Bangladesh had a rational dimension too: why not accept an existent reality and politically cash it vis-à-vis India, since another Muslim country was bordering her. In addition, the PM got another opportunity, when India went nuclear at

<sup>56</sup> Abdul-Hafeez Pirzada, the then PPP-cohort and close aide of Z.A. Bhutto, told in a recent television program- *Tonight with Najam Sethi* (3 January 2010)- that ' the move to declare Ahmedis non-Muslims was primarily a [political] compromise in order to control the situation on the street. Had this move not been made, severe damage would have been caused to the state and the society'. For details see: [http://www.dunyanews.tv/newsite/play\\_program\\_video.php?id=6731&pid=1793](http://www.dunyanews.tv/newsite/play_program_video.php?id=6731&pid=1793).

Pokhran the same year, to politically further arise by signaling the start of Pakistan's nuclear program. In sum, Bhutto government's foreign policy contours were politically oriented since Bhutto had, during the 1970 elections, played with the Indian card- the next section explains it in a little more detail.

### **5.2.2 Oversighting the Agents?**

As is already mentioned, Bhutto was a rational politician who believed in his agency- the inherent ability to affect change. Importantly, he was an extraordinarily intelligent politician who probably having worked with Ayub in various ministerial capacities had grasped the military's methodology if not mindset. Also, logically he would have known the working of civil bureaucracy more deeply. After all, both the military and civil bureaucracy had acted as principal contextually. Therefore, in order to secure the civilian principalship against the non-parliamentary, non-elective and undemocratic institutions, Bhutto preferred to restructure them in such a way that their institutional capacity is de-concentrated if not de-centralized.

Thus, the first victim in this regard was civil bureaucracy which was put to scrutiny and screening under a martial law regulation in March 1972. As many as 13,00 bureaucrats were scrutinized on charges of inefficiency, corruption misconduct etc. Moreover, further measures were taken in March 1973 to 'reform' the administrative system of Pakistan. In Kennedy's words

The implementation of Bhutto's service reforms altered the cadre system of organization of the bureaucracy in several important ways. First, the CSP, the lineal descendant of the ICS, was abolished. Its membership was scattered to the newly-created District Management Group, Tribal Areas Group, and the Secretariat Group...Second, the practice of designating non-CSP officers as 'listed post holders' in the All-Pakistan Services was abolished. Third, as a consequence of the former the century-old practice of the reservation of posts for members of the CSP and other elite services was discontinued. Fourth, the domain of All-Pakistan Services newly-constituted as the All-Pakistan Unified Grade; was expanded to include a majority of non-CSP and Non-PSP officers. Fifth, the former accounts services (PAAS, PMAS, and PRAS) were merged to form the Accounts Group. Finally, the composition of the PFS was greatly modified and expanded to form the Foreign Affairs Group...Given the heretofore impervious nature of the cadre system, such modifications were indeed 'revolutionary'.

(Kennedy 1987:105-106)

The crux of the quote is that the ‘cadre system’ was fundamentally modified. Besides, under the 1973 Constitution, little relief was provided to the agent civil bureaucracy.

**Box 5.3 The Civil Bureaucracy-related Reforms were politically-motivated**

The bureaucracy reforms under Bhutto were primarily politically-driven. He did not want to have a strong bureaucracy. The reforms opened the gate for political appointments. The aim was to have a pliable bureaucracy which could implement the government’s policies based on nationalization.

A civil bureaucrat from the Police Department shared these views with the author on 25 April 2008 in Islamabad.

Thus, in light of the foregoing, it is maintained that the civil bureaucracy reforms were primarily politically motivated as it provided the Bhutto government a ‘lateral entry’ into the services. Hence, political appointments, often of PPP affiliates, were made to benefit the allies and create a semblance of oversight of the agent bureaucracy (Khan 2002:513).

As regards the agent military, the indicators of implicit oversight- since the government opted not to pronounce and/or project it in this way- are concerned, the Chief Martial Law Administrator had a strategy, if not a proper plan, to be operationalized. The first step taken in this respect was a PTV program which aimed at highlighting the military’s weaknesses during the military operation in (former) East Pakistan and the 1971 war. The purpose of this move was clearly political: to get the military demoralized in popular perspectum. Secondly, in an unprecedented move the CMLA sacked the C-in-C and air chief- Lieutenant General Gul Hasan Khan and Air Marshal Rahim Khan respectively- on 3 March 1972 (Khan 1993:384). They were replaced with General Tikka Khan and Air Marshal Zafar Chaudhry accordingly.

Interestingly enough, the sacked officers, when given the choice by Bhutto preferred ambassadorship in Europe to maximize politico-economically. This fact should further corroborate agency and rationality of the generals who in the past staged coups for their own

interests. Moreover, in August 1972 Bhutto got Brig. Ali, Lt. Col. Muhammad Kurshid, Col. Aleem Afridi, Col. Javed Iqbal, Brig. Iqbal Medhi Shah and Major General R.D. Shamim removed, for they, in the former's view, attempted to prevent the return of civilian rule in 1971 (Nawaz 2008:335). Importantly, in order to reduce government's reliance on the army and general police for that matter- with respect to governance-, Bhutto established a parallel paramilitary organization, the Federal Security Force (FSF), in September 1972. This measure could fall under the implicit oversight mechanism which the politicians as principal had failed to come up with earlier. However, even at this critical juncture of civil-military relations, the establishment of FSF was politically driven move rather than purely institutionally.

These politically-oriented actions by Bhutto-led principal was assumed as anti-military measures by the latter. Though the military, at this point of time, was not politically and institutionally in a position to take the risk of a coup, a few 'young officers' led by Major Farouk Adam Khan opted to shirk in terms of attempting a coup against the Bhutto government on 30 March 1973. However due to effective military intelligence under General Tikka Khan, the plotters were arrested and subjected to court martial under Major General Zia-ul-Haq. The young officers were found guilty and therefore met with hard punishment. Bhutto, to make an example out of them for the rest of the military institution, 'had the convicted officers distributed across the country in distant jails.' (ibid 2008:336-338).

Moreover, having cognized the history of military coups and martial laws and importantly the recent attempted coup, Bhutto decided to go one step further. As is already mentioned, he was able to insert a provision in the 1973 Constitution which read:

- (1) Any person who abrogates or attempts or conspires to abrogate, subverts or attempts or conspires to subvert the Constitution by use of force or show of force or by other unconstitutional means shall be guilty of high treason.
- (2) Any person aiding or abetting the acts mentioned in clause (1) shall likewise be guilty of high treason.
- (3) [Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament)] shall by law provide for the punishment of persons found guilty of high treason.

(The Constitution 1973:Article 6)

The incorporation of this specific provision serves, if read in conjunction with earlier measures taken in this respect, as a constitutional indicator of civilian oversight of the



military. Last but not least, as an implicit act of oversight the principal opted to order military operations against the Baloch nationalists between December 1972 to July 1977.<sup>57</sup>

Two factors seem to have prevailed on Bhutto in this regard: first, military confrontation with the NAP-sponsored Baloch movement would not only drastically curtail the power of that party in the trans-Indus provinces but also enhance the popularity of the PPP government in the Punjab which was the core military recruitment area. Second, Bhutto did not see any harm in limited involvement of the military contingents in Baluchistan which was remote from the public mind in Punjab and elsewhere. This way the military would be fighting for national security on an internal front and would be off his back.

(Waseem 1994:323-324)

The above-quoted, on the one hand, further corroborates the study's foregoing analysis, and on the other, points to the fact that the Balochistan operations were carried out on the orders of the principal. Importantly, the ordering of the operations highlights principal politicians' agency and rationality for they primarily saw to their own/party interests. In addition, as mentioned earlier, the start of nuclear program by Bhutto government was basically political in nature. Being a politician with a constituency to look up to, at least during the elections, Bhutto had, more or less like the military, perceived India as a security threat to Pakistan. The agent military's input with respect to foreign/defense policy hence converged with the principal's preference. Thus, it should then not come as a surprise when the government opted to permit an increase in the defense expenditures during its tenure -see Table 18 on the next page.

On its part, the military, in order to institutionally build up itself, utilized the much-needed money on various projects of modernization. Here, it is imperative to posit that the increase in the Indian defense expenditure, during more or less the same period, is not necessarily Pakistan-centered since India, after its defeat in 1962, had China in mind as a potential threat (Smith 1994:79-80).

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<sup>57</sup> For a Baloch nationalist perspective, see Baloch, Inayatullah. 1987. *The Problem of "Greater Baluchistan": A Study of Baluch Nationalism*.

**Table 18 Defense Expenditure: 1972-1977**

Year	Defense Expenditure (Rs. million)	Percentage of total Expenditure
1971-72	3,725.5	59.09
1972-73	4,439.6	59.34
1973-74	4,948.6	42.02
1974-75	6,914.2	42.83
1975-76	8,103.4	46.00
1976-77	8,120.6	44.71

Source: Rizvi. 2000.


Last but not least, to further consolidate the principal's control over the agent military, Bhutto opted for Zia, who in the former's calculus was pliable, introvert, apolitical and junior in rank. So, having by-passed six senior generals Bhutto appointed Zia COAS on 1 March 1976. Furthermore, PM Bhutto

also strengthened his hold on decision-making related to defense matters. Having already deduced the former C-in-C of services to COS [Chief of Staff- for each service], he issued a White paper on Higher Defense Organization in May 1976 that gave the prime minister ultimate authority on matters related to defense and national security. A Defense Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) would assist the prime minister in his deliberations, while a defense council headed by the defense minister would implement the DCC's decisions. Meanwhile, Bhutto continued to increase the strength of his newly-raised FSF from about 14,000 in 1974 to over 18,000 in 1976. The Pakistan Army [military] remained wary of this move.

(Nawaz 2008:343)

What can be posited in view of the above is that the principal had taken conscious measures to re-organize the former principal, the military, in order to control it. Little wonder, the Supreme Commander of the military (the Army, the Navy, the Air Force- see Organigram, in this respect, on the next page) was the country's President, constitutionally. Paradoxically, however, the principal politicians, while seeing to their own political interests, allocated significant amount of national budget to meet defense expenditure. As already explained, the agent but rational military, on its part, bought time to build and modernize itself. In this regard, the unity of command (by army chief in the case of the army, in particular, and the military, in general) played an important role.

### Organigram of the Army Command & Control



Source: Siddiqi 2003:49

### 5.2.2.1 The State of Agent Judiciary

As regards the state of judiciary, it was little better than the bureaucracy institutionally. The third and fourth constitutional amendments- an indicator of politics under rules- curtailed the courts' jurisdiction and limited its powers related especially to contempt of court and judges' transfer. The Bhutto government took these measures in view of institution's history of political alliances, pro-military verdicts<sup>58</sup>, appointments and promotions. The amendments in question were an indicator of constitutional oversight to make judiciary do the principal's bidding.

### 5.3 Politics of Interests Revisited

As mentioned earlier, Bhutto's PPP had a pronounced agenda of nationalization grounded in socialism. Therefore, in order to politico-electorally reach and cultivate the masses- whom the slogan of *roti, kapra and makan*<sup>59</sup> was already eared to since the 1970 elections-, many reform measures were taken between 1972-76 period in the sector of labor, industry, education, health and land. To begin with, with respect to industrial labor, which had over the years emerged as a pressure group, a new labor policy was initiated which provided for compulsory bonuses and relatively free education and medical care etc. However, these measures were heavily criticized by mill owners, who complained of additional costs of Rs. 400 per worker per annum, and importantly investors who had a preference for capital-intensive machinery. Moreover, the policy had negative effect on the trades unions which decreased in number due to the emergence and multiplicity of workers' councils. However, despite this labor measures, the industrial labor opted for agitational politics which resulted in police-workers encounters- 15 in 1972, 26 in 1973 and 32 in 1974 (see Table 20 on page 212).

Similarly, Bhutto's education policy set for many goals in terms of establishment of 276,000 literacy centers, provision of 225,000 additional teachers and a National Literacy Corps, establishment of new universities, establishment of University Grant Commission, establishment of National Book Foundation and the National Curriculum Bureau and Service

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<sup>58</sup> As explained in Chapter 4 the agent judiciary opted to legitimize Mirza/Ayub-led coup/martial law on the basis of controversial doctrine of necessity. However, her judgment regarding the second coup/martial law came posthumously: it declared Yahya a 'usurper' in a post-Yahya period (see Khan 2002:444-445).

<sup>59</sup> *Roti, Kapra and Makan* stand for bread, cloth and a house respectively.

Corps and importantly nationalization of 178 private colleges and 3,693 private schools. However, despite the impressive measures taken, the education policy was also politically motivated with the aim to, on the one hand, relieve the middle class, and on the other, to depoliticize the politically-minded intelligentsia.

Nevertheless, the students especially of universities, the affected teachers and owners of nationalized institutions resented these measures vehemently. In addition, the health related measures were basically unrealistic given the goals set and limited economic capacity to meet them. By and large, the three reform policies were political rather than institutional in nature. These, by the very chemistry of their character, demanded more powers to be given to the civil bureaucracy for their intended implementation.

Similarly, though Bhutto's land reforms of 1972<sup>60</sup> and 1977 were ostensibly meant to rationalize the landholdings to increase agricultural productivity, they also met with, more or less, the same political fate and that at the hands of PPP's landed-interest, who preferred to legislate at the provincial level in order to maximize their own economic interests.

**Box 5.4 The Land Reforms was a Farce**

The land reforms under Bhutto, and for that matter under Ayub, were a political drama to please the poor farmers and tenants temporarily. The big landowners let not any meaningful decrease in their landholdings happen. Where it [decrease in land ceilings] happened, it was mostly of anti-PPP landowners or small-medium size farmers who had already little resources to seek political or judicial help.

A 55 year ex-*Patwari* [land record keeper] and *Zamindar* [landowner] informed the author in April 2008.

Thus, efforts at reforms, as the afore-mentioned suggests, changed little as regards socio-economic conditions of the poor, overall. However, this never implies the country overall faced an economic crisis as is normally projected- this shall be explained later in the chapter. What can be here emphasized is that the politics of interests prevailed to the extent that intra-PPP politics- often between reform-oriented and land-oriented sections- generated political and policy differences to be faced and settled by Bhutto himself. Moreover, by the mid-1970s

<sup>60</sup> For details, see Sayeed 1975.

Chairman Bhutto, who was able to replace one dissident politician with other at party and governmental level, had limited set of choices; either to side with proponents of the nationalization project or the landed-interests which were direct affectees of the government's land reforms. According preference to his long-term political interests Bhutto chose to sack his socialism-oriented comrades and sided with the landed-aristocrats with electoral prospects due to their local influence among the socio-economically resource-less section of the population.

The general elections under the constitution had to be held before 14 August 1977. Bhutto had started implicit campaign since early 1976. He invoked his successes with respect to the 1973 Constitution, Simla Agreement, initiation of nuclear program, Sino-Pakistan friendship etc. Moreover, he attempted to sell his performance at domestic front with reference to reform measures. His main aim was to attract the poorest of the poor who could probably elect him again. When the government, in January 1977, formally announced the election scheduled for March, nine opposition parties were subsequently able to unite under Pakistan National Alliance- the PNA (Syed 1977). The PNA election campaign remained overall Bhutto-centric: that he ruined Pakistan's economy, society, and ideology; and that he himself was un-Islamic. Nonetheless, the Bhutto-led PPP, after having chosen landed-elite as its core candidature, finally contested the National Assembly election on March 7- the NA results are as below:

**Table 19 1977 Elections: National Assembly Results**

Province	PPP		PNA		Independents		Total
	Seats won	% of total	Seats won	% of total	Seats won	% of total	
Punjab	107	93.0	8	7.0	-	-	115
Sindh	32	74.4	11	25.6	-	-	43
NWFP	8	30.8	17	65.4	1	3.8	26
Balochistan	7	100.0	-	-	-	-	7
Islamabad	1	100.0	-	-	-	-	1
Tribal Areas	-	-	-	-	8	100	8
	155	77.5	36	18.0	9	4.5	200

Source: Election Commission of Pakistan.

As is obvious from the table, PPP was able to win comprehensively. The PNA was defeated everywhere except in NWFP. However, instead of accepting the results, The PNA

had all along mobilized the people against what it perceived as the government's plans to rig the elections. In fact, some quarters had predicted that the PNA would boycott the provincial elections on 10 March in the case of a sweeping PPP victory in the National Assembly elections. That is exactly what the PNA decided to do...The world press was circumspect in this respect. The *Guardian*, for example, acknowledged that 'Mr. Bhutto has won unfairly and by no means squarely. But, there is a certain crude legitimacy to his victory.' However, the PNA was not prepared to bestow this legitimacy...It started its agitation from 14 March...Bhutto's offer to enter into a dialogue with the opposition was rejected by the PNA, which demanded his resignation...and the holding of fresh elections under the joint supervision of the Army and the Judiciary.

(Waseem 1994: 335-336)

What the quote informs is that the PNA had a plan to bring Bhutto down one way or the other for rational reasons. The personalistic politicians, while preferring their petty to national interests had gone to the extent of inviting the military to intervene in country's politics again. However, rational Bhutto had his own game plan. In the wake of rigging allegation, he opted to appease the PNA in terms of offering a judicial enquiry and holding a referendum on the issue of his continuation as PM- in fact, he got the constitution amended for the sake of a referendum. However, the more Bhutto chose to reconcile, the more the opposition demanded. The PNA's agitational politics, its demands, Bhutto's preference, and the military's attitude are explained in the next section.

#### **5.4 Actors and Agency: Explaining the Third Coup**

In the post-election period, the opposition, united for its political interests under the banner of PNA, had become devastatingly demanding. Since they deemed Bhutto government un-Islamic and socialist, a resort to religion was made to arouse the public. Thus, the demands for the establishment of Nizam-e-Mustafa (the Prophet's system) was vociferously put forward. Not only this, in order to operationalize their plan for the system- in case Bhutto refuses-, they had brought their 'thousands of students from orthodox religious seminaries' in order to wage a jihad against the un-Islamic government. Bhutto, on his part, decided rationally also. In order to appease the authoritarian clergy- JUI-JI-JUP were part of the PNA- and control the situation, he announced, on April 17, certain aspects of *Sharia* whereby

drinking alcohol and gambling were prohibited officially; Friday was declared holiday also (see Wilder 1995).

Nevertheless, Bhutto's *Sharia* measurers could not satisfy the opposition politicians who resorted to agitational politics. On April 20, they called for a strike which was observed almost country-wide and caused problems of governance. Therefore, Bhutto, in order to maintain relative law and order, decided to declare partial martial law in Lahore, Karachi and Hyderabad under article 245 of the Constitution. Moreover, he got an amendment passed to the Army Act that enabled military action with retrospective effect. Importantly, the three services chiefs preferred to work- to remain under the principal's control. To this, Air Marshal (retd)-cum politician Asghar Khan, also head of a party which was part of the PNA, wrote letter to various military officers to shirk- disobey the civilian orders (Khan 1983:114-118; also 2002:132-133).

At this critical juncture of civil-military relations, whereby the former was able to maintain non-institutionalized civilian control through various politico-economic and administrative measures, the principal led by Bhutto showed possible caution to deal with the otherwise political military with a history of coups and martial laws. Thus, Bhutto's preference to declare martial law (under the constitution), amend the Army Act and consult the services chiefs was politically driven. In an environment where the opposition was calling for his skin, in a country where coups and martial laws were no exception and a nation where politicians and their parties were personalistic and desperately urging the military to takeover, PM Bhutto thought it rational to strategically interact and meaningfully engage the agent military. Had he maintained distance at this stage, the political signal it would have sent to the opposition was that the military was no longer under control.

Nonetheless, to add insult to injury, the agent judiciary, out of blue, also decided to register her agency. On 2 June, the martial law was declared unconstitutional by the Lahore High Court. The court's judgment took the choice of applying military means for crisis-management, away. The political choice, however, was still there for Bhutto and the PNA.

From 3 June to 2 July, both parties progressed towards an agreement in an atmosphere of extreme mistrust. The agreement included the dissolution of assemblies, the holding of fresh elections on 7 October, constituting a supreme Implementation Council for overseeing compliance with the accord and appointment of higher



officers, withdrawal of the army to barracks in Baluchistan, the release of political prisoners as well as the withdrawal of the Emergency, Defense of Pakistan Ordinance, special courts and tribunals, Section 144 and restriction on press freedom. On 2 July, the opposition's negotiating team put the final manuscript of its accord with the government before the PNA's central council. It was categorically rejected by Asghar Khan and a few others. On the night of 4-5 July, the long-dreaded army [military] rule finally arrived.

(Waseem 1994:338-339)

On 5 July, army chief General Zia-ul-Haq, whom Bhutto had superseded over six generals, had successfully staged the third military coup d'état in Pakistan's history. Subsequently, the 1973 Constitution was abrogated- though the General preferred to call it being 'put in abeyance'-; the National and Provincial Assemblies were dissolved; and importantly PM Bhutto put under 'protective' custody (Rizvi 1984). Moreover, the General, like his predecessors, made, though in a totally different context, the following:

**Box 5.5 Excerpts from General Zia's Proclamation, 5 July 1977**

It must be quite clear to you now that when the *political leaders failed to steer the country out of crisis*, it is an inexcusable sin for the Armed Forces to sit as silent spectators...I saw no prospects of a compromise between the People's Party and PNA...*It was feared that the failure of the PNA and PPP to reach a compromise would throw the country into chaos*...The Army had, therefore, to act as a result of which the Government of Mr. Bhutto has ceased to exist: *Martial Law has been imposed throughout the country*: the National and Provincial Assemblies have been dissolved and the provincial Governors and Ministers have been removed...*the elections had been rigged on a large scale*...[Thus ] *I genuinely feel that the survival of this country lies in democracy and democracy alone*...[Therefore] *My sole aim is to organize free and fair elections* which would be held in October this year...I sincerely desire...*The life, honor and property of every citizen to be safe...the frontiers of Pakistan [are] fully guarded*...[italics mine]

(Rizvi 2000: Appendix H)

In addition, having coercively and arbitrarily violated the rules of the game set laboriously by the politicians, the CMLA promulgated Laws (Continuance in Force) Order 1977 to run the state. The courts were not allowed to touch orders, regulations etc., issued by martial law authorities. Interestingly, the agent judiciary decided rationally: when given the choice on the

coup day, the four Chief Justices of the High Courts of the four provinces preferred acting governorship of their respective provinces to possible removal; two days later, all the judges of the High Courts of Sindh, Peshawar, and Balochistan- from the Lahore High Court, twenty out of thirty- took fresh oath under the law of the military.

Moreover, in the wake of Supreme Court's admittance of Nusrat Bhutto's petition about his husband's detention, the CMLA, through an order, undid the Fifth and Sixth amendments which enabled Justice Anwar-ul-Haq to replace as Chief Justice of Pakistan the otherwise intriguing Chief Justice Yakub Ali. In addition, all the Supreme Court judges along with remaining ten judges from the Lahore High Court decided to take fresh oath. Interestingly enough, Justice Maulvi Mushtaq, whom Bhutto did not appoint as CJ Lahore High Court, was appointed the Chief Justice of Lahore High- he was also the Chief Election Commissioner along with being the acting Punjab Governor.

Thus, after having perked and privileged the agentship of the rational judiciary, the martial law authorities did not expect unwanted verdict from the courts. Not unexpectedly therefore, in *Nusrat Bhutto vs. the State*, the Supreme Court opted to unanimously validate the 5 July coup and subsequent martial law on the basis of the doctrine of state necessity- which by now would have become the *grundnorm* for the apex court (Khan 2002:585-595). Furthermore, the SC allowed the CMLA to amend the constitution at will. Thus, the military under Zia was able to get judicial validation.

### **5.5 An Analytic Narrative of the Coup**

As the preceding section showed the military was able to obtain legitimacy for coup/martial law. However, the judicial validation by an agent judiciary itself makes it necessary to explain this phenomenon empirically as well as conceptually. The following sections, therefore, tend to assume the coup as a narrative and analyze it in the light of study's deductive model. Hence, it shall be an analytic narrative whereby the actor's interests, preferences, and actions- outcomes- are kept central to the analysis along with due appreciation of context. To begin with, following conceptual variables are identified in the coup/martial law text given above:

*A = political leaders failed to steer the country out of crisis; It was feared that the failure of the PNA and PPP to reach a compromise would throw the country into chaos (law and order variable)*

B = *property of every citizen to be safe* (economic variable)

C = *the elections had been rigged on a large scale: I genuinely feel that the survival of this country lies in democracy and democracy alone; My sole aim is to organize free and fair elections* (democratization variable)

D = *the frontiers of Pakistan [are] fully guarded* (securitization variable)

E = *Martial Law has been imposed throughout the country* (policy variable)

The direct correspondence between variables are the following:

1. Since the politicians have failed to 'steer the county out of crisis', the military intervened to prevent Pakistan falling into a 'chaos':  $A \xrightarrow{+} E$   
(positive correspondence)
2. The country was going through a crisis whereby people's property was unsafe and insecure. Had the crisis been continued to transform into chaos, losses to property would have further worsened country's economic situation. Hence, the martial law was imposed to restore people's economic confidence and provide them with a safe economic environment to excel economically:  $B \xrightarrow{+} E$   
(positive correspondence)
3. Since the opposition had alleged the elections to be 'rigged'; and since the military believe in democracy alone, it is its aim to hold 'free and fair' elections and democratize the country truly. Hence, for this purpose coup/martial law was necessary:  $C \xrightarrow{+} E$  (positive correspondence)
4. Since the military has taken the political power directly, it shall never compromise Pakistan's security. It would protect its frontier at any cost:  $D \xrightarrow{+} E$   
(positive correspondence)

In light of the foregoing, the following observations can be drawn:

- The July coup and the subsequent martial law are justified by Zia-led military on accounts of problems of law and order and economy, democratization and securitization.
- The primary reasons/causes cited are related to governance and economy.
- The complementary reasons/causes cited are democratization and securitization.
- The military takes upon itself the task(s) to accomplish the stated goals.

As mentioned earlier, while explaining the first and second coup, the stated reasons/causes of the coup by the military could not be accepted or legitimized on their own. Hence, it becomes imperative to explain the current coup's occurrence empirically as well as theoretically. The following four sections are an effort in this respect. The primary aim of this exercise shall be to explore and explain the worth of existing positive correspondence between coup and rest of the variables. The secondary aim would be to test the study's hypotheses.

### **5.5.1 Law and Order Variable**

Like his predecessors, General Zia-ul-Haq was no exception when it came to legitimation of the coup. As the proclamation is self-evident, law and order was cited as one of the reasons of this otherwise undesirable and undemocratic action. In this section, however, the study empirically examines the strength or weakness of military's justification for direct intervention in Pakistan's politics. To begin with, as per conceptual basis of law and order, as Table 20 shows on the next page, the study, in this section, attempts a statistical analysis of murders and riots per million population.

To begin with, a comparative analysis- as Figure 3 shows on page 213- of murders and riots reported under the sacked government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Zia-led military rule is conducted accordingly. In this regard, the aim is two-fold: first, to see whether law and order had worsened under Bhutto as per our conceptualization and operationalization of the former; second, to see if the problems of law and order had been solved by the principal military led by General Zia-ul-Haq. Moreover, in order to achieve this objective, the thesis has relied on official source of relevant data.

Importantly however, as regards riots data, the present research had to rely on 1978 and 1979's data for statistically-oriented comparative purposes, for the category of riots is absent from the proceeding official record- the so called statistical yearbooks. Nevertheless, it, by no means, should affect the comparativeness of the two cases since the respective Bhutto years are greater in number. In addition, since the statistical analysis take murders and riots per million population- taking population increase into proper account- the difference in the number of years is, therefore, of no mathematical significance.

**Table 20 Murder & Riots per Million Population**


<b>Year</b>	<b>Murders per million pop.</b>	<b>Riots per million pop.</b>	<b>Pop. (million)</b>
1972	73	37	65.333
1973	70	27	67.201
1974	70	25	69.123
1975	66	22	71.238
1976	65	21	73.347
1977	56	23	75.518
1978	54	22	77.753
1979	47	24	80.055
1980	52	-	82.609
1981	55	-	85.484
1982	53	-	88.459
1983	51	-	91.537
1984	54	-	94.722
1985	54	-	98.306
1986	60	-	101.521
1987	62	-	104.840

Source: Pakistan Statistical Yearbook, 1977, 1988

Besides, the analysis has accorded coup year - coup occurred in July 1977- to Bhutto period due to two reasons: first, objectively it was arithmetically odd and unfair to divide the year with respect to number of riots since our previously analysis and the present case is analyzed on yearly basis; second, subjectively, the study wanted to put more weight in Zia-led military's scale since the former, in addition to pro-military politicians such as Air Marshal (ret'd) Asghar Khan, blamed Bhutto for worsening law and order situation especially post-March 1977 elections.

Turning to the findings, it is maintained, as the Figure is self-evident on the next page, that both murders and riots registered a significant downward trend during the Bhutto government. Hence, in light of this empirical evidence, it is suffice to conclude that the Zia-led military's attempt at self-legitimation, by invoking the issue of low governance, is fundamentally preposterous. Importantly however, the principal military itself failed to improve upon the law and order situation despite oft-repeated vows during a more-than-a-decade long military rule.

**Figure 3 Trend: Murder and Riots per Million Population**



Interestingly and ironically, the number and type of reported crimes increased during this period (see Table 21 on the next page). Noticeably, the Table contains crime categories such as attempted murders, cattle theft, other theft etc., which were hitherto non-present in the official record. Without attempting any generalizations, what is observable from the above is that the type, scale and degree of reported crimes increased manifold during this military rule. Importantly, this happened despite the Islamic (*Hudood*) laws<sup>61</sup> which had made, for instance, robbery and/or theft a punishable crime.

<sup>61</sup> It provided amputation of the right hand from the joint of the wrist for the first theft, and amputation of left foot up to the ankle for the second theft. For the third time, life imprisonment was provided (Khan 2002:628).

**Table 21 Crimes in Pakistan: 1978-1987**

Yr.	M.	A.M	K./A.	C.L	D.	R.	B.	C.T	O.T	O.	Tl.
1978	4168	7402	3934	99	84	482	10273	7538	18285	114709	166974
1979	3735	7024	3428	82	110	517	8764	5656	15763	105449	150531
1980	4307	7593	3166	62	70	530	8677	5094	15864	117049	162412
1981	4732	8283	3489	72	112	622	7910	4637	16235	127251	173347
1982	4707	8160	4593	92	110	484	7351	4111	22040	119000	170648
1983	4636	8474	4281	75	125	558	7400	3829	20863	127836	178079
1984	5104	8848	4736	105	240	813	8411	4306	17125	152462	202150
1985	5345	8855	4877	86	236	875	8612	4259	17125	159028	209525
1986	6076	10057	5155	102	340	1255	8499	5598	17352	174729	231723
1987	6486	10669	5109	137	315	1216	8286	3793	19349	194376	249736

Abbreviations: Yr. = Year; A.M=Attempted Murder; K./A =Kidnapping/Abduction; C.L=Child lifting; D. =Dacoity; R. =Robbery; B.= Burglary; C.T = Cattle theft; O.T =Other theft; O. = Others; Tl. =Total  
Source: Pakistan Statistical Yearbook, 1988

Regardless of increase in number and type of reported crimes during the period under analysis, one can safely conclude, on the basis of murder-riots per million population statistical analysis that the latter went upward despite opposite claims by the military. Therefore, this law and order variable lacks causation potency vis-à-vis the July coup.

### 5.5.2 Economic Variable

Under the economic variable the task shall be twofold: first, to briefly explain country's economic performance under the sacked Bhutto government in order to legitimize the coup, as claimed by Zia-led military, or otherwise; secondly, to explain whether the military rule brought economic fruits- which the sacked government could not- after having staged the coup and taken charge of country's economic affairs. To begin with, in new Pakistan Bhutto started with his nationalization program- see Table below- which, as mentioned previously, had certain politico-economic objectives to achieve.

**Table 22 Nationalization under Bhutto: 1972-77**

Year/Period	Type of Industry
January 1972	Public takeover of 31 large firms in 10 basic Industries: iron and steel, basic, metals, heavy engineering, motor-vehicle assembly and manufacture, tractor assembly and manufacture, heavy and basic chemicals, petrochemicals, cement and public utilities.
March 1972	Land reforms.
March 1972	Management and control of 32 life insurance companies.

May 1972	Banking reforms; State Bank of Pakistan extends controls over scheduled banks, re-orienting credit policy towards small farmers and small industrial entrepreneurs.
May 1972	Devaluation of rupee by 131 per cent
June 1972	Comprehensive labor reforms.
August 1972	Comprehensive public health program.
September 1972- September 1974	Nationalization of educational institutions.
June 1973	Trade in cotton and rice nationalized.
September 1973	Vegetable oil, petroleum marketing, and shipping nationalized.
January 1974	Nationalization of all private and domestically owned banks.
August 1976	Cotton ginning, rice husking and flour mills nationalized.

Source: Zaidi. 2005.

As is obvious from the Table, it was a phased nationalization which was carried out in accordance with political and economic concerns. For instance, one of its targets was the monopolist families of the 1960s whose financial position got affected negatively. However, the nationalization program, overall, remained unable to perform re-distributional functions. Indeed, it gave birth to a new section of industrialists (Noman 1988:77-78). Moreover, same was the case with his 1972 and 1976 land reforms. In addition, the trade balance stood negative.

Nonetheless, it never implies that Pakistan's economy remained in shamble during the Bhutto government. In order to assess his government policies one must not ignore the context. The loss of East Pakistan along with a large market was a cause for concern- 18 per cent of the West Pakistan's imports came from the East. Thus, in the post-breakup period, new markets were to be found to compensate for this loss of market. Gradually, when the government was able to access new markets, the devaluation measure that it took started to bore fruits in terms of a 153 per cent increase in exports in 1972/73 as compared with the previous year. Moreover, the manufactured exports registered a growth of 19 per cent in 1973/74. This growth in exports had a positive impact on industrial sector output between 1972 and 1974. In addition, the agricultural output increased due largely to the higher support price for wheat, rice and sugar. A timely and adequate supply of essential inputs along with credit-availability also played an important role in this respect (Zaidi 2005:105-106).



However, this economic boom was short-lived due primarily to ‘the bad luck factor’ which is outlined in the Table below.

**Table 23 Bhutto: Natural Catastrophe as Contextual Constraint**

<b>Year/Period</b>	<b>Nature and Type of Loss</b>
August 1973	Massive floods hits Pakistan; import of food grain.
October 1973	Four-fold increase in international petroleum prices; heavy imports cost; prices of fertilizers, essential inputs and oil soar; excessive inflation domestically.
1974-77	World recession follows OPEC price rise; demand for Pakistani exports remains severely repressed and affects industrial output.
1974-75	Huge failure of cotton crop by as much as 25 per cent at a time when international cotton prices had risen; affected industrial output.
1976-77	Worst floods in Pakistan’s history; crops destroyed; further import of food crops; excessive expenditure on public good measures, all affecting industrial output.

Source: Zaidi. 2005. *Issues in Pakistan’s Economy*.

Importantly however, owing to lack of appreciation of the ‘bad luck factor’ by many researchers such as William McCleary, Nawab Haider Naqvi and Khwaja Sarmad, the proper comprehension of the state of economy under the Bhutto government got dangerously depreciated. However, in light of the ongoing what can be concluded is that ‘things were not as bad as they seemed, given the conditions inherited and the odds against Bhutto. Moreover, it was more bad luck than bad management which resulted in poor economic growth rates’ (Zaidi 2005:107-108; also Noman 1990:97). Thus, it is maintained that the Zia-led military’ claim of worsening economic situation under Bhutto is empirically unfounded. However, the following takes a look at the economic performance under the principle military to see if things were different, on this front, under the military rule.

To begin with, the period 1980-88 generally witnessed a GDP growth rate of 6.5 per cent and real wages- in manufacturing- growth rate of 6.2 per cent respectively. Furthermore, the total annual growth in terms of value of output, labor and indicators for a large number of manufacturing industries stood at 9.6 per cent during 1978-88. However, despite these rosy figures, the productivity growth figures, during the period 1978-88, present a different story. The aggregate, in this respect, of 0.3 per cent per annum not only remained low compared to the 5 per cent in the 1960s but also the cross-sectoral variation was significant. Moreover, if the total factor productivity (TFP) growth rates are aggregated, then the consumer goods

register negative TFP growth with the barring exception of apparel industry. Moreover, the period from 1975 to 1986 had witnessed little growth in employment in most of the industries along with decrease in the rate of labor productivity growth. Interestingly, despite greatest increase in employment, the apparel industry experienced output fall by 19 per cent (ibid 2005:112).

In addition, if one analyzes the economic performance under the military rule in terms of five-year plans, the overall impression is extremely negative. For instance, the Fifth Plan, 1978-83, registered an annual GDP growth rate of 6.3 per cent which remained below the ambitious 7.5 per cent. Moreover, the commodity-producing sectors grew annually at 6.1 per cent, marginally higher than the 5.9 per cent growth of the service sector. However, in the 1970s the service sector grew at 6.9 per cent- almost twice the annual growth rate of the commodity-producing sectors. Interestingly, the manufacturing output increased partly due to the investments made under the Bhutto government.

Importantly however, the above-mentioned growth rate was achieved at the expense of long-term development prospects. Moreover, rapid growth, with low investment rates, was a result of running down of infrastructure and neglect of replacement investment. In addition, part of the growth performance was achieved with the help of output being generated from long gestating projects.

By the end of the Plan, debt servicing was absorbing 70% of gross aid inflow...The aggregate investment and savings performance was disappointing. The investment ratio fell from 16% to 13.4%. The decline was related to the change in strategy as the private sector was again given the prominence accorded to it in the sixties. While 6.3% growth rate in private investment represented a substantial recovery from the nationalization-induced paralysis, it was not sufficient to compensate for the fall in public sector investment. Consortium aid donors provided strong support for the revival of private enterprise...[Moreover] the domestic savings ratio fell. The resource shortages would have been critical were it not for the rapid growth in remittances from the Middle East. Remittances grew by 20% per annum through the course of the Fifth Plan. In spite of the Gulf bonanza, only 70% of the Plan was implemented due to the resource shortage...[Also] there was compensating borrowing from the non-bank sources to balance the budget. Non-bank borrowing doubled

during the course of the Plan. In 1982-83, the surplus on the consolidated revenue budget turned into a small deficit for the first time in Pakistan's history.

(Noman 1990:181-182; also Husain 2000:30-31)

In addition, the Sixth Five Year Plan (1983-84) met, overall, with a similar fate. For instance, despite projected 10 per cent increase in annual Middle Eastern remittances, the latter fell sharply. Moreover, the export diversification could not live up to the occasion and the narrow export base remained extremely vulnerable to exogenous shocks. Moreover, the Plan's performance remained highly poor as regards fiscal performance. The estimated net foreign resource inflows of US\$ 4.07 billion remained a distant dream; in reality, it barely amounted to US\$ 2.8 billion. As a result, the domestic borrowing increased (ibid 1990:186).

Regardless, one of the negatives of the economic activities under the Zia-led military was the mushrooming of a 'parallel and illegal economy'. The latter refers to diversion of aid inflows, the growth of smuggling, the rapid increase in weapons' sale and the large-scale drug business which gave birth to a 'subterranean economy' whose estimated worth was about 20-30 per cent of GDP (Husain 2000:30). Little wonder then, the concentration of wealth in a few resourceful and politically well-connected hands further increased overall poor-rich inequality in a rapidly increasing population- the population growth rate was 3.1% in 1981 (ibid:187)

Therefore, in light of the ongoing empirical evidences it is posited that the much-enchanting growth rates were superficial in nature and character since they heavily relied on foreign aid inflows and the Middle Eastern remittances- the good luck factor- along with trickle-downs of economic policies initiated by the Bhutto government. In fact, despite the claimed macroeconomic stability Pakistan's trade and budget remained in deficits. Moreover, in real terms the socio-economic inequality persisted. Importantly, the 'parallel and illegal' economy got thrived as a result of rational complicity between the principal military and a section of the agents. Besides, if one includes the negative effects of the drugs, weapons etc., on the rapidly increasing population- a significant portion of which was illiterate and poor- the cultural and psychological cost further adds to the aggregate. Hence, the stated positive correspondence between coup/martial law and economic variable cannot be held empirically.

### 5.5.3 Democratization Variable

As mentioned earlier in the chapter, having sacked an elected prime minister the military had put him in protective custody. However, the rational military opted to release Bhutto along with a few opposition members, on 28 July, to avoid any possible backlash from the opposition and especially the PPP. The following day, Bhutto, while addressing the party workers in the capital, gave vent that he had no intention to challenge the regime and its rules of the game. Thus, the politicians were allowed limited political activity. Moreover, the military gave the date for elections to be held on October 18 (Rizvi 1986). No sooner than later, quite contrary to the regime's calculations Bhutto decided to challenge the former with his speeches, addresses and slogans during the election campaign in almost all major cities, where he was accorded a hero's welcome. The former thought it prudent, given PPP's maiden vote, to take the opposition and military on, electorally.

Meanwhile, Ahmad Raza's family- Raza was ex-PPP cohort- opted to revive the murder case of Nawab Ahmad Khan who was murdered in 1974. Accordingly, the hearing of the case got shifted to the Lahore High Court on 27 August. In relation to this murder case, Bhutto was arrested on September 3, and bailed on account of weak evidence on 13 September. Meanwhile, elections campaign was going on. But, the PNA was struggling as regards its candidature strategy. Having noticed the PNA's internal divisions, the military hinted to postpone the elections if the former so desired. Moreover, to further nail down the politicians, it started an inquiry into the assets of deposed MNAs and MPAs with an aim to intimate them and possibly disqualify them to contest again.

On the other hand, in the post-bail period, Bhutto chose to confront the principal military. In this regard, having calculated his popularity during the huge crowds, he preferred to threaten Zia and his aides of dire consequence in case he resumed power(s). His threats were taken seriously by the military with the effect that, on 17 September, he was rearrested under a martial law order. A section of opposition politicians, being mindful of Nusrat Bhutto's recent leadership qualities, called upon the military to hold the deposed government accountable before the election. Therefore, the rational military, with an institutional distaste for elections, in strategic interaction with the PNA leadership opted to postpone the election and put a ban on all political activities on 1 October (ibid 1986). Ironically, the ban on all political activities was not what the PNA had in mind. It only wanted PPP to be banned. Importantly, the PNA stumbled to chalk any unanimous strategy in the post-ban period and

thus crumbled like a house of cards- the withdrawal of Asghar Khan from its fold is a case in point.

Quite paradoxically even, the martial law regime chose to dissolve the Hyderabad Tribunal and withdrew cases against the accused including Wali Khan, Marri and Bizenjo- the anti-state elements. The factionalized PNA and released politicians urged Zia to hold accountability of Bhutto years than to hold elections. The regime's preference converged with the latter and Zia finally decided to start the three-phase process of accountability under the stewardship of working judiciary. The main hunt was purging of politicians especially from PPP whose leaders such as Sadiq Hussain Qureshi, a form Chief Minister and Governor of Punjab, and Sheikh Rashid, a former federal minister, were disqualified.

Last but not least, instead of holding promised election, the military first gave hint of a 'national government' formation; the factionalized PNA rationally rushed to it. But due to their divergence in preferences, the idea was given up by the principal. Instead, on coup anniversary, a cabinet consisting general, agent bureaucrats and a section of agent politicians- i.e. Muslim League (Pagaro) - was announced. Having a formal cabinet in placed, the regime, in order to further de-politicize and possibly factionalize the PPP, issued White Papers between 23 July and 27 August. The papers were aimed at highlighting Bhutto's misdeeds with respect to elections, media, press, public funds etc.

Interestingly enough, the PNA, which had earlier, fail to mend electoral differences with the regime, opted to pursue its political, if not economic, interests by joining the military government on 6 August 1978. The CMLA and army chief, on his part, had a preference for country's presidentship when the office was vacated by President Fazal Elahi- a PPP man- in mid-September. The remaining hurdle in the road to democracy was removed by the agent judiciary which, after a lengthy judicial process conducted by mostly anti-PPP judges, found the former President, CMLA and Prime Minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, guilty of murder.

**Box 5.6 Bhutto was murdered judicially**

Bhutto was judicially victimized. [Chief Justice] Maulvi Mushtaq who had an obvious bias against Bhutto should not have chaired the bench of Lahore High Court who found him guilty of murder...Moreover, during the appeal process, Justice Qaiser Khan, who got retired during the appeal proceedings, should have been allowed to continue as ad hoc judge...Justice Waheedudin, who got ill, was also not allowed to sit on the appeal bench despite his request...The judgment was against the norm of the Supreme Court too; because when one members of the bench retires, dies or is incapacitated, the Chief Justice constitutes another bench to hear the case afresh...The judgment [in appeal] finally was divided; four against Bhutto; three in his favor.

A Senior Advocate Supreme Court and member Pakistan Bar Council gave this opinion in April 2008.

What the aforementioned informs is that the agent judiciary worked under the auspices of the principal military primarily for its own politico-economic interests as mentioned earlier. Hence, there was no need for shirking. Instead, its workability had found Bhutto to be a murderer with the effect that the latter was hanged to death on 4 April 1979 (Wolpert 1993:303-330).

With Bhutto's death, the PNA-regime alliance also met with death, but due to rational reasons. The principal did not need the agent and factionalized PNA- also factionalized- any more in post-Bhutto period; the latter, on its part, had got Bhutto removed politically and thus saw more benefits in contesting elections- in Bhutto's absence- than allying with the regime. However, to PNA's surprise, Zia opted to postpone the elections. Instead of holding general elections at national and provincial level, the military under Zia was able to hold, on 28 September 1979, local body election, on non-party basis, to de-politicize the provinces and especially political parties and strategically interact with the local politician directly who, in turn, could support the regime politic-electurally (Rizvi 1986).

When the PNA started questioning the postponement of general elections, the regime amended the 1962 Political Parties Act to further squeeze the parties which were now supposed to hold internal elections annually, register with the Election Commission, submit the details of their financial assets to the EC and importantly abstain from any activity prejudicial to Pakistan's ideology, public order, intendance of the judiciary and integrity and honor of the military. However, before the politicians and their parties were able to put their

house in order, the principal finally decided, on 16 October 1979, to take the principaled position to democratize Pakistan: the promised elections were postponed indefinitely; all political parties were dissolved; political activities banned; press suppressed etc.

In the post-postponement period, the politicians especially from the PNA were able to nominate the military regime as their revival which left no stone unturned to de-politicize, factionalize and physically crush them as well as their organizational structure. Moreover, as rational actors they saw little opportunity to grow politico-economically under the authoritarianism of the principal. The only rational choice was to mend their differences and believe in their agency to stand united against the military dictatorship. In addition, a section of politicians, non-PNA contextually, started political negotiations with victimized People's Party. They were able to form, on 6 February 1981, a political organization- the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) - to demand an end to the martial law and holding of election in accordance with the abrogated constitution.

The military, on her part, authoritatively chose to impose its rules of the game in terms of issuance of a Provisional Constitutional Order, the PCO, in March 1981 than to hold the elections and/or restore the Constitution. The opposition politicians in terms of MRD challenged these arbitrary rules of the game. They took to agitational politics and subsequently were accorded due punishment by the principal.

Nonetheless, being a rational actor, the principal military having met with agitations came up with a strategy to appease the opposition and hence reduce the political cost to its rule. Thus, it preferred to hold general elections. But before the elections were held, the leader of the principal military, Zia-ul-Haq, was to become the president for had the elections been held without this arrangement, the politicians would have gained political clout. Thus, in Decameter 1984, a referendum was held. The populace, the majority of which was illiterate and rural, was given the following choice:

‘Whether the people of Pakistan endorse the process initiated by General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, the President of Pakistan, for bringing the laws of Pakistan in conformity with the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and *Sunnah* of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) and for the preservation of the ideology of Pakistan, for the continuation and consolidation of that process, and for the smooth and orderly transfer of power to the *elected representatives* of the people.’ [italics mine]

(Khan 2002:660)

As a result, despite the MRD's boycott, the general was declared elected by the agent Election Commission(er). Subsequently, elections to National and Provincial assemblies were held. The MRD boycotted it as they were held on non-party basis. The Jamat-i-Islami could only participate as a political organization due to its alliance with the regime.

