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EXPLANATIONS OF THE POLITICAL BEHAVIOR OF
AMERICAN WOMEN: AN ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE

A Dissertation Presented

By

SHIRLEY HASLIP

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment
of the requirements of the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

May 1983

Political Science



Shirley Ann Haslip 1983

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
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
Jean Elshain, Chairperson of Committee



John Brigham, Member



Joyce Berkman, Member



Glen Gordon, Chairman
Political Science Department

For Albert Wagner, Emma Howe Wagner,
Polly Jo Haslip and Barry Delin

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All ideas are formulated in social contexts so that each individual's work reflects the work of those who have gone before you and those with whom she has the greatest interaction. Each of us is indebted to our friends and colleagues while retaining responsibility for the presentation of our final products. My list of debts is long.

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ABSTRACT

Explanations of the Political Behavior of
American Women: An Analysis and Critique

May, 1983

Shirley Ann Haslip, B.A. State University of
New York, M.A., University of Massachusetts,

Ph.D., University of Massachusetts

Directed by: Professor Jean Bethke Elshtain

A major goal of behavioral political science is the construction of a theory of political behavior. This study examines attempts by behavioral political scientists to develop a theory of women's political behavior. The conclusions are that such a theory does not exist and that there have been no systematic attempts to create one. Instead, there are two major competing behavioral explanations, the political socialization explanation and the situational explanation. The underlying assumptions and supporting evidence for each explanation are examined to determine whether one appears to be the better explanation for women's political behavior. The major finding is that neither explanation has adequate supportive evidence to indicate that it should be preferred.

A second finding is that there are no well documented general laws regarding women's political behavior in these

studies. In fact, the pattern of explanation which predominates is inadequate for the formulation of general laws. Explanations proceed in an ad hoc fashion. When the authors of behavioral studies discover a statistical relationship between women and another variable, they form hypotheses to explain this relationship. Hypotheses often include common but empirically unproven assumptions about the relationship between women and politics. Yet these hypothetical explanations are repeated in further studies as if they were well verified.

While the studies evaluated rarely address strategies for increasing women's political participation, this issue is a focus of this study. The explanatory frameworks suggest a limited range of policy alternatives to increase women's political participation. The two competing explanations highlight the need for policies to be established either in childhood or adulthood, but no study directly asserts policy recommendations to improve women's political participation.

The final assertion is that there is a need for additional studies of women's political behavior from a policy perspective with the stated goal of discovering necessary conditions for increasing women's political participation.

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C H A P T E R I

INTRODUCTION

In the late 1970's a number of works appeared that challenged the existing knowledge in political science with regard to women's political behavior and the image of women that was prevalent in political science.

New political behavior studies suggested that on almost all measures of voting participation, efficacy, activism and political ideology, that is, traditional indices of political behavior, differences between men and women, if present at all, were small.¹ Persistent inequalities between men and women seemed to be eradicated unless the researcher looked at who held political party offices and high elective offices in the state and national levels; here women continued to be underrepresented in proportion to their numbers.

This emerging interpretation of women's political participation represented a challenge to the image of apolitical women that was widely held in political science and to the empirical data which lent support to this image because the results of the studies of the 1970's contrast with the results of the studies conducted in the 1950's, published in the 1950's and 1960's. The major conclusions of these studies have been summarized in a number of articles that review voting behavior literature. Bonnie Freeman, whose review essay is entitled "Power, Patriarchy and 'Political Primitives,'" summarized the conclusions about women and politics

that are found in this literature: that women vote less than men; that women express less interest in politics than men, that women indicate less information about issues, campaigns and government than men; that women participate less often in political campaigns, run for and hold office less often than men.²

Constantini and Craik summarize an additional set of ideas about women that are found in the voting behavior literature:

...women voters are more provincial (in the sense of focusing upon local issues), more conservative in their stance on policy issues, more responsive to issues with moral overtones, more likely to personalize politics and to be more sensitive to the personality of politicians, less sophisticated in the level of concept formation and less comfortable with political conflict and contention.³

All of these studies seem to present a view of women as an apolitical being or at least a lesser political being when compared to men.

But, the findings of the 1970's, where woman emerges as a political being similar to men calls into question previous observations and conclusions about women's political behavior. Either women changed significantly in ten years, an explanation which many researchers accept, or the initial set of data misrepresented women's political behavior.

I am most interested in the studies that have been critical of the original observations and explanations regarding women's political behavior. Two of these studies seem particularly significant because of the extent of their review of this

literature. These studies are "Politics as Unnatural Practice" (1974) by Susan Bourque and Jean Grossholtz and Women and Voting Studies: Mindless Matrons or Sexist Scientism (1975), a monograph by Murray Goot and Elizabeth Reid. Both of these studies review a number of the voting behavior studies and political socialization studies that were widely accepted in political science.

Ultimately, the conclusions reached by Bourque and Grossholtz as well as by Goot and Reid are very similar. Both see the image of woman portrayed in the literature as apolitical and, more importantly, both believe that this view is at least in part, a product of the unexamined assumptions the researchers hold with regard to women, men and politics. The most fundamental assumption uncovered here is the notion that men are more political than women. As Goot and Reid state this:

Men are people who involve themselves in politics, and political judgments are masculine ones.⁴

Bourque and Grossholtz lodge a serious charge against political science with regard to this assumption when they state that the political science discipline is contributing to the perpetuation of a sexual definition of politics in which men are deemed political beings and women are not.⁵ Furthermore, they suggest that "women could never be full participants in politics as presently defined by political scientists given the assumptions made about the nature of politics

and the necessity for sex role differentiation in society."⁶

The definition of politics as a characteristic male activity and an uncharacteristic female activity is borne out by evidence that Bourque and Grossholtz cite from the voting behavior and socialization studies that show that the male political scientists engaged in these studies often distorted both evidence and their interpretation of the evidence when dealing with the explanation of women's political behavior. Bourque and Grossholtz cite four types of distortion that regularly appeared in this literature: 1. Fudging the Footnotes; 2. the Assumption of Male Dominance; 3. the Acceptance of Masculinity as Ideal Political Behavior; 4. A Commitment to the Eternal Feminine.⁷

Fudging the Footnotes, as Bourque and Grossholtz define it, might be interpreted as sloppy research. It refers to situations where political scientists make statements about female political characteristics, attitudes or behaviors which are misrepresentations of the original data they cite as source material.⁸ Often what the researchers do in this situation is make a claim about the interpretation of the original data which was not claimed by the original research.

The assumption of male dominance, the acceptance of masculinity as ideal political behavior, and a commitment to the eternal feminine all seem to be distortions related to a similar view of politics as a social role that is male rather than female.

When Bourque and Grossholtz point out that male dominance is assumed by political scientists, they note that it is assumed that men will occupy dominant political roles and control political decisions in society.⁹ Bourque and Grossholtz are not suggesting that observation of reality will offer us any other conclusion; males do dominate politics. But, they are insisting that political scientists should make a serious attempt to question why this should be the case; political scientists should be asking why male dominance occurs or why it should occur, not just contributing to its occurrence by assuming that is the usual state of affairs. Bourque and Grossholtz are questioning the unjustified assumption of male dominance in politics.

Bourque and Grossholtz also assert that the researchers assume that masculinity is the ideal for political behavior. The ideal they refer to is a set of stereotyped assumptions about masculinity: assumptions that males are more aggressive, competitive and pragmatic, for example.¹⁰ These masculine characteristics are said to be more suitable for the understanding and pursuing politics, more congruent with a political role.

On the other hand, not only do women not share in the characteristics of the masculine ideal but they are further hampered from the pursuit of politics by the constraints of their dominant social roles as wives and mothers. Bourque and Grossholtz maintain that the researchers in the voting

behavior and political socialization studies are committed to the Eternal Feminine in the sense that they believe that women's roles as wives and mothers are more important to the continuation of society than women being able to participate more fully in politics.¹¹

Goot and Reid, covering much of the same ground as Bourque and Grossholtz, arrive at similar conclusions, that the assumptions about women and their relationship to politics are more important to the explanations that are advanced for women's political behavior than the empirical evidence contained in the studies. According to their account, it is the assumptions that political scientists hold about women rather than the evidence that they present that contributes to the continuation of an image of apolitical woman:

How is this image maintained? by the play of prejudice, whereby the special and contingent are transformed to the general and necessary, by the reluctance to pursue conflicting evidence, or to consider alternative points of view (especially those of women themselves) and by linguistic fiat whereby parent means father, worker entails male.¹²

Additionally, however, Goot and Reid also seem to suggest that some of the difficulties with the voting behavior and political socialization research may lie in the theory and the methodology employed by the behavioralists engaged in this research. While their critique is not well-developed, the authors reject both the theory and methodology of these studies: theory is seen as socialization; methodology is

seen as the utilization of survey questionnaires:

In terms of theory, we reject 'internalization', 'socialization', and so on as the only possible ways to account for the political consciousness of women. In terms of methods we argue against the adequacy of questionnaires which are structured on the principle that they 'speak for themselves.'¹³

Furthermore, Goot and Reid suggest that the methodology of using surveys makes sense to behavioralists because of the view of human beings that is portrayed in the theory:

And theory and method are intimately related. For it is on the view that a person can do nought but take over, unmodified, the reasoning of clearly identified dominant others that it makes sense to think of surveys as means by which such reasoning is 'tapped' or 'indexed.'¹⁴

The survey questionnaire methodology is further criticized because it is replete with the values of the male researchers that set it up:

Like most 'value-neutral' research, much of the work we have reviewed simply assumes the dominant values of the dominant groups of society. The values taken for granted here are the values of the (male) researchers operating in a male dominated society in which they too are numbered among the beneficiaries.¹⁵

As Bourque and Grossholtz noted, political responses are, by definition, in most surveys the male responses. Conversely, women's responses are seldom judged as political.¹⁶

Goot and Reid even suggest that survey methodology hides from view the real explanations for political behavior, protecting the privileged theory:

The pre-coded, superficially quantitative questionnaire items commonly employed merely

reflect the weakness of the theory while ensuring that such data as might expose the theory cannot emerge.¹⁷

Ultimately the major criticism of Goot and Reid deals with the inadequacy of the theory's ability to explain women's political behavior, to get at the roots of why women are less political as they are assumed to be in these studies. Here, again, they are most critical of the assumptions of the explanatory format, the most fundamental of these being a non-interactionist view of the social-psychological; opinions in this explanation are seen to originate by being absorbed from one person to another.¹⁸

The end result of this format of explanation is a theory that tends to attribute women's non-participation to the personal attributes of women. That Goot and Reid disagree with this interpretation of women's political behavior is evident in the following quotation they borrow from Schattschneider:

It is profoundly characteristic of the behavior of the more fortunate state of the community that responsibility for widespread nonparticipation is attributed wholly to the ignorance, indifference, and shiftlessness of the people... there is a better explanation. Abstention reflects the suppression of the options and alternatives that reflect the needs of the nonparticipants. It is not necessarily true that the people with the greatest needs participate in politics more actively. Whoever decides what the game is about also decides who gets into the game.¹⁹

Goot and Reid thus seem to lean toward an explanation of women's political behavior that focuses on structural or political causes rather than personal causes, even though this is

not well-elaborated.

The studies I have cited made some important criticisms of the political behavior literature, that is, the voting behavior and socialization studies. However, they only skirt what I consider to be a central issue in these studies, what connections exist between behavioral methodology, behavioral explanation and the understanding of women's political behavior.

The introduction of behavioral methodology and the behavioral form of explanation to the study of politics promised the development of a scientific theory of politics, a theory that would be objective and neutral, freed from the values of the researcher. As part of this promise of a general theory, there were attempts to construct a theory of political behavior, one aspect of which might have attended to the explanation of women's political behavior.

But, as both the Bourque and Grossholtz study and the Goot and Reid study noted, women's political behavior was often incidental in the voting behavior and political socialization studies.²⁰ Nonetheless, in most of these studies explanations are advanced for why women are less political than men and the purpose of this dissertation is to examine these explanations.

The first task of this dissertation, therefore, is to outline the general principles of behavioral explanation with respect to their application to the study of women and

politics. This is the task undertaken in Chapter II. It will be argued that behavioralism embraces a particular methodology which emphasizes the collection of empirical data to test hypotheses which are constructed by the researcher and more significantly, that behavioralism embraces a particular form of explanation, the deductive-nomological model of explanation, at least in principle. But, with respect to the explanations which are advanced for women's political behavior, it will be argued that the format of explanation is more informal than the deductive model, more speculative, and open to substantial criticisms with regard to correctness, accuracy and usefulness. And yet, the explanations are often accepted as facts or general laws although there is little substantiation for this claim.

The behavioral explanations found in four sets of studies are analyzed in detail. The focus here is to ascertain exactly how the process of explanation is set out in each of these studies. Another concern is to evaluate the data that are said to support the explanations in each set of studies. A further concern is to ask what are the policy implications of each of these studies. By this, I mean, if women are found to be less political than men in all of the studies, what policies would be indicated by the researcher's explanations. I should point out here that most researchers do not offer policy recommendations to increase women's political participation but I argue that contained in their explanations are

notions about what changes would be necessary if one had a policy goal of increasing women's political participation. Thus, this will be a question constantly addressed in my analysis of the explanations.

The first set of explanations examined are those found in the voting behavior studies. This analysis is justified on three counts: 1. those who have criticized these studies in the past have not focused on the explanatory process; 2. the results of these studies are frequently quoted by later studies and thus, their explanations need re-examination; 3. these studies essentially provided the groundwork for two different explanations of women's political behavior, explanations that I label the socialization explanation and the situational explanation.

Two chapters (III and IV) concentrate on the socialization explanation. In general, theories of political socialization purport to provide an explanation for participation or lack of participation in the political system. The common assertion is that the person who has been well socialized into the political system will share the values promoted by that system and legitimize those values through participation.²¹ The well socialized individual will also be instrumental in transmitting the values of the political system to the next generation.²² The poorly socialized individual is seen as less likely to participate in the political system through legitimate political actions; in fact, if too few

citizens internalize the appropriate political values, the stability of the political regime may be endangered.

Chapter III focuses on the explanations of women's political behavior that are a product of what I call the early political socialization studies, studies in which there is no well-developed theory of political socialization. Rather, these studies shift survey methodology from the study of adult political behavior to children's political behavior. Thus, these studies advance political socialization as an explanation of the differential political behaviors they observe for boys and girls.

Chapter IV critiques the explanations contained in the socialization studies which adapted the psychological theory entitled social learning theory to the study of politics. The political scientists who adopt this model maintain that individuals arrive in this world as *tabula rosa*. The individual learns through imitation of socializing agents who act as models for behavior. The socializing agents encourage the individual when she exhibits appropriate behavior, from the agent's perspective, and discourage the individual when she exhibits inappropriate behavior. In this model, the early years are seen as the most crucial in the formation of adult personality and adult behavior patterns.

Political socialization, for the political scientists who adopt social learning theory, involves the learning of political values or, at the least, political predispositions.

This process is also usually seen to be part of early childhood learning, and the parents of the child are seen as the principle agents of political socialization. Since the mother is seen as the primary role model for the daughter in this learning process, the daughter is expected to mirror the political values of the mother. Thus, the expectation is that mothers who are not interested in politics or do not participate fully in politics will rear their daughters in a similar manner. Usually, the researchers infer that the mothers are disinterested in politics when their evidence shows lack of interest by the daughter. The method for changing this process so that more women would be politically involved would seem to require changing the mothers who are the major agents in the socialization process. How this could be achieved is seldom clearly delineated. I will suggest that most of these researchers are not concerned with the question of changing the extent to which women are politically involved, but that, nonetheless, if their theory is correct, it would have implications for the kinds of policies that would be needed if women were to become more political.

Finally, there is an additional behavioral explanation which has been more popular in the research of the 1970's and 1980's even though it was suggested by the early voting behavior studies. This is the situational explanation. The general dimensions of this argument were suggested in 1960 by Seymour Martin Lipset when he suggested the following explana-

tion for women's lower involvement in the political realm:

"The position of the married woman illustrates the problem of available time or dispensability as a determinant of political activity. The sheer demands on a housewife and mother mean that she has little opportunity or need to gain politically relevant experiences. Women might then be expected to have less concern with politics, and in almost every country they do vote less than men."²³

Orum and associates cited Lipset's earlier observations as a possible explanation for the results obtained in their study of Illinois school children in 1974.²⁴ Their study indicated that there were no significant differences between boys and girls on a number of political dimensions. Orum et. al. believed that these results indicated that early childhood political socialization was less important than was previously accepted. They concluded that a better explanation might be constructed from observation of the adult role differences which Lipset had referred to.

The research conducted by situational theorists differs in a couple of other ways from the research examined up to this point. First, the research often focuses on the study of women political leaders and tries to explain why there aren't more women in political leadership roles. These researchers believe that while women's political participation is now substantially equal to that of men, there is one area of participation where this is not true: women are still underrepresented as political leaders. Second, situational theorists have a heavier concentration of women as researchers

than the voting behavior studies and socialization studies we have examined. The core of the situational explanation is that women's adult roles as wives and mothers serve as constraints to their political participation or political action. These constraints become most clear when she assumes the adult roles of wife and mother. The care of husband and children is portrayed as an activity which is carried out in the individual households leaving little, if any, time for the woman to pursue any outside activity, particularly political activity. While situational theorists share the behavioral commitment to a particular form of methodology and explanation, the focus of their explanation suggests that the policies that will flow from their explanatory framework differ in significant ways from that of the socialization theorists.

The end result of this dissertation is a chronological overview of how behavioral explanation has dealt with the question women's political behavior and what policy recommendations might follow from these explanations. Since the 1980 election, questions about women's political behavior have become a central focus in the popular media and among the technicians of electoral politics who plot campaign strategies. A new term has been coined to refer to the divergent electoral behavior and issue positions that have reflected in women's and men's political responses since the 1980 election. In the epilogue, Chapter VII, I will look at this newly discovered "gender gap" and suggest that the reasons

advanced to explain the gender gap resemble arguments we see presented earlier in this dissertation. The implicit assumptions of gender gap explanations rely on the notion that politics is, more naturally, man's domain, that women's political behavior should always be compared to that of men, who provide the standard for political behavior and that if there are divergences between men's and women's political behavior, it is the political behavior of women that needs explanation.

Finally, I will address the question of why women must continue to grapple with the meaning of politics and with the meaning of their participation within politics bringing out the critical issue of whether studies of women's political behavior have focused on gathering the necessary information to understand women's relationship to politics and to expand it.

C H A P T E R II

THE NATURE AND REALITY OF BEHAVIORAL EXPLANATION

The stated goal of the behavioral revolution in political science was the development of a systematic theory of political behavior. While no general theory of political behavior is universally accepted within the political science discipline, those researchers who identify with the behavioral tradition share the commitment to develop a theory that will explain and predict political behavior.

All of the studies examined in this dissertation can be situated in the behavioral tradition and, in various ways, the enterprises they engage in can be evaluated in terms of their contribution(s) toward the development of a general theory of political behavior.

In work(s) intended to move toward a theory of political behavior, it makes sense that questions about women's political behavior should be raised. If it can be shown that women's political behavior is substantively different from the behavior of other groups in the American political system, perhaps even a middle-range theory¹ which would explain women's political behavior might be anticipated. But, there is no widely accepted middle-range theory of this type in existence either.

The question then becomes what knowledge have the political behavior studies, including voting behavior studies,

socialization studies and studies of women political leaders, contributed to our understanding of women's relationship to politics. In behavioral terms, what empirical observations have been confirmed and what explanations are advanced to account for the empirical observations that are recorded.

I will state in advance that, for the most part, behavioral studies have focused on women's political behavior only incidentally. In the voting behavior and socialization studies, observations and explanations about women's political behavior usually are concentrated in several paragraphs or a few pages. Only in the studies of women political leaders are women the central focus, although the statistical observations and the explanations for these observations contained in each of these studies has had a central place in shaping the view of (a)political women held by political scientists. Since the presentation and analysis of this research is organized chronologically in relationship to its appearance in political science, it should not be surprising that many of the early observations and explanations are reiterated by the later studies as factual statements about women's relationship to politics.

Because I intend to evaluate the explanations that are presented in each of these categories of behavioral studies, and, at least, initially, I wish to make this evaluation with respect to how these explanations are contributing to the behavioral goals of establishing general theory or, at a lower

level, general laws, it seems necessary to first explicate the stated assumptions and objectives of behavioral research.

While there are distinctions among political behavior-
alists, most behavioralists would concur with David Easton's
assessment that the following list contains the major assump-
tions and objectives of behavioral political science:

1. Regularities. These are discoverable uniformities in political behavior. These can be expressed in generalizations or theories with explanatory and predictive value.
2. Verification. The validity of such generalizations must be testable, in principle, by reference to relevant behavior.
3. Techniques. Means for acquiring and interpreting data cannot be taken for granted. They are problematic and need to be examined self-consciously, refined, and validated so that rigorous means can be found for observing, recording, and analyzing behavior.
4. Quantification. Precision in the recording of data and the statement of findings requires measurement and quantification, not for their own sake, but only where possible, relevant, and meaningful in the light of other objectives.
5. Values. Ethical evaluation and empirical explanation involve two different kinds of propositions that, for the sake of clarity, should be kept analytically distinct. However, a student of political behavior is not prohibited from asserting propositions of either kind separately or in combination as long as he does not mistake one for the other.
6. Systematization. Research ought to be systematic, that is, theory and research are to be seen as closely intertwined parts of a coherent and orderly body of knowledge. Research untutored by theory may prove trivial, and theory unsupported by data, futile.
7. Pure science. The application of knowledge is as much a part of the scientific enterprise as theoretical understanding. But the understanding and explanation of political behavior logically precede and provide the basis for efforts to utilize political knowledge in the solution of urgent practical problems of society.
8. Integration. Because the social sciences deal with the whole human situation, political research can

8. (Continued)

ignore the findings of other disciplines only at the peril of weakening the validity and undermining the generality of its own results. Recognition of this interrelationship will help to bring political science back to its status of earlier centuries and return it to the main fold of the social sciences.²

In this account, there are several assumptions which have a direct bearing on how behavioralists approach the study of political behavior and how they proceed with explanations that need further explication.

First, there is the assumption that there are uniformities in human behavior in politics, that behavior is not random; on the contrary, people behave in a regularized or recurring fashion when engaged in political acts. Furthermore, it is assumed that the political scientist can observe and identify this recurrent behavior pattern.³ To put this general assumption to the specific case of women's political behavior, the behavioralist assumes that women's political behavior has a recurrent, observable pattern.

The emphasis that behavioral research places on the explanation of behavior that has occurred, actions that have taken place, has an important consequence for the understanding of women's political behavior. For if women do not act in political ways, do not vote, do not run for office, these inactions are usually not interpreted as observable behavior in this tradition, and, thus, there is little justification for focusing on these so-called inactions.

No doubt behavioralists could reconceptualize some non-

actions, for example, non-voting, as a form of action. While the failure of the tradition to do so may in part be a result of the social and historical circumstances in which its proponents operated, part of the problem has to be ascribed to the behavioral tradition itself. A tradition that requires that all evidence be subject to external observation encourages researchers to examine those phenomena which are most readily observable. Thus, it is not surprising that in a study in which one of the objectives is to suggest policy recommendations for increasing women's political participation, this presents some difficulties, since the precise reasons for women's non-participation are seldom investigated.

However, explanations of women's non-participation are often advanced in behavioral studies indirectly. Since women's political behavior is usually contrasted with men's political behavior, the researchers do attempt to explain the differences between these groups. In this process, the researchers promulgate explanations that focus on women's lesser participation offering reasons that can be applied to both a lesser participation and non-participation.

Additional explanations which have bearing on women's non-participation surface in these studies when the expected (predicted) political differences between men and women, boys and girls do not occur. In this situation, the researcher is compelled to either reject his/her explanation or to give some statement of reasons for why the predicted correlation

was not upheld. In these statements, the researcher's underlying assumptions about why women don't participate as fully in ordinary circumstances often emerge.

Thus, even by concentrating our attention on studies where women's observable political behavior is the primary focus, we can discern explanations that attempt to provide reasons for women's lesser political behavior. If the reasons are accurate, presumably it is plausible to argue that policy recommendations that have the stated intention of increasing women's political participation could be made on the basis of these reasons. This argument will be picked up again after a discussion of the structure of explanation in the behavioral tradition, as Easton and others perceive it.

Another fundamental assumption already alluded to is that the political scientist can express these observed regularities in generalizations or theories. These generalizations are assumed to approximate scientific laws or theories found in the natural sciences.⁴ These generalizations are to be established through principles of scientific investigation, and the validity of the generalizations are to be testable by reference to observable behavior. Note that Easton states that these generalizations must only be testable in principle, that is, it is sufficient for one to be able to formulate the conditions which might lead to a test of the generalization. But there is also an implicit understanding that theory and general laws, if they are ever to be

systematic and scientific, will be supported by empirical evidence; that is, that some researchers will make the tests that are there in principle, that scientific laws of behavior will be formulated and tested empirically to establish their credibility.

At this point, at least one caveat must be lodged. This is the idea that general laws in political science are difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. What most researchers acknowledge is that political science, at its best, will only have statistical laws, laws that assert a high probability between two variables, but that a general law of the type, if X, then A where X is invariable followed by A, is impossible. Most researchers do not feel hampered by the necessarily statistical nature of the laws in political science. Usually, statistical laws are treated as logically equivalent to general laws and are seen to play the same logical function in the deductive-nomological model of explanation.

For the purposes of this dissertation, I accept the behavioralist assumption that statistical laws are logically equivalent to general laws, and I will use the statement general law to include statistical laws in political science.

I am concerned about the lack of general or statistical laws in political behavior studies particularly with regard to the lack of laws regarding women's political behavior.

And, here, my basic point is that while studies often use general statements about women's political behavior as if they were general laws, the criterion that statements that are utilized as general laws should be well supported by empirical evidence is often glossed over. What occurs instead is a situation where general statements with little empirical support or questionable empirical support are utilized as if they were general laws.

To understand this claim more completely, it is useful to look at the structure of explanation in the behavioral ideal.

Most behavioral scientists would contend that the ideal of explanation is expressed in the deductive-nomological model of explanation utilized in the natural sciences. This framework of explanation, also known as the covering-law model of explanation, makes the claim "that explanation is achieved by subsuming what is to be explained under general laws."⁵

The structure of the deductive-nomological model of explanation suggests that an explanation can be divided into two segments: that which explains and that which is to be explained. Hempel and Oppenheim term that which explains "the explanans" and that which is explained "the explanandum".⁶ The explanans contains two kinds of statements: general laws and sentences which state initial or antecedent conditions.⁷ From these, it is possible to arrive at the explanandum through

the process of deduction. To illustrate the deductive-nomological method of explanation, I will utilize a statement which some researchers might take to be a "general law" with regard to political behavior, the statement that groups who are exposed to social norms that disapprove of their voting are less likely to vote. With regard to the particular case of explaining women's lesser turnout, this general law would be utilized in the deductive-nomological mode of explanation in the following way:

- Step 1: Statement of General Law: Groups who are exposed to social norms that disapprove of voting are less likely to vote.
- Step 2: Statement of Initial Conditions: Women are a group exposed to social norms that disapprove of their voting.
- Step 3: Explanandum: Therefore, women are less likely to vote.

Thus, in this model of explanation, if we know general laws about political behavior and women's relationship to those general laws, we should be able to deductively explain women's political behavior.

Explanation in the deductive-nomological model is intimately related to prediction; perhaps explanation and prediction are even conflated. At the very least, they have a logical identity; both are deductively arrived at from the statement of a general law and sets of initial conditions. Thus, using our previous example, we can see that the same general law can be utilized to generate predictions as well as explanations:

- Step 1: Statement of General Law: Groups who are exposed to social norms that disapprove of voting are less likely to vote.
- Step 2: Statement of Initial Conditions: Women are a group exposed to social norms that disapprove of their voting.
- Step 3: Prediction: Women will be less likely to vote.

Thus, general laws about political behavior and initial conditions which establish women's relationship to these general laws, women's political behavior can also be predicted in this format.

Now, there are many problems with the use of the deductive-nomological model of explanation in the study of women's political behavior. Some of these problems seem to be inherent in the explanatory format itself while others seem to be a product of the difficulties of adapting the model to political inquiry.

The major problem with the deductive-nomological model of explanation seems to lie in what is meant by explanation. While in ordinary language, "to explain" has a variety of meanings, including "to describe", "to make intelligible", "to reduce the familiar to the unfamiliar", "to understand the motivations behind a particular action", the meaning of explanation in the pure deductive-nomological model does not encompass any of the ordinary language understandings. Rather, deductive-nomological explanation stresses that the significance of explanation is the logical deductive process where an event is explained by showing that it logically follows

from the premises.⁸ The power of these explanations is said to lie in the logical connection between the evidence and the fact to be explained.⁹ This formal notion of what constitutes an explanation seems to gloss over some of the important aspects of explanation in social science as irrelevant. Social scientists may want to ask questions about the accuracy of the explanation, whether or not it stresses the most significant reasons why political behavior occurs; merely checking the logical accuracy of the model does little to convince us that the reasons advanced are more than plausible. The significance of this question should be evident with regard to making policy recommendations. Policy recommendations based on fallacious general laws would have a high failure rate; most policy scientists would want for their recommendations to have a high probability of success rather than a high rate of failure. Thus, I would argue that the formal notion of explanation advanced here seems too narrow to accommodate these goals.

But, if prediction, as well as explanation, is an important process in the development of deductive theory, then it would appear that behavioral scientists using this methodology have a concern with more than the logical validity of explanation. Accurate prediction requires that there is a high rate of probability that the projected relationships are actually in existence. In fact, prediction treats general laws as causes; this is the full implication of stating

"if X, then A" even if this statement in political science is modified to mean "if X, then there is a probability of A."

However, earlier in this section, I stated that the deductive-nomological model of explanation was the ideal of explanation in political science. But political science is not replete with general laws from which hypotheses can be generated in a deductive manner. The primary task of research and explanation in political science has been the development of these general laws, the datum by datum construction of a general theory that will explain political behavior. That is, most behavioral political scientists concentrate on gathering statistical data from which general laws can ultimately be constructed. These researchers have developed a pattern for explaining statistical regularities that was outlined by Lipset, Lazarsfeld, Barton and Linz in "The Psychology of Voting: An Analysis of Political Behavior" in 1954.¹⁰

The following illustration is an example stated by these authors:

- Step 1: The researcher observes that a given social classification, e.g., sex, is found to be empirically correlated to a rate of behavior, e.g., women have a lower rate of turnout than men.
- Step 2: The researcher reinterprets the social category as given indicating some general attribute, e.g., women are exposed to social norms that disapprove of women voting.

