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POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF
LATIN AMERICA

A Dissertation Presented

By

N. JOSEPH CAYER

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

May, 1972

Major Subject: Political Science

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
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
(Howard J. Wiarda, Chairman of Committee)



(Glen Gordon, Chairman of Department)



(Edward E. Feit, Member of Committee)



(Jane M. Loy, Member of Committee)

May, 1972

PREFACE

My interest in the study of Latin America developed while I was a graduate student at the University of Massachusetts, where I took some courses on political development and Latin America from Howard J. Wiarda, Associate Professor of Political Science and wrote a critique of the literature of political development as it is applied to Latin America. With Professor Wiarda's encouragement, that study led to further exploration of the subject matter resulting in the current study. I am greatly indebted to Professor Wiarda for his encouragement and for his direction of the dissertation. No one could wish to have a better director because Professor Wiarda was always prompt in his consideration of the work submitted to him and raised stimulating questions about the work.

The second member of my committee, Edward E. Felt, Associate Professor of Political Science, was also helpful in reading and commenting on the manuscript.

Jane M. Loy, Assistant Professor of History, was particularly helpful in questioning my "political science orientation" to the subject. She made the historical chapter, Chapter II, much stronger by her insightful questions and comments. I also appreciate the contribution of Lewis Hanke, Professor of History, who read the first draft of the dissertation and made many valuable suggestions.

Stuart L. Rich, Assistant Director for Institutional Research, University of Maine at Orono, deserves a special thank you for the hours spent editing the manuscript. His assistance was invaluable.

My typist, Mrs. Betsey M. Shaffer, has performed valiantly under less than ideal circumstances. I appreciate her willingness to assume the job under short notice and her ability to decipher the copy given her.

In addition, financial support from the Department of Political Science, University of Massachusetts, enabled me to complete my graduate studies. I appreciate the department's support in the form of teaching assistantships for two years and a lectureship for one year.

Although many people contributed much to the development of this study, I alone bear responsibility for any of its shortcomings.

NJC

April 21, 1972
Milford, Maine

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CHAPTER I
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Introduction

In recent years, the field of comparative government and politics has focused on the problems of political development.¹ Students of the discipline have constructed a variety of frameworks and employed a wide range of approaches for analyzing the processes of political development. These frameworks, or "models," have been employed to facilitate cross-national comparison. Because it is impossible for any one student of

¹A few of the most prominent examples are: Lucian Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966); C. E. Black, The Dynamics of Modernization (New York: Knopf, 1965); Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); David Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965); Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966); and Almond and James Coleman (eds.), The Politics of Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960).

comparative politics to know all the emerging nations in detail, various frameworks of national development and modernization have been fashioned to identify commonalities and differences among nations. Identification and evaluation of such commonalities help provide a needed tool for comparison of national political systems.

While many general frameworks for the comparative analysis of political systems have been developed, it has also been recognized that differences in cultures or other distinctive features of individual political systems or clusters or regional groupings of systems have to be taken into consideration to fully understand any one national political system. As a result, there has been a counter-pressure to the construction of general frameworks. Thus, area studies, the study of political culture, and individual case studies have also retained their importance in the field.²

The whole concept of political development has gained increasing importance because of the large number

² Pye, op. cit.; Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); Pye and Verba, Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965) are among the most important general works on political culture. In terms of area studies, the abundant literature on Latin America cited throughout this study attests to the continuing importance of that kind of focus.

of nations currently "emerging" or attempting to develop themselves. The Third World encompasses a large portion of the world's population. According to 1965 figures, over seventy per cent of the world's people lived on the continents of South America, Asia, and Africa.³ These continents also tend to include the majority of the so-called under-developed or developing nations of the world.

The importance of the process of political development for the world as a whole makes it imperative that students of the process be clear about what it is. The author finds a vagueness in the use of the term "political development" in much of the literature of comparative politics. Thus, part of the purpose of this study is to help clarify the term and to evaluate the ways in which it has been used, with the hope of indicating a useful definition of the term.

Secondly, the current work is intended to provide an analysis of the use of the various political development frameworks in relation to the study of Latin America. Latin America, of course, contains about ten per cent of

³ Rand McNally New Cosmopolitan World Atlas, 1966
ed. (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), p. 195.

the world's population and has one of the highest birth rates of the world. As a result, its importance is destined to increase. For that reason alone, it is important to understand the political systems of Latin America. In addition, its special relationship to the United States makes Latin America particularly important for United States scholars to understand.

It should also be noted that the political development frameworks usually employed in the analysis of Third World nations originated in the works of Western European and Anglo-American scholars and as such have been somewhat culture-bound. The major purpose of this work is to determine whether the general frameworks used for examining the process of political development are appropriate for studying Latin American political systems. The major hypothesis is that the Latin American historical and cultural experience is sufficiently divergent from the Anglo-American and Western European experience to require different assumptions in the construction of a developmental framework.

To test the hypothesis, this study will analyze the literature of political development in order to identify the frameworks and evaluate the assumptions upon which such frameworks are based. The basic plan of the study is to indicate the usages of the term "political development" and to classify the various frameworks for greater ease of

analysis. The application of these frameworks to the study of Latin America will then be analyzed. The advantages and disadvantages of each framework as an aid in studying Latin America will be outlined. If the hypothesis proves valid, the concluding section will include an attempt to indicate a framework more appropriate to the understanding of the Latin American nations.

In evaluating the applicability of these various developmental frameworks to the study of Latin America, three major "issue areas" will be examined: the question of urbanization and its socio-political consequences, the question of the role and function of bureaucracy, and the role of the middle sectors in society. These particular subject areas are selected because they are used as indicators of political development in much of the literature. The political development frameworks attribute particular functions and/or roles to urbanization, bureaucracy, and the middle sectors in the development process. These roles and functions will be examined and discussed in the body of the study. A fundamental purpose of this study is thus to evaluate the role or systemic function attributed to each of these groups or socio-political forces by each of the frameworks of analysis. After evaluating the various roles and

functions attributed to each group, the author will present his own interpretation of the roles played by each.

Although there certainly are many other groups or issue areas which could be singled out for analysis, those indicated here are ones on which the frameworks of development place substantial importance, and they do help to illustrate the difficulties and ambiguities in the application of the general development models to Latin America. A final justification for selection of these particular indicators is that they represent three different types of variables. One (urbanization) is a process which usually receives much attention in the literature. Secondly, the bureaucracy represents a part of officialdom in being a part of the governmental machinery itself. Finally, the middle sectors of society represent a less organized interest group or "class" in the society. Because of the variety represented by these three issue areas and because of the importance attached to them by the literature on political development, the examination of them should provide some significant insights into the usefulness of the frameworks being analyzed.

The Concept of "Development"

There are numerous meanings of the term "political development"; almost every scholar using the term gives it a different meaning.⁴ It will be helpful to outline the various major usages before analyzing the frameworks used for studying development.

One of the most common usages of the term involves its interrelationship with economic development. If not equated with economic development, political development is often considered a necessary condition for economic development.⁵ The developing nations themselves have readily accepted this framework and have pushed for rapid economic development in most cases without such attention to the political and social consequences.

⁴ The variety of definitions is noted by Pye, op. cit.; Black, op. cit.; Alfred Diamant, Political Development (Bloomington, Ind.; Comparative Administration Group, 1963); and Robert A. Packenham, "Approaches to the study of Political Development," World Politics, XVII (October, 1964), 108-120 among others.

⁵ See Pye, op. cit., pp. 33-34 for a discussion of this usage. Others commonly associated with this position are: Barbara Ward, The Rich Nations and the Poor Nations (New York: Norton, 1962); Walt W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960); and to a lesser extent, A. F. K. Organski, The Stages of Political Development (New York:

The concern with economic factors can be traced to Karl Marx, of course. In the superficial view of Marxist analyses, the economic factors are the key to all other aspects of the society's operation. While some social scientists have denied the influence of Marx on their ideas, many have used variations of his analysis. Not all have denied his influence.⁶ The viewpoint of many of the authors in this tradition is that economic development will bring these nations to maturity and as such they will be "developed," politically as well as economically. With a larger gross national product or wider distribution of

Knopf, 1965); and Black, op. cit.. Those citing economic conditions as prerequisites stem from Alexis de Toqueville's Democracy in America, ed. by Richard D. Heffner (New York: The New American Library, 1956). Seymour Martin Lipset is probably the best known as a spokesman for this position in his Political Man (Garden City: Doubleday, 1960), and "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," The American Political Science Review, LIII (March, 1959), 69-105.

⁶Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), and Barrington Moore, Jr., The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), are examples of the direct influence of Marx. Others such as Rostow, op. cit., however, attempt to provide an alternative approach to Marx, but they are still tied to the economic factor.

material goods, other problems will pale into insignificance. This position is tantamount to saying that economic development produces or determines political development, although many scholars tend to look at the two as more or less the same.⁷

Barbara Ward's analysis explores another aspect of the same question. In her approach, political development precedes and actually provides the conditions for economic development.⁸ Again the emphasis tends to be on the material factor. Political development becomes the instrument for attaining economic prosperity. The political system is expected to provide a comfortable environment for development of the economy. While this approach is an interesting and important one, it is of limited use in this study because Ward and the others taking the same position do not really get to the point of defining political development. The tendency seems to be for them to adopt the standards of the United States and

⁷ De Toqueville, op. cit.; Lipset, op. cit.; Black, op. cit.; and Organski, op. cit., are good examples of this tradition.

⁸ Ward, op. cit..

Western Europe as models of politically developed nations and expect other nations to follow this pattern.⁹

A part of the economic approach to political development relates to the process of industrialization. For the above-noted frameworks, rapid industrialization is often seen as the path to economic development and therefore as an important factor in political development. Walt Rostow and A. F. K. Organski belong to this group.¹⁰ Eldon Kenworthy analyzes the assumptions behind this approach and the implications for Latin America.¹¹ More will be said about this in later chapters as these various approaches are analyzed. Many scholars have looked at the effects of industrialization on political development and

⁹Charles W. Anderson, "Political Factors in Latin American Economic Development," Journal of International Affairs, XX (1966), 242-243 considers this question.

¹⁰Rostow, op. cit., and Organski, op. cit..

¹¹"Argentina: The Politics of Late Industrialization," Foreign Affairs, XLV (April, 1967), 463-476.

their considerations will be important as an attempt is made by the author to provide a framework of his own.¹²

Most of the discussion so far has centered on the correlation of economic and political development. Some of the scholars noted above have emphasized the negative relationships between the two concepts of development. Though writing from quite different perspectives, Moore, Dahrendorf, Huntington, and Veliz focus on the problems economic development can provide for political development. In later chapters, these authors will be evaluated in greater detail. At this point, it should only be noted that not all scholars dealing with the economic factors of political development accept a deterministic or unilinear relationship between economic and political development.

The association of economic with political development has been one of the most common features of the literature on political development, particularly in the

¹²In addition to those noted above, some other very important works include Claudio Veliz (ed.), Obstacles to Change in Latin America (Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 1965); The Politics of Conformity in Latin America (London: Oxford University Press, 1967); and Huntington, op. cit.; Moore, op. cit.; and Dahrendorf, op. cit..

early stages of concern with the subject.¹³ As was noted above, the developing nations have placed a great deal of emphasis on the development of their economies. Foreign aid programs of the United States and others have often been geared to increasing the economic capacity of these newer nations. Thus, an understanding of the interrelationship of the two concepts is important in understanding the new nations themselves, even if it is decided that the economic determinist framework is not the best over-all approach to studying Latin America. Taking their cue from the economic determinists, many Latin American nations have accepted the idea that economic development is a prerequisite to political development. As such, the economic determinism approach will be helpful in understanding certain aspects of the Latin American nations' policies and expectations.

Another very common approach to the concept of political development is to equate it with participation in politics. This approach is very obviously based on Anglo-American and Western European experiences. For a nation to be considered developed, it must illustrate

¹³Almond and Coleman, op. cit.; Rostow, op. cit.; and Black, op. cit..

characteristics approaching political democracy as practiced in the Western nations.¹⁴ Since most of the literature in this field comes from Anglo-American and Western European scholars, it is perhaps natural that their own experiences with political democracy would weigh heavily in their analyses of development. The Western democratic nations are seen as the most highly developed and others must imitate them to join the "elite."

In equating development with political democracy, these scholars evaluate several factors. First are the basic institutions of government, especially constitutions and governmental organization. Some suggest that having a

¹⁴ Many authors in comparative politics and political development make this assumption either implicitly or explicitly. Among them are: Lipset, op. cit.; de Toqueville, op. cit.; Apter, op. cit.; Almond and Powell, op. cit.; Almond and Coleman, op. cit.; and Charles W. Anderson, Politics and Economic Change in Latin America (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1967), pp. 9-13 notes this difference for Latin America.

democratic constitution and stability implies political development.¹⁵ The obvious problem with this analysis is that the constitution may not indicate what is actually practiced, a factor particularly important in studying Latin American nations. Democratic constitutions often become the "front" for legitimizing undemocratic regimes. Lipset's analysis of "constitutional government," for example, would have to involve a much deeper analysis of actual practices in order to claim validly that democratic governments are in fact more stable than non-democratic ones.

Beyond looking at the nature of constitutions, some believe that political development involves an increase in political participation. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba have, perhaps, provided the most comprehensive treatment of this particular approach.¹⁶ Their analysis professes

¹⁵ See Martin C. Needler, Political Development in Latin America: Instability, Violence, and Evolutionary Change (New York: Random House, 1968). J. Lloyd Mecham, "Latin American Constitutions: Nominal and Real," Journal of Politics, XXI (May, 1959), 258-272, and Glen Dealy, "Prolegomena on the Spanish American Political Tradition," The Hispanic American Historical Review, XLVIII (February, 1968), 37-58 provide critiques of some of the literature.

¹⁶ Almond and Verba, op. cit.. Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958); Karl Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political

to go beyond democracy, but their "civic culture" is a form of democracy emphasizing citizen participation in the political process. With democratic values as a basis of analysis, it is clear that political participation has to be a very important ingredient of political systems. The question emerges as to whether it constitutes development. Some suggest that participation accentuates impossible demands on the system and actually leads to breakdown rather than development.¹⁷ Again, it is obvious that the values of the scholars themselves play a very important part in their use of the term "political development." This particular usage will have to be evaluated along with the others to determine whether or not it is appropriate in studying Latin America.

Often related to the equation of democracy and political development is the viewing of political

Development," American Political Science Review, LV (September, 1961), 493-514; and William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (New York: Free Press, 1959) provide other examples of this approach.

¹⁷ Among them, Huntington, op. cit., especially the first chapter and Veliz in the introductions to his edited volumes cited above.

development as stability of the nation-state.¹⁸ As noted above, Lipset is much concerned with stability in his analysis of development and democracy. The goal of the political system, according to this version of development, is to maintain itself and resist challenges to its legitimacy and stability. Orderly change becomes the watchword and thus any change is very gradual. While stability is all important, other features of the system tend to be neglected. Criticisms of the systems analysis approach abound in recent literature with special emphasis on the limitations imposed by concern with system stability. One question to be pursued in this work is whether stability by itself is worthy of being labelled political development. A very primitive society can be very stable, but few scholars are willing to call such societies developed--development obviously involves more than stability.

¹⁸ This view has origins in Max Weber's work and has been transferred to contemporary analyses by Talcott Parsons, The Social System (New York: Free Press, 1951); David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: Wiley & Sons, 1965); Almond and Powell, op. cit.; and Almond and Coleman, op. cit.. Among those viewing Latin America from a stability oriented perspective is Kalman Silvert, The Conflict Society (New York: Harper & Row, 1968).

The consensus (and systems) approach can accommodate gradual change in the system. Stability in the "systems approach" therefore means maintenance of the system with change coming within the system. Rapid change and possible destruction of the system are ruled out. The systems approach does not necessarily represent stagnation, as many of its critics would suggest. Nevertheless, because the changes which do occur come through the system, there is much opportunity for the biases of the system to filter out and defuse pressures for the larger changes.

Another aspect of stability involves the institutionalization of processes and organizations of government. David Apter and Samuel P. Huntington both tend to view development in terms of institutionalization. Apter sees the institutionalizing of roles as particularly important.¹⁹ Politics for him involves the differentiating of roles by citizens, and political parties become the major agent for role differentiation.²⁰

¹⁹Apter, op. cit., Chapters I, II, and VII are particularly instructive in this regard.

²⁰Ibid., see Chapter VI.

Thus, the institutionalizing of political parties brings about role differentiation, which is viewed as the key to development.

Huntington feels that the institutionalization of processes of government is the key factor.²¹ The process of political development for him should focus on building institutions rather than increasing democracy and participation. "Authority and the ability to govern" are the essential elements in stability and development.²² In this case, change comes very gradually and a lid must be kept on citizen aspirations to avoid destruction of the system.

Concern with institutionalization of processes leads to yet another approach to development. Some scholars equate legal and administrative development with political development.²³ This approach is sometimes also

²¹ Huntington, op. cit., and Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," World Politics, XVII (April, 1965), 386-430.

²² Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, p. 8.

²³ Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947); and Joseph La Palombara (ed.), Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963)

called the legal-formal approach. Until fairly recently much of the focus in comparative government had been on legal-formal aspects.²⁴ If the nation had the right constitutional-legal system, usually meaning a representative legislative body and adequate legal safeguards for citizens' rights, it would be considered developed. This tendency is particularly true of the early Latin American texts.²⁵ Specialization of function of agencies becomes a very important indicator of development, especially for those concerned with administrative factors. The administrative approach often concerns itself with the efficiency of operation of

are good examples of this approach. In addition, Fred Riggs' works, especially Administration in Developing Countries (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1964) treat this relationship.

²⁴ Carl J. Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy (London: Methuen, 1961), and Herman J. Finer, Theory and Practice of Modern Government (Boston: Ginn, 1950) are classic examples of such analyses.

²⁵ See for example: William S. Stokes, Latin American Politics (New York: Crowell, 1959); Harold Davis (ed.), Government and Politics in Latin America (New York: The Ronald Press, 1958); and Russel H. Fitzgibbon (ed.), The Constitutions of the Americas (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948).

government and how adequately the government performs its job of providing services to the citizenry.

The term political development is often used interchangeably with political modernization.²⁶ This equation of terms makes the criticism of an Anglo-American-Western European bias in the development literature particularly pertinent. Modernization in government is usually measured against the standards of the Anglo-American-Western European experience. Thus, what is modern can usually be translated into what is characteristic of Western democratic traditions. Perhaps to be most accurate, modernization should be reserved as a term to be applied to the changes in society as a whole and political development should be limited to governmental factors.²⁷ While such a suggestion is easy to make, there is little question that boundaries of systems are difficult to establish. It should be recognized, however, that the political system is only a part of the

²⁶ From the works discussed above, those of Apter, Black, and Organski, among others, tend to equate the terms in usage.

²⁷ Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, was one of the first to differentiate between political modernization and political development. Also see Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay."

larger social system and as such the terms "modernization" and "political development" should be differentiated. Hopefully this study will be able to clarify these terms.

Various definitions or usages of the concept "political development" have been outlined in the foregoing section of this study. The author does not suggest that this sketch exhausts the usage of the term, but he believes that most usages are accommodated by the foregoing typology. Obviously, many of these usages overlap and contradict one another. My hope is to be able to bring more clarity to the concept and bridge some of the inconsistencies in its usage with particular reference to Latin America.

In order to evaluate the concept in a systematic way, the individual approaches along the conflict-consensus continuum of social change analysis will be categorized. The conflict-consensus continuum is employed because conflict and consensus represent opposing ways of viewing plural societies.²⁸ There are many alternative classifications which could be used as the structure for

²⁸ See Leo Kuper, "Plural Societies: Perspectives and Problems," in Leo Kuper and M. G. Smith, Pluralism in Africa (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), pp. 7-26.

this study, but the conflict-consensus dichotomy has been employed in much of the literature in recent years. Both implicitly and explicitly, the conflict and consensus models have been applied to Latin America. For the reasons stated above, the conflict-consensus continuum provides a convenient method for classifying approaches to the study of Latin American politics.

Basically, the conflict theorists view change in plural societies as occurring because of irreconcilable clashes among power groups. Inevitably, one group wins out and exerts its power over the system. Eventually, new opposition forms and a new clash results in a new distribution of power.²⁹ In the consensus approach, on the other hand, conflicting interests compromise among themselves and no one power group very often achieves its goals. Instead, it is willing to give in for the benefit of keeping the system intact. The ensuing series of compromises characterizes the process of social change and a basic consensus emerges on the ends and means of political action.³⁰

²⁹ See Kuper, op. cit., and Diamant, op. cit., for a discussion of the differences of the models.

³⁰ Ibid.

Latin America and the Literature
of Political Development

As has already been noted above, the various frameworks of political development analysis have been created chiefly by scholars with experience in the Anglo-American and Western European traditions. This fact in itself indicates a neglect of Latin America in the literature of political development. In the major works on development, very little attention is ever given Latin American nations. Even when the literature takes note of these nations, little in-depth analysis is provided. Rather, surface observations are made on the basis of the author's general concept of the Latin American experience.³¹ Most of the authors creating frameworks for the study of development have not been trained in Latin American studies. They cannot be taken to task for not being experts on this region, but it is a factor which must be considered in looking at the relationship of Latin America to the literature of political development.

³¹ See Almond and Coleman, op. cit.. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, also devotes some attention to Latin America.

While the generalists have often ignored Latin America, the Latin Americanists have also usually been divorced from the theories of political development. Frequently they have ignored the theoretical works. Part of the reason for ignoring development theory is that for a long period, the Latin Americanists have been outside the mainstreams of comparative political analysis. The North Americans studying the region have not been fully associated with comparative politics developments while the Latin Americans themselves have not had a social science tradition comparable to that of the United States. Recent years have brought changes, but there is still a gap between the comparative political analysis tradition and studies of Latin America.³²

What may be more important to this study is that the various frameworks have been applied to the study of Latin America with rare questioning of the appropriateness of the models to the Latin American experience.³³ Many

³² See Juan Marsal, Cambio social en America Latina (Buenos Aires: Solar/Hachete, 1967), pp. 225-226.

³³ This fact has been treated by Alfred Stepan, "Political Development Theory: The Latin American Experience," The Journal of International Affairs, XX (1966), 223-234; Dealy, op. cit.; Albert O. Hirschman, "How Policy is Made," Americas, XV (August, 1963), 39-41;

scholars of Latin America have attempted to understand Latin America in terms of the previously summarized frameworks. Specific authors and their uses of the frameworks will be given detailed treatment in Chapter VIII, and selected treatment in Chapters III through VII.

The fact is, then, that there is a bias in the literature which causes neglect of the Latin American experience in the general developmental schemes and, secondly, there is a misapplication of the frameworks to the nations of Latin America. Briefly noted below are the reasons for the bias and the problems which unquestioned application of the models to the study of Latin America imply.

Many students of Latin America have attempted to evaluate the use of Western democratic frameworks of analysis. Alfred Stepan suggests that the underlying assumptions of the frameworks bear the primary responsibility for the neglect of Latin America in the literature.³⁴ The models usually assume that as societies

Howard Wiarda, "Elites in Crisis," an unpublished paper, n.d.; and Marsal, op. cit., among many others.

³⁴
Ibid.

become more industrialized, more urbanized, and better educated, they will inevitably show changes in the nature of their political systems, ordinarily accompanied by an evolution toward the democratic model. According to Stepan, however, these "indicators of development" just do not seem to follow the prescribed patterns in Latin America. Scholars who apply such models usually tend to reach conclusions consistent with the models because they do not take notes of other factors. Juan Marsal suggests that such models, as used by John J. Johnson, are self-fulfilling because they ask questions of the society in such a way that the answers will be consistent with the model's assumptions.³⁵

Glen Dealy and Charles W. Anderson point up another very important assumption of the models--namely that the models are based on the belief that people will act in a rational manner to gain particular goals.³⁶ The Latin American experience has often placed greater value on what the advocates of democratic models might consider

³⁵ Marsal, op. cit., p. 108.

³⁶ Dealy, op. cit., and Anderson, "Political Factors in Latin American Development."

"non-rational" factors, such as personalismo, rather than bureaucratic efficiency, for example.³⁷ Glen Dealy goes into much detail in comparing the Latin American experience with the belief of many scholars that Latin American nations have adopted the United States and Western European democratic systems as models to strive for. In an incisive analysis he evaluates the constitutions and practices of the nations of Latin America and illustrates how the values of the Latin Americans give different meanings to the terms and concepts of the Western democratic experience. He concludes that these nations probably do not aspire to our ideals or to the ideal of democracy as we think they do.³⁸

Related to Dealy's analysis is Juan Marsal's contention that much confusion has arisen in terminology because the Latin American intellectual tradition has not produced an indigenous social science. Rather, social science frameworks have been adopted from North Americans and Europeans. Because the Spanish language has not had

³⁷ Anderson, "Political Factors in Latin American Development," pp. 246-247, and 251.

³⁸ Ibid., pp. 54-58.

a social science vocabulary, many of the terms of social scientists have been appropriated from the English. Often, new and different meanings are given the terms by Latin Americans and North Americans may think the Latin American scholar means one thing when he actually means something else.³⁹

Another reason for the bias against Latin America in the development literature is that the historical experience of Latin America has been quite different from that of North America. The North American colonial experience was primarily associated with the Northern European nations, whereas Latin America's heritage is Southern European or more specifically, Iberian. As traced by Richard Morse, Howard Wiarda, and others, there is a significant difference in these traditions.⁴⁰

Because the values and thought of the Iberian tradition vary tremendously from the Protestant ethic of Northern

³⁹ Marsal, op. cit., pp. 225-226.

⁴⁰ Richard M. Morse, "Some Characteristics of Latin American History," American Historical Review, LXVII (January, 1962), 317-338, and "Toward a Theory of Spanish American Government," Journal of the History of Ideas, XV (1954), 71-93; and Wiarda, op. cit.. Dealy, op. cit., is also very instructive in this regard.

Europeans and North Americans, the models appropriate to the latter traditions just do not conform to the Iberian and Latin American experiences. Latin America is essentially authoritarian, Catholic, feudal, and conservative while the tradition of the United States is primarily democratic, Protestant, middle class bourgeois, and liberal.⁴¹ A more detailed analysis of Latin American historical experience will be presented in the next chapter.

The significance of the question of the appropriateness of the frameworks of political development analysis to the study of Latin America goes beyond just learning about Latin America. Policies of the United States and others toward Latin America are based on our knowledge of the area. It is important to have an accurate understanding of the area if our foreign policies are to make sense.

This introductory chapter provides an overview of the analysis to be presented in the study. The remainder of the study will provide detailed analysis of the

⁴¹ Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1947).

various factors and issues outlined above. Chapter II will present a very brief review of Latin America's pattern of political development. Chapter III will explain the consensus model in detail and evaluate its application to Latin America. Chapter IV will do the same with the conflict model. Chapters V, VI, and VII actually analyze the major issue areas under consideration and their treatment in the literature. Chapter V deals with the middle sectors, while Chapter VI analyzes urbanization and Chapter VII analyzes the phenomenon of bureaucracy. Chapter VIII presents a brief review of the major points of the arguments and the author's conclusions about the issues considered in the study, along with some suggestions on how one ought to approach the study of Latin America.

C H A P T E R I I
THE PATTERN OF LATIN AMERICAN
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Introduction

As was noted in the previous chapter, the historical experience of the Latin American nations has been quite different from that of the United States. Basically, the Latin American heritage is Southern European and Iberian while the United States' tradition is of a North European origin. In terms of societal differences this has meant that the Latin American nations have inherited the essentially feudal and medieval traditions of Spain and Portugal, whereas the United States was colonized primarily by Northern European nations which had already emerged from the feudal experience into an early capitalistic oriented economic system. Concerning religion, the Latin American tradition is Catholic with all of the Church's institutional and conservative Spanish moral values, while

the United States was colonized by a variety of sects most of which were dominated by the Protestant ethic, with its greater emphasis on pluralism, secularism, and material success. The religious experiences have had much influence on intellectual and scientific endeavor as well. The Thomistic Catholic tradition based its intellectual traditions on logic and deductive reasoning in search of absolute truths, while the Protestant tradition provided greater opportunity for questioning and scientific inquiry.¹

The social and political spheres of Latin America and the United States have been subject to different forces as well. The feudal and medieval system was based on rigid class lines which were transferred to Latin

¹ Leopoldo Zea, The Latin American Mind, translated by James H. Abbott and Lowell Dunham (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1963) was one of the most influential books on the philosophical traditions of Latin America. His analysis has been severely criticized recently. Among the critics is William D. Raat, "Leopoldo Zea and Mexican Positivism: A Reappraisal," The Hispanic American Historical Review, XLVIII, No. 1 (February, 1968), 1-18. Several of the readings in The Origins of the Latin American Revolutions, 1808-1826, ed. by R. A. Humphreys and John Lynch (New York: Knopf, 1966), present excellent analyses of the differences in philosophical traditions as well.

America through colonization.² Land-holding was the source of power in the social and political spheres. The Spanish tradition accepted absolutism as a legitimate kind of rule. The United States colonial experience, on the other hand, brought the beginnings of pluralism and the emergence of a strong middle class. In the political sphere, pluralism began to emerge, and the concept of limited government came from the English and French traditions.

Since the colonial experiences of new nations affect their future developments, the study of colonial traditions should provide a key to understanding later development of the systems. As a result, attention will now be turned to an analysis of Latin America's colonial experience; and then, its history will be traced interpretively rather than exhaustively, through modern times. The impact of the colonial experience as well as pertinent differences between the Latin American and United States' experiences will be noted. This analysis

²C. H. Haring, The Spanish Empire in America (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1947), especially Chapter X notes this tradition. For discussion of the liberal tradition of the United States, see Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1964).

will provide the basis for further evaluation of the western democratic oriented frameworks for the study of political development in relation to Latin America.

One further note about the study of Latin America should be made. Lewis Hanke, among others, has frequently cautioned that it is risky to treat all of Latin America alike.³ The author of this study realizes that there are many conflicting forces and trends from one nation of Latin America to another. None can be treated as exactly alike. While it may be hazardous to generalize about the "Latin American experience," there are enough commonalities in the historical and cultural traditions of the Latin Americans to treat the region as a whole. Pertinent exceptions to the general trends will be noted as these traditions are scrutinized.

³ This question is considered as part of an even broader question in Lewis Hanke (ed.), Do the Americas Have A Common History? (New York: Knopf, 1964), especially the Introduction as well as in his Contemporary Latin America: A Short History (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1968), pp. 4-6 and 242-265. In addition, see Luis Mercier Vega, Roads to Power in Latin America (New York: Praeger, 1969), especially pp. 1-3.

Colonial Traditions

The sixteenth century was one of exceptional colonial activity by the Spaniards and Portuguese, and the Americas provided a fertile ground for empire building. Their colonial empires in the Americas took hold during this century. There were several aspects of the colonial period which are important to the evaluation of Latin American political development.

The Indians. The native Indian population of the Americas presented an obstacle to colonization by the Spaniards and Portuguese. The variety of Indian civilizations created a number of different types of effects for the conquerors. In some instances, the Indians of Latin America had more advanced civilizations than their counterparts in North America. For example, the Incas, Mayas, and Aztecs facilitated the conquest in the Valley of Mexico, the Yucatan, and the Western Andean highlands.⁴ These sedentary Indians were fairly easy to conquer because

⁴ See Charles Gibson, Spain in America (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), pp. 25-32, and Chapter 7. Also Donald E. Worcester and Wendell G. Schaeffer, The Growth and Culture of Latin America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), Chapter II.

the Spaniards only had to get rid of the leaders and then they could take control of the civilization. This type of subjugation was particularly easy with the Aztec civilization which was highly centralized in organization.⁵ The Mayas were less easily subjugated because there was no one capital of the civilization and they did not fall to the conquerors as a unit. Instead, various bands of Mayas fought in an uncoordinated manner--the whole civilization did not submit as the result of loss of the leadership.⁶

The Incas, although perhaps the most advanced Indian civilization, proved even more difficult to conquer. The Andean topography may have been a partial factor in their greater resistance to conquest in that the highlands permitted holdouts in various mountain hideouts. However, the situation was complicated by civil war within the Inca civilization and various Spanish factions vied for control of the Incan empire. The Spanish

⁵Gibson, op. cit., p. 25.

⁶Ibid., p. 29.

factions led to conflict among the conquerors and permitted the Incas to retain some independence late into the sixteenth century.⁷

Once the elite elements of the Aztec, Mayan, and Incan civilizations were eliminated, the Spaniards had a readily submissive population at their disposal.⁸ These sedentary tribes were skilled in agriculture, weaving, and the mining of precious metals. All of these skills were valuable to the Spaniards and they took advantage of the Indians to provide for their own enrichment.

In contrast to the sedentary Indians, there were many nomadic tribes. The nomads inhabited Southern South America (the Puelche, Tehuelche, and Araucanian Indians) and Northern Mexico (the Apaches).⁹ These nomadic Indians were more akin to the Indians in what was to become the United States. The nomads were difficult to conquer and they made it difficult for settlements to exist because of attacks on the settlements. Conflicts

⁷ Ibid., pp. 30-32.

⁸ See Eric R. Wolf, Sons of Shaking Earth (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), pp. 213-215.

⁹ Worcester and Schaeffer, op. cit., p. 19.

with the nomads continued throughout colonization and still exist in some Latin American nations. Additionally, the nomads did not represent a stable source of labor for the colonizers as the sedentary Indians did so that there was not so much attraction to the conquerors in areas where nomads roamed.¹⁰

The Indians represented a vast source of labor to the conquerors and use of this supply of manpower took many forms. During the early period of colonization, the encomienda system developed. Through this system, Spaniards were given control over land and Indian labor on the land, although the land still remained in the hands of the Crown. This arrangement is different from the hacienda system which emerged in some parts of the area. The hacienda system included title to land; whereas the encomienda system extended control only over the Indians and whatever was produced on the land.¹¹ The person

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ See Eric R. Wolf, "Aspects of Group Relations in a Complex Society: Mexico," Contemporary Cultures and Societies of Latin America, ed. by Dwight B. Heath and Richard N. Adams (New York: Random House, 1965), pp. 90-92, and Wolf and Edward C. Hansen, "Caudillo Politics: A Structural Analysis," Comparative Studies in Society and History, IX (January, 1967), pp. 168-179 for a discussion of these differences.

granted the encomienda was supposed to protect and provide for the moral well-being (meaning Christianization) of his subjects. In return the Indian subject provided labor for the grantee. In effect this system was a form of slavery, even though moral and legal obligations were imposed on the landowner. Ronald Glassman refers to the encomienda system as part of a "semifeudal state system," carried over from Spain's own developmental experience.¹² In this system, there developed a very personalistic relationship between the master and his charges thus differentiating the system from a purely feudal arrangement with greater emphasis on traditional-legal factors.¹³ This personalism is an important factor in considering the modernizing process in Latin America. Attempts at creating bureaucratic organizations on the western model have had

¹² Ronald Glassman, Political History of Latin America (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1969), pp. 83-89; William W. Pierson and Federico Gil, Governments of Latin America (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), p. 55; Stanley Stein and Barbara H. Stein, The Colonial Heritage of Latin America (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), p. 36; and Haring, op. cit., Chapters III, IV, and VI explain some of the details of the encomienda system.

¹³ Glassman, op. cit., pp. 87-90 spells out some of the difference between feudalism and his "semi-feudal" framework.

to consider the personalistic feature. The assumptions behind the rational Weberian model, for instance, have not always been relevant to Latin America.

Another aspect of the semi-feudal arrangement was that the scale of organization of social relationships was fairly small. The peasant developed loyalty to his landholder rather than to a larger political unit such as the Crown or its administrative officers in the colonies. This feature was also to be of great importance for future political development. Much of the experience of Latin American political affairs relates to the many centers of power which have competed for supremacy in any one country. The caudillo system emerged partially as a result of this experience.