As the afore-mentioned suggests the electoral exercise under Zia-led military rule was a planned attempt at de-politicization of opposition politicians and their political parties as well as establishment of a pro-regime civilianized government. The overall objective of this electoral exercise aimed at making the masses believe that there was no military dictatorship. However, it continued.

Nonetheless, another arbitrary action taken on 2 March 1985 before the NA session by the principal was to order amendment in the constitution in terms of Revival of the Constitution of 1973 Order (RCO). The RCO, among other things, provided for a powerful President. It was, it is posited, a strategy to institutionalize the principal's rules of the game (Khan 1994:40-42). Thus, under the new rules, the President nominated the Prime Minister; the nominee was Muhammad Khan Junejo, a politician from Sindh. Junejo was calculated to be a pliable politician by the military who could never think of shirking. Moreover, under the new rules the provincial governors- generals indeed- were to appoint chief ministers. As a result of strategic interaction with the regime, a serving judge of the Sindh High Court was able to get appointed Chief Minister of that province and, in the case of Punjab, an industrialist, Nawaz Sharif, was able to strategically ally with the regime to assume chief ministership.

In the post-civilianization period, quite contrary to military's calculus, the agent politicians especially the Prime Minister had a different set of preferences. Being a rational actor he wanted to maximize his political, if not economic, interests. Thus, he started maneuvering, politically, personalistic politicians who stood on weaker political ground in the absence of organized and functioning parties. However, the PM's efforts bore fruit; he was elected to assume the presidentship of (All Pakistan) Muslim League. To further mark his agency, he was able to lift emergency and restore fundamental human rights.



Importantly, with respect to civil-military relations PM Junejo had a different take on the martial law from that of the military. The former had a preference for an open political activity so that his party among others could gain politico-electorally. The principal, on its part, having noticed the potential of shirking in the civilian section of the regime opted to play a game. It gave the agent a choice: either institutionalize the established rules of the game to get the martial law lifted or settle with the status quo. The rational politicians, however, saw more political benefits in getting the martial law lifted. Therefore, they, in the parliament, opted to validate all martial law regulations and orders; the doers of these actions were indemnified accordingly. Importantly enough, the President under this Eighth Amendment got the powers- 58 (2)(b)- to dissolve the parliament and provincial assembly at his discretion. Did the politicians make a correct political decision?

**Box 5.7 The Idea of a National Security Council could not materialize**

I think they made a political move to get the martial law lifted, so that they could excel politically. Because had they remained with the military, then the public would have seen no difference between them and the martial law authorities. But it was a costly deal...Because the President became more powerful. Perhaps the politicians thought when the martial law is over, they would take Zia on...[However] The fact of the matter is they did not allow him make the proposed National Security Council [NSC] a constitutional body.

Interview with Liaqat Baloch, Secretary General, Jamat-i-Islami, Pakistan. Lahore: 19 March 2008.

In light of the foregoing, it is, quite contrary to the existing literature, maintained that though the politicians primarily saw to their own interests, they were able to deal with the military tactfully. In this respect, they were, on the one hand, able to get the martial law lifted and, on the other, did not let the principal totally overrule them in terms of constitutionalization of the NSC- which the military brought forward to oversight the agents. From the study's theoretical perspective, the incorporation of the 58 2 (b) contextually suited Zia as President and importantly as leader of the principal. However, the provision did not constitutionalize- or institutionalize as is commonly believed- the military rule in Pakistan since the military intervention is, as is so far explained, a result of military agency and rationality.

Put simply, the politicians, despite the Eighth Amendment, had an equal opportunity to elect their candidate to the Office of the President in the future provided they had a preference for

this. Moreover, the military's efforts with respect to civilianization of its rule and empowerment (of the Office) of the President did not mark its often over-emphasized strength; rather, the very process of these developments highlighted its political weakness vis-à-vis the politicians.

Nonetheless, as mentioned above, in the post-civilianization period differences started to emerge between the principal military and the agent civil section of the government. The PM chose to, having perceived the military engaged at multiple fronts i.e. Afghan Jihad etc., shirk. To begin with, PM Junejo, showing his agency, had a different approach with regard to appointments of ambassadors, government secretaries and even heads of intelligence agencies- the removal of Major-General Nek Muhammad is a case in point. Moreover, the PM believed in austerity and, in this respect on the floor of the parliament, he vowed to *putting Generals into Suzukis* [italics added] (Khan 2002:690).

In addition, the principal and the agent's preferences could not converge on issues related to weapons procurements, foreign visits and protocols, normalization with India, Ojheri camp and the Afghan Jihad. Indeed, with respect to the latter, Junejo, quite opposite to the military's position, opted to sign the Geneva Accord on 14 April 1988. From the military's perspective this action of his would have caused crisis in the civil-military relations. Not the least, there was, according to Zia's own aides, secret reports of his removal as COAS at the parliament's hands (Arif 1995:392-396).

Therefore, the principal military having calculated not only the danger from the shirking agent but also the cost and benefits of his removal decided to punish the latter. Little wonder then, on 29 May 1988, the National Assembly stood dissolved<sup>62</sup>. The shirking agent was sacked accordingly. On the following day, the dissolution of provincial assemblies added insult to injury. Moreover, a caretaker government sans prime minister was announced. Also, in clear breach of the constitution, Zia gave 172, as against stipulated 90, days to hold generals elections. However, before Pakistan could be democratize the leader of the principal military died, in an air crash, on 28 August 1988.

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<sup>62</sup> Interestingly, the reasons, Zia cited on 30 May, were more or less the same which his-led military gave on July 5, 1977.

To summarize, the Zia-led military in order to legitimize itself held non-party local bodies' polls, an arbitrary presidential referendum and non-party general elections. The aim was to civilianize the rule. However, in the wake of post-election politicians' agency, the principal opted to undo the entire system than to (re)negotiate rules of the game with the former. Thus, in light of the ongoing it is posited that all attempts regarding democratization by the principal military during this period were arbitrary but rational in terms of preferring own to larger interests. As the empirical evidences have highlighted above, it would be morally unfair then to believe in the positive correspondence between coup/martial law and democratization.

#### **5.5.4 Securitization Variable**

As is obvious from the coup-text, Pakistan did not face any external or internal security threat from anywhere. Had this been the case, the reasons cited for coup would have placed the security concerns at the top. Regardless, following is an attempt to explain whether the military rule securitized Pakistan meaningfully.

To begin with, in July 1977, Kashmir was undoubtedly an issue between India and Pakistan. But the two countries were not in a war on this or any other issue in the pre-coup and the immediate post-coup period. Interestingly, the military even did not wage one to take Kashmir militarily. Nevertheless, it got an opportunity to participate in a war, and that too indirectly as shall be explained later, which was fought primarily between the intruding Soviets and Afghans during 1979-1988 in Afghanistan.

In this Afghan war, the rational military of Pakistan decided to ally with the US- whose President had severely criticized the regime' anti-human rights activities- to obtain politico-economic benefits. Indeed, Zia's refusal to accept the first offer of \$400 million as 'peanuts' should not be, from any nationalist perspective, associated with a strategic threat from the Soviets whom the US was already bent upon chasing.<sup>63</sup> Put differently, when a state perceives a threat to its physical survival, then it, arguably, must not negotiate the price for participation in the looming threat; rather, it should take its own security measures i.e. material offers to win allies etc., to confront the enemy. Moreover, the case to ally with other power(s) to fight a (common) threat is extremely problematic from the democratic theory

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<sup>63</sup> For the details of the US aid to Pakistan military see Arif (1995:334-348; also 2001:183-188).

perspective: how could a martial law regime, consisting of a few individuals at the top, decide the highly important matter of life and death for almost 80 million people without any reference to them? How can it be justified even morally?

Nonetheless, the regime rationally participated in the Afghan war which was subsequently labeled a jihad, an Islamic war, to kill the non-believers- the communist Soviets (Rashid 2002:212). The overall material benefits the principal military received were little less than \$ 5 billion which went primarily to the military's purse; in fact, part of the money was used to procure weapons to modernize the institution rather than the nation. However, the socio-economic and psychological cost the nation was forced to pay was huge.

By the exodus was over, some 4 million refugees had settled into makeshift camps in Pakistan and started permeating into the heartland... Apart from disrupting the social, economic, and political fabric of the tribal areas, the refugees brought their blood feuds and rivalries as well as links to the poppy-growing culture of Afghanistan that suddenly made Pakistan a major pipeline for heroin to the west... *The Politics of Heroin* author McCoy estimates that from 'zero heroin addicts in 1979, numbers rose to 5,000 users in 1980, 70, 000 in 1983, and then in the words of Pakistan's own Narcotic Control board, went 'completely out of hand' to over 1.3 million addicts in 1985. ...[Also] a new 'Kalashnikov Culture' was born in Pakistan.

(Nawaz 2008:371)

As the quote mentions explicitly the socio-psychological impact of the war, in which Pakistan' military had participated while according preference to its own interests, was extremely negative on the general public. For example, the Kalashnikov culture points to, on the one hand, the free-movement of weapons in the county- in which a section of the principal was involved for material reasons- and on the other, inherent danger that it entailed for the society at large. As one commentator wrote:

The government, particularly the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), was a conduit for the supply of arms and ammunition to Afghan freedom fighters. This afforded an opportunity to some of the generals involved in this effort to help themselves to handsome money by selling some of the arms to Iran... It cannot be said with any certainty whether it was to cover up such unauthorized sales of weaponry that an explosion occurred at Ojehri camp, or if the explosion on 10 April 1988 took place accidentally. Ojehri was an ordnance depot situated near the twin cities of Islamabad

and Rawalpindi and when it exploded, missiles, rockets and other weapons flew in different directions in the two cities, killing hundreds of people and injuring many others. About 100 people died within the first hour, most of them instantly, while many more were maimed permanently...There was also substantial damage to property.

(Khan 2002:689)

The flight of missiles, rockets etc., from Ojehri camp to the twin cities and the consequent losses of person and property, as the quote describes, certainly help conclude that despite claims to securitize the nation, the principal failed to 'guard' the latter. Rather, the empirical evidences, as given above, points to its complicity as principal in the said case. One wonders how an institution, which arbitrarily received the lion's share of the national budgets- see Table below-, could be neglectful of its primary task and stated goal of securitization.

**Table 24 Defense Expenditure: 1978-88**

Year	Defense Expenditure (Rs. million)	Percentage of Total Expenditure
1978-79	10, 168	34.00
1979-80	12, 665	33.34
1980-81	15,300	33.00
1981-82	18,630	36.41
1982-83	24,566	41.5
1983-84	26,798	38.86
1984-85	31,866	35.37
1985-86	35,606	35.59
1986-87	41,335	36.95
1987-88	47,015	34.53

Source: Rizvi. 2000.

Besides, related to the Afghanistan- and India for that matter- was the attributed linkages of Al-Murtaza Organization (AZO) for attempts on Zia's person. However,

The only successful operation of the AZO that garnered the headline was the hijacking on 2 March 1981 to Kabul of a PIA aircraft...carrying, among others, a retired army officer, Tariq Rahim who was once an ADC [aide-de-camp] to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto...Rahim, who apparently was seen by Murtaza as a traitor to Z.A Bhutto, was shot on 6 March by one of the hijackers...The flight then took off for Damascus

the next day. The hijacking ended that day, after Zia agreed to release some fifty-four PPP supporters in Pakistan jails.

(Nawaz 2008:378-379)

What the foregoing suggests is that the military regime, on the one hand, linked AZO with Afghanistan and India and, on the other, negotiated political issues with the People's Party. In other words, the threat, if any, from the AZO was political than security, and was politically, not militarily, sorted out. In addition, during the Zia-led military rule, Siachin (1984) and Brasstacks (1987) could be cited as threats from India. However, on the latter the following account should suffice

If Brasstacks was to be a precursor to an Indian attack into Sindh, it did not happen. However, the two nations had come close to a war, and the situation was only defused after Zia resorted to his famous 'cricket diplomacy' by going to India to watch a cricket match between India and Pakistan.

(ibid 2008:392)

One wonders why the General, COAS and President, the most pious and defender of Islam-Islamization under him is a case in point- preferred to watch a cricket match *in* India than to wage a war against a Hindu-enemy? The fate of Siachin<sup>64</sup> was no different. In this respect, a Pakistani military analyst observed:

It is no secret that since the 1970s both countries had an 'eye on the glacier'. Their disagreement was due to their divergent comprehension of their bilateral agreement reached at Simla on the demarcation of the boundary and the Line-of-Control (LoC). Towards the end of the 1970s Pakistan had tacitly begun to exercise control over the glacier by charging a fee form mountain climbing expeditionary parties which annoyed New Delhi. In 1983 General Zia-ul-Haq ordered its occupation but the army could not comply due to its involvement in the country's politics and Afghanistan. Hence, in 1984, Islamabad was practically caught with its 'pants down'...Equally

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<sup>64</sup> The Siachin is one of the largest and longest non-polar glaciers stretching over approximately 1000 square miles and situated over 20,000 feet above sea level. It is located in the Karakoram mountains at the northern edge of the Indian subcontinent and south of China. The Siachin is an extension of the existing Kashmir problem. After 1984 the glacier was converted into the world's highest battleground when India launched its operation Maghdoot to occupy the glacier. New Delhi's venture was essentially a pre-emptive measure to block Pakistan's control of the glacier.

questionable was the Pakistani propaganda after the invasion. The [military] establishment believed that India had plans to threaten the Karakoram Highway linking China with Pakistan. Keeping in view the geographical and atmospheric hazards this argument is far from logical.

(Siddiqi 2003:20)

Last but not least, the General, the leader of the principal, could not save himself: he died in a military aircraft. Thus, in light of the above-mentioned empirical evidences, it is maintained that there was not any existent internal/external threat in the pre-coup period. In the post-coup period the military regime joined the war in Afghanistan to accrue politic-economic benefits rather to confront any security threat. Importantly, the decision to participate in the jihad was entirely of the principal. As a result, the country became more insecure socio-economically if not religio-culturally and/or politically. Ironically, efforts were made to normalize with India. Yet the Kashmir issue remained there despite increase in the defense expenditures. Therefore, the securitization variable's positive relationship with coup and consequent martial law is unfounded empirically.

### **5.6 Military Agency: Causing the Coup**

As the preceding sections have shown that positive correspondence did not exist, empirically, between coup/martial law and the conceptual variables drawn from the coup-text. Similarly, as seen in Chapter 2, the existing accounts do not help one either. For example, the conspiracy theory, which pointed to Washington, could not qualify as a scientific theory since empirically the US had bad ties with the military regime pre-Afghan Jihad. The structuralist accounts face the same dilemma: if structure brought the (structurally powerful) military in politics in July 1977, then why did not it bring it earlier, for instance, in 1974, 1975 or 1976 and/or pre-election 1977? The path-dependent explanation (Aziz 2008) ignores context and importantly causes of a coup. Had there been military 'control' in Pakistan, the former needed not take the pain to stage a coup and impose martial law for it was, from this logic, already in control of the state ?

Thus, in light of the above, following is given, with the help of the model, an agency explanation of the coup. The primary objective of the explanation shall be to test the posed hypotheses and seek answers to the core question and the puzzle.

To begin with, the military had to assume an agent position post-breakup since politicians' preference had prevailed. The Bhutto-led principal took various measures to bring the military under civilian control. However, the nature and character of such measures could, at best, imply an implicit oversight of the agents- military, civil bureaucracy and judiciary. However, Bhutto preferred to appease the military in terms of defense expenditure for political reasons. The latter preferred to work than shirk since the cost of shirking would have been higher for a military which was demoralized after its defeat against India in December 1971.

Nevertheless, as a rational actor, with a taste for principalship, the military kept calculating (principal) politicians' weaknesses for the latter's weaknesses were the former's strength. Thus, in the specific context of July 1977, the agent military after having calculated the cost and benefits of shirking opted to stage the coup. The coup was successful since military's preference had prevailed (agency A).

Thus, military agency and not 'structure', conspiracy, path dependency etc., caused the coup and the consequent martial law. The coup was rational in nature and political in character for the primary objective was to capture political power. In other words, the military wanted to achieve certain objectives by staging the coup: a) it wanted to transform its agent character into that of the principal. Moreover, it wanted not to allow or better let the politicians to control the political process and gradually consolidate their position vis-à-vis the GHQ; b) it wanted to renegotiate the rules of the game which, if not changed, could have legally-constitutionally, if not politically, strengthened the political actors and elective institutions vis-à-vis the military. Hence, what the above suggests is that the military preferred its own interest (agency B); the economic dimension of interests is explained in the next section.

Moreover, as per study's hypothesis, the very act of coup highlighted the political weakness rather than strength, as the existing accounts often make one believe, of the military institution vis-à-vis the politicians. Had she been politically stable and composed there would have been no coup since the primary purpose of the action, as mentioned above, was political in character. However, political power was seen as an instrument by the military to facilitate her economic interests. Since this is also one of the hypotheses of the study, the following section tends to explain it in detail.



### 5.6.1 Maximizing Economic Interests

As explained earlier in the chapter, Bhutto's implicit oversight mechanism meant to prevent military from growing politically. Moreover, he had an implicit agenda to let not the military flourish economically- the decrease in the latter's economic activities is a case in point. Therefore, as hypothesized in the post-Bhutto period the politically powerful military set on a course of economic maximization. In this respect, it was able to establish the National Logistic Cell (NLC) on 6 August 1978. It was a public sector organization directly controlled by the army. Its stated purpose was

to reduce the congestion at Karachi Port, which had resulted in a waiting time of 50 days for the ships and was costing the Government \$12.5 Million per annum in demurrage. In the process NLC introduced in the country the concept of containerization and became the largest multi-modal freight handler in the region.<sup>65</sup>

Besides, the Fauji Foundation continued with its business ventures. In this respect, it was able to incorporate Fauji Fertilizer Company (FFC), in May 1978, as a private limited company in a joint venture between Fauji Foundation and Haldor Topsoe A/S of Denmark. The initial authorized capital of the company stood at Rs. 813.9 million. The FFC commenced commercial production of urea in 1982 at a cost of Rs.3, 300 million with annual capacity of 570,000 metric.<sup>66</sup> Furthermore, the FF incorporated, on 4 December 1984, Mari Gas Company Limited (MGCL) as an unlisted public limited company with shareholding by the Government of Pakistan (GoP), Fauji Foundation and Oil & Gas Development Company Limited in the ratio of 40:40:20 respectively. However, the GoP in 1994 opted to divest 20% of its shareholding to the general public through an IPO (Initial Public Offering) at the three stock Exchanges of Pakistan.<sup>67</sup>

In addition, the Fauji Foundation School of Nursing, located in the premises of Fauji Foundation Hospital Rawalpindi, was established in 1978. Also, the Foundation established Fauji Corn Complex, in 1982, with grinding capacity up to 50 Metric Ton Per Day (MTPD); to meet the growing demand of starches and derivatives in the country and abroad, the first

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<sup>65</sup> NLC Report 2009. Available from <http://www.nlc.com.pk/website.nsf/publication.html>

<sup>66</sup> <http://www.ffc.com.pk/contents/aboutffc.htm>

<sup>67</sup> See <http://www.marigas.com.pk/Financials.shtm>

Balancing, Modernization and Replacement (BMR) of the project was carried out in 1986 which enhanced the capacity up to 90 MTPD.<sup>68</sup>

In addition to the FF related economic ventures, the army's Welfare Trust- the AWT- also expanded operationally. For instance, in 1984 Askari Sugar Mills was established in Badin, Sindh.<sup>69</sup> Moreover, rice, ginning and oil mills, a bicycle manufacturing plant and a fish farm and a hosiery factory were established in Lahore and Rawalpindi respectively. The capital to run these enterprises was borrowed from public-sector banks. However, these ventures had to be closed down due to their unprofitability. Moreover, the AWT acquired 18,000 acres of land- the so called 'the enemy land' and established five farms in Punjab and Sindh (Siddiqua 2007:147).

Importantly, the other services of Pakistan military- Pakistan Air Force (PAF) and Pakistan Navy (PN) - did not prefer to lag behind their sister organization- the army. To begin with, the PAF was able to establish the Shaheen [eagle (in *air*)] Foundation (SF) in 1977 under the Charitable Endowment Act 1890. It had a seed money of Rs. 5 million. Under the Zia-led military rule, the SF established the following: a) Hawk Advertising (1977) - an advertising agency; b) Airport Services (APS) (1982) - an airport service company; c) Shaheen Knitwear (1980)- a knitwear factory; d) Shaheen Aerotraders (1988) - a trading company to supply hardware and required material to PAF.<sup>70</sup> The financial details of these economic ventures during this period are not available. Yet what can be argued is that the establishment of SF and its subsidiaries' were a product of politics of the principal military.

Similarly, the navy was also able to establish its welfare organization called Bahria [*sea* (navy)] Foundation (BF) in January 1982 under the (in)famous Charitable Endowments Act of 1890. The BF- with navy its controller- had its own welfare funds of Rs. 3 million to start with. In the same year the BF established its Falah Trading Company. In addition, the Foundation started its housing scheme in 1986 along with agent judiciary and civil bureaucracy.<sup>71</sup> In this regard, political power was instrumental for the state land acquisition.

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<sup>68</sup> <http://www.fauji.org.pk/fcc/briefhistory.html>

<sup>69</sup> [http://www.awt.com.pk/bs.php?id=14&sec\\_id=5](http://www.awt.com.pk/bs.php?id=14&sec_id=5)

<sup>70</sup> <http://www.shaheenfoundation.com/>

<sup>71</sup> <http://www.bahriafoundation.com/>

Last but not least, in 1977 the Rangers<sup>72</sup> was able to take control of fishing and other resources in some four lakes in Sindh. This action had an extremely negative impact on the local fishing community who was dependent on these sources to earn livelihood. In this particular case

strengthening the monitoring of bordering areas was used an excuse to exploit opportunities to generate funds. The Rangers, which is headed by an army maj.-general, leased out fishing in these lakes to private contractors at the cost of excluding the local fishing community and depriving them of their livelihood. Because the Rangers monopolized the grant of fishing licenses, the catch was sold at lower prices than previously, depriving the community of their rights. This was done in violation of the provincial government's Fisheries Ordinance 1980. Subsequently the Rangers took control of another 20 lakes in the province, and this too ultimately led to a conflict between the Rangers and the fishing community. The intrusion of the Rangers threatened the livelihood of hundreds of fishermen living in about a dozen big villages and thousands of small settlements on the 18,000 km coastline of Sindh and Baluchistan.

(Siddiq 2007:148-149)

Besides, the individualization of the economic benefits also continued under the military rule. For instance, housing scheme was initiated by the three services for their retired personnel. For this purpose, nominal deductions- from Rs.200 to Rs. 1,000 per month- were made from the salary of all officers during their service. As a result, before or after retirement, they were entitled for a house or an apartment. Indeed the army officers could join the scheme after ten years of service with the deductions to be made during the remainder of their service. Apparently the scheme was part of military professionalization- that the personnel would have more peace of mind. Yet the measure aimed at re-definition of the extent of the rent owed by the nation to officer cadre for providing security.' (ibid 2007: 149-150). Finally, the senior officers, approximately 43 between 1977-1997, were permitted to import luxury cars

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<sup>72</sup> The Pakistan Rangers are a paramilitary force under the control of the Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan. In 1995, the Pakistan Rangers got divided into two parts: Pakistan Rangers Punjab headquartered in Lahore; and Pakistan Rangers Sindh headquartered in Karachi. Its primary task included boarder security and assistance to civil administration to maintain law and order. Besides, it claims to combat terrorism also. See: <http://www.pakistanarmy.gov.pk/AWPRReview/TextContent.aspx?pId=141>.

*ohne* duty. In addition, military officers held top positions, both permanently and contractually, in the civil bureaucracy. For example,

in mid-1982, 18 out of 42 Pakistani ambassadors posted abroad came from the military (fifteen of them belonged to the Army). During 1980-85, 96 Army officers were inducted into the selected cadres of Central Superior Services on permanent basis, while 15 were re-employed on contracts...[Moreover] Special attention is[was] given to the improvement of the conditions of the ex-servicemen. A ten percent quota of civil jobs was reserved for them.

(Rizvi 2000:257-258)

## **5.7 Conclusion**

This chapter began by explaining the change in principal in the post-breakup period. In this respect, it was maintained that a defeated and demoralized military rationally chose to return to its barracks in order to avoid further damage to its institutional makeup. However, the military was able to strategically interact with a section of politicians in order to preserve its purely institutional interests such as the release of 90000 personnel from Indian custody. Bhutto-led politicians, on their part, saw in the military's weaknesses their strengths; hence, their agency and rationality allowed their preferences to prevail and the country's principalship was assumed by Bhutto-led politicians. Little wonder then, Bhutto was able to become Pakistan's first civilian Chief Martial Law Administrator as well as president- the posts which were instrumental to enhance his and his party's political position vis-à-vis political opponents and other agents such as the judiciary, civil bureaucracy and the military.

Moreover, during the period prior to the promulgation of the 1973 Constitution, Bhutto was able to take many a policy measure under the informal rules of the games- the interim constitution is a case in point. Hence, Mujib was released; top industrialists, who were his rivals, were put on an existing control list; anti-Bhutto journalists were arrested; basic industries were nationalized under the Economic Reform Order 1972; Land Reforms Regulations was enacted in March 1972; colleges and schools were nationalized in April 1972 and Federal Security Force- a paramilitary organization- was established in 1972. Importantly, where Bhutto became Pakistan's president under the informal rules of the game, the governorship of NWFP and Balochistan went to NAP-JUI. This fact explicitly marks, on the one hand, politicians' agency and, on the other, their rationality in terms of preferring their own rather than the larger interests, for the subsequent political developments further

corroborates this assumption. For example, the confrontational politics between Bhutto's PPP and the leadership of NAP-JUI resulted in the loss of Balochistan's chief ministership and governorship for the latter. In this respect, the former, in pursuance of its nationalization agenda, attempted to make inroads in NAP-JUI's constituencies. The latter, on its part, rationally confronted these measures. Consequently, the consensus on informal rules got relaxed due to divergence of preference between Bhutto and ANP-JUI. Hence, the latter opted to resign in NWFP in order to register its protest over Bhutto's new alliance with QML. However, the NAP leadership was put behind bars on stated charges of anti-state activities.

Nevertheless, the rational opposition, in order to pressurize Bhutto politically, gave more preference to agitational than participatory politics, for, in case of new elections, the chances for smaller parties to electorally confront PPP were minimum. Therefore, the former demanded restoration of true democracy in terms of formal rules of the game. Rational Bhutto, in order to safeguard his interests, opted to strategically interact with the opposition with the effect that both sections of politicians were able to formalize rules of the game in terms of the 1973 Constitution. Importantly, Bhutto was able to assume the country's prime ministership for the next five years- indeed the president also belonged to his party. Moreover, all martial law orders/regulations were validated and their initiators got indemnified. The opposition, however, was satisfied to have brought Bhuttoism under the law. Hence, in the post-1973 Constitution period, politics of interests was primarily rule-oriented- declaring Ahmedis non-Muslims is a case in point.

On the foreign policy front, Bhutto government was able to negotiate with India the release of POW at Simla in July 1972. Two years later, the prime minister was successful at hosting the Second Islamic Summit Conference at which Bangladesh was recognized as an independent and sovereign state. Moreover, as a reaction to India's nuclear tests at Pokhran in 1974, the PM vowed to pursue this goal too. Thus, Bhutto, due primarily to political reasons, remained unable to normalize Pakistan's relations with India on the pattern of Simla agreement. Importantly, the leader of the principal himself allocated considerable amount as defense expenditure to the military in order to appease the latter as well as the opposition and the general public.

However, since mid-1972 Bhutto had attempted to bring the military under the politicians/civilian control. In this respect, he was able sack army chief Gul Hasan and air

chief Rahim respectively. The latter, however, accepted ambassadorship, offered by Bhutto, in Europe- this further consolidates the study's assumption that the military's leaders saw to their own interests. In addition, Bhutto was able to introduce changes in the military's command and control structure- the DCC is a case in point. Importantly, the PM ordered the agent military to carry out military operations against the anti-state elements- the Baloch nationalists- in Balochistan. However, the underlying objective of the Balochistan operation was more political than strategic. In this respect, the PM made a rational choice to, on the one hand, tactically concentrate the military's forces in the country's remotest region, and, on the other hand, teach his political opponents a blue lesson.

Besides the military, the PM was also able to modify the so called cadre system of the civil bureaucracy. In this respect too, the reform measure was initiated during the period of informal rules of the game. The primary objective behind this action was to, on the one hand, accommodate PPP-affiliates through 'lateral entry' in the bureaucratic services and, on the other, make the bureaucracy do the principal's bidding more effectively. As regards the principal's policy towards the judiciary, it was comparatively less compelling. However, the third and fourth constitutional amendments- an indicator of politics under the rules- curtailed the courts' jurisdiction and limited its powers related to especially contempt of court and judges' transfer. The Bhutto government took these measures in view of the institution's history of political alliances, pro-military verdicts, appointments and promotions.

Overall, the above-mentioned measures were, as the chapter posited, reminiscent of implicit oversight whereby the principal through carrot and stick policy attempted to ensure its control over the agents. The latter, especially the military, rationally compromised in light of the situation since its topmost priority was to restore its image nationally and improve its institutional capacity to fight regionally. Little wonder then, the institution bore with the principal's interference. For example, Bhutto ably appointed Zia-ul-Haq as new army chief in March 1976 by superseding six generals. The former perceived the new army chief as apolitical, pliant and hence harmless to the government.

Importantly, by almost the middle of his government's tenure, PM Bhutto opted to practically sideline the socialism-oriented persons from within his party- the PPP. As a result, landed-interests were accommodated due to politico-electoral reasons. The rational alliance with the former showed that Bhutto- himself a big land-owner- remained unable to affect a

meaningful change in the socio-economic structure of the society. Thus, the chapter noticed that the government's land, labor, education and health etc., reforms were criticized by the opposition and the affected section of the populace. In order to reduce the political damage to his person and party, Bhutto came up with a follow-up reform package especially land in 1976/77. However, by then the opposition politicians, being able to unite under Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) for rational reasons, chose to confront Bhutto electorally.

The scheduled elections were held in March 1977. The PPP won the majority of seats. However, the PNA, having refused the results, alleged government of massive rigging. In order to further pressurize Bhutto, the opposition alliance resorted to agitational politics. Rational Bhutto, on his part, attempted to negotiate with the PNA in the crucial post-election period- declaring Friday a holiday is a case in point. However, the PNA-led agitational politics transformed into confrontational politics with the result that Bhutto, while asserting his control over the agent military vis-à-vis the intriguing opposition, opted to declare martial law- though under the constitution- in the country's major cities in April 1977- the Army Act was also amended that enabled military action with retrospective effect. At this critical juncture of Pakistan's civil-military relations, a section of opposition politicians called upon the military to shirk- indeed air marshal-cum-politician Asghar Khan wrote letters in this respect. However, despite these developments, Bhutto continued preferring negotiations with the PNA. The crucial phase of negotiations was going on in the first week of July when the military struck down in terms of staging a coup and imposing martial law. Subsequently, Bhutto was put under 'protective' custody; the 1973 Constitution was abrogated; national and provincial assemblies were dissolved; and political activity was banned.

In his coup/martial law proclamation, the military's leader, General Zia-ul-Haq, cited problems of law and order and economy as the primary reasons for the coup. In addition, democratization and securitization were cited as complementary factors. Since no claim can, logically, be taken as granted, the chapter, in its later half, conducted an analytic narrative of the coup. In this respect, four conceptual variables, namely, law and order, economic, democratization and securitization, were identified, on the basis of a coding system, in the coup-text. Moreover, the study observed positive correspondence between coup and each of the conceptual variables. Thus, in order to verify this positive co-relation, the model-inspired empirical explanation was carried out. As a result, it was shown that the positive relationship

of coup with each of the conceptual variables was empirically unfounded. Rather, it was maintained that such factors/reasons were an indication of attempts at self-legitimation.

Importantly, the analysis reverted to the model formally so as to explain this phenomenon. Thus, quite contrary to the stated reasons/causes, it was, with the help of the causal model, posited that the July coup was a function of the military's agency- its inherent capability to get things done. Being a rational actor, the military, having calculated cost and benefits of the coup-action, preferred shirking to working (agency A). In other words, the study maintains theoretical distance towards the existing structural, path-dependent, generalist, instrumentalist and conspiracy accounts, for they failed to explain the occurrence of the coup. For example, if the military was in 'control' of Pakistan's politics and the state, then there should have been no coup at all. Or if the coup was structurally determined, then why did it not occur in, for example, 1974, 1976 or pre-election 1977? Similarly, the US's policy, post-Afghan Jihad, towards the military regime is enough to refute conspiracy theories.

Moreover, the study maintained that the coup, being rational in nature, was political in character, for it was primarily aimed at capturing political power. In other words, as per the study's model, the coup was staged to assume Pakistan's principalship. However, the principalship was instrumental to facilitate military's economic interests- the establishment of Shaheen and Bahria foundations are a case in point. Thus, the assumption of political power and maximization of economic interests as a dominant actor, contextually, marks the military's rationality in terms of its preferring its own to larger interest- hence agency B. However, in the post-Zia period, as the chapter noticed, the rational military had a strategy to deal with the agents, especially politicians. The next chapter will apply the same model, analytic approach to explain post-Zia civil-military relations.



## Chapter 6

### Actors and Agency: Explaining the Civilian Circularity

This chapter seeks to explain the so called phenomenon of civilian circularity as suggested by the existing literature. This perspective has the tendency to view civil-military relations during this period from the perspective of the 'troika' whereby the prime minister, president and army chief determine the contours of politics and the state. Moreover, the legitimists, who believe that the military went back to barracks post-Zia, tend to justify the military's indirect intervention on account of politicians' incompetence, corruption etc. In addition, the structuralist and path-dependent works believe in structural military domination and institutionalized military 'control' respectively.

Quite contrary to the existing literature, the first part of the chapter maintains, in light of the model, that in the post-Zia period the rational military opted to remain in politics as the principal actor since its preference had prevailed vis-a-vis politicians regarding the country's foreign/defense policy and particularly domestic policy in terms of establishing a pro-military caretaker set-up and influencing the holding of 1988 general elections. Though the elections were rigged, Benazir Bhutto was able to form a government at the centre. Her political opponent, Nawaz Sharif, was able to become chief minister of Punjab. Being a rational agent, Bhutto moved cautiously. She chose to avoid confrontation with the principal and its agent, the president- Ghulam Ishaq Khan. Moreover, the FP/DP remained an exclusive domain of the military. Though a few issues related to army promotions surfaced between her and the military, the manner her elected government was dismissed, in 1990, by the agent president- who acted in strategic understanding with the principal- was quite anti-democracy and anti-political forces.

The Sharif government, which took charge as result of the 1990 elections, also remained an agent of the principal military for the former had little role to play as regards the making and implementation of Pakistan's foreign/defense relations. Moreover, Sharif, like Bhutto, took a rational course towards domestic policies especially the military's economic activities. Importantly, the mainstream leadership failed, due to divergence of preferences, to put up a united challenge to (the office of) the president in terms of repealing 58(2)(b)- the constitutional provision at president's disposal to dismiss government(s) discretionally. Nevertheless, Sharif, like Bhutto, did assert his agency when it came to the appointment and

promotion of military officers/personnel. Also, his relations soured with the president. Consequently, his government was dismissed through 58 (2)(b) in 1993. Surprisingly, the country's Supreme Court unprecedentedly restored his government. However, rationality prevailed and both President Ishaq and PM Sharif opted to leave as a result of (covert) military intervention.

In its second half, the chapter analyses the Bhutto government which returned to power following the 1993 elections. Since the principal retained its political clout, Bhutto's focus remained on prolonging her stay in power. For this purpose, she was able to bring a PPP-man, Farooq Khan Leghari, in the presidency. However, both Sharif and Bhutto remained unable to constitutionally undo the Eighth Amendment due to political differences. Moreover, the PM's relations soured with the judiciary. Ironically, after almost two years, the president tended to be indifferent to Bhutto government's concerns. Hence, the latter's government stood dissolved by the agent president who saw to his own than party or national interests. The chapter posits that contextually it was impossible for the president to operationalized 58(2)(b) without the principal's support which, in turn, seeks to weaker political institutions.

In its final part, the chapter critically analyzes the second Sharif government which came to power after the 1997 elections. Contextually, rational Sharif, having learned from his past experiences, decided to assert civilian control over the military politically-electorally. Thus, though he did not question the principal's economic ventures, he was able, primarily due to the heavy-mandate, to repeal 58(2)(b). This development is emphasized by the chapter since it marks the politicians' agency and rationality vis-à-vis the dominant actor- the military. Moreover, Sharif was also to divide the officer cadre by retiring the army chief General Jehangir Karamat. However, the chapter maintains that the military did not stage a coup at this point of time rationally for the political cost would be too high. Instead, it adopted a wait-and-see policy. Importantly, Sharif-military relations further deteriorated when the latter took a different stance over the Lahore Declaration. The chapter explains, with the help of its causal model, that the Kargil war was as rational move by the principal military to politically weaken the prime minister. In the post-Kargil period, the latter was sacked in a military coup d'état. A conclusion, at the end of the chapter, summarizes the entire arguments.

### 6.1 *Back to Barracks: Rationality Prevails*

In the immediate post-Zia context, the military had a few choices: a) it could have imposed martial law; b) it could have gone back to barracks and sincerely allow the politicians to decide their as well as country's fate; c) it could have hold the promised elections under the constitution and then return to barracks as principal. Contextually, the first choice entailed more cost than benefits given the dissolution of the assemblies and a section of shirking politicians; the second choice meant its death at its own hands- a sincere disengagement or withdrawal from politics might have deprived the military of the principalship; the third choice, if enacted, would have brought more benefits than cost.

#### **Box 6.1 General Zia's Death and the Military**

General Zia's sudden death had caused panic in the army [military]. The country was without a president and an army chief. It was prudent on the part of the [military] institution to show confidence in Mirza Aslam Beg who made a good decision not to impose martial law.

A retired Colonel expressed these views with the author in Rawalpindi in April 2008.

What the above informs is that the rational military went for the third choice. However, quite contrary to the existing accounts it did never go back to barracks; rather it turned its *back* to barracks and preferred to face the non-military actors in the capacity of principal with coercive means at the disposal to deal with the shirking elements if and when necessary. Therefore, immediately after its man's death, the organization's top brass assembled to show confidence in General Beg as the new chief of army staff.

Moreover, the military strategically interacted with the chairman of the senate- who basically belonged to agent bureaucracy- to assume the country's acting presidentship since the constitution had a provision for it. In addition, elections were vowed to be held as per schedule. Besides, the country's foreign/defense and economic matters remained an exclusive domain of the GHQ. What all this suggests is that the military's preference prevailed regarding domestic and especially defense/foreign policy (Hussain 2010).

## **6.2 Actors and Agency: Explaining the Civilian Circularity**

This section shall briefly explain the manner, if not mechanism, by which electoral politics was rationally operationalized by actors especially the principal military to pursue their respective interests. The main objective here is to highlight the analytical weaknesses in the existing literature which, while believing in the military's absolute political power, seriously compromises not only agency and rationality of both the military and non-military actors but also context. Moreover, the section would analyze why the principal strategically interacted with the president to get the governments dismissed. Also, it shall be explained why the politicians failed to empower the parliamentary institutions and establish democratic norms.

### **6.2.1 Politicians- in Parliament or Power? The Bhutto Government (1988-1990)**

As is the characteristic of democracy that elections are viewed as a means to gain political power, so were they looked at by Pakistani politicians. The People's Party had already started low-scale agitational politics since Benazir Bhutto- daughter of hanged Bhutto- landed in the country in April 1986. On the other hand, however, the non-PPP parties were struggling to form a united challenge to Bhutto. The principal, on its part, saw through it. It opted to strategically engage with a section of politicians to possibly keep PPP out of the parliament if not power.

The ISI chief and his deputy, Brigadier Imtiaz Ahmed...reportedly geared up the IJI [Islami Jamhoori Itehad] with threats that Bhutto would roll back the nuclear programme and damage the planned jihad against Indian occupation of Kashmir. Sharif acknowledges the forces behind the formation of the IJI in terms of political needs, 'it was the need of the hour that all the critical forces get together and fight elections jointly...I think the alliance did well.'

(Nawaz 2008:412)

What the quote highlights is that the personalistic politicians also accorded more preference to their own than larger interests and were able to form an anti-PPP alliance called IJI- Islami Jamhoori Itehad (Islamic Democratic Front). Nevertheless, when the electoral results came out, they stunned not only the IJI but also the military (see Table 25 on the next page):

**Table 25 1988 Elections: Party Position**

	Punjab	Sindh	NWFP	Balochistan	FATA	Islamabad	Total
No. of seats	115	46	26	11	8	1	205
PPP	52	31	9	1	-	-	93
IJI	45	-	8	2	-	-	55
JUI -FR	-	-	3	4	-	-	7
JUI-D	-	-	1	-	-	-	1
PAI	3	-	-	-	-	-	3
PDP	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
ANP	-	-	2	-	-	-	2
NPP-K	1	-	--	-	-	-	1
MQM	-	13	-	-	-	-	13
BNA	-	-	-	2	-	-	2
Independents	12	2	3	2	8	1	27

Source: The Election Commission of Pakistan.

As the Table shows, the PPP, despite pre-poll rigging, was able to emerge as the single largest party in the National Assembly, though not in a position to form government on its own. Also, in the provincial elections, the PPP maintained overall lead over the IJI. However, unlike in the NA, it failed to form majority in the Punjab. The post-election situation was critical for every actor. The IJI had to win over fifty seats to taste relative power. Since the former struggled to constitute enough strength to form government at the centre, PPP's (wo) man had to be 'appointed' by the president who, being an acting one, had an interest to prolong his stay in the office. Importantly, the principal wanted a weak, if not a pliant, government which abstains from meddling with its exclusive domain i.e. foreign/defense policy.

As mentioned above, the IJI remained contextually unable to form a majority; therefore, it had to confine itself at the provincial level excluding Sindh. In this respect, though the military did try to factionalize the PPP in terms of engaging Amin Faheem, its efforts bore little fruit. On her part, Bhutto, as a result of her strategic interaction with the military, chose to assume the premiership. Importantly the former had a desire, if not design, to replace the 'supper-bureaucrat' president with a PPP-man, but momentarily thought it rational not to create an issue since the president had good ties with the principal. Thus, it was in this context where the military was already a dominant actor in Pakistan's politics that Bhutto became Prime Minister on 2 December 1988. Having assumed the PM office she politico-electurally allied with President Ghulam Ishaq Khan who, on the same day with support from

the PPP, got elected for the next tenure. In this regard, Bhutto sided with the president to possibly win him over since he was, under the constitution, authorized to dissolve the government at his discretion. However, this move of hers was perceived negatively by her old MRD allies whose candidate for the presidency was defeated.

Provincially, the PPP was able to form a coalition government with the MQM in Sindh; however, the chief minister belonged to PPP. In NWFP, PPP-ANP formed government which soon witnessed the withdrawal of the latter: however, the PPP's CM was able to hold on. In Balochistan, a complex and fragile coalition of PPP-IJI-Independents formed government, with chief minister from the IJI. In the Punjab, with comparative ease the IJI was able to form government under her own CM- Nawaz Sharif. Having fulfilled the tasks of government(s) formation

The first major step of Benazir Bhutto's government related to the release of hundreds of political prisoners who were sentenced to various lengths of rigorous imprisonment by the previous Martial Law government. Similarly, cases against political exiles were withdrawn, which encouraged many of them to return to Pakistan. The government released various categories of woman prisoners, old prisoners and child prisoners, and generally commuted the death sentence of convicts into life imprisonment. It also withdrew rustication order against 400 university students. The government liberalized the media policy to cover the opposition's political activities through television and radio, first time ever in Pakistan's history.

(Waseem 1994:441)

As regards country's foreign relations, the PM, in order to gain more strategic space, attempted to assert her position vis-a-vis the principal military. In this respect, she was able to host SAARC annual conference and became its chairperson. Moreover, Bhutto sought to normalize Pakistan's relations with India.

**Box 6.2 The Foreign Policy remained under the Military**

Benazir Bhutto signed some accords with India as a sign of Pakistan's positive gesture towards Delhi. I think the military should not have objected to that as the late President Zia-ul-Haq had himself initiated that process for whatever reasons. The important thing, however, is that she was not in a position to make any significant changes in the country's foreign policy.

A senior PPP-P politician opined during a conversation with the author in February 2008.

Interestingly, it was not the military itself but the IJI- with a section of authoritative clergy in its fold- which, in order to politically pressurize the government, started charging the PM of a sell-out to India. Indeed, a few clergymen labeled Bhutto's cultural policy as un-Islamic. In addition, the government-opposition relations soured when the Punjab's chief minister chose to disobey the federal government's orders with respect to appointments and transfers in the agent bureaucracy. In addition, the dissolution of the Balochistan Assembly, on 15 December 1988, further complicated the situation for the IJI had blamed federal government for this. However, the matter was settled by the agent judiciary which unprecedentedly gave a verdict that the CM, in the absence of a majority of the total members of the assembly- not a majority of those on the floor and voting- had no power to advise the governor to dissolve the assembly. In addition, during this period, the judiciary was faced with a constitutional question as to what was the status of the state sans the (caretaker) prime minister for more than six months.<sup>73</sup>

Hence, the Supreme Court, which was afforded an opportunity to clean its past in the post-martial law period, was able to consider

this matter in *'Federation of Pakistan vs. Muhammad Saifullah Khan'* and held that the office of the prime minister was necessary at all times...and that the President should have appointed a prime minister to head a caretaker cabinet. It was also observed that the absence of the prime minister from a caretaker cabinet altered the character of the Constitution from a parliamentary democracy to a presidential system of government and was tantamount to violation and breach of the essential features of the Constitution which the courts could neither countenance nor condone.

(Khan 2002:716)

The judgment led to further complexities with respect to appointments during the stated period. The judiciary again had to take the pain to clarify the issue. Nonetheless, the seemingly series of problems for Bhutto government continued. Each time it had to tread the political path rational since the competitive actors also possessed these qualities. Not

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<sup>73</sup> This question, as the previous Chapter mentioned, pertained to the state of affairs after the death of President Zia-ul-Haq, whereby no (caretaker) Prime Minister was appointed by the (acting) President- the head of the state under the 1973 Constitution.

surprisingly then, the anti-PPP rational politicians were able to unite themselves under the Combined Opposition Parties (COP) to possibly replace the federal government from within the National Assembly. For this purpose, they instigated a motion of no-confidence against the PM. Subsequently, both sides strove to win over enough members to succeed. Thus, as results of actors' agency and rationality, nine defections of personalistic politicians- six from COP and three from the government, took place. The latter, however, was able to survive the move on 1 November 1989. However, Bhutto bore price in terms of accommodating the defectors in the cabinet accordingly.

Nevertheless, the dilemma of survivability lingered. Bhutto struggled to maintain a prime ministerial decorum vis-à-vis the constitutionally empowered president and the principal military with whom the president had a history of strategic interaction in the capacity of agent- Ishaq entered into the corridors of power post-1977 coup. Moreover, the president was aware of Bhutto's pronouncements to undo the Eighth Amendment. Therefore, the former never missed any opportunity to further cut the PM to size- the issue of appointments of military chiefs and superior court judges is case in point. In this respect, the president had a preference for cold-storage of files coming from the PM secretariat.