Step 3: The researcher relates this attribute to the behavior in question by a more or less general proposition, e.g., those groups who are exposed to social norms that disapprove of voting are less likely to turn out to vote.¹¹

There are some doubts about whether this form of explanation is logically equivalent to the covering law model of explanation. Thus, it makes sense to more fully examine the premises of this format.

What the authors are doing in this form of explanation is moving from a statistically observed fact to the development of a generalization. Merton calls these generalizations post factum interpretations, "...the introduction of an interpretation after the observations have been made rather than the empirical testing of a predesignated hypothesis. The implicit assumption is that a body of generalized propositions has been so fully established that it can be approximately applied to the data at hand."¹² Thus, one could argue that the statistical observation could, in theory, have been hypothesized/predicted/explained from the generalization. Thus, this set of steps could be restated in the deductive-nomological framework, and, if this were done, it would look like the example on page 28. Since the fact that this process can occur only after observation occurred, there is a question of whether this form of explanation is logically equivalent to the deductive-nomological model. Furthermore, this question becomes even more complicated if one understands, as Merton does, that the implicit assumption, that a body of generalized

propositions has been established, is seldom upheld. Rather, post factum interpretations are more often ad hoc, that is, they have a slight degree of prior confirmation.¹³

In the deductive-nomological model, there is an assumption that general laws have empirical substantiation, and there is also an assumption that the initial conditions have some empirical substantiation. Here the authors are moving from an empirical finding to generalized statements, which have the appearance of general laws although they frequently have little or no empirical foundation.

This can be illustrated more completely if the steps in this ad hoc or post factum form of explanation are spelled out more clearly.

Step 1 in this explanatory pattern is merely the listing of the observed statistical regularity; in the example Lipset and associates use for illustration, women have a lower turnout than men, a statistical fact undisputed at the time this research takes place.

Step 2, the statement which reinterprets the social category as given indicating some general attribute for that social category, is formulated like a factual statement that could be statistically proven but is really, more often, a hypothetical statement which posits an assumption about that social category. In their example, Lipset, Lazarsfeld, Barton and Linz are assuming that women are exposed to social norms that disapprove of their voting. They haven't

empirically shown that this is the case nor do they propose to do so. They hypothesize that this is an accurate assessment of women's relation to politics in American society.

Similarly, Step 3 is also a hypothetical statement relating the reinterpreted statement to the behavior in question by a general proposition. Our group of women voters who were hypothesized to be exposed to social norms that disapprove of women's voting are now hypothesized to be less likely to turn out to vote as a result of this. A generalization is then derived that any group exposed to social norms that disapprove of voting is less likely to vote.

Each of these propositions, the reinterpretation of the social category and the correctness of the proposition relating the interpretative attributes to the behavior in question are hypothetical statements which pose possible motivations for women's political actions. As hypothetical statements, they contain assumptions that the researchers make about women's connection or lack of connection to politics in American society. The hypothetical statements are attempts to explain women's political or apolitical behavior. Studies which utilize this form of explanation will cite statistical observations about women and then present the reader with an explanation that will contain an assumption about a general attribute of women and assumptions about how that attribute relates to the behavior under observation.

As Merton¹⁴ points out, the ad hoc hypotheses contained

in this form of explanation may be plausible to the reader, but this does not mean that they constitute compelling evidence for acceptance. The hypothetical explanations are plausible because they are consistent with the observations, but other, equally plausible, explanations could be advanced which are similarly consistent with the data. While this method of formulating explanations may generate a number of plausible explanations, choosing between plausible explanations seems to be dependent on his/her underlying assumptions about women and politics.

The validity of such an explanation, according to Lipset, Lazarsfeld, Barton and Linz, rests on the correctness of the reinterpretation of the original social category and the correctness of the proposition relating the interpretative attribute to the behavior in question.¹⁵ In the example I have given, validity would rest on whether women are exposed to social norms that disapprove of their voting and whether this has the predicted consequence of stifling their turnout. How this validity is actually established is not a primary concern. Lipset et. al. suggest that sometimes the reinterpretation of the original social category and the correctness of the proposition relating the interpretative attribute to the behavior in question appear obvious, i.e., everyone knows.¹⁶ In the example we have been using, the authors assume that it is common knowledge that women are exposed to social norms that disapprove of their voting and assume that

these norms influence women not to vote. Validity of this explanation rests on social scientists accepting the explanation without challenge. Competing explanations would unfold in a similar fashion and, presumably, differences would be resolved by appeal to which explanation appears most obvious.

The standard of validation as stated by Lipset, Lazarsfeld, Barton and Linz seems sufficiently at odds with the standard of validation advocated by the covering law model of explanation for me to state that strict behaviorists would find this mode of explanation unacceptable. Merton does warn against the use of post factum interpretations because of their tendency to postulate conditions and laws with little empirical verification.¹⁷ Hempel was also clear that ad hoc explanations did not have the scientific status of explanations which used the covering law model.¹⁸ Some authors maintain that ad hoc explanations are only another form of the covering model of explanation because they can be reformulated in the covering law framework and then can be tested by the generation of hypotheses.¹⁹ Using Lipset et. al.'s example, the reinterpretation of the original social category and the proposition relating the interpretative attitude to the behavior in question could be used as hypotheses that could be submitted for further testing.

My major criticisms of this form of explanation are that the underlying assumptions are seldom if ever tested nor are

the hypotheses that need testing and the conditions by which they might be tested ever fully formulated. Yet these hypothetical explanations often take on the status of generally accepted truths or general laws about why women behave politically as they do. The fact that they are hypothetical and not well substantiated is overlooked.

In fact, frequently subsequent studies pick up hypothetical explanations and treat them as if they have been statistically proven. This will become clearer as we examine the various explanations contained in the behavioral studies analyzed in this work and see that later studies utilize many of them as statistical or general law statements. An example of this from the study conducted by Lipset and his colleagues involves women's voting when moral issues are perceived to be at stake in an election. Lipset and his colleagues suggest that if moral issues are involved in an election (initial conditions), women will be more likely to turn out to vote. The general law that women are more interested in moral issues is actually a hypothetical explanation that was advanced in a previous study by Tingsten²⁰ to account for women turning out to vote in greater numbers than the authors expected, i.e., would have predicted. Lipset and colleagues use this ad hoc explanation as if it were empirically well-verified, as if the Tingsten study had established beyond any shadow of a doubt that this explanation was the correct one. Yet, the fact remains that this statistical or

general law was not well-confirmed but was a hypothetical assertion, which, within the framework of behavior explanatory goals, should have needed further testing before it was used as a general law.

One goal of this study then is to show that there are few statements which qualify for the title of general law in political science. Nonetheless, in every study there are explanatory statements advanced by the researchers to account for the particular political behaviors observed. It is in these statements that the basic untested assumptions that the researchers hold about individuals and their relationships to politics emerge.

The assumptions that are deemed most fundamental to this inquiry are the assumptions that the researchers hold about women in American society, particularly their assumptions about women's relationship to politics. I suspect that researchers often began their studies with the assumption that men and women had different relationships to politics in American society. Such an assumption could be grounded in traditional ideas about how women's lives were bound up with the private, apolitical sphere and men's lives were bound up with the public, political sphere. It is difficult to prove the existence of these prior assumptions since one of the promises of scientific behavioral research is to expunge preconceptions from one's explanatory framework nor can I establish that these notions necessarily predetermined

the direction or the results of this research. Yet, in the process of providing explanations, i.e., reasons to account for women's political behavior, these preconceptions re-enter the explanatory framework in the guise of generally accepted truths about women and their relationship to politics.

In this investigation, the assumptions contained in the proffered explanations, i.e., the statements which look like general laws and initial conditions, must be spelled out and subjected to close scrutiny. The empirical foundations for these generalizations must also be fully examined if we are to evaluate the explanations presented for women's differential political behavior(s).

An additional reason for analyzing the proffered explanations carefully is to ascertain the kinds of changes each explanation implies would need to occur if American women were to be more fully integrated into the political system.

One of the contentions of this study is that the significant differences in the explanations posited for women's political behavior are linked to the differing assumptions about women and their potential for political action that emerge in the ad hoc explanations. While the explanations may proceed in a similar manner, the ad hoc explanations do provide differing understandings of women's political behavior and would lead policy in different directions. The question which emerges between different groups of researchers in this study does not really hinge on their commitment to

the ideal of deductive-nomological explanations and their utilization (even if only temporary) of ad hoc explanation. Rather, as we shall see, different researchers employ different assumptions about women and their relationship to politics; the distinctions between these assumptions assume significance because they would lead to policy recommendations that focus on different periods of women's life. The pivotal question here is at what point in a women's life does she begin to behave in politically different ways. The socialization studies argue that this occurs in childhood while the situational studies argue this occurs in adulthood. These explanations are competing behavioral explanations with regard to women's political behavior. They are competing because by insisting that one factor is most significant, subsuming these explanations under a single general theory becomes implausible.

While the goal of using the empirical evidence that has been collected in a number of behavioral studies to suggest the kinds of changes that need to occur in American society for women to be more fully engaged in the political arena is a stated intent of this study, it should be noted that the research being analyzed seldom presents recommendations about how change might occur. There are several reasons for this. First, as noted earlier, the primary tasks of behavioral research focused on describing and predicting behavior. These commitments are seen as different in kind from evaluation and

the recommendation of certain policy changes. In order to make the move from describing women's political behavior to recommending changes that would lead to an increase, these authors would maintain that I am moving from scientific explanation to evaluation, from fact to value. By asserting that women's participation ought to be increased, I am moving to a statement of moral judgment, and while I am free to do this, I should not confuse this enterprise with scientific explanation.

In the earlier statement of the objectives and assumptions of behavioral political science, Easton included the notion that fact and value can be and ought to be separated in scientific explanation.²¹ Usually this is stated by behavioralists as the possibility of studying political happenings and arriving at generalizations which are not influenced or biased by the observer's personal values. Conway and Feigert (in a scope and methods text) tell students of political science:

A political scientist can both assert value judgments and present empirical explanations but it is possible and equally necessary to keep the two distinct and separate.²²

Thus, while behavioral political scientists would not necessarily discourage me from using their explanations for the purpose of making evaluative statements, they would argue that the explanations advanced should not affect the evaluative judgments that I make.

I am arguing here from a different point of view. As a number of political scientists have pointed out, description is always from a point of view.²³ The explanations that are advanced in each of the succeeding chapters have implicit ideas about what social, political or personal changes would be necessary for more women to participate in politics, whether at the level of voting, forming political parties or running for political office. In the example used throughout this chapter women's lower participation is ascribed to women being exposed to social norms that disapprove of their voting. This is seen as an example of a presumed general law that groups who are exposed to social norms that disapprove of their voting will be less likely to vote. It makes sense to suggest that policy recommendations based on this study would need to suggest policy alternatives that make some logical connection to this explanation. While there may not be a single policy direction that is indicated, the range of alternatives appears limited. Policies that would attempt to either modify the social norms or women's reaction to them are strongly indicated. The crux of the argument is that given the explanation they have presented, Lipset and his colleagues would be justly criticized if they stated at the end of their research that they believed that women's political participation could be increased by declaring election day a holiday. Those people who reviewed this statement as a policy goal would justifiably ask the researchers what

evidence in their study supported this conclusion. Since none seems visible, if the researchers persisted in this policy recommendation, we might well ask what other assumptions or explanations the researchers were implicitly holding that made this policy goal a viable, corrective measure.

The major purpose in the succeeding chapters is to demonstrate that the behavioral studies under examination offer a variety of explanations for women's political behavior as it is observed. Usually, these explanations are of the ad hoc variety rather than the covering law model variety although the authors under consideration do not usually distinguish between these types; neither are they explicit about their purposes in explanation nor their commitments to particular explanatory formats.

The explanations advanced in these studies are, however, often accepted without examination of the process of explanation. Since these explanations embrace certain assumptions about women that do not have a sound empirical base, this acceptance seems unwarranted.

Furthermore, the explanations have a bias to them which lends support to the continuation of the set of conditions which the explanations purport to account for and frequently imply that the requirements necessary to overcome this set of conditions would be difficult to surmount.

The end result of these studies is to present a picture of women as an apolitical being, a picture which is

projected into the future as well as encompassing the time period of the research.

The goal of this dissertation is to submit these explanations to closer scrutiny with regard to their empirical and assumptive foundations and to make explicit the implicit policies that would need to be pursued if these explanations are correct in their perception of the reasons why women participate less than men.

C H A P T E R I I I

VOTING BEHAVIOR STUDIES AND THE EXPLANATION OF WOMEN'S POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

The major goals of the majority of the voting behavior studies prior to 1960 were the collection of empirical data on voting behavior and the subsequent use of these data to construct a general theory of political behavior.

In the process of gathering data, political behaviorists advanced ad hoc explanations to account for the recorded differences in voting behavior for social categories, such as class and sex.

With regard to women, the major statistical observation of these studies was that women's rate of turnout in elections was significantly lower than that of men. Thus, voting studies usually proffered some explanation(s) for why this difference occurred. From these explanations, a picture of (a)political woman emerges; women are portrayed as less interested in politics, less informed about politics, dominated by men with regard to political decisions, only interested in politics when moral issues are present in elections and more interested in the personality of the candidate than in political issues.

This portrait of women as a political being is often sketched from empirical evidence that does little more than substantiate that, at the time these studies were conducted,

women were not as likely to vote in elections as men. The portrait emerges from post factum interpretations or ad hoc explanations which are attached to the empirical findings. These explanations are important both in understanding the picture of women that has been accepted in political science and also in evaluating what directions policy recommendations would have to take if these explanations of women's lower participation are the correct ones, that is, if the explanations tap the real reasons behind women's lower voting participation.

While there are a large number of voting behavior studies, I have chosen to concentrate my attention on the following works listed in order of publication: Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, The People's Choice (1948); Lipset, Lazarsfeld, Barton and Linz, "The Psychology of Voting: An Analysis of Political Behavior" (1954); Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee, Voting (1954); Campbell, Guerin, and Miller, The Voter Decides (1954); Robert Lane, Political Life (1959); and Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, The American Voter (1960). Each of these studies presents some explanations for the observed sex differences. Most of these studies present ad hoc explanations which follow the general outline of the format presented by Lipset, Lazarsfeld, Barton and Linz that was discussed in the preceding chapter. Many of the authors, however, are not explicit about using this framework. More often, their ad hoc explanations are a series of statements

following a set of data; how they move from a particular set of data to a general statement about political behavior is not specified. But, usually, the sequence of the ad hoc model of explanation is observable.

In order to better understand their explanations for women's voting behavior, it is useful to clarify the significance that behavioralists attach to the voting act. Essentially, the authors included posit there are two reasons why individuals vote: 1. People vote to influence the policies of the government. 2. People vote in response to group pressures whether they believe particular policies will affect them or not.¹ Again, it should be noted that these are hypothetical explanations for voting. The first reason advanced contains at least two unstated assumptions, that people are able to perceive that particular policies will affect their interests and that people believe that voting is a method for affecting policy choices and is, therefore, a method for promoting their individual interests.²

The second reason advanced to explain why individuals vote is intended to explain why a person would vote even if they weren't interested³ or didn't perceive that their interests were at stake.

Non-voting, in this framework, is said to reflect the absence of either of these two incentives for voting: the absence of the belief that one's interests are involved or the absence of pressures from a particular group to vote.⁴

A third possibility for explaining non-voting is also offered, the idea that an individual may have conflicting reasons for voting which make it difficult to reach a decision. Rather than facing this conflict, voters may choose to withdraw from the election process.⁵

From this analysis of the voting act, Lipset, Lazarsfeld, Barton and Linz set out four statements which they label "explanatory propositions" as summations of the specific explanations for group voting differences that have been stated in voting behavior studies:

1. A group will have a higher rate of voting if its interests are more strongly affected by government politics.
2. A group will have a higher rate of voting if it has more access to information about the relevance of government policies to its interests.
3. A group will have a higher rate of voting if it is exposed to social pressures that demand voting.
4. A group will have a higher rate of voting if the pressures to vote are not directed in different directions so as to create conflict over which way to vote.⁶

Each of these statements is a generalization offering an hypothetical explanation of why groups are more likely to participate in political elections. If there is sufficient empirical evidence, these statements would be statistical laws in political science. In the ad hoc framework of explanation, these generalizations are Step 3 statements, statements that are hypothesized from the existence of particular data.

Since the social group of interest here is women who,

in all the voting behavior studies examined here, exhibit a lower rate of turnout than men, each of these generalizations could be utilized in a deductive manner to predict and explain a lower rate of turnout for women. Thus, explanations for women's lower rate of turnout could lie in women's interests being less strongly affected by government policies, in women having less access to information about the relevance of government policies to their interests, in women being less exposed or not exposed to the social pressures that demand voting and/or in women being cross pressured by conflicting demands and withdrawing from voting altogether.

In fact, the authors suggest that each of these explanations may have a bearing on political participation for women. As I review the unfolding of each of these possible explanations by Lipset and his colleagues, I will situate explanations offered by other researchers in terms of their agreement or disagreement with this Columbia group.

Lipset and his colleagues never directly hypothesize that women constitute a group whose interests are less strongly affected by government policies. Yet, that they believe that this is usually the case can be inferred from their explanation of an anomalous situation, an election where women's voting turnout is higher than they would have anticipated.⁷ Such an election took place in 1952 when women turned out in higher percentages than they had since the 1940 election. The explanation advanced to account for this anomaly proceeds from

an evaluation that moral issues are at stake.

Utilizing the model of explanation the authors initially present, we see that Lipset et al's explanation progresses in the following manner:

1. They observed a statistical fact which appeared to be an anomaly to the stated statistical regularity with regard to women's voting behavior: Women's rate of turnout was higher than it had been since 1940.
2. They reinterpret this by assuming that women have a greater interest in moral issues.
3. Groups who have greater interest in moral issues are assumed more likely to vote when moral issues are involved in the election, as they were in 1952.⁸

Looking more closely at the reinterpretation Lipset and his colleagues make, we see that their assumption that women have a greater interest in moral issues is attributed to conclusions recorded in an earlier study which observed that women had a higher turnout in election(s) where prohibition was an issue. The author of the previous study, Tingsten defined prohibition as a moral issue and the findings were generalized to assert that women were more interested in moral issues.⁹ As alluded to previously, what Lipset and his fellow researchers are doing at this point is picking up this hypothetical explanation of women's past political behavior as if it were a statistically observed fact that women do have a greater concern with moral issues.

Furthermore, they are making the assumption that moral issues are present in the 1952 election; the issues that they identify as moral issues are Communism and corruption. They

are also assuming that these issues of Communism and corruption were the most salient issues for women voters in the 1952 election, a fact which is disputed by Campbell and his associates who ascertained, through survey research that directly questioned voters about the important issues in the 1952 election. This research indicated that corruption was an important issue to some voters whereas Communism was not. Overall, Campbell and associates found that issues were not very salient to voters in the 1952 elections; issues contributed little understanding to why individuals voted in particular ways.

Because Lipset and his associates assume that women have a greater interest with moral issues, they predict that women will be more likely to participate when moral issues are at stake. Conversely, when they observe a higher participation of women, they look for moral issues that might be present to explain this greater explanation.¹¹

This line of reasoning also assumes that women constitute a particular type of interest group when it comes to political issues with moral content, that women in this situation will be more likely to vote in a similar fashion and less likely to vote as men do. Men may be split on moral issues but women will solidify as a moral interest group.

Because women are viewed as constituting this moral interest group which solidifies whenever moral issues appear in elections, a counter image of women and politics is

revealed when moral issues are not addressed in the political arena. Fewer women would be expected to participate in this situation because women as an interest group are defined by their moral interests. The researchers do not have to be concerned with the question of why more women don't participate. They can shrug off women's lesser political participation by suggesting that women will participate more fully when moral interests are at stake; otherwise, they predict that women will not be as likely to participate because women's particular interests are not directly at stake.

Recalling the standard of validation that Lipset and his colleagues outlined for the acceptance of a post factum interpretation, we see that their explanation relies on the notion that there is general acceptance in political science that women are more concerned with moral issues. One has to agree that this has been a commonly held assumption in both political theory and political practice. In political history, this idea of women was prominent in the debates regarding the extension of suffrage to women where both women's suffrage proponents and opponents accepted this assumption, although they utilized it in different ways. The proponents of women's suffrage argued that women would bring their greater concern with morality to the political sphere and help to purify a realm which was perceived as amoral. Opponents, on the other hand, argued that women's greater morality might be adversely affected by their entrance into the amoral sphere

of politics.

Just as this assumption has been commonly held in political science, so too do political behavioralists hold the same belief. A similar view of women entering the political sphere with well-developed moral views was advanced by Robert Lane in a discussion of the fears that various political interests had with regard to women entering politics and the hopes that reformers held for women becoming voters:

Distilling and brewing interests were particularly alarmed because of the association of women with prohibition; corporate interests reared radical tendencies; and political bosses trembled over the expected impact of female reformist zeal. On the other hand, advocates of women's franchise, men as well as women, claimed...the unique qualities of women would sweep corruption from the scene.¹²

What I am disputing is whether this study or any of the behavioral studies have satisfactorily substantiated that women have a greater interest in moral issues than men. What Lipset and his colleagues have provided us with is a particular assumption held by political scientists about women as voters, that they will be more concerned with moral issues, but it is an ad hoc explanation rather than a statistically verified fact. Yet, this explanation is repeated by other studies as if it was a clear statistical observation rather than a disputable ad hoc explanation.

Ad hoc explanations with regard to women's greater morality do not end with the generalization that women will be more likely to vote if moral issues are at stake. Rather,

additional ad hoc statements are advanced for why women qua women are more concerned with moral issues than men. Robert Lane, for example, asserts that women's greater concern with moral issues is a natural consequence of women's dominant social role as mother:

A proper concern and responsibility for the young tends to focus attention upon endangering in them a suitable morality.¹³

Presumably, women's greater preoccupation with endangering morality in her children leads to greater concern with moral issues in both the private and the public sphere. That is, Lane seems to infer that women's greater concern with moral issues derives from their roles as inculcators of morality in their children, one role of motherhood as he depicts it.

What must be questioned is whether this is a peculiar feature natural to all women who are potential mothers or whether it derives from the actual practice of motherhood, and, in answer to this question, Lane is fuzzy to say the least. On the one hand he asserts:

Women have special reasons to be interested in problems of price control, housing, zoning, education, playgrounds, prevention of war and so forth - all of which may be issues in national and local elections.¹⁴

Again these particular interests seem to be generated by women's roles as wives and mothers. The contrast here is that Lane is proposing that certain types of policies may have greater intrinsic attachments for women than for men which could lead women to turn out in larger numbers if these issues

are at stake in an election.

At another point, Lane seems to imply that all women, not just mothers, are different from men as voters when he asserts that the public holds images of men and women as voters that differentiate them by seeing women as reform voters, detached from any personal gain, while men are seen as individuals whose votes reflect only their individual self-interest(s).¹⁵ If we look more closely at the implications of this statement, it would appear that women are construed as not having self-interests around which they might form interest groups or assess public policies. Instead, some public-regarding interest is exhibited when they vote.

Lane implies that these sex differences on issues will always transcend class differences on issues where women are concerned:

Women's political role is not only experienced differently in different social groups, but is experienced as properly concerned with substantively different problems within the same social groups.¹⁶

Again, the implication is that there are certain interests that bind women together as voters regardless of differences in class, race, religion, etc., the social divisions which are usually presented as significant for men. From what we have seen, Lane seems to believe that women constitute a group whose fundamental concerns are moral and will be more active politically when moral issues are prominent in elections.

There is no further ad hoc explanation presented in Lane's account to hypothesize why women behave in this way, so we do not know if the results he sees are somehow "natural" to women or a consequence of their social roles or inculcated in their process of maturation, etc.

Lane's ad hoc explanations of women's voting behavior and women's political interests may have been widely held but there were some behaviorists who cautioned that women should be viewed as a social category with explanatory relevance in terms of voting behavior only on a short-term basis. In a voting behavior study conducted by Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee, few statistical differences between men and women were noted; the authors argued that such differences as were apparent would disappear over time.¹⁷ The ad hoc explanation they gave to account for this hypothesis was that there were very few policy issues that would persist over time which affect men and women differently.¹⁸ Social class, for these authors, was a more meaningful differential social category as a basis for explanation of political participation. What they are really arguing here is that there are relatively few issues, if any, that women have in common as women and will organize or mobilize around. Instead, women are viewed as more similar with regard to voting patterns, to other members of their social classes, male or female, than they are to other women of other social classes with regard to voting patterns. In this ad hoc explanation, presumably motherhood

as a common denominator for women in each social class would still be experienced differently and, thus, lead to different rather than similar sets of interests.

Women's roles as mothers are frequently part of ad hoc explanations of women's lower voting turnouts in other behavior studies as well. In the Lipset, Lazarsfeld, Barton and Linz study, women's role of mother is postulated as an ad hoc explanation for why women have insufficient time to pursue information about political issues.¹⁹

Looking at their presentation of this second explanation, we can understand that if a group is presumed to vote if its interests are more affected by government policies, it is logical that the group will need access to relevant information regarding policies and the various policy positions of the candidates and political parties and how these policies will affect their interests. Lipset et. al. claim that individuals must have sufficient leisure time to be able to gain access to this relevant information.

With regard to women, the Columbia study assumes that women have less information than men about how government politics will affect them. Although they treat this as observed statistical regularity, they do not document this regularity with any data from either their study or previous studies. Yet, they proceed with an ad hoc explanation as if this statistical regularity were well observed. The explanation they derive for women having less political information

is based on the assumption that women have less leisure time because their roles as wives and mother are so demanding. Less leisure time leads to less access to information about the relevance of government policies leads to less voting.

In persuading us to accept this post factum interpretation, the authors offer evidence of another observed correlation, that as one goes down the income scale, the difference between the turnout rate for women and turnout rate for men increases.²⁰ The relevance of this correlation to the preceding explanation is again hypothetical; the authors contend it lends support to the explanation that women are less likely to vote than men because they have less leisure time. The lower income woman is presented as having more children to care for and fewer labor-saving devices that she can afford, thus having less leisure time. While there is no doubt that women's class position greatly affected the amount of housework and childcare they did, (and, in fact, we could point out that working class women were also more likely to be employed outside of the home as well which would further constrict their "leisure" time) the authors have presented us once again with an explanation that needs further investigation before it is accepted.

The more general notion that motherhood is handicap to being able to cast a ballot is postulated by other voting studies. The statistical evidence is in dispute. For example, Lane, citing a 1924 election study, stated that very

few women cited motherhood as a factor in their not voting.²¹ But, in 1960, Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes stated that their data showed that mothers of young children were consistently less likely to vote than were the fathers of young children across all age levels and all educational levels.²² Campbell and his colleagues appear to be somewhat surprised by their statistical finding because this same group of mothers did not significantly differ from other women or other men in their level of political interest in the election. Since Campbell, Guerin and Miller hypothesize that political interest is one of the explanations for voting, that political interest is a motivation for voting, they are compelled to give an ad hoc explanation for why these young mothers, who exhibit political interest, are less likely to vote. Here, an ad hoc explanation is used to account for a failure in prediction.

The post factum interpretation presented by the authors is that "the presence of young children requiring constant attention serves as a barrier to the voting act."²³ Furthermore, they suggest that "if primary responsibility for young children leads to some reduction in turnout potential, this effect is likely to leave a permanent discrepancy in participation between the sexes."²⁴ (emphasis mine) If women's role as mother could leave such a permanent scar on the simple and not very time consuming act of voting, one imagines that its influence on other forms of participation, such as running for

office, would be even more perverse.

While the explanatory propositions that a group will have a higher rate of voting if its interests are more strongly affected by government policies and that a group will have a higher rate of voting if it has more access to information about the relevance of government policies to its interests seem to be linked to Lipset et. al.'s first concept of voting, that people vote to influence policies, the third explanatory proposition is based on their second concept of voting, that people will vote in response to group pressures in absence of the belief that policies will affect them. Far from being a group where social pressures are exerted to encourage voting, Lipset et. al. assert that women, as a social category, are exposed to social norms that disapprove of them voting. While they note that these social norms do not appear to be strong enough in the United States to prevent women who are interested from voting, they do believe that women with little interest can feel free not to vote and justify their inaction by reference to the idea that political participation is not "women's place." Within this framework, women do not experience group pressures to vote that would overcome disinterest. Men with little interest are still presumed to be called to the polls, apparently because social norms mandate this as "men's place."

This particular assumption, that men are more likely to vote even when not particularly interested in an election,

seems to be derived from the Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet study where researchers found that women expressed less interest in the 1940 election campaign than men and that women who expressed disinterest were less likely to vote than men who expressed disinterest.²⁵ Interest here was ascertained by asking, "Would you say that you have a great deal of interest in the coming election, a moderate interest, a mild interest, or no interest at all?" and then categorizing individuals in terms of high, medium and low interest.²⁶ These data are frequently presented as evidence that women are less interested in politics and also as evidence that political interest is a determinant of whether an individual votes.

Recalling that Lipset, Lazarsfeld, Barton and Linz assert that a group will have a higher rate of voting if its interests are more strongly affected by government policies, we might ask whether this question asking about people's interest in a coming election is an operationalization of concept of interest being used in Lipset and his associates study. At least in ordinary language usage, it makes sense to distinguish between an individual expressing interest in following an election campaign and an individual who follows an election campaign because he/she perceives that his/her interests may be affected by the outcome of the election. This distinction may account for the interest in the election campaign acknowledged by the mothers in the Campbell study who turned out in lower percentages than the authors would have predicted.

Interest, for these women, may not have encompassed the psychological involvement based on the perception of one's interests that Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet believe is entailed in their question.

The ad hoc explanation that Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet give for women who express disinterest in the election not voting is also of concern in my analysis:

If a woman is not interested, she just feels that there is no reason why she should vote. A man, however, is under more social pressure and will, therefore, go to the polls even if he is not "interested" in the events of the campaign.²⁷

The only additional explanation proffered for men's greater willingness to participate in the absence of interest is that they are better citizens, a statement that appears to imply that they accept citizenship as part of the male norms. Women, on the other hand, are quoted as justifying their aloofness from voting by reference to its lack of appropriateness for women. Lazarsfeld and his colleagues use the following comments made by women in their study to illustrate the fact that while the legal restrictions upon women's participation in politics have been removed, the attitude of women toward politics has not yet brought full equality with men:

"I don't care to vote. Voting is for men."

"I think men should do the voting and the women should stay home and take care of their work."