The encomienda system seemed most suited to the early period of colonization when the Europeans were few in number and the native population was large. As the relative size of the indigenous population decreased, a new approach was needed and the encomienda system gave way to repartimiento.¹⁴ In this system the person in need of

¹⁴ This discussion of the use of Indian labor is based on Gibson's analysis, op. cit., pp. 157-158.

labor applied to local authorities and the local authorities distributed Indians among the Spanish employers. While the Indians were paid and supposedly treated humanely, this system was a form of forced labor. The system of repartimiento developed partly because of Crown pressure to abandon the encomienda system. Like its predecessor, repartimiento failed because of abuses by employers and because of increasing pressures by the Crown in the late sixteenth century.

During the seventeenth century, a system of free contract labor developed but was short-lived. The insufficiency of Indian labor and abuses by employers led to its demise. Peonage took the place of the aforementioned attempts at utilization of Indian labor. Through peonage, the Spaniard made loans to the Indians and required repayment in work. As the debt was repaid, a new loan would be granted thus insuring obligation of the Indian. Debts could be inherited by the children. This system has endured even though attempts at limitation have been made.

The hacienda and plantation systems represent a variation on the use of Indian manpower. In this system, the Spaniards acquired land by buying, through land grants, or by taking it away from the native population. The hacienda would often incorporate entire Indian villages.

While the Indian was taken advantage of in this system, the Crown did not react to it with controls as it did with the other forms of labor.¹⁵ As a result, the system became entrenched in Latin America and works hand in hand with peonage.

The generalizations made above cannot be applied to Brazilian Indians. In Brazil, the Indian civilizations were generally very primitive and usually nomadic. As a result, they either disappeared, were assimilated, or became isolated in uncolonized regions.¹⁶ The coastal areas of Brazil became devoid of Indians and even in the interior they were not very well suited to plantation work. In addition, the Jesuit influence in Brazil had the impact of reducing the use of Indians as slaves.¹⁷ All of these forces led to the introduction of the African slave in Brazil.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 156.

¹⁶ See Worcester and Schaeffer, op. cit., p. 27.

¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 27-28. Also see C. R. Boxer, The Portuguese Seaborne Empire: 1415-1825 (London: Hutchinson, 1969), pp. 96-97.

The African slave gave Brazil an ethnic minority which did not exist in such large numbers in much of the rest of Latin America. The African provided the muscle for development of Brazil's colonial economy. Black slavery was accepted by the Portuguese Crown until abolition in 1888. While the Africans were imported mainly for their labor, they also introduced new ideas to the Brazilian social system. Brazil became a mixture of African, Indian, and European with the result that Brazilians represent a people very different from most Latin Americans.¹⁸ In addition to providing labor and introducing different cultural traditions, the African helped explore and develop Brazil as well as provide manpower for protection against hostile Indians. Besides Brazil, many Caribbean nations were influenced by large African populations. This ethnic-cultural strain enriched the cultural tradition of Latin America and led to some racial problems at times. The Africans in Latin America, however, were assimilated to a greater extent than they were in the United States and their culture became a part

¹⁸ See E. Bradford Burns, A History of Brazil (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), pp. 39-43 for an excellent discussion of the contribution of the Africans.

of Brazilian and Caribbean cultures; whereas in the United States, they remained essentially a separate culture.

Generally, the ethnic-cultural make-up of Latin America is vastly different from that of the United States. In many cases in Latin America, the Indians outnumbered Spaniards and were not eliminated or assimilated. Compared to the United States, the Indians have had a much greater impact in Latin America. In many cases, particularly where the nomads are involved, Indians still exist in virtual isolation of the rest of the nation. As a result, integration of the nation is very difficult. Instead, two separate cultures often exist within the national boundaries with little bridging of the gap between those cultures.

Administration. In colonizing the New World, the Spanish Crown retained almost absolute control over acquired territories.¹⁹ In order to exercise the supreme

¹⁹ Haring, op. cit., pp. 1-22 analyzes the background to the Spanish view of the King's sovereignty over the colonies. The subject is also treated briefly by Stein and Stein, op. cit., pp. 3-26. William Lytle Schurz, Latin America: A Descriptive Survey (New York: Dutton, 1963), pp. 31-33 deals specifically with the aspects of discovery and exploration by the Spaniards.

authority, the Crown set up viceroyalties in the New World. First came the creation of New Spain in 1535 containing Mexico and Central America; the Viceroyalty of Peru was created in 1542 encompassing all of South America. Eventually New Granada was separated from the Viceroyalty of Peru in 1718 and still another, La Plata, was carved out in 1776.²⁰ It should be remembered that the creation of these units and the forthcoming administrative unity was for the purpose of extending more effective control over the regions by the colonial power.²¹

The fact that Spain attempted to maintain extensive control over its colonies means that the colonies did not have opportunity for acquiring experience with self-government except at the local level. By way of contrast, the English colonies had some element of discretion in the

²⁰ Pierson and Gil, op. cit., pp. 39-49 outline the administrative apparatus of the Spaniards.

²¹ Ibid., pp. 62-65. The authors provide an excellent comparison of the Spanish and English colonies in the Americas. In noting the different experiences of the two colonial traditions, they note that the English colonies were developed by settlements of colonists going to the New World for their own reasons while the Spanish colonies were attempts at transplanting the colonial power's culture in the new world.

operation of their own units despite the fact that authority still resided in the Crown. Robert Potash makes the suggestion that it might be lack of preparation of the people for life in modern society rather than the continued existence of outmoded colonial institutions which is important in Latin American development.²²

The cities. Another feature of the colonial system was the fact that it involved an element of city building on the part of the Spaniards. The cities were the centers of administration for the Crown as well as being showcases of splendor and luxury in the tradition copied from the Moslems by Spain.²³ They attracted the landholders and

²² Robert A. Potash, "Colonial Institutions and Contemporary Latin America: A Commentary on Two Papers," The Hispanic American Historical Review, XLVIII (August, 1963), 390-394 comments on Woodrow Borah, "Colonial Institutions and Contemporary Latin America: Political and Economic Life," pp. 371-379, and Charles Gibson, "Colonial Institutions and Contemporary Latin America: Social and Cultural Life," pp. 380-389 in the same volume.

²³ John Mander, The Unrevolutionary Society: The Power of Latin American Conservatism in a Changing World (New York: Knopf, 1969), p. 260, and Economic Commission for Latin America, United Nations Economic and Social Council, Social Development of Latin America in The Post-War Period (Mar del Plata, Argentina, May, 1963), pp. 11-61 deal with the issue and take a similar position.

more well-to-do. The development of cities in this way has two very important implications for this study.

First of all, the fact that cities developed as centers of grandeur by the aristocracy, who were the landholders, meant that the landed estates were often left in the hands of managers. The countryside eventually experienced a legitimacy vacuum of sorts. This vacuum may be partially responsible for much of the social disjointedness and political anarchy which was to plague Latin America's rural areas in the future. The cities became the centers of political power although land was the source of wealth, status, and power.

Secondly, that cities developed very early in Latin America and as showplaces of culture is important in evaluating frameworks for the study of political development. Many of the frameworks are based on assumptions and result in conclusions to the effect that urbanization is brought about by industrialization. In Latin America, in contrast, cities long predated industrialization and have existed without accompanying industrialization. The fact of Latin American urbanization experience will be important in considering the validity of such frameworks. Chapter VI, dealing with urbanization and political development, will treat this factor in depth.

The Church. Perhaps one of the most durable of colonial institutions in Latin America is the Roman Catholic Church. The relationship of church and state was traditionally one of interdependence. The Spanish monarchy exercised a great amount of control over the selection of the ecclesiastical hierarchy during the colonial period as a result of the Royal Patronage of the Indies worked out by the government and the Pope.²⁴ In effect, the Church operated at the pleasure of and for the benefit of the Spanish Monarch. It provided further assurances that control by the Crown would be upheld in the colonies.

There were some limitations to the governmental control over the Church in the colonies, however. As Pierson and Gil note, the Crown could not revoke an ecclesiastical appointment once made.²⁵ Thus, there was some room for independence on the part of ecclesiastical authorities. Further, the state's authority did not

²⁴ See Pierson and Gil, op. cit., pp. 50-53; Haring, op. cit., pp. 166-193; and Schurz, op. cit., for more information on this relationship.

²⁵ Pierson and Gil, op. cit., pp. 51-52.

extend to ecclesiastical matters. It is obvious that this arrangement provided some limitations on the state.

The close relationship between Church and state provided an opportunity for the state to further the interests of the Church as well. The state attempted to keep heretical ideas out of the colonies but for various reasons, it was not always successful. For one thing, the Indians did not accept Christianization without resistance. Instead, they retained many of their pagan beliefs and the result often was a mixture of pagan and Catholic practices. In Brazil and other places where African slaves were introduced, many slaves retained their Moslem or African religions and thus represented a source of heresy. In most of Spanish America, however, the efforts of the Spaniards to keep the faith intact paid off handsomely in terms of loyalty of the Church to state authority. The ecclesiastical authorities often became adjuncts of the state.

Not to be overlooked was the missionary zeal of the Spaniards. Usually people were not allowed in the colonies unless they were Christians, and the colonists attempted to spread the faith in some instances. In cases where the Indians were Christianized, the clergy were usually closer to the indigenous population than

were the governmental officials. One reason for the closeness of the Indians to the clergy is the fact that the Indians had been stripped of their humanity by the conquerors but the Church defended that humanity and gave meaning to the Indian's life. As noted by Eric Wolf, religion provided the Indian with a means of coping with his existence. It gave him hope, not in the sense of eternal salvation, but in the meaning of everyday life.²⁶ In addition, humane considerations on the part of clerics often tempered the brutal treatment of the Indians. As a result, where Indians had much contact with the Spaniards it was usually through the Church and loyalty tended to be to the Church rather than government. Of course, the ecclesiastical authority occasionally used this loyalty against the government, but usually it was translated into loyalty to the Crown.²⁷ The close relationship of

²⁶ Wolf, Sons of Shaking Earth, pp. 170-175.

²⁷ See Pierson and Gil, op. cit., pp. 51-53. Haring, op. cit., pp. 171-174 does not agree with the idea that the clergy was any less likely than others to exploit and abuse the native population. He relates examples of physical abuse as a means of ridding Indians of heathen practices as well as tales of destruction of Indian temples. Frank Tannenbaum, Ten Keys to Latin America (New York: Vintage Books, 1960), p. 56 states: "It is important to repeat that the only contact with

Church and state went hand in hand in transmitting Spanish culture to the New World.

The Church's role in Latin American political affairs increased as time went on, largely as a result of its acquisition of land. Much land was left to the Church and it eventually became the largest single landholder in Latin America. With wealth and power dependent on land, the Church gained unprecedented influence. Because of the system of mortmain, the lands, once acquired by the Church, were to remain in its hands perpetually. The Church's holdings continually increased.

Perhaps the most important legacy of the Church was its impact on thought. The Church's teachings emphasized reverence for authority and acceptance of the faith without question. Anyone who questioned the Church's teachings was considered a sinner. The idea was carried over to acceptance of authority in general because of the close interrelationship of church and

Europeans not unkindly to the American Indians was through the mission." Thus, agreement does not exist although it is generally conceded that if the Indians received humane treatment, it was from the Church.

state.²⁸ The lack of questioning created a fairly submissive population. The teaching that poverty, for instance, was a natural condition and a form of suffering leading to improvement in human nature and as a partial way to eventual salvation, caused the peasants to accept their lot as natural. Donald E. Worcester argues that religious traditions created a fatalistic and passive population. In addition he argues that incentive and creativity were dulled by the faith put in miracles or other acts of God.²⁹ Whether good or bad, there can be little doubt that the Church was a major force in the colonial setting and was to remain so for a long time to come.

The interrelationship of church and state was not so great in Portuguese as in Spanish colonies. While the rights of patronage existed in Brazil, there was much less rigidity in religious practices. The Portuguese were not so likely to exclude non-Christians and were

²⁸ Gibson, op. cit., Chapter 4 deals with this aspect, especially pp. 85-86.

²⁹ Donald E. Worcester, "The Spanish American Past: Enemy of Change," Journal of Inter-American Studies, XI (January, 1969), 66-75.

more open to acceptance of Indian and African practices; thus, the Church had less influence in state affairs.³⁰

Another difference in the Church in Brazil was that the Jesuits were dominant and because they were more open to new ideas and developments than the secular clergy, the Church had a different effect in Brazil.

In the other nations of Latin America, the various religious orders fought with one another and usually the Crown sided with the secular clergy who tended to be more conservative and loyal to the Crown.³¹ The Jesuits were not controlled by a secular hierarchy in Brazil. Many Jesuits in Brazil became spokesmen for humane treatment of the Indians and slaves as well as for curtailing the influence of the Crown. Brazil still has some of the most liberal clergy in all of Latin America although not necessarily Jesuit. As a result, there was a greater acceptance of diversity and, because of the African input, of racial mixtures so that discrimination did not become as strong in Brazil as it did in other parts of Latin America.

³⁰ See Pierson and Gil, op. cit., pp. 72-73, and pp. 80-81; and Stein and Stein, op. cit., pp. 21-24.

³¹ Gibson, op. cit., pp. 74-82.

Bourbon Reforms and Independence

The Bourbon reforms in Spain and Portugal were carried to the American colonies but often with effects very different from what happened in Europe. The primary intent of the Bourbons in instituting reforms in the Americas was to increase the amount of wealth to be collected by the Crown.³² There were reforms in the economic, political, and social areas of the system and all were directed at increasing colonial control. The political reforms in particular were calculated to consolidate Crown authority and diminish the influence of the Church in colonial affairs.³³ Many attempts at centralization of power were made with reorganization of colonial administration. The intendant system was intended as a means of decreasing the influence of local officials who had been embarrassments to the Crown because of their corruption and inefficiency.

³² See John J. Johnson, Simón Bolívar and Spanish American Independence: 1783-1830 (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1968), pp. 16-36.

³³ Ibid., p. 18.

While the intent of the reforms seemed to be to improve control by the mother country, there were also some results beneficial to the people of Latin America. Most important, the reforms meant more humane treatment for the Indian and slave populations. Although the lives of Africans and Indians continued to be dreary, at least the worst abuses were abolished.³⁴

The effect of the Bourbon reforms was to improve the established order through enlightened despotism. It did not have much impact in reducing absolute control over the system. However, the improvement of many elements of administration meant eventually that new power centers for opposition to the Crown would develop. In addition to new power centers, the various efforts by the Crown to increase the efficiency of its exploitation of the colonies only increased opposition.³⁵

In Brazil, the Bourbon reforms were tied to an increasing interest by the Crown in its colony. During the late eighteenth century, Portugal began losing its

³⁴ Ibid., p. 21; Charles C. Griffin, "The Enlightenment and Latin American Independence," in Humphreys and Lynch, op. cit., pp. 38-51; and Gibson, op. cit., pp. 165-172.

³⁵ Johnson, op. cit., p. 24; and Griffin, op. cit., p. 48.

empire and Brazil became its major interest after having been of minor importance as part of Portugal's empire in earlier days. The Crown attempted to tighten its control over the colony by taking away much of its local autonomy and transferring power from the landed proprietors to agents of the Crown.³⁶ With the transfer of the monarchy to Brazil in 1808, the conflicts between the local administration and Crown policies grew with the eventual result of complete autonomy for Brazil.

For nearly three hundred years, the colonial rule of Spain remained essentially intact. The success of Spain in retaining control over her colonies is notable in light of the eighteenth century developments in North America. The reasons for Spain's success in maintaining control are not easy to pinpoint. However, Cecil Jane suggests that a great portion of the credit for retention of control must go to the lack of desire on the part of the colonists for independence.³⁷ He argues that the

³⁶ See Caio Prado Júnior, "The Economic Interpretation of Brazilian Independence," in Humphreys and Lynch, op. cit., pp. 221-240; and Boxer, op. cit., pp. 198-200.

³⁷ Cecil Jane, Liberty and Despotism in Spanish America (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1966), pp. 44-50 and 57-64.

colonists were satisfied for the most part with Royal authority and that the Church was instrumental in instilling a loyalty to constituted authority. Another factor may have been the colonists' fear of domination by other European powers. At any rate, there is little question that the colonists had little desire for breaking their ties with Spain until the nineteenth century.

During the period from 1810 to 1825, however, most of the nations of Latin America severed their political ties with the colonial powers. Leading to the wars of independence, notes Lyle McAlister, there was a general erosion of the institutions and structures of the Spanish colonial powers.³⁸ Both Spain and Portugal had attempted to centralize their colonial administration but, as was noted above, their attempts produced forces leading to sentiment for independence. Most importantly, resentment began building up among the creoles who were virtually excluded from positions of political power. Instead, the peninsulares retained almost all power. Increasingly, the creoles made contact with the outside world and gained exposure to new ideas. Comparing their own society to

³⁸ Lyle N. McAlister, "Social Structure and Social Change in New Spain," The Hispanic American Historical Review, XLIII (August, 1963), 370.

those of Europe and North America, many creoles became impatient for change from authoritarian rule and, as such, became involved in independence movements.³⁹ Even though the Crown had become somewhat distant in dealings with the colonies, the peninsulares remained in control. One of the effects of this arrangement was to leave a power vacuum when independence did come since the creoles and native population had no training or experience in governing themselves.

Many of the colonists regarded themselves as being exploited by the mother country and this, combined with the miserable lot of the peasant, created greater interest in separation. The general feeling of repression in all spheres of life was responsible for much of the independence sentiment especially when combined with a widening horizon on the part of the colonists. Ideas from the Enlightenment and a tendency toward greater intellectual and social freedom were emerging.

³⁹ Pierson and Gil, op. cit., p. 83 deals with this element as well as the other ideas suggested in this section. Also see Ben Burnett and Kenneth F. Johnson, Political Forces in Latin America (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1968), pp. 3-6; and Schurz, op. cit., pp. 43-45.

Probably nothing had a greater impact than the example set by the North American colonies and the French Revolution. With their independence from Great Britain, the North American colonies stimulated similar activities in other colonial dependencies. The ideas of liberty, equality, etc., were being accepted by the colonists of Latin America. As will be seen, the ideals were not always carried into practice in the Latin American states.

While support for independence may have increased because of dissatisfaction with certain features of colonial rule, the wars of independence were not really anti-Crown. Instead, the independence movements were often justified on the basis of support for the real monarchy as opposed to the rule of Napoleon after his subjugation of Spain.⁴⁰ Loyalty to Spain was acceptable but most Spanish people in the colonies could not give loyalty to Napoleon's colonial empire and the seeds of revolution were planted. Additionally, the colonies were often revolting against peninsular authority under the guise of loyalty to the Crown, charging the peninsulares

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Johnson, Simón Bolívar and Spanish American Independence: 1783-1830, p. 36.

with violating the will of the Crown.⁴¹ Whatever the source of revolt, the wars of independence changed very little. Although often based on lofty ideals, the post-independence rulers tended to be as authoritarian as were the colonial powers. In the words of John J. Johnson:

The difference was that by 1825 authoritarians born in America had replaced those sent from Spain and Portugal; except in Brazil, which remained an empire until 1889, authoritarianism was wielded in the name of republicanism.⁴²

The social, economic, and political order tended to remain the same, the only change being that different people were holding power.

⁴¹ Jane, op. cit., Chapters V and VI.

⁴² John J. Johnson, Political Change in Latin America: The Emergence of the Middle Sectors (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), p. 17.

Post-Independence 19th Century

1830-1870. When independence came to Latin America, the colonists were often ill-prepared for ruling themselves. It will be remembered that the Spaniards practically excluded the creoles and natives from governmental affairs. As a result there developed a power vacuum when the rule of Spain and those loyal to the empire were removed in the Americas. To fill this power vacuum the military often appeared, but even the military was not very well organized on a national level. The era of the caudillo emerged in which military heroes with the support of their own bands would fight for peace.⁴³

The landed estate system was not changed with independence and thus the various large landholders often competed for political power as well. As a result of these conflicts, the period following independence was one of confusion and frequent changes in leaders. Brazil, with the monarchy helping to insure peaceful change did not experience the disruption of other Latin American nations.

⁴³ See Wolf and Hansen, op. cit., for an excellent discussion of this power vacuum and its implications. In addition, see William H. Beezley, "Caudillismo: An Interpretive Note," Journal of Inter-American Studies, XI (July, 1969), 345-357.

In addition to the forces noted above, there was another problem for the emerging independent nations of Latin America. The independence movements were often influenced by and based on the ideals of the French Revolution and the democratic ideals of the newly-formed United States of America. Thus, when new constitutions and governments were established, they often copied United States and Western European models. Whole sections of the United States Constitution were often inserted verbatim as parts of the new Latin American constitutions.⁴⁴ These constitutions were supposed to provide stability and order for the society.

Along with the new constitutions, many Latin American nations developed a political party system. Usually the political parties were divided along the lines of Liberals (often reformers) and the Conservatives (often defenders of the system as it existed). Electoral reform and participation by the people became the programs of the Liberals in nations such as Uruguay and Mexico, for example.⁴⁵ In Mexico, the one-party system developed with

⁴⁴ Pierson and Gil, op. cit., Chapter 5 has a good analysis of the early constitutions and their sources.

⁴⁵ Gibson, op. cit., pp. 214-216.

reform being the major doctrine of the party. Scholars from the United States often assume that Latin American political parties play roles comparable to those of parties in the United States, but again, cultural bias overshadows objective analysis. As with the constitutions of Latin America, the political parties may represent something very different from what they represent in the United States.

Unfortunately, the social and economic as well as religious institutions of Latin America were not conducive to the establishment or maintenance of pluralistic democracy. The assumptions of democracy run counter to the prevailing social, economic, and religious order.

In addition, there is some question as to whether the Latin Americans understood the democratic ideals in the same way Northern Europeans did. Glen Dealy takes the position that nineteenth century Latin Americans actually rejected eighteenth century political liberalism.⁴⁶

⁴⁶Glen Dealy, "Prolegomena on the Spanish American Political Tradition," The Hispanic American Historical Review, XLVIII (February, 1968), 37-58. J. Lloyd Mecham, "Latin American Constitutions: Nominal and Real," Journal of Politics, XXI (May, 1959), 258-272 also reviews this aspect although his attention focuses on twentieth century constitutions.

Dealy analyzes various provisions and features of nineteenth century Latin American constitutions to show what real meaning was given the adopted concepts and ideals of democracy. His argument is that the constitutions of Latin America were actually aimed at insuring control by political leaders over the populace rather than the other way around, as assumed in pluralistic democratic models.⁴⁷

At any rate, the dichotomy between the ideals as North Americans understand them and the conditions in which they were to be used left a great deal of confusion. As a result, the legitimacy vacuum left by Spain's removal meant that new sources of legitimacy had to be found. The period from 1830 to 1870 was one in which attempts to establish legitimacy occurred in most Latin American nations. Various aristocratic families and men on horseback contended for power, alternating in rule through the caudillo system. In effect, chaos and anarchy reigned after independence. Partly because the Portuguese monarchy was successful in its reform efforts,

⁴⁷ Dealy, op. cit., p. 52; and Jane, op. cit., Chapter VIII provide a similar analysis.

Brazil was an exception to this generalization. Some nations of Spanish America, such as Paraguay, did not experience such disruption either.

While there were constant changes in political leadership in much of Latin America in the first forty or fifty years of independent rule, in reality, little had been changed from colonial times. Instead of the Crown, the caudillo became the symbol of power, but the colonial institutions survived.⁴⁸ Moreover, change from one caudillo to another had almost no impact on social or economic considerations. Changes came only at the top.⁴⁹

1870-1930. The chaos of the early nineteenth century was bound to give way to some form of order and integration of the society eventually. The late nineteenth and early twentieth century saw the emergence of greater order in Latin America. This period is often

⁴⁸ See McAlister, op. cit., p. 370.

⁴⁹ Merle Kling, "Toward a Theory of Power and Instability in Latin American Society," Western Political Quarterly, IX (March, 1956), 21-35 evaluates the impact of caudillo government on the larger system.

called the period of national consolidation.⁵⁰ Various forces combined to integrate the societies more fully and replace the caudillo system with governments capable of controlling the whole society.

While the rest of Latin America gained independence during the mid-nineteenth century, Brazil did not do so until 1889. Brazil's independence also differed in the sense that it did not bring much violent change. Instead, a military regime deposed the monarchy with little noticeable effect for most of the population. This regime, however, attempted to develop the nation economically and was a stabilizing force in this nation in contrast to the independence periods of most of the rest of the Latin American nations.⁵¹

During the mid-nineteenth century, the Latin American nations were caught up in the desire for economic development. They saw economic development as the panacea for all their ills. As a result, progress in economic

⁵⁰ Howard J. Wiarda, "Elites in Crisis," unpublished paper, n.d., pp. 18-20 provides a brief description of the "consolidation" process.

⁵¹ Burns, op. cit., pp. 198-204.

spheres became the goal of Latin American governments.⁵² To help this economic growth, the countries of northern Europe became markets for agricultural goods of the Americas. In addition, much immigration from Europe to Latin America occurred during this period. Most immigrants came in search of agricultural opportunities. Foreign investment and foreign markets provided tremendous economic growth for the region and also led the Latin Americans to become dependent on agricultural products. World War I only increased the dependency of Europeans on the Latin American agricultural system.

The worldwide economic collapse of 1929 was to change this situation, however, and prove disastrous to Latin American economic and political institutions. Many nineteenth century government leaders such as Porfirio Diaz created economies dependent upon alien investors. When the alien investors lost their money in the 1929 crash, the economies of Latin America suffered greatly.

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Johnson, Political Change in Latin America, Chapter 3 provides one of the best analyses of Latin American development during this time. This section of the study borrows heavily from Johnson's account.

In order to spur economic growth, the governments of Latin America pushed various internal improvements. Notably, transportation and communication systems were established. Of course, this effort had important implications for political integration, since control is easier to exert when geographical factors can be diminished as forces of division.

The unprecedented economic growth of this period, especially with its emphasis on agriculture, improved the position of the landed elites in Latin America. They were able to gain even greater power than before in controlling society. The influence of the oligarchies in Latin America increased.

To provide a climate in which economic growth could occur, certain political changes were made. Partly as a matter of convenience, the landholding elite acquiesced to control by authoritarian rule and the classic caudillo revolts diminished in frequency. Dictatorships with mass support, as under Diaz, became a way of providing stability so that economic development could occur. Attracting foreign investors was partially dependent on stability in the political order and thus compromises were made among landholders to support dictators in the more general interest of developing the economy.

Ironically, the very success of the oligarchy in achieving its goals was to produce forces which later destroyed much of its power. The emphasis on economic development created new political forces. John Johnson sees this period of economic development as responsible for creating the middle sectors of society, which he considers the most important force in the modernization of the area.⁵³ The various groups in the urban centers of trade--managers, bureaucrats, and labor groups--were to have a role in political development. In addition, the improvements in transportation and communication provided opportunities for the peasant sectors to have contact with other elements. Eventually, they were also to demand some share in the system.

Politically, Latin America experienced a number of strong dictatorships during this period, but some nations also went through the beginnings of radical social and political change as Mexico did in the Mexican Revolution. Being very personalistic in orientation, the dictators seldom prepared successors to themselves. More importantly, governmental institutions which could

⁵³ Ibid., pp. 38-44.

continue to order the society were not created. When the dictator went, there was nothing to provide for an orderly transition of governmental authority. With the economic collapse of 1929 and thereafter, the political systems became the objects of distrust and frustration. As a result, a new era of civil wars and revolts ensued. A new legitimacy vacuum developed and brought about chaos as great or greater than that of the immediate post-independence period.⁵⁴ With the new chaos, we begin to see the emergence of various sectors of society involved in political struggles. The demand for a "piece of the pie" came from many quarters. These forces for change produced more significant changes than any experienced in all the previous history of the area.

⁵⁴ See Wiarda, op. cit., pp. 20-21 for a brief analysis.

Contemporary Latin America

Many observers, looking at Latin America prior to 1930, assume that it escaped the influence of most of the forces shaping the modern world. However, as noted in the previous section, forces which would eventually catapult many Latin American nations into the processes of modernization were developing below the surface. The attempt at economic development created some changes which provided a great deal more communication among various sectors of the society. As a result, those sectors which had previously been left out began to recognize that an alternative to their situation existed. Perhaps increased communication and transportation networks provided the greatest impetus to the so-called "revolution of rising expectations." The dispossessed elements became increasingly reluctant to accept their status as natural. Instead, they began to demand a share in the fruits of their labor.

The implications of the revolution of rising expectations for the political system were immense. The political leaders and emerging middle sectors promised that industrialization would be a cure-all for the problems of the area. Emphasis was put on developing

factories and declining dependence on foreign powers. Unfortunately, the political leaders were unable to keep these promises. Instead of curing problems, industrialization created new ones by putting all available resources into industrialization to the neglect of other segments of society. Secondly, increasing industrialization often actually brought greater influence from outside because foreign powers provided the major resources for the industrialization process.⁵⁵ Because the political systems were incapable of fulfilling the rising expectations of the people, more chaos and systemic breakdown ensued. Often, of course, the political leaders promised more than they could deliver and the results were increased impatience with the political system. Thus, a new era of political instability emerged.

Many changes in Latin American society have occurred in recent decades, although it is easy to exaggerate them. Even though the post-1930 changes may seem small from the perspective of highly modernized societies, the changes are significant in the light of the

⁵⁵ See Johnson, Political Change in Latin America, pp. 186-189, and Mander, op. cit., p. 261.

conditions existing in Latin America prior to 1930. Prior to 1930, very little change was possible; whereas, post-1930 experience indicates a greater probability for such change. Numerous traditional institutions still exert tremendous influence on the nations of Latin America.⁵⁶

Despite a certain continuity to the institutions, however, many significant changes have come about.

While large haciendas still exist in many parts of Latin America, there has been a tendency toward modification of the system. The product of economic development and especially industrialization has been a challenge to the landowners by new groups, especially capitalists and labor elements. Thus, land reform has been a key proposal in most leftist political circles. The Alliance for Progress had, as part of its goals, the reform of landholding operations.⁵⁷ Internal development

⁵⁶ Mander, op. cit., pp. 104-106. Claudio Veliz, The Politics of Conformity in Latin America (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), Introduction, looks at the approaches to change and relation of the middle sectors to the approaches.

⁵⁷ Víctor Alba, Alliance Without Allies (New York: Praeger, 1965) provides an excellent critique of the goals and performances of the Alliance for Progress.

of Brazil by Vargas and succeeding governments has created new power centers in the interior to counterbalance coastal interests. Along with these changes, the Church has become more socially conscious in recent years. Such pressures against the traditional elites have had significant influence. Even the military with its increased middle class make-up is becoming a little more socially and politically progressive. Perhaps the change in make-up of the military is itself partly responsible for some of the changes noted here.

Brazil has been contrasted with Spanish America several times in this brief analysis of Latin American history. Perhaps it would be useful to summarize the differences between Brazil and the rest of the region. First of all, there was a vast difference in the relationship of colonists to the indigenous population in Brazil. Since the Indian in Brazil was not suitable for labor as in most of Spanish America and since the Indian population was comparatively small, the colonial power imported a large number of African slaves. The influx of Africans gave Brazil a unique racial character among Latin American nations. The culture of the African slaves added to the make-up of Brazilian culture. Additionally, slavery itself was a much more highly developed

institution in Brazil than in any other part of Latin America.

Secondly, the economic history of Brazil is very different from that of much of Spanish America. In much of Latin America, the conquerors came in search of precious metals, many of which had been mined by the Indians. Once the mines were exhausted, the colonial power focused on agriculture. In Brazil, on the other hand, precious metals were not important until much later. Instead, brazilwood, sugar, cotton, and tobacco were important commodities in the economy of Brazil during the colonial period. The agricultural exploitation in Brazil helped to create a system highly dependent on slavery from the very earliest days of development. It was not until the eighteenth century that gold and diamonds became important to the Brazilian economy.

Brazil's economic development followed a reverse pattern from most of the rest of Latin America. More importantly, Brazil also represents the epitome of the "boom and bust" type of economy.⁵⁸ Brazil's development

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See Rollie E. Poppino, Brazil: The Land and People (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 113-157 for an excellent analysis of Brazilian economic development.

was cyclical with dependence on one commodity at a time. Usually, the economy has depended on foreign markets as well, making the nation economically dependent. As one natural resource was depleted or as agricultural markets fluctuated, the economy fluctuated as well. The rubber industry is perhaps the best example of the boom and bust character of Brazilian economy. Once the major export of Brazil, the rubber industry is now almost non-existent there. Now, of course, Brazil is most dependent on the coffee market although there is some diversification in its economy. Brazil has developed a one-crop or one-commodity mentality--as the bottom fell out of one market, a new resource was exploited. The effect of this approach has been disorganization and instability in the economic sphere as well as dependence on other nations' economies.⁵⁹

In effect the contemporary scene in much of Latin America is one in which traditional and modernizing forces coexist side by side. The traditional order has not been destroyed nor have modern institutions been

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 113, and pp. 153-154.

installed. Instead, some modernizing institutions such as new classes exist, but they have to exist with modifications of the old order.

The political systems of Latin America still reflect the authoritarian, personalistic, and rigidly hierarchical traditions, although those traditions have been modified.⁶⁰ In addition, there are forces for modernization existing in the same systems. The conflicts between the traditional and modernizing forces create difficult problems for Latin American attempts at developing social and political institutions relevant to this modern era.

Just because there is turmoil in Latin America does not mean that real changes are taking place. Some scholars note that while significant social and political changes are occurring in some nations, many of the changes in government are still only changes at the top.

⁶⁰ Wiarda, "Law and Political Development in Latin America: Toward a Framework for Analysis," American Journal of Comparative Law, XIX (Summer, 1971), 434-463 explores the current scene. In addition, James Busey, Latin America: Political Institutions and Processes (New York: Random House, 1964) explains the same characteristics.

In fact, it has been argued that some recent "revolutions" have really been attempts to return to the past.⁶¹

This necessarily brief review of Latin American history will provide a basis for a fuller analysis of the applicability of the various frameworks for the study of political development to Latin America in the following six chapters. Each chapter will provide greater detail on particular aspects of the several development models and on the peculiar nature of the Latin American developmental experience.

⁶¹ Iêda S. Wiarda and Howard J. Wiarda, "Revolution or Counterrevolution in Brazil," Massachusetts Review, VIII (Winter, 1967), 149-165 take this position concerning Brazil; and Alba, op. cit., assumes the same in discussing prospects for change in Latin America.

CHAPTER III

THE CONSENSUS MODEL

The consensus model for the study of social change is based on a tradition stemming primarily from Max Weber's works and carried into contemporary scholarly pursuit by Talcott Parsons.¹ The consensus model is also referred to as "the equilibrium model" by many social scientists, but as will be illustrated in the next chapter, equilibrium is not a concern exclusive to the

¹ Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947) provides the most complete formulation of his ideas on the subject, but other works to be noted in this study also provide important insights. Talcott Parsons has written extensively on the subject with his Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966), and his collaboration with Edward A. Shils, Toward a General Theory of Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951) being among the most important. In the comparative politics area, Gabriel Almond has probably been the most ardent spokesman for the Weberian model. In turn, Almond's influence on many of the political scientists to be examined in this study is great.

consensus model.² Despite the suggestion that both the consensus and conflict models are merely different paths toward equilibrium, some social scientists continue to look at equilibrium and conflict as identifying opposing models.³ In this study, consensus and equilibrium will not be considered the same. Rather the consensus model is taken to be one method of achieving equilibrium in the system.

Many equate the consensus model with democratic pluralism, indicating that the backgrounds of the people most identified with the consensus model are probably very influential in the results of their studies.⁴ According

² Leo Kuper discusses the equilibrium feature of the two models in "Plural Societies: Perspectives and Problems," in Leo Kuper and M. G. Smith (eds.), Pluralism in Africa (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), pp. 7-26. In addition, see Edward Dow, Politics in the Altiplano: The Dynamics of Change in Rural Peru (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1969), pp. 7-9.