In addition, being faced with an empowered president, challenging opposition and the principal military, which had a penchant to keep FP/DF its exclusive domain, Bhutto had a very limited and risky set of choices. Had she opted to remain low politically, the competitive actors would have undone her government within a matter of weeks if not days. Therefore, as a rational actor, having calculated the cost- for advice she had ex-military officers as advisors- the prime minister attempted to confront the president regarding the appointments and promotion of military officers/personnel. PM Bhutto, by this move, wanted to appoint pliant officers at the top of the institution. However, the agent president, a rational being himself, backfired, with the principal's support. The former claimed that the authority to appoint military officers lay with him under the constitution.

No wonder then, the time to pay the price had arrived when the Beg-led military decided to take the PM on due to latter's excessive interference in not only defense/foreign policy,



domestic military preferences- Sindh is a case in point- but also matters related to appointments, replacement and promotions etc.<sup>74</sup>

**Box 6.3 PM Bhutto attempted to assert her Position vis-à-vis the Military**

Prime Minister Bhutto had started to intervene in the internal affairs of the military. She had a different approach on Afghanistan as well. With president, she too had bad relations...Even the opposition parties were not happy with her policies.

A retired Brigadier told the author in an interview in Rawalpindi in April 2008.

What can be deduced from the afore-mentioned is that, as a result of strategic understanding between the agent president and the principal, Bhutto government was seen as a political liability. Thus, the president having operationalized 58(2)(b) dissolved the National Assembly, on 6 August 1990, on stated charges of corruption, failure to maintain law and order, bringing harm to the country's integrity, meddling with civil services and the judiciary etc. As a result, the PM and her cabinet ceased to hold office forthwith. The provincial assemblies were dissolved later on. The fate of these stated charges shall be explained later in the study but here it is suffice to ask: why did not the president order an inquiry, if not set up a commission, to probe the similar of the military regime under Zia?

To summarize, though Benazir Bhutto committed many a political mistakes- the hiring of ex-military officers is one of them- it is beyond one's comprehension how an elected government, with a majority in the National Assembly, could be sacked in such an arbitrary a manner. Moreover, quite contrary to existing legitimist accounts it is posited that the president acted in a strategic understanding with the principal military. How could a president, with no political constituency, no coercive force of his own, act alone in a country with a history of coups and martial laws? Nevertheless, the sacking of Bhutto government highlights agency and rationality of the principal military which wanted to further weaken the political/parliamentary institutions and democratic norms in the country. Because, the weaknesses of politicians and/or political institutions imply, at the end of the day, the political strength of the principal military.

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<sup>74</sup> Bhutto was able to replace DG-ISI, Hamid Gul, with a retired Lt. Gen. Shamsur Rahman Kallue.

### 6.2.2 Politicians- in Parliament or Power? The Sharif Government (1990-1993)

Having dismissed the Bhutto government, unlike his predecessor, President Ishaq Khan chose to appoint a caretaker cabinet headed by Prime Minister Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi- the leader of the opposition and a former PPP loyalist- at federal and provincial levels. Interestingly, the majority of cabinet members belonged to either the opposition or were openly anti-PPP. Same came true of caretakers chief ministers- all opposed to Bhutto's PPP. Moreover, the agent judiciary especially the Supreme Court<sup>75</sup> preferred to hold the order of dissolution. Nonetheless, to run the state under the constitution, fresh elections were allowed to be held in October 1990. The anti-PPP parties again decided to contest under the label of IJI. However, PPP, in order to stage the comeback electorally, was also able to ally with others and contest the elections under the banner of PDA (Peoples Democratic Action). Ultimately, the National Assembly results were as under:

**Table 26 1990 Elections: Party Position**

Parties	Punjab	Sindh	NWFP	Balochistan	FATA	Islamabad	Total
IJI	91	3	8	2	-	1	105
PDA	14	24	5	2	-	-	45
MQM	-	15	-	-	-	-	15
JUI	-	-	4	2	-	-	6
ANP	-	-	6	-	-	-	6
PNP	-	-	-	2	-	-	2
JUP-N	n3	-	-	-	-	-	3
PKMAP	-	-	-	1	-	-	1
JWP	-	-	-	2	-	-	2
Independents	6	4	3	-	8	-	21
	114	46	26	11	8	1	206

Source: The Election Commission of Pakistan.

As is obvious from the Table, the IJI won massively. However, the PDA did not accept the results and alleged that the president and the ISI (military) along with the caretaker set-up had played a conspiracy to keep the PDA especially the PPP, out of parliament. Indeed, the latter pointed to the fact that there was a massive pre/post poll rigging.<sup>76</sup> Moreover, the so called Mehran Bank Scandal further substantiates the above.<sup>77</sup> However, the president deemed it

<sup>75</sup> A full bench of the Peshawar High Court had, in response to a writ petition, declared the dissolution order unconstitutional and directed that the NWFP Assembly and Cabinet stand restored. However, the Supreme Court set aside this otherwise historic judgment by a majority judgment of her own (see Khan 2002:731-732).

<sup>76</sup> See The PDA's *White Paper* on the 1990 Elections.

<sup>77</sup> The Mehran Bank scandal, revealed on 24 March 1994 with the arrest of its president, Younus Habib, exposed the widespread level of financial corruption. Rs 5 billion was siphoned off, according to the press reports, from Habib and Mehran Banks. The amount was paid to senior politicians from both the PML-N and the PPP, the

rational neither to order an inquiry into the financial corruption related to the Mehran Bank nor call for re-elections. Nevertheless, as president of the IJI, Nawaz Sharif was able to form government in the centre. Provincially, in Punjab, IJI had a clear majority to form government; in Sindh, a coalition government of IJI-MQM-Independents got formed. In NWFP, IJI-ANP was able to ally, and in Balochistan JUI was able to form a coalition government.

Having assumed the office of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, being himself an industrialist-Ittefaq Foundries is a case in point- had a preference for maximizing the returns not only for himself and his alliance partners but also the constituency he was electorally inclined to. Therefore, his government started, domestically, with the introduction of an economic policy in terms privatization, free movement of foreign exchange and investment-friendly atmosphere. In this respect, following measures were taken: a) issuance of Economic Reform Ordinances, August 1991-April 1992; b) passage of Protection of Economic Reforms Act, 1992. As regards operationalization of these policies, the Sharif government was able to privatize/denationalize, industrial units and banks both in the private and public sectors. This process of privatization was carried out through the establishment of a Privatization Commission which provided ample opportunity for its functionaries and privileged parties to make money. For example,

the cartels were busy devising ways and means to take over certain industries so as to retain a monopoly within a particular sector. For instance, a number of cement industries were acquired by the same group by bedding through Calicon Pvt. Ltd... Under the bidders' plan, companies A and B did not comply with the letters of intent forwarded to them by the Privatization Commission in accordance with a pre-planned procedure and forfeited their deposits, company C was [thus] enabled to purchase the unit for a very low price. In some cases, the sale price was even lower than the commercial value of the land on which the unit was built. It is common knowledge that the cartels made windfall profits following divestiture of cement factories.

(Khan 2002:743)

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former army chief General Aslam Beg, and a number of provincial politicians. The discrepancy was exposed when the Mehran Bank failed to produce the money deposited by ISI in its account (Amin 1995; also Nawaz 2008:433-434).

While the government was busy in improving the economic lot of her clientele if not the country, the opposition under Bhutto was criticizing the former for privileging certain sections at the expense of the poor. Also, politically, Ms Bhutto started blaming the PM for entering into an alliance with the principal and its agent president. Bhutto, on her part, wanted the Eighth Amendment to be repealed. Moreover, the opposition also chose to attack the president for issuing 'references' against Bhutto. Nevertheless, the Sharif government paid more attention to the judiciary than the opposition. In this regard, the former was able to get 12<sup>th</sup> Amendment passed in July 1991 to create 'courts parallel to the constitutional hierarchy consisting of the High Courts and the Supreme Courts.' The country's higher courts had no control over the function of a special court established under this amendment. Though the judiciary, on its part, saw to it in term of a judgment which called upon the separation of the executive from the judiciary (Khan 2002:749-751), the government, with such measures, wanted to, on the one hand, contain the judiciary, and, on the other hand, get speedy justice since the normal proceedings especially of lower judiciary was seen time-consuming.

However, the real challenge to Sharif government came from the foreign policy front in the wake of the Gulf War. As explained earlier, since the principal military had a penchant for FP/DP exclusivity, it took a different policy stance on Pakistan's involvement in the US-led coalition. The former was opposed to it due to her own strategy vis-à-vis the US post-Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. The elected government had its own preferences; it, on the one hand, wanted to appease the US to possibly further her economic opportunities in the wake of nuclear sanctions, and on the other, appreciate the popular sentiments especially its electoral constituency. Ultimately, however, the principal's preference prevailed for the confrontation cost for Sharif would have been higher than the intended benefits. But, this policy-divergence helped further damage the civil-military relations.

Since the military's leader, General Beg, was about to expire his tenure, he had a choice either to stage a coup to teach the prime minister, who attempted shirking though unsuccessfully, a lesson or let the coming chief to settle the score. Hence, contextually, at this point, the principal's political position was already intact since the president was even physically weaker against the military to disobey. Rationally then, there was no need to topple the government which had just seen the daylight. Importantly however, the appointment issue created a rift between the PM and the President since the former deemed it his right to have the final say in this respect. Regardless, the second choice was enacted by

the military and Lt.-Gen. Asif Nawaz became the COAS. The new chief acted rationally and, resultantly, no coup occurred. Besides, quite ironically the new chief of the military institution attempted to normalize country's relations with India (Nawaz 2008:447).

Nonetheless, the military's relations with the Sharif government started to sour again when the former opted for a military operation against the ethnicist MQM which was in alliance with Sharif in Sindh. The politics of operation proved politically costly for the PM. Also, the opposition resorted to agitational politics to further weaken the government. Moreover, the sudden death of COAS- he died of heart attack in January 1993- further worsened the PM-President relations due to their preference-divergence over the appointment issue. Sharif had a different plan in mind. However, the principal's preference prevailed in terms of showing confidence in General Abdul Waheed Kakar as its new leader. The appointment-issue, however, again mattered for the PM who wanted to assert his position. This led to further bitterness in PM-President relations.

Moreover, there was news of Sharif's plans to repeal 58(2)(b) in order to appease the opposition especially the PPP. Therefore, in order to strategically pressurize the agent president, Sharif vowed to openly take the former on in his television and radio address to the nation on 17 April 1993. In strategic understating with the principal, the rational but agent president, while giving more weightage to his own interests than national interests, dismissed the Sharif government the very next day: charges stated were more or less the same as of 1990 dissolution. Accordingly, the assemblies were dissolved and a caretaker administration under an anti-Sharif Prime Minister, Balakh Sher Mazari, took charge.

To summarize, Nawaz Sharif, from the platform of IJI, was able to form government in the capacity of an agent of the principal military. The former retained its exclusive control over Pakistan's foreign/defense policy. Hence, when the prime minister, out of his own political interests, showed his priority to ally with the US-led coalition for the Gulf War, the principal's choice diverged and Sharif had to comply with, though rationally. Moreover, even on domestic issues the PM ran into trouble not only with the agent president but also the military. Thus, when Sharif, in a strategic move, attempted to repeal the provision which constitutionally had empowered the president, the latter, with military's support, toppled his government. The dismissal of Sharif government explicitly marks military's agency, which chose to punish shirking Sharif through the medium of presidency. It is, thus, maintained that

the primary reason for dismissal was military's rationality: having viewed Sharif as a potential shirker, the principal got his government topple for the prolongation of the Sharif government would have initiated a process of strengthening the parliamentary institutions and democratic norms vis-à-vis the principal military.

### **6.2.3 Politicians- in Parliament or Power? The Bhutto Government (1993-1996)**

In the post-dismissal period, paradoxically, the president invited Bhutto- whom he had charged of corruption etc., in 1990 - to sit on the cabinet. Interestingly, the offer was accepted by Bhutto who also had her spouse appointed as federal minister. However, the reasons to strategically engage each other were rational. On his part, the president, in strategic understanding with the military, wanted to give the impression to the general public that since the opposition leader's husband had joined the caretaker set-up, the latter should not be viewed partisan as well as anti-mainstream politicians/parties and democracy. Benazir Bhutto, in her calculus, wanted to tactically vigilant of the electioneering process along with appeasing both the president and the principal.

Nonetheless, while the caretaker government was busy highlighting Sharif's misdeeds, the Order of Dissolution was challenged in the Lahore High Court by the Speaker of the dissolved National Assembly. Moreover, Nawaz Sharif also filed a constitutional petition in the Supreme Court in this regard. Meanwhile, the PPP was able to politically damage the Punjab government where Sharif's CM was replaced with a Bhutto-man. On the other hand, the SC heard the case on daily basis and finally decided, on 26 May 1996, in Sharif's favor by a majority of ten to one. As a result, the dissolved NA, sacked PM and his cabinet got restored with immediate effect and the appointment of the caretaker government was held to be of no legal effect.

However, the verdict was not accepted by Bhutto and her aides in political terms. They argued that why the same court did not restore the PPP government in a similar case a few years ago? (Waseem 1993:52). However, on the other hand constitutional expert read it as a milestone in an agent judiciary's chequered history (Khan 2002:759). What can be deduced from the Supreme Court's verdict is that the judiciary possessed both agency and rationality. Hence, in the present context where the president was already taken on and was about to retire, if not re-elected, she chose to stand by the elected government in order to primarily

improve its institutional prestige. After all no heaven was to fall if her judgment was overruled since it was a norm in the country.

In the post-restoration period, the federal (Sharif) government was able to bring no-confidence motion with the help of defectors against the Punjab's Chief Minister who, in turn was rational enough to advise the governor to dissolve the assembly. Simultaneously, the NWFP assembly also met with the similar fate. This created a constitutional chaos. The matter was, therefore, referred to High Courts. The Lahore High Court judged the dissolution to be unlawful whereas the Peshawar High Court upheld it respectively. In Punjab's case, interestingly, a few hours after the judgment, the anti-Sharif governor again dissolved the assembly. To this, the federal (Sharif) government opted to take the administrative control in its hands after having passed a resolution in the parliament. However, the president did not accept it since it was not sent for his consent. This led to another constitutional crisis. Sharif's side again restored for judicial rescue.

By this time, the army's continuing behind-the-scene role emerged on the scene...COAS cancelled his visit to Somalia, along with other countries, ostensibly due to the brewing crisis in the country...Already military units were patrolling the area in the vicinity of the Presidency and the Parliament House.

(Waseem 1993:54)

Thus, as a result of strategic interaction and understanding among the PM, president and the principal, the two agents rationally decided to leave their respective offices than to stay on. Arguably, the president was not a challenge for the military since he was constituency-less and gun-less too. But, he had three choices contextually: a) to resign strategically; b) to leave disgracefully; c) if none of the two, then commit suicide. However, when pressed upon, he rationally preferred life over death. On the other hand, Nawaz Sharif had choices too; his government was restored and he could have continued since the Supreme Court had already decided in his favor. Why then did he advise the president to dissolve the judicially restored National Assembly?

**Box 6.4 PM Sharif's Resignation was a Rational Decision**

Actually the political situation had become too instable. There were earlier defections in the party. The opposition was also calling for elections. Moreover, in case Nawaz Sharif had decided not to leave the office, then there was likelihood of a military takeover.

Interview with Mohammad Pervaiz Malik, Secretary Finance PML-N and a Businessman.  
Lahore: 17 March 2008.

What the afore-mentioned suggests is that the PM being surrounded by anti-Nawaz Sharif forces represented by Junejo faction of the PML, the president, the four provincial chief ministers, the PPP as well as the 8-prty alliance (NDA), made a rational decision to confront these actors electorally rather than governmentally (Waseem 1993:52). Moreover, in case his party formed simple if not two-third majority, he would have an opportunity to either try to negotiate the repeal of Eight Amendment since it was also PPP's agenda or put his candidate for the presidency since Ishaq Khan was to retire after six months if not re-elected. Suppose Sharif had opted to carry on, then logically in that hostile environment there would have been a few choices for the principal military: a) it would have used the intelligence agencies to possibly defect MNAs from Sharif's party to formally send him home ; b) it would have had Ishaq Khan carried on and re-operationalize 58 (2)(b); c) in case the case had been referred to the judiciary and the agent had preferred to shirk, then there would have been a high probability of a military coup d'état since this would have meant a significant reduction in the principal's control of the agents.

However, since factually the military had chosen to openly intervene in this episode, it marked her agency for it was, within a short span of less than three months, capable of strategically and tactfully forcing shirking Sharif and the troublesome president to leave. Moreover, military's intervention in politics bespoke its rationality: it was necessary to end the vicious political instability which, if prolonged, could have negative impact on the growth of her economic ventures.

Thus, in the post-dissolution period, a new caretaker government was formed under the auspices of the principal. No wonder then, three of the four governors belonged to the military; agent 'civilian officers' were appointed as CMs to influence the elections results. Importantly, the caretaker prime minister was an economist- Moeen Qureshi- who was



expected to attract FDI and help the principal, if not the country, grow economically. In this respect, his government issued an economic reform packaged based on a *lassie faire* economy. Subsequently, to meet the economic deficiencies, Qureshi rolled back Sharif's policies i.e. Yellow Cab Scheme, and came up with economic, political and administrative reforms. For example, the caretaker government

submitted the list of politicians who were bank defaulters to the Election Commission...the list carried the names of over 300 politicians who had borrowed over Rs. 23 billion...The Pakistan Banking Council issued the list of defaulters...[who] owed Rs. 60 billion to the banks while Rs. 1.56 billion had been written off as of 30 June 1993. Almost all the prominent political figures from the major political parties were included in the list, along with serving or retired civilian bureaucrats, military officers as well as industrialists and businessmen.

(ibid 1993:65)

However, Nawaz Sharif's name was not published whereas Benazir, her mother, and husband could not escape the list. The PPP desperately condemned it. On his part, Sharif condemned PM Qureshi for a sell-out to the IMF and World Bank. In addition, the authoritarian clergy doubted his Muslim and Pakistani credentials. Despite this, the government took care to hold elections in October 1993. Following are given the NA results:

**Table 27 1993 Elections: National Assembly Results**

<b>Parties</b>	<b>Punjab</b>	<b>Sindh</b>	<b>NWFP</b>	<b>Balochistan</b>	<b>FATA</b>	<b>Islamabad</b>	<b>Total</b>
PPP	47	33	5	1	-	-	86
PML-N	52	10	10	-	-	1	73
PML-J	6	-	-	-	-	-	6
IJM	-	-	2	2	-	-	4
ANP	-	-	3	-	-	-	3
PIF	-	1	2	-	-	-	3
BNM-H	-	-	-	1	-	-	1
BNM-M	-	-	-	1	-	-	1
JWP	-	-	-	1	-	-	1
MDM	1	-	1	-	-	-	2
NDA	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
NPP	-	1	-	-	-	-	1
PKMAP	-	-	-	3	-	-	3
PKQP	-	-	1	-	-	-	1
Independents	5	1	1	1	7	1	15
	112	46	25	11	7	1	202

Source: Election Commission of Pakistan.

As the Table shows, the nation had, in a relatively fair election, given a split mandate. Therefore, both the mainstream parties opted to buy over the smaller parties and the independents to form government especially at the centre. Ultimately, the PPP-PML-J was able to form governments at the centre and in the Punjab. In NWFP, ANP-PML-N entered into a coalition whereas in Sindh the PPP had formed a majority government. In Balochistan, the PML-N in alliance with smaller parties helped an independent to lead the coalition. Importantly, having assumed premiership Benazir Bhutto had a political distaste for pro-principal presidency. Therefore, in order not to get re-victimized by 58 (2)(b) she was able to help PPP-man, Farooq Ahmad Leghari, got elected as president. By the standards of Pakistan's politics, this was a major development for it entailed far-reaching implications for country's civil-military relations. Ironically, however, despite many vows both Bhutto and Sharif, due to their diverging preferences, failed to repel the Eight Amendment which would have permanently benefited the politicians.

Nonetheless, having assumed the office Bhutto paid attention to economy since that was one of the stated reasons for her 1990 dismissal. Moreover, being a politician she wanted to improve not only her own but also her respective constituency's fortune. She took certain measures on this front. For instance, her government opted

to seek direct foreign investment in infrastructure projects; Energy, oil exploration, telecommunications, road construction and development of ports and airfields. Simultaneously, her government ventured to privatize the utilities and banking sector ...[also the] government boasted of signing of Memorandums of Understanding (MOUS) of worth 22 billion dollars of investment...with foreign firms...however, during 1994-1995 an investment of only 0.5 billion was registered. The ground work for some projects was started- for example, ICI [International Chemical Industries] put up 500 million dollars chemical plant in Punjab, South Korea's Hyundai established 800 million dollars oil refinery, 2.6 billion dollars Ghazi Brotha hydro-electric power project was finalized with foreign investors. However, Consolidated Electronic Power Asia (CEPA)'s much publicized thermal power project at Keti Bendar, worth 7 billion dollars ran into serious difficulties. All said and done Benazir Bhutto's government was able to attract an investment of about 1.5 dollars by 1996, but it fell short of the promise and expectations that it had aroused.

(Shafqat 1997:246)

In addition, her government's privatization and tax collection program- the IMF had emphasized it along with decrease in defense expenditures- generated less capital to relieve the already poor sections of the society. Hence, the overall economic non-performance was primarily due to resource-constraints. However, Bhutto government contextually had other choices. For example, the government, the core being land-based, did not prefer to reform the land which could have initiated a process of retributive justice for the poor peasants and tenets, at least. Besides, the industrialists- Sharif was part of it- and the merchant classes etc., also view the tax program negatively for it hurt them economically. Therefore, in order to safeguard their interests, the opposition chose to criticize the government for economic mismanagement and corruption related to the privatization especially of energy sector.

As regards her relations with the military, the only concern, as explained above, would have been the induction of PPP-president. However, the rational Bhutto, with a strategy of her own, chose to appease the principal by not questioning its economic enterprises. Had the government interfered into military's business activities the consequences would have been negative with the possibility of winning over the president and/or of in-house change through defections, for Pakistani politicians, by and large, had looked to their own than party or national interests. Or the possibility of a military coup d'état was also likely in that scenario whereby despite prioritizing personal interests, the politicians had failed to devise any oversight regime/mechanism let alone the repeal of Eighth Amendment.

Having taken a carrot-approach vis-à-vis the military the Bhutto resorted to stick-approach towards the judiciary and the opposition. In this respect, the NWFP government was made dysfunctional through a presidential proclamation which subsequently helped- through defections- PPP to bring down her rival. The dismissed CM, Sabar Shah, challenged the proclamation in the Supreme Court which decided the matter in his favor constitutionally. Similarly, the Punjab CM was sacked as a result of another presidential proclamation. The Lahore High Court, when asked her opinion, judged it to be unlawful. It was in this context that after the retirement of much disliked CJ Nasim Hasan Shah, Bhutto was able to supersede Justice Saad Saood Jan, who recreantly declined to appoint PPP-loyalists as SC judges, and appointed Justice Sajjad Ali Shah as the chief justice, with the hope that the latter would judicially support her government- Justice Shah had previously dissented in two cases related to Bhutto. Interestingly, the superseded Justice, while preferring his own interest, chose to work rather than shirk.

Last but not least, the tussle with judiciary went on when the former, in order to protect its interests, was able to direct the government to appoint permanent chief justices to the High Courts. This attitude of the apex court would have taken the air out of Bhutto's calculus in term for a pliant judiciary. After all, from the judiciary's perspective, it was a political rather than a military government.

On the foreign/defense policy front, Bhutto government, as per its policy of non-interference in the principal's domain, strategically allied with the latter. Hence, the latter allied with the US to procuring weapons- the issue of F-16s is a case in point- which would have further improved her institutional standing vis-à-vis the agents if not India. In this regard, the repeal of Brown Amendment was hailed as a success both by Bhutto and the military for different reasons: the former politicized it for her political purposes; the latter deemed it instrumental for military modernization. Moreover, on Afghanistan, especially on the issue of Taliban, the civil government also chose to toe the military's line (Nawaz 2008:474). Nevertheless, despite Bhutto's pro-principal strategy especially regarding FP/DP, her

administration was shaken by the news that the army intelligence had uncovered a plot in September by 1995 involving 40 army officers, including Major General Zaheer ul Islam Abbasi...to overthrow the government and the senior leadership of the army [military]. The aim was to capture and eliminate the military leadership during a high-level meeting at GHQ on 30 September and declare Pakistan an orthodox Islamic State. Abbasi was the man who had been removed from his command in Kargil area of Kashmir by General Asif Nawaz and given a non-operation desk role at GHQ after having undertaken an unauthorized and costly foray into Indian held territory in 1990...When the news of the attempted coup got out, Abbasi was court martialed and sentenced to jail.

(ibid 2008:477)

What the quote informs is that the civil government were viewed as a liability by (a section of) the military. Also, it highlights problems of professionalism within the principal due to its practical engagement with politics and economy. In addition, it points to the penetration of authoritarian clergy in, at least, a section of the military which claimed to be the most disciplined institution in Pakistan.

However, the real challenge came to Bhutto from the president who was primarily a PPP-man. Though having assumed the office President Leghari had resigned from the party as a gesture of political neutrality, this neutrality started withering due to divergence of priorities between the PM and the President regarding appointments of new army chief and higher courts judges. Moreover, Leghari kept Bhutto warning of corruption and misconduct. To add insult to injury, in September 1996 the murder of Benazir's brother, Murtaza Bhutto, furthered helped widen the chasm. Why did the PPP-picked president decide to turn against it?

#### **Box 6.5 Bhutto-Leghari Differences**

I think power factor played important part. The failure of PPP to repeal the 8<sup>th</sup> Amendment would have given him self-confidence. Besides, he was a politician...he had certain differences over [ministerial] portfolios with Benazir even during her first government. Finally, after the killing of Benazir's brother he sided with the establishment than Bhutto and her husband which further worsened their relations.

A senior journalist, who works with a private TV channel, informed the author during a conversation in Islamabad in April 2008.

'Against this background and in the light of the deteriorating situation, Leghari and Karamat began to see eye to eye (but separately) on the case against Bhutto' (Nawaz 2008: 485). Ironically, the opposition- Sharif included- saw eye to eye with the president. The former met with him and urged him to sack the government. Thus, it was in this context that on 5 November 1996 the president by invoking the 58 (2)(b) dismissed the Bhutto government on stated charges of corruption, misconduct etc. The provincial assemblies got dissolved accordingly.

In summary, having assumed premiership in the capacity of agent, Bhutto, having learned from her past experiences, opted to strategically engage with the principal. Thus, the former opted not to question and interfere in the latter's areas of activity i.e. businesses, foreign/defense policy. However, to avoid being politically pressurized and/or arbitrarily dismissed by president, she ably brought PPP-man in the presidency. Nonetheless, due to diverging preferences in terms of maximizing own interests, Farooq Leghari chose to oppose Bhutto. In this regard, the president acted in strategic understanding with the principal for the former had neither army nor political force to confront Bhutto on his own. Moreover, as is

already analyzed, the principal military saw further disorganization of political actors and institutions in the dismissal. After all, ‘the MI [military intelligence] was keeping tabs on the prime minister.’ (Nawaz 2008:482)

#### **6.2.4 Politicians- in Parliament or Power? The Sharif Government (1997- 12 Oct. 1999)**

In the post-dissolution period, the dismissed PM along with her husband was placed under protective custody; the PM was released later on. Soon, a caretaker government under Prime Minister Meraj Khalid, a founding member of PPP, was sworn in. His cabinet included among others old friends and cronies of the president; the veteran foreign minister- Sahabzada Yaqub Khan- represented the principal as regards FP/DF; to attract FDI Shahid Javed Burki, who was also on Qureshi’s cabinet, got appointed as chief economic advisor. In addition, a retired judge chose to be part of it. Besides, to clean the country of corruption, the Ehtesab Ordinance, 1996, was promulgated whose jurisdiction was extensive.

Though morally this action was appreciable, it came under severe criticism for it favored the incumbent president and governors. Moreover, the idea of appointing a judge, retired or serving, as Chief Ehtesab (Accountability) Commissioner was ill-conceived. In addition, as a rejoinder to the accountability process, the caretaker government, in order to purify the political system of corrupt politicians, amended the elections laws. Despite their symbolic significance, these measures were inadequate since the implementation and monitoring mechanism remained defective (Khan 2001: 803-804). Hence, as the inherent inefficacy of such measures speaks for itself, they were primarily politically motivated in order to influence the electoral process which was underway. The president’s reconciliatory approach towards Sharif and the resignation of the federal law minister, Fakhruddin G. Ibrahim, the judge-member of the cabinet, are further evidences in this regard.

Last but not least, Bhutto got also apprehended at the hands of the agent judiciary whose chief had developed a liking for ‘partisanship and ‘press statements’.

When Benazir challenged the order of the dissolution of the National Assembly, his [chief justice] attitude was clearly hostile. He returned her petition twice on flimsy procedural grounds...He pulled out old cases pending against the validity of the Eighth Amendment and fixed them ahead of the dissolution. On all previous occasions, the cases of dissolution of assemblies were heard by all available judges of the Supreme Court of Pakistan but this time he constituted a Bench of only seven

judges, keeping a number of senior judges out of the bench. Such maneuvers resulted in the dismissal of the petition only four days before the general elections...

(Ibid: 809-810)

As the quote shows, the judiciary had acted on partisan lines for rational reasons. On the hand, she wanted to settle the score with the sacked prime minister who had, during her tenure, developed sour relations with the former, and on the other, she, in strategic alliance with the principal, did not want the political institutions to develop to such an extent where they could pose any challenge to the interests of hers as well as the principal. The nature and character of the caretaker set-put further substantiates this argument. Nonetheless, the general elections were held, on 3 February 1997, in which the PPP opted to participate for its absence would have impacted its electoral and political standing negatively. The NA results are given in the Table below:

**Table 28 1997 Elections: Party Position**

	NA	PP	PS	PF	PB
PML-N	134	212	15	31	5
PPP	19	2	36	4	1
HPG	12	0	28	0	0
ANP	9	0	0	28	0
BNP	3	0	0	0	9
JUI-F	2	0	0	1	6
JWP	2	0	0	0	6
NPP	1	0	3	0	0
PPP-SB	1	0	2	0	0
BNM	0	0	0	0	2
PDP	0	1	0	0	0
PKMAP	0	2	0	0	2
PML-J	0	2	0	2	1
UNA	0	0	1	0	0
Independents	19	21	15	11	8
	202	240	100	77	40

Source: Election Commission of Pakistan

As the Table shows, Nawaz Sharif's PML-N was able obtain a heavy mandate. Hence, he faced little difficulty to form a coalition government at the federal level with ANP and MQM-A. At the provincial level, the PML-N entered into collations with ANP and MQM-A in NWFP and Sindh respectively. In the Punjab Sharif's brother, Shahbaz Sharif, formed a majority government quite easily. However, in Balochistan a multi-party coalition was

formed under Akhtar Mengal. The PPP decided to sit on opposition benches. The former wasted no time to charge the caretaker administration of rigging the election (PILDAT 2008).

Having assumed the office as heavily-mandated prime minister, Nawaz Sharif decided to chalk a cautious but rational path vis-à-vis the principal and pro-principal president who was able to appoint his crony as governor of Punjab. Being victimized by the (office of) president in the past, Sharif would have no desire to meet the same fate again. The PPP of Bhutto, on its part, had most recently felt the pain caused by 58 (2)(b). No wonder then, with a commonality of political interests, their preferences converged in terms of passage of Thirteen Amendment in April 1997. The amendment deprived the president of the constitutional prestige to dissolve assemblies discretionally. No longer could he appoint chiefs of armed forces as well as provincial governors.

Undoubtedly, from Pakistan civil-military relations perspective, this was a major development which certainly had tilted the constitutional balance of power to the parliamentary form of government. Moreover, it marked, quite contrary to the existing literature, agency and rationality of politicians who despite being agent of the military had chosen to shirk and thus affect the rules of the game defended jealously by the latter. This action of the agent politicians must have caused serious concerns in the GHQ since the instrument of destabilizing the political governments was history. Therefore, in the absence of such a mechanism the military's rational choices were as follows: a) it could have staged a coup to punish the shirking agent- but the post-coup political cost of this action would have been greater since the government was popularly elected; b) it could attempt through its intelligence apparatuses to cause defections- the chances of which were limited in the presence of heavy-mandate; c) it had the choice to strategically compromise with the status quo and adopt a wait and see policy. Contextually, the rational military operationalized the third choice.

However, Sharif, on his part, seemed to be in a hurry. In order to further stabilize the tenure, if not functioning, of the parliament and provincial assemblies, his government was bale to pass Fourteenth Amendment to put an end to defections which was an instrument in the hand of personalistic politicians to maximize their politic-economic returns. However, one negative aspect of it was that dissension, the hallmark of parliamentary democracy, became almost impossible. Not only this, the government, in order to, on the one hand, belittle



Bhutto's legacy, and on the other, politically harass if not victimize the opposition, replaced the Chief Ehtesab Commissioner with the Ehtesab [Accountability] Cell run by Sharif's confidant- Saif-ur-Rahman. The government claimed that the uncovered

certain foreign exchange accounts of Benazir, Zardari, and other members of the Bhutto family in Britain and in Switzerland. It also uncovered properties purchased by Benazir and Zardari in their own names or in the names of their frontmen. Benazir [however] had the audacity to deny this in one breath and admit it, somehow, in another. She moved the courts in foreign countries to lift injunctions against the operations of these accounts.

(Khan 2002:820)

Last but not least, Sharif government's relations with judiciary, from early on, started to worsen due to sever differences over the establishment of 'special courts', appointments of judges, suspension of Fourteen Amendment, contempt of court etc. The personalistic chief justice Sajjad Ali Shah was able to win the initial round of the battle but what came in the end was a bone-breaker. In this regard, the process started with the Quetta Bench of the SC entertaining a petition against the CJ and culminating in the storming of Supreme Court (building) by pro-government elements on 28 November 1997. The CJ called for military rescue but to no avail, for the rational military had no design to become partisan in this case. Importantly, without PM's permission, the only choice for intervention was through a coup d'état which it did not prefer at this point of time since the government enjoyed heavy-mandate. In addition, the military's agent, judiciary, stood divided: the Sajjad-Bench had suspended the Thirteen Amendment to ostensibly ally the president and the principal; instantly the rival Bench put it in abeyance. Later, the SC upheld it.

Hence, the rational actors involved in the game of power-politics preferred a rational end to the game in terms of notification of Justice Ajmal Mian as the new CJ on 23 December 1997. However, the gains of Sharif were higher since his preference prevailed in this case. Besides, during this episode the PM-President relations also got soured and the latter, after having failed to seek rescue from the GHQ, opted to resign in the face of impending impeachment. After all, there was no 58 (2)(b) at his discretion. Leghari was thus replaced with Justice (ret'd) Muhammad Rafiq Tarar- a friend of the Sharifs.

Nevertheless, the Sharif government took a moderate stance as regards the economic front. In this regard, his old vision of privatization was operationalized, though in a different context. Importantly, Sharif, in the post-Thirteen Amendment period, chose a carrot-policy towards military's economic enterprises. As regards the foreign/defense policy of Pakistan, the government, as a result of strategically interactive understanding, shared a convergence of preference with the principal. Had the government chose to interfere in functioning, if not making, of the FP/DF there was a high probability of a backlash. Hence, the prime minister took a politico-constitutional stance towards the civilian control of the military and therefore abstained from authoritarian measures.

Little wonder then, Islamabad's stance on Afghanistan remained more or less the same. However, the testing time for both the principal and the agent came in May 1998 when India tested her nuclear weapons. The military believed in a military approach; the politicians had a liking for a political response since they had a constituency to appease if not held accountable to. For the political government there was also a risk of international sanctions which would have socio-economically, if not politically, delegitimized the government. On the other hand, any such measure would have no political impact on the principal which operated with its *back* to barracks. However, after more than two weeks' calculation, the strategic interaction between the two actors helped produce the outcome: Pakistan too went nuclear. Both military and the Sharif government claimed the action. Nonetheless, the cost was to be paid by the common man- as shall be explained in detail in the next chapter- when Japan and the USA applied nuclear-sanctions. Arguably, this act of nuclearization further boosted the military's morale and its military policy vis-à-vis Hindu enemy. Hence, Kashmir came in the limelight and defense expenditures got increased with agent's approval.

As explained above, the PM had a strategy of his own to deal with the principal. Therefore, in post-nuclear period when the military was politically claiming all credit, Sharif, in order to minimize the impact, attempted to deploy the troops domestically in terms of patrolling the GT [Grand Trunk] road, enumerating the 'ghost schools' and helping the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) monitor its customers' electricity meters (Nawaz 2008: 497). Though this fact marks politicians' agency who, despite being in disadvantageous position, attempted to control the principal, such measures, at best, indicate the civilians' politically selective oversight since there was no effort to institutionalize any oversight regime/mechanism.

Moreover, the civil-military relations witnessed a critical point when the matter of new army chief's appointment, a prerogative of the prime minister under the Thirteen Amendment, surfaced. Serious differences emerged between the PM and the leader of the principal who had only two months of tenure left. Hence, the only choice, in order to confront the shirking Sharif move, was to stage a coup d'état. But given Sharif post-nuclear comparative popularity and heavy-mandate, it seemed a risky business as it entailed more cost than intended benefits. Therefore, the rational military went with her wait and see policy. Consequently, the PM was able to get the serving arm chief, General Karamat, retired. This fact further marks politicians' agency of affecting change if and when it helps maximize their benefits.

After Karamat's departure, Sharif had a choice of five leading candidates. The senior-most Lt. Gen. Ali Quli Khan...Next in line was Ali Quli's course mate, Khalid Nawaz...The next two [were], Lt. Gen. Salahuddin Tirmizi and Lt. Gen. Pervez Musharraf...On 7 October 1998, Sharif chose Musharraf to be the new army chief, replacing Karamat. Ali Quli and Khalid Nawaz sought early retirement after being superseded, following a tradition of the Pakistan Army [military]...Sharif settled on Musharraf, a Mohajir from North India and therefore not likely to have strong tribal or clan affiliation in the army [military].

(Nawaz 2008:500)

From the above the following could be deduced; a) the military acted rationally as General Karamat preferred retirement than a coup; b) despite the act of supercession the seniors (officers) preferred retirement than partisanship against junior Musharraf- this further consolidates our assumption which treats military as an institution; c) the PM, in order to establish political control over the military, played politics with the latter by appointing a junior in the hope of a pliant leader of the principal.

Nevertheless, having assumed the formal charge, General Musharraf chalked out a policy for his institution; strangely enough, during his meeting with the corps commanders there was no mention of any planned actions in Kashmir especially in Kargil and/or of Kashmir as a serious concern (Nawaz 2008: 501). However, on his part, Sharif was able to talk to India when he invited Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee to Pakistan in a move to observe nuclear non-proliferation. However, as the principal-agent relationship was at its low ebb, the COAS General Musharraf bothered not to receive the Indian PM at the Lahore

airport. This move of the military would have alarmed PM Sharif. Nonetheless, the two states were able to sign Lahore Declaration, on 21 February 1999, which recognized the Kashmir issue peripherally. Strangely however, a few months after the signing of the Lahore Declaration, the two states were engaged in a war in Kargil- this shall be explained in more detail in the next Chapter. In the post-war period, relations between the principal military and agent but shirking Sharif further deteriorated to the extent that the former staged a coup, on 12 October 1999, to oust the latter from political power- the next chapter would explain it further.

### **6.3 Conclusion**

The primary aim of this chapter was to explain civilian circularity as is propagated by structuralist, legitimist and path-dependent accounts. Quite contrary to the existing narratives, the present study, with the help of its model, sought an analytical explanation of civil-military relations, in the post-Zia period. In this respect, it was maintained that the rational military did not go back to barracks. Rather, it chose to stay on in politics as the principal. However, it rationally made a tactical move in terms of allowing the politicians to participate in elections- the latter, however, were not allowed to interfere in country's foreign/defense policy. Had General Beg-led military opted to remain in politics overtly after Zia's death, the political and economic cost- primarily to the military's businesses- of this choice would have been higher than the intended benefits.

Hence, elections were allowed to be held in 1988. Importantly however, the principal was able to strategically interact with a section of politicians who, with the blessings of the former, rationally formed IJI against Benazir Bhutto. Despite this, the latter was able to form a government at the centre. However, her political rival, Nawaz Sharif of the IJI, became the chief minister of Punjab. In other words, the Bhutto government had limited political choices. Moreover, she had to strategically interact with the principal which had developed, over the years, an anti-PPP mindset. Though Bhutto chalked out a rational course, her say in Pakistan's foreign/defense policy was next to nothing. Nonetheless, almost in the middle of her tenure she attempted to assert her premiership in terms of meddling with military appointments and promotions. However, before Bhutto could make any meaningful change vis-à-vis the principal, her government was dissolved, in 1990, by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan who operationalized 58(2)(b) in strategic understanding with the principal. The stated charges included corruption, misconduct etc. The opposition politicians welcomed her

dismissal for it provided them with another politico-electoral opportunity to test their strength.

Elections were held in the same year under the auspices of a pro-principal caretaker government. As a result, Sharif was able to form a government at the national level and Bhutto chose to sit in the opposition. The military, in its capacity of principal, was the watchdog. Being a rational actor with experience of working with the military, Prime Minister Sharif initially opted not to interfere in the military's matters especially FP/DP and military's economic activities. His focus remained on reviving the country's economy in strategic collaboration with IFIs. However, almost in the middle of its tenure the Sharif government started developing differences, apparently constitutional in nature, with the president over the appointment and promotion of military officers.

In this respect, Sharif's calculus aimed at strategically interacting with that part of the officer cadre who in the former's perception was less harmful to his government- the Bhutto episode was a case in point. However, Sharif's rational move brought more cost than benefits. The principal military viewed it as an open interference in its internal matters. Moreover, the rational president also saw in Sharif a potential shirker. Indeed, the latter politically vowed to repeal the Eighth Amendment which would have constitutionally tilted the balance of power in favor of the prime minister. However before Prime Minister Sharif could affect any change in the political system of Pakistan, President Ishaq in strategic understanding with the military opted to dissolve his government by operationalizing 58 (2(b) in 1993. A caretaker government was set up to take charge.

Interestingly, Sharif went to court and, quite ironically, the agent judiciary restored his government. However, the apparently ironic verdict of the apex court was rational in nature as it aimed at improving its institutional image in this specific political situation in which the president had already become controversial politically, if not legally. Moreover, the Supreme Court's judgment had implications for the agent president and not necessarily the principal military which was already reaping political benefits from the PM-President encounter. Little wonder then, in the post-restoration period, when their mutual differences resurfaced the principal provided the PM with choices; either to make peace or face the music. The rational Sharif saw more benefits in leaving the office for the opposition was already calling for mid-term elections. However, to appease Sharif and dissociate itself from a controversial

president, the principal sought his resignation also. A new pro-principal caretaker government assumed responsibilities including holding the general elections.

As a result of the 1993 elections, Benazir Bhutto was once again able to form a government at the centre. Having learnt from her past experiences, rational Bhutto took a calculated course of action. Instead of overtly interfering in the military's matters, she was able to bring PPP-man, Farooq Ahmed Leghari, in the presidency. However, she remained unable to bring the opposition on board to repeal the Eight Amendment to the 1973 Constitution. Also, Bhutto could not establish control over the country's foreign/defense policy. It remained an exclusive domain of the principal military. Importantly, as during her previous stay in office, this time also she opted not to question- in parliament, at least- the military's economic ventures. However, Bhutto's relations with the judiciary soured over the issue of judges' appointment. Moreover, ironically President Farooq Leghari chose to differ with PM Bhutto over policy matters. The death of the prime minister's brother further added insult to injury. Hence, being confronted with an unfriendly opposition, the president and the principal, Bhutto's set of choices was limited. Contextually, she signaled at impeaching the president in order to politically stabilize her government. However, before the PM could move in this direction her government was dismissed, in November 1996, by the president who saw more benefits in a strategic alliance with the principal. A pro-principal caretaking administration, with the responsibility to hold elections, took charge.

As a result of the 1997 elections, Nawaz Sharif was able to head the government in Islamabad. Like Bhutto, Sharif devised a rational course of action vis-à-vis the military. The latter's economic activities were treated as a non-issue. The foreign/defense policy was also considered to be the military's sphere. However, the PM chose to deal with the dominant actor politically. In this respect, Sharif was able- his heavy-mandate was an added advantage- to get his-man, Justice (retd) Rafiq Tarar, elected as Pakistan's president. Importantly, the 58(2)(b) was repealed in terms of Thirteen Amendment. These Sharif-led developments were perceived as indicators of shirking by the military since Sharif had amended the rules of the game meaningfully. Moreover, the PM's efforts to interfere in military appointments and promotions bore fruit and, army chief, Jahangir Karamat, sought retirement and later Pervez Musharraf got superseded. However, from the military's perspective, Sharif's successes added to his failures since the institution chose to deal a heavy-mandated prime minister tactfully. Hence, a coup at this point of time would have been politically more costly.

Last but not least, Sharif, on his part, continued with his incremental policy of controlling the principal military. His next move was to invite, against the military's wishes, India's Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee to Pakistan in early 1999. Though the two states were able to sign the Lahore Declaration, the strategic implications of Hindu enemy's visit were grave. Little wonder, a few months after the visit, a war broke out between India and Pakistan in Kargil. Sharif was bewildered for he was not taken on board. However, the damage to his political legitimacy was done when the opposition in particular and public in general blamed Sharif, not the military, for withdrawal. Moreover, the Kargil-differences further widened the gulf between the PM and the GHQ. Consequently, having perceived the growing military distrust, Sharif opted to replace Army Chief Pervez Musharraf- the leader of the principal military. However, this move of the PM was timely met with a coup d'état in October 1999- the next chapter shall explain this in detail.

To summarize, the phenomena of civilian circularity is rational rather than structural in nature. The four dismissals mark the military's agency and rationality for it never wanted political forces to take the strategic ground away from the principal. However, the politicians, on their part, gave more preference to their respective private rather than national interests. Hence, they failed to unanimously chalk out a strategy to replace the military as principal. Nevertheless, the sacking of elected prime ministers at the behest and, by the principal, demonstrated that the military- and presidents for that matter- also saw it as being in their own rather than national interests.

## Chapter 7

### **Military Agency Revisited: CMR under General Musharraf**

In its first three sections, the chapter seeks to explain the fourth military coup d'état, which are divided into sub-sections accordingly. In this respect, while re-capping the crux of the previous chapter, the chapter begins by briefly describing the nature and dynamics of civil-military relations in 1999 especially during the post-Kargil period. Since relations between Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and principal military's leader- General Pervez Musharraf were at a low ebb, the former, while exercising his constitutional prerogative, rationally chose to replace the latter with another military man who in Sharif's calculus was easier to get along with. However, this shirking move of Sharif was thwarted by the Musharraf-led military which sacked the popularly elected prime minister through a coup on 12 October 1999. The 1973 Constitution was abrogated; the assemblies were dissolved and the country was put under martial law.

Importantly, the military attempted to justify the coup-action on the basis of problems of law and order and economy. Moreover, it took upon itself the task to democratize and securitize the country- the coup/martial law text is a point of departure and reference in this respect. Logically and morally, since no claim to truth can be taken for granted, the chapter, therefore, tends to explain this phenomenon with the help of study's deductive model. In this respect, applying the method and approach of analytic narrative, the chapter analyses this fourth coup in terms of a combination of working/shirking and own/larger interests or agencies A and B- which are also the explanatory variables of the study. Hence, the analysis begins with the identification of conceptual variables in the coup-text. Of the variables, law and order, economic, democratization and securitization are observed to have a positive correspondence with coup/martial law. However, in order to judge the veracity of this positive correspondence, the chapter empirically explains each correspondence accordingly. As a result, it is found that there exists a negative relationship between coup/martial law and the rest of the conceptual variables.