"I never have voted. I never will...A woman's place is in the home...Leave politics to the men."²⁸

In this manner, responsibility for women's disinterest in politics is primarily placed on her shoulders. Women must overcome their "...general indifference to current affairs" refuting the idea that public life is, by common consent, the man's realm.²⁹ Women must, in this argument, create the social pressure that will lead to their voting in the absence of interest.

The conclusion that Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet have reached with regard to women's lesser sense of citizenry and men's greater sense of citizenry is directly contradicted by the American Voter study where women were ascertained to exhibit a slightly greater sense of citizen duty than men as measured by their responses to four questions that are said to comprise a citizen duty scale.³⁰ Women were just as likely as men to have accepted these ideals of citizenship as men; in some cases, they even accepted them more fully. To Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, this finding merely negates the importance of citizen ideals as an explanatory variable for participation. Since it doesn't serve the purpose of explaining differences between social categories such as men and women, it is insignificant.

But Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes also believe that the existence of social norms that identify the political realm as a critical concern for males and a lesser concern for

females has hampered the full participation of females in the political arena. Vestigial sex roles, in their analysis, account for the differences between men and women's voting behavior. They use sex role basically as a social norm. A sex role for political behavior is the set of expectations about behavior proper for a male or female that involve political responses.³¹ Political sex roles, the authors maintain, were well-defined until the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution:

A man was supposed to be the political agent for the family unit. A woman not only had no need to concern herself with politics; to one degree or another, political activity was unseemly for her.³²

Since the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment, what might be seen as the traditional political sex roles are breaking down, according to Campbell et. al., at least in voting participation. But the process of obliterating these sex roles, which are depicted as deeply ingrained and not easily uprooted, takes time. That this process is far from complete at the time of their study is attested to, according to the authors, by the fact that women interviewees still sometimes referred interviewers to their husbands whom they identified as the people in the family who paid attention to politics.

Nonetheless, Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes believed that there was also evidence of the waning of sex roles in politics. Even though the observed differences in turnout rate between men and women was 10% overall, this

difference tended to decline or even disappear as women attained higher education. In fact, the data showed that among the young, the single and the married who had no children, there was "no average difference in turnout between men and women across categories of education and age, outside the South."³³ (In the South, the sex roles were seen as more well-ingrained and more resistant to change than in other regions of the country.) In this analysis, Campbell et. al. paint a fairly optimistic picture of the future for women in politics; with the lessening of traditional sex role ideals and the increase in women's education, political sex differences will seemingly disappear.

Yet, one is led to question to what extent the authors really believe that these sex roles are vestigial rather than continuing. As previously noted, woman's adult sex role as mother is viewed as a permanent handicap to women achieving full participation; certainly there is nothing vestigial about this. Perhaps the confusion arises because Campbell and associates have not always specified the differences between women's adult sex role and her adult political role. While they seem to be somewhat interested in changes in women's political role, their interest in changing aspects of her adult sex role that might impinge on her having a full political role does not seem to emerge. Thus, what started out looking like vestiges of traditional roles suddenly begin to look more like social norms we will have to live with. The

following example taken from the Campbell study serves as an illustration. Campbell et. al. discovered that women were more likely to score lower than men on the political efficacy scale that they constructed. First, they postulated the following explanation for the observed statistical difference:

Men are more likely than women to feel that they can cope with the complexities of politics and to believe that their participation carries some weight in the political process. We conclude then...what has been less adequately transmitted to the women is a sense of some personal competence vis a vis the political.³⁴

This explanation represents a tautology for, in fact, political efficacy is defined as personal competence vis a vis the political. But even more importantly, from our perspective, men's ability to develop this personal competence vis a vis the political is linked to the differences in the male and female sex roles operating in society:

The man is expected to be dominant in action directed toward the world outside the family; the woman is to accept his leadership passively. She is not expected, therefore, to see herself as an effective agent in politics.³⁵

Again one is forced to ask, are these vestiges of former roles for women in American society or are they aspects of women's current sex roles? Furthermore, are these aspects of women's and men's adult sex roles or aspects of their adult political roles; at least, we need to understand how it is that Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes distinguish between these in order to be sure that there is consistency. We are left

with the uncomfortable feeling that while certain aspects of women's political role may be changing, according to the authors, other elements of women's adult roles that may have an effect on the extent to which they can participate in politics are impervious to change.

In the preceding quotation by Campbell and associates, we also notice the assumption of male dominance frequently postulated in voting behavior studies. Again, Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet were among the first researchers to suggest that wives followed their husbands' dominance in voting. This explanation was presented when they discovered that of the 22 pairs of husband/wives in their study who had decided to vote, only one pair disagreed. Male dominance was credited with this agreement because of the results of a question asked to elicit whom the husbands/wives had discussed politics with in recent weeks. 45 of the women, randomly selected, cited discussions with their husbands while only 4 husbands reported discussing politics with their wives. The authors stated that if women were equally influencing their husbands, there would have been approximately the same number of reports from both sexes. Since only the women seem to be aware of the political opinions of their husbands, the authors conclude:

Men do not feel they are discussing politics with their wives; they feel they are telling them. And the wives are willing to be told.³⁶

While we can agree that women do seem to be more willing to

report listening to the opinion of their husbands than vice versa, whether this can be extended to the idea that men are aware that they are influencing their wives' political views or that their wives actually vote on the basis of what their husbands have told them is not verified.

The authors of the American Voter present a similar view of the woman depending on her husband for both information and direction of vote:

The wife who votes but otherwise pays little attention to politics tends to leave not only the sifting of information up to her husband but abides by his ultimate decision about the direction of vote as well.³⁷

The fact that women were so dependent on their husbands for both information and their ultimate decision about voting direction helped Campbell and associates explain why women's entry into the electorate had produced little change in the percentage of votes garnered by each party in elections:

The dependence of wife's vote upon her husband's partisan predispositions appears to be one reason why the entrance of women into the electorate has tended to make little visible difference in the partisan distribution of the national vote.³⁸

While both of the preceding quotations appear in the American Voter, they come from data and an ad hoc explanation from the 1954 study by Campbell, Guerin and Miller. In this earlier survey, men and women were asked to indicate primary group relationships that influenced their vote:

Of the married women who voted, 27% said that their husbands' opinions helped them to

decide on their voting choices as contrasted by only 6% of the married men admitting influence by their wives.³⁹

This evidence is said to support the commonly held assumptions that political agreement is more a function of wives voting the way their husbands vote than vice versa.

Looked at from a different perspective, the fact that only 27% of the married women report political discussions with their husbands might lead one to conclude that the commonly held assumption that women are politically dominated by their husbands is given insufficient support in this study to merit much further attention. Even the authors admit that the differences in percentages between men and women could be partially a result of women finding it more socially acceptable than men to report influence by their husbands, although they don't believe this represents a serious restriction on their research results.

Again, the evidence for the assumption of male dominance that is presented in the voting studies leaves much to be desired; its acceptance requires the existence of commonly held assumptions about relationships between men and women. These assumptions again relegate women to a political role that will always be unequal to that of her husband.

One additional "explanatory proposition" was cited by Lipset, Lazarsfeld, Barton and Linz as an explanation that appeared in voting studies to account for differences in political behavior between social categories. Lipset et. al.

predicted that groups would have a higher rate of voting if the pressures to vote were directed toward the same outcomes so that cross pressures did not create conflict over which way to vote. This explanation was applied to women only in countries other than the United States and, thus, is of little significance in this study. The example given for women relates to conflicting demands being placed on women in some countries by their social class and their religious participation. The hypothetical explanation here is that while women's social class might lead them to vote for leftist parties in some countries, their religious beliefs and active support for the conservative parties by the church might cause women to feel so conflicted that they would abstain from political participation altogether.⁴⁰

The framework that Lipset et. al. set out provides us with quite a clear understanding of the nature of the explanations advanced for women's different political behavior with regard to voting. The hard statistical fact that is noted here is women's differential rate of turnout, an undisputed fact of the time, although this statistical difference will decline in the subsequent decades of the sixties and seventies. But many researchers will report that these studies also documented women's lesser interest in politics, women's greater interest in moral issues, women's lesser information regarding politics, men's dominance over women with regard to politics and the existence of social norms that affect

women's political participation in a negative way. As we have seen, most of these observations cannot properly be assigned the label of facts.

Rather, they are interpretations of why women behave politically as they do, interpretations that are replete with poorly examined and poorly documented assumptions about women and their relationship to politics. These explanations will be picked up by other behavioral studies as if they were well-substantiated by empirical evidence and they will constitute the core of knowledge maintained by political science with regard to politics. Not only will we see the explanations presented as evidence in future studies, we will also see the form of explanation outlined by Lipset, Lazarsfeld, Barton and Linz being utilized in a less self-conscious manner by some of the later researchers.

One result of the voting studies was that they pointed subsequent researchers toward possible lines of inquiry with regard to further understanding the roots of the differences between males and females in political participation. In 1954, Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee posited that "A necessary condition for the persistence of political differences is their transmission to succeeding generations."⁴¹ A similar suggestion of transmission was found in the American Voter in their discussion of political efficacy.⁴² The idea that political concepts are transmitted to younger members of the society will lead some researchers to the study of

this transmission, which will receive the title of political socialization. The direction and goals of this research will be evaluated in the succeeding chapters.

Similarly, the discussion of women's adult sex roles and the political role contained therein will provide the beginning point for other explanations of women's political behavior which will concentrate on the barriers to women's political participation found in the adult years. This work will be evaluated in Chapter VI.

Finally, it should be noted that none of the voting studies were specifically interested in the particular voting behavior of women except as it related to their general explanations about voting behavior in general. This may constitute one reason little attention was given to the question of what necessary changes would have to be put into effect in order to increase the participation in politics by women.

But, since one of the major goals of this dissertation is to ask what policy recommendations are implied by the explanations advanced by political scientists with regard to political behavior, we must review the possible explanations that have been discussed here.

Most of the authors included here seem to believe that women are responsible for determining their own political fate, that women need only show more interest in politics, become more informed about politics, particularly with regard to how policies affect their interests, and show more

involvement with politics and they will change their political behavior. Women seem to choose their apolitical behaviors and, thus, they should be able to reverse them by choosing to act in political ways.

At other times, the explanations advanced seem to suggest that there are constraints in women's lives that make it difficult for them to be able to fully participate in the political system. These constraints are usually posed by the general notion of social roles or the more particular notion that women's role as a mother precludes her full political participation. The possibilities of changing these social roles or woman's role as mother to allow women greater opportunity for political participation are unexplored. Since we don't know how these social roles are maintained, we are at a loss to state how policies might be instigated that would attempt to change these constraints.

Similarly, we are left to wonder whether women have genuine political interests since some of these studies tend to equate women's political interests with policy decisions that involve questions of morality. If moral interests are the only political interests women have, there is little reason for us to be concerned if women only enter the political realm when these issues are of significance. But, if women can have, do have, should have other political interests as well, then their lack of political participation is a policy concern.

If attempts had been made to construct recommendations for increasing women's political participation, perhaps some of the contradictory assumptions contained in these studies would have surfaced more clearly and the difficulties with ad hoc explanations would also have been discussed by the practitioners of the behavioral method, not just the political theorists.

What the explanations that have been presented thus far do accomplish is to give us an understanding of the picture of political woman as she is portrayed in political science. Now, we must see how that picture develops more fully as political scientists, who are also behavioral scientists, take up the task of more fully explaining the development of political behavior, the process by which people form their regularized patterns of behavior.

C H A P T E R I V

THE EARLY SOCIALIZATION STUDIES

The accumulation of statistical data from the voting behavior studies and the general acceptance of these data as empirical evidence of other regularities in political behavior helped to spawn a number of research projects in political science. These concentrated on answering the question why do the observed differences, e.g., that social groups do not participate or take interest in politics to the same extent, persist over time. In psychology and sociology, behavioral social scientists posited an answer to this question by hypothesizing that differences in behavior resulted from a differential learning process; the process of learning different behavior as the individual matured was entitled socialization. Political scientists who adapted the idea of socialization to the study of politics were hypothesizing that if different groups in society exhibited different political behaviors, this was because they had been socialized into different patterns of behavior.

In theoretical terms we can say that these researchers were attempting to subsume the explanation of political behavior under a general theory which explained human behavior; political behavior was seen as a subset of human behavior. Women's political behavior, in this research as in the voting behavior studies, was approached only incidentally, that is,

as it was seen to have a bearing on the clarification of political behavior in general. The answer to the question of why men and women exhibit different political behaviors and why these differences persist over time are answered by the explanatory statement: they have learned to behave in politically different ways.

While the shorthand notion of political socialization provided an explanation for the persistence of different political behavior patterns, more than one theory of socialization existed in the social sciences. There was no general agreement on which theory of socialization was the more useful one or the correct one. Instead, political scientists have made numerous attempts to attach general theories of socialization borrowed from psychology and sociology to the study of politics, to develop a theory of political socialization as a subset of socialization theory.

In this chapter and the succeeding one, I am evaluating several attempts to construct a theory of political socialization; women's relationship to politics is explained as a product of her socialization process. Chapter V looks at the attempts of political scientists to adapt a specific theory of learning, social learning theory, to the study of politics. This chapter concentrates on the examination of three early studies of political socialization, Herbert Hyman's Political Socialization: A Study in the Psychology of Social Learning, 1959; Fred Greenstein's Children and

Politics, 1965; and David Easton's and Jack Dennis's Children in the Political System, 1969.

The key purposes of this dissertation need to be kept clearly in mind as we approach these studies. First, since the one purpose of this work is to assess whether the studies examined develop a general explanatory theory for political behavior and the political socialization studies had a central objective to develop a general theory of political socialization, I can assess how well this objective is achieved.

Furthermore, since we are most interested in the process of political socialization with regard to women, we need to evaluate how the general theory of political socialization incorporates an understanding of women's political socialization. How is this process different than that of men? What is the nature of the evidence provided for the explanation that women and men exhibit different political behaviors because they are socialized into different political behaviors? Finally, since a key purpose of this work is also to examine the logical implications of each explanation, to understand what kinds of changes would be needed if women were to become more political, each explanation is also evaluated in terms of the policy recommendations that most logically flow from its premises.

I state at the outset that none of the studies to be examined has an explicit, well-developed theory of political

socialization that is made clear to the reader. Rather, the major emphasis of each of those works seems to be the examination of the political knowledge, attitudes and interests of boys and girls. The intent of this research is to demonstrate that the roots of the observed adult differences were embedded in pre-adult lives. As many of the voting behavior studies had done with regard to observations about adult behavior, these studies often focused on recording the observed statistical differences between girls and boys with regard to politics without fully developing a theoretical framework for how these differences arose. Thus, most of the initial observations about the political socialization of boys and girls relied on post factum interpretations as explanations rather than developing a clear theoretical statement about the political learning process and how this process differs for males and females. Again, because many of these post factum interpretations have endured along with the statistical data regarding political differences between boys and girls, it seems worthwhile to begin the examination of the political socialization explanation by turning to these three early studies of political socialization and their explanations about the differences that occur between men and women in this process.

Herbert Hyman, whose work was the first full-length title to use the phrase "political socialization", arrived at his theoretical conclusion that political behavior is learned

through his research with the Columbia group. He credits two observed patterns of adult political behavior with directing him toward this conclusion: 1. the regularities in the political behavior of adult individuals over time and 2. the stable political differences between groups of adults over time.¹

Hyman recognizes that the observed differences in adult political behavior might be explained in terms of contemporaneous features present in the adult lives of the particular groups or individuals, but he believes that "the continuity of such patterns over time and place suggest that the individual has been modified in the course of this development in such a way that he is likely to exhibit certain persistent behavior apart from transient stimulation in his contemporary environment."² (emphasis his) Persistence in particular political behavior by adults constitutes evidence for Hyman that learning has taken place. If the process of learning is occurring, then researchers should direct their study to "the socialization of the individual, his learning of social patterns corresponding to his societal positions as mediated through various agencies of society,"³ according to Hyman. Different social groups, such as males and females, will exhibit different patterns of political behavior because they will have learned different patterns from their socialization agents. Women's lower rate of turnout, therefore, is a result of her differential political socialization process in Hyman's

explanatory framework.

While the title of Hyman's work promises us an understanding of the psychology of the social learning process with regard to politics, Hyman, in fact, never fully explicates a theory about how political learning takes place nor how this theory of learning differs for males and females. What Hyman does attempt is the documentation that political behavior is learned. To prove this thesis, he turns to an examination of political behavior in childhood already recorded in other studies. Hyman postulates that adult political differences will be mirrored by political differences between boys and girls.

Hyman is predicting there are observable political differences between boys and girls. The empirical evidence of these differences will be utilized as empirical substantiation for socialization as the explanation for political behavior. On the one hand, Hyman seems to recognize the limited standard of validation that he has set up:

Studies at a single point in time which establish variations in the behavior of children who differ in group membership do not show directly the learning or socialization process but do imply that the totality of experiences in that childhood status has left its mark and is responsible for adult patterns.⁴ (italics mine)

Yet, Hyman seems content with inferential evidence as support for his assertion that socialization explains the existence of behavioral differences. Thus, Hyman sets out to establish that political differences are already in existence for social

categories such as males and females prior to adulthood.

Obviously, boys and girls do not directly participate in the political process, even at the level of voting. But Hyman proposes that precursors of adult political participation can be observed in certain aspects of boys' and girls' lives. The process for identifying precursors and the linkages between precursors and adult political participation are never clearly delineated. Yet, the existence of these precursors is assumed to be of critical importance to later participation.

Hyman presents four indicators, all of which have been observed in previous studies that he considers to be precursors of adult participation. The four indicators cited are choice of ego-ideal, media behavior, level of political knowledge and responses to questions that directly ask about the individual's political interest and political involvement. The general hypotheses that underlie the selection of these indicators, while not clearly stated, anticipate that boys will show greater interest in reading and hearing about politics (media behavior differences), that boys will have more political knowledge than girls (level of political knowledge), and that boys will respond to direct questions testing their political involvement and political interest with answers that suggest they are more politically involved and politically interested than girls.

Each of these hypothetical statements seems to evolve from

explanations that voting behavior researchers posit for women's political behavior: women were seen to be less interested in politics, less knowledgeable about politics and less involved with politics. Hyman, accepting each of these explanations, is suggesting that girls, when compared to boys, will exhibit similar disinterest, lesser knowledge and less involvement.

The assumptions behind the concept of ego-ideal are more difficult to clarify and evaluate. The term ego-ideal is most commonly associated with psychoanalytic theory, although Hyman does not credit his usage to any particular psychological paradigm. That he may be following the psychoanalytic usage is suggested by references he makes to the concept of identification, another concept primarily, although not exclusively, associated with psychoanalytic theory. Identification and ego-ideal are linked in psychoanalytic theory in the sense that identification is defined as a learning process in which children unconsciously mold their own ego-ideal after that of the parent or other significant adult model.⁵ The studies that Hyman classifies as measuring ego-ideal ask children to identify the figure they most admire or would most like to resemble. The person identified in responses is then classified in terms of their incorporation into politics. Hyman sees this response choice as the child's political ego-ideal, a model for his/her own conduct. The existence of such a model is expected to motivate the child in directions that are

congruent with the ideal.⁶ The more political the ideal, the more likely, Hyman asserts, that the child will be moved toward adult political participation.

Without challenging the notion of whether ego-ideals are formed by children and whether they serve as models for emulation, let us examine what constitutes a political ego-ideal in this study. In the list of works reviewed by Hyman, boys are found to be more likely to pick public or historical male figures as the persons they most admire or would most like to resemble. Girls, on the other hand, tend to pick parents, teachers and acquaintances for their "ideals."⁷ The models chosen by the boys are judged to be more political which leads Hyman to the following conclusion:

We may regard the type of ego-ideal chosen as being a model for the child's conduct and therefore, as motivating him in directions congruent with the ideal. Thus, already at early ages, boys are directed toward politics and here lie the seeds of the adult differentiation everywhere found in the studies of political participation.⁸ (italics mine)

Carrying Hyman's explanation to its logical conclusion one explanation for women's lower participation would be that the ego-ideals they choose to emulate in childhood are insufficiently political and, therefore, don't serve to direct them toward politics.

Even if we accept Hyman's operationalism that historical and public figures are inherently more political than parents, teachers and acquaintances, we must still point out some difficulties that arise with respect to this explanation of

women's lesser concern with politics. First, the cited studies were conducted between 1900 and 1930; the particular studies cited for the United States were conducted in 1903 and 1930. Surely, in the study conducted prior to woman's attainment of suffrage, there should have been little reason to assume that girls would choose to emulate political figures that they had no hope of becoming as adults. After all, political participation, defined as voting by Hyman, wasn't an option for most women and holding political office was even less attainable. Thus, by questioning the validity of applying cross-cultural data and historical data that preceded the 19th Amendment, the empirical evidence for this hypothetical explanation is reduced to evidence obtained in one study.

An additional problem arises with respect to the evidence. First, it may be questioned whether a concept such as ego-ideal which is stated to be unconsciously held can be evoked and measured by a question which asks an individual to name the person he/she most admires or would most like to resemble. This criticism is more than a challenge to the usual difficulties of operationalism; it is asking whether the unconscious can be brought to the level of consciousness by merely asking the right question.

Finally, there needs to be some attention to the question of whether boys and girls should or could adopt ego-ideals of the opposite sex. Hyman's operationalism of political ego-ideal

as primarily public, historical figures means that an overwhelming majority of political ego-ideals would be male. Girls then would have few political ego-ideals available to them who were also female.

If the concept of ego-ideal is borrowed from the psychoanalytic framework, the choice of an opposite sex-ideal would be discouraged since there would be potential psychological conflict for the development of the girls' gender identity. In order to become political, if Hyman's analysis is correct, girls may need to choose to emulate (male) political ego-ideals who are more readily available or choose to emulate female (apolitical) ego ideals who are also in great supply. Unless more female political models emerge, there seems to be little possibility for girls to develop as both female and political persons. Thus, Hyman seems to have created a psychological double bind for women with this explanation.

If ego-ideal is an indicator of women's political behavior that emerges in childhood is not well-documented, what evidence is provided for the other indicators? Hyman hypothesizes that the lesser political interest exhibited by adult women, verified in the voting behavior studies, will be mirrored by the existence of a lesser political interest on the part of girls.

In the previous chapter, we noted the various usages of the term interest and the assumption that political interest is directly related to adult participation. Hyman is

hypothesizing that adult political interest is fostered by the development of political interest in childhood. The use of political interest here seems most akin to ordinary language usage of expressing curiosity about politics or showing a desire to learn more about politics without any necessary implication that the individual has particular policy concerns that can be resolved in the political arena. This seems especially clear when we consider that neither boys nor girls can have a direct impact on the political system as it is presently constituted. Again, whether a generalized interest in politics will increase as one grows older and affect one's adult political behavior is not substantiated nor are the conditions for testing this linkage laid out.

Political interest, in Hyman's analysis, is operationalized in terms of the type of reading children did and the types of radio programs that they listened to in their leisure time. Political interest in reading material is purportedly exemplified by choosing history, biography and literature relating to non-home areas such as science and general information. These are the materials cited most frequently by boys. Girls selected fiction and home-type literature as their reading choices in this set of studies which range from 1898 to 1927.⁹ Studies conducted in 1936 and 1941, respectively, found boys to be more interested in radio programs that contained news and politics and more interested in reading political articles in newspapers.¹⁰ But, again, how the development

of political interest is linked to one's choice of childhood reading materials and how this childhood political interest is linked to adult political participation is not explicated. Nonetheless, Hyman contends that he has proved that boys have more political interest than girls.

Hyman also cites a number of studies as empirical evidence for the hypothesis that girls are less knowledgeable about politics than boys, another assumed precursor of political participation.¹¹ Hyman points out that if we assume that "opportunity and intellectual capacity are equal among different groups of children, it is reasonable to regard differential levels of knowledge as indicative of degrees of involvement."¹² Here political knowledge seems two steps removed from political participation; political knowledge is hypothesized to increase political involvement which is hypothesized to lead to an increase in adult political participation. Two studies are cited to show that boys have greater political knowledge than girls. One study, conducted in the 1920's and published in 1937, found that on knowledge of such concepts as candidate, polling place, political party, ballot, platform, primary election, etc., boys in every grade level from 5th to 9th grade show consistent superiority in political knowledge.¹³ A 1942 sample of high school youth which included an information test that contained political items also found boys to be better informed than girls about politics.¹⁴

To this point, we have reviewed the empirical evidence

presented for three indicators: ego-ideal, political interest, and political knowledge. Hyman maintains that there is empirical substantiation for each of these that lends support to the theory of political socialization even though he recognizes that the three indicators may appear "...somewhat approximate to the reader."¹⁵

His fourth indicator is the asking of direct questions about political involvement or political interest. Here he assumes everyone will see the responses as directly related to future participation. Presumably, at this point, the posited underlying differences between girls and boys will emerge even more clearly. But after discovering that in Remmers' study of 3000 high school students conducted in 1952, sex differences were negligible when students were asked, "How closely have you been following the political conventions this year?", a question that Hyman believed directly tested political interest and political involvement, Hyman switches the social category he is using for analysis from sex to social class.¹⁶ The socio-economic differences in Remmers' study closely parallel adult findings, according to Hyman, although the sex differences do not. The explanation for this abrupt shift is contained in an assertion made earlier in the study:

The socialization of children into politics can be established equally well from the study of sex differences or class differences in the political behavior of children. Since regularities in the political behavior of adults have been established in most of the usual social categories, it serves us equally well therefore in demonstrating that there are earlier

developmental stages to use interchangeably studies on one or another of these groups.¹⁷
(emphasis mine)

Interchangeability presumably works for Hyman because he is not interested in establishing what the differential socialization process is for either of these social categories, merely that there are beginnings of political differences that can be shown for either of these groups in pre-adult life, which to him, is sufficient empirical evidence that politics does not merely acquire importance in adulthood. The switch to social class, at this point in the discussion, seems to occur, at least in part, because social class differences on political issues which are believed to be related to political ideology and party preferences are more clearly upheld by Remmers' study than sex differences. To state the claim more boldly, on questions which Hyman assumes directly test political involvement and political interest, the empirical evidence he has at hand does not confirm that significant differences exist between boys and girls.

Summing up to this point, Hyman has not demonstrated very satisfactorily that political differences between girls and boys exist. Two of Hyman's indicators, the direct questions relating to political interest and involvement and ego-ideal have little empirical substantiation. The operationalization of the concept of ego-ideal and the operationalization of the concept of political interest are both open to skepticism. More importantly, how any of Hyman's indicators are linked to

adult political participation is left to the reader to discern.

Even if we grant that political differences between males and females have been clearly established by Hyman, a highly questionable conclusion given the evidence provided, we are still left to question why Hyman assumes that learning about politics has taken place and how this learning occurred. The evidence presented thus far seems just as congruent with an explanation based on a natural predisposition toward politics by males. How politics is learned is unfortunately never clearly laid out for us. We can, however, set out some fundamental assumptions that Hyman has about political socialization that are implicit in his study and further question how this process is hypothesized to differ for girls.

At least initially the learning process outlined seems to be similar for all the groups to be socialized in the society. Socialization is presented as a gradual developmental process which occurs throughout the lifetime of the individual. But, within the life cycle, childhood is viewed as the most fundamental period in which socialization occurs. Hyman avers that survey evidence indicates that, by the age of 16, the individual's political orientations are well-formed and not very disparate from the orientations of individuals in their twenties.¹⁸ Thus, he exhorts researchers to concentrate on the study of childhood as the primary period of political socialization. His emphasis on childhood as the primary period for political socialization also seems to be dependent upon a

fundamental assumption that he makes: that what is learned early is learned well and persists over time.¹⁹ This statement contains two assumptions which are found in many political socialization studies. First, it is assumed that politically relevant content is transmitted to the individual early in life. This has been labeled the transmission principle.²⁰ While the transmission principle assumes that politics is transmitted from one generation to another, the process by which this occurs is rarely delineated. This is particularly true of Hyman who sets out the conditions for empirical verification that transmission occurs by positing the following methodology:

When children and their parents are measured independently and agreements in political view are established, it supports the inference that the family transmits politics to the child.²¹

This is about as close as we get to an understanding of how, in Hyman's framework, political learning takes place. Parents transmit political learning to their children; how remains a mystery.

The second assumption that Hyman makes about learning is that learning that takes place in childhood is somehow learned better and is more enduring than learning that occurs later in life. This has been labelled the primacy principle.²² Again, while this is a fundamental assumption in Hyman's framework, it is never subjected to investigation nor are we given reasons for believing that this fundamental assertion is correct. This principle is particularly important from the standpoint

of making policy recommendations that could lead to an increase in women's political participation; the implication is that if individuals do not learn to be political as children, the probability that they will be political as adults is low. If this is an accurate assessment, then any policy recommendations concerned with increasing women's political participation would have to focus on their childhoods.

The fact that Hyman sees the family as the transmitter of political views to children and the fact that he sees childhood, the major period of life when children are under care of their parents, as the major period of political socialization leads to his assessment that parents are the major political socialization agents. We have seen that he posits that the process of political socialization can be substantiated by examining the correlations between the parents' political views and their children's political views.

Initially, Hyman attempts to provide evidence that parents transmit both their party identifications and their ideology to their children through socialization. When he examines the evidence found in other studies, however, he discovers that parents appear to be more successful at transmitting their party identifications to their children than their ideologies.²³ What this means is that greater correlations exist between parents' and childrens' party identifications than between parents' and childrens' opinions about political issues, Hyman's operationalism of ideology.

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Since Hyman hypothesized that both of these correlations would be significant, he posits an ad hoc explanation for why the correlations with regard to party identification were higher. In this explanation, Hyman recognizes that it is difficult to assert that a child is learning a set of specific political behaviors or positions on ideological issues since his/her actual participation in politics won't occur until adult life when the issues that are present may differ significantly from the political issues faced by his/her parents. He hypothesizes that party identification, on the other hand, can be retained from childhood to adulthood and can serve, in adulthood, as an organizing principle for handling the new issues which arise on which specific socialization has not occurred.²⁴ In this analysis, Hyman assigns party identification the status of a psychological structure which will mediate the individual's responses to political issues and events in adulthood. This is even more clearly brought out when he discusses the types of events that could lead one to change one's party identification. Here he refers to party identification as a 'stable psychological phenomenon.'²⁵ The fact that Hyman has granted party identification this psychological structural status means that if he is correct, party identification will be fairly impervious to erosion or change, although Hyman doesn't totally rule out the possibility that change can occur under extraordinary circumstances.