³ In addition to Dew, ibid., Alfred Diamant, Political Development: Approaches to Theory and Strategy (Bloomington, Ind.: Comparative Administration Group, 1963), pp. 26-43, discusses the approaches in this manner.

⁴ Kuper, op. cit., notes this tendency on the part of some scholars. David B. Truman, The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion (New York: Knopf, 1962); E. E. Schattschneider, Party Government (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1942); and

to this view, consensus emerges as a result of the peaceful resolution of conflicts of independent interests.

Consensus may be reached in a variety of ways including compromise of interest; acceptance of less than maximum satisfaction of interests in the interest of society as a whole; or as voluntary subordination to group pressures or decisions. Whatever the method of reaching agreement, a type of equilibrium tends to emerge as a natural progression of events.

The general features of the consensus model are usually couched in terms of the experiences of the Anglo-American industrial development experiences. According to this model, the development process will be one in which there is a tendency to move from an agrarian rural society to an industrial urban society. Instead of a particularistic and parochial social system there is movement toward universalism and centralization of societal institutions and values. In addition, it is expected that participation by the citizenry in all aspects of society increases with the resultant equilibrium and gradual

Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956) provide some of the best examples of the tendency to equate the consensus model with democratic pluralism.

change.⁵ It seems that these general features of the consensus model stem in large part from the basic assumptions made by its advocates. It would be instructive to note and evaluate the basic assumptions of the consensus model of change and then the conclusions occasioned by those assumptions.

Elements of the Consensus Model

Assumptions of the model. The basic assumption of the consensus model, of course, is that differing interests exist in society. There is little doubt that differing interests do emerge in all societies. Regardless of what creates the differing interests, it seems safe to accept this assumption of the conflict model, as will be noted in the next chapter. Once these differing interests exist conflict emerges among them for satisfaction of their needs. At this point the consensus and conflict models diverge both in assumptions and conclusions.

⁵ Howard J. Wiarda, "Elites in Crisis," unpublished paper, n.d., outlines these basic features of consensus oriented models. In addition, see Kuper, op. cit.; Dew, op. cit.; and Mohammed Guessous, "A General Critique of Equilibrium Theory," in Readings on Social Change, ed. by Wilbert E. Moore and Robert M. Cook (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1967), pp. 23-35.

In looking at the general features of the consensus model noted above, it will be remembered that one aspect was that there would be movement from an agrarian to an industrialized economy, a process which would help produce a consensus situation. Numerous assumptions lie behind this feature. First of all, it is assumed that industrialization produces greater pluralism in the society which in turn brings to fruition some of the other general features noted in the above discussion.⁶

Industrialization is supposed to bring about an equalization of classes in the social system and with this equalization would come greater cooperation among various groups in the society. Equalization of classes would come about because there would be a greater and more equitable distribution of wealth throughout the

⁶Walt Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960) provides one of the earliest examples of the use of this assumption. Following closely behind him were C. E. Black, The Dynamics of Modernization (New York: Harper and Row, 1966) and A. F. K. Organski, The Stages of Political Development (New York: Knopf, 1965). For an excellent review of the way some of these assumptions relate to Latin America, see Alfred Stepan, "Political Development Theory: The Latin American Experience," Journal of International Affairs, XX (1966), 223-234. In addition, see the Introduction to John Kautsky's Political Change in Under-developed Countries (New York: Wiley, 1962).

population. With wider distribution of the wealth, greater portions of the population would have an interest in the system and thus would work together for the common good. This view ignores the possibility that the industrialists could exploit the rest of the population and not distribute the wealth.

In addition to creating a wider distribution of wealth, industrialization is also supposed to increase cross-cultural experiences. As the society becomes more urbanized, larger portions of the population interact with one another. The rural residents suddenly have much more contact with the city residents and with the whole urban and more modern environment because the rural inhabitants are lured to the cities by jobs and economic benefits accruing from industrialization. These cross-cultural contacts tend to bring about a greater commonality in the interests and values of the population.⁷ Such a commonality of values, it is argued, helps to override differences in interests which might otherwise cause disintegration of the system.

⁷ Daniel Lerner's The Passing of Traditional Society (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958) is one of the best known works taking this position. Those concerned with economic development as a prerequisite to political development often take this position as well.

The limitations of this view of urbanization center in the fact that it ignores the rising expectations which might create havoc in the system as the system proves incapable of satisfying them. Thus, greater contact and communication among groups may ultimately lead to frustration and resentment, as the poor begin to realize that modern conveniences and goods exist but that they may never really hope to acquire them without violence.⁸

The idea that urbanization and industrialization create a middle class interested in political and social reform is also subject to question.⁹ As has been noted in the previous chapter, urbanization in Latin America was not the result of industrialization. Instead, the cities were often built as centers of culture and luxury for the elite.¹⁰ In addition, as Claudio Veliz notes, the middle

⁸ Claudio Veliz in the Introductions to his edited volumes, The Politics of Conformity in Latin America (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), and Obstacles to Change in Latin America (London: Oxford University Press, 1965) notes this possibility.

⁹ John J. Johnson, Political Change in Latin America: The Emergence of the Middle Sectors (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958) presents this position.

¹⁰ The point is made by Ronald Glassman, Political History of Latin America (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1969), pp. 246-247; John Mander, The Unrevolutionary Society: The Power of Latin American Conservatism in a

classes in Latin America are not necessarily associated with pressures for reform. Instead, he contends that the middle sectors merely aspire to becoming part of the upper classes and feel no commonality with the peasantry.¹¹ Such positions are in direct contradiction to the assumptions of the consensus model.

With the change from an agricultural to an industrial society, the economic units change as well. While the agricultural system can operate on a small scale, the industrialization process creates greater interdependence among various economic sectors. Because the industrial sectors usually depend on one another for raw materials, equipment, or capital, they are less likely to maintain independence from other sectors of the population. Only if an industry has a complete monopoly can it expect to be totally self-sufficient. The argument goes that increasing interdependence creates a greater

Changing World (New York: Knopf, 1969), p. 260; and Economic Commission for Latin America, United Nations Economic and Social Council, Social Development of Latin America in the Post-War Periods (Mardel Plata, Argentina, 1963).

¹¹ Veliz, op. cit. Richard N. Adams, "Political Power and Social Structures," in Veliz (ed.), The Politics of Conformity in Latin America, pp. 15-42 makes a similar point.

willingness to cooperate and stabilize the system.¹² This interaction is part of the tendency toward the universalizing of institutions of society. People are expected to consider broader issues rather than concentrate on their localized interest.

While there is a movement away from particularistic aspects on the societal level, there is a seeming counter-tendency toward differentiation and specialization in the society as well. This aspect of the development process has been well analyzed by Lucian Pye.¹³ Differentiation and specialization provide for greater expertise in dealing with each segment or aspect of societal operations. The greater specialization produces obstacles to coordination as well, in that each segment of society tends to become concerned with its own private interests and does not always consider its relationship to the other elements. In this way, there may be a tendency toward disintegration rather than integration. What differentiates this type of

¹²This assumption is made by Black, op. cit., pp. 64-74, and Organski, op. cit., pp. 5-10 in their discussions of the process.

¹³Lucian Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), p. 45.

particularism from that of more primitive societies is the fact that the specialization is coordinated at the top in order to reach agreed-upon goals.¹⁴ For example, an economic organization has highly specialized units or divisions which are coordinated for the ultimate production of a particular product. In the primitive societies particularism is characteristic of the whole fabric of society and coordination of specialties is not found.

The structural-functional theorists are most concerned with the roles of various sectors in the system and their orientation to its general goals.¹⁵ The charge is often made that the only goal for structural-functionalists is system stability. S. N. Eisenstadt, however, takes the position that structures just have not existed to meet the rising demands on the system in many modernizing societies, resulting in system breakdown.¹⁶

¹⁴Organski, op. cit., p. 7, and Black, op. cit., pp. 21-28 suggest this tendency.

¹⁵See David Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965) for a good example of the structural-functional approach applied to the development process--especially pp. 1-42.

¹⁶S. N. Eisenstadt, "Breakdowns of Modernizations," Economic Development and Cultural Change, XII (July, 1964), 345-367.

Another feature of the consensus model is the emphasis on social equality and increased citizen participation which is to emerge. These developments have a deterministic character.¹⁷ The assumption of increasing participation cannot be considered apart from the other assumptions outlined above. In order for participation to become probable, there has to be a certain equalization in the social system which, in turn, is brought about by the industrialization process. If the first assumptions are not accepted, participation is not likely to be realized.

Social equality and political participation are particularly interlocked. The argument is made that with social equality there is a lessening of ideological differences.¹⁸ As the gap between haves and have-nots

¹⁷ Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963) present the most detailed case for this position. In addition, Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba, Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965) employ this assumption in their analysis.

¹⁸ See Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (Garden City: Doubleday, 1960), especially Chapter 13 for the basic assumptions involved in this position. Also Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960), and Johnson, op. cit., among others take this position.

narrows and the levelling process goes forward, people tend to acquire similar values and do not see one another as antagonists. As a result, they can work together to resolve differences which are diminished in size by the decreasing social distance.

According to this view, increased participation in society also contributes to a reduction of ideological differences. As individuals participate in more and more social groups, their ideological loyalties tend to decrease in intensity. In other words, pluralism, which is supposed to result from industrialization and urbanization, reduces ideological conflict.¹⁹ Sidney Verba argues that the greater the number of organizations a person belongs to, the less intense his loyalties to any one of those organizations become. Cleavage in the system is reduced by overlapping membership in groups.²⁰

¹⁹ William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (New York: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 79-81, and Sidney Verba, "Organizational Membership and Democratic Consensus," The Journal of Politics, XXVII (August, 1965), 467-497 treat this feature of the consensus model. Gino Germani, Politica y Sociedad en una Epoca de Transicion (Buenos Aires: Editorial Paidós, 1963) discusses modernization in terms of social participation.

²⁰ Verba, op. cit., pp. 468-470. Also see Truman, op. cit.

If one accepts the argument that industrialization brings about greater participation in groups, Verba's argument becomes a powerful one.

The other side of the participation process involves participation in the political system itself. The idea that participation itself is an indicator of political development is indicative of the impact Western political systems have had on the concept of social change. Political participation by the citizenry is obviously one of the most cherished ideals of democratic beliefs. As such, the suggestion that development means participation approaches the equating of development and democracy. At any rate, the increase in participation is tied very closely to all the other features of the consensus model examined herein. Social equality enhances the possibility of increased political participation. As participation increases there is more opportunity for the expression of demands on the system; and as demands increase, greater communication of ideas and interests emerge. With this, the cycle starts anew with cross-cultural experiences, and so on. The concept of "partisan mutual adjustment" suggested by Charles E. Lindblom is an excellent example of the way in which differing interests impose claims on the system which are

eventually altered in favor of more generalized interests.²¹ Every specific interest has to be compromised in favor of the interests of all.

Conclusions of the model. The consensus model provides a deterministic character to the process of social change. Analysis of the assumptions of the model reveals a steady march toward "progress." What this seems to indicate is that once the initial aspects of development are set in motion, all political systems will move toward the Western European model. Specifically, if a developing nation could only become industrialized or economically developed, political development would follow.²²

Secondly, the process of change is seen to be a slow and incremental one. Each economic or social change

²¹ Charles E. Lindblom, The Intelligence of Democracy (New York: The Free Press, 1965). Albert O. Hirschman's Journeys Toward Progress (New York: The 20th Century Fund, 1963) takes a similar stance.

²² Most of the authors connected with the consensus model seem to accept this view. As an indication of its pervasiveness, a program as noble in ideals as the Alliance for Progress was based on this idea.

sets in motion some new change which in turn triggers others. However, no sudden or drastic changes can be incorporated into the model very effectively.²³

Another implication of the assumptions is that all people have access to the system. If participation is to be meaningful, all interests must have some assurance of being heard by the system. Robert Dahl, for instance, concludes that all elements in the society have some opportunity of having their demands considered by the system.²⁴ If their demands cannot be aired, the people's interests are stifled and compromise cannot result. The eventual outcome could be total destruction of the system by frustrated elements.

²³ Guessous, op. cit., p. 34 makes this point, suggesting that advocates of the model thus ignore many "essential characteristics of social life."

²⁴ Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), pp. 223-301.

Variations on the Consensus Model

While the consensus model involves a series of common assumptions and conclusions, there are differences in individual models. Perhaps the most widely known version of the model is the systems analysis version. Parsons, Easton, and Almond are most closely associated with this approach to the study of politics. Gabriel Almond has been most active in applying the systems approach to the study of comparative government. Actually, as Robert Packenham notes, systems analysis covers several of the approaches considered in Chapter I of this study.²⁵ Although they do not describe formal models, de Toqueville and Lipset must also be considered advocates of the consensus model, since they too are concerned with the social correlates of democracy. They analyze the roles played by various social elements in the stability of political systems, particularly democratic political systems.

²⁵ Robert A. Packenham, "Approaches to the Study of Political Development," World Politics, XVII (October, 1964), 115.

The analyses of Rostow, Black, and Organski indicate another aspect of the social system approach to studying political change. As with de Toqueville and Lipset, these authors do not prescribe a systems framework for their analyses, but such a framework is implied. The authors are concerned with the interrelationship of economic, social, and political variables in the operation of the system. David Truman in his concern with groups employs a similar approach, except that his unit of analysis differs slightly.

More explicit in the use of the systems approach are Karl Deutsch and David Apter. Both use a structural-functional framework in analyzing the relationship of "communications," in one instance, and "role," in the other, to the proper functioning of the system.

The systems analysis approach provides many alternatives for the study of various aspects of the political system. What is common to all, however, is that the factors which are studied are those which are functional for the system. Factors which can be accommodated by the system are studied, while those which are disruptive to the system are not considered or are rejected because the system cannot accommodate them. Many critics argue that systems analysis ignores certain essential features of politics. For example, systems

analysts assume that all major groups are able to participate. Without an in-depth analysis of political resources, however, it seems clear that some groups do find difficulty in articulating interests or demands. Some interests are thus articulated only weakly; others not at all.

Scholars interested in producing stability may also be clearly identified with the consensus model. David Apter and Samuel P. Huntington, for instance, both search for ways of institutionalizing structures and processes as a means of acquiring stability or equilibrium. Even though they are concerned about possibly disruptive forces in the system, their main concern is with finding a way of bringing about consensus and stability through institutionalizing the processes of change.

Lucian Pye's use of political culture provides an example of yet another consensus orientation to political development, even though it may be more flexible in application. But in Pye's analysis too, with his six crises of nation-building through which nations must pass before being considered developed, the basic assumptions of the consensus model are again clearly evident. The aspects of distribution and participation singled out in his analyses of these crises are indicative of the consensus orientation.

The consensus model, whatever its variations, is a very optimistic one which envisions harmony and pluralistic democracy as the ideals inevitably reached in modern societies. How this model has been applied to the study of Latin America and whether it is appropriate will be taken up in the concluding sections of this chapter.

Application of the Consensus

Model to Latin America

Most United States students of Latin America have used a consensus orientation in studying the process of political development in Latin America. Since the United States is a good example of what the consensus model is supposed to produce, it is not surprising that political scientists trained in that tradition should apply it to the study of other regions.

Adolf Berle, for instance, is a good example of a United States scholar and government advisor who adopted the consensus model orientation to the study of Latin America.²⁶ Such studies often seem to be occasioned more

²⁶ Adolf Berle, Latin America: Diplomacy and Reality (New York: Harper and Row, 1962). There are countless others of this nature oriented to the general public based on prodding Latin American nations to imitate the United States. Milton S. Eisenhower, The Wine is Bitter: The United States and Latin America (Garden City: Doubleday, 1963) is another.

by a concern for heading off Communist advances in the area than in gaining an understanding of the Latin Americans and their political systems. Most often these analyses conclude with a call for United States policies toward Latin America which will foster social and economic reform which will in turn create political changes consistent with the consensus model's version of political development. At the policy level, the Alliance for Progress was a singular manifestation of the consensus model.

Among Latin Americanists, John J. Johnson, Gino Germani, and Martin C. Needler are perhaps most closely associated with the consensus-equilibrium-pluralist approach.²⁷ Johnson's work, Political Change in Latin America: The Emergence of the Middle Sectors, is one of the clearest and most influential statements of the consensus position. In this work, Johnson views the middle sectors as the hope for political development and stability in Latin America. His view is that the middle sectors of the urban areas will increase pressures for

²⁷ Johnson, op. cit.; Germani, op. cit.; and Martin C. Needler, Political Development in Latin America: Instability, Violence, and Evolutionary Change (New York: Random House, 1968).

governmental activity to solve the acute social problems of Latin America. The process will include gradual change and stability of the system.²⁸ Johnson's study encompasses Uruguay, Chile, Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil, which are among the most developed Latin American nations and which have the largest middle sectors. These case studies are used to prove his hypothesis. Much of the literature has challenged Johnson's views of the middle sectors' role in Latin America, and that material will be discussed in Chapter V.

Víctor Alba takes a view similar to Johnson's, but his feeling is that the middle sectors and the oligarchs have worked out a detente to prevent much of the needed change at the moment.²⁹ While Alba is very pessimistic about the oligarchy ever supporting real

²⁸ See Johnson, op. cit., Introduction and Chapter 9 in particular. For a good critique of Johnson's analysis, see Juan F. Marsal, Cambio social en America Latina (Buenos Aires: Solar/Hachete, 1967), pp. 27-29, and 108-110.

²⁹ Víctor Alba, Alliance Without Allies (New York: Praeger, 1965), in which Alba presents a caustic analysis of how the United States and Latin Americans have both failed to stimulate the needed changes. His later work, The Latin Americans (New York: Praeger, 1969) is a little less caustic but makes the same point.

change, his emphasis is still on social and economic progress as the method of achieving political progress. He sees a need for modernization of the social structure of Latin America but argues that only the Latin Americans themselves can initiate it. When the Latin Americans modernize their own social structures, political development will also occur.³⁰ What puts Alba in the consensus camp, even though his background is of the old-line socialist school, is the fact that he envisions change taking place within a fairly stable system with gradualism as the key. Economic and social advance are basic to political development. While certainly very critical of the Alliance for Progress as it was implemented, Alba is very much in agreement with its initial objectives, all of which of course stem from the consensus model. The relationship of the Alliance and the consensus model will be explained in the last section of this chapter.

Robert J. Alexander is yet another student of Latin America who follows the consensus tradition. His concern is the means through which various sectors of society can

³⁰ Alba, The Latin Americans.

contribute to a stable and progressive system.³¹ His major thesis is that democracy is likely to emerge in Latin America for some of the same reasons proposed by Johnson. He particularly emphasizes the probability of the development of democratic pluralism as the result of economic development. Economic development, according to Alexander, creates a diversity of interests and, particularly, a new industrial wage-earning class which exerts pressures on the system similar to those exerted by the middle sectors in Johnson's analysis.³²

Martin C. Needler also views Latin American government from a consensus model orientation. His work is almost entirely concerned with making the Latin American nations over in the image of the United States or the Western European nations he considers politically developed.³³ Again, the attainment of democracy and

³¹Robert J. Alexander, Today's Latin America (Garden City: Doubleday, 1962), and Latin American Politics and Government (New York: Harper and Row, 1965).

³²See Alexander, Latin American Politics, pp. 171-176.

³³Needler, Latin American Politics in Perspective (New York: Van Nostrand, 1962), pp. 178-182, although all of Chapter 4 is relevant. Also see his Political Development in Latin America.

stability is the goal. This type of political development comes about through social and economic change. Needler devotes much of his attention to economic development in his analysis of political development in Latin America.

A large number of social scientists concerned with Latin America accept the positions implicit in the consensus model, among them, Kalman Silvert, Albert O. Hirschman, and Gino Germani. Most of these people see economic and social progress as the key to political development. Social and economic changes are expected to produce pluralism which provides for a system of bargaining for special interests.³⁴ There are variations on the intensity of optimism on the chances of progress being made through application of the consensus model. Some, such as Silvert, while implicitly employing the model, are very skeptical of the hope placed in the middle sectors of society or in groups which are supposed to emerge as the result of industrialization.³⁵

³⁴ Hirschman, op. cit., takes the position that a society in which there is a plurality of interests permits trading off on issues and insures over-all stability.

³⁵ Kalman Silvert, The Conflict Society: Reaction and Revolution in Latin America, rev. ed. (New York: American Universities Field Staff, 1966) is particularly skeptical about the effects of industrialization and the

This brief review of some of the literature on Latin American political development indicates how pervasive the use of the consensus model has been in analyzing the region. Obviously the above review has noted only some of the major works on the subject. The review was limited mostly to political scientists, although some historians and sociologists as well as economists were noted. The major point emerging from the review is that the Latin American nations have often been studied as though they were on the way to becoming copies of the United States or Western European democracies. The assumption has been that Latin America would follow the same steps as did the United States, that there is a clear and unilinear path to development.

middle sectors. Taking a similar position are Karl M. Schmitt and David B. Burks, Evolution or Chaos (New York: Praeger, 1963). Perhaps more optimistic is Frank Tannenbaum, Ten Keys to Latin America (New York: Vintage Books, 1962).

Implications of the Consensus Model for
the Understanding of Latin America

The consensus model is apt to ignore many aspects of Latin America which are important to an understanding of the area. By expecting the Latin American nations to follow the same pattern of development as the Western European nations and the United States, students of Latin America have a tendency to overlook the differences in historical experiences of the area, to say nothing of its unique socio-cultural-political tradition. As was noted in the previous chapter, the colonial history of Latin America gave it a much different political heritage from that of the United States. In effect, as John Mander notes, the consensus approach discourages consideration of differences in cultures. "Worse, it appears to rule out the possibility that other cultures may be striving for goals different from those American (i.e., United States) society proposes for itself."³⁶

This limitation is felt not only by United States scholars but by those of Latin America as well. To note Mander's view again, the intelligentsia of Latin America

³⁶ Mander, op. cit., p. 106.

have uncritically accepted economic development as the criterion of maturity and as such have "bought" the consensus model approach with little or no consideration of Latin America's own cultural differences from the industrialized nations.³⁷ The Latin Americans have accepted the fact (or adopted the myth) of their own "backwardness" or "underdevelopment." The fact that Latin Americans themselves have accepted the idea may be the ultimate in a kind of United States cultural imperialism.

If one accepts the consensus model's analysis of the relationship of industrialization and urbanization to political development, much of Latin American society would be ignored or misunderstood. As was noted in the first two chapters, industrialization did not have the same consequences for urbanization in Latin America as it did in the United States. Rather, cities were purposely built by the Conquistadores long before there was any industrialization. In many instances industrialization was introduced as a panacea for many of the problems which already existed in Latin America. The consensus model analysis is not very helpful in understanding these

37 Ibid.

societies. As Samuel P. Huntington notes, the industrialization process, especially if rapid, can cause many problems for the political system and destroy the stability for which the consensus model strives.³⁸ While Huntington notes the disruptive effects of rapid economic development and social modernization, he still accepts the view that economic and social development are necessary to political development.³⁹

Clearly related to economic development is the emergence of the middle sectors. The consensus model's view of the middle sectors misinterprets the facts of the Latin American situation. As has often been noted, the middle sectors of Latin America just have not put much effort into social and political reform. Instead they have frequently aligned themselves with or been coopted by the oligarchs, in the hope of improving their social

³⁸ Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 49-50. Also see Eldon Kenworthy, "Argentina: The Politics of Late Industrialization," Foreign Affairs, XLV (April, 1967), 463-476.

³⁹ Kenworthy, op. cit., 107.

status.⁴⁰ Since the consensus model does not seem to fit the situation, the particular role played by the middle sectors in Latin America is ignored. These middle sectors have become more oriented to the status quo than to progress.⁴¹

Although it is not to be examined here, one might question the applicability of the consensus model on this issue even to the United States. Does the so-called "silent majority" really fit the consensus model's characterization of the middle sector as progressive and democratic? Do the middle sectors in the United States really have all the solid virtues Johnson seems to think? One doubts it.

With its emphasis on democracy and gradual change, the consensus model creates problems for its advocates in explaining what happens in Latin America. Even in nations which are relatively industrialized, the political process often remains very chaotic and prone to violence. When

⁴⁰ Mander, op. cit., pp. 122-124, and 148; and Veliz, op. cit., "Introductions." These are two of the most incisive in their analyses of this point, but references in Chapter II and previously in this chapter note many others taking similar positions.

⁴¹ See Economic Commission for Latin America, op. cit., pp. 111-115.

democracy fails, many students of Latin America, rather than reject the model, reason that the people were just incapable of instituting democracy.⁴² With such reasoning, advocates of the consensus model keep their model intact while ignoring damaging facts, relieving them of the necessity of questioning the assumptions and/or conclusions of the model which might be at odds with the facts. The consensus model advocates thus reify their creation rather than accept the fact that it may not fit all nations and all contingencies.

While the model misinterprets or disregards some of the facts of the Latin American experience, there is no reason to reject the model entirely. In fact, it is useful in providing some insights into the processes of Latin American development. The positive contributions of the model for the study of Latin America will be evaluated in Chapter VIII of this study. What seems more important at this point is what implications the model has for

⁴²Glen Dealy, "Prolegomena on the Spanish American Political Tradition," The Hispanic American Historical Review, XLVIII (February, 1968), 37-39 makes this point in his analysis of Latin America's "democratic" experiments.

policy-making on the part of the Latin American governments as well as for United States policy toward Latin America.

It seems that many Latin American governments have accepted the understanding and assumptions of the development theory which emerge from the consensus model. The attempts at modernization of an Eduardo Frei Montalva, for instance, have involved various plans and strategies to implement those progressive changes which would put the nation on the road to development a la the consensus model. Nation after nation has looked at industrialization and economic development as the cure-all for its social and political problems. The tragedy of it is that resources have often been squandered on outmoded and inefficient industrial plants with little to show for it. Other areas of the society have suffered because resources were drawn away from them to support industrialization. Only recently have these nations found that they could not compete with other more efficient industrial nations in the world market.

Similarly, United States policy toward Latin America has often been based on our own developmental experience. We have simply carried over and applied our own growth model to a society and culture which lacks our traditions and to which it simply does not conform.

Industrialization and economic and social reform have been prime targets of most of our Latin American programs. The Alliance for Progress is the most notable of these programs. The idea behind this program is the familiar one that social and economic development will produce good liberal democracies in the area. A typical American view is that people who are well-off are happy people and anti-Communist people. The New Deal assumptions have been brought to bear unquestioningly on the problems of Latin American development. The lack of success of the Alliance for Progress attests to some of the problems with such a set of assumptions. Undoubtedly, the lack of success of the Alliance cannot be attributed only to United States misinterpretation of the Latin American experience. Lack of promised United States support, pressures by American economic interests, failure of the Latin Americans to plan needed reforms and resistance of the oligarchy to broad social and political changes are just a few of the other reasons for failure of the Alliance.⁴³ Some of these factors are discussed more fully in succeeding and the

⁴³ See Alba, Alliance Without Allies.

concluding chapters. It is clear that the United States policies often reflect the attitude that all developing nations will follow its model of development whether they want to or not. A large part of the reason for this attitude is that Americans understand Latin America from the perspective of the consensus model, a model which is uniquely Anglo-American and not necessarily attuned to the special needs of Latin America.

CHAPTER IV
THE CONFLICT MODEL

Introduction

Although Karl Marx's analysis of social change is used as the foundation for the conflict model, advocates of this model do not always employ his units of analysis --economic classes. Ralf Dahrendorf and Barrington Moore, Jr., are among the more influential contemporary scholars in the conflict tradition who have accepted Marx's analysis complete with economic class analysis.¹ Others use the general assumptions of the conflict model, but they do not limit the conflict to class conflict.

¹Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968); and Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1956) are the major works on the model. Stanley Rothman, "Barrington Moore and the Dialectics of Revolution: An Essay Review," American Political Science Review, LXIV (March, 1970), 61-82 presents an excellent critique of Moore's position.

They see that there may be conflict among various sectors of society including ethnic, religious, cultural, or ideological differentiation instead of viewing all conflict as resulting from economic class differences.²

Usually, however, those scholars employing the conflict model tend to isolate one particular root of conflict ordinarily class, which is used to explain all forces of social change.

Contrary to the consensus model, social change in the conflict analysis model does not come gradually and orderly. Instead change tends to be rapid and often violent because there are no mechanisms for the compromise of particular interests in conflict model analysis.

Violence may often occur although change is not always of

²M. G. Smith, "Social and Cultural Pluralism," in Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, LXXXIII (1960), 763-777 provides one of the best statements of the conflict model in application to modern society. Further note is made of it in Leo Kuper and M. G. Smith, Pluralism in Africa (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969). Lewis A. Coser has also published several works devoted to the conflict model, among which the most important are: Continuities in the Study of Social Conflict (New York: The Free Press, 1967); The Functions of Social Conflict (New York: The Free Press, 1954); and Lewis A. Coser and Bernard Rosenberg (eds.), Sociological Theory: A Book of Readings (Toronto: The Macmillan Co., 1969).

a violent nature. Whether violent or non-violent, change is brought about as a result of social conflict.³

In its most general view of society, the conflict model has some characteristics in common with the consensus model. Social diversity of groups or interests is important to each model, although the conflict model can accommodate a more simplistic society. The conflict model may view society in terms of a bi-polar arrangement; whereas the consensus model makes sense only if there is a large number of groups competing for power in the system.

The direction of change is usually thought to be similar for the consensus and conflict models. There seems to be an inevitability of movement from the rural, agricultural to a more complex urban industrial society.⁴ In many respects, the conflict model sees progress in terms of movement toward what exists in the industrialized

³ See Ralf Dahrendorf, "Out of Utopia: Toward a Reorientation of Sociological Analysis," in Lewis Coser and Bernard Rosenberg, op. cit., pp. 236-237.

⁴ See Howard J. Wiarda, "Elites in Crisis," unpublished paper, n.d. Also Edward Dew, Politics in the Altiplano: The Dynamics of Change in Rural Peru (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1969), pp. 8-10, and Leo Kuper, in "Plural Societies: Perspectives and Problems," Kuper and Smith, op. cit., pp. 10-13 for further elaboration.

societies. In some instances the deterministic feature of the conflict model is more evident than in the consensus model.⁵

The previous chapter indicated that equilibrium is also associated with the conflict model. While on the surface it seems that conflict analysis is antithetical to equilibrium, some critics of social theory view conflict analysis as also envisioning movement toward a state of equilibrium.⁶ According to this interpretation of conflict analysis, conflict emerges within an orderly social system and the over-all focus is on achieving a particular type of society. Marx's expectation of a final utopia of communism is an example of the equilibrium which might emerge.

Ralf Dahrendorf rejects this interpretation of the conflict model. Utopias to him are consensus models and have no validity in the conflict analyses. He contends that many analysts attempt to bridge the gap between

⁵See Dahrendorf, op. cit., in particular. In addition, James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin (eds.), Latin America: Reform or Revolution? (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett, 1968), in their introduction indicate the extent of the assumption of determinism in the conflict model.

⁶See Kuper, op. cit., pp. 7-26, and Dew, op. cit., pp. 7-9 for a statement of this position. Coser, Continuities in the Study of Social Conflict, especially

"reality" and some utopian scheme. Hence, conflict theorists are being taken in by the consensus approach. His position is that there never will be a society devoid of conflict.⁷ Thus, there is no room for the utopian scheme in conflict analysis.

When applied to the analyses of developing societies, conflict analysis often emphasizes the dependent status of the developing society upon the industrialized nation and the issue of imperialism or neo-colonialism becomes an essential feature of the analysis. Of course, the imperialism is not always external in source; rather, many analyses focus on internal colonialism or internal exploitation of one group by another.⁸ These

in the first chapter and Irving L. Horowitz, "Consensus, Conflict and Cooperation: A Sociological Inventory," Social Forces, XLI (December 3, 1962), 177-188 also note that conflict theory is not necessarily inconsistent with equilibrium.

⁷ Dahrendorf, "Out of Utopia: Toward a Re-orientation of Sociological Analysis," pp. 230-238.

⁸ See Shlomo Avineri, Marx on Colonialism and Modernization (Garden City: Doubleday, 1968), especially his introduction for some general discussion. In addition, Marx's views on the issue are expressed on pp. 125-131, and p. 439 of the work. Among Latin Americanists, most of the authors in the Petras and Zeitlin volume cited above express such sentiments but especially Rodolfo Stavenhagen, "Seven Fallacies About

issues will be discussed in greater detail in later sections of this chapter as well as in later chapters. The important point here is that this particular aspect of the conflict model often leads to the creation of a scapegoat for the problems of the society. Extreme nationalism often develops with some outside force being blamed for the problems of the country. Anti-United States sentiment in much of Latin America can be traced to such perceptions of societal problems.

Although the conflict and consensus models have some common features, there are also many differences between the two approaches. This chapter will spell out the distinguishing features of the conflict model, thus contrasting the conflict paradigm with the previously discussed consensus model.

Latin America," pp. 13-31 takes this position. For general discussion of the question, see Wiarda, op. cit.; Kuper and Smith, op. cit., p. 11; and Moore, op. cit., p. 431.

Elements of the Conflict Model

Assumptions of the model. As indicated above, the conflict model assumes the existence of a minimum of two interests or classes in society with the real possibility of a plurality of interests. In the conflict model, as in the consensus model, these differing interests compete for power in the system. In contrast to the consensus model, however, there is no natural mechanism for the compromise of diverging interests. In fact, compromise is alien to the conflict approach.⁹

The pluralism of the conflict society is one in which a variety of interests exist, but they do not combine or interact to any appreciable degree.¹⁰ People tend to belong to particular groups but there is not much overlapping of membership in the conflict society. Group membership tends to occur along ideological or other

⁹ See Kuper, "Some Aspects of Violent and Non-violent Political Change in Plural Societies," in Kuper and Smith, op. cit., pp. 153-167, as well as Dahrendorf, "Out of Utopia: Toward a Reorientation of Sociological Analysis."

¹⁰ See Kuper, "Plural Societies: Perspectives and Problems," p. 154; and Dew, op. cit., p. 8.

lines so that diverging values are not cross-fertilized in such a system. The major instrument of compromise for the consensus model--a plurality of loyalties which diminish intensity of loyalties--is absent in the conflict view. With lack of communication across group lines, there is little hope for acceptance of less than total victory by any one interest. The groups tend to become very close-knit and closed to outside influences.¹¹ A defensiveness about their values and positions emerges only to compound the difficulties in communication across group lines.

There is also a tendency for conflict theorists to view society as polarized between two major interests.¹² The two groups are usually denoted as the oppressed and the oppressors, and the source of oppression can take many

¹¹ Smith, op. cit., provides an excellent analysis of this point as does Dew, op. cit.. Of course, David Truman (ed.), The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion (New York: Knopf, 1962) and Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956) offer analyses of this point in presenting the requisites for consensus politics.

¹² Kuper, op. cit., pp. 154-161 analyzes this polarization and its implications.

forms.¹³ It is easier to analyze a society if only two opposing groups can be isolated for analysis--there are those in power and those out of power. If each of these two groups can be viewed as closely-knit, all problems of society can be analyzed in terms of the struggle between those in and those out of power. The people in power are not likely to give up their power without a struggle and conflict often takes the form of violence in such a simplistic view of society. The oppressed finally reach the point of total frustration and resort to violence.¹⁴

According to the bi-polar analysis of society, everyone belongs to one camp or the other and there is no middle ground between them. Thus, communication and compromise are next to impossible. The determinants of what constitutes the oppressed and the oppressors varies

¹³ Ibid., p. 154. Dahrendorf describes them as two groups, one defending the status quo and one attempting to disrupt the status quo in "Toward a Theory of Social Conflict," in Warren G. Bennis, Kenneth D. Benne, and Robert Chin (eds.), The Planning of Change (New York: Holt, Rinehart, 1961), pp. 445-451.