Therefore, the analysis then reverts to the model formally. With the help of the model's independent variables, the chapter maintains that the coup was caused by the military's agency. Moreover, it is posited that the coup is rational in nature and political in character. In



addition, the chapter, while testing one of the study's hypotheses, maintains that political principalship was instrumental to facilitate the military's economic interests.

Having explained the fourth coup, the chapter then- in its next three sections- seeks to explain the fifth coup that occurred on 3 November 2007. Before attempting to explain it formally, the chapter provides the contextual background to the coup. In this respect, the Musharraf-led military's attempts at preserving its political power are emphasized. Moreover, the agency and rationality of politicians is also highlighted, for they saw to their own interests by strategically interacting with the principal military. However, the hurdle in the way to formalization of political power by the military comes, quite surprisingly, from the agent judiciary which had a tendency towards shirking even before November 3 by questioning the military and its political allies' political as well as economic activities. The coup, the chapter describes, takes place in this context. However, quite coincidentally, the military's leader, General Pervez Musharraf, attempted to justify the coup on account of problems related to security, economy and governance. Also, democratization was invoked as a complementary factor. Moreover, the Musharraf-led military explicitly blamed the judiciary for its 'increasing interference' in government's affairs.

As done previously, the chapter takes the coup-text as point of departure and reference. Subsequently, five conceptual variables are identified in the text; namely, securitization, economic, law and order, democratization and coup/martial law, and, to keep uniformity of style the earlier sequence of variables is maintained. Furthermore, a positive relationship is observed between coup/martial law and each of the conceptual variables. However, in order to determine the empirical worth of these positive correspondences, the chapter examines this coup also in the form of an analytic narrative.

As a result of the model-inspired empirical explanation, the chapter is able to find a rather negative relationship between coup/martial law and the rest of the variables. Therefore, the analytic narrative, while formally relying on the model's agencies A and B, attempts to explain the fifth coup from the agency perspective; namely, the coup is as a result of the military's inherent capability to affect change. The change that it affected on November 3 was rational in terms of preserving its hold over political power. In other words, the rationally enacted coup was staged to protect the military's political principalship which was being questioned by the shirking judiciary. However, the coup-action highlights the military's

political weakness as well, for it failed to re-negotiate the rules of the game with the shirking agent- it faces the political implications of its choice in the post-coup period. Nevertheless, the chapter posits that the military is able to maintain its overall principalship, for it is able to maximize its economic interests as an independent actor.

### **7.1 Actors and Agency: Explaining the Fourth Coup**

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the civil-military relations were at its low ebb when India's Prime Minister visited Pakistan in February 1999. Though the two states were somehow able to melt the ice, the Pakistani military opted to drive the nail into the coffin of normalization. The latter

produced a plan to take advantage of the winter months, when India normally lowered its guard at the LOC, to infiltrate at five points into what they effectively called 'No Man's Land', the areas that were not occupied by the other side, and set up bunkers or stone shelters called '*sanghars*' at about 108 spots along the 480 km front. The Mujahideen would offer a cover for these operations...as far as the need to bring the prime minister on board is concerned, local actions, such as Kargil, are within the purview of the local commanders and stayed within the army's chain of command. There was no need...to openly bring the prime minister into the plan.

(Nawaz 2008:513)

The question that arises in light of the foregoing is why Sharif was not taken on board:

#### **Box 7.1 The Military objected to Sharif's Peace Measures towards India**

Fauj [the military] had its traditional position towards India. They did not like Nawaz Sharif meeting Vajpayee in Pakistan. Nawaz Sharif wanted to develop good relations with India in order to resolve the bilateral issues politically. This was the reason they [military] made their own plan to thwart the government's peaceful efforts.

Interview with Mohammad Pervaiz Malik, Secretary Finance PML-N and a Businessman. Lahore: 17 March 2008.

However, when the clandestine operation transformed into India-Pakistan war in the summer of 1999, the situation got out of hand of its planners. Indeed, they were surprised to witness India retaliating with her air force in that mountainous region. As a result, the stated aim of internationalization of Kashmir issue by the principal remained a desire. Ultimately, the

military's strategic and general public's concerns were perceived by the PM to be politically costly. Hence, Sharif, in order to reduce the political cost of the war, saw a way-out in terms of seeking third-party mediation.

Therefore, he chose to draw the international community especially the US, which had its own stance of nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia, into the matter to possibly prevent the two states from further escalation with a probability of resort to nuclear weapons. Consequently, one sees that the two rational states took the international input seriously and preferred de-escalation and subsequent end to the war. However, the status quo prevailed over Kashmir.

**Box 7.2 The Kargil Operation was a Military and Diplomatic Failure**

The Kargil like the Gibraltar operation was a total disaster. It seemed they the [military] did not plan it either. The military remained unable to gain international diplomatic support as regards [the] Kashmir [issue]. Thus, it was a diplomatic failure. In fact, there was heavy loss of personnel and weaponry which should have shocked the GHQ.

Interview with Ayesha Siddiqa, Military Analyst. Heidelberg: 1 July 2009.

Interestingly, the inability of the Pakistan military to achieve its stated goals in the Kargil operation was publicly recognized by none else but one of the planners of the operation- (Late) Lt. Gen. Jamshed Gulzar Kiyani. Gen Kiyani, in a rare show of dissidence over matters private to the principal, called for the establishment of Kargil commission to bring those responsible for the fiasco to book<sup>78</sup>. Nevertheless, the fall-outs of Kargil persisted as regards civil-military relations in Pakistan. The Kargil war was cognized differently by the principal and Sharif. For example, ‘Musharraf kept hearing stories that Sharif was looking to replace him as army chief and perhaps even move him upstairs to CJCS [Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff]’ (Nawaz 2008: 525). His calculus proved correct when, on 12 October 1999, Prime Minister Sharif- constitutionally empowered to appoint armed forces chiefs- opted to replace COAS Pervez Musharraf with Lt. Gen. Ziauddin. When the replacement got announced on the state media, Musharraf was about to arrive home from Sri Lanka. However, before the leader of the principal landed in, his institution had struck the same day:

<sup>78</sup> Interview of (Late) Lt. Gen Jamshed Gulzar Kiyani by Dr Shahid Masood in his Geo-TV program *Meray Mutabiq* on 2 June 2008. Available from: [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tK\\_WAtLcu5s&feature=related](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tK_WAtLcu5s&feature=related)

the country had witnessed its fourth successful coup and the shirking Sharif government was dismissed; the PM was placed under house arrest; the 1973 Constitution was abrogated.<sup>79</sup>

Moreover, the principal issued, on 14 October, a Proclamation of Emergency followed by a Provisional Constitutional Order- new rules of the game. Interestingly, under the newly imposed rules the leader of the principal chose to become Chief Executive (CE) of Pakistan rather Chief Martial Law Administrator. In addition, the agent judiciary, while preferring working and its own interests, took a fresh oath. Importantly, the CE, like his predecessors, addressed the nation to plead the case:

**Box 7.3 Excerpts from General Musharraf's Address to the Nation,<sup>80</sup> 17 Oct. 1999**

*Today, we have reached a stage where our economy has crumbled...state institutions lie demolished, provincial disharmony has caused cracks in the federation...the few at the helm of affairs in the last government were intriguing to destroy the last institution of stability left in Pakistan by creating dissention in the ranks of the armed forces of Pakistan... I shall not allow the people to be taken back to the era of sham democracy, but to a true one...The Constitution is but a part of the nation therefore I chose to save the nation...This is not martial law, only another path towards democracy. The armed forces have no intention to stay in charge any longer than is absolutely necessary to pave the way for true democracy to flourish in Pakistan.*

...our aims and objectives shall be:

1. Rebuild national confidence and morale.
2. Strengthen the federation, remove inter provincial disharmony and restore national cohesion.
3. *Revive the economy and restore investor confidence.*
4. *Ensure law and order and dispense speedy justice.*
5. Depoliticise state institutions.
6. *Devolution of power to the grass roots level.*
7. Ensure swift and across the board accountability.

*...Last year, we were compelled to respond to India's nuclear tests in order to restore strategic balance in the interest of our national security and regional peace and stability... We shall continue our unflinching moral, political and diplomatic support to our Kashmiri brethren in their struggle to achieve their right of self-determination...our*

<sup>79</sup> Though the Musharraf-led military claimed that the 1973 Constitution was only 'put in abeyance', it was, in author's view, abrogated and replaced with the PCO as new rules of the game. Moreover, the article 6 of the 1973 Constitution, as mentioned earlier in the study, considers any such action an act of 'high treason'.

<sup>80</sup> General Musharraf addressed the nation briefly on 13 October 1999. In this address he explicitly pointed to problems related to governance, economy and security if not democracy. Since the General, as vowed, was able to re-address the nation at length on 17 October, therefore the study prefers to rely on this address- the coup/martial law text. Available from: <http://presidentmusharraf.wordpress.com/2007/07/10/address-nation-7-point-agenda/>

*armed forces are fully equipped and ready to defend our national sovereignty and territorial integrity...*[italics mine].

As every military regime faces legitimacy crisis so did the one in case. Therefore, the judiciary was interacted to take fresh oath under the PCO in January 2000. Quite surprisingly, the apex court of the country was divided on the issue. Consequently,

the Chief Justice of Pakistan, Justice Saiduzzman Siddiqui refused to take oath. His standpoint was that the military regime had given solemn undertaking to the judiciary that it would not interfere with its independence and it would be allowed to function under the constitution. On his refusal to take oath, he was virtually put under house arrest until 11. A.M. on 26 January 2006 so that he might not influence those judges who were willing to take the oath...Only seven judges of the Supreme Court took oath and the most senior amongst them, Irshad Hassan Khan was appointed the Chief Justice. Two judges of the Lahore High Court, three judges of the Sindh High Court and two judges of the Peshawar High Court were not given oath and thus they ceased to hold the office. None of the judges of the High Courts refused to take oath voluntarily.

(Khan 2002:935)

As the quote shows, CJ Siddiqui along with other judges chose not to take oath under the PCO. A few others, however, preferred to work and hence the military was able to achieve its objective. Nevertheless, it raises the question as to what caused shirking by a section of otherwise agent judiciary.

#### **Box 7.4 The Judiciary allied with the Military**

It was a unique stand on the part of the Chief Justice who had a point to protest since the courts were assured of no interference in their functioning. He would have hoped that the other judges especially of Supreme Court and High Courts would follow suit. A few did. The majority took oath under the PCO [Provisional Constitutional Order].

A High Court Advocate expressed these views with the author in Karachi in April 2008.

What the above-mentioned suggests is that despite commendable resistance from the CJ and a few other judges the majority saw to their personal rather than institutional, if not national, interests. It also corroborates the study's assumption of judiciary being the agent of the principal. No wonder then, the pro-principal judiciary opted to judicially legitimize the regime. In this respect, it gave a verdict in April 2000 in which Nawaz Sharif was judged guilty of hijacking the PIA plane which carried General Musharraf. Sharif was awarded the sentence of life imprisonment. However, his co-accused got scot-free. Importantly, having re-activated the doctrine of state necessity, the Supreme Court of Pakistan judged the coup valid on 12 May 2000. Moreover, it empowered the Chief Executive to amend the constitution at his discretion. Interestingly, the removal of Musharraf was also judged invalid despite the fact that it was not the real issue before the SC.

Thus, what can be summarized in light of the above is that the Musharraf-led military was able to stage coup successfully on 12 October 1999. It remained the principal since its preference had prevailed. Importantly, the military, as a result of carrot and stick policy, got its coup legitimized from the agent judiciary.

## **7.2 An Analytic Narrative of the Coup**

As mentioned in the preceding section, the military was judicially legitimized. However, since the legitimizing institution- from the present study's perspective as well as empirical evidence given above- was an agent of the military, its judgment therefore cannot be taken for granted. Thus, in the following sections, the study tends to conduct an analytic narrative of this coup in order to explain the reasons/causes of its occurrence and the impact it had on Pakistan's civil-military relations. The analytic narrative, as done in preceding chapters, is a combination of agencies A and B; namely, working/shirking and own/larger interests respectively. The primary purpose of the analysis shall be to test the study's hypotheses, which contain the jist of its core question and central puzzle.

To begin with, the following conceptual variables are identified in the coup/martial law text:

*A = state institutions lie demolished; [to] Ensure law and order (law and order variable)*

*B = we have reached a stage where our economy has crumbled; [to] Revive the economy and restore investor confidence (economic variable)*

*C = I shall not allow the people to be taken back to the era of sham democracy, but to a true one; Devolution of power to the grass roots level (democratization variable)*

*D = we were compelled to respond to India's nuclear tests in order to restore strategic balance in the interest of our national security and regional peace and stability; our armed forces are fully equipped and ready to defend our national sovereignty and territorial integrity (securitization variable)*

*E= This is not martial law, only another path towards democracy. The armed forces have no intention to stay in charge any longer than is absolutely necessary to pave the way for true democracy to flourish in Pakistan (policy variable)*

Based on the text above, the main causal relations observed are:

1. The state's civil institutions- except the armed forces- are demolished by the previous government. Consequently, the law and order situation had deteriorated. Thus, the coup was staged and martial law declared to ensure law and order:

A  $\xrightarrow{+}$  E (positive relationship)

2. Pakistan's economy has worsened to the extent that 'investors' have lost their confidence. Hence, the military intervened to make Pakistan grow economically:

B  $\xrightarrow{+}$  E (positive relationship)

3. The previous government could only introduce 'sham democracy'. The military shall bring 'true democracy' even to the 'grass roots level' :

C  $\xrightarrow{+}$  E (positive relationship)

4. A strategic balance is established through nuclear weapons vis-à-vis India. The military is capable and vigilant to defend Pakistan's sovereignty:

D  $\xrightarrow{+}$  E (positive relationship)

The following observations can be drawn in light of the above:

- The October coup and consequent martial law is justified by General Musharraf-led military on accounts of problems of law and order and economy.
- Law and order and economic problems are cited as the major reasons/causes due to their extremely negative effects on the state and the society;
- The need to democratize the country is also prioritized along with governance and economy.

- Securitization is regarded and cited as a natural function of the military. However, it is complementary in nature.
- The coup/martial law is viewed and projected by the military as a solution-package to the stated problems.
- The military has the capability and determination to achieve the stated objectives.

As the afore-mentioned shows, there exists positive correspondence between coup and each of the conceptual variables. Therefore, it seems necessary to analyze this positive relationship empirically, though within the formwork of the model, in order to determine its status. Such an explanation shall also help to test the posed hypotheses. Hence, each of the following four sections deals with each variable accordingly.

### 7.2.1 Law and Order Variable

General Pervez Musharraf-led military attempted to legitimize the military coup d'état on the basis of deteriorating law and order situation in the country. The former blamed Nawaz Sharif government in this respect. However, in order to stand legitimized, the military under Musharraf has to undergo a statistical test. To begin with, the study has enumerated murders per million population- since riots are not mentioned in the official record- during the Sharif government and military regime - see the Table below.

**Table 29 Murder per Million Population**


<b>Year</b>	<b>Murders per million pop.</b>	<b>Pop. (million)</b>
1997	68	137.132
1998	73	140.629
1999	65	144.215
2000	60	148.132
2001	63	151.480
2002	61	154.903
2003	59	158.404
2004	60	161.984
2005	58	165.816
2006	59	169.398
2007	61	173.057

Source: Pakistan Statistical Yearbook, 1998-99, 2008



Having conducted a statistical analysis of murders per million population from 1997-1999, the murders-trend- see the Figure below- that the statistical data has provided is going in Sharif's favor. The trend of murders is gradually and consistently going downward when compared with that of its counterpart. Thus, it is posited, on the statistical ground, that the law and order variable cannot be invoked by the military minds to legitimize the October coup.

**Figure 4 Trend: Murders per Million Population**



In addition, in order to see whether General Musharraf-led military was able to solve the problems of law and order, as claimed in his first address to nation, the present research attempts to judge the military's performance on this front statistically. In this respect, a cursory look at the Figure 4 above makes one believe that the trend of murders from 2001 to 2003, and from 2004 to 2005 is going downward also. Therefore, the military takeover stands justified at the end of the day. However, a deep reading of the Figure shall also make it clear that the military badly failed to maintain law and order in 2000- which is a crucial year from the study's perspective of governance. Moreover, despite relative downward murders-trend

during the above-mentioned years, the sharp upward trend from 2005 onwards is a clear indication of low governance. Interestingly, these empirical findings should further corroborate the reporting of events of medium/large scale acts of terrorism which Pakistan unprecedentedly witnessed during the Musharraf-led military rule- this shall further be explained later in the Chapter.

Thus, in light of the ongoing statistical analysis of murders per million population and the resultant murders-trend, it is safely concluded that the military (rule) led by Musharraf terribly failed to solve the acclaimed issues of law and order. Hence, this conceptual variable cannot, by any means, be invoked to legitimize the coup action of 12 October 1999.

### 7.2.2 Economic Variable

Under this variable the task would be twofold. On the one hand, the study shall attempt an empirical analysis of Pakistan's economy in the pre-coup period in order to see whether the claimed deterioration of economic situation caused the coup. On the other hand, the aim shall be to explain whether the military under Musharraf can legitimize its direct intervention in politics on the basis of improved economic indicators.

To begin with, the economic context of the October coup was almost different from, for instance, the 1977 coup when the country was practically outside the gambit of IMF-led structural adjustment programs (SAPs). However, the 1990s was a different case. Moreover, this decade was severally affected by the so called bad luck factor in terms of low rate of remittances - see the Table below.

**Table 30 Key Economic Indicators: 1990-2003**

	<b>GDP growth rate</b>	<b>Agriculture growth rate</b>	<b>Manufacture growth rate</b>	<b>Inflation (CPI)</b>	<b>Population below Poverty Line</b>	<b>Remittances in US\$ million</b>
1990-91	5.6	5.0	6.3	12.7	22.11	1,848
1991-92	7.7	9.5	8.1	10.6		1,467
1992-93	2.1	-5.3	4.4	9.8		1,562
1993-94	4.4	5.2	4.5	11.3		1,445
1994-95	5.1	6.6	2.5	13.0		1,866
1995-96	6.6	11.7	3.7	10.8	31.00	1,416
1996-97	1.7	0.1	-0.1	11.8		1,409
1997-98	3.5	4.5	6.9	7.8		1,489

1998-99	4.2	1.9	4.1	5.7		1,061
1999-00	3.9	6.1	1.5	3.6		983
2000-01	2.2	-2.7	8.2	4.4	32.60	1,086
2001-02	3.4	-0.1	5.0	3.5		2,389
2002-03	5.1	4.1	7.7	3.3		4,236

Source: Zaidi. 2005.

As the Table shows, the remittances dropped to a considerable low in 1998/99 and 1999/00 due to political choice made in an interactive strategic process by the principal military and Sharif to go nuclear in May 1998. In addition, the subsequent freeze on the Foreign Currency Accounts (FCAs) further compounded the economic situation. Little wonder then, the *Pakistan Economic Survey 1998-99*, published in the pre-coup period, accepted the true impact the year 1998 had on the country's economy. Interestingly however, the *Annual Report* of the State Bank of Pakistan, published in the post-coup period- indeed in December 1999- also observed that the 1998 was the 'most difficult year for Pakistan's economy' (Zaidi 2005:359-363). The overall estimated short term cost- the Glenn Amendment is a case in point- the nuclear choice brought to the economy is given below.

**Table 31 Economic Cost of Nuclear Blasts**

**SHORT RUN (First Year)**

- Lower Gross Domestic Product by Rs. 12 billion\*
- Lower real per household income annually by Rs. 400\*
- Lower consumption expenditure by Rs. 17 billion
- Lower employment by 80, 000
- 16,000 more educated unemployed
- 2,000,000 more persons below the poverty line
- 400,000 additional malnourished children

\*Valued at constant process of 1980-81

Source: Zaidi. 2005.

Despite all this, in pure economic terms the year 1998/99 presented an altogether different picture. Zaidi wrote

Although both the State Bank of Pakistan *Annual Report* of 1998/99 and the *Pakistan Economic Survey* of the same year believe that this year was one of the most 'difficult' in Pakistan's history, it was certainly not one of the worst, in terms of economic indicators. In fact, as [Table 30 shows] that in terms of GDP growth, 1998/99 was far better than the two previous years and the three subsequent years, although no one will deny that after 1998, the situation did deteriorate on account of

developments of 1998. In fact, the growth rate for 1998/99 was only marginally lower than the average for the preceding eight years 1990-98. Although the May 1998 nuclear tests did have major consequences on the economy...the economy prior to 1998, cannot be claimed to have been doing very much better...This, we argue, was on account of the policies implemented on the advice of the IMF and World Bank, especially at a time when the debt from the 1980s, had become quite severe.

(ibid:359-363)

Thus, with the help of the afore-mentioned, the ongoing is concluded as follows: a) the pre-1998/99 economic indicators were not worst ; b) the nuclear-decision- in which the principal military played an important role- brought heavy economic cost to the country's economy; c) in pure economic terms, despite the 'nuclear-related' sanctions the GDP growth was better than the two preceding years; d) the *Annual Report* of the State Bank of Pakistan, published under the Musharraf-led military in December 1999, also verified the economic hardships the country faced post-May 1998. Therefore, in light of these empirical evidences, it is maintained that the economy-deterioration thesis, as propagated by the coup-making institution, is basically baseless a justification for the October coup.

Regardless, following is an attempt to see whether Pakistan's economy did better under the military rule. To begin with, the economic situation deteriorated rather than registering any positive signs during the year 2000/01- see Table 32 on the next page. However, the situation started to gradually reverse after the 9/11. In fact, on 23 September 2001, due to its geostrategic interests the US preferred to waive the key sanctions against both India and Pakistan. Consequently, it became easier for the regime to negotiate with the IMF, the WB and the Paris Club- with later the process was in place since the Sharif days. Anyhow, by December 2000, a fresh round of rescheduling was initiated with the commercial and sovereign creditors. In addition, a Stand-By Agreement was signed with IMF in November 2000. Importantly, in January 2001, the Paris Club and other bilateral and commercial creditors agreed to restructure debts worth US\$ 1.8 billion.

However, the earlier debt rescheduling was minuscule compared to the \$ 12.5 billion that took place in December 2001. Not only was this amount far larger than any such rescheduling in the past, more importantly, it was the terms of this agreement which set it apart...Consequently, this provided an implied debt reduction without having a HIPC [Heavily Indebted Poor Country] status...Basically , the entire bilateral debt of

consortium countries has been rescheduled , and this rescheduling has been for a longer period than in the past; Official Development Assistance (ODA) debt, which is 68 per cent of the total rescheduled , will be repayable after 35 years, with 15 years' grace period, and non-ODA debt is to be repaid over a 25 years period , with a five year grace period for other loans. Moreover, there has been a 're-profiling of the debt in such a way that it takes into consideration the country's capacity to pay. This rescheduling allows relief of between \$ 1.2-1.5 billion annually in payments of debt servicing on external debt during the years 2001-05.

(ibid:368)

Besides, as a consequence of military's rational alliance with Washington, the remittances, especially from the US, registered a huge increase in 2002/03. Nevertheless, despite this significant rescheduling, Pakistan made substantial payments in the form of debt servicing to its creditors. For instance, US\$ 6.3 billion -equivalent to more than half of export earnings- was paid in 2001/02.

Moreover, as mentioned above, the economic performance prior to the release of foreign aid and consequent remittances was abysmal as the GDP growth in percentage stood at 2.0 and 3.1 in 2000-01 and 2001-02 respectively. However, due to the aid inflows and remittances- the so called good luck factor- the growth rates during 2003-06 period looked attractive as the Table below shows.

**Table 32 Key Economic Indicators: 2003-2008**

	FY 03	FY 04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	
						Targets	Actual
	<i>percent</i>						
Real GDP (at factor cost)*	4.7	7.5	9.0	5.8	6.8	7.0	5.8
Agriculture	4.1	2.4	6.5	6.3	3.7	4.8	1.5
Major crops	6.8	1.7	17.7	-3.9	8.3	4.5	-3.0
Manufacturing	6.9	14.0	15.5	8.7	8.2	10.9	5.4
Large-scale	7.2	18.1	19.9	8.3	8.6	13.0	4.8
Services sector	5.2	5.8	8.5	6.5	7.6	7.1	8.2
Consumer price index (FY01=100)	3.1	4.6	9.3	7.9	7.8	6.5	12.0
Sensitive price indicator (FY01=100)	3.8	6.0	11.1	7.8	9.4	-	14.2
Broad money (M2)	18.0	19.6	19.1	15.1	19.3	13.5	15.5
Reserve money	14.5	15.5	17.6	10.2	20.9	-	21.6
Private sector credit	18.2	34.3	34.4	23.5	17.3	-	16.5
Exports (f.o.b.)	22.2	10.3	16.9	14.3	3.2	13.1	13.2
Imports (c.i.f.)	18.2	27.6	32.1	38.8	6.9	5.8	30.9

Official liquid FE reserves**(US\$)	10,769	12,389	12,598	13,122	15,646	-	11,399
<i>As percentage of GDP</i>							
Total investment	16.8	16.6	19.1	22.1	22.9	23.8	21.6
National savings	20.8	17.9	17.5	18.2	17.8	18.8	13.9
Tax revenue	10.1	9.8	9.6	9.8	10.2	10.2	10.0
Total revenue	14.9	14.1	13.7	14.0	14.9	13.2	14.3
Budgetary expenditure	18.6	16.4	17.0	18.2	19.2	17.5	21.7
Budgetary deficit	3.7	2.3	3.3	4.2	4.3	4.2	7.4
External current account balance	4.9	1.8	-1.4	-3.9	-4.8	-	-8.4
Total debt (inc. explicit liabilities)	80.1	71.4	65.8	59.5	57.9	-	60.7
a) Domestic debt	38.0	35.1	32.8	30.1	29.9	-	30.6
b) Foreign debt	39.5	34.4	31.3	28.2	27.0	-	29.0
c) Explicit liabilities	2.5	2.0	1.7	1.3	1.0	-	1.1

\* During FY08 sectoral share in GDP were as follow: agriculture (29.9 percent), industry (25.9 percent), and services (53.2 per cent)

\*\* Foreign exchange reserves include CRR/SLR on FE=25 deposits

Note: Targets are based on Annual Plan, Trade policy and Annual Budget Statement for FY08

Source: State Bank of Pakistan<sup>81</sup>

Though the Table above shows some positive macroeconomic indicators, primarily due to foreign aid and remittances, it was nonetheless clear to impartial observers that

the boom of 2003-6 rested on weak foundations; it could not be sustained unless a number of structural reforms were undertaken. The structures that need to be built or demolished altogether were created over a long time and a number of vested interests had developed around them to protect them from being changed. There were a number of weaknesses in the economy that needed the urgent attention of the policymakers in Islamabad. The most glaring of these was that the boom rested mostly on consumption and not on investment... The economic story would have been a success if the rate of growth in per capita income in 2003-6 could be sustained over a reasonable period of time; if significant reductions were occurring in the incidence of poverty; if policymaking in Islamabad had been thoroughly institutionalized; if economic decision-making had been decentralized to lower tiers of government that were closer to the people and if capacity had been created at these levels to deliver services and development to the people.

(Burki 2007:29-30)

Additionally, the regime's economic managers methodologically- as regards poverty incidence- chose economically a bad year as the base and a good year as the end point to drawn rosy conclusions (Economic Survey of Pakistan 2008/09:196). Importantly, during this

<sup>81</sup> www.sbp.gov.pk

entire period, the budget remained in deficit. Moreover, the external and internal debt loomed large on the national exchequer.

Besides, in 2006-07, only 0.70 million employment opportunities were created; the bulk of which was created in the rural areas (0.62 million) compared to only 0.08 million in the urban areas. This indicated a weaker labor market situation especially in the urban areas of Pakistan. Importantly, the inflation touched double figure during FY 07/08.

A review of price trends of essential items during 2007-08 indicates that the major portion of food inflation during this period stemmed from the hike in the prices consumed by the poor household such as wheat, flour, rice, edible oil, vegetables and pulses. Since April 2007, the economy has witnessed over 200 percent increase in the price of palm oil; and an increase of 150 percent in wheat prices, while over 100 percent increase in the price of oil in the international market.

(Economic Survey 2008-09:195; 2007-08:203)

Thus, in light of the above-mentioned quantitative facts it is posited that the economic situation, by and large, does not bode well for the military's claims with respect to enhancing Pakistan's economy. Instead, they point to an extremely poor and vulnerable economy structurally as well as non-structurally i.e. the uncertainty of foreign aid inflows and remittances etc. Hence, the ongoing analysis helps to conclude that the stated positive correspondence between economic variable and coup is empirically unfounded.

### **7.2.3 Democratization Variable**

As mentioned earlier in the chapter, having got judicial legitimacy the regime decided to democratize the county. In this respect, the first potent indicator of democratization came when

In the early hours of December 10th, Mr Sharif was taken from his dungeon in a 16th-century fort and, along with 17 members of his family and 22 containers of belongings...put on an aircraft to exile in Saudi Arabia. The general has thus been seen to be more merciful than an earlier coup leader, Zia ul Haq, who in 1979 hanged Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the prime minister he had deposed...According to a Pakistani army spokesman, Mr Sharif has paid for his freedom by agreeing to hand over 80% of the family's known assets in Pakistan and promising not to come back for at least ten years. The "ransom", if you can call it that, includes \$5m in cash, five factories,

several houses and 24 hectares (60 acres) of land...As a result, though, the armed forces' stock is at rock bottom. Those who had hoped they would clean up Pakistan and usher in decent democracy feel betrayed. Protests across the land are loud and clear.

*(The Economist 2000)*

What can be deduced from the above-mentioned is that rationality prevailed on the two sides. The military, already suffering from legitimacy deficit, saw it rational to let Sharif go since his presence or his (military) trial would have brought more political, if not legal-moral, complexities; rational Sharif, on his part, preferred alive than a dead Bhutto. Moreover, the exiled PM stood on a good-pitch since his wife, Kulsoom Nawaz, had surprised not only the regime but also the anti-PML-N forces by leading the party.

However, the military's intelligence apparatuses were also showing their agency in terms of baiting the personalistic politicians from especially Sharif's party. Again rationality mattered; a section of PML-N chose to defect and form 'like-minded' group which later emerged a proper political party- Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-i-Azam) or PML-Q. It was led by Chaudhris of Gujrat- Shujaat Hussain and his cousin Pervez Elahi. In addition, the military resorted to institutional measures to strengthen its hands. In this respect, a National Accountability Bureau (NAB)<sup>82</sup> was established to arrest, punish and importantly disqualify the guilty to holding public office and contest elections. The chief beneficiary of the NABization was the PML-Q whose members were cleared of corruption.

Moreover, the Q-League was favored in terms of non-institution of case against its members, disqualification of strong opposition candidates through the Accountability Courts and dropping/freezing cases against those succumbed to pressure to join the Q-League. Moreover, 24 PPP and 33 PML-N politicians were being investigated and tried by the NAB in August 2002- barely a month before the general elections. However, none of politicians from the Q-League was put on trial. Interestingly, the courts acquitted, during 2002, forty individuals-politicians included- who were wrongly accused by NAB- see Table 33 on the next page, in this respect.

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<sup>82</sup> The National Accountability Bureau was established on account of The National Accountably Ordinance, 1999. The NAB was headed by a serving Lieutenant General Muhammad Amjad.



**Table 33 Status of Investigation against Politicians (2002)**

	Authorized	Completed	Under Process	Closed
Punjab	135	39	58	38
Sindh	90	46	42	2
NWFP	29	15	4	10
Balochistan	23	12	6	5
Rawalpindi	33	5	19	9
Total	310	117	129	64

Source: Waseem 2006:58

In addition, another intuitional measure was taken by the principal when it established a National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB), run by a retired Lt. Gen., in November 1999. Its stated fundamental goal was to bless Pakistan with ‘good governance’. For this purpose, the NRB came up with a Local Government Plan (LGP) 2000 under which non-party local bodies election were held and the new Local Government system got placed on 14 August 2001. The plan introduced major structural changes in the distract bureaucracy; for instance the incumbent Deputy Commissioner was belittled into District Coordinating Officer (DCO) who was required to report to the district nazim (roughly mayor) directly. Why did the military regime come up with the LGP?

**Box 7.5 The Objectives of the Local Government Plan (LGP)**

The Local Government Plan had two main objectives to achieve: One, it aimed to localize politics since the political parties were more organized and mobilized at the provincial level; two, it wanted to tame the civil bureaucracy especially the DMG [District Management Group] due to the very fact that it was a DMG officer in Karachi who refused to side with Musharraf when he was on board PIA. So, it was a punishment.

A 31 year old mid-level officer of District Management Group recorded his views of Pakistan’s civil bureaucracy in Islamabad in April 2008.

As the foregoing informs the Musharraf-led military, in order to politico-electorally legitimize itself was able to utilize the local bodies for a presidential referendum to be held in April 2002. This was a planned move to avoid the implications inherent in the Syed Zafar Ali Shah case since Musharraf had assumed the office of president after having removed President Rafiq Tarar on 20 June 2001. No wonder then,

Musharraf’s campaign was taken up by a majority of the 250,000 councilors and nazims of the local government. The Punjab government’s approval of a hefty sum of Rs. 3.5 million for only two public rallies was an indication of the money poured into

that effort...[also] public and private transport vehicles were impounded in the cities to bring people to the rallies...The campaign ...was also unprecedented in terms of the visible involvement of the military officers...the corps commanders openly graced Musharraf's [military] campaign meetings...Initially Musharraf [himself] attended the public meetings in uniform.

(ibid 2006:78-79)

The opposition- PPP-PML-N-MMA (Mutahida Majlis-e Amal) - opposed the regime even on this front and challenged the 2002 Referendum Order in the apex Supreme Court which ultimately decided in Musharraf's favor. The latter was also able to be benefited by the political support of a section of politicians- of PML-Q, PTI, MQM, PML-F, PAT, NAPP, GDA, Millat (Nation) Party<sup>83</sup> etc.- during the course of court's proceedings as well as canvassing.

Finally, the referendum approached and General Musharraf, a sole-candidate, was arbitrarily declared winner in an exercise about which *The Economist* commented as follows:

Lauded in the West for backing America's war on terror, and admired at home for taking on both corrupt politicians and extremist mullahs while avoiding dictatorial excess, General Pervez Musharraf must have thought that he would sail through this week's referendum on his assumed presidency, and use it to cement himself into power. On April 30th the electorate duly granted the general a five-year presidential term. As bogus political exercises go, this one was a corker. The poll was conducted without the benefit of an electoral register, identity cards were not obligatory and the usual polling stations were supplemented by tens of thousands of makeshift extra ones: in railway stations, offices, on street corners, in hotels. The official figure of 97.5% in favor is probably reasonably accurate. The real test of the president's popularity was the turnout. The opposition maintains that as few as 5% may have voted. The government was claiming a figure of more than 50%, which no one outside it finds remotely credible. Reporters found polling station after polling station all but deserted.

(*The Economist* 2002)

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<sup>83</sup> The Millat (Nation) Party was established by former President of Pakistan, Farooq Ahmed Leghari.

Moreover, the regime promulgated the Political Parties Order (PPO) 2002 to apparently regulate the conduct and function of the parties. The political parties under the PPO were obligated to frame a constitution, hold inner-party elections every four year, and submit details of nature and sources of finances annually to the EC. In addition, the Legal Framework Order 2002

further amended Article 63. The new law provided that a person would be disqualified if he/she was: convicted by a court on the charge of corrupt practices or misuse of power and authority; had been dismissed or removed or compulsorily retired from service of federal, provincial or local government or a corporation on the grounds of misconduct or moral turpitude; had been held responsible for having written off or defaulted on payment of a loan of an amount of Rs. 2 million or more, or payment of government dues or utility charges of an amount of Rs. 10, 000 or more...The selective implementation of this law violated the spirit of the Constitution. It was pointed out after the elections that almost 40 per cent of the elected people had been implicated in provable financial crimes as defaulters, including Prime Minister Jamali, the Interior Minister Faisal Saleh Hayat and the Minister for Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA), Aftab Ahmad Sherpao. Apparently, the law did not affect them.

(Waseem 2006:104)

As is obvious from the foregoing that the PPO and LFO were arbitrarily designed instruments to depoliticize the political parties especially PPP and PML-N along with their leaders Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. More importantly, the LFO- a comprehensive set of new rules of the games- arbitrarily amended the Constitution- this was also violative of Supreme Court's May 2000 judgment. It, once again, turned the political system of the country from parliamentary to presidential. Hence, the president, the leader of the principal military, added five more years to his presidentship and empowered himself to nominate and dismiss the elected PM and the cabinet and dissolve parliament. Furthermore, the LFO gave the military's man powers to appoint service chiefs and justices of the superior but agent courts. Last but not least, it established the already delayed National Security Council (NSC) which Generals Zia and Karamat had proposed.

Thus, what one can conclude in light of the foregoing is that the arbitrary promulgation of legal-constitutional instruments in terms of PPO and especially the LFO was a strategy of the principal to, on the one hand, achieve desired results in the upcoming elections and on the other, bargain with the elected parliament to get the martial law acts and orders indemnified- the NSC is a case in point. Its arbitrary establishment, undoubtedly, reflected the principal's intention and aim to constitutionally institutionalize its rule. Yet it also marked the inherent political weakness of the principal in the body politic of Pakistan. After all, its ultimate approval rested on the preferences of the politicians a section of which had previously opposed it.

Interestingly, despite the regime's cordial relations with Western governments in terms of rational collaboration over the war on terror, the severe criticism of the regime's anti-democratic measures by the former was commendable<sup>84</sup>. Indeed, their democratic-moral stance was capitalized by the opposition which chose to organizationally reform itself- for instance, the PPP, to avoid the PPO-wrath, transformed into PPP-P (Parliamentarians). Nevertheless, the anti-regime political parties preferred participatory politics to gain enough political space to challenge the principal from within the parliament. Therefore, they took part in the October 2002 elections which were rigged in all respects. Following are given NA results:

**Table 34 2002 Election: National Assembly Results**

Party	Seats			
	General	Women	Minorities	Total
PML-Q	92	22	4	118
PPP-P	63	15	2	80
MMA	47	12	2	61
PML-N	15	3	1	19
MQM	13	3	1	17
NA	13	3	0	16
PML-F	4	1	0	5
PML-J	2	1	0	3
PPP-S	2	0	0	2
FATA	12	0	0	12
Independents	1	0	0	1
Others*	8	0	0	8
<b>Total</b>	<b>272</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>342</b>

\* Others include one seat each for BNP, JWP, PAT, PML-Z, PTI, MQM-H, PKMAP and PPP-SB  
Source: Election Commission of Pakistan

<sup>84</sup> Human Rights Watch World Report 2002. Available from: <http://www.hrw.org/wr2k2/asia9.html>

As the Table informs the electorate gave a mixed-mandate. The PPP-P and PML-N despite their top leadership in exiled, remained able to pose a challenge to the PML-Q. The MMA, which grossly benefited from the absence of PML-N and anti-Americanism, came as an electoral novelty. Nonetheless, the process of rigging continued in the post-poll period whereby rules of the game were hurriedly relaxed to accommodate Zafrullah Jamail, who had served as CM in the past, to possibly assume premiership. Moreover, the intelligence apparatuses were utilized to obtain defections and bait the independents to be able to form a pro-principal civilian government. Therefore, as a result of strategic interaction between the principal military and a section of working politicians- 10 PPP-P men changed loyalties at the critical juncture-, a civilianized regime came in the limelight under ‘one-vote-majority’ prime ministership of Jamali on 21 November 2002. His guardian-party, the PML-Q, entered into a coalition with MMA-MQM in the centre. In the Punjab, the PML-Q had enough majority to form its own government. In Sindh, MQM-PML-Q was able to join ranks. In NWFP and Balochistan MMA remained at the forefront.

Not unsurprisingly then, the opposition benches were occupied by vociferous PML-N and PPP-P. In this respect, the *Newsline* commented

Barely six months after the elections, the parliament is in crisis, paralyzed in a dispute over the legitimacy of Musharraf’s presidency and the contentious Legal Framework Order. Day after day, the National Assembly resounded with chants of “Go Musharraf, go,” from the opposition members, who drowned out the government benches, creating an unprecedented spectacle in the house. They stood thumping their desks with leather files, shouting: “No to the illegal amendments.” The rumpus invariably forced the Speaker to adjourn the session after a few minutes. The opposition’s decision not to let a president in military uniform address the joint session of parliament has blocked any serious parliamentary business... But there are no signs of any breakthrough. General Musharraf has firmly refused to give up his powers or quit his position as army chief, while an increasingly defiant opposition is clearly in no mood to soften its position on the issue.

(*Newsline* 2003)

In the following months, however, intra-coalition divergences of preferences over the issue of LFO and uniformed president became intensive. The MMA, in order to maximize itself politico-economically, opted to pressurize the PML-Q leadership (Hussain 2003). The

president, on his part, gave vent of imposing presidential rule in case the working politicians attempted to shirk.

However, rationality prevailed at the end of day and their preferences converged in terms of passage of 17<sup>th</sup> Amendment. *The Friday Times*' editorial is insightful in this regard:

After one fitful year of stop-go threats and negotiations, General Pervez Musharraf has finally obtained the consent of most members of Parliament to be president of Pakistan. In exchange, the MMA has got his agreement to give up the post of army chief within the year. He has compelled the MMA to agree that the LFO was a part of the constitution. But the MMA has forced him to dilute his discretionary powers as president. He has secured a formal degree of longevity for his cherished local bodies system. In the bargain, the MMA has ensured that the judges of the superior courts (those who supported General Musharraf) will not serve a day longer than their original tenure. And so on. The net result is that the yearlong LFO-deadlock in parliament is over.

*(The Friday Times 2004)*

However, when the deadline of 30 December 2004 approached, the uniformed president and the leader of the principal accorded more preference to uniform than the parliament. He chose to back off. Interestingly, his political allies also backed off; they opted for power and privileges than parting for the sake of their people. Moreover, in October 2007 when the president urged upon them to re-elect him they rationally did the job one way or the other. However, the military man's re-election from the almost expired assemblies was challenged in the country's Supreme Court- this shall be explained later in the chapter.

To summarize, the military regime's efforts in terms of arbitrarily promulgation of PPO and LFO, rigged referendum and October elections, usage of intelligence apparatuses to coercively cause defections, legislation of LFO, violation of the 17<sup>th</sup> Amendment and re-election from expired assemblies are empirical evidences to posit that the above-stated efforts at democratization were infact conscious attempts at de-democratization. Thus, it points to negative correspondence between the two variables; namely, coup and democratization. Moreover, the former highlights agency and rationality of the principal military which accorded more preference to its own interests. Also, the analysis marks

agency and rationality of a section of politicians that preferred working to shirking to accrue political and economic benefits.

#### **7.2.4 Securitization Variable**

As explained in the last chapter, Pakistan and India had fought a war in Kargil which came to an end in late summer 1999. By any standard of war studies, it was a limited war initiated by Islamabad with the aim to paradoxically localize the conflict militarily and internationalize it diplomatically. However, the objectives remained unfulfilled. Importantly, the two countries agreed to withdraw their troops to pre-war position. Also, there was a pronounced commitment by the two sides to observe the sanctity of LOC and international border. Therefore, this evidence is enough to maintain that in pre-coup and post-Kargil period<sup>85</sup> there was no external security threat to Pakistan from anywhere. Similarly, there is lack of any evidence of any internal security threat to the state of Pakistan. Importantly, if evidence is our guide, then there is also absence of any post-coup external/internal security threat. Had there been any the principal military would have been fighting it than legitimizing its coup.

Instead, history witnessed the visit of General-CEO-President Musharraf to Agra (India) in July 2001. The way the military tried to normalize with India in the post-coup period is an obvious indication of its political approach towards the (re)solution of bilateral issues. Here, an important point which surfaces is: what is the moral, if not strategic, ground then to criticize, if not degrade, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif when they tried to normalize with New Delhi? Regardless, Musharraf-led military's position over Kashmir also registered a sea-change. The uniformed president of Pakistan time and again propagated a beyond-UNO approach over the issue. In the words of a Pakistani international law expert

Musharraf appears to be a man in a great hurry. He seems to believe that now is the time for a deal on Kashmir favorable to Pakistan, as India is destined to become a global player before long. He does not trust future generations or the forces of history to deliver a verdict favorable to Pakistan or Kashmiris. Under him, Pakistan also appears to suffer from some kind of ennui on Kashmir, as if the burden of struggle for the Kashmiris' right of self-determination has been too exhausting to continue. Perhaps these factors explain Musharraf's numerous gratuitous concessions to India, particularly on UN resolutions. They also seem to inspire his latest offer to surrender

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<sup>85</sup> The 2001-2002 India-Pakistan military stand-off was direct consequence of a militant attack on India's parliament on 13 December 2001. Nevertheless, it never led to any armed conflict between the two states.

claim on Kashmir in return for large autonomy. In this backdrop, India deserves to be commended for conducting a relentless and ruthless campaign to bring Pakistan to its knees. The question is whether history will remember Musharraf conducting the Kargil misadventure twice.

(Hussain 2006)

What can be asked in light of the above is why the politicians are singled out when it comes to India-Pakistan relations? Why the former is labeled as anti-state elements whereby the military's leaders are projected as diehard nationalists? Nonetheless, it was in the post-coup or precisely post-9/11 period that the unprecedented internal security threat to the state of Pakistan emerged at the hands of none others but the military-created militants of the 1980s. Ironically, the militants decided to take their very masters on when the latter rationally allied with the US-led coalition against terrorism post 9/11. Following is an excerpt from President-General Musharraf's address to the nation in this respect:

**Box 7.6 Excerpts from President-General Pervez Musharraf's Address to the Nation, 12 January 2002<sup>86</sup>**

As you would remember, ever since I assumed office, I launched a campaign to rid the society of extremism, violence and terrorism and strived to project Islam in its true perspective. In my first speech on October 17, 1999, I had said and I quote; "Islam teaches tolerance, not hatred; universal brotherhood, not enmity; peace, and not violence. I have great respect for the Ulema and expect them to come forward and present Islam in its true light. I urge them to curb elements which are exploiting religion for vested interests and bringing a bad name to our faith". After this, I initiated a number of steps in this regard. First, in the year 2000, I started interacting with the Taliban and counseled them to inculcate tolerance and bring moderation in their ways. I also told them that those terrorists who were involved in terrorist acts in Pakistan and seeking refuge in Afghanistan should be returned to us. Unfortunately, *we did not succeed*. [italics mine]

The text is self-evident of the military's failure to bring terrorists and religious extremists to book. Moreover, in certain areas- Swat and Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) are cases in point- it seemed that the principal was politicizing the human tragedies- the politics of Red Mosque shall be explained later in the chapter. The question that a majority of the victimized and terrified Pakistanis frequently asked was: why the modernizing military preferred inaction

<sup>86</sup> <http://presidentmusharraf.wordpress.com/2007/04/01/address-12-january-2002/>



over action when the militants were wreaking havoc in, for instance, Swat and Islamabad- the capital? Pervez Hoodbhay, a physicist by training, vehemently commented that

the state has retreated before the Taliban in Swat. It did not do the things it could have easily done. It could have applied a helicopter, of which we have many, with a direction-finder [system] to locate even the mobile FM radio station of the Taliban. Or the army could have used a jammer for this purpose. After all, ducks are traced through ‘triangulation’. As a scientist, I am at loss why radio transmitter of max.100-200 watts could not be traced and jammed. I think it depends on motive and intention which was not there.<sup>87</sup>

Moreover, the internal security situation was less than stable in the FATA region. Importantly, people in the metropolitans such as Lahore came under constant terrorists attacks- often suicide ones. Interestingly, the military and its intelligence apparatuses i.e. ISI, was also targeted along with the police and other civil departments -see the Table below.