Hyman does recognize that the family is not necessarily

a monolithic unit in the process of political socialization, which is how he has presented it thus far. In fact, Hyman states that each parent can and may act as an independent agent in the political socialization process, whether or not the parents are in agreement or disagreement about politics. While this appears to be a reasonable set of assumptions, its uniqueness rests on the fact that, in later studies, many researchers assume that the influence of the family can be equated with the influence of the father, who is often presented as the primary familial agent of political socialization. Hyman states that the existing evidence at this point in time is too scanty and inconsistent to aver that one parent is more important than the other in political socialization.

In fact, the transmission of parental party identification to the child could be said to be more successfully achieved with female offspring than with males, according to the research data presented by Hyman.²⁶ This might lead him to conclude that parents are more successful in the political socialization of their daughters than their sons, given Hyman's analysis that transmission is substantiated by correlation, though Hyman does not state this conclusion.

Rather, Hyman cautions that the girls' reliance on parental models may have negative consequences for girls; this dependence on her parents as models for emulation could stifle the political development of the girl unless she is in a very active political family, particularly one in which other

members besides the father are politically active.²⁷ Boys, on the other hand, are presented as being open to influence from a variety of possible models so that if their familial models are not particularly political their opportunities to be politically socialized by other agents are greater. What Hyman is asserting as an assumption here is that the male sex role and female sex role have some differences that may pose difficulties for the adequate political socialization of the girls. The male sex role, in his opinion, permits greater independence, which on the one hand accounts for the attenuation of parental influence on the political behavior of the boys and at the same time provides them with opportunities to orient themselves to models outside the family.²⁸ The female sex role keeps the girls more closely tied to the home and their families so that if girls are not located in a political family the opportunity for them to be politically socialized toward active political participation will be constrained.²⁹

Once again, these are ad hoc explanations with regard to girls' political socialization, explanations which contain unexamined and unsubstantiated assumptions about the relationships between girls and their parents. These ad hoc explanations arise at a point in his study where it might be stated that girls more clearly exhibited the statistical relationship that was expected to substantiate the existence of political socialization, i.e., there was a higher correlation between the party identification of girls and the party identification

of their parents than between the party identification of boys and their parents.

Although Hyman doesn't tell us that he expected the correlation to be reversed, i.e., boys' party identifications to be more highly correlated with the party identification of their parents, I suspect that this was his acting hypothesis, and faced with statistics which supported the opposite relationship, he needed to be able to suggest some explanation which would account for this result and still account for the fact that males were more political than females.

The material presented in Hyman that discusses the family as an agent of political socialization makes no attempt to suggest how parents behave as agents. We don't know if parents recognize their roles as agents of political socialization or whether they are unconscious actors in what appears to be an unconscious process.

Hyman does state that some families may present no explicit political socialization. Since he has also posited that political socialization is a gradual process, he leaves open the possibility that additional agents and events can have influence on the individual's political behavior. Other agencies are viewed as influencing the formation of political ideas, the development of political interest and the acquisition of specific knowledge about political processes. What he is recognizing here is that the cognitive content of the 16 year old is substantially more developed than that of the

5 year old. In fact, Hyman turns again to some of the studies already discussed to show that there is a gradual development for boys in the strength of some precursors of political participation over time. He cites a 1936 study to show that boys tend to discuss news increasingly as they get older; for girls, discussion of news remains consistently at a low level.³⁰ Similarly with regard to choice of ego-ideals, "the patterning of ideals among boys in the direction of political figures shows a strong increase with age, but for girls the patterns remain relatively fixed and apolitical despite increasing age."³¹ A 1930 study which also noted a progressive rise in the identification of boys with public figures with age also leads Hyman to conclude that "the choice of parents (as ego-ideals) wanes for boys whereas the idealization of parents remains more stable among girls with age."³² Thus, boys seem to increase their interest and involvement with politics throughout the pre-adult years whereas girls seem to maintain a low level of interest and involvement so the gap between boys and girls should increase over time.

Hyman leaves us with a clear understanding that while the political socialization process is gradual and developmental for boys, girls do not develop in the same way. In fact, we are not quite sure that there is much political development at all for girls. If the gap between boys and girls in political socialization increases with age, the possibility of girls ever achieving an equal level of political socialization

is cut off. If we had a better understanding of how the developmental process proposed here occurred, we might be able to posit changes that could include girls in this developmental process; instead, we are left with the impression that girls are fated to remain hopelessly underdeveloped politically.

Throughout my summary and analysis of Hyman's presentation of political socialization as learning, I have returned several times to the fact that Hyman never explains, even in a speculative manner, how political socialization takes place. One possible explanation for his lack of attention to this as an issue is that he is basically unconcerned with the how of the political socialization process. Perhaps, he would even relegate that particular task of delineating how socialization occurs to the social psychologists, as Dawson and Prewitt do when they warn that:

Political scholars should guard against letting their intellectual energies and research resources be drained into social-psychological queries, however important they may be. The payoff in political socialization theory is not with the question posed as individual learning. More important are questions about the consequences of political socialization for society.³³

It is clear that Hyman agrees that one of the primary reasons for studying political socialization is to understand its consequences for the society rather than the individual. He states that if individuals didn't learn their political behavior early and well and persist in it, not only might there

be no observed statistical regularities about the political behavior of social groups, there might even be chaos in the political system.³⁴ Perhaps it is this focus on the effect(s) of the political socialization process on the political system rather than its effects on the individual that frustrate our understanding the differences in that process for boys and girls. While Hyman intrigues us with the possibility that differential political behavior for women may be learned, he fails to illuminate this process for us in a meaningful way, primarily because of his reluctance to address the question of how the learning occurs.

One of the most critical unanswered questions about the learning process regards the nature of the relationship between the learner and the person from whom he/she learns. The parent is defined as a transmitter but whether the transmission is intentional on the part of the model is unclear. Neither is it clear whether the modeling is conscious or unconscious.

The significance of these questions relates to the fact that frequently Hyman seems to place the responsibility for the results of their political socialization squarely on the shoulders of the girls. This surfaced most clearly in the evaluation of the statistical data on the precursors of ego-ideal and political interest. By not making it clear how ego-ideals come to be selected, Hyman makes it appear that girls could reverse their process of political socialization by choosing appropriate political ego-ideals. Similarly, in the

data on political interest, the girls' choice of (a)political reading material was seen to have a bearing on their girlhood political interest and, subsequently, their adult political interest. Again, if girls would choose to read more political materials, they might be able to reverse their political socialization. If this choice is unconscious rather than conscious on the part of girls, then we must question whether the process can be reversed by such a simple method.

Furthermore, since we don't understand what responsibility the model has in this process, it is difficult to evaluate how the interaction process would need to be altered if the outcomes of women's political socialization process, as Hyman sees them, were to be reversed. The one example we have with regard to the constraints of the interaction process between political socialization agents and the individuals being socialized involves parents and daughters. Hyman saw parents restricting the freedom of their daughters, keeping them more tightly bound to the home and suggested this could be a detriment to the political socialization of girls, who were less exposed to additional models to emulate.

Looking at the implications of these explanations, it is difficult to clearly outline policies that would help to increase women's political participation. We might state that if these explanations are correct, general policy goals that stimulate the political interest of girls should be encouraged. Similarly, the explanations suggest that girls should be

encouraged to choose political ego-ideals and that girls should be given more latitude and freedom outside of the home to expose them to additional political models.

While Hyman's work may fail to illuminate how women's political socialization process transpires and fail to convince us that the observations about political differences between boys and girls are necessarily meaningful or linked to their subsequent adult political behavior, nonetheless, the study is important in an evaluation of socialization studies because it was the first study attempting to explain the acquisition of political ideas as part of the social learning process. While Hyman spoke of socialization as social learning, he did so in a broad sense rather than applying the psychological theory of social learning to the study of politics. A similar usage was applied by Fred Greenstein in his survey research study of New Haven, Connecticut school children.

Overall, Greenstein's study found very few significant political differences between boys and girls; he still devoted a chapter of Children and Politics to reviewing the observed differences in adult male and female political behavior, providing childhood data to reinforce some of these conclusions, and also providing us with new hypotheses about the process of socialization for girls.³⁵

One of the first variables that Greenstein looked at was political information: his hypothesis was that boys would

be more politically informed than girls, since men, as he notes, are more politically informed than women.³⁶ The operationalization of this concept was a series of questions that asked for the names of the mayor, governor, and president, descriptions of their duties and descriptions of the legislative bodies at every level of government.³⁷ Greenstein does not provide us with a table of statistical results. He merely states that "the amount of political information held by this group of school children was infinitesimal."³⁸ Even so, he concludes that at all grade levels boys are judged to be significantly better informed about politics than girls. How one establishes significance when dealing with infinitesimal knowledge is not clarified. Presumably, whatever low level of knowledge existed resided with the boys. Some researchers might have decided, given the low levels of knowledge, conclusions about significance were unwarranted. At the very least, we must question whether the empirical evidence cited lends support to the hypothesis that is advanced. My judgment is that it is questionable statistical evidence.

Greenstein clearly needs this statistical difference between boys and girls to be significant, for it is a statistical observation that bolsters another hypothesis in his framework: "Differences in interest precede differences in information."³⁹ Having already presented "evidence" that boys are better informed about politics than girls, Greenstein proceeds to show boys' greater interest in politics,

which as he sees it, is a priori, a necessary although insufficient condition for seeking out political information. Given their interest in politics, boys will seek out political information.

Political interest was operationalized as giving "political" responses to questions such as "Can you think of a news story which made you happy? angry?"; "Name a famous person you want to be like"; and "If you could change the world in any way you wanted, what change would you make?"⁴⁰ Boys were considered to be more political than girls in responses to the first and second question which is reminiscent of Hyman's "ego-ideal" category.

Unfortunately, the coding of "political" responses to these questions is not well reported. We are informed in a footnote that responses to the news story question were coded following a broad use of political.⁴¹ Greenstein also tells us that the most frequently cited political news stories concerned satellite competition between the United States and the Soviet Union.⁴² Political responses to the question, "If you could change the world in any way you wanted, what change would you make?", are not cited, but Greenstein tells us that girls were more likely not to respond at all to this question or, when they did respond, to suggest a distinctly non-political change such as "get rid of all of the criminals and bad people."⁴³ Now, perhaps it is out of political context to suggest that such an answer might have been coded as political

in the late 50's or the early 60's when Greenstein was conducting this research, but clearly in today's context it is difficult to see why this is necessarily a less political response than the boys' interest in satellite competition for which we might suggest alternative bases for interest, such as science or fantasy, rather than politics. Thus, the statistical evidence for boys' greater political interest is also questionable.

Greenstein, at this point, takes these "proven" relationships, that boys are more interested and more involved with politics and constructs an ad hoc explanation for these political behaviors which is rooted in assumptions borrowed from psychologists. His general explanation is that girls and boys behave in politically different ways because they learn different non-political behaviors which lead to differences in political behaviors.

The non-political differences of interest to Greenstein are psychological differences between males and females that Greenstein believes affect the development of political differences. Greenstein notes three differences, that he believes have been verified by psychologists, that he feels have contributed to males being more involved in politics.

First Greenstein notes that males tend to exhibit aggressive and dominant behavior more frequently than females; according to the psychologists he is citing, this difference emerges early and is observable at all age levels.⁴⁴ Greenstein

maintains that this psychological observation may have a bearing on the issue positions of men and women. Here he claims this observation may account for women's tendency to be more pacifist, which he cites as a finding of previous research.⁴⁵ He also states that this psychological difference between men and women may have a bearing on participation, as well.⁴⁶ While he doesn't explicate this statement, presumably the more aggressive individual, i.e., the male, would participate more fully or more frequently.

The second observation that is brought in from psychology is that women have a more absorbing interest in persons and personal relations. Here, Greenstein connects this difference to women being more likely to be candidate-oriented, another observation which is not directly tested in his own data but is a restatement of data from the American Voter⁴⁷: a restatement which misrepresents the evidence presented there. Greenstein implies that women are more candidate-oriented than men and implies that men were more issue-oriented. The Campbell study found that generally issues were not very significant to voters in the 1952 election, male or female, and that women were slightly more candidate-oriented than men.⁴⁸

His third observation from psychology is more directly relevant to the general statement he has presented that boys have more interest in politics and subsequently acquire more political information. He discusses non-political interest differences that have been observed among girls and boys:

their differential interest in toys and reading material. Boys, he reminds us, choose toys that reflect male activities outside of the home: soldiers, fire engines, steam shovels while girls choose toys symbolic of home and femininity.⁴⁹ Girls read stories about home and school while boys read violent or outdoor adventure, sports, travel, exploration and war.⁵⁰ Boys prefer history and social science courses while girls prefer English and foreign languages. How do these non-political differences relate to political differences between males and females?

It is only a short step from the variations between the sexes in their interest in social studies and their civic grades to the greater political information of young boys. The step is slightly but not much longer from reading stories about the Wild West, rather than stories about home life, to interest in Washington news rather than New Haven news. Both of these steps seem to be related to the general non-political division of labor between the sexes in American society and to the early learning of this division as manifested in the 5 year old boy's insistence on playing with a toy soldier or fire engine and the girl's selection of the doll.⁵¹

What Greenstein is emphasizing here is that boys and girls develop differently in terms of non-political behaviors and that many of these non-political behaviors have a direct linkage to later acquisition of political behaviors. The political differences for males and females are also contingent upon the development of different sex identities which, according to Greenstein, are developed "through differential

opportunities, rewards and punishments which vary by sex and by identification with one or another parent. Among other things, this learning process associates girls with the immediate environment and boys with the wider environment. Political responses, developing as they do, relatively late in childhood, fall into the framework of already present non-political orientations."⁵²

What Greenstein seems to suggest here is that sex role socialization precedes and defines the possible limits for the later political socialization. Girls are at a political disadvantage because of their sex-role socialization, which to some extent, must precede and define the limits of their political socialization.

Thus, even though there were relatively minor political differences between boys and girls in his study, Greenstein is pessimistic about whether these sex differences can be obliterated:

The present data cast particular doubt on theories which suggest that political sex differences will disappear in the near future on the assumption that such differences derive mainly from adult experiences. An adequate theory must account for the psychological underpinnings of political sex differences, understood in terms of sex roles in the society, how they develop and what maintains them.⁵³

Again, as with Hyman, we see the postulation of the persistence of political socialization differences on the assumption that what is learned in childhood becomes psychologically embedded and, therefore, is particularly difficult to change.

While one might suggest that alternative models of sex role socialization might facilitate changing the political differences between males and females in this model of explanation, and that while this might be a difficult task, it is still within the realm of possibility, Greenstein's understanding (explanation) of the linkage between sex role socialization and political socialization becomes less clear in the following passage:

Politics, although not of deep interest to children of either sex, is more resonant with the "natural" enthusiasms of boys. Other psychological bases also will be found. For example, the need to conform to cultural definitions of masculinity is often bulwarked by powerful feelings. This need is complemented by the severe penalties which departure from the cultural definitions may bring. Women who find it especially threatening not to be "feminine" and who see politics as a male function, will be drawn into the political arena only at the cost of great psychic discomfort.⁵⁴

Here the psychological bases of the sex roles, as Greenstein presents them, take on a quality of deterministic imperative. To deviate from the learning of one's sex role promises dire consequences that might better be avoided. There is almost a threat here that natural order would be disturbed if men and women were to become politically more similar. Better to leave life as it is and not disturb the natural balance.

The more "natural" interest in politics by boys seems to be reinforced, in Greenstein's explanatory statement, by societal insistence on differential sex role and psychological internalization of these roles by males and females. For

women, the penalty for entry into politics, inappropriate for their sex role, would appear to be psychological distress. The exact nature of the learning process is no more clearly substantiated in Greenstein than it was in Hyman although there are hints that political socialization is linked to sex role socialization and that the sex role socialization of males includes an orientation toward the political arena.

Thus, attempts to modify the political socialization process for girls that Greenstein has outlined would necessarily have to address the fact that sex role socialization precedes and delimits politics socialization. Policy recommendations would need to place some emphasis on the process of sex role socialization, a process which is only briefly commented on but not fully developed by Greenstein.

Again, the role of the parents, as agents of sex role socialization and political socialization is unclear. Do girls and boys choose the toys Greenstein sees as a precursor of political interest or do parents choose the toys for these children? Who is responsible for choosing reading materials? Do sex role socialization and political socialization agents discourage children from choosing in ways that are inappropriate for their sex? None of these questions are answered by Greenstein.

Furthermore, there is in Greenstein's brief explanation of girls' political socialization the implication that one

should not attempt to alter the process, to attempt to make girls more political. There is the threat that, in some way, this might disturb the psychological balance of the girl. It is in this statement that Greenstein seems most contradictory. If he truly believes that political behavior is learned, then he should be able to maintain that what is learned is alterable. Here, again, it is the prior sex role socialization that he believes may be threatened and this sex role socialization seems almost "natural" rather than learned.

This question of the relationship between sex role socialization and political socialization is a significant one if one goal of examining the socialization studies is to make policy recommendations that could lead to an increase in women's political activity. Are sex role socialization and political socialization separate entities or is sex role socialization a subset of sex role socialization? While Hyman seemed to opt for separate entities, Greenstein subsumes political socialization under sex role socialization or, at least, suggests that sex role socialization establishes the contours in which political socialization develops.

In the final study to be evaluated in this section, Children in the Political System, published in 1969 by David Easton and Jack Dennis, the question of how political socialization interfaces with sex role socialization is also significant, although they approach this question from the standpoint of the political system rather than the individual.

Easton and Dennis contend that political socialization is particularly related to the persistence of political systems and the legitimation of political authorities. Therefore, their interest in understanding sex differences in political learning is concerned neither with the consequent effect on the individual nor possible effects on policies or voting decisions.⁵⁵ Instead, they focus on the role of sex differences in maintaining the stability of the political system:

Sex enters the analysis for us only as it affects the relative depth of the commitment or the type of response that is made. (i.e., to the political system and political authorities)⁵⁶

According to the authors, all of the data they gathered indicated small but pervasive sex differences.⁵⁷ Thus, again there is a questionable empirical foundation for the assumption of differences between women's and men's political socialization.

As we have seen in other studies, the process of how political socialization occurs, i.e., how political learning takes place, is not clear but there are two aspects of this process that Easton and Dennis purport they are particularly interested in. They suggest that as the child matures in age, he/she will develop politically in two ways: 1. They hypothesize that the child becomes increasingly politicized in elementary school, as revealed in his/her recognition of government. As part of this development, which they label as politicization, the child learns to distinguish between public and

private authorities and, at least, initially, will give greater weight to public authorities. 2. The child's cognitive image of government also is hypothesized to develop during this same time frame with the early dominance of personalization in the cognitive image of government gradually superseded by an institutional image.⁵⁸

What Easton and Dennis are proposing with these hypotheses is that the results of political socialization in early years should be 1) an increase in the child's understanding of government and 2) the adoption of the notion that government is a set of institutions rather than men or particular individuals. Since Easton and Dennis have already informed us that sex differences are relevant in their study, we expect their findings to indicate that girls will lag behind boys in their development of an understanding of government and will tend to retain a cognitive image of government that involves personalization of governmental authority rather than shifting toward institutionalization.

The operationalization of the first hypothesis, that the child becomes increasingly politicized in elementary school, was a question that asked the respondents in the sample, 2nd-8th graders, if they understood the meaning of the word government. Girls, at every level in the survey, were more likely to say that they did not understand the meaning of the word government than boys were. The difference was greatest in the younger age groups.⁵⁹ Easton and Dennis interpret this finding

to mean that "the young male has a higher probability of becoming politically sensitized from the beginning of the age span."⁶⁰ This is construed as giving boys a definite edge in political development by invoking the primacy principle:

The young male, more likely to have been sensitized to government early, is then in a position to develop deeper and more lasting orientations of other kinds toward the government.⁶¹

The political realm is apt to become a better-rooted part of the young man's conceptual and attitudinal framework.⁶²

The boy's earlier understanding of government presumably presents a handicap to girls that is difficult for them to overcome although, as the data in this study demonstrates, 68%-91% of girls in the grades surveyed indicate they do understand the meaning of the word government while 73%-91% of the boys understand the meaning.⁶³ Since the majority of both boys and girls indicate they understand the term, Easton and Dennis's generalization which seems to place all girls behind all boys in development is excessive. Crucially, from a purely methodological standpoint, the fact that no follow-up question ascertained whether, in fact, the respondents did understand the meaning of the term government, leads one to wonder how accurate the results are for the data presumed to be measured here.

Clearly Easton and Dennis believe that the understanding of the word government is a pre-requisite for advancing in other precursors of politics, such as political interest,

political involvement, etc.; but they neither make these connections clear, nor do they provide evidence to support these connections.

To test the hypothesis that children are increasingly able to distinguish between public and private authorities as they progress through elementary school, Easton and Dennis presented the respondents with the following question:

Here are some people. Which ones work for the government? Does the _____ work for the government?⁶⁴

In this way, the children were asked to identify whether the milkman, the policeman, the soldier, the judge, the postman, and the teacher were public or private employees.

Easton and Dennis's interpretation of the data obtained from this question indicates that the sex differences they find are small, fairly consistent, and suggest a slightly faster rate of politicization for boys.⁶⁵ The differences are clearly small; they are less clearly consistent if the end conclusion is that boys are better able to distinguish which individuals are publically employed and which individuals are privately employed. The data for the fifth through eighth graders shows that girls and boys are equally able to distinguish the soldier and the judge as public employees; boys are slightly more able to identify the milkman as a private employee while girls are slightly more able to distinguish the policeman as a public employee.⁶⁶ From grade 2 through grade 8, boys are consistently more able to identify the

postman as a public employee while the girls are consistently more able to identify the teacher as a public employee.⁶⁷ Between second and fifth grade, the data do suggest that boys are more aware that the soldier and postman are public employees and slightly more aware that the milkman and policeman are private and public employees, respectively.⁶⁸ While Easton and Dennis maintain they have substantiated a faster rate of politicization for boys than girls, their own data suggests that by eighth grade, girls have pretty much caught up with boys in this area. The advantages of earlier politicization are again assumed, but we have no way to assess how meaningful earlier development is in terms of a lasting effect on the system's persistence, which is the authors' concern, or on the politicization of the individual, which is my concern. The assumption that this early learning will lead boys to develop deeper and more lasting orientations of other kinds toward government may be assumed,⁶⁹ but this is not validated in the data. Instead, we have a picture of girls developing a little more slowly but apparently in the same direction as boys in terms of this criterion.

In order to ascertain whether the girls' cognitive image of government changes from a personalized image to an institutionalized image at the same rate as boys, Easton and Dennis asked three questions. First, they gave students a list and asked them to select the two choices from this list that they believed best symbolized the government of the United States.

The possible items for selection were policeman, George Washington, Uncle Sam, voting, the Supreme Court, Congress, the Capital, the flag, the Statue of Liberty and President Kennedy. In second grade, the two most often selected responses were President Kennedy and George Washington, for both the boys and the girls. Among eighth graders, the most popular choices for both boys and girls were Congress and voting, with President Kennedy the third most often selected response for the girls; boys were fairly evenly split between the Statue of Liberty, the Supreme Court, Uncle Sam and President Kennedy as the third most often selected response. Easton and Dennis' interpretation of these data stresses the fact that roughly twice as many girls as boys (29% to 16%) still pick the current president as an important symbol of government in grade 8.⁷⁰ Their post factum interpretation of the data concludes:

In this sense, girls remain political "primitives" (relative to the direction of aggregate development) on the average two or three years longer than boys, if we can project from our figures. Indeed the tendency for personalization of authority persists into adolescence (age thirteen or fourteen), for a significant proportion of females, whereas for males the tendency has declined considerably.⁷¹

Similarly, boys' greater likelihood of choosing Congress as most representative of the United States government, a difference which is sharpest in fourth, fifth and seventh grade, where it is a 7-8% difference, is evaluated as showing that boys have a more impersonal approach to government.

Correspondingly, if not as sharply, boys more often pick Congress as the best representative of government, indicating a greater impetus toward a more impersonal institutional interpretation.⁷²

The significance of this movement toward an impersonal institutional interpretation is, that as Easton and Dennis have set out their criteria, this is a sign of political maturity. In their framework, one must make this movement from a personal to an impersonal understanding of the functioning of government. Since girls are seen as less likely to do this, they are labeled political "primitives".

Congress, in this analysis, represents the mature institutionalized cognitive image of government while the president is depicted as the immature personalized cognitive image of government. Children in this study were asked to identify the chief lawmaker in the country to test whether the development of this political maturity occurred faster in boys than in girls. The younger children chose the President as the chief lawmaker. As grade level increased, both boys and girls were more likely to pick Congress as the chief lawmaker, although the percentage of girls who do so is usually smaller, albeit not always significantly smaller, at each grade level. The interesting aspect of this statistic is that by fifth grade, well over 50% of both boys and girls have learned that Congress is the chief lawmaker in the country. By eighth grade, 85% of both sexes identify Congress as fulfilling this function. Most students have clearly incorporated the notion that Easton and

Dennis expect to find with political maturity, that the Congress should be identified as the chief lawmaker in the United States.

Similarly, responses to the question, "Who does the most to run the country?" depict a gradual shift from the President to the Congress over grade levels, although, in this case, in every grade, the majority of boys and girls cite the President as doing the most to run the country. From grade 5 on, girls are more likely than boys to state that the President does the most to run the country. Easton and Dennis see this as a less politically mature understanding of the American political system by girls, recalling here that political maturity should lead one toward emphasizing impersonal institutions. Girls seeing the President as more important in the running of the country is considered evidence that girls personalize politics more than boys.

The understanding of political maturity that is presented here seems highly problematic. The authors have introduced their own political bias when viewing Congress as more important than the President in the running of the American political system. Secondly, they assume that an acceptance of the President as the key figure in running the country relies on an acceptance of the presentation of the personal image of the man who is President rather than an understanding that regardless who holds the office, the institutional power of the Presidency is substantial. They also ignore the extent

to which the President of the country tends to dominate the media presentations of politics and political activity in the United States. Perhaps, the greater wonder is that so many children have learned the traditional view of the separation of powers in the United States which casts the Congress as the chief legislator.

As was true with Hyman and Greenstein, Easton and Dennis have done little to advance our knowledge of how girls are politically socialized in a different manner from boys. Yet, they have presented us with a model of girls who seem politically deficient, political "primitives" as they capsulized them, always trailing behind boys in development of political understanding. Since the process that allows for this uneven development is so unclear, we are hardpressed to make suggestions about how changes in female political socialization might be wrought within this framework. Girls are left with their deficiencies with no obvious avenues of escape. The early development of political differences is seen as a barrier to future political development, depending on one's sex. Only at the end of this analysis do girls receive a suggestion of future possibility when Easton and Dennis note that the minor differences in their study may reflect a lessening of politico-cultural sexual differentiation. Sex typing was, in fact, transmitted from adults to children less than the authors expected.⁷³ In other words, Easton and Dennis fully anticipated more substantial sex differences than they actually

uncovered. When these differences fail to materialize as completely as they expect, the lack of these differences is reinterpreted to suggest that the learning of politically relevant sex differences is lessening.

The most important consequence of the socialization studies reviewed thus far is that the image of (a)political woman presented to us in the voting behavior studies is now complemented by an image of (a)political girl. Girls are presented as less interested in politics, less knowledgeable about politics, less politically mature, more interested in the personal images of politicians than in political issues. The foundation of women's lower participation is thus seen to lie in women's childhood experiences rather than in adulthood.

This picture of (a)political girl is constructed on an evidential foundation that is statistically unsound, yet the observations are frequently asserted by later studies as fact just as occurred with the statistical observations in the voting behavior.

While no clear theory of political socialization emerges, frequently the authors reviewed here borrowed, without critical examination, assumptions from psychology regarding the psychological characteristics of girls and boys. Whether or not these assumptions are well-substantiated empirically in psychology is not a concern of these authors. They assume that the observations are well-founded and can be applied to political socialization. From these studies, no clear theory

of political socialization can be formulated although we can see that all of the authors believe that it is the fundamental explanation for the continuity of regular behavior patterns.

The authors evaluated here have at least three major assumptions they agree upon: 1. that political socialization is the major explanation for differences in political behavior; 2. that the process of political socialization occurs in childhood; 3. that the results of political socialization are difficult to overcome later in life. If we look even more closely, we can see that within each of these assumptions there are suggestions of policy consequences. For example, the age at which political socialization occurs is an important question if one wants to address the question of what policy changes need to be made for women to participate more fully in politics.

While all the authors agree that political socialization occurs in childhood, the question of exactly when in childhood seems unclear. None of the authors specifically answer this question, although Hyman seemed to indicate that the process was complete by age 16. Easton and Hess's concentration on studying grades 2-8 established the idea that they locate political socialization in the elementary school and junior high years of the child. Greenstein also looks basically at elementary school age children. Thus, it would seem that policy recommendations based on the assumptions of this study would need to concentrate on the pre-adolescent period

if change was to be promoted. Furthermore, since all these authors believe that attitudes and beliefs established in childhood political socialization are difficult to extinguish in adulthood, there is even more reason to assume that meaningful policy recommendations would concentrate on this time period.

An additional question with regard to the age of political socialization is related to understanding how political socialization and sex role socialization are interrelated. It seems unlikely that these processes can be neatly separated, that is, it is difficult to imagine that agents of socialization allot ages 0-6 for sex role socialization and then take up the task of political socialization. It seems more likely that both tasks proceed over the same time periods and that girl's sex role socialization does have a bearing on her political socialization.

Now, this question is particularly important with regard to assessment of the policy implications of these political socialization studies. If girl's sex role socialization establishes limits for her political socialization, then policies that attempt to modify her political socialization without regard for her sex role socialization would be doomed to failure.

The most difficult assessment to make with regard to how the political socialization process could be changed so that more women would participate in politics, assuming that

this explanation is an accurate one, is how to instigate this change. For the most immediate consequence of not understanding how the process of political socialization process works and, in particular, how women are differentially socialized, is to have very little idea of how to intervene in the process. We must be able to understand how women learn that politics is a male perquisite not just that they learn it to address this question. As part of this process, the relationship between the learner and the agent(s) of political socialization must be made more explicit.

As we have seen, one of the most important inconsistencies in each of these studies is that the authors seem ambivalent about who should be held responsible for the political socialization that occurs. While explanations that see political socialization as part of a general learning process, even though this process is not made explicit, might assign responsibility for what is learned to the teacher(s) or agent(s) of political socialization, these studies frequently place this responsibility on the learners instead. Girls appear to have learning deficiencies when it comes to political socialization and, somehow, girls will have to overcome these learning deficiencies in order to be adequately politically socialized.

If the political socialization studies thus far examined have provided the correct explanation for women's adult political behavior even though their empirical base is weak and their theory is not well-elaborated, the outlook for increasing

women's political participation seems bleak unless we can further understand political socialization as a process. Perhaps, a more explicit theory of socialization will enhance these prospects. This is the focus of the succeeding chapter in which attempts by political scientists to attach a particular theory of socialization, social learning theory, to the study of politics are examined.