¹⁴ Kuper, op. cit., pp. 154-161. Also see C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959). Of course, Vilfredo Pareto, Mind and Society (New York: Harcourt, Brace, & Co., 1935); Roberto Michels, Political Parties (New York: The Free Press, 1949), and Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class, tr. by Hannah Kahn (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939), are some of the classics on this issue.

from one analysis to another, but economic factors are most commonly seen as the source of conflict in the conflict model.¹⁵ Most conflict analyses relate in one way or another to economic power and economic class conflict tends to be the driving force in societal change.¹⁶ One group is always struggling to get a greater share of the economic resources held by the group in control.

In some societies, of course, the economic factor may not be primary, and conflict analysis sometimes posits other sources of conflict as dominant. Religion, race, or place of residence (i.e., urban versus rural) may be the determinants of power in the system.¹⁷ Whatever the

¹⁵The economic factor is very explicitly stated in Marx's analysis, of course, and is carried over into the analysis of such as Moore and Dahrendorf. The economic goods may be stated in terms of industrial power, land, or other forms of wealth. See Kuper, op. cit., pp. 11-13 for a brief analysis.

¹⁶The source of this approach is Marx's own views as expressed in many writings. Perhaps his, "Value, Price, and Profit," in Marx, Engels, and Lenin, The Essential Left (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1961) traces the economic causes of change most clearly. See Henry B. Mayo, Introduction to Marxist Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), especially Chapter 3 for an analysis of the point.

¹⁷Smith, op. cit., notes some of these alternative sources of conflict as does Dew, op. cit..

source of conflict, there tends to be a conception of society in terms of caste or class broadly defined. If the division in society is bi-polar, the conflict is easy to analyze; but if divisions are multiple, the analysis becomes increasingly difficult as the number of groups or interests increases. It is not difficult to see why bi-polar analysis is so popular in the conflict tradition.

For the conflict model, industrialization is usually seen as increasing the gaps between sectors of the society rather than decreasing them, as the consensus model contends. Industrialization is conceived as a means of increasing the concentration of power, particularly economic power.¹⁸ Instead of reducing differences among groups, the industrialization process increases such differences. As a result, ideological differences become more intense rather than diminished; society becomes polarized and conflict results.

The conflict model usually accepts the consensus view that industrialization and urbanization go together. The validity of such a claim was analyzed in the previous chapter. The importance of the contention here, however, is that whereas for the consensus model urbanization

¹⁸Of course, this is a basic premise of Marx; and, Dahrendorf makes a similar contention in Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society.

promoted greater communication and participation, the conflict model sees urbanization as providing still another source of conflict. Greater differences emerge as the urban sector moves forward and enjoys some of the benefits of industrialization, while the rural sector is left behind and exploited by the urban sectors.¹⁹ As concentration of power is increased, the likelihood of increasing participation by other sectors is decreased because they become further subordinated.

Despite the tendency of conflict theorists to see a bi-polar society, they also argue that their model permits the opportunity for all sectors of society to have their interests articulated in some way.²⁰ This contention seems inconsistent with the earlier suggestion that participation tends to be decreased as society industrializes. Such is not the case, however, since articulation of interests occurs in a wider range of ways

¹⁹An excellent analysis of this point is made by Stanislaw Andreski, Parasitism and Subversion: The Case of Latin America (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966), pp. 1-3.

²⁰See Dahrendorf particularly. In all of his works cited above, he makes note of the continuity of conflict and the likelihood of all participating in this way.

in the conflict model. As noted before, violence and revolution often result from societal conflicts, and it is along this avenue that interest articulation can occur in conflict analysis.

Conclusions of the model. In reviewing the assumptions made by the conflict model, several conclusions seem almost inescapable. First of all, if conflict is to have any meaning as a force for social change, as the advocates of the system envision it, all sectors of the society have to have some possibility of making an impression on the system. All interests may be involved in conflicts in the society. What is difficult however, is to talk about any order at all if conflict is completely unchannelled. While conflict may be a useful concept, carrying the model to the extreme would seem to presuppose the existence of no social order at all.²¹

²¹ Alfred Diamant, Political Development: Approaches to Theory and Strategy (Bloomington, Ind.: Comparative Administration Group, 1963), pp. 38-41 discusses this and other features of the conflict model. He actually argues that Dahrendorf's analysis can be viewed as a group systems approach free of the constraints of equilibrium issues. Horowitz, op. cit., rejects the argument that conflict analysis presupposes a lack of social order.

In other words, it is very difficult to envision a society, even of conflict, without some order (i.e., consensus) to it.

Since a certain amount of order is necessary to even perceive the existence of a society, the advocates of the conflict model are led to the conclusion that restraint is in some way imposed on the system. They reject the idea that constraints emerge from interaction of groups, so they postulate enforced order. Order or constraint is imposed by the stronger or oppressing power over the weaker or oppressed.²² In the case of developing nations, this may be the enforced order of outside colonial power over the dependent nations.²³ However, the requirement of the conflict theorists is that interests be expressed in some way. Violence may become a way of expressing interests. A problem arises from attempts to claim that interests are expressed by the subordinate element when it is being suppressed by the more powerful. Since the conflict theorists criticize consensus theory for not providing opportunity

²² Dahrendorf, "Out of Utopia: Toward a Reorientation of Sociological Analysis," pp. 237-238; Dew, op. cit., p. 8; and Kuper, op. cit., pp. 11-13.

²³ Kuper, op. cit., p. 11.

for all groups to express demands, the question raised here becomes a crucial one. Obviously, the conflict theorists have some problems in operationalizing their theory on this point.

What Dahrendorf argues is that constraint actually provides the basis of conflict, and as constraint increases, greater conflict emerges--presumably as a result of increasing frustration on the part of those constrained by the force of those in power.²⁴ Since one group reacts to the force imposed on it by the other, an increase in such force makes the reaction that much greater. As Edward Dew argues, the smaller the group in control, the greater the dependence there is on force for constraint.²⁵ Following the implications of Dahrendorf's position, this situation would lead to increasingly intense conflict. At any rate, it is clear that in the conflict paradigm there is no self-regulating mechanism for the ordering of society as there is in the consensus model.

²⁴ Dahrendorf, "Out of Utopia: Toward a Reorientation of Sociological Analysis," p. 237.

²⁵ Dew, op. cit., p. 8.

Ideological polarization is a further implication of the conflict model. While the advocates of the conflict model do not necessarily spell out the consequences, it is implied that ideological positions become very intense and ideological loyalties increase. If one accepts, as the model assumes, that groups must necessarily view one another as enemies, it would seem that all issues would have to take a highly ideological tone. Every problem of society can be easily reduced to conflict among the major groups. When such conflict occurs, especially if the bi-polar position dominates, solutions to problems often become rather simplistic--the solution to all problems lies in terms of destroying the influence of the opposition group. Marx's economic analysis and suggestion for curing society's ills is just one example of such a simplistic approach. Not all conflict analysis is reducible to such simplistic accounts, but the assumptions implicit in the model create the possibility and tendency toward such a conclusion.

It seems that what the conflict model posits regarding industrialization and urbanization also leads to increasing ideological divergence. If it is accepted that industrialization and urbanization produce wider gaps between sectors in the society, it seems there would

be increasing insulation of ideological position because there would be less communication across group lines. If groups are not exposed to discussion of differing views, their own ideological positions will not be critically examined and will tend to become accepted with greater tenacity.

Perhaps the best way to summarize the conflict model is to use Alfred Diamant's comparison of the conflict and structural-functional (consensus) models:

Structural-Functional

Conflict²⁶

Every society is a relatively persisting configuration of elements

Every society is always changing: change is ubiquitous

Every society is a well-integrated configuration of elements

Every society always experiences conflict: conflict is ubiquitous

Every element in society contributes to its functioning

Every element in society contributes to its change

Every society rests on the consensus of its members

Every society rests on the constraint of some members by others

²⁶ Reproduced from Diamant, op. cit., p. 40. Diamant, of course, has paraphrased Dahrendorf in this classification.

The next task of this chapter will be to analyze the ways in which the conflict model has been used in studying Latin America. The following sections will note the application of the model to Latin America and evaluate the implications of the model for the study of Latin America.

Application of the Conflict Model to Latin America

In recent years there has been an increasing tendency for some scholars of Latin America to reject the consensus model and employ the conflict model in their analyses. Some, such as Irving Horowitz, Stanislaw Andreski, and Merle Kling, have provided very sophisticated analyses.²⁷ Others, however, have produced analyses which seem more concerned with making an ideological point than in illuminating Latin American

²⁷Horowitz, et al. (eds.), Latin American Radicalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1969); Andreski, op. cit.; and Kling, "Toward a Theory of Power and Instability in Latin America," Western Political Quarterly, IX (March, 1956), 21-35.

development processes.²⁸ Regardless of the tone of the analyses, there is a common assumption that struggle between groups, primarily economic classes, is the key to understanding Latin American politics. This struggle often leads to the conclusion that an impasse results, leaving Latin America with little hope of any real social change.²⁹

Most scholars using the conflict model in studying Latin America tend to envision a form of economic polarization of society, although there are many variations. The Petras and Zeitlin volume noted above contains a number of essays representing differing interpretations of economic polarization and its effect on political development. The authors of most of the essays tend to accept the idea that industrialization does help

²⁸The author has in mind particularly Petras and Zeitlin, op. cit., which consists of a number of essays primarily oriented to bi-polar class analysis. Perhaps John Gerassi, The Great Fear (New York: Macmillan, 1963) is another good example of such analyses.

²⁹See Torcuato S. Di Tella, "Stalemate or Co-existence in Argentina," in Petras and Zeitlin, op. cit., pp. 249-263 for an example of this position.

create a new sector in society, namely, the middle class.³⁰

The middle sectors are not the reform oriented group of the consensus model view. According to the conflict theorists, the middle sectors are often much less unified than consensus theorists tend to assume.³¹

Itself deeply divided, the middle class cannot be expected to provide a very strong force for change in any particular direction. More importantly, however, the lack of unity has meant that there has been no development of a strong middle class ideology.³² Because the middle

³⁰ Glaucio Ary Dillon Soares, "The New Industrialization and the Brazilian Political System," in Petras and Zeitlin, op. cit., pp. 186-201, for instance accepts this view, though others in the volume reject the position.

³¹ Ibid. Also see Milton I. Vanger, "Politics and Class in Twentieth-Century Latin America," The Hispanic American Historical Review, XLIX (February, 1969), 80-93 as well as Charles Wagley, "The Dilemma of the Latin American Middle Classes," Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, XXVII (May, 1964), 310-318. Several of the pieces in the Petras and Zeitlin volume make reference to this idea as well.

³² Vanger, op. cit., makes this point very strongly in his analysis. John P. Gillin, "Some Signposts for Policy," in Council on Foreign Relations, Social Change in Latin America: Its Implications for United States Policy (New York: Harper Brothers, 1960), pp. 14-62 as

sectors come from varied backgrounds and do not see themselves as a unified force, they do not develop a common ideological stance. The usual argument regarding their ideology is that the only concern of the middle sectors is to achieve the status of the higher class. This position and its advocates have already been noted in previous chapters.

Many of the conflict theorists argue that the landed elites, the industrialists, and now the middle sectors have actually made an alignment against the working class and peasantry. Specifically such theorists reject the idea that the industrialists and landed interests have been at odds with one another.³³ This view provides an excellent example of the simplistic

well as his "The Middle Segments and Their Values," in Latin American Politics, ed. by Robert D. Tomasek (Garden City: Doubleday, 1966), pp. 23-40 also make this point.

³³ Rodolfo Stavenhagen, op. cit., pp. 13-31; Oscar Delgado, "Revolution, Reform, Conservatism," pp. 381-398; Frederick B. Pike, "Aspects of Class Relations in Chile," pp. 202-219; and Gustavo Polit, "The Industrialists of Argentina," all in Petras and Zeitlin, op. cit., are just a few examples of those taking this position. Víctor Alba, Alliance Without Allies (New York: Praeger, 1965) is an essentially consensus theorist also assuming a similar stance.

bi-polar analysis as it is applied to Latin American study. While the bi-polarity of the society is sometimes a fact, the solutions recommended often ignore the realities of a more complex society. According to this position, the upper class and industrial sectors combine to exploit the lower sectors. The solution of societal problems is usually keyed to getting rid of the upper class or putting power in the hands of workers or peasants. John P. Gillin uses a similar approach, but sees the society as composed of substrata within the two larger sectors. He sees two lower classes--the workers and peasants; two upper classes--the industrialists and land owners; and a middle class.³⁴ As such, the conflicts emerging in Gillin's analysis are more complex than in the others noted here.

Some suggest that a form of "internal colonialism" exists in Latin America. In this analysis the rural peasantry are exploited by the combined industrial and landed interests.³⁵ This alliance of the landed and

³⁴ Alba, Alliance Without Allies, and Petras and Zeitlin, op. cit.

³⁵ Stavenhagen, op. cit., pp. 19 and 30. Andreski, op. cit., takes a similar stand.

metropolitan industrial sectors provide the greatest obstacles to development. The rural peasantry are kept in a dependent position by these interests. The analysis is again bi-polar. Eventually the peasantry will reach the point of revolution.

In looking more closely at the impact of industrialization in Latin America, the conflict theorists also suggest that new problems are created by the industrial process. One of the most severe problems is that of creating a new urban sector which cannot be absorbed by the industrialized society. More and more people move to the cities in expectation of a better life and greater employment opportunity. In fact, however, the system is incapable of absorbing the new sectors and the gap between the workers and the middle sectors only increases.³⁶ More importantly, the newly industrialized society seems incapable of integrating the new urban settlers into the political system, thus creating the possibility of greater disruption in the system.³⁷

³⁶ Soares, op. cit.

³⁷ James Petras, "Revolution and Guerilla Movements in Latin America: Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala, and Peru," in Petras and Zeitlin, op. cit., pp. 329-369. He makes the same point in his study of Chile, Political

Part of the problem of industrialization is that while the middle sectors may be growing, they are not growing nearly as rapidly as the lower classes. Because the lower class is growing at a faster rate than the middle class, sheer numbers would indicate a greater influence on the system by the lower classes. In addition, because conflict theorists argue that the economic factor is the source of conflict, the middle sectors would not be able to play the role assigned to them by the consensus theorists. They simply could not muster the support to hold back the eventual revolt of the lower classes.³⁸

A very popular theme of conflict model analysts is economic exploitation from the outside. In Marxian analysis of course, imperialism is necessary to the whole argument, for without foreign capital to get the

and Social Forces in Chilean Development (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), and in "The Latin American Middle Class," New Politics, IV (Winter, 1965), 74-89. Talton F. Ray, The Politics of the Barrios of Venezuela (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), p. 176, notes the problems of integrating migrants into the urban society.

³⁸ Soares, op. cit., and Stavenhagen, op. cit., base their analyses on this point.

development process going, most of the underdeveloped nations would still have "no history" in a Marxist sense; i.e., no production, no classes, hence no Marxian class analysis.³⁹ In this type of analysis, foreign economic interests are seen as the evil forces, but also historically necessary, in conflict with the exploited natives. One such analysis even contends that the concept of Latin America developing a feudal character as a result of its colonial heritage is a distortion of the facts. Instead, this study suggests that Latin America, even in colonial times, was the object of capitalist exploitation.⁴⁰

Others have concentrated on the more current experiences of Latin America. Foreign interests are seen as taking all the profits out of Latin America and leaving the Latin Americans nothing. There is often envisioned an alliance between native oligarchies and the

³⁹ See Avineri, op. cit., Introduction.

⁴⁰ See Stanley J. Stein, and Barbara H. Stein, The Colonial Heritage of Latin America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970); and Luis Vitale, "Latin America: Feudal or Capitalist?" in Petras and Zeitlin, op. cit., pp. 32-43.

foreign interests.⁴¹ While one cannot ignore the fact that Latin America has been exploited by foreign interests, it is also too simplistic to blame all its problems on such exploitation. It is not surprising that many conflict theorists have viewed the United States as the imperialist power par excellence.⁴² This analysis suggests that greater concentration of wealth occurs and, under foreign control, is often used to force out any chance of indigenous industrial development.

Recurrent in the conflict analysis literature on Latin America is the idea that rank and caste are at the base of much of the social structure. Extreme divisions are seen to exist among the various classes or groups.

⁴¹ Merle Kling, op. cit.; Teotonio Dos Santos, "The Changing Structure of Foreign Investment in Latin America," pp 94-98, and Maurice Halperin, "Growth and Crisis in the Latin American Economy," pp. 44-75, both in Petras and Zeitlin, op. cit..

⁴² This position is not unique to the conflict theorists. See Charles Wagley, The Latin American Tradition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968); Richard M. Morse, "Some Characteristics of Latin American History," American Historical Review, LXVII (January, 1962), 317-338; Frederick B. Pike, Chile and the United States, 1880-1962 (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1963); and Alba, op. cit., for discussion of the United States role from several perspectives.

While on the surface such visions are valid, they probably are overemphasized. At any rate, the conclusion emerges that there is almost no chance for compromise among groups because the interests of important groups are usually unalterably opposed to one another. Since no communication among groups occurs, they cannot work out solutions to conflicts in a very peaceful manner.

Implications of the Conflict Model for the Understanding of Latin America

It is evident that the conflict model leads to a very pessimistic view of the future for Latin America. With the position that groups are unalterably opposed to one another, the only thing to do is wait for the explosion which will inevitably come. Of course, the conflict theorists are ultimately optimistic that the explosion will bring a new order consistent with their own ideals. In such analysis, the only chance for progress is to revolutionize society completely, but since those in power are not going to give up their power, there seems little choice but violent revolution.

The conflict analysis model also creates a tendency to accept xenophobic nationalism on the part of Latin Americans. Much of the policy of those nations is based on the idea that the United States, for instance, has as

its only intention the exploitation of the Latin American nations and thus anything the United States does is suspect. Such suspicion, of course, means that there is a great deal of difficulty in the attempts of the two Americas to live and work together. Unfortunately, many Latin Americans have accepted this particular premise of the conflict theorists.⁴³ The danger in such an analysis is that it might lead to everyone giving up on trying to change anything.

Most important, however, the conflict approach often leads to very simplistic suggestions for resolution of problems. One group sees the millennium through destruction of its opposition groups. No social or political problems are subject to such simple solutions. Those who are successful in leading revolutions on such bases often only deceive their followers and create greater frustration in the long run.

Obviously, as with the consensus model, there are certain features of the conflict model which help explain

⁴³ Gerassi, op. cit., for instance, suggests that this sort of misunderstanding on both sides is responsible for much of the trouble between the United States and Latin America. Irving L. Horowitz, et al., Latin American Radicalism, includes selections employing similar themes.

some aspects of Latin American political development. However, as has been noted in this chapter, there are limitations to applicability of the model to Latin America. Forthcoming chapters will analyze uses and implications of the two models relative to particular issue areas in Latin America.

These last two chapters have outlined the dominant paradigms for study of political development--namely, the consensus and conflict paradigms. Of course, there are variations on the paradigms and attempts by some to synthesize the contrasting approaches. The following chapters will introduce some of the attempts at synthesizing these approaches, as discussion of specific application of the approaches proceeds.

C H A P T E R V

THE MIDDLE SECTORS AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

The Issue

Much has been written concerning the role played by the middle sectors in the process of political development. As was noted in Chapters III and IV, the consensus and conflict models differ in the roles they expect the middle groups to play. This chapter will provide more detailed analysis of the role the middle sectors are supposed to play in each model and then attempt to explain what role they actually assume in Latin America. The chapter is intended as a preliminary examination using the argument over the middle sectors as a case study for the consensus and conflict paradigms.

First, the term "middle sectors" is used rather than the more familiar "middle class." The reason for this preference is that middle class usually suggests a fairly precise delineation of economic classes in the society, while middle sectors or middle elements can be

used to denote a wide range of groups making up the center position of the socio-economic scale. The literature to be analyzed in this chapter is not consistent in the usage of the terms. Some authors use middle class and some use middle sectors to identify similar groups in the society. To be consistent, middle sectors will be used in this study.¹

Defining the term "middle sectors" or "middle class" has presented problems for social scientists. The terms have often been defined according to type of occupation or amount of wealth of those included in the groups. Such definitions lead to a great deal of imprecision and lack of scientific rigor.² Each scholar

¹ John J. Johnson, Political Change in Latin America: The Emergence of the Middle Sectors (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), of course, has popularized the use of the term "middle sectors" in relation to Latin America.

² This discussion is based on G. D. H. Cole's "The Conception of the Middle Classes," in The British Journal of Sociology, I (December, 1950), 275-290. Also see Alfred Meusel, "Middle Classes," Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, X (New York: Macmillan, 1951), pp. 407-415. Regarding Latin American middle sectors, Johnson, op. cit.; Víctor Alba, "Latin America: The Middle Class Revolution," New Politics, I (Winter, 1962), 66-73; and James Petras, "The Latin American Middle Class," New Politics, IV (Winter, 1965), 74-89 provide some of the best analyses and discussion of the problem of defining the groups which belong in the category.

has his own concept of which groups make up the middle sectors of society. As a result, there is often an arbitrary assignment of various groups to the category. As noted by G. D. H. Cole, another method of identifying the middle class is to ask a random sample of the society to identify the class to which they belong.³ Such a method is likely to be even more imprecise than the first method because statistics indicate that a huge majority of people identify themselves as part of the middle class.⁴ When studying Latin America, the difficulty is enhanced because the middle sectors have not developed a very strong identity of their own.⁵ What may be part of the middle sectors in one country or to one scholar may not be in another instance. The problem boils down to

³ Cole, op. cit., discusses the two methods of identifying the middle class.

⁴ Ibid., p. 276.

⁵ See Rodolfo Stavenhagen, "Seven Fallacies About Latin America," in Latin America: Reform or Revolution? ed. by James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin (New York: Fawcett, 1968), p. 26, and John P. Gillin, "Some Signposts for Policy," in Council on Foreign Relations, Social Change in Latin American Today: Its Implications for United States Policy (New York: Harper Brothers, 1960), pp. 23-28.

whether the middle sectors are defined in economic or social terms and which elements are encompassed in the definition.

Because of the difficulty in giving a precise definition to the term "middle sectors," we shall have to look carefully at the boundaries provided by each scholar in his own discussion of the middle sectors. What is most important to the present analysis is what role each scholar assigns to the middle sectors in his analysis of political development. For our purposes, each particular definition of the term is important as it affects the role the middle sectors play in the development process. For this reason, each author's definition will be stated and examined and note will be made if his particular definition implies a significant difference for the role he assigns to the middle sectors.

Although giving a precise definition to the middle sectors is difficult, there are some commonalities in use of the term. The general characteristics of the middle sectors are set forth by G. D. H. Cole as follows:

- 1) economically they are between the very rich and the manual labor wage-earners;
- 2) many of them receive a substantial portion of their incomes in the form of interest or profits;

- 3) salaries provide the major source of income for many;
- 4) collective bargaining is becoming more prevalent as a means of dealing with employers with this group;
- 5) there is often an alignment with the working classes regarding taxation and government spending policies; and
- 6) the intelligentsia is a part of the middle sectors although only a small minority of it.⁶

Obviously the various scholars to be analyzed here provide variations on these general characteristics, but these features are found in most definitions of the middle sectors. They serve at least to provide us with a working definition, even though all these characteristics may not be directly related to our analysis. One other feature of the middle sectors usually noted in the literature is that they are made up of a variety of backgrounds and that they are very much consumption

⁶ Cole, op. cit., p. 287.

oriented.⁷ These factors will have significance in the analysis of how the consensus and conflict models view the middle sectors.

The Effects of the Middle Sectors on
Political Development According to
the Consensus Model

The general literature. As was noted earlier, the consensus model views the middle sectors in a very optimistic light. According to the consensus model, the middle sectors will be the major instrument for reform and as such will lead developing nations to modernity. Dating back to the Weberian analyses of society, it can be seen that the middle sectors would be the prime agents in the move toward rationality-legality in the organization of society, which consensus theorists often interpret as modernity.⁸

⁷ Ibid., pp. 278-281. In addition, the Economic Commission for Latin America, United Nations Economic and Social Council, Social Development of Latin America in the Post War Period (Mar del Plata, Argentina, May, 1963), pp. 111-115 provides a discussion of this feature relative to Latin America.

⁸ Max Weber's analysis is presented most cogently in The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947). Interpretations

In the Weberian analysis, the middle sectors would make the society more rational through education and the spread of their value system, which includes the Protestant ethic of hard work and savings and investment for the future. In the experience of Great Britain, much of Western Europe, and the United States, the middle sectors accepted or were conditioned to play such a role. Some people suggest that these nations were the exceptions to the rule rather than the standard against which others should be judged.⁹ Regardless of whether the Western European and United States experiences were exceptions to the rule rather than the rule, the fact is that most students of political development have generally assumed that the middle sectors will assume roles in the developing nations similar to those in the already developed nations.

of Weber's position are provided by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946); Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait (Garden City: Doubleday, 1962); and S. M. Miller, Max Weber (New York: Crowell, 1963).

⁹ See Richard N. Adams, The Second Sowing: Power and Secondary Development in Latin America (San Francisco: Chandler, 1967), p. 48; Petras, op. cit., pp. 74-85; and Alfred Stepan, "Discussion: The Latin American Middle Class," New Politics, IV (Spring, 1965), 87-90.

Among the early writers who suggest that the middle sectors of society have a leavening effect on politics was Alexis de Tocqueville.¹⁰ In his analysis of United States society, de Tocqueville argues that it is democratic largely because of the extensive social equality which exists. Social equality produces political equality.¹¹ De Tocqueville's ideas found expression in the writings of many other scholars, among them, Louis Hartz who suggests that the absence of a feudal heritage is largely responsible for the particular character of the United States' development.¹² Perhaps Seymour Martin Lipset is most closely identified with the idea that the middle sectors provide for stability in the

¹⁰ Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. by Richard D. Heffner (New York: The New American Library, 1956). Of course, the idea can be traced back to Aristotle's "golden mean" and his idea that societies which had the most even distribution of wealth would be most stable.

¹¹ Ibid., pp. 49-55.

¹² Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York: Harcourt, Brace, & World, 1955).

political system.¹³ The idea of middle class moderation and stability is in turn often translated into a sign of political development by consensus oriented scholars.

Lipset's ideas have clearly had great influence on the study of political development. Many scholars specifically concerned with the process of development have accepted the idea that the key to development and political stability is in creating a large middle stratum in the society. The specific effects of this middle stratum will be the subject of the rest of this section of the chapter.

One of the most pervasive ideas concerning the middle sectors is that they will provide for political development because they lessen the ideological cleavages

¹³ Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," The American Political Science Review, LIII (March, 1959), 69-105, and Political Man (Garden City: Doubleday, 1960) exemplify this position. The application of this type of analysis to the United States is plentiful with David B. Truman, The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion (New York: Knopf, 1962) providing one of the most significant examples. E. E. Schattschneider, Party Government (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1942); and Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956) are also important works in this tradition.

of society. Also, the existence of a large middle class implies the relative lack of vast gaps between rich and poor. The argument goes that a large middle sector provides for the emergence of a wide range of groups in the society. With the large number of groups, there is overlapping membership and with the overlapping membership more exposure to differing ideas and interests. The exposure of groups to differing ideas and interests is supposed to broaden people's perspectives and facilitate compromise among groups.¹⁴ This feature extends beyond the emergence of middle groups as a potent force in the society and, as was noted in Chapter III, involves the larger issue of increased participation in society by all groups.

Essentially, the argument of the consensus theorists regarding the middle sectors is that the middle sectors will provide a moderating tendency in the political system. They will push for democratic reform and take a very humanitarian approach to governmental

¹⁴ See Lipset, op. cit.; Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958); and Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960).

policies. They are the elements which will exert pressure on the political system to modernize and democratize.¹⁵

The key to the middle sectors' role is the value system ascribed to the group. Most authors merely assume that the middle sectors in all societies will behave as they have in the United States and Western Europe. As was noted above, however, the roles played by the middle sectors in these nations may have been aberrations of what can normally be expected. The United States and Western European nations had a chance to modernize very gradually because of the time period in which they developed. Nations developing currently must contend with a variety of modernizing forces which were encountered one at a time by the United States and Western Europe. Students of Latin America often expect the developing nations to follow the pattern of the United States and Western Europe without critical examination of comparability of the development

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Most of the generalists noted in Chapter III fall into this category. Some of the more notable analyses using this approach are Robert L. Heilbroner, The Great Ascent (New York: Harper and Row, 1963); Walt W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960); C. E. Black, The Dynamics of Modernization (New York: Harper and Row, 1966); and A. F. K. Organski, The Stages of Political Development (New York: Knopf, 1965).

experience. There may be considerable doubt as to whether the middle sectors even in the United States or Western Europe actually behave in the fashion and play the role that the development theorists have assigned to them. When one looks at the relationship between the middle class and the lower class in our own modern society, doubts arise.

The middle sectors are usually thought to be willing to forestall current consumption or conveniences for the sake of a better future. Thus, the middle sectors are supposed to emphasize savings and investment. The implication is that capital is put aside for use in developing the economy. Because these groups are concerned with a better future, they are hesitant to make dramatic immediate demands or provide very great disruption in the system. Instead they work within the system to bring about social change. Somehow, in their essentially capitalist outlook, the middle sectors are also supposed to have a very moral outlook in the sense of having a social conscience. They strive for social justice and the development of the system toward the

ideals of modern democratic societies.¹⁶ Consequently, the middle sectors are expected to align themselves with the working elements to bring about social and political reform.

The literature on Latin America. According to James Petras, almost all Latin Americanists have accepted the "middle class thesis," as outlined in the above section.¹⁷ He believes that his analysis varies from the generalization. While it is true that both the advocates of the consensus and conflict models often see the middle sectors as providing much hope for modernization, there are differences in degree and emphasis. The task now is to note the position of Latin Americanists who use the consensus orientation, while the following sections of the chapter will deal with conflict analyses.

John J. Johnson is the Latin Americanist in the consensus tradition most closely identified with the

¹⁶ These ascribed characteristics are noted by Cole, op. cit., and Alba, op. cit.. Petras, op. cit., presents an excellent critique of this characterization.

¹⁷ Petras, op. cit., p. 75.

middle sectors argument.¹⁸ Joining him in his views concerning the middle sectors are others such as Víctor Alba, Richard Adams, and Robert J. Alexander.¹⁹ There are variations on the theme among these analysts, but all see a great deal of hope in the increasing strength of the middle sectors.

Johnson's study, which concerns Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, lists the values that the Latin American middle sectors are urban with urban value systems; they favor universal education; they favor a high degree of state intervention to solve social and economic problems; and they favor broad-based political parties oriented to social reform.²⁰ Noting the

¹⁸ Johnson, op. cit., presents the most precise statement on the issue.

¹⁹ Alba, op. cit.; Alliance Without Allies (New York: Praeger, 1965); and The Latin Americans (New York: Praeger, 1969). Richard Adams, in Council on Foreign Relations, op. cit.; and Robert Alexander, Today's Latin America (Garden City: Doubleday, 1962). Some of these authors have changed positions in more recent works. Richard Adams, particularly in The Second Sowing, seems to have given up much of his earlier hope as has Alba in the last two works cited.

²⁰ Johnson, op. cit.. See particularly the Introduction and Chapters 2 and 3.

unselfishness of the middle sectors, Johnson argues that they have often subordinated some of their own desires or interests in order to help the working classes.²¹

Víctor Alba has expressed almost the same sentiments in his 1962 New Politics article.²² Although Alba suggests that the middle sectors in Latin America will follow the route set forth by Johnson, he also notes that they may be tempted to accept efficiency over justice. Indicating that he tends to equate modernization with democracy, Alba expresses the fear that totalitarianism may emerge if the middle sectors value efficiency at all costs.²³ Nonetheless, he is optimistic that the middle sectors will resist such authoritarian tendencies.

An indication that Alba is not completely comfortable with Johnson's analysis emerges in his discussion of the middle sectors as being composed of two elements--the new middle class and the traditional middle class.²⁴ The new middle class has gained influence as

²¹ Ibid., particularly Chapter 9.

²² Alba, "Latin America: The Middle Class Revolution."

²³ Ibid., pp. 68-72.

²⁴ Ibid., pp. 66-67.

the oligarchies have diminished in Latin America. It is made up of industrialists, merchants, technicians, and executives of larger companies. The traditional middle class is composed of skilled workers, artisans who have become skilled technicians, small merchants, and provincial industrialists. While the division into two elements would suggest a possibility of differing views on policies within the middle sectors, Alba shrugs that off by saying that the new middle class has gained enough power to be able to manipulate the traditional middle class.²⁵

Alba's later works indicate somewhat of a shift from this position. He argues, in The Alliance Without Allies particularly, that the middle class has not followed the pattern it was supposed to follow. He does not make clear, however, whether he thinks they have submitted to the temptation to accept efficiency at all costs or whether they have perceived greater self interest in aligning with the oligarchy. While he is unclear on this point, it is implied that the latter is the more

²⁵ Ibid., p. 67. Some of the Latin Americanists to be noted in connection with conflict analysis also accept the idea of a divided middle sector but with quite different consequences.

likely explanation.²⁶ Even though his analysis in later works indicates growing pessimism on the role of the middle sectors, Alba still feels they are on the side of the liberals in questions of social change.²⁷

One of the most interesting expectations of some of the consensus analysts is that the middle sectors will be essentially anti-military.²⁸ Even those who stress the middle class origins of many officers of today suggest

²⁶ It will be remembered that his analysis of the failure of the Alliance for Progress rests on the idea that self-serving oligarchies have used the United States and vice-versa. For some reason, the unselfishness and social reform values of the middle class which he noted earlier are not evident in this work.

²⁷ Alba, The Latin Americans, p. 124.

²⁸ Alba, "Latin America: The Middle Class Revolution," p. 67. Johnson, op. cit., pp. 192-193, however, notes that the middle sectors are the source of many of the military officers and as such, it would be expected that military policy would be dominated by middle sector values. Edwin Lieuwijn, Arms and Politics in Latin America (New York: Praeger, 1960) also emphasizes the middle sector roots of the modern Latin American military. José Nun's "The Middle Class Military Coup," in Claudio Veliz (ed.), The Politics of Conformity in Latin America (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 66-118 provides an excellent review of the relationship of the military and the middle class as well as the way the military is perceived by various models of study.

that the middle sector values are antithetical to the traditional military position. With a stress on the middle sectors' values of justice and political equality, the military may often be seen as an instrument of the oligarchy against such values. If Johnson's contention that the middle sectors have actually allied with the working classes in promotion of common interests is accepted, the military coups which have attempted to prevent too leftward a leaning in public policy, as in Brazil, for example, would have to be considered contrary to middle sector values. The problem might be in the contention that the middle sectors and workers have actually allied. Even Johnson seems to temper this contention in noting that the middle sectors have been made to feel uncomfortable as the size and strength of working class elements have increased.²⁹

Since much of the middle sectors' increase in size stems from increasing governmental activity and the expanding bureaucracy, governmental policies are again expected to reflect middle sector values. The public

²⁹ Johnson, op. cit., particularly Chapter 9, deals with some of the problems of the alliance of middle and worker elements.

service employees are included as a major segment of the middle sectors by all those writing on the subject. As a result, it would be expected that the values of the middle sectors would be transmitted in much of the governmental policy made by such bureaucrats.³⁰

Whether the middle sectors perform the roles consistent with modernization and democratization as suggested by consensus model theorists is seriously questioned by many. In the next section of the chapter, some of these questions will be noted as the conflict theories are analyzed. In the final section of the chapter, however, the positions of both models will be critically analyzed in the light of the Latin American experience with the middle sectors.

³⁰ Ibid., pp. 193-194. Alba does not deal with the issue very specifically, but his analyses imply acceptance of this position.