**Table 35 Annual Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan: 2003-2007**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Civilians</b>	<b>Security Force Personnel</b>	<b>Terrorists/ Insurgents</b>	<b>Total</b>
2003	140	24	25	189
2004	435	184	244	863
2005	430	81	137	648
2006	608	325	538	1471
2007*	937	455	1041	2433

\* Data till October 2007

Source: South Asia Terrorism Portal<sup>88</sup>

As the Table shows the principal military, which had vociferously claimed to securitize the nation, remained unable to provide security to the civilian population if not its own personnel. Therefore, in the light of the foregoing explanation it is posited that the securitization variable is empirically unable to mark positive correspondence with the coup.

<sup>87</sup> Hoodbhay shared his views in a television program called *Capital Talk* on 23 February 2009. The views were expressed in Urdu except the terms used. Therefore, they are transcribed by the author. The program video is available from: <http://www.awaz.tv/playvideo.asp?pageId=2407>

<sup>88</sup> [www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/casualties.htm](http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/casualties.htm)

### 7.3 Military Agency: Causing the Coup

As the preceding sections make it empirically evident that the October coup could not be ascribed to any of the conceptual variables since the positive correspondence was empirically unfounded. In other words, the answer to the coup-cause is still at large, for even the structural, conspiratorial, path dependency-historical institutionalism and generalist perspectives remain unable to explain the phenomenon empirically and theoretically- as was explained in Chapter 2. For instance, if the military was structurally dominant in politics then why did it take the pains to stage coup, abrogate the constitution, publicize new rules of the game, attempt factionalization, hold referendum and elections to seek popular legitimacy, negotiate indemnity with the politicians etc?

In addition, the Milbus hypothesis, empirically, is also unable to explain the coup and consequent direct military intervention in politics. Instead, it helps complicate the matter. For instance, if the military was already doing Milbus sans any accountability by the politicians why did it feel the need to sack the incapacitated agent? Interestingly enough, had the military become an independent socio-economic class as well as a part of the *ruling elite*, as this thesis postulates, then why did it punish the same class in terms of sacking, arresting, beating and often forcibly exiling its fellow comrades- Sharif's person is a case in point? The same comes true to the path-dependent and generalist rhetoric. As regards the conspiracy theories, they got little empirical to support their claim- indeed President Clinton's visit to South Asia should be an eye-opener to conspiracy theorists.

Thus, quite contrary to the existing body of literature it is posited that the October coup was a result of military's agency. Having calculated the shirking politicians'- and for that matter other agents, namely, civil bureaucracy and the judiciary- strengths and weakness, the rational military saw to its own interests and preferred to stage coup, thus marking her agency. In other words, the coup was rational in nature which aimed at capturing the political power from the PM/shirking politicians to be able to politically deal with the shirkers in terms of re-negotiating rules of the game which had been being amended constitutionally/formally in favor of the politicians. Under the amended rules of the game the PM, or better the politicians, had constitutional prerogatives to appoint the services chiefs. In this respect, the military institution rationally perceived the shirking politicians a potential threat to their long term political and economic interests. This development was a serious politico-constitutional blow to the military which, as is already empirically explained, was

able to maintain her principalship institutionally, strategically and economically. Besides, the additional aim of the coup was to depoliticize the political and parliamentary institutions i.e. political parties, legislature etc., for the strength of the military, as explained in Chapter 6, lies in the weaknesses of political institutions and actors.

Thus, the coup characterized political interests of the principal military which, while preferring its own to larger/national interests, abrogated the constitution, sacked an elected prime minister, dissolved assemblies and issued its own rules in terms of Provisional Constitutional Order. Nevertheless, as per our hypothesis, the act of coup highlights military's political weakness rather than strength. For had it been politically dominant then it would have been able to resolve the matters politically in terms of strategically interacting with the shirking section of agent politicians- as indeed the former was able to do when the then PM Sharif and President Ishaq, after the former's restoration by the judiciary, chose to resign, though rationally.

Last but not least, the assumption of direct political power, as hypothesized, further facilitates military's economic interests. However, in order to test this hypothesis, the following section empirically explains the linkage between political power and the military's economic interests.

### **7.3.1 Maximizing Economic Interests**

Having staged a successful coup d'état the military was not only able to further consolidate its principalship but also protect and promote its economic interests sans any fear of accountability. To begin with, the Army Welfare Trust was able to launch its Askari Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) Project in 2002<sup>89</sup>. The project aimed to provide safe, efficient and reliable CNG to its valued customers. Also, in the same year, the AWT's bank- Askari Bank Ltd.- boasted of declared assets worth Rs. 70 billion approximately. Its non-performing loans (NPL) stood around 4 percent of the total NPL of private-sector banks. Moreover, the AWT's leasing and insurance companies also recorded positive turnover due primarily to the support provided by the Askari bank which, in turn, got financial support by the army along with armed clientele. The Bank also provided financial help to businesses in the finance sector which included SF's insurance business. Moreover, the AWT ventured in

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<sup>89</sup> [http://www.awt.com.pk/bs.php?id=31&sec\\_id=14](http://www.awt.com.pk/bs.php?id=31&sec_id=14).

small-scale enterprises in terms of the Blue Lagoon restaurant and a marriage hall. These projects were opened on state land (Siddiqi 2007:156-158) In addition, the Trust was able to set up the Askari Education Board (AEB) to conduct examinations for its educational institutions. The AEB and the military-run educational institutions are elitist in nature and run parallel to state-run Urdu-vernacular medium educational system and the *madrasa* education.

Besides, the AWT acted as military-sponsored realtor. The Trust enjoyed along with the Navy's BF two housing schemes in Karachi, Lahore and Rawalpindi/Islamabad each. Moreover, the Trust was entrusted with 'grabbed land' worth Rs. 4 billion by the military regime led by Pervez Musharraf. Last but not least, the AWT was accused of land grabbing (4,000 acres) by the villagers of Niazian, Hummak, Sihala and Dhok Kanial- all fall in the administrative district of Islamabad. Indeed, the affectees filed a writ petition in the Rawalpindi Bench of the Lahore High Court.

Interestingly, the High Court decided the case in the AWT's favor, upholding the acquisition as being 'in the national and defense interests of the country'. This is an odd judgment considering that the AWT is registered as a welfare foundation and claims to be operating in the private sector. This was a case of the army using its authority to benefit a private venture and a select group of officers at the risk of harming the interests of the general public. The Supreme Court, however, overturned the High Court's decision and asked the AWT to compensate the villagers. While these villagers had the sense and the will to move the superior court, there are many in cases in the country where the military had not paid any compensation.

(ibid 2007:199)

Overall, the AWT ran 41 independent projects; out of all it enjoyed shareholdings in about 13 projects whereas the rest were owned by it completely. Importantly, only five of these projects were listed with the stock exchange. Nevertheless, the Trust boasted of possessing assets worth Rs.50 billion (US\$862.1 million) and employing around 5,000 ex-services men (ibid 122).

As regards the Frontier Works Organization, it was able to further expand its business activities. Since the organization undertook a huge number of multi-dimensional projects, therefore the analysis sticks to a few major ones. To being with, in 2004 the FWO was able to

form its own subsidiary- LAFCO- mandated to make private-sector partnership for the construction of a 115.5 km Lahore-Sheikhupura-Faisalabad dual carriageway.

Reportedly, the partnership was necessary to facilitate successful bidding for the project. The FWO did not have all the equipment to prove that it could undertake the project on its own, and hence it partnered with a few big domestic construction companies including the Habib Rafique group and Sacchal Construction. This partnership also indicates that by 2004 the military companies had become more confident of their role in the economy and their acceptability by other domestic players in business.

(ibid:171)

This project was inaugurated by President-General Musharraf on 11 November 2006 and the stated construction cost stood at Rs. 6100 millions. Furthermore, the Organization undertook the construction of 124 km D.I.Khan-Mughalkot Road in March 2000. The project got completed in June 2007 at the cost of Rs. 2,297 millions. On 26 November 2000, Musharraf inaugurated the construction project of Barian-Nathiagali-Abbotabad-Road with a 'price tag' of Rs. 1.5 billion. President-General Pervez Musharraf was also called upon to inaugurate the 650 km Makran Coastal Highway project on 16 December 2004. The project cost Rs. 7720.30 million.<sup>90</sup>

In addition, in the post-earthquake 'rehabilitation' period, the FWO got engaged in the so called Earthquake Damaged Road Projects- indeed three projects with estimated cost of Rs. 4.833 billion. In Balochistan in April 2006, a 68.73 km road project- Gwadar-Pleri-Jiwani-Gabd Section- started at the estimated cost of Rs. 2487.034 million; this project was awarded by the NHA to the Organization. Importantly, the FWO was able to get Torkham-Jalalabad Road Project from the National Highway Authority (NHA) in May 2005. The agent PM Shaukat Aziz and Afghan President, Hamid Karzai, jointly inaugurated this 75 km road project on 13 September 2006. With respect to Iran, the Construction of Lakpass Tunnel- 180 meter in length with an approach road of 5.05 km- was undertaken by the FWO in June 2006 at the estimated cost of Rs. 932.153 million. Besides the road construction projects, the army-led FWO also engaged in the projects of construction of embankment and concrete structures

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<sup>90</sup> <http://fwo.com.pk/others.php?page=2&type=brochure>.

(bridges) from Khanewal to Raiwind. The length of this track was 256 km. The work commenced on August 2006 at the estimated cost of Rs. 760.274 million.<sup>91</sup>

Similarly, the National Logistics Cell was influential enough to acquire state land in Malir, Karachi. It also purchased railways land for the construction of a commercial place in partnership with a Qatar-based private investor. Moreover, the Cell engaged, since 1999, in the ‘tolling operations’ in ‘partnership’ with the NHA. The latter’s council (NHC)<sup>92</sup> was

previously headed by the Prime Minister of Pakistan. In July 2001, the provisions of the NHA Act, 1991 were amended by the GoP [the principal military] and the NHC was re-constituted. The revised composition [included among others]...A Professional in the field of Highway Construction and Management (nominated by the President) [and]...A Professional in the field of Finance & Accounts (nominated by the President).

Interestingly, despite the re-constituted composition according to which the Minister for Communications (GoP) was to be its ‘president’, the NHC(A) was, indeed, headed by a retired Maj.-General. Also, since 2003 the NLC started ‘tyre re-treading’ plant named Polymers. The NLC polymers claimed to have manufacturing facilities that ‘specializes in automotive rubber and plastics products’.<sup>93</sup>

As mentioned before the AWT had invested in education sector too. Similarly, the Bahria Foundation invested in the same sector. Indeed, the Foundation was able to get passed the Bahria University Ordinance in February 2000 which helped it to establish a university – Bahria University whose BoG’s chairman is the serving admiral of PN- and a chain college across the country. Furthermore, the BF along with the AWT ran two housing schemes in each of the big cities of Lahore, Rawalpindi/Islamabad and Karachi. This project was a joint-venture with a private investor. Therefore, the navy came up with its independent scheme-anchorage. Interestingly, the Bahria scheme used navy’s logo and blue emblem which were legally prohibited. Importantly, the basis for the housing schemes was provided by the Lahore Cantonment Cooperative Housing Society Ltd which was taken over and ‘converted’ into an authority directly controlled by the army. Interestingly, the takeover was carried out

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<sup>91</sup> <http://fwo.com.pk/others.php?page=2&type=brochure>.

<sup>92</sup> <http://www.nha.gov.pk>

<sup>93</sup> NLC Report 2009. Available from: <http://www.nlc.com.pk/website.nsf/publication.html>

through a Presidential Order issued by President-General Pervez Musharraf. The Presidential Order became a part of the constitution through the 17<sup>th</sup> Amendment (Siddiqi 2007:159,194).

Last but not least, the FF and SF also continued with their respective economic activities. For instance, the latter was able to establish its university- Air University- in 2002. The chairman of its BoG is the serving air chief marshal.<sup>94</sup> Overall, the organization ran about 14 independent projects none of which was listed with the stock exchange. Moreover, its claimed assets stood at Rs.2 billion (US\$34.4 million). The FF, on its part, also continued with its expansionist agenda. For example, it enjoyed the ownership of a ‘farm’ in Nukerji (Sindh). The 2,498 acres farm is located in the vicinity of its sugar mills and is instrumental to experiment new varieties of sugar cane. The FF, overall, took pride in running around 25 independent projects of which only fertilizer and cement factories were listed with the stock exchange. Its total declared assets amounted to Rs. 9.8 billion (US\$169 million) (ibid:119-124).

Besides the afore-mentioned construction, manufacturing, transportation and tolling, real estate etc., enterprises, the principal military also continued engaging in state-land acquisition, often coercively. For instance, the army’s attempts, in 2001 in Okara farms, to change the system of contract from share-cropping to rent-in cash vis-à-vis the poor peasants led to a violent conflict between the armed and armless parties. As a result, eight innocent people lost their lives. Moreover, in 2003, according to a parliamentary debate the army arbitrarily converted some camping grounds into golf courses. In Nowshera in NWFP, land used for ‘firing range’ was transformed into a citrus farm. In addition, in 2005, the MoD acquired 1,165 acres of land at lower price of Rs.40 per square yard for ‘official purposes’. Later, 1,085 acres got allotted by the federal government in the same area at Rs. 150 per square yard. This land acquisition was meant for the construction of military headquarters as well as officers’ residences, schools and markets etc. In more or less the same manner, the PN arbitrarily took land of poor villagers and a floating jetty along with its land in Mubarik and Yunisabad in Sindh respectively (Ibid:177).

In addition, the military especially its top brass continued with its policy of state land ‘conversion’ for personal-private purposes. For instance, in 2000

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<sup>94</sup> [http://www.au.edu.pk/board\\_of\\_governor.aspx](http://www.au.edu.pk/board_of_governor.aspx)

the army gave a 1,200 sq yd plot in Lahore Cantonment to its two top generals, Lt.-General Khalid Maqbool and Lt.-General Mohammad Amjad. While Maqbool was subsequently made governor of the Punjab, Amjad got a job as head of the National Accountability Bureau, and later as MD of the FF. According to a report submitted by the MoD to the senate in 2003, about 78,292 sq yd or 16.3 acres (a total of 130 residential plots) were given to an equal number of officers in different cities in the period from October 1999 to 2003. The locations included the cities of Karachi, Lahore and Rawalpindi, and smaller towns such as Kharian and Jhelum. The officers' ranks varied from full general to captain... However, these figures do not show the full extent of the land grab in Lahore. The cantonment area, which up until the early 1980s comprised a large segment of army training grounds and firing ranges, has almost entirely been converted into a residential area... [Also] the award of rural and urban properties added to the worth of the senior generals. As a result a typical maj.-general is worth Rs. 10 million (US\$172,000) and a Lt.-general Rs. 50 million (US\$860,000). However, as a result of the involvement of senior generals in real estate development such as Lt.-General Zarrar Azeem... the typical value of a senior general has escalated to Rs. 100 million (US\$1.72 million).

(ibid:188-189)

Last but not least, Lt.-General Tauqeer Zia, corps commander Mangla and the chairman Pakistan Cricket Control Board (PCCB), was able to transfer certain portions of Karachi National Stadium to Karachi Cantonment Authorities for 'further transfer to senior officers'. This move brought quick economic returns- barely an investment of Rs.0.6 million (US\$100,000) brought a profit of Rs.15 million (US\$258,000) in a period of less than 90 days. Importantly, President-General Pervez Musharraf himself bought a farmland worth approximately Rs.40 million (US\$690,000) in Islamabad. Also, Musharraf owned around eight properties including 2,000 sq yd of land in DHA (Karachi), a 1,200 sq yd plot (Morgah, Rawalpindi), a 900 sq yd plot (Peshawar), 600 sq yd (Eastidge, Rawalpindi), 12,00 sq yd (Gwadar, Balochistan) and 50 acres of agricultural land (Bahawalpur). In sum, the total estimated worth of his disclosed assets was around Rs.600 million (US\$ 10.34 million) by 2005 (ibid:190-193).

Thus, in light of the foregoing it is suffice to maintain- indeed in the support of our hypothesis- that the post-coup direct assumption of political power by the military was



instrumental to maximize its economic interests more confidently and without any threat of accountability. The analysis also showed that during this period a section of agent politicians rationally, and not structurally, allied with the principal military to accrue economic benefits.

#### **7.4 Actors and Agency: Explaining the Fifth Coup**

As is obvious from the last section, the military was ably maintaining its principalship: it was engaged in the economy as an independent actor; it was institutionally modernized as compared with the state's other institutions. Importantly, it was politically powerful vis-à-vis the agent politicians a section of which was rationally collaborating with it. Moreover, there was no threat to either its economic or political interests from the other two agents- the civil bureaucracy, which as is mentioned before, was punished in terms of reform measures, and the judiciary which had judicially legitimized the coup.

Nevertheless, the actors in politics normally base their action on preferences which are the outcome of inherent human interests. As far as the cognition of interests and the realization and formation of preferences/choices is concerned, the rational actor(s) is usually able to take into consideration the relevant information vis-à-vis the concerned actor(s). Often, in today's world of technological advancement, the strategy of the concerned actor could be perceived through a strategically interactive process if not comprehensively made to know. However, this may not be the same as regards the outcome of human actions or policies. Given the multiplicity of intervening variables, it may contextually be difficult, if not altogether impossible, to determine an action's outcome. In other words, in politics there are, at times, political situations where the consequences of a certain choice-based act could be unintended.

If the inferential output of the above-mentioned is assumed as a point of reference and departure, then the significance and impact of certain actions by the military under Musharraf could be analyzed. To begin with, the regime having taken an egoistic view of itself in terms of a modernizer opted to capitalize the innovative aspect of communicational technology. As explained earlier in the chapter, it invested in media business to make profit. No wonder then, Pakistan witnessed an unprecedented proliferation of privately owned TV channels and even FM radio station. This media-promotion move of the military had political dimension too. The principal had a strategy to publicize the positives of its principalship- the increase in women's seats, the separate electorate, its cultural policy etc. Regardless of the former's performance on the screen, the reception of this telecast by the common man was altogether

different since the opposition and civil society organization left no stone unturned to turn the military's positives into negatives. To add insult to injury, the ineffective economic policies of the regime fell short of the mark. Therefore, there is a high probability that the affected sections of society would have accorded one more choice to their respective set to confront the regime given an opportunity.

Surprisingly, the opportunity came as one of the indented consequences of the military's action: media proliferation. It so happened that on 9 March 2007 the principal called on the chief justice of the agent Supreme Court in its headquarters and ordered him to resign in the best interests of the principal. The *Newsline* wrote

It was supposed to be a typical commando action: flatten the target with overwhelming speed and force, allowing zero response time. But like most such planning, simulated in excited imagination in isolation from slippery realities, it all went wrong. Terribly wrong. Chief Justice of Pakistan (CJP) Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, though shell-shocked and shaken, held his ground in the intimidating environment of General Pervez Musharraf's camp office...Then Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz was brought in by the president's military secretary to add to the effect of the incredible demand of resignation and to show that everyone- government, military, intelligence agencies- wanted him to step down...Sources close to him have told *Newsline* that Justice Chaudhry simply wanted to get out of the camp office, which he described as a "temporary jail"...Indeed the media strategy for the anticipated resignation was planned on the assumption that the chief justice was history. An obsequious Justice Chaudhry meeting the mighty General Musharraf wearing khaki (the ultimate statement of his power) was filmed by government-controlled television and the official photographer, and then released to the media...Once out of the confines...he [CJ] made a few calls to his close lawyer friends at the Supreme Court Bar and the Lahore Bar telling them that a coup against him was unfolding...Chief Justice Chaudhry, who was supposed to be resting in oblivion, is swooning in the glory of a savior with the kind of spontaneous backing and support from the public that can easily be the envy of many an elected leader.

(*Newsline* 2007)

What can be deduced from the foregoing is: a) the principal, in a blatant show of its power, ordered the agent CJ to resign; b) the state media was placed to capture the proceedings; c)

the CJ- who, interestingly, had taken oath under the PCO- shirked and registered his, if not his institution's, agency; d) the privately owned media, in order to make profit, chose to sensationalize the story; e) the economically affected and de-securitized people chose to rationally, not structurally, capitalize the opportunity in terms of agitational politics and sided with the lawyers' community which, in the presence of political parties' deactivation, emerged as a potential social force. Despite this show of power, however the question that arises is why did Musharraf, the leader of the principal, feel the need to arbitrarily remove the CJ?

**Box 7.7 The Reasons behind Chief Justice Chaudhry's Dismissal**

The Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry had somehow started to take *suo moto* to provide relief to especially the lower strata of the society. We do not know how this change of behavior occurred since he was among those judges who had taken oath under the PCO; perhaps he might have come to know the poor's plight through media. Anyways, he judged many issues in favor of the country: for example, cancellation of the Steel Mills privatization, the New Murree Project, the Golf Club plan in Islamabad on a public park. Moreover, he did take notice of police's high-handedness and missing persons. In each of these cases, the non-parliamentary forces were involved to further grow economically, but sadly at the expense of the nation. However, despite all this, the most important factor behind his dismissal was his remarks about duality of office which Musharraf enjoyed at will. The latter [thus] sacked him.

A 30 year old young journalist, experiencing in electronic journalism, expressed these views with the author in Lahore in March 2008.

Nevertheless, in the post-9 March period, Pakistan observed some unprecedented developments. The chief justice of a traditionally agent judiciary was accorded a hero's welcome wherever he went. For instance, his caravan took 26 hours from Islamabad to reach Lahore- normally it hardly takes three hours. The CJ opted to selectively address the country's bars in order to create awareness of 'rule of law' among not only his lawyers community but also the masses. The private media also allied with the CJ due to both material and non-material factors. What role did the media play in Pakistan's politics especially after the event of 9 March?

**Box 7.8 The Contextual Constraints on the Freedom of the Media**

Up till the advent of 21<sup>st</sup> century [the] media in Pakistan has been serving the interests of the government, both military and democratic [civilian]. With the spread of private media channels the *accountability* of politicians and bureaucrats has been made possible to some extent...[It] is playing a significant role in making the public opinion and highlighting the popular perception. The Media's popularity lies in its outright crispy opposition to the government so public awareness is in progress regarding the constitutional development, political insight and institutional reforms in the country. [Despite this, it] has to bear the pressure of ideology, popular mindset of the masses- particularly in the case of religious issues and social taboos-, interests of the state, foreign countries (like Saudi Arabia) and market forces.

Interview with Abdur-Rauf, Senior Journalist, Anchor and Director Infotainment, GEO TV. Lahore: 10 September 2009.

As the above-mentioned informs, the media had emerged as an important factor at the political scene of Pakistan. However, it has yet to assume the role of an influential political actor on its own. Moreover, suppose it assumes such a character(istics) in the future, even then its credentials would be suspected due to its political affiliations with specific politicians and political parties. In addition, theoretically, what maximum media, both print and electronic, can do in Pakistan's context is to provide people with a variety of perspectives on a variety of issues. It is, hence, up to a common man whether, as a rational actor, (s)he takes its input into consideration or otherwise. In other words, the narratives of public opinion formation and governments dismissals by the media is a structural construct which dangerously compromises the actors' agency and rationality.

Nonetheless, the media opted to cover the CJ's visits and address to primarily maximize its economic returns. The masses, on their part, prioritized to side with CJ in the hope that if restored he would deliver more to them. The political parties allied with their cause politically. Importantly, a section of lawyers, which belonged to specific political parties, had a political reason to affiliate with its community. However, it was, as shall be explained later, primarily a legal cause which was taken as a larger interest by a variety of actors who strategically got united and posed a serious political and legal challenge to the principal military. The latter, on its part, accorded more weightage to a military rather than a political approach to the problem. It started a crackdown of the very media which it claimed to have planted. Apparently, the Musharraf-led military was unhappy the way the private channels

covered simultaneously the merry-making of Musharraf in Islamabad and mayhem in Karachi on 12 May<sup>95</sup>. However, the underlying factor was to stop the media from projecting the judiciary's cause. The *Newsline* commented

General Musharraf now stands isolated. The May 12 events have been a major blow to whatever was left of the government's legitimacy. There are now widespread demands for Musharraf to hang up his uniform and give up power. Hedging his bets on the support of the military and the continued embrace of Washington, the president has refused to bow out. Instead, he has decided to use coercion to suppress dissent. The restrictions on private TV channels to air live programmes and talk shows are just the beginning. There is a strong indication of the government imposing a state of emergency to prevent protests and political rallies.

(*Newsline* 2007)

It was not just one magazine which took a critical note of military's encroachment on the media. The country's other independently minded media groups also opted to criticize the regime on empirical grounds. For example, *The Friday Times* observed

President Pervez Musharraf has taken three steps in one week which suggest the unraveling of his regime. He has tried to gag the media by a new ordinance so that the truth doesn't get out, a reversal of a long standing good policy that had earned him high marks. He has roped in his corps commanders to signal that the army stands behind him, a veiled threat that he had consciously chosen not to make earlier because he didn't want to drag the army into everyday mundane politics. And he has called a meeting of the National Security Council to send the signal that his decisions have the sanction of state security...The PEMRA [Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority] ordinance is obnoxious. It imposes pre-censorship, a device reminiscent of martial law eras.

(*The Friday Times* 2007)

However despite the regime's anti-media and anti-democracy measures, the journalists and lawyers' community had a preference for agitational politics. In this regard, they suffered even physical punishment but they were, by and large, to stand united in the face of military authoritarianism supported by personalistic politicians who, on their part, faced a political

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<sup>95</sup> 34 people were killed and over 100 injured in riots in Karachi on 12 May 2007.

dilemma. If they continued to ally with the military then the cost was high since the common man took a collectivist view of it; if they shirked, there cost was a higher cost to pay since the opposition especially PML-N was already taking it on. Contextually, the working politicians prioritized the continuation of alliance with the principal in order to possibly thwart GHQ's negotiations with self-exiled Benazir Bhutto- indeed Sharif was also pursued in this respect. Yet, the policy-differences between working politicians especially PML-Q and the military started to surface especially over the issue of Lal Masjid which was besieged by the religious extremists- an objective indicator of authoritarian clergy's influence- during the first half of July 2007. The besiege of Lal Masjid raised many questions; for example, why was the military not able to securitize the seat of its own political power?

**Box 7.9 The Cost of 'Strategic Depth' Strategy**

The military views- at least since the Zia days- a section of clergy instrumental for the application of its 'strategic depth' strategy. However, the cost is born by the common man. The Lal Masjid is one such example. It was prolonged to politico-strategically sabotage the Chief Justice issue...I myself was not allowed to launch my book in the Islamabad Press Club; the aim of the saboteurs was the same: to make a story out of it. They, at the end of the day, failed on both counts.

Interview with Ayesha Siddiqa, Military Analyst. Heidelberg: 1 July 2009.

Nevertheless, the military resorted to military means to end the siege when the extremists started attacking and killing the latter's personnel. Hence rationality prevailed. Thus, the latter having calculated the political cost of confrontation with journalists-lawyers-opposition politicians decided, on 20 July 2007, to restore the deposed Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry. At last, his suo motes were thought to be less costly than his off-bench addresses and (long) marches.

Little wonder then, in the post-restoration period, the process of suo-motes got re-activated, for the regime along with civilian face had failed to provide any sort of socio-economic relief to the common man- this shall be explained later in the chapter. Importantly, the case of suo-motes is significant in more than one respect: first, it marks the judiciary's agency- it was able to shirk; secondly, the judiciary and the opposition politicians, and civil society for that matter, accorded more preference to the larger than own interest; thirdly, being a rational actor it was able to link its own interests, as political parties and politicians often do, to a

larger and/or national one whose politico-legal implications were negative for the principal military and its allied section of agents.

Nonetheless, the military minds had a strategy of their own to deal with the restored CJ in the post-restoration period. Hence, they opted to adopt a policy of non-implementation of Supreme Court's orders- the agent civil bureaucracy was instrumental in this respect. In this regard, an interesting case could be the SC's verdict which allowed exiled Nawaz Sharif to return to Pakistan. What fate the Supreme Court's verdict and Sharif met with can be gauged from *The Economist's* following observation:

Nawaz Sharif, a former prime minister of Pakistan, landed in Rawalpindi on September 10th with his head bowed in prayer and his supporters erupting around him. He was back from a seven-year exile to challenge Pervez Musharraf, an army coupster who had toppled and imprisoned him. "Go, Musharraf! Go!" screamed his retinue as Mr Sharif's plane rumbled to a halt. But four hours later it was Mr Sharif who was on the move. In the airport's VIP arrivals lounge he was charged with corruption, arrested and deported to Saudi Arabia.

*(The Economist 2007)*

Obviously, the disgraceful and illegal treatment meted out to Sharif indicated the death of any attempt at negotiations with him or his party. Therefore, Musharraf's diplomatic team turned seriously to Ms Bhutto. For this purpose, the old rivals- BB and Musharraf- were able to secretly negotiate the political future of theirs, if not the country, in Dubai. Arguably, the role of Riyadh/Dubai and Washington, in this regard, is of facilitation since the contours of diplomacy are determined by the domestic political variables. After all, why could not the Arabs and Americans make Sharif or Benazir return to Pakistan in, for instance, 2004, 2005, or pre-9 March 2007? Nonetheless, the BB-Musharraf negotiations were relatively successful. The latter issued a National Reconciliation Order (NRO) on October 5- a day before the presidential election- to remove corruption, misconduct and related charges against Bhutto among others. The former's political support was provided to Musharraf when PPP preferred non-resignation from assemblies. Moreover, the support of old working politicians came handy in this respect.

Regardless of the acclaimed electoral legitimacy from the assemblies, the presidential election was still to obtain judicial legitimacy as the conduct of the 'controversial' exercise was challenged before the shirking CJ Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry. Meanwhile, the

operationalization of NRO helped pave the way for Benazir's return to Pakistan on October 18. The following day she would have felt the difference between 1986 and 2007's Pakistan when she barely escaped a terrorist attack which took the lives of more than 172 people. Interestingly, Bhutto, in her *Reconciliation* (2009), accused the Musharraf-led military for the failure of promised security. However, on the other hand, legal scrutiny for Musharraf's election seemed a slow-go for the principal who had a traditional distaste for legality and constitutionality. Moreover, the opposition politicians were demanding the holding of parliamentary elections as promised in November.

The principal military contextually had a few choices: a) it could have hold general elections to defuse the criticism, but post-election scenario seemed alarming since Bhutto, a seasoned politician, would have become more demanding ; b) Musharraf, as leader of the principal, could have stepped down, but this would have shown the military's political weakness; c) it could have removed the shirking CJ again and replaced it with a pliant one, but given the lawyers' activism it would have added to the problem; d) being principal with coercive power at its disposal, it could have staged a coup to punish the shirking agents along with new rivals the like of media(men) and the lawyers. All choices involved cost.

However, the principal probably saw more benefits in choice d. Instead of patiently waiting for the Supreme Court's verdict, the Musharraf-led military chose to use military means: it staged a coup on November 3, 2007. The military declared it an 'emergency- see Box 7.10 on the next page. However, the media viewed it differently. The *Newsline* observed

It took the entire legal and political community eight years to come to terms with the consequences of his 1999 coup and, even then, the scars that the constitutional deviation left on the system were too deep to ignore. Now that he [Musharraf-led principal] has held the constitution in abeyance, once again, and virtually imposed *martial law*, the legal tangle that this has created will take a long time to sort out. [italics mine]

(*Newsline* 2007)

Nonetheless, with the martial law imposed, the assemblies, which had re-elected Musharraf as president a few weeks ago, were dissolved. However, unprecedentedly in Pakistan's judicial history, on the same day, a seven-member bench- including CJ Iftikhar Chaudhry- of the Supreme Court unanimously judged the military's action invalid.



**Box 7.10 Excerpts from General Musharraf's Proclamation and the Address<sup>96</sup> to the Nation, 3 November 2007**

a) *...there is visible ascendancy in the activities of extremists and incidents of terrorist attacks including suicide bombings, IED [Improvised Explosive Device] explosions, rocket firing and bomb explosions...posing a grave threat to the life and property of the citizens...there has also been a spate of attacks on state infrastructure and on law-enforcement agencies...[However] some members of the judiciary are working at cross purposes with the executive and legislature...there has been increasing interference by some members of the judiciary in government policy, adversely affecting economic growth...the law and order situation in the country as well as the economy have been adversely affected...the Constitution provides no solution for this situation...the situation has been reviewed in meetings with the prime minister, governors of all four provinces, and with Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, Chiefs of the Armed Forces, Vice-Chief of Army Staff and Corps Commanders of the Pakistan Army...I, General Pervez Musharraf, Chief of the Army Staff, proclaim Emergency throughout Pakistan...I, hereby, order and proclaim that the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan shall remain in abeyance. This Proclamation shall come into force at once.*

b) *... I had to take this action in order to preserve the democratic transition which I initiated eight years back... It is this third stage that is being subverted today. And it is this third stage which I want to complete with all my conviction. [italics mine]*

However, their action brought the wrath of the principal with the effect that they were punished: equally unprecedentedly, sixty shirking judges of the higher courts were arrested and thus mentally, if not physically, tortured.

However, a section of judiciary rationally preferred its own to larger interests and thus allied with the military. Therefore, the latter was able to announce and claim a new chief justice- Abdul Hameed Dogar. However, the political parties, the civil society organizations and even the international community morally, if not legally, refused to accord acceptance to such arbitrary measures- as the coup-text shows above- taken by the principal.

<sup>96</sup> General Pervez Musharraf addressed the nation at night after having issued the proclamation. The address- which lasted around 45 minutes - was primarily delivered in Urdu. The address highlighted the problems of law and order, security and economy at length. This section was delivered in English. The text of proclamation and the address is available from <http://presidentmusharraf.wordpress.com/2007/06/02/musharraf-3-nov-emergency/>. The study, for the sake of comprehension, have relied on both the texts.

### 7.5 An Analytic Narrative of the Coup

As is obvious from the text, General Musharraf cited problems of security, law and order and economy to necessitate the coup. Moreover, he claimed that the country was democratizing under his-led military rule. However, since this process was adversely affected by the interference of shirking judiciary, therefore the military would re-start the project of democratization. In order to critically explain these stated reasons/causes of the coup, the following sections tend to conduct an analytic narrative of the coup. The primary objective of the exercise shall be to test the posed hypotheses of the study.

To begin with, the conceptual variables identified in the above-given coup/martial law proclamation are the following:

*A = ...there is visible ascendancy in the activities of extremists and incidents of terrorist attacks including suicide bombings, IED explosions, rocket firing and bomb explosions...posing a grave threat to the life and property of the citizens...there has also been a spate of attacks on state infrastructure and on law-enforcement agencies (securitization variable)*

*B = there has been increasing interference by some members of the judiciary in government policy, adversely affecting economic; the economy have been adversely affected; (economic variable)*

*C = the law and order situation in the country...[has] been adversely affected; (law and order variable)*

*D = I had to take this action in order to preserve the democratic transition which I initiated eight years back... it is this third stage which I want to complete with all my conviction. (democratization variable)*

*E = Emergency [coup/martial law] (policy variable)*

Based on the text, the main causal relations observed are:

1. Pakistan is facing (religious) extremism with the effect that terrorist attacks including suicide bombings have paralyzed public life. The civil administration has failed to provide security to the people. Therefore, in order to securitize the country the military had to declare martial law:  $A \xrightarrow{+} E$  (positive relationship)
2. The country's economy is 'adversely affected' by 'increasing interference' of a section of judiciary in government policy. Hence, the military staged coup to remove such irritants and improve economic situation for the masses:  $B \xrightarrow{+} E$  (positive relationship)
3. The 'increasing interference' by a section of the judiciary has extremely negative impact on the functioning of law-enforcement agencies i.e. police. As a result, the law and order situation has deteriorated to an extent that the writ of the state is at risk.

Therefore, it was necessary to take control of the state and establish its writ in terms of improved law and order:  $C \xrightarrow{+} E$  (positive relationship)

4. The principal military, since October 1999, was working on a project of democratization. However, this process was hampered by the interference of a few from the judiciary. Therefore, it was imperative to remove that section through martial law in order to resume the project of democratization. Indeed its 'third stage' shall be completed :  $D \xrightarrow{+} E$  (positive relationship)

The following observations can be drawn in light of the above:

- The November coup/martial law is justified by General Musharraf-led military on the basis of securitization, problems related to economy as well as law and order;
- Securitization, economic and law and order problems are cited as the major reasons/causes due to their adverse effects on the state if not the society;
- Democratization is cited as complementary reason/cause of the coup;
- The military views the coup/martial law as the only way to deal with such paralyzing problems;
- The principal military has the capacity and determination to fulfill these tasks.

Having stated the empirical evidences for the coup/martial law as cited by military' leader, General Pervez Musharraf, the following four sections shall attempt to explain empirically as well as theoretically the claimed positive correspondence between coup and each of the conceptual variables. In this regard, the study tends to carry on with its earlier sequence of variables to maintain uniformity of style. Hence, law and order rather than securitization is the subject of the next section.

### 7.5.1 Law and Order Variable

As is mentioned in previous four analytic narratives, each military coup maker and the consequent martial law regime invoked problems of law and order, though without giving any definition and indicators of the phenomenon, to ostensibly legitimize the coup and the military rule. Nevertheless, to academically acknowledge or otherwise a coup action and the military rule what we did in the four analytic narratives was to present a statistical analysis of the murders and riots per million population and then concluded a trend of murders and riots accordingly. Importantly, if one re-looks at the findings of law and order variable under the


AN 4, it becomes empirically clear that the Musharraf-led principal military had failed to maintain, let alone improve, the law and order situation as inherited from the Sharif government. Interestingly, the thesis's statistical findings are corroborated by the coupster who had himself, in his November 3 proclamation and the follow-up address to the nation, admitted that the problems of law and order still hanged on. One wonders then why did the leader of the principal, on 3 November 2007, become oblivious to a similar resort to a similar claim on October 13 and 17, 1999? Is it an indication of short memory or long-term strategy? This shall be explained later in the Chapter.

Nonetheless, the above-mentioned empirical evidences are suffice to maintain that the attempts at self-legitimation by Musharraf-led military, on November 3, are totally baseless and preposterous. Moreover, in order to see whether the problems of law and order got solved post-November coup, the study conducted, while operationalizing Mitra's conception of governance, a statistical analysis of murders per million population for the coup year, namely, 2007.<sup>97</sup>

The findings, as presented in Figure 5 on the next page, speak for themselves. Noticeably, the murders' trend is sharply going upward from 2006. Importantly, there is a significant increase in the number of murders per million population- as is reflected by the Figure- in the year 2007. This empirical fact points to the prevailing problems of law and order in Pakistan as per our conceptualization. Moreover, the Figure, on the next page, statistically refutes the claims of the principal military under Musharraf that it was capable of maintaining, if not improving, relative law and order. Thus, on the basis of this empirical/statistical evidence, it is posited that law and order variable falls short of qualifying as cause of the November coup.

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<sup>97</sup> The fifth coup d'état, as is already mentioned in the study, was staged on 3 November 2007 by the Musharraf-led principal military. Though General Pervez Musharraf was succeeded as army chief by General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani on 28 November 2007, the overall principalship- as per the present study's model- of the military remained unaffected by this change of command. Hence, in order to statistically explain the state of law and order in the post-coup period, the study includes 2007, and excludes 2008 from the analysis due to the following. As a result of February 2008 elections, politicians/civilians were able to form government- much to the chagrin of the military- in the center as well as the four provinces. Thus, constitutionally it was the civil governments which were obligated to maintain law and order through the police etc.

**Figure 5 Trend: Murders per Million Population**

### 7.5.2 Economic Variable

As is already mentioned, this time around too, the deteriorating economic situation of the country was cited by the principal military to self-legitimize the coup-action on November 3. However, the resort to the economic variable is logically and factually unfounded since it was the General-President himself who, as leader of the principle military, had supervised the country's economy since October 1999. Empirically even, the military rule despite excessive vows failed to improve the key economic indicators of the economy as is explained earlier in this Chapter.

Moreover, as explained under economic variable in case 4 the financial year 2007/08 covered the period till April 2008. Therefore it seems statistically, if not morally, inappropriate to explain and analyze the FY2008/09 under Musharraf since he resigned in August 2008 as president and importantly the budget for FY 2008/09 was initiated by the newly elected civilian government led by PPP-P. Nevertheless, the Musharraf-led military was certainly responsible for the fate of the economy pre-2008/09 budget. In addition, if the trickle downs are a guide, then the gist of negatives of and on the economy under the military rule can be tasted from the State Bank of Pakistan's *Inflation Monitor* of August 2008. It stated

Inflationary pressures strengthened in the economy with CPI inflation (YoY) soaring to reach 25.3 percent during August 2008 compared to 6.5 percent in the same month last year. Both food and non-food groups of CPI contributed in this upsurge in headline inflation. Food inflation (YoY) remained persistently high and was recorded at 34.1 percent compared to 8.6 percent in August 2007. This rising trend was mainly led by increase in the prices of some key food commodities such as coriander seed powder (130 percent), pulse masoor (130 percent), rice irri (121 percent), wheat (76 percent), and maida (68 percent). Similarly, non-food inflation (YoY) also increased significantly reaching 18.7 percent in August 2008 compared to 4.9 percent during the same month last year. Amongst the various components of CPI non-food group, *transport & communication*, *house rent index (HRI)* and *fuel & lighting* sub-group witnessed significant increase in inflation (YoY) during August 2008 compared to the same month last year. Other measures of inflation i.e. wholesale price index (WPI) and sensitive price indicator (SPI) also showed strong growth during the month under review.<sup>98</sup>

As the quote shows the country's economic situation further worsened under General Musharraf's presidency during the post-coup period. Thus, the empirical evidences points to negative relationship between economic variable and the coup.

### **7.5.3 Democratization Variable**

As mentioned previously, general elections were supposed to be held in November. However, in the immediate post-coup period they were postponed indefinitely. Later, it was stated that they would be held as scheduled. However, on 8 November 2007, Musharraf announced that the election would be held by 15 February 2008. Again, there was a change in the date and it was stated that the elections may be held on or before 9 January 2008. Interestingly, this date was also withdrawn and the COAS instead suggested 8 January 2008 as the election day. Why did the regime play topsy-turvy regarding the holding of elections and then settled for January?

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<sup>98</sup> [http://www.sbp.gov.pk/publications/Inflation\\_Monitor/2008/index2.htm](http://www.sbp.gov.pk/publications/Inflation_Monitor/2008/index2.htm)

**Box 7.11 The Military attempted Defections in the Mainstream Political Parties**

It showed that the [military] junta had no liking for democracy. The January schedule was actually politically-motivated: the military wanted to give enough time to its old allies, for example PML-Q, to campaign under her auspices. Moreover, it wanted to cause defections in the mainstream political parties during this period.

Interview with Mohammad Pervaiz Malik, Secretary Finance PML-N and a Businessman. Lahore: 17 March 2008.

As the above informs the military and its pre-coup allies saw more benefits in a renewed political alliance. No wonder then, the working politicians and their parties were given official support during canvassing. On their part, the opposition parties especially PPP-P pointed to regime's bias towards PML-Q and MQM. However, the PPP-P itself was criticized for the NRO. Hence, to improve her rating, Benazir opted to politically ally with the CJ and the lawyers' community. Interestingly, Sharif, who was not allowed to enter Pakistan in September, was able this time to participate in the election campaign in late November. The prime factor behind his sudden arrival was political, however. The regime, after having developed serious political differences with Bhutto post-October 18, saw in Sharif a potential rival to Bhutto. The former rationally expected in the post-poll period either a hung parliament- thus easy to manipulate- or a scenario in which strategic interaction with Sharif was possible vis-à-vis PPP-P. Sharif, on his part, walked rationally too. He tried to avoid giving any pro-GHQ impression to his political rivals by criticizing the November 3 action. Also, his party along with JUI and TI supported the lawyers' cause to the extent that Sharif along with the partner-parties announced to boycott the elections.

However, before the elections got boycotted, they were postponed again. The cited reason was the tragic assassination of Benazir Bhutto on December 27 in Rawalpindi- coincidentally the city where his father was hanged, and Pakistan's first prime minister was shot dead. The PPP-P accused the regime for failure of security. The military put it on Baitullah Masud. Importantly however, Benazir herself in *Reconciliation*, which she was writing simultaneous to her election campaign, pointed towards elements from within the military and its political allies as potential threat to her life.

Besides, on the same day, unknown individual opened fires at PML-N members also. Thus, in light of the foregoing what can be argued is: a) the military regime failed to allay Bhutto's security concerns- indeed Sanger's account<sup>99</sup> has consolidated it ; b) the local civil bureaucracy especially the police also failed to fulfill its primary task; c) there was a plan to terrify the mainstream political parties and their recently returned leadership. Little wonder then, the elections got rescheduled for 18 February 2008. Problems of law and order were cited by the principal military as the main reason for postponement. Was the military justified on this count?

**Box 7.12 The Military's anti-PPP-P Mindset**

The real reason to postpone the elections was to deprive People's Party from sweeping the polls since the tragic death of Benazir Bhutto had generated a sympathy-wave for the PPP[-P]. The military did not like anti-establishment [military] party to form government and pose challenge to it.

A senior member of the PPP-P recorded this in February 2008.

As the above informs the primary reason to postpone the election was politico-electoral. Interestingly however, the justification for postponement was even empirically unfounded. Since Benazir and PPP-P is traditionally associated with Sindh, the law and order would have been a local phenomenon. One wonders why the people of NWFP and Balochistan, where the PPP-P had fared poorly in the October 2002 elections, should create law and order problems for the sake of People's Party. Nevertheless, despite the loss of their leader, the PPP-P, under the co-command of Bhutto's husband, Asif Ali Zardari, decided to take the 'revenge democratically'.<sup>100</sup> The PML-N, also, changed its mind at the eleventh hour and rationally preferred participatory to agitational politics. However, the JI, TI and the lawyers opted for boycott for different reasons. Finally, the elections were held on 18 February. Following are given the results:

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<sup>99</sup> Sanger, David. 2009. *The Inheritance: The World Obama Confronts and the Challenges to American Power*. New York: Harmony Books.

<sup>100</sup> This refers to a phrase, 'Democracy is the best revenge' coined and used quite often by late Benazir Bhutto. The post-Bhutto PPP-P maintains it as a politico-electoral slogan.



**Table 36 The 2008 Elections: Party Position**

<b>Party</b>	<b>NA</b>	<b>PP</b>	<b>PS</b>	<b>PF</b>	<b>PB</b>
PPP-P	88	77	66	18	7
PML-N	66	102	0	4	0
PML-Q	38	64	10	4	17
MQM	19	0	36	0	0
ANP	10	0	2	29	2
BNP-A	1	0	0	0	5
MMA	5	2	0	8	5
Others	41	39	11	16	10

Source: The Election Commission of Pakistan

As the Table shows, it was a mixed-mandate. In fact, there were incidents of pre/post poll rigging (PILDAT 2008). The boycotting parties pointed to the alleged regime's support to PML-Q which had, despite being criticized in the media for being king's party, emerged as the third largest party. Importantly, the lawyers refused to accept the very validity of this electoral exercise since it was conducted under the martial law. The mainstream parties, on their part, were able to maintain a cautious stance in this respect. They wanted not to give the principal an opportunity to call for a fresh mandate and thus spoil their chances of tasting relative power after so long. However, the military, on its part, was open to use even her intelligence apparatuses to cause defections especially in the Bhutto-less People's Party. To some extent, its efforts bore fruit when Makhdom Amin Faheem, a veteran PPP-P politician, publicly presented himself as the People's Party candidate for premiership.

However, Asif Zardari, to many's surprise, turned out to be a politician: he was able to outsmart not only Mr Faheem but also the leadership of the PMLs. On his part, General-President Musharraf did try to show his authoritarian skills by delaying the parliament's session in the hope of winning over either a section of PML-N or PPP-P to form government with the Q-League- a party of working politicians. The principal, however, remained unable to achieve the attempted goal. Quite contrary to its calculus, the PML-N and PPP-P rationally collaborated with each other with the effect of forming a coalition government at the centre and the Punjab. Interestingly, General Musharraf, in his capacity of Pakistan's president, opted to administer oath to the shirking politicians from PML-N and PPP-P. The latter, during the televised oath-ceremony, had tied black belts to their arms as a symbol of non-recognition of the Musharraf-led military rule. The military, however, acted rationally. It saw less politico-strategic cost in handing the political authority to politicians. Had it remained

adamant to its November 3 mentality, the political, if not economic cost, would have been greater for the military institution in the wake of agitational politics led by the lawyers. Little wonder then, General Musharraf resigned as president on 18 August 2008.