C H A P T E R V
SOCIALIZATION STUDIES AND SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY

In the early socialization studies we saw that political scientists attempting to develop a theory of political behavior explained the observed differences in political behavior between men and women by positing that behavioral differences were learned. They, then, turned their attention to the study of childhood political behavior looking for substantiation that these behaviors were learned. Failing to provide a clear theoretical framework, these researchers often resorted to ad hoc explanations for girls' political behavior, explanations that told us more about the assumptions of the researchers than about the reasons why girls learned a different set of behaviors.

As socialization studies proliferated in political science, political scientists made increasing attempts to explicitly adapt specific psychological and sociological theories of social learning to the study of politics. One of the most popular psychological theories that researchers attempted to adopt was social learning theory, a behavioral theory of psychological behavior. The advantage of adopting social learning theory to a behavioral study of politics seemed to be that there was already significant data in psychology to support the theoretical assumptions. Using this as an explanatory theory offered the possibility that deductive

hypotheses could be generated and tested.

In psychology, social learning theory is a developed set of assumptions on which hypotheses have been stated and tested. Most political scientists who adopt social learning theory state that they are incorporating that theory as postulated by Millard and Dollard¹ and later modified by Bandura and Walters.² Its adaptation to the study of politics has ignored the richness of the theory concentrating instead on a few of the key assumptions that seemed relevant to the study of political socialization. In the following summary of the major assumptions of social learning theory, I rely heavily on Herbert Hirsch's interpretation of social learning theory in Poverty and Politicization.³ Hirsch, in turn, relies most heavily on Millard and Dollard and Bandura and Walters.

The most fundamental assumption of social learning theorists is that the individual arrives in society as a tabula rasa.⁴ In the process of political socialization, the individual is molded into political citizenry by political socialization agents.

The early learning process of the child, in its simplest form, is based on trial and error. A situation, also labeled a cue, arises to which the individual makes a response. The response will be rewarded, punished or ignored by significant others: parents, teachers, peers, etc. Responses that are rewarded are said to be positively reinforced. The expectation is that positively rewarded responses will be used the

next time a similar situation occurs.⁵ Responses that meet with punishment or are ignored are said to be negatively reinforced; should a similar situation arise, it is assumed that the individual will not use the previous response but will try a new response.⁶

In the early learning experiences of an individual, with her dependency on others, social stimuli acquire positive or negative reinforcing values because they are initially associated with a variety of primary reinforcers, such as food, water or the removal of aversive conditions such as physical discomfort.⁷ Gradually, the infant will come to value not only these primary reinforcers but also secondary reinforcers, such as attention, approval, affection, praise, criticism, and tangible rewards such as money, honors, medals, and grades.⁸ By the time the child has passed through infancy, most of the occurrences that regulate behavior will imply social consequences rather than direct rewards or punishments. Just as the possibility of receiving praise or affection might motivate an individual to respond in a way that will secure rewards, the possibility that praise or affection might be withheld could lead the individual to an alternative response. The individual being socialized is presumed to act in a utilitarian fashion, maximizing the amount of praise or affection obtained as much as possible. Gradually, the individual may develop a standard of behavior that he/she self-reinforces.⁹

Millard and Dollard postulated that imitation is the

major type of response behavior for individuals. As a concept, imitation has several usages which often make it difficult to determine the precise meaning to a particular theorist. Three subtypes of imitation were outlined by Millard and Dollard but only two of these subtypes seem to have been adapted to the study of political socialization, "matched-dependent behavior" and "copying".

In "matched-dependent behavior", the leader or socialization agent is able to read the relevant environmental cues while the follower is not. In this situation, the follower is perceived to be dependent upon the socialization agent to indicate appropriate action in particular situations.¹⁰ The socialization agent is actively attempting to get the follower to approximate the appropriate behavior and positively rewards the individual when this behavior is attained.

In copying, the leader or model for the behavior is less aware or perhaps unaware, at least initially, that his/her behavior is being imitated. Hirsch states that "the copier must slowly bring his response to approximate that of the model and must know, when he has done so, that his act is an acceptable reproduction of the model act."¹¹ This seems more likely to occur after a child has developed a generalized concept that rewards will accrue for imitation. He/she can initiate the imitation and, if it is positively reinforced, will incorporate the behavior into his/her repertoire of positive responses.

In addition to these two sub-types, imitation is frequently used to refer to observational learning, a modification of social learning theory attributed to Bandura and Walters. Hirsch states that "observational learning depends upon the learner's being exposed to real-life models who perform intentionally or unwittingly patterns of behavior that can be imitated by others."¹² In other words, individuals watch the responses of significant others to particular situations and the manner in which these responses are received. In this way, the individual can accumulate a repertoire of possible responses to situations he/she has yet to experience himself/herself.

Social learning theorists maintain that most learning takes place on a vicarious basis through observations of other persons and environmental contingencies rather than direct reinforcements of the person's own behavior.¹³ Symbolic mediation can also affect learning; verbal or written instructions can communicate expected consequences of behavior and convey information about the rewarding or punishing power of objects, providing a shortcut to direct or observational learning.¹⁴ In this way, individuals might learn entire patterns of behavior by watching others or responding to verbal messages. Observational learning should speed up the process of socialization for individuals since not all learning will need to occur through trial and error. The observation of how parents and peers react in certain situations may

provide the child with adequate information about appropriate societal responses or the range of responses that are acceptable in particular situations.

Frequently, imitation and observational learning are used interchangeably to suggest that the individual is learning through the observation of the behavior of significant others without explicit awareness that either the observed or the observer are aware of the process. Sometimes, this process is also referred to as "modeling". Occasionally, imitation is even associated with identification, a concept which was attributed to the Freudian framework in my evaluation of the early socialization studies. Identification is a process where the individual tries to be another person, internalizing the model's attitudes as well as imitating the model's behavior.¹⁵ These variations need to be kept in mind as we examine the explanations of women's political behavior in the social learning theory socialization studies.

In the application of social learning theory to the study of political socialization, there is an assumption that politics is learned in the same fundamental way as other learning occurs. Political responses can be viewed as acquired response patterns according to Hess and Torney¹⁶ and Hirsch.¹⁷ Identifiable agents of socialization act as resource mediators for political information providing the individual with models for imitation. Imitation and observational learning lead to the acquisition of political beliefs.

Kenneth Langton posits the following social learning theory scenario for the child's acquisition of his political party identification:

A child seeking parental attention may hear his father announcing proudly that he is a Republican, his father and his father's father were Republicans, and any honest and decent man could not be anything but a Republican. The child responds by announcing proudly that he is a Republican and is rewarded by receiving attention.¹⁸

In Langton's example, the father puts out cues regarding his own party identification and the superiority of the Republican party, in general. The child, who appears to be male, responds to the cue with the announcement that he is a Republican, an imitation of his father's behavior and receives positive reinforcement for this position. Langton recognizes that the child, at least initially, will have little understanding of the father's reasons for identification with a particular party; he is merely imitating his behavior. Presumably, as the child matures, he may incorporate some of his father's beliefs about the Republican party as well as his party label. Langton's example can be viewed as an example of observational learning in the political socialization process.

H.T. Reynolds outlined the following example of a girl being politically socialized also using social learning theory as his model of explanation:

Sally Rae and her family are watching TV.

The six o'clock news shows Senator Sanborn, a Democrat, making a speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars. Sally, who is 14 and doesn't follow politics at all, suddenly and almost impulsively says, "Gee, he's good-looking. I'd vote for him." Her father frowns and replies, "Sanborn! He's a bum." The matter is dropped and Sally, not being interested anyway, goes upstairs to finish sewing a dress.

Two days later while watching TV with her family, Sally again sees Senator Sanborn but she says nothing.

The following week her father is reading Newsweek. Senator Sanborn is on the cover. "He doesn't look too honest," Sally says.

Mr. Rae grins. "That's right, honey. Sanborn tries but most Democrats just can't run things right."

Sally asks if Sanborn is a Democrat.

"Yeah, he's a Democrat all right. And like most of them, he doesn't know what he's doing."

The next day Sally tells her older brother that she doesn't like Democrats.

He responds, "Sis, that's the smartest thing you've said all day."

Sally Rae is beginning to dislike Democrats.¹⁹

Sally's initial response to the cue situation of seeing Senator Sanborn meets with scoffing from her father, which is interpreted as a punishment since it constitutes a withholding of her father's approval or praise, which Sally is assumed to value. Two cues later, Sally ventures another response; this one receives reinforcement from her father. Additionally, it provides her with a political generalization that applies to Democrats as a category, that Democrats are incompetent. Sally receives additional reinforcement for her newly incorporated

judgment about Democrats from her brother. Since she has twice been reinforced by significant others, H.T. Reynolds assumes that Sally Rae is developing a party identification which will lead her to vote for non-Democratic candidates.

The contrast between Reynolds' and Langton's examples of political socialization is that while Langton seems to locate the learning of one's political party identification in childhood, Reynolds locates it in adolescence. This discrepancy between political socialization theorists about what age children acquire their political attitudes hinges on a number of factors. Some of the theorists will argue, as we have seen previously in Hyman's, Greenstein's and Easton's and Dennis's accounts, that early learning is particularly difficult to extinguish; in social learning theory terms, this is explained by the fact that it is learned under conditions of partial reinforcement.²⁰ Similarly, it is argued that "...early learning interferes with and limits later learning."²¹ Yet, no social learning theorist can totally shut out the possibility that learning will continue throughout the individual's lifetime because new learning is always possible as the individual is exposed to new models for emulation and because socialization continues to be dependent on reinforcement contingencies; that is, throughout their lives, individuals must continue to receive rewards for particular behavior or at some point they will stop behaving in a particular way.

While those who stress that early childhood is the primary period of political socialization maintain that if political socialization occurs early enough, it is more resistant to change, those who stress adolescence as the major period of political socialization point out that this age group has greater cognitive ability to assess complex political concepts than young children do.

The other major distinction that occurs is that those who locate political socialization at a later age must take into account that sex role socialization is already well developed. Usually, these theorists are more likely to see political socialization as a subset of sex role socialization, where sex role socialization has a great impact on the political socialization that occurs.

Looking back at the Sally Rae example we can see that Reynolds incorporates several of the ad hoc explanations regarding women's political behavior in his assumptions about Sally Rae and the way she views the world. He also gives us clues about her sex role socialization, which clearly preceded her political socialization.

First, Reynolds presents Sally's initial response to Sanborn as a personal one where she comments on his good looks as a basis for casting her vote. Here we have the voting behavior view of women making voting decisions on the basis of the candidate's appeal, being candidate-oriented as Campbell et. al. state.

When Sally's father responds negatively to Sanborn, Sally quickly exits to pursue the feminine pursuit of sewing a dress, a clear indicator that her sex role is well-entrenched. In the same sentence, Reynolds indicates that Sally was disinterested in the news anyway. We aren't too surprised to find that Sally Rae is disinterested because this was a fundamental assumption about women in the voting behavior studies and girls in the early socialization studies.

Reynold's example leaves us with a great deal of curiosity. Presumably, Sally Rae learned the aspects of her sex role socialization in basically the same way that, at age 14, she is learning her political party identification. We are left to wonder whether her brother's political socialization process would be described similarly or whether his sex role socialization would have led to earlier political socialization.

Since the process of socialization would begin at birth, it is logical that the first available models for imitation are the members of one's family. Parents are seen as the most available models for imitation in both the sex role socialization and the political socialization of boys and girls.

Psychologists who posit social learning theory as an explanation of psychological behavior maintain that in sex role socialization, girls model their same-sex parents, their mothers, while boys model their same-sex parents, their

fathers.²² In this framework, the child will acquire his/her appropriate sex-role through the learning process. As the child imitates the behavior of particular models, he/she will be reinforced for imitating the proper behaviors for his/her gender. While boys and girls may start out by imitating their mothers, fathers and siblings, through the systems of rewards and punishments appropriate sex behaviors will be positively reinforced while inappropriate sex behaviors will be ignored or punished. Over time, the child develops a generalized distinction of male and female which results not only from his/her own experience but also from observation of male and female models and the behaviors they perform in certain situations. While children may begin to perform sex-appropriate behaviors because they are more often rewarded and less often criticized for imitating same-sex models, gradually they learn that the social environment holds similar expectations and imposes similar reinforcement contingencies on them and others of their sex.²³ Once children attain gender constancy, they will attend even more to same-sex models than previously.²⁴

This explanation of sex role learning stresses that girls are more likely to imitate female role models while boys are more likely to imitate male role models. Thus, if one assumes that an individual's political socialization is intimately connected with one's sex role socialization, one would assume that the mother is the most important political socialization agent for girls while the father is more

important for boys.

Frequently, however, political scientists who utilize social learning theory suggest that the father is the major political socialization agent in the family. In this explanation, the father is portrayed as the most political person in the family and, therefore, presents the clearest model for political imitation. If one assumes that political socialization is a separate process from sex role socialization, this would mean that the father could be a political role model for both the male and female child. But if political socialization is a subset of sex-role socialization, then a persistent tension is created here. If the father is the most political person, the fact that the father is also male could reinforce the notion that politics is more sex-appropriate for males and, therefore, should not be imitated by females. If this is the case, then if females attempt to imitate such behavior, they would not receive positive reinforcement. This tension is illustrated by Langton and Jennings:

Men are more visible politically at the mass and leadership level and politics is generally assumed to be sex-appropriate for men, whereas doubts prevail regarding women in politics. Therefore within the family, the father will probably have more influence on the children's political values than the mother.²⁵

On the one hand, they seem to posit that fathers will have a more significant impact on the political socialization of their children, male or female, but since at the same time they are suggesting that politics is more congruent with a

male sex-role, they set up a contradictory situation for females becoming more political.

A second hypothesis which provides a different basis for seeing the father as the most important political socialization agent in the family rests on observations by social psychologists that children are more likely to imitate the resource-controller or the most powerful adult in the family.²⁶ While one might posit that either the mother or the father could be the resource-controller in the family, usually political socialization theorists assume that the father will play this role if he is in residence in the family. The resource-controller is assumed to be imitated as a model because of his greater rewarding power and this rewarding power is posited to be more significant than the sex of the observer in imitation.²⁷ Thus, girls would behave in ways that were actively rewarded by their fathers; if their fathers rewarded their political behaviors, they would be more political, and if their fathers discouraged or negatively reinforced political behavior, they would be less likely to be political.

These questions of whether girls and boys basically learn their political roles from their mothers or fathers and how this process is related to their more general sex-role socialization are important ones for establishing patterns of change in the future. Therefore, it makes sense to determine what evidence exists to evaluate the relative influence of the mother and father in the political socialization

process.

Three studies which have a direct bearing on these issues are Herbert Hirsch's Poverty and Politicization (1971), Kenneth Langton and M. Kent Jennings' "Mothers and Fathers and the Development of Political Orientations," and M. Kent Jennings and Richard Niemi The Political Character of Adolescence (1974).

All of these studies start with the assumption that the father is the most important political socialization agent. In Langton and Jennings the father's perceived dominance usually is based on the fact that he is the major resource-controller in the family. Langton and Jennings maintain that in the process of political socialization, the child not only imitates the resource-controller but, through the process learns to identify with the imitated model, ultimately internalizing his (or her) political attitudes as well as imitating his political behavior.²⁸

Previously we noted that Langton and Jennings also observed politics was male-appropriate behavior rather than female-appropriate behavior in American society. Their study expresses concern about the political socialization of male children who are raised in maternal households, where the mother is controller of the resources and, consequently, will be the most significant political socialization agent. Their concern is that the maternal family structure might have negative effects on the male children who lack appropriate male

models with whom to interact and identify. Langton and Jennings hypothesize that, in this environment, male children may not learn sex-appropriate role behavior since appropriate political behavior is clearly presented as a subset of appropriate sex-role behavior for males, the authors contend that boys can only sufficiently learn this behavior if they have appropriate (father) models to imitate. They further predict that there will be little effect on girls with this type of family structure presumably because the mother is viewed as the female child's appropriate model for sex role/political role imitation. That the mother may not present a political model for girls does not seem to be an issue for the authors.

One of the empirical tests that Langton and Jennings construct to examine the effects of maternal structure on the political socialization of boys is asking boys about their level of political interest. The hypothesis is that boys from patriarchal nuclear families will show greater political interest than boys from maternal families.²⁹

In both the working class and middle class maternal families, male children were found, as predicted, to have less interest in politics than male students from nuclear families where two parents were present.³⁰ In upperclass maternal families, boys were as interested in politics as boys from nuclear families.³¹ On the other hand, we are told that political interest for girls is unaffected by the family

structure, maternal or nuclear.³² Though the gamma statistic for significance is cited to support this conclusion, we are not presented with any data that would elucidate for us the political interest of the girls in this study. We don't know if their political interest is generally similar to that of the boys in the study or if their political interest is at a high level or a low level. All we are told is that it is unaffected by the family structure.

There is an explanation provided by the authors for the lower political interest of boys in maternal families. This explanation again rests on the assumed politicalness of the father. In nuclear families, male respondents state they look to their fathers for political advice more frequently than they look to their mothers: 69% are cited as preferring their fathers as a source of political advice.³³ Boys located in maternal families are said to be deprived of the possibility of turning to their fathers for advice as Langton and Jennings believe they would if located in nuclear families. Therefore, they conclude that the father's absence removes a powerful political stimulus for the male child.³⁴ Presumably, the father's presence to give political advice would stimulate the son's political interest, although no linkage between political advice and political interest is specified.

Even when both the mother and father are present, however, Langton and Jennings suggest that families may have different internal structures based on who is perceived as

the controller of resources. Therefore, they classify nuclear families with regard to their internal power structures as mother-dominated, father-dominated or equally dominated. Setting aside the question of whether this classification is empirically valid, the results when correlated with political interest and political activity indicate that mother-dominated families produce male children who are less politically interested and less likely to engage in political activity than male children in father-dominated families, although this relationship weakens and reverses itself among the highly educated families.³⁵ Mother-dominance or father-dominance is again stated to have little impact on the female child, although since we have no direct comparisons of either the political interest or political activity of the male versus female respondents in this study, we are in no position to evaluate political interest and political activity levels for girls. Even though family structure is asserted to have little effect on the political development of girls, one could still ask whether any family structure is sufficiently attentive to the political socialization of girls.

But the focus of Langton and Jennings is the inadequacy of mothers as political socialization agents for the male child. This inadequacy is summed up in pejorative terms when Langton and Jennings note that "...maternal dominance has a debilitating effect upon male offspring -- this was particularly true of the least educated."³⁶ Furthermore,

these debilitating effects are depicted as persisting over time by using the questionable technique of presenting data that compares the responses of eighth graders and twelfth graders from maternal households and finds both groups exhibit less political interest.

A contrasting portrait of boys' political development is drawn from paternal-dominant households:

Boys appear to thrive politically in a patriarchal environment--at least in the lower classes--while there is little evidence that the conjugal power structure has a politically relevant effect upon female offspring.³⁷

At least on face value, Langton and Jennings have presented a compelling argument for paternal-dominated households. If boys thrive in them and the political socialization of girls is unaffected by them, then the logical conclusion would be to promote such households.

However, from my perspective, a critical question remains unanswered: Do girls thrive politically in any of the identified household structures? If, in fact, girls' political interest and propensity toward political activity is low in any or all of these family structures, than researchers must address the question of how to facilitate changes within these structures. Langton and Jennings, however, sidestep this issue altogether by avoiding evaluation of the political socialization of girls.

Herbert Hirsch also begins with the key assumptions that the father is the most important agent of political

socialization in the family and that the father's authority as an agent of political socialization is predicted on his control of resources in the family. Hirsch admits that this cultural norm can vary. While it may be most typical in the dominant U.S. culture for the father to be the resource controller and thus the major political socialization agent, Hirsch suggests that in subcultures in the United States, the female may be the more important political socialization agent because she is the primary resource controller in the family. Such a situation may exist in Appalachia where Hirsch sets up his study.

Hirsch compares the relative impact of mothers and fathers on the political socialization of the child by looking at three key variables. First, he asks the respondents to rank various agents with regard to their preference of these agents as sources of political information. While both parents are ranked behind the media with respect to this question, mothers rank higher as political information transmitters than fathers.³⁸

Second, Hirsch asks the respondents to state their party preference and the party preferences of their mothers and fathers. There is a higher level of agreement between the party identification of the mother and the child (83%) than the father and the child (30%).³⁹

Third, he asks the respondents to list their preferred sources of voting advice. Here fathers are the preferred

source with mothers second. Girls are slightly more likely to prefer their mothers as sources while boys are slightly more likely to prefer their fathers but not significantly so.⁴⁰

Qualifications emerge when Hirsch looks more closely at his sample by classifying the respondents in terms of whether the father is absent or present in the home. He discovers that when the father is absent from the home, (1) the child ranks him lower as an agent of information transmission (2) the child is less likely to agree with the party identification of the father and (3) the mother is the child's preferred source of voting advice.⁴¹ All of these observations make common sense if one begins with the assumption previously outlined by Hirsch that the resource controller will be the primary model for imitation. If the father isn't available, he is less likely to be important as an agent of political socialization. When the father is absent, the mother ranks significantly higher than the father as an agent of information transmission, political party preference and voting advice while when the father is present, the rankings of the two parents are the same.⁴² Thus, Hirsch concludes:

Indeed father absence appears to be the most important reason for the child's ranking the mother higher as an agent of socialization. A model that normally produces cues is absent and the child must turn to another.⁴³

From the perspective of social learning theory, with its concentration on observational learning as a fundamental

explanation of political socialization, it makes sense that more of the respondents will model the mother's political behavior if the father is absent. But Hirsch leaves us with the impression that children more naturally model the male parent with regard to politics and, only in his absence, turn toward the mother, even though, when both models are available, they appear to be equally significant in this study. When one returns to the central notion that the choice of the model for imitation is hypothesized to be based on resources control, Hirsch would need to make some modification here. If both parents are equally in control of resources, there seems to be no solid justification for assuming either will be more significant as a political socialization agent unless one goes outside of the framework of this explanation. If the primary method of learning is observation of the available models, then it makes sense that both mother and father will be modelled if they are available, and if one is absent, the other will fill this gap.

What we have witnessed in both Langton and Jennings' research and Hirsch's research is an inconsistent use of the explanations they are adopting from psychology. The assumptions that the primary political socialization agent would be the controller of resources in a family and that this resource controller might, in some families, be female appeared to be reasonable assumptions. But, by insisting as these authors do, that the father be seen as the primary agent of

political socialization and as the primary controller of resources, these authors undercut the statistical observations in their studies which seemed to provide some empirical support for their initial hypotheses.

In The Political Character of Adolescence, M. Kent Jennings and Richard G. Niemi also discover the importance of mothers as political socializers, even in nuclear households. While the authors predict that the father, as primary resource controller in the family, will be the most significant political socialization agent for both male and female children, their statistical evidence indicates that children are more likely to reflect their mothers' political orientation than their fathers', particularly if fathers and mothers are in disagreement.⁴⁴

Jennings and Niemi assume that high correlations between the parent's and child's political orientations reflect the existence of observational learning, i.e., the child has observed and modelled the behavior of the parent. Niemi and Jennings specifically state they they believe their research technique of "...comparing parent and offspring responses to the same stimuli in the interview situation is essentially a test for "matching behavior" or observational learning. The greater the match or congruency, the greater the grounds for inferring that the students have learned through the observation of their parents."⁴⁵ The existence of a high correlation between the political beliefs of the parent and

the child constitutes prima facie evidence in this framework for the transference of these beliefs from the parent to the child. While this is a restatement of the transmission principle that emerged in Hyman's work, it now includes, at least, a theoretical explanation of how the learning occurred, i.e., the child observes and imitates the behavior of the parent. Nonetheless, the empirical data needed to support this assumption continue to rely on inference rather than direct observation.

In this study the mother appears to be the most important observational model. In fact, Jennings and Niemi suggest:

If one could imagine a world inhabited only by grandmothers, mothers, daughters and girlfriends, the prospects for political continuity would be greater than they are now. One is tempted to say that among primary groups the bearers of political culture are more often female than male.⁴⁶

Political continuity here seems to indicate the relative strength of the political socialization agent. An effective agent should be able to secure the continuity of his/her political ideas. At least in terms of their evidence, the authors judge women to be more effective at this transmission.

The question then becomes why should women be more effective in this role. While Jennings and Niemi never approach this question directly, they provide us with some insight to their thinking when they suggest that women's influence as political socialization agents may have peaked and now is

declining:

The fact that mothers are increasingly away from the home may signal a renewal of the father's impact or of the influence of the non-family agents. It would indeed be ironic if the greater politicization, freedom and general liberation of women resulted in the reduction of their influence on the political orientations of the growing child.⁴⁷

Niemi and Jennings here directly associate women's greater role in the political socialization of her children with her primary responsibility for childcare, assuming that she is more available to her children in the home than the father and, therefore, is more available as a model for imitation and also as an agent to reinforce nascent political behavior. Yet, at the same time, Niemi and Jennings argue that women are currently undergoing greater politicization which may undermine their roles as the most important familial agent of political socialization. Although the manner in which this politicization is occurring is not made explicit, the process takes women out of the household, probably into the job market, and, therefore, may mean that women have less time for interaction with her children which could cut into her ability to act as effectively as a political socialization agent. Therefore, women's influence on her children could be waning.

However, even women's current influence as an agent of political socialization for her children is made suspect when the authors reintroduce men as agents of their wives' political socialization:

Evidence supports the view of considerable socialization of wives by their husbands after marriage.⁴⁸

Evidence here refers to studies that show that more wives than husbands change their party preferences after marriage. The explanation for this statistical observation rests on a view of the husband's political dominance and his ability to politically socialize his wife. Fathers are thus reintroduced into the political socialization equation. Now, their role is to socialize the wives who, in turn, direct the political socialization of the children. While this explanation may have some logical basis if one is looking at cases where husbands and wives are in political agreement, Niemi and Jennings' data regarding children following their mothers more frequently when fathers and mothers disagree certainly cannot be explained in a similar fashion. In that case, the mother must be seen as operating as an independent agent of political socialization.

If the roles of men and women in the process of political socialization are different, so is the effect of political socialization on boys and girls. Niemi and Jennings seem to suggest that political socialization is influenced by sex role or gender socialization that either occurs prior to political socialization or is concurrent with it and having a profound effect on the way that the political socialization process proceeds:

Being born a boy or girl almost predetermines a different pattern of socialization which

results in differences on political issues.⁴⁹

While no coherent set of hypotheses is presented by the authors to authenticate how this process occurs, there are several passages in the study that indicate differences in the process for boys and girls, most of which introduce assumptions about girls and boys that do not emanate from the social learning theory paradigm they indicate they are following.

The statistical observation about girls that is being explained is that girls even more than boys in this study reflect the party identifications of their parents, particularly their mothers. Thus, one might argue that parents are more successful political socialization agents for their daughters than their sons, and, given our earlier understanding that mothers are slightly more effective socialization agents, one could argue that mothers are the most successful political socialization agents for their daughters. The effectiveness of the family in the socialization process of girls might be congratulated.

But, it is at this point that the authors begin to bring in perceived differences between girls and boys that suggest that there is something wrong with the way that girls are politically socialized:

Even in adolescence girls remain more home centered than do boys. They have less freedom than boys, less often have jobs, depend more on the family for advice and entertainment and think and plan more about their own future

families. Boys are less family oriented than girls.⁵⁰

If these observations about boys and girls are correct, it makes sense that girls are more influenced by their families than boys. But the lesser freedom and greater home-centeredness of girls carries an implicit devaluation of the way that girls are politically socialized.

Girls in general reflect the image of immediately surrounding agents to a far greater degree than to boys. They seem to have somewhat less autonomy, carrying on less synthesizing and reprocessing than boys.⁵¹

Here the lesser autonomy of the girls is seen as a barrier preventing girls from being as exposed to other political ideas besides those of their parents as boys are. Presumably, it is these ideas which are synthesized and reprocessed, neither of which processes are more fully explained. But synthesizing and reprocessing appear to be higher level activities than the imitation and observational learning processes on which girls rely. Compliance with one's socialization agents, particularly one's parents, seems to be less virtuous if it is achieved by girls, and, yet, to make this judgment, Niemi and Jennings reject the central thesis of their theoretical framework, that socialization occurs primarily through observational learning. They introduce unexplained concepts in which males are hypothetically superior.

What this amounts to is another use of post factum interpretations. Discontent with the findings of their study which stated a commitment to social learning theory explanation,

the authors introduce ad hoc explanations for which no data is supplied. The only justification for this action, as far as I can see, is that their results were not as anticipated. Fathers were not the primary socialization agents; boys were not as similar to their parents as girls.

In a similar manner, Niemi and Jennings proceed to judge girls as more sensitive to the values of the people immediately surrounding them. Presumably, this also plays a role in their more readily assimilating the party identification of their parents. This sensitivity also appears to be an aspect of their sex role socialization influencing their political socialization:

The psycho-cultural conditioning of girls seems to lead to a greater stress on harmony and like-mindedness with one's intimates.⁵²

Again, while the authors would undoubtedly maintain that this explanation, post factum or hypothetical as it is, is not meant to denigrate, one is left with the uncomfortable feeling that harmony and likemindedness are psychological characteristics that are not up to snuff and, yet, observational learning as explanation depends on the continuity of likemindedness for verification of its theory.

At the very least, Niemi and Jennings owe us some explanation for how the concepts they have introduced fit into social learning theory. Otherwise, the theory is replete with unexamined contradictions. Their empirical work would seem to indicate that observational learning as an

explanation for political socialization, is more successful for female than male children although the theory presents reasons for presuming that political socialization will be more effective for boys than girls. The introduction of concepts that are outside of the theoretical framework to account for the discrepancies between the research results of this study and the expected research results suggests that the authors were aware of the cracks in their theoretical explanation and attempted to make repairs which unfortunately leaves us wondering about the credibility of the theory.

At the very least, Niemi and Jennings owe us some explanation for how the concepts they have introduced fit into their social learning theory adaptation. Otherwise, I insist that, within their perspective, the high correlations between parents' and their daughters' party identification should be interpreted to mean that the political socialization process they predict is occurring, that is, observational learning is more successful for girls than boys. And if this is the case and there are still observed statistical regularities in political behavior that show men to be more political than women, some other explanation for adult political differences would need to be developed.