The Effects of the Middle Sectors on
Political Development According to
the Conflict Model

The general literature. The conflict model for the study of political development finds difficulty in assigning a precise role to the middle sectors. The difficulty arises from the conflict analysis tendency to conceive of society on a bi-polar basis. The Marxian view of the middle groups offers a very imprecise mode of analyzing middle sectors. In Marx's view, the middle sectors would be extinguished by absorption into the worker groups or into the capitalist class or bourgeoisie.³¹

Because his basic assumption was that there would be two major economic antagonists in society, there was little room for a middle group in his analysis, and the likelihood was that the capitalists would exploit the

³¹ See Cole, op. cit., pp. 280-281. For Marx's writings on the issue see "The Manifesto of the Communist Party," and other selections in Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, and V. I. Lenin, The Essential Left (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1961). Interpretation and texts are found in Shlomo Avineri (ed.), Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modernization (Garden City: Doubleday, 1968), and L. S. Feuer (ed.), Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy: Marx and Engels (Garden City: Doubleday, 1959).

middle groups relegating them to the level of the working elements.³² In reality, according to Marxist theory, it was the bourgeoisie that was antagonistic to the working class.³³ Many conflict analysts have uncritically applied Marx's arguments concerning the bourgeoisie to the middle sectors in modern society. As Cole notes, there really is not a very close correspondence between the two concepts and, for this reason, Marx's arguments may not be applicable to the middle sectors.³⁴

Barrington Moore, for example, has used the Marxian analysis in describing the way in which societies develop.³⁵ As Moore sees it, the historical patterns of

³² Cole, op. cit., pp. 280-281.

³³ Marx, "The Manifesto," in Avineri, op. cit., pp. 31-33.

³⁴ Cole, op. cit., p. 283.

³⁵ Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1956). Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), and Essays on the Theory of Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968) is another of the better known conflict theorists applying Marx's ideas. For a good critique of Moore's analysis, see Stanley Rothman, "Barrington Moore and the Dialectics of Revolution: An Essay Review," The American Political Science Review, LXIV (March, 1970), 61-82. Moore responds in "Reply to Rothman," pp. 83-85 of the same volume.

development have involved the exploitation of one sector of society by another. The capitalist elements which embody the middle sectors tend to be in the position of exploiting the laboring classes. Dahrendorf assumes the same position.³⁶ Put very simply, the middle sectors might as well not be considered separately because they actually are tools of, if not actually the same as, the upper economic level of oppressors.

One of the keys to the conceptions of the middle sectors in conflict theory is the idea that capitalist societies are based on greater and greater concentration of wealth. The capitalist never satisfies his taste for greater wealth and exploits the worker to attain it. As a result of this view, the conflict theorists see power being concentrated as well when industrialization occurs.³⁷

³⁶ Dahrendorf's discussion of societal order relying on constraint of some elements of society by other elements emphasizes the factor of economic power of the "haves" over the "have-nots" in "Out of Utopia: Towards a Reorientation of Sociological Analysis," in Sociological Theory: A Book of Readings, 3rd ed., ed. by Lewis A. Coser and Bernard Rosenberg (Toronto: The Macmillan Co., 1969), pp. 222-240.

³⁷ Dahrendorf, in Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society, particularly notes this effect of industrialization.

Because the working class is seen as the exploited class and because the neo-Marxian analyses are most concerned with correcting the condition for the working classes, they tend to ignore the middle sectors or automatically assume that they belong with the exploiters.

The literature on Latin America. Although the temptation to ignore the middle sectors might be great for those adopting Marxian analyses, the Latin Americanists using the conflict model have not been able to ignore the middle sectors very easily because of the great emphasis placed on middle sector analysis by many of the consensus theorists. Although the conflict theorists among Latin Americanists have taken note of the middle sectors, there is a tendency to treat them as adjuncts of two larger groups--the oligarchy and the workers.³⁸ By suggesting that the middle sectors become part of the oligarchy or are shunted back among the working elements, the basic conception of a dual society necessary to the conflict model is kept intact.

³⁸ Petras, op. cit., and Juan Marsal, Cambino social en America Latina (Buenos Aires: Solar/Hachette, 1967) are two among many who take this position. The others will be noted as the issue is discussed further.

The major emphasis of the conflict theorists regarding the middle sectors is that they have not developed a value system similar to that of the middle classes of Western Europe or the United States. Instead, the middle sectors are viewed as adopting upper class attitudes.³⁹ One of the reasons given for the upper class attitudes of the middle sectors is that they have not developed a self-identity and no middle sector ideology is seen to exist.⁴⁰

Analysis of the middle sectors of Latin America indicates the reason for lack of a middle sector ideology. Richard Adams' study suggests that the middle sectors actually do not exist as a very identifiable group in

³⁹ Frederick B. Pike, Chile and the United States, 1880-1962 (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1963), pp. 284-287; most of the selections in Petras and Zeitlin, op. cit.; Gillin, op. cit.; and Luis Mercier Vega, Roads to Power in Latin America (New York: Praeger, 1969) are a few among many works which adopt this position. Veliz, op. cit., presents an analysis of some of the middle sector arguments.

⁴⁰ All of those cited in the above note make this point. In addition, Charles Wagley, "The Brazilian Revolution: Social Changes Since 1930," in Council on Foreign Relations, op. cit., pp. 177-230, among others makes the same point.

Latin American society. Instead, he argues that the middle sectors are split, with some being associated with the oligarchy and others associated with the working classes. He argues that Latin American society is of a dual nature with two major value systems which are not related to economic classes.⁴¹ Some of the middle sectors are more comfortable among the traditional elite and have worked their way into it while some of the lower middle sectors have been most comfortable with the working elements.

Even if the middle sectors can be identified as a group, it is difficult to view them as being conscious of feelings of unity. As Charles Wagley suggests, everywhere in Latin America there is a dichotomous society--a division "between the dominating upper class and the people."⁴² He says that the local upper class might be considered lower class or part of the middle sectors on the national scale, but in terms of the environment in which it

⁴¹ Richard N. Adams, The Second Sowing, p. 257. Charles Wagley, "The Dilemma of the Latin American Middle Classes," Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, 27 (May, 1964), 310-318 also suggests this point of view.

⁴² Charles Wagley, The Latin American Tradition: Essays on the Unity and the Diversity of Latin American Culture (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 55. Pike, op. cit., takes the same position in discussing the "Two Chiles," pp. 292-293, and Chapter 11.

operates, it is upper class because its everyday relationships are with the people in the local community which it dominates. In its local community, it is the elite, and the rest of the community is the mass. In terms of the urbanized sectors the society is divided between the "haves" and the "have-nots." Wagley's interpretation is a variation on the conflict model which accounts for the middle sectors by perceiving them as absorbed by one of the two major antagonistic elements in society.

Wagley's analysis, however, is not totally in accord with the conflict model. The middle sectors have not always been upper class in attitude, but they have tended to develop upper class attitudes as they have succeeded in society. The fear of being dropped back into the working class is a major force in keeping the middle sectors in line with the oligarchy. This theme is fairly common among Latin Americanists dealing with the middle sectors.⁴³

James Petras, in analyzing the "middle class thesis" as applied to Latin America, provides perhaps the

⁴³ See Vega, op. cit., pp. 60-65; Gillin, op. cit., pp. 21-28; Wagley, The Latin American Tradition, pp. 196-197; and Nun, op. cit., among many who adopt this stance.

best statement of the way conflict theorists view the middle sectors in the area.⁴⁴ His analysis maintains that the Latin American middle sector is non-revolutionary; cannot be counted on as a force for democracy and modernization; is anti-lower class; imitates United States and Western European middle classes only in consumption patterns and not in value systems; and is authoritarian in outlook.⁴⁵ The middle sector is perceived as self-interest oriented, with the result being that it attempts to squeeze out the working class elements.⁴⁶ Concentration of economic power is the key to understanding the situations.

It seems that the conflict view of the middle sectors is evident in many analyses of Latin America, even by those who do not necessarily accept the conflict model in its entirety.⁴⁷ Whether they hold out hope for the

⁴⁴ Petras, op. cit..

⁴⁵ Ibid.. Also in Petras, Politics and Social Forces in Chilean Development (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), particularly Chapter 4.

⁴⁶ Ibid., pp. 80-81.

⁴⁷ Among non-conflict analysts, Howard J. Wiarda, "Elites in Crisis," unpublished paper, n.d.; Alba, especially in Alliance Without Allies; and Veliz, op. cit., provide analyses stressing the tendency of middle sectors to adopt upper class values in much of Latin America.

middle sectors as moderating forces in the society or not, many of the scholars finally reach the conclusion that they are not acting as the middle sectors in industrialized societies of Europe and the United States have or are supposed to have acted.

The Effects of the Middle Sectors on
Latin American Political Development

If anything is illustrated by the foregoing analysis, it is that the middle sectors play a variety of roles in the political development process, some of which are contradictory. Robert F. Smith has noted the problem in indicating that the roles of the middle sectors differ from one nation of Latin America to another.⁴⁸ The problem with many of the analyses noted above is that they indiscriminately transfer the Western European concept of the middle classes to the study of Latin America when the Latin American experience calls for a different approach. In addition, many authors generalize about the middle sectors in Latin America on the basis of their roles in one nation without questioning whether generalization is

⁴⁸ Robert F. Smith, "Discussion: The Latin American Middle Class," New Politics, IV (Spring, 1965), 83-87.

warranted. Still another general problem is in defining what the middle sector is. As has been noted, different authors include different groups in the middle sectors arguments.⁴⁹ Depending on which part of the middle sectors is emphasized, the role ascribed to the middle sectors varies.

The consensus model seems to miss the mark on the role of the middle sectors by ignoring some of the facts of the situation. As James Petras has noted, analysis of some of the middle sectors indicates that the "new middle sectors" often present positions exactly the opposite of what the consensus-oriented scholars say they do.⁵⁰ The consensus theorists argue that the new middle sectors represent the hope for the future democracy of Latin America, while Petras indicates that it is even less likely to support democratic practices than is the traditional middle class.⁵¹ If such is the case, hope

⁴⁹ Robert Alexander's reply to Petras in "Mr. Alexander Replies," New Politics, IV (Winter, 1965), 85-89 makes a point of the variety of groups included in definitions of the middle sectors.

⁵⁰ Petras, "The Latin American Middle Class," pp. 77-81, and Politics and Social Forces in Chilean Development, pp. 139-153.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 78.

would not be very bright for the middle sectors' assumption of a modernizing role.

Perhaps the consensus theorists reach the conclusions they do about the middle sectors because they are so concerned with stability. For many consensus theorists, it will be remembered, stability is almost equated with political development. For this reason, any force acting in the interests of stability is considered a modernizing force. There is little question that the middle sectors are often effective forces for stability for reasons opposite to the assumptions of the consensus theorists, however. As many of the Latin Americanists have pointed out, the middle sectors are agents of stability because they mimic the values of the upper sectors and fear losing their own status and privileges if too many changes are brought about.⁵² Security and moderation become the main interests of the middle sectors because they have much to lose with drastic changes in policy. What has happened in many instances is that new

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A few among the many noting this tendency are: Veliz, op. cit.; Economic Commission for Latin America, op. cit., pp. 111-115; John Mander, The Unrevolutionary Society: The Power of Latin American Conservatism in a Changing World (New York: Knopf, 1969), pp. 122-124; and Marsal, op. cit..

faces have worked their way into positions of power, but the new faces pursue and perpetuate the same values in policy as those they replace. The middle sectors have provided a measure of stability but it is frequently the stability of the traditional, elitist, oligarchic society.

Another reason that the middle sectors are effective agents for stability is that government work has become one of the major paths to achieving middle sector status. Because a large portion of the middle sectors is dependent on government jobs, the middle sectors become defenders of the status quo rather than risk job security in the pursuit of other ideals.⁵³ In addition to the fact of bureaucratic growth, the growing state ownership and direct control of entrepreneurship also provides a stabilizing influence by discouraging moves for social action on the part of the middle sectors. Again, governmental control over the economic destinies of these

⁵³ Vega, op. cit., pp. 60-65; Stepan, op. cit., p. 88; and Stanislaw Andreski, Parasitism and Subversion: The Case of Latin America (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966), pp. 11-12 all note this factor.

middle sectors makes them support the upper classes rather than oppose them on reform.⁵⁴

In addition to internal pressures influencing the middle sectors in Latin America, many argue that outside forces also push them toward defense of the status quo. Richard Adams, for instance, argues that the upper sectors have an effective weapon to hold the middle sectors in line through their alliance with United States interests. Indeed, he states that the upper sectors have an effective lobby in Washington, D. C., because their values coincide with the values of United States economic interests in Latin America.⁵⁵ The United States economic interests lobby to protect their interests in Latin America, meaning that they do not want too much social change which could lead to nationalization as well as other such "harmful" policies. The upper sectors of Latin American society-- and now increasingly their middle sector allies--are often tied to United States interests.

⁵⁴ Vega, op. cit., pp. 64-65 draws this point out and also notes that the struggles for political control assume immense significance when political control also means effective control over the institutions and allocations of natural resources.

⁵⁵ Adams, op. cit., p. 271. Remember Adams argues that parts of the middle sectors have actually been coopted by the upper sectors in some instances and by the working sectors in others.

Without doubt, there have been many pressures on the middle sectors to orient them towards stability in the system. As Pike and Petras note, the position of the Chilean middle sectors on values has meant that there is almost no disruption in the political system as middle sectors assume control.⁵⁶ These facts create difficulties for the consensus approach. While the consensus approach emphasizes lack of disruption in the system, there also have to be questions as to whether stability is to be achieved at all costs. It seems that many of the consensus oriented Latin Americanists have emphasized the stabilizing influences of the middle sectors without examining exactly why they have been agents for stability and what kind of stability that implies.

Juan Marsal's analysis of John Johnson's approach suggests that the consensus orientation on this particular issue may ignore some of the facts of the situation precisely because the model being used is oriented to selectivity in what is discovered.⁵⁷ The point is that the

⁵⁶ Pike, op. cit., p. 287, and Petras, Politics and Social Forces in Chilean Development, pp. 139-140.

⁵⁷ Marsal, op. cit., p. 108, and pp. 26-27.

expectations of the users of the model may actually influence the facts they find.⁵⁸ The results or answers found are influenced by the types of questions asked. It would be very difficult to explain the seemingly erroneous explanations of the middle sectors by consensus theorists in any other way.

There certainly is no one approach to the study of the middle sectors in Latin America. Each nation in the area illustrates a different experience depending on its level of economic and social development, size of the middle sectors, and strategic position of the middle sectors. Thus, Chile, with a large middle sector population has had vastly different experiences from Nicaragua, for instance. On the other hand, the experiences of Paraguay and Uruguay may be quite different precisely because there is a difference in the character and size of the middle sectors in the two nations as well as a difference in economic and social development.

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This obviously is not a new idea. For an excellent analysis of this tradition, see William E. Connolly, Political Science and Ideology (New York: Atherton, 1967).

Moreover, we must recognize the diverse elements and interests which make up the middle sectors--businessmen, clergy, labor leaders, students, government officials, military leaders, etc. This very diversity helps explain why social origins analysis has been such a weak explanatory tool in enabling us to better understand the behavior of the Latin American officer corps, for example. "Rightist" military regimes as in Brazil, "leftist" military regimes as in Peru, and "centrist" regimes as in El Salvador are all led by middle class military officers.

The cultural heritage of the nation is yet another significant factor in determining the role of the middle sectors in particular societies. Those nations such as Chile or Uruguay which have very close cultural links to Western Europe contain middle sectors closer to the Western European model. On the other hand, the evidence suggests that societies without close ties to such a cultural heritage are not likely to show such characteristics.

Despite the fact that the middle sectors show many variations, some generalizations seem supported by the studies noted above. It seems obvious that the middle sectors are most concerned with assuring their own status in society and at present that usually means supporting

the elite elements rather than aligning with the workers. The reasons for their actions may not be ideological--in fact, the evidence suggests there is little ideological unity among the middle sectors. Instead, pragmatism seems the most important characteristic of the actions of the middle sectors. They take the positions calculated to pay off in job security and social and prestige positions.⁵⁹ Therefore, it would have to agree with Richard N. Adams that the usefulness of the middle class concept has been vastly exaggerated in the study of Latin America.⁶⁰

Many also argue that the universities and the expansion of education provide the best prospects for conveying the values associated with European middle

⁵⁹ Jane Lee Yare, "The Middle Class in Latin America," (Department of Political Science, University of Massachusetts, unpublished paper, 1971) suggests the middle sectors take a very pragmatic approach to their roles.

⁶⁰ Richard N. Adams, "Political Power and Social Structures," in Veliz, op. cit., pp. 15-42 at p. 16. This is also a major hypothesis of his book: The Second Sowing. Milton I. Vanger, "Politics and Class in Twentieth-Century Latin America," The Hispanic American Historical Review, XLVIV (February, 1969), 80-93, at p. 91 makes the same point along with many other Latin Americanists.

sectors.⁶¹ However, the experience on this score also indicates that such might not be the case in Latin America. Claudio Veliz, for instance, notes that the Latin American university students illustrate a surprising tendency to slide back into middle class conservatism once they leave the universities.⁶² They seem to follow the same sort of pragmatic caution as other elements of the middle sectors.

Unless some drastic changes occur, the middle sectors of Latin America are not likely to provide much impetus for modernization and development. The Alliance for Progress and other similar programs seem destined for failure unless their orientations are changed. As many of its critics note, the Alliance for Progress has been ineffective because it tends to take the cautious route of working through the elite and middle sectors rather than identifying with the more progressive elements of

⁶¹ Richard N. Adams, The Second Sowing, p. 258, is one who feels universal education may help expand middle class consciousness.

⁶² Veliz, op. cit., p. 7.

society.⁶³ At any rate, the tendency has been to place too much faith in the middle sectors as modernizing forces. The evidence indicates that such faith is misplaced. Recognition of this fact should help lead to more enlightening analysis of the issue.

⁶³ Eduardo Frei Montalva, for instance, in "The Alliance that Lost its Way," Foreign Affairs, XLV (April, 1967), 437-448, at pp. 443-447. Also see Alba, Alliance Without Allies.

C H A P T E R V I
URBANIZATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

The Issue

The population of the world continues to grow and, as it does, there is a tendency toward increasing concentration of population in urban areas. For example, predictions are that by the year 2000, approximately fifty-five per cent of the world's population will be living in urban areas.¹ Because the urban population is increasing, urbanization is an important aspect in the study of any society and particularly in the emerging nations. For this study, a consideration of the

¹ Homer Hoyt, World Urbanization: Expanding Population in a Shrinking World, Urban Land Institute Technical Bulletin No. 43 (Washington, D. C.: Urban Land Institute, 1962), Table 17, p. 50. For country by country breakdowns of rural versus urban population for the period 1965-1969, see United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Demographic Yearbook 1969 (New York, 1970), pp. 144-150.

urbanization process is especially important, as it affects the process of political development. Little argument is offered against the contention that urbanization provides various kinds of pressures on the political system. Questions do arise, however, as to precisely what sorts of forces urbanization sets in motion in the development process. The task of this chapter is to analyze the various interpretations of the role played by urbanization in the development process of Latin America.

Definition. One of the problems in studying the process of urbanization is that there is much confusion as to what constitutes "urban."² Authors vary greatly in the definition of the term and often use totally different criteria. There are normally three basic types of data taken into account in discussing urbanization, and they are not always compatible concepts. These criteria are: 1) population size; 2) population density; and 3) life

²Demographic Yearbook 1969, pp. 21-22 discusses the problems encountered in defining urban from one country to another. The variety of definitions is found on pp. 147-150.

style of the population.³ Life style can be independent of size or density of population, although these criteria tend to go together. The point is that definitions vary and the student of urbanization must be aware of the variations.

Defining urbanization in terms of population size is a very popular method of solving the problem of ambiguity in definition. However, the population size which constitutes "urban" varies from country to country and among authors in the same country.⁴ If scholars were

³ Robert Daland, "Comparative Perspectives of Urban Systems," in Robert T. Daland (ed.), Comparative Urban Research: The Administration and Politics of Cities (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1969), pp. 15-60 at pp. 22-26; and Louis Wirth, "Urbanism As A Way of Life," American Journal of Sociology, XLIV (July, 1938), 1-24, at 3-8 discuss these differing definitions of the term. Also see Giorgio Mortara, Characteristics of the Demographic Structure of the American Countries (Washington, D. C.: Pan American Union, 1964), pp. 8-10.

⁴ See the Demographic Yearbook 1969, pp. 147-150. For an example of variations on studies within one nation, see William L. Flinn, Rural to Urban Migration: A Colombian Case (Madison: Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin, July, 1966), p. 18. There he indicates that the official census defines urban as an agglomeration of 1,500 people or more, many studies consider 10,000 as a minimum population to be considered urban, and still another study defines any town or city which is the country (municipio) seat as urban.

to rely on the individual nations to define "urban," it would soon be apparent that size standards vary greatly in official censuses of nations.⁵ In recent years, there has been a tendency to use the official United Nations definition of urban which means a city of 20,000 population or more.⁶ Even if size were to be totally agreed upon as a definition, there would still be problems because of the inaccuracy of much of the data reported by many of the countries. In many instances, comprehensive censuses are not taken and estimates are substituted.⁷ Thus, even if the size definition can be agreed upon, other problems emerge.

The use of the criterion of density of population (defined as the ratio of people per square mile) also lends itself to some problems. The question of accuracy of data is relevant in this case as well. Nor does the

⁵ Demographic Yearbook 1969, pp. 147-150.

⁶ Ibid., pp. 21-22. Also see Philip M. Hauser (ed.), Urbanization in Latin America (New York: International Documents Service, 1961), p. 75.

⁷ Demographic Yearbook 1969, pp. 147-150 notes many instances of estimated and old data.

criterion of density necessarily take into account the value systems or interrelationships of people. Authors also differ as to what density constitutes "urban." The criticisms applicable to using size as the determining feature of urbanization are valid here as well.

The third definition is perhaps the most vague and troublesome to use in studies, particularly empirical studies. Urbanism as a life style is difficult to define in itself because urbanites differ so greatly among themselves. As Robert T. Daland notes, this definition attempts to characterize urbanism or "urbaneness" as the key to defining urban society.⁸ Usually this definition of urbanization relates to the values of the population along with their interests and social relationships. Of particular interest to this study is that urbanism in this sense is usually associated with modernism. According to this view, to be urban is to be modern and many students of development assume such a relationship even though not always consciously.⁹ As the discussion of the role

⁸ Daland, op. cit., pp. 22-23.

⁹ Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958) particularly equates urban society with modern society. Warren S. Thompson, "Urbanization," The Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. XV (New York:

attributed to urbanization in the development process continues, the assumption and its implications will be analyzed. Obviously, problems will be encountered in using this definition since the life styles of squatter villages or ghettos differ from those of the suburban middle or upper class.

While definitions of "urban" vary according to the author considered, we cannot permit such variation to direct our attention away from the more important problem of what relationship the process of urbanization has to political development. As a result, we will discuss each author in terms of his own definition. If and when an author's definition has specific implications for the role assigned by him to urbanization, special note will be made.

Macmillan, 1934), pp. 189-192; Lucian Pye, "The Political Implications of Urbanization and the Development Process," in Social Problems of Development and Urbanization (Geneva: United States Papers prepared for the United Nations Conference on the Application of Science and Technology for the Benefit of the Less Developed Areas, Vol. 7, 1963), p. 84; and Donald J. McCrone and Charles F. Cnudde, "Toward a Communications Theory of Democratic Political Development: A Causal Model," The American Political Science Review, LXI (March, 1967), 71-79 all make a similar assumption. For even more detailed explanation of the assumptions see, Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966) particularly pp. 93-94.

Causes of urbanization. Before meaningful analysis of the effects of urbanization can be attempted, an understanding of its causes and characteristics is necessary. The causes usually noted depend upon the period of urbanization being discussed as well as the particular society under consideration. For example, the Western European origin of the city was related to the medieval period and the particular economic requirements occasioned by the decline of feudalism.¹⁰ From this emergence and the development of capitalist society, many students have considered the city a product of the industrialization process.¹¹ Originally a center of trade and commerce, it is argued that the city provides the best means of gaining productive efficiency in the

¹⁰ Max Weber's The City, translated and edited by Don Martindale and Gertrud Neuwirth (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958) presents perhaps the most exhaustive comparison of the reasons for the development of cities from ancient to modern times. Pages 104-111 provide a good part of the essential discussion of the medieval city.

¹¹ Thompson, op. cit., notes this approach as do Philip M. Hauser, "The Social, Economic and Technological Problems of Rapid Urbanization," in Bert F. Hoselitz and Wilbert E. Moore (eds.), Industrialization and Society (Paris: Mouton, 1963), pp. 199-217 at p. 200; Ernest Weissmann, "The Urban Crisis in the World," Urban Affairs

manufacturing process. The labor and market needs of industrial society are conducive to urban living arrangements.

As has been noted before in this study, the development of urbanization in the Latin American countries does not closely follow that of Western Europe or the United States. Instead, cities were created as centers for the elite of the Spanish and Portuguese colonizers and their development usually bore no relationship to industrialization.¹² Rather industrialization has been

Quarterly, I (September, 1965), 65-82; and Almond and Powell, op. cit., pp. 93-94. Daniel Lerner, op. cit., takes a little different approach in that he considers the urban society as productive of industrialization although he is somewhat vague on the specific causal relationship between the two processes. At any rate, he believes the two are very closely interrelated.

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Among the many authors noting this feature of Latin American urbanization are: Jorge Enrique Hardoy, "Dos mil años de urbanización en América Latina," in Jorge Enrique Hardoy and Carlos Tobar (eds.), La urbanización en América Latina (Buenos Aires: Editorial del Instituto, 1969), pp. 23-64; Jaime Dorselaer and Alfonso Gregory, La urbanización en América Latina, tomo II (Bogotá: Centro Internacional de Investigaciones Sociales de FERES, 1962), Part I, especially Chapter II; Richard Morse, "Some Characteristics of Latin American Urban History," The Hispanic American Historical Review, LXVII (January, 1962), 317-338; and Ronald Glassman, Political History of Latin America (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1969), pp. 246-262. Obviously this is a very small number of the many works which could be cited, but others will be noted in relation to specific points being analyzed in the rest of the chapter.

proposed as one way of solving some of the acute problems of the already existing urban areas. At any rate, the cities were created as cultural, administrative, and social centers for the Spaniards and Portuguese and until more recent times, tended to exploit the countryside rather than serve as centers of economic development.

The question of rural-to-urban migration has also been a subject of concern to students of the urbanization process. The process is particularly important in Latin America where the rate of urban population growth is among the highest in the world.¹³ The migration process is produced by factors characterized as "push and pull" factors.¹⁴ These push and pull factors relate to the

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See Economic Commission for Latin America, United Nations Economic and Social Council, Social Development of Latin America in the Post-War Period (Mar del Plata, Argentina: May, 1963); Hauser, "The Social, Economic and Technological Problems of Rapid Urbanization," pp. 202-203; and Weissmann, op. cit., p. 67 among many others.

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See International Union of Local Authorities, Urbanization in Developing Countries (The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968), p. 12; J. Medina Echavarría and Philip M. Hauser, "Rapporteur's Report," in Hauser (ed.), op. cit., pp. 38-39; E. J. Hobbswawm, "Peasants and Rural Migrants in Politics" in Claudio Veliz (ed.), The Politics of Conformity in Latin America (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 43-65; and Gino Germani, Sociología de la modernización: estudios teóricos y aplicados a América Latina (Buenos Aires: Paidós, 1969), pp. 124-132.

differing conditions existing between urban and rural areas. Both forces seem to be important to an understanding of urbanization in Latin America as indicated in the ensuing discussion.

The "push" factors are usually noted as the lack of services and opportunities in the rural areas.¹⁵ Job opportunities are scarce because dependence on agriculture is decreasing and greater efficiency in agricultural technology decreases the need for labor. Education in the rural areas is either very poor or non-existent. The "pull" factors are perhaps even more important in that they represent the attractions of the urban centers to the migrants. The urban centers attract migrants by offering them employment, services, or luxuries that they think they need.¹⁶

The "pull" argument is that urban centers offer better educational facilities, job opportunities, luxuries such as movies, and the promise of a better life.¹⁷ The

¹⁵International Union of Local Authorities, op. cit., pp. 13-15; Flinn, op. cit., pp. 10-13; and Germani, op. cit.

¹⁶International Union of Local Authorities, op. cit.

¹⁷Germani, op. cit.; Hobbswawm, op. cit.; and Dorselaer and Gregory, op. cit., pp. 45-48.

development of better transportation and communication systems is the immediate instrument of migration. People learn of the "wonders" of urban life through the communications network and by being exposed to them in military service and in other contacts with modern life.¹⁸

Communications also evolve from the network of family relationships, with those in the urban centers providing contacts for family members left in the rural areas.¹⁹

Regardless of the causes of urbanization, the fact is that urbanization is occurring at a very rapid rate. Of particular importance to this study is the fact that the urban populations of developing societies are growing at a much faster rate than in the developed societies.²⁰

¹⁸ Flinn, op. cit., p. 12.

¹⁹ T. Lynn Smith, Latin American Population Studies (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1966), p. 64.

²⁰ See Wilfred Woodhouse, "Urban Development: Some International Comparisons," in G. M. Lomas (ed.), Social Aspects of Urban Development (New York: National Council of Social Service, 1966), pp. 64-72; Gerald Breese, Urbanization in Newly Developing Countries (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966); and International Union of Local Authorities, op. cit., p. 12.

The important point is that the effects attributed to urbanization in the process of political development become more significant as the rate and degree of urbanization increase. If developing societies become urbanized at faster rates than do developed societies, the effects of urbanization, both good and bad, should be greater as well. As a result, it is important to have a clear understanding of the process and its effects.

The Effect of Urbanization on Political
Development According to the
Consensus Model

The general literature. The consensus theorists tend to stress the modernizing features of urbanization. In their analyses, the increased opportunities provided by urban society and the political integration occasioned by the universalization of value systems of the population tend to be emphasized. In other words, the positive features and benefits of urbanization are emphasized while the negative, disruptive features are de-emphasized.²¹

²¹Dankwart Rustow, A World of Nations (Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institute, 1967), p. 245 notes the negative and positive features.

As with many other aspects of the consensus model, the treatment of urbanization by this particular model can be traced to Max Weber. Weber's analysis of the medieval city particularly has been accepted as the mode of development of urban society.²² According to Weber's analysis, the medieval city produced a form of pluralism in which those values now associated with modernization are most likely to emerge. People developed the cooperative spirit for solving common problems and worked together in the interest of all concerned.²³ In effect, the city becomes the center of the orderly and rational approach to solving society's problems.

Among more recent analysts of the impact of urbanization on modernization, none has been more influential than Daniel Lerner who practically equates urban society with modern society.²⁴ His thesis is that urbanization is the basic feature of society which sets in

²² Weber, op. cit., pp. 104-111.

²³ Ibid. See Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait (Garden City: Doubleday, 1960), pp. 70-79 for a good interpretation of Weber's analysis.

²⁴ Lerner, op. cit.

motion various modernizing processes. Specifically, urbanization tends to increase literacy levels which in turn produce greater exposure of the population to the communications media. Participation in economic and political life is encouraged and increased by media exposure; thus, urbanization is the stimulus of the modernizing forces.²⁵

Obviously, this is a very brief and oversimplified summary of Lerner's thesis, but it seems that the media really provide the key to modernization because they permit people to absorb a wide range of values through empathy with a wider range of life styles.²⁶ Urbanization, however, provides the conditions productive of the media and thus urbanization is the most important factor. Many people have attempted to test Lerner's thesis and most field studies using the specific hypotheses developed by him have concluded that they are valid.²⁷

²⁵ Ibid., particularly pp. 45-65.

²⁶ Ibid., pp. 50-61.

²⁷ Two of the most specific tests of the theory are provided by Gilbert R. Winham, "Political Development and Lerner's Theory: Further Test of a Causal Model," The American Political Science Review, LXIV (September, 1970), 810-818; and McCrone and Chudde, op. cit. Both confirm the essence of Lerner's theory.

Lerner freely admits that his model is based on the Western European industrial tradition, but he argues that it is not ethnocentric because the process is a historical fact which is verifiable.²⁸ His justification really does not confront the question of ethnocentricity. The fact that his model can be verified in terms of the experience of developed societies does not necessarily mean that societies of differing cultures will develop in the same way. It should be noted that his analysis is of the Middle East and thus questions of applicability to Latin America may be raised. He does not limit his conclusions to the Middle East, however. His analysis has been adopted by many students of development regardless of their particular geographical interests.

Gabriel Almond is among those generalists who have accepted Lerner's thesis as it applies to urbanization and the development process.²⁹ Almond notes that urbanization-

²⁸ Lerner, op. cit., p. 46.

²⁹ See Almond and Powell, op. cit., pp. 93-95 in particular. Also see Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.), The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960) particularly pp. 536-537 of Coleman's "Conclusion."

can have disintegrative effects, but he and his coauthors tend to emphasize the idea that the cities are the centers of modernity and that they also provide the instruments for modernization of the countryside.³⁰ In their argument, the cities tend to be the centers of national life, but they provide help for modernization of the countryside because the urbanites maintain family ties with the rural areas. In addition, a greater flow of information, of political participation, etc., emerges in the urban setting.

All of these developments are integral parts of increasing pluralism of society. Increasing urbanization creates different types of needs on the part of the population. As needs and differences of elements of society become apparent, group identity emerges. As people recognize solidarity with others, demands can be made on the system and then compromises posited by the pluralists begin to emerge.³¹ Political participation and modernity (stable democracy) are produced by these forces.

³⁰ Almond and Coleman, op. cit.

³¹ Almond and Powell, op. cit., pp. 94.97.

Many students of urbanization echo these ideas. Lucian Pye and Louis Wirth both tend to equate modernity and urbanization or at least see urbanization as the springboard to modernization.³² For them, all that is modern is associated with the growth of cities. In his "crises" of distribution and penetration, Pye sees the cities as playing key roles as they do to a lesser extent in the other crises.³³ In regard to group organization and political participation, A. F. K. Organski is yet another who adopts the Lerner and Almond theses.³⁴ His idea is that urbanization pulls the working class together physically for the first time providing them with greater opportunity of becoming organized. With large numbers of the workers together in one place, they can become effective forces in the political system. Warren Thompson echoes these thoughts in noting that increased economic opportunity in the cities provides for greater

³² Pye, op. cit., and Wirth, op. cit., p. 1.

³³ Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966).

³⁴ A. F. K. Organski, The Stages of Political Development (New York: Knopf, 1965), pp. 162-163.

freedom because of increased alternatives.³⁵ Increasing economic opportunity also opens new social doors and, as has been noted in Chapter III, social equality is productive of political participation and equality in the consensus approach. Numerous others adopt the foregoing position on the process of urbanization.³⁶

The most significant feature of the consensus approach is that urban areas are viewed as the agents of modernization and consensus-building. Very little emphasis is placed on the gulf which exists between the city and the countryside except to indicate how cities are forces for decreasing that gulf. Many Latin Americanists have adopted the consensus approach to urbanization and attention will not be turned to them.

The literature on Latin America. As with the argument concerning the middle sectors, John J. Johnson is

³⁵Thompson, op. cit., p. 192.

³⁶Other significant works include Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," The American Political Science Review, LV (September, 1961), 493-514; David Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965); and Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

one of the Latin Americanists most closely identified with the consensus model view of urbanization.³⁷ His argument on the middle sectors is that industrialization helps to create the middle sectors. Industrialization also brings about urbanization and it is in the urban centers that the middle sectors are found. The urban centers provide the forces for modernization, development, and new hope for democracy and stability. Many Latin Americanists, without evaluating all the evidence, accept this argument with the result that the urbanization process is seen as the creator of modernization in Latin America.

In addition to Johnson's works, the literature often stresses the fact that the middle sectors are most closely associated with urban areas. Urban development is seen as the place in which middle sectors develop, with all the implications usually associated with the middle

³⁷ Johnson (ed.), Continuity and Change in Latin America (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), and Political Change in Latin America: The Emergence of the Middle Sectors (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958) present a consensus argument on urbanization.

sectors argument.³⁸ Even Gino Germani notes the tendency of urbanization to produce growth of the middle sectors.³⁹ Again, the fact of growing middle sectors in urban centers cannot be denied; however, the role played by those sectors in the development process is questionable. Since the issue of the role of the middle sectors was analyzed in the previous chapter, it will not be discussed further here.