To sum up, the series of elections postponement, physical harassment of political leadership, regime's support to specific parties, pre-at-post poll rigging, boycott of the elections by lawyers and certain political parties, attempts at defections, delaying the parliamentary session are objective indicators of de-democratization rather than democratization. Therefore, this variable empirically does not carry a positive correspondence with the coup d'état.

#### **7.5.4 Securitization Variable**

The state's writ, as explained under law and order section, was challenged by the religious extremists who even resorted to suicide tactics to achieve their objectives. In the post-coup period, the internal threats to person and property continued to increase. Especially the security situation worsened in Swat where Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM) led by Sufi Muhammad had vehemently demanded the proclamation of *Sharia*. Moreover, his son-in-law Maulvi Fazlullah, on his part, continued applying terror-techniques to forcibly impose *Sharia*. The gravity of the situation could be gauged by the following account by a Swati intellectual:

Swatis ask why Sufi Muhammad was not kept in check by those who facilitated his rise; why was Fazlullah not tackled when he had been condemned by his society and was running a lone propaganda project; why did the intelligence agencies fail to predict Fazlullah's behavior and movement; why, even at a later stage, did the state not take notice of the public burning of CD shops and TVs...Further, why has the security apparatus failed to cut the militants' supply lines; how come random journalists can talk to Fazlullah but security forces are unable to track him down; and if the state's helplessness is genuine, how was the administration able to successfully hold general elections in Swat.<sup>101</sup>

Moreover, the situation in Federally Administered Tribal Areas was no different where a collaborative alliance between the Taliban and Al-Qaeda had virtually established a state of their own. In addition, the terrorists were able to penetrate into the metropolitans of Pakistan

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<sup>101</sup> *Daily Times* 2009.

and started targeting both civilian and security forces- the attack on Musharraf's person in July 2007 is a case in point. The year 2008 (see Table below) also witnessed the worst terrorist attacks in which the number of civilian casualties was higher than the security personnel.

**Table 37 Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan: Nov 2007 to Aug 2008**

Month	Civilians	Security Force Personnel	Terrorists/ Insurgents	Total
November	293	94	341	728
December	293	48	97	438
January	88	111	455	654
February	182	33	30	245
March	137	26	41	204
April	80	25	16	121
May	61	30	37	128
June	149	31	38	218
July	82	71	250	403
August	339	124	784	1247

Source: South Asia Terrorism Portal <sup>102</sup>

What the afore-mentioned suggests is that the securitization in Swat/Malakand and FATA remained chaotic. Importantly, the Pakistan state remained unable to establish its writ in the tribal areas. The state's failure with respect to securitization was highlighted by the independently minded media, civil society groups and opposition parties. The latter blamed the Musharraf-led military rule for selling Pakistan's sovereignty to the US. In this respect, the 'drone attacks' were cited as an empirical evidence. Interestingly, the democratic forces' criticism was further consolidated by a public statement of former COAS Aslam Beg. Beg opined that the drones were operated from within Pakistan (Beg 2008). In a nutshell, what, therefore, can be deduced from the foregoing is that the military remained unable to securitize its population from (internal) threats since empirically external threat was non-existent. Thus, the stated positive correspondence between this variable and coup/martial law is empirically negative.

### **7.6 Military Agency: Causing the Coup**

As the preceding sections have explained none of the conceptual variables empirically could be related to November coup. Hence, this situation of non-answerability of coup causes leads

<sup>102</sup> [www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/casualties.htm](http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/casualties.htm)

us to the model in terms of its explanatory variables, namely, working/shirking (agency A) and own/larger interests (agency B). Thus, since the existing body of knowledge on Pakistan's civil-military relations as well as the stated/cited justification by the military empirically remains unable to explain the coup phenomenon, it is therefore posited that the November coup and consequent martial law was a result of military agency- capability to affect change. Being a rational and principal actor, the military opted to stage the coup in order to safeguard its own than larger/national interests. Hence, the coup is rational than structural in nature.

However, the coup was political in character since its primary objective was to maintain hold over the political power and let it not slip into the hands of shirking agents especially the judiciary, which was able to accord more preference to a larger than own interest, and generally politicians. Importantly, the clues to political character of the coup was provided by the army chief General Pervez Musharraf himself in his 3 November proclamation and the address to the nation. He said

Then came the Presidential elections- a month ago. The procedure was adopted according to the Constitution and the Law...But some references were filed, especially against me, in the Supreme Court. That is no problem. It is fine. A matter of Law. But then a seven member bench was formed. Then after a while it was turned into a nine member bench and then it was turned into an eleven member bench and the case keeps on dragging interminably without a decision. Then the Presidential elections happened in which I was fortunate enough that the assemblies gave me 57% of the vote...But the case is still dangling. The vote was counted. The unofficial result was announced but we cannot notify because the case is there. Now the case is going. No decision is forthcoming. It inches along. Now one gentleman [SC's judge] wants to go to his daughter's wedding. So let's delay it even more! As if the entire nation, stuck in a strange state of hopelessness and uncertainty, can just keep hanging on indefinitely. Even the Prime Minister examined this grave situation and sent me a written analysis that there is a great deal of difficulty for the government to function in this situation.<sup>103</sup>

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<sup>103</sup> <http://presidentmusharraf.wordpress.com/2007/06/02/musharraf-3-nov-emergency/>

The above-mentioned makes it crystal clear that the general-president as leader of the principal military was obsessed with political power and the ‘reference’ in the Supreme Court was considered both a hurdle, insult and, as per our hypothesis, a constraint on its political space. Thus, the coup was calculated to disallow the agent judiciary to attempt to hold the principal accountable. Importantly enough, the imposition of consequent martial law was instrumental from the military’s perspective to re-negotiate the principal’s principles- rules of the game- in terms of issuance of a PCO under which a section of the higher judiciary rationally took oath on the coup-day. Additionally, the politico-strategic message of the coup and the martial law was more extensive in nature and character. In this regard, it targeted the political actors i.e. politicians, political parties etc., with long-term goal of de-politicization of political/parliamentary institutions in Pakistan.

However, despite this claimed show of strength the coup-action was, as hypothesized, a sign of political weakness of the military. Had it been politically strong then the contours of politics would have been (re)settled within the parliament if not the camp office. In addition, in the post-coup period the principal military was able to maximize, due to its overall principalship of Pakistan’s state i.e. determination of foreign/defense policy etc. its economic interests. Since this is one of the hypotheses of the study, therefore the following section deals with it in details.

### **7.6.1 Maximizing Economic Interests**

As was mentioned earlier in the thesis, the nature of military’s economic activities is secretive. The following is deemed insightful in this respect:

After every ten years the military comes [in politics]. With American money and *danda* [coercion], it can move on. Politicians cannot do like this. The military also plunder (*lootmaar*): land is transformed into cantonments; commission is taken on weapons procurement- all sort of things are done. However, since the military does it under some rules, the files are kept secret. Either we [journalist/civilians] are afraid of it [military’s *danda*] or we are unable to locate such documents.<sup>104</sup>

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<sup>104</sup> These views were expressed by Najam Sethi in a TV program *Tonight with Najam Sethi* (15 January 2010). Since the program’s language was Urdu, transcription except italicized terms is done by the author. The program’s video is available from: [http://www.dunyanews.tv/play\\_program\\_video\\_eng.php?id=6953&pid=1844](http://www.dunyanews.tv/play_program_video_eng.php?id=6953&pid=1844)

As the quote shows, it is extremely difficult even for a journalist to locate and document the extent of the military's economic ventures. Little wonder then, the present study also faced difficulty in this respect. The attempt to access the data was further hampered by the following: a) in the post-publication of *Military Inc* (2007), the institution had become not only more protective and secretive but also more authoritarian- often threatening physically; b) the post-9 March the lawyers' movement and the media's investigative approach have further helped the military to keep distance from the questioning civilians.

Nevertheless, to understand and explain the positive relationship between the military's politics and furtherance of economic interests the study, in the absence of any authentic research article/paper or book on this period, tends to rely on the military-orientated organizations' online sources. Though this material overall presents a rosy picture of the military's economic ventures, it is the only source which can help one understand and explain the extent of its penetration in Pakistan's economy, politics and the state.

To begin with, the Frontier Works Organization was lately engaging in a variety of projects of which only a few were mentioned under the fourth coup's analytic narrative. During the period under analysis, around a dozen projects of different nature started as Table 38 shows on the next page.


Overall, the FWO was involved in the following projects: roads (44), airfields (2), bridges (1), optical fiber (1), dams/irrigation (5), infrastructural development (12), railways (2), tunnels (1) and miscellaneous (7). These projects were supposedly 'sponsored' by NHA, PR, CDA, DHA, GHQ etc. Moreover, the Organization was able to acquire 8 more projects which pointed to its agency and rationality. In addition, in 2007 the FWO's consolidated income from operations, as Figure 6 highlights on page 327, stood at Rs. 13,649 million.

**Table 38 The FWO's On-going Projects**

	<i>Cost (Rs Million)</i>	<i>Start Date</i>
Kachhi Canal	6657.213	Nov-07
Construction of Lai Expressway and Flood Channel Project	2182.838	Jan-08
Construction of Multipurpose Link Road at PAF Qadri Skardu	9.300	Mar-08
Widening and Improvement of Road 120' Wide Beach Avenue-II, Phase-VIII, DHA Karachi	219.815	Apr-08
Construction of Lind Road between Khayaban-e-Ittehad and KPT Interchange & Misc Projects	29.359	Apr-08
Construction of Main Boulevard at Mehfooz Shaheed Garrison Lahore	255.217	Apr-08
Rehabilitation of Convoy Road Rawalpindi Cantt	150.000	May-08
Karakoram Highway Maintenance	160.00	Jul-Jun each year
Recarpetting of Secondary Runway End-33 at PAF Qadri Skardu	35.534	May-08
Construction of Hostel for Rehman Baba School at Afghanistan	951.549	May-08
Construction of Naeb Amin Ullah Khan Logari Hospital at Logar Afghanistan	1077.508	May 08
Construction of Roads, Walkways, Water Supply, Sewerage, Storm & Drainage (Package-III) at NUST New Campus Sector H-12, Islamabad	120.854	Jun-08

Source: FWO Online Brochure; n.d.<sup>105</sup>

<sup>105</sup> <http://fwo.com.pk/others.php?page=2&type=brochure>.

**Figure 6 The FWO's Consolidated Income (2007)**

Source: FWO<sup>106</sup>

Similarly, the NLC is involved in a variety of projects worth Rs. 32 billion. Currently, its engineering and construction task force is more than 3,000 individuals. Moreover, it transports more than 74,000 BBLs/crude per day with a fleet capacity of 1,500 vehicles of, for instance, Mercedes-Benz and Renault kind. In addition, the Cell takes pride in '6 modern container scanning sites across the country'. Also, it is operating 25 Toll Plazas on the National Highway (N-5: Peshawar-Lahore section), the Indus Highway (N-55) and at Nokundi (N-40).

Besides, the AWT also continued with its economic ventures. For instance, its Askari Bank (AB), in its quarterly report of March 2009, boasted of 'operating profit' of Rs.1, 2.98 million as well as increase in the number of branches from 150 to 204 from 2008 to 2009 respectively.<sup>107</sup> Also, the Askari Leasing Limited claimed total assets of Rs.12, 3 billion in 2008.

The Fauji Foundation, on its part, was able to remain in business as well. The extent of its economic ventures can be gauged from the operations of its subsidiaries. For instance, the


<sup>106</sup> <http://fwo.com.pk/>

<sup>107</sup> Askari Bank Quarterly Report 2009. Available from <http://www.askaribank.com.pk/financialstatement.php#>



Fauji Fertilizer Company's claimed Profit after Tax (PAT) stood at- as the Figure shows below- Rs. 5,604 million.

**Figure 7 Fauji Fertilizer Company: Profit after Tax**



Source: Fauji Foundation.<sup>108</sup>

Similarly, the Fauji Fertilizer Bin Qasim Limited (FFBL) claimed to have PAT margin of Rs. Rs. 2,540 million in 2007. In addition, during the same year the Fauji Cement Company Limited (FCCL) enjoyed Rs. 646 million as PAT. The company, however, had registered a slowdown in profit-making when compared with the preceding year. Moreover, in 2008, the Fauji Oil Terminal & Distribution Company Limited (FOTCO) claimed to have earned Rs. 322 million as profit after tax. The company

consists of an all weather jetty capable of berthing 75,000 DWT vessels, two pipelines of 36-inch and 30-inch dia for handling of HFO, Diesel and Crude Oil and three marine loading arms. Plans are underway for setting up another jetty of 9 million tons capacity for meeting Pakistan's additional handling requirements.<sup>109</sup>

In addition, the Mari Gas Company's PAT stood at Rs. 683.89 million during the year 2006-07. Very much like its sisters organizations, the Foundation Gas boasted of '65 distributors supplies LPG to approximately 366,250 domestic and 11225 commercial consumers'. Its total assets valued Rs.746 million during 2006-07. Similarly, the Fauji Corn Complex, Fauji Cereals and Fauji Security Services' claimed total assets stood at Rs. 696 million, Rs. 135

<sup>108</sup> <http://www.fauji.org.pk/Webforms/Home.aspx?Id=142>

<sup>109</sup> see [www.fotcoterminal.com](http://www.fotcoterminal.com)

million and Rs. 45 million during 2006-07 respectively. Moreover, the FF's Overseas Employment Services' total assets amounted to Rs. 16 million during 2007-8. Currently, the assets of the Fauji Group (which include those of the Associated Companies) are over PKR 121 billion (USD 2 billion). The total value of Fauji Foundation's shareholding in its associated companies has a market value in excess of c. USD 750 million, while the companies represent 3.3% of the total market capitalization at the Karachi Stock Exchange.<sup>110</sup>

Last but not least, the Shaheen Foundation also did not lag behind. Currently, the SF is doing business in a) aviation i.e. Shaheen Air, Air Eagle, SAPS; b) trade and services i.e. Shaheen Insurance, Shaheen Aerotraders, Shaheen Knitwear, Shaheen Medical Services, Shaheen Rent-A-Car, Shaheen Fuel Filling Stations; c) real estate i.e. Shaheen Complex Lahore, Shaheen Complex Karachi, Shaheen Housing Scheme Projects in Peshawar and Islamabad; e) Media i.e. Hawk Advertising; f) educational services i.e. Air University, Shaheen Schools System. Since the SF is comparatively a smaller organization and there is dearth of data it is, therefore, impossible to present a picture of its financial status. Same is the case with BF as regards the current extent of its economic activities and financials. However, with respect to individual economic pursuits the perception of the country's intelligentsia i.e. lawyers, journalists etc., is regarded as a point of reference given the non-availability of data about the military's state land acquisition in a highly fine-tuned manner. In this respect, the following is quite insightful:

**Box 7.13 The Military's Economic Activities are criticized in the Public**

It has now become public, thanks to the lawyers' movement and the media that the military is engaged in land acquisition- the land which belonged to the people. I remembered the banner which the lawyers hoisted in Rawalpindi in the wake of CJ's removal. It read 'Ae watan ke sanjeele genrailo, saaray *raqbay* tumhare liye hain [O' smart generals of the land, all *land* is for you!]. This kind of criticism is unprecedented in Pakistan's history. [italics mine]

A former ambassador of Pakistan made this observation in March 2008.

<sup>110</sup> [www.fs.com.pk/fauji.htm](http://www.fs.com.pk/fauji.htm)

Thus, what can be, in light of the foregoing, maintained is that the military remained a major economic actor in Pakistan ever after the November 3 coup. The coup and consequent martial law was instrumental to further maximize its economic interests. In other words, the political developments such as the lawyers' movement and elections etc., could not influence the military's engagement in economic activities meaningfully. Empirically, this fact further corroborates this study's assumption that the military is able to preserve its overall principalship of Pakistan's state due primarily to its agency and rationality.

### **7.7 Conclusion**

The chapter began by contextualizing the nature and dynamics of civil-military relations since the Kargil war which was planned by the military for rational reasons. In this regards, the chapter empirically and theoretically explained that the war was waged by the Musharraf-led military to, on the one hand, politically weaken the prime minister, and on the other hand, assert the military's principalship especially regarding the making and operationalization of the country's foreign/defense policy. Hence, the war thwarted the peace process initiated by the Lahore Declaration signed between India and Pakistan in February 1999. Moreover, in the post-Kargil period Prime Minister Sharif, in order to safeguard his political interests, opted to constitutionally replace the army chief, Pervez Musharraf, with Lt. Gen. Ziauddin on 12 October 1999. However, before the newly appointed army chief could assume charge formally, Prime Minister Sharif was sacked through a coup on the same day. Subsequently, the 1973 Constitution was abrogated, the assemblies were dissolved, the PM was put under house arrest and political activity was banned. In other words, Pakistan was run under new rules of the game- the Provisional Constitution Order (PCO) is a case in point.

However, the Musharraf-led military attempted to justify the action. In this respect, in the coup/martial law proclamation the problems relating to governance and economy were cited as main factors. The Sharif government was blamed for the failure. Moreover, the former was held responsible for introducing a 'sham democracy'. Therefore, the military intervened in politics to democratize and improve law and order and the economic situation. In addition, it was vowed that Pakistan would be securitized, for it is the primary responsibility of the military institution. Importantly, the principal military was able to seek judicial legitimacy from the agent judiciary. The commendable refusal of Supreme Court's Chief Justice Saiduzaan Siddiqui to take oath under the PCO, however, remained insignificant, for his colleagues rationally opted to take not only a fresh oath but also to legitimize the martial law

by invoking the infamous doctrine of necessity. Moreover, the agent judiciary empowered the Chief Executive- the military's leader- to amend the constitution at his discretion. Interestingly, the removal of Musharraf was also judged invalid despite the fact that it was not the issue before the apex court. Besides, Sharif was judged guilty of hijacking the PIA plane that was carrying General Musharraf from Colombo to Pakistan- whereas the co-accused got scot-free.

Nevertheless, since the military had, at first, attempted to self-justify the coup-action and later got judicial legitimacy, it becomes imperative, logically and morally, to explain this occurrence objectively. For this purpose, the chapter analyzed the coup in the form of an analytic narrative which was seen as a combination of working/shirking and own/larger interests- or agencies A and B. In order to formally conduct the analytic narrative, the chapter, as a point of departure and reference, identified, through a system of coding, five conceptual variables, namely, law and order, economic, democratization, securitization and coup/martial law. Furthermore, positive correspondence was observed between each of the four variables and the coup. Moreover, it was observed that the military took upon itself the responsibility to accomplish these tasks. Remaining within the model's framework, the chapter then moved on to empirically explain each positive correspondence in order to see whether the military's claims were justified or not.

To begin with, the chapter quantitatively/statistically showed, quite contrary to the stated claim by the Musharraf-led military, that the law and order situation was better under the Sharif government. This is done with the help of data that demonstrate that the trend of murders per million population was sharply decreasing at the time of the coup and during its preceding year. Moreover, during the military rule the problem of governance lingered on with the effect that from 2005 onwards the same figures reveal a trend that is steadily going upward. Thus, it was concluded that the positive correspondence between law and order and the coup could not be established quantitatively/statistically.

As regards the economic variable, it was also found on the basis of quantitative data, that the key economic indicators pointed to relative economic sustainability and that too in the wake of nuclear-related sanctions. Interestingly, the military under Musharraf was though able to project high growth rate in key sectors of the economy, the underlying factors for this military-led developments were foreign in nature: namely, foreign aid- that was a result of the

military's rational strategic alliance with the US regarding terrorism- and remittances which were also positively impacted by the alliance over war on terror. Moreover, despite projected high growth rates, the social sector remained neglected; poverty-related issues remained unsolved- indeed evidence pointed towards an increase in corruption and in the 'parallel economy'. In light of this empirical evidence, the chapter established a rather negative relationship between economic variable and the coup.

Similarly the chapter found, with the help of empirical data, that the project of democratization failed to achieve the stated objective of transforming Pakistan from a sham to a true democracy. Instead, the initial ban on political activity, a highly controversial and controlled presidential referendum, espionage over political forces, NABization of shirking politicians- and favors to working PML-Q-, rigged October 2002 elections and importantly unconstitutional attempts at re-election from the existing assemblies, which had almost completed their tenure, by the General-President was sufficient empirical evidence of a negative relationship between the democratization variable and the October coup. Last but not least, Pakistan witnessed the worst violence caused by terrorist attacks in its recent history. Indeed, the phenomenon of suicide bombings was quite unprecedented with the effect that the military's leader, General Pervez Musharraf, was targeted more than one time. Moreover, the military regime was severely criticized by the opposition politicians and civil society organizations for selling out the country's (external) sovereignty to the US in terms of permitting the latter to use and launch 'drone attacks' on Pakistani territory and the borderland areas. Hence, in light of the foregoing, the chapter posited that the securitization variable's positive relationship with the coup is also empirically unfounded.

Having exposed the negative correspondences between coup and the other conceptual variables drawn from the coup-proclamation, the analytic narrative then reverted to the model's explanatory variables in order to explain this puzzling phenomenon. Quite contrary to the existing body of knowledge on Pakistan's civil-military relations, the study posits that the coup was a result/effect of the military's agency- that the latter, being a rational actor, was able to stage a coup in order to maximize its political and economic interests. In other words, distancing itself from structural, generalist, instrumentalist, path-dependent and conspiracy accounts the chapter, on the basis of its agency model, maintains that the coup was rational in nature and political in character. It is demonstrated that the primary objective of the coup-action was to safeguard the military's political role at the expense of the Sharif-led shirking

politicians who, in the pre-coup period, were able to transform their own interest into a larger one, in terms of amending the formal rules of the game- the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment is a case in point. The foregoing, in other words, marks the model-based agencies A and B whereby the rational military, while preferring its own interests- and importantly expecting working from the agents-, is capable of punishing the shirking section of politicians who were, in turn, able to prioritize larger but diverging interest as far as the military was concerned. Had the Sharif-led politicians preferred working to shirking- as indeed they did in the 1990s- and not attempted to seek larger interests in terms of violating and amending the rules of the game, there would have been, according to the model, no military coup d'état.

Thus, by staging a coup, the principal military, which had exclusively dominated the foreign/defense policy of the country along with engagement in economic activities without any oversight mechanism, was able to take the political control of state in its own hands too. However, the assumption of political power unconstitutionally, undemocratically, illegally and immorally by the Musharraf-led military caused serious damage to the ensuing democratic process. Importantly, the coup-event exposed the military's political weakness rather commonly held strength for had it been politically in 'control' of politics if not of the state, then there was no need to sack an elected PM, dissolve assemblies and abrogate the constitution. In addition, as per its hypothesis, the study empirically demonstrates that the direct assumption of political power was instrumental to facilitate the military's economic interests.

In the post-coup period, the military's politics and economic activities went, by and large, smoothly in strategic interaction with a section of politicians who, while seeing to their own political and economic interests, opted to working with the military. Moreover, the judiciary, as mentioned before, also remained an agent. However, quite surprisingly, a section of the latter- indeed the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry- opted to shirk by according more preference to larger than purely institutional interests. The Supreme Court's judgments on the Steel Mill case, 'missing persons' etc., are evidence of this. Hence, in this specific context, the military's leader sought to, on 9 March 2007, seek the agent judiciary chief's (justice) resignation, and that too in the General Headquarters. To the principal's surprise, the Chief Justice (CJ) stuck to shirking. The former struck back by

‘suspending’ the latter. Consequently, quite to the suspended Chief Justice’s surprise, his colleagues and importantly the lawyers’ community chose to side with him.

Moreover, a majority of opposition politicians, a considerable number of civil society groups and the private media opted to join the ‘lawyer’s movement’ for a variety of rational reasons. However, contextually, they were able to maintain a unique balance between their own and a larger cause: restoration of CJ Iftikhar and an end to military rule. The rational military, in the wake of agitational politics, chose to ultimately restore the CJ so that the political, if not economic, cost remained bearable. The restored Chief Justice of Pakistan, however, continued to shirk by preferring larger to own interest- the judgment in favor of exiled Sharif is a case in point. Importantly, the CJ-led apex court opted to take a judicial note of Musharraf’s re-election. The case was pending in the Supreme Court when the Musharraf-led military chose to not only sack but also arrest the CJ along with sixty judges through a military coup d’état on 3 November 2007. Consequently, martial law was imposed.

In order to self-legitimize the coup/martial law, General Musharraf pointed to problems related to security, the economy, governance and democratization. In explicit terms, the judiciary was blamed for its ‘increasing interference’ in the government’s affairs, thus ‘adversely affecting’ its functioning. The chapter, in order to explain the stated factors/causes, conducted an analytic narrative of this fifth coup. In this regard, the point of departure was the identification of five conceptual variables- securitization, economic factors, law and order, democratization and coup/martial law- whereby the coup was observed to have positive correspondence with each of the remaining variables. Therefore, the chapter took each positive correspondence for a model-based empirical analysis so as to determine the worth of the military’s claims to legitimacy.

As a result, it was concluded, on the basis of empirical data, that the law and order situation- regardless of the pre-coup failure on this count- further deteriorated; the economic situation further worsened as, for instance, inflation touched double-digits; the securitization process remained paralyzed since the terrorist attacks as well as ‘drone attacks’ continued; and the democratization project suffered from delay-tactics, lack of physical security for the mainstream politicians, pre/post poll rigging etc. In other words, the study did not find any positive correspondence between coup/martial law and the rest of the conceptual variables.

Therefore, in order to explain the coup-occurrence, the analytic narrative reverted to a formal application of the model.

In light of the study's causal model, it was posited that the November coup was a result of the military's agency- its inherent capability to get things done. As a principal of its agents, the rational military, in order to protect its political interests- and economic interests for that matter- opted to stage a coup in order to capture the political initiative from shirking agents such as opposition politicians and especially the judiciary. The latter, quite unprecedentedly, was able to not only see the larger interest, but also to hold ground in the face of military might. Moreover, through the coup the rational military sought to re-negotiate the rules of the game which had been violated by the shirking judiciary, and to do so in a way that protected its overall principalship of the country. In addition, the peripheral aim of the coup and consequent martial law was to further damage the political process- the delaying of elections is a case in point- as well as the country's political institutions for, as mentioned earlier in the study, the strengths of the military lay in its agents' weaknesses especially that of the politicians and judiciary.

The chapter, as per the study's hypothesis, argued that the staging of a coup highlights the military's political weakness. Had it been politically in control of its agent judiciary if not of Pakistan's politics and the state, there was no rational need to sack and arrest judges, to delay and rig elections and most importantly, to transfer political authority to politicians. This is however, the usual story as portrayed by path-dependent and structuralist accounts. Besides, as hypothesized, the chapter found that the military's economic interests were further facilitated during the period under study.



## Chapter 8

### Conclusion

The primary objective of this research was to explain why the military intervenes in Pakistan's politics. This core question of the thesis, by its very nature, pointed to two different aspects of military intervention: first, what are the objectives/aims that the military want to obtain by intervening in the country's politics? Second, is the military intervention a result of structure or agency- the central puzzle of the study?

As regards the first aspect of the question, the study has, having scientifically highlighted theoretical as well as empirical weaknesses in the existing accounts on Pakistan's civil-military relations and the state, demonstrated- with a reasonable degree of certainty- that the military has intervened, both overtly (coups) and covertly in the capacity of the principal- in Pakistan's politics for its own interests which are primarily political in nature. Moreover, it is maintained that the military used its political power as an instrument to maximize its economic interests as an independent actor. With regards to second aspect of the question, the present study has, quite contrary to the existing structuralist, legitimist, path-dependent, generalist, instrumentalist and conspiracy works on Pakistan's civil-military relations, maintained that it is the military's agency- its capability to get things done-, not structure and/or culture, which causes a coup.

These conclusions are underpinned by references to both qualitative and quantitative findings, through an in-depth investigation of a developing state/transitional society- Pakistan. The case selection was motivated by the phenomenon and practice of military intervention in Pakistan. The latter though has drawn considerable scholarly attention, the existing accounts, one way or the other, demote actors, agency, rationality and context. Moreover, the matrixes and models, which some of these accounts rely on, are limited in nature and scope. In addition, the case of Pakistan with respect to military intervention and its possible causes(s) has been overlooked by such works.

Thus, the present study endeavored to build its own model of civil-military relations grounded in the assumptions of agency theory and rational choice-neo institutionalism. In this respect, it assumes that the actors i.e. the military, civil bureaucracy, politicians and judiciary, are inherently capable of making things happen (agency). Moreover, it is assumed that the

actors are inherently rational with a clear conception of costs and benefits, and that they given the choice(s) tend to maximize their interests i.e. politico-economic (rational choice). In addition, the study assumes actors to be institutions with their own institutional values and interests, and with the ability of playing a bridge role between society and the state in terms of articulating the former's interests and initiation of policies. Nevertheless, the context of Pakistan's case is kept central to the model.

The model is further enriched by its marriage to the method of analytic narratives (AN). The analytic narratives' proposal involves choosing a puzzle, then building a model and finally evaluating the model through comparative studies and testable generalization that the model generates. The method of AN favors parsimonious models. All narratives got to have an anchor(s) that are explicit in order to make it easier for critique and challenges to be made than in more configurative accounts. In addition, the method of analytic narratives relies on the assumptions of rational choice theory. Importantly, this method differs from other meta-narrative and qualitative analyses such as modernization theorists etc., when it comes to locating and exploring mechanisms that shape the strategic interaction between and/or among actors, their preferences and subsequent actions.

As the foregoing has marked the analytical capabilities of the AN method, this study therefore chooses to utilize it. In this respect, with the help of primary i.e. interviews, coup text(s), reports etc., and secondary sources i.e. books, journal articles etc., the aim is to understand and explain the central actors' interests, preferences, their evaluation of alternatives, the information they possessed, the expectations they formed, the strategies adopted. The pieces are put together, using the technique of process tracing in order to construct an analytic narrative that accounts for the particular outcome of interest: shirking or working (agency A), and preferring own interest to larger i.e. national, interest (agency B). Extracting the processes that produce the outcomes of interest captures the essence of the narrative.

As is mentioned above the interviews are used as primary source of information in order to qualitatively explain the variables in a given unit of observation. In total 35 semi-structured interviews with the elite i.e. military personnel, civil bureaucrats, politicians, and other stakeholders i.e., industrialists, lawyers etc., were conducted. The method adopted for interviews was that of the 'snowball system' given a relatively small sample-size, political

complexities, status and time constraints on the key respondents. All contacts with interviewees were established personally. They were called before hand to check their availability. On the appointed day, before the start of the interview the respondent was briefed about the general assumptions and aim of the study. Furthermore, care was taken to conduct interviews in a suitable environment. A majority of interviewees were found to be self-confident and expressive. At times and where relevant, awareness was shown about their past writings, actions or decisions in order to communicate a level of professionalism.

The interviews were partly standardized and mostly open-ended. The advantages of an open approach, arguably, outweighed the disadvantages due to the fact that the Pakistani elite tends to fluctuate, stretch, and exaggerate during conversation. Moreover, an ideal and rigid questionnaire was deemed to be helpful in trying to understand the level and degree of the elite and stakeholders' opinion of civil-military relations. All interviews but one, were conducted in person with the help of a guideline. Each interview lasted between 45 minutes to 2 hours. 30 out of the 35 were mostly conducted in English; the remaining 5 were conducted in Urdu in which the author of this study is fluent. One interview was completely tape-recorded with the permission of the respondent; two were partially tape-recorded since the recorder broke down due to technical faults. Nevertheless, handwritten notes in each case were carefully taken and were elaborated upon from memory right after the interviews. In addition, all of the interviews were properly transcribed.

The interview results were analyzed at an aggregate level, in the form of a number of clusters which were related to the issue areas formulated in the questionnaire. The clusters were: a) political system of Pakistan; b) dynamics of civil-military relations; c) role of religion in politics; d) contemporary politics and the state. Furthermore, three types of codes as distinguished by Aberbach, Chesney and Rockman were used for the purpose of this research. In this respect, *Manifest coding items* involve direct responses to particular questions such as: is there any difference between civilian and military domestic or security/foreign policy? Similarly, *Latent coding items* deal with the characteristics of replies which were not explicitly called for by the questions themselves; an example of this is the insights about the justification of use of force to topple a civilian government. 'Global coding items' are responses in which the coder makes judgments from the interview(s) transcripts about the general traits and styles. Examples are: inferences with respect to the political framework of the interviewee, or about preferences concerning a given issue. Quite naturally,

a move from 'manifest' to 'latent' involves a reduction in certainty. On the other hand, an interpretative approach becomes essential for an understanding of mindsets. Therefore in this case, latent and global coding items were used. Finally, given the type of coding, it made little sense to present the findings in terms of quantitative precision. Rather, they were ordered plausibly. Finally, besides the primary reliance on qualitative analysis, the study also used quantitative material, to construct a narrative, which was handled in two different but practical ways. On the one hand, to possibly determine the cause of a given coup, the law and order variable (Mitra 2006) was specifically accorded a statistical treatment.

Besides an overall introduction of which the above forms a part, this dissertation comprises seven chapters. The theoretical foundation of the research was built-up in Chapter 1 which began with the introduction of the central puzzle posed by this study, namely, whether it is structure or agency which draws the military in and out of politics. This was followed by the core question which asked why the military intervenes in Pakistan's politics. To explain this question and solve the puzzle, the study kept itself within the field of comparative political science and selected five cases of military coup d'état. These cases, for methodological reasons, were assumed as five analytic narratives of coups. Furthermore, coup d'état was assumed to be the dependent variable whereas shirking/working (agency A) and own/larger interests (agency B) were taken as explanatory variables to analytically explain each coup narrative.

Having defined the main puzzle, core question, variables and analytic narratives the chapter critically reviewed the major existing literature on civil-military relations theory in order to design a theoretical framework for the study. With this in mind, different theoretical paradigms were termed and categorized into sociological perspectives, comparativist literature, structural thought and actor-oriented work respectively. Each of these categories was analyzed critically. To begin with, the sociological perspectives as presented by Huntington and Janowitz sought to look at the civil-military nexus from the societal, and not necessarily at the political/institutional dimension. Regarding the question of military intervention and civilian control of the former, these works heavily emphasized the importance of subjective/normative factors i.e. 'subjective civilian control'. However, Huntington though introduced and applied the concept of 'objective civilian control', it could not exclude the ideological factor to maintain a balanced relationship between the praetorian and the civil. Importantly, despite its pioneering position within the domain of CMR theory,

these sociological perspectives were even criticized on empirical grounds; that they remained unable to predict the nature, patterns and importantly dynamics of civil-military relations especially in the USA.

The comparativist literature, on its part, tended to take a cross-national/cultural view of civil-military relations and especially military intervention. The exponents of this literature i.e. *Finer*, *Nordlinger*, *Perlmutter* etc, also relied more on the cultural rather than purely on institutional and political factors. Moreover, this literature, while aiming at a comparative analysis of different cross-national cases, seriously compromised contextuality. For example, it is very difficult to understand, from the perspective of comparative politics, how a contextually different case from Latin American can be compared with that of the Middle East.

The critical review of comparativist literature was followed by a similar review of structural theories of ‘civilian control’ over the military. The theorist, *Michael Desch* (1999), attempted to explain the question of civilian control over the military from primarily a structural-threat perspective, using cross-national cases for this purpose. Nevertheless, despite the significance of this structural thought, the chapter described, with the help of tables, that this theory could not be applied to the Pakistani case on empirical grounds, since Pakistan did not fit into *Desch’s* model/theory.

Having made a critical review of the structural thought, the chapter then examined actor-oriented- or the agency theory of civil-military relations. The agency of CMR, as postulated by *Peter Feaver* (2003), is grounded in a rationalist framework. As a point of departure, it starts with a critical analysis of pioneering works, especially of *Huntington* and *Janowitz*, on the subject of military intervention and/or civilian control of the former. Moreover, this theory explicitly gives due attention to actors, their interests, preferences/choices, and subsequent actions/outcomes. In other words, the agency theory while not demoting non-material factors relies on material factors in order to understand and explain the complexities inherent in civil-military relations. In addition, since the actor-oriented work appreciates the rationality and agency of actors, it helps to explain CMR almost on a daily basis. Therefore, due to its emphasis on actors, choices, rationality etc., *Feaver’s* theory was deemed highly useful for the puzzle and core question of the present research.

However, since Feaver's work is primarily specific to the US case, it became apparent that its application to the case of Pakistan was limited due to critical empirical differences between them. Hence, the need for modifying its otherwise useful assumptions was seriously felt. Therefore, the chapter, in its later part, contextualized and rationalized the agency theory's assumptions vis-à-vis Pakistan. In this respect, the analysis identified four actors- politicians, civil bureaucracy, judiciary and the military-, specified their interests in political and economic terms and importantly, categorized the four actors into either principal and/or agents contextually, over a span of about six decades of Pakistan's civil-military relations. Furthermore, with the help of the foregoing, an agency model of Pakistan's civil-military relations was designed. The model, grounded in the agency theory, incorporates the above-mentioned four actors, their (politico-economic) interests, preferences in terms for working/shirking (agency A) and own/larger interests (agency B) - the explanatory variables.

The deductive model is both context-specific and causal in the sense of explaining coup-causation as it occurs in a certain context whereby the four actors strategically interact with each/one (an)other for rational reasons. More precisely, when the military is an agent, it stages a coup, while marking agency A in terms of shirking, to achieve political interests- i.e. political power- which, in turn, is used as an instrument to facilitate economic interests- hence agency B in terms of preferring own to larger interests. However, when the military is the principal, itself a result of its agency and rationality, it stages coups, again registering its agency, to protect its political and economic interests. Here, it rationally chooses to stage a coup in order to disallow a section of shirking agents, either politicians or judiciary, to sustain its shirking in terms of preferring a larger interest which is, by its very nature and character, antithetical to that of the military. Finally, having designed the model, the chapter then attempted to ground the study's hypotheses in the causal model in order to test them. Six hypotheses were generated and each corresponds, one way or the other, to the main puzzle and to the core and, secondary questions of the study.

As regard the existing literature on Pakistan's civil-military relations, Chapter 2 undertook it critically. In this respect, the literature was divided into six sections and categorized as the legitimist point of view, conspiracy theorists, the generalist accounts, the instrumentalist work, the structuralist literature and the path-dependent perspective respectively. The first section of the chapter looked at the legitimist point of view. The legitimists- Khan, Huntington, Rizvi, Cheema- believe that Pakistan's political institutions remained unable to

grow democratically. The politicians, by and large, were incompetent too. Instead, it views the military as a modernizing force. Therefore, it was quite natural on the part of the military to takeover in such an institutional vacuum. Furthermore, since India had viewed Pakistan as its chronic enemy and had fought a war with Pakistan in Kashmir in 1947-1948, it was imperative, on the part of the military, to administer political obligations for the security of the state and the society. Hence, the military's intervention in politics is not viewed as a problem by these accounts. Rather, coups d'état and military rule is legitimized on account of the country's weak political institutions, politicians' incompetence and external security threat. Nonetheless, this point of view suffers from theoretical as well as empirical weaknesses. For example, despite its uni-focal over-emphasis on the inherent weaknesses of political institutions, there is no mention whatsoever of the factors which might have left political intuitions weaker. Moreover, despite its rhetorical stress on the external security threat, the legitimists have failed to name which institution of the state was supposed to perceive the threat and on what grounds.

In the second section, the chapter took a critical view of the so called conspiracy theory. The term referred to such accounts (Ali 1970, 1983) on Pakistan's politics, democracy etc., that had a tendency to posit, without any *evidence*, that no domestic change in Pakistan's politics can occur without support from the outside- by external actors/factors especially the US. In addition, the conspiracy theory had an internal dimension whereby a section of politicians conspires with the military to affect any change in Pakistan's political system. However, besides making a case of Pakistan's politics without evidence, the conspiracy theory lacks internal consistency. For instance, following the breakup of Pakistan, Bhutto was assumed to be a weak partner and the military to be a strong master. However, this conception and construction of the Bhutto-military relationship ignores, on the one hand, the demoralization and unpopularity of the military's officer cadre, and on the other hand, the electoral standing, if not popularity, of Bhutto in the post-1971 period. In addition, the conspiracy theory is highly essentialist in nature in that it demotes the value of context and the significance of agency and rationality.

The generalist accounts- for instance, of Jalal and Kukreja- were analyzed in the third section. These accounts have a tendency to describe and understand Pakistan's civil-military relations from a rather general perspective in terms of first selecting multiple domestic, regional and international variables and then understanding the phenomenon of military intervention by

operationalizing them. Moreover, these accounts were found to have a comparative ambition whereby Pakistan, Bangladesh and India were studied, with the help of a ‘composite’ model- which contained a variety of variables-, comparatively. The military intervened in Pakistan’s politics on account of the stated variables. However, there is no mention of a *single-* or two-particular variable which might have caused a coup/intervention, for example, in 1958 or 1977.

In other words, a generality of a variety of variables is prescribed in order to understand the phenomenon. However, as mentioned above, these accounts, despite their informative nature, severely suffer from a lack of theoretical as well as empirical rigor. The proposed model, which, for the most part, is grounded in imported concepts such as ‘praetorian polity’ and/or ‘reactive militarism’, suffers from explanatory capability to explain which factor causes military coup and how. Importantly, though the generalist accounts posit that a combination of various variables compelled the military to takeover, they are silent as to why the military takes the pain to intervene in the first place. Besides, these accounts give an explicit impression of carrying structuralist as well as conspiratorial overtones.

Having conducted a critical review of the generalist accounts, the chapter then attempted a similar review of the instrumentalist work in the fourth section. This work (Cohen 2004) looked at the Pakistan’s military from the lenses of Washington’s geostrategic interests in the South Asia region especially during the Cold War period. Despite its pioneering position within the domain of CMR-literature on Pakistan, the account focused primarily on the sociological aspects of military organization. In others, the question of military intervention falls outside the purview of the instrumentalist work.

The structuralist literature came up for a critical review in section five of the chapter. The exponents i.e. Alavi, Waseem, Siddiq, of this literature exclusively focus on the socio-economic and political structure of the colonial state and the society. Since structural accounts are conceptually grounded in Marxian conception of reality, they overwhelmingly attempt to locate and understand the existence, collaborative instinct and potential and socio-economic and political significance of classes within and around the British India state. Accordingly, three classes, namely, indigenous bourgeois, landed-feudal and metropolitan bourgeois, were identified, which viewed and treated the state as instrumental to maximize their returns. In addition, since the colonial state is viewed as an interventionist force in terms



of its modernizing capability, the indigenous bourgeois and the land-feudal entered into a structural relationship with the civil-military bureaucracy, the functional face of the state, in order to access and link itself with the metropolitan bourgeois.

Moreover, the structuralists argued that a section of the indigenous bourgeois- the salariat- resorted to protest and participatory politics in order to secure and maximize their socio-economic interests vis-à-vis Hindus and strategic British. The movement for Pakistan was, in substance and form, a salariat movement according to this literature. Hence, when British India was divided, the post-colonial state of Pakistan inherited the colonial state in terms of a civil-military bureaucracy and importantly the classes from the colonial to the post-colonial state and the society. In other words, there is qualified difference between the two states since the classes and the civil-military bureaucracy remained intact. Furthermore, the structuralist position does not view military intervention and constitutional/legal issues related to 'rule of law' as valid problems since, structurally, Pakistan observed 'qualified stability' and a continuation of the rule of law on account of its being an 'overdeveloped state'. In addition, most recently, one exponent of structural school of thought on Pakistan's politics/CMR argues that the military had, socio-economically, morphed into a military class due to its engagement in military businesses (Milbus). Therefore, the focus of studies on Pakistan's military ought not to be on how the military intervened in politics, economy and the society but rather how it should vacate the corridors of power.

Nonetheless, despite its informative character regarding the nature and functions of different classes in the colonial and post-colonial state, the structuralist literature, by and large, suffers from conceptual as well as empirical weaknesses. Conceptually, it has remained unable to distinguish between the nature, character and functions of the state and the classes (society). Moreover, the literature is devoid of any criterion to conceive and construct a class. In other words, it has ignored the inter/intra class dissimilarities and differences. Hence, context and individual rationality and agency are seriously compromised. Also, the structuralists' concept of the overdeveloped state is both conceptually and empirically invalid: conceptually, the state is, in a Marxian context, equated with the civil-military bureaucracy, thus ignoring, on the one hand, an institutional distinction between the civil bureaucracy and the military, and on the other, between the state and society. Empirically, the literature excluded the political institutions functional within British India- for instance, political parties, legislative councils

etc. One wonders on what criterion a civil-military bureaucracy-based state is termed 'overdeveloped' and that too in the presence of the state's political apparatuses.

As regards the post-colonial state of Pakistan, the structuralists' reasoning of structural transformation of the colonial-state into the post-colonial is additionally conceptually/logically flawed since it ignores the significance of context, agency and rationality. Importantly, this line of reasoning tends to give the impression that politicians and political institutions are inherently weak and incompetent to run the affairs of the state. In this sense, there is no fundamental difference between a structural and legitimist point of view. Equally illogical, empirically unfounded and thus misleading is the structuralists' concept of 'qualified stability' and 'continuum' of the rule of law, because these concepts seriously undermine the contested legality, constitutionality and morality of bureaucratic authoritarianism (of the 1950s) and military interventions.

Last but not least, the conception of a military class is also problematic. Firstly, it lacks an explicit criterion to judge- or statically measure- which section of the military organization falls within the military class. Secondly, if income and engagement in the Milbus is the basis, then, from this logic, the population below the officer cadre does not form part of the military class since it is the officer cadre which accrues most of the politico-economic benefits. Thirdly, since the concept of military class is an addition to Alavi's class thesis, one wonders what makes the military a different class from the indigenous bourgeois or the landed, feudal classes. Besides, the structural literature, by and large, shifts the focus away from civil-military relations to the haves and have-nots.

In the final section, the chapter critically analyzed the path dependency-historical institutionalist perspective on Pakistan's civil-military relations. The major themes covered by this work includes the colonial legacy in terms of Muslim separatism, the military institution, (pre-post partition) threat perception and importantly, institutionalization of these values and patterns (path) in the state of Pakistan. Having institutionalized the external threat-primarily from India- this account posited that the military was 'brought' in to politics by the state's psychological insecurity. Thus, when brought in, the military never left. Instead, it established 'control' over the civilians and emerged as a 'parallel state'.

Despite its significance in terms of applying the assumptions of path dependency and historical institutionalism, the account suffers from conceptual and empirical shortcomings. To begin with, like the structuralists, it assumes the structure of the colonial state and takes its inheritance by Pakistan's state, as a given. Importantly, it fails to describe how and, by whom, the threat perception was perceived. In addition, like the legitimists, this work tends to implicitly legitimize the military's intervention in politics on account of, firstly, an institutionalized external threat perception and, secondly, path dependency. In addition, the proponent of this work has ignored the *causes* of military coups. In other words, context, agency and rationality are under-appreciated. Ironically, the work, while attempting to explain the military's control over its civilians, lacks any definition and indicators of the concept. Finally, equally problematic is the concept of a parallel state due to its lack of conceptual and empirical rigor.

Since the existing structuralist and legitimist accounts had over-emphasized the structural transformation of the colonial state's institution into that of independent Pakistan, it was deemed necessary to critically analyze the impact, if any, of structure on the construction of the state in Chapter 3. In this regard, the study, with the help of its deductive model, categorized actors into four groups, namely, politicians, civil bureaucracy, judiciary and the military. Furthermore, with the support of empirical data, politicians were assumed to have been the principal actor at Partition- till October 1951- constitutionally, legally, electorally and morally. The other three actors were delegated powers, as is the practice of modern states, as agents. Also, these four actors were assumed capable of getting things done (agency A) and rationalizing their preferences in terms of their own rather than larger interests (agency B).