Niemi and Jennings' assumptions about the sex role and political socialization of girls are demystified when we realize that the interpretations they present derive from a different perspective; their assumptions can be traced to a

theory of sex role socialization advanced by David Lynn, which has been used by a number of other political socialization studies as well. Niemi and Jennings never credit Lynn as the source of their observations, but the language used in their explanations is so similar to that of Lynn that I assume they either read Lynn directly or used interpretations of Lynn presented by other political socialization theorists.

David Lynn's explanation of the process of sex role socialization differs from the explanation of social learning theory that has already been presented. Lynn posits that both the content of the sex role that is learned and the process by which each male and female child learns his/her sex role differs. The ramifications of this distinction can be spelled out more clearly by summarizing the sex role socialization Lynn postulates for each child.

Lynn depicts the average American family much as we have seen it depicted previously. The father as principal breadwinner works outside of the home and is rarely available to his children during the working hours. The mother's principal job is to provide responsible childcare. Lynn utilizes this distinction between the mother and father in terms of their availability to the child to claim that the mother is obviously the most important socialization agent for both the male and female child.

As infants, then, both male and female children are

hypothesized to identify with their mothers. His use of the term identification refers to the internalization of personality characteristics and unconscious reactions.⁵³

Mother identification thus means that the child will first identify with and, then, internalize the personality characteristics of the mother.⁵⁴

Obviously, for the girl, the mother is an appropriate same sex model. Thus, the girl's identification with her mother can lead to her appropriate sex role identification. The availability of her mother as an appropriate role model means that the task of the girl learning her appropriate sex role identification, i.e., the internalization of personality characteristics and unconscious reactions, appropriate to one's sex, will be easier for the girl. As Lynn states, "Much incidental learning takes place from the girl's contact with her mother which she can apply directly to her life."⁵⁵

For boys, however, the mother is not an appropriate sex role model. Thus, Lynn says, the boy must shift his initial identification with his mother to an identification with the masculine sex role. If the mother is not an appropriate model and the father is unavailable for emulation, the boy must learn his sex role identification in a different fashion, according to Lynn.

Lynn hypothesizes that despite the shortage of male models, a somewhat stereotyped and conventional masculine role is spelled out for the boy by his mother and his female

teachers.⁵⁶ These women will reward him for male-appropriate behavior and punish him for signs of female-appropriate behavior. In this manner, he will come to an understanding of his appropriate sex role. The content of the male sex role thus appears to be a stereotyped view of masculinity, as perceived by females, while the content of the female sex role in this process is akin to the individual girl's mother's adoption of the role.

But, the content, according to Lynn, is less significant than the manner by which the learning occurs. For the task of achieving these separate kinds of identifications requires separate methods of learning. Lynn argues that these separate identification tasks parallel two separate kinds of learning tasks: problem solving and learning a lesson.⁵⁷

In order to solve a problem, Lynn states that a learner must first explore the situation and find the goal before he can develop a solution. This is the learning task associated with the development of masculine role identification. Finding the goal of his sex role identification constitutes a major problem boys have to solve. When the boy begins to be aware that he does not belong in the same sex category as his mother, he must then attempt to discern what is the proper content for his sex role identification.⁵⁸

This learning task is further complicated for the boy by the fact that the desired behavior for the male child is rarely defined positively as something he should do or be

but rather is defined negatively as something he should not do or be.⁵⁹ It is from largely negative admonitions, primarily made by women, that the boy must learn to set the masculine role as a goal. In order to successfully achieve this goal, the boy purportedly restructures the admonitions in order to abstract the principles defining the masculine role.⁶⁰ The boy thus learns an abstraction of the masculine role.

On the other hand, for the girl, the learning task is said to more closely parallel that of learning a lesson. The distinction Lynn makes here is that when one learns a lesson, the problem-solving phase can be omitted or at least minimized. The learner, instead, can memorize and repeat what has been memorized at a later date. For the girl, Lynn says the lesson of female sex role identification is mother identification. The girl seldom has to address the question of what the goal of her sex role identification is. By looking at her mother, she can see the goal. Thus, she learns a concrete role and does not encounter the necessity of restructuring and abstracting principles in the task of her sex role identification.

Recapitulating, each sex acquires a separate method of learning in the process of sex role identification that is subsequently applied to learning tasks in general. Since the girl's learning method is purported to primarily involve a) a personal relationship and b) imitation rather than

restructuring the field, the girl is expected to learn other aspects of socialization in a similar manner. This is seen as the learning method she will be best at. The boy's learning method, on the other hand, is purported to primarily involve a) defining the goal b) restructuring the field and c) abstracting principles, and this is seen as the principal way in which boys will learn.

Lynn, himself, seems to believe that these different learning processes have long run implications for continued differences in development between boys and girls. Using the assumptions he has given, he generates additional hypotheses about how the content of male and female sex roles will differ. As a result of learning her sex role in a close personal relationship with her mother, the girl is portrayed as more likely to acquire the need for affiliation as a secondary drive than the boy is. Thus, Lynn expects that females will tend to demonstrate a greater need for affiliation than males.⁶¹ As a consequence of learning her sex role as a lesson, females tend to be more dependent than males on the external context of a perceptual situation and hesitate to deviate from the given.⁶² Since learning the lesson of her sex role does not provide the girl with the opportunity of developing problem-solving skills, Lynn predicts that males will tend to surpass females in problem-solving skills.⁶³

Whether Lynn himself judges the socialization process of males to be superior to that of females may in fact be

irrelevant. He does seem to indicate that the task of socialization is easier for girls in the earlier stages and more ambivalent, less well-defined and, thus, more problematic in the later years. But the researchers in political science who adapt this model usually present their assessment of the process in such a way that there is an implicit if not explicit evaluation that the socialization process better suits males to the pursuit of politics than it does females. Politics, conceptualized as abstract activity, requires the ability of thinking in an abstract manner. Politics as activity requires the ability to engage in problem-solving and actively or aggressively attack the problems at hand. Since women's opportunities to acquire these abilities is unnecessary in their socialization process, they will remain hampered all their lives in their abilities to transcend their socialization process.

The upshot of Lynn's revision of social learning theory is that girls seem to remain within the social learning theory paradigm while boys move outside of it in order to construct their sexual social identities. Women are depicted as relatively passive in their socialization process absorbing what is presented to them as their sexual social roles. Men are forced to take action, to take into their own hands the creation of their sexual social identity. In the greater freedom of males to create, the boundaries of what is allowed or disallowed may also be substantially enlarged;

more content and more variation in content may also be allowed in the formative years.

Looking back at Niemi and Jennings' interpretation of the political socialization process, I think it is quite clear that the concepts they use are those of David Lynn.

In The Development of Political Attitudes in Children, Hess and Judith Torney also make a direct attempt to incorporate Lynn's notions of sex role socialization into the understanding of the development of political socialization for boys and girls. They, at least, are explicit about it. However, since their understanding of Lynn's model is somewhat different than mine, I include their summary of Lynn's analysis:

Lynn (1962), attempting to clarify the sources of these sex differences, suggested that they arise both from the nature of the sex role to which the child is directly socialized and from the process of socialization. In his formulation, girls learn the feminine sex role primarily by directly imitating their mothers; boys however must model many men, since fathers work away from home and are less available for imitation. Since women also direct the development of masculine sex role, the boys learn a stereotyped rather than specific male role. To learn the masculine sex role, the boy learns a stereotyped rather than specific male role. To learn the masculine sex role requires the ability to abstract principles of masculinity from several different models. Lynn (1962) derived predictions about sex differences which concur with the findings of other investigations; girls have a greater need for affiliation or social response from others, they are more influenced by the standards of others, and are less dependent upon internalized moral standards; girls are less concerned with problem-solving and with forming abstract principles. ⁶⁴

In this statement, I think it can be said that Hess and Torney have correctly summarized Lynn's understanding of the sex role socialization of girls but they seem somewhat confused about Lynn's understanding of the sex role socialization of boys. Lynn does not argue that boys model many men and abstract their version of masculinity from these models but rather that women direct the political socialization of boys through a process which admonishes "incorrect " sex role behaviors and rewards appropriate sex role behaviors. This process is even more abstract than the one that Hess and Torney depict.

Furthermore, in their re-statement of the hypotheses that Lynn generated from his theory, Hess and Torney restate some of the conclusions in such a way that girls appear to be not only deficient in certain skills but also at fault for their shortcomings, a conclusion which is hardly sustainable within the explanatory framework. If girls are basically passive recipients in the socialization process, holding them responsible for the inadequacies in their socialization process is untenable; this would require perception of them as active agents in this process.

Notice, for example, that Hess & Torney state that "girls are less concerned with problem-solving and with forming abstract principles."⁶⁵ Lack of concern is not the question, as Lynn stated it. Rather, it is that the current feminine learning method is not well-g geared to the development

of problem-solving skills. The difference here is substantial, for while Hess & Torney seem to imply that girls need only to become more concerned with problem-solving and with forming abstract principles in order to overcome their deficiencies, Lynn sees this as a problem that is built into the process of their sex-role socialization. To overcome this problem would require a change in the process, not just a change in their desire to learn.

Hess and Torney adapt the ideas that Lynn has posited for a differential sex role socialization to hypotheses regarding a differential political socialization for boys and girls. As with the other socialization studies we have examined, the methodology remains the same. Survey questions are directed at school age children; the responses are correlated with their sex. The concern of the authors is primarily to interpret the empirical differences they discover in the different reactions of children to these questions.

In their interpretations of the differences they observe between girls and boys on these survey questionnaires, Hess and Torney rely heavily on Lynn's assertion that girls learn their sex role socialization in a close personal relationship with the mother which may result in girls acquiring a greater need for affiliation. The interpretation that Hess and Torney put on this process and its consequent effect on political socialization is that girls are hampered by this aspect of their socialization because it results in a personalization

of politics. This personalization of politics by girls comes out in several of the explanations for these empirical political differences between boys and girls in the Hess and Torney study.

For example, when Hess and Torney ask boys and girls the question, "Is it all right for the government to lie to protect America?" and boys were found more likely than girls to answer "yes", the following explanation is offered:

Boys have a somewhat different view of international morality than do girls, answering that it is acceptable for the government to lie in order to protect the American people. Girls are more likely to apply personal morality to political actions, feeling that all lies are wrong, while boys judge governmental actions in terms of political expediency.⁶⁶

Hess and Torney even construct what they believe constitutes a personification scale. Personification is measured by choosing the President or George Washington as depicting government, a source of national pride and the runner of the government.⁶⁷ When girls personalize politics on this scale more than boys, the explanations provided again rely on interpretations of David Lynn's work:

Girls symbolize government as a personal figure rather than as an institution. The discussion of previous research on sex role socialization suggests that girls are more involved with persons and less able to handle abstractions than boys.⁶⁸

This personalization of politics by girls is seen to hold at every age level:

Significant sex differences in the personalization of government appeared in every grade except

the second; this differentiation between the sexes increased with age. This conceptualization is important because it indicates that girls approach the government with a different set of expectations, expectations similar to those they have learned in personal relationships within the family.⁶⁹

As may be recalled, the earlier Easton and Dennis study also maintained that girls personalized politics more than boys and this contributed to their political primitiveness.⁷⁰ What the Hess and Torney study adds to this interpretation is a psychological theory that may provide explanation for this personalization. But, again, direct hypotheses from this theory were not generated. Rather, Hess and Torney apply the theory as explanation after data collection; this data collection is heavily reliant on their "personal" interpretations when it comes to the operationalization of personalization and also when they judge that saying it is all right for the government to lie to protect America is an expedient answer which separates personal morality from international (im)morality.

Generally speaking, the social learning studies reviewed here did little to contribute toward the generation of a theory of political behavior or an explanation of the differences between men's and women's political behavior. While the adaptation of social learning theory to the study of politics offered the possibility of generating testable hypotheses, it was seldom utilized in this manner. But, more importantly, perhaps, the authors who used social learning

theory abandoned it as an explanatory theory whenever the predicted consequences did not emerge, that is whenever boys did not appear to be more politically socialized than girls in the process or whenever women appeared to be the more dominant political socialization agents. What I have attempted to show is that, within the assumptions of social learning theory, this abandonment seemed uncalled for because utilizing the basic assumptions of the paradigm might have generated the very predictions and results that are denied. One of the primary examples of this was the role of the mother in the political socialization process. Recapitulating, if observational learning is the primary explanation for how learning occurs and observational learning is dependent on a model being readily available for imitation and for rewarding behavior, then authors who see the mother as more frequently in the home should not be surprised if the mother is viewed as the more important socialization agent for the child. The attempts to maintain the father as the primary socialization agent required ad hoc explanations that always went outside of the framework of explanation that is social learning theory. The authors insisted on attempting to preserve political socialization as a male dominated process which resulted in males being more political than females even when this was an untenable position given their statistical results.

In order to maintain this result, they bring in assumptions which are not part of the social learning theory, the

most prominent example of this being the use of David Lynn's work. Lynn's explanation of the process of sex role socialization, if it does have political socialization consequences as well, presents perhaps the greatest challenge to the goal of establishing policy alternatives since Lynn has suggested that not only the content but also the process of socialization would need to be changed for girls. While the task of socialization, in the early years, is easier for girls, the results of the process seem to place girls at a perpetual disadvantage to boys: how will they learn the problem-solving technique as Lynn defines it? Lynn does not provide an answer to this nor do Niemi and Jennings or Hess and Torney. While Lynn does not seem to assign blame to girls for their socialization process, the political scientists are not always clear that unless the process of socialization is altered for girls, they will continually be at a disadvantage. If Lynn's theory is correct, then intervention in the early stages of the girl's life would be necessary to increase the opportunities for political socialization. Perhaps, even the removal of the girl from the mother's care would be indicated.

However, since political socialization researchers do not address the question of whether women ought to be political, they also don't address the question of how, given their explanation would this be achieved. While this "ought" question would be deemed evaluation and, therefore,

should not be included in the "neutral" behavioral framework, I note that there was research which expressed concern over whether boys were receiving proper political socialization, i.e., the research of Langton and Jennings and that of Hirsch. Nowhere in the socialization literature by male researchers did such a question arise for females. I note also that in these studies, there was a policy implication; the authors promoted male-dominated families as the best political socialization environment for male children. No best political socialization environment for girls appears anywhere in this literature.

I am not attempting to maintain that social learning theory is the explanatory theory for political socialization or that political socialization is even necessarily the explanation for differential political behavior. What I am arguing is that those authors who applied social learning theory to the study of political socialization did little to advance our knowledge of this process. I am also arguing that the results found in most of these studies suggested that girls were politically socialized to almost the same extent as boys. These results might have been interpreted as a sign that political socialization was not as significant for the understanding of political behavior as the authors here presume.

In fact, this is the starting point of the behavioral researchers who utilize situational factors as more important

in the explanation of women's political behavior. These authors will look back at the results of the socialization studies and argue that the empirical observations do not confirm that the differences in male and female political behavior are explained by reference to socialization. The situational explanation is the focus of the next chapter.

C H A P T E R VI
SITUATIONAL EXPLANATIONS

While the attempts to explain women's political behavior in terms of a differential political socialization process focus our attention on the periods of childhood and adolescence as the relevant times in the individual's life for learning particular political behaviors, there is another behavioral explanation for women's political behavior that focuses our attention on the adult situations of men and women suggesting that the critical factors that affect their different political participation are found in their adult lives rather than their pre-adult lives. This explanation is usually referred to as the situational or structural explanation.

The seeds of the situational argument were encountered earlier in this work when we looked at the voting participation studies. Both the works of Lipset and his associates and Campbell and his associates suggested that motherhood limited women's political participation. In 1960, Lipset gave a concise statement about women's lower political participation in Political Man which summarizes the ideas of the situational argument:

The position of the married woman illustrates the problem of available time or dispensability as a determinant of political activity. The stern demands on a housewife and mother

mean that she has little opportunity or need to gain politically relevant experiences. Women must thus be expected to have less concern with politics and in almost every country, they do vote less than men.¹

According to this argument, the demands of being housewife and mother leave women with little time to pursue political activity. There is also an underlying assumption that there is little need for women to concern themselves with politics, presumably because the realm of the household does not intersect with the political realm: the interests of the private household are not political interests nor do political interests have impact on the household. The effects, according to this early research, of woman's situation as housewife and mother are that women tend to be less interested in politics and less likely to participate in politics.

Fuller descriptions of the situational explanation proceed in a similar vein. Tedin, Brady and Vedlitz who attempt a synthesis of the socialization and situational argument describe the situational model of explanation in the following manner:

The situational model argues that sex related differences in political expressiveness are not the result of norms learned in childhood but are a function of adult situational factors which are sex related. Women are less politically expressive because the environment of the housewife or the menial sort of employment available to most women does not encourage participation in politics or provide stimulation to gather and discuss politically relevant information. On the other hand, men--particularly middle class

men--have political concerns related to their work and usually are in environments that are relatively politically stimulating.²

The constraints of woman's adult life are again related to her roles as mother and houseworker although Tedin and associates do acknowledge women's participation in the economic sphere outside of the home as well if only to acknowledge that women's work in the economic sphere is not equivalent to men's, that the jobs women perform are more menial and that the environment of these jobs does not stimulate political participation. While many men might be surprised to hear that their job environments stimulate political concerns, Tedin et al. assume that this is true, particularly for middle class men, who are probably their greatest concern.

While situational explanations focus on the significance of women's roles as wife and mother as constraints on her political behavior, behavioral researchers who refer to their explanations as structural rather than situational generally emphasize that women's roles as wife and mother are only two aspects of the structure of her adult life which may provide external constraints to women's political participation. Additional structural components that will be presented focus on the constraints that can be found in current political party structures, women's experience of sex discrimination in party politics and political institutions and the possibility that the occupational structure for women may not provide

them with similar opportunities for participation or similar access to political participation.

In short, in contrast to the political socialization explanations, situational and structural explanations focus our attention on external constraints to women's political participation rather than internal constraints. As Susan Gluck Mezey puts it:

Briefly socialization theorists tell us that women do not want to become politically active because of internal restraints while situational and structural theorists tell us that they cannot due to external restraints.³

This belief that women's political behavior is externally constrained leads situational and structural researchers to focus on different questions with regard to women's political behavior.

While the early voting behavior studies utilized the constraints of women's roles as housewives and mothers to explain women's lower rate of turnout, the claim that these roles have much effect on voting turnout is discredited by recent research which concludes that in terms of voting, women's political participation equals or nearly equals that of men.⁴ The authors who utilize the situational or structural explanation today do not focus attention on women's voting behavior. Rather, they are more concerned with the question of why so few women seek political office, particularly at the higher levels. Thus, their research tends to focus on an even more select group of women, those

women who have sought and, in many cases, achieved political office. The assumption of these researchers is that through study of these "political women," they may be able to isolate the critical factors required to attain political office. Perhaps, in this sense, the researchers who espouse the "situational" or "structural" explanations for women's political behavior are truly different than most of the researchers that we have thus far examined because they are not content for the majority of women to be apolitical. They want to see more women in active political roles. They want to increase political participation, that is, the participation of women as officeholders, as members of the political elite. This concentration on women who have held political office means that the samples that are being used are always small and will often be composed of women with similar class and educational backgrounds. Researchers look at each aspect of the situational explanation. They attempt to verify that motherhood, wifehood, occupational inadequacies and political party structures mitigate against women achieving political office. I want to look at the evidence presented for each of these claims to see if the explanation is built on more solid ground than that of the voting behavior studies or the socialization studies. In many cases, we will see the reoccurrence of ad hoc explanations or interpretations of the data presented that may tell us more about the assumptions of the researchers than they tell us about the reasons motivating women's

political behavior.

Most of the researchers using the situational explanation set up behavioral studies of women who have held political office, that is, they identify those women who have held political office and ask them survey questions, categorizing their responses and sometimes, comparing the experiences of these women to those of men in similar positions. Several of these researchers have attempted to directly test whether the socialization explanation is a better explanatory theory of women's political behavior than the situational explanation. Two examples of these studies are those conducted by Orum and associates⁵ and the study conducted by Volgy and Volgy.⁶

Essentially, Orum and his associates attempted to replicate earlier political socialization studies of school children in a large survey conducted in Illinois in 1974. When they discovered that there were essentially no significant differences between boys and girls in response to their political questions, they suggested that the data gave support to a counter explanation, the situational or structural explanation, suggesting that fewer women than men go into public life because they are confined to their homes as wives and mothers whereas men are more active as a result of their jobs outside of the home.⁷ While it seems unnecessary to fully outline Orum and his associates' study, particularly since this work suggests there were many inconsistencies and

not many significant differences between boys and girls in the previous socialization studies, an important point to consider is that the advancement of the situational argument in this study is once again an ad hoc explanation, a suggested or hypothesized explanation, rather than an empirically verified explanation.

Volgy and Volgy in their re-examination of political socialization as an explanation for women's lesser political behavior also found that it was not a very satisfactory explanation. The authors begin with a set of assumptions about past research which points the way toward their ultimate conclusion. First, they are suspicious of previous research results because they maintain that "if differences in sex roles are due to varying socialization experiences leading to the development of different norms and roles for men and women then there should be considerable variation in the degree to which men and women are socialized into such roles."⁸

One of the major disagreements Volgy and Volgy have with the political socialization explanation is its emphatic insistence that not only is women's political sex role different than that of men's but also it is unalterably different.⁹ They are presenting an image of women as thinking beings who may be able to overcome past socialization experiences merely by changing their understanding of themselves and acting on this new understanding.

They hypothesize that the women's movement has provided women with the several opportunities:

"a) to take an active rather than a passive role in events outside the house b) to perceive themselves in a more positive way, thereby giving themselves increased self-assurance and greater confidence to evaluate critically the world around them c) to begin to perceive other women in a more positive and less competitive way, allowing them to take pride in other women's achievements."¹⁰

Volgy and Volgy's data also show little support for the socialization explanation; that is, they find few significant differences between the male and female respondents in the study. They state, in fact, that the situational explanation would seem to be more in line with their data. But even in behavioral explanation, the disproof of one hypothetical explanation is merely that. It may tell us that we need to look for other explanations, but it does not tell us that one explanation is any more persuasive than any other. Thus, their conclusion that the situational argument is more likely to depict the reasons for women's lesser political involvement seems precipitous at the least.

While much of the research discussed in this chapter focuses on studies reported in journal articles, there is one full-length study which utilizes the situational explanation and articulates the various dimensions of this argument so well that it can serve as an organizing framework to relate the findings of the smaller studies. The study in question was conducted by Jeanne Kirkpatrick;

the results were interpreted in her book, Political Woman.¹¹

In Kirkpatrick's study of male and female state legislators, she portrays the major focus of the situational researcher when she states that "the most important and interesting question about women's political behavior is why so few seek and wield power."¹² In Kirkpatrick, the wielders of power are located in the decision-making bodies of governmental institutions at the more centralized seats of government in the state and national capitals. Until women aspire to, seek, and hold power at this level where they are most unrepresented, she will characterize them as less political than men, no matter how important their roles are in other political arenas:

Women are numerous enough at the lowest level of politics--in the precincts, at the party picnics, getting out the vote, doing the telephoning, collecting the dollars--but remarkably scarce at the upper levels where decisions are made that affect the life of the community, state, nation.¹³

While I do not agree with Kirkpatrick's assumption that all of the important politics conducted in the United States are carried out in the state and national legislatures, I will set that disagreement aside to look at the findings of her study which utilized survey research techniques.

Kirkpatrick notes from the outset that she fully expects that the situational analysis which she calls the sex-role explanation will be more pertinent to her study,

although she recognizes that socialization undergirds sex-roles. The women legislators in her study, she notes, did not internalize the expectation that women would eschew public service and public careers in favor of purely private, family-centered goals.¹⁴ Thus, for Kirkpatrick, the relevant objective of socialization with regard to women is teaching them that politics is sex-appropriate for men rather than for women. Since her respondents don't appear to have learned this, she discounts the value of the socialization explanation for understanding women's political behavior; the observation that these women have not incorporated such a notion of politics into their psyches seems to suggest to her that, at least, for a number of women, the socialization explanation is insufficient.

At the same time, when Kirkpatrick compares the political behavior of male and female legislators, she finds that the situational or sex-roles explanation is significant in elaborating many distinctions between them. Noting that the legislators share more similarities than differences in their political backgrounds, she isolates the factors that make them different:

"...the legislators in this study turn out to be remarkably similar in many aspects of their lives most relevant to politics. The same social experiences seem to contribute to the development of politically active males and females. Observable differences between them apparently derive more from social roles than inherent dispositions."¹⁵

One way in which male and female legislators were seen to differ was in their ability to put themselves forth as political candidates. While a few women recruited themselves for office, others needed to be asked. Here, to explain the difference between the women who were able to recruit themselves and those who were not, Kirkpatrick relies, first, on the socialization explanation in her ad hoc speculations:

"The explanation probably lies deep in feminine socialization. It may be that girls learn that to put oneself forward is aggressive and that is to be unfeminine. Through years of waiting to be asked--women learn to stand back and let others (principally males) take the initiative. Traditional socialization and roles habituate women to taking initiative only within quite restricted circumstances, circumstances determined by others."¹⁶

But, then, women's situation as an adult woman is reintroduced in an additional ad hoc explanation:

Traditionally, the role of wife and mother involves a woman more in adapting than deciding: where she will live and on what budget are determined by her husband's career; how she will spend the early childrearing years is determined by the multiple needs and desires of her children.¹⁷

Each of these constraints is seen both to inhibit woman's choosing to pursue a political career and being able to do this with the same degree of ease as the male legislator. The male legislator can count on the acquiescence of his wife who presumably is bound by the same role expectations as these women legislators and willingly follows her husband in his career.

At the same time, Kirkpatrick is suggesting that the mindset promoted by the observance of these role patterns mitigates against women being able to make individual, long-range plans if they have a husband and family. Women are less likely to put themselves forth as candidates because they have fewer experiences of putting themselves first in any situation.¹⁸

However, Kirkpatrick's sample of women legislators is obviously composed of untraditional women since in her analysis of sex roles men are seen as the major breadwinners and women are seen as the major child-rearers. While she acknowledges that these women are untraditional, that they spend a great deal of time away from their homes campaigning, making speeches, and attending legislative sessions, Kirkpatrick maintains that these women are traditional in their view of their fulfillment of their sex roles, that they maintain a view of their primary roles as wives and mothers and ascribe to these ideals of what women should be. Thus, she proclaims that these women legislators are remarkable because they are able to harmonize their political roles with conventional women's roles.¹⁹

In this study, Kirkpatrick does not believe it is necessary for women to choose between their traditional sex roles and political careers which demand that they behave more as she portrays men. These women, apparently, have both:

Refusing to choose between "women's" roles and participation in the "man's" world of politics, they have worked out successful combinations.²⁰

The questions that immediately come to mind are what do these successful combinations look like and are they replicable, that is, can a majority of women in the society choose the options presented here.

One of the first requirements for successfully combining women's traditional sex-roles with a political career, according to this study, is a cooperative or, at least, non-obstructive husband. Kirkpatrick arranges the husbands of the women legislators into four categories: participant husbands who play an active role in their wives' political careers; helpful husbands, who, though not personally active in politics, are willing to shoulder an extra burden at home; acquiescent husbands who approve their wives' activity but remain uninvolved; and jealous husbands who disapprove of their wives' involvement and would like to end it.²¹ While the majority of the husbands are categorized as acquiescent, only one of the categories available sees the potential for conflict between wife and husband over the woman's appropriate role choices. Not too surprisingly, only two women in this sample had jealous husbands and these marriages seemed extremely shaky.²² Clearly, a first requirement for achieving political office would be a cooperative husband.

But the husband may also provide additional support for

his wife by fulfilling the requirements of his traditional sex role. Consider the following scenario that Kirkpatrick outlines to suggest that women's traditional roles may provide her with advantages as well as disadvantages in pursuing a political career:

Since breadwinning is conventionally assigned to the male, his wife is frequently freed from the necessity of remunerative employment. Being free not to work for money gives a woman more control over the disposition of her own time--once the children are on their own a large part of the day. In deciding whether or not to run for the legislature, for example, a woman financially supported by her husband need not be concerned about loss of income from other pursuits or about the low salaries of state legislators. The significance of this freedom to spend time in nonremunerative activities is frequently underestimated in these times when attention is focused on women's disadvantages. A woman supported by her husband need not balance her commitment to political or civic activity against the need for increased income. She need not justify the decision to devote large blocs of time to nonremunerative activities. In the legislature she is freed from the necessity of juggling economic and legislative roles--of supporting a family while developing a political career. Given the fact that being a state legislator is a part-time, low-paid job in most states, women probably provide the best source of high talent to fill the jobs. That so few women take advantage of this freedom to build a career in public service testifies to the power of cultural constraints.²³

Presumably, in this scenario, Kirkpatrick is presenting women who no longer have child care responsibilities but neither do they have financial responsibilities for themselves or their families. The picture that Kirkpatrick paints is one inhabited by a class of women who are financially dependent on their husbands, husbands who have a sufficient income

to support themselves, their wives, and their children. Given the high percentage of women employed outside of the house, Kirkpatrick's suggestion that the reason so few women choose to follow this path to the state legislatures is because of cultural constraints, i.e., socialization and sex-role expectations, seems to miss the point. The path that the women legislators in her study have taken is not readily replicable because her perception of women's lives sees only the lives of an elite group of women.

A second requirement for combining a political career with marriage appears to be that the women involved have "unusual amounts of empathy, flexibility and self-knowledge"²⁴ which the women in Kirkpatrick's study apparently possessed. Kirkpatrick emphasized the importance of these attributes in the following way:

Empathy enables the woman to see the situation from another's point of view; to understand the husband's need for reassurance of the continued centrality of the marriage in her life; to protect him from the threatening aspects of her job; to provide compensation and appreciation to spouse and children; to maximize or minimize their roles in her career depending on which is most appropriate. Being able to see herself as a husband with a wife in politics makes for more accommodation, fewer demands, more appreciation. Desirable or undesirable as these attitudes may be (as measured against equalitarian norms) they are highly functional in helping to sustain marriage and a political career. Flexibility is an equally important characteristic of this style of role management. The ability to doff one demanding role and enter another and to do so without anxiety and trauma is required of all politicians, but is especially vital to women. The flexibility required of her is greater than that of the legislator/lawyer/husband/father because

the roles of wife and mother involve less assertion and more accommodation to the needs and moods of others. Greater empathy is needed because the role requirements are more disparate. Self-knowledge is needed because it helps to keep priorities clear, and to guide one through complex choices.²⁵

While similar attributes in husbands might provide the basis for the ideal marriage as well as the possibility of combining marriage and a political career, Kirkpatrick seems to connect these attributes to women's traditional sex-roles; she seems to expect that more women than men possess these personal qualities as a result of constantly assessing the tensions that may exist between the fulfillment of women's traditional sex-roles and the fulfillment of other personal goals. Women, then, have the responsibility for resolving this tension for themselves and for their husbands and their families.