Michael Micklin adopts the urbanization thesis of modernization by analyzing the demographic characteristics of Latin America.⁴⁰ In his analysis, demographic modernization (low or decreasing infant mortality, low or decreasing population growth) is directly affected by the urbanization process. As a secondary factor, economic modernization is similarly positively associated with

³⁸ Francine F. Rabinovitz, "Urban Development and Political Development in Latin America," in Daland, op. cit., pp. 88-123 at p. 96. Also see Michael Micklin, "Demographic, Economic, and Social Change in Latin America: An Examination of Causes and Consequences," The Journal of Developing Areas, IV (January, 1970), 173-196 at p. 183.

³⁹ Germani, op. cit., pp. 199-225, particularly pp. 199-202 concerning Latin America.

⁴⁰ Micklin, op. cit., pp. 183-185.

demographic modernization in Latin America.⁴¹ These ideas provide the basis of a great deal of hope on the part of consensus theorists for modernization of Latin America.

The arguments concerning demographic modernization, as defined by Micklin, and urbanization are based on studies of developed systems. The facts indicate that birth rates in developed nations are lower in urban areas than in rural areas.⁴² Studies indicate, however, that the birth rates of Latin American urban populations have shown no significant declines.⁴³ This is not to say that these trends will not eventually occur. What is emphasized, however, is that the tendency of some scholars

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² See the United Nations Demographic Yearbook 1969, pp. 276-278.

⁴³ Ibid. Also see United Nations Population Branch, Bureau of Social Affairs, "Demographic Aspects of Urbanization in Latin America," in Hauser (ed.), op. cit.: Carmen A. Miró, "The Population of 20th Century Latin America," in American Assembly, Population Dilemma of Latin America (Washington, D. C.: Potomac Books, 1966); and O. Andrew Collver, Birth Rates in Latin America: New Estimates of Historical Trends and Fluctuations (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1965). Collver's discussion is particularly good. He cites Venezuela, Chile, and Mexico to support his argument.

to apply pre-conceived notions to analyses of differing societies provides distorted results. If the scholars were to take into consideration the Catholic heritage of Latin Americans, the concept of machismo, and suggestions of some Latin American nationalists that population control is a scheme for keeping Latin America weak, they might be more willing to recognize that the facts are different for Latin America. Perhaps the hope of modernizing tendencies provides too great an attraction to such scholars for them to be objective. Eventually, birth rates may start dropping and other modernizing tendencies may develop, but that is not sufficient for solving the problems of the present. To do that, an understanding of the present is essential.

Perhaps more widespread than the idea that urbanization will produce declining birth rates is the belief that it will provide modern values for most of the population. An indication of the popularity of this view is the fact that many authors state the view without offering any further explanation. They assume this to be self-evident. The idea takes the form of an argument that urban centers are the effective nations of Latin American systems and that all modernizing forces are found in the

cities.⁴⁴ The modern values and institutions are found in the cities and, beyond that, the leaders and organizers for modernizing society are also found in the urban areas. These leaders also stimulate the countryside through contact with families left in the rural areas. Thus, the urban centers are viewed as producers of a type of political leadership for modernization.⁴⁵

Closely associated with this aspect of urbanization in Latin America is that urbanism or "citification" of the rural elements comes about through contact with the urban centers. Andrew Hunter Whiteford states this argument quite nicely:

⁴⁴ See Jacques Lambert, Latin America: Social Structure and Political Institutions, tr. by Helen Katel (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 184-199; Kalman Silvert, "Leaders, Followers and Modernization," in Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown (eds.), Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings, rev. ed. (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1964), pp. 649-658 at p. 649; and Joseph Maier and Richard W. Weatherhead (eds.), Politics of Change in Latin America (New York: Praeger, 1964), pp. 8-9; and Francine F. Rabinovitz, op. cit., p. 99.

⁴⁵ Lambert, op. cit., pp. 145-148; and Margot Romano Yalour de Tobar, "El proceso de socializacion urbana," in Hardoy, op. cit., pp. 234-256.

Through contact with the city a vague conception of "progress" is instilled in the minds of village folk. . . . The process of "citification" or urbanization seems to be universal.⁴⁶

A quote from George I. Blanksten indicates a similar position with emphasis on the urban people and also an aspect of the Western bias to the argument:

Urbanization. . . contributes to the development of common sets of political attitudes and experiences on the part of the people who live in the growing cities of Latin America. Although in some instances urbanization aggravates political conflict between large municipal centers and rural areas--as in Cuba, Uruguay, and Argentina--the over-all effect of the movement to the cities is integrative, and Westernizing, so far as the urban folk are concerned.⁴⁷

The major consideration is that the familial contacts of the urban migrants are maintained and the urban migrant provides a channel of communication to the countryside in his contacts with family left there. There seems to

⁴⁶ Andrew Hunter Whiteford, Two Cities of Latin America (Garden City: Doubleday, 1964), p. 2. Pages 1-4 provide the general assumptions he uses in his two case studies.

⁴⁷ Blanksten, "The Politics of Latin America," in Almond and Coleman, op. cit., pp. 455-531, at p. 475.

be substantial evidence that such is the case and that breakdown of family ties--to be discussed in the next section--is not a necessary effect of Latin American urbanization.⁴⁸ In such a situation, the urban population has the potential to be an effective force for modernization.

Another feature of urbanization often noted by consensus theorists among Latin American scholars is the potential political role of the urban migrants. They do not stress the potential violent threat of the favelas or barrios but the constructive, development-oriented political pressures which they might bring to bear on the system.⁴⁹ Andrews and Phillips argue that the people in

⁴⁸ Rabinovitz, op. cit., p. 95; Richard Morse, "Latin American Cities: Aspects of Function and Structure," Comparative Studies in Society and History, IV (July, 1962), 473-493, at p. 485; Joan Nelson, "The Urban Poor: Disruption or Political Integration in Third World Cities," World Politics, XXII (April, 1970), 393-414, at pp. 396-399; and Oscar Lewis, "Urbanization Without Breakdown: A Case Study," Scientific Monthly, LXXV (July, 1952), 31-41. Lewis argues that family ties actually strengthen in cities as one means of protection against the strangeness of urban life (p. 36).

⁴⁹ This is a continuation of Organski's argument, op. cit. See Rabinovitz, op. cit., p. 96; and Frank M. Andrews and George W. Phillips, "The Squatters of Lima: Who They Are and What They Want," The Journal of Developing Areas, IV (January, 1970), 211-224.

the barrios of Peru are just the ones who are most necessary for change in socio-economic policies. They are the ones most likely to benefit and represent those who show a certain amount of initiative by the very fact that they migrated to the urban centers in search of a new life in the first place.⁵⁰ Rabinovitz carries the argument further, noting that political opportunities may attempt to direct attention to the needs of the shanty towns as suffrage is broadened.⁵¹ Such a move would encourage greater participation by the poor migrants as they see chances for specific changes beneficial to them.

The consensus theorists have an attractive argument if it is valid. If their view were to be accepted, we could look forward to gradual modernization in the pluralist tradition. Many, however, reject the consensus argument on the question of urbanization as on other issues. Attention will now be turned to some of the major differing points of view.

⁵⁰ Ibid., pp. 212-213. Nelson, op. cit., p. 406 and 411, however, stresses that the poor see their needs as very individualized and argues that this keeps them from taking unified action.

⁵¹ Rabinovitz, op. cit., p. 96.

The Effect of Urbanization on Political
Development According to the
Conflict Model

The general literature. It is difficult to discuss the role of urbanization in the conflict model among generalists because the generalists have not directed their attention to the process in any appreciable degree. This lack of attention supports the thesis that the model has Western biases--it will be remembered that the model is developed from association by Marx with an industrialized and urbanized society. While most general conflict theorists do not pay specific attention to the process of urbanization, the process has an implicit role in their model. This discussion is based on the assumptions implicit in the model and the logical implications of the model itself.

The conflict model, as was noted before, is usually based on the idea of class conflict. When we analyze Latin Americanists, it will be found that they broaden this approach to include conflict among many types of groups. For the generalists, however, the tendency is to

base analyses on economic class conflict.⁵² Economic class differences, of course, were most associated with the industrialization process for Marx. In that process, the capitalists began exploiting the working masses. Since the society Marx was most familiar with was the urbanized industrial society of Western Europe, particularly Great Britain, his analysis tended to accept urbanization as an inseparable part of industrialization. The analysis is relevant to this chapter in that it happened to be in the urban areas that class conflicts were most manifest. Urbanization may not be the cause of conflict, but conflicts might tend to increase in number and intensity in urbanized societies partly as a result of greater concentration of people. In addition, as larger and larger concentrations of the poor masses emerge, they may become increasingly impatient with their lot in life as they are exposed to the amenities of modern life while also recognizing that they are unattainable in the system

⁵² See L. S. Feuer (ed.), Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy: Marx and Engels (Garden City: Doubleday, 1959); Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, and V. I. Lenin, The Essential Left (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1961); and an excellent interpretation by Shlomo Avineri, in the Introduction to his edited volume, Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modernization (Garden City: Doubleday, 1968).

as it exists.⁵³ Obviously, the urban centers provide the greatest opportunity for exposure to modern life styles.

The emphasis of the "conflict" generalists is placed on the de-personalization and alienation which exist in the urban society. Again, they are not necessarily concerned with urbanization itself, but with modern society as a whole, which encompasses the urban setting.⁵⁴ In the urban society, people become much more independent from one another and more isolated from familial relationships.⁵⁵ This has been a common assumption of sociologists of the industrialized society. A form of alienation from the society emerges and societal bonds

⁵³ See Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959) for a discussion of the effects of urbanization on class structure.

⁵⁴ Dahrendorf, Essays on The Theory of Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968). Also Lomas, op. cit., p. 33.

⁵⁵ See William J. Goode, "Industrialization and Family Change," in Hoselitz and Moore, op. cit., pp. 237-255 for a good analysis of general theory on family relationships in industrial society.

disintegrate, leading to social disorganization.⁵⁶ As will be noted below, Latin Americanists have very readily accepted this analysis but much evidence also exists to indicate that the idea may have been greatly exaggerated.⁵⁷

Another more commonly accepted assumption about urbanization concerns the role of the urban migrants themselves. According to many analyses, the urban migrant is supposed to be a disruptive force in the society and also provide a large source of recruits for radical movements.⁵⁸ Because developing nations have such large

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Eric Josephson and Mary Josephson (eds.), Man Alone: Alienation in Modern Society (New York: Dell, 1962) presents an excellent collection of essays on the issue. See also Glaucio Soares and Robert L. Hamblin, "Socio-economic Variables and Voting for the Radical Left: Chile, 1952," The American Political Science Review, LXI (1967), 1055.

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See Nelson, op. cit., pp. 396-399 who argues that the theory has some validity, but it has become accepted to the extent that conflicting evidence is not even recognized anymore.

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See Hauser, "The Social, Economic and Technological Problems of Rapid Urbanization," pp. 210-211; Soares and Hamblin, op. cit.; and Joan Nelson, Migrants, Urban Poverty, and Instability in Developing Nations (Cambridge: Harvard University Center for International Affairs, 1969) devotes Chapter I to analysis of the theory of disruption by the migrants and Chapter II to analysis of radicalization theory, rejecting both. Also see S. N. Eisenstadt, Modernization: Protest and Change (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966), pp. 20-22.

migrant populations, the role played by the migrants becomes very important. The poverty of the recent arrivals, the impersonality of the mass society of the cities, and the increasing class consciousness of the workers all contribute to the possibility--or even inevitability--of accelerated conflict and class warfare. Unfortunately, however, the evidence often contradicts these most commonly held assumptions about the role of urbanization. Studies of Mexican urbanization, for instance, suggest that there is little evidence to support the idea that urbanization is a radicalizing force.⁵⁹

Joan Nelson's consideration of urbanization on a world scale leads her to reject this commonly held sociological assumption as well.⁶⁰

Yet another feature of the conflict model position on urbanization is emphasis on the differences between rural and urban areas. Instead of economic class

⁵⁹ Wayne A. Cornelius, Jr., "Urbanization as an Agent in Latin American Political Instability: The Case of Mexico," American Political Science Review, LXIII (September, 1969), 833-857, and Lewis, op. cit.. Concerning Latin America generally, see Margot Romano Yalour de Tobar, op. cit., and Lambert, op. cit., pp. 145-148 and 184-199.

⁶⁰ Nelson, "The Urban Poor: Disruption or Political Integration in Third World Cities."

differences between groups within the urban areas, conflict may be seen between the urban centers and the countryside.⁶¹ Whereas the consensus model emphasizes the modernizing influences which the urban centers provide for the countryside, the conflict model emphasizes the differences between the two and how the expectations of the rural inhabitants may lead to disruption in the system as they are exploited to an ever greater degree by the urban areas. Differences in culture and economy are noted, with the emphasis on the idea that a system of "internal colonialism" exists in which the rural elements are exploited by their urban brethren.⁶²

⁶¹ Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1956) indicates a belief that the peasantry is often exploited by the more modernized urban dweller particularly during the period of colonization. Also see Bert Hoselitz, "Generative and Parasitic Cities," Economic Development and Cultural Change, III (1955), 278-294, and Brian J. Berry, "Some Relations of Urbanization and Basic Patterns of Economic Development," in Forrest R. Pitts (ed.), Urban Systems and Economic Development (Eugene: University of Oregon School of Business Administration, 1962), pp. 1-15, at pp. 12-14.

⁶² See Rodolfo Stavenhagen, "Seven Fallacies About Latin America," in James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin (eds.), Latin America: Reform or Revolution? (New York: Fawcett, 1968), pp. 13-31.

In addition, the deterioration of the physical environment brought on by urbanization is often noted by the conflict oriented scholars.⁶³ As migration continues and urbanization increases at an ever faster pace, the environment keeps deteriorating. The deterioration of the environment only increases the squalor of the poor and as a result, the likelihood of violent disruption grows. As with the other features of the model regarding urbanization, it seems that the ideas have been too hastily accepted. As Oscar Lewis and others have noted, the new environment, despite the squalor, is often much better than the migrant knew in the rural area from which he came. A new culture emerges with the migrants developing close ties to new people in their shanty towns and finding new types of patrón relationships with employers or others.⁶⁴

The conclusions of the conflict model have been attractive to many Latin Americanists. The tendency to

⁶³ Hauser, "The Social, Economic and Technological Problems of Rapid Urbanization," p. 207, and Weissmann, op. cit., p. 67. The International Union of Local Authorities, op. cit., p. 15 discusses this effect.

⁶⁴ Lewis, op. cit.; Rustow, op. cit., p. 245 argues that chaotic riots and such may be the short-run result of the process but not necessarily a long-run effect.

consider Latin America as constantly in ferment or as revolutionary has increased the tendency to accept the analysis put forth by conflict theorists regarding the effects of urbanization and its accompanying class-based changes. Exactly how such analyses have been applied and with what implications is the concern of the rest of this chapter.

The literature on Latin America. While a number of Latin Americanists have been associated with the consensus view on urbanization, it seems that even more of them accept a conflict analysis. In contrast to the generalists who are often implicit in their approach to urbanization, many Latin Americanists are quite explicit in noting the conflict-producing tendencies of the urbanization process. Wayne A. Cornelius provides a convenient summary of the prevalent ideas concerning Latin American urbanization and its consequences.⁶⁵ He sees three basic themes in urbanization theory as it has been applied to Latin America:

⁶⁵ Cornelius, op. cit.

- 1) Urbanization breeds economic frustration among the migrant population, which aspires high but fails to participate in the material rewards of urban society.
- 2) Migrants experience major difficulties in adjusting socially and psychologically to the urban environment.
- 3) Urbanization, increased awareness of government and politics, and mobilization of radical opposition forces go hand in hand.⁶⁶

While he summarizes the general beliefs about Latin American urbanization, however, he concludes that the evidence in Mexico does not support them.⁶⁷ In fact, many recent studies have questioned these generally accepted assumptions.⁶⁸

Much has also been written regarding the suggestion that urbanization breeds economic frustration among the migrant population. There are many people who just cannot be absorbed by the economic systems which attract them to

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 833.

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 855.

⁶⁸ Morse, "Latin American Cities: Aspects of Function and Structure," p. 485; Nelson, "The Urban Poor: Disruption or Political Integration in Third World Cities," pp. 405-411; and Rabinovitz, op. cit., for consideration of the evidence.

the urban areas.⁶⁹ Many authors tend to discuss the issue as a problem of over-urbanization--in the sense that larger portions of the populations live in urban areas than are justified by the level of economic development.⁷⁰ The idea is that as people swarm to the urban centers in search of a better life and find no doors to economic success open, they turn to violence as a last resort. The evidence certainly indicates that masses of the migrants are unable to find work.⁷¹ However, a number of studies also indicate

⁶⁹ See Anibal Quijano Obregón, "Tendencies in Peruvian Development and in the Class Structure," in James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin (eds.), op. cit., pp. 289-328, at pp. 308-309 and 312-315; Talton F. Ray, The Politics of the Barrios of Venezuela (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), p. 176; and Hobbswawm, op. cit., for a discussion of the issue.

⁷⁰ See Hauser, "The Social, Economic and Technological Problems of Rapid Urbanization," p. 203, and N. V. Sovani, "The Analysis of 'Over-Urbanization,'" Economic Development and Cultural Change, XII (January, 1964), 113-122. Sovani notes that this concept of over-urbanization takes the Western urban societies as the norms indicating cultural bias, p. 117.

⁷¹ Obregón, op. cit., pp. 313-314.

that they have not generally turned to violence and are in fact politically quite passive.⁷² Yet it is difficult to believe that violence can be avoided. In this sense, the economic frustration of the people may be a very important consequence of the urbanization process. However, if policies were developed to relieve the economic frustration of the people, the assumptions of the conflict model concerning inevitability of revolution and chaos would require significant modification.

Closely related to the economic frustration argument is the idea that improved and increased channels of communications provide a ready means for the exploitation of these masses of people by radical elements.⁷³ As the people become more aware of what is potentially available, they are likely to aspire to it. Not being able to achieve what they aspire to, the masses are likely to revolt. Communications media are viewed as the immediate causes in this argument, but the real cause is still economic frustration.

⁷² Nelson, "The Urban Poor: Disruption or Political Integration in Third World Cities," pp. 396-399.

⁷³ See José Luis Romero, "La ciudad latinoamericana y los movimientos políticos," in Hardoy and Tobar, op. cit., pp. 297-310, at pp. 298-302, and 308.

The predicted breakdown in social organization or the alienation of the individual from the system has been accepted as fact by many Latin Americanists.⁷⁴ In this argument, the traditional family setting is viewed as a positive social integrating force. As the individual moves to the urban area he loses contact with much of his family and he is too busy and the urban society is too impersonal for him to develop new social ties. At times of crisis, he is incapable of finding people to help. As a result, social disorganization and disruptive behavior are found.⁷⁵ As with many other aspects of the model, however, the Latin American experience indicates that the degree of social isolation stemming from urbanization is slight at present.⁷⁶ Field studies indicate that urbanization does

⁷⁴ See Dorselaer and Gregory, op. cit., pp. 67-74, and Germani, op. cit., pp. 149-151.

⁷⁵ See Goode, op. cit., for a complete examination of the process.

⁷⁶ Rabinovitz, op. cit., p. 95; Lewis, op. cit., pp. 36-38; and Cornelius, op. cit., p. 855. The question is also discussed by Germani, op. cit., pp. 149-151.

not weaken family ties and may actually strengthen them. In addition, in Latin America, there seems to be a substitute in the patrón system which exists even in urban areas. The patrón may be the boss or a friend in the city or the trade union or the government agency.

Perhaps the most important feature of the urbanization process is the tremendous demands it brings upon the system. Urbanization, itself, creates different types of problems and only increases the types and quantity of demands with which the system must cope.⁷⁷ This feature of urbanization is related to the rising expectations and economic frustrations noted above. It goes even further, however, in that the question of urban services is brought in. The conflict approach tends to emphasize physical deterioration of the environment as well as social deterioration.⁷⁸ The new demands created by physical deterioration just help to overload the system. The system is expected to break down eventually and then explode.

⁷⁷ See Luis Ratinoff, "The New Urban Groups: The Middle Classes," in Seymour Martin Lipset and Aldo Solari, Elites in Latin America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 61-93, at pp. 62-64.

⁷⁸ See Hauser, "The Social, Economic and Technological Problems in Rapid Urbanization," p. 207, and Weissmann, op. cit., p. 67.

Yet another theme of the conflict literature on Latin America is the gulf between the urban centers and the rural areas.⁷⁹ In this view, the urban areas are seen as centers of modernity and the rural areas as backward. A common theme is that the urban centers, representing the elite elements, only exploit the countryside.⁸⁰ The expectation is that as the gap continues to grow, an explosion will occur. The suggestion that the urban sectors might actually be leaders in the process of modernization through the promulgation of modern values and ideas is rejected by the conflict approach. The gaps between the two societies are unbridgeable. Richard Adams notes that this is an oversimplification of the social system of Latin America. He contends that there is as much

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See Irving Louis Horowitz, "Electoral Politics, Urbanization, and Social Development in Latin America," in Glenn Beyer, The Urban Explosion in Latin America (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967), pp. 215-253, and Floreal H. Forni, "Aspectos sociales de la urbanizacion," in Hardoy and Tobar, op. cit., pp. 205-234.

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Horowitz, op. cit., pp. 216-220, and George Jackson Eder, "Urban Concentration, Agriculture, and Agrarian Reform," in The Annals: Latin America Tomorrow (Philadelphia: The American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, Vol. 360, July, 1965), pp. 27-47.

difference between society in "primate" cities and smaller cities as there is between rural and urban centers.⁸¹

The gulf between the rural and urban sectors often leads to discussion of primate versus secondary urban centers of Latin America. The primate cities are the ones which usually constitute the effective national life of the country. The primate centers were usually the seats of government for the Spaniards and Portuguese colonizers.⁸² These primate cities exploited the other cities and polarization between urban centers developed. Even outside the primate cities, the urban centers were primarily oriented toward using the available resources of the surrounding countryside and never replenishing them. They were exploitative in nature and many argue that the same relationship exists now.⁸³ Today the concept is described by some as a system of internal colonialism in which the elite elements of the urban centers prey like

⁸¹ Richard N. Adams, The Second Sowing: Power and Secondary Development in Latin America (San Francisco: Chandler, 1967), Chapters 3, 9, and 10 particularly.

⁸² The Economic Commission for Latin America, op. cit., pp. 18-23 provides one of the best discussions on the subject.

⁸³ Ibid., p. 18.

parasites on the countryside.⁸⁴ This factor is often considered to be the greatest obstacle to development in Latin America.⁸⁵

There is a wide variety in the conflict analyses of Latin American urbanization. However, the emphasis is placed on conflicts created by the urbanization process. Conflicts are seen to emerge within the urban areas, among different urban areas, and between the urban areas and the countryside. Tremendous problems of assimilating migrants into the system usually attract a good part of the attention of the conflict analysts. There is little doubt that many of the tendencies suggested by conflict analysts actually exist. The evidence suggests that the case is often over-stated. The concluding section will analyze the role urbanization has played in Latin American political development.

⁸⁴ See Romero, op. cit., pp. 299-301; Morse, "Latin American Cities: Aspects of Function and Structure," pp. 474-479; J. M. Houston, "Foundations of Colonial Towns in Hispanic America," in R. P. Beckinsale and J. M. Houston (eds.), Urbanization and Its Problems (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1968), pp. 352-390; and Ronald Glassman, op. cit., pp. 246-247.

⁸⁵ See Stavenhagen, op. cit., p. 30, and Stanislaw Andreski, Parasitism and Subversion: The Case of Latin America (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966), pp. 1-2. Many of the authors in the Petras and Zeitlin volume take this position.

The Effect of Urbanization on Latin
American Political Development

One of the most important considerations about the urbanization process in Latin America is that its historical roots are quite different from that of the Western or industrialized nations. Latin American cities were developed with the explicit purpose of providing a center of focus for the colonizers of the area. They served as commercial and cultural centers for the European settlements. In effect they were transplants of European cities to the New World.⁸⁶ Thus, in contrast to the Western European and United States experiences, industrialization did not produce urban centers.⁸⁷ Instead, Latin American cities were often points of

⁸⁶ Morse, "Latin American Cities: Aspects of Function and Structure," pp. 474-480; John Mander, The Unrevolutionary Society: The Power of Latin American Conservatism in A Changing World (New York: Knopf, 1969), pp. 260-261; Glassman, op. cit., pp. 246-262; Romero, op. cit., pp. 299-301; and The Economic Commission for Latin America, op. cit., pp. 17-19, among many others provide evidence on this point.

⁸⁷ See Milton I. Vanger, "Politics and Class in Twentieth-Century Latin America," The Hispanic American Historical Review, XLIX (February, 1969), 80-93, at p. 83, and Morse, "Some Characteristics of Latin American History," p. 329.

departure for exploitation of the rural countryside. As a result, the assumptions based on social change brought about by the industrial process are not always relevant. Unfortunately, scholars in both the conflict and consensus traditions often ignore this fact. Because industrialization was not the producer of urbanization in Latin America, it must be recognized that the modernizing tendencies produced by the industrialization process are not existent in many Latin American urban centers. As a result, there are not necessarily strongly united labor groups able to articulate the wishes of the people as opposed to the capitalist elite. The working class does not necessarily recognize a difference in its interest from that of the employer. Instead, the employer may also be the patrón and as such the worker may actually see a coincidence of interests and thus not be interested in radical activities.

The argument that urbanization creates various modernizing tendencies is even more confusing than the argument noted above for the Latin American scene. There is no doubt that expanding communications and transportation grids have an accelerating effect on the urbanization process. Urbanization also broadens the communication of ideas and values, however. Such an expansion in the communications process helps modernize

the population in the sense that more and more people become aware of modern values and the wonders of modern technology. To that extent, modernization certainly occurs, but the problems are intensified because increased communication of modern ideas encourages even greater migration to the urban centers where the wonders of modern society are available. Besides further compounding the problems of urban life, migration also drains the countryside of youth and efficient labor.⁸⁸

Directly related to the question of modernization is the fact that many of the urban migrants cannot be employed. The economy just cannot absorb the many migrants into the system.⁸⁹ These elements provide a potential threat to the system because their needs cannot be met. Some argue, however, that they are not potential troublemakers because their conditions in the squatter

⁸⁸ See Eder, op. cit., and Miro, op. cit..

⁸⁹ Soares, "The New Industrialization and the Brazilian Political System," in Petras and Zeitlin, op. cit., pp. 186-201, and Ray, op. cit., pp. 161-176 provide two of many studies of this problem.

settlements are actually improvements over their rural existence.⁹⁰ Thus, the suggestion that radicalization of the squatter settlements is to occur does not seem borne out by the experience of Latin America. There may be a difference in reaction from one generation to the next. The first generation of urban migrants may be content with what they find in their new homes, still being peasants and impressed with the advantages they have over their previous rural existence. Succeeding generations, however, may become more radicalized. As the children grow up in the urban environment, they do not have the old rural environment with which to compare their own experiences. Thus, they may not think in terms of how much better off they are, but of how much they still lack. The result may eventually be radicalization.

Another supposedly modernizing tendency of urbanization concerns the birth rate. According to the literature, birth rates are supposed to go down in urban centers. Both conflict and consensus theorists have

⁹⁰ See Alfred Stepan, "Political Development Theory: The Latin American Experience," Journal of International Affairs, XX (1966), 223-234, at p. 230. See the preceding section of this chapter for more detailed discussion of the evidence.

accepted this idea. Yet the evidence in Latin America indicates that there are no significant differences in birthrates between rural areas and urban centers.⁹¹

However, it cannot be assumed that such changes might not occur in the future.

All of the above indicates that the long accepted assumptions about urbanization are not easily applied to Latin America. Many questions have to be raised about each assumption. The only conclusion which can be reached is that Latin American urbanization varies from the generally accepted pattern. Commonly accepted beliefs about urbanization have to be modified if the process in Latin America is to be understood. Differences in the history and culture of Latin America have to be considered in any analysis of the area. There also may be considerable differences between specific countries. As has been noted, some of the assumptions and conclusions of the models provide useful insights, but neither can be applied to Latin America in toto.

⁹¹ See Zulma Recchini de Lattes, "Aspectos demográficos de proceso de urbanización en América Latina," in Hardoy and Tobar, op. cit., pp. 273-294, at pp. 283-289; and Demographic Yearbook 1969, pp. 276-278.

C H A P T E R V I I
BUREAUCRACY AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

The Issue

Of the three issues used as case studies in this work, none is more important to development than the bureaucracy. The bureaucracy is strategic to the process of political development precisely because the bureaucracy is responsible for fashioning and implementing the varied policies which produce and accompany the development process. The direction and scope of development policy (all government policy, for that matter) is directly controlled by the government workers. Thus, the role they choose to play--obstructive or facilitative--will have tremendous implications for the success of such programs. For that reason, it is important to understand the bureaucracy and the role it plays in the development process.

The study of comparative politics has, until recent times, treated public administration and the study of

bureaucracy as somewhat of a stepchild. Many of the traditional works often included analysis of administrative institutions, but systematic study of bureaucracy as a viable institution in comparative analysis was slighted.¹ Much of the work in comparative administration is done by the Comparative Administration Group (CAG) in the form of monographs. While comparative public administration as a whole has been slighted to some extent, the same is also true of the relationship between bureaucracy and political development. Recalling that the process of political development has gained detailed attention only lately, it is little wonder that the study of bureaucracy as a factor in political development is still in its infancy. Even though the study of bureaucracy and political development

¹ Carl Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy (Boston: Ginn, 1950), and Herman Finer, Theory and Practice of Modern Government (London: Methuen, 1961) are two of the traditionalists who direct attention to public administration agencies as institutions to be compared in study of government. One of the first major works to deal with the subject exclusively is William J. Siffin (ed.), Toward the Comparative Study of Public Administration (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1957). It has been followed by Ferrel Heady's Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966). To this date works on comparative public administration are somewhat scarce. The next footnote indicates a greater amount of attention paid to the subject in developing societies, however.

is rather new as a subject of systematic study, it has received much more attention of late than the more general area of comparative public administration.² Even though attention was focused on the subject relatively recently, there are indications that students of political development are becoming aware of the pivotal status of bureaucracy in the development process.

Definition. Defining the term bureaucracy does not present the problems we found in dealing with the other two issues studied here. In this study, bureaucracy refers to public bureaucracy as opposed to bureaucracies in private enterprise. Bureaucracy, thus, will be used to

²As with the study of public administration generally, the study of bureaucracy and political development has roots in Weberian studies to be noted later. Some of the earlier works on this specific topic were done by Fred Riggs. See his "Agraria and Industria--Toward a Typology of Comparative Administration," in Siffin, op. cit., pp. 23-116; and Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964) among many other of his works. The great interest in the topic is evidenced by the following works among many others: Joseph La Palombara (ed.), Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); Ralph Braibanti, et al., Political and Administrative Development (Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1969); and Dwight Waldo (ed.), Temporal Dimensions of Development Administration (Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1970). Martin Henry Greenberg, Bureaucracy and Development: A Mexican Case Study (Lexington, Mass.: Heath, 1970) is a recent study involving a Latin American nation.

refer to people in public or government employ. From time to time, different segments of the bureaucracy will be noted as pertinent to particular discussions. For example, there may be some instances in which the national, as opposed to regional public employees are pertinent. Still other distinctions may be made between upper levels and lower levels of the bureaucracy. In dealing with different authors, it will be noted that some direct their attention to all public employees; whereas others may be concerned with only a particular sector of the bureaucracy. This is the point at which definitional problems arise in the use of the term.³

As might be expected, most analyses of bureaucracy and political development deal with the upper echelon of bureaucracy since that echelon is more concerned with policy-making activities than the lower level. It is to be expected that the cabinet ministries or agency heads would have more impact on the direction of policy change than would the office clerk. When implementation of policy is

³ La Palombara, "An Overview of Bureaucracy and Political Development," in La Palombara, op. cit., pp. 3-33 presents an excellent discussion of problems of and varieties in definition, especially pp. 6-8.

in question, however, the lower levels of the bureaucracy may be more important. Thus, the questions under investigation help to determine which part of the bureaucracy receives the greatest attention of the analyst.⁴

One aspect of the definition of bureaucracy is the differentiation of the formal structure and informal factors in the operation of the system.⁵ The formal organization is that spelled out by the law or by the organization chart. It is common knowledge that more informal lines of communication and association often develop and some scholars place more emphasis on this aspect of bureaucracy than on the formal organization. This study focuses primarily on the formal aspects although the informal arrangements which affect formal operations

⁴ Ibid., pp. 6-8.

⁵ See Jonathan A. Slesinger, A Model for the Comparative Study of Public Bureaucracies (Ann Arbor: Bureau of Government, Institute of Public Administration, 1957), pp. 4-6. Robert V. Presthus, The Organizational Society: An Analysis and A Theory (New York: Random House, 1962); and Peter M. Blau, The Dynamics of Bureaucracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955) deal with some of the informal aspects and functions of bureaucracies. In addition see Eugene Litwak, "Models of Bureaucracy Which Permit Conflict," American Journal of Sociology, LXVII (September, 1961), 177-184 at p. 177.

and expectations are included--especially when considering Latin American bureaucracies.

Closely related to the problem of definition is the lament of many scholars that we have not had precise enough formulation of a framework for comparative study of public bureaucracies.⁶ The usual argument is that while studies of bureaucracies in many different systems are conducted, there is often little commonality between studies facilitating comparison. Jonathan Slesinger suggests a framework which will be employed here in analyzing studies of bureaucracy. His fairly simple, straightforward model uses the following questions:

1) Bureaucratic Organization: The Model Description

- a) What kinds of ends, personal and societal, are served by the existence of bureaucratic organizations?
- b) What form or shape do bureaucracies typically take?

⁶ Ibid., pp. 3-4; Heady, op. cit., Chapter 1; Herbert Emmerich, "Administrative Roadblocks to Co-ordinated Development," in Egbert De Vries and José Medina Echavarría (eds.), Social Aspects of Economic Development in Latin America (Paris: UNESCO, 1963), pp. 345-360, at pp. 345-346; and Slesinger, op. cit., pp. 1-3 among many others.

2) Bureaucratic Organization: The Model
in Action

- a) Who occupy the positions in bureaucracies, and what is their relationship to the total society?
- b) How do bureaucracies operate, i.e., what are the internal mechanisms of control and decision-making?
- c) What is the relationship of particular bureaucracies to their institutional settings, i.e., what is the relationship and balance between control by the bureaucracy over its setting and control of the bureaucracy by society??

All of the questions have implications for the role of bureaucracy and thus the model provides a good starting point for the analysis of bureaucracy. This study will go beyond use of this general model and investigate the relationship of bureaucracy to the specific aspect of political development. While Slesinger's framework is the basis for analysis in this study, the question will be considered in the general discussion instead of going through each question in a systematic way for each author studied, thus avoiding too stilted an analysis.

⁷Slesinger, op. cit., p. 3.

Another factor which should be noted here is that most scholars dealing with the subject of bureaucracy note that the size of bureaucracies is growing rapidly. As governments are forced to deal with more and more types of problems, new agencies must be created and/or additions of personnel must be made to existing agencies. This growth trend in bureaucracy seems to be more evident in developing societies than in the already developed ones.⁸ What growth in bureaucracy implies for political development will be noted as the various approaches are discussed. The important point here is that the increasing size of bureaucracy only increases the potential impact it might have on development, whatever the role it plays. Governments, particularly in developing societies, are increasingly under pressure to provide new services for their people, and bureaucracy grows with the increase in services.

⁸ Among many works see: Fred W. Riggs, "Bureaucrats and Political Development: A Paradoxical View," in La Palombara, op. cit., pp. 120-167, and Joseph La Palombara, "Bureaucracy and Political Development: Notes, Queries, and Dilemmas," pp. 34-61, at p. 34 in the same volume. Also S. N. Eisenstadt, "Problems of Emerging Bureaucracies in Developing Areas and New States," in Harvey G. Keeschull (ed.), Politics in Transitional Society (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1968), pp. 239-246; and Emmerich, op. cit., pp. 345-346.