Quite contrary to the structuralists thesis of an 'overdeveloped state' (Alavi 1988), it was posited that the political leadership of Pakistan, instead of compelled by the structural constraints, had certain interests and strategies as regards the construction of the state in terms of institutions such civil bureaucracy and the military. Hence, though the former rationally retained the nomenclature of the so called pre-colonial civil-military bureaucracy, the latter was thoroughly overhauled in terms of reorganization of personnel, ranks etc. Importantly, where needed new offices/departments were established by the principal. Thus, it was maintained that the overdeveloped state was, from a Marxist perspective, equated with the civil-military bureaucracy despite the fact that the latter remained an agent of the British-

the civilian section of the British Indian state. Undoubtedly, Pakistani politicians, though in a different context and for different purposes, also treated the civil bureaucracy and the military not so differently- the latter remained an agent.

In addition, the chapter exposed crucial weakness in the legitimacy thesis, which believes that the military intervened in politics due to external (i.e. the Indian) threat perception, on logical and empirical grounds. In this respect, it was maintained that the legitimists fail to explain which institution(s) perceived the threat, for without a perceiver a threat cannot be constructed and hence military intervention cannot be justified. This study attempted its own analysis of the crucial early years of Pakistan's history and, with the help of the model, explained that it was the principal politicians who perceived the external threat and then rationally constructed strategies to deal with the situation. In this regard, the first India-Pakistan war (1947-48) in and over Kashmir is cited as a case in point whereby the principal, having judged the matter, ordered the agent military to engage India militarily. The latter, instead, preferred to shirk twice, revealing its agency and rationality.

Paradoxically, however, the principal abstained from punishing the agent meaningfully for example by devising an oversight regime/mechanism. However, in the post-war period, the principal did appoint, from its perspective, an apolitical Commander-in-Chief in order to prevent future shirking. Besides, having realized the consequences of agitational politics of the authoritarian clergy, the principal politicians chose to appease not only the clergy but also the general masses. In this regard, the Objectives Resolution (1949) was passed in the Constituent Assembly. However, contrary to the existing literature on the impact of the Resolution on Pakistan's state, it was posited here that the aims of this Objectives Resolution were political rather than purely religious, instrumental as it was for the political leadership in resolving future difference with the religious authorities.

Moreover, the chapter, with the help of its casual model, explained the change that took place in the principal in October 1951. It was posited, in this regard, that in the post-Liaquat period the agent civil bureaucracy's preference for shirking prevailed in terms of assuming the office of the Governor-General undemocratically, if not immorally. The explanation emphasized the importance of the bureaucracy's inherent agency to affect this change to maximize its political and economic benefits. Also, the working agency and rationality of politicians- both Muslim Leaguers and the general opposition- were pointed out, for they accorded more

preference to their own rather than larger, party and/or national, interests. In the changed political context of Pakistan's state, judiciary and the military worked as agents.

In its last part the chapter emphasized the strategic interaction between the principal, politicians and the military whereby each actor engaged the other for rational reasons. For example, in 1954 a section of politicians opted to repeal those sections of the constitution which empowered the Governor-General to dismiss governments at his discretion. However, before this smart politico-legal move could take root, the agent judiciary chose to undo it, for the cost of confronting the principal would have been greater. Hence, the judiciary looked to benefits i.e. non-transfer, pay and pension, prolongation of tenure etc. Moreover, the military chose to work with the principal bureaucracy in order to accrue politico-economic benefits, especially military aid and hardware from the US. The former, on its part, strategically interacted with the latter to not only appease it but importantly use it in extreme situations i.e. the maintenance of law and order.

Overall, the chapter maintained that politicians, due to their preference for own interests, failed to devise any oversight regime/mechanism and/or to put up a politically united resistance to the principal bureaucracy. Thus, the latter, in October 1958, due to a commonality of interests and convergence of priorities with the agent military, opted to dismiss PM Noon's ministry. Importantly, the country was put under martial law as a result of a successful coup.

The October coup, the consequent martial law, its constitutional, legal and moral basis, its reasons and consequences for the state were explained in Chapter 4 of the dissertation. The chapter began by explaining the first successful coup staged in Pakistan's political history. Since the coup and the consequent martial law was formally declared, on 7 October 1958, by President Iskander Mirza- the leader of the principal civil bureaucracy- this itself posed a puzzle which the study looked at theoretically and empirically. In this respect, it was posited that Mirza issued the coup/martial law proclamation in a strategic interaction with the agent military. The former's aim was to secure and prolong his-led bureaucracy's principalship vis-à-vis shirking politicians especially from East Bengal. However, the rational military, having calculated the costs and benefits, chose to sack Mirza within weeks after the formal declaration of martial law and thus, assumed the principal position. The civil bureaucracy,

with no coercive means at its disposal, could not resist this change. Strangely, a section of it chose to ally with the military. So did a section of politicians.

As regards the reasons/causes of this coup Mirza, in his address to the nation on 8 October 1958, pointed to factors such as the deteriorating law and order situation, worsening economy, the need for a true democratic/constitutional rule and the security of the state. Mirza's reasoning was supported by General and CMLA Ayub Khan the following day. Importantly, in the post-Mirza period the above-mentioned justification continued to hold. Interestingly, the analysis noted that the legitimist, path-dependent and structuralist accounts tend to legitimize the coup one way or the other. Therefore, the study took the coup as an analytic narrative of a combination of working/shirking (agency A) and own/larger interest (agency B).

To conduct the narrative, the chapter used the coup/martial law text as a point of departure and reference. With a system of coding, conceptual variables were identified; namely, law and order, economic factors, democratization, securitization, coup/martial law. The first four variables were theorized accordingly since the coup was already conceptualized in Chapter 1. Moreover, the analysis noticed a positive correspondence between each of the four variables and coup/martial law. Since the cited/stated reasons/causes could not be justified on their own, it was thought imperative to empirically and theoretically analyze the positive correspondence between the occurrence of the coup and the identified conceptual variables.

Hence, with the help of qualitative/quantitative data, it was maintained that the law and order situation was relatively better as compared to post-coup years. Had it deteriorated to the extent claimed, it was the Mirza-led principal which was responsible for this failure. Therefore, the study found no logical, empirical and moral reasons to put the county under martial law. Even the Ayub-led principal military could not maintain orderly rule for the statistical analysis pointed to a larger number of murder and riots in the final years of the Ayub-led military rule- indeed this was, from the military's perspective, one of the main reasons behind the second military coup. As regards the economic situation in the pre-coup period, it was posited that though key economic indicators pointed to a slowdown in economic growth, it was the principal bureaucracy which should have accepted responsibility rather than declare martial law. Nonetheless, the new principal did attempt to modernize Pakistan but the growth indicators it projected, were primarily based on foreign aid- which

was also affected negatively by the 1965 war. Importantly, the military's economic policies helped increase the rich-poor gap and particularly, cross-regional inequality, with the result that the majority Bengalis in East Pakistan opted for agitational politics.

With respect to democratization, the chapter explained that measures such as referendum and the Basic Democracies' system were meant primarily to depoliticize the political forces especially at the provincial level. Though, a section of politicians strategically allied with the principal in this project of democratization, there were also those who chose to shirk for their own rational reasons. Similarly, the stated purpose of securing Pakistan from threats remained a distant dream- given the ongoing military operations in Kashmir and consequent war with India, in 1965. Moreover, the West Pakistan-concentrated defense measures during the war further alienated the majority Bengalis in East Pakistan, with the effect that they began to lose faith in the state- the Six-Points are a case in point.

Having explained the empirically negative correspondence between the conceptual variables and the coup/martial law, the analysis reverted to the causal model for an alternative explanation. Quite contrary to the existing body of knowledge- the legitimists, structuralists, conspiracy theorists, path-dependents etc. - the chapter posited that it was the military's agency (the inherent capability to make things happen), which resulted in the coup. More specifically, being a rational actor the military made a calculation of costs and benefits of the action and chose to shirk and replace the civil bureaucracy as principal (agency A). In other words, the coup was rational rather than structural- or conspiratorial- in nature. Moreover, it was political in character for the primary aim was to capture political power in order to negotiate the rules of the game, on the military's own terms, with other actors concerned; a section of which, preferring its own to larger interests, strategically allied with the military. In addition, political power was used as an instrument by the principal military to maximize its own economic interests (agency B). In a nutshell, the 1958 coup was an outcome of agencies A and B.

Having explained the October coup, the analysis returned to the narrative of the Ayub-led military's final year- a time where his regime faced agitational politics led by the shirking politicians of both wings of the country. It was maintained that the primary reason behind public uprisings against military rule was the latter's lack of preference for re-negotiating the rules of the game with shirking politicians such as Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Sheikh Mujib-ur-

Rahman. Instead, the principal chose to stage another coup on 25 March 1969. As its leader, General Yahya Khan, in his maiden address to the nation the following day, cited worsening law and order and the falling economy as primary reasons/causes of this action. The need to democratize and securitize the state were stated as complementary factors to self-legitimize the event. Quite interestingly, the study founded that the legitimist accounts also tended to legitimize it. The structuralists and path-dependent works, on the other hand, compromised the context and causes respectively. Moreover, the military remained unable to provide conceptual basis for its statements regarding law and order and/or worsening economy.

Therefore, the study preferred to conduct an analytic narrative of this second coup as well. In this respect, in the coup/martial law text conceptual variables, namely, law and order, economic, democratization, securitization and coup/martial law were identified. It was observed that there existed a positive relationship between coup/martial law and each of the rest. Hence, it was deemed necessary to empirically- while remaining within the framework of the model- explain not only the positive correspondence of these conceptual variables but also the status of cited claims by the military.

With respect to law and order, the following was maintained: a) the claim that the country was facing a serious law and order problem was illogical and immoral since the military, which had attempted to justify its 1958 intervention on this aground, had failed to accomplish this task under the Ayub-led rule; b) the Yahya-led military rule also failed to maintain law and order despite resort to a military operation in East Pakistan. On the economic front, the regime's arbitrary economic approach helped increase poor-rich and cross-regional inequality. Similarly, though the martial law administration was able to promulgate its rules of the game- martial law regulations/orders are cases in point- and hold general elections, no meaningful change was let to happen by the principal who, while preferring its own interests, chose not to hand over political power to the representatives of majority Bengalis. The former was strategically supported by a section of West Pakistan-based politicians who also saw to their personal interests. The non-transfer of authority politically further alienated more than half of the country's population. To cap it all, the project of securitization in terms of the military operation in East Pakistan to cover up failures related to law and order, economy and democracy, was a complete disaster: it paved the way for the state's physical disintegration in December 1971.



Having explained the negative correspondence between conceptual variables, the analysis then centered around the model in terms of applying its explanatory variables, namely, working/shirking and own/larger interests to explain dependent variable- coup d'état. In this respect, the analytic narrative continued as an approach. Thus, it was posited that the coup was a result of military agency- being a rational actor the military was able to affect change. Hence, in the specific context of late 1960s when the Ayub-led military rule was seriously challenged by the shirking politicians, the former, in order to preserve its principalship, chose to stage the coup. The coup was thus rational than structural/conspiratorial in nature. Moreover, it was political in character since the primary objective was to control the political situation from military's perspective. Moreover, it enabled the military to re-negotiate the rules of the game with the agents especially politicians.

Most importantly, the military, having retained its principalship, used its political clout to further its economic interests. However, since the country's political situation was unstable- especially in East Pakistan and due primarily to the principal's political and economic policies, the extent of economic ventures remained limited. The chapter concluded that the Pakistani state disintegrated due to the principal military's preference for its own rather than national interests. Though a section of agents strategically allied, for their own interests, with the military as regards the military operation in the East, the ultimate power, however, lay with the former. Had preference been accorded to the national/larger interest in time, there was a high probability of Pakistan staying united. The breakup of the state increased the costs for the military to continue its principalship.

Thus, in the post-partition period the dynamics of civil-military relations were quite different. Chapter 5 began by explaining the change in principal in the post-breakup period. In this respect, it was maintained that a defeated and demoralized military rationally chose to return to barracks in order to avoid further damage to its institutional makeup. However, the military was able to strategically interact with a section of politicians in order to preserve its purely institutional interests such as the release of 90,000 personnel from Indian custody. Bhutto-led politicians, on their part, saw in the military's weaknesses their strengths; hence, their agency and rationality allowed their preferences to prevail and the country's principalship was assumed by the Bhutto-led politicians. Little wonder then, Bhutto was able to become Pakistan's first civilian Chief Martial Law Administrator as well as president- the posts

which were instrumental to enhance his and his party's political position vis-à-vis political opponents and other agents such as judiciary, civil bureaucracy and the military.

Moreover, during the period prior to the promulgation of the 1973 Constitution, Bhutto was able to take many a policy measure under the informal rules of the game i.e. the interim constitution. Hence, Mujib was released; top industrialists, who were his rivals, were put on an existing control list; anti-Bhutto journalists were arrested; basic industries were nationalized under the Economic Reform Order 1972; Land Reforms Regulations was enacted in March 1972; colleges and schools were nationalized in April 1972 and Federal Security Force- a paramilitary organization- was established in 1972. Importantly, where Bhutto became Pakistan's president under the informal rules of the game, the governorship of NWFP and Balochistan went to NAP-JUI. This fact explicitly marks, on the one hand, politicians' agency and, on the other, their rationality in terms of preferring their own rather than the larger interests, for the subsequent political developments further corroborates this assumption.

For instance, the confrontational politics between Bhutto's PPP and the leadership of NAP-JUI resulted in the loss of Balochistan's chief ministership and governorship for the latter. In this respect, the former, in pursuance of its nationalization agenda, attempted to make inroads in NAP-JUI's constituencies. The latter, on its part, confronted these measures. Consequently, the consensus on informal rules got relaxed due to divergence of preference between Bhutto and ANP-JUI. Hence, the latter opted to resign in NWFP in order to register its protest over Bhutto's new alliance with QML. However, the NAP leadership was put behind bars on stated charges of anti-state activities.

Nevertheless, the opposition, in order to pressurize Bhutto politically, gave more preference to agitational than participatory politics, for, in case of new elections, the chances for smaller parties to electorally confront PPP were minimum. Therefore, the former demanded restoration of true democracy in terms of formal rules of the game. Bhutto, in order to safeguard his interests, opted to strategically interact with the opposition with the effect that both sections of politicians were able to formalize rules of the game in terms of the 1973 Constitution. Importantly, Bhutto was able to assume the country's prime ministership for the next five years- indeed the president also belonged to his party. Moreover, all martial law orders/regulations were validated and their initiators got indemnified. The opposition,

however, was satisfied to have brought Bhuttoism under the law. Hence, in the post-1973 Constitution period, politics of interests was primarily rule-oriented- declaring Ahmedis non-Muslims is a case in point.

As regards foreign policy, Bhutto government was able to negotiate with India the release of POW at Simla in July 1972. Two years later, the prime minister was successful at hosting the Second Islamic Summit Conference at which Bangladesh was recognized as an independent and sovereign state. Moreover, as a reaction to India's nuclear tests at Pokhran in 1974, the PM vowed to pursue this goal too. Thus, Bhutto, due primarily to political reasons, remained unable to normalize Pakistan's relations with India on the pattern of Simla agreement. Importantly, the leader of the principal himself allocated considerable amount as defense expenditure to the military in order to appease the latter as well as the opposition and the general public.

However, since mid-1972 Bhutto had attempted to bring the military under the politicians/civilian control. In this respect, he was able to sack army chief Gul Hasan and air chief Rahim respectively. The latter, however, accepted ambassadorship, offered by Bhutto, in Europe- this further consolidates the study's assumption that the military's leaders saw to their own interests. In addition, Bhutto was able to introduce changes in the military's command and control structure- the DCC is a case in point. Importantly, the PM ordered the agent military to carry out military operations against the anti-state elements- the Baloch nationalists- in Balochistan. However, the underlying objective of the Balochistan operation was more political than strategic. In this respect, the PM made a rational choice to, on the one hand, tactically concentrate the military's forces in the country's remotest region, and, on the other hand, teach his political opponents a blue lesson.

Besides, the PM was also able to modify the so called cadre system of the civil bureaucracy. In this respect too, the reform measure was initiated during the period of informal rules of the game. The primary objective behind this action was to, on the one hand, accommodate PPP-affiliates through 'lateral entry' in the bureaucratic services and, on the other, make the bureaucracy do the principal's bidding more effectively. As regards the principal's policy towards the judiciary, it was comparatively less compelling. However, the third and fourth constitutional amendments- an indicator of politics under the rules- curtailed the courts' jurisdiction and limited its powers related to especially contempt of court and judges'

transfer. The Bhutto government took these measures in view of the institution's history of political alliances, pro-military verdicts, appointments and promotions.

By and large, the above-mentioned measures were, as the chapter posited, reminiscent of implicit oversight whereby the principal through carrot and stick policy attempted to ensure its control over the agents. The latter, especially the military, rationally compromised in light of the situation since its topmost priority was to restore its image nationally and improve its institutional capacity to fight regionally. Little wonder then, the institution bore with the principal's interference. For example, Bhutto ably appointed Zia-ul-Haq as new army chief in March 1976 by superseding six generals. The former perceived the new army chief as apolitical, pliant and hence harmless to the government.

Importantly, by almost the middle of his government's tenure, PM Bhutto opted to practically sideline the socialism-oriented persons from within his party. As a result, landed-interests were accommodated due to politico-electoral reasons. The rational alliance with the former showed that Bhutto- himself a big land-owner- remained unable to affect a meaningful change in the socio-economic structure of the society. Thus, the chapter noticed that the government's land, labor, education and health etc., reforms were criticized by the opposition and the affected section of the populace. In order to reduce the political damage to his person and party, Bhutto came up with a follow-up reform package especially land in 1977. However, by then the opposition politicians, being able to unite under Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) for rational reasons, chose to confront Bhutto electorally.

The scheduled elections were held in March 1977. The PPP won the majority of seats. However, the PNA, having refused the results, alleged government of massive rigging. In order to further pressurize Bhutto, the opposition alliance resorted to agitational politics. Bhutto, on his part, attempted to negotiate with the PNA in the crucial post-election period. However, the PNA-led agitational politics transformed into confrontational politics with the result that Bhutto, while asserting his control over the agent military vis-à-vis the intriguing opposition, opted to declare martial law- though under the constitution- in the country's major cities in April 1977- the Army Act was also amended that enabled military action with retrospective effect. At this critical juncture of Pakistan's civil-military relations, a section of opposition politicians called upon the military to shirk- indeed air marshal-cum-politician Asghar Khan wrote letters in this respect. However, despite these developments, Bhutto

continued preferring negotiations with the PNA. The crucial phase of negotiations was going on in the first week of July when the military struck down in terms of staging a coup and imposing martial law. Consequently, Bhutto was put under 'protective' custody; the 1973 Constitution was abrogated; national and provincial assemblies were dissolved; and political activity was banned.

In his coup/martial law proclamation, the military's leader, General Zia-ul-Haq, cited problems of law and order and economy as the primary reasons for the coup. In addition, democratization and securitization were cited as complementary factors. Since no claim can, logically, be taken as granted, the chapter, in its later half, conducted an analytic narrative of the coup. In this respect, four conceptual variables, namely, law and order, economic, democratization and securitization, were identified, on the basis of a coding system, in the coup-text. Moreover, the study observed positive correspondence between coup and each of the conceptual variables. Thus, in order to verify this positive co-relation, the model-inspired empirical explanation was carried out. As a result, it was shown that the positive relationship of coup with each of the conceptual variables was empirically unfounded. Rather, it was maintained that such factors/reasons were an indication of attempts at self-legitimation.

Importantly, the analysis reverted to the model formally so as to explain this phenomenon. Thus, quite contrary to the stated reasons/causes, it was posited that the July coup was a function of military agency. Being a rational actor, the military, having calculated cost and benefits of the coup-action, preferred shirking to working (agency A). In other words, the study maintains theoretical distance towards the existing structural, path-dependent, generalist, instrumentalist and conspiracy accounts, for they failed to explain the occurrence of the coup. For example, if the military was in 'control' of Pakistan's politics and the state, then there should have been no coup at all. Or if the coup was structurally determined, then why did it not occur in, for example, 1974, 1976 or pre-election 1977? Similarly, the US's policy, post-Afghan Jihad, towards the military regime is enough to refute conspiracy theories.

Moreover, the study maintained that the coup, being rational in nature, was political in character, for it was primarily aimed at capturing political power. In other words, as per the study's model, the coup was staged to assume Pakistan's principalship. However, the principalship was instrumental to facilitate military's economic interests- the establishment of

Shaheen and Bahria foundations are a case in point. Thus, the assumption of political power and maximization of economic interests as a dominant actor, contextually, marks the military's rationality in terms of its preferring its own to larger interest- hence agency B.

However, in the post-Zia period the military had a strategy to deal with the agents, especially politicians. Contrary to the existing narratives, Chapter sought an analytical explanation of civil-military relations, in the post-Zia period. In this respect, it was maintained that the military did not go back to barracks. Rather, it chose to stay on in politics as the principal. However, it made a tactical move in terms of allowing the politicians to participate in elections- the latter, however, were not allowed to interfere in country's foreign/defense policy. Had General Beg-led military opted to remain in politics overtly after Zia's death, the political and economic cost of this choice would have been higher than the perceived benefits.

Hence, elections were allowed to be held in 1988. Importantly however, the principal was able to strategically interact with a section of politicians who, with the blessings of the former, formed IJI against Benazir Bhutto. Despite this, the latter was able to form a government at the centre. However, her political rival, Nawaz Sharif of the IJI, became the chief minister of Punjab. In other words, the Bhutto government had limited political choices. Moreover, she had to strategically interact with the principal which had developed, over the years, an anti-PPP mindset. Though Bhutto chalked out a rational course, her say in Pakistan's foreign/defense policy was next to nothing. Nonetheless, almost in the middle of her tenure she attempted to assert her premiership in terms of meddling with military appointments and promotions. However, before Bhutto could make any meaningful change vis-à-vis the principal, her government was dissolved, in 1990, by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan who operationalized 58(2)(b) in strategic understanding with the principal. The stated charges included corruption, misconduct etc. The opposition politicians welcomed her dismissal for it provided them with another politico-electoral opportunity to test their strength.

Elections were held in the same year under the auspices of a pro-principal caretaker government. As a result, Sharif was able to form a government at the national level and Bhutto chose to sit in the opposition. The military, in its capacity of principal, was the watchdog. Being a rational actor with experience of working with the military, Prime

Minister Sharif initially opted not to interfere in military's matters especially FP/DP and the military's economic activities. His focus remained on reviving the country's economy in strategic collaboration with IFIs. However, almost in the middle of its tenure the Sharif government started developing differences, apparently constitutional in nature, with the president over the appointment and promotion of military officers.

In this respect, Sharif's calculus aimed at strategically interacting with that part of the officer cadre who in the former's perception was less harmful to his government. However, Sharif's move brought more cost than benefits. The principal military viewed it as open interference in its internal matters. Moreover, the president also saw in Sharif a potential shirker. Indeed, the latter politically vowed to repeal the Eighth Amendment which would have constitutionally tilted the balance of power in favor of the prime minister. However before Prime Minister Sharif could affect any change in the political system of Pakistan, President Ishaq in strategic understanding with the military opted to dissolve his government by operationalizing 58 (2(b) in 1993. A caretaker government was set up to take charge.

Interestingly, Sharif went to court and, quite ironically, the agent judiciary restored his government. However, the apparently ironic verdict of the apex court was rational in nature as it aimed at improving its institutional image in this specific political situation in which the president had already become controversial politically, if not legally. Moreover, the Supreme Court's judgment had implications for the agent president and not necessarily the principal military which was already reaping political benefits from the PM-President encounter. Little wonder then, in the post-restoration period, when their mutual differences resurfaced the principal provided the PM with choices; either to make peace or face the music. The rational Sharif saw more benefits in leaving the office for the opposition was already calling for mid-term elections. However, to appease Sharif and dissociate itself from a controversial president the principal sought his resignation also. A new pro-principal caretaker government assumed responsibilities including holding the general elections.

As a result of the 1993 elections, Benazir Bhutto was once again able to form a government at the centre. Having learnt from her past experiences, Bhutto took a calculated course of action. Instead of overtly interfering in military's matters, she was able to bring PPP-man, Farooq Ahmed Leghari, in the presidency. However, she remained unable to bring the opposition on board to repeal the Eight Amendment to the 1973 Constitution. Also, Bhutto

could not establish control over the country's foreign/defense policy. It remained an exclusive domain of the principal military. Importantly, as during her previous stay in office, this time also she opted not to question, in parliament at least, the military's economic ventures. However, Bhutto's relations with the judiciary soured over the issue of judges' appointment. Moreover, ironically President Farooq Leghari chose to differ with PM Bhutto over policy matters. The death of the prime minister's brother further added insult to injury. Hence, being confronted with an unfriendly opposition, the president and the principal, Bhutto's set of choices was limited. Contextually, she signaled at impeaching the president in order to politically stabilize her government. However, before the PM could move in this direction her government was dismissed, in November 1996, by the president who saw more benefits in a strategic alliance with the principal. A pro-principal caretaking administration, with the responsibility to hold elections, took charge.

As a result of the 1997 elections, Nawaz Sharif was able to head the government in Islamabad. Like Bhutto, Sharif devised a rational course of action vis-à-vis the military. The latter's economic activities were treated as a non-issue. The foreign/defense policy was also considered to be the military's sphere. However, the PM chose to deal with the dominant actor politically. In this respect, Sharif was able to get his man, Justice (retd) Rafiq Tarar, elected as Pakistan's president. Importantly, the 58(2) (b) was repealed in terms of Thirteen Amendment. These Sharif-led developments were perceived as indicators of shirking by the military since Sharif had amended the rules of the game meaningfully. Moreover, the PM's efforts to interfere in military appointments and promotions bore fruit and, army chief, Jahangir Karamat, sought retirement and later Pervez Musharraf got superseded. However, from the military's perspective, Sharif's successes added to his failures since the institution chose to deal a heavy-mandated prime minister rationally. Hence, a coup at this point of time would have been politically more costly.

Last but not least, Sharif, on his part, continued with his incremental policy of controlling the principal military. His next move was to invite, against the military's wishes, India's Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee to Pakistan in early 1999. Though the two states were able to sign the Lahore Declaration, the strategic implications of Hindu enemy's visit were grave. Little wonder, a few months after the visit, a war broke out between India and Pakistan in Kargil. Sharif was bewildered for he was not taken on board. However, the damage to his political legitimacy was done when the opposition in particular and public in general blamed



Sharif, not the military, for withdrawal. Moreover, the Kargil-differences further widened the gulf between the PM and the GHQ. Consequently, having perceived the growing military distrust, Sharif opted to replace Army Chief Pervez Musharraf- the leader of the principal military. However, this move of the PM was timely met with a coup d'état in October 1999.

In its final Chapter, the study attempted to contextualize the nature and dynamics of civil-military relations since the Kargil war which was planned by the military for rational reasons. In this regards, the chapter empirically and theoretically explained that the war was waged by the Musharraf-led military to, on the one hand, politically weaken the prime minister, and on the other hand, assert military's principalship especially regarding the making and operationalization of the country's foreign/defense policy. Hence, the war thwarted the peace process initiated by the Lahore Declaration signed between India and Pakistan in February 1999. Moreover, in the post-Kargil period Prime Minister Sharif, in order to safeguard his political interests, opted to constitutionally replace the army chief, Pervez Musharraf, with Lt. Gen. Ziauddin on 12 October 1999. However, before the newly appointed army chief could assume charge formally, Prime Minister Sharif was sacked through a coup on the same day. Consequently, the 1973 Constitution was abrogated, the assemblies were dissolved, the PM was put under house arrest and political activity was banned.

However, the Musharraf-led military attempted to justify the action. In this respect, in the coup/martial law proclamation the problems relating to governance and economy were cited as main factors. The Sharif government was blamed for the failure. Moreover, the former was held responsible for introducing a 'sham democracy'. Therefore, the military intervened in politics to democratize and improve law and order and the economic situation. In addition, it was vowed that Pakistan would be securitized, for it is the prime responsibility of the military institution. Importantly, the principal military was able to seek judicial legitimacy from the agent judiciary. The commendable refusal of Supreme Court's Chief Justice Saiduzaman Siddiqui to take oath under the PCO, however, remained insignificant, for his colleagues rationally opted to take not only a fresh oath but also to legitimate the martial law by invoking the infamous doctrine of necessity. Moreover, the agent judiciary empowered the Chief Executive- the military's leader- to amend the constitution at his discretion. Interestingly, the removal of Musharraf was also judged invalid despite the fact that it was not the issue before the apex court. Besides, Sharif was judged guilty of hijacking the PIA

plane that was carrying General Musharraf from Colombo to Pakistan- whereas the co-accused got scot-free.

Nevertheless, since the military had, at first, attempted to self-justify the coup-action and later got judicial legitimacy, it becomes imperative, logically and morally, to explain this occurrence objectively. For this purpose, the chapter analyzed the coup in the form of an analytic narrative which was seen as a combination of working/shirking and own/larger interests- or agencies A and B. In order to formally conduct the analytic narrative, the chapter identified, through a system of coding, five conceptual variables, namely, law and order, economic, democratization, securitization and coup/martial law. Furthermore, positive correspondence was observed between each of the four variables and the coup. Moreover, it was observed that the military took upon itself the responsibility to accomplish these tasks. The chapter then moved on to empirically explain each positive co-relation in order to see whether the military's claims were justified or not.

To begin with, quite contrary to the stated claim by the Musharraf-led military, it was statistically showed that the law and order situation was better under the Sharif government. Moreover, during the military rule the problem of governance lingered on with the effect that from 2005 onwards the same figures reveal a trend that is steadily going upward. Thus, it was concluded that the positive correspondence between law and order and the coup could not be established statistically. As regards the economic variable, it was found on the basis of quantitative data, that the key economic indicators, during the Sharif government, pointed to relative economic sustainability and that too in the wake of nuclear-related sanctions. Interestingly, the military under Musharraf was though able to project high growth rate in key sectors of the economy, the underlying factors for this military-led developments were foreign in nature: namely, foreign aid- that was a result of military's strategic alliance with the US regarding terrorism- and remittances which were also positively impacted by the alliance over war on terror. Moreover, despite projected high growth rates, the social sector remained neglected; poverty-related issues remained unsolved- indeed evidence pointed towards an increase in corruption and in the 'parallel economy'. In light of this empirical evidence, the chapter established a rather negative relationship between economic variable and the coup.

Similarly the chapter posited, with the help of empirical data, that the project of democratization failed to achieve the stated objective of transforming Pakistan from a sham to a true democracy. Instead, the initial ban on political activity, a highly controversial and controlled presidential referendum, espionage over political forces, NABization of shirking politicians- and favors to working PML-Q-, rigged October 2002 elections and importantly unconstitutional attempts at re-election from the existing assemblies- which had almost completed their tenure- by the General-President was sufficient empirical evidence of a negative relationship between the democratization variable and the October coup. Last but not least, Pakistan witnessed the worst violence caused by terrorist attacks in its recent history. Indeed, the phenomenon of suicide bombings was quite unprecedented with the effect that the military's leader, General Pervez Musharraf, was targeted more than one time. Moreover, the military regime was severely criticized by the opposition politicians and civil society organizations for selling out the country's (external) sovereignty to the US in terms of permitting the latter to use and launch 'drone attacks' on Pakistani territory. Hence, in light of the foregoing, the chapter posited that the securitization variable's positive relationship with the coup is also empirically unfounded.

Having exposed the negative correspondences between coup and the other conceptual variables drawn from the coup-proclamation, the analytic narrative then reverted to the model's explanatory variables in order to explain this puzzling phenomenon. Quite contrary to the existing body of knowledge on Pakistan's civil-military relations, the study posits that the coup was a result/effect of the military's agency- that the latter, being a rational actor, was able to stage a coup in order to maximize its political and economic interests. In other words, distancing itself from structural, generalist, instrumentalist, path-dependent and conspiracy accounts the chapter, on the basis of its agency model, maintains that the coup was rational in nature and political in character. It is demonstrated that the primary objective of the coup-action was to safeguard the military's political role at the expense of the Sharif-led shirking politicians who, in the pre-coup period, were able to transform their own interest into a larger one, in terms of amending the formal rules of the game. The foregoing, in other words, marks the model-based agencies A and B whereby the rational military, while preferring its own interests- and importantly expecting working from the agents-, is capable of punishing the shirking section of politicians who were, in turn, able to prioritize larger but diverging interest as far as the military was concerned. Had the Sharif-led politicians preferred working to shirking- as indeed they did in the 1990s- and not attempted to seek larger interests in

terms of violating and amending the rules of the game, there would have been, according to the model, no military coup d'état.

Thus, by staging a coup, the principal military, which had exclusively dominated the foreign/defense policy of the country along with engagement in economic activities without any oversight mechanism, was able to take the political control of state in its own hands too. However, the assumption of political power unconstitutionally, undemocratically, illegally and immorally by the Musharraf-led military caused serious damage to the ensuing democratic process. Importantly, the coup-event exposed the military's political weakness rather commonly held strength for had it been politically in 'control' of politics if not of the state, then there was no need to sack an elected PM, dissolve assemblies and abrogate the constitution. In addition, as per its hypothesis, the study empirically demonstrates that the direct assumption of political power was instrumental to facilitate the military's economic interests.

In the post-coup period, the military's politics and economic activities went, by and large, smoothly in strategic interaction with a section of politicians who, while seeing to their own political and economic interests, opted to working with the military. Moreover, the judiciary, as mentioned before, also remained an agent. However, quite surprisingly, a section of the latter- indeed the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry- opted to shirk by according more preference to larger-than-purely institutional interests. The Supreme Court's judgments on the Steel Mill case, 'missing persons' etc., are evidence of this. Hence, in this specific context, the military's leader sought to, on 9 March 2007, seek the agent judiciary chief's (justice) resignation, and that too in the General Headquarters. To the principal's surprise, the Chief Justice (CJ) stuck to shirking. The former struck back by 'suspending' the latter. Consequently, quite to the suspended Chief Justice's surprise, his colleagues and importantly the lawyers' community chose to side with him.

Moreover, a majority of opposition politicians, a considerable number of civil society groups and the private media opted to join the lawyers' movement for a variety of rational reasons. However, contextually, they were able to maintain a unique balance between their own and a larger cause: restoration of CJ Iftikhar and an end to military rule. The rational military, in the wake of agitational politics, chose to ultimately restore the CJ so that the political, if not economic, cost remained bearable. The restored Chief Justice of Pakistan, however,

continued to shirk by preferring larger to own interest- the judgment in favor of exiled Sharif is a case in point. Importantly, the CJ-led apex court opted to take a judicial note of Musharraf's re-election. The case was pending in the Supreme Court when the Musharraf-led military chose to not only sack but also arrest the CJ along with sixty judges through a military coup d'état on 3 November 2007. Consequently, martial law was imposed.

In order to self-legitimize the coup/martial law, General Musharraf pointed to problems related to security, the economy, governance and democratization. In explicit terms, the judiciary was blamed for its 'increasing interference' in the government's affairs, thus 'adversely affecting' its functioning. The chapter, in order to explain the stated factors/causes, conducted an analytic narrative of this fifth coup. In this regards, the point of departure was the identification of five conceptual variables- securitization, economic factors, law and order, democratization and coup/martial law- whereby the coup was observed to have positive correspondence with each of the remaining variables. Therefore, the chapter took each positive correspondence for a model-based empirical analysis so as to determine the worth of the military's claims to legitimacy.

As a result, it was concluded, on the basis of empirical data, that the law and order situation- regardless of the pre-coup failure on this count- further deteriorated; the economic situation further worsened as, for instance, inflation touched double-digits; the securitization process remained paralyzed since the terrorist attacks and 'drone attacks' continued; and the democratization project suffered from delay-tactics, lack of physical security for the mainstream politicians, pre/post poll rigging etc. In other words, the study did not find any positive correspondence between coup/martial law and the rest of the conceptual variables. Therefore, in order to explain the coup-occurrence, the analytic narrative reverted to a formal application of the model.

In light of the study's causal model, it was posited that the November coup was a result of the military's agency- its inherent capability to get things done. As a principal of its agents, the rational military, in order to protect its political interests- and economic interests for that matter- opted to stage a coup in order to capture the political initiative from shirking agents such as opposition politicians and especially the judiciary. The latter, quite unprecedentedly, was able to not only see the larger interest, but also to hold ground in the face of military might. Moreover, through the coup the rational military sought to re-negotiate the rules of the

game which had been violated by a shirking judiciary, and to do so in a way that protected its overall principalship of the country. In addition, the peripheral aim of the coup and consequent martial law was to further damage the political process- the delaying of elections is a case in point- as well as the country's political institutions for, as mentioned earlier in the study, the strengths of the military lay in its agents' weaknesses especially that of the politicians and the judiciary.

The chapter, as per the study's hypothesis, argued that the staging of a coup highlights the military's political weakness. Had it been politically in 'control' of its agent judiciary if not of Pakistan's politics and the state, there was no rational need to sack and arrest judges, to delay and rig elections and most importantly, to transfer political authority to politicians. This is however, the usual story as portrayed by path-dependent and structuralist accounts. Besides, as hypothesized, the chapter found that the military's economic interests were further facilitated during the period under study.

### **Hypotheses Revisited**

As a result of the model-guided explanation of Pakistan's CMR, it seems not inappropriate to revisit, though briefly, the study's hypotheses. To begin with, the core hypothesis, namely, *Military intervenes in politics because of its inherent agency, and not culture, identity, religion, conspiracy, 'structure' or threats. It is a rational institution which attempts coup(s) after having calculated the costs and benefits of the exercise. The coup-attempt marks more politico-economic benefits than cost (H 1)*, is corroborated by the model-led empirical analysis. Thus, military intervention is a function of military agency and rationality. Moreover, the thesis maintains that *the military intervention- both direct and indirect- is primarily caused by its political interests (H 2)*. In a post-coup period, the thesis has posited that *the military utilizes its political space to maximize its economic interests (H 3)*.

As the above shows, as a result of a coup (intervention), the military, as per the study's causal model, assumes the principal position. In order to maintain its principalship, it applies a carrot-and-stick approach vis-à-vis agents, namely, politicians, civil bureaucracy and the judiciary. The latter, as rational actors, normally prefer working in order to maximize their respective political and economic interests. However, *the military stages a coup d'état when its political space is perceived to be constrained by non-military actor(s) - politicians, civil bureaucracy and judiciary (H 4)*. The aim of such an exercise is *to politically enable itself to*

*(re)negotiate the rules of the game with other stake holders i.e., politicians, bureaucrats, judges (H 5)*. However, quite contrary to the existing accounts on Pakistan's civil-military relations, the present research has explained, both conceptually as well as empirically, that a *coup is a marker of the military's political weakness rather than strength (H 6)*, for had the military been 'structurally' powerful and/or followed a certain 'path' there was then no need to take the pain to stage a coup and then (re)negotiate rules of the game with agent but rational actors.

To sum up, what can be argued, in view of the above, is that all of the study's hypotheses hold on empirical ground. However, since they are tested in a specific context of Pakistan's CMR, they cannot necessarily come true to another case/context. Nevertheless, there is no logical and moral constraint on a researcher to try to test either of them in another case where the military tends to intervene in domestic politics, quite frequently.

### **Contribution of the Study**


This research contributes something new to all the three vital aspects of social science research: theoretical, empirical and methodological. Theoretically, the study has built an agency model of Pakistan's civil-military relations. The model proposes that military intervention in politics is a function of military agency and rationality. In this respect, a combination of working/shirking (agency A) and own/larger interests (agency B) was grounded in the model in terms of explanatory variables.

Methodologically, quite unprecedentedly the thesis married the method of analytic narratives (AN) to its causal model, whereby each coup was assumed an analytic narrative. Moreover, primary data, both qualitative and quantitative, was used to mark the extent of the military's economic interests. In addition, Mitra's theory of governance was applied, in each coup's AN, to address the question of law and order. Empirically, in this regard primary data of murders and riots was used.

Finally, the study, having contextualized and rationalized civil-military relations in Pakistan, maintains that there is a context-oriented flow in the principal-agent relationship (see Figure 8 on the next page). This points to, in unequivocal terms, to agency and rationality of the four actors the military being one. Besides, the present research posits that military intervention in

politics can be (cross-nationally) explained by taking the military’s agency and rationality into account.

**Figure 8 Flow of Principal-Agent Relations in Pakistan (1947-Present)**



Source: This is the author’s own depiction.



## Appendices

### Appendix A

#### Talking Points for an Interview

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#### **1. Political System of Pakistan**

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- 1.1 How do you define Pakistan's political system?
- 1.2 Do you think Pakistan is a constitutional state?
- 1.3 How do you look at the country's parliamentary history?
- 1.4 Do you think there is a separation of powers between the executive, legislature and the judiciary?
- 1.5 What role politicians and political parties have been playing over the decades?

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#### **2. Dynamics of Civil-Military Relations**

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- 2.1 What is the nature of civil-military relations in Pakistan?
- 2.2 What are the important factors in the determination of civil-military relations?
- 2.3 What role the civil bureaucracy in Pakistan has been playing?
- 2.4 Is civil bureaucracy an important actor?
- 2.5 Is the civil bureaucracy financially corrupt?
- 2.6 What is the relationship between civil bureaucracy and the military?
- 2.7 What sort of relations the judiciary has with civil bureaucracy and the military?
- 2.8 Is judiciary financially corrupt?
- 2.9 What brings the military in Pakistan's politics?
- 2.10 Has the military become a political actor?
- 2.11 Has the military emerged as an economic actor?

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#### **3. Role of Religion in Politics**

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- 3.1 What is an Islamic state?
- 3.2 Do you think Pakistan is an Islamic state?
- 3.3 How do you look at the Objectives Resolution and the Islamic Provisions in the three constitutions – 1956, 1962 and 1973?
- 3.4 Are religious groups including religious political parties important actors?
- 3.5 Do you think there is a military-mullah nexus in Pakistan?
- 3.6 What is the role of religion in the civil-military relations in Pakistan?

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#### **4. Contemporary Politics and the State**

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- 4.1 What are the implications of military rule for regional security?
- 4.2 Has the military rule brought economic prosperity to the country?
- 4.3 What implications the military rule has for the federation of Pakistan?
- 4.4 Are political parties and politicians important?
- 4.5 How do you see the future of the lawyers' movement?
- 4.6 Is there any causal relationship between the phenomenon of suicide blasts and the military rule?
- 4.7 How do you look at the February 2008 elections?

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#### **5. Other Questions**

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- 5.1 Does civil society exist in Pakistan? If yes, then what is the future of the civil society?
  - 5.2 What could be the best solution(s) for Pakistan's political problems in your opinion?
  - 5.3 Is there any message that you want to share with?
  - 5.4 What readings would you like to suggest?
  - 5.5 Which further interview partner(s) would you suggest?
-

## **Appendix B**

### **1) Sample Interview Transcript**

**Name:** Hamid Khan

**Designation:** Senior Vice President Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), member Pakistan Bar Council and Former President Supreme Court Bar Association

**Place:** Lahore

**Date:** 20 March 2008

**Language:** English

**Duration:** 90 min.

**Q:** How do you look at Pakistan's political system?

**A:** I think Pakistan has not been able to evolve a political system over the years. We are still in a process of evolving a political system which should be close to a parliamentary form of government, where the parliament is strong and other constitutional institutions are competent.

**Q:** How do you interpret the Objectives Resolution (1949)? Do you think it stipulates Pakistan an Islamic state?

**A:** No. It does not say so. I think it is [Pakistan] a modern democratic state which is envisaged by the Objectives Resolution. The mere fact, which it mentions, that sovereignty belong to Allah [God] and that it should be exercised by the chosen representative, means that we [it] wanted to have a parliamentary democratic system in Pakistan; which is a modern system of democracy... Therefore we are a Muslim state, and not an Islamic state as many of our political actors have tried to define it.

**Q:** How do you look at the politics of the Fifties? Do you agree with Dr Mohammad Waseem and scholars like him who thinks there was a 'gang of four' at that time in Pakistan, which virtually ran the country's affairs?

**A:** I am not in agreement with that. I think it was much deeper than that. They only represented the initial formation of a political establishment in Pakistan; which had decided to rule the country and defeat the democratic forces in Pakistan. Their objective was to promote undemocratic forces in the country which could rule it undemocratically and unconstitutionally. The persons that you mentioned in the 'gang of four' were a symbol of the anti-democratic actors. I think the list is extensive. I would include Justice Munir, the landed-feudals of the time and the founders and members of the Republican Party into it as well. So, the problem is much deeper than those four persons. They just happened to be at the surface.

**Q:** If the landlords, the bureaucrats and the military were in an alliance or formed an oligarchy at best, as you have pointed out, then why did the military stage the coup d'état in 1958?

**A:** Actually there was tug of war among these forces. Though the bureaucrats and the landlords were in an alliance yet they had difference of interests. The important point is that they were backed by the military in the 1950s. The latter had come to the conclusion: if we are backing and sustaining these undemocratic forces, then why not take the set up- I would not call it a system- on and assume power directly. In other words, it was a coup against the undemocratic forces.

**Q:** The factors you mentioned pertain, in my view, to the relationship between different actors in the pre-coup period. My question is: what did the military want to achieve by staging the coup? Did it want to achieve any political goal? Or did it had any other kind of objective?

**A:** I think it was more than mere political interests. Actually it had international backing. However, it does not mean that there was no power struggle between the military establishment and the civil bureaucracy. They were engaged in a power game as I mentioned already. The military was able to win it. However, after quite some time, the civil bureaucracy joined hands with the military to play second fiddle. In fact, during and after the martial law imposed by Generals Ayub and Yahya Khan, the civil bureaucracy played the role of a junior partner. The shots were called by the senior partner: the military.

**Q:** Since the military had intervened in politics having abrogated the 1956 Constitution, how was then it able to stand the test of the day? What were the issues which it may have faced legally or constitutionally?

**A:** As I mentioned already the military had no serious problems from the civil bureaucracy. But, the politicians especially whose political interests were compromised by the coup and later on the martial law, were seriously concerned about the fateful event. Not only this, a few from among the lawyers also had legal reservations about the act of coup and the consequent martial law rules and regulations. The martial law- or [technically] the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order- was challenged in the Supreme Court. It was headed by Justice Munir who had in the mid-Fifties given a biased verdict in favor of the then dictator, Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad.

The question before the Supreme Court was if the Lahore High Court's writ had abated under the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order [Clause (7), Article 1]. The case is famously known as the Dosso Case in legal circles, if not the corridors of power. In his judgment Justice Munir maintained that a successful revolution or coup is an internationally recognized legal method to change a constitution. Therefore, the martial law had created a new law-creating organ. I think Justice Munir made an arbitrary judgment. Interestingly, he relied on Hans Kelsen [*General Theory of Law and State*] to make a case. Not only this, the Chief Justice decided hurriedly to legitimize the martial law. In my opinion, there was no need on the part of the Supreme Court to decide its cases while entering into question of the validity of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order since even before the imposition of martial law, there were appeals pending before the [Supreme] Court. These appeals were heard a few days after the martial law. Clearly, it shows that the Court dragged the validity of the Order into a controversy. It did not wait until someone could directly challenge the very validity of the martial law [Laws (Continuance in Force) Order].

**Q:** So, you do not subscribe to the Chief Justice's reasoning?

**A:** Absolutely not! I have certain reasons not to agree with the resultant Order. As I have just mentioned, it was based on an imported theory grounded in the European legal experiences; the legal practices and experiences which had no relevance whatsoever with the case at hand. Moreover, the proceedings of the Court regarding the case were stretched to consciously favor the regime. Most significantly, the Chief Justice Munir's legal reasoning deprived the people of Pakistan of their fundamental human rights. It also, by the way, did disfavor to the country's High Courts in terms of curtailment of their writ jurisdiction.