Successful combinations of fulfilling traditional sex-roles and having a political career must also deal with the requirements of mothering. In Kirkpatrick's study, over half of the women legislators bypassed potential conflicts between mother roles and legislator roles by running for office only after their children were grown.²⁶

Those women who chose to run for office while they had children at home relied on other women, not their husbands, to supplement their mothering role. These women either had cooperative women relatives who filled in for them with their children or they had the financial resources to hire acceptable mother surrogates.²⁷ All of these women also had to

confront, from time to time, some guilt about not devoting all of their energy to the fulfillment of sex-role expectations. As Kirkpatrick states, even when the women legislators are satisfied that they have provided an adequate mother surrogate, they still have to justify their choice of allotting only some of their time to their traditional sex roles:

In addition, they must confront the question of whether they are justified in leaving the child-- a question which may be difficult in a culture where mothering is considered a full-time occupation, where theories of childrearing take a dim view of absentee parenthood.²⁸

Of course, as Kirkpatrick has presented sex-roles, it is absent motherhood rather than absent parenthood that is taken a dim view of in this culture. Thus, similar concerns do not arise for the male legislators.

Kirkpatrick's women legislators were also different from her male legislators in that they were less likely to have pursued typical male occupations prior to their entry into politics. The access from particular male occupations such as law and business into political careers were thus unavailable for most of the women in this study. Instead, there appeared to be a female route into politics which started with volunteer service. While volunteer roles allowed women to acquire skills to be successful political candidates, these roles, Kirkpatrick maintained, were more consonant with the traditional women's roles:

Volunteer roles are convergent with traditional nurturing roles and can provide training and experience during the years a woman is principally involved with the wife-mother role.²⁹

Thus, an additional prescription for women who desire political careers but want to maintain their traditional roles is to acquire the skills necessary to make the transition to politics by first participating in volunteer organizations.

Here it seems necessary to ask how woman's participation in voluntary organizations creates fewer tensions with regard to her traditional sex-roles. One of the answers to this question is that women's involvement with voluntary organizations is often seen as a secondary priority; if conflict occurs between this involvement and her first priorities to her husband and children, the secondary priority will be dropped or set aside. A second answer, I believe, involves geographic proximity, that although the women may be away from home at meetings, a phone call can bring them quickly home to deal with family emergencies. But, there is also a possible contradiction here; sometimes the commitment of time and energy to voluntary service may be as substantial as that required for political service. Perhaps the differences here are illusory rather than real.

Consider, for example, the findings of a study conducted by Marcia Lee.³⁰ Lee did a survey analysis of active political participants in Westchester County, New York State.

Lee's study brings out the reasons that the respondents give to explain their actions. In her survey, the politically active women committed more time to politics and indicated more interest in politics than men. Yet, these women, as many of the women in Kirkpatrick's study, were still reluctant to seek public office. The reasons cited for this reluctance focused on their child-care responsibilities and how they would be perceived by other men and women if they ran for political office.³¹ The first concern is an obvious aspect of the situational explanation, and, in this study, where that explanation is directly tested, it seems to be upheld as one dimension of potential women candidates' concerns. The importance of the child care responsibility as a limiting factor to the decision made by these women is illustrated statistically by the fact that only 5.3% of the women who had sought political office had children at home while 26.1% of the women without children at home had run for office.³²

The second concern with regard to how their running for office would be perceived is also related to how these respondents interpreted their appropriate sex roles. Most of these women perceived running for office as something that did not fit in with the traditional female role and believed that others would prefer to see them in some other activity besides politics.³³

But, the most interesting aspect of the findings in

Lee's study, in my opinion, is the fact that a significant number of these women were already spending 20-40 hours per week on politics.³⁴ It certainly isn't clear to me how running for political office would have taken a significantly greater amount of time away from their families. What I believe is depicted in Lee's study is a portrait of woman who can justify her political activity and be very active politically as long as she continues to define her political activity as an avocation peripheral to the central concerns fostered by her traditional sex-role. This keeps her political activity within the acceptable limits of voluntary service which Kirkpatrick maintained converged with women's traditional sex-role. To run for office would be to assert that politics was not just voluntary activity but was a career goal.

Studies of women's activity in political parties also suggest that women are able to pursue political interest and make substantial time commitments to political activity as long as this activity is seen as voluntary or is somehow classified as women's work. In two studies which focused on the activities of men and women in political parties, while the authors noted that women were putting significantly more time into party activities, they devalued the time that women were spending in political activity by suggesting that women and men understand that just as there are appropriate sex-roles for men and women in the larger society, so

are there appropriate sex-role activities for men and women to follow within the party structure.

Constantini and Craik³⁵ initiated the idea that various jobs in political parties can be characterized as male or female jobs. Using Parsonian language, these authors suggest that the jobs in political parties can be classified as instrumental or expressive. By maintaining that women more often perform the expressive functions, the authors conclude that political party work experience is not as useful toward moving women toward political office because it is the instrumental tasks which are more significant for political officeholders to possess.³⁶

While the logic of the explanation as presented is appealing since it would seem to present a rationale for why women devote more time to party affairs but don't run for political office as frequently as men, a closer look at this explanation shows that its persuasiveness breaks down when the manner by which tasks are assigned to the instrumental or expressive categories is scrutinized. A preconceived notion that the tasks that women do are expressive and the tasks that men do are instrumental seems to be the major determining objective in the classification scheme.³⁷

The male authors of this study identify the male tasks as most important to the party. How the party members might weight the importance of these tasks is not considered. To

illustrate, attending meetings, telephoning and making arrangements for political events and putting out the mail were all identified as female, expressive functions, whereas recruiting new members, raising money and giving speeches were seen as instrumental male functions.³⁸ While the authors may accurately depict the breakdown of the party work and who performs the various jobs, they are less convincing with regard to the absolute necessity that any of these functions is necessarily seen as more important to the party to such an extent that the party will reward the performers of those functions with nominations for elective office.

The parallel between the expressive functions of women in the party and in larger society is illustrated by the following quotation:

"the male party leader, like the husband, is more likely to specialize in the instrumental functions...those concerned with...external affairs. The female party leader, like the wife, tends to specialize in expressive functions...those concerned with internal affairs."³⁹

In a study that built on the distinctions elaborated by Constantini and Craik, Fowlkes, Perkins and Rinehart⁴⁰ studied Georgia party leaders where they report similar divisions of labor between men and women in the party structure and a similar heavy time commitment by female party members; these women are also less likely to express interest in running for electoral office.⁴¹ This is seen by the authors as a lack of personal ambition rather

than a lack of the requisite skills. Again, however, one needs to ask whether what is happening in these illustrations is that women, as long as they can define their political work as voluntary, no matter what amount of time they are putting into it, or as long as they can see their work within the political parties as appropriate women's work, feel more comfortable with the politically active role they are taking. To run for office would, however, mean confronting the fact that one was very politically active and also make that active role highly visible to those around you.

If women are as politically active in political party activities as these studies and additional studies illustrate,⁴² then situational theorists who stress the time constraints of the motherhood role have an argument with shaky foundations, for these women present evidence that these time constraints can be or are overcome in certain situations. While no data are contained in these studies that directly test whether these women perceive themselves as constrained by the roles of wife and mother, other situational studies do attempt to verify the significance of these variables.

Cornelia Flora and Naomi Lynn found that motherhood had significant impact on women's political participation and their sense of political efficacy.⁴³ Mothers were more likely to perceive themselves as politically ineffectual

and to participate in politics less than women who were not mothers, but both of these findings were mitigated if the mothers had husbands who were supportive with child-care, if the mothers were involved in adult interaction networks, voluntary service or job networks which took them outside the home. They suggest motherhood need not be debilitating with regard to political participation; what was required was a tempering or modification of the traditional sex-role played out in the isolation of the home.

Susan Gluck Mezey set up a study of Hawaiian men and women political officeseekers which had as a primary goal to ascertain whether there was evidence that a woman's family created obstacles to the pursuit of a political career.⁴⁴ The women in this study were less often married, than the men, had fewer children than their male counterparts, were older and said they devoted less time to political work than the men. The women who were married stressed the significance of their husband's approval of their political activity claiming that they would not engage in political activity without their husband's support.⁴⁵ Thus, Mezey's study also supports the contention that women's roles as wives and mothers have an impact on their political activity.

In a study by Merritt, women also were found to seek office only when their children were older while males did not appear to be hampered by the ages or numbers of children they had at home.⁴⁶

Frequently, situational studies discover that women are more likely to run for and be elected to lower level political offices than higher level offices. From the situational perspective, this phenomenon is generally explained by pointing out the less competitive nature of running for such offices, their lesser importance, and the perception that these local offices are more compatible with women's traditional concerns. Similarly, fewer adjustments by the women officeholder's family and husband are hypothesized as an additional reason why women are more likely to choose local political careers.

Several studies have examined local officeholders comparing men and women who are in these positions or, in some cases, aspire to these positions. One of the findings of these studies seems to be a confirmation of the fact that women officeholders at the local level often are able to combine their political activity and family life without feeling conflict between their political roles and their traditional sex-roles. For example, Susan Gluck Mezey studied Connecticut women local officeholders and found that these women did not seem to need the support from their family and their husband which she saw in her other research where women were seeking state or national offices. Mezey hypothesizes that local office holding is not as disruptive of the officeholder's family life and doesn't require as many adjustments by the officeholder's family.⁴⁷

Trudy Heffron Bers who studied men and women on local boards of education found that there were very few differences between the men and women in these positions with regard to age, number of children, or age of children.⁴⁸ This suggests that in school board politics, where women's political participation in terms of serving in elective office in the United States is the highest, presents few adjustments between the woman's political role and her traditional roles.

In an article on the recruitment of women to suburban city councils, Sharyne Merritt notes that women who hold city council offices but aspire to higher level political offices feel more conflict than women who do not aspire to higher political offices. This conflict centers on being able to fulfill their roles in the family and satisfy their own desires for achievement. While most of the women, then, seem to be able to integrate their family lives and their local political careers as councilwomen, the idea of reconciling higher level political office with family responsibilities does not seem as plausible.⁴⁹

Women who are interested in pursuing political careers at higher levels may also encounter other structural barriers that mitigate against them seeking political office. In the case of partisan elections, the support of the political party may be a necessary condition for gaining nomination or for obtaining financial support.

Clarke and Kornberg, for example, use the situational argument to illustrate what they perceive to be women's disadvantages with regard to political participation within existent political party structures:

The contention is that women are deprived of the leisure time men are able to allocate to party work because the burden of homemaking, childbearing and childrearing fall upon them more heavily than their spouse. Because of this, women may have to forego joining a party or else postpone the event until their children no longer need their more-or-less constant attention.⁵⁰

For the same reasons, as compared to men, women have less time to devote to organization affairs; may need to drop out of their parties frequently and for longer periods; and may not have the opportunity to hold as many party positions, particularly high level positions.⁵¹

Explicit in these statements is the idea that women's roles as wife and mother place limitations on her ability to take a continual active role in political parties. Implicit in these statements is the idea that men's lives allow them the opportunities to actively and continuously pursue political activity in their leisure time, a leisure that is presumably provided by the support of their wives who are occupied with the care of the children.

Clark and Kornberg imply that women will be less likely to be offered the opportunity to run for political office as a result of their inability to participate as fully or as early in their lives as men can in political party activities. The underlying assumption here is that this party activity is a precondition for recruitment to stand for political office,

particularly higher political office. Whether this assessment is an accurate analysis of how individuals currently attain political candidacy is open to dispute. But, for my purposes, the important point here is that it is women's life activities that are seen as needing to be malleable, not the political party structure. However, many of the assumptions that Clarke and Kornberg present here seem to be disputed by other works; that is, women do seem to be active in political parties and, in fact, often contribute more of their time to this activity. Additional elements about the party structure may be more significant in terms of whether women become party nominees.

Recalling the discussions of Constantini and Craik and Fowlkes, Perkins, and Rinehart⁵² regarding the division of labor in political parties, it is undoubtedly important to suggest that whether women's work in political party organizations is really expressive or instrumental, the party membership's perception of the importance of the work that women do in political parties may be significant in terms of whether women are encouraged to run for political office or not.

Both of these studies mentioned that the women party members had lower political aspirations than their male counterparts, attributing this to the personalities or personal choices of the women involved. Constantini and Craik suggested that the personal motivations for men and

women becoming involved in party affairs differed. Women party leaders, according to these authors, are motivated by public-regardingness⁵³ while men's political party activity is motivated by self-regardingness. The meaning of this distinction, according to Constantini and Craik, is that, for women, service to the political party is service to the public good and, thus, is an end in itself, whereas men see their party activity as promoting certain personal career goals they have established for themselves. In effect, their party work may be directed toward achieving political office careers.

Some authors have suggested that political party structures pose even more pertinent barriers to women interested in political careers and running for political office than any of the studies cited thus far. One study, which drew primarily on the related experiences of women who had fought for and, in most cases, achieved high elective offices at the state or national level was written by Susan and Martin Tolchin.⁵⁴ Political party structures, according to the Tolchins, do not encourage women to run for political office. Political parties, in their book, are depicted as "stag parties" to emphasize the unwillingness of most political parties to endorse women as political candidates except in throwaway districts, that is, districts in which the candidate sponsored by the party is perceived as having little opportunity to succeed. These "stag parties" are dominated by male

leadership, convened at times most suitable for male membership, and supposedly relegate the "shitwork" to their women members. Women party members are more likely to be active in the party but aren't encouraged to seek political offices; women who achieved political office encountered discrimination from male party leaders or male officeholders. Susan Welch in a study of women's recruitment to politics also suggested that discrimination was an important factor in women not seeking office.⁵⁶

In Marcia Manning Lee's study of Westchester County political leaders, over half (58.6%) the women in the survey felt that women would have problems different from men if they were to seek public office. 74% of these 58.6% said that women not being accepted by men would be the main difficulty.⁵⁷ These women believe that men would prefer for women to participate in politics in ways other than running for office.⁵⁸

One of the difficulties with determining whether sex discrimination is an external structure constraining women's political activity is the fact that many of these studies rely on survey questions that elicit the women's opinions. Some interpretations would suggest that these responses may merely categorize the way that the woman believes that discrimination exists but does not necessarily prove the existence of discrimination. The difficulties here are illustrated by Susan Gluck Mezey in her study of Hawaiian

officeholders. 69% of the women in this study, when asked to mention the disadvantages of being a woman in office, pointed to sexism and bias against them by males in office.⁵⁹ The men in the study, however, interpreted the women's experience differently. According to the men, "the problems of women officeholders stemmed from their own inadequacies: emotionalism and weakness, demands for extra privileges, and interest in minutiae and trivia."⁶⁰ Thus, men frequently deny the perceived existence of sex discrimination as a structural problem.

In Mezey's study, sex discrimination was perceived by women as an external constraint on their ability to be political leaders, but the lack of agreement by men and women over the existence of discrimination suggests that additional observations of outside trained observers would be necessary to persuade both men and women that this is a structural factor. The evidence presented by the Tolchins lends some support to this thesis. In the Tolchins' book, women politicians were relating their personal experiences of discrimination by male party leaders and male colleagues. Bella Abzug, for example, relates an incident when the party leadership moved a crucial party meeting and failed to notify her.⁶¹

Similarly, Irene Diamond's study of New England women state legislators also indicated that these women believed they had encountered male hostility and sex discrimination,

and these factors limited their aspirations to seek higher political offices.⁶² Diamond noted that Connecticut women legislators were, at the time of her study, excluded from the male-only Hawaiian Room where the male legislators ate lunch and discussed political issues.⁶³ This was obviously an external structural barrier that placed clear distinctions between the male and female legislators.

A further structural problem which may discourage women from seeking higher political office is the accumulation of the substantial amounts of money necessary to finance a political campaign. While the level of money needed for local candidacies is still personally manageable, state-wide offices and national offices increasingly require substantial financial resources. Witness the 1980 and 1982 elections where it was not uncommon in contested elections for the candidates to spend millions of dollars.

Tolchin and Tolchin verified the difficulties of the women candidates in their study being able to raise campaign money.⁶⁴ These women were less likely to have the personal income to finance expensive campaigns. The large campaign donors, the political parties, labor unions, and business organizations were less willing to contribute support to women candidates. While these factors obviously present significant difficulties for grass roots candidates whether they are male or female, the structural deterrence

which the need for substantial campaign money presents cannot be ignored.

A further dimension of the situational argument is to suggest that women have not been channeled into the proper occupational categories to assure themselves of a proper foundation/base for political action. Susan Welch attributes the fact that women do not pursue occupations that directly feed into political careers to their sex role socialization, although she maintains that this merely defines a situational barrier to women who want to seek political office:

Traditionally, women have been socialized into other occupations, that is, occupations that are not as likely to lead toward running for political office. This does not mean that they have less time and energy than men but rather that they are socialized to pursue occupations that do not have direct connections to political office.⁶⁵

In Diamond's study of New England legislators, she noted that more men (16%) than women (7%) identified their job as a factor in their initial interest in a political career. To explain this difference she notes the situational argument that the occupations that women most frequently hold in the labor sector, service and clerical jobs, do not facilitate movement into public office in the way that certain male jobs, such as business and law, do.⁶⁶

While the assumption that certain occupations are "feeder hierarchies" for political careers is widely held in political science, there is insufficient evidence of its

importance documented in the situational studies to make a judgment about its significance. However, if this is a factor in explaining fewer women seeking and holding political offices, the policy implication of this constraint would indicate the need to persuade more women to enter the appropriate occupations, which might return us, as Susan Welch suggested, to policy changes that are directed at the socialization process. Alternatively, it might suggest that women must, as they did in Kirkpatrick's study, develop alternative routes to political office that are congruent with other aspects of women's adult roles.

In my examination of the situational or structural studies, I have often felt that the questions being asked and the observations presented were more solidly based than the observations presented in the voting studies and the socialization studies.

Many of the findings presented in the situational or structural studies appear more compelling because of the emphasis that was placed on actually eliciting the opinions of the women in these studies with regard to their own understanding of the reasons why they were less likely to seek political office. The perceptions of the participants are a logical beginning point for research. Yet, it is also always appropriate to question whether the perceptions of the participants are an accurate assessment of the external limitations. I am not maintaining that this is an either/or

situation or that, frequently, these relationships aren't complexly related; I assume that external structures and internal structures may be difficult for both the observer and the participant in the study to isolate. In fact, I would argue that this is one of the reasons that the situational researchers assert that the adult situation of women is more important to understanding why women don't run for political office but frequently fall back on the socialization explanation when they encounter data that doesn't quite fit the situational explanation.

Consider, for example, the importance of women's roles as housewives and mothers as constraints, according to the situational theorists, limiting women's pursuit of political offices. While there is much evidence in these studies confirming that the women respondents feel this is a constraint, it is still difficult to determine whether this constraint is merely an aspect of women's adult social roles because the distinction between women as housewife being constrained in her adult life by the roles involved and woman as girl constrained by the socialization process to primarily aspire to become a mother, to see this as the primary role for women in American society to achieve, is difficult to isolate. It is true that it is only as an adult that women get to actually experience the constraints of motherhood and the duties of the housewife. But if the woman as child and later as woman is unable to conceptualize herself in any

other role but that of mother, it is hard to know if the real damage is done in childhood or adulthood and hard to prescribe a potential cure.

The situational theorists were less likely to invoke ad hoc explanations than the behavioralists previously examined. This, I suggest, is a result of the fact that they were more likely to be asking their respondents specific questions which did not need additional interpretation. If directly asked, how does your husband view your political activity, it seems obvious that the respondents will be giving their understanding of the husband's role which does not necessarily require interpretation by the researchers. On the other hand, the questions that the researchers ask may frame the types of responses that they receive.

It also seems relevant to point out that the research using situational or structural explanation was more frequently conducted by women researchers. This is true both in the sense that women researchers seldom seem to focus on the political socialization explanation and that more women than men seem to be actively doing research on the situational question. Perhaps this is insignificant, but it may reflect an intuitive belief by these women that the situational explanation is a better beginning point for research in this area.

From a policy perspective, the situational or structural

theorists present a number of areas in which women's adult lives will need significant changes if women are going to seek and wield power through elective offices. One can envision here that changes in the structure of child care relationships, changes in the occupations women pursue, changes in political party organizational structures and changes in the financing of elections might be necessary to attain this goal. As in the socialization studies and voting studies, the researchers stop short of asserting necessary policy changes. In part, this is a consequence of the fact that most of these researchers believe that the situational barriers can be overcome by individual women who choose to confront the difficulties. The opinion that this is a viable alternative is bolstered by the fact that a number of women have overcome the barriers.

The most significant difficulty with the situational explanation, from a policy perspective, revolves around the fact that the women who have achieved political office have done so by finding individual solutions to their perceived situational or structural problems but these individual solutions are not replicable on a large-scale basis, because most of the women in the American society do not have access to these solutions, nor is it possible to imagine that the solutions could be made more readily available without a massive restructuring of American society. While a few more middle class and upper class women, with childcare

support and financial support and the best wishes of their husbands, might be able to seek and wield political power, this model offers little advice to the majority of women in the middle class and working class, whose lives are unrepresented in these studies. These women, combining the roles of wife, mother, and workers, may have even greater structural constraints to their political participation, particularly in terms of running for elective office.

If the situational theorists have a more accurate explanation of the reasons for women's limited political participation, then to imagine increasing the access of more women, from a variety of social classes, to political office might require a massive restructuring of society, not only in terms of political relationships but also in terms of social relationships. This question is insufficiently addressed in the situational studies.

This brings to the surface a difficulty with the behavioral research reviewed throughout the entire dissertation. The focus on political activity, narrowly defined as voting, political party activity and running for elective office in the studies may give us an inadequate picture of the political activity of women. In one of the few studies which features working class women as political participants, Kathleen McCourt⁶⁷ presents working class women organizing to protect their neighborhoods against the building of an expressway and attempting to reverse the

racial changeover of their neighborhoods. For many of these women, political activity may have been a once-in-a-lifetime event. While these women confronted the traditional institutions of government, they used tactics that are seldom considered as legitimate political behavior in the United States. In fact, political scientists even have a separate term for this political behavior, labeling it protest politics.

Nor do the behavioral studies deal with political activity directed against other institutions of power besides governmental institutions, such as businesses. The political activity of women in unions or the political relevance of large-scale boycotts, such as the meat boycott upheld primarily by women, is unexamined

In many cases, we also witnessed a hierarchical ordering of the value of individual political activity which placed more value on political activity that was conducted in the more central loci of political institutions. Thus, national office-seeking was ranked higher than state office-seeking. While there is a certain rationale to this ranking in that more decisions, many of which have more widespread impact, are made at the higher levels of decision-making, there is also a devaluing of the policy decisions made at the local levels where women are more numerous.

In the same way, women's activity in political parties was frequently devalued with regard to its worth. One

begins to wonder if there isn't a belief by researchers that if women perform an activity, it can't be political, or, if the activity is clearly political, even in their definition, and women are performing it, it must be less important.

While I have suggested throughout this paper that women's relationship to politics and the explanations for this relationship are not well supported by statistical evidence and that the explanations advanced to account for women's political behavior are often ad hoc, nonetheless, interest in the question of why women and men behave in politically different ways, which is a belief many people in the society subscribe to, is evident in the popular media as well as in political science research. The epilogue which follows will examine this interest, suggesting that many of the ill-founded ideas about women's political behavior are advanced in the popular media and that popular journalists also have created some additional ad hoc explanations to interpret the statistical data gathered from public opinion and election polls.

C H A P T E R VII

EPILOGUE

The previous chapters in this dissertation explore the development of political behavior research in the political science discipline and the explanations that have been advanced to account for women's political behavior. In each chapter we have seen that these explanations have possible policy implications. When we approach these explanations with the question, what would be required to change women's political behavior if the explanations are presumed to be correct, various answers emerged, some of which required instituting different patterns of political socialization, others which seemed to require greater flexibility in the adult roles of women.

The question of explaining women's political behavior has, since this dissertation was initiated, come to the fore again, not as an academic question but as a practical question that engages the popular press and political analysts whose job it is to find the persuasive techniques that will send the voter to the polls to cast a ballot for the candidate who is his/her client. The development of practical and popular interest in women's political behavior was stimulated by the gathering of statistical data using behavioral techniques similar to those of the early voting studies although more sophisticated in survey sampling. The relevant data is

again election statistics and issue questions asked by pollsters who have come to play an extremely significant role in election campaigns.

The event that precipitated the rebirth of interest in women's political behavior was the 1980 election when pollsters discerned what they perceived to be a new trend in the voting patterns of men and women which emerged during the Carter/Reagan election. Since this election numerous articles have appeared which examine the "gender gap," a catchphrase coined to capture the phenomenon of men and women disagreeing about political issues and political candidates.

Reviewing some of the articles that have appeared with regard to the gender gap, I see the re-emergence of many of the assumptions that have dominated political science research with regard to women and politics. The departure point for most of these articles is that politics has characteristically been male behavior and that male political behavior is the standard against which women's political behavior should be measured, ideas which Bourque and Grossholtz criticized in their article, "Politics as Unnatural Practice."¹ The difference is that, on this occasion, it is popular journalists and pollsters who are expounding these views.

The policy implications of the "gender gap" seem more immediate as the professional campaign organizers scurry to utilize their understandings of women's political behavior to secure the votes of women for their candidates. Thus, I want

to use this epilogue to examine the explanations currently found in the popular media, to see how unsubstantiated assumptions about women and politics are resurfacing in the current articles and how new twists are given to these old explanations.

An understanding of the gender gap and the possible explanations for its existence must begin with the election data from 1980. This data was collected from exit polls conducted by New York Times/CBS News and ABC/Time magazine. Exit polls are the latest device for gathering instant statistical data on how particular groups of people vote in an election. Individuals leaving selected polling places are asked for whom they voted. Data regarding the voter's sex, ethnic background, political party identification, educational background, religion, age, family income, regional location and whether they perceive themselves as liberals, conservatives or moderates are recorded. Each person is also asked to respond to several issue questions such as whether the United States should be more forceful dealing with the Soviet Union even if this would increase the probability of war.²

The significance of the 1980 election with regard to women's political behavior was that this was the first presidential election to elicit significantly different behavior from men and women. In previous presidential elections, the difference between the percentages of women voting for a particular candidate and men voting for a particular candidate

had never been greater than 6%.³

In the 1980 election, however, while Reagan won the vote of women by one or two percent, he received 17% more of the male vote than Carter did. The statistical breakdown provided by the exit polls shows that women, who represented 49% of all voters in the 1980 election, cast 45% of their votes for Carter, 46%-47% of their votes for Reagan, and 7% of their votes for Anderson.⁴ Men, on the other hand, cast 37% of their votes for Carter, 54% for Reagan and 7% for Anderson.

It is important to keep these statistics firmly in mind because frequently subsequent reports of them paint a false impression, the impression that if only women had voted in the election, Reagan would not have been elected. Consider, for example, the report of the New Republic:

Women voted against Reagan in exactly the same proportion that men voted for him:
54%.⁵

New Republic cites as its data source for this observation the New York Times/CBS News exit poll. To understand how they arrived at their statistic which leads us to the conclusion that 54% of American women voted for Carter (because we quickly forget third and fourth candidacies), we discover that they have lumped together all the votes women cast for other candidates and presented them as votes against Reagan. The lack of validity in this statistic can be amply illustrated if we use a similar technique with regard to women's vote

and Carter. One could state just as (in)correctly that 55% of women voted against Carter. While women's opposition to Reagan is a favored interpretation of the 1980 election data, it seems initially to lack statistical validity unless one assumes that the standard for political behavior is that of the male and only deviation from male behavior needs further examination. Such an assumption seems implicit both in the New Republic article and in the initial analysis of the exit poll data by Adam Clymer, a New York Times reporter. Clymer seems to suggest that if only women had followed the male pattern, Reagan's victory would have been an even greater mandate than Reagan was able to claim:

Mr. Reagan's long-standing difficulties in persuading women to vote for him, the Times/CBS News Poll also showed, held down his percentages again Tuesday. Those problems were strongest among women at either end of the education scale, those with less than a high school education and those who graduated from college. The poll suggested that both fear about the war and his opposition to the equal rights amendment handicapped Mr. Reagan's bid for their support.⁶

Although Time magazine interpreted virtually the same data--the ABC exit poll data showed that 47% of women voters voted for Reagan and 45% of women voters voted for Carter while the percentages for men were the same as in the New York Times/CBS exit poll--as indicating that Reagan didn't have his usual difficulties with women,⁷ it is the Clymer interpretation that has been more widely accepted.

Women's opposition to Reagan for President is then seen

as the opening edge to understanding the existence of the gender gap. Gloria Steinem, for example, credits this opposition with opening political parties' eyes to the existence of women as a potential political source:

Belated and incomplete as this year's well-publicized discovery of the women's vote has been, we owe an odd debt to current right-wing control of the Republican party machinery and Ronald Reagan himself. Not until there was a whopping 20-point difference between women's and men's choice of Reagan in 1980 did we begin to be "discovered." And not until that disapproval of the Reagan Presidency continued to grow did we get to be regarded as a hot item.⁸

Unlike most of the popular analysts, Steinem appears to believe that women have always had differing reasons for voting than men. She implies that even in elections where men and women have voted in similar directions, the reasons behind women's votes may have differed. She cites previous issue differences between men and women as substantiation for this view. Thus, Steinem indicates that there may be separate patterns of male and female political behavior that have merely become more discernible at the present point in time.

Yet, Steinem has also exaggerated the opposition of women to Reagan in the 1980 election, at least from a statistical point of view. In this article, the reporting of the statistics leaves the distinct impression that women had little responsibility for the election of Reagan to the presidency.

There are additional uses of the exit poll data which are

just as misleading in their interpretation, but the point that really needs to be made is that what is frequently at the base of such misinterpretations is a continuing notion that male political behavior is normal political behavior against which women's political behavior is always contrasted.

From the standpoint of a statistician, the abnormal distribution of votes in the 1980 election might have been perceived as that of males because men clearly divided their votes by larger percentages than would have been predicted by previous election data, party identification data, or even pre-election data. In the 1982 election data, which overall indicated a lessening of the gender gap with regard to differences between men's and women's support of Democratic candidates, the lessening of the gap seems to be a result of men returning to Democratic support. This fact, I believe, lends credence to the idea that it was men who exhibited unusual political behavior in 1980.

While interpretations of the 1980 election data did stimulate reinterest in the political differences between men and women in the popular journals, it is only as these articles attempt to articulate the differences and account for them that the underlying assumptions in the concept "gender gap" become clearer. Increasingly, references to the gender gap suggest that political party differences underlie candidate preference differences for men and women and that

these political party differences are a result of issue differences between men and women.