The Effect of Bureaucracy on Political
Development According to the
Consensus Model

The general literature. Perhaps more so than in any other aspect of the consensus model, Max Weber is the primary source for the assumptions and conclusions regarding bureaucracy and the political process. Weber, of course, is the founder of the classical study of bureaucracy and public administration. His studies have provided the basis for study of bureaucracy in Western society.⁹ While Weber himself realized that his ideal type of bureaucracy would not exist in any society, implicit in his theory was the belief that this was the norm to be

⁹ See Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, tr. by A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), particularly pp. 324-345 among others of Weber's works. Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait (Garden City: Doubleday, 1960), pp. 423-457, and S. M. Miller (ed.), Max Weber (New York: Crowell, 1963), pp. 59-82 provides excellent selections and interpretations from his work. Of course, H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (translators), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946) is perhaps the best volume of selections of Weber's writings.

sought.¹⁰ The rational-legal model he suggested became the model associated with modernity, and now many theorists suggest that if that model is not approached, a nation cannot be considered modern.¹¹ The elements of the Weberian ideal type bureaucracy include: 1) a hierarchical system; 2) responsibility for actions reposing in the bureaucracy; 3) rationality; 4) achievement orientation; 5) specialization and differentiation in functions; 6) discipline; and 7) professionalization.¹² Quite often, the development literature accepts these as the norms to be attained.

¹⁰ See La Palombara, "An Overview of Bureaucracy and Political Development," and "Bureaucracy and Political Development: Notes, Queries, and Dilemmas," both in La Palombara, op. cit., for a discussion of this interpretation. Gerth and Mills, op. cit., particularly in the Introduction, provide an excellent discussion of ideal types in Weber's works.

¹¹ La Palombara, "An Overview of Bureaucracy and Political Development," p. 10 discusses this point and also some of the implications of such a position. Also see Michael Walzer, "The Only Revolution: Notes on The Theory of Modernization," Dissent, XL (Autumn, 1964), 432-440.

¹² These are La Palombara's condensation of the characteristics of bureaucracy from "An Overview of Bureaucracy and Political Development," p. 10. The list varies from author to author, but this list contains the major elements. For Weber's discussion see Bendix, op. cit., and Miller, op. cit.

One of the most common themes of political development consensus theorists is that the bureaucracy becomes more and more functionally specialized as systems become more developed. In effect, modernization and specialization are often equated.¹³ Some suggest that such specialization keeps the bureaucracy from attaining too much power because specialization has the effect of circumscribing the goals of individual bureaucrats. Since their goals are limited in scope, they have to compete with others with similarly limited scopes of activity.¹⁴ The competition is supposed to provide an element of control over the bureaucracy. Of course, others argue that concern with limited goals serves to inhibit co-ordination of needed policies and thus is detrimental to development. This argument will be considered later in the chapter.

There is little doubt that bureaucracies become more specialized as societies become more complex and

¹³ For example, see Bert F. Hoselitz, "Levels of Economic Performance and Bureaucratic Structures," in *La Palombara*, op. cit., pp. 168-198.

¹⁴ David Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), particularly pp. 218-220.

governments provide more services. The effect of specialization, however, may be questionable.

Specialization, as Weber noted, produces greater expertise in particular areas of activity. Greater specialization may also blind the bureaucrat to the over-all objectives of the system. There is at least a potential obstructive role here. The evidence seems to indicate, however, that most developing nations suffer from domination by too many generalists in bureaucracy and from too few specialists.¹⁵

Fred Riggs is perhaps the most widely known student of bureaucracy and its relationship to the development process. Riggs views society in terms of two poles-- "Agrarian" and "Industrial"; later, this typology was changed to "fused" and "diffracted."¹⁶ Both typologies outline differences between a "developed" and "undeveloped"

¹⁵ R. S. Milne, "Comparisons and Models in Public Administration," Political Studies, X (February, 1962), 1-14, at pp. 8-10 has a very good discussion of this point. This will be discussed more fully in considering the conflict model.

¹⁶ Fred Riggs, "Agraria and Industria--Toward a Typology of Comparative Administration," in Siffin, op. cit., pp. 23-116. The new typology is put forth in Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society.

society. The Agrarian society (undeveloped) has the following characteristics:

- 1) Predominance of ascriptive, particularistic, diffuse patterns.
- 2) Stable local groups and limited spatial mobility.
- 3) Relatively simple and stable "occupational" differentiation.
- 4) A deferential stratification system of diffuse impact.

and Industrian society the following characteristics:

- 1) Predominance of universalistic, specific, and achievement norms.
- 2) High degree of social mobility (in general --not necessarily vertical sense).
- 3) Well-developed occupational system, insulated from other social structures.
- 4) "Egalitarian" class system based on generalized patterns of occupational achievement.
- 5) Prevalence of "associations," i.e., functionally specific, non-ascriptive structures.¹⁷

¹⁷ Riggs, "Agraria and Industria--Toward a Typology of Comparative Administration," p. 29.

This characterization has much in common with Talcott Parsons' concept of a modern social system.¹⁸

While the Agrarian and Industrian patterns only suggest some of the particular aspects of bureaucracy, the fused and diffracted models provide explicit discussion of the bureaucratic system. The essence of the argument is that in the fused system, the bureaucratic structure is highly generalized with one or a few structures conducting a large number of activities. In the diffracted model, however, structures become differentiated and specialized, thus, approaching the Weberian model. While Riggs disclaims any normative position, his analysis, in fact, indicates that he expects societies to move from the fused to the diffracted types.¹⁹ Thus, a unilinear development process seems implicit in his analysis. Of course, he notes that no societies fit one or the other extreme and thus he uses the prismatic model for analyzing developing

¹⁸ Talcott Parsons, Toward a General Theory of Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), and Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966).

¹⁹ His disclaimers are found particularly in the Introduction and first chapter of Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society.

countries. This model recognizes that elements of both extremes exist and are "fused" in any one society and must be studied with that in mind. The particular prismatic society under study is affected by its own culture and history.

While Riggs claims to be developing a model free of the biases of the Weberian model, in fact his model is no less value-laden. The society to be achieved is the Industrian or diffracted. These are in effect the societies Weber considered to be the goal of modernization. In this respect, Riggs and Weber actually complement one another. Riggs only articulates a model for studying those societies on the path to the ideal type; whereas Weber, for the most part, dealt with the ideal type itself.

Another common characteristic of the consensus model theorists is the idea that bureaucracies are the neutral servants of the political leaders in power. This view, of course, follows from Weber's idea of professionalism and neutrality or impartiality in office. This particular aspect has been discredited, especially in developing societies, but some continue to argue that the bureaucracy does and will play a neutral role in the political system or at least that this role is the proper and appropriate

bureaucratic goal.²⁰ A problem with this approach is that the bureaucrats might become overconcerned with legalism, procedures, and efficiency, and not sufficiently concerned with the objectives of their policy.²¹ At any rate, the argument from this perspective is that the bureaucrats can serve the cause of development best by being neutrally subservient to the political leadership. If society is moving unilinearly toward development in a deterministic fashion, as some consensus theorists have suggested, a neutral role by bureaucrats would be adequate.

Some theorists of the consensus persuasion, seeing that bureaucracy is not a neutral force in developing societies, argue that it is or must be a leader in the modernization and development process. Quite often the

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A. F. K. Organski, The Stages of Political Development (New York: Knopf, 1965), pp. 44-46 implies this position while noting that problems emerge because the bureaucracy in new nations is usually untrained and cannot function as it should. Harold F. Alderfer, Public Administration in Newer Nations (New York: Praeger, 1967) seems somewhat naive in his contention that bureaucracies refrain from political roles in these nations. Robert A. Packenham, "Approaches to the Study of Political Development," World Politics, XVII (October, 1964), 108-120, at pp. 113-115 discusses this idea.

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Packenham, op. cit., p. 115, and Walzer, op. cit., p. 439.

educational and cultural backgrounds of bureaucrats are emphasized in the analysis of consensus theorists. The urban background of the bureaucrat and the fact that he tends to be from the middle sectors is used as evidence of his tendency to foster modernization of the system.²² This approach, of course, must rely on the assumptions of the consensus model concerning the middle and urban sectors, which have been discussed in early chapters. If the consensus theorists' arguments about those values are valid, then the bureaucrats might be leaders for modernization. As has been noted in the previous two chapters, there are many questions about the argument.

Consensus theorists have also emphasized the strategic location of the bureaucracy. If bureaucrats are agents for modernization, the positions they hold in society provide a good location for spreading modern values. Almond and Powell note that the bureaucracy is an

²² Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," The American Political Science Review, LV (September, 1961), 493-514, at pp. 495-501, notes some of these tendencies. Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), pp. 96-97, and S. N. Eisenstadt, op. cit., pp. 243-246.

effective force in improving the flow of communications in the system.²³ As was noted in the previous chapter, communications flow is important to the consensus analysis of the political development process. But it is not altogether certain that bureaucracies in developing nations actually perform this function.

Another modernizing feature of the bureaucracy is its tendency to provide a certain modicum of stability to the system. Those authors emphasizing institution-building as an aspect of political development stress this feature of bureaucracies.²⁴ The bureaucracy is one institution which tends to survive even when political leadership changes. If stability of institutions is the objective to be pursued by the system, the bureaucracy's persistence would be a welcome sign. As will be discussed later, however, some argue that the reasons for and

²³ Almond and Powell, op. cit., pp. 96-97.

²⁴ See Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," World Politics, XVII (April, 1965), 386-430; Apter, op. cit., pp. 218-221; and Riggs, "Bureaucrats and Political Development," in La Palombara, op. cit., pp. 120-167. Riggs particularly notes that bureaucracies often become over-institutionalized and that emphasis should also be placed on building other political institutions.

implications of bureaucratic stability might actually be detrimental to development.

Obviously, the various consensus authors recognize that there are differences in bureaucracies in developing societies. Even those theorists accepting a more or less deterministic approach indicate that historical and cultural factors affect the type of bureaucracy which is likely to emerge in any one nation.²⁵ Bureaucracies differ according to the colonial history of the nation and according to the "stage" of development. S. N. Eisenstadt notes that nations with a history including strong colonial rule find themselves dominated by the remaining administrators of the mother country left in the newly independent nation.²⁶ If the colonial bureaucrats have not stayed behind, there is often a vacuum existing in the structure and chaos is likely to ensue. The consensus theorists, however, often feel the colonial powers do a service to the dependent nations by training bureaucrats

²⁵ See Seymour Martin Lipset, "Bureaucracy and Social Change," in Robert K. Merton, et al., Reader in Bureaucracy (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1962), pp. 221-232, at pp. 227-231; La Palombara, "An Overview of Bureaucracy and Political Development," pp. 19-20; and Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society.

²⁶ Eisenstadt, op. cit., pp. 240-243.

in the classical tradition. Perhaps a neutral bureaucracy is not what is needed in many developing nations. Western nations too often attempt to build up the administrative framework and leave the social, economic, and other political institutions undeveloped. This may lead to bureaucratic domination and be a hindrance to development.²⁷

The foregoing discussion indicates that the consensus theorists stress the integrative role of bureaucracy in developing societies. By providing for increased specialization of function, greater amounts of work can be done. In addition, the neutrality and professionalism of public servants means that government functions can be carried out efficiently and fairly. Moreover, the consensus theorists argue that bureaucracies are integrative forces because they are staffed by middle class urbanites embracing modern democratic values. Institutionalization of bureaucracies also fosters stability. All of these elements represent features of the

²⁷ See Riggs, "Bureaucrats and Political Development: A Paradoxical View," p. 26. This issue will be discussed more fully later as it is a major theme in the conflict analyses.

consensus model. It would be unfair to imply that these authors disregard the negative effects of bureaucracy because many of them note that bureaucracy also has disintegrative tendencies. However, these theorists do stress the integrative functions and usually only note that the opposite tendency exists. As such, this discussion has highlighted the factors emphasized by the theorists under consideration.

The literature on Latin America. Bureaucracy in Latin America has been neglected in political studies to an even greater extent than in the general literature. In 1959 George Blanksten went so far as to say that bureaucracy had actually been ignored in studies of Latin America, thus making evaluation of its role a difficult task.²⁸ In fact the bureaucracy has been put under some scrutiny, but the data are rather scarce. The consensus theorists among Latin Americanists have been particularly guilty of neglect on this issue. Perhaps the reason is that the consensus view on bureaucracy really does not fit Latin America very well.

²⁸ George I. Blanksten, "Political Change in Latin America," The American Political Science Review, LIII (March, 1959), 106-127, at p. 108.

John J. Johnson once again leads the list of consensus theorists dealing with Latin American bureaucracy. He notes that the bureaucracy has grown in size and scope and thus in influence. Not surprisingly, he finds a close interrelationship between the middle sectors and the bureaucracy. Bureaucrats are part of the middle sectors.²⁹ Remembering Johnson's arguments on the middle sectors outlined in Chapter V, it is not surprising that he believes the present bureaucracies of Latin America to be committed to social change and progress.³⁰ Because the bureaucracy is in a very strategic position, he argues, it tends to be very effective as a modernizing force. It can and does spread the values of the urban middle sectors--as envisioned by Johnson.

Johnson believes that other aspects of the bureaucracy are important besides the fact that bureaucrats are largely from the middle sectors. He argues that they have also developed a loyalty to development programs for

²⁹ John J. Johnson, Political Change in Latin America: The Emergence of the Middle Sectors (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), p. 13, and pp. 24-25. To be fair, it must be noted that Johnson viewed the bureaucrats as servants of the elite sectors in the period of 1810-1850, but he feels it has now become a force for progress.

³⁰ Ibid., pp. 193-194.

historical reasons as well as economic ones. In Uruguay, for example, he argues that the Colorado party helped create a large bureaucracy through the enactment and implementation of many social welfare programs.³¹ This fact along with the creation of a widespread middle sector as a result of these programs, has made the bureaucracy loyal to the Colorados--the more liberal of the two major Uruguayan parties. Arguing in a similar view, he feels that the large number of jobs created by progressive programs throughout Latin America has created a tendency for the middle sectors and bureaucrats to become committed to progressive development.³² In other words, out of appreciation for increased numbers of jobs and for employment security, these groups support development policies. While there may be some truth to the argument, it seems Johnson may be over-stating the case when he says:

³¹ Ibid., p. 59.

³² Ibid., pp. 193-194.

. . .they [the bureaucrats] have become firm converts to progress through technological advance.³³

The Pan American Union commissioned a recent study on administrative arrangements in Latin America which was grounded on many of the same presuppositions.³⁴ The basic assumptions of the study were that efficiency in the administrative apparatus would produce a bureaucracy productive of democratic stability.³⁵ Although the study recognizes problems in Latin American administration, it sets as a goal a bureaucracy on the order of the Weberian or Western model. Much of the concern is with economic development, and an efficient neutral bureaucracy is viewed as an instrument of economic development.

³³ Ibid., p. 194. Robert J. Alexander, Latin American Politics and Government (New York: Harper and Row, 1965) makes a similar point, pp. 133-134.

³⁴ Pan American Union, Public Administration in Latin America (Washington, D. C.: Organization of American States, 1965).

³⁵ Ibid.. The assumptions are implicit in the study's discussion of the limitations of Latin American bureaucracies, pp. 13-23.

Robert Scott's analysis of Latin American bureaucracy indicates that some aspects of the consensus model are found in the Latin American system. For example, the bureaucrats are drawn mostly from the educated, urban, middle sectors. Urban values and experiences are predominant in the bureaucracies.³⁶ The bureaucrats are also effective forces for stability but, as Scott notes, the reasons may be inconsistent with the consensus assumptions on the issue. While they may view themselves as modernizers, the bureaucrats are in fact often trapped by the fact that their jobs depend upon the continuation of the system.³⁷ Thus, they tend to support the status quo from fear that change may cause loss of job security.

In a study of Bolivian policy-making, Albert Lepawsky is optimistic that Bolivian administration will be a force for effective development.³⁸ His view is based

³⁶ Robert E. Scott, "The Government Bureaucrats and Political Change in Latin America," Journal of International Affairs, XX (1966), 289-308, at pp. 294-295.

³⁷ Ibid., pp. 295-297.

³⁸ Albert Lepawsky, "Revolution and Reform in Bolivia: A Study of the Root and Branch of Public Administration in a Developing Nation," in Siffin, op. cit., pp. 219-252.

primarily on the types of policies developed by the bureaucrats, indicating a belief that bureaucracy plays more than a policy implementation role. He feels the greatest problem will be in timing public policies for development in such a way that policies will be coordinated.³⁹ If too many policies are developed at one time, resources will be thinned out and thus all may be doomed to failure. It may be comparable to the idea of new nations now having to face all six of Pye's crises of nation-building at once. When too many demands come all at once, the system tends to break down. With greater coordination of policies, the chances for effective development will be increased.

Because of the limited attention paid to bureaucracy by Latin Americanists using the consensus approach, the role of bureaucracy in such analyses is difficult to evaluate. Many analyses, as will be noted in following sections, actually tend to accept more of a conflict analysis approach to the bureaucracy. Such is the case concerning analysis of bureaucracy as it exists now. However, the consensus theorists still believe

³⁹ Ibid., pp. 228-229.

bureaucracy should play the role assigned to it by the Weberian construct. The problem, of course, is that the acceptance of the Weberian construct often makes it difficult to see the situation as it exists. It also makes it difficult to accept a bureaucracy more attuned to pushing for political change rather than to being the servant of the political leaders.⁴⁰

The Effect of Bureaucracy on Political
Development According to the
Conflict Model

The general literature. The Marxian view of the bureaucracy is not difficult to imagine. Marx sees the bourgeoisie as the holder of power in the system.⁴¹ The state, of course, is viewed as the instrument of the

⁴⁰ Scott, op. cit., pp. 298-299.

⁴¹ See "The Manifesto of the Communist Party," in Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels and V. I. Lenin, The Essential Left (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1961), pp. 7-47, at pp. 16-17. Also see Shlomo Avineri (ed.), Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modernization (Garden City: Doubleday, 1968), pp. 125-131.

bourgeois capitalist class. In the power struggle between the capitalists and the proletariat, the bureaucracy is unalterably opposed to the proletariat. Marx stated that the bureaucracy must be destroyed because it is the instrument of the power centers--the capitalists.⁴² With the conflict model emerging from Marx's ideas, it is only natural that this model should conceive of the bureaucracy as operating in the interests of the elite elements of society.

Some of the most important work on the bureaucracy employing neo-Marxian analyses have concerned the United States. The work of C. Wright Mills, for instance, views the economic interests of the United States as being in league with the governmental bureaucracy to the disadvantage of the poor or the people in general.⁴³ John Kenneth Galbraith is another one who comes to mind.⁴⁴ Although he probably would not be classified as a Marxist,

⁴² Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Correspondence 1846-1895 (New York: International Publishers, 1936), p. 309.

⁴³ C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959).

⁴⁴ John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1967).

his analysis of the interlocking of governmental and economic interests is supportive of Marx's ideas. With evidence indicating such collusion in a nation priding itself on humanitarian and democratic values as does the United States, it comes as little surprise that the conflict theorists find much evidence to support the conflict thesis in developing societies. A measure of the potency of the argument is the fact that many consensus theorists concede that the conflict analysis of bureaucracy deserves a great deal of credibility.

Barrington Moore, Jr., recognizes that bureaucracies have had an integrative effect on developing societies because centralized bureaucracies have overridden the fragmenting tendencies of local nobilities.⁴⁵ In addition to these integrative roles, according to Moore's analysis, bureaucrats have also been the instruments of the landholders and have actually provided means of attaining wealth.⁴⁶ Even though some integrative functions

⁴⁵ Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), p. 417.

⁴⁶ Ibid., pp. 168-170, and 179-180. Milne, op. cit., pp. 10-11 notes the fragmenting effects of decentralization of administration in developing societies suggesting that it tends to strengthen traditional power bases.

are served by bureaucracies, they have also acquired a position more concerned with self interest than in serving the people as a whole. They serve themselves or the elite who put them in power. In this sense, bureaucracies do not aid the process of political development. These practices of bureaucracies instead become the focus of radical, particularly Communist, movements.⁴⁷

On the surface, Dahrendorf's analysis presents a Marxian interpretation--the bureaucrats are in league with the capitalist class against the laboring elements.⁴⁸ The issue is further refined by Dahrendorf in his suggestion that constraint is the only way of holding societies together.⁴⁹ Since societies are held together in the interests of the upper economic levels of society, the

⁴⁷ Moore, op. cit., p. 169.

⁴⁸ Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), particularly the Introduction and first chapter.

⁴⁹ Dahrendorf, "Out of Utopia: Toward a Reorientation of Sociological Analysis," in Lewis A. Coser and Bernard Rosenberg (eds.), Sociological Theory: A Book of Readings, 3rd ed. (Toronto: The Macmillan Co., 1969), pp. 222-240, at p. 237.

bureaucracies which hold the societies together do so as instruments of the capitalist classes. Again, the analysis is a fairly clear application of Marx's ideas.

Many essentially consensus theorists, however, pay some homage to conflict analysis in their perceptions of the bureaucracy. S. N. Eisenstadt, for instance, takes a consensus position but recognizes that the bureaucracy is often a roadblock to effective development.⁵⁰ In its original role in a newly independent nation, Eisenstadt sees the bureaucracy as a defender of the status quo. He also cites the rigidity of the bureaucracy as an inhibitor of development.⁵¹ Others argue that it retains this role, while Eisenstadt, in the Weberian tradition, feels it eventually becomes a positive force for political development and is representative of and responsive to the people.⁵²

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See Eisenstadt, op. cit., and "Breakdowns of Modernization," Economic Development and Cultural Change, XII (July, 1964), 345-367, and "Bureaucracy and Political Development," in La Palombara, op. cit., pp. 96-119.

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Eisenstadt, "Problems of Emerging Bureaucracies in Developing Areas and New States," p. 246.

52

Eisenstadt, "Bureaucracy and Political Development." For the position that bureaucracy tends to remain a defender of the status quo, see Emmerich,

The theme of the rigidity of the classical model of bureaucracy is recurrent in the development literature. The argument is made that the classical model emphasizes procedures and legalism. As a result, bureaucracies in developing societies often follow very rigid rules and regulations, thus bringing constructive change to a virtual standstill.⁵³ Part of the problem is traced to the idea that there are too many administrative generalists in the bureaucracy and not enough specialists in particular problem areas. The generalists tend to stress legalism and procedure, whereas it is felt the specialist is more likely to be pragmatic in reaching his specific objective. Whatever the motive, stress on procedure and legalism obviously leads to much red tape and slowing down of activity.

Many of these authors seem to make a complete turnabout in indicating that bureaucracies in developing societies do not follow the classical model prescription

op. cit., p. 355; Fritz Morstein Marx, "The Higher Civil Service As An Action Group in Western Political Development," in La Palombara, op. cit., pp. 62-95; Hoselitz, op. cit., pp. 168-169; and La Palombara, op. cit., pp. 55-59 among many others.

⁵³ La Palombara, "Bureaucracy and Political Development," pp. 54-55; and Milne, op. cit., p. 9 are just two of many who adopt this stance.

of neutrality and professionalism (in terms of ethics). Rather, they often view the bureaucracy as highly politicized and highly corrupt.⁵⁴ Of course, politicization makes the bureaucracy partial in its dealings with the people and thus causes distrust and disruption. Corruption helps rake off economic resources and causes the system to suffer in the long run. It also fosters distrust and increased costs for the system.

The idea that bureaucratic centralization is an integrative force was discussed briefly above. However, many scholars indicate that centralization is a major roadblock to over-all development. They argue that too much centralization of administration discourages development in the hinterlands. The nation becomes too oriented to the needs of the capital or major cities and ignores other regions of the nation.⁵⁵ It is not difficult to imagine how some parts of the nation can be completely omitted from policy considerations if

⁵⁴ See La Palombara, "Bureaucracy and Political Development," p. 59, and "An Overview of Bureaucracy and Political Development," pp. 25-26; and Eisenstadt, "Problems of Emerging Bureaucracies in Developing Areas and New States," p. 245.

⁵⁵ Emmerich, *op. cit.*, p. 356 makes particular note of this. Also see Eisenstadt, "Problems of Emerging Bureaucracies in Developing Areas and New States," p. 245.

administration is centered in one spot and not accountable to the nation as a whole. In addition, conflict between the bureaucracy and the rest of the nation might easily emerge.

Many conflict themes have been noted in the preceding analysis. Generally, it might be said that the conflict analyses emphasize the relationship of the bureaucracy to the upper economic groups of society in opposition to the poor. The other factors mentioned usually relate to this one main theme in some way. So, for the conflict analyst, bureaucracy serves the conservative forces of the status quo and actually inhibits productive change in society. Some of these themes are even more fully developed in the literature on Latin America, to which attention will now be directed.

The literature on Latin America. Because control of government is commonly seen as the route to economic prosperity in Latin America, the government is usually viewed as the private preserve of the economic elite. This includes the bureaucracy, which is often viewed as the instrument for retention of control by the economic elite.⁵⁶ Andreski notes that conflict and instability are

⁵⁶ See Merle Kling, "Toward a Theory of Power and Political Instability in Latin American Society," Western Political Quarterly, IX (March, 1956), 21-35 at pp. 28-34.

inevitable in a situation in which governmental power is the major or only road to wealth.⁵⁷ Because government work is a route to economic power, it also acquires a certain amount of status or prestige. Thus, the bureaucracy of Latin America is often described in terms of its display of power, rudeness, keeping people waiting, and personalismo.⁵⁸

In addition to the direct acquisition of wealth by the bureaucracy there is another theme quite common in the conflict analysis of bureaucracy in Latin America. The theme is that the bureaucracy has, in fact, been absorbed by the oligarchy.⁵⁹ Because the oligarchy often controls political life, it controls the jobs in government; and

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Stanislav Andreski, Parasitism and Subversion: The Case of Latin America (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966).

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Richard N. Adams, The Second Sowing: Power and Secondary Development in Latin America (San Francisco: Chandler, 1967), pp. 179-180. Irving Horowitz, Revolution in Brazil: Politics and Society in a Developing Nation (New York: Dutton, 1964), p. 285 notes how the bureaucracy is often more interested in splendor and prestige citing Brazil's new capital, Brasilia, as a "monument to bureaucratic dysfunction."

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Among the many suggesting such are Fernando H. Cardoso, Cuestiones de sociologia del desarrollo en America Latina (Santiago, Chile: Editorial Universitaria, S. A., 1968), pp. 66-67; Luis Mercier Vega, Roads to

the theory is that bureaucrats are unlikely to push for very much social or political change for fear of losing their jobs. In addition to ordinary bureaucracy, the state involvement in much of Latin American economic activity provides a similar type of control over entrepreneurial bureaucrats as well.⁶⁰ When job security depends on the oligarchy, the bureaucracy is likely to serve oligarchic interests. This particular argument goes hand in hand with the middle sectors argument of the conflict theorists. It will be remembered that bureaucracy provides the means for entry into the middle sectors for many people, and the conflict position on the middle sectors thus carries over to their conception of the bureaucracy.⁶¹ Since the middle sectors are viewed as emulators of the upper sectors and are not interested in real change in the society, it is logical to conclude,

Power in Latin America (New York: Praeger, 1969), pp. 62-63; and Charles Wagley, The Latin American Tradition: Essays on the Unity and Diversity of Latin American Culture (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), pp. 4 and 207.

⁶⁰ Vega, op. cit., pp. 60-65.

⁶¹ Wagley, op. cit., pp. 104 and 207.

given its middle sector character, that the bureaucracy would react similarly.

Because many conflict theorists see control over the institutions of government, including bureaucracy as the road to economic wealth, there is a tendency to view the system as constantly being in turmoil. Intense struggles are the direct result of the desire for control over this strategic element of the system.⁶² Even though such conflicts emerge, conflict theorists suggest that instability exists primarily at the political level and that the bureaucracy only changes its allegiance to leaders.⁶³ New political leaders in Latin America are not usually faced with bureaucracies intent on frustrating their programs. If the existing bureaucracy refuses to cooperate with the new leader, he shuffles bureaucrats around and increases the size of the bureaucracy by adding his own followers to it.⁶⁴

⁶² Vega, op. cit., pp. 64-65.

⁶³ John Mander, The Unrevolutionary Society: The Power of Latin American Conservatism in A Changing World (New York: Knopf, 1969), p. 266, and Kling, op. cit., p. 34.

⁶⁴ Laurin L. Henry, "Public Administration and Civil Service," in Harold E. Davis (ed.), Government and Politics in Latin America (New York: Ronald Press, 1958), pp. 477-495, at pp. 483-485; and Scott, op. cit., pp. 298-303.

Conflict theorists frequently mention the size of bureaucracy in Latin America. As noted above, bureaucracies are often increased in size so that the leader can insure his control. The increasing scope of government activity also causes increased bureaucratization. Whatever the cause, the expanding bureaucracy has a negative effect on development because it is an economic drain. The money to pay salaries and to operate bureaucracies could perhaps be put to better use in needed programs. The greatest criticism on this issue is directed at the increase in size resulting from the desire of political leaders to insure their control over the system by placing their friends, relatives, and clientela in official positions.⁶⁵

No discussion of bureaucracy in Latin America would be complete without mention of corruption. The political factors mentioned above provide an atmosphere in which corruption may flourish. The usual descriptions of bureaucracy in Latin America make the assumption that no action is free of favoritism. Low salaries as well as general acceptance of personalismo in government make

⁶⁵ Henry, op. cit., pp. 483-484.

corruption rampant.⁶⁶ Again, regardless of the cause, there is little question that government conducted on a basis of favoritism benefits those with economic power and good connections and tends to ignore others. As a result, there is also a tendency for people to lose faith in the political system. Any attempts at change may be accepted with much skepticism if at all. Of course, the argument may also be made that this type of corruption is functional in the sense of generating loyalty to the system among government workers.

Still another problem emphasized by Latin American conflict analysts is the tendency to worship procedures and legalism. This is a result of the adoption of the Weberian model of bureaucracy with no attention to the fact that there is a tremendous cultural difference between Latin America and the Western developed nations. Another reason for this development is that there are many administrative generalists in the bureaucracy and technical specialists are usually few in number. Thus,

⁶⁶ Ibid.. James L. Busey, Latin America: Political Institutions and Processes (New York: Random House, 1964), p. 7; Roberto de Oliveira Campos, Reflections on Latin American Development (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1967), p. 47; and Wagley, op. cit., p. 78.

attention is directed to procedures rather than to substance.⁶⁷ Such attention to procedure often has the effect of slowing the governmental process down considerably. A more important consideration is that procedures do no good if the goal for which the bureaucracy exists is not reached. All are aware that this is a problem hardly exclusive to developing societies. But, because of the inordinate power of bureaucracies in Latin America, it creates a very difficult problem.

Yet another concern of conflict theorists is the question of centralization of bureaucratic authority. Some suggest that it is the major roadblock to development in Latin America.⁶⁸ One of the reasons centralization of authority is such a problem is that it provides a means of insuring direct control by political leaders.⁶⁹ Where political power results in intense competition for control, it is not surprising that centralization remains

⁶⁷ Scott, op. cit., pp. 296-298, and Henry, op. cit., pp. 485-486.

⁶⁸ See Enmerich, op. cit., p. 356, and Henry, op. cit., pp. 484-485.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

a feature of the bureaucratic structure. The problem is that an efficient bureaucracy controlled by a dictator can easily inhibit any sort of progress in political development.⁷⁰ If bureaucracy is highly centralized, it tends to become isolated from the nation as a whole and the effective nation becomes that of the bureaucracy's world no matter how limited that world might be.

The conflict analysts (and many consensus analysts) adopt several different approaches to the analysis of bureaucracy in Latin America. In general, they tend to stress the obstacles put in the path of development by the Latin American bureaucracies. In doing so, they tend to stress the interlocking of the bureaucracy and the oligarchy. Noting that the bureaucracy is often middle class, the middle sectors argument of the conflict theorists is accepted. In addition, emphasis is usually placed on the inefficiency and corruption of the bureaucracy and on its self-interested and self-serving nature. All of these factors indicate to the conflict theorists that the bureaucracy

⁷⁰ Henry, op. cit., p. 494.

cannot be counted on as a force for constructive social and political change in Latin America.

The Effect of Bureaucracy on Latin
American Political Development

Bureaucracies in Latin America display characteristics suggested by both the conflict and consensus models. Neither model by itself provides a complete picture of the situation. This section will outline some of the features of bureaucracy in Latin America and their relevance to the two models.

Both the conflict and consensus analysts note the constantly increasing size of Latin American bureaucracies. The effects of increasing size are the determinants of the differences between the approaches. For the conflict analysts, increasing size represents an increasing economic drain on the system and increasing control by the oligarchy through the absorption of greater numbers of people.⁷¹ The consensus analysts, on the other

⁷¹ See Emmerich, op. cit.; Horowitz, op. cit., pp. 285-288; and Wagley, op. cit., pp. 104 and 207.

hand, note the increased opportunity for dispersion of middle class urban values with increasing bureaucratic size.⁷² The evidence seems to indicate that the bureaucracy's size is certainly larger than necessary and that it does cause a drain on economic resources.⁷³ The suggestion that it provides a forum for dissemination of modern values does not seem valid, especially when it is noted that this argument is based on the consensus model's middle sectors argument. Consensus theorists argue that the middle sectors, dominant in the bureaucracy, cause the bureaucracy to be an instrument of progress. The arguments about the middle sectors, with questions concerning the consensus model, have been discussed in Chapter V. The limitations of that argument serve to limit the applicability of their conclusions about the bureaucracy. Both models are wrong for Latin America. To understand Latin American bureaucracy, we must look at the functions it actually performs. Bureaucracy serves as a means of employment, as a social security agency, as a patronage

⁷² See Johnson, op. cit., particularly p. 13 and pp. 193-194, and Scott, op. cit., p. 303.

⁷³ See Henry, op. cit., pp. 483-484; Scott, op. cit., pp. 302-303; and Pan American Union, op. cit..

agency, and as a means of buying off political foes in Latin America. The carrying out of effective developmental programs may be a distinctly secondary function.

The idea that Latin American bureaucrats tend toward legalism and proceduralism also provides for different perspectives. The conflict analysts stress the rigidity of such attitudes and how it inhibits pragmatism in the development of new programs.⁷⁴ On the other hand, consensus analysts emphasize the idea that a neutral professional bureaucracy is necessary for effective development policies. Since the industrialized societies have functioned well with the classical bureaucracies, analysts assume that the Latin American nations should be striving for similar bureaucratic systems.⁷⁵

It is very difficult to evaluate this difference in the models because of the lack of sufficient evidence. However, it does seem that excessive legalism becomes a substitute for substantive programs in many cases in Latin

⁷⁴ Horowitz, op. cit., p. 287, for instance.

⁷⁵ Johnson, op. cit., p. 194, and p. 59. The Pan American Union, op. cit., bases its analysis on the assumption that administrative efficiency will produce a society conducive to development in all sectors.

America.⁷⁶ Glen Dealy's analysis indicates that much of the administrative and legal framework of Latin America may not represent what United States scholars tend to think they do or ought to do.⁷⁷ The value systems of the Latin Americans may indicate that the institutions and legal provisions of constitutions have different purposes than Anglo-Americans would assume. Nevertheless, legalism undoubtedly does provide some inhibitors to the process of development. It may be found that, in the long run, the bureaucracies actually produce a fusion of modern values throughout the society.

Related to the rigidity of bureaucracy is the fact that bureaucratic centralism is a fact of life in Latin America. There seems to be no argument on this point. Again, the effect is the differentiating factor in the analyses of the two models. Centralization does have an advantage in integrating society in the sense that it can assure universal practices throughout the system. This

⁷⁶ Henry, op. cit., pp. 485-486, and Scott, op. cit., p. 296.