**Q:** What about the coup staged by the Yahya-led military? Was it legally justified?

**A:** How could a coup d'état be a legally valid action? Yahya Khan's coup was attempted at the very edifice of constitutionality and legality. Yahya Khan did the same. The 1962 Constitution, which had actually empowered Ayub Khan arbitrarily, was abrogated. A Provisional Constitutional Order [PCO] was promulgated by the Chief Martial Law Administrator [CMLA]. As was the case with the Ayub Khan's martial law, this time around too the courts were not allowed to make any judgment, issue any decree, order etc., against the CMLA or his appointees.

Legally, the matter was not referred to the courts during the period 1969-1971. However, it did come before the Supreme Court in what now is called Asma Jilani Case [1972]. Retrospectively, the martial law was judged illegal, and Yahya Khan was termed a usurper. The important point of the Case was that it invalidated the assumptions of the Dosso Case. But, it is also a matter of fact that the Supreme Court did not have the inclination to take the matter up during the military rule.

**Q:** How do you read the 1973 Constitution? Do you think it was a consensual document?

**A:** It was a consensual document: all the political parties had participated in the process of its passage by the [National] Assembly. However, one may object the legitimacy of the assembly since it was based on the pre-breakup electoral process in which Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's Peoples Party and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman-led Awami League had won majority of seats in West and East Pakistan respectively. The fact of the matter, however, is that the post break-up assembly subsequently got legitimacy since the almost all the political parties accepted it, sat on its floor, and negotiated the pros and cons of the new constitution- 1973. Perhaps the reason why the political parties and the politicians agreed to accord legitimacy to the assembly was the retrospective conviction in the pre-Partition Constituent Assembly (1946) which was primarily elected for the whole of India. At Partition in 1947, the Assembly was divided also. In 1972, the situation was quite similar to 1947. The politicians and their parties benefited from the past and, in post-partitioned Pakistan, did to assembly what politicians had done to the 1946 Assembly. I think it was a way to sort things out and move forward.

**Q:** But what do you think of the relationship between the politicians especially Bhutto and the military?

**A:** Since the results of 1971 elections, there emerged a triangle of power. The actors were: Yahya Khan, Zulfikar Bhutto and Sheikh Mujib. Of the three, Bhutto sided with General Yahya to get rid of not only Mujib but also East Pakistan. It was not a one-sided love. The military establishment had the same towards East Pakistan and its leadership especially Mujib. In other words, what we can say is that there was collaborative relationship between

the military and Bhutto as far as East Pakistan and Sheikh Mujib was concerned. This relationship remained intact up till the fall of Dhaka. From then onwards, however, the collaborative relationship got changed to confrontational. The burden of responsibility lay on both sides. Bhutto saw in the military a potential threat to his rule. The military establishment, on its part, viewed Bhutto a threat to its rule. However, for the time being, Bhutto had an advantage over a defeated and demoralized army [military].

**Q:** How do you look at politics under Bhutto?

**A:** Bhutto assumed power in peculiar circumstances: the country had broken up. Bangladesh was a reality; the military was demoralized; the economic situation had worsened extremely. As per his promises to his primary constituency- the poor section of the population- Bhutto was initially able to deliver re-distributive justice to them relatively. My point is not that every poor got richer; however, he got something material to satisfy his basic human needs. However, the relative relief to the poor came, overall, at the cost of the middle classes, to which belonged country's civil bureaucracy, the military and lawyers. They were certainly disenchanted by his policies be that administrative or economic. On the other hand, the landlords, the class he himself belonged to, also prospered- certainly not all of them especially his opponents.

**Q:** If Bhutto was favorite of the poor, as you described, why then he was deposed by another General?

**A:** As I have already mentioned, due to his politics or better policies, Bhutto had, to the end of his tenure of five years, distanced the middle class. Moreover, his nationalization policy further brought resentment from the industrialist class. Therefore, it was quite natural that at the 1977 polls these classes had different and divergent options. Having perceived this, Bhutto had no other option but to rig the elections. As a result of massive rigging, even of by-elections, he attempted to gain political legitimacy. However, this was not to be the case since the aggrieved section was already taking to the streets. I think they led a genuine political movement against Bhutto.

**Q:** But how did the military come in the picture?

**A:** The military, by and large, is a part and parcel of Pakistan's middle classes. It was also hurt by his policies. Interestingly, the opposition political parties, instead of urging Bhutto to announce and hold fresh and free elections, were calling the military to remove Bhutto from the scene, and thus clear way for them. This attitude of the politicians would have encouraged the men in *khaki*. However, the generals should have been planning by April at least- since a coup cannot be attempted in a void. The military should have observed the popular mood and demand. Unfortunately, the politicians the like of Asghar Khan were openly inviting the military to take over. Little wonder then, in July 1977- a few months after the [rigged] elections- General Zia-ul-Haq, a pious man but by no means innocent, struck back.

**Q:** How do you look at General Zia and the military politics during the 1980 generally?

**A:** The politics in the 1980s revolved around Zia. He remained the central most figure during this entire period. He fought the Afghan Jihad; he had a tough stance against India; he collaborated with the Americans who got penetrated in Pakistan's politics unprecedentedly; he allied with the religious forces. Very importantly, there took place a transformation in the

country's political system whereby the military happened to dominate the system in ways and manner not known before. Moreover, the part of the transformation was that through the military, especially its intelligence agencies, the foreign forces, having interests in our region, also got entered into our political system in an unprecedented way.

**Q:** What about the judiciary during this period? Did it uphold the legal and constitutional principles?

**A:** The judiciary remained a partner of the military establishment during this period. Unfortunately, it remained unable to hold the ground in the face of military rule this time around too. When the question of the legality and constitutionality of the imposed martial law came before the Supreme Court in what is now famous as The Nusrat Bhutto Case, the Supreme Court validated the coup and martial law rules and regulations [Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1977] in the name of 'state necessity'.

**Q:** Why was Bhutto hanged? What role did the judiciary play in it?

**A:** I think Bhutto was perceived to be a potential personal threat by General Zia-ul-Haq. Therefore, he was arrested in a murder case retrospectively. The role of the judiciary especially the apex court remained dubious during the entire course of proceedings. The fact of the matter is that Maulvi Mushtaq, the Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court, had personal antipathy towards Bhutto. So, the prejudicial process of proceedings started from the very beginnings. At later stages, the Supreme Court's Chief Justice was replaced with a favorable one. Moreover, there were obvious breaches of law in terms of non-treatment of Bhutto's transfer application which were moved both in High Court and the Supreme Court. There were other instances as well; one of them was that the retiring member of the Bench, despite the existing norm of continuing in the capacity of ad hoc judge, was not recalled. Ultimately, the final judgment in the Appeal was divided: three judges in favor of Bhutto whereas four judges held the judgment given in the Appeal. So, Bhutto was hanged due to a difference of one vote.

**Q:** What is your take on the Eighth Amendment?

**A:** The origins of the [in]famous Eighth Amendment lay in the Provisional Constitutional Order enforced in late March 1981. Indeed, it served as constitution of the country since it was upheld by the Lahore High Court- which showed the judiciary was still toeing the establishment's line. The next blow to legal and constitutional norms came in March 1985 when the 1973 Constitution was amended with the help of what now is known as Revival of the Constitution [Revival of the Constitution of 1973 Order (RCO)]. The RCO was actually used as a device by the Zia-led military establishment to accrue maximum concessions from the politicians and their parties. I think it served as a bargain mechanism between the democratic forces and the non-democratic actor. However, at the end of the day, the military was successful in its efforts; it got the very essence of the 1973 Constitution amended in its favor. The martial law rules, regulations and orders along with the issuing authorities were indemnified. Moreover, Pakistan was no longer a parliamentary democracy constitutionally. As a result of the passage of the Eighth Amendment, the presidential form of government was incorporated in the corpse of the constitution.

**Q:** Why, in your opinion, did the politicians do so?

**A:** As I have [already] mentioned, the RCO was promulgated to put the demanding politicians in a perplexing situation. As they were going with the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy [MRD], and revival of the original constitution was one of their main demands as a basis of any democratic process, the military establishment saw through it. Therefore, as a result of negotiations, both sides believed in give and take, for political reasons. What the politicians gained, at the end of the day, was the relative restoration of democratic process in terms of lifting of the martial law.

**Q:** Do you think the 1990s was a decade of democracy?

**A:** I do not see [it] so. Though we see that civilian governments were formed, we also know that they were dissolved by the president who without an iota of doubt, did so on the behalf of the military establishment. In this respect, interesting evidence is the sacking of Nawaz Sharif's first government [1990-1993] by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan. The sacked prime minister sought judicial rescue. The Supreme Court of the country, quite to the surprise of the president or the military establishment for that matter, restored the sacked assemblies and the government. However, we see that despite this restoration, which in itself was a rare judgment from a judiciary which had previously endorsed the martial laws, both Nawaz Sharif and President Ishaq had to leave their respective office. It was because the real power lay with the military which had played the role of an arbiter in the country's political system. Therefore, I do not agree to the view that the 1990s was really a decade of democracy.

**Q:** Agreed that the president toed the military line, but how do you evaluate President Farooq Ahmed Leghari who was appointed [to the Office of President] by Benazir Bhutto? Why did he then sack his benefactor?

**A:** President Farooq Leghari is, very much like the Supreme Court's decision to which I have just referred, an interesting reading. Actually, in Pakistan's politics almost everyone looks to his [or her] interests. Benazir Bhutto got him appointed as president because she did not like to be victimized by Ghulam Ishaq once again- her government was also dismissed by President Ishaq in 1990. Therefore, it seems quite perfect that she brought her man in the presidency which had practically become a palace of intrigues. Farooq Ahmed Leghari, on his part, also wanted power. So, quite naturally he agreed to assume the office. He, in my view, should be happy to know that the 58(2) (b) still lay with him since it was not excluded from the constitution by either Sharif or Bhutto. In fact, they had different views on it. Thus, during the course of time, differences emerged between the prime minister and the president; especially the killing of Mir Murtaza, Benazir's brother, further brought disharmony between the two. Bhutto had plans to remove him possibly through an impeachment. However, before she could do so the 58(2)(b) was operationalized by President Leghari and Bhutto government stood dissolved on stated charges of corruption, mismanagement of the economy etc.

**Q:** So, you think military was not involved in it?

**A:** Not to the extent it was involved during her first dismissal. There was no need for arbitration since the duel between the prime minister and the president was already benefiting the military establishment. They should have amused at her removal.

**Q:** Do you think the Thirteenth Amendment was a positive development as far as constitutionalism was concerned?

**A:** Of course, it was. The Thirteen Amendment was significant in more than one way. It empowered the Office of Prime Minister vis-a-vis the Office of President; it authorized prime minister to appoint the three services chiefs- an important and at times thorny issue. Moreover, it provided a hope to the people of Pakistan that the country was struggling to strengthen the parliamentary institutions. However, it was also unfortunate that during Nawaz Sharif's second term in office the apex court- the Supreme Court- was attacked by hooligans who had not unknown affiliations with the ruling party.

**Q:** What was the primary motive behind this Amendment?

**A:** The main factor that should have played its role in the passage of the said Amendment was realization on the part of the prime minister that without amending the constitution in favor of the prime minister it was almost impossible to avoid tension with either the constitutionally empowered president or the military establishment; Nawaz Sharif, given his heavy mandate, was quite confident to obtain this objective.

**Q:** Why was the [October] 1999 coup staged? What was the main reason?

**A:** There is no single factor which might have caused the 1999 coup when Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was arbitrarily removed from his office by General Pervez Musharraf. I think the way and manner the PM had dealt with the military establishment- he had sought resignation from General Jahangir Karamat; he had a few generals to appoint Musharraf as the new army chief; he had differences with the military establishment over the operation in Kargil- should have caused deep concerns in the GHQ [General Headquarters]. In other words, it was a cumulative process of a variety of factors which ultimately led to his sacking. However, the immediate reason was the appointment of General Ziauddin as the new army chief. This decision of the prime minister to replace General Musharraf, urged the institution of the military to take action against Nawaz Sharif. In other words, it was institutional reaction against the prime minister.

**Q:** Was the coup justifiable then?

**A:** I did not mean so. I just pointed out the reasons including the immediate one. As regards its justification, there are different ways and level to read it. Obviously, the sacking of Nawaz Sharif satisfied his political opponents. It was then no wonder that members of some political parties were seen disturbing sweets in the streets of major cities. However, an important fact in the aftermath of the coup was that a good number of lawyers protested against this illegal and unconstitutional act by General Pervez Musharraf. Moreover, with the passage of time the rejoicing elements also came to realize the extent of damage done to democracy by the martial law.

**Q:** What role did the judiciary play as regards the question of legality of the martial law?

**A:** When the military establishment had taken charge of the country on 12 October 1999, Pakistan was virtually standing in a legal vacuum. In the immediate aftermath of the coup, a Proclamation of Emergency was issued which designated General Musharraf as Chief Executive of the country. This Proclamation was practically the law of the land. However, on October 14, 1999, a Provisional Constitutional Order was promulgated which further improved upon the Proclamation of Emergency. The PCO did the two important damages as



in fact all PCOs had done in the past: one, it restricted the courts' jurisdiction; two, it encroached upon the fundamental human rights of the people of Pakistan.

The judiciary witnessed all this. However, it was allowed to function without taking a fresh oath PCO. This would have sent a positive signal to the courts, especially the higher courts that in the course of time legal matters would be sorted out. However, when the case was filed in November 1999 against the very legality of the October coup by Syed Zafar Ali Shah- a PPP man who was member of the suspended National Assembly- tough time awaited the judges especially of the Supreme Court because they now had to judge the coup on purely legal basis.

Nevertheless, in December, 1999 a five-member Bench of Supreme Court was constituted to hear the appeals filed against the act of coup. The Bench was headed by Chief Justice Saeed-uz-Zaman Siddiqui and had Justice Mohammad Bashir Jahangiri, Justice Nasir Aslam Zahid, Justice Abdur Rehman Khan and Justice Wajeeh-ud-Din Ahmed on it as members. The proceedings took time as is normal in litigations. The military establishment had no patience for this. Perhaps they also were uncertain of the mental makeup of the members of the Bench since they were not required to take oath. Therefore, on 26 January 2000 the members of the superior judiciary were required to take a fresh oath under the PCO. Interestingly, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court along with five other judges of the apex court in addition to seven judges of the High Courts [two from Peshawar High Court; two from Lahore High Court; and three from Sindh High Court], in an unprecedented manner, refused to take oath under the PCO. Subsequently, they were retired prematurely. This act of the judges was commendable in all respects. However, it is a fact that the remaining seven judges of the Supreme Court along eight two High Courts judges took oath under the PCO. The reconstituted court validated the martial law on the basis of the doctrine of 'state necessity'. However, to save face they called upon the Chief Executive to hold general elections by October 2002. This was the overall picture of the role played by the judiciary with respect to the validity of the coup.

**Q:** How do you comment the accountability measures taken by General Musharraf since he claimed to clean the country of corrupt elements?

**A:** Initially, claims were made in this respect: a National Accountability Ordinance was issued in 1999 which subsequently became the basis of the National Accountability Bureau [NAB]. The NAB was aimed to achieve one of the objectives, namely, accountability- as was stated in the Seven-Point agenda of General Pervez Musharraf. Many statements were made in the press by the General and his associates with respect to accountability, democratization, improvement of the country's economic conditions etc. However, very soon the real face of the regime became visible. It was quite unpleasant to see corrupt politicians- including investigated to be corrupt by the NAB- assuming ministerial posts under Musharraf. Not only this, the Chief Executive replaced President Rafiq Tarar, through an Order; later, he got his presidential tenure extended for next five years through a highly controversial referendum. The same came true to the country's economic conditions. So, overall I do not see any structural improvement in the political system of Pakistan. In fact, it started to deteriorate since his [Musharraf] policies brought more foreign influence to the country. For instance, the US was provided bases in Balochistan in order to fight the War on Terror. In addition, the suicide attacks started under him. Finally, the drone attacks too are his gift to Pakistan.

## 2) Sample Interview Transcript

**Name:** Mr. Abdur-Rauf

**Designation:** Senior journalist/Anchor/Director infotainment, GEO TV Pakistan

**Place:** Lahore

**Date:** 10 September 2009

**Duration:** 75 min.

**Language:** English

**Q:** What is the nature of civil-military relations in Pakistan?

**A:** For the praetorian nature of our society and historical significance of armed forces in power-politics and weak civil institutions the ruler type military presents itself as the dominant institution that has to control the state. Moreover, it assumes the role of arbiter type [military], from time to time, to rationalize its dominant role as a social arbitrator that steps into the governance to correct the imbalance created by the democratic leadership.

**Q:** What are the important factors in the determination of civil-military relations?

**A:** Unwillingness to accept the role of political leadership in coping with the key state issues; lack of military's independent political organization, the concept of the time limit for army rule, a low level of national consciousness, fear of civilian retribution and concern for army's [military] consolidation as the most supreme institution are some factors that determine civil-military relations in our country.

**Q:** Are the political parties and politicians important actors?

**A:** On key issues like Kashmir and defense budget political parties can play merely a symbolic role. They are important to present Pakistan as a state that is not ridden with totalitarianism. The democratic face of the state is shown through the political actors. Politicians are important in that they of late didn't accept the totalitarian approach of a military ruler and launched a strenuous movement against him. Political parties, anyway, are representative of the people of Pakistan and people have always put confidence in them.

**Q:** What role the civil bureaucracy in Pakistan has been playing historically?

**A:** [Civil] Bureaucracy has been plundering the country instead of working out efficient mechanism to serve the nation. In collaboration with corruption mafia and commission mafia bureaucracy has been serving their own interests whether it is civil bureaucracy or military bureaucracy. The top brass of the bureaucracy avail of all the perks and privileges at the cost of the rights of lower strata. They keep people their *slaves* mentally by keeping them unfed, uneducated and unhealthy. Bureaucracy is now serving the interests of capitalist world in letting the market forces use our markets for selling their goods.

**Q:** Is civil bureaucracy still an important actor politically?

**A:** It is important as the political leadership is generally unaware of the technicalities, mechanism, policies that are underway to cater to the needs of the people. It is civil

bureaucracy that actually influences the political forces to devise mechanism to start different projects, though in a way that serves their interest. There is no system of accountability in bureaucracy. Bureaucrats are supposed to be affiliated with different political groups and their key positions in various governments serve the interests of their sphere.

**Q:** What is the relationship between civil-bureaucracy and the military historically?

**A:** Civil and military bureaucracy has been serving the interests of their class instead of consolidating their institutions. The elite of both military and civil bureaucracy are one as far the key national issues are concerned. There has been a power struggle between them in the pre-Ayub era but after the Afghan war military bureaucracy has become more powerful. Civil bureaucracy is not generally at daggers drawn with the military bureaucracy, thanks for the dominance of particular elite.

**Q:** What role the judiciary has been playing historically?

**A:** Judiciary has been supporting the military rulers of late but in the immediate past it has achieved a position of glory after it said NO to a military ruler who is supposed to be the most powerful person in the country. Earlier some key players from judiciary have been on cross roads with the democratic rulers but both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif influenced the institution as did military rulers. Judiciary interpreted the laws in favor of military rulers though it has reached up to a code of ethics now.

**Q:** What sort of relations the judiciary has with civil bureaucracy and the military?

**A:** With military its role has been submissive and subdued, but it has dominated the civil bureaucracy though not to the extent that it could make a difference. Suo Moto tradition in vogue is a strong expression of this dominance.

**Q:** Is judiciary financially corrupt?

**A:** Judiciary, on the whole, is corrupt but news about its corruption is not made public for keeping its image intact; otherwise it is easier to buy a judge (particularly from lower courts). Corruption of judiciary lies in siding; protecting and giving legal cover to the accused. Legal cover has been given to the overriding of the constitution by military dictators as well and this happened in higher courts. Judiciary is being revamped these days.

**Q:** What is the nature of different religious groups in Pakistan?

**A:** There are different religious groups with altogether varying ideologies, motif and line of action. Some are politically active and their ideology is based on consolidation of Ummah by occupying the throne in the state. Some have been militants in the past but they have now 'taken a right course' by declaring themselves social workers. These parties are involved in sectarian violence; religious fanaticism and outright preaching of religion. They are involved in the persecution of their fellow countrymen with a different religious background. On sectarian level they have been killing one another in the past. A religious party [Jamaiat Ulma-e-Islam] is supposed to be the most influential group for Taliban as most of the Taliban have received education in their madarrasas. Religious parties are fed by foreign countries that correspond to their respective ideological affiliation held by these religious groups. Some religious groups preach Islam irrespective of caste, creed and political attachment.

**Q:** Are religious groups (including religious political parties) politically important?

**A:** Some religious groups had developed into political parties before the advent of Pakistan and these are political legacies of those political parties. Jamat-e-Islami and Jamiat Ulema-i-Hind are two of them. Jamat-e-Islami has been in power partly during Musharraf era under the banner of MMA and it has been very important during Zia era. Afghan war is supposed to be fought by this religious group in collaboration with Pakistan army [military]. Jamaat Ulma-e-Islam has been very influential as it represents the Deobandi school of thought. Taliban of Pakistan are also Deobandi in general. Even today Jamiat Ulma-e-Islam (F) is partner in the coalition government of PPP[-P].

**Q:** What is the role of religion in the civil-military relations in Pakistan?

**A:** Civil and military establishment upholds the ideology of Islam and state is run under the banner of this ideology though the ideology has never compelled them to distribute powers and privileges to the lower strata in the country. The symbolic importance of ideology is anyway upheld by both of them.

**Q:** What brings the military in Pakistan's politics?

**A:** Capability of intelligence agencies to influence; threaten and bribe the politicians; Indian factor; the power to manipulate by the dint of power and money; the weakness of democratic structure in the country; the vested interests of political leadership; the eroded democratic institutions in the country and lack of political will to thwart military intrusion bring military in to politics.

**Q:** Has military become a political actor?

**A:** Military has become a big corporate sector. It has put huge investment in development projects; financial institutions, services sector and real estate. Even if army institutions fail, they are fed by civil institutions like Army Welfare Trust [AWT] was rejuvenated by civil institutions when it was going to the dogs. NLC [National Logistics Cell] has replaced Railway cargo effectively. With the power of money and traditional military discipline it easily manipulates in politics.

**Q:** What are the implications of military rule for the regional security?

**A:** Different regions are facing tribulation and agony for the too much interference and decisions made by military- like Baloch and Swati people accuse military of their grievances.

**Q:** Has the military rule (both present and past) brought economic prosperity in the country?

**A:** The prosperity brought about by military is not far reaching as billions of dollars have been given by the US to pursue its own interests in the region and that is why the inflow of capital in the country brought opportunities but the country had to give back eleven dollars for every one dollar gained so far. The Military has opened up new vistas in the realm of services sector but no industry has been developed and no means of production have been exploited by the military. Job opportunities have been given in private sector but infrastructure for local industry has not been resorted to. Right after the Musharraf

government, the economic crisis loomed large and it was for the artificial blockade of the crisis in the country. A lot of sectors were privatized for peanuts in the country.

**Q:** What implications the military rule has for the federation of Pakistan?

**A:** Federation has become weaker as the people in all the provinces affiliate themselves with the regional groups that lay their foundation on ethnic and provincial basis. People are against establishment that works on the behalf of the centre.

**Q:** Is there any causal relationship between the phenomenon of suicide blasts and the military rule?

**A:** Suicide blasts started during the military regime and rose to its peak all along the military rule. Musharraf's crackdown against Red Mosque in Islamabad ignited the suicide bombers that allegedly had affiliation with their fellow religionists.

**Q:** Does civil society exist in Pakistan? If yes, what is the future of the civil society?

**A:** Civil society is a pressure group and it has recently launched a movement against a military ruler in collaboration with lawyers and has achieved its target. Civil society is composed of educated people but their approach towards life is somehow elitist as they never talk about the injustice of free market economy; uneven development, under-globalization and squeezing market for the poor.

**Q:** What could be the best solution(s) for Pakistan's political problems, in your view?

**A:** Redistribution of wealth; reallocation of resources; long term approach to exploit the resources of the country; less dependence upon foreign aid; minimum military role on political decisions; less obsession with the Indian factor and march towards the development of infrastructure in the country are solutions for our political problems.

**Q:** How do you look at Pakistani media over the decades?

**A:** Up till the advent of 21<sup>st</sup> century [the] media in Pakistan has been serving the interests of the government, both military and democratic [civilian]. With the spread of private media channels the *accountability* of politicians and bureaucrats has been made possible to some extent...[It] is playing a significant role in making the public opinion and highlighting the popular perception. The Media's popularity lies in its outright crispy opposition to the government so public awareness is in progress regarding the constitutional development, political insight and institutional reforms in the country. [Despite this, it] has to bear the pressure of ideology, popular mindset of the masses- particularly in the case of religious issues and social taboos-, interests of the state, foreign countries (like Saudi Arabia) and market forces.

**Q:** Do you think the media- both print and electronic- was free under Ayub, Z.A. Bhutto, and Zia?

**A:** During all these three eras media served the interests of the ruling party. In Bhutto's age there was a reaction against the suppressed voice of the people so media resorted to the hitherto neglected intellectuals, analysts and literary people.

**Q:** How do you look at the media's role post-9 March 2007?

**A:** The media is playing a significant role in making the public opinion and highlighting the popular perception. The media's popularity lies in its outright crispy opposition to the government so public awareness is in progress regarding the constitutional development; political insight and institutional reforms in the country.

**Q:** Do you think Pakistan's media is free from any sort of pressures from any sort of actors?

**A:** No. Media has to bear the pressure of ideology; popular mindset of the masses (particularly in the case of religious issues and social taboos), interests of state; foreign countries (like Saudi Arabia) and market forces.

**Q:** How do you see the future of the country?

**A:** Brightness of future is conditional. Reliability on its resources; strict check and balance on the money that travels into and out of the country; long term planning for developing infrastructure; sound policies for trade routes; contentment of the people living in the far flung areas; non-intervention of military elite and pursuit of economic prosperity are to be focused otherwise the state cannot be kept intact forcibly.

### 3) Sample Interview Transcript

**Designation:** A civil bureaucrat from the Ministry of Commerce

**Place:** Islamabad

**Date:** 29 April 2008

**Duration:** 45:45 min

**Language:** English

**Q:** Today is 29 of April 2008, and I have with me [a civil bureaucrat, who works] in the Ministry of Commerce. Thanks for your time. [0:1]

**A:** Welcome...

**Q:** How would you like to define Pakistan's political system in general? [0:37]

**A:** First of all I think, we have to decrease the military's role in Pakistani politics. Because wherever you see the political system as an emerging force, you would find that there is (always) a trial and error process. The country's forces like the military, bureaucracy give them a space and opportunity to groom. For example, we have whole of the US history and United Kingdom's history (*pause*), that we see they pass through very critical phases during the kingship in the United Kingdom whereby the political forces continued their personal development. They challenged the authority of the king, and even at one time they beheaded Charles I. In the same way, if we look at the American history, they challenged the British supremacy and then the political parties emerged with the passage of time, and they got strong. But unfortunately in Pakistan if we look at the history since inception...Pakistan was

achieved through a classical nationalist movement headed by a few westernized elite like our founder Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah , and other political leaders like Liaquat Ali Khan and some other famous leaders [Ispahani etc]. They exploited the religious sentiments of the people. Jinnah wanted to give the Muslims of India an independent land free from Hindu domination and the British Raj [domination].

**Q:** Sorry to interrupt you, what you really want to say is the political parties like Muslim League was very weak from the very beginning. Is it weakness of the political forces which provided opportunity to extra-parliamentary force which led [themselves] in politics? [2:55]

**A:** Exactly. *Pause*. One thing that I want to tell you is [that] Pakistan was achieved as an ideological state. Our founder got the religious support from the different sections of the society, like different clerics...most of the clergy was behind the nationalist movement of the Quaid. But immediately after the creation of Pakistan if we look, the clergy went to the other side, and there was polarization of politics. And, some people wanted Pakistan to be a theocratic state; but some liberal elements wanted Pakistan to be a more democratic Islamic state. Right. And, since inception (when) the polarization emerged and when the vacuum [got] created, because when these [two] forces, the liberal forces, the feudal forces and the clergy [they] become polarized (*pause*), the army [military] saw (that) it is their duty to save Pakistan's ideological boundaries. And, once in his speech at Quetta Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah suppressed Mr. Ayub as the [latter] wanted to be in the politics of Pakistan. He [Jinnah] categorically denounced the role of military. A military which was recruited by the British from present day Pakistan- from [Rawal]pindi, Chakwal, and Jhelum regions...when they saw vacuum they got into the politics on the (very) first day when Ayub was inducted as defense minister in the cabinet of Mohammad Ali Bogra.

**Q:** You are right from your perspective. My question is what was that which led to the fragmentation of religious clergy, civil bureaucracy and politicians under Jinnah? Because it was the same Jinnah who, as you mentioned, was in control of this whole coterie of forces, for example Muslim League, civil bureaucracy [etc.]. But what was that which made these forces after the creation of Pakistan to fall like house of cards? [5:10]

**A:** Well said. Stanley Wolpert said about the Quaid [Jinnah] that some leaders create nations, some leaders create countries. But Jinnah did both. And the reason for that is whole of political leadership was united, but [due to] untimely death (of the Quaid) led to polarization in the Pakistani politics

**Q:** Right. What you really want to say is there was lack of leadership? [6:11]

**A:** Y[es] exactly, [there is a] lack of leadership. If we compare it with India, we (see) that Nehru ruled for approximately twenty years after the creation of Pakistan [and India]. And he gave, I think, direction to the Indian politics. And secondly, [in today's Pakistan], before Partition the present day Pakistan had no political roots. Because the Congress in India had its roots right into the masses. They appealed and gave consciousness to the people that it's your right and you should go ahead for your rights: you should protest; you should boycott.

**Q:** I got your point in a comparative perspective. So, what I really want to know from your side is, in the absence of leadership, why did the Pakistani masses in the '50s not react to the coming of extra-parliamentary forces, or even parliamentary forces such as politicians? Though there was a Constituent Assembly if not a parliament, still it [Constituent Assembly]

was there. But why Pakistani masses did not come to streets and demand the emergence of a new leadership? [6:59]

**A:** Right. If we look t the early years of partition we will find the masses who were already living in the contemporary Pakistan had no political consciousness...they were direct[ly] under the subjugation either of feudal lords or Hindu- economic system . They didn't have so much awareness for their rights. Secondly, people who were politically conscious migrated right from India but they got involved in their own settlement issues. That's why they couldn't protest against the extra-parliamentary forces. They had to take care of their own square meal, that's why they didn't actively participate in the political system. And, *pause*...

**Q:** May be lack of organization among unions like the trade union (was a factor)? [8:44]

**A:** Y[es] exactly. You can say that Muslim League didn't have so much deep roots in the present day Pakistan

**Q:** Right. You mentioned that it was primarily the structure which influenced Pakistani state and society from the very beginning and the example you cited was the recruitment of military from the three districts (of British India), and then the officers at the top further intensified the process of the of extra-parliamentary forces coming into politics. So, once they were there, what was that which led them not get out of it [politics]? [9:01]

**A:** You are talking about the army and the forces that kept them in politics for such a long time?

**Q:** Of course. Are there any factor, any reasons, and any interests? [10:06]

**A:** I have some logical answer to this question. As I mentioned earlier the British army was recruited from Northern Punjab [of today's Pakistan]. These people got emerged as defenders of the ideological boundaries of Pakistan. Because from the very first day they were inculcated that you are the real defenders of the motherland, and this psychology forced them to think that [these] politicians are corrupting the state of Pakistan – corrupting the ideological boundaries of Pakistan. They [the military] thought politicians had vested interests in politics. They were not professionals. They were not mature enough to lead a new state into some direction. They [the military] thought themselves to be genius because they had training under the British [military values and institutions]. In that sense, that superiority complex enforced them to political maneuvering

**Q:** So, were they successful in achieving these objectives as being savior of the nation? [11:43]

**A:** No, not at all. Pakistan army [military] is not a savior of the nation. Actually, they proved, I think, to be the Armageddon for this nation. Because once they entered into politics, they initiated their corporate interests. And once their corporate interests surfaced, they wanted to remain in politics to save their corporate interests. Second, the geostrategic position of Pakistan is such....I would like to say the distortion in Pakistan's politics is directly linked with its geostrategic position. Because during the Cold War Pakistan had to be ally of the USA in order to condemn communism. And, the US thought Pakistan army is professional one – it was considered to be the elite of the country. They thought they should have contact with the elite. Because it is easy to deal with the elite rather than the common people. Once



they established their linkages with the army, she got confident that [now] she has political, economic and strategic support from the US. They should prolong their stay in politics of Pakistan in order to achieve their own interests as well as those of America. And that was (due to), I think, the corporate interests. This is the reason which impose them to be in politics

**Q:** Do you think herein lies the reason for the break-up of the country ...I mean the interests of the military in terms of its corporate interests kept them in politics and as a result the Eastern Wing didn't get proper rights. So, do you think that these interests of one particular group or institution led to the break-up of the country? [13:36]

**A:** Exactly! I do agree with this. First of all, (there is) the attitude problem with Pakistan military, and that attitude was (caused by) the superiority complex. Because most of the Punjabis dominated the army who thought that these bully, black Bengalis are not competent enough to rule the country. And this attitude (of) superiority complex pushed them to suppress the Bengalis. Right. Secondly, with the passage of time their corporate interests got increased. Thirdly, the factor vis-à-vis India- they thought if India was their enemy, so Bengalis was thought to be more close to India [culturally and geographically]. That's why they thought them to be their internal enemy. They thought Bengalis were not sincere with the state of Pakistan, and this ideological misperception enforced the Pakistan army to think in different directions. Because once the country is ruled by the army, it is definitely under the dictatorship which doesn't have space for negotiations, for tolerance, and for political dialogue. The dictator says it should [must] be done, and it's all.

**Q:** In the post-break up period we see that Bhutto became Chief Martial Law Administrator and the President of the country, so what do you think was the real reason behind his assumption of two offices? Was it that Pakistani military got discredited or demoralized in the war against India in '71? Or was it that Bhutto was powerful personality in that particular context? Or is there any third or fourth reason? [15:42]

**A:** Well, if we look at the personality of Mr. Bhutto, [we will see that] he himself belonged to a feudal family. He had some kind of feudal attitude. Though he got majority in the Western Wing, but mentally he was feudal: he didn't tolerate the opposition, he even killed his opponents; he suppressed his opponents, he started the military operation in Baluchistan. Some time he was at loggerheads with Mujib only because he [Bhutto] knew that had there been election for the National Assembly Mujib [-ur-Rahman] would get the premiership of the country. That's why he maneuvered in such a way- he compelled army through his maneuvering to undertake the military operation in the Eastern Wing. Because he (himself) belonged to the Western Wing and most of the military too came from this Wing. That's why Tikka Khan led the operation in East Pakistan. This is the reason that even after winning the majority and presenting himself as the first democratic leader of Pakistan after the Quaid, when he assumed the position of decision making he thought that the problems of the state could not be easily solved through a plain process of democracy or dialogue. That's why he reverted back to military-style dictatorship. This was the reason [of the break-up and Bhutto's rise]. There is no doubt that Pakistani problems of security were genuine; there were tribals who were challenging the writ of the state in Balochistan, and even in Sindh and tribal areas. That's why he didn't have any option. Because Western Pakistan didn't have broad political base. That's why he being the leader of a single democratic party, assumed himself to be a dictator. I think that was an attitudinal problem.

**Q:** Do you think that it was his attitudinal problem which led to rig the 1977 elections, and his subsequent downfall? [19:45]

**A:** Y[es] exactly. In the 1977, there was rigging. Obviously! He even used his Federal Security Force [FSF]. He, basically, after assuming of powers as Prime Minister, wanted to subsidize the role of the military in Pakistan [‘s politics]. [Therefore] he initiated the nuclear program, so that once he maintained the nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis India, the role of the army [the military] would [get] automatically reduce[ed]. Because conventionally Pakistan could not challenge such a large [Indian] force[s]. With the achievement of nuclear parity with India, it would have been impossible for the two states to fight a war. And, this would automatically reduce the role of the military from politics. Right. When he initiated the nuclear program it gave him the presumption that now the role of the army would automatically reduce, he should go ahead with his despotic rule. And he wanted to be powerful at any cost. That’s why he rigged the elections of 1977. Because he was a power-loving creature.

**Q:** Do you think rigging was really an issue, a problem which made the military intervene again in 1977? [21:11]

**A:** No. Rigging was just a pretext under which the military assumed power. Because even despite the humiliating defeat in Dhaka at the hands of General Arora Singh [Indian army], the Pakistani military was [such] a demoralized institution in 1971. No doubt Bhutto gave them space and [help them get] the 90 thousand prisoners [POW]. With the passage of time, Bhutto used the military to achieve his political objectives- to suppress his political opponents. And, it gave the military an indication that the prime minister is weak: the civilian set-up is weak, the political leadership is weak. They [politicians] are again using military to achieve their objectives. Right. This gave, I think, wrong signal to military that now there is again a space to intervene in politics. And, for seven years [1971-77] the military got itself established on some solid basis; they restored their position and again intervened.

**Q:** How do you look at Zia era (or decade) generally? [22:47]

**A:** Zia’s eleven year rule was such a ruthless that what we are facing right now- the phenomenon of suicide bombing, religious extremism and Islamic militancy- have direct linkages with Zia’s eleven-year rule. Because he led the extremists forces to gain ground in Pakistani society. Zia was a ruthless dictator without any vision, without any (*pause*) sympathy for political, democratic and cultural forces.

**Q:** As you know that Zia did many things i.e. initiation of the Jihad and Kalashnikov culture. One thing that he also did was the induction of article 58 2(b) in the 1973 Constitution. So, how do you look at that amendment and its fallouts or its consequences on Pakistan’s political system in the 1990s? [23:40]

**A:** Y[es], exactly. We have experienced the downfall of four [civilian] governments under 58 (2)(b). That’s like a sword which is still hanging on the heads of politicians. Zia basically maneuvered...under some international pressure for democratization; the military wanted to have the juggler vein (of civilians) in her hand, and that was (through) 58 (2)(b).

**Q:** Why did they want to have 58 (2)(b)? [24:49]

**A:** Because at that time they have developed such a massive corporate interests in the body of Pakistani state that they could not easily relinquish the charge of (politics).

**Q:** What is your definition of corporate interests? [25:13]

**A:** Corporate interests are such (that) once you have some kind of businesses- heavy businesses and heavy investment- in any economic system that you need a political power to sustain that.

**Q:** You intend to say that it is something which also includes budgetary benefits or is it something beyond that? [25: 34]

**A:** Pardon.

**Q:** Do you think that corporate interests include budget[ary] money that they [the military] got from the national exchequer or something else? [25:42]

**A:** If you look at (this phenomenon), legally corporate interests are operating under the name of welfare institutions for the military personnel. But actually if we search through the very basis of these corporate interests, we will find that National Logistics Cell [NLC], that is the main transporting fleet in Pakistan, [is] head[ed] either by ruling Major General or Lieutenant General. And it is such a notorious organization- no doubt it is the main luggage forwarding body in Pakistan vis-à-vis Pakistan Railways [PR] - [that] it hindered the growth of the PR.

**Q:** I got your point. My next question to you is: how do look at the relationship between civil bureaucracy, the military and politicians in the last six decades? Do you think civil bureaucracy had cooperative relationship with these actors or they had [has] conflictual one? Or is it a mixture? [26.59]

**A:** Well, if we look at the early ten years of Pakistan, we will find that it was solely ruled by the [civil] bureaucracy right from 1947 to 1958. That was a pure rule of the bureaucracy because Pakistan didn't have too much seasoned politicians and, I think, well trained army [military]. It was only the bureaucrats who were running the affairs of the country. Because they considered themselves to be the most well educated and well exposed men who could serve the public. Right from 1958 to 1968, it was the civil bureaucracy which gave techniques- which gave ways to the military to get itself involved in politics. Right. *Pause*. Because for the civil bureaucracy it was just a change of masters after the British. Right from 1958 to 1968 there was a very good symphony of bureaucracy and military. They well coordinated with each other. And that's why we see that Bhutto thought that it was the bureaucracy which showed the ways of intervention to the military. That's why Bhutto clipped the wings of the bureaucracy in his early years of government. It was also easy for him to clip the wings of bureaucracy rather than the military. Zia again used [the civil] bureaucracy because at that time bureaucracy had assumed a junior partner's role. Between 1948 and 1958 it was the senior partner in running the affairs of the country.

**Q:** So, you think till now from 1958 it is a junior partner? [30:06]

**A:** Y[es], exactly! Still it is a junior partner.

**Q:** But still overall it has a conflictual or interest-based relationship? Or, if not conflictual one, it has cooperative relations with the military? [30:12]

**A:** Look, Pakistani bureaucracy is very much resistant to change. But if we look at the cheequeered history of Pakistan we will find that bureaucracy had been at more ease during the military rules rather than the civilian governments.

**Q:** Why? [30:45]

**A:** Because it is very easy to take decisions during the era of dictators and bureaucracy have just to execute the decisions. No doubt they [civil bureaucrats too] are policy makers; they give some policy guidelines to the dictators and they [dictators] take decisions, and get the bureaucrats involved in executing those decisions.

**Q:** How do you look at the 1999 military coup by Musharraf? Was it structural one? Or was there any other factor? [31:13]

**A:** It was a structural one as I already told you Bhutto initiated the nuclear program to reduce the military role. And we should analyze Pakistani politics vis-à-vis its geostrategic environment. No doubt, Nawaz Sharif was hand-picked man by the establishment. But with the passage of time he started to get free from the clutches of military establishment. He wanted to gain a strategic breakthrough with India. He was a business-minded person who wanted good relations with India. But the army did not want that. Right. Because once you establish good relationship with India without the involvement of the army, it is (a) direct challenge to the military.

**Q:** What you want to say is that his desire of normalizing with India became a kind of a difficult thing for military to digest? [32: 48]

**A:** Exactly. I can give you one example. In 1999 Mr. Nawaz Sharif was successful in bringing Mr. Vajpayee, the then Prime Minister of India, under the shadow of the minaret of Pakistan in Lahore- that was a symbolic ideological statute of Pakistan. And the military chief [General Musharraf] refused to salute him [Prime Minister Vajpayee]. Even the military maneuvered Jamaat-e-Islami. And, they protested harshly against the visit of Mr. Vajpayee.

**Q:** Do you think that Kargil was not that much important factor in this context? [33:53]

**A:** Kargil was the culminating factor in the bringing down of Nawaz Sharif. Because that was just, I think, a shameless, misperceived [and] misconceived army adventure. Because they wanted Kargil to be a clue in overthrowing Nawaz Sharif

**Q:** How do you look at Musharraf years, briefly? [34:27]

**A:** Musharraf was welcomed in the very early years by different sections of society. But with the passage of time...*Pause*. Whatever kind of dictator he is, he is a dictator. He showed his (real) face with the passage of time. In the beginning, he presented himself as a very enlightened man – a man who genuinely presented himself as a democratic[ally-] minded dictator. Though it is ridiculous to say a dictator a democrat. But he presented himself in such a way. And, immediately after his arrival [in politics] he maintained contacts with the [civil]

bureaucracy. The very loyal crony of Musharraf is a bureaucrat- Mr. Tariq Aziz, who is from the Income Tax Group [of the civil bureaucracy].

**Q:** If he is allying with the chief of the bureaucracy, why did he [Musharraf] do damage to the DMG [District Management Group of the civil bureaucracy)]? [35:37]

**A:** That was again a personal vendetta against the DMG. Because it was the District Magistrate [from the DMG] who refused the landing of plane of Mr. Musharraf [on 12 October 1999]. It was under the orders of the District Magistrate that the Civil Aviation Authority refused the captain of the plane to land at Karachi airport. Right.

**Q:** So, you think it [the changes in the DMG] was his [Musharraf] personal [agenda]? [36:19]]

**A:** Exactly. It was the brainchild of General Tauqeer Zia, and Musharraf implemented it.

**Q:** Ok. How do you look at the role of judiciary in Pakistan's politics briefly, and then what you think was the real reason behind 9 March [2007] episode? [36:29]

**A:** Before I answer this question, let me add more comment on Musharraf. Actually, immediately after Nine Eleven – 9/11 was a turning point not only for the world but also for the Musharraf. Because 9/11 gave legitimacy to the Musharraf regime, it was easy for the Americans to deal with the dictator. It is astonishing to listen that...when he was phoned by President Bush that either you are with us or against us.... Musharraf categorically said that without any condition we are supporting you. And after 9/11 he didn't have any clear military stance. He even deceived Americans at many points. He deceived his nation [too]. He lied to the nation that he would doff his uniform by the end of 2004. But he didn't. In the same way, he killed many innocent people. He was considered to be the king of missing people. In the same way, he prolonged his rule to gain economic and military aid from the US (for himself and the top military brass). He is still loyal to his institution.

**Q:** Why the 9<sup>th</sup> March occurred? [39:38]

**A:** The reason was that the lawyers are representative of the lower middle class or the middle class of Pakistan. The very day [12 Oct. 1999] when Musharraf assumed powers, the lawyers protested. But that was not published in the press; they were not given (proper) coverage (by state media) to create consciousness in the people. But when Musharraf assumed powers he led private [TV] channels to play their role. And, with the passage of time there was growing frustration. Because the Musharraf and his cronies couldn't deliver to the Pakistani people. His hand-picked political party [ PML-Q] couldn't do anything. So, there was a great hatred against these people. Since 1999 to 2007 there was accumulation of anger, frustration and fear against the military dictatorship, and against the looming crisis of suicide bombing and other social problems – that created hatred [among] the people. And the media led the people think and judge freely. And, definitely the judges are from the society. They also thought.

**Q:** Do you think it was for the first time in Pakistani history that the judges thought? Before this we had doctrine of necessity [from the judges]. [41:29]

**A:** No doubt. (But) we did have some judges in our history who refused the PCO; who didn't take oath under the PCO. But they were minor enough to [get] count[ed].

**Q:** But I am talking about the institution of judiciary. Do you think that overall it was a first incident in Pakistani's history that they took a potential stance? [41:53]

**A:** Y[es], exactly. It is (un)fortunately the first example in Pakistan's judicial chequered history that such an apex body of court took decision against Musharraf.

**Q:** Ok. So, you think the lawyers have now a movement? Do you think that they are going to be successful? [42:30]

**A:** Y[es], they do have potential to create problems for the [recently] elected government. Because they have experienced such a massive popular support during the last one year of their movement; and they are so resolute; and they show perseverance and patience in their political movement- they are appreciated throughout the world. The whole world watched them [when] the Chief Justice [of the Supreme Court] went from Islamabad to Lahore. It took [them] 25 to 26 hours to get to Lahore. Wherever he [the Chief Justice] visited, even a small town or a big town, he received such a rosy welcome whose example we don't have in our history.

**Q:** So, you are hopeful that the movement is going to get fruit[ful], maybe in two or three days? [43:48]

**A:** Exactly. I am hopeful. If the present coalition government could not restore the judges without any condition, they would go ahead and launch massive protest.

**Q:** Ok. Thank you very much. I have asked all the questions. Anything else that you want to share with? [44:08]

**A:** I do like to share with you that now Pakistan is entirely a different state. We can say Pakistan is not a failed state. It is an unpredictable state. It could take a course of theocracy. It could take a course of protocracy. And, it could take a course of semi-democratic [system]. But if the middle class [including the lower middle class] along with other members [i.e. academia, media,] of the civil society are able to play their positive role, I think there are chances that the institutions in Pakistan would get strong. Because at this [particular] moment I feel [that] right from the lay man in the countryside to upper middle classes in the urban areas, there is a united hatred against the domination of a single institution. This is a positive thing. I think it would take some years [for] democracy [to get mature] in Pakistan.

**Q:** Thank you very much...for your kind words. [45:34]

**A:** You are always welcomed...

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