Now, one might logically assume that issue differences between men and women would center around what might be considered traditional women's issues such as abortion and the equal rights amendment. In fact, in the 1980 election, the equal rights amendment issue seemed to have some impact on the way that women cast their votes. Those women who favored the equal rights amendment, representing 22% of all voters in the 1980 election, strongly favored Carter over Reagan, casting 54% of their votes for Carter, 32% for Reagan and 11% for Anderson. Conversely, women who were opposed to the equal rights amendment were 15% of all voters in the 1980 election, and these women strongly favored Reagan casting 66% of their votes for Reagan, 29% of their votes for Carter and 4% of their votes for Anderson.⁹

However, according to the pollsters and the popular journals, it is not the traditional women's issues which generate significant differences between men and women, for men appear to be equally supportive of these issues in the polls. To understand the type of issues that generate significantly different responses from men and women, it is expedient to review the findings of an article on these differences that appeared in the April/May issue of Public Opinion, an article that seems to have been widely read by both political parties.

Public Opinion reviewed the data that they had collected from 1948 until the 1980s in an attempt to delineate the basic issue differences between men and women. The authors summarized their findings by grouping their statistics into four time periods: 1948-1952; 1960-1964; the early seventies and the late seventies through the eighties.¹⁰

In the 1948-1952 time period, Public Opinion concluded that (1) public opinion differences between the sexes were very modest, (2) the biggest differences in responses between men and women in this time period occurred with regard to expressed levels of political information and interest. Women, at this time, tended to more frequently state a lack of interest in politics or to say that they had no opinion with regard to political issue questions, (3) the one dimension where men's and women's attitudes did differ consistently, although not by a large margin, was on questions involving the use of force. For example, in 1949, women(25%) were slightly more likely to say that the United States should never use the atomic bomb first than men(21%). Women were also slightly more likely than men to suggest that the atom bomb should be outlawed completely; 6% of women and 4% of men were in favor of this.¹¹

In the 1960-1964 time period, the pattern of male/female responses to political issues was similar to that of 1948-52. No consistent differences between men's and women's responses to issue questions emerged except with regard to questions

dealing with the use of force and the possibility of war. For example, when asked about their concern with regard to the United States becoming involved in another war, women were more concerned about this issue than men: 25% of women responded that they were pretty worried about the probability of another war as compared to 17% of men, 51% of women said they were somewhat worried about the possibility of war compared to 41% of men, and only 24% of women said that they were not worried at all as compared to 42% of men.¹²

In the early seventies, 1971 and 1972, the differences already cited continued to hold, but, by the late 1970s, a different pattern seemed to emerge, according to Public Opinion. While, on some questions, there were still no significant differences, in other areas significant and consistent differences began to emerge. The two general headings that Public Opinion categorizes these issues under are the "risk dimension" and the "compassion dimension."

Issues that were classified as part of the "compassion dimension" involved questions such as whether one favored the full employment bill - in 1977, 70% of women as compared to 61% of men favored this legislation;¹³ whether one agreed that the government should work to substantially reduce the income gap between the rich and the poor - 73% of women as compared to 61% of men favored this and whether spending for social security should be increased - 56% of women as compared to 43% of men favored this issue.¹⁴ All of these differences

are about 10% or higher although only in the case of social security is there a difference in the direction of the opinion, since less than a majority of men were in favor of increasing social security.

The "risk dimension" was said to be measured by questions which usually involved policy considerations that presented conflicting goal choices. For example, when asked whether they would be in favor of relaxing the environmental protection laws if it will help improve the economy, 58% men in contrast to 48% women favored this.¹⁵ A similar question which asked whether environmental standards should be relaxed to allow industries to convert to the use of coal elicited a favorable response from 51% of men but only 35% of women.¹⁶ Labeling this a "risk dimension" seems to imply that women are less likely than men to be willing to take the risk of increasing environmental pollution for economic considerations.

The Public Opinion article also maintains that the previously noted differences between men and women over the use of force increase in the late seventies and early eighties. Women, for example, registered disapproval to the reinstatement of the draft; 61% of women as compared to 48% of men were opposed to this.¹⁷ Women trailed men in support of increasing spending in the military budget; 68% of women as compared to 81% of men favored the increase.¹⁸

The major conclusion of the Public Opinion article is that there are a variety of significant political issue

differences that are emerging and becoming more sustained between men and women, i.e., in the idiom of the popular press, a gender gap has developed, but this gender gap is reflected on issues other than those of traditional women's issues, that is, those issues that address the interests of women or matters that affect women differently or more directly than men such as the equal rights amendment or abortion. The Public Opinion article stresses that men and women have not differed significantly in their support for various women's issues since the 1950s. What they mean by this is that the responses of men and women to these issues tend to be within 4 percentage points of each other and tend to be similar in direction. Put more simply, at least in response to hypothetical questions, men tend to be about as supportive of women's issues as women.

As usual, however, this discussion of gender gap differences does not merely revolve around statistically tabulated responses. There are attempts to account for the gender gap differences that are noted. The explanations again provide us with hypothetical reasons for women's political behavior.

The authors of the Public Opinion article do not directly interpret the statistical results they have provided, although it could be argued that in labeling certain issues as compassion, as opposition to force, or as unwillingness to engage in risks, they have presented a fairly traditional view

of women. But the primary interpretation of this data is presented in edited synopses of the responses of two women, Betty Friedan and Midge Decter, who were asked to interpret the data by responding to questions such as "why do the differences between men and women appear to be more pronounced than they did twenty years ago," "why are there negligible differences between men and women on women's issues," and "will these trends continue?"¹⁹

Since Friedan and Decter are usually identified as ideological opponents, Friedan as a feminist, Decter as an opponent of the women's movement, the perspectives they bring to bear on the data might be anticipated as divergent. In fact, there are both similarities and differences in their interpretations.

Both Friedan and Decter seem to accept the assumption that men have been dominant in the political domain. Friedan states this specifically, interpreting the current issue differences between men and women as a change from women's former behavior of following men on issues of politics. At one point, she states:

Women used to follow men. At first they simply voted like their husbands; men charted the high ground politically and women followed.²⁰

The new data suggest to her that women are no longer following men but beginning to think for themselves and express their own thoughts with regard to issues:

The data are fascinating. What we're seeing is that women don't necessarily

follow men. When women begin to move toward real equality and a full sense of their own personhood, they don't follow men at all; they speak with their own voices.²¹

Both Friedan and Decter link the issue differences found between men and women to what they perceive as women's greater concern for life. Both women see this concern for preserving life as resulting from the life experiences of women, although Decter believes these life experiences merely reinforce a greater natural inclination women have with regard to life.

Friedan articulates how this greater concern for preserving life is reflected in women's current issue options:

Women, more than men, have been concerned with life, and this, has given them superior values and a better sense of what's needed for the survival of the species and human evolution...issues having to do with children, the elderly, families, the sick, the quality of life, and our actual survival are more basic to women.²²

Friedan believes it is this concern that is reflected in questions such as those that are labeled the "comparison dimension" in the Public Opinion article as well as those issues that are grouped into the "risk dimension." She reinterprets the "risk dimension" in the following way:

Women's concern for the pollution of the environment and the hazards of nuclear radiation does not indicate conservatism or unwillingness to take risks, as you imply. It means that women have more sense about life and no-win ventures that are lethal to life.²³

Decter sees what she classifies as women's historic "dovish" inclination as a natural response from women whose daily lives she characterizes by stating that "women spend most of their waking hours trying to prevent various forms of harm from coming to those she looks after. It's a natural inclination."²⁴

Decter also believes that women have a natural inclination to be more liberal. While she does not explain precisely what she means by liberal, Decter does say that liberal values are virtually identical with what she considers to be the natural values of women: compassion and nurturance.²⁵ Presumably liberals seek public policies that are compassionate and nurturing.

Both Friedan and Decter believe that the women's movement is, in some sense, responsible for the current gender gap, although their assessment of the movement's role differs. Friedan thinks that as a result of the women's movement, women have acquired the confidence and self-respect to assert their own political values:

Women now have enough self-respect, independence and sense of their own personhood to assert their values politically instead of keeping quiet, figuring that men are always right.²⁶

From Decter's perspective, the women's movement seems to have several linkages to the current "gender gap" differences. The role she most clearly identifies is the role of reinforcing liberal values of compassion and nurturance.

To her, this is an ironic, rather than intended, consequence of the women's movement:

The change in women's attitudes over the past decade has had much to do with the women's movement itself. The ideology of the movement, which has had a profound influence on women's opinions, was far more liberal/left than people generally understood. The women's movement used the so-called women's issues as a platform from which to critique our society from a liberal view. There is some irony in the result. The liberal values and the traditional feminine virtues - nurturance and compassion - are virtually identical. Thus, by accepting a liberal women's program, women have become politically influenced to take more traditionally feminine attitudes. In other words, the movement has made them more feminine ideologically.²⁷

However, unlike Friedan, Decter does not believe that the women's movement left a positive imprint on women's personality. She believes that women in contemporary society are lacking in personal security and happiness even though one of the questions in the Public Opinion article elicited responses from women that indicated that they were personally self-confident and happy. But Decter, noting that women are less confident than men about the future of the society, sees this expression of lack of confidence as a symbol of women's personal insecurity.²⁸ Women are really personally insecure but are unable to express this to pollsters. Her evidence for this assertion is personal observation:

Women are saying that they feel better about the way their lives are going because they've been told to feel better about it. There are all kinds of conclusions to be drawn but not by polling

them but by looking at them, by observing their conduct. There is evidence that they are not nearly as cheerful as they say about the way their own lives are going.²⁹

Thus, while they are unable to express this personal insecurity, which seems to derive from the confusion about appropriate sex roles that Decter sees as a result of the ideology of the women's movement, women are able to express this personal insecurity indirectly, in Decter's interpretation, by expressing insecurity over the future of the country. Decter seems to infer that this insecurity is unjustified although one might argue that it is a rational extension of her idea that women are more concerned with the preservation of life than men; that women express greater concern about the future of the country, particularly in a society whose political context is a nuclear dominated world.

Men also seem to be suffering from personal insecurity as a result of the women's movement, according to Decter. She maintains that the reason that men support women's rights issues in the polls is because they are lying either out of a sense of fear or out of a sense of courtesy to women, not because they see these rights as fair or just.³⁰ Rather, the suggestion is that these ideas have been socially imposed on men but are not ideas that will be acceptable to men over time. Rather than resisting these ideas, as men naturally should, according to Decter, they are currently immobilized:

Men have completely collapsed, without the

slightest show of resistance under a major league assault on them. They've collapsed socially, intellectually, and politically.³¹

Thus, at the present time, men lack the self-confidence to express their own opinions just as women do, in Decter's explanation.

Yet, both Decter and Friedan seem to be convinced that the gender gap phenomenon is a temporary, culturally produced anomaly to the more usual situation where men and women are basically similar in their political attitudes. So both predict that this gap will close. While the reasons that underlie this belief for each woman remain unclear in this article, Friedan's expectation of the closing of the gap seems to assume that men will come to accept the importance of human priorities as an important element of politics. Thus, her version of the gap closing envisions men being persuaded to the position she states is currently held by women, presumably because she sees an inherent rationality to this position. Men, in this scenario, will catch up to women.

Decter, on the other hand, forecasts an end to the gender gap because she believes it is unnatural. In this context, I assume that her understanding of what is natural is that men are more naturally concerned with politics and that it is natural for women to defer to men in this area. To return to this natural condition, both men and women who are currently under the sway of the ideology of the women's

movement will see their natural interests and return to the condition of men setting the pace in politics and women following.

While articles such as the Public Opinion article might ordinarily have little policy impact, this article may have had a certain amount of influence on the organization of the election campaigns in the 1982 elections. The article was accepted by both political parties whose major pollsters were already interested in the phenomenon of the gender gap. If the Public Opinion article is correct in its assessment of the issues that are most important to women, a possible policy implication in terms of campaign strategy is that appeals may be made to women voters on the issues that are perceived to be most of concern to them but not necessarily on traditional women's issues.

Richard Wirthlin is currently President Reagan's pollster and also was the pollster for many prominent Republicans in the 1982 elections. Wirthlin was one of the first to note the gender gap in relation to the way that men and women feel about Reagan's handling of the Presidency since his election and to argue that the lower support of women for Reagan might present difficulties for Republicans seeking election or reelection.³² in 1982 and the future.

In Wirthlin's opinion, the campaign strategies of the Republicans should be based on an appeal to women voters on the issue concerns identified as gender gap issues, such

as war and peace.³³ In a comment to Los Angeles Times reporter Robert Scheer, Wirthlin noted that if the economic situation was sufficiently improved, the intent of the Republicans was to make peace the central issue of the 1982 elections.³⁴ On the other hand, Wirthlin has not been concerned about trying to reach women voters on traditional women's issues although some recent political appointments by Reagan have been given to women which may indicate Reagan's concerns in this area.

Gloria Steinem, a woman strongly identified with the women's movement, is concerned about the emphasis that the political parties are putting on the importance of gender gap issues as opposed to traditional women's issues in the campaigns of the 1982 elections. While she doesn't deny the existence of gender gap issues, Steinem does deny that these issues are more fundamental to women's voting behavior than the traditional women's issues, such as the ERA and abortion. Steinem states that the traditional women's issues, such as the ERA and abortion, are more likely to activate women - to actually get them out to vote.³⁵ Citing statistics from an unidentified source, she notes that 65% of women(50% of men) have stated that they would vote against any candidate who opposed the ERA and that 68% of women(57% of men) have said they would vote against any candidate who supports a ban on abortion.³⁶ On the one hand, Steinem seems to be reminding the two parties that some attention must be paid

to furthering women's issues to be assured of women's electoral support. On the other hand, Steinem also seems concerned that women might increasingly accept the gender gap interpretation of which issues are of significance to them. In polemical language, Steinem suggests that the women-don't-care-about-women's issues is the 1982 version of there-is-no-women's-vote.³⁷ If women accept this notion, then Steinem is concerned that there will be no one assuring that traditional women's issues are protected. As Steinem presents it,

Yes, women care disproportionately about general issues, too. But the nuclear freeze, environmental protection, and the like all affect the male half of the nation just as much as the female half, and therefore, they have other sources of support. Self-determination and equality are the natural concerns of women in every race and group. If women don't make them a priority, who will?³⁸

Steinem's prescription for women would keep traditional women's issues at the forefront of voting decisions. Women should, if necessary, relegate the more general interests shared with men to men's support and concern themselves primarily with women's issues.

Steinem also believes that the identification of the gender gap issues as politically significant to women may give women an opportunity to prove their political potential and political seriousness at the ballot box. This position is reflected in the warning she issues:

If we don't deliver in the ballot box the opposition to supporters of anti-equality

and militaristic policies (whatever their party label) that we've been promising in the polls, we will send this message to politicians: you can proceed with impunity. The women's vote stays home.³⁹

Steinem clearly sees the current political situation as one in which women, because of their perceived divergences from men, can have a greater impact on the electoral political system, at least in terms of casting their ballots for candidates who support policy positions of interest to women in terms of both the traditional women's issues and the gender gap issues. Whether women saw her message or not, early findings of the 1982 elections seem to indicate that women did respond politically to both traditional women's issues and to gender gap issues in making candidate selections.

Since, in Steinem's view, a woman's vote has existed for as long as women have had the vote even though the pollsters have interpreted its non-existence on the basis of the lack of sustained disagreement between men and women on political issues, she feels no need to explain its sudden emergence; rather, she believes that pollsters and the political parties have merely discovered what women have always known, that men and women may vote in similar directions or respond to issue questions with similar answers but the underlying reasons for these actions may differ.

However, the pollsters and campaign organizers for political candidates are currently interested in the

motivations of women as well as their issue positions. Many national campaigns are now being handled by sophisticated marketing techniques that attempt to understand and manipulate the psychological motivations of individual voters. Appeals to individual voters are designed to address their psychological motivations for voting. One popular theory of what motivates women politically has been extrapolated from a book by female psychologist, Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice.

Gilligan's central thesis is that women and men have different patterns of moral development which result in alternative approaches to moral questions. Following the work of moral development psychologists, particularly Kohlberg, Gilligan accepts the interpretation of how males develop morally but rejects Kohlberg's moral development framework for women. Kohlberg's work concluded that women were morally not as developed as men. Gilligan rejects this conclusion arguing that women have their own pattern of moral development within which they answer moral questions.

The Gilligan conception of male morality is one in which morality is equated with fairness; and moral development is tied to an understanding of rights and rules.⁴⁰ For women, Gilligan says, morality is concerned with caring for others and is linked to the development of understanding responsibilities and relationships.⁴¹ Solutions to moral dilemmas, in the male paradigm, appear to concentrate on the resolution of

conflicting rights, whereas solutions to moral dilemmas, in the female paradigm, emphasize the resolution of conflicting responsibilities in relationships.

Richard Wirthlin believes that Gilligan's book is the key to understanding gender gap differences although what use he makes of this is not clear. Robert Turner, a political columnist for the Boston Globe, spelled out the connections that he believes Gilligan's thesis provides for the explanation of women's political behavior more fully.

Turner points out that the differences reflected in the gender gap are found most reliably on issues that may express the moral concerns of women. As Turner sees it, women are more supportive of issues such as peace, jobs, social security and education because of their moral development and the stress this development places on responsibilities and relationships.⁴²

In a similar manner, Turner illustrates that Gilligan's thesis also explains men's support of traditional women's issues:

On many women's issues, such as the ERA, equal employment opportunity, and equal pay for equal work, the central question is one of equity - precisely the kind of issue that appeals, in Gilligan's terms, to the male sense of morality, one guided by a desire for fairness and justice.⁴³

Ellen Goodman, also a political columnist for the Globe, similarly ties Gilligan's thesis to an understanding of gender gap differences by suggesting that women's greater

support of the Democratic party and democratic candidates at this point in time is linked to the fact that the Democrats are perceived as the standard bearers of liberal policies. Goodman equates liberal policies with caretaking policies and sees women, now voting for their own values, naturally voting for caretaking policies in line with their moral development.

Turner doesn't reject the idea that women's rights issues are important to women's political behavior, however, in his acceptance of the importance of the gender gap issues. Rather, he suggests that there are currently two motivations operating when women make voting decisions: self-interests and moral interests. Gilligan's analysis suggests that the self-interests of women with regard to politics may be easier for them to articulate now than was possible prior to the women's movement. Although Turner makes no mention of this, Gilligan suggests that, while, in the past, women had trouble including self-responsibility in their resolution of moral dilemmas, the discussion of rights with regard to women as a result of the women's movement has made it easier for women to include herself as someone who should be cared for.

If Gilligan's analysis can be tied to the differing political responses of men and women, then Friedan and Decter's beliefs that the gender gap differences will disappear will need re-examination, for, once again, differing

patterns of moral development that occur over an individual's life cycle will take more effort to change than attitudes based on short term considerations. There is the additional question of why it is that these differences should emerge at this moment in history.

Most of the attempts to answer the question of why these differences have emerged at this point in time point to the policies of the Reagan administration which has not only made policies that might be considered caretaking a low national priority but, in many cases, has eliminated or severely cut back these programs. Perhaps, it is only with the arrival of the Reagan administration that women can see clearly that their caretaking concerns are not widely held by the politicians in power.

While the Reagan administration provides all of us with the opportunity to see the low priority to which caretaking policies are assigned, there is also the danger that the low priority of such policies can be attributed to the administration of one individual. The complicity of the Democratic leadership in cutting back the programs targeted by the Reagan administration in the first two years of his Presidency is ignored. Also ignored are the longstanding policies of previous administrations, Democratic and Republican, to build a nuclear arsenal which threatens humanity's future. Presumably, this arsenal has been less significant to individuals in the past because there was more

trust that the intention of the president was not to utilize these weapons. Yet, there is some documentation that every President since Truman has considered the use of these weapons on at least one occasion during his presidency. The difficulty here, as I see it, is that the insights into the priorities of the national government which have been made possible by the Reagan candidacy and election to the presidency may be solely attributed to Reagan's personal priorities, that the disparity between the promise of American politics and the reality of American politics may be interpreted as "Reaganpolitics."

There is, it seems to me, a further difficulty with the current assessment that a differential moral development may be a crucial aspect to understanding the issue differences that have emerged between men and women. It remains to be seen how campaign organizers may attempt to manipulate this explanation with regard to appeals to men and women on issues. The question might emerge here whether pollsters see two different but equally valid models of moral development or whether they believe that one model is superior in relationship to the political arena. It seems possible to me that men may well continue to believe that the male model of moral development is more attuned to the political arena and is preferable to the model described by Gilligan for women. Were this the case, appeals to women as voters might address themselves to the concerns of women but attempt to

show women that these concerns must often be overridden by other priorities in the political arena. So Reagan might couch his priorities for increasing nuclear weapons in terms of concerns for keeping peace and protecting human life.

In a similar vein, although with different consequences, I believe that women, including myself, may tend to view Gilligan's model for women's moral development as superior to that of men's since it focuses on the responsibilities and relationships of individuals to one another. It has, I would argue, an appealing human dimension. Similarly, the appraisals of both Friedan and Decker present women in a positive view as compassionate human beings who value the sanctity of human life. Yet, while I value these ideas and fully believe that they must be promoted in the political arena where they have too typically been shunted aside, I do not believe, as Friedan blithely does, that there is a rational necessity for these ideas to be accepted as the foundation for national public policy. Concern for human life can be utilized as a justification, as it has been in the past, for the taking of other human life. Consider the attack on civilian lives in Hiroshima and Nagasaki rationalized by Truman as necessary to bring the war to a quicker end and thereby save tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands of lives.

So, at the very least, I would argue that if the concerns that are being voiced by women in response to gender

gap issues are to remain within the political arena, this may well require significant political effort on the part of women. While politicians may pay heed to these concerns in order to advance their own self interests of winning political office or maintaining political power, there is no guarantee that there will be follow-through in terms of actual policy impact unless sustained political pressure, a pressure that must encompass more than periodic election support, can be maintained.

This points to a general limitation of the gender gap research which is shared with the research previously examined in this dissertation. Frequently, I have noted, this previous research has proceeded from a view of women's political behavior which sees voting as the major, if not sole, aspect of that behavior. A similar limitation exists with the gender gap interest. The vote, in each instance, is presented as a weapon which can be used to punish those who disagree with your policy goals or as a reward for those who agree with you on issues. The vote, in this respect, is credited with significant power, the power to assure those who are not direct participants in the political process that they have power over their selected representatives who will respond to their concerns.

The limitations of the power of the voter are a thesis in themselves. It is clear, however, that in order to move government toward public policies desired by the people, the

vote is frequently an insufficient means to achieve this end. Consider the inadequacy of the vote in the Love Canal incident, for example. Lois Gibbs'⁴⁴ account of the attempts by Love Canal residents to move the state and federal government to recognize their plight and to provide the necessary funds to evacuate them from their homes seemed to require periodic protests to convince the governments that the citizens would continue to fight and cause elected officials embarrassment until they achieved their goal of permanent evacuation. The Love Canal incident appears to me to be a useful one because it illustrates quite fully the low priority that is assigned to a concern for human life in politics. No level of government wanted to acknowledge a responsibility for the health plight of these citizens. Government officials were worried about establishing a precedent that would allow private citizens to obtain federal or state relief for these problems, probably because of their knowledge that the example of Love Canal is only one of thousands of possible similar situations in the United States. Throughout, the attempts by Love Canal citizens to get the state, local and national governments to take responsibility for their situation, the various governments attempted to cast the problems as personal rather than political ones. Personal problems, as we know, require personal solutions rather than political solutions. There was an unwillingness to understand that even if the residents of Love Canal might

have preferred personal solutions (they would gladly have moved out of their homes when they began to understand the problems their community faced), that this was not a solution available to these citizens. Their capital was tied up in homes which no longer had market value but continued to have mortgage payments and property taxes that needed to be met. In the Love Canal incident, as in many grassroots politics incidents, it is women with no previous political experience, who are thrust to the fore by concerns for their family's well-being. Their lack of understanding of politics, initially, is amply illustrated, but because of the threat of particular issues to their family's health or security, these women acquire the skills to deal with politicians and the political system. They may be reluctant politicians, but they discover ways to effect the political ends they are seeking.

Thus, researchers that focus primarily on the behavior of women office seekers insufficiently address the questions which must be pursued in order to understand women's political behavior. I would argue that if any serious attempts are to be made to increase women's political behavior, whether at the level of voting, running for office, or taking part in protests, there must continue to be exploration of the reasons why women politically behave as they do and why there remains an idea, accepted by both men and women, that there will be gender differences on political issues.

I maintain that this commonly held assumption that underlay the early voting studies, the socialization studies and the studies of women political leaders is still a significant belief shared by women and men. It is a notion affirmed by Steinem who maintains these differences exist even when men and women appear to act in similar manners and a notion reaffirmed when polls show substantial differences with regard to responses made by men and women to particular issue questions.

Such a widely held common belief needs continuing reflection that attempts to illuminate both the foundations for this assumption and the method(s) by which it is maintained or altered from one generation to the next.

Ultimately, what I am asking, at this point, is what type of research might further illuminate the reasons for women's political behavior, whether this behavior is construed as the reasons for women casting their votes in particular ways or women not voting at all, the reasons why women do and do not seek political office or the reasons why women might engage in behavior that is construed as protest behavior. Throughout this dissertation I have questioned the weaknesses of extant studies in part because my own policy inclination would attempt to increase women's political behavior in all dimensions, including that of protest behavior. Moreover, I would maintain that, in many circumstances protest behavior is a necessary alternative in

attempts to promote certain political goals.

Given my policy inclinations, I would stress the necessity of continuing to do research on women and their political ideas. I would particularly like to see a study of adult women which focused on the ways in which women define politics and the roles that they perceive for citizens, particularly women citizens, to engage in politics. Women, I anticipate, often subscribe to definitions of politics which are as narrow in focus as those maintained by the studies that have been reviewed in this dissertation. Others may define politics broadly. The sample of women for this hypothetical study would then want to include women who define politics in a variety of ways, from a broad to a narrow focus, women who see political participation solely in terms of legitimate political institutions and those who would include protest activity in their definition, women who have never engaged in political activity, women who only occasionally engage in political activity and those who consider themselves to be political activists. The emphasis here is to get a clearer view of the meaning of politics to women and the settings in which women are most likely to participate in politics.

I see this study as a sample conducted through the use of in-depth interviews over an extended period of time so that historical political events which were transitory or lasting in their impact on these ideas could be measured

Within this study, I believe it would also be necessary to ascertain whether Gilligan's thesis that men and women develop morally in different ways is linked to the development of different ideas about the meaning of political activity and the circumstances in which men and women become politically active.

On an intuitive level, I find Gilligan's analysis of women's moral development compelling; this analysis portrays more accurately my perception of the way which I personally approach moral dilemmas. The model also has greater appeal for me as a prescriptive standard because of its greater emphasis on individual variables and its priority of maintaining positive personal relationships.

It seems to me, then, that one might explore, in this study whether or not differing perceptions of evaluating moral dilemmas are linked to differing perceptions of what politics is or can be. Since the legitimate political arena has been dominated by males who may have a different pattern of moral development, it seems logical to assume that these males, who may well judge their pattern as superior to that of women, will resist attempts to include women who cannot understand and accept the male pattern. One expectation I would have is that women may understand the male pattern more fully, but men may not even perceive that there is another possible pattern. What I am suggesting here is that those who are part of the

dominant ideology often do not perceive alternative views that are in existence, whereas those who are subordinate in that ideology often can articulate the features of the dominant ideology without fully sharing in it.

An additional expectation I have is that women who have successfully entered the political arena at levels where men are more typically the power holders will be more likely to approach dilemmas from the accepted premises of the male model and have either relegated the female model to personal life situations or are unaware of its existence or convinced that the male model is superior.

Gilligan's ideas may also provide clearer understanding for the active role that women have played in grass-roots politics organizing around issues that have a direct impact on their families and then withdrawing from political activity once their objectives were satisfied.

While this speculation could be pursued indefinitely, the intent is to suggest that there are approaches which might be pursued in the study of women and politics which might provide us with more understanding of the relationships which exist between these variables and might suggest to us public policies which would incorporate more citizens into the democratic polity. It is this objective that was lacking in many of the studies that were analyzed in this dissertation. Too often, the studies were interested in looking at women's political behavior without asserting a goal of

suggesting policy changes which would stimulate women's political participation in a variety of political settings and, yet, the results of these studies always suggest a range of policy alternatives that would make sense if the explanations in these studies were assumed to be correct interpretations of the reasons why women participate or do not participate in politics.

To recapitulate, the early voting behavior studies presented a set of ideas about women and politics that postulated that the foundations of women's lesser political participation might either be established in pre-adult socialization or that women's lesser political behavior could best be attributed to the preoccupations of women with their adult roles as wives and mothers. In the examination of these explanations, political scientists tended to focus on research that would lend support to one of these explanations as being more important. I would suggest that this attempt to amass evidence in support of one thesis versus the other was a product of the behaviorist emphasis for establishing a cause, preferably a single cause, that determined women's political behavior. If such a cause could be isolated, it would provide the possibility that policies could be promulgated which would alter the causal relationship.

Thus, if early childhood socialization is really the determining factor in women's political behavior, one could

presumably suggest a series of policies that would attempt to alter the political socialization that occurs in this time period.

Similarly, if women's political behavior is primarily determined by inherent tensions between an active political role and her roles as wife and mother, then policies directed at eliminating these tensions would be indicated.

While the actual policies that could be suggested might be quite diverse, the important consideration here is that none of these explanations is devoid of policy implications. It makes little sense for the theorist, who believes that socialization is the major underlying cause for women's political behavior and that this socialization occurs in early childhood and is difficult to extinguish in adult lives, to suggest policies to change women's political behavior which focused on the constraints of her adult roles. If this occurred, we would be justified in challenging his/her espousal of the socialization explanation.

While the policy implications of the studies analyzed in this work are implicit in the research interpretations rather than explicit, it can still be argued that if there was a consistent pattern to the research findings, if the same factors were repeatedly revealed as the reasons for women's political behavior, then, there might be a possibility for organizing around these concerns, for attempting to promote policies that would increase women's political

participation. While my research shows that lack of agreement in the results of the studies is rife, a greater concern has been that under the rubric of scientific investigation, unsubstantiated views of women's relationship to politics and explanations of this relationship have been perpetuated. In sum, from a policy perspective, the research completed, to this point, is an inadequate foundation for policy decisions.

NOTES

Chapter I, Introduction

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