⁷⁷ Glen Dealy, "Prolegomena on the Spanish American Political Tradition," The Hispanic American Historical Review, XLVIII (February, 1968), 37-58.

contention is based on the assumption that the centralized bureaucracy considers the whole nation in its policy-making. In reality, however, the bureaucracy may limit its sphere of activity to the large cities or the capital city. When such is the case, there is little stimulation of strong regional institutionalization. As a result, a fragmented system might emerge. In Latin America, much of the evidence indicates that bureaucracy is centralized for the purpose of more direct political control, rather than for purposes of political integration.⁷⁸ It may be argued that Latin American government systems are centralized because they are Hispanic-Latin-Iberic, not because they conform to Weberian or Marxian models.

The role of the bureaucracy in political development is dependent on many factors. Some have been discussed in detail but there are also many others of importance. The relationship of the bureaucracy to the socio-economic elites certainly raises questions as to the likelihood of bureaucracy being a positive force for political development. Petras notes that in Chile, the bureaucracy

⁷⁸ Henry, op. cit., provides a particularly good discussion of the evidence.

has been a progressive force in the past, but that it has now acquiesced in representing the interests of the middle and upper sectors. He argues that it is actually somewhat schizophrenic in publicly representing a modernizing role, but in fact acting to support the status quo.⁷⁹ Robert Scott echoes this position, suggesting that the bureaucracy of Latin America sees itself as a modernizing force, but out of fear of losing jobs, bureaucrats become obstacles to change.⁸⁰

People who degrade Latin American bureaucracies often forget that the United States and Western European nations went through some of the same problems.⁸¹ The United States did not formally embody the ideals of Weberian classical bureaucracy until passage of the Pendleton Act of 1883. Yet we analyze Latin American bureaucracies in developing stages in terms of our twentieth century "Weberian" model, a model that does not even correspond to our own situation. No one can argue

⁷⁹ James Petras, Politics and Social Forces in Chilean Development (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), pp. 307-337.

⁸⁰ Scott, op. cit., p. 297.

⁸¹ Ibid., p. 298 makes this point.

that corruption or inefficiency never existed in our system. Perhaps we should view the bureaucracies in terms of the whole social and cultural value systems. Certainly bureaucracy can emerge as a leader in the modernization process, but it is unrealistic to think that it can be completely free of the values of its society. Indications are that in most developing nations it is in fact ahead of the other political institutions in the sense of being firmly implanted in and integrated with the larger society. Because it is often the only stable institution, it provides tremendous opposition to the development of other political institutions since it does not want opposition for political control. It opposes development of other effective political institutions such as political parties, courts, or even effective legislatures for fear of losing its own privileged position.⁸²

⁸² See Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society.

C H A P T E R V I I I
LATIN AMERICA AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Applicability of Political Development
Models for the Study of Latin America

Insights provided by the models. Both the conflict and consensus models for the study of political development provide some valid insights for the understanding of Latin America. Some mention has been made of such insights in the previous chapters, although the discussion has emphasized deficiencies of the models.

Both the conflict and consensus models tend to accept the idea that societies are "progressing" or moving toward societies like those in the modern Western world. While much of the experience in Latin America indicates that a unidirectional movement toward political democracy is not occurring, the fact is that many of the governments of Latin America have attempted to emulate the United States or other Western societies and thus have adopted this sort of progression as their goal. To understand

the motives of the governments themselves, it is necessary to understand what they hope to accomplish. Unfortunately, the consequences of Latin American government's acceptance of the models have often been negative.

The acceptance of Western models by the Latin American nations has usually meant placing an inordinate emphasis on economic development. Because both the models tend to accept economic development as a prerequisite to or a producer of political development, it is felt that once economic development takes place, all other problems will be easily solved. What usually happens is that economic institutions are developed but political and social institutions are ignored except to the extent to which they foster economic development. Consequently, the economic interests concentrate wealth in their hands and leave the rest of society outside the system. Supposedly, the economic wealth is concentrated primarily for the purpose of providing for further economic development a la Rostow's pre-conditions for take-off and take-off stages of economic growth.¹

¹W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960).

Since economic power is concentrated, it is likely that political power also becomes so. The political system becomes a means for achieving wealth, power, and status. As was noted in the previous discussions, the fact that people acquire wealth through politics means that they tend to bend to the will of the economic elites. Secondly, of course, many of the government workers are directly dependent on the economic interests for their livelihood and, therefore, are loyal supporters of the ruling groups.

The people left out of the effective political system provide another force. The likelihood is that they will come to resent the concentration of power in the hands of the elite and eventually become agents for change--most likely violent change. Whether they have in fact developed this stance at present is not the question since our interest is in what type of development can be expected. Of course, we have to recognize the existing situation, as well, for a full understanding. It does seem, though, that unless some change is made in distribution of wealth and political control, that those outside the system may eventually feel no stake in maintaining the system. When a group is outside the power system, it may feel that it can afford to be radical and activist, but

when it has some power its activism may be blunted for fear of losing what it has.

In terms of the over-all character of the society, the conflict model, in many ways, offers a better perspective than the consensus model. The conflict model's analysis in terms of the bi-polarity of Latin American society is very instructive. It does seem that Latin American society and politics are characterized by a split between those who have access to wealth and power and those who are outside the system for the most part.² Much of the activity of the society can be viewed as productive of maintenance of power by those who already have it and continued subordination of those without power. If and when the subordinates feel they are being exploited, conflict may result.

While the general characterization of society presented by the conflict model may provide valid insights, it does not mean that the conflict model is

²For evidence on this point, see Richard N. Adams, The Second Sowing: Power and Secondary Development in Latin America (San Francisco: Chandler, 1967); Kalman Silvert, The Conflict Society (New York: Harper and Row, 1968); Luis Mercier Vega, Roads to Power in Latin America (New York: Praeger, 1969); and Claudio Veliz (ed.), The Politics of Conformity in Latin America (London: Oxford University Press, 1967).

totally applicable. The bases of the consensus model also provide some points of departure for analysis. The consensus approach's emphasis on plurality of interests has some very significant implications for the study of Latin American politics. There is no doubt that more and more groups are emerging in Latin America.

In analyzing the behavior of the newly emerging sectors in the society, it seems necessary to combine the ideas of both models. For instance, the element of self-interest of these groups is recognized by both models. Each presumes that groups (or people for that matter) will operate to maximize their own self interests. With the consensus model this presumption means that compromise among groups takes place because they recognize the collective benefit of working together. What often happens in Latin America, however, is that these groups perceive their self-interests in aligning with the elite elements.³ It is often argued that various groups find that their only hope for maintaining or gaining status is in being

³ See James Petras, Politics and Social Forces in Chilean Development (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969); Vega, op. cit.; and Adams, op. cit., among many others.

coopted by the upper sectors. This tendency is particularly true where government employment is the major road to economic success. Thus, the argument of the conflict analysts that economic dependence on the upper sectors creates a tendency for alignment with the elite seems valid in analyzing the Latin American scene.⁴

It seems that self-interest certainly plays an important role in the activities of groups in Latin America. Because of the structure of economic and political power, some of these groups perceive their best interests being served by maintenance of the status quo. To do away with the system or to change it too drastically might mean loss of security or at least a decrease in economic benefits. Such pressures have an important bearing on keeping the groups from reacting as the pluralists of the Western Anglo-American tradition would expect.

⁴ Stanislav Andreski, Parasitism and Subversion: The Case of Latin America (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966); Fernando H. Cardoso, Cuestiones de sociologia del desarrollo en America Latina (Santiago, Chile: Editorial Universitaria, S. A., 1968), pp. 66-67; Vega, op. cit., pp. 62-63; and Charles Wagley, The Latin American Tradition: Essays on the Unity and Diversity of Latin American Culture (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), pp. 4 and 207. All make this point.

In looking at the three issue areas which have been examined in this study it becomes obvious that both models present some valuable perspectives for the study of political development in Latin America. Perhaps the best way to review the value of the models is to reiterate briefly the arguments on each issue area for the two models.

The middle sectors. Regarding the middle sectors, both models have some important contributions to make. If we look at the Latin American middle sectors as they behave today, it seems that the conflict model often provides a better analysis of what is actually happening.⁵ Because the society of Latin America is often bi-polar, the middle sectors find it easier and more advantageous to align with the ruling oligarchs as a way of maintaining economic security.⁶ As Ratinoff argues, the middle

⁵ See Chapter V of this study for a review of these issues. Some excellent summaries of the character of Latin American middle sectors of today are: Víctor Alba, "Latin America: The Middle Class Revolution," New Politics, I (Winter, 1962), 66-73; James Petras, "The Latin American Middle Class," New Politics, IV (Winter, 1965), 74-89; and, of course, John J. Johnson, Political Change in Latin America: The Emergence of the Middle Sectors (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958).

⁶ See Petras, "The Latin American Middle Class"; Vega, op. cit.; and Veliz, op. cit., among many others.

sectors tend to ally with those groups which are able to provide them with the best chance of attaining something tangible from the system--at one point it was the lower class which seemed most likely to provide the middle class with some power. But as the middle sectors gained in size, access to the upper sectors became available and the middle sectors perceived their best interests in allying with the upper elements.⁷ The conflict analysis perspective on this point seems instructive in understanding what is presently happening in the Latin American middle sectors.

The conflict model does not provide a complete picture of the situation, however. Instead the roles played by the middle sectors seem to differ, depending upon the stage of development of the society. At the stage of development when the middle sectors are extremely small and outside the centers of power, they tend to ally with the laboring elements and tend to be more reform oriented

⁷ See Luis Ratinoff, "The New Urban Groups: The Middle Classes," in Seymour Martin Lipset and Aldo Solar (eds.), Elites in Latin America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 61-93, at p. 69.

than seems to be the case today in much of Latin America.⁸ The role played by the middle sectors depends on what they perceive to be in their own best interests. When the middle sectors are outside the system, they can afford to attack it. Once they themselves are a part of the system, they become coopted by the oligarchy and/or ruling groups which wish to reduce the negative impact of the middle sectors. Then the middle sectors become defenders of the status quo.⁹ The time, context, and political circumstances have to be considered if we are to understand the role of the middle sectors completely. The

⁸Two people employing vastly different approaches tend to reach this conclusion. Johnson, op. cit., particularly Chapter 9 reviews some of the alliances of labor and the middle sectors with analysis of the shift away from that alliance as times changed. Petras, Politics and Social Forces in Chilean Development, particularly in Chapter 4 notes how the changing society requires changing roles for the middle sectors. Frederick B. Pike, Chile and the United States, 1880-1962 (Buenos Aires: Solar/Hachete, 1967) makes similar observations.

⁹The author is indebted to Jane Lee Yare, a graduate student in the Department of Political Science, University of Massachusetts, for some of the ideas here. In a paper, "The Middle Class in Latin America," (Unpublished paper, Department of Political Science, University of Massachusetts, 1971) and in discussions with me, she helped me form some of these conclusions.

idea of maximizing self-interest may involve some degree of playing the game according to the consensus model, but as has been illustrated in present-day Latin America, the middle sectors seem to help themselves most by playing the role of supporting the elitist system. Clearly, this role is not in accord with the patriotic, progressive picture of the middle sectors as painted by Johnson.

Obviously it would be only speculation to suggest what might happen in the future with the Latin American middle sectors, but some prediction might be in order. It seems that as the middle sectors grow in size--something which appears to be inevitable--they will be able to exert ever-increasing influence over public policies. In such an event, there may be more of a tendency toward liberalization of regimes, if Johnson's views on the values of middle sectors are correct. He ascribes a liberal democratic character to this sector, although noting that, for reasons of survival, such values are often suppressed. If the society were to become overwhelmingly middle class, however, their "true" values should come out. As people become more and more educated and exposed to more alternatives, they are no longer going to accept rigid control over their activities. Thus, it could be expected that the systems will move toward greater democracy, although this does not mean they

will copy United States or European democratic processes. The consensus theorists who expect the Latin American middle sectors to mimic their United States counterparts are most likely to be disappointed. On the other hand, those conflict theorists who expect the middle sectors to maintain a state of war with the lower classes are probably also wrong. A more realistic view is to recognize that they are going to do what contributes most to their positions and self-interests at the time. As times and contexts change, the middle sectors' roles change also.

The urban groups. Consideration of the urban sectors in Latin America reveals even more evidence that neither model by itself is capable of giving a complete picture of the situation. There are many factors to be considered in analyzing urbanization in Latin America. First of all, there are the differences between urban areas. The major city or cities of a nation constitute one element of the urbanization factor. However, there are medium and small-sized urban centers which must also be considered. The differences in life style and political practice between cities often provide competition between

urban centers in Latin America.¹⁰ In addition, of course, there is the split between rural and urban sectors. Usually, the conflict theorists tend to simplify the analysis in terms of urban versus rural elements. Obviously, such an analysis is incomplete. The vast differences between urban elements must be considered. There seems little doubt that the urban areas and especially the primate cities have dominated politics to the detriment of rural areas. To understand the whole story, however, the differences among urban areas must also be recognized. Perhaps a certain amount of compromise among urban areas occurs, thus approaching consensus model behavior. In political life, the urban areas have to recognize one another's needs, although there certainly are instances in which one city may overshadow all of national life, as in Uruguay (Montevideo) or Paraguay (Asunción).

While the conflict theorists have a valid point concerning urban domination of political life, the evidence indicates that the process of urbanization may actually provide for greater integration of the society.¹¹

¹⁰ See Adams, op. cit., Chapters 3, 9, and 10 in particular.

¹¹ See George I. Blanksten, "The Politics of Latin America," in Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.),

The argument is that as more people migrate from rural areas to urban centers there is a greater amount of communication between these two major sectors of society. The new urban dwellers transmit modern values back to the families they have left behind in the rural areas. This argument, of course, follows that of Daniel Lerner who says that urbanization provides the stimulus for modernization, with communication the instrument for the spreading of modern values.¹²

Another feature of urbanization is the change in social structure which occurs simultaneously. It had been assumed that the conflict theorists were correct in suggesting that urban society creates breakdown of primary social units such as the family. With such a breakdown comes turmoil in the society with the dispossessed elements becoming violent. Recent evidence suggests that

The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 455-531.

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Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958). See Chapter VI of this study--particularly that section dealing with consensus model literature--for a detailed discussion of this idea.

this development may not be true in Latin America.¹³

While indications are that the new urban dwellers have not lost familial identity and are transmitters of modern values to the countryside, it seems inevitable that they will also be instruments in the revolution of rising expectations.

Perhaps the author's view of human nature clouds his expectations here, but it seems that as people become more aware of what is available in society, they will want it. As they also come to realize that it is out of their reach in the present system, they may turn to more radical movements to acquire it. When people have nothing, they risk nothing in taking radical action. If urban slum dwellings continue to increase in numbers, it is expected that the conflict model would be most capable of predicting what will happen. On this particular issue, the conflict model may provide insights on what will happen, but misses the mark on what exists at the present time. Once again, there seems to be some validity to parts of both models in analyzing this sector of society.

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See Oscar Lewis, "Urbanization Without Breakdown: A Case Study," Scientific Monthly, LXXX (July, 1952), 31-41 as one among many noting the situation in Latin America. See Chapter VI of this study for further discussion of the issue.

The bureaucracy. The arguments on bureaucracy are quite similar to those regarding the middle sectors. Regardless of what value systems bureaucrats take into their positions, it seems that enough pressures exist to bring them under the control of the ruling elites. Because the ruling elites control the livelihood of the bureaucrats, they also control the roles played by bureaucracy in the political process.

With some similarity to the arguments on the middle sectors, James Petras argues that the bureaucracy's role changes as different periods of national development are studied.¹⁴ Generally, it seems that bureaucracies have been instrumental in integrating political institutions in Latin America, but out of personal security and self-interests, they have not been very active in seeking social and political change. Because the economic security of the bureaucrats may be dependent upon the support of the oligarchy, the tendency is for the bureaucracy to support the status quo. In that sense, the conflict model often seems most appropriate to studying Latin American

¹⁴ Petras, Politics and Social Forces in Chilean Development, pp. 307-337. For discussion of this point, see Chapter VII in this study, especially the last section.

bureaucracy because it emphasizes the economic self-interest of bureaucracies.

In reviewing the three variables and their treatment by the two models, it is obvious that neither model is adequate by itself. On the other hand, both provide some instructive insights into the relationship of the variables to Latin American political development. Any model which can be used to understand Latin America would be expected to incorporate some features of the conflict and consensus models.

Gaps in the models. Perhaps the greatest deficiency in the models under consideration is that they both ignore the cultural peculiarities of the Latin American nations and the differences between the Latin American tradition and the Northern European-Anglo American tradition. It is the latter, of course, from which both the conflict and consensus models discussed here were derived. It will be recalled that both the conflict and consensus models were developed in the Northern European or Anglo-American environment and reflect the value systems found in that cultural tradition. Many refinements to the basic models of Marx and Weber have been made, but again this has happened in the intellectual climate of the Western industrial nations and their

cultural traditions. The major advocates of these respective models have traditionally been Northern European or United States intellectuals. Where Latin Americans have used the models, it has been a case of grafting the models onto the Latin American scene rather than developing the models from the Latin American experience itself.¹⁵ This Northern-European-Anglo-American tradition assumes a Protestant ethic toward work and accomplishment. It also assumes a rational approach to problem-solving with carefully constructed plans for the accomplishment of specific objectives. The Iberian cultural tradition of Latin America differentiates it from those societies on which the models are based.

In order to justify the assumptions of the models, certain circumstances have to be present in the society. Certainly, the populace has to have a certain minimum level of physical satisfaction. Intellectual reasoning about rational goals does not occur if the physical necessities--particularly food--are not met. Secondly and

¹⁵ Howard J. Wiarda, "Elites in Crisis: The Decline of the Old Order and the Fragmentation of the New in Latin America, A Dominican Case Study and the Corporativist Model," an unpublished paper, n.d., presents an excellent discussion of the cultural biases of the models.

perhaps more importantly, there has to be a minimum level of education or at least understanding in the populace. Without the ability to perceive problems and possible solutions to them, this process of making rational plans for action to solve the problems cannot occur. The populace must have access to information and have the ability to digest that information. This requirement is particularly true for the consensus model approach, however, it also applies to the conflict model in the sense that the people in constant battle with one another have to recognize the source of their problems in their enemies. Thus, even the conflict model requires some sense of understanding of the problems.

For the consensus model to operate effectively, some special political conditions must exist. The consensus model assumes that channels for communicating needs and demands exist. If the system is to accommodate demands of varying groups, these groups must have the means for making their demands known. A fairly free and open system of communications would seem necessary. More importantly, it is presumed that people are free to participate in the political process to bring about satisfaction of their demands.

The advocates of the two models usually do not say that such conditions exist. Eventually they expect this

particular order of society to emerge as a result of the models they use for perceiving societal change. The fact is, however, that these conditions are implicit in the analytical framework used by the advocates of the models. If the society is to progress in the unilinear way they propose, certain pre-existing conditions, as outlined above, are required.

The point of the current discussion is that the value system of Latin Americans and the circumstances extant in their societies are vastly different from those presupposed by the conflict and consensus models. There has been much discussion of the colonial and cultural traditions of Latin America and the impact of these traditions on societal development.¹⁶ These traditions have been extremely important in shaping political beliefs and practices in much of Latin America. Some of the characteristics most frequently noted in studies of Latin

¹⁶ Ibid. Some of the major works include: Lewis Hanke (ed.) Do the Americas Have A Common History? (New York: Knopf, 1964); C. H. Haring, The Spanish Empire in America (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, Inc., 1947); Stanley and Barbara H. Stein, The Colonial Heritage of Latin America (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970); and Ronald Glassman, Political History of Latin America (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1969). Obviously, this is only a very partial mention of numerous such works.

America's political development are that the Iberian tradition left Latin America with an authoritarian, centralized, hierarchical system with emphasis on caste and class systems throughout the society.¹⁷ In addition, the Reformation had little impact on the tradition in Latin America--even less than in the Iberian peninsula itself. Therefore, the Catholic tradition of Latin America was not modified as it had been in much of Western Europe. Consequently, much of the hierarchy of Latin America remained extremely conservative and orthodox in theology. All of these forces have critical implications for the development of modern societies. The so-called "modernizing" forces identified with the emergence of the modern age and order in the "West" took different forms in Latin America. The Bourbon reforms, which resulted in liberal democracies in much of the world affected by them, had a very different impact in Latin America. The Crown extracted the ideas from the Enlightenment which helped consolidate its power in the Latin American colonies. As was noted in Chapter II, the Bourbon reforms in Latin America helped create some of the forces leading to

¹⁷ See Wiarda, op. cit., for a fuller discussion of these issues. In addition, of course, most Latin America histories include accounts of these cultural characteristics.

independence, but the reforms were primarily oriented to improving the efficiency of the colonial administration. As a result, the conditions and fundamental framework of Latin American society are strikingly different from those of North America or most of Western Europe.

To great portions of the population, the stratified class system was considered natural. If it were your misfortune to be born poor, that was by design of the good Lord. The Church taught the peasants such, and there is little doubt that the coincidence of Church-state relationship in maintaining one another's position played a great role in such teaching. The main thing is that people in Latin America were slow to question the naturalness or God-given inevitability of the rigid class system. As a result, many of the modernizing ideas of Western European society were further retarded in Latin America.

Although the clergy was often at the forefront of education in Latin America, its influence on the life of the population was limited. Except in Brazil and a few other instances where the Jesuits were independent of the conservative hierarchy, the Church resisted education of the common man. More importantly, the Church was able to lend its own interpretation to the ideas of the Enlightenment and because of its loyalty to the Crown, as

described in Chapter II, the Church usually used its power to support the Crown. While there were many Jesuits who did not follow the leadership of the hierarchy, their over-all impact on Latin American development was very limited. With such a situation, some of the prime ingredients for operation of the models under consideration are missing in Latin America. Illiteracy is still extensive in Latin America and thus the ability to perceive problems and rationally pursue a course intended to solve them becomes impossible. With the Church's hesitation to educate the populace, much of human life is built on spiritualism and superstition. Trying to pursue rationally conceived processes becomes difficult at best under such circumstances.

Obviously, the authoritarian tenor of much of Latin American society has meant that participation in the social and political systems has been rather limited. Participation is limited to those who agree to go along with the power structure. As a result, the oligarchy or elite elements usually tend to coopt the various sectors of society as they emerge as identifiable forces in these nations. The elite elements are able to quiet any

disruptive or opposing forces in the society.¹⁸ The conflict and consensus models both find it difficult to explain such behavior. The consensus model views emerging groups as making demands on the system which are accommodated in some way. The conflict model sees such groups as struggling with the power centers, but these groups most often tend to become supporters of the elite elements because of the advantages of such behavior. Wiarda has discussed this aspect as part of the corporatist nature of Latin American societies.¹⁹

It was noted earlier that if political participation is to occur, there must be minimum physical satisfaction. Even if all were permitted to participate in politics in Latin America, there is so much poverty and hunger that large portions of the populace cannot conceive of anything beyond food for the next meal. In addition,

¹⁸ See Wiarda, "The New Developmental Alternatives in Latin America: Nasserism and Dictatorship with Popular Support," an unpublished paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Pacific Coast Council on Latin American Studies, University of California at Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, California, November 6-7, 1970, pp. 5-6.

¹⁹ Wiarda, "Elites in Crisis: The Decline of the Old Order and the Fragmentation of the New in Latin America, A Dominican Case Study and the Corporativist Model."

most of the poorer elements are entirely outside the political and social systems; their demands are never even expressed, let alone acted upon.

Perhaps the largest problem in the cultural gaps is that the advocates of the models are just talking past the Latin Americans. Lack of a common frame of reference for social science terms makes it impossible for these models to be effectively applied to Latin America. The Spanish language lacks a strong social science tradition and, as a result, English terms are often just adopted by Latin Americans. Problems occur in the meaning of such terms, however. The same term--"rights," "democracy," "representation," etc.--conjures up greatly disparate visions to United States and Latin American social scientists.²⁰ Social scientists studying Latin America often mistakenly assume that when they speak of democracy, rights, or other such political concepts, these words correspond to the English meanings. Unfortunately, such is

²⁰ See Juan F. Marsal, Cambio social en America Latina (Buenos Aires: Solar/Hachete, 1967), pp. 225-226.

not the case and it has led to much confusion and misinterpretation of Latin American politics.²¹

Another problem of the models is that they tend to assume that changes in political leaders mean vast changes in the power structure. In fact, what usually happens is that changes occur only at the top while the basic structure remains intact. Exceptions exist, but even regimes oriented to vast change such as Castro's in Cuba have had to accommodate many existing power centers and have remained in the corporatist-elitist tradition. Usually, coups mean replacing one group with another representing the same power groups in society.

One last point regarding the gaps in the models is in order. Usually when the models are applied to Latin America, we expect the Latin Americans to react to the grafting on of our institutions in the same way we react to them. Both the conflict and consensus models tend to forget that the societies of Western Europe and the United States have not always existed in the form they take today.

²¹See Glen Dealy, "Prolegomena on the Spanish American Political Tradition," The Hispanic American Historical Review, XLVIII (February, 1968), 37-58 for an excellent and detailed discussion of the problem for United States students of Latin America.

Instead, there have been many problems in the evolution of those societies. The fact is that even if these models were appropriate for understanding Latin America, we would have to take into account that today's Latin American society is not comparable to our own and so cannot be evaluated in terms of today's standards in the United States or Western Europe.

Factors which must be considered in studying Latin America. The preceding discussion notes some of the important factors which must be accounted for in any framework purporting to provide for the understanding of Latin American political development. From the discussion of the cultural differences, it seems clear that any complete study of Latin America must consider the differences produced by cultural disparity. There is no question that cultural differences produce differing value systems. When value systems differ, the political system is bound to differ.

It is folly to expect that Latin Americans will react to efficient administrative or political systems in the same manner United States citizens do. The Latin American heritage puts more emphasis on familial factors. It is more important that one take care of his family and friends than to have a modern efficient political system. Who is to question which value system is better?

Obviously if efficiency of operation, impartiality, and lack of corruption are the ends the society is striving for, the political systems of Latin America would rate low on any evaluation of them. However, if the human factors of concern for fellow beings is considered, there would be a difference in the rating of administrative systems. This discussion is not meant to imply preference for the Latin American way of governing. Rather it is meant to illustrate how a difference in culture and values can have a very specific impact on the operation of the political system. More importantly, by evaluating Latin America in terms of our own political system, we tend to criticize those systems because they do not measure up to our standards. Perhaps we should ponder whether our standards are relevant to Latin America or, in any case, whether they are the standards which systems should be striving to emulate.

The idea that the Latin American nations should all be striving for a democratic equality also conflicts with the Latin American cultural tradition. The implied assumption of many students of Latin America is that democratic equality is being sought by the elements outside the realm of political power in Latin America. As some studies on urbanization have indicated, many of these groups just do not have an interest in participation in the

political process.²² The fact that much of the historical tradition of Latin America is based on a stratified social system means that inequality in the political system is often accepted as natural. People just do not question the inequality of power because they have been acculturated to believe it is the natural state of affairs. It must be recognized that there are exceptions to such a generalization in that groups in some Latin American nations are demanding a share of the power, as in Chile and Uruguay. But for many Latin Americans, concern with democracy is still of limited importance.

Another consideration which has to be made is the difference between the indigenous and the colonizing populations in Latin America. Compared to the United States and Canada, some Indian populations of Latin America were much larger and more highly civilized. Most importantly, some of the Indians in Latin America were not eliminated or assimilated by the society as they were in North America. As was noted in Chapter II, there was a variety of Indian cultures in Latin America with a variety

²² See Joan Nelson, "The Urban Poor: Disruption or Political Integration in Third World Cities," World Politics, XXII (April, 1970), 393-414.

of effects for the political system. There are some nations, such as Paraguay, and some parts of Colombia, where the population is still primarily of Indian culture. As a result, some Latin American nations have large populations of Indians living independently of the rest of the nation. In other societies, Mexico for instance, the Indian has become a part of the society and his cultural traditions have made an imprint on the society. In cases where the Indian has not been assimilated, it must be recognized that political integration is extremely difficult because two separate societies exist side by side but often with almost no interaction. The expectations of the models concerning political integration are certainly affected by this fact.

Somewhat related to the "Indian question" is the geographic character of Latin America. Because of its extremes in geography, political integration has been difficult. The United States, of course, has geographical extremes as well, but it is not so chopped up as Latin America. The mountain ranges prove impassable barriers in many nations of Latin America. The problem of communications and transportation across natural barriers complicates political integration. In addition to the mountains, Latin America has almost impenetrable jungles to cope with. In some of these regions live Indian tribes

almost unknown to the rest of the nation. Obviously they feel themselves no part of the over-all political system. In addition to the Indian populations in these inaccessible areas, there is the problem of merely trying to keep communications networks across such barriers. As a result of the peculiar geography of Latin America, there is a great deal of isolation of segments of the population. They just do not have much contact with the rest of the society.

Complicating the communications problem is the fact that the technological revolution did not affect Latin America as it did North America and Europe. Latin Americans do not have the communications or transportation networks which exist in the so-called "modern" nations. As a result, the spread of common values and identities is more difficult. Certainly the transistor radio has provided some impetus to such integration, but it has not been able to solve all the difficulties--particularly the integration of the various political units.

In short, to provide an understanding of Latin America, a framework must permit consideration of all of the factors which make Latin America different from other areas of the world. This suggestion sounds like a plea for the political culture approach and to some extent it is. General models can explain only so much. To complete

the picture, differentiating factors must also be considered. The discussion here has provided some suggestions on issues which must be considered and which have often been ignored. Obviously it is not a formal framework for the analysis of Latin America. Instead, this study has attempted to point out the shortcomings of currently used models and indicate what factors should be considered in formulating a framework uniquely attuned to the Latin American ambience. Perhaps future work will provide more explicit analytical frameworks embodying some of these suggestions.

Implications of this study for Latin American governments' policies. The nations of Latin America have often depended on the United States to initiate programs, and when these programs proved ineffective, they blamed the United States. Obviously many United States policies have been tied to United States economic and political-strategic interests, and as such have not taken the interests of the Latin Americans very seriously. As a result, much bitterness toward the United States has developed. Perhaps the greatest problem, however, has been that the Latin Americans themselves have accepted the assumptions and expectations of the models which have been discussed in this study. Consequently, the Latin American

government officials have also been guilty of ignoring special circumstances in Latin America.

As Víctor Alba notes, before there can be much hope for change in Latin America, the political leaders of the area have to become committed to their own nations.²³ Certainly, they speak in terms of progress for their nations through economic development and increased political participation, however, the actions of the political leaders belie a lack of confidence in their political systems. More importantly, in Alba's view, they often indicate a complete disregard for anything but personal gain for the leaders and their friends. As evidence, Alba uses the tendency of many Latin American oligarchs to accept United States aid for investment in the economy while putting their own money in Swiss bank accounts for their own future use.²⁴ In other words, they are unwilling to invest their own funds in their own economies, yet expect the United States to provide aid for

²³ Víctor Alba, Alliance Without Allies (New York: Praeger, 1965), and The Latin Americans (New York: Praeger, 1969).

²⁴ Alba, Alliance Without Allies, Chapter IV in particular.

such. As usual, there are many exceptions to this situation, but the point is that the Latin Americans have to bring the changes about themselves. The United States cannot do it for them. In order for the changes to take place, the Latin Americans must want them.

Because many of the young and the dispossessed have become frustrated with democracy, it seems that the route to change and stability in the region will be different from the democratic way. The young people have become disillusioned because they see democracy supporting oligarchs in their countries rather than aiding in social and political reform.²⁵ As a result, it is even more important that we understand the character of Latin American society. The assumption that Latin American nations will emulate the United States political system is no longer tenable. The Latin Americans will follow the path calculated to serve their best interests. Of course, it is almost impossible to predict precisely what the path

²⁵ Ibid., Chapter I. Also see Wiarda, "The New Developmental Alternatives in Latin America: Nasserism and Dictatorship with Popular Support," and its discussion of the frustration of Juan Bosch regarding the role the United States played in killing a democratic experiment in the Dominican Republic. Bosch is one of the better known "democrats" who has given up on the ideas of democracy for his country.

will be, but it is likely to be unappealing to the United States unless attitudes here change significantly.

Implications of this study for United States policy toward Latin America. The most important implication of this study for United States policy concerning Latin America is that virtually all the assumptions behind that policy must be re-evaluated. As has been noted several times, the belief that our political style will be copied is based on faith rather than facts. Partly because of our policies, such assumptions have become invalid.

Alba makes a very good point in noting that almost all of our Latin American policies have been geared to keeping the oligarchy and the elite-oriented middle sectors in control. By building hospitals and schools, we support the already existing political structure.²⁶ Alba's argument is that the Latin Americans must decide on what direction to take in their own societies and then commit themselves to the necessary changes. The United States cannot bring the "revolution" about for them if it is to be successful. We must be willing to help, but the

²⁶ Alba, Alliance Without Allies, Chapter III.

current policies of using our power and influence to prescribe policies of Latin American governments or to protect United States economic interests at the expense of the Latin Americans is doomed to failure.

While the Cold War seems to be thawing gradually in terms of the direct relations between the United States and the Communist nations, we seem to keep the Cold War as a basis for much of our Latin American policy. Another needed change in our approach to Latin America is to recognize that there are different routes to modernization in various political systems and that every leftist government is not automatically a part of the so-called Communist bloc. Cuba and Chile, for example, are as much Latin as socialist. The assumption that they are automatically a part of the Communist bloc is no more valid than the idea that every democracy is a model of the United States. So to be realistic in our policy toward Latin America, we must stop becoming hysterical about every leftist who appears on the scene and instead treat each government as unique.

Our support for any regime friendly to the United States, including many military dictatorships, is only going to cause further strain in United States--Latin American relations. To stop the polarization which often occurs between the United States and Latin America, the

United States must re-evaluate its assumptions about our Latin American neighbors. With our help, some of these governments, as in Chile, may encourage profound changes without engendering total alienation from the United States. Otherwise, we may drive them into anti-United States and anti-democratic positions such as occurred in Cuba. Our intransigence on the issues only makes it more difficult for the Latin Americans to manoeuver out of anti-United States postures even if they should desire to do so.

There is no easy solution to the dilemmas faced by United States policy-makers. It is also obvious, though, that past policies have been riddled with unfounded assumptions and expectations. The current lull in interest in Latin America is probably even more damaging than all the rest. Many Latin Americans seem to be wondering if the United States cares at all anymore. With a seeming lack of interest on our part, the Latin Americans may become more alienated from us. The rising popularity of Castro among Latin American governments may be an indication of such a tendency.

What is needed is a recognition that the United States cannot dictate the character of development in Latin America. Instead, we have to demonstrate a sincere desire to help in bringing about changes instigated by

the Latin Americans themselves. Secondly, we have to recognize that each Latin American nation will follow its own route to development depending on its own background and needs.

Conclusion. So far this chapter has dealt with conclusions about the specific models under study and their relationship to political development. One further point concerning the use of these models seems in order. Models themselves are aids in studying phenomena. It is not expected that any system ever fully replicates or is a mirror image of the model. Secondly, the general models provide a very vague outline or order to the study and thus are not appropriate to very intensive analysis of any system. To make in-depth analyses of specific systems, adaptation of the models becomes essential. These criticisms can be made of any general model or framework. Indeed, if the suggestions for study of Latin America made in this study are ever formulated into a full-fledged model, the criticism will undoubtedly be made that not all the Latin American nations can be made to fit into it. The model would likely be more conducive to the study of one nation than to that of all the others. Consequently, the only complete model for study of any nation or system

is the one prepared specifically for the study of that system.

While the preceding paragraph notes the difficulties of using models, it is not meant to imply that models are useless. Instead, the limitations of the models should be recognized by those who use them. We must also be careful not to reify the models we use. Rather than rely blindly on the consensus and conflict models, Latin Americanists must develop new approaches, concepts, and frameworks for the study of Latin America consistent with the history and culture of Latin America.

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